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CONFLICT OF POLICIES IN ASIA

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BY

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FOREWORD

The purpose of this work is to present my conception of the policy and interest of the United States in the Orient; but attitudes and policies of other nations principally concerned also are indicated, and the relation of Europe to the question.

The survey includes the post-World War period from the peace conference at Paris to the present, with enough of background to make the argument comprehensible. In presenting the subject I have chosen often to give my own memoranda written contemporaneously with the events to which they apply, feeling that this method has the merit of revealing pointedly the political processes which motivated and shaped these events currently, and that this is the better way to demonstrate political science. The memoranda are unrevised and undeleted except here and there to omit repetitions and personal allusions.

Explanations and criticisms of American institutions are included because this work may be read in parts of the world where American administrative functions are not well understood; and they relate to the foreign policies of the American Government.

THOMAS F. MILLARD.

February, 1924.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I	Clash of Policies	3
II	Pawns at Paris	50
III	Transfer to Washington	82
IV	Geneva	134
V	Interim	159
VI	Washington Again	219
VII	Disintegration	289
VIII	Residue	339
IX	Japan: Reform or Dissimulation?	363
X	Constructive	379

APPENDICES

A	Washington Treaties and Resolutions	405
	Four-Power Treaty 406	
	Armaments 409	
	China 431	
	Resolutions 445	
B	Notes of American and Chinese Governments Regarding Germany	450
C	British Far East Press on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance	452
D	The Cassel Agreement	469
E	The Twenty-One Demands	476
F	Statement of the Position of the American Government Regarding Loans in China	487
G	Russo-Japanese Treaty	488
H	Inter-Power Agreements Relating to China	490
I	Statements in the Washington Conference Regarding Siberia	494
	Index	505

CONFLICT OF POLICIES IN ASIA

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I

CLASH OF POLICIES

§ 1

TREND of world evolution has given the issues now focused in the Far East and the Pacific Ocean first place in the foreign policy of the United States of America. The Hay Doctrine has superseded the Monroe Doctrine in urgency and importance.

This statement, with its broad implications, runs contrary to general opinion of Americans. It challenges ideas that have become almost traditional. Yet assuredly it is true; and if proof is needed that the American Government is approaching realization of it, this will be found in causes and effects of the international conference held at Washington in the late months of 1921 and extending into 1922.

The doctrines to which the names of James Monroe and John Hay are attached were separated, in their pronouncement, by a lapse of about eighty years (1823–99); but both doctrines sprang from similar general causes and reasoning. Both are predicated fundamentally upon the geographical position and political institutions of the United States.

The Monroe Doctrine was pronounced because tendencies of European politics as expressed by alliances and combinations of the period, which was the outgrowth of the Napoleonic Wars, were deemed by American statesmen of that time to endanger, by encroachment and interference with new and

weak states on the American continents, the free development of democratic institutions and ideals, and likely to create a situation in the Western hemisphere that might menace the security of the young American republic. The Monroe Doctrine as originally pronounced did not mention economic aspects specifically. The close linking of economics with international politics which has been an outstanding development of the last half-century had not begun to attract the serious attention of statesmen in President Monroe's time. Nevertheless, although the term had not been coined then, in practice the Monroe Doctrine has been the major influence in maintaining the "Open Door" in the Western hemisphere.

The Hay Doctrine came about because of the development of conditions in the region of the Pacific Ocean and especially in eastern Asia which in the opinion of far-seeing American statesmen presented a danger to American political institutions and national security closely analogous to apprehensions of the statesmen of Monroe's time. The Asian continent, with its immense populations, territory, and undeveloped resources, had become a field of imperialistic ambitions of the more powerful nations in Europe. A large portion of Asia had been annexed by European powers, and the process of bringing China and other weak Asiatic nations under the political and economic control of those powers was proceeding apace. While many thoughtful Americans perceived the danger and the economic disadvantages to America that might come from such developments, John Hay is credited with formulating and bringing into existence the international doctrine that bears his name.

The practical test of any political formula is found in its application to conditions as they arise; and in their practical applications the Monroe and Hay doctrines on close examination will be found to have the same fundamental motivations and very similar causations. The doctrines, however, differed in form.

The Monroe Doctrine had the form of a dogmatic statement of a unilateral position taken by the United States without consulting or seeking the approval of other nations.

The Hay Doctrine took the form of a diplomatic approach by the American Government to other powers with a view to establishing among them by general agreement a recognition of certain principles. What is called the Hay Doctrine consists of a number of diplomatic communications among governments, made at different times and under somewhat different circumstances, but in all of which the principles advocated by Hay are stated, recognized, and affirmed. All of the so-called principal powers—Great Britain, Russia, France, Japan, and Germany—which then and thereafter took prominent parts in events with respect to China, have subscribed to the Hay Doctrine by diplomatic commitments, in alliances, and in public utterances of statesmen. The elements of Hay's doctrine were taken as the foundation principles for covenants made at Washington in 1922, which covenants now may be considered as constituting the revised written international status.

The difference in form of the Monroe and Hay doctrines has caused them often to be construed differently, and has left a way open for various diverse and specious interpretations of the doctrines by governments which at times have desired to evade, undermine, and destroy them. This is not surprising, nor is it unusual or derogatory of the doctrines that they are liable to tergiversation, for that is a common defect of statutes.

That the Monroe Doctrine has withstood for a century all direct and indirect efforts to destroy or repeal it suggests much more than the presumed might of the United States to maintain it: it carries a positive assurance of its intrinsic worth and general beneficence. If it had accomplished nothing except to withdraw the Western hemisphere from the scope of Europe's political rivalries and war provocations, its value would be beyond question. That was a result of the

Monroe Doctrine; but it was not one of its professed objects, for it was pronounced before the saving of Europe from itself was urged as a duty of the United States. Recurring tergiversations and consequent misunderstandings have required the occasional reiteration of the doctrine, the more recent being given by Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes in a speech before a convention of the American Bar Association on August 30, 1923. Speaking of the doctrine "as it has been and as it is believed to remain," Mr. Hughes said (my italics):

First. The Monroe Doctrine is not a policy of aggression; *it is a policy of self-defense.* It was asserted at a time when the danger of foreign aggression in this hemisphere was very real, when the new American states had not yet established a firm basis of independent national life, and we were menaced by threats of Old World powers directed against republican institutions. But the achievements of the century have not altered the scope of the doctrine or changed its basis. It still remains an assertion of the principle of national security. As such it obviously is not exclusive.

Second. As the policy embodied in the Monroe Doctrine is *distinctively the policy of the United States,* the Government of the United States *reserves to itself its definition, interpretation, and application.* This Government has welcomed the recognition by other governments of the fact and soundness of this policy and of the appropriateness of its application from time to time. But the United States has not been disposed to enter into engagements which would have the effect of submitting to any other power or to any concert of the powers the determination either of the occasions upon which the principles of the Monroe Doctrine shall be invoked or of the measures that shall be taken in giving it effect. As President Woodrow Wilson observed: "The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It always has been maintained and always will be maintained upon her own responsibility." This implies neither suspicion nor estrangement. It simply means that the United States is asserting a separate national right of self-defense and that in the exercise of this right it must have an unhampered discretion.

Third. The policy of the Monroe Doctrine does not infringe upon

the independence and sovereignty of other American states. Misconception on this point is the only disturbing influence in our relations with Latin-American states. The declaration of our purpose to oppose what is inimical to our safety does not imply an attempt to establish a protectorate any more than a similar assertion by any one of the southern republics of opposition to the conduct of any of the others endangering its security would aim at the establishment of a protectorate. I utterly disclaim as unwarranted the observations which occasionally have been made implying a claim on our part to superintend the affairs of our sister republics, to assert an overlordship, to consider the spread of our authority beyond our own domain as the aim of our policy, and to make our power the test of right in this hemisphere. *They find no sanction whatever in the Monroe Doctrine.*

I have thought it worth while, even necessary, to include here an official and recent résumé of the Monroe Doctrine because of its living place as a key-stone of our foreign policy, and further because of tergiversations which seek to demonstrate an inconsistency of it with that other and later fundamental foreign policy of the United States, the doctrine of John Hay.

Much of the essence of the Hay Doctrine is given succinctly in Secretary of State Hay's circular to the powers of date July 3, 1900, urging in respect of the various issues arising out of the so-called "Boxer" disturbances in China; viz., "*bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and by international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.*" In Monroe's doctrine it was asserted that certain acts and policies are regarded as inimical to the safety and interests of the United States. As more diplomatically advanced by Hay, in stating a general principle designed to assure the territorial integrity and administrative autonomy of China, the fact that the continuation of China as a field

for the exploitation and contentions of European imperialism constitutes a menace to the security and interests of America was conveyed by implication.

The Hay Doctrine as enunciated originally has two propositions:

1. Preservation of the territorial integrity and administrative entity of China.

2. Safeguarding the "Open Door" in China.

The first proposition ought to require no elucidation. What it means is plain. All persons having primary education know what the territorial entity of a nation is at a given time, for the boundaries are marked in maps and stated in geographies. If the boundaries are changed, then the territorial entities of nations are enlarged or diminished. China's territorial entity as meant by the Hay Doctrine obviously is as it existed when the doctrine was first pronounced. It existed then substantially as it had been for centuries previously without question, and as it exists to-day in international theory. There is slight ground for misapprehension of what is included in the territorial entity of China; no ground at all, in fact, except as the subject is obscured in the interest of nations that are trying to obtain an expansion of their own territorial entity by acquisition from China.

The "Open Door" is less plainly defined, especially in popular conception. A cloud of obscurities have been attached to the phrase since it was introduced by Hay as a diplomatic precept designed to apply to an element in world politics that has developed since Monroe's day, which every year takes on more significance and vitality, and is expressed in the conjunction of international commerce and finance with diplomacy. This conjunction was an inevitable result of modern industrialism and commerce and their extension into the field of international relationships. It is accepted now that international trade embraces and gives the wider expression to vital factors of civilization. It is by trading with each other,

rather than by reading, proselyting, and casually visiting, that peoples and nations progress to better mutual understanding. This economic interdependence in the fabric of international comity gradually is coördinating humanity.

Hay used the phrase "Open Door" first as applying in China; but nowadays it is heard almost daily in association with international developments in many regions, particularly in connection with "mandated" regions. The term quite aptly describes a principle which is by way of becoming an axiom of international policy; yet it is often misconstrued. Many people have an impression that the Open Door with respect to China and other weak nations means that foreign nations are to have the right to trade there as they wish, regardless of the wishes of Chinese and the Government of China; that the Open Door means a door for foreign trade into China, but does not mean reciprocity of an open door when Chinese want to trade in territories controlled by the major powers. That of course is a perverted definition or interpretation of the Open Door, as meant to be applied to China by the Hay Doctrine, and as now insisted upon in all analogous circumstances by the American Government. The Open Door as it is interpreted and insisted on by the American Government does not, for instance, assume to dictate to China the conditions under which foreign nationals shall do business in China. It merely desires that when the Chinese Government by its own volition or by treaties has established conditions for foreign trade in China, these conditions then shall apply impartially and equally to all foreigners. The Hay Open Door does not concern itself with the amount of tariff that China will impose on imports; it merely insists that when an import or other tariff is enacted by the Chinese Government, all commerce shall pay the same rates. The Hay Open Door does not concern itself with methods which the Chinese may adopt regarding the construction and operation of railways in their country, or for the development

of natural resources by foreign capital and with foreign assistance; it only insists that when Chinese do adopt regulations and conditions they shall apply impartially to all foreigners who may want to participate in developing China.

In using a phrase to embody what he was aiming at, Hay scarcely could have contemplated then that it would be adopted into diplomatic terminology and become world-wide in application. Moreover, apropos of certain implications invidious to China that occasionally have been read into the doctrine, it is pertinent that the Chinese Government was not approached by Hay regarding an open door in China. The matter was broached with an object of relieving China of dangers and apprehensions by agreement among outside nations. I frequently note a fallacy in current comments on this subject, to the effect that the Open Door doctrine contains an affront and injustice to China. The contrary is true. When it was pronounced, and to the present, the Chinese Government and Chinese generally strongly have approved the Open Door. The opposing thesis relating to China, exemplified by the so-called "spheres of interest" policy, was (and is) hindering development and insidiously undermining her administrative autonomy. The "sphere" thesis implies that a nation may assert for its nationals an exclusive privilege for the exploitation of certain opportunities within areas outside of its national territory. "Spheres of interest" usually are created by two or more powers mutually agreeing to restrict their own operations to specified regions, and jointly to exercise their diplomacy to protect their "spheres" from being penetrated by nations which are not included in the "sphere" cycle of agreements.

Prior and subsequent to promulgation of Hay's doctrine, the American Government respected and practised its guiding principles. Therefore there is no American "sphere" in China, or anywhere. But the whole of the territorial entity of China prior to the Washington Conference was divided into "spheres" apportioned among other powers. Those

"spheres" rested upon private (and sometimes secret) agreements of the "sphere" powers among themselves. This is none the less true because on occasion governments have attempted to legalize their "sphere" claims by referring them to interpretations read into agreements to which by devices the sanction of Chinese officials was obtained.

The basis in international law for the Open Door doctrine rests chiefly on so-called "most favored nation" clauses of modern commercial treaties. This clause owes its existence to the tendency of world politics which called the Hay Open Door into being. The American Government has taken pains to insert in most of the treaties it has made in recent times a provision assuring to American trade with the treaty nations a "most favored nation" treatment. This gives no especial advantage to American commerce with those nations; it means merely that in case a nation with which the United States has such a treaty grants an economic privilege to a third nation, the same (or equal) privilege automatically extends to American corporations and citizens. And in return the United States gives the same privileges and position to the commerce and economic penetration of those other nations in its country and possessions. The Open Door in China and elsewhere, as pronounced and construed by the American Government, is nothing else than fair play as between foreign commerce and exploitation in the territories of weaker nations which may be unable effectively to assert their preferences and rights. To China especially it means fair play in respect of foreign economic penetration. It is not a scheme to give to Americans any special advantage or privilege in countries where it is applied, nor to force upon those countries any economic policy which they do not want. The oblique meanings and implications given to the Open Door in the course of years of persistent and tortuous evasion by a majority of powers find no genuine justification in the doctrine of Hay, which survives disingenuous criticism and obscurantism.

§ 2

As the inherent vitalities of the American political and social system, when the national growth developed extensive foreign contacts and wider consciousness, found logical expression in the doctrines of Monroe and Hay, so also did the similar contacts of the older states of Europe develop in pursuance of Europe's institutions and traditions. The political game as practised among racial and national groups there always has been a game of grab. To the conqueror belonged the authority and spoils. During the period when Europe was pursuing territorial discovery and implanting its footholds afar, political institutions centered in the king idea. Kings and nobles who had power took what they wanted. When states became more consolidated and legalized, expansions of their authority and territory were in the names of kings and emperors. Royal standards were raised over discovered lands on sight; there was no pretense of considering the rights or wishes of native inhabitants if they were not able to repel invaders by force. In that way the principal states of Europe extended their domination over the greater part of the earth according to their accepted political and ethical standards. It could not have been otherwise; and it is mentioned here only because those old political and ethical standards of Europe, diluted and tempered by civilization, in this day constitute the postulate of European policy toward the colored world. Such policies no longer are proclaimed or confessed; but they persist powerfully in the secrecy of cabinets. The situation caused by the meeting in the Orient of the European thesis and the American policy as expressed by the Hay Doctrine, and reactions of this dual impact upon the rising revolt of the submerged peoples against white domination, are the issue which Americans face now across the Pacific.

By every standard of comparison the British policy in this question has greater significance to America. For years

the idea has been growing that if the United States and Great Britain could develop a genuine unity in world politics the combination would be strong enough to effect in time a real comity. To have the wish is sufficient in some quarters to leap beyond the thought and to assert this unity to be already a fact; much is made of coincidences of language, racial and political derivations. These attributes greatly help the two nations to understand each other; but understanding does not always mean agreement and common purpose. No one who has got beneath the surface of the matter can doubt that there is a serious divergence of American and British policies in Asia.

In seeking motivations of the white nations which have applied and still apply powerfully to policy of the West in the East, they fall into two plainly defined divisions. The policy of the United States and its satellites is one division. The policies of European nations form the other division. The United States is the only strong supporter that its policy has. Several powers and a number of second-rank nations compose the other group. Broadly, the division is as between America and Europe, with one Asiatic power, Japan, now (since the Washington conference) in the balance.

Of white governments that constitute what for convenience I will here term the opposition to American policy, by far the more influential and powerful is Great Britain, whose actual sovereignty and quasi-sovereignty extend over more than half of the world of color. Aligned in this case with Great Britain are France, Holland, Russia, Germany; their methods and objectives and effects differing in degree but not in kind. The real policies of those governments, notwithstanding the lip-service they all give to the Hay Doctrine, are opposed to American policy in Asia. To understand this opposition it is necessary to comprehend what the American policy is in its theoretical and practical applications, and how it conflicts with the other hypothesis.

§ 3

The Government of the United States always has had a serious "color question" to handle within its national jurisdiction; and conditions involving the problem of treatment of so-called "backward" states at times have compelled it to take action. In recent years the United States has "intervened" (the term has been made obnoxious by predatory imperialism, but is descriptive) in Cuba, Santo Domingo, Hawaii, and Haiti; it set up a government in the Philippines. These interventions on the Western hemisphere involved a paradox. It was liability of weak American states to interventions from Europe that caused the pronouncement of Monroe's doctrine: and when the United States intervened with some of them it was cited as violation of its own policy. Superficially it was. Academically, for the United States to intervene with the avowed purpose of "assisting" those states was the same as for a European power so to intervene; yet the United States, which would go to war rather than permit such intervention by a European power, intervened itself, knowing that its motives would be misconstrued and that propaganda misrepresenting it would sow suspicion throughout Latin America. The difference lay in the fact that the United States Government was pursuing a unilateral policy and knew its purposes and objects, knew that when its mission was accomplished it would withdraw; whereas it felt that intervention by Europe might lead, and probably would be designed to lead to permanent occupation. It is a fashion of the time to call American foreign policy impractical; but it is practical enough where it sees clearly. It has not allowed theoretical inconsistencies to stand in the way of giving very practical applications of the Monroe Doctrine. When conditions came to a pass where intervention indubitably was needed, and Europe was inhibited by the Monroe Doctrine, the United States recognized and acted on its responsibility.

As an example which throws American policy plainly in

contrast with the policy of Europe toward Asia, the Philippines are the best available. Those islands geographically are a part of the Orient, and are populated by Oriental peoples. They came under the administration of the United States more by circumstance than by design; yet by way of logical and perhaps inevitable national tendency. Intervention in Hawaii had led to annexation of those islands because they are essential to the security of the nation; the native peoples rapidly were being infiltrated and in due course would be submerged by Asiatic immigration, and it was not possible to regard with indifference or equanimity the possession of them by an Asiastic or European power. There, however, was no plan or purpose to extend the defensive outposts of the nation farther westward. When the Philippines were acquired unexpectedly, a majority of Americans regarded them as a liability and an embarrassing responsibility; a view that persists strongly twenty-five years afterward.

But while a definite strategical object did not cause the United States to take sovereignty of the Philippines from Spain, this consideration indubitably lurked in the background. At the time of negotiations for peace between the United States and Spain, it was evident that Spain would be unable to retain sovereignty in the Philippines; and the question of what was to become of them had to be considered. Conditions in the world and in the Far East then made it almost certain that the islands would not be able to maintain a national independence. More than one power was manœuvering to inherit Spain's position there; of which designs the acts of a German naval squadron at Manila gave evidence. As in the case of Hawaii, more was involved than whether the islands in themselves were a desirable possession for the United States: what would be the consequences of turning them adrift? It was a matter where the decision was strongly influenced and probably determined by alternatives.

Having the Philippines on its hands, the American Government, sustained by the spirit of the American people, set to work with enthusiasm to give in the islands a concrete example of its Oriental policy. It suffices here to give this policy in outline by citing its major propositions. The gist of a policy is its objective, what it is trying to accomplish. Whatever sneers and innuendos are applied to American policy by others, there is no doubt in the minds of Americans about its character. We know what we are trying to do in the Philippines; and the complete record of American administration there proves that its purpose was to bring the Filipinos as quickly as is possible to the same intellectual and political plane that has been attained in the United States, and when they have reached that plane or approximated it, perhaps to give them the option of remaining as a part of the American republic or of setting up as an independent nation. The political life of the American republic revolves about the constant effort of the whole people to assure the continuation of their liberties and to improve their condition. An impulse stronger than reason and superior to calculation carried these motives with American policy in the Philippines and imbues it everywhere.

The purpose of the United States was not only to equip the Filipinos to govern themselves ultimately; the design was to do this as quickly as is possible, the sooner the better. And if our national optimism led us to think that this end could be attained in a single generation, and to minimize Oriental traits and traditions unreceptive of the intensive inculcation of republican institutions, it was a mistake of the head rather than of the heart.

The United States took sovereignty of the Philippines in 1899. Less than two years later, in 1900, a civil commission was sent to lay the groundwork for a civil government, and in 1901 civil government was established. This notwithstanding that the peace of the islands was disturbed by a serious revolt against American authority, which a large

army was required to subdue. From the beginning, Filipinos held important offices in the government. In 1907 an all-native legislative body was created to act in conjunction with the governor and Commission. Under the administration of President Wilson, the process of Filipinizing the insular government was greatly accelerated. An act of Congress (the Jones Bill, 1916) reorganized the administration and promised independence to the islands when it could be granted safely. Functions of the native legislature were extended; and it was enlarged to two houses, a Senate and Assembly. All members of the Commission (the administrative cabinet) except the governor and vice-governor are natives. Filipinos replaced Americans as judges of the courts, in all minor official positions, and in all but a few of the important executive positions. To some extent the World War was responsible for this acceleration of the process of turning government in the Philippines over to Filipinos. Attention was concentrated elsewhere; and the governor during this period, Francis Burton Harrison, evidently considered that the policy of Washington was to concede virtually whatever the native politicians insisted on. It was almost certain that there would be a reaction from this hurried thrusting of authority and responsibility on a people whose preparation and experience had been so short; as it perhaps was inevitable that the desire of the American Government to confer full administrative autonomy upon the Filipinos would cause it to go too fast. American institutions function in terms of "citizens"; they are uneasy with "wards," and always are anxious to change wards into citizens, merge them into the body politic, and make them carry their full part of the load. The nation has grown by this process and does not readily adapt itself to any other.

But the saving grace of common sense (which is the unwritten charter of any people to govern themselves and which is possessed in a large degree by the American citizenry) always has acted in the United States to check abuses of

liberty and the excesses of demagogues; and it followed that until the time arrives when Filipinos safely can be granted statehood or independence their capacity to organize and administer government would be put to the test of American common sense.

Notwithstanding generalizations about it, political liberty is not inherent with humanity, but the use of it has to be gained by fitness. On this point much satire is directed at the American Declaration of Independence, and at the alleged inconsistencies with it that practical politics leads the United States Government into. (Americans living in the Orient hear a good deal about this.) But what the declaration really asserts is the universal right of man to acquire the privileges of liberty; it says men are "created equal," meaning that they emerge by procreation with equal right to fit themselves for liberty, which right shall not be denied or withheld.

Similarly about political independence. Because the American colonies, for specific reasons, asserted and maintained their independence of England, many now presume that independence is a universal right. Americans, proponents of the right of political independence in modern times, know better. They know how independence differentiates; among other lessons on this point, they fought a long civil war to find out. The alleged right of races and political groups to independence can be and often is stretched to ridiculous applications. By some interpretations, every small political faction can arrogate to itself the right of independence, regardless of ties and obligations to a greater national organization with which they are affiliated. We see this idea operating in China to-day, where every province (or military chieftains who presume to speak for the inhabitants of the province) on occasion asserts its independence of all other administrations in the nation; results caused by this situation in China provide a pertinent example of the independence idea running wild. As with personal political

liberty, political independence among nations has to be earned by fitness and can be maintained only by fitness. Tradition and long continuation have a recognized bearing because they establish a definite ability to create and a presumption of ability to preserve nationality. But there is no permanence in nationalities. The right of national independence must be subject to continuous proof of fitness; it must be able to resist and rise superior to forces of disintegration within and without. Failure to meet these tests disproves the "right."

To say that only a qualified right of independence exists is not to mean that it should be determined dogmatically by existing authority or by force (although it often is); or, as frequently, by strategical considerations solely. The equities and jurisprudence of nations should be weighed in such cases; and nowadays there nearly always is at least a show of weighing them and of conforming actions with them. Economic elements are an important factor. But the first test of the right of any racial or political group to national independence is whether its government can command the allegiance of and exercise authority over its subjects or citizens; failing that, it cannot function internally, nor can it expect for long to maintain independence against external pressures.

The right of the Philippines to independence has been proved by none of these tests; indeed, the traditions, status quo, and reasonable presumptions are to the contrary. Since the period when the population consisted of barbarous tribes, the islands never have been independent. In modern history they always have been under the domination of an outside government; of a government, it should be stated (until the islands were annexed by the United States), that gave little evidence of any purpose except to keep the islands in that position. And in this connection a very important principle applies: such a policy of a government toward its dependencies constitutes denial of the fundamental right of

man, as stated in the American Declaration of Independence, to fit himself for political equality and liberty. American administration brought this principle to the Philippines and set to work, almost with feverish activity, to provide facilities for the Filipinos to acquire fitness to exercise the privileges of political liberty.

The United States began by firmly denying the right of the Philippines to independence *per se* and suppressed a revolt with force. This was in accordance with international equity and law, and it reflected American political common sense and experience. It implies no purpose perpetually to refuse independence to the islands, no more than does a resolution of one Congress favoring the granting of independence limit the judgment or bind the action of subsequent Congresses on this question.

The administration of the Philippines now is fixed by act of Congress: it virtually places government in the hands of Filipinos, reserving to Americans the governor with a few Supreme Court justices (who may, however, all be Filipinos) appointed by the President. The governor is appointed by the President, following the custom which obtains in other territorial possessions of the United States and which applied to parts of continental United States territory before all of it was given statehood. Powers given by Congress to the governor of the Philippines under the Jones Bill definitely followed precedents of the American political system: as chief executive, the governor is presumed, even when not specifically so stated in the act, to fulfil the customary functions of American executives; to advise and recommend legislation, to perform other functions of authority, and especially to have a veto of acts of the legislature. These constitutional functions of the executive are a distinguishing feature of the American form of government, and evidently were intended to make, and in practice actually have made, the executive a real power, not a figurehead. The federal practice in this matter was adopted by the States in their constitutions;

and powers of the executive have been strengthened rather than weakened with passage of time. It cannot rationally be presumed that Congress desired or intended, in forming an administration under United States sovereignty in the Philippines, to introduce an entirely foreign theory regarding powers of the executive, to make the governor's position there similar to that of the President in France and other countries, and to the governors of the Crown in British self-governing dominions. On the contrary, the circumstances of the case, debates on the act, and conformity with American constitutional precedent and practice all indicate plainly that in this instance more than usual the powers of the governor were intended to operate as a safeguard against the risk involved in so rapidly Filipinizing the administration of the islands. Indeed, it is a question if Congress, had it so purposed, could constitutionally take such a departure from American theory and practice as would be involved in making the governor of the Philippines a figurehead.

But, apparently with the tacit consent of Governor Harrison, Filipino politicians adeptly manœuvered to establish a theory in administration of the islands under which the governor, like the premiers of Canada, Australasia, and South Africa, is responsible directly to the native legislature and cannot exercise authority independent of it. By the time Governor Harrison's term expired (when President Harding took office in 1921) the subtle process of circumscribing the power of the executive had gone far to bring about what was tantamount to obliquely substituting the European for the American political system.

For some time before Governor Harrison resigned office there were many and significant evidences of the unfortunate result of this condition. From a stable and prosperous state, the insular finances had come near to insolvency; deterioration was apparent in most branches of government; the fine educational system which Americans took such pride in creating and bestowing was disintegrating;

healtn and sanitation measures established by the United States were relaxed; public improvements were neglected. These were conditions found by the special commission sent promptly by President Harding to investigate and report, on which General Leonard Wood and Cameron Forbes (Mr. Forbes for many years was in the Philippines as commissioner and governor) served; and when, after investigation and report, General Wood remained in the islands as governor and set to work to reorganize the administration and correct abuses, his efforts, and especially his refusal to follow Governor Harrison in abdicating responsibility and authority, met with active opposition of native political leaders and brought on a crisis.

Apropos of insistence of Filipino politicians of the right of the islands to independence, their attitude toward the same question as it exists in the Philippines is interesting. The southerly region of the archipelago is populated chiefly by Moros, a people who differ somewhat in race from natives of the north and middle islands. Under American government, the Moro province formerly was designated separately and given different administration; and its status still is different. The Moros always have been hostile to the other Filipinos, and frequently at war with them; they have different language and religion (being Moslems), and nourish an inherited antipathy. The Moros now are reconciled to be governed by the United States, but they object to being governed by the other Filipinos, a condition illustrated by occasional violent disorders. Moros have made it known that in the event of the independence of the Philippines being granted by the United States, the Moro province does not want to be included with the Philippine Republic or with the new nation whatever it might be named. The Moros apparently prefer to remain with the United States; and, anyhow, they demand separation from the Filipinos. Here, then, is an "independence" movement within the Philippines, and of serious potentialities. Yet Filipino politicians at

Manila and Washington, while insisting on the "right" of independence for themselves, object to independence for the Moro province, which they insist is an integral part of the embryo nation.

In an address at Boston in 1924, former Governor-General Cameron Forbes said;

> A few days ago Mr. Moorfield Storey in an open letter to "The Boston Herald" advocated the immediate granting of independence to the Philippines on the ground that the Filipinos had established a stable government and that under the terms of our declaration in regard to them we were obligated forthwith to give the islands their independence. I am not using his exact words. As a matter of fact, the Filipinos have not established the government there. The government is one established by Americans, and when we come to analyze its stability we must figure just how far this stability is due to the fact that it is a government so established.

The status and administration of the Philippines are introduced here in outline in order to contrast American policy with policies of other white nations in the Orient, and to show how our Philippine policy relates to and influences the evolution of civilization there.

§ 4

Great Britain, Russia, France, and Holland are European governments which have territorial footholds and administrative functions in Asia. They are named in the order of their influence and importance.

Political prognostication, to have practical value, must be limited to periods when it reasonably can be assumed that certain conditions, relations, and tendencies will hold. One would hesitate to predict, in these times, the duration of any hegemony; but for purpose of argument it can be assumed as probable that the foregoing classification will remain correct for one or two generations yet. Results of the World War eliminated Germany as an important political influence in Asia and diminished for the time the influence

of Russia. Germany's influence formerly rested on relative contacts, on her position in the diplomatic arrangements of Europe. Russia's influence formerly also had that leverage, which now is weakened; but it further and more importantly was founded on territorial contiguity and racial assimilation, and these remain virtually unaffected by results of the war; while intellectual reactions from the Russian revolution carry an influence which is incalculable now. France's influence in European diplomacy has been enhanced, perhaps temporarily, since the war, and France has territorial possessions in eastern Asia; but France does not contain and is not likely to acquire the elements which give a government definite and prolonged influence in that region. There is no noticeable growth of French influence in Asia since the war, and there is no probability of it becoming one of the factors which will determine the course of events there. Holland is a minor nation which is included only because, as an inheritance of the era of colonial discovery and acquisition, she possesses and governs populous islands in the East Indies, which she holds safely enough for the moment against any dissatisfaction of the natives, but at the mercy of shifts of the balance of power and possible upheavals in the Asiatic world. French and Dutch influences in Asia, although minor in degree, nevertheless contribute to the congeries of ideas which imbue Orientals concerning Western character and institutions. It has been said that every white man or woman wears the garment of Christian civilization as he presents himself personally to colored peoples.

Recently a man of great knowledge and experience of world politics remarked to the writer that a result of the World War is to reduce the real powers with regard to Asia to three—the United States, Great Britain, and Japan—which, he argued, is a beneficent development, for it tends to simplify the situation and fix responsibility. He commented upon the fact that at the Washington Conference the naval reduction and limitation treaty fixed ratios in the pro-

portion of five each for the United States and Great Britain, three for Japan, one and three quarters for France and Italy, and other nations not included; and he said this concretely represents the division of influence in Asia and the Pacific as it is now and is likely to continue for the next century; France and Italy, in his estimation, standing for the whole of continental Europe.

Whatever theory one may have on that point, I think it can be taken as a fact that Americans consider British position and policy in Asia to be more significant and consequential, and therefore more interesting, than other manifestations of what, as differentiated from the American, I have termed the European thesis. India gives the outstanding example and the measure of British policy in Asia, and of British attitude toward issues arising from contacts of East and West.

§ 5

In estimating the true character of British policy in India, one should seek rather to discover its ultimate *object* than to judge it by casual results. The deep political purpose of an alien government is not revealed by the material improvements it makes, or those that occur under its administration of a country; railways, roads, imposing public buildings, factories and other betterments conduce and in modern times are essential to profitable economic development, as also are peace and public order. Betterments of this character in a country cannot be attributed altogether to a purpose of the government to improve the condition of the inhabitants. They occur in all countries and under all forms of government. The guiding motive may be profitable economic exploitation. It is possible for a policy of economic exploitation and a policy of political and intellectual repression to move side by side.

As a criterion for measuring divergence of American and

British policies in Asia, the whole history of British rule there cannot be taken as showing the present eventuation, any more than the disagreements of England and America a century and more ago are active factors in their relations now and hereafter. What the England of three hundred or two hundred or one hundred years ago considered right in India does not determine what Great Britain of to-day and to-morrow may consider right. When British rule in India began and its character was formed, Englishmen had not gained political liberty for themselves. Nevertheless it is illuminating to consider the high lights of that historical record, and how the government of India arrived where it is now.

The charter of the East India Company was granted by Queen Elizabeth in 1600; from that date its operations had a definite association with the Government of England. There was great rivalry among the maritime nations of Europe in extending their conquests and colonization; in India the English, Portuguese, French, and Dutch adventured. The English eventually displaced their competitors; by the latter part of the eighteenth century they were in complete possession of the country. (Colonel Hyndman, an English authority, says the success of the English was due to the fact that they were supported by their government, while their competitors were not similarly supported.) English connection with India thus covers a period of more than three hundred years.

In respect of distinctions in administrative policy, there have been three major periods: period of commercial penetration unaccompanied by direct assumption of administrative authority, which lasted about one hundred and fifty years; period of exercise of extensive administrative authority by the East India Company, which lasted until 1858; period of exercise of authority directly by the British Government. The first period was nearly contemporary with the adventures in America of the Spanish *conquistadores,* and the methods of the time were employed. If there were differences, the

methods of the East India Company of that period were more enlightened and humane, according to standards of to-day, than contemporaneous methods of similar enterprises. The relationship (from 1600 to 1858) of the English government to what transpired in India under the régime of the East India Company was something as if the United States should give a charter to the Standard Oil Company or the Steel Corporation or to a combination of them (nothing invidious to these organizations is meant) for the exclusive economic exploitation of Alaska or Mexico; a charter supported, if need arose, by the United States army and navy. It is almost unthinkable now that the American or any great government would become a party to such an arrangement; but the world was different in the period from 1600 to 1858.

Though the charter of the East India Company was not revoked until 1858, for a long time before that date the public conscience of England was greatly exercised about conditions in India. The trial of Warren Hastings, beginning in 1788, was an expression of this growing sense of moral responsibility. Yet it was not until well into the nineteenth century that the reform idea began to appear in the thesis of administration of India. Writing to Lord Canning in 1820, Sir Thomas Munro, then governor of Madras, remarked: "Our present system of government, by excluding all natives from power, and trust, and emolument, is much more efficacious in depressing them than all our laws and school books can do in elevating their character. We are working against our own designs, and we can expect to make no progress while we work with a feeble instrument to improve, and a powerful one to deteriorate." I am indebted to the articles of Eleanor Franklin Egan published in 1923 in "The Saturday Evening Post" for recalling to memory this trenchant observation of one of the greatest administrators England has given to India. At the time Munro wrote those words the East India Company had been operating for two hundred and twenty years and had exercised administrative supervision for about a century;

yet by the statement of a man whose life was devoted to work in India, no progress had been made toward preparing the natives of India for and allowing them to participate in the government of their own country. Mrs. Egan, who writes as a friend and admirer of the British, commenting on the trial of Hastings (whom she evidently respects), had this to say: "It was Warren Hastings who first acted upon the assumption that Indians could not be entrusted with authority to handle revenues and to administer justice. This assumption has been the prevailing influence in England's conduct of the affairs of India ever since, and it is in protest against this assumption that the people of India to-day have risen to a point of practically open rebellion against British domination." In another article Mrs. Egan wrote, "To be firm in the imposition of a benevolent despotism and to keep the natives in their place have been, from the British viewpoint, the fundamental requirements of the British position." Thus is British policy epitomized by an acute observer who visited India in 1923. If this description is correct, the fundamental hypothesis of British policy in India has not changed in three centuries.

The writer has visited India on two occasions; the later visit some time ago. It was made in the course of a study, apropos of discussion about administration of the Philippines by the United States, of administration of similar peoples in the Dutch East Indies, in French Indo-China, in Korea, and in India, to discover whatever might be useful in solving the Philippine question, which at that time was a somewhat active political issue in America. I found administrations in the Dutch Indies, Indo-China, and Korea too foreign to American political thought to be readily applicable, but they were interesting nevertheless; and a result of that observation was a rough mental classification of the so-called "colonial" administrations of Western nations into three distinguishable grades, typified by American policy in the Philippines, British policy in India, and Dutch policy in the East Indies.

I remember a remark made to me at that time in Java by a Dutchman who had great experience in the East Indies, an apt apothegm of the policy of Holland. Speaking of the natives, he said, "Keep their bellies full, but don't teach them how to read." As nearly as I could comprehend it, Holland's policy with her brown dependencies is to provide generously for the material well-being of the natives, but not to stimulate mental development, which tends to convert contented and unthinking people into dissatisfied agitators. In the thesis of such a policy, education complicates and aggravates the political problem.

It was to British policy in India that Americans naturally would look for inspiration and guidance in formulating a government in the Philippines, if that was to be found anywhere. We have given the British credit for turning out a very good job in India. So on that occasion I went to India prepared to approve and learn. A few weeks in the country and contact with the solidarity which constitutes the British Raj, getting an insight into the real opinions of members of the Indian civil government, changed my mind. The work I was engaged on served perfectly to bring out distinctions of American and British points of view; for I found the British in India, both in and out of the government, in a state of subdued rage about what the Americans were doing and proposing to do in the Philippines. I found that they regarded the introduction of American policy into Asia as an unmitigated disaster. They were not shouting this opinion from the housetops (exigencies of imperial politics inhibited), but it was stated plainly in private talk, and imbued the English administrative and social organisms. I found that ideas of an intensive educational uplift of the natives, of conceding their right to administrative autonomy and hastening it, of perhaps quickly giving them national independence, in short, the extension of American political institutions and ideals to the Philippines were regarded as equivalent to throwing a political firebrand into Asia. The matter was not quite

so unequivocally stated, as a rule; but that was the inevitable deduction from arguments which were advanced, and a state of mind variously revealed.

One only had to analyze the character of the Indian civil government and compare it with what was being attempted in the Philippines to see that the policies are distinctive. They have one thing in common, a profession of benevolent purpose.

After Munro, in 1820, advanced the idea that by repressing or failing to develop administrative capacity in the natives the British administration (then that of the East India Company) was defeating its own greater ends, that hypothesis became influential in shaping the course of the Government of England. Followed then a period in which there was some effort at intellectual stimulation; but this effort was feeble and ineffective compared with the similar American effort in the Philippines. And at the time of that visit to India, I found among officers of the Indian civil government a strong reaction against Munro's idea. Enough time had passed to reveal some results of the application of that idea; to show how education and admission of natives even to the lower fringe of administrative functioning had helped to create an acute political unrest, which found expression in constant criticism of the government and a continuous demand for wider participation in it. At that time (about 1906) the agitation for complete self-government had not become active; but the English in India foresaw it as the next step, and as imminent if the American experiment in the Philippines met with prompt success. I have heard Englishmen in the government of India express regret that the effort to educate the natives ever had begun and say that it ought to be stopped; but in the next breath they would admit that it could not be stopped, that the idea of political rights once having penetrated India, and the natives once having tasted participation in the government, that page could not be expunged.

Those Englishmen were correct about effects in the Asiatic

world emanating from American policy in the Philippines. It has influenced every significant political deviation in Asia since it was instituted; the revolution in China, resistance of Koreans to Japanese rule, demand of various Oriental groups for "self-determination," all are traceable to it in a measure. Writing in 1923, of her visit to India in that year, Mrs. Egan mentions a talk with the Hon. E. S. Montagu, then secretary of state for India in the British Government, when she was in India in 1917, when he said: "It may interest you to know that the American Philippine policy, whatever it is, is influencing the situation in India very decidedly. As you know, the Viceroy and I have just finished a tour all over the country. We have received deputations and delegations and petitions innumerable, and have talked the matter up and down and inside out with every person who had anything to offer in the way of suggestions or information; and I assure you that, in effect, what the educated Indians are saying to us to-day is that what the United States has done in the Philippines we must do in India. They seem to know all about it." When I visited India, ten years before this comment of Mr. Montagu in conversation with Mrs. Egan, English administrators in India already were predicting this result. They saw it coming; and it did not require a seer's vision. The effect on Orientals of witnessing a brown people, who for centuries like most of their neighbors had been arbitrarily ruled by aliens, substantially taking charge of their own affairs and operating their own government, and this not as a gracious favor but as a right freely conceded by a great Western power, could not fail to be profound. The news and the significance of what the United States did in the Philippines ran through the Oriental world like quick-silver.

It is not my purpose, at this point, to praise or to condemn British administration in India, but only to try succinctly to indicate its character. On this point I will again quote Mrs. Egan's recent impressions (1923): "You go to India to-day

and you behold the amazing spectacle of a handful of white foreigners, just a few thousand of them, dominating the whole scene and imposing upon brown races numbering some 317,000,000 an absolutely autocratic sovereignty. You look back across the years and contemplate the workings of the great and perhaps justly lauded Pax Britannica, and you realize that under it a large majority of the 317,000,000 have remained in a state of mental flaccidity. You see at least 90 per cent. of the 317,000,000 sunk in abysmal depths of benightedness out of which no sincere attempt ever seems to have been made to lift them. You see perhaps 70 per cent. of them wallowing in abject poverty and in such conditions of life as probably exist nowhere else on earth." English writers recently have written severer criticisms than this, which is merely a statement of facts. To offset these criticisms Englishmen in the government of India recite a vast array of facts and conditions, which in effect amount to claiming that British rule in India is doing the best it can in the circumstances, and pointing out the alleged disastrous consequences of alternatives to British rule.

Since the United States took sovereignty in the Philippines, these points have been argued whenever Americans and Englishmen interested in the problem of the Orient have met. Americans point to the state of India after three centuries of British domination and say it is n't good enough, that more progress should have been made. To this argument, I have heard Englishmen speak in effect as follows: "It is well enough for you to criticize us, and to boast of your work in the Philippines; but the comparison is unfair. For one thing, your proposition is that of a nation of over one hundred million population and vastly wealthy taking a sort of guardianship over less than ten million Christian people who live on islands and therefore are segregated and more easily controlled. This is a situation you always can handle; if by mistakes of policy it gets out of hand, the leash can be slipped on again. Therefore you can afford to experiment; you take a

thesis that appeals to your altruism and plunge ahead. Our proposition is very different in physical elements. With less than half of your home population, and less wealth, we have to direct and prevent from getting out of hand a complex, non-Christian population of over three hundred million. We can't afford to experiment and take chances; the consequences of mistakes are too great. If this thing ever should get out of control we might never be able to bring it into order again. Then there is the matter of cost. Have you ever calculated what it would cost to apply the American intensive uplift policy to India? It would bankrupt our government. Another thing: the Philippines are not necessary to you. If you drop them, they will not be missed economically or politically. But India has become an integral link in our economic system. We cannot let India go without impairing the empire."

There are points that Americans should consider in estimating British rule in India. Should one expect that a policy which began over three hundred years ago would be like one that started in 1898? Political methods and ideals have changed a good deal in that time. It is a reasonable presumption that if England had annexed India in 1898 a different system would have been adopted from that which exists. But making every allowance for the difficulties that beset British policy, most Americans who have investigated and reflected about it remain unsatisfied. To our way of thinking something is wrong.

Here one must focus on the major objects of British policy or become hopelessly confused. For more than two centuries India was controlled by an English trading corporation, and the chief object of a trading corporation is profits. There we have one major object defined, and it persists powerfully to-day. As quoted previously, Mrs. Egan attributed to Warren Hastings the assumption in British administration that Indians could not be intrusted with the handling of revenues and the administration of justice, and I repeat what she wrote in 1923 (my italics): "This assumption has been *the*

prevailing influence in England's conduct of the affairs of India ever since." One might add that there is much evidence that a prevailing influence in British policy in India is an assumption that Indians never can attain trustworthiness to administer stable government.

§ 6

Even superficial notice of what is happening in Asia conveys the impression that something in the nature of a revolt against the domination of Western governments is animating the Oriental peoples. In some regions this demand is for the attainment of complete independence; elsewhere, as in China, it is for the preservation of national independence and integrity; again, as in India, it is for self-government in affiliation with an imperial federation; in other places, with lesser and wholly subordinated groups, it is limited to vague aspirations for self-expression; and in the case of a nation which has been able to resist Western political penetration, Japan, it insists on altering the treatment of Orientals in Western countries.

In these variations the case of India can be taken as the middle ground, of moderation between extremes. I am familiar with the development in recent times of political thought among the intelligentsia of India. Some of them have been in my employ as journalists. I have read the writings of their leading propagandists, and have talked with some. The position of Indian nationalists of the moderate school is very well given by Lajpat Rai in one of his books, "The Political Future of India," published in 1920. In the preface of this work, he thus states the position:

> The prince and the peasant, the landlord and the ryot, the professor and the student, the politician and the layman—all have spoken. They differ in their estimates of the "blessings" of British rule, they differ in the manner of their profession of loyalty to the British Empire, they sometimes differ in shaping their schemes

for the future Government of India, but they are all agreed:—

(1) That the present constitution of the Government of India is viciously autocratic, bureaucratic, antiquated and unsatisfying.

(2) That India has, in the past, been governed more in the interests of and by the British merchant and the British aristocrat than in the interest of her own peoples.

(3) That the neglect of India's education and industries has been culpably tragic and

(4) That the only real and effectual remedy is to introduce an element of responsibility in the Government of India.

On the point of competence of Indians to participate in the government of their country, Lajpat Rai writes:

The people of India are willing to be guided in their development towards modern democracy by the people of Great Britain and they would be grateful for their coöperation in this difficult task, but they must be made to realize that the task is their own and that they should undertake it in a spirit of courageous faith—faith in their destiny, faith in their ability to achieve it, and faith in the friendship of the British nation. The test of all measures in relation to the Government of India in future should be, not how far the people of India can coöperate, how far they can be entrusted with responsibility, but how far it is necessary *in their interest* to control and check them.

A point of Indian denunciation of British rule that will sound an echo in the minds of Americans who remember the history of their own nation touches the matter of British garrisons in India. Lajpat Rai writes:

There is no need of British soldiers in India for the purposes of defense; but if the British Government wants to keep them as safeguards against mutiny among the purely Indian army or against the spirit of rebellion that at any time may exhibit itself among the Indian people, then the British exchequer must pay for them as it did in the case of British garrisons in South Africa or as the United States does in the case of American troops in the Philippines. It is adding insult to injury to argue that we should not only pay for British troops but that the fact British troops form a constituent element of the Indian army should be used against us for denying us responsibility even in civil affairs. . . . That the Indian army should be almost exclusively officered by the British

is a survival of the policy of mistrust, jealousy and racial discrimination which has hitherto prevailed. The Indian army in the future should be mainly officered by Indians.

Lajpat Rai further writes:

The grievances of the Indian nationalists against the Public Services of India may be thus summarized: (a) That the services monopolize too much power and are practically uncontrolled by and irresponsible to the people of the country. (b) That the higher branches of the services contain too many foreigners. (c) That these services are recruited in England, and from some of them the Indians are altogether barred. (d) That even when doing the same work Indians are not paid on the same scale as the Europeans. (e) That the Government often has kept on men of proven inefficiency and of inferior qualities. (f) That, considering the economic conditions of India, the higher servants of the Government are paid on a scale unparalleled in the history of public administration in the world. (g) That the interests of the service often supersede those of the country and the Government. (h) And last, but not least, that by the gathering of all powers of initiative and execution in their hands they have emasculated India.

The part taken by Indian troops in the World War virtually forced the British Government to attend to complaints of the Indians regarding the government of India; so in 1917 Lord Chelmsford, then viceroy of India, and Mr. Montagu, then secretary of state for India, prepared a report and recommended reforms. These promised reforms will not be described here except as to their essence, which is to the effect that something is done by way of seeming to meet the more insistent demands of the Indian nationalists. I say "seeming" purposely; for examination shows that the reforms advised by his Majesty's Government's commission are carefully devised to retain real authority and initiative with British officials. The reforms are a promised step in the way of self-government, a step however that does not satisfy more than the most conservative element of Indian politicians.

These matters are mentioned not so much to analyze them closely as to indicate the state of mind of natives of India

who are capable of political thought. It is notable that the summary of the Indian demands presented by Lajpat Rai does not go so far as to ask as much as the United States already has given the Filipinos, who still demand more. There are efforts to establish a parallel between the interpretation which Filipino politicians are trying to read into the Jones Act and the form of self-government asked by Indians; but the cases are not parallel. To make the government of India a "responsible" one in the British parliamentary sense is compatible with the circumstances. It follows out the British system; and there is as yet no general demand of the people of India for separation from the British Empire. But under the sovereignty of the United States, it is the American constitutional system that applies in its administration of the Philippines. There is no obscurity on this point. Englishmen cite results in the Philippines as evidence of what is likely to happen if the process of giving self-government in India is begun, and they dread the prospect.

Some years ago an Englishman (Mr. Ranade) made these observations concerning economic effects of British policy in India: "The political domination of one country by another attracts far more attention than the more formidable, though more unfelt, domination which the capital, enterprise and skill of one country exercise over the trade and manufactures of another." Lajpat Rai quotes a public utterance of Lord Curzon in 1917: "The fiscal policy of India during the last thirty or forty years has been shaped far more in Manchester than in Calcutta." The implication of this statement substantially is confirmed by parts of the Montagu-Chelmsford report.

No criticisms of British rule in India that I have seen are as condemnatory as those of some Englishmen. In his book, "The Awakening of Asia," suppressed by the censor during the war and published in 1919, H. M. Hyndman wrote: "India, with its population of 315,000,000 inhabitants, has for sixty years been under the management of the most ex-

traordinary and fortuitous system of foreign domination known in the history of man. The rulers come in succession from without, educated, until their appointment at the age of more than twenty-one, in accordance with methods as remote from, and as irreconcilable with, Asiatic ideas as it is possible for them to be. Alike in their work and in their pleasures, they keep as far aloof from the people they govern as possible. Very rarely do they marry Indians; still more rarely do they settle permanently in the country. The head of the Government, who himself is brought out fresh from Europe, and is entirely ignorant of India, does not remain in office more than five years. His subordinates return 'home' frequently for their holidays and go back to England permanently, to live on a considerable pension, after their term of service is completed. The longer this reign of well-meaning but unsympathetic carpet-baggers continues the less intimate do their general relations with the Indian people become. The color and race prejudice, which existed not at all or to a very small extent, at the beginning of English dominance, now becomes stronger and stronger every year."

Meredith Townsend wrote in 1899: "Not only is there no white race in India, not only is there no white colony, but there is no white man who purposes to remain. . . . No ruler stays there to help, to criticize or to educate his successor. No white soldier founds a family. No white man who makes a fortune builds a home or buys an estate for his descendants. The very planter, the very engine-driver, the very foreman of works, departs before he is sixty, leaving no child, no house, no trace of himself behind. No white man takes root in India." Colonel Hyndman further writes: "Meanwhile, India is still shut out from the possibility of receiving any education for the people. We Englishmen deplore their ignorance. This is how we enlighten them: Out of the total revenue raised in British India we spend only one penny per head on education and only 1.9 per cent. of the population ever go to school."

Indians are not permitted freely to reside in other parts of the British Empire; they do not have equal status in the self-governing dominions. At the imperial conference in London in the autumn of 1923 the attempt of Indians to obtain any satisfaction in this matter was prevented by the premiers of South Africa and Australia; the subject quietly was relegated.

The instances cited indicate the character of British rule in India, and serve to illustrate the European thesis. The psychological reactions of the Oriental world to this situation are becoming definite. Asia is emerging from political twilight.

§ 7

Policies of Western nations with regard to the Orient confront portentous facts and quandaries. Asia and closely neighboring countries contain more than half the population of the earth. This is something to think about if Asia actually is renascent.

The population of the Oriental world is about equally divided between the yellow and brown peoples, so called; but their ethnic differences are slight. It is of greater consequence that the peoples of Asia, brown and yellow, are beginning to form an intellectual bloc on the basis of seeing themselves similarly situated as suppressed peoples, and are making common cause in their desire to throw off alien domination.

Procreation is a fundamental element in human evolution; and from that aspect some affrighting conclusions may be drawn. Many writers have discussed the possibilities of this condition. The theory of a Yellow Peril will not vanish; and now it usually is merged with the upheaval in the whole world of color in alarming prognostications. Of these, Lothrop Stoddard's book, "The Rising Tide of Color," published in 1922, is the most recent. He states that white races tend to

double in eighty years, yellows and browns in sixty years, and blacks in forty years; and the rate of procreation is falling with the white race. Dr. Stoddard writes:

> On the other hand, none of the colored races shows perceptible signs of declining birth-rate, all tending to breed up to the limits of available subsistence. Such checks as now limit the increase of colored population are wholly external, like famine, disease, and tribal warfare. But by a curious irony of fate, the white man has long been busy removing these checks to colored multiplication. The greater part of the colored world is to-day under white political control. Wherever the white man goes he attempts to impose the bases of his ordered civilization. He puts down tribal warfare, he wages truceless combat against epidemic disease, and he so improves communications that augmented and better distributed food supplies minimize the blight of famine. In response to these life-saving activities the enormous death-rate which in the past has kept the colored races from excessive multiplication is falling in proportions comparable with the death-rate of white countries. But to lower the colored world's prodigious birth-rate is quite another matter. The consequence is a portentous increase of population in nearly every portion of the colored world now under white political sway. Even those colored countries which have maintained their independence, such as China and Japan, are adopting the white man's life-conserving methods and are experiencing the same accelerated increase of population.

Intelligent persons who read Dr. Stoddard's book will lay it down in a thoughtful mood, if not entirely convinced of the imminence of danger. No one who has lived for long in any part of the Orient, and reflected upon results and eventual consequences of the impact of Western civilization there, can fail to perceive the paradoxes that are involved in the relationship. Regarded one way, all the presumedly beneficent methods carried to the Orient by Western civilization and more or less forced on the colored peoples logically are contributing to the eventual subjugation of the white nations by the colored races.

On this hypothesis, almost everything to which white people point with pride as evidence of their benevolent purposes

and good intentions in the Orient is contributing to the downfall of white supremacy on earth. Education, sanitation, and communications all work to that end. Do not think this side of the matter escapes the notice of white residents and administrators in the Orient. The more observant and thoughtful of them always have seen it. I recall the shock I felt once, on the occasion of one of the periodical famines in China when the matter of relief organization (usually left to America) was under discussion, an Englishman of long experience in Asia blurted out in a committee meeting: "What is the use? They are better dead." Once put on the track of it, I afterward could perceive this feeling in many matters, but kept under cover and seldom spoken of. Rarely has a prominent person ventured to express such thoughts in the open. It is regarded much like the expression of atheism in a church; if people have doubts they must be silent about them in that place. That the Western nations are in the Orient to uplift the natives is modern political orthodoxy. It seldom is questioned publicly; but that often occurs in private conversation, when people feel free to speak their real thoughts. I have heard missionary activities denounced on these grounds; and the great Rockefeller medical foundation work in China is sometimes deprecated on this hypothesis. The reasoning applies especially to Christian missions in Oriental countries; for it is understood there that Christianity, as interpreted by Americans particularly, carries a powerful political propaganda.

I recall a letter written by the late Bishop Bashford to President Wilson in 1915. The letter was apropos of the presentation of the famous twenty-one demands of Japan to China, and I published parts of it in one of my previous books (my italics):

> In the very nature of the case, every American missionary, Catholic and Protestant, sympathizes with China in her desire to preserve her independence and integrity. Indeed, while our missionaries are not preaching politics, *our usefulness with the Chinese would be*

immediately at an end if they felt that we were out of sympathy with their aspirations to preserve their national freedom and independence. The Japanese Government understands that all missionaries, and especially Americans, whether they express it or not, feel in their hearts hostility to any effort on Japan's part to secure control of China by threats of force. Christianity inspires individuals to be loyal to God rather than to man, and to contend for freedom to worship Him according to the dictates of their consciences. *Such convictions necessarily are in conflict with any attempt at military dictation to a nation by an alien government and race.* The Japanese Government as instinctively feels the antagonism of Christianity to her policy in Korea and in China as the Roman Government felt the antagonism of early Christianity to her imperial despotism.

The political doctrine likely to be inculcated along with ethical canons of Christianity is apparent, and is not overlooked by statesmen. In some backward countries now under the administration of Western nations these ideas are deleted from religious teaching; which is easier with governments where there is association, actual or traditional, of state and church. Not so wherever American religious propaganda penetrates. American missionaries almost invariably are as eager to teach American political ideals as they are to teach religion; as Bishop Bashford intimated, it is hard for them to keep from doing so. I have heard men in the government of India say privately that they wished the American missionaries were out of the country, because of the political ideas they unconsciously and unavoidably communicate in their contacts with the natives. As a publisher of newspapers in China, I have often been made to feel that what was with me a natural expression of the American point of view, regarding one of the questions always coming up in respect of administration of the foreign municipalities or concerning the position of foreigners, violated the unwritten inhibitions imbuing white policy in Asia, and by English and Europeans were taken as "rocking the boat."

In the opening chapter of his book, "A Revision of the Treaty," published 1922, the English writer, John Maynard

Keynes, draws a distinction among kinds of public opinion. Mr. Keynes wrote: "It is the method of modern statesmen to talk as much folly as the public demand and to practice no more of it than is compatible with what they said, trusting that such folly in action as must wait on folly in word will soon disclose itself as such, and furnish an opportunity for slipping back into wisdom." My experience in the East has shown me plainly that in respect of their pronounced policies, as distinguished from their real policies, most governments talk humbug which they conceive to be sympathetic with popular notions, while conforming actions as far as can be to the guidance of inner motivations and perfectly understood but not-to-be-spoken-of realities. Mr. Keynes says (my italics): "There are, in the present times, two opinions; not, as in former ages, the true and the false, but the *outside* and the *inside;* the opinion of the public voiced by the politicians and newspapers, and the opinion of the politicians, the journalists and the civil servants, upstairs, backstairs and behind-stairs, *expressed in limited circles.*" Among a majority of white officials and residents in Asia, except Americans, the ideas included in the foregoing constitute the *inside opinion;* and the American policy, and the exuberances of Americans relative to political institutions, are regarded as inimical not only to Western influence there, but to white world hegemony. Many Americans can, and do, live for years in Asia without finding this out, or without comprehending it; but it cannot for long escape the notice of experienced political observers.

The logic of that "inside" thesis follows through every important factor of development. It applies to industrial progress, with its possibility of educating and equipping cheap Oriental labor to compete with its products in world commerce. By that thesis, pestilence and famine are useful. It applies to militarism and its concomitants, involving Western governments in various inconsistencies. There is an international agreement to prevent importation of arms into China, because of stimulation afforded to the numerous civil

broils and to banditry; on the other hand, the dissensions created by this condition and the decimation of Orientals by wars are aids to the continuation of white supremacy.

§ 8

Homeward bound across the Pacific Ocean, after having visited India, China, and Japan in 1923, Eleanor Franklin Egan wrote: "There are elements in Asia to-day brewing a hell brew that must explode into a general conflagration unless it is cooled in time by the breath of reasonable compromise." Lothrop Stoddard's study of the world race question led him to some conclusions, which I illustrate by quoting a few sentences: "This profound Asiatic renaissance will eventually result in the substantial elimination of white political control from Anatolia to the Philippines. . . . This does not mean a precipitate white 'scuttle' from Asia. Far from it. It does mean, however, a candid facing of realities and a basing of policy on realities rather than on prepossessions or prejudices. . . . Our race duty is therefore clear. We must resolutely oppose both Asiatic permeation of white race-areas and Asiatic inundation of those non-white, but equally non-Asiatic, regions inhabited by the really inferior races. . . . By taking a reasonable, conciliatory attitude toward Asiatic aspirations to independence we would thereby eliminate the moral factors in Asia's present hostility toward ourselves."

Outbreak of the World War in Europe found the American Government without a policy to meet the situation, except a traditional belief that we should keep out of all such affrays. If the American people can be said previously to have had any definite opinion on the subject, it was that such a war was impossible. Confronted by the fact, the instinctive effort (in accordance with international law) was to be neutral; trying to pursue that policy the United States drifted on without knowing where it was heading or where it wanted exactly to get. Eventually it was sucked into the conflict by forces

external and little related to practical interests of the nation or to any practical diplomatic hypothesis; and as a direct consequence of that unreadiness the United States came out of the war with little except a huge bill to pay, and a precedent of almost a blank draft on an alleged moral obligation to go to the rescue of Europe. To-day Americans know they helped to win a fight; but they do not know just where the United States or the world has arrived as a result of winning.

If war comes out of the situation in Asia, it is impossible that the United States will not be drawn in. The issue of race, if nothing else was involved, would compel us to go to the assistance of Europe if it was in danger of being overwhelmed.

But in that event the American Government at least will have a policy to follow, an idea definitely of what it desires to bring about, which was lacking in the World War. And the American Government will have a portion of direct responsibility for the occasion of such a war. In the case of the great war of 1914–18, American policy had no part in shaping the situation which caused it; it was not included with the preceding diplomatic manœuvering and arrangements, or the secret treaties on which the belligerent line-up was based in the beginning; it had no positive knowledge and little suspicion of the real nature and purpose of those diplomatic arrangements; it scarcely imagined the inner motivations of European nationalities. But the United States was included in the war nevertheless, under circumstances and with results that give it the rôle of a puppet of European diplomacy.

This is not the case in respect of developments in Asia. In the course of one hundred and fifty years of national independence the American Government has promulgated only two foreign policies, and one of them has to do with the Far East. No matter what happens, the United States cannot deny its share in shaping events. The American Government, before the situation comes to the issue of war or peace, may have sought to withdraw its influence; it may allow its

own policy to be superseded or emasculated by gradually yielding to other policies. But by no such evasion can the consequences be avoided.

The inclination of Americans, in casting about for some international combination or alignment to meet this situation, is to look to Great Britain. Can the British and American policies with regard to Asia be brought into step? They are somewhat opposed now; and here one is not so much concerned about differences of method or timeliness as about principles, about ultimate objects. In his book, "Asia and Europe," published 1899, Meredith Townsend wrote: "It is evident to me that the white races under the pressure of an entirely new impulse are about to renew their periodic attempt to conquer or at least to dominate that vast continent [Asia]." Hay saw that, too; his doctrine (now the American policy) was advanced in 1899. Townsend knew India well, and he wrote: "The English think they will rule India for many centuries or forever. I do not think so, holding rather the older belief that the empire which came in a day will disappear in a night. . . . Above all this inconceivable mass of humanity, governing all, protecting all, taxing all, rises what we call here 'the empire,' a corporation of less than 1,500 men, partly chosen by examination, partly by co-optation, who are set to govern, and who protect themselves in governing by finding pay for a white garrison of 65,000 men, one-fifth of the Roman legions—though the masses to be controlled are double the subjects of imperial Rome. That corporation and that garrison constitute the 'Indian Empire.' There is nothing else."

John Hay's doctrine is to the effect that the tendency so stated by Townsend must be checked; Asia (as was done in the Western hemisphere by the Monroe Doctrine) must be withdrawn from the further imperial penetration of European powers. Hay's doctrine was advanced adroitly; it was made at first specially applicable to China, where the rivalries and jealousies of Europe contributed to induce the powers to con-

sent to what in effect constituted a mutual check. But does British policy in India now cling to the hypothesis described by Townsend? If so, its objective motivation is antagonistic to American policy. A fundamental of American policy is that the preëminent rights of Asiatics *in Asia* must be conceded, encouraged, stimulated, and respected by white nations which now do and intend to continue to restrain Asiatic penetration of white and other colored race-areas. Are British and American policies in Asia "getting together" or drifting farther apart?

Speaking before the Political Institute at Williamstown, Massachusetts, in 1923, Sir Edward Grigg, a member of the British Government, indicated the British position in respect of what is termed "imperialism." He said: "The slogan of 'self-determination' rings in our ears from all quarters of the world. It is confidently assumed that every people must have the right to make its own particular mess of its own affairs. I submit that civilization cannot allow this to be done. It is bad for civilization; it is bad for the material welfare of the civilized peoples; it is bad for the moral relations of the civilized governments; it is bad also for the backward peoples of the world. Imperialism therefore must undertake the task of seeing that the resources of the whole world are available to raise the life of struggling humanity. Self-government by all means where self-government is practicable. But the test of it must lie not merely in the demand for it, but in the ability of each people to assist in orderly and peaceful development." Sir Edward Grigg directed his comments particularly at what is now termed "economic imperialism" as distinguished from the older form of military-political imperialism. He thinks "the greatest danger of the century will be the competition for raw materials and markets among civilized powers." Hay saw that; hence the Open Door. Sir Edward Grigg says further (my italics): "There are two laws which seem to me essential to imperialism, if it is to justify itself on moral grounds. The first of these is that

in taking charge of a backward race it must always do its utmost *to prepare that race for self-government.*"

There 's the rub between British and American policy in Asia. Sir Edward Grigg quite exactly states what is the thesis of the policy of the United States in the Philippines, and elsewhere in Asia. Yet it is the practical manifestations of this policy, especially in the Philippines, that so irritate British administrators in India and elsewhere. One idea or the other has to give way; and there is ground for the presumption (as asserted by Asiatics) that the British policy in Asia talks by the American thesis and thinks and acts by a very different one.

The comparative importance of the Monroe and Hay doctrines cannot be determined academically. In now giving the Hay Doctrine first place in the foreign policy of the United States I do not mean to infer that the issues covered by Monroe's doctrine are of less consequence. Both doctrines are vastly important in their abstract inclusions. A century ago the dangers apprehended by Monroe were actual and imminent. They are now almost eliminated. There is little likelihood now that any imperialistic nation in Europe, or group of such nations, will be able hereafter to extend sway over the Western hemisphere. This thought was revived in the hysteria of war propaganda recently: a Germany which in fact was unable to get across a row of trenches to the east or west, and on the seas was limited to crawling about under water, was pictured as advancing to the conquest of America; a militaristic Europe, which since time immemorial never has been able to create one imperial hegemony within itself, and now seems farther than ever away from such a consummation, was imagined as forcibly superseding republican institutions in America. Calm reason banishes that bugaboo. The Monroe Doctrine still has its uses and value; it should be firmly maintained as a cardinal policy of the United States. But it is by way of always being better established and is in no apparent danger of being overthrown.

On the other hand, the Hay Doctrine is concerned with a coming danger, with now an imminent one, and one which is more serious in character and possible results than anything that might have happened from the policy of the Holy Alliance. Those projects at most contemplated the uniting, or the reuniting, of Europeans who had been transplanted to the Americas, with their former governments in Europe—a serious set-back, as Americans regard it, to free institutions and human progress, but involving no fundamental racial submergence in which white civilization might sink beyond hope of recovery.

My opinion is that if the American Government should be confronted with a necessity to abandon one of its two great doctrines, and should have the option of choosing which to preserve, it could better afford to let go the Monroe Doctrine than the Hay Doctrine.

II

PAWNS AT PARIS

§ 1

THE conference to formulate a peace at the end of the World War was organized at Paris on January 18, 1919. Early in its proceedings a line was drawn in the conference between the so-called Principal Powers and minor nations. In the organization of the conference, the Principal Powers took the position of a supreme court to which the minor nations presented their causes for judgment. The preference of minor nations was not considered in determining that arrangement; it was decided arbitrarily by the major powers, and the small nations were under various compulsions to accept it.

The Principal Powers, self-determined, were the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. It was remarked after the conference had finished that this was the only instance it gave of putting the Wilsonian principle of "self-determination" into practice. The rating was based absolutely upon organized military and naval power.

Soon after formal organization was effected, the minor nations and nationalities in some cases were called upon to make statements of their positions and claims. In respect of the Asiatic world, only two nations—Japan and China—were accorded recognition and independent places in the conference, but with this distinction: Japan was admitted as a Principal Power, China as a minor nation. China's population and territorial area are approximately ten times as large as Japan's, and both had been belligerents in the Allied

group. Other Asiatic nationalities—Egypt, Korea, Arabia, Persia, Siam—hovered on the outskirts of the conference, seeking recognition and adjustment of their status on the basis of President Wilson's fourteen points and the principle of self-determination of peoples.

As one coming to Paris fresh from the Orient, familar with reactions of the war in that region, I quickly perceived that the brown and yellow peoples were to be treated there merely as pawns in the game of world politics, unless perchance the influence of the United States could succor them. I knew the hopes that had been raised among those peoples; they were centered on President Wilson. At a time when the Oriental world had lost confidence in the propaganda of the original belligerents, the United States entered the war, and the fresh voice of the American President trumpeted the principles for which the Allies were fighting and which would control the making of peace. It is interesting now to reproduce some public and official utterances of President Wilson that were broadcast in the Orient by every useful publicity device at the command of Americans:

The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, or economic arrangement, or political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

The destruction of every arbitrary power, anywhere, that can separately, secretly and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world, or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotence.

The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the people directly concerned shall be sanctioned.

There was more to the same general effect, but those quotations from the public war utterances of President Wilson embody the fabric of ideas and hopes that the Oriental world took to Paris; censors had retarded them in places, but they penetrated everywhere eventually. For the most part (which is true of all peoples) Orientals are simple-minded politically. They take such statements literally. Whether they credit them depends on the confidence reposed in the man who utters them. Orientals at that time would have given little credence to similar utterances of any prominent war statesman of Europe; but they believed President Wilson. In that they were very much in the category of "outside" opinion concerning the war and its issues.

The diplomats who represented most of the European states at Paris, and especially the representatives of all the Principal Powers except the United States, were very much in the category of "inside" opinion about these matters. If I previously have made at all clear the broad character of European policy in relation to the colored peoples, their resources and territories, the reaction of that "inside" opinion to such propositions as, for instance, President Wilson's self-determination-of-peoples doctrine, will be understood. At the time when the President first enunciated this doctrine the Allied governments were sorely pressed in the war, and their position forced them to obtain if possible the help of America on any terms, and especially to be careful not to put a damper on the ebullition of American popular "outside" opinion that was drumming up enthusiasm for the war. Furthermore, those governments knew that in the greater part of the world their altruistic professions had ceased to impress; they needed new war slogans to line up support and sympathy for a final drive. The voice of President Wilson, and the new and popular twist he gave to the alleged objects of the Allies, was welcomed as useful propaganda. For the moment it helped enormously; indeed, there is ground for some doubt that the Allies could have succeeded without it. But

while recognizing the usefulness of the Wilsonian formula for effect in neutral states, and on nations that were hesitating which side to take, as affording new hope for the despairing peoples of the belligerent countries in Europe, and as especially effective in weakening the will to fight among the enemy entente, diplomats of the "inside" school did not think that the President really took his own statements seriously. To "inside" opinion, the Wilsonian formula for settling the war was only campaign oratory, to be camouflaged when the time came to fix things. They did not dream that the President himself was an "outsider," or that he seriously thought it was possible to use his formula in the actual making of the peace treaty. I believe that to this day the great body of trained diplomats are profoundly puzzled what to make of Mr. Wilson; they still wonder if his attitude was not a deep political finesse which the professional diplomats have not yet been able to fathom.

The spectacle of aspirations and hopes which "outside" opinion had founded on President Wilson's utterances dashing into bits against the stone wall of "inside" diplomacy at Paris was depressing enough in all cases, but there were some particularly pathetic instances.

The case of Korea is one. If the reader has forgotten (as most people probably have) about Korea, it can be stated briefly that when Japan went to war against Russia in 1904 her principal stated cause of action was to preserve the independence of Korea; Korean independence was guaranteed by the treaty of peace between Japan and Russia. Yet Japan occupied Korea during that war and never has withdrawn; the country was formally annexed a few years afterward. As a consequence, there is an independence movement in Korea, kept alive in the hearts of the people under repression and persecution. It perhaps is a trite exhibit of the childish naiveté of "outside" political opinion, but in that light it is worthy of mention that Koreans took literally President Wilson's self-determination-of-peoples doctrine and believed it

would have influence in shaping the peace terms. Therefore they decided to send a delegation to present their case at the conference. In that they encountered great difficulties. Being technically Japanese subjects, they only could travel on passports issued by the Japanese Government, and at that time nobody could travel without a passport. The Japanese Government would give no passports to a Korean delegation to Paris, and by diplomatic objections at Washington it prevented appointed Korean delegates who were then in the United States from getting there; but by clever devices one Korean delegate managed to reach Paris by the Suez route on a neutral ship. I remember that delegate (Mr. Kim), meagerly supplied with funds, living in one room in a *pension,* typing, himself, on an old machine his presentation of Korea's case and carrying copies about in the effort to get them to the attention of the Big Four and the press. He visited me several times, and on two occasions I dined with him at his *pension.* Soon after Mr. Kim reached Paris, Koreans at home thought they ought to do something to give him moral support; they decided to hold demonstrations as evidence of their sentiments. At an appointed time, in Seoul and other towns, thousands of Koreans, men and women, adults and children, dressed mostly in pure white, entirely without arms (they had none), carrying garlands of flowers and banners modestly stating their desire for restoration of national independence, marched through the streets silently. That is, they started to march, but they did not go far. Japanese gendarmes and troops, acting under orders of the Japanese authorities, dispersed them. They made slight resistance; but hundreds were killed, thousands were injured, thousands were thrown into prison; some of those were tortured in the effort to elicit "confessions" of a plot to assassinate the governor and thereby excuse the slaughter. A description of those events is given in reports printed in the "Congressional Record." Thus did Koreans brave and suffer death and maltreatment to bring their situation to the atten-

tion of the High Excellencies at Paris. Of course they had not the slightest chance even of having their case considered. Japan had a seat with the High Excellencies, and Korea's case was taboo.

Great Britain had the political wisdom to adapt her treatment of India better to accord with "outside" ideas. Indians were among the other imperial units that had representatives attached to the British delegation at Paris; if they seemed to have little positive influence in the deliberations, it may be presumed that their views were heard within the delegation, and assurances were given them that India's complaints and aspirations would get attention as soon as peace was made. Minor Oriental nationalities at times voiced protests about the subordination and neglect of their questions by the conference, but got little attention, except in regions included in areas to be "mandated." Those areas were undivided among the powers, or were to be redivided as a result of the war; they got attention.

§ 2

In preparing its case for presentation at Paris the Chinese Government evinced a desire to maintain the close association with the United States resulting from the circumstances under which China entered the war.[1] Soon after the armistice was signed, the Peking Foreign Office (Wai Chiao Pu) showed to the American legation at Peking a summary of the matters that China desired to raise in the conference. It included a readjustment of all of the major vexations of China's international status. The Wai Chiao Pu, however, was informed (whether on the personal opinion of the American minister at Peking or on instruction from the State Department, I do not know) that in the opinion of the American Government it would be inexpedient for China to raise so

[1] A detailed description of those events is given in the author's book, "Democracy and the Eastern Question," published in 1919

many questions at Paris, and she would better confine her case there to questions directly relating to the war. Evidently the American Government felt that for China to bring up so many and so complex issues would tend to befog the making of peace, and might complicate the situation to the disadvantage of China. That was sensible advice.

China had severed diplomatic relations with Germany on the invitation of the American Government when it had itself taken that action.[2] Suspecting that China was assigned the rôle of cat's-paw, the Wai Chiao Pu for a time held out for positive assurances from the Allies that China's administrative autonomy and territorial integrity would be respected in the peace terms; and when the Allies evaded the point, it was only the persuasion of the American Government that induced the Chinese to act. The exact nature of this persuasion is clouded in doubt. It has been denied that the State Department authorized the American minister at Peking to give any positive and definite promises; the American minister himself [3] supports that denial technically, but in the lack of definite instructions from Washington he felt himself justified in assuring the Wai Chiao Pu of his personal belief that the American Government would exert its influence to obtain justice for China. "Justice" in such connection is a vague word; but the Wai Chiao Pu knew the private opinions of the American minister about the principal matters in which China was interested, and knew that he strongly favored China's position. There is much in the circumstances to support the claim of Chinese diplomats that they had a right to understand that the United States would strongly support the major claims of China in the making of peace. What they did not understand, what a professional diplomat could not be expected to imagine even, was that the American Government itself had entered the war blindly,

[2] Appendix B.

[3] Paul S. Reinsch was American minister to China, 1913–20. He died in 1923.

without any previous explanation and information of the intercommitments of the Allied Powers, and without obtaining any declarations from them regarding questions in which the United States had special interest.

If the American Government thus (without intent, I believe) misled China, the same charitable construction does not apply to the conduct of other Allied nations. I am assured by a Chinese diplomat that at the time when China was being urged by the Allies *en bloc* to declare war on Germany, and when China very naturally wanted to obtain guarantees for her protection, some Allied diplomats in Peking denied that anything invidious to China existed in interallied war commitments and said that China could be sure of fair treatment.

One understands, then, the feelings with which the Chinese delegation at Paris learned at a session of the so-called Council of Ten on January 27, 1919, of the existence of a series of secret agreements whereby the British, French, Russian, and Italian governments obligated themselves, in effect, to support Japan's claim to inherit the position of Germany in Shantung province. On hearing from Baron Makino of the existence of those agreements, President Wilson asked that their texts be provided for the information of the conference, which subsequently was done. The agreements follow:

DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE ALLIED POWERS

AS TO THE DISPOSAL OF GERMAN RIGHTS IN RESPECT OF SHANTUNG PROVINCE, AND THE SOUTH SEA ISLANDS NORTH OF THE EQUATOR.

THE BRITISH EMBASSY TO THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (February 16th, 1917)

Monsieur le Ministre:

With reference to the subject of our conversation of the 27th ultimo when Your Excellency informed me of the desire of the Imperial Government to receive an assurance that, on the occasion

of a Peace Conference, His Britannic Majesty's Government will support the claims of Japan in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the Islands North of the Equator, I have the honor, under instructions received from His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to communicate to Your Excellency the following message from His Britannic Majesty's Government:

His Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the request of the Japanese Government for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in Islands North of Equator on the occasion of Peace Conference, it being understood that the Japanese Government will, in eventual peace settlement, treat in same spirit Great Britain's claims to German Islands South of Equator.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Monsieur le Ministre, to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed: CONYNGHAM GREENE,
H. B. M. Ambassador.
Tokyo.

His Excellency
Viscount Ichiro Motono,
H. I. J. M. Minister for Foreign Affairs,
etc., etc., etc.

THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY
(February 21, 1917)
Translation

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of the 16th instant, giving assurance that His Britannic Majesty's Government will support the claims to be advanced by the Imperial Government in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in Islands North of the Equator on the occasion of a Peace Conference.

The Japanese Government is deeply appreciative of the friendly spirit in which your Government has given the assurance, and is happy to note it as a fresh proof of the close ties that unite the two allied Powers. I take pleasure in stating that the Japanese Government, on its part, is fully prepared to support in the same spirit the claims which may be put forward at the Peace Conference

by His Britannic Majesty's Government in regard to German possessions in Islands South of Equator.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed: ICHIRO MOTONO,
etc., etc., etc.

His Excellency
Sir Conyngham Greene,
etc., etc., etc.

THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE RUSSIAN AND FRENCH EMBASSIES

(February 19, 1917)

Translation

The Imperial Government has not yet formally entered into conversations with the Entente Powers concerning the conditions of peace it proposes to present to Germany, being guided by the thought that such questions ought to be decided in concert between Japan and the said Powers at the moment when the peace negotiations start.

Nevertheless, in view of recent development in the general situation, and in view of the particular arrangements concerning peace conditions, such as arrangements relative to the disposition of the Bosphorus, Constantinople and the Dardanelles, having already been entered into by the Powers interested, the Imperial Government believes that the moment has come for it also to express its desiderata relative to certain conditions of peace essential to Japan and to submit them for the consideration of the Government of Russia (of the French Republic).

The Government of Russia (of the Republic) is fully aware of all the efforts the Imperial Government has made in a general manner to accomplish its task in the present war, and particularly with a view of guaranteeing for the future the peace of Oriental Asia and of the security of the Japanese Empire, for both of which it is absolutely necessary to deprive Germany of its bases of political, military and economic activity in the Far East.

Under these conditions the Imperial Government intends to demand from the German Government at the time of peace negotiations the surrender of the territorial rights and special interests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and in the Islands

belonging to her, situated to the North of the Equator in the Pacific Ocean.

The Imperial Government ventures to hope that the Government of Russia (of the French Republic), in view of the legitimacy of these claims, will give the assurance that, whenever the case arises, the Imperial Government may count upon its full support on this question.

It goes without saying that reparations for damages caused to the lives and property of the Japanese people by the unjustifiable attacks of the enemy, as well as other conditions of peace of a character common to all the Entente Powers, are entirely outside the consideration of the present question.

THE FRENCH EMBASSY TO THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(March 1, 1917)

Translation

The Government of the Republic is disposed to give the Japanese Government its assistance in regulating, at the time of the peace negotiations, questions essential to Japan concerning Shantung and the German Islands in the Pacific situated in the North of the Equator. It also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed before the war in this Chinese province and the Islands.

M. Briand requests, on the other hand, that the Japanese Government give its support to obtain from China the rupture of its diplomatic relations with Germany, and that she push this act to a desirable extent. The consequences of this, according to him, would be:—

1. The handing over of passports to the German diplomatic and consular agents.

2. The obligation of all German nationals to leave Chinese territory.

3. The internment of German ships having sought refuge in Chinese ports and the ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the disposition of the Allies following the example of Italy and Portugal. From the advices which reached the French Government, there are fifteen German ships in Chinese ports totaling about 40,000 tons.

4. The sequestration of German commercial houses established in China.

5. The forfeiture of the rights of Germany in the concessions she possessed in certain ports.

THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE FRENCH EMBASSY
(March 6, 1917)
Translation

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note of the French Embassy, under the date of March 1, 1917, informing that the French Government is disposed to give the Imperial Government its assistance in regulating, at the time of the peace negotiations, questions essential to Japan concerning Shantung, and the German Islands in the Pacific, situated to the North of the Equator, and that it agrees to support the demands of the Imperial government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and in the aforesaid Islands.

The Imperial Government takes note of this communication with profound gratitude for the friendly sentiment which inspired the French Government in giving its full assent to the desiderata of the Imperial Government.

The aforesaid Note equally set forth the desire of His Excellency, M. Briand, of ensuring the support of the Imperial Government with a view to obtaining from China the rupture of her diplomatic relations with Germany, to its full, desirable extent. Concerning the question, the Imperial Government, as the French Government was constantly kept informed if it did not fail to make all efforts from the beginning, consequently, the Imperial Government has hereby only to confirm its intention of giving its entire support to the desire expressed by M. Briand, in accord with a view to bringing about the consequences enumerated in the above-mentioned Note.

THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY TO THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(February 20, March 5, 1917)
Translation

In reply to the Note of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the date of February 19th last, the Russian Embassy is charged with giving the Japanese Government the assurance that it can entirely count on the support of the Imperial Government of Russia with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual surrender to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung and of the German Islands, occupied by the Japanese forces, in the Pacific Ocean to the North of the Equator.

THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY
(March 8, 1917)
Translation

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Note of the Russian Embassy, under the date of March 5, 1917, in reply to the Note of the Ministry under the date of February 19th of the same year.

In the said Note, the Russian Embassy was good enough to declare that it was charged with giving the Japanese Government the assurance that it could entirely count upon the support of the Russian Government with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual surrender to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung and of the German Islands in the Pacific, situated to the North of the Equator.

The Japanese Government takes note of this communication with profound gratitude for the sentiment which inspired the Russian Government in giving its full assent to the desiderata of the Japanese Government.

THE JAPANESE EMBASSY TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
(March 23, 1917)
Translation

The Imperial Japanese Government intends to demand from the German Government at the negotiations of peace, the surrender of the territorial rights and special interests which Germany possessed, before the war, in Shantung and in the German Islands in the Pacific, situated North of the Equator.

In view of the present phase of events, the Imperial Government believed it bound to ensure forthwith the entire support of the English, French and Russian Governments, in case the foregoing claims should be presented to Germany at the peace negotiations.

In bringing to the knowledge of the Royal Government of Italy as a very confidential information that an arrangement has recently been entered into between the Imperial Government of one part and the British, French and Russian Governments of the other part, relating to the foregoing, the Imperial Government has the firmest conviction that the Royal Government of Italy, being inspired by the sentiments of friendship which animate the two countries, and considering the necessity of mutual assistance for the triumph of the common cause in the present war, will be good enough to welcome with satisfaction the conclusion of the above-mentioned arrangement.

ITALY'S REPLY TO THE NOTE OF THE JAPANESE EMBASSY
(March 23, 1917)

Upon reading the foregoing Memorandum, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs said to the Japanese Ambassador that the Italian Government had no objection regarding the matter.

The essence of this series of secret agreements among the major nations in the Allied war group (all of them, with the exception of Russia) sitting (self-determined) as Principal Powers in the peace conference, is that whatever Japan had been able to grab in China and the Pacific islands in the course of the war [4] would be allocated to her in the peace terms if the Allies won the war.

At this point a comparison of dates is interesting. The United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3, 1917. The next day, February 4, it addressed a note to the Chinese Government through its legation at Peking, inviting it to join with the United States in taking appropriate action in protest at Germany's submarine policy.[5] From February 4 to February 9, inclusive, the American legation at Peking, and legations of all the other Allied nations there except the Japanese, were urging China to fall in with America, and the Wai Chiao Pu was hesitating and trying to obtain guarantees regarding the disposition of China's territories.

Now look at the dates of the series of secret agreements concerning China's territorial and other rights made by the Allied Powers with Japan. The dates of those agreements are: February 16, 19, 21; March 1, 5, 6, 8, 23; all in 1917. It scarcely can be presumed that the Allied Powers made those agreements out of a clear sky at the time they were exchanged between the chancelleries; they must have been preceded by some discussion. Their dates and all the circum-

[4] Full details of the proceedings of the Japanese Government and its policy during the World War are given in the author's books, "Our Eastern Question" (1916), and "Democracy and the Eastern Question" (1919).

[5] Appendix B.

stances indicate a concert in the matter; each of the powers knew what all were doing. At the very moment, almost, when China was being urged to sever relations with Germany (a step which logically led to entering the war), and when to the Wai Chiao Pu's uneasiness about how China's territorial rights would be treated the Allied diplomats were assuring fair play, those agreements were negotiated and signed. It is evident why the Allied Powers did not want to give guarantees to China; at the moment they were engaged in trading China's war desiderata to Japan for considerations not disclosed, but connected indubitably with the then rather desperate military situation of the Allies.

Two months passed between severance of diplomatic relations and a declaration of war by the United States (April 6, 1917). It was regarded as a foregone conclusion that America soon would enter the war; a situation which, taken with the precarious military position of the Allies, made it desirable from them to encourage such action of the American Government, and to avoid anything that might cause it to hesitate or withdraw. One now wonders that the Allied Powers dared to take the chance involved in perpetrating that obliquity behind the backs of China and the United States; but they did. Very soon after the United States declared war, all the principal nations in the Allied group sent delegations to America, chiefly to ask for help. One of those was a British mission headed by Mr. Arthur Balfour. It was announced by the press, taking its information obviously from inspired sources, that a chief purpose of Mr. Balfour's visit was to give President Wilson full information of the Allied situation, plans, and commitments; and it was presumed that he did so. Beyond question, "outside" opinion was allowed and encouraged to believe that. In view of the disclosure at Paris of the Shantung and Pacific islands, and, in various ways, other secrets inter-Allied agreements, and subsequent results of that exposé, a controversy has arisen whether President Wilson was told

by Mr. Balfour or any Allied statesman of the existence and character of those agreements. Men who know, choose not to be explicit on that point; but writers who have scrutinized every scrap of information that has been divulged since the war relating to the diplomacy of the war can reach no other conclusion than that President Wilson knew of most of those commitments before he went to Paris, although he may not have comprehended them.

Notwithstanding that close students of Far Eastern events had perceived long before the end of hostilities many strong circumstantial indications of the existence of secret agreements relating to China among the Allied Powers, their revelation at Paris was sensational and ominous. It was revealed then plainly that at the time when the United States was on the verge of entering the war, and was inducing China to follow, the Allied Powers entered into secret agreements which if sanctioned by the peace treaty would impair American policy in China and would stultify diplomatic assurances given or implied by the United States to China. Some testimony is relevant:

FROM OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AT THE WHITE HOUSE, AUGUST 19, 1919

SENATOR BORAH. I wish to ask some questions in regard to the secret treaty. . . . I should like to know when the first knowledge came to this government with reference to the secret treaties between Japan, Great Britain, Italy and France concerning the German possessions in Shantung.

THE PRESIDENT. I thought that Secretary Lansing had looked that up and told you. I can only reply from my own knowledge, and my own knowledge came after I reached Paris.

REPORT OF THE HEARINGS ON THE TREATY OF PEACE BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AUGUST 11, 1919

SECRETARY LANSING. Mr. Chairman, I was asked twice during the hearing on last Wednesday in relation to my knowledge as to

the secret treaties or secret agreements which existed between Japan and Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia. . . . Gentlemen, in connection with those inquiries and the apparent implication that I must have had knowledge, or should have had knowledge, of those agreements prior to the Lansing-Ishii agreement, I can now state that my first knowledge of the actual agreements came in the first part of February, 1919. Under date of February 26 they were transmitted to the Department of State by the American Peace Commission, and the department has no record or any knowledge of the treaties prior to that time. . . .

In regard to the statement that I knew of the British agreement before I went to Paris, let me say—

SENATOR JOHNSON. Just what British agreement do you refer to, if you please?

SECRETARY LANSING. Between Japan and Great Britain.

SENATOR JOHNSON. And in your statement of the other treaties you referred to you meant those with Japan?

SECRETARY LANSING. Yes. And I now refer to the text of the British agreement—

SENATOR JOHNSON. With Japan?

SECRETARY LANSING. Yes. As to my knowledge at the time of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, which was negotiated in September and October, 1917. I did know that Great Britain and France had at least an understanding as to the disposition of the German islands in the Pacific. . . . Furthermore, at my first interview in connection with our negotiations, Viscount Ishii, on September 6, 1917, told me that in 1915, on his way to Japan, he stopped in London; that he saw Sir Edward Grey there, and stated to him that Japan intended to return Kiaochou to China, but that the islands would have to be retained because no government in Japan could stand if there was an agreement to return them to Germany. . . . He said it was then practically arranged that the Equator should be the line of division between Japan and Great Britain so far as the conquered islands were concerned.

SENATOR HITCHCOCK. That was an agreement reached between those two nations before we entered the war?

SECRETARY LANSING. Oh, yes; in 1915.

SENATOR BORAH. Mr. Secretary, as I understand you, the first knowledge you had of any of those agreements other than that British agreement was on what date?

SECRETARY LANSING. In the early part of February, 1919.

SENATOR BORAH. You received the information through what channels?

SECRETARY LANSING. I cannot tell you, except that the Commission received it in Paris.

SENATOR BORAH. The secret treaty with reference to Shantung and the German possessions in China had not been made in October, 1916?

SECRETARY LANSING. No.

SENATOR BORAH. When did you first learn of that agreement?

SECRETARY LANSING. Early in February, 1919.

SENATOR BORAH. Will you state again briefly what it was that Viscount Ishii told you as to the understanding he had with Great Britain, and when it was?

SECRETARY LANSING. His statement was made to me on September 6, 1917, and he told me that in 1915—that was after Kiaochou and the German islands had been captured—he was in London, and that he stated to Sir Edward Grey that Japan intended to return Kiaochou to China, but that the islands would have to be retained.

SENATOR BORAH. Is that the only statement that Viscount Ishii made which would indicate to you any understanding between Japan and Great Britain with reference to the German possessions in China?

SECRETARY LANSING. That did not indicate any.

SENATOR BORAH. Did he make any other statement indicating to you that Japan had any agreement with Great Britain in regard to the German possessions in China?

SECETARY LANSING. None at all, sir. After the statement that it was the intention of Japan to restore Kiaochou to China, the subject was never again mentioned during the conversation.

SENATOR BORAH. You do know now, Mr. Secretary, that at the time Viscount Ishii made that statement to you, Japan had a secret agreement regarding Shantung with Great Britain and those other Powers?

SECRETARY LANSING. I do.

SENATOR BORAH. And the Viscount Ishii either affirmatively or by his silence concealed it from the Secretary of State of this nation?

SECRETARY LANSING. That is the truth. I do not know whether it was an intentional concealment or not. He did not tell me about it.

SENATOR BORAH. I want to say, Mr. Secretary, in answer to an intimation in your opening statement that we were indicating that you must have had knowledge of these things, that that was not my desire at all. My desire was to show what Viscount Ishii was doing.

I desire to read a statement which appeared in the Parliamentary Debates in the House of Commons on March 4, 1918. (Reading):

"Mr. King asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether there have been communicated to President Wilson copies of all treaties, whether secret or public, and memoranda of all other agreements and undertakings to which this country has become a party since August 4, 1914; and if not, whether copies of all such documents will be handed to the American Ambassador in London."

"MR. BALFOUR. The honorable member may rest assured that President Wilson is kept fully informed by the Allies."

You would understand from that that these secret agreements had been made known to the President?

SECRETARY LANSING. I should dislike very much to interpret the language of Mr. Balfour.

SENATOR BORAH. It does not need much interpreting, does it?

SENATOR HITCHCOCK. What was the date of that statement?

SENATOR BORAH. March 4, 1918. [To Mr. Lansing]: When did this Government make known to China the existence of those secret agreements?

SECRETARY LANSING. I do not know if the Government ever made them known to China, because China had delegates at Paris, and I assume that she was more or less cognizant of the agreements at the same time we were.

SENATOR BORAH. Notwithstanding the statement of Viscount Ishii and the statement of Mr. Balfour, it is a matter of fact that the Secretary of State of the United States had no knowledge of those treaties until after the signing of the armistice, is it not?

SECRETARY LANSING. That is true.

Without implying that President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing must have known before they went to Paris about the Shantung and other interallied secret agreements, it can be demonstrated that they ought to have known. Some of the secret agreements had been published (not those about Shantung), and the existence of the Shantung agreements had been distinctly intimated by the agreements that were published. Most commentators assert, from a survey of the circumstances, that if President Wilson and Mr. Lansing did not know officially (that is, by being officially informed) of the secret treaties before they went to Paris, they must have known of them unofficially. Certainly there was

sufficient ground for suspicion that such agreements existed for the American Government, when it entered the war, to have made definite inquiries and to have insisted on definite answers. For the American Government to have gone through the war and to have entered upon negotiations for peace lacking that information is, to say the least, a striking case of ineptitude.

§ 3

At the head of the American delegation, President Wilson had appeared at Paris with a political and moral prestige never held at any given time in history by any other person. Heads of the other Principal Powers devoted much of the first weeks of the conference to attempting to estimate him. All of those statesmen knew fairly definitely what they wanted to obtain for their nations; they knew to what extent they already were committed to each other; but none of them comprehended the man Wilson, nor knew what he would demand on behalf of his nation. Those other statesmen knew the character of their own positions in the conference; they knew they were there as representatives of their governments, and that the governments were charged with responsibility for protecting the interests of their nationals. None of them conceived himself as a guardian for civilization in general; and privately they would have called the widely trumpeted world altruism attributed to the President as "bunk." It had been great war propaganda, but they expected to sit in conference with a practical statesman. If the President could be brought to support or to agree to schemes which every one of the other Powers brought to Paris, and to their composite adjustment on some basis of diplomatic trading, his immense prestige with the "outside" opinion of the world would make it easier, in the vernacular, to "put it over." The first thing was to discover what the President wanted for his own nation; and

when the attitude of not seeking anything for the advantage of the United States was persisted in (diplomats took it for posing, and its prolongation "made them tired"), they became puzzled.

The comprehension of President Wilson by the old-school diplomats at Paris quickly followed the revelation of existence of the secret Shantung agreements. That was the "tip-off." Here was a matter, as the professional diplomats well knew, that touched a fundamental policy of the United States and involved moral commitments of the American Government. How would the President take it? If he "stood for" the secret Shantung agreements, it could be concluded that he would not stickle at similar agreements between the Powers relating to other regions rated of less importance and concern to America. When the President seemed to take the disclosure complacently, they were relieved. From that time the old-school diplomacy took charge of the conference.

The leading and I think the best of the apologies for President Wilson's conduct at Paris is Ray Stannard Baker's book published in 1922 with the title, "Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement." Mr. Baker stresses the alleged deficiency of technical expertness in the American delegation, and says in effect that it was hampered by lack of previous knowledge of the secret agreements. I am not satisfied with that explanation. While the American delegation was somewhat deficient in technical preparation, it was not lack of such preparation or of expert consultants that caused its failures at Paris. Failure was caused by the fact that the President arrived at Paris without a plan; he failed to get anything of consequence that America wanted because he had no outline of objects and method ready.

On that point, Mr. Lansing ought to be informed. In his book, "The Peace Negotiations," published in 1921, he writes: "If the President had a programme, other than the general principles and the few territorial settlements in-

cluded in his Fourteen Points, and the generalities contained in his 'subsequent addresses,' he did not show a copy of the programme to the Commissioners or advise them of its contents. The natural conclusion was that he never had worked out in detail the application of his announced principles or put into concrete form the specific settlements which he had declared ought to be in the terms of peace. The definition of the principles, the interpretation of the policies, and the detailing of the provisions regarding territorial settlements were not apparently attempted by Mr. Wilson. They were in large measure left uncertain by the phrases in which they were delivered. Without authoritative explanation, interpretation, or application to actual facts they formed incomplete and inadequate instructions to Commissioners who were authorized 'to negotiate peace.'"

If his own minister of foreign affairs and his own colleagues of the American delegation did not know the President's objects and purposes at Paris, how could the representatives of other powers know them? That knowledge, however, was not essential to those practical diplomats. To them a plenipotentiary without plans or instructions is an impotent one. A President at Paris with no plans suited them perfectly; they were ready to give a complete set of plans to the conference, which they proceeded to do. Previous and usually secret agreements among the Principal Powers provided the groundwork for a treaty. As to matters about which no previous understandings or commitments existed, it remained only to make trades among themselves; then by collusion it should not be difficult somehow to put whatever was agreed on into the treaty. One thing they learned the President did want—a league of nations. Good! That provided a trading-point, and useful it proved to be. It practically is impossible to trade with a person who wants nothing.

Once the vagueness and mutability of the President's position was understood by statesmen of the Principal Powers,

American influence, except for gestures to preserve amenities and *amour propre,* became almost negligible in fixing the terms of the treaty.

§ 4

From January 18 to April 30, when the decision of the Supreme Council (the Big Four) on the Shantung articles of the treaty * was made public—a period of over three months—

* SHANTUNG CLAUSES OF THE VERSAILLES TREATY

Article 156

Germany renounces in favor of Japan all her rights, title and privileges—particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, railways, mines, and submarine cables—which she acquired in virtue of the treaty concluded with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung.

All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, including its branch lines, together with its subsidiary of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material, for the exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto.

The German state submarine cables from Tsingtau to Shanghai and from Tsingtau to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties attached thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan free and clear of all charges and incumbrances.

Article 157

The movable and immovable property owned by the German state in all territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany might claim in the consequence of the works or improvements made, or of the expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with the territory, are and remain acquired by Japan free and clear of all charges and incumbrances.

Article 158

Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming into force of the present treaty the archives, registers, plans, title deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial, or other, of the territory of Kiaochow.

Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the right, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding aricles.

there was much ado in the purlieus of the conference about the cases of China and other Asiatic nations and groups. The case of China was regarded as the test of all such. The Chinese delegation was industrious and careful in its presentation of the case, and little fault can be found in the way it was handled. Robert Lansing, in his book about the peace negotiations, wrote: "On January 27 the Japanese argued their case before the Council [of Ten], the Chinese delegates being present; and on the 28th Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo spoke on behalf of China. In a note on that meeting I recorded that 'he simply overwhelmed the Japanese with his argument.' I believe that opinion was common to all who heard the two presentations. In fact it made such an impression on the Japanese themselves, that one of the delegates called upon me the following day and attempted to offset the effect by declaring that the United States, since it had not promised to support Japan's contention, would be blamed if Kiaochou was returned directly to China. . . . It was an indirect threat of what would happen to the friendly relations between the two countries if Japan's claim was denied."

The facts and arguments regarding China's case at Paris need not be reviewed extensively here; we were to meet all of them later at Washington in a clearer atmosphere. Looking back, it is plain that the Shantung matter never was open to be decided on its merits at Paris; it had been decided by the secret agreements, unless perchance the whole structure of private agreements among the Principal Powers should be overthrown by the United States. The motions were made of allowing China to present her case, and there was pretense of pondering her arguments. For effect upon "outside" world opinion, the Japanese delegation from time to time, when occasion offered, sought to obscure the issue by dragging diplomatic herrings across the trail. One of those was the request by Japan that a clause guaranteeing race equality be put into the Covenant of the League of Nations, coupled with

an implied threat not to join the League unless that was done.

Within the American delegation, however, China's case was treated seriously, as if the conference actually intended to try to do justice. President Wilson took it seriously, also; and just before the final decision of the Big Three (Italy being absent and Japan not sitting on her own claim) he consulted with his American colleagues on the matter. In his book, Mr. Lansing quotes from notes made at the time: "At the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference this afternoon [April 28] Baron Makino spoke of his proposed amendment to the Covenant declaring 'racial equality,' but said he would not press it. . . . I concluded from what the President said to me that he was disposed to accede to Japan's claims in regard to Kiaochou and Shantung. He also showed me a letter from——to Makino saying he was sorry their claims had not been finally settled [by the Big Three] before the Session. From all this I am forced to the conclusion that a bargain has been struck by which the Japanese agree to sign the Covenant in exchange for admission of their claims. If so, it is an iniquitous agreement. Apparently the President is doing this to avoid Japan's declining to enter the League of Nations. It is a surrender of the principle of self-determination, a transfer of millions of Chinese from one foreign master to another. This is another of those secret agreements which had riddled the 'Fourteen Points' and are wrecking a just peace. In my opinion it would be better to let Japan stay out of the League than to abandon China and surrender our prestige in the Far East for 'a mess of pottage' —and a mess it is."

On the forenoon of the day on which that Plenary Session was held, three of the American commissioners—General Bliss, Mr. White and Mr. Lansing—held a meeting together and decided that the President should be informed of their joint opinion on the Shantung question, then about to be decided. It was agreed that General Bliss should put their

views into a letter, which all should sign. The now famous Bliss letter follows:

Hotel de Crillon, Paris,
April 29, 1919.

My dear Mr. President:

Last Saturday morning you told the American Delegation that you desired suggestions, although not at that time, in regard to the pending matter of certain conflicting claims between Japan and China about the alleged German rights. My principal interest in the matter is with sole reference to the question of the moral right or wrong involved. From this point of view I discussed the matter with Mr. Lansing and Mr. White. They concurred with me and requested me to draft a hasty note to you on the subject.

Since your conference with us last Saturday, I have asked myself three or four Socratic questions the answers to which make me, personally, quite sure on which side the moral right lies.

First. Japan bases certain of her claims on the right acquired by conquest. I asked myself the following questions: Suppose Japan had not succeeded in her efforts to force the capitulation of the Germans at Tsingtau; suppose that the armistice of November 11 had found her still fighting the Germans at that place, just as the armistice found the English still fighting the Germans in South-East Africa. We would then oblige Germany to dispose of her claims in China by a clause of the treaty of peace. Would it occur to anyone that, as a matter of right, we should force Germany to cede her claims to Japan rather than to China? It seems to me that it would occur to every American that we would then have the opportunity that we have long desired to force Germany to correct, in favor of China, the great wrong which she began to do to the latter in 1898. What moral right has Japan acquired by her conquest of Shantung assisted by the British? If Great Britain and Japan secured no moral right to sovereignty over various savages inhabiting islands in the Pacific Ocean, but, on the other hand, we held that these peoples shall be governed by mandates under the League of Nations, what moral right has Japan acquired to the suzerainty (which she undoubtedly would eventually have) over 30,000,000 Chinese in the sacred province of Shantung?

Second. Japan must base her claims either on the Convention with China or on the right of conquest, or on both. Let us consider her moral right under either of these points.

(a) If the United States has not before this recognized the

validity of the rights claimed by Japan under her Convention with China, what has happened since the armistice that would justify us in recognizing their validity now?

(b) If Germany had possessed territory, in full sovereignty, on the East coast of Asia, a right to this territory, under international law, could have been obtained by conquest. But Germany possessed no such territory. What then was left for Japan to acquire by conquest? Apparently nothing but a lease extorted under compulsion from China by Germany. I understand that international lawyers hold that such a lease, or the rights acquired, justly or unjustly, under it, cannot be acquired by conquest.

Third. Suppose Germany says to us, "We will cede our lease and all rights under it, but we will cede them back to China." Will we recognize the justice of Japan's claims to such an extent that we will threaten Germany with further war unless she cedes these rights to Japan rather than to China?

Again, suppose that Germany, in her hopelessness of resistance to our demands, should sign without question a clause ceding these rights to Japan, even that we know that this is so wrong that we would not fight in order to compel Germany to do it, what moral justification would we have in making Germany do this?

Fourth. Stripped of all words that befog the issue, would we not, under the guise of making a treaty with Germany, really be making a treaty with Japan by which we compel one of our allies (China) to cede against her will these things to Japan? Would not this action be really more unjustifiable than the one which you have refused to be a party to on the Dalmatian coast? Because, in the one case, the territory in dispute did not belong to one of the Allies, but to one of the Central Powers; the question in Dalmatia is as to which of two friendly powers we shall give territory taken from an enemy power; in China the question is, shall we take certain claimed rights from one friendly power in order to give them to another friendly power.

It would seem to be advisable to call particular attention to what the Japanese mean when they say that they will return Kiaochou to China. They *do not* offer to return the railway, the mines or the port, i. e., Tsingtau. The leased territory included a portion of land on the north-east side of the entrance of the Bay and another on the south-west and some islands. It is a small territory. The 50 kilometer zone was not included. That was a *limitation* put upon the movement of German troops. They could not go beyond the boundary of the zone. Within this zone China enjoyed all rights of sovereignty and administration.

Japan's proposal to abandon the zone is somewhat of an impertinence, since she has violated it ever since she took possession. She kept troops all along the railway line until recently and insists on maintaining in the future a guard at Tsinan, 254 miles away. The zone would restrict her military movements, consequently she gives it up.

The proposals she makes are (1) to open the whole bay. It is 15 to 20 miles from the entrance to the northern shore of the bay. (2) To have a Japanese exclusive concession *at a place* to be designated by her, i. e., she can take just as much as she likes of the territory around the bay. It may be as large as the present leased territory, but more likely it will include only the best part of Tsingtau. What then does she give up? Nothing but such parts of the leased territory as are of no value.

The operation then would amount chiefly to an exchange of two pieces of paper—one cancelling the lease for 78 years, the other granting a more valuable concession which would amount to a permanent title to the port. Why take two years to go through this operation?

If it be right for a policeman, who recovers your purse, to keep the contents and claim that he has fulfilled his duty in returning the empty purse, then Japan's conduct may be tolerated.

If it be right for Japan to annex the territory of an Ally, then it cannot be wrong for Italy to retain Fiume taken from an enemy.

If we support Japan's claim, we abandon the democracy of China to the domination of the Prussianized militarism of Japan.

We shall be sowing the dragon's teeth.

It can't be right to do wrong even to make peace. Peace is desirable, but there are things dearer than peace: justice and freedom.

Sincerely Yours
(signed) T. H. Bliss.

To the President.

General Bliss, Mr. Lansing and Mr. White concurring, mentioned the similarity of the moral issue drawn by the President in his attitude on the Fiume controversy with the moral issue involved in the Shantung case. That analogy had previously attracted the attention of others, including myself. On the day that President Wilson's Fiume statement was issued, I wrote a confidential memorandum, as follows:

By Thomas F. Millard,
Paris, April 23, 1919.

ANALOGY OF PRESIDENT WILSON'S STATEMENT RE THE ADRIATIC SITUATION TO THE CASE OF CHINA

AS TO PRINCIPLE AND REASONING

The President's statement says: "When Italy entered the war she entered upon the basis of a definite, but private, understanding with Great Britain and France now known as the Pact of London. Since that time the whole face of circumstances has been altered. Many other powers, great and small, have entered the struggle, with no knowledge of that private understanding."

Thus the President proceeds to argue that secret agreements among belligerents made during the course of the war may, as a matter of fact and also of principle, become abrogated by events. He further argues that such agreements are liable to be subordinated, and that they ought to be subordinated, in making peace, to an adjustment to the principles which were publicly accepted by the nations in the Allied group as the basis for peace.

The relation of this argument to the case of China at the Peace Conference is plain, with respect to the secret agreements about the disposition of former German tenure and rights in Shantung; in short, those secret agreements cannot be held as binding now.

With respect to the agreements relating to German tenure in Shantung made during the war between the Japanese and the Chinese governments, the position of China is that those agreements were obtained by intimidation, and therefore they cannot be presented now as instruments which the Peace Conference should validate by its acts. The analogy of those agreements and the treaties wrung by Germany from Russia and Rumania which are now condemned, is apparent.

AS TO RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES

With respect to the Adriatic and other European questions, the American Government is committed to no policy by any previous acts or agreements. In the case of China, however, the American Government did assume moral responsibilities by inducing China to enter the war, by previous undertakings to preserve the territorial integrity and political autonomy of China, and under a treaty with China, made in 1858.

In his book Mr. Lansing gives parts of a private memoran-

dum he wrote on May 1, the day following the Shantung decision, from which I quote:

China has been abandoned to Japanese rapacity. A democratic territory has been given over to an autocratic government. The President has conceded to Japan all, if not more than, she ever hoped to obtain. . . . Mr. —— (of the Chinese delegation) said that Mr. Baker stated that the President desired him to say that the President was very sorry that he had not been able to do more for China, but that he had been compelled to accede to Japan's demand *"in order to save the League of Nations."* . . . Frankly my policy would have been to say to the Japanese, "If you do not give back to China what Germany stole from her, we don't want you in the League of Nations." . . . But she would not have gone. She would have submitted. . . . The whole affair assumes a sordid and sinister character, in which the President, acting undoubtedly with the best of motives, became a cat's-paw. . . . I do not think that anything that has happened here has caused more severe or more outspoken criticism than this affair. I am heartsick over it. . . . I can offer no adequate explanation to the critics. There seems to be none.

Notwithstanding strong pressure on them in Paris and from Peking (instigated by Japanese influence in China's capital) to accept the Shantung articles and sign the treaty, the Chinese delegation remained firm and refused to sign. The crumb of consolation proffered to China was the intimation conveyed to the delegation from President Wilson to the effect that China eventually would secure satisfaction from the League of Nations. It is interesting now to recall some views on that proposition I gave then in a memorandum:

Firstly, the League of Nations has no existence.

Secondly, if a League of Nations should be organized its powers and authority will be problematical.

Thirdly, the real ruling force in any League constituted at this time will be the same major Powers that composed the Council of Five at Paris and which made the decision in the Shantung question.

Fourthly, that it is not logical to assume that a League of Nations created by the same body as made the Treaty and in conjunc-

tion with the Treaty is designed to reverse the terms of the Treaty.

Fifthly, that it is only the so-called weak nations that are asked to depend for justice and security upon the League of Nations, while the so-called Principal Powers decline to rest their own positions and security on the League alone and plainly regard its assurance to be insufficient.

The quotations given show beyond question that action taken by the American Government at Paris (that is, by President Wilson) in respect of the case of China was not, as some intimate, because the President lacked expert counsel and therefore became confused in the labyrinth of cross-purposes and a mass of details. They show positively that a majority of his colleagues on the Commission, to which was added the undivided opinion of the Far East experts attached to the Commission, were in no doubt about the issue, and the correct position for the United States. They were able to, and did, support their opinions by complete information on all phases of the subject. This not only was available to the President if he had asked for it; there existed in the Commission what amounted to a conspiracy to break through the exclusiveness of the Supreme Council, where the President was immured, and force the facts upon his attention. As one attaché of the Commission remarked in the hearing of the writer, "The President has a faculty amounting to genius for avoiding facts which interfere with what he already on snap judgment has decided to do." After the Shantung clauses, as drafted by the Japanese delegation, had been written into the treaty, the High Excellencies of the conference assumed an attitude minimizing the importance of the matter and diverted attention to other things.

§ 5

Was Shantung unimportant?

Lothrop Stoddard writes in his book, "The Rising Tide of Color": "The ethnic focus of the yellow world always has

been China. Since the dawn of history this immense human ganglion has been the center from which civilization has radiated through the East. . . . However diverse may have been the individual developments of the various Far Eastern peoples, they spring from a common Chinese foundation. Despite modern Japan's meteoric rise to political mastery of the Far East, it must not be forgotten that China remains not only the cultural but also the territorial and racial center of the yellow world."

Of Oriental national groups that appeared at Paris as petitioners, China had the better position. Her history, population, and territory compelled attention to her, was presumed to warrant consideration and respect of her rights; moreover, she came to Paris as a member of the Allied consortium. If her claims were treated negligibly and arbitrarily, what hope was there for lesser and weaker peoples? I wrote in 1919: "Chinese sensibilities are stirred by the Shantung award of the peace treaty just as the sensibilities of Belgians would have been outraged had Antwerp been awarded to Germany, or even to an Ally, and the Belgians had been told that any injustice would be rectified by a league of nations. Already the symptoms of a powerful revulsion against the treaty, and against the nations that made and will try to enforce it, are manifested not only in China but also in India, Egypt, Persia, and other Oriental countries. It is conceivable that an outgrowth of this disappointment and disillusionment may be a recrudescence of outright anti-foreignism in Asia. To Asiastics the outstanding significance of the conference is that it treated Asia as a chattel of European diplomacy."

But the High Excellencies at Paris were not omnipotent. Their decisions were not final.

III

TRANSFER TO WASHINGTON

§ 1

AFTER Paris, it was evident that any hope to reverse decisions and trades made there was in an appeal from "inside" to "outside" opinion. This definitely was portended early in the conference. The Shantung case made it certain.

During the war secret diplomacy, so called, had taken on a sinister character with outside opinion; but there now is something of a reaction from what one writer has called "the political ogres and fantasies of that spook-ridden period." While it is true that at one time—its climax perhaps coincided with the Paris conference—outside opinion made a worse monster of secret diplomacy than it actually is, nevertheless there is "such an animal," and outside opinion does well to distrust it. My own opinion is that the American failure at Paris chiefly can be attributed to secret diplomacy. I have no positive information of how President Wilson was induced to immure himself with the heads of delegations of the self-determined Principal Powers, a privacy so safeguarded that even his American colleagues and experts could not penetrate it; but I believe that by so doing he lost whatever chance he might have had to obtain peace terms that would be acceptable in America.

In his book on the peace negotiations, Robert Lansing wrote:

> Another matter, concerning which the President and I disagreed, was the secrecy with which the negotiations were carried on be-

tween him and the principal European statesmen, incidental to which was the willingness, if not the desire, to prevent the proceedings and decisions from becoming known even to the delegates of the smaller nations which were represented at the Peace Conference. Confidential personal interviews were to a certain extent unavoidable and necessary, but to conduct the entire negotiation through a small group sitting behind closed doors and to shroud their proceedings with mystery and uncertainty made a very unfortunate impression on those who were not members of the secret councils. . . . He, [the President], was not disposed to discuss matters with the American Commission as a whole or even to announce to them his decisions unless something arose which compelled him to do so. . . . The consequence was that the American Commissioners, other than Colonel House, were kept in almost complete ignorance of the preliminary negotiations and were left to gather such information as they were able from the delegates of other Powers, who, naturally assuming that the Americans possessed the full confidence of the President, spoke with much freedom. . . . But, in addition to the embarrassment caused the American Commissioners and the unenviable position in which they were placed by the secrecy with which the President surrounded his intercourse with the foreign statesmen, his secret negotiations caused the majority of the delegates to the Conference and the public at large to lose in a large measure their confidence in the actuality of his devotion to "open diplomacy," which he had so unconditionally proclaimed in the first of his Fourteen Points. . . . Behind closed doors these four individuals, who controlled the policies of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, passed final judgment on the mass of articles which entered into the Treaty of Peace, but kept their decisions secret from the committee which was drafting the articles.

Under the theory of the constitutional law of the United States, the authority to negotiate peace at Paris was delegated to the American commission, not to President Wilson exclusively; but there is no doubt whatever that while the other commissioners were called on to and did affix their signatures to the treaty, they took virtually no discernible part in arriving at the decisions written into the treaty. Also, it is certain that at one time it was the intention of the President to prevent and to ignore, in effect, the real participation of the other part of the treaty-making power designated by the

Constitution, the American Senate. In that, however, he miscalculated.

I remember well how nearly all Americans in Paris, who understood the Far East situation, then felt about the Shantung decision. I was in close touch with the Chinese delegation and with the Far East experts attached to the American commission. Within a few minutes after leaving the American press headquarters, the evening of April 30, where I had listened to the announcement of the decision to the American correspondents by Ray Stannard Baker, I met in the Hotel Crillon the chief Far East expert of the American commission, who had served the United States officially for more than thirty years in China. "This is terrible, ruinous," he said. "It may bring on war in Asia."

Late that night I was among those who gathered in the rooms of the Chinese delegation at the Hotel Lutetia. It was a profoundly depressed group of men. Most of the Chinese delegates and attachés were stunned; a few of them were bordering on hysteria; a few broke out into denunciations at times. One of the chief Chinese delegates shed tears as he said: "I was educated in America and in a sense am half American; but I do not understand American diplomacy." That night or on the following morning (in a pour of rain) all of the Oriental experts attached to the American commission visited the Chinese delegation to express their sympathy and their personal dissent from the Shantung award. One of them remarked to me, "This will destroy the treaty so far as America is concerned; and I fear it will ruin the President."

I returned to my hotel in Rue Rivoli very late, but before I went to bed I wrote a brief memorandum outlining the situation as it stood and indicating a procedure for the Chinese delegation. I quote from it here: "It can be taken as certain that no reversal or modification of this decision can be obtained of this conference. Nevertheless, every care should be taken to establish China's protest and position and

to get them into the records of the conference. The matter will not end here. . . . On the question of whether the Chinese delegation should sign or refuse to sign the treaty including the Shantung clauses, I unhesitatingly state my opinion that they should refuse to sign. . . . I believe that the decision of the conference on Shantung, acquiesced in by President Wilson, will not be acceptable to the American people, and probably, taken in conjunction with other features of the treaty and the covenant of the proposed league of nations, it will cause its modification or rejection by the Senate."

Up to that point, the loyalty to the President of members of the American commission had been absolute, but the Shantung decision breached it. Some of the American Oriental experts in the commission privately advised the Chinese delegates not to sign the treaty. That was casting off the President's leadership and authority. But the experts saw that more was involved than an outward appearance of loyalty to Mr. Wilson as official head of the American commission; the experts knew that a disastrous, perhaps a fatal blow had been given to the Asiatic policy of the United States; their minds, after a primary feeling of sympathy with China, reverted to the effects on their own nation. It would not do to allow the Shantung articles in the treaty to obtain the sanction of China in addition to that of the American commission; China therefore must refuse to sign, as the only obstruction which could be interposed immediately. It should be understood, also, that great pressure was brought to bear to induce the Chinese delegation to sign the treaty; and in the state of mental depression and confusion which followed the collapse of China's case that pressure had some temporary effect.

For one thing, a presumption immediately was advanced to the effect that if China did not sign the treaty she would not be permitted to join the League of Nations, and therefore could not go to any quarter for redress; that she would be

left isolated, outside the international comity. Intimations of this nature were conveyed to the Chinese delegation from influential quarters—from Mr. Wilson, Mr. Balfour, and others of almost equal eminence. For a brief time those arguments had some effect; and they were supplemented by panicky and irresolute instructions from Peking, where the weight of certain diplomacies was brought to bear on the Chinese President, the Premier, and the Wai Chiao Pu to persuade them that China should sign the treaty. It is not surprising, after such a blow and in such dispiriting circumstances, that the Chinese delegation should have doubts of its course. Their indecision soon passed, however; and I wish to mention in this connection the demeanor in that crisis of one of the Chinese delegates, Chenting Thomas Wang, whose vision and courage did not waver for a moment. He remarked to me once that he would cut off his hand before he would use it to sign the treaty. In the end, that was the attitude of the entire delegation.

Before I went to sleep that night when the Shantung decision was announced, I saw, in respect of Asiatic questions, that the struggle at Paris was over, and that it would be transferred to Washington; and I so advised the Chinese delegates. As soon as I could conveniently, I left Paris, and arrived in America in June.

§ 2

I remained in New York for some weeks before going to Washington, for I wanted time to review files of the American newspapers to learn what of the conference they had been publishing, and the comments of editors; also from the newspapers I learned the reactions of events at Paris on the other part of the American treaty-making machinery, the Senate.

In Paris I had observed the hypnosis imposed on press correspondents, even to a great degree on the American pressmen, by the sedulously urged idea that it amounted to treason

to a sacred cause to publish anything revealing dissension among the nations that constituted the "Allies" or anything likely to cause suspicion of their motives with regard to each other. According to that idea, nothing ought to be conveyed by the press to "outside" opinion casting doubt upon the wisdom and beneficent objects of those supermen who in solemn conclave were reorganizing the world. As a newspaperman of twenty-five years' experience in the field of international politics, I had been amazed and depressed by the disposition of the press to submit to inhibitions drawn from the trick-bag of secret diplomacy; never had my own profession been revealed to me in such a disappointing light.

Toward the close of the conference, however, a number of influences began to breach the wall of inhibitions. Of those influences, the more effective was the development of a decided schism of the "inside" opinion concerning the conference. There could, it seemed, be too much secrecy even in secret diplomacy; and the diplomats, the experts, the journalists, and others who composed the "inside" opinion gathered at Paris had reached a point when the concentration of authority and power of decision in the conference with four men, and the exclusion (except by back-stairs hearsay) of the body of the conference from information of and participation with the proceedings (except to sign on the dotted line), was considered "a bit thick." Moreover, which was more important, the body of "inside" opinion had begun seriously to doubt the ability and efficiency of the Big Four; in some delegations experts were resigning because their fully informed and thoughtfully reasoned conclusions were ignored in the decision of important matters; others were on the verge of resigning. From all sides were premonitions of a flare-up and maybe an outbreak within the conference, which reached the Big Four and made them hasten to get the thing finished and the conference adjourned before an explosion came. In the last-minute rush, matters and principles of the greatest importance were settled on the basis of hurried

compromises, and an immense lot of questions were left as residue, including virtually everything which the Asiatic world was vitally interested in.

It can be said with verisimilitude that the factor that survived everything, and which exercised the chief determining influence on the treaty, were the secret agreements among the Principal Powers; in their essential objects and meaning they were written into the treaty and into the Covenant of the League. In a very definite sense, that fact gives the true measure of American influence in the making of peace, for the secret agreements all were made without the knowledge or consent of the United States.

§ 3

When I reached America from Paris the revolt of the United States Senate against the actions of the President at Paris had become known; that is, the fact was known, but not exactly the character and extent of the opposition. From the newspapers, which, although they had imperfectly transmitted to the public what occurred at Paris, gave a fairly accurate picture of the reactions at Washington, I could see that the Senate was very much in the dark about the treaty and how it had been made. One thing was obvious: a strong element in the Senate had declared an uncompromising opposition to certain conditions of the treaty, and to the League of Nations. This opposition was derived, apparently, from various motives: the press supporting President Wilson attributed it to party politics, i. e., a purpose of the Republican majority in Congress to use criticism of the work of the President at Paris to regain power for itself. To me it did not matter, for the time, what were the political motives of hostility to the treaty in Congress; the opposition constituted an opportunity to expose the situation, to turn light on the whole subject free of the inhibitions that had operated so powerfully at Paris.

To my mind, the fact that the Senate was but little informed of what happened at Paris (at that time no copy of the treaty had been presented to it) then was, and is still, of grave significance. The Constitution of the United States makes the Senate a part of the treaty-making power; and it cannot exercise that function intelligently unless it is fully informed about the treaties it must ratify. Mr. Lansing, in the quotations from his book that I have given previously, revealed that the American commissioners at Paris, except Mr. Wilson, and in a degree Colonel House, were virtually outside of the negotiations. Of the American Government but one man, President Wilson, knew how the treaty had been made and the "inside" reasons for making it. And it seems certain that Mr. Wilson then had the intention of reserving to himself the knowledge so necessary for any real understanding of the treaty; he felt that it should be ratified on his recommendation. Furthermore, he assumed that his recommendation would be sufficient to insure the ratification of the treaty. That attitude was a logical sequence of the state of mind engendered with himself by the President's course at Paris; by the arrogation of exclusive and complete authority to the Big Four, and the toleration by the conference of that arrogation. But as he turned his face again toward America, something of the actualities of the American political system that confronted him at home began to reach him across the ocean, and to recall to him that the treaty and covenant now faced a different test than it had received in the cabinet of the Big Four.

There are some, no doubt, who, in reading at this time criticisms of the peace conference and its accomplishments, will think that it is easier five years after an event to estimate it than at the time it occurred; the old adage to the effect that hindsight is better than foresight applies; that what since have been revealed clearly as great mistakes at that time seemed the best that could be done. It is true that time is required to discover the effects of any political action or

policy; often a great deal of time. But statesmen are supposed to look ahead when they frame treaties; also, they are credited usually with the prescience required to do that intelligently. If prescience is to be eliminated from statesmanship, there need be no bother about how and by whom treaties are made, or how and by whom laws are made. I have thought it would be interesting and perhaps more useful, therefore, in trying to elucidate this subject, to show something of what was understood of those matters at the time of the conference and when the treaty and covenant were before the Senate. In respect, at least, of Asiatic questions involved with deliberations of the Paris conference, I lay claim to belong to the "inside" opinion as it was applied to the situation. So in what follows I will quote frequently from memoranda and letters I wrote while the discussions were proceeding. If they show nothing else, those memoranda and letters will indicate that it was not beyond the capacity of "inside" intelligence to calculate with considerable accuracy the immediate consequences and the probable eventual results of what was or was not done.

From the newspapers in America I gathered that Senator Hiram Johnson of California was prominent among opponents of the covenant and treaty; so I wrote to him:

New York, July 8, 1919.

Hon. Hiram Johnson,
Washington.
Dear Sir:—

In to-day's "New York Times" I read an apparently official statement from Washington to the effect that President Wilson, soon after his arrival from abroad, will summon the members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate to a conference, at which the President will explain his handling of affairs at Paris, and will answer questions concerning the treaty and covenant of the League of Nations, and other matters that affect the nation. It also has been published that in speeches he is expected to make, the President is going to "take the American people into his confidence" about the reasons that shaped his course at Paris.

Judging from the past, I rather expect that the President in addressing the public about the treaty and the league, and the proposed Anglo-French-American alliance (referred to usually as the "supplement to the treaty"), will confine himself mainly to generalities, describing eloquently the assumed purposes and objects of those measures, instead of demonstrating exactly how what was done at Paris will accomplish those purposes and objects. However that may turn out to be, with the President's public utterances, I can see no good reason why at a private conference with Members of Congress on these subjects, Senators may not properly ask, and the President comply, for definite information about the treaty, covenant, and alliance they are asked to ratify.

If you are not among those who are invited to confer with the President on this subject, I ask that you will communicate the suggestions I am about to make to Senators who do attend the conference. I address you because of the interest you have shown as a critic of the results at Paris, and more especially because, as a Member from a Pacific Coast State, you probably feel a particular concern about problems of the Pacific and of Asia, *vis-à-vis* America, that are bound up in the treaty, the covenant, and the alliance, which the Senate now is asked to ratify and make binding on our Government.

I suggest that the following or similar questions be asked the President:

IN REFERENCE TO THE SHANTUNG DECISION

(a) At the time when the United States Government invited and urged the Chinese Government to follow the example of the American Government, and to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, did the State Department either directly, or through the American minister at Peking, or to the Chinese minister at Washington, assure the Chinese Government that the American Government, in case China's acceptance of its advice did bring China into war against Germany, would use its offices to protect China's territorial rights in the settlement of the war?

(b) Subsequently, when the Chinese Government again followed the advice of the American Government, and declared war on Germany, were such assurances repeated?

(c) In February, 1917, at the time when the United States Government was urging and advising the Chinese Government to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, did the American Government have any knowledge of the since-disclosed fact that the British, French, Russian, and Italian governments had been asked by the

Japanese Government to make secret agreements to support Japan's demands for the cession, in the event the Allies won the war, of all so-called "rights" of Germany in Shantung province to Japan?

(Note: Secret agreements to this effect were made, as follows: British, February 16, 1917; France, March 3, 1917; Russia, February 20, 1917; Italy, March 23, 1917.)

(d) When did the United States Government first learn of the existence of these secret agreements?

(e) How soon after it learned of the existence of these secret agreements did the American Government apprise the Chinese Government of their existence, or has it ever done so?

(f) Is it true that neither the American nor Chinese governments knew of the existence of these secret agreements until it was disclosed incidentally, by the Japanese delegation, at a meeting of the Council of Ten, at Paris, in January, 1919?

(g) If it is true that the existence of these agreements was withheld from the American and the Chinese governments by their "Allies" until the disclosure no longer could be avoided, and that in effect they contradict China's rights and stultify the diplomatic assurances (?) given by the American Government to induce the Chinese Government to enter the war, does not the incident amount to giving America and China the "double-cross"?

(h) In permitting these secret agreements to supersede and to overrule China's rights, and also the diplomatic commitments of the American Government to China, did not President Wilson sacrifice the honor of the United States, and yield its diplomatic prestige to secret arrangements made by the other Powers, such as the President himself often has denounced in principle?

(i) Does not such an action virtually give notice to all nations that the American Government is unable or unwilling to sustain its own just and proper diplomatic engagements when they conflict with the improper and secret engagements of other Powers? and will not such an act undermine the diplomatic influence and prestige of the American Government hereafter not only in China, but also with all nations?

(j) Did the President, in the conferences of the Council of Four (or Three, the Italian representative then being absent), or from the Japanese delegation, obtain written or oral promises with regard to the evacuation by Japan of Shantung province, and of Tsintau, within a specified time? And were such promises, if made, recorded in the minutes of the Council of Four, or of the conference as a whole?

(k) Has the President any knowledge of a new secret agreement,

or entente, concluded presumably at Paris between the British, French, and Japanese governments concerning Asia?

(l) Did the President, in assenting to the decision of the Council of Four on the Shantung question, obtain any definite assurances or promises from the British and French governments that, hereafter (the secret agreements with Japan made in 1917 having been paid in full by the Allies), the British and French governments will aid the American Government in sustaining the territorial integrity and political autonomy of China, and the open-door for commercial penetration of China?

IN REFERENCE TO THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE

(a) Does not Article XXI of the proposed Covenant of the League of Nations amount to defining the Monroe Doctrine as a "regional understanding"?

(b) Does the President accept that definition?

(c) Does not article XXI of the proposed Covenant recognize and make legitimate under the constitutional law of the League not only "regional understandings" that were made previously to the organization of the League, but by inference also make legitimate any such regional understandings which may be made hereafter?

(d) In case it hereafter develops that the British, French, and Japanese governments did, at Paris, make a new private agreement regarding Asia (see my memo.), and hereafter those Powers inform the League of that fact, must not the League accept that private "regional understanding" as *fait accompli,* along with the Monroe Doctrine?

(e) Will not any such "regional understanding," or tri-Power entente, regarding Asia, align the British and French governments with Japan and Japan's interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement (which also is a regional understanding), in case there is a divergence between the American and Japanese governments (already distinctly foreshadowed) about interpretation of that agreement?

(f) Will not such a tri-Power "regional understanding" regarding Asia virtually align the British and French governments with Japan in other issues which may arise between the American and Japanese governments about questions of Asia and the Pacific Ocean? For instance, about interpretations of the Hay Doctrine, and "mandated" islands in the Pacific Ocean?

(g) If hereafter, by reason of the existence of such an entente regarding Asia, or for any other cause, there arises (almost a sure contingency) a divergence of viewpoint, or of interest, about in-

terpretations of the Hay Doctrine, or the Lansing-Ishii agreement, or of Japan's alleged promises to evacuate Shantung and restore China's territories and autonomy, between the American and Japanese governments, or between China and Japan, how can China or the United States obtain satisfaction or redress from a League of Nations whose real ruling power is constituted in five Powers, three of which acted in collusion on those points throughout the Paris conference, and are believed to still have regional understandings with each other to the contrary?

(h) Is it true that at a time *before* the composition of the revised Covenant of the League was adopted by the conference at Paris, representatives of the British, French and Japanese governments at Paris had reached a private mutual understanding regarding a future policy in Asia? and if so, does not a logical sequence of motivation indicate that certain clauses of the revised Covenant (notably Articles X, XXI, etc.) were phrased so as to give those three Powers, with their satellites, the means to confirm and enforce their private regional agreements, even over the objection of the United States?

In Reference to the Proposed Anglo-French-American Alliance

(a) Are there any provisions of this treaty designed to protect and safeguard the policies and interests of the United States?

(b) In agreeing to give military and naval assistance to France under certain circumstances, has the American Government required any equivalent guarantees from France?

(c) According to the published draft, does not this proposed alliance place the obligation to give support entirely upon the United States, as between America and France, leaving France free to make private agreements and "regional understandings" which may be invidious to America, and which, without the previous knowledge, approval, or consultation of the American Government, may lead to war?

(d) Would it not be wise, in case it is deemed necessary for the United States to join in a guaranty of the security of France in Europe, to require that France in turn will guarantee to support the United States in certain policies and under certain conditions?

(e) Would it not be proper, and also wise, in case the United States enters into an alliance which, however camouflaged, is designed to sustain a certain balance of power and status in Europe, which is desired by France and Great Britain, to require, as a quid pro quo, that Great Britain and France will engage in the same

instrument to support a policy in eastern Asia and the Pacific Ocean that is satisfactory to the United States?

(f) Would it not be proper and wise, in case the United States enters into such an alliance to sustain a balance of power in Europe in the especial interest of France and Great Britain, and which further contemplates the extensive advancement of American financial support and credit to those nations, to include in the terms of the alliance provisions designed to insure that American capital and resources, thus advanced, will not be used to impede and endanger American political policy, or economic interests, elsewhere?

(g) Is not this proposed Anglo-French-American alliance a supererogation if it is assumed that the League of Nations will be able to preserve international peace and order?

(h) Has the President obtained from military and naval experts an estimate of the armaments and costs which this proposed alliance would entail upon the United States in order for it to fulfil its obligations assumed under it?

GENERAL

Is it true that in respect of the Shantung articles of the treaty, the proposed tri-Power guaranty to aid France, certain articles of the covenant of the League of Nations, and other questions, the settlement of those matters by the Council of Four, with the consent of the President, was contrary to the opinions of a majority of the American Commissioners, and of the experts attached to the American Commission?

I was present, Senator Johnson, when the President's explanation of his reasons for consenting to the decision of the Council of Three on the Shantung question was communicated to the Chinese delegation in Paris. The President (by his spokesman) virtually admitted that the decision was regrettable and unjust to China, but that the President felt compelled to consent from expediency, because of the implied threat of the Japanese delegation to bolt the conference, in order to save the League of Nations; he, the President, would try to see that China eventually would obtain justice from the League. . . .[1]

In those circumstances, and failing to obtain permission to enter exceptions and reservations, the Chinese delegation, as you

[1] Here were given the points which are previously quoted, giving the doubts of the Chinese delegation about getting the treaty articles reversed by the League.

know, refused to sign the treaty with Germany. Thus China had the courage, weak and almost helpless as she is, to reject a treaty judged to be adverse to her interest; yet some people hold that unless the United States accepts what was done at Paris without reservation, and on superficial examination, we will suffer some great disaster.

The Senate can obtain the facts about the Shantung decision, and how adverse it is to the interests both of the United States and China, by summoning the experts who were attached to the American Commission at Paris. They soon will return to this country; some of them already are here. Other information can be obtained, I should think, in that way, provided the President withholds it.

I think you will agree that the Asiatic problem as it touches America is left in a very dangerous situation by results of the Paris conference; a situation which tends to be aggravated and confirmed by provisions of the treaty of peace in conjunction with the covenant of the League of Nations, as those stand now. There are objections to both the treaty and the covenant on other grounds, but I am confining my criticism now chiefly to conditions in the Far East. The danger is not imaginary. Since I returned from Paris I have been going over newspapers from Japan, and the Japanese press is in full cry against America, which is accused of trying to "evade" the Lansing-Ishii agreement (Japan's interpretation).

May I suggest some alternative for the handling of the ratification question by the Senate? There are these alternatives:

1. Separate the treaty from the covenant; in which case they can be adopted, rejected, or amended, without getting their issues mixed. Peace in that way could be made promptly, leaving time for deliberate consideration of the League.

2. Amend the treaty and / or the covenant, or append reservations to them.

3. Reject the treaty and / or the covenant altogether if the amendments and / or the reservations are not accepted.

4. Insist that guarantees for the United States be written into the proposed Anglo-French-American alliance, aligning those Powers with the United States on Pacific Ocean and Far East questions.

If it is not feasible, or is considered to be inexpedient to separate the treaty and the covenant, or to amend them, or to reject either or both of them, it is possible to inject safeguards for America into the proposed alliance. That may open a way out of the diffi-

culty, for the alliance is not presented as an indivisible part of the treaty. If such an alliance is ratified (with mutually protective guarantees), the League will then be in theory as in fact an experiment which remains to be worked out in practice, gradually taking over functions formerly and now performed by alliances, ententes, and "regional understandings."

If inquiries directed by the Senate to the President should reveal that he has no knowledge of a new tri-Power entente regarding Asia (as per my memo.), then direct inquiries ought to be made of the British, French, and Japanese governments before our Government commits itself to the League of Nations, or to the covenant as now drafted, and especially before our Government is committed to any alliance to sustain a balance of power in Europe. The President cannot refuse this information to the Senate, nor can the Senate afford to act without it. If the President has not all of this information now, he should be asked to obtain it through the proper diplomatic channels, and transmit to the Senate. Such procedure will force either the acknowledgment, or the official denial, by the British and French governments of such a tri-Power agreement with Japan, and our Government then can deal with the situation accordingly. Let us not wait (as occurred with regard to China's rights and our own interests in China, with the Shantung secret agreements), to learn of such a tri-Power "regional understanding" regarding the whole of Asia after those nations have got all they want from us.

I went to Paris, if not sanguine about a League of Nations (my practical experience of world politics would not permit complete optimism), at least strongly hopeful that it might provide a means to get international affairs reëstablished on a legal basis and provide a way perhaps to keep peace. But after closely observing the workings of the peace conference, and the methods and motives that prevailed there, and the treaty and covenant in conjunction with those motives, I feel that if the covenant cannot be amended and separated from the treaty it had better be rejected regardless of uninformed outcry or the fear, largely chimerical, I believe, of serious adverse consequences. I wish, however, that it would be found possible to save the League and the idea embodied in it. But the way it was framed at Paris, in conjunction with the treaty, I feel that it is merely a device to carry on the old system, and that a majority of the so-called Principal Powers have devised it as a means to strengthen and confirm them in particular designs. As I analyze the treaty and the covenant, they will work in practice adversely to the American thesis in world politics, and also very likely against

American economic interests. The Senate is the last court of review in so far as America is concerned. I hope that its members will subject the treaty, the covenant, and the proposed alliance, to careful scrutiny.

I enclose herewith copies of my memo. to which I refer in this letter, etc.

With regards, I remain

Yours truly,

THOMAS F. MILLARD.

I am attempting now to depict the situation as it was in the summer of 1919, immediately after the close of the Paris conference, and when the American Senate was beginning an examination of the treaties negotiated at Paris which soon would be presented to it for ratification, and in doing that I shall follow fairly closely a chronological order.

Most of what is definitely known now about those matters was then chiefly guessed at, or founded on circumstantial deduction, based on back-stairs information. A tremendous obscurant propaganda, stimulated by governments, was running its course in the American press; for the transfer of the scene to the Senate, and the prospective contest between the majority in Congress and the President, stimulated popular interest. In general, defense of the President's acts at Paris about China and Asiatic questions consisted of vague assertions that he had "done everything for the best" and "had done the best he could." Much was made of the alleged promise given by Japan to restore Shantung to China. More was made of the forthcoming equitable adjustment of all such questions by the League of Nations; thus the Shantung and similar injustices of the treaty were used to demonstrate the necessity to set up the League, and for the United States to join it so that its influence could be exerted. If the United States did not join the League, it was urged that the nation would be left "isolated" and without influence in world affairs. It seems queer that less than five years ago those assumptions were taken seriously by perhaps a majority of the American people,

and by a majority of the American press. I know of no other occasion in modern times when such a phantasmagoria has so held the attention of a people presumably of more than average intelligence.

The memorandum mentioned in my letter to Senator Johnson was written in Paris and shown there to the Chinese delegation and to the Far East experts attached to the American Commission. Soon after I sent the letter to Senator Johnson, I had copies of it made and mailed them to every member of Congress, members of the cabinet, some prominent editors and writers, and various interested persons; in that way (afterward it was put into the record of the Senate's proceedings), it became public, and thereupon there was the usual and the expected diplomatic *démenti* from British and French sources. I still believe, however, that something of that nature did take place in Paris, and would have become effective but for unexpected events. It may be recalled that more than three months passed between the revelation of the Shantung secret agreements and the decision of the Shantung question by the Big Four; in the meantime, the matter seemed to sleep most of the while, but experts could perceive many instances and circumstances which showed collusion between the British, French, and Japanese governments not only about the matters included in those no longer secret agreements, but indicating mutual agreement of much wider scope and duration. To recite all the evidences of this would require more space than I wish to use here; but in the following year at Geneva, during the first session of the League of Nations, when the Chinese delegates were trying to get consideration for the Chinese questions and discreetly sounded out the attitudes of the British and French governments, they learned that the British and French foreign offices felt bound to support the spirit of the Shantung agreements until the question was finally disposed to the satisfaction of Japan. As, on their face, and in legal logic, those agreements obligated the powers only to support Japan's

claims in getting them written into the treaty of peace, it would be supposed that when that had been done, and the treaty written and ratified by the powers that were parties to those agreements, the agreements would be satisfied and canceled. But intimations given to the Chinese delegates at Geneva, more than one year after the Paris conference adjourned, by Mr. Balfour and M. Viviani, revealed that the agreements were still alive in spirit. This showed conclusively either that the original agreements carried an unwritten obligation of the powers not only to aid Japan in getting what she wanted into the peace treaty, but also to aid her in getting that part of the treaty enforced; or that a new or a supplementary agreement of similar import had been made at Paris. In fact, a member of the Japanese delegation at Paris told me confidentially before the Shantung decision had been given that the outcome was sure to be entirely satisfactory to Japan, as the French, British, and Japanese governments had reached a complete accord regarding the whole of Asia and the Pacific. My memorandum follows:

By T. F. M.
Paris, May 8, 1919. *Confidential*

CONJECTURAL BASES OF THE ALLEGED BRITISH-FRENCH-JAPANESE ENTENTE REGARDING ASIA

There are many indications that the attitudes of the British, French and Japanese governments as expressed by the decision of the Council of Four on the Kiaochou and Shantung questions were determined some time before the formal decision was arrived at, and that the unqualified support given to Japan by the British and French governments in the Council of Four was based on some definite private agreement by those three governments about a *future* mutual policy, as well as on the private Shantung agreements made in 1917.

It is currently but unofficially reported in Paris that an entente, or tri-Power private agreement, *regarding all Asia* has been made by the British, French and Japanese governments. If that is correct, it scarcely can be doubted that its formula coincides with

the status given to Japan in Shantung, and by the Manchurian agreements, which in practice is a definite revival and recognition of the "sphere of influence" thesis. It is utter folly to presume that the British and French governments are not fully informed as to the true character of Japan's policy and actions in China, or that they have any illusions as to its future import and tendency. Therefore, if it proves correct that Great Britain and France have *recognized and have agreed hereafter to support* Japan's position and policy in the Far East, it is conclusive evidence that those Powers have decided to accept a Japanese suzerainty over certain regions as a *fait accompli.*

Territorial Scope

Such information as is obtainable, and the logic of the situation, indicates the territorial scope of the new Asiatic tri-Power entente as follows:

Great Britain:	India, Persia, Arabia, Tibet, Burma, Szechuen province, western Siam; the Kwangtung region forming the littoral of Canton; and equality of commercial opportunity in the Yangtze valley.
France:	Yunnan and Kwangsi; Indo-China and Tonkin; eastern Siam.
Japan:	Eastern Siberia; all of China except the regions previously mentioned.

Other Considerations

All Powers parties to the entente to accord to each other reciprocal commercial opportunities in their spheres, and to respect concessions and investments now existing.

The entente Powers to support France in securing French prewar investments in Russia.

The entente Powers to support Japan's interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement in case there develops a divergence of policy and viewpoint between the United States and Japanese governments *re* that instrument.

The entente Powers to support Japan in case a divergence of policy regarding Siberia develops between the United States and Japanese governments.

The entente Powers to support Great Britain's position and policy in India and southwestern Asia.

Reactions on America

Such a private (or public) entente would practically eliminate the United States from political influence and commercial equal

opportunity in Asia. The previous and present practical operation of the "sphere" thesis unmistakably demonstrate that.

In that connection, it is interesting to consider how France can consistently ask (as she is doing) the United States to guarantee her military security in Europe, and to finance her economic reconstruction, while at the same time she is entering a combination to exclude American influence and commerce from Asia; and which will fasten Japanese imperialism on democratic China.

An analysis of the foregoing outline and the practical conditions by which it of necessity would be given effect, shows plainly that such a combination is directed primarily at American political and economic influence in Asia.

If such a combination becomes effective, the United States must either submit to its rulings in Far Eastern affairs, or *go to war to maintain its rights.*

EFFECTS ON CHINA

The effect of such an agreement would be to destroy the political autonomy and territorial integrity of China, as is guaranteed by the Hay Doctrine and various other international treaties.

NOTE:—This reported tri-Power entente regarding Asia seems to be a direct corollary of and answer to the Monroe Doctrine clause in the Covenant of the proposed League of Nations, which contains a phrase recognizing "regional understandings," or words to that effect, and collateral agreements between members of the League, thus giving them validity under the League

It may be impossible, therefore, and surely it will be difficult for the United States or China to appeal to the League of Nations for relief from, or to abrogate, such a tri-Power entente, which would include a majority of the Great Powers which will constitute the real ruling force of a League.

Back of the (to the expert) evident collusion of the British and Japanese governments at Paris, in respect of Asiatic and Pacific Ocean questions, was the Anglo-Japanese alliance. I do not intend to discuss that alliance at this point; but introduce it as something to be kept in mind always when seeking the true motivations of some diplomacies at Paris. During the first weeks of the Paris conference the statesmen of the Principal Powers had learned, I take it, that President Wilson was sincere in his various pronouncements about the objects of the war and the principles to be embodied in the

peace; that is, the President morally and spiritually was sincere, but, as the diplomats of the old school soon discovered, he was practically without ideas of how to translate his principles into action, or written treaties, which might be accepted by Europe. That situation suited the diplomats of Europe to a nicety; for it left them comparatively free to proceed with the usual method of making the treaty by private deals among themselves, then combining to give their trades the sanction of the Big Four. (The "Big Four," it perhaps should be stated, was merely a current pseudonym for the Supreme Council; the Big Four in reality was a Big Five, for it included Japan whenever Asiatic and Pacific Ocean affairs were under discussion; at other times, when Italy temporarily had withdrawn, it became a Big Three.) Whether it was a council of five, or three, or four, President Wilson invariably had a majority combination against him in it, and against his theory of making the peace.

For instance, take two of his leading principles as he had enunciated them prior to Paris, "open diplomacy" and "self-determination of peoples." We have seen what happened to open diplomacy. In regard to "self-determination," it is interesting again to quote Mr. Lansing's book on the peace negotiations.

In discussing the method by which the final draft of the covenant of the League of Nations was decided, Mr. Lansing tells how the President had wanted to put a clause into the covenant designed to save his self-determination idea: in Article III of the first draft occurred the words "such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination . . . may be effected if agreeable to those peoples. . . . The Contracting Powers accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary." In the revised draft, that

article became: "Article 7—The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all States members of the League."

Not a word about self-determination got into the treaty or the covenant; and the reason is plain. Mr. Lansing wrote: "It was generally believed that the elimination of the modifying clause from the President's original form of guaranty was chiefly due to the opposition of the statesmen who represented the British Empire in contradistinction to those who represented the British dominions. It was also believed that this opposition was caused by an unwillingness on their part to recognize or to apply as a right the principle of 'self-determination' in arranging possible future changes of sovereignty over territories."

Quite so! Imagine, if one can, British imperial statesmen, or any old-school diplomats, consenting to put territorial arrangements to the literal test of "self-determination." On that test, a large part of the British Empire would be well out of hand at once. It may be said that the core of European diplomatic hypothesis in shaping the treaty and the covenant was *to preserve and if possible to extend the hegemony of European diplomacy.*

Mr. Lansing continues:

> I do not know the arguments which were used to induce the President to abandon this phrase and to strike it from his article of guaranty. . . . Whatever arguments were advanced by his foreign colleagues, they were successful in freeing the Covenant from the phrase. . . . Without such a disavowal the phrase remained as one of the general bases upon which a just peace should be negotiated. It remained a precept of the international creed which Mr. Wilson proclaimed while the war was still in progress, for he had declared, in an address delivered on February 11, 1918, before a joint session of the Senate and House of Representatives, that "self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen hereafter will ignore at their peril."

When it came to writing the peace treaty and a covenant for a league of nations, statesmen did, however, dare to ignore Mr. Wilson's principle, and they induced him also to relegate it. By the end of the conference, it had vanished, none knew where or how. Mr. Lansing published some of his notes on the subject, made in December, 1918:

> When the President talks of "self-determination" what unit has he in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? Without a definite unit which is practical, application of this principle is dangerous to peace and stability. . . . The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of "self-determination," the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. . . . The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. . . . In the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist who failed to realize the danger until too late to check those who attempt to put the principle into force. What a calamity that the phrase ever was uttered!

If Mr. Lansing so regarded self-determination, it requires no effort to conceive how it was regarded by the diplomats of Europe, and by statesmen of powers which included vast regions and populations under their authority that undoubtedly would come under Mr. Lansing's definition of "certain races." Nor can there be any doubt of the identity of those "certain races" with whom, by the conventional thesis of European diplomacy, self-determination is taboo. Broadly, they are the colored races, four fifths of whom are concentrated in Asia and contiguous islands. Which powers, therefore, have the greater interest in keeping the principle of self-determination out of peace treaties and covenants? Here is the basis of the combination which I indicated in my memorandum on a possible tri-power entente for Asia, which in effect was an agreement to maintain the existing status quo. It was logical. Also, it was not a matter to be made public at that juncture; that is obvious.

In presenting a memorandum giving presumptions concerning the constitution of a tri-power Asiatic entente, I explained to those interested that I did not want to be understood as asserting that a new "regional agreement" positively was consummated at Paris. It is virtually certain, however (and I was so informed), that the Japanese delegation at Paris advanced such a proposal privately to the British and French governments before the Shantung decision was made and again after that decision was announced. The Japanese Government foresaw that if the British and French governments wrote off the secret Shantung agreements, that would leave Japan without any powerful support thereafter in distinction with America, and that Great Britain and France might be swung around later by the United States to support a genuine integrity of China and open-door policy. The Japanese therefore took time by the forelock and sought a means to secure Japan in possession of what she would get at Paris, a situation which Japanese diplomats saw would collide inevitably with American policy and interests.

I could not learn at Paris how the Japanese proposal was received by the British Government; but circumstantial evidence at the time made the Far East experts attached to the American commission very uncertain as to the real British policy toward the China questions. The Chinese delegation, after I presented my memorandum, obtained definite confirmation that the French Foreign Office had the matter of a new understanding with Japan under advisement and by no means was antagonistic to the idea. Certain contingencies (chiefly the proposed "alliance" whereby the United States would be obligated to give military support to France in Europe) made it expedient for the French Government to withhold its assent to a new regional understanding about Asia until after the American Government had acted on the treaty and the alliance.

The explanation of why the British and French govern-

ments might be willing to make such an agreement with Japan is found in the conditions which I previously sketched, embracing the corpus of Europe's Asiatic policy, and its relation to the imperial policy of Japan, and, at Paris, Britain's new relation to the renaissance of France. In such a regional understanding with Japan, Great Britain and France would be seeking balances and safeguards which, at that time, they could not perceive in the altruistic generalizations of President Wilson, nor in any probable policy of the American Government. Great Britain then felt (and probably feels now in greater measure) the absolute need to stabilize Asia; and with the United States pursuing a vague and actionless policy there, such a combination with Japan, which government at least knew what it wanted, promised better results. This attitude of the British Government toward the problem of eastern Asia was quite apparent at Paris. It was no secret that M. Pichon, then French minister of foreign affairs, thought that a frankly imperialistic policy is the only way to recoup the position of France in the world.

A few days after the Shantung decision was announced, Baron Makino, head of the Japanese delegation, gave a statement to the press in which he said that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would not be affected by the treaty, or by the covenant of the League; this was confirmed by utterances to the same effect in the British Parliament then and later. There were many indications that the unqualified support given to Japan by the British and French governments at Paris was founded on an understanding for the future, as well as on the secret Shantung agreements.

§ 4

I spent some time in Washington during the summer of 1919, when the discussion of the treaty and covenant was prevalent, devoting my time to putting before responsible members of the Government whatever information

I possessed. I found with Congress a strong antipathy to the treaty and covenant as signed at Paris by the President; but a confusion existed about what to do to prevent ratification. Lack of information was a difficulty. Scarcely anything was known. The Bliss letter at that time was not heard of in Washington; I think I brought the first news of its existence.

The newspapers (numerous and influential they were) which then were advocating a prompt ratification of both the treaty and covenant accused Senator Lodge, Senator Johnson, Senator Knox, Senator Borah, Senator McCormick, Senator Moses, and other leaders of opposition to the treaty and covenant of being inspired by petty partizanship, and in some cases by a personal hatred of the President. In my mind, such accusations were irrelevant. President Wilson's American colleagues at Paris, and the personnel of expert attachés to the American commission, did not hate Mr. Wilson and were not influenced by partizan politics; on the contrary, they had regarded the President with affection, pride, and, until late in the conference, with almost unlimited confidence; yet with practical unanimity they dissented from many of his acts at Paris for broad moral and patriotic reasons. Those men, however, had been mute, as to their views reaching "outside" opinion; while the President's views and his arguments for doing what he had done were broadcast. A strong case for anything can be made by that process.

In private interviews with opposition senators I learned that even the more determined of them lacked confidence in the success of their endeavor to prevent ratification; the best they hoped for was to append some reservations. One senator said to me: "I know the whole thing ought to be beaten, but no power on earth can defeat the League of Nations. The people think they want it." I told him I thought it was possible to prevent ratification of the treaty and covenant as they were signed at Paris; that when the whole matter had been studied and sifted, to make changes or append amendments

would not be difficult, notwithstanding anything the President would do. The opposition senators were dubious, although expressing themselves publicly with the utmost confidence. As practical politicians they simply could not conceive that the President would have issued his declaration that he would confound the opposition by an appeal to the country and an explanation to the people of his acts at Paris, unless he felt sure of his ground. Politicians at Washington had difficulty in believing that the President would express himself so positively unless, as they put it, he had "something up his sleeve" to confute his critics. I told them that the President had nothing "up his sleeve," or anywhere, that would enable him successfully to defend certain phases of his conduct at Paris if that was exposed intelligently. Senators wanted to believe that, but remained doubtful. The prestige of Mr. Wilson in America then was only a little impaired. A large part of the American people saw the President and the League through a rose-colored haze of altruistic optimism; but I knew that the treaty and covenant would not bear critical examination.

That was in July. In all ways that I could, I tried to get the real situation before an intelligent nucleus of Americans, by correspondence and the distribution of memoranda. Here is a letter to the late Charles R. Miller, whom I regarded as a friend:

Washington, July 18, 1919.

Charles R. Miller,
Editor New York Times.
Dear Mr. Miller:

Your letter reached me here. Of course I have not been able to see all that "The Times" has published re the Shantung matter, or about the treaty and covenant. I enclose a copy of a reply I made to Dr. David Jayne Hill, which contains some matters that may interest you; and I hope Dr. Jenks will not fail to send you a copy of my letter to Senator Johnson. As far as I can, I am putting all the information I have at the disposal of the Democrats, as well as the opposition to the President.

As to the alleged Jap-German treaty, I obtained last December from an American official (military) source a copy of the alleged draft, which now has been published. I did not include it in my book "Democracy and the Eastern Question" because its authenticity was then scarcely established, and I was afraid to take a chance of it being correct. There is no doubt, however (I give details in my last book, published in May) that Japan was flirting with Germany during the war, and used circumstances to blackmail the Allies. *That system seems to pay in international politics,* for at Paris it was Japan that Great Britain and France lined up with on Eastern questions, not with America, which gave real help in defeating Germany. As for "The Times" and its policy *vis-à-vis* this and other issues now involved in the discussion of the treaty, the covenant, and the proposed "alliance," I expect to see a little later that you will find it necessary, in explaining and trying to defend some acts of the President at Paris, to drag out and air all the specious and superficial arguments about China and Shantung that Japan's propaganda has invented. That is the way it works: first, get the United States to agree to certain wrongs in a treaty and covenant, then that eventually will compel us to defend those wrongs in theory as well as to support them in practice.

You say in your letter (an argument which the President used to console the Chinese envoys at Paris) that, after the treaty and the League are adopted by us, "pressure will be brought on Japan" to make her play the game properly in the far East. Pray, how is that pressure on Japan going to be applied in the circumstances which would then exist? What forces exist, or hereafter will exist, that can be effective on Japan, which did not exist in greater measure a few months ago at Paris? As a matter of fact, when the issue is joined (coming soon now) between the American and the Japanese interpretations of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, will not the pressure be on America rather than on Japan, unless something is done to alter conditions? Notwithstanding that more elements of power were in President Wilson's hands at Paris than ever before were held by any statesman, there was sufficient "pressure" put on him in the pinch (bluff, I think) to make him give way in the Shantung and other equally important matters. How can you ask me to believe that when the President so yielded to that pressure at Paris, that he or his successors will be able to resist it hereafter, especially if the status quo is written into a treaty and the League and ratified by our Government? I can't believe that, Mr. Miller.

However, the effort to suppress discussion of these issues and

to have the treaty, the covenant, and the proposed alliance, ratified on the President's say-so and without scrutiny, so obviously has failed that I now have slight fear but that some rectification of certain wrongs can be accomplished. The fight is on, and patriotic Americans must line up as their minds and consciences dictate. You say that the treaty and the covenant are "certain to be ratified." Of course, a treaty of peace with the nations we have been at war with will be ratified eventually in some form. As a matter of fact, we now actually have peace with Germany, et al.; and the form of a treaty largely is a matter of record for the future, and a base for future actions of governments. I regard as simply bosh the talk about a "danger" in not ratifying the treaty and covenant immediately. You must know quite well there is no present danger of the war being renewed on a large scale, or soon, for none of the governments in Europe, Allies or former enemy, have a division of troops they can order into conflict with surety that the order will be obeyed. The truth is, at least for a spell, that the Powers cannot prevent the world from having something as near to peace as the distracted state of the world will allow.

With regards, I am, etc.,

THOMAS F. MILLARD.

In talking privately with senators, I endeavored to impress on them that both of the cardinal policies of the United States—the Monroe and Hay doctrines—in effect had been scrapped at Paris; action which, if the Senate accepted the treaty and covenant as drafted there, would obtain the sanction of the American Government. That would end them. That, I pointed out, was none the less correct because the scrapping of those doctrines had been so cleverly camouflaged that, presumably, it had escaped the notice of the President; or it might have been that he was willing to merge the American doctrines into an international organization dominated by European powers. Whatever the President's intentions, that, in effect, is what had been done; although, in deference to the well-known prejudices and convictions of the American people on the subject, that part of the press which supported the President strenuously tried to demonstrate that neither of the doctrines were impaired by the treaty and the covenant.

In testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during its hearings on the subject of the treaty and covenant, I mentioned the numerous "regional understandings" concerning Asia which were known to be in existence,[6] and which would, if the powers so desired, obtain the sanction of the League of Nations. I was asked to write a memorandum outlining my views on this point, which I did, and the memorandum was published in the official report of the Senate's proceedings. It follows:

By Thomas F. Millard
August 20, 1919.

"REGIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS" AND THE SHANTUNG DECISION

DEFINITION OF REGIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS

Article XXI of the proposed Covenant of the League of Nations validates "regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine" which are in existence at the time the League is organized, and other such understandings made later that are approved by the League.

Another Article of the Covenant provides that all Members of the League must inform all the other Members of any and all treaties, agreements, pacts, alliances, and regional understandings (or the Article is presumed to have that meaning) that exist among Members of the League, or between Members of the League and nations not members of the League.

A reading of the various Articles of the Covenant bearing on this phase of international relations under the League indicates that Members of the League will have until a time after the formal organization of the League to make, and to declare, whatever regional understandings they have, and that such regional understandings thus formally declared to the League within that time shall be recognized as valid.

A point has been advanced that *only* regional understandings which properly are "like the Monroe Doctrine" will be made valid by Article XXI of the Covenant.

CONDITIONS AFFECTING INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XXI

Only the Monroe Doctrine is mentioned by name in Article XXI as being a valid "regional understanding" under the terms of the Covenant.

[6] Appendix H.

But the language of the Article expressly indicates that it is the intention of the Article to validate regional understandings other than the Monroe Doctrine.

It may be, subsequent to the organization of a League, that a question may be raised upon the presentation of some regional understanding, as to whether it is "like the Monroe Doctrine." If a difference of view develops on that point, it would be a question to be decided by the governing body of the League. The decision of the question in each particular case would depend on the alignment of votes in the governing body of the League.

For the purpose of the argument, let us assume, for instance, that *after* the American Government signs the Treaty of Peace, and the Covenant, and an Anglo-French-American alliance, in the present form of those treaties, the League is notified of a regional understanding covering Asia entered into by the British, French and Japanese governments.

Let us further assume that that regional understanding would be regarded by the American Government as *not "like the Monroe Doctrine,"* but, on the contrary, as being subversive of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and as destructive of that counterpart of the Monroe Doctrine in Asia, the Hay Doctrine. In that case, the American Government probably would enter objection to such an arrangement as being not in conformity with Article XXI.

In such a case, it is probable that the British and French and Japanese governments would take an opposite view of the meaning of Article XXI, whereupon the issue would depend on a vote of the governing body of the League.

The constitution of the governing body of the League is such that it would be almost certain that the American Government would be outvoted on such an issue.

If it was held (and accepted) that the four Powers directly involved in the dispute should be excluded from voting on the decision of it, and they were excluded, and the decision was left to the remaining members of the governing body, it also is practically certain that the American Government would be outvoted, for these reasons:

(a) There are known to exist more than twenty regional understandings about Asia, involving all the Great Powers except the United States. Also, it is suspected that several other regional understandings exist whose texts never have been disclosed.

(b) Outside of Asia, there are many known and probably also many secret regional understandings in existence, involving all of the Great Powers except the United States, and also involving a

majority of the lesser nations that are expected to be Members of the League.

(c) That condition establishes a situation whereby almost all the members of the League *except the United States* have regional understandings which they may desire to make valid under the League. In that situation, it is highly probable, and it certainly is possible, that the Members having regional understandings which they want to sustain will combine to define Article XXI as meaning to include regional understandings of whatever character that were made before the formal organization of the League.

Application to China and the Hay Doctrine

Since the Paris Conference met, there have been several distinct intimations of the purpose of some of the Principal Powers to advance certain regional understandings about China as the basis for international action regarding China.

In connection with the newly formed international (4-power) financial group to operate in China, it already is reported that the Japanese Government will insist that Manchuria and Shantung will be excepted from the operations of the Group, Japan reserving those regions for her exclusive economic exploitation.[7]

If the Japanese Government has developed, or subsequently does develop this attitude, it can be taken for certain that the British, French and other governments which have regional understandings about China based on the "sphere of influence" thesis will insist on maintaining their exclusive rights under those regional understandings.

That would array three of the four members of the new financial Group in opposition to the American member of the Group, and, since the United States has no "sphere" or any regional understanding regarding China, or Asia, giving it any special position or privileges in any region, such a situation will be tantamount to excluding America, and will defeat the announced purposes and objects of the banking group.

Such a situation will effectively prevent any effort to relieve China of the "sphere" condition, and will fasten it upon her more strongly than before.

Note. The statements of the President at his conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 19 positively demonstrated how the existence of secret regional understandings can compel, or induce, the American Government to yield on important questions.

[7] The Japanese Government did do this subsequently.

It therefore is possible that the American Government would find, after it ratified the treaty, the covenant, and the proposed alliance, that new secret regional understandings thereafter may be consummated, which can be made valid under the League.

It is an illustration of the confusion of the time that the article of the League Covenant which in effect relegated the Monroe Doctrine was cited by the President and by his defenders as a "recognition" and guaranty of it. The President plainly stated that as the chief reason for putting that article in the covenant; if so, his purpose adroitly was reversed in the phraseology of the article. I think this article, when it was announced at Paris, gave "inside" opinion the heartiest laugh it got during the conference. "Who put that over on the President?" was a common remark; and the credit usually was given, whether correctly I cannot say, to Mr. Balfour. On that point, Mr. Lansing wrote:

> Opposition would, in my opinion, develop [in America] on the ground that the guaranty would permit European Powers to participate, if they could not act independently, in the forcible settlement of international quarrels in the Western Hemisphere . . . while conversely the United States would be morally, if not legally, bound to take part in coercive measures in composing European differences under similar conditions. It could be urged with much force that the Monroe Doctrine in the one case and the Washington policy of avoiding "entangling alliances" in the other would be so affected that they would both have to be substantially abandoned or else rewritten.

Mr. Lansing's book was not published until two years after the peace conference, and I did not know his views at the time; but the possible effects and meaning of some clauses of the covenant were perceptible to "inside" opinion at the instant when they were announced at Paris.

§ 5

With the return of President Wilson from France, the real contest between him on the one side and the

Republican majority of the Senate on the other side about ratification of the treaties and the covenant signed at Paris commenced. Resounding defiances had been uttered by both sides. The attitude of senators, still obsessed by the belief that the American people could not be detached from support of a league of nations, varied from absolute opposition to both the treaty and covenant in any form, to mild and strong reservations, and to full acceptance. On the whole, a majority of senators inclined to ratify the treaty and covenant with reservations. The President from the beginning of the contest took an uncompromising position, to the effect that the treaty and covenant must be ratified unaltered.

For weeks the contest proceeded on the part of the Senate as if calculated to sound the sentiment of the country. Even with the "bitter-enders" of the opposition, there was a fear that the President was holding back some important information, which he would disclose at a moment calculated to embarrass the opposition greatly; they waited for the President, as he had declared his purpose, to "take the people into his confidence." Meanwhile, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate held hearings with a purpose to gather information about the treaty and covenant. The hearings were public—a contrast to the President's methods at Paris.

The President returned from France on July 8, and on July 10 he presented the treaty and covenant to the Senate. The "supplement" to the treaty, known as the "alliance," was for the time withheld, to be presented later. It was apparent that the President felt that to present the supplement and treaty simultaneously would be poor tactics. The hearings of the Senate committee commenced early in August. After a few witnesses had been heard, their disclosures raised matters that tended to embarrass the President and to make the public uneasy; so the President abandoned his aloofness

and invited the Senate committee to confer with him and to question him concerning the treaty and covenant. This conference was set for August 19. When the meeting occurred, the opposition senators on the Foreign Relations Committee were well supplied with ammunition to fire at the President.

STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT LANSING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AUGUST 6, 1919

SENATOR BORAH. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the settlement of what is known as the Shantung affair, did you take part in the discussion by which the question was finally adjusted?

SECRETARY LANSING. No.

SENATOR BORAH. Did you file any statement in regard to it?

SECRETARY LANSING. No.

SENATOR BORAH. Did any one of the American Commission file any statement?

SECRETARY LANSING. General Bliss wrote a letter prior to the settlement.

SENATOR BORAH. Is that letter available?

SECRETARY LANSING. That I do not know. It was written to the President.

SENATOR BORAH. Who signed the letter?

SECRETARY LANSING. General Bliss.

SENATOR BORAH. Did the letter purport to be written on the part of anyone other than himself?

SECRETARY LANSING. Yes: on the part of Mr. White and myself.

SENATOR BORAH. Can you recall in a general way the contents of the letter?

SECRETARY LANSING. I should not want to, as it was a matter between General Bliss and the President.

SENATOR BORAH. Was it in the nature of a protest against what is known as the settlement of the Shantung affair?

SECRETARY LANSING. No.

SENATOR BORAH. What was the nature of it, then?

SECRETARY LANSING. The President had conferred with the Commissioners in my office in connection with the Japanese situation, and after we had expressed our general views in regard to the matter, the President wanted to know if we would communicate them in writing. General Bliss prepared a letter and showed it to Mr.

White and myself, and we concurred in it, and there was no reason why we should write separate letters, as we had nothing to add to it. That was some days before the Shantung settlement. It was a matter of advice, of our advice to the President.

SENATOR BORAH. Did the advice correspond with what was afterward done?

SECRETARY LANSING. No.

STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND PRESIDENT WILSON, AUGUST 19, 1919

SENATOR JOHNSON of California. Did China enter the war upon our advice—the advice of the United States?

THE PRESIDENT. I cannot tell; we advised her to enter and she soon after did. Whether she had sought our advice, and whether that was the persuasive advice or not, I do not know.

SENATOR JOHNSON of California. Do you recall, Mr. President, that preceding that advice we had asked China, as one of the neutral nations, to sever diplomatic relations with Germany?

THE PRESIDENT. Whether we had asked her?

SENATOR JOHNSON of California. Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT. I do not recall, Senator. I am sure Mr. Lansing can tell, though, from the records of the department.

SENATOR JOHNSON of California. Do you know, Mr. President, whether or not our Government stated to China that if China would enter the war we would protect her interests at the Peace Conference?

THE PRESIDENT. We made no promises.

SENATOR JOHNSON of California. No representations of that sort?

THE PRESIDENT. No. She knew that we would do as well as we could. She had every reason to know that.

SENATOR JOHNSON of California. Pardon me, a further question: You did make the attempt to do it, too, did you not?

THE PRESIDENT. Oh, indeed I did, very seriously.

SENATOR JOHNSON of California. And the decision ultimately reached at the Peace Conference was a disappointment to you?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, sir; I may frankly say that it was.

SENATOR JOHNSON of California. You would have preferred, as I think most of us would, that there had been a different conclusion

of the Shantung provision or the Shantung difficulty or controversy at the Paris Peace Conference?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes; I frankly intimated this.

REPORT OF THE TESTIMONY OF PROF. EDWARD T. WILLIAMS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, CHIEF ADVISOR ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS TO THE AMERICAN COMMISSION AT PARIS, GIVEN BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AUGUST 22, 1919

SENATOR JOHNSON. Were you called upon at any time to render any advice concerning the Shantung decision?

PROF. WILLIAMS. Not before the Council; but on our own Commission I was asked several times for memoranda on various phases of it.

SENATOR JOHNSON. Did you furnish any memoranda?

PROF. WILLIAMS. I did.

SENATOR JOHNSON. Do you remember substantially what you advised?

PROF. WILLIAMS. Yes.

SENATOR JOHNSON. Please state in your own way your advice on the Shantung question.

PROF. WILLIAMS. My own opinion is that the decision was an unfortunate one; that the leased territory of Kiaochou and the railways and mines in Shantung which had been in possession of Germany ought to have gone automatically to China at the conclusion of the peace; that they were taken by Germany from China by force, by an act of piracy; that the fact that some other power had driven the Germans out of Shantung did not seem to constitute a title to this property, which naturally would revert to the rightful sovereign of the territory.

In January I prepared a memorandum on the whole Shantung question, which was sent to the American Commission, and that was supplemented later by another memorandum on the question of the railways in Shantung. On the 9th of April I prepared a memorandum calling attention to the fact that in our treaty with China of 1858 we were pledged to China to use our good offices in case any nation acted unjustly toward China. . . .

I called attention to that, and suggested that we ought to draw a clause for the peace treaty which would provide for the transfer of the German Shantung rights directly to China. That memorandum was sent to the American Commission, and the next day I

received instructions to draft such a clause and to consult with Dr. James Brown Scott of the American delegation, who was our international law expert. . . . Dr. Scott suggested as an alternative that instead of transferring the German rights directly to China they might be transferred to the five Principal Powers in trust for China. That might be a compromise that would be satisfactory to Japan. . . .

On the 22nd of April I received a telephone message that the President wanted to see me. I went, and the President said he wanted me to consult with the Far Eastern experts of the British and French delegations as to which of two alternatives would be less injurious to China, to transfer to Japan all the rights and privileges formerly enjoyed by Germany in the province of Shantung, or to insist upon the execution of the convention of May 25, 1915, between China and Japan. The President said to me that unfortunately the British and French governments were bound by certain engagements which they had made with Japan to support Japan's claims for the transfer of these rights to herself directly, and that Mr. Lloyd George said they were bound to support only the transfer of the rights enjoyed by Germany, but no others. The President said the war seemed to have been fought to establish the sanctity of treaties, and that while some treaties were unconscionable, at the same time it looked like they would have to be observed. . . .

I replied: "Well, Mr. President, do you think that a treaty which was extorted from China by force and by a threat of military operations against her ought to have any binding force?" He said: "Well, perhaps the Japanese will not admit it was obtained that way." I suggested that the documents seemed to indicate that treaty was obtained in that way, and said: "Of course, if the documents show that, then the Japanese would not deny it"; but he asked me to consult the British and French experts about the alternatives he had raised.

I asked if I might suggest another alternative solution, and he said: "Certainly," and I suggested that we might put a blanket article in the treaty covering all German properties in China, saying that Germany renounced all rights and title to those government properties in China and that they reverted automatically to China, but since the port of Tsingtau and the railways and mines in Shantung Province had been taken from Germany by Japan with the aid of Great Britain, and were now in the possession of Japan, that in so far as those German government properties in Shantung were concerned they would be transferred to China by Japan

within one year after the signing of the peace treaty. The President said he had not considered the matter from that angle, and asked me to put it in writing. . . .

On April 24th the Far Eastern expert of the British delegation and the Far Eastern expert of the French delegation and myself met and signed a statement which was sent to the Council of Three—President Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau—in which we said that in our opinion it would be less injurious to China to transfer all the rights formerly enjoyed by Germany in the Province of Shantung to Japan than it would be to insist upon the observance of the China-Japan convention of 1915; and I told the British and French experts that I was going to send an independent statement trying to point out that neither alternative ought to be adopted; that we ought neither to insist upon the enforcement of the China-Japan treaty of 1915 nor the transfer of the German rights to Japan. . . .

At first Mr. Macleay, of the British delegation, said that he would not be able to do anything on that line, but afterward he changed his mind and he also made a statement that we were not shut in by those two alternatives. . . . I sent a written statement to President Wilson in which I begged to call attention to that fact. I cannot recall positively the argument that I used, but I think I must have pointed out that the China-Japan convention of 1915 was extorted from China by force. . . .

To return a moment to my interview with President Wilson on April 22nd, I then asked the President if the settlement proposing to transfer the German rights to Japan directly, or to insist upon the execution of the convention of 1915, was not contrary to the fourteen points laid down as a basis of peace. He said that unfortunately he did not see anything in the fourteen points that exactly covered this case. But on looking over the addresses of President Wilson and the statement made by Secretary Lansing to the German Government with regard to the bases of peace, I found this [reading]:

"The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government and by a large majority of the German Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses, justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision with regard to the communications of the German Government of the 8th and 12th of October, 1918." [The armistice communication.]

Now as to subsequent addresses, one was that made on July 4th

at Washington's tomb at Mount Vernon, in which the President said:

"No halfway decision is conceivable. These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace."

Then he mentions (1) "The destruction of any arbitrary power anywhere," and (2) to which I want to call attention:

"The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery."

I think it was in that memorandum to the President that I mentioned this point, and I said that my understanding was that all the powers who entered the agreement for the negotiation of peace after the armistice of November 11 practically accepted the basis of peace as laid down by the American Government, and that no exception, or reservation, had been made then by any of the powers to that point, and therefore it seemed to me that any prior engagements such as the secret treaties between Great Britain and Japan and between France and Japan ought not to be held any longer in force because they really were abrogated by the acceptance of those bases.

SENATOR JOHNSON. Did you state that to the President?

PROF. WILLIAMS. I am not positive whether it was in a memorandum to the President or an argument to the Commission.

SENATOR JOHNSON. Was there any response?

PROF. WILLIAMS. I received only a note from the President's secretary thanking me for the memorandum. . . . On the 30th of April I was informed that the question had been decided; it had been determined to transfer all the property formerly belonging to Germany and all the rights and privileges belonging to Germany in the Province of Shantung unconditionally to Japan.

SENATOR JOHNSON. Was there any other expert upon Oriental or Far Eastern affairs at Paris with you?

PROF. WILLIAMS. Yes. Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck.

SENATOR JOHNSON. Did his views coincide with yours?

PROF. WILLIAMS. Entirely.

SENATOR JOHNSON. Up to the time of the rendition of the decision you both had protested strongly against such a determination?

PROF. WILLIAMS. Yes: we had objected very strongly to the suggested transfer of the rights and properties to Japan.

SENATOR JOHNSON. What effect in your opinion does the decision have upon China, or our relations with China?

PROF. WILLIAMS. I felt that it would raise a storm of protest in China, and that it tended to strife rather than peace, because I knew or felt sure that the Chinese would not submit to it without considerable protest, and there was a danger of violence. Also, I felt that it was injurious to American interests, although I regard that as of secondary consideration.

SENATOR JOHNSON. Injurious to what?

PROF. WILLIAMS. To our own interests in China, because it would raise a feeling that China had come into the war on the invitation of the United States and had rather looked to the United States to help bring about a just settlement of these troubles, and now in turning over the whole situation to Japan we were injuring our own standing in the Far East.

SENATOR JOHNSON. Are you familiar with the provisions inserted in the peace treaty concerning Shantung?

PROF. WILLIAMS. Yes.

SENATOR JOHNSON. Will you state whether or not in your opinion those provisions give to Japan more in Shantung than either the convention of 1915 or the German lease?

PROF. WILLIAMS. I think they do.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. As I recall it, the President told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he had implicit confidence in the agreement or promise that Japan has given to return to China these rights and concessions that she gets under the treaty?

PROF. WILLIAMS. Yes.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. Have you stated exactly what that agreement of Japan consists of?

PROF. WILLIAMS. No, I have not.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. Will you tell us whether it was a verbal statement between the representatives, and which ones, and whether it appears at length in the process-verbal; whether it is accessible so that the terms can be known?

PROF. WILLIAMS. You mean a promise that Japan made at Paris?

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. Yes.

PROF. WILLIAMS. I do not know whether Japan made anything

more than a statement that her agreement of 1915 with China would be carried out, and that to make any further promise in the treaty would be a reflection on her bona fides. Therefore, it is not stated in the treaty.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. So far as you know, was there any assurance given by any official representative of Japan in Paris, either to the Conference or any member of the American Commission, in addition to what is contained in the treaty?

PROF. WILLIAMS. I only remember one case. Something of the sort may have been said in a meeting of the Council of Four. That I do not know. But I do remember an interview between Viscount Chinda and Secretary Lansing, in which Viscount Chinda said that the China-Japan treaty of 1915 must be carried out exactly, and of course the convention of 1915 has annexed to it an exchange of notes in which Japan agrees on four conditions to transfer the leased territory in Shantung to China.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. I have seen in the newspapers statements to the effect that representations have very recently been made by Japan or some of its spokesmen to the effect that while Japan will get out, the terms and conditions of getting out are to be decided by agreement between Japan and China at some time in the future.

PROF. WILLIAMS. Yes.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. If it is true that Japan has agreed to get out of Shantung only in accordance with such conditions as she may hereafter agree upon with China, does it not leave it practically in the sole power of Japan to get out or to stay there? That is, cannot she refuse to agree with China and continue to stay on the ground that China is unreasonable about the conditions, and that the treaty provides that Japan need not get out until the conditions are agreed on?

PROF. WILLIAMS. Well, the conditions were practically established by the convention of 1915; but China's position is that that treaty is no longer binding on her because after making it she declared war on Germany and abrogated all her treaties with Germany, including the lease of Kiaochou. Therefore, there is nothing to be settled between Japan and Germany.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. What relation does the treaty give Japan to economic conditions in Shantung?

PROF. WILLIAMS. It practically gives her control of the economic conditions of Shantung.

From the foregoing, it is plain that virtually the whole American commission at Paris, including President Wilson,

regarded the Shantung provisions of the treaty as unjust to China and unsatisfactory to the United States. It also is plain that three of the five American plenipotentiaries, and both of the special Far Eastern experts attached to the American commission, felt that it was not necessary to accede to Japan's demands. In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at Washington, Secretary Lansing gave his opinion:

SENATOR JOHNSON. Would the Japanese signature to the League of Nations have been obtained if you had not made the Shantung agreement?

SECRETARY LANSING. I think so.

SENATOR JOHNSON. You do?

SECRETARY LANSING. I think so.

SENATOR JOHNSON. So that even though Shantung had not been delivered to Japan, the League of Nations would not have been injured?

SECRETARY LANSING. I do not think so.

SENATOR JOHNSON. And you would have had the same signatories that you have now?

SECRETARY LANSING. Yes, one more—China.

After the conference with President Wilson, the opposition senators took courage, for they began to feel sure that he had "nothing up his sleeve." That evening I met a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and found him jubilant. "You were right," he said. "He has nothing in reserve; it was all bluff. We will beat the treaty and covenant now."

On September 3 the President started on the speaking tour that was to end so unfortunately. In his second address, at St. Louis, on September 5, he attempted to explain his action at Paris in consenting to the Shantung award, and said:

"Great Britain and other powers, as everybody knows, in order to make it more certain that Japan would come into the war and so assist to clear the Pacific of the German fleets,

had promised that any rights that Germany has in China should, in the case of the victory of the Allies, pass to Japan."

That statement is misleading and contrary to the known facts. Japan declared war on Germany August 24, 1914. The secret agreements between Japan and Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy, concerning reversion of the alleged German rights in Shantung, were signed in February and March, 1917, two and one half years later. At that time, Tsingtau and Shantung had been occupied by the Japanese armies for more than two years, over the protest of China; and the Pacific had been entirely cleared of German naval forces. Therefore, the secret agreements given in 1917 by the Allied Powers were not to induce Japan to *enter the war,* although they may have been made to induce Japan *to remain in the war on the side of the Allies.* There is no doubt of the impression that President Wilson had obtained in Paris of the reason why the Allied Powers made those agreements; he only had the dates wrong.

In other speeches made on that tour, the President in explaining the Shantung decision at different times put it on different grounds. On several occasions he stated that being unable to persuade the British and French representatives on the Supreme Council to relegate the secret agreements made during the war, he felt compelled, in order to prevent a schism, to consent to Japan's demands. That amounted to yielding the open obligations of the United States in the matter to the secret and invidious engagements of other powers; a course which, in the opinion of a majority of the American commission and experts, was not necessary.

The President's tour and the reception given to his speeches indicated that his position was losing ground before the country. That tendency wrought strongly on the already weakened health of Mr. Wilson and brought on a collapse in Kansas, on September 26.[8] However, he did not recede in the least degree from his position with regard to the treaty

[8] This was written and put into type before the death of Mr. Wilson.

and covenant. But he steadily lost ground; and in the end the Senate refused to ratify, after a prolonged parliamentary circumlocution, which, in respect to the Far East, had one significant instance. On August 23 the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate reported an amendment to the Versailles treaty, substituting for the Shantung articles the following resolution:

> The United States withholds its assent to Articles 156, 157, and 158,[9] and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles.

In so far as action by the Senate then could do that, the resolution reversed President Wilson's assent given at Paris to the Shantung articles of the treaty, and made clear the position of one part of the American Government. That was in August; and the vote of the Senate on the treaty and covenant was not taken until November 19, when Congress adjourned. From that time the treaty and covenant virtually were suspended, in so far as the participation of the United States is concerned; although argument about them was renewed periodically apropos of developments. I give a memorandum of mine written in October:

By Thomas F. Millard,
October 17, 1919.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SHANTUNG QUESTION

Efforts to rectify the so-called Shantung provisions of the Treaty adopted at Paris have two major considerations and objects:

(a) Protection of the interests of the United States.

(b) Protection of China.

In dealing with the question it is presumed that the American Senate gives primary place to the first object, with a sincere desire also to secure the second object.

No statements or arguments have been brought into the discussion by prominent Americans indicating that any branch of the American Government except the Executive has thought of abandoning the traditional American policy toward China, as embodied in

[9] See page 72.

the Hay Doctrine of the commercial open-door for all nations and the preservation of the territorial integrity and administrative autonomy of China. The argument is about means to preserve that Doctrine and policy in relation to the Treaty and Covenant adopted by the Paris conference. It is evident that a majority of the Senate and of the American people regard the Treaty provisions concerning Shantung as unsatisfactory and as subversive of both of the above-named objects. Two methods of correcting the Treaty and Covenant are proposed—by amendment and by reservations.

A distinction can be made between these methods, viz.: amendment of the Treaty and Covenant attempt to reverse certain things that were done by the Paris conference; reservations attempt to deprive those acts of the conference of binding force upon the United States. Amendments attempt to react upon the past; reservations look more to the future. Both methods may have the same ultimate results. From the standpoint of the interest of America in the Shantung question, they seem as well safeguarded either way.

The Interest of China

There is no doubt that it would have been more satisfactory to China had the Paris conference adopted provisions regarding Shantung by which Germany's position and rights and property there were ceded to China instead of to Japan, especially if Japan had signed a Treaty containing those provisions; and even if Japan had not signed such a Treaty, a powerful international force would have been formally aligned against her. It may be pointed out, however, that even if the Treaty had awarded the German rights and position in Shantung to China, Japan still would have been actually in possession of those rights, and the task of enforcing the Treaty would have remained a delicate and difficult one; in short, the problem of getting Japan out of Shantung and other parts of China would have been a very embarrassing question for the Powers.

In that connection, the matter of the so-called "secret" Shantung agreements has an important bearing. These were private engagements made in February and March, 1917, whereby the British, French, Russian, and Italian governments agreed in substance to support Japan at the peace conference in her claim to inherit the German rights and position in Shantung. An examination of the texts of those diplomatic engagements indicates that the four governments mentioned did not commit themselves in those private agreements to support Japan beyond the peace con-

ference. Therefore, by supporting Japan at the conference those governments fulfilled the letter of their engagements, and the secret Shantung agreements were terminated by being paid in full. If, however, it was proposed to amend the Treaty by reversing its articles relating to Shantung, and such an amendment was referred back to the conference, the secret Shantung agreements would be revived in their binding force on the British, French and Italian governments and those governments almost certainly would feel compelled again to support Japan's position. In those circumstances, there is little prospect that the consent of the Principal Powers to a change in the Shantung clauses could be obtained.

On the other hand, the position of the United States on the question can be made clear by an explicit reservation, leaving the American government free hereafter to pursue its traditional policy toward China. By not reviving the secret agreements, and leaving them extinguished by being satisfied, the British and French governments also are left free regarding a future policy toward China, *provided those governments have not already made or do not hereafter make other engagements with Japan binding their actions.*

From these circumstances it appears that any advantages that might be gained by attempting to amend the Shantung clauses of the Treaty might be offset by revitalizing the Shantung agreements, thereby circumscribing the policies now and perhaps hereafter of the British, French and Italian governments.

The acceptance of an amendment on Shantung by the conference at one time would probably have induced the Chinese Government to sign the Treaty with Germany; but it hardly would have that result now because the Chinese Government already has declared peace with Germany by resolution and will arrange the details by negotiation. By signing the Treaty with Austria, China has become eligible for membership of a League of Nations should one result from the Paris conference.

China's interest is apt to be served now and hereafter by measures that will determine or influence the alignment of the Principal Powers on the broad issues of the Hay Doctrine, and on moves to induce Japan to restore Shantung and Manchuria and to abandon her policy of aggression in China.

How to Preserve the Hay Doctrine

China can be saved by saving the Hay Doctrine and by converting its basic principles into international practice. On this purpose American diplomatic policy should be concentrated. These conditions are essential to the success of such a policy:

(a) An alignment of Great Britain with the United States on this question.

(b) Knowledge by the American Government of *all* diplomatic agreements and understandings, private or open, between Great Britain and those other Powers in Europe relating to China and Asia, and of those Powers with Japan.

(c) Prevention by the American Government, if possible, of any further agreements between those Powers, or between any of those Powers and Japan, or between any of those Powers and China, which are antagonistic to or subversive of the principles of the Hay Doctrine; and the abrogation of existing agreements of that character.

(d) A declaration by the American Government that it regards the political development of China and of Eastern Asia on democratic lines and free of the interference and oppression of the imperialistic policies of any nations, to be of fundamental importance to the United States.

(e) Refusal by the United States to allow its capital wealth and other resources to be used either directly or indirectly through other nations to obstruct or impede the fruition of the American policy in Eastern Asia; and the withholding of American financial and other assistance to nations that either directly or indirectly oppose or try to subvert the Hay Doctrine.

(f) Creation of the necessary facilities and agencies for extending and securing the American position in Eastern Asia.

(g) Establish a definite understanding with Great Britain and France by which those Powers will aid America in sustaining and putting into practice the Hay Doctrine in China.

It of course is true that the treatment of some of these matters lies outside of the prerogatives of the Senate in dealing with the present Treaty and Covenant; but it is in the power of the Senate to lay the foundations for them in its action relating to the treaty and covenant.

Anglo-French-American Entente or Alliance

Interwoven with the Treaty and Covenant adopted at Paris and as a Supplement to them, the President will lay before the Senate for its consent a treaty whereby the United States engages under certain conditions (of an "unprovoked" attack on France by Germany) to come to the assistance of France with military and other forces. By reason of the fact that at the same time a similar treaty was arranged between France and Great Britain, the two treaties constitute in effect a tripartite defensive alliance.

This proposed alliance is designed to secure to France safeguards not believed to be assured by the League of Nations. Its territorial application is confined to Europe and to a single specified contingency. By becoming a party to it the United States will be committed to obligations which entail great responsibility and expense, and which involve this nation in the whole corpus of European politics. While the language of the proposed alliance treaty makes the condition of American participation an unprovoked attack by Germany upon France, the nature and causes of such provocation manifestly are not and plainly cannot be confined strictly to issues that may arise directly between Germany and France. The treaty adopted at Paris re-shapes the political map of Europe and creates conditions and relations which plant possible causes for provocations between Germany and France in every boundary, and question, arising in Europe, and even outside of Europe. If the United States enters upon this proposed alliance, every friction of nations in Europe, or of European nations anywhere in the world, will carry the possibility of eventually bringing this alliance into effect.

In the terms of the proposed alliance, the United States assumes heavy obligations, in the interest of France; or, to broaden the application to its real content, to sustain a certain balance of power in Europe by backing up France.

But the alliance as written contains no compensation for the United States. It provides for no defense or support of American territory or interests anywhere by France and Great Britain.

In connection with the far Eastern policy of the United States, a clause in this proposed Anglo-French-American alliance treaty by which the French and British governments again express adherence to and engage under certain conditions to aid America in defending or enforcing the Hay Doctrine would clarify the attitudes of those Powers vis-à-vis this question and aid greatly in establishing the future tranquillity of China and in averting a rupture of the peace about the Shantung and Manchuria questions. Such a clause will protect the interests and rights of China, and safeguard the American policy toward China, as well as can be done now by diplomatic prevision.

That memorandum outlines the questions as they existed then, when it seemed probable that the Senate would ratify the treaty and covenant with amendments and reservations; indeed, on September 10 the Senate Foreign Relations Com-

mittee reported to the whole Senate the treaty with forty-eight amendments and the covenant with four reservations. Rumors of compromises appeared frequently in the press; and had the President moderated his uncompromising position, and accepted reservations, it might have been possible to obtain ratification. So the crisis was prolonged until the treaty and covenant sank under a swelling sentiment of suspicion and disapproval.

§ 6

Out of the welter of that contest between the executive and the parliamentary branches of the American treaty-making machinery a few salient matters appear. In the field of foreign relations and policy, the two cardinal doctrines of the American Government were preserved as to status and intent; the Monroe Doctrine was rescued, the Hay Doctrine was resuscitated; a way for the United States to work unhampered out of the muddle was held open. For the moment the independent position of the nation in world affairs was reëstablished.

It was demonstrated that there did exist a power of appeal from the cabinet decisions of diplomats to public opinion; for that the action of the Senate in the end was determined by public opinion is evident. That was heartening to vast populations of repressed peoples, who had seen at Paris their hopes and aspirations the pawns of the diplomacy of Europe. In a degree the moral prestige of America in the Orient, which had been almost lost at Paris, was restored.

In my opinion, that incident served remarkably to demonstrate the wisdom of the makers of the American Constitution. It exactly created a situation which evidently was anticipated in providing for a dual responsibility in the making of treaties, and in respect of foreign relations. In the bitterness of controversy (which still persists), the supporters of President Wilson were wont to compare his personality

with those of members of the Senate who were opposing him, greatly to the advantage of Mr. Wilson, whose unusual intellectual, spiritual, and moral qualities were, and rightly, appraised very highly. In those attributes Mr. Wilson did tower above the average of the Senate as composed in the year 1919. But, to me, those qualities of Mr. Wilson that so commend him to certain classes of people were perhaps his greatest handicap in attempting to negotiate treaties under circumstances which existed at Paris. The Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate was almost wholly composed of lawyers, some of them eminent in that profession, all of them experienced in politics; one former secretary of state was among them. That committee, and indeed the Senate as a body, was better equipped and qualified to see through the machinations of diplomats, and the phraseological devices of diplomats in drafting articles, than the President was.

But the makers of the Constitution could not be sure that at all times when questions of vast consequence to the nation would be the subject of treaty enactment the superiority of wisdom and character would be with the President, or with plenipotentiaries the President would appoint. A President is one man; and human experience proves that any man can be over-persuaded and overreached at times; there is the possibility of intimidation, bribery, even of treason. It is possible (indeed, on the average it is more likely) that at any given time the superiority of practical political intelligence would be in the Senate. So the Constitution requires that the consent of the Senate must be obtained to all treaties negotiated by the executive. Events of 1919 provide a complete illustration and proof of the prevision of the founders.

IV

GENEVA

§ 1

THE weaker nations and suppressed peoples that were turned away empty at Paris were offered consolation by a promise of obtaining satisfaction and justice from the League of Nations. I must qualify that statement at once; for I know of no leading statesman at Paris, except President Wilson, who then or soon afterward admitted that injustices were done by the treaty. The official presumption at the time was that only justice was done by the Principal Powers in writing the treaty; the widely held doubts on that point which now prevail developed later. I know that representatives at Paris of Principal Powers privately did try to assuage dissatisfaction of weaker nations about the treaty by indicating the possibility of ameliorating action by the League; but, so far as I know, they made no promises. In that way, the League, even in prospect, was very useful as a palliative.

I am somewhat interested now to recall my attitude toward the League in its progressive phases. When the idea first was advanced, and indorsed by President Wilson, and seemed in the way of becoming an actuality, I felt a strong impulse in its favor. My experience in world politics had convinced me of a serious lack in existing methods of conducting international affairs; the proposed League seemed to promise an improvement, or anyhow a change, and a change meant inserting the wedge of reform into what in some respects is a pernicious system. So I regarded it hope-

fully and sympathetically. But for one to agree to the desirability of the construction of an edifice dedicated to a stated purpose does not mean that one must accept the first, or any, set of plans that is suggested. As well presume that the founders of the United States should have adopted the first draft of a constitution that was proposed. We are familiar with the method by which the announced purposes of laws often are negatived, and sometimes reversed, by the insertion of "jokers" in the phraseology. I was, and am still, favorable to a League of Nations as an ideal.

When I realized what the President had consented to at Paris, and what he afterward presented to the American Senate and the American people as a fulfilment of their idealistic aims, I became very strongly opposed to accepting what was offered. My reasons are intimated by the preceding discussions. The League which Mr. Wilson had been instrumental in formulating is wrongly devised; by its fundamental organism it almost surely would, and obviously by certain governments was calculated to, obstruct what the American people had in mind to accomplish. What, following American political phraseology, can be termed the Constitution of the present League is composed jointly of a treaty and a covenant, purposely made inseparable by the Supreme Council at Paris, and duly signed there by the plenipotentiaries of the participating nations, including the United States. The treaty, as much as the covenant, is part of the organic law of the League. There is a provision for an International Court in conjunction with the League; the association distinctly indicates that the court will derive sustenance and its statutory law principally from enactments of the League. It follows, then, that the United States is invited to merge its conduct in international affairs, and in some degree perhaps in domestic matters, with an institution whose organic law contains statutes and implications adverse to the interests of the United States and likely to impair its security; an institution in which the Ameri-

can Government would have a minority position. Unless one assumed that the American Government should join this League for the purpose of reforming it, I cannot discover why it should do so; and that course would be attended by great risk.

But the fact that I was opposed to having the American Government join the League as it was constituted at Paris did not mean that I thought all governments should not join it. Whether to join or not is, for any nation, a question of practical politics. The United States stands to lose too much, and to gain too little, to enter the League as it is now. It might be different with other nations, and is. China is a case in point. Follows a memorandum showing my opinion regarding China and the League. It was written three days after the Shantung decision was announced:

By T. F. M.,
Paris, May 3, 1919. *Confidential*

CHINA, THE PEACE TREATY, AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Since it seems probable that the terms of the Peace Treaty concerning the China-Japan questions will be such that the Chinese delegates will feel constrained to refuse to sign the Treaty, the reasons for and the possible results of such refusal should be carefully considered.

It may be urged that China should sign the Treaty anyhow, notwithstanding its objectionable features, because by refusing to sign China will remain at war with Germany by herself, and in making a separate peace with Germany she would be at a disadvantage. It may be further argued that, since the treaty of peace and the League of Nations are to be adopted as indivisible instruments by the Conference, by refusing to sign the treaty China also will exclude herself from the League of Nations, and thereby deprive herself of any advantages which may accrue from such membership.

There would appear to be no especial dangers to China by being left to make a separate peace with Germany; on the contrary, the

conditions in the world are such that it is probable that Germany will be willing to make peace with China on better terms than China gets in the treaty as it stands. China declared war on Germany separately, and is free to make peace separately. China now is in no danger of any aggressions from Germany. It even is possible that Germany will be anxious to conciliate the Chinese by making easy terms, amounting merely to a cessation of a state of war and a resumption of friendly relations.[1]

With regard to the League of Nations, its Covenant provides for the inclusion of other nations under certain conditions. China at any time subsequently can apply for admission to the League, and she cannot be justly excluded. The Covenant of the League contemplates the eventual inclusion of Germany and other present enemy nations. As to the League being a defense to China in her present plight, it is very unlikely that the League will get organized and be able to establish its authority within a shorter time than would elapse in case China should ask admission later. Moreover, the League as yet has no existence; its authority is problematical, and its power to reverse the status left by the treaty of peace at least is doubtful.

By signing the Treaty which in practical effect confirms Japan's position in all parts of China, and by moral implication sets the stamp of international approval and acceptance on her policy and actions in China during the war, the Chinese delegation also will add their own and China's assent to those conclusions and to that status. To do that will deprive China of her moral position, and will take much of the force out of whatever appeal she may make hereafter to the public sentiment of enlightened peoples.

The opinion therefore is expressed that *the Chinese delegation should refuse to sign the peace treaty*, and at the session of the Conference to be held for that purpose should make a public statement to the world why they cannot sign. They can say that while China is too weak to resist being deprived of her rights, she will not give her consent to what is done.

China's hope to reverse the provisions of the treaty regarding Shantung lies in an appeal to the League of Nations, and in an appeal to the sentiments and sense of justice of enlightened western peoples. For China officially to assent to these provisions of the treaty by signing it will qualify her cause in such appeals. The modern history of China contains many instances of the danger to

[1] This subsequently did occur.

China of signing agreements merely to escape a present dilemma, or for causes of momentary expediency.

It is advisable to procure expert opinion about the question of signature by China of the treaty qualifying legally her appeal later to a League of Nations, or to the International Court which is to be established by the League, as provided by the Covenant. It would be well to obtain opinions on this point from an American, a British, and a French international lawyer.

The treaty leaves a considerable number of important questions to be decided, or adjusted by the League of Nations. Among these questions are reduction of armaments, allotment of certain mandatories, etc.; which directly grow out of the settlement of the war and which carry out the requirements of the treaty of peace. It is necessary, therefore, for the League to be organized as quickly as is possible, and to proceed with the consideration of those questions. It is probable, almost certain, that such questions will take precedence over such collateral and incidental questions as an adjudication of the numerous issues comprised in the case of China. From this, one may conclude that some time, perhaps years, may pass before China's case before the League, or the International Court, can be taken up. This period affords time for China to consider her position, and for her to join the League, if meanwhile she decides not to sign the treaty. In fact, the allowing of a period of two months after the adoption of the Covenant for the notification of nations mentioned in the original list of their adherence to its provisions gives at least that much time for consideration. By the Covenant, new nations may be admitted to the League, after due formality, at any time after it is organized.

Expert legal advice should be obtained on the question whether China can sign the treaty and covenant, and at the same time refuse to sign the objectionable articles relating to Shantung:—that is, can China sign part of the treaty, and the covenant, without giving her assent and adherence to the whole of the treaty?

Whether China does sign the treaty, with reservations, or whether she refuses to sign it in toto, the time pending the consideration of China's appeal to the League, or International Court, should be utilized in trying to create a sentiment favorable to China among enlightened Western peoples, and in urging all points that may influence the course of events relating to China.

In case China does not sign the treaty, the Chinese delegation might state publicly its reasons for declining to sign:—that it fully realizes the possible consequences of not signing, that it adheres strongly to the League of Nations and hopes to become a member of

it later, but that it cannot go on record as acceding to such a disposition of China's sovereign rights as is made in the objectionable articles of the treaty. That course will make China's historical record straight, and will give emphasis to her protest before the democratic peoples.

Consideration should be given to the possible and probable consequences of signing or not signing the treaty upon the Chinese nationality internally. If the treaty containing the Shantung provisions is signed, it will have either of two effects in China, viz.: to cause a great popular upheaval of protest, with various disturbing consequences; or to allay the uneasiness of Chinese and cause them to accept hereafter Japan's position *vis-à-vis* China in a spirit of resignation. On the other hand, a dignified refusal to sign the treaty will strengthen the sentiment of Chinese to rally patriotically to resist such aggressions from all quarters. In a rallying of this sentiment is China's best hope for eventual deliverance, for without that it seems certain that no foreign sentiment in her favor can accomplish much to avert the impending fate. *Foreigners will not exert themselves to save for China what Chinese are willing to let go.*

In view of the foregoing considerations, the opinion is expressed:

1. If it is possible legally to sign the treaty, while saving an exception to the Shantung articles that will be heard later by the League of Nations, or by an International Court, then sign.

2. If it is not feasible to make such a *legal* reservation, then refuse to sign.

Most of the resultants indicated in my memorandum did occur. The Chinese delegation was refused permission to sign the treaty with exceptions or reservations. Permission was refused by the Supreme Council (Big Four) for the Chinese delegation to make a statement of its position and its reasons for declining to sign before a plenary session of the conference; but the Chinese delegation, disregarding that inhibition, nevertheless did make a statement of its position to the press, and also before the conference as a whole. For the reasons indicated, the Chinese delegation refused to sign the treaty. Also, the reactions in China predicted in my memorandum did happen.

§ 2

On my way from China to attend the first session of the League of Nations, I paused in America, and while there I wrote a memorandum indicating China's course at the League meeting. In the meantime, since the Paris conference, China had become a member; an action which I considered judicious. That memorandum follows:

Confidential, October, 1920.
By T. F. M.

CHINA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MEETING

PRESENT STATUS OF THE LEAGUE

Notwithstanding that the nation which has taken an important part, prior to and during the Great War, in laying the foundations in popular sentiment for a League of Nations—the United States of America—so far has declined to join the League under the Covenant and Treaty adopted at Paris in 1919, and because of this abstention the League now lacks some prestige and authority it would have otherwise, the League nevertheless embodies a moral idea containing a wide and deep appeal to mankind.

Being a part of the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty Powers are under a very strong compulsion on that account to endeavor to vitalize the League, and to give it an appearance of actuality, and of an ability to function according to its announced purposes. To do less than this would be to admit that the Treaty already is a failure; an admission which for many reasons the "Allied and Associated Powers" cannot afford to make now.

Since, by its Covenant, the League professes to provide a means for the hearing and the adjudication of issues between its members, and *especially of complaints of weaker nations in defense of their rights,* every failure of the League to do this will tend to destroy such moral prestige as it now has, and to discredit it except as an agency for the fruition of the objects and the power of the Great Powers. Because the League realizes, at this time, that it is subject to severe scrutiny and criticism on this point, it is probable that in the first full session of the Council and Assembly at Geneva considerable liberty will be allowed the lesser nations for the presentation of their causes, and the representatives of the Great Powers

will hesitate to adopt summary or arbitrary methods of treating these cases.

In short, the League is under a heavy fire of criticism, and those who control its processes (representatives of the Great Powers) will be sensitive of this critical attitude of mankind, lest the moral prestige of the League will be destroyed at this point of its existence.

The Case of China

The situation previously indicated creates a political psychology at the forthcoming session that is favorable to China. The Chinese Government therefore should take adequate steps to utilize this psychology in China's favor to obtain these objects:

(a) To secure a revision of the Shantung articles of the Treaty.

(b) To obtain a declaration of the League respecting the unimpaired preservation and respect of China's territorial integrity and political autonomy.

(c) To obtain a declaration of the League that all treaties and agreements among nations, either published or secret, that qualify or restrict the territorial integrity and political autonomy of China, to be contrary to the public policy of the League.

(d) To obtain a declaration of the League that all rights and privileges now exercised by foreign nations in China that qualify and infringe China's political autonomy and territorial integrity ought to be abrogated in due time. Nations now having and exercising such rights and privileges will be asked to declare their intention to consent to their abrogation and annulment under conditions to be determined by a Commission of the League. (Note. This will include such matters as extra-territoriality; territorial leaseholds such as Weiheiwei, Port Arthur, Kowloon, etc.; and the so-called treaty ports; railway and mining "concessions," etc.)

All of the important questions that China now has at issue with foreign nations come under one of the above headings. Japan's policy in Manchuria and Shantung, in respect to railway and police administration, is included. China should have these collateral objects:

1. Take the opportunity afforded by these discussions to exploit China's grievances before the world by means of publicity.

2. Take the opportunity provided to force the various Powers to go on record as to their real policies.

3. Take the opportunity to make China's case provide the first real "test" of the validity and bona fides of the League.

4. A majority of the Assembly of the League will be comprised of small nations whose situations are in many respects analogous

to China's, and it is possible to make mutual combinations with these nations to force action by the League on questions of common interest.

TECHNICAL ASPECTS AND PROCEDURE

Among Articles of the League Covenant that may apply to the presentation of China's case are:

1. ARTICLE XIII. Provides for the submission of disputes between members of the League to arbitration. From the phraseology, that article may be taken to apply only to disputes that arise between Members after the organization of the League about issues that *arise after* the organization of the League. Under such an interpretation this article would not apply to the dispute between Japan and China regarding Shantung. Japan perhaps will claim that the Shantung question is not a "new" question, but was disposed of by the Treaty of Versailles. Besides, the article in effect is nullified by the provision of its first paragraph, viz.: "whenever any dispute shall arise between them which *they* recognize as suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy." Japan may refuse to submit any of the issues between her and China to arbitration under that paragraph. If however Japan would refuse to arbitrate, her moral position would be adversely affected.

That article says further: "The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith."

2. ARTICLE XV. Provides that Members shall carry disputes that are not settled by arbitration to the Council of the League. Either party to a dispute can have the matter investigated by a Commission of the League, by communicating to the Secretary General a statement of their case, and the Council may direct the publication of the papers. That evidently is intended to turn publicity on such matters, and prevent secret diplomacy from getting nations into war. A paragraph of that article, however, reads: "Any Member of the League *represented on the Council* may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same." Japan is a member of the Council, and China is only a member of the Assembly. Japan could publish her version of the case on her own motion, but China might get her version published only by inducing another member of the Council to do that. Later paragraphs of that article indicate that in respect to

such actions, members of the Council which themselves are parties to the dispute cannot take part in the decision of the Council. If the Council does not reach an agreement, the issue can be referred to the Assembly, on the request of a party to the dispute. Under conditions, the decision of the Assembly holds as the act of the League.

3. ARTICLE XX. This provides a loophole for China, in case Japan advances the doctrine that the Covenant is a part of the Treaty and that the Covenant does not revise the Treaty *ex post facto*. That article seems to intend that a way will be opened to question the validity of *all obligations that contradict the spirit of the League*. The whole list of agreements relating to China made before and during the war comes under that category.

CONDITIONS UNFAVORABLE TO CHINA

The present Council of the League consists of representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Spain, Brazil, and Greece. Belgium is controlled in all matters not directly touching her national security by Great Britain and France. Spain is under British influence. Brazil and Greece are negative in Far Eastern questions; but Greece will be influenced by Great Britain and France. If the United States were a member of the Council, it probably could influence Brazil; but at present America is not represented. An agreement of Great Britain and France, with scarcely any doubt, can control the attitude of the Council on Eastern questions.

How will Great Britain and France stand if China raises the Shantung and other questions? Japan probably will urge that the British and French governments are bound to insist that the Treaty be put into effect, and until it is put into effect *with the consent of China*, the British and French governments are still bound by the "secret" Shantung agreements to support Japan. On the other hand, China can claim that the secret Shantung agreements bound the British and French governments only to support Japan at the peace conference, in getting certain provisions written into the Treaty, and when that had been done, or when they had so supported Japan, all the obligations of the British and French governments under those agreements were fulfilled. It is a nice distinction; so nice that the British and French governments can with an appearance of consistency take either view of it, according to how they may want to stand now. It is of great importance to China to disclose, and to make public, exactly how the French and

British governments do stand on this question now. (NOTE. Its relation to the banking consortium is important, and the revelation will create much interest in America.)

If the British and French governments, in view of the world situation now, want to sever themselves from responsibility in respect to Japan's China policy, in order to clear the way for a genuine coöperation with the United States in the Far East, they will welcome an opportunity to go on record. On the contrary, if those governments intend to support Japan's policy toward China, rather than that of America, their representatives at Geneva will attempt to deter and hinder a presentation of China's case. In that case, various arguments of expediency will be advanced.

No such arguments of expediency, however cleverly set out, should be permitted to deter China from pressing her case at Geneva. China's representatives well may and should give due consideration to expediency as to when and how to advance certain subsidiary questions and issues; but on the main issues, especially as to Shantung and Manchuria, she should be firm and outspoken. China should make it plain to the world that she is not satisfied with Japan's conduct toward her, nor with the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, and that she never will be contented with them.

China must do this for her historical record, even if she obtains no present relief and satisfaction.

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

In the writer's opinion, China's representatives at Geneva should openly and forcibly advance the objections of China to the existing alliance between Great Britain and Japan, and to its renewal. They should point out the practical operation of this alliance during its duration, and give an analysis of its underlying meaning and objects. In this connection, China's objections to *all* alliances and agreements relating to China, and made without the knowledge and participation of China, should be made plain.

It can be anticipated that the British representatives in the League, and officials of the British Government elsewhere, may take exception to this attitude of China; indeed, if the British Government intends to renew the Japan alliance, or desires to do that, it no doubt will try to put pressure on China to prevent any criticism of the alliance. If the British Government wants to "keep the lid" on this question at Geneva, it will use all means to induce China to keep quiet, perhaps even making secret promises to be redeemed later.

But under no circumstances should China be deterred from

raising this question. It is fundamental; and it has a very especial interest to the United States, which Power, in case the British and French governments are inclined to "trade with" Japan in the Far East, presents the only force that is able to deflect the British and French foreign offices, and to restrain Japan.

§ 3

The first session of the League—Council and Assembly—convened at Geneva on November 15, 1920. It was preceded by several meetings of the Council.

The occasion was momentous, and it attracted extraordinary interest throughout the world, which the presence of several hundred press correspondents testified to. Whatever its ultimate fate may be, the League is an interesting experiment. I felt before going to Geneva that the meeting afforded the best conceivable mirror of Europe's diplomatic motivations as they stood at the moment, and also of world psychology with respect to the problems of reconstruction and reform. About forty nations had joined and had sent representatives to Geneva. It was evident that the minor nationalities took the League seriously, and that many hopes and aspirations were focused there.

While deeply interested in every phase of the experiment of which that meeting was the first practical example, I was especially concerned with questions of China and of the Asiatic world; for in those questions the fate of the Hay Doctrine is involved, and, by consequence, the definite interest of my own nation. As the session commenced, and for long thereafter, there was a general presumption that it was only a matter of a short time when the United States would join the League; but I felt sure that would not happen, and expressed that opinion whenever it was appropriate, to the obvious disappointment, and disagreement, of the large number of American League enthusiasts who attended.

China's possible course of action at Geneva was outlined in advance with approximate accuracy; it remained to adapt

it to conditions. Three days after the Assembly met, I wrote the following memorandum:

Confidential, Genève,
By T. F. M. November 18, 1920.

SUBJECT: FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES AND QUESTIONS AFFECTING CHINA AT THE ASSEMBLY SESSIONS

POSITION OF FRANCE VIS-À-VIS AMERICA

The most serious cause for the uneasiness of French statesmen in regard to the whole corpus of conditions that affect the position and security of France during the next period of European and world development is the isolation of the United States from the European concert and exclusion from the League of Nations. It is safe to say that France would not willingly have accepted the Treaty with Germany and the League Covenant had not French statesmen believed that the United States would sign the so-called supplement to the Treaty (agreeing to aid France in certain contingencies), and that America would join the League of Nations. France's diplomatic calculations were disappointed when America rejected both the Treaty and the League.

In the period since the Paris Treaty with Germany was signed, there have developed serious divergences of policy between the French and British governments; it is doubtful if the existing Allied entente will endure for more than a few years. This divergence leaves France comparatively isolated; for it is apparent that Italy aligns with Great Britain in European questions, and France is almost hopelessly out of sympathy with Russia and Germany. With conditions as they are, France is left without influential support, and she can look nowhere in Europe to obtain it. (NOTE. To prevent a possible alliance of France with Japan may be a motive with Great Britain in respect to the A-J Alliance.)

There are reasons to believe that France is anxious to induce America to join the League of Nations, or somehow to exert a strong influence in the European concert. To accomplish this, France will make any reasonable concessions to American opinion and sentiment: *and France will be especially cautious of offending American opinion, or of getting in opposition to any firm policy of the American Government.*

This situation provides an excellent opportunity to present to the French delegates in the League Assembly the tendency adverse to America that is involved in certain propositions and motives advanced by Japan, and possibly also by Great Britain.

Since the United States has no membership in the League, and consequently has no official spokesman at Geneva, the American Government's point of view will have no expression in the deliberations of the League. But it may be pointed out that if the League, or some of the major members of the Council and Assembly, evince an attitude in respect to Asiatic questions that conflicts with the traditional policy of the United States in the Far East, that the prospect of America joining the League will be impaired seriously.

Care should be taken by the Chinese delegates that they do not assent to, or are not tricked into seeming to assent to any attitude relating to Far Eastern policy which antagonizes the American Government. The Senate of the United States refused to accept the Shantung provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, specifically taking exception to them; the leading Republican members of the Senate and House are on record on this question; the next President, Senator Harding, was a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that adopted the Shantung reservation, and is committed to that policy by his public utterances during the presidential campaign. It will be very unfortunate if any action of China, or of her representatives at Geneva, should alienate American sentiment from her by a deflection from the American policy.

I truthfully can say that I did not get a single surprise at Geneva during that first session; for I remained from the opening day until it ended, some five weeks later. Everything "ran true to form," without serious hitches. The story of the first session, as I analyzed it, is included in a memorandum which I wrote one month after it ended. That memorandum follows:

By Thomas F. Millard

Confidential
January, 1921

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS—ITS CHARACTER ANALYZED

NOTE: The writer of this Memorandum attended the Peace Conference at Paris, and was present at Geneva during the session of the Assembly of the League, November 15 to December 18, 1920. This analysis is pointed especially to the relation of China to the international situation, but it also has particular applications to the United States.

It of course is not possible now to estimate with any accuracy the ultimate character and accomplishments of the League of Nations, but its progress so far sufficiently has indicated its motives and controlling influences to permit some conclusions to be drawn. These conclusions are:

(a) The League as now constituted is under almost absolute control of the so-called Principal Powers, which framed the treaties of peace and the Covenant of the League themselves, without consulting the minor nations.

(b) This control is used by the Principal Powers to convert the League into an instrument to enforce the Treaty of Versailles and the other treaties, with only such modifications as the Powers themselves decide, and to enforce all other objects and policies of the Principal Powers.

(c) With these objects, the plan evidently is to close all means by which the minor nations can contradict or reverse the decisions of the Principal Powers.

(d) In respect to important matters to be dealt with by the League, the first session of the Assembly indicated plainly that what it was allowed to act upon, or to discuss, was in conformance with agreements previously arrived at secretly by the Governments of the Principal Powers (at the "Premiers" conferences, etc.), and were not the result of the free will of the Assembly openly reached by discussion among the members.

THEREFORE, the League is now merely a "camouflage" for the old "secret diplomacy"; and its functions will be, if the major Powers can so dictate, to perpetuate secret diplomacy, and the diplomatic hegemony of the so-called Principal Powers of Europe.

THE FIRST ASSEMBLY MEETING

A study of the actual acts of the first Assembly shows that they were almost wholly under the head of Organization. Rules and regulations were adopted and amended; some new members were elected; a new Council was elected with one change in its membership (China was substituted for Greece); a number of humanitarian matters were approved, recommended, or otherwise taken within the purview of the League. Those matters constituted the only *action* of the Assembly. Most of those matters come within the scope of established humanitarian organizations, and probably were taken up by the League more to give it an appearance of doing something for the world than because any action by it was needed.

None of them touch the great issues for which the League was recommended.

Primarily, the League has been proposed and organized as a means to *prevent war*. Most students of world politics have ascribed modern wars to two principal causes—secret diplomacy, and excessive armaments. The League was supposed to eliminate them, and to create a means to adjudicate disputes and contentions among nations as a substitute for resort to war.

As to Secret Diplomacy

Propaganda favoring the League has stressed the provisions of the Covenant providing for the registration with the Secretariat of the League, and publication, of all treaties and agreements among members of the League, and of all other treaties and agreements among nations that can be obtained from any source. It has developed however that this provision of the Covenant is construed ambiguously, and is now held to mean that all treaties and agreements *made before the organization of the League* (now presumably the date of the first session of the Assembly) may be kept secret at the will of the parties to such agreements, during the time of their continuance. Under that construction, all treaties and agreements made prior to November 15, 1920, *may be kept secret,* and are recognized as valid by the League. Nations therefore had eighteen months after the signing of the Covenant to readjust their policies to the post-war situation, and to make new secret agreements based on the new situation. As such treaties usually have self-extension provisions, they may be extended automatically for an indefinite period without being disclosed to the League Secretariat and to the world. (Note. The refusal of the French and Belgian governments to register the recent military agreement between those nations is a case in point.) Under the extension clause of the existing Anglo-Japanese alliance, it can be revised and extended and its terms kept secret, and still be valid under the Covenant of the League. It is plain therefore that the League Covenant, instead of relegating "secret diplomacy," has rather given it an indefinite lease of life.

As to Disarmament

The course of the Assembly session revealed that a large majority of the nations represented there were anxious to move for the disarmament of nations in the League. Several groups came to Geneva with prepared programs to accomplish disarmament. It soon developed that none of the so-called Principal Powers would

entertain any proposal for disarmament at that time. The method used to prevent action by the Assembly was not *opposition,* but the equally effective method of *postponement.* No Power at this time wants to go on record as opposing disarmament. All of the major Powers in the League were against bringing up any definite plan for disarmament at Geneva, but for as many different reasons. These various reasons can be summarized as follows:

Great Britain: Disinclination to commit herself on the question until after the new Washington Administration has indicated its foreign policy; and until the decisions as to British Imperial policy resulting from the Imperial conference in June, 1921, when also the question of renewing the alliance with Japan will be decided. A further factor is indecision of the British naval experts as to naval tactical and strategical values.

France: Refusal to reduce her military strength until relieved of apprehension regarding Germany (an assurance which, in the nature of conditions, is impracticable to attain for several decades, if ever), and uneasiness about the adjustment of France's international policy and aims with the policies of America and Great Britain. (NOTE. This latter adjustment is exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible.)

Italy: Fear for her new position and the policy born of her accretions and ambitions following the war, which require a certain military and naval preponderance over her European neighbors, and to retain her rating as a "Principal Power."

Japan: Recognition that military and naval power constitute Japan's only title to assumption of a superior and preferred position *vis-à-vis* China and Siberia, and equality with the United States; and also to a place among the "Principal Powers."

In the face of the private opposition of all the Principal Powers now members of the League, disarmament was side-tracked at Geneva. The reasons given showed the usual diplomatic politics of trying to "pass the buck" to the United States. Under the Covenant, even had the Assembly adopted a disarmament plan (which required a unanimous vote), it then would have to be referred to each of the member nations for ratification. In other words, any plan adopted by the Assembly would be only the recommendation of a plan to the governments. Had the United States been a member of

the League, and been represented at Geneva, and the Assembly had adopted a plan for disarmament, the plan then would have had to be presented to Congress before the United States could be bound by it. Furthermore, even had the present Assembly adopted a plan, it could have been presented to the United States for acceptance, and also to all nations not now members of the League, for their acceptance, just the same as if they were members. *To ascribe to the refusal of the United States to join the League the reason for the failure of any disarmament plan at Geneva is simply humbug.* None of the nations in the League fear, or have any sound reason to fear, aggression from the United States, or an unprovoked attack by America; nor is there any good reason to think that the American Congress and Administration will not give as favorable consideration to a plan for disarmament adopted by the League as any government that is now a member will. The failure of the Assembly to make any progress toward disarmament in its first session is *symptomatic of the underlying motives of the Principal Powers that control the League,* and of their opposition to any proposal or measure that will deprive them of their present control over international politics.

The outstanding feature of the League so far is the revelation that the European Powers and Japan still are imbued by the motives and the practices of the old diplomacy. By them the League is now regarded merely as a convenient novelty that can be very serviceable to the Powers at least for a time, as a means to beguile peoples who are distrustful of the old methods.

The Proposed International Court

As a genuine power to adjust international dissensions and issues, this proposed Court was practically emasculated by limiting its jurisdiction in such disputes to cases where *all* the disputants, or claimants, must consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. It is very probable that under this provision only minor issues ever will be submitted to the Court; which means no real improvement of methods of arbitration that have been in use for many years. Cases where one of the major Powers is the aggressor on a weak nation, and consequently has a bad case in law and equity, have little chance to be tried in this Court, for the Principal Powers seldom will consent to submit their affairs to its review and decision. Thus the hope of lesser nations and repressed peoples that the League will provide in its Court a means by which they can demand and *compel* a fair adjudication of their disputes with the major Powers was disappointed.

Applications to China

The apparent intention of some of the Principal Powers (all of them with the possible exception of Great Britain) to make the League an instrument for the enforcement of the peace treaties, with such modifications as the *Principal Powers themselves exclusively may decide,* diminishes any hope which may have been entertained that the League could and would revise terms of the Versailles treaty in justice to China. When President Wilson at Paris (explaining the Shantung award) advised the Chinese delegates to sign the Treaty, and gave the opinion that the League would remedy any injustice to China, the Chinese delegation correctly pointed out the almost insuperable difficulties in the way of obtaining satisfaction by that method, and refused to sign the Versailles treaty. Nevertheless, China joined the League, and officially has stated her intention to demand a revision by the League of the Shantung and other questions. But with the Principal Powers controlling the League, and in combination to enforce the Versailles treaty (with only such modifications as may be agreed on privately by the Powers themselves), opposing China in this instance, her chance to obtain satisfaction from the League is practically hopeless.

China's other alternative, to appeal her case to the proposed International Court, now can be effectively blocked by the opposition of Japan alone, for it requires the consent of Japan for the Shantung and other questions to be submitted to the Court. And in respect to the group of questions touching the contacts of various foreign nations with China, and to which Chinese now entertain serious objections, for the Court to take jurisdiction of them requires the consent of *all* of the nations affected, a condition practically impossible to secure.

From the foregoing it is evident that the existence of the League in its present form in no appreciable degree has improved China's chance to obtain justice and satisfaction and reparation for the injuries she rests under from foreign nations, and especially from one of the Principal Powers. The organization and processes of the League as demonstrated by meetings of the Council and the first session of the Assembly at Geneva provide no means or promise for the rectification of China's injuries that are not provided by the customary diplomatic methods.

China and the League

Soon after the convocation of the Assembly at Geneva it developed that there was no hope whatever to obtain serious consid-

eration of the Shantung and other China questions during the first session, nor any chance to get a favorable action on them by the League at the time. The opposition of Japan of course was anticipated, and might have been offset but for the attitudes assumed by other Principal Powers. Those attitudes can be summarized as follows:

Great Britain: British representatives in the Assembly intimated plainly that the British Government regarded the raising of any serious controversial questions at the first meeting of the Assembly as inadvisable and as likely to inject elements of dissension that might wreck the League. If China insisted on bringing up the Shantung question, it was intimated that the British delegation and British Government felt under a certain compulsion to support Japan's rights under the terms of the Versailles treaty, and that the British Government also was under the same compulsion to support Japan under the secret Shantung agreement, and that that agreement must be considered in force until Japan's claims were satisfied. In short, the influence of the British Government was exerted to induce China not to raise the Shantung and other questions.

France: The influence of the French Government and delegation in the Assembly also was exerted to prevent and discourage the raising of the China questions on much the same grounds as Great Britain advanced. The real motives of the French Government were, however, different from the motives of the British Government.

Italy: Also opposed to raising controversial questions at this session, but for different reasons.

In respect to this matter, those three Principal Powers evidently acted in conjunction under private understandings reached between them before the Assembly convened, to confine the session if possible to organization, and to defer action on any of the great questions until the positions and accretions of the Powers under the peace treaties can be consolidated.

As the session progressed, certain influences began to be felt by the governments of some of the major Powers affecting the China questions. The French Government especially seems to have begun to comprehend the effects which an alignment with Japan in respect to Far Eastern questions might have on the relations of France with the United States, and upon the sympathy and aid of America for and to France. Those ideas, taken in conjunction with the

growing schism of policies between the British and French governments on European and near Eastern questions, and the consequent impending isolation of France in Europe unless she pays more than she wants to pay for the continuation of the "entente" with Great Britain, gave the French Government pause. During the latter part of the session the isolation of the Japanese delegates was apparent; the reason can be summed in the statement that needy Europe has a hope of obtaining financial and other accommodations from America, and no hope of obtaining anything tangible from Japan. Among the minor States in Europe, Japan is suspected of being a purely imperialistic and predatory Power, and is disliked accordingly. On the contrary, the Chinese delegation was embraced in an atmosphere of general friendliness; although the British and French Governments felt forced by circumstances and their own immediate interests to consent to Japan's insistence on certain questions, they showed a desire to conciliate China by a superficially friendly attitude and pleasant attentions.

China and the League Council

The conditions indicated in the preceding paragraph, combined with clever diplomacy of the Chinese delegation in the Assembly, made possible the election of China to the place in the League Council vacated by Greece. That election stands as a diplomatic victory for China on its face, and was worth striving for for several reasons: it will help to allay dissatisfaction in China about delay in bringing up the Shantung question; it adds considerably to China's international position and prestige; it will for the next year at least put the Chinese Government in a position to know first-hand what transpires within the Council. At Geneva the thought occurred to observers that a place on the Council might have been a concession by the Principal Powers to induce China not to bring up the Shantung question, perhaps to defer it indefinitely. However, the Chinese delegation positively avers that it made no promises or engagements in that respect, whatever may have been in the minds of other delegations. Japan was opposed to giving China a place on the Council: it diminished Japan's comparative position to have another Oriental nation put on the Council, and somewhat rebuked her assumed attitude as the dictator and guide for the other Oriental nationalities, and of a premier position in respect to China. To do this may have been among the motives of some of the Powers in giving China a place on the Council. In this connection, however, it should be distinctly kept in mind, that *to beguile China and the United States*

is a conceivable interpretation of the diplomatic motives leading to China's election.

THE ASSEMBLY AND THE SHANTUNG QUESTION

In the sense of securing any satisfactory consideration of or definite adjudication of the Shantung question, it was obvious even before the Assembly met that there was slight hope to accomplish that during the first session. Within a short time after the Assembly met, it was evident that those anticipations were correct. The League was not sufficiently organized, or stabilized, to attempt a legal or equitable solution of such questions. The Chinese delegation therefore had these alternatives:

(a) To present the Shantung question anyhow, regardless of its treatment by the Assembly, with the purpose of agitating before the world China's grievance, and to contradict Japan's propaganda designed to give the impression that the question is in a way to be equitably settled between Japan and China.

(b) To defer to the wishes of the Principal Powers to delay controversial questions and take whatever diplomatic compensations which could be had by that course.

The latter course eventually was adopted after much consideration. This memorandum will not express any opinion as to the merits of the decision. At the end of the session, Dr. Wellington Koo, chief Chinese delegate, read in open session a statement by authority of his Government reserving China's right to present her case at any time subsequently. So the matter rests. Certain consequences of this postponement can be seen plainly now. One is that the Japanese Government surely will resume its pressure upon China for a private (between the two governments) settlement of the Shantung and other similar questions. Another possible result is that it will become, by the dissatisfaction of the Chinese people, a cause for irritation in China's internal politics, an irritation which may be used by Japan to prolong the disturbed condition of China and to prevent any united national action on foreign questions.

As the writer forecasts the international situation, he believes that to fail to bring China's case before the next meeting of the Assembly (in September, 1921) is likely to prejudice seriously China's chance to gain any advantage or justice through the agency of the League of Nations.

The argument has been advanced that for China to bring her case before the Assembly will constitute an irrevocable submission of it to the jurisdiction of the League, and then, if the decision

should go against her or not to her satisfaction, she is bound to accept the decision; and that with the League constituted as it is under the domination of the same Principal Powers which made the Treaty of Versailles, China has slight chance of securing a revision or reversion of that Treaty.

It seems to the writer, on that theory, that by joining the League of Nations China already has gone so far as tentatively to submit all such questions to its jurisdiction. It may however be pointed out that China has the right to withdraw from the League; and that a legal way may be found by which the Shantung and other questions can be presented to and argued before the Assembly without committing China irrevocably to accept its decision or action as final. If it was taken that to submit China's questions to the League assumed that risk, then it would be better for China to withdraw from the League at once, for her membership under those circumstances carries the danger of merely by inaction accepting the provisions of the Versailles treaty and recognizing it as a *fait accompli.*

The League and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

One view of the objections of certain Principal Powers to having China's case brought before the Assembly at its first session is that the British and Japanese Governments have pending the question of a renewal of the alliance between them.

It is obvious, for instance, that the position of the British Government *vis-à-vis* the whole corpus of China questions must be positively affected, and perhaps absolutely fixed, by the alliance question. Such phrases, used currently in speeches by high officials of the British and Japanese governments giving expression to the policies of those governments, as "adjusting the alliance to the League of Nations," are very significant in view of the interpretation given by the Powers to the so-called "secret agreements" and "regional understandings" clauses of the League Covenant.

The Chinese Government should apprehend the true character of those diplomatic moves.

The United States Government also should take note of this situation, which affects most seriously the security of America and the traditional American policy in the Pacific.

§ 4

That analysis of the League as it appeared to me at its first regular session was confirmed by attendance at the subsequent

sessions in 1921 and 1922; and it remains my opinion of it at this writing.

At Geneva during the first session the tendency was toward optimism among members of the Assembly and outside observers. We used to have many arguments about it, especially among Americans who were there. The idea was sedulously propagated that, if the League did show any weaknesses, it was because the United States had not become a member. "It is a shame we are not here," some Americans would say.

I used to reflect about that; to try and picture mentally what the real situation would be if three American (meaning United States) delegates were sitting in the Assembly, and an American had a seat in the Council. At times I would sit in the press gallery and look down at the scene on rostrum and floor, at the imposing array of some twenty-odd delegates who sat for the British Empire, at the rows of delegates who represented minor nations, at the few colored men scattered about, and listen to the speeches. It soon developed, however, that the speeches, as in the American Congress and other parliaments, did not mean much in relation to action of the League. At the first session the speeches mostly were about details of organization; a manœuvering by the Principal Powers to keep the power in their hands securely, to put and keep a "lid" on; and a manœuvering by the little and weak nations to arrange some of the power so that on occasion it might be exercised by them and in their interest.

I could not see how the presence of American delegates would make an important difference in what the League then was doing or trying to do. There would have been just two courses for an American delegation in the circumstances: to align with the Principal Powers in making a close corporation of the League, as the President did with the Supreme Council at Paris; or to align with the minor nations to resist and oppose the domination of the Principal Powers. Either way, it meant arousing resentment against the United States, and getting the American Government inextricably inter-

woven with the methods and the projects of European diplomacy. I could not see how doing that would assist in solving any question before the League that could not be more easily and more powerfully influenced by action of America independently. And I cannot see it yet; while the embarrassments of such entanglement to the United States are more apparent as time passes.

It is no part of the purpose of this book to criticize the League of Nations except as it has applied to and still may apply to the adjustment of Far Eastern and Pacific Ocean questions. My observation convinced me that the League provided no means to avert dangers which all the time are becoming more acute in the Orient. That was worth going to Geneva to learn.

V

INTERIM

§ 1

TO any one conversant with political trend of the Asiatic world, the course of events there in the years immediately following the Paris conference could not fail to cause profound uneasiness. The cumulative effect of Paris on the psychology of the colored peoples was ominous. Hopes raised by President Wilson's war speeches were crushed; in their wake was a deep resentment and a feeling that the Oriental world had been duped. The effect of seeing at Paris the only Oriental nation which is fully armed (Japan) being accorded a status among the Principal Powers, and getting pretty much what she wanted of the conference, was tremendous; the palpable lesson was that the only way to obtain fair treatment is to arm, and only by threat of violence can attention of the Western powers to the aspirations of Asia be obtained. Reactions to that reasoning were noticeable from Suez to China.

China, the important section of the Oriental world that retains something of autonomy and independence and which ethnically has equivalent influence in Asia to that of the Nordic race in Europe, provides the more interesting example of those reactions. China had a recognized and an independent position at the Paris conference, and was presumed to have been promised the powerful protection and support of the United States. (This belief prevails throughout the Asiatic world even now; events, and statements of American officials that no definite promises were made to China, are taken as

diplomatic evasions, and only add to Oriental suspicion and distrust of Western nations.) No weak Asiatic nation could expect to appear at a world conference in a better position or a better light than China did at Paris; her case therefore was regarded in Asia as a test. It was a test, too, by every correct standard that is applicable.

An immediate result of China's treatment at Paris was what almost amounted to an explosion of patriotic sentiment among Chinese. Happening in a nation of which, since any knowledge of it penetrated the West, an accepted axiom has been that it has no patriotism, it attracted attention as an interesting phenomenon. That outburst is spoken of as the "student movement," because it started and was propagated by students of the higher and middle schools throughout the country. The students of both sexes organized demonstrations, and quickly secured the encouragement and support of influential elements of the people. The Government at Peking, and officials everywhere in the country, were intimidated; a direct result was that the so-called Anfu political group, which notoriously was under the influence of Japan and had connived with many of Japan's devices to bring China under her control, was driven from office, and its leaders were forced to take refuge in Japan.

Another demonstration of that patriotic upheaval took the form of a commercial boycott of nations which were believed to be responsible for the treatment given to China at Paris. At its beginning, the boycott threatened to include America and Great Britain, but it was confined to Japan in the end, with severe effects; the anti-Japanese boycott begun in 1919 has continued, with varying intensity and results, to the present. Prompt action of the United States Senate in repudiating the Shantung articles of the Versailles treaty, and the final rejection of the entire treaty, did much to "save the face" of America with Chinese, and to restore their belief in the good will and good intentions of the United States. The attitude of Americans in China at that juncture contrib-

uted to restore confidence of the Chinese in the purposes of the American Government. Americans in China, through all their organizations, and as individuals, promptly made known their disapproval of the acts of the American commission at Paris concerning China. Meetings were held, and resolutions were telegraphed to Washington. I never have met an American in the Far East, who can be included in the politically intelligent class regarding such questions, who approved or condoned the treatment given China's case at Paris. What Americans feel strongly they usually are outspoken about; and through those who were in China the real American sentiment about the Shantung decision was communicated directly and forcibly to the Chinese people. The belief that the United States still would help, and that something by way of getting justice for China through the mediation or action of the League of Nations might be accomplished, revived hope among Chinese, and tended to restrain violent manifestations of resentment.

The years from the ending of the Paris conference to the calling of a conference at Washington (1919–20–21) were marked in China by gradual and continuous progress of internal administrative disintegration, which here will be indicated in outline only. There was steady encroachment by the provincial officials on the prerogatives of the Central Government at Peking; its authority, and what was even of more consequence, its revenues, gradually were undermined and diverted. Some of the provinces declared their independence of the Peking Government; and at Canton a so-called independent "republic" was set up, where the majority of the dissolved parliament gathered and proclaimed themselves to be the genuine government of China. To Canton eventually gravitated Sun Yat Sen, who, by a deal made with the officials who at that time had local military control, was "elected" President of the "Republic of South China." Some Southern provinces contiguous to Kwangtung became obliquely affiliated with the Canton government, but no real

fusion ever was accomplished. The action of the Canton government that most affected Western political ideas about China was its propaganda, which was widely disseminated. That propaganda was and is chiefly the personal propaganda of Sun Yat Sen, whose reputation and influence were created by that method, and still are sustained by it. It is said that if the name of any politician or statesman should be kept out of the newspapers for six months the public would forget him, and he would be dead politically. That aphorism applies to Sun Yat Sen; he takes care, whatever his political vicissitudes are, to keep in the newspapers, and especially in the Western press. I will revert to China's internal situation; but now I am examining it only in relation to international politics. As having an important international bearing, the financial status of the Government must be considered, because of the large foreign debt and foreign investments in the country. It suffices at this point to mention that, in the period previously sketched, the finances of the Government (in this connection, the Central Government at Peking is meant) went steadily from bad to worse.

§ 2

The impact of external political influence on China in the period immediately following the Paris conference indicated with considerable definiteness the diplomatic reactions of the Principal Powers from that conference.

Briefly, those reactions in effect showed that the European powers, and Japan (which must be grouped with them at that time), deduced from events at Paris that the previous policy of the United States with regard to China had been relegated and safely could be disregarded. There is no doubt that the American policy was overridden at Paris, with the outward acquiescence of President Wilson and the American commission; a presumption therefore was that it scarcely could make itself felt in China as opposed to the

European thesis. I know that a majority of officials of the Peking Government took that view. At best, the policy of the American Government was regarded as altruistically benevolent, but quite ineffective in practice.

The European powers in their Chinese policy felt that they must, for a time, be careful not to affront the United States, if that could be avoided; the accommodation of America in helping Europe's post-war reconstruction was too important to risk losing it in China. But in many minor instances, and a few important ones, it was shown that the powers had gone back to the "spheres of influence" policy, and had revived the old (or made new) "regional understandings" in regard to China."

It quickly developed that the Japanese Government especially was interested in reviving the "spheres" thesis. Also it was evident that the Japanese Government confidently expected that attitude to be supported by other powers; by the same powers which under the secret agreements had stood solidly with Japan at Paris. Japan's diplomacy at Peking, after Paris, moved steadily to put into practice Japan's interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement,[1] and to make that agreement conform with the "inside" meaning of all other "regional understandings" concerning China. It was important to accomplish that; for although Japan might have been able to get the consent of all the powers in Europe to that interpretation of their mutual regional understandings in Asia, and might have made a new tentative adjustment of "spheres" with those Powers, how it would work out eventually still depended importantly on what the United States would do. Action of the American Senate showed that President Wilson was not the deciding factor in American foreign policy: it was evident that the American people were dissatisfied with much of what had been done; and while Japan felt able to differ from the American Government with re-

[1] An account and analysis of the Lansing-Ishii agreement is given in the author's book, "Democracy and the Eastern Question," published 1919.

gard to China and Siberia, if that was necessary, and to maintain her position, Japanese statesmen knew that other powers did not feel that independence of America. So a process of diplomatic finesse was set in motion at Peking with the object, apparently, of writing the majority interpretation of regional understandings about China into diplomatic procedure, and to establish a status quo which would have the indirect assent of the United States. If that was done, the diplomatic coup de grâce would be put to the Hay Doctrine.

There were intimations, however, that it might not be easy to make effective with the American Government then and thereafter the import of secret trades among the powers in the Far East. Action of the American Senate showed that; and the American position regarding the Lansing-Ishii agreement had been elucidated somewhat. The Lansing-Ishii agreement remains to this time one of the diplomatic mysteries of the war period. Why the American Government made it challenges conjecture; about all one reasonably can be sure of is that the causations announced by the State Department when the agreement was made are not an accurate reflection of the "inside" motives of the governments. It is regrettable that Mr. Lansing did not in his book on the peace negotiations give the "inside story" of the Lansing-Ishii agreement; perhaps he is reserving it for revelation hereafter. But in one way and another light has been shed on that instrument.

TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT LANSING BEFORE THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, AUGUST 11, 1919

SENATOR POMERENE. Mr. Secretary, up to the time of the exchange of the notes which embraced the Lansing-Ishii agreement, did the Republic of China have any information concerning that agreement?

SECRETARY LANSING. Not until it was negotiated and the notes were exchanged.

SENATOR POMERENE. As this related to Chinese territory, what

reason was there, if any, for not conferring with the diplomatic representatives of China about it?

SECRETARY LANSING. It was merely a matter of declaration of a mutual policy between Japan and the United States in regard to their attitude toward China. It did not directly affect any rights of China, except that the two governments agreed that they would keep their hands off.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. You said the other day, Mr. Secretary, that your principal object in making this so-called agreement was to get a renewed declaration from Japan in favor of the Open Door in China?

SECRETARY LANSING. Yes.

SENATOR POMERENE. When, if at all, did you first learn that the Chinese Government took any exception to the Lansing-Ishii agreement?

SECRETARY LANSING. We had no definite information that China took exception to the Lansing-Ishii agreement. They did make a declaration, which I was going to state later.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. Mr. Secretary, I suppose you mean that no protest was made by China against the Lansing-Ishii agreement; but my recollection is that the newspaper dispatches of that time stated that Chinese sentiment was very much opposed to it. Do you remember that?

SECRETARY LANSING. There was something of the sort, yes, in regard to the Lansing-Ishii agreement. I suggested to Viscount Ishii that it would be well for the two governments to reaffirm the open-door policy, on the ground that reports were being spread as to the purpose of Japan to take advantage of the situation created by the war to extend her influence over China—political influence. Ishii replied that he would like to consider that matter, but that, of course, he felt that Japan had a special interest in China, and that that should be mentioned in any agreement we made; and I replied to him that we, of course, recognized that Japan, on account of her geographical position, had a peculiar interest in China, but that it was not political in nature, and that the danger of a statement of special interest was that it might be so construed, and therefore I objected to making such a statement.

At another interview we discussed the phrase "special interests," which the Japanese Government had been very insistent upon, and which, with the explanation I have made, I was not very strongly opposed to, thinking that the reaffirmation of the open-door policy was the most essential thing that we could have at that time; and we discussed the phrase which appeared in the draft note, "special

interest," and I told him that if he mean "paramount interests" I could not discuss it further; but if he meant special interests based on geographical position I would consider the insertion of it in the note. Then it was, during that same interview that we mentioned "paramount interests," that he made a reference to the Monroe Doctrine, and a suggestion that there should be a Monroe Doctrine for the Far East.

And I told him that there seemed to be a misconception as to the underlying principle of the Monroe Doctrine; that it was not an assertion of primacy or paramount interest by the United States in its relation to other American Republics; that its purpose was to prevent foreign powers from interfering with the separate rights of any nation in this hemisphere, and that the whole aim was to preserve to each Republic the power of self-development. I said further that so far as aiding in this development the United States claimed no special privileges over other countries.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. Were those oral statements?

SECRETARY LANSING. Oral entirely.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. This is from memory?

SECRETARY LANSING. Not at all. It is made from memoranda which I dictated to a stenographer immediately upon the departure of Viscount Ishii.

SENATOR WILLIAMS. That is the usual way of keeping such records?

SECRETARY LANSING. It is the only possible way. I told Viscount Ishii that I felt that the same principle should be applied to China, and that no special privileges, and certainly no paramount interest, in that country should be claimed by any foreign power. While the phrasing of the notes to be exchanged was further considered, the meaning of "special interest" was not again discussed.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. What did Count Ishii say? Did he apparently coincide with your view, or did he maintain silence?

SECRETARY LANSING. He maintained silence.

SENATOR BORAH. Mr. Secretary, in order to get a connected statement as to the situation, at the time that Ishii appeared here for the purpose of making this agreement, the twenty-one demands [2] had been made in the early part of the year 1915?

SECRETARY LANSING. Yes.

SENATOR BORAH. The first four groups of those demands had been acceded to by China in what is known as the China-Japan convention of 1915?

[2] Appendix E.

SECRETARY LANSING. Yes.

SENATOR BORAH. Then at the time that Ishii appeared here, that agreement, which followed the Twenty-one demands, had been made known to the world?

SECRETARY LANSING. Yes.

SENATOR BORAH. Now, who suggested the insertion in the agreement that you made with Ishii this proposition of special interest?

SECRETARY LANSING. It was made by Count Ishii.

SENATOR BORAH. You suggested to him that if it meant political control or paramount control, you did not care to discuss it?

SECRETARY LANSING. Yes.

SENATOR BORAH. What did he say in reply to that which would indicate that he waived that construction?

SECRETARY LANSING. He continued the discussion.

SENATOR BORAH. Continued it along what line?

SECRETARY LANSING. Well, only along the line that he inserted the words "special interest" in his counterdraft of a note and urged that it be included. But he understood exactly what I interpreted the words "special interest" to mean.

SENATOR BORAH. And you understood what he interpreted them to mean?

SECRETARY LANSING. No, I did not.

SENATOR BORAH. He had said that his idea was that Japan had special interests in China which ought to be recognized, and by those special interests he meant paramount control?

SECRETARY LANSING. Yes; and I told him I would not consider it.

SENATOR BORAH. Did he say, "Very well, I adopt that construction of it," or anything of that kind?

SECRETARY LANSING. No, but he continued to introduce the words "special interest." But he knew that if he did not take my meaning that I would not continue the discussion.

SENATOR BORAH. Is it not a fact that before and after he appeared in this country his government, officially or semi-officially, placed the construction upon those words which Ishii had placed upon them?

SECRETARY LANSING. Before?

SENATOR BORAH. Yes.

SECRETARY LANSING. Not to my knowledge, further than his statement.

SENATOR BORAH. I have here a dispatch from the Russian ambassador at Tokio to his home government, made October 22, 1917, in which he said that the Japanese—

SENATOR POMERENE. From what are you reading?

SENATOR BORAH. From a copy of this dispatch published in "Democracy and the Eastern Question." [3]

SECRETARY LANSING. By whom?

SENATOR BORAH. By Mr. Thomas F. Millard. Is there any question about the authenticity of the dispatch?

SECRETARY LANSING. No question, because I do not know anything about it except his publication of it.

SENATOR BORAH. Do you have any doubt about this publication being correct, as to this dispatch?

SECRETARY LANSING. I have no information on the subject one way or the other.

SENATOR BORAH. Then you do not desire to have it inferred from your answer that it is false?

SECRETARY LANSING. No.

SENATOR BORAH. We will read it and see whether time proves it to be true [Reading]:

> "The Japanese are manifesting more and more clearly a tendency to interpret the special position of Japan in China, inter alia, in the sense that other powers must not undertake in China any political steps without previously exchanging views with Japan on the subject—a condition that would to some extent establish a Japanese control over the foreign affairs of China. On the other hand, the Japanese Government does not attach great importance to its recognition of the principle of the open door and the integrity of China, regarding it as merely a repetition of the assurances repeatedly given by it earlier to other powers and implying no new restrictions on Japanese policy in China. It is therefore quite possible that in some future time there may arise in this connection misunderstandings between the United States and Japan. The minister of foreign affairs again confirmed today in conversation with me that in the negotiations by Viscount Ishii the question at issue is not some special concession to Japan in these or other parts of China, but Japan's special position in China as a whole."

[3] In July, 1919, when the controversy regarding the Versailles Treaty was at its height, the U. S. Department of Justice, acting on the suggestion of the Department of State, commenced an action in the United States court to enjoin the further publication and circulation of "Democracy and the Eastern Question" on the ground that it disclosed confidential documents and information. That court action, however, was hastily abandoned because, it is believed, of instructions from President Wilson.

That information, I take it, was unknown to you at the time of discussion with Count Ishii?

SECRETARY LANSING. Entirely so. I would call your attention to the fact that the Root-Takahira agreement included an arrangement between Japan and the United States that they would take no steps without consulting each, and it would have the same effect as this statement made by the Russian ambassador.[4]

SENATOR BORAH. And in another dispatch from the Russian ambassador under date of November 1, 1917, there is another paragraph which I quote [Reading]:

"To my question whether he did not fear"—

This was the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs that he was talking to [Reading again]:

"that in the future misunderstandings might arise from the different interpretations by Japan and the United States of the meaning of the terms 'special position' and 'special interests' of Japan in China, Viscount Motono replied by saying [a gap in the original]. Nevertheless I gained the impression from the words of the minister that he is conscious of the possibility of misunderstandings also in the future, but is of the opinion that in such a case Japan would have better means at her disposal for carrying into effect her interpretation rather than that of the United States."

Now, it is a fact that you stated the other day, is it not, Mr. Secretary, that after this Lansing-Ishii agreement was made, Japan placed the construction upon it which Ishii desired to have you place upon it in the first instance?

SECRETARY LANSING. I have no recollection that there is any statement made by the Japanese Government as to the fact which you set forth.

SENATOR BORAH. Have you information that it has been made by the press of Japan?

SECRETARY LANSING. Oh, yes.

SENATOR BORAH. And by publications that are under the control of the Japanese Government?

SECRETARY LANSING. That I do not know.

SENATOR BORAH. Now, these notes between yourself and Count Ishii were published first by Japan, were they not?

SECRETARY LANSING. Yes.

SENATOR BORAH. Was that in accordance with the understanding?

SECRETARY LANSING. I believe not. I believe they came to the knowledge of China before they were made public.

[4] Appendix E.

SENATOR BORAH. Japan presented the information of these notes to China?

SECRETARY LANSING. That is my recollection.

SENATOR BORAH. Yes; and the first knowledge that the American minister to China had of the contents of the notes or that they existed came to him from the Japanese Government?

SECRETARY LANSING. That I cannot tell you. Very likely that is so, however.

SENATOR BORAH. There was an agreement as to the date upon which they should be published and made known to the world?

SECRETARY LANSING. The 6th of November, four days after they were signed.

SENATOR BORAH. They were made known to China prior to that?

SECRETARY LANSING. Yes.

SENATOR BORAH. And the information came back here prior to the time it should have been published?

SECRETARY LANSING. I think not. I do not think we could have had it by cable.

SENATOR BORAH. The information came to this country not through the Secretary of State, but by press telegrams from China and Japan. . . . The Chinese Legation issued a statement in the nature of a protest on November 12, 1917?

SECRETARY LANSING. Not a protest.

SENATOR BORAH. What do you regard it?

SECRETARY LANSING. A declaration, as it was termed.

SENATOR HITCHCOCK. That declaration was in entire accord with the American interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement?

SECRETARY LANSING. Entirely.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. May I ask you, Mr. Secretary, at the time you and Count Ishii were having your conversations in relation to this subject, and as to what "special interests" meant, did he say anything which would allow you to understand what he meant by the term "special interests?"

SECRETARY LANSING. Nothing further than I have stated.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. Did he at any time intimate that it meant paramountcy of interest different from that of any other nation, other than Japan's propinquity to China?

SECRETARY LANSING. My only recollection as to that is that he wished to have inserted the words "special interests and influence," and I objected seriously to the insertion of the words "and influence," and they were stricken out.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. He gave no intimation of what he understood by those terms? He did not attempt to define either "influence" or "special interests?"

SECRETARY LANSING. Nothing further than that, except that the insertion of the words "and influence" in the counterdraft indicated that he understood fully my interpretation of "special interests."

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. "Special interests" could not mean anything else, in your opinion, except——?

SECRETARY LANSING. Political?

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. Except political?

SECRETARY LANSING. That is true.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. Has the so-called Lansing-Ishii agreement any binding force on this nation?

SECRETARY LANSING. No.

SENATOR BRANDEGEE. It is simply a declaration of your policy, or the policy of this Government, as long as the President and the State Department want to continue that policy?

SECRETARY LANSING. Exactly.

A difficulty of "outside" opinion in following the workings of diplomacy is how to comprehend the meaning of diplomatic language. When a diplomat says publicly that he "has no knowledge" of this or that, it is taken by diplomats to mean that he has not been informed "officially" of the matter; and there are shades of meaning of what constitutes being "officially informed." For instance, those despatches of the Russian ambassador at Tokio to his Government referred to in the previous testimony were published by the Kerensky Government at Petrograd following the revolution in Russia, and their significance at once was noted by all who understood their meaning; no doubt they were noticed by Mr. Lansing. But he told the senators that he had no information of those despatches. In that sense, it would require that the information be communicated to the American Government by the Russian Government through diplomatic channels to give Mr. Lansing "any knowledge" of them. These phraseological fictions are dear to diplomacy; they are useful in keeping "outside opinion" on the outside; they

serve to obscure whatever the diplomats prefer to keep secret when, notwithstanding precautions, the press makes embarrassing revelations.

Mr. Lansing's testimony to the Senate, in conjunction with other known facts about the matter, shows that when it made the Lansing-Ishii agreement the American Government (which, in that case, probably was not more than two men, the President and the Secretary of State) understood perfectly that Viscount Ishii was trying to "put something over," and understood that the agreement in the form it was signed was ambiguous and susceptible to different interpretations. That agreement was a diplomatic finesse directed to an existing war situation and designed to hold Japan with the Allies, or it is a rare bit of diplomatic ineptitude on the part of the American Government.

§ 3

The use by Japanese diplomacy, especially in relations with the United States, of the so-called "racial equality" question, at times has been clever; and by many the Lansing-Ishii agreement is attributed to a phase in the progress of that question. Japanese diplomacy has used the "racial equality" issue in many ways and on many occasions, notably the bringing up of the question in connection with discussion of the Covenant of the League of Nations at the Paris conference. Follows a memorandum I wrote at that time:

JAPAN, "RACE EQUALITY," AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

By Thomas F. Millard,
Paris, April 6, 1919. *Confidential*

ECONOMIC RELATION OF JAPANESE AND OTHER ORIENTALS

In comparison with their neighboring Oriental peoples the Japanese now are on a considerably higher economic plane as to earnings and living standards. Consequently, Japanese are unable to compete on equal terms and conditions with Chinese, Koreans, and Indians. That Japanese, and the Japanese Government, recognize

this condition is shown by reports of special commissions and by the published writings of many Japanese authorities. It furthermore is proven by the fact that Chinese and other Oriental laborers *are excluded from free competition with Japanese in Japan by restrictions on immigration;* and also by regulations favoring Japanese in Formosa and Korea (countries now governed by Japan) over the natives in order to enable Japanese to compete with the native labor and production, and also in commerce. Placed side by side anywhere, on equal conditions, Chinese can undermine and supersede the Japanese in all forms of manual labor, in most forms of modern mechanical industry, and in lesser manufacturing and commercial enterprises and operations.

Japanese Emigration to Western Countries

The modern issue of so-called "racial equality" as advanced by Japan has sprung from conditions arising out of Japanese emigration to Western countries, *principally in the United States of America.* It should be recognized fully, however, that the objections to Japanese immigration in the United States heretofore are not founded really on racial reasons, although racial characteristics have an influence in the matter, and ordinary persons are unable to distinguish between economic reactions due to the presence of Asiatics and the racial qualities of Asiatics. The chief objection to Japanese immigration into the United States is so far economic, but *with the possibility in the event of unrestricted immigration, of developing a genuine racial issue.*

In respect, for instance, to the attitude of the Japanese Government toward the restraints put upon the immigration of Japanese to the United States, the question in its original form involved only Japanese. The Japanese Government did not then pretend to be concerned (nor could it properly so act) about the position *of Chinese and other Orientals in America.* It merely was trying to better the position of its own nationals. Later, however, the Japanese Government perceived the usefulness of this issue, when presented in a certain form, *to the Pan-Asian propaganda* which for a number of years Japan has been carrying on in all Asiatic countries, and it was expanded, as a doctrine, to its present "race equality" form.

"Race Equality" and Immigration

Race equality as a universal human and international principle is one thing; the desire of the Japanese Government to gain admission for its nationals into Western countries is quite another

thing. The two propositions superficially seem identical: *they really are antagonistic.*

When the Japanese Government in recent times has tried to secure admission of Japanese into Western countries, and their residence there on equal terms with white peoples, it has had in mind the advantages and national pride of *Japanese exclusively.*

If Japanese would be admitted freely into the United States and/or other Western countries, and would enjoy the same rights in those countries as immigrants of Caucasian origins, Japan and the Japanese emigrants to those countries would benefit greatly because of their economic advantages over the native and other white residents. But if *all* Oriental peoples should have the same privileges and rights, then the practical advantages to Japan and to Japanese of such a status would diminish and perhaps vanish, for other Oriental immigrants could undercut the Japanese almost as easily and effectively as the Japanese undercut the Western natives. Eventually, therefore, the result of such a status of Orientals in Western countries would cause the restriction of the Japanese there, because in numbers, closer economic shaving, and lower standards of living, the other Orientals have the advantage over Japanese. That the application of any genuine "racial equality" to the question of immigration among nations would, in the case of Japan, *tend to defeat Japan's exclusive objects in contending on the issue* vis-à-vis America is understood by the Japanese Government.

The Japanese Government, therefore, does not really desire to have a genuine application of the "racial equality" principle to the immigration issue.

Japan's Reasons for Raising This Issue at the Peace Conference

Japan's reasons for raising the "race equality" question at the Peace Conference, in connection with the proposed Covenant of a League of Nations, can be epitomized as follows:

(a) For its bearing on Japan's Pan-Asian propaganda.

(b) To create sympathy for Japan in Western countries.

(c) In case Japan's request is rejected, to enable Japan to pose as having a grievance which should be redressed or *compensated* by the Conference.

(d) In case Japan's request is granted by the Conference, it will enable the Japanese delegation and the Japanese Government (the present Ministry) to present something to assuage popular disappointment in Japan if other and vastly more important matters concerning Japan are rejected by the Conference.

Relation of Japan's Present Situation to This Question

The symptoms of political, social and industrial unrest in Japan, together with other factors, indicate almost with certainty that hereafter Japan cannot succeed in equalizing the economic plane of Japanese with that of other Orientals; on the contrary, there is every prospect of a further widening of the margin of difference.

In that event, the only way by which the Japanese Government could apply an international "race equality" principle to the advantage of Japanese in Western countries would be by Japan's obtaining the political and economic hegemony of China and other Asiatic nations, in which case Japan could regulate matters so (as the Japanese Government does now with Koreans and Formosans) *that Japanese exclusively would enjoy whatever benefits would come from that status.*

To obtain the hegemony of eastern Asia has been the chief purpose of Japan's foreign policy, and it is the *major object* of the Japanese Government at the Peace Conference.

Danger to China of This Situation

In case Japan, as a result of sympathetic and other reactions of the "race equality" question, and its treatment by the Conference, should succeed in obtaining something in the nature of redress and compensation, it is obvious that any such compensation or redress is apt to be *at the expense of China*, by confirmation by the Conference, in the Treaty of Peace, or by supplementary action, of the secret treaties confirming Japan's aggressions in China made by the British, French and Italian governments during the war, and before the United States became a belligerent.[5]

This aspect and possibility of the question gives Japan's agitation of the "race equality" question a significance to China far beyond its apparent content.

The Question and Western Nations

In view of the conditions which would make the translation of a "race equality" clause or commitment in the Covenant of the League of Nations into a *practical application* to the immigration question disadvantageous to Japan, it safely may be assumed that a vaguely worded clause of that import in the Covenant need give no especial uneasiness to Western countries which have reason to dread an influx of Orientals. This probably is the reason why

[5] This afterward did occur. See Mr. Lansing's views given previously on page 73.

(as is reported) the American Government does not especially object to the placation of Japan and Asiatic peoples by enacting such a clause, while at the same time the American people are firm in purpose strictly to regulate, and if need be to exclude, Asiatic and any other immigration.

Again, at Geneva, at the first meeting of the League of Nations, Japanese diplomacy attempted to use the issue, but did not get entirely the reaction which was desired. I give a memorandum I wrote at Geneva, three days after the League convened:

Confidential,
By T. F. M.

Geneva,
November 18, 1920

SUBJECT: JAPAN, THE "RACIAL EQUALITY" QUESTION, THE LEAGUE, AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE; RELATION TO THE INTEREST OF CHINA

PREMISES

1. Japan desires to extend the alliance with Great Britain provided it will advance these objects:

(a) Enhance Japan's international prestige. Refusal of Great Britain to renew the alliance at this juncture will reflect adversely on Japan's prestige.

(b) That hereafter the alliance will be construed by Great Britain (as it has been) in accommodation to Japan's policy in China; and that a similar disposition be displayed toward Japan's policy in Siberia.

(c) Strengthen Japan morally and financially in the event of there being a collision between Japan and the United States.

2. A renewal or extension of the alliance apparently can have for Great Britain only these advantages:

(a) A strengthening of Great Britain's position and policy in respect to India and other Asiatic nationalities now under British authority. There can be no genuine community of British and Japanese policy in Asia *except on a hypothesis that British policy in Asiatic regions under her present control is analogous with Japan's policy in extreme eastern Asia,* and that the British Government has decided that it must make a division with Japan by yielding ground in Siberia and northern China.

(b) To prevent Japan from seeking alliances in other quarters.

3. Disadvantages to Great Britain:
   (a) Such an arrangement must concede to Japan a considerable encroachment upon British "spheres" and commercial position in China.
   (b) A renewal of the alliance on these conditions will place British policy in Asia in direct opposition to the policy of the United States, a situation that contains great difficulties for the British Government now and in the future. It is possible, however, that the present British Foreign Office may hold the opinion that it safely can enter into such an agreement (its real content of course will be kept secret) with Japan, and for a time it can placate the American Government with assurances camouflaging the true character of the Pact with Japan.
   The British Foreign Office may calculate that by renewing or extending the alliance, Japan can be held in a certain position for a period; then when Great Britain further has consolidated her position in the world, if the United States develops serious antagonism to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, a way will be found to drop the alliance and effect an entente with America before the issue leads to estrangement. This policy of course requires the British Government to "play it both ways" at the same time, a course that contains dangers.

THE "RACE EQUALITY" ANGLE

Until within the last two months Japan's inspired propaganda has stressed the alleged intention of the Japanese Government to raise the "racial equality" issue before the Assembly of the League at Geneva. Recently, however, this propaganda has been suppressed, and instead the idea has been sent out that Japan will not bring up the question at this meeting. Of the reasons given for this change of plan, they are vague, and probably have no genuine relation to the real reason. It is probable that Japan's manipulation of the "race" issue now is meant to influence the question of the renewal of the alliance with Great Britain by the following line of reasoning:

1. Owing to Great Britain's various Asiatic dependencies and the fact that all of Great Britain's great self-governing Colonies, or Dominions, are strongly opposed to some interpretations that may be read into a recognition of "race equality" as a principle of international law, any agitation now of this ques-

tion contains embarrassments to the Imperial British Government.

2. By threatening to agitate the question at this time, the Japanese Government can create a situation which Great Britain wants to avoid.
3. By suspending its threat to raise this question now, in abeyance to the wishes of Great Britain, the Japanese Government can obtain a "leverage" on other questions, and especially on the question of renewing the alliance.
4. Recent events have minimized the use as a diplomatic expedient which Japan can make of the race equality question *vis-à-vis America,* without reacting too strongly on Japan; *so it is turned on England.*

THE BEARING ON CHINA

The bearing of a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance on the situation of China has been pointed out in previous memoranda. It only is needed to suggest that China's representatives at Geneva should be alert for any developments, or intrigues, that may indicate manœuvers by the Japanese delegation on the lines indicated.

The objections of China to such a course should be put before the British representatives, and especially before the representatives of the self-governing Dominions and India.

The danger contained in such a course of the British Imperial Government of bringing it into antagonism with the United States may be pointed out.

§ 4

An opportunity for the Japanese Government to test its interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement with respect to the American interpretation occurred in connection with an effort to vitalize the international banking consortium which was organized at Paris, during the conference, and of which Mr. Lansing as secretary of state was the protagonist. An American banker, Thomas W. Lamont, of the firm of J. P. Morgan & Company, visited China and Japan in the spring of 1920, for the purpose of studying the situation there in respect of possible financing activities, and especially, I believe, to sound out the position of the Japanese financiers and the Government about international finance in China. The press in Japan, and utterances of Japanese statesmen,

had intimated distinctly that whether the Japanese Government would oppose operations of the consortium, or would participate with it, would depend on the reservation of Manchuria and "Inner" Mongolia for the exclusive financial provision of Japan. Mr. Lamont remained in the Far East about two months, first stopping in Japan, then proceeding to China, and stopping in Japan again on the return homeward journey. He had conferences in Japan with Japanese bankers and diplomats about the consortium and its policy. It developed in those conferences that the Japanese Government was disposed to reserve Manchuria and "Inner" Mongolia, those regions, it may be mentioned, being included in special privileges accorded to Japan under the disputed 1915 agreements with China. The Japanese Government's diplomatic manœuvering in the matter of the consortium was designed to obtain directly, or indirectly by inference, the tacit recognition by the American Government of a special position and influence of Japan in Manchuria and "Inner" Mongolia which Mr. Lansing privately had refused to concede to Viscount Ishii in 1917. The American Government, and Mr. Lamont as the representative of the American banking group in the consortium, distinctly refused to exclude Manchuria and "Inner" Mongolia, or any part of the territory of China, from the scope of the consortium; and after much diplomatic squirming the Japanese Government decided to participate in the consortium on that understanding, with a "reservation" in the form of a mutual "understanding" to the effect that the American Government and the consortium had no purpose to encroach upon or interfere with Japan's existing vested interests in Manchuria. No one in China, except Japanese, felt satisfied with leaving the matter in that form, especially as the "inspired" Japanese press distorted the "understanding"; but as there was no prospect of the consortium's doing any business then, there seemed no use in adding to the existing diplomatic aggravations by prolonging the controversy.

Moreover, by then it was evident that the clash of policies in China would have to be harmonized at their sources, if they could be harmonized at all.

§ 5

At that time there was a vociferous effort of a section of American opinion, supported by a tremendous press propaganda instigated from Europe, to demonstrate that what it called the "isolation" of the United States was injurious to that nation and ruinous to Europe, that the United States should join the League of Nations, that the United States should forgive to nations in the Allied group what they owed to the American Government, and that additional loans should be made to Europe. The same propositions were brought forward in many guises.

The question of disarmament especially was agitated by the international sentimentalists in America; and various ways were suggested to have the American Government take the lead on that question and initiate a program. I had returned to America from Geneva, where I observed the first meeting of the League; and at the request of a member of the House Committee on Military Affairs I wrote a memorandum giving my views. It follows:

SUBJECT: THE UNITED STATES, THE "ALLIES ENTENTE" AND THE ASIATIC QUESTION

By Thomas F. Millard *Confidential*
January 29, 1921.

THE LIMITATION AND REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS

The first session of the Assembly of the League of Nations having revealed that there is slight hope to secure through the League any prompt action leading to international disarmament (NOTE. See memo. on character of League),[6] it is proposed that efforts be made to obtain an agreement by the customary diplomatic methods

[6] That memorandum has been given previously.

between Great Britain, Japan and the United States in respect to naval reductions. This plan is described as a "naval holiday."

There also is considerable advocacy of extending this effort to general disarmament, or reduction, by including France and Italy in the deliberations. In the writer's opinion, thus to extend the scope of the plan will be to risk its defeat, for there is no genuine prospect of inducing the French and Italian governments to reduce their military forces at present. (NOTE. See memo. on character of League.)

The naval preparations of the United States primarily are directed to the state of affairs *vis-à-vis* the Oriental nations fronting on the Pacific Ocean. A 2 to 1 preponderance over Japan is necessary for our security on the Pacific Coast, and for the fruition of the American policy in China and the Far East. A 3 to 1 preponderance is safer still, and is considered necessary by some experts. This proportion considers Japan separately, *and not in conjunction with another Power;* and the calculation is based on the requirement, in a collision with Japan about broad policy, to defeat Japan or bring her to terms by control of the sea.

The character of the alliance between Japan and Great Britain, if it is renewed, was analyzed in another memorandum, and its menace to the United States was demonstrated. Taking the American, British and Japanese navies as they stand now, a combination of the British and Japanese navies will overpower the American navy about 3 to 1. Furthermore, *a proportional reduction or suspension of naval programs on this basis will place the United States permanently in that inferior position.*

Therefore, the United States should not consent to any "naval holiday" or suspension of naval building *until it has definite and positive information of all engagements and treaties of the British Government regarding the Far East, and of the intentions of the British Government regarding a renewal of the alliance with Japan.* Previous mistakes of the American Government of this character should not be repeated. (NOTE. President Wilson neglected to ascertain from the Allies governments, when the United States entered the great war—or he was deceived by them—what secret agreements they had made, and consequently learned only when the peace conference had convened of the secret Shantung agreements and other agreements equally opposed to the policy and interests of the United States.) If the United States at this time should enter into a tri-partite agreement with Great Britain and Japan for the restriction of naval armaments *on the basis of present strength,* and then afterward it develops that the British and Jap-

anese governments secretly have agreements concerning Far Eastern affairs antagonistic to the American policy (as any such agreement logically will be), and that treaty is supported by an alliance of those nations, *the United States would find itself in a position of being forced to submit to the joint policy of Great Britain and Japan,* or *resist the opposition of a greatly superior naval force.* The very existence of this situation, in conjunction with an Anglo-Japanese alliance, places America's position in the Pacific under a grave diplomatic disadvantage from the moment it is established.

Finances and American Policy

There are pending a number of proposals whereby the United States Government, and in some cases American private financiers, are asked to make either large loans to foreign governments, or give a similar credit by extending existing loans and funding the interest on them. Great Britain, France and Italy—all so-called Principal Powers of the Allies entente—particularly have favors of this nature to ask of the American Government, and indirectly of the American people.

The writer is of the firm opinion that none of these accommodations should be granted *until the United States Government has positive assurances from those governments to the effect that they are not by secret agreements or otherwise aligned against any of the major propositions of American Foreign Policy.* For instance, the accommodations asked by the British Government should not be granted *as long as there is any doubt as to the position of the British Government in respect to Far Eastern questions and while there is any possibility of the British Foreign Office continuing an alliance with Japan.*

In respect to financial advances to foreign nations the American Government should refuse to permit the national accumulations of wealth to be diverted by the indirect method of credits extended abroad to finance policies and armaments adverse to the interests and security of the United States.

Effects of the California-Japan Question on World Politics

Certain reactions directly attributable to the insistent agitation by the Japanese Government and the Japanese press of the rights of Japanese in America already can be observed in Europe, and in England and the self-governing British dominions. This reaction is due not to any special interest of those peoples and governments in the question itself, but is due to a growing realization of the effects upon the position of the so-called "Allies" group of Powers

and the nations composing it of a serious schism between Japan and the United States. All nations composing the "Allies" group in Europe strongly desire the good will of the United States for urgent reasons. All those Powers need and want assistance from America which will be impossible to obtain if by any chance or for any reason popular thought in America should come to regard the policies of those Powers as inimical to America.

European statesmen begin to perceive the possibilities of an alienation of American sympathy from Europe and England reacting from a sympathetic attitude of those nations toward Japan in respect of issues between Japan and America. The influence of this reasoning was plainly noticeable during the sessions of the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva, where a disposition to avoid the outward appearance of intimacy with Japan was displayed by all the Powers. This psychology has been inadvertently created by Japan in the process of an agitation designed by the Japan Foreign Office to apply solely to Japan-American questions, and its reactions without doubt have contributed to modify Japan's attitude. It should be comparatively easy for American diplomacy to use this situation to keep Japan isolated until the Far Eastern question can be brought into an easier position with respect to the United States. Some plain intimations to certain foreign offices, with current comment in the press, might be used to impel the Allies "entente" along the line desired by the United States.

§ 6

A study of the Anglo-Japanese alliance extending over a long period had convinced me that it was the root of the gradual emasculation of the Hay Doctrine which had been taking place since the Russo-Japanese War; and I had endeavored to impress both the American and Chinese governments with that opinion. Prior to the first meeting of the League at Geneva, I submitted to the Chinese delegation some views on that point, as follows:

CHINA AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

Confidential
By T. F. M. August, 1920.

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SECRET SHANTUNG AGREEMENTS

As an example of the invidious character of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, in its application to China, may be cited the secret agree-

ment whereby Great Britain without informing or consulting China agreed to support Japan on the Shantung question at the Peace Conference, and to dispose of China's inherent rights in one of her own provinces, contrary to the sentiments of the Chinese people.

China's International Relations Complicated

The Anglo-Japanese alliance and similar agreements have the effect of complicating China's international relations by creating antagonisms and suspicions among various Powers concerning China, with which the Chinese people desire to maintain friendly and unclouded relations. Notably does the Anglo-Japanese alliance complicate China's position *vis-à-vis* the United States and Siberia, and also with the British dominions of Canada and Australasia.

Other Agreements Relating to China

The Chinese people hereafter should object to agreements made between other nations concerning and applying to China, and without the Chinese Government being a party to or being consulted about such agreements. In so doing, however, a distinction can be made between alliances of an offensive and defensive nature, and agreements that have the character merely of an open declaration of policy, like the Hay Doctrine. It can be remarked, however, that even open policies such as the Hay and Monroe doctrines are susceptible of meanings that are resented by peoples to which they apply; as, for instance, some South Americans resent the Monroe Doctrine as paternalism. While Chinese have nothing to resent in the Hay Doctrine, they do resent agreements such as the Lansing-Ishii agreement, made between the American and Japanese governments without consulting China, and which instead of clarifying the position of China, have confused and further complicated it.

The Diplomatic Independence of China

The Chinese people regard with apprehension and resentment the practice that in recent years has been developing among the Powers, of treating China as a diplomatic appanage, and of treating among themselves in matters concerning China instead of treating directly with China. They especially resent and condemn assumptions of any Powers of a paternal diplomatic relationship to China, or of any pretense of a right or privilege to intervene in the diplomatic intercourse between China and any other nation.

China's Case before the League of Nations

A continuance or renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance under the existing or similar terms, taken with the previous interpre-

tation of the alliance in practice, will give cause to suspect that if China eventually makes an appeal to the League of Nations for redress of her grievances, Great Britain and Japan will be found to have made a private agreement prejudicial to China's case, and which may adversely affect China's hope of obtaining justice from the League of Nations.

Events at Geneva confirmed the suspicions I expressed in that memorandum, as I have indicated in a previous chapter.

The attitude of the British delegation at Paris toward questions of the Far East, and especially in regard to Chinese questions, had been something of a puzzle to American experts on the Orient who were attached to the American commission. The Orient experts of the British delegation on most questions seemed to agree with the Americans on the merits of issues, and their sympathies appeared to be with China; but it was evident that their personal feelings and opinions were subject to repression by the imperial policy of their Government. That left the American commission all the time feeling as if they did not know exactly where the British stood about China, and the logical conclusion was that in the background of British policy were inhibitions arising from relations with Japan. In the end, where Great Britain stood was in no doubt: she stood squarely on the secret agreements, and on the usually accepted implications of the alliance with Japan.

Paris therefore proved that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was a living and comprehensive instrument; and public declarations of the Japanese and British governments made it plain that membership of those powers in the League of Nations did not alter or qualify their alliance.

Manifestations of British policy in China after the Paris conference therefore took on, especially to the United States, a fresh significance. Of many illuminating instances, I will describe two.

In April, 1920, there was signed an agreement between officials of the so-called independent Government of Kwang-

tung province (Canton) and Major Louis Cassel, of the British army, retired, as the representative of a British syndicate, which, in effect, gave to the British corporation a monopoly of the exploitation of mineral and other economic rights in Kwangtung province, and provided for the absorption by the British syndicate of mining properties already opened.[7] That agreement, while not having the character of a secret agreement, was kept as secret as was possible. It became known early in 1921 [8] and caused much discussion; eventually, because of criticism and the failure to obtain the sanction of the Peking Government, the concession was put into the background. Its present status is dubious; but such things rarely die in China. They reappear sooner or later in some form.

The significance of the Cassel concession, so called, is that, primarily, it is evidence of British dealing with a section of China which claimed independence from the "recognized" Government at Peking. While the British Government did not, so far as I know, officially support the Cassel concession with its diplomacy, the concession had the moral and financial support of British interests in the Far East which have close relations with the British Government. The impression left by the Cassel concession incident is that it was carried through at Canton on the hypothesis that the various commitments to the United States regarding the integrity of China and the Open Door were to be relegated, and British enterprise merely was anticipating events. It also was a violation of the spirit of the consortium agreement. Plainly, the Cassel concession was based on a presumption that there would be a reversion to "spheres of interest" in China on the old demarcation, or a new demarcation fixed by new regional understandings made at Paris or later. Whatever the diplomatic exigencies at Peking may have required of

[7] It was believed that this syndicate was connected with the great British oil companies operating in the Near East and East Indies.

[8] Appendix D.

the British legation there, it was evident that British interests in China in general, and particularly in the region of which Hongkong is the port and financial center, considered the Cassel concession as quite in order.

Even of more significance, as intimating British policy, was the so-called "American wireless" case, which developed early in 1921 at Peking. That case is concisely stated in a memorandum on it which I wrote at the request of the American legation at Peking, after I had been permitted to read the *dossier* to date. My memorandum follows:

SUBJECT: PROTEST OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE FEDERAL WIRELESS AGREEMENT WITH CHINA

By T. F. M. Peking, May, 1921.

RÉSUMÉ OF FACTS

In March, 1918, the Chinese Government was induced, under diplomatic pressure from Japan, to enter into an agreement, confirmed by letter, with a Japanese firm for the construction and operation of a wireless plant in China. In a letter confirming the contract was a clause giving the Japanese company a monopoly on wireless communications between China and Europe and America for thirty years. This agreement was *kept secret;* or the monopolistic part of it was suppressed.

Without knowledge of the above situation, and acting in good faith, an American firm in January, 1921, entered into a contract with the Chinese Government to construct and operate a number of wireless telegraph stations in China, located, however, at different points from the Japanese stations. The American agreement contained no monopolistic provisions.

On learning of the American enterprise, the Japanese legation at Peking entered a protest with the Chinese Government, contending that the American project was an infringement of the Japanese rights under the secret agreement of 1918. To that protest the American and Chinese governments replied by disputing the *exclusive character* of the Japanese agreement. The American government took the position, under a treaty with China made in 1858, that American citizens are entitled to participate in any enterprises opened to nationals of any other nation in China, and cannot be excluded or discriminated against by monopolistic provisions.

ARGUMENTATIVE

That the Chinese Government did not regard the Japanese agreement as conferring a monopoly is shown by the fact that subsequently it made an agreement with an American firm for additional wireless facilities.

After the American contract was known, protests to it were made also in behalf of Danish and British interests, by the Danish and British governments, on the claim that it infringed upon agreements previously made by the Chinese Government with Danish and British subjects, conferring exclusive communications rights on them. (QUERY. Did the Danish and British know of the existence of the Mitsui agreement prior to the Japanese protest to the American contract?)

From the foregoing, it is evident that the Chinese Government did not regard those other agreements as conferring any monopolistic rights. In his Note to Bell, Count Uchida states: "Moreover, the construction of the means of communication within the territory of a country is purely a matter of domestic administration and the government of each country ought to be competent to regulate all plans regarding such matters according to their *own uncontrolled discretion.*" This seems to state affirmatively the sole right of China to "regulate all plans regarding such matters [telegraph communications] according to her own uncontrolled discretion." Evidently China has done exactly that, and, with full knowledge of the Mitsui contract, has contracted with an American firm for an extension of wireless facilities in China.

In respect to Japan's protest that the fulfillment of the contract with the American firm will result in financial damage to the Japanese wireless enterprise, it may be pointed out that money damages are one thing, and monopolistic rights are another. If a Japanese firm claims that by reason of default of an agreement with it by the Chinese Government, the Japanese firm therefrom suffers financial losses, its recourse obviously is a suit in law to recover its damages from the Chinese Government, *and not a demand for the exclusion from China of bona fide business of other foreign nations.* In case of a suit in law or a claim for money damages, it is necessary to *prove* the actual damages. In this case, the Japanese Foreign Office advances the, at present, purely supposititious contention that the erection and operation of wireless plants contemplated by the American company will result in financial damages to the Japanese company. The contention therefore seems invalid at this juncture, and establishes Japan's protest

olely upon the alleged monopolistic rights of the Japanese company, obtained by questionable methods, in secrecy.

For the American Government to recognize the principle on which ie Japanese protest in this matter is founded will be to concede s application to all similar questions in respect to commercial nd economic development in China: in fact, it will be *a definite bandonment of the Open Door.*

If the Japanese Government contends that the non-monopolistic greement of the Chinese Government with an American firm to xtend wireless facilities in China is an infringement of previous greements made with Japanese firms, then *the secret clauses of the litsui wireless-contract would seem to be invalidated by the same easoning,* for they constitute even more of an infringement of ien existing agreements than the American contract does. Yet ie Japanese Government advances this Mitsui agreement, obtained secretly, as both superseding previously made telegraph greements, and excluding subsequently made agreements.

THER CONSIDERATIONS

Contemporary developments in this matter plainly intimate a iplomatic collusion of the British, Danish, and Japanese legations o intimidate the Wai Chiao Pu and the Chinese Government by xercising joint pressure. This circumstance raises the question f the motives of Great Britain, Denmark, and Japan, in jointly rotesting against this American contract.

The paradox is presented of *three* governments separately proesting to the Chinese Government that *three distinct* agreements re violated by the intrusion of an American business firm in a eld of development. Here are *three separate claims* of what is antamount to a monopoly of the *same thing,* under *three* distinct greements. It is obvious that there can be only *one* monopoly of ny given thing. It follows therefore that of those three protests, *wo of them* cannot be valid, on the face of the situation.

It further is evident that in this matter the legation of Denmark is cting as the cat's-paw of Great Britain. I have heard that the Danish cable company, in whose behalf the Danish protest is made, really s a subsidiary of a British cable company; or, (which in effect is he same), a majority of shares of the Danish company are owned y the British. If that is correct (NOTE. The American Legation hould ascertain positively), it appears that the British are making wo distinct protests in the same matter, in each claiming what mounts to monopoly, based on two distinct agreements. The

conclusion is obvious that the British and Danish protests are connected back stairs, and are brought forward in order to create as many complications as can be, with a purpose of defeating the American contract.

If, by the above-indicated diplomatic collusion, the Chinese Government should be so intimidated as to revoke the American contract, it is possible that afterward there will be a private diplomatic arrangement between the British, Danish, and Japanese legations, whereby this matter will be mutually adjusted. Such an adjustment might, and probably would, include considerations and matters which have no connection with wireless installations, but which are contained in the corpus of private understandings between the British and Japanese governments respecting Asia.

On that occasion my opinion, I take it, was desired merely in order to obtain an outside point of view of one familiar with the conditions and background. The American legation already had taken a firm position, supporting the contract of the Federal Wireless Corporation. Charles R. Crane at the time was American minister to China; and he, and the entire legation staff, felt strongly that the incident constituted a calculated attempt to put the Open Door into oblivion.

The Japanese wireless plant erected near Peking by the Mitsui Company, which was the occasion of the protest of the Japanese Government, as yet has not been able to work properly; and the opinion is held by some that, knowing that the Mitsui plant was defective, the protest was an oblique device to get the Chinese Government to accept and pay for it by obstructing its additional wireless program; or it may have been a diplomatic device to get something from the Chinese Government in an entirely different matter. Any of those suppositions accord with the usual methods of "economic diplomacy."

The American Government was closely watching that matter, and evidently it thought the time was opportune to make its position plain, which is done in the following exchange

of notes between the Chinese minister at Washington and Secretary of State Hughes:

THE CHINESE MINISTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Chinese Legation
Washington, June 9, 1921.

Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that on the 8th of January last an agreement was made between the Ministry of Communications, on behalf of the Chinese Government, and the Federal Telegraph Company, an American corporation, for the erection and operation, as a joint enterprise of the Chinese Government and the American Company, of stations for wireless communication. Against this agreement protests were presented to my Government by certain Governments, claiming that by granting to the American Company the right of participation with the Chinese Government in wireless communications the rights of their nationals secured under prior contracts were violated.

In a recent conversation with you on the subject, I understood from you that the American Government could not admit the validity of such claims by reason of their contravening the treaty rights of American citizens in China and the principle of "the open door."

My Government is informed that those Governments have explained their views to you, and therefore instructs me to inquire whether or not it is the intention of the American Government to maintain its position in the matter.

Accept, sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

Honorable Charles E. Hughes,
Secretary of State.

SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE CHINESE MINISTER

Department of State,
Washington, July 1, 1921.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of June 9th, and in reply assure you that it is not the intention of this Government to withdraw from the position hitherto taken by it in support of the rights accruing to the Federal Telegraph Company under the contract of January 8 last; in its view, the com-

munications which it has received from the other interested Governments, in reply to its inquiries as to the reasons for their protests to the Chinese authorities against this contract, tend only to confirm this Government in its belief that the adverse claims which have been urged as excluding the Federal Telegraph Company from participating with the Chinese Government in establishing wireless communications are founded upon assertions of monopolistic or preferential rights, in the field of Chinese Governmental enterprise, which cannot be reconciled either with the treaty rights of American citizens in China, or with the principle of the open door.

Your reference to the principle of the open door affords me the opportunity to assure you of this Government's continuance in its whole-hearted support of that principle, which it has traditionally regarded as fundamental both to the interests of China itself and to the common interests of all powers in China, and indispensable to the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean. The government of the United States has never associated itself with any arrangement which sought to establish any special rights or privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of other friendly states: and I am happy to assure you that it is the purpose of this Government neither to participate nor to acquiesce in any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of foreign interests any superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in designated regions of the territories of China, or which might seek to create any such monopoly or preference as would exclude other nationals from undertaking any legitimate trade or industry or from participating with the Chinese Government in any category of public enterprise.

Accept, sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) CHARLES E. HUGHES.

Mr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze,
Minister of China.

§ 7

Events in China and elsewhere were symptoms of motivations of the Principal Powers regarding Asia that could not fail to cause uneasiness to the American Government, which, meanwhile, had passed under the authority of a new administration; one, it is important to note, which was free of the hypnosis, the glamour, the regional understandings,

and the inhibitions that controlled at Paris and Geneva. Warren G. Harding had been inaugurated President on March 4, 1921; and Charles Evans Hughes took office on that date as secretary of state. The State Department, in the last year of President Wilson's administration, had functioned only to carry on diplomatic routine. Mr. Lansing had resigned as secretary of state on February 12, 1920, and was succeeded by Mr. Bainbridge Colby, who for the remaining time of Mr. Wilson's term followed such instructions as the invalid President gave. In that period the foreign policy of the American Government marked time. With an opposition Congress, which had declared its hostility to his foreign program, and the revelation which the election gave of the sentiment of the country, Mr. Wilson could make no headway had he tried to; and he showed little disposition to initiate anything important.

Although not much was published about it then, there is no doubt that the issues focussed about the Anglo-Japanese alliance were the gravest question that confronted the new American Government. As embracing the more significant aspects of that situation, I give a memorandum of mine written in 1920:

ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC AND THE EASTERN QUESTION AS THEY RELATE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Confidential

By Thomas F. Millard,
July, 1920.

IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES

It scarcely is open to dispute that the corpus of issues and problems embraced in the situation in the Far East constitute now and for the next few centuries the most important question which the United States has to deal with in the field of foreign affairs.

Now and probably for the next half century China is the focus of this problem. Nothing should divert the attention of the American Government from this fundamental fact. The Peking lega-

tion is the most important diplomatic post of the American Government, although outranked by many others. Next to Peking, the Embassy at Tokio probably is the more important post. The relative importance of these diplomatic points is due to the focusing of international ambitions and contentions in eastern Asia and the complexities of the issues now concentrated there.

The Pacific Ocean Question in World Politics

The results of the great war have reduced the number of *actual World Powers to two only*—the United States and Great Britain.

The classification of France, Italy, and Japan as World Powers is a diplomatic fiction; for none of these nations possess the population and resources which constitute a really Great Power. France and Italy may be classed as first-class powers in Europe, although even that position is dependable ultimately upon the support of either or both Great Britain and the United States. Outside of Europe, France and Italy are negligible as to actual power in world affairs.

Japan has no actual power as to European affairs, or on the Western hemisphere. Even in the Far East Japan's power can be circumscribed and controlled by the United States and Great Britain in combination. Japan, however, ranks as a first-class power in the Far East and will hold that position as long as she maintains a large army and navy, and while China remains weak and undeveloped.

The true classification of Powers within the next 50 years is:

1. World Powers—United States and Great Britain.
2. Local Powers—France, Italy, Japan.
3. Potential Powers—Germany, Russia, China.

In respect to its foreign policy, the United States should place the Pacific Ocean question (embracing the fate of China and Siberia) as ranking first, and as transcending any passing issues of European politics.

Questions relating to South and Central America rank second.

European questions rank third in importance to America.

The reason for this classification is that with respect to Europe that region under conditions that now exist and which probably will obtain during the next century contains within itself the forces to maintain a political and social equilibrium. Events in Europe at times will inconvenience and irritate and damage, but are unlikely to endanger the security of America.

The same is true to a lesser extent of South America.

The Far East does not contain now within itself the forces to es-

tablish and maintain a political and social equilibrium sympathetic to ideals and institutions of America. In that region the influence of the United States is required to give events a satisfactory course, and to prevent developments there from becoming a menace to the United States.

An agreement as to policy and a combination of the United States and Great Britain in respect to Far Eastern questions can control the course of events there for some decades.

An agreement as to policy and a combination of Great Britain and Japan based on a hypothesis and method inimical to the American policy (as it logically will be) may be able to defeat the American policy, and surely can greatly hinder and embarrass it.

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

Any alliance between nations has two distinct aspects:

(a) Objects to be attained.

(b) Antagonisms to be offset.

Alliances almost invariably are stated in defensive terms, but they frequently are conceived in a purely offensive spirit. Alliances are conceived in relation to or in opposition to some Power (nation) or combination of nations that is superior in force to any single nation composing such alliance, and which opposing force or combination is presumed to antagonize and threaten the interests of nations making an alliance.

The present Anglo-Japanese alliance expires in July, 1921; provided that by July, 1920, one of the parties to it does not give formal notice of intent to denounce it, and failing such notice it continues automatically for one year.

In the part of the year 1920 preceding July, when the question of the renewal or extension of the alliance is in abeyance, it has been extensively discussed by the British and Japanese press in the Far East. Practically without important exception, the British press in the Far East denounces the alliance as now constituted, for these reasons:

1. Because the antagonism against which the alliance was devised originally has become negligible.
2. Because in recent years Japan has pursued a policy in the Far East, and especially toward China, that is contrary to the *announced purpose* of the alliance, and contrary to British interests in China.
3. Because of a general incompatibility of British and Japanese interests in China.

4. Because of the resentment and suspicion of Chinese against Japan, and consequently, against any nation allied with Japan.
5. Because of the opposition of Canada and Australasia to certain features of the alliance.

NOTE. For references, see the files of the "North-China Daily News" (Shanghai), leading British organ in China; the files of the "Peking and Tientsin Times," the leading British organ in North China; and "The Japan Chronicle," the leading British organ in Japan. All these papers published extensive analyses and criticisms of the alliance in the first half of 1920.[9] One or two British papers at Hongkong published similar criticisms.

It is noteworthy in that discussion by the British Far Eastern press, they seldom referred to, and then with slight emphasis upon, the important relations which a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance now has to the United States.

In view of the fact that Russia for the time has become ineffective, or negligible, even as a theoretical menace to British and Japanese policy and interests in the Far East (which was a reason for the original and subsequent Anglo-Japanese alliances) and that Germany has become ineffective as a menace to Great Britain in Europe, the question arises: *What is the reason and need for an Anglo-Japanese alliance at this time?* In other words, *Against the policy of what Power will such an alliance be directed?*

Analysis of the existing situation in the Far East, and the world, plainly indicates that the *only* theoretical opponent of an Anglo-Japanese combine now is *the United States of America.*

It is practically certain that if the alliance is renewed, no matter what its published terms may be, its *real essence* will be a secret understanding on the line indicated in my [Millard's] article in "Asia Magazine" for August, 1919. That policy, if carried out, means the destruction of the Hay Doctrine and the defeat of the traditional American policy in China and Eastern Asia.

In short, a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on the old or on any similar terms, indeed on *any terms whatever,* can be taken definitely as directed against the policy and the interest of the United States. Its logical outcome will require the American Government either to abandon its Far Eastern policy, to submit it to the dictation of Japan and Great Britain, *or to develop its naval and military program on a basis of equaling the combined power of Great Britain and Japan.*

[9] Appendix C.

POLICIES OF FRANCE, ITALY, ETC.

Intimations that France tentatively had come to a secret understanding with Japan and Great Britain relating to all Asia were presented in my [Millard's] article in "Asia Magazine" for August, 1919. (Subsequent events, however, indicate that France has not got what she considers to be her quota from that tentative arrangement of "spheres" in Asia, for the French press evinces great irritation over the demarkation between the French and British influence in extreme Western Asia.) Nevertheless, almost every tangible indication of France's policy toward China, and Siberia, in the last year, are in the line of an understanding as stated in my "Asia" article.

Nations like France, Italy, and lesser States in Europe, can be taken as negligible in connection with the question of the Pacific, except as they may augment or diminish a Balance of Power. Neither France, Italy, or any present State in Europe except Great Britain, has power within its own national control and authority to be an important factor in the Pacific. But if those nations should become aligned with an Anglo-Japanese combination concerning Asia as opposed to the American policy there, it would have significance. The present tendency of the French and Italian governments is toward such an alignment.

COURSE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

In this discussion it is assumed that Japan's policy toward China, indeed vis-à-vis *the whole question of Eastern Asia, is opposed to the American policy.* If the State Department is now in a state of obscurity that would doubt this, it is without diplomatic competence to handle the situation, and needs to be informed in the rudiments of the question. It is believed, however, that the State Department has the major elements of the situation correctly outlined. Its mistakes, if any are made, are more likely to be in the application of details, and in failing to discern possible oblique moves of other foreign offices, and in failing to estimate correctly the present and ultimate results of moves in the game. (The Lansing-Ishii Agreement was an error of this nature.)

The American Government should not wait passively upon events in the Far East, but it should move definitely through its diplomatic channels, and perhaps also by economic pressure, to prevent an untoward course of international policy in Eastern Asia. In respect to the secondary class of European Powers (like France and Italy) the American Government ought to intimate distinctly to them that an alignment of those Governments against American policy in

the Pacific will alienate from them American sympathy and financial support.

The same intimation, stated in stronger terms, ought to be made to the British Government. In fact, in respect to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the writer firmly believes the American Government is justified in representing to the British Government (and in protection to our Nation it is necessary) privately that under the circumstances the American Government cannot regard a renewal of the alliance with Japan except as a danger to America.

This occasion seems to offer an opportunity to preserve peace in the Pacific and the Far East by circumscribing Japan within her proper scope and limits, of restraining her imperial pretensions, of limiting her influence in Eastern Asia to its legitimate range, and to get the international policy of the Powers in China again on a footing satisfactory to the United States. Great Britain should be made to choose definitely as between Japan and America in the Far East.

Until the American Government knows positively what is the real policy of Great Britain in Eastern Asia, it cannot formulate a course of action for the United States either in the Pacific, or in the world.

COLLATERAL FACTORS

In the event of a war between Japan and the United States occurring, or threatening acutely (it is threatening now in portent), a very important element will be the attitudes, and the acts, of the other Far Eastern nationalities—China, Siberia, and Korea. All of those peoples are now strongely antagonistic to Japan, and until Japan's policy is changed or moderated, they will remain hostile to her. In case of a war between Japan and any other Power, those countries comprise a semi-circle completely shutting off Japan from the mainland of Asia. During the next few years measures should be taken to keep the American Government fully informed of sentiments and political movements in China, Korea, and Siberia, and a plan should be formulated by the proper administrative branches of the Government (State, War, and Navy) with a view to using those peoples in case of a war with Japan. Cut off from the resources of the continent, and having to withstand also the armed hostility of all her neighbors, Japan's military power against the United States would be greatly weakened. The American Government therefore should take measures as follows:

1. Keep in close touch with Chinese, Koreans and Siberians, as to their sentiments, political tendencies, organizations, plans, etc. To do this efficiently the personnel of our diplomatic

and information services in the Far East should be increased, and ample funds provided for this work.

2. Maintain friendly relations as between those peoples, organizations, etc., and the United States.
3. Devise a practicable plan whereby in the event of war between America and Japan (or any other Power) the Government of China can be induced to enter the war against Japan and render effective aid. This could be accomplished by the United States providing arms, ammunition, finance, and military and naval instructors. With the present political and psychological situation, it should be comparatively easy to align China on the side of America. In a collision between Japan and America, China will have all to gain from a victory of America, and all to lose from a victory of Japan. A victory of Japan would confirm her in her aggressions upon China, and open the way for untrammeled further aggressions. On the other hand, the United States, by defeating Japan, could offer China a restoration of Manchuria and Shantung, and security against the menace of Japan.
4. Do the same in regard to the Siberians and Koreans. This is not to say, of course, that the American Government should intrigue against Japan in Korea. That is improper, and it is not necessary. Americans had nothing to do with creating the bitter hatred of Japan that now imbues the Koreans, and they need do nothing to keep it alive. The American Government, however, should recognize the existence of this sentiment of Koreans, and in case of war should make all legitimate use of it. This factor should be considered in all naval and military plans of the United States.
5. Investigate and compile complete information about propagandas carried on and maintained in the Far East by all other Powers.

A skillful use of the elements indicated in the foregoing can be made by the United States to exercise a strong influence *to prevent war*, by causing Japan to consider and hesitate and by placing difficulties in her way.

British Elements

Certain phases of the Asiatic question tend to align the sentiments of Canadians and Australasians with the United States as against Japan. The sentiments of British residents in Japan and in China also naturally tend to align with America on these issues. Taken alone, however, those sentiments of parts of the British Empire and

of some Britishers will not be able to dictate the policy of the British Government, as has been demonstrated frequently. But it may be possible for the American Government, by proper diplomatic activities and other means, to use that British sentiment so as to bring pressure on the British Government and to prevent a mistaken policy of the British Foreign Office from developing a serious and perhaps a fatal schism between America and Great Britain on a great question of international policy. It is legitimate for the American Government to utilize this element in trying to influence the British Government in respect to the Far Eastern question.

In this connection the current proposal for the Canadian Government to have its own diplomatic representative at Washington may have significance. The strategical position of Canada *vis-à-vis* disputes between Great Britain and the United States has had in the past a tremendous influence in favor of America: for in the end Great Britain has been under almost decisive compulsion to yield because the geographical juxtaposition of Canada with the United States makes it impossible for Great Britain to defend Canada. Thus whatever results a war between those nations would have elsewhere, Great Britain almost surely would lose Canada, and no possible gain elsewhere at the expense of the United States would compensate for that loss. This circumstance has given the United States a tremendous leverage on Great Britain in all issues between them. The question now arises: *By having separate representation at Washington, will the international status of Canada in respect to questions between the United States and Great Britain be altered?* It appears, if by excluding Canada by this method from the scope of Anglo-American disputes, the British Government thereby would be relieved of the task of defending Canada and of the risk of losing Canada as a part of the Empire, that it would have much freer hand in regard to issues with the United States in *other parts of the world.* It may seem a far cry from the proposed Canadian representation at Washington to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, but there may be a definite connection established at any time, and this possibility ought not to be overlooked at this juncture. At least, the American Government should take all due precautions that what appears on the surface as an agreeable bond in the relations with a neighbor State does not have the effect of weakening its capacity to protect the national interests elsewhere.

The Attitude of China

Chinese evince a growing restlessness under and resentment at the practice of the Powers to treat China as a diplomatic chattel

by making agreements and alliances among themselves regarding China and without consulting the Chinese Government, whereby China's national possessions and rights are qualified or disposed of.

This induced the Chinese Government, in May, 1920, to formulate a memorandum (addressed, it is stated, to the British and Japanese Governments) objecting to a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance relating to China without the Chinese Government being first informed and consulted. This action is significant and it is a departure in the diplomacy of the Far East.

That action of the Peking Government was supported, in July, 1920, by a memorial jointly composed and signed by all the representative Chinese organizations, which was presented to Sir Bielby Alston, British minister to China, at Shanghai, on July 5, 1920, and which was subsequently published in "Millard's Review" and other papers. This memorial set forth the objections of Chinese to a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in plain terms. (NOTE. A copy of that memorial accompanies this Memo.)

In that connection it is significant that the American Government in the past has taken the course to which China now objects (and to which China objected at the time the action was taken, viz., Minister Koo's note to the State Department dated in November, 1917, relating to the Lansing-Ishii agreement). It would be good policy, in respect to American position in Eastern Asia, for the American Government to take the lead in conceding China's point by voluntarily denouncing the Lansing-Ishii agreement on those grounds. (The agreement greatly embarrasses the American Government anyhow.)

Furthermore, there are intimations of a diplomatic attempt further to involve the American policy in China in ambiguities, and to cloud it in suspicion, by making it appear that, if the Anglo-Japanese alliance is renewed, the American Government is contented with its terms, objects, and operation. It is alleged that there are taking place "consultations" between the State Department and the British and Japanese foreign offices on this subject; such reports have been widely published, with particulars of the meetings.

It should be recognized positively that nothing whatever that can be done will induce Chinese to regard the Anglo-Japanese alliance as having any other purpose, or as likely to have any other result than to destroy the nationality and override the sovereignty of China. In every important event since the alliance was first made, the actual operation of this alliance has been opposite to the terms of its statement of its objects. Under this alliance, which in the beginning guaranteed the independence of Korea, and the unimpaired

sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, and the open door in China, Great Britain has connived with the annexation of Korea by Japan, the virtual occupation by Japan of Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, the occupation by Japan of Shantung province, and a general policy of Japan in China which beyond question aims at and rapidly is accomplishing the extension of Japanese control over China. (NOTE. See files of British newspapers published in China and Japan.) There is no good reason to doubt that Japan's objects in securing a renewal of the alliance are to gain its support for a continuation of her policy in China and in Siberia. No student of Far Eastern politics will believe, if Great Britain renews the alliance with Japan after many years of practical demonstration of what Japan's policy really is, otherwise than that the British Government is prepared to assent to a continuance of that policy, and to support it morally, and perhaps with force if necessary. *No matter what the phraseology of a new alliance may be, there can be no better reason to credit its objects as stated by its phraseology than to believe at this time that the real purposes of the previous and existing alliances are expressed by their phraseology.*

If the Anglo-Japanese alliance is renewed, its general objects will be the same as those of the existing alliance; and which have been demonstrated by the events of the past fifteen years.

But a new alliance will be different from the old one in an important respect—

Whereas, the presumed antagonist to its objects in the old alliance was Russia, the presumed antagonist in a renewed alliance will be the United States.

All this is plain as the noonday sun to residents of the Far East, and to Chinese who think in political terms. Therefore, if the Anglo-Japanese alliance is renewed, and it is made to appear by its (the U. S.) own statement or otherwise that the American Government approves it or is satisfied with it, such attitude of the American Government will not in the least reassure Chinese about the alliance, but *merely will convince them that the Japanese interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement is correct, and that the American Government is in line with Japan's policy in Eastern Asia.*

An immediate result of such an attitude or declaration of the American Government would be to turn the present friendly feelings of China toward America into strong suspicion and resentment. It would take perhaps a generation for American policy in China to recover from the effects of such an action. As a means to discredit American policy utterly in the eyes of Chinese, the inclusion

somehow of the American Government, either tacitly or by definite utterance, in a renewal of an alliance of Great Britain and Japan, would perhaps be the cleverest diplomatic move that Powers which desire such a result could conceive. Great care should be taken that any "consultations" of the State Department with the Japanese and British governments, on this or any other related questions, should not be given such a coloring. It would be a clever stroke for Japan if Chinese sentiment can be turned against America now.

THE SO-CALLED CALIFORNIA JAPANESE QUESTION

The writer, since he first penetrated into the actualities of Japan's foreign and domestic policies, has held a firm opinion that the Japanese Government uses the "race equality" issue as a device to cloak its more serious objects and designs. Encompassed within the general "race equality" issue as advanced by Japan is the principal concrete expression of it—the so-called immigration question in California and other American territories. It has been officially announced that the Japanese Government intends again to raise the "race equality" question before the League of Nations when it begins its meetings at Geneva. In my opinion the Japanese Government is insincere in advancing this issue, for reasons set out in a memo. written by me during the Peace Conference at Paris, in 1919. (Copy of that memo. herewith.)

A study of the elements that compose the so-called California-Japanese question indicate plainly that the Japanese Government uses it as a diplomatic "herring." It agitates this question not because it intends to press it to any definite conclusion, or that it expects to be able to change the attitude of Americans on the question, but *to create a psychology among Americans that will concede something to Japan elsewhere.*

Study and reflection reveal the impossibility of the United States yielding what Japan wants in respect to this question. (I discussed this question at some length in Chapter XIV of "Our Eastern Question.") The Pacific Ocean slope of North America is perhaps the most salubrious and fertile region on earth for the habitation and creative abilities of mankind. It is capable of sustaining 150,000,000 to 200,000,000 people. Such development as it has attained has been due to the labors of the white races. It is now included within the territorial boundaries and the political jurisdiction of white nations. It should be held under their control, for their future needs, and for the further development of their civilization. There can be no reasonable doubt that this will be done. Any

Administration of the American Government which abdicates, or for diplomatic expediency qualifies the position of the American people on this question will deserve and surely will receive the contempt and aversion of our people.

There is no cognate relation of the inherent right of the American Nation (and of every nation) to determine the conditions whereby foreigners may become its citizens or may reside in its territory to the group of questions that embody the policy of the American Government in Eastern Asia.

All efforts of Japan or any other Power to create such a relation should be definitely rejected by the American Government.

The major interests of American policy in the Far East concern China, and now Siberia. Neither the China nor the Siberian questions have any genuine connection with the present issue between Japan and the United States *regarding the conditions under which Japanese may reside in America.*

The American Government should not be tricked, or intimidated, into protecting its inherent and exclusive right to determine conditions within its own territory at the expense of yielding or qualifying its rights in regions and with nations not included in the scope of this particular question.

If this so-called California-Japanese question cannot be settled according to the wishes of Americans without war, then there will be war. The American people will fight a dozen wars before they will yield the issues affecting their sovereign nationality and racial preservation that are involved in this question. Once the Japanese Government understands this fully, and that the issue no longer can be used to obscure in their favor the whole Asiatic question, it will subside. In respect to popular notice and sentiment in Japan, the question is entirely the creation of a Government press propaganda, and is sustained by it.

The Bankers' Consortium and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

Most impartial students of the present situation in China are convinced that foreign assistance is required in reorganizing and stabilizing the Chinese Government.

Foreign action, if it comes, will take either of two forms:

(a) A benevolent assistance having the purpose of aiding China to become a stable and independent nation.
(b) An intervention designed to establish and perpetuate foreign control over China.

Of these alternatives the American Government by its traditional and frequently declared policy will support the first-mentioned (a) if forced by events to do so; and it should strongly oppose in any event the second (b) method.

As a means to promote the first (a) policy the American Government has proposed a 4-Power Banking Consortium. Such a Consortium can exercise a restraining influence upon China and upon nations that may violate its policy that in time will induce the dissenting political groups in China to permit the reformation and reorganization of the Government.

A banking consortium organized on the line of the proposal of the American Government (Mr. Lansing's statement issued in July, 1918),[10] and directed on that policy in a spirit of sincerity of the composing Powers, now offers the best chance for a solution of China's chief difficulties.

In the writer's opinion, the chances for success of the bankers' consortium depends on *the sincerity of the Powers in wanting it to succeed.* If any of the Powers that may join the consortium for motives of temporary expediency really should be opposed to the objects it seeks to accomplish—the genuine preservation of China—they perhaps can defeat those objects by making the operations of the consortium ineffective. What, then, are the real positions on this question of the British, Japanese and French foreign offices?

The writer's belief, based on many years' study of British policy in Asia, is that the British Government does not now desire to have a consortium succeed under the leadership of America; but that British financial obligations to America now are so great that Great Britain probably will consider it inexpedient to oppose a plan for China that is firmly advanced by the American Government and supported by leading financiers in America. The purposes of this consortium as announced by the American Government *are directly opposed to the real basis for a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.* Therefore a renewal of that alliance should be taken as inimical to the success of a consortium.

The policy of the French Government in Eastern Asia at present is purely opportunist; but an analysis of French possessions and interests in Asia indicate plainly that the French Foreign Office probably will incline toward an alignment with Japan on a "sphere of influence" basis (NOTE. The Franco-Japanese agreement relating to China made in June, 1907, still is effective, and this and

[10] Appendix F.

other similar "sphere" agreements relating to China now are validated by Article XXI of the Covenant of the League of Nations), rather than with the United States on a genuine open door and integrity of China policy. The French Government, however, in this matter will be influenced by similar considerations that affect the British Government *vis-à-vis* America at this juncture.

It is possible for the American Government to induce the British and French Governments (aided by various influences of that tendency) regarding Far Eastern policy by political and financial pressure applied elsewhere; and then, with Great Britain and France coöperating with America, a very strong coercion can be put upon Japan in respect to her China policy. Lacking such coercion by the United States, it is practically certain that Japan will continue her imperialistic course on the continent of Asia, and that (lacking a positive policy by America) she will be able to effect private or open agreements and alliances by which she will have the consent and the diplomatic support of Great Britain and France.

The writer holds the opinion that if the American Government does not make it clear to the British Government that it dislikes a renewal of an alliance between Great Britain and Japan, the alliance will be renewed on much the same terms, and with the same secret meaning as formerly.

The proposed banking consortium will provide a test of the real positions of the Principal Powers in respect to policy in Asia. If the Anglo-Japanese alliance is renewed, the chances of a consortium as proposed by America ever accomplishing its objects in China will be measurably diminished.

§ 8

Almost a year after the next previous memorandum was written, I had a talk with some naval and military intelligence officers of the United States in China about the situation in the Far East. All were agreed that the situation was portentous, and that matters were tending to a "showdown," and probably to a collision between America and Japan. As a result of that and other talks, I was asked to put my views in writing, for the use of the intelligence officers of the Government, which I did:

By. T. F. M.
Confidential

Peking,
May 4, 1921.

SUBJECT: DETERMINING FACTORS IN A WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

GENERAL STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This would be a war about "policy"; that is, it would be because the Governments differ as to their fundamental objectives, and can find no way to reconcile them. Given such a divergence, it is of slight moment what the immediate occasion of the rupture may be. (NOTE. The essential character of wars of policy, as differing from wars from other causes, is elucidated in the writer's book, "Our Eastern Question.")

The character of that war, combined with the geographical position, requires the United States to take the "offensive," and places Japan on the "defensive," strategically; in other words, Japan, at the opening of hostilities, will be in possession of the elements that *control the issue of policy,* and it would be necessary for the United States to dislodge Japan from that position in order to win the war.

In that war, the sovereign territories of both belligerents are practically immune from invasion by the enemy; therefore the war cannot be brought to a decisive conclusion by a military penetration of enemy territory, or by breaking down at its center of energy the military force of a belligerent. The most either belligerent can accomplish by direct military action may be to attack and seize some outlying possessions of the enemy.

It is not feasible for Japan to penetrate the sovereign territory of America, nor to force the United States to submit by wearing away its war-making powers, for the United States contains secure within its own territory all the essential elements required to wage modern war on a grand scale. On the other hand, Japan does not contain within her own sovereign territory all the required elements, nor a sufficiency of them, to wage a prolonged war against a first-class power.

Nevertheless, in this case Japan might substantially win a war against America, by being able to prevent herself from being ousted from control of *the factors which determine the question of policy at issue,* for these factors lie almost entirely in the *Far East.* Therefore, Japan only can be defeated by *economic and financial attrition,* applied by stopping her sea-borne communications and

commerce, by cutting off her supplies of food and raw materials, and by stopping her exports.

A survey of the position indicates that, to win such a war, the United States *must* have these factors:

1. *Complete control of the sea.*
2. *Allies on the mainland of Asia.*

These factors are placed in their essential order. Unless the United States has at the beginning of a war, or secures soon thereafter, the control of the sea (which means, in this case, control of the sea in Asiatic waters), it will be impossible to obtain the second necessary factor to win the war. The second factor therefore depends on the first.

Measures to secure control of the sea in a war between America and Japan must be determined by naval and military experts, but in the opinion of the writer, the following is set as the minimum:

(a) A naval force double the strength of the Japanese navy.
(b) A secure naval base in Far Eastern waters.
(c) Adequate wireless communications.
(d) Adequate air forces and equipment in the Far East.

Relation of China to the Problem

China will be the decisive factor in a war between Japan and America about policy in the Far East. It is from China that Japan must, in a prolonged war, draw largely for supplies. If this source of supply is stopped, Japan in the end will lose the war.

The prevailing sentiments of the Chinese are antagonistic to Japan; and in such a war popular sentiment will be overwhelmingly in favor of America. On the other hand, Japan controls or influences (usually by purchase) a number of the important Chinese Tuchuns (Generals), who in turn control existing Chinese military organizations. An overwhelming majority of Chinese will *hope* for America to win; but in the beginning they will be dubious of that result, and will be constrained for various reasons to maintain an attitude of careful neutrality, until the trend of events gives a distinct intimation of the outcome.

Relation of Russia to the Problem

The relation of Russia (especially Siberia) to the problem varies from that of China only in degree. *Vis-à-vis* Japan the sentiments of Russians are substantially the same as those of Chinese, and for similar reasons. Siberia is a source of supply, for Japan, of certain food products and raw materials. In the event of war

between Japan and America, the Siberians (who in this case will be backed by European Russia if American diplomacy handles the situation with any skill) willingly will enter the war on the side of the United States provided a situation where they can do so opportunely is created. In Siberia, however, as in China, Japan has under pay a number of Russian military adventurers, and it can be expected that she will endeavor, through them, to prevent Russian sentiment from taking a turn adverse to Japan. The hatred of Russians for Japan is such, however, that it is necessary only for a practicable means to be provided for them to enter the war against Japan.

JAPAN'S MOVES ON THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Immediately on the declaration of war (probably anticipating a declaration by some days), Japan will move to establish herself in secure military possession of Manchuria, of the pri-Amur region, and of Eastern Shantung. She already is practically in control of these regions, and of the railways therein. (NOTE. Japan now entirely controls, and "polices" with troops, the South Manchurian Railway, connecting with the Japanese railway in Korea at Antung, and with Port Arthur and Dalny; the railway from Tsingtau to Tsinan, in Shantung; the ports of Vladivostok and Khabarosk in Siberia, with the railway connecting those towns.) It may be expected, in the event of war, that Japan will take control of the Chinese Eastern Railway; also Japan will seize all mines, etc., in those regions. Japan has made complete preparations for a quick occupation of these railways and regions; in fact, already is practically in occupation of them. It will not be possible to prevent Japan from accomplishing this, and a complete military occupation can be made effective in two weeks after war is declared.

It is a question whether Japan in such a war will also seize the Peking-Mukden railway. This of course would be an open and flagrant violation of China's neutrality. A strict respect for China's neutrality requires that Japan cannot use the Manchurian and Shantung railways for military purposes; but it can be expected that Japan will disregard China's neutrality in that respect; as she did in the Russo-Japanese war, and the World War.

(NOTE. In this connection, there is a possibility that Japan has a secret agreement, or "military pact," with China permitting her, in the event of war, to occupy those railways and regions. Such an agreement might have been obtained secretly, by bribery or coercion, while the Anfuites controlled the Peking Government, or

from Chang Tso-lin. It may be anticipated that, when war breaks out, Japan has provided a number of so-called "agreements" designed to give legality to her invasions of the neutrality of China and Russia. That the "agreements" are forged, or otherwise illegal and irregular, will not matter in the least; they can be made momentarily useful for Japan's propaganda to masquerade her aggressions. Whether or not such "agreements" exist should be made the subject of investigation by American intelligence officers.)

In respect to the Peking-Mukden railway, an occupation by Japan presents international difficulties. It should be borne in mind, however, that Japan may have offset these difficulties in a measure, so as to feel safe in moving in this matter, by secret clauses of the alliance with Great Britain. By the terms of the international procotol of 1901, some American troops are stationed along the Peking-Mukden railway, to assist in guarding communications between Peking and the sea. Also, by that procotol, there is a detachment of American marines at Peking, quartered in the American legation grounds. Also, there is a wireless plant in the legation grounds, capable, when completed, of communicating directly with America, and all American wireless stations in the Pacific Ocean. It may be that Japan will disregard the international amenities, and seize this wireless plant, and also will attack and capture the American legation guard and the American garrison for the railway protection. Japan's previous conduct in many instances gives reason to expect that she may take these measures.

There is a project to construct, under American management, but for the Chinese Government, large wireless plants at Shanghai, Harbin, and other points in China. It can be expected in the event of war that Japan may seize or attempt to control these communications.

It can be expected that Japan immediately on the outbreak of war (or before war is declared) will try to cut the cables of the Pacific Commercial Company. This of course is a legitimate act of war.

It can be expected that Japan will attack or make a naval demonstration (this of course depends on the pre-war naval dispositions of America) on the American naval base in the Philippine Islands. How successful such an attack is will depend on the preparations of the United States before war is declared. Possession of such a base is *essential* to American success in the war, unless it is to be greatly prolonged.

Except for a Japanese naval attack on American naval bases, all of the above-mentioned measures are possible of accomplishment by Japan very quickly after war is declared, and cannot be prevented by American military and naval forces. A study of a map of the regions indicated will show that those moves will establish Japan in control of a large area of China and of Eastern Siberia. Those regions are very accessible to Japan by communications that are difficult to interrupt. It is probable that, in addition to the entire Japanese navy based in those waters, the straits connecting with the Japan sea, and the Gulf of Chihli, will be mined and otherwise placed in a state of defense, so that Japan can maintain uninterrupted communications with Siberia, Manchuria and North China.

The geographical position in that locality, taken with the known and potential strength of the Japanese navy and army, thus establishes a situation which it probably is impossible for the United States to impair *except with the aid of allies on the continent of Asia.*

Under these conditions, Japan can throw almost any amount of troops into Manchuria, Shantung, Siberia, and Korea, and can supply them there.

However, the necessity to take those measures requires the mobilization and maintenance under arms of a large army to secure to Japan the supplies of those regions, and more especially to guard against attacks from those quarters; and this will add enormously to the cost of the war to Japan, increasing the financial drain on her resources.

Contravening Action by the United States

The effective strategy for the United States in a war commenced under those conditions is to attempt to draw a ring around Japan and gradually to tighten its pressure until Japan yields. This requires that China and Russia be brought into the war as allies of the United States.

At this point of the discussion, it is pertinent to state a dogma which, in the writer's opinion, covers the situation: *The longest purse will win the war.* This of course is not to say that the longest purse alone can win that or any war; the purse must be backed by determination, and intelligent use of opportunities, in respect to all the factors involved.

From the time when war is declared, or when it appears to be inevitable or likely, the policy of the United States should be directed to two principal objects:

(a) Concentrate in the Pacific Ocean the naval forces sufficient to secure effective control of Asiatic waters, and supplement those forces with all necessary equipment and appliances.
(b) Pursue a course calculated to bring China and Russia, and eventually Korea, into the war as allies of the United States.

The first object (a) is for the naval and military experts of the Government to decide and organize.

The second object (b) may be divided into the following heads:

1. Intelligence Work.
2. Propaganda.
3. Economic bearings.

INTELLIGENCE WORK

It is assumed in view of the conditions already stated that when war commences China and Russia (Siberia) will consider it expedient to declare their neutrality; and it is perhaps wise under the circumstances for the American Government *to advise China and Russia to take that course.* American diplomacy should, all along, endeavor to give their potential allies wise diplomatic counsel, both in order that they may take correct courses and to enhance the influence of American diplomats with them.

By declaring their neutrality, Japan thus is forced at the very beginning of the war to take action which must have the effect of estranging Chinese and Russian sentiment; viz., by violating the neutrality of both China and Russia in the seizure of railways and occupation of territory. This act of Japan also can be used by American propaganda as showing the unscrupulousness of Japan, and comparisons can be made with Germany's invasion of Belgium and Luxembourg. Thus Japan will begin the war by a series of acts affronting the Chinese and Russians, and also the enlightened opinion of civilization.

America, next to Japan, has the best nucleus for an effective intelligence organization in China. The 8,000 Americans in China (many of them missionaries) are distributed in every part of the country; many of them speak the Chinese language, and their relations with the people are on the whole friendly and cordial. The means to organize them into a good intelligence force at once suggest themselves, and need not be given in detail. A certain character of information work, requiring technical knowledge and special training, must be done by selected men; most of them probably drawn from the navy and army. It should be the duty of the intelligence branch, by close coördination with the diplomatic

branches of the Government, to establish liaison with leading Chinese officials, and with Chinese (and Russian) military officers, with a view to aligning them with America in sympathy and interest, and to using them if those countries enter the war. The intelligence division should be provided with *ample funds.*

PROPAGANDA

The *general objects* of the three divisions mentioned are identical; and propaganda is the *publicity* methods employed to accomplish the same things that the intelligence division does privately.

Propaganda may consist of various forms of publicity—telegraphic news, pamphlets, newspaper publicity in all forms, in the English language, Chinese, and other language publications in the Far East; news services, etc.; motion pictures and illustrations.

To conduct such propaganda successfully it should be directed and conducted, as far as is feasible, by men who are experienced in the Far Eastern newspaper and publicity field, who understand the currents of opinion and thought, the true attitudes and policies of governments there and in respect to the outcome of such a war; the local conditions, prejudices, and personalities; and the avenues and means of communications. In such a propaganda it will be found necessary to organize and deliver telegraph news services in several languages; to subsidize newspapers; to establish outright or purchase newspapers; perhaps to establish or purchase printing plants; and to create a complete organization for reaching every part of the Orient and every grade of intelligence. The propaganda division also should have *ample funds.*

ECONOMIC BEARINGS

This division should be composed of and directed by experts in the purchasing and transportation of commodities; and its work should be principally to prevent and deter products of China and Siberia from reaching Japan, and to interrupt all forms of Japanese commerce with those countries. Early in the war, when it will not be feasible to interrupt by force the acquisition in China of products by Japan and their transportation, this may be prevented by purchasing or "buying up" those commodities. This could be done through firms of neutral nationality, operating in collusion with Chinese merchants. In the same way a watch can be kept over shipping facilities, etc. (Same process throughout world.)

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

It is evident that the outcome of such a war can be seriously,

perhaps decisively, affected by certain apparently extraneous elements. Of these, the most important is the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

The true character of this alliance as it affects the United States has been analyzed in another memorandum; and how it is directed against the policy of the United States was demonstrated. The essence of the alliance is a division of the whole of Asia, as between Japan and Great Britain, into "spheres," wherein each agree respectively to refrain from encroaching upon the other, and agree further to assist each other in repulsing encroachments or infringements of other Powers. Just where the line of demarkation between the Japanese and British spheres is cannot be stated positively now, but the boundaries are pretty well indicated by conditions and circumstances.

When the renewal of the alliance is announced (if it is renewed) it is certain that a calculated effort will be made to convince the United States that there is nothing in the alliance to cause any uneasiness to America, and that in the event of war between Japan and America, Great Britain will remain neutral. It is probable, however, that some clauses of the alliance will be kept secret; and that the alliance will contain a clause, perhaps ambiguously worded, to the effect that in case Japan is attacked in the Far East by more than one Power, then Great Britain is to come to her assistance. *There was such a clause in the original Anglo-Japanese alliance.*

The effect of such a clause will be to prevent America from obtaining any allies in the war; and as America probably cannot secure a satisfactory result except by obtaining allies on the continent of Asia, *the alliance thus would be just as much designed against America as if it stated that openly.*

The extent to which Japan will feel it is safe to go in occupying China's territory and railways, in seizing Chinese property, and in other violations of China's neutrality, in the early stage of the war, *probably will be determined by secret clauses of the Anglo-Japanese alliance,* and by the secret demarkation of the Japanese and British "spheres" as fixed by it.

To a certain extent, Japan's moves in the next year or two will indicate the true content of the Anglo-Japanese alliance by showing how far Great Britain has agreed to support Japan in China and Siberia.

§ 9

During the period of the World War and since, I have had considerable contact with the persons who compose the body

of what can be called "expert" American official and unofficial opinion concerning the Far East, and I believe the views stated in my memoranda represent, with some divergence as to method and details, the consensus of those persons on the questions I have included. As those opinions constantly were being communicated to the Government at Washington by and through its officials in the Far East, they made in time an impression.

That was the situation when the British Imperial Conference, held at London beginning in June, 1921, was approached. One of the principal matters to be decided by that conference was the question of renewing the alliance with Japan. That provided the occasion of a discussion of the alliance by the British press in the Far East, whose views I summarized in one of my memoranda given previously. A summary of British Far Eastern press criticisms of the alliance is published as an appendix to this volume; and I recommend those who are interested to read them.[11] For years—in fact, since the alliance with Japan was made—British interests in China and other parts of Eastern Asia have felt handicapped by the trend of British imperial policy shaped to the alliance, and on occasion have stated their objections strongly and frankly.

Among Englishmen who attended the Imperial Conference in London in 1921 was B. Lenox Simpson (better known by his literary pseudonym of "Putnam-Weale") author of many volumes on politics and conditions in Eastern Asia, and at that time an adviser to the President of China. In that capacity, and also as an Englishman born in China and conversant with British position and interests there, Mr. Simpson bore the commission to communicate to the Imperial Conference information and arguments showing why the alliance ought not to be continued. In his book, "An Indiscreet Chronicle from the Pacific," published in 1922, Mr. Simpson gives a memorandum written by himself and presented to members of the conference, as follows in part:

[11] Appendix C.

MEMORANDUM: CHINA AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

The steps China has taken in regard to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance are rehearsed in the copy of the press communiqué she issued in June last year, which is annexed hereto. China, having no status in the matter except as a protestant, could not raise the essential point in her Communication—that any renewal of the Alliance would be considered by all China as an endorsement by Great Britain of all wrongs Japan inflicted upon her during the war, and also a deliberate endorsement of the admittedly outrageous Shantung clauses in the Versailles Treaty.

It is well at the very start to grasp these points thoroughly, since whatever decisions are arrived at at the Imperial Conference will infallibly be measured by the Government and people of China by this yardstick.

The writer is unable to say officially whether the sketch of the four modifications in the Treaty, copy of which was handed to the Prime Minister, is accurate or not, as they only reached the Peking Government as a confidential communication, reporting informal conversations. But the probabilities are that they are accurate in the main. We know that a London Foreign Office Commission, including Sir John Jordan, recently British Minister to China, has been sitting for a year engaged in a study of the Treaty. Obviously by now these "studies" must be embodied in a draft, and this appears to be the document of which we have received a telegraphic sketch.

So far as the ostensible aim of the Alliance is concerned—namely to guarantee peace and security—the proposed new agreement will be just as effective as the three preceding instruments. In fact the only possible character it can possess is that of a fighting compact, a military document, to be invoked when it suits the senior partner, Great Britain. And because beneath its smooth phrases the Alliance possesses precisely this quality, Britain is forced to allow Japan to recoup herself for the risk involved to her own polity by spoliations carried out in China.

This point is thoroughly realized by the Peking Government, who know that their principal enemy is not Japan, but British policy, which for twenty years has declined to infuse morality into its consideration of China's political future.

The chief, and indeed the only reason for the Alliance in the past has been the weakness and the ineffectiveness as an international factor. The first steps which would be taken were China a European country instead of an Asiatic country would be to find the seat of the trouble. And because of the importance of this point the

writer would venture particularly to bring to the notice of the Prime Minister what he is quite sure is the source of China's difficulties which ought to be considered at the Imperial Conference if that desires to safeguard peace on the Pacific—and to do away with the possibility of war between Japan and the United States. . . .

A new treaty of alliance between Britain and Japan would also force China to avail herself of the constant offers of help she is receiving from Russia. Such a treaty of alliance would tend indeed to drive China in the direction of Persia and Afghanistan, both of which countries have found that they obtain more consideration from the Soviet Government than from Britain.

Finally, there is this to be remembered. No treaty can be called a treaty of alliance unless it can be invoked against some one. Even if the new treaty is so worded that it exempts Britain specifically and absolutely from participation in an American-Japanese struggle, it will have to apply against China if she throws in her lot with the United States. And thus sooner or later it would in effect bring Britain and the United States into collision with one another, first on Chinese soil and then by natural processes everywhere on the Pacific.

4th May, 1921.

No analysis of the practical conditions that would exist in a war between Japan and the United States about any issue whatever could fail to disclose the effect of an Anglo-Japanese alliance on efforts of the United States to obtain allies in Asia, without which the United States scarcely could win the issue of such a war if that issue, as is virtually certain, must have its crux in the Far East. Furthermore, the existence of such an alliance in any form appreciably must influence *the probability of war,* for its moral support and the strengthening it gives to Japan's finances and credit would be sufficient to determine the action of the Japanese Government on the question of going to war; and the alliance would continue to strengthen the diplomacy of Japan everywhere, as it did at Paris and has done in the entire period of its existence.

While the British Imperial Conference of 1921 was meeting, international press despatches, particularly in the Far East, conveyed definite intimations that the American Government

was being informed of consultations about renewal of the alliance with Japan, the implication being that, in case the alliance was extended or renewed, the American Government in a way would have been consulted and therefore would have no uneasiness or objections. Secretary of State Hughes was not disposed to be caught in that diplomatic trap or to have it woven around him by implications; so he took occasion on June 22 to issue a categorical denial at Washington that the State Department was informed of the plans of the British Government.

That the British Foreign Office expected and desired to renew the alliance with Japan was no secret. Mr. Simpson wrote in his book, "London aimed at renewal of the alliance, *pari passu* with conversations with the United States and Japan on the subject of naval reductions." But the dominions hesitated to approve.

At that point came the invitation of the American Government to a conference; a way conveniently was discovered to extend the alliance automatically for one year, and it was put aside to wait on events at Washington.

VI

WASHINGTON AGAIN

§ 1

THE conference to discuss limitation of armaments and questions of the Far East and the Pacific Ocean perhaps will occupy a considerable place in history; a transcript of its proceedings fill volumes and occupy much space in archives. A number of books each devoted to particular phases of it have been published. Therefore I hope that it will not be expected of me that I shall attempt to give a comprehensive description of it here. What I hope to do at most is to outline its distinguishable issues and phases, the motivations and methods of diplomacies which were felt there, and my own estimate of the results and consequences.

The genesis of the Washington conference has been indicated in the previous part of this volume if I have made the points plain. That is the international background. Other and less worthy purposes sometimes have been attributed to the Washington administration in desiring to have such a conference then, objects relating to internal partizan politics; but I see no need to seek for lesser motives when great and compelling incentives existed.

The invitations to nations to participate in the conference were issued by President Harding on August 11, 1921; but the purpose of the American Government to do so was made public on July 10. Issuance of formal invitations was preceded by a "sounding" of attitudes through diplomatic channels which required several weeks. The interval between publication of the intent and the invitations was enlivened by preliminary diplomatic manœuvering and a deal of discussion

by the press, in which the attitudes of the powers were very well defined.

It was presumed at first that the conference would be chiefly on the subject of disarmament, and would include only the so-called Principal Powers which participated in the Paris conference. Disarmament, a subject of perennial interest to international sentimentalists and of genuine importance in respect of international relations, was very much to the fore. Already it had appeared (although denied in some quarters) that the "war to end war" somehow had failed to accomplish just that; and that an immediate disarmament program need not be expected of the League of Nations. Nations remained armed; some powers which by proclamation had fought to end all wars, and to "relieve humanity from the crushing burden of armaments," had increased their armies after the peace.

The American Government during the war had inaugurated a large naval program which, if carried on, would give to the United States first rank as a naval power, for, under existing conditions, no other power was able to finance a program to equal that adopted and in progress of being accomplished by America. That is significant, and was potent in inducing some powers to accept President Harding's invitation when for other reasons they preferred not to. The United States was the only Principal Power in a financial and economic position to build and maintain a new and large navy. Unless the other Principal Powers would show a disposition to accommodate their policies in certain areas to the American policy, it was probable that Americans would feel that nothing less than the first navy would make their nation secure; a presumption which was sound strategically.

Soon after the first announcement of plans for a conference, it became known that the American Government desired to include in its purview a discussion of Far Eastern and Pacific Ocean questions, and to enlarge the conference to include lesser nations having interest in those questions.

Invitations, therefore, as it transpired, were extended to China, to Belgium, to Holland and to Portugal, making those nations parties to the conference. The inclusion of China in any discussion of Far Eastern questions is inevitable; but why Belgium, Portugal and Holland should be invited is not so obvious. That Holland would be invited was appropriate if the discussions should include the area where her possessions in the East Indies lie. But why Belgium and Portugal? Portugal is included on a technicality; she has a leasehold of Macao, in South China. Belgium, however, has no territorial possessions in the Far East; her only interest is investments and commerce.

Diplomats were inclined to attribute the inclusion of Belgium to the suggestion of France, which power wanted an offset to Holland in the conference; for Holland is looked upon as a satellite of Great Britain in Oriental questions. Private overtures of that nature led, finally, to the inclusion also of Portugal; also, by the way, a satellite of Great Britain. Regarded as diplomatic elements in the conference, Holland, Portugal, and Belgium mattered little to the United States; and in America at that time there was a sentimental disposition favorable to Belgium and a desire not to ruffle her sensibilities; to include her was a complimentary gesture that was popular. Furthermore, Belgium is under obligations to America; and Holland's position in the Far East, and certain incidents and apprehensions of its security caused by the policy of Japan during the World War, would incline the Dutch Government to align with the United States in that juxtaposition. The minor nations were not presumed to participate in the armament discussions, in which they were ineffective.

§ 2

There was a time, following the first publication regarding the conference, when Japan's participation was in doubt. As

a diplomatic portent, the calling of the conference was ominous to Japan. Japanese diplomats were startled; and especially by emanations from London indicating cordiality to the project on the part of the British Government. The British Imperial Conference was in session at the time; and the Japanese Government (having previously come to an agreement on the matter with the British Foreign Office) felt assured that the alliance with Great Britain would be renewed, which, to the Japanese Government, meant that the regional understandings and private trades carried through at Paris, preserved at Geneva, and embodied in the arch of Japan's Far Eastern policy, would not be disturbed. When the British prime minister suddenly shelved the alliance and was disposed to hold it in suspense awaiting eventuations at Washington, it gave cause for deep thought at Tokio.

Japanese diplomacy immediately became very busy. At London and Paris it endeavored to interpose deviations. Exactly to what extent the British Government at that time was committed to Japan in regard to renewal of the alliance is not known definitely; but events quickly showed that those considerations were sufficiently strong with the British Government to make it lend an ear to Japan's alarms and objections to having the whole matter exposed at Washington. Japanese diplomacy at that stage had a definite purpose to prevent the Washington conference if that was possible; and if the conference could not be prevented, to get it postponed, or to make preliminary arrangements by which Japan's policy could not be seriously impaired there.

Evidently the British Government felt unable, or thought it inexpedient then, to refuse to lend some assistance to Japanese diplomacy in the crisis; for it was through Downing Street that the more plausible plans to draw the fangs of the conference in respect of Far Eastern questions were advanced. Those plans can be differentiated as follows:

1. **Delay.** It was suggested that the conference should be

postponed until the next spring, giving more time for study of the subjects it would discuss; and especially to enable the British Government to communicate fully with its self-governing dominions and to obtain the opinions of the dominions. It was pointed out that time would be required for the dominion premiers to return home, obtain there something in the nature of a mandate from their governments, and attend at Washington. It further was argued that the time before the conference was insufficient for the naval experts to study the questions to be dealt with.

2. To have a preliminary conference confined to the Principal Powers, to decide on the agenda, and to clear away certain points of general policy.

3. To limit the agenda.

Those deviations were supported by a plausible propaganda in the British and Japanese press, and of course were reflected by the press in America. For a time it seemed that the pressure would induce the American Government to yield; but those presumptions were incorrect. The American Government objected to postponement, and it declined to engage in any preliminary discussions. It took the position that it would be the business of the conference to discuss everything: that was what it was for; therefore it was a supererogation to have preliminary discussions which might be construed as predetermination privately by the Principal Powers of matters of interest to all nations invited to the conference. Which of course is what was intended by the Japanese and British Governments.

After the position of the American Government on those points was revealed, British diplomacy ceased actively to give aid to the Tokio Foreign Office, which was left alone to interpose difficulties. The issue was drawn on the question of the agenda. Tokio wanted limitations on the discussion of Far Eastern and Pacific Ocean questions. Japan would have preferred to exclude those questions entirely; and, as it was, the Tokio Foreign Office intimated its objection to having

questions relating to Japan's policy and position in China discussed. Since to concede that would be to eliminate the very questions which in the opinion and purpose of the American Government constituted the crux of the conference, and would render it nugatory, the State Department refused, and endeavored to induce the Tokio Foreign Office to participate without reservations. Detached from Great Britain, as it then was, Tokio was confronted by the alternatives of coming in or staying out; and both alternatives contained serious embarrassments and possibilities. If Japan stayed out, it was likely that the conference would be held anyhow; and Japanese diplomats feared the consequences of what might occur without them present and having a say; moreover, refusal to participate would isolate Japan, and make her position conspicuous, which for many reasons was not desired. If Japan came in, she probably would be unable to prevent the discussion of very embarrassing questions; and she would be in a minority at the conference table. In the end, Japan decided to enter the conference, but with obvious reluctance.

§ 3

I arrived in Washington, from China, a short time before it became known that the American Government purposed to call a conference; and I at once saw the importance and significance of the event. By request, I wrote a memorandum indicating my impressions. That memorandum follows:

Confidential,
By Thomas F. Millard.

Washington,
July 16, 1921.

SUBJECT: THE SO-CALLED "DISARMAMENT" CONFERENCE

OBJECTS OF THE CONFERENCE

The objects of this conference, as intimated in the preliminary invitations to the Powers by the Government of the United States, are two, namely:

1. To find a basis for mutual reduction of armaments.
2. To discuss questions of Far Eastern and Pacific Ocean policy.

In preliminary propaganda, disarmament is stressed as the major object of the conference. In reality, the object is to find a basis for *policy* of the major Powers *which will warrant disarmament*. The linking of the Far Eastern and Pacific questions thus with disarmament indicates plainly, indeed specifically, that the American Government considers those issues in respect to itself the "core" of any agreement on disarmament. In other words, the United States cannot disarm until there is assurance that American interests in the Far East and in the Pacific are protected.

In much of the preliminary public discussion of the issues of the conference there is noticeable an impression that if this conference is able to secure a satisfactory (to the United States) policy of the Powers in the Far East and the Pacific, disarmament can follow as a matter of course. That is not entirely correct. For the last two decades there has been a public international policy (the Hay Doctrine) that, in the abstract, is satisfactory to the United States. The Principal Powers repeatedly have subscribed to this doctrine. Had their public agreement as to a policy been sufficient, there would be no need for the conference that is now summoned. It is the fact that some of the Powers, while publicly subscribing to the Hay Doctrine and professing to uphold it, flagrantly violate it in practice and devote their diplomacy to undermine and vitiate it, and spend the greater part of their national revenues in armaments whose purpose cannot be other than to give power and effect to that individious diplomacy, that makes a new effort toward clarification of the situation necessary if peace is to be preserved.

If this conference does no more than to secure the reaffirmation of the powers to the Hay Doctrine, or to a new policy of similar import, it will accomplish little of practical value.

Positions of the Powers

The United States. The motives of the American Government in summoning the conference may be taken as they are officially stated. If this was not evident from the traditional policy, and course, of the United States with respect to the issues broached, the fact that the American Government takes the initiative in convening the conference is conclusive; for unless the American Government felt the need of a clarification of the situation, or of an effort to clarify it, there is no valid reason why it would desire such a conference now.

Further, if the American Government did not feel that certain

Powers are pursuing policies adverse to the interests of America, the security of America, the tranquillity of America, it would have no occasion to summon a conference concerning the Pacific. These logical premises of course cannot be stated publicly without offending certain Powers, and without prejudicing the prospects of the conference.

But while the underlying motives of the American Government may be taken face value as they openly are stated by the Government, it is obvious that American diplomacy is trying, in this instance, to create a situation whereby it will be able to dominate the conference. This is legitimate, and in a sense will be (or would be in similar circumstances) the object of every Power at the conference. For instance, Italy has no compelling interests in the Far East and the Pacific; is in no sense a Pacific Ocean power. The invitation to Italy can be taken as a move by the American Government to augment its power in the conference, for there is little doubt, when all the circumstances are considered (indeed, it may be that Italy's attitude had been ascertained by the State Department before the invitation was sent), Italy will vote with America on the major issues involved. The same is true of France, with modifications; and also is wholly true in respect to China.

The leverage obtained at this juncture by the American Government with Italy and France, and to almost the same extent with Great Britain, from the financial obligations of those nations to America, and their need for the support of America for the fruition of their positions and for their security in Europe, will be decisive in establishing American leadership of the conference, provided the situation is handled with any degree of skill by the American Government.

Great Britain. An analysis of recent events, combined with a true perspective of their meaning, intimates plainly that until after the meeting of the "Imperial Conference" in London, in June, 1921, the British Foreign Office predicated its world policy on a renewal of the alliance with Japan. As late as May, 1921, British diplomacy in China, and elsewhere, revealed that motif unmistakably. Moreover, it is erroneous to assume that objections or alarm of British Dominions (the "self-governing dominions") led the British Foreign Office to defer and perhaps now to abandon the alliance renewal. Great Britain would have been able to bring her own sheep into the fold, with the exception of India, perhaps; and as a purpose of the British Government in lining up with Japan is to repress the rise of democratic ideals and institutions in Asia and

their spread to India from China and the Philippines, it is found increasingly difficult to reconcile Indians to the Japan alliance.

The alliance with Japan is undermining British position in China, but this in time could be adjusted by the practical dismemberment of China and the exclusion of American political influence and commercial competition. The essence of the alliance is a division of Asia between Japan and Great Britain; which Powers, by combining their diplomacy and military and naval power, could control the situation against all probable contingencies, with one exception. This exception is the outright antagonism of America. The balance of risks in the situation, if the Japan alliance should cause (as logically it will) a schism on world policy between Great Britain and America, is too grave a liability for the British Government to assume now, by openly taking a position which must alarm America.

How the Anglo-Japanese alliance applies to the United States has been analyzed in other memoranda by this writer. Perhaps the situation in that respect, as pertaining to the inner motif of the British Foreign Office *vis-à-vis* America and the Far Eastern situation, can be elucidated by a strategical summary:

With the Japanese alliance: A war between Japan and America under those circumstances probably will mean a drawn fight, which is tantamount to a defeat of America on the issue of policy, and the elimination of America as an important political factor and commercial competitor in China and Asia. But to be an open ally of Japan while Japan is at war with America carries a serious risk for Great Britain, because of the geographical position of Canada. After the war starts, and war passions become aroused, and the practical operation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to the detriment of America would become apparent, it would be difficult to prevent American resentment from reacting against Great Britain and taking the form of an attack upon Canada. A study of the elements of the situation reveals that America has a better chance of coming out advantageously in a war against Japan and Great Britain *combined* than against Japan singly.

Without the Japanese alliance: A war between Japan and America, with Great Britain really neutral or sympathetic outwardly to America, may result in a stalemate (which substantially would be a victory for Japan's policy); and in any event such a war would be a long one, leaving Great Britain free to recapture world trade, and to regain her position as financial center of the world.

Thus, the second alternative carries for Great Britain the same

prospects as the first, and without the risks and odium that would accrue to Great Britain under the first alternative.

France. France has not, nor has in prospect, any position or prospects in the Far East or the Pacific which she will not trade for advantage or security for her position in Europe, the Mediterranean, and North Africa. It is probable that in connection with the question of disarmament the French Government will try to revive the so-called "annex" to the Paris Treaty and Covenant, by which the United States and Great Britain were to come to the military assistance of France in case of an unprovoked attack by Germany on France. At the time this so-called "annex" was made public, the writer directed attention of the U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs to the fact that it violated the canons of contract by having no quid pro quo for the United States. The American Government was asked to assume a heavy liability, while on its part the French Government assumed nothing on behalf of America. The writer of this memo. suggested, if the American Government did make such a pact, that a quid pro quo be inserted by requiring France to support America in the major issue of America's world policy—the Far Eastern question. It seems likely that this contingency will be posed in some form at the forthcoming conference.

Italy. Italy has even less interest in the Far East and the Pacific than France has. She has no position there, and no prospects except under the Open Door. She is indebted to America, wants financial accommodations from America, and further desires American diplomatic support in her European policy. Italy's attitude was intimated by her statement with regard to the Yap question, when she announced her full accord with the American position.

Japan. Japan (the present Government) is opposed to all and each of the purposes of the American Government in calling this conference. Japan is against disarmament fundamentally. Japan's present place as a world power is due to arms, and is dependent upon arms. Japan's diplomacy depends on arms for effectiveness. Deprived of arms, Japan inevitably within twenty years will fall back into her proper position—that of a second class power. Deprived of arms, and with her diplomacy lacking the power of intimidation conferred by arms, Japan inevitably must see herself deprived of the loot acquired at the expense of other nations in the course of her recent career as a predatory imperialistic nation.

The Japanese Government without doubt has no illusions about

the situation which it will confront at this conference: it considers that it already has been "framed" by the American Government, that it is being forced into a position where it must sit at a conference table, on which every gain it has made at the expense of China will be placed for reëxamination. During the great war Japan took advantage of the stress of the European Powers to wring from them secret agreements fortifying and consolidating her position in China and the north Pacific; she sought further to complete the ring of international assents to her position by the Lansing-Ishii agreement; she was successful at Paris because she secured those secret agreements as the basis for acts of the British and French governments; her complete diplomatic success only was broken by the action of the American Senate in specifically rejecting the Shantung award of the treaty. Japan knows where her opponent is, and probably considers that her opponent now has called a conference with the purpose of breaking up her carefully built diplomatic structure, and then of depriving her of the power to defend it by disarming her. This undoubtedly is the Japanese viewpoint of the conference; not the less so because, from expediency, the Japanese Government may profess otherwise.

Moreover, this viewpoint of the Japanese Government correctly estimates the situation and its possible consequences to Japan.

In a speech made at Manchester, England, on July 15, 1921, apropos the conference called by President Harding, Gen. Sir Ian Hamilton, recognized as a leading British military expert on Japan, put it with truthful directness when he said that the Japanese will be loyal only to a "military alliance," and recommends a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This is perhaps an indiscreet revelation that the Anglo-Japanese alliance is in fact a "military alliance," when British and Japanese propaganda are at such pains to prove it is not. The essence of the alliance of course is military, and its military application in the present situation must apply to America; indeed, unless it does apply to America, it has no practical value to Japan. The Japanese Government perceives clearly that this conference if it works out a solution in accordance with the purposes of the United States, means the end of the alliance with Great Britain, which is the keystone of Japan's world diplomatic influence.

China. The conference offers to China an opportunity to secure a reversion in her favor of the Shantung provisions of the Paris Treaty, and to ameliorate other oppressions under which she is

suffering. China is for the conference for the reasons Japan is against it.

Issues of the Conference

It already is apparent that an effort will be made, for various reasons, to inject into the conference a number of extraneous questions. The elimination of such questions will help to disclose the genuinely vital ones.

One of these extraneous questions is that of the status of the Philippines. It is evident that the Philippine question can have no place in this conference unless its scope is extended beyond what logically and properly is included in the preliminary statements of the objects of the conference. It is obvious that Filipino politicians gladly will seize upon this, or any opportunity to agitate for independence for the Philippines: and a press writer (David Lawrence) has advanced the idea that this conference may make a real independence for the Philippines feasible by the formulation of an international agreement guaranteeing them from attack, thereby relieving the American Government of the cost of maintaining fortifications in the Islands and of garrisoning them.

That argument has two fallacies: the first, that merely an international agreement can assure the Philippines from attack; the second, that fortifications in the Philippines were placed there, and are now garrisoned, to protect the Islands.

No time will be wasted here in proving that international agreements in themselves and by themselves assure nothing. If such amateurish doctrine pervades the deliberations of this conference, and the diplomacy of the American Government, it will be fruitless.

As for the existing fortifications and garrisons in the Philippines, they are primarily for the *protection of the United States.* The fortifications of Corregidor Island are as much, and as important, a part of the defenses of America as the forts at Sandy Hook and Golden Gate, as long as we have reason to apprehend any peril from the direction of Asia, or any encroachment on our position in the Pacific. Indeed, it can be stated with much reason that Corregidor possesses, in any peril coming from that quarter, many times the strategical value of any fortifications on the coasts of America, for the defense of America. Regarded solely as defenses for the Philippines, Corregidor has slight value unless supported by an American naval power superior to any attacking power or combination of powers. This phase is mentioned here because it represents a popular fallacy that is wide-spread, and which may be used to cloud really essential matters.

In respect to political aspects, the Philippine question cannot be included in the scope of this conference unless, on the same principle, Korea also would be included. In case the Japanese Government tries to use the question of Philippine independence as a "dust screen," it can be effectually silenced by a proposal that the United States will include the Philippines in the discussions, provided Japan wishes to bring in the question of the status of so-called subordinate peoples, and raise the question of self-determination in connection with the wider issues of the conference. That proposal will silence Japan; for it would, if persisted in, bring in India, French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, etc. None of the Powers at the conference will want this question raised, and will be angry with Japan if, to serve her own ends obliquely, she tries to bring them in.

Another side-issue which Japan may try to use obliquely is the so-called "race equality" question. As the writer of this memo. pointed out, when Japan made use of this question to raise dust at the Paris conference, it is easy to turn it upon Japan if her genuine attitude toward it is comprehended. It should be clearly understood that *Japan does not want race equality.* . . . [See other memoranda.]

If Japan seeks to raise the question of "race equality" in this conference, it easily can be turned against her.

Dangers of the Situation

In the forthcoming negotiations, the American Government should take certain propositions as axiomatic, viz.:

Japan is against *any* basis of armaments except one which will leave her superior or equal to the United States in respect to Asiatic waters. Equality in this case constitutes superiority for Japan, for all she has to do is to hold her position to defeat the American policy. The bearing of an Anglo-Japanese alliance on this proposition is obvious. Also, in considering disarmament, Japan may introduce subterfuges designed to sustain her comparative naval and military power, by basing them upon budgetary expenditures. As Japan can sustain naval and military forces at less than one half what the same forces cost the United States, the fallacy of a budgetary comparison is plain.

With an Anglo-Japanese alliance in existence, the *combined* forces of those nations must be taken as the unit of comparison *vis-à-vis* the United States. This is true *regardless of the published terms of such an alliance,* and of assuring utterances of British and Japanese statesmen about it.

The Japanese Government fully comprehends the nature of the situation affecting the present and future position and status of Japan in the world that is focused in this conference, and to try to deceive Japanese statesmen on this point is useless. Whatever Japan assents to, or dissents from, at the conference, will not be because her statesmen are beguiled in regard to any of these questions; but they will be governed by definite calculations seeking the advantage of Japan, and in their outward manifestations will be guided largely by expediency.

Broadly, the situation has two aspects: *with* an Anglo-Japanese alliance in existence, and *without* such an alliance. With an alliance, taking the situation as it stands, the chances may be placed at 75 to 25 in probability of war. Without an alliance the chances probably are reduced to 50-50.

The conduct of the Japanese Government with reference to the conference, and acts and utterances of its representatives in the conference, may bear only indirect relation to the real purposes of the Japanese Government. For instance, if the Tokio Cabinet decides to go to war with America rather than submit to the American policy in the Pacific, and in the Far East, that decision will be kept secret, and the attitude of Japan toward disarmament and on all questions will be designed to conceal her purpose until she is ready to strike. In that event, it is likely that Japan's representatives in the conference would rush to the front, and be more strongly for disarmament than any one else. In the event that Japan secretly decides on war, she will agree to almost anything in the conference, for if she intends to resort to force, what she may agree to now will not matter. It will be possible, at any time, to raise a plausible pretext for war.

With regard to the real motivation of Great Britain (the present régime of the Foreign Office, not the English people) on the issues taken within the purview of this conference, it must be kept steadily in mind that Great Britain privately is opposed to the fundamental American thesis *vis-à-vis* Asiatic peoples, because of its reactions upon the 330,000,000 Asiatics under British rule. For instance, the British Foreign and Colonial offices do not view with real sympathy the efforts of Chinese to organize a republic, for if there is established one successful republic in Asia, the idea cannot be kept from spreading into India.

For a similar reason, the Japanese oligarchy is hostile to a republic in China: and in that mutual antipathy and fear lies the basis for an Anglo-Japanese combination in the Far East.

Obviously, the British Government cannot *publicly* state its ap-

prehensions about and objections to the spread of democratic institutions among Asiatics; nor can Japan afford to do that; and it is this divergence between the public and private policies of some of the Powers that constitutes the core of the war danger in the Pacific, and the clash of policies.

Furthermore, it can be taken as a fact (and this hypothesis is not necessarily a mere suspicion of the underlying motives of British world policy) that a war between Japan and the United States (such a war will last two to four years probably) will accrue to the comparative *advantage of Great Britain's position in the international balance of power,* and perhaps also to her financial and commercial advantage. The extent to which this incidental condition will influence the motives of Great Britain at the coming conference, and in considering the question of armaments, can be judged by circumstances and developments.

Factors of America's Position

In the event of one of the European Powers (France or Italy) developing at the conference a tendency or disposition to align against the United States on important questions, it privately can be pointed out to them that the only logical offset for America to an alignment of the "Allies" group in Europe against America in the Far East, and with regard to questions of the Pacific, is an entente of the United States, China and Russia; and that a logical corollary of that situation will be that a military renaissance of Germany will become to the interest of America. Such an intimation should be sufficient, in conjunction with other means of influence with those Powers, to deter them from taking sides against any firm stand of the United States.

It is the writer's opinion that early occasion should be taken by the American Government privately to inform the British Government that it must regard the renewal, or extension, of the Anglo-Japanese alliance *in any form* as threatening to America; and that its existence will compel a reorganization of the foreign relations of America on a different hypothesis.

The Basis for Real Security

The essence of the proposed conference, from the standpoint of the United States, *is to devise and enforce a curb on Japan.* Considering the consequences to Japan of the application of a curb, that she may go to war to avert or to break it must be taken as a serious possibility.

It is not easy to meet this situation practically; that is, to devise

practicable measures to accomplish what is necessary if war is to be averted; or to enable the United States to win the war, at a minimum of time and expense, if war comes.

A mere agreement on lines the same, or similar to, the Hay Doctrine, *will not avert war.* Such a new agreement by itself in no essential respect will alter the situation from what it is now, and from what it has been during the entire course of Japan's aggressive policy.

An agreement for reduction of armaments *will not avert war,* if it leaves the balance of power with respect to Japan's position in the Far East as it is now; or if it allows Japan's diplomacy to be strengthened by an alliance with Great Britain, with the bearings that condition has on every practical move to relieve the existing dissensions.

An agreement as to principles and policy *will not avert war,* unless means are provided to put forcible restraint upon any infractors of the agreement, so that the existence of such means will act as a deterrent.

The only effective check upon Japan is an international combination so greatly superior to her in naval and military power, and in economic power, that she scarcely will dare to encounter it.

The United States alone, or in combination with other nations, should take measures to supervise materials that are required to make modern war—steel, minerals, chemicals, oils, etc. A check should be instituted to prevent any Powers that will not respect an openly stated policy from obtaining these materials in so far as they are drawn from other countries. (NOTE. Japan's excessive purchases of materials within the last two years, some of them used only for the manufacture of war munitions, relates to this phase.)

SUMMARY

From the above analysis it might be argued that there is little prospect for the forthcoming conference to accomplish anything of practical utility; and on the other hand that it carries a grave liability of injecting dissensions among the Powers, and of precipitating war. It should be realized that this conference may precipitate war. It does carry this liability. But it should have been called by the American Government, and should be proceeded with; for on the face of the situation as it stands, nothing that turns upon the ponderable and the imponderable elements of politics and economics is more sure than that unless the American nation finds a way

to alter the present situation and course of events in the Far East and the Pacific, before many years it will have to fight to preserve its existence.

§ 4

When the conference assembled, early in November, it was noted that its official personnel was much the same as those who dealt with Asiatic questions at Paris.

The Chinese delegation included S. K. Alfred Sze and V. K. Wellington Koo, both of whom had been delegates at Paris. Dr. Koo had been chief Chinese delegate at Geneva; and formerly he was attached to the Wai Chiao Pu when the twenty-one demands were presented at Peking. The third principal Chinese representative was Dr. Wang Chung-hui, former chief justice of China, and now a justice of the International Court at the Hague. As principal counselors, the delegation had Admiral Tsai Ting-kan; M. T. Liang, former minister of foreign affairs; Dr. Hawkling Yen, of the Secretariat of the League of Nations; Chung Mun Yew; Philip Tyau; Chow Tzu-Chi, former premier; and a technical and secretarial staff. It was expected that Dr. W. W. Yen, then minister of foreign affairs, would head the Chinese delegation; but the situation required him to remain at Peking to handle matters at that end. Dr. Alfred Sze during the World War was Chinese minister in London and now is minister at Washington. China's interest in the conference was intense. Organizations in China unconnected with the Government, and representing all parts of the nation, sent observers to Washington.

As the conference convened a disposition was noticeable to assume that the Chinese were in need of foreign advice and assistance in presenting their case. That impression was erroneous. No government in the conference was more capably represented than China was. No foreign advocates, no matter how eminent, could have understood the case of China as well as the Chinese delegation did. Foreign ad-

visers were useful, no doubt, in respect of some technical matters, and to obtain a foreign point of view when that was appropriate. It has been said, and justly, that if all branches of the Chinese Government displayed the ability its diplomats usually do, especially in the last decade, China would be one of the leading nations in the world.

Japanese diplomats, like the Chinese, are all experts on Asiatic and Pacific Ocean questions; the Japanese delegation at Washington, headed by Admiral Kato, was highly competent. Whatever others may have thought, the Japanese did not underrate the Chinese. Mr. Balfour had been with the British delegation at Paris; and the expert staff of the British delegation at Washington included most of the Orientalists in the Foreign Office. Of the American delegation, the plenipotentiaries—Senator Lodge, Elihu Root, Senator Underwood, and Secretary Hughes—differed entirely from the American commission at Paris, but the chief Oriental experts, Dr. E. T. Williams of the University of California and Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, had been asked to serve again. The American delegation had at its service a competent group of naval and military experts on Eastern Asia and the Pacific.

Just before the conference convened, I wrote a memorandum for the notice of the Chinese delegation. It follows:

Confidential November 9,
By T. F. M.

SUBJECT: STRATEGY AND TACTICS AT THE CONFERENCE

CHINA'S POSITION

As in a game of chess, or poker, against highly skilled players, one cannot risk making assumptions that the opponent will play badly, or that he may fail to take advantage of openings; so in this conference the Chinese delegation should not rest its policy upon any illusions about the possible attitudes and moves of nations which it has reason to apprehend may be aligned against the accomplishment of what China desires, but should assume that wholly practical considerations will animate the Powers in view

of what they consider to be their several selfish interests and ambitions.

From all the information at hand, it should be assumed that the alignment of Principal Powers *vis-à-vis* China is as follows:

For China: The United States.

Against China: Great Britain and Japan.

Neutral, with opposition leanings: France and Italy.

The alliance, the Shantung agreements, and the general solidarity in support of the Versailles Treaty for a variety of reasons indicate plainly a close association as to plan and objects, *vis-à-vis* China, of Great Britain and Japan. The utterances of British liberals should not delude Chinese as to the true position of the British Foreign Office and the British naval and army staffs, which probably control the foreign policy of the Empire. Japan's real position of course is clearly understood.

France and Italy are indifferent to a great extent as to issues regarding China that will come before the conference, and in this position both those Powers will incline to *align with power rather than with weakness.* As between China and Japan, France and Italy will support Japan because Japan carries weight in a military balance of power, and China does not. However, if America takes a firm position alongside China, the situation will then assume for France and Italy that of a choice between Japan and America, in which case they both probably will support America. In this connection it should be remembered that France and Italy have slight power in the Far East in any issue that in the end depends upon a resort to force.

This analysis reveals plainly that China's hope to secure a satisfactory (to her) outcome of the conference depends upon the position taken by the United States; and the position taken by the United States in turn will be influenced by American public opinion.

OPPOSITION STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Strategy: To keep the real issues and the truth about China's position and the policies of those Powers there in the background, while diverting the American Government and the American people by other questions, and by a propaganda of obscuration.

Tactics: Get armaments placed first on the order of business of the Conference; then prolong the armament discussions purposely by various devices and pretexts (as easily can be done if the American Delegation will permit it), until the public becomes tired of the conference as a "news

story," and loses interest, and a sentiment forms in favor of *doing something* and adjourning.

The effect of these tactics will be to defer the consideration of the China questions and keep them out of the public eye until they take in the public mind a position of minor importance; then when they do come up the public will be so surfeited with the conference that they will give slight heed to its actions and discussions.

This strategy and tactics thus may superinduce a psychology favorable to placing the China questions in a place of minor and comparatively unimportant relationship to the work of the conference, and make it possible to "put over" private deals agreed upon by the signatories to the Versailles Treaty, and to induce the passive acquiescence of the American Government and people.

NOTE. The general conduct of the Paris Conference and how it affected the final disposition of China's case can be recalled. It is reasonably sure that if action on China's case at Paris could have been had early in the conference, China would have had a better chance to obtain satisfaction. Also, it will be recalled how public interest and opinion to a great extent was dulled and stupefied by the prolongation of the conference, and in the end was ready to accept without much protest almost any decisions so long as something was done and the affair brought to an end.

CHINA'S COUNTER STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Strategy: To bring up the China questions as early in the conference as is possible, and to keep them to the fore as a principal issue.

To pave the way, by publicity, in case China's case is lost or impaired in the results of the conference, for an obstruction or a revision of the decisions of the conference by the United States Senate.

NOTE. The Shantung articles and the Senate are a case in point, as illustration.

Tactics: Lose no time in issuing a concise and forcible statement of China's position.

Take every opportunity thereafter to elucidate China's case and the real motives of certain Powers by publicity, so as to implant the facts firmly in the minds of the American people and Congress.

Resist at every point attempts to relegate and to postpone consideration of Far Eastern questions.

Convocation of the conference was preceded and accompanied by an enormous press publicity, an excellent and beneficial circumstance for the United States and for China. The American press as a rule was impartial and unencumbered by prejudices: it was open to news and impressions from every quarter. China was not prepared to stimulate and incite publicity by the organization and methods controlled by other nations in the conference; on the other hand, in a sense China was the heart of the conference, which insured attention to her.

In the earlier period of the conference, when propagandas were running in full flood, I lunched one day with several persons who all were strongly sympathetic to China. We were discussing the situation of the moment, and one of them remarked to me, "Can't something be done to stop or to offset this pro-Japan propaganda which the newspapers are flooded with?" He mentioned an article that had been published that morning as a case in point.

I replied, in effect: "I know of no way to stop it. The newspapers will print whatever comes to them from legitimate sources; and I am glad they do. But I do not want to stop the pro-Japan propaganda. It 'tips off' what their diplomacy plans to do, for one thing. Also, it puts the issues before the public, arouses attention to them, and therefore makes the 'come-back' all the more interesting to print. Most of that stuff is of a brood of diplomatic chickens; in the end they will go home to roost. What I would fear much more would be to have the press saying nothing at all about these matters."

A few days after the conference began, I wrote a memorandum in which I touched on propagandas that were operating. It follows in part:

Confidential November 18,
By T. F. M.

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE

OPPOSITION PROPAGANDA

A rough calculation based upon a reading of the principal newspapers, which include all the press news association services, the "feature" services, and the leading political writers, reveals that probably 90 per cent. of current news and comment about the conference consists of the exhibition of what may be termed the "stalking horses" and "trial balloons" of the various Powers. Obviously it is the plan to attempt to bewilder public opinion in America by a propaganda of obscuration, to retard definite action as long as is possible in order to dampen public interest, and then to press for results partly by oblique persuasion, and partly by means of "bluff."

Examples

One of the more noticeable "stalking horses" so far put on exhibition is the discussion about an Anglo-American-Japan alliance, or entente, or "agreement," or "understanding," in respect to the Far East, and especially with regard to China.

Of course it is impossible to obtain anything like an Anglo-American-Japan alliance, because it would be impossible to obtain the consent of the United States Senate to it. The President and the Secretary of State know this.

The British and Japanese governments know it also.

Yet the propaganda for such an alliance continues, obviously not with the expectation of obtaining such an alliance, but in order to advance certain arguments and propositions under cover of such a discussion, and if possible *to build up a foundation for some sort of renewal or extension of the Anglo-Japanese alliance,* with its covert purposes.

Another "trial balloon" is the propaganda seeking to impress the idea that Secretary Hughes, who is assumed to speak for the present American Administration, is willing to concede to Japan some kind of "special position" in respect to China. The latest example of this propaganda is the attempt to read into Secretary Hughes's remark at the session of last Wednesday (Nov. 16) that Japan's position "on the threshold" of China gives her special advantages under the Open Door.

Secretary Hughes obviously meant to point out that Japan logically will profit most by genuine observance of the Open Door by reason of her geographical situation, and not that Japan is en-

titled to any exceptions from the operation of the Open Door. Yet in much press comment (especially the French and British correspondents) Secretary Hughes's remark is perverted.

NOTE. The writer has directed attention to this perversion and has instigated steps to secure a clarification of Secretary Hughes's meaning.

In respect to all this "trial balloon" and "stalking horse" propaganda, the writer's opinion is that it need cause no uneasiness at this stage of the conference. Stalking horses never can be driven far, and the harder they are driven the sooner they fall down. It is quite likely that the actual and ultimate results of much of this propaganda will have reactions in direct opposition to the objects designed by the instigators of it. However, that should not be left to chance. Steps are being taken to meet all the principal points advanced by these opposition propagandas, and to give them publicity in due course. They will be all the more effective coming *after* the "stalking horse" propaganda has begun to collapse of itself, as it probably will.

GENERAL SURVEY

So far, the situation of the conference can be taken as being as favorable to China as reasonably could have been expected. Notwithstanding the dust raised by the propagandas of obscuration, no real breaches in what is assumed to be the American position can be observed, and China's cause depends ultimately, in so far as this conference is concerned, *upon the firmness of the American position. The Chinese delegation never should lose sight of this fundamental fact.*

Developments with respect to the attitudes of France and Italy are satisfactory to the case of China, and are as was anticipated. Those attitudes are dependable also on the firmness of the American position.

All the preliminary moves and developments in the conference so far indicate plainly a collusion of British and Japanese diplomacy with respect to certain issues. This of course was expected and disturbs no previous calculations and estimates. But analysis shows that British support to Japan has a distinct "limit" beyond which it will not go. The "limit" to British support of Japan, as to definite matters, probably is defined by private understandings reached, before the conference met, between the British and Japanese foreign offices.

The diplomatic "limit" of British support to Japan is the point where, to go farther, would imperil the good relations of Great

Britain with the United States. That is a line which the British delegation will not cross. The exact position of this "line" is, or will be, *fixed by the point where the firm position of the American Government is established finally.*

As long as this firm position of the American Government remains obscure, British and Japanese diplomacy in the conference, and the British and Japanese propagandas, will strive to press the American position as far as is possible the way they want to move, and in the course of this effort a good deal of diplomatic "bluff" will be employed, and numerous "herrings" will be drawn across the road. At Paris Japan used her "bluff" to leave the conference, and thereby break up the formation of a League of Nations, to induce President Wilson to yield on Shantung. Having discovered, or calculated, that President Harding and Secretary Hughes want especially to "put over" a limitation of armaments, Japanese and British diplomacy can be expected to try to trade against that desire to get what Japan and Britain want in the Far East.

The main strategy of China's "opposition" therefore is quite obvious and is developing entirely on lines that was expected. It should be met at the proper time, with a "counter offensive."

§ 5

Since the beginning of nations, wars usually have been caused by clashes of policy. In that sense, policy at different times takes different superficial forms. In ancient times and through the Middle Ages, wars seemed to be caused by clashing ambitions of sovereigns; but the ambitions clashed about policy. Later, when the whims of sovereigns could not so easily plunge nations into war, governments became the contenders, and governments as a rule do not act for sentiment or because of impulse or anger—one government, the aggressor, nearly always acts deliberately—and governments become opposed over policy, for policy provides the motive for all acts of governments.

Yet few people discriminate between the policy that causes a war and the passions that are roused by it; they loosely reason that the passions caused the war. This confusion of thought explains the prevalent theory that wars are caused by armaments, and, conversely, that if the nations would disarm there would be no more war. That is much

like saying that to arm the police causes disorder, and if there were no police there would be no violent crimes. Armaments, at least to the extent of providing adequate international police power, are necessary to civilization.

Eight years ago, in my book "Our Eastern Question" (1916), I wrote:

On one point public opinion in America is correct in its conception of modern contacts of Japan and the United States. In almost all discussion of this problem by Americans the defensive idea is uppermost. There is no disposition by Americans to political aggression in any part of the Orient, or to obtain any unfair commercial advantage there. But most Americans are confused about what is to be defended by their nation in the Orient, and how it should be defended. I have shown, as between Japan and the United States, that American rights and interests that are menaced by Japan's policy shape into two questions—the situation of China, and Asiatic immigration. In respect to the immigration issue, it is clear to Americans that with them it takes a purely defensive form. About questions involved with the situation and fate of China, American opinion is not clear as to their defensive or aggressive character. As Americans understand the open-door policy, it only means fair play among commercial competitors coupled with respect of China's independence, and contains no essence of aggression on China or any nation. Yet, why the United States should defend its position under the Open Door in China is by no means as clear to American public opinion as why the Government should defend their country against objectionable immigration which seeks to enter America by force. The mandatory nature of the obligation of a Government to defend its own territories and its sovereign rights within those territories is plain, but the obligation of a Government to defend interests and rights outside its territories is not so clear to the average citizen. The reason for this vagueness of popular thought is because the thing to be defended in one case is tangible and is linked obviously with the law of self-preservation, and in the other case the thing to be defended is a Policy. Yet every war the United States has had, including the Revolution, was about policy, or principle; the great European war was caused by conflict of policies; nearly every war of the last two centuries was about policy; and it is practically sure that most future wars will be about policy. Belgium went to war in 1914 because her territory was invaded; but her territory was invaded because policies

of greater nations which did not concern Belgium had collided. In modern times, and probably in the future, nations not only will be brought into war by their own policies, but they also will be dragged into war by the policies of other nations. [Written before the United States was dragged into the World War.] From this condition of modern civilization we may draw the conclusion that to sustain a policy often is as obligatory and as necessary to a nation as to defend its own territory and sovereignty. . . . The policy of the United States in the Far East has two phases—moral and material. These are distinct; yet often they are so closely interlocked as to be almost indistinguishable. Moral aspects of the policy embrace certain obligations to China and to other Powers from historic relations and under the terms of treaties; certain obligations to uphold Christianity, political liberty, justice, education, scientific progress, the humanities; certain special obligations in the Philippines. The moral principles of any policy will have expression in material matters, or have no practical expression at all. Moral responsibility remains nothing but a phrase unless it is translated into practical effort.

The American Government, I take it, had in mind at Washington to attempt to infuse vitality into its Far Eastern policy, which in the course of a decade or longer had been reduced to a piece of paper, the very phrases of which had been interlined by "interpretations" of other powers until the original meaning of its protagonist almost was gone.

Any policy of a government, like any law, is not effective unless sustained by police power; it is not required that the policeman always be shaking his club, but it is essential for it to be known that he is alertly walking the beat. At Washington it would not suffice merely to restate and revise statutory bases of the American policy; it might be necessary to call the policeman shortly afterward.

The work of the conference therefore had two sides, political and strategical. The political side had to do with the formulation and definition of policy. The strategical side had to do with the means to enforce and defend policy. In other words, treaties and armaments.

§ 6

China was the focus of political aspects of the conference. All the experts in attendance knew that. All the governments knew it. If, to "outside" opinion, other issues seemed more prominent, other nations seemed to hold the spot-light, it was only because the Principal Powers assumed the major rôles before the public and by their gestures concentrated attention on their movements. Diplomats and propagandas spoke in terms of the Principal Powers; of *their* attitude, *their* interests, what *they* could or would or could not or would not do, what *their* obligations and understandings were, in the Far East. But if one looked a little beyond the posturing of the Principal Powers, there could be seen the huge and very old nation with four hundred million people in its ancient borders—China—about which it all revolved.

Thirty years before, John Hay had said, "He who understands China holds the key to world politics for the next five centuries." In 1921 a conference was held at Washington to try to find that key.

Four days before the conference convened, I wrote a memorandum, as follows:

Confidential

Nov. 7,
By T. F. M.

OUTLINE FOR POSITION OF CHINA AT THE CONFERENCE

China's position in respect to this conference should be based on the following general propositions:

1. An open reaffirmation by all the Powers, in a less ambiguous and more definite form, of their adherence to the policy of respect for the territorial integrity and political autonomy of China.
2. A similar reaffirmation by all the Powers of their adherence

to the commercial principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity for all foreign nations in China.

3. A disclosure by all the Powers of all agreements, private and otherwise, that exist among themselves or between any of them and other nations, relating to China, and a readjustment of all such agreements to conform with the assent of China.
4. A complete revelation of all such agreements must be a sine quo non of China's assent to participation in any plan for the assistance of the Powers in the readjustment of China's position and finances.
5. The assent of China must be a prerequisite of any plan for the "coöperation" of the Powers with respect to questions relating to China's territorial integrity and political autonomy.
6. The assent of China is essential to any agreements of the Powers relating to China's territorial integrity and political autonomy.
7. China will decline to recognize as valid any agreements of the Powers, to which she does not assent, or which are kept secret from China or from Powers that may not be included in such agreements.
8. The abrogation publicly of all agreements that exist among foreign nations that are based on the "sphere of influence" hypothesis as relating to China.
9. The restoration to China and to the full control of the Chinese of all natural resources of the national domain and all public utilities that are essential to the preservation and security of the Nation, in due course and on a basis equitable to legitimate foreign interests.
10. The recession to China or the readjustment of all concessions now claimed under old agreements by foreign interests in China, which rightfully have lapsed by non-fulfillment, or which have become inequitable by changes of conditions; and the revision of existing agreements in order to facilitate the protection and recovery of China's national rights.
11. In case there is hereafter an international conference, or an international commission, for the purpose of a readjustment of the so-called "interallied" indebtedness, and to provide a means for the equitable liquidation of these debts, China's financial obligations will be included in any international or interallied equalization; and the so-called "concessions" obtained or claimed by foreign Powers and by foreigners in China also will be included in any such readjustment.

The first important action relating to China in the conference was the presentation, on November 16, by the Chinese delegation, of a declaration of China's position. That declaration was spoken of as China's Ten Points, and was presented by Dr. Alfred Sze, doyen of the Chinese delegation. The Ten Points follow:

In conformity with the agenda of the Conference, the Chinese Government proposes for the consideration of and adoption by the Conference the following general principles to be applied in the determination of the questions relating to China:

1. (a) The Powers engage to respect and observe the territorial integrity and political and administrative independence of the Chinese Republic.

(b) China upon her part is prepared to give an undertaking not to alienate or lease any portion of her territory or littoral to any Power.

2. China, being in full accord with the principle of the so-called open door or equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations having treaty relations with China, is prepared to accept and apply it in all parts of the Chinese Republic without exception.

3. With a view to strengthening mutual confidence and maintaining peace in the Pacific and the Far East, the Powers agree not to conclude between themselves any treaty or agreement directly affecting China or the general peace in these regions without previously notifying China and giving her an opportunity to participate.

4. All special rights, privileges, immunities, or commitments, whatever their character or contractual basis, claimed by any of the Powers in or relating to China are to be declared, and all such or future claims not so made known are to be deemed null and void. The rights, privileges, immunities, and commitments, not known or to be declared are to be examined with a view to determining their scope and validity and, if valid, to harmonizing them with one another and with the principles declared by this Conference.

5. Immediately or as soon as circumstances will permit, existing limitations upon China's political jurisdictional and administrative freedom of action are to be removed.

6. Reasonable, definite terms of duration are to be attached to China's present commitments which are without time limits.

7. In the interpretation of instruments granting special rights or privileges, the well-established principle of construction that such

grants shall be strictly construed in favor of the grantors, is to be observed.

8. China's rights as a neutral are to be fully respected in future wars to which she is not a party.

9. Provision is to be made for the peaceful settlement of international disputes in the Pacific and the Far East.

10. Provision is to be made for conferences to be held from time to time for the discussion of international questions relative to the Pacific and the Far East, as a basis for the determination of common policies of the Signatory Powers in relation thereto.

That was China's declaration of rights. I may without vanity call attention to the analogy of those Ten Points of China to the eleven articles of my memorandum given previously. I do not know that there was any intention in the coincidence; but the similarity as to points and principles is apparent.

A few days afterward, on November 21, the Hon. Elihu Root presented a draft of four resolutions concerning China to be adopted by the conference. Subsequently, at the meeting of December 10, the Root resolutions were adopted with a few minor changes of phraseology, but without any change of purpose or meaning. They follow:

It is the firm intention of the Powers attending this Conference hereinafter mentioned, to wit, the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

4. To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in China, in order to seek special rights and privileges which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

It was noted that the Fourth Resolution was initiated by the American delegation alone, and it constitutes a self-denying ordinance on the powers themselves distinct from China. In view of what had happened in the invasion and occupation of her territory in the Russo-Japanese and World Wars, China requested of the conference, and obtained, a declaration incorporated in the Nine-Power Treaty, as follows:

> The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree fully to respect China's rights as a neutral in time of war to which China is not a party; and China declares that when she is a neutral she will observe the obligations of neutrality.

The Chinese delegation was anxious to have its principal question, that of Japan's position and claims in Shantung province, discussed by the whole conference. The Japanese delegation objected to submitting to be reviewed by this conference questions which had been decided and fixed by the Treaty of Versailles; and an embarrassing *impasse* threatened. But Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hughes brought forward a suggestion that the Japanese and Chinese delegations should hold separate conversations, in the presence of observers of other powers, to settle those questions amicably themselves, and then report their agreement to the conference.

For a time it seemed that the Far East part of the conference would go to pieces on that issue. The Chinese had strong reasons for not wanting to have "separate" negotiations with Japan about the Twenty-One Demands treaties and the Shantung issue. Several times subsequent to the Paris Conference the Japanese Government had tried to draw the Chinese Government into separate negotiations, and China, with good reason, always declined, for fear that it would be subjected again to intimidation and secret pressure, as in 1915. It therefore was with some difficulty that Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hughes induced the Chinese delegation to have aside conversations with the Japanese delegation.

Indeed, the position of the Chinese delegation in that matter was precarious. When the news reached China, popular demonstrations against the Government were held; even in Washington a gathering of Chinese students in America made a demonstration before the headquarters of the Chinese delegation. At one time there was talk of China's withdrawing from the conference; one or two of the secretariat of the delegation did resign.

The memoranda which I wrote, almost daily, during the conference, indicate the shifting positions as it progressed. and I will give a few of them in chronological order:

Confidential December 6,
By T. F. M.

CHINA'S CRITICAL POSITION IN THE CONFERENCE

COURSE OF THE CONFERENCE

This Conference has developed no surprises. So far all of the participating Powers have revealed exactly the positions which they were expected to assume. The diplomatic collusion for the Conference of the British and Japanese Governments which was distinctly forecast by their previous positions and the preliminary moves is developing as was anticipated. Its major objectives may be stated as follows:

(a) To remove American objections to a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; or if this is impossible, to replace it with an Anglo-American-Japanese (perhaps including France) "alliance" or "entente" covering China and Pacific Ocean questions.

(b) To secure in some manner a recognition of Japan's "special position" in respect to Manchuria by the Conference, or by such an Anglo-American-Japanese entente; or if this cannot be secured specifically, to establish a condition which will assure that Japan's position and policy in Manchuria cannot be interfered with.

(c) To bring about some form of "international coöperation" with respect to China which in practice will amount to international supervision and control of China's finances and communications.

(d) In the event of failure to induce the American Government to enter an Anglo-American-Japanese entente or alliance, to unite British and Japanese diplomacy for the purpose of undermining the American policy in China, and undermining the prestige of the American Government with the Chinese people and Government.

All of these objectives are more or less interdependent, and the accomplishment of one in a measure will tend to the accomplishment of all. For instance, if objective (a) is accomplished, it at the same time will almost completely accomplish objective (d); for if the American Government enters such a tripartite alliance or entente (to call it an "understanding" will make no difference, for every one will know that it means the same thing), nothing can induce Chinese to regard it in any other light than as a concrete indication that the American Government has accepted the thesis of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and that hereafter the influence of the American Government must be taken as supporting the alliance as it has operated in respect to China. All the circumstances will support this view of such an entente or understanding. Chinese will not readily believe that the American Government, in such a combination with Great Britain and Japan, will be able to carry its own policy as against the policy of its *two allies*. Furthermore, the Chinese under those circumstances will regard the motives of the American Government with deep suspicion, and will consider the previous attitude of the United States as having been insincere. *The net result will be to undermine American prestige in China and to diminish the chance for the United States to bring China to her side in case there develops later a clash between America and Japan.*

The accomplishment of objective (a) also will go far toward assuring the ultimate accomplishment of objective (b), because in the course of the constant adjustment of the Manchurian situation to the course of events, the combination of British and Japanese diplomacy usually can outweigh and outmaneuver the other "ally" Power in respect to the actual meanings of political phrases and commitments, and their adjustment to practical propositions as they arise.

The addition of France to such an alliance, or entente, in the end will have minor effects, because France has slight actual power in the Pacific and Far East, even should France at all times align with America *vis-à-vis* Great Britain and Japan. Furthermore, certain points in the position of France *vis-à-vis* China indicate that

France at times may prefer to support the policy of Great Britain and Japan rather than the so-called American policy.

China and the Conference

Progress of Negotiations

The writer cannot disabuse his mind of serious apprehensions concerning the method of "outside" conversations between Japan and China regarding the issues between these nations. It involves the danger ultimately of placing the China questions outside of the main business of the Conference. It also tends to give a minor position to the China questions, and to make easier the obvious Japanese diplomatic strategy to keep postponing any decisions of the China questions until the public becomes tired of the Conference and ceases to attend to its proceedings.

To allow this process to proceed without interruption carries *a grave danger to China.* There is no doubt that the situation of China has general sympathy of the American people, and if brought plainly before the people and Congress by publicity, China's case has aspects which can be used to accomplish certain results in the Conference, or if not there, in Congress afterward in preventing ratification of the status quo resulting from the Conference.

Already the American press is cutting down the amount of space devoted to the Conference; many of the special writers are being dropped, and published matter is being more and more confined to reports of actual doings of the Conference, and the elucidation of those doings. In respect to the case of China, very little is of importance to the press *that is not placed directly on the conference table and argued there, forcing action one way or another.*

The writer continues of the opinion that all of the points enumerated in his memorandum of November 22 should be brought before the *full conference* by the Chinese Delegation. Those points were:

1. An adjustment of the Shantung Question.
2. Publication of all international agreements and understandings concerning China and their readjustment to conform to the Principles already adopted by the Conference, viz., the Ten Principles of China and the Four Principles of Mr. Root.
3. The specific abrogation of the Twenty-One Demands.
4. Cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
5. Cancellation of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement; or its revision or clarification with respect of the "special position" phrase.
6. An undertaking by the Powers to proceed without delay to

readjust foreign "concessions" in China to conform to the fourteen principles (the Ten and Four), adopted by the Conference.

7. China's foreign financial obligations and economic commitments to be placed in the same category as other international obligations in case hereafter there is a readjustment of the same, or a moratorium.

THE CHINA-JAPAN QUESTIONS

In discussing specific questions (such, for instance, as railways in Shantung and Manchuria), the position of China should rest on the conflict of certain conditions with what has been adopted by the Conference as a fundamental proposition, viz., respect for the sovereignty of China. The railway question should not be discussed on the basis of details of management, etc.; but on the basis of what does or does not infringe the fundamental sovereign rights of China. On the basis of details of management China's position is weak, for Chinese management of railways notoriously is inefficient; just as, compared with foreign standards, the administration of police power in China notoriously is inefficient. It is difficult on that basis to make out a case in favor of China, and any attempt to do so will involve China's case in a hopeless mess. By getting those questions on the basis of details of management, etc., the way is paved (which is the purpose of Japanese and British delegations here) for the reference of China questions to "expert commissions," which pushes their settlement off into the indefinite future, a future which may be clouded by an Anglo-American-Japanese entente.

JAPAN'S "SPECIAL POSITION" AND "VITAL INTERESTS" IN CHINA

At every point, the Chinese delegation should refute attempts of the Japanese delegation to obtain acceptance, either by word, or document, or the acquiescence of silence, by China of any "special position" of Japan, or "vital interests" of Japan, in *any part of China*. The phrase "vital interests" is more comprehensive and consequently more dangerous to China than the phrase "special interests" is. No nation can have "vital interests" within the territory and within the administrative scope of another nation. "Vital interests" imply sovereignty, and to admit that Japan has vital interests in China is tantamount to admitting that Japan has sovereign rights in China. The bearing of the term "special position" to Japan's relation to China is fully understood.

Confidential December 11,
By T. F. M.

Status and Prospect of the Conference

The Four-Power Agreement

The Agreement of the four Powers [1]—United States, Great Britain, Japan, and France—regarding their insular possessions and positions in the Pacific Ocean should be regarded as a development favorable to China. The terms of the Agreement in themselves are entirely innocuous; in reality it is merely a sort of decent burial sheet for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, devised to "save face" for Great Britain and Japan and avoid the appearance (which is the fact, apparently) of having to give up the Alliance under pressure from the United States.

The outstanding and important feature of this Agreement is that it will *terminate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.*

The fact that certain of the press in America and elsewhere will give this Agreement a coloring of being an Alliance (and the probability that Japan's propaganda in Asia will stress that fictitious aspect of it) is of little consequence, *for the agreement is not an alliance and has no characteristic of an alliance;* nor does it *include China in its scope.*

By terminating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the way is cleared for a genuine accord of American and British policy *vis-à-vis* China; and every international coöperation in respect to China now will take a different aspect than it would have had formerly.

The termination of the Alliance clears the way also for the acceptance by the United States Congress of the 5-5-3 naval reduction and limitation ratio, and practically assures agreement on that basis. China is interested in the question of naval reduction and limitation in the sense that any reduction of Japan's naval and military forces lessens the ability of Japan to intimidate and aggress upon China, and weakens Japan's potency in international politics.

Elimination of Contentions in the Conference

The conference now has arrived at a stage where only the China questions remain to be settled. Little difficulty is expected in reaching an agreement among the Powers regarding China, with the exception of the *China-Japan* questions. Provided the Chinese dele-

[1] Appendix A.

gation remains firm, there is little doubt that all of the Powers except Japan will consent to adjust their positions and interests in China to conform with the Principles already adopted by the Conference. Difficulties doubtless will develop regarding the working out of agreement as to details, time limits, methods, etc.; but a fairly satisfactory formula can be found which the Powers will agree to, and which China can accept.

The Shantung Question

The writer holds the opinion that if the Chinese delegation remains firm, Japan will concede almost everything with respect to Shantung that China wants. There is no doubt that the Chinese delegation should refuse absolutely to compromise on Shantung. In this attitude China can expect the firm support of the American Government, from all indications. In respect to Shantung, the American Government has a definite interest and a right to intervene, because the existing Shantung situation resulted from the Great War and the Paris Conference, in which the United States participated, and like China, the United States has refused to accept the Versailles Treaty, and has stated plainly that the Treaty could not dispose of any interests and rights of America, a principle which applies also to China.

The Manchuria Question

With respect of the American Government's position, the Manchuria question is on a different basis. Japan's position in Manchuria antedates the Great War and is based on treaties which China assented to. It is true that the agreements extending for 99 years Japan's tenure of the South Manchurian railways, and the leasehold of Liao-tung, were obtained from China by ultimatum. China therefore has an indisputable *moral right* to insist that she be relieved of those obnoxious agreements which she signed under duress, and the Chinese delegation firmly should stress this position in the Conference. But since those agreements did not come under review at the Paris Conference, or before any international convention, the American Government has slight grounds for intervention, and *probably will not be disposed to intervene,* except to use moral suasion with Japan.

It can be expected that Japan will take a firm position in refusing to give up the Liao-tung lease, and her tenure of railways in Manchuria. In that event, it is very unlikely that the Powers, or any Power, will attempt to coerce Japan to yield. When this situation develops, what should be China's course? In the writer's opinion, the Chinese delegation should take the following course:

(a) Demand a plain statement by the Powers that Manchuria is an integral part of the territorial entity of China.
(b) An undertaking by Japan to respect in all parts of Manchuria and in the Liao-tung leasehold, the Open Door, and the administrative autonomy of China.
(c) In the event that Japan refuses to agree to give up the railway tenure and the Liao-tung lease on the expiry of the original agreement with the Russo-Chinese Bank, *the Chinese delegation will make a public statement to the conference that China in the interest of peace will tolerate this position of Japan in Manchuria, but under protest, and that Chinese will continue to resent this intrusion upon her sovereign rights as long as it exists.*

SUMMARY

This course will leave China when the Conference ends in the following position:

> The Powers reaffirm their adherence to the principle of respect of the sovereignty of China and of the territorial entity of China. (Defined.)
>
> The Powers (except Japan) recognize that occupation of sectors of China's maritime territory is incompatible with respect of China's sovereignty; and all the Powers except Japan consent to give up such leased territory, in due course. (Time limit to be fixed or indicated.)
>
> Restoration to Chinese administration of posts, telegraphs, railways, etc.; restoration to China of her fiscal autonomy (customs); eventual abolition of extra-territoriality: and a guarantee of China's neutrality in wars of other nations.
>
> *An agreement signed by all the conference nations in the above effect.*

This situation probably is the best which can be obtained for China in the present Conference. It, however, will be a great improvement over the pre-Conference position, and will be a long advance to a complete restoration of China's independent sovereign position.

Furthermore, this situation will leave Japan diplomatically and morally detached, a position which as time passes will become more and more difficult to maintain.

Confidential

January 1, 1922.
By T. F. M.

Last Stages of the Conference

General Position of China

China's general position in the Conference practically is the same as when the Conference began. If there has been any change, it is for the better. The net results of the diplomatic maneuvering of the Powers in Conference has been to display their actual motives and policies and to throw much light on the facts.

In respect of Far Eastern questions, nothing has been finally decided, except general principles. The next two weeks will witness the crisis of the China questions.

It is probable that the diversion of the attitude of France *vis-à-vis* naval questions will have a favorable psychological reaction for China, for the results are not likely to encourage Japan to assume an intransigeant posture, and to flout the moral opinion of civilization.

Course of the Chinese Delegation

So far, little exception can be taken to the conduct of China's case in the Conference. In the writer's opinion, China so far has lost nothing by participating in the "separate conversations"; but rather, she has gained by the consequent exposure of Japan's diplomatic policy. The disposal of the naval and other questions also should affect China's position favorably, for now the Conference *must* concentrate attention on Far Eastern questions.

Nothing has happened to change the views expressed by the writer in his memorandum of December 11. The Japanese delegation has pursued almost exactly the expected tactics of delaying final decision on all questions, thus holding them open for last-minute trading purposes.

Notwithstanding the announced purpose of Japan to decline to discuss the twenty-one-demand treaties, the Chinese delegation should press them firmly before the Conference. If the Japanese refuse to entertain discussion of those treaties, then the Chinese delegation could demand to be allowed to present their case at a plenary session. If the Conference should refuse this opportunity, then the Chinese delegation will have full and adequate reason for withdrawing from the Conference and publishing her case to the world.

However, it is strongly urged that with respect of withdrawing from the Conference or any other important moves the Chinese delegation *should not make any "bluffs." No attitude should be taken*

or posture assumed except what are based on the actual position of China and on the firm position of the Chinese Government. The American delegation in the Conference, and also the American press and people, are tired of diplomatic "bluffs," and they will react against the Government which employs them in the Conference. The Chinese delegation should leave "bluffs" to other nations and should confine their case to a plain and straightforward presentation.

The position taken so far in respect of the Shantung and Manchuria questions should be *rigidly adhered to in the face of any persuasion or pressure; whether from Powers in the Conference, or from Peking.*

In the unexpected event of the Peking Ministry advising or instructing the Chinese delegation to abandon any points that are vital to China's sovereign position in Shantung and Manchuria, the Chinese delegation should *resign* rather than obey such instructions.[2]

Any advice or pressure to that effect from any other Power, even from the American Government, should be firmly *rejected.*

The Chinese delegation should firmly reject any and all proposals to secure the rights of China in Shantung or in respect of other lesser questions by conceding to Japan any validation of or extension of her position in Manchuria. For example, if Japan should propose to meet China's wishes fully in respect of Shantung if the Japanese lease of Liao-tung and of the Manchuria railways is extended say for twenty-five or fifty years, *the Chinese delegation should reject the proposal firmly.* To consent to any validation of Japan's position in Manchuria will be to assent to Japan's violations there of the sovereignty of China, and probably will enable Japan to establish her position firmly on a legitimate basis, whereas it now rests on an illegitimate basis.

A Nine-Nation Agreement Concerning China

The terms and phraseology of any such general agreement respecting China should be studied closely. Any attempt to include in such an agreement anything which can be interpreted as a recognition of a "special position" of Japan with respect to China as a whole, or to Manchuria or any part of China, or of any "special interests" of Japan in China, or of any "vital interests" of Japan in China, or of any special or superior position of *any Power or*

[2] This warning had in mind the possibility of Japan's utilizing her influence over certain men in the Peking Government to undermine the Chinese delegation at Washington, as was done during the Paris Conference, and again attempted at this juncture.

Powers with respect to China, should be firmly rejected by the Chinese delegation.

The Chinese delegation should insist that any such agreement should include a clause *expressly disclaiming all claims to any special position or interests by all the signatory nations.*

Confidential
By Thomas F. Millard

Washington,
January 10, 1922.

NOTE: For the American delegation.

SUBJECT: ADVISABILITY OF CONCEDING CERTAIN RESTORATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY TO CHINA

HYPOTHESIS OF ORIENTAL INCOMPETENCE

The disposition of the American Government, in conformity with its traditional policy, is to assent to the request of the Chinese Government with respect of restoring to it certain functions of administration in China; such as post offices, and in fiscal matters, and in the eventual termination of the extra-territorial status of foreigners in China.

It has developed (as was expected) that certain Powers are opposed to granting those proposals of the Chinese Government, on the grounds that the Chinese lack experience and ability to administer such functions efficiently; that they will not attain that efficiency for some generations to come; and that any recession from the present status of foreigners in China invites, and almost surely will cause, a further weakening of order in China, which is dangerous to the safety of foreigners there, to foreign investments and enterprises there, and also would be detrimental to the best interests of the Chinese.

That hypothesis of the fundamental incompetence of Orientals in modern political and economic functions is the basis of all policies of European Governments in Asia, and is applied by all of them to their Asiatic dependencies and possessions. The outstanding examples of it are the British administration of India, and Dutch administration in Java and Celebes.

The outstanding refutation of that hypothesis of course is Japan. While modern Japan is far from being the model of efficiency which her Western adulators depict, it cannot be denied that the Japanese, on the face of things, are capable of self-government, and of func-

tioning as a nation in the modern world. In this connection, one wonders if the European Powers would concede this status to Japan if Japan had not had the foresight to develop military and naval efficiency and organization before Western encroachment upon her had established its political ascendency?

The Case of China

It cannot be denied that a doubt exists, on the face of things, of the ability of the present Government of China to function efficiently in the matters which it is proposed to concede to it. The internal situation of China is gravely disorganized; one hesitates to predict that the present Government will be able to check the course of disintegration now taking place, and restore its authority throughout the country. Without doubt there is a possibility that China for an indefinite period may lapse into a completely disorganized condition; in which situation it is probable that public order will be shaken, and that the control over the people of the Government will be loosened, even may almost disappear. In that event, it would seem, from one way of looking at the question, dubious to relinquish from the administration of foreigners certain necessary public functions, or to weaken in any way their authority and prestige in China.

At present, however, those doubts merely are doubts, not certainties. The question arises (which is being asked in all parts of Asia by the native inhabitants); Who are to decide if the Asiatics are capable of conducting government for themselves? Is this question to be decided exclusively by the Western Powers?

In the present case of China, that decision of the Western Powers will be *a priori*. In the event of such a decision on the point of competency being adverse to China at this conference, it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to convince the Chinese (and other Orientals) that the motive of the Western Powers was not to keep China in subordination, and to deny to Chinese their right to opportunity to control the destiny of their nation. It is not difficult to see the psychological reactions of such an attitude upon the entire Asiatic world.

On the other hand, by this conference not taking *a priori* judgment adverse to China in this matter, and consenting, with proper reservations and limitations, to her request, the ethical position of the Western Powers *vis-à-vis* the Asiatic world will be correctly indicated. The Powers will have done the right thing. Their action will have the character of encouraging the Chinese by an evidence of belief in them; by, in a way, "putting up" to the

Chinese the proof or disproof of their fitness for self-government; by showing that the Powers wish, and hope, to see the Chinese preserve their nationality, and conduct their own government in all its functions.

In the event of the worse fears regarding China being realized, and if the Government of China proves to be incapable of preserving an orderly administration of the country, and it should become necessary for the Powers in the interest of civilization to intervene in behalf of the protection of life and property in China, or for any purpose arising from lack of an effective government there, the Powers in that case would be in a better position to assist China than if they should refuse her request at Washington. Intervention by way of extending help to China by the Powers may be impossible of accomplishment because of the sentiments of Chinese, and their suspicion that any such assistance merely is a device to fix foreign control firmly upon China. (There is no example of a Western Power having gone to the "assistance" of an Oriental nation and thereafter relinquishing the position so acquired.) On the other hand, by acting generously toward China now, and establishing by treaties made here a new statutory basis for China's international relationships, the natural suspicions of Chinese of the motives of the Powers can be reduced, and perhaps brought to a point when it is possible to extend effective financial and other assistance to China with the consent and coöperation of Chinese.

Apart from China, the sentiments of the entire world of color must be considered in this connection. The Asiatic world is watching the treatment given to China in Washington with an interest which is intensified by what occurred at Paris. The applications to other nations and races in Asia should not be overlooked.

Unilateral Position of the United States

In respect of China, and of Asia, the United States Government long ago took a unilateral position, based on the thesis of non-interference and non-aggression upon those countries and racial groups. The American Government has observed its policy in China to the extent that it refused to accept residential "concessions" in treaty ports, even when those were proffered by the Chinese Government; and the same position has been observed in other matters.

Per contra (and this is very important), the American Government reserves to itself the sole right to determine its policy regarding the conditions by which Orientals may enter the territorial possessions of the American nation, and by which Oriental governments may create colonies on the American Hemisphere.

The conduct of negotiations at the Paris conference, concerning the claims of China there, subjected the American Government to criticism on the ground of having broken faith with China; a criticism which was qualified subsequently by action of the American Senate. But for the American Government now, in view of all the preceding circumstances, to associate itself with a refusal to move in the direction of restoring administrative autonomy of China, would arouse again the suspicions and sentiments which its course at Paris caused.

Action of the American Government in this conference never should be swerved from the guiding principle of its traditional policy *vis-à-vis* Asia, by any considerations of momentary expediency.

NOTE. A logical presumption regarding the motives of some Powers toward this question is its relation to the whole question of self-government for the Asiatic peoples. If it is conceded that the Chinese are entitled to, and are capable of, self-government, it becomes increasingly difficult to avoid conceding the same to other Oriental groups. The American Government should not allow itself to be maneuvered into a contradictory (*vis-à-vis* the Philippines) and untenable position on this question.

Confidential January 13,
By T. F. M.

THE CONFERENCE AND AFTER

THE GENERAL POSITION

Concurrent developments of world politics tend to strengthen the position and influence of the United States. One result of the Washington conference will be to convince the British Government and all the governments of the Powers that the United States will not permit Great Britain nor any combination of nations to dominate the naval situation, nor to endanger the American position and policy in the Pacific. This will be true regardless of the outcome of the Washington conference, for the psychological reactions of this conference will be felt hereafter in respect of all calculations of world politics.

The Tory element of British politics, which in the last twenty years has dominated the foreign and colonial policies of the British

Imperial Government, has been defeated at Washington in its effort to preserve the Anglo-Japanese alliance; and it may be expected that this political group, as long as its influence imbues British Imperial policy, will endeavor to cling to its old thesis and to keep alive the inner motivation which was based on that Alliance. That effort, however, is likely to be futile, especially if Lloyd George remains in power; for Lloyd George is an adroit politician and he evidently realized that he must choose between America and Japan in the Far East, and he chose America. In the end, this new policy will guide British Imperial politics, for the contrary policy contains too grave dangers to Great Britain to be risked.[3] Ultimately, British policy must align with the United States in the Pacific Ocean and the whole Far East, however reluctantly men of the Balfour and Curzon type may accept that position now.

Furthermore, the divergence between Britain and France is becoming more marked and serious; which makes it the more necessary for Britain to keep in sympathetic touch with America. The next few years will be marked by a contest between France and England to dominate and direct the course of events in Europe: and an inevitable corollary of that contest will be a struggle of France and England for the favor and support of America. In respect of Europe, the influence of Japan is inconsequential in comparison with the influence of America there.

Notwithstanding the superficial diplomacy which endeavors to permit Japan to "save her face" in the Washington conference, and to send the Japanese delegation home with a semblance of having protected Japan's position in the Far East, it now appears that the net result of the conference will be a serious weakening of Japan's position. Japan's international position as a major Power depends entirely and absolutely on *armaments;* consequently, *any* and *all* reduction of armaments and limitations of same proportionately lower the position of Japan as a world power, and lower Japan's diplomatic influence and prestige. *Complete disarmament* totally would destroy Japan's position as a Power, just as relative disarmament weakens it.

A status of complete disarmament relatively enhances the position of the United States *because of the superior industrial and financial resources of America and their capacity for rapid warlike energization and mobilization.* There is no likelihood of this comparative position being changed during the next fifty or one hundred years.

[3] The political trend in England and the installation of a Labor ministry confirms that prognosis.

Therefore, the naval limitation agreements made by the Washington conference, if carried out, tend inevitably to the relative weakening of Japan, and the relative strengthening of America.

The same effects ensue from the so-called Four-Power Pact concerning the insular regions of the Pacific Ocean, because the general effect of this agreement makes for *delay* in beginning a war between or among the signatory Powers, and the geographical position is such that delay operates in favor of the United States. Otherwise, this pact does not affect the situation in the event of a collision between Japan and America, except in the very important matter of abrogating the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which was the real purpose of the agreement.

A study of the strategical position in the northern Pacific indicates that nothing essential with respect of the strength of the American military and naval position was sacrificed to secure the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Although the effects may not be immediately apparent (indeed, probably will not be while the Tory influence dominates the British foreign and colonial offices), the cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance can be expected within a few years to alter the diplomatic balance at Peking and in respect of all China questions. Once the tie with Japan is severed, a severance of the economic and other collusions of British and Japanese interests in respect of China is foreshadowed; indeed, this is almost sure to come about, for it will be increasingly difficult for British policy in the Far East to oppose the policy of the United States there at the expense of straining British-American concords in respect of Europe and elsewhere.

France for a while may flirt with a Japanese entente to counterbalance British pressure on France in Europe, and perhaps also with the idea thereby of inducing American inclination toward France; but that association is without practical power in the existing international situation, without genuine community of interest, and cannot stand. Its weaknesses are so apparent that it is safe to assume there will be no genuine effort to accomplish it. It therefore may be expected that within the period of ten or twenty years hereafter, Japan to a large degree will be isolated, and will be subject to the diplomatic disabilities and restraints which that position will impose.

The Conference Position

The conference has reached a stage where its work and accomplishments are susceptible of being distinctly outlined with a few

exceptions. The exceptions are certain Far Eastern questions, especially some of the China questions. It is apparent that British diplomatic influence in the conference is allied with Japan in the effort to prevent any revision or discussion of the 1915 treaties, which constitute the core of the issue concerning China. There are indications that the Anglo-Japanese combination might turn the scale against China within the conference, by inducing the American delegation to agree not to press for a discussion of these questions.

But in regard to the China questions, the American delegation is subject to a powerful influence outside of the conference. This influence is the United States Senate, and back of the Senate, the sentiments of the American people. The attitude of the Senate and the sentiment of the American people are the result of the agitation of the Shantung question before the Senate at the time when the Versailles Treaty was under discussion there, and the consequent effects upon public opinion in America. In a sense, a majority of the Senate is committed to a certain attitude *vis-à-vis* the Shantung and other China questions; many Senators are on record about it (as the President is also), and both in the White House and in the Republican Party councils there is a serious fear of the consequences upon a ratification of the Treaties enacted by this conference, and upon the popular position of the Republican Party, of an abandonment of or a reversal by the American delegation in the conference of the American position regarding Shantung and China as a whole. Prior to and during this conference attention has been given to cultivating the opinion of the Senate in respect of these questions now before the conference, with a result that even should the American delegation be disposed to allow them to be shelved, the Administration fears the consequences of that course. To deny justice to China in the conference, or at least to deny to China a full and fair hearing by the conference, would subject the results of the conference to a serious danger of being rejected in toto or in part by the Senate. The present party political division of the Senate requires that about ten Democratic votes must be obtained in order for the conference agreements to be ratified, even if every Republican senator votes for them: and it is practically certain that several Republican senators will refuse to vote for the treaties if justice is not done to China in substance.

This situation is favorable to China in the conference, and gives ground for a firm attitude of the Chinese delegation on all questions which involve the fundamental sovereignty of China and the inalienable rights of China. In respect of its position in the con-

ference, the Chinese delegation should consider the following elements:

1. The argumentative position of China in respect of ratification by the U. S. Senate. China's case cannot be defended in the Senate if the Chinese delegation, or the Chinese Government, should abandon or weaken it.
2. The ultimate effects upon China's international status as a whole. There should be enough in recent events and present circumstances to demonstrate how difficult it is in international matters to secure the revision or abrogation of treaties of any character, even of treaties obtained under immoral conditions. This should be a warning to the Chinese delegation in this conference not to yield on any point that will compromise China's sovereign rights, or place difficulties in the way of the eventual recovery of what already have been compromised. In all cases where there exists any doubt whatsoever about whether to sign or not to sign, the Chinese delegation will be on the safe side *not to sign,* and to leave the conference instead if they are not allowed to place China's reservations plainly in the records of the conference.
3. Concerning the so-called Twenty-one Demands treaties, the Chinese Delegation should firmly insist that they will be discussed by the conference. China's situation cannot be changed in the line of a genuine reëstablishment of her sovereign rights *except by a broadcast revision of treaties.* Therefore, to deny to China the right of a hearing in this conference with reference to a revision of treaties which beyond question do contradict her sovereign rights, and the principles adopted by the conference, amounts to a denial of respect of China's sovereign rights; and for the conference to take that position is susceptible logically of interpretation as a recognition of the status quo. Rather than submit to that, the Chinese delegation should retire from the conference and publish its position to the world. In view of the reactions which such action by China would have upon ratification of the conference treaties by the U. S. Senate, it is reasonably certain that the Administration will hesitate before allowing China to be forced into such a position. It will be almost impossible for the Administration to defend in the Senate any act of the American delegation tending to sacrifice China's rights, or to qualify the sovereignty of China. In the private background of this question also are the naval and military requirements of

America's position *vis-à-vis* the Far Eastern situation, which is predicated in part on retaining the friendship and confidence of Chinese and Russians.

§ 7

Of inestimable advantage to real international comity was the virtually unrestrained publicity given to the Washington conference in America. Publicity was not limited to official communiqués, accompanied by journalistic criticism hedged in all directions by inhibitions, and flavored by national prejudices and designs. At Washington the "lid" was off; and in the atmosphere created by the exposure of every aspect of questions before the conference it was very difficult for the diplomats to give plausibility to the stock "properties" of the international scene. The old-school diplomats didn't like that of course; much of their usual method did not work, and that which was used did not get the habitual reactions. For old-school diplomacy to work efficiently, its (self-made) rules must be observed; and one of the key-rules is that "outside" opinion should not be permitted ever to take a look at the inside machinery and see what makes it tick. Scrutiny of the inside machinery of the old diplomacy often reveals merely a lot of tricky politicians wearing the habilaments of pomp and ceremony.

In the course of press publicity about the conference, a number of international political "herrings" were exposed, and some of them were so discredited that probably they cannot be used again for considerable time. In that class of diplomatic expedients is the so-called doctrine of irrepressible expansion. That interests the United States greatly, for it can be made to apply to one of the most important and increasingly pressing questions that confront the American people—immigration. At Washington, the Japanese delegation early in the conference sought to use this argument obliquely to support its policy toward China and Siberia. I give a memorandum I wrote on that subject:

By Thomas F. Millard

Washington
November 10, 1921

SUBJECT: JAPAN AND THE "IRREPRESSIBLE EXPANSION" DOCTRINE

In the preliminary propagandas employed by all of the Powers as a means to enter the conference in favorable (to themselves) positions, it is evident that the plea of Japanese that they must have room for expansion because their present national domain is overpopulated has been more sympathetically received than other arguments designed to forecast Japan's attitude in the conference.

Put in terms of international relations, this proposition is based on the doctrine of "irrepressible expansion." The doctrine of "irrepressible expansion" often has been used as a diplomatic device by aggressive and imperialistic nations, but it never has secured any recognized status in international law. The practical formula of the doctrine amounts to this: If a Power desires possession of territory belonging to another nation, and the Power wanting that territory is stronger in military force than the other nation, then the Power which wants to expand *decides itself* that it requires the additional territory and moves into it. Usually the process of moving in is oblique and gradual; frequently it takes the form of "peaceful economic penetration" of the region which it is purposed later to annex—first the traders, then the "colonists," then troops to "police" the country for the protection of the traders and colonists. If excuse for "policing" the region is needed, political "agents provocateur" are employed to stir up the native population to resent the intrusion, and to incite clashes between the natives and the foreign "colonists." Events have made this process familiar to those who follow intelligently the modern causes for international frictions and wars. The doctrine of "irrepressible expansion" was cited as justification for the arming and the policy of Germany which led into the Great War; and it had more justification in the case of Germany than it has usually.

OUTLINE OF THE DOCTRINE

The doctrine of "irrepressible expansion" can be subdivided as follows:

(a) Legal foundations;
(b) Ethical foundations;
(c) Populations;
(d) Economic elements.

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE

The failure of this doctrine to establish for itself any recognized status in international law probably is due to its obvious inequities, and further because of the practical difficulties in arriving at any general rule for its application. It is practically impossible for the doctrine to be invoked in favor of one nation without at the same time working to the disadvantage or the dissatisfaction of at least one other nation, and usually to the disadvantage of several other nations.

For instance, Belgium and Holland are the most densely populated nations in Europe, and consequently have in fact the greater need to use that doctrine of "irrepressible expansion" if the doctrine was based on law and equity. What would happen if it was proposed to expand Belgium and Holland in Europe, or anywhere, by taking territory away from other nations? Under the existing conditions the proposal will not be advanced because Belgium and Holland are too weak to "police" such an expansion outside of Europe; and the nations contiguous to Belgium and Holland are almost as densely populated as those countries are, and if necessary would repel by war any attempt to annex them without their consent.

A combination of the so-called Principal Powers might formulate and be able to enforce a doctrine of "irrepressible expansion" provided they could agree as to their own mutual advantages and disadvantages in practical applications of it. With the world as it is now such agreement is impossible, for no important shift of territory under this doctrine is possible without importantly altering the international "balance of power."

A legal basis for this doctrine, if any exists, must be found in analogies to the law of Eminent Domain; that is, under certain circumstances it is recognized as legitimate to take property and apply it to essential public uses. The law of Eminent Domain usually is limited in its applications to the taking by a State of property of its subjects for the uses of the State; or, in other words, for public uses. Eminent Domain never has (so far as the writer knows) been recognized in international law explicitly. A State assumes ultimate control over all the property of its subjects, even over their lives; but one State has no valid authority over the subjects of another State, or of their property, or of their lives, except as these are brought within the territorial jurisdiction of the State.

Under certain conditions one State can take external jurisdiction over the subjects and property of another State. This status is termed suzerainty—mandate is a new word for it. The suzerainty

of one State over another means that the State exercising suzerainty has a qualified sovereignty over the subordinate State or entity. In international practice, a position of suzerainty usually in time is converted by annexation into actual sovereignty.

In respect to discussion of this question at the Washington conference, it should be borne in mind that any enforced application of an "irrepressible expansion" doctrine to China, or to Siberia, will give to the Power or Powers applying the doctrine a position of suzerain over China and Siberia, with annexation distinctly forecast.

Ethical Foundations of the Doctrine

It is difficult to discover any genuine ethical basis for the doctrine of "irrepressible expansion." Henry George attempted to establish that in his demonstration of the "single tax" idea, which rested on the thesis that land is the universal property of the human race and cannot be sequestered in the interests or at the will of individuals or of any section of society. But Henry George did not attempt to extend his thesis to international relations; to assert the moral right of a nation, or a people, which lacks land and the natural products of the earth within their native domain to demand and take those things from other peoples and nations which have more of them proportionately. As expounded by George, the idea was restricted to a single nation, and its operation kept to national domain, and was dependable upon the popular consent as legally determined.

The George thesis, which is the law of Eminent Domain expanded to include popular rights as well as public rights, might, if applied to the positions of the United States and Canada work out as follows: The United States grow to have 300,000,000 population and the people become cramped, or think they were cramped, within the present national territory; Canada would not grow so rapidly, and would have only 20,000,000 population within a larger area: it therefore would be right for the United States to annex Canada, or take as much Canadian territory as Americans thought they needed. And if the United States had the *force* to make it good, such a doctrine would become *de facto* internationally, which would *make it legal.*

Population and "Irrepressible Expansion" in the Far East

When Japanese statesmen talk about the urgent necessity for Japan to "have room" for her rising population, they mean that Japan wants more territory. When Japanese statesmen speak of "room" they do not mean room in Mars, or on the oceans, or the

blue sky. They mean land. And to give more land to Japan under existing conditions means to take the land away from another nation or nations.

Just what land is to be taken from other nations to make "room" for Japanese distinctly is indicated by the facts of geography, and by the utterances of Japanese statesmen and propaganda. Japan probably would take land wherever she could get it. At times during the Great War when the outcome was uncertain and the ability of Europe to protect its outlying possessions was dubious, there was much discussion in Japan of the opportunity to acquire the Dutch East Indies, and French Indo-China. Those acquisitive conceptions have been relegated for the time; and in so far as the Washington conference is concerned, the direction which Japan's expansiveness takes is distinctly intimated. Japan wants Manchuria, Eastern Inner Mongolia, and possibly eastern Siberia.

Manchuria has belonged to China for many centuries, and is almost entirely populated by Chinese. Mongolia is chiefly desert.

Eastern Siberia has been a part of Russia for more than a century, and it is populated almost entirely by white people.

Japan has expanded her territory a good deal in recent times. She has annexed Korea, Formosa and Southern Saghalin; having together a total area of about 110,000 square miles, as compared to the area of old Japan of 148,000 square miles. In twenty-five years Japan has expanded her territory about 70 per cent.

The population of Japan proper increased rapidly for two decades until about five years ago, when the rapid increase arrested apparently by natural or internal causes. It now is almost at a standstill; being about one half of one per cent. for the year 1920, according to figures recently compiled by foreign experts. This is a smaller per centum increase than in the United States now.

The population per square mile of old Japan approximately is 370. The total population of old Japan in 1921 is between 55,000,000 and 56,000,000.

The population of Korea in 1921 approximately is 17,000,000, which is 205 to the square mile. Japan proper and Korea are similar as to terrain, both countries being hilly, with considerable regions unsuitable for agriculture. Korea produces enough to support its native population, but little more. On the face of these figures it hardly will be assumed that the necessity to obtain Korea to get "room" for the excess population of Japan is a valid reason, or was the real reason for Japan to annex Korea.

The greater part of the population of old Japan is located in the southern islands, where the climate is mild. The northern part

of Japan is thinly populated. The reason is that Japanese do not like to live in a cold climate. The south end of the large island of Saghalin was annexed to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War. It is fertile and has a meager population; but few Japanese go there to live. There is "room" for many millions of Japanese in the northern part of old Japan and in Saghalin, but the climate is too cold to suit them. They like places like Hawaii and California.

The population of China exclusive of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet, roughly is placed at 400,000,000. The 1921 China Year Book gives it as 413,977,395. The population per square mile in this area is 270. Great areas of China are sterile and thinly populated; other large areas have had their productiveness reduced by deforestation and causes superinduced by deforestation, like erosion and floods. Roughly, old China in size is three-fifths of the area of the United States. The population of China in that area is four times as great as the population of continental United States. China barely produces enough to sustain her population; the frequent famines show this.

Shantung Province, next to Chekiang, is the most densely populated region of China. The population of Shantung is 550 to the square mile, and parts of the province are mountainous; a density that is exceeded elsewhere only by Belgium. Whatever reasons Japan may have for wanting to keep a hold on Shantung, the reason hardly can be to get "room" there for Japanese to colonize. For Japanese to emigrate to a country, and an Asiatic country, too, where Japanese are under an economic disadvantage, and where the density of population is almost double that in Japan, seems to offer slight prospect of relief.

Manchuria as a whole is fertile, and there is "room" there for many people and much agricultural development. Manchuria has belonged to China for 600 years. Manchuria has about 13,000,000 population, of whom all except about 300,000 are Chinese. The population per square mile is less than 40; which, however, is *more than the population density of the United States.* In recent years more Chinese have gone to settle in Manchuria. Chinese do not mind the cold, they are used to it; that is, those are who have inhabited the northern provinces of China proper. Since 1905, when the present "position" of Japan was established there, about 200,000 Japanese have emigrated to Manchuria. About 120,000 remained there in 1920. The tide is ebbing.

Siberia is farther north and generally is colder than Manchuria. It is thinly populated as a whole, something like Alaska. The total population of Siberia in 1914 was 10,377,900; of whom less

than 2,000,000 live in Eastern Siberia. The population of all Siberia per square mile is 2; but a large part of Siberia is a wilderness and much of it is but partly explored.

At this point I will quote from my own previous writings on this subject; from Chapter XIV, page 255, of "Our Eastern Question," published in 1916:

"The idea of Korea and Manchuria providing a satisfactory field for Japan's excess population no longer is widely entertained in Japan, and no longer, if it ever did, has a place in Japan's genuine as distinguished from her pretended foreign policy. Some wrong assumptions about this question are widely accepted. It is incorrect to say that Japan is overpopulated in a territorial sense, for a large area of Japan proper is sparsely populated, and more than one third of the arable land in Japan is uncultivated. Therefore it is not lack of land that impels Japanese to emigrate; it is a desire for economic betterment. . . . Manchuria long has been a part of China, and large sections of China are more densely populated than any parts of Japan. Yet Chinese have not occupied Manchuria in large numbers for various reasons, among which were lack of communications and insecurity. Those conditions are improving, and China now would like to use Manchuria for her own surplus population; but she is blocked by Japan. This being so, one cannot accept an assumption of a right of Japan to annex Manchuria on those grounds. If it is a question of rights and justice, then China's right should supersede Japan's, for China's need of her own undeveloped territory is greater. . . .

"But a curious, though logical, outcome of Japan's efforts to colonize in Korea and Manchuria and in other parts of China is that, notwithstanding the unjust preferential conditions maintained for them by their government in comparison with Koreans and Chinese, Japanese immigration to the continent of Asia comparatively is a failure. The reason is simple. In going to Korea and China, Japanese find they have moved into an even lower standard of living than obtains in Japan; that is, into a more cramped economic field, not a wider one. Japanese even with preferential facilities cannot compete in large numbers with their neighbor Orientals. Chinese and Koreans are able to, and do undercut Japanese in business economies and standards of living. Preferential exactions in their behalf by the Japanese Government enables some Japanese to improve their state by pursuing commercial and other occupations in China, but to the millions of Japan's peasantry China offers no lure and little opportunity for betterment. The application of this situation to Japan's contacts with America is easily

deduced. It is not toward the East with its lower economic level that Japan's millions yearn; but toward the West with its higher economic standards, under which Japanese of all classes can eat and still find room for an immense improvement of their condition. . . .

"In an address made in 1914 Professor Kichisaburo Endo of the Imperial University, Tokio, said: 'It is impossible for our people, who from elementary school-days have been bred with teachings of loyalty and patriotism, to lose their characters and adopt those of the country to which they emigrated. The suggestion that they can completely ignores the history of our country. There are some Japanese who try to refute the contention of the American people that the Japanese are utterly unassimilable. It is undisputed, when weighed very carefully, that we may prove to be most refractory for assimilation by another race. As a Japanese of manly spirit never will be swallowed up by the national characteristics of other peoples, the refutal is impossible.'

"The report of the Japan Sociological Society for 1915, said: 'The present tendency is to drive Japan's surplus population into Korea and China, where density of population is almost as congested as in Japan, a movement which, if it continues, is likely to lead to a clash and war between Oriental races. . . . From a humane point of view it undoubtedly would be better for our emigration to distribute itself in Canada, the United States, South America, and Oceania, as is its present desire and natural tendency.'"

The foregoing excerpts from "Our Eastern Question" display Japanese thought on this subject as it existed at the beginning of the great war. Nothing has occurred since then to change any fundamentals of the question; but the collapse of Russia, the weakness and isolation of China, and the preoccupation of the Western Powers for a prolonged period, gave the militarist "expansion" party in Japan a fresh lease of power, and set it moving along the line of least resistance.

Economic Aspects of the Doctrine

Confining now Japan's "irrepressible expansion" doctrine to its practical delimitation at the Washington conference (which is the Far East), its objects and reactions can be illustrated by analysis of some propositions that are advanced. One of these propositions is that Japan requires "access to" the raw materials and products of the Asian continent, especially to the products and resources of China. It has been stated that Japan is willing to consent that the territorial integrity and autonomy of China shall be respected, *provided* (to quote one important newspaper) that Japan "will be

guaranteed access to materials which are essential to her economic development and living needs."

The truth of course is that Japan has now and always has had full "access" to the products of China on an equal basis with all other nations, in the accepted sense of international law and commerce. Japan's "access" in that sense is assured by the Open Door, and will be safeguarded by the genuine observation by all nations of the Open Door. The extent to which the natural resources and products of China can be utilized by Japan will, or ought to, depend on the extent they can be diverted to Japan by legitimate economic processes. If Japan needs and wants, for instance, iron ore and iron products, or coal, or oil, from China, and needs them more than other nations need them, under the Open Door they can be attracted to Japan by the simple process of paying a slightly higher price than is offered elsewhere. Taking into consideration the geographical proximity of Japan to China and the closeness of the two countries as to economic levels in comparison with Western countries, the usual case will be that Japan can overbid other nations for the products of China and still have sufficient economic "margin" to make the transaction profitable to Japan. This is what Secretary of State Hughes probably had in mind when he referred to the advantages which Japan's position "on the threshold" of China gives to Japan under the Open Door.

It is obvious that to grant such a "guarantee" to Japan is to give Japan a *Special Access* and vested right in the natural resources and products of China: which plainly is a *negation of the Open Door.*

This Japanese suggestion really means, when stripped of camouflage, that Japan wants the right to use the natural resources and products of China ("have access to them" is the diplomatic euphemism) regardless of the needs of China itself. And such a condition would make China an economic and eventually a political vassal of Japan; while it would shut the Open Door to other nations.

The character of this proposal is revealed in some of the particular instances set out by propaganda in its favor. In an interview, a member of the Japanese Diet who is now in America is quoted as protesting against China's prohibition of the export of rice as an injustice to Japan. The right of any nation to conserve its own natural resources, and especially its food supply, for the needs of its own people is one of the fundamentals of nationality. The reason to forbid the exportation of rice from China is shown in the frequent famines and their consequences. If conditions in this respect alter in time so that it is safe to allow the exportation of rice from China, the laws of commerce soon will remove the obstacles. In any

event, it is a question for China to deal with without external pressure or intimidation.

To transpose this proposition, suppose the United States was asked to sign a treaty, or was coerced to sign one by a combination of armed Powers, giving to other Powers a right of "access to" the mineral and agricultural and industrial resources and products of the nation?

For Japan to claim the privilege, or the right, to penetrate China for Japanese colonization is comparable, let us say, to a demand by England to occupy parts of Holland and Belgium because the British Isles are over-populated. The possible application of this doctrine, if it should become established in international law, to the question of Asiatic emigration to Western countries is apparent.

§ 8

Questions of policy in international affairs—that is, policies about which governments will go to war as distinguished from policies trumped up overnight to get around a corner—should, and endeavor to, take the long view. The Asiatic policy of the United States is devised permanently to shape our progressive relationships with that part of the world; it is intended to indicate a set of principles that will retain their vitality through the centuries, and will provide the basis for a harmonious and mutually sympathetic contact with the native populations of those regions.

Questions of the strategy, and the armaments, suitable to support a political policy, of necessity have to be adapted to a short view. Conditions affecting the conduct and the outcome of wars are subject to frequent variations. It is seldom that any system or theory of military and naval warfare holds good for as long as twenty years. A quarter of a century can be taken as the theoretical maximum of a military strategical thesis.

Therefore, estimation of the armament and associated trea-

ties made at Washington always must bear in mind that they are limited to ten years. Beyond a decade none of the signatory governments are committed. That is the time-limit of whatever chances and risks are taken in conditions imposed by the treaties.

The two fundamental foreign policies of the United States have been indicated. Each in turn has had its complement of a strategical policy designed to sustain it. Until the World War, the strategical policy of the United States to sustain the Monroe Doctrine was founded on a division of power in Europe into two approximately equal and antagonistic sides. Without that condition, which has prevailed in Europe at all times since the Monroe Doctrine was pronounced, it is questionable if the doctrine could have survived through the long period when the American Republic was comparatively weak, and when its ability to sustain its policy by arms was very doubtful. American statesmen might deplore in the abstract the division of Europe into "armed camps"; but it was that division which gave security to the young nations on the Western hemisphere, not the dogmatic utterance of a President of the United States. It is doubtful if the colonies could have made good their declaration of independence from England had not England at the time been harassed by European complications.

The World War did not change that principle. Probably every American naval and military expert felt that a deadlock outcome of the World War was the best strategical situation for the United States, and the only positive guaranty that the United States would not be assailed or molested by a European power or alliance. At the time the American Government entered the war the military situation indicated such an outcome of the war; and when the entrance of the United States broke the stalemate and led to a victory of the Allies, American military experts understood the consequences to the American strategical position. I never have talked with an American naval or military expert who took

seriously the idea, if the United States did not enter the war, that there was a danger of Germany's being a military menace to America. Such a theory is refuted by the entire political and military history of Europe.

But the United States did enter the war, not, I take it, because of such apprehensions, but because of unbearable provocations from Germany. The result is not unfortunate to the strategical security of the Monroe Doctrine; for if a victory of one side in Europe temporarily does displace the usual military equilibrium there, any strategical loss to the United States from this circumstance is offset by the demonstration which the war gave of the military potentialities of the American nation. It can be assumed that no power in Europe now entertains, as a part of its foreign policy, a purpose to disregard the Monroe Doctrine.

The strategical considerations which animated American policy at the Washington conference therefore almost exclusively were directed to secure that other fundamental policy, the Hay Doctrine. At the beginning of the conference, the American Government was confronted by a situation of the combination of the only other real Pacific powers—Japan and Great Britain—in an alliance, and having at the support of that alliance a naval and military preponderance over the United States of about three to one. It was necessary to change that position, or for the United States to equalize it by a large increase of its navy and army. The measures devised by the American Government to get the strategical position in the Pacific on a satisfactory basis for the United States were simple, and had only two points: (a) to break the Anglo-Japanese combination; (b) to limit armaments in a proportion reasonably to secure, with a new political status, the American position.

Those things were done. The desire to preserve national sensibilities, and to allow diplomats to keep their dignity and to cover their retreat behind a decent camouflage, required much discussion, and at times a little straining in the search

for a formula. In arriving at a solution acceptable (although not agreeable to all) to other powers, the American delegates were aided by the fact that the American policy as a public formula comes nearer to a just division of advantages than anything else that was offered at Washington, or ever has been proposed.

It is possible to give the essence of the armament treaties briefly. What was done at Washington in respect of reduction of armaments will not prevent war; it even does not appreciably reduce the probability of war. (Any lessening of the probability of war from what was done at Washington is found in the political treaties.) What really was done is for a time to lower the cost of armaments to governments. The boldness and simplicity of the American proposals left the other powers with little that could be said. The prolonged discussions that ensued in the end modified the first American proposals only in particulars that have slight effect on the strategical position of powers in the Pacific. The original naval ratios were not changed; the variations that were made altered the form but not the effect of the ratiocination. The dispute about submarines, and the failure to obtain an agreement to eliminate them, was a disappointment to most people in America; but it affected no American strategical calculations seriously; indeed, it is likely that American naval experts preferred to retain submarines, in view of their utility under certain conditions in the Pacific. As to the schism of the British and French governments about the use of submarines exhibited at the conference, and the reasons therefor, that appertains to the strategical policies of Europe, and it easily is within the compass of American naval devices to meet any applications it may have to the Western hemisphere.

The only point conceded by the American Government in respect of its strategical position in the Pacific which is dubious to experts is the limitation put upon fortifications and naval bases. The United States, to conciliate Japan and

allay the alleged uneasiness of the Japanese delegation lest their acceptance of the treaty might be repudiated at Tokio, agreed that it will not increase the fortifications and base facilities west of a line in the Pacific Ocean. That excludes the further fortification and equipment of bases in the Philippines and at Guam. There is no doubt that by agreeing not to improve its bases in the Far East the United States weakens its offensive potentiality in that region, and makes it probably impossible to protect the Philippines in the case of war with an Oriental naval power.

Granting that, the factor to be considered in that stipulation is not the de facto status but the element of risk. Unless there is a war against a naval power in the Far East in the life of the treaty (which is ten years), whether the bases in the Far East are improved and augmented will not affect the security of America or of its position in the Pacific. The measure of the risk taken, therefore, is the chance of a war in ten years or less.

I have been accused of being a "scaremonger" because in previous writings I have persisted in showing the danger of war in the Far East as events have been moving in the last decade, and so I scarcely will be suspected of leaning the other way now. At Washington it was evident that nothing could be accomplished by way of reduction of armaments, which really only is an economic measure, or in the much more important effort to improve the political status in Eastern Asia where the causes of war lie, without taking some risk. I have noticed in arguments of those who seek to demonstrate that the United States seriously weakened its security by the Washington treaties an *a priori* assumption that, if there had been no conference, the provisions to make the American position in the Far East secure would have been carried out. They assert that bases at Guam and in the Philippines are necessary to establish our position in the Pacific securely, and bemoan that the right to create them was relinquished. But is it certain, if there had been no conference, that Congress

would have authorized adequate bases in the Far East? American naval and military experts, ever since our nation took the Philippines, have urged the establishment of complete bases at Guam and in the Philippines; yet when the conference at Washington assembled there was no base at Guam, and an inadequate one in the Philippines.

The "chance" really taken by the United States in this matter is the chance that there will be war with Japan inside of ten years. That was quite a risk prior to Washington; and it still is something of a risk. But that "chance" is less now than it was before Washington. I would say that the lessening of the chance of war by the political action at Washington offsets the loss from the strategical concessions that were made.

I will not elucidate the factors of comparative war-making power of Japan and the United States in the post-Washington situation; but I am familiar with them, and have given them a good deal of thought. In the last analysis, the war-making power of these two nations depends on their self-contained resources, population, inventiveness, industrial energization, financial strength. In all those the United States exceeds Japan greatly. None can foresee the conditions under which wars hereafter will be fought; the part that will be taken by air forces, by under-water ships, by destructive chemicals, and by all the imponderables, including importantly invention. No nation equals the United States in the possession of these elements within its national boundaries.

As an abstract proposition, it is probable that the most advantageous position for the United States to commence a war against any power is for both nations to be completely disarmed at the beginning; for the United States can energize for the creation of war equipment more quickly and more efficiently than any other power. The United States therefore takes less risk in reducing armaments than other nations do. The lower the scale of preparedness in ratio at which a

war begins, the better the chance of the United States to win a war against any nation it is likely in the period of present calculations to have a war with. I do not think the American Government took excessive risks in making the Washington armament treaties.

A memorandum of mine written before the conference is apropos:

By Thomas F. Millard — July, 1921,
Confidential — Washington.

SUBJECT: RELATION OF THE PHILIPPINES TO UNITED STATES POSITION IN THE PACIFIC

STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

(NOTE. This memorandum is based on the proposition that in any war requiring extensive naval and military operations in the Pacific and Asiatic waters, the principal opponent of the United States will be Japan.)

The first consideration regarding the Philippines in respect of American strategy and tactics is the *state of preparedness* in the islands when a war commences. The proposition therefore has two aspects, viz.:

(a) If an adequate naval base exists in the Philippines.

(b) If an adequate base does not exist there.

An adequate base used in this connection is one which is sufficiently protected and garrisoned to assure that it can hold out, against any force capable of being brought against it, until the major fleet of the United States reaches Asiatic waters; which has facilities for the dry-docking and repair of all classes of units in the United States navy; which has reserves of fuel sufficient to supply the major fleet for one year; which in emergency can manufacture munitions and explosives in minor quantities.

(NOTE. *Adequacy* in this instance can be placed at a garrison of 25,000 troops; 50 large and small submarines; 20 large destroyers; 40 aircraft; provisions and supplies for one year under blockade conditions.)

Inadequacy is a condition considerably below what is indicated above.

(NOTE. The present condition of the base in the Philippines is inadequate.)

If there exists when war commences an adequate American naval

base in the Philippines, with the essential communications with America, the strategy of the war from the beginning should be to take the Philippines as the Western front and base operations from there.

If there does not exist, when war commences, an adequate American naval base in the Philippines, the strategy of the war at the beginning should be based on Hawaii and Alaska. From those bases, the operations would be extended westward gradually as the means to do so were developed, until in due course it would become possible to establish the base in the Philippines, and, by the inclusion of China, on the mainland of Asia.

Once bases were established on the mainland of Asia, the problem of driving Japan from the high seas, and cutting off her food and other essential supplies from abroad, would be comparatively simple.

Political Considerations

For strategical purposes, it is necessary only for the United States to hold securely a naval base in the Philippines. That is possible regardless of the attitude taken by the Filipinos in the war. The presumption is that in a war between the United States and Japan, the Filipinos will be loyal to the American Government.

If the Filipinos are loyal to the American Government, they can give considerable assistance against the enemy, particularly in relieving the American Government from the duty of maintaining local order, and in supplies and labor.

If the Filipinos are not loyal to the American Government, it will relieve the United States of all obligation to protect them, or to assist them, or, if they are occupied by Japanese forces, to rescue them.

Assuming that the Filipinos will be loyal in spirit to the American Government, it is held in some quarters that the United States could not abandon them to Japanese occupation, but would be "forced" to defend them. By that hypothesis, it is argued that the Philippines are a liability in the event of war, and the United States would be better without them.

In my opinion, that hypothesis is inconclusive. There always is an obligation of a government to defend to the best of its ability all parts of its territory and all of its citizens everywhere. But instances where a government is able *to do that literally are practically unknown in war.* In all cases, strategical considerations and the existing conditions determine the extent to which that obligation will be met. Instances when it is possible for a government to

provide adequate and complete protection to all its territory and all its nationals never have occurred, and, in human probability, never will occur. Occasional instances have occurred in war, when the territory and nationals of a nation have been comparatively immune from invasion; but only seldom. It happens frequently that a nation which wins a war suffers at times from invasion; or is forced by strategical considerations to surrender parts of its territory to the enemy forces. It may be (it is usually) that the frontiers of a country are unsuitable for a line of defense against enemy armies. In such a case, there is no hesitation in evacuating regions for the purpose of obtaining better defensive positions. At times, enemy forces have been allowed to enter the territory of a nation purposely, in order better to defeat them.

In the case of the Philippines, if on the outbreak of war strategical considerations require that they shall be abandoned temporarily, that will be an unavoidable misfortune of war, to which many peoples have been subjected. If such a course should affect the loyalty of Filipinos, it would be evidence that no genuine loyalty existed. The loyalty of the French inhabitants of border regions was not affected by the necessity the French military command was under, in the early stage of the late war, to evacuate them to German occupation.

Nor does it follow that, unless there *exists at the commencement of war* an *adequate* base in the Philippines, any base there is useless. If a war began in those circumstances, it is probable that such American forces that were in the Philippines soon would be cut off; and perhaps eventually would succumb to enemy attack. That is not to say, correctly, that their presence and the defense which they could make would have no effect on the war. It certainly would have a moral effect; and it would have a strategical effect by compelling the enemy to send forces to subjugate such defenses and garrison that existed. That would detach for a while a considerable enemy force, which otherwise would be free from the beginning to assist in operations elsewhere.

I do not agree with arguments which represent the Philippines wholly as a liability in war. In no circumstances are they a total liability: and properly defended and equipped they will make the Far East position of the United States almost invincible.

It will not, I hope, be deduced from the foregoing that the lessening of the probability of war in the Far East which

seems to have been accomplished at Washington will warrant a neglect of the armaments permitted to the United States under the treaties. The Government steadily should proceed with the completion and consolidation of our strategical bases in areas exclusive of the treaty limitations; and its naval and military organizations should be maintained at the highest efficiency.

§ 9

As the conference progressed, and especially toward its ending, it became apparent that the Japanese delegation increasingly was conscious of the tightening of a ring about its policy on the continent of Asia. It had lost the alliance with Great Britain, and had by way of strategical compensation only a ten-year recess of base development and fortification in certain areas. It perceived that it was going to lose its grip on Shantung. It had a "jingo" popular spirit at home to face on its return.

By the time when in regular order the Manchuria and Siberia questions were to be taken up, the Japanese delegation evidently determined that it would make no more concessions. As it required unanimous consent to secure agreement on any matter, it therefore seemed inexpedient to press the Japanese further. By a sort of common consent, only perfunctory treatment was given to the Manchuria and Siberia issues. That was a disappointment to the Chinese delegation, and also to the unrecognized Russian delegation that was in Washington. But the expert consensus was that it was better politics to ease tension than to aggravate the Japanese by further pressure. In that view the Chinese delegation eventually concurred; and the Russians, having no status in the conference, only could voice their dissatisfaction in the press.

I give a memorandum I wrote at the time:

By Thomas F. Millard
Confidential

Washington,
January 20, 1922.

SUBJECT: TREATMENT OF THE SIBERIAN QUESTION BY THE CONFERENCE; ITS RELATION TO THE UNITED STATES

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In abstract theory, it is desirable that this conference should clarify the situation of Siberia; just as it is desirable that all aggravating international questions be ameliorated. It appears, however, that a genuine clarification of the Siberia situation cannot be obtained by this conference, nor attempted without imperiling accomplishments of the conference in respect of other more pressing questions.

But the American Government should not allow this opportunity to pass without making its position *vis-à-vis* the issue plain. The question in effect involves the aggressive impact of an Asiatic nation upon outlying possessions and populations of a white nation; therefore it contains deep-lying forces which sooner or later will be felt powerfully among the white peoples. As long as there is a possibility of a collision between the United States and Japan in the Far East, care ought to be taken by the American Government to do nothing to alienate the sympathy and the confidence of the Russians. A gesture to that effect at this time is appropriate.

STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The importance for the American Government to obtain help from Siberia in the event of a war between the United States and Japan has been indicated in previous memoranda. Taken strategically, at this time, it is to the advantage of the United States to have friction and antagonism between Japan and Russia, especially in Far Eastern Russia. Also, Japan's policy and methods in Siberia are a great drain on Japan's finances, and in other ways. It works to the advantage of the United States to have this situation continue as long as it will, for several reasons, viz.:

(a) Because it keeps alive antagonism between Japanese and Russians.

(b) Because it is a severe drain on the finances and economics of Japan.

(c) Because it keeps Japan's aggressive tendencies occupied, and lessens the probability of their finding expression elsewhere.

(d) Because of the exposure it gives of Japan's imperialistic

designs, and the effect that it has upon Japan's moral position before the world.

From the above it can be seen that a failure of this conference to effect a satisfactory solution of the situation in Siberia will not be without compensations to the United States.

NOTE. The argumentation of the foregoing is not intended to be construed as recommending that the American Government's policy regarding Siberia at this juncture should be governed by the considerations mentioned. It is meant to indicate that, unfortunately, if efforts to clear up the Siberian question fail here, the failure need not be taken as a weakening of the American diplomatic and strategical position.

The powers which had participated in the "intervention" in Siberia during the war made declarations to the conference of their positions, and let it go at that.[4]

§ 10

The results of a conference should be measured by what it gets done in comparison with what it started out to do. By this test, the Washington conference was an outstanding success; probably more so than any great political conference of modern times.

What the conference started out to get done must be measured by the objects of the American Government; for the American Government was the protagonist of the conference. The United States was the only power really desirous of having such a conference then, and it was in a position to influence the other powers to participate.

The objectives of the American Government gave the conference its character and purpose. Other nations went to Washington with their own objectives and purposes; but those were reflexes and concomitants of the policy of the United States. The American Government from the beginning to the end gave the conference its purpose and direction.

[4] Appendix I.

The contrast of Washington and Paris is significant. At Paris the American commission arrived without specific territorial and strategical objectives and without a plan of action. At Washington the American delegates had perfectly specific objectives and a definite plan to attain them. To that the outcome can be attributed.

VII

DISINTEGRATION

§ 1

IT has been emphasized that the political actions of the Washington conference constituted its more important functions. It is notable also that in the political discussions of the conference matters directly connected with China occupied the entire time, except one session given to Siberia. That is conclusive evidence of where the focus of international political friction in Asia is.

Results of that conference caused the customary psychological reactions. Popularly, especially in America, it was taken as a great success, this opinion being founded chiefly on the idea that a long step had been made in the direction of general international disarmament. Analysis of acts of the conference shows virtually nothing to justify that view; which is not an adverse criticism of the conference, for at no time did it declare that purpose.

What the conference expected to do, and what it actually did in respect of disarmament, was to bring forward and to obtain the assent of the Principal Powers, so called, to a recognition of the principle that the size of armaments should have a definite relation to the police power they are designed to *exercise in peace,* and that peoples ought not to be taxed to support armaments in excess of that requirement; and some reductions of armaments by that hypothesis. That "outside" opinion conceived it differently only showed that outside opinion was running true to form: the "inside" opinion gaged it correctly.

Among diplomats, opinions regarding results of the con-

ference took the usual colorings inspired by nationalistic prejudices. In making a contract involving complications, and with persons that are reputed to be sharp traders, each party affixes signature with mental reservations and a latent suspicion that somehow he has been "done." So with the diplomats at Washington. None had obtained exactly what they had wanted, or what they wanted just in the form they desired. The Japanese especially had a feeling that they had been overreached; it is certain that in many matters they gave more than they had wanted or expected to. The Chinese got more than they had reason to expect, yet assumed an attitude of being disappointed to cover their private satisfaction. Some powers had suffered a little in their pride. But on the whole the conference ended in an amicable atmosphere. It had required unanimous consent to make treaties there, and unanimous consent had been obtained.

The popular habit of taking a promise for a fulfilment never is better illustrated than by treaties. A treaty is only a declaration of intention; it does not become effective until it is translated into action. And in respect to the more important section of the Treaties of Washington—the political issues—the so-called Nine-Power Treaty relating to China remained a dead letter two years after the adjournment of the Washington conference because it had not received the ratification of all the signatory governments. France only had not ratified. The armament and Four-Power Pacific treaties did not secure complete ratification until eighteen months after they were signed.

In so far as reforms can be written into treaties, those made at Washington undid much that had been done in China in the last previous quarter of a century. The more significant matters in the treaty about China were things the Powers *agreed not to do.* No admissions were made of previous delinquencies or faults (governments do not admit, except at the demand of armed victors, that they do wrong); in this case the powers blandly promised not to do it again.

§ 2

I reviewed the resultant situation in a memorandum written soon after the conference had adjourned. My memorandum follows:

Confidential March 12, 1922.
By Thomas F. Millard

SUBJECT: CHINA AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE; AN ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY.

NOTE. In the conclusions and arguments used in this memo. it is assumed that the United States Senate (and the other governments) will ratify the Treaties negotiated by the American delegation in the Conference. Ratification by the Senate is almost certain from the indications, although without doubt there will be much discussion and some opposition. From the standpoint of the interests of China, any and all discussion in the Senate of the Conference treaties is likely to be beneficial by exposing the working of certain diplomacies and by sustaining interest in the Pacific Ocean and Far Eastern questions. While it is to the interest of China to have the treaties ratified by all the Powers, any association with the fight on ratification in the Senate by the Chinese Government should be strictly avoided.

In this memo. the terms and conditions of the treaties will not be quoted or catalogued. It is assumed that readers of the memo. are familiar with the terms of the treaties, and have copies of them for reference.

DIRECT REACTIONS ON CHINA

The international situation of China is profoundly affected by the treaties signed at Washington; affected in ways and means which it perhaps is impossible to enumerate completely, or to foretell the results. The outstanding elements are:

(a) Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

(b) Relegation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement.

(c) Disclaimer by Japan of purpose to insist upon a "special position" in Manchuria or any part of China.

(d) Reiteration under public and solemn circumstances of the

adherence of the Powers to the doctrines of the territorial integrity of China and of the Open Door for foreign commerce in China.

(e) Commitments recognizing and defining the territorial sovereignty of China.

(f) Public and solemn declarations and undertakings by the Powers not to take advantage of China's weakness and of disturbances there to encroach upon the sovereignty of China or to interfere in her internal affairs.

(g) Agreement by the Powers to take measures calculated to effect in time a complete restoration of China's political sovereignty and to remove existing restraints on same: such as extra-territoriality, customs duties, concessions of a certain character, posts and telegraphs, etc.; and restoration to China of "leased regions"; withdrawal of foreign troops.

(h) Shantung. Conditions whereby Japan's clutch on the province will be reduced to a minor element, and in time removed.

(i) Obligation to respect the neutrality of China in wars among other nations.

The New Balance of Power

Logically, and in all probability, the results of the Washington Conference will completely alter the balance of power in the Far East. In this connection, power is used in the sense of actual physical power applicable to and in the Far East, coupled with the concurrent alignments of political and economic interests.

At present, and probably for some years to come, only three nations have important power in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East. They are mentioned in the order of their importance, or power:

1. The United States.
2. Great Britain.
3. Japan.

To those nations should be added Russia, but it can safely be assumed that perhaps for twenty years or longer Russia will play a secondary rôle in the Far East.

The above rating of Powers is based on a striking of the average of the elements which compose power in the modern sense: population and its increase; natural resources and their disposition; financial strength; industrial development; geographical position; character of peoples and political institutions.

In territory, population, and resources, Great Britain is the greatest nation in the world. But nearly 90 per cent. of the population of the British Empire are subject peoples deeply imbued with dis-

content with their status and determined to alter it, even perhaps to assert their complete economic and political independence. It may be that in time British Imperial politics will be skillful enough to compose these dissenting elements and to weld them into a genuine nationality based on the consent of the governed. This, however, is dubious, and may never be accomplished; in any event it cannot be accomplished within the period included in the survey of this memo., which is twenty years. During this time, therefore, the real power of the British Empire is not as expressed by the coloring of a map, or by the populations and resources of regions as indicated on a map. As conditions are now, the real power of Great Britain is represented by her Anglo-Saxon people; for a majority of the other British populations are, or may become, elements of weakness rather than of strength.

The most powerful nation on earth at the present moment is the United States. It has a white population more than double that of Great Britain. This population is placed compactly within the continental territory of the nation. Within this territory also are tremendous developed and undeveloped resources exceeding by far any possessed or under the actual and sure control of any other nation. There is room in continental United States for an enormous growth of population: 300,000,000 people will not overcrowd it. The population, and the financial, industrial and resourceful functions of the nation are constantly expanding. The Americans are a virile, undaunted, inventive, adventurous people. Within the next century it can be expected that the power and influence of the American nation will expand greatly in fact, and also in proportion to that of other nations.

The somewhat precarious situation of Great Britain in the position of having yet to compose and consolidate her peoples and possessions, coupled with the geographical location of Canada, which perhaps is the most valuable British possession, makes good relations with the United States the keystone of British international policy. This is obvious. It received ample demonstration at the Washington Conference. At present, Great Britain is not strong enough to take serious issue with the United States on an important question of policy. A collision with America would expose Great Britain to dissolution; indeed, it would make imperial dissolution almost certain under existing conditions. Therefore, the British Government will exercise great care not to come into conflict or antagonism with any firm policy of the United States. In the international field, no combination can be formed by Great Britain now

that is strong enough to combat successfully the forces which almost automatically would line up with the United States, for various and intricate reasons, in such a conflict.

Japan is given a rating as a first-class power in the Pacific and Far East because of her geographical position and present armaments and state of development, rather than because of inherent and fundamental qualifications. Japan has not the population nor the resources to maintain permanently a position as a first-class power. This is the sinister canker in Japan's foreign policy and provides a clue to its inner motivation.

The general effect of the Washington treaties is greatly to weaken Japan's position. Primarily, it detaches Great Britain from Japan. The full effects of this detachment will not be felt immediately, but will be gradual. In respect of armaments, the status quo remains the same with Japan *vis-à-vis* America, but with this ultimate ratiocination: It is likely that the policy of armament reduction begun at Washington will continue, and eventually there will be further reductions. Each reduction will weaken Japan proportionately because of the enormous superiority of the United States over Japan in ability to produce naval and military armaments in the event of war or apprehension of war. As to fortifications, the status quo is maintained. Some will argue that in this matter America has lost ground: but this seems by no means the case. The value of the existing type of land fortifications in wars of the future is doubtful: it is probable that different and perhaps entirely new devices will control. Supremacy in the next war may lie in the air, under the water; and even more probably in superiority of financial and industrial resources, coupled with inventive ability and mechanical capability. In the event that Japan (a not improbable contingency) tries to evade the conditions of the treaties respecting armaments and fortifications, this quickly will be detected and measures taken accordingly, for such evasion could have only sinister purposes and objects.

As a result of the Washington Conference Great Britain for the first time in more than a century must be content to have a naval power only equal to that of another great nation—the United States. The significance of this should not be lost. It means that the policy of Great Britain does not contemplate the likelihood of any collision with America: in other words, British statesmen have decided to shape British world policy to harmonize with the policy of the United States. The application of this thesis to the situation in the Pacific and in China is obvious. Combined, the British and American navies will control almost any situation. Evidently it is the

purpose of the two governments to keep them combined by harmonizing their world policies.

Reactions on International Policy

A study of the acts of the Washington Conference and of the motivations of governments exhibited there indicates plainly that in the total result it was the policy of the United States in respect to China that controlled. In toto, the essence of all the treaties is a rehabilitation and reaffirmation of the Hay Doctrine. All contrary doctrines and all camouflages of contrary doctrines broke down in the end, and the other Powers felt impelled to accept the American policy whether it in fact accorded with their real desires or not.

In the course of the Conference, the Japanese and British governments made efforts at times to swerve the American Government from its policy, but without success. In the end the British Government felt under decisive compulsion to give up the alliance with Japan, which logically will mean dropping the policy which had become the unwritten essence of that alliance concerning China. The British Government knows that for any extended time it cannot cajole or deceive the American Government in respect of any question. Consequently, it may be taken that in dropping the Japan alliance and in accepting at Washington the reaffirmation of the Hay Doctrine, and accepting also equality with America in naval armaments, the British Government meant hereafter sincerely to align with the United States in supporting the Hay policy in China. Any other course would carry such serious dangers to Great Britain that one hardly can assume that British statesmen are so foolish as to contemplate following it.

Within the next twenty years France will be preoccupied with conditions in Europe; and this is true of Italy also. These nations cannot, nor can any combination which they may be able to organize, seriously obstruct an American-British combination in Asia. In case Japan looks about for an alliance or entente to offset an American-British entente in the Far East, where can she find it? At present, Japan has antagonized her Far Eastern neighbors—China and Russia; and no nation in Europe has the strength to oppose the United States or Great Britain, or those nations combined, in the Far East. Moreover, no nation in Europe now has any genuine interest in supporting Japan in opposition to America or Great Britain, or a combination of the two.

The probability therefore is that the American and British Governments will endeavor to carry out the general policy of which the Washington covenants are the expression, and that however Japan

may dissent from some phases of this policy, she is confronted with the alternatives of assenting and conforming with it, or of going to war singly to overthrow it.

If, contrary to probability, intransigeant motives originating in the politics of Europe should induce any Power in Europe to make a combination with Japan *vis-à-vis* Great Britain and the United States, that combination might detach Great Britain by confining her influence to Europe: but it could not circumscribe the United States, which can act in the Pacific independently of Europe.

Weaknesses of China's Position

It perhaps is not too much to say that if the policy expressed by the Washington covenants comes to naught, *it will be due to faults and weaknesses of China herself.*

In respect of China at this juncture, the motives and disposition of the Powers can be summarized thus:

(a) Japan: Desire to prevent China from becoming a strong nation because that automatically will relegate Japan to a secondary position in Eastern Asia and to a minor position in world politics. The disposition of the Japanese Government therefore will be to aggravate and exaggerate evidences and indications of incapacity of the Chinese to create and conduct a stable government.

(b) Great Britain: Somewhat between two schools of policy regarding the Asiatic world and its relations to the British Empire. Under the thesis as exhibited by the policy in India, a strong and *republican* China would be a danger to British rule everywhere in the Asiatic and African world; and on that thesis British policy would incline (as it has for the last twenty years or so) to align with Japan in repressing certain nationalistic ideals of Chinese, and to keep China subordinated to a group of Powers in which Great Britain exercises a powerful influence. But tendency of the times, and recent developments, intimate strongly that the traditional policy will have to be abandoned in favor of a policy holding out hope for administrative autonomy for India; and in that probable event the British Government will cease to regard a strong and democratic China with uneasiness. It should be recognized, however, that at present the British attitude toward China is deeply tinged with skepticism of the ability of the Chinese to erect and maintain a stable government, or to make any secure progress except under a measure of foreign control and supervision.

(c) United States: Policy based fundamentally on the American conception of fair dealing with all nations, non-interference with their affairs, and no aggressive tendencies toward them; and on the

thesis that the development of democratic institutions in China and among all Asiatic peoples constitutes the true foundation for good relations with them now and hereafter. Attitude will be tolerant of China's mistakes, backwardness, and delinquencies; will hesitate long before consenting to any pressure upon China or coercion of her, and to any form of foreign control in China; will endeavor to assist in the rehabilitation of China by methods which do not infringe, at least not permanently, with the sovereign rights and functions of the Chinese Government. Desiring strongly to see China become a self-sustaining nation, the United States Government and the American people will be inclined to have *faith* that this can be accomplished and to insist on time and occasion for completion of the work.

It should be borne in mind always that although certain Powers were under a degree of constraint to yield at Washington on some points, consent by them to the covenants by no means implies a final and sincere acceptance of the principles of the covenants. It is possible, for instance, that Japan pursued a cautious and conciliatory course at Washington, regarding China, because the Japanese Government believes *that the Chinese themselves can be depended on to wreck all hopes* founded on the American thesis; that Chinese dissension, incompetence, and lack of national cohesiveness without any outside interference will tear China asunder and bring about a condition when even the United States will agree that the administration of government in China cannot be left in the hands of the Chinese.

However, we have as a result of the Washington Conference a situation where it is exceedingly difficult for any Power openly to violate the covenants and their principles, and no concert of Powers to reverse or qualify the covenants is feasible unless Chinese themselves by their failures plainly show the Hay thesis to be untenable in practice.

The problem which confronts the Chinese therefore is to demonstrate, by establishing national unity, by establishing stable government, by putting China's finances on a sound basis, and by other measures, their fitness to govern their own country and to maintain its sovereignty, to be ready for the abolition of extra-territoriality and the other reforms promised by the covenants.

Looking Forward

The course of Chinese who are capable of assisting in the reorganization of their nation (and the Government) should be devoted to two principal objects:

(a) The internal unification and tranquilization of China.

(b) A foreign policy calculated to prevent foreign Powers from interfering with and obstructing that process.

No plan will be set out here for the unification of China, for that is a task for the Chinese themselves, and no foreign-made plan will confer self-government on China. What the Chinese think out for themselves they perhaps will be able to work out themselves. If Chinese cannot think out and work out a plan to save China, then China cannot be saved, for her people will be incapable of sustaining a nation in the modern world. This memo. assumes that the Chinese are capable of thinking and working out a plan to save China, and that they will do this if freed from invidious foreign interference, and allowed sufficient time.

China's foreign policy must be calculated to gain time for the Chinese to reorganize their nation, and during this period to secure for China all the foreign assistance, financial and other, which is compatible with a genuine preservation of China's sovereignty.

To this end, these precepts are presented:

1. Maintain invariably close and sympathetic relations with nations and peoples genuinely sympathetic with China's national aspirations, and with nations and peoples which are afflicted with ills similar to China's and consequently lie under the same apprehensions from predatory Powers.

2. Make close relations with the United States the keystone of China's diplomacy, and subordinate all other diplomatic relationships to that.

These primary precepts of course do not imply that Chinese diplomacy should neglect China's relations with other nations than those in the above category. China should desire and try to have friendly relations with all nations, and to avoid friction as far as may be possible. The precepts are meant in the sense that, in every significant question with any nation or Power, China's attitude should be studied primarily with a view to how China's relations with America would be affected.

Friendly relations with Siberia (and all parts of Russia) should be strictly adhered to as long as conditions in Eastern Asia are as they are now, because in the event that China continues to suffer under the aggressions of Japan the Russians are natural sympathisers and allies of China *vis-à-vis* Japan.

§ 3

When I returned to China in the spring of 1922 the general results at Washington were beginning to penetrate Chi-

nese psychology, and to dispel suspicions caused by inadequate press reports and intransigeant propagandas. Some of the Chinese delegation had got home, and their explanations helped to tranquilize popular opinion. A hopeful patriotic sentiment sprang up among the people.

That hopefulness quickly became felt at Peking, and was manifested by efforts to extricate the government from its growing inertia and to give it vitality. A reorganization of the ministry took place, which for a few months then included in its personnel men of the so-called "progressive" political element, men experienced in the principles of modern government and international relations. Dr. Wang Chung-hui, one of the principal Chinese plenipotentiaries at Washington, became premier, and Dr. Wellington Koo became minister of foreign affairs.

This slight stirring of reform at Peking in some degree was a consequence of the outcome of a military collision between the Peking Government (what stood for it) and the forces of Chang Tsao-lin, dictator of the Manchurian provinces, who sought to extend his control over Peking, but who was defeated by troops commanded by General Wu Pei-fu. That success of the "government's" troops gave an appearance of actuality to its authority in the North; and the tuchuns of contiguous regions, observing what happened to Chang Tsao-lin, became less assertive of local autonomy. General Li Yuan Hung, one of the popular heroes of the revolution, who had been President for a while, emerged from his retirement and assumed the Presidency with an announced policy of unification of the nation.

It quickly developed that while the "progressives" ostentatiously had been thrust to the fore, that was in the nature of a political device of a faction to use their casual popularity to steady the government and to give it "face" with the country, but with no intention to allow them real authority. It was a moment when the finances of the government were at a crisis. The progressive ministry took

office with a flourish of reform trumpets and announced a program of financial retrenchment; but it was not permitted to get ahead with its plans, for it soon was elbowed out of office by the group of militarists who controlled the situation.

A few months in China convinced me regarding the realities of the situation, and caused me to believe that unless some kind of international action to assist in stabilizing it was brought into play a collapse could not be averted. So I returned to America with a purpose to try to stimulate such action. Going over my papers of that period, I chanced on a copy of a letter which I wrote to a member of the ministry at Peking just before I left there, in which I said:

I fear there is a tendency among the general class of officials in Peking, and throughout China, to misunderstand the possible consequences and applications to China of the treaties signed at Washington. A majority of officials, instead of taking those treaties as a great opportunity for them to do something for their country and to get it out of the morass, seem rather to regard the relief which the conference gives of immediate apprehensions of foreign intervention and aggression as leaving them free to loot their country without the fear of foreign complications therefrom. In many ways the reactions of the official class in China to what was done for China at Washington are exactly opposite to what had been hoped and predicted by the friends of China at Washington.

Soon after I reached America I summarized my impression of the situation in China in some memoranda, which follow:

Confidential August 18, 1922.
By Thomas F. Millard

SUBJECT: THE SITUATION OF CHINA; AN OUTLINE AND A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

CHINA'S INTERNAL SITUATION

The writer's opinions here expressed are based upon a recent study of conditions in China following the conference at Washington. Three general conclusions may be stated:

1. Chinese are unable to effect now or soon a reconstruction and stabilization of their nation.
2. Conditions in China tend toward a rapid political disintegration.
3. Foreign aid is required to reconstruct and stabilize China.

The Central Government (Peking) has practically no real authority outside of the district immediately adjacent to the Capital. It preserves a semblance of Government only because of the "recognition" of the Powers. If this was withdrawn the Peking Government probably would disappear within a few weeks or months. At present the Government is unable to collect revenues in any regular, dependable and important amounts, *except through those sources which are under a degree of foreign supervision and control,* like the import duties and the salt gabelle. Other revenues which formerly constituted the greater portion of governmental income now are retained or diverted by Provincial governments, and do not reach Peking. The Peking Government now has no means of compelling the Provincial governments to forward the taxes that are collected locally, or of controlling and checking the expenditures of those revenues. Even the railways are getting out of control of the Peking Government: the northern part of the Peking-Mukden line is an example of a condition that is extending to other lines. The railways are deteriorating rapidly in this process, and as they are the basic security for foreign loans it is a case which, if continued, will invite and provoke foreign action. The Peking Ministry exists in hardly more than name: ministers decline to take the responsibility of office when it is impossible to maintain administrative organization and meet administrative expenses, and the positions go begging.

There is no promising prospect of correcting these conditions by agreement among Chinese political groups, nor are there any outstanding personalities among Chinese politicians and leaders that seem to possess the needed ability. On the one side are the politicians who control the Provinces and who (notwithstanding their patriotic professions for public consumption) are determined to permit nothing which will undermine and destroy their present positions; and on the other hand are the politicians at Peking who hope to restore authority of the Central Government. In these circumstances, there is slight prospect of a genuine unification except by a gradual process extending over years, by which the present position and power of the Tuchuns can be limited, and the authority of the Central Government restored. At present the reactionary elements in Chinese politics control the situation. The younger group, which might possess the ability and knowledge to handle the situa-

tion, now cannot obtain the power. Time is required to effect the change.

There is no short cut to a solution of China's problem.

A Constructive Program

It is not feasible at this time to devise a program that can be depended on with certainty to effect the reconstruction and stabilization of China. It is possible only to outline a course which promises substantial progress in the desired direction, and to check disintegrating elements now at work. The process of reconstruction will be comparatively slow.

Outline of Program

1. Financial liquidation and reorganization.
2. Economic development.
3. Process of gradually weakening the "Tuchun" system and strengthening the Central Government.

A study of the present situation indicates that in the fiscal status of China lies a cause of her international troubles, and the feebleness of the Central Government. Solution of China's fiscal difficulties will open a way for economic development of the nation, and set in motion forces which automatically will undermine and in time destroy improper power of the Provinces; which means those provincial powers which infringe upon and prevent the establishment and continuation of a real nationality by means of a practical and effective Central Government. Moreover, by financial means is the only way that foreign nations can render practical aid in the reconstruction of China that is compatible with the Treaties signed at Washington in 1922.

Financial liquidation and stabilization of China may be accomplished by the following formula: (a) a moratorium for debts owed by China to foreign Governments; (b) release of China's economic resources by abrogation of "concessions" that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Washington Treaties; (c) bring all revenues except such as are required for the proper local administrations under the control and disbursement of the Central Government; (d) a liquidation in equity of other foreign debts of China which were made under dubious legal and ethical circumstances.

That may be accomplished by the following formula:

1. Debts owed by China to foreign governments to be suspended for a stated period of years and China allowed to fund the interest.
2. China's revenues now hypothecated to those debts to be released during the period of suspension under specified conditions.
3. China to be granted a substantial tariff increase gradually dis-

tributed so as to reduce the disturbance of trade conditions and to yield an increase of revenue.[1] As an offset to the resulting charge on foreign imports, China will agree to abolish the likin taxes.

4. China will agree to use revenues and funds obtained by this process for specified purposes.

That formula should have the following results:

1. The release of the customs and salt revenues allocated to the service of foreign debts, and increase of customs duties, will provide funds sufficient for the economical administration of the Government.

2. A portion of the customs and salt revenues can be allotted to provide for interest on a new foreign loan for immediate constructive uses, and for the purpose of clearing up the financial affairs of the Government.

3. Abolition of the likin taxes will remove an obstacle to China's domestic commercial and economic development; and it may have an important political effect by removing a considerable revenue from the control of the Provincial governments and restoring it to the uses and control of the Central Government. It is doubtful if any feasible measure that might be taken now will weaken the Tuchunate as much as this would.

4. Make possible the financing of railway development, with its effects on the economic progress of the nation, and the consolidation of the authority of the Central Government.

5. Make possible currency reform.

6. Stimulate the domestic and foreign commerce of China, with all the progressive forces which accompany this process.

7. In general, work to the advantage of all nations which sincerely desire the reconstruction of the Chinese nation and the commercial Open Door there.

Part of the United States

Analysis of the present state of the world reveals that the foregoing program *cannot be carried out except by the assent and affirmative action of the American Government.*

Reasons for U. S. Action

(a) General interest in world-wide political, financial and economic reconstruction and stabilization.

(b) Special interest in making the Washington Treaties, which embody the American policy *vis-à-vis* China and the Pacific Ocean, actually effective.

[1] Provided for in the Washington treaties.

(c) Prevention of the spread to China of the doctrines and practices known as Bolshevism.

POWER OF THE UNITED STATES

It is not too much to say that the American Government now has the *power* in international affairs, and especially in respect of the Pacific Ocean and Far East, to bring about acceptance by the other Powers of the foregoing formula, and the practical application of it to China.

It is possible for the American Government to secure the application of this formula to China *without costing the American Government or people one dollar,* and also without sacrificing the true equities and interests of *any other nation.*

It should be plain (assuming the Powers intend sincerely to abide by the Treaties signed at Washington in 1922) that *all nations* will benefit commercially by the political stabilization and economic progress of China under the Open Door. Therefore, any formula that will accomplish those results is in the true interest of all nations.

The American Government can secure the application of the foregoing formula merely by a process of bookkeeping: by transferring China's debts to other foreign governments to the United States, and reducing what those governments owe the United States by the amounts. Then whatever accommodation is granted by the United States to those governments by way of extension of credits, or reduction of debts, can be extended to China also.

In principle this process will be the application to the treatment of the debts of Europe to America of the policy of adjusting the settlement as far as possible to accomplish the broad international objects of the United States, and to provide the security of America. *It is practically certain that public opinion in the United States will not consent to an adjustment of the European debts on any other basis.*

Morally, and by all the equities of the situation, China has a clear right to request, even to demand, the same treatment in principle as other nations in international readjustment; and logically the United States is justified in insisting that China be accorded that treatment.

The general trend of international conditions is favorable for the acceptance of the formula including China. Recently high officials of the British Government have suggested the reference of certain fiscal questions to the League of Nations. One conference will follow another on the more acute phases of these issues, and

there is a constant effort by the European Powers to induce the United States to participate in a general conference; and a growing disposition of the American Government (sensing the psychology of the American people on that subject) to be wary of plans proposed by European Powers. Eventually, the American Government *will devise and bring forward its own plan,* and insist that it be accepted by the other Powers as a means to obtain financial and other accommodations from America. Herein lies China's opportunity. Steps should be taken to have "observers" in behalf of China at all important conferences in Europe on economic and financial questions, with a view to laying the ground for the inclusion of China's case in any settlement, and as preliminary to the conference in which the United States will participate, and almost surely dominate.

In all efforts to promote this formula for China, care should be taken *not to give the proposition the appearance of "giving" anything to China,* or of proposing that America undertake the financial salvage of China at cost to the American taxpayer. The American people will give slight attention to propositions that take the color of another "drive" on the American pocketbook. Analysis of this proposed formula shows that it contains nothing of the character of charity, and involves no extra financial outlay or obligation on the part of the United States. *On the contrary, by taking certain of China's debts instead of debts of other nations, there is an improvement of assets,* for China's ability to pay eventually is superior in prospect to some of the debtors to America.

Possible and Probable Opposition

Opposition to the proposed formula can be anticipated from the following:

1. Certain Powers whose positions and interests in China may be (as they now conceive it) weakened by the application of the formula. The sound answer to this class of objections is that a genuine cleaning up of the slate in China, in conjunction with a similar cleaning up in Europe, in the end will better the position and enhance the interests of all, rather than a status quo which continues to apply to China the strangling methods of "economic imperialism." This class of opposition almost certainly will break down under the pressure of the American Government.

2. At first, the formula may encounter the opposition of influential financial groups in America, which, for purely narrow and selfish reasons, are induced to accept various formulas advanced by European Powers and financiers; which formulas, on close examina-

tion, invariably purpose to load almost the total cost of the war on American taxpayers, and for this reason never can be put through. This class of opposition will not be formidable.

3. Certain holders of special "concessions" in China, and of special advantages there which will be disturbed by any process of clearing up and adjustment in equity, will oppose the formula and will raise an outcry of "confiscation" against the proposals. This opposition has an unsound equity and economic position, and can be overcome without great difficulty. It probably will be the more vociferous in the beginning; indeed, it is likely that this class will be the curtain behind which certain diplomatic and political opposition will hide.

The Attitude of Japan

It might be thought that the proposed formula will encounter the strong opposition of the Japanese Government. That, however, is by no means sure. Indeed, there is reason to think that the Japanese Government can be brought to favor and to support the formula.

Japan's position with respect to the whole question of international financial readjustment differs from that of other Powers. Japan is not a debtor to the American Government, and therefore cannot be brought under the same pressure which can be applied to governments in Europe.

But if, by the formula indicated previously, the American Government should take over China's debts due to European governments, and also certain dubious debts of a "private" character, and then should extend liberal terms to China in respect of payment and interest, it would be very difficult for the Japanese Government to maintain an attitude of exacting its pound of flesh from China, or of being a harsh creditor. Moreover, such action by the Japanese Government is not in the true political and economic interest of Japan. In that case, if the American Government invited the Japanese Government (as the two major creditors of China and the nations having the greatest interest in the Pacific) to join with America in a liberal policy toward China, the Japanese Government would be hard put to find excuses for refusing.

Or if Japan refused to join America in such action, it would place Japan before the world, and the Chinese, in a very invidious and uncomfortable position. There are indications in Japan that the Government seriously is considering the advisability of following sincerely a different policy toward China.

Even if Japan should refuse to adopt the formula in conjunction

with America, the operation of the formula independent of Japan will so improve China's finances that it will be feasible to satisfy her debts to Japan by the adoption of certain measures (as for instance, covering them by a loan obtained in America). Japan's loss of prestige from such a process would be so severe that rather than permit it to occur she probably would abate her claims and see the advantage of a liberal policy.

Confidential August 30, 1922.
By Thomas F. Millard

SUBJECT: THE UNITED STATES AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CHINA: A PLAN TO MAKE THE WASHINGTON TREATIES PRACTICALLY EFFECTIVE

NOTE. This memo. assumes that readers are familiar with the historical background of the policy of the American Government toward China and of the reasons and purposes which caused it to call the international conference at Washington, in 1921–22. The conference resulted in giving a new treaty status of the nations chiefly concerned with and interested in the Far East. On the whole, the new treaty status is satisfactory to the American Government, and to China as a definite step toward a promised end. As the protagonist of the Treaties of Washington, the American Government may assume now to have an important interest and responsibility in *making the treaties practically effective.* What follows is an outline of a plan to make the treaties effective and to carry out the broad policy which the treaties are presumed to embody.

The figures given herein relating to fiscal affairs in China are presented only as approximate, for the purpose of showing certain calculated results. The latest China Year Book and other official and semi-official sources are taken as the authority for the figures; but certain facts are lacking which might aid the demonstration. The plan here given presumes that in case it is adopted, its administration will be entrusted to a commission of experts with powers to disclose correctly all the important factors.

THE SITUATION TO BE MET

The present internal condition of China has been presented in a recent memo. by this writer and need not be repeated. But it is necessary to outline briefly certain external elements as expressed

in the positions and attitudes of the Powers which are parties to the Washington Treaties.

In general, it may be said that none of the signatories of the Washington Treaties except the Japanese and American governments so far show from their acts and attitudes *in China* any comprehension of the real essence of the Washington Treaties. The legations and consular representatives of most nations at Peking and throughout China still pursue courses and take positions in respect to current happenings and questions based on pre-Washington presumptions and hypotheses. Evidently the meaning of the Washington Conference and of the Treaties signed there has not yet been communicated to diplomatic representatives of various nations in China, nor to business interests of their nationals there. The inference seems to be that although the Powers may have, for expediency, assented to what is called "the American idea" at Washington, in practice things will continue as formerly. This attitude may not be due to instructions from Governments; it may be merely that what happened at Washington has not yet been analyzed and absorbed by European diplomats in China, and that lacking new instructions they are proceeding as usual. There is little evidence as yet of any *purpose* of Powers to evade and to render ineffective the Washington Treaties: rather does it seem that European Governments are waiting to see what line of action is taken by the American Government. Meanwhile, since their "interests" in China are largely predicated on the pre-Washington treaty status, they are not inclined to initiative in putting the new order into effect.

GREAT BRITAIN

Events in China since the Washington Conference indicate a purpose of the British to cling to whatever advantages they obtained and have had under the old system. A number of instances since the Washington Conference showed this attitude of British diplomats in China. A majority of so-called British "interests" in China have their roots in the "sphere of interest" hypothesis and in the various agreements secured from China in that period; these agreements (of which each of the Powers except the United States had a number, and protected them by mutual private "understandings" among themselves) are the source of various diplomatic and economic pressures and advantages which Great Britain has in China, and make British influence predominant in the Maritime Customs and Salt Administrations, to mention one noteworthy instance. It perhaps will not be possible or feasible for the British Government to relegate or openly obstruct the operation of the Washington

Treaties: but it can be assumed that in giving practical definition to the Treaties the British Government will try to retain certain advantages.

FRANCE

In principle, same comment as above: but French "interests" in China are less and not so well intrenched as the British.

OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS

Same comment as above: with still less of "interests" and influence. The European diplomatic mind and personnel trained in the "old school" finds it very difficult if not impossible to reason in new or different terms, and to adapt its attitude and reasoning to new conditions. At bottom, the average European diplomat (in this sense England is considered a part of Europe) still believes that American statesmanship is incapable of taking advantage of the powers and the opportunity to shape world events and policies that lies with the present situation. For instance, recently (since the Washington Conference) the Minister in Peking of a minor European government, which had just obtained a considerable loan in the United States, privately told a member of the Chinese Cabinet that America never would be able to exert much influence in international finance and politics, and that China should look to Europe for financial support, for Europe would be able to get the money in America.

JAPAN

In contrast to European Governments, the Government of Japan is taking a course in the Far East which indicates that it has reflected seriously of the Washington Conference and that it learned there what is causing Japan to reëstimate the situation and to recalculate her course.

Whatever may be the motives and the ultimate purposes of the Japanese Government, it now somewhat ostentatiously is proceeding as if with the intention of abiding by the Washington Treaties in so far as Japan is committed to them. (It will be recalled that in respect of some matters, Japan made "reservations.") This present attitude might be due to either of two eventual objects: (a) a true appreciation of the altered international balance of power as shown by what happened at Washington and a sincere decision to readjust Japan's policy to this condition, or (b) a purpose to deceive other Powers (especially America and China) until Japan is in a position to evade and upset the Treaties.

The writer's opinion is that the Japanese Government will be influenced and perhaps guided by events. If the United States Government follows up the Washington Conference by action calculated to enforce the Treaties and to make the Hay Doctrine really effective, then Japan will adapt herself to that situation perhaps not quite contentedly, but will yield to the various "pressures of expediency." On the other hand, if the American Government is satisfied to allow the Treaties to be gradually and indirectly evaded and undermined, and the situation to drift without affirmative action to shape it, the influence of the military imperialists at Tokio will revive, and the Japanese Ministry will throw its influence to support the "old diplomacy" of Europe on the plan of all "holding to what they have" and supporting each other against opposition of the outsiders or victims. This would again raise the very situation which caused the American Government to convene the Washington Conference. In short, unless the American Government proceeds affirmatively to make the Washington Treaties effective, events in China and the Far East will tend gradually to revert to the same old conditions, with all the frictions and dangers involved in those conditions.

Problem of the United States Government

An important part of the Washington Treaties is the consent of the signatory Powers to relieve China of the processes usually described as "economic imperialism," and to aid the Chinese people, or at least not to obstruct them, in reconstructing their nation on a firm and stable basis. This also is the essence of the Hay Open Door and is the outcome desired by the American Government. At the Washington Conference, the British and other Governments refused to apply specifically the principles of the Treaties "ex post facto," so as to revoke or revise "concessions" and "interests" previously obtained and then held by foreigners in China. A majority of these "concessions" and "interests" allegedly are of an economic character; but most of them are the means of exerting political influence. The Hay Doctrine, and the purposes of the American Government shown in the Washington Conference, aim at the complete eradication of such "concessions" and "interests" of a nature that conflict with the spirit of the Treaties and with the real political and economic autonomy of China.

At many points, when it is proposed to revise or revoke certain allegedly economic matters in China, the plea is advanced that to do so will infringe on the "rights" of certain concessionaires, and will be inimical to the "interests" of certain foreigners in China. At all

points, the efforts of the American Government to effect a real readjustment encounters an international "bloc" resisting any revision of "concessions" and "interests." Of course, a readjustment of those matters in accordance with the true spirit of the Hay Doctrine and the Washington Treaties will tend to impair the *political influence* of some Powers in China; and this is why the diplomacy of those Powers resist revision. China's debts to those Powers constitute probably the most effective hold upon her, when coupled with her military and economic weakness. *If those debts were removed, a pernicious source of foreign diplomatic interference with and influence in China would terminate;* in fact, the heart would be cut out of the "sphere of influence" and "special interest" positions. With that accomplished, international coöperation in respect of China could proceed without special difficulties, on the Hay policy. Until this is done, all efforts to put the Washington Treaties into effect will encounter an oblique opposition intrenched in alleged "interests" and "positions."

A plan to assist in the reconstruction of China by the American Government taking over the debts of the Chinese Government to European Governments and deducting the amounts from what those Governments owe the United States has been outlined in a previous memo. by this writer. (See other memo.)

PROBABLE RESULTS OF SUCH ACTION

China's foreign debts are divisible into two classes: debts to *governments,* and debts to foreign *investors.*

The debts to Governments are indemnities that were exacted from China following the war with Japan in 1895 and the so-called Boxer uprising in 1900.

Governments to which China owes the remainder of the Boxer indemnities, about $270,000,000, now owe the American Government approximately $12,000,000,000. If the $270,000,000 was deducted from that total, those Governments would still owe the American Government over $11,000,000,000. In other words, deducting China's debt would reduce what those Governments owe the United States only about 2½ per cent—a negligible amount in comparison with the total.

Such a transaction would have the general effect of concentrating the debts of China to foreign governments, *thus lessening the political and economic complications involved in adjusting them.*

China's debts to foreign investors are of the usual character, in the form of bonds, secured in various ways by revenues and liens, chiefly on railways. In this category also may be included various

bills payable, chiefly due for railway and other materials purchased recently. By taking over China's debts to other Governments (by the U. S.), China's debts to foreign investors would not be affected except as the general fiscal situation of China would be altered. The proposed plan contemplates and has the purpose of causing a decided improvement of China's fiscal situation; therefore, it should result in *improving the status* of all outstanding financial obligations of China. Since a large majority of those obligations are held by European investors (presumably, although since the war it is hard to say exactly where they are held), it follows that *Europe will be the principal economic beneficiary* of that readjustment.

The proposed formula (see other memo.) provides that China will agree to abolish likin taxes as an offset to obtaining an increase of customs duties. By raising the import duty from 5 per cent to say 10 per cent, it is estimated that an annual revenue of $70,000,000 will be obtained. (NOTE. The revenue from this source in 1921 was Tls 58,000,000, about $40,000,000, with 5 per cent import duty.) It is estimated that the salt gabelle, which in 1921 yielded about Tls 96,000,000, will yield Tls 100,000,000, or $70,000,000. The wine and tobacco taxes yield $20,000,000. Miscellaneous taxes still controlled by the Central Government yield about $7,000,000.

By this method, an annual revenue of approximately U. S. $167,000,000 would be obtained by the China Central Government without interference and intercception by the Provinces.

The budget for governmental (Central) expenses in 1921 was approximately Mex. $100,000,000, or about U. S. $55,000,000. This can be taken here as the amount needed to operate the Government.

Tentative balance

Revenues		$167,000,000.
Expenses		55,000,000.
	Surplus	$112,000,000.

If the American Government would permit China to fund the interest on the readjusted debt to the United States—$270,000,000—for say ten years, the surplus then could be used for other purposes. It would be ample to take care of interest on the other class of foreign debts (private investors) and also might take care of interest and amortization of a new loan for constructive purposes, such as railway development, etc. With China's fiscal affairs thus placed on a secure and sound basis, a loan probably could be floated abroad.

By this plan the Central Government would be assured of a

dependable revenue sufficient to carry on administrative expenses and provide also for getting out of debt eventually. The Provinces, although deprived of likin taxes now collected and retained, could be allocated the land and local taxes, which should provide enough revenue for legitimate administrative expenses, but not for inflated provincial armies.

POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS

In a previous memo. possible opposition to the plan was indicated. The serious opposition to be anticipated is from certain Powers which may advance reasons against the plan. Whatever reasons in argument against the plan may be advanced by Powers, it is practically certain that the real reasons for opposing it will be *political,* because the plan would weaken the hold and influence of those Powers in China, and proportionately *augment the influence of the United States.* Propagandas will accuse the United States of planning to control China for selfish purposes, and to eliminate other nations.

The answer to that argument is that the American Government intends to and will treat those China debts *exactly as it will treat the debts of Europe to America,* and whatever plan is adopted with a view of assisting international financial and economic stabilization thus will be extended to the Far East to the benefit of all nations. In fact, this plan logically ought to benefit all nations in proportion to their existing economic positions relating to China. At present Great Britain has the leading position in China, with Japan a close second, and America third. Unless America should exact preferential terms from China, using the debt as a lever, the easing of China's financial and commercial position should benefit Japan and Great Britain more than it would benefit America.

Moreover, the American Government definitely is committed not to employ such preferential methods in China, and without doubt it has no purpose of doing so. By taking over those debts of China, the matter would be put in a position where whatever general plan to assist international stabilization is adopted by the American Government can be applied to China without the United States having to consult and argue with a number of governments all jealous of their prestige, political influence, and so-called "interests."

Judging by some of their utterances, bankers composing the China Banking Consortium may oppose this plan. It is difficult to perceive or discover any sound reason for their opposition. If it is based on a fear that business (entirely in prospect) of the Con-

sortium would be hindered, the fear seems without good foundation: for the plan should make it possible for the Consortium to float some substantial China loans, which is practically impossible under present conditions, and unlikely to be possible soon unless something like this plan is adopted.

If the American Government proposes this plan to governments in Europe, and they demur to it, the action nevertheless will bring up the subject, and the American Government can invite those Governments to join it in extending the plan to China jointly.

It is difficult to see how European Governments can refuse so to act toward China, while at the same time asking of America exactly (in principle) what they refuse China. If China's debts to Europe are regarded as dubious assets, those Governments ought to be glad to liquidate them by reducing their debts to America, *unless it is their plan and purpose not to pay their debts to America,* and at the same time *to compel China to pay her debts to them.*

An argument which is almost certain to be raised against the plan is that Chinese cannot be trusted to do their part in making it benefit China and accomplish the desired results. It will be asserted that the indicated betterment of the fiscal position of the Chinese Government merely will present itself to Chinese officials as an opportunity to "squeeze," and that they will divert to their private pockets most of the funds brought into the treasury by the plan. It will be argued that it is impossible to prevent Chinese officials from "squeezing" much of the funds thus obtained except by imposing on the Chinese Government something in the nature of foreign fiscal control; and that since the American Government is committed against the imposition of any such control on China, it cannot make the plan work, or advance it without great embarrassment.

The answer to that argument is that the administrative machinery to make the plan workable already is in existence and operation. The maritime customs and salt administrations, which by the plan are expected to provide nine tenths of the revenues, are now under foreign supervision. Under the plan, the principle of the administrative operation of those revenues need not be altered for the present, except as the American Government might place more Americans in executive positions. The plan therefore would require the imposition of no new or additional checks on China's administrative autonomy; on the contrary, the situation contemplated by the plan probably would please Chinese by relieving them of certain apprehensions, for Chinese do not suspect the United States of any ulterior or invidious purposes toward China, or fear that

America will use any power it has to weaken or destroy China. The international Administration now in existence could be retained, with the exceptions noted; and in the matter of gradually modifying it with a view to the complete restoration of China's autonomy, the American Government would be *free to decide and to act,* since it would take all of the financial risks. It is probable that Chinese would prefer such a situation instead of the one that exists, or to one that would exist under an international moratorium.

It is probable that the American Government, at least until considerable progress toward reconstruction and stability in China had been made, would consider it prudent to stipulate, in extending such accommodations, conditions by which the revenues thus obtained should be used. This would be merely a matter of arrangement *between the American and Chinese Governments,* and would, or need not involve any restrictions on China beyond what now exist; indeed, it is likely that there safely could be some relaxation. In any event, whatever arrangement was adopted would conform strictly to the American hypothesis of policy toward China.

§ 4

I am not an expert on international finances; and the plan outlined in my previous memorandum merely was the common-sense ideas of one acquainted with the political and economic complications of China. The memorandum is given as it first was prepared and without attempting to correct the figures by later information. The compilation of China's national debts published in 1923 by G. Padoux, financial adviser to the Chinese Government, was not then available for consultation. What I was trying to do with that memorandum was to indicate in outline the situation and a possible solution, not to give a mathematical demonstration. Indeed, the fiscal commission appointed in 1923 by the Peking Government announced as its primary object "to investigate and tabulate a statement of the debts of the Government." It is a question which needs elucidation; and an important part of the plan given in my memorandum was for China's finances to be studied by a commission of foreign financial and taxation experts.

Prior to the Washington conference, it was understood among experts on the Far East that the fiscal situation of the Peking Government was difficult, and it was probable that it could not be solved without outside help. An occasion occurred during the conference for me to advance some of my ideas, which I did in a brochure, as follows:

Washington,
December 20, 1921.

CHINA, AMERICA AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL READJUSTMENT

In respect of measures calculated to ameliorate the present situation of China by action of the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments and Pacific Ocean and Far Eastern Questions, two points have been suggested:

(a) An undertaking by the Powers to proceed without delay to readjust all foreign "concessions" in China in accordance with the Principles already agreed to by the Conference, viz.: the Ten Proposals of China, and the Four Proposals of the American Government.

(b) China's foreign financial obligations to be placed in the same category as other international indebtedness in case there hereafter is a readjustment of same, or an international moratorium.

The meaning of these suggestions perhaps requires some elucidation. The essence of them is in case there is an international conference, or commission, convened to examine, ascertain the equities of, and to readjust international credits and obligations with a view of restoring and stabilizing industry and commerce, that China's foreign obligations and commitments of an economic character will be included within the purview of such a conference and of its acts.

It is likely that such a conference will be called eventually; perhaps within a short time after the Armaments and Far East Conference has adjourned. The American Government so far has declined suggestions that the Armaments and Far East Conference would discuss international finances; it has refused to commit itself regarding the debts due to the United States by other Powers until the positions of those Powers regarding armaments and Pacific Ocean and Far Eastern questions are disclosed. But the question of a readjustment or liquidation of international financial obligations remains suspended among the greater issues that demand action.

In respect of this question of international financial liquidation the United States holds the key. There can be no readjustment except with the consent of the American Government, because the American Government is almost the only creditor nation among the Powers. All of the Powers except Japan owe vast amounts to the United States which they cannot pay now, and which it may be that they never will be able to satisfy in terms of finance. But the same general rule applies to international debts which applies to corporation and private debts. If a debtor cannot pay in money, whatever it has in the way of property is liable to seizure in liquidation. If nations cannot pay their debts by financial process, whatever other assets they possess thereupon become liable to seizure in liquidation. The assets of a nation roughly may be classified as revenues, resources and territory.

The practical application of this rule to the case of China is pertinent. In security for foreign debts China has been required to give liens on and supervision of her means of revenue, concessions involving her natural resources and communications, and leases of her territory. The rule has been applied to China without abatement in principle, although sometimes relaxed in practice. *The rule as applied to China is that she must fulfill her foreign obligations or surrender some of her assets to foreign administration or control.*

The Rule and Other Nations

Turn to other nations. If the rule as applied to China should be applied to other nations, then in case Great Britain and France and Italy (to limit the illustration) do not or cannot pay their debts to the United States, the American Government legally and morally is justified in demanding other forms of compensation, such as concessions, or territory.

If a private person *cannot* pay his debts it is termed bankruptcy: if he *will not* pay his debts it is regarded as dishonest.

If a State cannot pay its debts it is insolvent: if a State will not pay its debts it is termed repudiation.

A person who because of misfortune or incompetence or oppression cannot pay his debts is entitled to and usually obtains sympathy and pity. A person who can but will not pay his debts is not entitled to sympathy, and rigorous methods to collect such debts are considered to be justified.

There may be sympathy for a weak nation which cannot pay its debts, but is willing to pay them. But a Power which cannot pay its debts thereby raises presumptions against its pretensions

of being a Power. A Power which *will not* pay its debts should be made to pay them or lose its rating as a Power, and if it has any seizable assets they should be taken in liquidation of the debts.

Many nations are in debt to the United States now; but for purpose of illustration I will confine comparisons to the principal debtor Powers and to those nations which have "interests" or possessions in the Far East and China. The figures used are not presented as accurate, although they approximate the real figures.

Roughly, nations which are participating in the Armaments and Far East Conference owe the United States Government $12,000,000,000 principal and interest. A recent published statement showed that over $1,000,000,000 *arrears of interest* is due, and the debtor nations are falling in arrears of interest at the rate of about $1,700,000 a day. What this means to the United States may be comprehended by saying that if these debts were paid now the American people need pay no national taxes for four or five years; or the United States could build a navy equal to the combined navies of Great Britain and Japan and still have to collect no taxes for three years.

Recently the Chinese Central Government was unable to meet on its maturity a small debt to an American bank; whereupon there was much criticism concerning China's insolvency, and it even was mooted that China's position in the Washington conference would be impaired by the circumstance. Yet Powers sitting in the same conference owe billions to America on which they are not paying interest, and no suggestion was made that this fact should impair their positions in the conference. China is restricted and cramped in her fiscal administration by conditions imposed by those same Powers so that she cannot make her revenues meet her cost of administration, and also pay indemnity exactions to those same Powers. China is hindered by the existence of foreign "concessions" and the limitations imposed on her by the "sphere of influence" Powers from freely developing her own natural resources and building up a material prosperity which would relieve her financial stringency.

Several suggestions have been advanced regarding the liquidation of the debts of the Powers to America. One suggestion has the merit of extreme simplicity; it is for the American Government to cancel the debts—to make the other Powers a present of what they owe us, unconditionally.

Another suggestion is termed "readjustment." This plan is to have all the so-called "Allies" nations mutually wipe off their debts to each other.

Let us examine this readjustment plan. Great Britain owes to the United States about $7,000,000,000 and other nations owe Great Britain a little less than that amount. Therefore this mutual forgiving of debts would leave Great Britain about even on the transaction, and would clear up her books; British finance and trade would revive rapidly. The readjustment plan has a further advantage for Great Britain; she cannot well afford either to become insolvent by failing to pay, or to repudiate by refusing to pay her debts to America. Great Britain has seizable assets which under those circumstances the United States might demand in liquidation—Canada for instance. On the other hand, a good part of what is due to Great Britain from the other "Allies" nations may be classed as dubious and perhaps uncollectable and unrealizable. So by cancelling dubious debts Great Britain would relieve herself of a debt to America which is collectable from her in one form or another.

France, Italy and Belgium each owe more than they have debts due them as offsets. Those nations would gain hugely by the "wipe off" plan.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FINANCE

America does not owe anything to other nations. By the "wipe off" plan America is the only creditor—she pays the whole bill.

It is argued that it is good "business" for America to wipe off these debts, for that will revive foreign trade. If we let the other nations off from paying us that money, they will be able to buy from America great quantities of goods, and industry and commerce will revive quickly. There is something in that argument: but to the writer it is not altogether clear that America surely will profit by the deal. In ordinary trading, if one has goods to sell and gives a prospective customer the money with which to buy one's goods, it amounts to the same thing as giving him the goods; and if after one has given away the money, the customer goes across the street and buys in another store, that, as Abe Potash would say, "is something else again." It might be that a part of or all of the capital thus restored to other nations would be used to build up and extend their economic communications with other countries in competition with American trade. It even might be used to develop the "interests" of those nations in China under their "sphere of influence" system, to the relegation of the Open Door and the handicapping of American opportunity in China.

There is something to be said for the policy of "wipe off" in business; of liquidation, of cleaning things up and taking a fresh

start. It may be a good thing all around to accept a man's plea in bankruptcy and allow him to begin again with a clean slate. But if the creditors learned that the bankrupt was buying expensive motor cars, and keeping a mistress and a yacht, they probably would feel differently toward him. How a bankrupt spends his time and his money have a bearing on his claim for leniency and on his chances to "make good" afterward.

There, however, is a fallacy in discussing this question of international financial readjustment in economic terms exclusively. These debts of the Powers to America were not incurred as economic transactions. *The debts were incurred by the Powers; the loans were made by the United States, for political reasons solely.* Since political considerations provided the reason for creating the debts, it seems to follow logically that political considerations inevitably are involved in their liquidation.

The policy of the American Government and the ideals of the American people are opposed to war and to excessive armaments. It properly is argued that the American people should not consent to be taxed to maintain excessive armaments. Yet it is proposed to present certain Powers with a vast amount of money that is due to America when it is known that a great part of it, or its equivalent, will be spent on armaments. In order to give this immense amount to those nations the American people will have to tax themselves that much more. Is there any difference in morals between Americans taxing themselves for their own armaments and taxing themselves to pay for the armaments of foreign nations?

Furthermore, by the process of taxing Americans to support *foreign* armaments, it is possible that they may be taxing themselves to support armaments which may be used to contradict and defeat the liberal policies of the American Nation, and to strengthen alliances which undermine the security of America. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is a case in point.[2]

It is announced that the British Government intends to spend a large amount on a naval base at Singapore. In conjunction with the Japanese naval bases in the Far East, American naval operations in those oceans thereby will be circumscribed. It is not pretended that Americans have a right to dictate to the British Government how it shall spend its revenues; but Americans have something to say about how *American revenues* will be spent by the British Government in naval combinations which directly affect the most important foreign policy of the American Government.

[2] Written before the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

The fiction, now that the war is over, that the huge "Allies" debts to America should be treated on a purely economic basis and readjusted on that basis, or on a purely sentimental basis, should be given no credence. Those debts usually are termed "inter-Allies" obligations, probably in order to cover them with a veil of sentiment. Yet there is something in the term "inter-Allies obligations" that really is pertinent now. The money was loaned to help nations associated with us in war. All the more reason theoretically why it might remain on the basis of serving the national vantage in any readjustment, and not be used to strengthen combinations or to promote policies inimical to American security, interests and ideals. There is a difference between loans to "Allies," and giving money to nations that are combined with other Powers against America, or to Powers which oppose the major propositions of American foreign policy.

China and Readjustment

China's foreign debt roughly can be placed at $1,500,000,000. Of this about $250,000,000 is for indemnities; mostly due to the Boxer disorders in China (1900). Incidentally, the United States long ago forgave China the part of the Boxer indemnity allotted to America that remained after legitimate American claims were paid. About $250,000,000 is still due to the other Powers—Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Russia—of that Boxer indemnity. China already has paid more than fair compensation (compared with the adjustment regarded as equitable by America) for actual damages done to foreigners' life and property by the Boxer rioters, and still owes nearly as much as she did when the indemnities were first assessed, because of accrued interest. If the other nations would adopt now the policy which America has pursued it would be a great relief to China and would help restore her fiscal solvency and stability.

In any readjustment of "inter-Allies" indebtedness Japan probably will not be included unless Russia and China are brought into the settlement. In this connection it should be remembered that China is an "Ally"; having, chiefly on the urging of the United States, declared war on Germany and Austria in 1917.

"What a magnificent gesture!" remarked a French statesman apropos the suggestion that America shall "wipe off" what is due her from our former associates in war. But the proposal as it is conceived in England and Europe, so far as I have observed, is limited to Europe and England in application: it does not include members of the "Allies" in Asia.

Why that limitation? The "wipe off" round robin does not include China, it seems. Great Britain is to forgive France and Italy and Belgium; France is to forgive Belgium and perhaps Italy (but not Germany); Italy is to forgive (?); and America is to forgive them all.

Except China! Why except China?

It is as important to America to establish and maintain tranquillity in the Far East and in the Pacific Ocean as it is to accomplish those results in Europe. A process which perhaps may stabilize one-half of the world while leaving the other half unstabilized hardly can be regarded as complete. The American nation faces *two* continents across two oceans; and at this moment it is from the Asian continent and across the Pacific Ocean that the more serious portents of danger come. If the American people are to forgive to England and Europe (which means tax themselves) the sum of twelve billions of dollars, why not make the transaction cover our other national exposure by spreading it out a little?

Suppose the American Government should propose to the Powers that they will submit all their monetary claims against China and concessions in China from which the Chinese want to be relieved and which are contradictory to the Open Door to the appraisal of an international commission of experts, and when the total amount thus is fixed, will credit it against the debts of those nations to America. That would reduce the debts of those nations to America, and would make China owe it instead. Then if America should want to readjust the "inter-Allies" obligations on a "wipe off" or any other basis, the process would include China and extend the alleged beneficent influence of the action to the Far East as well as to Europe.

Up to the time that brochure appeared, certain propagandas in connection with the conference were making a great deal of the alleged insolvency of the Chinese Government as evidence of the incapacity of the Chinese for self-government. No more was heard of that argument then. On Capitol Hill Congress intently was watching the proceedings in Memorial Hall. The treaties made there would have to be submitted to Congressional scrutiny in some of their conditions. Although in 1921 the propaganda in favor of having the United States "wipe off" the war debts was losing effectiveness, it still was

running strongly. Whatever is done regarding the war debts requires action of Congress: the carte blanche given to the President as a war measure has been rescinded. In relation to propositions before the conference, it is evident that the matter of so-called interallied indebtedness had many bearings. On every hand were intimations that the common sense of the American people was reasserting itself.

The line of action suggested in my memoranda, by which the American Government might have instigated a financial and political renaissance of China, had not time to be examined thoroughly when the rapid disintegration of administrative organization in China discouraged it. There is reason to think that a plan of its general nature might have been favorably considered had not conditions in China tended to make its fruition so difficult. But the idea is worth thinking about. In the end foreign financial assistance to China, if that ever is extended, will take something of its character.

Meanwhile, unable to get revenues paid by the people, and due it, the Peking Government has taken a leaf out of the financial book of Europe; and from promising but failing to pay, it no longer troubles to make promises, but metaphorically shrugs its shoulders when its debts are mentioned, as the governments of Europe do. If nations which assert their positions as Principal Powers, and which owe much more than China does, take that attitude, why should China worry?

Which indicates that international financial readjustment will include China in the end, whether at this time the powers have admitted that idea or not.

§ 5

To foreign observers in the country, China in the years 1922 and 1923 seemed a nation sliding with alarming speed into the abyss of chaos. The breaking up of the national territory into separate administrative sections, all claiming

independence of the others, and all maintaining that independence in a considerable degree, proceeded apace.

An idea of the situation may be conveyed to Americans by assuming that the States would assert their separate autonomy, give no practical attention to the authority of the Federal Government, quit permitting the Federal Government to collect taxes within state boundaries, quit remitting Federal taxes to the Treasury, each State maintaining its own military forces commanded by officers who did not respect the orders of the War Department at Washington. Add to that a situation where a dozen States simultaneously were at war against a contiguous State about some private quarrel between their governors or military chieftains, and where nearly every State at war would be trying to obtain military assistance by making political combinations with other governors or chieftains, and to obtain foreign loans.

To that confusion, after a time continue the process of disintegration by breaking the country into lesser "independent" administrative units. Divide the states into sections under the authority of "independent" military leaders. Continue the process further. Have a number of important cities assert their "independence," and exist under the rule of military officers who for one reason and another had fallen out with their immediate superiors.

Have at Washington at the same time a Federal Government whose actual authority was confined to the District of Columbia; and whose revenues were obtained from the district, and from maritime customs administered by an international commission, like some which exist now in parts of Europe, and as recently administered by the United States in Haiti and Santo Domingo. Have that government at Washington "recognized" as the government of the whole country by foreign nations, who would continue to maintain their embassies and legations there and keep up the forms of diplomatic intercourse as if they really meant something more

than merely keeping up forms. Have, further, most of the important cities of the country—New York, Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, San Francisco, et al.—designated as "treaty-ports," and parts of their municipal areas set aside for the residence of foreigners and under the municipal administration and police authority of foreigners. Have those treaty-ports, by reason of their foreign administration and inviolable neutral position, almost the only safe places for residence in the whole country, where people are free from rapacities of officials and depredations of bandits; and by consequence of that security have them the haven for politicians and militarists occupied in the interstate broils, where they can invest their wealth acquired as casual rulers, where they can flee when defeated or in danger, where they safely can plot further adventures, where they can buy arms and munitions from international "gun-runners."

Have a Parliament, or Congress, elected by no one and representing no place in particular, deriving its seats from a so-called election which took place a decade ago; a Parliament which twice has been dissolved by the President, which at times has held its sittings in one city, again in another; which sometimes proclaims itself a legal part of the government at Washington, and again proclaims itself a legal part of an "independent" government set up in San Francisco; which at times divides into sections each proclaiming that the other section is illegal; which separates, gathers together, and separates again, its moves usually caused by financial inducements provided first by one, then by another ambitious military official or politician.

Imagine, further, that a million and a half of the soldiers who returned from Europe were dispersed over the country, in the armies of the different governors and generals, or roaming the country in partizan bands difficult to distinguish from bandits, and often soldiers one month and bandits the next month. Imagine the greater part of the

country subject to those conditions; to looting, to kidnapping, to rapine, to financial exactions of military and bandit chieftains, to the economic drain.

That is China to-day, as the foreigner sees it close up.

Why mention one instance more than another? Why single out this or that politician and militarist instead of another? There are degrees of prominence, of leadership, of culpability, of efficiency and inefficiency, of corruption and honorable action; but in the last few years all have become merged into the political mess, which alters its surface appearance so frequently that one scarcely can follow the changes in affiliation and alignment.

Sun Yat Sen will do as well for illustration as another. He is better known outside of China, which is to say that the personal propaganda he has maintained in the Western press for years has advertised him well. All his life Sun has been a political adventurer. It is his profession. Wealthy Chinese who live outside of China have been his principal financial backers; Chinese who originally wanted to overthrow the Manchus and start a liberal government in their native land. After the revolution of 1911, Sun went to China and was able for the first time publicly to participate in affairs there. He has had every chance to play a great part in the reconstruction of the nation; but somehow he has frittered his chances away, more from lack of practical constructive ability, I think, than from faults of moral character. In the last few years Sun has been the occasional head of the so-called Republic of Kwangtung, at Canton: thrice, as I recall, he has been in power there; thrice he has been forced to flee. As I write I do not know whether he is in or out; that has ceased to matter, for none who comprehends China to-day expects any genuine constructive action to spring from Sun, although none would venture to predict into what position the throes of China's political quakes might cast him temporarily. As casual head of the Canton government, Sun usually has required about six months to break it down finan-

cially, by useless military expeditions grandiloquently ordered against Peking, which seldom did more than to ravage neighbor localities, and by extravagance in general. Recently the "Weekly Review," an American newspaper published at Shanghai, gave a prize for the best plan to obtain internal peace in the nation; and a plan submitted by a native of Kwangtung consisted of four words: "Banish Sun Yat Sen."

Sun's experiences at Canton exemplify similar instances elsewhere in China. A locality or city will endure a governor as long as it can; then the wealthier class will raise funds to hire outside military mercenaries to throw out the incumbent dictator; a few months later they will raise another fund and hire a new lot of mercenaries to throw out that crowd. So it goes, an apparently endless chain. The attraction which those so-called "armies" have for some elements of the lower classes of people, and for military bravos, is evident. Those troops are for sale to whichever politician or tuchun offers the highest price; and they will resell their services as often as the chance occurs. The need for funds for military purposes has caused a recrudescence of opium growing in some provinces.

The evolution of that condition is palpable. As the fabric which formerly constituted administrative authority becomes more and more weakened, giving way here and there and everywhere, each lesser politician and military commander sees his own opportunity in the prevailing "independence" fever, and seeks a chance to get free of subordination to his superiors. "Independence" means dictatorship in a locality, small or large as the case may be, with whatever financial returns the wealth of the region make possible; every small "independent" militarist thereby becomes valuable to the greater dictators, who bid for his support. Every militarist who can control a body of soldiers or a naval ship has his value, and his price of adherence to the fortunes of any dictator.

The general state of the nation now is noticeably infecting every relation of the Chinese Government with the world. There is a growing disregard of treaties by both provincial officials and the Peking Government. Under stress of trying to meet plausibly the constant protests of foreign governments resultant from internal disorganization, and to evade the consequences of the breakdown of government, the Wai Chiao Pu resorts to specious pleading and subterfuges. Even the Chinese political intelligensia apparently fail to see that the process of ignoring and evading treaties must affect treaties favoring China as well as those irritating to China.

In such a vicious circle government inevitably is ground into bits. What is happening in China may be likened to a house which is decaying: it will reach a point where it cannot be repaired, but must be demolished and rebuilt.

§ 6

It was not a reason for surprise, perhaps, that immediately after the Washington conference what was done there should not be very well understood in China; although it could be presumed, since China was more affected by the conference than any other country, that close attention would have been given to the matter. But the morass of political confusion which is China to-day is not favorable for reasoned estimation of events; and a dust of conflicting propagandas is thrown about every question of internal and foreign policy. One would have thought, however, that when a year had passed a fairly clear conception of the conference would have prevailed. That was not the case. Two years after Washington, what was done there is less understood in China than at the time when the conference was in session.

It is a commonplace of the press in the Far East, both native and foreign-language, and especially the English-language press, to place the blame for the administrative

collapse in China on the treaties made at Washington; and, by inference, on the American Government, which was the protagonist of the conference and of the policy adopted in the treaties. The truth (except for the possible exception that I mentioned previously, that the lessening of the fear of Chinese officials of foreign intervention removed a restraint on their conduct) is that the Washington treaties have nothing to do with the disintegration in China. This disintegration correctly can be attributed to two main causations: the throes of a nation in the course of a fundamental change of its political structure, and the designs of foreign powers which wanted to keep China weak and inefficient. This latter influence was powerful, and contributed to the situation that exists now.[3] But it may be that without the "shove" given by foreign corruptive intrigue and action, the first causation alone would have driven China into a long and troublous period of reconstruction.

Arguments which blame the Washington treaties for the swift crumbling of administrative order without exception are superficial; so much so that one scarcely can avoid the thought that an underlying hostility to the Hay Doctrine is the motif of them. Of matters dealt with in the treaties, only two so far have had any practical expression; and of those one is a continuation of something started before the Washington conference was thought of—revision of the Chinese maritime customs tariff. The other is the abolition of foreign post-offices in China; and, except for a brief period immediately after the change was made, that has operated with reasonable efficiency. Hindrances to the mails in China which exist now are due to the disordered state of the nation, and would be felt if the foreign post-offices had remained.

The other alteration of conditions in China which resulted

[3] A description of this process is given with circumstantial details in Chapter VIII of the author's book, "Democracy and the Eastern Question" (1919).

from Washington is Japan's recession from Shantung; and most critics of the Washington treaties would not want Japan's former position in Shantung restored.

Of other reforms promised by the treaties—withdrawal of foreign troops, abrogation of extraterritoriality, et al.—nothing has been done. As to extraterritoriality, all that the treaties do is to state the recognition by the powers of the principle that extraterritoriality is not regarded as permanent and is incompatible with complete sovereign integrity of any nation, and to provide for a commission to inquire into conditions and to recommend a procedure by which the status eventually will be given up. Even so, the only new matter is the agreement to appoint a commission of inquiry; and that has not been done because the Peking Government, being aware that the present internal situation could not fail to impress a commission unfavorably, intimated to the powers that it would be better to wait. All of the so-called liberating statutes of the treaties are conditional.

A way of estimating such criticisms of the Washington treaties is to compare the existing situation with what the situation would be had there been no conference and no new treaties. As to internal conditions, there is no reason to think that it would be any different than it is; for, omitting Washington, what would have checked the process of internal administrative disintegration, except, perhaps, foreign intervention? And what would be the character of foreign intervention under pre-Washington conditions? It scarcely is needed to elucidate the answer to that postulate. Under those circumstances, foreign intervention would take a form more likely to add to the confusion than to allay it; it would have carried a serious probability of plunging the Far East into a war.

On the other hand, in case it becomes necessary for the powers to act in China, the "intervention," or "assistance," whatever it may be called, will have a more satisfactory basis than it would have if Washington never had occurred; that

is, unless one accepts the thesis that the preservation of the integrity of China and the Open Door there are undesirable. On that hypothesis, adverse criticisms of the Washington treaties are comprehensible.

And unless it is assumed that the sentiments of Chinese in the matter are negligible, and that their coöperation with any form of "intervention" or "assistance" is not essential to its success, it is probable that Chinese assent to whatever might be done is easier to obtain under the post-Washington than it would be under the pre-Washington situation.

§ 7

Some of my reflections on those phases of the problem appear in memoranda and letters which I wrote after spending some time in China in 1923. They follow in part:

I can summarize the situation in China, as I found it, as follows:

1. The Peking Government is incapable of functioning in any correct sense: and there is little prospect that it can or will be resuscitated by the Chinese themselves within a generation or longer.
2. There is no foundation for a resuscitation of the Peking Government, which requires two principal factors—a patriotic and fairly honest set of political administrators, and genuine popular support. Neither of these factors exist at present. Politics in China now is imbued with corruption, treachery and incompetence. There is no political group which gives promise of ability to change this condition soon. I believe that 95 per cent. of the Chinese people are indifferent as to the existence of the Peking Government, and probably two thirds of the people actually desire to see it die.
3. If the foregoing is true, it follows that the Powers by continuing to "recognize" the Peking Government and by measures to maintain its position and nominal authority are opposing the sentiments of a majority of the Chinese people.
4. Almost any methods calculated to preserve the existing Peking Government, and which are practical and effective, will depend for effectiveness on foreign administration of certain revenues and expenditures; a situation which in time will appear to the

Chinese masses as the maintenance by the foreign Powers of a puppet government at Peking for their (the foreigners) purposes, and to keep China in subordination. Nevertheless, it is probable that a majority of Chinese, especially the business elements, will prefer such a situation to the political chaos and disorder which exist.

5. Such government (authority) as now exists in China resides in local administrations, which in places is fairly effective, and in other places loose and inefficient. Even provincial and local authority is being steadily and rapidly undermined, and lawlessness is growing. I believe that a status of provincial autonomy more nearly conforms to what the Chinese people want now than any other form of government. Appeals to uphold the Peking Government get no response from the people: the Peking Government always has stood to them as an agency of oppression; it never has done anything to help the people, and they expect nothing from it. This is true in measure of any other so-called "national government." To the Chinese masses, and to a majority of business men, too, it is better to have the revenues spent locally than to send a part of them to Peking, there to be squandered or stolen, or paid out to foreigners. The Chinese masses have no belief whatever that revenues which get to Peking ever will be used to benefit them in any way. As to the foreign debts, the people think that much of that money was stolen by officials, or spent on a militarism which has devastated the country. So far as Chinese popular opinion is concerned, a system of provincial autonomy approximates their desires in government; with perhaps a central clearing-house to deal with general matters and foreign relations.
6. None of the existing governments in China which are opposed to Peking (such as the Canton Government) are any better in kind, although on occasion some of them perhaps are a little better in degree, than Peking; nor do any of these governments give promise of developing soon into a real national government.
7. If militarism and the conflicting ambitions of the militarists can be subdued and kept within bounds, China might go on indefinitely on a status of provincial autonomy, held loosely together by a form of confederation. It is possible, in that situation, for there to be a great material progress throughout the country, and a gradual enlightenment and progress in political lines.

8. Any permanent and reliable political regeneration of China must come about through the gradual mental evolution of the Chinese. If they do not want a strong central government now, there is no way to bring them to create one, nor to make them accept one that is not supported by foreign power. When the Chinese people really see the benefits of a strong central government, they will themselves create and support it; and a central government created in that way will stand.
9. It is possible, should the Peking Government collapse entirely and not be replaced by any other national government, for the interests and rights of foreigners in China to be safeguarded and protected. Such protection as foreign interests and foreigners have in China now is not provided by the Peking Government; it is due to the status of extraterritoriality and conditions arising therefrom. The relations of foreigners with China can be conducted as easily (through consuls) with autonomous provinces, or States, as they now are through Peking; indeed, they can be handled better as things are. No cataclysm, therefore, would follow the withdrawal of "recognition" of the Peking Government, even if no other government was recognized; such a status could continue indefinitely without especial difficulty or danger.

Replying to a letter from an American resident of China, who was anxious about the situation and the inactivity of the American Government, I wrote late in 1923:

The American people have for the time pretty definitely decided that this country alone cannot save the world, and should concentrate on keeping its own house in order; and this general psychology controls the policy of the Administration. Just as in Europe our common sense convinces us of the folly of trying by pouring out our wealth to straighten out that mess, so also Americans at home are extremely doubtful of our ability to supply to China the political efficiency required to stabilize that country. We are beginning to see plainly that by recklessly risking our wealth in other countries we do not thereby give that which is essential to political stability in those countries, viz., an ability to govern their own nations properly by the peoples of those countries.

To proceed from the general to the specific, it seems to me that the "Review's" editorial comments, while they read well enough, fail to meet the specific points advanced by Mr. Stevens.[4] I

[4] Formerly representative of the American bankers' group in China.

have seen a great deal in the Far East press about the need for the American Government to "do something," but I have not seen a single specific statement of just what it should do; and I think that such insistence is useless and will have no effect at Washington until a definite plan is proposed which is practicable and which offers at least a fair promise of accomplishing something. To go back a little, the period immediately following the Washington conference presented perhaps the most favorable time to do something that will occur for many years. The psychological effects of the Conference were still active, and for a short time Chinese who had been at Washington and who comprehended the actual situation were in office at Peking. That was the time to go ahead with any scheme for foreign assistance to China. I saw it plainly at the time, and I devised a plan which, if promptly proceeded with, might have turned the trick. The effort failed for various reasons: but the chief reason why it never got really started was *because the Chinese themselves would not and could not be induced to take the initial steps to launch it. . . .*

It seems to me (and I think this will be the viewpoint of most people in America) that Stevens rather stumps you with his questions: "Have you considered to whom money loaned to China could properly be paid?" "What security would you suggest for a loan and how would you protect that security?" "Just what should be done?" "What reason have you to think that a man of the Hoover type would recommend a loan to China?"

To these pertinent questions, the Review replies with generalities. It mentions that various foreign loans have been floated in the United States since the war, especially the portion of the Austrian loan. But if you will examine the conditions of those loans, you will find that in all cases they were made under conditions which give some assurance of their security. The Austrian loan is under the auspices of the League of Nations, and carries certain sanctions as to payment and to the spending of the money in Austria. But the point is this: in each case there was sufficient as to security and sanctions to induce American investors to take up a fair amount of the bonds. *Sentiment* played an important part in this; most of those loans were taken in America by people who for sentimental and perhaps practical reasons wanted to help restore those countries. We have large populations in America who are swayed by such considerations; but there is no important group of investors here who have similar inclinations toward China.

At the time when I first advanced a plan to assist China financially, the American Government had not entirely relinquished its

war finance powers, and it then had done nothing by way of agreeing to a settlement of the foreign war debts; so the way was open to adjust the matter by the inclusion of certain of China's debts. At that moment, also, there was a better chance than now to *obtain the assent of the Chinese people* to the *precautions and sanctions* that are absolutely essential to get financial help from abroad.

You should know that it is foolish to talk of any extensive financial help (by foreigners) to China now except under these conditions:

(a) Strict limitation of how the money will be spent.

(b) Effective supervision of expenditures, and of the administration of the factors which constitute the security and sanctions.

Is it possible to obtain these conditions in China now?

Take the first question of Mr. Stevens that I have quoted: "Have you considered to whom money loaned to China could properly be paid?" There is no government in China to-day which even nominally is representative of more than one fourth of the country. If any one of those "governments" was selected as the one to which the proceeds of a foreign loan would be paid, it is likely that all the other alleged governments, representing three fourths of the country, would raise a clamor of protest and would repudiate all obligations under the loan. And if three fourths of the country repudiated the loan and opposed the functioning in those regions of the administration of the loan, what would be the security? and what would become of the sanctions? The answer is that three fourths of the security and the effect of the sanctions would vanish, *unless the foreign powers provided a military force capable of enforcing the sanctions.* And if that was done, what becomes of the essence of the Washington treaties, and of the traditional American policy? Moreover, how would such action help foreign business in China? What help will it be to foreign business in China possibly to be boycotted in three fourths of the country in order to help a Chinese political faction in the remaining one fourth?

There is not the slightest chance that I can see that the Washington Administration now will seriously consider, either separately or in a consortium of Powers, any interference in the political affairs of China that requires foreign police power to enforce it. Furthermore, it is almost certain to oppose any such action by other Powers.

On the other hand, there is no prospect that I can see that the Chinese will be able to effect a national political unification sufficient to imply a genuine national consent and coöperation with any effective method to administer the security and sanctions for an important foreign loan. And without such *consent and coöper-*

ation there is practically no chance that the American Government will act.

You remember, no doubt, that the chairman of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, at the meeting of the China Banking Consortium held in New York two years ago, remarked that the time had come when it is necessary to consider the feasibility of entering into separate negotiations with the different political sections of China; and how this suggestion then was taken as conducing to the breaking up of China into a number of nations. That would be the result, at least for the time, of such a policy. Has it come to that? and is Sir Charles Addis right?

The crux of the question of course is: What substitute is there for the lack of national political adhesiveness and administrative efficiency in the Chinese?

§ 8

If one should attempt to pick out a real weakness of the work of the Washington conference in its effort to lay the foundations for a renaissance of China, the choice well might fall on its failure to give certain of the self-denying ordinances of the powers a retroactive effect.

It is believed that all the powers, except the United States, were disinclined to permit an open international examination of the agreements, "concessions," and various engagements of the "spheres of influence" period in China; but it was the British delegation that interposed.

At the fifteenth meeting of the conference committee of the whole, on December 12, 1921, Dr. Wang Chung-hui in behalf of the Chinese delegation raised the question of "spheres of interest" and asked that the powers disavow whatever pretensions they had of that character.[5] At the last previous meeting of the committee of the whole Mr. Balfour had said: "So far as Great Britain is concerned, spheres of interest are things of the past. The British Government have not the slightest wish to prolong a situation which, so far as they are concerned, has been abandoned.

[5] Appendix H.

A better way of dealing with the matter is to make clear what already had been implicitly, if not explicitly, indicated, namely, to declare that no one wishes to perpetuate either the system of spheres of interest or the international understandings on which they depend." At a later session Mr. Balfour said further: "The British Empire delegation understood that there was no representative of any Power around the table who thought that the old practice of 'spheres of influence' was either advocated by any Government or would be tolerable to this Conference. So far as the British Government was concerned, they had, in the most formal manner, publicly announced that they regarded this practice as utterly inappropriate to the existing situation."

That is quite satisfactory. There remained no doubt of the intention of the conference to end completely the "spheres of interest" condition in China.

But the Chinese delegation wanted the conference to go further, and to engage to make that disavowal cover all "restrictive stipulations" and "concessions" made prior to the Washington conference, and which legitimately must be construed as founded on a "spheres of interest" hypothesis. There Mr. Balfour suavely interposed; and as it was evident that to push the Chinese request would create a serious *impasse*, it was not pressed. While it was Mr. Balfour who voiced the opposition to making the disavowal retrospective, it was well understood that the principal objector was Japan; for a retrospective application of that principle would include the treaties exacted from China by ultimatum in 1915 and would uncover Japan's position in Manchuria. It may be presumed, also, that British interests in China preferred not to have the principle applied retrospectively to the mass of British economic "concessions" in China. All the powers except the United States were in that position.

Yet it is plain that no single factor stands so squarely across the way of an effective reformation of foreign status in China, and of China's fiscal and economic condition, as

does the mass of loans, "concessions," and "agreements" secured one way and another by the powers and their nationals in the course of the "spheres of influence" period. What legitimate objection can be made to having a reëxamination of those engagements by an impartial international commission? The proper ones could stand the scrutiny; the others ought to be revised, or scrapped. And I will venture the opinion that such action would result in better business for everybody in China.

VIII

RESIDUE

§ 1

THE Washington conference essentially was "practical"; although it is a posture of one type of political thought to refer to it as "altruistic," emphasized by a lift of the eyebrow. Altruism was not absent from Washington, but did not appear there in the aspect of international sentimentalism.

In so far as this may be true of any national policy, the policy of the American Government indicated at Washington is altruistic, in that a widely beneficent purpose and a kindly sentiment for other nations and peoples is within the purview of whatever is proposed. It is not feasible for all nations to pursue an altruistic policy in their foreign relations. In an international sense, altruism implies benevolence; and benevolence is associated with a position of greater prosperity and superior strength, of being in a secure position, of being threatened by no immediate dangers. That is the material side. Above all, an altruistic policy in international relations is possible only if a nation has good will toward all other nations, and in turn has their good will. Altruism among nations is not possible across a gulf of suspicions, mutual hatreds, and revengeful memories. That is the psychological side. Experience has shown, in personal human affairs, that indiscriminate charity is not as beneficial as discriminating charity is. That law applies to altruism in international relations. To become effective in world politics, the altruism of the United States must be discriminating.

At Washington in 1922 the American Government no doubt would have preferred to get a "clean slate" in the Far East, and that would have required adjustment of the Manchuria and Siberia questions. But at a point in the conference the pragmatic view indicated that it was imprudent to subject the various "good wills" of governments in the conference to a further strain. The American delegation firmly had resisted and defeated efforts of certain diplomacies to get the United States "pocketed" in the conference, as it was at Paris: it had perceived the meanings of oblique moves designed to deflect the American Government from its major objects, and had frustrated them without at any time digressing from its position of polite host and friendly mediator. But when the major objects of the American Government in the conference had been acted on, and in many ways reasonably projective of the American policy, it was not considered expedient to continue to press upon minor sore spots.

It was logical, in respect of American objectives in the conference, that the Manchuria and Siberia questions should be desiderata. In a greater degree, that was the position of other powers. So in the end those questions were given that treatment.

When, toward the end of the conference, the Manchuria question was approached, it became evident that it had taken with regard to the American strategical and diplomatic position in the Far East approximately the same relationship that the Siberia question had. In the course of diplomatic manœuvering about the China-Japan questions it was evident that the Japanese delegation was trying to "trade" its claims in Shantung to secure Japan's position in Manchuria. The Japanese delegation resolutely had opposed efforts of the Chinese delegation to bring the so-called Twenty-One Demands agreements before the conference. The Chinese delegation on its side had been equally firm in resisting Japan's efforts to detach Manchuria from inclusion by the Root Four Principles, and would not be trapped into "trad-

ing'' anything of China's rights in Manchuria to obtain something in Shantung. It is necessary always to remember that at Washington it was not possible to apply coercion to any nation, although strong ''moral'' pressure could be applied. In that division between Japan and China, the ''moral'' pressure of the conference, after the initial diplomatic collusion of Great Britain and Japan founded on the alliance was destroyed, was with China. But on the Manchuria question the Japanese delegation refused to yield to ''moral'' pressure, and the conference possessed no power to make it yield. Among diplomats at Washington, then, there was a feeling that it was unwise to try to press Japan further and that in the interest of giving effectiveness to what had been done it was desirable to allow all the delegates to go home with something to show to home nationalistic sentiment.

Furthermore, there was the question of how China as a whole would react to the results of the conference. On that point, an extract from a memorandum of mine is pertinent:

By T. F. M.
Confidential

Washington,
January 22, 1922.

SUBJECT: DESIDERATA OF THE CONFERENCE

. . . . . .

ASPECTS OF THE MANCHURIA QUESTION

The Chinese delegation should be firm in its refusal to make a recognition of its sovereign position in Shantung conditional upon the recognition of any "special position" of Japan in Manchuria, or of any diplomatic concessions to Japan anywhere. The Chinese delegation here has not the right to "trade" any of China's sovereign rights in any part of the territorial domain of the nation, as recognized now by this conference. . . .

POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

An argument advanced during the conference and strongly urged by some diplomacies here is that it is dangerous to remove suddenly what are termed "checks" upon the inefficiency and the alleged official venality of the Chinese. One of those "checks" is alleged to be the fear which now imbues Chinese officials of

"foreign intervention." It is argued that quasi-occupation of parts of China's territory by foreign governments is a useful check on venal officials, operates as a restraint on their exploitation of the people under their rule, and tends to uphold stability and order; and if those checks are withdrawn or modified, the unscrupulous characteristics of Chinese officials will be given full play.

It may be pointed out that certain phases of this kind of foreign pressure in China and of quasi-occupational status of some governments (especially that of Japan) has resulted in an enormous extension of the prevalent venality of Chinese officials, by so-called "loans" made to the Chinese central and local governments, which in many cases are only an indirect method of bribing officials in the interest of a foreign government, or foreign concessionaires.

Considerations previously (in another memo.) advanced indicating the strategical and diplomatic effects on American policy of the Siberia situation also apply to Manchuria; that is, in practice it may not be disadvantageous to the eventual fruition of the American policy in Eastern Asia to have, for a time yet, a condition of pressure of Japanese aggression upon China somewhere. Until the new international alignment of policies indicated by results of this conference has been consolidated (which is likely to take several years), it may be useful to the United States to have the feeling of distrust of Japan, and fear of Japan, continue among Chinese, and for there to be points of serious friction between those nations. As long as the existing condition of Manchuria continues, there will not be a complete rapprochement of Japan and China.

The inclusion of Manchuria within the "territorial integrity" of China accepted by the conference, and within the scope of the "open door" as defined here, perhaps is as far as this conference is called on to touch the Manchuria question, unless the Japanese Government should show a disposition to discuss the matter. The way has been paved for revival of the Manchuria question at any time subsequently.

§ 2

The Manchuria question as it was presented to the conference at Washington is outlined succinctly in a brochure which I published during the conference. The brochure treated the question as it appeared earlier in the conference than is indicated in my memorandum just quoted. It follows, in part:

No attempt to readjust the relations of the Powers to China is complete which does not include a clarification of the situation in Manchuria.

The leases of certain maritime sectors of China's territory to foreign nations—viz., Tsingtau (Germany), Port Arthur (Russia), Weiheiwei and Kowloon (Great Britain), Kuangchouwan (France) —drove the wedge into China's territorial integrity and opened a way to extend foreign authority in China by the process of "economic penetration." Manchuria is the principal example of this insidious process and provides therefore a test case of the system of indirect territorial absorption.

Origins of the Manchuria Question

The Manchuria question in its present form is traceable directly to Imperial Russia's efforts to reach an outlet to the major seas. Blocked from the Mediterranean Sea and from exits through the Baltic, Russian statesmen turned to the Pacific and sought a road to the open sea through Siberia. This led to the conception of the Siberian railway and of Vladivostok as a seaport. The direct route of the railway lay across Manchuria.

Manchuria belonged to China; a condition which required the Russian Government to negotiate a treaty with China for a railway right-of-way there. Such a treaty secretly was negotiated in 1895 and came into effect in the following year. It took the form of an agreement between a Russian corporation, the Russo-Chinese Bank (created for that purpose), and the Chinese Government, whereby the Chinese Eastern Railway was to be built. The capital for the railway was to be provided jointly by the Russo-Chinese Bank and by the Chinese Government. Chinese were to participate with Russians in the construction and operation of the railway. China reserved the right to purchase the railway entirely in thirty-six years. The agreement gave to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company the right to maintain order (police power) along a strip of territory adjacent to the railway line; to construct stations and other buildings required for the operation of the railway. Under the Russian régime the police power in the railway zone was administered by so-called "railway guards," or special troops.

The next step was the lease (1898) to Russia of the Liao-tung, the "nose" of the peninsula of Southern Manchuria extending into the Gulf of Chihli, where Russia built Port Arthur and Dalny. Then followed (1898) an agreement for the extension of the Chinese Eastern Railway from a point in Central Manchuria (Harbin) to Port Arthur and Dalny. Joint intervention of three Powers (Rus-

sia, France and Germany) had compelled Japan, after the China-Japan war, to relinquish her demand for the cession of Liao-tung; consequently the leasing of Liao-tung soon thereafter to Russia was taken (as indeed it was) as an injustice to Japan in one sense. That Japan had cause to be disgruntled in that case has no legal or moral bearing on the Manchuria question as it stands to-day, or on China's sovereign rights in the territory.

In this connection there is no need to confuse the issue by bringing in the Weihaiwei, Kowloon, Tsingtau and Kuangchouwan leases, and their validity, except to point out that they all come within the same general category regarding the question of respect for the fundamental sovereignty of China, and China now is trying to secure the abrogation of all of them. All those leases were a reflex of one another, and were obtained or exacted from China "while the grabbing was good," and at about the same time.

Japan in Manchuria

Japan's present position in Manchuria resulted from the Russo-Japanese war. Follow quotations from the text of the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia:

"Article III. Japan and Russia mutually engage:

"1. To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria except the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of Article I annexed to this Treaty; and

"2. *To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria* now in the occupation or under the control of the Japanese and Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned.

"*The imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.*

"Article IV. Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.

"Article V. The Imperial Russian Government transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, *with the consent of the Government of China*, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and adjacent territory and territorial waters and all rights, privileges and concessions connected with or forming a part of such lease and they also transfer and assign to the Imperial Government

of Japan all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above mentioned lease.

"The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

"The Imperial Government of Japan on their part undertake that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be perfectly respected.

"Article VI. The Imperial Russian Government engage to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Changchun (Kuanchengtzu) and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all coal mines in the said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway.

"The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

"Article VII. Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes *and in no wise for strategical purposes.*

"It is understood that that restriction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula."

Those articles of the Portsmouth Treaty form the technical basis of the position acquired by Japan in Manchuria as a result of the Russo-Japanese war. The "nose" of Liao-tung, with the fortified harbor of Port Arthur and the commercial port of Dalny, included in the lease to Russia, was transferred by Russia to Japan, "with the consent of China." Also with the consent of China (to be obtained afterward), the southern part of the Chinese Eastern Railway, from Changchun to Port Arthur, was transferred by Russia to Japan. The name of this section of line was changed by Japan to the South Manchurian Railway, and now is known by that name. The line crossing Manchuria East and West, and the "stub" from Harbin southward to Changchun, which were retained by Russia under the Treaty of Portsmouth, continued to be called the Chinese Eastern Railway, and their status was unchanged by the war.

In December, 1905, China entered into an agreement with Japan regarding the rights in Manchuria ceded to Japan by Russia. Follow quotations from the text of that agreement:

"Article I. The Imperial Chinese Government consent to all the transfers and assignments made by Russia to Japan by Articles V and VI of the Treaty of Peace.

"Article II. The Imperial Japanese Government engage that in regard to the leased territory as well as in the matter of railway construction and exploitation, they will, so far as circumstances permit, *conform to the original agreements concluded between China and Russia.* In case any question arises in the future on these subjects, the Japanese Government will decide in consultation with the Chinese Government."

In short, with respect to the Liao-tung leased territory and the southern part of the railway line between Harbin and Port Arthur, Japan succeeded to the position of Russia on the same conditions as the original agreement, and China consented to the transfer.

In a supplementary agreement signed at the same time, between the Japanese and Chinese governments, China agreed to open several places in Manchuria to foreign trade; and this article was included:

"Article II. In view of the earnest desire expressed by the Imperial Chinese Government to have the Japanese and Russian troops and railway guards in Manchuria withdrawn as soon as possible, and in order to meet this desire, the Imperial Japanese Government, in the event of Russia agreeing to the withdrawal of her railway guards, or in case other proper measures are agreed to between China and Russia, consent to take similar steps accordingly. When tranquillity shall have been reëstablished in Manchuria and China shall have become herself capable of affording full protection to the lives and property of foreigners, Japan will withdraw her railway guards simultaneously with Russia."

That agreement contained also this article:

"Article VIII.—The Imperial Chinese Government engage that all materials required for the railways in South Manchuria shall be exempt from all duties, taxes, and likin."

The use made by the Japanese of this article will be shown later.

The World War Period

The time between the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty and the beginning of the World War did not alter the situation in Manchuria with respect to treaty status, as between Japan and China. That period, however, was marked by manifestations of an international readjustment concerning Manchuria by most of the major

Powers, which by private agreements with Japan and among themselves virtually gave to Japan a "free hand" in Manchuria. The outstanding evidence of this transposition was afforded by the so-called Knox proposal [1] for the internationalization of railway exploitation in Manchuria; which revealed the existence of a four-power compact between Russia, Great Britain, Japan and France, to support a "sphere of influence" thesis there based on private trades among those Powers.

The general situation in the Far East caused by the outbreak of the World War perhaps is sufficiently understood. Its effect was to place Japan free from any restraint in respect to her policy except such as might be applied by the United States, and no strong action by the American Government was contemplated. The Japanese Government, having taken advantage of the conditions to take possession of Tsingtau and to overrun Shantung Province, then went further, and made a series of moves calculated to impose a Japanese suzerainty upon China and to clinch Japan's position in Manchuria. Those moves were:

(a) The Twenty-One Demands.[2]

(b) The 1915 agreements, obtained from China under ultimatum.

(c) The secret agreements obtained in February and March, 1917, from Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy, by which German leased territory and economic concessions in Shantung were to pass to Japan.

(d) Additional agreements procured by pressure on China, in 1917 and 1918, concerning Japan's position in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. [NOTE. The validity of those agreements is disputed.]

The sweeping character of the original Twenty-One Demands has been shown by the writer in a recent brochure; so this discussion will

[1] A full exposé of this well-meant effort of Secretary of State Knox to clarify the situation in Manchuria, with the texts of the secret diplomatic notes of the Powers in applying pressure on China to defeat it, is given in Chapter I of the writer's book, "Our Eastern Question," published in 1916. Further light on the subject was given by the publication, after the revolution in Russia, of secret treaties and agreements regarding the Far East made by the Russian Imperial Government after the Russo-Japanese war and during the World War. Those documents were printed and their meaning analyzed in the writer's book, "Democracy and the Eastern Question," published in 1919. See also Appendix G.

[2] Appendix E.

be confined to conditions resulting therefrom which apply to Manchuria.

The main features of the 1915 agreements, to which China acceded only after an ultimatum from the Japanese Government, were: The extension of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny for ninety-nine years; right of Japanese in Manchuria to own land there; freedom of residence and travel for Japanese in Manchuria; confirmation by China of all the agreements for railway extensions in Manchuria, and for exploitation of mineral and agricultural resources there, which had been exacted by Japan since the Russo-Japanese war; the extension of the South Manchurian Railway position of Japan for ninety-nine years.

By the original agreement with the Russo-Chinese Bank, the Chinese Government would have the right to purchase the foreign interest in the Manchurian railways in 1938; and the Liao-tung leased territory would revert to China in 1923. Japan, taking advantage of the World War and China's military weakness, seized the occasion to force China to sign agreements extending Japan's position in Manchuria for ninety-nine years, which is equivalent to making it permanent in so far as a treaty ever can do that.

The Russian revolution gave Japan an excuse to increase her military forces in Manchuria, and an official estimate made early in 1921 gave the number of Japanese troops there at 70,000.

The Open Door in Manchuria

Japan's course in Manchuria since the end of the Russo-Japanese war accurately can be described as the using of every conceivable device to shut the Open Door of commercial opportunity there, and to supersede China's administrative autonomy, in violation of the letter and spirit of the Chinese Eastern Railway agreement and the Portsmouth Treaty.

A dozen volumes would be required to enumerate the details of this process in the last fifteen years. The writer in his books, "The New Far East" (1906), "America and the Eastern Question" (1909), "Our Eastern Question" (1916), and "Democracy and the Eastern Question" (1919), elucidated with considerable detail the situation in Manchuria, based on personal observations and on official reports. I quote from "Democracy and the Eastern Question," page 274, Chapter XI:

"Recently a special agent of the United States Department of Commerce made a summary of the disabilities under which Ameri-

can merchants now operate in Manchuria and Shantung, as follows:

"1. Delays at the Japanese banks. Shroffs of American and other foreign firms are made to wait while Japanese are given prompt attention.

"2. Holding of goods at the ports of entry and railway stations on various pretexts, while goods shipped by or consigned to Japanese merchants are moved and handled promptly.

"3. Similar delays at Kobe, Japan, and at all other points of transhipment, where cargo shipped by or consigned to American firms is held up, while cargo shipped by and consigned to Japanese firms is moved promptly.

"4. Special favors accorded by the railways in China under Japanese control to Japanese shippers, including an obscure system of rebates.

"5. Subjection of the Chinese to a 'graft' system, except those who work in with the Japanese.

"6. Encroachments on Chinese business and property, except those who work in with the Japanese.

"7. Evasion of local Chinese taxes by Japanese traders and merchants, while foreign merchants and the Chinese have to pay them.

"8. Manipulation of public utilities controlled by the Japanese, like postal and telegraph communications, to give advantage to Japanese merchants.

"9. Taking advantage of the war censorship and the circumstances which have caused mails from America destined to China and other places in the Orient to be turned over to Japanese postal authorities in Japan to be forwarded to delay the business mail of American firms trading in China and other Oriental countries, to learn the business secrets of those firms, and to use the information thus gained to secure the business for Japanese firms; and similar use of telegraph and other communications controlled by Japan.

"10. Refusing space in Japanese ships to American cargo in order to give advantage to competing Japanese firms, and giving lower rates or rebates to Japanese shippers than are given to American firms.

"11. Counterfeiting of the trade-marks and other distinguishing features of well-known American manufactured articles and the extensive sale in China of inferior Japanese imitations of those articles.

"I quote from the annual report of the American Association of China made on December 29, 1914:

"'Turning now from trade in general to some particular considerations, what is the outlook? American cottons formerly held a premier position in Manchuria. Under Russian occupation, every nation stood on an equal footing in Manchuria. The same duties and charges were assessed against all and facilities for distributing goods and doing business in general were satisfactory. Now it is all changed. Under Japanese administration, no chance to advance Japan's trade is overlooked, and to competitors the means taken appear to be a departure from fair trading. In fact, they constitute a most serious violation of the Open Door principle on which the diplomacy of the United States in China is based. Japanese competition takes the form of a system of rebates not only in railway and steamer freight rates, but in remission to Japanese of duties and charges which are assessed against all other nations. In addition to this, many forms of petty annoyances have been worked out for the non-Japanese trader, and the imitation of established trade-marks is common.'"

With possession of the principal ports of entry to Manchuria—Dalny and at Antung (from Korea)—and control of the railways penetrating Manchuria from those ports, Japan has almost complete economic control of Manchuria. The condition depicted by the quotations from "Democracy and the Eastern Question" now have been supplemented by Japanese military occupation of Vladivostok and other ports of entry to Siberia, so that the commercial "doors" to those regions now are held by Japan exclusively.

"Special Position" and "Vital Interests"

During the World War, by a diplomacy which still is enveloped in obscurity, Japan obtained the secret Shantung agreements, and also induced the American Government to make the so-called Lansing-Ishii agreement, in which the "special interest" of Japan with respect to China was mentioned. . . .

The American Government took occasion at the time the 1915 agreements between Japan and China were signed to declare, in a note to those governments, that the United States will except to any terms of that agreement which may conflict with its treaty rights in China as previously established, and with "the political or territorial integrity of China."

Nevertheless, Japanese diplomacy in the Washington conference reveals plainly a purpose to attempt to establish by the consent of the conference Powers some kind of special position for Japan with respect to Manchuria. This purpose has distinguishable phases, viz.,

(a) An attempt to define China's territorial domain as excluding Manchuria and Mongolia.

(b) To make any concessions of Japan with regard to the evacuation of Shantung conditional (privately, of course) on China making concessions to Japan in Manchuria.

(c) An attempt to induce the Powers and China to recognize that Japan has "vital interests" in Manchuria.

Having apparently failed to "put over" a general recognition of Japan's "special interest" in China, Japan now is advancing a claim that she has "vital interests" in China. Those "vital interests" are predicated, apparently, upon Japan's alleged need to obtain the products of China for industrial purposes. The phrase "vital interests" is far more comprehensive and therefore is more invidious to the sovereignty of China than "special interest" or "special position" are. No nation can have "vital interests" within the territorial entity of another nation without qualifying the sovereignty of that nation. To grant that Japan has "vital interests" in China would be tantamount to conceding to Japan a suzerainty over China.

Prior to convening this conference and for a time thereafter, certain propagandas stressed the proposition that the Great Wall should constitute the northern boundary of the territorial entity of China. This would set Manchuria and Mongolia apart from China, and would pave the way for the ultimate annexation of those regions by Japan in the process of "economic penetration." The invidious nature of this proposition was so apparent, and its contradiction of the previous commitments of other Powers and of China so positive, that it met with little credence.

It probably will be found in the end that Japan's real position, what she really hopes to obtain in the conference, is the confirmation by the Powers and China of the extension of the lease on the Liaotung for ninety-nine years, and of the same extension of Japan's control of the Manchurian railways.

It can be expected that China very strongly will oppose such a settlement. The foreign leaseholds of China's maritime sectors all are parts of a system which has been eating into the vitals of China's national existence. They vary in practical effects in accordance with varying policies and measures of the Powers that hold them; but they are the same in principle, and China now asks to be rid of all of them, and to have her authority and control over her territories fully restored.

Japan failed to obtain at Washington anything which can be distorted into a "recognition" of a "special position" in

Manchuria, or as setting Manchuria apart from the integral territorial integrity of China. On that point Chinese diplomacy was completely successful. Indeed, Japan's chances to obtain such a delimitation from the conference was lost as soon as it was realized that the conjunction of British and Japanese policies in China under the alliance had ended. Freed of that inhibition, British policy became free to follow the line of British interests in China, which is to adhere to the Open Door in Manchuria.

In connection with the Manchuria question, French diplomacy in the conference was indefinite. That probably was due to French "interests" in the Chinese Eastern Railway, and in the whole subject of Russia's financial obligations to foreign bondholders. The French "interests" in the Chinese Eastern Railway rest upon an association of French financiers with the Russo-Asiatic Bank (formerly the Russo-Chinese Bank), which was fiscal agent of the railway. By some process of international financing, there was an investment of French capital in the bank, and French financiers were on its directorate. After the revolution in Russia, the branches of the Russo-Asiatic Bank in the Far East were anomalously situated; for a period it was a question what their national status is, and this is not cleared up yet. In a way the bank continued to function, but gradually its operations were restricted. Eventually the French investors took over the management of the bank, although the legality of that action was disputed by the Soviet Government of Russia, which contended that Russian rights and equity in the railway and the bank are vested in Russia, and are not subject to seizure by outside interests. France has no important commercial interests in Manchuria.

In March, 1923, the Peking Government addressed a note to the Japanese Government to the effect that China denounced the Manchuria agreements made under ultimatum in 1915, and subsequently in continuance of those Twenty-One

Demands agreements. The Japanese Government replied as follows:

(Text as published in press, from information given by the Wai Chiao-pu at Peking. Dated at Tokio, March 12, 1923.)

Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 10th instant in which under instructions from Peking you were good enough to communicate to me the decision of your Government respecting the abrogation of the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of May 25, 1915.

After quoting the statement of your Government published immediately on the conclusion of the said Treaties, the statement of the Chinese Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, and the contentions advanced by the Chinese Delegation at the Washington Conference, your Note concludes that the said Treaties and Notes should now be cancelled in total, except those stipulations and reservations contained therein, which have already been adjusted or which the Japanese Government have already renounced or withdrawn.

The Japanese Government are unable to conceal from themselves the sense of surprise and regret at the communication under acknowledgment. The Treaties concluded and the Notes exchanged were formally signed by the Japanese and Chinese representatives who were properly invested with full powers by their own respective Governments, the Treaties having been moreover duly ratified by the respective heads of the States.

The views of the Japanese Government concerning these Agreements were declared by their delegates at the Washington Conference. The attempt on the part of your Government to abrogate of their own accord the Treaties and Notes which are perfectly valid will not only fail to contribute to the advancement of friendship between our two countries but should be regarded as contrary to the accepted principles of international intercourse. This Government accordingly cannot in any way lend themselves to the line of action now contemplated by your Government.

The Japanese Government have always had near their heart the promotion of cordial relations between our two nations and they trust you will agree that their solicitude in that direction has been abundantly proved in their dealings with the Chinese Government by repeated acts of goodwill.

Furthermore, the Japanese Government have recently concluded the new agreement with China on certain matters stipulated in the said Treaties and Notes and have also declared their decision to waive the rights secured to them under various other clauses in the instruments in question and to withdraw certain reservations made in them.

In this situation, they feel compelled to declare that they find absolutely nothing in the Treaties and Notes which is susceptible of further modification.

It therefore seems to the Japanese Government that there is no occasion for entertaining in any way the proposals of your Government respecting the discussion of the questions incidental to the restoration of Port Arthur and Dairen consequent upon the abrogation of the said Treaties.

I avail myself of this opportunity, etc.

(Signed) UCHIDA.

The following editorial criticism of the "North-China Daily News," principal British press organ in China, is interesting. It is dated March 19, 1923, and is headed "The 1915 Treaty":

Nobody appears to have felt any surprise at the uncompromising rejection by the Japanese Government of the Peking Government's Note of March 10 requesting the abrogation of such portions of the treaty of May 25, 1915, as Japan had not renounced at Washington. We scarcely imagine that even Peking expected any other reply than that it received. However, the original lease of Port Arthur and Dairen should expire this month, if it had not been extended under the 1915 Treaty to ninety-nine years, and no doubt the Peking Government thought the opportunity a good one, although there might be no possible chance of those towns being retroceded, to bring fresh disrepute upon Japan by reviving recollections of a treaty which is certainly open to grave question.

The treaty in question was the subject of statements by the Japanese and Chinese delegates at the Washington Conference which leave no doubt as to the attitude taken by their respective Governments. The most obnoxious clauses of the so-called Twenty-one Demands, including Japan's original reservation of right to reopen the discussion of the famous Group V (to which China absolutely refused to subscribe), were withdrawn. But Baron Shidehara took the stand that the Chinese Government had entered voluntarily into

the rest of the compact and accordingly it was impossible that the Chinese delegates could now seriously contest its validity.

"It is evident," he said, "that no nation can have given ready consent to cessions of its territorial or other rights of importance. If it should once be recognized that rights solemnly granted by treaty may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceedingly dangerous precedent will be established, with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe and everywhere."

The Chinese Delegation promptly retorted: "that a still more dangerous precedent will be established with consequences upon the stability of international relations which cannot be estimated, if, without rebuke or protest from other Powers, one nation can obtain, from a friendly, but in a military sense weaker, neighbour, and under circumstances such as attended the negotiation and signing of the treaties of 1915, valuable concessions which were not in satisfaction of pending controversies and for which no *quid pro quo* was offered. History records scarcely another instance in which demands of such a serious character as those which Japan presented to China in 1915, have, without even pretence of provocation, been suddenly presented by one nation to another nation with which it was at the time in friendly relations."

The discussion was ended with a statement by Mr. Hughes, the United States Secretary of State, expressing satisfaction that Japan had withdrawn her preferential claims, and America's insistence on the principle that treaties with China must allow of equal opportunities for all nationals.

Morally speaking, there is undoubtedly justice in the Chinese contention. Their description of the manner in which the treaty was forced upon China is not exaggerated. In the spring of 1915 the attentions of the Western Powers, not excluding America, were concentrated upon the war in Europe. There appears little doubt that the then Japanese Government believed that Germany was bound to win, and it is extremely probable that it made haste to endeavour to make for itself eternal habitations in China against Germany's reappearance on the Pacific. It took pains to conceal the Twenty-one Demands from the other Powers and if we are not misinformed, when it did communicate them to the British Legation it omitted the crucial Group V. A very different Government and a different spirit reign in Tokio to-day and these facts may be recalled without rancour or offence.

What we would emphasize is that until a different Government and

a different spirit reign in Peking, its requests, however well grounded, are likely to meet with the same fate as the Note of March 10 has met. At the time that that document was being presented the eleventh Ministry in Peking had just resigned and there is certainly no prospect that either itself, apparently back in office, or any of its successors will be more permanent. The atmosphere of international beneficence which enabled the Chinese officials at Washington to obtain so many concessions has been rudely dispelled by their own subsequent misdoings.

The recent communication from Peking to the Powers that China is not ready to receive, this year, the commission of international jurists, which was to investigate her fitness for the abolition of extraterritoriality, is one of the most damning confessions that any Power could make, which cuts away the whole foundation for the policy indicated at Washington. For if a Government cannot even pretend to promise justice in its courts, what can it do? In these circumstances Japan may very well say that whatever moral claims Peking may urge upon her, she has a moral duty towards thousands of people, Chinese as well as foreigners, who have embarked on all sorts of businesses in all good faith that the Treaty of 1915 would continue, and that this duty she cannot ignore while China remains in her present state. In a word, it is impossible to distinguish between the rights of the Chinese people as such and the Government which they permit to misrepresent them in Peking. That is the bitter moral for the people of China of Japan's rejection of the Note of March 10.

So the matter rests, with China in the technical position of declaring that certain alleged treaty rights of Japan are terminated, and Japan in the position of claiming that the denounced treaties are still in effect.

It is a very pretty example of diplomatic fiction, which can be contrasted with the actual conditions. In fact, there is no relinquishment of Japan's hold on Manchuria noticeable, except for intimations here and there of a weakening of Japanese local diplomatic influence with Chinese officials that may be attributed to reactions from the Washington conference. Japanese troops remain in Manchuria. The press of Japan continues to allude to Manchuria in the sense of its being a Japanese dependency. Advertisements of the South Manchurian Railway which appear in magazines in America,

and in other countries, depict the opportunities for commercial and industrial development in Manchuria attractively, much as similar advertisements of American railways describe the development possibilities of regions which they penetrate. A casual and uninformed reader of those advertisements natually would conclude that Manchuria is under Japanese rule. It is probable that those advertisements in the foreign press are designed to make a market for "improvement bonds" of the South Manchurian Railway, for development and extension. But they intimate a purpose of the Japanese Government to retain its hold there. It has been noted, however, that the truculence and assertiveness of Japanese residents in Manchuria, and of Japanese military and consular officials, have abated since the Washington conference.

§ 3

Siberia—that vast possession of Russia comprising two thirds of the total area of Asia—by force of circumstances, like China, also had become involved in the cross-fire of war ambitions of the powers; and its inseparability from any adjustment of international relations in the Far East caused its discussion at Washington.

With the presumed purpose to assist in the evacuation of Czecho-Slovak troops which had drifted eastward from the eastern war front after the Russian debacle, but probably with the actual purpose of preventing an exclusive Japanese occupation, the Allies jointly had intervened in Siberia. That intervention commenced in August, 1918. From that time until late in 1922 eastern Siberia was occupied by foreign troops. At the beginning, the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, and China were the participating governments; but by 1920 all of those nations had withdrawn their troops except Japan. Japanese military occupation of parts of Siberia extended into 1923.

Intervention had been nominally at the instance of the

American Government, which stated in its published declaration of date August 5, 1918, viz.:

> The United States and Japan are the only Powers now able to act in Siberia with sufficient forces to carry out even the modest aims that have been indicated above. The Government of the United States has therefore proposed to Japan that each of these two governments send detachments of several thousand men to Vladivostok. These detachments should act as a sufficient force for the purpose of occupying Vladivostok and defending the Czecho-Slovaks in their Eastern movement. The Japanese Government has consented to this.

In a manner, the American Government took responsibility before the world for the presence of foreign troops in Siberia. That so-called Allied intervention took an uneven course, in which the one definite fact that stood out distinctly was that the Allies disagreed in regard to their purposes and their methods. The original agreement was to limit the number of troops sent by each power; but Japan immediately disregarded the limitation and sent a large number of soldiers into the country. When the armistice was signed, all of the Western powers except the United States withdrew from Siberia and washed their hands of the mess; but the American Government either felt that it could not drop the situation as it stood, or that it had a fundamental interest to safeguard, and so for a time it remained as a counterbalance to the Japanese. China's participation in the intervention was technical and was limited to her own territory—Manchuria and Mongolia.

The course of Japan's four-year occupation of eastern Siberia can be summarized:[3] agents of the Japanese Government intrigued with different factions of the Russians, backing some of the groups and leaders financially and in a military way; turbulences were instigated to provide excuse for further military interference; Japanese military and

[3] Details of the early period of the Allied intervention in Siberia are given in the author's book, "Democracy and the Eastern Question," published 1919.

diplomatic officers sought to obtain exclusive control of the Chinese Eastern and Pri-Amur railways, and obstructed and interfered with the technical railway commission appointed by the Allies to supervise the railways. Frequent armed clashes between Japanese and Russians occurred, and at times between Japanese and Chinese. Japanese sought to obtain possession and ownership of vested interests and of monopolistic exploitation in the country. In short, the policy of Japan in eastern Siberia was one of exclusive and intensive political and economic penetration. Before the Washington conference met, the so-called Allied and Associated Powers had detached themselves from responsibility for Japan's continued occupation of Siberia, and for her acts there; but they could not so easily detach themselves from their co-responsibility for Japan's entering Siberia in the first place. For that reason, and for other reasons, no doubt, the question of Siberia was placed on the agenda at Washington.[4]

In opening discussion of the question in the conference, Secretary Hughes said: "It was stated that the American Government proposed to ask all associated in this course of action [he was referring to the original intervention] to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the Governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in Northern Russia contemplated any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or thereafter, but that each of the associated Powers had the single object of affording such aid as would be acceptable to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny."

To the conference the Japanese delegation declared: "The Japanese Government remain unshaken in their constant desire to promote relations of enduring friendship with Russia and the Russian people, and reaffirm their avowed policy of

[4] Appendix I.

respecting the territorial integrity of Russia and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that, upon the realization of the projects above indicated, they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases whether political or military."

At the time the Japanese delegation made the above statement to the conference at Washington, the Japanese Government was in complete military occupation of Vladivostok and other centers in eastern Siberia, and had subordinated the local Russian administrations to the authority of Japanese military officers.

It is obvious, then, that the Siberia question touched Japan on a tender spot, and the Japanese delegation would have preferred to avoid it altogether. But that was not to be, although the conference showed marked leniency to Japan in the manner of treating the matter. In his statement to the conference, Secretary Hughes said: "In view of the conviction that the course followed by the Government of Japan brings into question the very definite understanding concluded at the time troops were sent to Siberia, the Government of the United States must in candor explain its position and say to the Japanese Government that the Government of the United States can neither now nor hereafter recognize as valid any claims or titles arising out of the present occupation and control, and that it cannot acquiesce in any action taken by the Government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights or the political or territorial integrity of Russia."

From that statement of Mr. Hughes, it is evident that the course of Japanese intervention in Siberia was considered by other governments to be outside the original purposes of the joint intervention, and to include acts which in fact do "impair existing treaty rights or the political or territorial integrity of Russia." Secretary Hughes observed to the

conference that he hoped that the Japanese Government in the near future would find it possible to terminate the occupation of Siberia finally.

It was evident that there was no intention of the conference to push the Siberia question further than again to put the Japanese Government on record. References in Mr. Hughes' statements in conference are perfectly understood to apply to "concessions" of an exclusive and monopolistic character which were known to have been secured by Japanese, with the backing of their Government, in Siberia in the course of backing and filling among the various Russian military adventurers and casual "governments" which from time to time in the years following the revolution sprang up in the Far East.

In the face of persistent opposition of the Japanese delegation to prevent interference with Japan's position, the conference finally adopted the following resolution and reservation concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway:

Resolved, that the preservation of the Chinese Eastern Railway for those in interest requires that better protection be given to the railway and the persons engaged in its operation and use, a more careful selection of the personnel to secure efficiency of service, and a more economical use of funds to prevent waste of the property.

That the subject should immediately be dealt with through the proper diplomatic channels.

Reservation. The Powers other than China in agreeing to the resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, reserve the right to insist hereafter upon the responsibility of China for the performance or non-performance of the obligations towards the foreign bondholders, stockholders, and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway Co. which the Powers deem to result from the contracts under which the railroad was built and the action of China thereunder and the obligations which they deem to be in the nature of a trust resulting from the exercise of power by the Chinese Government over the possession and administration of the railroad.

While in all action by the conference the presumption that the Peking Government exercised sovereign authority in

Manchuria was maintained, it is well known that the Peking Government exercises a very limited authority in Manchuria, and over the Chinese Eastern Railway. For several years the Manchurian provinces actually have been under the authority of Chang Tso-lin; and after the defeat of Chang Tso-lin's effort to take Peking in the spring of 1922, the Manchurian tuchun retreated north of the Great Wall, took possession of that part of the Peking-Mukden Railway lying north of the wall, and of much of its rolling-stock, and still retains it, permitting through trains to operate under some kind of private understanding between Chang Tso-lin and Tsao Kun, who, prior to his election to the Peking Presidency in the autumn of 1923, was tuchun of Chihli province. In the time the Chinese have had practical management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, its operation has been unsatisfactory, and the property more and more passes under the system which makes public utilities in China the playthings of the official class.

Since the organization at Chita in January, 1920, of a "Far Eastern Republic," comprising all sections of Russian Eastern Asia, that region gradually has become tranquilized, except in the extreme eastern part, where Japanese influence is prevalent. Japan withdrew her troops from Vladivostok late in 1922, but remained in occupation of northern Saghalin. In the years 1921, 1922, and 1923, negotiations were conducted between the Japanese Government and the Far Eastern Republic to clear up the outstanding desiderata of the Japanese military occupation.

IX

JAPAN: REFORM OR DISSIMULATION?

§ 1

WHATEVER conception may be taken of Japan and her eventual position in the world, one thing is certain: in the course of modernization and rise to a place among the Principal Powers she has not done anything original or displayed any characteristics of originality. It can be said that Japan's political development and expression in this period merely is the conventional governmentation and diplomacy of Europe dressed in a kimono.

If the civilization of the West is to be taken as the standard, what is termed Japan's "progress" began when she sent forth some of her young men to study the West, and on their return, commenced to adapt her internal organization to what those young men had observed and learned. By her own reasoning, Japan concluded that she was inferior to the West, if not in forms of culture and philosophy, anyhow in elements that create power in the modern world. Having nothing within her own civilization to substitute for, or to supersede, those Western elements of power, Japan decided to copy them. Her success in doing that is remarkable, and usually it is considered to be creditable. So it is, if getting into step with the currently dominating factors of "progress" is creditable; and this is the accepted hypothesis of the time we live in.

Current history proves that the Japan of superdreadnaughts, well-trained armies, Germanized efficiency, and up-to-date diplomacy takes rank as a Principal Power in the

world; just as we know (if we think about it) that the Japan of picturesque junks, ancient armor, slender swords, and Oriental calm did not and could not exert influence in world politics. Japan still possesses remnants and survivals of her ancient culture and her old philosophy, but they contribute nothing tangible to her influence in international affairs. In a word, what gives her a place among the Principal Powers is her armaments.

Japanese have no illusions on this point. In 1915 Marquis Okuma, then premier of Japan, wrote: "Diplomacy, to be really effective, must be backed up by sufficient national strength. It is only ten or fifteen years since Japanese diplomacy began to carry any weight with foreign countries, and it began from the time that Western Powers commenced to recognize Japan's military strength." The Japanese would have been stupid indeed had not their study of Western politics revealed to them this axiom of Western diplomacy.

Japan's modern "progress" is divisible into two periods: preparation and fulfilment. The preparatory period was the time required to reorganize the nation after the Western model. While that was being done, the Japanese "progressives" continued their study of the West. They saw the Western nations in control of the entire earth except a portion of Eastern Asia. They saw the predatory imperialism of Europe steadily extending its course eastward, absorbing Asiatic nations in its progress. It was beginning to sap the foundations of China's independence. The Japanese saw that unless that progress was checked it would reach Japan; and her statesmen determined to prevent that if it was possible. With that in mind, they studied Western imperialism to discover how it was done. It was not difficult to get the hang of it.

The formula is something like the following: First, a nation must become strong in military and naval forces. That done, it can look around for some territory it would like to have. If it finds any not occupied by pow-

ers which got into the game earlier, and with native governments too weak to make effective resistance, the acquisition is simple; it only is necessary to make a pretext to "intervene" in the country, then absorb its administration gradually. If it finds another power also wanting that territory and perhaps able to interpose effective opposition, the process is to make a private combination with that or a third power, based on some community of interest or ambition or apprehension elsewhere, and to use that combination in the international balance of power to prevent interference. Imperial expansion is largely a process of international trading, in which the native populations of acquired territories are not consulted. In this system, the accepted "trading-stamps" are armaments. Unless a nation has armaments, it has nothing to trade with in terms of actual power.

When the Japanese had mastered the principles and methods of this system, and had developed an army and navy, they set out to show to the world that they possessed some power. Came the war with China in 1894; but Japan had been premature, and a combination of powers intervened to limit the fruits of her victory. Japanese statesmen bided their time and took that lesson to heart; it demonstrated to them the principle of combination in world politics. They looked about for an alliance. It has been revealed that in seeking to gain strength by a combination with some power, two nations were considered seriously, Great Britain and Germany. Diplomatic expediences of the moment turned the scale, and an alliance was made with Great Britain in 1902.

The alliance with Great Britain marked the entrance of Japan into world politics. Her diplomacy now, for the first time, was backed by an understanding with a great power. In his "Secret Memoirs," Count Hayashi, who negotiated the alliance in its first form, wrote: "The Anglo-Japanese alliance is the established policy of Japan. It is the basis of the country's foreign policy." A later Japanese minister

of foreign affairs, Baron Kato, said in 1911: "The Anglo-Japanese alliance is respected in Japan as long as it can be used as a stepping-stone. . . . It will remain in the future, as in the past, the shaft on which the wheels of Japanese diplomacy revolve." Having obtained that alliance, the next step came soon after: the Russo-Japanese War. From that point Japan's course was fairly smooth. The alliance carried on, and served Japan's purposes conveniently until it died at Washington.

Japan had got extraordinary value out of the alliance while it lasted. It was at her elbow in every important move in the field of world politics. It sat with her among the international bankers when she came to the West to finance her war against Russia in 1904. It helped her to consolidate her gains in that war, to finance her exploitation of Korea and to fortify her position in Manchuria. It gave her credit abroad, enabling her quickly to build a powerful navy and to maintain a strong army. It sat with her in the diplomatic councils at Paris and Geneva. Next to her army and navy, it was Japan's principal diplomatic "trading-stamp." She used the alliance cleverly, and at times unscrupulously, straining it almost to the limit. But it held until it broke under an opposition too powerful to withstand. In debate in the United States Senate on the treaties made at Washington in 1922, Senator Lodge said: "The chief and most important part of the [Four-Power] treaty is the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. That was the main object of the treaty. . . . It is sufficient to say that in my judgment the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the most dangerous element in our relations with the Far East and with the Pacific. . . . It immobilized England and prevented the exercise of her influence in the East for the cause of peace."

Although the British alliance was the keystone of Japan's diplomatic arch, she had studied European diplomacy too closely to allow it to confine her. She fortified herself here and there, as occasion arose, by cross-agreements with other

powers. Here she would make a deal with France; there she would make a deal with Germany. During the World War she made a secret treaty with Imperial Russia,[1] palpably directed against the United States, and in essence running contrary to an unwritten meaning of the alliance with Great Britain. That soon was found out, and the collapse of Imperial Russia made it of no use; but the disclosure did not injure Japan's diplomatic standing. The fine art of "double-cross" is an established convention of old-school statesmanship. The Japanese have learned the game thoroughly. By the accepted tenets, Japan is a Principal Power, and is accorded the position of one. In diplomacy, governments are judged by their weight in balances of power, not by ethical standards.

§ 2

During the last twenty years the Japanese Government has had a double-headed thesis relating to world policy. One head was to use the standards and methods of European statesmanship to check European imperialism in Asia. The other head was to obtain for herself the hegemony of Asia, and perhaps then, by uniting the Asiatics, to throw off the domination of the white nations, to create an equal political balance as between the white and colored peoples, even to swing ascendancy to the latter. This is the concept which Japan disseminated through her Pan-Asian doctrine.

It is evident that Pan-Asianism, as conceived by Japanese intellectuals, ultimately is destructive of measures and policies founded on combinations and alliances with white nations; for in the end, if successful, militant Pan-Asianism would overthrow in Asia the positions of those white nations which, by lending to Japan of their diplomatic strength, in effect are building a power destined to react against them. This possibility has not escaped the notice of European statesmen;

[1] Appendix G.

but they, if they take Pan-Asianism seriously, have regarded its possible dangers as a long time away, and meanwhile Japan on occasions serves transitory expediences of Western international politics. In their subconscious ruminations statesmen in Europe comprehended the ultimate effects of using colored troops against each other in the World War; but everything was sacrificed to urgency of the moment.

Japan's double-headed foreign policy involves the Government in perplexing situations. At times the two heads of her policy bump each other. For example, the stage of her policy which required the use of combinations with Western powers to become strong enough to turn back European imperialism in Asia at the same time led the Japanese Government into establishing its own continental position by aggressions on Korea and China; in other words, to check predatory Europe in Asia, Japan found it necessary to follow their predatory methods in establishing her own hegemony. That caused complications to her Pan-Asian doctrine and reacted against it. It was unfortunate, but it did not daunt Japanese diplomats, for they calculated that once Japan's continental hegemony is established firmly, it then will be feasible to effect a Pan-Asian conciliation.

But that was not the principal dilemma of Japanese statesmen. In reorganizing the Government of Japan, the old monarchical system had been followed, and the New Japan had been built around a pillar of theocracy. One comprehends, then, the inner misgivings with which the Japanese oligarchy witnessed the collapse of monarchy in China, and the spread of democratic ideas over Asia. It requires no prophet to foretell that if a republican form of government becomes established in China and in the Philippines, it cannot be confined to those countries, and in the end will break down theocracy in Japan. Everywhere among the Asiatic peoples Japan's Pan-Asian propaganda encounters the democratic current, and it creates a quandary.

One often is amazed at the apparent ease with which two

opposite and antagonistic policies for a while can move along together in international relations. Yet one need not be astonished, when one remembers that international alignments almost invariably are based on immediate apprehensions and fears of nations; they cast about anywhere for support in emergency; and the ephemeral character of such alignments is notorious. The ultimate antagonism of Japan's Pan-Asian doctrine to British rule in India is obvious; that also is perfectly understood by British statesmen, who on occasion have taken measures to suppress the propaganda in India. But as long as their mutual support in a balance of power helped to sustain the situation of the moment, the British and Japanese governments continued their alliance, and made the necessary vicarious sacrifices of their interests here and there to maintain it. That is the nature of political trading, whether it is swapping votes in a convention, or swapping military and naval support in international balances of power. If Japan's Pan-Asia hegemony should attain a point where it needed to oppose a continuance of British rule in India, her international combinations would be adjusted accordingly; and vice versa. Diplomacy recognizes, creates, and uses sentiment; but it does not permit sentiment to actuate its policies.

It is interesting to observe that the exigencies of Japan's course in opposing Europe's predatory imperialism in Asia with a predatory imperialism of her own brought her into opposition to the only great power whose policy is opposed to the extension of imperialism in Asia, the United States. On the long view, the American policy coincided with one objective of Japanese policy; but the American policy would object as much to a Japanese imperialism in Asia as it would to a European imperialism, which interferes with the attainment of Japan's hegemony there. Alliances between nations never are based on the long view, always on the short view. This is a point worth keeping in mind. The ententes between nations which spring from fundamental coincidence

of interest and ideals do not need alliances to support them.

From the foregoing it appears that since Japan entered the field of world politics her policy has not followed a plain road, but is obscured by diverging and contradictory theses.

§ 3

A great light broke upon Japanese statesmen at Washington. One cannot doubt this. The evidence is conclusive. Before their faces, the Japanese delegates saw the diplomatic axis of their Government's foreign policy destroyed; and they were unable to prevent it. The loss of the alliance with Britain compelled Japan to begin to construct a new foreign policy.

That is something which cannot be done overnight. For more than twenty years the alliance with Britain had been, as Baron Kato remarked, "the shaft on which the wheels of Japanese diplomacy revolve"; and in the period when the alliance had provided that shaft, the international balance of power had been subjected to the most complete revolution in modern times. All the pre-World War diplomatic trading bases had been altered. For the time, Germany and Russia were out of it; their principal "trading-stamps" (armies and navies) were spent. In their places among the Principal Powers appeared the United States, which prior to the war had been rated as outside the international balance of power except relating to the Western hemisphere. Furthermore, the United States by its geographical position and declared policy is eminently a Pacific Ocean power, and logically therefore a Far Eastern power. Also, Washington had made it evident that the only nation of Europe which held its influence in Asia through and after the World War—Great Britain—would not be detached from the United States in respect of Pacific and Far East questions.

At Washington, and after, all that diplomatic politeness and casuistry could do was done to ease the shock that had

been given to the Japanese and to camouflage it before the public. One cannot say to what extent "outside" opinion was bamboozled, but it is certain that the Japanese Government comprehended exactly what had occurred. A diplomat at Washington remarked apropos of the positions of the participating governments at the end of the conference: "The Japanese will take home a bad headache." It amounted to that. Beyond the talk, to impress "outside" opinion, about Japan's getting what she wanted in retaining her battleship *Mitsu,* and about getting the American Government to stop fortification in the Far East, and about Japan's keeping the island of Yap under mandate, and queer interpretations read into the Four-Power Pacific agreement, and a number of little issues of slight ultimate import, the fact remained that the main prop of Japan's foreign policy for the previous twenty years was gone. What is to replace it?

Japanese naval strategists and Japanese diplomats, one can be quite sure, in their hearts did not feel satisfied even with the so-called "concessions" made to them at Washington concerning fortifications and bases in the Western Pacific. They pondered the fact that, although the American Government had consented for ten years not to add to its fortified positions in the Western Pacific, it had not objected to the exclusion of Singapore from the limitation by an obscure phrase written into the treaty. On reflection, this circumstance indicates plainly to "inside" opinion that the American Government does not expect a serious divergence of British and American policy and interests in the Orient within the period of the treaty, or soon thereafter. It was no secret at Washington during the conference that acceptance by the United States of the 5-5-3 naval ratio was conditional on the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; and it also was known that the American Government would not consent to limit its fortifications and bases in the Western Pacific if the alliance continued, but on the contrary it would have proceeded with them energetically on plans already

prepared. Not long after the conference, when it became known that the British Government was intending to construct a first-class naval base and fortifications at Singapore, the Japanese thought clearly was shown by comments of the Japanese press, which without important exception regarded this British base as circumscribing Japan and as strengthening the United States. Had the alliance continued, it is obvious that reasoning about the Singapore base would have taken an opposite trend.

In the time that has passed since Washington, the traceable manifestations of the Japanese Government's readjustment to the new situation indicate that it realized that it had lost the keystone of its diplomatic influence, and furthermore that it might hereafter be found on the opposite side of the balance in the Far East. That would amount to transferring an important weight from one end of the balance-scale to the other end. To restore the balance for Japan would require a double weight; and no such double weight is discoverable in the existing state of world affairs. As Japanese statesmen observe the international political scene, they perceive that Japan's territorially contiguous nations, China and Siberia, are antagonistic, even are hostile to her. In Europe, except Great Britain, there is not a government which within twenty years can dispose important power in Eastern Asia and in the Pacific Ocean. The nations which diplomatically are ranked as Principal Powers in Europe—France and Italy—are limited to Europe and near regions as to actual power; their naval forces are small, and they cannot reach the Far East or the Pacific except by passing strongholds of British and American naval power, and they are cut off completely from contacts by land. It is possible for Japan, perhaps, to make a diplomatic combination with France and Italy; but such a combination would be merely a gesture and would have only a theoretical influence in the Far East; and its presumable usefulness to France and Italy, in comparison with adverse influence on other very important relations, is

so slight that it lies outside of diplomatic probabilities. For a time, until international conditions take a different form, Japan is isolated. In this period she must play her own game, and play it without important help.

§ 4

The internal situation of Japan must be strongly influenced by, and in turn will strongly influence, the foreign policy of the Government. Backed by the alliance with Great Britain, Japan could press an acquisitive continental policy in certain regions with comparative safety; and the superficial success of that policy served to obtain the consent of the Japanese people to the heavy expense of pursuing it.

Even before the Washington conference, however, the cost of the imperialistic policy in China and Siberia, in comparison with results, was beginning to be criticized in Japan. Japanese business elements were getting doubtful of the economic benefits of that policy. In China the boycott injured Japanese trade; and the "wildcat" loans of the Nishihara orgy now assume the aspect of highly speculative ventures. The same apprehensions were felt concerning most of the "concessions" and investments of the Japanese occupation of Siberia. It was estimated in 1922 that the military and other Government expenses of the Siberian intervention exceeded one billion yen (U. S. $500,000,000), with an additional aggregate of fifty million yen for unremunerative private Japanese investments. In the war period and after, Japanese expenditures in China exceeded five hundred million yen, the greater part of which is in unsecured loans to the Peking and local governments. In return for that large (to a nation like Japan) financial outlay, the net political results were the hostility and antagonism of Chinese and Russians, and a precarious territorial foothold on the continent. It began to look more like economic wastefulness and political ineptitude than secure imperial expansion.

Effects of the post-war liquidations were felt strongly in the commercial and industrial affairs of Japan. There were much economic dissatisfaction and unrest, and a general demand for greater economy in the Government's expenditures. The discrepancy of the Government's expenditures for internal improvements and for education, and the costs of its imperialistic adventures, became an internal political issue.[2] It is probable that this aspect of the matter influenced the Government in deciding to temporize its policy in China, and to withdraw from Siberia.

The Japanese Government felt almost simultaneously the pressures of all the factors I have indicated. From different quarters came an imperative demand for retrenchment and readjustment. To continue to press a policy of predatory imperialism in Eastern Asia, contrary to the policies of the United States and Great Britain, detached from any possibility of effective support from any other quarter, and against the bitter hostility of the peoples of those regions, seemed sheer recklessness. If the ambitions which dictated that policy were not abandoned altogether, it had become necessary at least to moderate them outwardly.

Visible manifestations of Japan's policy on the continent of Asia since the Washington conference have conformed in a reasonable measure to the treaties made at that time, and to assurances given there by the Japanese Government. In regard to Shantung, the Japanese Government proceeded with the agreements, and has gone as far in carrying them out as time and circumstances have permitted. Soon after the Washington conference, the Tokio Government took measures to put the Shantung agreements into effect, and, after negotiations conducted on the part of China by Chentung Thomas Wang, the process of evacuation and restitution was

[2] In the period of Japan's national expansion policy, extending over about twenty years to date, the proportion of military and naval expenditures of the Government in time of peace to all other administrative expenses averages more than fifty per cent of the budget. That does not include war costs or military "occupations."

set in motion. In Siberia Japan also commenced to withdraw her troops from the Pri-Amur provinces, and completed the process by 1923, except for the northern part of Saghalin, which is occupied pending settlement with the Far Eastern Republic of Japanese claims for indemnity for the alleged "massacre" at Nikolayevsk, and incidentally as a diplomatic trading-point in adjustment of the great mass of loans, concessions, et al., which are residue of the Japanese "intervention." It can be said with verisimilitude that in respect of putting the Washington agreements into effect, and of indicating a comprehension of their purpose and implications, Japan's actions compare favorably with those of other powers.

The earthquake which occurred in Japan in September, 1923, and its consequences, are taken as likely to have a strong influence on Japan's foreign policy. For one thing, students of Oriental psychology think it will impress the Japanese people *en masse*, and also the upper stratum of the oligarchy, as an intimation of divine disapproval. As the outstanding subject of general criticism is the national foreign policy, there will be a trend of thought to take that as the object of the divine reprobation. The effects of such reasoning with the subjects of a theocracy is evident.

Furthermore, effects of the disaster are felt severely by the national finances. It is estimated that it will cost five billion yen or more to restore normal conditions, which will strain the national finances to an extent that makes great naval and military expenditures difficult, and only justifiable for a defense against imminent danger to the security of integral national territory. The territorial integrity of Japan is in no danger of being attacked from any quarter now. The extent of Japan's naval losses from the earthquake is known to be considerable; but the Government perhaps can sustain its ratio under the Washington treaty by retaining (by consent of the other powers) vessels which were designated to be scrapped, in place of vessels lost by the disaster.

There is a disposition among informed people in the Far

East to believe that the consequences of the great earthquake in Japan will cause the temporary abandonment by the Japanese Government of all aggressive tendencies in China. On this point, I will quote from a letter I wrote recently: "One cannot foretell now what effects in China the Japan disaster will have; but it seems probable that at least for a few years the Japanese Government will not be obstreperous and venturesome in foreign affairs, unless perchance the threat of internal upheaval because of economic unrest should cause the oligarchy to create a diversion in the field of foreign relations."

The contingency indicated is not probable; but the diplomatic world will ponder it.

§ 5

Results of the Washington conference have improved the relations of Japan and the United States. In view of the fact that the American Government was instrumental in drawing Japan into the conference, and responsible for the situation which caused Japan to lose there her diplomatic axis and leave her isolated, that statement may seem paradoxical. But I believe it is true.

Relations of Japan and the United States had two main points of friction: (a) Japan's policy in Eastern Asia, and (b) the question of Japanese immigration to United States territories. Diplomatic friction on the latter question came about almost entirely because the general international diplomatic strategy of the Japanese Government made it serve oblique purposes relating to Japan's major world policy, which is to obtain the hegemony of Asia. As a question confined to the two Governments, Japan and the United States, the immigration issue cannot be pressed by Japan, nor by any government in similar circumstances; for it involves the claim of one nation to determine the conditions under which its nationals can enter and reside in other countries.

Of all nations in the world, the United States is the last one which would concede that claim. As a diplomatic premise, Japan's attitude is untenable; and, as I have exposed in previous writings, the Japanese Government, by limiting Chinese and other Asiatic immigration in Japan, and the conditions under which all foreigners can reside there, undermines its position. The question of Japanese immigration to America, which as a diplomatic "herring" usually is called "racial equality," made scarcely a ripple at Washington in 1921, for its uselessness there to Japan was apparent. With the reshaping of international positions at Washington, the question of Japanese immigration to the United States takes its proper status. When the question no longer is useful to Japan's Weltpolitik, the Japanese Government probably will cease to agitate it with the Japanese masses to obtain desired reactions; and the issue as an international irritant will be allowed to die. There are intimations that the Japanese Government is taking thought of other means of managing its population problem; it has permitted the organization of a birth-control society in Japan.

I have contended that the better course for Japan is to align with the American policy in Asia, for if Japan's aims are stripped of grandiose ambitions, the ultimate effects of the American policy will work out for the preservation of the political autonomy and independence of Asiatics; and will secure the Asiatic nations, including Japan, from aggressions. The thesis of Japan's policy of a counter-imperialism of her own to defeat the imperialism of Europe in Asia required it to succeed in that object before its consequent objective of extending it to the West through Pan-Asianism could be accomplished. Even the most grandiose Japanese statesmen must, at times, have doubted Japan's ability alone to repulse Europe from the political domination of Asia; and if Japan should fail in that, her vision of imperial hegemony recedes.

Although the time since the Washington conference is too

short to permit a firm opinion on this point to be formed, there are distinct intimations of a trend of Japanese thought in the direction I have indicated. On the other hand, there is a possibility that the Japanese oligarchy will be unable to reorient its concepts of the nation's position and to effect a sincere readjustment of foreign policy to a different hypothesis, in which case it might alter only the superficial aspects of its policy, while holding as strongly as before to its ultimate imperialistic objectives.

X

CONSTRUCTIVE

§ 1

BY compressing a thesis into graphic aphorism, poets sometimes play the deuce with practical politics. It is probable that Kipling's phrase,

> For East is East and West is West,
> And never the twain shall meet,

has had more effect in shaping general Western ideas of the East than the corpus of international policies. Yet, taken literally, Kipling's aphorism is categorically wrong. The truth is that East and West met long ago, and never again can they be set apart.

Lenox Simpson ("Putnam Weale") in the opening paragraph of his latest book, "An Indiscreet Chronicle from the Pacific," writes, "I have lately come to the conclusion that the fundamental policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate (which was likewise the initial policy of the defunct Manchu dynasty) in forbidding in the Seventeenth Century in as absolute a manner as possible intercourse with Western countries was scientifically correct." That idea is entertained by a school of thought in America, and crops out in arguments to the general effect that Western nations ought to "withdraw" from the Orient and leave that part of the world to the native inhabitants.

As abstractions, such hypotheses are interesting, perhaps. But it is plain that they are impossible of realization now, and they never were possible of realization. The unwork-

ability of that thesis was intimated by a reply of Admiral Tsai Ting-kan at Washington to a question put by an American, who asked if the Chinese wish to be freed from Western contacts and innovations. Admiral Tsai replied, after pondering a moment, "You might ask me how I would go about it to forget my English." Which is a way of saying that the past cannot be un-lived. When Mr. Simpson says the dictum of the shogunate was "scientifically correct" no doubt he means that in his opinion it was theoretically correct; for the fact that it is proved to be scientifically impossible to keep East and West apart shows that it is scientifically correct for them to touch and mingle.

Orient and Occident primarily are terms of geography. The East and West are not situated on different planets, nor inhabited by different forms of life. They are places on the same earth, made more accessible to each other almost with every passing day. It is easy to say that it would have been better all around for imperial dictators of China, Japan, and India to forbid intercourse with Westerners; but those dictators at times did try to do that, and failed. Nor in the light of modern knowledge can one believe that it ever was possible to keep East and West apart permanently. When men's voices traverse Asia in a fraction of a second by radio, when men fly across continents in one day and across a great ocean in the same time, when ships travel under as well as on the surface of water, how can one conceive the disconnection and detachment of great sections of the earth, and of inhabitants of those sections?

§ 2

The serious obstacles to a genuine and complete British-American accord in world policy lie almost entirely in Asia. The American and British governments no doubt will have frictions and irritations in their direct contacts, and arising

occasionally from questions of Europe or Africa or South America; but no divergence in those quarters is likely to contain the elements of a deep and hostile schism. In all parts of the world except in Asia, the policies of the American and British governments have become adjusted to each other in the last century; conflicting aims have been compromised or abandoned; by process of continuous explanation and argument, and give and take, the two nations have taken comparatively statical positions. Their communion is continuous and sympathetic: they approach in fact the theoretically ideal "understanding" between nations.

In Asia the British and American policies differ openly in method and privately in objectives. Differences in method are not so important or ominous; they will not lead the nations into hostility. Differences of objectives go deeper.

In his book about the peace negotiations at Paris, Robert Lansing commented on the introduction by President Wilson into world politics of the principle of "self-determination of peoples," and he wrote: "The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of 'self-determination,' the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races." I read Mr. Lansing's book in Peking, and soon afterward I had a talk with a Chinese diplomat who was at Paris during the peace conference. We mentioned Mr. Lansing's book, and he said in effect: "Did you notice what Lansing said about 'self-determination'? He thinks it is a dangerous idea to put into the minds of 'certain races.' I suppose there is no doubt about which are the certain races he means. I know that is the British and in general the European view; but it is surprising to have it uttered by an American. A logical corollary of the danger of putting the idea of self-determination into the minds of certain peoples is to prevent the idea from reaching them. How can that be done, I wonder. Ideas are hard to confine. Presumably, the better plan would be to commence at the root of ideas, the mind, and to bar such ideas from penetrating

to certain peoples by preventing them from obtaining education. I have heard natives of India assert that to be a fundamental of British policy in India; and the same thing is said of Dutch policy in the East Indies, of French policy in Indo-China, and of Japanese policy in Korea and Formosa. I suppose you know that the other powers are provoked by the American educational policy in the Philippines? Are we to understand that general benightedness has become a premise of authority in rule by the great powers of 'certain peoples'?"

Whatever opinion one may hold as to the theoretical desirability implied by Mr. Lansing's view or its expediency as a doctrine for the moment, it is certain that now it is too late to prevent those ideas from getting into the minds of Orientals. Also it is not possible to prevent the idea of self-government from spreading, and reaching every stratum of Asiatic intelligence; indeed, one can say that it has permeated the Orient already, and that the idea cannot be rooted out.

The aspirations of Asiatics to retain it where they have it, and to recover it where they have lost self-government, or "self-determination," for a while may be repressed, but it cannot be uprooted, any more than it would be possible to compel Admiral Tsai to forget his English. Similarly, it is not possible to withdraw Western influence from Asia; its roots now are too deeply planted, and the channels which nourish and extend it are ever broadening. How would it be gone about to compel or induce the millions of Chinese who now are accustomed to electric lighting to return to the oil or tallow dip of their ancestors? How replace the sewing-machines which are in homes in China with the slow and clumsy needle of former ages? How induce Chinese, Filipinos, and Indians to quit going to the "movies"; to quit riding in tram-cars and motor-cars; to stop buying phonographs and radio sets; to stop planning for their cities modern waterworks, electric tram-lines and lighting and telephone systems, factories with modern machinery; to stop

printing books and newspapers in their own languages? Some of those activities can be, and are, suppressed in places now and then by the authority of governments: in India the British exercise a political censorship of motion-picture films, and other governments take similar measures to confine ideas. In Japan a few years ago the use in colleges of the Constitution of the United States was considered by the Government to inculcate "dangerous thoughts." But the officials who put those measures into effect do not know whether the net result of them is to subdue or to energize the thoughts which they are attempting to prevent.

If I were to select the most powerful of all Western influences in Asia, and especially in China, that would be the cities which the Westerners have built there. To take for example China, the "foreign settlements," except for the atmosphere caused by their large Oriental populations, are distinctively of the West. To pass from areas under native administration into one of the large foreign settlements is like entering another country. In the one there are indications of "progress" (which invariably is taken by Chinese and foreigners alike to mean the introduction of Western improvements), but accompanied by insecurity and the drawbacks of confused governmentation. In the other are all the evidences of modern civilization: handsome and substantial buildings, well-paved streets, efficient policing and municipal administration, security to life and property, port facilities where the commerce of the world comes and goes, the reign of law according to Western standards. Although these cities are called "foreign settlements" to indicate their technical treaty status, the Chinese population exceeds the foreign population; in Shanghai the ratio probably is one hundred to one. It is to the foreign settlements that Chinese go to live when they have acquired wealth, where they can reside safely and with their property protected. The growth everywhere in Asia of the cities administered by foreigners is conclusive evidence that many natives prefer to live under

foreign administration even within their own countries. The reason of course is better security. Asiatics realize that the art of government in modern times is better understood and managed in the West than it is in the East, and they are glad to be able to take advantage of it for their own individual benefit. But in so doing they do not cease to cling to their natural wish to improve their own government and to preserve its independence. Asiatics are willing to place themselves under foreign administration voluntarily, as they do by living in a foreign settlement; but they do not thereby consent to subject themselves permanently and involuntarily to alien government.

The educational effect of the existence of "foreign settlements" in China and all Asiatic countries is incalculable, and undoubtedly exceeds by a large margin all other Western stimulations combined, for in fact they do combine all of them, with the added effect of impression *en masse*. So if one were to undertake to "withdraw" Western influence from, let us say, China, one should begin by burning the foreign settlements. From that pass to destruction of the missions and schools and hospitals distributed in all parts of China, and so on, until all traces of Western institutions were removed. By that thesis, when Chinese bandits burn a mission they are doing a good thing; yet it is not taken that way even by the Western sentimentalists who favor withdrawal. To unscramble eggs would be simple compared to the task of withdrawing Western influence from the Orient.

§ 3

Since it is impossible to withdraw Western influence from the Oriental world, what is to be done about it? There are two theses of the proposition thus posed, as indicated by the American policy and the European, which latter in practical effect means the British policy. One theory of handling the

question is by repression; the other theory is to solve it by stimulation.

Progress in anything is accomplished by stimulation rather than by repression. Essentially, repression is opposed to progress. A brake gives no momentum to a vehicle, although it is useful at times. This reflection leads to rumination as to the objectives of policies which express themselves in repressive forms: do those policies really want to progress? In Asia, with Western powers established in positions of overlordship, progress logically will be in the direction of weakening those positions. Is it the policy of some Western powers to make their suzerain positions over Oriental peoples permanent? That is the question which Oriental intellectuals are asking. Evasion serves only to intensify their suspicions and distrust.

The American policy toward the Oriental world is not now under the suspicion of Orientals implied by the collocation I have mentioned; but conditions are shaping to subject it to scrutiny in the course of harmonization with British policy in Asia, for one accepts the logic of events and assumes that a resolute effort to bring the American and British policies into line will be carried on. What educated Orientals are thinking, what they are asking in their press and privately, is: In bringing the British and American policies into line so that they can march along together, which thesis—the repressive or the stimulative—will be subordinated? Orientals regard this question much more seriously and apprehensively than, apparently, the British and American governments and peoples do.

I take it that no argument is needed to establish which of those theses coincides with American popular conceptions. The natural expression of American institutions and ideals in Asia is shown in the Philippines. The natural expression of British concept is shown by the British attitude (in Asia) toward the American policy in the Philippines. Recently,

in conversation with an Englishman well informed on conditions east of Suez, the subject of granting independence to the Philippines was mentioned. He said, "You Americans think it is quite all right to come to the East, light a political bomb here, and then when it is about ready to explode you get out and leave us to face the consequences." My friend was sincere in that statement; that is the way most Englishmen whose life has taken them east of Suez look at it. There is a good deal to support that view, too, when one reflects soberly.

Yet, after considerable direct contact with the East, and observation and study of policies operating there, I have reached a conviction which I state without diffidence: the American policy in Asia should not yield any of its major premises in favor of the British or any other prevailing hypotheses. The more I reflect, reasoning from the fundamentals of political science as they obtain in the United States (which Americans have no thought of abandoning or of confessing as having failed) the more I believe that repressive and restrictive policies in Asia lead to no outcome which Americans desire, and which they would regard as conducive to the ultimate stability and comity of nations and races. But a frequent criticism of the attitude of the American Government toward Asia is that it has a *policy*, but has no *plan* to put it into effect.

Alike as they are in many things, Americans and English are dissimilar in the way they react to some political problems. The Englishman is able, when he leaves home, to detach himself from the political institutions and forms which exist there and which in the course of centuries of struggle he has created for his own enjoyment and security, and to step without apparent effort into a political régime based on a different principle. At home the English insist for themselves on a high degree of political liberty; in India, and to some extent everywhere east of Suez and in dark Africa, they shift into a political régime akin to that of the Elizabethan

period. At home the Englishman is a democrat; east of Suez he assumes the air and the prerogatives of the proconsuls and citizens of Imperial Rome with respect to barbarians. The ability to do that without effort and even without consciousness of doing it perhaps is an evolutionary inheritance from the beginnings of British rule in Asia, when it naturally took the character of its times. To this day Englishmen think of political liberty in England as belonging to Englishmen. Americans think of American political liberty as belonging to all peoples.

When Americans assume authority outside their own country, they carry with them the ideas and forms of their government at home, and nothing discourages them from attempting to put those forms into practice. Rebuffs and seeming failures do not shake their belief in the general superiority of home political methods, which they persist in thinking to be suitable or adaptable to all situations and all peoples. And it must be conceded, from the available evidence, that Americans are at least as successful in their administrations of so-called backward peoples as the British and other governments are. But it is not so much the methods of other governments in those conditions that Americans are dissatisfied with; they find much to admire and approve in them. It is those other objectives, or what Americans suspect those objectives to be, that causes them to withhold indorsement. If Americans cannot see, somewhere in the future of a policy, a result which takes a semblance of American institutions and ideals, they are not inclined to accept that policy. Moreover, Americans are not in favor of continuing indefinitely or of perpetuating political science on a double-standard basis.

There can be no doubt of how the sentiments and aspirations of the Asiatic and other colored peoples align on this question: they overwhelmingly side with the American thesis. The proposition then becomes: Can the repressive thesis in Asia bear up under and throw off the combined American and

Asiatic influence? Or will the American policy be won over to the European thesis, and, by combining with that of Great Britain, succeed in continuing to apply Western influence repressively to the political development of Asia?

This argumentation applies of course to the political motivation of a repressive policy. It is very doubtful, in fact, if a repressive political motivation of Western policy in Asia can hold its position against the stimulating elements which are set in motion there by every other form of Western contact and influence. I do not believe it can. If my opinion is correct, in the case of a stimulative motivation of foreign political influence it will harmonize and coincide with all other forms of Western influence; in the case of a repressive motivation of foreign political influence it will create a situation of one form of Western influence working in opposition to other forms of Western influence. Is it not scientifically correct, then, to make a self-governing Asia the sincere object of Western political motivation there, and to devise a stimulative policy to accomplish that?

These queries indicate the divergence of American and British policies, and intimate the difficulties in the way of harmonizing them. But I am not without hope that it can be accomplished. Americans, and the American Government, have no purpose or wish to interfere with or put obstacles in the way of British policy in India. But in respect of American policy in Eastern Asia, and especially in China and the Philippines, Americans are not disposed to repress it in order to moderate its psychological reactions upon British policy in India, and to make it easier for the existing method of British administration in Western and Southern Asia.

§ 4

On the Chinese rests the onus of proving or disproving the American thesis in Asia. The Philippine experiment is inter-

esting, but it will not be taken as conclusive for the Oriental world. China will be so taken.

Americans wonder, then, why at this critical time Chinese political leaders persist by their conduct in giving countenance to the European thesis. If one were to take snap judgment based on events of the last fifteen years in China and the present situation, the conclusion would be that the Chinese have not the capacity for self-government in the modern sense. Of the official class in China, few see and understand the true position of the country, and the effects abroad of political conditions there. With few exceptions, the minds of Chinese political leaders are concentrated upon the struggle for power among factional groups in China; and if they think about external effects and possible reactions, the matter is lightly dismissed; for the average Chinese politician, from a previous constant apprehension of foreign intervention, suddenly has concluded that that danger is past, and is indifferent to foreign opinion. Some results of this new attitude are disquieting.

However, before one surrenders to pessimism about China, a glance in the direction of Europe will help to restore a mental balance. A large part of Europe is seriously disorganized; yet the difficulties of reconstructing governments there do not give rise and credence to presumptions that those peoples are not capable of self-government or self-determination of their forms of government. Before the World War, Germany perhaps was the most closely organized and systematically governed nation in the world; to-day she is one of the most disorganized and poorly governed, and it is not expected that normal stability will be recovered for years. Other nations in Europe are as badly off.

If one took the Chinese official class for the criterion, one almost would despair of discovering in China the intelligence and patriotic purpose required to unify and reorganize the nation. The Chinese political intelligentsia seem to be hope-

lessly in dissension. Conference after conference to secure national unification and to relieve the people from the sufferings occasioned by civil strife are held. The conferences are preceded by portentous declarations of all the leaders that national unification is the dearest wish of their hearts, and that it must be effected to end the misery of the people. As is the nature of politicians everywhere, the hearts of the tuchuns, governors, generals, parliamentarians, and presidents bleed for the people in manifestos. But conferences come to nothing, not because there are any fundamental preventions to unity, but because the political leaders do not want unity, for it would mean the surrender of power and perquisites which they control under the prevailing system.

Sun Yat Sen is a stormy petrel in politics, but at times he has a flash of vision. On one of the frequent occasions when Sun was "out" of power, he gave (early in 1923) a statement to the press to the effect that there was no use to try to accomplish unity and pacification of the country by agreement among the Chinese political leaders; that they feared and distrusted one another too much; and that the only prospect of preserving the nation was to invite the mediation of a friendly foreign power, which would undertake to guarantee that whatever agreements the Chinese leaders subscribed to in conference would be carried out. Comments on Sun's proposal in the Chinese press showed that the foreign power in mind was the United States, as the only Western government that Chinese would intrust to perform such a function impartially and without selfish motive.

Sun Yat Sen's proposal, if it was feasible, would provide a good opportunity for an imperialistic foreign power to take over the governmentation of China by indirection. The proposal was indorsed by a number of tuchuns, not one of whom would have consented to it had there been a real chance of its being done; and it is doubtful if Sun himself would have submitted to it. The statements were political gestures of publicly declaring for unity while privately working to

preserve the system of provincial autonomy and quasi-independence.

Apart from the governing class in China, the only politically minded elements of the people are the business and propertied group, and the younger foreign- and partly-foreign-educated class spoken of as "students." It is a tradition of the business elements in China not to meddle in politics, and they are reluctant to do so; but more and more they are feeling that the conditions are intolerable and that the official class never will clear up the situation. One can observe a new kind of public opinion slowly but none the less certainly forming, with the business elements as a nucleus. It may take years before this new kind of political opinion will become effective in giving character and strength to the Government; but already it is exerting an influence on the official class through the Chinese bankers' consortium and in other ways. What Americans will regard as an encouraging symptom was the outburst of popular criticism in the autumn of 1923 about the manner of electing Tsao Kun President of the Peking Government, when it was alleged that members of Parliament were paid an agreed price for their votes. There is no doubt of the growth of a sentiment among Chinese in favor of purging the country's politics and administration of the old corruptions, but the people have not found a way to do it.

In any nation the people are the bed-rock of the government and of all national activities. There can be no doubt that the Chinese people are splendid material out of which to make a great nation. In the same degree that in America crimes and scandalous incidents occupy space in the newspapers, so in the foreign press published in China, and in telegrams to the press abroad, the news of bandit outrages and political failures and misdemeanors get more attention that other phases of existence there. Ninety-nine per cent of the Chinese people are peaceful, docile, law-abiding and industrious; continuing their lives and occupations with an amazing regularity in the midst of administrative confusion.

Evidences of modern "progress" are noticeable in every province. Some of the much-abused tuchuns and local governors give to their districts very good administrations, as administrations are in China; some provinces never have been better governed than they are now, nor so progressive. But the germ of governmental disorganization is eating into all parts of the country, and sapping the traditional stability of the people. Unless the process is arrested, it is difficult to foresee where it will lead. There is little influential sentiment for a revival of the monarchy. I am unable to discover much real evidence of Bolshevik penetration of China; but Russia is China's great continental neighbor, and it is inevitable and unavoidable that psychological effects of the Russian revolution and its aftermath would reach China. It is dangerous to prolong the demoralization of the government.

Persons who do not comprehend China are astonished that notwithstanding the disturbed conditions commerce manages to function. The year 1922 showed the largest volume of foreign trade in the history of the nation; and internal trade was little under normal. One wonders how it is done; but then it is remembered that trade in China always has had to get along under disturbed and irregular conditions. Compared with Western nations, China's fiscal position is highly solvent. I quote from a report on the finances of China compiled in 1922 by M. Padoux, a financial expert:

With more than 400 million inhabitants, it is doubtful whether the governmental, provincial and local taxation in China proper exceeds 500 million dollars a year (silver), an average of $1.20 per head. It is almost nothing when compared with taxation in other parts of the world. Precise figures cannot be worked out because of the fluctuations in the rates of exchange and because the budgets of most of the foreign Powers are still subject to important variations from year to year. But a rough calculation, which is quite sufficient for our purpose, shows that the annual per capita revenue derived from taxes and duties in the following countries, reduced into silver dollars, amounts to:

Great Britain	$170
France	90
Italy	24
Belgium	30
United States (Federal taxes only)	120

Of course, fully developed States of Europe and America can pay higher taxation than China. But turning to the countries of Asia which are lying on the coast of the Pacific and whose conditions may compare with those obtaining in China, the figures are, per capita:

Japan	$16.00
Philippines	7.50
French Indo-China	5.50
Siam	9.50
Dutch East Indies	15.00

The Chinese average of $1.20 is about one-fifth of the average taxation paid in French Indo-China, and one-eighth of the average taxation paid in Siam. Yet the population of China is more industrious and has more resources, agricultural, commercial, industrial and mineral, than the populations of French Indo-China and Siam. . . .

National debts at present are a crushing burden on most of the European and American Powers. Their per capita reaches appalling figures in several countries:

Great Britain	$1440
France	1310
United States (Federal debt only)	433
Belgium	312
Italy	190
Japan	50

The present public debt of China, domestic and foreign (exclusive of railway debts, which are not included in the above foreign statistics), is under 1900 million silver dollars, or $4.75 per head; 250 times less than the per capita ratio of the British and French public debt.

I was conversing a few years ago in the lobby of a hotel in Peking with an accomplished American lady, who was enthusiastic about the ancient Chinese capital, and exclaimed

in surprise when I said I did not like to be there, for I always felt depressed.

"Why?" she asked.

"Because the most discouraging thing in China, almost the only discouraging thing, is the Government of China. Peking is the only place in China where it is possible to be wholly pessimistic about the country," I replied.

§ 5

The interest of the United States in the fate of China is greater than that of any other Western power. This does not estimate "interests" in the sense of investments, present commerce, active or inert "concessions," or what not, or by what has happened in the past. It estimates in terms of geography, of populations, of races, of fundamentals of government, and looks toward the future.

The policy of the American Government toward China is like the policy of the Monroe Doctrine in the Western hemisphere; indeed, the Hay Doctrine truly is the Monroe Doctrine extended to the Far East. The conditions and circumstances differ, but the principles are the same. Europe has a larger commerce with Latin America than the United States has. Until the World War caused a general shifting of bonded investments, Europe's capital investments in Latin America were very much greater than those of the United States. The Monroe Doctrine is not concerned about that; it stands for the Open Door. What the Monroe Doctrine is concerned about in Latin America is its detachment from the political interference of Europe. And in respect of China, that is the Hay Doctrine. Imperishable fame awaits the American statesman who will declare the Hay Doctrine to be the unilateral policy of the United States, as its forerunner, the Monroe Doctrine, is. The time is ripe for such a declaration.

The immediate problem of the American Government in

the Far East is to make the Washington treaties effective. In this, that division of the treaties which comes under the heading of self-denying ordinances of the powers is of no help constructively. Constructive possibilities of the treaties lie in the agreements and resolutions concerning China, which can be described as parts of a process of restoring administrative autonomy and territorial integrity to China. For the time, results of those provisions are disappointing, because the Chinese Government is incapable of carrying out its part toward making the treaties effective. It is quite useless to talk about giving up extraterritoriality now or soon. (However, at Washington there was no expectation that it could be done in less than twenty-five years.) The Chinese see that, and the Peking Government wishes to postpone the visit of the foreign commission of investigation.

If there is a practical way to accelerate the process of putting the Washington treaties into effect, it seems to be by helping China to straighten out her fiscal affairs, and making possible the safe introduction of foreign capital to aid in development. It is believed that the American and other governments are willing to help China that way, provided it is feasible, and to keep within the letter and spirit of the treaties. A *sine qua non* of American financial help to China (and it can be presumed that unless the United States participates, it cannot be done at this period) is the consent and cooperation of the Chinese to whatever is attempted. At the present time the difficulty is not so much to devise a plan by which foreign financial support could be given in China, as it is to obtain the popular coöperation of Chinese in its execution.

The trouble, of course, is the political division of the nation, and the antagonism of each powerful faction to anything that would strengthen another faction. The question is how to apply foreign financial assistance to China as a whole without having the administration of it conduce to the power of one political faction with respect to the others. It

is reasonably certain that while other large sections of the nation object, no arrangement made separately with any of existing "governments" is feasible. There seems to be nothing to do but wait until the Chinese can devise a way to get around this difficulty, or until there develops a situation in China and a state of Chinese public opinion which makes mediation by a friendly power likely to obtain Chinese consent to a practicable plan. Provisions of the Washington treaties evidently foresaw obstructions in their execution, and left ways open for further conferences. It may become necessary for the American Government, as the protagonist of the Washington treaties, to invite the signatory powers to a new conference that will discuss the application of constructive measures in China. It will be easier to approach a new conference devoted exclusively to China if the Chinese would invite the other nations to take such action.

Once the subject of foreign financial help to China has been elucidated at a conference, in which representatives of China would sit, many of the now presumed difficulties would diminish. If there is in America a popular opinion that is averse to having the American Government participate or take independent action in reorganizing the finances of China, it probably would yield to full explanation of the conditions. In recent times the American Government has performed competently and without undue friction similar offices in Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Haiti. In those countries the situation approximately was as it is with China: there were obligations to foreign bondholders, and government treasuries unable to meet those obligations and administration costs, because of poor management. In a few years, in each case, the fiscal experts appointed by the American Government succeeded in reorganizing the finances of those countries; then they withdrew. The American people were not opposed to having their Government "intervene" with those countries at their request, for it was understood that it was responsive to the Monroe Doctrine, which Americans believe in uphold-

ing; and the assistance was accepted by those countries in the same spirit. The extension of such help by the United States to China will be as logical an expression of the Hay Doctrine as help to Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Haiti were logical expressions of the Monroe Doctrine; and there need be no more fear of complications in this case than in those.

This topic is inclusive of all the foreign financing of America. I firmly hold the opinion that supervision and restrictions should be put upon diversion of the wealth of the United States, through the medium of foreign securities, to uses which do not conform with, or which are opposed to, the national political hypotheses. It is not difficult to impose proper restraints upon the sale of foreign securities in the United States; other governments exercise supervision in similar circumstances. It should not be feasible to finance in the United States, by the sale to American investors of the securities of foreign governments or corporations, operations which contravene American interests abroad, or which intrust to the management of other governments or nationals affairs which should be kept under the control of Americans. This subject was not important while the United States was a borrowing nation; but now that it has become a lending nation, and is involved with international politics and finance in almost all parts of the world, and has its own foreign policies to sustain, the case is different. I would not suggest, at this time, that the American Government should dictate to private investors in America by law how they shall invest their capital; but I do believe that the Government should note all important foreign bond issues in America, and in cases where it is believed that the funds so obtained will be used adversely to the national interests, or in contradiction of existing commitments, the Government publicly should denounce the loan, and give its reasons. This especially applies to loans to foreign governments.

I have in mind a credit reported to have been given in America in 1923 to the South Manchurian Railway. That

railway is the southern part of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was acquired by Japan as a result of the Russo-Japanese War. It lies entirely in China; and the future validity of the Japanese title is disputed by the Chinese Government, which in 1923 denounced the treaties by which, under ultimatum in 1915, the Japanese Government obtained an extension for ninety-nine years of its leaseholds in Manchuria. The report of the credit I have mentioned caused much criticism in China, where it had some obvious implications. In fact, the South Manchurian Railway in effect is owned by the Japanese Government, is policed by Japanese troops, and is the backbone of Japan's "special position" in Manchuria. I will recall that at the time the Japanese Government tried to have Manchuria set apart from operations of the China banking consortium, a vaguely worded understanding was made by which the intention of the consortium not to infringe on existing vested interests of Japan in Manchuria was conceded. The collocation to Chinese minds is evident.

Explanations to the effect that that credit merely was to cover purchases in America for ordinary improvements of the railway did not dispel the unpleasant impression created in China, so soon after the Washington conference expressly had refused to recognize a Japanese "special position" in Manchuria. Was that refusal another diplomatic euphemism? And were American financiers supplying the funds to consolidate and improve Japan's position in Manchuria? This is a matter which should have been overseen in all its stages by the State Department (which may have been the case), and a plain explanation of it made for publication. The matter is susceptible of explanation which ought to satisfy the Chinese, as I see it. Coming after the Washington conference and the fresh status established there respecting the territorial content and integrity of China, which includes Manchuria, it is not injurious to China's interest and position to establish an American equity in railways in Manchuria,

whether these be now under Japanese control or not. So regarded, there would be no reason why profitable American business in railway materials should be refused. In its political aspects now, to have American investments secured by railways anywhere in China may add to the security of China.

§ 6

Facing the prospect, certain possibilities can be noted. It may be that for a time American policy in the Far East will have to deal with the situation caused by a weak and disorganized China. An effective Government may be established in China within a few years; but something like present conditions may continue for twenty or even fifty years. If that happens, it should not shake the American Government in its position, nor in its fundamental policy; but the position will have to be adapted to the circumstances.

A principal difficulty of dealing with China's state in the continuance of internal political dissension, which may be prolonged indefinitely, is how to retain political touch with all the parts of the country while the nominal government of the nation has only restricted authority. As things are, the position of the diplomatic corps at Peking is becoming ridiculous; they "recognize" as the Government of China a hollow authority which is not recognized by at least three fourths of the country, and which is destitute of power to function except in a very limited area. It is plain that prolongation of this situation leads into a cul-de-sac where foreign diplomatic influence with China may be lost completely, and when it will become almost impossible to maintain real diplomatic contact with the nation. I wrote in 1923, while in China, to a Chinese diplomat in the Wai Chiao Pu: "Do not think there is no danger of the powers withdrawing recognition from the Peking Government. It is inevitable, if things go on as they are, that they will be forced to con-

sider alternatives in the search for a solution. Recognition is continued now only because in the circumstances the Powers do not know what else to do."

There is a presumption that if recognition should be withdrawn from Peking, it would precipitate an insoluble confusion worse than that which exists. I do not agree. With conditions as they are, in some ways the recognition of Peking impairs the foreign position, and weakens the diplomatic touch with the country. Outside of Peking the points of official contact with the country are the treaty-ports and the consulates there. The fact is that effective diplomatic contacts and influence now are almost entirely through the consulates, for, while the superior diplomats at Peking maintain the fiction that the Government there is the actual government of China, the consuls in other localities, mostly in regions where the governments are "independent" of Peking, go on dealing with the local officials just as if nothing were awry. Locally and in a general sense, therefore, foreign diplomatic contact is kept up only by the consuls shutting their eyes to the political situation and taking up local questions with the local officials in the usual way. This can go on indefinitely; and if official "recognition" of Peking should be withdrawn by the powers, or by some of them, there would be no appreciable impairment of foreign influence as long as the powers maintained their consulates and kept in communication through them with the local administrations. A time is certain to come, if there is no national unification in China, when the powers will find themselves in a position of seeming to sustain by their "recognition" a government that is repudiated by the country. That is an invidious position before the Chinese people, and would have reactions unfavorable to the general position of foreigners in China.

§ 7

The Philippines are the gateway of American influence in Asia. Psychological effects of American institutions upon

Orientals are communicated chiefly through those islands. What the American Government does or does not do there will have important results to the future of American policy in the Far East and to American position in the Pacific.

I see no extraordinary or insurmountable obstacles to a satisfactory outcome of the Philippines problem. In my opinion, it needs nothing more than the application to it of customary American common sense. To use the situation of the moment in the Philippines for illustration, all it seems to require is the exercise of ordinary judgment. There is no question of the fact of United States sovereignty there; the authority of the American Government is the supreme authority in the islands. There is an issue about the division of local authority as between the governor and the insular parliament which takes the form of the parliament (or factions of it) refusing to coöperate with the executive part of the insular Government. Now if a State of the Union, by its legislature, were to assume or usurp prerogatives of Federal officers in the State and try to prevent them from functioning, the American people would have no doubts what to do about it. The functions of the Federal Government would be supported. There need be no confusion of thought about a similar situation in the Philippines; distance does not alter principles. Sustaining the authority of the United States (which is the same as its dignity and prestige) in the Philippines as long as the national flag flies there has no positive relation to any action concerning the status of the islands which the United States may take hereafter; and the two things should not be mixed.

There is foundation for disgust of the English at what they call the proposed American "scuttle" from the Philippines. The British have been irritated by effects which American policy in the islands has on British rule in India, and they may wish that the United States never had acquired the islands. Since that did happen, however, it is felt that there is a greater occasion for disturbance in the Asiatic

world by an American withdrawal from the Philippines than for the United States to remain there.

I have sought to avoid using in connection with action of the United States in regard to the Far East the word "responsibility," because it has been used so promiscuously in recent years. To international sentimentalists, the American Government is "responsible" for the rectification of a large part of what is wrong in the world. The responsibility of governments is fairly well defined. It is plain that a government has responsibility where its flag has been implanted, as with the United States in the Philippines. A government has a degree of responsibility in respect of issues where it has made commitments, actual and by direct implication, as the United States has done in regard to the Western hemisphere and China. I know of no actual responsibility to which the United States is committed in regard to Europe. Yet in the eyes of many sentimentalists the American Government has great "responsibilities" in Europe, while its genuine responsibilities in the Pacific seldom are mentioned in that way.

In China, with Japan, and especially with regard to the meeting of American and British policies in Asia, a steady and continuous use of common sense in time should carry the American policy safely through. One thing could defeat it in the end: a failure of the American Government to comprehend its importance and to support it with constructive action.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DECISIONS OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

A. ARMS TREATIES.

1. Four-Power Treaty and Annex.
2. The Five-Power Naval Treaty.
3. Submarines and Poison Gas Treaty.

B. TREATIES AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING CHINA.[1]

1. The Nine-Power Treaty.
2. Chinese Tariff Treaty.
3. The Shantung Treaty.
4. Resolution regarding a board of reference to secure the principle of the Open Door in China.
5. Resolutions regarding Chinese railways.
6. Resolution regarding reduction of Chinese armies.
7. Resolution regarding publication of all international commitments affecting China.
8. Resolutions banishing spheres of influence.
9. Resolution regarding radio stations in China.

The nine commissions, conferences, or boards established, were:

1. A five-power conference (created by the naval limitation treaty), to meet eight years hence to discuss the question of naval armament anew.
2. A five-power commission to revise the rules of warfare in the light of the World War.
3. A board of reference to consider economic and railway questions in China—what may be called the Open Door Commission.
4. A nine-power commission on "extraterritoriality" rights in China.
5. A special conference to prepare the way for Chinese tariff revision.

[1] Resolutions were registered to abolish foreign post-offices in China as from January 1, 1923; to appoint a foreign judicial commission to visit China and investigate on the spot the question of the abolition of extraterritoriality; and to summon a conference of Chinese officials and foreign diplomats in Peking, to meet subject to China's request, in order to determine the procedure under which foreign military or police troops shall be withdrawn from China.

6. A separate commission to revise the existing Chinese tariff.
7. A conference of Chinese officials and foreign diplomats at Peking, to meet subject to China's request, in order to determine the procedure under which foreign military or police troops shall be withdrawn from China.
8. A conference of the managers of foreign wireless stations in China and the Chinese communications minister, to work out the details of radio regulation.
9. A joint Sino-Japanese Shantung Commission to determine the procedure under which Japan shall restore Kiaochow and Shantung rights to China.

A

1. THE FOUR-POWER TREATY AND ANNEX

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE AND JAPAN,

With a view to the preservation of the general peace and the maintenance of their rights in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean,

Have determined to conclude a treaty to this effect, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America:

Charles Evans Hughes, Henry Cabot Lodge, Oscar W. Underwood and Elihu Root, citizens of the United States.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

The Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour, O.M., M.P., Lord President of his Privy Council.

The Right Hon. Baron Lee of Fareham, G.E.E., K.C.B., First Lord of his Admiralty.

The Right Hon. Sir Auckland Campbell Geddes, K.C.B., his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America.

And for the Dominion of Canada, the Right Hon. Robert Laird Borden, G.C.M.G., K.C.

For the Commonwealth of Australia, the Hon. Georges Foster Pearce, Minister of Defence.

For the Dominion of New Zealand, Sir John William Salmond, K.C., Judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand.

For the Union of South Africa, the Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour, O.M., M.P.

For India, the Right Hon. Valingman Sankaranarayana Srinivasa Sastri, member of the Indian Council of State.

The President of the French Republic:

Mr. René Viviani, Deputy, former President of the Council of Ministers.

Mr. Albert Sarraut, Deputy, Minister of the Colonies.

Mr. Jules J. Jusserand, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America, Grand Cross of the National Order of the Legion of Honor.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

Baron Tomosaburo Kato, Minister for the Navy, a member of the first class of the Imperial Order of the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun with the Paulownia Flowers.

Baron Kijuro Shidehara, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Washington, a member of the first class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun.

Prince Ivesato Tokugawa, a member of the first class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun.

Mr. Masanao Hanihara, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, a member of the second class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun.

Who having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

I The high contracting parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

If there should develop between any of the high contracting parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other high contracting parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.

II If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other power, the high contracting parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

III This treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the time it shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period it shall continue to be in force, subject to the right of any of

the high contracting parties to terminate it upon twelve months' notice.

IV This treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the high contracting parties, and shall take effect on the deposit of ratification, which shall take place at Washington, and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded in London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate.

The Government of the United States will transmit to all the signatory powers a certified copy of the *procès verbal* of the deposit of ratifications.

The present treaty, in French and in English, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to each of the signatory powers.

In faith whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty.

Done at the City of Washington, the thirteenth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one.

Following is the text of the reservation note, prepared by the American delegates and accepted by the other powers:

In signing the treaty this day between the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Japan, it is declared to be the understanding and intent of the signatory powers:

1. That the treaty shall apply to the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean, provided, however, that the making of the treaty shall not be deemed to be an assent on the part of the United States of America to the mandates and shall not preclude agreements between the United States of America and the mandatory powers, respectively, in relation to the mandated islands.
2. That the controversies to which the second paragraph of Article I refers shall not be taken to embrace questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective powers.

Washington, D. C., Dec. 13, 1921.

ANNEX TO PACIFIC TREATY

ADOPTED ON FEBRUARY 4, 1922, AND SIGNED ON FEBRUARY 6

The United States of America, the British Empire, France and Japan have, through their respective plenipotentiaries, agreed upon

the following stipulations supplementary to the quadruple treaty signed at Washington on Dec. 13, 1921:

The term "insular possessions and insular dominions" used in the aforesaid treaty shall, in its application to Japan, include only Karafuto (or the southern portion of the island of Saghalin), Formosa and the Pescadores and the islands under the mandate of Japan.

The present agreement shall have the same force and effect as the said treaty, to which it is supplementary.

The provision of Article IV of the aforesaid treaty of Dec. 13, 1921, relating to ratification, shall be applicable to the present agreement, which, in French and English, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other contracting Powers.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement. Done at the City of Washington, 6th February, 1922.

2. THE FIVE-POWER NAVAL TREATY

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY AND JAPAN,

Desiring to contribute to the maintenance of the general peace, and to reduce the burdens of competition in armament,

Have resolved, with a view to accomplishing these purposes, to conclude a treaty to limit their respective naval armament, and to that end have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America:
Charles Evans Hughes,
Henry Cabot Lodge,
Oscar W. Underwood,
Elihu Root,
Citizens of the United States;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India;
The Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour, O.M., M.P., Lord President of his Privy Council;
The Right Hon. Baron Lee of Fareham, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of his Admiralty;

The Right Hon. Sir Auckland Campbell Geddes, K.C.B., his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America;

And for the Dominion of Canada: The Right Hon. Sir Robert Laird Borden, G.C.M.G., K.C.;

For the Commonwealth of Australia: Senator the Right Hon. George Foster Pearce, Minister for Home and Territories;

For the Dominion of New Zealand: The Hon. Sir John William Salmond, K.C., Judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand;

For the Union of South Africa: The Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour, O.M., M.P.;

For India: The Right Hon. Valingman Sankaranarayana Srinivasa Sastri, member of the Indian Council of State;

The President of the French Republic:

M. Albert Sarraut, Deputy, Minister of the Colonies;

M. Jules J. Jusserand, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America, Grand Cross of the National Order of the Legion of Honour;

His Majesty the King of Italy:

The Hon. Carlo Schanzer, Senator of the Kingdom;

The Hon. Vittorio Rolandi Ricci, Senator of the Kingdom, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Washington;

The Hon. Luigi Albertini, Senator of the Kingdom;

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

Baron Tomosaburo Kato, Minister for the Navy, a member of the first class of the Imperial Order of the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun with the Paulowuia Flower;

Baron Kijuro Shidehara, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Washington, a member of the first class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun;

Mr. Masanao Hanihara, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, a member of the second class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun,

who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I

General Provisions Relating to the Limitation of Naval Armament

ARTICLE 1. The contracting powers agree to limit their respective naval armament as provided in the present treaty.

ARTICLE 2. The contracting powers may retain respectively the capital ships which are specified in Chapter II, Part 1. On the coming into force of the present treaty, but subject to the following provisions of this article, all other capital ships, built or building, of the United States, the British Empire and Japan shall be disposed of as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2.

In addition to the capital ships specified in Chapter II, Part 1, the United States may complete and retain two ships of the *West Virginia* class now under construction. On the completion of these two ships the *North Dakota* and *Delaware* shall be disposed of as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2.

The British Empire may, in accordance with the replacement table in Chapter II, Part 3, construct two new capital ships not exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement each. On the completion of the said two ships, the *Thunderer, King George V, Ajax* and *Centurion* shall be disposed of as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 2.

ARTICLE 3. Subject to the provisions of Article 2, the contracting powers shall abandon their respective capital ship building programmes, and no new capital ships shall be constructed or acquired by any of the contracting powers except replacement tonnage which may be constructed or acquired as specified in Chapter II, Part 3.

Ships which are replaced in accordance with Chapter II, Part 3, shall be disposed of as prescribed in Part 2 of that chapter.

ARTICLE 4. The total capital ship replacement tonnage of each of the contracting powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States 525,000 tons (533,400 metric tons); for the British Empire 525,000 tons (533,400 metric tons); for France 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons); for Italy 175,000 tons (177,800 metric tons); for Japan 315,000 tons (320,040 metric tons).

ARTICLE 5. No capital ship exceeding 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of, any of the contracting powers.

ARTICLE 6. No capital ship of any of the contracting powers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 16 inches (406 millimetres).

ARTICLE 7. The total tonnage for aircraft carriers of each of the contracting powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for the British Empire 135,000 tons (137,160 metric tons); for France 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Italy 60,000 tons (60,960 metric tons); for Japan 81,000 tons (82,296 metric tons).

ARTICLE 8. The replacement of aircraft carriers shall be affected

only as prescribed in Chapter II, Part 3, provided, however, that all aircraft carrier tonnage in existence or building on Nov. 12, 1921, shall be considered experimental, or may be replaced, within the total tonnage limit prescribed in Article 7, without regard to its age.

ARTICLE 9. No aircraft carrier exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be acquired by or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of, any of the contracting powers.

However, any of the contracting powers may, provided that its total tonnage allowance of aircraft carriers is not thereby exceeded, build not more than two aircraft carriers, each of a tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons (33,528 metric tons) standard displacement, and in order to effect economy any of the contracting powers may use for this purpose any two of their ships, whether constructed or in course of construction, which would otherwise be scrapped under the provisions of Article 2. The armament of any aircraft carriers exceeding 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement shall be in accordance with the requirements of Article 10, except that the total number of guns to be carried in case any of such guns be of a calibre exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres), except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (126.7 millimetres), shall not exceed eight.

ARTICLE 10. No aircraft carrier of any of the contracting powers shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 millimetres). Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 9, if the armament carried includes guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the total number of guns carried, except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5 inches (126.7 millimetres), shall not exceed ten. If alternatively the armament contains no guns exceeding 6 inches (152 millimetres) in calibre, the number of guns is not limited. In either case, the number of anti-aircraft guns and of guns not exceeding 5 inches (126.7 millimetres) is not limited.

ARTICLE 11. No vessel of war exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier, shall be acquired by or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of any of the contracting powers. Vessels not specifically built as fighting ships, nor taken in time of peace under Government control for fighting purposes, which are employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of hostilities otherwise

than as fighting ships, shall not be within the limitations of this article.

ARTICLE 12. No vessel of war of any of the contracting powers hereafter laid down, other than a capital ship, shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 millimetres).

ARTICLE 13. Except as provided in Article 9, no ship designated in the present treaty to be scrapped may be reconverted into a vessel of war.

ARTICLE 14. No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6-inch (152 millimetres) calibre.

ARTICLE 15. No vessel of war constructed within the jurisdiction of any of the contracting powers for a non-contracting power shall exceed the limitations as to displacement and armament prescribed by the present treaty for vessels of a similar type which may be constructed by or for any of the contracting powers; provided, however, that the displacement for aircraft carriers constructed for a non-contracting power shall in no case exceed 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement.

ARTICLE 16. If the construction of any vessel of war for a non-contracting power is undertaken within the jurisdiction of any of the contracting powers, such power shall promptly inform the other contracting powers of the date of the signing the contract and the date on which the keel of the ship is laid; and shall also communicate to them the particulars relating to the ship described in Chapter II, Part 3, Section 1, (b) (4) and (5).

ARTICLE 17. In the event of a contracting power being engaged in war, such power shall not use as a vessel of war any vessel of war which may be under construction within its jurisdiction for any other power, or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another power and not delivered.

ARTICLE 18. Each of the contracting powers undertakes not to dispose by gift, sale or any mode of transfer of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the navy of any foreign power.

ARTICLE 19. The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder:

(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;

(2) Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110 degrees east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and (c) New Zealand;

(3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace.

ARTICLE 20. The rules for determining tonnage displacement prescribed in Chapter II, Part 4, shall apply to the ships of each of the contracting powers.

CHAPTER II

RULES RELATING TO THE EXECUTION OF THE TREATY—DEFINITION OF TERMS

PART I

Capital Ships Which May Be Retained by the Contracting Powers

In accordance with Article 2, ships may be retained by each of the contracting powers as specified in this part.

Ships which may be retained by the United States:

Name	Tonnage	Name	Tonnage
Maryland	32,600	*Nevada*	27,500

Name	Tonnage	Name	Tonnage
California	32,300	*New York*	27,000
Tennessee	32,300	*Texas*	27,000
Idaho	32,000	*Arkansas*	26,000
New Mexico	32,000	*Wyoming*	26,000
Mississippi	32,000	*Florida*	21,825
Arizona	31,400	*Utah*	21,825
Pennsylvania	31,400	*North Dakota*	20,000
Oklahoma	27,500	*Delaware*	20,000
Total tonnage			500,650

On the completion of the two ships of the *West Virginia* class and the scrapping of the *North Dakota* and *Delaware*, as provided in Article 2, the total tonnage to be retained by the United States will be 525,850.

Ships which may be retained by the British Empire:

Name	Tonnage	Name	Tonnage
Royal Sovereign	25,750	*Emperor of India*	25,000
Royal Oak	25,750	*Iron Duke*	25,000
Revenge	25,750	*Marlborough*	25,000
Resolution	25,750	*Hood*	41,200
Ramillies	25,750	*Renown*	26,500
Malaya	27,500	*Repulse*	26,500
Valiant	27,500	*Tiger*	28,500
Barham	27,500	*Thunderer*	22,500
Queen Elizabeth	27,500	*King George V*	23,000
Warspite	27,500	*Ajax*	23,000
Benbow	25,000	*Centurion*	23,000
Total tonnage			580,450

On the completion of the two new ships to be constructed and the scrapping of the *Thunderer, King George V, Ajax* and *Centurion*, as provided in Article 2, the total tonnage to be retained by the British Empire will be 558,950 tons.

Ships which may be retained by France:

Name	Tonnage (Metric Tons)	Name	Tonnage (Metric Tons)
Bretagne	23,500	*Jean Bart*	23,500

Name	Tonnage (Metric Tons)	Name	Tonnage (Metric Tons)
Lorraine	23,500	*Courbet*	23,500
Provence	23,500	*Condorcet*	18,890
Paris	23,500	*Diderot*	18,890
France	23,500	*Voltaire*	18,890
Total tonnage			221,170

France may lay down new tonnage in the years 1927, 1929 and 1931, as provided in Part 3, Section 2.

Ships which may be retained by Italy:

Name	Tonnage (Metric Tons)	Name	Tonnage (Metric Tons)
Andrea Doria	22,700	*Dante Alighieri*	19,500
Cai Duillio	22,700	*Roma*	12,600
Conte di Cavour	22,500	*Napoli*	12,600
Giulio Cesare	22,500	*Vittorio Emanuele*	12,600
Leonardo da Vinci	22,500	*Regina Elena*	12,600
Total tonnage			182,800

Italy may lay down new tonnage in the years 1927, 1929 and 1931, as provided in Part 3, Section 2.

Ships which may be retained by Japan:

Name	Tonnage	Name	Tonnage
Mutsu	33,800	*Fu-So*	30,600
Nagato	33,800	*Kirishima*	27,500
Hiuga	31,260	*Haruna*	27,500
Ise	31,260	*Hiyei*	27,500
Yamashiro	30,600	*Kongo*	27,500
Total tonnage			301,320

PART II

Rules for Scrapping Vessels of War

The following rules shall be observed for the scrapping of vessels of war which are to be disposed of in accordance with Articles 2 and 3:

1. A vessel to be scrapped must be placed in such condition that it cannot be put to combatant use.

2. This result must be finally effected in any one of the following ways:

(a) Permanent sinking of the vessel.

(b) Breaking the vessel up. This shall always involve the destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers and armour, and all deck, side and bottom plating.

(c) Converting the vessel to target use exclusively. In such case all the provisions of Paragraph 3 of this part, except Subparagraph 6, in so far as may be necessary to enable the ship to be used as a mobile target, and except Subparagraph 7, must be previously complied with. Not more than one capital ship may be retained for this purpose at one time by any of the contracting powers.

(d) Of the capital ships which would otherwise be scrapped under the present treaty in or after the year 1931, France and Italy may each retain two seagoing vessels for training purposes exclusively; that is, as gunnery or torpedo schools. The two vessels retained by France shall be of the *Jean Bart* class, and of those retained by Italy one shall be the *Dante Alighieri*, the other of the *Giulio Cesare* class. On retaining these ships for the purpose above stated, France and Italy respectively undertake to remove and destroy their conning towers, and not to use the said ships as vessels of war.

3. (a) Subject to the special exceptions contained in Article 9, when a vessel is due for scrapping, the first stage of scrapping, which consists in rendering a ship incapable of further warlike service, shall be immediately undertaken.

(b) A vessel shall be considered incapable of further warlike service when there shall have been removed and landed, or else destroyed in the ship:

(1) All guns and essential portions of guns, fire-control tops and revolving parts of all barbettes and turrets;

(2) All machinery for working hydraulic or electric mountings;

(3) All fire-control instruments and range-finders;

(4) All ammunition, explosives and mines;

(5) All torpedoes, warheads and torpedo tubes;

(6) All wireless telegraphy installations;

(7) The conning tower and all side armour, or alternatively all main propelling machinery; and

(8) All landing and flying-off platforms and all other aviation accessories.

4. The periods in which scrapping of vessels is to be effected are as follows:

(a) In the case of vessels to be scrapped under the first paragraph of Article 2, the work of rendering the vessels incapable of further warlike service, in accordance with Paragraph 3 of this part, shall be completed within six months from the coming into force of the present treaty, and the scrapping shall be finally effected within eighteen months from such coming into force.

(b) In the case of the vessels to be scrapped under the second and third paragraphs of Article 2, or under Article 3, the work of rendering the vessel incapable of further warlike service in accordance with Paragraph 3 of this part shall be commenced at later than the date of completion of its successor, and shall be finished within six months from the date of such completion. The vessel shall be finally scrapped in accordance with Paragraph 2 of this part, within eighteen months from the date of completion of its successor. If, however, the completion of the new vessel be delayed, then the work of rendering the old vessel incapable of further warlike service in accordance with Paragraph 3 of this part shall be commenced within four years from the laying of the keel of the new vessel, and shall be finished within six months from the date on which such work was commenced, and the old vessel shall be finally scrapped in accordance with Paragraph 2 of this part within eighteen months from the date when the work of rendering it incapable of further warlike service was commenced.

PART III

Replacement

The replacement of capital ships and aircraft carriers shall take place according to the rules in Section I and the tables in Section II of this part.

SECTION I—Rules for Replacement

(a) Capital ships and aircraft carriers twenty years after the date of their completion may, except as otherwise provided in Article 8 and in the tables in Section II of this part, be replaced by new construction, but within the limits prescribed in Article 4 and Article 7. The keels of such new construction may, except as otherwise provided in Article 8 and in the tables in Section II of this part, be laid down not earlier than seventeen years from the

date of completion of the tonnage to be replaced, provided, however, that no capital ship tonnage, with the exception of the ships referred to in the third paragraph of Article 2, and the replacement tonnage specifically mentioned in Section II of this part, shall be laid down until ten years from Nov. 12, 1921.

(b) Each of the contracting powers shall communicate promptly to each of the other contracting powers the following information:

(1) The names of the capital ships and aircraft carriers to be replaced by new construction;

(2) The date of governmental authorization of replacement tonnage;

(3) The date of laying the keels of replacement tonnage;

(4) The standard displacement in tons and metric tons of each new ship to be laid down, and the principal dimensions, namely, length at waterline, extreme beam at or below waterline, mean draught at standard displacement;

(5) The date of completion of each new ship and its standard displacement in tons and metric tons, and the principal dimensions, namely, length at waterline, extreme beam at or below waterline, mean draught at standard displacement, at time of completion.

(c) In case of loss or accidental destruction of capital ships or aircraft carriers, they may immediately be replaced by new construction subject to the tonnage limits prescribed in Articles 4 and 7, and in conformity with the other provisions of the present treaty, the regular replacement programme being deemed to be advanced to that extent.

(d) No retained capital ships or aircraft carriers shall be reconstructed except for the purpose of providing means of defence against air and submarine attack, and subject to the following rules: The constructing powers may, for that purpose, equip existing tonnage with bulge or blister or anti-air attack deck protection, providing the increase of displacement thus effected does not exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) displacement for each ship. No alterations in side armour, in calibre, number or general type of mounting of main armament shall be permitted, except:

(1) In the case of France and Italy, which countries within the limits allowed for bulge may increase their armour protection and the calibre of the guns now carried on their existing capital ships so as to exceed sixteen inches (406 millimetres), and (2) the British Empire shall be permitted to complete, in the case of the *Renown*, the alterations to armour that have already been commenced but temporarily suspended.

SECTION II

REPLACEMENT AND SCRAPPING OF CAPITAL SHIPS—

UNITED STATES

Summary

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Ships Retained Pre-Jutland	Ships Retained Post-Jutland
			Maine (20), *Missouri* (20), *Virginia* (17), *Nebraska* (17), *Georgia* (17), *New Jersey* (17), *Rhode Island* (17), *Connecticut* (17), *Louisiana* (17), *Vermont* (16), *Kansas* (16), *Minnesota* (16), *New Hampshire* (15), *South Carolina* (13), *Michigan* (13), *Washington* (0), *South Dakota* (0), *Indiana* (0), *Montana* (0), *North Carolina* (0), *Iowa* (0), *Massachusetts* (0), *Lexington* (0), *Constitution* (0), *Constellation* (0), *Saratoga* (0), *Ranger* (0), *United States* (0) [3]	17	1
1922	.....A, B [4]		(12)	15	3
1923	.....		.....	15	3
1924	.....		.....	15	3
1925	.....		.....	15	3
1926	.....		.....	15	3
1927	.....		.....	15	3
1928	.....		.....	15	3
1929	.....		.....	15	3
1930	.....		.....	15	3

[3] The United States may retain the *Oregon* and *Illinois* for non-combatant purposes, after complying with the provisions of Part 2, III. (b).

[4] Two *West Virginia* class. A, B, C, D, &c., represent individual capital ships of 35,000 tons standard displacement, laid down and completed in the years specified.

Ships Retained

Summary

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Pre-Jutland	Post-Jutland
1931	C, D			15	3
1932	E, F			15	3
1933	G			15	3
1934	H, I	C, D	*Florida* (23), *Utah* (23), *Wyoming* (22)	12	5
1935	J	E, F	*Arkansas* (23), *Texas* (21), *New York* (21)	9	7
1936	K, L	G	*Nevada* (20), *Oklahoma* (20)	7	8
1937	M	H, I	*Arizona* (21), *Pennsylvania* (21)	5	10
1938	N, O	J	*Mississippi* (21)	4	11
1939	P, Q	K, L	*New Mexico* (21), Idaho (20)	2	13
1940		M	*Tennessee* (20)	1	14
1941		N, O	*California* (20), *Maryland* (20)	0	15
1942		P, Q	2 ships *West Virginia* .. class	0	15

Replacement and Scrapping of Capital Ships—

GREAT BRITAIN

Ships Retained

Summary

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Pre-Jutland	Post-Jutland
			Commonwealth (16), *Agamemnon* (13), *Dreadnought* (15), *Bellerophon* (12), *St. Vincent* (11), *Inflexible* (13), *Superb* (12), *Neptune* (10), *Hercules* (10), *Indomitable* (13), *Témér-*		

Summary

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Ships Retained Pre-Jutland	Ships Retained Post-Jutland
			aire (12), *New Zealand* (9), *Lion* (9), *Princess Royal* (9), *Conqueror* (9), *Monarch* (9), *Orion* (9), *Australia* (8), *Agincourt* (7), *Erin* (7), 4 building or projected[5]		
1922	A, B[6]			21	1
1923				21	1
1924				21	1
1925	A, B		*King George* V (13), *Ajax* (12), *Centurion* (12), *Thunderer* (13)	17	3
1926				17	3
1927				17	3
1928				17	3
1929				17	3
1930				17	3
1931	C, D			17	3
1932	E, F			17	3
1933	G			17	3
1934	H, I	C, D	*Iron Duke* (20), *Marlborough* (20), *Emperor of India* (20), *Benbow* (20)	13	5
1935	J	E, F	*Tiger* (21), *Queen Elizabeth* (20), *Warspite* (20), *Barham* (20)	9	7
1936	K, L	G	*Malaya* (20), *Royal Sovereign* (20)	7	8
1937	M	H, I	*Revenge* (21), *Resolution* (21)	5	10

[5] The British Empire may retain the *Colossus* and *Collingwood* for non-combatant purposes, after complying with the provisions of Part 2, III. (b).

[6] Two 35,000-ton ships, standard displacement. A, B, C, D, &c., represent individual capital ships of 35,000 tons standard displacement laid down and completed in the years specified.

Ships Retained

Summary

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Pre-Jutland	Post-Jutland
1938	N, O	J	*Royal Oak* (22)	4	11
1939	P, Q	K, L	*Valiant* (23), *Repulse* (23)	2	13
1940		M	*Renown* (24)	1	14
1941		N, O	*Ramillies* (24), *Hood* (21)	0	15
1942		P, Q	A (17), B (17)	0	15

Replacement and Scrapping of Capital Ships—

FRANCE [7]

Ships Retained

Summary

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Pre-Jutland	Post-Jutland
1922				7	0
1923				7	0
1924				7	0
1925				7	0
1926				7	0
1927	35,000 tons			7	0
1928				7	0
1929	35,000 tons			7	0
1930		35,000 tons	*Jean Bart* (17), *Courbet* (17)	5	s
1931	35,000 tons			5	s
1932	35,000 tons	35,000 tons	*France* (18)	4	s
1933	35,000 tons			4	s
1934		35,000 tons	*Paris* (20), *Bretagne* (20)	2	s
1935		35,000 tons	*Provence* (20)	1	s
1936		35,000 tons	*Lorraine* (20)	0	s
1937				0	s
1938				0	s

[7] France expressly reserves the right of employing the capital ship tonnage allotment as she may consider advisable, subject solely to the limitations that the displacement of individual ships should not surpass 35,000 tons, and that the total capital ship tonnage should keep within the limits imposed by the present treaty.

				Ships Retained	
		Summary			
Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Pre-Jutland	Post-Jutland
1939				0	[8]
1940				0	[8]
1941				0	[8]
1942				0	[8]

REPLACEMENT AND SCRAPPING OF CAPITAL SHIPS—

ITALY [9]

				Ships Retained	
		Summary			
Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Pre-Jutland	Post-Jutland
1922				6	0
1923				6	0
1924				6	0
1925				6	0
1926				6	0
1927	35,000 tons			6	0
1928				6	0
1929	35,000 tons			6	0
1930				6	0
1931	25,000 tons	35,000 tons	*Dante Alighieri* (19)	5	[10]
1932	45,000 tons			5	[10]
1933	25,000 tons	35,000 tons	*Leonardo da Vinci* (19)	4	[10]
1934				4	[10]
1935	35,000 tons		*Giulio Cesare* (21), *Conte di Cavour* (21)	3	[10]
1936	45,000 tons		*Duilio* (21)	1	[10]
1937	25,000 tons		*Andrea Doria* (21)	0	[10]

[8] Within tonnage limitations; number not fixed.

[9] Italy expressly reserves the right of employing the capital ship tonnage allotment as she may consider advisable, subject solely to the limitations that the displacement of individual ships should not surpass 35,000 tons, and the total capital ship tonnage should keep within the limits imposed by the present treaty.

[10] Within tonnage limitations; number not fixed.

REPLACEMENT AND SCRAPPING OF CAPITAL SHIPS—

JAPAN [11]

Summary

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Ships Retained Pre-Jutland	Ships Retained Post-Jutland
			Hizen (20), *Mikasa* (20), *Kashima* (16), *Katori* (16), *Satsuma* (12), *Aki* (11), *Settsu* 10), *Ikoma* (14), *Ibuki* (12), *Kurama* (11), *Amagi* (0), *Akagi* (0), *Kaga* (0), *Tosa* (0), *Takao* (0), *Atago* (0), Projected programme 8 ships not laid down.[12]		
1922				8	2
1923				8	2
1924				8	2
1925				8	2
1926				8	2
1927				8	2
1928				8	2
1929				8	2
1930				8	2
1931	A			8	2
1932	B			8	2
1933	C			8	2
1934	D	A	*Kongo* (21)	7	3
1935	E	B	*Hiyei* (21), *Haruna* (20)	5	4
1936	F	C	*Kirishima* (21)	4	5
1937	G	D	*Fuso* (22)	3	6
1938	H	E	*Yamashiro* (21)	2	7
1939	I	F	*Ise* (22)	1	8

[11] A, B, C, D, &c., represent individual capital ships of 35,000 tons standard displacement, laid down and completed in the years specified.

[12] Japan may retain the *Shikishima* and *Asahi* for non-combatant purposes, after complying with the provisions of Part 2, III. (b).

Summary

Year	Ships Laid Down	Ships Completed	Ships Scrapped (Age in Parentheses)	Ships Retained Pre-Jutland	Ships Retained Post-Jutland
1940	G	*Hiuga* (22)		0	9
1941	H	*Nagato* (21)		0	9
1942	I	*Mutsu* (21)		0	9

NOTE APPLICABLE TO ALL THE TABLES IN SECTION II

The order above prescribed in which ships are to be scrapped is in accordance with their age. It is understood that when replacement begins according to the above tables the order of scrapping in the case of the ships of each of the contracting powers may be varied at its option; provided, however, that such power shall scrap in each year the number of ships above stated.

PART IV

Definitions

For the purposes of the present treaty the following expressions are to be understood in the sense defined in this part:

Capital Ship

A capital ship, in the case of ships hereafter built, is defined as a vessel of war, not an aircraft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons (10,150 metric tons) standard displacement or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches (203 millimetres).

Aircraft Carrier

An aircraft carrier is defined as a vessel of war with a displacement in excess of 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement designed for a specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft. It must be so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon, and not designed and constructed for carrying a more powerful armament than that allowed to it under Article 9 or Article 10, as the case may be.

Standard Displacement

The standard displacement of a ship is the displacement of the ship complete, fully manned, engined and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and im-

plements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board.

The word "ton" in the present treaty, except in the expression "metric tons," shall be understood to mean the ton of 2,240 pounds (1,016 kilos). Vessels now completed shall retain their present ratings of displacement tonnage in accordance with their national system of measurement. However, a power expressing displacement in metric tons shall be considered for the application of the present treaty as owning only the equivalent displacement in tons of 2,240 pounds. A vessel completed hereafter shall be rated at its displacement tonnage when in the standard condition defined herein.

CHAPTER III

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 21. If, during the term of the present treaty, the requirements of the national security of any contracting power in respect of naval defence are, in the opinion of that power, materially affected by any change of circumstances, the contracting powers will, at the request of such power, meet in conference with a view to the reconsideration of the provisions of the treaty and its amendment by mutual agreement.

In view of possible technical and scientific developments, the United States, after consultation with the other contracting powers, shall arrange for a conference of all the contracting powers, which shall convene as soon as possible after the expiration of eight years from the coming into force of the present treaty to consider what changes, if any, in the treaty may be necessary to meet such developments.

ARTICLE 22. Whenever any contracting power shall become engaged in a war which, in its opinion, affects the naval defence of its national security, such power may, after notice to the other contracting powers, suspend for the period of hostilities its obligations under the present treaty, other than those under Articles 13 and 17, provided that such power shall notify the other contracting powers that the emergency is of such a character as to require such suspension.

The remaining contracting powers shall, in such case, consult together with a view to agreement as to what temporary modifications, if any, should be made in the treaty as between themselves. Should such consultation not produce agreement, duly made in accordance with the constitutional methods of the respective powers, any one of said contracting powers may, by giving notice to the other con-

tracting powers, suspend for the period of hostilities its obligations under the present treaty, other than those under Articles 13 and 17.

On the cessation of hostilities, the contracting powers will meet in conference to consider what modifications, if any, should be made in the provisions of the present treaty.

ARTICLE 23. The present treaty shall remain in force until Dec. 31, 1936, and in case none of the contracting powers shall have given notice two years before that date of its intention to terminate the treaty, it shall continue in force until the expiration of two years from the date on which notice of termination shall be given by one of the contracting powers, whereupon the treaty shall terminate as regards all the contracting powers. Such notice shall be communicated in writing to the Government of the United States, which shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notification to the other powers and inform them of the date on which it was received. The notice shall be deemed to have been given and shall take effect on that date. In the event of notice of termination being given by the Government of the United States, such notice shall be given to the diplomatic representatives at Washington of the other contracting powers, and the notice shall be deemed to have been given and shall take effect on the date of the communication made to the said diplomatic representatives.

Within one year of the date on which a notice of termination by any power has taken effect all the contracting powers shall meet in conference.

ARTICLE 24. The present treaty shall be ratified by the contracting powers in accordance with their respective constitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the United States will transmit to the other contracting powers a certified copy of the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications.

The present treaty, of which the English and French texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other contracting powers.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty.

Done at the City of Washington the first day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

To the naval treaty was added a supplementary resolution, adopted at the plenary session of Feb. 4. This addition was an amplification of Article 18 of the treaty, which binds the signatory powers

not to dispose of war craft—in such condition that the vessels might be utilized as warships—"by gift, sale or transfer." The new resolution, which is to be taken as a part of the treaty, reads thus:

It should, therefore, be recorded in the minutes of the subcommittee (on naval limitation) and before the full conference that the powers signatory to the treaty of naval limitation regard themselves in honour bound not to sell any ships between the present date and ratification of the treaty, when such a sale would be a breach of Article 18.

3. SUBMARINES AND POISON GAS TREATY

TEXT OF THE FIVE-POWER COMPACT UNDER WHICH THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, JAPAN, FRANCE AND ITALY BIND THEMSELVES TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF SUBMARINES AS COMMERCE DESTROYERS, AND OF POISON GAS IN WARFARE

The treaty embodying the resolutions passed by the conference against the use of submarines as commerce destroyers, and also against the employment of poison gas in warfare, the text of which is given herewith, was presented by Mr. Root at the fifth plenary session of Feb. 1, and signed at the seventh and last plenary session on Feb. 6, 1922. Both subjects had been debated at length in previous sessions, and the decisions here translated into treaty terms were not reached without considerable discussion. (See February "Current History.") Mr. Root was sponsor for both of the original resolutions prohibiting these agencies of warfare. The text of this double treaty is as follows:

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY AND JAPAN,

Hereinafter referred to as the signatory powers, desiring to make more effective the rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, and to prevent the use in war of noxious gases and chemicals, have determined to conclude a treaty to this effect, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries [here follows the list of names], who, having communicated their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The signatory powers declare that among the rules

adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, the following are to be deemed an established part of international law: (1) A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine its character before it can be seized. A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to submit to visit and search after warning or to proceed as directed after seizure. A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first placed in safety. (2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules above stated; and if a submarine cannot capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules, the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.

ARTICLE 2. The signatory powers invite all other civilized powers to express their assent to the foregoing statement of established law, so that there may be a clear public understanding throughout the world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents.

ARTICLE 3. The signatory powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and seizure and destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person in the service of any power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy, and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found.

ARTICLE 4. The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in the recent war of 1914–1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations they now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves, and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto.

ARTICLE 5. The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials and devices having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world, and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties, to which a majority of the civilized powers are parties, the signatory powers,

to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law, binding alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.

ARTICLE 6. The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the signatory powers and shall take effect on the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington. The Government of the United States of America will transmit to all the signatory powers a certified copy of the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications. The present treaty, in French and English, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to each of the signatory powers.

ARTICLE 7. The Government of the United States of America will further transmit to each of the non-signatory powers a duly certified copy of the present treaty and invite its adherence thereto. Any non-signatory power may adhere to the present treaty by communicating an instrument of adherence to the Government of the United States of America, which will thereupon transmit to each of the signatory and adhering powers a certified copy of each instrument of adherence.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty. Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-two.

B

4. TREATIES AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING CHINA

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BELGIUM, THE BRITISH EMPIRE, CHINA, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, THE NETHERLANDS AND PORTUGAL,

Desiring to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity;

Have resolved to conclude a treaty for that purpose, and to that end have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries [here follow the names of the plenipotentiaries], who having communicated

to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The contracting powers, other than China, agree:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government.

3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

ARTICLE 2. The contracting powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement or understanding, either with one another, or individually or collectively with any power or powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article 1.

ARTICLE 3. With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the open door, or equality of opportunity, in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the contracting powers, other than China, agree not to seek or to support their respective nations in seeking:

(A) Any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region in China;

(B) Any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

It is understood that the foregoing stipulations of this article are not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be necessary to the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial or financial undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and research.

China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in the foregoing stipulations of this article in dealing with applications for

economic rights and privileges from Governments and nationals of all foreign countries, whether parties to the present treaty or not.

ARTICLE 4. The contracting powers agree not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory.

ARTICLE 5. China agrees that, throughout the whole of the railways in China, she will not exercise or permit unfair discriminations of any kind. In particular there shall be no discrimination whatever, direct or indirect, in respect of charges or of facilities on the ground of the nationality of passengers or the countries from which or to which they are proceeding, or the origin or ownership of goods or the country from which or to which they are proceeding, or the nationality or ownership of the ship or other means of conveying such passengers or goods before or after their transport on the Chinese railways.

The contracting powers, other than China, assume a corresponding obligation in respect of any of the aforesaid railways over which they or their nationals are in a position to exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special agreement or otherwise.

ARTICLE 6. The contracting parties, other than China, agree fully to respect China's rights as a neutral in time of war to which China is not a party; and China declares that when she is a neutral she will observe the obligations of neutrality.

ARTICLE 7. The contracting powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which, in the opinion of any one of them, involves the application of the stipulations of the present treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the contracting parties concerned.

ARTICLE 8. Powers not signatory to the present treaty which have governments recognized by the signatory powers and which have treaty relations with China shall be invited to adhere to the present treaty. To this end the Government of the United States will make the necessary communications to non-signatory powers and will inform the contracting powers of the replies received. Adherence by any power shall become effective on receipt of notice thereof by the Government of the United States.

ARTICLE 9. The present treaty shall be ratified by the contracting powers in accordance with their respective constitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the United States will transmit to the other con-

tracting powers a certified copy of the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications.

The present treaty, of which the English and French texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other contracting powers.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty. Done at the City of Washington the sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

THE SUPPLEMENTARY RESOLUTION

The United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal,

Desiring to provide a procedure for dealing with questions that may arise in connection with the execution of the provisions of Articles 3 and 5 of the treaty to be signed at Washington on Feb. 6, 1922, with reference to their general policy, designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity,

Resolve, That there shall be established in China a board of reference to which any questions arising in connection with the execution of the aforesaid articles may be referred for investigation and report.

The special conference, provided in Article 2 of the treaty to be signed at Washington Feb. 6, 1922, with reference to the Chinese customs tariff shall formulate for the approval of the powers concerned a detailed plan for the constitution of the board.

DECLARATION BY CHINA

China upon her part is prepared to give an undertaking not to alienate or lease any portion of her territory or littoral to any power.

TREATY ON THE CHINESE TARIFF

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BELGIUM, BRITISH EMPIRE, CHINA, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, THE NETHERLANDS AND PORTUGAL,

With a view to increasing the revenues of the Chinese Government, have resolved to conclude a treaty relating to the revision of the Chinese customs tariff and cognate matters, and to that end have appointed as their plenipotentiaries [here follow the names of the plenipotentiaries], who, having communicated to each other their

full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The representatives of the contracting powers having adopted, on the 4th day of February, 1922, in the City of Washington, a resolution, which is appended as an annex to this article, with respect to the revision of Chinese customs duties, for the purpose of making such duties equivalent to an effective 5 per centum ad valorem, in accordance with existing treaties, concluded by China with other nations, the contracting powers hereby confirm the said resolution and undertake to accept the tariff rates fixed as a result of such revision. The said tariff rates shall become effective as soon as possible, but not earlier than two months after publication thereof.

ANNEX. With a view to providing additional revenue to meet the needs of the Chinese Government, the powers represented at this conference, namely, the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal, agree:

That the customs schedule of duties on imports into China, adopted by the Tariff Revision Commission at Shanghai on Dec. 19, 1918, shall forthwith be revised so that rates of duty shall be equivalent to 5 per cent effective, as provided for in the several commercial treaties to which China is a party.

A revision commission shall meet at Shanghai, at the earliest practicable date, to effect this revision forthwith and on the general lines of the last revision.

This commission shall be composed of representatives of the powers above named and of representatives of any additional powers having governments at present recognized by the powers represented at this conference and who have treaties with China providing for a tariff on imports and exports not to exceed 5 per cent ad valorem and who desire to participate therein.

The revision shall proceed as rapidly as possible, with a view to its completion within four months from the date of the adoption of this resolution by the Conference on Limitation of Armament and Pacific and Far Eastern Questions.

The revised tariff shall become effective as soon as possible, but not earlier than two months after its publication by the Revision Commission.

The Government of the United States, as convener of the present conference, is requested forthwith to communicate the terms of this resolution to the Governments of powers not represented at this conference, but who participated in the revision of 1918 aforesaid.

ARTICLE 2. Immediate steps shall be taken through a special conference to prepare the way for the speedy abolition of likin and for the fulfilment of the other conditions laid down in Article 8 of the treaty of Sept. 5, 1902, between Great Britain and China; in Articles 4 and 5 of the treaty of Oct. 8, 1903, between the United States and China, and in Article 1 of the supplementary treaty of Oct. 8, 1903, between Japan and China, with a view to levying the surtaxes provided for in these articles.

The special conference shall be composed of representatives of the signatory powers, and of such other powers as may desire to participate and may adhere to the present treaty, in accord with the provisions of Article 8 in sufficient time to allow their representatives to take part. It shall meet in China within three months after the coming into force of the present treaty on a day and at a place to be designated by the Chinese Government.

ARTICLE 3. The special conference provided for in Article 2 shall consider the interim provisions to be applied prior to the abolition of likin and the fulfilment of the other conditions laid down in the articles of the treaties mentioned in Article 2; and it shall authorize the levying of a surtax on dutiable imports as from such date, for such purposes and subject to such conditions as it may determine.

The surtax shall be a uniform rate of 2½ per centum ad valorem, provided that in case of certain articles of luxury which, in the opinion of the special conference, can bear a greater increase without unduly impeding trade, the total surtax may be increased, but may not exceed 5 per centum ad valorem.

ARTICLE 4. Following the immediate revision of the customs schedule of duties on imports into China, mentioned in Article 1, there shall be a further revision thereof, to take effect at the expiration of four years following the completion of the aforesaid immediate revision, in order to insure that the customs duties shall correspond to the ad valorem rates fixed by the special conference provided in Article 2.

Following this further revision there shall be, for the same purpose, periodical revisions of the customs schedule of duties on imports into China every seven years, in lieu of the decennial revision authorized by existing treaties with China.

In order to prevent delay, any revision made in pursuance of this article shall be effected in accord with rules to be prescribed by the special conference provided for in Article 3.

ARTICLE 5. In all matters relating to customs duties there shall

be effective equality of treatment and of opportunity for all the contracting powers.

ARTICLE 6. The principle of uniformity in the rates of customs duties levied at all the land and maritime frontiers of China is hereby recognized. The special conference provided for in Article 2 shall make arrangements to give practical effect to this principle, and it is authorized to make equitable adjustments in those cases in which a customs privilege to be abolished was granted in return for some local economic advantage.

In the meantime, any increase in the rate of customs duties resulting from tariff revision or any surtax hereafter imposed in pursuance of the present treaty shall be levied at a uniform rate ad valorem at all land and maritime frontiers of China.

ARTICLE 7. The charge for transit passes shall be at the rate of 2½ per centum ad valorem until the arrangements provided for by Article 2 come into force.

ARTICLE 8. Powers not signatory to the present treaty, whose Governments are at present recognized by the signatory powers and whose present treaties with China provide for a tariff on imports and exports not to exceed 5 per centum ad valorem, shall be invited to adhere to the present treaty.

The Government of the United States undertakes to make the necessary communications for this purpose and to inform the Governments of the contracting powers of the replies received. Adherence by any power shall become effective on receipt of notice thereof by the Government of the United States.

ARTICLE 9. The provisions of the present treaty shall override all stipulations of treaties between China and the respective contracting powers which are inconsistent therewith, other than stipulations according most favoured nation treatment.

ARTICLE 10. The present treaty shall be ratified by the contracting powers in accord with their respective constitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the United States will transmit to the other contracting powers a certified copy of the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications.

The present treaty, of which the English and French texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other contracting powers.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty. Done at the City of Washington the sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

In connection with the tariff treaty, the Chinese delegation presented and caused to be spread upon the record a resolution which states that "the Chinese Government have no intention to effect any change which may disturb the present administration of the Chinese maritime customs."

THE SHANTUNG TREATY

CHINA AND JAPAN, being equally animated by a sincere desire to settle amicably and in accordance with their common interest outstanding questions relative to Shantung, have resolved to conclude a treaty for the settlement of such, and have to that end named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Excellency the President of the Chinese Republic;

Soa Ke Alfred Sze, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary;

Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary; and

Chung-Hui Wang, former Minister of Justice;

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan;

Baron Tomosaburo Kato, Minister of the Navy;

Baron Kijuro Shidehara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary; and

Masanao Hanihara, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

I THE FORMER GERMAN LEASED TERRITORY OF KIAO-CHAU

1. Japan shall restore to China the former German leased territory of Kiao-Chau.

2. The Governments of Japan and China shall each appoint a commission with powers to make and carry out detailed arrangements relating to the transfer of the administration and of public property in the said territory and to settle other matters equally requiring adjustment. For such purposes the Japanese and Chinese commissions shall meet immediately upon the coming into force of the present agreement.

3. The said transfer and adjustment shall be completed as soon

as possible, and in any case not later than six months from the date of the coming into force of this agreement.

4. The Japanese Government agrees to hand over to the Chinese Government, upon the transfer to China of the administration of the former German leased territory of Kiao-Chau, such archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and other documents, in the possession of Japan or certified copies thereof, as may be necessary for the said transfer, as well as those that may be useful for the administration by China, after such transfer, of that territory, and of the fifty-kilometre zone around Kiao-Chau Bay.

II PUBLIC PROPERTIES

1. The Government of Japan undertakes to transfer to the Government of China all public properties, including land, buildings, works or establishments in the leased territory of Kiao-Chau, whether formerly possessed by the German authorities or purchased or constructed by the Japanese authorities during the Japanese administration of the said territory, save those indicated in this article (Paragraph 3) of this treaty.

2. In the transfer of such public properties no compensation will be claimed from the Government of China except (1) for those purchased or constructed by the Japanese authorities and also (2) for the improvement on or additions to those formerly possessed by the German authorities. With regard to cases under these two categories, the Government of China shall refund a fair and equitable proportion of the expenses actually incurred by the Government of Japan for such properties specified in (1) or such improvements or additions specified in (2), having regard to the principle of depreciation.

3. It is agreed that such public properties in the leased territory of Kiao-Chau as are required for the Japanese Consulate to be established in Tsing-tao shall be retained by the Government of Japan, and that those required more especially for the benefit of the Japanese community, including public schools, shrines and cemeteries, shall be left in the hands of the said community.

Details of such matter shall be arranged by the joint commission provided for in an article of this treaty.

III JAPANESE TROOPS

The Japanese troops, including gendarmes now stationed along the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway and its branches, shall be with-

drawn as soon as the Chinese police or military force shall have been sent to take over the protection of the railway.

The disposition of the Chinese police or military force and the withdrawal of the Japanese troops under the foregoing provisions may be effected in sections. The date of the completion of such process for each section shall be arranged in advance between the competent authorities of Japan and China. The entire withdrawal of such Japanese troops shall be effected if possible within three months, and, in any case, not later than six months from the date of the signature of the present agreement.

The Japanese garrison at Tsing-tao shall be completely withdrawn, simultaneously, if possible, with the transfer of the administration of the leased territory of Kiao-Chau to China. and in any case not later than thirty days from the date of such transfer.

IV THE MARITIME CUSTOMS

1. It is agreed that upon the coming into force of the present treaty the Custom House of Tsing-tao shall be made an integral part of the Chinese maritime customs.

2. It is understood that the provisional agreement of Aug. 6, 1915, between Japan and China relative to the maritime customs office at Tsing-tao will cease to be effective upon the coming into force of the present treaty.

V THE TSING-TAO-TSINANFU RAILWAY

1. Japan shall transfer to China the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway and its branches, together with all the properties appurtenant thereto, including wharves, warehouses and other similar properties.

2. China, on her part, undertakes to reimburse to Japan the actual value of the railway properties mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The actual value to be so reimbursed shall consist of the sum of 53,406,141 gold marks (which is the assessed value of such portion of the said properties as was left behind by the Germans), or its equivalent, plus the amount which Japan, during her administration of the railway, has actually expended for permanent improvements on or additions to the said properties, less a suitable allowance for depreciation. It is understood that no charge will be made with respect to the wharves, warehouses and other similar properties mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this article, except for such permanent improvements on or additions to them as may have been made by Japan during her administration of the railway, less a suitable allowance for depreciation.

3. The Government of Japan and the Government of China shall each appoint three commissioners to form a joint railway commission, with powers to appraise the actual value of the railway properties on the basis defined in the preceding paragraph, and to arrange the transfer of the said properties.

4. Such transfer shall be completed as soon as possible, and, in any case, not later than nine months from the date of the coming into force of the present agreement.

5. To effect the reimbursement under Paragraph 2 of this article, China shall simultaneously with the completion of the transfer of the railway properties, deliver to Japan Chinese Government Treasury notes, secured on the properties and revenues of the railway, and running for a period of fifteen years, but redeemable at the option of China at the end of five years from the date of the delivery of the Treasury notes, or at any time thereafter upon six months' previous notice.

6. Pending the redemption of the said Treasury notes, the Chinese Government will select and appoint, for so long a period as the said notes remain unredeemed, a Japanese subject to the post of traffic manager and another Japanese subject to be chief accountant jointly with the Chinese chief accountant with coördinate functions. These officials shall all be under the direction, control and supervision of the Chinese managing director, and removable for cause.

7. Financial details of a technical character relating to the said Treasury notes, not provided for in this article, shall be determined in mutual accord between the Japanese and Chinese authorities as soon as possible, and, in any case, not later than six months from the date of the coming into force of the present agreement.

VI THE EXTENSIONS OF THE TSING-TAO-TSINANFU RAILWAY

It is agreed that the concessions relating to the two extensions of the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway, namely, the Tsinanfu-Shunteh and the Kaomi-Hsuchowfu lines, will be thrown open for the common activity of an international financial group, on terms to be arranged between the Chinese Government and the said group.

VII MINES

The mines of Tsechuan, Fangtse and Chinlingchen, for which the mining rights were formerly granted by China to Germany, shall be handed to a company to be formed by a special charter of the Chinese Government, in which the Japanese capital may not exceed the amount of the Chinese capital. The mode and terms of such ar-

rangement shall be determined by the Chinese and Japanese commissions which are to be appointed for that purpose and which shall meet immediately upon the coming into force of the present agreement.

VIII OPENING OF THE FORMER GERMAN LEASED TERRITORY

The Japanese Government declares that it has no intention of seeking the establishment of an exclusive Japanese settlement or of an international settlement in Tsing-tao.

The Chinese Government, on its part, declares that the entire area of the former German leased territory of Kiao-Chau will be opened to foreign trade, and that foreigners will be permitted freely to reside and carry on commerce, industry, and other lawful pursuits within such area.

The vested rights lawfully and equitably acquired by foreign nationals in said area, whether under the German régime or during the Japanese military occupation, will be respected.

All questions relating to the status or validity of such vested rights acquired by Japanese nationals shall be arranged by the Sino-Japanese Joint Commission.

IX SALT INDUSTRY

Whereas, the salt industry is a Government monopoly in China, it is agreed that the interests of Japanese companies of Japanese nationals actually engaged in the said industry along the coast of Kiao-Chau Bay are to be purchased by the Chinese Government on payment of fair compensation, and that exportation to Japan of a quantity of salt produced by the said industry along the said coast is to be permitted on reasonable terms. Arrangements for the above purposes, including the transfer of said interests to the Chinese Government, shall be completed by the Chinese and Japanese commissions as soon as possible, and in any case not later than six months from date of the coming into force of the present agreement.

X SUBMARINE CABLES

Japan declares that all the rights, titles and privileges concerning former German submarine cables between Tsing-tao and Chefoo, and between Tsing-tao and Shanghai, are vested in China, with the exception of those portions of the said two cables which have been utilized by the Japanese Government for the laying of a cable between Tsing-tao and Sasebo—it being understood that the ques-

tion relating to the landing and operation at Tsing-tao and the said Tsing-tao-Sasebo cable shall be arranged by the Chinese and Japanese commissions as subject to the terms of the existing contracts to which China is a party.

XI WIRELESS STATIONS

The Japanese wireless stations at Tsing-tao and Tsinanfu shall be transferred to China upon the withdrawal of the Japanese troops at those two places, respectively, with fair compensation for the value of these stations. The details of such transfer and compensation shall be arranged by the Chinese and Japanese commissions.

ANNEXES

I. PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS. Japan declares that she renounces all preferential rights with regard to foreign assistance in persons, capital and material, stipulated in the Sino-German Treaty of March 6, 1898.

II. PUBLIC ENTERPRISES. Enterprises relating to electric light, telephone, stock yards, etc., shall be handed over to the Chinese Government, with the understanding that the stock yard, electric light and laundry enterprises are, in turn, to be handed over to the municipal government of Tsing-tao, which will form Chinese corporations in conformity with the Chinese Company law to manage them under municipal supervision and regulations.

III. TELEPHONES. 1. The Japanese Government agrees to turn over to the Chinese Government the telephone enterprise in the former German leased territory of Kiao-Chau.

2. As regards such telephone enterprise, the Chinese Government will give due consideration to requests from the foreign community at Tsing-tao for such extensions and improvements as may be reasonably required by the general interests of the public.

IV. PUBLIC WORKS. The Chinese Government declares that in the management and maintenance of the public works in Tsing-tao, such as roads, waterworks, parks, drainage, sanitary equipment, etc., handed over to the Chinese Government by the Japanese Government, the foreign community in Tsing-tao shall have fair representation.

V. MARITIME CUSTOMS. The Chinese Government declares that it will move the Inspector General of the Chinese maritime customs to permit the Japanese traders at Tsing-tao to communicate with the said customs in the Japanese language, and, in the selection of

a suitable staff for the Tsing-tao customs, to give consideration within the limits of its established service regulations to the diverse needs of the trade of Tsing-tao.

VI. THE TSING-TAO-TSINANFU RAILWAY. Should the Joint Railway Commission fail to reach an agreement on any of the matter entrusted to its charge, the points at issue shall be taken up by the two Governments for discussion and adjustment by means of diplomacy. In the determination of such points the two Governments shall, if necessary, obtain recommendations of an expert or experts of a third power or powers who shall be designated in mutual agreement with each other.

VII. EXTENSION OF THE TSING-TAO-TSINANFU RAILWAY. The Japanese Government has no intention of claiming that the option for the construction of the Chefoo-Weihsien Railway should be thrown open for the common activity of the international financial consortium if that railway is to be constructed with Chinese capital.

VIII. OPENING OF THE FORMER LEASED TERRITORY. The Chinese Government declares that, pending the enactment and general application of laws regulating the system of local self-government in China, the Chinese local authorities will ascertain the views of the foreign residents in the former German leased territory of Kiao-Chau in such municipal matters as may directly affect their welfare and interests.

SPECIAL UNDERSTANDINGS

1. It is understood that on taking over the railway, the Chinese authorities shall have full power and discretion to continue to remove the present employés of Japanese nationality in the service of the railway and that reasonable notice may be given before the date of the transfer of the railway. Detailed arrangements regarding the replacement to take effect immediately on the transfer of the railway to China are to be made by the Chinese and Japanese authorities.

2. It is understood (1) that the entire subordinate staff of the Japanese traffic manager and of the Japanese chief accountant is to be appointed by the Chinese Managing Director; and (2) that after two years and a half from the date of the transfer of the railway, the Chinese Government may appoint an assistant traffic manager of Chinese nationality, for the period of two years and a half, and that such assistant Chinese traffic manager may also be appointed at any time after six months' notice for the redemption of the Treasury notes is given.

3. The Japanese delegation declares that Japan has no intention

to claim that China is under any obligation to appoint Japanese nationals as members of the said subordinate staff.

4. It is understood that the redemption of the said Treasury notes will not be effected with funds raised from any source other than Chinese.

Resolution

Regarding a Board of Reference to Serve the Principle of the Open Door in China

I. With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the powers other than China represented at this conference agree:

(a) Not to seek or to support their nationals in seeking any arrangement which might purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of right with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China;

(b) Not to seek or to support their nationals in seeking any such monopoly or preferences as would deprive other nationals of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China or of participating with the Chinese Government or with any local authority in any category or public enterprise which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the principle of equal opportunity.

It is understood that this agreement is not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be necessary to the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial or financial undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and research.

II. The Chinese Government takes note of the above agreement and declares its intention of being guided by the same principles in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from Governments and nationals of all foreign countries whether parties to that agreement or not.

III. The powers, including China, represented at this conference agree in principle to the establishment in China of a Board of Reference to which any question arising on the above agreement and declaration may be referred for investigation and report. (A detailed scheme for the constitution of the board shall be formed by the special conference referred to in Article I of the convention on Chinese customs duties.)

Railway Resolutions of January 19

(a) The Chinese Government declares that throughout the whole of the railways in China it will not exercise or permit any unfair discrimination of any kind. In particular there shall be no discrimination whatever, direct or indirect, in respect of charges or of facilities on the ground of the nationality of passengers or the countries from which or to which they are proceeding, or the origin or ownership of goods or the country from which or to which they are consigned, or the nationality or ownership of the ship or other means of conveying such passengers or goods before or after their transport on the Chinese railways.

The other powers represented at this conference take note of the above declaration and make a corresponding declaration in respect of any of the aforesaid railways over which they or their nationals are in a position to exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special agreement or otherwise.

Any question arising under this declaration may be referred by any of the powers concerned to the Board of Reference, when established, for consideration and report.

(b) The resolution for railway unification, as finally adopted, read thus:

The powers represented in this conference record their hope that, to the utmost degree consistent with legitimate existing rights, the future development of railways in China shall be so conducted as to enable the Chinese Government to effect the unification of the railways into a railway system under Chinese control, with such foreign financial and technical assistance as may prove necessary in the interests of that system.

Resolution Regarding Reduction of China's Armies

Whereas the powers attending this conference have been deeply impressed with the severe drain on the public revenue of China through the maintenance in various parts of the country of military forces, excessive in number and controlled by the military chiefs of the provinces without coördination; and

Whereas the continued maintenance of these forces appears to be mainly responsible for China's present unsettled political conditions; and

Whereas it is felt that large and prompt reductions of these forces will not only advance the cause of China's political unity and economic development, but will hasten her financial rehabilitation;

Therefore, without any intention to interfere in the internal problems of China, but animated by the sincere desire to see China develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government, alike in her own interest and in the general interest of trade; and being inspired by the spirit of this conference, whose aim is to reduce, through the limitation of armaments, the enormous disbursements which manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity; it is

Resolved, That this conference express to China the earnest hope that immediate and effective steps may be taken by the Chinese Government to reduce the aforesaid military forces and expenditures.

Resolution Regarding Publication of All International Agreements

The powers represented in this conference, considering it desirable that there should hereafter be full publicity with respect to all matters affecting the political and other international obligations of China and of the several powers in relation to China, are agreed as follows:

I

The seven powers other than China will, at their earliest convenience, file with the Secretariat General of the conference for transmission to the participating powers a list of all treaties, conventions, exchange of notes or other international agreements which they may have with China, or with any other power or powers in relation to China, which they deem to be still in force and upon which they may desire to rely. In each case citations will be given to any official or other publication in which an authoritative text of the documents may be found. In any case in which the document may not have been published, a copy of the text (in its original language or languages) will be filed with the Secretariat General of the conference.

Every treaty or other international agreement of the character described which may be concluded hereafter shall be notified by the Governments concerned within sixty days of its conclusion to the powers who are signatories of or adherents to this agreement.

II

The several powers other than China will file with the Secretariat General of the conference at their earliest convenience for trans-

mission to the participating powers a list, as nearly complete as may be possible, of all those contracts between their nationals, of the one part, and the Chinese Government or any of its administrative subdivisions or local authorities, of the other part, which involve any concession, franchise, option or preference with regard to railway construction, mining, forestry, navigation, river conservancy, harbour works, reclamation, electrical communications, or other public works or public services, or for the sale of arms or ammunition, or which involve a lien upon any of the purviews or properties of the Chinese Government or of any of its administrative subdivisions. There shall be, in the case of each document so listed, either a citation to a published text or copy of the text itself.

Every contract of the public character described which may be concluded hereafter shall be notified by the Governments concerned within sixty days after the receipt of information of its conclusion to the powers who are signatories of or adherents to this agreement.

III

The Chinese Government agrees to notify, in the condition laid down in this agreement, every treaty, agreement or contract of the character indicated herein which has been or may hereafter be concluded by that Government or by any local authority in China with any foreign power or the nationals of any foreign power, whether party to this agreement or not, so far as the information is in its possession.

IV

The Governments of powers having treaty relations with China, which are not represented at the present conference, shall be invited to adhere to this agreement. The United States Government, as convener of the conference, undertakes to communicate this agreement to the Governments of the said powers, with a view to obtaining their adherence thereto as soon as possible.

Resolution Banishing Spheres of Influence

Resolved, That the signatory powers will not support any agreement by their respective nationals with each other designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the enjoyment of exclusive opportunity in designated parts of Chinese territory.

Resolution Regarding Radio Stations in China

The representatives of the powers hereinafter named participating

in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions in the conference on the limitation of armament, to wit, the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal, have resolved:

1. That all radio stations in China, whether maintained under the provisions of the International Protocol of September 7, 1901, or in fact maintained in the grounds of any of the foreign legations in China, shall be limited in their use to sending and receiving Government messages and shall not receive or send commercial or personal or unofficial messages, including press matters; provided, however, that in case all other telegraphic communication is interrupted, then, upon official notification accompanied by proof of such interruption to the Chinese Ministry of Communications, such stations may afford temporary facilities for commercial, personal or unofficial messages, including press matter, until the Chinese Government has given notice of the termination of the interruption.

2. All radio stations operated within the territory of China by a foreign Government or the citizens or subjects thereof, under treaties or concessions of the Government of China, shall limit the messages sent and received by the terms of the treaties or concessions under which the respective stations are maintained.

3. In case there be any radio station maintained in the territory of China by a foreign Government or citizens or subjects thereof without the authority of the Chinese Government such station and all the plant, apparatus and material thereof shall be transferred to and taken over by the Government of China, to be operated under the direction of the Chinese Ministry of Communications upon fair and full compensation to the owners for the value of the installation, as soon as the Chinese Ministry of Communications is prepared to operate the same effectively for the general public benefit.

4. If any question shall arise as to the radio stations in leased territories, in the South Manchurian Railway zone or in the French concession at Shanghai, they shall be regarded as matters for discussion between the Chinese Government and the Government concerned.

5. The owners or managers of all radio stations maintained in the territory of China by foreign powers or citizens or subjects thereof shall confer with the Chinese Ministry of Communications for the purpose of seeking a common arrangement to avoid interference in the use of wave lengths by wireless stations in China, subject to such general arrangements as may be made by an international conference convened for the revision of the rules estab-

lished by the International Radio Telegraph Convention signed at London, July 5, 1912.

RESERVATIONS

The powers other than China declare that nothing in paragraphs 3 or 4 of the resolution of December 7, 1921, is to be deemed to be an expression of opinion by the conference as to whether the stations referred to therein are or are not authorized by China.

They further give notice that the result of any discussion arising under Paragraph 4 must, if it is not to be subject to objection by them, conform with the principles of the open door, or equality of opportunity, approved by the conference.

The Chinese delegation takes this occasion formally to declare that the Chinese Government does not recognize or concede the right of any foreign power or of the nationals thereof to instal or operate, without its express consent, radio stations in legation grounds, settlements, concessions, leased territories, railway areas or other similar areas.

APPENDIX B

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE AMERICAN MINISTER AT PEKING AND THE WAI CHIAO PU REGARDING ACTION RELATING TO GERMANY

1

(The American Minister at Peking to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Copy.)

Peking, February 4th, 1917.

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to advise Your Excellency that I have been instructed by my Government to make you the following notification in its behalf:

This Government, in view of the recent announcement by the German Government of its intention to renew indiscriminate submarine warfare, has no alternative but to pursue the course laid down in its note to the German Government on April 18th, 1916. It will therefore recall the American Ambassador and his suite at Berlin, and will forthwith deliver to the German Ambassador in Washington passports for himself and his suite.

I am further instructed to say that the President is reluctant to believe that Germany will actually carry out the threats made against neutral commerce, but, if it is done, the President will ask from Congress authority to use the national power to protect American citizens engaged in peaceful and lawful errands on the high seas. The course taken is, in the view of the President, in entire conformity with the principles enunciated by him in his address to the Senate on January 22nd, and he therefore believes that it will make for the peace of the world if the other neutral Powers can find it possible to take action similar to that taken by the United States.

I avail, etc.,
PAUL REINSCH.

2

(The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American Minister at Peking. Translation.)

Peking, 9th day, 2nd month,
6th year of the Republic.

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of February 4th, 1917, informing me that the Government of the United States of America, in view of the adoption by the German Government of its new policy of submarine warfare on the 1st of February, has decided to take certain action which it judges necessary as regards Germany.

The Chinese Government, like the President of the United States of America, is reluctant to believe that the German Government will actually carry into execution those measures which imperil the lives and property of citizens of neutral states and jeopardize the commerce, even legitimate, between neutrals as well as between neutrals and belligerents and which tend, if allowed to be enforced without opposition, to introduce a new principle into international law.

The Chinese Government being in accord with the principles set forth in Your Excellency's note and firmly associating itself with the Government of the United States, has taken similar action by protesting energetically to the German Government against the new measures of blockade. The Chinese Government also proposes to take such action in the future as may be deemed necessary for the maintenance of the principles of international law.

I avail, etc.,
WU TING-FANG.

APPENDIX C

How British in the Far East View the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

"The Japan Chronicle," published at Kobe, recently celebrated its thirtieth anniversary under the same editorship—that of Robert Young, who resided in Japan for thirty-five years. The "Chronicle" is firmly established as the leading British organ published in Japan, and Mr. Young (who died in 1923) is recognized as an authority on policies and conditions in that country. Follow extracts from editorials in "The Japan Chronicle" on various developments and phases of the alliance:

Does the Alliance "Maintain Peace"?

"The Japan Chronicle"
June 9, 1921

In translating certain phrases from English into Japanese or from Japanese into English, it is necessary, on account of association of ideas being so diverse, to add explanations, indicate exceptions, and explain implications. This must happen in the case of any languages that lack a common origin or have far diverged.

But there is no reason to suppose that this is so in the case of the well-worn phrase "the peace of the Far East." The words must mean just the same in Japanese as they do in English. Yet they are assuredly used in a very special sense. For instance, the "Asahi," in an article of which we published a translation on the 1st instant, states perfectly seriously that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has maintained the peace of the Far East since 1902, and has contributed to the peace of the world at large. The Russo-Japanese War was not a very happy example of the preservation of the peace, and if one thing is more certain than another it is that that war was the direct outcome of the Treaty. The Boxer rebellion and a long series of civil wars in China, the siege and capture of Tsingtau, the mobilization of a military expedition to compel China to sign a predatory treaty in 1915, the invasion of Manchuria, and the expedition to and occupation of Siberia, are none of them eminently peaceful episodes. As for assisting in maintaining the peace of the world, it is nearly seven years now since the world knew what peace was.

Yet it is not with the tongue in the cheek that Japanese writers continually say that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has maintained

the peace of the Far East and buttressed that of the whole world. It is said in all seriousness. There is only one possible explanation, and that is that when Japanese writers think of peace in the Far East they think of it only as a condition imposed by Japan—a sort of pax Romana on a small scale.

A peace imposed by Japan and depending upon Japan's dominance is their ideal of "peace in the Far East," and there is a sort of naïve simplicity in not only assuming that this is the best possible kind of peace, but in also assuming that it is the kind of peace that will best be appreciated by other nations. It is probably a legacy of long seclusion that Japanese writers always seem to assume that what is satisfactory to themselves must needs be satisfactory to all peoples. But when it is thoroughly grasped that the praise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for maintaining the peace is really praise for its having secured Japan's hegemony, it will begin to be apparent, except to insular Japanese writers, that the world at large has no particular reason for regarding the Alliance as an instrument of unexampled beneficence. The most unfortunate effect of calling a military hegemony "peace" is that it leads to self-deception.

Real Character of the Alliance

"The Japan Chronicle"
June 23, 1921

In the parliamentary debate preliminary to the Imperial Conference, all the critics of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance quoted by Reuter are Coalition-Unionists, which indicates that there is no lack of dubiety regarding the needs and objects of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But, as is only to be expected of a Parliament constituted like the present one, the debate was so feeble that Mr. Chamberlain was able to congratulate it on its high tone. He confessed that the reasons for the Alliance have passed away and that there is no reason for the Alliance at present. But, he said, the future must be looked to. To its eyes being bandaged in this manner the House of Commons appears to have submitted without a protest. Its misgivings are set at rest by the suggestion that the Colonial Premiers will have a deciding voice. But it is questionable whether they are any more independent agents than the average party man in Parliament. The conversion of Messrs. Hughes and Massey was rather too sudden to carry conviction. There is a good deal of secret diplomacy within the Empire, and both Premiers are very susceptible to arguments re-

garding the value of a policy which will make it possible for the mother country to ease their throes of budget-making.

Mr. Chamberlain carefully kept away from the essentials of his subject. He said that future contingencies had to be provided against, but he did not explain what contingencies these were. The Alliance is not, as the Government organ in Japan says, a mere testimonial of warm friendship. It is the pretence that alliances have this character which leads to the foolish demands for an alliance that shall include America, France, Belgium, Italy, and everybody else concerned in the reconstruction of the world after the war.

The essence of the Alliance is that it is a military pact, and Parliament has a right to know whom it is that the makers of the Treaty believe that they may have to fight in the future. Those who recommend its renewal most warmly do so on the grounds of its past value as a fighting instrument. They cannot pretend that such an alliance in the future will have no military implications whatever. That is simply to confess that there is no need for an alliance, and it is contrary to the intentions of those who are arranging for a renewal.

Emphasis is laid on the fact that it will not be and cannot be directed against the United States. Then who is the enemy? The Japanese navy is not necessarily being enlarged at such a frantic rate because of any intention to fight the United States. But it is clear that it will create an effective deterrent to protests which the United States might feel inclined to make regarding Japanese action on the Asiatic mainland. The only surmise towards which this points is that Britain and Japan desire to coöperate in deterring interference with their Asiatic operations. This, as diplomatists understand the truth, would not prevent diplomatists from truthfully declaring that the Alliance was not directed in any manner against the United States.

The whole point of the objection lies in the fact that while the Alliance has been an effective military instrument, it has acted in a manner directly contrary to its professions so far as they have been pacific. It has not preserved the integrity of China but has prevented other Powers making any attempt to preserve it.

Purposes of the Alliance

"The Japan Chronicle"
July 7, 1921

Like most men who take up a cause in which they do not believe, Mr. Hughes, the Australian Premier, does the renewal of the

Alliance more harm than good. He harps upon the entire lack of hostility towards America and on the influence which Britain will acquire in Far Eastern counsels. Then the only justification for his point of view, and the only recommendation of Alliance that he has to offer America, is that Britain will use that influence in order to protect American interests if Japan should try to encroach upon them. This may be a very high-minded spirit in which to enter an alliance—"with hostility to none, with charity to all," and all that sort of thing—but it is not a reason for joining in an alliance that appeals to the unregenerate. And Mr. Hughes does not make his appeal to the elect only. He appeals to the unregenerate on the value of the Alliance which will give Britain Japan's powerful support. In other words, according to Mr. Hughes, the Alliance is to support Britain's aims and checkmate Japan's—a one-sided alliance indeed which would be insulting to Japan to seek.

It is curious how the proposals regarding the warlike intention of the Alliance limit themselves to negatives. We hear a great deal about how it must be made quite plain that America is to be free from any suspicion of British hostility or attack. Considering that America is better able than any country in the world to take care of herself, this seems rather superfluous. It would be more reassuring to many countries if the treaty should be subject to attack in common. For instance the Treaty might say:

"In consideration of the fact that France, Holland and Russia (confound them!) have interests both in Europe and the Far East, the High Contracting Parties will jump on any of these States at both ends simultaneously if they get too uppish, and will share the spoils in common. And as for poor old China, that predestined spoil shall be shared in the friendliest manner in the world and American interests frozen out so far as they do not put themselves into the hands for operation of the High Contracting Parties. Only all must be done in the politest manner so that the unbroken friendship may be expressed all the time with any degree of oleaginousness required. And in every possible way the High Contracting Parties shall prevent any matters in which their interests are involved from coming before that absurd contraption the League of Nations, and shall prevent the League from settling any matter such as shall create a precedent for meddling in the affairs of the High Contracting Parties, to the end that the glorious tradition of alliance in arms may be preserved and disarmament heresies squelched."

This would be "positive" policy such as Japanese politicians are

fond of advocating, and it would bring great comfort and reassurance to all the countries not named, and would make them love Britain and Japan. Or if they did not love them, they could be brought to their senses very easily. Of course, the scheme is only tentative. The language needs a little diplomatic polish. All that we intend to suggest is that when two countries, both members of the League of Nations, ally themselves in arms, they should specify what country or countries approves or not.

Whom Does the Alliance Threaten?

"The Japan Chronicle"
July 14, 1921

All the protestations that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance threatens nobody are stultified by the admissions that assurances have been necessary to the United States. So dangerous an instrument was it that was concluded in 1902 that on its revision in 1911 the British Government had to declare to the Japanese Government that it would regard as a treaty of general arbitration an arrangement with the United States that did not provide for arbitration at all.

But the danger remains of other countries finding themselves faced by an Anglo-Japanese combination. If such a danger is less regarded it is only because, with the exception of the United States, there is now no country in a war with whom either Japan or Britain would need the help of the other, though there are contingencies where this combination might have the most far-reaching effects.

It is in its aspect as an instrument of war that the Alliance has become most objectionable. Under the League of Nations it is extremely improper that such instruments of war should exist between members at all. It is true that, by making military alliances with Belgium and Poland, France has secured a military hegemony of Europe, directed against interference by British, but this does not justify Britain and Japan in doing likewise, and, except with regard to Russian relations, an Anglo-Japanese Alliance would not be of much value in any European dispute. Even as regards Russia, only after a diametrical change of policy could the Alliance become useful in the rescue of that State. Up to the present Japan's policy has shown a considerable susceptibility to French influence, whether in the rescue of the Czechs or the spoliation of the Germans, so it is hardly possible to regard the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a set-off against the French hegemony of Europe. To some readers it will seem hardly decent, after the protestations of eternal friendship with France, to discuss such

possibilities at all. But if there is any impropriety at all, it consists in the creation of armed alliances, not in a discussion of their possible reasons and results.

Futility of a "Triple Alliance"

"The Japan Chronicle"
September 1, 1921

It might have been thought that the world had had enough of alliances after the last war. That war would probably never have been fought if Europe had not been divided into two camps by alliances, which led to the arming of groups against each other and then to the precipitation of a war which, as can easily now be seen, would have been avoided if the fatal instruments of conflict were not ready for immediate use. But mankind does not learn rapidly even by experience.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is to all intents and purposes dead. That is admitted even by Japanese who a few months ago were most enthusiastic for its renewal. It is recognized as dead by the British Foreign Office. Even the English advocates who are in favour of renewal admit that it has failed to accomplish its avowed objects, and their only excuse for its continuance is that somehow and by some means it might be serviceable in accomplishing the purposes for which it was originally drafted.

But the opposition to it having grown strong, it is proposed that instead of renewing the Alliance, the instrument should be extended so as to include America. Mr. Lloyd George is in favour of this plan, principally, it would seem, as a means of "saving face"—the face in this case being the militarist desire that "strong" Powers should stand together. The suggestion has not been received favourably in America, and it has a cold welcome in Japan. But the opposition in the two countries is based on very different grounds. The United States opposes it partly because of the traditional objection to entangling alliances, but chiefly because it is realized that if the alliance of Japan with Britain failed to accomplish the object set forth in the agreement there is no reason to believe that the accession of America to the pact would make any essential difference.

It is realized in America, as it is realized by every one who has made an impartial study of the history of the existing Alliance, that so far from acting as a check on the designs of Japan's militarists, Britain's part in the Alliance has come to condone what she found herself unable to resist. No doubt there have been occasions where

Britain's influence has prevented Japan from going the full length advocated by some of her militarists, but the only effect of this has been to give an air of moderation to Japan's policy of penetration, and thus to render it more effective in practice. If America comes into the pact, she also will be constrained to adopt the same policy, and to condone where it would be better for the interest of America and even of Japanese people to protest.

The oldest and leading British newspaper published in north China is "The Peking and Tientsin Times." Its editor now and for several years past is H. G. W. Woodhead, C. B. E., who has lived and worked in China for more than ten years. He was decorated by the British and Belgian governments for his journalistic work during the World War. He is also the editor of the China Year Book. Follow extracts from a series of editorials written by Mr. Woodhead and published in "The Peking and Tientsin Times" in 1920, analyzing and criticizing the Anglo-Japanese alliance in the light of its record:

JAPAN, THE ALLIANCE, AND THE GREAT WAR

"The Peking and Tientsin Times"
March 29, 1920

Japan's policy then underwent a radical change. As the Ally of Great Britain she was pledged to do all in her power to consolidate and maintain the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India, to preserve the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China, and to maintain the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and India. The naval and military resources of her Ally were strained to the utmost during the European war, and Japan, by providing the bulk of the forces necessary to reduce Tsingtau, and by employing a portion of her Fleet to hunt for German raiders and submarines, rendered valuable services in the common cause. But her interpretation of her responsibilities in the Far East was amazing. As soon as it was clear that the war was likely to be protracted, and that the whole civilized world was so preoccupied with events in the West that little or no interest was felt regarding the situation in the Far East, Japan initiated a policy of naked aggression towards China.

The story of the negotiations in connection with the Twenty-one Demands is familiar to most of our readers. It is a story that few Japanese can recall without a feeling of shame. Viscount Kato, who had signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911, was Foreign Minister, in Count Okuma's cabinet, at the time. And it would be difficult in the most unsavory chapters of modern diplomacy to find anything worse than the chicanery and deceit employed to ward off foreign protests until Japan had got her way.

When the details of the demands had leaked out, in spite of Japanese threats and precautions, Count Okuma gave out an interview in which he declared: that the criticisms of Japan were due to German instigation; that Japan's propositions "are in complete accord with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and with all treaties and engagements with other countries guaranteeing equal opportunity and the integrity of China"; that Japan was not seeking to establish any monopoly in China or improperly to infringe the rights and interests of other Powers; that Japan had not demanded the appointment of Japanese advisers; and that when the final disclosures were made, it would be found that "the entire situation has been grossly exaggerated."

Every one of these statements was untrue. Japan knew full well that the acceptance of her outrageous demands could never be obtained by peaceful means. It is probable that she would have pressed for the acceptance of the whole of the Twenty-one Demands, but for the fact that her actions were beginning to excite hostile comment in Europe and America. Sir Edward Grey was being bombarded with questions in the House of Commons—questions to which he was unable to give frank or full replies. He could only state that Great Britain continued to be bound by the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, when what all the world wanted to know was whether Japan, also, continued to be bound by them. It was not until May 16th that America took any action, though it may be supposed that she had made inquiries of Peking and Tokio before matters came to a crisis. On that date she presented identic Notes to China and Japan, declaring that the Government of the United States "cannot recognize any agreement or understanding, which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the Treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door policy."

On May 7, 1915, a day which will go down in history in connection with two tragedies, one in the West (the sinking of the *Lusitania*) and the other in the Far East, Japan presented an Ultimatum to China, requiring immediate acceptance of all but Group V of the Twenty-one Demands. Group V, compliance with which would have converted China into a Japanese Protectorate, was at the last moment "detached" from "the present negotiations," to be discussed "separately in the future."

China was helpless at the moment. She could expect no real aid from Europe or America in resisting Japan's pretensions, and had, perforce, to accept the Demands, many of which could only be reconciled with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the exchange of Notes between America and Japan, by a casuist of an exceptional (shall we say Japanese?) mentality. It is, however, on the strength of the pledges thus extorted from China that Japan bases her present claims in respect of Shantung—claims which, as the Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce pointed out only on Friday last, admit of only one construction, "namely, she is not going to allow any other nation to have the opportunity of trading on fair and equal terms with her nationals."

The Japanese will probably never understand the impression made upon Britons and their European Allies in China by the Twenty-one Demands. It seemed to us a complete betrayal of our Ally—a betrayal the more callous because it was committed during a period when the British Empire was literally fighting for its existence. During the brief period that intervened between the presentation and the acceptance of the Japanese Ultimatum, Britons throughout the Far East were asking themselves, what next? Was Japan, our Ally, deliberately provoking a rupture with China as a pretext for changing sides during the Great War? Every Briton knew that this crisis had been brought on against the wishes of his Government. It seemed impossible that if we emerged victorious from the War, the concessions extorted from China in this outrageous manner would be recognized by our own and Allied Governments. If Japan really wanted to make sure of her booty, was not her obvious course to make common cause with our foes, who would gladly have granted her a free hand in the Far East, and much else besides, for her coöperation? Confidence in Japan's integrity and intentions was shaken as it had never been shaken before in the whole course of the Alliance, and as it must never be shaken again, if that Alliance is to be renewed, and to be of the slightest value to Great Britain. And when Japanese statesmen,

when Japanese Missionaries, tell us that "there is not a shadow of aggressiveness in the policy of the present Japanese Government toward China" we are constrained to reply that even if that be true, the present policy of Japan in China is deep-rooted in the great injustice of 1915, and that the only way to regain the confidence of China, and of the rest of the world, is to lay the axe to the root, which can never produce aught but poisonous and bitter fruit.

Japan's Pressure on China

"The Peking and Tientsin Times"
April 7, 1920

It is an open secret that the reason advanced for Japan's opposition to China's entry into the war in the latter part of 1915 was her fear of the consequences of awakening military activity on the part of a nation of 400 millions. But the sincerity of this reasoning appears doubtful when one recalls the huge contracts for arms which were made by Japan with the Northern Militarists, between 1916 and 1918, and the attempt in the first half of 1915, to secure control of the Chinese Army, and a virtual monopoly of the supply of its arms and munitions. The least reproach that can be levelled at Japan on this score is that she showed herself extremely selfish, and quite indifferent to the wishes and interests of her Allies in Europe.

The real reason for Japan's attitude at this time must, we fear, be found in her design to turn the preoccupation of her Allies to the fullest possible account in prosecuting her schemes to make herself, indisputably, the paramount Power in the Far East. Some time later, when America had ceased to be neutral, the obvious trend of Japan's policy in the Far East prompted Mr. Lansing to suggest to Viscount Ishii the reaffirmation of the policy of the Open Door, and the preservation of China's territorial integrity. Viscount Ishii at once raised the question of the recognition of Japan's "special interests," but, as Mr. Lansing has since testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he declined to extend his recognition on behalf of the United States Government, unless it were clearly understood that there was no question of acknowledging that Japan had "paramount interests" in China. All that America was prepared to read into the words "special interests" was "that Japan, on account of her geographical position, had a peculiar interest in China, but that it was not of a political nature." Mr. Lansing

was averse to the use of the phrase at all, fearing that it might be wrongly construed, and in this fear he was, as it proved, correct. The Lansing-Ishii Note really achieved nothing except to make the Chinese believe that they had been "sold" by the United States.

Mr. Lansing had good ground for fearing that it was "the purpose of Japan to take advantage of the situation created by the war to extend her influence over China—political influence." For, following the 1915 Ultimatum, Japanese agents concluded a host of secret financial and economic agreements with various unscrupulous Chinese officials, the obvious object of which was to acquire by these means the privileges upon which she did not dare to insist, in May, 1915. Loans ranging from one to forty million yen were made to the Governments in Peking and the Provinces, and in some cases to Provinces in open rebellion against Peking. Twenty-nine such loans, totalling more than yen 246,000,000 were made in the year 1918 alone, and the effect of this indiscriminate financing of notoriously corrupt officials was to foment and prolong the internal dissension from which China is suffering even to this day. Whenever taxed with responsibility for these loans, the Japanese Government invariably took shelter behind the excuse that they were contracted without its knowledge or approval, but this pretence is belied by the lavish rewards bestowed upon those who were most successful in "financing" China.

The dramatic termination of the war, which aroused less enthusiasm in Japan than in any other Allied country, caused serious misgivings in Government circles in Tokio as to the results of Japan's policy in China during the preceding four years. It is scarcely necessary to recall the clumsy efforts that were made in Peking to intimidate the Chinese Government into suppressing the various secret engagements into which it had been compelled to enter during the war and to make the Chinese Delegation to Paris subordinate to the Japanese Delegates. Japanese statesmen were unable to conceal their apprehension at the prospect of China's playing an independent part at Paris, and but for the immediate publicity given to Tokio's attempts at intimidation, and the deplorable impression that would have been created throughout the world had Japan proceeded to carry out her threats, China would probably have been compelled to submit all her proposals at Paris to Japan, for the latter's approval, and to limit her activities in the Peace Conference to echoing the opinions of the Japanese Delegation. On this occasion, however, China was not bludgeoned into silence. She entered a very effective protest against the injustice to which she had been compelled to submit by Japan during the Great War, and

maintained her opposition to recognition of Japan's claims to the extent of refusing to sign the Peace Treaty.

Would Japan Seek Another Alliance?

"The Peking and Tientsin Times"
April 16, 1920

The Alliance must be denounced by one of the High Contracting Parties on or before July 13, 1920, if it is to terminate in July, 1921. It may be taken for granted that no denunciation will come from Japan. The Alliance has worked admirably from her point of view, and its extension, indefinitely, upon the same terms would suit her very well. Its denunciation, on the other hand, would seriously affect her position in international politics.

There is some suggestion that if the Alliance were not renewed Japan might be driven into the hands of Russia or Germany. So far as the Russians are concerned, unless there is a complete revulsion of feeling, any Alliance with Japan must be considered incredible. As well might one expect an Alliance between Germany and France. There has never in history been a time when the Russian people have been animated by such intense hatred of the Japanese as to-day. A Japanese Alliance with Germany would be futile as long as the Entente Powers insist upon the observance of the naval and military provisions of the Versailles Treaty. There is no other Power that is likely, with full knowledge of Japanese activities in the Far East, to seek an Alliance with her. Before the war her army, having beaten the Russians in Manchuria, was considered one of the most formidable and efficient in the world. To-day, compared with the armies and equipment of France, Britain and America, it must be considered a second-rate force. Japan has not yet succeeded in manufacturing or developing the use of any of the instruments which proved so effective in achieving the overthrow of the Central Powers: aëroplanes, monster artillery, tanks, and other weapons which were in daily general use on the European battlefields. Her navy is far more efficient, but dwarfed by the navies of Britain and the United States. She has, indeed, very little to offer as a quid pro quo for an alliance with an important European Power. If the war revealed anything it was her absolute dependence upon foreign supplies for the raw materials with which to make ships, weapons and munitions.

We do not expect Japan to make any serious attempt to find an Ally in another quarter, but we shall be extremely surprised if she does not strive might and main to secure the renewal of the Anglo-

Japanese Alliance. Its abrogation by Britain's denunciation would be a disastrous blow to Japanese prestige throughout the world. For it would be generally interpreted as evidence of Britain's disapproval of Japan's policy in the Far East during the Great War, and of British distrust of Japan's pledges in the future. If Japan had played the part we expected of her during the war there could be no question of denouncing the Alliance. If, in 1920, we evince a desire to have our hands free, only one possible interpretation can be placed upon our action. Do we wish the Alliance abrogated or renewed? If we desire it renewed, upon what basis? These questions we must leave for consideration in a subsequent article.

Should the Alliance be Renewed?

"The Peking and Tientsin Times"
April 20, 1920

It is not unreasonable to urge that if the Alliance is to be renewed, Britain, as well as Japan, should derive some advantage from its renewal. Powers do not enter into Alliances unless they expect to derive some benefit from such a course, whether it takes the form of freedom to develop a policy which both Allies have at heart, or the protection of each other's interests in the event of hostilities in which either Ally is involved. It is, therefore, only reasonable to inquire whether the British Empire can expect any advantages from the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which it could not reasonably expect to enjoy without an Alliance with Japan. The war has shown us how Japan interprets her obligations under the Alliance in its present form, when her Ally is "involved in war" as the result of "an unprovoked attack or aggressive action" on the part of another Power. Japan interpreted her obligations in the narrowest possible sense. From the time of the reduction of Tsingtau her chief concern appears to have been to exploit to the full the preoccupation of her Ally in Europe for her own selfish objects in China. As we have stated in a previous article, our chief gratitude to Japan must be based upon the fact that she abstained from attacking the territories of her Ally in the Far East, at a moment when we should have found it extremely embarrassing to defend them.

But what of the future? Can we reasonably expect a change in Japan's attitude? Is it conceivable that the extension of the Alliance will further our policies in Eastern Asia, and ensure the protection of our possessions in this portion of the Globe? We have seen that the policies of Great Britain and Japan, respectively,

in China are absolutely irreconcilable. Not only do we not approve of much that Japan has done in China during the past five years, but our own interests have suffered very substantially through our passive acquiescence. We have incurred, both in China and America, some of the moral obloquy which our Ally has earned by her actions in the Far East. We have, at certain crises in the recent history of China, been unable, owing to our loyalty to the Alliance, to range ourselves openly on the side of America and other enlightened Powers in opposition to Japan. Our statesmen have frequently found it impossible to give frank or full replies to reasonable inquiries regarding developments in the Far East, for fear of wounding Japanese susceptibilities. We have been compelled by the exigencies of the European situation, temporarily to concede to Japan the rôle of paramount Power in the Far East, and meekly to acquiesce in intrigues and outrages revolting to the Anglo-Saxon conscience. Are we to put the seal of approval upon our Ally's actions by the renewal of a Pact which she has thus abused?

The abrogation of the Alliance would be a great relief to the British Empire as a whole, which has much to lose, and nothing to gain, by its perpetuation. If the League of Nations Covenant, to which the Japanese, like ourselves, are a signatory, means what it says, every advantage we actually enjoy by virtue of the Alliance will still be ours. For under it, Japan is pledged to "respect and preserve as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League." Under it Japan is pledged to submit "to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council" every dispute likely to lead to a rupture with another member of the League. And under it, "should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of the covenants—it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League." If the covenant, then, be something more than a mere "scrap of paper," we have nothing to fear from Japan if the Alliance be abrogated, while, instead of meekly acquiescing in her aggression in the East, under the specious pretext that we are bound to support our Ally, we should be able to challenge, and insist upon its submission to the Council of the League, every Japanese, every Japanese action which we considered of an aggressive or immoral character.

Our interests in either hemisphere do not march harmoniously with those of Japan, and our Alliance with her constitutes a serious obstacle to a real Anglo-American rapprochement. In this part of the world both Britain and America stand for the Open Door, abolition of special privileges, fair play in China, the eradication

of militarism, and "the destruction of every arbitrary Power anywhere that can separately, secretly and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world." Elsewhere the two great Anglo-Saxon nations are united in their determination to resist unrestricted Asiatic immigration, a policy based upon economic and racial considerations which cannot be overborne. Britain and America desire to see a strong, united China, with an efficient government of its own choosing.

Japan's policy is in opposition to ours at nearly every point. She does not want the Open Door, though she will sign agreements innumerable approving of it in principle, so long as she is the doorkeeper. She is striving might and main to secure formal recognition of her "special privileges." Fair play for China does not even appear in her political creed. And if any proof were needed of the existence in the Far East of an "arbitrary Power" capable of "secretly and of its single choice" disturbing the peace of the world, surely we have had it recently in the aggressive actions of the Japanese militarists in Manchuria and Siberia. We can only continue to walk in the same pathway as Japan if we are content to tramp stolidly behind her with a torpid conscience. Neither the British Government of to-day, nor any British Government we are likely to have within the present generation, would dare to become an accomplice, upon equal terms, in Japan's policy in China. Our aspirations and traditions, moreover, do not fit us for the rôle of a passive accomplice in the commission of deeds of which we disapprove.

Parting of the Ways

"The Peking and Tientsin Times"
April 21, 1920

A few more words and we have done. The series of articles of which this is the last deals with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance from the point of view of a Briton in the Far East. Most of the facts mentioned are within the knowledge of all Britons who have resided in China during the past eight or nine years.

The deductions from those facts are necessarily a matter of individual opinion. We have attempted to be frank to the point of brutality because we believe the question of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to demand frankness. Ill-informed writers and public men in Europe and America present the public with a picture of Japan and her activities in the Far East which all impartial observers who have been in the Far East know to be a

travesty of the truth. If we have erred to the extent of exaggerating the other side of the picture we have done so without malice, and solely with the desire to reveal what most intelligent Britons in this part of the world have been thinking, if they have not been saying, during the crisis from which the British Empire has recently emerged. We must not be interpreted as suggesting that in all that had happened in China since the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty Japan has been wholly in the wrong, and we wholly in the right. There have been mistakes, serious mistakes on the part of British statesmanship as well as on the part of the statesmen of Japan. There have been times when our own policy towards China has not been free from the taint of Imperialism and aggression. The war, however, had led to a revision of our standards and our policy. We are endeavoring, we have been endeavoring for the past five years, to apply those new standards to our relations with other Powers. In the exigencies of war that has not always proved an easy or indeed a possible task.

But our eyes are fixed upon the hills for which we are making. The Conference of British Chambers of Commerce at Shanghai, last year, was a sign of the times. The resolutions it adopted, the discussions that preceded them, indicated an attitude towards China and her problems which would have been considered visionary and idealistic only a few years ago. Britons throughout the East today are champions of fair play for the country in which they live and trade. And their opposition to Japanese policies in this country is based upon the conviction that they are unfair to China, unfair to other nations, inconsistent with Anglo-Saxon ideals, and harmful to our good name as Japan's Ally. It may be that Japan herself will emerge from the present political turmoil with new standards, and honest and just policies. The almost universal opposition of the Japanese Press to the recent excesses of the Japanese Militarists in Siberia is a hopeful sign. But until we know Japan's intentions, until we know the path that she intends to tread, we ought not longer to be associated with her, even nominally, in her Far Eastern enterprises. We could and did plead that during the war we were too preoccupied in Europe to check Japanese aggression in China. That plea will no longer serve. As long as we are Allies we must in the eyes of the world, share the moral responsibility of Japan's actions. Can we continue to do so without drugging our consciences and conniving at violations of principles, the "maintenance of which is vital to the civilization of the world"?

Extract from an article contributed in 1921 to "Millard's Review

of the Far East" (Shanghai) by Mr. O. M. Green, editor of "The North-China Daily News" and "The North-China Herald." "The North-China Daily News" and the "Herald" are the senior and the principal British newspapers published in China, and Mr. Green has been connected with those papers as subeditor and editor for about fifteen years, having been editor for the last twelve years. Mr. Green exhibits the point of view of that class of British opinion which is disposed to tolerate a renewal of the alliance with Japan under certain conditions, but which distinctly stresses the need to revise it.

"To turn now to what China thinks of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it has at the outset to be confessed that one may more truly say that "China thinks" (that is, as a united nation) more on this subject than on any other; nor does she think calmly or kindly. The Peking Government is not accustomed to enjoy much approbation among the vocal part of the Chinese population. But when it tells Great Britain that any renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance containing reference of any kind to China on which it has not been consulted will be regarded as an insult and an unfriendly act, it has the support of practically every student in the country. It would be absurd to affect surprise and dangerous to British standing in China to proceed with renewal of the Alliance, except under the most clearly expressed conditions and with the full cognizance of China. Conversely, however, the Chinese have no excuse for being surprised if other Powers conclude agreements with direct reference to themselves. For a weak, ill-governed and divided country which is full of rich but imperfectly developed possibilities is an undeniable source of trouble as the world wags to-day, and it is only natural that other Powers should endeavor to hedge about the potential powder mill with fire-proof barriers. Of such attempts the Lansing-Ishii agreement is a conspicuous example and more recently the New Consortium. It seems to be believed by the pro-denunciationists that to break the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be a favorable means of enabling China to settle her internal troubles and to get upon her legs again. But there are reasons for doubting it. An alliance that has endured for so many years cannot be dissolved without fear of injurious results, and this appears to be specially true of the Anglo-Japanese. Were it denounced, it would be difficult to avoid making Japan appear as a pariah among the nations, as one unworthy of confidence, one that must be kept at arm's length. Nothing could be better calculated to revive the drooping power of the mailed fist and to drive Japan

into antagonism to all others having business in this part of the world. Her withdrawal from the Consortium could not be long delayed, and she would regain the position of a free lance, wielded by those of whom the outside world has most cause to think with misgiving, and with all the advantages which propinquity and the political divisions of China give her to make this country a virtual appanage to herself. One cannot resist the conclusion that the Chinese have far more to fear from an Alliance dissolved than from one revised and renewed.

But of the need for revision there can be no doubt. The Open Door in Manchuria needs real opening and effective hooking back, to take but one aspect which specially appeals to British merchants, and redress for China on her just complaints must be obtained with security against future like causes of complaint."

APPENDIX D

THE CASSEL AGREEMENT

Agreement made this twenty-third day of April one thousand nine hundred and twenty, being the ninth year of the Republic of China, twenty-third day, fourth moon, between the government of the Province of Kwangtung in the Republic of China, represented by their Excellencies the Military and Civil Governors of the Province of Kwangtung (hereinafter called "The Kwangtung Government") of the one part, and Major Louis Cassel (Retired), of Victoria in the Colony of Hongkong, an Officer of the most excellent Order of the British Empire and Sum Pak Ming of Victoria, aforesaid gentlemen as trustees for and on behalf of a syndicate to be formed for the purpose of exploiting certain coal-bearing districts in the said Province (hereinafter called "the Syndicate") of the other part, whereby it is agreed by and between the parties as follows:

1. The Kwangtung government will permit the Syndicate to bore, examine, and survey such ground as the Syndicate may be advised, or have reason to believe, contains coal within the following districts (abutting over, or adjacent to, the Canton-Hankow Railway and the Canton-Kowlon Railway), viz.: Nam Hoi, Pun U. Tung Koon, Po On, Sam Sui, Fa Yuen, Ying Tak, Ching Yuen, Yeung Shan, Lin Yuen, Kuk Kong, Lok Cheong, Yue Yuen, Yan Fa, Chee Hing, Nam Hung, Fat King, Yung Yuen, Ko Ming, Tsang Shing, Tsung Fa, etc. And the government will not after the date of

signing of this Agreement grant permits to any other person, firm or Company to bore, examine, survey and mine in any of the districts above mentioned until the period set forth in clause 13 hereof shall have elapsed.

2. The Kwangtung government shall cause this agreement to be provisionally signed and chopped, whereupon the Syndicate shall take all such steps as may be necessary to obtain the Official sanction, and approval, thereto of the Central government of China at Peking, and upon such sanction and approval being obtained the Kwangtung government shall ratify this agreement and immediately thereupon the Syndicate shall deposit with the Kwangtung government the sum of one hundred thousand dollars Hongkong currency.

3. Within a period of nine months from the ratification aforesaid of this agreement the Syndicate shall, in the event of the said boring, examination, and survey of the grounds in the districts aforesaid appearing to the Syndicate to justify the Syndicate so doing, float a Company to be called "The Kwangtung Collieries, Limited" with a nominal capital of ten million dollars for the purpose of working coal mines in the said districts, and of dealing with the coal thereby procured, and shall transfer to such Company all rights and benefits and liabilities of the Syndicate under this agreement.

4. In the event of no such Company being floated by the Syndicate within the said period of nine months the Kwangtung government shall be entitled to retain the said sum of one hundred thousand dollars, and this agreement shall thereupon terminate; but in the event of such Company being floated a further sum of nine hundred thousand dollars (making with the said sum of one hundred thousand dollars a sum of altogether one million dollars) shall be deposited within the said period of nine months by that Company with the Kwangtung government, as security for the due carrying out by the Company of its objects as set out in the memorandum and articles of association.

5. The said sum of one million dollars, when so deposited in pursuance of clause 4 hereof, shall bear interest at the rate of six per cent per annum, which interest the Company shall be entitled to deduct from the dividends payable to the Kwangtung government or its nominees in pursuance of the provisions of clause 8 hereof. There shall be further deducted from the dividends so payable to the Kwangtung government or its nominees four per cent per annum on the said sum of one million dollars for the purpose of forming an amortization or sinking fund which shall be exchanged in sums of not less than ten thousand dollars for the "B" shares referred to

in clause 8 hereof until the whole of the said sum of one million dollars shall be so received by the Company. If no dividend is payable the Kwangtung government will not pay any interest on the said sum of one million dollars. If the dividend payable is not sufficient to pay the interest of the said sum of one million dollars, the Kwangtung government will not make up the deficit. The deduction from the dividend for forming the amortization or sinking fund is similarly calculated. If the Company goes into liquidation the deposited money shall be returned by the Kwangtung government and this agreement will determine.

6. The said capital of the Company of ten million dollars (fixed as the nominal capital of the Company to be floated as aforesaid) shall be divided into one million shares of ten dollars each, half of which shall be classed as "A" shares and shall be allotted by the directors of the Company who are of British Nationality in such manner as they may decide, but in pursuance of an agreement previously to be entered into with the Syndicate the other half of such shares shall be classed as "B" shares and shall be considered as fully paid up shares and shall be allotted by the Directors of the Company who are of Chinese Nationality in such manner as they may decide (subject to the provisions of clause 8 hereof).

7. The articles of association of the said Company to be floated as aforesaid shall provide that, out of the profits of the Company, there shall be first paid all working expenses, a royalty not exceeding one dollar per ton of all coal extracted and dealt with, all reasonable expenses to staff, sums properly payable to the Kwangtung government, and, interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum on the Capital represented by the "A" shares to the holders thereof; and the remainder of the said profits as shall be declared available for dividend shall be paid by way of dividend to holders of "A" and "B" shares equally.

8. Upon the incorporation of the Company to be floated as aforesaid the Company shall make the following allotment of shares, namely:

(a) Fully paid "B" shares to the nominal value of one million dollars, which shall be held by the Company in trust for the Kwangtung government, the dividend on which shall (inter alia) form the amortization or sinking fund referred to in clause 5 hereof. As and when sums of not less than ten thousand dollars are available in the said amortization or sinking fund the said fully paid "B" shares to an equivalent value shall be transferred to the Kwangtung government.

(b) Fully paid "B" shares to the nominal value of five hundred

thousand dollars to Trustees to be nominated by the Kwangtung government for the benefit of the poor people of the Province of Kwangtung.

(c) Fully paid "B" shares to the nominal value of five hundred thousand dollars to Trustees to be nominated by the Kwangtung government for educational purposes in the Province of Kwangtung.

In consideration of the said allotments as aforesaid the government will cause to be executed all such documents as may be necessary for the purposes of definitely granting to such Company the right for a period of ninety years from the date of such incorporation, to bore, dig, extract, transport, export, and sell, or otherwise utilize, all or any portion of the coal extracted from all or any of the areas mentioned in clause 13 hereof except the areas conceded to other Companies and worked on a commercial basis as provided in clause 18 hereof.

9. The Company shall pay the Kwangtung government only such duties as are for the time being imposed upon the Kailan Mining Administration.

10. At the expiration of the said period of ninety years the same to be extended, or continued, upon such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon between the government and the company so to be incorporated as aforesaid.

11. From the date of the ratification of this agreement and during the said period of ninety years, and extended period (if any), the Kwangtung government shall use its best endeavors to protect the persons employed by the said Company and their rights for property and the rights of property of the said Company, in the mines, machinery, buildings, plant and other goods, effects for property to which the said persons and the said Company may be entitled to for the time being.

12. The articles of association of the Company to be floated as aforesaid shall further contain provisions of the following effect:

1. That the board of Directors of such Company shall consist of seven persons, three of whom shall be elected by the holders of "A" shares and shall be of European nationality, and three of whom shall be elected by the holders of "B" shares and shall be of Chinese nationality. The remaining Directory shall be of British nationality, and shall be elected by the other six Directors.
2. That the staff of the said Company shall consist of a European Manager, and of such European Engineers or Supervisors as may be deemed necessary by the Company and shall also

consist of two Secretaries, one of whom shall be of British or other European nationality, and the other of Chinese nationality.

3. That the miners and unskilled labourers shall all be of Chinese nationality, and, so far as possible, be natives of the districts in which they are employed.
4. That the existing laws and regulations of China with regard to mining shall be followed.

13. Immediately upon the payment of the said sum of one hundred thousand dollars referred to in clause 2 hereof the Company shall have the right to demarcate within a period of nine months such areas in the districts set forth in clause 1 hereof as areas in which the Company desires to carry on mining operations, and upon the payment by the Company to the Kwangtung government of the sum of nine hundred thousand dollars referred to in clause 4 hereof the said period of nine months shall be extended for a further period of six months (making a period of fifteen months in all). The Company shall from time to time during the said period notify to the Director of Mining in Canton or such other person as the Kwangtung government may designate their or its desire therefor, and he shall cause such areas to be registered in the name of the Company in parcels of land (whether separate or adjoining) each not exceeding ten square Li.

14. The Company shall not deliberately destroy or damage any cultivated lands, graves, or tombs, belonging to individuals, and in the event of any accidental destructions thereof, or damage thereto, the said Company shall, at its own expense, repair such damage or pay the individual sustaining the same reasonable compensation therefor.

15. The said Company when incorporated shall, for the purpose of its business, be entitled to use any waterways, wharves, ports, railways, and other means of transport or storage now existing in the Kwangtung Province, and also to construct, manage, superintend and work any other roads, railways, waterways and buildings as may be deemed advisable for the purpose of the business of the said Company, or to improve those now existing but shall pay reasonable remuneration or compensation to any individuals or individual affected, or prejudiced, by such use or construction.

16. In the event of there being in existence unworked coal mines within the districts mentioned in clause 1 hereof, the Company shall be entitled to work the same in all respects as if such mine had been discovered by the Syndicate or the said Company.

17. Any concessions or mining rights within the said districts already granted by the Kwangtung government which have not yet been worked on a Commercial basis or exercised, shall be revoked by the Kwangtung government; and all such concessions or mining rights as have been worked on a Commercial basis, or exercised, may be acquired by the said Company on payment to the proprietors thereof of such sums as they may agree to accept; and the Kwangtung government will render all such assistance as it is able to render the said Company to acquire such concessions or mining rights at a reasonable price.

18. The coal mines for which mining rights have been granted and on which work has been commenced by other companies are as follows:

Names of Coal Mines	Districts	Area	
Tai Tong Shan	Nan Hoi	576.55	Mao
Joung Shan	"	8.071	Sq. Li
Cheung Kong	Pun U	540	Mao
Tai Woh Ling	Fa Yuen	1100	"
Kow Chun Woo	"	270	"
Wank Tong Ling	"	342.45	"
Kow Woo Tseung, Tai Tat Sha Kwut.	"	351	"
Koon Tsaun Tin Sze Ling	Yue Yuen	573	"
Junk Ngam Chung	"	272.57	"
Lu Tseung Pay Tse Ling	"	364.34	"
Koon Tseing, Kit Tsze Tun	"	8494	"
Po On Shan	Lin Yuen		Nil.
Lin Tong Tseun	"	200	Mao
See Tsze Kong	"		Nil.
Ki Tsze Kurk	"	502	Mao
Pak Moon Heung Lo Fo Tung	"	972	"
Bap Shak Par	Kook Kong	808	"
Lap Shak How Shan	"	one	Sq. Li
Ling Chai Tow	"	87.5	Mao
Hap Chai Tow	"	18.4	"
Tong Chung Ling	"	547.73	"
Lo Tong Shan	"	one	Sq. Li
Tung Sui Har Sun Shan	"	829.141	Mao
Tin Lor Ling	"	98.583	"
Tung Sui Moi Shan Sui Chong	"	540	"
Kong Ying Ling	"	800	"
Ngam Pin Ling	"	399.8	"
Cheung Chung Lin	"	366.66	"

Names of Coal Mines	Districts	Area
Lo Tong Ling	"	one Sq. Li
Tung Sui Mat Shan Aui Ling	"	470 "
Tui Mun Ling Kwai Tow Shan	"	270 "
Tong Cheung Ling	"	one Sq. Li & 7.7 Mao
Poon Ying Ling	Lok Cheung	325 "
Tin Tong Lin	"	Nil.
To Chu Ling	"	894.26 Mao
Ting Tsze Pouy	"	3906 "
Tong Ngam Lee Shan	"	154.16 "
Cham Mok Tow	Ying Tak	540 "
Kai Ting Po	Fa Yuen	one Sq. Li & 492.15 Mao
Koon Chun	Yue Yuen	314.533 "
Tai Wuk Ngow	Pun U	Nil.
Kow Cheun Wo King Shiu King	Fa Yuen	276.5 Mao
Kwoo Lin Tsze	Lok Cheung	699.8505 "
Pak Kong Ling	Koon Kong	471 "
To Chong	Lok Cheung	4875 "
Chan Mok Ling Kow Ngam Tung	Yue Yuen	840.55 "
Chai Kurk Cheun Nam Ling Tow	"	536.21 "
Ling Wan Shan	Ko Ming	725 "
Woo Shak Tu	"	23.652 "
Tung Kok Shan	"	103.075 "

19. The coal mines which have been granted to other companies but which have not yet been worked, are as follows:

Names of Coal Mines	Districts	Area
Lung Hang Ling	Fa Yuen	727.4 Mao
See Mow Wor	Lin Yuen	265.8 "
Sai Ling Pouy	Lok Cheung	342.891 "
Cheung Fung Ling	Lin Yuen	Same section as Ki Shan Kurk.
Shak Pay Toi For Tong	Tung Koon	7 Sq. Li & 246.219 Mao
Tin Tow Show Kow Ling	Lok Cheung	373 "

20. In the event of civil war, strikes, boycotts, or other disturbances occurring in the Districts specified in clause 1 hereof or any part thereof during the period mentioned in clause 13 hereof which shall prevent or interfere with the Syndicate or the said Company carrying on its or their operations under this agreement, the said period mentioned in clause 13 shall as regards the Districts affected

be extended for the same length of time as the Syndicate or said Company shall be so prevented from carrying on or interfered with in the carrying on by them of the said operations as aforesaid.

21. This agreement is drawn up in English and Chinese. It is hereby expressly agreed that in case any difference shall appear or disputes arise as to the construction thereof the English copy shall prevail and be adopted.

22. In the event of any dispute or difference arising between the said Company and the Kwangtung government, or any of the individuals mentioned in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 19 and 20 hereof, in relation to this agreement, the same shall be submitted to the arbitration of two persons, one to be appointed by the Syndicate or by the said Company as the case may be, and the other by the Kwangtung government, and in case of such arbitrators not agreeing, to an umpire to be appointed by them who shall be of neither British nor Chinese nationality; the award of such arbitrators or the umpire shall be final and conclusive.

In witness whereof the said parties have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and the year first above written

Signed, sealed, chopped and delivered by the above mentioned His Excellency the Military Governor of Kwang-Tung.	Private chop of Mok Wing Sun.	The official seal of His Excellency the Military Governor of Kwang-Tung.
Signed, chopped, sealed and delivered by the above mentioned His Excellency the Civil Governor of Kwang-Tung.	Private chop of Cheung Kan Fong.	The official seal of His Excellency the Civil Governor of Kwang-Tung.
Signed, sealed and delivered by the above named Louis Cassel in the presence of: Ho Shing Chong.	L. Cassel, Major. [L. S.]	
Signed, sealed and delivered by the above named Sum Pak Ming in the presence of: Ho Shing Chong.	[L. S.]	

APPENDIX E

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

Note: The following brief elucidation of the demands was written

by Mr. Millard and was published as a brochure by "The Weekly Review" of Shanghai during the Washington conference.

Intelligent persons who are trying to follow the issues of the Conference on Limitation of Armaments and Far Eastern and Pacific Ocean Questions at Washington cannot have failed to notice the repetition by responsible Japanese statesmen, by the Japanese press, and by writers of other than Japanese nationality, of the assertion that the policy of the Japanese Government in no sense is threatening to China and is not conceived in a spirit of aggression upon the territorial integrity and political autonomy of China.

It is in acts of the Japanese Government that a true exposition of Japan's policy in China is to be found; and the most significant recent exposé of the real policy and objects of Japan *vis-á-vis* China is contained in the notorious "Twenty-One Demands" made by the Japanese Government to the Chinese Government in 1915.

The content of those demands is discovered in the text; but before giving the text of the demands in full a brief preliminary explanation will help in understanding their significance.

In 1914, a few weeks after the Great War began (disregarding efforts of the Chinese Government and other nations which would have neutralized the German leased port at Tsingtau, China, without embroiling China in the hostilities), Japanese military forces occupied against the protest of the Chinese Government the territory of the German leasehold on Kiaochou Bay, in Shantung Province, and also extended Japanese military occupation over almost the whole area of that Province outside of the German leasehold. That was the situation when on January 18, 1915, the Japanese minister at Peking, acting under instructions from his Government, privately presented to the Chinese Government a series of proposals in five groups and twenty-one articles.

As showing the obliquity of this action of the Japanese Government at a time when other principal Powers were completely preoccupied by the great war, certain clauses of then existing international agreements are cited. The preamble and body of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (renewed in 1911) stated the following:

"A. The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India."

"B. The preservation of the common interests of all the Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China."

"ARTICLE I. It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Japan or Great Britain, any of the rights and interests referred to

in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly," etc.

"ARTICLE III. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement."

Under date November 30, 1908, the American and Japanese governments made an Agreement regarding their policies in China, commonly known as the Root-Takahira Agreement. After a reaffirmation of the integrity of China and the "open-door" principles, that Agreement states:

"5. Should any event occur threatening the status quo as above described or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined, it remains for the two Governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful to take."

Nevertheless, the Japanese Government, without informing the British and American Governments, privately presented and pressed demands on the Chinese Government which constituted the gravest and most radical revision of the status quo of China that ever has been attempted: and it was due to the eventual exposure of the attempt by the press that Japan's action became known.

The text of the original demands which follows is the official translation into English published by the Chinese Government, and confirmed officially in various ways. As a device to make the true meaning to China, and the purposes of the Japanese Government plain to American comprehension, I have in parallel columns given, on the left the actual text of the demands, and on the right a paraphrase of the demands showing with approximate accuracy how those demands would have transposed had they been addressed to the American Government, instead of to China.

THE REAL DEMANDS	THE DEMANDS PARAPHRASED
I	I
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighborhood existing between	The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States of America, being desirous of maintaining the general peace in the Pacific Ocean and further strengthening the friendly relations and good

the two nations, agree to the following articles:

ARTICLE 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

ARTICLE 2. The Chinese Government engages that within the Province of Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third Power under any pretext.

ARTICLE 3. The Chinese Government consents to Japan building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow (in Shantung) to join the Kiaochou-Tsingtau Railway.

ARTICLE 4. The Chinese Government engages in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners to open by herself as soon as possible certain important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung as commercial ports. What places shall be opened are to be jointly decided (by Japan and China) in a separate agreement.

II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, since

neighborhood existing between the two nations agree to the following articles:

ARTICLE 1. The Government of the United States of America engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and property which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the State of California.

ARTICLE 2. The American Government engages that within the State of California and along its coast no territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third Power under any pretext.

ARTICLE 3. The American Government consents to Japan building a railway from a port in California to be selected by Japan to join the Southern Pacific Railway System.

ARTICLE 4. The American Government engages in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners to open as soon as possible certain important cities and towns in the State of California as commercial ports. What places shall be opened are to be decided in a separate agreement.

II

The Japanese Government and the American Government, since

the Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:

ARTICLE 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of the lease of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to the period of 99 years.

ARTICLE 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming.

ARTICLE 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to engage in business of any kind whatsoever.

ARTICLE 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant to Japanese subjects the right of opening the mines in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards what mines shall be opened, they shall be decided upon jointly.

ARTICLE 5. The Chinese Government agrees that in respect of the (two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese Government's consent *shall be first obtained* before action is taken:

the American Government has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Japan in Alaska and in the States of Oregon and Washington, agree to the following articles:

ARTICLE 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that the term of the lease to Japan of the Port of Seattle and of the Alaskan and Northern Pacific Railways shall be extended to the period of 99 years.

ARTICLE 2. Japanese subjects in the States of Oregon and Washington, and Alaska, shall have the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming.

ARTICLE 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in the States of Oregon and Washington, and Alaska, and to engage in business of any kind whatsoever.

ARTICLE 4. The American Government agrees to grant to Japanese subjects the right of exploitation of the mineral resources in the States of Oregon and Washington, and Alaska. As regards what resources shall be exploited, they shall be decided upon jointly.

ARTICLE 5. The American Government agrees that in respect of the (two) cases herein below mentioned the Japanese Government's consent shall be first obtained before action is taken:

(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third Power to build a railway, or to make a loan with a third Power for the purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

(b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third Power pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as security.

ARTICLE 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if the Chinese Government employs political, financial or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Japanese Government shall first be consulted.

ARTICLE 7. The Chinese Government agrees that control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway shall be handed over to the Japanese Government for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this Agreement.

III

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, seeing that Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Company have close relations with each other at present and desiring that the common interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following articles:

ARTICLE 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment ar-

(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third Power to build a railway, or to make an international loan for the purpose of building a railway in the States of Oregon and Washington, and in Alaska.

(b) Whenever a loan is to be issued for international subscription pledging the local taxes of the States of Oregon and Washington, or Alaska, as security.

ARTICLE 6. The American Government agrees that if the American Government employs political, financial or military advisers or instructors in Oregon, Washington, or Alaska, the Japanese Government shall first be consulted.

ARTICLE 7. The American Government agrees that control and management of the Oregon Short Line Railway shall be handed over to the Japanese Government for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this Agreement.

III

The Japanese Government and the American Government, seeing that Japanese financiers and the United States Steel Corporation and its associated industries have close relations with each other at present and desiring that the common interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following articles:

ARTICLE 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment

rives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and they further agree that without *the previous consent of Japan,* China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said Company nor cause the said Company to dispose freely of same.

ARTICLE 2. The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the neighborhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by other persons outside of the said Company; and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out *any undertaking* which, it is apprehended, *may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said Company, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.*

IV

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China agree to the following special Article:

The Chinese Government engages not to cede or to lease to a third Power any harbor or bay

arrives the United States Steel Corporation and its associated industries shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and they further agree that without the previous consent of Japan and the American Government shall not by its own act dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said Corporation and its associated industries, nor permit the said Corporation to dispose freely of same.

ARTICLE 2. The American Government agrees that all mines in the neighborhood of those owned by the United States Steel Corporation and its associated industries shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Corporation, to be worked by other persons outside of the said Corporation; and the American Government further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said Corporation, the consent of the said Corporation shall first be obtained.

IV

The Japanese Government and the American Government with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of the United States agree to the following special Articles:

The American Government engages not to cede or to lease to a third Power any harbor or bay

or island along the coast of China.

V

ARTICLE 1. The Chinese Central Government *shall* employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

ARTICLE 2. Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

ARTICLE 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese to settle, cases which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese, or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese police service.

ARTICLE 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent or more) of what is needed by the Chinese Government, or there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be used.

or island along the coast of the United States.

V

ARTICLE 1. The American Government at Washington, D. C., *shall* employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

ARTICLE 2. Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the United States shall be granted the right of owning land.

ARTICLE 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the American Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Americans (in America) to settle, cases which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important cities in America shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Americans, or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese so that they may help to plan for the improvement of the American police service.

ARTICLE 4. The United States shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent or more) of what is needed by the American Government, or there shall be established in America a Japan-American jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material used.

ARTICLE 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, and another line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and another line between Nanchang and Chaochou.

ARTICLE 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and construct harbor works (including dock-yards) in the Province of Fukien, *Japan shall be first consulted.*

ARTICLE 7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right of missionary propaganda in China.

ARTICLE 5. The American Government agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway connecting Chicago with St. Louis and Pittsburg, and another line between Pittsburg and Baltimore, and another line between Pittsburg and Charleston.

ARTICLE 6. If the United States needs foreign capital to develop mines, build railways and construct harbors (including dock-yards) in the States of Virginia and North Carolina, Japan shall be first consulted.

ARTICLE 7. The American Government agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right of Buddhist propaganda in the United States.

Shantung Province has a population of about 30,000,000. The region has been an integral part of China continuously since before the dawn of authentic history, and is peopled to-day by the descendants of families who have lived there for thousands of years. The coast-line contains a number of the best harbors in China, and the railways in the province penetrate directly to the heart of China and the whole region drained by the Yellow River.

In respect to Group I of the demands, regarding Shantung Province, the comparison with California in the paraphrase requires one to take it as if, when the Great War commenced, German capital was invested in the Southern Pacific Railway and the entire harbor works of San Francisco, and these interests were to be transferred to Japan by the terms of the proposed agreement.

In the articles relating to the Hanyehping Company, the only important steel works in China, and controlling most of the yielding iron beds, it may be stated that these works are located at Hanyang, one of the three cities (Hankow, Wuchang and Hanyang) situated at the junction of the Han and Yangtze rivers, and which together compare to Chicago in America, with this difference; Hankow is 650 miles from the mouth of the Yangtze, and is

reached by ocean-going ships of considerable tonnage, is in fact a seaport in the center of China. Taking advantage of the disorders in connection with the rebellion of 1913, the Japanese Government erected permanent barracks at Hankow and still maintains there a military garrison, over the protests of China. The proposals regarding the Hanyehping Company should be read by Americans as if the Bank of Japan, or the Mitsui Company, owned a controlling interest in or a blanket mortgage over the property of the Steel Corporation, and had a garrison at Pittsburg to protect their interests.

The paraphrase of articles of Group V should be read as if Japanese in America were under "extra territorial" provisions, and were exempt from the processes of American law and courts, and could only be tried for offenses committed in America in Japanese courts or by Jananese consular officials. In this connection it is pertinent to remember that the Government of Japan denies to Chinese, and to Americans also, the right to own land in Japan; and limits Chinese immigration to Japan.

One of the outstanding inequities of these demands is the fact that they nowhere mention or allow anything in the way of a quid pro quo, or compensatory equivalent, to China for what she is asked to concede to Japan.

After the Chinese, contrary to the stern injunction of Japan, had informed the other Powers and the press of the presentation of the demands, diplomatic pressure and other factors induced Japan to moderate her demands, principally by the temporary abeyance of Group V. It is believed that British opposition to Article 5 of this Group, whereby Japan invaded the British "sphere" in the Yangtze, was influential in causing the Japanese Government to abate somewhat. The Chinese Government retarded the negotiations as long as it could, but was compelled to yield finally to an ultimatum delivered by Japan.

Text of Japan's Ultimatum to China

"The Imperial Japanese Government hereby again offer their advice and hope that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give a satisfactory reply by six o'clock p. m. on the ninth day of May. It is hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the specified time the Imperial Japanese Government will take such steps as they may deem necessary."

Peking, May 7, 1915.

Extract From
Text of China's Statement Re the Ultimatum

"It is plain that the Chinese Government proceeds to the fullest extent of possible concession in view of the strong national sentiment manifested by the people throughout the whole period of the negotiations. All that the Chinese Government strove to maintain was China's plenary sovereignty, the treaty rights of foreign Powers in China, and the principle of equal opportunity. . . . In considering the nature of the course they should take in reference to the ultimatum, the Chinese Government was influenced by its desire to preserve the Chinese people, as well as a large number of foreign residents in China, from unnecessary suffering, and also to prevent the interests of friendly Powers from being imperiled. For these reasons the Chinese Government was constrained to comply in full with the ultimatum, but, in complying, the Chinese Government disclaims any desire to associate itself with any revision which may thus be effected in the various conventions and agreements concluded between other Powers, with respect to the maintenance of territorial independence and integrity, the preservation of the status quo, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China."

The monopolistic and exclusive advantages which Japan attempted to establish in China for its subjects, and a position of quasi-sovereignty over China, appear in the text of the Twenty-one Demands; and they did not escape the notice of other Governments.

Text of Note of the American Government

"In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place or which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which had been entered into, or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy commonly known as the open-door policy.

"Dated May 16, 1915."

An identical Note was at the same time handed to the Japanese Government by the American embassy at Tokio.

APPENDIX F

STATEMENT OF THE POSITION OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING LOANS IN CHINA, MADE BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT JULY 29, 1918

China declared war against Germany very largely because of the action of the United States. Therefore this Government has felt a special interest in the desire of China so to equip herself as to be of more specific assistance in the war against the Central Powers.

Until the present time the engagements of the United States in preparing to exert effectively its strength in the European theatre of war has operated to prevent specific constructive steps to help China realize her desires. Recently, however, this Government felt that, because of the approach to Chinese territory of the scenes of disorder, a special effort should be made to place proper means at the disposal of China. Consequently a number of American bankers, who had been interested in the past in making loans to China and who had had experience in the Orient, were called to Washington and asked to become interested in the matter. The bankers responded very promptly and an agreement has been reached between them and the Department of State which has the following salient features:

First. The formation of a group of American bankers to make a loan or loans and to consist of representatives from different parts of the country.

Second. An assurance on the part of the bankers that they will coöperate with the Government and follow the policies outlined by the Department of State.

Third. Submission of the names of the bankers who will compose this group for approval by the Department of State.

Fourth. Submission of the terms and conditions of any loan or loans for approval of the Department of State.

Fifth. Assurances that, if the terms and conditions of the loan are accepted by this Government and by the Government to which the loan is made, in order to encourage and facilitate the free intercourse between American citizens and foreign States which is mu-

tually advantageous, the Government will be willing to aid in every way possible and to make prompt and vigorous representations and to take every possible step to insure the execution of equitable contracts made in good faith by its citizens in foreign lands.

It is hoped that the American group will be associated with bankers of Great Britain, Japan, and France. Negotiations are now in progress between the Government of the United States and those Governments which it is hoped will result in their coöperation and in the participation by the bankers of those countries in equal parts in any loan which may be made.

APPENDIX G

RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATY

The Russian Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial Government, aiming to strengthen the firm friendship between them, established through the secret agreements of July 17–30, 1907, June 21–July 4, 1910, and June 25–July 8, 1912, have agreed to supplement the aforesaid secret agreements with the following articles:

ARTICLE 1

Both the high contracting parties recognize that the vital interests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, having hostile designs against Russia, or Japan: and therefore mutually obligate themselves, in the future at all times when circumstances demand, to enter into openhearted dealings, based on complete trust, in order to take the necessary measures with the object of preventing the possibility of occurrence of said state of affairs.

ARTICLE 2

In the event, in consequence of measures taken by mutual consent of Russia and Japan, on the basis of the preceding article, a declaration of war is made by any third Power contemplated by Article I of this agreement, against one of the contracting parties, the other party, at the first demand of its ally, must come to its aid. Each of the high contracting parties herewith covenants, in the event

such a condition arises, not to conclude peace with the common enemy without preliminary consent therefor from its ally.

ARTICLE 3

The conditions under which each of the high contracting parties will lend armed assistance to the other side, by virtue of the preceding article, as well as the means by which such assistance shall be accomplished, must be determined in common by the corresponding authorities of one and the other contracting parties.

ARTICLE 4

It is requisite to have in view that neither one nor the other of the high contracting parties must consider itself bound by Article 2 of this agreement to lend armed aid to its ally, unless it be given guarantees by its allies that the latter will give it assistance corresponding in character to the importance of the approaching conflict.

ARTICLE 5

The present agreement shall have force from the time of its execution, and shall continue to be in force until July 1–14 of the year 1921.

In the event the other of the high contracting parties does not deem it necessary twelve months prior to the end of said period, to declare its unwillingness to continue the present agreement in force, then the said agreement shall continue in force for a period of one year after the declaration of one of the contracting parties disclaiming the said agreement.

ARTICLE 6

The present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both of the high contracting parties.

In witness whereof the persons invested with full power by both parties have signed and affixed their seals to the present agreement at Petrograd on June 20–July 3 of the year 1916, which corresponds in the Japanese calendar to the third day of the seventh month of the fifth year of the reign of Tais.

SAZONOFF.
MOTONO.

APPENDIX H

Inter-Power Agreements Relating To China

Note: The following arrangement of documentary records of the conference, and the summarizing comments, are from "China and the Conference," by Dr. W. W. Willoughby, who was a technical adviser to the Chinese delegation at Washington.

The third of the Chinese Ten Points had declared as follows:

With a view to strengthening mutual confidence and maintaining peace in the Pacific and the Far East, the Powers agree not to conclude between themselves any treaty or agreement directly affecting China or the general peace in these regions without previously notifying China and giving to her an opportunity to participate.

This proposition was brought before the committee of the Whole at its fourteenth meeting, held December 8, by Dr. Koo, who called attention to the fact that, in the past, agreements relating to the Far East generally and to China in particular, had been made by the Powers between themselves without notification of China that such agreements were in contemplation, and, therefore, without giving to her an opportunity to participate therein should she desire to do so. Dr. Koo then continued: [1]

[1] The Chinese delegation submitted the following tentative list of inter-power agreements that had, in the past, been entered into with reference to China:

1 Franco-Japanese Agreement, June 10, 1907 (MacMurray 640).

2 Anglo-Japanese Treaty, July 13, 1911 (MacMurray 900).

3 Russo-Japanese Convention of July 30, 1907 (MacMurray 657).

4 Russo-Japanese Secret Convention of July 30, 1907 (text not available).

5 Russo-Japanese Convention of July 4, 1910 (MacMurray 803).

6 Russo-Japanese Secret Convention of July 4, 1910 (text not available).

7 Russo-Japanese Secret Convention of July 8, 1912 (text not available).

8 Russo-Japanese Convention of July 3, 1916 (MacMurray 1327).

9 Russo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, of July 3, 1916 (MacMurray 1328).

10 American-Japanese Exchange of Notes of November 30, 1908 (Root-Takahira Agreement) (MacMurray 769).

11 American-Japanese Exchange of Notes of November 2, 1917 (Lansing-Ishii Agreement) (MacMurray 1394).

12 Anglo-French Agreement of January 15, 1896, Article IV (MacMurray 54).

13 Anglo-Russian Agreement, April 28, 1899 (MacMurray 204).

14 Anglo-German Agreement, September 2, 1898 (MacMurray 266).

These agreements, he said, fell roughly into two divisions, the one being in the nature of mutual engagements to abstain from certain action in special parts of China, the other being engagements for mutual assistance in support of the general interests of all foreign powers in China or of the special interests claimed by the parties to the agreement.

As to these treaties and agreements, Mr. Koo said he felt that they were all so well known to the members of the committee that the complete enumeration of them or specific illustrations would be unnecessary.

The first kind of agreements usually was in the nature of an engagement on the part of one contracting party not to seek any railway concessions in one part of China in return for a similar promise on the part of the other contracting parties not to seek railway concessions in another part of China.

As first it might seem as if a nation were within its rights in promising another to forego certain opportunities within a specific region. But any deeper examination of this matter would immediately show that there were a great many objections to such a method of arranging the action of one nation upon the territory of another. In the first place, it involved an incipient national monopoly or preference within the region affected, because the nation which had secured a promise of abstention from one power would then proceed with efforts to secure a similar promise from others. Thus by the making of only one agreement two nations would be backing a system of artificial limitation of economic activities.

The rights of China were involved both because she must wish that all the parts of her territory should be open on equal terms, or on such terms as she herself should determine, to foreign capitalists, merchants, and residents. As soon as such treaties as the above were made, without consultation with China, her territory was divided into distinct spheres for foreign enterprise. To this she could by no means be indifferent.

The other group of treaties dealt with the safeguarding and defending of territorial rights or special interests in the Far East, including or specially mentioning China.

These all had one or more of the following three features:

(1) A declaration that the contracting parties had a special interest in having order and a pacific state of things guaranteed in the regions of China adjacent to the territories where the contracting powers had rights of sovereignty, protection, or occupation, and an engagement to support each other for assuring peace and security in these regions; or

(2) A declaration to support the independence and integrity of China and the maintenance of the open door for foreign commerce and to aid each other for the defense of the contracting parties' special interests in said regions; or

(3) The recognition by one contracting power that, since propinquity creates special relations, the other contracting power had special interests in China.

It was clear that any one of the foregoing three features must be of vital interest to China. The assurance of peace and order in any part of Chinese territory was a matter of great concern to China herself. The maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of China touched the supreme rights of China. As to the recognition of propinquity as creating special interests in China. it was equally obvious that such recognition could not be valid, because special interests on Chinese territory could not be created without the consent of China, and China had always contested the soundness of the doctrine of propinquity.

The effect of all such treaties and agreements had been to maintain in China conditions which intimately affected the rights, prospects, and liberty of action of China herself.

It appeared, therefore, that the Chinese Government had an equitable right to be consulted in all agreements which dealt with or pretended to deal with, the general situation in the Far East, including China. Even if such treaties were animated by an entirely friendly spirit toward China, yet their bearing was such that they might involve consequences which would result in limitations on Chinese freedom of action; even such treaties, therefore, should not be made without consultation with China.

It might, of course, be said that China, not being a party to such treaties, need in no way recognize them nor consider herself bound by any of their provisions. That was legally true. But the political effect produced by a group of such treaties, just as in the case of spheres of influence, tended so to modify the political and economic situation in China that no efforts on the part of the Chinese Government would succeed in preserving its liberty of action. Should recognition be given to the practice that China need not be consulted, the total results of a group of such cases must be examined. In that case it was plain that vital interests of China would be affected, and that the nature of activities and interests within China would be determined entirely by the action of outside powers. The Chinese Government would then find itself obliged to move along grooves laid down by others without having once had an opportunity of insisting upon her own life needs as seen by herself.

It must therefore be concluded that though an individual agreement might, on the face of it, concern only the action of outside powers, if that action related to China, the Chinese Government could not remain indifferent to it, because of the effect which the continued practice of making agreements of this kind would have upon the liberty of movement and the development of the Chinese Government and the nation itself.

Following upon this statement by Dr. Koo, there was an extended discussion in which the following objections were made to accepting, without qualification, the Chinese proposal.

Mr. Balfour thought that China could best be benefited, not by adopting the broad principle which her Delegation had proposed, but by dealing with her difficulties one by one, as the conference had been doing, for example, with regard to spheres of interest, post-offices, extraterritoriality and the like. "All that the Conference could do was to see that no undue limitations, no limitations which were not necessitated by the facts of the situation, were placed on China's sovereign independence, and to give all the help in its power toward the creation of a pure and vigorous administration." He also thought that the proposition put forward by Dr. Koo would, if accepted, involve a limitation of the treaty rights of the powers. For example, if made of general international application, it would prevent France and Belgium from entering into a defensive treaty of any kind without consulting Germany. All agreed that the powers had entered into treaties not only in regard to China but also as to other nations which reflected no credit on the parties to them, but the correction of this evil should be sought in publicity. Most of the nations represented at the conference were members of the League of Nations and were bound by Article XVIII of its covenant to publish their agreements. The United States, while not a member, was virtually obligated by its Constitution to make its treaties public. He would ask the Chinese delegation, therefore, not to press its proposition in the form in which it had been presented.

Secretary Hughes spoke somewhat along the same lines, stressing the four Root Resolutions that had been adopted by the conference, and especially the one that provided that no advantage should be taken of China because of her present domestic difficulties, but that each power should be left free to make agreements necessary for the preservation of its own proper interests, and that there should be no secret engagements.

Sir Auckland Geddes suggested that to the four Root Resolutions

there might be added a fifth according to which the Powers would agree

To enter into no treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another or individually or collectively, with any other Power or Powers which would infringe or impair the principles which they have herein declared.

Mr. Hanihara, speaking for the Japanese delegation, expressed the view that this proposed resolution was virtually included within the scope of the first of the Root Resolutions, and that to adopt it would have the effect of weakening that resolution; also that, if such proposed resolutions were adopted, China herself should be brought within its application.

As a result of these observations Sir Auckland's draft resolution was amended so as to read:

That the powers attending this conference, hereinafter mentioned, to wit, the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal declare that it is their intention not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or individually or collectively with any power or powers, which would infringe or impair the principles which have been declared by the resolution adopted November 21 by this committee.

In this form the resolution was unanimously approved by the committee and reported to the conference which adopted it at its fourth plenary session, held December 10.

As it appears as Article II of the Nine-Power Treaty Relating to Principles and Policies to be Followed in Matters Concerning China, it reads:

The Contracting Powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another, or individually or collectively, with any Power or Powers, which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article I [the four Root Resolutions].

APPENDIX I

STATEMENTS IN THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE REGARDING SIBERIA

Japanese Statement

The statement by Baron Shidehara on behalf of Japan was as follows:

The military expedition of Japan to Siberia was originally undertaken in common accord and in coöperation with the United States in 1918. It was primarily intended to render assistance to the Czecho-Slovak troops who, in their homeward journey across Siberia from European Russia, found themselves in grave and pressing danger at the hands of hostile forces under German command. The Japanese and American expeditionary forces together with other Allied troops fought their way from Vladivostok far into the region of the Amur and the trans-Baikal provinces to protect the railway lines which afforded the sole means of transportation of the Czecho-Slovak troops from the interior of Siberia to the port of Vladivostok. Difficulties which the Allied forces had to encounter in their operations in the severe cold winter of Siberia were immense.

In January, 1920, the United States decided to terminate its military undertaking in Siberia, and ordered the withdrawal of its forces. For some time thereafter Japanese troops continued alone to carry out the duty of guarding several points along the trans-siberian railways in fulfilment of Interallied arrangements and of affording facilities to the returning Czecho-Slovaks.

The last column of Czecho-Slovak troops safely embarked from Vladivostok in September, 1920. Ever since then Japan has been looking forward to an early moment for the withdrawal of her troops from Siberia. The maintenance of such troops in a foreign land is for her a costly and thankless undertaking, and she will be only too happy to be relieved of such responsibility. In fact, the evacuation of the trans-Baikal and the Amur provinces was already completed in 1920. The only region which now remains to be evacuated is a southern portion of the Maritime province around Vladivostok and Nikolsk.

It will be appreciated that for Japan the question of the withdrawal of troops from Siberia is not quite as simple as it was for other Allied Powers. In the first place, there is a considerable number of Japanese residents who had lawfully and under guarantees of treaty established themselves in Siberia long before the Bolshevik eruption, and were there entirely welcomed. In 1917, prior to the joint American-Japanese military enterprise, the number of such residents was already no less than 9717. In the actual situation prevailing there, those Japanese residents can hardly be expected to look for the protection of their lives and property to any other authorities than Japanese troops. Whatever districts those troops have evacuated in the past have fallen into disorder, and practically all Japanese residents have had precipitately to withdraw, to seek for their personal safety. In so withdrawing, they

have been obliged to leave behind large portions of their property, abandoned and unprotected, and their homes and places of business have been destroyed. While the hardships and losses thus caused the Japanese in the trans-Baikal and the Amur provinces have been serious enough, more extensive damages are likely to follow from the evacuation of Vladivostok in which a larger number of Japanese have always been resident and a greater amount of Japanese capital invested.

There is another difficulty by which Japan is faced in proceeding to the recall of her troops from the Maritime province. Due to geographical propinquity, the general situation in the districts around Vladivostok and Nikolsk is bound to affect the security of the Korean frontier. In particular, it is known that these districts have long been the base of Korean conspiracies against Japan. Those hostile Koreans, joining hands with lawless elements in Russia, attempted in 1920 to invade Korea through the Chinese territory of Chientao. They set fire to the Japanese consulate at Hunchun, and committed indiscriminate acts of murder and pillage. At the present time they are under the effective control of Japanese troops stationed in the Maritime province, but they will no doubt renew the attempt to penetrate into Korea at the first favorable opportunity that may present itself.

Having regard to those considerations, the Japanese Government have felt bound to exercise precaution in carrying out the contemplated evacuation of the Maritime province. Should they take hasty action without adequate provision for the future they would be delinquent in their duty of affording protection to a large number of their nationals resident in the districts in question and of maintaining order and security in Korea.

It should be made clear that no part of the Maritime province is under Japan's military occupation. Japanese troops are still stationed in the southern portion of that province, but they have not set up any civil or military administration to displace local authorities. Their activity is confined to measures of self-protection against the menace to their own safety and to the safety of their country and nationals. They are not in occupation of those districts any more than American or other Allied troops could be said to have been in occupation of the places in which they were formerly stationed.

The Japanese Government are anxious to see an orderly and stable authority speedily reëstablished in the Far Eastern possessions of Russia. It was in this spirit that they manifested a keen interest in the patriotic but ill-fated struggle of Admiral Kolchak.

They have shown readiness to lend their good offices for prompting the reconciliation of various political groups in Eastern Siberia. But they have carefully refrained from supporting one faction against another. It will be recalled, for instance, that they withheld all assistance from General Rozanow against the revolutionary movements which led to his overthrow in January, 1920. They maintained an attitude of strict neutrality, and refused to interfere in these movements, which it would have been quite easy for them to suppress if they had so desired.

In relation to this policy of non-intervention, it may be useful to refer briefly to the past relations between the Japanese authorities and Ataman Semenoff, which seem to have been a source of popular misgiving and speculation. It will be remembered that the growing rapprochement between the Germans and the Bolshevik Government in Russia in the early part of 1918 naturally gave rise to apprehensions in the Allied countries that a considerable quantity of munitions supplied by those countries and stored in Vladivostok might be removed by the Bolsheviks to European Russia for the use of the Germans. Ataman Semenoff was then in Siberia and was organizing a movement to check such Bolshevik activities and to preserve order and stability in that region. It was in this situation that Japan, as well as some of the Allies, began to give support to the Cossack chief. After a few months, such support by the other powers was discontinued. But the Japanese were reluctant to abandon their friend, whose efforts in the Allied cause they had originally encouraged; and they maintained for some time their connection with Ataman Semenoff. They had, however, no intention whatever of interfering in the domestic affairs of Russia, and when it was found that the assistance rendered to the ataman was likely to complicate the internal situation in Siberia, they terminated all relations with him, and no support of any kind has since been extended to him by the Japanese authorities.

The Japanese Government are now seriously considering plans which would justify them in carrying out their decision of the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime province, with reasonable precaution for the security of Japanese residents and of the Korean frontier regions. It is for this purpose that negotiations were opened some time ago at Dairen between the Japanese representatives and the agents of the Chita Government.

Those negotiations at Dairen are in no way intended to secure for Japan any right or advantage of an exclusive nature. They have been solely actuated by a desire to adjust some of the more

pressing questions with which Japan is confronted in relation to Siberia. They have essentially in view the conclusion of provisional commercial arrangements, the removal of the existing menace to the security of Japan and to the lives and property of Japanese residents in Eastern Siberia, the provision of guarantees for the freedom of lawful undertakings in that region, and the prohibition of Bolshevik propaganda over the Siberian border. Should adequate provisions be arranged on the line indicated the Japanese Government will at once proceed to the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime province.

The occupation of certain points in the Russian province of Sakhalin is wholly different, both in nature and in origin, from the stationing of troops in the Maritime province. History affords few instances similar to the incident of 1920 at Nikolaievsk, where more than seven hundred Japanese, including women and children, as well as the duly recognized Japanese consul and his family and his official staff, were cruelly tortured and massacred. No nation worthy of respect will possibly remain forbearing under such a strain of provocation. Nor was it possible for the Japanese Government to disregard the just popular indignation aroused in Japan by the incident. Under the actual condition of things, Japan found no alternative but to occupy, as a measure of reprisal, certain points in the Russian province of Sakhalin in which the outrage was committed, pending the establishment in Russia of a responsible authority with whom she can communicate in order to obtain due satisfaction.

Nothing is further from the thought of the Japanese Government than to take advantage of the present helpless conditions of Russia for prosecuting selfish designs. Japan recalls with deep gratitude and appreciation the brilliant rôle which Russia played in the interest of civilization during the earlier stage of the Great War. The Japanese people have shown and will continue to show every sympathetic interest in the efforts of patriotic Russians aspiring to the unity and rehabilitation of their country. The military occupation of the Russian province of Sakhalin is only a temporary measure, and will naturally come to an end as soon as a satisfactory settlement of the question shall have been arranged with an orderly Russian Government.

In conclusion, the Japanese delegation is authorized to declare that it is the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the prin-

ciple of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions.

Statement of the United States

The reply on behalf of the American Government, by the secretary of state, was as follows:

The American delegation has heard the statement by Baron Shidehara and has taken note of the assurances given on behalf of the Japanese Government with respect to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime province of Siberia and from the province of Sakhalin. The American delegation has also noted the assurance of Japan by her authorized spokesman that it is her fixed and settled policy to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions.

These assurances are taken to mean that Japan does not seek, through her military operations in Siberia, to impair the rights of the Russian people in any respect, or to obtain any unfair commercial advantages, or to absorb for her own use the Siberian fisheries, or to set up an exclusive exploitation either of the resources of Sakhalin or of the Maritime province.

As Baron Shidehara pointed out, the military expedition of Japan to Siberia was originally undertaken in common accord and in coöperation with the United States. It will be recalled that public assurances were given at the outset by both Governments of a firm intention to respect the territorial integrity of Russia and to abstain from all interference in Russian internal politics. In view of the reference by Baron Shidehara to the participation of the American Government in the expedition of 1918, I should like to place upon our records for transmission to the conference the purposes which were then clearly stated by both Governments.

The American Government set forth its aims and policies publicly in July, 1918. The purposes of the expedition were said to be, first, to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces; second, to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves might be willing to accept assistance; and, third, to guard the military stores at Vladivostok.

The American Government opposed the idea of a military

intervention, but regarded military action as admissible at the time solely for the purpose of helping the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful coöperation with their Slavic kinsmen, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves might be willing to accept assistance. It was stated that the American Government proposed to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the Governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplated any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or thereafter, but that each of the Associated Powers had the single object of affording such aid as should be acceptable, and only such aid as should be acceptable, to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.

What I have just stated is found in the public statement of the American Government at that time.

The Japanese Government, with the same purpose, set forth its position in a statement published by the Japanese Government on August 2, 1918, in which it was said:

"The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desires of the American Government and also to act in harmony with the Allies in this expedition, have decided to proceed at once to despatch suitable forces for the proposed mission. A certain number of these troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok. In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remain unshaken in their constant desire to promote relations of enduring friendship with Russia and the Russian people, and reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that, upon the realization of the project above indicated, they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military."

The United States of America withdrew its troops from Siberia in the spring of 1920, because it considered that the original purposes of the expedition had either been accomplished or would not longer be subserved by continued military activity in Siberia. The American Government then ceased to be a party to the expedition, but it remained a close observer of events in Eastern Siberia and

has had an extended diplomatic correspondence upon this subject with the Government of Japan.

It must be frankly avowed that this correspondence has not always disclosed an identity of views between the two Governments. The United States has not been unmindful of the direct exposure of Japan to Bolshevism in Siberia and the special problems which the conditions existing there have created for the Japanese Government, but it has been strongly disposed to the belief that the public assurances given by the two Governments at the inception of the joint expedition nevertheless required the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from all Russian territory—if not immediately after the departure of the Czecho-Slovak troops, then within a reasonable time.

As to the occupation of Sakhalin in reprisal for the massacre of the Japanese at Nikolaievsk, the United States, not unimpressed by the serious character of that catastrophe, but having in mind the conditions accepted by both Governments at the outset of the joint expedition, of which the Nikolaievsk massacres must be considered an incident, it has regretted that Japan should deem necessary the occupation of Russian territory as a means of assuring a suitable adjustment with a future Russian Government.

The general position of the American Government was set forth in a communication to Japan of May 31, 1921. In that communication appears the following statement:

"The Government of the United States would be untrue to the spirit of coöperation which led it, in the summer of 1918, upon an understanding with the Government of Japan, to despatch troops to Siberia, if it neglected to point out that, in its view, continued occupation of the strategic centers in Eastern Siberia—involving the indefinite possession of the port of Vladivostok, the stationing of troops at Habarovsk, Nikolaievsk, De Castries, Mago, Sophiesk, and other important points, the seizure of the Russian portion of Sakhalin, and the establishment of a civil administration, which inevitably lends itself to misconception and antagonism—tends rather to increase than to allay the unrest and disorder in that region.

"The military occupation"—I am still reading from the note of May 31, 1921—"The military occupation in reprisal for the Nikolaievsk affair is not fundamentally a question of the validity of procedure under the recognized rules of international law."

The note goes on to say that "the issue presented is that of the scrupulous fulfilment of the assurances given to the Russian

people, which were a matter of frank exchanges and of apparently complete understanding between the Government of the United States and of Japan. These assurances were intended by the Government of the United States to convey to the people of Russia a promise on the part of the two Governments not to use the joint expedition, or any incidents which might arise out of it, as an occasion to occupy territory, even temporarily, or to assume any military or administrative control over the people of Siberia."

Further, in the same note, the American Government stated its position as follows:

"In view of its conviction that the course followed by the Government of Japan brings into question the very definite understanding concluded at the time troops were sent to Siberia, the Government of the United States must in candor explain its position and say to the Japanese Goverment that the Government of the United States can neither now nor hereafter recognize as valid any claims or titles arising out of the present occupation and control, and that it cannot acquiesce in any action taken by the Government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights or the political or territorial integrity of Russia.

"The Government of Japan will appreciate that, in expressing its views, the Government of the United States has no desire to impute to the Government of Japan motives or purposes other than those which have heretofore been so frankly avowed. The purpose of this Government is to inform the Japanese Government of its own conviction that, in the present time of disorder in Russia, it is more than ever the duty of those who look forward to the tranquilization of the Russian people, and a restoration of normal conditions among them, to avoid all action which might keep alive their antagonism and distrust toward outside political agencies. Now, especially, it is incumbent upon the friends of Russia to hold aloof from the domestic contentions of the Russian people, to be scrupulous to avoid inflicting what might appear to them a vicarious penalty for sporadic acts of lawlessness, and, above all, to abstain from even the temporary and conditional impairment by any foreign power of the territorial status which, for them as for other peoples, is a matter of deep and sensitive national feeling transcending perhaps even the issues at stake among themselves."

To that American note the Japanese Government replied in July, 1921, setting forth in substance what Baron Shidehara has now stated to this committee, pointing out the conditions under which Japan had taken the action to which reference was made, and giving the assurances, which have here been reiterated, with

respect to its intention and policy.

While the discussion of these matters has been attended with the friendliest feeling, it has naturally been the constant and earnest hope of the American Government—and of Japan as well, I am sure—that this occasion for divergence of views between the two Governments might be removed with the least possible delay. It has been with a feeling of special gratification, therefore, that the American delegation has listened to the assurances given by their Japanese colleague, and it is with the greatest friendliness that they reiterate the hope that Japan will find it possible to carry out within the near future her expressed intention of terminating finally the Siberian expedition and of restoring Sakhalin to the Russian people.

French Statement

On behalf of the French Government M. Sarraut said he gave his full and unreserved adherence to this resolution. In giving this unreserved adherence, he liked to remember that France was the oldest ally, perhaps, of Russia, and in this respect it was with a particular feeling of gratification that he would state that he had listened with great pleasure to the exchange of views that had just taken place before the committee between the representatives of the United States and Japan. The French Government would hear with the same feelings the formal assurance given by Baron Shidehara of the intention of the Japanese Government concerning Siberia; of Japan's desire to withdraw her troops from Russia as soon as possible; of its firm intention not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Russia; and of its firm purpose to respect the integrity of Russia.

France had full trust in Japan, who had always proved a loyal and trustworthy friend. It was quite certain that this assurance would be carried out. France accepted this with all the more pleasure because it was exactly the program which the French Government had adopted in 1918 and which led them to interfere in Siberia under the same conditions as those set forth so exactly by the secretary of state of the United States. At this point he could not fail to restate quite clearly France's intention, like that of her Allies, to respect the integrity of Russia, and to have the integrity of Russia respected, and not to interfere in her internal policy.

France remained faithful to the friendship of Russia, which she could not forget. She entertained feelings of gratitude to the Russian people, as she did to her other Allies. Russia had been

her friend of the first hour, and she was loyal; she had stuck to her word until the Russian Government was betrayed in the way with which those present were familiar. France also remained faithful to the hope that the day would come when through the channel of a normal and regular government great Russia would be able to go ahead and fulfil her destiny. Then it would be good for her to find unimpaired the patrimony that had been kept for her by the honesty and loyalty of her allies. It was with this feeling that the French delegation with great pleasure concurred in the adoption of the present resolution [that the American and Japanese statements be spread upon the minutes of the conference].

INDEX

Anglo-French-American Agreement, 95, 106, 113, 116, 130, 228.
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 102, 144, 155, 181, 183, 195, 214, 231, 254, 366, 452.

Baker, Ray Stannard, 70, 84.
Balfour, Arthur James, 64, 86, 100, 115, 236, 249, 263, 336.
Bankers' Consortium, 114, 178, 186, 204, 313, 398, 487.
Bashford, Bishop J. H., 41, 42.
Bliss, General Tasker, 74, 77, 117.
Bliss Letter, 74.
Borah, Senator William E., 65, 108, 117, 166.
Brandegee, Senator, 123, 166, 170.

California-Japan question, 182, 203.
Cassel Agreement, 469.
Chang Tsao-lin, 299, 362.
Chelmsford, Lord, 36.
China: territorial entity, 8; spheres of interest, 10; position at Paris, 50; case at Paris, 55; China and League, 136, 140, 152; Versailles Treaty, 72, 136; Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 183; regional agreements, 184 and Appendix H; results Washington Conference, 291; national debts, 311, 321.
Chow Tzu-chi, 235.
Chung Mun Yew, 235.
Colby, Bainbridge, 193.
Curzon, Lord, 37, 263.

Disarmament, 150, 180, 220, 263.

East India Company, 26.
Economic Imperialism, 47, 310.
Egan, Eleanor Franklin, 27, 28, 31, 33, 44.

Far Eastern Republic, 362.
Fiume, 77.
Forbes, W. Cameron, 22, 23.
Fourteen Points, 73.
France: influence in Asia, 24; relations with Japan, 264.

Great Britain: policy in India, 25, 46; Far Eastern policy, 46; imperialism, 47; position at Washington, 226; obstacles to accord with America, 380.
Grigg, Sir Edward, 47.

Hamilton, General Ian, 229.
Harrison, Frederic Burton, 17, 21, 22.
Hastings, Warren, 27, 33.
Hawaii, 15.
Hay Doctrine: origin of, 4; form of, 5; essence of, 7; major propositions, 8, misconceptions of, 10; British policy, 46; importance, 48, 49; treatment at Paris, 111, 113, 114; preservation of, 129; plan to extinguish, 164; reaffirmation, 295; unilateral import, 394.
Hay, John, 46, 47.
Hill, David Jayne, 109.
Hitchcock, Senator, 170.
Hornbeck, Stanley K., 122, 236.
House, Edward M., 89.
Hughes, Charles Evans: Monroe Doctrine, 6; Washington Conference, 236, 249.

Hoover, Herbert, 334.
Holland, policy in Asia, 29.
Hyndman, E. M., 26, 37, 38.

Imperialism, 47.
Independence, right of, 18, 22.
India: character of British policy, begin, 25; native viewpoint, 34; economic policy, 37.
International Court, 151.
International financing, 182, 319, 396.
Intervention: United States in Western hemisphere, 14, 396.
Irrepressible Expansion, 268.

Japan: position at Paris, 50; emigration, 173, 182, 273; internal situation, 373; Pan-Asian propaganda, 173, 174; two-headed foreign policy, 367; Washington Conference, 221; relations with America, 376.
Johnson, Senator Hiram, 90, 108, 118, 125.

Kato, Admiral, 236.
Keynes, John Maynard, 42, 43.
Knox, Philander C., 108, 347.
Koo, V. K. Wellington, 72, 155, 201, 235, 299.
Korea, 53.

Lamont, Thomas W., 178, 179.
Lansing, Robert, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 77, 78, 82, 103, 104, 105, 115, 117, 125, 164, 171, 179, 381.
Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 66, 101, 110, 163, 164, 172, 178, 184, 201, 291.
Lawrence, David, 230.
League of Nations, 73, 79, 88, 97, 108, 113, 134, 145, 147.
Liang, M. T., 235.
Li Yuan Hung, 299.
Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot, 198, 236.

McCormick Senator Medill, 108.
Makino, Baron, 57, 73, 107.
Manchuria, 272, 285, 340, 342.
Miller, Charles R., 109.
Monroe Doctrine: origin of, 3, 4; Open Door sustained, 4; value of, 5; definition of, 6; established, 48; obliquely circumscribed, 111; regional understanding, 112, 115; in Far East, 166.
Montagu, E. S., 31, 36.
Moros, 22.
Moses, Senator George, 108.
Munro, Thomas, 27, 30.

Open diplomacy, 103.
Open Door: definition of, 8; legal basis, 11.

Pan-Asianism, 173, 174, 367,
Paris Conference, organized, 50.
Philippines: American occupation, 15; American policy, 16; government of, 20; English view of, 32, 386, 402; analogy to India, 37; strategical position, 230, 282; problem of, 400.
Pichon, 107.
Pomerene, Senator Atlee, 164, 168.

Race equality, 172, 177.
Rai, Lajpat, 34, 35, 36, 37.
Regional understandings, 93, 102, 112, 163, Appendix H.
Reinsch, Paul S., 56.
Rockefeller Foundation, 41.
Root, Elihu, 236, 248.
Root-Takahira Agreement, 169, Appendix E.
Russo-Japanese Secret Treaty, 488.

Secret diplomacy, 82, 87, 149.

Self-determination doctrine, 51, 52, 103, 104, 105, 381.
Senate, 88, 116, 160, 163, 265.
Shantung: secret agreements, 57, 125, 126, 128; analysis of secret agreements, 63; Lansing's opinion, 78; importance of, 80; questions regarding, 91; Senate hearings, 119; President Wilson's opinion, 65, 125; Senate amendment, 127; articles Versailles Treaty, 72; position of American Government, 127; League of Nations, 155.
Siberia, 101, 286, 340, 357, Appendix I, 494.
Siberian Railway, 343.
Simpson, B. Lenox, 215, 379.
Singapore naval base, 320.
Special interests, 165.
Spheres of influence: thesis of, 10; how created, 10; recrudescence, 163; abolished, 336.
Stoddard, Lothrop, 39, 40, 44, 80.
Sun Yat Sen, 326, 390.
Sze, S. K. Alfred, 235, 247.
Tri-Power Asia Agreement, 94, 99, 100, 105, 106, 107, 113.
Tsai Ting-kan, Admiral, 235, 380.
Tsao Kun, 362, 391.
Twenty-one Demands, 476.
Tyau, Philip, 235.

Underwood, Senator Oscar, 236.

Viviani, Rene, 100.

Wang, Chentung Thomas, 86, 374.
Wang Chung-hui, 235, 299, 336.
Washington Conference: effects in China, 328.
Washington Treaties, 405.
White, Henry, 74, 77, 117.
Williams, Edward T., 119, 236.
Wilson, Woodrow, 17, 51, 52, 53, 57, 64, 68, 69, 77, 78, 102, 115, 118, 132.
Wireless case, 187.
Wu Pei-fu, 299.

Yen, Hawkling, 235.
Yen, W. W., 235.