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THE GOVERNING OF MEN

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THE Governing of Men

General Principles and Recommendations
Based on Experience
at a Japanese Relocation Camp

Alexander H. Leighton
LT. COMDR., MEDICAL CORPS, U.S.N.R.

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TO

ADOLF MEYER, M.D.

TEACHER

Preface

In the spring of 1942 the United States Government had its first experience with large-scale evacuation when it removed from the Pacific coastal regions all of the approximately 110,000 Japanese who had formerly lived there. These people were sent to ten Relocation Centers in the West and Middle West, and since they were American citizens and their alien parents against whom there were no charges of subversive activity, the Government adopted the policy of protecting their welfare, developing self-government within the Relocation Centers, and re-establishing economic independence. At a later date, many thousands were resettled in various parts of the United States not under military restriction.

The Hon. John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, was associated with the project from the start because of his extensive experience in the administration of many different kinds of communities. He believed that research and observation through applied psychology and social anthropology should accompany the enterprise from its beginning, since the problems presented by the Japanese relocation were a challenge to democratic principles and an opportunity to gain experience and improve methods. The results, Mr. Collier thought, would have value later in the government of occupied areas, in relief and rehabilitation and in the re-establishment of millions of displaced persons after the war. Through the Commissioner's initiative, and that of the Hon. Oscar Chapman, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, a research activity in the Colorado River War Relocation Center at Poston, Arizona, was jointly sponsored by the Navy, the Office of Indian Affairs and the War Relocation Authority.

The project had two major aspects: first, advising the administrative officers concerning current situations in the Center; and second, making observations and analyses that would have bearing on general problems of administration

and government, particularly in occupied areas. The first requirement was carried out during residence in the Center through memoranda and personal contacts with the administrators. This book is part of the effort to fulfill the second.

Those who are familiar with the Center will note that the story deals with only one of the three units which made up the camp, that many events are omitted, and that certain persons and organizations have been mentioned in detail while others equally important do not appear. For some of this I must plead ignorance, but in other instances the disproportion is deliberate because of emphasis on central themes. Thus, where one illustration served, it has not been thought necessary to present all other possible illustrations as well.

In the normal course of scientific research, the proper procedure is to take time not only for detailed analysis and the formation of conclusions, but also for cross-checking through extensive reference to the literature and further observations in the field. It is also mandatory that the conclusions be exposed to the critical scrutiny of other social scientists through publication in professional journals before they are prepared for those who might want to employ them in practice. The war, however, forces all scientific effort to short cuts, and this report is no exception. For those interested, an outline of the concepts, organization, and methods employed is presented in the Appendix.

In preparing the book, there has been no intention to give credit or to distribute praise. Still less has there been any wish to blame. The desire has been to follow Adolf Meyer's formula of critical inquiring common sense:

"What is the fact?

"The conditions under which it occurs and shows?

"What are the factors entering and at work?

"How do they work?

"With what results?

"With what modifiability?"[1]

[1] Reference 28.

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The American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations does not take a position on public problems, and the facts and interpretations herein are therefore entirely the responsibility of the author. Similarly, the opinions given here do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the United States Navy or of the service generally.

THE GOVERNING OF MEN

Oh, it were better to be a poor fisherman than to meddle with the governing of men.

—Danton, before his execution.

Introduction: The Problem

In the late afternoon of November 20, 1942, a visitor would have found a crowd of several thousand persons gathered around the jail of one of the three camps that made up the Colorado River Relocation Center for evacuated Japanese. There were people of all ages and both sexes grouped about numerous fires that sent sparks and smoke from burning mesquite logs into the retreating light of the sky. Old peasant men with sun-baked skins looking serious and determined, talked in little clusters or stared silently at the flames. Placid mothers conversed with neighbors, while children ran gleefully about the bonfires, or stooped to roast wieners on the ends of sticks. Some of the young men and girls looked sulky and weary. Several groups of boys played cards, laughing among themselves while others were thoughtful and preoccupied.

Japanese music from phonograph records blared out of loud-speakers and reverberated among the even rows of black military barracks that were the homes of the evacuees, over the naked earth and along the irrigation canals. Its rhythm seemed to stir invisible cords of tension that bound together the members of the crowd. On placards and banners were pictures of dogs being hung and beaten. Flags with marks like Japanese emblems fluttered from poles in the wind that began to move up the valley of the Colorado with the approach of night and the deepening of shadows in the stone mountains.

The visitor might have made several guesses as to the meaning of the crowd. He might have thought of a holiday and a mass picnic; he might have detected in the atmosphere feelings of release that suggested a revival meeting. He might have thought of a lynching party.

At a table in one barrack a small group of men talked and debated. Speeches were made with gestures, with flow-

ery words and intense nobility of sentiment. There was talk of "defending the people," and of "being willing to die for them." There were statements that it was time to be men and demand their rights, and refuse to be beaten and pushed around any further. Some spoke of "sacrificing all" for their children's future and security. Heated individuals demanded force and drastic action. More temperate voices spoke of collaboration with the Administration of the Relocation Center, of negotiation and compromise.

Through the rest of the community people sat at their doorsteps, went to the shower rooms, lounged on their beds, or helped prepare supper; but all had a preoccupied, expectant air, even when not talking about the crowd before the jail and its significance.

A number of the top administrators of the Center were gathered in an office where they discussed the situation with the humor of nervous tension, and, like the people, waited and watched for what might be coming. Their lines of communication ran out to the nearby military police who stood on guard around the Center, to the Army headquarters of the area, to the Sheriff of Yuma County, to the nearest branch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and to government offices in Washington.

Among some employees of the Center, including a few near the top, there was discontent. They huddled together in small groups, angry and resentful, with a desire to disperse the crowd by force and show the people their place. A dozen theories as to the meaning and cause of the crowd were exchanged. Some of these men were frightened, seeing mob violence imminent. One or two ran away.

In the bars and stores of the nearest town, in the lobby of its casual hotel, newspapermen had come to get a story on the "Jap Riot." Prevented from visiting the Center, they gathered what bits of exciting copy they could from local free talkers. Bars were pounded and men bristled with an indignation they felt made them important. Stories grew in

the telling and winged their way on wires over the Cactus Plains to Phoenix and over the Sierras to Los Angeles, to appear in the next day's papers in a shape more suited to excite than to inform the reader.

While the crowd stayed thus before the jail, while the peoples' leaders talked and argued, while the administrative leaders watched and waited, while a minority among the administrative group trembled and agitated for action, while public indignation fed on sensation mounted, the workings of this camp had come to a stop. Except for the hospital, schools and some other essentials, the project lay like a huge machine stalled on a hill with internal pressure mounting and the question open as to whether it would burst with destructive violence, or lurch again into constructive action.

After springing up with incredible speed in the desert; after having existed for eight months during which the resettlement of 9,000 human beings was accomplished without loss of life, famine, epidemic, or violence; after having initiated community stores, agriculture, land-clearing projects, employment, welfare, police, fire-fighters, schools, health department, kitchens, mess halls, churches, adult education, a newspaper, elective government, an administrative organization akin to civil service, a judicial commission, law department, recreational organizations, post offices, libraries, census bureau and departments for construction, maintenance and the transportation of supplies—after all these accomplishments, the unit had come to a halt, with its motor still turning over, but no longer pulling. The community government had resigned, the offices of evacuee managers were empty. No typewriters hummed under evacuee hands in the administrative offices. Requisitions lay stranded on desks, dust collected on unanswered correspondence. Tools and tractors were idle.

A breach was widening between the administrators and the administered, and in place of working relationships there

were waves of rumor, mistrust, resentment, fear and hate. Among the administered, new leaders were appearing while old ones lost the confidence of their followers. The administrative staff was seriously split at the very moment when unity and steadiness of hand were most needed. The attitude of the outside public toward the Relocation Center was moving to antipathy for both evacuees and the Administration, with another gulf appearing here of rumor, misunderstanding and resentment.

The most important question that hung over the Center, seething in the growing dusk like bees about to swarm, was not what would the crowd do, was not what the Administration or the Army would do, nor what the Government, Congress or the American public would think. It was not a matter of who was right or who was wrong. It was not a question asked by anybody present and concerned, but it might have been asked by the detached visitor. It was the question of what in all this is recurrently human. What are the laws of individual behavior, what are the perennial social forces at work here? Under the confusion, under the excited passions, amidst all the milling and cross-pulling, what general characteristics of human nature are in action, a knowledge of which would prevent such sudden diseases of society as this? The breakdown of man's organizations of himself and his fellows are not events isolated in evacuation camps. They cover as much of the earth as is covered by the human race, and questions that run deeply into the fate of mankind in a shrinking world are involved. Included are such things as the rights of citizens, the treatment of minority groups in the heart of a nation and the capacity of a democracy for efficient, consistent government and just international relations.

Out of this particular episode could one extract a few particular constants of practical value?

The visitor might have glanced at the sky as dark advanced making the fires brighter and the Riverside Moun-

tains loom like nearer shadows. He would have seen the stars of the desert night scattered glittering and countless. He could have reflected that the men who know the stars, who can read the constants in their apparent confusion, can fix time and sail ships on empty seas.

PART I

THE STORY OF POSTON

1. Evacuation

BEFORE the start of World War II, there were people living around the earth in their accustomed places, faintly if at all aware of each other. In the years since, they have come together and acquired marks of experience which, for better or for worse, will endure the rest of their lives and leave long effects on their classes, nations and races. At the battle grounds, at the bases and at the sources of supply there are mingling clerks and millionaires, housewives and welders, Rocky Mountain ranchers and Australian sheepmen, sharecroppers and Egyptian fellahs, Eskimos and orange growers.

Never before in all history has there been such traffic of the human race across the face of the world. Some of the movement has been with the zest to win, some has been flight, and some has been in the forced marches of prisoners. Workers have come from field and town and crossed the United States to reach industrial centers. Construction crews have gone abroad. Millions of French have been in the camps of Central Europe, while German prisoners of war build dikes in the Mississippi Valley. Our armies crossed the seas to Europe, Asia, Africa and the South Pacific and from those places people journeyed to us.

One tiny portion of all this change and exchange was the evacuation of Japanese from the Pacific coastal region of the United States and their resettlement inland. In the perspective of world movement and world suffering, this does not appear of much consequence. And yet when viewed closely, it resolves into a case record of a particular sample of world movement and mingling, and therefore has some wide implication as well as crucial significance to those involved.

BEFORE the war, the Japanese on the West Coast, like the rest of the world, lived and worked in their accustomed

places, the still unmixed ingredients of the future relocation centers.

On a tuna clipper out from Terminal Island, a 200-pound fisherman picked his teeth and scowled at the Pacific in search of a surface "riffle" that would mean fish. A Baptist minister preached the faith with inspiration to his congregation in Gardena. At dusk in the San Joaquin Valley a farmer worked in the fields with his family, stooped over melons. A Y.W.C.A. leader organized girls' clubs in Boyle Heights. At a saloon in Salinas, "Texas Mary" smiled for the boys. A gardener directed landscaping on an estate in Beverly Hills. At night in the Los Angeles Central Market while trucks backed up and "swampers" shouted, a wholesale merchant inspected celery and lettuce and turned over $10,000. A Buddhist priest in Fresno intoned the *sutras* at a funeral. In Seattle, a maid washed her mistress's stockings to a perfectionistic cleanliness. The slim manager of the Tokyo Club down Jackson Street in Los Angeles surveyed his patrons at blackjack and *hana*. The director of an orphanage planned recreation for the children. At El Centro, a housewife frugally patched her husband's underwear and thought of her boy and girl in college and the long road to optometry and pharmacy. A nurse entered a patient's temperature on a chart. A doctor worked at research in the laboratory of a hospital. An instructor taught Judo and the spirit of Bushido. Gangs of "fruit tramps" followed the season for picking "cots" and other fruits up and down the coast, and spent their money as they got it in cards and sake. At a university, a student graduated with highest honors and as president of his class.

These were "the Japanese," not one type, not one cultural pattern, but men and women and their children, large and small, fat and thin; the healthy and the sickly; the virtuous and the rascals; of different layers in society, of all degrees of education and all degrees of Americanization and Nipponization.

THE future administrative staff of the Relocation Center in the Colorado River Valley was also scattered and represented another, although smaller cross section of society.

The superintendent of the Papago Indian Reservation rode the 4,000 square miles of his domain and lingered by fires to hear old men talk. A deputy United States Marshal stood firmly on the letter of the law. In Washington, a meticulous accountant placidly checked government records. The correspondent of a weekly news magazine was returning in gloom from Europe. A doctor directed a hospital for Navahos. A missionary taught English to Japanese Christian ladies in Hakodate. At Yale a teacher took his final examination for a Ph.D. in education. The principal of McKinley High School in Honolulu tended the growth of democracy in his students of Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Spanish and Hawaiian descent. In the heat of Arizona's desert a road boss took a chew of tobacco and thought only of the job at hand. Engineers in offices poured over plans for the irrigation of 80,000 acres in the Parker Valley. At scores of government desks from Washington to San Francisco, from Oklahoma to Montana, clerks worked steadily and calmly on the ponderous, unhurried, conservative routine of government business.

Time was pregnant with events which would lead 18,000 of these various people, from tuna fishermen to government clerks, to begin a trek from all compass directions to a focal point in the Valley of the Colorado where they would rub elbows, shoulders, customs, opinions, hates, fears, pride and loyalties, like a confluence of currents to produce a thousand eddies.

At 7:55 A.M., Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, the United States Naval Station, Pearl Harbor, on the Island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, was attacked by Japanese aircraft.

EVACUATION

BEFORE nightfall, the Japanese on the West Coast of America had begun to feel the effect.

The son of a small farmer south of San Diego:

"We were busy making preparations for the cucumber season and it wasn't before dark that we finished furrowing. We had noticed that we were receiving more stares than was comfortable from people coming home from a horse race in Mexico, but we least expected to hear of a war. After having taken the horse home, and given him his hay, it was already 7:30. When I entered the house I heard a special commentator over the radio giving the latest bulletin on the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. For a while I could not overcome the shock of the horrible news. We were unable to eat very much. The only thing my parents could say was for us to keep in contact in spirit wherever we may be for we shall all be together again someday after the war. I cannot forget the countenance of anxiety they had that night. I could not sleep trying to see the future in the light of reality and wondering what course I should take. Finally I decided to withdraw from college because I believed that this was the time my parents needed encouragement and aid if ever there was a time."

A manager of a produce store in Los Angeles, the father of two small children:

"All Japanese funds were frozen right away on December 8. We had had our house for eight years. My landlord came to me and said, 'We can't have Japanese people living here.' That was happening to everybody. 'Get out,' the landlords were saying. You can think how hard it would be to find another place then. There was no money to do anything with."

A mother with grown sons:

"Tuesday we were threatened with the shut-off of our utilities, unless the checks we sent on Saturday, December 6, were replaced by cash the following day. I went among

the Caucasian neighbors selling things I had bought for Christmas gifts to raise sufficient cash."

A non-Japanese Treasury employee:

"We are glad that our measure [freezing order] is working so well. We did not want you folks to have money to help the enemy. Perhaps your friends, your societies or the Red Cross will help you with your sustenance."

A young Japanese American businessman:

"When I returned to Japanese town on the night of the 7th, the lights were dimmed and there was little activity going on. The next day there was already a sign of tension and fear for the future written on the faces of those people. Daily the number of the stores locked up increased and the families of those men who were interned began to suffer from lack of income."

For a time, because of prohibitions against trading with the enemy, grocers refused to sell food; milk companies ceased to deliver and wholesalers stopped supplying Japanese merchants. Simultaneously, there was a general tightening of credit from the usual 30 days to a week and often the terms were C.O.D.

December 10, 1941, Attorney General Biddle issued the following statement:

"So long as the aliens in this country conduct themselves in accordance with the law, they may be assured that every effort will be made to protect them from any discrimination or abuse. This assurance is given not only in justice and decency to the loyal non-citizens in this country but also in the hope that it may spare American citizens in enemy countries unjust retaliation."

December 12 the Federal Reserve Bank made arrangements to release frozen funds to the amount of $100 per month per family for subsistence.

The small farmer's son:

"Gradually we returned to our equilibrium, having made

readjustments and preparations. The people of the town were peaceful and friendly."

January 2, 1942, Manila fell before the army of Japan.

THE produce merchant:

"I checked the sales of produce dealers and they fell away off. When it came to the annual license, they would not renew them to the Japanese. In the produce market I saw with my own eyes some rowdies upset the tables of Japanese dealers and scatter the produce all over the market. The state decided not to issue permits to aliens to collect sales taxes, and that meant you could not sell anything. I was one of those."

A Japanese social service student:

"There were increasing signs of discrimination especially in business relations. 'No Japs allowed' appeared at some store windows and added to the mounting tension."

A non-Japanese fisherman:

"It is unfair to stop Japanese American citizens while allowing Italian and German aliens to operate their boats."

The small farmer's son:

"There was greater difficulty in making a living because of lack of credit with which to finance the crops. It was worse in the cities. They had to pay rent, telephone and light bills and most of the people who owned restaurants and shops didn't have any money."

A wholesale produce merchant:

"When men were picked up by the FBI, the women and children couldn't run the farms or hire help to do it for them, and so $10,000 worth of celery would rot in a field and there would be a lifetime of savings invested in it. On top of this the press and local public would accuse the people of trying to sabotage the war effort by not caring for their crops."

Another small farmer's son:

"The laborers employed by Japanese went on strike for higher wages. One said to me, 'The boss's bank account is frozen so if I don't want to work hard, that is up to me.' "

Immediately with the beginning of the war, the Department of Justice through the Federal Bureau of Investigation had arrested registered enemy agents and persons known to have hostile intentions. Then followed repeated investigations and arrests wherever there were grounds for suspicion.

JANUARY 12, 1942, Attorney General Biddle addressed a conference of mayors at Washington, D.C., and said:

"Wholesale internment, without hearing and irrespective of the merits of individual cases, is the long and costly way around, as the British discovered by painful experience; for by that method not only are guiltless aliens themselves demoralized, but the nation is deprived of a valuable source of labor supply at a time when every available man must be at work."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 4, 1942:

"Families of the Japanese aliens taken into custody and of Japanese fisherman who are American citizens expressed fear for their livelihood. These men no longer can fish. The Japanese American Citizens League composed of American citizens of Japanese descent, has been administering aid, but is unable to assume the burden of hundreds of additional families."

THE *Los Angeles Times*, February 2, 1942:

"A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched. . . . So, a Japanese American born of Japanese parents, nurtured upon Japanese traditions, living in a transplanted Japanese atmosphere and thoroughly inoculated with Japanese . . . ideals, notwithstanding his nominal brand of accidental citizenship almost inevitably and with

the rarest exceptions grows up to be a Japanese, and not an American in his . . . ideas, and is . . . menacing . . . unless . . . hamstrung. Thus, while it might cause injustice to a few to treat them all as potential enemies, . . . I cannot escape the conclusion . . . that such treatment . . . should be accorded to each and all of them while we are at war with their race."

The small farmer's son:

"Nothing was as it used to be. Everywhere there seemed to be something between the Caucasians and us, regardless of our friendships built through the many years."

The mother:

"I found that my Caucasian friends were dropping away. Even women I had gone to school with stopped writing or calling me."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 2, 1942:

"BIDDLE WARNS AGAINST PERSECUTION. Attorney General Biddle said tonight the Government is 'taking every precaution to guard against espionage, sabotage or other fifth column activities.' . . . 'At the same time,' he said, 'I want to point out that the persecution of aliens—economic and social—can be a two-edged sword. Such persecution can easily drive people, now loyal to us, into fifth column activities.' "

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 3, 1942:

"Mr. Biddle is the Attorney General in Washington, but he could run for office in California and not even win the post of third assistant dogcatcher. . . . I've been in California a week now . . . and have yet to meet a man, woman or child who doesn't think that Mr. Biddle's handling of the bow-legged sons and daughters of the Rising Sun is mighty ridiculous."

The mother:

"There was a general impression among the victims that hearings to determine loyalty were necessary and that the disloyal and the dangerous should be interned. The hearings

themselves were conducted with dignity and understanding. However, people were whisked away from their respective tasks with no respect to the duration of the detention required before a hearing was possible (4 to 8 months) as though it were a matter of a few hours or overnight, and no opportunity was given for care of their interests. Impersonators of the FBI with their attacks on girls and promises of release of those arrested in return for money, added to the misery of the Japanese."

A Japanese American Ph.D.:

"The FBI weren't so bad, but they swore in deputies to go with them and they were the mean ones."

A college sophomore:

"Coming home from school I was told that all Buddhist reverends had been taken to the city jail. The wife of one preacher was also taken, leaving behind their two small daughters without any care. It was hard to explain such 'Gestapo' methods to my parents and other older people to whom I had often said that the American Government would not be unjust in whatever it did. The strain and tension on the men in the community was terrific. Most of them had a little parcel of food, night shirt, etc., ready in case they were next on the list. It was a pathetic sight to see their faces. It was as if they were awaiting an execution."

The young Japanese American businessman:

"Pictures and stories came out in the papers about sabotage. One day we went to Long Beach on business and somebody phoned the FBI saying that we had been taking pictures of the Vultee Aircraft Factory. The road we took was 2 miles from the factory. One paper ran a story about a raid on a farm and there were pictures showing a length of water pipe that was supposed to be used for manufacturing guns, clothes line wire that was supposedly a sending aerial, and insecticides that were said to be for killing off the civilian population. It made me feel that if the public were that gullible, our goose was cooked."

A college girl:

"Rumors that enemy fliers shot down in Hawaii wore the rings of McKinley High School in Honolulu led more people to demand evacuation."

February 5, 1942: a joint statement by Attorney General Biddle and Secretary of War Stimson:

"On the Pacific Coast to date there have been no substantial evidences of sabotage by enemy aliens. . . . The Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies of the Federal Government are very much alive to the possibility of acts of sabotage—particularly in case of a possible attack on our shores by the enemy."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 6, 1942:

"Removal of the entire Japanese population—alien and native born—inland for several hundred miles was advocated by Mayor Bowron last night in a radio talk. . . . 'If there is intrigue going on, and it is reasonably certain that there is, right here is the hot bed, the nerve center of the spy system, of planning for sabotage,' said the Mayor."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 7, 1942:

"Official Washington believes the Coast population is panicky; feels that all proper measures to prevent sabotage have been taken. . . . Mr. Biddle enlisted the services of a United States Senator from California who was persuaded to address a radio broadcast to the senator's constituents, urging them to repress hysteria, to abstain from violence of any kind."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 10, 1942:

"Senator John H. Swan of Sacramento yesterday threatened court action unless immediate steps were taken to remove American-born Japanese from Civilian Defense duties as air-raid wardens."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 11, 1942:

"Opposition to the city and county policies of ousting civil service employees of Japanese blood but American citizenship from public jobs was embodied in a resolution to

the board of supervisors from the Los Angeles Industrial Union Council. . . . The measure resolves: 'That we go on record as being strongly opposed to the above policies of the city of Los Angeles and the State of California because we feel such policies will promote disunity and intolerance at a time when unity and understanding are needed.' "

The small farmer's son:

"In schools, the students were very sympathetic toward the Japanese Americans. They went out of their way to give us words of encouragement. There were also some of the older people who were friendly and asked that they be consulted for any type of aid. They were understanding, true Americans."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 12, 1942:

"The council of World War Combat Veterans Association, Inc., passed a resolution demanding that all Japanese, aliens and citizens of the United States, unless they can prove they have foresworn allegiance to the Imperial Government of Japan, be interned and removed from California."

Public opinion poll conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Denver:

Three-fourths of Southern Californians recommended segregation of all Japanese aliens in camps. In Northern California less than half of the people favored this treatment. One-third of the Southern Californians would also segregate Japanese who are citizens, but in the other three Pacific Coast areas no more than 14 per cent recommended such drastic action.

February 15, 1942, Singapore fell before the army of Japan.

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 16, 1942:

"Japanese enemy aliens and their American-born sons and daughters labored all day yesterday in fields of growing

crops throughout Los Angeles County prior to the midnight deadline which, by government order, was the hour when all of them should have removed themselves from restricted areas. . . . Preparations for mass exodus and other restrictive measures have caused widespread suffering among Japanese aliens and their American-born children, it was declared yesterday by Kiyoshi Higashi, president of the Japanese American Citizen's League. He said that 185 families, numbering approximately 500 persons, are destitute and estimated that more than 1,000 persons would be destitute soon. 'These people,' he said, 'would have no food and no means of support.' "

The small farmer's son:

"In April I talked to people who had not had a job since the war started. They had just been lying around, hardly getting their meals all that time. If you go too long that way, it rots your ambition."

A non-Japanese social worker:

"Two men worked in Sacramento for many years, and now they had no money and no job. They were on their third day without food. I think they were in the early stages of starvation."

The college sophomore:

"Men were laid off from their jobs without explanation. It brings to mind the Germans' persecution of the Jews."

The small farmer's son:

"Creditors came to make collection regularly with cold pressure and without any consideration of what we were facing."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 17, 1942:

" 'Martial law also would help find hundreds of high power rifles not turned in by hostile aliens,' Harvey S. Van Vlear, secretary [of the San Joaquin County Farm Bureau Federation] asserted. . . . In spite of the complaints we'll starve if the Japanese farmers are moved out, we can do without them. . . . As far as farm labor itself is concerned,

it is a different situation, but we certainly can do without Japanese farm operators and supervisors."

The mother:

"The agricultural interests saw an opportunity for unseating the Japanese truck gardeners and started working through the medium of various farm organizations. The wholesale produce market interests backed the ousting of Japanese from the Commission Merchant Business. Bonding houses refused to issue bonds. This seemed to be an attempt to secure for nothing the leases on the Japanese stalls in the market which had great value. A small percentage of the Japanese Americans were allowed to continue to operate. Some of these felt this an opportunity to buy up stocks from the aliens and operate the business themselves, which brought about bitterness."

THE *Los Angeles Times*, February 17, 1942:

"I paid a visit to Japantown today. . . .

"A really good saboteur, or a hustling fifth columnist, could cover the distance from Japantown to San Francisco's important naval and military bases in practically no time at all. . . .

"It's hard to believe, but I didn't run across a tough, rough, discourteous Japanese in the lot. They seemed very happy and content, living here under the warm California sun, only a few miles from where the ships are leaving to take our boys to fight their kin.

". . . Oh yes, the Japanese have their air-raid wardens, their air-raid shelters and their blackout curtains. They are perfectly drilled in what to do in case bombs come from the enemy whose blood runs in their veins.

"Silly damn set-up, huh?

"Dr. Motto Itatani was one of the Japanese I talked to. He was fitting a pair of horn-rimmed glasses when I dropped in to see him.

" 'Good morning. Delighted. Yes. No. Thank you very

much. Honored. No trouble. Government very kind. Very considerate. Business not so good. Not so bad. Thank you. Come again.' . . .

"My last call was on the taxicab driver whose stand is in the center of Japantown. I wanted to know what he had noticed.

" 'They're getting cocky again, pal,' he said. 'When the war broke out they tried to act as if they weren't Japanese. Talked English on the streets. Kinda turned their eyes when they passed.'

" 'Now, they're just the way they used to be. They give you the full once-over, and the Japanese once-over has a sneer in it. They oughta' chase 'em all to the hills.'

"That is what I found in Japantown."

A farmer:

"The worst thing is that people say such terrible things about the Japanese and you can't do a damn thing to prove otherwise. You just have to sit and take it. I would like to show that I am a good American, but I can't do a thing. That is what makes you really mad."

The college sophomore:

"One of the professors addressed our group of Japanese students and stressed that it would be well if we kept inconspicuous around the school and did not laugh among ourselves in the study hall or library. Another professor addressed us later and said that we were too quiet and that others would be suspicious if we all carried such long faces. So, there we were, we couldn't look sad and we couldn't look happy. We tried just keeping our faces straight, and then came rumors that we were poker-faced."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 20, 1942:

"A double-barreled program to remove all Japanese alien and American-born from California and the Pacific Coast was proposed last night by Mayor Bowron in a radio address. . . .

"He proposed an amendment to the United States Con-

stitution which would provide legal means through which American-born Japanese and all persons who, within the past 10 years, changed their citizenship from German or Italian to American, should be reclassified. . . .

"The Army then could induct 'classified men' into the Army and put them to work, on farms, in timber cutting, etc. These workers would be 'called up by the Army arbitrarily, not by chance.' This might include the calling of women who could be put to work, he said.

" 'Mark you this, if there is a repetition of Pearl Harbor on the Pacific Coast the responsibility is going to be fixed upon somebody's shoulders, not by the report of an investigating board headed by an associate justice of the Supreme Court, but by the verdict of an enraged American people. But just as at Honolulu, the verdict would come too late.

" 'Public opinion has crystallized. The people of California, the American citizens of California say the Japanese, both aliens and American-born, must go.' "

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 20, 1942:

" 'We need action and need it now,' declared Larry Tajiri, former Washington (D.C.) correspondent for a Japanese news service. 'The Federal authorities have been very fair in their treatment of us despite tremendous pressure from certain interests. We know we are loyal to the American flag but race hatreds are being stirred up now in the Fascist pattern.'

" 'If the Army and Navy say we are a menace, let's get out,' said Kay Sugahara, produce merchant, and civic leader of "Little Tokyo," but if it's merely a question of fighting politicians that would gain favor by hopping on "those defenseless Japs," we should fight them to the last ditch.' "

A tuna fisherman:

"We had to pay about $60,000 a year to politicians to keep bills from being passed that would stop our fishing. It was a racket. The politicians would stir up the public about

spies and sabotage and we would pay to get it quieted down."

A member of the Department of Political Science, the University of California:

"On the whole, the public has not shown so much hate or spite except as it has been incited to do so. But pressure groups and short-sighted politicians facing an election year are out for blood and wholesale internment. Jingoes are endeavoring under the cover of wartime flag-waving patriotism to do what they always wanted to do in peace time—get rid of the Japanese, harness labor, and frighten the liberals. . . . Up to the beginning of the year there had been no panic and little infringement upon rights and liberties. In January the commentators and the columnists, professional 'patriots,' witch hunters, alien haters, and varied groups and persons with aims of their own began inflaming public opinion."

Washington, February 19.—By executive order today President Roosevelt gave the Army authority to establish military zones anywhere in the United States from which any persons, citizen or alien, may be evacuated and excluded.

Those chiefly affected are American citizens of Japanese parentage.

Citizens of German and Italian descent will not be involved except for specific cause.

The Tolan Committee:[1]

"When widespread demand was manifested for complete evacuation of the Japanese, the Attorney General initiated the drafting of an executive order transferring authority to the Army."

[1] Reference 38.

THE small farmer's son:

"I was very confident that there would be no evacuation on a major scale. In the years I had been through the American system of education I had learned the principles of democracy and it gave me faith that our government would not be moved by economic pressure and racial prejudice and would not evacuate American citizens of Japanese ancestry, even if the aliens were moved."

Social service student:

"Somehow the feeling that I, an American citizen, together with thousands of other Japanese Americans, was being denied every right as set forth in the United States Constitution to prove my loyalty to this country and innocence of any guilt as a dangerous member of society was very difficult to subdue. It grieved me to think that evacuation had automatically set up a sharp line between a racial minority and the dominant group in a country which had spoken of equality of opportunity, and freedom from want, from fear, and of religion and speech. The large minority of the Japanese would have been enthusiastically willing to serve the United States in any constructive way toward the war effort. Evacuation meant the rejection of their services by the American Government and accentuated the breach between the Japanese in the United States and the American public."

An old farmer:

"They took my boy to the army, and now they take my other children to a concentration camp."

A Japanese American soldier:

"They are evacuating all the Japanese from the Coast and even trying to take away our citizenship. I don't know why I am in the Army. I want to see democracy as it is supposed to be, but this is getting just as bad as Hitler."

The mother:

"The Japanese Americans themselves are not so important, but America will find in her mad vengeance she has

spat upon and flogged her own idealism while setting her beacon light atop the Washington Monument to inspire the world."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 21, 1942:

"Giving little direct credit to administration officials for the evacuation plan, Senator Bone (D), Washington . . . [said] 'I believe it came as a direct result of the demands made by the people of the West Coast.'

"An administration supporter, Senator Downey (D), California, expressed 'hearty endorsement' of the evacuation order, but said he knew of no single instance of definite sabotage on the Pacific Coast since the beginning of the war."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 24, 1942:

"Pacific Coast Japanese marshalled their friends and leaders before a Congressional committee today to plead for treatment as considerate as that accorded Germans and Italians.

". . . The gist of their testimony was that to order indiscriminate mass evacuation of Japanese would be in some measure parallel to the Nazi government's treatment of Jews and would invite reprisals against Americans in Japan and the Philippines as well as lower this country in the esteem of foreign people."

The social service student:

"To reason that because a few individuals, probably less than one-half of one percent of the Japanese, were dangerous the other ninety-nine and a half percent should be evacuated seemed to me illogical, undemocratic and contrary to Christian ethics. My contention is that properly trained government agents, and there were numbers of them with many years of experience working among the Japanese, could have sought out the dangerous or the potentially dangerous there as readily as among the Italians, Germans and any other groups."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 25, 1942:

"The United Citizens Federation comprising . . . American-born Japanese . . . presented . . . a parchment . . . addressed to President Roosevelt. 'We reaffirm our absolute allegiance to the United States of America, pledge all-out energy to defeat Japan and the Axis, place complete faith and confidence in your leadership as commander-in-chief of our armed forces, appeal to you to call upon us that we may do our part for our country.' "

THE *Los Angeles Times*, February 24, 1942:

"Notified that farmers of the county might take 'matters into their own hands,' unless action is taken soon by government agencies, the County Board of Supervisors today adopted a resolution urging Army officials to remove from California all enemy aliens and persons of Japanese birth, regardless of American citizenship.

"Five hundred farmers would be on the march by nightfall today if they felt their action was necessary."

A college girl:

"Many rumors began making their rounds. One concerned a family I knew and said that their possessions were burned to the ground and they were shot at in the night. It was later proved false, but these rumors scared people."

The young businessman:

"There was a defenseless Japanese and his wife shot by some persons. I had known them for a long time and they were good people."

February 24, 1942: a Japanese submarine shelled oil wells near Santa Barbara, California.

THE *Los Angeles Times*, February 25, 1942 :

"IMMEDIATE EVACUATION OF JAPANESE DEMANDED. Shocked by news of submarine gunfire on oil wells near Santa Barbara, Southern Californians yesterday demanded summary evacuation of all enemy aliens to inland points.

" '. . . We must move the Japanese in this country into a concentration camp somewhere, some place, and do it damn quickly,' says Representative A. J. Elliott to the House.

" 'Don't kid yourself and don't let someone tell you there are good Japs,' he continued, 'Perhaps, one out of a thousand. . . .' "

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 26, 1942:

"Growing dissatisfaction with the Army's slowness in moving Japanese from the Pacific Coast today brought threats of renewed Congressional demands for prompt decisive action to eradicate the fifth column menace from California.

"Senator Steward (D), Tennessee, voiced in Senate debate the feeling that 'the time has arrived when we should deal sternly with the Japanese in this country.

" 'Instead of leaving the question to the discretion of military authorities, Congress should order the apprehension of all Japanese and Japanese Americans,' the Tennessee Democrat declared."

"Telegrams poured into Governor Olson's office. . . .

"Typical . . . was a message from a Los Angeles woman, sent at 7:28 a.m., just seven minutes after the 'all clear' had sounded.

" 'Each new hour that a single Jap is at liberty in this state is an hour we might tragically regret,' she said."

The small farmer's son:

"Our Caucasian friends did much to give us some feeling of security in these abnormal times, but there were many factors leading us to feel the insecurity strongly in our day-to-day living, not knowing what was in store for us tomorrow. Only working in the field gave one an opportunity for relief from fear of the dark clouds ahead."

The college sophomore:

"The Mexicans and the Negroes were very amiable toward the Japanese in the community. The Chinese were

aloof from us, but not all. Some were very sympathetic and the meat market was extra courteous and gave us the benefit of an extra pound or two."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 27, 1942:

"While the United States Navy was sweeping all Japanese off Terminal Island yesterday, a rising chorus of indignation swelled throughout California at the continued presence of Japanese anywhere in this state.

" 'For God's sake,' one telegram said, 'don't let official bungling and red tape and other suicidal niceties pussyfoot us into another Pearl Harbor.' "

The *Los Angeles Times*, March 20, 1942:

". . . No acts of sabotage preceded the December 7, Japanese attack on Hawaii, nor have any been reported to the Honolulu Police Department since then, according to Honolulu's Chief of Police, W. A. Gabrielson. . . .

" 'I wish to advise there were no acts of sabotage committed in the city and county of Honolulu December 7, 1941, nor have there been any acts of sabotage reported to the Police Department since that date.

" 'The Police Department had charge of traffic on the Pearl Harbor road from Pearl Harbor to Honolulu shortly after the bombing started, with several officers on duty there.

" 'There was no deliberate blocking of the traffic during December 7 or following that date by unauthorized persons.' "

THE young businessman:

"In the city a mounting number of aliens were drawn into the Federal Bureau of Investigation net. Many of them on the slightest accusation. There were Buddhist priests, Japanese school teachers, Christian ministers, invalids, an 85-year-old veteran of the Russo-Japanese war who was deaf and half blind and had cancer of the stomach. The Japanese members of the American Legion found themselves prepar-

ing for probable internment. These men had fought in the last war and were cooperating with the authorities in every way to make evacuation easier. 'What did I fight for in the last war?' was the question they asked themselves."

The produce merchant:

"They cleaned out all the men who were trusted by the Japanese. There was no one to go to for advice."

The mother:

"Next to the shearing of the constitutional rights of citizens, the unwarranted and inhuman wholesale FBI pick-up of innocent people started more disastrous repercussions than any other factor."

The *Los Angeles Times*, March 12, 1942:

"MANY DECLARED TO BE ESCAPING INTERNMENT; BIDDLE LENIENCY FLAYED.

"Fear was expressed here today that the program of the Army for evicting dangerous enemy aliens from strategic areas in the Pacific Coast may be impaired seriously by an excessively lenient attitude of the Department of Justice.


". . . On the basis of statistics made available by Biddle today, . . .

"Of the total cases heard, 766 brought orders for internment, and after showing of evidence 270 aliens were released outright. The number placed on parole up to Monday of this week is 587."


The college sophomore:

"Now came rumors that the FBI would ransack houses. Everyone became frantic. I think every family must have gone through their homes in search of incriminating articles. Of course most of the items were harmless, yet the FBI agents had a funny way of interpreting innocent articles. We must have burned 50 or 75 books, merely because they were written in Japanese. I spied mother with tears burning pictures of her relatives back in Japan, looking at them one by one for the last time and burning them.

"It was also unsafe to converse with just anyone. It was



Japanese business in California before evacuation: restaurant and optometry



Evacuee baggage

reported that there were many 'dogs' [informers] about. Many people thought that the Japanese American Citizens' League was responsible for many arrests."

The young businessman:

"Many rumors leaked out concerning grilling by G-men. Dr. Honda of Gardena committed suicide in the immigration station and rumors went around that his body was covered with bruises and that he had been beaten to death. The wife of the proprietor of one of the largest chop suey houses hung herself in jail."

The *Los Angeles Times*, March 2, 1942:

"Aliens are not going to be persecuted by the government in the war emergency but the government is going to be 'just as tough as the situation warrants,' Tom C. Clark, coordinator of the Western Defense Command of the alien enemy control program, declared yesterday.

"Clark's discussion of the handling of the alien problem was delivered over a local radio station by Homer H. Bell, a member of the Los Angeles Bar Association, after Clark had been delayed in San Francisco:

" 'The American people will not stand for pushing human beings around,' Bell explained. 'The American people would not let their government do so, even if it were so inclined—and it isn't.'

" 'On the other hand, we are at war. We do know there are such things as sabotage and espionage and we also know that certain of these aliens are disloyal, that they have no allegiance to this country and are working for Germany, Japan or Italy.'

" 'This is no field for independent judgment nor for inexperience. The government, particularly the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has been training men for many years to meet just this sort of problem.'

" 'They are experienced. They know where to look for sabotage and espionage and they know just what groups to

suspect. Let them do it. If you try to do it on your own, you may be accusing innocent people, and just as important, you may be getting in the way of the experienced investigators.' "

The mother:

"It was a tug and pull between the ideal on the one hand and mass hysteria on the other, fanned by yellow jingoism and economic and political rapacity."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 24, 1942:

". . . Clark [regional coordinator of alien control] promised that there would be no mass evacuation, no transfer of people by the scores of thousands."

The *Los Angeles Times*, March 7, 1942:

"DeWitt [lt. general in command of Western Defense] reiterated that no mass evacuation is planned for Japanese."

The *Los Angeles Times*, March 16, 1942:

"In four integrated phases of evacuation, military and civil branches of the government are preparing to move 117,000 alien and American-born Japanese men, women and children out of defense areas in California, Oregon and Washington."

The college sophomore:

"The aliens were hazy as to every new regulation because the newspapers in Japanese were prohibited for a time. They were hungry for news.

"When reports came out in the local newspaper that we were to turn in flashlights, guns and other contraband articles, we telephoned the police station, but to our surprise, they said that they knew nothing about it."

The college girl:

"I was very anxious about the curfew law because I had to travel a round trip of 40 miles to college. I phoned the FBI and they directed me to another office and I phoned there and they couldn't tell me either. I had a merry time phoning various offices till I finally learned that I could go to school."

The small farmer's son:

"No one knew exactly when our evacuation order would be issued. Every one of us was held in suspense as to what we were to do, how to make preparations and when. Even when the evacuation order was announced, we did not know how we were to be transported. We packed and repacked, believing we would be taking our own vehicle. Then three days before leaving we learned that we were to go on the train and had to limit our baggage to what we were able to carry. Trying to sell our vehicle at a reasonable price caused us more worry."

The young businessman:

"Uncertainty came more and more to the fore and was intensified by the evacuation of Terminal Island on 48 hours notice. We thought we could expect the same thing at any time. It was pitiful the way people were groping around for some definite piece of information."

The produce merchant:

"People began to get desperate. No money, no business and no evacuation except in spots."

The mother:

"There was a marked increase in church attendance Buddhists and Shintoists went to the Christian churches because they felt that there would be more protection for them."

The non-Japanese social worker:

"The community was blown to pieces. They had no idea what would happen. It was the uncertainty."

The *Los Angeles Times*, March 8, 1942:

"Clark said that Japanese aliens and citizens of Japanese lineage leaving this military area may save themselves unnecessary trouble, hardships and expense by moving at least beyond the confines of Military Area 1 and also outside the smaller prohibited zones in Military Area No. 2."

The *Los Angeles Times*, February 28, 1942:

"The Pomona City Council voted a resolution to the Los

Angeles Board of Supervisors protesting against the resettlement and relocation of enemy aliens or other persons evacuated from defense areas by military authorities or others."

The mother:

"People were advised to evacuate voluntarily and many did this at great expense and re-established themselves. But they were forced into Relocation Centers later by orders based on the relentless pressure of mass hysteria."

The *Los Angeles Times*, March 24, 1942:

"Japanese evacuees moving inland from California in a great mass migration, will be put in concentration camps if they enter Nevada, Governor E. P. Carville warned tonight."

The *Los Angeles Times*, April 1, 1942:

"Governor Payne Ratner gave orders today that 'Japs are not wanted and not welcome in Kansas.'

"Representative Rankin (D), Miss., told a Senate Immigration subcommittee today that all Japanese, alien or native born, should be taken into custody immediately and deported to the Orient after the war.

" 'There can be no compromise on the Japanese question,' Rankin declared. 'We are going to get rid of them or they will get rid of us.' "

The Tolan Committee, May 1942:[2]

"The statement was repeated again and again by communities outside the military areas, 'If they are not good enough for California, they are not good enough for us.' "

The Los Angeles Times, March 26, 1942:

"All Japanese and Japanese-Americans residing in Military Area No. 1, comprising the western parts of Washington, Oregon and California and the southern part of Arizona, will be forbidden to leave the area after Sunday, the Western Defense Command announced tonight.

[2] Reference 38.

"Several groups planning voluntary evacuation have been fearful of starting because of reports of threats in other States should they pass through these States.

"The freezing order prepares the way for an Army regulated program of removal."

THE mother:

"If the evacuation of 110,000 Japanese aliens and citizens could be forced by *military necessity*, the question arises if arrangements could not have been made for their acceptance by other states as a *military necessity*."

THE *Los Angeles Times*, March 5, 1942:

"It was quiet in Little Tokyo yesterday.

" 'We've told the people to keep calm and to await orders,' explained Fred Tayama, chairman of the southern district council of the Japanese American Citizens' League.

"He said approximately $4,000,000 in business will be dislocated when the order comes to move out."

The *Los Angeles Times*, March 10, 1942:

"Takahashi said that the approximate annual value of commercial truck crops grown by California's Japanese is $40,000,000.

" 'This represents,' he said, '40 per cent of the total acreage farmed in the State, or 200,000 acres. Japanese,' he said, 'produce half of the state's tomato crop, 75 per cent of the celery, 80 per cent of the snap beans, 65 per cent of the cauliflower, 80 per cent of the peas, 95 per cent of the strawberries and 60 per cent of the processed spinach.'

" 'Japanese farmers stand to lose approximately $100,000,000 in investments,' he added."

"In San Francisco, Clark, whose title of Alien Control Coordinator is being changed to Chief of the Wartime Civil Control Authority, warned that any attempt to defraud Japanese who must move from the coastal area would provoke prosecution.

"Clark said those facing ouster do not need to hire representatives to handle their assets but that Federal agents will help them streamline the handling of their property, removal permits, crop leases and other details vital to their early departure."

THE mother:

"It was not the evacuation itself of the Terminal Islanders that drew so much resentment, it was the unnecessary hardship incurred due to broken promises. The necessity of this evacuation was obvious to anyone, but they were to have 30 days, then it was cut to two weeks and finally to 48 hours. To realize the full difficulty of the residents, one must realize that practically the whole male population had been taken in early FBI raids for the crime of being fishermen. The people left were mostly older women who did not speak much English and minor children. Telephone conversations had to be in English and travel to and from the Island was restricted. Thus planning evacuation was greatly hampered. Trucks and assistance in moving were promised, but when the time came, there were no government trucks or other assistance. Various religious organizations did rush to assist with trucks and with manual labor. Two major groups were the Baptists and the Friends. They rounded up vacant buildings and prepared to house the 'refugees,' and proceeded to feed them on a cost basis. Many families piled their belongings or as much as they could on trucks and set off for some unknown destination."

The young businessman:

"Some left their goods on the Island hoping to get transportation for them after they found a new location. When they returned, they found their houses broken in and the goods stolen."

A janitor's son:

"When I heard rumors of how the sharp businessmen came and tore the shirts off their backs, getting a $100 refrigerator for $5.00, it made me boiling mad at the injustice."

The Japanese American Ph.D.:

"I was down there then. A woman would come into a house without ever asking and demand, 'What you got to sell?' If people didn't want to sell, they tried to force them to. Buyers were everywhere, offering small prices for things. People would try to keep them out, but they would push their way in."

A member of the American Friends Service Committee:

"In most cases that came to our attention, the individual received a telephone call, purportedly from an agency of law enforcement—in which they were given a friendly tip, that 'You are going to have to move sooner than you thought. We are giving you a break. You had better start packing.' Well, some time in the same day this person would be visited by someone who was very generously offering to buy. It is that sort of thing that is going on and on until you can realize the state of dismay and despair and even terror resulting from that."

The *Los Angeles Times*, March 19, 1942:

"Gen. DeWitt explained that the government was 'endeavoring to provide services to avoid forced sales and prevent unscrupulous persons from taking undue advantage, but if the affected groups fail to take early advantage of these means their lot will be harder.' "

The young businessman:

"My resentment grew with the cheating of Japanese of their property, families fast becoming destitute and unable to get public assistance because of red tape, white guys trying to buy out farms ready to be harvested—gad, what a feeling."

A member of the American Friends Service Committee:

"———, of Compton, bought one horse, four tons of hay, three-quarters of a ton of fertilizer, harrow, cultivator, and plow, all for the sum of $100."

The chief of the Division of Immigration and Housing,

California Department of Industrial Relations (Carey McWilliams):

"People have been threatened that unless they dispose of their property to those who are eager for it, they will be reported to the FBI and their property will be confiscated. In the absence of statements from high government authorities to the contrary, the aliens who are at the mercy of rumors and rumor-mongers, have no choice but to accept what they are told at the moment."

A small farmer's son:

"A representative came from Washington to help the Japanese dispose of their property in the fairest way. There were many questions the representative could not answer, such as the value of the property. He was very helpful but some of the Japanese misunderstood his motives and had a great dislike toward him."

The Tolan Committee, May 1942:[3]

"Liquidation of real and personal property held by evacuees is proceeding at a rapid pace, in many instances at great sacrifice. The conditions under which the bank [Federal Reserve] will accept property for storage have thus far been cautious in the extreme. The principle of owner's risk laid down as a condition of accepting property for storage including automobiles also must be regarded as a bad psychological factor. . . . For example, one of the alternatives presented to the evacuee owner of automobiles is amplified as follows:

" 'To deliver his motor vehicle to the Federal Reserve bank . . . for storage at owner's risk without insurance; which storage will in most instances be in open areas . . . and must of necessity be of a character which will subject motor vehicle to a more or less rapid deterioration.'

"The slender margin of time allowed for the completion of property transfers has already led to several unfortunate consequences for evacuees."

[3] Reference 38.

The social service student:

"It was not so much the loss of their homes and accumulated wealth which amounted to millions and millions of dollars, but rather their present and future status which caused the greatest anxiety in the Japanese Americans."

The Los Angeles Times, March 18, 1942:

"President Roosevelt today created a War Relocation Authority under which enemy aliens who have been forced to move from military areas, especially on the Pacific Coast, may voluntarily enlist in a War Relocation Work Corps.

THE *Los Angeles Times*, March 20, 1942:

" 'Gen. DeWitt has insisted there be no evacuations until these could be conducted with justice and humanity to the affected groups,' Col. Bendetsen pointed out. . . . The Japanese go to 'well-prepared reception centers, not to the hardships of a concentration camp.' "

The *Los Angeles Times*, March 25, 1942:

"In the temporary quartering of Japanese evacuees at Santa Anita race track, every precaution will be taken to protect the welfare of the surrounding residential areas and to prevent the interned Japanese from contacting or in any way embarrassing or affecting the lives of Americans living in the areas.

" 'Santa Anita,' said Gen. Wilson, 'was selected as the site for a much-needed detainment camp for evacuees near Los Angeles because it afforded facilities for hurried construction of a camp and immediate internment of the Japanese.' "

The *Los Angeles Times*, April 1, 1942:

"The mass evacuation of 5,000 Japanese represents the largest exodus yet ordered by Lieut. Gen. J. L. DeWitt, Chief of the Western Defense Command and the 4th Army."

The social service student:

"I was evacuated with 2,000 others from the Los Angeles area. They were saying goodbye to their homes and their countless dear friends. As I sat in the train and looked out at the friends of the Japanese who had come to pay their last formal respects, my heart was immensely gladdened to know that in the midst of the uncertainty there was still a group of loyal understanding friends the Japanese could count on."

The *Los Angeles Times*, April 4, 1942:

"Multimillion-dollar Santa Anita track—the world's most beautiful and luxurious racing plant—yesterday opened its gates as an assembly center for Japanese evacuees.

"Worried mothers with babies sighed with relief when they learned that farsighted Army authorities had provided them with facilities for warming milk for the feeding of infants.

"As nearly as possible, the evacuees will live lives as normal as can be arranged under the circumstances.

"They will have the freedom of the grounds.

"They can have the use of long-wave radios.

"They will have special recreational centers for both adults and youngsters.

"The kitchen eventually will be staffed with members of their own race, as will the hospital unit, with accommodations for more than 100 persons."

The small farmer's son:

"I still had hope that the Assembly Center would be well organized and able to give us at least satisfactory food and housing. No, I was wrong again in believing that our welfare would be considered to a certain extent. We were led to the stables which were to be our homes for an indefinite time. With bad ventilation, an asphalt floor and the aroma of the horses lingering even though the rooms had been painted, it was very unhealthy. I would like to challenge anyone to live in such a home for a quarter of a year. The

floors were condemned by the County Health Department, but nothing was done about it. No, nothing was done about it.

"The food we had the first day was potato hash and stale bread, which had mold and had been bitten by mice. At times the food caused diarrhea."

The janitor's son:

"When we stepped off the train and entered the white-washed, stench-filled horse stalls, tears came rolling down the cheeks of my mother and father and they weren't the only ones. We had to crowd 7 people into a unit 12 by 24 feet. In due time an epidemic of measles started and my sister came down with it. There were so many cases that there was no isolation and the patients' families ate in the common dining hall and washed in the common sinks."

The Ph.D.:

"Civil liberties were at a minimum. The whole camp was closely guarded with watch towers in which men sat constantly with machine guns in front of them. Searchlights played all around the camp at night."

A pharmacist:

"I am an American, I have never known anything else. This evacuation can't change me because I am old enough and will always be the same. But what about the children in their formative years? What will it do to them?"

THE *Los Angeles Times*, March 23, 1942:

"Workers . . . will receive a security wage ranging from $50 a month for unskilled help to $94 for a person highly skilled."

The *Los Angeles Times*, March 31, 1942:

"The authorities promise no disruption of wage scales in the new settlement sites."

The *Los Angeles Times*, June 10, 1942:

"The wages of the workers are as follows: unskilled $8

per month, skilled $12 per month, professionals $16 a month. As yet no one has been paid."

* * *

In this manner, many voices spoke. A few have been selected to give a general picture of the attitudes and reactions of the Japanese on the Pacific Coast from December 7, 1941, to May 8, 1942, when they began arriving in the Colorado River War Relocation Center. If the quotations and fragments appear confusing and irritating, they will carry so much the better the feelings of the people who were involved.

There has been no intention to marshal data to show whether or not the evacuation was justified, or to analyze the way it was carried out. These questions involve matters concerning which data for forming an opinion are not available at present and they are not taken up in this study.[4]

Some of the quotations are probably not true statements of fact, but, fact or not, all are true statements of feeling—and that is the point that is of critical significance in the present report. The behavior of the Japanese after they arrived in the Relocation Center was not so much determined by what had "really" happened to them as by what they thought had happened to them.

The administrator has to deal with people as they are, not as they should be. "People ought . . ." is a phrase he would do well to drop from his thinking and from his vocabulary. He may modify his plans to suit the attitudes of the people, or he may modify the attitudes to meet his plans through education and other means, or he may do both.

The one thing he cannot do and administer successfully is to ignore the attitudes.

Below will be summarized some of the attitudes and

[4] For further information on this subject see References 11, 27, 37 and 38.

sentiments found among the evacuees, the understanding of which was important for the Administration of the Relocation Center. They were as significant in determining the outcome of administrative plans as were such matters as technical personnel, equipment and supplies. For example, had administration been based on the supposition, seriously held by some people, that "the Japanese loyal to America were glad to stay in a Relocation Camp as their contribution to the war," it would have quickly got into grave difficulties. There were Japanese Americans who would have been glad to join the Army or participate in war industry and there were some who were glad that being in a Relocation Center kept them from being drafted (at that time), but there were none who "gladly" accepted relocation as their "contribution to the war."

Fear, frustration and anger were the basic emotions and they pervaded all the Japanese, both alien and American. In some, as typified by members of the Japanese American Citizen's League, these feelings resulted in efforts to prove their loyalty and to insure their future by all-out collaboration with the Government. Others reacted by becoming apathetic, submissive and withdrawn from any initiative or spontaneous action. Still others brought their anger to the surface and were ever ready to complain and attack, at least with words.

However, whether cooperative, passive or aggressive, almost everyone had the following specific attitudes:

They thought evacuation had been unnecessary because the Japanese had been law-abiding and not engaged in subversive activities.

They thought they had been victimized by racial prejudice and war hysteria fanned by predatory political and economic interests.

They thought they had been crushed economically and the results of 30 or 40 years of pioneering wiped out. The aliens, being elderly, would never recover from this blow,

and for the citizens it would take years, if they accomplished it at all.

They thought they were objects of public scorn and ridicule as well as exploitation and had no way of protecting themselves.

They thought that the Japanese American citizens were in a particularly bad plight because they would be completely unsuited to life in Japan.

They were disillusioned with the Americanism taught in school and felt that democratic principles and the ideals for which the war was being fought had failed to prove a reality.

They thought they had been torn from friends and associates and all that "home" meant.

They thought the American Government had failed to give the citizens the protection it had early promised, and to which they are entitled by the Constitution, and on which they had been relying.

They thought the American Government during evacuation proved to be unreliable, inconsistent and inefficient. As a consequence, they suffered many unnecessary hardships that involved property, health, and future security. The Government's promises had been untrustworthy and it had been easily swayed by pressure groups from a course designed to care for the evacuees' interests.

They thought the Federal Bureau of Investigation had inflicted untold hardships on the Japanese by extensive unwarranted arrests during evacuation. Communities and families were left without leadership and became the more easily victims of predatory persons and of their own inability to cope with the situation, since much of the responsibility fell on the shoulders of inexperienced women and children. These raids were inexcusable since they did not protect the rest of the people from evacuation.

They thought great harm had been done to the Japanese by "dogs" (Japanese informers) who for money and their

own self-aggrandizement, turned in the names of innocent people to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.


They thought certain individuals, churches, and educational organizations had proved themselves true friends, but were too weak to exert much influence on government policy.

They gave little appreciative thought to certain points on which those responsible for the conduct of evacuation were inclined to pride themselves, such as keeping families together and permitting self-government in the Relocation Centers.

2. Beginning of Poston

It is evident that many of the people who advocated the removal of the Japanese from the West Coast were thinking in the tradition of riding the unwelcome stranger out of town and giving no thought either to his future or to the welfare of other towns. However, the persons who were actually responsible for the planning of evacuation and relocation anticipated serious problems that could not be solved in any cavalier manner. Numbers of experienced minds labored over the matter and devised policies that were both far-sighted and practical. At the same time there was an avalanche of pressing needs that changed by the day and that swept over the infant administrative organization groping in numerous unprecedented situations. These things were a foretaste, and they warned that even those with the keenest vision saw in the beginning little more of the total picture than they would have seen of an iceberg floating in the sea.


The Indian Reservation in the Colorado River Valley near Parker, Arizona, was selected by the Army as one of the locations for evacuated Japanese, and U.S. Engineers immediately began building a camp. After the creation of the War Relocation Authority on March 18, 1942, an agreement was made with the Department of the Interior whereby this Relocation Center would be administered by the Indian Service. On March 21, Milton S. Eisenhower, Director of the War Relocation Authority, addressed a memorandum to the Hon. John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in which he stated that the "over-all policy and program decisions will be developed by the Authority with the cooperation of the Office of Indian Affairs." Mr. Collier was advised to "draw together from among the competent personnel of your bureau a project organization which will



Evacuation scenes: family ready to go; boarding a train



Clearing away desert mesquite in preparation for building Poston



Building Poston

supervise on the ground the irrigation, health, educational and all other phases of a well-rounded public work and community project."

In accordance with this letter, Mr. Collier appointed the Superintendent of the Papago Indian Reservation to the position of Project Director of the Japanese Relocation Center, and by April 9 a nuclear staff was in the field. Policies were developed in harmony with the general administrative experience of the Indian Service and in accord with what appeared to be the demands of the situation and the available resources. They took this general form:

1. As quickly as possible the community was to become economically self-sufficient. In time of war, with every dollar and all manpower in demand, it was important to convert the Center from an item of government expense into an asset. Thus personnel, material and money would be released for other work and thousands of idle Japanese hands would become busy in agriculture and certain kinds of manufacturing needed for the war effort.

2. It was believed that evacuation had been a great shock to the Japanese and that for their own welfare and future usefulness as members of the American nation, it was important to get them busy as quickly as possible in work that would provide independent livelihood, self-respect and an opportunity to make a record that the rest of the country could appreciate.

3. Through the development of irrigation and agriculture in the wild land of the Parker Valley, permanent national assets would be created.

4. It was most important to show that the United States could carry out a program of evacuation and relocation in a democratic manner that would provide the greatest possible contrast to population shifts in Axis countries.

5. To accomplish these policies, it seemed that adequate incentives would have to be created, that the Japanese must

feel some security and some acceptance as fellow Americans and friendly aliens. A program of self-government was envisaged that would develop gradually and enable the Project Administration to withdraw.

In the words of William Zimmerman, Jr., Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs, "We confidently expect practically all positions except a few highly technical ones and a few top administrative jobs to be handled by the Japanese themselves. Many of the staff who are now taking charge of the project are on temporary detail from positions in the Indian Service and will return to their regular work as soon as a competent Japanese may be selected or trained and put into these jobs."

6. The evacuees were to be treated as American citizens and loyal aliens, against whom there were no charges or suspicion of subversive activity. The control of dangerous persons would be the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who would make inquiries and arrests in the Center as in any other community.

7. No definite plans were made concerning the fate of the evacuees after the war. It was felt that if they were successful in cultivating the Parker Valley, some, at least, might obtain long-term leases from the Indians. In the course of time and with the development of public education and understanding, it might be that many evacuees through employment outside the Center could be absorbed again into the national life. For the present, however, it was thought best to emphasize the creation of a community that would provide security, stability and an opportunity to earn a living.

THE conceptions of the Federal agents charged with administering the Relocation Center matched rather closely the opinions expressed in the report of the committee investigating national defense migration, of which John H.

Tolan of California was chairman.[1] Said the Report in May 1942:

"It has become clear that a curtailment of the rights and privileges of the American-born Japanese citizens of this country will furnish one of the gravest tests of democratic institutions in our history. As with all previous crises in the nation's history, the preservation of liberties will depend upon the degree to which clear vision is applied to momentary difficulties. Realism must go hand in hand with a profound sense of responsibility for the maintenance of our way of life. . . . Unless a clarification is forthcoming, the evacuation of the Japanese population will serve as an incident sufficiently disturbing to lower seriously the morale of vast groups of foreign-born among our people. America is great because she has transcended the difficulties inherent in a situation which finds all races, all nationalities, all colors and all creeds within her borders. This breadth of vision must be applied to the present circumstances.

"The realization that this nation is at war must form the cornerstone of all our national policies in connection with the treatment of aliens and citizens alike. This realization of conflict must likewise carry with it an enlightened understanding and a thorough appreciation of the aims and purposes of that conflict.

"This realization in turn must motivate the operations of the War Relocation Authority. . . . The majority of the evacuees to date are American citizens against whom no charge of individual guilt has been lodged. A constructive performance, therefore, on the part of the War Relocation Authority will go far toward fashioning the whole pattern of our policy on racial and minority groups now and in the post-war world. . . . Private employment would appear to be entirely impracticable for some time to come and should not be considered in present plans as a solution to the resettlement problem. . . .

[1] Reference 38.

"Projects should be as self-contained as possible. They should include, in addition to agricultural production, such war-manufacturing activities as are economically feasible. . . .

"Wages should be the same as those prevailing in the same or similar areas for this type of agriculture, manufacturing or other pursuits. This policy should be dictated by twin considerations: to achieve the maximum production of commodities which are useful and vital to successful prosecution of the war; simultaneously to place the community on a self-sustaining basis at as early a date as possible. . . .

"The organization of the project should allow for administrative self-government to a maximum degree. . . .

"The regular law-enforcement agencies of the Federal Government with the cooperation of the Authority should be responsible for determining the loyalty or disloyalty of aliens and citizens alike. Citizenship rights should be fully respected and the American concept of justice should prevail; namely, that groups shall not be judged guilty in advance, and the disloyal shall be determined and interned, or tried by the established procedures of the Federal Government."

ALTHOUGH the evacuation of the Japanese has been an infinitesimal part of world change, there are certain implications inherent in the event that have bearing on national and international problems of the immediate future. These have been touched upon in the description of the administrative policies and the recommendations of the Tolan Committee, but they should be further amplified.

The first concerns internal unity and security. It is vital to the welfare of this country that there be harmony among the various racial and cultural groups who compose it. For example, there are within our borders, approximately 13 million Negroes, 4 million Italians, and 2 million Spanish, to name but a few. Out of these and other groups, there are

over 32 million citizens one or both of whose parents were foreign born.[2]

The precedent established in handling the Japanese has direct bearing on the future security and behavior of these others. The treatment of one minority is a rip-cord that leads into the affairs of others, particularly during war when there are unusual opportunities for exploiting the labor of minority people, and when the irritations and frustrations of the times easily lead to emotional sprees of aggressive expression at the expense of scapegoats. Such events are dangerously contagious and can spread not only to other minorities, but to groups distinguished because of religious and economic differences. In the French Revolution, what began as an indiscriminate persecution of aristocrats spread to other groups one after another till the Reign of Terror was in full swing, killing off the revolutionists themselves and ending only with the wiping out of the Jacobins who had been chiefly instrumental in setting it going.

That the matter is one requiring care and consideration at present in the United States is obvious from the nature of our population and our past record for sporadic vigilante activities. Nor should we forget that our history contains a conflict between the states which was one of the most devastating wars the world had ever seen and in which racial attitudes were among the causal and perpetuating factors. The occurrence in 1943 of race riots and minor disturbances is a reminder that the problem is alive.

Closely related to the internal implication of evacuation is an international aspect. We have told the world that we fight for principles of justice in which creed and skin color carry no weight. However, other nations, even those fighting most closely with us, look on our promises with skeptical eyes and judge us by our deeds, rather than our words. The management of evacuated American citizens of Japanese ancestry is a straw in the wind by which our policies in mat-

[2] Reference 9.

ters of race can be seen in action by Chinese, Indians, Filipinos and the people of the East Indies, as well as by Japan. Equally important, it is a concrete demonstration to ourselves as to how well we are able to apply our principles across cultural lines and from it we can learn what education we need, and how best to cut the cloth of our future plans so it will cover both our ideals and our actual performance.

However, in spite of the interesting and significant nature of these problems of internal and international relationships, they are outside the scope of this report and are only mentioned as reference points in the confusion of events, policies and attitudes that will be unfolded.

The third implication of importance in evacuation is the administrative problem itself and it is with this that we are exclusively concerned.

PARKER, Arizona, sits in the desert, a stopping place on the highway between Wickenburg and Needles. Formerly a mining town, it is today a vestige of the old West with stores, saloons and rooming houses strung along covered sidewalks and a main street, and is surrounded by rubbish and decay which the desert bleaches, but does not absorb. Parker's life is kept flowing by scattered ranchers along the Colorado, the government colony at Parker Dam, the Indian Reservation with its employees, and 1,200 Mojaves and Chemehuevis, the Santa Fe Railroad, and, more recently, troops in desert training.

A mile from Parker toward the river is Silver City, the Indian Agency with neat government houses, and irrigated lawns among eucalyptus trees and oleanders. Here are administrative offices, hospital, garages, machine shop, dormitories and houses, and to it came the administrative nucleus of the Relocation Center.


Just beyond the Agency, the ground drops suddenly almost to the level of the Colorado and spreads southward in a widening plain of heat-shimmered green through which

the river flows between deserts and rock mountains. For several miles along the dusty roads, there are meadows with cattle, or fields for cotton, and on the banks of the irrigation ditches occasional lofty tamarisk and cottonwoods create shade. Farther on, the wilderness closes in and the road bumps along between dust-laden mesquite and creosote bushes until at a point 17 miles from Parker the site of the first evacuee camp is reached.


In April 1942 this was a scene of intense activity. Speed was the keynote. The U.S. Engineers supervised contractors who were putting up buildings to house 10,000 Japanese. For several square miles the mesquite and all other forms of shade had been cleared and on the hot dust, blocks of military barracks were being erected. Each block contained 14 barracks, a recreational hall, a mess hall, a latrine for men, a latrine for women, and a laundry and ironing room. There was also a 250-bed hospital under construction, warehouses, water tower, artesian wells, sewage-disposal systems and offices and quarters for the administrative personnel. About three miles to the south the outlines of a second camp to house 5,000 more evacuees was beginning to take shape and approximately three miles beyond this, preparations were under way for a third camp of similar size.

In keeping with the spirit that animated the planners and administrators of this community-in-the-making, all three units together were named "Poston" in honor of Charles Poston, a government engineer who in 1864 had a vision of the Parker Valley filled with agriculture and who conceived an irrigation system to accomplish it. For various reasons, the development scheme had never become a reality, but now it was felt that Poston's dream would come true, and that at least 80,000 acres of waste land would be converted into a national asset and a home for the duration of the war to busy, productive Japanese.

OVER the ancient cart tracks of the Parker Valley and the



Location of Poston


Indian
Agency
Parker
RIVER
COLORADO
Poston
UNIT I
Poston
UNIT II
Poston
UNIT III
Road
Railroad


banks of dust, like snow on the half-made roads, there lumbered in and out autos, trucks and trailers bringing boards, beams, tar paper, nails, meat, men, plans and thousands of other things necessary for the support of a growing camp and its builders. On top of these came loads of supplies and equipment that nobody knew what to do with. They were intended for storage in warehouses not yet built and they had to be packed in any obtainable space in Parker and in the Indian Agency. Still they came and were piled for miles along the roadside. Freight cars were sent by hundreds to Parker where there was no siding to accommodate them and no means of unloading them, and they had to be scattered in the country around wherever temporary space could be found.

On the other hand, some equipment, essential to the speedy completion of the work did not appear. Out of approximately 140 trucks approved and ordered, 20 were received and later another 5. The situation was similar with other items. Men who had been speeded across the country to do technical jobs, stood idle with rush orders on their desks because they did not have things their work required.

At the Agency, on April 9, 1942, the Project Director and his administrators took over offices, filled every room twice full, put up beds in the garage and cots on the lawn. Each day new arrivals came by bus, train, private car and plane. Some were prepared to fill whatever job had to be done, some to observe, some to make suggestions, some to organize and create plans. As they came, they passed others on their way out seeking contacts, contracts, clarification of orders and policies, new ideas, the expedition of requisitions and the relieving of bottlenecks.

The necessity for speed, the lack of precedent, and the trouble securing men and material imposed by war conditions plunged the Project from the start into a welter of gravest difficulties. Lines of authority and responsibility were not clear between the War Relocation Authority, the Indian

POSTON UNIT I.



Service, the Office of Emergency Management, the contractors, the Wartime Civil Control Authority and the Army. Before the organization of the Project could be effected, it was necessary to deal with immediate problems of supplies, equipment and men. Over all hung the constant threat that within a few days thousands of men, women and children, including infants and invalids, would begin flowing into the center at the rate of 500 a day. Mess halls were unfinished, there was lack of refrigeration for meat, plumbing was incomplete, the hospital was not built, there was danger of failure of the water supply and other matters on which life would depend.

That collapse did not occur was largely due to the mutual understanding of men in each of the organizations concerned, and their will to help. They had the courage to assume responsibility for action in the emergency without knowing whether or not they would be backed up by the law, the Government or Congress. There were other individuals, however, who in the confusion were human enough to think more of protecting themselves from errors of procedure which might make them liable for thousands of dollars or a prison sentence, than of the urgent requirements of relocation. Still others could not adapt lifelong habits of peacetime government routine to the pressure of the new situation.


Such were the plans and such were the difficulties in the beginning of Poston.

3. "Intake"

IN MAY the physical shell of Poston began to fill with its human occupants. First came the volunteers and then a swelling stream of evacuees until the city of barracks had become alive. Many different kinds of persons were in the crowds and they were received and directed by many different kinds of administrators.

"I was the first Jap to knock on the gates of Poston," said one of eleven volunteers from Imperial Valley, California, who arrived in Poston on the warm and windy afternoon of May 8. They had come to offer their services to the Government in preparing the camp. The fact that they found the Administration unaware of their approach introduced them at once to the confusions and difficulties of communication that characterized the relocation program.

These first volunteers were soon followed by others until a total of 251 turned to in the growing heat and cleaned up the barracks for the 7,450 evacuees who arrived during the succeeding three weeks. The volunteers worked at the receiving stations interviewing, registering, housing and explaining to the travel-weary newcomers what they must do and where they must go. The volunteers became clerks, stenographers and receptionists in the administrative offices, filled necessary positions in the small emergency hospital, laid the foundation of a kind of municipal civil service composed of block managers, set up the community store and entered the agriculture department. On the whole they proved to be diligent workers, were prepared for hardships, seemed cheerful, and were among those who had reacted to the evacuation situation by a determination to make the best of it. They were receptive to the Administration's ideas for building a model community.



Regions in California from which evacuees came to Poston

"INTAKE"

THE new arrivals, coming in a steady stream, were poured into empty blocks one after another, as into a series of bottles. The reception procedure became known as "intake" and it left a lasting impression on all who witnessed or took part in it.

Picture the brightness of morning and a sun that heats the earth and beats down on rubbish piles and row after row of even, black tar-papered barracks. There is the sound of hammers and the hum of motors in trucks, cars, bulldozers, tractors, pumps and graders. In the single wooden building that houses the administrative offices, desks are jammed together and the members of the departments of law, housing, supply and transportation, bump into each other as they go about their business and try to shout above each other's noise.

Everywhere is the question, "When will they come?" It was said yesterday that the day's quota of 500 evacuees would arrive at 8 in the morning, and everything has been in readiness since 7. Later it is learned that they will not arrive until 10. This is again changed to 3 and finally at 5 it is said that the train is in Parker and the busses have gone to get the people. Clerks, stenographers, interviewers, guides and baggage carriers collect at the mess hall that will serve as the scene of "intake" and a crowd gathers to watch.

It is almost 6 when someone shouts that the first bus is coming, and it can be seen plowing through the dust, like a ship on a choppy sea. People are saying to each other that it is a good thing that they are arriving late because the worst heat of the day is over.

When the bus stops, its forty occupants quietly peer out to see what Poston is like. A friend is recognized and hands wave. The bus is large and comfortable, but the people look tired and wilted, with perspiration running off their noses. They have been on the train for twenty-four hours and have been hot since they crossed the Sierras, with long waits at

desert stations. Nevertheless, there are remnants of daintiness among the women, and all are smiling.

One of the volunteers gets into the bus and makes a short speech in Japanese and then in English. He tells them that everyone understands that they have just had a long hot train ride, that the Administration therefore will try to send them through the necessary routine in the shortest possible fashion and that as soon as it is over, food will be served. In the allotment of apartments, they are told, that if there are less than five in a family, they must be prepared to have others living with them.

They begin to file out of the bus, clutching tightly to children and bundles. Military Police escorts anxiously help and guides direct them in English and Japanese.

They are sent into the mess halls where girls hand them ice water, salt tablets and wet towels. In the back are cots where those who faint can be stretched out, and the cots are usually occupied. At long tables sit interviewers suggesting enlistment in the War Relocation Work Corps. Overhead is a placard stating briefly in Japanese the main points of the enlistment application.

Men and women, still sweating, holding on to children and bundles try to think.

A whirlwind comes and throws clouds of dust into the mess hall, into the water and into the faces of the people while papers fly in all directions.

Order is restored again.


The new arrivals are constantly urged to be quick.

The contents of the enlistment form may be summarized as follows:


I swear loyalty to the United States and enlist in the War Relocation Work Corps for the duration of the war and 14 days thereafter in order to contribute to the needs of the nation and in order to earn a livelihood for myself and my dependents. I will accept whatever pay, unspecified at the



Supplies arriving by road



Supplies arriving by rail



A completed section of Poston

present time, the War Relocation Authority determines, and I will observe all rules and regulations.

In doing this I understand that I shall not be entitled to any cash or allowances beyond the wages due me at the time of discharge from the work corps; that I may be transferred from one relocation center to another by the War Relocation Authority; that medical care will be provided, but that I cannot make a claim against the United States for any injury or disease acquired by me while in the Work Corps; that I shall be subject to special assessments for educational, medical and other community service as may be provided for in the support of any dependents who reside in a relocation center; that I shall be financially responsible for the full value of any government property that I use while in the work corps; and that the infraction of any regulations of the War Relocation Authority will render me liable to trial and suitable punishment. So help me God.

Most people, including even lawyers, sign without reading the form, a few read it carefully and a very few refuse to sign.

Interviewers ask some questions about former occupations so that cooks and other types of workers much needed in the camp can be quickly secured. Finally, fingerprints are made and the evacuees troop out across an open space and into another hall for housing allotment, registration and a cursory physical examination. With them go guides, while outside there are men who periodically shout in English and Japanese, "Stay with your guide! Don't lose your guide!"

In the end, the evacuees are loaded on to trucks along with their hand baggage and driven to their new quarters; there each group who will live together is left to survey a room 20 by 25 feet with bare boards, knot-holes through the floor and into the next apartment, heaps of dust, and for each person an army cot, a blanket and a sack which can be filled with straw to make a mattress. There is nothing else. No shelves, closets, chairs, tables or screens. In this space 5 to 7 people,

and in a few cases 8, men, women and their children, are to live indefinitely.

"Intake" was a focus of interest and solicitude on the part of the administrative staff. The Project Director said it was one of the things he would remember longest out of the whole experience at Poston. He thought the people looked lost, not knowing what to do or what to think. He once found a woman standing, holding her 4-day old baby and sent her to rest in his room. The Associate Project Director said that one of the pictures which would always stay in his mind was one he saw in an "apartment" where people had just arrived. An elderly mother who had been in a hospital some years sat propped on her baggage gasping and being fanned by two daughters, while her son went around trying to get a bed set up for her. The old lady later died.

* * *

THE "intake" scene, representing the first confluence of evacuees and Administration, is perhaps an appropriate point at which to pause and examine more closely what manner of people these were.

IT has already been stated that the Japanese on the Pacific Coast were many diverse sorts of persons and some of their turmoil in response to evacuation has been described in Chapter 1.

In attempting further definition it may be said that human society, like any other complex pattern can be described in numerous ways. It is possible to block it out by occupational groups, by class, by economic levels, by religious organizations and other forms. In this preliminary survey there will be selected, for reasons that will be apparent later, three segments, well-known to the Japanese and called by them, *Issei, Nisei,* and *Kibei.* The Isseis are the first generation, the original immigrants. The Niseis are their children, born in the United States. The Kibeis are those Niseis who have

been sent back to Japan for a part or all of their education, but who have since returned to America.

Many unwarranted and sweeping generalizations have been made under each of these headings and they have been overemphasized at the expense of other important considerations. Nevertheless, these names do represent fundamentally significant trends in attitudes and social organization and are pertinent in the problem of relocation and its administration.

THE ISSEIS. The Isseis had come to the United States about the turn of the century, mostly young men from poor families, very often farmers. They did not intend to make America their home, but hoped to acquire a little money and return to Japan where that little would go a long way and they could live at ease. As a consequence, they made no particular effort to learn English or to become a part of the American community. To a large extent they took laboring jobs, on the railroad and at big ranches. Frequently they worked in gangs with one of their number as "boss," this man acquiring some English and making contracts for their labor. With the passage of time, many found individual employment, or a patch of land to clear and farm for themselves and most of the work gangs gradually disintegrated. After about ten years the men began sending to the old country for wives, often selected from a photograph provided by agents, and the women who came were consequently known as "picture brides."

The thought of eventual return to Japan remained, and the newly created families tended to cling together and to enjoy their common interests in Japanese sports, plays, societies, music and folkways, much as do the colonies of Poles, Italians, Germans and other first-generation immigrants. Hard work for long hours left the Isseis with little opportunity or energy for learning English or for extensive relations with Americans.

Nevertheless, there was increasing contact. Employers became friendly with the people who worked for them and helped them in business and legal relations that were hard for them to understand. Ministers and missionaries of various denominations early took an interest, and many Japanese were converted from Buddhism to Christianity. With the appearance of children and their entry into schools, relations with Americans were extended still further through teachers and the parents of their children's schoolmates.

However, in spite of this the essential hanging together of the Japanese community, their language, manners and physical appearance, made them objects of suspicion and dislike to many Americans. Perhaps more fundamental was the resentment engendered in labor by the fact that the Japanese would accept lower wages, and in farmers by the fact that they would pay higher rents for land and offered severe competition in production. There was also some desire to obtain the acreage which the Japanese had developed. It was often said that because they could live on so little, and put in such long hours of "stoop labor," no white man could compete with them, and that they lowered the standard of living. It is probable, too, that they fell heir to an antipathy toward Orientals that had previously developed against the Chinese on the Pacific Coast.

Politicians repeatedly whipped up agitation against the Japanese as a means of gaining attention and power. Various discriminations were practiced such as prohibiting naturalization, inter-marriage with white people, immigration, and the right to own land. As a result of this last act, there was a loss of property due to forced sales and more than one Japanese pioneer found he must rent the land he had cleared with his own hands.

In spite of discrimination there was a gradual rise in the Isseis' standard of living. The small farmer who worked in the fields with his family and one or two hired men was probably the average. At the bottom of the economic scale

were the "fruit tramps," old bachelors, remnants of the former work gangs, who followed the picking season for fruits and vegetables up and down the coast. They were generally considered by the rest of the Japanese to be immoral, troublesome and ignorant fellows. Above the small farmers were a number of large farmers and a few very wealthy wholesale produce merchants.

In various towns, the urban counterpart of the rural Japanese appeared in stores, restaurants, amusements and the professions.

The Isseis were reluctant to give up their dream of returning to Japan, but before the war they had gradually come to look on it as unlikely. Their children had turned out to be something they did not understand too well, but they recognized that these young people would not fit into life in the old country and that their future was in America. In a sense, the hopes which were originally directed at a return to Japan became transferred to the children's future in America. Moreover, the Isseis' own habits of life had become fixed and, while Japan was pleasant to think about, there was a great weight of inertia inhibiting any change.

A few did go back, only to return within a short time saying that the "freedom" of the United States was preferable to the "confined" life in Japan. They also said that nothing was as it used to be; friends of their youth were dead, or they were changed and old and were not much interested in the returned immigrant. Children who were not even born when they left home forty years ago were now a crowd of important strangers in the old familiar village. Time had not stood still in Japan any more than in America and the land to which the immigrants really wished to return no longer existed in the world. It was their own lost youth.

Therefore, the Isseis cheered Japan in her war with China; read with enjoyment articles about the development and greatness of Japan in newspapers and magazines

under the influence of the Domei News Agency and similar sources; and subscribed to funds that would help the Japanese soldiers; much as the Chinese in America did on their side. None of this was considered prejudicial to the interests of the United States since she was at peace with Japan and the Isseis subscribed to the local community chest and to the American Red Cross.

In their moral ideas, the Isseis were rather puritanical, with emphasis on hard work, personal integrity, self-sacrifice and scorn of luxury. As one might expect, these ideals were achieved to varying degrees in actual practice. For the most part in relations with Americans, they were careful to deal honestly, but among themselves there was a good deal of suspicion of sharp practice, especially of the wealthy by the less fortunate. There was considerable pride in self-reliance and independence, in never being on relief, in having a very low crime record, and in the educational achievement attained by their children. They were inclined to look on the average American as being rude, materialistic, and without the fine moral and spiritual qualities that distinguished the Japanese. Identification with the glories of their native land was no doubt in part a compensation for the position of inferiority imposed by racial discrimination.

The war, even though it greatly troubled the Isseis, worked no miraculous change in them. They were still imbued with strong sentiments for their native land and were still legally its citizens and not citizens of the United States. On the other hand, the war did not make them suddenly hate the country in which they had dwelt for thirty or forty years and where they had gained more material advantages than they would ever have had in Japan. It did not make them hate their American friends who had helped them in times of need. It did not alter the fact that the stake that they had spent their lives building was tied to the fortunes of the United States. Perhaps most important

of all, it did not change the fact that their children had grown up to be Americans and that their future lay here.

In this dilemma, the Isseis wanted Japan to win, confidently expected that she would, but at the same time they wanted no harm to come to America. They hoped for and expected some sort of compromise peace in which the Japanese would keep their gains in the South Pacific, but never violate American shores. Most of all, they wanted to keep out of trouble themselves and wanted to retain their children's future. They were willing to do any work that would contribute food or other commodities not directly concerned with armament. Because they were citizens of an enemy country and by American law had never been allowed to become naturalized, they felt they could not be asked to produce war materials. Their children, who were United States citizens, on the other hand, should throw their full weight into the support of America.

As enemy aliens, they expected to be interned, or at least closely watched, but they hoped that they would not lose their resources and that somehow without jeopardizing the children's position they would not be separated from them.

In this precarious balance, and yet with a potentially constructive attitude, mass evacuation had the effect of pushing many of the Isseis toward more active support of Japan. Three of the strongest ties to America became much reduced, namely, contact with American friends, the economic stake, and their children's security in the United States.

The Isseis came to Poston with feelings of a life's work wasted, bitterness, apathy, and fear, shot through with the conviction that there was no future in America for the Japanese. As for democratic principles and form of government, they thought that had proved a failure. To them, equal rights and opportunity were pure fiction and when they thought of government action, they thought of confusion, inefficiency and a long string of "broken promises"

such as that there would be no mass evacuation, and then that there would be good housing, that there would be going wages, and that their property would be protected. They expected that their experience with the Administration at Poston would be no better and were prepared to mistrust and misinterpret much of what it did and said.

Nevertheless, for the most part, they intended to obey rules as they had done all their lives, to sit quietly, to play *goh*, and to talk with their friends. As far as work was concerned, they might do a little something to earn spending money, but their real working days were over. For years and years they had labored long hours every day. Now they were going to rest. Whatever they owed America had been cancelled by the evacuation, and while they might assist their neighbors with odd jobs to promote mutual comfort, working in the desert heat for nominal wages was out of the question. They were not in the least interested in building a model community, but thought that since the Government had brought them to Poston, it was up to the Government to take care of them. There was the Spanish Consul as intermediary and there was Japan, a great and powerful nation, back of them.

Man cannot live without some hope, and so bright dreams of a future that would compensate for a dark present emphasized a Nipponese Victory. They and their children would return to Japan after the war, and the children would find plenty of good work in helping develop the vast new colonial empire in the South Pacific. Japan might even force the United States to reimburse them for the losses and hardships suffered during evacuation.

On both sides of this probably average set of attitudes were extreme feelings, on the one hand toward aggressiveness, and on the other hand toward ideas more like those of the volunteers. There were numbers of Isseis who did not feel that all was lost in America, who thought that their children and themselves still had a chance and that

the best thing to do was to set a good example in fortitude, cooperativeness and hard work.

Probably no one person thought any of these things exclusively and consistently, but swung from one extreme to another, or held both simultaneously, and was thus further confused and frustrated by his own ambivalence.

Somewhat in this wise, the Isseis felt as they filed through "intake," weary, sweating and polite. They were one-third of Poston's total population, the men with life experience and ability, and they went past the volunteers and the Administrators whose heads held dreams of building the community of Poston.

THE NISEIS. The Niseis are the American-born, American-citizen, and American-raised children of the Isseis. Most of them spoke Japanese as their first language, but from the age of six when they entered school both the language and culture of their parents had been dropping from them.

The California schools were liberal in race attitudes and the Niseis did not suffer much from discrimination there. They had friendly relations with their fellow students, took part in athletics and extra-curricular activities, were elected to class offices and were often distinguished students, athletes and leaders. Many became Christians, and the Buddhist groups took on features of American religious life, such as regular Sunday services, Sunday schools, church weddings, and young people's associations. In spite of social barriers, the Niseis had a fairly wide circle of friends both old and young among other Americans, and it was largely from these that they acquired their goals and ideals in American life as well as their manners, language and habits. They went to the movies, followed the ball games, were up on their slang and could "cut a rug."

As children and adolescents they did not realize the full force of economic, occupational and social barriers. This made their frustration all the greater after leaving school,

and rendered the evacuation especially difficult to accept when they found themselves cut off from the things to which their education and social conditioning had fitted them and to which their emotions and expectations were attuned. Numbers of them felt that if the war had been delayed ten more years there never would have been an evacuation because the other Americans who had been their schoolmates would have achieved positions of influence in the communities.

Growing up in American ways meant a corresponding growing away not merely from the customs of their parents, but from the parents themselves. The older people wished their children to conform to the standards they knew and by which they had been raised, just as is common among the immigrants from Europe and among the conservative Southwestern Indians. The children, however, wanted to be modern, to be like their own age-mates, and realized that much of what their parents desired would constitute severe handicaps in getting along with other Americans. Numbers of Niseis became ashamed of their parents' bowing manners, of their old clothes, shabby heels and Japanesy English. In some cases, this went as far as a strong antipathy toward anything Japanese. They sneered at the *Shibai* and *Kabuki* dramas, at flower arrangements and tea ceremonies and other such cultural traits dear to the Isseis. Nearly all Niseis felt superior to their parents in their ability to understand modern American life and thought that they "knew the score" while the old folks did not.

The Isseis on their part, feeling something like the hen who has hatched a duckling, gave the Niseis equally severe criticism. They said that the Niseis were soft, selfish, ignorant and only interested in movies, dances and a good time. They lacked the spiritual qualities, character and stamina of a real Japanese. Often it was stated, "The Niseis don't know *anything*. The Niseis have no spine."

In most cases, parents and children did not address these

remarks directly to each other. The older people spoke about other Niseis and hoped that their own children were different, while the Niseis confined their rude comments to Isseis who were not related to them. On the whole, however, this was mere deflection of aggressive impulses from forbidden objects to available substitutes. The feelings of irritation and resentment were strong for the very reason that they existed between people whose lives were closely bound up with each other.

It is evident, therefore, that communication between children and parents languished, not only because of language difficulty, but even more because exchanges that went beyond everyday practical contacts were very likely to lead quickly to injured feelings. Relations were off-hand and each member of the family attended to his own affairs. The more or less easy give and take of emotions with some demonstration of affection that characterizes family life in America was absent. Affection itself, was, of course, not absent, particularly between the mother and the children, but it rarely appeared on the surface and was considerably mixed with the irritations and resentments already described.

The family members, however, gave each other support in time of need and all major decisions were discussed together. The average Nisei would not bend himself to every wish of his father with unquestioning obedience as many fathers desired according to old custom, but on the other hand he consulted his parents in most big things, had a strong sense of duty and was very loath to take a course against their firmly expressed disapproval.

Thus, the pattern of family solidarity and complete obedience to authority which is a feature of Japanese culture was much attenuated in the Niseis as compared to the Isseis, but it was still present to some extent. It was a trait that was easily carried over in relations with teachers, employers and other non-Japanese figures of authority. Nisei girls were more compliant to family authority than the boys, and, corre-


spondingly, developed the reputation for being exceptionally conscientious and reliable employees.

Since the Niseis were unable to get the ordinary parental guidance and support in their growth and development, they had to look for it somewhere. Many developed important partial parent substitutes in white teachers, ministers, employers and other older persons. To a large extent, however, they were dependent on each other. Although a long way on the road to assimilation into American life and culture, they were not completely accepted. They were therefore thrown on their own resources and they formed strong cliques where, in rubbing together, they had their close friendships, gave each other moral support, and worked out the problems of developing young people in matters of social conformity, sex, marriage and career.

Their position recalls Samuel Butler's comment that it may be hard on a hen to have a duckling but is it not also hard on the duckling?

The divergent point of view between Isseis and Niseis has been called the "Issei-Nisei conflict." As can be seen, it has much in common with the differences between the generations that characterizes the rest of American life. However, as in the case of other immigrants (and Indians), it is heightened by wide differences of culture and language between the two generations and, in the case of the Japanese, by strong antipathy to their cultural traits on the part of the dominant white group.


One other factor of importance must be noted. In most segments of human society, there is a large number of people between the ages of 30 and 40 who are in touch with both youth and age and who gradually take over leadership from the hands of the older people. This group is very small among the Japanese in America because of the character of the immigration and late marriages already described. It is thus evident that among the Japanese there are few persons who can bring together the polar views of raw, im-



petuous, but plastic youth and older age that is experienced, but rigid and inclined to act and think in terms of other days and other ways.

Many Niseis came to Poston with burning feelings of, "They can't do this to me!", and very much at sea as to what they should do and what to expect. In the bewilderment, there was a tendency to cling closer to the family, and they were a more receptive audience to the ideas of their parents

POPULATION BY AGE GROUPS
UNIT ONE, POSTON, ARIZONA.
JULY 31 1942.



than they had been for many years. They had no reply when it was said, "I told you so" and they listened, unconvinced, but largely without protest to talk about a future in Japan or in the Japanese colonial empire. The questions that troubled them were not cosmic, but were concerned with the common things that all youth wonders about. They thought of a job, "three square meals," and what they would make of their lives. They wondered about getting married and achieving some security and recognition from neighbors and friends, and they felt their chances were not very good. Many believed that now they must assume full financial responsibility for their parents and that all personal desires in career, marriage, or education must be set aside. Because of evacuation and the Issei-Nisei conflict they faced these

questions with greater intensity and uncertainty and with less guidance and emotional stability than most youth has when it faces such problems. From a relatively sheltered life they were forced to assume mature responsibility suddenly.

Their loyalty, as with the loyalty of most people, was largely a matter of having something to be loyal to, and of such practical considerations as the source of greatest security, both physically and socially. The last thing in the world they wanted was to get involved in anything that might increase the danger of their position. Unlike the Isseis, the Niseis although confused and suspicious still had faith in some American leaders.

There is a Japanese proverb which says that in a rain one should always seek the largest tree, and to the average Nisei the United States was by far the largest tree, as well as the only one they knew.

Thus the Niseis came through "intake," carrying bags, tugging little brothers along by the hand and explaining notices to their parents. They were mad, discouraged, critical, fearful, wondering if they would be "treated right" in the Relocation Center or if it would turn out to be "another racket," and yet they were not without hope, "wanting to believe," "looking for a chance," and on the whole receptive to the ideas of community building entertained by the Administration.

THE KIBEIS. Strictly speaking, the term "Kibei" applies to any Nisei who has ever set foot in Japan, but as generally used, it refers to only one segment of these people distinguished by certain common characteristics.

Typically, they are young persons whose formative years have been spent in Japan and who have returned to America bringing with them types of behavior that make adjustment difficult in this country. However, even though in many cases the maladjustment in the United States may be due

to Japanese training, there is evidence that some Kibeis did not get along well in Japan either. The attributes which give trouble are domineering or superior airs, gambling and drinking, going about in gangs, inability to speak English and a tendency to vaunt all things Japanese.

Before the war, the Kibeis' greatest conflict was with other Niseis, but there was also some friction with Isseis; for, despite closeness in manners, language and many points of view, barriers and misunderstandings were interposed by age differences and the reputation Kibeis had for being dissolute.

In addition to the type just outlined, there is another sort of Kibei, little mentioned, but of considerable importance in the history of Poston. These persons seem to stress the advantages of their marginal position between two cultures, rather than the hardships. At any rate, they speak English as well as Japanese and have friends among Isseis, Niseis, Kibeis and among other kinds of Americans. Their tendency seems to be toward living peacefully with all types and if they become active at all, it is to promote understanding and the expansion of common ground. Some of these Kibeis are loyal to America, some to Japan, while very many are torn between the two.

Of all the Japanese in America, the Kibeis as a whole have been most suspected by American authorities in matters of espionage and sabotage. By the rest of the Japanese they have been considered trouble makers.

The aggressive Kibeis came to Poston viewing the other evacuees and the Administration alike with a scornful air. They stayed together and looked about for excitement and entertainment.

The collaborative Kibeis sought out quiet spots where they could work inconspicuously and contribute to the general community welfare.

In considering the description that has been given of



Evacuees arriving



Evacuees going through "Intake"

Isseis, Niseis and Kibeis, the reader should bear in mind that there are many exceptions and variations to these generalizations and that under each heading people can be found who are very different from the traits outlined. There are Niseis who think almost exactly like their parents and there are Kibeis and Isseis who are highly Americanized with liberal and democratic political views.

The distribution of the different groups in Unit I of Poston was as follows:

Isseis	34.9%
Niseis	51.3
Kibeis	9.2
Sanseis (children of Niseis and Kibeis)	4.6

THE administrative staff in whose hands the incoming evacuees found themselves was composed at this time of about 100 persons, and it later increased for a time to 492. Like the evacuees, the members of the Administration came from many different walks of life and, also like the evacuees, they could be grouped and described in various ways. For bearing on Poston's subsequent history, it seems most profitable to classify them as "people-minded" and as "stereotype-minded." This is grouping them according to predominant attitudes toward the evacuees, and it will be perceived that it offers some parallel to the classification of Japanese into Isseis, Niseis and Kibeis where one of the important features is the varying attitude toward America, and consequently toward the Administration.

THE "PEOPLE-MINDED" STAFF MEMBERS. To the people-minded staff members, the evacuees were people first and Japanese secondarily. They were looked upon as human beings with the usual range of virtue and rascality found in any group of comparable size. Correlated with this view, if not actually resulting from it, were certain liabilities in dealing with the evacuees. There were a few staff members who were at times carried away by their generous sympathy

for persons in an unfortunate situation and they allowed these feelings to dictate impulsive acts before considering all pertinent facts. There were some persons who came into conflict with Japanese because of lifelong personal methods of dealing with people, whether trying to lead, persuade, educate, or exert authority over them. Still others were inclined to think of the evacuees as so much like themselves that they neglected to discover and make allowances for differences in attitude and basic assumptions arising out of the fact that all the residents had been influenced to some extent by a culture and by customs quite different from those of the administrators.

However, in spite of these limitations, the people-minded staff members on the whole established effective relationships with the evacuees pertinent to the accomplishment of their various jobs, and they regarded the official policies of self-government and self-management in economic enterprises as both practical and desirable, though they differed among themselves as to the best means of attainment.

Persons holding the people-minded view included the Project Director and his immediate assistants, and those in charge of law, health, housing, schools, adult education and welfare work. They were not a numerous group, but they did occupy most of the positions of power and influence and it is worthwhile pausing to describe briefly certain representative individuals.

The Project Director, age 36, married and the son of a doctor, began his career as a school principal in Oklahoma. Later he went to the Philippines where he was principal of an agricultural school. He made a good record for constructive dealing with native peoples and gained acquaintance with many oriental groups, including the Japanese. Afterward, he was a personnel officer in a mining company. In 1939, he became superintendent of the Papago Indian Reservation in southern Arizona and, building on foundations

already laid by his predecessor, he was instrumental in a great improvement in the Papago cattle business and in the advancement of self-government.

He was tall, slender, blue-eyed and meticulous in dress with shoes brushed and tie at neck in spite of Poston's heat and dust and in contrast to most of his staff. Although his face had a cheerful boyish expression, he looked older than 36 and spoke with a slow western drawl. His general appearance suggested coolness and self-possession and this was increased by his calm, kindly, yet distant manner. He liked to deal with people in a one-to-one relationship or in small groups. Those who met him for the first time liked him and felt that he was able.

The Associate Project Director, age 39, and married, had spent his youth on a cattle ranch in Colorado. He had studied agriculture at Colorado State College and afterward been an extension agent in dairy farming. For the ten years before coming to Poston he had been in the Indian Service and at one time worked very closely with the Project Director when they were both on duty in the Papago Reservation Before coming to Poston he had been superintendent of the Truxton Canyon Reservation in northern Arizona. He was short and more heavily built than the Project Director, but like him, quiet and neat. Hunting and fishing were his hobbies, and on the Project he liked to spend his time out in the field rather than in his office.

Both men gave the impression of practical ability and calm good sense, and both were anxious to promote the policies of community building as laid down by their superiors.

The Assistant Project Director and director of Unit I, the largest of the three camps that made up Poston, was 40, married and the product of a wealthy New York background. His mother was well-known as a liberal, a patroness of progressive arts and politics, and as a dynamic and unconventional personality. He had attended Yale, had ranched,

mined, operated stores, promoted real estate, published two novels, and had been foreign correspondent in France after the German occupation. He thought a great deal about world political and social problems and felt deeply the significance of the Japanese evacuation. If something constructive could be made out of it he believed it would be a contribution to the world situation.

In appearance, he was tall and dark, with a dramatic and sensitive face. His energy was intense and restless, and in private conversations he talked freely and warmly. In large groups, however, he spoke rarely, yet what he said was usually carefully prepared and to the point. His clothes were in western style with a Spanish hat low over his eyes.

THE "STEREOTYPE-MINDED" STAFF MEMBERS. To the stereotype-minded staff members the evacuees were Japanese first and people secondarily. Inherent in this was a feeling that they were all alike with motivations and behavior different from that of "white men" and therefore requiring different treatment. This conception of the evacuees varied a little from one staff member to another, some leaning more to hostility and suspicion than others, but for each individual it remained pretty constant no matter what kind of evacuee he was dealing with. It constituted a caste line between the staff members who felt this way and the residents of the camp, but it did not embody any accurate knowledge of Japanese culture and custom.

Because of an inclination to draw conclusions disadvantageous to the evacuees in any doubtful situation, the stereotype-minded staff members were quick to pick up infractions of regulations and other improper activities, but they were not very successful in securing the cooperation of the residents for efficient work in their respective jobs. Furthermore, some were made distinctly uncomfortable by the kinds of relationship that existed between the people-minded staff members and evacuees. As one man indignantly said, "Why,

they are giving some of those Japs white men's jobs!" Self-government and self-management of economic enterprises were on the whole regarded as visionary and impractical and the realistic as well as the idealistic considerations underlying the over-all administrative policies as set forth in Chapter 2 of this history did not enter their thinking.

Among many of those who were stereotype-minded was a conviction that the Center was or ought to be a concentration camp. To some it had never occurred that there was any alternative, while others had given it consideration. Without admitting any desire to be harsh, they felt that the evacuees should follow the dictates of the Administration in matters of work and camp management as well as in law and order, and that the principal, perhaps only, way to secure this was through what they called "discipline," meaning punishment for any evacuee who did not do what he was told. Since the stereotype-minded staff members were thinking of their stereotypes, rather than of human beings, they gave little attention to the incentives of human behavior other than those concerned with fear of punishment.

If the statements concerning the range of attitudes and sentiments existing in the evacuees during and after evacuation are even approximately correct, then it seems plausible that being treated as people would operate toward establishing security and hence toward making active and spontaneous participation in the operation of the Center more likely. On the other hand, being treated as stereotypes would seem a continuation of the forces that had already destroyed much of their security, would increase the cloud of their uneasiness and would encourage attitudes inimicable to the efficient running of the Project.

The staff members who thought in terms of a stereotype and of the internment kind of camp management included the majority of the personnel in the departments that handled accounting, fiscal matters, timekeeping, procurement, transportation and supply, land subjugation, irrigation and

utility maintenance. It also included most of the contractor's men, the U.S. Engineers and the Post Office employees.

In addition to being stereotype-minded, these people had certain other general characteristics in common:

With some exceptions, they occupied the lower levels in the hierarchal ranks of the Administration.

The amount of education they had received was generally less than in the case of those who were people-minded.

They had had little opportunity to learn the reasons underlying the official self-management policies for running the Center and with which they were not in harmony.

The type of work they performed in the Project usually involved money, material, equipment, procedures and structures for which they as individuals were directly responsible in a way that was not so true of those who were interested in self-government and whose position called for thought about over-all plans. The people with internment ideas tended to judge themselves, and felt judged by others, according to whether or not they successfully completed a specific job or carried out a procedure in the prescribed way. The integration of accounting, construction, engineering, etc., to make a successfully administered community was not a dominant part of their thinking although if asked, they would have given it lip service. Each was inclined to be intent on his own job and, as a result, felt very insecure when it came to giving evacuees responsibility which might interfere with the success of a specific aim or which might result in the use of an irregular procedure. Furthermore, it soon became evident that there were few or no evacuees who had the prerequisite training for doing most of the necessary work in these particular fields and that there were many who, due to attitudes arising out of evacuation, had little interest in caring for government property and little sense of responsibility in regard to it. The lack of going wages removed not only an important incentive from the evacuee workers, but also deprived their supervisor of the usual con-

trol over subordinates. Being fired was not too important to those who were getting less than 50 cents per day and would be housed and fed whether they worked or not. In such a situation it was almost inevitable that a supervisor would try to exert absolute control over the actions of the evacuee workers on whom he was dependent for the accomplishment of his job.

Two persons important in Poston's story may be presented from among the large number of those inclined to a stereotype view, the first being close to the people-minded margin while the other tends to the opposite extreme.

The Chief Administrative Officer was 37 and married. Shortly after graduating from high school he entered the Indian Service as a timekeeper and had been in that service ever since. He took courses in accounting at the American University in Washington, D.C., and in the Alexander Hamilton Institute and prior to being called to Poston was a senior accountant and auditor of the Indian Service. Dressed in neatly tailored clothes, strongly under cowboy influence, including high-heeled boots, he appeared to approach his work in a regular, unhurried conscientious manner with an eye to detail.

As Chief Administrative Officer, he was responsible for fiscal accounting, auditing, procurement, personnel, supply and transportation, mails, files, communications, and the steward's department. This meant that he had under him approximately 3,000 employees (including evacuees) and charge of work that involved the expenditure of $10,000,000 during the year. He did not often visit the scene of "intake" or go about the Project, but stayed close to his offices and the paper work which was his concern. Unlike most of the people-minded administrators, he did not live in Poston but at the Indian Agency sixteen miles away, and to it he went each evening.

In regard to the relocation program, he said, "We have a wonderful opportunity to serve our country and to serve

mankind, but we must do it within administrative regulations and with due regard to the obligation of government funds."

The Chief Fiscal Officer was 50 years old and born in Texas; his father came from Louisiana. He had nine years of regular schooling, with some additional training in engineering and business. A number of years ago he had worked in the Indian Service, but for six years before being called to Poston by the Chief Administrative Officer, he had been a deputy U.S. Marshal in Tucson, Arizona. He was a man of dignified bearing who wore dark conservative clothes, but who worked in his shirt sleeves without collar and tie.

To him, the Poston residents were enemies of a deceitful, inferior race. He felt that they should be treated kindly, but with firmness and should receive suitable punishment if they did not obey orders. In no case should they be trusted. It seemed that he applied to the Japanese the usual southern attitude toward Negroes with the additional consideration that they were enemies. He was honest, forthright, and inflexible in his views. Even less than the Chief Administrative Officer did he come to intake or go about the camp establishing contacts with the people; and like the Chief Administrative Officer, he lived off the Project, near Parker.

ALMOST all the principal administrative officers and their assistants, whether people-minded or stereotype-minded, in assuming their duties at Poston undertook much greater responsibility and complexity of problem than they had ever faced before. In particular they had to deal with larger numbers of people and far greater sums of money. Almost all received substantial increases in salary over anything they had had previously. Many worked extremely hard, frequently into the small hours of the morning and went for weeks with little sleep. Often, after a full day's work in their offices some would go out into the camp and help evacuees who

needed special assistance, particularly the old and infirm; or one might drive all night for hundreds of miles to Los Angeles or some other point in an effort to expedite a piece of the Project's business. The will to work and achieve was strong among them.

4. Early Days

In the early days the Poston Administration continued to be faced with problems related to establishment of the Project. This included matters of procurement and cooperation with other agencies as well as securing assistance from the evacuees for the work in the Project. In spite of the handicaps, the creation of new grievances and the lack of confidence among the residents, the fundamental needs of community existence were accomplished. Further development became a matter of gaining the full support of the majority of the community who as yet remained in the middle ground between the extremes of cooperativeness and resistance.

For some time the Administration remained chiefly occupied with immediate matters of supply, equipment and personnel, struggling to keep up with the stream of incoming evacuees, who often arrived a matter of hours after the carpenters had left the barracks. Responsibility for construction was in the hands of the U.S. Engineers, while the Western Defense Command determined the transshipment of the people. The Poston Administration's duty began with making the structure left by the Engineers function and having rooms, lights, water, food, bedding and medical care ready by the time the evacuees arrived. For the most part there was good understanding among the Project Administration, the Army and the Engineers, but there were also hitches arising from the divided responsibility which resulted in the arrival of evacuees before the necessary construction was completed, and this worked hardship on both Japanese and Administration.

The Chief Administrative Officer, the Fiscal Officer, and their staffs were swamped with requisitions, details of procedure and the requirements of government record keeping.

There was a small group of experienced Indian Service employees, but the bulk of the work had to be done by evacuee employees to whom it was unfamiliar and who had to be trained before they were of much value. In addition to this, matters were forever arising that posed entirely new questions even to the experienced staff. Delays were constantly occurring in things that vitally affected the welfare and growth of the community.

Above the project level there were also obstructions that affected the community program. Decisions that governed actions or the obtaining of equipment were held up because of uncertainties as to whether or not a given matter should be handled by the Indian Service, the War Relocation Authority, the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the Office of Emergency Management, the Army or some other agency. Much of this was inherent in the situation because of the national emergency, the sheer size of governmental organization and the nature of average human beings. People in key positions in central offices had much on their minds besides the evacuees, and did not readily understand in human terms the significance of things which came across their desks or what they meant to the success or failure of the Project. To this may be added confusions inevitable in the rapid growth of the War Relocation Authority, and the war-induced changes in policies and organization of other government agencies which affected the War Relocation Authority.

A particular cause of disjointed operation arose from misunderstanding concerning division of responsibility between the War Relocation Authority's Regional Office in San Francisco and the Poston Project. The Regional Office felt that it had direct jurisdiction over Poston, while the Director and his associates thought themselves responsible only to the Indian Service and felt that the function of the Regional Office was to give aid, not orders. Attitudes developed between the staffs of the two offices which affected Poston

adversely when it came to obtaining supplies and other matters requiring cooperative effort.

As a consequence of all these troubles, the Administration had little time to look after the adjustment and indoctrination of those evacuees who were past the initial stages of settling in Poston.

In such a situation it was not long before many new grievances were added to those which the people brought with them.


There was anger at the nature of the Work Corps enlistment which seemed to require that the evacuees renounce all chance of reimbursement for losses, that they promise everything, and gain no definite assurance in return, not even as to wages. It was particularly resented that they had been asked to enlist during the first moments of arrival when they were too tired and exhausted to give proper thought.

The increasing heat, which was reaching 108° in the shade by June, and the dust storms made some feel both anger at being sent to such a place and fear of illness. There was dislike of the food and the belief that it was inadequate both in quantity and quality and was a serious threat to health. The crudeness of the living quarters, the enforced crowding —sometimes eight people in one room—the lack of furniture, the lack of privacy, and the treeless outdoor environment were other prominent sources of discontent.

The appearance of a little booklet issued by the War Relocation Authority called "Questions and Answers for Evacuees" caused considerable indignation among the residents because it contained advice about how to prepare for evacuation but had not been received until after they were in Poston. It also made a number of promises that had not been fulfilled, as for example, that there would be banking facilities, special food for babies and invalids, a well-equipped hospital, no more than five persons to a room,

MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM TEMPERATURES AT POSTON

MAY 1942 TO JULY 1943



materials for making partitions and furniture, and cash advances in lieu of wages paid monthly. None of these had as yet appeared and their omission added to the general mistrust of official statements and disbelief in government promises. These, along with previous experiences, contributed doubt concerning the community building program and bolstered those residents who sneered and said that "Pioneering Community" was just a fancy phrase for a concentration camp and was designed to "get work out of Japs."

On June 23, a constitution for the municipal government of Poston was approved by a committee of residents who voted to submit it to the Director. This constitution was the result of intensive effort on the part of certain cooperatively disposed evacuees who were interested in building the community. Over a period of more than four weeks there had been a series of meetings in mess halls, and a body which called itself the Civic Planning Board had been created to develop the constitution. This activity had come about as a result of encouragement from the Administration and such statements from the War Relocation Authority as the following which appeared in the booklet, "Questions and Answers for Evacuees."

"It will be up to each community to plan its design of community life within the broad basic policies determined by the War Relocation Authority for over-all administration of Relocation Areas."

The meetings of the Civic Planning Board and the drafting of the constitution had not proceeded without conflict. There had been several competing plans and the Board had broken down into opposed Issei and Nisei groups. However, there had been final agreement on the constitution, which provided for executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government and made no distinctions between Isseis and Niseis holding office. It was a concerted attempt to assume

the responsibility for self-government and, except for initial impetus, it was entirely an evacuee product.

On June 26, three days after completion of the constitution, the Civic Planning Board permanently disbanded, its members disgruntled and generally convinced that they had been wasting their time. This happened because it was announced that the War Relocation Authority had issued a detailed scheme of its own for the establishment of temporary self-government in all the centers. The plan had been completed on June 5, more than two weeks before the Civic Planning Board had drafted their constitution and yet they had not been informed but had been allowed to continue working on something that was already settled. Furthermore, in the War Relocation Authority's regulations was a ruling that limited elective office to Niseis. Thus it appeared that self-government organization was taken out of the hands of the evacuees and that the Issei-Nisei issues with which they had wrestled and toward the solution of which they had made some headway were to be controlled by others.

The members of the Civic Planning Board put their constitution in the files of the Law Department and sat back to watch the new development. Their assumption of responsibility had ended in new resentment and a tendency to stand by and see what would happen next. One of the first major frustrations of leadership at Poston by administrative order had taken place.

ANOTHER source of irritation concerned the volunteers. It was natural that they should become the principal helpers of the Administration. They had arrived first and most had come with the express purpose of setting up the community. Considering the circumstances, resources, and time, they did an excellent job.

However, the incoming evacuees had many feelings as already described and among them were hostility, suspicion

and lack of confidence, all transferred to the Poston Administration from previous contacts.

Consequently, trouble soon arose between the volunteers and the rest of the community. The volunteers had received authority by delegation from the Administration, but they had not assumed it with the support and recognition of the 8,000 evacuees who were in Poston by June 1. The abilities and motives of the volunteers were unknown to the majority of the people. The Isseis did not take well to having such young persons in high places, and other Niseis felt that simply because the volunteers had not had personal responsibilities, they had been able to rush in early and secure all the good positions. The volunteers were thought of as "siding with the Administration," instead of with "the people," of trying to be "big-shots," of clambering up on their fellows' misfortunes; and they became objects of dislike and mistrust—especially when their duties forced them to reject requests or block the wishes of other evacuees.


Neither the Administration nor the people brought forward any solution. No plan was offered whereby the volunteers could be rewarded for their early services and then retired while jobs were thrown open on a basis of merit to old and newcomers alike. Instead, matters merely went on as they were and the rain of criticism fell on the just and the unjust among the volunteers. The friction that arose, however, early indicated the need for better methods of selecting administrative assistants from among those being administered.

In spite of the difficulties, the Administration filled and organized block after block. Cooks, kitchen help, warehousemen, truck drivers, firemen, police and hundreds of other workers were employed and set to their tasks.

Under stimulus of the Administration and using the personal credit of some of its members, the evacuees created "Community Enterprises" which operated a store to supply



Newly arrived evacuees stuffing ticks with straw to make their mattresses



Living quarters

toilet articles, refreshments, clothes, shoes, newspapers, and all the other things people need over and above physical shelter and food.

The Agricultural Department came into existence, made plans, drew maps, tested soil, built a lath shed and prepared some fields.

The *Press Bulletin*, which much later became known as the *Poston Chronicle*, was founded and published every day in mimeograph form, carrying local news and official announcements. Effectiveness was limited by a paper shortage which prevented adequate distribution and by the fact that for a long time there was no section written in Japanese. It was, however, the beginning of something that could become of great importance to the community and it provided worthwhile work to a large number of Niseis.

ALL this was an indication, not only that the Administration was having success in bringing order out of chaos, but that the evacuees were doing their part. The Chief of Police, himself an evacuee and former Terminal Island fisherman, characterized the residents with much truth, although too simply, when he said that they could be divided into three groups; one that was actively interested in developing Poston; one that was indifferent toward everything; and one that was bitter, resentful and determined to do nothing to help.

It was clearly an administrative task of major importance to win more people to the first group, if Poston were to be a successful rehabilitation of the Japanese and were to become largely self-supporting.

The people in the first group were mostly those who worked closely with the Administration. Many were highly Americanized Niseis who had sought contact with the Administration because there was in them already before they came to Poston at least a germ of interest in making the best of evacuation. Associating with some of the administrative personnel, seeing their plans and becoming convinced

of their sincerity operated to arouse enthusiasm in these people and to attract others.

However, the vast majority of the residents of Poston had little or no contact with the administrative officers, or they had it with persons who, like the Fiscal Officer and others in his department, were stereotype-minded. As a consequence, the evacuees were exposed to few influences that would move them from their positions of indifference or bitterness. Such people included those who were least in touch with things American, people cut off by language, and therefore they included large numbers of the Isseis and Kibeis. Nevertheless, there were many among them who could be moved toward a more constructive attitude. The accomplishment of this depended on improved communication, the ability of the Administration to meet their needs and the mitigation of resentments.

In all three cultural types—Isseis, Niseis, and Kibeis—there was the normal range of human personality. The evacuees were not people cut to one stamp of oriental inscrutability and craft. On the other hand, neither were they shorn lambs, suffering in saintly meekness and asking only to be given back their fleece. They were as any other segment of the public would be when they reacted to the experience of evacuation with all the varieties of reasonable and wildly unreasonable attitudes that are found in human nature. Under stress they were no more immune to rumors, hysteria, and rigid opinions than the California public which had pressed for their removal, but they were likewise susceptible to education and change of opinion.

Their various grievances hinged on needs, some physical, some psychological, and some social, but all related to security. The Administration's ability to gain the people's confidence depended on its ability to meet their needs—as is the situation with all administrations, anywhere, anytime.

5. Community Planning

ALTHOUGH Poston continued to swell with people until the end of August when it reached a peak population of 17,867 evacuees, the routine of intake ran smoothly and by July at Unit I the Administration was able to begin trying to reach the established residents with messages of hope and community building. The evacuees, however, were not readily impressed. They were too close to what they felt were innumerable discomforts, irritations and frightening threats to care about what seemed nebulous plans. They were slaves to a longing for remedies that would be immediate, specific and concrete.

THE first general community celebration was held on the Fourth of July to mark the opening of the irrigation canal into Poston. A prominent figure in the program was the Reports Officer.

The Reports Officer of the Project was 39, single, a graduate of Stanford University and had had a variegated career as a journalist, for the most part on small papers. He had traveled to some extent, staying almost three years in Hawaii, and he had visited Japan. In appearance he was of a lean, athletic build, was full of energy and had a constant flow of friendly talk. His skin was well tanned and he liked to wear turtle-neck sweaters and sport shirts. He enjoyed contacts with people and the promoting of enterprises.

At Poston, his duties called for making regular reports about the Project for the Director to transmit to the head offices in Washington, handling the distribution of information within the Project, supervising the creation and production of the daily paper and any other work of a similar nature that might be assigned to him. On his own initiative he called himself "Intelligence Officer" and gave the impression that he was an official concerned with the detection of

subversive activities and had connections with Naval Intelligence. In actual fact, however, he had none.

It was difficult to tell whether he belonged to the group that believed the Center should be operated like an internment camp, or to that which favored the official policies. In this matter as with many others, he seemed to hold enthusiastically the views of the person with whom he was speaking at any particular time.

In the Fourth of July celebration which he helped promote, the principal participants were those Nisei who were close to the Administration. In the hot summer morning about 150 out of the 9,000 residents then in Camp assembled on the dusty east firebreak near the fire-house. Thirteen little mulberry trees were planted in a circle, each sponsored by a department whose representative spoke a few words of dedication as it was put in the ground. The Reports Officer called these "the first trees planted in the Great American Desert."

In the evening as the heat abated, some 2,000 people watched a pageant on the banks of the canal. It was intended to be a Water Festival and was so called, but the water did not appear along the canal in time. An historical panorama was presented stretching from the coming of the first Indians to Parker Valley to the arrival of the Japanese, and ended with a suggestion of vigorous agricultural and industrial development in the future. Finally it was announced that within two months water would be flowing through canals to irrigate the fields of all three units of Poston.

This Water Festival without water set the keynote for the month of July. It was a time when the hopes of the administrators were widely expressed and when the evacuees were partially interested but with delays and interferences continuing at pivotal points.

THE Director of Education of the Indian Service spent many weeks in Poston working out plans for the schools.

It was decided that the buildings should be of adobe instead of boards like the barracks, because it would thus be possible through evacuee labor to secure cool and permanent structures of fine appearance. These would not only benefit the residents during their sojourn in Poston, but would remain afterward as assets for the use of the Indians or whomever the Indians might allow to lease the land.

Plans were announced for a summer school wherein seventy-five young evacuees would be given courses in education so that they could serve as teachers in Poston during the coming winter. The Principal of McKinley High School in Honolulu arrived to take charge of all the schools.

A member of the National Student Relocation Council paid a visit to the Center, and plans were made for aiding college students to complete their education at institutions outside areas under military restriction.

THE Fire Department received a new fire engine. Various industries were planned such as barbers, and repair shops for shoes, watches and radios. A Department of Fish Culture began digging ponds, and the Agriculture Department received 60,000 guayule seedlings and planted several fields with tomatoes. In the blocks, many people were busy starting gardens of vegetables for the mess halls. Some of the seeds were provided by the Agricultural Department and some by the residents themselves.

THE Project Attorney, who arrived June 20, promoted the formation of the Temporary Community Council.

The Attorney was a 38-year-old native of New York City, from a Jewish family, a freethinker in religion and a liberal in politics.

He had a law degree from Columbia University and had been in private practice for seven years before entering government work in 1939. Prior to this service, he had engaged in lecturing and radio speaking on current events and had

actively participated in political campaigns. Government and world affairs still remained matters of vital interest to him. He was a voluble talker, appeared always extremely busy and was ready to battle fiercely for the things he thought right. The development of Poston's self-government was one of these and he said, "I favor democracy to such a degree that I believe in securing the views of the governed. A member of the minority race which has been subject to discrimination—and almost all of them have been—responds readily to sympathetic understanding."

On July 21 the Temporary Community Council of Unit I was elected, one member from each block except for a few that were not sufficiently settled. The percentage of votes among the eligible voters was rather high but this may have been passive compliance with regulations rather than actual interest and there was a general feeling that the Council would have no power and therefore no real significance.

THROUGH meetings and speeches, the Project Director, the Associate Director, the Assistant Director, the Attorney and others who were people-minded began to convey their ideas and hopes for the community to some of the residents. There were numbers of meetings with various groups of Niseis but communication with the Isseis was meager. An attempt to remedy the situation was made by some cooperatively-minded Isseis and Kibeis of better than average education who organized a series of talks which were called "Orientation Meetings." The various administrators spoke on schools, agriculture, self-government, medical care and food. They carried the message that they wished to make the best kind of community possible out of Poston's dry dust. It was said that there would be productive fields, chickens, hogs, a democratic government, progressive schools and seminars on the best books of the ages.

Early in August the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Mr. Collier, paid his third visit to Poston and made a series of

speeches in which he said that the community must face the reality of their situation and the war and must build for a period of between five and ten years. With the first agony of spirit behind them, it was only necessary now that the residents dig in and work hard and a good community could be forged out of the wilderness. The eyes of the nation, even the world, were on them, and they had in their own hands a large measure of what it would take to establish their future security.

Community building was very important to the Administration, although most residents were little able to appreciate the depth of their sincerity. Not only did the administrative officers believe in the official policy because they regarded it as a test of democratic principles and the best way to serve the nation, but also because it began to have personal meaning to them. As the confusions and pressures of establishing relocation were prolonged and the Administration became more and more ground between outside influences and higher offices on the one hand, and the needs and complaints of the evacuees on the other, the individual members felt considerable insecurity themselves. To this may be added the fact that there was a certain contagion in the general uneasiness of the residents. In such uncertainty, community-building and the creation of self-government became for the Administration the guiding star that they wished it to be for the evacuees.

THE hopeful speeches did not fall on deaf ears, but they fell on relatively few ears. Those who did hear plied the speakers with endless questions, some disconcertingly trivial, some based on fantastic fears and others deep-going, probing the foundations of the Project. For the rest of the people, the thoughts of the speakers arrived in many strange forms after passing through translation, transference by word of mouth and after blending with rumor and preconceived notions.

Talk about democracy and making Poston a democratic community was particularly resented by Niseis who looked on evacuation and their detention in the camp as a violation of their citizen rights indistinguishable from Fascism. To speak to people in their position about democratic principles seemed a mockery and they were too close to their misery and anger to have any perspective concerning it. It is probable, too, that members of the Administration ineptly overemphasized democracy in their talks to the evacuees because they were defensively anxious to prove that in spite of what had happened, democratic principles existed, and would operate, somehow.[1]

Indian Office supervision was a source of complaint and some people wanted to know if they would be "kept" all the rest of their lives on "reservations like Indians." Inherent in this was the belief that Indians were forced to stay on reservations much like animals in a zoo and that the Indian Office was a sort of keeper. The Indians were regarded in a stereotyped manner as a lower race of people with whom it was an insult to compare the Japanese.

There was much criticism of the school program. The residents did not want "progressive" education, they wanted the kind they had had back in California and they wanted teachers of long experience, not half of them Niseis who were themselves just out of school. Adobe buildings were unfamiliar and were looked upon as inferior. The labor involved was arduous, with the temperature now between 115° and 124° in the shade. Furthermore, dabbling in mud was considered degrading, and ruined their clothes which the Government would not replace. The wages of $12 per month made this an important matter, and the wages were in themselves no incentive to work. The non-Japanese fore-

[1] On reading this sentence, one of the administrators commented, "In my opinion this was not a matter of defense. I believe that we were definitely and positively anxious to show the evacuees that this Government was acting in good faith."

men in charge of construction seemed too bossy and superior, or too condescending. Finally, it was believed that the schools were really not for the residents, but were for the Indians or were to be hospitals for invalid soldiers, and that the whole plan was a scheme to get labor for next to nothing.

In spite of such attitudes, quite a few evacuees did go out to work on the school buildings, but many of these became discouraged and quit when they found that the equipment was inadequate and that needed supplies did not arrive.

Similar criticisms and questions arose about the plans of the Agricultural Department. In particular it was desired to know what would happen to the land that would be developed under evacuee labor and management. The Director said that he believed they would be reimbursed for the capital improvements they made, as well as receive the benefit of the crops, but beyond this statement he could not go for nobody knew the answer. The evacuees, reflecting on what they considered the Government's previous broken promises —such as that they would get going wages in the Centers— wanted some definite guarantees and said that they did not intend to "work for the Indians for nothing."

There were other hard and practical questions. How would the agricultural products be marketed? What would be the effect on morale of living under government supervision? What would happen to the Americanization of their children, now cut off from almost all contacts other than Japanese? How much food was stored ahead in the warehouse? If there were a raid on the Pacific Coast and railroads and highways became disrupted, would they all starve?

On July 17, the first wages were paid to residents. In June it had been announced that these would be $12 per month for common labor, $16 per month for clerical work, and $19 per month for professional activities or work equivalent to each of these levels. The low figure caused protest and re-

peated appeals for at least the minimum Army wage as had been "promised."

The long delay in payment was a further source of irritation, for some people had been waiting since May and a number were sorely pressed for funds, particularly those who did hard outdoor work. Payment was a slow process, with people standing in line all day and it was dragged out over a number of days.

Immediately afterward there was a storm of protest from the evacuees concerning the classification of their jobs. Great numbers of those receiving $12 thought they should be getting $16 and some of those getting $16 thought they should be getting $19. People in jobs that were physically disagreeable, which included practically all the outdoor labor because of the heat, expressed great annoyance that others who sat at "easy jobs" in cooled offices should be getting a higher rate of pay. The Issei-Nisei conflict entered the picture when older farmers working in agriculture and land subjugation received less than clerks just out of high school. In addition to these troubles, there were loud cries that even at the classification given, the payment was inadequate because of numerous errors. A man said that he had worked over 200 hours in one month and received only 19 cents. Such episodes and the low classifications were taken by many as indicating that the Administration did not appreciate their efforts. Appreciation and recognition were of increased importance in proportion to the smallness of the wage.

Another crop of adverse evacuee attitudes appeared when on July 22 there was a severe storm which did about $50,000 worth of damage. There were no human casualties, but the top parts of double roofs were blown from a number of barracks, tar paper was stripped off, windows smashed, flying boards driven through walls and power lines torn down. Many of the residents attributed the damage as much to the flimsiness of the barracks as to the severity of the storm and felt that it was another indication that the Government

"didn't give a hang" about them, and had built as cheaply as possible.

The buildings had not yet been accepted from the contractor and it was therefore his responsibility to carry out the repairs without additional charge to the Government. This produced considerable delay which further antagonized the evacuees who did not see the reasons but only what they regarded as government inefficiency and indifference to their plight.

Finally, from within the Administration itself there emerged a number of facts that corroborated the residents' skepticism and uneasiness in regard to the plans for building a democratic community through the harmonious working together of administrative personnel and residents. These matters were in part due to difference in privilege and status between government employees and the residents and in part due to emanations from those who were stercotype-minded. For example, the attitudes of the Fiscal Officer and his department touched over 1,500 evacuee employees at this time and spread from them to others with whom they came in contact. Similar feelings were shown by many of the construction and other foremen who directed groups of residents. The contrast in salaries between government employees and residents was keenly felt and it was well recognized that many of the former had gone up the economic scale as a result of promotion to their jobs in relocation in almost the same measure that the evacuees had come down.

Organization charts hanging on office walls conspicuously reserved all top positions for "white men." Some of the government personnel acted on the principle that one must never admit before an evacuee that a white man can be wrong. The food in the personnel mess hall was vastly superior to that which evacuees received. The personnel quarters, while not very comfortable, had furniture, gave individual and family privacy and were much better than those of the residents. The administrative offices had numerous coolers

to lower the temperature inside, while none was provided for the evacuees except those who worked in these offices. It was firmly believed, not only by the public, but by the Japanese doctors, that a number of babies had died in the hospital as a result of dehydration caused by the heat. Therefore, when three new coolers were placed on the personnel mess hall and none was assigned to the infants' ward, indignation ran high and there was a move on foot in some blocks to come in force and transfer the coolers from the mess to the hospital. However, more level heads prevailed, and protests were limited to verbal expostulations.

Thus the residents, in so far as they heard the hopeful talks by the administrators at all, listened with a hard-boiled air.

NEVERTHELESS, many people continued to work, some hard and some with a leisurely attitude of giving just $16 or $12 worth.

Through the camp, social activities and other sources of recreation were developed. Very prominent at this time were the girls' clubs, which showed a great deal of initiative and organized games, dances, picnics, "Jamborees" and amateur shows. A musical troupe of Japanese from Hawaii gave repeated concerts. The Isseis began to have Shibai and Naniwabushi performances. Movies were sponsored by the Community Enterprise organization which ran the store. In sports, softball became very popular with games every evening. There were eight fields and a total of eighty-three teams. Judo, sumo (another type of wrestling) and goh (Japanese checkers) were also played, and clubs for their promotion developed. Fishing along the river and creeks attracted many, especially the Isseis, while the younger people enjoyed swimming. Parties and dances were frequent. Churches, both Buddhist and Christian, became more and more active, and Bible schools and nursery schools were opened for children.

A good deal of attention was given to making the barracks more livable by the purchase of coolers and furniture in the case of those who had money, and by making these articles in the case of those who had not. Some dug cellars 4 to 6 feet deep below their barracks and spent the hottest hours down there. Floors were washed several times a day, showers were taken, the minimum of clothing was worn, soda pop was bought at the store.

Said one of the residents:

"Some of the laughter that prevailed in pre-war days seemed to have become once again evident in various ways."

6. Self-Government

SELF-GOVERNMENT in the form laid down by the War Relocation Authority directives was in effect by early August and it promptly took actions which high-lighted the needs of the Poston residents. Fear was very evident and there was some aggressive assertion. The Administration was inclined to be doubtful of the capacity of the newly elected Council and to feel that it was causing trouble, rather than helping build Poston in the right direction.

WAR Relocation Authority called for the establishment of a temporary government in all Relocation Centers pending the organization of a more permanent structure. The major provisions were the following:

1. A Temporary Community Council composed of representatives from each block.
2. Voting by all persons in the Center eligible for the Work Corps.
3. Only American citizens, 21 or older, to be candidates for office.
4. Election by majority vote of the block.
5. No payment for services on the Council.
6. Function of Council to be the making of recommendations to the Project Director on internal affairs and the establishment of a judicial committee to deal with problems of law and order.

The duties of the individual Council members were designated as:


a. To cooperate with the Project staff in securing the participation of the residents.

b. To apply all administrative regulations and policies in the blocks.

c. To make reports to the Project Director and his staff

on the functioning of the community services of the Administration.

As a result of these regulations and the nature of Poston's population, the Council was composed of Niseis who had an average age of 31, who had no previous experience in



self-government and very little in leadership, who did not know the people of their blocks very well, and who in turn were largely unknown to their constituents.[1]

ALTHOUGH the setting up of self-government was a basic administrative policy and although the Attorney early had confidence in the members who were elected, the Administration as a whole was not without apprehension and, feeling a little like Frankenstein, wondered uneasily what its creation would do.

[1] On reading this observation, the Attorney said, "I do not agree with the statement that most of the Councilmen were out of touch with their constituents. I believe the Niseis on the First Temporary Community Council were known to their constituents much more than the average legislature. This was natural because they lived in the block and represented far less people than the average legislature."

It was not left long in doubt. The Council tackled the primary needs of the community and began vigorous investigations to find out why they were not being met.


Thomas Carlyle said that a social explosion will "first try all the old Institutions of escape"; he compared it to a volcano which hisses through existing fissures before making a rupture of its own.[2] At Poston there were few old institutions that could function in this manner, but the creation of the Council provided something which might have become such an outlet.

The Council members, being themselves part of the community and feeling the pressures, went at once to the sore points. This does not mean that they necessarily understood the causes, or had the right remedies. They were not all-wise any more than the Administration, but they were like a patient who may not know as much about diagnosis as the doctor, yet knows far better where he hurts.

THE Chairman of the Council was a 40-year-old Nisei from Los Angeles. A graduate of the University of California, married and with several children, he had practiced optometry for many years. He was a member of the Japanese American Citizens League, but before the war had not played a prominent part. Afterward he became a member of the Anti-Axis Committee and was outspokenly loyal to America. His chief interests had been in athletic associations, Boy Scouts, charitable organizations and especially his chairmanship of the board of trustees of a Japanese orphanage. During the evacuation he had been disturbed that the Government did not appear to have any plans for taking care of these children. He succeeded in establishing contact with Assistant Secretary of War McCloy and in the end a "Children's Village" was created at the Relocation Center of Manzanar.

His first destination after evacuation was the Santa Anita

[2] Reference 7.



Upper, *Scene from a shibai, or Japanese drama;* Lower left, *Evacuee firemen;* Lower right, *Adobe bricks for the schools*



Children's ward



Mess hall scene

Assembly Center where he rose to prominence as a member of the food committee. The story of his adventures there, he frequently told to Poston administrators and evacuees. According to him, the food was not fit to eat and the health of old and young was being undermined. He felt that this was not the Army's intention, but all his efforts to get results from the local Administration failed and eventually the members would not discuss it with him. He spoke aggressively to the Assembly Center residents about the situation and went over the heads of the Administration in a letter to Mr. McCloy. He states that as a result of this, two majors were sent to investigate and that they agreed the situation was terrible and took steps to have it improved. However, he believes that the Assembly Center Administration did not forgive him and had him promptly transferred to Poston as a punishment, since it was considered an uncomfortable place because of the heat.

In appearance, the Council Chairman was a portly person who wore green glasses, colored shirts and brown duck pants. He smoked cigarettes rather heavily and had a friendly, talkative manner. It was common for him to call others by their first names and he liked to be addressed by his own nickname. He could think and speak on his feet in public, but he also enjoyed private "bull-sessions" in which he would discourse with enthusiasm, chiefly on one of three topics: the doings of the council; his contacts with important people; and problems of community welfare.

His strong convictions, self-confidence, aggressiveness and frankness made him popular with some Niseis, but he was not the type of leader the Isseis could admire and respect. In spite of his ability to speak Japanese and his interest in such cultural activities as kendo (fencing) he lacked the dignity, humility, polish and command of flowery speech they esteemed and he lacked interest and confidence in them.

THE first committee formed by the Council was appointed to investigate the Health Department.

Many of the nurses were of very poor quality. The Japanese nurses were average, but there were not enough of them, and the white nurses with one or two outstanding exceptions were largely what the Army, Navy, Red Cross and civilian hospitals would not accept in spite of their great needs.


The hospital building had been partially open since June, but in early August it still lacked most of the essential equipment and had hardly any medicine. There were few surgical instruments and none for dentistry. The usual drugs for relieving pain and producing sleep were missing and diabetic patients went without insulin.

This situation came about because the orders given many months previously for standard 100-bed Army hospital equipment had never been filled. Week after week and month after month it was expected daily. Small orders for medicines were placed from time to time to meet current needs, yet they also were delayed by the processing of purchases in the Administrative Department, and when they finally came were soon used up. Doctors and patients contributed supplies and money from their own limited resources, but these were never enough.

Aside from the hospital, there were public health problems in the failure of garbage-collecting, the smell from the sewage lagoon, its contamination of the slough where people fished and swam, the periodic interruption of the water supply to the whole community and other similar matters.

Probably no group worked harder or for longer hours than the medical staff, but it was natural that the public blamed them, both evacuee and government personnel, for lack of attention and treatment. Being themselves part of the whole evacuation disturbance, the Japanese doctors were not in the best position for calmness and patience, and under the additional frustrations of having excessive work with inade-

quate equipment, they tended to conserve their resources by reducing house calls and attendance at clinics scattered about the community. This further annoyed the people and many rumors went through the community about the hos-



pital. It was said that the doctors were not qualified, that they would not make a house call even to see one who was mortally ill, that great numbers of people were dying from the conditions at Poston and the lack of medical facilities and that their bodies were being taken away secretly in the night.

It happened that about the time the Council's committee was making its investigation, the hospital supplies did arrive and a new Medical Director came to take charge of the hospital, clinics and all other matters related to health. There was an improvement in conditions and the Council ended by making some moderate and fairly sound recommendations. It also became enlightened concerning the nature of the difficulties that faced the hospital staff and was

thereafter inclined to defend the staff and promote confidence in it.

At the same time it grappled with Poston's medical problems, the Council appointed another committee to investigate the food. No doubt the Chairman's previous experiences at Santa Anita Assembly Center had some influence, but there were plenty of other reasons. Although the meals varied a good deal from one block to another they were in general very poor, lacking in variety, insufficient in quantity and not at all comparable to Army rations. Men going out to work frequently complained that they could not get enough to sustain them. There was no adequate means of feeding infants and small children if the parents did not have the money to purchase their specialties and the situation was similar for invalids who required diets.

A certain portion of all this was due to bad cooking and to poor management by the evacuees of their supplies. However, the relocation authorities could not disclaim responsibility, for it was because of their organization plans that many residents with no experience in cooking and stewardship were suddenly saddled with the feeding of 250 to 300 persons.

Some of the food shortage was caused by hoarding, by the playing of favorites, and by disputes between different groups of residents working in the kitchens and the supply departments.

Most basic of all, however, was the fact that there was not enough food. The funds allotted were ample, but there were serious difficulties in securing what was wanted and the constant increase in the size of Poston may have led to some miscalculations. Yet, none of these things seemed sufficient to account for the discrepancy between what appeared on the mess hall tables and the sum of money allowed for subsistence. The Director has said that it was because the Chief Steward hoped to make a reputation as

one able to save the Government money and was endeavoring to feed the people for as little as possible.

The Council's food committee became impressed with the fact that the meals did not seem to be worth the 37½ cents per day per capita that was allotted. When they attempted to see the accounting books, they were refused. On reporting back to the Council they were given a vote of confidence to continue the investigation. This they did until well into September when a general improvement in the food made further effort unnecessary. They never achieved access to the books, probably at least in part because of their own ineptitude and aggressive manner. However, they did uncover an invoice on which a barrel of Japanese pickles ordinarily costing less than $20 was listed at $171.38. This became a banner and a symbol of administrative bungling and was frequently mentioned in Council meetings and elsewhere in jeering tones, with the "38 cents" never omitted.

Numbers of people in the community felt that there was graft in the Steward's Department and this suspicion was shared by Council members including the Chairman. The inability to inspect the books increased the belief.

The resoluteness with which the Council pursued its aim did much to gain the respect of the relatively few residents who knew of its activities. When the Director advised the Chairman that the Council was going too fast, the latter replied that it was the War Relocation Authority's place to catch up with the Council, and he began writing letters over the Director's head to top officials.

On the other hand, the Council's lack of success in seeing the books dealt a blow to its growth as a body capable of assuming responsibility and leadership in the community, and confirmed many people (including its members) in the conviction that it would be allowed no real power.

The agitation in the community about food and health which prompted these Council investigations were symp-

toms of an underlying insecurity about life itself. The physical discomforts and loss of home and property had been bad enough in themselves, but they were much worse as evidence and symbols that living was threatened. With the future dark, the irritations of the present were feared beyond what might seem reasonable because they were possible harbingers of worse to come.

A chronic pain in the abdomen may give us little concern as long as we believe that it is merely indigestion, but it will become enormously distressing as soon as we suspect that it may be cancer. For the evacuees, trivial things had unexpected powers of arousing emotions which would not have bothered them had they been genuine pioneers, roughing it as a result of their own choosing with confidence in the leadership and in the outcome. As it was, specks of dust in the water, or strange tastes in the food brought strong agitated complaints regarding health protection.

There was a connection, also, with the problem of getting the residents to work. A considerable number felt that labor in Poston's heat on Poston's diet would lead to illness which would not be correctly treated in Poston's hospital.

In people generally there is closely related to feelings of fear, and the frustrations co-mingled, a natural reaction of aggression and a desire to strike back, and this was true of the evacuees. Ever since the beginning of the war they had been taking orders and doing as they were told. It was inevitable that sooner or later they would attempt something on their own. The health and food investigations had an element of this aggressiveness in them as well as of fear and apprehension. However, more purely in the form of aggression was the investigation of the Community Enterprises organization that managed the store.

Although almost entirely an evacuee group, Community Enterprises had been started by the volunteers and was therefore considered to be very close to the Administration

and apart from the rest of the community. Because its members were nearly all Niseis, it was also the target of some antagonism that sprang from the Issei-Nisei conflict. The charges made against it by the public were that its prices were too high and that it made huge profits which through graft went into the pockets of its principal officers. When the Council's committee approached the store they were willingly received and, in contrast to the experience with the Fiscal Office, were permitted to see the books and anything else they desired. They carried out public opinion surveys to determine the adequacy of the store service, and finally, after making some recommendations for the improvement of the system for checking accounts, passed a resolution that the store was properly run and serving the community as well as possible.

BESIDE the investigations mentioned in some detail, there were a number of others by the Council into various phases of community management. In addition, a Code of Offenses was drafted and a Judicial Commission was set up to try minor cases of law infringement.

One member of this Commission was a small 27-year-old single man who will reappear later in this history as the center of considerable excitement. Although he was a Kibei, he was well disposed toward the Administration, was very popular with almost all who knew him, and was one of those who succeeded in the difficult task of being on friendly terms with government personnel, Isseis, Niseis and Kibeis.

THE Project Director endeavored to carry out most of the recommendations of the Council, insofar as they were practicable, but the food investigation remained a sore point between the Council and the Administration. The Fiscal Officer, backed by the Chief Administrative Officer, wanted no interference from the Council in the affairs of the Steward's Department. The Attorney felt that a duly appointed

committee of the Council was within its rights in asking to see the books and that refusal was a slight to the Council and a hindrance to the development of self-government. The Director and Associate Director steered a middle course, seeking to modify the Fiscal Officer's stand without force, recognizing from their own investigation that the food was poor and inadequate, and causing a replacement of the Chief Steward.

However, they felt that the Council was proving a nuisance rather than an aid to administration, and the Director said, "We don't want a lot of investigating committees around here. We want some constructive thinking." The Assistant Director thought the Council was getting itself off on the wrong foot and meddling in things it had better let alone. In his opinion, the Chairman was "a small-town politician."

About this time, the Administration dealt a second blow to the Council's efforts to gain prestige and power. When the Council had drawn up the Code of Offenses and created the Judicial Commission, it confidently expected on the basis of intimation from the Administration, that it would be allowed to control the police. Instead, the Assistant Director took the force over. This was in part because of the Administration's mistrust of the Council's capacity and degree of maturity and because of uneasiness about the line of action it had been taking. However, there was also concern about the police themselves, for many complaints came from the residents charging high-handed actions, and it was thought wise to have a capable government officer give them close attention for a while. Later on, if the Council proved its ability, it might be allowed to take charge, but it had a lot to learn first.

As a total result, the Council was suspended between the Administration and the people, both of whom were skeptically waiting to see what it would be capable of doing before giving their support.

7. Social Organization

At the beginning of this history it was stressed that the evacuees consisted of a great variety of people from almost every walk of life. Later, it was shown that broad social generalizations could be made that grouped the people into Isseis, Niseis and Kibeis, and the influence of these portions of the population has been noted from time to time.

There were, of course, a large number of other formal and informal patterns of relationship. The most basic one was the family, but there were in addition societies of people who had emigrated from the same prefectures in Japan (Kenjin-kai), business and farming associations, the Japanese American Citizens League, Japanese community associations (Nihonjin-kai), mutual aid societies (Tanomoshi-kai), women's clubs (Fujin-kai), fraternities, gambling syndicates, city gangs, religious societies, and athletic organizations for baseball, football, wrestling (judo) and fencing (kendo). Equally important were groups distinguished for former geographic location, such as those in Boyle Heights, Terminal Island, Imperial Valley and San Diego. A complete list of all associations that formed patterns in the society would run into many hundreds.

Although the war and evacuation blew apart much of the social organization, remnants and tatters were brought to Poston and there, little by little, some of them began to assume new life, like willow twigs that sprout roots and leaves when stuck in the ground. The weak withered and died, while the strong were tempered by adversity and survived with increased strength.

In addition to the old social patterns, new associations came into being as a result of living conditions in Poston, some created by the Administration, some as a result of urges in the community combined with administrative co-

operation, and some arising spontaneously and independently among the people.

All of the social institutions came into existence in response to human needs and all were engines for the satisfaction of these needs. However, some had more direct bearing on administrative acts and policies than others, and a number of these will be discussed in the present chapter.

EARLY in September, about the time the food was improving, the Project Director and the Council Chairman developed a friendly and understanding relationship that lasted the rest of the period covered in this report. They were both by nature inclined to enjoy the discussion of community problems and they were no doubt also able to appreciate their respective abilities as shrewd dealers with men. The Chairman's conception of the position of the evacuees —"Our future depends on the record we make now"—and his thoughts on how the community should develop were very close to the aims with which the Director and the other people-minded administrators had come to Poston.

From this time onward, the Chairman, even at the expense of his own popularity, would argue with evacuees who were excessively critical of the Administration and would try to make them comprehend the difficulties involved in operating the Center. He was frequently heard to say that the Director was "all right."

However, communication between the Project Director and other Council members continued to be poor, and the Council's contact with the rest of the administrative officers was even less satisfactory. Except for the Attorney, to whom the Council was a major interest, few understanding relationships developed, and the wariness and mistrust typified in the food investigation persisted.

Considerable rivalry appeared between the Council and many of the Niseis who were assistants to the Administration, such as Block Managers. These evacuee employees

were on their guard and disposed to prevent the Council from usurping the authority and prestige they had attempted to exercise since the early days of the Project.

It is probable that low wages caused people to cling the more tightly to prerogatives and recognition inasmuch as these were almost the only rewards they received for their work.

Most of the Councilmen were also out of touch and out of favor with their constituents. Having little or no previous experience in government and politics, they were often inept in handling people. Frequently they did not report back to their blocks concerning Council activities and took it on themselves to make decisions in community matters.

The majority of the Isseis resented having Niseis in such putatively elevated positions as Councilmen, referred to them as the "child Council" and were disposed to "cut them down to size."

In addition, it was currently felt by the Isseis that the Councilmen constituted a "puppet government," a creature of the Administration, and were "not really working for the people," but for their own self-interest. This was increased by the Chairman's tendency to seek out people of importance and ignore others, and his refusal to sponsor complaints and petitions that were palpably foolish, or concerning which he knew the Administration was doing all it could. The emotionally stirred people, however, wanted results, not reasons, and consequently turned some of their antagonism from the Administration to the Council which was, anyway, a much safer object.

It was even said that some of the Councilmen were "dogs" (informers) and the Chairman's membership in the Anti-Axis Committee of the Japanese American Citizens League came up for discussion in the light of a rumor that every member of that Committee had pledged himself to turn in at least five people to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

From all of this it was evident that the Council was a

target of aggressive attitudes arising from such various things as local rivalry, resentments against evacuation, and factors going far back into the Issei-Nisei conflict.

THE Issei Advisory Board was formed during September and became a functioning reality in Unit I by October. It was made up of one elected Issei from each block and was supposed to advise the Council and the Project Director on community affairs. It was formed as a result of pressure from many Isseis for some voice in what happened in Poston. Although the Board had no official position (for no Issei could hold elective office), the Director favored it and felt that a community could never function properly run by young people without the support and participation of older persons. It was customary for him to refer to the residents of Poston as "fathers, mothers and children" and he consistently urged the Niseis and the administrative staff to seek the advice of the more mature and experienced minds.

The rest of the Administration had little to do with the Issei Advisory Board, and were inclined to regard it with mistrust and suspicion.

Most of the Council members were afraid of the Board, looking on it in terms of the Issei-Nisei conflict. The Council Chairman thought that in general it was a good idea to have such an organization, and spoke in its favor a number of times against the opposition of other Councilmen. Nevertheless, he was on his guard lest the Isseis attempt to dominate, and said that some of them were "sure radical."

However, the Isseis seemed to approach Poston's problems in a reasonable manner and were disposed to work for improvement in a spirit of give and take with the Niseis and with the Administration. None of them had had any more previous experience with self-government than the Council members, but many were able as leaders and were politically wise.

The Chairman of the Advisory Board was a 57-year-old

former secretary and business manager of a Japanese growers association in California. Although he said he was the son of a judge in Miyazaki Ken, it seems he never went beyond the 8th grade in school and in 1903 had come to the United States at the age of 18. He could speak English, but rarely did so. For some years before the war he had been in the produce business for himself and had worked as adviser, mediator and collection agent for farmers and growers. He once said that he was married, but that his wife was in Japan. Apparently self-educated, his hobby was the study of philosophy, religion and science.

One of the most impressive things about the Advisory Board Chairman was his ability to deliver a speech in formal Japanese that was far above the usual language of farmers. Audiences were always quiet and attentive when he spoke, and even though they could not themselves command the style he used, they were able to follow his lofty appeals to the emotions. He seemed to be more at home with a crowd than with intimate personal relations, for in meetings and gatherings he was usually alone and had apparently few close associates.

In appearance he was a little tall for a Japanese and rather heavy set, with a large head and close-clipped hair that made him seem bald. His clothing was always clean and neat, but shabby, dull in color and showing signs of long wear. He gave the impression of being active and healthy for his age.

He came to Poston in May and a few months later emerged as an "agitator" and leader of a group of bachelors who would not work and who discouraged others from doing so. He said, "We were unjustly herded into camp and therefore the Government should support us," and he appealed to international law to back his point. The American citizenship of the Niseis seemed to mean no more to him than it did to the anti-Japanese groups in California, and he harped on the theme, "We are all Japanese together." In his block, feeling became so strong against him among the Niseis and

some Issei parents that a petition was drawn up requesting his removal.

Nevertheless, he was elected to the Issei Advisory Board and there he exerted an influence that was much more moderate than one might have expected from his previous speeches.

It is interesting to contrast the Council and the Issei Advisory Board. The former was artificially created by the Administration and was composed of people who were very young and mostly devoid of any previous experience of a comparable nature. The Issei Advisory Board members were wise in life experience and many of them had previously dabbled in the politics of Japanese communities. Furthermore, the form which the Board took was not too far removed from the gathering of elders that customarily managed the local affairs of the Japanese village.

The respective chairmen of the two groups also presented contrast. The Nisei leader was frank, informal and hail-fellow-well-met, while the Issei Chairman was dignified, elaborately formal and reserved in personal relations.

THE cooperative movement arose in Poston like the Issei Advisory Board, partly as a result of pressure from the residents and partly as a result of fostering by administrative policy.

One of its leaders was a 37-year-old Issei Methodist Minister who spoke both English and Japanese fluently. Born in Tokyo, the son of a Christian clergyman, he had graduated from college there and then come to America in 1929. He secured further education from the Biblical Seminary in New York, Columbia University, Ohio Wesleyan College, the University of Southern California's Graduate School of Religion and Tempe College, Arizona, where he studied cooperatives. At one time he was interested in the Moral Rearmament movement. His career was interrupted

by tuberculosis, but by 1939 he had a church in Mesa, Arizona, and later another in Bakersfield, California.

After the war began, he served as interpreter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and consequently became an object of much suspicion and dislike in Bakersfield, especially among the Buddhists.

In appearance, he was tall but extremely thin, probably not weighing much more than 100 pounds, and he had a great fund of tense, nervous energy. He dressed neatly in a business suit and had a friendly manner, yet with something pontifical about it that quickly suggested the minister. His voice was soft, which contrasted with rather angular features, and in public speaking he was a spellbinder in either language. In private conversation, he was very polite and an attentive listener, but quick to inject his own opinions and rather inclined to convert discussion into a monologue. His hobbies were reading and playing the guitar.

This Methodist Minister came to Poston as one of the volunteers and conducted the first Christian service, but thereafter for many months his interests seemed to be exclusively in community affairs and he was not part of the interdenominational movement that created a unified church. He was a participant in the Civic Planning Board which created the ill-fated Constitution, but withdrew early when a plan which he offered was not sufficiently well received by the other members.

He was given a position in Community Enterprises when it was organized and was put in charge of education. Under his influence, this work developed into a cooperative study and then into a movement to have cooperatives replace Community Enterprises.

Rivalry immediately sprang up. The split between the volunteers and the rest of the community entered the picture, and also the Issei-Nisei conflict. The Community Enterprises was almost exclusively a volunteer organization and composed of Niseis, while the cooperative enthusiasts were

largely Isseis and later-comers. The fact that the Minister was a volunteer himself was soon lost in his identification with the Isseis and his opposition to Community Enterprises.


As mentioned in the previous chapter, the charges brought against the Community Enterprises were that the prices in the store were too high and that the profits were being consumed in graft. This was a widespread feeling among all kinds of people, and the cooperative group fanned it for their own ends. The fact that the Council investigation showed that the store was being well run had little more effect than to satisfy the Council members.

On the other hand, Community Enterprises and its supporters accused some of the cooperative leaders of having past records for shady dealings. The Minister himself was said to be a "dog" (informer). This, plus his status as a Christian minister, caused much opposition from Buddhists.

In July he requested Commissioner Collier to send some experienced cooperative teachers to Poston. Five of these arrived in the middle of August and were at once drawn unwittingly into the conflict. Instead of restricting themselves to teaching, the experts campaigned for what could now be called the Cooperative Party, and in their zeal to show the superiority of the Rochdale System they attacked Community Enterprises, both directly and indirectly. Their success was considerable in rallying those who were dissatisfied with the store, especially the Isseis, but they failed to get the interest of the Niseis and failed to educate the community concerning the nature of cooperatives. A petition to create cooperatives was circulated early in September and obtained about 3,800 out of a possible 5,800 signatures from residents of Unit I who were 18 years old and over. However, a large proportion of these were from people who had no understanding of cooperatives and were merely against the store. Still others signed their names simply because asked



Community store



Evacuee police



Dancers in Obon Odori

to do so, much in the spirit—or lack of it—seen in the Council elections.

The attitude of the Administration was divided. Those who were stereotype-minded were naturally opposed to anything which increased the autonomy of the residents, but for the most part, the matter did not greatly concern them. In the case of the people-minded administrators, although from the start there had been a policy of developing cooperatives, the political aspects of the movement in Poston and the attack on the Community Enterprises led many of the officers to feel that the residents whom they had established in responsible positions were being unfairly treated.

Looking at the cooperative struggle in general terms, it seems to have been largely a struggle for power and opportunity for self-expression between those who had it and those who did not. On the one side was the Community Enterprises, the Council and at least the sympathy of most of the established departments in Poston. On the other side were those who had achieved as yet little recognition. It was not possible to draw a line that divided these two groups unreservedly into Isseis and Niseis, but there was certainly a high proportion of Isseis backing the Cooperative Party. Since the Isseis were barred from many positions in the community either by rule or by the natural tendency for administrators to select people whose language and cultural values they could understand, and of whose loyalty to the United States they were sure, the Isseis naturally made up the bulk of those who had no recognition.

In sponsoring the established Nisei administrative assistants, as in the case of the Council, members of the Administration became involved in the Issei-Nisei conflict and inherited new sets of antagonisms based on that identification. The relationship here had some elements in common with the antipathy that often arises between parents and teachers, where the former resent the latter's intrusion between themselves and the children.

The Director remained non-committal for a time. He had personal conferences with the Minister and other Cooperative Party leaders on community affairs and said that he thought they were "all right," "did the best they could" and had some sound ideas. He did not seem to feel that it was necessary to sponsor those residents who happened to be appointed to positions of prominence in the early, groping days of the Project, but rather looked to see which of the conflicting groups had the best to offer and which had the most support from the community. After the petition was presented, he announced that cooperatives would be created in Poston with administrative backing.

The Cooperative Party thus gained considerable strength and there was corresponding irritation among those who opposed it, both among the residents and in the Administration.

SOCIAL organization was evident in a number of spontaneous cohesions that revolved around working issues in Poston.

One of these consisted of "the old bachelors," remnants of the former labor gangs, who now agitated against the Administration, the Council and the working evacuees. These men had been hard-living fellows with a reputation for spending their earnings on drink, gambling and women. Having no stake in America in the form of children, property or established business, they were inclined to be resistant and obstructive, even though they had lost far less through evacuation than many of those who had families. Totaling 350 in Unit I, they lived in groups of about forty in common barracks situated in different blocks. They early became conspicuous for their refusal to work, and many of them severely ridiculed those who did work and in other ways exerted influence to interfere with the constructive activities of the Project. For the most part they did not get along well with

their fellow block members and were thought to have a bad effect on morals.

It has already been mentioned that the Chairman of the Issei Advisory Board was at one time their leader, and it can be readily appreciated that he and they had a fertile field in which to sow discontent. An illustration may be given from the experiences of an evacuee foreman who supervised a gang of men.

As a result of urging by administrative officers and their Nisei assistants, a group, mostly Isseis over 50 years of age, went to work clearing away rubbish on the open firebreak with the temperature ranging from 110 to 140 in the sun. The wages, they understood, would be $12 a month, but they were also told that the work was a public service and would be much appreciated by the Administration.

They had been on the job several days when the Issei foreman discovered from a tractor driver that he was also supposed to supervise the men who unloaded the rubbish at the dump. When he went to investigate, he saw two men unloading frantically with perspiration running down their faces and two tractors waiting in line. There had been 15 men working the first day, but they had quit because there had been nobody to take their attendance, because the pace of the work was too fast in the heat and because there was no drinking water available.

The foreman had the impression that he was working under the Assistant Director, but in the course of time two other members of the administrative personnel came, and each said he was boss. Once they gave the foreman conflicting orders and then quarreled between themselves about it in front of him.

The men working said repeatedly they doubted that they would ever be paid for what they were doing, but were reassured by the foreman who relied on the Assistant Director's word. After they had been working ten days, a time sheet was returned with the comment that it had not been

honored. When the foreman went to see the Head Timekeeper, a person who was very stereotype-minded, he was told, "These Japs worked as volunteers, didn't they? That means they didn't have work cards. We can't pay wages to guys who worked without cards."

The foreman was angry and replied, "The Assistant Director promised us we were going to be paid for what we were doing, although we don't have the cards."

The Timekeeper answered that the Assistant Director did not set the policy in the Timekeeping Department. The cards were eventually secured, but the men were not credited with the days already worked.

After two months the first pay was issued and many of the men received sums much below that indicated by the number of hours they had worked, even at $12 per month. Two got $7.38 for 196 hours of work, two were not listed on the payroll at all. The foreman himself received $9.28 for 220 hours of work, and was rated at $12 instead of the $16 he had expected.

And yet this was at a time when the Administration was extremely anxious to interest the residents in work and this crew of men was considered one of the best in the Project.

He would be rash who would leap to the conclusion that this was administrative bungling for which specific individuals should be blamed. It was the end result at the evacuee level of all the complications of administrative procedure, confusion, rapid growth, limited personnel and equipment, ignorance of policy, and lack of communication from the Washington offices down to the foreman.

None of this, however, made any difference in the effect on the workmen. Shortly after the pay-day episode, they disbanded.

Much of the outdoor work was characterized by this kind of dissatisfaction with the nature of the job, the working conditions, the wages, and delays and errors in payment. These things led to arguments and minor strikes in which

numerous clusters of workers developed feelings of common interest and experience in acting together.

The mess halls were other places where groups of people took action on issues. Although there were some kitchens that did an excellent job of organization and of supplying the wants of the residents, in many there was factional strife leading to walk-outs and sometimes almost to physical fighting. Frequently the people of the blocks complained that the kitchen crews played favorites, cooked badly, and wasted supplies. On the other hand, the cooks and their helpers would invite anybody to come in and try it who thought he could do better—and would threaten to quit in a body or actually do so. In some cases they were able to intimidate the rest of the block by such methods and set up a despotic rule that made them more powerful than any other segment in the block.

ALTHOUGH the Administration had little official contact with religious activities, such matters were of considerable indirect importance. Like the other forms of social organization that have been described, religious groups operated to satisfy human needs. However, where the political and semi-political associations endeavored to satisfy human needs by interaction with the Administration or by pressure on it, religious associations worked chiefly through the inner life of the individual resident. It follows, therefore, that to the degree that religion was non-political and was successful in its own field, to that degree would the driving force be reduced that put pressure on the Administration. For, the more religion succeeded in creating emotional states of satisfaction, the more it tended to mitigate general fear, anger and restlessness.


Considerable spiritual satisfaction became possible through the growth of both Christian and Buddhist services and activities. In August and September the Buddhists held Obon festivals in the three camps. This ceremony marks the time

of year when the spirits of the dead are thought to be close to their living relatives and it is an occasion for rejoicing and celebration. The fact that the ceremony was allowed in Poston reassured those people whose culture was predominantly oriental and who were farthest from the Administration. It gave some hope that freedom of religion would be a reality, and that there would be an end of the indirect suppression (for instance, the arrest of their priests) which had been in operation since the beginning of the war because of the suspicion with which Buddhists were regarded. Christians and Buddhists together enjoyed the pageantry and dancing of the Obon. The Director made a speech on the opening night at Unit I, and the members of the Administration were invited to prominent seats where they enjoyed the music and the color.

The Christians were equally busy with "Singspirations" and other programs to lift the spirits of the people and promote morale.

In addition to the social organizations which have been described as established by administrative act, or as coalescing about issues, jobs, and plans, there were many more. A comprehensive description would have to include all the administrative departments, recreational activities, athletics, religious bodies, Japanese cultural activities and other associations.

Most of the different forms of social organization were rather isolated from each other and some were in actual conflict. Although there was in many cases a rather solid nucleus that had come from pre-evacuation days, for the most part these various groups were not very stable. They were suspended in the total population of Poston which still consisted of an accumulation of people of great variety and origin who were as yet unacquainted and who under the strange conditions of Relocation Center life were pretty much at sea as to what to expect from one another, as well as from the Administration.



Activities Organized at Poston by November 1942

In the flux, the family was the social unit which best maintained its identity and cohesion, but in the course of time, pride and loyalty began to appear for blocks where small groups of people lived together, met often and got to know each other.

For example, the local government of many blocks, usually in the form of a council, became much more representative of their constituents than did the Temporary Community Council.

The displays at the fair held in Unit I in the latter part of October under the stimulus of the Reports Officer showed clearly the trend toward block solidarity. The exhibits could be divided into two classes—accomplishments and hopes. The accomplishments were nearly all block and individual products—handicrafts or garden produce. The hopes were of the community as a whole and took the form of scale models of factories yet to be built, and agricultural projects yet to be developed.

An opportunity to pick cotton in the Parker Valley further made evident this growth of group participation and cooperation. It happened that the professional cotton-pickers who usually migrate to the valley in season were in other work and consequently there was serious danger that a valuable crop would be lost. Permission was given by the Western Defense Command for the people of Poston to work in the fields at going wages. To prevent uneven distribution of income within Poston, and the withdrawal of workers needed for the operation of the Project, an over-all trust fund was proposed by the Administration as a repository for all earnings in the cotton fields over $19 per month. The idea met with a mixed reception and on October 22 a meeting of Administration and evacuee leaders was held to push the matter. The Reports Officer was one of the leading speakers for the Administration and stressed the advantages of bringing "bright, crisp, folding money" into the community.

Others urged the residents to realize the opportunities provided by cotton-picking for developing good relations with the ranchers in Parker Valley, and for proving to the American public that the evacuees were hard working and loyal.

The leaders of the residents agreed to the plan, and some, particularly the Council members with the Chairman to the fore, were enthusiastic. However, when the matter was taken back to the people, the response was meager. The attitude changed as soon as the Administration allowed small trust funds for churches, blocks, schools, and similar groups, instead of the over-all plan. When it was clear that the funds would be used for immediate needs over which the workers would have some control, the residents began to pick cotton, and soon there were more pickers than there was transportation available to take them to the fields. People cared what their neighbors and fellow block members thought of them and were willing to work to help each other where the results could be seen, but the conception of "the good of the whole of Poston" was too nebulous.

In Chapter 3 it was said that the Administration could be divided into those who were stereotype-minded and those who were people-minded and some observations were offered on the kinds of people who made up both of these sections. Later it was noted that the cooperative movement resulted in a major portion of the self-government-minded administrative officers becoming identified with Nisei groups and opposing other portions of the community, largely Isseis, who were struggling for position. For the present, it is necessary to make only a few additional comments.

With some exceptions, most of the members of the Administration were strangers to each other when they undertook their duties at Poston. No less than the evacuees, they had to develop social structure and social relationships before they could function effectively, but because they were

a far smaller group this could happen more rapidly than in the case of the residents. Nevertheless, a good deal of the early disjointedness was as much due to lack of familiarity with each other and with the place of each as it was to lack of equipment. As compared to a well-integrated and seasoned team, the Poston Administration was forced to begin its career at a considerable disadvantage.

The progress of time from spring to fall did not bring much agreement between those who wanted to see self-government develop and those who were reluctant to yield responsibility to the residents. In fact, new issues arose which tended to widen the cleavage, one of the most obvious being between the Chief Administrative Officer's department and the rest of the Administration. On all sides one heard it said that the delays which hampered or ruined plans for the effective building of Poston were caused by the "paralyzing red tape" and "inefficiency" of that department. It is certain that such sore points as the payment of wages, the provision of clothing, the quality and quantity of food, and other matters of supply were largely the responsibility of its members. However, the Chief Administrative Officer and his assistants pointed out that they had not made the regulations they were in duty bound to observe, that they were as much handicapped as anybody else by outside factors they could not control, that many delays were the fault of other departments in the Administration that did not observe the proper forms and procedures, and finally that nobody took into consideration the things which they did accomplish. They freely said, however, that they considered much of the work the other departments were doing superfluous and out of keeping with the way in which the Japanese should be treated.

A new member of the Chief Administrative Officer's division came more and more to the fore as an exponent of the concentration camp philosophy. He was the Supply and Transportation Officer who entered duty the first of Sep-

tember. Fifty-seven years old, married and a native of Oklahoma, he had had a great many different jobs in the course of his life, and claimed to have been a colonel in the last war. As recently as 1938, he said he had been making $150,000 per year and was currently promoting a $125,000,000 ranching scheme. The skepticism roused by such statements later proved to be more than justified.

In appearance he was a man with gray hair and considerably overweight. His manner was friendly, with a lively and dramatic way of speaking which was interesting, but suggested exaggeration.

On first arriving in Poston, he had spoken with enthusiasm about building the community and of the skill and aptitude of the Japanese people. In fact, he went so far as to suggest grading the bank of the Colorado and spreading sand to create bathing beaches for the residents. At the same time, he appeared mistrustful, and for a while it was difficult to understand his apparent inconsistencies. By October, however, he was expressing considerable fear and hatred of the residents and insisting that a "Jap was a Jap" and none could be relied upon. He carried small arms and advised other employees to do the same. To the Military Police he talked at length of his fears, and wrote a letter to the commanding officer urging him to tell his men to shoot to kill, so that in the event of trouble in the camp, they would not be held back by humanity or any pangs of conscience.

THUS there were in both groups, residents and Administration, the extremes of possible attitudes of the one toward the other. There was the resident pleading for patience and struggling to build Poston and the resident who cherished his hate. There was the welfare worker fighting to relieve human suffering and there was the Supply Officer wanting to kill.

Administration is the art of keeping elements such as these in balance.

8. Social Disorganization

In the previous chapter, an attempt was made to sketch some of Poston's social organization and it is probable that the reader was given an impression of more order and consistency than really existed. Certainly, to the leaders and Administrators who were actually involved in the life of the Project, there was a tendency to think of Poston as a socially integrated and functioning community. They often spoke of the three units as "One Poston" forgetting that there was little cohesion even within one unit and that they were expressing a wish rather than giving an accurate description.

Although social patterns did exist, some new and some old, more prominent was disarticulation and the absence of the accustomed habits of human relationship. People were strangers to each other in a strange situation and did not know what to expect. The whole order of position and authority was topsy-turvy and efforts at adjustment were trial and error—and with trial and error there was inevitably error.

"A social organism," said William James, "of any sort whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic team, all exist on this condition without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is even attempted."[1]

Thomas Carlyle expressed the same idea more dramatically when he said, "Individuals, on the sudden, find all their old paths, old ways of acting and deciding vanish from under their feet. And so there go they, with clangor and terror, they know not as yet whether running, swimming or flying."[2]

In the present chapter, after a brief note on some of the

[1] Reference 17.

[2] Reference 7.

constructive influences, the forces of disintegration for Administration and residents will be described and discussed.

* * *

THE autumn brought to Poston relief from the heat and in its place a mellow climate that has few equals in the world. The days were fresh and clear and the star-studded nights were crisp. The Parker Valley changed from tropical green to golden tones of brown, and ducks came to the river. Here and there over the valley floor a lone cottonwood raised a tawny mane in quiet solitude above all the other trees.

Young people went on hikes to river and mountains. Fresh vegetables from the block gardens began to appear on the mess hall tables. The schools were open and a number of young men and women were able to leave camp in order to continue their education farther east.

The harvest season opened opportunities for employment outside the Project. In September the War Relocation Authority announced a new policy of getting evacuees out of the Relocation Centers and reabsorbed into American life through jobs in the Middle West and East. The Chief Counsel of the War Relocation Authority made an address in Poston in which he spoke of the Relocation Centers as merely way stations on a road between evacuated California homes and a new and more secure place in American agriculture and industry. Poston was pictured as sending its members out in a steady stream to supply the expanding needs of wartime America.

At first this statement and others later reinforcing it made little impression. Gradually, however, as the representatives of sugar companies began to appear in Poston and laborers were recruited to harvest beets in Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado and Nebraska, a new restlessness took hold of the people. More and more young men jumped in big trucks and headed for the world outside until over 800 had gone from all three units. Some of these received permanent jobs, but most returned after harvest. Nevertheless, a trickle of

people went out to steady work, and a feeling grew that Poston still had contacts with the rest of the world.

With six months of existence behind it, the Project was beginning to get over the hump of emergency conditions and it was time to look for a well-geared organization with stable policies on which all could rely. It was a time for developing more adequate communication with the residents and the expansion of education concerning the nature of Poston and its probable outlook.

The majority of the influences, however, were not in the direction of stability and the Project was far from a state of social health.

THE local employment picture was unhappy. Just as the cotton-picking was in full swing, a military order put an end to it. Thus, the Administration was again forced by circumstances to stop an activity in which, by its own efforts, the interest and enthusiasm of the evacuees had been aroused. All the speeches that had been made about the need for picking cotton, all the trust fund schemes, and all the work done by evacuee leaders to get the people out picking came to nothing. For those who did not understand the order, which included practically all the residents, it looked as if this were one more thing to make them doubt the word of the Administration and the evacuee leaders in touch with the Administration, and one more thing to convince them that it was not worth while trying to do anything in Poston.

Another focus of irritation was the impending opening of a factory for making camouflage nets—the evacuee employees to receive what they were paid for work in Poston, that is, no more than $19 per month. Since the factory had nothing to do with the welfare of the community, most of the residents could see no reason why they should receive less than the going wage for that kind of work. Most of the Administration felt the same way and eventually had the situation altered. However, some of those who were stereotype-

minded thought that the attitude of the residents was evidence of anti-American sentiment. When the raw material for the nets arrived, there was considerable difficulty getting it unloaded. While some of the administrative personnel cried "Sabotage," the evacuees replied with "Exploitation."

Work in the Project itself continued to be characterized by delays in the payment of wages and as late as October there were many persons who had not been paid since July. The situation was similar in the matter of clothing allowances. There were also irritations concerning food and transportation for workers, treatment by foremen and other such matters, some unreasonable, many reasonable.

At the time the wages or "cash advances" for evacuees were fixed, it was often stated by officials that, after all, people work from many motives besides money and for that reason it should be possible to get satisfactory results from the Center residents. This rationalization is no doubt true, but it is correlated with the need of some other reward. Possible substitutes are vocational training, security, recognition and prestige, and opportunities for self-development; and the program of community-building had been designed to offer some of these. However, although many persons were quick to exhort the evacuees by calling on them to show devotion to the community and to the nation, the course of time revealed that the alternative rewards were even more meager, delayed and uncertain than the wages, and that the discomforts were great.

With a deterioration of interest, there was a corresponding drop in efficiency and conscientiousness. For, while people may work for little or no money, they will not work without *some* incentive.

THE apparent attitude of the American public, particularly on the Pacific Coast and in the Southwest, as it reached the evacuees through the papers, was disquieting. Religious and educational institutions and the publications


under their influence were for the most part well disposed, but their voice was relatively small and the things which stood out prominently were of the opposite character.

In June there had been a railroad wreck near Parker, and accusations of sabotage by Poston residents were carried in press and radio. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the railroad officials were convinced after investigation that no sabotage was involved, and the talk died down. However, there remained a feeling of suspicion which was ready to become dominant again at a later date in the public mind.


At another time there had been considerable agitation on the general theme that the evacuees were "little brown enemies" who were being absurdly pampered by the Federal Government, and Arizona was going to see to it that they stayed in their camps and were moved out of the state as soon as the war was over. There was particular clamoring when milk became scarce and it was widely reported that Arizona women and children were being deprived so that the healthy and indolent Japanese (by implication all men) could have it. This occurred about the time that the residents were first beginning to get a little milk for the children, invalids and mothers. As some of the papers reported later, the milk shortage in Arizona was due to the military training centers there; and furthermore, all the milk for the Poston residents came from California, not from Arizona.

Resentment was also expressed in the press at the luxurious education which the residents were supposed to be receiving. The fact that private funds supported some seminar courses sponsored by St. John's College was twisted to appear as if the Federal Government were spending money on silly experiments in education. The University of Arizona refused to cooperate in any plan to continue the college education of the evacuees, and its President gave as the reason, "These people stabbed us in the back at Pearl Harbor."

In Parker, to which crews of evacuees went every day to



A bird's-eye view of a block by Gene Sogioka, an evacuee artist



Two views of block gardens

work in the Project warehouses at $12 per month, there was a barber shop with a sign, "Jap, Keep out, you rat!"

The feelings of the Poston residents regarding all this might be summed in the word "unfair." Old wounds broke open, and the evacuees wanted to know if such was the reward "promised" them for cooperating in evacuation as loyal Americans. Stories of outside hostility were quickly distorted into sensational rumors that included mass murder of evacuee harvest workers. Many residents were frightened away from seeking outside employment, and numbers of Issei parents, more inclined to believe wild rumor than the Niseis, exerted their influence to keep their children from venturing forth.

IN THE course of the summer and fall an increasing number of men entered Poston to join their families after being released or paroled from internment. From some of them stories went into circulation describing how much more comfortable the internment camps were than the Relocation Centers. It was rumored that the Government had to meet certain standards in the places of internment because of supervision by the Spanish Consul who represented Japan, but that in the case of the Japanese who were American citizens, there was no such protection, and the Government could do with them as it liked.

Letters from other Relocation Centers also caused some dissatisfaction for they told of partitions for rooms, lack of crowding, linoleum on the floor and similar advantages not as yet found at Poston. These differences were in part due to the fact that centers built after Poston profited by its mistakes and also the fact that the War Relocation Authority emphasized structural protection against weather in centers that were farther north. In noting the discrepancies between Poston and other camps, people very easily forgot to count Poston's advantages.

THERE was continual postponement and collapse of the agricultural and industrial schemes for making Poston a going community and giving it an economic base. The 60,000 guayule plants and the first acres of tomatoes all died. The material for the chicken ranches did not come. The irrigation system was many months behind schedule in its development.

The War Relocation Authority announced a change in policy to the effect that all manufacturing and industrial activity in the Center would be discouraged or prohibited. As a result, numerous schemes that represented months of concentrated labor went the same road as the self-government ideas created by the Civic Planning Board in June.

The War Relocation Authority's decision was based on the consideration of many factors that concerned all ten Relocation Centers and much that lay quite outside the immediate situation in Poston. Nevertheless, no matter how wise the ruling may have been as general policy, it had an adverse effect on people who had been urged to build a community in order to achieve security and had been promised the opportunity to do so in lieu of going wages and other common incentives to work. The War Relocation Authority's plan was to substitute employment on the outside for industrial activity in the Center, but in October and November the reality of opportunities on the outside had not become apparent to the residents to any appreciable extent. It was thought by many to be just another sudden arbitrary change in which one fine-sounding plan was scrapped for a totally different one which would likewise promise much and come to little except trouble for the evacuees.

Some of those who had been the most ardent supporters of the Administration were disheartened. It seemed that almost everything gave justification to the cynics.

ON October 5, the schools got under way in the face of severe difficulties. They lacked buildings because, although

a good many adobe bricks had been made after great urging by the Administration and some special concessions in wages and food to the adobe workers, the necessary lumber had not arrived. Crowded recreational halls scattered all over the camp were used, and very little equipment was furnished. Each child had to bring his own chair or a box to sit on and a piece of board to use as a desk. Good books had been ordered, but they had not come. The quality of the teachers varied from those who were of exceptionally high standard to those who were entirely unsuited to their jobs. Teachers and pupils together had to make the best of classes so close together that the noise from one was a constant distraction in others. The situation was very wearing on the teachers, causing a number to become ill and leave the Project, while the children and their parents looked on the schools as a jerry-built organization from which they would receive neither education nor credit acceptable anywhere in the country.

THE isolation of Poston produced a certain provincialism that pervaded many of the attitudes. Out of touch with the changes in wartime United States, people were unaware of the deprivations that were being suffered by the rest of the country and inclined to contrast their own condition, not with America as it was, but as it had been before the war. All hardships were apt to be considered persecution rather than difficulties in which the whole nation was sharing.

IN THE fall, a considerable reduction in the fear and anxiety that had been present in the summer was noticed, and with it a corresponding increase in aggressive expressions of dissatisfaction. The Chairman of the Issei Advisory Board reflected this when he told his Board at one meeting, "There is nothing to be afraid of, so voice your grievances." There was recklessness in the air combined with a "what's the use?" attitude toward most constructive plans. The emo-

tions of the evacuees seemed to be following an order often seen when strong fear is followed by equally strong anger.

The rise of aggressiveness was evident in the matter of procuring material with which to make the quarters livable. Although some people bought what they needed in furniture, closets, shelves, and coolers, and others had them sent from their original residences, many were unable to do either of these and had to make what they required. In spite of the fact that it had been promised in "Questions and Answers for Evacuees," no official method was established for providing material. The Poston Administration bought scrap lumber from the contractor, but it did not go very far and early comers got most of it. Under the pressure of these circumstances, the people, who previously had a high record for honesty, began to take what they wanted from wherever they could get it. Lumber was stolen from the builder, wire was clipped off refrigerators, cement was taken from the school project. The residents, with their tongues in their cheeks called this "borrowing," and rationalized that the material had been bought for their use, so they were not really stealing, but only putting it to a more immediate purpose, and the Government could get more.

It actually worked out just that way. To a large measure, the Government did provide the material for making housing better, as it had promised, but did it in spite of itself and got no credit. A premium was placed on dishonesty and selfishness, which greatly angered those who abided by the rules. Many of the more serious-minded, particularly parents, felt that the whole process of "borrowing" was going to have a very bad effect on the morals of the children growing up in such a light-fingered atmosphere.

As time went on, the depredations increased both in quantity and in boldness. This was not only an indication of a developing aggressive spirit, but also an outstanding sign of social disorganization; it revealed the disappearance of former standards and the absence of control either by the

pressure of public opinion or by the law-enforcement agencies.

Assaults were still more serious indicators of the same thing. They occurred in the following setting:

From time to time the Federal Bureau of Investigation had made arrests in Poston and as a consequence it became widely believed that they were being tipped off by "dogs" (informers) in the community. It was widely charged that the names of "innocent" people were being turned in and that "FBI Checks" were being cashed by certain parties at the store. Mutual suspicion increased and "dogs" were thought to be lurking outside every barrack and listening at every crack. The Reports Officer with his predilection for investigation and his self-created title of "Intelligence Officer" drew a good deal of hostility.

The assaults typically took the form of a gang of about five men entering a room in the dead of the night and severely beating a resident with canes or clubs. In each case the person selected was an alleged "dog," and either a Nisei or a Kibei.

While a few people deplored the lawlessness of the beatings, almost everybody, whether Issei or Nisei, felt that the persons attacked had got what they deserved.

However, in addition to the assaults themselves, there were numerous warnings and threats conveyed indirectly and there was a lot of talk about a "Black List" and rumors of who was on it and who was not. From this there was a growing wave of uneasiness particularly among the Niseis who were in the Council, the Community Enterprises, and all the other departments that were closely associated with the Administration.

Among those threatened were the Chairman of the Council and the Methodist Minister.

Although, as in the case of "borrowing," the assaults were part of social disorganization, they also indicated a form of organization since they were perpetrated by gangs. Along

with other gangs which were appearing in the community, many of them juvenile, they represented the formation of closely knit groups, which if not new among the Japanese were assuming importance and dominance far greater than any they had known before. They were trying out their wings and finding that while some resented them and some tacitly approved, nobody was able to stop them.

THE Administration was no more immune to the forces playing upon it than were the residents, although the latter rarely realized that they were kicking against human beings as sensitive as themselves. In the beginning, the administrative staff had been in a far more secure position than the evacuees, but in the course of time the strain on the conscientious and responsible members became very great and probably worse than anything suffered by the majority of the Poston residents.

For one thing, coming, as many of the administrators did, with the desire to build something better for the evacuees, it was very hard to find themselves powerless to relieve much of the suffering which they saw, and it was still harder to bear the brunt of the antagonism engendered in the residents. The lack of supplies and the fizzling out of plans bothered some of the administrative officers more than it did anybody else. Reactions of irritation appeared among those who were people-minded. It was felt that the residents were not being realistic about the situation they were in, and while bickering among themselves and making demands on the Administration for the moon, were not taking advantage of the opportunities they did have. There was a growing feeling that they would have to be "dealt with firmly" and, as the Assistant Director said, if they could not manage better for themselves, "They will have to be shown." The assaults and failure to find the culprits was a dominant source of irritation to the Administration and seemed a reflection on it.

Although, unlike the evacuees, the administrative personnel received just compensation in salary for the work they did, like the evacuees, other forms of reward such as recognition and prestige and the satisfactions of accomplishment were lacking. It seemed that nowhere, from the residents, from higher offices in the Government or from the American public, was there any appreciation of what the Administration accomplished to balance the criticisms received from without and the feelings of frustration that arose within the individual persons. Although almost any one of the staff would have denied being interested in recognition, most of the important and productive members had come to Poston feeling that the task was at least a small part of a great national effort to win the war and the things the war stood for. The sense of belonging to all this was important to them. After six months they were more inclined to feel isolated in the desert and cut off from everything except criticism. More than one person thought longingly of military service where, even if detailed to the dullest work, there would at least be no doubt about what you should do, who you were and where you stood.

Among the demoralizing influences coming from outside the Project an important item was the continuing division of authority between the Indian Service and the War Relocation Authority. Poston received orders, information, notices and inquiries from both offices that were uncoordinated and confusing. Similarly, it was often a puzzle to know where to send outgoing business. Thus, to the other frustrations and uncertainties of the situation in Poston was added the burden of divided loyalties which is always a very serious and incapacitating matter for the very people who are otherwise most able to give efficient and faithful service.

Poston was no exception to the rule that no man can serve two masters.

A related major source of trouble was the change in War Relocation Authority policy. In June the directorship passed

from Mr. Eisenhower to Dillon Myer, and by September, as already noted, Mr. Myer made it clear that he wished to see the Relocation Centers dissolved and the evacuees resettled permanently in those parts of the United States where there were no restrictions.

Nobody in the Poston Administration felt any hostility to the policy as part of the total program for handling the problem of relocation, and many were quick to praise the great strides that the Authority made under Mr. Myer's leadership in opening opportunities for the evacuees. However, as a result of various announcements and private statements it appeared that the War Relocation Authority was emphasizing resettlement to the exclusion of other considerations and determined to discourage directly and indirectly all efforts at community building on the ground that such would make the people "too comfortable" and would operate against resettlement.[3]

The members of the Administration were not in harmony with this emphasis for a number of reasons. In the first place they did not think the Authority would be able to resettle many of the residents, particularly the Isseis who could not adjust to life in wartime America, and it was also thought that the American public would not readily accept persons who so plainly showed the physical appearance, language and manners of a bitter enemy. In addition to this, the playing down of community-building was directly contrary to the incentives which the Project Administration had endeavored to set up for the evacuees and it was also a contradiction of the pledges given by both the Indian Service and the War Relocation Authority at the beginning of the relocation program. It was another addition to the things which the

[3] The War Relocation Authority uses the word "relocation" to mean both the movement to Relocation Centers and the movement from Relocation Centers to outside employment. In this book, in order to avoid confusion, "relocation" is used to refer only to the movement into the centers and "resettlement" is employed for movement into jobs in non-restricted areas.

residents would be able to point to and say, "See, nothing you say is reliable." Furthermore, the Administration felt that the residents seriously needed some immediate sense of stability and security. Finally, as pointed out in a previous chapter, the building of a community had come to have a personal meaning to many of the administrative staff because of their identification with it and because they had made that aim the one certain objective in a very uncertain world.

It would be foolish to suggest that a policy once established should not be changed, even in the face of previous commitments, especially if better opportunities can be made. However, it is a good general principle that in making such changes, the previous commitments should be taken into consideration, the people to be affected consulted and an orderly process of step by step transition worked out.

At any rate, in the specific instance at Poston, many difficulties and new conflicts might have been avoided had some such procedure been followed embracing both evacuees and Administration.

In brief, it can be said that in the fall, the struggle to build a community that would be a secure and going concern was being lost by its sponsors both in the Administration and among the residents, and that social disorganization was making itself more and more felt. Since the channels for social organization that had been originally planned were never sufficiently dug, the rising flood in the population of Poston began to swirl on its own and to dig here and there in preparation for cutting its own way.

9. Fires

In November, bonfires became a picturesque feature of the Poston landscape. They glowed in the dark with silhouetted figures moving before them, and in the mornings they pushed up hundreds of columns of blue smoke in the quiet air. The nights had turned very cold with the thermometer dropping to freezing, and the fires were part of an effort to keep warm. Although stoves had been ordered long ago, they had not arrived. Neither was there any weather-stripping, wallboard, or material to cover the cracks through which the wind came slicing easily. Clothing, or clothing allowances, had been promised, but had not been forthcoming, and there was considerable physical suffering among old persons, invalids and children, especially in the poorer classes who could not buy extra protection in blankets and coats.

After breakfast, people gathered about the fires at the periphery of their blocks and stood working the stiffness out of their muscles and joints. Those who had jobs for the most part did not go to them for several hours, because it was too cold in the offices to hold a pencil or touch a typewriter. In this, the residents did not differ from most of the Administration, for everywhere there was a forced slowdown or omission of duties in the first hours of the working day.

As the residents stood around the fires, warmed by the flames and the fellowship, there was an atmosphere conducive to group solidarity, to rumination on grievances and the reinforcement of resentments by mutual exchange. It was easy for the mind to travel from the absence of stoves to other things. The mosquito screens had been in the warehouse for months, but had not been released until the mosquito season was over. Although the Government could not get materials to improve the physical conditions of the

evacuees they were able to get them to build new offices, and although they could not get what was needed to construct chicken ranches and enclosures to keep Indian cattle out of the gardens, they were able to build twelve miles of fence around the three units—serving to make the place seem more than ever like a concentration camp. Nobody had been paid since September.

And so it went—narrow, in-growing thoughts back over the whole string of "injustices," the formerly poor food, the previous lack of medical care, the tragedies of evacuation, piling one thing on top of another to create accumulations of indignation that grew into monsters out of all true proportion.

The fires, drawing people together in their mutual discomfort, contributed to the levelling of the former differences in wealth, education, occupation and religion that had separated the many varieties of Japanese in America. This process had been going on ever since the beginning of evacuation because of common problems, common threats to security, common branding with the "Jap" label, and common housing, food and immediate needs in the Center. Being treated all alike was beginning to make them alike.

However, the Issei-Nisei differences were not obliterated, and if one looked at the fires, one could see that Isseis and Niseis tended to gather in separate clusters.

One type of fire group was exclusively men, Isseis with a sprinkling of Kibeis. Their talk easily ran from their current discomforts and blaming the Administration, to blaming the Niseis even more and pointing out that most of the evil, from evacuation down to the lack of stoves, was due to mishandling by Nisei leaders, especially the Japanese American Citizens League. They were weak, it was said, did not know how to stand up for their rights and needed the leadership of the older people. There was evident resentment at having their juniors in years, experience and social position occupy places of superiority both in self-government and

in jobs. Sometimes there was aggression expressed in such form as "The Niseis must learn"—which interestingly paralleled the Assistant Director's feeling that the residents "must be shown." The assaults which had occurred were looked on with approval in this light, although only a small number of persons knew who the actual perpetrators of the attacks were. Sometimes the antagonism was more sublimated and took the form of insisting that they were all Japanese and they must pull together, Isseis and Niseis, as one. Inherent in this, however, was the idea that the Niseis would do as the Isseis told them and then, when thus united, there would be "nothing we cannot accomplish."

National feelings were closely related and might be summarized in this manner: since we have all been kicked around by the United States Government, let us stick together and not let any spurious citizenship rights lead us into separation; since we have been deserted by America, let us look elsewhere for help in our struggle when we need it. They were fervently pro-Japan and spoke warmly and openly to each other about it. Neither the big over-all plans for community-building of the Indian Service nor the resettlement schemes of the War Relocation Authority were attractive to them. They wanted to make the best of Poston for the duration of the war and then return with their children to Japan as their only hope for security and happiness. Their ties to America had become greatly weakened since the days before evacuation and there was an element of blind faith in their conviction that Japan would win and that within a year the war would be over and they would be seeing better days. Premonitions, prophecies and fortune-telling devices like the Ouija Board were very popular and widely discussed.

There was nothing at variance with common human trends in this attitude of the Isseis, although they themselves wrapped it tenderly and protectively in many layers of Japanese culture and noble, mystic sentiments. It was the usual retreat from reality into the fantasies of hope that is often

seen when human beings are under stress—a retreat which can stir whole groups to fanaticism and messianic movements.

Insofar as such behavior is a mystery anywhere, in that degree it was mysterious and inscrutable at Poston, but there was no indication that it included anything innately peculiar to the Japanese as a race.

Although hungry for news, the Isseis were badly informed on current events because of inability to understand English and dependence on Nisei translations of radio and newspapers which were often far from adequate. Under the pressure of their desires, as well as their fears, the Isseis were able to believe the most absurd rumors and when they encountered news unfavorable to Japan, they rejected it as "propaganda."

It is worth recalling that prior to evacuation, Attorney General Biddle warned that "persecution of aliens" would drive them into support of the enemy.

Personalities who had always been disposed to complain and cause trouble now had attentive audiences about the fires such as they never had had before. Cranks found their grandiose or suspicious notions taken up and passed around the camp as effective rumors. For those who wanted to achieve power by stirring up indignation, there was plenty of material, and this behavior was after the very same pattern that politicians had used for years in California when they created followings by playing on anti-Japanese sentiment. In this case, the focus was different, it was anti-Administration sentiment, but the mechanism was the same.

Rowdies who before the war had been regarded with disapproval were now in favor because they were aiming their gangsterism toward punishing certain Niseis who were symbols against which the antagonism of the Isseis was directed.

Persons who were initially skeptical or fearful of all this nevertheless had no place to go except to the fires for

warmth and, after a time, they came under the spell of the constant reiteration and the feelings of the others.

"Such a goose is man," said Carlyle, "will cackle with his whole soul merely if others cackle."

Around other fires, there were family groups, including Nisei children in their early teens or younger. The trend of thought in these was similar to that already outlined, and the children, mirroring the ideas of their parents, sometimes horrified the teachers in school when they repeated them. Women and children whose husbands and fathers were interned were strongest in expressing bitterness and resentment against the Niseis, the Administration and the United States.

A third type of cluster was composed of Niseis, young men and women together, or at different fires. To a large extent, they were sore at everything. They were annoyed and uneasy about the talk of their parents and other Isseis, and they were equally bitter about the treatment they had received from the American public, Government and the Poston Administration. Although ever since evacuation they had been growing more and more into the orbit of Issei life —because of constant contact, hearing more Japanese, and working more closely with their families to solve the problems which they shared—this very closeness served to make the lines of cleavage more marked and more painful.

The general lack of social structure affected the Niseis perhaps more than the Isseis. Most aspects of life were lived with acquaintances made since coming to Poston and every individual and every family was trying to adjust to a society that had no framework and no stability. Hardly anyone had a confident expectation as to how anybody with whom he worked or had contact would behave from week to week. The result was that each seemed to the other unpredictable, even odd, or queer. Not really knowing one's neighbors, the political leaders, and the trustees of the community funds, or knowing only scraps and gossipy fragments from their

past, reported frequently by personal enemies, the community was left a prey to vicious rumors and vivid fears. Threats, beatings and "Black Lists" were manifestations of this and were increasing until as one individual said, "The lack of harmony is almost unbearable."

To the Niseis, there seemed to be no protection. All efforts by the Project Administration and law enforcement agencies to find the perpetrators of the assaults had been futile. Nevertheless, the Niseis had to live in the community amid all sorts of unknown people and realizing that the Administration could give them nothing but moral support.

The power of the Nisei leaders had never been much, but was now on the decline because they had not been able to produce through their contacts with the Administration the things which the community needed and were not able to control the threats and reduce the suspicions.

With the general lack of social organization, the lack of security in relation to other Americans and lack of success arising out of Nisei leadership, two other factors of significance operated to prevent the Niseis from welding themselves into a group sufficiently solid to deal with the circumstances. One was the fact that they shared the Isseis' hatred of informers and believed that untold suffering had been visited upon the Japanese by the arrest and detention of great numbers of persons who were genuinely innocent of any harmful act or intention. They were also full of pent-up aggressive feelings as a result of their many frustrations, and these urges were ready to take advantage of any outlet. Consequently the Niseis got considerable satisfaction, in the beginning, at any rate, out of the reports of the beatings, though latterly they began to appreciate the painful effects of the spreading universal suspicion.


Secondly, family relationships cut across the tendencies making for Nisei solidarity. The Niseis might talk against Isseis but they were not very likely to take action against

them as a group. It was much easier for the Isseis to band together against the Administration and brush their children aside, telling them it was for their own good, than it was for the Niseis to band together against their elders, however divergent their views. For Isseis to punish Niseis, even by sponsoring or condoning beatings, was not too far out of the ordinary family pattern, but for the Niseis to punish Isseis was at great variance with the family patterns and values of both American and Japanese society.

The reaction of the Niseis to all this was various, but certain general trends could be noted. Some were outspokenly rebellious and aggressive toward the Government, but with nothing pro-Japan intermingled. Instead it was in the American tradition, with cries for constitutional and individual rights and a revolt against being pushed around by authority. In dwelling on their misery, some had become intensely selfish, often seeing nothing but their own individual problems and caring not at all for the future of their fellow residents, much less the United States. With others there was a quiet drift, taking the easiest course, into conformity with the views of the Isseis. Perhaps the largest number were inclined to be apathetic and cynical and subscribed to the phrase common in Poston, "Don't stick your neck out," followed by some personal version of "A plague o' both your houses," addressed to Administration and Isseis.

One final characteristic of the groups around the fires should be noted. They were block members together and, in addition to the clustering along Issei and Nisei lines, there was also some gathering in terms of the cliques and factions already established within the blocks, such as kitchen workers, bachelors, women's associations, block manager's staff and others.

Thus Poston stood by the middle of November, with inhibitions wearing down, with small lumps of social organization appearing in the fluid confusion, and with mount-



Above: *Fishermen*
Below: *Harvesting Daikon*





Queen of a harvest festival

ing emotional pressure so that the "lack of harmony was almost unbearable." The flood was swelling and the dam was weakening and it only remained for a small opening to appear anywhere and the whole pent-up weight would tear it wide and rush through.

10. Beginning of the Strike

With individual human beings, severe and prolonged frustration frequently leads to aggression in some form.

However, even when this happens to a group of people, it does not necessarily follow that the group as a whole will revolt. It is possible that the aggressive tendencies and actions of the individual members may be directed against each other and consequently no united action be achieved. For societies, it is perhaps a valid generalization to say that severe frustration may lead to diffusely directed aggression with consequent social disorganization and deterioration, or it may lead to sharply focused aggression with improved social organization and consequent capacity for performing as a concerted group—or both may happen simultaneously.

The predominant development which a given society will show in a given situation depends on many factors of which the following are no doubt important: type of frustration, degree of frustration, previous social organization, especially type of leadership, and the dominant opinions and attitudes of the people.

In the specific case of Poston, the aggression took the form of openly expressed hostility and was accompanied by a development in social organization.

On Saturday night, November 14, while asleep in one of the bachelors' barracks an evacuee was attacked by a number of unidentified men and beaten with a piece of pipe until he was unconscious and nearly dead.

This individual was a 30-year-old Kibei who, among several other occupations, had formerly been a rice broker in California. Long before evacuation there had been many people who thought that he swindled farmers and it was said that he had treated his wife and her family very badly.

After Pearl Harbor, it was believed that he gave numerous innocent names to the authorities as a means of making money and settling personal grudges. After he came to Poston, stories began to go around that he was attempting to achieve political power by telling newly arrived residents that they would have to "register" with him and do as he told them, or he would "report" them. For a while he was close to the Administration, particularly the Reports Officer, and had been placed in charge of making translations of official announcements. However, as the accusations concerning his past life became known and as it became apparent that he was using the translations as a means of achieving power, he fell into disfavor. When the Council was formed, he was elected a member by his block, but had recently resigned and was preparing to leave the Center.

Shortly after the beating, the evacuee police rounded up some fifty suspects who were interviewed by the Chief of Internal Security and by the Reports Officer.

The latter thought he was on the trail of "something big." According to him, there was a "pro-Axis" gang in camp which was gaining control, but thanks to his information the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be able to save the situation.

Of the men interviewed, two were detained for further investigation.

One has appeared previously in this history as one of the members of the Judicial Commission which had been handling minor crimes in Unit I. He was a Buddhist, single, aged 27, and a Kibei, but he spoke English well and was popular with numerous Niseis, Isseis and members of the Administration as well as other Kibeis. He had completed high school in Japan and had then gone to the University of Southern California for two years to study foreign trade. His family were wealthy and operated a large restaurant in a town in California.

In appearance, he was small, well built, and exceedingly

neat in dress. His manner was quiet, unobtrusive and friendly and almost all who knew him agreed that he was a very likable person. He took his responsibilities to the community seriously and seemed cooperative and well disposed toward the Administration.

One of his sisters had been married to and then divorced from the victim of the beating and there was considerable hostile feeling between the two men.

The other man detained was also a Kibei, single and aged 27, but he spoke very little English and was unknown to the Administration. The son of a farmer in California, he had received in Japan a fourth-grade rating in judo which is considered extremely high. Prior to evacuation he had been a judo instructor and after arriving in Poston he had continued in that activity at the Judo Club under the auspices of the Department of Adult Education.

He was not widely known to the Poston residents but moved among close friends, neighbors, the Goh Club, and his associates in judo. Because of his high judo rating, he enjoyed a good deal of prestige and was the leader of a group of younger men who were principally his students. Although he had a brother in the American Army, his own attitude was one of dislike toward the United States.

As far as the attack was concerned, there was no evidence that he had had anything to do with it, but there were considerable circumstantial data indicating that he had participated in one of the previous beatings.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation was called and their aid secured. The investigation went on over a period of days and although no charges were lodged, the Poston police continued to hold the men for the Federal Officers.

WHILE this was happening, the family and friends of both men began seeking ways and means for their release. A central fear seemed to be that the prisoners would be taken out of the community and that, public sentiment being what

it was in Arizona, no Japanese could have a fair trial. Considerable resentment was felt as a result of rumors that the Reports Officer and the Chief of Internal Security had used harsh methods in their cross-examinations and had hinted that if the suspects did not talk it might result in internment of their parents.

Meetings were held in the blocks where the two men had lived, and a number of Isseis were delegated to visit the Project Director. This they did on Tuesday, November 17, and, attesting to the good character of both the suspects, offered to show evidence that they were innocent. The Director referred them to the FBI investigators, who refused to consider release pending completion of their examination. The delegates came away feeling that they had been rudely handled, and meetings were held that night in at least six blocks to discuss what to do next. Plans were laid for staging a demonstration in front of the jail to prevent removal of the men, and some organization was established for promoting a strike if release was not obtained promptly.

The leadership in these meetings was predominantly Issei and the plans and division of work formed the nucleus around which the entire strike movement later coalesced all over Unit I.

It has been many times stated by residents that the strike was "spontaneous" and represented "the will of all the people." Every bit of evidence, however, indicates that while the will for something to happen was already present in the consciousness of most people, the movement, like almost all other social movements that have ever been carefully examined, was not truly spontaneous, but was whipped up by a small group playing on a responsive instrument.

Before 9 o'clock in the morning of Wednesday the 18th, a second delegation appeared with a petition containing one hundred and ten names from one block and respectfully requesting the release of the prisoners on the ground that they were innocent—and again offering to show evidence to

prove it. These were once more referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, where as before they were unsuccessful in achieving their aim.

About the middle of the morning the Director and the Associate Director left to attend a War Relocation Authority meeting in Salt Lake City. The extent of the unrest in Poston was at that time unknown to them and to the Assistant Director who was left in charge.

It so happened that a number of other people important in the leadership of Poston were also out of the community. The Project Attorney was away on Project business and the Council Chairman had gone to attend a national conference of the Japanese American Citizens League.

IN THE camp at large, excitement mounted. Rumors flew that the Judo Instructor was to be held for murder. There were stories of new beatings and new threats and it was said that the Methodist Minister who had been active in the cooperative movement was going to be killed. Before the jail a few hundred people gathered, as had been planned the previous night and a number of members of the Judo Club were evident among them. Some speeches were made to the effect that they would prevent the removal of the prisoners at any cost and were prepared to turn over the Federal Bureau of Investigation car when it came and to spirit the prisoners out of the jail. The bell of a nearby mess hall was struck to attract attention and people were urged to join the crowd.

The Chairman of the Issei Advisory Board appeared, and, commenting that this was a mass meeting, wrote out a declaration and climbed up on a tank that happened to be lying near and made a speech stressing the demand for release.

At noon representatives from the demonstrators, chiefly the older men, went to all blocks and announced that there would be a general strike and that everybody was to go

down to the jail in the afternoon. The spark of excitement caught, even though people did not know a thing about the prisoners or the matter for which they were being held. A good many individuals were uncertain when they heard these firm announcements of a strike and being called to the jail, but it seemed easier and more interesting to drift down after lunch and see what it was all about than to return to jobs. By afternoon, the crowd had increased to several thousand, and was getting more and more fired by speechmakers and by the rising tide of its own feelings. As one participant said, "I didn't know what the issues were and I don't imagine anyone else did either—there were so many conflicting issues. Every one took up the torch in defense of his own particular peeve."

A LITTLE after 1 P.M., the regular Council and Issei Advisory Board meeting took place, but all matters were set aside in favor of considering what to do about what they called "the mob" at the jail. Councilmen had in some cases received hastily written petitions and they were asking questions of each other in regard to the charges against the prisoners. Spectators and demonstrators trickled into the meeting to watch and exert pressure.

The proceedings were interrupted by the dramatic appearance of the Assistant Director, who said that he had addressed the crowd urging them to disperse and to trust the Project Director to see that justice would be done and further to trust the "properly constituted authorities to do the job for which they are equipped." This speech, the Assistant Director said, did not have the desired effect, so he wished the Council to assume responsibility for making the wants of the people known to the Project Director in proper form. He warned them that gatherings like that outside the jail were dangerous for the community.

The Assistant Director was finding himself projected into these events suddenly and without much information con-

cerning what had gone before. He did not know of the two delegations that had come to see the Director, nor of the circumstances under which the men were being held. His first desire was to get rid of the crowd and he told the Council that he had the word of the FBI investigators that the prisoners would not be taken out of the camp before the following Monday. In that case, he thought, matters could be held on an even keel until the Director's return.

The idea that the Council should represent the people fell in with its intentions, but it was unimpressed by the promise not to remove the men until Monday. The members tried to find out on what grounds the prisoners were being held and pondered delaying matters.

At this point the Chairman of the Issei Advisory Board arose and made a speech in which he said that representation had already been made to the Administration without effect. The crowd before the jail wanted results and would never be satisfied with anything less than immediate and complete release. As usual, the Issei Chairman was fluent and persuasive. Wanting definite "results" struck a chord to which almost all responded. It was time to end promises and delays; it was time, for once, to get something they wanted and to get it now. There were murmurs of approval through the Council, Issei Advisors and spectators and a few low and firm voices saying, "Yes, yes."

Some of the legal minds in the Council pointed out that release of the men could not interfere with the FBI investigation since the prisoners would still be in camp and the charges against them could be filed later if the evidence warranted it. In the meantime, the crowd would be dispersed and the Council would have shown itself able to fulfill the desire of the people.

There seemed to be some general agreement that this was the course to take in order to prevent the situation from becoming worse. Release did not mean stopping the inves-

tigation, but meant making sure the men would not be taken out of the community for the time being.

On this basis, a member of the Law Department drew up a resolution for presentation to the Assistant Director. The nub of the matter was release, and "reasons" were added in an effort to achieve that end.

"Whereas, [the two prisoners] have been held in jail since 2 A.M. Sunday morning, the 15th of November, 1942, and

"Whereas, no charges have as yet been filed against the above named parties, and

"Whereas, the residents of Poston feeling aggrieved and indignant of this unjust action taken against these two people have demonstrated in numbers their feelings in open meeting, and

"Whereas, for the orderly preservation of law and order and for the peace and dignity of this community, and

"Whereas, the above named two parties should not be further restrained until complete investigation has been made and in the event the evidence so justifies a lawful charge be filed against them, the Temporary Community Council of Poston I lawfully assembled make the following petition and request:

"Be it resolved, that the above named persons . . . , be released immediately."

A recess was called and the results of the Council's action were taken down to the jail for presentation to the crowd. The Assistant Director, in the meantime, was in consultation with the Federal Bureau Officers and after hearing the evidence, became convinced that it was sufficient to warrant holding the Judo Instructor for trial.

No information, however, concerning the grounds for suspicion was given to the prisoners, their families or any evacuee.

When the Council met again at 4, there came with it a number of persons from the crowd who looked tough and belligerent and some of them carried clubs. They took posi-

tions chiefly at the back of the hall and they joined in the shouts and exerted pressure on the far from unwilling Council.

Proceedings began with the Assistant Director making a short speech in which he said that he could not comply with the Council's recommendation. Council members now in the growing spirit of the crowd began calling for unqualified dropping of the case, not mere release.

The emotional spree was on and matters moved rapidly to a climax.

The Assistant Director said that law and order must be maintained and he entreated the Council to have faith in the Administration and to think of their own future. The Vice-Chairman of the Council, a very Americanized Nisei acting in the absence of the Chairman, carried by the intense waves of feeling of those around him said,

"These men [the prisoners] are not even charged. They have not been held legally. Now, if that is granted to us, I think things will run smoothly. If they are guilty, it is up to the people to determine that they are guilty."

There was widespread clapping at this, and then he added, regretfully, "If you cannot trust us, then we have nothing more to do. We feel you should give us self-government."

The Assistant Director stood firm.

The Council resigned in a body.

The Issei advisers followed after a short speech by their Chairman.

All trooped out of the hall and went down to join the demonstrators before the jail.

Later, the Block Managers resigned en masse and soon the Administration received word that on the next day there would be a general strike of all evacuee help in Unit I.

ABOUT 6 o'clock the Assistant Director held a meeting in his office that was attended by the principal staff members, the Federal Bureau of Investigation officers and two Army

representatives. Discussion centered on whether or not to call in the Military Police to disperse the crowd.

Everybody present considered it at least a possibility that behind the demonstration there was a pro-Japan plot aimed at causing destruction of property, trouble and discredit to the Government. There was also a reaction to the challenging attitude of the demonstrators that disposed administrative officers to wish strongly to defeat them and to see that they did not get what they wanted, quite irrespective of the merits of their case.

For those who were stereotype-minded, like the Fiscal Officer and the Supply Officer, the matter was very simple. The "Japs" (considered all alike) were "raising hell" and it was the duty of any good American to go in there, slap them down and show them their places. The whole disturbance was due to previous coddling and "lack of discipline."

The Chief Administrative Officer thought that the Army would be required for the sake of protecting government property.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation representatives and the Chief Internal Security Officer of the Center said that they could not continue their work unless order was restored and in addition they thought that prompt action was a duty owed to "the loyal Japanese in Poston."

The Army Officers refrained from expressing an opinion, but said that they would be ready to act if the Assistant Director declared that a state of riot existed and asked for their assistance. They made it clear that once they came in, they would take complete charge of Poston while the crowd was dispersed and order was restored, but that they would not stay beyond the time required to accomplish this purpose and that the Administration would be responsible for carrying on immediately afterward.

To the Assistant Director and most of the rest of the staff, the matter appeared to have serious aspects not appearing in the thinking of those who called for the prompt applica-

tion of military force. A number of these were as follows:

It was obvious that the evacuees had suffered many things which, quite aside from "pro-Axis" tendencies, would make them likely to demonstrate on almost any convenient pretext.

Among the demonstrators and strikers were numerous persons well known to the Administration as loyal, cooperative and intelligent. Their presence not only gave the impression that the demands should be carefully considered, but it also suggested that the movement had stable and fair-minded influences at work in it.

Although it seemed likely that "pro-Axis agitators" had seized an opportunity to create trouble, there was no reliable information as to who they were. Consequently, it seemed that waiting would do more than affirmative action toward getting them to show their hands, and would reduce the possibility of committing injustices which would aggravate the situation.

Although at this time wrapped in considerable obscurity because of the absence of the Project Attorney, the legal position of the Administration was very shaky. The Constitution of the State of Arizona provides that all persons charged with crime shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great. In California where most of the evacuees had formerly resided, the law requires the defendants in all cases to be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay and in any event within two days after the arrest. There were hardly any grounds for holding the Judicial Commission Member. Against the Judo Instructor there were considerable circumstantial data indicating that he had participated in a previous beating, but this was a matter for the State rather than the Federal authorities, and the State had not yet entered the picture. It seems probable that had the situation occurred in an ordinary town with access to writs of habeas corpus, the Judo Instructor's lawyer would

have had him out of jail long before this, or else charges would have been filed in a proper manner. It was a combination of the unusual circumstances, the power of the Administration and the helplessness of the evacuees that had made the current condition possible.

To what extent the Administration was bound to detain the men for the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not certain, especially in the face of doubt concerning the technical justification. On the other hand, it was the Administration that had asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation for help and it was in any event the duty of every American in time of war to do whatever the Federal Bureau of Investigation requested unless it was absolutely certain that the individual officer making the request was in error and asking something definitely contrary to law.

In considering what would happen if the soldiers were brought in, there seemed to be no question but what they could stop the demonstration in short order. However, it appeared most likely that the fire would be driven underground rather than quenched and that the hitherto collaboratively-minded residents would be alienated from the Administration and moved deeper into the arms of the oppositional group by what they would regard as high-handed injustice that gave the lie to all the Administration had said about self-government. Breaking up the crowd would not stop the strike, and there was no machinery whereby the Army could detail men to force work upon aliens much less citizens, even had such been considered desirable.

The possibility of bloodshed had to be carefully weighed. There were large numbers of women and children in the crowd as well as able-bodied though unarmed men. The adjacent unit of Military Police consisted of about seventy-five soldiers and they were not seasoned, as the Administration well knew from observation, and included many who had been in the Army only a matter of weeks. It was reason-

able to wonder how careful they could be should somebody start throwing pop bottles. The shooting of a few unarmed persons, especially if by accident they were children, would not only be a matter of extreme repugnance to the Administration, but it would probably make enemies of almost all the evacuees and render future collaborative effort extremely difficult. Furthermore, it would have a damaging effect on the other Relocation Centers and have propaganda value for Japan in the Far East.

However, there was another side of the picture. Without the aid of the Army, would damage come to government property, and to the lives of government employees, their wives and children who were living in the community? Quite aside from what Axis agents might do, there are always plenty of hoodlums and irresponsible persons to be found in any group as large as 9,000 who would be likely to take advantage of a disturbance in order to commit vandalism, petty thievery, or attack persons against whom they had a grudge. Under the existing emotional imbalance, the numbers of people so disposed would probably be greater than average. An ill-advised act by either a resident or government employee might precipitate the present rather controlled demonstration into a real riot. The possibility of fires that might cost many lives had to be considered.

Nobody entertained the idea of letting the prisoners go. In spite of the legal uncertainties, it was thought that such a gesture would gain scant respect from the community and would weaken the influence of the Administration. Besides, it simply went against the grain to be ordered by a mob, even if the mob were partly right. "Face" seems to be important in all societies and certainly Orientals have no monopoly as compared to our own American traditions.

Not all of these various possibilities were so definitely evident as here described during the meeting in the Assistant Director's office in the gathering dusk of that November evening. Nevertheless, the main pressures made themselves

felt and it was only too clear that, no matter which way the Assistant Director decided, there was grave risk and grave responsibility for the lives of persons and the future of the Project.

After listening to the discussion and advice, the Assistant Director stood reflecting and looking out a window at the gray sky and the gray desert.

There was no doubt as to what the easiest course would be as far as his own welfare was concerned. If he called in the soldiers, then his personal responsibility would be ended and, no matter how badly things went subsequently, he at least would be in the clear. It might be construed as administrative failure, and his superiors might feel that he had let them down, but no one could really blame him, or say that he had in any way failed in his duty since he was only Acting Project Director. On the other hand, if he did not ask for military help and one person were hurt, or a fire started, he would be directly to blame for having permitted it to happen, for disregarding the advice of the FBI officers, for disregarding the statement by the Army representatives that they were prepared to stop the demonstration and for failing to listen to the wishes of some staff members. It was a thing that the newspapers, already hot about the "coddling" of Japanese, could use with telling effect, and it was something that a war-angry public would not pause to understand even if the facts became available. Most likely those who now advised him against calling in the Army would nevertheless hold him accountable if this course failed; the responsibility was his and his alone.

Indeed, the essence of his position was a choice between a certain escape for himself and an act which, if it succeeded, would be its own reward, but if it failed would be proof of poor judgment and bring condemnation from those who approved his principles as well as from those who disapproved of them.

Every administrator must be prepared when the time

comes to back himself against the world, and if necessary take the consequences of losing. It is no field for the faint of heart.

The Assistant Director turned back from the window and said to the staff that he would not as yet ask the Army to take charge of the camp. He would, however, ask them to patrol around the outside of Unit I, to guard the motor pool, to stop all travel between the three units except what was especially authorized and to place a soldier as a liaison man in the administrative office.

On hearing this, the stereotype-minded members of the Administration were greatly disturbed. The most outspoken were the Fiscal Officer and the Supply Officer. The Chief Administrative Officer was more restrained and held the other members of his staff in line, but he worried about property and was out of sympathy with the Assistant Director's policy.

It has been suggested that among the evacuees one of the motivating forces of the Poston strike was the accumulation of many repressed feelings of anger and indignation from a great many different frustrations. The same reaction could be noted in the staff, and from some of them there rushed a white heat of hostility to meet the antipathy of the residents. This is not to say that the staff members who suffered the greatest total amount of frustration were the most antagonistic toward the Japanese in any simple ratio. It did seem, however, that there was a high proportion of antipathy manifested among those who had found their aims in Poston directly disturbed by Japanese, such as the engineers and construction men who had been trying to work with $12-per-month evacuee labor.

It might also be pointed out that those who showed marked antagonism had in general the least knowledge of the residents, and it was concerning these persons that complaints of racial prejudice had most often been heard. Included in this number were also those who, quite aside from

whether or not they could have helped it, had nevertheless been most responsible for delays in payment, clothing allowance, stoves, other supplies, and structural improvements—delays which had adversely affected the achievement of social stability and paved the way to the strike.

PARALLELING the meeting of the administrative staff, another gathering for discussion was held among the residents. The members of the delegation that had called on the Director seeking the release of the prisoners, the Chairman and other leaders of the Issei Advisory Board, the Methodist Minister and others in the cooperative party worked together to form an emergency committee. They asked the people assembled before the jail to select two representatives per block from among their number and send them to a meeting. When assembled, this committee consisted of 72 persons many of whom were newcomers in community leadership, but there were also among them 20 members of the Issei Advisory Board, 12 Councilmen and 5 Block Managers.

Speechmaking went far into the night and covered the full range of Issei sentiment from cool conservatism to wild demands for instant forceful action, even as had the thoughts expressed in the administrative staff meeting. While some believed they should achieve their objectives by orderly procedure and without violence, others wanted to kick the Administration and the United States Government as hard as they possibly could. They were drunk with the pleasure of being able at last to express their angry feelings and although stating that they were prepared to die before the machine guns of the Army, they were relying on protection by the might of Japan, exerted through the Spanish Consul, and through her hold on American prisoners.

It was found that the Committee of 72 was too large to make progress and so an Emergency Executive Council of 12 was created in the early hours of Thursday morning, November 19. This included one representative from each

group of four blocks, or "quad" and three additional members. Eleven were Isseis and one was a Kibei. The Chairman of the Issei Advisory Board and the Methodist Minister occupied prominent places.

THE Niseis, although in general giving their support to the strike, found their power and influence pushed into the background while Isseis took over the reins of the community with Kibeis assisting.

By the evening of the 18th, from a small group concerned only with the release of the prisoners, organization had spread to the whole of Unit I. The mass of the population knew little about the prisoners and cared less, until their plight became a symbol of everybody's grievance. From that point on, the movement rushed with gathering momentum, leaving some of its initiators far behind and sweeping up into its form many other issues.

The various more or less isolated elements of social organization which have been described in the course of this history began working together. The Judo and Goh Clubs were supporters of the Judo Instructor. The Judicial Commission and the Council had been closely associated with the Judicial Commission Member. The Chairman of the Issei Advisory Board was of course their leader and he still had his following of bachelors. The Minister was a pivotal figure in the cooperative group, and also drew on the sympathy of the Christians. From each of these, lines ran out to other clusters. It is noteworthy that the form which the governing body of the community took was similar to that originally outlined by the rejected Civic Planning Board in June and that the geographic units of block and quad were the funda mental bricks out of which the total structure was built. Representatives came from these units to make up the Committee of 72 and from each quad to compose the Committee of 12. Every block sent pickets in regular eight-hour shifts to watch before the jail, and each such group gathered about

a fire and a flag that bore the block's number. The kitchens provided additional meals for night shifts and women took over cooking so that the men could serve their turn with the pickets.

Radiating from the central committee, departments were set up to take care of immediate needs. One was formed to maintain law and order, and about twenty young men were detailed to patrol quietly and see to it that there were no acts of vandalism.

Thus, from a small focus, cohesion spread through Unit I, binding those lumps of social structure that had hitherto been floating more or less freely in the matrix.

AT THE Military Police camp there was evident a good deal of excitement and running to and fro. Apparently as a result of misunderstanding on the part of subordinates, a weapon carrier and a jeep entered Unit I instead of patrolling the outside, and twice representatives of the Administration had to appeal to the commanding officer to have them removed.

It seemed that the Supply Officer's ideas had permeated many of the men. They talked excitedly with torrents of abuse against the evacuees and expressed the desire for an opportunity to shoot them. The Commanding Officer said the sentries were so nervous that it was dangerous even for administrative personnel to approach them.

LATE in the evening the Assistant Director received a note borne by the former assistant supervisor of the Block Managers. It was polite in tone and suggested that arrangements be made for the continued operation of subsistence, police, fire department and hospital during the general strike, and it guaranteed that there would be no violence.

The note was signed by two men in the name of "all the people of Poston." One of these was an Issei Advisory Board member. He was a 53-year-old farm manager, a Christian

and married, who could speak, read and write English as well as Japanese.

He had reached Poston on August 10, paroled from internment at Bismarck, North Dakota, and had gone to live with his family which was already established in a block that was composed chiefly of volunteers. His daughter was a teacher and took a prominent part in girls' activities. He early displayed active interest in the plight of the prisoners, saying that he was going to "fight" with his "life" to get them released. At the meeting of the Committee of 72 he was the principal organizer and later had a prominent position in the Emergency Executive Council of 12.

The other signer was 36, married, and had had ten years of schooling in Japan, when he returned to the United States at the age of 16. In America he had six more years of education, including training as a mechanic, and later he successfully ran his own farm in California.

In appearance he was of stocky build and sloppily dressed in laborer's clothes. His manner in addressing Niseis and other Americans was abrupt, even rude and arrogant, but properly respectful toward the older Isseis. His English vocabulary was extensive, but he had a marked Kibei accent and frequently reversed his "R" and "L". Another Kibei once sized him up as "not very intelligent looking, but smart enough."

In Poston, he lived in the same block as the Chairman of the Issei Advisory Board and was elected to the Council when it was formed. Although he did not play a prominent role there, he was made a member of its Works Progress Committee and was in a clique within the Council that was, on the whole, in opposition to the Administration. In serving on the Works Progress Committee he had dealings with the cotton picking, the camouflage and other ventures and took a stand that was questioning and not very cooperative. He consistently sought more power for the Japanese in Poston and at times served as an interpreter and explainer

concerning community affairs for the Isseis. Although he was quick to challenge the Administration to live up to its promises in self-government, he did not believe in democratic procedures and spoke disparagingly of the elective system. Some of his attitudes are revealed in a speech he made at a Kibei meeting sometime after the strike. He said, "After the strike, I became convinced that it was necessary to teach ultrapatriots what real Japanese are like. Many Niseis over 30 began to think, 'We have to fight for the Japanese people.' They are now working with the sole intention of benefiting the Japanese people. Many Niseis around 20 are still irresponsible and must be brought into line. For this they must learn the Japanese language and ways."

The members of the Administration who were opposed to the Assistant Director's policy wished to force the strikers into submission by refusing their request for continued operation of subsistence. The Assistant Director, however, decided to accept the proposed agreement as long as the residents abided by their promise. Since the policy of withholding military force unless necessary had been decided upon, there did not appear to be any reason for applying coercion in another form. It seemed that such a step would only end the possibility of reaching an understanding; it would confuse the issue and create fresh ground for popular resentment. As yet no laws had been broken but it seemed pretty certain that a refusal to allow the distribution of subsistence would lead to attempts to take the food, which would make the summoning of military help mandatory.

Late in the evening the Assistant Director went down to look about the crowd. A public address system had been set up before the jail, but at the moment Japanese music supplied by a record player was pouring out instead of announcements and speeches. The police were on duty and the Chief gave his usual gruff greeting. He and his men were assuming at least an outward appearance of neutrality and trying to preserve orderliness. Scattered on the open ground

in front of the jail and its neighbor, the community store, were many fires burning in the chilly night, just as they had burned around the various blocks. Twenty-five or thirty people gathered about each fire, while half as many more wandered in the space between. The Assistant Director received a few, but very few nods and smiles. Way was made for him silently, and as one resident said afterward, he looked very lonesome there among all the people. By far the greatest number were Issei men.

Although the Assistant Director knew hundreds of the residents by sight, there was scarcely a familiar face to be seen as he moved from one group to another.

It seemed as if the Poston people he knew had vanished and in their place had appeared from hidden recesses innumerable old men, silently aloof, gazing at embers, or warming their backs and looking out into the dark.

11. Deadlock

T. E. Lawrence once said[1] discussing life in general and Arab warfare in particular that the stoutest enemy is always within the household. It certainly seemed in Poston that the threats of disaster lay as much within the Administration as in the community. The extremists among those who were stereotype-minded and internment-camp-conscious were very disrupting when the situation was at its most delicate, and their influence came close to demoralizing the government employees and provoking disorder among the residents. It was a vivid demonstration that when an organization is subjected to pressure, it will crack along its major lines of disharmony.

On Thursday morning, November 19, the idle administrative offices showed that the strike was in full swing. A few individuals came to work, but were sent back by their department chiefs so that no harm would come to them at the hands of the pickets.

The Assistant Director called a staff meeting that included many persons who had not been present the preceding evening. The development of the strike was sketched insofar as it was known at that time, the policy which had been adopted was outlined and the reasons for the decision in regard to the military were stated. After some discussion, the members of the welfare and educational group moved and seconded a vote of confidence in the Assistant Director.

The Fiscal Officer strongly protested, saying that he was opposed to "mollycoddling" the Japanese and had been all along. Government property was at stake and the time had come to take strong measures and run things with an iron hand. He believed that the present course was weak and he was "ashamed to see Americans acting that way."

[1] Reference 21.

The Supply Officer appeared only for a moment at the meeting and took no part in the discussion. He was in very good spirits and was on his way to Parker with a "fine bunch" of residents who had volunteered to unload freight cars that contained supplies of food.

Other staff members spoke vigorously in support of the Assistant Director and pointed out again that the Military Police would not be able to stop the strike and would not accomplish what those who desired them expected.

When the confidence motion was put to the vote, it was passed with the Fiscal Officer dissenting while the Chief Administrative Officer and one other in his department refrained from voting. The Reports Officer commented, "I don't think a vote of this kind has got you anywhere."

After the meeting, word was received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that since they were unable to proceed with their inquiries, they were suspending the investigation, at least temporarily, and that they were not asking the Project to hold the prisoners for them.

The Assistant Director conferred with a number of the staff as to the best course to follow in the light of this development, and the Fiscal Officer was invited to participate, partly because of his experience, as Deputy Marshal, with Arizona law-enforcement offices, and partly because it was hoped that he could be won over to a more constructive attitude. It was eventually decided to release the Member of the Judicial Commission, but to hold the Judo Instructor for the Yuma County Court.

About the middle of the afternoon, while the Assistant Director was working on these matters, the Supply Officer came into his office, visibly upset. The trip to Parker in the morning to unload the freight cars had failed because he had attempted to have the volunteers unload some non-subsistence supplies on the plea that they must do this in order to reach the food. Immediately the volunteers had felt

that it was a put-up job to get extra work out of them, and had returned to Poston.

The Supply Officer now said to the Assistant Director that he had in his possession the keys of the Project gas tanks and that if the Assistant Director asked him to give them up, then the Assistant Director could "go to hell." The Supply Officer felt that he was responsible for the lives of the government personnel who at any moment would need transportation out of the camp. Growing more and more emotional, he said that he was ashamed to be associated with a group who would let themselves be bullied and insulted by the Japanese. "I didn't know such Americans existed!"

On leaving the office the Supply Officer summoned a number of the teachers and other employees to a meeting and told them with intense feeling that they were in great physical danger because of the Assistant Director's weakness and mishandling of the situation. He said that the "War Department" was ready to come in and "shoot the Japs in their tracks," only they "could not get permission." As he talked, his audience began to grow excited, until matters were interrupted by the arrival of a representative from the Assistant Director who explained the true state of affairs. After that, general approval was expressed at the way things were being handled.

ABOUT 3:30 a delegation of six men from Unit II and six men from Unit III led by the Chairman of the Community Council in Unit II, came to the Assistant Director and offered their services as mediators between the Administration and the people of Unit I. The Unit II Council Chairman was a lawyer, a prominent member of the Japanese American Citizens League, an acquaintance of the Unit I Council Chairman, and keenly interested in the development of Poston as a community.

The Assistant Director stated his position, which was that

sufficient evidence existed to warrant filing charges against the Judo Instructor for assault with a deadly weapon and there was no choice but to hand him over to the proper authorities for trial.

The delegates said that the people believed the prisoner would not receive a fair trial in Arizona because of public feeling, and they wanted to know why the case could not be tried in Poston according to the judicial procedures that had been established.

The Assistant Director explained that only misdemeanors could be tried in Poston and that assault with a deadly weapon was a felony which came under the jurisdiction of the state.

The Unit II Council Chairman said he believed that according to War Relocation Authority rules the Assistant Director had discretionary powers in such matters. Furthermore, there was a precedent, because in Unit III one man had attacked another with a knife and the first step had been for the Judicial Commission to review the evidence. After doing so, the Commission had notified the Project Director that they considered the case a felony and recommended that it be handled by the State Court. This had been some weeks ago and the man was still in Poston awaiting action by the Project Director. Why was the case of the Judo Instructor different? Why was he to be spirited away without the Judicial Commission or other responsible body hearing the evidence? Why could he not be released in the custody of the Council or the Judicial Commission and held for a preliminary hearing in Poston? It was a case, after all, that was of primary concern to the people of the community in which one evacuee was accused of attacking another. There was no involvement of Federal law, government property or anything else that went beyond local law and order.

In all this there was a reflection of what another evacuee expressed more pointedly later when he said, "Either give us self-government, or call in the Army and get it over with."

However, throughout the discussion, the Unit II Chairman made it clear that he was not trying to argue the Administration into any particular course of action, but was attempting to make them aware of how the people felt and of some of the opportunities for compromise which he saw.

The Fiscal Officer, who was present, addressed the Unit II Chairman as if he were a representative of the strikers and insisted that he had no right to question what the Government did. Their words became heated and ended with the Fiscal Officer saying, relative to the suggested trial in Poston, "I don't believe that you are in a position to ask for any such thing," while the Unit II Chairman replied that the Administration was using a "Star Chamber system."

The Assistant Director restored balance to the tone of discussion, but said:

"One of the men is to be released. I believe the other is guilty. I have no other course."

The Unit II Chairman and the delegates said that it would do no good for them to carry such a message to the people of Unit I, and so they withdrew their offer to mediate.

IT WAS late in the afternoon when the Assistant Director and a number of his staff went to one of the empty wards of the hospital that served as a hall in order to meet with the Committee of 72 and the Emergency Executive Council of 12. The day was cold and cloudy, and dust swirled thickly in gusts. From down by the jail the strains of Japanese music could be heard, fitfully carried by the uneven wind. November gloom was heavy in the hall and the light was bad.

Among the residents, the conflict between the conservatives and the radicals had continued. There were some who had talked of setting fires, only to be vigorously reprimanded by others. There had been reckless and melodramatic talk about "risking my life for the people," of hunger strikes, suicides, and other demonstrations of martyrdom.

However, the leading voices had been voices of moderation and they had come from such people as the former Chairman of the Issei Advisory Board and the Methodist Minister who had been a cooperative propagandist. While the newly returned internee and the Kibei who signed the proposal about continuing essential services during the strike took prominent parts in the direction of things in Unit I, the former Issei Chairman had eluded the military guards and spent many hours in Units II and III urging the people to give their support, but not to strike. He had said it would be better for them to be in a position to act as mediators and that all should work together for a better community.

A struggle for power was clearly in progress between various individuals who sought to ride the "will of the people" and guide it toward the achievement of its aims. They were playing with and against each other in changing teams and were striving to gain political strength by keeping the people and the Administration apart and by maneuvering the one against the other.

As the administrative group entered the hall, they had for the first time a chance to see the Committee of 72 and, although there were numbers of unfamiliar faces, the Administration was impressed by the presence of many persons who were known to be of good intelligence, character and intentions.

With the Minister acting as interpreter, the Assistant Director came forward to address the committee and was greeted with moderate applause. He said, "First of all, I want to thank the group of public-spirited citizens of Poston II and III who came out this afternoon in an effort to help us.

"I have been informed by the Special Agent in charge of the District Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that for the present they are not completing the investigation of the prisoners. Since the state has no complaint against [the member of the Judicial Commission] he is to be

released. The charge of assault with a deadly weapon has been filed with the County Attorney of Yuma County, Yuma, Arizona, against [the Judo Instructor]. He will be brought to trial before the Superior Court of the State of Arizona. He will be entitled to have a fair and impartial trial before a jury. This will entitle him to representation by an attorney of his own choosing and the right to subpoena witnesses from Poston or any other place in his defense.

"I now want to read to you a sentence from Paragraph III, of Section 5, of Administrative Instruction 34, of the War Relocation Authority: 'In criminal cases involving felonies, the Project Director shall deliver over the defendant to the state and local officials for prosecution.' "

A discussion followed in which various opinions, both intelligent and absurd, were advanced. They ranged from, "You have dog. Evidence against prisoner I consider are false," to "Is there any possibility of asking the Project Director to hear the evidence?" Through it all there were patent the ideas which the Unit II Council Chairman had described. The general mood was calm and serious, with occasional flashes of passion. At length the returned internee, who had been playing a leading role, brought the meeting to an end by saying that they were getting nowhere and it would be best to stop.

There was some casual talk afterward between members of the Administration and the residents who lingered. Everywhere the theme was the same. "The Judo Instructor should be tried by the people of Poston. The Judo Instructor is innocent. Every man, woman and child would swear to it, one hundred per cent."

All this was actually beside the point. The main thing was that the crowd and those trying to be its leaders wanted to accomplish what they had set out to do. They wanted a victory. Most people didn't know whether or not the Judo Instructor was innocent, though probably many had persuaded themselves that he was. One resident said that he

meant "moral innocence," because the man beaten had deserved what he got and the Judo Instructor was too fine a fellow to spend years in the penitentiary. This was probably the true sentiment of the majority of those most active in the demonstration.

On this day, both the Supply Officer and the Fiscal Officer disappeared from the foreground of the strike scene. After the words with the Unit II Council Chairman, the Fiscal Officer said he did not believe that he was doing the Assistant Director any good and thereafter he did not participate much in meetings or in policy discussions. The Supply Officer shortly left the project altogether and, making an unauthorized trip to Oklahoma in a government car, did not come back until the strike had been settled.

Although this was a welcome relief, it did not by any means free the Assistant Director of the stereotype-minded group of administrative employees who disliked his policies and were hostile toward the evacuees. It was evident and logical that the people most likely to set off an explosion were those who had all along been most out of harmony with the aims of the Project. It was also clear that if their actions caused the Administration's plans to collapse, they would, with honest belief, point to it as proof of faulty policy and ignore their own role in faulty execution.

Prevalent among these men, but also seen in the Military Police, the residents and to some extent even among the people-minded administrators was a curiously unreal attitude toward the whole situation. Things were seen in terms of plots, secret agents, and the strength of Japan pitted against the greatness of the United States. One might have thought that the Burma Road went through the adjacent mesquite. Some people, behaving like characters out of a comic strip, seemed to look on themselves as potential heroes of great proportions and on others as opponents with superhuman craft. At times, it even appeared as if the out-

come of the war was going to be determined by the settlement of the strike and as if the very heavenly bodies stood still while it was decided whether or not "Americans were going to be bullied by the Japanese" or whether some little old immigrant peasant man was going to "give his life for the people" by defying the Poston Administration.

The tendency to live in melodrama, however, was the most fearful thing in the whole of the Poston disturbance and the leaders among the evacuees as well as among the Administration struggled with it. Because of it, misinterpretation had a hair trigger, so that a valve turned off by a plumber became an act of sabotage and the dimly seen interior of an ambulance became a machine gun and its crew.

Things like this are dangerous because they lick around the edges of panic, are contagious and can lead to acts which provoke other acts until, where there was only smouldering before, a blaze is roaring. Such mental process is the common product of fear, social disorientation and prolonged frustration. It has a satanic power to create after its own image. As a result, what is in the beginning only imagination becomes real, and out of the figments of the mind springs actual catastrophe.

FRIDAY, the 20th, was another gray day and very cold. The continuous Japanese music was beginning to get on the nerves of the administrative personnel and many were a prey to disturbing rumors.

However, the Assistant Director and his aides came more and more to think that there was some justification for the residents' demands that they be allowed to handle the case in the community in accordance with the avowed policy of self-government. There was also serious thought given to the possibility of somehow turning the unity and leadership displayed in the strike into a more efficient running of the community when the disturbance was over.

All attempts to reach the Project Director for consulta-

tion had been in vain, so contact was made with the Indian Office in Washington and the current situation described. It was proposed that the Judo Instructor be released on condition that a trial in proper form be held in the Community. After some discussion between members of the Department of the Interior, the War Department and the War Relocation Authority, word was sent back to Poston authorizing the Assistant Director to proceed in that manner if he wished.

In the meantime, the Sheriff of Yuma County arrived and after examining the evidence stated that it was sufficient in his opinion to warrant holding the Judo Instructor for trial, but that the decision was up to the Project Administration. He was very cooperative and said that the County would not feel impelled officially to file the charges and insist on an arrest unless the Project pressed the matter.

In the afternoon, the Assistant Director held a staff meeting in which the Unit II Council Chairman was summoned and asked to act as a go-between and to feel the strikers out on the possibility of a trial in Poston. The Chairman agreed and went off very confident that this would yield satisfactory results.

The top administrative group were beginning to get used to their troubles and were relaxing a little. A sense of humor had never been lacking but now it came more to the fore and did everybody good. There was much merriment over a feud between the police and fire departments and a scuffle that occurred when the police arrested a fire truck for speeding. Another source of laughter was the arrival of a visiting official who, knowing nothing of the strike, innocently asked if it would be possible to get a crowd together so he could talk to them.

Among the strikers and demonstrators there was still the conflict between the radicals and the conservatives, and there was manifest a decrease in the total feeling of unity on the part of the people. Some were growing tired of the strike

and some Niseis were beginning to mutter and demand that the issues be made clear. Many people, both Isseis and Niseis, felt that the Emergency Executive Council of 12 was too close-mouthed, not telling the public what was going on and what progress was being made. When the proposal for a trial in the community was brought to the people, there were meetings in all the blocks and sentiment was rather sharply divided between acceptance and holding out for "unconditional release."

DOWN by the jail, the scene had assumed something of a carnival air. A stage had been set up and on it, in the evening, movies were shown, actors performed skits and entertainers sang to keep the crowd amused and their interest alive.

Very obvious in many places were the three symbols of the strike, a Dog, a Martyred Man, and Japan.

Since early in the development of the demonstration, the Dog had represented one of the strongest feelings, namely, hate of the informer. Nailed to the police station was a large piece of cardboard on which was painted in black a picture of a dog devouring money and with it was the legend, "No Dogs Allowed, Except on Chain." Other similar pictures ranged from large cut-out cardboard figures dressed in Government Issue clothing to cartoons drawn on flags that waved above the fire groups. Some dogs were shown hanged, others being beaten. In conversations and speeches there was constant reference to "dogs" and one night a whole speech was devoted to a discussion of the classification of "dogs."

The symbol, Dog, went far back in Japanese tradition and had been used for ages in reference to the informers who lurked in the villages and reported persons guilty of acts and ideas contrary to the wishes of the overlords. Since Pearl Harbor among the Japanese in America, it had become applied to those suspected of aiding the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In Poston it had been a source of extreme

anxiety for months preceding the strike. There was the fear of being informed against, and there was the fear of being branded an informer—for to be called a "dog" by anybody was to become at once liable to the "Black List" and the gangs that traveled in the night.

As a symbol in the strike, the "dog" became a scapegoat against whom the animus of the crowd was directed. It stood for the cause of the insecurity and the personal misery which permeated Poston. To hate it and destroy it meant social solidarity again. It meant uniting in a cause and cleaning out the evil that was within. The evacuees were not able to control the outside world which had oppressed them, but the canker in their midst was another matter. Action could be taken against it and social harmony restored.

Undoubtedly the symbol had somewhat different meanings for different kinds of people, and there was a considerable range in the degree of intensity felt, but it was nonetheless a focus of emotion for nearly all. There was a common denominator for even the most loyal Americans in the moral situation depicted by the dog eating money.

The Martyred Man symbol was, of course, the prisoner, the St. George who was accused of killing dog-dragons. His plight had meaning for every resident from the progressive liberal who thought in terms of civil liberty to the uneducated farm laborer filled with resentment against an unseen "government." The fine young judo hero and through him his mother and father were being injured by the same relentless forces from the outside that had long harassed the Japanese group. To hold him and save him was to achieve some measure of self-defense and retaliation. He was their Dreyfus case.

In the Martyr and the Dog, the people of Poston had effective symbols which together stood for unity against outside pressures and for the elimination of disrupting forces within.

The symbol, Japan, as has been previously pointed out, was for the Issei an outstanding emblem of hope in a world that had fallen crashing about them. In many of the speeches there was an extremely nationalistic tone and the style of address was frequently a model of Japanese oratory. Numbers of the picket groups flew banners on which the block numerals were arranged to form a round red monogram on a white background so that from a distance it looked like the Japanese flag. In this there was no doubt an element of spitefully sticking out the tongue at the Administration, but there was also genuine nationalism. There was loud clapping at a movie which showed Buckingham Palace being bombed. Every morning at dawn the pickets gave banzais for the rising of the sun. Finally, the peak was reached Friday night when a man mounted the stage and mistakenly told the crowd that Unit II had joined the strike. There was wild enthusiasm and in the furor, a banzai for the Emperor was proposed and given.

It is also noteworthy that many aspects of the strike recalled the innumerable peasant uprisings that have dotted Japan's history up to recent times. In those, mobs gathered in protest against oppression, work was stopped, flags were flown, speeches made, representatives elected and "terms" written out for presentation to the authorities. However, unlike the Poston strike, the peasant revolts were generally accompanied by violence and destruction.[2]

Nationalism at Poston was a mantle of unity and harmony that many Isseis and Kibeis threw around themselves. However, when they tried to spread it to include the Niseis, they failed, and the unity of the strike movement began to crumble. Niseis got angry and tore the flags down. They spoke up warmly at meetings, and many Isseis backed them up. Some of the flags were burned. In the course of the next day, all the block flags that suggested the Japanese emblem

[2] Reference 4 and 32.

were removed and the music shifted from "Aikoku Kyoshinkyoku" to "Don't Sit Under the Apple Tree."

From within the people themselves came the cause of dissolution of the strike. Two of the symbols unified the camp, but the third split it wide apart again and the wave of reaction set in.

12. End of the Strike

As THE days went by, signs of dissolution of the strike organization came to the attention of the administrative personnel in a variety of ways.

For one thing, there was a general increase in contact with the residents. Members of the Education and Welfare Departments received furtive visits from their Nisei friends who emphasized that "loyal Japanese-Americans" were being coerced with clubs and threats into "staying in line." This was not representative of all Nisei attitudes, but rather of those of a special group who had better-than-average American education and who were on the whole more in touch with their friends in the Administration than they were with the community. However, it was one part of a general Nisei stirring.

Another hint was the coming forward of a crew of volunteers who said that they would go to Parker and unload anything the Administration wished. They were taken to the railroad, but again returned empty handed, this time because of anti-Japanese feeling that had mounted in Parker and because the regular government employees would not work with them.

Again, evacuee teachers held a meeting to discuss the strike issues and the way the whole thing was being conducted.

The hospital was a hotbed of anti-strike feeling. By common consent it had been regarded as "neutral territory" and its personnel had been exempt from participation in the picketing. However, the young doctors, dentists, pharmacists, clerks and others talked among themselves, resented what they considered the jeopardizing of their future by a lot of crazy antics, and some even went so far as to say that they wished that the Army would come in and "break it up." Not unconnected with this attitude was the fact that

the Issei-Nisei conflict had been particularly bitter among the professional people in the hospital.

With the strike leaders, the struggle for power grew more intense. The Emergency Executive Council of 12 became increasingly secretive about its dealings with the Administration, showed a tendency not to push the question of a trial in Poston to a definite decision and began promising the people that it would accomplish far more than mere release of the remaining prisoner. It would lead Poston into harmony and fruitful living and Isseis and Niseis would work together for the good of all.

The members were very anxious to prevent any contact between the Administration and the residents, except through themselves. They were annoyed that the Assistant Director had made a direct announcement concerning the release of the Judicial Commission Member and had not given them a chance to build it up as something they had accomplished; nor did they welcome the Unit II Chairman as a mediator but feared that if he were successful he might achieve recognition at their expense.

In a meeting with the Assistant Director, the Minister revealed that they wanted the support and backing of the Administration to help maintain their leadership. He said that if the Assistant Director would grant their demands so that they could show the community that they were able to get results, then in return, they would use that power to guide their followers toward collaboration and better understanding of the Administration's aims. On the other hand, he hinted that if the Administration did not support the leaders and they lost their control of the crowd, dire things might happen. He said,

"The point is that the mob is formed. . . . If confidence cannot be won by the leaders, the mob not only loses its guide, but also loses its head."

THE Director and the Associate Director arrived back at

the Project in the early hours of Sunday morning, November 22, after having been finally reached at Salt Lake City and notified of conditions. They were welcomed by the staff members and by the Assistant Director who said as he turned over the reins to the Director, "I have tried to keep things on an even keel until you got back."

In so doing, he had a right to feel that he had accomplished his purpose in spite of severe handicaps. He had been suddenly plunged into the situation without knowledge of its immediate history and without available legal advice. As Acting Project Director, his position was in many ways more difficult than if he had had full freedom of choice and decision. After some preliminary groping, he had assumed a middle course and had withstood storms of pressure beating on him from the evacuees, from one section of his own staff and from many sources outside the Project.

The extent to which he had been uncomfortable and had suffered, only he knew, but he had sought to guide matters with gentleness and restraint, whether he was dealing with rebellious evacuees or recalcitrant staff. After he was relieved of his responsibilities, however, a reaction appeared and hostile feelings rose to the surface directed primarily at the strike leaders as the most obvious source of his discomfiture and frustrations.

He was not alone in this, for among many of the people-minded members of the Administration there was a rising tide of resentment that came in part from frictions of the summer and fall and in part from the strike itself. It was attached to the disillusionment they were feeling concerning what could be accomplished in Poston.

Among the people in the Welfare and Education Departments, influenced by the stories received from their Nisei friends, there was growing alarm on behalf of the "loyal Japanese-Americans" who were thought to be suffering persecution. There was some talk of organizing a "Nisei

Army" who would patrol with red, white and blue armbands and suppress those who were "pro-Axis."

The Reports Officer was one who had thought all along in terms of Japanese agents working within the camp and believed that he was about to be instrumental in their detection and seizure. He did not like the way things had been handled and said ominously that he was sure there would be a Congressional investigation. Although he was out of favor with numbers of the staff who thought his excess of investigatory zeal had been a major cause of the strike, nevertheless, the release he prepared for the newspapers under the Director's signature expressed the ideas of many in the Administration. As the article appeared in the *Los Angeles Times*, it was in part as follows:

"——, public relations and intelligence officer, said the troublemakers originally protested the arrest of two men who participated in gang fights between alien and American-born evacuees. They were charged with beating another resident of the camp.

"Taking advantage of the excitement thus created in the mile-square camp, which has more than 8,500 residents, the recalcitrants seized the so-called city council, or local government, normally made up of American-born citizens. Through a reign of terror, they forced 6,500 workers, most of them youths and women, to quit their jobs.

" 'The strategy of the pro-Axis group apparently was to deliberately attempt the destruction of the Americanism of the American-born Japanese,' the Director stated. 'In this way they have failed, because the other two Poston units which have populations of 5,000 and 4,000 respectively have had the situation under their control at all times, and have loyally cooperated with the Administration.'

"The Director lauded the hundreds of fine, loyal American-born Japanese who have . . . worked as a team in defeating all pro-Axis groups without bloodshed or loss of property."

It is evident that the symbol, Japan, became the focus for aggressive feelings among the administrators in a manner not unlike the "dog" among the evacuees. By playing the Japanese music and displaying banners the residents did much to give form and direction to these ideas. In the stereotype-minded group, antagonism was a blunderbuss aimed at all the residents. The other staff members, however, were restrained from any such easy outlet and compensation by their training, principles and actual experience with numerous residents in the community. It was not permissible for them to go overboard and hate all evacuees, but they could and did hate an unseen band supposed to be in the midst of the community acting under the influence of Imperial Japan and corrupting and intimidating the "good Japanese."

"Belief," said Samuel Butler, "like any other moving body, follows the path of least resistance." In this case, belief in Axis agents explained failures of accomplishment, gave relief from self-blame, and tended to unite persons with otherwise divergent opinions, even bringing those who were stereotype-minded and those who were people-minded closer together in the common discomfort.

The Assistant Director spoke for many besides himself when he said of one group of evacuee leaders that they were "all sons of bitches except one and he is a bastard."

The Attorney, who had also returned to the Project, and some others had a little different attitude. Pro-Axis suspicion was not lacking, but they tended to see the strike leaders more as they would see opponents in court or in labor negotiations and to feel a keen desire to out-maneuver and defeat them. They advocated a show of indifference on the part of the Administration that would cause delay and prevent the leaders from bringing back any clear-cut gains to the people. As a result of this, it was thought, the strike would fall apart, with its instigators discredited, and the Council and most of the other community figures would be restored to power. Then the Administration could proceed to de-

velop its policies according to the War Relocation Authority regulations more or less as if nothing had happened.[1]

The Director spent most of the first few days after his return collecting impressions in his own way. He sat in the night by the picket fires, he talked to all sorts of persons both in the staff and among the evacuees and he did a good deal of quiet thinking by himself.

In gathering facts, he was very greatly aided by the Attorney who secured a list of the names of persons in the Committee of 72 and its creation, the Emergency Executive Council of 12. The Attorney had been quick to perceive that one of the things most needed by the Administration was accurate knowledge concerning the identity of those with whom it had to deal.

In addition to trying to find out what was going on in the community, the Director assessed the full strength of his resources by conversations with representatives of the Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the state law enforcement agencies. At one time he leaned toward establishing military rule in camp and having a "thorough housecleaning" to get rid of all "agitators," but later decided against it, saying that the authorities who would have to participate or assist in such a move were not in a position to guarantee the necessary cooperation and that half-measures in segregation would be worse than none.

[1] On reading this paragraph, the Attorney said, "The statement of the view of myself is not in my opinion very accurate. For example, I emphasized that there was no pro-Axis suspicion, although there might be some pro-Japanese. . . . I favored dealing with the committee on peaceful settlement and had vigorously upheld keeping out the Army. However, I did not favor agreement on an honor court and other devices outside the framework of the War Relocation Authority's administrative instructions. . . . I felt that the turning over of the whole community to the Committee would have been an endorsement of threats and violence. On the other hand, I felt that some of the causes of the strike were due to the fault of some of the administrative officials. . . . I felt that the failure of the Administration to effectuate self-government had been one of the causes of the incident."

He realized the multiple factors leading to the strike and the justification for some of the strikers' attitudes and he was not dazzled by the glare of pro-Japan sentiments. Of course, there was considerable overlap between those who supported and led the strike and those whose real sympathies were with Japan. Since it was primarily an Issei movement, it could not very well be otherwise and probably there were numbers of people who, believing that Japan would win, were glad to get a reputation for Nipponese patriotism in the hope of post-war rewards. However, in most cases, sympathy for Japan did not mean an uncooperative attitude toward the Poston Administration or an unwillingness to live up to the obligations of a "friendly enemy-alien." Many Isseis who were fathers and mothers with American children were more concerned with their family's welfare than with anything else. Furthermore, there were among the strikers, many Japanese Americans, whose demands for "their rights," sprang from their very Americanism.

Although the Director thought that there might be a real gang in camp operating on behalf of Japan, he was loath to act as if it were a fact until he had more definite evidence, and he wished to feel out the possibility of utilizing the strike leadership for better management of the community.

In words that were very characteristic, he said:

"We will just have to settle this ourselves. . . . It doesn't worry me a bit. . . . If we handle it right, we will come out of it in a much stronger position."

THE negotiations which led to the conclusion of what the evacuees were beginning to call the "Incident" took place around a long table in the evacuee Red Cross office during three sessions on November 23 and 24. The Emergency Executive Council spoke on behalf of the residents with the former Issei Advisory Board Chairman, the Returned Internee, the Minister and the Kibei playing leading roles. The Director had with him the Associate Director, the Assistant

Director, and some others. At one side during part of the discussion sat an evacuee lawyer representing the Judo Instructor.

As the first meeting started, it was another gray and drafty day with a dull light that did little to elevate the spirits. Whereas at the beginning of the strike, the Administrative officers had appeared the more bothered, now among the faces grouped about the table it was the residents who seemed disturbed. They looked fatigued, and while no doubt hoping to win their points seemed to have a weary desire to see the whole business ended. During the discussions one old man burst into tears.

When the Director arose to open the proceedings, there was general tension. His manner was dignified and distant with a slight tremor of the voice that suggested restrained anger. He gave an impression of latent thunder that seemed to put the Committee on the defensive immediately. After looking them over a few moments, he asked, "Who is this committee?"

Somewhat taken aback, they identified themselves and under the prodding of further questions explained by what right they believed they represented the people of Poston, and then began to state their case. They wanted unconditional release of the prisoner and promised in return effective aid to the Administration in running the Project. In short, they were again asking the Administration to take a step that would establish their power with the people and they were pledging themselves to use that power in a collaborative manner.

For a while, the Director said little, but gradually he began to speak more and more and to emphasize a number of points which he brought up repeatedly in various connections. These could be summarized as follows: The law of the United States and the State of Arizona must be observed, and nobody, whether resident or in the Administration could get away from that fact; he, the Director, had no

power to release the prisoner; it was the plain duty of the Emergency Executive Council to educate the residents concerning these facts; and he was sure the Emergency Council members were good people and could do it.

"When I went to the Philippines," the Director had once said in a private conversation, "there were two words I learned first. The first was 'How much?' and the second was 'Too much.' I used them in that order."

The turning point probably came while the Minister was urging that an affidavit to the prisoner's innocence signed by "all the people in Poston" be accepted as a basis for granting release. The Director turned to the prisoner's attorney, and asked how he felt about it. This man replied, "We would prefer a trial if there is any suspicion, rather than have 20,000 people say that he is not guilty. I think that the evidence should be presented in order to clear his name. . . . I cannot take any other position as attorney for him."

The Minister then admitted that the Judo Instructor had said that he wanted a trial, and so the Emergency Executive Council's argument for unconditional release was effectively cut away.

In the minds of nearly all the members of the Administration present, there arose the satisfied conviction that the strike leaders could now be easily discredited, perhaps punished, and things returned to normal.

The Director, however, had a different view. Instead of following a line designed to demolish the Emergency Executive Council, he began discussing with them various other points in a possible agreement. Before his return, the Assistant Director had told them that if the Administration conceded a trial in the community, some definite improvements in the prevention of assaults, and in work efficiency would have to be part of the residents' side of the bargain, and he urged them to draw up some proposals. The Director

inquired into these and the Minister produced the following prepared statement:

"In order to establish peaceful and unified self-government, the present Emergency Council submits the following three proposals:

"1. Establish a Public Relations Committee to mediate with and settle all problems affecting personal reputations and damages out of court.

"2. The Poston residents be given the right to nominate, select or appoint all evacuees for administrative personnel and other important positions.

"3. The present Emergency Council shall establish within the framework of the War Relocation Authority, a City Planning Board which shall create the necessary administrative, legislative, and economic organizations."

Members of the Administration had discussed these matters among themselves before the negotiation meetings and had decided that the evacuees' proposals must include the following points:

1. The assumption of responsibility by the people of Poston for law and order and the ending of gang activities and beatings.

2. The complete firing and rehiring of all evacuee employees with a view to a better distribution of labor within the camp and the elimination of unessential positions.

3. The setting up of joint temporary committees composed of both government personnel and evacuees to cooperate in the re-employment program and the re-establishment of self-government.

As one staff member said, the two sets of propositions were remarkably similar, the chief difference being that "in the one proposed by the evacuees they are boss and in ours, we are boss."

Both the Emergency Executive Council and the Administration stressed the need to control the beatings and the

"Black Lists" and the need to improve the low level of work efficiency in the community.

The Public Relations Committee idea was a recognition on the part of the evacuees of the role played in their trouble by the lack of social orientation. It was an attempt to substitute an artificial institution for the intimate knowledge of leaders and neighbors which normal communities necessarily have, and was intended to be a means of eliminating gang activities by providing formal means by which suspicion and character assassination could be controlled.

In the employment situation, where Administration stressed work efficiency as such, the Emergency Executive Council emphasized the importance of social adjustment as a prerequisite to efficiency and sought a means of clearing up frictions typified by the case of the volunteers. It was thought necessary to have key evacuee positions filled by persons capable of commanding the respect and cooperation of their fellows.


In its third proposal, the Emergency Executive Council sought to perpetuate itself as an executive body that would manage Poston's Unit I for the Project Director. Most of the Administrators wanted evacuee advice but were vigorously opposed to having this particular committee embark on any such career.

The Director carefully avoided committing himself to specific promises in these matters but assured the members of the Emergency Executive Council that they would have his full cooperation if they did their part and dealt honestly both with the people and with the Administration. He intimated that in the light of these considerations, he was prepared to recommend to the state that the prisoner be released for trial in Poston, and he said, "I have a feeling that if this committee will go back to the people and say that we have talked this over and that I say I will give you 100% cooperation, they will back you up," and then, adopting somewhat the Japanese style of speaking, "I am staking my

reputation on this committee and the people in Poston."

In doing this, the Director was acting in the belief that even if the strike did collapse, the members of the Emergency Executive Council would still have a strong minority following, and he preferred to have them working with rather than against him. He suspected that there was some good in them and he did not lose sight of the fact that the strike had been conducted for a week in an orderly manner with no depredations on property. By allowing those men a little power it would be possible to learn about their honesty of purpose, their competence and whether or not they were really pro-Axis agitators. Every day of the strike that passed peacefully—and in fact the whole course of events—made it less and less probable that enemy agents had any significant control if they existed at all. It seemed unlikely that real agents would draw attention to themselves in a place like Poston where there was little to observe and nothing to sabotage except the well-being of the evacuees. The Director thought the members of the Emergency Executive Council might be able to do a better job of community leadership than any previous evacuee group, and he warned his staff that it wasn't a question of whether or not they liked these men personally, but of whether or not "they can do the job we want to see done." By keeping them close to him he could find out what they were like better than he could if they were hidden in the obscurity of the community's population, having secret meetings that could not be prevented except by martial law and sufficient personnel for carrying it out.


The Director's decision to give some recognition to the Emergency Executive Council instead of exterminating it was opposed by almost everybody else in the Administration. Although there were whisperings among the staff at the meeting and notes were passed to him, it is doubtful that he was fully aware of the extent of the hostile reaction. In any event, about 8 P.M., November 24, he uttered these con-




Poston machine shop



Sewing school



Shoe repairing



Lathe operator

cluding words to the evacuee leaders: "Here is one thing I want to stress, gentlemen, to you and all the people of Poston. You have taken this responsibility. I am going to feel that if anything happens now, that this group has failed. It is up to us to work together to get a community government that will function. I think you all understand the hugeness of the thing that you are undertaking. It is your responsibility to draw every man, woman and child into a good wholesome community, to see that no more of this threatening goes on.

"I appreciate being here and meeting with you."

The Minister replied, "We also agree with you one hundred percent. We will accept the part just as much as you accept your part. We thank you for having the same ideas on these things."

The Director wrote a note authorizing the release of the Judo Instructor to the custody of his attorneys and the meeting was over.

* * *

A LITTLE after the conclusion of the negotiations, the strike ended with a mass meeting before the jail. The pickets were augmented by several thousand spectators who crowded close to the fires under pressure of the cold night and stared with hot eyes through the smoke at a succession of overcoated speakers who appeared on the platform under glaring lights. An heroic picture was given by the speechmakers of the accomplishments of the Emergency Executive Council and all the subsidiary bodies who had helped to run the strike, maintain community services and keep law and order. There were golden promises of harmony in Poston's future, and although people tittered at the Kibei member's mispronunciations of English, they gave him resounding applause afterward. The Director appeared and spoke briefly to the effect that the strike was nobody's fault and that "we're just all people together. It's not the Administration up there and you people down here, but we're all working

together." This speech was apparently well received and long remembered.

The whole proceedings wound up with three banzais and then while the crowd went away quietly as if after the theater, the stage and other temporary structures, the fires and all rubbish were cleared away to the last fragment and the ground was left looking clean, swept, well trodden and—for the first time in a week—bare.

As the lights went out and sleep came over Poston, hardly anybody had a clear thought as to what the Emergency Executive Council had done, or what to expect next. However, there was a very widespread easing of tension and in some quarters, jubilation and a feeling of liking everybody, even the members of the Administration. In spite of some Nisei dissatisfaction there was a feeling that the evacuees together had at last done something and that out of it there would come harmony, happiness and an end of the previous awfulness. Isseis, Niseis and Administration would pull together. Tomorrow camp life would start reborn and better.

The strike itself had been a reaction, and now began a reaction to the strike that had about it something of a happy delirium.

By contrast there was darkness and foreboding in the living quarters of the Administration. The stereotype-minded members had long ago given up hope of anything going as it should, but now in addition, nearly all those who were people-minded were bitterly feeling that something irreplaceable had been lost. One group held a solemn wake with candle burning for the death of Poston.

In this manner the strike was finished, but not the problems involved in it. The settlement stopped a gap and paved the way for coming to grips with those fundamental needs of the community on behalf of which the strike had been only an imperious cry for attention.

13. Self-Management after the Strike

THE emphasis in this report on the strike has been dictated in part by the fact that it was an important incident in itself and is a type of upheaval which is likely to be faced by the administrators of any group of people if the perennial forces tending to disrupt society are as prevalent as they may be in occupied or liberated areas and in the community management of various parts of the post-war world, including some within the United States. However, an additional and perhaps more significant reason for emphasis has been that the Poston strike brought into sharper contrast and, as it were, diagrammed, some of the social forces that had been operating all along, which continued to operate afterward, and with which it was important that the Administration deal effectively.

BETWEEN November 24, 1942, when the strike ended, and January 30, 1943, when the Central Executive Board became appointees of the Council, Poston's formal political bodies turned from being little more than names into functioning parts of community life.

At the time the strike negotiations were concluded, the Emergency Committee of 72 and the Emergency Executive Council were the only groups evident that possessed political organization and neither of them conformed to War Relocation Authority regulations. However, although mostly resigned, fragmented and overlapping with these two there still existed other bodies of political significance, such as the Council, Issei Advisory Board, Block Managers and the Cooperative Party.

On the day following the settlement of the strike, block meetings were called all over Unit I and the Emergency Committee of 72 was subjected to a re-election. As a consequence, there were some alterations in membership, repre-

sentation by one Issei and one Nisei from every block was made consistent, and the name was changed to "The City Planning Board of Unit I."

In the course of the next few days this Board evolved three new bodies, the Central Executive Board, the Labor Relations Board and a committee to set up an Honor Court for the purpose of handling accusations of "dog" and other forms of "character assassination."

The Central Executive Board was for the most part composed of the same people who had belonged to the Emergency Executive Council which negotiated the strike settlement. However, the Returned Internee was not present because his block did not re-elect him and he dropped from sight as a leader in Poston. The Minister, although elected to the City Planning Board, was not in the Central Executive Board either. It seemed that the other members felt he had not done a particularly good job as spokesman at the negotiations. One of them commented that he "would give anything away in words."

As soon as the Board was created, it began meeting with the Project Director and the Attorney, hatching plans, attempting management of the camp and trying to establish its power.

The Labor Relations Board in which the Minister did secure a position for a time, proclaimed "A New Deal in Jobs" for Poston and began meeting with members of the Administration, but its career was closely tied to that of the Central Executive Board and it was two months before it began to accomplish much.

The Committee for setting up the Honor Court never functioned and in the course of time faded out of existence. The agitation about "dogs" decreased markedly and there were no more gang beatings in Unit I after the strike.

From these movements it is plain that within a few days of the conclusion of the strike negotiations, evacuees had set up the framework for carrying out their part of the agree-

ment. However, the basis of this framework was clear to no one in the Administration and to few of the residents. Many evacuees felt that the meetings at which the members of the City Planning Board had been re-elected had not been conducted fairly, and that there had been railroading through of certain nominees. Some felt that only an election according to War Relocation Authority regulations could validate such organizations as the Central Executive Board and the Labor Relations Board. In short, although the newly established bodies had much support in the community, it was far from the "100%" which they claimed and concerning which they had signed statements from some blocks.

THE Director, the Project Attorney, and other members of the Administration put pressure on the evacuee leaders to hold an election according to War Relocation Authority regulations so that the resigned Temporary Council could be replaced. This was carried out on December 15 and, when all the returns were in, it was discovered that the new Temporary Council consisted almost entirely of the Nisei members of the newly created City Planning Board. Therefore, it seemed that on the whole the delegates appearing during the strike had represented and still did represent the majority of the people and that the Director had been wise in giving them consideration. Of the new Council members, only about one-third had been members of the former Council and the average age of the whole group was a little higher.

At the first Council meeting an attempt was made to elect the former Chairman once more, but he refused to accept, saying that there were stories of his being a "dog" and other rumors circulating in the community which placed him at the "crossroads of misunderstanding." In spite of considerable pressure and expressions of appreciation and loyalty from Council members, he insisted that he would not as-

sume leadership and soon resigned from the Council altogether.

It seems probable that part of his reluctance was due to considerations of political caution and uncertainty in regard to the character of some of those he would have had as running mates. Although deploring the bad outside publicity it produced, he viewed the strike and the bodies which came into being as a result of it as good for the community, but he feared Issei dominance and did not care for some of the leaders, especially in the Central Executive Board, who were reputedly "gangsters."

However, even if he did not again hold a position of political supremacy, he nevertheless remained a strong force in the community. He was chairman of a commission that created the charter for the permanent self-government later established, he worked hard to have "innocent" men released from internment and to have "agitators" removed from Poston; he strove to help families who were in need; and he remained an unofficial adviser to the Project Director, to the Washington office of the War Relocation Authority and to the War Department.

THE Chairmanship of the new Council went to a 36-year-old Nisei from Seattle who was in some ways a sort of rougher edition of the former Chairman. Although speaking Japanese adequately, he had never been to Japan. After leaving the University of Washington where he had studied pre-law and journalism, he began a period of wandering from job to job that took him as far as the Middle West and back. He rubbed up against all kinds of people and probably acquired a much better knowledge of the labor and lower middle classes in the United States than is possessed by most Niseis. About 1932 he appeared in San Francisco, where he worked for a number of years on the English section of the *Japanese Daily News* and wrote a very popular sports column. Later he had a small grocery store in Los Angeles

and was living there with his wife when it became necessary to evacuate.

In appearance, he was of average height for a Japanese, but very massive in build, which, combined with a slow, unruffled manner of moving, suggested a bear to some people. His clothes were always those of a working man, but clean. Often he puffed a cigar and used it as an instrument of expression as he talked. His voice was high-pitched and gentle, but his speech was slangy and abrupt, without any trace of the formal politeness characteristic of Isseis and seen to some extent in many Niseis. His brand of humor was unsubtle and wisecracking.

He entered Poston May 15, 1942, one of the very early arrivals, but he did not seek any position of prominence. Instead, he got a job in the sign-making department, was on its softball team and played chess in the evenings with the Chief of Police, a burly Terminal Island fisherman. When the elections were held for the first Temporary Community Council in July, he was nominated but not elected. In September he became clerk of the court and in that position had contact with the member of the Judicial Commission who later became one of the two prisoners figuring in the strike. During that incident, he was elected by his block to the Emergency Committee of 72, but although nominated as a member of the Emergency Executive Council, he was not elected. This fact may have been important later as an influence in his hostility toward the Central Executive Board which had essentially the same personnel as the Emergency Executive Council.

ONE of the first questions taken up by the members of the new Council was the status of the remaining (Issei) half of the City Planning Board with whom they had been meeting ever since the strike. It was decided to recognize these men as unofficial advisers and, from that time until the establishment of the permanent self-government in

June, the two bodies met together, with the Issei and the Nisei Chairman acting as co-chairmen and sitting at the same table.

Thus, the City Planning Board disappeared, leaving the Central Executive Board and the Labor Relations Board suspended in air "like the smile of the Cheshire Cat," as the head of the Adult Education Department expressed it. This would have raised no particular problem except for the fact that the Central Executive Board and the Labor Relations Board were not content to derive their power from the Council and the Issei Advisory Board, but were soon in competition with their former sponsors. Of the Central Executive Board members, the Kibei was one of the most aggressive along these lines and it seemed that the group wished to be in effect the executive arm of the Project Director and to regard or disregard the Council at will.

THE new Chairman, supported by the Council, soon showed that he would tolerate nothing that would undermine the position of the Council. He wanted the Administration to make it clear to the Central Executive Board that their plans must be ratified by the Council; he refused to call meetings which the Central Executive Board desired; and he arranged a conference for the discussion of the formation of evacuee administrative offices without including the Central Executive Board in the plan.

Opposition from the new Issei Advisory Board was even stronger than that in the new Council, again probably because of competition for leadership, rather than differences in ideas concerning the needs of the community. The member of the Issei Advisory Board who headed this opposition was a dentist, a man who had tried in vain to get into the Central Executive Board during and after the strike.

He was 55 years old, born in Wakayama Ken, Japan, the son of a police chief. After graduating from middle school he came to the United States at the age of 20 in 1904. For

a time he was secretary and English teacher at the Japanese Congregational Church in San Francisco and then later entered the University of Southern California, from which he graduated in 1916 with a dental degree. He established himself in private practice, married and had three children.

In addition to dentistry, he had many interests which included church activities, reading, original writing in Japanese, and translating stories. At one time, in company with two other men, he owned a Japanese paper and for a while had employed the man who later became the victim of the beating which led to the strike and demonstration.

In 1941, his wife took the children to Japan, presumably so that they could learn Japanese. One of the boys soon returned and later the dentist heard that his wife was not getting along well among the Japanese and was homesick for America. She and the rest of the children were bound home on the *Tatsuta Maru* when the war broke out and they had to turn back. Since that time he has had no word from them.

In appearance he is short, spare, and wiry. As he went about the camp, he was usually untidy in dress and was said by one evacuee to look "more like a horse doctor than a dentist." He always seemed busy, the breast pocket of his shirt bulging with pieces of paper and pencils. His speech was rapid, enthusiastic, as if he enjoyed talking very much, and he nearly always wore a bright smile. Clean shaven except for a little mustache, the most notable feature of his face were his eyes which were bright and clever. Although fluent in English with many picturesque expressions, he spoke it brokenly. In Japanese he made public speeches with machine gun rapidity, but lacked the polish that was so much a part of the former Issei Chairman's oratory.

In private conversation the dentist was inclined to speak rather boastfully of his exploits and was proud of being able to get around people for his own ends. He once said

that the word "dog" was "too familiar to me to mean anything. I am used to being called a 'dog.' "

He came to Poston on May 29, 1942, with his 18-year-old son and very soon took a job in the census office. For one with political ambitions, it was a strategic position from which to learn about the composition of the community. He was a member of the adult education group that sponsored the explanatory speeches about Poston, given by administrators for evacuees, and called "Orientation Meetings." In the cooperative movement he took a leading part, being one of the early promoters, and was later elected as his block representative to the Cooperative Congress and became its secretary. He was also a member of the first Issei Advisory Board and was nosed out of its chairmanship by the man who has been previously described as "the Issei Chairman." During the strike he was in charge of maintaining law and order, but was not allowed to participate in the meetings of the Emergency Executive Council or in the negotiations, and this he intensely resented. He said that he had been one of those who had caused the Japanese-like flags, which had appeared during the strike, to be hauled down, and he slyly remarked that he had brought the pro-Japan people into line behind this move by telling them that the demonstration was a defamation of the Japanese national emblem. After the strike, he was elected to the City Planning Board and moved from there into the second Issei Advisory Board of which he was at first vice-chairman and later chairman. Through the winter he led the large faction in the Issei Advisory Board that tried to have the Central Executive Board eliminated.

MEANWHILE, in the Administration, the antipathy toward the strike leaders which had appeared at the time of the negotiations continued to burn and was directed at the Central Executive Board and the Labor Relations Board which together contained most of the obvious figures. Members

of the administrative group refused to believe that good could come from them and refused to recognize them as anything except advisers to the Project Director. Although at times he spoke in favor of the Central Executive Board, the Director's attitude seemed to be not so much support as a determination to give them a chance to show what they could do. He consistently refused to delegate any definite power and left it up to them to make their own place in community affairs.

THUS it was that early in January the Central Executive Board and its companion, the Labor Relations Board, had no clear and formal lines of support. They were rejected as an executive body by the Council, by the Issei Advisory Board, by the majority of the administrative staff, and by numbers of residents of all kinds. In spite of this, however, the Central Executive Board really had considerable backing from the community, especially from those who regarded it as a symbol of victory; and its leader, the former Chairman of the Issei Advisory Board, retained a strong personal following among Isseis.

This man's attitude on community problems had undergone a drastic change since the days when he was an agitator among the bachelors. A resident of his block who had previously disliked him intensely said, "We couldn't picture him as the same man." Although never in any way trying to play down his Japanese feelings, he spoke for moderation, peace, harmony and holding things together in the Project and for the suppression of radicals. He said, "We will not only be doing the United States a favor by being ideal residents, but also, it would be thus that the Japanese Government would expect us to act." As far as the Niseis were concerned, he said that they were and should behave as Americans, should be in the army fighting for their country and that the Japanese Government would only respect them for it.

One of the first opportunities for effective attack on the Central Executive Board and the Labor Relations Board came when their members, led by the former Issei Chairman and the Minister, met with the Spanish Consul and made a request through him to the Japanese Government for $200,000,000 for the rehabilitation of the Isseis after the war. There was a reaction of disapproval to this on the part of many Isseis, for they felt that it lowered their self-respect and that no true Japanese would make such a request while his country was pressed with war. The dentist and his friends seized this opportunity to exploit these feelings as a means of turning Issei sentiment against the Central Executive Board. In consequence, the former Issei Chairman and the Minister were forced to send a telegram retracting their request, and the Boards they represented lost ground in the community's esteem.

The next attack came when the Issei Advisory Board passed a vote of no confidence in the Central Executive Board and asked its members to resign. When the Central Executive Board refused, the Issei Advisory Board pinned notices on the walls of all the mess halls explaining to the public why the resignation had been requested. In essence, they said that the Central Executive Board had done nothing to clear Unit I of the evil publicity it had received during the strike in regard to a pro-Axis gang, that they had not taken steps to settle the Judo Instructor's case, that they had unwarrantedly taken it on themselves to ask the Japanese Government for money, that they concealed facts and that they had not prevented the Administration from reducing their power.

The Central Executive Board countered with a notice fastened to the doors of the latrines explaining that it had refused to resign because it had been working hard, because the Issei Advisory Board gave it no chance to explain before suddenly demanding the resignation, and because a combined vote of the Council and Issei Advisory Board—not just

the Board alone—would be required to abolish the Central Executive Board.

THE dispute was finally settled by a move which indicated considerable advance in community integration, an increasing ability to handle its own affairs, and the playing down of Issei-Nisei differences and other conflicts. This consisted in the Central Executive Board and the Issei Advisory Board both asking the Council to arbitrate. The Council agreed and appointed a committee composed of the oldest Niseis who, after looking into the matter, decided that the Central Executive Board should continue until the pending charter for a permanent self-government was complete and a new election was held to establish the Permanent Council. At that time they thought the new members of the permanent self-government organization could decide whether or not they wanted a Central Executive Board.

The verdict was accepted by both sides, but the Central Executive Board immediately tried to consolidate its gain by presenting the Council and the Issei Advisory Board with a statement of its powers and duties for their ratification. These demands were promptly rejected, whereupon the Central Executive Board resigned.

IN spite of this, the Director was still not sure that the usefulness of the Central Executive Board was at an end, and he still wanted to secure help rather than opposition from its members. Consequently, with the aid of the Attorney, he drew up a statement of the functions of the Central Executive Board and the Labor Relations Board and presented it to the Council.

For the Central Executive Board the main points of the proposal were as follows:

The Central Executive Board would:

1. Act as adviser to the director of Unit I.

2. Cooperate with department heads and Block Managers and execute recommendations of the Council after approval by the Project Director.

3. Select, appoint, discharge, or transfer evacuee personnel in key positions, subject to the approval of the Project Director.

4. Encourage and promote activities conducive to the welfare of residents of Unit I, with special emphasis on the translation and transmission of information.

The Labor Relations Board would:

1. Mediate all labor disputes, on request.
2. Study labor conditions and make recommendations.
3. Act as spokesman for evacuee workers.

The Council and the Issei Advisory Board accepted these proposals and immediately appointed the same chairman of the Central Executive Board and the same chairman of the Labor Relations Board as had held these positions before the resignation. These were instructed to select the other members of their Boards subject to the approval of the Council and the Issei Advisory Board. This was done and in the process the former Issei Chairman dropped from the Central Executive Board those men concerning whose past record and general character there had been so much objection from the community. Thus was the Central Executive Board purged and made over.

The Kibei was one of those who disappeared from the Central Executive Board and never again had such a prominent position. Later in the year, he remarked that he had retired from politics "disgusted." He was quite scornful of the Council and resentful toward the Director for not having lived up to "his promises" at the time of the strike negotiations. By this he seemed to mean that the Director should have given and maintained for the Central Executive Board absolute executive power.

He reappeared in community affairs once or twice briefly

as one of a number who were protesting strongly against the Council and the Administration in particular issues, but he seemed to sink progressively in the eyes of the people. He eventually went to the Tule Lake Relocation Center when it became reserved for those Japanese whose records indicated they wished the Japanese way of life.

After reorganization of the Central Executive Board and the Labor Relations Board, the political framework of Poston was relatively clear. The Council, elected according to War Relocation Authority regulations, emerged as the basic political organization from which all others derived their sanction. However, the Council constantly collaborated with the Issei Advisory Board and for all practical purposes the two bodies were one. Both in general meetings and in committees, the Isseis and Niseis worked together on equal terms and in most cases managed to reach mutual agreement.


The Central Executive Board and the Labor Relations Board were from this point on no longer like the smile of the Cheshire Cat, but existed by authority of the Council. They existed, however, not as the result of spiritless conformity to an administrative blueprint, but in answer to needs and as a result of changes coming from within the community itself. By absorbing them, the Council developed beyond mere recommendatory powers and assumed some executive functions, combined with both the willingness and the ability to be responsible. Thus it was that ultimately a form of self-government emerged which did not come purely as a result of orders from Washington, or as a result of arbitrary acts of power on the part of the Administration, but from a combination of planning in Washington, guidance from the local Administrator and the interplay of real political factors and social forces in the community.

During all this sparring of the Central Executive Board, the Labor Relations Board, the Issei Advisory Board, the Council and various other cliques in the community which

have not been mentioned, there was more genuine and widespread interest in community affairs than had been seen at any previous period. At the same time, the Administration was able to move out of its former position of being predominantly the symbol of evil and the target of most hostilities. It moved to a more neutral ground in which it played the role of an arbitrator between various evacuee bodies who struggled with each other and tried to secure the Administration's favor and support.

THE activities to which the self-government bodies turned included efforts toward better informing of the people, reduction of juvenile delinquency, control of gambling and drinking, the securing of nurses' aids for the hospital and the finding of labor for the completion of the adobe school buildings and other projects. In close collaboration with the Administration they worked on the program of getting people resettled in jobs outside the camp and in the readjustments within camp made necessary by the departure of workers. Much work was done to alleviate a manpower shortage, and help was given in the weeding out of unnecessary evacuee employees. A trust fund plan was developed for handling money derived from the camouflage-net factory and of this $5,000 was given to the hospital, $20 was given to each evacuee teacher, $50 was given to each block and the remainder was divided as a bonus among all the workers of Unit I who were not employed in the factory and were therefore receiving only $19 per month or less. The Council made a loan from the Trust Fund of almost $18,000 to the Community Enterprises to enable it to cash paychecks of the evacuees. Finally, there was developed and put into effect a system of permanent self-government in which, through a change in War Relocation Authority policy, Isseis were allowed full participation.

Through all this, the new Council Chairman was vigorous and to the fore, constructive in attitude, but nobody's "yes



Schoolboy



Potential delinquents—much energy and little control or guidance in a disorganized society

man." He had the Reports Officer on the mat for his press policies, he once called the Director "the biggest bottleneck on the Project" and challenged the Director of the War Relocation Authority at a public meeting with the question, "Could you live on $19 per month?" However, in spite of such tactics, he did not antagonize the Administration, many of whose members admired his forthrightness and felt he could be trusted.

In the community he seems to have become more and more respected, and even the Isseis appeared to like him in spite of his brusqueness.

On May 15, one year to the day after his arrival, he suddenly in the midst of a Council meeting announced his resignation and imminent departure from Poston and said he was going out to become a millionaire. He left at the end of the next week, following parties given in his honor, went to work in the Sweet Mine of Utah, and when last heard from was treasurer of the local miners' union.

THE former Issei Chairman, now leader of the Central Executive Board, although he remained distant from the Administration, gradually won the respect and confidence of those members who had been against all the strike leaders. He concerned himself chiefly with problems of community welfare, especially moral problems and the control of gambling. At his suggestion, a Social Relations Board was established, composed of both Isseis and Niseis of good character and standing, who worked successfully toward the harmonious settling of difficulties arising in interpersonal relations. While he wanted "innocent" internees returned to their families in Poston, he opposed a suggestion that *all* internees with families in Poston be allowed to return because he felt that the Center should be kept distinct from an internment camp and only those cleared as a result of hearings should be allowed to enter. There were those who thought he was "All fancy talk and no practical solution," but to

many he was a guiding light and very greatly respected. People went to him for advice about their children, about family matters, and about their future. He was, it would seem, the self-appointed keeper of high morals for Poston, godparent to the young people, the promoter of collaboration and, above all, the voice of ideals. When a rumor started that the Director was going to leave the Project, this Issei leader was a prime mover in the circulation of a petition asking him to stay. The document eventually contained many thousands of names from all three units and expressed appreciation of and faith in the Director. This occurred only six months after the strike and was inspired by some of the principal leaders in that incident.

The dentist and the Minister dropped from Poston's politics early in the spring, very largely as the result of mounting criticism and failure to get support in the community.

The member of the Judicial Commission, whose plight as a prisoner had been one of the factors that set the strike going, was a friend and confidant of the new Council Chairman and became Secretary to the second Council and to the ultimately established Permanent Council. He was particularly interested in the construction of the schools and did much to promote community interest in them. Later on he became Chairman of the Police Commission and then one of the three trustees for the Trust Fund.

He was one of those Kibeis who, instead of displaying reactions of maladjustment and aggression, seemed to use his marginal position between American and Japanese culture quietly and consistently to bring the poles in Poston closer together, to promote better understanding among Isseis, Niseis and Administration and to work for just and fair-minded solutions to the community's major problems. There were several such in the Council and the Central Executive Board and in other places, and their influence in the post-strike period was very important.

The other prisoner, the Judo Instructor, was never tried. As a result of pressure from forces outside the Project, a warrant for his arrest was issued in December about two weeks after he had been released. The Director called some of the community leaders together and explained the situation and also talked privately to the Judo Instructor. As a result the Judo Instructor quietly packed his bag and was taken to the Yuma County Jail. Within two days he was back in camp, the United States Attorney having said he would not press the case.

For a time following the strike, the Judo Instructor was a hero and he spoke of doing something for the community by taking a gang out to work on some of the projects, such as irrigation construction, where it had been hard to secure men. He did this for a while and contributed much help, but in time trouble occurred between his followers (nearly all of the aggressive Kibei type) and others. They participated in several other kinds of work and then joined the fire department, but wherever they went there seemed to be friction with other residents and with government employees. Like the Kibei member of the Central Executive Board, the Judo Instructor seemed to sink lower and lower in the esteem of the community, and many of those who had most ardently followed the symbol he had represented came to feel "very disappointed." Had he died, or been taken away by force during the strike, he probably would still be a shining light of martyrdom, but since neither of these happened, people gradually began to see him in his true proportions. He eventually went to the Tule Lake Center.

The victim of the beating, the forgotten man in all the turmoil, left camp as soon as he had recovered from his wounds and no more was heard of him.

On the whole, the Administration was slower in recovering from the effects of the strike than were the evacuees. For

months there was a general spirit of depression and considerable dissatisfaction.

As has been noted, there was a reaction of antipathy on the part of many staff members toward evacuees who were prominent in the strike. This included numbers of those who were usually people-minded though they were inclined to think of the Isseis as stereotypes. As a result of the attitudes of these administrators it was difficult for the Director to put in effect his policy of utilizing the emerging leadership and social organization for the better management of the community. However, in the course of time, some of those who were most uncomfortable and hostile toward the new leaders left the Project, and others gradually became able to participate in the furtherance of the Director's plans, especially after the relationship between the Central Executive Board and the Council became clear.

In the case of those who felt that Poston was or ought to be a concentration camp, there continued to be no real adjustment to the basic policies. It could hardly be otherwise since their training and the organization of their work focused their interest on matters of procedure and on the protection of government funds and property for which they were responsible, rather than on the successful and most inexpensive accomplishment of over-all plans. In many respects, they seemed pennywise and pound foolish. Added to the matter of responsibility was their stereotyped way of regarding the evacuees, and this involved prejudices and fundamental attitudes most difficult to change.

Along with the unadjustable members of the people-minded group, a number of these stereotype-minded employees also left the Project, among them the Fiscal Officer, the Supply Officer and the Reports Officer.

No account of the Poston Administration would be even approximately complete without reference to the extent it suffered at the hands of those who either willfully or in-

nocently misrepresented it. To do the matter justice would require an historical account as long as the present one but devoted to this subject alone. The sources of these antagonistic comments were numerous and consisted primarily of politicians and newspapers, at times aided by discharged or disgruntled employees; and the strike was a rich source from which to draw ammunition. The attacks were cruel, widespread, and repeated with numerous distortions or falsifications of fact. Instead of receiving honest praise for a hard task faithfully and often brilliantly performed, the Administration was constantly liable to bitter accusations for achieving in the face of difficulty the very things which represented its duty—such as settling the strike quietly, justly, and without military intervention.

In many instances, the hostile attitudes were the result of actual ignorance and misunderstanding, and for this lack of good public relations the Administration now rightly recognizes that it was in part responsible. In the early days, because aware of so many unfriendly forces surrounding it and because inexperienced in the use of publicity, it followed a policy of being too close-mouthed about what was going on in the Project. As a result, some newspapermen who could not get real information published inventions.

However, most of the misinterpretation was from people who were in a position to know better. It seemed that they represented merely the carrying forward of the anti-Japanese forces that had been active for decades in California and had been concerned in the bringing about of evacuation.

The following quotation from the press will serve as an illustration:

> Los Angeles, June 10, 1943—AP—A former official of the Poston, Arizona, relocation center testified before the Dies congressional sub-committee, it was disclosed today, that Japanese in the Poston camp cached bread and other food in the desert for invasion forces and paratroopers.
>
> "We purchased 3,750 pounds of bread daily," [the Supply Officer] testified, the transcript showed. "They [the Japanese] are not

great bread eaters. The majority of this bread was dried and stored away.

"They stated that they were hoarding food, bread and other supplies, for parachute troops and for invasion forces.

"The information that was furnished me by certain friendly groups," [the Supply Officer] continued, "was that they had placed different types of emergency food in secret cellars under the mess halls for the invasion armies and parachute troopers.

"But in addition to that they had large caches of food throughout the desert, buried, that could be used for similar purposes. This information was furnished by friendly Japanese who were endeavoring to get special favors. We were constantly trying to find out what was happening to certain supplies. . . . We constantly had probably 15 or 20 informants that kept us advised as to certain storages within the camp area."

[The Supply Officer] declared the Japanese camp occupants "would state they would have our country before long." I have been told that 20 times, at least; in other words, that camp is 100 per cent of the idea that Japan will have the United States in a few months. In talking to them, they are very frank about it.

"There are over 1000 Japanese soldiers and Japanese officers in that camp. . . . They are the most indifferent fellows. If you ask them, 'Were you fellows organized on the west coast?' they will say 'Yes, we had our program all set up.'

"I have asked them, 'What were you going to do?' and the answer was, 'As soon as our soldiers come over, we were going to help them.'

"They tell you right off that they were going to win the war. And that is the type of man that is drilling over there almost daily in military tactics, right under our noses in that camp.

"They drill them in various ways, but still drill them, and they are making soldiers out of them, and they are not kidding about it. They don't even presume to hide it.

"For instance, I can take you down to an admiral down there. He was our chef in Camp 3. I can't quite recall his name. I talked to him. I know he was an admiral in the Japanese Navy and he was running a fishing boat at San Pedro.

"I said to him, 'Is it a fact that your boats were equipped for military purposes?'

"He said, 'Yes, all of our boats were equipped so we could convert them.' He said that all the Japanese fishermen are military men."

Describing a riot at the camp last November 18, [the Supply Officer] said that amid defiant cat-calls the Japanese flag was hoisted on a pole in front of the jail "and the American flag was absent from many places." The inmates later raised another Japanese flag

which "flew there for two weeks and our own flag—all the flags at the camp—were taken down."

[The Supply Officer] pictured "the poor simpleton, cowering Caucasian employees standing around like whipped children, lucky to be spared and allowed to live from hour to hour, with ambulances filled with disguised soldiers with machine guns guarding their sleep, so they would not be slaughtered or burned, as hourly threatened."

[The Supply Officer] explained that the military police were not allowed to be in uniform on the camp side of the highway, so soldiers in civilian clothes manned the hospital ambulance with mounted machine guns at the rear of the Caucasian sleeping quarters.

A little of this sort of thing can be taken in one's stride, but when it comes up over and over again, rarely balanced by honest estimates, and when it persistently interferes with the accomplishment of duty, it is a trial that few can stand indefinitely. The administrator who is not conscientious can probably take cover and protect himself (at somebody else's expense if necessary), but the man who is trying to do his work to the best of his ability in the interest of the taxpayer, the people he is administering, and the principles of democracy, can hardly avoid Danton's despairing conclusion which gave the title to this book.

14. Reconsideration

THE Poston incident was not a simple affair, but neither was it so complicated or so chaotic as to be incomprehensible. It was a thing of human acts and attitudes, with causes and consequences, and bound by the customary functions of biology, individual psychology, and society, many of which are well known and obvious. It was the outcome of major themes that had been operating ever since the beginning of the Project. It did not spring from any one theme alone, but from the net effect of their combination and intensity.

THEME I. *Many of the features of evacuation produced extensive mental and emotional reactions in the evacuees which in turn greatly affected the way they behaved in relation to administrative acts and new events.*

THE emotion-producing features of evacuation and the reactions to them outlined in Chapter 1 were manifest when the Japanese came to Poston. The months that followed brought little reduction in these trends except in the case of those relatively few evacuees who were close enough to the Administration to appreciate the character of its leaders and to grasp its main purposes.

The economic losses remained and also the lack of opportunity to recuperate. Rejection and hostility from other Americans continued to be felt in the fact that the evacuees were held in the Center and continued to be perceived in press reports and in the attitude of many members of the administrative personnel. Life in Poston brought numerous new frustrations to pile on the old as "promised" improvements and progressive plans guttered or went out. The feeling that those in authority were unreliable and indifferent

if not hostile was given impetus by experience with delayed hospital supplies, poor food, slow payment of wages, lack of heating stoves and similar matters. There was a continuation of compulsory confinement to a small area and crowded quarters with many physical discomforts from heat, dust and cold. Dissatisfaction over inability to determine one's own food, health-protection, shelter, child-care and education became reinforced with events in mess halls, hospital and schools. Finally, there was no alteration in the continual feeling of not understanding what was happening and not knowing what to expect in the future or how to prepare oneself.

Resultant aggressive feelings tended to discharge on persons and objects which were more substitutes and symbols than actual sources of discomfort. As has been noted, this operated both among the evacuees and among the members of the Administration and did much to obscure issues and to produce illogical courses of action.

THEME II. *Evacuation broke apart and reshuffled the society of the Japanese with the result that for some time most forms of collective activity, including those related to work, were unstable and inefficient.*

THIS theme played an important role in the disharmonies in the work programs, in the self-government and in the Administration's efforts to operate the Project through resident assistants. Misunderstandings entered the picture between rural and urban people, between rich and poor, between high social prestige level and low, and between the educated and the uneducated. The difficulties of the volunteers, the isolation of the first Council from the people, the friction with Block Managers, the lack of agreement on trust funds, the mistrust of the store, the conflicts surrounding

the cooperative movement and the labor troubles were all augmented by this theme.

The mixture of types of people also contributed to the general anxieties that were widespread in the community. For example, it increased the tensions arising out of the overcrowding of apartments because families of very different personal habits were forced to live together. It produced situations in which persons of previous weight in their communities found themselves receiving orders from those who would ordinarily have been their servants. Most of all, it was a fundamental part of the uneasiness which came from people finding each other's behavior strange and unpredictable.

This general lack of unity and common understanding was an important element in causing the residents to be docile toward the Administration in the early days and, by the same token, later on made it easier for the rise and power of the gangs.

Nearly all the leaders in the Administration were aware to some extent of the psychological effects of evacuation on individuals and, indeed, some staff members said that one of their principal aims was to help the people get on their feet by aiding them to recover from the "emotional shock" they were suffering. However, for the most part, neither the Administration nor we who were analyzing and reporting on the situation sufficiently grasped the social aspects of the matter and did not realize that in addition to individual stability it was also necessary for social cohesiveness to grow through the establishment of new associations, familiarity among the people who lived and worked together and new habits of interpersonal relations. It was not seen that the society was like a dissected watch, which, even if the parts were in good order, would not run until they were in a functional relationship with each other. To this extent, almost everybody fell into the popular error of thinking of the

Japanese as a stereotype, the common fallacy wherever members of one cultural group think of those in another.

THEME III. *Strong differences of opinion, often amounting to considerable antagonism, divided a number of groups among the Japanese and greatly affected their adjustment to the relocation program.*

As has been said before, the Issei-Nisei conflict was the most notable of these differences. The operation of the camp, the work programs and the self-government were in the beginning exclusively Nisei, and this led to Issei opposition in all three fields, at first passive, and then more active in some aspects of labor agitation, the cooperative movement and the Issei Advisory Board. Resistance to the volunteers, the weakness of the first Council, and the ineffectiveness of many Niseis as administrative assistants all developed in part from this theme. It played an important role in the breakdown of Nisei leadership that was evident in the period before the strike.

In the general conflict of loyalties, national allegiance was of course significant. However, it probably did not loom so large in matters of cooperation with the Administration as was frequently supposed. As has been stated in the course of this report, the evacuees could not be divided into cooperative and uncooperative strictly along lines of national loyalty. Some who were pro-Japan were nevertheless willing to do their share to make Poston as good a community as possible and to work in harmony with the Administration, while others who were American in their sympathies were hostile to the Relocation Camp and its Administration.

As far as the emotional state of the population was concerned, divided loyalties was probably one of the most serious and complicating factors with which the people and the Administration had to contend. Highly charged with emo-

tion, it confused issues and caused the injection of irrelevant suspicions. A source of severe personal conflict, it greatly augmented the general uneasiness and fear in the community and increased the uncertainty with which people regarded each other. Affections and repulsions between husbands, wives, children, friends, and former associates were rendered confused and painful in many cases.

The effect of the Issei-Nisei conflict was devastating to the roots of security in personal relationships and did much to create the widespread emotional state that made the strike possible. The strike itself was in part an effort to cut through the intolerable conflicts and establish more certainty. In one of its most significant aspects, the strike was a revolt of the Isseis and an assertion of their demand to have more say in the management of their affairs and to rule, rather than be ruled by, their children.

As a result of all these things, life became bound by a past that was full of bitterness, a present that was intensely uncomfortable, and a future that was uncertain, threatening and beyond control. The emotional response to this expressed itself in wild rumors, unrealistic points of view on community and other issues and the intense feelings that appeared in connection with such various matters as health care, trust funds, and "dogs."

THEME IV. *As a reaction to their feelings of insecurity, the evacuees struggled hard to achieve a sense of security.*

THIS took many forms, depending on the type of person in whom it was operating. It was responsible for much of the cooperative effort seen in the volunteers and other Nisei assistants to the Administration, as well as in many Isseis. It was also a significant motive behind the aggressive actions of other people. For the majority of the Poston residents, the quest for security made them cautious and apathetic rather than very active in either cooperation or aggressive

resistance to the Administration. It was a factor in docility, the obeying of rules and instructions. On the whole, it probably operated more against than for initiative and enterprising participation in the plans of the Administration. Because of this it also made the way easier for the aggressive ones who formed the gangs.

The quest for security played its part in the development of solidarity in various groups in the community, such as the bachelors, the cooperative movement, the churches, the blocks and in many other places. It was a motive in the manifestations of solidarity around symbols of Japanese nationalism, which was hard for members of the Administration to understand until they realized that such people believed Japan would win and that even during the war she could and would protect them. In the latter supposition, of course, there was some truth as evinced in the visits from the Spanish Consul and his interest in the welfare of the aliens. Rumors that the physical conditions, food and similar matters were better in the internment camps than they were in the Relocation Centers encouraged leanings in this direction.

THEME V. *There was a continuous struggle for recognition and supremacy on the part of individuals and groups of individuals.*

THE struggle for influence gradually emerged in community life and reached a climax during the Poston strike in which it was one of the principal issues. Much of the activity of the Council, the Issei Advisory Board, the cooperative movement, the Block Managers, the Community Enterprises, the evacuee administrative aids, the gangs and numerous other segments of the camp were motivated by it. In some cases it promoted a healthy rivalry that improved the function of these different organizations, while in other situations, as for instance in the labor agitation, it was largely

destructive to community efficiency. A good deal of the Director's management of the strike negotiation was dictated by the belief that it was better to try to guide the struggle for power along lines that would be helpful to the Project than to take one or another side and thereby become involved in probably unsuccessful attempts to suppress it.

To some extent the struggle for power was the result of an effort by a limited number of individuals to achieve personal satisfaction out of life in the Relocation Center by gaining positions of importance through playing on the dissatisfactions and fears of their fellows.

Aside from this, however, there were people, including both leaders and followers, each group of whom thought they had a formula that would bring comfort and satisfaction to everybody. One such formula was that a committee of wise and mature Isseis was best for the camp, another involved the principles of cooperative organizations and a third emphasized more authority in the hands of the evacuee aides to the Administration. As a result, the struggle for power was, among other things, a competition of formulas, each seeming to promise its adherents advancement in the quest for security.

THEME VI. *The development of Poston was much affected by difficulties of achieving integrated actions by various government agencies and by the different departments of the local Administration.*

THIS theme was most in evidence in the first months of the Project when the nation in general and the Government in particular were in the throes of the social disarticulation and reorganization imposed by war. As time went on, the situation gradually improved and in many cases collaboration was always both cordial and efficient, as exemplified by the Yuma County law-enforcement authorities, the Quartermaster's Corps, and others.

However, there continued to be incongruities, and of these the difference in policy between the War Relocation Authority and the Indian Service was serious. In the same week that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs spoke to the residents and stressed the need of making Poston a successful pioneer type of colony, at least for the duration of the war, the head of the War Relocation Authority told them that everybody was to be resettled soon and that all plans for "anything above decent minimum subsistence" in the Project were to be abandoned. To complete the picture of contradiction, the one point on which both speakers agreed, namely that the Government intended to treat the residents as American citizens and peaceful enemy aliens and not as prisoners, appeared strange in the light of the fact that the Army was at the same time building a fence around the three units.

Such matters, of which this is only one sample, contributed not only inconsistencies of action, but also delays and deficiency in supplies and equipment. To say that this added to the confusion, fears, mistrust and uncooperativeness of the evacuees would be expressing it very moderately.

It seems probable that the occurrence which actually set off the Poston incident—the detention of two men without explanation and due process of law—was an example of poor coordination and understanding of purpose between the Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is likely that the objectives of each could have been attained without striking the spark which kindled the disturbance had they been sufficiently acquainted with and interested in each other's problems.

THEME VII. *A tendency on the part of many persons to think of people in terms of emotionally colored stereotypes and sweeping generalizations greatly modified the conversion of official policies into action and was an*

obstacle in the way of cooperation between the Administration and the evacuees.

THIS theme contributed to the previous one, but it was tended to come more and more to the fore rather than to recede with the passage of time. The consequent inefficiencies of camp management and the deleterious effect on evacuee sentiment contributed to the strike.

During the strike itself, the stereotype "enemy" was very prominent in the minds of some of the government personnel and made it necessary for the Administration to give as much energy and thought to keeping it under control as was devoted to the handling of evacuees.

THEME VIII. *There was great difficulty in the transmission of information concerning policies, attitudes, and ideas among the various people, groups, and organizations concerned in relocation both in the Administration and among the evacuees.*

This theme arose in part out of the social disorganization and then in turn contributed to it and entered as an adverse influence into almost every phase of Poston life. Among the evacuees it promoted misunderstanding, as for example, concerning what the Council was doing; it caused trouble between the evacuees and the Administration as seen in the case of the Civic Planning Board which in June of 1942 attempted to create a form of government that would be suitable for the camp; it caused difficulties between different parts of the Administration; it caused confusion in the interactions between the Administration and the head offices in Washington; and it augmented antagonism on the part of public and press toward the Center.

One of the central difficulties in communication between the Administration and the evacuees was the lack of selected and trained interpreters. In any Administration across the

barriers of language difference this matter should not be allowed to take care of itself but should be treated as a specific problem which will have profound effect on the activation of almost all plans and policies.

THEME IX. *The effort to rehabilitate the evacuees and to protect their interests served to counteract many of the adverse influences insofar as this effort became recognized.*

In some ways, this theme is the center of the conflicting forces in relocation and the point to which all the other themes are specifically attached. It had very great constructive value in the Project, because, in spite of the fact that the stereotype-minded administrators and some extreme Japanese nationalists were opposed to it, everybody else, both administrators and evacuees, accepted it as an ultimate purpose no matter how much their understanding differed as to means of attainment. In counteracting adverse influences, this theme did much to promote working efficiency, cooperativeness, morale, and general human welfare. One spearhead was the impression of sincerity and good will combined with ability which a number of the top administrators made on the people. This was particularly true of the Director himself and it is no exaggeration to say that one of the most important influences which operated to prevent the strike from becoming disorderly and destructive was the fact that scattered through the community and more concentrated among the leaders were people who, in spite of all, fundamentally subscribed to the words of the first Council Chairman, that "the Director is all right."

* * *

In conclusion, it is worth re-examining the original policies and aims with which the Relocation Center was founded and comparing these with the results obtained at

the end of a year and a half. The policies and aims have already been set forth in Chapter 2, but will be briefly summarized again here.

1. As quickly as possible the community was to become economically self-sufficient and in a position to contribute food and some forms of labor to the war effort.

2. It was believed that evacuation had been a shock to the evacuees and that for their own welfare and future usefulness as members of the nation it was important to get them busy in work that would provide independent livelihood, self-respect and an opportunity to make a record that the rest of the country could appreciate.

3. Through the development of irrigation and agriculture, it was intended that permanent national assets would be created, as well as food immediately needed in connection with the war.

4. It was thought to be important to show that the United States could carry out a program of evacuation and relocation in a democratic manner that would provide a useful basis for future responsibilities of a similar nature and the greatest possible contrast to population shifts in Axis countries.

5. To accomplish these policies, it seemed that adequate incentives would have to be created, that the Japanese must be brought to feel some security, some opportunity, and some acceptance as fellow Americans and friendly aliens. A program of self-government was envisaged that would develop gradually and enable the Project Administration to withdraw for the most part.

6. Security measures were to be handled by the responsible agencies as in any other community.

It is evident, from the account given in this report, that many of these aims were either not accomplished, or achieved only in a very limited sense. The creation of an economic base for the community, the stimulation of food production in connection with the war effort and the devel-

opment of at least a temporary sense of security among the evacuees were stalled by over-all changes in War Relocation Authority policies which prohibited anything more than a decent minimum subsistence in the Center and by extensive anti-evacuee sentiment on the part of press, public and politicians. The program of resettling evacuees with jobs in communities widely scattered throughout the United States brought reasonable security and economic independence to several thousand Niseis, but did not solve the problems of the Isseis and the many Niseis who were too young to leave, or were bound by family responsibility.

However, in the sphere of developing self-government and self-management among the evacuees, the Administration may be said to have achieved its aims. Considering all the forces operating in opposition from outside the Center, from within the Administration itself and from among the evacuees, it was a considerable accomplishment. The Center became truly run by the elected Councils of its three units, and by a number of commissions appointed jointly by the Director and the Councils. As a result, it was possible in the course of time to reduce the number of government employees as more and more work and responsibility was shifted to the evacuees and as good will developed between them and the Administration. Ultimately, an evacuee was selected and appointed as Unit Director in each of the three segments that made up the Center.

It is obvious that these successes did not come merely from the way the strike was settled. The description of the strike and its conclusion only illustrate the complex of policy, method and performance in the Administration which affected the development of the Center week in and week out.

However, granting the success, one may well ask if it would not have been possible to achieve the same ends with less of the political backing and filling and struggling for power that went on among the residents. Might it not

be that the negotiating and dickering by the Administration merely encouraged this sort of thing?

Such was probably the case. However, it seems a universal observation that one cannot have self-management in any kind of community without struggles and politics, sometimes more disturbing, sometimes less, but always there. That these should occur is a part of the philosophy in the American form of government, whether in large or small communities. Consequently, we have no reason to expect that the situation should have been very different among the evacuees.

The alternative is toward force, to which there is always resistance and this leads by action and reaction to extremes of suppression, resulting in tyranny, slave labor and undercover antagonism. Inefficient self-rule, charged with good will, sloppy as it may be, seems to be better and more economical than anything else attainable. In Poston, the Project from the start was committed to developing self-rule. The question was the encouragement of the good will which was in a most precarious state at the time of the strike. That it was salvaged, there can be no doubt.

Some further illumination to these considerations is given by the fact that at the Manzanar Relocation Center a strike occurred a few weeks after that at Poston. It seemed to be the result of circumstances very similar to those which had obtained in Poston, but the Administration was at a greater disadvantage because of several factors and in this instance military force was used. Although no command to fire was issued, a number of soldiers did shoot into the crowd, wounding a number of persons and killing two. Following this incident, the Center was in turmoil for many months with a turnover in government employees and an increase in the total number, with resistance and antagonism from evacuees, with embitterment and loss to the Administration of good leaders, and with the need to remove many residents from the Center and to set up a new, smaller center to house them.

PART II

PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

"Only by taking an infinitesimally small unit for observation (the differential of history, i.e., the individual tendencies of men) and attaining to the art of integrating them (i.e., finding the sum of these infinitesimals) can we hope to arrive at the laws of history."—LEO TOLSTOY

"It seems to me that at this time we need education in the obvious more than investigation of the obscure."—JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES

Introduction to Part II

In describing the scene of the Poston strike at the beginning of this book, a question was posed regarding the possibility of discerning constants and general principles of human social life "under the confusion, under the excited passions, amidst all the milling and cross-pulling." From time to time in unfolding the story of Poston, particularly in the last chapter with its "Themes," attempts were made to point out some of the broader aspects of the things that happened. However, it is in the pages which follow that the main effort will be made to answer this question which has served throughout as a guide, not only in the written presentation, but in all the field work as well.

As the title of Part II implies, Principles and Recommendations will both be given. The *Principles* are thought to have validity which is independent of any political theory or design for living. The *Recommendations* are based on the supposition that any administration will aim at the successful accomplishment of its assigned task, whether that be relief, rehabilitation, resettlement or outright government, and will aim at operation with a minimum cost of men, materials, money and time. Both Principles and Recommendations are offered with the reservation that there are always exceptions to general statements and that application must be tempered by the particulars of each concrete situation.

The discussions which are interspersed among the Principles and Recommendations have two purposes. The first is to illustrate meaning through references to particular instances in the story of Poston. The second is to indicate possible width and range of significance through calling on observations in psychology, psychiatry, sociology, anthropology, history, literature and wherever else sound observations regarding human life may be found. Such data are

presented in no sense as comprehensively or systematically marshalled facts to prove points, but merely as illustrations and indicators. Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity and familiarity, some of the illustrations, such as the Civil War and the Detroit riots, are used repeatedly.

As for the order of presentation, after stating a basic postulate, the behavior of the individual human being will be considered. Following this, two sections will deal with the behavior of human beings acting together in societies. The first of these will set forth some facts about the nature and influence of beliefs held in common and the second some facts about the habits, customs and ways of doing things which make up social organization. At the end will be a chapter of somewhat abstract, general suggestions. These divisions are of course artificial and are a convenience for expression and study. They do not represent separate compartments in nature because the individual, his systems of belief and the systems of social organization are one continuous phenomenon.

The results of this attempt to give some sort of answer to the question posed in the beginning are far from satisfying. At best they consist in the integration of fragments of concrete experience and observation to form abstractions which remain themselves fragments interrelated by tenuous and often dim connections. At the worst, they are abstractions which fail to integrate and which distort because they are sadly incomplete.

On the other hand, I am certain that in the Relocation Camp experience my hands groping blindly below the surface touched here and there on a real body of constants and laws in human living. I hope that the reader will be equally convinced of this, and that if he does not like the things I say he will be moved not to general doubt, but to do a better job of discovery, analysis and reporting, or at least to encourage others for that end.

15. Fundamental Postulate

PRINCIPLE 1. *In all the different peoples of the world there are universal, basic characteristics inherent in human nature; and*

PRINCIPLE 2. *There are profound differences in belief, sentiment, habit and custom among the various communities, tribes and nations which make up humankind.*

THESE two linked principles are accepted by practically all modern scientists who have seriously studied the nature of man and his society. Lawrence Frank expresses it thus:

"We must start with an acceptance of the diverse cultures all over the world, with a sympathetic understanding of their basic similarity of purpose and process, recognizing their diversity and their different emphasis, as productive of the richness and color and variation that man has achieved in living and human relations . . . all men, everywhere, face the same life tasks, share the same anxieties and perplexities, the bereavements and tragedies, seek the same goals in their cultures; to make life meaningful and significant, to find some security, to achieve some social order and to regulate their conduct toward values that make life more than mere organic existence."[1]

T. E. Lawrence, who was eminently successful in winning Arabs to the Allies in World War I, said:

"Arab processes were clear, Arab minds moved logically as our own, with nothing radically incomprehensible or different, except the premiss; there was no excuse or reason except our laziness and ignorance whereby we could call them inscrutable or Oriental or leave them misunderstood."[2]

More recently, John Embree in reporting on his studies in Japan has said:

[1] Reference 14.

[2] Reference 21.

"There is nothing 'mysteriously oriental' about Japanese. Like other human beings, their thoughts and acts are conditioned by early training and cultural environment—the better these are understood, the better the behavior of the people may be understood and predicted."[8]

Similar expressions could be quoted at length from many careful observers among many different people in all parts of the world. There is probably a demonstration of this postulate in the reputed Russian achievements with the integration of minorities and the development of education, industrialization and more cohesive government in the contrasting tribes and nations spread from East Cape to Turkestan.

In stating this postulate, no claim is made that all differences between nations and "races" are due to belief, habit, custom and mode of existence. There may be differences of emotions and personality traits that are based on inherited characteristics of endocrine glands, nervous system and the biochemical nature of the body. This is a matter not yet proved one way or the other for any set of behavioral traits or any individual trait. What is certain is that most of the ways of behaving which are popularly supposed to be biologically inherited in this or that "race" are, in fact, not so. In many instances, such ideas are false generalizations, and in the cases where they are true, the causes lie in the effects of growing up in a particular way of life, or in particular current circumstances and not in germ-plasm heredity.

In our popular thinking and in the minds of many administrators there is a tendency to overemphasize one or the other of the two halves of the postulate stated.

Some too easily think that "folks are folks the world over" and become puzzled when they find that other groups of people do not have the same sense of value in regard to such things as property, money, work, time, rank, or religious practice.

[8] Reference 13.

More often they go to the other extreme and imagine the foreigner to be a person governed by altogether different instincts, almost as if he were a different species of animal. This is part of our traditional folklore and it persists for many reasons. For each of us it is to some extent a matter of habit, of imitating other people, and of having little opportunity to get any other point of view. More forceful are satisfactions and feelings of security regarding our own way of life which we derive from the contrasts we make with what we deem the inferiority of the stranger. But also, there are times when this attitude enables us to believe that we need not apply to such people the same ethical standards we use in dealing with each other—and thus we are free to take predatory advantages of them without guilt feelings and even to make hate targets of them when we need to hate something.

All of this is very human and understandable, but it does not make for good administration. The effective general is not the man who regards his opponent as inscrutable, but the one who can put himself in his enemy's place. The good administrator will do likewise in regard to the people he is administering, and—whether they be friends or enemies, "primitive" or "modern"—will give them credit for the common run of brains, feelings and motives, while trying to understand whatever differences exist between their ways and his.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Do not think of people as racial, national or class stereotypes.

2. Think of people as a wide range of different kinds of personalities who possess certain fundamental characteristics in common with all other groups of human beings.

3. Think of basic similarities and national or cultural differences as matters to be perceived and understood in the furtherance of administration.

16. Individuals under Stress

A. TYPES OF STRESS

PRINCIPLE 1. *The following specific types of stress are disturbing to the emotions and thoughts of the individual:*

a. *Threats to life and health;*
b. *Discomfort from pain, heat, cold, dampness, fatigue and poor food;*
c. *Loss of means of subsistence, whether in the form of money, jobs, business or property;*
d. *Deprivation of sexual satisfaction;*
e. *Enforced idleness;*
f. *Restriction of movement;*
g. *Isolation;*
h. *Threats to children, family members and friends;*
i. *Rejection, dislike and ridicule from other people;*
j. *Capricious and unpredictable behavior on the part of those in authority upon whom one's welfare depends.*

LOOKING at Poston it is evident that most of these types of stress were present in the Relocation Center, some of them in considerable intensity, and they played their part in creating the strike as well as much unhappiness and many inefficiencies of operation long before the strike.

Thus, the hospital equipment was three months late in arriving and the people had profound fears in regard to health. Discomforts from heat, dust, fatigue, poor food and overcrowding were numerous and continuous. Almost everybody suffered some economic loss and many families were made destitute. At the same time their prospects for future recuperation were extremely uncertain. Lack of privacy was disturbing to intimate and customary family relationships

including those that are sexual. Family units were dismembered or felt threatened with dismemberment by the detention of parents for investigations, by actual internments, and by the movement of younger people out of the Center to resettle in other parts of the United States.[1]

One of the most potent forces of adversity was rejection and dislike by other Americans. This was apparent in the press, in speeches by politicians, in the attitudes of some members of the Administration, in differences of wage, privilege and position that made caste lines between the evacuees and the administrative personnel and in the whole situation of forced evacuation and confinement to the Center. As one man said, "When I saw the machine gun pointed toward us, it gave me an enemy feeling."[2]

Equally prominent was the belief that those in authority were capricious and untrustworthy. Such an attitude was based on experience, going back many years, with state and local administrations in which economic and other discriminations had been either permitted or actively enforced. Since the beginning of the war, there had been numerous abrupt changes and contradictions in Federal policy. For example, it was at first stated that there would be no evacuation, then that evacuation would be voluntary, then that it would be compulsory for only limited areas and then finally that it would be compulsory and complete. Each of these changes caused radical alterations and frustrations in personal plans. After evacuation became a certainty, there were many "promises" in connection with it which were unfulfilled, such as protection of the personal property left behind, good housing in the Center, and opportunities to work at going wages. Finally, the leaders from the evacuee group itself were for the most part not such as inspired confidence because they lacked experience, represented many different

[1] See pp. 16, 21-23, 37-41, 43, 44, 92-94, 114-118, 143, 154, 155, 232.

[2] See pp. 17-21, 23-26, 29-31, 107, 108, 142-145, 232.

views, were in conflict with each other and, being evacuees, lacked power.[3]

While the members of the Administration were not under so much pressure as the evacuees, they nevertheless suffered from the specific types of stress that have been listed. Although better protected from the climate through superior housing and the use of cooling systems in the buildings, they had much to endure from heat and from overcrowded and uncomfortable quarters.

Rejection by other people was also a severe strain on the Administration and came from two different directions. On the one hand, there were many evacuees who treated the members of the Administration as if they were personally responsible for the miseries of evacuation. On the other hand, there were repeated attacks from press, public and politicians based variously on opposing ideas of policy, ignorance and ulterior motives. These attacks not only criticized the technical efficiency of the Project personnel but cast aspersions on their honor as well.[4]

Uncertainty regarding the actions of those in authority was almost as much a trial to the members of the Administration as it was to the evacuees. The uncertainty was caused by changes in policy, confusions regarding lines of authority and disarticulations between government agencies, much of which was inevitable and incidental to the nation's preparation for fighting the war.[5]

It should be emphasized that these points are not made with a view to eliciting sympathy for the evacuees and still less are they intended as a general criticism of the people in authority. The latter were very hard pressed and did a remarkable job in spite of handicaps that have been repeatedly pointed out. The purpose here is to demonstrate a

[3] See pp. 31-36, 39-44, 92-96, 103-108, 117, 120, 122-124, 142-143, 146-147, 154-155, 158-161, 232, 235, 237-239.

[4] See pp. 150-151, 228-231.

[5] See pp. 55-60, 81-89, 90-92, 151-153, 227-228, 238-241.

practical point in administration; when certain types of stress occur, human beings react to them no matter what the cause and no matter what the rights and wrongs of the situation. Apples will fall to the ground when we shake a tree irrespective of whether we do it on purpose or by accident.

Types of stress which were not characteristic of Poston were enforced idleness and individual isolation.

Looking at the specific types of stress listed from a. to j. projected on to a wider field than the Relocation Center, it is evident that they can be found again and again in the writings of historians, anthropologists, social and clinical psychologists and others who have described human beings in states of upheaval. The items are often put in different words and combined in various orders, but the central set of ideas is the same.[6]

Some of the types of stress are more commonly noted than the others, particularly *threats to life, to subsistence, to protection from the elements and to family unity*. Accounts of these may be found in descriptions of local riots and of great revolutions such as the French, the American, the Meiji, the Boxer, the Russian and many more.

Other specific types of stress, that is, *isolation, idleness, rejection by others and capricious authority*, have not always been so clearly understood, but their importance is becoming more and more manifest as a result of observation in many different but related fields.

For instance, in the Detroit Riots of June 1943, although physical discomforts and economic problems were significant, there was also enforced idleness in non-working hours because of lack of recreational facilities, and there were intense feelings of rejection and dislike stemming from race prejudice fanned by the economic competition. Furthermore those in authority, from the police up to high city

[6] See for example Chapter 13, in Reference 29, for a useful digest derived from many sources.

officials, were profoundly mistrusted by the Negroes while their capacity was doubted by many of the Whites.[7]

The adverse forces of dislike and rejection and of authority-mistrust are repeatedly stressed in almost all the recent work on the maintenance of morale and the prevention of war neurosis. A military psychiatrist states that "The group itself is the emotional equivalent of a 'kitty' from which all participants are eligible to draw the additional security necessary to fulfill their personal demands."[8] A social psychologist observes that the terms "sneak," "thief," and "chisler," because they carry the threat of rejection, do more to keep social order than the Army and police together.[9]

Capricious authority has been one of the most devastating forces pressing the conquered and subjected American Indian. Rejection, dislike and ridicule also played their part. The following quotation from Mark Twain illustrates a common frontier attitude toward the Indian after his defeat and when there was no longer a need to fear him so intensely as previously.

"Such of the Goshoots as we saw, along the road and hanging about the stations, were small, lean 'scrawny' creatures; in complexion a dull black like the ordinary American negro; their faces and hands bearing dirt which they had been hoarding and accumulating for months, years, and even generations, according to the age of the proprietor; a silent, sneaking, treacherous-looking race; taking note of everything, covertly, like all the other 'Noble Red Men' that we (do not) read about, and betraying no sign in their countenances: indolent, everlastingly patient and tireless, like all other Indians; prideless beggars—for if the beggar instinct were left out of an Indian he would not 'go,' any more than a clock without a pendulum; hungry, always hungry, and yet never refusing anything that a hog would eat, though often eating what a hog would decline; hunters, but having no higher ambition than to kill and eat jackass-rabbits,

[7] Reference 22. [8] Reference 31. [9] Reference 10.

crickets, and grasshoppers, and embezzle carrion from the buzzards and coyotes; savages who, when asked if they have the common Indian belief in a Great Spirit, show a something which almost amounts to emotion, thinking whisky is referred to; a thin, scattering race of almost naked black children, these Goshoots are, who produce nothing at all, and have no villages, and no gatherings together into strictly defined tribal communities—a people whose only shelter is a rag cast on a bush to keep off a portion of the snow, and yet who inhabit one of the most rocky, wintry, repulsive wastes that our country or any other can exhibit.

"The Bushmen and our Goshoots are manifestly descended from the self-same gorilla, or kangaroo, or Norway rat, whichever animal-Adam the Darwinians trace them to."[10]

Such attitudes combined with unreliability and inconsistency on the part of authority as represented by the Federal Government have been major factors in producing and perpetuating the social and personal deterioration which has been seen in some Indian groups.[11]

That people dislike having their movements restricted is shown by the fact that imprisonment has been a form of punishment for centuries. It is possible that the average adult's hatred of confinement is based on something innate and instinctive, for terror of restricted movement has been demonstrated in very small infants and seems to be of the same primordial nature as the fear of falling and the fear of sudden loud noises.

Fear of isolation is probably another very basic and innate tendency.

All things considered, it is evident that knowledge of the specific types of stress that have been listed under Principle 1 is fairly widespread. In fact some readers may feel that all that has been said so far consists in nothing but an unwarranted statement of the obvious.

This would be a valid criticism were it not for the rarity

[10] Reference 36.

[11] Reference 16.

with which the obvious is acted upon in practice at the time when it could be most effective. The people who actually feel the ill effects of the different types of stress are, of course, aware of them, but others not directly affected at the moment, though in a position to see plainly, can be blind to a degree that often seems incredible in later perspective.

In many instances administrators are among those who are not, in the beginning at any rate, directly affected by the adverse influences which may grow in a community and as a consequence they are among those who do not see what is going on. These things may be manifested in several different ways.

a. The administrator may ignore all the types of stress until every opportunity for taking effective action is past.

b. He may see and concentrate his attention on one or two types of stress while ignoring others that are also present and equally important. In the last analysis, most people realize that other human beings must eat, must be clothed and must be treated when ill, but there are many who do not understand that capricious authority or rejection and dislike by others can be more damaging to individual and group welfare than a deficient diet.

c. The administrator may recognize the existence of all the types of stress present, decide that he cannot do anything about them and then go ahead with his plans as if the people affected would also behave as if the stresses did not exist.

Because of these three tendencies, administrators are not infrequently caught by surprise when reactions occur that have been some time in the process of formation. To the blind, all things are sudden.

It is sometimes said as an explanation of this state of affairs that it is impossible to see the intangibles that govern human behavior. This is a dangerous half truth. Human behavior is greatly influenced by many factors that are difficult to

detect and by others that are unknown but it is also influenced by factors that can be objectively noted. The existence of "intangibles" and "subjective factors" is no excuse for neglecting those that can be considered objectively, particularly since many of them are of basic significance and capable of overruling some of the intangibles.

Considering again the list of specific types of stress from a. to j, all can be detected by objective means and measured in some approximate way that is sufficient for practical purposes. Such measurement would not be comparable to that used in physics and chemistry, but it would be sufficient for the kind of material and problems with which it dealt. Every day, court cases and doctors' diagnoses, upon which lives depend, are determined by rougher methods and in regard to much less available facts.

The net effect of all this is that a principle which in some sense is recognized by nearly everybody is inadequately applied in administration. For this there are several reasons. One is that few administrators are trained to think in such terms and another is a general failure to recognize the need for such thinking though the ill effects in end results are plain enough. In the words of Machiavelli:

"Thus it happens in matters of state; for known afar off (which it is only given to the prudent man to do) the evils that are brewing, they are easily cured. But when for want of such knowledge they are allowed to grow so everyone can recognize them; there is no longer any remedy to be found."[12]

However, the most basic reason why the obvious is ignored has to do with the position of the administrator in relation to the forces of stress, his systems of belief and the social organization of the group. The influences of belief systems and of social organization will be described in subsequent chapters. Here it may be pointed out that while the administrator is frequently not subjected to the same forces of

[12] Reference 24.

stress as the community, he is subject to other stresses of his own which have their due effect on him. This will be taken up under Principle 9 in the present chapter.

PRINCIPLE 2. *The following general types of stress are derived from the more specific types, but are in themselves particularly disturbing to the emotions and thoughts of the individual:*

a. *Persistent frustration of goals, desires, needs, intentions and plans;*
b. *Circumstances that promote the dilemma of conflicting and mutually incompatible desires and intentions;*
c. *Circumstances creating confusion and uncertainty as to what is happening in the present and what can be expected in the future.*

FRUSTRATION was characteristic of evacuee existence. Being moved from the West Coast to a Relocation Center interrupted jobs, careers, education, family and social life and many other common expectations and aspirations. After reaching the Center, the people found that day-to-day living was filled with great numbers of additional frustrations. The water supply would be cut off when one was most in need of a shower, noisy neighbors would prevent sleep at night, room-mates interfered with personal habits, attempts at work were hampered by inadequate equipment, wages were not paid on time, etc., etc., etc. Many of these irritations were minor, but their frequency and persistence often made them harder to bear than the major deprivations.

Conflicting desires in the same individual at the same time arose in such issues as whether to leave the Center and settle in non-restricted areas or remain to care for elderly parents; in whether to get married or stay single in order to aid in the education of younger brothers and sisters; and in how to be

loyal to the United States and also to parents who held the status of enemy aliens.

Uncertainty and confusion were as prevalent as frustration during the first half year or more of the Center's existence. The evacuees were permeated with a feeling of not knowing what to expect. This came as a result of seeing so many things that had been planned or "promised" come to nothing and of being unable to get reliable information concerning matters on which their future welfare depended.[13]

The members of the Administration suffered as much or more than the evacuees from frustration, incompatible desires and uncertainty. In their position they not only endured all the usual friction of a group of people forced to live closely together with uncomfortable physical conditions and to work with inadequate facilities under pressure of time, but in addition they were beset with uncertainties arising from their dependencies on other government agencies and on the evacuees, and by the attitudes of the public and politicians.[14]

That frustration, incompatible desires and uncertainty adversely affect individuals has been demonstrated over and over again in the practice of psychiatry and clinical psychology. Hundreds of thousands of case records attest to their influence, and many articles and books have been written concerning the various forms they assume and the ramifications of the reactions arising from them. In particular they are prominent in most of recent work on war neuroses.

In addition to clinical cases, these types of stress turn up repeatedly in anthropological studies, in sociological studies of crime and delinquency, and in experimental work on a variety of animals.

Few principles have been more thoroughly demonstrated by experience, observation and experiment than this one.

It may be justly pointed out that frustrations, difficult

[13] See pp. 44-47, 70-73, 77-80, 94-95, 120, 131-132, 142-143, 146-147, 154-155, 158-160, 232-236.

[14] See pp. 90-92, 119-120, 150-153, 210, 227-231, 238-241.

decisions and uncertainty are part of life and no commander, governor, administrator or diplomat can make himself responsible for the fortitude that individuals must have in order to live. However, it should also be realized that while *some* of these general types of stress are always found wherever there is life, they are not always present in such *quantity* and of such *quality* as to seriously threaten the emotional and mental equilibrium of most individuals exposed to them. The prevention of excessive stress is not only an administrative responsibility, but a very practical requirement for effective operation. To argue otherwise is like maintaining that because some dirt is always found where people live, the prevention of excessive accumulation and spread is not an administrative responsibility.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In a disturbed community look for all the specific and all the general types of stress, not one or a few; note which are actually present and try to estimate their intensity.

2. Never underestimate the deleterious force of circumstances which foster repeated *frustration, incompatible desires* and *uncertainty.*

3. Never dismiss complaints as trivial; they may be only "gripes," but they may also be clear warnings of imminent trouble and one cannot tell which without investigation.

4. Keep in mind that the strength of an administration rests largely on its ability to meet the needs of people; that relief from the various types of stress comprises a major set of needs; and that complaints are clues to needs.

5. Beware of letting *personal likes* and *dislikes* muddy the issues when dealing in disturbed human reactions; it should make no difference in how a man trims a ship for a storm whether or not he thinks the storm is justified.

6. It is best to approach problems involving human reactions as one would think of other kinds of complex

problems—get the facts and see what can be done about them to promote the administration's central aims.

B. THE WAY PEOPLE REACT TO STRESS

PRINCIPLE 3. *Cooperation, withdrawal and aggressiveness are three universal kinds of behavior with which individuals react to authority when subject to forces of stress that are disturbing to the emotions and thoughts of the individual.*

THESE three reactions were plainly present in the Relocation Center[15] and they have been seen in every kind of human group that has ever been carefully studied. They are particularly evident in minorities where it is often possible to divide a community roughly into three parts in terms of those who show predominantly cooperation, withdrawal or aggression in relation to the majority group. This has been noted in many American Indians, among Negroes, in Jewish communities, among Italian Americans and among Spanish Americans, and it was, of course, true of the Japanese in America long before the war.[16]

In occupied countries there can be no doubt that these three reactions will divide the people subjugated, and be of great practical importance in the establishment of efficient administrative programs. Indeed, they may be anticipated as attitudes toward any authority in war-torn countries.

PRINCIPLE 4. *Cooperation and compliance with authority resulting from disturbed emotions and thoughts may:*

Operate to free the individual from the forces causing the disturbed emotions and thoughts;

Operate to permit the continuance of the forces

[15] See pp. 71-73, 97, 236-238, 241. [16] See for example Reference 8.

causing the disturbed emotions and thoughts;
Lead the individual to extremes of blind submission
that rob him of the ability to take care of himself.

COOPERATION and compliance among the evacuees was seen in the development of the Block Managers and other administrative aides, in the maintenance of law and order, in the obeying of regulations, in enthusiastic work on plans for community building, and, in short, in practically every aspect of daily living. From the point of view of public relations and the ultimate security of the evacuees in America this was a wise course to follow.

However, when it came to the satisfaction of immediate needs, there were instances where cooperation served to perpetuate adverse influences while aggressive action got results. For example, people crowded together, often two different families in an unfurnished room, wanted material to make partitions, shelves, tables, chairs and cupboards. Those who took from the government lumber piles were able to make these fixtures. Those who abided by the rules and waited for the material to be supplied got little or nothing. Or again, it was not those who quietly accepted the poor food in the early days who secured its improvement, but those who loudly and repeatedly complained, threatened strikes, and wrote to higher officials.

There were some instances of evacuees showing extreme dependency, and clinging for support to various members of the Administration. Such evacuees were likely to agree to any administrative proposal, however ill advised, and would even maintain that their food was satisfactory when it was inadequate by any normal standards. This sometimes made things easy for the Administration, but more often it became clear in time that such reactions served poorly not only the welfare of the individual but also the administrator who found these persons too weak to take responsibility and incapable of initiative.

PRINCIPLE 5. *Withdrawal, apathy and indifference arising from disturbed emotions and thoughts may:*

Serve to protect the individual from some of the forces causing the disturbed emotions and thoughts and enable him to survive until conditions improve;

Operate to permit the continuance or increase of the forces causing disturbed emotions and thoughts;

Lead to extremes of selfishness, isolation, personal deterioration and unreliability.

IN THE Center, withdrawal from painful contacts, lying low, not "sticking your neck out," were, perhaps, the most widespread of all reactions. It was commonly a middle-ground, conservative attitude and a considerable asset to the Administration because of its very inertia. Although it operated against active cooperation and initiative, it served equally to retard radical aggressive behavior and contributed much stability to the community. In spite of being extremely exasperating, stolidity made for reliability.

There were also examples of extreme withdrawal as in the case of one man who lived out in the mesquite, coming in occasionally for rice to supplement the fish he caught in the river. Numbers of patients brought to the hospital for "mental trouble" gave evidence of being persons escaping from the stress of Center life and all it implied into fantasy worlds of their own.

Groups of people became devotees of religious cults, and magic and prophecy were sought as modes of relief rather than the active solution of problems.

PRINCIPLE 6. *Aggression arising from disturbed emotions and thoughts may:*

Stimulate the individual to take decisive actions that

will free him from the forces causing the disturbed emotions and thoughts;
Lead to confused and violent action wholly inappropriate to the circumstances of the individual.

AGGRESSIVE attitudes were present among the evacuees, just as they would be among almost any group of people undergoing similar experiences. In the beginning the signs and symptoms were not so evident, but they gradually increased. There were complaints, and clamorings for more living space, better food, better hospital facilities, threats, attacks by gangs on individual evacuees suspected of being "dogs" (informers), disregard of regulations, refusals to work, speeches by agitators, flourishes of Japanese nationalism, minor strikes, the taking of government property for private use and juvenile delinquency.

As a result of the growth of these aggressive tendencies, the running of Unit I became less and less efficient until the major strike, when operation almost ceased.

Three related but distinct factors contributed to the rise of aggressive expressions and acts. One was a reduction in fear of the Administration and a realization that the aggressive individual could hide in the mass of people who made up the Center. Another was the continuation without relief of most forms of stress, with an increase in some of them. The third was the fact that because of frustrations and uncertainties, attempts at cooperation continued to be more immediately punishing than rewarding in many instances.

If coercion had been employed in sufficient strength it could have prevented most demonstrations and insubordination. However, it would have retarded cooperation, and would have involved much higher cost. Relief from the major causes of stress would seem to be cheaper and tend to promote more ability on the part of the evacuees to control themselves.

The history of the Center makes it evident that much of

the aggressiveness that arose among the evacuees was controlled and directed in such a way as to help relieve some of the stresses impinging on the community. This was true of many complaints, petitions, requests, clamorings and even strikes. They not only relieved feelings by giving expression to emotions, but they caused alterations for the better in the running of the Center. The way in which the strike was settled and self-government was cultivated later did much to direct aggression along constructive lines.

Violent action inappropriate to the circumstances of the individuals concerned never occurred in any extreme degree so far as the whole community was concerned. However, there were many instances of confused and ill directed aggression that made circumstances worse rather than better. The attacks on supposed "dogs," abuse of members of the Administration who were doing the best they could, demands for things that were beyond possibility, refusals to work, and delinquency were in part examples of such profitless aggression.[17]

The considerable scientific work that has been done to understand the nature of aggression indicates that it is *not so much an innate quality or instinct as it is a way of reacting to stress.* For example, it has been found in fourteen Southern states that when the price of cotton goes down, the number of lynchings goes up. In cities where the population is dense and increasing, with many consequent adverse forces, the homicide rate is higher per unit of population than elsewhere.[18] All riots are forms of aggressive expression, and wherever they have been adequately examined, the stresses precipitating them have been plainly evident. The factors causing the Detroit riots of 1943 were not only seen by those who looked into the situation afterward, but had been noted years before by social scientists, and because of these factors the riot had been predicted.[19]

[17] See pp. 79-80, 92-98, 103-108, 111-119, 122-133, 147-150, 155-161, 166-170, 181-182, 189-191, 193-196, 235-238, 242-244.

[18] Reference 10.

[19] Reference 22.

There is some evidence that of all the different kinds of adverse forces from which men can suffer, the situation most likely to lead to aggression is that in which *frustration* predominates.

PRINCIPLE 7. *Aggression combined with fear may:*

Cause the spreading of and belief in "pathological" rumors, characterized by atrocity stories, betrayal stories and suspicions of plots;

Lead to attacks on persons who have little or nothing to do with the causes of stress.

STUDIES of individual and crowd psychology show that fear and panic often underlie expressions of aggression, particularly the kind that is reckless, unreasonable and prone to jump to conclusions. Psychiatrists observing patients who are emotionally unwell have long known that when they go into a state of panic they misinterpret ordinary events as horrible threats. The whistle of a distant train becomes a death scream, or two people seen talking together are instantly assumed to be plotting. More than this, it has been seen that patients in a panic can become hallucinated and see people coming to attack them who are not there at all, or may smell smoke and gas where none exists. It is more than probable that this happens to otherwise normal individuals when in a state of intense fear, and it may be that those persons in the Center who saw non-existent machine guns and their crews during the strike were suffering from such distortions of their senses. In the Detroit riots the police were bothered by people calling up and giving specific details of murders and violence, sometimes said to be going on before their "very eyes," but which actually never occurred. There are similar instances in reports on the behavior of people under stress in war zones.

It goes without saying, of course, that such behavior greatly increases whatever real danger exists.

Closely related to this is the appearance of loud-talking would-be heroes who spread a sense of melodramatic extremes with themselves cast in the role of the only man who really understands what is happening and able to save the day. Their solutions are usually starkly simple and likely to make the situation worse. Nevertheless, because many people are suffering from disturbed thoughts and emotions the would-be heroes may find an effective following and no one may recognize that their ideas, their apparent self-assurance and their aggressive actions, have roots in fear and distorted imagination. On the contrary, it may be felt that they have courage and wisdom based on superior information.

Rumors depicted the Center residents dying like flies because of the heat, the food and the lack of medical equipment. Hearses were said to come in the night to take away countless bodies, and there were recurrent stories about the murder of evacuees who responded to opportunities for employment outside the Center. Particularly agitating was the belief that babies were dying in the hospital nursery because it lacked a cooling system, while the administrative offices and the personnel mess hall were well equipped. The policies and acts of officials were often interpreted as schemes to get work out of the evacuees for next to nothing, to steal their property, to create excuses for interning them, and even to place them deliberately in circumstances—for instance Poston's great heat—that would kill them.[20]

The similarity of rumors in all reports on situations of human stress is very striking. Before the French Revolution the people believed that a member of the aristocracy took baths in human blood to restore "his own all spoiled by debaucheries." The same story is current today, with trans-

[20] See pp. 44-47, 103-104, 115, 145, 149, 156-159, 166-167.

fusion substituted for baths. Before the American Revolution the populace grew agitated on false stories of "massacres" and attacks on women by British soldiers.[21] During the Civil War, the South believed the North shot poisoned minié balls, smuggled poisoned drugs into the hospitals, and that prisoners of war were starved into eating rats. The North also fed on the same kind of stories. "Newspapers paraded exaggerated accounts of prison atrocities before their readers. Escaped or exchanged prisoners published lurid tales of their experiences. The worst cases of emaciation and disease were photographed and the pictures reproduced in every Northern community. . . .

"Northern opinion was thus rigidly shaped in the belief that 'tens of thousands of national soldiers . . . were deliberately shot to death, as at Fort Pillow, or frozen to death as at Belle Island, or starved to death as at Andersonville, or sickened to death by swamp malaria as in South Carolina.' "[22]

In a New England manufacturing town that happened to be a subject of study in the early days of the depression that came in 1930, it was found that the workers believed that the rich were running over the children of the poor in their expensive cars and never caring, and that the whole depression was some sort of plot by the upper classes to cut the wages of the workers.[23] In the Detroit riots, the Negroes were in a frenzy over stories of Negro babies being thrown off a bridge and of Negro girls being attacked, while White sections of the population were stirred by the very same stories with White babies and White girls as victims.[24]

Horrors do occur, of course, but they occur on both sides and there are usually hundreds of rumors to every actual event. The most terrible thing about atrocity stories is that they lead to retaliations and what is in the beginning fictitious, eventually becomes real.

[21] Reference 1.
[22] Reference 6.
[23] Reference 39.
[24] Reference 22.

The tendency to believe in the most elaborate and unlikely plots is perhaps as universal as the uncritical credence in atrocities. Consider the following:

They had a "perfect comprehension of the passions, prejudices, susceptibilities, vices and virtues and knowledge and ignorance of the people upon whom they had to practice. They knew every quiver of the popular pulse, and what it signified. They could weigh out to a grain the small quantity of truth to which the public appetite was equal, and they perfectly understood and measured the supernatural extent to which the popular conception could assimilate falsehood. They were masters of every artifice that could mystify or mislead, and of every trick that could excite hope or confidence, or rage. . . . Understanding their pit thus well, they played to it, with wonderful tact and effect. They filled their armies, established their financial systems, controlled the press, and silenced opposition by the same ingenious and bold imposture."[25]

This is not, as you might suppose, a description of Dr. Goebbels and his henchman, but of Lincoln and his cabinet by a Southern paper of that day.

Suspicions have a tendency to grow like snowballs and multiply like guinea pigs. During the early part of the French Revolution, there was focus on particular individuals who were thought to be oppressive, then all aristocrats were deemed suspects and faithful friends of the revolution were swept away in this generalization. Next, every part of the revolutionary body began to suspect every other part, and each committee to suspect all other committees, until everyone suspected everyone and there were such spectacles as Camille Desmoulins believing that when thousands rose cheering at his words they were all hired to do it. The same sort of thing has repeated itself in Europe in the last decade, and as one modern writer says,

"When people begin to suspect that every neighbor is a

[25] Reference 6.

member of the fifth column and that the government itself is honey-combed with them, the result may be as disastrous as if it were true."[26]

Attacks on persons who had little or nothing to do with the causes of stress appeared when evacuees suspected of being "dogs" (informers) became targets for hates it was not safe to express directly against the Administration and the other agents the evacuees thought were making them suffer. Gangs broke into barrack rooms in the night and beat supposed "dogs" after the usual fashion of the Ku Klux Klan and other vigilante organizations. The arrest of the two men, which set off the major strike, was in connection with such an incident.

It is commonly observed that when aggression cannot spend itself on the forces directly responsible for the stress from which the individuals are suffering, then there is a tendency to attack substitutes. Look almost anywhere at people under adverse forces and this may be observed. The man who is frustrated by his boss but dares not talk back to him is very likely to pour out his wrath on the office boy, or even his cat when he gets home.

Tolstoy pictures the tendency in the Governor of Moscow at the time the city was falling into Napoleon's hands:

" 'This is what they have done with Russia! This is what they have done with me!' thought the Governor, full of an irrepressible fury that welled up within him against the someone to whom what was happening might be attributed. As often happens with passionate people, he was mastered by anger but was still seeking an object on which to vent it. 'Here is that mob, the dregs of the people,' he thought as he gazed at the crowd: 'this rabble they have roused by their folly! They want a victim.' And this thought occurred to him just because he himself desired a victim, something on which to vent his rage."[27]

The result was the lynching of a helpless youth. The in-

[26] Reference 18.

[27] Reference 35.

cident depicts how it is that people, themselves on the verge of disaster, will pause to attack someone else—like a frog in the jaws of a snake trying to catch flies.

Very often the substitute selected for attack has some superficial link with the sources of stress, as when the famished crowd of St. Antoine during the French Revolution, unable to get bread, hung an innocent, and probably equally famished, baker.

This is a universal human trait of finding an excuse to break the usual social codes and to indulge in the pleasures of hating and killing when stresses build aggression and the desire for its release becomes intolerable. In such a situation, the question of whether or not the victims are actually the source of trouble disappears in the wish to believe they are. Thus, the attacks by evacuee gangs on "dogs," the hate of some of the administrative personnel for the Japanese Americans, the German's treatment of the Jews and the irrational intolerance of minorities which sweep this country especially during a depression—all have roots in situations of stress and are, as Dollard and his associates at Yale have noted, "symptomatic of the strong instigation to aggression that men possess." Aggression which cannot be directed outward may turn inward on the members of the group itself, and ultimately an individual can turn on himself and commit suicide.

Well known and often repeated as these things are, they are rarely recognized and controlled at the time they are occurring.

When the forces causing aggression continue and the panicky, scapegoat-chasing, rumor-spreading and suspicion-harboring aspects of it go unchecked and reinforce each other, then there may be seen a period in which the whole group of human beings seem to go mad together as if caught in some devastating contagious disease of the mind. Mob action and riots take place, conventional restraints snap and laws do not exist. Strangers ride up and kill stran-

gers, as they did long ago in the French Revolution and just yesterday in Detroit, for no reason except that everybody is killing somebody and the aggression accumulated from hundreds of specific irritations is being gloriously relieved.

PRINCIPLE 8. *Following an outburst of aggressive action, there is usually a period in which the individual has a sense of relief and well-being.*

THIS is a common observation that anybody can make on himself after losing his temper. He may feel a little foolish, and be sorry for what he did and said, but on the whole he feels better and is in a mood to respond to and cooperate with other people and to like people where he only hated them before.

Careful psychological studies bear out this common-sense assumption that an act of aggression reduces the instigation to aggression.

At the Center such a swing in the mood of almost the entire population was evident in the months that followed the strike and demonstration. By contrast, it was largely absent from the Administration, who got an increase in their various stresses out of the experience and little opportunity to discharge their aggressive feelings.[28]

Periods of holiday mood with enormous and elaborate carnivals were features of the French Revolution and similar tendencies have been noted more recently in strikes during the depression, when bands, flags, parties and good feeling appeared, if only briefly.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. Bear in mind that all three of the principal social reactions of individuals to stress (*cooperation, withdrawal* and *aggression*), have both advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of those in authority.

[28] See pp. 209-210, 211-213, 224.

7. Cultivate cooperation, but not extremes of compliance and dependence; there are "yes-men" of all races and creeds and they are usually poor assistants.

8. Regard extremes of withdrawal, apathy, and indifference as bad signs, but accept mass inertia as characteristic of people and learn to rely on its stability.

9. Consider aggression as a human reaction to circumstances, not merely as innate cussedness, the work of evil men, or a racial peculiarity.

10. Recognize rumors, suspicions, scapegoat tendencies, gang activities and crime increase as symptoms of aggression arising out of stress.

11. Try to guide and control aggression, but do not try to stamp it out; in most instances one cannot destroy it and even if he could, he would lose a force that might be of much value. It is the horse with spirit that is balking.

12. Remember that it is a common failing of administrators to refuse mild requests they can and should grant, while yielding later to aggressive demand that forces itself on their attention; such behavior encourages the destructive aspects of aggression.

13. Never make threats or pass laws that cannot be enforced; there is no quicker way to undermine the power of an administration.

14. Never take a strong stand on a weak position.

15. Never use a little force where a strong one is needed; if a boy is sent on a man's errand, he will have the work of two men to do, but if two men are sent on a man's errand, they will only have boy's work.

16. Capitalize on the feelings of relief and cooperativeness that are likely to occur after an outburst of aggression; do not set the clock back by an ill-placed act of punishment which rouses new aggressions and controls nothing.

C. ADMINISTRATORS UNDER STRESS

PRINCIPLE 9. *The members of an administrative body are human beings and react to stress along the same general lines as do other people.*

THIS fact is glaringly obvious, and yet both the people being administered and the members of the administrative group themselves often plan and act as if those in authority were some order of human being superior to the effects of stress and circumstance. Those being administered tend to overestimate the authorities either as too great or too evil. The members of the administration tend to feel as if they had a constitutional superiority and not be sufficiently on their guard to perceive and control their own reactions to stress.

As was stated earlier (page 259), the members of an administration are usually subjected to combinations and intensities of the general and specific types of stress (outlined under Principles 1 and 2) that are different from those affecting the people. This obscures the administration's perception of the types and degree of stress afflicting others lower down.

Additional obscurity and unrealistic practice of administration is likely to arise when the administrators react to their stresses with excessive cooperation, withdrawal, and aggression, either toward each other, or the people administered.

Just as with those being administered, tendencies toward cooperation on the part of administrators are not so likely to prove a liability through excess as is the case with the other two types of reaction. However, it can occur, and there were examples of this at the Center in government personnel who, though anxiously eager to please, were ineffective because too easily deflected from the proper course of action by evacuees, by other persons in the Administration, or by other government agencies.

Withdrawal and self-blinding to administrative responsi-

bility was a reaction that interfered with effective government at the Center more frequently than did too much cooperativeness. When it becomes complicated, baffling, or painful for the administrator to think of the various adverse influences at work among the people with whom he must deal, he has a tendency to minimize their importance or to dismiss them from his mind. If the people complain, the administrator looks on their protests as "excuses," as "gripes," as due to some peculiarity of "race," or feels that the whole situation is "their own fault" anyway. On the other hand, if complaints from the people do not reach him, he may assume that as a result of "race," the people really don't mind, or even prefer things that way. If, after these considerations, the administrator still feels a little uneasy about the situation, he will comfort himself with the thought that after all it is not so bad as some other place, and so the people should be thankful.

To expect this, is, of course, to expect something that is not one of the common reactions of any people. The man with a toothache gets little relief from being told that he is lucky that he doesn't have heart trouble.

Withdrawal from the realities of the administrative situation, and the resultant tendency to suppress the evidence of things being wrong, prevents steps of a corrective character from being taken early when they might be effective and permits pressures to develop extensively in the community. History is replete with instances in which those in power refused to face situations and sought escape through destroying the indicators while leaving the causes untouched. Before the French Revolution, men coming in an orderly manner to draw the King's attention to grave difficulties were executed.[29] The same was true for generations before the Russian Revolution, when the ideal of the Government was "public calm" which, as Pares says, soon came to mean "public silence," a very different thing.[30] In the numer-

[29] Reference 7.

[30] Reference 30.

ous agrarian revolts of Japan there are similar instances.[81]

Ostrich tendencies result in selling the future for a brief respite of make-believe security.

On the other hand it should not be supposed that the administrator must always wade into every difficult situation he perceives. Very often it is wise to let things develop and to permit situations to evolve their own solutions. The point it is desired to make here is that the administrator, whether he stands by or interferes, should know what he is doing. He should use his judgment and not be misled by his own reactions to the stresses playing on him.

Aggressive reaction in administrators can be very helpful when it takes the shape of initiative and provides the driving force for constructive change. However, poorly directed reactions of aggression on the part of administrators do much damage to effective operation. In the historical illustrations mentioned above this element was important as well as the noted refusal to face the situations.

At the Center it is certain that aggression and fear, arising in the members of the Administration and ranging in a footloose manner, took numbers of forms and was most destructive.

There were rumors that the Center residents had hidden guns and ammunition, were plotting attacks on personnel, and scheming to sabotage the American war effort. It reached the point where in some instances the most justifiable protests from residents were likely to be interpreted as acts under orders from Tokyo—and of course even more so the usual foolishness and irresponsibility found in any large group of people. Some members of the administrative personnel made scapegoats and hate targets of particular groups of evacuees, while others took this attitude toward all of them.

Although the war and hatred of the enemy played an important part in creating these attitudes, it was not the

[81] Reference 32.

whole story. The reaction of aggression arising out of frustrations in the Center made people more prone than they would otherwise have been to identify the Japanese Americans with the enemy and to leap to conclusions about plots, espionage and sabotage without basis by any standards except those of a mind in the throes of fierce, impelling anger and resentment. In spite of the fact that the FBI was doing a thorough job of security control there were government employees who thought vegetable cellars dug to conserve food because of the heat were caches for Japanese paratroops, who saw kitchen cooks as admirals in disguise and believed athletic teams were Japanese soldiers drilling. During the major strike there were people willing to swear they had seen men, machine guns and knives where none existed.

All of this was, of course, very serious in the efficient operation of the Center. It not only blocked many of the steps that could have been taken to relieve forces causing stress on evacuees, but it increased many frustrations and introduced new ones; and this in turn increased the disposition to aggression, resulting in a vicious circle.

In addition to aggression turned outward toward the evacuees, there was much of it turned inward toward groups and individuals who were part of the Administration. This paralleled hostilities that the evacuees developed in regard to each other, and in both instances often furnished energy for disputes and conflict between factions and for punishing individuals. In the case of the Administration it contributed its share to the friction between those who identified themselves with the Indian Service and those who felt loyalty to the War Relocation Authority. It also adversely influenced the relations among the various departments that made up the Center Administration, and between the Center Administration as a whole and the head offices in Washington.

In short, aggression generated in the stress of life of the Center flowed through ready-made channels, widening and

deepening them, and it also developed new stream beds of its own.[82]

However, on the whole, the people in the Center, both administrative and resident, never went to extremes of violent, confused and destructive aggression, as often happens to persons under such circumstances. This was largely due to the success of the Center Director and his aides in breaking the vicious circle and in harnessing the forces of aggression as well as those of cooperation and apathy for better community management.

RECOMMENDATIONS

17. Be prepared to find members of the Administration (including oneself) reacting to stress, and understand how resultant disturbance of emotions and thoughts can harm effective operation.

18. Try to prevent excessive cooperativeness that attempts to please all and ends in satisfying none.

19. Try to curb tendencies to withdraw rather than solve trouble; do not let too much sales-resistance to complaints develop.

20. Remember that when the administering body is of a different nationality or "race" from the people being administered, there are particular temptations to make scapegoats out of the people; do everything possible to prevent this, for it can easily destroy all possibility of good administration.

21. Beware of disordered emotional thinking in administrative officers and the elements of fear that may underlie behavior that is *apparently* bold, angry, shrewd and determined.

22. Watch out for administrative officers who give way to fruitless hating under the guise of enforcing discipline;

[82] See pp. 58-60, 81-89, 90-92, 106-108, 119-120, 137-139, 150-153, 170-177, 179, 183-185, 190-191, 198-203, 208-210, 218-219, 227-231, 238-241.

such behavior is a form of self-indulgence and dereliction of duty, and one may become addicted to it as to alcohol.

D. CONTROL OF REACTIONS TO STRESS

PRINCIPLE 10. *Relief from excessive stress reduces the likelihood that individuals will develop disturbed emotions and thoughts.*

IN THE Center, neither the strike settlement nor any other formal measure would have led to community stability had there not been at the same time a progressive relief from numbers of the most severe forms of stress which were affecting the people.

While it is never possible for an administration to eliminate all stress either from its own members, or from the community it is dealing with, it is common to find that some of the stresses can be eliminated and that many can be much reduced. It follows, therefore, that just because no single move will guarantee a cure, one is not justified in avoiding all action and innovation. A close checking for the types of stress listed under Principles 1 and 2, and an examination of the circumstances under which they occur will often reveal the means by which improvements can be made.

One of the most neglected of the avoidable stresses is that which has to do with uncertainty and lack of information. It is very common to find that the distribution of reliable information is treated as a secondary matter in administrative operation. Proper attention to the dissemination of the right facts to the right people at the right time can have far-reaching effects in the control of one of the most harassing of all forms of stress—doubt in the face of the need to do something.

PRINCIPLE 11. *The resources of the individual that can be counted upon at a time of stress are the sense of*

humor, the relatively long time it takes aggression to rise to the point of violence, the fact that most people most of the time prefer peace and security, and the fact that people have ingrained constructive tendencies.

IN CONSIDERING the factors which prevented the disturbances and inefficiencies in the Center from becoming worse than they did, relief of some of the principal stresses and the reduction of aggression through discharge in minor incidents and in the major strike and demonstration must be counted. However, the positive side of the picture is equally important, the part contributed by the resources of the individuals and their reactions to opportunities. These will be mentioned under Principle 12.

One significant characteristic of humor is that it can provide a harmless way of discharging anger and of diverting attention from painful feelings. It certainly was a most important element in the ability of the administrative staff to withstand the stresses impinging on them, and among many of the evacuees, particularly some of the leaders, it served the same purpose.

Perhaps more important than anything else was the desire of the bulk of the population for peace and their fear of trouble. This is something an administrator can lose sight of and it is easy for him to imagine that a few outspoken individuals or a forceful minority represent the people who actually are standing quietly by, waiting to see what will happen and hoping not to get in trouble with either side. Writers who describe revolutions and insurrections have many times said that what appear like mass movements, are in reality rarely so, or are achieved only with difficulty.

PRINCIPLE 12. *Constructive tendencies which may operate toward community stability are:*

Creating economic security;

Gaining prestige and admiration;

Gaining and giving love and affection;
Performing work that is esteemed;
Participation in sports and recreation;
Acquiring knowledge;
Aesthetic and spiritual development.

IN REGARD to the Center considerable weight must be given to the fact that in the course of time there was opportunity to develop some of the constructive human tendencies. Building economic security was never one of these, except in the sense of taking jobs outside the Center, but it did become possible to build prestige and admiration among both the people and the Administration by working for the good of the community in self-government, in block councils, as administrative aids, or in raising crops. These same occupations also yielded a sense of performing useful work. Administrative programs for training clerks, nurse's aids, hospital technicians and teachers, together with the creation of a library and the establishment of courses in adult education, did much to advance the quest for knowledge. Sports, dances and parties developed recreation into a positive satisfaction in community life. Painting, wood carving, poetry writing and handicrafts also became interests and gave aesthetic pleasures. The churches, both Christian and Buddhist, played major roles not only in individual spiritual development but also in community life.

It was not a matter of just giving idle hands something with which to kill time, but of having personalities develop and express themselves, and in the process becoming something richer than they were.[88]

In both relieving stress and in creating opportunities for the development of the constructive side of individual personalities, it is wise for the administrator not to attempt to do everything himself, or to have his organization assume

[88] See pp. 96-97, 108-109, 121-122, 124-126, 133-137, 141-142, 224-227, 236, 241.

full responsibility. Colonial and Indian Service experience has repeatedly shown that no matter how good a plan is, whether it be an irrigation project or a system of self-government, if the people who are to participate in it fail to feel it belongs to them, it will not work successfully. Administrative organization functions best in relieving stress and creating opportunities for positive development when it restricts itself to making it possible for the people to work out their own solutions. The itch to do too much is almost as destructive as the refusal to do anything.

PRINCIPLE 13. *In the control of human behavior, whether cooperative, apathetic or aggressive, punishment and reward are equally important.*

THIS is a principle easily eclipsed when anger, aggression, or fear in the administrative group becomes aroused. A tendency to overemphasize force and punishment is likely to appear with a corresponding reduction in a tendency to consider and remedy causes underlying the behavior being punished. It will be said that if the people once "get the idea they can get away with it" there will be no stopping them. This is a perfectly sound observation as far as it goes and it is detrimental to any administration to have people form habits based on finding that aggressive acts directly against the administration are rewarding. However, it is equally bad for people to find that nothing else they do, including reasonable cooperation and initiative, is rewarding, or that these acts are equally punishing. In such a situation, with indiscriminate "clamping down" by administrators, frustration, uncertainty and conflict are easily increased with consequent increase in random and destructive aggression, or in non-productive apathetic withdrawal and indifference.

Punishment is most effective when it serves as a guide toward other types of behavior that are rewarded by relief from stress and opportunities to satisfy needs and desires.

RECOMMENDATIONS

23. Relieve all avoidable stress and reduce as much of the rest as is modifiable.

24. Give special attention to the distribution of reliable information in an understandable form.

25. Provide opportunities that will enable the people being administered to develop their constructive tendencies; this not only provides intrinsic satisfactions, but compensates for stresses that cannot be relieved.

26. Have the administration stimulate and facilitate, but not smother, the initiative of the people; man learns only by doing things for himself, and some of the best administrators are catalysts.

27. Remember that the constructive aspects of cooperation, apathy and aggression will develop among people in the degree that each is felt to bring relief from stress and opportunity to achieve satisfactions, and that they will be inhibited in the degree that each is felt to increase stress and bring punishment.

28. In conquered enemy country it is particularly important to show that cooperation pays just as surely as noncooperation brings punishment.

29. Remember that punishment is only one among many useful tools for the control of people. Never use it alone; punishment without relief of underlying stress is like tying down a safety valve and stoking up the fire.

30. It is more important to use punishment in the right place than in large quantities; if poorly applied, it vastly increases stress by making authority seem capricious.

31. Keep in mind that to be effective in the long run as an aid to administration, punishments given must be recognized as just by the community.

32. Be sure that the carrying out of reward and punishment is real and not an administrative illusion due to interference from routine and regulations.

TO SUM UP

UNDERSTAND the stresses, needs and reactions of the people in the community and in the Administration and adjust plans and policies accordingly as part of achieving ultimate aims.

17. Systems of Belief under Stress

A. THE NATURE OF SYSTEMS OF BELIEF

THE previous chapter was devoted to types of stress and to some of the ways in which people respond to these stresses. The responses were grouped under three general headings as *cooperation, withdrawal,* and *aggression.* Such a grouping means that the subject has been viewed in terms of the way people interact with each other. It might also have been treated in terms of emotional changes, variations in basic motives, the reactions of different kinds of personality, or otherwise. The purpose in the presentation adopted was to aid the administrator by focusing his attention on a limited set of trends which appear in some combination in any situation of stress. Thus, he may be better able to evaluate events and perhaps to anticipate part of what is coming next. In some instances he may be able to detect unsuspected stresses by following to their sources the kinds of reaction that have been described as arising out of stress—should these appear or be indigenous among the people with whom he has to deal.

However, it is clear that even though general trends can be described, there is still wide variation. A particular form or intensity of stress is not related in any simple or direct fashion to a given form of reaction. This is because other influences come to bear.

One of the most potent of these additional influences is the beliefs of the people who suffer the stress and the opinions, attitudes, notions, convictions, values and concepts related to these beliefs. How such things are related to the needs and deprivations discussed in the preceding chapter has been well illustrated by Kluckhohn and Kelly:

"*What* a man eats is of course limited by sheer objective

availability, but is also partly regulated by culture. It is a biological fact that some types of berries are poisonous, but it is a cultural fact that, a few generations ago, most Americans considered tomatoes to be poisonous and refused to eat them. On the other hand milk, which we regard as a healthful and pleasing food, is regarded by certain peoples of the earth as either dangerous or disgusting."[1]

The present chapter is concerned with the nature of beliefs and the manner in which they modify how people react to stress and how people mobilize the resources of their personalities. Man acts in terms of what he perceives, and what he perceives must pass not only through his eyes, ears and other special senses to reach his consciousness, but also through the dark and iridescent waters of his beliefs.

Because beliefs commonly contain central ideas with many related, secondary and dependent ideas and ramifying suppositions, they are described here as "Systems of Belief." Any nation, tribe or community will have many such systems. (For further explanation of what is meant by "belief" in these pages, see Appendix, pp. 383-388.)

PRINCIPLE 1. *All people everywhere have systems of belief which range from the deeply ingrained to the superficial.*

THE deeply ingrained systems of belief are fundamental assumptions regarding values, man's place in life, the nature of the world and the nature of the supernatural. Although influenced by observation and reason they are profoundly emotional rather than intellectual, are felt with certainty rather than thought through, and are acquired from other people by example and the pressure of general opinion rather than by argument and direct persuasion. Some are so basic that they are never completely expressed in words but taken for granted and some have connections running

[1] Reference 19.

down below the level of consciousness. In systems of belief grow the roots of human motive and security, the sense of protection in the storms of the world, the capacities to do things and create things.

The superficial systems of belief are opinions and attitudes which, while anchored to the deeply ingrained beliefs, are more easily modified by immediate experience and by reasoning. Like blades of grass, they blow this way and that in the winds of circumstances, but do not readily let go of their roots.

Between the deeply ingrained systems of belief and those that are superficial are many shades of intensity dealing with many different topics such as right and wrong, law and order, earning a living, preserving health or the practice of religion.

An important characteristic of belief systems is the fact that a single community, and even one individual, commonly harbors beliefs that are incompatible with each other by standards of reason. Circumstances can create clashes between these systems, either within individuals or within a community, but the remarkable thing is the frequency with which people simply retain their contradictory beliefs without feeling any necessity to bring them into an orderly relationship. Samuel Butler has called the tendency ". . . This merciful provision of nature, this buffer against collision, this friction which upsets calculations but without which existence would be intolerable, this crowning glory of human invention whereby we can be blind and see at one and the same time, this blessed inconsistency."

Whether blessed or not, this inconsistency exists in all systems of belief, east, west, north, south, civilized and uncivilized, but, like a personal mannerism, it is a thing more easily seen in the stranger than in ourselves. The following are some examples in American culture pointed out by Robert S. Lynd:

"Everyone should try to be successful.

But: The kind of person you are is more important than how successful you are.

"Life would not be tolerable if we did not believe in progress and know that things are getting better. We should, therefore, welcome new things.

But: The old, tried fundamentals are best; and it is a mistake for busybodies to try to change things too fast or to upset the fundamentals. . . .

"Education is a fine thing.

But: It is the practical men who get things done. . . .

"Women are the finest of God's creatures.

But: Women aren't very practical and are usually inferior to men in reasoning power and general ability."[2]

In spite of their alogical qualities, systems of belief do make sense. To be sure they run out of sight into questions regarding the nature of the mind, the forces of emotions and even the meaning of life—questions concerning which it is not too modest to say our knowledge is incomplete. Nevertheless, many psychiatric and psychological studies have revealed that systems of belief perform definite functions in the process of human living. They enable thousands, even millions, of people to act together in common understanding where otherwise there would only be strife and confusion; they protect the conscious self from devastating doubts and uncertainties and provide compensation for such adverse influences in life as the inevitability of death and the loss sooner or later of all things held dear. The logical relationship that systems of belief may have to each other does not count nearly so much as their capacity to fulfill these functions. In fact, apparent contradictions may represent opposing trends of feeling which are actually in a state of equilibrium with each other and thus, like spokes of a wheel, can point in opposite directions provided they articulate with and keep from the ground the man who is the hub.

Popular reaction to the theory of organic evolution as set

[2] Reference 23.

forth by Darwin may serve as illustration of the functional nature of belief systems. When the theory appeared, almost a century ago, it was vehemently attacked; and even today, although it is generally accepted by educated people, there are numbers who still reject it. This was not because the idea was hard to grasp, or because the evidence advanced was insufficient. It was not even because it hurt human pride to recognize the apes as next of kin in the animal world. It was because the theory seemed to strike at the basic systems of belief regarding the nature of God and Man. The standards by which past life had been lived, the moral structure of society and the bases of behavior, spiritual support in frustrations and disappointments, the whole scale of values in future striving, consolation in sorrow and the hope of life after death—all these were felt to be threatened. In actual fact, they were not necessarily destroyed, but extensive modifications were required and people were afraid. Several generations had to die before the concept of organic evolution became incorporated in our systems of belief.

The administrator who grows impatient with beliefs that clash with his own, who feels that the people should forget about their former political systems and accept our democracy quickly, or give over their superstitions and accept modern health measures, would do well to remember that he may be handing them just such a problem as the acceptance of organic evolution presented to our society.

Because systems of belief have deep connections with the springs of man's existence, they are often interdependent in a manner that may not be obvious on the surface. The theory of organic evolution had bearing on morals because both morals and the conception of the origin of species are encompassed by beliefs called the Christian religion. Systems of belief resemble a thick matting of roots under the floor of the forest which if cut may result in the withering of some distant bush or a whole tree. The man who intrudes into another culture, or way of life, with administrative acts

may be like one who cuts bothersome roots without being aware of their functions and interconnections. The people of the other culture, however, like the trees of the forest, even if themselves ignorant of the functional nature of their systems of belief, nevertheless feel it when their roots are cut.

In times of stress, human dependency on belief systems becomes greater and has significance in determining the direction in which events will move. Beliefs influence the degree to which individuals will be sensitive to the forces of stress outlined in Chapter 16, Principles 1 and 2, and have much to do with the form reactions take, whether *cooperative, withdrawing,* or *aggressive* (Principles 3 to 7) and to the utilization of *personal resources* (Principles 11 and 12).

PRINCIPLE 2. *Human groups cannot effectively carry out acts for which they have no underlying systems of belief.*

THIS point has been well expressed by Elton Mayo in regard to the industrial worker:

"If an individual cannot work with sufficient understanding of his work situation, then, unlike a machine, he can only work against opposition from himself. This is the essential nature of the human; with all the will in the world to cooperate, he finds it difficult to persist in action for an end he cannot dimly see."[8]

This does not mean that each man must become convinced of the correctness of an aim as a result of careful reasoning, but only that he must be convinced. Conviction may be achieved in many ways that range from the use of reason to acceptance because some esteemed person said that such and such was so. The point is, that a system of belief of whatever source, from science to religion, must underlie action if it is to be effective in the long run. People may act under coercion, or in bewilderment without any-

[8] Reference 26.

thing other than notions that are too unstable to be called systems of belief, but such action will not have permanence or much force.

From the life in the Center, one of the best examples of this principle was the inability of the people to do much with self-government until they began to believe that it was possible.[4]

PRINCIPLE 3. *Some of the outstanding differences between the various classes, tribes and nations of men arise from different systems of belief and the attitudes derived from them.*

THIS fact is so obvious and so generally experienced that it scarcely requires further comment, but it is perhaps worth noting one of the many ways in which it showed itself in the Center. American belief regarding the nature of leadership as represented by members of the Administration and by the Japanese Americans emphasized the vigorous individual who, after popular election, assumes personal responsibility for devising plans and getting things done. A Japanese system of belief represented in the Center by most of the older people emphasized community guidance through a council of elders and heads of families who reach mutual agreement regarding policies and who assume responsibility as a group for what is done and avoid dominance by any single individual.[5]

The struggle between these two systems eventuated in a compromise. As early as June 1942, a joint Issei-Nisei group proposed a plan for community government that was in effect such a compromise, but it was set aside by over-all War Relocation Authority policy which aimed at making the plan in all Centers uniform and strictly after the American pattern. A community council composed only of Ameri-

[4] See pp. 120, 210, 223-224.

[5] See Reference 12 for account of this in a Japanese village.

can citizens was developed according to a system of popular election and emphasis on the popular leader was encouraged. At the time of the strike, this was eclipsed by the more Japanese form, and then in the period of readjustment, the compromise took shape and thereafter seemed to work relatively well serving the needs of Isseis and Niseis and the Administration, and did not seem to violate any fundamental principles of democracy.[6]

Although systems of belief may vary greatly from one group of people to another and constitute many of the differences that are commonly thought of as "racial," their functional nature seems much the same in all peoples. In this they resemble languages which may differ profoundly in form and sound, yet all have the function of enabling people to express themselves and evolve ideas and feelings so they can live and work together, care for their families, protect themselves, gain what they need and transmit their aspirations and creations to their fellows.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Never forget the strength there may be in a system of belief and the fact that no matter how foreign, useless or destructive it seems it may still be interconnected with those things upon which the security and capacity of the people depend.

2. Do not ignore complaints that are based on belief rather than fact; people act on what they believe.

3. Study complaints for the underlying systems of belief they reveal.

4. Learn the following systems of belief among the people being administered as a general would learn the geography of the country in which he was going to campaign, namely, beliefs regarding:

   a. The nature and purpose of your administration.

[6] See pp. 223-224.

b. Authority in their own society.
c. Prestige, reward, and punishment.
d. The nature, purpose and value of the different kinds of work people do.
e. Etiquette.
f. Religion.
g. The nature of sickness and the guarding of health.
h. Minority groups in the community.
i. Outside groups with whom the people have contact.

5. Do not expect people to adopt behavior or carry out programs for which they have no underlying systems of belief.

6. Adjust administration to the people's systems of belief as well as to their stresses and needs, and do it as realistically as one would adjust an agricultural program to conditions of soil and climate.

7. It is not good to surround oneself with native administrative aides whose systems of belief are merely a reflection of those in the administration.

8. It is good to surround oneself with native aides whose systems of belief are representative of the community or country.

9. Never confuse what the administration wants the people to believe with what they actually do believe.

10. Expect people to respond to the administration in terms of their systems of belief—not the administration's.

B. SYSTEMS OF BELIEF UNDER STRESS

PRINCIPLE 4. *Systems of belief influence the way people respond to stress.*

SYSTEMS of belief are like lenses which magnify, reduce, distort and color that which is perceived through them, and cause different people to react very differently to the same

situation, whether it be war, defeat, new government or rehabilitation measures.

In the Center, the evacuees who believed the administration was doing the best it could for them and the evacuees who believed it was trying to exploit them reacted differently to the school-building program. Many of the former went to work confident that if they did their share the children would have schools in the coming year, while the latter refused to work and maintained that the buildings would be used as dormitories for government personnel.

Innumerable other illustrations could be given, not only from experience in the Center, but from every place where people of different beliefs have contact. The spark which set off the rebellion of India in 1857 was the coating of the cartridges used by the soldiers with a grease. To people with British systems of belief it was a matter of indifference, but to men with Moslem systems of belief who took the grease to be pig-fat, it was a source of great agitation.

Tolstoy points out that during Napoleon's attack on Russia, the French believed Moscow was deliberately burned by its Governor in ferocious patriotism while the Russians believed it was barbarously burned by the French. "In reality, however, deserted Moscow had to burn as inevitably as a heap of shavings has to burn on which sparks continually fall for several days. A town built of wood, where scarcely a day passes without conflagrations when the house owners are in residence and a police force is present, cannot help burning when its inhabitants have left it and it is occupied by soldiers who smoke pipes, make campfires of the Senate chairs in the Senate Square, and cook themselves meals twice a day."[7]

PRINCIPLE 5. *People under stress are inclined to become more intolerant of belief systems which they perceive to be different from their own.*

[7] Reference 35.

PRINCIPLE 6. *Related to this intolerance is the common belief system that persons who live by foreign belief systems are cut to one stereotyped pattern and are possessed of traits that are unaccountable, inferior or repugnant.*

THESE two principles naturally follow if it is true that systems of belief have roots running deeply into man's sense of security and his hopes of achieving his aspirations. He will be intolerant of anything that shakes his orientation, his sense of knowing where he stands, and which offers competition to the guide posts of value upon which he has counted. One method of protecting his belief systems is to evolve further belief systems which deny virtue to foreign systems and their possessors by regarding them as at the best quaint and, at the worst, stupid and dangerous. This is probably one of the factors important in the persecutions, massacres and wars that have been carried out in the name of religion.

In the Center there were no massacres, though there were moments during the strike when things might easily have developed in that direction. There were, however, numerous different systems of belief accompanied by intolerances that came between different parts of the Administration, between Administration and evacuees, between older and younger evacuees, between Buddhists and Christians, between city people and country people, between the more Americanized and the less Americanized, between the educated and the uneducated, between the rich and the poor, between the different units that made up the camp, and between the different blocks in a single unit. They varied considerably in degree but their general quality of reciprocal intolerance combined with simple, inaccurate and prejudiced convictions was the same everywhere.[8]

World-wide prevalence of intolerance and stereotyped be-

[8] See pp. 44-47, 66-81, 95-98, 112-119, 122-134, 147-150, 154-161.

liefs is plainly evident, and everyone is familiar with the way the Germans played it up rather than attempted to mitigate it. The following quotation from a pre-Nazi newspaper indicates the kind of beliefs upon which Hitler was able to build.

"The Serbians are professional regicides, the Russians half animals, the French vengeful, vain coxcombs, the British barbarous highwaymen and world pirates in the hypocritical cloak of Christianity, the Italian assassins, the Japanese apes and hyenas, that is, far from being fully human."[9]

However, it is not only in Germany that one finds such belief systems. After the Civil War, the proponents of the "Bloody Shirt" in the Northern States, who did much to prolong economic and social chaos in the South, worked on the belief that slavery had debased the Southern mind, that nobody who had ever been active in the Confederacy could be trusted and that rebels never changed. Southerners were even referred to as a different "race" and Stevens declared that Congress must treat the Southern States as "conquered provinces and settle them with new men and drive the present rebels as exiles from this country."[10]

In the Detroit riots of June 1943 participants who attacked Negroes at random made such remarks as, "Those black bastards damn well deserved it." While other citizens were saying, "But Carrie, they're only niggers, and everyone knows that niggers always revert to that cannibal blood in them and always kill, or something."[11]

Beliefs of this sort absolve the person holding them from treating other groups of people by the same standards he applies to the members of his own group. In the words of Mark May, "Conscience thins out and weakens when it crosses international and interracial boundaries."[12]

Of comparable significance with belief systems in regard to the inferiority of other groups are belief systems in regard

[9] Quoted in Reference 5.
[10] Quoted in Reference 1.
[11] Quoted in Reference 22.
[12] Reference 25.

to the superiority of one's own ideas. Most people of whatever nation believe as a fact that their ways are superior to all others just as they believe as a fact that the ocean is deep, that the sun rises in the east, or that their own religion is the only "true" religion.

For generations European and American explorers in the Arctic died of malnutrition and starvation in the midst of plenty because convinced that they could not subsist on the fare of the Eskimo which embraced raw animal organs now known to be well filled with vitamins.[13]

Not only do most people think that their beliefs are superior, but they expect others of different nations and tribes to recognize this superiority. As a consequence, individuals from different groups are constantly likely to baffle and anger each other by behavior which seems to be stupidly blind to the superiority of the other's systems of belief and to the deficiencies in their own ways.

In times of stress those intolerances and prejudicial convictions are likely to multiply in numbers and grow in firmness of conviction and add their weight to the vicious circle of increasing stresses and social and psychological deterioration.

PRINCIPLE 7. *In communities undergoing stress it is common for belief systems to:*

Become more emotional and less rational,
Increase in number and variety,
Increase in tendency to conflict,
Become plastic and changeable.

PRINCIPLE 8. *The longer and more intense the stress, the more extensive will be the changes in the systems of belief until some new equilibrium is established.*

[13] Reference 34.

RECALLING Chapter 16, it may be said that change in systems of belief is another way in which individuals react to the various types of stress that were outlined (Principles 1 and 2) and those alterations follow, among other things, the trends toward *cooperation*, *withdrawal* and *aggression* (Principles 3 to 7). Under the hammer blows of adversity the belief systems break into fragments which the people struggle to change and use as formulas for getting out of their predicament. New religious cults appear and old ones take on new life. Political, social and military panaceas become rallying grounds for groups, each of which thinks it has the answer to all things. Slogans and symbols representing the various belief systems become common.

It has been mentioned (Chapter 16, Principles 6 and 7) that one of the reactions to the stresses of the situation in the Center was aggression directed against "dogs." This had as an integral part a system of belief in which informers were thought to be at work among the evacuees. It is possible that in actual fact there were or had been Japanese in the group who, as alleged, turned in the names of "innocent people" to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to make money or settle grudges, but it is certain that numbers of men were thought to be "dogs" without any reasonable basis. The point about the "dogs" was not so much the detection and punishment of the really guilty as it was the finding of persons who could be regarded as guilty and thus stand for easily understood concrete, obvious and reachable causes of the personal misery which permeated the Center. Hating and beating these "dogs" gave the people a feeling of doing something, of "making somebody suffer for this," of cleaning out the evil that lay within their own group and of pulling in harmony with each other again. They were unable to control the outside world which had oppressed them but they could have the satisfaction of attacking causes if they believed them to exist in their own midst.[14]

[14] See pp. 33, 147-150, 155, 156, 157, 158-159, 193-196.

In behaving thus, the evacuees were probably doing much the same as the people of California had done when, suffering the discomforts of war preparation and frightened by events in the Pacific, they uncritically attributed espionage and sabotage to the Japanese Americans and clamored for their removal without being willing to leave the matter to the Army, Naval and Federal intelligence offices responsible for security. Bitterly as the evacuees resented the way they had been treated by other Californians and much as they complained of "injustice," they were blind to the fact that their attitudes toward "dogs" displayed the very same kind of prejudicial belief.

The two men whose incarceration started off the strike were also symbols of starkly emotional belief systems which took the men to be innocent without reference to fact. Later events seemed to indicate that they were innocent, but at the time of the strike very few of the thousands claiming their innocence were in a position to know whether they were or not. These people did not want to examine the evidence objectively. What they wanted was to get the men released and they desired this because many of their feelings and needs were answered by believing them to be fine young heroes martyred through persecution from those same relentless forces which all evacuees felt were harassing them. To save the prisoners was to achieve some measure of self-defense, to retaliate and, for once, to do something on their own.

These feelings and the beliefs based on them outweighed by far the influence of any rational appraisal of what, in fact, they could accomplish and the serious damage to their future welfare they might do if they antagonized people who were trying to help them, and if, by creating an incident, they gave ammunition to those who were urging more severe and discriminatory treatment for all people of Japanese ancestry in the United States.

All of these trends have been noted in many different

communities in many different cultures and societies by many different observers. If ways and means of curing or compensating for the underlying causes of the stress are not worked out as was the case in the Center, then the drift seems to be toward more and more disorganization with the eventual achievement of a state of chronic apathy and shiftlessness as may be seen in some American Indian groups and in parts of the Orient, or a continuous series of upheavals as in the Balkans or parts of South America.

"When the accustomed ways of life of a group of people are severely hampered by conditions over which as individuals they have no control but which they are led to believe could be remedied by mass action, the psychological stage is set for an aggressive social movement. . . . If a group tastes the benefits of raid and plunder without experiencing too much punishment, it is likely to shape its internal affairs to a policy of external aggression. It seeks better weapons and more skilled users of them. It invents an ideology (systems of belief) . . . that reinforces its policies; . . . all designed to implement the type of group conduct which has been found to be most profitable."[15]

PRINCIPLE 9. *As systems of belief in a community under stress become more emotional, unstable and conflicting, the community becomes less able to deal with its stresses.*

PRINCIPLE 10. *Out of the confusion of a community under stress there is likely to arise a single radical system of belief which may or may not bring a new stability, but which will bring to a large section of the population a sense of at least temporary relief from stress.*

IT IS in this situation that communities are most susceptible to the social and political quack. Exhausted, con-

[15] Reference 25.

fused and frustrated people will snatch at any hope if it has only an outward shell that shines brightly, just as distraught patients respond to the promises of the medical quack. In both cases, the essence of quackery is that the hope is an illusion which brings a temporary feeling of relief, but in the end leaves the people worse off than before.

PRINCIPLE 11. *After a period of stress, there is a drift back toward former systems of belief, but the return is rarely, if ever, complete.*

A PARALLEL may be noted here with the trend toward good spirits after an outburst of aggression. Following the strike in the Center, many of the hostile beliefs which people held regarding the Administration, the conviction that the prisoners were innocent, the widespread credence in the activity of informers and many other systems of thought which had been to the fore, either disappeared or were greatly reduced in extent. The belief that older people should run the Center receded again and gave place to belief in self-government in which old and young both participated and which gave heed to the needs of both aliens and citizens.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. In times of stress, be prepared to find rapid changes and increased intensity and conflict in systems of belief.

12. Try to determine which systems of belief promote disunity and inefficiency in the community and which help the people to cope more effectively with the sources of stress.

13. In particular watch out for increase of stereotyped and intolerant systems of belief dividing different groups in the community and the community as a whole from the administration.

14. Do not react to these attitudes with fear or hostility, but accept them as natural forces with which an administrator must deal.

C. SYSTEMS OF BELIEF IN THE ADMINISTRATION

PRINCIPLE 12. *The members of an administration, like any other group of human beings, have systems of belief, and these may or may not facilitate the carrying out of the administration's aims.*

EVERYTHING that has been said thus far about systems of belief applies to the attitudes of administrators just as much as to those of the people being administered. However, several particular points may be selected for illustration and emphasis.

The systems of belief held by the administrators and by the people whom they control may be in conflict. In the Center, everyone agreed that the working conditions of the evacuees were bad by any standards. To those government clerks and foremen who believed that the evacuees were fundamentally enemies, this was a matter of indifference and they thought the people should be grateful for getting materials with which to feed, clothe and house themselves. To the evacuees, however, it was persecution and exploitation since they believed that they were entitled to all the rights of American citizens and law-abiding aliens. They felt that the Government was legally and morally responsible for their welfare and should be grateful to them for the cooperation they had given in evacuation, for the way they had accepted their losses and for the work they were willing to do at $12 to $19 per month.

The attitudes of both the government employees and the evacuees were reasonable enough on the basis of their respective premises, but they were incompatible with each other and with the development of efficient work.

There were numerous other belief differences that influenced work. The administrative personnel responsible for

developing irrigation believed the evacuees should be willing to build canals for their own use, while many of the evacuees believed that the canals were not for their use and that promises in regard to them were only part of a scheme to get cheap labor. Again some of those in the Administration believed in farming large tracts of land through gangs of laborers, while evacuees believed in farming small patches with a few men or families taking responsibility and pride in each, as had been their custom for years in California and centuries in Japan.

It is interesting to note that during the occupation of the Rhineland after the last war there were differences in belief between the people and the occupying forces similar to those just described in the Center. Many of the men in the American Army considered themselves victors and thought the people should feel guilty for past misdeeds, and should submit to any hardships that might come their way as deserved punishments. The people, however, believed that there had been an armistice and not a defeat, felt injured rather than guilty and did not think the American soldiers had any right to push them around. Therefore, instead of responding with submission, they responded by making things hard for the military government which was dedicated to the policy of working through their cooperation. Thus an administrative program designed to break down hostility and promote collaboration was handicapped by officers and men who, acting in terms of their beliefs, stirred up the antagonism of the people. One of those responsible for some ot the administrative work has said, "Such men could not understand that sympathy for the rights of Germans as human beings was not pro-Germanism, a close approach to treachery, but really a safe-guarding of the reputation of America, to say nothing of their own. As one of them said to me, 'What the hell difference does it make what they think of us?' "[16]

[16] Reference 3.

More than twenty years later in the Japanese Relocation program various representatives of our Government were asking the same thing. In occupied areas and in liberated areas there will be people who will ask it again. Yet in all such instances, the success of the administrative program depends on the cooperation of the people being administered and it always will as long as most Americans believe in democracy and prefer spending their lives in their own country. A government strong enough to operate independently of the willingness of the people to cooperate would require a force that America will not tolerate abroad after hostilities cease.

The great danger we face in occupation is that we shall come in believing in our own power to make the people do anything we please and without taking into account their stresses, needs and beliefs and then—after stirring up more hatred because of this—retire shortly after the war is over without insisting on the few constructive things that are in our power to insist upon and which the people would accept.

People under stress may believe various things, but one of the rarest is to believe that they are guilty or that the adversities they are suffering are deserved. The inhabitants of occupied areas are more likely to feel wronged than punished, and the inhabitants of liberated areas are more likely to feel that they are getting only a small part of what they deserve for "fighting America's battles while she was neutral" than they are to feel grateful. This is not to say that they are justified in these views, but simply to say that systems of belief among administrators which count on guilt feelings and gratitude are bound to fail. It is much safer to settle immediate issues in terms of the specific factors concerned in them, and with accurate application of the punishment-reward principle in harmony with the belief systems of the people, than it is to confuse the picture by bringing in matters concerning which the people and the administration have widely different premises.

Thus, if the labor situation in the Center had been handled as a problem of adjusting compensation and working conditions in accordance with what is generally considered fair practice in the United States and with due recognition for what the evacuees had done and were doing, and if there had been no admixture of believing that the evacuees should feel both guilty and grateful, there is plenty of evidence that work would have been more efficient, the people relieved of much stress, and dollars saved. On the other hand, it seems equally certain that if the strike had been settled in general terms of punishing "Japs" and "not letting them get away with anything," instead of in terms of specific justice for two specific persons and a reconsideration of the specific needs of a specific community, it is reasonably clear that subsequent management of the camp would have been vastly more difficult and expensive.

It is important to note that in both the instances cited the official policies were on the whole realistic and workable, but they were diverted in application by systems of belief on the part of some employees reinforced by similar systems of belief from the public, press and politicians outside the Center. As a result, in spite of official policies, matters took a most disadvantageous turn in working relations, and very nearly did in the strike settlement.

In these comments, the belief systems of the administrators have been stressed, not because it is thought that they must submit to the beliefs of the people administered, but because it is a question of bringing about adjustment between two systems, and the administrative group is smaller and more under control and presumably more flexible.

What has been said about cooperation in matters of labor applies equally in securing cooperation necessary to the furtherance of military objectives, securing supplies, maintaining law and order, distributing relief, establishing public health programs, the reactivation of industry and commerce and the development of well-disposed self-government and

otherwise reducing stress, creating opportunities and laying foundations of peace.

In the Center, those departments which through design or chance framed their work so as to meet part way the evacuee viewpoint, as in medicine and education, had little trouble procuring cooperation and much hard work in their service. Outdoor construction, where failure to secure evacuee help was most noteworthy, was of a different character, but it was actually no harder than hospital work. What it lacked was an incentive that would appeal to the evacuees and it lacked this because those responsible were not able to create one in harmony with the belief systems and attitudes of the evacuees. As Thomas Carlyle said, "The set Law . . . men will live under is the one which images their Convictions. . . . Other laws, whereof there are always enough *ready-made* are usurpations; which men do not obey but rebel against, and abolish at their earliest convenience."

Administrators no less than those administered move in times of stress toward more emotionally charged beliefs. Corresponding to the evacuee belief in "dogs," some government employees believed that a gang of Tokyo agents existed in the camp. This conviction was not based on any attempt to appraise the facts realistically, but on fears and on desires to attribute blame for operational failures. It led to many absurd interpretations of evacuee behavior; for example when a mess hall caught fire and burned, it was seriously suggested that this had been sabotage and that the evacuees should be punished by a refusal to rebuild. The Director of the Center very aptly called this sort of thing "ghost hunting."

Stereotyped systems of belief regarding people are likely to be found wherever two groups with different belief systems come together, and the more these stereotypes intrude between an administration and the administered, the greater the danger of inefficiency and mismanagement. This is not because it is impossible to make any valid generalizations,

but because the generalizations that are made are not founded on fact. Instead, they are founded on belief systems which in turn are based on the worries, fears, hates, loves, hopes and other emotional needs of the administrators.

Stereotyped thinking on the part of government personnel in Poston caused them to miss opportunities to secure responses from evacuees upon which work depended and which other administrators less stereotyped in their thinking were able to obtain. Unfortunately, stereotyped rather than realistic thinking was sufficiently common to warp the process of converting official policies into action—with the result that cost of operation was increased while stresses on the people were made more severe and eventually reacted as additional stress on the government employees too.[17]

It is often found that government employees believe that *means* are *ends*, with the result that those who deal in construction, fiscal matters and bookkeeping come to value the *routines* of their duties more than the accomplishment of the *aims* for which the organization exists in the first place.

Had the Fiscal Department in the Center had a system of belief that gave human nature and human reactions a place of value comparable to that allotted to details of procedures, it would never have allowed evacuee wages to get three months behind any more than it would have let its own wages get three months behind, and it would have treated evacuee complaints very differently. Similarly when hospital supplies arrived after a three-month delay, the warehousemen would not have attempted to keep them in the warehouse for a week while they made a detailed inventory.

This is not to say that regulations must be disregarded, but only that if the relative values of means and ends are properly balanced in the belief systems of the personnel, ways can usually be found to accomplish main purposes within the framework of the regulations. In the instance of

[17] See pp. 84-89, 107-108, 122, 137-139, 170-177, 181, 183-185, 187, 190-191, 227-231, 239-240.

the hospital supplies, it was possible to issue at once those things that were needed as emergencies without any violation of regulations, but it did involve a departure from routine. The warehouse personnel could have taken this step at the very start (and not forced the Medical Department to appeal to higher authority) if their scale of values had made them aware of the connections among evacuee sense of security, confidence in authority, willingness to work and the economical operation of the camp.

Very often when the word "bureaucrat" is bandied about, it is behavior of this sort that is meant, and yet the person using the term would probably behave just as the bureaucrats do if he were beset with the same insecurities, filled with the same hopes and conditioned by the same systems of belief. One of the cruelest estimates of the bureaucrat has been written by Franz Werfel:

"It may be fairly argued that the arrogance of bureaucrats, when provoked, surpasses that of all other classes of society. For in his eyes the bureaucrat is not simply a chance functionary of the power of the State. At his desk he has the feeling that he himself is that power. Even though he is only stamping letters, he deems himself of another and higher order than the public, as, let us say, any angel is of another and higher order than mortal man. In his capacity of judge, chief of police, collector of imposts or taxes, he has a far more visible control over the fates of men than Providence itself. . . . He knows very well that in actual fact he is less and knows less than any scholar, physician, engineer, or even than any smith or locksmith who has learned his trade. Rob him of the magic which power radiates, and there is left a rickety and declassed scrivener. Human arrogance tends to defend itself with a bitterness in proportion to its vulnerability."[18]

Although this is true as far as it goes, it is a mistake and of little profit to think of such officials only with personal dis-

[18] Reference 40.

like and to wish vainly that they might be exterminated. As soon as one is removed, another takes his place. Their behavior may be in part due to shallow usurpation of power, but it is often merely the common workings of human nature maintaining personal security or responding to stresses and opportunity in terms of a system of belief. If a belief system including a better sense of administrative values existed in the group, then pride, power and prestige-seeking and the discharge of aggressive feelings could work toward, rather than away from, the main purposes of the administration. Men can be on their mettle to see that a hospital gets its supplies in twenty-four hours just as much as on their mettle to see that every item is checked. What they believe depends to an appreciable extent on what they have been taught, on the systems of belief that existed in their segment of the organization when they came into it, on what they have found by past experience is rewarded and what punished, and on the stresses and strains of the present.

It is expecting too much of human nature to think that individuals will, for the sake of purposes only dimly seen, rise above the belief systems of those around them and risk the disapproval of their fellows in the same segment of the organization. Setting the stage so that the right education is provided and that rewards and punishments are applied so as to build efficient attitudes is a responsibility of the top administrators and is part of the job of building a good organization.

If the prevalent belief systems are ill adjusted, then in times of stress, which inevitably affect the administration as well as the people, there will be increased tendencies to produce behavior that in turn increases the stress on all concerned. The more the evacuees kicked about working conditions, the more arbitrary and disinclined to do anything about it some of the government foremen became.

What has been said regarding belief differences between the administration and those under them, also applies to

beliefs that make for efficient and inefficient relationships between various segments of an administration and between different agencies. Here, too, the common tendency is to think rather exclusively in terms of personalities, while actually much of the trouble may be a conflict in belief flourishing in emotional reactions to correctable sources of stress. One of the types of belief quickest to appear and most damaging in effect is that which gives relief from anxiety and a target for resentment by shifting the blame from oneself to others.

In addition to belief systems which are skewed in relation to basic aims, an administration may harbor beliefs that are incompatible with each other. It is surprising how far this may go at times. In the Center, the outstanding clash in systems of belief was the one already noted between those who thought "a Jap is a Jap" and should be treated as a deceitful enemy and those who believed the evacuees were loyal Americans with alien parents. There were also other conflicts in belief which did not so clearly demarcate groups in the Administration but which were often held simultaneously by the same individual. Thus, there was never any satisfactory adjustment between the belief (a) that the evacuees should run the camp themselves; and (b) that no evacuee could be allowed responsibility for government property and equipment; or between the belief (a) that the Administration should build up self-government; and (b) that the Administration should get the evacuees out of the Center as soon as possible.

History is full of instances where incompatibility in belief systems damaged activities of great importance. In the Civil War, the Union's military and cotton-marketing policies were not compatible at Memphis, with the result that Northern money flowed into the South and, in the opinion of Grant and other generals, did much to prolong the war another year and cost additional lives.[19] In the Near East dur-

[19] Reference 15.

ing the last war, British policy was divided between the belief in securing Arab aid and a disbelief in it. In consequence there was friction and disarticulation which went to the extreme of creating a situation in which Arab prisoners of war captured by the British in one place were sent to fight on the side of the British at another.[20]

RECOMMENDATIONS

15. Understand those belief systems of the administration that affect the relationship of one part to another and of the whole to other agencies and to the people administered.

16. Realize that systems of belief are as important in administrative function as are policy statements, plans, regulations and organization charts; they can change or cancel all the rest.

17. Accept the guidance of belief systems in the administration as a major administrative responsibility.

18. Carry out administration in terms of facts as found, not in terms of sweeping, stereotyped beliefs.

19. Every administrator should learn to control his prejudices and intolerance, as a pilot must learn to control his fear of falling; this is a qualification for the position of administrator and if one cannot make the grade, he should go into some other field.

D. SYSTEMS OF BELIEF AND THE CONTROL OF STRESS

PRINCIPLE 13. *To be effective, all measures aimed at correcting stresses must be applied in accordance with the belief systems of both administration and the people administered, or else the belief systems must be altered.*

THIS principle follows from what has been previously pointed out regarding the nature of systems of belief and

[20] Reference 21.

their influence on the way people perceive and respond to stress. As a matter of general practice, the administrator will find it better to work through the systems of belief as they exist among the people and as they change spontaneously rather than attempt to introduce extensive alterations. Aside from the fact that administrative efforts to exert thorough control over what people believe is at variance with the democratic philosophy, it is a task of enormous practical difficulty. The production of even moderate changes in systems of belief is likely to prove a long job and worth the effort only when restricted in scope and when there is plenty of time, clear goals, stable policies and consistent administrative operation.

On the other hand, systems of belief as they exist and as they change of themselves, are often elastic and flexible and offer the administrator a wide field within which to operate. As has been noted, the plasticity and the number of differing systems of belief increase during times of stress, thereby enhancing this opportunity.

However, after due emphasis on the advisability of letting systems of belief alone whenever possible, it must be recognized that every administration is faced with a number of specific attitudes, both in its own ranks and among the people with whom it has to deal, which are, from the administrator's point of view, unrealistic and obstructionistic. In times of stress there will be systems of belief, such as those involving scapegoats, which are imminently dangerous. In such cases, alteration must be secured.

PRINCIPLE 14. *The things which alter the systems of belief that people hold are:*

a. *Observation of fact and reasoned thinking.*
b. *Contact with other systems of belief.*
c. *All types of stress.*
d. *New opportunities for achieving security and satisfying aspirations.*

THE basis for this principle is partly empirical observation by clinical and advertising psychologists, psychiatrists and students of public opinion, and partly conclusions drawn from the other principles that have been stated.

The appeal to reason through words and the presentation of facts so that they speak for themselves has its place in any plan to influence beliefs, particularly in dealing with people who are accustomed to having their emotions modified by such means. However, it is a method which is as a rule overestimated and can usually do little by itself if standing in the way of onrushing feeling.

Reason operates most powerfully when it takes the form of actual experience of what works and what does not work, but administrators are usually too timid to let people find out for themselves.

Administrators have an irresistible urge to insist on their wisdom.

The more a group of people is under stress, the less power is reason likely to have. It has been noted in studies of communities and countries suffering social upheaval as a result of stress, that the moderate, intelligent and far-sighted leadership which exists at the beginning is likely to give way, if the stress continues unrelieved, to leadership that consists chiefly in an ability to feel and express vividly what the mass of the people feel and to ride up and down on the surgings of their passions, like a cork on waves, with little or no ability to comprehend, foresee and plan. The administrator who approaches turbulent people with reason is likely to get about as much result as if he were addressing a jungle. Before reason will have force, he must get attention and must develop a feeling toward himself in which there are elements of confidence. This is probably best done by a move that clearly gives the people some of what they want, some answers to their needs, and a hint that more may be forthcoming. After that, it may be possible to move in ways

that are well founded on intelligent assessment of the resources of the situation.

In his handling of the strike, the Director of the Center, gave both the leaders and the people a feeling that they could "get somewhere" with him, and when he granted the release of the prisoners the tide turned from opposition to a working with and through him. Having got their attention and confidence, he was able to guide their desires, feelings of needs and systems of belief so that they were more than immediate emotional outlets and led to relief from some of the basic types of stress. There can be no doubt that this is an excellent pattern of administrative action whenever it is practicable.

Of very great strength in the modification of systems of belief is contact with a different opinion. The nature of the contact and the kinds of people concerned is of course important; and under some circumstances it can operate to harden convictions rather than dissolve them. However, this is likely to be a transitory stage, and if the contact is maintained it usually happens that while both groups may change their beliefs to some extent, one or the other will show extensive alteration.

In the case of individuals, the pressure of group opinion is enormous, and the modern trend in psychiatry to treat people in groups ("group psychotherapy") represents in part a harnessing of this social force in the service of medical treatment. A glance at the advertising in almost any magazine will show page after page where through pictures and words the reader is made to feel that everybody who is anybody believes in this toothpaste or that vitamin. It evidently works or business concerns would not continue to spend millions in this manner. In the case of the vitamins, reasoned statements from the medical profession telling people that they have been oversold have little effect. The very man who smiles with condescension at the magic rituals whereby an African weaves a feeling of security, will himself

perform the daily ritual of consuming his magic vitamins. Both the African and the civilized man do as they do because they have anxieties and have been exposed to other people who believed that the rituals bring security. If challenged in regard to their beliefs, both African and American will quote endless examples of persons, including themselves, who have been benefited by performing their respective rituals.

Whenever possible, the administrator should channel the force of group opinion to suit his aims, but in so doing he must recognize that people are more susceptible to opinions of persons in groups that resemble their own than they are to beliefs of people who are very different. Thus one segment of a community may strongly influence another, while the opinions of the administrative group, especially if they are of a different nation and language, may have relatively little effect. It is necessary to work through the leaders and different groups among the people themselves.

Since belief systems can change as a result of stress on the individuals in the community, it is important never to lose sight of this relationship when dealing with events. In the Center, releasing the prisoners stopped the demonstration and strike. If the Military Police had been called in, they also would have stopped the demonstration, though it is unlikely they could have terminated the strike. However, neither releasing the prisoners nor the use of force through Military Police would have been of more than passing value in community management had it not been possible at the same time to improve health facilities, reduce some of the overcrowding in the quarters, help people secure furniture and partitions, and by the whole trend of the negotiations and subsequent administrative acts show the evacuees that some improvements in security and opportunity were available. Out of this came a partial sense of relief from apparent threats to life and health, physical discomforts, separation from family and friends, the feelings of being disliked and rejected by other people, capricious and unreliable authority

and the derived feelings of frustration, dilemma and uncertainty regarding both present and future. Negotiations in terms of the situation had the advantage not only of stopping the strike, but of paving the way for relieving fundamental stress and of building cooperation—none of which simple force would have accomplished. The success achieved in this instance was shown in improved efficiency in work and in community management by the evacuees. The reason it was achieved is illustrated by the fact that six months later, when the people learned that the Director might transfer to other duties, a petition requesting him to stay was presented with many thousands of evacuee names on it. The persons prominent in promoting this move were among those who had formerly been leaders during the strike.[21]

Opportunities to satisfy needs and aspirations no less than situations of stress cause systems of belief to change. Those evacuees who found new career opportunities as a result of working for the Government not only shifted from hostile to friendly beliefs in regard to the Government, but came to feel that other evacuees were being unreasonable. When the ranchers of the Parker Valley discovered that they needed evacuee help in harvesting their cotton, there was within the space of a few weeks a miraculous shift from beliefs which pictured all evacuees as enemies to thinking of them as hard-working and cooperative Americans of Japanese ancestry. (It must also be added that when the cotton-picking was stopped by military order, the drift back to former attitudes was equally noticeable.)

The world has seen many religious, political and other types of conversion brought about by opportunities to satisfy desires. Perhaps one of the most familiar of all examples is the radical who turns conservative when he achieves high office and status. Such behavior is often labeled hypocrisy, but it is not true hypocrisy since the individual or the group

[21] See pp. 224-227, 242-244.

of people experiencing the shift really hold the new beliefs with as much sincerity as they held the old.

Any belief system is easier to change in some directions than in others and it is wiser to begin by trying to move in an easy direction that approximates the administration's aims than to insist on a difficult direction that exactly fits its purposes. In the Center it proved more workable to incorporate into the self-government program the older people's conception of community management through meetings of elders than to insist on adherence to an ideal plan for democratic government created in Washington by people who never lived in the Center and who had little knowledge of the systems of belief held by the older evacuees. The ultimate result was no less democratic than the initial plan, but it began with what was familiar to an important segment of the people concerned and then moved in a direction in which they were able to go.

Many other illustrations of this exist. It is easier to teach unacculturated Navaho Indians the elements of hygiene on the basis of their own belief in contagious magic than to begin with an explanation of germs. The spread of dangerous influences from one object to another by touch, and the need in certain circumstances for sterile techniques are perfectly compatible with Navaho systems of belief but talk about the existence and behavior of bacteria sounds to them at first blush as fantastic as any of their religious beliefs sound to us. It is only after prolonged contact with white culture and considerable education that the average Navaho will begin to take stock in germs.

The actual tools to be employed in exerting influence on systems of belief will depend on the opportunities presented in each concrete situation. In general, all pertinent forms of communication should be utilized to the full. These forms of communication include radio, newspapers, magazines, posters, leaflets, movies, lectures, meetings with leaders for discussion and mass meetings. In addition, administrative

power may be employed to give support to persons and groups of persons who promulgate the belief systems the administration wishes to encourage, while persons advocating opposite trends can be discouraged directly and indirectly. The power of public opinion can be skilfully directed to the point where it will do the most. At all stages, judgment and knowledge of the immediate situation should temper action, and the emphasis should be on guidance of trends in the community rather than on insistence and force. Nevertheless, the creation of appropriate laws and regulations and their enforcement are of fundamental importance. While these must, in order to be effective, operate in consonance with the existing belief systems of the people concerned, they may still function to influence change in those belief systems in one direction or another.

The handling of the development of self-government in Poston after the strike is an example of successful administrative treatment of belief systems in pursuit of an ultimate goal. It was greatly handicapped by weak and uncoordinated methods of communication, the importance of which was never fully grasped by the Project Director and the other administrators.

RECOMMENDATIONS

20. Remember that prevention is easier than cure; take care of the basic sources of stress and most of the disruptive systems of belief will take care of themselves.

21. Granting people some of what they want should not be neglected as a means of establishing rapport with the administration and paving the way for modification of inimical systems of belief.

22. In applying reward and punishment be sure that the form they take fits with the systems of belief of the people concerned; if this is not done, the effects may be distorted, even to the extent of bringing results that are the opposite of those desired.

23. When it is necessary to modify systems of belief, start early, relieve stresses, and utilize all practicable methods of information distribution, education, and reward and punishment.

24. Remember that new systems of belief held by only a few people are easier to control than those that are older and widely held; it is best to act soon if one is going to act at all.

25. In trying to alter belief systems, as with anything else, understand what is to be altered and have clearly in mind what is to be accomplished.

26. Work what is workable and change what is changeable; do not exhaust time and resources on systems of belief that are least yielding.

27. Do not overestimate the power of reason as a means of controlling systems of belief.

28. Do not dismiss as irrational everything that does not agree with the administrator's system of belief.

29. Take advantage of the multiple systems of belief that are likely to appear during stress and select for encouragement those that most nearly conform to the administrator's aims.

30. Take advantage of the plasticity of belief systems likely to appear during stress and move them in directions that conform to the administration's aims before they move in some other direction of themselves.

31. Never, under any circumstances, attempt to eliminate a system of belief by force; there is no surer way to give it life and permanence.

TO SUM UP

PEOPLE perceive stress and react to it through their systems of belief. The administrator must know these systems of belief both among the people administered and among the members of the administration in order to understand the behavior of both groups and in order to communicate with and direct them.

18. Social Organization under Stress

A. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

In the previous chapter systems of belief were discussed because they constitute one major set of influences that affect the way people perceive and respond to stresses. Closely related to what people believe are the habits and customs they practice and through which they respond to their systems of belief in satisfying their needs and in achieving their aspirations. Since virtually everything human beings do relates to other human beings, the habits and customs whereby persons interact with each other are the most significant and may be designated as "social organization."

Social organization and systems of belief taken together constitute the core of what most anthropologists mean when they speak of "culture." The latter term has been little used in these pages because for administrative purposes it has been thought useful to consider systems of belief and social organization separately. This division does not mean that these subjects are regarded as separate entities, but rather that both of them, and also the basic drives and needs of individuals, are aspects of the complex totality of human life. The division is artificial and imposed only as a means of understanding. Our minds are so constituted that ideas have to enter in small packages, like a machine taken down for going mule-back over mountains; but once inside the parts must be reassembled and conceived as a whole in action, or comprehension is lacking.

The relationship between social organization and systems of belief is so close that social organization may be described as certain systems of belief in action and many systems of belief may be thought of as ways of grasping and feeling social organization.

PRINCIPLE 1. *Except for very recent mixtures of unacquainted individuals, all people everywhere have social organization.*

THIS is to say that all people have established customs and routines whereby they can work together, raise children, maintain families, select and follow leaders, practice their religions, enjoy recreation and perform other acts in which two or more persons must join in a reciprocal if not cooperative relationship. Social organization is an enormous mass of patterned habits, manners and ways of doing things, into which each man is born, which he learns and which he passes on to those who come after him. By its means, people know what to expect of each other and without it there would be little food, clothing or protection against the elements, and there would be no buildings, no streets, no home life, no buying and selling, no money, no language and no knowledge beyond what one person untaught could pick up in the course of his existence. Degree of social organization is one of the principal characteristics that distinguishes an army from a mob.

The various patterns of social organization in any society are interrelated so that change to one pattern may affect others with the result that alterations occur far more extensively than might be expected. The invention of the automobile, for example, represented changes in customs and habits of transportation and communication that were fairly obvious from the start; but a large array of derived alterations in our social organization ranging from methods of courtship to the introduction of urban habits in rural areas could not have been so easily foreseen.

PRINCIPLE 2. *Differing patterns of social organization, like differing systems of belief, mark off from each other the various classes, tribes and nations of men.*

In discussing systems of belief the example given from the history of Poston in regard to this point was the contrast between American and Japanese belief concerning the form community government should take. It must now be added that the difference was greater than the difference in belief, for it included contrasting, lifelong, ingrained habits and ways of doing things. Even if the older Japanese had been able to alter completely their beliefs and opinions, there would still have been the difficulty of learning new and unfamiliar ways to substitute for those that were second nature.

Principle 3. *Human groups cannot carry out actions for which they have no established social organization.*

This was a matter of very great importance in the operation of the Center, although not too well understood at first. Most of the administrative planners realized that evacuation had been an emotional shock to the people, but few if any comprehended the alterations and obliterations in social organization that had taken place, or the significances of these in the mechanics of community activity.

Whether an individual evacuee came from town or country, there had been disturbance in his accustomed daily relationships with family members, neighbors, employers, employees, customers, the police, the law, clubs, associations and fellow workers, and, in short, in almost all the social habits and manners he knew how to carry out. On arriving in the Center, circumstances demanded that each person do things in relation to others and in relation to the Administration for which little or no social organization existed. Families had to get adjusted to living in crowded, scarcely furnished rooms, with father no longer the breadwinner and mother no longer a housekeeper, and with little opportunity to exercise former methods of training and controlling children. Private life had to become life in a block of barracks

where all classes were mixed and former systems of authority and respect were topsy-turvy. Instead of family meals, 250 to 300 people had to assemble three times a day in block mess halls, for the operation of which kitchen crews had to be organized. Block leadership and common agreement on block activities had to evolve. In the community as a whole, not only did the evacuees have to fill jobs that represented new occupations for many of them, but they also had to establish community government without previous experience in such affairs and had to assume new positions of authority, representation and conformity in regard to each other, much of which was out of keeping with lifelong habits and systems of belief.[1]

The difficulty of getting people to perform acts for which they do not have the requisite social organization is common the world over in administration. A recent report on promoting health programs among Bulgarian peasants notes the failure of education attempted through calling the women of the villages together at meetings in the local schools. Public meetings in schools were an imitation of a pattern that exists in our western culture, but which is not present in the social organization of the Bulgarians. As a consequence, the people did not respond. The author of the report points out that other forms of meetings did exist and could have been used for teaching and that it was not necessary to begin the transmission of an unfamiliar set of ideas with the enormous disadvantage of an artificial pattern in that society.[2]

No society can perform work, elect a government or pursue any other kind of collective activity for which it does not have social organization any more than an animal without wings can fly.

As expressed by the authors of *Psychology for the Fighting Man*, "You can't even boss a dog unless the dog has been trained to obey and has formed habits of responding to

[1] See pp. 140-153.

[2] Reference 33.

commands. And before you can boss him, you must know what commands he will respond to. . . .

"Authority is not power. No amount of legal authority over the grizzly bears of British Columbia would enable you to get yourself obeyed by them out in the woods."[3]

A single individual who goes to another country can adapt himself to new social circumstances, if he is young and if he has time not only to acquire the information he lacks, but also to form the habits and ingrained responses that are necessary for smooth and accurate performance. For a whole group of people to acquire new social organization is equally possible, and involves the same principles of learning, but it is infinitely more complicated and takes much longer.

It seems that because habits, customs and systems of belief do not have physical form like a mountain or a house, we are prone to believe that people ought to be able to change them whenever such change appears "practical." However, we forget that a capacity to change is not the same thing as change accomplished, any more than the capacity of a boy to grow is the same thing as a grown man. Almost every type of social organization is the product of long growth, some of it beginning far back beyond the earliest recorded history. In all societies social organization is still growing and changing, either quickly or slowly and can be administratively modified, but not just any old how, in any direction and over night.

Numerous illustrations of this principle could be cited from experience in agricultural programs and the work of the Office of Indian Affairs. Attempts to make farmers or traders out of Indians who do not have social organization geared to this type of living and economy have run into difficulties—just as attempts to drive across country without roads will give difficulties.

Again, in studying problems of housing among people of

[3] Reference 29.

our own culture, it has been noted that it is extremely difficult to inform tenants of their rights and privileges, while owners are quick to take every advantage. One of the principal reasons for this is that the owners have developed real estate boards and other similar patterns of social organization through which to function, while the tenants as a group are usually without organization for tackling their rental problems.[4]

Perhaps the most familiar example of all is the well known ability of producer organizations to bring pressure on Congress that is more effective than that of the very much more numerous consumers, largely because the one body has appropriate social organization and the other lacks it.

This does not mean that it is impossible for an administration to create social organization if it is needed, but only that no program or plan which is dependent upon a particular pattern of social organization can work until such a pattern has come into existence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Never forget that people are dependent on their social organization, and that no matter how inadequate or superfluous a particular set of customs and practices seems, it may still be interconnected with ways of doing things that are necessary for the security and capacity of the people.

2. As with the systems of belief, learn the social organization of the people being administered, particularly the following patterns:

   a. Local and national government.
   b. The family.
   c. Cliques.
   d. Law and order.
   e. Class and prestige systems.
   f. Principal kinds of work going on among the people.

[4] Reference 2.

g. Trade.
h. Relations with outside groups or nations.
i. Maintenance of health and treatment of the sick.
j. The practice of religion.

3. Do not expect people to adopt behavior or carry out programs for which they have no social organization.

4. Adjust administration to the existing social organization of the people.

5. Never imagine that passing a law or regulation creates social organization; a team does not come into existence when the members are named, but only after they have learned how to interact with each other.

B. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION UNDER STRESS

PRINCIPLE 4. *Social organization influences the way in which people respond to stress.*

THIS principle follows from the description that has been given of the nature of social organization. If it consists in the patterned habits whereby people interact with each other in order to create security and satisfy needs and aspirations, then it provides, but also limits, the means people have at their disposal for coping with the things that happen to them. If a community lacking those patterns of social organization, which include the activities of doctors and nurses and health regulations, is suddenly hit by an epidemic it cannot possibly rise to the occasion with adequate medical care even if it should have all the necessary physical equipment. If the same community has developed those patterns of social organization that include religion, then it would respond to the stress of the epidemic with an increase in religious activity and practice. In both instances, the nature of the response to the stress would be as much influenced by the accustomed interactions of the people—that is,

by social organization—as by their needs and by their beliefs.

Since societies vary a good deal in the array of patterns of social organization they possess, different societies may have very different equipment with which to cope with stresses. Any given society may manage very well with one form of stress, but be unable to deal with another form; and what is relatively easy for one society may be extremely difficult to another.

One of the reasons that evacuation and the establishment of the Relocation Camp involved as much inefficiency as it did and caused so much misery to both the evacuees and the administrators was the fact that no pattern for operating such a program previously existed in the social organization of the United States, which is to say, in the customs, habits, and practices of the people.

PRINCIPLE 5. *Forces of stress alter the social organization of communities.*

IN THE situation at the Center, physical discomfort, economic losses, idleness, restriction of movement, family separations, rejection and dislike by other people, and being under the control of an authority which seemed to be unpredictable affected the social organization of the evacuees through making some former modes of behavior impossible, making others the occasion for punishment and through demanding acts for which there were no established modes.

Because of these things, there was inefficient and conflicting leadership and even more inefficient followership. People did not know what to do, they did not know the meaning of things that happened and they did not know how to pull together. It was not that they lacked answers to their questions, but rather that there were so many different and conflicting answers with few precedents, customs or uniform systems of belief to serve as guides for the elimination of some alternatives and the uniting of the people

in others. Numerous frictions and disagreements appeared. In the blocks there were differences of opinion about how the kitchens should be run, what privileges mothers and invalids should have, how the food should be prepared, how the block gardens should be laid out and so on. In the community at large, the people felt the Council did not represent them, there were labor troubles, disputes between the group who operated the store and the customers, and with the other group who wanted to create cooperatives. Petty factions and cliques appeared with individuals struggling for power and prestige while the people alternately accepted and rejected them. The evacuees tried to achieve their needs not only through their Councilmen, but through Block Managers, through direct appeals, petitions, minor strikes, backing up now this fluent speaker and now that, through ministers, teachers, personal friends, letters of protest and, in fact, through every device possible from argument to bribery, but none of them consistently.

The nature of the three general reactions to stress outlined in Chapter 16, *cooperation, withdrawal* and *aggression* meant the formation of at least three bodies out of harmony with each other. Persons disposed to cooperate with the Administration and those inclined to aggression were prone to clash with each other and both to have friction in their relations with the stolid and withdrawn group. Between the extremes within each of those groups there were other areas of conflict and disorganizing competition.

Not only were there new clashes caused by alterations and absence of patterns of social organization, but old disharmonies flared up with new strength when former adjustments were disrupted and new strains felt. Of these, the most marked was the difference between the older people and the younger generation born in America. The policy of giving all privileges possible to those who were American citizens resulted in very young persons being in positions of authority over their elders—for instance in the Council—and this

caused strong resistance from many of the older generation.[5]

The picture at the Center is but one example of what happens to communities under severe stress such as famine, epidemic, war, economic depressions, migrations, evacuations or any other set of forces that profoundly affect the accustomed relationships of people. One is reminded of a storm on the range which not only stampedes the cattle but also tears down the fences—that is to say, the guiding and restraining structures—and lets the animals run in all directions.

PRINCIPLE 6. *Social disorganization tends to increase stress in communities.*

THIS is in part the converse of the previous principle. Thus, if the forms of behavior which are an integral part of family unity, group solidarity, leadership or working relationships become disrupted, the people are less well able to protect themselves and to achieve the satisfactions of their needs. Physical discomforts, threats to life and health, frustrations and uncertainties are multiplied. This constitutes another of those vicious circles which are so common in human behavior, and perhaps in nature generally.

One of the most significant things in social disorganization is the lack of means for the distribution of information. The importance of information has been touched upon before in Chapter 16, Principle 2, and in Chapter 17, Principle 14 but it is worth emphasizing again in the present connection. At the Center, the amount of ignorance and misinformation among the evacuees was extraordinary, and matched only by the enormous difficulties inherent in trying to make all the people in the community aware of even the simplest administrative policy. In part this was confusion arising out of the existence of two languages and differing systems of belief leading to different interpretations of things which

[5] See pp. 74-81, 140-153.

happened; but more than anything else it was lack of social organization necessary for the spread of information. The Council and various other evacuee groups who attempted to inform or influence the public of the Center had almost as much difficulty as did the Administration. The administrative officers, however, were more inclined to fall victims to the delusion that they had informed the people, when as a matter of fact they had only spoken to a few hundred men out of the 18,000 persons who made up the community, and of these few hundred, not more than a handful would carry away any very clear idea of what had been said. And out of the handful, perhaps only one would believe it.

Because some kinds of information did spread, there was a tendency for administrators to have an almost superstitious credence in the "grapevine" and to assume that when they said something to one evacuee, they had told all of them. This tendency was no doubt furthered by the simple kind of belief system which pictured all evacuees as stereotypes —alike and therefore, by implication, well coordinated.

PRINCIPLE 7. *Communities undergoing social disorganization also show new organization; break down and repair take place simultaneously.*

PRINCIPLE 8. *Where stress is severe and social disorganization is extensive, the breakdown-and-repair process is likely to take a violent form consisting in groups of people, each coalesced around a different system of belief, struggling with each other until one group dominates or until an equilibrium is achieved among several dominant groups.*

THIS is in keeping with the behavior of individual reactions and systems of belief under stress, and is the story of revolutions and civil wars. Speaking of the French Revolu-

tion, Carlyle calls such groups "Clubs" and describes the process thus, "The whole world in such a plastic time is forming itself into Clubs, some one club, the strongest or luckiest, shall by friendly attracting, by victorious compelling, grow ever stronger, till it becomes immeasurably strong; and all others, with their strength be either lovingly absorbed into it, or hostily abolished by it."

Thus it is that many of the symptoms of social disorganization are at the same time signs of the repair process. This is a point easily missed by an administrator who does not understand the nature of men and society, with the result that he spends his energy trying to stop the repair instead of guiding it in the direction that will be least expensive and least painful to all concerned. An analogy may be made here to medical recognition of the role of "laudable pus" in the healing of wounds. Left alone, the community will repair itself somehow or die, as will a sick human being, but proper diagnosis and treatment can greatly speed the healing, prevent excesses and yield a better end result. Such can be accomplished only by the administrator who tries to work with causes and who does not mistake attempts at self-cure for the disease itself. The critical question in any kind of aggressive disturbance in a community is: To what extent is it a process of repairing social structure and how can the repair aspects be efficiently utilized?

In the Center, the strike was judged in these terms, and the subsequent results in improved community management bore out the soundness of the action taken. The Director gave the different groups a chance to show what they could do for the community, he judged them by their fruits and took into account how other people judged them. Had he tried to cure the strike merely by suppressing one or another of them, he might have succeeded in that specific aim, but would have missed his opportunity to secure support from most of the different kinds of people who made up the community, and to achieve a situation in which they balanced

each other. By the action he took he avoided getting into the position of taking a particular side with one group of evacuees, thus making enemies of all the others and placing himself in the role of their inevitable oppressor. Instead, he became a referee watching various groups compete with each other, and he operated by rules and premises that most of the evacuees on all sides were willing to recognize as fair, though they did not always agree with his decisions.[6]

PRINCIPLE 9. *The most stable part of the population is that portion in which the systems of belief and the social organization are most resistant to change.*

IT HAS been noted in Chapter 16, Principle 5, that moderate reactions of apathy and indifference on the part of people under stress can be helpful to an administration through providing stability. So, too, a conservative clinging to old and established ways and ideas can be a bulwark against social disorganization, insurrection, confusion, violence and other movements likely to result in administrative failure.

In the Center, many of the older people who resisted the ambitious programs of community-building and who resisted resettlement of all the evacuees in jobs outside the Center, were also the people whose influence was paramount in maintaining decorum and law and order and who worked diligently in block gardens where they could farm in a manner approximating that to which they had been accustomed. The fact that a good many of them had sympathies with Japan was a matter of secondary importance to the fact that they were stable and a stabilizing influence in the life of the Center.

T. E. Lawrence noted at the end of the successful Arab revolt against the Turks that 90 per cent of the population had been "too solid to rebel" and yet, it was on their solidity

[6] See pp. 197-227, 241-244.

that the new state must rest. As a consequence it was necessary to build on "those elements which had been most useful to the Turkish government."[7]

There is danger that administrators coming into occupied territory will not understand this aspect of human society and will have natural but unrealistic attitudes toward those who have formerly cooperated with the enemy or who were themselves enemies. This is not to minimize the importance of eliminating from power and influence associations dedicated to advancing national and political aims inimical to the interests of the United States, but to emphasize the need for distinguishing such groups from the mass of the population who may have given such groups support. The large and relatively inert mass of the people on whose support and acquiescence the administration must depend will probably cooperate with anyone who shows himself able to satisfy their needs and who does not interfere too much with their belief systems and social organization. Basically, most people want to be let alone.

PRINCIPLE 10. *The patterns of leadership in the social organization of a community greatly affect the way it reacts to stress.*

BY "patterns of leadership" something more than the personality and methods of individual leaders is meant. The patterns include the whole hierarchal system of leadership from top to bottom and all the collateral branches and they encompass leadership in work, recreation, religion and informal groups as well as local and national government. Also included are the acts and attitudes that the people expect the leaders to have and the forms of communication in both directions between leaders and followers.

Although in all societies leadership serves many of the same functions, its patterns may differ widely from one group

[7] Reference 21.

to another. For example, the pattern whereby individuals achieve leadership may range all the way from inheritance to popular selection, as one goes from one society to another.

In times of stress, leadership patterns will consolidate and modify themselves in a progressive fashion to meet the situation, or they will give way in many incoordinated fragments out of which sooner or later new leadership patterns will arise, like a phoenix from its ashes. Whether one or the other of these trends occurs depends on both the nature of the stresses and the nature of the pre-existing patterns of leadership. In general, modification of the existing patterns is a much less devastating and wasteful experience than passing through the social chaos which may last a long time before adequate new patterns are formed.

In the Center, the formation of self-government was handicapped not only by the fact that evacuation had swept away so much of the people's social organization, but also by the fact that patterns of this particular sort never had existed among the Japanese in America. There was family headship and various clubs and associations had their leaders and politics, but there had never been any self-government of Japanese communities in this country because such communities were part of counties, towns and states in which most of the political leadership and offices were in the hands of non-Japanese.

Thus the creation of effective leadership in the Center not only was a matter of repairing and modifying former leadership patterns, but also involved the creation of a wholly new element, local self-government. This required the formation of many new habits and relationships between people directly and indirectly affecting many parts of their lives.

However, although new as an experience it was not something concerning which the evacuees were completely without knowledge. All had some vague idea of the American democratic system, and many of the American-born Japanese

were very familiar with it as observers and critics though not as participants—much as is the case with the majority of citizens all over the country. On the other hand, the older people were more aware of the traditional systems of authority and management in Japanese rural communities. It was natural, therefore, that the emerging self-government patterns should form along both lines. In the early days of the Center, the Administration was largely unaware of the patterns characteristic of the older people, and in some ways the strike was a clash between the two systems. It is to the credit of the Administration that it eventually succeeded in guiding toward harmony both of the two main trends in the community.

PRINCIPLE 11. *Correlated with the appearance of multiple systems of belief and changing social organization in a community under stress is the appearance of numerous competing leaders.*

THIS was evident in the Center where after a few months the leaders of such groups as the Council, the Issei Advisory Board, the Block Managers, the evacuee assistants to the Administration, the cooperative movement and numerous others could be seen struggling to function and coming into opposition with each other. Furthermore, within each group there were cliques with leaders likewise struggling to exert influence and secure position. Much of this was wasteful of available resources and detrimental to the future of the evacuees, but it was also the process whereby strong patterns of cooperation and leadership were being formed. The strike was in many ways merely an important stage in this building up, tearing down and rebuilding. The settlement of the strike was in no sense a termination of these struggles, but it did mark the time from which both Administration and evacuees were able to reduce the wasteful aspects of conflict

and competition and integrate them more adequately with the needs of the community.[8]

Inherent in all this was the question of what is "a good leader," with Administration and evacuees both trying in the light of their various needs and belief systems to select and encourage such leaders. This is always an extremely difficult problem, especially in the confusion and chaos of a community under stress, but it is one that every administrator must solve as best he can. It is probable that the general tendency is to regard those leaders who support one as "good" and those who oppose one as "bad." This is a human view, but not altogether reliable as far as promoting effective administration is concerned, because for community needs, it may be that the administrator is mistaken or only partly informed while the "bad" leader is more nearly correct in his views. Administrators who think only of leaders as for and against them are likely to miss an opportunity to learn new things of value about the community. It would seem advisable to give careful consideration to the ideas advocated by all leaders and to try to evaluate them in terms of the practical resources of the situation, the people's needs, their systems of belief, and their social organization.

In addition to evaluating the avowed aims of the leaders, it is important to weigh their methods of leadership. This will of course vary from one society to another and one must beware of judging people in a different culture by the standards of one's own culture. However, with this reservation in mind, it almost always seems worthwhile to find out to what extent the man in question seems to believe what he is saying and whether or not he places his own pride and prestige ahead of the welfare of the people. Does he emphasize stirring the people up irrespective of what he is talking about? Does he always tend to set groups against each other and

[8] See pp. 112-113, 119, 123, 124-127, 162-170, 177-182, 185-190, 193-195, 197-198, 203-209, 211-227, 237, 238.

against the administration rather than to seek reasonable common ground?

Harold Lasswell has said, "The essential mark of the agitator is the high value he places on the emotional responses of the public. Whether he attacks or defends social institutions is a secondary matter."[9] Such people seem to have a vested interest in community disunity and in keeping the emotions of the people flaming. After the Civil War, it was Northern leadership of this sort which, through waving the "Bloody Shirt," did much to delay national reintegration. Many of the leaders of the political party in power sought to retain their position by the constant reawakening of wartime emotions and prejudices as a means of attacking the other party which happened to be advocating collaboration and rebuilding. The price which the nation paid in human misery and delayed economic advance during the "Reconstruction" period is well known.[10]

In the Detroit and Los Angeles riots of 1943, it was clear to observers that the situations were made very much worse by persons and newspapers who whipped up the mob spirit.[11]

In addition to scrutinizing what a leader says and his methods of influencing the people, the administrator should also look to see what kind of following he has and note whether it is large or small, what place it occupies in the social structure of the community and whether it seems stable or unstable.

PRINCIPLE 12. *Conflict between older and younger generations is characteristic of the organization of many societies and has important bearing on the patterns of leadership.*

IN THE Center, this was seen in the Issei-Nisei relationships in which conflict was exaggerated because of the war and the fact that the Japanese population in America was

[9] Reference 20. [10] Reference 6. [11] Reference 22.

peculiar in having few middle-aged persons to link the older and younger generations together. However, even without these special circumstances a very similar type of conflict has been described among many other immigrants[12] and it has been seen in American Indian groups. It has also been noted in families striving for economic and social advancement where the children acquire manners, friends, interest and education that are strange to their parents. Even when there is no upward struggle, the technological and social changes that have been occurring from decade to decade in recent times have been so marked that much of what is familiar and needful to the present generation is foreign to its parents.

To call all this merely "conflict" gives perhaps a false picture, for if it were only conflict, with clearly marked sides pitted against each other, the circumstances would be much simpler than they are. As a matter of fact, the conflicting needs, conflicting systems of belief and conflicting patterns of social custom and habit which separate the generations are combined with other needs, systems of belief and patterns of social custom and habit that are shared in common and bound by strong ties of affection and interdependence. However intense resentment may get, and it does become very tense on both sides, the deepest and most enduring ties are still those binding parents and children. The son may rebel against restraints the older people would like to put upon him and arrogantly defy them and call them ignorant and narrow, and the parents in turn may say that the younger generation has gone to hell and that they do not understand their own children, but let some outside agent seem to attack either one side or the other, and the ties will be soon apparent.

This is a matter of considerable importance to administrators who may have to operate in areas where former political trends have to be rooted out and where a program of rehabilitation is necessary. Because youth is more plastic

[12] Reference 8.

than age there will be a tendency to concentrate on the younger generations and to by-pass their elders, much as the Administration in the Center tended to think of the Niseis and to ignore the Isseis. An attempt to educate the younger people is, of course, sound, but it should be done with the inclusion of the parents rather than their exclusion. Even if trying to work with older people makes for considerable immediate difficulty and slows up the initiation of programs, it will pay dividends in the long run. The fact that the parents of the younger generation are an important part of the population must be accepted and incorporated in whatever action is taken.

The administrator who delegates an abnormal amount of authority to young people will be attempting to turn the authority system and leadership patterns of the society upside down and he will never be strong enough to do it successfully. Moreover, he will lose the support of people who could help him, for, while it is true that youth is more plastic and progressive than age, it is also true that youth lacks stability and experience while age is inclined to have both these qualities. Finally, although young people may work ardently and faithfully in the building of programs of which their parents disapprove, if it comes to a showdown in which drastic punishment or physical violence is imminent, the young people will not often stand up against their parents and may turn against the administration. It is one thing to rebel against the traditions of your parents, but it is quite another thing to be a party to a program that causes them suffering. In such a situation the administration can very quickly become a substitute target for all the resentments and aggressions old and young harbor for each other.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. In times of stress, be prepared to find social disorganization which increases the severity of the stress and a counter current of repair tending to relieve stress.

7. Try to distinguish between the changes in social organization which increase stress and the changes which relieve stress.

8. Look on factional struggles in a community under stress as part of the process of breakdown and repair of social organization; be very hesitant to take sides.

9. Do not back up a minority and force its control on a society simply because that minority is partial to the administration.

10. In occupied areas, do not let dislike of an enemy interfere with utilizing the solid qualities inherent in the mass of the people as an aid in restoring damaged social organization.

11. Insofar as possible, utilize the type of leadership patterns to which the people are accustomed.

12. Judge leaders not by their ability to curry favor but by their grasp of the people's needs and their capacity to move toward stability.

13. Judge agitators by their overemphasis on popular emotions and on the creating of sensations rather than by whether they are for or against the administration.

14. Remember that all leaders have their assets and liabilities; try to evaluate the balance in each leader and avoid classifying them in absolute terms of "good" and "bad."

15. Be prepared to give the administration's opponents credit for honest motives.

16. Be prepared to find that some of those flocking to the administration's side are distrusted by the people for very good reasons.

17. Do not miss opportunities to seek common ground with opponents.

18. Be ready to learn what opponents can teach.

19. Remember that some of the best support obtainable in a community may come from honest opponents converted to the administration's side.

20. Remember that if the administrator can prove his capacity to relieve sources of stress, he has a powerful means of securing the support of honest opponents.

21. Remove from influence those who have vested interests in keeping communities disjointed and the emotions of the people flaming; but beware of making heroes and martyrs.

22. Do not get into the position of backing the younger generation against the older generation, or both may turn against the administration; ultimately they are more attached to each other than they are to the administration.

23. Do try to enlist the support of the older people for the administration and remember that the common devotion of parents to their children gives the administration a powerful lever.

24. Do not expect the authority system of a community to work if turned bottom up.

C. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE ADMINISTRATION

PRINCIPLE 13. *An administrative body is always part of the patterns of leadership and authority in the social organization of the community in which it operates.*

IF administrators think of their administrative organization as a thing apart from the community they will miss significant problems until such appear as sudden and unpleasant surprises. One of the major tasks of a new administration is that of integrating itself with the patterns of leadership and authority which exist in the community. It is like a new keystone in an arch, useless if it does not articulate properly with the curved portions arising on each side. The matter is doubly difficult and doubly important in a community that is under stress.

To accomplish these ends, the administrator has to give

much careful consideration to his own administrative organization, to its internal cohesiveness and efficiency and to the closeness of fit of all its peripheral parts with the people of the community.

In Poston, many of the clerks, foremen, timekeepers and others who had large daily contact with the evacuees did not carry out their duties in a manner that facilitated the operation of the Center. This was in part because of their own reactions to the stresses they were enduring and in part because of some of their systems of belief, as noted in Chapter 16, Principle 9, and in Chapter 17, Principle 12. However, equally important was the fact that their habits of working and the kinds of leadership patterns in which they moved were not adjusted to dealing with the evacuees. More than this, the need for developing new ways of interacting with people that would be in keeping with the new situation was not perceived, and the men went right on trying to practice their former habits and customs. It was not recognized that integration with the leadership patterns in the social organization of the evacuees was one of the major problems of the Administration. Instead, it was felt that adjustment was up to the evacuees and that all the administrative departments had to do was to give orders, and that if the Center residents did not carry them out they were in the wrong and should take the consequences. Unfortunately, the members of the Administration inevitably had to take the consequences also, in the form of work poorly done, goals unachieved and the resultant feelings of failure and frustration.[18]

Analysts of the Detroit riots in 1943 state that an important factor was the absence of effective machinery for interracial cooperation, either in local government circles, or unofficially. There were numbers of leaders among both the Whites and the Negroes who wanted to get together to work out a solution, but they were unable to do so during the

[18] See pp. 97-98, 107-108, 119-120, 227-228, 239-240, 243-244.

crisis because, since no customary channels for contact existed, they did not know how to go about it.[14]

This touches upon one of the most difficult of all problems connected with the interaction of an administration and the people being administered—the existence of social barriers, of "caste and class" lines separating the one group from the other. Such barriers are apt to appear because of the very nature of an administrative hierarchy, but where there are differences of language, systems of belief and social organization dividing the groups of people concerned, the tendency is reinforced. If there is in addition a difference in skin color the barriers are likely to be of enormous strength and durability. Not only do they serve to limit the social and economic opportunities of the lower groups by reserving prerogatives for the upper group, but they block the flow of information and understanding between the two. What flow of information does take place is distorted by a host of beliefs, opinions and notions which each group holds in regard to the other and which function to reinforce the barriers but not to picture accurately existing conditions.

In spite of our democratic philosophy, when we Americans have attempted to administer other peoples our performance has often been far from either admirable or practicable. From Alaska to Guam, from the Philippines to the Indian reservations we have been guilty of being authoritarian democrats. We enact a paradox by educating and encouraging native people to be like us on the grounds that by this means they can have the same things we enjoy, but at the same time we make this impossible for them by erecting social and economic barriers which cut them off from numerous rewards of prestige, status and economic advantage—in short, the very items we claim to be the fruits of our way of life. It is little wonder that some native people feel that they would rather have out-and-out imperialism

[14] Reference 22.

than this business of being led up to a feast and jerked back as soon as they attempt to partake.

The existence of social barriers is obvious enough and the point need not be labored. What should be stressed is the fact that this tendency, which arises from our systems of belief and our social organization, interferes with the integration of people and administration at the places where it is most needed, and that it can seriously undermine any policy that does not take account of it. To exaggerate it or to ignore it is equally dangerous.

PRINCIPLE 14. *Incoordinations and disarticulations within the administrative structure increase the social and psychological disorganization of a community under stress.*

THIS principle is a corollary of the preceding one, since if the administration is part of the social organization of a community, then weaknesses and disharmonies must affect the leadership patterns of the group. This in turn adds to the stress of the community because the leadership patterns influence any society's ability to meet situations of stress.

The fact that the Administration of the Center was of necessity thrown together in a hurry, was built on organization charts and not on years of teamwork, caused as much or more damage to the effective operation of the Center as did the lack of supplies, equipment and other physical difficulties. The Administration's ability to help the evacuees was proportional to the degree in which it became molded into a functioning organization rather than a paper one. This was accomplished through practice and the development of relations between people that became habitual and unconscious as they worked together.

The fact that most of the top administrators were handpicked, and were clear in their purposes probably did more

than anything else to prevent collapse in the early days and was one of the chief reasons that the organization as a whole was able to develop in as brief a time as it did. It must be recognized, however, that the strike did as much to bring clarity and cohesion to the Administration as it did to the evacuees. It did not do away with conflict and factions within the Administration, but it did produce more cohesion than had previously existed, made the issues clearer and led to the departure from the Project of those persons who were least well adjusted.

However, had it been possible to tackle the operation of the Center with an administrative organization composed of people who were accustomed to working together as a team, who knew their respective tasks thoroughly and the part each was playing in relation to the whole, and had they agreed throughout as to the main purpose of the Center and the policy for treating the evacuees, the resultant performance would have been as much better as the performance of a trained army is better than a militia.

By and large, humanity has and is paying a heavy price for disarticulations of this sort. In the Center it cost the evacuees much suffering and it cost the members of the Administration themselves almost as much. For the Government and the American people, it cost the money that could have been saved by better operation and it cost something in democratic principles.[15]

Almost everywhere one looks into disturbed communities and the problems of administering them, he can see the same story—the situation made worse by fractures and jumblings in the administrative organizations concerned. The internal working of the Government during the Civil War is notorious, but so is the story of the American Revolution, and the story of other governments and administrative organizations in all parts of the world.

[15] See pp. 13, 55-60, 81-89, 90-92, 99-100, 137-139, 150-153, 170-177, 183-185, 190-191, 210, 218-219, 227-231, 238-241.

One can react to this universal character of administration by fatalistic acceptance of it as inevitable, or one can say it is a problem to be tackled, and that if it cannot be cured at least it can be improved.

The matter is not unlike the problem of correcting malnutrition. A popular argument against dietary improvement is that people have been eating a long time. This is, of course, true, but the accompanying implication is false, namely that people in consequence do not have much to gain by changing their food habits. Once it became recognized that selection of the best diet for good health was a problem to be solved and not something to be taken for granted, then the way was open for considerable advance in this phase of human welfare.

So, too, it may be with the art and science of administration. Once it is recognized that there is more involved than making plans, creating organization charts and hiring technical assistants, giving orders and other traditional practices, once it is grasped that the social organization of the administration is itself a problem of major importance, once it is recognized that any administration must meet the needs and fit the belief systems of its constituent members no less than the people being administered, then it is possible to tackle these matters. However, until that recognition is clear and definite, it is not possible to move forward. Economics, man-hours of labor, supplies, costs, all these are important, but so too are answers to the needs of people, the adjustment of belief systems, and the adaptation of customs and practices which permit the collective efforts of administration and administered.

The running of the Center was a task that had to be done in a hurry, but this is not true of much other administrative work that is done no better. Most occupied-area administration will have to be carried out hurriedly in the beginning, but not afterward except through administrative ineptitude. Careful planning and adequate thought in regard to needs,

human reactions, systems of belief and social organization in the administration and in relation to the administration, will save much and cost no more than what is often spent now.

RECOMMENDATIONS

25. Give special attention to the task of integrating the administration with the leadership customs and habits in the social organization of the people being administered.

26. Recognize that the development of effective social organization in the administration is a responsibility of the top administrators; this means teamwork, not merely paper organization.

27. Keep out of the administrative group persons whose intelligence is below that required for the type of work they must do—this includes not only technical proficiency, but ability to grasp and act on general policies.

28. Keep out persons who have deeply ingrained systems of belief that are incompatible with their duties; for example, strong racial prejudice in people who are part of an administrative organization that will have jurisdiction over other races.

29. Make sure that members of the organization understand the main purposes and policies; use staff meetings and all educative methods possible in order to keep interest alive and thinking active.

30. Make sure that no member of the administration is placed unnecessarily in a position where he is exposed to excessive frustration, conflict and uncertainty; have the right man in the right job.

31. Make sure that the organization of the administration is a functioning social structure and answers the needs, reactions, aspirations and belief systems of its constituent members.

D. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE CONTROL OF STRESS

SOCIAL organization is significant in the control of stress because it is one of the means through which control can be exerted and because social disorganization not only interferes with such control but also increases the stress. It is a matter of first importance to be aware of the signs and symptoms of disorganization.

PRINCIPLE 15. *Social disorganization may be detected in numerous, conflicting factions, break-up of family unity, multiple leaders, lowered ethical standards, and an increase in crime; and it may be surmised wherever there are numerous emotional and conflicting systems of belief, and where many people are showing the reactions of disturbed emotions and thoughts such as exaggerated compliance, apathy, poorly directed aggression, suspicions, attacks on scapegoats, and "pathological" rumors.*

THIS principle sums up and draws together much of what has been said in the present and preceding chapters. The items listed are not isolated factors but parts of a whole, the rest of which may or may not be visible. If an administrator's attention is attracted to one item, he should then look for the others. He should think of the inter-relationship of needs, reactions, belief systems and social organization, adapt his measures to meet conditions all along the line, and not be content with the elimination of only the most obvious symptoms. Too often there is a tendency to believe that, by punishing and making an example of particular individuals, the behavior of people under stress may be controlled or diverted in a more constructive direction through intimidation. This sometimes works, but it is liable to failure

unless the administrator knows what he is about in terms of the larger picture of total stresses on the community, the way most of the people are reacting, the kinds of belief systems through which they are reacting and the kinds of social organization they have with which to react. It not infrequently happens that the prominent figure in a community, the apparent leader or agitator, is himself no more than a creature carried along by much larger social forces so that if he is eliminated, another will take his place. Like a herd of cattle stampeding over a cliff, those coming to the brink do not anticipate it and they do not intend to go over, but when they get to the edge it is too late, they are pushed on by the emotions and actions of those behind, by the social forces of the whole group. As soon as they are gone, the next in line take their places and go the same way.

PRINCIPLE 16. *To be effective, all measures aimed at correcting stresses must be applied in some consonance with the social organization of both the administration and the people administered, or else the social organization must be altered.*

As WITH systems of belief, so with the customs and habits that make up social organization, it is easier to start with the patterns as they exist and as they change spontaneously, rather than attempt to create at once extensive alterations. Changes can be produced, but not quickly or easily. When administrators seem to produce coordinated sudden change, it usually turns out that they are riding on the back of a movement that welled up from among the people.

On the other hand, within any society there are many kinds of social organization which offer the administrator a wide array of implements from which to select those best suited to his needs in coping with a stress situation. In spite of this it is not uncommon to find administrators adding to

their difficulties by trying to enforce social organization that is new to the habits of the people while leaving untouched useful patterns that already exist. An example of this at the Center was the introduction of the factory system of farming (gangs of men under a foreman), which, while not unfamiliar to the evacuees, was not nearly so well suited to their habits as farming plots in family and neighborhood groups. A little ingenuity in planning could have adjusted plot farming to the needs of the Center.

However, there are times, especially under circumstances of stress, when it may be necessary to modify social organization or introduce unfamiliar patterns. In such cases, the administration must take active measures while seeing clearly the magnitude and dangers of the task that is involved.

PRINCIPLE 17. *The things which lead people to alter their social organization are:*

a. *Alterations in systems of belief.*
b. *Perception of new needs or new sources of stress that are not adequately controlled by existing social organization.*
c. *Interference with existing forms of social organization.*
d. *Discovery of new forms of social organization that are more rewarding*
e. *Discovery that former types of social organization are more punishing.*

FROM the administrative point of view, the key to the control of social organization is the influence that can be brought to bear on systems of belief and the related opinions and attitudes. When people alter their opinions, the relevant changes in social habits and customs follow. The alteration of systems of belief has been discussed in Chapter 17, Principle 14, and need not be repeated here. As far as

change in social organization itself is concerned, the chief thing for the administrator to remember is that the change takes time and comes into existence only gradually as the people get familiar with new relationships through practice.

The development of self-government at the Center was in part the story of gradual formation of new habits of interrelations between the Council members and the Administration, among the Council members and between each member and the people he represented. No matter what its needs, information or beliefs, the Council could not have functioned effectively until a certain amount of practice and "know-how" in these relationships had developed.

Where new patterns are emerging the administrator must steer a course between expecting too much too soon, and not giving the patterns enough opportunity so that they die from lack of being practiced.

The changing needs and sources of stress which occur in a community are not likely to be open to manipulation by an administrator as a means of controlling social organization. They constitute whole problems in themselves and it is probable that the administrator will be seeking to alter social organization as a means of combatting stress rather than the other way around. However, it is possible to take advantage of the spontaneous tendency of social organization to change during stress and by this means to select for encouragement those forms which seem best suited to the needs of the community.

People respond to stress with many different kinds of behavior and interactions with each other. These furnish the raw material for new social organization. Experience sooner or later shows that some kinds of behavior are more punishing than rewarding, while other kinds are more rewarding. The latter then are repeated and become reinforced by habit and eventually by tradition.

RECOMMENDATIONS

32. Regard the behavior of a community under stress as the net result of reactions to stress (Chapter 16), systems of belief (Chapter 17), and social organization (Chapter 18); bring the influence of administration to bear on all aspects, and do not be content with single measures.

33. Do not waste energy trying to change or destroy forms of social organization which could just as well serve an administration that tried to use them.

34. In the control of social organization rely chiefly on the administration's ability to influence systems of belief and opinion; the tools are its power to educate and transmit information, and its power to establish and back up regulations and laws which reward and punish.

35. Above all, make sure that the net effect of the contact between the administration and the people is reasonably consistent and that rewards, not penalties, are given for behavior the administration wishes to encourage; it is easy for a large organization, running by rules rather than a sense of purpose, unwittingly to punish the very things it should encourage and to allow other kinds of behavior to be rewarding.

TO SUM UP

PEOPLE react to stress and follow the leads of their beliefs through the channels provided by their social organization; the administrator must know the social organization of both the people administered and his administration in order to adjust the one to the other and in order to be able to direct the kind of action that will relieve stress.

19. Conclusion

THE preceding chapters have presented a number of considerations that are important for an administration dealing with a community under stress. It is not presumed that every significant point has been touched upon, and it is clear that the principles and recommendations have often been too sweeping and dogmatic. Furthermore, as with all generalizations, application must be cautious since every actual situation is likely to include some factors that are peculiar and at variance with expectation. Even such regular forces as the tides may differ from what is anticipated as the result of local wind. Divergence between abstract generalization and specific situations does not mean that the generalization is useless, but only that it has to be interpreted according to the conditions of each situation.

In addition to lack of completeness and to the distortions that are inherent in most generalizations, what has been said up to now must be further qualified by pointing out again that the division into chapters labeled "Individuals under Stress," "Systems of Belief under Stress," and "Social Organization under Stress," is an artificial dismemberment carried out for study and presentation. With such groundwork laid, it is now possible to reassemble the parts and set forth a number of ideas which depend not on any one of the aspects covered in previous chapters, but on all of them considered together, and on human society considered as an integrated whole.

1. The problem which faces the administration of a community under stress is the problem of introducing remedial change. Before such change can be decided upon successfully, there must be understanding of the nature of the stress, the reactions of individuals to it, the effect on systems of belief and the effect on social organization.

This does not mean that great change is always necessary, but only that great understanding is. The slight, deft touch is often better than major alterations which—by upsetting total equilibrium—produce quite unexpected and unwanted results. Not infrequently the natural reactions of self-healing in the community are adequate. The point to be stressed is that when an administration decides to do little, it should do so on the basis of comprehension and not a blanket policy of laissez-faire.

2. In producing its elected changes, an administration should select means that are readily workable, not only in terms of the causes of the stress, but also in terms of the way the people are reacting, in terms of their habitual attitudes and beliefs and in terms of their customary forms for dealing with each other. It is never possible to ignore successfully these matters because in human society the cultural slate is never found wiped clean.

It is a common error of idealists and reformers to forget this fact, as was well illustrated at Poston. The people in charge of the schools and adult education brought to the Center a program of a progressive character that seemed to be excellent in itself, and possibly better than anything many of the evacuees had experienced previously. However, in their planning these educators talked as if the physical removal of the evacuees had caused them to leave behind all their previous habits, notions and expectations in education. Attempts to put the progressive program into practice soon made it clear that the evacuees had brought to Poston their former ideas, and they were vocal in demanding that to which they had been accustomed. The education program ran into other difficulties besides this one (such as inability to get the kind of teachers who could carry it out), but the false assumption of a clean slate and a clear field in evacuee education was one of the principal pitfalls.

3. The remedial changes elected by the administration of a community under stress should be planned in successive stages stretched over a period of time. The results of each stage should be thoroughly examined and the plans for subsequent stages modified accordingly.

This suggestion concerns one of the basic differences between human engineering and other types. With a bridge or a building the entire structure can be laid out in advance in the form of a blueprint. For a community this may not be, because the foundation on which the structure is raised and the materials used in the building (that is, the individual people, their needs, reactions, beliefs, and social organization) are in a state of equilibrium that alters as the work progresses. Only by frequent checking for results and for changes in the material can human society be guided in a desired direction by an administration.

Clinical medicine is the common example of the same kind of problem. It is not possible to examine a patient once and then prescribe the whole course of treatment. Instead, the sick one has to be examined again and again so that both the effects of spontaneous alterations and the results of treatment can be taken into account.

The introduction of advisable alterations in general plans raises the problem of the effect of inconsistency. There can be no doubt that if people under stress feel that the administration is a ship without a rudder, it greatly adds to their uncertainties and consequently increases their stress. How can an administration change its course without appearing inconsistent?

Two things are needful: First, no alteration of policy should be arbitrary, and second, those alterations which are decided upon should be carefully communicated to the people concerned in such a manner that they will see the advisability. The role of communication and education will be discussed later in this chapter under heading 9.

With the best of conditions, some arbitrary alterations

will be forced upon an administration through outside pressures, changes in personnel and other circumstances. One can only advise the administrator to keep these to a minimum and to make them as reasonable as possible and to avoid attempting to protect himself with silence which, of all the courses open in a difficult situation, is usually the most tempting and least profitable.

Finally, in proposing alterations in policy and in other connections, it is well for administrators not to be too afraid of admitting they have been in error. It is more worthwhile to endeavor to have the people believe that the administration is honest than to try to convince them that it is infallible. No matter what happens, they will never believe the latter.

4. Wherever possible, plans for social change should be tried out on a small scale in a segment of the community and then, after the indicated modifications have been made, applied to the whole.

By this method, ponderous errors may be avoided, for administrative practice often suffers from the kind of limitation that is imposed on mass production. When an article is being manufactured by mass production methods, any change in form is likely to require that the whole assembly belt be stopped and tools and dies remodelled. Since the administrative machinery, with its formal memoranda, printed regulations and habits of the operators, is in many ways just as inflexible, it is wise for administrators to do what the manufacturer does, experiment with models before altering the plant. Not only does the model provide the administrator with an opportunity to try out various possibilities without any of them becoming irrevocable, but also, when the model is in good working order, it can, by serving as a demonstration, become both a vehicle for communicating the idea and an illustration of its usefulness. Furthermore, since the model will be possessed by only one

part of the community, it may stimulate rivalry in other parts so that the administration may find itself impatiently besieged with requests to set into operation measures which otherwise would have been coldly received.

5. In producing changes in communities, the administration must identify and deal with the basic social units of the communities.

A basic social unit is a group of people who feel they belong together. In many places, particularly rural areas, these are neighborhood groups, but they may also be defined by kinship, religion, occupation, social caste and class, or minority status, etc., depending on the community concerned. The essential thing is that they have systems of belief in common that promote solidarity and have well-established habits of acting together as a group. The particular form and pattern varies in different parts of the world, and in complex societies there may be a number of overlapping basic social units, sometimes with considerable conflict. Successful administrative planning is dependent upon a knowledge of these units, of the organization of their leadership and of how they work together. With such information, an administration can employ the basic units as bricks in its over-all operations, as demonstrated in the extension work of the Department of Agriculture for which much care has gone into defining rural neighborhood units. The administration which attempts to put large plans into operation in complex societies without regard to the basic social units is like a man trying to put up a circus tent all alone in a high wind.

Poston, in the early days, was notable for having few stable social units with which the Administration could deal, but in the course of time the block emerged as the preeminently important segment for administrative purposes.

6. Communities under stress, with their labile but intense emotions and shifting systems of belief, are ripe for

change. While this is a situation fraught with danger because of trends which may make the stress become worse before it gets better, there is also an opportunity for administrative action that is not likely to be found in more secure times. Skilful administration may be able to seize the moment not only to guide spontaneous shifts in constructive directions, but even to achieve extensive changes that would otherwise be impossible or extremely difficult.

It is fairly well recognized in psychology that at periods of great emotional stir the individual human being can undergo far-reaching and permanent changes in his personality. It is as if the boney structure of his systems of belief and of his habitual patterns of behavior becomes soft, is pushed into new shapes and hardens there when the period of tension is over. There is probably always some slipping back toward the previous status, but there is often much retention of the new religious conversion and the effects of serious illness; and in some cases the results of intensive psychotherapy are probably of this character.

Possibly the same can be true of whole groups of people, and there are historical examples of social changes and movements occurring when there was widespread emotional tension, usually some form of anxiety. The Crusades, parts of the Reformation, the French Revolution, the change in Zulu life in the reign of Chaca, the Meiji Restoration, the Mormon movement, the Russian Revolution, the rise of Fascism, and alterations in the social sentiments of the United States going on at present are all to some extent examples.

However, when attempting to take advantage of a plastic condition in a community and introduce radical change, action must be well timed and based on adequate knowledge of the immediate situation. Administrations new to the community must be particularly cautious because an early blunder may make more impression than several blunders of greater magnitude committed later on after the people have come to accept and have some trust in the administra-

tive leaders. It is much easier to avoid a bad impression at the start than to correct it later after people have developed convictions.

7. When an administration introduces change into a community, such change takes the form of alterations both in systems of belief and in social organization. New patterns in the social organization, such as self governing bodies, or systems for education or the promotion of public health can be created in communities that previously did not have these things.

The most important points to keep in mind are that the people must feel motives for these innovations and that time is required for growth and establishment. It is very dangerous for administrators to assume that because they desire a certain pattern, such as self-government, and have decreed it and got the people to go through the forms, it therefore exists. Given time and an opportunity to function, what is in the beginning only a hollow shell will gradually develop solidity, but the weight and reliance placed on it by the administration should be commensurate with its stage of growth. At the same time, too little responsibility and too little opportunity to function will cause the shell to crumble and vanish.

8. In producing remedial changes in a community, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that people are more moved by appeals to the feeling man than to the rational man.

This point, already touched upon in Chapter 17 "Systems of Belief under Stress," has long been known to practical men of trade, of politics, of advertising and of showmanship. Applied social science in industry has repeatedly shown that wage-incentive schemes and other plans based on a narrow assumption that man is a logical animal motivated by economic considerations, may yield poor results. Such schemes

were usually based on the systems of belief of the top business executives and not on those of the workers.

Most people use their intelligence to attain ends dictated by their feelings and convictions and not as a matter of their basic motivations. With ourselves, no less than with foreign or "primitive" people, the choice of a career, of a marital partner, of religion, of friends, of political candidates, of place to reside, of food, of a doctor, of a lawyer, and many other crucial steps in life are carried out far more on the basis of feeling than on the basis of reasoning—and feeling means systems of belief and related patterns of sentiment in varying combinations, powered by needs, drives, aspirations and insecurities.[1]

Societies move on the feelings of the individuals who compose them, and so do countries and nations. Very few internal policies and almost no international policies are predominantly the product of reason. To be sure, reason and thought are components, but they take the form either of rationalization to justify or of scheming to attain ends already decided upon at the dictates of feeling. Such thinking is not of the same order as that employed by the scientist who studies the biochemistry of muscle action. It should be noted, however, that even the scientist who reasons critically and with self-discipline in his approach to the muscle, is just as much a creature of his feelings as anybody else when it comes to his relations with other people and to achieving his aspirations and securities. The chances are that the origin of his interest in the muscle is the result of feelings that have their roots in his systems of belief and his desire to be admired, to support his family, to prove his ability to himself and others and similar matters, conscious and unconscious.

To blame people for being moved more by feeling than by thought is like blaming land for being covered by the sea or rivers for running down hill. The administrator's job is

[1] For further discussion see Appendix, p. 383.

to accept these things as they are and to take them into consideration, turn them to advantage if possible, but never to ignore them.

9. Communication and education are tools of major importance at the disposal of an administration engaged in producing change in a community under stress.

In the first place, the creation of adequate communication in itself constitutes a remedial measure. When communities are suffering from adverse influences, imaginations are busy with conjured images of hopes and fears that pass for reality, systems of belief become more than ever recalcitrant to reasoning, and with the general breaks in social organization there is often extensive damage to the routes by which reliable information was formerly spread.

While information and education are not cure-alls, they are powerful antidotes. There was hardly a phase of activity in the Center from agriculture to self-government that did not suffer as much or more from lack of information as it did from lack of supplies. This not only produced uncooperative attitudes in evacuees, but also clogged the workings of the Administration itself, and promoted bad relations between the Center and the newspapers and public of the surrounding regions.

It is true that, because of the national emergency and the speed with which evacuation was accomplished, there were many important questions concerning which it was impossible to secure answers until much later. The whole situation was charged with inevitable uncertainty. However, this made it all the more important to make sure that those facts which were available were disseminated so that *no avoidable uncertainties* would be added to those which could not be helped. It was here that the absence of channels for adequate information distribution made itself felt and contributed a considerable additional load to the stresses the

community was bearing. Many months passed before either the local Administration or the War Relocation Authority became aware of the magnitude of the problem.

This is an old story in government. Ignorance was an important factor in permitting the evils of the reconstruction after the Civil War, and one of the most significant forces making for later improvement was the appearance of better reporting in the North regarding the South. Students of industrial psychology have noted again and again that men cannot do good work when uninformed concerning its significance. Reports regarding morale in the armed forces stress time and time again the need of keeping men informed regarding what is happening to them and the meaning of what they are doing. T. E. Lawrence observed concerning his experiences in Arabia, "Morale, if built on knowledge, was broken by ignorance."

However, in addition to being remedial measures in themselves, communication and education are means whereby other remedial measures may be introduced into the community and made a part of its life. No matter how good a plan or an idea hatched by an administration may be, it is of little value until it becomes part of the consciousness and activity of the people. The history of government and industry is littered with schemes that have been labeled failure, but which in reality were never tried because they were never understood by those who had to grasp them before they could become action.

For all these reasons, the administration that gives special attention to communication with and education of the people will find itself properly repaid. Special attention means giving the matter first-order importance in plans and organization, comparable with that accorded public health, the police system, and the provision of supplies and food. Where the people being administered speak a different language from the administering group, there is need for particular

emphasis on the selection and training of interpreters, with reference both to their language skill and to *their individual acceptability to the people.* This is a matter far too often left to chance.

10. Communication from the people to the administration is no less important than the stream in the opposite direction, although it is even more often neglected. "I know just how these people think and feel" should be classed among "famous last words" of administrators.

The more formal and informal channels the administration sets up for the flow of complaints, observations and recommendations from the people the better. These are inherent in elective forms of self-government, but the process should not be limited to political mechanisms. Other techniques such as prizes for suggestions, boxes where anonymous complaints may be deposited and a number of agencies where people may come to discuss their problems without fear of reprisal should be instituted. Such measures not only serve to keep the administration aware of what is going on, but they also provide a means through which aggressions can be harmlessly discharged, whereby people can talk things out of their systems and whereby they can arrive at new perspective through a thorough airing of their feelings. The office of "Counselor" that has been created for workers in a number of large industries serves such purposes.

The direct flow of ideas from the people to the administration in one or another form, is not, however, sufficient. The people, while able to tell the administrators many things of value, do not know the whole story and frequently have far from adequate perspective concerning what they do perceive.

There is thus a gap in the total knowledge and insight of both people and administration—a gap which involves a broad view and interpretation of constantly changing com-

plex relationships between people and their needs, stresses, beliefs and social organization. Such knowledge is required not only for retrospective understanding but also for the active tackling of current problems. The modern developments in applied social science show some promise of being able to fulfill these requirements.

The greatest promise, however, for men and their government, in stress and out of it, is in a fusion of administration and science to form a common body of thought and action which is not only realistic in the immediate sense of dealing with everyday needs, but also in the ultimate sense of moving forward in discovery and improved practice. This requires more than hiring social scientists to make reports. It requires an administration with a scientific philosophy which employs as its frame of reference our culture's accumulated knowledge regarding the nature of man and his society. Such an administration would have stated principles of operation thoroughly familiar to all its members and generally available for others to see. These principles would, however, be subject to revision on the basis of systematic and critical observation in which the members of the administration participated. Thus, hypotheses and supposed constants would be tested as in natural history by multiple, careful observations. The administration would be geared, not to exploitive or irresponsible experimentation, but to utilizing to the full the experiments constantly being performed by nature—by changing circumstances and the actions in relation to them which have to be taken.

This may seem visionary, and yet such a union exists to some extent between science and practice in other spheres of human activity. In medicine, for example, there is a scientific philosophy and a body of accumulated knowledge, and in addition, a set of principles which are continually receiving accumulations and modifications as a result of experience and practice. This does not mean, of course, to mini-

mize the role of laboratory and controlled experiment in medical advance, but only to emphasize that clinical practice itself when carefully observed, recorded and analyzed is also a tremendous force for progress. Closely related to clinical practice is the autopsy which the physician approaches, not to justify his diagnosis, but to learn how things really were and to improve his judgment.

It may be argued that administration cannot afford to be scientific because of the pressure it is usually under from the urgings or attacks of well meaning enthusiasts, vested interests and political forces. Granting this to be a serious problem because of the emotions and conflicting, often hidden, motives that suffuse social issues, one may still insist that narrow expediency and secretiveness do not seem to be very effective means for solution, even temporarily.

No administration can avoid some errors and none can avoid misrepresentation. Truth, on the other hand, makes an exceedingly strong appeal for fair judgment. There is more hope for progress if the fear of leaving a mistake on the record is replaced by the desire to record improvement.

However, it is evident that the responsibility for such a development rests as much with the public as with the administrators, because in the long run it is the governed who determine the governing of men.

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APPENDIX

APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY IN A DISLOCATED COMMUNITY

Lt. Comdr. Alexander H. Leighton,
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AND
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HISTORY OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

DURING the years that John Collier was Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he utilized the assistance of cultural anthropologists and other social scientists as technical aides to administration and has found their contribution of value. Consequently, in March 1942, when the Office of Indian Affairs became responsible for the management of Poston, a Japanese Relocation Center in the Colorado River Valley on Indian land, he at once began making preparations for the establishment of scientific analysis as an integral part of the project. As a result, Leighton, a psychiatrist who had some previous experience in studying Navaho and Eskimo communities, was detailed from the Navy to take charge of the research, and he arrived at Poston on June 26, 1942. After a preliminary survey of the Center, and several consultations with Collier, the aims and functions of the research project were defined and recorded. They may be summarized as follows:

1. To aid the administration by analyzing the attitudes of the evacuees with particular reference to their responses to administrative acts and to draw practical conclusions as to what worked well, what did not work so well and why.

2. To gather data of a general character that might be of value in the administration of dislocated communities in occupied areas.

A few months later, a third aim was added:

3. To train field workers of Japanese ancestry in social analysis so that they could be helpful in occupied areas of the Pacific, during or after the war.

On August 1, 1942, Spicer, an anthropologist with experience analyzing Yaqui communities, joined the research work as Leighton's assistant. About the same time, through the Society for Applied Anthropology, Collier secured the temporary services of Conrad M. Arensberg, associate professor of sociology and anthropology at Brooklyn College, who aided Leighton and Spicer for most of August in a preliminary analysis of the community, the definition of the research problems and the selection of methods. Arensberg brought to bear the results of his experience with community studies in Ireland and with applied anthropology in industry. Laura Thompson also acted as a consultant on a number of occasions and contributed suggestions based on her work in communities in the Pacific. In November, Elizabeth Colson, M.A. in anthropology from Radcliffe, with field experience among the Pomo and Makah Indians, joined the staff as a permanent member.

Through 1942 Poston was the only Relocation Center to have social scientific observation and analysis allied to its administration and as has been noted, this was due to Indian Service experience.[1]

1 The War Relocation Authority determined general policy for all ten Relocation

However, within the War Relocation Authority organization there was arising a movement in the same direction. One important influence was the Chief of Community Services, John H. Provinse who as both anthropologist and administrator had had many years of experience with applied social science in the soil conservation program of the Department of Agriculture. For some time he had been maturing ideas relative to developing an organized department of social analysis as an adjunct to administration, and he was interested in the course Collier took in regard to scientific work at Poston. In August 1942, Robert Redfield, Dean, Division of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago, acting as a consultant to the War Relocation Authority, wrote a memorandum proposing a plan for utilizing social analysis in the administrative program. About the same time, John Embree, an anthropologist with extensive experience among the Japanese in Hawaii and in Japan, came as archivist to the reports division of the War Relocation Authority and in conjunction with Provinse gradually brought to the attention of other members of the staff the possibilities in applied social science.[2]

In November and December, a number of things occurred which resulted in the full establishment of applied anthropology in the War Relocation Authority's administrative organization. Arensberg turned in a report analyzing the management problems of Poston which was rather widely circulated among the top officials of the War Relocation Authority in Washington.[3] In the major strike which occurred at Poston, our research project played a part in its control and settlement and was able to give by telephone a brief account of the factors involved to the Indian Office in Washington. Later we followed this with an analytical report which was transmitted to the War Relocation Authority. Several weeks after the Poston strike, a similar episode occurred at the Manzanar Relocation Center, but in this case there were no trained observers on the spot, the mode of settlement was different and the immediate results less satisfactory.

Drawing on these events and their own experiences, Provinse and Embree were able to establish the usefulness of applied anthropology, and Embree was requested to organize a department. In January, he visited Poston and asked for our collaboration in building his program. Information concerning our methods and materials were made available to him, and Spicer was loaned for a period of five weeks in which he made a survey of another Center and helped prepare the way for the establishment of social analysis there. In the

Centers and directly administered nine. The Indian Service administered the remaining one, Poston, but did so under the general policies.

2 Embree, John, "Community Analysis—An Example of Anthropology in Government," *American Anthropologist*, XLVI, 1944, 277.

3 Arensberg, Conrad M., "Report on a Developing Community, Poston, Arizona," *Applied Anthropology*, II, 1942, 2.

meantime, working in Washington and in the field, Embree aided by Frank Sweetser organized and put into operation the Community Analysis Section.

In September 1943, we terminated our field work and Leighton began a period of analysis and preparing reports directed at fulfilling the second of the general aims with which the project was started. Subsequent field work at Poston became a part of the War Relocation Authority's Community Analysis Section, and Spicer went to Washington to become acting Senior Community Analyst on the resignation of Embree to teach in the Civil Affairs Military Training School in Chicago and Frank Sweetser to accept a commission in the Navy.

ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH UNIT

LIKE the other Relocation Centers set up to house the evacuated Japanese, the Poston Center took form slowly as an organized community. During the first months the Administrative framework was nebulous and the functions of individuals within it were little related to the Civil Service titles which they held. The Reports Officer, for example, spent a large amount of time organizing the process of ushering evacuees from the busses in which they arrived to the newly built barracks. The Director of Adult Education spent his time as housing administrator. The efforts of all were bent toward the urgent, inescapable problems of caring for the physical needs of the up-rooted people. Lines of authority had little relation to the organization charts posted in the offices, and functions of individuals were constantly changing. The place of research within the administrative framework, its organization as a working unit, and its relations to the community of evacuees evolved slowly during the course of the year.

It was originally planned to include three assistants to Leighton, an anthropologist, a sociologist, and a psychologist, but there was difficulty in securing this personnel. At the end of five months the three assistants secured were all anthropologists. One of these, an evacuee, left the staff about this time, and the research unit continued to function with the two anthropologist assistants, Spicer and Colson.

It was early decided to include as an important part of the work, the training of an evacuee staff. This influenced greatly the total plan of work and the kind of personnel participating in the research. It led to the securing of young persons who were interested in training in social science. The time required for teaching the courses reduced by so much the time that we could devote to widening and deepening our contacts with the community. In this aspect of the work, therefore, we were geared less to an immediate contribution

to the administration of the project and more to: (1) rehabilitation of evacuees, (2) utilization of the situation to contribute to occupied area work, and (3) long-term planning of a research base in the project.

THE RESEARCH STAFF

THE advantages in evacuee aides were that they could penetrate the community in a manner impossible for us because of physical appearance, cultural differences, and our relationship to the Administration. Furthermore, the aides permitted the establishment of systematic methods of observation, recording, and analysis which, once set up, could function of themselves without our close supervision.

Staff members were acquired gradually and there were some changes from time to time. However, after three months, an essentially stable core was in existence and remained so for the rest of the time we were in the field. It consisted of nine field workers, two secretaries, four typists, an artist, a draftsman, and a teacher of Japanese who functioned both as instructor and as translator. There were also a number of high school students who gave faithful service as part-time workers and there were at various times many persons who voluntarily contributed much of their energy to the studies.

The staff was heavily weighted on the side of college-graduate or undergraduate American-born Japanese because we attempted to secure persons with some previous acquaintance with social science. Another feature contributing bias was the fact that of the field workers only two were women. However, in spite of these factors, the group as a whole represented rather widely different natural contacts in different parts of the camp and in such different groups as urban and rural, Christian and Buddhist. Four out of the nine field workers spoke Japanese fluently. A consistent and partially successful effort was made to compensate for the college-student bias by making the staff aware of it. In addition Leighton and Spicer carried out field work in which contacts were sought with alien Japanese and with American-born Japanese educated in Japan.

A group of young persons signed up for research and equipped with paper, typewriters and pencils, did not, of course, constitute a research organization. The members came impelled by many different motives, in many different states of mind, and as already said, from many different backgrounds. Only the secretaries and typists had sufficient training to be immediately qualified for their duties. However, they and all the other members were in the midst of the upheaval of evacuation and were no more immune to its disturbing effects than were the other residents of the Center. Therefore, both the need for sound work and our respect for and desire to help people in a difficult situation made it clear that we must do

for this little group what the Administration was trying to accomplish for all 18,000 evacuees. That is to say:

1. Create a sense of purpose and an opportunity for personal achievement that would make the work absorbing and rewarding beyond consideration of the $16 a month they received as salary.

2. Encourage the development of forms of working and other social relationships among all the members of the department so that each would feel identified with it, a coordinated part of it and able to get out of it satisfactions that arose from performance of work, from fellowship and to some extent from recreation.

3. Develop a sense of confidence in the leadership of the research department.

4. Promote adjustment to Relocation Center life by an opportunity for greater understanding and an opportunity to participate usefully.

These aims were in a large measure based on a working concept of morale formulated by Leighton some time previously.

"Morale is the capacity of a group of people to pull together persistently and consistently in a common purpose. The factors most concerned in its production and maintenance are: (1) Faith in the common purpose; (2) Faith in each other; (3) Faith in the leadership; (4) Adequate health and a balance of work, rest and recreation." [4]

There is no need to present all the plans and acts whereby these general aims were put into particular effect, but a few instances may be given.

The teaching program was instituted and organized for the field workers somewhat along the lines of a group carrying out clinical studies, but with the community rather than patients being the subject of study. Regular lectures were given, field work was supervised in personal consultations with Spicer, Colson, or Leighton, and twice a week staff meetings were held partly to give direction to the work and partly for discussion and exchange of ideas. The meetings were also an opportunity to "feel the pulse" of the community as it was registered currently by the staff, coming as they did from different blocks and other social groups. All members, including the secretaries, were encouraged to contribute, and their suggestions were considered by the group as a whole and often adopted. The emphasis was on discussion and agreement, and Leighton and Spicer tried to contribute leadership as persons with wider knowledge and experience in the kind of work that had to be done, rather than as employers giving orders. The employer type of relationship between evacuees and government personnel was extremely weak in the Center for many different reasons not the least of which was the low

[4] Leighton, A. H., "A Working Concept of Morale for Flight Surgeons," *Military Surgeon*, XCII, 1943, 601.

wage. We tried to lay information before our staff members, to propose problems and to allow them to make selection, but then we held them responsible for results and tried to develop in each one spontaneity coordinated by general aims and integrated with the work of other members.

Through the courtesy of Dean Redfield, arrangements were made whereby the field workers who completed their courses received credits as students-at-large from the University of Chicago. This connection not only gave the field workers something that had specific value for them as individuals, but also increased the standing of the research project in the community and gave a sense that it had some recognition outside the Center.

A few parties, picnics and other forms of group recreation served to build feelings of mutual enjoyment and pleasure in the project.

During the early days when organization of the research project was weak or non-existent and while the individual members had not yet found their "sea legs," inquiry into complicated or sensitive problems was avoided, but gradually as it became apparent that the load could be borne, the work became more significant. This was possible in proportion to the development of interest, knowledge and training, the dropping out of persons maladjusted to the work or to other staff members, the realization of the aims and value of the research, and the adjustment to Center life.

Trips away from Poston taken by individual members and on two occasions by almost the entire group did much to improve feelings and to create more objectivity and efficiency in tackling the problems in the community.

WORKING RELATIONS WITH THE ADMINISTRATION

THE administrators who had been chosen for the responsibility of setting up and running the Poston Center had not asked for a research unit. Its inclusion was suggested from above in the Indian Service, although the Project Director readily concurred in it. When Leighton arrived to establish the unit, he found no plan worked out for placing it in the organization, nor did he find any crystallized ideas as to what his relations ought to be with the rest of the Administration. It was three months before the place of research in the administrative framework was formally established.

Leighton was an M.D. and his training was immediately turned to practical account in the health problems of the mushrooming community. During his first months on the Project he spent a considerable amount of time as Chief of the Public Health Department and, in the course of this, also laid the foundations for social analysis. He set up a special section of the Public Health Department and

called it "The Bureau of Sociological Research." The considerations which gave rise to this name were (1) that "sociological" was preferable to "anthropological" in that it would not give offense to evacuees who might associate the latter with studies of "primitive" people, and (2) the whole title seemed neutral enough not to give rise to serious misunderstanding as to function.

The name was not a good choice. The term Bureau turned out to have connotations of the FBI for some among the evacuees, and "sociological research" was for the administrative staff associated either with social welfare or with remote and "useless" activities of a "pure science" nature.

The Bureau of Sociological Research continued under that name during the rest of its existence. It was never wholly dissociated in the minds of the evacuee community from the Department of Public Health, for most of its staff continued to work in the hospital wing where it was first established.

The utilization of Leighton in public health work was indicative not only of the urgent need for operational personnel, but also of the initial attitude of the top administrators toward social analysis. They made further use of Leighton's special training by appointing him Acting Chief Medical Officer in charge of the hospital. When Spicer arrived there was also immediate pressure to put him into administrative work. The chronic emergency situation of these early days was one reason for desiring this use of the research workers, but it was also the considered opinion of the top administrators that actual experience in administrative responsibility would be a good foundation for research designed to assist the administrative program later. Although we agreed that there was something in this latter idea, we nevertheless insisted that it was essential to get started immediately on the systematic study of the community if the research were to have value for guidance in the multiplying administrative problems. It is doubtful if the administrators at this time believed that research had much to contribute, but they yielded and released Leighton from his hospital responsibilities as soon as he could be replaced.

During the third month the place of the Bureau of Sociological Research was formally established within the Project organization. Social analysis was conceived by us as having an over-all function, namely to advise the administration concerning community sentiments and social organization as they bore on any aspect of the administrative program. The Project Director had begun to recognize the over-all character of the research findings and with Leighton worked out a plan to set up the unit as a separate division with its head reporting directly to the Project Director. The unit thus ceased to be identified with any single branch of the Administration

and began to operate as a special advisory group to the Project Director's office.

The formal relations with the top administrators thus established were paralleled by the informal relations. Contacts through which knowledge of and points of view about the community could be passed on informally to the Project Director and his immediate associates were maintained through social life, as well as through the formal organization. Such contacts were not developed to any extent with the Engineering, Agriculture, and Fiscal and Personnel Divisions. On the other hand, relations with the staff of the Community Management Division and the Project Attorney's office were close and continuous throughout the year.

This placement of ourselves in relation to the other staff members had both advantages and disadvantages. We reaped the benefits of contact with the heart of the administrative thinking that determined policies and consequently we had that much more opportunity to bring the products of our work to bear on operations. However, by that same fact we created obstacles in our relations with other parts of the administrative organization. As in virtually all systems of society arranged in a hierarchy, there were certain sanctions governing communication between the different levels, and the closer one was to the top, the more he was isolated from levels further down. There were also cliques within the administration divided from each other on matters of internal policy, and by becoming identified with one group we automatically acquired a certain amount of hostility from others. To put the matter crudely, we had to work against being considered either "apple polishers," or "snoopers" for the top administration.

We strove to overcome the obstacles through personal contact with individuals, and through the fact that time proved we did not report on individuals or indulge in any maneuvers in the administration of a political character. Each of us attempted to move in rather different areas in the society of the administration so that even though we overlapped to some extent, between us we would cover most of the important cliques and associations and have friendly contacts in each. We were not as successful in this as we were in the same problem in the evacuee community, probably because we did stick closely to the top administrative group, not only in our working relations, but also in our recreation. However, in spite of this we did not run into any serious interference as far as collecting data was concerned. There were resistances, however, in some quarters which prevented the results of our work being sought and used as it might otherwise have been.

APPENDIX

THE POSITION OF THE RESEARCH UNIT IN THE COMMUNITY

FROM the point of view of operation, the position of the research department and its personnel in the community had the same two important aspects it had in regard to the Administration, one being concerned with gathering information, and the other being concerned with the transmission of the results of analysis to the places where it could be used.

Social analysis was something new and strange in the experience of most of the residents and, because of their psychological state, was ipso facto open to suspicion and hostility. This initial reaction was enhanced by finding out that a large part of our work consisted in some sort of investigation, which was immediately associated with intelligence work and the fear that what we gathered would be used against individuals. Leighton's naval uniform gave impetus to this idea. Then there was the general fact that we were associated with the Administration and like them liable to identification as a symbol of all the frustrations suffered by the residents and in consequence a target for hostilities arising from many sources. In time, there also came to be special problems arising out of jealousy of such things as the college courses, trips into seclusion for analysis and parties which were regarded as special privileges. To some extent they were special privileges, but those who were resentful lost sight of the fact that they had been earned.

The course we steered in these choppy seas had the following general characteristics: We avoided extensive publicity, yet tried to make it as plain as possible through talks and conversation to those who were aware of our activities and were critical of them just what it was we were trying to do A general impression that we were contributing to community welfare was furthered by the initial relations with the Health Department and by the fact that Leighton acted as psychiatric consultant to the hospital and for the Welfare Department. Most significant was getting to know the evacuee leaders who, our studies indicated, were influential persons in the community and making them acquainted with our aims and the nature of our work. Numbers of these became important contributors and as a consequence felt an interest in what we were doing as well as in our personal friendship and carried to their friends and followers the impression that we were at least harmless, and perhaps a source of help to the evacuees. In time both of us developed a circle of evacuee friends who liked to come and talk about community affairs, feeling apparently that we had some influence with the Administration, but that at the same time we were safe confidants. It was an opportunity for such persons to pour out their feelings to interested listeners without fear of consequences, and we thus

played a role somewhat analogous to the "counselors" in the Western Electric Company.[5]

In the beginning, we had hoped to lean rather heavily on actual contributions to community welfare that would be obvious. As part of this, we had expected to deliver reports and recommendations to the evacuee leaders in work programs and self-government in about the same manner as we did to the administrative personnel. On the whole, we failed in this, partly through lack of skill, partly through the disorganized state of the community and the difficulty of becoming active in practical issues without getting embroiled in conflicts between hostile factions.

However, we did contribute some talks on community matters and gave a little advice to community leaders who asked for it, though usually it was they who gave the advice. Spicer helped the Community Council in the preparation of organization charts and in other minor matters. The thing which probably did more than anything else to make the members of the community feel that we were an influence of a constructive sort was the reputation, considerably exaggerated, which we acquired after the strike for having brought about negotiation and for having kept the military out of the camp.

The net result was that although there was some hostility toward us and some suspicion of our being spies, it did not assume proportions that seriously interfered with our work or which involved us more heavily than many other departments. To most of the community we were unknown, or little thought of, and to those who did know us, we were considered honest and sympathetic, if somewhat obscure as far as usefulness was concerned. The mainstay of our existence in the community was the nature of the personal relationships which the different members as individuals had or established. When we were accepted as persons who were "all right," the nature of our work was presumed to be all right.

Since this was the basis of adjustment, it is important to note that it involved a matter of applying our own science to ourselves. It was manifestly impossible for us to know everybody in the community on a personal basis, and it was therefore necessary to make sure that among those who did know and accept us there was an adequate selection of leaders from all the different parts of the community's social organization. Through this, support for us spread in many different quarters and we avoided the weakness of having all our friends in one or a few areas in the society and consequently of being open to attack from other quarters.

[5] Roethlisberger, F. J. and Dickson, William J., *Management and the Worker*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939.

APPENDIX

CONCEPTS AND METHODS

THE state of chronic upheaval which existed during the first ten months of the Project was both a source of frustration and a source of invaluable insights into the community for the research workers. Each systematic program for mapping out the pre- and post-evacuation social organization of the evacuees was broken into by the need for following up some current crisis or event. But each crisis constituted a new revelation of the complex systems of sentiments at work in the group and of the nature of the social disorganization and of the social organization that was developing. It can be said that the ruling concepts with which we began the study of the community continued with little alteration to guide us throughout, but our field approach veered and shifted with the rapidly changing relations among the many different groups of people concerned.

We conceived the understanding of the community as being dependent upon knowledge of its patterns of sentiment and its social organization. We emphasized the inter-relationship of the two and sought to learn how individuals are influenced by them and how in turn the patterns of sentiment and social organization are modified by contributions from individuals.

As a result of psychiatric training under Adolf Meyer and later under John C. Whitehorn, and as a result of some field experience in which personality study was used as a means of research in communities, Leighton was largely preoccupied with sentiments, interpersonal relations, and intensive studies of sample personalities. After two weeks of general observation at the Center, he made the following notes for the research staff regarding the conceptual basis of the work to be done.

"The word 'sentiments' will be used by us in a special sense as a brief equivalent of opinions and attitudes. Sentiments are ideas or action tendencies charged with emotions and persistent like habits—they are partially cognitive, partially affective, and partially conative.

"Sentiments are important due to the degree in which they influence the way people respond to changes. When an event happens in a person's life requiring some response, that response depends in part on the person's intelligence, in part on the demands of the situation and very largely on the person's sentiments. A raise in salary causes A to celebrate. To some extent, this is because he knows he can now have more security in food and clothing and other pleasures of life, but even more because of a general sentiment that it is a good thing to have a raise.

"The same amount of raise causes B to have attacks of fear and anxiety because in spite of knowing that he can purchase more

security with more money, he has a sentiment of being entirely inadequate for coping with his increased responsibilities.

"Roethlisberger[6] diagrams this relationship somewhat after this fashion:


CHANGE ——— (SENTIMENT) ———→ RESPONSE

"From this it is evident that sentiments can produce responses which may or may not be appropriate to the circumstances.

"The sentiments shared by a social group are even more important than individual sentiments. They play a role in determining the ability of the group to adjust its own internal problems and to adjust its relationship to the rest of the world.

"The mechanism by which sentiments are acquired is probably not unconnected with the phenomenon of conditional reflexes that has been studied extensively in lower animals. Human responses certainly show some tendency to follow the laws of conditioning, reinforcement and extinction. In each individual, his sentiments arise as a result of his personal experiences in life—particularly during childhood and youth, the 'formative years.' They are modified, kept alive and reinforced by the type of relationship that exists between the individual and his fellows—the current social situation. Thus, when A on getting his raise has a sentiment that leads him to rejoice, it comes in part from A's previous experiences and in part from A's feeling that all his friends and family will admire or envy him. B, on the other hand, who fears the raise, has had unhappy experiences with responsibility and feels everybody will expect him to make a mess of things.

"These statements are, of course, gross over-simplifications of complex inter-relationships, but they give an idea of the general trends. Again following Roethlisberger, we may amplify the previous diagram.



"In any study of the dynamic relationships of a community, it is important to investigate carefully the prevailing sentiments. What is their nature? With what topics do they deal? What quantitative indicators can be devised? How well are the sentiments adjusted to the biological and other aspects of reality? How do they contribute

[6] Roethlisberger, F. J., *Management and Morale*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941.

and interfere with efficient and happy living? How can they be modified to produce improvements? From a knowledge of the sentiments, what predictions can be made about the response to a given change?

"Much data concerning the origin of sentiments should in time become available from the selected personality studies which are being carried out. In the meantime, the sentiments themselves should be carefully surveyed.

"A sentiment may be expressed in two ways—(a) by words, (b) by actions. Either of these is acceptable for recording in our notes. Opinions regarding sentiments and interpretations of actions are sentiments of the author and are also acceptable as part of these records provided they are clearly marked for what they are. In order to know how thorough and extensive our survey is, it is essential that the origin and context of each entry be clearly stated if known. If not known, an effort should be made to find out, and as a last resort, the entry made stating that origin and context are not known."

To amplify a little, the complex of sentiments regarding authority may be taken as an example. The kind of attitude a child develops toward his father—whether competitive, compliant, affectionate, rebellious or some combination of these—is likely to persist as an attitude toward other forms of authority he meets in later life. This does not mean that at the age of 30 he feels exactly the same toward his boss as he did toward his father when a child, but there is a genetic relationship between the two attitudes. The complex of sentiments regarding the boss is derived from the complex of sentiments regarding the father through the process of association, with the addition and substitution of particular sentiments as a result of later experience.

Similarly, for new forms of authority the man encounters still later in life, he will have sentiments derived from earlier experiences, but with the father complexes always making up a core. As the bulk grows, the total pattern of sentiments regarding authority figures will become less and less open to new additions that force major changes in his general point of view and habits, even though the character of the authority itself may be very different on different occasions. This is not to deny the physiological causes of rigidity of behavior with the advance in years, but merely to point out additional predisposing factors which arise in the nature of sentiments and the process of their acquisition. It is easier to furnish an empty house than one already filled.

The tendency of sentiments to persist makes their study useful because of the possibility of prediction within the limits imposed by available information and the complexity of each particular situation.

The role of the cognitive component in the formation and strength

of sentiments varies a good deal. It is possible to classify sentiments on this basis as logical, non-logical and irrational. Elton Mayo[7] considers the matter as follows:

"a. Logical. In this area [a man] . . . has developed skill and capacity for discrimination and independent judgment.

"b. Non-logical. . . . The individual's actions may be adequate to the situation but any intelligence they exhibit is socially and not personally derived. This form of response is the effect of training in a social code of behavior.

"c. Irrational. Non-logical response is typical of social adjustment. Irrational response, on the other hand, is symptomatic of social maladjustment. . . . Both types of response are rooted in individual unreason, but it is only the latter which technically interests the psychopathologist. . . .

". . . When a code or tradition, that has been sufficiently adequate to its material problems and to its social controls, is faced with a situation it cannot meet, the individuals of the group will turn from non-logical to irrational action."

In Part II of this book, the terms "Systems of Belief" are employed in an effort to convey in a few words much of what has been elaborated here. More narrowly defined, systems of belief are those sentiments which are socially shared and relatively resistant to change, but including, interconnected with and shading into a wide variety of other sentiments, complex and simple.

Spicer, with his training in social anthropology under Robert Redfield and Radcliffe-Brown, directed his attention toward determining the social organization of the community. He looked on society as made up of individuals who expect certain kinds of behavior of each other. Each individual knows from experience how others will behave toward him or has certain rules of thumb by which he can quickly predict to his own satisfaction how an individual with whom he has not had personal contact will behave. Every person in his daily life constantly makes use of certain categories for individuals which provide him with a guide for his own behavior and a basis of expectation concerning the behavior of others. Thus he is constantly making use of categories such as man, woman, mother, son, boss, friend, policeman, mayor, doctor, servant, and even New Yorker, Oklahoman, Japanese, etc. The recognition of standardized behaviors appropriate to individuals is the basis of all social organization. These behaviors in a long established community come to seem as inevitable as the contours of the land and all newcomers are quickly fitted to them or else new categories are established which in turn become standardized within the community. Each individual, no matter how many personal idiosyn-

[7] Mayo, Elton, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, The Macmillan Company, 1933, New York.

crasies he may have, such as a way of walking or an irreverence for the deities, conforms with a preponderant and essential set of standardized behaviors or else he cannot live in the community.

The process by which individuals conform is the application of sanctions by others in which, of course, patterns of sentiment play a leading part. People laugh at others—or they speak unfavorably of them, they refuse to work or eat or play with them, they put them in jail or they beat them up—if they do not conform in the essential minimum of ways of behaving. Every group within a society has its sanctions by means of which it "makes people behave" according to established custom.

The agreed-on behaviors and the sanctions by which they are imposed constitute the basic data for the understanding of any society. If we know these we are in a position to predict approximately how the people in the society will act from day to day in their usual routine of living and we also have some basis for predicting how they will act if new stimuli are injected into their routine.

The study of social organization in Poston was aimed at compiling a schedule of the standard behaviors recognized by the evacuees with especial emphasis on outlining patterns of leadership and followership and on defining the principal groups, cliques and social levels of which the community was composed. However, it was immediately apparent that the people of Poston were in a state of rapid transition. They had come from a condition of organized group life in California to a condition very different in which the old social organization was in process of almost daily change and new groupings were appearing from the moment of arrival. It was necessary to study simultaneously the old social organization as best we could through retrospective accounts of it and the tentative new social organization which we could observe directly in the Center. Thus we began to gather at the same time accounts of the former local communities in, for example, Orange County, California, and also to observe the growth of social relations in the new geographic unit of the block which to some extent cut across the old groupings. It became steadily apparent that social disorganization—the absence of agreed-on behaviors among individuals—was an outstanding feature of the transitional state in which the evacuees existed.

The transition in the social organization was determined by the physical features of life in the Center, by the social relations imposed by the Administration of the Project, and by the shift in the whole set of relations between the Japanese and the "Caucasian" majority. These factors in the dynamics of the social organization and disorganization were early recognized and the study of social structure formulated in terms of them.

On the basis of the general aims and the concepts outlined, the following questions were kept in mind.

1. What are the predominant sentiments in the community?
2. How well are these adjusted to the biological needs of the people and do they facilitate or interfere with the attainment of these needs?
3. How do the sentiments contribute to the satisfactory living of the people in relationship to each other and to the administration?
4. Which sentiments are most modifiable and which are most resistant? In what directions can modification be achieved most easily?
5. What are the principal groups of people in the community and how are they related to each other and to the total social organization?
6. What sentiments are characteristic of what groups?
7. On the basis of a knowledge of the social organization and the sentiments found in its different parts, what kinds of action may be expected from the community as a whole or from its principal parts?
8. To what extent is the administrative *program* realistically geared to what the community can do on the basis of its predominant sentiments and social organization?
9. To what extent are the *methods* used by the administration to achieve its program realistically geared to what the community can do on the basis of its predominant sentiments and its social organization?

COLLECTING DATA

METHODS of collecting data through staff activities and through our own field work were developed rather gropingly, but eventually took the form of five general approaches applied more or less simultaneously.[8]


1. General observation of what was happening and what was being said in all the parts of the community we could reach. Casual conversations were included in these recordings, but special emphasis was placed on meetings that were held concerning community problems, politics, religion and recreation.
2. Intensive interviews which consisted in prolonged and repeated discussion with certain representative individuals on topics relevant to ascertaining information about sentiments and social organization.
3. Records were collected, in whole or in part, from all available sources such as the census office, the employment division, welfare and schools.

8 Leighton, A. H. and associates, "Assessing Public Opinion in a Dislocated Community," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, VII, Winter 1943, 652.

4. Public opinion polls according to standard techniques were conducted during the latter part of our field work.[9]

5. Personality studies of a limited number of individuals with emphasis on life-stories, interpersonal relationships, mental and emotional make-up, and deeper patterns of sentiment were secured through interviews and a few psychological tests.

Our view of the data-gathering problem in the community may be represented schematically in the accompanying diagram.



A indicates the amount of data gathered per individual, increasing toward the top, while B indicates the number of persons concerning whom it is possible to gather data, increasing toward the right. Thus there is a continuum from studies of one individual to studies of the entire community, with the amount of material that it is possible to gather inversely related to the number of individuals concerned. Personality studies would come at the upper apex of the triangle (X) representing considerable material about a few individuals, while census records, containing as they did some facts on everybody, would be at the bottom (Y). Between these two extremes come the other forms of data gathering.

What the diagram helps to make clear is that any type of material is rendered much more valuable by correlation with other types than when considered by itself. For example, a personality study might reveal sentiments of considerable significance in understanding a particular Japanese American tuna fisherman, but whether or not these were important among tuna fishermen generally could be found only by some sort of sampling through interview or observation; and whether or not tuna fishermen are significant in the total community would involve some reference to census records. Conversely, the "deeper" meaning of sentiments discovered through polling techniques might very well be much illuminated by personality studies on a few individuals.

[9] We are greatly indebted to Harry H. Field, director of the National Opinion Research Center and to the members of his staff for training two of our field workers, Toshio Yatsushiro and Iwao Ishino, in public opinion polling methods and for supervising their subsequent surveys.

Consequently, we determined to obtain as much material as possible from the total area represented in the triangular figure and to avoid viewing the community narrowly through one technique limited to one level of data sampling.


With the realization of the importance of breadth, there was at the same time the need to avoid becoming so all-inclusive as to be inconclusive. The aims of the research which have been mentioned limited the manner in which the total area in the triangle would be used. We were not trying to acquire *all the facts* about everything but to approach our particular problems in such a way that we would gather all the facts pertinent to our problems from *all sources*. Of course, we did not succeed in this, but it was a goal, the striving for which sharpened rather than muddled our work.

THE ORGANIZATION OF DATA

After establishing channels through which information might be taken in from the field, the next step was the storing of that material in a manner that would make it as systematic and as available as possible without imposing more artificial categorizing than was essential. For this purpose a journal was established to which members of the staff contributed their observations in chronological order. The journal was, in effect, a field notebook, kept by the entire staff, rather than by one individual. For a schematic representation, prepared in July 1942, for the guidance of the field workers, see Chart I.


The personality studies constituted a second system of organizing data. A folder was kept on each of certain selected individuals into which went data from all the sources indicated in Chart II. From time to time the miscellaneous material so gathered was

Chart I. The Field



APPENDIX

Chart II. The Field




analyzed and interpreted according to a system developed from psychiatric methods of studying individuals.[10]

In actual practice, the personality studies were developed very slowly because of uneasiness on the part of residents in regard to any fact-finding about individuals, and our desire to avoid becoming identified with intelligence work. It was not until the spring of 1943 that we began to acquire a body of data that had much significance.

A third type of organization dealt in surveys on particular problems, such as food, family adjustment, the reactions to a severe storm and other matters. Data of this type were kept together in folders under the heading of the subject of the survey.

Chart III shows how it was intended to integrate the three different storehouses of material for a better understanding of the community's sentiments. It was planned to analyze these sentiments

Chart III



for their significance and distribution and controlling factors. To some extent this was done all through the year, but because of preoccupation with the surveys and other matters that at the moment seemed more pressing and because of the time required to train the staff so that they would be able to carry out such analysis, a really systematic attack on the problem was not made until after we left the field. This is to be regretted, and we believe that had we continued with our work in the Center for a second year we would have been able to establish a system whereby major sentiment changes

10 A monograph on this method as employed in a Navaho community by Alexander H. Leighton and Dorothea C. Leighton is to be published soon by the Peabody Museum of Harvard University.

week by week could be mapped and some approximate interpretations given.

As the staff expanded and became organized, and the amount of material they obtained increased and its general nature became more obvious and the natural divisions apparent, the character of the sociological journal gradually changed and finally was completely reorganized. Folders were kept on topics of significance in the community such as City Management, Community Enterprises, Education, Health, Religion, studies of individual blocks and so on. These, combined with the survey folders, were organized according to a number system in such a manner that any folder could be reclassified into several subdivision folders, or new folders added without upsetting the system. All subjects were cross-referenced with each other through the use of cards. Thus, it became possible to look up a topic in its folder, then through the cross-references to find almost all other references to that same subject scattered through different folders or in the journal.

The original sociological journal became a sort of miscellany after the filing system was established.

Aside from what went into the files and the sociological journal, each staff member was encouraged to keep a personal journal which he discussed privately with one of us, or kept to himself as he wished, but which formed a basis over a period of time for some of his generalizations about the community and from which he eventually contributed to the files. This was found necessary because in practice the journal shared commonly became limited by the sanctions of the group itself and material of value was omitted that might otherwise have been recorded. The keeping of a journal that was absolutely private and personal enabled the field worker to put things down as he saw and felt them and then decide later about how and when to contribute them. This matter was of more importance in our work than it might be in some community studies, because our staff members were themselves part of the community. In many cases this policy resulted in field workers making private notes on things that had high emotional significance and then months afterward, when the matter had cooled off, contributing these observations to the general file. Had personal journals not been encouraged, only a retrospective account would have been obtainable. It should be noted, however, that the tendency to hold back decreased progressively as the spirit of the group increased and they became more clear as to what it was they were doing, how the material would be used, and aware of the reality of ethical consideration for confidence.

Another matter which developed the confidence of those who contributed data was the Project Director's statement that no one, including himself, had access to our files and that no material which we collected would ever be used against any individual.

This protection was further reinforced by an understanding with

the Indian Service that only the reports and general conclusions were to be considered government property and that the disposition of the raw field notes on which these were based was a matter to be decided between Leighton, Spicer and the field workers, though it was understood that eventually the data would be given to some institution of research and learning.

The research department's policies were set forth on August 15, 1942, as follows:

"1. All confidential material must be safely guarded and prevented from falling into the hands of persons who might misuse it for personal gain or to harm others.

"2. The files are our own and no other division or branch has authority over them.

"3. No data relative to subversive activities will be kept in our files.

"4. Individual members of the Bureau of Sociological Research will refrain from divulging any of the material that they collect or that they learn from other workers. They will not express publicly individual opinion on any subject when such opinion is based on data in the Bureau.

"5. From time to time the Bureau will give out statements of opinion and fact, but these must come only from the Head of the Bureau or someone acting in his place. As a rule those statements will be carefully discussed by the entire group and a general agreement reached. No name will be attached to the statements other than that of the Bureau.

"6. All requests from outside persons for information should be referred to the Head of the Bureau.

"7. In giving statements, the Bureau must attempt to avoid getting involved in controversy, or taking sides. Above all, it must refrain from any attempt to propagandize or maintain the correctness of its own stand.

"8. The Bureau must avoid becoming a competitor with any group or persons in any issue whatever. It must not take pride in the acceptance of its suggestions. The point for attention is whether or not in the long run the suggestions turn out to be correct, not whether or not they are accepted."

Item 4 operated to prevent members of the research staff holding political or administrative jobs in the community or even participating as leaders in community issues. This served to avoid temptations to permit the leaking of confidential information and to avoid having the research group become identified as followers of any particular reform movement or banner with all the attendant possibilities of acquiring strong bias. While serving its purpose the policy probably also resulted in losing the services and knowledge of some very able but aggressive individuals who wanted to be in action in community affairs.

Because of the way the community developed, with each block becoming a sort of village unit in a larger community, the block studies combined with personality and family studies gradually increased in significance and in the attention given to compiling data concerning them.

Leighton and Spicer found that making monthly and weekly reports on events, trends, and sentiments in the community greatly sharpened their perceptions and served as a means of pulling together otherwise scattered material. The monthly reports were usually read to the staff for their comments and suggestions, while the less carefully worked out weekly reports were for the most part kept merely as a record of our current opinions, and a means of reviewing the direction of changes.

RESULTS

THE results may be summarized under four general headings as: the creation of a research team that would have value in war and postwar activities, contributions to the general problem of administering dislocated people, the compilation of scientific data of some permanent value, and contributions to the immediate needs of the Center Administration.

The core of the research team developed in the Center became the nucleus of a unit in the Office of War Information and now works on problems related to Japan.

The scientific data accumulated and maintained for future use consists in files on a number of topics of which the following are the most significant: studies of individual personalities, studies of individual blocks, the Center Administration, self-government, Block Managers, food, housing, health, welfare, labor and work projects, Community Enterprises, the cooperative movement, clubs and associations, religions and religious activities, and family life. In addition there are a number of completed and partially completed surveys focused on topics that were of particular interest, such as the reasons why people did or did not wish to leave the Center when they had opportunity to do so.

As far as contributions to the general problem of administering dislocated peoples is concerned, the present book is the principal effort.

Other publications are:

1. "The Japanese Family in America," The Bureau of Sociological Research of the Colorado River War Relocation Center. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 229, September 1943.
2. "The Psychiatric Approach in Problems of Community Management," The Sociological Research Project of the Colorado River

War Relocation Center. *The American Journal of Psychiatry*, Vol. 100, No. 3, November 1943.

3. "Assessing Public Opinion in a Dislocated Community," Lt. A. H. Leighton and associates, *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 7, pp. 652-668.
4. "The Japanese American Looks at Resettlement," Toshio Yatsushiro, Iwao Ishino, and Yoshiharu Matsumoto, *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 8, pp. 188-201.

In the matter of contributions to the immediate needs of the Center Administration, some description and comment is appropriate.

The effectiveness of research as an aid to the administrative program depended on the one hand on the accuracy of our observation and analysis and on the other on the extent to which our findings could be injected into policy making. We ourselves, of course, attempted to subject our work to the standards of the social disciplines in regard to evaluation of samples and objectivity in collecting data. However, the standard applied by the administrators was different and consisted mainly in feeling whether or not our suggestions aided immediately in the solution of current difficulties. Thus the accuracy of our work remained a question with which we wrestled ourselves.

The real problem of application was that of discovering means of presenting whatever we found in such a way that it would be utilized. To the administrators our data remained, as it properly should, merely one element in the total situation to be dealt with. We emphasized the need for considering the actual feelings and attitudes of the evacuees in all policy decisions and procedure making. Since we constituted one source of information on such matters, sometimes our information was acted on and sometimes it was not. We early came to realize that whether or not it was acted on depended not on whether it measured up to our standards of accuracy but rather on the circumstances under which it was presented to those in a position to act.

Our first idea of presentation was to dig out facts concerning evacuee reactions, with summary reports, and lay these on the Project Director's desk. Thus during the first month a careful report was prepared on the anxieties which a destructive wind and dust storm had caused among the residents and some suggestions were included as to how some of these anxieties could be allayed. Similarly an extensive report on reactions to food served in the mess halls was prepared and focused on the importance of food dissatisfactions and anxieties in evacuee adjustment to the new life.

These reports were not regarded as very helpful by the administrators. They were characterized as interesting but were not really absorbed or acted on. Although the reports were concerned with

immediate and current problems, they were not cast in a form with which the administrators were familiar.

Another approach consisted in a series of monthly reports in which Leighton summarized one or two major trends in community sentiments and organization during the current month. Running to no more than ten pages, these were analyses of events that had already happened and therefore did not influence decisions in regard to the particular events described. But a selection of material was made which emphasized the long-term, never-fully-solved problems of administering the Center. For example, the first of these reports pointed out the emergence of the block as the fundamental social unit and the implications of this for incentive to work and community morale. The second analyzed the general strike as an example of the appearance of effective community leadership for the first time and the basis of that leadership. Another pointed up the elements in the social organization hindering good communication between administrators and evacuees and among evacuees. Each report contained recommendations or suggestions for dealing with the problem described. Few of these were acted upon by the local administration, or even read except by one or two of the top staff. However, they were approved and forwarded to the central offices of the Indian Service and the War Relocation Authority in Washington where they were found useful because they contributed information covering what was happening in the Center. Such influence as they had consisted in broadening and deepening the picture various officials had of what was happening in the Center, an intangible though useful contribution. They did not serve as a specific and definite basis for action.

We found before long that information and points of view which were influencing the administrators were in the form of off-the-cuff statements in conversation and informal conference among the top staff. There was no time for the latter to sit down with a stream of reports, digest them, and formulate ideas and decisions in their light, nor had they ever had experience and training in understanding such material.

Realization of this moved us to a totally different approach. Leighton worked out a plan for establishing his relations with the top staff, which consisted essentially in assuring a place for himself in the meetings during which they formulated policy. We thus became aware of what would seem to be a basic principle in the application of social science to a fast-moving administrative program, namely, that the research staff have direct access to the policy-makers and participation in policy meetings. This does not mean responsibility in operations: it means that there be a constantly open channel from the research work to the top group in the administration who make policy from day to day.

What this meant at Poston was that Leighton participated in the almost daily give and take of planning and decision and in the course of this injected orally fragments of fact and opinion and ultimately a general point of view based on the understanding of the community which he was gaining from systematic study by the research unit.

This sort of utilization of the research material became thoroughly established at the time of the most extreme crisis of the year—the general strike in November 1942. We were called in and given every opportunity to express ideas and suggest actions as to how to resolve the situation. Our view of the community was presented, not in systematic descriptive fashion, but by implication in our specific suggestions as to what administration should do as the crisis developed to a climax. The result was an influence in the settlement which in turn affected basic policy for the future of the Project. From that time on we were regularly called on and given a voice in policy-making, whether in minor crisis situations or in the general course of administration. Suggestions that worked, rather than carefully documented systematic data, had made a place for research in the administration of the Project.

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