TEXT IS FLY WITHIN

THE BOOK ONLY

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_156296

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 201 W36p Accession No. 54

Author Webb, Clement, C.J

Title Problems in the

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

First published 1911
Reprinted 1915
,, 1924

Printed in Great Britain

TO MY WIFE

Ecce quomodo sibi admirabili commercio divina et humana sociantur.—FAUSTUS REIENSIS.

PREFACE

IN the year 1910 I was appointed by the Delegates of the Common Fund of the University of Oxford to deliver during the academical year next ensuing a course of eight lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. These lectures, which were accordingly given in the Hilary Term of 1911, dealt with three antitheses: those of Reason and Revelation, of Nature and Grace, of Man and God. It is the substance of these lectures which is here offered to the reader. This account of the origin of my book must serve as an apology for the fact that the presuppositions of the enquiry receive such scanty treatment, and that with many questions which will certainly suggest themselves to the mind of any one who follows the course of the discussion, there is no attempt to deal thoroughly. No one can be more conscious than myself of the inadequacy of the equipment with which I have ventured to make public my thoughts, such as they are, on a subject at once so difficult and so august. I can only plead in my excuse that I have often lamented the reluctance of men who have been my chief teachers in philosophy to put the results of their

thinking into print, and have thought myself bound to practise what I have preached. The special theme which I have chosen makes my temerity illustrate only the more aptly the lines of Pope:

> "Nay, fly to altars; there they'll talk you dead,
> For fools rush in where angels fear to tread."

My warmest thanks are due to my friend the Rev. H. H. Williams of Hertford College for his kindness in reading the proofs of this book.

Oxford, 1911.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY . . . . . pp. 1–17

Religion neither needs nor admits of definition (pp. 1–6). Analogy of Beauty (pp. 6–10). Defence of the special attention paid in these Lectures to Christian theology; and of the comparative neglect in them of the researches of anthropologists into the origins of religion, and also of those of psychologists into the phenomena of religious experience (pp. 10–16). Three antitheses to be discussed (pp. 16, 17).

PART I

REASON AND REVELATION

I. THE ANTITHESIS OF REASON AND REVELATION pp. 21–48

Reason and Revelation not to be regarded as independent sources of religious truth; but rather as correlative, as subject and object in the same process; so that Revelation is the truth in the sphere of Religion and Reason in that sphere the apprehension of it (pp. 21–27). This position supported by a consideration of the relation of subject and object in the spheres of ordinary perception, of natural science, of the apprehension of the beautiful in nature and art, of personal intercourse, of religion (pp. 27–38). In the sphere of Religion the attitude of subjective idealism is more obviously unsatisfactory than elsewhere (pp. 38–48).

II. NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION . . pp. 49–63

The traditional distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion described and discussed (pp. 49–52). In view of modern knowledge it is more difficult than formerly to draw the line between Natural Religion as the common element in all religions and Revealed Religion as the special element in one (pp. 52–55). Two distinctions to which the phraseology of the old distinction is not inappropriate: (1) that of the manifestation of God in nature from his manifestation in the human spirit; (2) that of the philosophical content of Religion from its historical setting (pp. 55–63).

III. Religion and Religions: Rationalism and Sentimentalism . . . . . pp. 64–84

(1) *Religion and Religions.* The peculiarities of particular Religions are not unimportant to the philosophical student of Religion; nor is the recognition of an evolutionary process embracing all Religions inconsistent with the recognition of the superiority of some Religions to others or even of one to all the rest (pp. 64–68).

(2) *Rationalism and Sentimentalism. Rationalism* which rejects what is most characteristic in Religion as not rational, provokes as a reaction *Sentimentalism* which treats Religion as belonging to the sphere of Feeling and not of Reason at all (pp. 68–72). Both alike rest on the refusal to Reason of its rights in Religion (pp. 72–75). The nature of *Intuition* and its place in religious experience (75–84).

PART II

NATURE AND GRACE

IV. The Antithesis of Nature and Grace . pp. 87–103

History of the conception of Grace (pp. 87–92). Kant's discussion of it. He eliminates Grace from Religion as inconsistent with moral Freedom (pp. 92–103).

V. Grace, Freedom, Morality, and Original Sin . . . . . pp. 104–135

The antinomy directly suggested by religious experience is not that between God's foreknowledge and man's free will, but that between *responsibility* and *merit* (pp. 104–108). The attempt (suggested by the affinity between the Pauline doctrine of predestination and the determinism of Spinoza) to represent Religion as ridding itself of the problem of Freedom by the substitution of willing acquiesence in the inevitable for a real choice between alternatives, proves unsuccessful (pp. 108–109). Unsatisfactoriness of Spinoza's proof that the natural consciousness of Freedom is illusory (pp. 109–114). Religion, like determinism, does not seek the ground of individual conduct wholly within the individual life, yet does not obliterate the distinction between acts for which we are and acts for which we are not responsible. Grace as a spiritual environment of the soul consisting of

social and personal influences making for good. There must be a counterpart to this consisting of social and personal influences making for evil. This does not exactly correspond to what is meant by Original Sin, the importance of which Kant reasserted (in principle) while denying that of Grace (pp. 114–127). Original Sin the counterpart not of Grace but of the 'Image of God' in man. It stands for the solicitations of the lower nature, conceived of proleptically as sin, of which they constitute the potentiality, described from the point of view of one who has already turned away from evil to God (pp. 127–129). *Freedom* as lower than *Grace* and higher than *Nature*. Assimilation of Grace to Nature, as alike *given*, both in Naturalism and in degenerate doctrines of Grace (whether predestinating or sacramental) (pp. 130–132). *Grace*, *Freedom*, and *Nature* as differences within a unity, but as differences still. Recapitulation (pp. 132–135).

PART III

MAN AND GOD

VI. The Conception of God . . . . pp. 139–188

The religious consciousness sufficient evidence of the existence of its object (139–143). The demand for a proof of the existence of God not the demand for a proof that there is an object of religious experience, but the expression of a doubt whether what we have been accustomed to call God is God at all; and, in the last resort, whether the ultimate nature of Reality, if known as it really is, would still excite the sentiment of reverence (pp. 143, 144). The great question not *whether God exists* but *what God is* (p. 145). Dr. McTaggart's objection that by God is commonly meant another finite person beside ourselves, more powerful and better than we, whom we can imagine to exist, but whose real existence is quite problematical (pp. 145, 146). Our attitude towards God as knowing our hearts is inconsistent with thus regarding him as just another finite person; nor is he so regarded in the historical religions; the conception of God most nearly corresponding to Dr. McTaggart's is the Epicurean (146–154). The traditional arguments for the existence of God do not prove or aim at proving the existence of a problematical finite being (pp. 154, 155); but the necessity of recognizing an Absolute (pp. 155–159).

NOTE ON THE PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AND ON KANT'S CRITICISM OF THEM

The Physico-theological Argument or *Argument from Design* (which does not stand or fall with Paley's way of stating it, nor is disposed of by the theory of evolution) requires to be eked out with the *Cosmological Argument*, and this in its turn with the *Ontological Argument* (pp. 159–165). The Argument from Design may be called the plain man's argument, the Cosmological Argument the argument of ancient philosophy, and the Ontological Argument the argument of modern philosophy (pp. 165–173). The Ontological Argument not finally dismissed by Kant (pp. 173–187). It is the assertion of the fundamental nature of knowledge as knowledge of Reality and the acknowledgment that the recognition of the relativity of our knowledge involves the recognition of the presence to us or in us of an Absolute in the sense of a unity within which the relation of subject and object falls (p. 187). The consideration of the question whether 'the Absolute' is a synonym for God postponed (pp. 187, 188).

VII. THE EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF GOD . pp. 189–214

Defence of the method of seeking light on the nature of God from a survey of the different conceptions of deity entertained at different stages of the evolution of humanity (pp. 189–193). A beginning of religious belief in the recognition of *Mana* and of religious practice in the use of *Magic* (193–196). Magic as the germ both of Natural Science and of Religion. Natural Science, Metaphysics, and Theology only gradually differentiated from one another. Comte's law of the three stages describes the process from the point of view of Natural Science only (pp. 198–202). The primitive confused unity adumbrates an ultimate unity of the three, only to be reached through the differentiation which has broken up the primitive unity (pp. 203, 204). Man is always a social being, and finds himself in relation to God not as a mere individual, but as a member of a community (pp. 204, 205). The conception of God is developed *pari passu* with the development of the conception of a common good (pp. 205, 206). We find God conceived at first as a physical object because only under this form can Reality at that stage be conceived (p. 207). The idea of God developed from that of a physical object invested with *Mana* into that of a man

living on after death as the permanent centre of the community of his descendants (pp. 207, 208). The subsequent development of the idea illustrated from the religions of Israel and of Hellas. Jewish prophets and Greek philosophers. The latter in purifying Greek Religion did not develop the traditional religious usages and beliefs so much as rise out of them and above them. Greek philosophical theology thus came to be too far removed from the definitely religious needs of the unphilosophical, and so taught the world but could not save it (pp. 208–214).

VIII. The Personality of God . . . pp. 215–282

The belief in the divinity of a person, such as a savage chief or wizard, not what is meant by belief in a Personal God (p. 215). At this stage the conceptions of personality and of God are neither of them sufficiently developed to give occasion to the difficulties found in combining a belief in the Personality of God with a belief in his absoluteness or infinity (p. 216). But the thought that God is real, concrete, and individual is already involved in the attribution of divinity to a particular man (p. 217). This thought is lacking in Pantheism, although this may seem to be in some ways a higher form of Religion than belief in a God who stands as an individual person side by side with other individual persons (p. 218). Yet belief in the divinity of a particular individual person does not seem to meet the religious need generally implied in the demand for a Personal God, which is in fact the need of personal communion with God (p. 219). This need is not met by such beings as the Homeric gods ; nor by the God of Aristotle, the self-sufficingness of whose individuality excludes all other beings from intercourse with him ; and whose failure to be a Personal God, in the sense implied by a religious demand for personality in God, is due to the detachment of Aristotle's theology from the tradition which connects the divine directly with the social life of man (pp. 219–226). This detachment does not exist in Christianity (pp. 226, 227). Plato's doctrine of the identity of the structure of the State with that of the soul in its citizens compared with St. Paul's doctrine of the body of Christ, which views the social life of man as the expression of the divine life (pp. 228–230). The elaboration of this thought in the doctrine of the Trinity and the development of this doctrine itself under philosophical influences

into the attribution to God of a complete personality (pp. 231–236). In the doctrine as so developed, as in the kindred speculations of the Neo-Platonists, there reappears a tendency to χωρισμός, of the kind charged by Aristotle upon Plato's theory of Ideas; by which the life of the Church and its members tends to fall outside of the divine life (pp. 236–238). This is corrected according to Augustine by the specifically Christian doctrine of the Incarnation (p. 238). The same tendency, however, reappears in connexion with this doctrine also; and that in two forms, represented respectively by Docetism and Arianism (pp. 238, 239). Nor is the doctrine of the Incarnation peculiar to Christianity, although it assumes in Christianity a distinctive form, in which the thought which it embodies is worked out in a fuller manner than elsewhere, so as to leave neither suffering nor death altogether outside of the divine life (pp. 240–247). This thought expressed in the symbolism of the Eucharist, which has its roots in the oldest traditions of religious worship (pp. 247–249). The objection that the inclusion of the life of the Christian within the life of God is inconsistent with the personality either of God or of man rests on an attempt to explain away the facts of religious experience on the ground of the inapplicability of the notion of partial inclusion, the phraseology of which is, however, used here only because no other will so well describe the actual experience (pp. 249–251). The conclusion is that God can be called personal only in the sense that man can stand to him in the relation expressed by worship (p. 252). God is the Absolute, that is, the one all-comprehending Reality, but, when it is recognized that the Absolute is God, it is recognized that this Reality is worshipful (pp. 253, 254). The difficulty is raised that the Absolute must include evil as well as good. In Christianity imperfection of power and knowledge are represented as finding a place in a personal life which is yet throughout divine; and sin as conditioning the actual form of that life (pp. 254–259). Morality and Religion are always distinct although in constant mutual interaction (pp. 259–263). Grave difficulties about their relation arise only when the Platonic axiom is admitted that nothing but what is good is to be ascribed to God; an axiom difficult to reconcile with the representations of the divine action found in religious tradition. A more philosophical kind of difficulty is felt in attempting to combine

the view that God is the universal Reality with belief in the moral freedom of the individual (pp. 263–265). But we have already seen that the freedom of man does not exclude the operation either of divine grace or of evil influences (pp. 265–267). The problem of the existence of evil in general may in a certain sense be called insoluble. But some considerations may be offered (pp. 267, 268). *Pain* is least inexplicable where we know it best; and it does not belong to the genius of the Christian religion to wish the Passion of Christ away from the divine life, or to think the crown more glorious without the cross (pp. 268–272). The problem of *sin* is harder, for here moral compensation seems out of the question; nor does Christianity represent sin as entering like pain into the divine life; yet it represents atonement, which presupposes sin, as so entering (pp. 272–274). The thought implied in the hymn *O felix culpa* does not necessarily lead to regarding sin as no sin; for the condition of atonement is repentance, and this excludes the antinomian attitude towards sin (pp. 274, 275). The attitude of Religion towards sin, which differs from that of 'mere' Morality in at once intensifying the horror of sin and assuring the sinner of forgiveness, is accused of morbidity on one side, of immorality on the other, and of inconsistency on both. It is true that the former characteristic would be morbid without the latter, and the latter immoral without the former; and that the two are inconsistent as thesis and antithesis (pp. 275, 276). Apart from God man can do nothing, in union with God he can do all things (p. 276). Lastly, Personality is not merely what divides one person from another; the more we suppose a consciousness immersed in itself, the less disposed we should be to call it personal; nor is the Universal Mind or Spirit a mere abstraction, but that of which only so far as individual spirits are organs are they what by their very nature they aim at being (pp. 276–279). Has then God no life of his own? Yes, for the universal life is most surely his since all others have it only through him and from him; nor is he a mere aggregate of spirits, which cannot be loved or worshipped (pp. 279–281). When we are and do that by being and doing which we realize the best that is in us, and do this consciously as God's will, we live as sons of God and share in the eternal self-expression of his being (p. 281). The mutual interchange of love between Father and Son, of which the worship of God

and the grace of God which we receive therein and thereby is but a part, is itself the eternal issue and process of the divine Being, in which it for ever completes itself as Spirit, and so manifests itself as a unity in trinity and trinity in unity (p. 282).

INDEX . . . . . pp. 283–288

PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONS OF GOD AND MAN

INTRODUCTORY

A LECTURER who undertakes to deal with problems in the Philosophy of Religion must be prepared to face difficulties which do not confront one who selects for his theme problems in History or Archæology, in some branch of Natural Science or in Philology. A lecturer on any of these has not to encounter a doubt in the mind of his audience as to the very existence of that which he proposes to discuss. Even were it problems in Ethics or Æsthetics that he had chosen, he might have counted on a fairly general agreement as to the subject-matter in view. But with the lecturer on the Philosophy of Religion it is otherwise. Some will ask him how he defines Religion and will profess themselves in doubt until he has defined it as to the sense in which the word is used. Some will question his right to

speak of Religion in general at all, and will insist that there are many Religions, and that each of the most important among them professes to be the only true Religion. Some, while admitting his right to speak of Religion in general, will not admit that it can be made the subject of philosophical treatment; since (they would urge) it belongs not to the cognitive but to the emotional or to the conative side of our nature. If one were to venture to join issue with these last-mentioned critics and boldly to permit oneself to consider Religion as at least involving a kind of apprehension or awareness, the consciousness of a certain object, of God, then one will be asked, What do you mean by God? or, Which of all the gods—for, as St. Paul says, 'there are gods many'[1]—do you mean? And one will even be called upon to prove that any such alleged object as has been called God really exists at all except in the imagination of men at a certain stage of their intellectual development; and we shall be reminded that there are Religions without a God, and that some thinkers have even considered these Religions not less but more worthy on that account to be called Religion.

I would make it plain at the outset that I am very far from underrating the importance of such difficulties as these, which may be raised on the threshold of my subject. If I deal with them cur-

[1] 1 Cor. viii. 5.

sorily, not to say dogmatically, in this introductory part of my discussion, it is merely because to do more would require a much larger space than is now at my disposal, and I am thus compelled to content myself with indicating in outline my position in regard to some of these preliminary questions before passing on to the particular problems which I have selected for special consideration.

In the first place, then, I should be prepared to defend the position that Religion neither can be nor need be *defined*. Although it is easy to point to experiences, to books, to institutions, to characters, the right of which to be called *religious* would be matter of dispute, it is no less easy to point to others about which there would be no dispute. Thus the civilized man will find much of what he is accustomed to regard as pre-eminently religious lacking in what seem to him the fantastic and cruel rites of savage initiation; and the savage would probably not recognize as religious much that we should hold to be worship 'in spirit and in truth.' Within the more restricted sphere of our own civilization, we could without difficulty find people who would deny the presence of religion in Spinoza's *Ethics* or (to take a very different example) in Mrs. Eddy's *Science and Health;* or who would call the Pope (with a certain Gifford Lecturer) 'the high priest of irreligion.' But perhaps no one who knew those books would deny the name of religious to

the Fourth Gospel or the *Imitation of Christ* or the *Pilgrim's Progress*. In this respect Religion is in the same case with Beauty. To appreciate the beauty of what we should call the highest achievements of poetry or music or plastic art a considerable development of culture may be necessary; and barbaric music or ornament often appears to the civilized man not to be beautiful at all. Even among members of the same race, among fellow-citizens of the same State, classes differently educated will differ in their æsthetic tastes. Yet we should probably have to go far afield to find any one who denied that a gorgeous sunset was beautiful. Neither of Religion nor of Beauty can a definition be given which we could conceive as binding us to refuse the recognition of either in instances which the definition would exclude, or to recognize either in instances which it would cover. When we turn to consider definitions of Religion which have been given by eminent writers we shall find that they usually presuppose for the understanding of them the very knowledge which they are supposed to impart. Thus, to take two examples only, and omitting other objections which might be brought against them, in Matthew Arnold's definition of Religion as 'morality touched with emotion,'[1] it requires no great consideration to perceive that it is not *any* emotion that is meant, but specifically *religious*

[1] *Literature and Dogma*, ed. 1883, p. 16.

emotion; and when M. Salomon Reinach tells us [1] that Religion is 'an assemblage of scruples which impede the free exercise of our faculties,' [2] he is compelled to add that not *any* scruples are meant, but a particular kind of scruples which he calls *taboos*. The sanction of such scruples, he tells us, is not a practical sanction, such as the fear of injuring oneself; nor is it the fear of a legal penalty. It is fear of 'a calamity such as death or blindness which strikes the offending individual.' But M. Reinach would not, I take it, call the fear of death from electric shock which prevents one from touching a live wire, or the fear of blindness from having vitriol thrown in one's eyes which might restrain a returning officer from hindering the interferences of a militant champion of woman suffrage with the ballot-box, an instance of the sort of scruple which he means. In point of fact he means a *religious* scruple, and so the word 'scruple' in his definition is open to just the same kind of objection as the word 'emotion' in Matthew Arnold's.

I should maintain then that Religion neither needs nor admits of definition. But I should be prepared to defend the position that Religion always involves the consciousness or apprehension of a certain object or, if we prefer, of an objective character

[1] *Orpheus*, ed. 1909, p. 5.

[2] *Un ensemble de scrupules qui font obstacle au libre exercice de nos facultés.* There is an admirable criticism of this remarkable definition in M. Loisy's *A propos d'Histoire des Religions*, pp. 49 foll.

of reality or of some part of reality, and to contend that although the relation of this object or this objective character of reality to other objects or characters of reality of which we are no less conscious, may be difficult to determine—and although the name by which this object or objective character of reality, such as 'God' or 'the divine,' may require to be used with great care, so as to avoid a further determination of this object or objective character of reality than we are justified in assuming, yet the *onus probandi* lies on those who would declare our consciousness of it to be an illusory experience. The primary evidence of the existence of any perceived object must be our perception of it; and if it is to be shown notwithstanding that what we suppose ourselves to perceive, does not really exist, this cannot mean that we perceive nothing. It can only mean that what we perceive is not what we think it to be; in other words, the question is not so much *whether it exists* as *what it is*.

I should be ready here again to illustrate the case of Religion by the case of Beauty. Difficult questions may be raised concerning the relation of the beauty of the external world to those characteristics of it with which the natural sciences deal; or again with regard to its dependence or independence upon the physical and psychical organization of the beings who are capable of perceiving it. But still it is perceived; and, moreover, notorious and

proverbial as is the variety of tastes, yet the very recognition of this variety implies the recognition of something identical, which one man finds here and not there, and another man there and not here. The case of Religion is parallel here. But it is to be noticed that while Religion is a subjective term, in that it is the name of a kind of consciousness, or of an attitude or activity involving a kind of consciousness, Beauty is an objective term, the name of that whereof we are conscious. We more naturally speak of Beauty and the sense of Beauty, but of Religion and the object of Religion. We have indeed a name, Taste, for the sense of Beauty, and a name, God, for the object of Religion. But these names need explanation and qualification before they can be used quite generally. We feel ourselves on less disputed, on safer ground when we speak of Beauty and the sense (or perception, or apprehension, or consciousness) of Beauty, but of Religion and the object of Religion. This difference is connected with the familiar fact that while it would seem absurd to doubt the existence of Beauty (though we may doubt whether it exists as an object for any beings not organized as we are) it is quite common to question the existence of God. We do not dispute the existence of Beauty, whatever we think to be the nature of its connexion with other characteristics of the external or sensible world; we may assume its existence as something to be

discussed. But, in the case of God, we seem unable to do this; what we may with tolerable security assume, is the existence of Religion as a kind of behaviour, emotion or consciousness (different people may prefer one or other of these terms to describe the genus to which they would refer it), though there may be many conflicting theories as to its origin, its affinities, and its value.

This difference between Religion and Beauty is significant of an important circumstance connected with the former. We are content to admit without question the existence of Beauty, because Beauty, the object of the æsthetic consciousness or experience, is, so to say, separable from other objects of consciousness or experience as the object of Religion is not. The world is, or some things in it are, beautiful, we may say, whatever else they may be; and the other characteristics which they may really possess, or seem to us to possess, do not, on the whole, affect their beauty. If we find them beautiful to our apprehension, beautiful, so far, we confidently call them. But the object of Religion cannot be merely the object of Religion. There is a sense in which Religion always demands for its object (to quote a comprehensive phrase of Tertullian's)[1] *totum quod sumus et in quo sumus.* This I take to be true, though at the present stage I must leave my reasons for the

[1] *Adv. Marcionem* I, 10. Habet testimonia Deus totum quod sumus et in quo sumus.

view unstated, even where religion exists in such primitive or rudimentary forms as are found where we should not suppose the explicit thought of Reality or the Universe as a whole to have been attained.

Now this is as much as to say that Religion will always be found, if we press it, to claim for itself what some would call an ontological value. This means no more than that it claims to apprehend something which is really independent, not merely of the present apprehension of this or that individual (we might perhaps say this of Beauty), but of any apprehension whatever; something which belongs to the ultimate nature of reality and to which nothing in that nature can be wholly indifferent, nay, not even in the last resort (as we shall see hereafter) the fact that it is apprehended.[1] It is here that we are to find the true explanation of the fact that we cannot use the word *God* without seeming to commit ourselves further than at the outset we may wish to do.

I assume then, without at present attempting to enforce or justify them further, these points. Firstly, that no preliminary definition of Religion can be given which should bind one in advance, as it were, to include this or exclude that, without looking afresh into each instance of something professedly religious, as it comes before us; but also that no

[1] I am quite aware of the *prima facie* inconsistency of these last words with the immediately preceding statement that it is independent of any apprehension whatever.

such definition is wanted. Secondly, that Religion involves a kind of apprehension or awareness, whose object is always, however, in such a sense the whole of reality, or at least the heart and centre of reality, that it is in the long run impossible for Religion to remain contented, as the æsthetic consciousness can, with an object which is merely *its* object, without placing it, so to say, in the centre of things, and relating to it everything in itself and in its environment, and hence committing the religious man to what the Germans call a *Weltanschauung* correspondent to his religion.

To these observations, which relate to the attitude which I would take up in respect of the Philosophy of Religion in general, I think it well to add some others in order to avoid certain possible misunderstandings. The description of the three problems which I propose to discuss as those of Reason and Revelation, of Nature and Grace, of Man and God, suggests that I shall have especially in view contrasts which belong to the theology of the Christian Religion. The antitheses which I have named are found indeed in principle outside the theology of that religion; but these designations of them suggest and are intended to suggest the forms which they assume in Christian theology. Fielding, in *Tom Jones*, has introduced a character, Mr. Thwackum, representative of the divinity in vogue in his days among defenders of the established religion of this country.

Square, the philosopher, has maintained that honour '"may exist independently of any religion whatever. Nay," added he, "you yourself will allow it may exist independently of all but one; so will a Mahometan, a Jew, and all the maintainers of all the different sects in the world." Thwackum replied, this was arguing with the usual malice of all the enemies to the true church. He said he doubted not but all the infidels in the world would, if they could, confine honour to their own absurd errors and damnable deceptions; but honour, says he, "is not therefore manifold, because there are many absurd opinions about; nor is religion manifold, because there are various sects and heresies in the world. When I mention religion, I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of England. And when I mention honour, I mean that mode of divine grace which is not only consistent with, but dependent upon this religion and is consistent with and dependent upon no other."'[1] I wish to distinguish my position in specially attending to the traditional theology of Christendom from that which was taken up by Mr. Thwackum. I have already touched in passing[2] upon the difficulty presented to the student of the Philosophy of Religion by the claim

[1] *Tom Jones*, Book III, ch. III.

[2] Above, p. 2.

(to which Mr. Square alludes in the passage just quoted) made by each of the higher religions to be the only true religion. I shall have more to say on this subject when I come to speak of the contrast of Reason and Revelation. But here I shall only justify myself for devoting the larger share of my attention to the characteristically Christian forms of this and the other contrasts which constitute the subject of the present lectures, by an analogy from another field. No one would be surprised if a lecturer on philosophical problems of a kind not specifically religious were to concentrate his attention upon the forms which these problems have assumed in the great European systems of Plato and of Aristotle, of Descartes and of Spinoza, of Locke and of Leibnitz, of Kant and of Hegel, to name none of later date. He would count upon a general recognition among his hearers that these and others which might be added are the classical systems, in which speculation upon the problems of philosophy is seen at its ripest and best. He would not be supposed necessarily to be denying that there are philosophers belonging to other civilizations than the European, that the classical schools of European philosophy have themselves an historical background of less highly developed speculation, or even that the speculations of thinkers belonging to other civilizations may have something to teach us which is not to be learned from the great European thinkers who stand in

the succession which we regard as classical and central. He would not, I say, be understood necessarily to deny any of these things; and it would be admitted as his sufficient justification for limiting himself to a certain field, that this was the one best known to him, and also the one in which by general consent the best thinking is on the whole to be sought. So too here. I may justify myself in concentrating my attention on Christian theology by saying that the Christian religion is the religion which I know best and the only one which I know from within; and by appealing to a very general agreement that no religion and no theology can be on the whole ranked higher than the Christian, even if certain others may be ranked in some respects upon a level with them. It is needless to add that I have no desire further to limit the word Christian as Mr. Thwackum limited it; but rather to use it on the whole in that wide sense in which it is applicable to the entire religious and philosophical development which has the Christian tradition as its starting-point and background.

Perhaps some excuse may also be needed for the smallness of the space which will be occupied in the following discussions by the facts and conjectures which have been brought to our notice by the researches either of anthropologists or of students of what is sometimes called religious psychology. I have certainly no wish to disparage the importance

of these to any one who desires to make religion the subject-matter of serious thought. Religious practices cannot be fully understood apart from the knowledge of their history, and, in the case of Christian religious practices this will take us back far beyond the origin either of Christianity or of the religions which divide to-day with Christianity the allegiance of civilized men. Nor is the student of this history justified in neglecting, where it can be had, any such knowledge of what these practices are in the consciousness of those who engage in them as may be gained from the study of their autobiographies, or of such information concerning the conditions in other respects of these same persons as the observation of physicians and psychologists can supply. It is true that the larger part of the information on these latter points to be found in such books as Professor Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion* and the late Professor James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* is, as was inevitable under the circumstances of their composition, gathered from a field far more restricted than that which has found expression in the catholic tradition (I use the word 'catholic' in no technical sense) of Christian theology. But what has been thus gathered is of no small interest and importance. Of these anthropological and psychological researches I have, however, no claim to speak with the authority of a first-hand investigator, and there will be, as I have already

intimated, but little said about them in these lectures. To this apology for the comparatively small room assigned to these two subjects I will only add, before, concluding these introductory observations, that it is my conviction that between the religion which finds for itself a reasoned expression in Christian theology and the religions of what is called the 'lower culture' there is a genuine continuity traceable, that for this very reason we can study best in its fullest development that of which we discern the vaguer and more confused beginnings in primitive worship and belief; and that we only recognize the pathological character of the more eccentric kinds of religious behaviour (such as perhaps loom disproportionately large in books on religious psychology) by comparison with the standard provided in that system or those systems which exhibit the religious principle in its richest and (in the proper sense of the word) most rational form. By 'most rational,' I do not intend that which offers least difficulty to what Hegel called 'the abstract understanding'—'for which every term or product of thought presents a stereotyped distinction from every other'[1]—which treats its object from an external, general point of view, a point of view, in Aristotle's phraseology,[2] merely

[1] Wallace, *Logic of Hegel*, 1st ed. p. 122 : a paraphrastic translation of *Logik*, § 80 (*Werke*, VI, 147).

[2] See *Top.*, I, 1, 2; cp. Mr. H. W. B. Joseph, *Introduction to Logic*, pp. 359 foll.

dialectical. I mean rather that which, when studied as it really is, in its own special and peculiar way or manner of being, comes nearest to exhibiting that character which affords the most perfect satisfaction to the intelligence; the character, that is to say, of thoroughgoing necessity, in which every part is absolutely indispensable to each other and to the whole, and all opposites mutually or reciprocally determine each other. There is nothing extravagant in the supposition that this character, though perhaps nowhere completely exhibited by any religious system, is more nearly approached in Christian theology and in the implications of Christian worship than in the religious beliefs and institutions of primitive men, and at least as nearly realized there as in any other religious system to be found in the world.

The three contrasts or antitheses which I have chosen for special consideration are those of Reason and Revelation, of Nature and Grace, of Man and God. They are not unrelated to each other; the consideration of the first will be found to lead naturally on to that of the second, and that of the second to the third. Such contrasts or antitheses are characteristic of philosophy; and in the Philosophy of Religion we find them presented in what is at once their acutest and their most hopeful shape; or rather in what is their most hopeful shape, just because it is their acutest, because here the opposition is, so to say, pushed to its extremest point and the

fullest justice is done to either side. The antithesis of Reason and Revelation is the characteristic form assumed in the sphere of Religion by the antithesis which we know in a more general way as that of Subject and Object; for Reason is thought of as what is *ours*, who know God, Revelation as what is from God, who is known; and the principle of this antithesis recurs in the contrast of what is *ours* to start with by *nature*, and what comes to be ours by the *grace* or free gift of God; while in discussing this second contrast we shall find ourselves dealing at close quarters with that famous problem of Freedom and Necessity, which morality inevitably raises for those who reflect upon it, but which cannot be satisfactorily handled without passing beyond the sphere of Ethics in the strict sense of that word. Lastly we shall find ourselves led on by our consideration of both these earlier antitheses to ask ourselves what we mean by *Man*, to whom *reason* belongs by *nature*, and what by *God*, who *reveals* himself to man of his free *grace* or favour. And in dealing with this last contrast we shall find ourselves at no great distance from the problem of the Particular and the Universal, than which of course none is more fundamental in general philosophy.

PART I

REASON AND REVELATION

CHAPTER I

THE ANTITHESIS OF REASON AND REVELATION

THE first of the three antitheses which I have selected for discussion is that of *Reason* and *Revelation*. If we begin by asking ourselves what the mention of this antithesis suggests at first sight to an educated Englishman who has given no particular thought to the matter, we should probably not be far wrong in giving some such answer as the following. He would think of a body of religious doctrine consisting of two parts; one part which has been or could be discovered by the unaided use of an intelligent man's natural faculties; and another part which has been, and could only be, derived from an external source, taken to be a supernatural or divine being freely communicating information to men which otherwise would have remained beyond their reach. Here what is taken as our own contribution is represented as due to the exercise of our highest capacity, of Reason. What is taken as the contribution which is not our own, is taken as definite and intelligible information voluntarily and designedly imparted. There are thus two co-operating parties, who are described as acting,

if I may so express it, at their highest pitch. One is man rational and exercising his reason; the other God, conceived of likewise as rational and personal Spirit, actively communicating truth about himself. Reason and Revelation are not here as yet opposed (as I hinted in my preliminary observations that we should find them opposed) quite as Subject to Object; although Reason is already what comes from ourselves, Revelation that which comes from what is not ourselves. For at this stage Reason is regarded as one process with its own result, and Revelation as another process with its different result. There are Subject and Object in both, and in both they are the same Subject and Object, for the two processes are here in each instance contemplated as falling within the same sphere, that of Religion. By Reason, applied, as we are here thinking of it, to the subject-matter of Religion, Man discovers for himself what he can of God; in Revelation Man becomes aware of what God tells him about himself.

Now, so long as we do not look very closely into the matter, so long as we do not, strictly speaking, *think* about it, but only *picture* it, there seems to be no great difficulty in this notion of a twofold knowledge about the same thing (which happens, in this case, to be God); a knowledge partly based on Reason from within us, partly upon Revelation imparted to us from without. We picture easily enough a situation, such as is perfectly familiar to us in

daily life; the situation in which we desire to know, and in which it is very important to us that we should know, the motives and purposes of a certain man; and thereupon try to infer them from a study of those actions of his which fall under our observation. But we are working in the dark, as it were, until we come face to face with the man himself, and he tells us what he means, and what he is aiming at. Or again, we may picture a situation, in which we are in doubt about the very existence of a certain person; as, for example, in the notorious Humbert case of a few years back, we were in doubt of the very existence of the American who was said to have entrusted Madame Humbert with the box; and we try to discover whether there really is or ever was such a person in the world at all. And then we might meet the person, might come face to face with him, and our doubts about his existence, which had persisted up to that time, would now be completely removed. I have taken these two illustrations, because we find among those who contrast Reason and Revelation in the way which I have been trying to describe, some who would assert that the existence of God could be found out by Reason, but that we stand in need of Revelation to enlighten us further as to his character and purposes; and others who would hold that Reason could do no more than frame the hypothesis that there was a God, which without the intervention

of Revelation could not be verified, but must remain unproved.

Such situations as I have described often occur, and are easily enough pictured. But the moment that we try to get behind this picture-making, and try to see whether we can really *think* of a knowledge of God based upon Reason as related to a knowledge based upon Revelation in the same way in which an opinion based on inference from a man's actions to his motives is related to knowledge of them gained from the man himself, we shall find that our analogy will turn out to be of no real use to us at all.

For, to begin with, in the supposed case of inference from a man's actions to his motives, what we have on one side is (as was hinted in the last sentence) not *knowledge* properly so called at all, but only *opinion*. *Ex hypothesi* I am only *guessing* at the man's motives. I should not say that I *knew* them until I had heard of them from himself or from some one to whom he had confessed them. And, when I had so heard them, I should say that my *opinion* or guess-work had now given place to *knowledge;* but I should hold that I was employing *reason* in the one case no less than in the other. Only by my *reason* do I recognize one interpretation of my man's acts as more probable than another; only by my *reason* do I judge whether what he tells me or has told my informant, concerning these motives, is to be relied upon; only by my *reason* again am I aware that his

communications clear up what my guesses had left doubtful, explain seeming contradictions and so on. In the same way, in the analogue, *Reason* is the only possible judge of *Revelation*, and those who have distinguished Revelation from Reason in some such way as I have described have often been quite ready to submit its original credentials to Reason; although it has no doubt sometimes been held that, these credentials once accepted, Reason has no further say as to the contents of the Revelation. The judgment of the original credentials, however, at least cannot possibly be withdrawn from the tribunal of Reason; I must have some *reason* (even if not a good one) for accepting the Revelation as genuine. And so Reason cannot possibly be confined to a sphere distinct from that of Revelation. On the other hand, in the case of the man whose motives we first guessed and afterwards came to know from his own lips, there is no difficulty in supposing that something could be found out about him, without his co-operation and even against his wishes. But when we pass from the illustration to the thing illustrated, it is not easy to suppose this of a God, such as, according to the teaching of any religion which we could conceive ourselves at our present level of intellectual development as accepting, we could admit to be rightly called God at all. We could not allow the name of God to a being on whose privacy an Actæon could intrude, or whose

secrets a Prometheus could snatch from him without his assent. This antithesis of Reason and Revelation, moreover, in the form in which we have been considering it, belongs to an advanced stage of religious development; we may therefore legitimately criticize it from the standpoint of the stage which must have been reached when it comes into prominence.

I do not think it necessary to work through the variant of the illustration which we have been considering, in which the relation between Reason and Revelation is pictured as that between a conjecture and its verification by sensible experience. What has been said of the other form of the illustration can easily be applied to this, and we shall find ourselves later on returning to a representation of this kind in another connexion, when we come to speak of what is called 'proving the existence of God.'

The view, then, of Reason and Revelation as independent sources of religious truth—truth, that is, about God—with distinct spheres, has been found unsatisfactory. What Reason reaches cannot be regarded as unrevealed, since it cannot be thought of as discovered without the co-operation of God, nor can the contents of Revelation be thought of as discerned and recognized otherwise than by Reason. Reason and Revelation can no longer be regarded as distinct processes which have indeed in one sense the same subject and the same object, but yet in

another sense distinct subjects and distinct objects; for although the spirit of man is the subject in both, it is the spirit of man as active intelligence in the one case, as receptive in the other; as Reason in the one, in the other as something which[1] may be very variously regarded, but is at any rate not Reason, as we speak of Reason, when we treat it as the faculty to which the various sciences owe their being. So, too, although God is the object in both cases, yet usually, or at any rate very often, it is a different part or aspect of the divine nature that is held to be revealed from that part or aspect which can be found out by Reason. This way of describing the two, then, having proved unsatisfactory, can we take Reason and Revelation as correlative, as subject and object in the same process, *Reason* (in the sphere of Religion) apprehending only what is *revealed*, and *Revelation* (in the same sphere) being that which *Reason* can there apprehend?

We shall be in a better position to give a satisfactory answer to this question if we first consider more generally this relation of Subject and Object as it exists elsewhere than in the special sphere of Religion; for we may thus be led to think that what we find in religion will prove to be the natural sequel of that which we shall have found elsewhere, and so will throw light back, as it were, upon these lower levels of experience.

[1] See below, pp. 45 foll.

Let us begin, then, by considering our perception in our daily life of material objects, such as tables and chairs. I intentionally choose my examples from the field of artificial things, contrived for our use—though what I am going to say will extend further. We commonly regard such things as on the one hand wholly indifferent to, and unaffected by, our perception of them, except so far as our perception of them leads to further action, as when, seeing a chair, we sit down upon it. It is the converse of this same fact that we ourselves may be said, so far, to be indifferent to these objects, except so far as they are perceived by us. Thus, so far as we can depend upon seeing and touching a chair when we want to sit down, we are content, and although no doubt the famous doctrine of Berkeley,[1] that the *esse* of material things is *percipi* never fails to wear the air of a paradox, and although serious objections may be brought against it in these as well as in other cases, yet it is in such instances as these that it may be made to assume a certain plausibility. One may easily find it hard to say what *difference* it would make to us if the *esse* of chairs and tables *were*, as Berkeley says it is, *percipi*, and if, when not perceived by any one, they did not exist at all. A 'pragmatic' attitude, as it is now the fashion to call it, is not so very unnatural at this level of experience, and it is noticeable that

[1] *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 3.

there are expressions used by Berkeley himself which suggest such an attitude.[1]

But when we pass from this perception of material objects in which we are interested only as they serve our purposes, to the perception of material objects in which we are interested as a man of science is interested in them, as parts of a great system governed by mechanical laws, the two parties, as I may call them, to the transaction of knowledge, the Subject and the Object, seem to have abandoned some of this mutual indifference which we described above. Although theories which insist that the natural sciences are only 'descriptive' are now much in vogue, and harmonize very well with the tendencies which find expression in pragmatism, and although there are very likely some scientific doctrines of high reputation which can really claim to be no more than 'descriptive,' yet I think that students of natural science are quite in the right when they entertain a certain suspicion of this writing down of the accounts which their sciences give of the objects with which they are concerned as merely 'descriptive.' If the scientific man's interest in these objects were merely what we may call a utilitarian interest, if he really only wanted to know how to manipulate matter to his own and others' profit, it would not much concern him whether or no the formulas which he employs were really quite true, so long

[1] *Principles of Human Knowledge*, §§ 119 foll.

as they are faithful enough to fact to enable him by their means to manipulate his material environment. But if he be really a man of *science*, if he wishes not merely to exploit the material world, but to understand it, he surely cannot remain content with 'merely descriptive' formulas; for, if that is all he has, he has *ex hypothesi* not *understood* what he is dealing with, he has only *described* it. It is true that it is difficult to justify the application of the term 'descriptive' to formulas which do not state what the things described really are; if they do not do this, how can they be rightly said even to describe them? One may however, no doubt, admit a use of the word 'description' to signify an account not false indeed, but still superficial or external; but even in that sense of the word, I do not think that the man of science can be satisfied with mere description. He may well be content to believe that some of his hypotheses will not stand to the end; that some of his formulas contain error, so long as the error that they contain will not be such as to affect his results. But he cannot be content with this as the ideal of his science; as a man of science, he must aspire to knowledge of things as they really are, not only so far as they will serve other purposes of his than that of knowing the truth about them.[1]

[1] It is of course a further question how far he can satisfy this aspiration while remaining within the limits of what he would call Science.

Hence the Berkeleian doctrine that the *esse* of the material world is *percipi* will never satisfy him; the imperceptible is for him part of the system in which he is interested; while in the conduct of our daily life we do not care about the imperceptible; it adds what, we may say in our haste, is nothing to our purpose. Thus in the sciences the knower is less indifferent, in proportion to his genuinely scientific interest, to the object's real existence independently of the subject. On the other hand, it is at this stage of experience, at the scientific stage, that the puzzles arise which are so familiar to all students of philosophy about the place of our apprehension itself in the universe which the sciences apprehend. Here originate the efforts made to explain it as the outcome of the laws that rule the material universe, as involved in its circle of mechanical action and reaction. The scientific man can neither, it would seem, stomach the attribution to his object of a *merely* perceived reality; nor can he allow the complete indifference of the object to the process by which it is apprehended. He is irresistibly impelled to attempt to bring them both somehow within the sweep of his survey, and to make them out to be interconnected parts of a whole, each part of which mechanically determines every other. It is true that this attempt is doomed to failure; but it is none the less inevitable that it should be made; and we are lifted to a better understanding

of the nature of reality by its being made. Nor do we part with the notion of a single universe when we abandon the belief that the principles of mechanism are sufficient to explain its unity.

We may be said to take a further step when we conceive the object, which is here still the external world, as *beautiful*. The poet and the artist are certainly disinclined to tolerate the denial of an external reality to that beauty which they find in the external world. They may often indulge what Ruskin, in a passage full of sound and accurate criticism,[1] has called the 'pathetic fallacy'; but surely never, except where the poetry is quite frigid and artificial, with the consciousness that it *is* a fallacy. When Wordsworth[2] contrasts the Miltonic lines—

> 'Sky lowered, and muttering thunder, some sad drops
> Wept at completion of the mortal sin'[3]—

with those of an epigram attributed to Lord Chesterfield—

> 'The dews of the evening most carefully shun,
> They are tears of the day for the loss of the sun,'

one sees at once that the latter is a mere conceit; the writer did not even for a moment believe the sky to be a living being in grief. But Milton is in earnest with the thought of a real sympathy of nature with the moral catastrophe of mankind. The sug-

[1] *Modern Painters*, III., pp. 160 *seqq.*
[2] Preface to *Poems*, 1815.
[3] *Paradise Lost*, IX., 1002–3.

gestion that the sympathy was only read in by Adam and Eve, or by their poet, cannot be entertained for a moment without destroying the impressiveness of the passage. Of course the reader need not at other times be convinced that nature does sympathize with men in this way; Milton himself may not have been so convinced. That is not the point. But the passage is emptied of its impressiveness if the conviction is not treated as real by the imagination of the reader when reading it. And I should not doubt that it loses something which it would have for a believer in the possibility of such a sympathy, when read by one to whom it is difficult even imaginatively to enter into the state of mind of one who believes it. But quite apart from this particular belief in a sympathy of nature with man, the poet's conviction that the glory and beauty of nature are not the creation of his own mind, that the perception of it is no illusion, but the *revelation* to him (and here we have this very thought of *revelation* which we are trying to understand) of what is real independently of him; this conviction is not to be destroyed without the loss of what we care for in the poetry of nature. This will be seen if any one tries to read Wordsworth, keeping steadily in his head the notion that what the poet found in nature was not really there independently of him. The glory will have passed away from the poetry.

But if, in this connexion, when we are dealing with external things as *beautiful*, we shall be less content than we were when dealing with them as merely things of daily use, to regard the being of the object as dependent on the process by which it is apprehended, we shall find here that we are also more ready to speak as though it could have been in some way a loss to the beautiful things which we admire to have missed the admiration which they excite in us.

> 'Full many a gem of purest ray serene
> The dark unfathomed caves of ocean bear;
> Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
> And waste its sweetness on the desert air.'[1]

We think of the fragrance—and so, too, of the colour of the flower and the radiance of the gem—as *there*, but as *wasted*, so long as they are not perceived. In one sense, no doubt, we may say that the flower is not fragrant when no one smells it; but the other, the poet's phrase, is more natural.

Here perhaps I may be told that one could say as much of mere things of use, such as tables and chairs. They, too, if unperceived, would be wasted, thrown away. And so it is. But I think that a distinction may be drawn. For, while the verse which I have just quoted from Gray's *Elegy* is moving or pathetic, a passage which should describe a whole Maple or Shoolbred shop, full of chairs and tables,

[1] Gray, *Elegy written in a Country Churchyard.*

wardrobes and looking-glasses, which no one could ever get at, would only be trifling and ridiculous, unless indeed one should picture it as expressive of some *person's* disappointed hopes and ambitions, in which case it might become pathetic. But then, in that case, as in the case of the flower and of the gem, what moves us is the thought that something which is of high value *in itself* does not meet with the appreciation which it *deserves*. The workman's skill, the tradesman's enterprise, can be thus valued; but hardly apart from these the furniture, unless indeed it be regarded as a beautiful work of art, and so pass into the same category with the gem and the flower. On the other hand the store we set by the flower and the gem is, I think, unaffected by the belief or disbelief that they are made by a personal divine artist.

If now we pass on from the world of external nature to the world of spirit, and consider great poets or artists as themselves in their works the object of our admiration, we do not, of course, think that Shakespeare, for instance, is a great poet *because* he is admired; that his works, if they had been lost, would have been less excellent; yet it belongs to the notion of great poetry that it should excite admiration; and we should find it difficult to understand what could be meant by calling any one a great poet whose poetry should awaken no feelings of admiration in its hearers

or readers. No doubt we might in the same way allow that we should be puzzled to say how a tree or a mountain could be really *there* and yet no one who was present and had the use of his eyes be able to see them; and indeed up to a certain point the case of the work of the poet or artist is quite parallel with the case of the mountain or the tree. Yet I think we may say that we do not regard the admiration felt for a poet or artist as something accidental to his genius in the same way as our happening to see a certain tree or mountain seems to be accidental to the existence of that tree or mountain. The object is not in the same way indifferent to the apprehension of it by the subject; to fail of this apprehension would be here to fail at least to a considerable degree of its *raison d'être.* But again it might be observed that we could say this also of things of *use:* it is *their raison d'être* to be used, and to be used they must be perceived. With them, however, as we saw, so far as their usefulness goes, we are on the whole indifferent to their existence in themselves, whereas we should be far less patient in the instance of the poet or artist of a fancy that he was nothing apart from our apprehension of him; to think that, like 'Alice through the Looking-glass,' in relation to the Red King, he was 'only a sort of thing in our dream,' would take the heart out of our feeling toward him.

This last instance affords an easy transition

to what we may call the knowledge of *acquaintance*, the knowledge of one person by another. I do not think it necessary to dwell at length upon the obvious fact that we could not for one moment consent to the thought that our friends have no existence independently of our apprehension of them. We could not entertain such a supposition without at the same time regarding ourselves as mad or dreaming in what we supposed to be our converse with them. It is to be noticed that Berkeley himself, who held that the *esse* of material things was *percipi*, did not extend this opinion to the *esse* of persons, of spirits, to use the word which he preferred. But, on the other hand, while it is no doubt possible to have *some* knowledge of a person without, or even against his will, it is plainly only possible to a very limited extent. Only through self-communication is real acquaintance possible; and moreover, while acquaintance thus does not merely add an external relation to the nature of the person known, but implies an inner activity on the part of that person himself, it can, on the other hand, hardly be denied that only in such self-communication as makes real acquaintance or friendship possible can a person come to realize his own personality. In solitude or among hostile or indifferent companions, he would not *himself* be what he develops into under the influence of friendship and of love. Here, then, the Subject

and the Object stand, so to say, upon a level, and not as in the perception of material things, the Subject on a higher level, as it were, than the Object; and in the most perfect intercourse between persons, the confidence of friends does not admit of any inequality in the self-revelation of each to each.

When we pass at last to that kind of knowledge which now especially concerns us, man's knowledge of God, here it would certainly kill religion to suppose that the Object, God, was only real so far as known or worshipped. God cannot be God merely because we worship him; rather we cannot, as we have already seen, even suppose, with reference to him, as we may in a measure with reference to a finite person, that there can be any knowledge of God *without*, still less *against*, his will. It is the instinct of the religious man—and that most obviously at the higher stages of religious development—to ascribe the preponderant part in this kind of knowledge to the object of his knowledge, that is, to God. He is sure that he is himself from the beginning wholly known to God, even though he himself has not from the beginning been aware of it. When St. Paul speaks of others as knowing God he adds at once, as if in correction, 'or rather are known of him.'[1] In this region we naturally speak not of 'perception' or 'discovery' (as where the subject is regarded

[1] Galatians iv. 9.

as, so to speak, the predominant partner in the intercourse of knowledge), nor even of 'acquaintance' (as where the subject and the object are regarded as standing, if I may use the expression, on the same level), but rather of 'revelation.' Although, as we saw before,[1] we can use this word of other kinds of knowledge, yet here it is the one most natural word. For here it is God, the Object of our knowledge, that in this knowledge must be thought of as *revealing* himself to us; he it is that is active throughout.

The very activity which we ascribe to ourselves in the matter, the activity whereby we apprehend him, we recognize as due to the operation of God in ourselves. It is of his grace alone that we know him. And although I have here used the language of that religion which is to me and probably to most of my readers the most familiar, I do not suppose that the same statement would not hold also of the higher among those forms of religion in which the object of religion is not regarded as what we are accustomed to call 'a personal God.' There too, I think, we should find the emphasis laid on the reality and substantiality not of the individual subject of religious experience, but of the eternal Object, however described, to which the individual's religious knowledge is itself to be referred. The last line of

[1] See above, p. 33.

Emerson's well-known quatrain expresses this: Brahma speaks:—

> 'They reckon ill who leave me out.
> When on they fly, I am the wings;
> I am the doubter and the doubt,
> And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.'

The further thought conveyed in the first three lines does not now concern us; but the last is, I should suppose, quite in character, and indeed refers, I imagine, to the fact [1] that the neuter name of *Brâhmă*, given to the divine essence, of which the Demiurge denoted by the masculine *Brahmá*, literally a worshipper, is merely a manifestation, actually means originally *worship* or *a hymn;* so that the very transference of the name indicates a recognition of the real presence of the object of worship in the worship itself. The thought that the sacrifice [2] and worship and meditation of the religious man are themselves divine seems to be quite familiar in those Indian religions which do not represent the object of Religion as a personal God, in the sense which that expression usually bears to a Jew, a Christian, or a Mohammedan.

It seems to me, then, that in the form of experience which we call religious, the attitude which may be described as (in one sense of that ambiguous

[1] See *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th ed.; art. "Brahminism." I have no expert knowledge of Indian religion, and none at all of any Indian language.

[2] Cp. Bhagavadgîta, tr. Telang (*Sacred Books of the East*, VII), pp. 61, 83 foll.

term) 'idealistic,' which takes the object primarily for just an object, for something with respect to which we may be content, if not to deny, at least to doubt, whether it does not depend for its existence upon our apprehension of it (though it is to be observed that we cannot thus speak without distinguishing *it* from *apprehension*), that the unsatisfactoriness of this attitude is here particularly obvious. But if so, we shall find in this fact a confirmation of a view which I took leave in my introductory lecture to assert without entering upon the proof of it; the view, I mean, that an attitude which is at bottom no other than that which we have now seen to be inadequate, the attitude which expresses itself in denying that religious judgments are ever judgments of existence or fact, which minimizes or even roundly denies [1] the presence in religion of a cognitive or speculative element—that this attitude is one with which we cannot remain content. Curiously enough, as it may seem at first sight—and yet no one accustomed to philosophical investigations ought to be surprised at it—the fact about Religion which makes it possible for people whose own religious life is very real and deep to adopt this kind of attitude, is just the very fact which characterizes the form of consciousness involved in Religion as standing at the very opposite pole to that in respect of

[1] As does *e.g.* Prof. Leuba, *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion* (in Constable's series of *Religions Ancient and Modern*).

which the 'idealistic' or subjectivist attitude has, as we saw,[1] a certain plausibility. For to the religious consciousness God is so far from being merely 'our idea' that our 'idea' or knowledge of him must, as we have seen,[2] be conceived as a mode of *his* life, of *his* activity, the working in us of *his* Spirit, that is of himself. The persons of whom I am thinking can adopt a subjectivist or 'idealistic' attitude in the theory of religion just because they know that their knowledge of God *is* God in them; but they misunderstand (in my judgment) the implications of what they thus know. If one may so express it, where they ought to say, 'This knowledge of God which I have is no other than the real presence of God in my soul,' they say (for purposes of formulation), 'This presence of God in my soul is not real, but only my feeling that it is there.' Indeed it may be said that all subjectivist philosophy depends in the last resort upon the emphasis laid on the fact of consciousness in general in abstraction from that of which we are conscious, and in reference to which alone consciousness has its being.

We have found, then, that the opposition of two distinct kinds of religious knowledge, depending, the one upon Reason, the other upon Revelation, could by no means satisfy us. The two supposed kinds of knowledge could not be held apart. The subject-

[1] See above, p. 30. [2] See above, p. 38.

matter of the one was not separable from that of the other. Nor indeed has this always been affirmed by the maintainers of the distinction. For the knowledge derived from Revelation has often been supposed to include knowledge about matters such as the origin and destiny of the material universe, and even sometimes miraculous interruptions of the ordinary course of nature, which also fall, at least in part, within the survey of the scientific understanding. And it has, on the other hand, seldom been denied that there is a certain measure in which Reason can attain to a knowledge at least of the existence, if not also of some of the attributes of God, while, for a believer in Revelation (unless indeed he be one of those who, like Marcion in Christian antiquity, are prepared to deny their God to be the Creator of the world [1]), the truths reached by the scientific understanding must at least concern the effects of the divine activity. But even the distinction of two sources of knowledge of the same subject-matter—namely, God and his manifestation of himself to man—has been found difficult to maintain. To suppose any knowledge about God attainable except through his own self-communicating activity, appeared to contradict our conception of God. The only notion we could form of a knowledge of God which was *not* due to revelation would be that of a mistaken knowledge,

[1] See Tertullian, *Adv. Marcionem*, I. 2.

that is, of what would not be *knowledge*, properly so called, at all. And conversely we should not regard a process of thought as rational, as Reason, which should reach erroneous conclusions. It would then be only false reasoning, that is, not really what Reason requires. Hence what is *thought* about God, but not *revealed*, would not be Reason, any more than it would be Revelation. The upshot is that Reason and Revelation in Religion cannot, it would seem, be opposed to one another, but must rather be regarded as correlative, Revelation being the truth in the sphere of Religion, and Reason in that sphere the apprehension of it.

It is to be observed that here, as well as elsewhere, we find in Religion more plainly manifested than in other spheres what is nevertheless characteristic of our thought everywhere. As I have already suggested, the mistake of regarding Reason when employed on the subject-matter of Religion as a rival to Revelation is in principle one with the mistake of taking Reason or even Perception as an activity of ours which can be considered as a 'psychical fact' without reference to its object. It is also one in principle with the paradox which distinguishes the object of Reason in general as the product of the activity of our intelligence from Reality as it is in 'itself' independently of this activity. But we do not naturally regard Reason as a process of making something out of ourselves,

The German in the story who drew the camel out of his own inner consciousness was not really doing a reasonable thing. Rather we mean by Reason the apprehension of the true nature and structure of an independent Reality. The highest achievement of Reason is attained when the mind is so completely informed by its object that there is as little as possible in the notion we have of the object which belongs to our way of apprehending it, and not really to the object itself. Yet the last thing that can be said to characterize the mind when thus possessed by reality is passivity. Such genuine apprehension demands a great activity. If, as Aristotle says, the life of speculation is, as compared with what we commonly call the life of action, a life of leisure,[1] this is of course not because he regards it as a kind of lazy and inactive day-dreaming, but because it is an activity which cannot consist with distraction by other tasks; the whole undivided attention must be free for it.[2]

When, in the sphere of Religion, the mistake is made respecting Reason of taking it in abstraction from the independent reality in apprehending which it has its being, it is not unnatural and not infrequent to take the state of the soul which corresponds to Revelation for something very different from Reason;

[1] *Eth. Nic.*, 10 7, § 6, 1177*b* 4 *seqq.*

[2] It does not follow that participation in other activities than that of philosophical meditation is not requisite to afford that meditation an adequate subject matter.

for some dim and dreamy, some distracted and 'dissociated' condition, below the level of waking consciousness. And it will be objected, no doubt, to such a formula as I have given above for the relation of Reason to Revelation that it is not always to Reason that Revelation makes its appeal; that it more characteristically appeals to such a state of mind as I have just attempted to describe. No doubt it is a very ancient and a very persistent opinion that it is in such a condition of mind that divine intimations are usually received. The description which Balaam in the Book of Numbers [1] gives of himself might be given of many primitive (and not only of primitive) recipients of supernatural visitations: 'the man whose eye was closed'—that is, to the outer world, 'falling down'—in a trance—'and having his eyes'—which were closed to the world without—'open'—to the vision of which he goes on to tell. So, too, Plato in the *Phaedrus*[2] tells us that 'the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when out of their senses have conferred great benefits on Hellas, as regards both public and private life, but when in their senses few or none.' But such inspiration as this Plato in the same dialogue[3] ranks far below the philosopher's vision. It is he that has seen most of truth when in his former life he followed in the train of the gods and beheld the beatific vision

[1] Numbers xxxiv. 3, 4 (R.V.). [2] 244 A, B. [3] 248 D.

who, says Plato, is born again as a philosopher in this life; he who is born again as a prophet or hierophant has seen truth only in the fifth degree. In a like spirit Hegel has said [1] in criticism of those by whom the effort after intellectual comprehension is disparaged in comparison with obscure perceptions which approximate to feeling rather than to understanding, that while they flatter themselves that they are of those beloved of God to whom he gives wisdom in sleep, what they actually produce is what one would expect from sleepers, to wit, dreams. I shall have more to say upon this subject later on; at present I will only add that to recognize in the comprehension or understanding of one's religious experience something higher than such experience without comprehension is not to deny that there may be dim and obscure forebodings in the soul of a prophet of something into which a philosopher may have no insight; and that then the philosopher will act wrongly if he refuse to allow any value to the prophetic foreboding because he, the philosopher, has no insight into what it forebodes. What I am concerned to insist upon is only that obscurity or dimness ought not to be reckoned in themselves superior to intelligent insight respecting the *same* subject-matter. We shall, however, find ourselves hereafter led back to the difficulty which I have here only lightly touched upon. For the present

[1] *Phänom. der Geistes* Vorrede (*Werke*, II. 9).

I return to the main conclusion to which our discussion of Reason and Revelation has led us; that we cannot admit the theory of two kinds of religious knowledge, one due exclusively to the activity of our Reason and one due exclusively to the revealing activity of God; that on our side there is no Reason in Religion without Revelation; and that the discernment of Revelation, not merely initially, but throughout, is the function of Reason in Religion; so that we were brought to regard the two, Reason and Revelation, as in Religion correlative, Reason being the apprehension of Revelation, Revelation the substance and content of Reason. It was not however denied that there might be some lower kind or degree of Revelation to which some lower faculty than Reason might correspond; though we must observe that just so far as this latter could not be called Reason, because there is in it no proper understanding or comprehension of its object, so far that which it apprehends should not be called Revelation; it is rather something seen *through* a veil—'in a glass darkly,' and not 'face to face.'[1]

[1] 1 Corinthians xiii. 12.

CHAPTER II

NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION

IT is inevitable that at this point the question should be raised, Is there, then, no meaning in the traditional distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion ?

I think that it is due to the place which this distinction has held in the history of religious thought to consider it more closely and to see whether it may not express some real and important distinction ; although not that which we have just discarded between a knowledge of God reached by reason but unrevealed, and a revealed knowledge of him which has not been reached by reason.

Now it would, I suppose, be true to say that at the period in which this distinction of Natural and Revealed Religion was most in vogue, it was, on the whole, regarded as a distinction between what is special to a particular religion or to certain particular religions, and what is possessed in common by all religions. The importance of this contrast was emphasized by schools of opinion which notwithstanding regarded it from very various points of view. The tendency however was most

often, at least in the long run, to lay stress on the *common* element in different religions rather than on the special characteristics which distinguished one religion from another. Some might deny the need of any addition to the common stock of religious belief, the truth of which sound thinking would demonstrate, or at least make probable to all who would examine without prejudice the facts which nature in star and plant and animal and man presents to the studious observer. Such facts would, it was held, prove the existence of a wise and (it was often added) a good Creator. Some were ready to go further and to contend that in the facts of *human* nature was evidence enough of freedom and immortality as well. To such an alleged revelation of doctrines other than these was needless, and they did not look for it. Such was, put very roughly, and not without many variations and qualifications which would have to be considered, if we were at present treating of them historically, the position of the so-called Deists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To others, who agreed on the whole with this position, it yet seemed that 'Revelation,' while not adding to the substance of Natural Religion, had anticipated the slow processes of reasoning by setting forth in a vivid symbolism, which he who ran could read, truths to the knowledge of which only a few could otherwise have attained; and supplied additional motives

for following a line of conduct, the intrinsic reasonableness of which would not otherwise have been likely to prevail with the majority of men over the powerful passions that ever tend to drive them into courses incompatible with their true and ultimate interest. Thus future rewards for virtue and punishments for vice were promised or threatened, as the case might be, by persons accredited as divine messengers by a display of supernatural power; or a winning example of goodness was presented, inducing love and devotion in the beholders. It is easy to see that the second way of putting the distinction would harmonize with the traditional belief in a 'fall of man' which had crippled his spiritual nature. For to this fall and its consequences could be ascribed the necessity of something over and above man's original endowment—itself the gift of God—to make up for what he had lost, and to permit him, notwithstanding his fall, to reach the point which he would, had he not fallen, have reached in virtue of his original endowment.

Now, with respect to all these ways of drawing a distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion, it is, I think, true to say that the essence or substance of Religion is found in what is 'natural.' 'Revealed Religion' is only what the celebrated Matthew Tindal called it (in a phrase which, as well as the title of his own chief work, he seems to have adapted

from Bishop Sherlock, a prominent figure on the orthodox side of the deistic controversy[1]), a 'republication of the Religion of Nature,' though a republication in terms more striking and more readily intelligible to those to whom it was addressed than without this republication it could have been made.[2] Even those defenders of the necessity of Revelation who laid stress on the difference between the content of Revealed and that of Natural Religion, and on the impossibility of the truths of the former having been found out by natural reason (at least as crippled by the fall), held, I suppose, for the most part, that Revealed Religion was a superstructure resting on foundations consisting of the truths which were apprehended by Natural Religion. They must therefore have thought of the articles of Natural Religion as necessary to the whole structure of Religion in a sense in which the 'revealed' doctrines were not; since what they called 'the truths of natural religion' could be held and had been held without the 'revealed' doctrines, while the latter could not be held without the former.

[1] *Discourse before the S.P.G.* (*Works*, III. p. 348). 'The gospel was a republication of the law of nature and its precepts declarative of that original religion which was as old as the creation.'

[2] It is noteworthy that Tindal—and I have no reason to suppose that he stood alone in this—did not deny 'Natural Religion' to be in a sense 'revealed.' 'Natural Religion,' he writes (*Christianity as old as the Creation*, ed. 1732, p. 2), 'differs not from Reveal'd but in the manner of its being communicated: the one being the Internal, the other the External, Revelation of the same unchangeable Will of a Being who is alike at all times infinitely wise and good.'

Now, apart from the philosophical difficulties which we have already seen to be involved in a distinction between revealed and unrevealed religious truth, and considering the distinction of Natural and Revealed Religion merely as a distinction between the common element in all religions and the special element in one religion, it is more difficult for us than for our fathers to be satisfied with such an account as I have tried to summarize above; an account which I have endeavoured to make broad enough to express the common basis of the opposed parties in the deistic controversy. What has made it more difficult for us is in part the evolutionary idea, which since the period of the greatest vogue of the distinction which we have been considering has come to dominate so much of our thinking; and in part our better knowledge of primitive religion, which has at once promoted the advance of that idea and has itself been to a great extent due to studies carried on under its influence. For, on the one hand, our newly acquired knowledge does *not* support the belief once widely current in the primary and universal acceptance of the great doctrines of 'Natural Religion,' while, on the other hand, it still less supports the notion that the characteristic doctrines and practices of what was called Revealed Religion—and by this the parties to the controversy in which this distinction played so important a part practically meant Christianity — are really

unique. Indeed it may even seem that it is there rather than elsewhere that the common and original element in religion is to be sought; that the large generalizations with which Natural Religion was held to be concerned are reached later and more rarely. It is thus no longer possible for us to identify what is primitive in religion and common to all religions with what commends itself best to the Reason, as was done both by those who treated what was added (if anything was added) by any special revelation as subsidiary, and by those who regarded it as something which transcended reason, even if it did not actually baffle and confound it.[1]

Thus from the intellectual context to which the old distinction of Natural and Revealed Religion belonged, from the assumptions of those who used it, assumptions common to both parties in the controversy which hinged upon it, we have moved so far away that we cannot profitably draw the distinction as it was drawn when it was most talked of. But yet I think that there are certain distinctions which ought to be drawn, and to which the phraseology of the old distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion is not inappropriate; which, moreover, were—and otherwise there would be no justification

[1] It was generally left to the irony of opponents of the established religion at the period of the deistic controversy to dwell upon the baffling and confounding character of the special doctrines of Christianity; on the other hand, Pascal used it as a method of apologetic in his *Pensées* (xi., xii., ed. Havet).

for stretching that phraseology to cover them—really in the minds of those who used that old distinction, although not disentangled from one another, or from that between the common and the special in religion, or indeed altogether from that between Christianity, on the one side, and all other religions, on the other.

Two such distinctions, I think, may be recognized as closely related to the old distinction of Natural and Revealed Religion, so that they may throw light upon what was in the mind of those who used it.

1. The first of these is a distinction between a manifestation of God in nature apart from man, and a manifestation of God in the human spirit.

It is a commonplace that the progress of the natural sciences has made it more difficult than it was to discover, with the old deists and their opponents alike, convincing evidence of the existence of a wise and good—especially of a good—God in the order of the world, that is, of the world apart from man. A striking poem by a living English poet, Mr. William Watson, expresses very well a kind of reflexion very familiar to thoughtful persons in our time:

> 'Higher than heaven they sit,
> Life and her consort Law,
> And One whose countenance lit
> In mine more perfect awe
> I fain had deemed their peer

Beside them throned above,
Even him who casts out fear,
Unconquerable Love.
Ah, 'twas on earth alone that I his beauty saw.'[1]

A seemingly infinite fecundity, an order which seems never to disappoint the aspiration of our reason after the discovery of a necessary connexion among phenomena, these (it is suggested) science finds in the world, but not the other member of this trinity—

'. . . him who casts out fear,
Unconquerable Love.'

Rather it is disposed to speak with Heraclitus[2] of 'Strife the parent of all things,' πόλεμος πατὴρ πάντων; for it finds the secret of the development of the manifold kinds of life in a universal 'struggle for existence.' It is (as Mr. Watson hints) not in nature as distinguished from man, but in human life, in the human spirit and in the institutions, the civilization, art, morality, religion, in which the human spirit has expressed itself, that we have that higher principle *revealed*, while in Nature, if it be there at all (which Mr. Watson seems to deny), it is not there revealed, but rather hidden. This doctrine, that God, who is hidden, *unrevealed*, in Nature, is *revealed* in Man, is thus enunciated by Jacobi: 'Is it unreasonable to confess that we believe in God not by reason of Nature which conceals him, but by reason of the supernatural in man

[1] *The Hope of the World*, § 1. [2] Ed. Bywater, § 44.

which alone reveals and proves him to exist? Nature conceals God; Man reveals God. . . . As man has a living faith in this power superior to Nature which dwells in him, so has he belief in God, a feeling, an experience of his existence. As he does not believe in this power, so does he not believe in God; he sees, he experiences nought in existence but nature, necessity, and fate.'[1] And thus though, as we have seen, we cannot think of any genuine knowledge of God, which is not in fact revealed knowledge, yet we may admit a difference of degree within the sphere of revelation, and call the manifestation of God in the human spirit pre-eminently *revelation*, in contrast with the manifestation in *nature* of power and system apart from goodness, of life and law (to use Mr. William Watson's words) apart from love. No doubt when once the revelation in the spirit of man is recognized, we may go on to seek in nature attributes of the divine Being which, apart from their revelation in man, we should not have been able to discover there.

Such is one distinction which it is worth while to draw, and which may be intelligibly called a

[1] *Von den Gottlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenburung, Werke*, III. pp. 424–6. Quoted by Sir W. Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, I. pp. 40, 41. For Hegel, too, that is the Revealed Religion in which God is no more a mere object to consciousness, but Spirit conscious of itself; wherein, that is, we recognize our mind as not merely something by which we lay hold of a divine being other than ourselves, but rather that which is itself the truest manifestation of the divine nature, *Geist fur den Geist* (*Werke*, XII. p. 198).

distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion. In it the expressions 'natural' and 'revealed' are, of course, if our previous contentions were sound, used in a sense which cannot in either case be pressed. For any knowledge of God which may be obtained from the world of nature as distinct from that of spirit is not to be regarded as unrevealed, although we may call the sphere of spirit, in which he is more clearly revealed, the sphere of Revealed Religion, in contrast to one which, whatever manifestation there is, is in comparison obscure and doubtful. On the other hand, although the sense of *nature* in which it is used as exclusive of the mind and thought of man is familiar, it is plain that mind and thought of man are part of nature in a wider sense; so that the revelation of God in the spirit of man is not *unnatural*, and only relatively (what we found Jacobi calling it in the passage quoted above) *supernatural;* in reference, namely, to a use of the word 'nature,' which is not the widest that can legitimately be given to it.

2. I now pass to a second distinction which exhibits a relationship to the traditional distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion. Here it is not easy to use the word 'natural' of one side of the distinction even in a relative sense; on the other hand, this second distinction is perhaps on the whole more closely akin to the traditional distinction than that which we have just been discussing.

We shall, I think, find it to be characteristic of the various operations of our intelligence, when we differentiate them by means of the various sorts of objects to which they respectively correspond, that the more concrete is the object the more important does the individual personality of the subject become. In mathematical science, where our object is most abstract, many sides of our spiritual nature seem not to come into play at all; and so, though we no doubt admire the genius of a great mathematician, yet his individual personality, which is, of course, a condition of his attaining his results, seems to enter scarcely at all into the results themselves; and this seems to be the reason why in such sciences the student does not commonly study, except out of historical curiosity, the works of the great pioneers; they are or may be superseded by the works of those who stand, to use the metaphor of Bernard of Chartres,[1] upon the shoulders of the giants. But in art, poetry, philosophy, this is not so. Phidias, Homer, Plato cannot be thus superseded; our interest in them cannot become archaeological merely; their personality is so intimately mixed with their results that we cannot get at the latter in any way except through actual communion with their minds as expressed in their works. And what is true in art, in poetry, in philosophy, is true above all in religion.

[1] John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, III. 14.

The same contrast may be expressed in another way. The universal nature of the triangle, for instance, although it does not exist except in particular triangles, yet is expressed equally well and (within a certain limited range of variation) in the same way in any. For the varying element, e.g. the equality or inequality of the sides, can be without difficulty ignored, since we know just what we are ignoring, and that ignoring it will make no difference to what we do not ignore. Hence the general treatment of the nature of the triangle is easy. But the universal nature of poetry, for example, expresses itself with such various individuality in every good poet and good poem that it cannot be abstracted with the like ease; and so neither can the universal nature of religion. Here, above all, are the special manifestations of the universal so individual, so far from a mere repetition of what is found in other manifestations, that an abstractly general consideration of it is a matter of no small difficulty; and what is sometimes taken for such is often nothing of the sort; it is often an arbitrary extract whose historical context is merely concealed and not separated off by legitimate abstraction. Hence that impossibility of *defining* religion to which I referred in my introductory lecture.

A legitimate treatment of religious topics in a general way—for such I think there may be—though it will to a considerable extent correspond, as regards

its content, with what used to be called Natural Religion, can scarcely be called so without overmuch straining that expression. For it will not be the original stock from which the world's religions have diverged, but the result of advanced reflexion upon them. In contrast to this there corresponds to Revealed Religion in the traditional antithesis that *historical* element, different in every religion, and always, we may perhaps find ourselves driven to admit, remaining in a certain way opaque, if it may so be put, to the understanding. By the *historical* element I do not here mean exactly the same as what I called above the *special* element. I will show by an example what the difference is which I should make between the two expressions. The doctrines of the Trinity or of Original Sin in Christianity, or that of Karma in Buddhism, may be said to be *special* to those religions, but they express certain speculations on the nature of God or of the human soul which may be supported by reasons; they do not state facts which have occurred in certain times or places, although it is true that their prominence and the way in which they are formulated may be determined by the historical facts connected with their promulgation. Special dogmas, such as I have instanced, invite us to study them as philosophical doctrines do, with a view to seeing how far we can discover in them the form of necessity; but when we come to the historical

circumstances of their promulgation, we never seem to see into the necessity of these; we do not understand, for example, why a certain eternal moral principle should be first announced by a Jew, any more than why the syllogism was first formulated by a Greek, or the law of universal gravitation by an Englishman. Yet we are reluctant to believe but that to a mind with a complete comprehension of the universe that seeming opaqueness in the fact which makes one say: 'I see no reason why this should have been so' would disappear; just as for such a mind we are inclined to suppose that what Mill[1] called the 'collocations' which cannot be eliminated from the system of nature, wherever you start your attempt to work out its necessary sequence, would not have the appearance of arbitrariness which they wear to ours.[2] It is perhaps a sign that in Religion we have reached the most concrete and complete form of experience that here some recognition of the importance and even the necessity of the historical setting (though it is a necessity into which in the sense described we do not *see*) seems demanded in a way in which it is not with the discovery of a scientific law, or even of a moral principle. In the case of religion it would on the whole be true to say that it is in

[1] *Logic*, III. 5, §§ 8, 9.

[2] This does not necessarily imply that they are, and therefore would to a perfect intelligence be known as, parts of a system fatally determined, or of one explicable throughout by principles of mechanism.

what are admittedly the highest forms of religion that this intimate connexion of the historical setting with the doctrine is most strongly felt, and that by the religious believer himself; while in the case of the abstract sciences it is not felt by the man of science himself as such, but only, if at all, by the philosopher in his pursuit of a general comprehension of the mutual relations of the Universal and the Particular.

CHAPTER III

RELIGION AND RELIGIONS: RATIONALISM AND SENTIMENTALISM

BEFORE leaving the first of our three problems, that of Reason and Revelation, I propose to offer some brief observations on two points which have been raised in the course of our discussions, and to say no more at all of which would seem to leave our treatment of the problem glaringly incomplete. Yet either of them, if discussed with the fullness which it deserves, would carry us far beyond that problem in the form in which we have undertaken to examine it. Here, therefore, as in my preliminary observations, I shall be occupied chiefly in stating a position, without pretending to supply an adequate justification of it.

1. The first of these points is the relation of *Religion* to *Religions*. We have seen that the question of this relation presented itself as a difficulty at the outset of my discussion of the Philosophy of Religion; and later on, that it was desirable to distinguish (on lines which, though not quite the same, roughly corresponded with those of the traditional distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion) between

what, in the religions of the world, is amenable to general treatment, the ideas, that is, implied in religious practices or expressed in religious doctrines, and what belongs to the historical context of particular religions, and varied from one to another. About this historical element we noted two things: one, that, contrary to what one might perhaps have expected, an insistence on the importance of the historical element does not go with a lower, but rather with a higher type of religion; and the other, that this is perhaps not so surprising as it might at first seem, because, if in religion we have reached the highest form of experience, we should expect it to relate to an object in the fullest sense concrete, no part of whose nature could be conceived of as indifferent to any other. To these considerations I will, on this occasion, add only one more. The peculiarities of particular religious systems which have appeared in the course of the history of mankind are not to be considered by the philosophic student of religion as unimportant. They are rather to be regarded much as in the study of philosophy itself we regard the details of different philosophical systems. It is just in the study of these, of their relations to one another, of their points of difference and agreement—of the points of difference just as much as of the points of agreement—that a large, perhaps the greatest, part of our philosophical studies, as a matter of fact, consists. We look upon

actual philosophy as the whole body of serious thinking on ultimate questions, and regard the great systems as making each its own contribution thereto; and while we do not deny the existence of what are, from our point of view, accidental circumstances affecting the order in which philosophical questions have been asked, the course followed in the transmission of philosophical interest from one group of people to another, or the form assumed by particular answers to philosophical questions, yet we find ourselves able to recognize a general process of more or less continuous development in the changes of opinion among men belonging to the same civilized society, within which an interchange of ideas goes on among the different peoples included within it. There is nothing in all this that is inconsistent with the recognition of the superiority of some systems to others or even of some one system to all others. On the contrary, the more we can discern what we may call an organic connexion among the different systems, the more we shall expect the whole body to have a definite structure or plan; the less, that is, we shall expect to find one part interchangeable with another. Moreover, in tracing the descent of systems, the analogy of organic evolution would lead us to expect to find some main line of descent which has led to higher issues than others; although the recognition of this does not involve the superiority in all respects of all the beings on the direct line of descent of what

is on the whole the highest form evolved, to all those on other lines more remotely related to this higher form. The most intelligent animals after man are not necessarily those most nearly akin to him among the races which inhabit the earth. The analogy is easily applied; but it must not be forgotten that it is no more than an analogy. In particular there is nothing in it to correspond to the exclusive claims to truth which are characteristic of the higher religions, and of none more markedly than of Christianity. My present limits prevent me from discussing this fully. I would only say that this claim appears to be the expression of the conviction which—despite the popularity at present of a different view—I hold to be essential to Religion, when it has come to full consciousness of itself; the conviction, namely, that it involves the recognition of an independent Reality about which its doctrinal statements are either true or false. But, while it must be admitted that truth in the proper sense is thus claimed by religious doctrines, there is a possibility here as elsewhere that some statements are relatively true, true that is as against those to which they were at first opposed, but not true as against others which were not in the minds of those who originally enunciated them. There is also a possibility of incidental (or even of more than incidental) mistakes which can be corrected without denial of the correctness in general drift of the whole body of doctrine.

Lastly, there is possibility of a synthesis between various statements which are *prima facie* at variance, and require further experience or knowledge for their conciliation.

But perhaps this question of the relation of *Religion* to *Religions* would not seem to possess the difficulty which it is often felt to exhibit, apart from the presence of practical problems, the discussion of which lies beyond my present purpose.

2. The other point of which, before leaving altogether this antithesis of Reason and Revelation, I think it desirable to say something, which will not pretend to be at all complete, is one of great importance in itself, and also one upon which I have already touched in passing.[1] In concluding my description of the antithesis of Reason and Revelation I contended that they were to be considered as correlative in the sense in which Knowledge and Reality in general are correlative; that, just as, except where what is apprehended is Reality, we should not call the apprehension Knowledge, nor, except where the apprehension is Knowledge, is that which is apprehended that which *really is*, so here, in the sphere of Religion, we proved that, except where God was *revealing* himself, we could not regard the process of religious apprehension as *rational*, nor, except where there is the active

[1] See above, pp. 45 foll.

exercise of *reason* in the apprehension of God, is God truly *revealed* to the human soul.

But there are many (as we saw) who would deny that Reason and Revelation stand in any such close relation at all to one another. The position of those who regard them as rival, or at least as parallel, sources of religious knowledge has been discussed. But others would reject Reason altogether, or almost altogether, from the sphere of religious experience. They would restrict it to the sphere of 'science' and make the world of space and time, of number and measure, its only object. If religion be admitted at all as a mode of experience, the organ of this kind of experience would be described as *feeling*, and not as *understanding* or *reason* at all.

This type of view which makes *feeling* as opposed to *reason* the organ of religious experience usually appears as a reaction from some form of what is called Rationalism, and finds a relative justification for its existence in its insistence upon facts which Rationalism has ignored. By Rationalism I understand not belief in *Reason*, but an exclusive reliance upon *reasoning*. What is characteristic of Rationalism is its notion of *proof*, with which its tendency to *abstractness* is closely connected. Every experience is referred away from itself, and brought under some general rule applicable to itself and to other things alike. Hence there is a tendency to miss what is

individual or unique in favour of what is abstract and common. Now we have come across this tendency already in the notion of 'Natural Religion' as the *common* element in Religion; and it was characteristic of the age which has been called the *Saeculum Rationalisticum* [1] to lay especial stress upon this. It might seem at first sight inconsistent with this account of Rationalism that it should also be blamed for treating things in a *hard and fast* way, insisting upon distinctions and missing the living bond of connexion which holds together in one organic unity what Rationalism takes only as it appears, so to speak, after dissection, so that, as Mephistopheles says,[2]—

'Wer will was Lebendiges erkennen und beschreiben
Such erst den Geist heraus zu treiben;
Dann hat er die Theile in seiner Hand,
Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band!'

But there is in truth no real inconsistency here. It is in virtue of the abstractly general character of each distinguished element in the whole that each element is set apart from that with which in this individual instance it is organically united. Where then this Rationalism prevails, Reason comes to be regarded as something which never looks at things as they are, which always misses the unique reality

[1] I know not by whom; the phrase is modelled on the titles given to earlier Christian centuries in Cave's *Historia Literaria*.

[2] Goethe, *Faust, Part I.* (*Werke*, ed. Schmidt, 1909, I. 276).

before us, and confounds it with others under a general formula. And so there arises over against Rationalism the antagonistic view which cleaves, in despite of Reason (thus understood), to the immediate certainty of Feeling, where the demand for proof is not applicable, since the feeling is itself its own sufficient and only possible evidence. But we shall not really evade our difficulties in this way, least of all perhaps when dealing with Religion. For if there is nothing in Religion but feeling, one feeling is (as such) as good as another. As feelings they can be distinguished only as pleasant and unpleasant. To discriminate them further, we must refer to what may be called their content, that is, to the characteristics which may be discovered in them by analysis, when we are no longer absorbed by the feeling, but asking ourselves what this feeling which we have had *is* or *means*. Thus we are thrown back into the sphere of Reason, the discriminating, classifying, generalizing faculty from whose tyranny we were endeavouring to escape. No doubt Religion always involves an element of what may be called feeling or emotion, without which a conviction (for example) that God exists (such as St. James [1] attributes to the devils) is not a religious conviction at all. But neither, on the other hand, can a feeling or emotion be properly called religious which does

[1] James ii. 19.

not involve the consciousness that it is excited by and towards an independent reality.

No one accustomed to the study of ideas will be surprised to discover that at the root of these two opposite extremes of Rationalism and what we may perhaps call, for want of a better name, Sentimentalism, there lies the *same* mistake. Both decline to enter upon the task of attempting to *understand* Religion *from within;* that is, Rationalism as well as Sentimentalism refuses to Reason its full rights. In Rationalism Reason holds off, as it were, from trying to comprehend what is most characteristic in religious experience. Instead of allowing the paradoxical nature of religious doctrines to be provocative [1] to it and to stimulate it to further effort, the rationalistic understanding makes it a ground for declining to consider them further. Thus doctrines like those of the Trinity or of Original Sin in Christian theology are set aside because in arithmetic one and three are different numbers, and because the citizen of a civilized state will not accept responsibility for his ancestors' criminal acts. The question is not put, why such obvious contradictions to our ordinary ways of thinking have been entertained and considered of high importance. Or it is put, and the answer is suggested that we have here mere survivals of fanciful notions elsewhere discarded; and the further question is

[1] παρακλητικά. See Plato, *Rep.* VII., 524 D, E.

not raised, why they are not discarded here also; for it is plainly not because they have not been made the subject of close attention. The rationalistic criticism ought only to bring out the need of putting and answering such enquiries; but it may simply lead to the neglect of them as not worth pursuing. Like Sentimentalism then, Rationalism denies the intelligible or rational character of religious experience. Thus Rationalism and Sentimentalism are found in history in close contiguity. It is no accident that in the *saeculum rationalisticum* the heyday of Deism and of the Wolfian philosophy saw the rise of a series of strongly emotional religious movements, of Pietism, Moravianism, Methodism in Protestant Europe, and in Catholic Europe of the devotion (presenting marked affinity with these) of the Sacred Heart; while, outside of the Churches, close upon the heels of Voltaire there came Rousseau.

The distinction, which Kant introduced the fashion of making, between the Understanding and the Reason, may be used to express the distinction between the rationalizing consideration of things in a general way from without, apart from a real insight into their special nature—this may be called Understanding—and the consideration of them from within, when one follows, so to speak, their actual structure [1]—this may be called Reason. Or again

[1] τὰ μέλη τε καὶ μέρη διέλων τῷ λόγῳ. Plato *Philebus*, 14 E. See also *Phaedrus*, 266. Cp. E. Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, I. p. 175.

we may describe the distinction which we wish to draw in Aristotelian language as a distinction between Dialectic which disregards and Science which takes account of the ἴδιαι ἀρχαί, the principles appropriate or peculiar to the subject with which we are dealing. But it should always be remembered — it has sometimes, I think, been forgotten—that one must not simply take *Feeling*, call it by the name of *Reason*, and under this *alias* exalt it above *Understanding*; that one's *understanding from within* must be *understanding* still, though not understanding in the special sense of *understanding from without* or in a *general* way. When Carlyle in his *Life of Sterling*[1] says sarcastically of Coleridge as he 'sat upon Highgate Hill' in his later days that he 'knew the sublime secret of believing by the Reason what the Understanding had been obliged to fling out as incredible,' this is, I suppose, the essence of the error which he is condemning; I do not stay to enquire how far the accusation, as levelled against Coleridge himself, was just or no. Reason is not, as such, emotional any more than Understanding is emotional; but when a certain object cannot be known without a certain kind of feeling, Reason will not pretend to know it without that kind of feeling. With respect to whatever sphere of experience it is trying to comprehend, and so in respect to Religion, it is not content to rule out any part

[1] c. 8.

of that experience as inessential by the application of an external (in the case before us a non-religious) criterion. It will not, to revert to an illustration which I have already used, reject the doctrine of the Trinity because it is arithmetically incoherent, or that of Original Sin because the law-abiding citizen will rightly refuse to be held responsible for crimes committed by his ancestors. It will rather attempt to penetrate the *religious* significance which such doctrines may have for those who hold them, despite their obvious inconsistency, as stated, with principles which the very same people would readily recognize elsewhere. This attempt to understand religious doctrines from within is likely to result in the discovery that they are neither mere absurdities to be set aside as such, nor yet to be allowed a merely figurative or metaphorical significance. On the other hand, it will probably bring any one sincerely undertaking it to distinguish in the doctrines an essential from an accidental element. By an accidental element I do not mean an element without any intelligible relation to the development of the doctrine, but an element which belongs to a stage which it has passed or may pass beyond, and so has come to possess a *merely* historical interest, as a 'survival,' in the proper sense of the word, from an earlier stage, and now (if we may use the phrase) no longer *functioning*.

There is a word often used in these discussions

which is especially open to misunderstanding, and about which it may be worth while saying something here—I mean the word *intuition*. Not only in considering religion in particular, but also in considering other departments of our experience also, is it important to be sure what we mean by this word 'intuition,' and to distinguish *intuition* from *feeling*. Intuition (when used in such contexts as I now have in mind; Kant's *Anschauung*, usually so translated, is a different matter and, although there is an historical connexion between the usages, we shall do best to leave this out of account for the present) seems to be properly used of such an immediate apprehension as is not 'discursive,' and can without absurdity be attributed to God, who cannot be supposed to need what is, by way of contrast, called 'discursive reasoning.'

Discursus ('discourse of reason') as attributed to the human mind, has, we are told by St. Thomas Aquinas,[1] a twofold reference; to the temporal succession of our thoughts, and to the separate steps by which in a process of reasoning one is gradually conducted to one's conclusion. In neither reference can it be attributed to God. The divine thought cannot be supposed either to require time for its development, or to attain its end by separate steps, as it were, but must rather be conceived as apprehending the whole of reality *uno intuitu*, at

[1] *Summa Theologica*, I. qu. 14, art. 7.

a single glance; *simul omnia videt.*[1] All these expressions, which in their literal sense refer to *sight*, are intended to suggest not what we sometimes describe as *blind* instinct, or any such kind of apprehension as we should call *dim* or *obscure*, but rather what by an English word of corresponding significance we often name *insight*. It is plain, then, that we ought never to use *intuition* of obscure or vague apprehensions, but only of something which can without absurdity be designated *insight, immediate* indeed, but *clear*.

The confusion which undoubtedly haunts some minds between *intuition* and mere *feeling* seems to arise from the fact that in the case of neither can we give a *proof* of that which we apprehend. But there is a great difference, which should always be borne in mind, between these two things; one, not being able to *prove* something which we *feel* (as we say) but do not *see* to be true, something which we take to be, as it were, in some way less sure for not being proved, or of which, even though we be certain of it ourselves, so that we desire for ourselves no further proof, we cannot communicate our certainty to others; and the other, not being able to offer a further proof of something which is perfectly clear already, which is (as we put it) *self-evident*. One cannot prove that twice two are four to any one who does not see it when he has the units put before him. Nor, again,

[1] Augustine, *De Trin.*, XV. 14, § 23, quoted by St. Thomas, l.c.

can we *prove* the 'Principle of Contradiction,' unless we call it proof to show the man who calls it in question that he assumes it in his very denial of it. For when he says 'The Principle of Contradiction is not valid' he must mean, if he means anything at all, to exclude the contradictory statement that it *is* valid; that is, he assumes the validity of the principle itself, the law that two contradictory propositions cannot be in the same sense true at once; and his denial of it, apart from such an assumption of its validity, would have no semblance of meaning at all.[1] Now, in such cases as these it is natural to say not that we *feel* that twice two are four or that the Principle of Contradiction is valid, but rather that we *see* these things to be so. Now I am not asserting that it is possible to find religious truths which could be at once admitted to be unquestionably true like those which I have instanced.[2] Such unquestionableness can hardly be found except in a subject-matter where simplification and abstraction are more possible than they are in the subject-matter of Religion. But I do wish to insist on the difference thus illustrated between *intuition* and *feeling;* and on the importance of not confounding the one with the other. All knowledge is actually intuitive to some extent, for even where we reach our conclusion through a long series

[1] Cp. Aristotle, *Metaph.*, Γ. 4.

[2] Dante makes Justinian in Paradise find the theology of the Council of Chalcedon as self-evident as the Principle of Contradiction is to men on earth.—*Par.*, VI. 19–21.

of intermediate steps we see *directly* or *immediately* the connexion of each step with the next, and our perception of the cogency of the whole argument must be direct or immediate likewise. The highest conceivable form of religious knowledge, as of all knowledge, would, I suppose, be intuitive throughout, in the sense that the whole result would be present to consciousness in the parts or moments, and all the parts or moments explicit in the whole or result. But this is something very different from saying that the highest form of religious experience would be, or is, mere feeling.

In the later writings of that remarkable man, the late Father George Tyrrell, particularly in his book called *Through Scylla and Charybdis*,[1] we find him insisting on the importance of distinguishing between the *intuitions* of prophets, of men, that is, possessed of original religious genius, on the one hand, and on the other the theological reflexion upon these which inevitably arises in the schools or communities of which these prophets become the founders. I am not here concerned with the special context in which Father Tyrrell was led to insist upon this distinction. But it is a distinction upon which many beside him are disposed to lay stress, and I should like to indicate very briefly what seems to me to be the truth about it as it stands. That it expresses something which is really a fact in the history of religion I do not doubt.

[1] See especially Chapters IV. V. XI. XIII.

There are beyond question prophets, not in the sense in which Plato, in a passage I quoted above [1] uses the word of the Delphic priestess, or in which we might employ it of the hierophants or diviners whom he describes as having seen truth in the fifth degree, but men of religious genius, who seem themselves to enjoy a direct vision of things spiritual and declare to others what they see. These men become the originators of religious movements. There are also theologians, who do not originate religious movements, but make the declarations of those whom I have called the prophets the subject-matter of their reflexion, who throw the statements of the prophets into systematic form, discuss the relation of these statements to other parts of their own knowledge and belief, and so on; and lastly, as a rule, it is not the same men who enjoy the vision and who thus reflect upon it, or, if sometimes the same men do both, we can distinguish their hour of vision from their reflexion upon what in that hour they saw. An analogous distinction may be pointed out in other spheres, especially in that of poetry and of art generally.

Now, when I was trying to state the distinction between *intuition* and *feeling*, I used language implying that the readiness with which the content of an intuition can be communicated—as when we show some one that twice two are four, or as Socrates in Plato [2] shows Meno's slaveboy that the square on

[1] See above, p. 46. [2] *Meno*, 82, 83.

the doubled line is not twice but four times as great as the square on the original line—was a mark by which an intuition may be discriminated from a mere *feeling*, which, as such, defies expression and cannot be communicated. But it may be pointed out that in intuitions of those whom I have called prophets there is something incommunicable, so that in this respect they approximate to the condition of mere feelings. Now here we must, I think, distinguish. In the first place we may exaggerate the incommunicability of the prophet's intuitions. We have already seen that it is precisely these prophets, these men of original religious experience, who found religious communities. But this is surely just because they *can* and *do* communicate what they see, their intuitions. The writer of the Fourth Gospel makes Christ say, 'All things which I have heard from my Father I have made known unto you.' [1] And the same writer throughout his Gospel evidently regards it as characteristic of the supreme inspiration of him whom he sets before his readers as the only-begotten Son or Word of God that it is no dim or obscure feeling, for which words cannot be found, but a clear knowledge which, where fit recipients can be found, can be without reserve or hesitation imparted. Such, however we may think of the value of this writer's witness to the character of the teaching of the historical Jesus, was at least the conception formed by one who

[1] John xv. 15.

was himself a great religious genius of what the highest inspiration would be. We may compare the Jewish tradition[1] concerning the difference between the inspiration of Moses, to whom Jahweh spoke face to face and not in riddles and figures, and that of other prophets, to whom revelation only came in dreams and visions.

We must not then press too far the supposed incommunicableness of the highest inspiration. But, of course, communicability in this as in other spheres is relative to the presence of competent recipients. 'I have many things to say unto you,' says the Johannine Christ again, 'but *ye* cannot bear them now,'[2] though he looks forward to their being able to do so hereafter. Newton's discovery of the law of gravitation would have been, and is, incommunicable, except as a dogmatic formula, to men whose lack of mathematical insight or training disqualifies them from intelligently following the proof of it. And in the same way a prophet's inspiration may happen to be in fact incommunicable because his companions and contemporaries stand at a level of insight so far below his own, and yet that need not involve any lack of clearness or distinctness in the vision itself or justify us in describing it as mere feeling. Again *non omnia possumus omnes;* the task of the man who has original intuitions is to declare them in the readiest form in which he can

[1] Numbers xii. 6–8. [2] John xvi. 12.

express them, leaving it to others to work them out; and although there may be sometimes, and is in our days, a danger of underrating (just as at other times there has been a danger of overrating) the dignity of the work done by the reflective understanding in bringing out what was implicit in an original intuition; yet we no doubt do tend to place the man of original intuition above the systematizer who only works out the original intuition of another. In proportion, however, as the prophet's own insight is less clear, we are more ready, though recognizing that he has the distinction of originality, to regard the interpretative work done by the reflective understanding upon it as approaching the same level of value with the original insight. Nor, I think, should we be disposed to rank the great theologian (even if he be not also a prophet, in our present sense, as well) below the kind of man whose vague, unsystematic and one-sided utterances we should admit to be original and suggestive, but should regard as approximating to the expression of emotion rather than as the description of a clearly presented reality, and as so far removed from the 'open vision' of the greatest men in the history of religion.

I need not say that I am aware of serious difficulties which might be encountered in the detailed working-out of the view which I have stated in the instances afforded by history. But I do not think I am travelling beyond the facts in insisting that clearness, sanity,

communicableness, are marks of what is recognizably a higher inspiration, and obscurity, frenzy, confusion, of a lower; nor beyond a just inference from the facts in rejecting any theory of religion which makes it an affair of feeling and *not* of reason, which assigns it the region of the subconscious as its proper seat,[1] which would dispense it (not merely in the case of this man or of that, but in the case of the whole religious community) from the formation of a theology, or which denies the possibility of it having a conflict with 'science' on the ground that it should profess to make no assertions of fact to which 'science' could have anything to say.

[1] Sanday, *Christologies, Ancient and Modern*, p. 159.

PART II

NATURE AND GRACE

CHAPTER IV

THE ANTITHESIS OF NATURE AND GRACE

WITHOUT supposing that I have by any means exhausted what might be said upon my first antithesis of Reason and Revelation, I now pass to my second, that of *Nature and Grace.*

It would be quite possible to contend that this antithesis would have been more properly placed before, instead of after, that of Reason and Revelation. In either antithesis, it might be argued, we have a particular way of regarding two parties in whose intercourse with one another Religion consists; and in the contrast of Reason and Revelation, as we ended by regarding it, we have advanced in the definiteness of our conception upon that involved in the contrast of Nature and Grace. On the one side you have no longer merely *nature*, but a nature of a special kind—*rational* nature; on the other not merely *grace*, something freely imparted by God, but grace in the specific shape corresponding to the special kind of nature which we call rational, name *revelation*, the answer of a rational being to a question asked by a rational being, an answer which carries forward the reasoning process of which the question

is the starting-point to a conclusion satisfactory to the reason in which it originated. Grace is thus a more general name for divine influences than Revelation; Nature a more general name for their recipient than Reason. Moreover, we seem to be nearer a comprehension of the terms of our third and last antithesis, Man and God, when we know man not only as Nature, but as Reason, and God not merely as a source of influence, but as a Revealer, Spirit and mind meeting with spirit and mind.

Such an arrangement of our antitheses might thus be defended; but the arrangement here chosen may be supported by an appeal to the same facts. Man's nature, though rational, is not *wholly* or *merely* rational (it may be put either way from different points of view), nor is that in our nature which is other than Reason out of all relation to God, whose grace thus comes to us not only in the form of Revelation, but also otherwise. Though man is not man *without* reason, he is not reason alone; and though a God our knowledge of whom was not due to his self-revelation [1] would not be what we mean by God, yet God's whole activity in relation to us cannot be called in a strict sense Revelation. Thus the pair of more general conceptions, Nature and Grace, may be taken as mediating between the pair of more special conceptions, Reason and Revelation, and the pair of complete notions, Man and God. We

[1] See above, p. 25.

shall, however, not be able to lose sight of the fact that the language of the antithesis of Nature and Grace can, as compared with that of the antithesis of Reason and Revelation, be applied more easily than the latter to religious beliefs which belong to lower stages of human development than those at which the higher religions and their theologies arise.

I do not intend to stray—for I am in no way qualified to do so—into a field now occupied by so many able workers, the field of the study of those religions which belong to what is called the Lower Culture. I would only point out that the conception of Grace as it appears in the theology of Christendom is no doubt a conception the pedigree of which may be historically traced back to such cruder and vaguer conceptions as that of the *Mana* of the Polynesians,[1] and other kindred notions which prevail among uncivilized peoples all over the world; conceptions which seem to belong to what Mr. Marett has called pre-animistic religion; religion, that is, at a stage in which the mysterious or supernatural character of things whose appearance or effects are out of the common, is not as yet explained by any definite theory of a personal ghost or spirit which is possessing it. Such vague conceptions of a mysterious or supernatural, because inexplicable, power or virtue supposed to inhere in things which strike men as in any

[1] For a brief description of which reference may be made to Mr. R. R. Marett's *The Threshold of Religion*, pp. 115 foll.

way out of the common have at first, one may suppose, little or nothing of what we should call an ethical character. To take instances from ancient literature, belonging no doubt to a period at which the stage of animistic explanation has long been reached, but which sufficiently illustrate this point, the strength by which Samson rent the lion as he would have rent a kid when the Spirit of Jahweh came mightily upon him,[1] and the divine beauty with which the Homeric gods so often on great occasions invest their favourites[2] would be instances of such *grace* bestowed upon and again withdrawn from men who would be by *nature* without these advantages. Such grace may be regarded as depending upon some talisman which has nothing to do with the moral character of him who enjoys it. Samson's strength is 'as the strength of ten,' not 'because his heart is pure,' like Sir Galahad's, in Tennyson, but because his locks are unshorn; and similarly the hero in many a fairy tale has nothing to recommend him to the princess except when he is wearing a magic ring or the like.

With the advance of the religious consciousness to a higher level, this conception of a supernatural excellence of some kind added to the original nature of a man is, so to say, moralized. The long history of this process cannot here be traced; and passing over many intermediate steps I take up the consideration

[1] Judges xiv. 6. [2] *e.g. Odyssey*, VI. 230, 231.

of this family of conceptions at the very advanced stage represented by Christian theology. Here the goodness of God has become axiomatic, and the object of divine favour is conceived as a saint, a person of exceptional moral excellence. Even if there is thought to be requisite, in the words of Dante,

'la fè, senza la qual ben far non basta,'[1]
'the faith, without which good works nought avail,'

yet this faith is in the first place something which only a rational being can hold, and in the second is conceived of as making a higher moral condition possible than would be possible without it; while the very disparagement of 'good works,' which at first seems unethical, is itself inspired by the moral reprobation of that self-complacent temperament which esteems one's own good works sufficient to merit heaven, a temper which (it is thought) implies a lower standard than that expressed by the confession that 'all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags.'[2]

At this stage, however, not only does the tradition still persist that things other than men, things which are not subjects capable of moral predicates at all, may yet receive such a supernatural excellence in addition to their original nature; but even with respect to men the *grace* bestowed upon them has sometimes been described in a way which raises serious difficulties from the point of view of the moral consciousness. Thus it has been regarded as

[1] *Purgatorio*, XXII. 60. [2] Isaiah lxiv. 6.

something which has predestinated the elect person to salvation, antecedently to the doing by him of either good or evil; or as something communicated to him through certain material substances endowed with a sacramental virtue as means of grace. We must be careful here to speak exactly and not to misrepresent the views to which we refer. Certainly neither was predestinating grace thought to fail in at least ultimately sanctifying its object, nor sacramental grace to be effective of salvation where the right moral dispositions could be present and were not, or where actual sin had supervened; unless, indeed, this in its turn should have been removed by repentance and forgiveness. Yet there has been a constant and urgent need of an effort on the part of theologians who accepted the traditional language to answer the objections that predestinating grace is arbitrary, and sacramental grace magical, or, in other words, that the recognition of either is offensive to the enlightened moral consciousness.

Kant, in whom the movement of thought which was characterized by the claim made by those who partook in it to enlightenment, and which derived thence its German title of *Aufklärung*, found at once its crowning representative and its destructive critic, expressed his dissatisfaction from the point of view of morality with the traditional doctrine of 'operations of grace'[1] and 'means of grace'[2] in his book

[1] *Gnadenwirkungen.* [2] *Gnadenmitteln.*

on 'Religion within the limits of the Mere (or bare) Reason.'[1] To the first division of this work is appended a 'general remark' on the former, to the fourth division a 'general remark' on the latter. Both in his view rank among *Parerga* for one who is concerned with Religion only within the limits of the Mere Reason.

Kant held that the only truly rational and permanent element in religion was the ethical; nothing else had or could have more than a merely symbolical or instrumental value. Reason was either theoretical or practical; but the theoretical reason could achieve nothing beyond the world of phenomena in space and time but Ideas, which have a merely *regulative*, not a *constitutive* use; that is, they ensure the progress of knowledge, but do not add to it. The Idea of the world, for example, as a *completed* system of causes and effects can never be presented to us as an object of experience; but the Reason having (inevitably) formed this idea can never be satisfied by stopping short of it in its search for causes, and thus the Idea constitutes not indeed a part of our knowledge, but a *problem*, the raising of which at once ensures the continual progress of Natural Science and warns it off from the claim to an illusory finality to which it can never in fact attain. So much for the competence of Reason in its theoretical aspect. In its *practical*

[1] *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blosen Vernunft* (*Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, VI. 97 foll.).

exercise, Reason can attain to knowledge of what we ought to do; but here also, although we ought to act *as though* we were free, *as though* we could in our own persons fulfil all the demands made by the moral law upon us, *as though* there were a God whose supreme moral government rendered to virtue the happiness which it deserves, yet we do not thus obtain any speculative or theoretical knowledge of the reality or nature of freedom, of immortality, of God. We know just this, that we must *act as though* we were free, immortal, and under God's government; that is all, though it is also enough. Whatever, then, in any historical religion seems to go beyond this is for Kant of no substantive value; but (as we have said) only at the best of symbolical or instrumental use. From this point of view the alleged 'operations of grace,' being supernatural, cannot be objects of theoretical or scientific knowledge, for this is restricted to the natural or phenomenal world, beyond which the conception of cause and effect cannot be legitimately extended. Nor can they be moral *postulates* (like freedom, immortality, and God) since the acknowledgment of them does not make us *do* anything, but rather to wait for God to do something to us. The Good is represented in the theology of *Gnadenwirkungen* as not our act, but that of another Being; and so we could only get it by *not doing*, which is a contradiction. The utmost, then, that Reason can

do with these 'operations of grace' is to admit them as something beyond our conception, the existence of which we cannot deny, and on the possibility of which we may reflect, but of which we cannot make any *use* in behalf either of theory or of practice.

Such are Kant's remarks on *Gnadenwirkungen*. We see that, regarding them as destitute of ethical significance, he has no real place for them in his philosophy of religion at all. When he comes to speak of 'means of grace,' *Gnadenmitteln*, he contrasts *Freedom*, where we know its law (that is, the moral law, of which we are conscious as laying obligation upon us, and which presupposes Freedom in its subjects), although its nature is inscrutable, with *Grace*, of which not only the nature but the procedure is necessarily unknown to us. In his view, the only true 'means of grace' is a morally good life; this and this alone will make us deserve any such supernatural assistance as may be necessary to supplement our best endeavours, and so (if such assistance be forthcoming) will be the only *means* towards obtaining it which we ought to adopt. The other so-called 'means of grace' are only, as such, invented to evade the necessity of adopting the one true means, a good life. They may, however, have a use as outward symbols of the true service of God which, wholly consisting, as it does, in a certain attitude of the will, is necessarily invisible, and may thus demand some visible symbol to bring

it vividly before our minds. Thus by prayer we may revive our own moral sentiments, by church-going we may help to revive those of others, by the custom of baptism we may aid in securing the propagation of morality among the next generation, by sacramental communion we may do something towards the preservation of the corporate society of religious persons. Of the ordinances which the Mohammedan religion (says Kant [1]) puts forward as 'means of grace'—washing, praying, fasting, almsgiving, and the pilgrimage to Mecca—in only one besides 'praying' (which occurs also in his list of Christian 'means of grace') does Kant find any relation to morality, and in that only under favourable circumstances. This one is almsgiving. Of the four Christian 'means of grace' (so called) which he enumerates, and which are, he adds, to be distinguished from the previously discussed 'operations of grace,' because in them we are not passive but active, the first, *Prayer*, is no more than an uttered wish, acting on us, and not on God, who, indeed, is better adored in silence, since not even the Psalter (he observes) is worthy to express the profound consciousness (which Kant himself had) of the divine wisdom in creation. Indeed, of the details of that wisdom the Psalmist (remarks Kant) probably knew but little. The second, *Church-going*, is a public duty; the third, *Baptism*, a useful

[1] He was probably following Relandus *De religione Mohammedica*, lib. i. c. 1.

and significant ceremony; and the fourth and last, *Communion*, a custom well devised to arouse a sense of fellowship in the universal moral community. But none of them are for Kant 'means of grace' properly so called; that title must be reserved for the good life alone, which deserves whatever grace God may have in store; about which grace we shall never know any more than just this, that, if it exist, we shall deserve it by a good life.

Such is Kant's attack on the doctrine of Grace. The ethical difficulties connected with that doctrine receive here their most decided expression, and this must serve as an excuse for the length at which I have described it.

I think it is difficult not to be impressed in reflecting upon these passages of Kant both by the force of the criticism which he brings to bear upon a large part of actual religious practice from the point of view of morality, and also by his exclusion from the sphere of rational and ethical religion of sentiments and attitudes which seem to most religious men intimately bound up with their religious experience. One does not greatly wonder when *en revanche* Schleiermacher in the next generation makes the very essence of religion consist in the feeling of dependence,[1] to which Kant seems to

[1] It is thus expressed in his *Glaubenslehre*, Einleitung, § 9: 'Das Gemeinsame aller frommen Erregungen, also das wesen der Frommigkeit ist dies, dass wir unser selbst als schlechthin abhängig bewusst sind, das heisst, das wir uns abhangig fühlen von Gott.'

attach no value at all. For what is more characteristic of religion than that spirit of 'patient waiting upon God,' which is precisely what Kant seems to rule out altogether? And, although Kant does not deny the utility of outward observances, his attitude towards them is so grudging, so suspicious, that there would seem to be in it no possibility of a heartfelt devotion finding in them such a necessary natural and adequate expression as educated thought finds in civilized language, by means of which it rejoices to communicate itself, and in this self-communication is carried further than in solitary silence it could have been.

We are reminded here of what we know of Kant's personal shrinking from the external forms of worship; how he thought[1] that a man would be ashamed to be found upon his knees by a stranger, and how, as we are told, even when at rectorial inaugurations he consented to walk in the academic procession to church at Königsberg, he would, unless he were himself rector, pass by the church without entering.[2]

In truth, however, not merely the personal temperament of Kant, but the very spirit of the Kantian philosophy, finds utterance in his theory of religion.

[1] *Werke*, ed. H., VI. p. 294 n. (*Die Religion, etc.*, IV. Allg. Anm.).

[2] Stuckenberg, *Life of Kant*, p. 354. Cp. Wallace's *Kant*, p. 46. A question as to Kant's habits in this respect is among those asked by Wald of Reusch (Reicke, *Kantiana*, p. 36), but was not answered. Schubert, p. 181, says that he was never a frequent attendant at public worship, and in the last years of his life only went to church on official occasions.

That philosophy everywhere tends so to hold apart the phenomenal and the ultimately real that the intelligence finds nowhere a secure ground on which to take its stand; for the phenomenal object it perceives to be *only* phenomenal, while the ultimately real remains to it no more than problematical. Now in Religion, at any rate, we cannot be content with this. It is true that it is often said that Religion is the sphere not of Reason but of Faith; and we have all heard of the child's definition of Faith—to Kant's we shall come presently—as the quality which enables you to believe what you know to be untrue. But it is plain that were we to take this famous definition seriously, we should have to pronounce it self-contradictory; for what you know to be untrue you cannot believe. Rather must Faith be an act of Reason; we cannot believe anything without *some reason* for doing so; and, if faith may be unreasonable, that means that it aims at being, or claims to be, reasonable, but that in this instance it fails of its aim, or puts forward an ungrounded claim. Of processes in which Reason has no part one cannot properly say that they are unreasonable. Thus one does not, except as a jest, say that a man is unreasonably short; for one cannot by taking thought add a cubit to one's stature. It would take us too far out of our present course to pursue much further the question as to the nature of Faith; and I will only add two

observations which I shall not here develop. The first is that the saying of the philosopher-saint, Anselm,[1] *Credo ut intelligam*, will be found to contain a truer view of the relation of Faith to Reason than that which opposes them the one to the other. The second is that, if it be true, as Tennyson tells us,[2] that—

> 'There lives more faith in honest doubt
> (Believe me) than in half the creeds'—

this is because the man who doubts shows by doubting that he is discontented so long as he is uncertain, and that faith falls short of its own ideal unless it be 'assurance.'[3] Thus it is one thing to say that Religion is the sphere of Faith and quite another to say that it is directed towards a problematical object.

But not only can Religion not rest content with a merely problematical object. It cannot rest content with a merely *practical* character, such as Kant attempts to assign to it. For Kant Faith is a taking of something for true[4] 'on a ground objectively insufficient but subjectively sufficient,'[5] that is, sufficient to act upon, but not to satisfy one's intelligence. Therefore Religion must not, he holds,

[1] *Proslogion*, c. 1. [2] *In Memoriam*, § 96.

[3] So the R. V. translates ὑπόστασις in Hebrews xi. 1.

[4] *Fürwahrhalten.*

[5] *Kr. der r. V.* (*Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, III. 542: tr. Meiklejohn, p. 498). Cp. *Logik*, Einleitung ix. (*Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, VIII. 67 foll.).

trespass beyond the practical sphere, or seek speculative assurance of what it acts upon as though it were true. Morality, however, is, as such, always incomplete—always concerned with what *ought to be*, whether it *is* or no ; but, by the time that Religion has reached that stage in its development at which it is even possible to confound it with Morality, it involves the conviction that what *ought to be* really *is*. And from this it follows that although it may be rightly said that belief in particular historical facts is *morally* indifferent, this is not the same thing as to say that for *Religion*, when it has come to reflect upon itself, its historical circumstances might just as well be other than they are. In the simplest language used by religion itself, the way in which God has chosen to manifest himself must be the best ; in more philosophical phraseology, we shall not in the last resort be content to ascribe to the universal a complete indifference to the particulars in and through which alone it has its being. Into that insistence by Christian theologians on the moral necessity of faith in certain historical facts which provoked as a reaction the Kantian denial of it [1] there has no doubt entered, along with less reputable factors, such as prejudice and lack of imagination, indolence and party-spirit, a perception, more or less obscure, of the truth that, when Religion has come to itself, it must

[1] See *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blosen Vernunft*, Part III.

give birth to the effort to discover in its history (which no doubt these theologians were apt to limit arbitrarily to certain of its phases) the necessary or only adequate form of the divine self-realization.

Closely parallel with Kant's lack of interest in the historical element contained in the creeds actually held is that lack of sympathy with personal private devotion which is illustrated by his feeling, already mentioned,[1] that a man would naturally be ashamed to be caught by another in the posture of prayer. Morality is represented by him as essentially common to all rational beings, something in which abstraction is made from whatever in me cannot be predicated of any rational being. This *I* indeed ought to do, not, however, as an individual subject of desires and interests that are *peculiarly* mine, but as a rational being in these circumstances. Religion, on the other hand, demands a 'particular Providence.' Notwithstanding all the difficulties in verifying the reality of such a 'particular Providence,' and all the dangers of illusion and superstition which beset the attempt to verify it, Religion cannot remain content with a merely *general* Providence which *cannot* be verified in the individual. The saying that 'the very hairs of your head are all numbered' [2] expresses an essential characteristic of religious faith.

The reference to Kant has led me to diverge from my main theme, that of the antithesis of Nature

[1] See above, p. 98. [2] Matt. x. 30.

and Grace; but the consideration of the general view or *Weltanschauung* which is exemplified in his refusal to recognize what are called 'operations of Grace' as having any practical bearing, or what are called 'means of grace' as at all deserving of their traditional name, has called our attention to some considerations of importance both for our present subject and for that which is to follow it.

But to come to closer quarters with Kant's criticism of the doctrine of Grace, we see that in accordance with his design of eliminating from religion whatever is not in the strictest sense ethical, he must eliminate *Grace*, which just because it is, as its name denotes, what is freely given us, is not *our* free or autonomous activity, as in Kant's view all that is of moral worth must essentially be. Now here, as often with Kant, even where one finds most difficulty in accepting his conclusions, his way of putting the question admirably brings out the real point at issue. It is just in respect of this conception of *Freedom* that we find Morality and Religion apparently opposed to one another, and if we turn our attention to their apparent opposition in this respect, we shall find ourselves in a better situation for understanding the true significance of the religious conception of Grace.

CHAPTER V

GRACE, FREEDOM, MORALITY, AND ORIGINAL SIN

THE simplest form in which Religion seems to come into conflict with the ethical demand or postulate of Freedom—of the 'can' implied in the 'ought,'[1] we find in the inconsistency so often thought to exist between our freedom to do this or that, which is implied (we may for the present assume) in saying that we *ought* to do this rather than that—and the foreknowledge of all that comes to pass which is attributed to God. I do not propose now to question our right or need to attribute such foreknowledge to God. I take it for the moment as something which most men among ourselves do attribute to God whenever they admit the existence of God at all. Now foreknowledge of actions does not, of course, in itself imply control. We might imagine the divine foreknowledge as a kind of reversed memory, and as involving control of the future as little as memory involves control of the past. But, if the being who has the foreknowledge be held to be the cause of the existence of those beings whose

[1] Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, III. 379; tr. Meiklejohn, p. 339).

actions he all along foresees, and some of which are evil, we cannot but think either that he is himself a necessitated, not a free, cause, which has brought these beings into existence, though knowing that they will do what is evil, because he could not help thus bringing them into existence; or that when he made them he willed the evil that they were to do; or at least that he thought the evil they were to do a less evil than would be their non-existence, and was tied down to a choice between these alternatives. And in this last case he would seem to be in a moral relation to these beings which in the case of a human person would be held to disqualify him from acting as their judge. Nor, I think, is it satisfactory to attempt to avoid this conclusion by falling back, as has sometimes been done, on the transcendent nature of God, which renders inapplicable to him the laws of human morality. For in this case his punishment of wrongdoing must also be in consistency denied any moral character, that is, it will not be *punishment*, properly speaking, at all.

I do not, however, think that we shall have done anything worth mentioning toward the solution of this problem, so long as we treat the relation of God to men in this mere external manner. I must not here anticipate the third part of this course; but will only say that the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, in the form in

which I have just been stating it, seems to be raised not directly by any definitely religious experience, but by reflexion upon the *Vorstellung* or imaginative picture of what is implied by religious experience; this imaginative picture representing it as a relation between two men who are members of the same society. What we have to do is rather to consider what it is that our religious experience directly yields; for it is only because of the data of religious experience that there exists such a problem for us at all.

Now what we find in our religious experience is an antinomy between *responsibility* and *merit*. The religious man is conscious of responsibility for what he does; and to this responsibility freedom would seem to be requisite; though not such a freedom as severs the act of each moment from the life of the agent as a continuous process. Such a freedom as would do this is surely not only not implied in responsibility, it is inconsistent with it. When we think that what a man does at one moment affords us no ground for predicting what he will do next, we at once say: Such an one is *not responsible for his actions*. But responsibility for an act *does* imply that it was the agent's own act; and that he could in some sense have done otherwise than he did. This is necessarily so if remorse is to be anything but sheer illusion.

On the other hand, while, when approaching

the subject from the side of opposition to a mechanical determination, which seemed to leave no room for moral responsibility, because none is left for spiritual independence, we might expect a religious man, to whom his own soul and God were, in Newman's often-quoted phrase,[1] the 'two and two only supreme and luminously self-evident beings,' to insist especially on the individual freedom implied in moral responsibility and spiritual independence, the facts do not at first seem to confirm this expectation. Rather has it been characteristic of representative men of religion such as St. Paul, St. Augustine, Luther, to disclaim all *merit* and refer all their good actions not to themselves but to 'the grace of God which was with them.'[2] The well-known saying[3] of the Protestant martyr, John Bradford, on seeing a criminal led to execution, 'There but for the grace of God goes John Bradford,' is typical of this religious attitude. How are we to understand this disclaimer of merit? It is, we must note, a disclaimer as against God, not as against man. There is no such inconsistency, as there is sometimes thought to be, in a religious person confessing himself a 'miserable sinner' and refusing to look upon

[1] *Apologia*, Part III. ed. 1864, p. 59. Cp. Aug. *Soliloqu.* i. 7.

[2] 1 Corinthians xv. 10.

[3] Bradford's editor, Aubrey Townsend, gives no authority for this 'familiar story,' but calls it 'a universal tradition which has overcome the lapse of time.' (*Writings of John Bradford*, Parker Soc., 1853, Vol. I. p. xliii.).

his own good deeds as possessing merit, while at the same time he repudiates calumnious assertions and insinuations made by other men, and takes his stand, as other men might, on his 'good character' as something which entitles him to consideration among his fellows. For the merit claimed and the merit disclaimed are here not the same, but different. The man may be said to disclaim merit for himself in such a case, while at the same time he claims it for his conduct, in which he recognizes the result of God's grace, the fruits of his Spirit. This point need not be further pursued. But the religious man's disclaimer of merit may conveniently engage our thoughts a little longer. Attention has been called before now [1] to the kinship which seems to exist between the Pauline doctrine of predestination and the consequent disclaimer of merit characteristic of those whose religious experience has conformed in its general outline to St. Paul's, and the determinism expounded in its best form in the *Ethics* of Spinoza. It will be remembered that the only freedom claimed for us by Spinoza is that which depends upon, or rather consists in, the *knowledge* of the determining causes of our actions; the 'sense of freedom' so-called, which consists in *ignorance* of, and consequent disbelief in, these determining causes he dismisses, as illusory and not worth having; [2]

[1] e.g. in Prof. A. E. Taylor's *Problem of Conduct*, c. 8.

[2] Spinoza, *Eth.*, I., Appendix; cp. *Ep.* lxii.

and in the same way the only freedom, it may seem, consistent with the Pauline theology is that which consists in doing with cheerful acquiescence what God wills us to do, in contrast with the servitude of those who repine at it. As Augustine has it, *Præceptum liber facit qui libens facit.*[1]

Now so great are the difficulties which beset this question of Freedom, that it is easy to yield to the attraction of the suggestion that we may escape from them by insistence upon a kind of Freedom which does not involve the admission of a really possible alternative, as being the only freedom which is of ethical value. But I doubt whether in this direction we can find a way for ourselves out of our perplexities. It is perfectly true that in religion what, apart from the religious experience, appears as the tyranny of enslaving circumstance, may be recognized as the providence of a divine Father, and a man may thus be enabled to do freely, in the sense of doing with acquiescence, what otherwise he would none the less have done, but have done with the feeling that he was merely *compelled* to do it; and that thus he may get rid of the sense of compulsion by exchanging it for that of a 'service' which, in the phrase of the collect, 'is perfect freedom.' But I am not convinced that this settles the question which is troubling us. Spinoza indeed suggests, as we have seen, that

[1] *De Gratia Christi*, c. 13.

the alleged consciousness of a freedom to do otherwise than we actually do is an illusion which can be seen through. We may indeed admit that there are cases, as he points out,[1] in dreams for example, where we seem to *feel* as free as ever we do, and yet on subsequent consideration, when we are awake again, we do not *think* we were free to do otherwise than we did (or rather, dreamed that we did). This may give rise to a doubt as to whether we can assert our belief in freedom on the evidence of a direct or immediate consciousness. But we may observe first that, as we do not in telling our dreams say that we really acted in this way or that, but that we *seemed* to do so, so we should in the same way say that we *seemed* to be conscious of freedom rather than that we *were* conscious of it. The only difference between the two cases is that whereas when I wake in my bed in Oxford, it is obvious that I was not really walking over a pass in Switzerland in the course of the preceding six hours; it is less obvious that I was not really conscious of freedom during this period, since that I might be as I lay in bed. And, secondly, it is to be noted that in general we should be disposed to say that only where we know a thing otherwise can we mistake something else for it; for example, only if I know what a man is like, at least from a picture, can I mistake some one else for him. We may therefore reasonably reply to

[1] *Eth.*, II. 49, schol.

the argument against the sense of freedom taken from dreams, that we may indeed make a mistake here as elsewhere, and think that a sense of freedom which is not; but how could we make such a mistake unless we had experience of a real sense of freedom for which this false semblance of it could be mistaken? Or, at any rate, would not the illusion disappear, when once resolved, as Spinoza would have us resolve it,[1] into the combination of the consciousness that a certain movement is our own with ignorance of its cause? Notoriously however it persists, and not only as an illusion of the senses persists, when we can at the same time *think* the facts to be otherwise. For *in acting* we cannot *think* ourselves not free, although, *after* having acted, we may look back and deny that we were free when we acted. Moreover, it is not to be overlooked that we may actually have experiences which correspond exactly to Spinoza's account; experiences, for example, of being ourselves in a state of uncontrollable excitement, caused perhaps by intoxicating fumes or drugs, of which we might say, '*Why* do I feel like this?' and yet clearly distinguish them from the experience of freedom. Nay, if we were to be actually in the situation of Spinoza's stone which should, while flying through the air, become aware of its forward movement; if *we* were to be, while in a state of unconsciousness,

[1] *Ep.* lxii. §§ 3, 4, 5.

shot through the air and recover consciousness as we went, should we really suppose ourselves, as Spinoza seems to think we should, to be moving of our own free will? Surely we should think nothing of the kind. Nor does the undeniable fact that in our voluntary movements an elaborate mechanism is brought into play of which we have no direct consciousness, really affect the question before us, merely because this mechanism is internal to our body. We are not the less conscious of initiating our voluntary movements because we are not conscious of all the physical conditions, within or without our bodily organism, which may be necessary to those movements. Nor are we the less conscious of free choice in ourselves because, on some occasions, through the derangement of the nervous or muscular mechanism, the limb we would move is not moved after all.

These remarks are intended to throw doubt on the success of Spinoza's attempt to explain away the consciousness of freedom. But, if this attempt is unsuccessful (and no other is likely to be more successful than this) we have this consciousness still on our hands, and cannot treat it as negligible, so that the name of Freedom may be without further scruple transferred to something else which can be asserted consistently with the assertion of universal determinism; a transference which seemed to be recommended to us not only by the reasoning of Spinoza himself, but

by the coincidence of his results with those reached by St. Paul and other great religious thinkers from an analysis of the religious consciousness. It is, however, to be observed that although religion, or, at any rate, a certain type of religion, certainly denies merit to our good actions by ascribing them to the grace of God, it does not for all that equate actions which we choose to do, under the impression that there is no alternative open to us, with actions (if actions they can be called) in respect of which we have, as we put it, no choice. The religious man thanks God for his goodness to him in the circumstances of his life, and he thanks him also for his enabling grace; but he distinguishes the two gifts at the same time as he recognizes them as alike manifestations of the favour or the grace of God; and the abolition of the distinction between them would empty of meaning a considerable range of religious experience.

I would add here that, in rejecting Spinoza's arguments for the illusoriness of the natural consciousness of freedom, I am far from intending to reject his doctrine of freedom altogether. His teaching that through acquiescence in the universal order based upon knowledge of what it is and what is our place therein we enjoy that liberty which the man who is 'passion's slave'[1] can never have; his insistence that in all our willing, our connexion

[1] Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, II. 2, 77.

with the universal order remains unbroken; in these two respects we may follow him. But we may, notwithstanding, reasonably doubt whether he does not, with the help of the inconclusive reasoning which was examined above, allow himself to treat as though they were the same two things which are not the same, although both fall within the universal order, namely, an event mechanically determined and a voluntary action.

But though we may thus not find that the distinction between acts for which, because we were free to do them or no, we are responsible, and acts for which, because we were not thus free to do them or no, we are not responsible, will disappear when we pass from the sphere of Morality to that of Religion; yet I think we shall be justified in saying that the difficulty which we experience in deciding how far a man is on any particular occasion responsible for what he has done—a difficulty which arises even for the agent himself—takes upon itself a different shape for the religious consciousness from that which it wears for the *merely* moral consciousness. For the former, the religious consciousness, 'circumstances over which,' as we often say, 'we have no control,' appear as the appointment of divine Providence, while 'character,' which is ourselves, appears as from its roots upwards dependent upon divine Grace for any goodness which may belong to it;[1] and our

[1] Cp. Augustine, *De Gratia Christi*, c. 18.

concern is here not so much to press the distinction of character from circumstances in order not to lose *ourselves*, and find, in place of *ourselves*, merely parts of a soulless mechanism, as on the other hand to press the continuity of the Providence to which the environment is due with the Grace which has formed the character so far as it is good, and to rejoice in losing ourselves as separate from God in order to find ourselves again in him. And in this way Religion, with its doctrine of Grace, falls into line with 'scientific' determinism to the extent of refusing to seek the ground of what appears as the course of individual lives wholly within those individual lives. So far, but only so far, can the theological doctrine of Grace be equated with the determination of philosophical systems based upon what we are accustomed nowadays to hear called 'the scientific view of the world.'

At this point we must remind ourselves that it is not only those human actions which we call *good* (of which we have been so far principally speaking) that are considered by determinism as of a piece with the general nature of things, but also those which we call *bad*. And correspondingly we find that just as the good actions of individual men are referred by religion to the grace of God in them, so their evil actions are traced by religion to 'sin which dwelleth in them'[1] The doctrine of Grace has here as its counterpart the

[1] Romans vii. 17.

doctrine of Original Sin. This doctrine was one peculiarly uncongenial to the spirit of the *Aufklärung* or Enlightenment, but it is remarkable that, while Kant, as we have seen, rejects the doctrine of Grace from his philosophy of religion and in this respect represents the thought of the *Aufklärung* which lay behind him, in respect to the doctrine of Original Sin he broke with its tradition. So that nowhere was his work on the philosophy of religion more epoch-making than in his insistence on a doctrine of Radical Evil in the will, which was in principle a reassertion of the doctrine of Original Sin. It is true that the German phrase for Original Sin, *Erbsunde* ('hereditary sin') he did not approve. He could not[1] be content (as he put it) to conceive the propensity to evil in human nature after a medical fashion as a sort of inherited disease, after a legal fashion as an inherited obligation, after a theological fashion as an inherited subjection to divine wrath. These ways of conceiving it seemed to him to be coloured by the prepossessions of the three learned professions respectively, and to introduce what was irrelevant to the actual fact. Nor could he ever have agreed as to the consequences of the propensity with a strong expression of Luther's: '*a debere ad posse non valet consequentia*'[2] ('from *ought* to *can* the consequence does not hold'), for this

[1] *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blosen Vernunft*, I, iv. (*Werke*, ed. Hartenstein IV. p. 134 n.).

[2] *Disputationen 1535-1545*; ed. P. Drews, 1895–6. I owe this reference to the kindness of Professor Eucken.

directly contradicts his own principle,[1] that the 'ought' of the moral law *implies* the 'can.' But the fact which the theologians had in view in their doctrine of Original Sin is the same which Kant had in view in his doctrine of the radical propensity to evil in the will, and he does not shrink from describing it by the Latin term (into which the notion of hereditary transmission is not introduced) of *peccatum originarium.*[2] The propensity to evil in the individual will he could not explain wholly from within the individual life.

Now it is notorious that the doctrine of Original Sin, understood, it is true, somewhat after the 'medical' fashion deprecated by Kant, is nowadays popular enough. But it is often presented in a form which either makes the term *sin* inappropriate or else empties it of all meaning, according as one looks at it from the one side or from the other. I mean that the inherited evil (for so it is considered) is not really regarded as *morally* evil, that is, as *sin*; or, if it be so regarded, it is only because nothing is seen anywhere in moral evil except the survival at a higher stage of development of instincts appropriate to a lower—'the ape and tiger'[3] in man, which should be let die, but which die hard.

[1] See *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, III. 379; tr. Meiklejohn, p. 339).

[2] This is the form which he used. The more usual phrase is *peccatum originale*, which alone (if we may trust the Benedictine index) is found in Augustine.

[3] Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, § 118.

But it is extremely difficult not to regard the consciousness of sin as something very different from the consciousness of lower instincts surviving at a higher stage of development than that at which they were useful; the consciousness of sin is rather the consciousness of the voluntary surrender of oneself to such instincts where a different course of action was open. But with respect to the expression 'Original Sin' for the propensity to evil in individuals which seems to be inexplicable from anything falling within the individual's own life, there is more to be said than this. 'Sin' is indeed not a strictly appropriate word if sin be defined as I have just defined it—as the voluntary surrender of oneself to lower instincts where a different course of action was open. For in that sense I do not, strictly speaking, regard a propensity to evil whose origin is not traceable to my own individual will, as my own sin. We must not, however, forget that the word 'sin' carries with it, owing to the history of the idea of sin, associations which are not incompatible with its use in the phrase 'Original Sin.' It is only gradually that either 'holiness' on the one hand or 'sin' on the other comes to be regarded as the name of what is fully a 'moral quality' in our sense of the term.[1]

[1] I need only allude in passing to the view now current among students of primitive custom that at a certain stage the same mysterious quality which makes its possessor sacred is the source of pollution to others, and the same words are used for sanctity and for uncleanness and pollution, both being varieties of what it is now the fashion to call *taboo*. Cp. Frazer, *Golden Bough*, 3rd ed., Pt. II. p. 224. Of

When we remember how the curse of 'Thebes or Pelops' line'[1] in Greek legend clung to the accursed family independently of the individual's will or knowledge, how, for example, Œdipus was thought to have sinned in marrying his mother, although he had no reason to suppose she was his mother, we realize that the individuality of sin is a late discovery. In the Old Testament it is proclaimed as new by Jeremiah.[2] 'In those days they shall say no more, The fathers have eaten a sour grape and the children's teeth are set on edge; but every one shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eateth the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge'; and is still regarded by Ezekiel[3] as a truth little recognized. The older view had justified the destruction[4] of Achan's family along with himself; the sin of taking the accursed thing had polluted them all. In the sense in which sin can only be individual, Original Sin is not sin. Yet it is not for the religious consciousness evil merely as pain and sickness, physical or even mental infirmity are evil. These may come to one through no fault of one's own; they are certainly 'evils,' but they are not 'Original Sin.' They may be supposed to be the 'punishment' of Original

this original connexion between the two notions we have a survival in the language of a more advanced period of religion, as when by the Jews the Scriptures, being holy, are said to 'defile the hands' which, having touched them, may not, without precautions of ritual purification, engage in the actions of common life. The double meaning of *sacré* in modern French would, of course, be another monument of the same connexion.

[1] Milton, *Il Penseroso*. [2] xxxi. 29, 30. [3] xviii. [4] Joshua vii. 24.

Sin; but they do not constitute it. By calling Original Sin by that name there is, I think, expressed a difference between what is so called and inherited or environing disadvantages, such as sickness and poverty on the one hand, as well as between what is so called and 'actual,' that is, individual sin on the other.

A clue to the puzzle here suggested may perhaps be sought in Kant's observation[1] that it is through men's association with each other—all men alike having the same radical propensity to evil—that they are exposed to the assaults of evil. Can we say that those antecedents of our actions which are properly to be ranked as 'original sin' are the social and personal influences which bias the soul whose spiritual environment they constitute, in contradistinction from what we reckon as physical environment, including under that head our bodily constitution and the natural forces which surround us? Can we thus understand Original Sin as the counterpart of that divine Grace to which we saw that religious men were disposed to attribute their good actions; and which, so far as it is found environing the individual soul, certainly seems to be found in the form of social and personal influences?

We shall find ourselves in a better position to answer these questions if, leaving them for a moment unanswered, we follow up the hint just given as to the

[1] *Die Rel. i. d. Gr. d. bl.* V., 3rd pt., *ad init.*

nature of *Grace*, and return later on to the subject of Original Sin. Whatever we are to say of the latter, we may claim that in conceiving of Grace as a spiritual environment of the soul, consisting in social and personal influences to which it responds by conscious acts, and making for good, we have discovered a real place for it, which at once secures the freedom of individual action which the recognition of Grace seemed to imperil, and confirms the religious estimate of Grace as standing in a closer relation to the individual moral life than any purely material conditions. The suggestion of such a theory came to us from some observations of Kant with respect to Original Sin and the exposure of man through intercourse with his fellows to the assaults of evil. We may now recall that in his review of the so-called 'means of grace,' though he does not allow their right to this designation, he notices the social character of church-going, baptism, and communion, and so confirms our general theory. It is true that his language by refusing the name grace to what is obtained through these sacramental institutions, and also his tone, by insufficiently emphasizing the connexion between social intercourse and the individual character which is moulded by it, tend to disguise from his readers the true scope of his words. It is clear that, whether this be all that is meant by Original Sin or no, we must admit the existence of a spiritual environment corresponding to Grace, and also

consisting of social and personal influences, but making for evil. This may be called 'sin,' although it is distinguished from *actual* or individual sin, without falling back into the earlier notion of sin, according to which it is regarded as a possibly quite involuntary or even unconscious pollution. For, to revert to our instance from the Old Testament, although the bond which attached Achan's family to himself may be pictured after the fashion of something merely physical, yet the actual bond in a human family or other community is, in fact, constituted by processes of personal intercourse such as are truly 'means of grace' or 'means of corruption' as the case may be. Thus the historical connexion between the earlier and later meanings of sin becomes intelligible. So too with the historical connexion between the notion of Grace and that of magical efficacy, so obvious, not only to the anthropologist or investigator of primitive religion, but also to the student of the higher religions, who has often to observe the ease with which the notion of a sacramental means of grace degenerates into that of a magical operation. My present limits will only permit of my stating what I mean in a summary way. Magic, I would suggest, so far as it is anything more than a name for a sort of practices quite similar to those which occur in our own manipulation of external nature, but based upon mistaken beliefs as to what is likely to cause what, involves an attempt to attribute to objects which

are not persons powers which belong only to persons, and which at a later period of intellectual development are attributed only to persons, whether to the community to which we belong or to particular members of it, visible or invisible. At a certain stage, as is well known,[1] magic tends to be distinguished from religion as an alternative means of obtaining a control over one's environment which ought only to be obtained through the medium of the gods of the community. Such a means may be the procuring of the intervention of alien spirits, or it may be the use of formulas or secret rules, the knowledge of which makes the wizard independent of the regular gods of his people. Herein is implicit that connexion of magic with a neglect of the influences inherent in a human society, which comes out at a yet later stage of development, when a relapse from a doctrine of sacramental grace to one of magical efficacy means just the obscuration of the essentially social and personal nature of the influence which it is now wrongly sought to draw from what is, if rightly regarded, not spiritual or personal at all.

Readers of Augustine may perhaps detect a resemblance between the view of Grace here suggested and some representations of its nature which Augustine found unsatisfactory when put forward by Pelagius. I think, however, that it may be shown

[1] See Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 264; Jevons, *Introd. to Hist. of Religion*, p. 178.

that it does not involve the weak points of the Pelagian position, its tendency to an exaggerated individualism, its comparative neglect of subtler spiritual influences than those of conscious imitation and study, the general abstractness (in the Hegelian sense) of its thinking. Yet it is not, I conceive, Augustinian either. In reaction from the tendencies of Pelagianism, as well as in accordance with his own personal temperament and history, there was present in Augustine's thinking (though both in closeness to the facts of experience and in speculative profundity it is far superior to Pelagianism) an opposite tendency to submergence, if I may so express it, of the moral individual, to which a merely magical theory of sacramental grace on the one hand and an arbitrary theory of predestinating grace on the other could with some confidence appeal; for indeed it is not easy to deny that both are actually present in Augustine's own theological teaching.

Moreover, in distinguishing the view of Grace which I have suggested from the Pelagian, I would lay stress upon this, that I would not limit in any arbitrary fashion the possible extension of the phrase, 'social and personal influences.' Certainly the Pelagian expression '*lex et doctrina*'[1] limits it far too narrowly. Not only would I extend it to influences of the sort of which Aristotle is thinking

[1] See Aug. *De Gestis Pelagii*, c. 14, §§ 30 foll., *De Gratia Christi*, c. 9, § 10, etc.

when he talks of ἔθισμος,[1] and to all kinds of personal intercourse with other men. Without either at present affirming or denying the reality or possibility of direct personal communion with superhuman spiritual beings or with God, I should certainly include such direct communion, if it exist, under the expression, 'social and personal influences.' On the subject of personal communion with God I shall have something to say hereafter. Here I would only add that even those who regard all alleged experience of such personal communion with spirits other than human, or with God as illusory, must still reckon what calls itself such as falling among 'social and personal influences'; for the form of the illusion, if such it be, is certainly determined by other such influences which are unquestionably real. For example, it is largely determined by the tradition of the community to which the person who is the victim of the illusion belongs. Indeed, it is scarcely possible for those who admit the reality of such communion to deny that a considerable element of illusion, the form of which is so determined, has actually entered into the majority of such experiences, even though they cannot be regarded as wholly illusory. This conclusion is rendered inevitable, if by no other considerations, by that of the actual adaptation of such experiences to mutually inconsistent convictions antecedently embraced.

[1] *Eth. Nic*, I. 7, § 21, 1908, b. 4; and see *ibid.* X. 9.

As we have already seen, such an account of Grace as we have given implies the recognition of a counterpart of Grace, consisting in such social and personal influences tending to evil (and inclusive of intercourse, if any such there be, with superhuman evil beings) as form part of the spiritual environment of the individual. But while the conception of Original Sin seemed to be in some respects a fellow to that of Grace, the name seems scarcely suited to express such a counterpart to Grace as I have just described. For the word 'original' is inapplicable to social and personal influences of which at least the greater part will not have been present at the outset of individual life, and to which there seems no reason for ascribing a temporal priority to those which fall under the head of Grace; and while 'grace,' though it may be treated as a quality of the gracious person, yet emphasizes rather the bestowal of it upon him from without, 'Original Sin' (and the same may be said of such allied although not quite equivalent phrases current among theological writers as τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός,[1] *concupiscentia*, and the like) seems to describe something *in the person*, something inherent *in his nature*, though not to what in his nature is reckoned as merely individual, but rather to what is conceived as specific or racial.

It would therefore seem as though Original Sin could not be considered as the exact counterpart of

[1] Romans viii. 6; cp. Article IX of the Church of England.

Grace as above described; but yet as if no distinct name existed for such an exact counterpart as we saw ourselves constrained to recognize. We shall, I think, learn something to our purpose if in consideration of these facts, we enquire, firstly, what precisely are the facts intended to be described by the term 'Original Sin," and secondly, how it is that the traditional terminology does not provide a name for the exact counterpart of Grace in distinction from 'Original Sin' properly so called.

By Original Sin then seems to be meant the solicitations of the lower nature conceived of proleptically as sin, because, as present in the nature of a rational or moral being, they constitute the potentiality of the sin, which consists in such a being's yielding to them, despite the consciousness that to do so is wrong. The exact counterpart of Original Sin then is not Grace, but the potentiality of resisting these solicitations, described proleptically as the 'image of God' in which man is said by theologians[1] to have been originally made, and which he has not lost, although this image can yet not be said to be actually formed in him[2] from the first, but only as the result of his moral career. Original Sin belongs to the social and personal nature of man because consciousness of it as such is a consciousness which could only be present in a member of society. For it

[1] Quoting Genesis i. 27.

[2] See Galatians iii. 14; Ephesians iv. 13; Colossians i. 15, iii. 10.

is when any of us beholds another man yielding to the solicitations of the lower nature, that he recognizes a bad act which he has it in himself also to do, and it is when he reflects upon the past evil deeds of men among the consequences of which every man that comes into the world is ensnared and entangled, that he recognizes in them too, not something alien to himself, but something the responsibility of which he, as a member of the same social organism, in some sense shares, so far as he does not dissociate himself from it by uniting himself to the influences which make for good; influences which appear first as the *law* against yielding to lower impulses, and afterwards as the *grace* which transforms and regenerates the whole nature, and makes the *flesh* an organ of the *spirit*.

So much for the significance of the expression 'Original Sin.' We have still to enquire why there is apparently no distinct name for the more exact counterpart of Grace; why it is on the *original* propensity to evil that theology has laid the stress, rather than on the subsequent evil influences, social and personal, which certainly act upon the soul no less than the good influences which we call Grace.

The answer to this question is to be sought in the fact that only in virtue of a *religious* experience has the group of expressions which we are now considering come into use, so that we shall expect to find them represent the facts as seen from a certain point of

view, and in relation to a certain kind of experience, namely the religious. Now religion (at least in the form which we are now considering) involves the consciousness of God, and the man that has religion is aware of himself in his religious life as in relation to God; and it must be remembered that at the stage of religious development with which we are at present concerned, the goodness of God has become axiomatic. The religious man, then, is turned, so to speak, towards God and away from evil; *ex hypothesi* he is now not in communion with evil persons, but with God. The recognition of good influences as coming to him from God is of the essence of the religious attitude; on the other hand, while he is in this attitude, the influences which may have acted at other times upon him, when he was in communion with evil persons and not with God, are operative now for him, not as influences coming through personal communion—for he is *not* now in personal communion with their originators—but merely through the effects left in himself, which thus do not call for a special name to discriminate them from the effects of 'Original Sin' properly so called, from the 'infection of nature' which (as the Anglican Article of Religion[1] has it) 'doth remain, yea even in those that are regenerated.' Both alike are present because he *was* formerly something other than he now *is*. What he now is, he is by the grace of God.[2]

[1] Article IX. [2] See 1 Corinthians xv. 10.

I said in my introductory chapter that the problem of Nature and Grace would bring us into contact with the antinomy of Freedom and Necessity; and we saw that while it was precisely its apparent inconsistency with the Freedom which he insisted was a postulate of Morality that led Kant practically to reject the notion of Grace from his theology (although he retained or rather reintroduced the closely connected notion of Original Sin), it was in this same notion and those which go with it that others had sought to find a refuge from the difficulties which notoriously beset the idea of Freedom. I have, however, tried to show reason for holding that we do not thus, by taking the point of view of Religion, succeed in escaping from the consciousness of Freedom of which we find ourselves possessed as moral beings, and that we are not consequently justified as theologians in declining the consideration of the questions which the possession of that consciousness raises. Yet I think we may admit that when we have passed from Morality to Religion these questions are found to wear a somewhat different air. This is indicated by our use of the word *Nature* in the two connexions. In Ethics we oppose *Nature* to *Freedom*, and what is regarded as originating in the individual falls on the side of *Freedom*, while what is regarded as *given* him independently of his individual efforts, whether it be external environment, inherited constitution, or personal outfit, is put down to the side of *Nature* or

Accident; and by *accident* one does not here mean something without a cause in *nature*, but something whose cause is not in the agent, that is either in his *free* choice or in his own *peculiar* nature; so that as against *Freedom* we may in this connexion include *Accident* under *Nature*. But in Religion *Nature* is opposed not to *Freedom*, but to *Grace;* and here what is reckoned to be of the individual's own originating is assigned to *Nature*, while it is *Grace* which is the *given*. Thus Grace is reckoned superior to Nature because it *is* given; while Freedom is reckoned superior to Nature because it is *not* given. Degenerate doctrines of Grace tend, as we have already seen, to assimilate Grace, as being *given*, to the Nature which is below Freedom, by regarding it as acting in a mechanical or external fashion, either by way of irresistible predestination, or through ceremonies which are supposed to take effect without free co-operation on the recipient's part, much as an infectious disease may be caught by one man from another. Naturalism in a like manner endeavours (however unsuccessfully) to represent social and personal influences, in the class of which Grace (as we have seen) must be reckoned, as falling under the general laws of mechanical causation. This emphasis upon the *given*, this neglect of Freedom, leads in either case to results which are at bottom much the same, little as the champions of the two positions think of themselves as standing on the same ground.

Freedom, then, seems to be placed between Grace and Nature as a kind of debatable land. From the side of Nature it seems to belong to the spiritual, the supernatural, and hence its real existence is denied by Naturalism; from the side of Grace it seems to be itself merely natural, the belief in man's power of doing good by himself is branded as heresy, and the only source of good actions is sought in the power given from above, that is in Grace. And just as Naturalism denied the existence of Freedom from one point of view, so does an extreme doctrine of Grace practically or even professedly deny the existence of Freedom in man, at any rate as he actually is.[1]

We shall, however, do better to regard Grace, Freedom, and Nature, from the point of view of Religion as differences with a unity, but yet as differences still. To Religion, when it has attained to reflective consciousness of itself, and worked out the implications of its own experience, not only are the spiritual inspirations which we call most readily by the name of Grace divine gifts, but so are the natural environment and inherited constitution; so too is the good will itself, whose essential attribute is Freedom. 'It is God,' says St. Paul,[2] 'which

[1] For, in the Augustinian doctrine, Freedom is not retained by fallen man—that is, by man as he actually is—as it originally existed in fallen man. In fallen man it is sufficient to evil action, but is not sufficient to good without a grace additional to that which was involved in the creation of man at all. (See *De Gestis Pelagii*, c. 3, § 7.)

[2] Philippians ii. 13.

worketh in you both to will and to work.' And this being so, the free will and the divine grace are seen to be in truth parts of human *nature;* and the environment and the inherited constitution to be there for the sake of that higher nature, the exercise of whose *freedom* is unthinkable, as Lotze has well pointed out,[1] except we suppose a surrounding world on the uniformity or rather regularity of whose processes we can, to a considerable extent, reckon; while the divine *grace* itself is the complement of that moral *nature*, which is most properly conceived as a capacity or receptivity for it.

Once more, as Grace has thus been found both in Freedom and in Nature, and as Nature has been found both in Freedom and in Grace, so in the religious experience we find Freedom in its turn both in Grace and in Nature. For Grace is not Grace except as *freely* accepted, and the religious man also *freely* accepts his own nature as the appointed means of his higher life; even its evils he treats as probationary trials and opportunities of victory.

In this triform unity, however, the differences are not lost; and the very heart of the religious life is taken out of it, if they are supposed away. The unity in each of its three forms is in the Hegelian phrase 'result'[2]; the differences are necessary to it, and are the condition of its being just the unity which it is.

[1] *Practical Philosophy*, § 21 (Eng. tr. p. 45). [2] *Resultat.*

The individual thus by *freely* accepting the divine *grace* becomes a conscious organ of the divine *nature*—in the New Testament phrase, a 'partaker of the divine nature'[1]—and recognizes himself as such throughout the whole compass of his being.

We are already on the threshold of our third and principal problem. But before entering on it, let us review some of the questions which our consideration of the problem of Nature and Grace has left upon our hands; we shall find them awaiting us again later on.

We have distinguished Grace, together with Original Sin and that wider range of evil influences to describe which we found ourselves at loss for a separate traditional name, from merely external or physical conditions of individual action, regarding both as belonging to the class of social, spiritual, or personal influences, and standing thus in a different relation to the free will of the individual from that in which external or physical conditions can stand to it. But we have taken the presence of Evil in our spiritual environment for granted, and have not as yet entered upon the problem raised by the presence of evil side by side with good in a world of which God is the author or ground.

We have spoken of Grace quite generally, and distinguished it from Nature, from Freedom, from Magic; but we have not attempted any more definite

[1] *θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως*, 2 Peter i. 4.

account of the form in which it is actually found to exist.

Lastly, the discussion of the relations of Nature and Grace has shown us how the difference between them is present to the religious consciousness in its fully developed form as a distinction within a unity; but this thought has not been worked out, nor could be without a more thorough-going discussion of the distinction of Man from God and the relation of God to Man than we have as yet attempted.

To this investigation, which is our third and principal topic, we must now turn.

PART III

MAN AND GOD

CHAPTER VI

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD

IN taking as my third subject the antithesis of Man and God I am intentionally confining myself to the consideration of those forms of religion in which this antithesis is consciously present, except so far as I refer to others by way of contrast comparison, or illustration. There may be an early stage of religious development at which the notion of a god has not yet arisen; and at the upper end of the scale we find one of the great historical religions of the world, Buddhism, and some important philosophies of religion, which dispense, at least nominally, with the notion of a definite God; I use the word 'definite' here rather than 'personal,' because as I hope shortly to show, this latter expression requires a closer investigation. I do not, however, by 'a definite God' mean what is sometimes meant by 'a finite God.' I mean only a God who—however man's relation to him be conceived—can be in some way or another contrasted with man. I assume, then, that there is a contrast or antithesis between God and man to be discussed; though, of course, admitting that in a systematic account

of the philosophy of religion as a whole (which the present book has no pretensions to be) it would be necessary to discuss the origin and history of this contrast, which here, on the whole, I take for granted.

And yet, while thus claiming the limit not to go fully into a subject which would certainly require far more space than is here at my disposal for its adequate treatment, I shall approach the contrast we are now to consider by recalling a peculiarity which I have already mentioned[1] as attaching to religious experiences; namely, that there is often demanded a proof of the existence of its object, and by saying something about this demand, its meaning, its justification, and the response which may be made to it.

I have already called attention[2] to the circumstance that Religion is a subjective, not an objective term; that is, it describes a certain attitude of ours, not the nature of the object towards which we adopt this attitude. This circumstance may perhaps be thought to encourage the attempt now so common to approach Religion from the subjective side. But this method of approach will not save us from the necessity of facing the difficulty raised by the demand for a proof of the existence of its object. For, so far as Religion is or involves a kind of consciousness, it must be the consciousness

[1] See above, p. 2. [2] See above, p. 7.

of something, of an object; and ultimately our only evidence of the existence of anything must lie in our consciousness of it, or in our consciousness of something in which its existence is involved.[1]

Thus the religious consciousness is sufficient evidence of the existence of its object, just as the æsthetic consciousness is sufficient evidence of the existence of Beauty; and so far as we mean by God no more than the object of the religious consciousness, the existence of God is not really doubtful at all. The possibility of illusion no more constitutes a difficulty here than anywhere else. Ultimately our only evidence of the existence of light is that we see it; when the optic nerve is stimulated by a blow, we 'see stars,' as it is called; but we could not describe this experience as resembling the perception of light without assuming that the real perception of light is something with which we are acquainted. There is a genuine difficulty, well worth discussion, which might be raised at this point, as to the principle of the distinction which we draw between the real and the illusory, or, as it may be otherwise put, as to what it is that the 'real' and the 'illusory' experience have in common. This difficulty, however, I do not now raise; for it is no way peculiar to Religion, but applies equally to all forms of consciousness; and it is not

[1] This is, of course, not by any means the same thing as saying that its existence depends upon or consists in our consciousness of it.

a universal scepticism, but a scepticism in respect of Religion as distinguished from other kinds of consciousness, with which I am here concerned. In a certain sense, then, I should be prepared to say that the existence of God, so long as we mean by God no more than 'the object of the religious consciousness,' is not really doubtful. That is, the religious consciousness has, like all consciousness, some object. But we have to explain why we feel doubt to be possible in this case as we do not, for example, in respect of the existence of Beauty, to revert to an illustration of which I have several times made use. The explanation of this fact I should find in the fact that the religious sentiment is a sentiment for an object which is regarded as not merely its object, but as somehow the fundamental or ultimate reality. Such a statement may well be thought paradoxical and absurd, when we remember what may be and has been at various times and in various places 'called God and worshipped.'[1] But I believe it, notwithstanding, to be essentially true. Worship is doubtless far older than the capacity for any such feats of abstraction as are implied in the use of such a phrase as 'ultimate reality.' But is there not from the first in our sentiment towards the object of worship something which from the first would not be excited, except by something which is imagined as holding

[1] 2 Thessalonians ii. 4.

in itself that mystery or secret, which, as the worshipper's horizon widens, we come at last to realize is the mystery of the ultimate ground of all things? The demand for a proof that God exists is not really the demand for a proof that there is an object of religious experience. That there is such an object the existence of the experience itself affords sufficient testimony; but that this object is truly what it gives itself out to be, the 'secret and mystery of existence,'[1] may certainly be doubted, and in point of fact the progress of religion is marked by the desertion one after another of idols which are found not to be what they gave themselves out to be, that is, not to be gods at all.

And this, I think, is, at each stage of the history of religion, the meaning of the continually recurring doubt of God's existence; it means the doubt whether what we have been accustomed to call God is God at all. In the last resort of all it means the doubt whether the ultimate nature of reality, if it were known as it really is, would continue to excite the religious sentiment of reverence and worship; whether, in fact, not merely is this or that conception of the divine inadequate to satisfy the demands of that sentiment, but whether indeed there is any satisfactory (though, as we have seen, there is certainly *some*) 'object of religious experience'; whether what seems worshipful may not prove

[1] F. W. Robertson's Sermon (1st Series, III.) on *Jacob Wrestling*.

no fundamental or ultimate character of reality, and therefore after all not worshipful at all. Were what is thus doubtfully suggested actually true, with the discovery of the truth religion must sicken and die. Such a doubt is indeed one which may and which does arise; and perhaps such doubt is the condition of the profoundest religious consciousness, in which it becomes the measure of the inadequacy of its attainment, and thus a stimulus to further wrestling with him whose true name, as in the old legend of wrestling Jacob,[1] is still withheld, so that even for those that so far prevailed there is something yet in store. Religious experience has so far progressively prevailed; mankind has not ceased, and shows no sign of ceasing, despite all their far-reaching doubts, to find in the world something which excites the religious sentiment; the veriest nightmares of doubt witness to the fact that Reality, even while offering to our view aspects which seem most unworshipful, is still divine enough by continuing to excite the religious sentiment, to create this terrible sense of contradiction between what are both alike experienced attributes of Reality.

Hence, using the word God now not merely in the sense of 'the object of the religious consciousness,' but with the conscious implication that nothing can continue to be the object of the religious consciousness which is known not to be ultimate or

[1] Genesis xxxii. 29.

fundamental, I should be disposed to think that the great question for the thinker about religion is not *whether God exists*, but rather *what God is*. But here too we shall be met by the objection that we are but playing with words; that the plain man when he asks whether God exists does not mean by 'God' anything so vague as we here have in mind; he means, 'Does there exist a particular being, *un nommé Dieu*, who, we have been told, exists, whom we cannot well prove not to exist, but whom there seems no strong reason for supposing to exist?' Such an objection is raised, for example, by Dr. McTaggart, in his interesting book, *Some Dogmas of Religion*. Dr. McTaggart holds that the only natural and proper meaning of the word 'God' is that of a being who is 'personal, supreme, and good.'[1] These expressions he further defines as follows: 'In calling him personal, I mean to assert that he is self-conscious, that he has that awareness of his own existence which I have of my own existence. In calling him supreme I do not mean to assert that he is omnipotent, but that he is at the least much more powerful than any other being, and so powerful that his volition can profoundly affect the whole sum of existence. In calling him good I do not mean to assert that he is perfect, but that he is, at the least, of such a nature that he would be rightly judged to be more good than evil.' We might

[1] p. 186, § 152.

observe that Gods have not always been conceived at all stages of religious development as predominantly good. But Dr. McTaggart is quite within his rights in looking to the highest developments of religion. It is true in some of these highest developments, in Buddhism for example, there is no God in Dr. McTaggart's sense of the word, but then in Buddhism the object of religion is not described by any word which we could well render in our language by 'God.' In the highest developments of what we may call theistic religion, or, as Dr. McTaggart expresses it, in Western theology, God is certainly held to be a being 'at least more good than evil.' Dr. McTaggart then would insist that God is a word which is only used in a way that can honestly be regarded as consonant with the common usage of the word in plain, unphilosophical English, when it is used to imply a powerful and predominantly good person; and using the word 'God' in this sense, he finds no sufficient proof of the existence of such a being.

But it may well be doubted whether religious people really do think of God in the way described by Dr. McTaggart.

Aristotle has observed[1] that drawing distinctions is not a thing at which the majority of people are good—and I dare say many religious people could

[1] *Eth. Nic.*, X. 1, § 3.

easily be induced to accept Dr. McTaggart's phrase as fairly describing the God whom they worship. But I think that if we consider more closely the sentiments of religious people, and the language in which they find expression, even when this language is most 'anthropomorphic' (as the phrase goes), we shall come to doubt whether they really think of God as just another person standing side by side with them among the many beings which the world contains, though no doubt vastly their superior in power, wisdom, and goodness. One particular indication that they do not thus think of God I will allege. I venture to affirm that most of us, if we were to guess that any other man or angel saw and knew, without our consent or privity, the innermost thoughts of our hearts, should feel that nothing could be more horrible than such an invasion as this of the sanctuary of our personality. It is not uncommon to find people shrinking from having anything to do with hypnotism, lest they should become—or even be convinced of the possibility of becoming—the victims of such an invasion. I do not here enquire how far such an invasion is really possible even in the hypnotic state. I am only concerned with the existence of this attitude of fear and suspicion towards such a relation between two private persons, as the people whom I am describing suppose to obtain between the hypnotizer and his patient. To open, of our own

accord, the secret chambers of our heart to those we love we may reckon as the highest privilege of affection, but it would be a very different matter to think it possible even for those whom we love to know our thoughts as thoughts unuttered and unexpressed by act or word, look or gesture; even although on certain occasions these signs of our thoughts issue unbidden and, as it were, instinctively from their springs within the heart, and betray secrets which we had wished to keep, or wished to tell but did not dare to do so. Yet such knowledge of 'the thoughts and intents of the heart'[1] all believers in God, at least when religion has reached a certain level, the level of a genuine monotheism, would attribute without hesitation to him; but I venture to say that, however much they may tremble at the thought that there is nothing in them but 'is naked and open to him'[2] 'in whose sight the very heavens are not clean,'[3] yet not for one moment do they feel the sense of insecurity and outrage which they would feel if they believed their hearts to be exposed to unauthorized prying by a fellow-creature.

What, then, we may ask, is the cause of this difference? Is it not because it belongs to our very notion of God that he is not just another finite person, however superior to ourselves, over against us, but rather one of whom it can truly be said

[1] Hebrews iv. 12. [2] Hebrews iv. 3. [3] Job xv. 15.

that 'in him we live and move and have our being,'[1] from whom even in the depths of our personality we are not divided? In other words, because he is not a problematical, powerful, and predominantly good Being, about whose existence we might be doubtful, as we might be about that of the sea serpent or of a planet alleged to exist within the orbit of Mercury. And not only can we, I think, with tolerable confidence affirm that the plain religious man does not really think of God in this way, but, if we turn to the historical religions, we shall find that they also do not suggest that he does so. It is only when one who has been a believer has come to doubt his religion that he looks upon the god of that religion in this way. While he still really believes in his religion, he does not think that he is merely entertaining a probable hypothesis. Laplace, when according to the well-known story he told Napoleon that he had no need of the hypothesis of a God, did not speak as a believer in any religion. The believer does not thus regard his God. The worshipper of an idol has no such problematical deity. He knows his god very well; his god stands there in the temple, feeds upon the sacrifices which are laid upon his altar, or at least smells the sweet savour, which perhaps is more (he fancies) to a god's taste than the solid flesh. At a higher level of religious development, when the worshipper is no longer content with an idol as the

[1] Acts xvii. 23.

object of his religious veneration, and says with the Psalmist, 'As for our God, he is in heaven,' he adds at once, 'he hath done whatsoever pleased him.'[1] God is indeed no longer at this stage believed to be visible to the bodily eye; but his actions are regarded as the object of direct experience, and this is the evidence of his reality; not as we speak of evidence brought to support an hypothesis, but rather in what is, I suppose, the stricter sense of the word, as what shows you, whether you thought of it before or not, that the thing in question is certainly there. And unquestionably the conception of God which we find in Christianity is not the conception of a problematical or hypothetical being: God is in Christ reconciling the world unto himself,[2] God is Spirit,[3] and as Spirit can be and is *in* us; God is love, and whoso loveth dwelleth in God and God in him.[4] Perhaps no *real* religion (as distinct from a mere abstract from real religion, such as that of some of those we call deists) ever conceived of God in the way which Dr. McTaggart's criticism suggests. God is always in real religion an object of experience; if not actually an object of touch or sight or hearing, yet what (it is held) can only be his operation is directly experienced.[5] He is never something merely problematical. Even when the

[1] Psalm cxv. 3.
[2] 2 Corinthians v. 19.
[3] John iv. 24.
[4] 1 John iv. 16.
[5] I mean that the thing which happens is at once and without hesitation referred to the god, as we at once refer to a person with

religious soul has, as it were, lost its God and seeks if haply he might find him, always it is as one whom it has known that it seeks him; and the very doubt as to the existence of the object of religious experience, the constant recurrence of which, we saw, distinguishes the religious from other forms of experience is, if the view we have taken be correct, not really a doubt whether there be an object of religious experience at all, but a doubt whether the object of religious experience be what in its excitation of the religious sentiment it claims to be, the heart or ground of all reality.

It may readily be granted that if what the religious man means by God were really what Dr. McTaggart says it is, it would be very difficult to obtain satisfactory proof of his existence. Laplace is reported to have said that the astronomer, sweeping the heavens with his telescope, finds there no God. But this only surprises us if we have supposed God to be a being whom we could discover in this way. No doubt at a certain level of religious development it is fancied that God is somewhere up above, where you could see him if you had such an instrument as the telescope is. But even with those who stand on this level (and this level is not one which corresponds to the level of

whom we are conversing (though at a distance, for example through the telephone) the words we hear; that the fact is not first observed, then the question raised 'How are we to account for this?' and the answer suggested, 'Perhaps by the action of a supernatural being.'

scientific attainment at which the telescope would be likely to be invented), this fancy by no means expresses the whole of their conviction, which will certainly be found to include theophanies, such as a Shekinah upon the mercy seat, or an oracle through the mouth of a possessed priest or priestess, a miraculous image, a significant dream or what not. The very fancy of a throne on Olympus or the like itself expresses rather what we have seen all through to be an inexpugnable element in the notion of deity, namely, that the object of religious worship is not exhausted in the particular religious experience (for example in the theophany), but is independently real and bound up with the heart or ground of reality; it is just this which is imaginatively or pictorially expressed in the representation of it as having a dwelling-place of its own on the summit or at the centre or in the roots of the material world. When more advanced reflexion suggests that a God on Olympus or Sinai, in some earthly paradise or in the nether regions, would be only a particular and in this case problematical being, the only sort of being which Dr. McTaggart would call God at all, then the belief in such a local habitation of deity expires for the religious, and only persists for such as the Epicureans, who believed indeed in splendid and long-lived beings dwelling in the intermundane spaces, but not the objects of religion; religion being, it will be remembered, derived by Lucretius[1] not from the reasonable (though

[1] V. 1161 foll.

hypothetical) belief in gods, but from the unreasonable fears inspired by the erroneous attribution to these probably real gods, the effluxes from whose forms sometimes strike upon our senses in slumber, of responsibility for and control over the hostile forces of nature which are in truth not the work of gods at all. The only worship which Epicureanism could offer to its gods was not prayer, as to beings on whom we in any sense depend, but merely the admiration which we may feel for beings more excellent than ourselves ; [1] and there is much in Dr. McTaggart's way of expressing himself to suggest that this is not very remote from his idea of worship, and that on that very account he regards the dismissal of God as little more than the loss of one, though the most excellent, of many admirable and lovable persons, whom we may rightly rejoice in admiring and loving.[2] The Gods of Epicurus and Lucretius (though it must be admitted that they differ in that they were not held to have any power over the course of nature), perhaps correspond more accurately than any others to the description which Dr. McTaggart gives of the sort of being which alone he considers entitled to the name. They may reasonably be called hypothetical or problematical, as we may also call the ghosts in whom a good many folk among ourselves are inclined to

[1] See Lucr. VI. 68 foll., and the passages collected in Zeller, *Stoics, etc.*, Eng. tr., p. 440. Cp. Mr. Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience of the Roman People*, p. 360.

[2] *Some Dogmas of Religion*, §§ 239, 240, pp. 289, 290.

believe, because they think that there is no smoke without fire, and know this, that, or the other ghost story, which they cannot explain away. In the same way the Epicurean gods are introduced to explain the universal belief in beings of superhuman excellence, and to account for dreams and apparitions which seemed to imply on Epicurean principles that there should be bodies from which such appearances could proceed. But Epicurus and Lucretius are by no means representative of the ordinary religious man, and it is to the ordinary religious man that Dr. McTaggart would appeal.

The very attempts to *prove* the existence of God which are embodied in the traditional Teleological, Cosmological, and Ontological Arguments, illustrate what I have just been urging. I do not mean so much that these arguments are unsuccessful in proving what they set out to prove as that they plainly do not aim at proving the existence of a problematical finite being. Indeed, I think that one may reasonably doubt what could be meant by a *proof* of the existence of a problematical finite being. Would not the only proof which could be given be a proof of the kind described by Mill in his account of the so-called Deductive Method,[1] which would require for its completion such a verification by the actual exhibition of the particular finite being to the senses as took place in the discovery of the planet

[1] *Logic*, III. 11.

Neptune? In that case the hypothesis of the existence of a planet beyond the orbit of Uranus, and affecting its motions, was framed to account for irregularities in those motions; calculations were made to ascertain what would be the position of a body which should thus affect the motions of Uranus; and Adams and Leverrier, 'sweeping the heavens with their telescopes,' or rather directing their telescopes upon the position indicated, detected Neptune. This was the verification of their hypothesis, the necessary completion of the proof of it. The traditional proofs, so called, of God's existence, include no such stage in their procedure; and though it is true that Kant's celebrated criticism of them seems to disparage them on that account, I do not think that his disparagement of them on this ground is the most valuable feature of that criticism.

The importance of these Proofs or Arguments, and of the criticism of them, is not limited by their use in the philosophy of Religion. They involve principles raising fundamental problems of general philosophy. But here the few observations which I shall make about them will relate (so far as we can hold it apart at all) to their use in the speculative comprehension of religious experience.

These arguments prove (in a somewhat peculiar sense of the word [1]) the existence of an Absolute, or to put it otherwise, they go to establish the necessity

[1] See below, p. 185.

of recognizing an Absolute. In so doing they undermine a certain kind of doctrine which, under such names as Relativism, Positivism, Secularism, Agnosticism, and so forth, aims at ruling out the Absolute in favour of its correlative, without observing that the recognition of the Absolute is implied in the experience of that which alone it acknowledges to be real at all, and which it can only declare to be relative or phenomenal because in so doing it contrasts it with an Absolute Reality, of which it thus confesses itself aware, and of which it thus declares the relative phenomena to be the partial appearance to us. These traditional Arguments thus (if I may so put it) seem to remove an inhibition from the mind, and permit it to investigate an aspect of its experience which the doctrine I have mentioned would dismiss as unworthy of investigation. Nay, by establishing the necessity of the recognition of an Absolute, they may go further than this in helping us toward the determination of the object of religious consciousness. One of the strongholds of the type of doctrine which I have mentioned as undermined by these Arguments is the principle of the necessary relativity of knowledge as consisting in a relation. The object is never, it is said, known as it is, but only as it is in relation to the subject. Absolute knowledge (which would here seem to mean knowledge of the object as it is out of relation to the subject) is thus held to be unattain-

able. This might be dismissed as merely the truism that a thing cannot be at once known and not known.[1] But there is implied an attempt to reckon the relation between subject and object in knowledge (or more generally in all self-distinguishing consciousness) among the relations which obtain between the objects which constitute the external world, and which are studied by the natural sciences. This attempt is, however, fallacious. The naturalistic reduction of consciousness to the rank of an 'epiphenomenon' has really the same motive as (for example) Green's denial that a self-distinguishing consciousness is a part of nature. This motive is the avoidance of such an inclusion of the relation of subject and object among the relations between the objects studied by the natural sciences as must necessarily reduce them to uncertainty and confusion. We must not deduce the nature of knowledge from a theory of the general nature of relations, but take it as it actually is. We shall then find that our minds are known to us only as apprehending a reality independent of them in the sense that it is presupposed by their activity in apprehending it. Thus they are seen to have their being in a relation to something beyond themselves; they are not as individual minds self-sufficient, complete in themselves. Their complement, their 'other,' is independent of them, in the sense that it does not depend

[1] Cp. below, p. 181.

for its existence upon being known by them. Otherwise it would not be *known* in the proper sense of the word at all. For knowledge is not knowledge, except it be knowledge of something as it is in itself, not of something which is altered by the very fact of being known, still less of something whose existence cannot be distinguished from its being known, instead of being presupposed thereby. On the other hand, our minds are independent of their objects, in the sense that knowledge, though it must be knowledge of an independent reality, is not, *as* knowledge, explicable by anything else. In knowing we have the consciousness of autonomous activity, since the laws of thought are not derivable from anything else or corrigible by anything else. Aristotle conveys this truth in his doctrine of the infallibility of νοῦς;[1] and so far from that doctrine being upset by the fact that we often find ourselves mistaken, this very fact presupposes and requires such an immanent standard (not an external criterion) of truth as Aristotle indicates. This relative independence upon one another of the mind and its object is at the same time a relative dependence upon one another, in so far as they are in the relation of knowledge, to which this mutual independence is essential, and in our recognition of them as thus related, we recognize them as therefore embraced within a unity which is the ground of the possibility of this

[1] See Zeller, *Aristotle*, Eng. tr., I. pp. 197 foll., 248.

relation. Thus our consciousness of self, the Cartesian bed-rock of certainty, when reflected upon, resolves itself into a consciousness of self, of not-self, and of the unity in which self and not-self are related to each other. Now in Religion the consciousness of this unity of the self and the not-self is present, not at first in a reflective form, but in the form of a sentiment of awe or veneration towards a mysterious something which is at once other than us and yet somehow intimately akin to us, which is felt to be the very secret heart of things, at once of ourselves and of what is not ourselves.

Note on the Proofs of the Existence of God and on Kant's Criticism of them.[1]

The first of the three traditional Proofs of the Existence of God is what is called by Kant the Physico-theological Argument, or, to use the name by which it is best known to Englishmen, the Argument from Design. This may be called the plain man's argument. The fact that we know it by a less technical name than it bears in the discussions of the schools, while the other two traditional Arguments bear none but technical names, is an indication of this characteristic. As the plain man's argument too, Kant, despite his drastic and damaging criticism of it, treats it with

[1] See Kant, *Kr. der r. V.* Elementarlehre, II Th., II Abth., II Buch, 3 Haupt., 3 Abschn., tr. Meiklejohn, pp. 359 foll. See also Hegel, *Werke*, XII. 359 foll. (Eng. tr *Philos. of Religion*, III. 155 foll.).

a sympathy which is absent from his treatment of the two more exclusively philosophical Arguments.[1]

From the apparent adaptations of means to ends in nature, this Argument proceeds to the inference (on the model of that which we should make, as Paley said,[2] should we find lying on the sands a machine exhibiting an intricate adaptation of parts to one another, like a watch) of its construction by an intelligent being who designed this mutual adaptation in order to the accomplishment thereby of certain ends.

The Argument from Design does not stand or fall with Paley's way of stating it, or with his illustrations. For the impression of design made upon us by the spectacle of the world is prior to the elaboration of an argument based upon that impression, nor does it disappear with the perception of gaps in such an argument. There are simpler forms of argument, resting on the same foundation, which do not lose all their force with that discovery of the principle of the preservation of useful variations in organic beings through natural selection which has led us to explain in a different way the origin of ' adaptations ' which seemed to Paley and his contemporaries to be directly due to the designing skill of a divine artist. Such are the Psalmist's ' He that made the eye, shall he not see ? '[3] or the more exact reasoning of Plato

[1] *Kr. der r. V.* (*Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, III. 423 foll., tr. Meiklejohn, p. 383).

[2] *Natural Theology*, c. 1. [3] Psalm xciv. 9.

in the *Philebus*,[1] where the origin of the elements of man's material frame from the great mass of like elements in the universe suggests by analogy that the mind of man must also have its source in 'a royal soul and mind in the nature of Zeus.'[2] And we may otherwise make too much of the effect of the discovery of the principle of 'natural selection.' It is very doubtful whether this principle will be found able to bear all the burden which some would place upon it. And it is often forgotten that behind the question of the method by which 'evolution' has been carried on, lie the questions whether the results, unless some other factor than mere natural selection be admitted, will not, as regards their apparent goodness and general upward tendency, be merely accidental; whether this is not more than any one really believes; and lastly whether, as the whole of this hypothesis relates only to organic nature, we are not still left without an explanation of the impression of natural order made upon us by inorganic nature. Here are a number of difficult problems, which I make no pretence of discussing here, or even of raising in a form suitable for discussion; I am only concerned on the present occasion to suggest that it is no means plain that current theories of 'evolution' have so completely disposed of the Argument for Design in every possible form as is sometimes hastily assumed. On the other hand, a closer familiarity with the or-

[1] 29 A foll. [2] 30 D.

ganic processes of nature has, I think, changed the general impression made by them upon us from one of skilful designing by an external artist to one of immanent reason and purpose, such as fits in better with the Aristotelian teleology than with what in England we may call the Paleyan; and which enlarges and deepens, although making less tractable to a pictorial analogical treatment, our conception of the power and wisdom concerned in the process. But the Argument from Design in its traditional form had not to wait for Darwin for a serious attack. That it had already undergone more than half a century previously at the hands of Kant.

The main point brought out by Kant in his special criticism of this Argument is this: that (assuming it to be successful) it does not prove the existence of such a being as we mean by God; not, that is, of one omnipotent and all-wise creator. Adaptation may point to an intelligence which has shaped nature to its ends, as in the case of the watch found on the seashore we should infer an intelligence which had thus shaped a pre-existent material; but we have no more reason in the one case than in the other for inferring there a *creator*, from whom not only the form, but the matter to which this form had been given, had derived its origin. Thus at the outside it is not a Creator, but only an Architect of the universe whose existence the Argument from Design can hope to establish. In the next place, although the adapta-

tion of means to ends which we find in nature seems to imply a skill or wisdom, and also a power very much greater than our own, we have no such standard of the possibilities of wisdom and power as would enable us to call the architect whose existence we divine all-wise or all-powerful. Moreover, although the apparent unity of the system of nature points to unity of design, it is no less compatible with the existence of a number of beings who have conspired together and collaborated in the work than with that of a single author.

Hence, when the argument is used to prove the existence of God as the one all-wise and all-powerful creator of the universe, there is much more in the conclusion than the premises will yield. This, however, was from the first inevitable, if such a conclusion was to be reached from such premises. God cannot be thought of as a consequence of his works; hence, in the language of the modern logic-books, the argument is not really 'deductive,' but 'inductive'; it moves from effect to cause, not from cause to effect. Nor in this case are the effect and the cause reciprocating. For it is affirmed in the conclusion of the argument that the cause of the effects observed must be one omnipotent and all-wise Being; but all that the premises at their best prove is, as Kant points out, the existence of a Being or Beings with enough unity of purpose, powerful enough, wise enough, to shape things just as they are shaped.

More than this cannot be affirmed, unless, as Kant also says, the argument be eked out with the Cosmological Argument.

In this Argument, the Argument *a contingentia mundi*, we start from the contingency of any particular thing or of all particular things taken together. Each particular thing or the aggregate of all particular things might or might not exist, so long as we consider them in isolation. The reason of their existence must in every case be sought outside of itself, and this process will go on *ad infinitum*, so that our demand can never be satisfied, unless we come to rest in the apprehension of a necessary Being, upon whose existence the existence of all the rest depends, while its own existence depends on nothing outside of itself. If we compare this second Argument with the first, we shall find that it is in comparison more philosophical, in the sense of being further removed from common apprehension, and requiring more thought before it can be formulated. On the other hand, it is also more abstract, and so leads to what is a barer, a more inadequate conception of Deity. It is less exposed, indeed, than the Argument from Design to the charge of inconclusiveness; but it is no less subject to whatever insecurity may attach to the procedure from consequent to ground as compared with that from ground to consequent. Moreover, Kant has pointed out in it an inherent ambiguity: it admits of two meanings, and in neither does it give us

what we want; like the former proof it cannot, as a proof of the existence of God, stand alone. Just as that needed eking out with this very Cosmological Proof, so the Cosmological Proof in its turn needs eking out with the third, the Ontological.

We may now somewhat fill out this brief sketch. I called the Physicotheological Proof or Argument from Design the plain man's argument. It would not be altogether erroneous to describe the Cosmological Argument as the Argument of ancient philosophy. This does not mean that the Argument from Design was not used by ancient philosophers, or that there is in them no anticipation of the Ontological Argument to which we shall come hereafter.

We have already noticed a form of the Argument from Design in Plato's *Philebus*, and we find it employed in its most usual shape by Socrates in Xenophon's *Memorabilia:*[1] while in a famous passage[2] Cicero has translated a fine statement of it from one of the lost books of Aristotle *On Philosophy*, which were probably of earlier date and more Platonic in tone than those writings of his which we still possess. But the argument by which Aristotle proved[3] the existence of an unmoved first mover, to explain the motion of the universe without going on *ad infinitum* is the argument which has been generalized in the

[1] I. 4. [2] *De Natura Deorum*, II. 37, § 95.

[3] See the references given in Zeller, *Aristotle*, Eng. tr., I. 383 foll.

argument *a contingentia mundi*.[1] We may draw an obvious distinction between ancient and modern philosophy in respect of the different emphasis laid in the two upon the mind, considered as that which knows, as the subject of knowledge. For the ancients the mind is one of the things in the world, though maybe the most interesting; for the moderns since Descartes' *Cogito, ergo sum* it is the primary fact of experience.[2] The difference is reflected in the starting-point of the Cosmological and Ontological Arguments respectively; that of the one is the complex of *objects*, the world: that of the other thought, the *subject*. On the other hand, the Cosmological Argument may be reckoned more philosophical than the Argument from Design, in so far as it does not start from certain specially striking objects, in which we seem to notice an adaptation of means to ends, not equally obvious elsewhere, but rather from the general nature of objects as finite or contingent. And as it is the general nature of objects that this argument takes as its starting-point, *any* object will do as well as any other: and hence the Cosmological Argument can be adapted to the use of those who follow Descartes in making *Cogito, ergo sum* the bedrock of certainty; for they can say, '*I* at any rate

[1] See Leibnitz, *Théodicée*, I. § 7. Cp. J. Hutchison Stirling, *Philosophy and Theology*, p. 125.

[2] This way of regarding it is not here intended to be endorsed. It is only pointed out as characteristic of a majority of modern philosophers.

exist; but I did not always exist: therefore I am impelled to ask after a cause of my existence'; and having in this way started on the search for a cause or ground, they will be led on to the conclusion of the Cosmological Argument, that there exists a necessary and therefore eternal being, whose existence has no cause beyond itself.

The Cosmological Argument may indeed be reckoned as more philosophical than the Argument from Design, since it requires more thought to reflect on the contingent nature of objects in general than to notice the appearance of design in certain particular objects; on the need to ask for a cause of *anything* coming into existence than in the case of things which remind us of what we know to be manufactured articles, to guess by analogy at the existence of a manufacturer. The human mind, though there is present in it from the first the impulse to seek for causes, does not at first realize that it is only asking for them in special cases, while in other cases, though they are no less required there, it neglects to ask for them. So that the realization of this marks a step in advance, and this is taken in the passage from the Argument from Design to the Cosmological Argument.

But in this way, although in a certain sense more philosophical, the Cosmological Argument is also more abstract than the Argument from Design. The conception of God to which it leads is at once more and less than that to which we seemed to be conducted

by the Argument from Design. For it is that of a necessary and eternal being, the ground and condition of the universe, instead of a being or society of beings of great but not necessarily unlimited power, of great but not necessarily of perfect wisdom, confronted by a matter capable of being shaped to certain ends; and so a being, or society of beings, which, though the cause of certain things, is so far only an element in reality and not its ground. In this way therefore the God reached by the Cosmological Argument is more than the God reached by the Argument from Design; this is God, that was only a god or gods; and, as Kant said, it was only by reading the Necessary Being of the Cosmological Argument into the great Architect or Architects of the Argument from Design that the latter could be made to appear as a proof of the existence of *God*.

On the other hand, the God of the Cosmological Argument as just the ground of the world as a whole has lost the distinctive and concrete characteristics of the God of the Argument from Design. That God (or Gods) had a character which could be traced *here* rather than *there*; the very speciality of the striking phenomena to which the Argument from Design attended allows us to conclude to a being, anthropomorphic if you will, but, like a man, having a definite character recognizable in his works. The God of the Cosmological Argument is in comparison abstract; no particular phenomenon is here regarded as mani-

festing his nature more than any other. He is the ground of *all* phenomena indiscriminately. If we have got nearer to the God of religion in one way, we seem in another to have removed farther off.

Again, the Cosmological Argument may seem to be less inconclusive than the Argument from Design. The inference from consequent to ground, from the contingent to the necessary, seems to be inevitable, as it is stated. There does not appear to be possible an alternative explanation of the data such as has been suggested to the intelligent designer, whose existence is inferred by the Argument from Design. It does not, of course, follow the order of nature in the sense in which Aristotle[1] distinguished the order of nature from the order of our knowledge ; the existence of the consequent depends on that of the ground and not *vice versa*, but our knowledge moves in the opposite direction. But although the Cosmological Argument, like the Argument from Design, infers the cause from the effect, not the effect from the cause, yet since here the effect and cause are correlative, as consequent and ground, and since we attend to nothing but the abstract general nature of *consequent* in the premise, to nothing but the abstract general nature of *ground* in the conclusion, there is so far no inconclusiveness.

Yet there is a great difficulty involved in this very correlativity. If the Necessary Being is really necessary—in the sense of being utterly independent

[1] e.g. *Anal. Post*, I. 2 ; 71, b. 33 foll.

upon anything else—how is this to be made consistent with the dependence upon it of the world? If the production of the contingent was necessary in the Necessary Being, then the contingent world is included in his necessary being, and is at once as necessary as any other part of it, and we have thus got no farther. On the other hand, if the production of the contingent was itself contingent, we have to ask what determined the Necessary Being to produce it, and we are no longer able to rest in the necessity of his being as the ground of the contingent. Kant expresses this in the following dilemma. Is, he asks, the Necessary Being other than the contingent world?—that is, is it a transcendent God? or does it include the contingent world?—that is, is it (like Spinoza's God) only a necessary universe?

If we take the former alternative, then it does not do what it was called in to do—it does not explain the contingent world; and thus the whole argument collapses. If we take the latter alternative, how can the Universe be *more* necessary than the parts of which it is the sum? Each of them depends upon the other, but what (we are compelled to ask) do they all depend upon? Thus again the conclusion of the argument escapes us, and we have not found the Necessary Being after all. Kant's conclusion from this is that the whole conception of a Necessary Being, the ground of all the contingent phenomena of which the world is made up, is only what he is accustomed to

call a 'regulative' principle for the interpretation of nature. The progress of Natural Science is assured by our continual enquiry after a cause, an enquiry which we can never cease to make short of reaching a Necessary Being—whether a Being transcending the world or the world itself as a whole—as to which the question will not arise again. But that Necessary Being (he holds) we never reach. We can never have it presented to us as an object in any possible experience, and in the attempt to conceive its nature, we fall (as we have seen) into antinomies, from which there is no escape, so long as we seek for it as a reality, and not merely as a limit, short of which we cannot stop in our search for causes. I do not propose to discuss further at this point this difficult notion of a 'regulative' principle which is not 'constitutive.' We have already met with it [1] in dealing with Kant's account of Grace and Freedom, and it is a very characteristic feature of his philosophy. Anything which it is to the purpose to say of it here will be said more suitably apropos of the third or Ontological Argument. But of the alleged impossibility of conceiving the nature of a Necessary Being I may say that it seems to arise from the attempt to hold the Necessary and the Contingent apart, much as the puzzles about the Platonic Ideas arise from the attempt to hold the Universal apart from its Particulars. A Necessary Being above and beyond

[1] See above, p. 93.

the world of the contingent can have nothing whatever to do with that world, and therefore would be no explanation of it. Contingent things which were merely contingent would not make up a necessary whole. But if we ask ourselves what we mean by the contingent, we shall not find that we mean what is not necessary at all; if we did, we should certainly not be able to get from it to a Necessary Being as we attempt to do in the Cosmological Argument. No, what we mean is something necessitated by something else; and conversely the only Necessary Being which we could get would not be a Necessary Being apart and away from the contingent altogether, but a Necessary Being which, just because it is that on which the contingent depends, is in a mutual or reciprocal relation with it, and so *not* independent or necessary in such a way as to exclude contingency, that is dependence on something else. In other words, we have not a *merely* necessary whole made up of *merely* contingent parts, but a whole which is necessary throughout, in the parts as well as in the whole; and in which the parts are contingent, that is *necessarily* dependent on each other and on the whole, and the whole is also contingent, in the sense that it is dependent—*necessarily*—upon the parts: it is not conceivable without them nor they conceivable without it.

We see, then, that the Cosmological Argument proves at best a Necessary Being, who, as Kant would

say, must either be—and yet can neither be—separated from the world or identified with it. We may object, as we have done above, that this is not rightly put—that the necessity and contingency in the world are correlative, and that one cannot be without the other. But at any rate it is plain that more is meant by God than just a Necessary Being, however conceived. And this Kant expressed by saying that the Cosmological Argument could never lead to the conclusion to which it professed to lead, except it were in its own turn eked out with the third of the three traditional Arguments, the Ontological.

If we may call the Argument from Design the plain man's argument, and the Cosmological Argument the argument of ancient philosophy, the Ontological Argument may be called the argument of modern philosophy. Though the germ of it may be found in St. Augustine,[1] it owes its first explicit formulation to St. Anselm.[2] Anselm's aim in the construction of his argument was the establishment

[1] See *De Libero Arbitrio*, II. § § 14 foll.

[2] In his *Proslogion* in Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, t. clviii. col. 223. On his argument, see E. Caird in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, Oct., 1899. In a paper in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society of London* for 1896 (Vol. III. No. 2, pp. 25 foll.) I have given an account of its history and a discussion of its significance; some of the views in this paper I should not now endorse, having been when it was written less critical than I am at present of 'idealistic' language. I may also mention a shorter and less technical notice of the argument contained in the introductory and annotative matter contained in *The Devotions of St. Anselm* in Messrs. Methuen's *Library of Devotion*.

of a proof of God's existence by reason alone which must be accepted by any man, independently of any reliance on the authority of revelation. His way of stating it is this. Even the fool in the Psalms[1] who says in his heart 'There is no God' would not say this unless the word *God* had a meaning for him. This meaning may be admitted to be 'that than which no greater can be conceived.' But to say that this does not exist is really a contradiction in terms. For it is saying in effect that you can conceive something greater than 'that than which no greater can be conceived,' namely this as really existing; and therefore you are in one breath saying that it is and that it is not 'that than which no greater can be conceived.' Hence a denial of the existence of God (in this sense of *quo majus cogitari nequit*, 'that than which no greater can be conceived') is impossible without contradiction.

The impression made upon most minds by their first introduction to this celebrated argument is one of bewilderment. It seems simple and unanswerable; so much so that a snare is suspected. It is, of course, true (to this we shall return later on) that in Religion we mean by God not indeed *more* than Anselm's definition covers; for *ex vi terminorum* we cannot mean *more* than *the greatest conceivable object;* but we imply a more definitely characterized object than this. But, apart from this, we are perhaps inclined on

[1] Psalm xiii. 1.

further consideration to think that at this rate we are committed by the acceptance of Anselm's argument to a confidence in the correspondence of our ideas to reality which we do not really feel. An acute contemporary critic of Anselm, by name Gaunilo (whose criticism, together with Anselm's reply, is appended to the *Proslogion* itself), took this point, and suggested that, if Anselm were right, we should be bound to admit the actual existence of a 'most perfect island conceivable,' such as the Fortunate Isle of ancient mythology, because we could not deny its existence without affirming in the same breath that it at once was and was not the most perfect island conceivable. For an island which, having the characteristics which we should attribute to 'the most perfect island conceivable,' *actually existed* would be more perfect than a merely imaginary island with the same characteristics; and hence the merely imagined island would *not* be the most perfect conceivable, as it was at the outset said to be. Now it would not help Anselm to point out that an island could not have these characteristics, unless it existed, for then the retort would be easy that then he was not *proving* the existence of God by his argument, but merely assuming it, as he might that of anything else; so that no distinction is established between God's existence as indubitable and that of cases of existence with which there was room for doubt. Accordingly, Anselm's reply is directed to the establishment of

such a distinction between the case of God and that of the Fortunate Isle. His answer is to the effect that his argument applies to no object but that *quo majus cogitari nequit;* for *that*, among its other perfections, must be eternal; and hence there will in *this* instance be no sense in drawing a distinction between its *actual* and its *possible* existence. In the case of any finite object, such as Gaunilo's island, this can very well be done. If the characteristics which we suppose united in the most perfect island are really conceivable in this union (for we cannot conceive the union of *some* characteristics; thus a 'round square' is a mere combination of *words*; it cannot be *thought* at all) that proves not the *actuality* but the *possibility* of the object which shall unite them. Such an object *may* now exist, *may* have existed, *may* exist hereafter; but it need not actually exist at the present moment. But an essentially Eternal Being, if it *may* be, *must* be now and always. It cannot be thought of as having existed, existing now no longer, or as being yet to exist, but not existing as yet. Its possibility is not separable from its actuality.

Although this argument is sometimes supposed to be pre-eminently a 'scholastic' argument, it obtained little more than occasional respectful deference in the period of scholastic philosophy properly so called (which begins with Abelard, a generation later than Anselm). It had not the recommendation

of being Aristotelian in origin, and it was in many respects, which it would be irrelevant to my present purpose to consider, uncongenial to the temper of that age. St. Thomas Aquinas was held to have refuted it,[1] and Descartes, in reviving it, was careful to explain that he was not reviving it in a form exposed to this refutation.[2] At the initiation of modern philosophy by Descartes, it was immediately put forward again, and, starting as it does from the conception of God in our minds, it has an obvious affinity with the system which adopted as its fundamental maxim *Cogito, ergo sum*, and took the certainty that 'I think' or 'form conceptions' as the starting-point of its whole theory of knowledge.

Descartes re-stated the argument in a double form in his *Meditations*. The first form is this :[3] I exist, and I have the idea or notion or conception of a most perfect or infinite Being. This idea is, however, not an idea which I can have derived from myself; for I am a *res incompleta*, an imperfect being, and my self-consciousness is a consciousness of myself as such. There must therefore be a most perfect or infinite Being to originate this idea. No doubt I have ideas of imaginary beings, of centaurs for example, which I do not believe to exist. But these are ideas of the combination of natures to whose originals I can point; but no mere combination of finite natures will yield

[1] *Summa contra Gentiles*, I. 10, 11.

[2] See his *Meditationes, Resp. ad 1mas Objectiones* (Crateri). [3] *Med.* III.

such a conception of an Infinite nature as I actually find in myself; a conception clear and distinct, involving no contradictions, and by contrast to which I discover the finitude of myself and the finitude of other things, the knowledge of which others involves the knowledge of that from which I distinguish them.

The second form in which Descartes presents the thought of the Ontological Argument is as follows.[1] This idea, which I find in myself, of a most perfect Being includes, among other perfections, that of *existence*. If *existence* be omitted from our conception, it ceases to be the idea of a most perfect Being. This second argument is practically Anselm's. I shall pass over the criticisms and modifications which Descartes' argument received at the hands of his successors,[2] and turn at once to Kant's criticism of it in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[3]

Kant's criticism of the Ontological Argument is illustrated by an instance which is far more widely known than the real point of his objection to that argument. If this instance really settled the question, as it may at first blush seem to do, it would follow that the Ontological Argument was a mere quibble or sophism of no great importance. But Kant did not, I think, mean to suggest that it was this. We saw in our account of his discussion of the Design

[1] *Med.* V.

[2] For some account of them see *Proc. of Aristotelian Society* (see above, p. 173).

[3] *Werke*, ed. H., III. 405 foll.; tr. Meiklejohn, pp. 364 foll.

Argument and the Cosmological Argument that he represents the Ontological Argument as really involved in them. Apart from this implication of the Ontological Argument they do not reach the conclusion which they seem to reach at all. With it they do reach it; but, as Kant thinks he can show, illegitimately. He thus treats the *Ontological Argument* as a very serious matter; it is the very heart of what he describes as the Rational Theology. It is really more than that, or rather (since it is always in theology that the difficulties of a philosophical position emerge in their acutest form) as being the heart of the Rational Theology it is the heart of that 'dogmatic' position that Reason can apprehend reality as it is in itself, against which the Kantian 'criticism' is throughout levelled. Hence the instances by which Kant seems to make the Ontological Argument ridiculous must not be taken as disposing of it.

This instance is the celebrated instance of the hundred dollars,[1] which it is one thing to conceive ourselves to have, and quite another actually to have in our pockets. This instance appeals readily to the ordinary man; and he may easily go away with the notion that the Ontological Argument seeks to prove from the idea of anything in our heads the existence of that thing *in rerum natura*. But this, of course, it does not do, or it would certainly

[1] *Werke*, III. 409; tr. Meiklejohn, p. 368.

not be worth the attention which we are bestowing upon it. Kant's dollars only repeat Gaunilo's island (of which Kant had probably never heard). The answer of Anselm to Gaunilo will serve for Kant so far as the dollars are concerned.[1] To no particular finite object can the argument plausibly be applied; but only to the infinite and eternal object, from which we distinguish finite objects in recognizing their finitude. We can conceive dollars, or an island, which might exist, but whose existence depends upon conditions beyond themselves; but in the case of God, it belongs to the notion of his eternal and necessary being that it does *not* depend upon external conditions for its realization.

The real criticism of Kant upon the Ontological Argument is not to be found in his instance of the dollars, but in his observation that the conception of a thing *as existing* does not add anything fresh to the conception of it; that there is no difference between the conception of x and the conception of x as existing. Hence the conception of x *as existing* contains as a conception no more than the conception of x without the addition; so that there is no force in the argument that the conception of a most perfect Being is contradicted, if that Being does not exist. The notion remains as be-

[1] So Hegel answers Kant by distinguishing the case of God from that of the dollars: *Logik*, § 51 (*Werke*, VI. 112; tr. Wallace, 2nd ed., p. 108).

fore; only it has no object, it is not the notion *of* anything, but a *mere* notion. It might seem inconsistent with this that we may discover something to correspond to a notion which we previously supposed to be merely imaginary: 'Flying fish really exist.' But here the *notion* remains what it was before, if by the notion of 'flying fish' we mean that of fish capable of propelling themselves through the air; while, if the notion with which we started was the notion of an imaginary or fabulous animal of this kind, then in asserting that such animals are real, we are substituting a quite different notion for it, and not adding a new predicate to *it*.

Thus to the principle laid down by Kant that the assertion of existence does not add to the conception of the subject a new predicate we may, I think, assent. But we need not draw from it the consequences which Kant drew. We may allow it to be valid against the Ontological Argument, so far as that argument is so expressed as to suggest that by its means we can take, as it were, a leap from thought to existence, existing side by side with it as another part of reality, with which it stood in no closer relation than any part of reality must have to any other.

The impression of a trick which has been played upon us, which, as I said before, the Ontological Argument tends to produce, is due to the suggestion

which it seems to make, that there, so to say, *happens* to be among notions in our head *one* which (though we might chance not to notice it) has the magical power of assuring us of the existence of its object. But, when we realize that what we have in it is the general statement that *all* thought is thought of reality, we see at once that it is no mere trick. There is, as we have seen, a sense indeed in which the Argument concerns only the thought of God, as defined by Anselm, *id quo majus cogitari nequit*, and not of anything else, such as a hundred dollars or an island of the blest. But that is because this thought as so defined is just the thought of Reality as a whole.

Kant's attack upon the Ontological Argument was thus inevitable, because it was the expression of his general doubt as to the relation of thought to reality.

It was of the essence of Kant's so-called 'critical' doctrine to assert that our knowledge could not be understood without the existence of things independent of our knowledge, but yet was never knowledge of these things as they were in themselves. This position leads, as is well known, to two grand difficulties. If we do not know things as they are in themselves, and that on grounds applicable to all knowledge as such, we have then, not to put too fine a point upon it, no knowledge in the proper sense of the word at all. No doubt we often

say about this or that, that we have not the means of knowing it properly or as it really is. There are, we mean, circumstances which bar us from all but indirect acquaintance with it. For example some event in history may be related only by some historian whom we know to have written under the influence of some strong prejudice, so that we cannot be sure that we have an undistorted record of the facts which he relates. And we may think it highly improbable, so improbable as to be practically out of the question, that a more dispassionate account will ever come our way. But in such a case our whole distrust has as its background an assumption that we might, under other more favourable circumstances, have known the fact as it actually was, that the fact as it was is in itself knowable. It is in contrast with this perfect knowledge which might be had, that we condemn the imperfect knowledge which we have. But if we extend this scepticism to all possible knowledge, we remove the very assumption which gave it meaning. We do, however, extend it to all possible knowledge if our reason for distrusting what we know of our object is only that it is in relation to a knowing subject. For unless this is merely equivalent to saying that we cannot know a thing without its being known, that is, cannot know and not know it at once (which is a mere truism), it must mean that we cannot know anything without altering

it by knowing it; but this is to deny the possibility of real knowledge altogether.

Such a view, which, if it is to be consistently carried through, must lead to complete and universal scepticism, though it has been held by some who found their point of departure in Kant, yet was not Kant's own, since Kant held that he could point to the features in the *human* faculty of apprehension which barred *us* from a knowledge of things as they are, while he attached significance to the conception of a knowledge not subject to this drawback — an 'intuitive understanding.'[1] And he never ceases to lay the strongest emphasis on the necessity of supposing to account for knowledge that there *are* 'things in themselves,' though *what* they are we have no means of ascertaining. But this only lands us in another difficulty. Certainly knowledge implies the reality of its object in itself, that is, independently of its being known. But how comes our knowledge that there *are* things in themselves to be exempt from the general doom of a knowledge exercised by means of faculties unsuited to apprehend aught but 'phenomena'—that is things not as they *are*, but only as they *appear* to us? Why should this bare minimum of true knowledge, that things *are*, be allowed, and no more at all?

Now were our business here the exposition and

[1] See, e.g. *Kr. der r. V.* (*Werke*, ed. H., VI. 79, 117, 123; tr. Meiklejohn, pp. 43, 83, 89).

criticism of Kant, we could not stop here. Kant's position that we know things to *be*, since if they *were* not, they could not *appear* to us, but that we only know them *as* they appear to us, and have reasons for holding that they do not appear to us as they are in themselves,—this position is full of difficulties, but is not incapable of defence. But what we have here to observe is that his attack on the Ontological Argument is the consequence of this position. Although that argument had been much criticized since its first enunciation by St. Anselm, no criticism had been so important as Kant's, because no one had really seen so clearly that what was in question was the fundamental relation of thought to reality, and not their relation in a special and peculiar case. When the plain man hears of Kant's instance of the hundred dollars, he is all on Kant's side. The Ontological Argument appears to him the purest essence of the juggling with words, for which metaphysicians have a bad name; and in Kant's criticism of it he seems to hear the natural voice of sound common sense. But in this view the plain man is mistaken. In a form unfamiliar enough the Ontological Argument reposes on and indeed expresses what the plain man never really doubts, that real knowledge is attainable. Kant, on the other hand, is putting the subversive and revolutionary question whether after all this is so. This is a question which, understood in its full extent,

is far more remote from the plain man's way of thinking than the Ontological Argument itself. For he would commonly not hesitate to take the fact that he could not think a thing to be otherwise as the best of all reasons for taking it to be so; but this Kant does not do. On the contrary he always indulges a suspicion that just because we *must* think a thing to be thus, it *may* be really in itself quite otherwise. To apply this to the present question. We do right, if some one sets himself to prove a hundred dollars to be in our pockets, to feel for them there, and to hold that our failure to find them there will invalidate his argument. But why? Because, if he is right, if they *are* there, they will be, since they are tangible things, found there when we feel for them. But Kant has abundantly shown that God is not an object which can be presented in a sensible experience. How then does it invalidate a proof of his existence that we do not find him so presented?

Thus we may be disposed to consider that Kant has not finally dismissed the Ontological Argument; that, if we understand it not as having to do with a peculiar case in which we are compelled to believe in the reality of the object of a conception, but as the assertion that the existence of knowledge implies an ultimate union of thought with reality; that thought which is thought of nothing is not thought, nor is knowledge knowledge which is not

knowledge of reality ; and that, though we sometimes think we know when we do not, or, in other words, the reality is sometimes not what we suppose it to be, this would be a meaningless statement except on the assumption of a real knowledge with which we contrast the sham.

But when all is said and done, is this what it professes to be—a Proof of the Existence of God? No, we must reply, it is not. It is, in the first place, not a proof, in the sense of the logic books, whether of the existence of God or of anything else. It does not bring any particular fact under a general rule. On the contrary, it is the assertion of the fundamental nature of knowledge as being knowledge of the Real. And it is also, particularly as stated in the form of the first of Descartes' two arguments, the acknowledgment that in this very recognition of the imperfection, finitude, relativity of our knowledge, which is sometimes taken to exclude any apprehension of an Absolute, is involved the presence to us of the Perfect, Infinite or Absolute Being, by the standard of which we try the objects of each particular apprehension that we have and find them wanting.

But the Absolute, it may be said, is not God.[1] The full consideration of the discussion whether 'the Absolute' is a synonym for 'God' must be reserved. Like the problem which underlies Dr.

[1] This is a point on which much stress is laid by Dr. Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, II. pp. 238 foll.

McTaggart's view of what ordinary men mean by 'God,' after it has been stripped of the guise in which we found it to be in flat contradiction with the facts of religious experience, this question, whether the Absolute is God, must be kept till we come to deal with what is called the problem of the Personality of God. At the present stage we may content ourselves with saying that 'the Absolute' is a description which, though it seems to leave nothing out, is certainly an abstract one; one may almost put it that it expresses the abstraction of concreteness. It implies that nothing is left out; but it does not say what is there.

The discussion of the traditional Arguments for the Existence of God, and of Kant's classical criticism of them, is not, however, I venture to think, without some value for the understanding of the religious experience. We have seen that the arguments culminate in the Ontological Argument, and that the Ontological Argument proves, not indeed in the sense of deducing from some more general principle, but in the sense of evoking the recognition of what is presupposed in our actual knowledge, that in our knowledge of finite beings as finite is involved a knowledge of an infinite or absolute Reality.

CHAPTER VII

THE EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF GOD

IF we are to advance further in the process of making clear to ourselves what is the nature of the unity of subject and object which, as we saw in the last chapter, is postulated by knowledge and divined by religion as its own object, we shall expect to learn much from the records of actual religious experience; and a survey of the different conceptions of deity entertained at different stages in the evolution of humanity would, one may suppose, inform us as to what this experience has been.

But we may here be met by a certain kind of criticism to which it will be desirable to devote some consideration.

The student of Natural Science is quite ready to recognize the value of such a survey as adding a chapter to History or at the most to Psychology. But he will be indisposed at first to recognize its value as the starting-point of an enquiry into the nature of God as an objective reality. Accustomed to think of only two kinds of reality, one an external

material world, whose existence is known to us through the senses, and the other a world of 'concepts' existing in our heads, but in part (though only in part) 'corresponding' with the external reality, he will probably be inclined to think that the search for knowledge of an objective reality through a survey of what has been thought is a mere study of 'concepts'—if disposed to be abusive, he may call it 'a futile fumbling with concepts'[1]—but at any rate a mere study of concepts, palmed off upon him as equivalent to what seems to him something quite different, namely, a study of external fact. This is a prejudice which we ought to respect, for we all probably share it, or have shared it, ourselves. Yet it is possible to offer a defence of the procedure which incurs this suspicion.

We must, then, notice that this way of opposing 'concepts' and 'real objects' does not bear a close inspection. Our knowledge of a real object is not something different from the possession of a concept of it. It is only by knowing it that we know it, and we know no more of it than we know. We cannot, as it were, sit apart and compare our 'concepts' with the 'objects' as though they were there side by side before us. The object is the object of our concept, the concept our concept of an object.

Again, all 'concepts' are not capable of verification in a sensible experience. In Mathematics we neither

[1] I forget where I have come across this phrase.

ask for nor obtain such verification. Yet Mathematics are universally admitted to be the indispensable groundwork of Natural Science.

There is no doubt a point of difference to be observed between the procedure of the mathematician and that involved in the investigation of the nature of God by means of a study of what is or has been thought about God. The mathematician is not, as a mathematician, concerned with the *history* of mathematical ideas. This history may, of course, interest him as an independent subject of curiosity and enquiry, and may even incidentally throw light on his mathematical investigations. Thus it might show that it was owing to the way in which mathematicians were led to raise particular questions that they had approached them in particular ways which need not have been the only ways possible, or even the best ways.

The ground of this difference between mathematical and theological investigation is to be sought in the abstract simplicity of the objects of mathematical science which reduces to a minimum the influence exerted on mathematical thinking by the circumstances of the thinker.[1] It is not due to any use by the mathematician of empirical verification, or to his dealing in anything but 'concepts'—though not, of course, in concepts which are concepts of nothing, *οὐδένος νοήματα*, as Parmenides says in

[1] Cp. above, p. 58.

Plato,[1] but concepts of certain objects, of figures, magnitudes and numbers. These objects are not mental in the sense of having no independence of the mind which contemplates them; but we can only treat them by the way of concepts, that is, by conceiving them. In the sphere of æsthetics, in the sphere of morality, in the sphere of religion, we deal in concepts too; not more so, however, than in mathematics; nay, in one sense, less. For here the more concrete or complex objects with which we are concerned are so immersed in a historical context that it is not possible to ignore the latter; so that if, in these fields, we take 'conception' to be opposed to 'observation' (which we shall do at our peril; for we conceive in observing and cannot observe save by conceiving), we have something more like what we have in the natural sciences than like what we have in mathematics; we cannot dispense with alleging 'empirical facts,' because we cannot attain *a priori* to a sufficient grasp of the conditions upon which the truths depend of which we are here in search.

This must here suffice as an apology for the use of the historical method in approaching the problem of the nature of God. But a fuller justification will be gained hereafter, when it has become plain to us that God's revelation of himself to man is not to be regarded as falling outside the real objective

[1] *Parmen.*, 132 B.

life of God himself; though of this truth we have already had a glimpse during our discussion of the nature of Revelation.[1]

However, I have neither the room, nor, had I the room, have I the knowledge necessary myself for making such a survey as that of which I have just been maintaining the utility. The utmost that I can do is to pick out certain episodes in the history of Religion, about which I have something to say which may illustrate the general view of Religion, that is of the relation of God to man and of man to God, which I have suggested, and may also help us toward a further understanding of that relation, of which I have so far only spoken in a very vague and general fashion.

I have already,[2] when discussing the idea of Grace, referred to that primitive notion of a mysterious power or efficacy which anthropologists call by the Polynesian name of *Mana*.[3] This mysterious quality is ascribed by primitive men to all sorts of things,[4] men and animals and plants, inanimate objects and forces of nature, which by some striking manifestation of power, some oddity of shape or behaviour, awaken a sense of surprise and awe. Now there is, no doubt, much that is lacking in this notion of *Mana* which we should require to be

[1] See above, pp. 40 *f.* [2] See above, p. 88.

[3] See an interesting account in Mr. R. R. Marett's *Threshold of Religion*, pp. 115 foll.

[4] Cp. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*, I. p. 11, on 'worship of stocks and stones.

present, before we were prepared to call anything *divine*. In particular, *Mana* is not regarded as what we should call 'ethical' or 'rational'; it is rather what we should describe as 'uncanny.' But in the recognition of *Mana* in certain things, in this 'uncanny' character ascribed to them, we have, I venture to think, a primitive form of that recognition of a divinity in the world which in its fuller development becomes Religion.

To these few observations on *Mana* I shall add a few on another subject of much importance in the study of the origins of Religion. I mean the subject of *Magic*.

The relation of Magic to Religion has been differently represented by different investigators.[1] A view held by some authorities [2] is that in Magic we have a primitive form of Natural Science, by which men seek to control nature for themselves through discovering the causes of those natural processes which specially concern us, and manipulating them for the production of their effects at times and in ways convenient for ourselves. Thus, when by what is called Sympathetic Magic [3] it is attempted by some ceremony imitative of a thunderstorm to make rain come, although the method seems to us fantastic, it may be in the eyes of those

[1] Cp. Loisy, *A propos d'histoire des religions*, pp. 166 foll.

[2] Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*, I. ch. 4; Frazer, *Golden Bough*, 3rd ed., I. pp. 221 foll.; but see Marett, *Threshold of Religion*, p. 55.

[3] See Frazer, *Golden Bough*, 3rd ed., I. pp. 52 foll.

who employ it no less an application of natural science than an attempt to increase the rainfall by afforestation is in ours. The theory that imitation is thus effective may be, and doubtless is, a mistaken theory; but only as others of more modern date have been found to be, which we should admit without hesitation to have been in intention scientific. But while the inferiority of Magic to Natural Science as a means of controlling nature is, as Bacon [1] observes, comparable to the inferiority of the fabled exploits of Amadis of Gaul and other heroes of chivalrous romance to the real achievements of Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar, we may yet reasonably ask ourselves what is the nature of the charm that belongs to the tale of magic and is absent from what Tennyson has called [2] 'the fairy tales of science.' The latter are wonderful, and one may very likely find them more interesting, but this particular charm they seem to lack.

I will attempt to give an answer to this question. It is a commonplace of the history of philosophy that the Ionian fathers of European speculation were at once what we should call 'philosophers' and what we should call 'men of science'; that they did not discriminate, as the experience of the centuries has taught their successors to discriminate, between the problem or problems which we call scientific, and which relate to the detail

[1] *Nov. Org.*, I. 87. [2] *Locksley Hall.*

of nature, and the problem of the ultimate character or structure of reality which we call pre-eminently philosophical. In the same way at a far earlier stage of intellectual development than theirs, the primitive wise men who strove by magical practices to manipulate nature and make it serve the purposes of man were not only the predecessors of Edison and the inventors, but of Newton and the searchers for scientific truth on its own account; not only of these, but of the philosophers who seek to penetrate the ultimate structure of reality as a whole; and not only of these, but of the men of religion who seek not so much to understand as to live consciously as the instruments or organs of the universal life. Hence in Magic we have claimed not merely knowledge of natural processes and the power to control nature by means of such knowledge, but a closeness of touch with the ultimate reality which we have or seek to have, not in Natural Science, but in Religion. In this way then Magic is in a sense the germ at once of Natural Science and of Religion.

When anthropologists distinguish Religion from Magic they sometimes regard Religion as replacing Magic, in which it is sought to control Nature through obtaining a knowledge of the forces which may be counted upon to produce the effects we want and setting them to work, by an attempt to control Nature more effectively through prayers to man-beings who are supposed to have the power

we lack, of producing the effects we desire.[1] It is, so it is suggested, because Magic had failed in doing what it professed to do, that resort is had to another course wherein failure is less fatal to the theory, because it can always be explained away as due to the discretion of the god, who does not grant what he knows would not be good for us, or to his anger, which makes him refuse requests from those who have incurred his wrath. Magic and Religion however, which—whether as distinct ways of influencing the course of nature they really arose in this order as the theory supposes or not—certainly come to be on the whole contrasted in this kind of way, will be found when thus established as rivals to exert a mutual influence upon each other. Spells and prayers are often not very sharply distinguished,[2] and our knowledge of the way in which the gods may be induced to work in our interest is thought of in a manner not very different from that in which men think of the way in which natural forces may be worked by magic. Conversely Magic comes to be thought of as, like Religion, a dealing with spirits who are not the gods of the community to which we belong, but gods of alien tribes or outcast, wandering, homeless spirits who do not stand in relations of kinship with any community.[3] Thus perhaps

[1] Frazer, *Golden Bough*, 3rd ed., I. pp. 237 foll. For a damaging criticism of this speculation see Mr. Andrew Lang's *Magic and Religion*, c. 3.

[2] Cp. Marett, *Threshold of Religion*, pp. 33 foll.

[3] See Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 264.

it was that when Balaam[1] got no satisfactory answer from Jahweh he 'set his face to the wilderness', where these spirits dwelt, 'to seek for enchantments.' We shall shortly see how closely correlated with each other are the community in which men live and the religion which they practise. But for the moment I would point out how what has just been said of the relation of Religion to Magic may help us in judging of that not unfamiliar view of human development which is most clearly presented in Comte's celebrated law of the three stages,[2] and which suggests the view that the object of religious experience, although in a sense it is what we have said,[3] namely, the ultimate nature of reality, is that ultimate nature *wrongly* conceived, so that, with the substitution of a right conception, Religion will either disappear or at least become something quite different from what it has historically been.

Comte held that man naturally passed in the course of his mental development from a *theological* through a *metaphysical* to a *positive* stage of thought. At first he sought for the causes of phenomena in imaginary personal beings, spirits, or gods. This is the *theological* stage of his mental development. Subsequently he came to entertain doubts of the reality of these, and substituted *metaphysical* abstractions, ideas, forms, powers, forces, laws, or what

[1] Numbers xxiv. 1. [2] *Positive Philosophy*, tr. Martineau, I. 131.
[3] See above, pp. 8, 157.

not, which take the place of the old anthropomorphic gods and easily effect a transition from the *theological* to the *positive* stage. For about these abstract beings, divested as they are of personal attributes, the same questions do not arise as arose about the anthropomorphic deities, whose ghosts in a sense they are; but since they are still spoken of, like the old gods, as something *other* than the phenomena which they are said to cause, they satisfy the habit of seeking for causes beyond phenomena; at the same time they really do no more than (as it were) duplicate the phenomena. Opium causes sleep because of its dormitive virtue; but this dormitive virtue, though it is spoken of as a cause, has no content beside the phenomenal fact that the taking of opium is regularly followed by sleep. Hence there is a gradual and easy transition effected by means of the *metaphysical* to the final stage, the *positive*, at which we are content to study phenomena as we find them, and to abandon the search, which has never been successful, for causes *beyond* phenomena, whether anthropomorphic or metaphysical. We can see how in this view monotheism was, within the theological stage, an advance upon polytheism. One supreme God must be less anthropomorphic than one of a group of gods loving and fighting with each other, such as we find in old mythologies; and monotheism passes naturally into pantheism, for which God is no longer a person at all, but rather

an abstract representation of the order and system of the phenomenal world.

Now, apart from Comte's particular way of putting things—which I have indeed not been careful to follow very closely—the thought that Religion, as a worship of gods or God, fades as positive knowledge of the world grows, and is in fact a primitive form of Science which must in the natural course of things give way to a more highly developed one, is very widely spread, and we may reasonably ask whether we ought not to regard Religion as in this way destined to be superseded by positive Science, rather than to continue side by side with it in some higher form.

The plausibility of the suggestion, however, depends upon the combination of an underlying assumption that the end which man seeks in religion is the knowledge of natural phenomena, with the historical fact that in the early stages of intellectual development the different kinds of that knowledge which (says Aristotle) all men naturally desire [1] are not differentiated from one another. If with Comte we concentrate our attention on the kind of knowledge which we eventually have in its best form in the natural sciences, we shall find, as he does, that the search for this kind of knowledge is at first not dissevered from the search after knowledge of the ultimate essence or structure of the world as a whole which comes to constitute the task

[1] *Met.*, A. 1, 980 a 21.

of the metaphysician or philosopher, nor yet from the effort towards a conscious and practical relation with the ultimate Reality in which the self and not-self are to be no longer felt and treated as mutually alien, but felt and treated, because at least implicitly known, as manifestations of one and the same principle. We shall find further that, as time goes on, the search after knowledge of phenomena which we call science, dissociates itself from the search for religious knowledge, while still remaining associated with metaphysics, as we see in the early Greek philosophers, who had abandoned mythological explanations of natural phenomena as due to the operations of anthropomorphic deities, but still, in such theories as those which found the ultimate principle of reality or primary substance in water or air or fire or number, showed a lack of discrimination between the strictly scientific and the metaphysical problems. This may be called, if we please, the advance of *science* from the theological to the metaphysical stage; but, let us carefully observe, of *science* in its specialized sense of Natural Science, not of human thought as a whole, unless we arbitrarily limit human thought to one of its departments. So too we may recognize it as a *scientific* advance when 'observation and experiment' take the place of *a priori* speculation as the method of ascertaining what the details of the course of nature actually are; where, that is, *science* in the

specialized sense, not human thought as a whole, passes, in the phrase of Comte, from its *metaphysical* to its *positive* stage. In just the same way Metaphysics was long associated with Theology, and has only in quite modern times won its way to full recognition as an independent pursuit, although its differentiation from natural science is widely (not universally) acknowledged. And when we turn to Theology or specifically religious knowledge itself, a parallel development presents itself. In its earliest stage, not only do men conceive of physical processes anthropomorphically, but they conceive of God as a physical object, a stone, an animal, a man. At a later stage, both Science and Theology are in danger of dissolution by Metaphysics; the scientific enquirer is put off with occult virtues, the theological with pantheistic abstractions. While, at a later stage yet, Theology, like Natural Science, comes to its own; their problems are distinguished. We do not look to Theology for the explanation of physical processes, nor to Natural Science for the statement of the ultimate relation of the human personality to God; while the universals of Metaphysics are seen to be empty apart from the particulars of experience—of religious experience among the rest—in which is manifested the general structure of reality, which philosophy aims at descrying, and the special character of which cannot be deduced from what is common to them with others.

I do not mean that in this differentiation reason has uttered its last word. Rather did the primitive confused unity adumbrate an ultimate unity, which can only be reached through the differentiation which has broken up the primitive unity. This tendency towards a redintegration, of which our continued pleasure in such products of the primitive unity as the fairy tale and the ghost story may perhaps be taken as a prophecy, finds an apt illustration in the history of the thought of the very philosopher whose formula of the three stages was the text of our discussion of the differentiation. The positive science which should be merely descriptive of phenomena becomes in his hands a 'Positive Philosophy' which in its very denial of the possibility of metaphysics is itself a metaphysic. For it is as much metaphysics (whether it be better or worse metaphysics) to fix the limits of science *a priori*, as Comte was prepared to do, as to extend them by means of *a priori* speculation. Nor did Positivism stop here. It passed into a religion—the so-called Religion of Humanity—wherein Comte attempted to find in the world of his experience, as conceived in accordance with his Positive Philosophy, or rather in that part of it which we call human society, the consolation and inspiration which had been found by his forefathers in that world as conceived theologically. Though we may be dissatisfied with the Comtian return of the original unity out of the

distinctions into which it had suffered disruption, we cannot, I think, dispense, either in religion or in philosophy, with the aspiration after some such return. The latter must aim at exhibiting the rationality of all that is real; the former cannot be content short of the satisfied vision of God *πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*, all in all.[1]

It is now important, before we go further, to remember that when the sentiment of a relation to the reality at the heart of things arises in man, and he becomes religious, he is already social *πολιτικὸν ζῷον*,[2] and that this relation in which he finds himself is not a relation to God of himself as a separate individual, but of himself as a member of a community. This may, I think, be confidently asserted. Only a being which is rational could be conscious of this relation, could be religious; and we have no acquaintance with finite rationality apart from society. There is, I believe, no evidence—though many tales of such stealing of infants by wolves, as happened in Mowgli's case, are current—that such stolen children grow up like Mowgli in the *Jungle Book*, rational beings, although altogether outside of human society. It is said that on the contrary they do not come to the use of reason at all. It belongs indeed to the nature of a judgment such as a rational being shows his rationality by making, that, so far as it goes, it claims to be *true*,

[1] 1 Corinthians xv. 28. [2] Aristotle, *Pol.* I. 2, 1253 a, 3.

that is, valid *for* (not necessarily *of*) all rational beings; and we can scarcely imagine how any man could have arrived at the stage of mental development at which such judgments are possible, apart from an actual experience of fellow-men having interests in common with himself. A rational being, then, we may say confidently, is always a social being, and only a rational being can be religious. This, of course, does not of itself prejudge the question what beings *are* rational. But if there be, for example, any truth in the often-mooted notion that the dog's attitude towards his master is really a religious attitude, this will be found to imply a germinal rationality in the dog; and no one will deny that this is only developed through the admission of the dog into the society of human beings.

The religious relation then, the relation to God, is a relation in which man stands at first, not as a separate individual, but as a member of a community. With the development of the consciousness of a common good, and the extension of the area of this good (to borrow a phrase of Green's [1]) from tribe to nation, from nation to empire, from empire to universal humanity, we shall find the conception of God widening *pari passu*. There could be no more interesting task than to work this out in detail; here it must suffice to indicate very briefly, taking instances from the line of develop-

[1] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, III. 3, § 206.

ment to which we ourselves belong, how in the stage of tribal warfare the tribal gods are also mutual enemies; how the dawning of a national consciousness shared by many tribes is expressed in the recognition of a national god in a sanctuary at Jerusalem or at Delphi, common to them all; how the national unity when achieved is reflected in a national Pantheon wherein what were originally distinct tribal divinities are grouped together around some chief or king of the gods; how the extension of the Roman dominion over the civilized world brought with it the first form of a catholic hierarchy in the organization for the worship of Rome and Augustus, while at the same time the recognition by the Stoics of the fellowship of all men as sharers in a common reason became the basis of a religion in which the intelligent principle of the universe is that Zeus, whose spiritual city, the Cosmos, takes for the emperor Marcus Aurelius[1] the place which the city of Cecrops took for the Athenian poet; lastly, how the Christian conception of the Church, as the body of one in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily,[2] is directly correspondent with the Christian conception of God with which we shall afterwards come to deal at closer quarters.

[1] IV. 23 : ἐκεῖνος μέν φησι Πόλι φίλη Κέκροπος· σὺ δὲ οὐκ ἐρεῖς Ὦ πόλι φίλη Διός. The poet quoted is Aristophanes (fr. 110).

[2] Colossians ii. 9.

But these reflexions, suggested by the mention of the social character of Religion, have led us far away from the more primitive manifestations of it, to which I must now return. In the earliest stages of the perception of a contrast or relation between God and man, God is conceived as a physical object, because this is the only form under which reality, even the supreme reality, can be envisaged. And even the *Mana* (or whatever else it may be called), which belongs to the physical object that is reckoned divine, is thought of as a physical or quasi-physical quality of the object. The physical object invested with such a mysterious power which stands at this stage for God may be a stone, or a tree, or an animal, or it may be a man, a wonder-working man, a wizard, or a king. To take for God a savage king who can say, 'I am a god,'[1] and whose descendants, as the notion of deity rises higher, will drop from gods to sons of God, from sons of God to vicegerents of God, from vicegerents of God to kings by the grace of God—to take such an one for God is more than to find God in a material object of lower nature than the human. But although a person is here regarded as God, we are yet very far from what we should call a Personal God. We are still at the level of the identification of God with a particular natural object, although with a particular natural object of the highest kind. In

[1] Frazer, *Golden Bough*, 3rd ed., I. p. 389.

some ways an idol or statue, in which the particular human form is idealized and which is not subject to death, is a higher object of worship than a mortal individual. Still higher is the individual wizard or king or ancestor conceived of as having passed beyond the vicissitudes of earthly life, and living on as a permanent though invisible or but rarely visible centre of the community of his descendants.

It is a long leap from this point to the episode in the history of religion to which I now turn; but, as I have already stated, I only intend in this chapter to make a few remarks upon such stages in the development of the notion of God as I have anything to say about. I propose now to consider the very different courses taken by theology in the two ancient nations whose religious thought has most affected our own—the Greeks and the Jews.[1] The original religions of the two peoples were, we may conjecture, not so very dissimilar. We may trace in both the prevalence of the widely spread conception of kinship with a tribal deity, and of a system of sacrificial and other rites by which communion was maintained between the god and the worshippers who were united to him by a tie of blood. And while the groundwork of both religions was perhaps so far alike, so too both in Israel and in Hellas there eventually arose a series of remarkable men, the prophets in one, the philosophers in the other,

[1] Cp. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 32 foll.

whose higher conceptions of God came into conflict with those which were implied in the traditional customs of worship and in the traditional mythology. But the Greek philosophers, in purifying Greek religion, did not so much develop the traditional religious usages and beliefs as rise out of them and above them. The usages themselves they left much as they found them. Even Plato, though occasionally, as in his strictures in the *Republic* [1] upon the hawkers of pardons which could be obtained not by a good life but by means of sacrifices and ceremonies, he speaks of the baser sort of religious observances with severity comparable to that of a Jewish prophet, yet on the whole treats the traditional rites with a sort of half-respectful, half-ironical tolerance. We may remember for example how, in laying down for his ideal State the law that legends which represented the gods as vicious or contemptible should not be told to the youthful citizens, he says [2] that, if in any particular rite such tales *must* be told, it might be well to make the sacrifice offered on such an occasion something so expensive and difficult to procure that as few as possible may be able to hear them. The God of Plato himself or of Aristotle has little to do with the deities of popular Hellenic tradition. He is the supreme Being who is all that mind or intelligence, which is the highest sort of being there is, can be. But for that very reason

[1] II. 364 B foll.

[2] *Rep.* II. 378 A.

it is true emphatically of Aristotle, though not perhaps without some qualification of Plato, that all vestiges of that personal relation of the worshipper to his God which in its earlier form is connected with the tribesman's claim of blood-relationship on his tribal deity have fallen away from his theology. Hence it was that in the view of the Jew, St. Paul,[1] 'the world by wisdom knew not God.' The philosophical theology was too far removed from the definitely religious needs of the unphilosophical. The religions of foreign origin to the peoples of the Hellenic world, which attracted to themselves so much of the religious enthusiasm of those peoples during the first century of the Christian era, and as one among which Christianity itself first appeared upon the stage of classical civilization, owed their success to the power, which the native religions of Greece and Italy, divorced, as to a great extent they were, from the higher spiritual influences of the time, did not possess, to move a world which Greek philosophy had taught, but which it had failed to save. The Jewish prophets who had played in the history of the religion out of which the earliest Christianity sprang a part analogous to that played by the philosophers in the history of Greek religion, inferior, as no doubt they were, to the latter in scientific and speculative insight, remained in closer touch with the national worship. Thus they arrived at

[1] 1 Corinthians i. 21.

the conception of one God of all the nations of the earth, the creator and lord of the universe, without losing their sense of a covenant relation to him. This no doubt here as elsewhere had originated in a notion which we find spread everywhere throughout the world, the notion of the fellowship of the tribesmen through kinship or adoption with the divine head of the tribe. But by the prophets this consciousness of a covenant relation was so spiritualized and individualized (for it came to be thought of as belonging to the individual Israelite, not indeed in isolation from his people, but yet as an inner possession of his soul) that it was found capable of surviving the disappearance in Pauline Christianity of its limitation to the seed of Abraham through the breaking down in Christ of the wall of partition between Jew and Gentile.[1]

We may study this difference between the development of Jewish and the development of Greek religion as illustrated in the instance of one important religious conception, that of divine sonship. This conception is, I suppose, rooted in those primitive conceptions of kinship with the tribal god to which I have several times already referred. In its most ancient form it may have been the notion of a literal physical sonship or descent.[2] But at the stage which

[1] Ephesians ii. 14.

[2] See Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 40 foll. It is easy, however, too lightly to interpret a honorific use of the titles 'father' and 'mother' as applied to gods in a literal sense which was never intended. (See Warde Fowler, *Roman Religious Experience*, pp. 155 foll.)

had been reached at the period of the appearance of Christianity, this gross and literal sense of sonship had been left behind by Jew and Greek alike. The Jewish prophet and the Greek philosopher may, however, be said to have retained in a transfigured form, each a different side of the original notion. With the former the relation of sonship to God, though no longer conceived as a relation through physical descent, retained its tribal significance. Israel was God's son and the individual Israelite shared in the relation through his membership of the chosen race.[1] With the Greek philosopher the tribal significance of the divine sonship was lost; but the sonship remained a physical relation in another way. The legends of descent from particular divine beings were of course abandoned; but the relation of sonship to God came to be thought of as belonging to man as the offspring of the power to which the origin of the world was to be traced. It is the World that in Plato's *Timæus* is God's only begotten Son.[2] Any special sonship of man would belong to him as a recapitulation in little of the world, as a 'microcosm.'[3] In the philosophy of the Stoics a further advance may be noted, namely the recognition of a moral sonship of God in the individual. The Stoical conception of a divine sonship

[1] The passages collected by Prof. N. Schmidt in the article, 'Son of God,' in *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, §§ 3, 4, will be found to illustrate this account.

[2] *Tim.*, 31 B.

[3] See *Vit. Pythag.*, ap Phot. *Biblioth.*, 259 (Migne, *Patrologia Græca*, ciii 1584; cp. Macrobius *De Somnio Scipionis*, II. 12).

is still so far physical that the conception of God as an intelligent fiery nature[1] is a physical, or even a materialistic, although not a *merely* materialistic, one.[2] But the divine sonship of man is here also *moral* and *individual;* it is also *universal,* common to free man and slave alike.[3] It is, moreover, *immediate,* for the distinction between the human and divine natures is minimized, and it is said that Zeus has no advantage over the good man except in his longer continuance.[4] The Sonship of God may thus be a ground of pride in the Stoic who is conscious of it,[5] just as in a very different way in the Israelite who knows himself distinguished thereby everywhere and always from the Gentile. The peculiarity of the Christian conception of divine sonship is that it is mediated not through the world or through the nation, but through a person who is regarded as God's Son by nature. It is thus a sonship according to the traditional expression 'by adoption'[6]; based not on the individual's merit, like the Stoic's, but on the grace of Another,[7] and accessible not to the member of one nation only, like the Israelite's, but to every child of man.

[1] See Ritter and Preller, *Historia Philosophiae Graecae,* 398 B.

[2] Cp. E. Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers,* II. p. 82.

[3] See Epictetus, *Diss.,* I. 13.

[4] See Seneca, *Ep.* lxxiii. § 13: 'Jupiter quo antecedit virum bonum? diutius bonus est'; cp. *de Providentia* I. § 5: 'Bonus tempore tantum a deo differt'; and other passages quoted in Zeller, *Stoics* etc., Eng. tr., p. 259.

[5] Cp. Epict., *Diss.,* I. 3.

[6] The expression is St. Paul's; see Galatians iv. 5, Romans viii. 15, Ephesians i. 5.

[7] Galatians iii. 26, 27.

We shall find this discussion of some of the various notions which have been entertained of a divine sonship useful not merely in illustration of a particular process of development in European religion, but as assisting us in the further consideration of the notion of God as Personal. To this subject of Divine Personality the concluding chapter of this book shall be devoted.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PERSONALITY OF GOD

IN a celebrated passage Matthew Arnold speaks of the ascription to God of personality as the imagination of 'a magnified and non-natural man.'[1] This phrase, taken out of its context, may be regarded as fairly descriptive of the conception of God, not indeed as a merely natural object, or even as a natural object of the highest kind, as a man, but as a *super*natural man, a wizard or king, invested with mysterious power, and living in the sky or on some sacred mountain or in some distant land.[2] But, as we have already

[1] *God and the Bible*, ed. 1884, p. 15.

[2] The phrase of Matthew Arnold is actually used by Mr. Andrew Lang to describe the 'high gods,' unmistakable traces of belief in whom are found, according to the view defended in his *Making of Religion* and *Magic and Religion*, among very primitive peoples. These 'high gods' were never mortal men, they live in the skies, they desire no sacrifice, and they are the guardians of morality. The precise bearing of the evidence alleged for the belief in these beings is difficult to ascertain. Mr. Marett holds that their ethical character is derived from their association with the initiation ceremonies ('Religion,' *Enc. Brit.*, 11th ed., XXIII. 64, 65), and indeed believes them to be 'ætiological myths,' to account for the use of the bull-roarer therein (*Threshold of Religion*, p. 18). The argument of Mr. Lang that the recognition of these 'high gods' is inconsistent with the theory that all gods are but glorified ghosts is convincing, but it seems more probable that their ethical character should be due to their being the gods of the ceremonies in which the code of tribal custom is imparted to those on the threshold

seen, before even this conception of God is reached, a living man, a person, may be thought divine. Is this belief in a divinity of a savage king or medicine man a belief in the personality of God? The king or medicine man is certainly a person; he is considered and considers himself 'a God,' or 'all the same as God.'[1] But the expression 'Personality of God,' as used among ourselves, implies a far more highly developed notion both of *personality* and of *God* than that which we find in the primitive belief that a certain chief or wizard is divine. A modern controversy about 'the personality of God' will be found to turn upon the difficulty involved in reconciling the finitude which seems to be essential to human personality with the absoluteness and infinity, or at least omnipresence and omnipotence, which we are accustomed to ascribe to God. We shall have one

of manhood, than to a speculation which it seems difficult to suppose originating among men on so low a level of culture as those by whom the existence of beings of this sort is asserted. This does not imply that this special association of a god with morality, as understood by the tribe, has not a promise of higher things than the 'animistic' mythology and savage ritual which, it is admitted, has always pushed these 'high gods' into the background (if indeed they were ever in the foreground). At a much higher level the comparative history of Greek and Roman religion shows that while the individuality of the characters in an anthropomorphic mythology like that of the Greeks undoubtedly testifies to the possession by their worshippers of higher powers of imagination and intelligence than the more vaguely conceived *numina* of the Romans, yet there was a moral loss involved in the acquisition of a *chronique scandaleuse*. (See Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience of the Roman People*, Lect. VII.).

[1] Frazer, *Golden Bough*, 3rd ed., I. 389, 396. Compare the whole chapter.

writer denying the personality of God because 'the Absolute is not a finite person'[1] and another asserting it, but confessing in agreement with the former that the assertion involves the denial that the Absolute is God and even that God is omnipotent.[2] Such discussions would clearly not be possible on the basis of the belief in the divinity of a particular being or wizard: for at the stage at which this is held, there is as yet no thought either of the necessary limits of personality or of the infinity of God. On the other hand the thought, which *is* involved in the later doctrine of the personality of God, namely, that God is a concrete, individual reality, this is already expressed in the attribution of divinity to a particular man. But a statue or idol is a concrete individual reality likewise; it has, indeed, as we have already observed,[3] in some ways a better claim to divinity than a particular mortal man, for it is more enduring, and in it the human form may be, as in the works of Greek sculptors, idealized, and given a beauty and dignity which one could scarcely find in any particular individual. The departed chief or ancestor is conceived as a concrete individual reality too; but, being invisible, he is on the way to lose his concrete individuality; and in the highest existing form of this type of religion, the present State religion of

[1] F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 1st ed., p. 533.

[2] Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, III. 1, § 9 (Vol. II. pp. 237 foll.); cp. *Philosophy and Religion*, pp. 81 foll.

[3] See above, p. 206.

Japan (Shinto), the person of the reigning Emperor seems now to be conceived as the embodiment or incarnation of the virtue which has been formerly embodied in his ancestors, and which may be regarded as the 'abstract universality' of the divinely descended imperial house.[1]

It is often, indeed, felt and said that belief in a God who should stand as an individual person alongside of other individual persons is a lower form of religion than one of the kind commonly called *pantheistic* —I use this word here with no attempt at precision— in which the personality of God is frankly given up. At the same time it is felt on the other hand that a 'pantheistic' deity falls short of a 'personal' deity even of the sort described above, in that he has not the concrete reality of the individual person who stands side by side with other persons.

We are now approaching the question which underlay the contention which we came across earlier,[2] that the Absolute should not be called God, since the name God ought, in conformity with usage, only to be applied to a particular being, powerful and predominantly good. God, it is said, must be regarded as finite, and must be distinguished from the Absolute, of which he is only a part, although, maybe, that part to which all the other parts owe their origin.[3]

[1] Cp. the observations of Boissier on the worship of the Roman emperors, *La Religion romaine*, I. p. 155. [2] See above, pp. 187, 188.

[3] This is Dr. Rashdall's view; see *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II. p. 239; cp. *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 119.

I mention here these important contentions which are urged upon us by contemporary thinkers, because I think that we shall be in a better position for coming to a conclusion respecting them, if we have them in view during our study of conceptions of God, less highly developed than those which have given occasion to them, and notice, as we go along, what may be learned from a discussion of these more primitive conceptions that may throw light upon the controversies connected with the more advanced.

Now I think we may say that to take for God a particular person, whether a mortal man or a man become immortal, is really inconsistent with the satisfaction of the need which finds expression for the demand among ourselves for a 'personal God,' so far as this is a really religious demand at all. The Homeric gods, for example, are in one sense inhuman, just because they are in another sense so human. We whom, as Augustine says,[1] addressing God, 'thou hast made for thyself, and whose heart is restless until it rest in thee,' cannot find this rest which it seeks in communion with beings like the Homeric gods. Between them and us exists that mutual exclusiveness, which, as we sometimes complain, sets one finite person for ever apart from another.

> Each in his hidden sphere of joy or woe
> Our hermit spirits dwell, and range apart.[2]

[1] *Confessions*, I. 1. Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.

[2] Keble, *Christian Year*, Twenty-fourth Sunday after Trinity.

With the gods of the Homeric or other such mythology their very human passions on the one hand and their superhuman power and beauty on the other combine to make sympathy difficult or impossible. That possibility of personal *communion* which gives religious significance to the doctrine of divine personality is here out of the question. Their very likeness to one kind of person makes such beings far from any capacity of winning personal sympathy from another kind of person remote from the former kind in time or place, in civilization or in race. The Homeric or other such mythological gods are then conceived as persons, but their personality does not meet the religious need expressed in the modern insistence on the doctrine of divine personality as of great importance to religion.

We shall learn more of what is or is not meant by this insistence on the personality of God if we ask ourselves the question whether the God of Aristotle should or should not be described as a personal God. The God of Aristotle is an individual being; he is no pantheistic abstraction. But, though he is not a Homeric divinity, though he is, as God is said in the Anglican Articles of Religion to be—'without body, parts, or passions'—he is an individual being removed altogether from personal intercourse with man. Just because of the self-sufficing completeness of his individuality, with which no necessary relation to beings other than himself can be permitted to interfere, any

such intercourse is utterly excluded. Although the motion of the universe is said to be caused by him, it is represented as a movement on the part of the universe towards him, which cannot be thought of as reciprocated. He is an Unmoved First Mover; there is no going out of power from him to move, still less to create the world. He moves the world indeed, but as the beloved moves the lover,[1] drawing him towards himself by the perfection of his beauty, himself unmoved, so does the Chief Good set up the eternal motion of the whole heaven. The inner life of God is perfectly self-contained; it is an eternal thought of which his own being is the sole adequate and sufficing object, *νόησις νοήσεως*.[2] This real, individual, but utterly transcendent God is surely not what we mean by a 'personal God.' But why? Not because he is not a 'self-conscious centre of experience.' That he is, and we are *like* him so far as we think and contemplate in the sciences the eternal and the immutable; although we can only intermittently and for a time exercise an activity which he exercises eternally and unintermittently.[3] He is an individual thinking Being, and he has pleasure in his thinking; he enjoys 'one simple and changeless pleasure'[4] the necessary accompaniment of his unhindered activity of thought. He is thus, so far as I

[1] *Met.* Λ. 7, 1072 b 3. [2] *Met.* Λ. 9, 1074 b 34.
[3] *Met.* Λ. 1072 b 15, 16; cp. *Eth. Nic.*, X. 7, 8.
[4] *Eth. Nic.*, VII. 14, 1154 b 26.

can see, a personal God, in the sense of a 'self-conscious centre of experience,' but he is not a God with whom personal communion is possible; and I think that most people would feel that a God whom, at the cost of this transcendent, self-contained individuality, we could conceive, even though it were in a way which some would call 'pantheistic,' as animating the world and entering into our inner life, would come nearer than the Aristotelian God to meeting the religious need expressed in the dedman for a personal God, in the sense in which religious people among ourselves, when they have learned the phrase, do undoubtedly make that demand.

This Aristotelian theology illustrates what I said before about the Greek philosophers as contrasted with the Jewish prophets. The Greek philosophers rose to a conception of God far more exalted than that of the popular religion of their country; but in so doing they strained to breaking the bond which connected their theology with that religion. The fundamental religious experience of communion with God was not only ignored by Aristotle, but excluded by the very principles of his theology. The later development of this way of thinking in Neo-Platonism carries this exclusion still further. The ultimately Highest Being, the Good or the One, becomes there, just because he transcends the very antithesis of subject and object which is involved in knowledge, altogether unknowable. At the same time, at this stage

the demand for communion with God reviving seeks to satisfy itself even under these seemingly unfavourable conditions through the experience which Plotinus is said by his biographer Porphyry to have more than once enjoyed—four times indeed during the time which Porphyry spent in his company—of ecstatic union with the One.[1] For in the state of trance it might seem as though the distinction of subject and object were transcended, and the rapt person made one with that God who is described as *ὁ μήτε μορφὴν, μήτε τινὰ ἰδέαν ἔχων, ὑπὲρ δὲ νοῦν καὶ πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν ἱδρυμένος*.[2] I do not now enter upon the enquiry whether we have not here what is really a lower mental condition than that of ordinary perception and not a higher. I only point out that in this claim to ecstatic union the religious consciousness finds for itself a way of overcoming the negation of its claims involved in the speculation which seemed to have removed God to a distance which no thought could bridge.

I return to the Aristotelian conception of God. It exhibited, we saw, a complete detachment from the fundamental religious demand for communion with God expressed in the traditional rites of worship, which Aristotle made no attempt to connect with his own theology. There is a significant passage in the *Metaphysics*[3] immediately following Aristotle's account of the First Mover and his explanation of the celestial

[1] *Vit. Plotini*, c. 23. [2] *Ibid.*

[3] Λ. 8, 1074 b 1 foll. I quote in the text from Mr. Ross's translation.

motions as due to the single motion of the whole heaven, which is traced to the attraction of God, or rather to the desire of the universe for him—for this and no exercise by God of an activity going out from himself upon the world, is as we have seen, what for Aristotle sets up this universal motion—in combination with the independent motions of each heavenly body, every such motion being itself due to a lesser god, an unmoved first mover, not of the whole universe but of that particular sphere. The passage runs thus: 'Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to us their posterity a tradition in the form of a myth that these substances (i.e. the stars) are gods, and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form with a view to the persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency; they say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals, and they say other things consequent on and similar to those which we have mentioned. But if we were to separate the first point from these additions and take it alone—that they thought the first substances to be gods—we must regard this as an inspired utterance, and reflect that, while probably each art and science has often developed as far as possible and has again perished, these opinions have been preserved until the present, like relics of the ancient treasure. Only

thus far then is the opinion of our ancestors and our earlier predecessors clear to us.'

This passage makes quite plain to us just how far Aristotle connected his own theology with the religious tradition of his people. He was ready to welcome any adumbration in this tradition of the truths which he held himself to have reached by his scientific and philosophical investigations; but to that part of the tradition which linked the divine nature immediately with the social life of his people, to all which answered to what in speaking of the religion of Israel we should call the covenant-relation between God and his worshippers, he attributes no scientific or philosophical value whatsoever; it is to him merely a creation of man, intended to subserve the purposes of legislators and statesmen.

I should conclude, then, from this survey of the Aristotelian theology that its God, although an individual conscious Living Being,[1] the highest that Aristotle could conceive, realizing completely and eternally a kind of life to which we at our very best can only attain intermittently and imperfectly, is yet not a Personal God in the sense in which the personality of God is insisted upon by religious people among ourselves; he is not, that is to say, a being with whom we can enter into what we should call *personal* relations; and he is not this just because of the detachment of Aristotle's theology from the religious

[1] ζῶον ἀίδιον ἄριστον, *Met.* Λ. 7, 1072 b 29.

tradition which connects the divine directly with the social life of man. We, as was pointed out in our discussion of Revelation, are disposed to think of God as *hidden* in nature and *revealed* in the life and thought of man. But to Plato and Aristotle the stars were '*visible* Gods.'[1] On the other hand, it is no doubt true that in speculating concerning the nature of the stars, and of the first Mover of the whole starry heaven, they had recourse to what they knew as highest in themselves. For Aristotle this is θεωρία. It is true that θεωρία is never *developed*, as it is in ourselves, outside of a free political life. In God and the movers of the stars (if, as I suppose, their activity is taken by Aristotle to be an intellectual activity like that of God and of the human soul at its best), it is not *developed* at all, but exists eternally and unchangeably. Only among free Greeks do philosophers arise.[2] But, when developed, θεωρία is an activity which (he says[3]) demands less than any other the co-operation of our fellow-men.

In the Christian religion there exists the connexion between the philosophical theology and the tradition of social worship which is lacking in Aristotle. We

[1] Plat. *Tim.*, 40 D; cp. *Laws*, VII. 821 B, X. 885 E foll.; Aristotle, *Met.* E., 1, 1026 a 18, Λ. 8, 1074 b 2, 9.

[2] Mathematics arose among the leisured class of priests in Egypt (*Met.* A. 981 b. 24, 25). But the institutions of States which, according to the views expressed in *Politics* vii. 14, 15, made φιλοσοφία their end are plainly Greek, and contrasted with the servile institutions of a despotic State where the people are φύσει δοῦλοι. Cp. *Eth. Nic.* x. 6 § 8, 1177 a. 9.

[3] *Eth. Nic.* x. 7. 1177 a. 32, foll.

have already seen how during the course of religious development in Israel, the prophets had come to see in their national deity the God of all the nations of the earth. He was still thought of as the national deity, whose continuous life linked together the different stages in the history of his people whom he 'bare and carried all the days of old.'[1] But yet he was the only God. Not only for the Israelite, but ultimately for all men, 'there was no God beside him.'[2] He had brought up the Philistines from Caphtor and the Syrians from Kir, as well as Israel out of the land of Egypt.[3] One day Egypt would be addressed by Jahweh as his people, Assyria as the work of his hands, no less than Israel as his inheritance.[4] These speculations of the prophets made it possible for a religion rooted in that of Israel to reach the conception of one universal God without such a breach with religious tradition as the Greek philosophers had made; but the religious tradition of Israel itself as actually embodied in the community was still national, and often even narrowly so. I have no time here to follow the development of Christian universalism very closely, but will content myself by just calling attention to its culminating stage in the doctrine of St. Paul, to which I have already referred,[5] about the body of Christ. We must not look in the

[1] Isaiah lxiii. 9. [2] Exodus xx. 3; Isaiah xliv. 6.
[3] Amos ix. 7. [4] Isaiah xix. 25.
[5] See above, p. 206.

metaphorical language of St. Paul for the philosophical exactness of a Plato. A community is not an animal organism; and although the analogy between a community and an organism is ancient, convenient, and instructive, an analogy it still remains. Herbert Spencer's discussion of 'the social organism'[1] is marred by a tendency to treat this metaphor as literal fact.[2] Plato's so-called analogy between the community and the individual soul in the *Republic* is a different matter. This is not, properly speaking, an analogy at all. It is the setting forth of a real identity of structure; the community in its structure is and must be the expression of the spiritual nature of its members. But Plato, while once for all pointing this out, yet envisages the community in which even the best soul finds its expression as a Greek city-state. Here we are disposed to feel dissatisfied. Even of a vaster and more complex political system than that of any Greek city-state we find a difficulty in using without qualification those words of Burke's—words in which, in passionate reaction against the disrespect to the State

[1] See *Principles of Sociology*, II.

[2] Thus the 'cardinal difference' between 'individual' and 'social organisms' is stated to lie in the fact that 'in the one, consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate; in the other it is diffused throughout the aggregate' (p. 479). The 'social organism' is lacking in 'physical cohesion.' This is to treat society as literally a *body;* not (with Plato, whose doctrine Spencer misrepresents as that of a special likeness between social organization and the organization of a man's body) as a *soul.* Nevertheless, at the end of his discussion Spencer dismisses his ingenious parallels as mere 'scaffolding' (p. 614).

and its continuous tradition, shown, as it seemed to him, by the revolutionaries of his day, he re-stated a higher view of it, a view such as the great Greek philosophers had taken—as a 'partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection.'[1] We are rather apt to think of large departments of our life as falling altogether outside of the political fellowship; we regard ourselves as members of other fellowships, religious, scientific, or what not, which are not co-extensive with the political. This, of course, was true to a far less degree of the ancients. The distinction between Church and State, in which Comte[2] saw the great contribution made by the Church to the cause of intellectual, and Lord Acton[3] to that of civil freedom, was alien from their minds. With the ancients the religious bond was primarily one which linked a man to his fellow-citizens; with the moderns it commonly does not bind him to all his fellow-citizens while it does bind him to others who are not his fellow-citizens. The State then, though the most highly organized of all the manifestations of the social principle, does not cover or exhaust the social potentialities of our souls. On the other hand, although there are spheres of conduct in which we pursue a good which cannot be represented merely as a means to social

[1] *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (*Works*, ed. 1882, II. p. 368).

[2] *Positive Philosophy*, tr. Martineau, II., p. 217 foll.

[3] See esp. *Freedom in Antiquity* (*History of Freedom and other Essays*, 1907, p. 29). Cf. Lacordaire, *Conf. de N.-D.*, I. p. 327.

welfare, nor the goodness of it explained by reference to society as contrasted with the individual, yet there is no part of morality which is extra-social, nor any way of conceiving a moral being as not also a social being in virtue of the same nature which makes him a moral. The thought of St. Paul meets this with the conception of a community whose life is nothing less than the life of God—for this is involved in the metaphor by which he calls the Christian community the body of one 'in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.'[1]

Here, then, the social life of man is not merely, as it was in Aristotle's philosophy, a condition for beings who are not divine of a life resembling the divine; it is actually taken up into the divine life, and becomes the expression of it. And, although the thought implied in St. Paul's metaphor allows, if it be followed up, of our seeing in all worthy activities of the human spirit an expression of the divine, yet the thought actually present in St. Paul's own mind is no doubt the thought of the community which he called 'the body of Christ' as a *religious* society, in which the communion with God and conscious reference of conduct to a divine law which characterized the life of the pious and patriotic Israelite was carried on without the old restriction to a particular nation, since 'in Christ,' as St. Paul himself says,[2] 'there is neither Greek nor Jew, barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free.'

[1] Colossians ii. 9. [2] Colossians iii. 11.

The animating spirit of this organism, the continuous life which this society embodies, is conceived as the Spirit of Christ—the Spirit of God's Son sent forth into the hearts of his disciples, crying, Abba, Father.[1] Here we have, I suppose, the germ of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity: God manifest in Christ, and Christ living on in the community of his founding as its Spirit.[2] Seeing in its own life the life of its Founder continued, and in the life of its Founder the life of God himself, the Christian Church developed from this thought a conception of God which was truly a conception of him as *personal*, not because it was a conception of him as an individual conscious being (Aristotle's conception of God was that), but because it recognized in the *personal* relations of fellow-Christians to one another a relation to him who said,[3] 'Inasmuch as ye have done it to the least of these my brethren ye did it unto me'; and again, in this relation to him, a relation to the Father, who was 'in him,'[4] according to St. Paul; whose 'express image' he was, according to the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews,[5] whom he had seen that had seen him, according to the Fourth Evangelist.[6]

When the Christian theology became the subject of speculative study this doctrine of the Trinity was eventually elaborated into the doctrine of a complete

[1] Galatians iv. 6.
[2] See 2 Corinthians iii. 17.
[3] Matthew xxv. 40.
[4] 2 Corinthians v. 19.
[5] Hebrews i. 3.
[6] John xiv. 9.

personality. This process took place to a great extent on the lines and under the influence of Greek philosophy, which had reached its own conception of God by the method of raising what in ourselves we recognize as highest to a higher power than it could attain under the limitations imposed by the conditions of human life.[1]

Now I have not the room here, nor if I had, have I the necessary learning to attempt to trace the history of this development, and to exhibit the various influences, philosophical and otherwise, which went to determine the speculation of Christian thinkers on the nature of God, and their interpretation of the primitive formula in which Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were mentioned together. I will content myself with describing what seems to me to be of principal importance in the developed form of the doctrine as found, for example, in St. Augustine *de Trinitate*, which formed the starting-point of mediæval thought upon the subject, and in St. Anselm's *Monologium*, and with showing that it was a legitimate development of the thought of those earliest Christian theologians, whose works are included within the New Testament itself, and whom we quote as St. Paul and St. John. The latter had conceived God as

[1] Thus Aristotle, as we saw (p. 221), conceived God's life as a life of complete knowledge, with an object adequate to the subject and a subject adequate to the object; and this activity of knowledge he did not conceive to be emotionless, but held that it must involve the greatest conceivable pleasure.

essentially love;[1] and in the developed doctrine this is held to imply an eternal object of his eternal love, his beloved Son, whom he eternally begets, in whom, that is, his nature ever finds a complete and adequate expression of itself; his Word and Wisdom, which just because it is thus an adequate self-expression, is no less a person than himself, and reciprocates the love of his Father, which indeed, if unreciprocated, would be imperfect and fail of its end.[2] This mutual love of Father and Son is the Spirit of God, whereby is lived this life of eternal love;[3] and this Spirit, whereby the Father loves the Son and the Son the Father is the very Spirit which indwells the Christian community.[4] We have seen this thought already in St. Paul, where he finds the characteristic of the Christian life in the consciousness of sonship to God through the Spirit of God's Son sent forth into our hearts;[5] while the passage in which the other great theologian of the New Testament says that 'God is love' goes on immediately to add that 'he who liveth in love liveth in God and God in him';[6] where the context makes it plain that the love of which he is thinking is the mutual love which

[1] 1 John iv. 8.

[2] See Anselm, *Monologium*, cc. 49, foll.

[3] See Aug., *de Trin.*, VI. 8, § 7; Anselm, *Monologium*, cc. 51, foll.; Peter Lombard, *Sent.*, lib. i. dist. 10; Thomas Aquinas, *S. T.*, I. qu. 37.

[4] Aug., *de Trin.*, VIII. 7, 8; XV. 17, 19; Peter Lombard, *Sent.*, lib. i. dist. 17; cp. Thomas Aquinas, *S. T.*, II. 2, qu. 24, art. 2.

[5] Galatians iv. 6; quoted above, p. 231. Cp. Romans viii. 15.

[6] 1 John iv. 16.

exists among the members of the Christian brotherhood.

In this doctrine, then, we may note that it expresses, as I said before,[1] the thought of a complete self-consciousness or personality, the fulfilment or archetype of what we have imperfectly manifested in our individual selves. For in ourselves we recognize the self as contrasted with a not-self, which is thus the necessary complement of the self, without which our self is incomplete, is (if we may so put it) a mere abstract subjectivity. This not-self always is, nay, must be different from the self which is aware of it; yet this difference which is necessary to knowledge, or even to consciousness, is felt also at the same time as an obstacle to full comprehension, in so far as we cannot enter into the inmost nature of things unlike ourselves; while if the things of which we are conscious, or which we know, are persons like the person that knows them, the 'knowledge of acquaintance' is possible (as we saw in our discussion of Revelation [2]), and we are able by sympathy and love to achieve a closer union, yet this too has its limitations. There remains a bar which all the love and insight in the world cannot do away with. At any rate, as Pascal said, *on mourra seul.*[3] While in what we sometimes call self-knowledge, our consciousness of our selves in

[1] p. 231. [2] See above, p. 36.
[3] *Pensées*, XIV. 1., ed. Havet; 179, ed. Michaut.

introspection, self-examination, and so forth, seems to involve something which may lead to illusion in more ways than one, and which, at its best, is an abstraction, a treating as two that which is one and single. Now the doctrine of the Trinity represents the divine self-consciousness as freed from the limitations which we find in our own. God's 'not-self' or 'other' is described as wholly what he himself is and knows himself to be; yet in this inner converse of God with God, the self and the other have the satisfactory completeness of two persons; while, on the other hand, these two persons are each in the other in a mutual inwardness of which the utmost human love and sympathy can but afford a faint image. Moreover, the unity which makes possible the mutual intercourse of the two, and is actualized in that intercourse, is regarded as being not (as in us, when we contrast ourselves as subject with any object) something to be described by some such abstract name as 'unity,' 'absolute,' or the like; nor (as when we are thinking of our relations with other persons) as a love which we feel, an attribute which belongs to us, a relation in which we are—no, nor even as something individual and personal, yet not fully individual or personal, like a community, a commonwealth, or church, in which we live at one with our fellows; but as something which, 'proceeding from both' those who are mutually

subjects and objects of the eternal process, possesses the complete reality of personal spirit, *naturæ rationabilis individua substantia.*[1]

We have here considered this doctrine of the Trinity only in its Christian form, and especially in that form which ultimately obtained the most general acceptance in the Christian Church. But it is, of course, by no means an exclusively Christian doctrine. There is a celebrated gibe—perhaps suggested by an observation of Bolingbroke's to the same effect[2]—to be found in the table of contents prefixed to Gibbon's great work, in which the doctrine is said to have been 'B.C. 300 Taught in the School of Alexandria, A.D. 97 Revealed by the Apostle St. John.' But the sting of this gibe is taken away with the view of Revelation which Bolingbroke and Gibbon had in their minds. Augustine (as Bolingbroke, indeed, points out)[3] had recognized and insisted even to exaggeration upon the Platonic antecedents of the doctrine. 'In the books of the Platonists,' he writes, 'I found . . . the same truth fortified with many and divers arguments that "in the beginning was the Word," etc.[4] . . . but that "the Word was made flesh and dwelt among

[1] This definition, the standard definition in the middle ages, comes from the treatise attributed to Boethius, *De duabus Naturis et una Persona Christi*, lib. iv. (ed. Basel, 1570, p. 1206).

[2] *Essay* IV. § 12 (*Phil. Works*, ed. 1754, iv. 341).

[3] e.g. *Essay* IV. § 16 (*Phil. Works*, iv. 379).

[4] John i. 1.

us,"[1] this I found not there.'[2] In one sense, indeed, there may be here perhaps some misunderstanding of the Platonic or rather (as nowadays we should call it) the Neo-Platonic view. This view is in its origin rather a doctrine of the nature of mind and of reality than a speculation about the inner nature of a Being of whom we have first 'heard through the hearing of the ear.'[3] Yet Augustine's criticism is not altogether misplaced; for the old tendency to χωρισμός with which Aristotle had charged Plato himself in respect of the theory of Ideas,[4] made its appearance in this doctrine also. It left outside of God the detail of life and its evil, and it tended, if we may so express it, to be cosmical rather than ethical.[5] The possibility of χωρισμός, however, existed in the Christian doctrine also. It might be considered as though it were an account, a 'natural history,' so to speak, of a transcendent Being, and the sign of this tendency is that the original notion of the Spirit as the Spirit by which

[1] John i. 14.

[2] *Confess.* VII. 9. I quote in the text from Dr. Bigg's translation.

[3] Job xlii. 5. [4] e.g. *Met.* Z. 16, 1048 b 8 foll.

[5] St. Bernard in the twelfth century was not altogether mistaken in scenting something out of harmony with the spirit of the Christian religion in Abelard's identification of the third person of the Christian Trinity, the Holy Ghost, with the third person of the Platonic Trinity, the soul of the world or *Anima Mundi*. See *Tract. de Erroribus Abaelardi*, c. 4 (Migne, *P. L.* clxxxii. 1062). The passage in Abelard to which he refers is *Introd. ad Theol.* (Migne, *P. L.* clxxviii. 1012, 1013). St. Bernard ignores Abelard's gloss on the phrase, *animam mundi, id est universorum fidelium vitam atque salutem*. The gloss is perhaps doubtfully consistent with the Platonic text.

the Church and the Christian live falls into the background, and the Trinity tends to become in fact mythological. When this happens it tends further to follow the general course of mythological development, and to give place in the imagination of Christians to a more human (which is also a more ancient mythological) Trinity, connected with that of the dogma through the historical figure of the Christ, of the Father, the Mother, and the Son, such as we often find suggested in Italian art, while this, again, in more recent times is apt to be superseded as a practical object of devotion by the yet more human group (sometimes nicknamed the 'Jesuit Trinity') of Jesus, Mary, and Joseph, which is so vividly present to the popular religious imagination in Roman Catholic countries to-day.

The correction of this tendency to χωρισμός in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity lies in the doctrine of the Incarnation in which, as we have seen,[1] Augustine finds the distinctively Christian supplement to the doctrine of the Trinity common to the Platonic and Christian theologies. This second doctrine expresses the thought that human life, our life, does not fall outside of the divine, but is 'taken into God.'[2] But here, too, there is a danger of χωρισμός. This χωρισμός may take place in either of two opposite ways, or even in

[1] See above, p. 237.

[2] *adsumptione humanitatis in deo* (*Quicunque vult*, 35).

both at once. The Incarnation may be thought of as an afterthought, an accident, so to speak, of the divine life; or as a transaction in which no one takes part but one historical individual who is not one with us, nor we with him. The former way may be illustrated both by Arianism and by views which, as seeing in the Christ not a being less than divine, but a mere mode or temporary appearance of the divine, might seem to be diametrically opposed to Arianism; for example, by that of Marcellus of Ancyra,[1] against whom was directed the clause in the Nicene Creed,[2] 'His kingdom shall have no end,' expressing the permanence of the union of God and man. The second may be illustrated by the type of doctrine known as Docetism, so widely prevalent at an earlier period, by which the humanity of the Christ was regarded as merely phantasmal; [3] as well as by the doctrine of a later theology which represents the Atonement effected by Christ as a 'finished work' in so extreme a sense that we cannot be said in any way, in the language of St. Paul, to 'fill up what is lacking of his afflictions.' [4]

[1] Our chief authority for Marcellus' doctrine on this subject is Eusebius of Cæsarea, *Contra Marcellum*, II. 4, and *de Ecclesiastica Theologia*, III. 13 foll. (in Migne's *Patr. Gr.*, xxiv.).

[2] As now recited. The clause was not in the original creed of Nicaea, and first appears in one used at Jerusalem about A.D. 347. This creed, as put together from the Catechetical Lectures of Cyril of Jerusalem, is printed by Hort, *Two Dissertations*, p. 142. (See Cyr. Hieros. *Catech.*, XV. 27 foll., in Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, xxxiii. 910 foll.)

[3] See e.g. Tertullian, *adv. Marcionem*, III. 8. [4] Colossians i. 24.

The doctrine of a divine Incarnation is even more obviously than that of a divine Trinity no peculiarity of the Christian religion. But the form which it assumes in Christianity is distinctive. It is not the doctrine that a particular man is God, as savage kings or wizards are sometimes supposed to be ; nor that *a* man became god, as in the apotheosis of heroes in ancient Greece or modern India,[1] or in that of the Roman emperors,[2] nor yet merely that the highest or even the only God appeared in human shape. For in Christianity human nature is regarded as becoming not a passing disguise, but a permanent organ of the divine ; and it is human nature and no other which is so regarded. The appearances of God under other than human forms, which are congenial to Indian religion,[3] in which (so far) 'God is not known as Spirit, but rather as power in general,'[4] are quite excluded by Christianity. Man was, it teaches, from the first in the image of God, and the Son is eternally an element in the Godhead. That is, the union of God and man belongs to the very essence of both the one and the other. The Incarnation is, moreover, conceived of as taking place in a definite individual person, so that it is no abstract ideal but a concrete

[1] See Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*, I. pp. 25 foll.

[2] See Mommsen, *Provinces of the Roman Empire*, Eng. tr. I. 345 foll.

[3] Three of the ten incarnations of Vishnu were in animal forms, and a fourth in a half-human one (see Monier Williams, *Brahmanism and Hinduism*, pp. 107 foll.).

[4] Hegel, *Philosophie der Religion* (*Werke*, XI. 447). (Eng. tr. II. 112.)

and determinate reality. On the other hand, this definite individual Person is thought of as born 'in the fulness of the time,'[1] and the incarnation of God in him is for all mankind; it is not an incarnation for one age, like those of Vishnu, which needs repeating for another. And the opposition which encountered alike the Nestorianism which separated the divine and human in Christ, and the Monophysitism which seemed to merge the human nature in the divine, represents the emphasis laid by the Christian religious consciousness upon the complete and concrete reality of the union of God and man, which seemed to be imperilled either by the ascription of independence to the human personality,[2] whose apotheosis might then be regarded as contingent, as *earned*—and then why should it not happen to some one else to earn it too, independently of his predecessor?—or, on the other hand, by such absorption of the human in the divine as might destroy its genuinely human character. The union is conceived of, then, as thoroughly concrete and definite, as it is not in the repeated incarnations of Vishnu,[3] or in the continuous incarnation in a succession of persons, such as that of the Bodhisattva Avalokita or Avalokiteśvara in the Dalai Lama, according to the Tibetan form of Buddhism.[4]

[1] Galatians iv. 4. [2] *Homo assumptus, homo dominicus.*

[3] See Monier Williams, *Brahmanism and Hinduism*, pp. 107 foll.

[4] See Rhys Davids, *Encycl. Brit.*, 11th ed., art. 'Lamaism.' This Bodhisattva is the same being as is venerated in China and Japan as Kwanyin or Kwannon, the goddess of mercy; see below p. 256.

That the incarnation is real and concrete, and therefore is effected in a determinate individual, because humanity only exists in determinate individuals, and an incarnation in humanity in general would therefore be merely abstract and incomplete; this we have now seen to be a feature of the Christian, which is also the most highly developed form in which the doctrine of divine Incarnation has been held as the dogma of an actual religion. On the other hand, the specific character of the Christian incarnation must not be supposed to lie in its alleged miraculous accompaniments. Such miraculous accompaniments have been, as the comparative study of religions abundantly shows, related of more than one great teacher [1] and of many mythical heroes.[2] The comparative study of religion has, indeed, as we saw before,[3] rendered untenable the older view that the speculative contents of all religions are much the same, and that miraculous attestation alone can give to the 'revealed' religion any advantage over others. On the contrary, miraculous

[1] e.g. Gautama, the Buddha (see *Buddhist Birth Stories*, tr. Rhys Davids, pp. 58 foll.; cp. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, pp. 182 foll.), and Plato (see Diog. Laert., III. 2).

[2] Mr. Hartland, in his *Legend of Perseus*, has collected many such stories. It is true that the fact of a story being told of several people does not of itself prove it true of none. Whether it be true in any particular case is, of course, a matter to be decided according to the evidence; and, when an alleged miracle is in question, we have to ask ourselves what sort of evidence of a miracle is admissible. But both these considerations fall outside the limits of my present subject.

[3] p. 50.

attestation is claimed for every sort of religion; in the case of none does the evidence put its occurrence beyond all reasonable doubt; but in their speculative content, the more one considers the different religions, the more they are seen to differ, although, no doubt, not in such a way as to forbid the recognition of their right to the common name of Religion. This fact is often disguised by vagueness of language. One may, for example, talk loosely of the apotheosis of St. Francis, of Mohammed, of Gautama, of Jesus. But on closer inspection it will clearly appear that while the followers of all these teachers came to exalt more and more the dignity of their respective masters, it is not accurate to say that Godhead was claimed for them all, or that the worshippers of each found themselves able to worship them as God. No one would say this of St. Francis, nor yet of Mohammed, though the latter case differs from the former, in that the Mohammedan knows of no human life more divine than his Prophet's. Of Gautama the Buddha it may, of course, be more plausibly said; for Gautama is, I suppose, in the religion of his founding (apart from late and partial developments) the Highest, not only (as Mohammed is in his) the highest *man*; God in our sense (and in Mohammed's) there is none. The Buddha is thought of indeed as *more* than *a* god. The gods of the polytheistic systems, among which Buddhism arose, are thought of as real beings inferior to him, who

do homage to him upon his attainment of Buddhahood,[1] and beseech him not to withhold his saving law from a perishing world. He is, moreover, a real historical person, like Jesus,[2] who has, like Jesus, inspired a church or community with his spirit. He is a preacher and an example of righteousness as Mohammed is, but he is more. Like the Christ, he is a Saviour, but a Saviour rather *from* than *of* the world. I do not pretend to speak with any expert knowledge of Buddhism; very probably on a closer acquaintance with that religion, some of the things which I am saying might turn out not to hold water. But, if one in this respect 'occupying the room of the unlearned,' may express for what little it is worth the impression made upon him by what he has read of that faith, the meaning of religion is not so fully expressed in the worship of the Buddha as in that of the Christ. The dying Gautama says to Ananda, 'After I am gone let the Law and the Rules of the Order which I have taught be a Teacher to you.'[3] There is no claim to a perpetual presence of the Teacher himself in his community. The passing of the Christ is represented in a different

[1] See *Mahâvagga*, tr. Rhys Davids and Oldenburg, I. 5 §§ 4 foll., 6 §§ 30 foll. (*Sacred Books of the East*, XIII. 85 foll., 97 foll.). *Nidânakathâ* (tr. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birth Stories*, pp. 95 foll.). Bigandet's *Legend of the Burmese Buddha*, Eng. tr., pp. 112 foll.

[2] It is unnecessary here to advert to the recent denial by certain scholars of the historical existence of Jesus. See the last essay in M. Loisy's *A propos d'histoire des religions*.

[3] See *The Book of the Great Decease* (*Mahâ-Parinibbâna-Sutta*), tr. Rhys Davids (*Sacred Books of the East*, XI. 112).

way. He dies, but his disciples believe him to have risen again, they are assured of his being 'alive for evermore'; [1] and his parting message is said to have been, 'Lo, I am with you always.' [2] Whatever be thought of the story of his miraculous ascension, considered as a piece of history,[3] the phraseology associated with the story is expressive of a thought essentially bound up with the Christian dogma, the thought, namely, that the Christian life is not merely an accidental or transient manifestation of the divine activity; that the assumption of manhood into God is complete, so that the Christian is conscious of himself as being, so far as he lives a life such as Christ led or Christ's Spirit inspires, already in God and God in him,[4] already, in the Pauline language, 'seated in the heavenly places' with Christ at God's right hand.[5] Thus the Christian life, which is always not something private or merely individual, but social, the life of the Church, is represented in Christianity as an actual partaking of the life of God.

Philosophy of Religion is an attempt to understand Religion as it is, as it really exists. Thus it is of first-rate importance that it should enter into

[1] Revelation i. 18. [2] Matthew xxviii. 20.

[3] It does not seem to belong to the earliest stratum of the evangelical tradition, for the genuine texts of the Gospels do not contain it. It is narrated, however, at the beginning of the Acts of the Apostles.

[4] See 1 John iv. 16; cp. John xiv. 20. [5] Ephesians ii. 6; i. 20.

the actual content of historical Religion, and exhibit it as the elaborated expression of the idea of Religion. This is the justification of our investigation of Christian dogma. Christianity is the religion which I know best and which most of my readers will know best, and, judged by its position in the history of civilization, may fairly be taken as that one in which we shall reasonably expect to find the general nature of religion most fully and richly developed.

To resume, then, we have seen that in the Christian dogma God is represented, not as a thing or an animal, or even as a man, natural or supernatural, but as person and spirit, existing in the completeness of a personal or spiritual nature; wherein the subject has an adequate object, no less fully real than the subject, yet neither of the two transcending the other; and wherein the bond of relation between them is conceived of as no accident of the substance of either, but as a Spirit of love as fully real as those who in it and by it are united to one another. Further, the relation of the worshipper to God is no merely external one. The life of worship is not one of servile homage, but of filial love, and this filial love is again no accident in respect of the divine substance, but is intrinsic to the divine nature, an element of God's inmost being and life, which in such a life we share, since we have such a life through the Spirit of the Son who lives and moves in the soul and in the Church. 'God is love'—we may quote once again

those words of the writer whom we call St. John[1]— 'and he that loveth dwelleth in God and God in him.' We may remember that Spinoza also says that our love for God (it does not matter here that he represents it too exclusively as an *amor intellectualis*) is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.[2]

Again this life is represented as no mere dream or ideal, but as an actual historical life, which takes its place in the world as embodied in the Christian community, wherein its Founder's life of sonship, seen in him as a real individual life, lives and works as a real and energizing presence, turning the natural elements of social intercourse into the vehicles of a divine life of love. Nor, again, are suffering and death left outside of this life; they are conceived of as entering into the necessary form of the life of sonship wherein God unfolds his nature and is manifested or revealed. It has often been represented not as a necessary but as an accidental form; but the deepest thought of the Christian religion is better expressed by the scriptural expression[3] that the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world; and a like thought is expressed in the form of *cultus* or worship in the symbolism of the Eucharist.

In the Eucharist the presence of God to his worshipper and within his worshipper in the social life

[1] 1 John iv. 16. [2] *Eth.*, V. 36. [3] Revelation xiii. 8.

of the religious community is expressed by the worship of him as 'really present,' this worship taking the form of a common meal, which is the most natural symbol, because the most effective means, of social intercourse. The life sustained by this common meal is here conceived of as the divine life itself, and this divine life as essentially an act of self-sacrifice, just as it was seen to be in the death of Christ. This sacrifice is regarded as the substance or reality of the common act of worship, through which the worshipper becomes a participator in it. In the light of the researches of anthropologists it would seem[1] that the symbolism by which this is set forth has its roots in the oldest traditions of religious worship, in which the feeding upon the sacrificed victim, identified with the common life of the religious community and so with its God, is regarded as the sign and the means of maintaining and strengthening the common life in the individual members of the community. Thus the doctrine of the Eucharist is not, any more than those of the Trinity and Incarnation, peculiar to Christianity, but is developed by Christianity in a characteristic manner of its own.

At this point a difficulty presents itself. If we thus ascribe to God, conceived as Trinity in Unity, a personality, complete as that of one of us is not

[1] See Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, Lecture IX.; cp. Jevons, *Introd. to the Hist. of Religion*, p. 147; *Introd. to the Study of Comparative Religion*, pp. 175 foll.

complete, containing within itself what each of us has to seek in others and in God, must not such a self-sufficing personality leave as little possibility to us of personal relations with it as did the self-sufficing individuality of Aristotle's deity, which also included within itself the only adequate object of its activity, and was thus described as *νόησις νοήσεως*?[1] We must, however, observe that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, although, as we saw, it was developed in the Christian Church under the influences of Greek philosophy, was, as an outcome of religious experience, the speculative account given by the Church of its own social life as a manifestation of the divine nature; so that that is not properly the *Christian* doctrine in which connexion with that social life is unrecognized or falls into the background. In the Christian doctrine the life of the Church is the life of the Spirit, and the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, whereby he is the Son; and this relation of Sonship which has this Spirit for its principle is regarded as integral to the divine essence. Some may object that we are here in danger of losing the personality either of God *or* of man, which (it is thought) cannot both be preserved unless man's life fall outside of God's, and God's outside of man's. The language of religion—'God in us and we in him'—will seem to these critics to be 'merely figurative.' How can one consciousness, it is asked, include another

[1] Ar. *Met.* Λ. 9, 1074 b 34.

consciousness? Is not such language, if taken to be more than merely 'figurative,' a misuse of spatial metaphor, which must lead us astray, when we are speaking of what is not spatially extended at all?[1]

Now it is of the first importance to make clear to ourselves what we mean by such words as 'figurative,' 'metaphorical,' and the like. There is a sense in which all language used of other than material things is figurative and metaphorical. 'Spirit' itself originally meant 'breath'; 'understanding,' 'insight'; 'perception,' 'comprehension'—all contain metaphors from the sensible world. No language can be used of spiritual things which is not in this way originally metaphorical. On the other hand, a metaphor, which is not merely a metaphor in origin, but in present meaning, if at all appropriate, and if not a mere literary conceit—certainly where we are trying to describe experiences of the utmost importance—is intended to express something which could not so well be expressed otherwise. Metaphor used for the sake of using metaphor—where the meaning might be put *as well*—and therefore better—without, is merely trivial, and should be kept out of the discussion of serious subjects altogether.

But it is not, I venture to think, those who with an earnest intention use such language as 'God in us and we in him' that are guilty of a misuse of spatial metaphor, but rather those who, instead

[1] Cp. Dr. Rashdall, *Philosophy and Religion*, pp. 101 foll.

of seeking the meaning of such an experience in some real experience which they who use it are intending to describe, proceed on purely general, or what Aristotle would have called merely dialectical grounds, and starting from the general notion of spatial inclusion, go on to contend that one consciousness cannot include another consciousness, and that there is no more to be said. This is surely no proper criticism of language used, not for the sake of talking, but to express a real experience. At this rate one would have to dismiss the reality of the musical experiences denoted by such phrases as 'thrilling,' 'penetrating,' 'stirring,' 'moving,' because the instruments do not get inside our skin, nor their noise shove us out of our seats. But surely there is a genuine experience which these phrases are used to describe; and if we ask *how* the manipulation of the musical instruments can do these things, the answer would be, 'In the way in which all who are musical know that they do.' In like fashion no one who uses such phrases as 'God in us and we in him' is bound to give any explanation of the way in which the human spirit is included in the divine, or the divine present in ours, which ignores the definitely religious experience. This experience can (it would seem) only express itself thus, and is not adequately expressed by phraseology which would appear to the critics of this language less metaphorical. We might perhaps find better words; but they will not be better if they obliterate the dis-

tinction between this experience and other experiences which are not at all the same. Thus I should say that if by affirming the 'Personality of God' we mean that the relation of man to God is such as that in which the religious man knows himself to stand—a relation which expresses itself in prayer, worship, thanksgiving—then to deny the personality of God is to make religious experience illusory; but that on the other hand the very relation, which is thus experienced, is quite distinguishable from the relation of one finite person to another finite person. So that, if we refuse to use the word 'personality' except of a finite person, I think we must deny that 'personality' in this sense can be rightly attributed to God.

A difficulty is sometimes felt as to the possibility of directing religious worship towards the Absolute conceived as an assemblage of real beings—and in the system of Dr. McTaggart, to which I have already referred, more definitely, as a collection of *persons*—among which, or whom, we are included. It is implied that towards a Being to whom we should stand in the relation in which one finite person stands to another, but who should vastly excel us in power and goodness, it is easy to conceive religious worship as directed. We have, however, already seen that this is not after all easy; that the object of religious worship is, if we consider it carefully, not really conceived as another, although a superior, finite person. A more intimate relation to himself seems to be presupposed by the

worshipper in the object of his adoration. There may, however, seem to be a difficulty in understanding how any being who is not the Absolute can make the Absolute an object of worship, since by the Absolute is meant the unity within which both subject and object fall, and which is the ground of their relation; but precisely the same difficulty exists as to any being who is not the Absolute making the Absolute an object of thought; yet that is certainly done by those who raise the difficulty. I do not know that the difficulty is so very great in any case. There would be a great difficulty, I should admit, did one worship God as just another finite person, though greatly superior to oneself, but I have tried to show that one does not worship God as such; or if one thought of the Absolute as excluding oneself, but if one means anything by the term one does not so think of the Absolute. No doubt God, or the Absolute, may be pictured or imagined as another finite person or as merely *an* object; but then the picture or imagination is simply, as often happens, inadequate to the thought which it is introduced to assist.

I would conclude this part of our discussion by saying that to the question whether God is to be identified with the Absolute, I should answer that I take God, that is, the object of my religious worship, to be the one all-comprehending Reality, but that, in worshipping, I recognize this *as God*, that is, I recognize that this one all-comprehending Reality

is worshipful: and so God is more (not less) than the Absolute, in so far as in religion I know (or at least feel) the Absolute to be in this respect more than by itself the abstract term Absolute expresses.

A more serious difficulty is raised when the identification of God with the Absolute is called in question on the ground that the Absolute must include *all* and so must include evil as well as good, and that on the other hand, according to Plato's canon of theology, which lays it down that we must ascribe to God the causation of good only,[1] we can suppose no evil in God. In particular, it is said, *we* are evil, at least in part; and it is contrary to what is highest in our religion to suppose that our sins do *not* fall outside of the divine life—are they not just what divides us or separates us from God?

Now, we have already seen that in the Christian religion we have the thought that man is made one with God; that humanity with its pain and suffering and mortality is envisaged as falling within the divine life. We may add that in this religion even 'the iniquity of us all' is considered as 'laid on'[2] the Person in whom the union of man with God is accomplished as a concrete individual fact. The Christian consciousness does not even shrink from the assertion that this Person was 'made sin for us,' even

[1] *Rep.*, II. 379 c.

[2] Isaiah liii. 6. The passage is already referred to Christ in 1 Peter ii. 24.

though with the addition that he 'knew no sin,' that is, as his own individual voluntary act.[1]

It is, of course, not to be overlooked that there exist great religions, in which God has not been regarded as *personal*. To such religions is sometimes given the nickname of Pantheism. Strictly speaking, Pantheism should mean, not, as is sometimes said, 'God is all' (that 'God shall be all in all' is, by the way, a Christian form of expression,[2]) but 'all is God,' which is something very different.[3] And I suppose it to be true that there exists in Indian religion a genuine Pantheism (although I do not mean to suggest that the Brahmanical religion as a whole can be so characterized)—and that morality is sometimes seriously compromised by the tendency to find in everything, just as it stands, a manifestation of deity.[4] Buddhism, which is historically the offspring of a religion of the Indian type, is able to be an ethical religion only through a complete renunciation of the world: so far from the world being God as it stands, it is altogether evil and illusion; there is properly no God, because existence is in no wise good; the goal of religion is a state which is the negation of all forms of separate existence, including the divine. If we leave out of sight later developments of Buddhism, which approximate more closely to a theistic type, we may

[1] 2 Corinthians v. 21. [2] 1 Corinthians xv. 28.

[3] Cp. Hegel *Phil. der Rel.*, I. A. c. (*Werke*, XI. 93 foll.; Eng. tr., I. 96 foll.)

[4] Cp. Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*, 2nd ed., I. 83.

say that the Buddha is not an object of worship in the religion of his founding, because he has entered into this state.[1] Between his attainment of Buddhahood and his death he, out of his mercy and pity, did not enter upon this state, though he might have done so, but remained in a state short of it in order to help others towards it. He is said to have offered, if prayed to do so, to remain for a whole world-age in existence for this purpose; but his offer was not understood and not accepted.[2] What Gautama thus did for the latter years of his life, one of the Bodhisattvas, Avalokiteśvara, is said to have been doing for many ages; refusing to become a Buddha till all may be saved with him (or her; for this gracious being is represented in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism as a woman, Kwanyin or Kwannon, the goddess of mercy).[3] To such a being prayer may be, and is addressed; and so too the future Buddha, whom Gautama is said to have foretold would come next after himself, Maitreya, has become an object of worship, since he is not yet a Buddha, but only on the way to become so, a Bodhisattva. But so far as a being is thought to have entered upon his final state of deliverance, like Gautama, he is not an object of worship. This, I gather to be true, but I do not (I repeat) speak with expert knowledge of Buddhism,

[1] See *Questions of King Milinda*, tr. Rhys Davids, Book IV. (*Sacred Books of the East*, XXXV. 144 foll.).

[2] See Bigandet, *Legend of the Burmese Buddha*, Eng. tr., p. 33.

[3] Cp. p. 242 above.

and there may very well be inaccuracy in my account.[1]

Now the significance of Pantheism and of the frequent appearance of pantheistic tendencies even in religions as far as possible removed from the pantheistic type, such as Judaism and Islam, is, I suppose, this, that religion is not satisfied where anything is let fall ultimately outside of God, and sometimes, by way of reaction from ways of thinking which seem to do this, tends to take (though perhaps it is never more than a tendency) the easy course of finding God in things just as they stand. But the quest of religion is not so light a task.

In the religion which I and most of my readers know best, it certainly seems as though in the last resort man as the subject of religion were *not* allowed to fall outside of the divine life. The Christian says with St. Paul: 'It is no longer I that live but Christ liveth in me,'[2] that is, the eternal Son of God whose life is a necessary and intrinsic element of the divine life. I noted above[3] that the word 'Religion' is what we may call a *subjective* word, that is, that we do not naturally use it of the object of this particular kind

[1] I have availed myself in respect of the above of the help which Dr. Estlin Carpenter is so ready to give to his friends who consult him; but he is, of course, in no way responsible for what, after consulting him, I have written. (See also Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, pp. 200, 201, and Beal, *Buddhism in China*, p. 145. Chapter xi. of the latter work is devoted to 'The Worship of Kwan-yin.')

[2] Galatians ii. 20. [3] p. 17.

of consciousness, we do not make it an attribute of God. But we see, now that we have arrived at the consideration of a more advanced stage of religious reflexion, that in Christianity the Son, whose Spirit of sonship is just the religious spirit, into whose mouth are put the words, expressive of the religious attitude, 'Lo, I come to do thy will, O God,'[1] who, as man, is the very type and pattern of the religious life, is represented as a divine person, a necessary element in the divine life.

When, however, we come to our particular selves, it is plain that this inwardness to the divine life remains a mere unrealized ideal. If it be ever more, as the expressions of some mystics would suggest,[2] it is only at certain quite exceptional moments of heightened religious consciousness. Imperfection of power, of knowledge, and of love; weakness, ignorance, and sin; of all these the individual is aware as present in himself; and so far as they are present, the task of religion is not, it would seem, accomplished. Weakness and ignorance, however, at any rate, are represented in the Christian dogma as finding their place in the one personal Life, which is yet recognized as throughout divine; and although sin is

[1] Psalm xl. 7, 8; applied to Christ, Hebrews x. 7.

[2] For example, the words of Schwester Katrei, Eckhart's spiritual daughter, to her confessor: 'Herr, freuet euch mit mir, ich bin Gott geworden.' But it has by some been supposed that her story is only intended as a parable (Lasson, *Meister Eckhart*, p. 211). Cp. St. John of the Cross, *Spiritual Canticle*, St. xxii. 5, xxvi., xxxix. 2 foll. (tr. Lewis, pp. 174, 207, 292 foll.).

not, as such, represented as finding a place therein, yet the form of this personal life is conditioned by the sin which in that life is 'taken away.'[1] The hymn sung in the Latin office of Easter Eve, at the blessing of the paschal candle,[2] has expressed the deepest thought of Christianity: *O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est, O felix culpa, quae tantum et talem meruit habere Redemptorem.*[3]

We are here brought up against the very difficult and important question of the mutual relations of Morality and Religion. Religion has been represented by some as an appendix to Morality. I have already quoted Matthew Arnold's definition of religion as 'morality touched by emotion'[4] and found it unsatisfactory if only because it is not *any* emotion but specifically *religious* emotion by which morality is 'touched' in religious experience. In Kant's *Religion within the Limits of the Mere Reason* the whole meaning of religious doctrines is found in this relation to moral conduct; this follows from his view that belief in God is justified only as a 'postulate of the Practical Reason.'

[1] See John i. 29.

[2] The attribution of this hymn to Augustine (approved by Martene, *de Antiqu. Eccl. Ritibus*, IV. p. 145) cannot be sustained. It is to be noted that (*de Civ. Dei*, XIV. 23) Augustine regards the statement '*hominis peccatum necessarium fuit*' as inadmissible.

[3] Cp. Leibnitz, *Théodicée*, §§ 10, 11.

[4] *Literature and Dogma*, ed. 1883, p. 16.

Now such a view of religion is not that suggested to us by a study of its history. I may refer to Dr. Westermarck's *Origin of the Moral Ideas* for a collection of facts which in the author's judgment go to show that the development of morality goes on among primitive people independently to a great extent of their religious beliefs.[1] Without pretending to agree with much that Dr. Westermarck says on the subject of religion, or with the details of his theory of the original mutual independence of morality and religion and the subsequent moralizing of religion, I do think that the facts which he gives bear out, what may be shown empirically in other ways, that the evolution of Morality and that of Religion are distinct (though by no means unconnected) processes.[2] Religion and Morality are no doubt alike social in their origin. Morality is at first the custom of the tribe, Religion at first the attitude of the tribe to the mystery which encompasses us. The breach of tribal custom is the violation of a taboo or scruple of the kind of which

[1] II. pp. 663 foll.

[2] I was interested though not surprised to learn, from the results of a careful enquiry recently conducted in the American University of Wisconsin by Prof. F. Chapman Sharp, that the attempt to ascertain from a number of students, not philosophically educated, nor accustomed to reading about such subjects, nor yet irreligiously brought up, what their habits of moral judgment were, went to show that the so-called 'religious sanction'—belief in rewards and punishments beyond this life—of which our law courts require a recognition from a child before he can be sworn, although it was not definitely rejected, played but a very small part in determining those habits.

M. Salomon Reinach, as we saw,[1] defined Religion as an assemblage; nor can the tribal deity be supposed indifferent to tribal custom. Right through all the stages of the development of both religion and morality, they must always affect one another, until at the last we are sure that God can will no evil, nor anything be evil that God wills, and find in this the source of our greatest difficulties. But, though there is this perpetual interaction between them, yet the religious sentiment and the moral sentiment are distinct; and so in the early stages tribal custom is felt to be binding of itself, not because imposed by a god; while a god is not, because he is a god, bound by the tribal custom. And at later periods, the development of religion and the development of morality by no means proceed of necessity *pari passu*. Religious tradition may continue to consecrate usages which otherwise are, according to the improved ethical standard of the time, immoral; we see this abundantly illustrated in the writings alike of the Jewish prophets and of the Greek philosophers. On the other hand, the history of Christendom affords numerous examples of the morality which is sanctioned by public opinion lagging far behind the standard officially acknowledged by the recognition as divine of the life and teaching of Christ. Thus the identification of religion and morality is against the obvious facts of history. But the philosophical problem of

[1] See above, p. 5.

this relation will be found to offer serious difficulties. So far we have seen that to say 'God is good' is not tautology. Plato was not wrong in considering the enunciation of it as a theological canon of principle, a step of great importance.[1] But for ourselves it may be said that the principle has become axiomatic. No feature of classical religion seems more strange to us than the low morality attributed in the sacred legends to the gods in juxtaposition with an actual higher morality whose followers were not always at so much pains as Plato to repudiate these legends as false. St. Augustine has recorded[2] his disapproval of the classical education which he received in the writings of poets who represented Jupiter as at once thunderer and adulterer; and reminds his readers of the young man in Terence who justifies his profligacy by the example of Jupiter's amour with Danae.[3] But one may wonder whether a 'divine example' under paganism meant what it would to ourselves; although no doubt the persistence of religious traditions of this kind, even though the gods were not regarded by any one as patterns of moral conduct held up for imitation, did not, to say the least, promote the progress of morality; and so deprived the world of classical antiquity[4] to a considerable extent of the

[1] *Rep.*, II. 379. [2] *Conf.*, I. 16.

[3] *Eunuchus*, III. 5. 36–43; cp. Ovid, *Tristia*, II. 287 foll.

[4] That is, the Greeks, and the Romans after they had adopted the Greek mythology. The Roman gods were originally, Mr. Warde Fowler writes (*Religious Experience of the Roman People*, p. 147), 'not thought of as existing in any sense in human form, nor as personal beings bearing any human characteristics.' At any rate, they were not so human as to have a *chronique scandaleuse*.

powerful impulse given to that progress under Judaism and Christianity by the more consistently ethical interpretation given in those religions to the 'holiness' of God, in consequence of which we now find it hard to realize that the primitive conception of this 'holiness' of the divine, 'aloofness,' as it might almost be put, was to a great extent not what we should call ethical at all.[1]

The really grave difficulties about the mutual relations of Morality and Religion are reached when the principle that 'God is good' is accepted as an axiom. We see that this acceptance led with Plato to a breach with traditional religion resulting on the one hand (in contrast with the line taken by the Jewish prophets with *their* religious tradition) in the abandonment of that religion to a lower ethical standard, and on the other hand to a divorce of philosophical from popular religion which justified St. Paul's saying[2] that the 'world by wisdom knew not God.' In the *rapprochement* between the two in the Neo-Platonic period, however, the same sort of difficulties began to show themselves as early began to beset Christianity. For Christianity the Platonic principle was already axiomatic; and the labours of the Jewish prophets had raised the Jewish religion before the time at which Christianity issued thence to a level at which the axiom was not in such flagrant contradiction as in

[1] See Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 140 foll.

[2] Corinthians i. 21.

Greece with the stories told about God. Yet the Old Testament contained not a little belonging to an older stratum of religious development which at a very early period was felt to be discrepant with the axiom, and led with some, as with Marcion,[1] to rejection of the Old Testament as a narration of God's actions, with others to a system of allegorical interpretation, of which Philo had already under Judaism set the example, for the explaining away of what in its literal sense was inconsistent with the accepted principle. Nor can it be denied that in Christianity, just because here a 'divine example' was, owing to the acceptance of this principle, a potent influence on moral conduct, the view that the Old Testament was a record of God's actions has at certain epochs to a considerable extent impeded the development of morality on one side, though a different side from that which Augustine had in view in the passage quoted above; on the side, namely, of what we call humanity as opposed to cruelty.[2]

The difficulties, however, created by this kind of divergence between religious tradition and moral sentiment are not properly difficulties in the philosophy of religion; for they depend upon the particular traditions about God or the gods handed

[1] See Tertullian *adv. Marcionem*, passim.

[2] The story (told by Philostorgius, *H. E.* II. 5) is well known, that Ulphilas, the apostle of the Goths, excluded the books of Kings from his translation of the Bible, in order to avoid encouraging the warlike tendencies of his converts.

down in different places. But when the axiom that 'God is good' has been reached, we shall find arising not only this sort of difficulty in conciliating Morality and Religion, but others which are more properly philosophical.

Morality seems to involve freedom; the 'ought,' as Kant says,[1] implies the 'can.' But how can the individual have freedom against or alongside of God? Does not any view which regards God as the ultimate Reality necessarily lay the axe to the root of any doctrine of real freedom and hence of any real morality in the individual?

In our previous discussion of the antithesis of Nature and Grace we gave our reasons for holding that Grace did not exclude but implied Freedom, and that in religion, although the problem about Freedom presented itself in a different form to that which it assumes when religious experience is not taken into account, yet we did not in religious experience find that the distinction could really be eliminated between freely willed actions for which we are responsible, and actions for which, as not freely willed, we disclaim responsibility. But we also discovered that neither the good nor the evil in our actions proved explicable wholly from within the individual life; that we were obliged to admit in divine grace on the one hand, and on the other

[1] *Kr. d. r. V.* (*Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, III. 379; tr. Meiklejohn, p. 339).

what is called by theologians Original Sin, as well as in the sinfulness of the world in which our lives are spent, influences not physical but spiritual, personal or social, which affect us not as soulless things are affected, but as only free persons can be affected, and which could not be disregarded in tracing the history of our moral conduct.

Our later discussions of the relation of man to God will be found to have rendered more definite our conception of Grace, and to have shown that when the consciousness of it is most highly developed, it is the consciousness of that Sonship which is recognized in Christianity as an integral element in the eternal nature of God. We must now turn our attention to the *evil* principle which, as religion advances beyond its lower levels, we find ourselves distinguishing more and more sharply from grace, in the sense of the operation of God upon the soul. At a certain stage Jahweh can be believed to have sent a lying spirit to deceive Ahab,[1] and Zeus a vain dream to mislead Agamemnon;[2] or the Adversary of mankind to appear among the sons of God in the court of Jahweh.[3] But at a later period it is held that 'the judgments of Jahweh are true and righteous altogether';[4] that 'the sum of his word is truth,'[5] and that his testimonies are commanded in righteousness and very faithfulness,[6] that

[1] 1 Kings xxii. 22. [2] *Iliad*, II. 1 foll. [3] Job i. 6.
[4] Psalm xix. 9. [5] Psalm cxix. 160. [6] Psalm cxix. 138.

'he is of purer eyes than to behold evil,'[1] and that without holiness none can see him.[2] The evil influences which affect us may, it is thought, be mistaken for the grace of God, but cannot at once be recognized as evil *and* traced to a divine origin.

Although the divine grace comes thus to be sharply distinguished from the evil influences of which it is said that 'the whole world lieth in the evil one,'[3] yet there is a close parallelism between the relation of the one and of the other to the individual soul. Just as a man sometimes distinguishes himself from the divine grace, and says with St. Paul, 'Not I, but the grace of God which was with me,'[4] so he sometimes identifies himself with his higher life, and speaks not of Grace, but of sin, as something which is not himself, but an alien power dwelling in him.[5] And this sin which dwells in him is, indeed, as we saw, not wholly traceable to sources within his individual life; and, although we admitted that there was nothing to prevent us from supposing that spiritual influences act upon the soul which are more than human, this supposition in no way removed the ultimate difficulty of the existence of evil at all, whether in the world or in ourselves.

Now we may distinguish evils of various sorts—pain, ugliness, error, sin. The little I have to say now on a question, a solution of which, as Lotze

[1] Habakkuk i. 13. [2] Hebrews xii. 14; cp. Matthew v. 8.
[3] 1 John v. 19. [4] 1 Corinthians xv. 10. [5] See Romans vii. 7.

has observed,[1] we cannot even imagine, will concern the first and last members of this series; but what is said of them may perhaps point the way to similar reflexions upon the others. And, firstly, of *pain*. I shall here use pain in that very wide sense in which we designate by this name not only painful physical sensations, but all kinds of 'unpleasant feelings,' including those which we should call mental, and which involve thinking, such as 'feelings' of disappointment, regret, and sorrow.

It is a commonplace that pain is often the occasion and condition of things, such as patience, courage, heroic love, which we reckon to be the best things in the world. But there is, of course, pain which seems to be without any possibility of such good resulting from it. Such is especially the pain which the lower animals endure. The problem of the suffering of the lower animals is the most difficult part of the problem of pain. When it was usual to regard such suffering as always due to the results of the fall of man (which would include human cruelty)—as Milton, for example, represents the matter to us in *Paradise Lost*—the problem was not really eased, although it might seem to be so, because the fact of animal suffering was considered to be due to human sin, and so we might pass on to the problem of human sin. Nor can we in any case hold this view, since we have every reason to suppose

[1] *Microcosmus*, IX. 5, §§ 5, 6; Eng. tr., II. 716 foll.

that animal suffering existed ages before the appearance of man upon the earth. We are not, indeed, debarred, as I shall shortly try to show, from the conjecture that this pre-human suffering might yet be traceable to an evil, though not a human, will; for such a conjecture cannot be ruled out of court because it has in the past been presented in a mythological shape in which we cannot accept it.[1] A supposition of this description cannot, indeed, afford any answer to the ultimate question of the origin of evil in a world wherein in the last resort God is all in all. But it is worthy of notice that *some* of the difficulties which are commonly felt in approaching the problem are certainly due to an assumption which we are nowadays too apt to make without hesitation, that moral evil can exist only in human wills, and that the environment of humanity must be attributed wholly, if at all, to God. The very ancient and widely held view that the world, as we know it, is depraved through the activity of an evil will or wills antecedent to the appearance of man in it, is often hardly considered as worthy of serious consideration. Yet many thinkers have found themselves unable to dispense with it. Plato in the *Laws*[2] found it necessary to place an evil

[1] I owe to conversation with Prof. Cook Wilson the first suggestion that this view is one for serious consideration, but for nothing in my working out of it can I claim his authority.

[2] *Laws*, X. 896, 897. Zeller has conjectured this passage, on account of its uncongeniality to Plato's teaching elsewhere, to be an interpolation.

world-soul side by side with the good. Mill, as is well known, maintained in his *Essay on Theism*, (and the same thought is emphasized in his recently published Letters [1]) that a dualism of this kind was that to which the facts of experience pointed. For my part I cannot doubt that an ultimate unity is required alike by religion and by philosophy. But that morally evil *human* wills exist, we know; that they affect injuriously the environment of other persons we also know. No new difficulty is added by the thought that superhuman evil wills exist and have injuriously affected the environment of humanity as a whole. And this supposition would go some way towards explaining why it is hard to regard Nature as altogether good; even if we do not go so far as Coleridge, when he said that for him 'so far from the world being a goddess in petticoats, it is rather the Devil in a strait waistcoat.' [2] Something also, it is true, might perhaps be gained by the recognition of its origin in a will; since the possibility of a wrong choice seems to be involved in the freedom of the will, and a world without beings possessed of free will would (one would be inclined to say) be an inferior world to a world in which such beings existed. But this conjecture, though not to be dismissed as idle, is no answer to the ultimate problem of the existence of evil in

[1] Vol. I. 239, 240.

[2] *Table Talk*, April 30, 1830.

the world. Nor, though it should have hit the truth, does it remove the difficulty we should still find in the 'permission' (to use a phrase familiar in this connexion) of pain in beings like the lower animals, for whom it can have no moral significance. Can this fact be reconciled with that reference of all ultimately to God which Religion has all along seemed to involve?

I have only one consideration to suggest under this head, and it is this. We do not find pain to be most inexplicable where we know it best. We do not say, 'Where pain does not come near us or our likes, we are content to suppose it to have some purpose, some justification, which we do not know; but when it touches ourselves, then we cry out.' Our attitude is just the reverse of this. What pain is in an animal which does not 'look before and after,'[1] in whom it is not complicated by recollections of past and anticipations of future pain, by conceptions of a happiness which it mars, by conscious contrast with happier times, we can scarcely guess. I am not, of course, denying the possibility that the germs of these higher and complicating states of mind may exist in the higher animals. But just where they seem to exist, or where beside the physical suffering we suppose a sense of regret and sorrow, there there *does* seem to be moral compensation, as in the instance of

[1] Cp. Shelley, *The Skylark*, § 18.

the dog commemorated by Scott [1] and Wordsworth, to whom in the latter's words God had given

> '. . . that strength of feeling, great
> Above all human estimate.' [2]

But what pain is in the vast majority of the lower animals, which certainly do not share much that gives to human pain its greatest poignancy, that, I repeat, we can scarcely guess. It is where we know it best, in ourselves, that we understand how it may be that we would not for anything have *not* had to endure acute physical pain or even very bitter and intimate grief. The crown without the cross would be a less glorious crown. It is not, we may observe, in accordance with the genius of the Christian religion to regard Christ's passion and death as something which we would fain have away from the divine life; rather they belong to what we count as of highest worth therein. Our position, then, is that the problem of pain presses least where we know it best from within; most where we least know what it is from within. I do not know that we can get farther than this, but this is a consideration adverse to despair of the problem.

I pass to the problem of *sin*, and this is admittedly more difficult. For though the resulting of pain from sin is approved by our moral consciousness, and hence the reference of pain to sin, where possible, seemed to ease the problem of pain, the

[1] *Helvellyn* (1805). [2] *Fidelity* (1805).

problem of sin is not itself thereby eased. *Moral* compensation for *sin* seems out of the question. It is to be noted that, in what was said of *pain*, the suggestion made was not merely that we could think of pain as compensated indeed, but only in such a sense that we should contemplate the non-occurrence of pain and consequent absence of need for compensation as better than its occurrence together with its compensation. It was rather that in certain cases, and those the most intimately known, we should not wish the pain not to have occurred. But could we put ourselves in the position of not wishing that sin had not occurred? We might perhaps say that we would rather sin should have occurred than that it should not have been possible, that is, that there should have been no beings capable of freely choosing, and therefore of freely rejecting good; but we go farther than this in the case of pain. We may, I think, say that we should not wish pain not to have been. On the other hand, we naturally shrink from saying that we did not wish sin not to have been, although the language of the famous hymn already quoted might seem to venture even so far: *O felix culpa quæ talem et tantum meruit habere Redemptorem.*[1] And when I pointed out just now that in Christianity we would not have the passion of Christ away from our thought of God, we must

[1] Cp. Dante, *Paradiso*, IX. 94–108; Mother Julian of Norwich, *Revelations of Divine Love*, c. 84 (p. 217 in the 1902 reprint of Cressy's translation).

remember that the Passion of Christ is conceived in Christian theology not as mere suffering, but as a sacrifice for sin. Sin is the presupposition of Atonement; and although the dogma does not represent sin as entering as a personal experience into the divine life, it does represent atonement, which presupposes sin, as so entering.[1]

Now it is quite natural that we should shrink from the full recognition of this, because it seems to be in flagrant contradiction with our moral consciousness, to imply that one could rightly be glad that sin had been committed, even that one had oneself sinned, and to lead logically to the principle with which (it is worth observing) the early Christians were already reproached,[2] of doing evil that good may come.

I think that there is an answer to this criticism, which is sufficient, although in respect of the problem of evil as a whole I should certainly be willing to subscribe to Lotze's words, 'No one has here found the thought that would save us from our difficulty, and I too know it not.'[3]

The condition of *atonement* is *repentance;* except where there is *repentance*, sin is not done away. Now repentance excludes the antinomian attitude which regards sin as no sin. It presupposes a realization of its character as sin. Nor is it possible to 'do

[1] Cp. above, p. 259.

[2] See Romans ii. 8.

[3] *Microcosmus*, IX. 5, § 5 (Eng. tr., II. p. 716).

evil that good may come' in the only way in which a sinful will can pass into a good, namely, through repentance. The repentance which a man could intend while sinning would be no real repentance at all. Real repentance could only supervene through a complete change of will upon the state in which a man should set out to sin with the intention of repenting, and thus obtaining something better than innocence. In other words, the attitude to which the doctrine of the *felix culpa* is supposed logically to lead is really impossible. A man could not be at once in the attitude of making light of sin by treating it as the proper and inevitable means to something better, and in the attitude of condemning sin as sin must be condemned in any repentance which could bring the forgiveness by which the sin is taken away.

The difference between 'mere' Morality and Religion comes to a head in the difference between their respective attitudes towards sin.

It is a paradox that Religion seems at once to intensify the horror of sin and yet to give assurance of forgiveness. From the point of view which is 'merely ethical' the religious horror of sin seems *morbid*,[1] and the religious assurance of forgiveness *immoral*. And further, the two seem *inconsistent* with one another. From the 'merely ethical'

[1] 'The higher man of to-day,' says Sir Oliver Lodge from this point of view, 'is not worrying about his sins at all' (*Hibbert Journal*, April, 1904, II. 3, p. 466).

point of view one is rather inclined to say, 'Let us do better for the future, let bygones be bygones'; but, on the other hand, to affirm that the *effects* of sin endure always, and that we can depend on none but ourselves for the partial counteraction of them.

What solution shall we find for these antinomies?

We must observe that the religious horror of sin *would* be morbid apart from the religious assurance of forgiveness, and that the religious assurance of forgiveness *would* be immoral apart from the religious horror of sin, and that the two *are* inconsistent with each other as the thesis and antithesis of the Kantian antinomies are so. The religious solution is that while apart from God man can do nothing, in union with God he can do all things;[1] and this is the significance of the doctrine of the Atonement in which through the union of God with man the taking away of man's sin is accomplished. What man cannot do without God, God in man can do.

I said in my first Lecture that in dealing with my third subject, the antithesis of Man and God, we should find ourselves not far off from the problem of the Particular and the Universal. Feuerbach, one of the most considerable of the writers who in the nineteenth century made contributions to the Philosophy of Religion, actually in his *Essence of Chris-*

[1] See John xv. 5; Philippians iv. 13.

tianity [1] (which George Eliot translated into English) treated the antithesis of divine and human as equivalent to that between human nature in general and human nature in individuals. I shall only be able to touch here very briefly on the question thus raised. I would point out that when we speak of a Universal Mind or Spirit, we are not merely speaking of an abstract universal, in which the distinctive features of all real individual minds have been omitted, and only what is common to them all left behind. For it is the nature of mind in the activity wherein it has its life and being to *aim* at the elimination of what is *merely* individual or subjective, so that it is most truly *mind* when it apprehends what all other minds must also apprehend under the same intelligible conditions, when it knows the *truth*, which is not merely for it, but for all, when it understands or comprehends the objective nature of reality. And yet it is not, I think, quite correct to say that in doing this each individual mind merely drops out what belongs to its separate individuality. It no more does this than two astronomers observing a celestial phenomenon from far-distant observatories drop out of account the difference in what they see, which is due to the difference between their respective stations of observation. They do not

[1] *Das Wesen des Christenthums.* I may here refer to the criticism of Feuerbach's theology by Baron F. von Hugel, *Religione ed Illusione*, in *Cœnobium*, No. 1–2, 1911.

drop it out, but they do not treat it as affecting the objective identity of what they observe. They do not say each that the other is wrong; they ascertain the relation of the two points of view to one another in space, and say that the same object seen from these two points of view *must* look thus from the one and thus (a different *thus*) from the other. Just so the real world, which is the common object of all knowledge, is not really known completely as it is, so long as we do not understand why it is apprehended in this way by you and in that way by me. The truth fully grasped would, we think, give the explanation of the different forms in which it has been held, nay, even of the errors which have been entertained respecting that to which it relates. 'Personality' is sometimes regarded as something which divides one person from another, but the more we suppose a consciousness immersed in itself, incapable of relating itself to others through a common object of consciousness, the less we should call that consciousness personal. This name we give only to a self-distinguishing consciousness, a consciousness of objects which it recognizes as distinct from itself, and as being capable of being objects also to another consciousness. We do not call the lower animals persons, because we do not suppose their consciousness to be of this sort. Again, within the limits of humanity, we should call those 'great personalities,' not who

were most shut up within a world of their own—these would rather be madmen or idiots—but those whom we should call men of universal genius, such as Plato or Shakespeare or Goethe, in whom we find the least eccentricity, the least restricted capacity of sharing the thoughts and feelings of others.[1] Even with some singular and elusive mood which comes and goes and seems incapable of description in words or otherwise, when an Emily Bronte or a Maeterlinck succeeds in expressing it, we recognize it with admiration just when it has thus escaped from its privacy and been communicated to the world and become an element in the common life of sentiment and thought. The universal Spirit, then, is no mere abstraction; it is the concrete reality of which the individual spirits, so far as they remain above and apart, are but, as it were, fragments, though so far as they bring what is in each of them into its true place in the spiritual organism they realize themselves as constituent organs of the universal life with none of which and no part of which it can dispense. 'The very hairs of your head are all numbered.'[2]

If, then, it be asked, as sometimes it is, 'Do you mean that God has no life of his own apart from the lives of the spirits (not necessarily only human spirits, there may be other spiritual beings besides

[1] Cp. *Proc. of Ar. Soc.*, N. S., V. pp. 106 foll.

[2] Matthew x. 30.

men) who "live and move and have their being"[1] in him?' how shall we answer?

We shall, I think, say *firstly* that God must indeed have a life of his own; the universal life is his own, as it is none other's, for all others have it only from him and through him. To attribute to him a life of his own which is *not* shared by any is not to make him more properly personal, but less, because his whole substance would then not exist, in Aristotle's phrase, ἐνεργείᾳ, but in part δυνάμει, not brought into play, as it were, in the universal life. Christian theology here expresses the truth better. There never is nor was a time when God existed without his only begotten Son. The Son is eternally begotten, and lacks nothing of the fulness of the Godhead, which is completely present in the Begotten as in the Begetter.

Secondly, we shall say that this does not (as it is sometimes hinted that it may) make God a mere aggregate or plurality of spirits, which could not be loved or worshipped. We can love and feel loyalty to a community, to a college, a religious order, a nation, a Church, nor do we regard the community which we thus love and to which we devote ourselves as a mere aggregate or plurality. If we so regard it, we may find it sometimes a questionable object of love or devotion; but in fact we do not so regard it. No doubt the individuality and personality of such a corporation (to use the legal word) is defective.

[1] Acts xvii. 28.

The individual person, although a less enduring, in some ways a less august, object of devotion than the community, yet has in his individuality something which the community lacks. But in God, the eternal and universal Spirit, in his indefeasible individuality has that which the community has not, and yet has in a transcendent degree all those claims which the community, the State or the Church has, and to which we sometimes think it right to sacrifice the interests of an individual friend, although, as we saw, there is something which the individual friend has which is wanting to the personality of Church or State. God can thus be rightly described in terms of individual personality, although the life of God is not narrower than that of any community, but vaster, and indeed contains it within the compass of its universal activity.

The eternal being of God is then that in which ours is rooted, which, since he is before and beyond our individual being, we can worship and love and make the object of our devotion. But when we are and do that by which we fill that place and discharge that function in being and doing which we realize the best that is in us, and do this consciously as being God's will, then we live as sons of God. Such a life is not extraneous to God nor an afterthought, as it were, in respect of his being, but a conscious sharing in what is the eternal expression or utterance of his whole being, *Deus de Deo, Lumen*

de lumine, Deus verus de Deo vero.[1] Lastly, this eternal self-expression is not to be thought of as some mere natural process which culminates in the putting forth from God of something which thenceforward remains apart from him. The unity of the Father and the Son in a mutual interchange of love, of which our worship of God and the Grace of God that we receive therein and thereby is but a very little part—this is itself the eternal issue and process of the Divine Being, in which it for ever completes itself as Spirit, and so eternally manifests itself as the threefold unity described in the time-hallowed language of Christian theology as Father Son and Holy Spirit, three Persons and one God.

[1] In Christian theology, as has been already pointed out (p. 213), this participation is attained only through Christ. It is only as a 'member of Christ' that the Christian is a 'child of God.' This *mediated* sonship is an essential feature of Christian religious experience. An examination of details of historical evidence, such as would be required in a discussion of the bearing of this upon the purely historical questions connected with the Gospel story and the origins of Christianity, does not fall within the scope of the present work, nor is the present writer competent to undertake it. But it may be observed that the development of Christology was determined rather by what, under the guise of the ascertainment of an ecclesiastical tradition, was fundamentally an analysis of the Christian religious consciousness, than by considerations of historical evidence, as that is understood to-day; that the precise form assumed by creeds was affected by various influences, among which an impartial and critical study of historical evidence was not one; and that the theological problem which now lies before the Christian Church is the adjustment of the results of the process of analysis above mentioned to those of an independent criticism, proceeding upon the lines proper to historical investigation, and concerned with the former only in so far as it is part of the historian's task to assign causes adequate to the effects which are known to have followed from them.

INDEX

N.B.—*References to the books of the Bible will usually be found under the names of their reputed authors.*

Abelard: 176, 237 n.
Absolute: 155 f., 187 f., 217 f., 252 f.
Accident: 131 f.
Achan: 119, 122
Actæon: 25
Acton, Lord, 229
Acts of the Apostles: 149, 245 n., 280
Actual sin: 120
Adam and Eve: 33 f.
Adams: 155
Adaptation: 160 ff.
Adoption: 213
Agamemnon: 266
Agnosticism: 156
Ahab: 266
Alexander the Great: 195
Alexandria: 236
Alice through the Looking Glass: 36
Almsgiving: 96
Amadis of Gaul: 195
Amor intellectualis: 247
Amos: 227
Ananda: 244
Anima Mundi: 237 n.
Animals: 268 ff.
Anschauung: 76
Anselm: 100, 173 ff., 232
Anthropology: 13 f., 248
Architect of the universe: 162 f.
Arianism: 239
Aristophanes: 206 n.
Aristotle: 12, 15, 45, 74, 78 n., 124, 158, 162, 165, 169, 200, 209 f., 220 ff., 226, 230 ff., 237, 249, 251, 280
Arnold, Matthew: 4, 5, 215, 259
Arthur, King: 195
Articles of Religion: 126 n., 129, 220
Ascension: 245
Assyria: 227
Atonement: 239, 274
Aufklarung: 92, 116
Augustine: 77, 107, 109, 114 n., 117 n., 123 f., 132 n., 173, 219, 232 f., 236 ff., 259 n., 262, 264
Augustus: 206
Avalokita: 241, 256
Avalokitesvara: See Avalokita

Bacon: 195
Balaam: 46, 198
Baptism: 96
Beal, Mr. S.: 257 n.
Beauty: 4, 6 ff., 32 ff., 141
Berkeley: 28, 31, 37
Bernard of Chartres: 59
Bernard, St: 237 n.
Bhagavadgîtâ: 40 n.
Bigandet, Bp.: 244 n., 256 n.
Bodhisattva: 241, 256 f.
Boethius: 236 n.
Boissier: 218 n.
Bolingbroke: 236
Bradford, John: 107
Bradley, Mr. F. H.: 217
Brahma: 40
Brahmanism: 255
Bronte, Emily: 279
Buddha: 242 n., 243 ff., 256 f.
Buddhism: 61, 139, 146, 242, 244, 255 ff.
Bunyan: 4
Burke: 228

Caird, Edward, 73 n., 173 n., 213 n.
Carlyle: 74
Carpenter, Dr. J. Estlin: 257 n.
Carroll, Lewis: 36
Chesterfield, Lord: 32
Chinese Buddhism: 241 n., 256
χωρισμός: 237 ff.
Christ: see Jesus Christ
Christianity: 10 ff., 40, 54, 61, 67, 72, 89, 91, 101, 150, 206, 210 ff., 227 ff., 254 ff., 257 ff., 263 ff., 272, 274, 280, 282
Church: 206, 229 ff., 249, 281
Church and State: 229
Churchgoing, 96
Cicero: 165
Coleridge: 74, 270 f.
Collocations: 62
Communion: See Eucharist
Comte: 198 ff., 229
Concepts: 190 ff.
Concupiscentia: 126
Contingency: 164, 166
Contradiction, Principle of: 78
Cosmological Argument: 154, 164 f., 167 ff.
Covenant: 225
Creator: 162 ff.
'Critical' and 'dogmatic': 182
Cyril of Jerusalem: 239 n.

Dalai Lama: 241
Danae: 262
Dante: 78 n., 91, 273 n.
Darwin: 162
Deductive Method: 154
Deism: 50, 73
Delphi: 46, 80, 206
Dependence: 97
Descartes: 12, 166, 177 f., 187
'Descriptive': 30 f.
Design, Argument from: 159 ff.
Determinism: 108 ff.
Devil: 267 ff.
Dialectic: 16, 74
Diogenes Laertius: 242 n.
Discursive reasoning: 76
Docetism: 239
Dodona: 46
'Dogmatic': See 'Critical'
Dogs: 205, 272
Doubt: 141 ff.
Dreams: 110

Easter Eve: 259
Eckhart: 258 n.
Eddy, Mrs.: 3
Edison: 196
Egypt: 227
Eliot, George: 277
Emerson: 40
Emperor-worship: 218 n., 240
Epictetus: 213 n.
Epicureanism: 152 ff.
Epiphenomenon: 157
Erbsunde: 116
Esse and *percipi:* 28 ff.
Eucharist: 96 f., 248 f.
Eucken, Prof. R.: 116 n.
Eusebius of Cæsarea: 239 n.
Evil: 267 ff.
Evolution, 53, 66 f.,
Exodus 227
Ezekiel: 119

Faith: 99 f.
Fall of man: 51
Fasting: 96
Feeling: 71 ff.
Feuerbach: 277
Fielding: 11 ff.
'Finite God': 139
Flesh and Spirit: 128
Foreknowledge: 104 f.
Forgiveness: 276
Fortunate Isle: 175 f.
Fowler, Mr. W. Warde: 153 n., 211 n., 215 n., 262 n.
Francis, St.: 243
Frazer, Prof. J. G.: 118 n., 194 n., 197 n., 207 n., 216 n.
Freedom: 17, 94, 95, 103 ff., 265

Galahad: 90
Gaunilo: 175 f., 180
Gautama: See Buddha
Genesis: 127 n., 144

Gibbon : 236
Gnadenmitteln : 92 ff.
Gnadenwirkungen : 92 ff.
Goethe : 70, 279
Good works : 91
Goodness of God : 91, 262 ff.
Goths : 264 n.
Grace : 10, 16, 17, 87 ff., 193, 265 ff.
Gray : 34
Greek Religion : 119, 208 ff., 222, 227, 263 ff.
Green, T. H. : 157, 205
Ground and Consequent, 169 f.

Habakkuk : 267
Hamilton, Sir W., 57 n.
Hartland, Mr. E. S. : 242 n.
Hebrews, Epistle to the : 148, 231 f., 258 n., 267
Hegel : 12, 15, 47, 57 n., 124, 133, 159 n., 180 n., 240 n., 255 n.
Heraclitus : 56
'High gods' : 215 n.
History : 61 ff., 189, 191, 282 n.
Holiness : 118, 263
Holy Ghost : 231 ff., 245 ff., 258
Homer : 59, 90, 219 f., 266
Hort : 239 n.
Hugel, Baron F. von : 277 n.
Humanity, Religion of : 203
Humbert case : 23
Hypnotism : 147
Hypothesis : 149 ff.

Idealism, 41 f.
ἴδιαι ἀρχαί : 74
Idols : 143, 149, 208, 217
Image of God : 127, 240
Immortality : 94
Incarnation : 238 ff.
Indian Religion : 40, 240, 255
Individuality : 119, 236
Insight : 77
Intuition : 76 ff.
Intuitive Understanding : 184
Isaiah : 91, 227, 254
Islam : See Mohammedanism
Israel : 208 ff., 222, 225, 227, 263 f.
Italian art : 238

Jacob : 144
Jacobi : 56 ff.
Jahweh : 82, 90, 198, 227, 266 f.
James, St. : 71
James, William : 14
Japan : 218, 241 n., 256
Jeremiah : 119
Jerusalem : 206, 239 n.
'Jesuit Trinity' : 238
Jesus Christ : 81 f., 206, 227, 230 ff., 243 ff., 254, 257 f., 261, 272, 274
Jevons, Prof. F. B. : 123 n., 248 n.
Jewish Religion : See Israel
Job : 148, 266
John, St. : 4, 81 f., 150, 232 ff., 245, 247, 259 n., 267
John of the Cross, St. : 258 n.
John of Salisbury : 59 n.
Joseph, St. : 238
Joseph, Mr. H. W. B. : 15 n.
Joshua : 119, 122
Judaism : 40, 118 n., 257, 263 f.
Judges : 90
Julian of Norwich : 273 n.
Julius Cæsar : 195
Jupiter : 262
Justinian, 78 n.

Kant : 12, 73, 76, 92 ff., 130, 155, 159 ff., 259, 265, 276
Karma : 61
Katrei, Schwester, 258 n.
Keble : 219
Kings : 207, 215 f.
Kings : 266 n.
Kipling, Mr. Rudyard : 204
Knowledge : 24, 68, 182 ff.
Konigsberg : 98
Kwannon : See Kwanyin
Kwanyin : 241 n., 256

Lang, Mr. Andrew : 197 n., 215 n.
Laplace : 149, 151
Lasson : 258 n.
Law and Grace : 128
Leibnitz : 12, 166 n., 259 n.
Leuba, Prof. J. H. : 41 n.

Leverrier: 155
Locke: 12
Lodge, Sir O.: 275 n.
Loisy, M. Alfred: 5 n., 194 n., 244 n.
Lotze: 133, 267, 274
Love of God: 150, 247
Lucretius: 152 ff.
Luther: 107, 116
Lyall, Sir A.: 193 n., 194 n., 240 n., 255 n.

Macrobius: 212 n.
McTaggart, Dr. J. E.: 145 ff., 188, 252
Maeterlinck, M. Maurice: 279
Magic: 122 ff., 134, 194 ff.
Mahâ-Parinibbâna-Sutta: 244 n.
Mahâvagga: 244
Maitreya: 256
Man: 10, 16, 17, 88, 135 ff.
Mana: 89, 193, 207
Marcellus of Ancyra: 239
Marcion: 43, 264
Marcus Aurelius: 206
Marett, Mr. R. R.: 89, 193 n., 194 n., 197 n., 215 n.
Martene: 259 n.
Mary, St.: 238
Mathematics: 190 ff., 226 n.
Matthew, St.: 102, 245, 267 n., 279
Means of Grace: 92 ff.
Mecca: 96
Merit: 106 ff.
Metaphor: 250 ff.
Metaphysics: 198:
Methodism: 73
Mikado: 218
Milinda, King, Questions of: 256 n.
Mill, J. S.: 62, 154, 270
Milton: 32 f., 119, 268
Miracle: 51, 242 f.
Mohammed: 243 f.
Mohammedanism: 40, 96, 244, 257
Mommsen: 240 n.,
Monier Williams, 240 n., 241 n.
Monophysitism: 241
Monotheism: 199
Morality: 17, 101 ff., 259 ff., 275 f.
Moravianism: 73
Moses: 82
Mowgli: 204

Napoleon: 149
Natural and Revealed Religion: 49 ff.
Natural Science: 93, 189, 191, 194 ff.
Naturalism: 131 f., 157
Nature: 10, 16, 17, 87 ff., 265, 270
Necessary and Contingent: 171 ff.
Necessary Being: 167 ff.
Necessity: 17, 130
Neo-Platonism: 222, 237, 263
Neptune, discovery of: 155
Nestorianism: 241
Newman: 107
Newton: 82, 196
Nicene Creed: 239
Niddnakathâ: 244 n.
νόησις νοήσεως: 221, 249
νοῦς: 158
Numbers: 46, 82, 198

Œdipus: 119
Old Testament: 264
Olympus: 152
Ontological Argument: 154 f., 165, 173 ff.
Operations of Grace: 92 ff.
Opinion: 24
Original Sin: 61, 72, 75, 104 ff., 266
Ovid: 262 n.

Pain: 268 ff.
Paley: 160, 162
Pantheism: 199, 218, 222, 255, 257
Particular: See Universal
Pascal: 54 n., 234
Paul, St.: 2, 38, 107 ff., 113, 126, 127 n., 132, 142, 150, 206, 210, 211, 213 n., 228 ff., 233 f., 241, 245, 255, 257 f., 263, 267, 274 n.
Pelagianism: 123 f.
Personality of God: 139, 207, 214 ff.
Peter Lombard: 233 n.
Peter, St.: 134, 254 n.

Phidias: 59
Philistines: 227
Philo: 264
Philosophers, Greek: 208 ff., 222, 226, 232, 249, 261
Philosophy of Religion: 1, 245
Philostorgius: 264 n.
φρόνημα σαρκός: 126
Physicotheological Argument: See Design, Argument from
Pietism: 73
Pilgrimage: 96
Plato: 12, 46 f., 59, 72 n., 73 n., 80, 160, 165, 171, 209, 212, 226, 228, 237, 242 n., 254, 262, 269, 279
Plotinus: 223
Polynesians: 89, 193
Polytheism: 199
Porphyry: 223
Positivism: 156, 198 ff., 203.
Postulates of Practical Reason: 94
Pragmatism: 28
Prayer: 96, 102
Pre-animistic Religion: 89
Predestination: 91
Prometheus: 26
Proof, 69 ff., 78, 154 f., 187 f.
Proofs of the existence of God, 154, 159 ff.
Prophets, 79 ff., 208 ff., 222, 261, 263 f.
Providence, 102, 115
Psalms; 96, 150, 160, 174, 266
Psychology of Religion: 14 f., 189
Punishment: 105
Pythagoræ Vita: 212 n.

Quicunque vult: 238 n.

Rashdall, Dr. H.: 187 n., 217 n., 218 n., 250 n.
Rationalism: 69 ff.
Rational Theology: 179
Reason: 10, 16, 17, 21 ff.
Reinach, M. Salomon: 5, 261
'Regulative' and 'constitutive': 93, 171
Reicke: 98 n.
Relandus: 96 n.
Relativism: 156
Relativity of Knowledge: 156 ff.
Religion, definitions of: 3 ff.
Religion and Beauty: 6 ff., 141
Religion and Magic: 123
Religion and Religions: 64 ff.
Repentance: 275
Responsibility: 106 ff.
Resultat: 133 n.
Reusch: 98 n.
Revelation: 10, 16, 17, 21 ff., 226, 234, 242
Revelation of St. John: 245, 247
Rhys Davids, Mr. T. W.: 242 n., 257 n.
Ritter and Preller: 213 n.
Robertson, F. W.: 143 n.
Roman Catholicism: 238
Roman Religion: 262 n.
Rome: 206
Rousseau: 73
Ruskin: 32

Sacraments: 92, 96 f., 103, 121 ff., 131
Sacred Heart: 73
Sacrifice. 248
Saeculum Rationalisticum: 70, 73
Samson: 90
Sanday, Dr. W.: 84 n.
Satan: 266
Schleiermacher: 97
Schmidt, Prof. N.: 212 n.
Scholastic Philosophy: 176
Schubert: 98 n.
Science: 30, 69, 74, 84, 200 ff.
Scott: 272
Secularism: 156
Self-evidence: 77
Seneca: 213 n.
Sentimentalism: 72 f.
Shakespeare: 35, 113, 279
Sharp, Prof. F. Chapman: 260 n.
Shekinah: 152
Shelley, 271 n.
Sherlock, Bishop: 52

Shinto, 218
Sin : 117 ff., 272 ff. See also Original Sin.
Sinai : 152
Smith, W. Robertson : 123 n., 197 n., 208 n., 211 n., 248 n., 263 n.
Social Organism : 228 ff.
Socrates, 165
Son of God, 211 ff., 231 ff., 238, 240, 246, 249, 258, 266 f., 280, 282
Spencer, Herbert : 228
Spinoza : 3, 12, 108 ff., 170, 247
Spirit : 150, 240, 277 ff. See also Holy Ghost
Starbuck, Prof. E. D. : 14
State, the : 229, 281
Stirling, J. Hutchinson : 166 n.
Stoics : 206, 212 f.,
Stuckenberg : 98 n.
Subject and object : 17, 22, 27 ff.
Subjective Idealism : 41 f.
Supernatural : 58
Sympathetic Magic : 194
Syrians : 227

Taboo : 5, 118 n.
Taste : 7
Taylor, Prof. A. E. : 108 n.
Teleological Argument : See Design, Argument from
Tennyson : 90, 100, 117, 195
Terence : 262
Tertullian : 8, 43 n., 239 n.
Theology : 83 f., 198 ff.
Theophany : 152
Θεωρία : 226
'Things in themselves' : 184
Thomas à Kempis : 4
Thomas Aquinas : 76 f., 177, 236 n.
Tibetan Buddhism : 242 n.
Tindal : 51
Townsend, Aubrey : 107 n.
Trinity : 61, 72, 75, 231 ff., 248 f., 282
Tyrrell, George : 79

Ulphilas : 264 n.
Understanding : 73 f.
Unity of self and not-self : 234, 253
Universal and Particular : 17, 60, 63, 171, 277

Vishnu : 240 n., 241 f.
Voltaire : 73

Wallace, W. : 98 n.
Wald ; 98 n.
Washing : 96
Watson, Mr. William : 55 ff.
Westermarck, Prof. E. : 260
Wilson, Prof. J. Cook : 269 n.
Wisconsin, University of : 260 n.
Wolf : 73
Wordsworth : 32, 33, 272

Xenophon : 165

Zeller : 153 n., 158 n., 165 n., 213 n., 269 n.
Zeus : 206, 213, 266

WILLIAM BRENDON AND SON, LTD., PRINTERS, PLYMOUTH, ENGLAND