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THE
INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

SILVER JUBILEE COMMEMORATION VOLUME

1950

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EDITORIAL NOTE

The publication of the present Volume was planned as part of the Silver Jubilee Celebrations of the Indian Philosophical Congress. At the General Body meeting held at Patna on the 27th of December 1949, an Editorial Committee was constituted with the following as its members:

Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan (Convener),
Prof. N. A. Nikam,
Dr Rasvihary Das,
Prof. G. R. Malkani,
Dr N. V. Banerjee, and
Prof. D. D. Vadekar.

At the end of the Patna session the Editorial Committee met and formulated the general lines on which the work of collecting material, etc., for the Volume had to proceed. Invitations to the contributors were sent by the Secretary in charge of papers, Professor N. A. Nikam, and the editing was done by the Convener of the Committee, Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan.

The Volume begins with an account of the founding of the Indian Philosophical Congress, its aspirations and aims, achievements and hopes, by the Chairman of the Executive Committee since 1937, and one of the Foundation-Members, Rajasevasakta Professor A. R. Wadia. To the names of past presidents who are no more with us, mentioned on page six, the name of Dīnabandhu C. F. Andrews is to be added. After the Retrospect follow the succession lists which are not as complete as we wish they were. Even the available records do not give all the names; and some of the oldest members who were requested to furnish data were not able to recall the names of all the office-bearers. The tradition of Indian philosophy which stressed principles rather than personalities seems to run in the blood of even the contemporary Indian philosopher.

The Welcome Address of the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta, the Hon'ble Justice Sri S. N. Banerji, is printed next.

The next part of the Volume consists of Presidential Addresses. We regret that it has not been possible to include the Address of the General President Professor S. Radhakrishnan. His duties as Ambassador for India in the U.S.S.R., and as Spalding Professor at Oxford, have not given him the time required to write out the Address and send it for inclusion in this Volume. We hope to print it separately or along with other Addresses that may be delivered at the Silver Jubilee Session by Delegates from foreign countries.

Instead of the usual two symposia we have three this year. The first symposium is on the place of the philosopher in modern society. A clarification of our ideas as regards the value of the philosopher for the contemporary world is what the world itself needs today; and that clarification is given by two of our eminent philosophers, Professors A. R. Wadia and H. D. Bhattacharyya. The second symposium covers two of our greatest philosopher-seers, Śrī Śaṅkara of the classical age and Śrī Aurobindo of our own times. The symposiasts who take part in this symposium argue out the *pros* and *cons* of Māyāvāda. The third symposium is a special feature of the Silver Jubilee Session. It has been said that in India philosophy is not divorced from religion. True to that character of Indian thought, the Congress has arranged for a meeting of religions on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee. The representatives of six of the world's living faiths expound the fundamentals of their respective religions with understanding and in a spirit of universalism.

Among those who have contributed articles to this Volume will be found the names not only of professional philosophers but also of others who have made a mark, each in his own way, in developing a *world-view*. We should like to make special mention of two of our distinguished contributors. Śrī Aurobindo's name is well known to the philosophical circles all over the world. One of his unpublished papers entitled *The Indian Conception of Life* appears in this Volume through the good offices of Dr Indra Sen. The other contributor whose memory we highly cherish is the late Professor M. Hiriyanna. In spite of his failing health, he found the time and energy to send us a special article on *A Neglected Ideal of Life*. May it not be said that in these two contributions is reflected the essentially Indian view and way of life!

We have received messages from all the quarters of the globe. Representatives of different walks of life, institutions and societies, have sent us their best wishes. It is a matter for gratification to know that there is such an amount of good-will in the world for the philosopher and his pursuit.

At the end will be found a note on the contributors, and, as an appendix, Poet Rabindranath Tagore's Presidential Address to the First Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1925. The Address is reproduced from the Proceedings of the First Session.

We have included three photo-prints: those of the President of the First Session, Rabindranath Tagore, of the Founder of the Congress and President of the Jubliee Session, Professor S. Radhakrishnan, and of the group taken at the First Session. We regret we have not succeeded in identifying the names of all the persons in the group.

Our thanks are due to all those who have helped to make this Commemoration Volume a grand one. We offer our thanks to Professor A. R. Wadia

whose advise was sought at every stage and was unstintingly given; to the members of the Editorial Committee for their uniform co-operation; to the sectional presidents, symposiasts and contributors of special articles; to those who have sent us messages; to the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta, the Hon'ble Justice Sri S. N. Banerji, and the Local Secretaries, Professor S. K. Das and Dr Rasvihary Das; to Dr S. C. Chatterjee and Prof. N. A. Nikam, Secretaries of the Congress; to Professor Haridas Bhattacharyya, Retired Head of the Department of Philosophy, Dacca University, and Miss P. V. Sulochana, Research Student, University of Madras, who rendered help in preparing the succession lists; and to Dr V. A. Devasenapathy and Mrs Sarasvati Chennakesavan, Assistant Professors of Philosophy, Pachaiyappa's College, who assisted in reading the proofs. We are also grateful to the staff of the Associated Printers (Madras) Ltd. for their neat and expeditious execution of the printing of this Volume.

THE EDITOR.

MADRAS,
4th December, 1950.

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Professor S. Radhakrishnan

A RETROSPECT

SUCCESSION LISTS

WELCOME ADDRESS



Dr Rabindranath Tagore

Dr Rabindranath Tagore

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS
1925—1950

A Retrospect

by

A. R. WADIA

THE editors of the Silver Jubilee Volume of The Indian Philosophical Congress have honoured me by requesting me to write on the History of The Indian Philosophical Congress. This is an honour which I greatly value whether as a foundation member or as a General President, or as the Chairman of the Executive Committee during the last thirteen years. But I do not feel sure that there is enough material to write on the history, as such, of an association that has been meeting but once a year. That is why I content myself with writing *A Retrospect*, a humble record of various points that would serve to refresh the memory of old members or would interest those who are in one way or another devoted to the cause of philosophy in India.

In 1914 the Indian Science Congress came into existence and when it opened its portals to psychologists, there was an unspoken desire in many that philosophy too should have an all-India platform. The credit for giving a shape to this idea must go to Professor S. Radhakrishnan, the then George V Professor of Philosophy in the University of Calcutta, and to the late Dr N. N. Sen Gupta who was then the Head of the Experimental Psychology Laboratory in the University of Calcutta. Professor Radhakrishnan as an old friend and colleague wrote to me and asked for my co-operation, which of course was given without any hesitation. We had to give considerable thought as to who should have the honour to be the first president of the Congress. Professor Radhakrishnan had just emerged into fame as a historian of Indian philosophy, and as a rising philosopher. As the man mainly responsible for bringing the Congress into existence, he would naturally not allow any one to think of him as the first president. Opinions were divided as to this or that professor of philosophy. The Gordian knot was cut by selecting the great Rabindranath Tagore as the first president. If he was not, and did not claim to be, a philosopher in the technical sense of the term, he was a philosopher as a lover of wisdom. I still have a very vivid recollection of the opening of the Congress by the then Governor of Bengal, His Excellency Lord Lytton. It was a very heartening address to the philosophers assembled, for it came from one who had evidently read and digested a good few philosophical classics. In fact among the visitors it was a common remark : " We did not know that our Governor was a philosopher ". The Chairman of the

Reception Committee was, as has been the practice in all the succeeding years, the Vice-Chancellor of the University under whose auspices we had met, Sir Ewart Greaves. It was a pleasure and an honour to be welcomed to the city and the university which had produced such a giant as Sir Asutosh Mukherji with whose name all university developments in the India of the 20th century must be associated. Then followed the presidential address of Rabindranath Tagore. He read it in his musical voice with the emotion inseparable from a poet and he brought out the significance of philosophy in the life of India as he alone could have done. After the opening, the five different sections met : Logic and Metaphysics section presided over by The Rev. Dr A. G. Hogg of Christian College, Madras; Indian Philosophy section presided over by Prof. R. D. Ranade of the University of Allahabad; History of Philosophy section presided over by Prof. Phanibushan Adhikary of Hindu University, Banaras; Ethics section presided over by Prof. A. R. Wadia of the University of Mysore; Philosophy of Religion section presided over by Prof. G. H. Langley of the University of Dacca.

The sectional presidential addresses were read to the sections concerned, a practice which was not found satisfactory; and so in the succeeding years these addresses have been read before the full sessions of the Congress.

On the entertainment side we had a musical concert from the famous singer Sri Dilip Kumar Roy, who has gathered greater laurels since then. A visit to the Botanical Gardens with its famous banyan tree remains an unforgettable memory. Dr Saroj Kumar Das, a junior member of the staff at the time, made himself particularly useful to the delegates and the lady delegates were equally well looked after by Mrs Das.

At the end of the third day the session ended and the Congress has had no reason to look back. It has gone ahead year after year with but one unfortunate break in 1942 when we were due to meet at Lahore, but owing to the disturbed state of the country we found it impossible to meet there or anywhere else at short notice. In these intervening years the Congress has met at almost all university centres except Annamalai and Agra among older universities. It has been invited twice to Delhi, Patna, Madras and Banaras. Bombay invited the Congress thrice, one session being held in Poona. Similarly for the third time Calcutta finds itself as our venue for our Silver Jubilee Session this year. Most of us felt that as the Congress was born in Calcutta, Calcutta should have the honour of having the Silver Jubilee Session, and as this desire met with a very cordial reception at the hands of the authorities of the University of Calcutta, the Congress very gladly welcomed the opportunity of meeting in the place of its birth. In these twenty-five years Calcutta has passed through many sorrows, the man-made famine of 1942 being the saddest. It has figured a little too prominently with its endless strikes of students and labour. But the study of philosophy, the seeds of which were sown by the late Dr Brajendra Nath Seal, the

GROUP PHOTO : FIRST SESSION OF THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

Sitting on the Floor : J. K. Chakravarthi, A. Nag, ———, R. V. Das, G. R. Malkani, S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, ———, P. P. S. Sastri, P. G. Dutt, ———.

Chairs : J. R. Banerji, ———, M. N. Tolani, M. R. Oak, A. R. Wadia, R. D. Ranade, Sir W. E. Greaves (*Vice-Chancellor*), G. H. Langley, S. N. Das Gupta, ———, W. S. Urquhart, H. Haldar, Sisir K. Maitra, A. G. Hogg.

Standing (*First Row*) : ———, S. Radhakrishnan, N. Venkataraman, ———, D. D. Vadekar, S. V. Dandekar, ———, U. C. Bhattacharyya, Kshirode Chandra Mukherji, ———, R. Ramanujachari, ———, E. Ahmed Shah, P. N. Srinivasachari, I. J. S. Taraporewala, N. Sengupta.

Standing (*Second Row*) : Radhakamal Mukherji, H. S. Bhattacharyya, ———, S. C. Datta, D. M. Datta, S. C. Sinha, ———, H. K. Deb, H. M. Bhattacharyya, B. L. Atreya, P. G. Bridge, B. K. Mullick, ———, J. Mckenzie, S. Sen, ———.

Standing (*Third Row*) : B. K. Nag, J. N. C. Ganguli, B. S. Guha, P. D. Sastri, R. Kimura, G. C. Chatterji, S. C. Chatterji.

first George V Professor of Philosophy, and which were subsequently fostered under Professor Radhakrishnan, Dr K. C. Bhattacharya, Dr Haldar, Dr Das Gupta and others, is still kept alive and the torch of philosophical lore has been passed on through their writings and inspiration to all parts of India.

We have had a long and distinguished list of general presidents. The selection of the presidents, as of the sectional presidents, has rested with the Executive Committee, elected every three years, and the succeeding executive committees may well claim to have done their work in a very catholic spirit, selecting people in virtue of their merit, and no community or province has found itself deprived of the honour of having its best men as general and sectional presidents. The only person who has had the honour of being invited to preside over the Congress more than once is Professor Radhakrishnan, who presided at the Bombay session in 1927 and at the Mysore session in 1932; again this jubilee year finds him General President for the third time. Two omissions need to be mentioned. The late Dr Brajendra Nath Seal, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Mysore, was invited to preside over the Banaras session in 1926, but he pleaded inability for reasons of age and health. When the Congress was to meet in Mysore in 1932 Professor Radhakrishnan and I were very anxious to have the great Dr Mahomed Iqbal of Lahore to preside, but even a personal visit from both of us could not persuade him to accede to our request for he was in indifferent health. Opinions will differ about his life and work, but there can be no denying that if he was a great poet, he was greater even as a philosopher and his association with the Congress would have been a great honour indeed.

The number of sections in the Congress has undergone changes from time to time. At the Allahabad session in 1938 it was resolved to create a new section for Islamic Philosophy. This continued till 1944, when at the Lucknow session it was resolved to drop the sections on Indian Philosophy and Islamic Philosophy and to regroup the sections into History of Philosophy, Logic and Metaphysics, Psychology, and Social Philosophy. This arrangement was brought into force from 1946. There is a good deal to be said for this change. The old practice tended to over-emphasize the differences in the general approach to philosophical problems in India, in Arabia and Iran, and in Europe. If philosophy is to justify its existence as a dispassionate study of truth it cannot have geographical boundaries. Moreover the use of terms *Indian* and *Islamic* in connection with philosophy tended to give an antiquarian or religious tinge to problems discussed, whereas all philosophical problems have to be treated as living problems in the solution of which we have a right to make use of ideas coming from the East and the West alike. Many looked upon it as a revolutionary change, but welcomed it all the same as the proper approach to truth.

In the election of the Executive Committee from the very beginning a due representation of the different universities was kept in mind. One year when it

was proposed to regularize this practice by giving a representative to each university in India, it was negatived. But in 1940 at Madras it was accepted as a part of the Constitution that each university should have a representative on the Executive Committee.

Apart from the academic activities of the Congress attempts have been made to take a part in the larger activities of the country. In 1937 the Congress passed a resolution in favour of founding an Indian Academy of Arts and Letters on the lines of the British Academy. It has met with no response so far, but in free India it should be possible to see the resolution take a concrete shape.

That philosophy as a subject for study in the universities is not so attractive as the study of sciences and even of economics is a fact common not merely in India, but in Western universities as well. The situation became worse when the Public Services Commission abolished Indian Philosophy paper at the I.C.S. examination and of Philosophy altogether at the Audit and Accounts Service Examination as well as at the Police Service Examination. This step-motherly attitude has given rise to strong protests and the Congress pressed their point year after year on the authorities concerned, but without success. But here again in free India philosophy should come back to its rightful heritage and we trust our resolutions of the past will be given effect to in the future.

In 1945 at the request of the Malwa Philosophical Association in Indore, the Congress for the first time accepted the principle of affiliation, and since then in 1949 the Bihar Darshan Parishad of Patna has also been affiliated. If the principle of affiliation is accepted whole-heartedly and the various philosophical associations in our universities and colleges get themselves affiliated, it will go far to bring together all the students of philosophy in one fold, and to a certain extent add to the importance of the Congress itself.

In recent years we have had the benefit of having Western philosophers in our midst. In 1946 Professor E. A. Burtt of Cornell University, U. S. A., was in our midst and in the following year Professor Charles A. Moore of Hawaii University addressed the Congress and evoked considerable interest in the East-West Philosophers' Conference at Honolulu, planned to meet in 1949. A number of our members took part in it and forged a further link between philosophy and philosophers : Eastern and Western. This movement is likely to be accentuated when in our Jubilee session we look forward to meet a number of our distinguished colleagues from Western universities.

In the space of twenty-five years death has claimed many of our leading lights. Among our general presidents we remember with gratitude the precious services rendered to the Congress by Dr Rabindranath Tagore, Mahamahopadhyaya Ganganath Jha, Acharya Anandshanker Dhruva, Dr K. C. Bhattacharya and Professor M. Hiriyanna. Among sectional presidents we mourn the loss of

Mr K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar, Rajasevasakta V. Subrahmanya Iyer, Dr Zagrul Hussein, and Professor J. P. D'Andrade.

Among the General Secretaries who are not with us, special mention has to be made of Dr N. N. Sen Gupta. As the organizer of the first session of the Congress, the debt of the Congress to him is unlimited. He was the General President of the second Madras session in 1940. His health prevented him from attending the sessions as regularly as we wished. But whenever he did come, he brought his sunny personality to bear on the problems of the Congress. Good work done is never forgotten and we shall always cherish his memory.

More intimate to me personally has been the loss of Mr S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Reader in Indian Philosophy, University of Madras, who was our General Secretary from 1931 to the time of his death in 1942, which came all too suddenly. Because of the services he had rendered to the Congress and to Indian Philosophy by his editing various philosophical classics, and because of the love and regard he had won by his genial nature, the members of the Congress resolved to perpetuate his memory by founding the S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri Memorial Prize, awarded every alternate year to a university student for writing the best essay on a prescribed philosophical subject. The first such prize was awarded to Miss S. S. Shukla of St. John's College, Agra, in 1948.

There is one event in the history of the Congress which I cannot pass over. On 5th September 1948, Prof. S. Radhakrishnan completed 60 years. It is an event which Hindus celebrate with great jubilation. The members of the Congress felt that it would be in the fitness of things if at the Session of the Congress which was to be held at Bombay in 1948 a Souvenir were to be presented to him on behalf of the Congress; for after all he was the Founder of the Congress, twice general President and Chairman of the Executive Committee for 12 years. The members decided to have a silver plaque containing in the form of a letter a brief appreciation of Dr Radhakrishnan's work and conveying to him the good wishes of the Congress. The silver plaque was beautifully designed and executed by the well-known firm of Messrs. Barton Son & Co. of Bangalore. The plaque reproduced the facsimilies of the signatures of all the members who had contributed towards the cost of the plaque. This gave a very warm touch to it. It was presented by The Rt. Hon'ble Dr M. R. Jayakar, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Poona, who inaugurated the Session at Bombay in 1948.

Coming to a review of the work done by the Congress it has often been asked: What has it done? The question has come more often from critics than from loyal friends, carrying an innuendo that the Congress has done nothing except having a pleasant yearly outing. I have heard the same criticism advanced against the Indian Science Congress and all the other academic congresses. Even assuming that these bodies have done nothing more than meet once a year, it would be futile to deny

the great advantages of such annual gatherings. India is a land of vast distances and the provincial feelings are stronger than in the smaller, more closely-knit nations of the West, and so an opportunity to meet our colleagues working in the same field in different parts of India is an advantage of very great importance in itself. Before 1925 the professors of philosophy were hardly known to one another even by name. To-day they have become great friends through their annual meetings, they have learned to measure one another and appreciate philosophical talents wherever found. I have known how the death of a philosopher in Mysore or Calcutta spreads waves of sympathy and appreciation in all the other philosophical centres in India. But to say that this is all the work that an academic association has performed or can perform would be a mere travesty of facts. In fact the Congress has given a positive impetus to teachers of philosophy to write. It is an open secret that conditions in our colleges and universities are not such as to encourage research on any great scale. As a rule the hours of teaching are far too many and on too varied subjects, which hardly allow opportunities for specialization. In these circumstances one can imagine the opportunity that the Congress affords to our teachers to do some work that can be presented to their fellow-workers at the end of the year. The Proceedings of the Congress go to show how abundantly this aim has been fulfilled. Many of the papers are of real worth—and only such papers have been usually published. They have been quoted and thought about long after their original publication. Philosophic scholarship has risen distinctly in these twenty-five years and considerable credit for this must in fairness go to the Congress.

On the whole the Congress can look back upon its career of twenty-five years with justifiable pride, but it does not mean that those responsible for running it are not conscious of flagrant deficiencies. We had all hoped that all teachers of philosophy in India would see that they join the Congress and contribute to its stability, but this legitimate hope has not been satisfied. Many of them join the Congress when they attend a session, but in years when they could not come, they would not pay the subscription and this has seriously affected the financial stability of the Congress. They do not seem to realize that the backbone of the Congress is constituted by the teachers of philosophy and without their full support the Congress cannot fulfil all its aims and objects. In this respect an excellent example has been set by Rao Bahadur P. C. Diwanji, a retired member of the judicial service, but with whom philosophy has been as good as second nature. Almost a solitary figure among teachers of philosophy, his reading and enthusiasm have won their respect and his unfailing humour and kindliness have won their love. During the last fifteen years he has been very regular year after year and his occasional absence would evoke anxious inquiries as to why he did not come. His legal advice, of course unremunerated, has been most helpful at the time of registering our Congress. He has added to the debt the Congress owes him by presenting the gold medal that he is awarding at the Silver Jubilee

session this year for an essay on Sāṅkhya, which he looks upon as the fountainhead of philosophy in India. If the regular teachers have but half his zeal, the future of the Congress would be assured.

The second deficiency has been the method of publishing the annual proceedings. The cost of printing has gone so high that it is literally impossible for the Congress to shoulder the responsibility of publishing the proceedings. So we have had to come to some sort of arrangement with *The Philosophical Quarterly* published by The Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner. Thanks to the financial resources of Seth Pratapsingh of Amalner, the founder of the Institute, and the whole-hearted co-operation of Prof. G. R. Malkani, the Director of the Institute, the presidential addresses as well as a selected number of other papers read at the Congress are published in the *Quarterly* and the off-prints bound together as the Proceedings of the Congress. Needless to say this has meant delay in publishing the Proceedings, and it has also meant a very incomplete record, when addresses of the Chairmen of Reception Committees or votes of thanks, which in their nature are not strictly philosophical, do not find a place in the Proceedings. We have tackled various means of overcoming this fundamental weakness of the Congress, but without success so far. It has produced at least one comic interlude in an ultra-serious organization. A valued colleague of ours suggested that we should have more Patrons and make them pay for the honour to the tune of Rs. 10,000. This did not seem a practical proposition and the figure was reduced to Rs. 5,000, because our valued colleague assured us that he knew at least one Indian Prince who would gladly pay Rs. 10,000. Unfortunately soon after the political changes in the country the disappearance of the princely order has left our resolution high and dry. If in philosophic India we can find patrons in sufficient numbers who would pay even a thousand each, we might be able to build up a Publication Fund which would enable us to meet our responsibilities. We have also hopes that our Government would come to our aid with a yearly grant. One can turn to our universities as well, but they are all faced with their own financial problems and as members of our universities we can hardly turn to them with our begging bowl.

If our Proceedings can be independently published, it will be all the better for *The Philosophical Quarterly* too, for it can then function as an independent journal, discovering and encouraging new talent. The first philosophical journal in India was started by Prof. Widgery of Baroda about 1917, but it ceased publication after some years. Subsequently Professor Ranade began to publish his *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, but in 1937 he offered to amalgamate it with *The Philosophical Quarterly* of Amalner. So there now remains in the field only one philosophical journal in the whole of India, and in the interests of philosophy it must be enabled to develop on its own lines without being fettered by its arrangement with the Indian Philosophical Congress.

It may not be out of place to note here the plan on which the work of the Congress has been carried out. At the very first session in Calcutta in 1925 we had only the opening session when all the members met together, for all other meetings were sectional. This was found unsatisfactory and from 1926 it has been the practice that all the sectional presidential addresses are read at full sessions. It was also thought desirable that every year two symposia should be arranged: one on a metaphysical subject and another on a subject of more practical importance as in ethics, religion or sociology. They have been found to be extremely popular and have been always very well attended, and alas! time has always stood in the way of these engrossing discussions of eternal problems continued *ad infinitum !*

Some members of the Congress have off and on sought to abolish the sections altogether and to focus attention only on some selected topics as has been the practice in the All-India Economics Conference and the Political Science Congress. But the majority of the members so far have been in favour of having sections as heretofore, for it gives a chance to those who have been working on particular problems to present their views to the Congress instead of forcing every teacher of philosophy to just think only on two or three selected subjects.

The Constitution of the Congress provides for an Executive Committee elected every three years. Apart from the Secretaries there is the Chairman of the Executive Committee who is naturally held responsible for the smooth working of the Congress year after year. For the first twelve years this responsible office was held by Professor Radhakrishnan, but in 1937 at the Nagpur session he expressed a desire to be relieved of this office on account of his increasing activities in so many other fields of life and his frequent absence from India owing to his Spalding Professorship in Oxford. The honour of becoming his successor fell to my lot, and though I have frequently asked to be relieved so as to make room for a younger man, I have found it difficult to resist the pressure of my kind and good friends at every one of the last three elections. I have still two years more of office and I shall be glad to be relieved, not without a sense of pride that I have done my humble best for the Congress. This sense of pride carries with it the full consciousness of all the assistance I have received from successive general secretaries : the late Sri S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Dr S. K. Das, Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan, Dr N. V. Banerji, and last but not the least Prof. N. A. Nikam, my pupil and friend, who has borne the heavy brunt of organizing the Silver Jubilee Session. I should particularly like to mention also the names of Dr D. M. Datta and Dr Ras Vihari Das, whose interest in the Congress, regularity in attendance and wise counsel have been great assets. Prof. Humayun Kabir has always had the interests of the Congress in mind and never failed to help us with his wise counsel. Nor have I words adequate to express all that I owe to the willing co-operation of so many other members of the Congress. If the Congress

has worked well, the credit must go to those who have stood by it all these years, and if it is going to achieve still greater success in the coming years, as we all hope, it will be due to the interest taken and zest displayed by all the teachers of philosophy in India.

So much for the Retrospect, but we can also look ahead. It has been a source of untold pleasure to all concerned that on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the Congress we have received the blessings and good wishes of Dr Rajendra Prasad, the President of India, and Ministers of the Central Government, Governors of States, Vice-Chancellors of Universities in India and Pakistan. We are grateful to them and grateful too to the authorities of our sister-organizations like the Indian Science Congress and Indian History Congress for their messages of good will. The cordial greetings of the President of the University of the United States of Indonesia, and of the Institute International De Philosophie of Paris have touched us deeply. Messages have been thankfully received from the President of the Council of Ministers of Thailand and the High Commissioners in Delhi of Great Britain, Canada, Australia and Pakistan. Mr Warwick Chipman, High Commissioner for Canada, refers to "India's historic leadership in philosophic thought," and Mr H. Roy Gollan, High Commissioner for Australia, speaks of philosophers as "among the few men who are able to close their ears to arguments which are opportunist, selfish or merely propagandist. They are devoted to the ideal of seeking out truth in its simple, universal form." Language like this makes us proud as well as feel humble. We feel obliged for their heartening words.

To the American Philosophical Association we are particularly indebted, not merely for their greetings, but even more for having appointed two eminent American thinkers like Professor F. S. C. Northrop of Yale University, and Professor George P. Conger of the University of Minnesota to be present at our Silver Jubilee Session. Not merely this Congress but Indian Universities will welcome this opportunity to have lectures from them. To the famous Mind Association and Aristotelian Society of Great Britain we express our obligation for their greetings.

We hope to have in our midst at least some professors of philosophy from Great Britain. In the meantime, we greatly appreciate the messages received from veterans like Dr Bertrand Russell, Dr G. E. Moore and Prof. C. D. Broad, who can claim to have passed on their philosophy to their Indian students, who now figure as professors of philosophy in India.

The words of Dr Leon Roth, F.B.A., now of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, command our attention : " India has always implied for the world at large the inward light of the spirit ; and this light is the more needed to-day because of the dark mists of scientific barbarism, which seem to be closing in upon the world from all sides." Dr Y. P. Mei of the University of Chicago, while welcoming the East-West Cultural Relationship, pleads for a revival of the

"mutual understanding and appreciation between minds of India and China." With nearly half the human race comprised within China and India, what a vista of hope opens out before the world for an enduring peace!

In the midst of so much appreciation and good will manifested from all the parts of the world, it may be permissible to pick out for special emphasis the message received from so great a personality as Viscount Samuel, Statesman and Philosopher, President of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, London. He refers with obvious pleasure to the ending of the two centuries of British rule in India " without bloodshed—a peace treaty without a war " and points out how " the ending of political antagonism has released the underlying good will that was always there." I may draw attention to one passage in his long letter, which should be of perennial interest to all students of philosophy :

" Great, therefore, is the responsibility, in this seething troubled age, that rests upon the intellectual leaders of the peoples. But great also is the opportunity; for in the long run it is always ideas and not things, philosophy and religion and not technology and economics, which decide the welfare or the ruin, the happiness or the misery of mankind."

In the midst of this lavish display of good will and love and encouragement we can but say to all our well-wishers in deep humility but with perfect sincerity: Thank you, we shall do our best to prove worthy of your blessings.

SUCCESSION LISTS

Chairmen of the Executive Committee

1925–1937	..	Professor S. Radhakrishnan
1937–	..	Professor A. R. Wadia

Secretaries

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1949–	..	Prof. N. A. Nikam
1950–	..	Dr S. C. Chatterjee

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1941–	..	Prof. J. C. Banerjee
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1950–	..	Sri A. K. Mazumdar

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1925—CALCUTTA

Inaugurated by His Excellency the Earl of Lytton, Governor of Bengal

General President: Dr Rabindranath Tagore, Santiniketan

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Logic and Metaphysics: Rev. A. G. Hogg, Madras

Philosophy of Religion: Prof. G. H. Langley, Dacca

History of Philosophy: Prof. Phanibhushan Adhikary, Banaras

Ethics and Social Philosophy: Prof. A. R. Wadia, Mysore

Chairman of the Reception Committee: Justice Sir Ewart Greaves, Vice-Chancellor

Local Secretaries: Dr N. N. Sengupta and Dr P. D. Sastri

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Sectional Presidents:

Indian Philosophy: Prof. A. B. Dhruva, Banaras

Logic and Metaphysics: Prof. Hiralal Haldar

Philosophy of Religion: Rev. Dr W. S. Urquhart, Calcutta

History of Philosophy: Prof. A. Chakravarti, Madras

Ethics and Social Philosophy: Prof. J. Mckenzie, Bombay

Psychology: Prof. M. N. Tolani

Chairman of the Reception Committee: Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya

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Inaugurated by H. H. Maharaja Sir Sayaji Rao, Gaekwad of Baroda

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Indian Philosophy: Sri V. Subrahmanya Aiyar, Mysore

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History of Philosophy: Dr S. N. Dasgupta, Calcutta

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Local Secretaries: Principal Mckenzie, Professors Wadia and Sathe

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Philosophy of Religion: Dr Enola Eno, Lucknow

History of Philosophy: Prof. S. K. Maitra, Banaras

Ethics and Social Philosophy: Prof. P. A. Wadia, Bombay

Psychology: Prof. G. C. Chatterjee, Lahore

Chairman of the Reception Committee: Sri K. Ramunni Menon

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Indian Philosophy: Sri S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras
Logic and Metaphysics: Prof. A. R. Wadia, Mysore
Philosophy of Religion: Prof. H. D. Bhattacharyya
History of Philosophy: Dr Prabhu Dutt Sastri
Ethics and Social Philosophy: Dr Adityanath Mukherji
Psychology: Dr N. Sen.

1930—DACCA

Inaugurated by the Hon'ble Mr. K. Nazimuddin, M.A., C.I.E.
General President: Prof. A. R. Wadia, Mysore

Sectional Presidents:

Indian Philosophy: Dr M. N. Sircar, Calcutta
Logic and Metaphysics: Prof. T. D. Sully, Agra
Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy: Dr K. A. Hakim, Hyderabad
Psychology: Dr G. S. Bose, Calcutta

Chairman of the Reception Committee: Prof. G. H. Langley, M.A., I.E.S., Vice-Chancellor, Dacca University
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Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy: Prof. N. Venkataraman, Vizianagaram
Psychology: Prof. N. K. Sen
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Convener : Sri D. N. Sen.

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Indian Philosophy: Prof. P. P. S. Sastri, Madras
Logic and Metaphysics: Prof. P. N. Srinivasachari, Madras
Ethics, Social Philosophy and Religion: Prof. S. G. Sathe
Psychology: Dr Suhrit Chandra Mitra

Chairman of the Reception Committee: Dr E. P. Metcalfe, Vice-Chancellor, Mysore University
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1933—POONA

Inaugurated by H. H. The Rajah Saheb of Sangli
Presidential Address: Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya

Sectional Presidents:

Indian Philosophy: Dr Saileswar Sen
Logic and Metaphysics: Dr Rasvihari Das
Ethics, Social Philosophy and Religion: Prof. A. F. Markham
Psychology: Dr T. A. Purushottam
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Ethics, Social Philosophy and Religion: Sri K. R. Srinivasaiengar
Psychology: Prof. H. P. Maiti
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Local Secretaries: Dr Saileswar Sen and Dr T. A. Purushottam

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Logic and Metaphysics: Prof. N. G. Damle
Ethics, Social Philosophy and Religion: Prof. J. C. P. D'Andrade, Bombay
Psychology: Prof. J. N. Sinha
Chairman of the Reception Committee: Dr W. S. Urquhart
Local Secretaries: Dr S. K. Das and Prof. U. C. Bhattacharya

1936—DELHI

Inaugurated by Sir Girija Sankar Bajpai, Minister for Education
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Indian Philosophy: Dr D. M. Datta
Logic and Metaphysics: Prof. M. M. Sharif
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Psychology: Prof. B. Hivale
Chairman of the Reception Committee: Rai Bahadur Ram Kishore
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Psychology: Prof. Kali Prasad
Chairman of the Reception Committee: Dr Sir Hari Singh Gour
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Logic and Metaphysics: Prof. G. R. Malkani
Psychology: Prof. Jamuna Prasad

1940—MADRAS

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General President: Prof. Dr N. N. Sen Gupta

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Logic and Metaphysics: Sri G. Hanumantha Rao
Psychology: Prof. Muhammad Aslam
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Islamic Philosophy: Dr M. Zuhuruddin Ahmed, Junagadh
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Indian Philosophy: Dr N. K. Brahma
Logic and Metaphysics: Sri T. R. V. Murti
Psychology: Sri P. S. Naidu

1942-1943—LAHORE

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Ethics and Social Philosophy: Prof. P. M. Bhambani, Agra
Psychology: Prof. S. N. Roy, Patna
Islamic Philosophy: Prof. M. Umar-ud-din, Aligarh
Local Secretary: Prof. M. Aslam

1944—LUCKNOW

Inaugurated by Dr Pannalall
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Sectional Presidents:

Indian Philosophy: Dr Jwala Prasad, Amroati
Logic and Metaphysics: Khwaja Abdul Hamid, Lahore
Ethics, Social Philosophy and Religion: Sri D. D. Vadekar, Poona
Psychology: Dr D. G. Londhe, Nagpore
Islamic Philosophy: Maulvi Mahesh Prasad, Banaras
Chairman of the Reception Committee: Lt.-Col. Raja Bisheshwar Dayal Seth
Local Secretary: Prof. Kali Prasad

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Inaugurated by H. H. The Maharajah of Travancore
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Sectional Presidents:

Indian Philosophy: Sri P. C. Divanji, Bombay
Logic and Metaphysics: Prof. P. S. Ramanathan, Nagpore
Ethics, Social Philosophy and Religion: Prof. Humayun Kabir, Calcutta
Psychology: Dr N. S. N. Sastri, Mysore
Islamic Philosophy: Dr Valiuddin, Hyderabad
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Local Secretary : Prof. V. Sundararaj Naidu

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History of Philosophy: Dr R. Das, Amalner
Ethics and Social Philosophy: Dr R. N. Kaul, Allahabad
Psychology: Prof. V. Sundararaj Naidu, Trivandrum

Chairman of the Reception Committee: Sir Maurice Gwyer, K.C.B.
Local Secretaries: Dr N. V. Banerjee, Mrs. N. Sherjung, and Sri B. N. Kaul

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Inaugurated by Prof. Radhakrishnan, Vice-Chancellor
General President: Dr M. N. Sircar, Calcutta

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Ethics and Social Philosophy: Sri J. C. Banerjee, Calcutta
Psychology: Prof. K. C. Mukherji, Dacca

Chairman of the Reception Committee: Dr S. Radhakrishnan, Vice-Chancellor, Banaras Hindu University
Local Secretaries: Dr B. L. Atreya, and Prof. S. L. Dar

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General President: Prof. Sisir Kumar Maitra, Banaras

Sectional Presidents:

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Chairman of the Reception Committee: Mahamahopadhyaya Dr P. V. Kane

Local Secretaries: Dr J. N. Chubb, Rev. J. Esteller and Prof. S. Dokerji

1949—PATNA

Inaugurated by H.E. Sri M. S. Aney, Governor of Bihar
General President: Prof. G. R. Malkani, Amalner

Sectional Presidents:

Logic and Metaphysics: Dr A. C. Das, Calcutta
History of Philosophy: Rev. J. F. Butler, Madras
Ethics and Social Philosophy: Principal V. K. Joag, Poona
Psychology: Dr (Miss) Lyra Rebeiro, Delhi
Pandit Sabha: Pandit Rajeshwar Sastri Nyayacharya

Chairman of the Reception Committee: Shri Sarangdhar Sinha, Vice-Chancellor, Patna University

Local Secretaries: Profs. S. N. Roy and D. M. Datta

SYMPOSIA

1926	..	The Problem of God The Problem of Reality
1927	..	Values The Place of Psychology in Philosophy
1928	..	Universals The Concept of Progress
1929	..	Intellect and Intuition
1930	..	Psychological Basis of Personal Identity
1931	..	The Self in relation to Knowledge
1932	..	On the Possibility of a New Morality Sarvamukti-- Universal Salvation
1933-34	..	Idealism and the Physical World Sabda as Pramana (Verbal Testimony as a Source of Valid Cognition)
1934	..	The Place of God in Advaita The Status of Consciousness in Contemporary Realism
1935	..	The Future of Democracy What is Real Heaven?
1936	..	The Place of Feeling in Conduct in Indian Philosophy The Philosophical Implications of Evolution
1937	..	What is Philosophical Knowledge? The Source of Legal Obligation
1938	..	Philosophy and Mysticism Freedom and Authority in the Modern State
1939	..	Karma and Fatalism Negative Judgment in Relation to Reality
1940	..	Nationalism as a Principle of Political Philosophy Causality and Indeterminism
1941	..	Is the Unverifiable meaningless? Is there a Group Mind?
1942 43	..	Has Philosophy a method of its own? Is Beauty Objective or Subjective?
1944	..	Soul: One or Many Foundations of Perpetual Peace
1945	..	Philosophical Basis of Marxism Is Time real?
1946	..	Role of Buddhism in Indian Life and Thought Freedom and Security as Political Principles
1947	..	Factors of Social Disintegration The Criterion of Reality
1948	..	Philosophical Significance of Negation Is there a Philosophy of History?
1949	..	Philosophy and Sadhana Logic as Metaphysics

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS, 1950

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Chairman: Prof. A. R. Wadia

Secretaries: Prof. N. A. Nikam and Dr S. C. Chatterjee

Assistant Secretaries: Lt. J. C. Banerjee and Prof. A. K. Mazumdar

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24.	,, Saugor ..	Prof. S. S. Roy
25.	,, Rajputana ..	Dr R. P. Singh
26.	,, Kashmir ..	Prof. S. K. Tochalchani
27.	,, Mysore ..	Prof. N. A. Nikam
28.	Institute of Philosophy, Amalner ..	Prof. G. R. Malkani
29.	Nominated by the President of the Executive Committee.	Sri P. C. Divanji
30.	,,	Dr Miss Lyra Rebeiro
31.	,,	Dr D. M. Datta

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS 1950

SILVER JUBILEE SESSION 1950—CALCUTTA

General President : Professor S. Radhakrishnan, M.A., D.Litt., F.B.A., Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, University of Oxford, Indian Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

Sectional Presidents :

History of Philosophy: Professor Humayun Kabir, Secretary, Ministry of Education, New Delhi.

Logic and Metaphysics: Professor A. C. Mukherji, Head of Department of Philosophy and Dean of the Faculty of Arts, University of Allahabad.

Ethics and Social Philosophy : Dr T. M. P. Mahadevan, Head of the Department of Philosophy and Reader in Indian Philosophy, University of Madras.

Psychology : Professor S. C. Dutt, Professor of Philosophy (Retired), Cotton College, Gauhati, Assam.

Chairman of the Reception Committee: The Hon'ble Justice Sri Sambunath Banerji, M.Sc., LL.B., Bar-at-Law, Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University.

Local Secretaries:

(i) Dr Saroj Kumar Das, M.A. Ph. D. (London), Senior Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, Presidency College, Calcutta.

(ii) Dr Rasvihary Das, M.A., Ph.D., Lecturer in Philosophy, Post-Graduate Department, Calcutta University.

WELCOME ADDRESS

by

S. N. BANERJI

FRIENDS

This is the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress. Twenty-five years ago this congress came into existence and held its first session in this city. It is therefore in the fitness of things that this session should be held in this city.

We are grateful to the Executive Committee for their decision to hold the Jubilee Session under the auspices of the Calcutta University. We are grateful to them for their acceptance of our invitation.

We extend a very cordial welcome to the delegates who have come from different parts of the country. We know the difficulties of travel these days. We know the trouble one has to take to move from one part of the country to another. Yet they have been good enough to come. It is a matter of great satisfaction and pleasure.

A special feature of this Session is the presence of delegates from countries outside India. The " Mind Association ", England, is represented by Dr A. C. Ewing, F.B.A., University of Cambridge, and the American Philosophical Association is represented by Professors Northrop and Conger. We welcome them and we thank them for their visit to this city to attend the conference.

I, on behalf of our University, extend our hearty welcome to our illustrious philosopher, Professor Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan who presides over this session. We are grateful to him for his coming over to this city from a different part of the world, perhaps leaving important duties there.

This session is made memorable by the presence of eminent men who will preside over the different sections and who will address the conference on different subjects.

Gentlemen, today our heart is heavy-laden with sorrow and anxiety. Bengal today is not the ' sujala ', ' suphala ' Bengal of Rishi Bankim Chandra. Bengal today is divided, truncated. She has suffered at the hands of men and from the fury of nature. Her tears have mingled with the waters of the Ganges. Today, we are not, perhaps, able to offer you the same rich offering as we did in the past. But I assure you our welcome to you is none the less cordial. Gentlemen, having regard to the present condition of Bengal, I hope and trust you will forgive us our transgression, if any, in our service and welcome to you.

Though our sorrow is great still we are not without hope. For we know sorrow sanctified is better than joy.

Gentlemen, in this galaxy of great philosophers, it would be childish on my part to recount Bengal's contributions to Indian Philosophy. They are well-known to you. Bengal has not only contributed in the past but it has also contributed in recent years. But I should be very reluctant to take a provincial view of the matter. There is no Bengal Philosophy, just as there is no other provincial philosophy. There is only one philosophy in India and that is the Indian Philosophy, which is our pride, our glory and which is held in the highest esteem in the world.

Philosophy is the art and law of life. It teaches us what to do in all cases. The two most important objects of philosophy are the discovery of what is true and the practice of that which is good.

Since the beginning of life what has life sought for ? What has it yearned for ? Happiness ! It thinks that this happiness can be got from money, from land, from power. And night and day it has toiled for them. But has it got the happiness ? No. Why not ? Because true happiness is not there. Instead of happiness, instead of Supreme Bliss, which makes life happy, it has met Death. On this subject there is a fine story of Tolstoi :

One day a merchant came to a peasant and told him that for a small price he could get much land in the country of Bushkirs. The merchant left his wife and children at home and taking only his workman with him started for this unknown country. He reached the country on the seventh day. There he told them what his mission was and Bushkirs said, " You can have as much land as you like. Our price is only one thousand roubles per day. We sell only by the day. That is to say, as much land as you can walk round in a day, that much land is yours. Only there is a condition —namely, that if on that same day you do not return to the spot whence you started, you do not get the land and your money is forfeited." The bargain was struck and the peasant after hard day's labour slept and dreamt. The dream was not a pleasant dream. In his dream he saw the Devil looking at him. The peasant gave a gasp and awoke. Then he looked to see if it were getting light yet, and saw that the dawn was near. " It is time to start and I must start now ", he thought. Then he started and walked. He walked neither slowly nor hurriedly. He looked at the sun and saw that he had covered very little land. He said to himself : " I must hurry on ". And he hurried on. But then he found walking very difficult. His feet were aching badly for he had chafed and bruised them. Then he saw the sun reach the horizon. He said to himself, " When shall I reach the spot whence I started ? " It seems everything is lost. His fears served to render him only the more breathless. But still he ran on, his shirt clinging to his limbs with sweat, and his mouth parched. Yet on he ran with his last remaining strength and thought, when

the sun had just touched the horizon, that the spot was close. He thought then " I have much land now, if only God should bring me safe to live upon it." He ran on and for the last time he looked at the sun. Large and red, it had touched the earth, and was beginning to sink below the horizon. The peasant was about to reach the spot just as the sun had set. " Ah ", he cried in his despair, for he thought that everything was lost. And then, he stumbled and fell and in the very act of falling stretched out his hands to touch the spot, and died. Blood had come out of his mouth and the peasant lay dead. A grave was dug for him —of the same length as the peasant's form from head to heels and there he was buried. This is what we are all doing !

Philosophy teaches us that the happiness is not in much land. It is in ignoring pain, and feeling our oneness with the Absolute, where there is no such distinction as pain and pleasure, good and evil, virtue and vice, merit and sin.

The supreme teaching of our Upaniṣad is " Ātmānam viddhi " which is, " Know Thyself ". Our Vedas have told us how to acquire that knowledge. Once you attain that knowledge there comes the Supreme, Uninterrupted and Perpetual Bliss as in a sea of light, bright, yet not burning.

The wise men of India came to recognize this truth before it was recognized anywhere in the world. To attain this stage one need not neglect his duty : one need not renounce the world : nor despise or ignore the existence of matter. Sir William Jones in the last of his essays, " On the Philosophy of the Asiatics ", pointed out : " The fundamental tenet of the Vedānta School consisted not in denying the existence of matter, that is, of solidity, impenetrability, and extended figure (to deny which would be lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no essence independent of mental perception, that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms." Schopenhauer said : " These words adequately express the compatibility of empirical reality and transcendental ideality."

Today this world is like that peasant seeking much land and thinks that when we have that land, we shall attain supreme happiness. And to get that land mighty weapons of destruction are being invented every day, for one nation to kill another.

The greatest fear of Life is Death. They are two opposites. Death begins where Life ends. Life shuns Death. The single form of Real Life is the present. We do not know the Past before Life nor the Future after Death. Yet there cannot be a Present without a Past or a Future. Time is like an unceasing stream and the Present a rock on which the stream breaks itself, but does not carry away with it. We fear death because it robs us of the present. The greatest benefit that mankind can have is the banishment of this fear. Philosophy teaches us how to banish the fear. Whether this world is to be explained as an idea or as

a will, it is clear that there will be many discussions, many theories in quest of the Truth. I do not know whether that Truth has been unquestionably established. But there is no doubt that various discussions on it which are summed up in the word ' Philosophy ' help us on to get near the Truth.

In this Conference there is no doubt that discussions will take place which will be for the benefit of mankind.

Philosophers are the good men of this world. It is for them once again to assert themselves like the Hindu Rishis of old. They are the men in whom the greatest responsibility rests for the general development of mankind. Shall we not look to you, philosophers present here today, once again to teach us to pray : " Lead us from what is Untrue to the Truth ; from Darkness to Light ; from Death to Immortality !"

Let the divine music of the prayer stop the roaring thunder of the destructive weapons made by men and get the Kingdom of God once again on earth.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES

ON THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY

Presidential Address

Section : History of Philosophy

by

HUMAYUN KABIR

I am deeply grateful to the Indian Philosophical Congress for giving me this opportunity of associating myself with the celebrations of its Silver Jubilee Session. The Congress has from its inception stood for the development of studies and interest in different aspects of philosophy, and I shall deem it a privilege if I am able to help in any way the promotion of these ends.

Paradoxical as it may sound, India, which in the past has been one of the foremost centres of philosophical study and speculation, has in recent years tended to show a diminution of interest in the study of philosophy. This is reflected by the fall in the number of students who take it up as their special subject in Honours and Post-graduate courses in the different Indian Universities. One University, situated in an area which produced some of the greatest philosophers, not only of India but of the whole world, has severely curtailed, if not altogether abolished, the facilities for the teaching of philosophy in its faculties. Even Universities which provide the necessary facilities do not attract a sufficient number of students with the necessary ability. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in Universities like Oxford or Cambridge where a large number of the ablest students—irrespective of what career they intend to adopt later—take to the study of philosophy for the value of its intellectual discipline.

I have sometimes wondered why Indians who have always been noted for their sensitive and acute intellect, and for their interest in finding out the wherefore of everything, should now exhibit such disinclination for the study of philosophy. Metaphysics, with its research into first causes, and its delight in acute dialectical reasoning would at first sight seem to be peculiarly fitted for the supple and subtle Indian intellect. Nevertheless, the fall in the number of students in the philosophical subjects cannot be gainsaid. Many of them have been attracted to other sociological studies, particularly economics which deals with the theory of money, perhaps in the mistaken hope that a theoretical knowledge of money may in some way lead to its material possession. This, however, cannot be the only cause. There must be something in the nature of the syllabus and the way studies in philosophy are organized which fails to satisfy the young students' love of abstract knowledge or hope of worldly betterment. A restatement of the

value of the study of philosophy and an analysis of some of the drawbacks and defects in existing courses may, therefore, help to remove some of the causes which today make philosophy unpopular with the younger generations.

The study of philosophy which attempts to discover and understand the first causes of things is important at any time. No culture can flourish unless it understands its own basic assumptions. They are often regarded as first principles that are self-evidently true, but reflection and analysis invariably show that they are in fact pre-suppositions and hypotheses which we have accepted without even realizing that they are such. So long as a culture is not faced by any inner conflict or external challenge, such a non-critical attitude is no great handicap, but when different cultures and outlooks confront and oppose one another, such tacit assumptions do not suffice. Man must in such a situation think out the implications of his attitudes and habits of thought and action, and find a justification for them in a reasoned view of experience. If he fails to do so, the clash of conflicting ideologies destroys the buttress of faith which sustains his life. Anthropologists tell us that primitive peoples die when they come into contact with a civilized people, not only because of the physical destruction they have to face, but still more because their world of belief is shattered by the impact of a more developed and self-conscious outlook. Today, when the world is gradually but inexorably coming closer, the different ideologies which different societies produced in different ages must meet one another's challenge. If modern man is unable to combine in one common synthesis the world outlooks evolved in different ages and different climes, there is little hope of the survival of any one of them. In the present crisis of the world's history, the study of metaphysics has, therefore, become an obligation which no person with any intellectual conscience can escape or deny.

All action is ultimately based on knowledge or what passes for knowledge. No one in his senses would ever frame a policy of action on what he himself knows to be error. Difficulties, however, arise because it is not always possible to distinguish between knowledge and what passes for knowledge. If knowledge exhibited any characteristic which unmistakably distinguished it from opinion or error, the world would be a much simpler place to live in. Unfortunately, however, error and opinion, till we attain a stage of knowledge, are never recognized as such. A further complication is introduced by the fact that experience itself is a process of continuous growth. What seems to be knowledge in a particular context is later seen to be error with a widening or alteration of the context. Just as the addition of a new tint changes the tone of existing colours and subtly transforms the composition of the whole picture, the discovery of new facts tends to change the meaning and significance of facts previously perceived. The infinite complexity of experience at any one moment and the possibility of changes through the process of time demand that there must be continuous examination of the principles which operate in experience.

In a sense, such examination is the essence of philosophy. It is not only a criticism of its own pre-suppositions, but also an effort to make explicit what is implicit in experience. Philosophy thus brings to consciousness what is unconsciously implied in our attitudes and actions. The need for such analysis is obvious if we consider the nature of human activity. Where action results from feelings, there can be no guarantee of uniformity or universality, as feelings are essentially private. Conduct or attitude based on feeling would thus tend to disrupt the structure of society. Where action is based on instinct, we can expect a uniformity of response among different individuals. The difficulty with instinct, however, is that it tends to the same pattern of action in the same situation. Where the situation changes, instincts are unreliable as guides to action. In the modern world, with its complexity and change, instincts cannot, therefore, offer any guarantee of uniformity of conduct or thought.

The importance of the study of philosophy in the modern world may, therefore, be taken for granted. Even then the question arises whether there is any justification for the study of history of philosophy. Some may perhaps enquire if there is any justification for the study of history of any type. Human history, in spite of many attempts to reduce it to a science, still remains a mere summation of observed instances. All attempts to frame any general law of history or to reduce it to a science have so far failed, and as far as we can judge from the nature of the case, are bound to fail. Though it is often said that history repeats itself, the statement is true only with wide qualifications. A historical situation has so many elements and so many ramifications that it is difficult, if not impossible, to apprehend it in its entire complexity. When we judge two situations to be similar, we do so only on the basis of certain observed similarities, but as many features remain outside our notice, the observed similarities can give no logical guarantee that the two situations will in fact lead to similar developments. Besides, every historical situation is the resultant of what has gone on before, and hence strictly speaking no historical situation can ever be repeated. Nevertheless, the study of history is of genuine value in understanding even contemporary events. One may go further and say that we cannot understand the present unless we understand the past, for the present is largely—even if it is not entirely—the result of what has happened in the past.

It is true that in the case of philosophy, there are certain features which differentiate its history from the history of events, or of science. In philosophy, each philosopher seems to start almost *ab initio* and builds up his system by criticizing, if not condemning, the work of his predecessors. In science, subsequent workers base their theories on the findings of former scientists. Political and economic events also show the influence of preceding events. It is generally possible to trace a course of advance and development—at least over a certain specified period. We rarely find in philosophy any such sense of direction and progress. In addition, the personal factor plays an even more decisive role in

the formulation of a philosophy than in the shaping of historical events. Nevertheless, all such differences are ultimately differences only in degree. One may well doubt the belief in the inevitability of progress in human affairs. Even in science, we know that certain truths achieved in the past have been lost to subsequent generations. On the other hand, later philosophers can and do benefit by the experience of their predecessors.

Perhaps even more important is the fact that the study of history of philosophy is in a sense integral to the study of philosophy itself. In philosophy, the object of study is the nature of knowledge and being. In order to arrive at this nature, we seek to distinguish the *what* of a thing from its *that*. *That* refers to existence, which is conditioned by space, time and causality. Philosophy thus attempts to understand the nature of objects without reference to space and time. The object of philosophy is, therefore, in a special sense timeless and hence the history of philosophy tends to merge into philosophy. We must also remember that philosophy not only seeks to understand the timeless object, but also to make time itself the object of its analysis. In fact, philosophers may be broadly divided into two classes according to their attitude to the problem of time and change. From the earliest times, some philosophers have sought to find out the changeless entity in the midst of change, and others to reduce reality itself to a flux.

There are two other reasons why the study of the history of philosophy is a necessary preparation for the study of philosophy. The history of philosophy teaches us that no belief is sacrosanct and beyond question. Acute philosophers have held passionately and with conviction to beliefs that seem to us totally absurd, and on the other hand, things which seem self-evidently true to us were rejected outright by men of the greatest intellect. The history of philosophy, therefore, encourages its students to develop an attitude which is both critical and humble: critical because the spirit of enquiry and scepticism is essential to any progress in thought and humble because experience shows that even the greatest genius had his blindspots.

This combination of curiosity and detachment, of intellectual daring and intellectual humility develops a spirit of toleration that is important not only for the study of philosophy but also for the conduct of affairs. The consideration of alternative hypotheses and the awareness that there may be elements of truth as well as error in either creates an attitude of mind in which we can learn to accept differences without violent revulsions of feeling. The widening of intellectual sympathies which results from such a discipline helps to create the basis of a civilized social order. Unless we can tolerate differences, we cannot recognize the value of the individual, and without recognition of the dignity of the individual, there can be no democracy, and without democracy, society cannot be creative, free and co-operative.

While history of philosophy is thus an essential ingredient in the study of philosophy, it is curious that the study of such history as a separate discipline is not very ancient. It is true that in the old traditions of Indian or Hellenic philosophy, an individual philosopher built up his system by a statement and criticism of the position of his predecessors. Such criticism was, however, intended only to establish his own position, and naturally the philosopher chose only those aspects in the teachings of his predecessors which were relevant to his purpose. There was not, as far as one can judge, any attempt to study the development of philosophy as a systematic process. One reason for this may be that many of these ancient philosophers were primarily interested in action, while the pre-occupation with understanding for its own sake is a comparatively late development. Another, and perhaps a more fundamental reason may be that philosophy till the modern period has largely developed through commentaries on either what are regarded as revealed texts or the work of some great philosopher whose writing was regarded as infallible. Even when new wine was poured into old bottles, every effort was made to induce the belief that the new wine did not differ from the old. Thus new developments had to come under the garb of amplifications or explanations of the old. It was inevitable that such an attitude with its undue reverence for authority should hamper not only the growth of individual adventures in philosophy, but also the emergence of histories of philosophy which must, from the nature of the case, compare and judge—sometimes favourably but sometimes adversely—all old texts, whether revealed or otherwise.

We need not enter here into a discussion as to the reasons which led to the contemporary shift of philosophical interest from ethical or ontological questions into problems of epistemology. Suffice it to say that the shift is itself evidence of the vitality of the philosophical tradition and its attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of all aspects of experience. In recent time, our knowledge has expanded in all directions. There have been great advances within particular fields simultaneously with an increase in the number of such fields. Contacts between different societies and different sciences have led to many new developments, which demand a new synthesis of all knowledge and the evolution of a new outlook. A crying demand of the modern world is, therefore, a more intensive study of philosophy and the development of a truly philosophical spirit. Never has there been a more pressing need than to-day for a disinterested survey of the conflicting ideologies which, unless they can be reconciled, threaten to disrupt the world we know.

It is, therefore, surprising that India should at such a juncture suffer from a lack of interest in philosophy. One cannot help feeling that this is at least in part due to defects in the organization of the syllabus and the methods of teaching in the Universities. In the attempt to make the study of philosophy a purely academic discipline, the background of its social development is often overlooked.

In fact, the craze for abstraction tends to deny the inter-relations between the different departments of human knowledge. Even within philosophy itself, there are large gaps of knowledge which prevent a realization of its social significance. We have seen how there can be no systematic or satisfactory study of philosophy without the study of its history. Unfortunately, such study is yet in a most unsatisfactory stage. We have to-day specialists who are authorities on some particular philosopher of the East or the West. We also have historians of philosophy who have given more or less systematic accounts of the development of philosophy in some particular area of the world or of human thought. In spite of occasional attempts by a few adventurous spirits, we however lack even to-day a historian of philosophy to trace the development of human thought on a global scale.

According to the European tradition which has been largely followed in the Indian Universities, the study of philosophy begins with the Greeks. The earliest Greek philosophers take us back to the sixth century before Christ, but India and China certainly, and perhaps Egypt, had already achieved a high degree of development before this period. The philosophical standpoints of the Buddha in India, and Confucius in China presuppose many centuries of previous speculation and enquiry. There is, therefore, little doubt that systematic study of philosophy had begun in these countries at least a thousand years—if not more—before the Christian era. Greek philosophy itself contains internal evidence of influence from abroad, but our knowledge of such influence is at best rudimentary. Nor have we any knowledge of the contacts between the ancient schools of thought in China, India and Egypt and cannot, therefore, judge how far their inter-connections led to any new developments. In recent times, there have been many independent studies in the philosophical systems of India and China, though the thought of Egypt still remains largely unknown. Their antiquity is unquestioned, and it is universally admitted that they precede the development of Greek philosophy by centuries, but nevertheless, even to-day most histories of philosophy begin the story of the development of human thought with the Greeks. This cannot but make the study of philosophy somewhat unreal to Indian students.

Equally big is the gap in our knowledge of the influence of Indian thought on Arab thought. There is general agreement that ancient Indian thought influenced the Arab conception of mathematics, chemistry and philosophy. It is possible that there are works in Arabic in which the story of such influences is still imbedded. So far as the general student of philosophy is concerned, these are, however, still largely matters of speculation. It is also known that the Arabs preserved the Greek heritage and passed it on to modern Europe. The impact of Arab thought on Europe was, therefore, full of momentous consequence, and according to some, is the immediate cause of the Renaissance. It is, however,

not realized that a comprehensive survey of such influence is not possible without discovering in what way Arab thought had combined the elements which it inherited from Hellenic, Hebraic and Indian sources. What is still more strange is that many students of philosophy are not even aware of such gaps in our knowledge or of the consequences which follow from them.

In this connection it may be of some interest to refer to the 'History of Philosophy' which is being sponsored by the Government of India. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, at a meeting of the All-India Education Conference in 1948 proposed that the Government of India should undertake the preparation of a 'History of Philosophy' without any territorial or temporal qualifications. Such a work could alone claim to be a true history of philosophy, for it would seek to illustrate the continuity in the development of human thought without reference to any particular age or people. The state of our knowledge to-day is the result of the co-operation stretching over millenniums of all the peoples in the world, but for various reasons, most of the current histories of philosophy written by European or American scholars either altogether ignore or make merely passing reference to the contribution of the Orient. On the other hand, books by Indian and other Oriental scholars generally deal exclusively with either Indian or some other special school of Oriental Philosophy. In consequence, the unity in the development of human thought is hardly ever grasped.

In view of past neglect, it is perhaps necessary to place a greater emphasis on the study of Indian philosophy in our Universities. This also is the reason why the proposed "*History of Philosophy : Eastern and Western*" will embody a special reference to the value of the Indian contribution to the development of human thought. The reorganization of our University syllabuses are, however, still not fully satisfactory. Indian philosophy has no doubt found a place, but it is still treated as a special branch and what is worse, the syllabus is so arranged that in some cases, it is an alternative to some other school of philosophy. Thus in some universities, students who take up Indian philosophy must remain ignorant of Arab philosophical thought and *vice versa*. The Indian Philosophical Congress has re-organized its sections on the basis of subjects, and it seems that a similar re-organization of the syllabus of philosophy in Indian Universities is long overdue.

The state of study of philosophy in a country is in the end only a measure of the state of intellectual health of its people. To be alive is to think, and hence some kind of philosophy is altogether inescapable for man. The only choice is between sound philosophy and unsound. Unsound philosophy—which really means lack of philosophy—may breed a spirit of dogmatism and rigidity which would be fatal in the modern world. Even for purposes of bare survival, it is thus necessary to ensure the maintenance of a spirit of critical enquiry, intellectual humility and toleration of differences. These constitute the essence of man's

philosophical quest and are in turn best developed through the pursuit of the philosophical discipline.

The need of a new philosophical renaissance is borne upon us even more inexorably by the impasse to which modern science has brought the whole of humanity. The tremendous advance of scientific knowledge is one of the most glorious achievements of the human intellect, and has for the first time in human history created conditions in which a civilized standard of life is possible for everybody. It has also brought about a liberation of the spirit by sweeping away many old superstitions and offering rational explanations of many of the mysteries of nature. Nevertheless, science itself is facing a crisis to-day, on account of its inner paradoxes and also because of its divorce from the values of the spirit. The destructive aspects of science have in consequence become a threat to human survival. It is this crisis in science and civilization which offers both a challenge and an opportunity to philosophy. If there is to be a transvaluation of old values and the emergence of new standards for humanity as a whole, it is for the philosophers to take up the task and through a critical examination of the old scaffoldings of faith prepare the framework for a new temple of the human spirit.

TRADITIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Presidential Address

Section : Logic and Metaphysics

by

A. C. MUKERJI

About a couple of decades have passed since I had the privilege of first presiding over this section and acquainting my learned colleagues with the reasons why, notwithstanding my deep respect for a particular philosophical tradition, I felt then dissatisfied with its modern form in which an apparently abrupt turn has been given to an analysis of experience which, if pursued more resolutely and boldly, would yield a richer harvest than what has so far been reaped. I would very much like to use the present opportunity for presenting before you some of the considerations that have further deepened my allegiance to that old, mistakenly fancied dead, tradition in spite of my profound admiration for the overwhelming scholarship and remarkable ingenuity with which some of the comtemporary theories of epistemology and metaphysics have been, and are still being, worked out. But this being impossible in a brief presidential address I shall try to give here the barest outline of my views against the background of some arbitrarily selected new orientations in epistemology and metaphysics.

That every new reorientation in the field of logic and metaphysics necessarily represents a forward step opening the way to a hitherto unattained insight into the nature of experience and reality has been a disastrous assumption in the history of philosophy. The assumption is disastrous for it promotes an unhealthy craze for originality and encourages a sort of dilettantish attitude to the achievements of the past. Personal initiative is, no doubt, a great virtue in philosophy as in the other spheres of life; but it must be admitted at the same time that this virtue, when completely divorced from an intelligent appropriation of the heritage of the past, degenerates into a perverse crotchet, and sometimes even a deceitful conceit, that is ill-suited for furthering the cause of truth. I have often asked myself if some of the recent developments in logic and metaphysics, notwithstanding the remarkable ingenuity with which they have been, and are still being, worked out, are not born of the craze for novelty rather than a genuine speculative impulse. When, for instance, it is proclaimed that all philosophers from Plato and Aristotle down to Kant and Hegel, have only erected the pillars of aberration in their efforts to analyse experience, it would *prima facie* arouse the suspicion that such a presumptuous generalization could not be the result of any fairly sympathetic or thorough study of the great thinkers of the past.

Before proceeding to justify this suspicion, it may be useful to start with what may be called the common platform of the warring theories.

Paradoxical as it may appear, a total discontinuity between a new theory and the old would render its critical weapons totally ineffective against the latter. To put it from the other side, the underlying unity and continuity of views is the very reason why they come into clash in respect of certain specific problems and particular situations. In a philosophical controversy it is but natural for the disputants to be oblivious of the solid core of knowledge which supports and lends force to the weapons of offence and defence, much as in the heat of the battle the combatants remain unconscious of the solid common ground under their feet. If they had not been absolutely certain about the general features of what reality must be, the participants in the controversy would not so much as feel the need of differing from one another in regard to the specific formulations of their respective positions. The assertion " The virtuous are happy " does not come into conflict with the assertion " All crows are black ", because there is no common concept uniting them; similarly, " You are just " and " He is unjust " are not conflicting assertions, because the predicates, though mutually exclusive, lose their opposition when they are ascribed to different subjects.

Every theory of reality, for example, lays claim to truth and consequently challenges the truth-claim of a rival theory. That there is a reality which refuses to be represented by conflicting theories is, therefore, one of the common assumptions uniting the new with the old theory. If reality, as philosophical perversity has sometimes claimed, had been in its ultimate nature the subject of conflicting and mutually destructive judgments, there could be neither science nor philosophy. Even the most radical sceptic or a confirmed misologist, in so far as he claims truth for his assertion that knowledge is unattainable or that reality is inscrutable, makes the unconscious assumption that reality has a positive nature by virtue of which it repels conflicting formulations. Thus radical scepticism or total agnosticism is a disguised parasite that feeds upon the sap supplied by the parent tree of absolute knowledge.

One of the results of these considerations is to disclose the utter futility of an unbridgeable dualism of knowledge and reality. Even when reality is taken to lie beyond the frontiers of knowledge, the position owes its plausibility to a confusion between the general and the specific features of reality, and then our obvious ignorance of the details is misconstrued as total ignorance including that of its general features. What is not clearly realized by those who make this mistake is that a completely unknowable reality, being a contentless vacuity, cannot be intelligently used for demarcating or limiting the sphere of human knowledge. Existentialism, when viewed in this light, has only revived an old fallacy, by creating an impassable gulf between knowledge and existence. Even if it be granted that existence cannot be resolved into mere logic and that it is best

illustrated in the spontaneity or creative resolve and in the attitude of men, it does not follow from this that " existence " is, on that account, beyond knowledge or beyond the principles involved in a systematic presentation. In fact, the existentialistic mistrust of system which is supposed to stifle spontaneity and human personality would make existentialism either speechless or senseless. If personality and spontaneity are to convey any definite meaning they must conform to the principles of significant assertions and systematic presentation; and so to condemn the rationalistic practice of building up an impersonal objective system, far from preparing the ground for an alternative formulation of reality, would knock off the ground from under the feet of " existence " itself. The need of a philosophical or scientific reform arises when a particular theory is found to be inadequate for the purpose of complete systematization and a new theory comes to establish itself by reason of its greater systematizing capacity. Thus, system being the most fundamental demand that unites the new with the old theory, an initial distrust of system is utterly incompatible with the claim to reform or improve upon the old doctrines of epistemology or metaphysics.

To discard system is, in fact, to eliminate the universal from an analysis of experience and reduce knowledge to incommunicable flashes of extreme subjectivity which render all questions of truth and error as irrelevant as unmeaning. That some existentialists have perceived this paradox in an extreme type of subjectivism is apparent from the super-existential philosophy of Heidegger with its emphasis on the human-being-in-general by which he has sought to remove the paradoxes in the existential philosophy of Jaspers. The reduction of truth to a mere subjective attitude of man may no doubt display an excessive zeal against the objectivation of existence, but it betrays at the same time the *reductio ad absurdum* inherent in an one sided emphasis on the abstract particular.

These observations, of course, are not intended to belittle the importance of recognizing an unobjectifiable principle for a sound and systematic theory of knowledge, and so far the contention that human personality contains a principle that does not admit of objectivation may be essentially right. But from this it does not follow that the unobjectifiable principle is beyond the region of coherent thought; all that follows is the inapplicability to it of the specific characters that belong to the objectifiable facts. Indeed, this inapplicability is accepted as much in the interest of coherent thought as any other discovery in science or philosophy; and it would, therefore, be a very serious confusion of issues to extol the virtue of incoherent thinking, as some existentialists have actually done, in formulating the doctrine of existentialism. It is one thing to insist that existence cannot be objectified, but it is an entirely different thing to deny on that ground an objective system of knowledge born of coherent thought.

Another new departure in epistemology is represented by what is called logical positivism, analysis, or logical empiricism. Like every type of positivism

it dismisses all metaphysical problems as psuedo-problems due to linguistic confusion and proceeds to solve afresh the problems of epistemology which are supposed to be insolvable without a strictly logical analysis of language designed to clarify the meaning of words. It would be an endless task to go into the considerations which have led to the conclusion that the meaning of words is determined by syntactical and semantic rules of the language. But what is significant is the acute difference of opinion in the camp of the logical positivists themselves about the truth or falsity of empirical propositions, particularly of the "Protocol" sentences, some holding that truth or falsity of these sentences is determined solely by the formal relation each of them has to a given system of sentences, and thus enunciating a modified form of the coherence theory of truth, while others questioning the possibility of any sentence, howsoever coherent and consistent, conveying knowledge about matters of fact simply on the ground of its formal self-consistency. Thus an old dispute has received a new lease of life, and one would not be far wrong if it is surmised that the importance of the logical analysis of language for solving the problems of philosophy has been considerably exaggerated by the modern positivists.

If this is an instance of the exaggerated claims of contemporary positivism to solve an old problem, the renewed emphasis it has laid on the dualism of *a priori* and empirical knowledge may be taken to be an instance of its uncritical acceptance of an old questionable solution of another important problem of epistemology. This dualism to which the empiricists of all grades of perfection have persistently clung, as is well known, was thrown into prominence by Hume by his famous distinction between the truth about the relations of ideas and that about the matters of fact. It is only in the case of the former that, according to him, there may be demonstration while our knowledge of the matters of fact is bound to remain in the region of probability. In reverting to Hume's dualism and accepting his verdict as final, the logical empiricists, along with the majority of contemporary thinkers, appear to have completely ignored the value of an alternative theory of knowledge, according to which neither the *a priori* nor the empirical knowledge is a species of knowledge by the side of the other species; on the contrary, what is called *a priori* knowledge is nothing more than the knowledge of the universal elements involved in the very existence of an empirical object or an empirically given event. If, for instance, it is assumed that sense-data are the ultimate materials of experience, our analysis, according to this theory, is defective, for it does not take into consideration the conditions of there being a world of sense-data at all. Every sense-datum, for example, must be identifiable in different contexts, and must, at the least, be distinguishable from the other sense-data by its spatio-temporal and other relations. These formal relations being involved in their very existence, to abstract them from the sense-data is to reduce the latter to what would be as good as nothing for us. When considered in this light, the distinction between the formally true or formally false

and the factually true or factually false propositions would be found to be based upon an unfortunate mistake in interpreting the meaning of *a priori* knowledge.

No careful exponent of *a priori* knowledge has denied the substantial truth of Hume's contention that we can never be quite sure of the truth of a given inductive generalization. But at the same time it would be a blunder to infer, as has been done by the logical empiricists, that one never has a good reason for believing that any event will occur rather than any other. This is a blunder because the conception of an objective order of succession, which no empiricist can doubt except through a confusion of thought, implies that every event has a definite place in the spatio-temporal system. What the past has taught us may be untaught by the future. Such an uncertainty is conditioned by the absolute certainty that the past is necessarily followed by the future, but this necessity is after all the necessity with which one event follows another. Here, once more, we come upon the truth, explained above, that our ignorance of the special features of reality is based upon our absolute certainty about its general features. That is, to put it in the present context, the validity of objective succession is necessarily presupposed by, and consequently cannot be derived from, or assailed by, particular inductions of doubtful validity.

A modified form of the same confusion has been at the root of the logical positivists' dualism between the world of meanings and the structure of reality. Criticism of the rules of logic is not a new venture in the history of philosophy ; nor is there much room for adding to the points that have been historically made out to meet this misological challenge. One may, therefore, afford to be brief in bringing out the self-contradiction in the positivists' attack on the logical rules on the ground that their application is restricted to the field of discourse organizing our meanings and, as such, have no ontological significance. The simplest way of realizing the inherent paradox of this criticism would be to enquire whether or not this itself is an assertion claiming to be absolutely true, and, as such, possessing a meaning which, though expressed in language, is not determined by the syntactical rules of the language; and whether or not its truth claim is an implicit rejection of the truth of any other assertion that is its contradictory. It will then be evident that the positivists' criticism of the logical rules cannot be left standing except on the basis of those very principles it seeks to deprecate. The law of contradiction, for instance, regulates, not only the use of words, but also every significant assertion, and every systematic formulation of our views. What defies systematic formulation, as we have urged in the context of existentialism, is not a profounder reality than the logical reality but a contentless vacuity, a mere word emptied of the least shred of meaning. Even the distinction between the field of discourse and the structure of reality, like every other distinction, has for its ultimate sanction the logical demand for coherent and systematic thinking. The conclusion, therefore, seems to be unavoidable that all attempts

to deny, or restrict the application of, the principles of logic are but the offspring of an illegitimate particularization of the universal and a consequent co-ordination of the transcendental principles with what they condition. A new theory, a new analysis, a new orientation,—these are all alike dictated by the principles of logic, and so far they may be called foundational principles as distinct from the superstructural rules. The latter are certainly subject to change and revision; but these changes being always dictated by the former, it would be as insane to condemn the logical principles as mere tautologies as to expect that the superstructure will not collapse on the removal of its foundation.

A similar conclusion would follow from a careful and impartial examination of the other empirico-sceptical re-orientations of epistemological and metaphysical thought of the present day. The hunt for the pure data isolated from the transforming activity of thought, the phenomenological description of the data of consciousness in their original purity and immediacy, the attempt to replace the Critique of Pure Reason by the Critique of Historical Reason or by the biogra--phical studies of great men's lives, are but new bottles containing old wine. None of them, when every thing is said and done, can afford to ignore the conditions of systematic thought and, inasmuch as the logical principles provide these conditions, every criticism of the older types of epistemological analysis which unearthed the foundational principles of knowledge is bound to be ineffectual and abortive.

BEYOND ETHICS

Presidential Address

Section : Ethics and Social Philosophy

by

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

The philosopher not unoften figures in popular opinion as a lover of the paradox. The title of my address, I am afraid, may lend credence to that prejudice. But not all paradoxes are idle puzzles or meaningless riddles. Very often, what is apparently self-contradictory is seen to contain a concealed truth. And, is it not the task of the philosopher not to rest content with the appearances, but to pierce through them and reach the heart of reality ? To seek to address the Section of Ethics and Social Philosophy of the Indian Philosophical Congress on a sphere which is beyond ethics may savour of a paradox. My choice, however, is based on a conviction that if one is confined strictly within the frontiers of ethics, one runs the danger of getting bogged and missing the life-giving and exhilarating air of the free land of the Spirit. To show how this is so shall be the theme of my address.

I

It is generally accepted by experts in moral science—if science it may be called—that ethics is concerned with conduct as expressive of character, and that conduct is not only three-fourths of life, as Matthew Arnold would have it, but the whole of life. Now, in what way is ethics concerned with life ? Is ethics concerned with life as it is *actually* lived or with life as it *ought* to be lived ? The consensus of opinion among moralists is that ethics which is a *normative* study deals with the *ideal* of conduct and not with conduct *as such*. Whether the ideal be regarded as a *rule* to which conduct has to conform or as an *end* towards which conduct has to be directed, the morality of conduct is to be determined not by asking how conduct arises or in what manner it functions but by enquiring how far it approximates to the rule or approaches the end. So, ethics is usually defined as the study of what is *right* or *good* in conduct. In other words, what we are interested in in ethics is the good will or the ideal self, and not merely the actual modes of action or activity-types. We may, therefore, say that where there is no ' ought ' there is no morality. It is in the oughtness of morality that its strength and weakness lie. And, it is because of its oughtness that morality cannot be the *finale* of life and can serve only as the footstool of heaven.

II

Attempts have been made, mainly by positive scientists, to construct an ethic without the 'ought'. Seeking to give a purely scientific formulation to the foundations of ethics, an American scientist, Dr Chauncy D. Leake, converts ethics into what he calls "ethicogenesis"[1]. Dismissing classical ethics as 'metaphysical irrelevance' and 'dogmatically normative', he wants to adopt, in the study of morals, the 'descriptive' approach characteristic of scientific effort, and discover thereby a natural principle operative in human relations. Agreeing with scientists like Carlson and Julian Huxley, the essence of the scientific method, he says, is the rejection in *toto* of all non-observational and non-experimental authority in the field of experience. The procedure that is followed in the natural sciences involves three stages : (1) Observation and description, as accurately as possible, of oneself and one's environment, (2) suggestion of a tentative hypothesis as to the ways by which an individual and his environment may operate, and (3) testing the validity of the tentative explanation by experiment, which consists in the isolation and control of specific factors, and arriving at conclusions warranted by such a process. If seeing is believing, one should not believe without seeing ; and 'seeing' for the modern scientist is sense-perceiving through observation and experiment. The scientific method, therefore, is descriptive, what is called explanation being but a more detailed and accurate mode of description. In the scientist's vocabulary, then, expressions like ideals and norms do not find a place. What he is concerned with is only collection of data and generalizing about them.

Employing the descriptive method as the sole instrument of knowledge, the scientist finds no evidence for the objective existence of 'immutable and absolute principles of Truth, Beauty and Goodness'. The human individual, as a conscious agent is the source and measure of all value, according to Warner Fite, as quoted with approval by Leake[2]. Ethics, therefore, is not a value-science devoted to the definition of 'Goodness' as an objective value. It is a life-science included in the wider science of biology. From our biological knowledge it is clear "that survival for an individual living thing or for a particular living species is 'good' for that individual or that species. Whatever is conducive toward the continued survival of that particular individual or that particular species is therefore 'good' for it."[3] The clue, then, to understand morality lies in Darwinism, whose central doctrine is that survival is accomplished through adaptation and adjustment to environmental conditions. That individual or group which adjusts itself harmoniously toward other individuals or groups has a better chance of survival

1 Chauncy D. Leake and Patrick Romanell, *Can We Agree?* A Scientist and a Philosopher argue about Ethics (The University of Texas Press, Austin, 1950).

2 *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

3 *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

than that which does not. The ethical implication of this Darwinian dictum is that that mode of conduct is good which is conducive to harmonious adjustment to environment. Leake calls it the 'harmony' theory of ethics. Thus the justification for the 'Golden Rule' that one should love one's neighbour as oneself is that any living thing, in order to survive, must adapt itself harmoniously to its environment. To the criticism that the Darwinian conception of Nature as 'red with tooth and claw' and of the process of life as 'a struggle for existence' is more consistent with the 'Iron Rule' of Nietzsche than with the 'Golden Rule' of Jesus Christ, Leake's reply is that it is an unfair criticism. "Darwin's contribution to ethics", he contends, "was essentially to offer biological evidence in support of the Aristotelian harmony theory of ethics. This, as has been later developed, appears to be a matter of adaptation, adjustment, and compromise toward what may become mutually satisfying."[4]

The 'naturally operative ethical principle', then, is to be conceived in terms of a concomitant variation between 'mutual satisfaction' and 'survival'. Leake formulates the principle as follows : "*The probability of survival of a relationship between individual humans or groups of humans increases with the extent to which that relationship is mutually satisfying.*"[5] This is a natural principle because, it operates anyway, whether we are aware of it or not, like the laws of thermo-dynamics. The only advantage of recognizing it is that we can function better by taking advantage of it.

The implications of the natural symbiotic principle as formulated above, claims Leake, are in accord with the general ethical exhortations of the centuries. Only those exhortations in their imperative form have been misleading the traditional moralists. Not merely that. Fear of punishment and hope of reward which serve as tags to those exhortations have not been particularly fruitful in promoting good conduct among men. S. J. Holmes says, "Peoples may believe that their moral customs derive from a supernatural source, but one potent reason for their adoption is their conduciveness to survival."[6] The *raison d'etre* for acting right or good conduct is of the same grade as the one for not putting one's hand in the fire. "The answer to the question 'why not put your hand in the fire ?' is the answer of fact", says John Dewey, "If you do, your hand will be burnt. The answer to the question, 'Why acknowledge right ?' is of the same sort. For right is only an abstract name for the multitude of concrete demands in action which others impress upon us, and of which we are obliged, if we would live, to take some account."[7]

4 *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

5 *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

6 Quoted by Leake from an article in *Science*, 90, 117. See *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

7 Quoted by Leake ; see *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

Professor Patrick Romanell, an American philosopher, has argued the case for philosophical ethics as against Dr Leake's ethicogenesis. The line of his argument is as follows. The scientific method does not consist merely in observation and description ; it involves also the use of " constructive imagination ". This is characteristic of all inquiry, including the ethical. But so far as the aim is concerned, an inquiry may be *existential* or *normative.* The former is concerned primarily with things as *they are*, and the latter with things as they *ought to be.* The contrast, then, is not between the ' descriptive ' and the ' normative ' method, but between the ' existential ' and the ' normative ' aim. The aim of inquiry in ethics is normative, since ethics is an examination of the *good* life, whether it exists or not, unlike biology which is a study of life as it exists in nature. When once this is granted, Romanell would have no objection to Leake's general thesis that ' a system of ethics to be sound and relevant to human conduct must have a naturalistic foundation '.[8] A naturalistic philosophy, however, he says, by incorporating man into nature, does not stop with naturalizing man ; it also humanizes nature. Biology and ethics belong to two different groups of study. By seeking a biological basis for ethics, Leake has introduced illegitimately into the sphere of ethics ' relativism ', ' egoism ' and ' practicalism ' which are features of biology as a natural science. Even life as it is cannot be adequately explained in terms of these features. It is needless, therefore, to say that they are inapplicable in the realm of morals.

While Romanell's critique of Leake's ' ethicogenesis ' is good so far as it goes, it is not good enough. It suffers from the limitation of all modern Western philosophy with probably a few exceptions, besides the special limitations of the kind of ' realistic ' philosophy sponsored by Professor William P. Montague in whose footsteps Romanell follows. Since it is not my purpose here to examine Romanell's view in detail, I shall refer only to what I consider to be the fundamental defect of modern Western philosophy. Philosophy, according to the most generally accepted view in the West, does not differ from science so far as its method is concerned. " The philosopher is a theorizer, even as the scientist is. He cogitates about the world as a whole, while the scientist investigates the nature of a particular aspect of it."[9] Descartes who is hailed as the father of modern philosophy set mathematics as the model for metaphysics. Locke, who inaugurated modern empiricism, went one better by choosing to follow the pattern of physical science. Thus European philosophy which broke off from the apron strings of theology has, in what is known as the modern era, clung fast to the coat-tails of physical science.[10] Reliance on science has become almost an obsession with the Western philosopher. That is why he is not willing to recognize Indian philosophy as philosophy. Even those Western philosophers who

8 *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

9 See the present writer's paper ' Western and Eastern Thought ' in *Goethe and the Modern Age* (Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1950), p. 299.

10 *Ibid*, p. 299.

have some interest in Indian thought anxiously ask : " Will not the march of science alter the content of the Vedāntic *Weltanschauung* ? How can the Vedānta remain the same today as it was before the discoveries of modern science ?" The role of philosophy, so thinks the Western philosopher, is to bring to order the results of science. No wonder, then, that there should have arisen in the West, in recent times, a school of philosophy which says that the empirically unverifiable is nonsensical and that the so-called metaphysical questions are void of meaning. The only task left to the metaphysicians, it would appear, is to deny the possibility of metaphysics. " We seem to be having a second Kantianism without Kant's reverence for the eternal values which he regarded as the necessary postulates of morality."[11] Combine with the Western philosopher's inordinate dependence on science his inheritance of the distinctive characteristics of Greek culture, viz., humanism and positivism, you have a complete picture of modern Western philosophy.

But philosophy as *darśana* is quite different. Though it employs the rational method of inquiry, it is aware of the limits of reason. What it aims to give us is not so much knowledge by description as knowledge by acquaintance. Philosophy, in a word, is self-realization. I use the word ' self ' here not in the sense of a psychical entity or mental stuff, but to mean the inner reality of all things, including the individual soul. Philosophy, then, is not an attempt " to know both *everything* as a whole and everything down to its minutest detail ", nor is its goal merely ' intellectual '[12]. It seeks to discover the *truth* of things by looking within ; and its goal is intuitive wisdom or *in*sight and not mere theoretical knowledge. Hence it is that the method of self-discovery one finds in the Upaniṣads consists in an advance from the outer to the inner, from the gross to the subtle. However far science may go in its analysis of matter, it will still be in the region of the gross. Therefore, the results of positive science have not the power to affect or unsettle the conclusions of philosophy. And, morality which is one of the modes of self-realization cannot become the content of a natural science—even though that science be biology.

In the light of such a conception of the function of philosophy and of the nature of ethics, it should be clear that Leake has succeeded only in demolishing the basis of ethics and not in giving us any new moral foundation. To urge that survival, whether of the individual or of the species, is the goal of morality, and that mutually satisfying relationships are the means thereto, is to miss the central problem of ethics. There are several questions which we may ask with reference to Leake's thesis, and for which there seems to be no adequate reply. As Leake speaks indifferently of survival of the individual and of the species, it is not clear what he means by survival. It cannot be survival of the individual in the sense

11 *Ibid*, p. 299.

12 See Romanell's words in *Can We Agree ?*, p. 40.

of continuance after physical death ; for Leake as a naturalist-positivist cannot believe in a soul, and to him there can be no ' mind ' apart from the functional operation of the brain[13]. If survival refers to the species, then, in what does such survival consist ? Does it consist in the increase in numbers ? Is such increase always good ? If so, why should population experts advocate drastic reduction in the size of the population of certain lands ? Again, is the human species alone to survive, or others too ? If the latter, which species should survive and which not ? The corner-stone of Leake's ethicogenesis is that survival is good ; but he does not tell us why it is good or what is meant by goodness. In the language of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* we are inclined to ask him : who shall revel in mere length of life ? *atidīrghe jīvite ko rameta* ?[14] Are there not instances of individuals sacrificing their life for the sake of a cause ? Is life always precious ? Are there not things more precious than life ? Leake speaks of mutual satisfaction as the measure of survival ? But what is mutual satisfaction ? Is there a universal standard ? Do the same things or deeds please all ? And further, accepting Leake's version of Darwinism, has it been established that adaptation, adjustment, harmonization is the only way to survival ? If ' the gladiatorial theory of existence ' should prove to be more satisfactory, will it be ethical to adopt Nietzsche's ' Iron Rule ' as the rule of life ?

I believe that these questions cannot be answered from the standpoint of naturalism. The outward look of things cannot guide us to the solution of the problem of goodness which is the central problem of ethics. We, as moral beings refuse to acquiesce in what is and strive for the realization of an ideal, which for lack of a better term may be called perfection. There is in us a ' divine discontent ' which makes us dissatisfied with our self as it is and aspire for the ideal self. The moral experience takes the form of ' I ought to have done this; I ought not to have done that ', or ' I ought to be this ; I ought not to be that '. That is why it must be admitted that there is no morality without an ' ought '. And, all the rationalization of the naturalist will not be able to dismiss from the realm of morality the sense of obligation or duty.

III

Having shown that ' oughtness ' is essential to morality, let me proceed to demonstrate the self-discrepancy which is inherent therein with a view to justify my thesis that morality cannot be man's last rest-place and that he must rise even above it to an experience where there is fulfilment and no more endeavour no aspiration and no regret.

One aspect of the self-discrepancy of the ' ought ' manifests itself in the conflict between the form and content of morality, between the rule and the end, between the right and the good. The rationalistic view of Kant stresses the

13 See *Can We Agree ?*, p. 6.

14 *Kaṭha*, I, 28.

form at the expense of content. All types of hedonism seek content without paying due regard to the form or rule. Kant gives us the *how* of 'ought' when he teaches that we should so act that the principle of our action may be universalized. Utilitarianism gives us the *why* of '*ought*' when it sets forth the greatest happiness of the greatest number as the end of morality.[15]

The issue of form *versus* content has in Indian thought, centred round the question regarding the ground of willed action. What prompts activity, it is asked, is it the awareness of a deed as something *to be done* (*kāryatā-jñāna*) or is it the cognition of a deed as the means to some end to be gained (*iṣṭasādhanatā-jñāna*) ? The contestants over this issue in the classical age were the Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas. According to the Prābhākaras, kāryatā-jñāna or the consciousness of something to be done results in volition. *Kāryatā*, however, may mean either what can be done (*mayā idam kartum śakyate*) or what *ought* to be done (*mama idam avaśyam kartavyam*). It is the latter sense that the Prābhākaras accept ; for the obligatoriness of duty lies in the awareness of the ought-to-be-done. Here, again, it is not the simple awareness of a deed as something to be done that constitutes obligation. The agent should be conscious of the fact that *he* ought to do it, that the deed ought to become a qualification of his (*sva-viśeṣaṇa*). It is not only in the case of obligatory duties (*nitya-* and *naimittika-karmas*) that there is the sense of oughtness but also in the case of optional deeds (*kāmva-karmas*). Though in the latter case the desire for an end serves as a motive, the deed acquires the quality of oughtness by the end being regarded as a qualification of the agent (*sva-viśeṣaṇa*). Thus in the Prābhākara view, all willed action is prompted by *kāryatā-jñāna*. In their eagerness to universalize the law of duty, the Prābhākaras bring under its operation even the optional deeds (*kāmya-karmas*).

The Nyāya view, of which the Western hedonistic theory is more or less a parallel, stresses the importance of the consciousness of good in all volition. In order that there may be a willed act, there must be the knowledge that the act is instrumental to a desired end (*iṣṭasādhanatā-jñāna*), and also the knowledge that the attainment of the end is unaccompanied by a more powerful evil (*balavad-aniṣṭā-'nanubandhitva-jñāna*). This is so not only as regards the optional deeds but also in the case of obligatory duties. It is the end that determines all voluntary action—but it is the end as chosen by the agent and not as an external impelling force conditioning his behaviour.

The conflict between form and content, or rule and end is one of the modes—probably the most comprehensive one—in which the contradiction of morality appears. The incompatibility takes on various other forms such as the one between the real and the ideal or the one between self-interest and self-sacrifice.

15 There are alternative views of the end, a consideration of which is not necessary for our present purpose. I have cited utilitarianism only as an example of content-ethics.

Suffice it for us to note here that in the very heart of morality there is contradiction. The very fact that moral life consists in a struggle of good with evil shows that it is a realm of imperfection. "Morality does involve a contradiction", says Bradley, "it does tell you to realize that which never can be realized, and which, if realized, does efface itself as such. No one ever was or could be perfectly moral ; and, if he were, he would be moral no longer. Where there is no imperfection there is no ought, where there is no ought there is no morality, where there is no self-contradiction there is no ought. The ought is a self-contradiction."[16] That this must be so is because of the very constitution of man. There is self-contradiction in morality because man is a contradiction.[17] Were this not so, man would be either a beast or a god. Struggle through contradiction is of the very essence of morality.

Yes, man is a contradiction. But he is also more. It is this 'more' which makes him not rest in a contradiction, and by rising even above the realm of morality conquer the heaven of perfection. Before I indicate how this conquest is made, let me refer to one or two empirical modes in which the resolution of the moral conflict has been attempted from the standpoint of what I would call the 'lower' morality.

The disparity between the code prescribed for individual citizens and that followed by states is well-known. For the individual to lie or murder is immoral, whereas for the state to do these very things is considered to be quite in order. The statesman as an individual may not lie, but as a representative of his state in what are called 'diplomatic negotiations' it may become his duty sometimes to lie or at least not to tell only the truth. Similarly, as an individual he may be willing to sacrifice his self-interest for the benefit of his neighbour ; but if he acts in a like manner in his official relations to a neighbouring country, he will be branded as a traitor. The German sociologist Max Weber sought to justify the conduct of the state by characterizing it as based on the ethic of responsibility (*Verantwortungsethik*) which is distinct from the ethic for *non*political relations among individuals, which he calls the ethic of conscience (*Gewissensethiik*). But by giving it a new name and calling it an ethic, the Machiavellian rule does not become moral. At least the Italian theorist was candid enough to say that the Prince, as the ruler of the State, is often forced to do the bad thing, and that the ethically bad is politically good because it is useful. All that Weber has succeeded in doing is to identify ethics with group ethics, morals with morale.[18] In order to resolve the conflict between means and end, form and content, he creates two moralities, one of which, viz., the "ethic of responsibility", is, strictly speaking, immorality. A reconciliation between ethics and politics is

16 F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies* (Oxford University Press, Second edition, 1927), p. 134.

17 *Ibid*, p. 313.

18 Professor Simon in a Symposium on Ethics and Politics, *Goethe and the Modern Age*, p. 375.

not to be had this way. We should rather turn to Gandhism for light, which tells us that even in politics the moral law should reign. The unique contribution of Mahātmā Gandhi to political thought is that not only did he urge that the means should be as good as the end even in politics but also discovered such a means in the twin spiritual principles of truth (*satya*) and non-violence (*ahimsā*). That is, he sought to reconcile ethics and politics from the standpoint of what may be called 'higher' morality.

Let us now turn to another mode of resolving the conflict of form and content from the standpoint of ordinary or 'lower' morality. In the Dharma-śāstras and Mīmāmsā a distinction is made between optional deeds (*kāmya-karmas*) and obligatory duties (*nitya-karmas*). While the former are dependent on the agent's inclination, the latter are not so dependent. The obligatory duties have to be performed without any ulterior motive. Their performance does not bring in any merit, it is contended ; their non-performance, however, causes demerit. One has to do his duties in obedience to the moral law. The imperativeness of the moral command is categorical. As regards optional deeds there is no question of 'ought'. Each deed has its own particular end, and only he that desires the end need perform that deed. But in so performing he is enjoined to see that the principles of morality are not violated. Thus it is only in the negative sense that the performance of optional deeds may be moral. Properly speaking, the obligatory duties alone belong to the sphere of morality. Here, again, the solution offered for the moral problem is a dichotomy in the field of human volition ; pleasure and duty are distinguished ; and from such a standpoint the performance of duty must be a laborious and monotonous affair.

A true and noble synthesis of the conflicting factors in morals is to be found in the *Gītā* teaching of disinterested action (*niṣkāma-karma*). For normal earthly social existence which necessarily involves claims and counter-claims, all that is required is a judicious adjustment of rights and duties. The individual as a member of society has to look to not only his own interests but also to the interests of the social whole of which he is a member. In fact, it is by serving society that he can, in part, serve himself. Self-love is not bad, but it must be reasonable. There is nothing wrong in the individual seeking his own interests. But such self-interest must be enlightened. It is on consideration such as these that the sphere of action is divided into two parts, one concerned with self-interest and the other with social obligation. That is the way of ordinary morality. But, as we saw, man cannot rest in it, for it does not solve the moral conflict and does not enable him to rise above the imperfections natural to empirical life. What the *Gītā* does is to consecrate all action and thus make of it a pathway to spirituality.[19]

19 Though this teaching may be traced to earlier sources, it received its definitive formulation in the *Gītā*, and has been gaining in popularity ever since.

Action ordinarily binds a man. It binds him by attaching him to its fruit and also by affecting his character. But there is a way of doing one's work, according to the *Gītā*, by which one could liberate oneself from the fetters of work. The way is to eschew all selfish desire and thought of private profit to be reaped out of work. If there is no craving for a reward, nor revulsion from failure to satisfy one's self-interest, work will lose its power to bind. So, work has to be done, not out of inclination or attachment to the fruit thereof, but from an exalted sense of obligation. The older teaching applied this principle, as we saw, to one group of actions, viz., the obligatory duties (*nitya-karmas*). What the *Gītā* does is to extend it to all actions. No matter what the deed is, let it be done because it *ought* to be done. That is, let there be no action which is selfish. ' You have a right to work alone, and never to its fruit '.[20]

All acts of social service may appear to conform to the principle of unselfishness. One who renders service to society may not have any selfish end in view. He aims at the good of society, and engages himself in acts of beneficence. So, in the place of selfish interest, can we have social welfare as a worthy end of action ? The reply is, no. There is no knowing in what subtle form selfishness may creep into one's heart. In the region of the unconscious there may lurk a desire to serve oneself, even though the ostensible reason may be to serve the society of which one is a part. Moreover, it is usual with the social benefactor to think that but for him the world would go to ruin. Social service under modern conditions has only accentuated the ' saviour ' complex in the servants of society— a complex which is the enemy of spiritual growth. So, the *Gītā*-teaching of *karma-yoga* is that in action all aims should be discarded, both the narrow private ends and the so-called public good. It is not that the world is not benefited by the disinterested action of the *yogin*, but that, from his standpoint, such benefit is not an *end* but a *consequence*.

It may be asked whether the *Gītā*-view of disinterested action does not err on the side of formalism. Can there be action without desire ? Could any one act without an end in view ? The reply is that only finite ends are to be rejected. Instead of each action having its particular material goal, let all action have one and the same end, viz., perfection. Looked at from this standpoint, even social weal is a finite goal, and can serve as the objective of only a certain type of action. So, the teaching of *karma-yoga* is that instead of letting the mind be shattered in the pursuit of a plurality of goals, let it be set on the path leading to the true goal, which is spiritual realization. Morality is thus emptied of its finite contents, and at the same time filled by attaching it to the supreme end which is the infinite spirit. A reconciliation between form and content is effected by opening the door that leads to the region beyond ethics.

20 *Gītā*, ii, 47.

The supreme end, which may be described as perfection, spiritual realization or absolute goodness, has been envisaged in two ways. For theism it is God-realization, while for absolutism it is Self-realization. According to the former of these attitudes, one has to perform one's duties, completely surrendering one's will to the divine will. In short, one must become a mere instrument (*nimitta-mātra*) in the hands of God. All work is thus dedicated to the Lord. Work becomes worship ; *karma* is transformed into *bhakti*, by which the devotee realizes God. According to the absolutistic view, the proximate end of *karma-yoga* is the ' cleansing of the heart ' (*sattva-śuddhi*), which in its turn prepares the way for the onset of wisdom (*jñāna*) that liberates the soul. In whichever way the end be conceived, it will be seen that there is no room for selfishness. For, the God that is realized in theism is no limited person ; and the Self of absolutism is not the individual ego. Both the ways lead the moral agent to a realm where he renounces all sense of agency. The Lord of the *Gītā* exhorts the devotee to surrender all his duties to him, and promises to save the devotee from all evil.[21] The same Lord describes the end, from the standpoint of absolutism, as a transcendence of all work (*naiṣkarmya-siddhi*) which is attained through renunciation (*sannyāsa*).[22] In both the realms, viz., *bhakti*, and *jñāna*, we go beyond the moral *ought*. Here we are in the region of *is-ness*[23] ; but it is an is-ness which is quite different from the is-ness of naturalism.

Let me explain the difference between the ' lower ' morality of social obligation and the ' higher ' morality of *karma-yoga* which leads to a ' beyond ', with the help of a distinction that Bergson makes between two moralities—one, that of the ' closed ' soul, and the other, that of the ' open ' soul,—without, however, committing myself to the French philosopher's metaphysical position. The ordinary morality is conduct under pressure. Here the rule is, ' you must because you must '. Natural obligation exercises on the agent a propulsive force ; and though there is a certain measure of liberty, there is compulsion too. The second morality is not confined to the narrow limits of class and country. It differs from the first in that it is human instead of being merely social. Nay, it is more ; for it takes within its sweep all sentient beings. The difference between the two moralities is not one of degree but of kind. In the second, ' we yield not to a pressure but to an attraction.' [24] Founders and reformers of religions, mystics and saints, do not rule by imperatives.[25] They ask nothing, and yet they receive. They have no need to exhort ; their mere existence suffices.[26] Inspired by their example, a few are prepared to leave all and follow them. The

21 *Gītā*, xviii, 66.

22 *Gītā*, xviii, 49.

23 F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, p. 314 : ' Reflection on morality leads us beyond it. It leads us, in short, to see the necessity of a religious point of view....what it tells us is that morality is imperfect, and imperfect in such a way as implies a higher, which is religion.' Again p. 319 : ' The ideal self, which in morality, is to be, is here the real ideal which truly is'.

24 Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, p. 37.

25 Cf. Sri Kṛṣṇa's final teaching to Arjuna : ' do as you like ' (*yathecchasi tathā kuru*) *Gītā*, xviii, 63.

26 Bergson, *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

worldly goods cease to fascinate them. What served as real comforts at home 'would become hindrances, burdensome impedimenta, if we had to take them on our travels.'[27] And so, the soul that is drawn to the 'divine city' leaves behind the trappings of worldliness. As it opens, material objects vanish before its very eyes, and it is lost in sheer joy.[28] It is this process of opening that is accomplished through *karma-yoga.*

The soul that is completely open cannot even be called *a* soul ; for it has no individuality. It is from the point of view of us, the unreleased, that the *mukta* appears to be an individual. From his own standpoint—if that can be called a standpoint—there is no division, no duality. He is the same in pleasure and pain, cold and heat, praise and blame. He is not tormented by the thought, 'Why have I not done the good (*sādhu*) ? Why have I done the evil (*pāpa*) ?'[29] Since there is no agency in him, he is no doer at all. His struggles are all over. The *ought* and the *ought-not*, the relative good and evil have no meaning in his case. From the supreme height of spirituality which is his even the so-called good is evil. That metaphysical evil he has transcended by the wisdom that sees the non-dual spirit in all. As the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* puts it, 'Evil does not overcome him ; he overcomes all evil. Free from evil, free from impurity, free from doubt, he becomes a knower of Brahman.'[30] It is to this heaven of freedom that morality serves as footstool. It is the perfectly open soul that is the ideal of moral endeavour and spiritual progress. *Dharma* is the gateway to *mokṣa.*

27 *Ibid.*, p. 40.
28 *Ibid.*, p. 45.
29 *Taittirīya*, II. ix. 1.
30 IV, iv, 23.

PRESENT TREND OF PSYCHOLOGY AT HOME AND ABROAD

Presidential Address

Section : Psychology

by

S. C. DUTT

I am extremely grateful to the members of the Executive Committee of the Indian Philosophical Congress for conferring on me the honour of presiding over the Psychology Section of this Jubilee Session of the Congress. I shall briefly present to you a few thoughts on the present trend of psychology, the problems it raises and their probable solutions, and also the bearing of these on our own universities.

Two questions that have been sorely exercising the minds of its votaries in recent years are:—(1) Should the ancient tie between psychology and philosophy be snapped altogether? (2) How can the unity of the science of psychology be maintained in the face of the prevailing acute fissiparous tendencies in it? These questions naturally arouse gloomy forebodings in the minds of many lovers of psychology regarding the future of the science and hence claim our serious, but dispassionate, consideration for dispelling misgivings and restoring confidence.

From time immemorial philosophers in the West as well as in India have felt the need of psychology for constructing a correct philosophical theory. Philosophers today too do not think much otherwise. The reasons are well known, but will bear repetition. The primary function of philosophy is to form a world-view, a consistent theory of the universe as a whole. But man, supposed to be the latest visible emergent of cosmic evolution, is also the highest in the hierarchy of beings. He is the richest known unfoldment of the unfathomable nature of the universe. Quantitatively he is a microscopic speck in this limitless universe, but qualitatively he is the most significant fact of the whole, and hence virtually the key with which to unlock the mystery of the universe. Now, therefore, while philosophy in seeking after a sound world-view must reckon with the highest results of all the sciences dealing with the various grades of existence constituting that world, it can not but be specially indebted to psychology, the science of man par excellence, anthropology being confined to the mere human animal.

Besides its creative function of comprehending the universe, philosophy has also a critical function indispensable to the former. Its work of construction must necessarily be checked by a consideration of the congnitive power of man, its nature, condition and limitation. Here also philosophy must turn to psychology

for light. Albert G. A. Balz of the University of Virginia brings out admirably well the above distinction between the two functions of philosophy in their bearing upon its relation to psychology in his illuminating paper on " Relations between Philosophy and Psychology."[1] He calls philosophy "the spectator of all time and existence " after Plato, and its two functions the spectatorial and the critical function respectively, and also shows how philosophy must depend on psychology for both.

But while philosophy on her part is ready to own her obligations to psychology and is loth to part company, the rapidly growing youthful science of psychology considers any further continuance under the parental roof to be positively harmful to her healthy growth. She thinks so particularly as she finds philosophers never agreeing among themselves, never attaining any positive conclusion and making no progress whatsoever.

But the above charge against philosophy, if valid, cuts both ways. If philosophy is really in such a bad pass, is not psychology largely to blame for it, seeing that the former in both its creative and critical function is mostly dependent upon the latter? If philosophy is yet self-contradictory, vacillating and unprogressive, it is mainly because psychology is not yet a dependable compact body of opinions safely and freely to be drawn upon. The fact of the matter is that the task of both from the nature of the case is bound to be far harder than that of any other science. The idea of an ascending gradation or hierarchy of beings, made so popular by Morgan and Alexander, throws a flood of light on such a question. Man is the summit of the visible creation. In him the laws of all lower levels of existence play their part. Over and above them he has his own distinctive laws incidental to his superior status. Corresponding to the ascending scale of beings there is an ascending order of complexity among the related sciences, namely, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, zoology, anthropology and psychology. Hence the science of man may, nay rather should, lay under contribution many other sciences, if not all. The task necessarily is stupendous in all conscience. " In sum ", says Balz, " the central problem of psychology is far more difficult than the central problems of other sciences."[2] It is no wonder then that psychologists should fall asunder, clash with one another and make a poorer show than physicists and chemists, whose tasks are incomparably simpler.

Let us then turn to philosophy. Is not a study, which aspires to gain a total view of the universe and has hence to draw upon and co-ordinate all the sciences including psychology itself, a still more formidable affair? Is it any wonder then that philosophers should differ from one another, make slow progress and reach only vague opinions and not positive truths? But then it may be asked, " Should not the philosophic adventure, which is in effect merely running after a veritable will-o-the-wisp, be abandoned for ever? " The reply is, " No, it can not."

1 Vide *Psychological Review*, Vol. 55, 1948, p. 115.
2 *Ibid.*, p. 123.

The passion for knowledge is ingrained in human nature. This passion finds partial satisfaction in creating sciences and seeks fuller satisfaction in creating philosophy. In this enterprise man may fail again and again, but nevertheless he can not help making ever-renewed efforts.

But philosophy is not merely an end in itself, a mere intellectual pastime. It has utility for life and science, and particularly for psychology, which lies closest to it. The total view, however dim and obscure, that philosophy represents can not but be helpful to the partial views of the sciences. The independence of science has its limits. The sciences must also fit into a total scheme of things that philosophy tries to visualize. This is truer of psychology than of any other science.

It is right to hold that psychology should enjoy ample freedom and should no longer be in the leading strings of philosophy. This is amply justified by the rapid advance made in the past fifty years especially in America, England and Germany, by groups of enthusiasts engaged in laboratory research and field work under reputed leadership in the various branches of theoretical and applied psychology. There is a growing insistence today on the thesis that psychology is the science of human adjustment.[3] There is no gainsaying the fact that mental life consists in continual adjustment to the environment. And specialists working in the circumscribed fields of their own choice must view mental life each from his angle of vision, be it that of reflex activity, goal-seeking, gestalt, psychoanalysis or any other visual angle. They must each consider only one mode of human adjustment or adjustment to a single aspect or portion of the world. But they can not but feel interested in and profit by pausing now and then to study the philosopher's view-point which is no other than the total intellectual adjustment of man to the whole of that world. The philosophic view of the world and the place and destiny of man in it ought to help us understand the true import of the daily behaviour of the common man. For the common man also has an implicit philosophy, a dim background vision of the world, to which he unwittingly adjusts himself. And in the light of the Gestalt theory we see how his adjustment to the whole must colour all his piecemeal adjustments which go to make up the stream of life.

Then, again, the antipathy to metaphysics should not be carried too far. Psychology should no doubt steer clear of metaphysical speculation. But is the dread of metaphysics sufficient ground to taboo the words, mind, consciousness and reason? Is not this unconsciously, but surely and dogmatically, flying into the opposite camp of metaphysics, namely, materialism? Is not this also indirectly lowering psychology, the study of the whole man, to anthropology, the study of the mere human animal which is but an abstraction or cross-section of the true man? A modicum of metaphysics is inseparable from common sense and indis-

3 Cf. N. L. Munn, *Psychology : The Fundamentals of Human Adjustment* (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1946.)

pensable to even physics and chemistry as a starting point. Physics has to start with an assumption of the reality of matter, though in the end the higher physics of relativity and intra-atomic structure lands us in the shadowy border-land between matter and spirit.

There is another reason, to be presently elaborated, why psychology needs the friendly guidance of philosophy in its critical function as a harmonizer. There is today no psychology, but psychologies, to all appearance, warring creeds that tend more and more to fall apart. Philosophy by applying its great canon of knowledge and of criticism, namely, the principle of consistency, may remove their incongruities, curb down their excesses, smoothen their angularities and co-ordinate and unite them into a single system. That for psychology co-operation with philosophy is no less helpful than its independence is practically demonstrated by the existence in U.S.A. of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology alongside of the American Psychological Association, both illustrious bodies.

Let us next turn to the second question that I propose to discuss: How can the unity of the science of psychology be maintained? Today there is little unanimity among psychologists as to the scope or method of psychology owing to the conflicting view-points of divergent schools: Structuralism and Functionalism, Behaviourism and Purposivism, Psychoanalysis, Gestalt Theory, and Factor Psychology. To these we have to add the latest methodological controversies over Operationism, Postulationalism and Mathematical Psychology. Different stresses laid on specific problems like Learning, Mental Tests and Heredity tend also to divide psychologists into opposing camps. The resulting diversity of technique and terminology make current works and text books on psychology appear as a babel of languages scaring away beginners and distressing even genuine lovers of the science.

How are we to get out of this impasse? Reflecting on the cause and cure of this malady, Madison Bentley of Cornell University writes: "Our main and underlying contention will be that the present confusion of tongues, now widely deplored, is chiefly due to the fact that outside concerns and foreign interests have played too great a part in shaping and defining our field. Really psychological points of view and interests have been made secondary to evolution, the doctrine of heredity, zoological classification, animal hierarchies, physiological and neurological hypothesis, clinical medicine, psychiatry, theory of knowledge, the training of infants, educational doctrines, sociology, anthropology, propaganda for 'efficiency,' and amateurish conceits about human nature."[4]

While it may not be possible to steer absolutely clear of these outside concerns and foreign interests owing to the inherent complexity of our subject, we should

4 Vide 'A Psychology for Psychologists', *Psychologies of* 1930, *p.* 5.

always try to keep the central theme at the centre and clearly distinguish the main issue from the side issues and the end from the means. Thus pleading for unity in psychology, Stanford C. Ericksen of the University of Arkansas remarks : " As psychologists we are not trying to discover 'vectors,' 'means-ends-readinesses', rational learning curves, postulates and the like *per se*. These should be but means to the end of trying to understand the nature of man and his behaviour, not alone in the abstract, but specifically, here and now."[5] So the subject of our study is man in the complete sense, i.e., the living human organism as informed by mind. It is mind that plays the dominant role. Leaving out mind we may have the physics, chemistry, or biology of man, but not psychology. The psychological study of man includes further that of the distinctively human, emergent qualities of mind, namely, self-consciousness, reason, conscience, aesthetic sense and religious sentiment. These last you may explain any way you like, but can not explain away. Militant behaviourism entering the arena about four decades ago made a heroic effort to brush aside mind with all it implies. In the wordy battle of behaviourism that ensued between stalwarts like the late William McDougall and J. B. Watson, behaviourism succeeded in drowning the voices of opponents by the mere beat of drums and clash of cymbals.[6] Even though its influence is waning now, it has sufficiently infected many psychologists with an aversion for words like introspection, consciousness, mind, will and instinct, erroneously supposed to be bygone superstitions. But to preserve the unity and continuity of psychology we should hold fast to the central fact. From this view-point, it is possible to maintain a healthy balance between the diverse contemporary schools. We can not allow any of them to usurp the whole field, and yet we should appreciate the laudable role each plays in its own way and in its chosen field. We should thankfully accept the new facts, revealed and the new insight gained by each. The dazzle of the new should not also blind us to the wisdom of the old. We should treasure and develop what is of value in the contributions of old psychologists. But happily as a matter of fact even in America, as Woodworth points out by reference to statistics, a very large majority of psychologists, including many eminent ones, are advancing in the middle of the road, shunning the extreme views of the schools. Woodworth reckons himself as one of the unattached middle-of-the-roaders.[7]

Stanford C. Ericksen of the Arkansas University draws our attention to a fruitful source of disunity and pleads for its removal. " I can not," says he, " speak for other sciences, but it does seem that many psychologists have been somewhat naive in expressing their American tradition of individuality. Tactics often used are coining new terms and phrases, or applying old concepts to radically different conditions. Such practices lead to confusion within psychology and

5 Vide 'Unity in Psychology', *Psychological Review*, Vol. 48, 1941, p. 79.

6 Cf. *The Battle of Behaviourism* by J. B. Watson and W. McDougall (New York : Norton & Co., 1929).

7 Cf. Woodworth's *Contemporary Schools of Psychology*, 2nd .Ed., 1937, Chap. VII, 'The Middle of the Road,' p. 218.

should be discouraged in the interests of a mutual understanding, if not agreement."[8] This reminds one of the curious attempt to expunge the very word "psychology" and replace it by the novel term "anthroponomy."[9]

As scholars can not aim at confounding each other or scaring away new entrants into their field, innovation in language, unless absolutely necessitated by new facts or fresh insight, should be disparaged for the sake of unity.

I may now be permitted to make a few observations on the condition of psychological studies here in India. Our backwardness in this regard and the extent of work lying ahead of us will be easily realized, if it is pointed out that even ten years ago in 1940, forty universities of the United States of America awarded 120 doctor's degrees in psychology. Psychology gave almost as many doctor's degrees as did physics that year in that country. The American Psychological Association had 664 members and 2,075 associates, a total of 2,739 in 1940. The majority of even associates, not to speak of members, were holders of doctor's degrees. This huge body of learned psychologists were not all mere professors or academicians; 115 members (i.e., 17%) and 661 associates (i.e., 31%) were employed in full-time non-academic fields such as child clinics, mental hospitals, vocational guidance centres and industry.[10]

We may here pause to ask, how long in India will it take psychology to attain a similar status and to play a similar role of importance in social service? Alas! How long? It may be tediously long, for the question is bound up with that of our material prosperity. Meanwhile we may make the best of a bad situation and make a headway, though slowly, yet steadily.

For the present psychology is bound to remain largely a cultural study in our country. In the B.A. classes in our universities psychology is and should remain a necessary part of philosophy. But no department of philosophy in a college should go without a moderately equipped psychological laboratory under a competent M.A. or M.Sc. in psychology. And there should be no university in India without a department of psychology with fully equipped laboratories for special post-graduate work on a few chosen lines at least. A few of our universities in Calcutta, Mysore, Lucknow, Patna and other cities have made humble beginnings. Our professors of psychology will have yet to do a lot of uphill pioneer work of propaganda to popularize their science and to impress its social utility on the public so as to enlist the financial support of our new-born State as well as its wealthy citizens. The utility of educational psychology for the training of teachers has been recognized fairly long in India. But fully qualified psychologist doctors to take charge of mental hospitals and lunatic asylums or to run private clinics for neurotics are a crying need of our country, claiming priority. Then our State

8 Vide 'Unity in Psychology', *Psychological Review*, Vol. 48, 1941, p. 78.

9 Vide 'Anthroponomy and Psychology', W. S. Hunter, *Psychologies of* 1930, p. 281.

10 Vide 'On The Professional Training of Psychologists', by W. S. Hunter, *Psychological Review*, Vol. 48, p. 505.

can even now fruitfully employ competent psychologists to devise various kinds of dependable mental tests for selecting recruits to various civil and military services. The burden of Public Service Commissions and similar other bodies will thus be immensely lightened and their efficiency increased manifold for taking in the right man for the right job. Our big industrialists should also emulate the wisdom of their counterparts in the West by employing trained psychologists for increasing the efficiency consistently with the health and happiness of their human material.

But there is one ancient field of applied psychology suited to India's genius which we may yet pursue with advantage. In the Indian systems of philosophy, especially in the Yoga system, psychology was harnessed to the spiritual end of attaining the supreme bliss. Miss G. Coster rightly says, " In the east experimental psychology has gone as far as if not much further than with us. Thousands of students have experimented, and the claim is that the system of Yoga training built on the Sankhyan philosophy has an experimental basis in exactly the same sense as have the ordinary facts of experience."[11]

Yogic practices constitute a correlated psycho-physical system of volitional control and concentration on the one hand and regulation of breath and posture on the other (Prāṇāyāma and Āsana). These also include a technique of activating the nerve-centres from the bottom of the cord (Suṣumnā) upwards. These are the six traditional discs or lotuses (ṣaṭ cakra or ṣaṭ-padma), working in unison with the autonomic system.[12] Through them the Yogī gets a complete mastery not only over the automatic mechanism of his body, but also over his instinctive and emotional nature having its roots in the unconscious depths, the Id of Freud. Such knowledge is necessarily esoteric. But nothing can long remain a sealed book to the earnest enquirer.

And we can also set to work on the ancient lore treasured in our classical works on music, rhetoric, histrionic art and religion, e.g., Saṅgīta-ratnākara, Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra and Vaiṣṇava literature.[13] Their delineation of sentiment (*rasa*) and expressions of emotion is often superb.

In conclusion I make once again a fervent appeal to the learned professors of both psychology and philosophy in our Indian universities for closer co-operation than is evident at the present moment and that in the vital self-interest of either for very practical considerations. Philosophy here simply can not think of parting with psychology for reasons stated before, and hence should try to keep abreast of the times and help create a scientific bias for laboratory work in so far as the teaching of psychology is still entrusted to its hands at least at the undergraduate

11 Cf. G. Coster, *Yoga and Western Psychology*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1935, p. 9.

12 For details see *Positive Sciences of the Hindus* by B. N. Seal, M.A., Ph.D., pp. 218-228; and also the article on ṣaṭ-cakra in Visvakosa, the Bengali Encyclopaedia, by N. N. Basu.

13 See the excellent paper, the Aesthetic Gestalt, by A. S. Narayana Pillai, M.A., M.Litt., *Proceedings of The Twenty-Fourth Indian Philosophical Congress*, Patna, 1949, pp. 63-68.

stage. As for psychology an attitude of aloofness and apathy towards philosophy would be suicidal. For psychology is destined to remain here long mainly a cultural study and will have to struggle hard and long for the public recognition of its many-sided potentialities for social service. And from philosophers, of all people, it can expect most both an understanding appreciation as a cultural discipline and a warm advocacy for its wide employment in the varied fields of social service. In America psychology has the backing of the State, the big industries and the medical profession and institutions. But even there, where psychologists are so much in demand, the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, counting among its members such eminent psychologists as the late McDougall and Watson, is still a flourishing institution.[14] This is a proof positive that even today the close association of philosophers and psychologists is thought profitable there. Should not this be an eye-opener to our Indian psychologists and philosophers?

14 Vide 'The Past Ten Years of Psychology in the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology' by J. B. Miner, *Psychological Review*, Vol. 48, 1941, p. 555.

SYMPOSIA

SYMPOSIUM I

THE PLACE OF THE PHILOSOPHER IN MODERN SOCIETY

I

by

A. R. WADIA

The very idea of discussing the place of the philosopher in modern society at the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress may appear to be odd, for it implies that his place and his importance are both questionable, whereas in any cultured society and most so in India with her hoary philosophical traditions, it should be taken for granted that without philosophy there can be no culture. Even to suggest that modern society can do without philosophy would be to cast doubt on the cultural value of our modern society. Yet in the fitness of things it may not be undesirable to take stock of what the philosopher may be presumed to have done in the space of twenty-five years, especially in India where life has been shaken to its foundations by her contact with the new virile ideas of the West and the impact of a personality like Gandhiji's, which while challenging the Western civilization has let loose forces which have transformed India from being a socially conservative and politically impotent country into a country pulsating with a new political vigour and a new social conscience, seeking to elevate her womanhood and the Harijans after the neglect of centuries. One might expect that in such a great revolution the philosopher could not but have played his part, and yet in this very Congress last year in the symposium on *Philosophy and Sādhana* views were expressed which practically cold-storaged philosophy. It was argued by Dr Chubb that Truth could not be attained by reason, that philosophy was only an agitation of the mind, that philosophy had turned jailor and that " more and more intelligent persons should break out of the prison house of philosophy", and that the place of philosophy had to be taken by some mystic Silence, repudiating the claims of Reason. Professor Dandekar put forth substantially the same plea, though in a more temperate vein. He developed the paradox that " The truth is: we know it not, yet we know it ", i.e. we know it not through reason, but through some mystic intuition. Both Dr Chubb and Professor Dandekar do not mince words in their condemnation of the Western approach to philosophy or in their desire to revive the old Upaniṣadic way of learning Truth through the *Śruti* or the grace of some illumined teacher.

Surely in such a climate it is neither impertinent nor irrelevant to review the worth of philosophy from the standpoint of modern society. But in this review

we cannot be blind to the fact that there is some fundamental difference in the way philosophic truth is approached and envisaged in India and in Europe-America. Both look upon philosophy as the search for Truth, but the Europeans from the Greeks downwards have looked upon it as knowledge, disinterested knowledge apart from any practical axe to grind, and they have looked to reason as its main, and even perhaps the only, instrument, though the very finitude of reason has put an inevitable limit on the attainment of knowledge whether in its totality or its fullness. But this has led to a wonderful development of science, which superficially has led people to talk of Western philosophy and culture as materialistic without caring to probe a little deeper into the inner significance of the development of philosophy in the West. It has on the one hand tended to a deeper and deeper understanding of the secrets of nature and a resulting mastery of it, and on the other it has tended to raise man's stature in the economy of nature. If it has marked out man as the highest manifestation in the world of nature, it has pointed out how in him the spirit struggles to break away from the limitations of nature and create a new world of fresh values as embodied in art and morality. Man the Animal has struggled to become Man the Spirit. In this struggle the Europeans may have cast wistful glances at the heaven of religion after death, but this has not deterred them from creating a heaven on earth as much as they can, and the Americas and Australia of to-day bear witness to this. Not that heaven is to be found anywhere on earth to-day, but there is a will to raise the lowest man to something better, to raise his standard of life, to make him immune from epidemics, to develop his mind and bring the treasures of literature and science to his door. This may be called materialism by those who despair of life here and now and seek compensation in dreaming of better worlds hereafter and elsewhere. But with greater justice it could be spoken of as the spiritualization of the material. In short, philosophy in the West has not sought to run away from the shortcomings of life, rather it has sought to overcome them.

In India on the other hand philosophy has developed on appreciably different lines. Apart from the joyousness of the Vedas, from the days of the earliest Upaniṣadic seers there has been a persistent consciousness of the ills of life and hence the attempt not merely to know the Ultimate but to realize it as a means to rid one's self of the cycle of births and deaths. So philosophy has become *Darśana*, a Vision, a realization of the Ultimate. In this search emphasis has fallen on *Ātman* and its identity with *Brahman*. One might expect that this approach would not lead to a cleavage between nature and man, but oddly enough it has. This cleavage already appears in the Upaniṣads, becomes accentuated in Buddhism and has found a home in *Advaita Vedānta*. This has led to philosophy becoming a search for the Ultimate not in the world but away from it. The approach of Dr Chubb and Prof. Dandekar finds some justification in the general history of Indian philosophy. Swami Vivekananda with his Ramakrishna Mission has done a lot to make philosophy a live pursuit in India not as a preparation for some

life hereafter, but for a better life here and now. Yet we find a member of his Mission writing in his Preface to his translation of *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*: "The generality of mankind bereft of the power of discrimination is, no doubt, satisfied with empirical experience. Let it do so. But it is the aim of the philosopher that is bent upon the discrimination of the real and the unreal to point out the truth, the Ultimate Reality, even if it proves the unreality of the tinsels and baubels of sense-perception." It would not be difficult to find endless passages in Indian philosophical classics running down things of sense and all the ordinary joys of life. Just as an illustration I shall quote a few passages from an ancient classic *Aṣṭāvakra Gītā*, which is reputed to have greatly influenced Gauḍapāda, the grand-teacher of Śaṅkara, and even Swami Vivekananda in our own times. It is admitted that it is not a technical book on philosophy as such, any more than the Upaniṣads or the Gītā can be said to be technical, but it contains passages teaching the supremacy of the Self which in themselves are of great philosophical importance. To Janaka's inquiry about knowledge, liberation and renunciation, Aṣṭāvakra begins by replying : "If you aspire after liberation, my child, shun the objects of the senses as poison and seek forgiveness, sincerity, kindness, contentment and truth as nectar". If depreciatory of objects of sense, here at least he upholds the moral values. In II-4 he even admits the importance of these things of sense, for "As waves, foam and bubbles are not different from water, even so the Universe emanating from the Ātman is not different from it". But as the thought develops the general tendency of depreciating things of sense and even moral values asserts itself, as e.g.

> "The heart of one who has known That is not touched by virtue and vice, as the sky is not touched by smoke, even though it appears to be."—IV, 3.

> "Look upon friends, lands, wealth, houses, wives, presents and such other good fortunes as a dream or a juggler's show, lasting three or five days."—X, 2.

> "One who knows for certain that this universe is but an illusion and a nothing, becomes desireless and pure Intelligence, and finds peace as if nothing exists".—XV, 17.

> "Happiness belongs to that master of indifference to whom even the closing and opening of eye lids is an affliction."—XVI, 4.

Passages like these are by no means uncommon in Sanskrit philosophical classics, though it has to be admitted that passages of a contrary type can be found galore in Sanskrit literary classics. This aversion to things of beauty, which primarily make an appeal to our senses, and to life in general and the eagerness to get out of this "sorry scheme of things" raises an interesting psychological and sociological problem. Nature is very cruel to Europe and yet is hugged by

people there and spring and summer inspire poets and artists. People there are forced to be active and rejoice in the spirit of boundless adventure. So far as India is concerned Dr Paul Brunton hazards an interesting theory : "A fiercely hot and depressingly humid country whose climate causes everyone to shun physical effort, led man naturally to search for part of his satisfaction in contemplative thought and inward life ". Many of us who have had an experience of the gruelling heat of our plains and have delighted in the cool night breezes, just lying flat and relaxed and gazing at the eternal beauty of the stars are likely to accept Dr Brunton's theory. And those of us who have not the energy even to open or close their eyelids may legitimately flatter themselves that they are at least on the lowest rung of the ladder which will lead them ultimately to *mukti* (liberation). However reasonable such an explanation may appear to be on the surface, it does not justify this studied distrust of things of sense and looking only within and seeking knowledge only in Silence. So long as ideas of this type prevail there is sufficient justification for the contempt in which our younger generation holds philosophical studies and for the paucity of students in our philosophy classes. There is a widespread feeling that India has had too much of philosophy and it would be better to have less of it, if not nothing of it. Acharya P. C. Ray years ago said this to me and very recently a Rotarian in proposing a vote of thanks to a speaker on philosophy gently hinted that India should do without philosophy. For this reason too the subject of this symposium is justifiable.

Whatever may be the shortcomings of Western philosophy it has had at least one merit that it has brought us back to solid earth and made us realize that philosophy must make us better, morally and metaphysically, here and now, and should not be merely an escape mechanism to get away from the responsibilities of life. Hunger for peace is legitimate, but it becomes illegitimate when it aims at securing peace by turning one's back on the crying evils of our society or by exploiting the resources of logic to prove that this world is an illusion or just a dream, and liberation comes smiling as soon as this is realized. What then can philosophy hope to do for our modern society?

There can be no doubt that philosophy, whatever *-ism* it may propound, is a basic subject, giving a certain character to our cultural outlook. There was a time when philosophy compassed within its bosom the whole gamut of knowledge, but the growth in our knowledge of the various sciences has made it impossible for any person to master all knowledge, and yet if the palpable shortcomings of knowing more and more of less and less—and this is what specialization has come to mean—are to be overcome, we must have a science which can look at things as a whole, and that can only be metaphysics. It may be superior to science, but cannot be completely divorced from it, for what exists cannot be totally

divorced from the Real. On the logical side of metaphysics all the categories of science have to be correlated into a synthesis, so that the ultimate unity of knowledge may not be dissipated in the conflicting demands of the different sciences. In the nineteenth century it appeared as if the sciences would constitute the last word in knowledge, completely ousting metaphysics. This was a claim which few philosophers could venture to support, but the twentieth century has brought sobriety to the scientists themselves and the most towering of them have grown conscious of the limitations of science. No less a person than Sir Arthur Eddington writes in his *Time, Space and Gravitation* : " All through the physical world runs that unknown content, which must surely be the stuff of our consciousness. Here is a hint of aspects deep within the world of physics, and yet unattainable by the methods of physics. And, moreover, we have found that where science has progressed the furthest, the mind has but regained from Nature that which the mind has put into Nature ". Similar passages are to be found in the writings of Sir James Jeans, Max Planck and other eminent scientists. The great Einstein has not allowed himself to be insensible to the many aspects of life over and above science. He is said to be " awed by the incredible beauty of nature." His love for music brings out the romantic in him and is perhaps responsible for his love of the mysterious when he says : " The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious, the source of all true art, science and religion." Thus he is conscious of the oneness of the whole universe and is driven to accept the need for philosophy as the cementing force in the world of knowledge. In these days of extreme specialization and the resulting narrowness of head and heart, it is only to philosophy that modern society can turn to save itself.

If philosophy to-day cannot be the summation of all knowledge it can at least claim to be the completion of knowledge in the old Platonic sense of the term. Metaphysics as the ground of all sciences and as the unifying force of all sciences still holds, whatever pretentious claims a few individual scientists may put up against the legitimacy of metaphysics. Such scientists need to be reminded that there is no science which has not emerged out of philosophy and which has not been founded by a philosopher, whether it be mathematics or physics, chemistry or biology, economics or politics, psychology or sociology. When the protagonists of these new sciences are anxious to repudiate their paternity and look upon philosophy as an unwanted parent, their very excesses lead them back to philosophy, for only philosophy can make them conscious of their inner contradictions and bring them round to a sober outlook. This has been abundantly illustrated by the history of economics. If its excesses as a science of wealth or of profit and loss have been liquidated, it is only because it has come to have a new orientation as a science of human welfare, where the profit motive has been placed within a proper perspective, if not entirely liquidated as in Marxian economics, and this has been achieved not by specialists in economics but by thinkers who have been nurtured in philosophical studies, Marx not excluded. This has a

lesson for our budding psychologists in India, who seem to be unduly anxious not to be mixed up with the vulgar herd of philosophers. But it will not be long before their own excesses change them into thinkers and not mere observers of, and experimenters on, mental phenomena.

This is what philosophy has done in the West. What is to be its role in India? As already noted earlier in this paper, there are professors of philosophy in our midst who look upon the inroads of Western philosophy into India as a disaster. Whether there is any substance in their distrust time alone will show. In the meantime it may be noted that apart from people, who look upon philosophy as a part of their inheritance to be jealously guarded against all foreign contamination and look upon philosophy not as a search for Truth, but as a ready-made portion of their religion, there have been Indian thinkers who have made full use of their training in Western philosophy and sought to develop their own philosophy without repudiating their Indian inheritance in the field of philosophy. One such case is that of Professor Radhakrishnan whose mastery of Western thought has enabled him to put through Indian philosophy to Western minds. But it has been a charge against him that he has read Western philosophy into Indian philosophy and thus blurred the characteristic differences between the philosophies of Europe and India. Students of Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya claim to have benefited by his reading Kant into Śaṅkara and Śaṅkara into Kant. Śrī Aurobindo, who combines in himself the best of the East and the West, accepts the importance of matter but claims that we can transcend its limitations through the development of the spiritual in us. If philosophy is something more than an effect of mere climatic and geographical conditions and if it is fundamentally a search for Truth, the East and the West must meet at some point and cannot be always confronting each other like two hostile armies. This can never happen so long as Indian philosophy claims to be supra-rational and Truth is something to be found only in the depths of Silence with a capital S. Protagonists of Indian philosophy do not adequately appreciate that even within the four walls of Indian spiritual experience there have been marked differences between the different schools of Vedānta, all based on intuition, and these differences can never be solved so long as we stick to mere intuitions and do not have these differences threshed out in the open forum of reason in spite of all its limitations. Vedānta claims to be nothing if not logical, and so the challenge of the West can be safely accepted and the palpable lacunae of Western philosophy can be logically filled up. Mere assertions about the superiority of Indian philosophy will cut no ice and Westerners will continue to talk of there being no philosophy in India—at least in the Western sense of the term—or they will continue to look upon it as mere theology.

But apart from what Westerners may choose to think of our philosophy it is very vital for our national existence to show what philosophy can do for the

regeneration of our life. This we can hope to do only if we keep it clear of its religious trappings and make it a live instrument of thought for the problems which face us to-day. If philosophy is not only metaphysics dealing with the Ultimate Reality, but also an over-lord whose function it is to co-ordinate the different sciences, it has a vital bearing on ethical and social problems as well. If we say that these problems are all a part of *māyā*, having nothing to do with philosophy, we shall have no reason to quarrel with those of our countrymen who openly say that philosophy is of no use, nay that it is positively harmful, for it just offers a sort of defence mechanism to escape the living problems of life. Assuming that India with the rest of Asia has definitely turned her back on the old feudal middle ages and seeks to transform herself into a modern state wedded to industrialism and socialism of one brand or another, the need for philosophy is no less acute. It will not do just to speak of Western civilization as merely materialistic. Rather we shall have to purge our own religious practices of the materialism latent in them, develop a new democratic outlook, for democracies are not created by paper constitutions, but only by the birth of a new sense of human dignity and by a fresh valuation of human life. If the West is apt to over-emphasize the pleasures of material life, it will be for India to remind the world that behind matter and sustaining it there is spirit.

There is yet one other important role that philosophy has to play in modern society. Very fortunately old religious acerbities have almost disappeared from civilized societies, but something equally ugly and unhealthy has taken their place in the form of racialism and nationalism. Philosophy with its capacity to view things as a whole and in their totality has to show up the spiritual poverty of racialism and nationalism just as it has so successfully shown the futility of one religion claiming to be superior to another. In this respect China has been a wonderful world-teacher. The Chinese can bow with equal reverence before a Confucian and a Buddhist temple. One can note with pleasure that this spirit has entered even Japan in spite of her more limited insular vision. There is a Japanese Rotarian who sits at the feet of Buddha for four hours each morning and yet he gave to his Christian wife funds for the building of a Y.W.C.A. In such a catholic attitude there is more philosophy than in books on philosophy, and the aim of philosophy should be to make us better men and women : more cultured, more tolerant of others' shortcomings—*tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*—more appreciative of the good in others.

To sum up : the philosopher has still to play a vital part in our modern society. He can make full use of all the wealth of scientific discoveries and yet be conscious of their limitations. He can bring a philosophic outlook to bear on the problems of life not just to escape the ills of life as an unreal manifestation of our ignorance, but to face them and transform them into good. He can help his generation to become conscious of its social problems and to solve them. Lastly

he can bring to light the inner source of life which runs through the inorganic to the organic, through the organic to the mental, through the mental to the spiritual. Above all he will have to show that the Ultimate is not something far removed from us, rather that it is *here* and *now* with us. The Vedāntic *tat tvam asi* finds its echo in Christ's pregnant saying : The kingdom of God is within ye.

THE PLACE OF THE PHILOSOPHER IN MODERN SOCIETY

II

by

H. D. BHATTACHARYYA

The title of the symposium is a little intriguing. Instead of asking the direct question whether philosophy serves any useful purpose in the modern world or has any right to existence in a cultural evironment we are·discussing whether philosophers fill any useful place in society and have any justifiable existence as a class. Underlying this question there is a veiled implication, if not insinuation, perhaps that modern society differs from primitive and ancient societies and as such its needs are not identical with those of the latter. We are invited to believe, in fact, that the scope of different branches of learning expands and contracts according to the nature of the social organization and so what might have been necessary or even laudable in the past need not be so now. In other words, with every change in social perspective the need arises of revaluing old disciplines and rearranging them according to a new scale of excellence. A parallel is furnished by changes in social gradation caused by the shift in emphasis on social values. Sages and saints, priests and prophets do not have the same place of honour in a society controlled by economic or other motives as they have in a social group dominated by ideals of spirituality. The Vedic classification of castes, for instance, was partially reversed in Buddhistic scriptures where the Kṣatriya came before the Brahmin in enumeration. Primitives were free from many of the wants of later times and had, therefore, no corresponding classes to satisfy those wants: what need have naked savages, for instance, of a weaver class? It might conceivably so happen also that society will totally outgrow the need of a particular class and then that group will drop out of existence altogether, as, for instance, soothsayers have done in most civilized societies. Some other classes, again, might continue to exist with an altered function or modified objective—our present-day hunters do not kill game for a living though they do so in sport or for safety. Perennial social needs necessitate the formation of stable classes—food-gatherers can never be lacking in any society though the nature of the food to be gathered will obviously determine the exact form their class would take, namely, hunters, fishermen, shepherds, tillers, etc.

To settle the place of philosophers in modern society we have to face two problems at a time. The first is: Are philosophers a necessity at all in any social organization? Is there any need at any time to foster and maintain a class of people whose main, if not sole, function is to speculate on ultimate problems

or seek after ultimate truths? Are there some abiding interests of human life which can be satisfied only by philosophy and by no other branch of study? If so, what are those interests that man can never outgrow at any stage of his culture and that force him to philosophize in spite of himself, as it were? Unless philosophy satisfies a basic need of human nature, it runs the risk of being outmoded and abolished at some time. Not only that; philosophy to be socially tolerable must not satisfy only the needs of individual lives—it must also satisfy collective needs or interests which are basic for social existence, harmony and progress. In other words, philosophy must not be an oddity of individual adjustment but must be foundational for the existence of social life as such without reference to individual convenience, if need be. It must take up an attitude towards men and things which all thinking persons can at least understand and appreciate even if they are personally unable to propound them, just as the appreciators of works of art are infinitely larger in number than the creators of artistic objects. In short, philosophy must be capable of striking a sympathetic chord in the hearts of men to be able to persist as a distinctive form of culture. Truth, like music, has got to be socially shared to win recognition, though social training might sometimes be necessary to facilitate that recognition. A validated truth-claim, to use the language of Pragmatism, becomes an article of social knowledge, only that it is possible that personal illuminations, as of mystics and saints, may not be immediately shared by others and that only through proper intellectual training and spiritual discipline these may come to appreciate and absorb the truth of the mystic vision in course of time. In other words, the germs of philosophical thinking of a certain kind may be latent in some minds which have got to be roused to a full sense of their existence and value. The mystic may enjoy his own experience and remain uncommunicative through words and symbols, but thereby he runs the risk of raising doubts about the validity of his personal illumination and the spiritual value of his individual enjoyment. Conversely, those who would not take the trouble of going through the necessary intellectual and spiritual drill to share the intuition of the mystic have no right to challenge the possibility of its truthfulness. To disbelieve, however, in the possibility of mystic visions being shared by all normally constituted individuals, who are able and willing to undergo the training for spiritual experience, is to interpose an irremovable distinction between man and man, which would militate against the homogeneity and solidarity of the human race. The temporary isolation of the divinely inspired or the spiritually exalted need not be transformed into a permanent feature of social life, for unto all who knock the door of spirituality becomes open sooner or later. It is only when the mystic is unwilling or unable to communicate his thoughts and feelings that people find it difficult to assess their authenticity and value. To base truth on personal feeling alone is to invite scepticism, though as a method of personal satisfaction it might be a perfectly legitimate procedure. Therefore, when we are to determine the place of the philosopher in society we

shall have to keep before our mind the distinction between the lone mystic and the indefinably large social group that is capable of a common speculative thought. If by philosophy is meant a mode of personal satisfaction, it has no necessity of developing on strictly rational lines. In the asylums for the mentally deranged may be found persons who revel in peculiar thought-constructions, and even among the so-called normals, moods and temperaments have much to do with the determination of their philosophy of the moment. It is the social reference that puts philosophy on its mettle and demands the formation of a system of thought that satisfies common rationality and purpose. This, in its turn, implies the acceptance of the similarity of reason in all normally constituted individuals and the identity of their satisfiers in intellectual matters. If man were the measure of things intellectual, then all philosophies would have been personal and all pursuits of common truths would have been impossible. We have, therefore, to postulate the existence of something like Kant's Consciousness-in-general operating according to a uniform law in all minds and making philosophical discussion and acceptance of common truths possible. And when we talk of social reference we mean by it reference to humanity at large at all times and places, for there is no philosophy which is true of one part of the world and not of another or of one period of time and not of another. There is no privileged philosophic class, land or time.

If the above statement be true, then it is obvious that the title of the symposium would be misleading unless seen from a different angle of vision. By ' place ' can be understood one of two things. We may mean by it either ' possibility ' or ' value '. A person has a place in society in so far as a definite social need is fulfilled by him : there is room for him there because he serves a purpose which none else can. But it is not as an individual as such that we assign a place to the philosopher. There are places for weavers, fishermen, farmers, etc. in society in so far as cloth, fish, corn, etc. are necessities of daily life. It is quite possible to conceive of a society where these needs are non-existent and there these classes need not be. But if certain psychological situations demand at all times a certain way of looking at things and events and a certain attitude towards men and social phenomena, or towards a supersensible world, then philosophy of some sort would be inevitable and there would always be a place for it in society though the nature of it will naturally depend upon the developmental stage of the society concerned. Primitive society had both a crude science and a crude philosophy: as at all later times it was a question of bad philosophy and good philosophy, and not of philosophy and no philosophy. Perhaps superstition about the supernatural world filled a larger place in primitive thinking than speculation about the nature of the physical and mental worlds, and the medicine-man was held in greater esteem than the thinker and the scientist, just as even in modern times the priest or the clergyman, as being concerned with God and the supernatural, is more respected than other classes in many societies. The passing away of old beliefs has meant a

loss in the social position and prestige of the ministers of religion, though the persistence of religion in some form or other has ensured the continuance of their class. Should the search after the ultimates of existence cease altogether and men refuse to look beyond the empirical plane, the philosophers of the speculative type would lose their importance, though a kind of philosophy would still remain, limiting enquiry to the sensible alone. But the fact is that science or search after sensibles and verifiables has not been able to silence the voice of enquiry beyond the seen and has been obliged to admit that entities and events do not explain themselves. The *how* of things it has partially discovered but the *why* or the *what for* of processes it does not profess to explain or speculate upon, though it has tried to understand in its own way the *whence* and the *whither* of cosmic phenomena.

So long as man remains curious, the obstinate questionings that experience raises will force him into speculative issues irrespective of their practical utility. Even in the realm of science Higher Mathematics and Theoretical Physics often go beyond the necessities of immediate practical adjustment to the environment and give intellectual exercise not strictly needed for maintaining mental vigour. Philosophy satisfies intellectual curiosity just as Fine Arts satisfy aesthetic craving --it is the surplus thought and sensitiveness that form the sauce of the higher life of the spirit. Freedom from pre-occupation with the struggles of existence is marked by a development of the quest after truth and beauty for their own sake and not as mere appendages to striving for more successful and comfortable life. It is not necessary for certain purposes, for instance, to know what Space, Time, Relation, Causality, Universal, etc., are, for we can carry on our scientific and life activities without that knowledge; nor is it imperative for us to enquire why certain qualities always cohere and lay down the foundation of classes and their laws alike. Similarly, why mind apprehends its object concerns the epistemologist, and though the psychologist attempts to understand the how, he has to confess that in the last analysis the problem of knowledge is a philosophical one. Spirit answering to spirit, thereby making inter-subjective intercourse possible, is also a metaphysical question. Thus commerce with things and persons inevitably raises in inquisitive souls profound philosophical questions. In the special domain of science itself the problem of the necessity of a world process is additive to the problem of change. If the world is a kaleidoscopic show, why is it so and whither is it tending? If there is evolution, is it all chance or is it planned or at least orthogenetic in character? It is not the correctness of the answer to these questions that concerns us—it is the raising of the questions themselves that marks the restlessness of the inquisitive mind. History is strewn with the fragments of shattered creeds and exploded theories in all fields of human knowledge, for in spite of his advancing knowledge man is after all finite and cannot possess omniscience. He lives in time which brings fresh problems into life and

thought and these demand renewed speculative thinking. A philosophy based on insufficient or erroneous data naturally suffers a landslide when advancing knowledge demands a re-organization of the materials of experience and necessitates a more consistent and comprehensive system of thought.

We are now face to face with the second problem: Has modern society outgrown those needs that demanded philosophical thinking in the past and have philosophers outlived their usefulness? Has human nature altered so radically that all speculations about the ultimate have lost their charm and value in the modern world? This would be hard to believe and is not borne out by facts. Speculations are as rife to-day as they were at any time before, and even those whose primary profession is anti-metaphysical are increasingly turning to abstract thinking for better understanding of the problems in their special line of enquiry. Mathematicians, astronomers, physicists, chemists, biologists, psychologists and other scientists are being increasingly drawn into the vortex of speculation, leaving off their exclusive pre-occupation with the world of experience, because a deeper understanding of their special problems is bringing about a conviction that the phenomenal features of the world are rooted in more recondite elements and aspects which require a different mode of approach. It is indeed true that the more abstract need not be identical with the metaphysical. Faraday's mathematical centre of force radiating in all directions, for instance, is a more abstract description of atom than Dalton's indivisible particle of matter or even Rutherford's system of electrical forces, but it is not non-physically conceived as Leibniz's monad is. But even if Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy be not after all a denial of physical causality, the same cannot be said of Driesch's Entelechy which is more metaphysically conceived. Thus recruits are being gathered from unexpected quarters to the fold of philosophy in modern times. It is no longer a philosopher like Aristotle or Hegel dabbling in science but a scientist like Jeans or Eddington, Lloyd Morgan or Wundt, compelled by the logic of his explorations in the scientific field to scale the heights of metaphysical thinking in order to get a better view of his own restricted domain of enquiry. It is not necessary to assume an apologetic attitude in explaining the persistence or importance of the philosophic tendency of our own age. Those who feel that experience is not self-evidentiary or who refuse to live upon axioms and assumptions are bound to be landed in critical investigations into their nature and turn philosophers in the end. You may call philosophy an intellectual luxury like Higher Mathematics or an idle man's occupation with his weary hours like a game of patience and you may call the philosopher a dreamer of empty dreams or a slothful parasite of a peaceful and prosperous community, willing and able to amuse itself with vain speculations like an idling group watching a game of chance or solving a crossword puzzle. It is difficult, however, to believe that mankind would have permitted a class of people with no useful function in society to persist had they not fulfilled a definite need either at all times or at critical moments. If the satisfaction

of animal needs were the be-all and end-all of earthly existence, then animal faith and instinctive seeking of self- and race-preservative goals, lightened up occasionally by flashes of intelligence, would have sufficed for adaptation to the environment. Scepticism about appearances is the first sign of human revolt against the complacent acceptance of things at their face value. To see incongruity and inconsistency and injustice in existing beliefs and practices and to suggest a more harmonious and humane way of dealing with men and things are the primary requisites of a philosopher and a reformer. These can be achieved only by transcending the given and viewing it in the perspective of the whole of space and time as far as human capacity of knowledge can go. Things in their isolation and evanescence might content the unthinking, and temporary solutions might satisfy their pressing needs. But philosophers and reformers think in terms of a lasting, or at least a more stable, resolution of doubts and disabilities in order to save mankind from compartmental thinking and pursuit of conflicting ideals and harmful social tendencies. Their race has not become extinct in modern times. On the other hand, the tremendous pace at which new information about the world is being poured into the social mind by explorers in different fields of knowledge and the rate at which man is going further afield in search of new social contacts have been responsible for quickening the progress of philosophical thought and transcending all geographical and racial limits. Older speculations are being tested to see how far they are capable of shedding their tribal or national limitations and of being appreciated and accepted by the entire world. Racial temperament and parochial vision are slowly receding to the background and philosophical discoveries are being fitted for world reception. Particular religious beliefs, which filled such a large part in the ancient philosophies of different countries and communities, have shrunk into negligible dimensions with the advancement of knowledge and acquaintance with the creeds of other religious groups. Where unshakable conviction once ruled the field we have now apologies, excuses and allegorical or symbolical interpretations.

This will explain also why psychology is making such a large inroad into philosophy in recent times. We are trying to understand not only the psychology at the back of philosophical formulations—the personal urges that dictate a particular way of thought, but also psychological experiences as furnishing new materials for thinking. We may no longer discuss whether the world is an illusion, but discussions about the nature and status of sense-data and of perspectives have an identical bearing on the problem of a common real world. Similarly, the problems of personality raised by Abnormal Psychology have an equal importance with the problems of individual spirituality discussed in Absolutistic philosophy, whether in the East or in the West. We no longer fancy Platonic Ideas living apart from the phenomenal world; but we quietly distinguish subsistent universals and relations from existent entities. And while we no longer

swear by Aristotle we still use his fourfold distinction of causes with a new terminology, namely, Space-Time for material, Motion for efficient, Universal or Space-Time configuration for formal and Nisus towards the Deity for final cause. Philosophers are still fulfilling the other function of speculative thinking, namely, supplying the basis of a subjective orientation to actual facts through the formulation of palliative theories to blunt the edges of sorrow and shed rays of hope on the gloom of despondency, either by trying to prove the inevitability of suffering with the help of fatalism or pessimism or by predicting its disappearance, in the long run, in God's good world. Can we then not say that philosophers in modern society have exactly the same place as their prototypes in ancient society had, namely, that they have to philosophize in order to satisfy intellectual curiosity through strenuous thinking and to bring solace through religious beliefs or, in other words, to bring satisfaction through the double Platonic procedure of Dialectic and Myth, or the double Hegelian device of Understanding and Speculative Reason? The philosopher would then acknowledge the presence of both intellectual and non-intellectual elements in man and agree with Bradley that it is the whole man with the faculties of thinking, feeling and willing that must be satisfied in any scheme of reality. But with this widening of the scope of his duties the philosopher may find that while agreement on the intellectual level is attainable by common endeavour to arrive at truth, it may not be easy to make men agree about their affections and ideals. He, therefore, advocates the pursuit of Truth, though he is aware that Beauty and Goodness have an equal right to human allegiance. But though the world has often clamoured for philosopher-kings to set right a disjointed realm and demanded of them a practical demonstration of the truth of their theories, it should be made clear in no unmistakable terms that the duty of philosophers ends with formulating correct theories. It is as a philanthropic citizen or as a practical politician that a philosopher may also put his theory into execution, but thereby he would be overstepping his proper jurisdiction. To expect him to fulfil these additional functions would be like expecting a teacher not only to instruct his pupils and mend their manners but also to cook their food and mend their clothes.

If, therefore, it is suggested that philosophers should be practically useful in society to ensure the continuance of their class, we must seriously try to understand the meaning of the word 'useful'. The brain is as much useful as the hand for the purpose of the organism as a whole and yet it is not expected to perform the function of the latter. Because it suits our economic and political convenience that spiritualistic tendency should lessen and materialistic outlook should gain ground to increase the worldly prosperity of the community, therefore the panlogistic dialectic should give way to dialectical materialism—this adjustment of the philosophic sails to the shifting winds of economic and political doctrines will only spell ruin to genuine philosophical thinking. Many will share the opinion of Hobhouse that the metaphysical theory of the State to be found in Hegel is

responsible for Prussian militarism, just as at the present moment the ideology of the Soviet Republic is regarded as a direct offshoot of the Marxian economic doctrine. Tendencious thought is bad enough in literature—it is an intolerable nuisance in philosophy. Once considerations of prudence enter into speculation, philosophy runs the risk of exposing itself to the influence of all passing political opinions, economic requirements, communal prejudices and social fashions. Heaven save us from that contingency! Philosophy deals with eternal verities and is above temporal and spatial considerations. Whether idealism or realism, monism or pluralism, is the correct theory of reality is not to be decided by contemporary votes or the dictation of the political party in power. That which can be defended by reason has alone the right to be considered true, though fuller knowledge of facts may require a fresh exercise of the same reason at a later time. The eternal vigil of the spirit must not, however, be slackened and it is on the stepping stones of dead and decaying beliefs that men rise to higher truths.

It is futile to charge some philosophies, especially of the East, as being escapistic in their attitude towards the world of sense and isolationistic in their theory of social relation. The quarrel between acceptance and rejection of the world is not yet ended and their permissible extent is still a matter of dispute. So long as we are unable to decide whether the soul thrives at the expense,or with the help, of the body we shall not be able to decide the issue between abnegation (*nivṛtti*) and indulgence (*pravṛtti*), acceptance and rejection of the world. That some foregoing of worldly pleasures is a necessity of spiritual life all systems of morality and religion would agree. Sensuality and selfishness can never hold society together, not to talk of the advancement of spirituality in individual life. The philosophical cure of acosmism and solipsism lies in pointing out the inconsistency involved in denying the existence of the physical world and other finite spirits, just as the antidote to extreme asceticism lies in showing the futility of a rational life that ignores the legitimate claims of sensibility altogether. In other words, the willing acceptance of the world must follow from, and not dictate, philosophical thinking. Because the world has an aggressiveness and an attractiveness about it, therefore it must be accepted at its face value is what critical thinking would consider to be a very naive way of recognizing its existence and worth. It would be like accepting the secondary qualities of matter as real and attempting to stop all enquiries about the ultimate units of physical existence because these do not possess or manifest those qualities. If the argument is advanced that without admitting the reality of the physical world we are not likely to enhance our material prosperity, we shall have to discuss and determine the ultimate value of material civilization with due regard to the needs of the spirit before we accept the world as real. In other words, without discussing the nature and gradation of values no direction as to what we should or should not do can be given. The demands of life have compelled the recognition of the reality of the

world in some form even in Absolutistic systems; but the nature and degree of that reality will depend upon what reality we are prepared to give to the physical nature of our being. It should not be forgotten that in philosophy we talk of ultimates and we cannot make compromises that jeopardize the fixation of their nature by means of proper reasoning. Idealism and Realism will continue to divide human speculation in the present age as they did in the past, and the pragmatic necessity of altering our philosophic creed to adjust ourselves to life-conditions of the age will only serve to raise further questions about the justification of the pragmatic attitude itself. It would be ridiculous to suggest, for instance, that non-violence or non-injury (*ahimsā*) is the correct philosophic attitude of dependent nations, while the attainment and defence of independence would make the pacifist standpoint outmoded and antiquated and justify the adoption of war and violence as the philosophic creed. This would mean maintaining a double standard of national morality, namely, non-violence as the morality of slaves and underdogs and violence as the morality of masters and top-dogs,, as Nietzsche advocated in his philosophy. In India, for instance, the science of statecraft (*arthaśāstra*) was kept as a separate discipline from that of morality and social concord (*dharmaśāstra*), the rules of private morality being not conducive to the maintenance and vigour of the state. We have to set our foot upon such dangerous dualities of social relation unless we are able to establish philosophically that national independence is morally higher and more philosophically real than tame submission to an alien state and that without the maintenance of an attitude of dominance, if need be with the use of force, by an independent state, believing in the preservation of the spiritual values which it stands for, the dark forces of the world will thrust humanity back to barbarity and misery which it is the duty of every civilized nation to prevent. In short, a philosophical justification of national conduct is as much necessary to-day as it was at any time before. We shall have to discover, in fact, what conditions of individual, social, political and international life justify resistance to intimidating power and even encroachment upon human liberty and to what extent, in the interest of humanity itself, which is supposed to be the basic objective of all spiritualistic theories acknowledging the reality, equality and community of finite individuals.

Unfortunately our experimentation with social relations has not attained a satisfactory stage and it is in this field that philosophic aid is most urgently needed. It has taken humanity long ages to extend the horizon of vision beyond the family and the tribe so as to include the nation and the race within its orbit. But we have generally stopped short at both ends: we have accepted the reality and interest of bigger and smaller groups but ignored them in respect of individuals and humanity at large. The last two, in fact, hang together, for unless it is admitted that each individual is to count as one and not more than one and that every one is to be himself an end and never a means to any other's advancement,

it is not possible that opportunities will be equalized for all and the conception of God's chosen race or Heaven's appointed guardians would be given up at any time. Conflict of ideologies proceeds from difference in the conceptions of human relation. Once it is claimed that all men are not equally entitled to the privileges of social, economic and political existence, there is bound to appear the distinction between the citizens and the slaves, the capitalists and the labourers, the high castes and the untouchables, the whites and the coloured races, the faithful and the infidels. Common ideals and interests cannot evolve under such conditions of discrimination between man and man. It becomes necessary then to state anew the philosophy underlying the origin of man, the purpose of his creation, and the value and destiny of individual existence. Should the worth of individual lives depend upon the accidents of birth and artificial social classification? Maine has pointed out that social progress is characterized by a transition from the idea of man as a creature of status to that of man as capable of entering into contracts as individuals. The group cannot absorb and engulf the individual and has no right to create any privileged class with the right of lording it over the rest in such a way that personal worth in any other class does not get adequate recognition. Philosophers of the modern age have to tackle seriously the problem of the relation between the Individual and Society or the State and provide a satisfactory philosophic basis for the personal rights and social obligations of individuals as members of the human race. Now that science has broken down the barriers of space and revealed the essential kinship of all human beings, philosophers of the modern age would be justified in dreaming of one world where sympathy does not align itself with geographical proximity or commonness of descent. Racial arrogance, religious fanaticism, caste exclusiveness and class pride are strangely out of place in the context of human equality in rights.

If in the game of finding out a hidden thing we fail to locate the object, we may still follow the rules of the game and establish friendly relations. If philosophy as the pursuit of absolute truth fails, we may still establish firmly the foundation of social understanding. If the conclusion about the unreality of the world from the Vedāntic great saying *sarvam khalu idam brahma* (All this is verily Brahman) be unpleasant and repugnant to us, we may still accept the just and comfortable conclusion therefrom that in an ultimate reference human distinctions have no meaning, all finite spirits being equally unreal. If philosophy cannot give us the clue to truth, it can at least enable us to ignore and resist unjust claims advanced on behalf of any particular individual, group or race. We may cultivate *samatva* —equanimity or indifference to all distinctions, whether negatively as apathy or positively as equal treatment to all, retaining full mental equipoise and refusing to be deflected from the right path by any emotional consideration. Being freed from the trammels of clannishness, we may then cultivate cosmic sympathies, treating all men and all nations alike. Social philosophy is after all man-made and can be easily scrapped in the interest of better human relations provided this is

accepted as a cardinal objective of human existence. If it can be proved that, to use the language of Hegel, the truth of individuality is kinship with the whole world, then and then only will the back of isolated living be completely broken. Then only will the world be made safe for democracy and democracy safe for the world. We have discussed too long academically whether substance can be thought of without relation. It is time to make an unequivocal declaration that the reality of man depends on his relations with humanity at large. Too much emphasis on the self-sufficiency of the individual and too little on the necessity of establishing social contact with the world as a whole would make of man an abstraction shorn of reality. If to philosophers of the modern age has fallen the glory of probing deeper than ever into the mysteries of the physical universe with the rapid advance of science in all fields, to them has also fallen the duty of evolving a social philosophy that would hold the scales even between man and man (and woman too), between the rival claims of the individual and the group, and between the conflicting interests of diverse social, political and racial elements.

The Discovery of Man is the principal necessity of modern times just as the Discovery of Nature was of earlier centuries. To this task must be brought not only a keen intellect but also a broad human sympathy. Philosophers are expected to take a dispassionate view of things. This dispassion may be brought about either by abjuring passion and prejudice altogether and taking only an intellectual interest in the solution of all problems, or by universalizing sympathy so that kindly disposition might extend equally to all objects. Man will be most Godlike when universal love will permeate all his thoughts and actions. In this way we shall, to use the language of Bradley, get homoeopathically cured of our partiality, namely, by extending its operation to the whole world, ignoring all racial and geographical distinctions. We shall then have conquered the whole of Space and the whole of Time in a new sense altogether, for against this invasion of Love there will be no opposition at any place or time. A philosopher will not have justified his existence in the modern age by encouraging men and nations to raise the tempo of worldly pursuit except in so far as this can be done without fostering inequality, jealousy and struggle. The intellectual solution of ultimate questions must embrace a consideration of the moral problems implicated in human relations. The pursuit of truth must not be dissociated from the establishment of ideals so that fact and value may form a lasting alliance in philosophical thinking. Philosophy has often been looked upon as the bringer of solace to individual and national lives in times of distress and crisis because it either shows the inevitability of worldly happenings, against which it is useless to contend or for which man's moral lapses are responsible, or advises the cultivation of an attitude of indifference or else of faith in a merciful Providence. But while submission to the brute forces of nature can be partially prevented by scientific knowledge, man-made havoc can be effectively stopped only by popularizing the creed of human

dignity and equality, and by preaching the gospel of co-operation as against the cult of conflict and the hymn of hate that even benches of Bishops have blessed in the past in national and communal interest.

As Professor Price said in his Presidential Address to the Joint Session of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society at London in 1945, the philosopher has a double task, namely, to produce the philosophic good called wisdom and to purvey it to the public. As in the case of all other goods, the consumer's point of view must be respected if philosophical productions are not to fall on a weak market. Linguistic precision and clarity must characterize all philosophical teaching now more than ever before, because there is now a much wider public to cater for than in the past when people took their philosophy partly from the ministers of religion and education was not so widespread. You have to sow ideas which will take firm root in the social mind and lead to active effort in the direction of higher ideals. To use Price's words, only a rational unified outlook on the world will satisfy the consumers of the philosopher's productions though it is quite conceivable that the method of approach will give each formulation its peculiar look. The poet and the mystic may portray in dim outlines what the philosopher draws in bold relief and yet their work is not useless as a call to contemplation and a guide to conduct. Conversely, much of what passes for philosophy in recent literature is mere logomachy like some of the arid discussions of Navya-Nyāya. If, as Joad pointed out in his paper on *Appeal to Philosophers* in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for 1940, " philosophy has the dual purpose of revealing truth and increasing virtue," and if we have to formulate our philosophy against a " background of religious disbelief, ethical anarchy and political bitterness," no tinkering or half measure will make philosophy popular and effective. Philosophers are charged with the task of turning men's thoughts to the quest of truth and pursuit of ideals. This can be fulfilled only if they shed their fear motive and boldly proclaim what they consider to be right and true. Too often have they contented themselves with mutual recrimination and destructive criticism, forgetting that thereby no new criterion of truth and standard of value are placed before the public. If the philosopher will not perform his job, let him not complain if the world turns to those, whose profession is not purveying of wisdom, to satisfy its curiosity. Hungry souls are clamouring all around for the bread of life: let us not offer them the stone of technical and forbidding discussion and hair-splitting analysis. That is the surest way of losing our hold on the insatiable spirit of man which, even in the state of the utmost degradation, gropes for ideals and enlightenment. May we be the harbingers of the New World of Thought that distressed Humanity, torn by wars and rumours of wars, is seeking to bring harmony and peace into its troubled soul! And may our practice be as perfect as our precept!

SYMPOSIUM II

HAS SRI AUROBINDO REFUTED MAYAVADA?

I

by

INDRA SEN

The word ' Māyā ' is as ancient as the Ṛg-veda, but 'Māyāvāda' as a philosophical school came into being with Śaṅkara in the 9th century A.D. The author of this *Weltanschauung* was a most dynamic personality and even during his life-time, which was exceedingly short, his thought had become fairly dominant in this vast sub-continent. The succeeding centuries witnessed a growth in the power and influence of it and the philosophers who appeared on the stage of Indian life during this time, on the whole either accepted him and wrote elaborative commentaries on his works or rejected him and wrote refutations of the view that the world is *māyā*, an illusion, *mithyā*, false, and *asat*, non-existent or *vyāvahārika*, purely empirical and phenomenal. However, it continued to be the major and the dominant trend of Indian thought, with of course many vicissitudes, uptil about the middle of the 19th century, when primarily through impact with the West a new ferment started in Indian life. A reaction appeared against the idea of ' Māyā ' and the world and life-denying attitude and thinkers and leaders of Indian life, one after the other, emphasized action and the value of life in the world. Under this changed cultural atmosphere the old ' Māyāvāda ' or illusionism itself tended to become more or less a ' Sattāvāda ', a positive creativity justifying life in the world.

The classical critics of Śaṅkara have often called him a ' Pracchanna Bauddha', a disguised Buddhist, meaning that he was virtually reaffirming the same Buddhist position regarding the world process, with the difference that he affirmed a Supracosmic Absolute too, regarding which Buddha had chosen to remain silent. This is, however, only a historical antecedent of Māyāvāda, which is hardly of any direct significance in considering the philosophical value of the doctrine.

We have said that since the middle of the 19th century, thinkers and leaders of Indian life have repeatedly rejected Māyāvāda and stressed life and world-affirming attitude. However, a full-fledged philosophical system, which offers a complete *Weltanschauung* involving a revaluation of Māyāvāda has found expression in Śrī Aurobindo. But a refutation of Māyāvāda is no essential objective of his. His *leitmotiv* and the first formulation of the philosophical question is : How is divine life, a full life of the Spirit, possible on earth? How can Spirit be reconciled to Matter ? These are the two practical and theoretical issues of his philosophy, which receive a comprehensive ontological, epistemological and

axiological treatment at his hands. Obviously there are some assumptions here, but were there no assumptions in Kant's question : How is knowledge possible ? Or Hegel's fundamental affirmation that reality must be rational. It is not necessary for us to go into the validity or otherwise of the assumptions involved. What we wish to show is that Śrī Aurobindo's philosophizing starts independently with an original question of its own and in seeking to work out its answer the refutation of Māyāvāda becomes an incidental circumstance, virtually an aid to evolve a fuller Monism free from the necessity of a negativist attitude towards any sphere or part of experience. The positive part of the system, its fundamental philosophical approach and the substantiation and correlation of its constituent elements have reinforced this refutation with a constructive alternative. Now assuming that the doctrine, as traditionally represented, is still held by some we can consider and discuss, " Has Śrī Aurobindo refuted Māyāvāda ?" or rather " How Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy refutes Māyāvāda ? "

Māyāvāda is essentially an expression of a sense of inexplicability, *anirvacanīyatā*, in the presence of a contradiction between, on the one hand, the normal experience of the world or multiple finite objects and, on the other, the supernormal spiritual experience of an undifferentiated infinite existence. The quality and the intensity of the latter, its undifferentiated unity in contrast to the multiplicity of the normal experience and a rigid adherence to the logical law of contradiction are sufficient to show Māyāvāda as an intelligible philosophical consequence. Unity being undifferentiated, in fact absolutely featureless, and then more intense as an experience, multiplicity must naturally become unreal and illusory. Yet the multiplicity does exist, our practical life is intimately bound up with it, we cannot deny it altogether. Therefore it exists, but only as *vyāvahārika sattā*, a practical and empirical reality. Now this must somehow be related to the real reality, the transcendental or the *pāramārthika* reality. That is obviously the crux of Monistic philosophy, which, in essential impulse and character, Śaṅkara's system is and, in fact, one of the best known to the history of thought. Now the Māyāvāda's solution of this critical issue is that the world only appears to be, actually it is not. The world is no more than the jugglery of the juggler, the snake in the rope or the silver in the shell. It is like the dream, which appears to be real while it lasts but on waking we know it definitely as unreal. The world too we come to know as absolutely unreal when we awaken to the reality of the Brahman, which is the supreme, undifferentiated Unity, one and sole, without a second.

This world of variety and colour is an *adhyāsa*, a super-imposition, on the one and the uniform reality of the Brahman. But how does this come about ? On account of ' Māyā '. But then what is ' Māyā ' ? This proves to be a very uncomfortable question. Māyā is supposed to be the solution of the greatest difficulty of Monistic philosophy, that of the relation between the apparent 'many'

and the real ' one ', yet it in itself becomes a more serious problem. Metaphysicall it cannot be admitted as another principle of existence besides the Brahman therefore it cannot be said to be real. Yet unreal it is not. Therefore it is declared as real as well as unreal, *sat* as well as *asat*.* It is in fact *anirvacanīya*, inexplicable. Epistemologically it determines our ordinary cognitions, which being of the apparent ' Many ' involving relational judgements are all false. The cognition of the absolute undifferentiated ' One ' alone can be knowledge, which is an intuition.

A most wonderful crop of dualisms was the result of the great Monistic sowing of Śaṅkara. Yet it answered to the metaphysical needs of the people of those times in such an abundant measure that it found a ready acceptance with them. The spiritual reality of the Absolute Brahman afforded such a great satisfaction that the difficulties due to ' Māyā ' were ignored. Or perhaps ' Māyā ' and the unreality of the world were themselves positive satisfactions to the people nursed on Buddhist view of life. But this general satisfaction did not last long and the dualisms so sharply brought into play by Śaṅkara's Monism and, in particular, his concept of ' Māyā ', as it were, provoked new orientations of Vedāntic thought. Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Vallabha and Madhva are the chief of such creators and they uniformly reject the idea of Māyā. To all of them the world is real. None of them resorts to the idea of illusion to explain one or the other part of experience, whether normal or supernormal. Rāmānuja (12th century), in particular, evolves a powerful philosophy and a more powerful religion, which is also the more dominant trend of contemporary Hinduism. His philosophical approach to reality is truly Monistic, i.e. all-embracing and all-inclusive. He accepts the experience of the ' one ' as well of the ' many ' as equally real and then proceeds to reconcile them in a whole-hearted manner. It can be said that his account of unity is rather weak but he is not prepared to achieve a unity by rejecting plurality as illusory. His seven arguments, *Saptavidhānupapatti*, against ' Māyāvāda ' constitute the classical and the most authentic criticism of the doctrine. He asks for the locus of Māyā or *Avidyā* (Ignorance) and says that it cannot be the human individual, because he is himself the product of it. Nor can Brahman be the locus, because It is absolute self-luminosity in which there is no ignorance. Avidyā can also not hide away the Brahman, which is absolute knowledge. It can also not be a third thing from existence and non-existence. It can also not be a positive factor, since ignorance means want of knowledge. And if we admit it as positive, then it will be impossible to destroy it. Lastly, an Avidyā-beset universe contradicts moral effort and religious aspiration, because it negates human individuality and offers for an ideal an impersonal existence. Nimbārka (13th century) urges one special argument, i.e. " If the world were not real, it could not be superimposed on another ".[1] And Vallabha (16th century) insists that

* The Advaita view is that Maya is neither *sat* nor *asat*. Ed.

1 Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 753.

' those who accept the force of Māyā as the explanation of the world are not pure Advaitins, since they admit a second to Brahman ".[2]

The Māyāvāda thus became an issue for centuries but in spite of all the polemic raised against it, it continued to be influential. However, the successors of Śaṅkara, whether in consequence of the criticisms levelled against Māyāvāda or independently, felt obliged to modify their position in a number of ways. With the author of the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*, for example, the ' Māyā ' becomes " a *modus operandi* (*vyāpāra*) which coming itself from the material cause (Brahman) brings about the material product, i.e. the world."[3] In connection with the *Īśvara*, a concept accepted by Śaṅkara, Māyā is even for him the power which creates the world. Māyā as creative power, on the whole, acquired emphasis during this later period.

Some contemporary interpreters of Śaṅkara too have either been much struck by some special passages in his commentaries or otherwise felt inclined to give new meanings to old terms and passages but in every case the result is that Śaṅkara's abstract non-dualism tends to be changed into a concrete Absolutism.[4]

However the Śaṅkara of these contemporary exponents is not the Śaṅkara known to and accepted by his classical exponents or critics. Śrī Aurobindo accepts the classical Śaṅkara and regards his Māyāvāda a legitimate philosophical alternative and examines it as such. As we have said before, he uses it often to develop and state his own position. Now the most fundamental and crucial attack of Śrī Aurobindo against Māyāvāda consists in his formulation of the philosophical problem itself. Spirit and Matter are to him the two undeniable decisive facts of experience and, therefore, to reconcile them is the proper philosophical issue. And, says he, " True reconciliation proceeds always by a mutual comprehension leading to some sort of oneness ".[5] The same thought is stated in a variant form like this : " As in science, so in metaphysical thought, that general and ultimate solution is likely to be the best which includes and accounts for all so that each truth as experience takes its place in the whole."[6] A unification of

2 *Ibid*, p. 756.

3 *Ibid*, p. 571.

4 (1) " There are in the world many samanyas with their viseshas—both conscious and unconscious. All these samanyas in their graduated series are included and comprehended in one great samanya, i.e. in Brahman's nature as a mass of intelligence ", (Sankara-bhashya on Brhadaranyaka Upanishad, ii. 4.9, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol.II, p. 534).

(2) *tajjanyatve sati, tajjanyajanako vyāpārah.* Maya is only a modus operandi (*vyāpāra*), which coming itself from the material cause (Brahman) brings about the material product, i.e., the world (*Sankshepasārīraka—ibid* p. 571)

(3) *Yathā kāranam brahma trishu kāleshu sattvam na vyabhicarati, tathā kāryam api jagat trishu kāleshu sattvam na vyabhicarati.* Just as the Brahman as cause is eternally real, so is the world as effect eternally real.

Sankara-bhashya on *Brahma-sutra*, *Outline of Indian Philosophy*, Chatterjee and Datta, p. 425.

5 *The Life Divine* (First Edition), Vol. I, p. 39.

6 *Ibid*, Vol. II (1), p. 265.

Spirit and Matter or the discovery of that " ultimate solution " which " includes and accounts for all " becomes the aim of philosophical inquiry. Such unification has to proceed by a systematic " mutual comprehension " or intimate inter-relatedness so that in the end the whole of experience becomes perfectly intelligible. Here the attitude towards all experience is one of acceptance and seeking to interpret and explain it.

Śaṅkara's approach to the philosophical problem was much different. He sought for the " foundational " in experience, which, he thought, must be eternal, unchanging and uniform. He came to regard the " undifferenced consciousness alone " (*nirviśeṣacinmātram*) as real and then naturally the rest became unreal and illusory. Here too a unity is achieved, but as Śrī Aurobindo says, " Illusionism unifies by elimination "[7].

It is hardly necessary to comment on the relative merits of the two approaches, as we now regard it as almost axiomatic that to interpret experience is the proper business of philosophy and that means really to account for all the principal facts of experience. Anything given in experience is existent and not illusion or unreal and surely illusion is no valid form of explanation either. Our sole concern regarding each fact of experience is to determine the nature and the character of its reality in the scheme and the unity of the whole, for truly are " all problems of existence essentially problems of harmony ".[8]

Now the one general consequence of this difference of attitude is that, while both, Śaṅkara and Śrī Aurobindo are Monists by philosophical seeking, the one constantly dichotomizes while the other always reconciles, in the one you suffer divisions, rejections and eliminations, in the other enjoy growing orientations and ever larger harmonies.

Obviously, according to Śrī Aurobindo, illusion will be an illegitimate term to be applied to any fact of experience. If so, falsehood can only be partial truth. Rāmānuja had rightly stressed against Śaṅkara that error cannot exist and this indeed threatened to knock the bottom out of the case of Māyāvāda, because it would make illusion impossible. But Rāmānuja had overstated his case. When he said that all knowledge is true (*yathārtham sarva-vijñānam*) he failed to see that even if all things admitted to be composed of the same constituents, they might yet differ in the relations of those constituents. *Anirvacanīya-khyāti-vāda* of Śaṅkara and *Sat-khyāti-vāda* of Rāmānuja, both have their respective shortcomings. The one theory of error ends in inexplicability and the other in the affirmation that even in the so-called illusion, the real appears. Virtually error is best explained as ' relative in nature ' dependent on the ' perversion ' and ' contradiction ' of Truth[9] and as ' an indispensable step or stage in the slow

7 *The Life Divine*, Vol. II (1), p. 265.
8 *Ibid*, I, p. 3.
9 *Ibid*, II (1), p. 474.

evolution towards knowledge.'[10] It is a consequence of the cosmic ignorance conceived as a self-limitation of its absolute knowledge so as to produce the divided action of the mind and the ego.

Now if absolute falsehood or error does not exist then we should be obliged to consider and examine his principle of non-contradiction (*abādhitatva*), which rests upon a complete opposition of truth and falsehood and which governs his thought from one end to the other. The experience of a snake in the rope is false, because our normal experience of the object contradicts it. Things seen in the dream are untrue, because waking life does not confirm them. And our entire normal waking experience of the world is invalid because experience of spiritual intuition (*anubhava*) contradicts it. Firstly, it can be questioned whether there is really a contradiction between the experience of ' a snake in a rope ' and that of ' a rope as a rope '. Is there not a continuity and link between the two which makes the relating possible and hence the perception of the difference possible. Similarly, if there were really no relation between the world and the Brahman, the apparent and the real, the relative and the absolute, it could not have been possible to think of the two together as we actually do. The illusory appearance is surely not absolutely contradictory of the real object. That is a psychological impossibility. The terms ' dream ', ' illusion ', ' jugglery ', etc. connote unreality in the very limited sense of practical objectives of life. As facts and phenomena by themselves they are not unreal. And a right use of them as analogies (even though the best analogies are no reasons to prove a thing) cannot suggest unreality but only a different order of reality.

Secondly, whether the law of contradiction can have a valid application to questions of total reality, which by its essential nature and concept involves inclusion and affirmation of all facts rather than exclusion and rejection of any, which is the necessary method of this logical principle. Śrī Aurobindo argues that " A law founded upon an observation of what is divided in Space and Time cannot be confidently applied to the being and action of the indivisible : not only it cannot be applied to this spaceless and timeless infinite, but it cannot be applied even to a Time Infinite and Space Infinite ".[11] The lesson of the Eleatic Zeno must come back to our mind in this connection. From discrete moments of rest a unitary process of motion cannot be produced. A logic which is at home in dealing with discrete finite objects gets entangled in contradictions when it attempts to take up the infinite as its subject-matter. Positively delineating the scope of the law of contradiction Śrī Aurobindo trenchantly says that " the law is necessary to us in order that we may posit partial and practical truths, think out things clearly, decisively and usefully, classify, act, deal with them effectively for particular purposes in our divisions of Space, distinctions of form and property, moments of Time ".[12]

10 *Ibid*, II (1), p. 491.
11 *The Life Divine*, Vol. II (1), p. 51.
12 *Ibid*, II (1), p. 130.

Obviously if Śaṅkara had recognized the proper sphere of application of this law he would surely have been spared all the dualisms and sharp divisions which so tenaciously pursued his search for a monism. In the West, it has been the merit of Hegel to have clearly recognized that the Absolute Idea must reconcile the very last contradictions and antinomies. It was, indeed, a supreme perception which showed him the necessity of a larger synthesis inherent in the nature of two contradictions. And it was surely a feat of philosophical genius, which enabled him to conceive of Synthetic Reason and the Dialectic Process as a higher function of thought indispensable to the consideration of the Absolute Reality.

Śrī Aurobindo's perceptions in this connection are in fact clearer and more definite. " An Omnipresent Reality ", says he, " is the truth of all life and existence, whether absolute or relative, whether corporeal or incorporeal, whether animate or inanimate, whether intelligent or unintelligent....All antinomies confront each other in order to recognize one Truth in their opposed aspects and embrace by the way of conflict their mutual unity. Brahman is the Alpha and the Omega. Brahman is the one besides whom there is nothing else existent ."[13] Such ultimate Reality in which all antinomies confront and realize their ' Unity ' will obviously lie beyond our Intellect and Reason, which rely upon the law of non-contradiction. Says Śrī Aurobindo : " Our way of knowing must be appropriate to that which is to be known."[14] Now a greater reason than ours is obviously operative in the ultimate Reality which being all-inclusive must reconcile all contradictions and whose " essence is a higher spiritual unity " and, therefore, a higher spiritual reason or intuition is necessary to know it. Such reason must be " more vast, subtle, and complex in its operations " [15] so as to be able to comprehend the " unbounded variability " of the life of the Infinite. Our normal reason works indirectly through representative ideas and has to infer and build up constructs of reality on the basis of fragmentary gathered data. The larger and higher reason must necessarily be an instrument of direct knowledge and essential truth. If we are able to recognize that our normal reason in its search after truth is limited to an indirect approach and can at best achieve constructs of reality—and obviously this faculty is a great advance on the perception of the animals and the continuation of evolution is a fact—then the possibility of a direct instrumentation of knowledge becomes fairly obvious. Now the data of facts that this instrumentation might yield can be of immense importance to philosophical thinking. Such data will probably give us new unities in place of the distinctions and oppositions of our intellectual reason. But our intellect too is, to an extent, capable of a larger action, as in the West, Hegel had shown ; and that by itself can prevent the catastrophic consequences of sharp mutilations of reality as has happened in Māyāvāda. " Our intellect ", says Śrī Aurobindo, " must consent to pass out of the bounds of finite

13 *Ibid*, I, p. 51.
14 *Ibid*, Vol. II (1), p. 437.
15 *Ibid*, II (1), p. 52.

logic and accustom itself to the logic of Infinite", and continues he, "if we insist on applying finite logic to the Infinite, the omnipresent reality will escape us and we shall grasp instead an abstract shadow" [16]. This is exactly what happens in Māyāvāda, which is a perfect demonstration of the incapacity of our common logic, born out of our practical handling of the finite objects of the world, to deal with the issues of ultimate Reality.

Thus ultimate Reality must be Integral Reality and it will be wrong to suppose that such Reality will be a relational whole involving the fallacy of infinite regress. Bradley was right in affirming that if Reality were constructed on the basis of relational judgement, absolute knowledge would be impossible. But the view here presented is not of such a relational whole ; it is of an intimate Unity, which however being not abstract blankness but real unity involves inner relations, presented to it in a perception of self-identity.

Śaṅkara's severe conception of identity and his exclusive prepossession with the Upaniṣadic descriptions of the Unity of the Brahman in negative terms proved absolutely determining for his philosophy. The Absolute Reality should be to him nothing but just Identity. Any difference meant a denial of it. Every determination, as in Spinoza, meant a limitation of the Absolute Substance.

To Śrī Aurobindo, however, identity necessarily involves difference and the higher the identity the richer its content and the more complex its organization. Surely things of the world cannot be attributed to the Brahman, because He is more than the world. Therefore, the Upaniṣads describe Him by the terms *neti neti*, not this, not this, but they also described him positively in the terms *sarvam khalu idam brahma,* All this is Brahman, or *annam brahma,* Matter is Brahman, *prāṇam brahma,* Life is Brahman, etc.

Here are the two basic positions and perceptions, which make all the difference between the two philosophies.

To Śaṅkara the Brahman is also the Supreme Universal in which no particulars can have any place. "Brahman is devoid of anything of a like kind or of a different kind and has no internal variety". [17] This universal obviously becomes a supracosmic Transcendent Reality. But the nature of relations between the Particular, the Universal, and the Transcendent as conceived here could not but lead to Māyāvāda and we must carefully examine them. This again implies an old controversy which has raged long and furiously both in the East and the West and we are conscious of the abstractions that vitiated the old discussions. Śrī Aurobindo affirms, "The Universal particularizes itself in the individual ; the individual contains in himslef all the generalities of the Universal", [18] and they both represent the Immanence of the Absolute which

16 *Ibid,* II (1), p. 43.

17 sajâtīya-vijâtīya-svagata-bheda-rahitam. (*Indian Philosophy,* II. p. 353.)

18 *The Life Divine,* II (1), p. 129

must rest upon the Transcendence of the Absolute. " The transcendent ", says Śrī Aurobindo, " contains, manifests, constitutes the cosmos and by manifesting it manifests or discovers as we may say in the old poetic sense of that word, its own infinite harmonic varieties." [19] The individual, the universal, and the transcendent are thus necessary to one another and they together constitute the three poises of the Absolute. Now if this relation between them is correct then the individual and the universal can certainly not be sundered from the Transcendent ; but if they are, the consequence irresistibly will be, on the one hand, the unreality of the world including all the moral, religious and spiritual effort of man and, on the other, a complete poverty of the Transcendent.

We know that the spiritual experience or *anubhava* of *nirviśeṣacinmātram* (undifferenced consciousness as such) represents to Śaṅkara the Ultimate Reality because it is not contradicted by anything further. It is most interesting that Śrī Aurobindo has a full appreciation and understanding of this experience. Says he, " the mind, when it passes those gates (the gates of the Transcendent) suddenly, without intermediate transitions, receives a sense of the unreality of world and the sole reality of silence which is one of the most powerful and convincing experiences of which the human mind is capable." [20] Buddha's basic spiritual experience was different. Now while each spiritual experience is intense and powerful, we have to recognize that in the spiritual realm too, perhaps more than the intellectual, there are large ranges and varieties of experiences. Śrī Aurobindo's contribution in this connection is of the highest importance to the interpretation of Indian philosophy. He has given us an ascending order of these experiences and also a criterion of their relative valuations. Śaṅkara's experience, says he, is higher than Buddha's, but if Śaṅkara had taken a step further he would have arrived at an experience which presents the *nirguṇa* Brahman and the *saguṇa* Brahman in a single unity. To Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy this fact of spiritual experience is basic and determining, as that of the *nirguṇa* Brahman was to Śaṅkara. Obviously this contradicts, contradicts in Śaṅkara's sense of the term, his own experience. Applying his own criterion of Truth then shall we not say that this special experience of the unity of the *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa* must be taken as the final until a yet higher experience becomes available?

Between this experience of the Supreme Unity of the *saguṇa* and the *nirguṇa* Brahman and our normal experience of plurality Śrī Aurobindo describes a spiritual experience of a unique character and significance. This is his well-known Supermind. In it the unity is presented in and with plurality as a fact of immediate experience. In mind the plurality is the more marked and evident experience and the unity has to be constructed through piecing together of detached data. In Supermind the unity is the direct experience but the plurality is, as it were, nascently present in it. It is the instrumentation which creates out of the spaceless and timeless Absolute through self-extension the world of space and time.

19 *Ibid*, II (1), p. 129.
20 *Ibid*, I, p. 34.

Śrī Aurobindo says that in the *Rg-veda* the description of the *ṛta-cit*, Truth-Consciousness, seem to suggest the Supermind and this is, he affirms definitely, the proper solution of illusionism as it is " the intermediate link " between the Absolute and the world, which " can explain them to each other ".

The fact of Supermind is equally a matter of logical inference. We have already shown how a higher instrumentation of knowledge than mind is implied in and suggested by it. Now the Supermind is really the stage and form of the cognitive action which may best be described as the experience of the ' many-in-one ' or the ' one-in-many '. As a universal principle it would represent the consciousness which holds the divided ' many ' of the mind in an essential unity. Looked at from above the Transcendent Absolute must needs have an instrumentation through which the unity begins to translate itself into a plurality.

If we recognize our responsibility to accept all experience as valid, the Spirit as well as the material world, then Supermind is the best idea to explain their relation. And it is an idea, as much supported by logical need as by experience, present and Vedic.

Śaṅkara had said that his Absolute undifferenced consciousness was a fact of his experience. But an absolute Being is to him equally a necesssity of common experience. All unreal and passing things imply to him something abiding. Buddha could deny the world process as *anitya* (passing show) but for Śaṅkara the *anitya* (passing) world must imply a *nitya* (abiding) Brahman. Says he, " Wherever we deny something as unreal, we do so with reference to something real ".[21] Śaṅkara's thinking here is very cogent. The temporal implies the eternal, the apparent the real, the relative the Absolute. He apparently saw the inter-relatedness of these pairs and the impossibility of thinking of the one without the other. But was it then not arbitrary to call one member of these pairs unreal, virtually the one which was the starting-point and which led on to the other. If he had faithfully followed the trend of his original thinking, which had relied upon the inter-relatedness of these pairs, then he would have logically arrived at the concept of a Brahman, which in Its rich unity must have comprehended both the aspects of these pairs.

The whole-hearted monist that Śrī Aurobindo is, he naturally asks " If Brahman is the only reality, why speak of Māyā at all ? " And if you do it, says he, " there will always be some form of ultimate dualism ". And is the Māyāvādin, with all his subtle logic, really able to escape an ultimate dualism ? Śrī Aurobindo also urges that " the world cannot be all an illusion " since " it has real objectivity for us in any conceivable sense of the term." But " if the world is an illusion, then illusion in some sense is ". And, therefore, the Brahman cannot be the only reality.

21 Śânkara-bhâshya, iii, 2.22, (*Indian Philosophy.*)

However the world is not the full reality of the Brahman and, therefore, an element of illusion, ignorance, Māyā or Avidyā has to be admitted as operative in the cosmic process. But it can only be conceived as a power of the Brahman through which he creates a world in space and time. The mind and the ego, which are the limited terms of knowledge and being subject to division, can also be nothing but willed creations, serving as transitional stages in the process of cosmic evolution. The purpose of cosmic evolution, and of the original involution, its necessary correlate, can only be the delight of becoming or *līlā*. The original involution and the self-withdrawal implied in it released the force of *Avidyā*, necessary for the joy of the rediscovery of the Brahman through evolution. It created the possibility of a superficial, partial and divided regard of things in the world. Ignorance is, therefore, only " a half-knowledge evolving towards knowledge ".[22]

The concept of the *Iśvara* is a most curious phenomenon in Māyāvāda. It is the Lord and the Creator of the world and the Māyā is a real power to it. This Supreme Immanence in the world is perhaps an admission of the need and demand of the religious nature of man. But the Māyāvādin refuses to recognize that the religious need in itself requires an eternal principle of experience and that an *Iśvara* which is as illusory as the world it creates, cannot satisfy it.

Māyāvāda, we will concede, affords much satisfaction to the logical reason for the subtlety and sharpness of thinking and to the spiritual instinct for a fundamental reality, even though it leaves us in a sharp contradiction. But so far as our religious and the active aspects are concerned, it completely disappoints.

There is also another way of looking at this phenomenon of the *Iśvara*. The *Iśvara* is the representation of the Absolute Brahman in the world or the Brahman itself as It appears to us in the world. Looked at from the world It is real as immanent Brahman, so is his power of Māyā or Avidyā and so is the world. But looked at from the transcendent Brahman all this becomes unreal. Evidently, as Śrī Aurobindo says, there is " a missing link " between the transcendent and the immanent Brahman. Should Śaṅkara have seen the necessity of a positive relation between the two, the whole picture of his philosophy would have been different.

The individual human existence too is as unreal as the world, for Māyāvāda. The Vedāntic thought and the seeking for Brahman, which takes place in this world would also then be unreal. Is this not a consequence as suicidal as that of scepticism, which saying that no knowledge is possible affirms something and thereby refutes itself. The Māyāvāda philosophy is obviously destructive of its own seeking (*jijñāsā*) for the Brahman, its supreme objective. And Liberation or Mukti too, which is oneness with the Brahman[23] involves a most interesting contradiction. Says Śrī Aurobindo " The individual soul can only cut the knot

22 *The Life Divine* II (1), p. 282.
23 brahmaiva hi mukty-avasthā (*Indian Philosophy*, II, p. 639).

of ego by a supreme act of egoism, an exclusive attachment to its own individual salvation ". Other souls seem to be of no consequence because they " who were equally myself remain behind in bondage ".[24]

We may now bring our consideration of Māyāvāda to a close. The question with which we started " Has Śrī Aurobindo refuted Māyāvāda ? " will recur to us. Māyāvāda is an old subject and many of the objections which Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy raises are bound to appear familiar. But there is an evident freshness and originality about them, because they arise out of the present-day cultural situation and answer to the curiosity of the modern mind. However the greater strength of a criticism must always lie in the constructive solutions it can offer for the same problems and herein consists the true originality and the unique satisfactoriness of Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy. These constitute also the more powerful refutation of Māyāvāda and in this connection we would repeat that we have to carefully consider and recognize whether the " mind " and the " ego " are just " intermediate representations " and " transitional stages " or not. If they are, then philosophical thinking must no longer take them as final in the cosmic evolution and should rather seek to determine the nature and the conditions of the higher instrumentations of knowledge as an epistemological inquiry precedent to the ontological determinations. The " Larger Reason " with an understanding for " the logic of the Infinite " is a function and ready possibility of our normal rationality. It can easily pave the way to an appreciation of the other instrumentations of knowledge leading to the decisive " Supermind ". Phiolsophy limited to the mind and intellect will always have to proceed upon an exceedingly partial data and will always have to remain content with a construction or a reconstruction of reality. A *knowledge* of reality will always remain denied to it. Our philosophical divergences under such circumstances will always remain ununderstandable and irreconcilable. Philosophy can surely show greater progress than it has done, but then we must be able to recognize that besides sense and reason there can be other cognitive processes, which may yield fresh data and suggest new explanations. Thus the advance of philosophy and the solution of its many insoluble problems lies, as Śrī Aurobindo says, in " an extension of the field of our consciousness and an unhoped-for increase in our instruments of knowledge ".[25]

24 *The Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 60.
25 *The Life Divine*, I, p. 31.

HAS SRI AUROBINDO REFUTED MAYAVADA?

II

by

N. A. NIKAM

1. Dr Indra Sen observes that Śaṅkara and Śrī Aurobindo are both monists, but Śaṅkara " constantly dichotomizes " and Śrī Aurobindo " always reconciles ". Śaṅkara's position is : ***brahma satyam jagan mithyā jīvo brahmaiva nā 'paraḥ***: " Brahman is the only Reality ; the world is an illusion or a false appearance ; the individual soul is identical with Brahman." Brahman is one without a second. The two main points of Śaṅkara's teaching are :—(*a*) that Brahman undergoes only an " apparent modification " in creating the world ; (*b*) that the appearance of a world of multiplicity is due to *avidyā* ; an original or ' primitive ' Ignorance, which is *anādi* or is beginning-less but has an end. In discussing the question of this symposium the main point on which it is necessary to dwell is to see whether : (*a*) in Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy of the *Life Divine* this sense of " apparent modification " is also present, or whether it is transcended ; and, (*b*) whether Śrī Aurobindo does, or does not, find it necessary to postulate, also like Śaṅkara, an ' original ' Nesciene or *Avidyā* or Ignorance in his philosophy. It will not be sufficient merely to accept or reject Śrī Aurobindo's weighty arguments against māyāvāda in chapters V & VI in Vol. II of the *Life Divine* but to make a survey of the general features of the philosophy of the *Life Divine*.

2. Throughout Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy of the *Life Divine* there is present a certain logical distinction which I shall call the distinction between ' Appearance ' (or illusion) and Manifestation ; and, I shall analyse the logical pre-suppositions of the Appearance-Theory and the Manifestation-Theory. While Śaṅkara's advaita may be called Appearance-Theory, the advaita of Śrī Aurobindo may be described as Manifestation-Theory. From among the several meanings of the term appearance in Western and in Indian philosophy I shall arbitrarily select one meaning : appearance " must belong to reality and yet it cannot belong to reality ".

So Appearance is in its nature essentially inconsistent and self-contradictory and complex and false : it is *sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa*, " other than real and unreal ". (***Essentials of Indian Philosophy***, by M. Hiriyanna p. 161). Secondly, ' appearance ' is always due to a " ***misperception*** "[1] or wrong judgment ; and, in either

1 The term ' misperception ' is used by McTaggart in *The Nature of Existence*, Vol. II, chapter XLVI : " Some percepts are perceived as having characteristics which they do not possess ". So, error is " in the observing subject ". " But when the error is one which is believed to be shared by all thinking beings in the universe........and when the effects of the error are not such as to prevent the formation of an orderly and uniform system of experience, it often happens that the error is called phenomenal truth ". (p. 206.)

case appearance presupposes error. If there is no error *within* there is no appearance of multiplicity without. Thirdly, the Appearance-Theory implies the conception of a transcendental Reality which is above and behind appearance and the true nature of Reality is correctly stated by the logical law of non-contradiction or Identity which says : A is A ; or, its true nature is correctly stated by excluding negatives : *neti, neti,* 'not-this', 'not-this.' Śrī Aurobindo designates his philosophy "realistic advaita" or realistic non-dualism and the nature of Reality is to him *saccidānanda* (existence-consciousness-bliss) but the world is *not* an "appearance" of *saccidānanda.* It is a real Manifestation of *saccidānanda.* "The pure existent is then a fact and no mere concept ; it is the fundamental reality. But, let us hasten to add, the movement, the energy, the becoming are also a fact, also a reality" (*Life Divine,* Vol. I, p. 99). The relation of *saccidānanda* to the world in Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy is not "that of an original reality and phenomenal unreality, but of an original to a resultant and dependent, a temporal and manifested reality" (*Life Divine,* Vol. II, p. 197).

So what are the logical implications of this theory of Śrī Aurobindo which defines the relation between the world and *saccidānanda* as Manifestation ? The following are some of the logical implications of the Manifestation Theory ; these implications progressively define the relation between Reality and the world of manifested phenomena in Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy.

(1) B may be said to be a manifestation of A, when B is 'dependent upon' A and is dependent upon no other. (E.g. the world is a real creation of Brahman and is dependent upon it.)

(2) If B is a manifestation of A, B 'belongs to' A, and B 'reveals' A ; it reveals A's essence. In the Manifestation Theory, if B is the manifestation of A, then, A is the material cause of B. In the Appearance-Theory this is not the case : e.g. Brahman is *not* the material cause of the world.

(3) In the relation of Manifestation A is *never without* B, where B is a manifestation of A. A is never without *some* Manifestation. As Śrī Aurobindo puts it : there is "an eternal recurrence" but not an "eternal persistence" of Forms.

(4) In manifestation there is an integral relation between opposites : the Eternal in the Temporal, Spirit in Matter, Unity in Multiplicity, the Static in the Dynamic, the Divine in the Human. This relation is integral in the sense that one is necessary to the other and does not contradict the other, while, the advaita of Śaṅkara "definitely denies that there can be any relation at all between two such disparate entities as spirit and matter." (*Essentials of Indian Philosophy* by M. Hiriyanna, p. 160).

So the Law of integral Manifestation is not the Logical law of Identity which says A is A, but the comprehensive and inclusive Law : A is both A and not-A.

(5) Since there is an integral relation between Reality and its manifestations *all* manifestations of Reality are real, because all manifestations are of the *same* Real. " If Brahman alone is ", says Śrī Aurobindo, " then, all that is, is Brahman ".

(6) Manifestation is a Process; it is a 'yet to be'; Reality is " labouring to realize the Idea " ; and the Process of manifestation is an Evolution ; thus the tremendous importance of the idea of evolution and of its application to spiritual life in the philosophy of *Life Divine.* In this evolutionary process the Future is of overwhelming importance and so Śrī Aurobindo's vision is described as a " Vision of the Future ".

(7) There are two aspects of Manifestation : Descent and Ascent:

Manifestation of A in B is a " Descent ". It is a " Veiling ". By an act of self-oblivion Spirit has 'veiled' itself in Matter, according to Śrī Aurobindo.

If the Descent of Spirit in Matter is a " Veiling " the self-discovery of Spirit in Matter is an Ascent ; and the Path of this Self-discovery in Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy of *Life Divine* is not *jñāna* as in Śaṅkara or *bhakti* as in Rāmānuja, but an integral *yoga* which is " a labour of self-discipline and self-perfection, which is a sacrifice to the Supreme " ; " a sacrifice of works, a sacrifice of love and adoration, a sacrifice of knowledge." (*The Synthesis of Yoga* by Śrī Aurobindo, p. 103). The two processes of Descent and Ascent are always going on, and they constitute the cycle of cosmic existence ; thus we are brought to the fundamental problem of the *why* and *how* of Existence and of the Cosmic Process of Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy.

3. It may be noted that there is a distinction between the *being* of things and their *becoming.* Why is there Being at all and why is there any Becoming at all are two distinct questions and need distinct answers. Existence is not an inscrutable mystery, but is a delight of existence. " For who could live or breathe if there were not this delight of existence as the ether in which we dwell ? From Delight all these beings are born, by Delight they exist and grow, to Delight they return ". (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad,* II, 7 ; III ; 6). [2] Existence is a Delight because " absoluteness of conscious existence is illimitable bliss of conscious existence ; the two are only different phases of the same thing. All illimitableness, all infinity, all absoluteness is pure Delight ". (*Life Divine,* Vol. I, p. 115). " Delight of being is universal, illimitable and self-existent and not dependent upon particular causes. (*Life Divine,* Vol. I,-p. 123).

The particular problem which the subject of this symposium raises is not the why of Existence but the why of Becoming. The philosophy of the *Life Divine*

2 Quoted by Sri Aurobindo.

says that Becoming is a *Līlā*, a Play : " the play, the child's joy, the poet's joy, the author's joy, the mechanician's joy of the Soul of things eternally young, perpetually inexhaustible, creating and re-creating Himself in Himself for the sheer bliss of that self-creation, of that Self-representation, Himself the Play, Himself the Player, Himself the Playground ". (*Life Divine*, Vol. I, p. 129). Supposing this is true, the play must imply a Method ; as there is ' a method in madness ' so there is a Method in everything ; there is a method in Play. So we come to the how of cosmic Becoming. According to the philosophy of the *Life Divine*, the *method* of Cosmic Play is : " the Formless imposes Form upon itself " ; this self-imposition is in the nature of a ' formative ', ' limiting ', ' measuring ' consciousness which is a consciousness of self-division and self-oblivion. " It is to find himself in the apparent opposites of his being and his nature that *saccidānanda* descends into the material Nescience and puts on its phenomenal ignorance as a superficial mask in which he hides himself from his own conscious energy, leaving it self-forgetful and absorbed in its works and forms " [3] (*Life Divine*, Vol. II, p. 361). " The Ignorance is a necessary, though quite subordinate term which the Universal Knowledge has imposed upon itself that movement might be possible, not a blunder and a fall, but a purposeful descent, not a curse, but a divine opportunity ". (*Life Divine*, Vol. II, p. 36). So there is an original ignorance in the philosophy of the *Life Divine* as in Māyāvāda which is the cause of phenomenal multiplicity. The point is *not* that the multiplicity is real in Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy and is unreal in Śaṅkara's philosophy ; the point rather is that *Līlāvāda* has the same metaphysical pre-suppositions as *Māyāvāda*, and uses the same method as Māyāvāda to explain cosmic Becoming. Śrī Aurobindo distinguishes between two senses of the term Māyā: (a) a measuring, limiting and formative consciousness : (b) a certain cunning or fraud or illusion or enchantment (Vol. I, p. 127). It is in the second sense that the term Māyā is used, he says, in Māyāvāda .

Now, if the doctrine or the Līlā has refuted Māyāvāda, it has ' refuted ' it in the Hegelian sense in which a lower category is refuted by *including* it in the higher. The philosophy of the *Life Divine* implies both the meanings of Māyā. The first possibility of there being any cosmic becoming consists in a measuring, limiting and formative consciousness ; while the actuality of the Descent of Spirit in Matter is possible by a " Veiling " which is another name for ' cunning '. It is the ' cunning ' of *saccidānanda* that it " loses itself in the appearance of non-being and emerges in the appearance of discordant Rhythm of varied pain, pleasure and neutral feeling, love, hatred and indifference ; infinite Unity loses itself in the appearance of a chaos of multiplicity and emerges in a discord of forces and beings which seek to recover reunity by possessing, dissolving and devouring each other. In this creation the real *saccidānanda* has to emerge " (*Life Divine*,

3 It is asked : *where* is the Ignorance ? On what *plane* of Being does this occur ? The answer in *Life Divine* is : on the plane of *mind*. (Vol. II, p. 363).

Vol. I, p. 139). Yes, the real *saccidānanda* could emerge only from a real *saccidānanda*. Real *saccidānanda* is at the end because it is at the beginning. So the question is : Has *saccidānanda* undergone a real or only an "apparent modification"? There is no unambiguous and straight-forward answer to this question because, two different standpoints, the empirical and the transcendental, are involved in it ; and, on this point, Līlāvāda is in no better position than Māyāvāda, which says that the world is empirically real and transcendentally ideal. The motive of realisitc Līlāvāda is to "justify the presence of reality in all its appearances", which F. H. Bradley said is 'the last word of philosophy' ; so according to Līlāvāda everything is real because it is of the same Real. Realistic Līlāvāda, after all, asserts, like Māyāvāda, the Law of Identity : A is A : 'All this is Brahman', because Brahman is the All : *brahmaiva sarvam nānyad asti* : Brahman "alone is ; nothing else is".

4. Between the Māyāvāda of Śaṅkara and the Līlāvāda of the *Life Divine*, there is a Major premise which is common to both. Māyāvāda says :

The world is a Dream
Dreams are unreal
Therefore, the world is unreal.

The Līlāvāda of *Life Divine* says :—

The world is a Dream
Dreams are real
Therefore, the world is real.

In refuting the Māyāvāda doctrine that the world is a dream, the philosophy of the *Life Divine* does not merely discuss this theory but constructs an elaborate metaphysical (and not a psycho-analytical) theory of Dream to prove its minor premise : 'Dreams are real'. The outlines of this metaphysical theory of Dream are as follows :—

(i) In Sleep, the waking activities are in abeyance, but the "inner consciousness is not suspended but enters into new inner activities".

(ii) The whole of this inner activity we do not remember ; we remember only *what is near the surface*.

(iii) Near the surface there is "an obscure subconscious element which is a receptacle or passage for our dream experiences and itself also a dream-builder". (*Life Divine*, Vol. II, p. 155) (It is the subconcious that is the dream-builder).

(iv) But behind it is the " subliminal " self which is the totality of our inner being and consciousness ; this subliminal self " is *quite of another order* ".

From this it would look as if the subconscious which is intermediate between the waking self and the subliminal self is the dream-builder. The philosophy of the *Life Divine* observes : " But the sub-consciousness is not our sole dream-builder ". (Vol. II, p. 156). The substance of the difficult and rather paradoxical argument on p. 157 in the *Life Divine* is : we dream not only in *dreams*, but in ' dreamless *sleep* '. " We are dreaming there but unable to grasp or retain in the recording layer of subconscience these more obscure dream figures ". (Vol. II, p. 157). If this argument is correct then the implication is that, the deeper we go into our inner being the more we discover that we *dream* : " If we develop our inner being, live more inwardly than most men do, then the balance is changed and a larger dream consciousness opens before us ; our dreams can take on a subliminal and no longer a subconscious character and can assume a reality and significance ". (*Life Divine,* Vol. II, p. 159). This may be true ; but the meaning of the term ' dream ' has changed and it seems that we ought to substitute for the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum* the proposition : *I ' dream ', therefore, I exist.*

5. Throughout the philosophy of the *Life Divine* there recurs the term ' the logic of the Infinite '. The extraordinary merit and charm of the philosohphy of the *Life Divine* is that, while it denies the logic of idealistic Māyāvāda, it does not deny the reality of its spiritual experience. It recognizes that the experience which Māyāvāda " formulates into a philosophy accompanies a most powerful and apparently final spiritual realization ". (*Life Divine,* Vol. II, p. 212). What Līlā-vāda, however, denies is the logic of Māyāvāda. Like Modern Realism, Līlāvāda denies the ultimate validity of the Law of Contradiction. Speaking of Realism and of mathematical logic Professor C. D. Broad says that it does " not *welcome* contradictions as proofs that such and such features in the apparent world are unreal ". (*Contemporary British Philosophy,* First Series, p. 781). Likewise, but in a different manner, the philosophy of the *Life Divine* : " But what appears as contradictions to a reason based on the finite, may not be contradictions to a vision or a larger reason based on the infinite ". (*Life Divine,* Vol. II, p. 229). " To understand truly the world-process of the Infinite and the Time-process of the Eternal, the consciousness must pass beyond this finite reason and the finite sense to a larger reason and spiritual sense in touch with the consciousness of the infinite and responsive to the logic of the Infinite which is the very logic of being itself and arises inscrutably from its self-operation of its own realities, a logic whose sequences are not the steps of thought but the steps of existence " (*Life Divine,* Vol. II, p. 219-220). This must bring us after all, to a sense of " dichotomy " between the logic of the finite and 'the logic of the infinite,' between thought and existence. So, there *is* a dichotomy in Śrī

Aurobindo's philosophy as there is alleged to be in Śaṅkara's philosophy. This dichotomy is such that it leaves Māyāvāda unrefuted.

6. But there is no treatise which has urged such powerful arguments against the doctrine of the unreality of the world and has endeavoured to present to us the true philosophy of our Upaniṣads with a logic and a light all its own, which conveys so successfully the sense of the reality of the Divine and the divine operation in things than the profoundly important two volumes of Śrī Aurobindo's *Life Divine*.

HAS SRI AUROBINDO REFUTED MAYAVADA ?

III

by

HARIDAS CHAUDHURI

There is a sense in which none of the ultimate standpoints of thought or representative philosophical positions can be finally refuted. Logical refutation in the usual acceptation of the term can hardly be expected to knock the bottom out of a philosophical theory; to the opponent's mind, it only underlines the necessity of a better and more accurate formulation of his own particular point of view. That is why all such basic metaphysical positions as Realism and Idealism, Monism and Pluralism, Materialism and Spiritualism, and the like, survive up to the present day, all opposition and refutation notwithstanding. Realism repudiates Idealism, and Idealism hits back, and both go on merrily expanding their respective spheres of influence ; Pluralism attacks Monism with its " atomic weapons ", and Monism seeks to conquer Pluralism in its inclusive embrace ; Materialism pours contempt on Spiritualism as idle day-dreaming or wishful thinking, and Spiritualism quietly sets aside Materialism as no better than a kind of enlightened animalism. And thus the same old conflict that started with the history of philosophical reflection perpetually goes on. Every philosophical system, in so far as it embodies an important aspect of Truth, or a definite perspective of Reality, survives by reason of its own inner vitality. Apparently vanquished or finished with, it always re-appears with renewed vigour in ever fresh forms. Every great philosopher realizes that synthesis or harmony is the very essence of philosophical truth. Consequently, every philosophical system endeavours to achieve some sort of synthesis within itself by exhibiting the opposed standpoints as subordinate factors in its own *Weltanschauung*. But the real harmony can hardly be achieved at the logical level, because no rigidly logical scheme of thought or conceptual formulation can fully articulate the integral Truth, or do full justice to the truth of the opposite standpoint.

Māyāvāda is one such fundamental philosophical position. No conclusive refutation of it is possible at the logical level, because seldom do logical arguments carry conviction to the human heart. There have been critics of Māyāvāda in the past, there are critics at the present day, and there will be critics in future, but still Māyāvāda is sure to survive. No intelligent supporter of Māyāvāda can have any difficulty in finding an answer to every point of criticism that may be made against it. It has its own peculiar standpoint and framework of fundamental assumptions. All refutation, therefore, quite naturally appears to it

as external, and, consequently, inspired by a greater or lesser degree of misunderstanding of its own real position. Now, it should be stated at the very outset that Māyāvāda is not simply refuted but transcended and sublated in Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy. Philosophical criticism is, for Śrī Aurobindo, not a purely logical affair, but an evaluation of fundamental metaphysical or spiritual insights in the light of his own integral spiritual experience. He places before us a higher metaphysical insight such as is inclusive, not exclusive, of the truth inherent in Māyāvāda. He appeals to an integral spiritual realization such as discloses the deepest secret of reconciliation of all philosophical conflicts. The arguments which he advances against Māyāvāda are, in the last analysis, the negative side of a rational articulation of his supra-intellectual truth-vision. They are indeed perfectly reasonable, but reasonable with a deeper rationality of the reality that transcends the intellect, and as such they embody what has been described by him as " the logic of the Infinite." It has been said that when in the Upaniṣadic age of ancient India one seeker of Truth met another, the main question which they put to each other was, not " What is your theory and your argument ? ", but " What is your spiritual realization ? " That was followed by a comparison and evaluation of different forms of spiritual experience. Śrī Aurobindo believes that if a particular form of spiritual experience is found to include within itself and illumine another form of spiritual experience, then the former must be accepted as a greater revelation of the supreme Truth. Self-luminous or self-coherent inclusiveness is indeed the criterion of ultimate truth.

In the present paper, I should like first of all briefly to indicate what according to Śrī Aurobindo is the value, impotrance, or significance of Māyāvāda. Next, I shall turn to a consideration of the various misunderstandings to which Māyāvāda has been subjected at the hands of its critics, and then to a critical examination of the various modes of interpretation to which Māyāvāda has lent itself at the hands of its advocates. I shall conclude with a few observations on Prof. N. A. Nikam's criticism of Śrī Aurobindo's position.

The Significance of Māyāvāda :

Māyāvāda represents one of the ultimate standpoints of philosophic thinking. It is noted for its logical charm and simplicity and its speculative boldness, in consequence of which it has a great intellectual appeal. But, what is of much greater importance, Māyāvāda embodies a very deep spiritual insight into the nature of ultimate reality. The enunciation of Māyāvāda was indeed a historical necessity in the course of India's varied spiritual experiments with the Truth. Prior to an integral realization of the Spirit in its multiform richness of content it was of vital importance that the Spirit should have been clearly grasped in its transcendent purity. Māyāvāda is a clear logical formulation of an unfettered realization of the Spirit, the Self, Brahman, in its aspect of supra-cosmic Transcendence. Only, in its eagerness to perceive Reality in its highest height, it turns

a blind eye to its extent or comprehensiveness; in its eagerness to know the Self in its full freedom it fails to take note of its immeasurable opulence. But still, viewed from the perspective of the history of spiritual evolution, it was imperatively necessary that Brahman should have been grasped in its utmost purity before being experienced in its full integrality.

Consideration of some misunderstandings about Māyāvāda :

It has already been observed that Māyāvāda has been subjected to various misunderstandings at the hands of its critics. In order to form a correct estimate of Māyāvāda it is essential that its true meaning should be carefully disentangled from all such misunderstandings.

The fundamental contention of Māyāvāda is that the world is essentially a product of Māyā · it is *mithyā* or unreal. It is in the nature of an illusory superimposition on the basis of Brahman which is pure, unobjective, undifferentiated consciousness. But, what is the precise meaning of the term ' mithyā ' or ' unreal ' ? It does not surely mean that the variegated world of our experience is a mere non-entity or void, a metaphysical zero, an asat or śūnya. Śaṅkara's scathing criticism of the Śūnyavāda school of Buddhism is clear evidence of that. It is meaningless to suggest that the world which is a positive fact of our experience emerges out of nothing. Nor can it be reasonably held that a mere non-entity or void functions as the positive content of our experience.

Secondly, the world is assuredly not unreal in the sense of being ' *tuccha* ' or formally self-contradictory like ' round square ' or ' barren mother '. Such self-contradictory entities which owe their origin to some sort of verbal jugglery, and cannot really be even so much as thought of by us, can no more function as the object of our experience than a mere non-entity.

Thirdly, the world is not said to be unreal in the sense of being *alīka*, i.e., imaginary or fanciful like the sky-flower. It cannot obviously be a free creation of our fancy, because it is obstrusively thrust upon us, and is " given " to our perceptual experience.

Fourthly, Māyāvāda does not imply that the world is a mere externalization or objectification of our subjective cognitions. That is evident from Śaṅkara's refutation of the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism. Had there been no objectively real facts at all, it would have been impossible even to mistake internal cognitions for external facts. Epistemologically considered, Śaṅkara is an uncompromising realist. He assigns some kind of objectivity even to our ordinary illusory experience. He speaks of *prātibhāsika sattya*, and expounds what is known as *anirvacanīya-khyāti-vāda*, having energetically repudiated *asat-khyāti-vāda* and *ātma-khyātivāda*. Śaṅkara's Māyāvāda must, therefore, be carefully distinguished from all forms of Mentalism or Subjective Idealism. While, according to Berkeley, the essence of a thing consists in being perceived, according to Śaṅkara, the perception

of a thing is conclusive proof of its objectivity. Śaṅkara agrues much with the emphasis of a modern neo-realist that the object of perception, by reason of the very fact that it is perceived by us, must be admitted to have some kind of reality of its own. He is, however, unyielding on one point, namely, that everything short of Brahman is real only relatively to the standpoint of Ignorance (Avidyā.)

Finally, it should also be noted that the world is not unreal in the sense of being a pure sense-illusion. Śaṅkara makes a clear distinction between the illusory and the phenomenal, the *prātibhāsika* and the *vyāvahārika*, even though both of them may be equally unreal from the standpoint of Brahman. While the illusory is private and short-lived, the phenomenal is universal and relatively permanent. While the illusory is not only useless but also harmful from the practical point of view, the phenomenal is undoubtedly endowed with practical usefulness or pragmatic validity. From this it should not, however, be concluded that Māyāvāda looks upon the *prātibhāsika* and the *vyāvahārika* as different degrees of truth and reality in the Bradleian sense of the term. They are, as we have already observed, equally unreal from the standpoint of ultimate reality. The distinction between them is pragmatic, not ontological.

Thus we find that when Māyāvāda declares the world to be unreal, it does not mean that the world is a void or non-entity (śūnya or asat), or that it is formally self-contradictory (tuccha), or that it is fanciful or imaginary (alīka), or that it is a subjective idea (vijñāna), or that it is a pure illusion (bhrānti).

An Examination of Māyāvāda :

What then is the exact meaning of the statement that the world is unreal (mithyā) ? Eminent authorities on the Śāṅkara Vedānta are agreed that the world is unreal in the sense that it is logically indeterminable (anirvacanīya), so that the categories of being and non-being are simply inapplicable in the determination of its ontological status. The world cannot be said to be non-existent, because it functions as the positive content and objective terminus of our perceptual experience. The world cannot also be said to be existent, because it is flatly contradicted (bādhita) on our realization of the supreme Truth, Brahman. Nor is it open to us to hold that the world is at once existent and non-existent, because that would be a flagrant violation of the fundamental law of contradiction. [1] While from the standpoint of Avidyā or Māyā the world is real and endowed with pragmatic validity, it is assuredly unreal from the standpoint of ultimate reality. It is sadasadvilakṣaṇa.

Now, it will be evident from the Māyāvādin's elaboration of his concept of unreality (mithyātva) that he finally takes his stand upon a fundamental duality of standpoints, the empirical and the ultimate or transcendental. And yet he leaves that duality unresolved and unreconciled. What is the logical transition

1 See Śankara's *Vīvekacuḍāmani*, st. 109 : *sannāpy asannāpy ubhayātmikā na*

from the higher standpoint to the lower ? In other words, how are we to understand the logical derivation of the empirical standpoint from the ultimate or transcendental standpoint ? A failure to answer this question is extremely unsatisfactory in a monistic system of thought. The Māyāvādin's usual reply in this connection is : " Oh, that is a question which ought not to be asked at all, because it proceeds from abysmal Ignorance!" Now, to explain everything in terms of Ignorance and yet make no attempt to derive Ignorance from Knowledge is as irrational as it is inimical to the monistic outlook. The Māyāvādin will perhaps retort by saying that the demand for an explanation of Ignorance in terms of Knowledge is prompted by a total failure to understand the very meaning of Ignorance. For, is not Ignorance a final irrationality, about which no further question should be asked ? That is indeed a very curious position. In order to avoid Dualism, the Māyāvādin says that Māyā is an eternally cancelled falsehood (sanātanī mithyā) ; in order to account for the world of our experience, he declares that Māyā is beginningless and positive (anādi and bhāvarupā); and in order to avoid the necessity for a rational explanation of the principle of Māyā, he describes it as a final irrationality, a logically indefinable mystery (mahādbhutā anirvacanīya-rupā). And it passes one's comprehension how an eternally cancelled falsehood and irrationality can function as a beginningless positive entity productive of a highly significant world of experience.

It has been observed that according to Māyāvāda while the world is real from the standpoint of Avidyā, it is unreal from the standpoint of Brahman. There seems to be some difference of opinion on this point among the interpreters of Māyāvāda. According to some, the world is unreal in the sense that it is not as real as Brahman, from which it follows that the world possesses a subordinate and inferior type of reality intermediate between Brahman and non-being. Whereas Brahman is permanent and non-temporal, the world is impermanent, evanescent or ephemeral ; whereas Brahman is the embodiment of the highest values of life, the world is void of any enduring worth or value. Now, the world so understood is either related or not related to Brahman. If the world be in any way related to Brahman, then the necessity is imposed upon the Māyāvādin for precisely determining the nature of that relationship consistently with the undifferentiated unity of Brahman. If the world, supposed to enjoy a peculiar subordinate type of reality, be not in any way related to Brahman, then we are landed in a position of unmitigated dualism.

According to a second school of interpretation, the world is unreal in the sense of being absolutely non-existent (asat or tuccha) from the standpoint of ultimate reality. On such an interpretation, no satisfactory explanation of the world of our experience can evidently be sought in the nature of Brahman. Brahman, which is void of any power of self-determination (nirguṇa), can have nothing to do with the world of deṭerminations, which is a more nothing to it. The

Māyāvādin will no doubt reply by saying that the world being essentially unreal, the question of its explanation does not arise at all. But it must be noted that even though the world be unreal or illusory, the fact of its being so remains and demands explanation. The appearance of an unreal world as a real world is no less in need of explanation than the creation of a real world by a real power. The Māyāvādin will perhaps say that the appearance of the world is itself false or illusory because the world being illusory there can be only an illusory and no true perception of it. How can there be a true perception of a false world ? But this will appear on examination to be an evasion of the real difficulty. Taking for granted that we have only a false perception of a false world, there is no getting away from the fact that there is the *appearance* of a true perception of a real world. Taking for granted that the world and our perception of it are equally false, the fact of a false world falsely appearing to false perception must itself be admitted to be an eternal truth. It is an eternal fact, or an eternally true proposition which has got to be explained. If this eternal fact also be declared to be false, then the Māyāvādin would be confuted out of his own mouth. If this eternal fact be accepted as true, then the Māyāvādin must provide some explanation of this eternal truth in terms of its ultimate principle —Brahman. But can the Māyāvādin's Brahman be treated as a source of explanation of this eternal truth ? If so, then Māyā conceived as a power of presenting a false appearance to some false percipient must be accepted as a power inherent in Brahman, in which case Brahman would cease to be absolutely *nirguṇa*. If, on the contrary, no explanation of this eternal truth is to be found in the nature of Nirguṇa Brahman, then the latter ceases to be the sole ultimate reality, and must be accepted as only a particular poise of being of the supreme Reality, as Śrī Aurobindo maintains.

Again, the question may be raised : Does the world have even a false appearance from the standpoint of Brahman ? According to some, the world appears as unreal only to the Jīvanmukta and to Īśvara, but not to Brahman, from whose standpoint the world as a pure non-entity is less than a false appearance. On the realization of Brahman, the world entirely vanishes into nothingness, just as the false snake completely disappears on the true perception of the rope. So, viewed from the standpoint of Brahman, not only is the world unreal, there is not even any appearance of an unreal world. On such an interpretation, Brahman must suffer from some limitation of knowledge in so far it is unaware of the eternal fact of a false world falsely appearing to the false perception of false individuals. According to others, Brahman, who is the ultimate ground-consciousness, must indeed be aware of the world, but then Brahman is aware of the world as a false appearance just as the scientifically enlightened human mind is aware of the sun's movement in the sky as a false appearance. In that case, what is it that is responsible for the presentation of a false appearance to Brahman ? It cannot be a power of Ignorance inherent in Brahman, because Brahman is nirguṇa. It cannot be a power of Ignorance inherent in Īśvara, because from the standpoint of Brahman

Īśvara does not exist as a separate reality. It cannot also be regarded as a self-existent power, because that would militate against the undivided unity and sovereign reality of Brahman.

Finally, there is another question that may be put to the Māyāvādin. Is Iśvara in any way affected or deluded by Māyā ? Īśvara is the creator, sustainer, and destroyer of the world. But does Īśvara labour under any false impression that the world is ultimately real, or that the qualities of being creator, sustainer, and destroyer are His limiting determinations. If so, then Īśvara is not the Lord of Māyā in the strict sense of the term, but is as much a victim of Māyā as the Jīva is. If, on the contrary, Īśvara is free from any such self-delusion, then why regard Iśvarahood as a mere illusory superimposition (adhyāsa) on the basis of Brahman ? Why consider mokṣa or absorption in Brahman as a higher ideal than *Līlā-sāhacarya,* i.e., blissful communion and conscious co-operation with the dynamic Divine for the fulfilment of His purpose in the world ? If Īśvara is the Lord of Māyā in the full sense of the term, then He can by no means be regarded as a mere phenomenal manifestation. So Śrī Aurobindo rightly contends that Brahman and Iśvara, supra-cosmic Silence and cosmic Creativity, are equally real and eternal terms of existence. It follows from this that dynamic co-operation with the Divine Will for the fulfilment of the Divine purpose immanent in the world is a far greater ideal of life than that of static absorption in Nirguṇa Brahman. That is why Śrī Kṛṣṇa emphatically declares in the Gītā that a yogī, or a man dynamically united with the Divine, is by far preferable in his eyes to all other categories of spiritual aspirants.[2]

Prof. Nikam's Observations examined :

Prof. N. A. Nikam has brought out with admirable clarity and precision the full significance of Śrī Aurobindo's view that the world is a genuine manifestation of Brahman, and not an unreal superimposition on its basis. As Śrī Aurobindo views it, the variegated world of our experience is indeed an expression of some imperative truths in the nature of ultimate reality. Prof. Nikam is also perfectly right when he observes at the conclusion of his article that Śrī Aurobindo's two profoundly important volumes of *The Life Divine,* more than any other treatise, have endeavoured to present to us the true philosophy of the Upaniṣads and convey to us the all-pervasive and dynamic presence of the Divine in all things. But the comments which he makes on Śrī Aurobindo's philosophical position seem quite encompatible with the aforesaid appreciation. Dr Indra Sen has said that while Śaṅkara " constantly dichotomises ", Śrī Aurobindo " always reconciles ". Prof. N. A. Nikam points out by way of criticism that in Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy also there is a dichotomy,—the dichotomy between the logic of the finite and the logic of the Infinite, the dichotomy between thought and existence. But had Prof. Nikam looked a bit closer into Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy, he would have

2 tapasvibhyo 'dhiko yogī jnanibhyo 'pi mato 'dhikaḥ, karmibhyaś' ca 'dhiko yogī tasmād ycgī bhava 'rjuna. (vi,46).

certainly noticed that whatever dichotomy or antinomy one comes across in that philosophy is not left unresolved, but is reconciled in the harmony of an inclusive unity. True, there is according to Śrī Aurobindo an essential difference between the logic of the Infinite which constitutes the deeper rationality of Reality itself and the logic of the finite which is characteristic of our rational thinking. But there is, in his view, no yawning chasm or unbridgeable gulf between the two. He shows how the supra-mental self-knowledge of the Infinite expresses itself at a lower level in the form of the rational intellect as its own subordinate instrumentation or inferior mode of operation, and how again the rational mind, by casting off its vanity and rigidity and through adequate self-opening and self-surrender, can pass over into the infinite consciousness of the Supermind. There is not only a continuous passage between the logic of the Infinite and the logic of the finite, between supra-rational Being and rational thinking, between the Supermind and the Mind, but the latter can even be more and more expanded and heightened and finally transformed into a flawless medium of self-utterance of the former.

Then again, Prof. Nikam says that between the Māyāvāda of Śaṅkara and the Līlāvāda of Śrī Aurobindo there is a common premise, namely, " The world is a dream ". Prof. Nikam supposes that Śrī Aurobindo considers the world to be real, because although the world is a dream, dreams are in his view real. Now, such a presentation of Śrī Aurobindo's view about the world appears to our mind to rest upon a misunderstanding. In Śrī Aurobindo's view, the world is real, not because dreams are real, but because it is a genuine self-manifestation of the supra-cosmic Spirit. It is an expression of some imperative truths embedded in the nature of the Infinite. It is an outcome of the fullness of joy that is in the heart of God, a manifestation of His delight of becoming (ānandād hy eva khalv imāni bhūtāni jāyante). The question of dream crops up in Śrī Aurobindo's philosophy in connection with his critical evaluation of Māyāvāda. Māyāvāda considers the world to be as unreal as a dream. Just as dreams disappear into nothingness on the attainment of wakeful experience, so also the world is supposed to be revealed as an unreality on the realization of the self-shining Truth. But Śrī Aurobindo points out that dreams, rightly understood, provided no real support to the contention of Māyāvāda. Dreams are not unreal simply because they are excluded from waking experience. Waking experience is as much excluded from dream experience as dream experience is excluded from waking experience. The truth about the matter is that waking and dreaming represent two different orders of one and the same Reality ; they constitute different grades of our self-experience and world-experience. [3]

Modern Psychology in course of its exploration of the unconscious regions of the mind has come to discover that dreams have a profound truth and connected

3 *The Life Divine*, Vol. II (1), p. 202.

significance of their own. In modern European philosophy, such extremes of thought as Neo-Realism and the Absolute Idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet, agree in holding that dreams can hardly be dismissed as unreal and arbitrary constructions of fancy. Śrī Aurobindo maintains that besides the bulk of our ordinary dreams which are significant creations of the subconscient, there are "subliminal dreams", some of which occur to us in the shape of warnings, premonitions, prophetic utterances, glimpses into the future and the like, and some of which again are records of happenings seen or experienced by us on other planes of our own being or of universal being into which we may enter on the automatic stilling of the surface mentality during sleep.

The point to be particularly noted here is that the dream analogy is not, according to Śrī Aurobindo, available as an illustration of the lack of significance and reality of the external world. Both the dream world and the waking world (Jāgrat and Svapna) are in truth different forms of manifestation of the same ultimate Reality. What is unreal is not the world as such but the world ignorantly supposed to be self-existent and real apart from Brahman. The world as it wrongly appears to the eye of Ignorance is a distorted perspective of the world which is revealed to the eye of Knowledge as a genuine self-manifestation of the supreme Reality. In Śrī Aurobindo's view, the world is not only real, but is deeply significant as the field of progressive self-revelation of the Divine in such apparent contraries of His nature as discord and division, darkness and distress, death and disability. But be it observed that the reality of the world does not in any way detract from the full freedom, eternal self-sufficiency, and infinite opulence of the supreme Spirit. Just as on the one hand Śrī Aurobindo does not accept the position of Śaṅkara that the world is unreal from the standpoint of ultimate reality, so also on the other hand he would not agree with Bradley that the Absolute Spirit "has no asssets beyond the appearances" such as constitute the very stuff of its existence, or with Hegel that the Absolute depends on the world for its own perfection and self-fulfilment. Although in respect of His delight of becoming Brahman descends into the world of manifestation as infinite Creativity, in respect of His delight of immutable being, He is eternally self-sufficient as supracosmic Silence. Although by virtue of His superconscient creative Energy, the śakti, He is the Creator and Lord of the universe, yet He is absolutely free either to allow or not to allow His śakti, the Divine Mother, to embark upon her creative adventures. To be at once freedom and creativity, transcendence and universality, silence and activity,—that is indeed the profoundest mystery of existence, the standing miracle in the nature of the Spirit.

HAS SRI AUROBINDO REFUTED MAYA-VADA?

IV

by

G. R. MALKANI

1. I hold the view that Śrī Aurobindo has not refuted māyāvāda. My positive contribution to the subject is offered elsewhere. Here I merely tackle certain points raised by my esteemed friends, with all of whom I disagree.

2. According to Indra Sen, the fundamental attack of Śrī Aurobindo consists in his formulation of the philosophical problem itself. This is the reconciliation of spirit and matter, which are both taken to be real. The idea is that all experience is to be accepted, and no form of it is to be rejected.

Acceptance and reconciliation certainly. But reconciliation must not be artificial or forced. The fundamental fact of experience is that the spirit is known to us only in the intuition of ' I ' (*aham-pratyaya*) ; and matter is only known to us in the intuition of ' this ' (*idam-pratyaya*). These two intuitions are absolutely opposed to each other like light and darkness. Nothing accordingly can ever have the character of both I-ness and this-ness. How is the reconciliation to be achieved without rejection ? Śrī Aurobindo looks at the matter from a neutral standpoint, and sees no opposition. We cannot agree with this external view of spirit. It degrades spirit to the status of an object. The reality of matter is a challenge to the integrity of spirit. The so-called duality of the subject and the object is not a higher form of reality inclusive of both. It is still presentable as object, and is thus reducible to the category of ' this-ness ', which is the category of matter. The purity and the integrity of spirit demand the rejection of matter as an illusory appearance in all its forms, gross and subtle.

3. The same argument is to be pursued strictly with regard to the reconciliation of unity and multiplicity. Both can never be true, and both can never be reconciled. It is no real unity, which is not a pure undifferentiated unity. The moment we introduce multiplicity within it, and conceive a differentiated unity, we take away from its unitary character and disrupt it from within. We wrongly ask, unity of what ?, as though the unity *must include* a multiplicity. But if the multiplicity thus included is *real*, no amount of unification can avail against it or unify it. We are misled by teleological unities, which are only functional or subjective. Such unities are, ontologically speaking, quite fictitious. We cannot therefore agree with the view of Śrī Aurobindo that " identity necessarily involves difference and the higher the identity the richer its content and the more complex its organization " (Indra Sen). This makes the conception of identity meaningless. We have the perception of identity only in the case of the

self,—I am the same person today as I was yesterday. This perception of self-identity, which is never annulled, can only be true, if the differences of today and yesterday are completely eliminated from the unity of the self.

4. Another form of attack against māyā-vāda is on the basis of a superior spiritual experience. Nikam and Chaudhury hold opposite views in this respect. Nikam says, " The extra-ordinary merit and charm of the philosophy of the *Life Divine* is that, while it denies the logic of idealistic māyā-vāda it does not deny the reality of its spiritual experience. . . ." Chaudhury, on the other hand, avers that no conclusive refutation of māyā-vāda is possible at the logical level. " Śrī Aurobindo places before us a higher metaphysical insight which is inclusive, not exclusive, of the truth inherent in māyā-vāda. He appeals to an integral spiritual realization such as discloses the deepest secret of reconciliation of all philosophical conflicts."

I cannot agree with Nikam that the main difference is about the logic of māyā-vāda, and not about the spiritual experience at the back of that logic. The real difference is here. Śrī Aurobindo concedes that the experience of undifferentiated unity is an intense spiritual experience which tends to wipe out multiplicity or at least to make it appear unreal or illusory. But he contends that it is one-sided. There is a more inclusive experience, an experience that presents the Nirguṇa Brahman and the Saguṇa Brahman in a single unity.

There is, it appears to me, some confusion here. I can understand that there is an experience of Brahman as undifferentiated unity, or Brahman understood as wholly transcendent and giving no place to the multiplicity of experience. I can also understand an experience of Brahman as the indwelling Spirit qualified by the multiplicity, the position of Rāmānuja. But how are the two experiences to be reconciled so as to constitute a single experience of both Saguṇa Brahman and Nirguṇa Brahman passes my understanding. Saguṇa Brahman must either lose its differentiating character and coalesce with Nirguṇa Brahman, or it must stand *out* and thereby qualify or limit the latter in some way. In the former case, Nirguṇa Brahman constitutes the only reality ; in the latter case, Nirguṇa Brahman is degraded and replaced by Brahman that is qualified. How is any experience *possible* which can keep them what they are and still bring them into a unity ? To call the experience of Nirguṇa Brahman as one-sided does not make sense.

There is another verbal subterfuge by which this contradiction is sought to be resolved. It is said that Nirguṇa Brahman is only a certain *poise* of Ultimate Reality. Ultimate Reality sometimes retreats within itself to a deeper stratum where it loses all differences, and becomes to all appearance Nirguṇa Brahman. But then does not this deeper stratum represent its true Selfhood ? Are there any differences there ? If they are present in a nascent form and are not wholly

abolished, let us at least admit that there is no genuine experience of Nirguṇa Brahman, and that what appears to be such is quite illusory in character. There can be no compromise between reality that is qualified and reality that is unqualified. The one cannot be a *real poise* of the other. We can only mistake the one for the other.

5. In this connection, I cannot agree with Indra Sen's contention that falsehood is partial truth. The distinction between truth and falsehood is logically absolute. Truth is one and indivisible. There can be no degrees of it. There can be degrees of error, and that for practical purposes only. For error can take different forms almost indistinguishable from truth. It can take us farther and farther away from truth, or bring us nearer and nearer to it. But on a strictly theoretical plane, the distinction between truth and error is complete and absolute. The only true experience is that which cancels all other forms of experience as erroneous, but itself remains uncancelled. By this test, the experience of undifferentiated unity cannot be *partially true*. It must be wholly true, or not at all.

6. Indra Sen finds fault with the principle of non-contradiction or *abādhitatva* as he calls it, which rests upon a complete opposition of truth and falsehood. He thinks that there is a continuity and a link between the experience of 'a snake in a rope' and the experience of the rope itself. This is a complete misunderstanding of the experience of *bādhā* or cancellation. The illusory appearance is to be *wholly* rejected or negated. It has no place in the truth. Its only link with the truth is the ground or adhiṣṭhāna ; but this is a complete negation of it. We must not confuse a logical evaluation of the truth-value of a fact with the fact itself as a psychological occurrent. The illusory snake is part of a misperception, but it is *wholly non-existent* as objective truth.

We are told that the law of non-contradiction does not apply to the whole or to the infinite, and that māyā-vāda is based upon the universal validity of this law. But can any intelligence accept a contradiction ? Can reality for instance be both qualified as well as unqualified ? If it can be both, then we do not know what we are talking . The so-called logic of the Infinite cannot annul the law of non-contradiction. All that it can possibly show is that there *is no* contradiction in the Infinite, not that the law itself is abrogated there and that contradictory elements can both be housed in it. Logic itself may be superseded ; for the very distinctions and conflicts on which logic is based are unavailable in the Infinite. But if logic is applicable, the law of non-contradiction is also applicable. The logic of the Infinite can only consist in the recognition that the Infinite is wholly transcendent and unrelated to the finite, and that the latter is only an erroneous formulation of the former that requires to be negated. There is no higher or larger reason that can reconcile the two, or abrogate the law of non-contradiction itself.

7. In this connection, we may also note that māyā-vāda is not an expression of a sense of inexplicability in the presence of a *contradiction* between the normal experience and the supernormal experience, as held by Indra Sen. It is not a case of frustration of our intelligence and the acceptance of a contradiction which we cannot get over. The higher experience *cancels* the lower as untrue. Where then is the contradiction? Where is the mystery or inexplicability? If māyā-vāda is true, the riddle of existence is completely resolved. The world is an illusory appearance; and no intelligent question can be raised about the *why* and the *wherefore* of this appearance. It is wholly explained by erroneous perception. An erroneous perception is an irrationality that we can get rid of through right knowledge but can never explain. For an error is never *necessitated*; and what is not necessitated has no real cause. It is an irrationality that has got to be recognized; and when it is recognized, it is simply transcended. This is all the explanation that it is capable of. In other words, we reject an error; we cannot explain it. No legitimate question accordingly can be raised about the illusory.

8. It is contended by Indra Sen that māyā-vāda explains through rejection. Once we adopt this method, we are faced with an ultimate dualism, which conflicts with the main thesis of māyā-vāda, namely that Brahman alone is the reality. The right method of explanation would be the method of integration. It alone can lead to a true monism. Everything is real and has its place in Ultimate Reality. This reality is a harmonious whole. "All problems of existence are problems of harmony", we are told.

We contend that māyā-vāda does not entail any kind of ultimate dualism. In fact, it is the only view possible consistently with the non-dualistic character of Brahman. Māyā is not something real that is "second" to Brahman. That would be the Sāṅkhya position. But if Brahman is the only reality, and *Brahman is completely opposed in nature to the world*, the latter, together with its cause can only be an illusory appearance; and an illusory appearance never can qualify or limit the underlying reality. It is quite as non-existent as the purely imaginary or the self-contradictory or tuccha. It *never was* at any time and *shall never be*. Can we still speak of an ultimate dualism?

Let us however try the alternative process of explanation, namely that of integration. This means that we can deduce the world from Brahman alone. But how is this possible? Brahman is self-luminous knowledge, pure joy, etc. The world is full of division, discord, evil and pain. Such a world cannot be literally contained in Brahman. Even according to Śrī Aurobindo, it is the result of *cosmic ignorance* "conceived as a self-limitation of Absolute Knowledge so as to produce the divided action of the mind and the ego." Is this language intelligible? Can Absolute Knowledge contain within itself the principle of its own limitation? Briefly, can ignorance reside in knowledge as a certain action of

knowledge itself ? Can darkness be a function of light, pain a function of joy, etc. ? Is this any kind of monism ? Is not monism disrupted from within ? As against this, māyā-vāda offers us the purest form of monism there can be. For there is no dualism, including the dualism of Brahman and māyā, that is not the result of *ignorance*. This ignorance itself, in the last analysis, is not a reality, but a principle of explanation only, that explains itself away. Like the mythical monster, it first devours its children, then it devours as much of itself as it can bite on,– and that means the whole realm of objectivity, leaving pure Brahman alone.

The positive approach to Brahman that takes for its text the Upaniṣadic saying " All this is Brahman," can only be understood to mean that ' all this ' is not ' all this ', but that it is in truth and in reality nothing but Brahman. It is as much negative in its import as the text " neti, neti (not this, not this)." There is no difference in their meaning.

9. Māyā-vāda may be wrong. But what is the alternative ? We are offered in its place a theory of creation and of evolution. We are told that the purpose of cosmic evolution, and of the original involution, can only be the delight of becoming or Līlā.

Nikam in his paper makes līlā-vāda appear similar to māyā-vāda. He says, " .... So according to Līlāvāda everything is real because it is of the same real. And this realistic Līlāvāda, after all, asserts, like māyā-vāda, the Law of Identity : A is A. ' All this is Brahman ', because Brahman is the all." The real issue between the two theories is not the acceptance or the rejection of the Law of Identity. The real issue between them is the conception of Brahman, and the relation of the world to Brahman. For Līlāvāda, Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. Brahman so to say spins out the world out of Himself just as the spider does his web. Māyāvāda emphatically denies this. Brahman does nothing. He does not undergo any modification, real or apparent. He is merely the support or *adhiṣṭhāna* of the world-appearance or *vivarta-upādāna*. While therefore the Brahman of Śrī Aurobindo is liable to real modification through the exercise of His power or *śakti* which is part of Him, no such charge can be made against māyā-vāda. As to the delight of becoming or playfulness, which is attributed to Brahman, it is only intelligible in relation to an inner tension and the release of suppressed energy. Will that not make for a certain deficiency in Him, and for a real change or mutation ? A playful Brahman is conceived wholly on the analogy of the finite man.

10. I agree with Nikam that Śrī Aurobindo has not refuted māyā-vāda, but I do not agree with his reasons for saying so. He attributes to both the theories the view that the world is a dream. This is quite wrong. The world is not a dream for Śrī Aurobindo. It is real. It is quite a different matter that,

according to Śrī Aurobindo, dreams too happen to be real in their own way. And then Nikam's conclusion that Śrī Aurobindo has urged very cogent arguments against the doctrine of the unreality of the world leaves me amazed. If Śrī Aurobindo has not refuted māyā-vāda, then the reason can only be that his arguments are not cogent or convincing. We cannot have it both ways. It appears as though Nikam does not want to dissatisfy either side, and prefers therefore to sit on the fence.

11. Chaudhury says, "It passes one's comprehension how an eternally cancelled falsehood and irrationality can function as a beginningless positive entity productive of a highly significant world of experience". Here we are confusing two different stand-points. An eternally-cancelled snake-appearance does produce fear in me. Indeed, the snake-appearance is cancelled in time. But so is māyā. And yet there is a sense in which the snake did not exist in the rope *at any time*, and can therefore be taken to be cancelled for all time or eternally cancelled. Those who see Brahman see nothing beside Brahman. There is no māyā for them. But those who see the world cannot altogether disown the function of māyā. For them māyā is undeniable as a principle of explanation. The ontological status of māyā is one thing, and the fact itself at a certain level of our experience is another. There is no conflict between the two.

12. It is admitted by Chaudhury that the world ignorantly supposed to be self-existent and real apart from Brahman is indeed unreal. But then what are the logical implications of this view ? I contend that the only thing real is the self-existent real. If the world is not self-existent then it is not real at all. That which is created can have no appearance of reality if it is not confused with the self-existent.

Creation involves volition. But what is willed is so dependent upon the willing that it can have no appearance of existence or being to the person who wills. What is willed is always an act which is put forth and also retracted. Our acts seem to effectuate something that is real and that continues to exist even after we have ceased to act. The arrow that has once been released will go to its target, even though we have ceased to have any connection with it. But then we are here dealing with self-existing arrows and self-existing targets in which our act is embodied. Let arrows and targets be all matters of our creative will. Can they appear to us as given or as real independently of us ? Evidently not. The same is true about the world and its Creator. *Nothing real is ever created.* If the world is created, it is for that reason alone incapable of existing in itself ; and it can only appear to exist when it is confused with a self-existing and abiding reality. The evanescent is confused with the enduring, the willed with the known, the imaginary with the real. That is the position of māyā-vāda. The world is my creation. So is any illusory appearance. Can it be real ?

SYMPOSIUM III

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LIVING FAITHS

HINDUISM

by

S. C. CHATTERJEE

1. Definition of Hinduism

Every historical religion may be interpreted in the light of its earliest beginnings or in that of its most developed form. So also it may be considered in its popular form or its authoritative scriptural form. But to represent a religion in the form and the character it has among the unenlightened general mass of its followers is not to judge it at its best or even in its correct perspective. Rather, it is to misinterpret it in the same way in which a beautiful statue is misrepresented when described in terms of the characters of the block of stone out of which it is carved or in those of the impressions which an uncultured man without refined artistic sense gets from it. So the best way to present the fundamentals of a religion is to take it in its developed form as that is found in the original authoritative texts bearing on it.

What is true of religions in general applies with greater force to Hinduism as a living faith. To an unsympathetic and unenlightened observer the Hindu religion may appear as a conglomeration of superstitions and contradictions, of prejudices and corruptions. To such uninformed critics we would only make an appeal to study Hinduism, not in its vulgar and popular forms, but in its developed true form as found in the authoritative Hindu scriptures and exhibited in the lives and teachings of the Hindu sages, saints and religious leaders and reformers.

Hinduism is not based on the message of any single prophet or incarnation. Nor is it founded on the teachings of any one saint or reformer. On the other hand, it is based on the varied moral and religious experiences and teachings of many Indian sages and seers, saints and philosophers. These are recorded in the Vedas including the Upaniṣads, the Smṛtis, the Purāṇas, the Itihāsas including the *Bhagavad-gītā* and the Darśanas or philosophical systems. Of these the Vedas constitute the primary ground and final authority in the Hindu religion. Next in importance to the Vedas is the *Bhagavad-gītā* which is an exegesis of Hinduism. It is a religio-philosophical treatise in which we have the quintessence of the Vedic religion and the Upaniṣadic speculation, and a synthesis of the pro-Vedic systems of Indian philosophy.

Now the central teachings of the Vedas, the Upaniṣads and the philosophical systems as conserved and synthesized in the *Bhagavad-gītā* are as follows: There is one universal spirit who is self-luminous and manifests himself as the earth, the sky and the heaven, and dwells in every heart as its inner ruler and guide. The supreme spirit can be realized and thereby perfect and eternal life attained by man by following any one of the four main paths of religion, viz., dhyāna or concentration, karma or unselfish action, bhakti or devotion to God and jñāna or knowledge of reality.

In the light of the foregoing observations we may, therefore, say that Hinduism is a monistic religion which believes in one ultimate spiritual reality or existence which reveals itself as this and many other worlds, and dwells in all beings as their inner ruler and supreme lord. This ultimate reality is the Supreme God in Hinduism. It also believes that though God is one He has various manifestations in many gods, any one of which may be worshipped as a form of the Supreme Deity. The divergent schools of Hinduism like Śaivism, Śaktaism, Vaiṣṇavism, etc., are at bottom based on a philosophy of one Supreme God, nay more, of one all-inclusive reality. Hinduism may thus be regarded as a unique form of monotheism which believes rather in the unity of the gods in God, than the denial of gods for God. While God is one, there are, according to Hinduism, many different ways of reaching Him, just as there are many paths that lead to the same destination. Among the many paths followed in the different religions of the world, it emphasizes four, namely, yoga or concentration, karma or the disinterested performance of religious and moral duties, bhakti or devotion to and worship of God, and jñāna or the philosophical knowledge of reality. Hinduism is the sublime religious faith which finds one in all and all in one, and recognizes the unity of all genuine religious faiths as being so many paths leading to the same goal, i e., God.

2. *The Idea of God*

In Hinduism God is conceived as the Supreme Person who manifests Himself as the world of many things and beings and is both immanent and transcendent in relation to it. Thus we have in it a monistic conception of God which should be distinguished from ordinary forms of theism and monotheism as found, for example, in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In these religions God is, of course, one and only one. But they admit more than one reality, namely, God, man and nature, and hold that neither man nor nature is a part of God. Hinduism, however, holds that God is the only ultimate reality that is manifested as the world of many selves and the physical universe of many things.

It may be objected here that Hinduism is polytheism, since it believes in many gods and goddesses. But that this is not really so will appear from two important facts. First, each of the many gods and goddesses who are recognized in the Vedas is raised to the status of the Supreme Deity at the time he or she

is adored and worshipped. The name 'monolatry' which is sometimes given to this phase of religion is not quite appropriate for the Vedic religion. For monolatry means the worship of only one god, although the existence of others is recognized. Secondly, we find that the Vedas describe the different gods and goddesses as manifestations of one underlying reality, as only different forms and names of one universal Being (ekaṁ sad viprā bahudhā vadanty agniṁ yamaṁ mātariśvānamāhuh)[1]. So we seem to be justified in holding that Hinduism is a monistic religion which believes in God as the supreme reality that is manifested in the infinite universe of many things and beings including gods and goddesses.

God has two aspects, namely, the immanent and the transcendent. He reveals Himself as the world and pervades it. But he is not exhausted in the world ; He is also beyond it[2]. He is both the material and the efficient cause of the world, its creator, preserver and destroyer. Corresponding to these three functions, there are three forms of the Godhead which are called Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra or Śiva respectively. But these are really three powers of God. The totality of God's powers is called māyā or prakṛti. God possesses to the full six perfections, namely, majesty, omnipotence, beauty, omniscience, infinite glory and perfect freedom. Such is God's glory that He holds both death and immortality in His hands, is both infinite and infinitesimal, and although one and absolute He becomes many and mundane ! God's activities in creation, maintenance and destruction of this and many other worlds is a free play of his free will which is of the nature of līlā or sportive activity.

Then, God is the moral governor of the world including ourselves (vidhātā), the impartial dispenser of the fruits of our actions and the supreme arbiter of our joys and sorrows (karma-phala-dātā). God is also the saviour of all men who are sincerely devoted and resigned to Him. He protects all religious souls and gives them His grace so as to enable them to realize Him. God is not a reality external to us, He is the self within us. God dwells in our heart as its inner ruler, and guide (antaryāmin). He is also the gracious Lord who guides us from life to life till we realize our unity with Him and become liberated. God also comes down to the world and incarnates Himself to set the world right when the forces of evil vitiate the eternal religion of man.

What God as immanent is, has so far been explained. But what God as transcendent may be, cannot be adequately described nor even properly conceived. The Hindu scriptures declare that we cannot know this by our mind and intellect, nor describe it by words. 'It is that from which all speech with the mind turns away unable to reach it'. The only way to know it is to have

1 *Rg-veda*, 1.164.46 (*vide* also 10.114.4, 10.129, 10.82, *et. passim*).

2 *Vide Rg-veda*, 10.90.2-3 ; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 2.3.1 ; *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 3.15.

a direct experience of God through meditation and concentration. In the light of such intuitive experience the Hindu scriptures describe the essential or transcendent nature of God as pure existence, consciousness and bliss, as reality, consciousness and infinity and call Him one without a second (ekamevādvitīyam).

In the Hindu religion we have thus a conception of God as both immanent in the world and transcendent over it. A careful study of the Hindu scriptures will convince one of the truth of this view. There are many passages which bear unmistakable testimony to the fact that, according to Hinduism, God pervades the world no doubt, but He also transcends it and exists beyond it.[3] Hinduism is generally characterized as pantheism. If by pantheism we mean the theory that God is just the totality of all objects of the world and nothing more, it would be a mistake to describe Hinduism as pantheism. For Hinduism, all this is God no doubt, but God is more than all this. All things and beings are in God as His parts ; but God is not wholly in them, He is in them and also beyond them. Hence it would be more correct to say that the Hindu theory of God is panentheism (the theory that all is *in* God) and not pantheism.

3. *The Conception of Self*

By self is here meant the individual self or the embodied soul called jīvātmā as distinguished from God who is called paramātmā. Although related to a body, the soul is quite distinct from the body, the senses, the mind and the intellect. The distinction between the soul and the mind-body organism is fundamental to Hinduism. Even when associated with the body it is possible for the self to realize its utter distinction from the latter and abide in its pure essence as the self-conscious spirit which is above everything material.

As associated with the body the self has certain characters which are empirical in the sense that they pertain, not to the essential nature of the self, but to its embodied condition. Of these, some are physical, some mental and some moral. On the physical side the soul has a threefold body, namely, the gross which is constituted by physical elements, the subtle which is made up of finer elements like the senses, the mind, the intellect, etc. ; and the causal, which is the origin of the first two. On the mental side, the soul performs the functions of thinking, feeling and willing. There are four states of consciousness of the self, namely, the waking, dream, dreamless sleep and turīya or the transcendent. The moral attributes of the self are the effects of its own actions. These actions are different according to the different natures of men. Thus men who are sāttvika by nature have such attributes as virtue, knowledge, selflessness and excellence. Those who are rājasika are swayed by the desires and passions of life, and make incessant efforts for wealth, power and position in life. The individuals who are tāmasika have such bad qualities as vice, ignorance, greed, apathy, laziness, etc.

3 *Vide Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, 2.5.9-11 ; *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 2.3.1 ; *Bhagavad-gītā* 9.4-5.

As distinguished from its empirical characters, its individual soul has certain real or noumenal characters. The individual self in its essential nature is a conscious and eternal reality which is not really limited by any physical or mental characters. As eternal and unchanging it has no activity or movement in it. Activity or motion involves change and cannot, therefore, really belong to the self which is unchanging. The self being quite distinct from the body and the mind is not really subject to bodily or mental affections and afflictions. It is also different from the ego or the moral agent who strives for good or bad ends and enjoys or suffers accordingly. But it becomes subject to all these when, through ignorance, it thinks itself to be a mind-body and practically becomes identified with it. The real self of man is revealed in an ecstatic state called samādhi which is attainable through yoga. In this state there is consciousness, no doubt, but no one, i.e., no individual is conscious of anything. It is a state of pure existence and pure consciousness. And, as such, it is a state of pure bliss too, since it is free from the limitations and contradictions of our bodily and mental life. In this state the self abides in its own essence as pure consciousness enjoying the still vision of pure self-shining existence. Thus pure existence, pure consciousness and bliss are the inalienable and essential characters of man's real self. As such, the self is also free, eternal and immortal. The liberation of man from sin and suffering lies in the realization of his real self as permanent, pure and divine. This is the general conception of the self that we find in Hinduism, although there are slight variations in it in some schools of Hindu philosophy.

4. *Theory of the World*

In Hinduism the world is called Brahmāṇḍa, a word which literally means the ' egg of Brahmā ' and suggests that the world is evolved out of Brahmā, the personified creative energy of God. The world or Brahmāṇḍa generally means a universe which comprises seven lokas or regions, namely, the bhūr-loka or the earth, the bhuvar-loka or the sky above the earth with the sun, the planets and the stars set therein, the svar-loka or the first heaven, the mahar-loka or the second heaven, jana-loka or the third heaven, the tapo-loka or the fourth heaven, and the satya-loka or the fifth heaven. There are seven surfaces below the earth which are named Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasātala, Talātala, Mahātala and Pātāla. Taking these seven as separate regions, the universe is sometimes said to comprise fourteen regions. There are, of course, many minor regions within the universe. Now we are told that there are innumerable Brahmāṇḍas or world systems surrounding the one in which we live.

Hinduism does not believe in the creation of the world out of nothing. On the other hand, it is here generally held that the world is evolved by God out of Himself, although we sometimes find in it the idea that the world is created by God out of pre-existing material or that it is evolved by Prakṛti or primal matter independently of God. The idea that the world is created by God out of His

infinite power or energy, that it is sustained by Him and finally dissolved and retracted within Him, governs the general trend of the Hindu religion and philosophy.

The account of the creation of the world as given in the different systems of Hindu philosophy is somewhat different. Here we shall content ourselves with the Paurāṇika theory of the world which is generally accepted in the different schools of Hinduism. It may be stated as follows :—

God who was one meditated and willed to become a world of many things and beings. God's will to create a world moves Prakṛti, the primal divine energy, to act and conceive Brahmā or the world-soul who is endowed by God with infinite powers of knowledge, will and action. Now Brahmā is the creator of the world in all aspects, gross and subtle, physical and mental. Brahmā is surrounded by Prakṛti, the cosmic energy of God, in which the three guṇas or elements of sattva, rajas and tamas were originally held in equilibrium. Brahmā acts on Prakṛti and disturbs her equilibrium, and then there is a tremendous motion in the bosom of Prakṛti. As a result thereof, there is first the appearance of mahat or buddhi, the cosmic consciousness. Out of buddhi comes ahaṅkāra, the principle of individuation which differentiates homogeneous primal matter into elements of the finest kind. With the predominance of tamas in Prakṛti, there arise out of ahaṅkāra the five tanmātras or subtle essences of ether, air, fire, water and earth. And out of these five, the gross elements of the same name are formed by the combination of the one with the others in different proportions. Similarly, with the predominance of rajas, ahaṅkāra gives rise to the five sense organs and the five motor organs. The same ahaṅkāra when dominated by sattva generates manas or the mind and the presiding deities of the senses and the forces of nature. All objects of the physical world—minerals, plants, animals and men—thus arise from Prakṛti through buddhi and ahaṅkāra. The gross elements of ether, air, fire, water and earth compose the physical bodies of individual souls and the various lokas or regions of the universe. The subtle bodies of the souls are formed by the subtle products of Prakṛti like the tanmātras.

The world thus created is maintained by God for a long period of time and then destroyed or reabsorbed within Him. It is in these aspects that God is called Viṣṇu and Śiva or Rudra. The cycle of creation, continuance and destruction of worlds goes on repeating itself endlessly, so that we can assign neither a beginning nor an end to the cosmic process.

5. *The Doctrine of Rebirth*

Like some ancient religions of the world, Hinduism believes in the rebirth of the individual soul after death. But although the belief is to be found in other religions, yet a philosophical justification of it is scarcely met with anywhere else than in Hinduism. The possibility of the soul's future life and of its

rebirth depends on its permanent existence. In the Hindu religion the individual soul is regarded as a permanent reality which is essentially divine in nature. Just as the sparks from a fire are identical in nature with the fire, so the individual souls which come from God have a nature identical with God's. It is just this nature of the individual soul that justifies both the ideas of its rebirth and gradual evolution through different births.

While the soul's permanence makes rebirth possible, the essential identity of its nature with God's makes rebirth actual and significant. The individual soul is identical in essence with God. But in its ignorance it forgets itself and hankers after worldly objects and sensual enjoyments. It thus becomes embodied and passes from one body to another in search of worldly pleasures. The departure of the individual soul from one body and its reappearance in another body are ordinarily known as its death and birth respectively. The individual soul wanders from life to life so long as it isolates itself from God and runs after worldly objects. But it is never completely shorn of its divine nature and so cannot long remain satisfied with the pleasures of the world. The individual soul passes through births and deaths in order that it may realize its essential identity with God, and it cannot free itself from the cycle of birth and death until it reaches the far-off divine goal. In view of this we are to say that the birth and death of the individual soul is a part of the divine plan and purpose of the world.

In the normal course of evolution the soul passes from the bodies of the lowest kind to those of the highest. Thus it passes from plant bodies to those of amoebas and insects, and from these to the bodies of oviparous animals, and then to those of viviparous animals. In the animal kingdom also the normal order of the soul's development is from the lowest to the highest form of life by a gradual process in which each preceding life is the basis for the next higher, till it is born as a human individual. The soul in human form manifests the three powers of cognition, desire and will which reflect the triune nature of God from whom it comes and to whom it strives to return in course of its evolution. But the evolution of the human individual does not maintain a steady upward course. There are certain set-backs at times brought about by the misdeeds of this or that life. Thus a vicious man is born as a lower animal after death. But in course of time and through successive births it will once again attain the human level and continue its upward course till at last it is liberated from bondage to birth and death. The transmigration of the soul from one gross body to another in this earth is sometimes immediate and sometimes mediated by an intervening life in some other invisible region like heaven or hell where it lives till the merits or demerits of its earthly life is completely exhausted and the time comes for it to be born again in the earth. The body that sustains the soul during its passage from one gross body to another or in the invisible worlds is the subtle one with which it is

associated till it is liberated.[4] The law that governs rebirth is the law of karma to which we should now turn our attention.

6. *The Law of Karma*

Indian philosophy and religion are spiritualistic not so much because they believe in a world of spirits as that they admit an eternal moral order of the world. The law of karma is the philosophical expression of the belief in an eternal moral order of the world. In its simplest form the law means that all actions, good or bad, produce their proper moral consequences in the life of the individual who acts. There is no loss of the effect of work done (kṛtapraṇāśa) and no happening of events to an individual except as the result of his or her own work (akṛtābhyupāgama). The law of karma is the universal law of moral causation which governs not only the life and destiny of all individual beings but even the order and arrangement of the physical world.

Generally speaking, there are three kinds of karma, namely, those which have already begun to bear fruits in this life and are called prārabdha karma ; those which were performed in a previous life and remain stored up without producing their effects and are called sañcita karma ; and those which are being performed now and are to produce their effects in future and are called sañcīyamāna karma. A man's present circumstances of life, his joys and sufferings, his success and failure in this life are the cumulative effects of all his actions in the past and the present life. So also his future life is determined by his past and present actions. A man is to act well in order to deserve well in future. It is he who makes or mars his fortune by his own actions.

The law of karma is almost universal in its scope. It governs all actions which are done with a desire for their fruits. But it has no sway over actions which are perfectly disinterested. Actions which are performed by a man in a selfless spirit without any motive for any gain to himself do not produce any effects in his life. Hence it is that the liberated saints and perfected souls are believed to rise above the law of karma. They may act for the good of mankind but are not bound and affected by the effects of their actions. But even such perfect persons have to reap the consequences of their prārabdha karma which have already begun to bear fruits.

The law of karma has been criticized on several grounds. First, it has been urged that the law militates against man's free will and thereby takes away the basis of his moral life. As against this we are to point out that instead of denying man's free will and moral responsibility, the law of karma, rightly understood, insists upon them. If I am now to reap the consequences of my past actions, that is because I was responsible for them in the past. And if my present condi-

4 Vide *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.4.4-6.

tion is determined by my past conduct, there is no reason why I should not be able to determine my future by my present endeavours. The law of karma only stipulates that given such-and-such actions, such-and-such consequences are bound to follow. So far the law of karma is on the same footing with the law of causality. If causal uniformity among physical events is no ground for denying man's moral responsibility, we do not see how the uniformity among moral actions and their moral effects can possibly be made a ground therefor.

Another objection against the law of karma is that it is inconsistent with the theistic faith in God and His forgiveness of the sins of man. It is here held that if the law of karma be a sufficient explanation for the origin and order of the world we need not believe in God, and if it be absolute and inviolable God cannot forgive a repentant sinner and prevent the injurious effects of his sinful actions from recoiling on his head. In reply to this objection we are to say that the law of karma, like any law of nature, is not a power or force, but only the uniform mode of operation of some force or agent. It is God's power that brings the world into existence and establishes the moral order of the world. The law of karma, as a law that makes for righteousness, expresses the moral nature of God. It formulates the ways in which the will of God operates in the world. As for God's forgiveness of human sins we are to say that God forgives our sins when through repentance we become purified. Hence God's forgiveness implies no violation of the law of karma.

Then, again, it is urged against the law of karma that it discourages social service. It is here contended that pursuant to the law we need not try to relieve the miseries of fellow beings, for they reap, as they should, the fruits of their own actions. But here we should point out that for Hinduism God is present in all living beings. To serve the poor and the distressed is, therefore, to serve God. If some men suffer because they have sinned in the past, it would be no less a sin for others not to help them, if they can ; for the latter thereby refuse to serve their God as present in those suffering beings.

The law of karma in its different aspects may be regarded as the law of the conservation of moral values, the merits and demerits of actions. It is the law that nothing befalls a man except as the result of his own actions and nothing merited by a man by his actions is lost unto him. Fatalism or determinism is, therefore, a misrepresentation of the doctrine of karma.

7. *The Doctrine of Bondage and Liberation*

The aim of both Hindu religion and philosophy is, generally speaking, the attainment of liberation from bondage. Although this may appear as somewhat peculiar to Hinduism, yet it becomes intelligible when we bear in mind the Hindu conception of the soul. For Hinduism, the individual soul is really different and distinct from the mind-body organism. There is nothing in the intrinsic

nature of the soul that binds it to a body and makes it liable to birth and death, and the consequent miseries of life in this world. Hence the condition in which the soul is subject to birth and rebirth in this world is known as bondage (bandha), while the cessation of that condition is called liberation (mukti). The one is called bondage because it entails certain limitations and sufferings on the individual soul, and the other is called liberation because it puts an end to all its miseries and sufferings.

The doctrine of bondage and liberation has laid Indian philosophy and religion open to the charge of pessimism. If by pessimism we mean the admission of evil in the world and of suffering in human life, then they are pessimistic like some other systems of philosophy and religion. But that they are not really so, becomes clear when we consider that according to them evil is not at the heart of reality, nor is suffering the final word for human life. Rather, they hold that God, the ultimate reality, is of the essence of blissful existence-consciousness. So also the individual soul which is essentially divine in nature is pure, free and blissful existence. Man becomes subject to sin and suffering when in ignorance he forgets his real self, separates himself from God and considers himself to be only the body with its natural impulses and evil propensities. A life thus led by man is by no means the best. Rather, it leads to and prolongs misery. Although Indian thinkers assert that life thus thoughtlessly led is full of misery, yet they point to a way of deliverance from suffering. And that way is, generally speaking, the right knowledge of reality, of the self and the world. There is difference of opinion among the schools of Indian philosophy and religion with regard to the exact nature of the path and the state of liberation. But it is admitted by all of them that liberation is a state of perfected existence in which man becomes fully and finally free from all sin and suffering. According to some systems of philosophy, it is also a state of pure and perfect bliss which is attainable in this life (jīvanmukti). Other systems, however, hold that it can be attained only after death (videha-mukti). Both these views are to be found in the different schools of Hinduism. With regard to the way of attaining liberation, Hinduism recognizes, as already stated, four main paths, namely, rāja-yoga or the method of concentration, karma-yoga or the path of selfless action, bhakti-yoga or the way of religious devotion, and jñāna-yoga or the course of philosophic knowledge. These cannot be elaborated further within the limited space of this article.[5]

8. *Varṇāśrama-dharma and Hindu ethical ideas*

Varṇāśrama-dharma is a unique feature of Hinduism as a religion. It is a moral code of life which a man is to follow in order to realize the four main ends of life, namely, kāma or enjoyment, artha or wealth, dharma or virtue, and mokṣa or liberation which is regarded as the highest of all. In it the life of a man born in this world is divided into four stages, namely, brahmacarya or student

5 For a detailed study of these paths the reader is referred to S. C. Chatterjee, *The Fundamentals of Hinduism*, Chapters IX-XII

life, gārhasthya or family life, vānaprastha or retired life and sannyāsa or life of renunciation. So also the society in which an individual man lives as a member is divided into four varṇas or classes, namely, the Brahmins, the Kṣatriyas, the Vaiśyas and the Śūdras. The duties and virtues which pertain to these stages and strata of life give us the ethical ideas and moral teachings of Hinduism as a religion.

The first stage in the moral life of the individual is the student's life called brahmacarya. The student should live a life of self-control and continence and be devoted to the study of the different arts and sciences. The special virtues of a student are : chastity, temperance, simplicity, hardiness, devotion to knowledge and God, and service to the teacher. This stage is preparatory to the next at which a man is to shoulder the responsibilities of a householder's life.

As a general rule, all men should enter the householder's life on the completion of their educational career. In Hinduism the householder's life is extolled as the highest and most useful order of life on which the well-being of the other orders depends. A householder should pay his debts to the gods, his ancestors, teachers, fellowmen and other living beings. The special virtues of a householder are : charity, industry, honesty, frugality, temperance and devotion to religion and social service.

The first two stages constitute what is known as the path of desire and enjoyment (pravṛtti mārga) in Hinduism. The next two stages of vānaprastha and sannyāsa constitute the path of nivṛtti or renunciation. Vānaprastha is the life of retirement from ordinary worldly activities. At this stage, a man should serve the world by means of prayer and sacrifice. The duties of a retired man are : sacrifice, constant study of the Vedas, austerity and equanimity, amity, readiness to give and not to take anything, love and compassion for all living beings.

The last stage of life is sannyāsa in which a man renounces in spirit everything of the world, including even sacrifices, and rests calmly in God, ever meditating on Him. He becomes free from attachment to the world and attains perfect equanimity of mind and, having realized Brahman or God, remains content with the self within him. Such a man stands liberated from bondage, from sin and suffering for all time.

As already stated there are four classes in the Hindu society. These classes were at first determined by the qualities, duties and virtues possessed by different groups of individuals living in the society. But subsequently the classes hardened into castes which became hereditary and were split into many subcastes and mixed castes. Of these classes, the first is the class of Brahmins who are the teachers and the spiritual leaders of society. The natural qualities of a Brahmin are : self-restraint, austerity, purity, serenity, forgiveness, simplicity, wisdom in the

holy lore, faith in God and the scriptures, and philosophical knowledge of Truth and Reality.

Of the second class of Kṣatriyas the natural qualities are : courage, strength, firmness, skilfulness, undauntedness in battle, charitableness and administrative ability. It is his duty to protect the State and its people, to contribute liberally for the good of others, to study the Vedas and perform Vedic rites, and to own riches without, however, attachment to them.

The third class of Vaiśyas must possess such qualities as dexterity in agriculture, protection of cattle, and in trade, banking and commerce. They should also be engaged in Vedic study and Vedic rituals, and render liberal help to the poor and the needy and also to all good causes.

The fourth class is the class of Śūdras. Their great merit and virtue lie in service to the other classes of society. They are the labourers and builders of the State and should have a full sense of the dignity of labour, in whatever form it may be.

When we come to the duties and virtues that pertain to one's class and stage of life, we get the idea of one's svadharma, that is to say, ' one's station in life and its duties '. In Hinduism the concept of svadharma gives us the highest moral ideal which every man should try to follow in life. Perfection of the moral life is attained by a man through the performance of all those duties which pertain to his position in society and to the particular stage of his life.

There are certain cardinal virtues and duties which have been enjoined by Hinduism upon all members of the society. These are : truthfulness, purity, self-continence, non-violence or abstinence from unjustifiable injury to life, self-control, honesty in thought and deed, detachment, simplicity, fortitude or courage in dangers and difficulties, study of the holy scriptures, worship of God and service to all living beings. These cardinal virtues should be given their due place of importance and used as corner-stones in any future reconstruction of the Hindu society as that is necessitated by a changing world. It is neither possible nor desirable for Hinduism to reinstate its ancient social system under modern conditions of life in exactly the same form. But if there is sufficient vitality in it, which it undoubtedly has, it will, as in the past it did, successfully adapt itself to the new conditions of Indian life in the new atmosphere of political freedom, achieved after many years of hard struggle and intense suffering on the part of the sons and daughters of mother India.

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THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LIVING FAITHS

JAINISM

by

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I record my sincere thanks to the authorities of the Indian Philosophical Congress in kindly inviting me to speak on Jainism in this Symposium on Religion, under the title ' The Fundamentals of Living Faiths ', the object of which is to bring out the Universal character of each of the living Faiths and not to discuss ' the merits of different Religions '.

Jainism is a remarkable ideological phenomenon in the cultural history of India ; but, for various reasons, its historical antecedents, metaphysical basis and ethical outlook are not fully appreciated in the scheme of Indian thought-pattern. The adherents of Jainism are even less than half per cent of the total population of India ; but, almost, in contrast to their numerical strength, the Jaina contributions to Indian literature in various languages, art and architecture, all along in the past, and their philanthropic propensities at present, have certainly enriched the cultural heritage of our land and benefited the contemporary society in general.

The historical antecedents of Jaina religion and philosophy deserve a careful investigation and study. The history of Jainism goes back to an ancient period, and its doctrines have arisen out of early currents of thought of Eastern India which also gave rise to systems of philosophy like the Early Sāṅkhya and Buddhism. Jainism is a typical, if not the best, representative of Śramaṇic culture, a characteristic monastic institution which thrived in Eastern India even prior to the advent of Āryans in Indian Midland. The metaphysical basis is substantially identical in Jainism and Sāṅkhya, though further details have differently developed ; and the monastic tenets of Jainism and Buddhism have a close resemblance, though their philosophical stand varies.

According to Jaina metaphysics, *sat* or reality is eternal and uncreated ; and it is characterized by origination or appearance (*utpāda*), destruction or disappearance (*vyaya*) and permanence (*dhrauvya*). Every object of reality is found possessed of infinite characters, both with respect to what it is and what it is not. It has its modes (*paryāya*) and qualities (*guṇa*) through which all along persists the essential substratum. The basic substance with its qualities is something that is permanent, while the modes or accidental characters appear and disappear. Thus Jainism accepts both change and permanence as facts of experience.

The substances are reals, characterized by existence, and they are six in number. They can be broadly divided into living (*jīva*) and non-living (*ajīva*). The Jīva means soul or spirit. It is essentially an unit of consciousness, and there is an infinity of Jīvas. The souls are either bound in Saṁsāra (*baddha*) or liberated from it (*mukta*). Those in Saṁsāra are of various kinds according to the number of sense-organs possessed by them. The class of non-living substances is made up of matter (*pudgala*), principles of motion and rest (*dharma* and *adharma*), space (*ākāṣa*) and time (*kāla*). Though all these are characterized by existence, the constitution of time is conceived a bit differently : it has no extension in space. The matter is the non-living stuff possessed of sense-qualities with varied functions and forms ; the principles of motion and rest facilitate all movements and static states in this physical universe ; it is the space that accommodates all these substances ; and it is the principle of time that marks continuity or change. These substances are eternally existing, uncreated and with no beginning in time. As substances they are eternal and unchanging, but their modifications are passing through a flux of changes. Their mutual cooperation and interaction explain all that we imply by the term ' Creation '. This metaphysical position of Jainism brings us face to face with two doctrines of Jainism, namely, creation according to Jainism and the idea of God in Jainism.

The well-known presumptions and arguments of Hindu theologians that every product must have a sentient and intelligent producer, that this world is such a product and that its producer is an extraordinary Being, a God, have been fully discussed by Jaina logicians. According to Jaina metaphysics, the basic substances are eternal and their interaction explains all changes. Naturally the question of assuming a Creator does not arise at all. Not only it is not quite logical but is also inconsistent with the fundamentals of Jainism. The idea of absolute creation and destruction by any agency such as God, therefore, is not acceptable to Jainism. If the function of creating the world, distributing favours and frowns to the individual and finally destroying the universe are to be attributed to God, the idealistic dignity of godhood is sure to be undermined by the liabilities and blemishes which these functions bring with them. The changes in the universe are associated with the very nature of the basic substances.

Jainism accepts a God or gods, but he is not a Creator. The God in Jainism is a liberated soul, a spiritually perfect ideal. He is an ideal example to inspire and to guide. In fact, following such an example, every soul can aspire to achieve Godhood by annihilating Karmic forces. The Jaina God cannot hold any temptation of favour for or any threat of punishment against his devotees. He stands only as a detached Ideal, and it is for the devotee to keep this ideal before him and carve out his own career. Thus the basic conception of divinity in Jainism is much different from that in Hinduism. The Jaina prayer and worship are not a solicitation of favour, but constitute a devotional meditation on the merits

of the Ideal in thought, word and deed. It is with this attitude that Jainas offer prayers to their God, worship him both in concept and concrete, and meditate on his spiritual characteristics with the one aim of cultivating them in oneself. The divinity can be adored at the various stages of spiritual evolution. Siddha or the liberated soul ; Tīrthaṅkara or the omniscient teacher ; Ācārya or preceptor ; Upādhyāya or preacher ; and Sādhu or the monk : these mark the various stages of the soul's spiritual progress. The individual thus is left to his resources, the God being only a spiritual ideal for him., He is his own help or ruin. Thus by its theological outlook, Jainism is a religion of self-help, and enables one to cultivate individual strength and courage on the path of spiritual progress and in every walk of life without requiring one to depend on the aid of any God as such.

In explaining the march of the individual along the path of progress, based on this outlook of self-help, one has to take into account the Jaina Karma doctrine. The term Karma is common practically to all Indian religions, but the import and the detailed apparatus of Karma which the Jaina philosophers have worked out are not found anywhere else. The Karma, according to Jainism, is a subtle matter, or energy, which is associated with Ātman from beginningless time ; and the spiritual emancipation becomes complete when the Ātman develops its inherent glories by removing the Karmic shackles which were all along eclipsing the nature of Ātman. The Karmic influx into the soul is due to one's activities, mental, vocal and physical. The Karma is to be viewed with reference to its type, duration, intensity and quantity. Some Karmic types lead one to pain and others to pleasure ; and spiritual emancipation is not possible unless one is free from both. The Karmic influx can be stopped by proper restraint over mind speech and body, and by various religious and moral practices in particular. The stock of Karma can be further destroyed by penances and austerities. In this way the Jaina Karma doctrine is an elaborate system most meticulously worked out, showing how different Karmic energies become operative or inoperative in the spiritual career of the mundane soul from its lowest state to final liberation. It is made to explain all the vicissitudes in life. Just as the interacting eternal substances postulated in Jainism admit no Creator, so also the automatically working, inviolable law of Karma makes man the master of his destiny and dispenses away with the favourite theistic idea that some divinity bestows on us favours and frowns.

As indicated above, according to Jaina philosophy, the object of knowledge is a huge complexity constituted of substances, qualities and modifications, extended over three times and infinite space, and simultaneously subjected to origination, destruction and permanence. Such a complex object can rightly be comprehended only in omniscience which is not manifested in the case of worldly beings who perceive through their sense-organs. But the senses are the indirect

means of knowledge, and what they apprehend is partial like the perception of an elephant by those seven blind persons : each one touches only a part of the animal and concludes that the animal is like a log of wood, like a fan, etc. The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of his senses ; so his apprehension of reality is partial and valid only from a particular point of view : this has led to the Nayavāda of Jaina philosophy. Eschewing technical details one can say that there are admitted seven Nayas or view-points : some of them refer to the substance and others to modes or modifications ; and some arise out of the nature of the subject and some out of the limitations of language.

A thing, or the object of knowledge, is of infinite characters (*anekāntātmaka*) which require to be analysed and apprehended individually : that is the function of the Nayas. Individual Nayas reveal only a part of the totality, and it should not be mistaken for the whole. This Nayavāda is a unique instrument of analysis. The Jaina philosopher has taken the fullest advantage of it not only in building his system by a judicious search and balance of various view-points, but also in understanding sympathetically the views of others from whom he differs and in appreciating why there is difference between the two. This analytical approach to reality has saved him from extremism, dogmatism and fanaticism, and has further bred in him remarkable intellectual toleration.

It is not enough if various problems about reality are merely understood from different points of view. What one knows one must be able to state truly and accurately. This need is met with by the famous theory of Syādvāda in Jainism. The object of knowledge is a huge complexity covering infinite modes and related to three times ; human mind is of limited understanding ; and human speech has its imperfections in expressing the whole range of experience. Under these circumstances all our statements are conditionally or relatively true. So Jaina logic insists on qualifying every statement with '*syāt*', i.e., 'may be', 'somehow', 'in a way', to stress its conditional or relative character. Whether this term is specifically added or not, it is always to be understood to be present. Ordinarily speaking, a judgement can assume two forms, affirmative and negative, and has a reference to the substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and shape or concept (*bhāva*) of an object. An affirmative judgement predicates the characters possessed by a thing, while the negative one denies characters absent in this but belonging to others. Besides these two judgements, namely 'Somehow S is P' and 'Somehow S is not P', Jaina logic admits a third kind of judgement, namely, that of indescribability, 'Somehow S is indescribable'. This is of great philosophical significance. In view of complex objectivity, limited human knowledge and imperfect speech, the Jaina logic admits situations which cannot be described in terms of plain 'yes' or 'no'. A thing cannot be described at all, when no distinction of standpoints and aspects can be made. Some aspect can be affirmed, or denied, separately from a certain point of view, or both affirmed

and denied successively. But when this predication is to be made simultaneously one is faced with contradiction which can be wisely avoided by this third judgement of ' indescribability '. These three are the basic predications; and when they are combined successively and simultaneously, the maximum number of combinations is seven and not more. Naturally these should be able to answer every purpose howsoever complex it may be. Thus we have the following seven conditional predications: (1) Somehow S is P; (2) Somehow S is not P; (3) Somehow S is indescribable ; (4) Somehow S is P and is also not P ; (5) Somehow S is P and is also indescribable ; (6) Somehow S is not P and is also indescribable ; and lastly (7) Somehow S is P, also is not P, and is also indescribable.

This doctrine of sevenfold predication is often misunderstood and misrepresented by idealists who have not been able to appreciate its metaphysical basis and intellectual approach. It reminds us of the realistic relativists of the West like Whitehead and others. The Jaina logician is neither a sceptic nor an agnostic ; but he is a realist working with a sound common sense. He does not want to ignore the relative or conditional character of the judgement arising out of the very nature of the object of the knowledge. No point of view should be affirmed as absolute and final at the expense of others.

Turning to Jaina ethics in its religious aspect, it aims at the realization of Nirvāṇa or Mokṣa, which, we have seen above, means that the soul is to be completely liberated from the shackles of Karma. One who aspires after liberation is required to possess a belief in the fundamentals of religion indicating a correct attitude for the acceptance of the truth. His understanding of the religious principles should be flawless. And his conduct imposes on him the duty of abstaining from what is harmful and doing what is beneficial to others. Understanding or knowledge, to be worthy of its name, must be preceded by a correct attitude and should lead to good behaviour. The process of destroying the Karmas demands purity of thoughts, words and deeds; and it is further achieved by observing a code of morality which is less rigorous in the case of a householder but more hard for monks. Here we may confine ourselves to the moral code prescribed for a householder and try to assess its social implications.

Jainism lays down five basic vows (*vrata*) : (i) Abstention from violence or injury to living beings (*ahiṁsā*) ; (ii) Abstention from false speech (*satya*) ; (iii) Abstention from theft (*asteya*) ; (iv) Abstention from sex pleasure (*brahmacarya*) ; and (v) Abstention from greed for worldly possessions (*aparigraha*). Amongst these vows Ahiṁsā is not only the first but the most important vow. It is the logical outcome of the Jaina metaphysical theory that all the souls are potentially equal, and it requires us to accept the sanctity and dignity of life in its various forms. No one likes pain. Naturally one should not do unto others what one does not want others to do unto one. The moral implications of this principle of reciprocity are profoundly beneficial. Jainism, more than any other Indian religion, has

explained this principle thoroughly and systematically. Violence or injury is of three kinds : physical violence covers killing, wounding and causing any physical pain ; violence in words consists in using harsh language ; and mental violence implies bearing ill feeling towards others. Further this injury or violence may be committed, commissioned and consented to. A householder is unable to avoid all these in an ideal manner. So he is expected to cause minimum injury to others. In view of the routine of the society in which we have to live, injury is classified under four heads : (i) There is accidental injury in digging, pounding, cooking and such other activities essential to daily living. (ii) Then there is occupational injury when a soldier fights, an agriculturist tills the land, etc. (iii) Then comes the protective injury when one is required to protect one's or others' life and honour against wild beasts and enemies. (iv) And lastly there is intentional injury when one kills living beings for wanton sport, etc. A householder is expected to abstain fully from intentional injury and as far as possible from the rest. What matters more is the intention or the mental attitude than the act itself. The last vow also has a great significance. By limiting his possessions the householder is expected to spend his additional earnings in helping the poor and needy by fourfold gifts : food, shelter, medicine and books. If the individual practises these vows, he is sure to develop a humanistic outlook on society and grow into a detached citizen. In fine, these vows give us universality of outlook and enable us to eschew all attachment and possessive instinct.

The Jaina principles of Ahiṁsā and Aparigraha were enunciated thousands of years ago, and we have to assess their value in the context of present-day world problems. The achievements of modern science have made man more powerful than what he was once. Today the nationalistic tendencies have placed the state above everything, and the powerful politician is harnessing all the resources to fulfil his ambitions for further political domination. The two world wars have taught the sober thinker to realize that distinctions based on territory, colour, race, religion, etc. are all superficial. Aeroplane, wireless, radio and other appliances have brought men nearer ; and if judiciously used they can go a long way to shape a common mind and common ideals for the entire globe. Thus it has become all the more urgent today to realize that men are men wherever they are, and every one of us has to struggle for the common good of man.

We are all yearning for a new order, but mere talk of making the world better cannot work like a miracle. If we want the world, or the human society, to be well shaped, founded on sound moral laws, we should begin by trying to shape the individual primarily. Man has to refine himself even to reap justly the fruits which science has bestowed on him with remarkable rapidity. Without good individuals we cannot have a good society which is essentially an indivisible human organization, if not an organism. By neglecting the individual we cannot develop that sense of fellowship, the prerequisite of good life. In this respect the

Jaina vows have fundamentally aimed to shape the individual morally and spiritually, and if we properly interpret them under the present circumstances, Jainism has certainly a great lesson for the erring humanity.

From the latest wars it is abundantly clear that human relationships, mostly founded on force and fraud, have made the twentieth century society a civilized jungle. We must make a tremendous effort, both rational and moral, to substitute force and fraud by Ahiṁsā and Truth to achieve universal peace and welfare. The principle of Ahiṁsā, as lately interpreted by Mahatma Gandhi, can work as the highest moral standard to judge the behaviour of men and women individually and collectively.

sattveṣu maitrīṁ guṇiṣu pramodaṁ
kliṣṭeṣu jīveṣu kṛpā-paratvam
mādhyastha-bhāvaṁ viparīta-vṛttau
sadā mamātmā vidadhātu deva.

> " Lord, may my Ātman ever entertain friendship towards (all) the living beings, rejoicing at (the sight of) the virtuous, highest compassion for the suffering souls, and an attitude of detachment towards the ill-behaved."

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THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LIVING FAITHS

BUDDHISM

by

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Namo Thassa Bhagavato Arahato Samma Sambuddassa !

The *Buddha Dhamma* commonly called Buddhism is not strictly speaking a religion in the sense usually understood because it has none of the attributes of a theistic system of blind faith and worship owing allegiance to a God Creator. It is an ethico-philosophical way of living, its sole criterion being immediate self-realization. Says the *Dhammapada,* " Abstinence from all evil, fulfilment of all good, purification of one's mind, this is the teaching of the Buddhas." Meditation leading to self-control, self-discipline, self-purification, and self-enlightenment takes the place of prayers.

The *Buddha Dhamma* is the golden mean (*majjhima paṭipadā*) avoiding the two extremes of self-mortification and self-indulgence. It is a code suited equally to the house-holder and the monk. It rests on three pivots namely *anicca, dukkha* and *aṇattha*, that is to say everything is impermanent, everything is suffering and everything is impersonal not having a permanent entity or core. Understanding every phenomenon in relation to these three characteristics and developing the contemplation on them, one is able to penetrate the impermanency, the unsatisfactoriness and impersonality of all existence.

The *Buddha Dhamma*, the Universal moral law discovered by the Buddha, is summed up in the Four Noble Truths (*caturārya saccha*). They are the *dukkha saccha* or the universality of suffering, *samudaya saccha* or the origin of suffering, *nirodha saccha* or the extinction of suffering and lastly *nirodha gāmini paṭipadā* or the path which leads to the extinction of suffering. The first truth emphasizes that all forms of existence not only in this world but also in the *Dēva lōkas* are of necessity subject to suffering. Birth is suffering, old age is suffering, disease is suffering, death is suffering, to be associated with undesirable people is suffering, to be parted from our beloved ones is suffering, disappointment in not getting what one wishes is suffering, in short everything in relation to *pañca upādāna khandas* is suffering. Now what is the cause of this suffering ? This will be clear from the second noble truth. All the suffering arises from *taṇhā* or thirst that is craving after sensual pleasures, craving for *bhava* or existence in this world, or *vibhāva* existence in other worlds like Dēva lōka, Brahma lōka, etc. This *taṇhā* led by lust takes a sip here and there seeking after pleasures which at best are transitory. The third noble truth shows how with the cessation of this *taṇhā* or craving all

suffering will vanish and liberation from this cycle of births and deaths is obtained like the flame of a lamp going out when its stock of oil becomes exhausted and is not replenished.

Next we come to the most important of the four noble truths, the way or the means by which one attains this goal. This consists of one living and practising the *ārya aṭṭhāṅgiko maggo* or the eightfold noble path. The path consists of eight components, viz. right understanding, right determination or right mindedness, right speech, right bodily action, right livelihood, right effort, right attentiveness and right concentration of mind. Right understanding is the very foundation of progress and means a clear understanding of the four noble truths, the true nature of existence and the moral laws governing the same. The second stage of the eightfold path is right determination or right mindedness and denotes a pure state of mind and thoughts free from lust, from ill-will, and from cruelty with their positive counterparts of self-renunciation, goodness and compassion. Right speech consists in not uttering falsehood, that is, always speaking the truth, in refraining from harsh words likely to wound one's feeling, tale-bearings, and avoiding frivolous talk, wasting one's time and frittering away one's energy. Right action consists in refraining from intentional killing or harming any living being or creature, abstaining from dishonest taking and adultery. Right livelihood consists in following righteous means of living and abstaining from certain mean and injurious trades as for example, trading in arms and weapons of destruction (like atom bombs and hydrogen bombs of the present day unknown in ancient times), trading in poison, animals for purposes of slaughter, trading in slaves, etc., in short, following a noble and peaceful avocation. Right effort consists in overcoming old bad actions and in not accumulating fresh bad actions through the mind, body or speech. Right attentiveness means alertness of mind, the ever ready mental alertness and clearness always present in whatever we are thinking, speaking or doing, keeping before our mind the actualities and the realities of existence, its phenomena such as *anicca*, *dukkha*, and *aṇattha*.

Thus we reach the eighth and highest stage in the noble eightfold path. Right concentration of mind or *samādhi* progressing step by step to different heights, is next door to *nibbāṇa*. The eightfold noble path falls into three main categories *śīla* (morality), *paṇṇā* (wisdom) and *samādhi* (concentration). Under the head *śīla* come right speech, right bodily action, and right livelihood. Under *paṇṇā* come right understanding and right mindedness. Under *samādhi* come right effort, right attentiveness, and right concentration.

It will be seen that *śīla* or morality comes first in the ladder of self-discipline and development. Neither *paṇṇā* (wisdom) nor *samādhi* (concentration) is of the slightest use without *śīla* as they can be likened only to a flower bereft of smell. In no other system is so much prominence given to *śīla* as in the *Buddha Dhamma*. The very first verse of the *Viśuddhi Magga* says " *śīle patiṭ-*

ṭāya " then comes *paṇṇā* and so forth. *Śīla* consists in abstaining from killing, adultery, theft, etc. The observance of *śīla* may be limited in its scope or unlimited. For example a person may observe *śīla* so long as such observance does not adversely affect his profit, fame, kith and kin, limbs or life. But if there is a risk of these attributes being in any way affected by the observance of *śīla*, *śīla* is thrown to the wind. This cannot be a proper observance of *śīla*. Proper observance of *śīla* denotes its observance even at the risk of one's life and limbs and if the choice lies between the observance of *śīla* and risk to life the former should prevail. Says the *Viśuddhi Magga* " Neither the waters of the Gaṅgā, Yamunā, Sarabhu or Sarasvatī can purify one to the same extent as *śīla* ".

A proper observance of *śīla* is speeded up by two factors *hirī* (the shame which deters a man from sinning) and *ottappaṁ* (which connotes a tender conscience afraid of sin and shrinking from sin). Śīla is one of the ten *pāramis* or perfections which the Lord Buddha himself had to observe and attain a standard of perfection. The importance of *śīla* cannot therefore be exaggerated for development or self-discipline, self-control, self-purification, and self-enlightenment.

Paṇṇā or wisdom, intellect, reason falls into different classifications. There, is the *sekha paṇṇā* which is the wisdom of one walking in the first three paths of *sotāpanna* (one who has entered the stream and has attained the first grade of sanctification), the wisdom of an *asekha* (*Arhat* i.e. one who has attained final sanctification) and the wisdom of the *puthujjana* or unconverted man. There are also the wisdom obtained by thought, the wisdom obtained by study and the wisdom obtained by meditation.

Samādhi signifies a state of supernatural tranquillity or calm, one of the most characteristic attributes of the *Arhat*. It is sometimes confounded with *jhāna* (meditation or contemplation) but it is really a far wider term denoting preternatural calm. Jhāna (*dhyāna* in Sanskrit) is mental culture, mental concentration. There are four stages progressive from the first *jhāna* to the fourth or highest during which verbal activities of the mind and the fivefold sense-activity ceases step by step and the supersensual states of perfect mental absorption is attained. Several kinds of exercises in concentration are prescribed such as gazing at bright or coloured objects, contemplation of all-embracing kindness, compassion, altruistic Joy and perfect equanimity. Special emphasis must be laid on the development of all-embracing kindness which according to the *Viśuddhi Magga* starts with wishing one's own self happiness and freedom from suffering and extending the same thoughts to the teacher, the neighbours to the village, town, the whole country and even the *cakravāla*, other spheres, making no difference or exception between friend, enemy and embracing not only human beings but also the animal kingdom down to the tiniest ant or insects. In no other system is the value of life of living beings given such high value as in

the *Buddha Dhamma* and therefore the *Buddha Dhamma* is verily a religion of compassion.

The attainment of mental perfection is beset with certain pitfalls or hindrances which one should avoid. These are sensuality, hatred or anger, sloth and torpor, restlessness, flurry and worry, and lastly, doubt or scepticism. As long as these find a place in one's mind and are not eradicated it is impossible to make any real progress. One should cultivate their opposites like energy, joy, calmness and equanimity for speedy progress and attainment of the goal.

Since the *Buddha Dhamma* does not postulate a creator, some other explanation must be found not merely for birth and death but also for the inequalities existing in the world. This is explained by the law of *kamma* which is in one sense unique to the *Buddha Dhamma*. Unlike the Hindu conception, the *Buddha Dhamma* does not admit the existence of a soul independently of the body which after death leaves its physical body and passes over into a new body. Buddhism does not recognize in this world any existence of mind apart from matter and mind without matter is an impossibility. Our so-called individual existence is a mere process of mental and physical phenomena in a state of constant change or flux, a continually changing process, nothing that is persistent even for two consecutive moments. There can be no transmigration in the absence of an ego-entity unchangeable. How then is rebirth possible without an ego or soul? The Rev. Nyānatiloka explains this in a succint and clear manner. He says " Here I have to point out that even the word rebirth in this connection is really not quite correct but used as a mere makeshift. What the Buddha teaches is correctly speaking the law of cause and effect working in the moral domain. If every physical state is preceded by another state as its cause, so also must this present physico-mental life be dependent upon causes anterior to its birth. The present life process is the result of craving for life in former birth and the craving for life in this birth is the cause of the life-process that continues after death. Nothing transmigrates from this moment to the next, nothing from one life to another."

The doctrine of *kamma* explains in a logical manner the inequalities of a totally ill-balanced world. These inequalities are not due to blind chance, accident or the whims of a creator. They are the result of one's actions in previous births. We are ourselves responsible for our present state, and as we sow so shall we reap. The *Aṭṭhaśālini* says " Depending on this difference in *kamma* appears the difference in the birth of beings high and low, base and exalted, happy and miserable ". According to the doctrine of *paṭicca samuppāda* (dependant origination), *kamma* rooted in ignorance is the cause of birth and death. From ignorance arises volitional activities which in their turn give rise to consciousness, then in its turn to name and form, i.e., mind and matter, then to the

six senses, thence to contact, to sensations, thence to craving resulting in attachment. This attachment or clinging causes *kamma* which in its turn conditions future birth, the natural results of birth being old age and death. If the root cause of *avijja* (ignorance) is cut off, the rest of the edifice collapses with the cessation of further births and deaths.

Births may take place in the states of unhappiness or the happy states according to one's *kamma* which manifests itself as the kammic energy conditioning such births. The unhappy states are *niraya* (akin to hell), the animal kingdom, *pēta yōni* (ghosts), and the *asuras* (demons), their opposites the happy states such as the realm of human beings, the realm of the four guardian deities of the four quarters of the firmament, the Dēva lōkas six in number which are the realms of Dēvas, a class of beings possessing more refined bodies than human beings. These two categories of states constitute *kāma lōka*. Above them there are other planes *rūpa lōkas*, *arūpa lōkas*, the *suddha vāsas* (the pure abodes), the camping places of *anāgāmis* (those who will never return to this world or to Dēva lōkas) and Arhants (the perfected ones).

After, maybe, countless number of births and deaths and after passing through innumerable stages, a perfected one reaches *Nibbāṇa*, the summum bonum of all true followers of the *Dhamma*. Unfortunately the term *Nibbāṇa* has fallen into the category of disputed questions, possibly because of the different interpretations given to the expression by commentators and scholars. One school considers it as extinction or annihilation; others that it denotes merely an extinction of suffering. It would not be possible for me to discuss in this article the *pros* and *cons*. Since there is no ego it is not easy to think of any other kind of extinction than that of births and deaths which must necessarily lead to an extinction of suffering.

There are one or two misconceptions about the *Buddha Dhamma* to which I should like to allude before closing this article. It has been said that the *Buddha Dhamma* is atheism. This is not correct. The Buddha never denied the existence of an Almighty (in the theistic sense) because denial of a thing carries with it its affirmation. The Buddha is silent about the conception of an Almighty. Why? Because the existence or non-existence of an Almighty is extraneous to our purpose which is the extinction of suffering. An illustration given by Dhalke serves the purpose of explaining this attitude. Suppose a man drops into the mid-ocean suddenly, what are his thoughts? Does he speculate on the length and breadth of the ocean or is his whole effort concerned with vigorously working his arms and trying to keep afloat? Again, if a person is struck by an arrow and some one comes and wants to pull it out, is the victim going to ask for the geneology of the rescuer, his abode and place of birth or will his first act be to get the arrow removed? Similarly, the Buddha found sorrow and suffering in the world. He

suggests a simple and effective remedy for the extinction of the suffering without troubling himself or us with other matters not strictly relevant to the object.

The other charge is that the *Buddha Dhamma* is pessimistic and takes only a negative attitude. This is also unfounded. The *Buddha Dhamma* can be likened to a physician diagnosing a serious disease who at the same time offers an effective remedy. It would not be right to call the physician a pessimist because he realizes that the disease is a serious one and does not wish to lull the patient into a false sense of security which would be doing him a positive harm. The Buddha recognized the sorrow and suffering in this world even though sometimes there may be a veneer of temporary happiness. But at the same time he also provided a way of escaping the misery just as a physician prescribes a potent medicine to cure the disease. The Buddha's teaching is boldly optimistic and holds out hope of salvation or *Nirvāṇa* to the most unfortunate. It lays special emphasis on the fact that not by rites, rituals or ceremonies one can achieve success and attain *Nibbāṇa* but only by one's own strenuous efforts, walking and earnestly persevering in the Eightfold Noble Path of inward perfection, purity of heart.

"May all living beings be happy!"

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THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LIVING FAITHS

ZOROASTRIANISM

by

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Zarathushtra, the Prophet of Ancient Iran, founded his religion in Airyana-vaejah, ' the stem-land of Airyana (Aryan) which later became Iran. He is generally known by his familiar name Zoroaster for the last 2,500 years. The Greeks spoke of him as Zoroastres. It became Zoroastres in Latin, which later became Zoroaster. The earliest classical allusion to him is found in Platonic Alcibiades. The Avestan form ' Zarathushtra ' became Zaratusht and Zartusht or Zardusht in Modern Persian. Aristotle, Eudoxus and Hermippus write that he flourished 5,000 years before the Trojan war. Other Greek writers state that he flourished 6,000 years ago. Some Pahlavi authors, writing after the downfall of the last Zoroastrian Empire in the seventh century, speak of his coming three hundred years before Alexander the Great invaded Iran. Albiruni, Masudi and other Arab writers perpetuated this fanciful tradition. Hence arose the erroneous idea that Zoroaster flourished in the Sixth Century, B.C. So his date of birth is placed somewhere between 600 B.C. and 6000 B.C.

Avesta, the sacred language of Ancient Iran, is the sister language of Sanskrit. There is a marked closeness between the grammar, metre and style of the Ṛg-veda and the Gathas. Even the Gathic inflexions are more ancient than the Vedic. Under such circumstances there cannot be any considerable distance of time between the composition of the Gathas and the Vedas.

Ahura Mazda, later Ormazd, meaning 'The Wise Lord' is the name of God. He is Almighty, Omnipotent, Omnipresent and Omniscient. He is the Creator, Nourisher, and Protector. He is True and Just and Merciful. He is the Friend and Father of those who seek his friendship and love. Many are his attributes. They are not accidents of his being, but are his very essence. He is the Light in the physical aspect as he is Truth in the spiritual. He lives in the heavenly realms and wears the firmament as his heavenly garment. Yet he can be addressed and greeted by the righteous. Man can enter into close relationship with him and with devotion and love, own him as his friend and brother and father. He loves those who seek his love and befriends those who seek his friendship. Zarathushtra saw him and conversed with him and so can man by meditation when he makes his devoted heart the temple of the Lord.

Spenta Mainyu, the self-revealing activity, the Holy Spirit, intervenes between the unmoved mover, Ahura Mazda, and the world of change. He spans the chasm between the supersensuous and the sensuous. He brings the transcendence and immanence of Ahura Mazda into a synthesis. Ahura Mazda, as the self-existing being, is not completely separated nor completely merged in the world. The projection or manifestation of his creative will and thought is his working principle, Spenta Mainyu, the Holy Spirit. He ever was in Ahura Mazda and with Ahura Mazda. Though he is thus part of Ahura Mazda, in his manifestation as the working self of Ahura Mazda, he is different from Ahura Mazda. He is not an entity or personality. Ahura Mazda is the greatest spiritual personality. Spenta Mainyu is his image, his replica. He represents the creative attribute of Ahura Mazda in his relation to the created world.

Spenta Mainyu symbolizes the ideal or perfect existence as conceived in thought by Ahura Mazda. The materialization of the divine thought in creation spells imperfection, and Spenta Mainyu is shadowed by his inseparable opposite. These two primeval spirits, who are spoken of as twins, emerged from the divine bosom and by their innate choice appeared as the better and worse in thought, word and deed. The Holy Spirit chose righteousness and the Evil Spirit wooed the worst as his sphere of action. The better of the two spirits told the evil one that they were by nature opposed to each other in their thoughts and teachings, understandings and beliefs, words and deeds, selves and souls—in nothing could they ever meet. When the two first came together in the world, they created life and non-life and established the law of reward and retribution for mankind, that the righteous will reap at the end of existence the weal of Best Thought and the wicked the woe of the Worst Existence.

The Gathas or the holy hymns composed by Zarathushtra, speak of the Holy Spirit as the attribute of Ahura Mazda, or as his vicegerent, or as his co-worker, or as identified with him or as distinct from him.

From the days of Thales (about 600 B.C.), the head of the School of Miletus the Greek thinkers were in touch with the Orient. The Ionians were in close contact with the Persians. Alexandria later became a cosmopolitan school of learning and the intellectual East and West met there. Persian influence, it seems, had been felt in Greece in the early formative period of its philosophy. Zarathushtra, we have noticed, postulated a quasi-independent spirit intermediary between the godhead and the universe. Anaxagoras calls it Nous, acting between God and the world as the regulating principle of existence. Plato says in his Timaeus that the universe becomes an organism through the universal World-Soul that is created by the Demiurge, the Supreme Deity.

The Old Testament refers to the Spirit of Yahweh. Philo Judaeus unites the Greek and Jewish ideas about Logos and says that Logos is the first-born

Son of God and acts as a vicegerent of God between God and the world. He is the prototypal Man after whose image all men are created. Logos is something more than Plato's Idea of the Good, because, like Spenta Mainyu, he is creatively active. In common with Spenta Mainyu, Logos is not a personal being, and like Spenta Mainyu again, he appears sometimes as identified with God and at other times seems to be an attribute of God. The Zoroastrian texts refer to Spenta Mainyu and his adversary Angra Mainyu as *thworeshtār* or the fashioners or cutters, and speaking about the work of Logos, Philo speaks of him as Tomeus, ' the cutter,' employing the word of the same meaning. Again as Spenta Mainyu or the spirit of light is shadowed by the opposite spirit of darkness, so Logos, says Philo, is the Shekinah or Glory or Light of God, but he is also the darkness or shadow of God. This is so because, he adds, the creature reveals only half the creator and hides the other half. In the Book of Wisdom of Solomon, Wisdom, identical with the Greek Logos, is the divine essence, living a quasi-independent existence in God and side by side with God. She works as the active agent of God in the creation of the world.

Numenius of Apamea, writing in the second century, says that God has bestowed divine qualities upon a second god who acts in the world as the power for good. Origen, writing shortly after him, says that God created Logos or Son. His relation to the Father is the same as that which exists between Ahura Mazda and Spenta Mainyu. The Son or Logos, says Origen, is co-eternal and co-equal with the Father, but the Son is lesser than the Father. Clement of Alexandria says that Logos represents the will, power, and energy of God. He is the creator on behalf of God. He has introduced harmony in the universe and conducts its affairs as the pilot.

Just as man, in his religious evolution, comes to the belief in the existence of kindly beings who protect and nourish and help him, so he discovers that there are hostile powers who wish him evil. Such demons are presided over by powerful chiefs who rule over the world of darkness and evil. They have weak personalities as incarnating evil, but each one is Satan in the making. Satan was in conflict with Horus in Egypt, as Tiamat was with Marduk in Baylonia and Vṛtra with Indra among the Indo-Iranians.

The opponent of Spenta Mainyu, the Holy Spirit, who disputes the sovereignty over human hearts is Angra Mainyu. Evil is a challenge and Zarathushtra accepts it. He does not palliate it. It is not the passive negation of good. It is the active enemy of good. It is not complementary to good, nor is it good in the making. It is not evil only in name. Evil is just evil, nothing more or less. Life is co-operation with good and conflict with evil. Good and evil are co-existing polarities. Man can think of things only in terms of their opposites. Light is light because of darkness.

'Resist Evil' is the clarion call of Zarathushtra to mankind. Evil is equally the enemy of Ahura Mazda and man, and man is created a comrade in arms to resist evil in his own nature and in all its manifestations in the world. It is his birthright to fight evil. The world is imperfect in all its phases, and it is man's mission to make it perfect. The world is a battlefield and man is a soldier in the struggle. The soldier's duty is to stand firm at his post and fight even to death. If he holds overtures with the enemy, or succumbs to his wiles, he is a rebel ; if he evades fight, or ignores it, or turns his back upon the enemy, he is a coward, dishonouring his manhood.

Evil is the common enemy of Ahura Mazda and man, and man is engaged in fighting as an ally of the godhead. In his fight against evil, he is a co-worker and a fellow-combatant with Ahura Mazda. Men of all times and places have to fight individually and collectively for the mighty cause. Man has to fight the forces of evil to his last breath. His life is one of a continued crusade against the powers of wickedness. Men and women have to adjust social wrongs, regulate society, and redeem the world of humanity.

To be good and eschew evil are passive virtues ; to further good and to fight evil are active virtues. Personal salvation is the basic principle, the motive power that inspires all religious life. Zarathushtra insists that every human being's duty is to seek salvation of all mankind. To secure individual salvation and leave others to their fate, without working and struggling for their salvation, is to fail in one's duty towards his fellow-men. To be good, but not to make others good ; not to be evil, yet not to resist evil caused by others, are merely negative virtues. Just as the individual's duty ends not in practising virtues which tend to make him good, but in making others good, so also he must not rest when he has eradicated his own evil thoughts, bridled his passions and overcome the evil that lurks in his inward nature, but he has further to reclaim others who have embraced evil. It is not enough that he should himself eschew evil, but he must induce others to give up their evil. He cannot remain a passive spectator while his neighbour is suffering. The fact that something evil and imperfect exists around him, no matter by whom caused, is a sufficient reason why he should rush into the fray and do his part to mitigate and remove it. Nay, he has even to hunt out the hydra of wrong and strike at its many heads, so that the world of goodness may not suffer.

The Prophet of Ancient Iran warns man that happiness is not the criterion of the value of human life, pleasure is not the standard ; but duty in its two-fold aspect, that is, working for righteousness and fighting against wickedness, is the guiding principle of life. Incessant work for the Kingdom of Righteousness deepens man's life ; uncompromising war against the Kingdom of Wickedness strengthens it. This two-fold activity makes life complete. To further righteousness is only half the duty ; to combat wickedness and demolish it is the other

half. Both are indispensable to realize the Zoroastrian ideal of righteousness. Then will the world be perfect and the Kingdom of Righteousness will come.

In the Gathas, Spenta Mainyu, the Holy Spirit was apart from Ahura Mazda. In the later period the Holy Spirit is identified with Ahura Mazda. So Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu become the two rival powers of good and evil.

We find that Hippolytus says on the authority of Aristoxenus about 320 B.C. that Zoroastrianism was the religion of dualism. This view had long prevailed everywhere.

Although Angra Mainyu, later Ahriman, seems to be co-equal with Ahura Mazda, (later Ormazd) he is not co-eternal, because there will be a time when the world will be perfect, when Ahriman will enter into nothingness. It may be said that Ormazd was, is and shall be, whereas Ahriman was, is, but shall not be. When righteousness will destroy wickedness, Ahriman will meet with his natural death. It may therefore be said that Ormazd and Ahriman are not actually balanced equally against each other, and Zoroastrianism is monotheism and not dualism.

In the same way, for hundreds of years the writers of different faiths have been urging that the Zoroastrians were Fire-worshippers. Fire is light, and spiritually Ahura Mazda is Light as Angra Mainyu is Darkness. Light is thus the sacred emblem, and is ever kept burning in all Fire-Temples or Zoroastrian Churches. The Great poet Firdausi rightly says: "Magui ke ātash parastān budand, Parastanda-i Pāk Yazdān budand." "Say not that they were the Fire-worshippers, they were the worshippers of one Holy God."

With the godhead at the pinnacle, the Amesha Spentas or the Holy Immortal Ones form a heptad. They are the seven Archangels. After Ahura Mazda at the head, come Vohu Manah, 'Good Mind', Asha Vahishta, 'Best Righteousness,' Khshathra Vairya, 'Desirable Divine Kingdom,' Spenta Amraiti, 'Holy Devotion,' Haurvatat, 'Perfection,' and Ameretat, 'Immortality.' They are all of one thought, one word and one deed. They hold their celestial councils on the heights of the heavens and come to the seven zones into which the world is divided and help and guide mankind. They are the ever-living and the ever-helping ones. They are the wise ones and good rulers. They are the makers, rulers, fashioners, guardians, protectors and preservers of the creation of Mazda. Plutarch and Strabo refer to them in their works.

The Yazatas or the Adorable Ones are the Angels next in rank to the Archangels. About forty only are mentioned by name in the extant Avestan texts. Several of the Yazatas have individually consecrated to them a Yasht, or hymn of praise, which narrates the doings and functions of thier respective genius. Besides the Yashts that form a special bibliographical literature of these minor divinities,

the whole Iranian literature is filled with the record of their achievements. Ahura Mazda himself is a Yazata, even as he is an Amesha Spenta. He is the greatest and the best Yazata. Zarathushtra himself is spoken of as a Yazata.

Some of these Yazatas go back to the Indo-Iranian period. We shall group them under two headings and distinguish those that are common to the Indians and the Iranians from those that are purely Iranian.

Indo-Iranian : Mithra, Airyaman, Haoma, Verethraghna, Parendi, Rata, Nairyosangha, Ushah, and Vayu.

Iranian : Atar, Ardvi Sura Anahita, Hvarekhshaeta, Maonghah, Tishtrya, Drvaspa, Sraosha, Rashna, Raman, Daena, Chisti, Erethe, Rasanstat, Ashi Vanghuhi, Arshtat, Asman, Zam, Manthra Spenta, Damoish Upamana and Anaghra Raochah.

The Yazatas are divided into two groups. The Celestial Yazatas represent Divine Wisdom, Rectitude, Victory, Felicity, Charity, Peace, Spell, Health, Riches and Cattle. Among the Terrestrial Yazatas are Light, Wind, Fire, Water and Earth.

Mithra was physically Light, as he was spiritually Truth. The fighting armies invoked him for help as the War Lord. He rose to world fame. Mithraism, which was Zoroastrianism contaminated with Semitic accretions, was according to Plutarch, first taken to Rome by the Cilician pirates who were taken captives in 67 B.C. His cult rapidly spread in Europe. Mithra was proclaimed by Diocletian in 307 A.D. as the protector of his empire. Mithraism remained the religion of Rome for two hundred years. It fell when it lost the protection by the State and Christianity triumphed over its great rival. Mithraism lingered in the Alps and Vosges and in the out of the way places for considerable time. It perished, but not without leaving its mark behind and many of its beliefs and ritualistic practices and its art influenced Christianity. The votaries of Mithra used to celebrate the birth of the Sun on December 25, because during the winter solstice, light triumphed over darkness and the lengthening of the day began. The Christians chose this day as the feast of the Nativity of Christ, which is celebrated even to this day.

Ahura Mazda as the Omniscient Lord had the ideas, or prototypes of his coming creation in his mind. They are the higher doubles of mankind. Before creating mankind, he asked them whether they would like to remain in the celestial world where they were happy or whether they would like to go to the other world that he was going to create. This world would be good as well as evil. Every man and woman there would be endowed with a soul which will have to live in the world of polarity. He, the godhead would send one Fravashi as the guiding spirit of the soul of every individual man and woman. The Fravashi as the infallible guide and guardian of the individual will have to lead the soul to fight

evil within the inner world of the individual and fight without in the outer world. This struggle between truth and falsehood, virtues and vice, righteousness and wickedness will be perpetual. After the struggle of countless ages, the forces of good will ultimately triumph over those of evil.

The Fravashis undertook to embark upon this agelong struggle and help and protect and guide the souls of mankind to fight and demolish evil from everywhere, and bring about the Perfection of the World.

The Fravashis are like the Vedic Pitṛs, the Platonic Ideas and the Roman Manes. The Nous or the image of God constitutes the true nature of man according to the Platonists, Aristotelians and the Stoics. Philo calls it Pneuma as distinguished from the soul. Such is the twofold psychic division of man, soul and spirit or Fravashi.

At the initiation or the ceremony at which a Zoroastrian child is invested with the sacred shirt and girdle after the age of seven, it is made to recite and all along life afterwards that he or she will always embrace *humata, hukhta* and *hvarshta*, "Good Thoughts, Good Words and Good Deeds" and always abjure *dushmata, duzhukhta* and *duzvarshta*, " Evil Thoughts, Evil Words and Evil Deeds."

Aevo-pantão yo ashahe, "One Alone is the Path—it is the Path of Righteousness." Human life is a struggle between Righteousness and Wickedness. The din of the struggle that rages in the breasts of human beings is louder than the howling of any tempest upon earth. Happy is the man or the woman who outlives the storm. All right-speaking and right-doing originate from right-thinking and this in turn, springs from a pure mind. Purity of mind is the best riches. All are reminded : " Up with your feet and up with your hands and up with your minds to do lawful, timely good deeds and to fight against unlawful, untimely, evil deeds."

Righteousness is the highest riches. There comes a day or there comes a night, when the master leaves his cattle, when the cattle leave their master, and the soul leaves the body. But righteousness, which is the greatest and the best of all riches accompanies the soul after death. The best man is the righteous man. He is not heroic who is not heroic in righteousness, he is not valiant who is not valiant in righteousness. Life while departing leaves the richest empty in the midst of his abundance, if he lacks righteousness.

Every individual has to shoulder his or her load of good or evil deeds on his or her own shoulders, which can never be cast upon another. When a righteous person dies, his or her soul hovers about the head of the corpse before being removed from the house and chants : " Happiness unto him or her from whom happiness is unto others."

The soul of the righteous one makes its triumphal ascent to heaven, towards Chinvat or the Bridge of Judgment, wending its way from fragrant perfumes and amid the wind that blows from the regions of the south, a sweet-scented wind, sweeter-scented by far than any which the soul ever inhaled on earth. There now appears to the soul its own *daena* or conscience, in the shape of a damsel of unsurpassed beauty, the fairest of the fair in the world. Dazzled by her matchless beauty and grandeur, the soul halts and inquires as to whose image this may be, the like of which it had neither seen nor heard of in the material world. The apparition replies that she is neither a fairy nor a damsel, but just the impersonation of the soul's own good thoughts, good words and good deeds in life. The soul then enters paradise.

On the other hand, the soul of the wicked person is harassed by the thoughts of its wicked life and bewails in bewilderment : " Whither shall I go ? To what direction shall I turn ?" The soul now marches on dreary and dreadful path that lies amid the most foul-scented wind blowing from the northern regions. The wicked soul is then confronted by the personification of its own conscience in the shape of an ugly old woman. She mercilessly taunts it and says that she is the impersonation of the evil thoughts, evil words and evil deeds. The soul is now tried by the three celestial judges and condemned to hell.

Heaven in general is Vahisht, Paradise. The divisions of heaven are *Humata*, or Good Thought, *Hukhta*, or Good Word and *Hvarshta*, or Good Deed, as beatific abodes for the soul. *Garonmāna*, the fourth and the highest heaven is later designated as the place of *anaghra raochah*, or Endless Light. The heavenly region is the shining, all-happy abode of the righteous. Vohu Manah, the premier archangel, hails the pious souls on their arrival in paradise and introduces them to Ahura Mazda and the other heavenly beings.

The intermediary place between heaven and hell is called *Hamistagān*. It is for those souls in whose case the balance trembles evenly between good and evil at the Bridge of Judgment. The souls that are transported to this place have no other sufferings than shivering in winter and frost and being scorched in the tropical summer, upto the day of Resurrection.

Four are the hells. The Evil Thought Hell, Evil Word Hell, Evil Deed Hell and the Worst Existence of Darkness. Hells are deep and dark and dreadful and stinking, vile and grievous, cold and stony, full of punishment and pain, misery and torture. Ahriman greets the wicked souls in hell with scorn and mockery. The wretched souls now repent of their sins and exclaim that it would have been better for them if they had not been born upon the earth. All conceivable forms of torture prevail in hell. Solitude in hell is appalling.

Zoroaster postulated the renovation of the universe, a new dispensation in which the world will become perfect at the last day. We learn from Diogenes, on the authority of Theopompus and Eudemus, that the classical authors were

familiar with the Zoroastrian doctrine of the millennium and the final restoration of the world as early as in the fourth century B.C. Plutarch draws his materials on this millennial doctrine from Theopompus.

According to the teachings of Zarathushtra, every man or woman is his or her own saviour. Salvation depends entirely upon the righteous life of the individual. Besides this individual salvation there is to be the universal salvation in which the renovators will finish the work of bringing salvation to all human beings. They are called Saoshyants or Saviours. The last Saviour will bring about the final reconciliation of the entire creation to its creator. There will be general Resurrection of the dead. All dead human beings from the time of Gayomard, the primeval man, down to the last human being will be raised again to life. Universal judgment will take place. The righteous and the wicked shall thereafter no longer remain as divided, but unite into one.

All angels will smite their rival demons. Demons and fiends, deceit and falsehood, strife and anger, hatred and ill temper, pain and disease, want and greediness, shame and fear, all will perish. Evil of every kind will disappear and good of every kind will be perfected.

Angra Mainyu or Ahriman, the Prince of Evil, will then be impotent. He will bend his knees and bow his head and acknowledge his defeat in the warfare of the countless ages between the forces of Light and Darkness, Truth and Falsehood, Righteousness and Wickedness. Ormazd at last will become completely predominant and his Kingdom of Righteousness will be built upon the earth. The world will be Perfect.

Humanity will attune its will to the will of Ormazd. All men and women will now become of one will and remain of one accord in the faith of Ormazd, giving voice in song to the Glory of their Lord. All will now live in the blessed company of Ormazd and work to exalt his glory.

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THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LIVING FAITHS

CHRISTIANITY*

by

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Some years ago while taking a university course in Buddhist philosophy from an eminent authority on the subject, I was struck by the great variety of schools of thought and of fundamental concepts in Buddhism. Each of the many texts we studied seemed to present a different philosophy, even in fundamentals. Being too Westernized for my own intellectual good, I brought to the subject a naive literalness which made me ask the professor repeatedly, " But what is Buddhism itself ? What does Buddhism say ? " He did not really answer my question, but he gave a reply which, in colloquial words, " put me in my place," an answer which has remained vivid in my mind ever since, and an answer which is extremely appropriate to the subject at hand in this paper. His reply was, " What is Christianity ?" I could not answer that question then, nor can I answer it now—nor do I think anyone can answer it in the sense in which I had asked the question about Buddhism—and yet my task in this paper is to do just that, namely, to set down in black and white the fundamental tenets of Christianity which are intrinsic to and characteristic of Christianity as a whole. It is impossible to perform this task with any degree of assurance and without a full realization that there have been theologians and scholars, throughout the ages who would deny the interpretation given, and would, instead, find the essence of Christianity in very different principles or interpretations.

In other words, not only in religious practices, but also—and perhaps chiefly—in philosophical doctrines, Christianity is a fluid, dynamic, and growing set of ideas. In this respect it is not unlike both Hinduism and Buddhism, and all three of these major religious points of view, it seems to me, must be viewed in other than literal, exact, static terms if one is to grasp the spirit of the respective religion and understand its philosophy. To the Western mind, rigidity and literalness of concept have been an essential demand of thought from the very beginning of Greek philosophy. Such definiteness of concept has disenabled the Westerner to comprehend and appreciate the manifold aspects and the changing perspective of such a complex doctrine as is the philosophy of Christianity. In this respect, we of the West must learn from the East and must be willing to say, not that one interpretation or another must be correct and all others incorrect, but that the several interpretations may all be correct from some aspect of the broad subject and from the comprehensive and philosophical perspective of the whole.

* I am indebted to Dr J. Leslie Dunstan for consultation and suggestions in connection with this paper.

As a matter of fact, this synthetic attitude is rather essential to Christianity, which in some of its doctrines achieves much in the direction of merging heretofore conflicting perspectives. For example, as Ueberweg and Hegel have made a special effort to point out, Christianity has deliberately tried to reconcile or merge—without distorting or discarding either—the infinite and the finite, the human and the divine, the transcendent and the immanent, the natural and the supernatural, and the God of Love and the God of Justice (and even, at times, the God of Wrath).

However, despite this general synthetic point of view and despite also the lack of a precise demonstrably exact set of doctrines, Christianity does seem to teach, within limits, certain fundamental principles, principles which, with the warning of the first paragraph of this article in mind, I shall proceed herewith to state.

1. *A Personal Deity*

The ultimate reality for Christianity is a personal deity who, in contrast to the unqualifiable ultimate realities of Hinduism and Buddhism, is the possessor of many qualities and attributes. The deity of Christianity is never thought of as a mere expression of an Absolute, an expression which possesses qualities which are categories of the world and which therefore do not belong to the ultimate in its essence.[1] Though Christianity does have the concept of the distinction between God as He is in Himself and God as known or thought of by man, God is always characterized by the qualities of personality and deity, and these qualities are intrinsic to His nature, though man knows them only "through a glass darkly."

Specifically, God is most prominently characterized by omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection (perfect righteousness). The attribute of reason and wisdom is sometimes considered most fundamental of all or at least an especially prominent characteristic (although during the history of Christianity there has been a constant debate as to priority of God's will or His intellect). The rationality of the Christian deity in Christian theology was very probably a specific contribution of Greek philosophy to Christian thought, and came into prominence in the era of the Church Fathers when the effort was made to synthesize Christian revelation and Greek philosophy in order to universalize, rationalize, and defend the religion by providing it with philosophical formulations and bases with the aid of concepts and arguments drawn from rationalistic Greek philosophy. (Present tendencies in Christian thought are challenging this rationalism as extrinsic to original and therefore basic Christianity)[2].

1 See S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, Oxford University Press, 2nd edn., 1940, pp. 92, 104.

2 For example, see Karl Barth, *The Doctrine of the Word of God*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1936.

On that side of His nature which is perhaps most directly related to Man, God is characterized by love and justice. In view of the basic principle that " God is love," that aspect of His being is most often emphasized as expressing His essential nature, but, although interpretations differ on this matter, the God of the New Testament is as much a God of justice as is the God of the Hebrew Old Testament, which, of course, is also a part of Christian scripture. However, God is not characterized by universal love which extends to all, good and bad, believers and unbelievers, alike. [3] The New Testament speaks of the " wrath of God " and of His " righteous judgment," and neither of these entails undiscriminating universal love of man. [4]

2. *Knowledge of the Deity*

The question immediately arises as to how man gains knowledge of God. In the first place it must be pointed out that mysticism—both as a method and as a metaphysic—is considered decidedly unorthodox in Christian thinking. God does not possess either the absolute oneness of mysticism nor the non-qualitative character which mysticism usually ascribes to the deity. As to method, Christianity is generally in strong opposition to mysticism in that, according to traditional Christianity, God reveals Himself to man, and man cannot, of his own ability, reach or become identical with God, as he can and does in most forms of mysticism. In mysticism—as in Hinduism and Buddhism—man in a sense *is* God (or the ultimate) and can reach God and the knowledge of God by his own efforts. The Buddha, for example, was a man who, as it were, reached God (or the truth), knew directly and fully what the deity (or truth) was, and then explained that nature to man. As said above, the rationality of God is a strong element in Christian thought, and many Christian thinkers, among them St. Thomas Aquinas, have believed that reason could lead to a knowledge of God. Nevertheless, there is a question as to whether this is strict Christianity, and there is also the fact that, even in a Thomas Aquinas, the higher mysteries of the religion remain mysteries despite all powers of human reasoning—for example, the doctrine of the Trinity. Some recent Christian thinkers speak of the " boundary situation " [5] to represent the " gap " which exists between God and man both on the theoretical side, such that man can never attain to a knowledge of God by his own intellectual power, and, secondly, on the practical side, such that man can never gain salvation by his own efforts.

3. *Jesus Christ*

Jesus Christ was God in living form. The doctrine of the Trinity, which transcends all efforts at adequate rational explanation, holds that God the Father, God the Son (Christ), and God the Holy Spirit are all equally God in essence and

3 For example, see Reinhold Niebuhr, *Faith and History*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1949, p. 113ff.

4 Romans 1 : 18 ; Ephesians 5 : 6 ; Luke 19 : 12-27 ; etc.

5 Paul Tillich, *The Protestant Era*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948, p. 195ff.

yet in some way distinguishable, at least in thought. Christ represents the unity of God and man, both in the metaphysical sense of being God and yet being man also, and in the practical sense in which Christ is the redeemer of man and thus re-unifies sinful man with God. (According to some interpreters, this is *the* unique doctrine of Christianity as contrasted with Hellenism, Judaism, and " Orientalism." [6]) Christ is also a revelation of the nature of God, but, although He is a living revelation of God's nature, He obviously does not reveal that nature fully or as God is in Himself, but only as God is for man.

Predominantly the doctrine of Christ is one of salvation rather than one of metaphysics. Christ's purpose was to redeem the world.[7] Metaphysically, He was the embodiment of God's rationality in the world—" In the beginning was the Logos and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God " [8] ; but more pronounced was His embodiment of the love of God—and His justice.

4. *The Status of the World*

The world and all things therein were created by God. The world was created " out of nothing." There was no special reason for God's creation of the world. He created it out of perfect love and perfect free will—without any compelling cause or reason. Although in the account of the creation in Genesis I, God looked upon the world and saw that it was " good," almost everywhere else in the Bible the evil in the world is made one of its important characteristics. Evil is very real in Christianity. Moral evil is explained as being due to man's misuse of his freedom, although it is recognized in Christian theology that man's possession of freedom entails the power to choose evil since it entails the possibility of significant choice which must involve the possibility of a choice of evil. Christianity also recognizes that the world, being a created entity and being other than God, is not and cannot be perfect. There is thus the doctrine of evil as a lack of perfection or good. In this doctrine—rather basic to Christianity—there is no ultimate force for evil in reality, for only God is ultimate ; the evil was permitted to exist by God in order that man might prove his worth.

5. *The Nature and Status of Man*

Man was created by God and, in one interpretation, was created in the image of God, but nowhere in Christianity is it held that man is divine. The Hindu statement " *Tat tvam asi* " does not apply to man in Christianity. All fall short of the glory of God. In fact, in most of the sacred literature of Christianity, man is far from the image of God ; perhaps he was originally so, but he has " fallen," and to all intents and purposes is a sinner by his very nature. The widely held doctrine that all men, however sinful, " possess an inalienable God-

6 Friedrich Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy*, E. T., G. S. Morris, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1871, Vol. I, pp. 264-265.

7 Luke 19 : 10.

8 John 1 : 1.

given value which should elicit respect and love, ..." [9] is open to serious question, in view of several other teachings of Christianity wherein some men seem to lack God-given value entirely—as for example when men are divided into "sheep" and "goats," the latter being apparently unworthy even of God's love. [10] Man is in the image of God, however, in the sense that he is a free spirit and remains such as long as he loves and obeys God. Like God he is a person and has, within the limits of a created being, the capacity for the various attributes of God, such as righteousness, love, and justice.

An important teaching of Christianity is that the physical body is real and significant. It is not evil, nor is it necessarily the source of evil. The dualistic theory of the evil of the body is counteracted by the fact that Christ Himself had a body and by the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. Since the body is real and since man is—to use Aristotelian language brought into Christianity by St. Thomas Aquinas—a "substance" composed of soul and body, the good life is to be lived in the body and in the world where the body may act. Although there are many indications of what might be called a negative attitude toward life, Christianity is not essentially negative or escapist. [11] It cannot be so in view of the doctrine of a human Jesus, who, by living in the flesh, sanctified life and showed that the perfect life could be lived in the body.

6. *Ethics*

Christian ethics, like much of Christian doctrine, is very general and very fluid. To a greater extent than is often realized, there are very few specific commands or duties voiced by Christ to form the content of Christian ethics. Love of God and of one's neighbour as oneself is basic to the Christian point of view, and this is *the* commandment of Christianity. All else depends upon such love. Of course, Christianity absorbs the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament, but the spirit of the law becomes much more significant in Christianity than the letter of the law which seems to dominate the Hebrew point of view and practice. The famous Sermon on the Mount advocates a general type of life and puts forward many beatitudes which seemed to imply a certain mode of conduct. Meekness, forgiveness, and purity of heart are praised, but do not constitute a system of ethics. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to derive any precise system of moral law from the gospels. For example, does Christianity justify war or demand peace? Texts will justify both. [12] It is sometimes said that Christianity has two distinct levels of morality, one, Counsels of Perfection for the more serious-minded aspirants, and another, consisting essentially of the

9 Theodore M. Greene, *Religious Perspectives of College Teaching in Philosophy*, The Edward W. Hazen Foundation, New Haven, 1950, p. 17.

10 Matthew 25 : 31-46.

11 See S. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, Ch. III, and Albert Schweitzer, *Indian Thought and Its Development*, E. T., Mrs. C. E. B. Russell, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1936.

12 Matthew 5 : 39, 43 ; 26 : 52 ; 10 : 34.

commandments, for laymen in general. (This would accord well with similar points of view in such systems as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism.)

7. *The Way to Salvation*

Faith in God (and Christ), purity of heart, and God's forgiveness and grace are component parts of the road to salvation in Christianity. If one is thinking in terms of comparative religion, perhaps the most significant aspect of the way to salvation in Christianity is the absolute necessity of God's forgiveness and grace, that is, the free gift of salvation to men, who by their very nature cannot achieve salvation of their own ability. This is in sharp contrast to the doctrine of *karma* and absolute individual responsibility as found in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. While the doctrine of merit (which would correspond to the doctrine of *karma*) is not strictly upheld, neither is it abandoned entirely. Man's only merit would be far short of salvation without God's forgiveness, but Christianity does not exclude the principle of justice, holding that one's life in the hereafter depends in part at least upon the kind of life one lived before death.

In another sense, purity of heart would appear to be the sum and substance of the requirement for salvation. The question is, however, how to reach that exalted state which involves essentially the love of and devotion to God in such a complete sense that all other prerequisites of salvation are met almost automatically.

The problem of the way to salvation has been the cause of a major debate in Christian thought through the ages, there being strongly divergent opinions concerning the question as to whether salvation is gained by faith or by works. Essentially, Christianity is a religion of faith, but one's works may be interpreted as a criterion of the depth and sincerity of one's faith, and thus both become significant.

8. *Man's Destiny—The Nature of Salvation*

The destiny of man is personal immortality, a future life in which the individual persists as an individual and lives a life rich in the content of personal living. This is most difficult to describe in any detail, of course, but it is a life given by God and a life that is good, provided that man has lived well on earth and has attained God's forgiveness for his wrongdoings. As said before, justice is meted out, but love and forgiveness are also effective in determining what life man shall live in the hereafter. If one has been evil in life, justice requires either no significant life whatever or a life of suffering. The important aspect of the Christian doctrine of immortality, as contrasted with, for example, the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, is that man is never identified or merged with God or the ultimate and remains forever the distinct individual he was made by God in the beginning. ***Man never attains divinity in Christianity.***

9. *Conclusion*

From time to time throughout the history of Christianity there have been major revisions of interpretation of Christian doctrine. Emphasis has been other-worldly or worldly, Platonic or Aristotelian, etc One of the most significant of such major reconsiderations of doctrine has been taking place during the last ten years, during which time a very strong effort has been made to remove from Christianity all extraneous influences and to restore " pure " Christianity or the teachings of Christ. This would necessitate the removal from Christian doctrine of many influences of Greek philosophy and would make of Christianity a much less sophisticated and much less rationalistic set of teachings.

It is very difficult to say what in Christianity, if anything, is amenable to synthesis with the major attitudes of the East. Very few of the cardinal teachings of Christianity could be brought into distinct and detailed harmony with the attitudes of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism as found in India. Christianity is from the East, but due to its entrance into the West, it became a religion quite different from those of its homeland. Most incompatible with the thought of the great Eastern religious philosophies are Christianity's teachings : first, that its personal God, having qualities, is the ultimate reality ; second, that man is not and cannot become divine ; and, third, that man cannot attain salvation by his own efforts.

Perhaps the teachings of Christianity have been so strongly influenced by the general tenor of Western culture, civilization, and life that its teachings are no longer compatible with those of the land from which it sprang. Nevertheless, if current movements[13] in Christian thought succeed in extricating basic Christian teachings from extraneous influences and thereby remove from Christianity the external modifications brought about by the effort of Christianity to make its way in the world of Greek thought and Roman government—which effort involved compromises with that thought and that government—then " original " Christianity may be found to be much more in harmony with the religions of the East than traditional Christianity has ever been. Such a development would entail a major revolution in Christian philosophy, but it may be the hope for the future religious unity and peace of the world.

13 See Soren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, E.T., David F. Swenson, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1941 ; Emil Brunner, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, Vol. I, 1950 ; Nicolas Berdyaev, *The Divine and the Human*, Geoffrey Bles, London, 1949.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LIVING FAITHS

ISLAM

by

KAZI ABDUL WADUD

In the symposium on Religions, organized by the Indian Philosophical Congress at its Silver Jubilee Session, I have been asked to speak on Islam. It is the kind of honour to which I, a plain litterateur, can have no pretensions. I have therefore accepted it humbly as a call to duty for which I offer my grateful thanks to the organizers.

The symposium coming as it does after our political liberation is highly significant. Our liberation with its great promise of a fruitful new era for our ancient land has, very unfortunately, been attended by an outburst of strange insensibility and inhumanity on the part of a large section of our people, I mean, the people of India and Pakistan. The happenings have staggered, so to say, our leaders of all walks of life, and particularly the workers on the cultural front who stand to-day miserably thwarted and humiliated.

The symposium with its emphasis on the fundamentals of living faiths bears for these perplexed workers a ray of hope indeed, and I, a member of this humiliated group, approach the subject in the spirit which alone befits us to-day, namely, the spirit of lowliness and prayer : may our misfortune come to an end ; may we be vouchsafed more effective light ; may we have the capacity to devote ourselves wholly to truth than which there can be no stronger refuge, no truer ally.

The earliest contacts between Islam and India were pleasant : the Muslim missionaries were received kindly by Indian potentates—so goes the tradition—and Indian learning was valued highly at the Caliph's Court at Baghdad. In Al-Beruni the appreciation of Hindu learning by Muslim scholars was perhaps to be seen at its highest, inspired as it was by a disinterested love of knowledge and truth. But that great savant had to witness Sultan Mahmud's successive expeditions to India which he deplored deeply. "Mahmud's assaults have reduced to naught", so run his remarks, " the wealth and prosperity of India ; the Hindus have been scattered hither and thither like particles of dust ; and these particles harbour in the core of their hearts bitterest hatred for Mussalmans ". In the epochs that followed Sultan Mahmud's expeditions the Indo-Islamic relationship had some brilliantly creative periods indeed, e.g., the ages of Kabir, of Hussain Shah in Bengal, and particularly of Akbar, in which the Hindus could forget

their humiliation on account of an alien rule so thoroughly that they could exclaim in joy and thanksgiving : *dillīśvaro vā jagadīśvaro vā*, the lord of Delhi resembles the Lord of the World ! The memory of those ages is sweet and sustaining even in our age. But, with all its glorious achievements the Indo-Islamic relationship has about it, it must be admitted, a measure of uncharitableness and bitterness that is profoundly distressing and disquieting. An attempt at apportionment of blame for this disharmony between two great brother-hoods will be of little avail. Even a murderer, says the psychologist, is not wholly to blame for his gruesome deed,—the endeavour will simply serve the purpose of setting the ball of never-ending mutual fault-finding rolling. Besides, to the religious spirit—the spirit that approaches life and living in all earnestness and reverence—the supreme question before a mishap of such a magnitude can never be any adjudgement but the acute realization that the best in man has failed to be operative in the right manner. Against the back-ground of such a sense of failure and with the resolve not to slacken in our attempt to realize the best in us let us view the ideals our respective religions stand for.

Islam is the youngest of the major religions of the world. But its own claim is that it is the oldest inasmuch as the Quran declares it to be the religion of all the prophets of the world. Nay even more, it is claimed to be the natural religion of man :—" Every child ", says the Prophet of Islam, " is born in Islam, it is their parents who make them Jews or Christians ". Viewing from this angle Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has made this significant remark in his famous Commentary of the Quran : the Prophet came not so much to found a sect as to remind humanity of the eternal principle running through all religions—" Believe in God and do good deeds ". Evidently this oft-recurring expression in the Quran " Believe in God and do good deeds " constitutes in his view—as in the view of all liberal-minded men—the kernel of Islam. But to the average Muslim theologian this view is not acceptable not because he does not prize liberal outlook in life but because it militates against his conception of religion. Religion to him—as to all orthodox believers—is the sum total of commandments, exhortations, regulations, stories and observances connected with them, all owing their origin to revelation, i.e., to authority other than the normally human, and it is this supernatural authority that matters most in questions religious according to the orthodox standpoint. So along with ' belief in God ' and ' doing of good deeds ' the average theologian demands from every Mussalman the acceptance of the Prophet Muhammad as the last of God's prophets. The philosophy behind this orthodox standpoint seems to be that religion is to be obeyed implicitly more than understood because human capacity is limited and ' truth ' and ' good ' at their highest can be vouchsafed to man only through divine agency.

The conflict between this attitude towards religion and liberal thought has been a long-drawn one culminating in something like victory for the latter in

Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the influence of which was felt in some oriental countries also. But neo-religionism is again upon us on the plea that liberalism has led to the nurturing of egotism on a wide scale and to aimless drifting in regard to ultimate values in life. In India where liberal thought made some headway only among the educated, neo-religionism may be said to be enjoying at the present time wide popularity among intellectuals. Among Muslims the high priest of neo-religionism is Iqbal.

The neo-religionists' criticism of liberalism is not wholly unjust : the wide vogue of liberalism in the last two centuries, particularly in the last, has not yielded the sort of enlightenment and responsibility in the civilized man's conduct that were expected of it. But what about the achievements of neo-religionism itself ?—has it succeeded, apart from its destructive role, in rousing any genuine enthusiasm for religion (by which we must mean moral life) among modern men and women ? And in educationally backward areas like India and Pakistan the votaries of neo-religionism are clearly exploiting the religious credulity of the masses to achieve their political ends.

A look at the recent history of Islam will also disclose how a religious movement in it of the orthodox variety led to developments other than religious. I mean the Wahhabi Movement in India which undertook in the nineteenth century to purge Indian Mussalmans of all non-Muslim customs, beliefs and tendencies that had grown on them and take them back to the pure ways of pristine Islam. The movement played at that time a fairly big political part also inasmuch as it had sharp encounters with the Sikhs, the Hindus and the British rulers in which however it got practically routed in the third quarter of the nineteenth century ; but its reformatory role met with wide response among Indian Mussalmans who purged themselves to an appreciable extent of their non-Muslim manners and customs and took to religious practices with enhanced zeal. But the success of the movement became noticeable not in any moral regeneration among them in spite of all their emphasis on better regulation of their religious observances, but in their political consciousness which resulted in the partition of India in 1947.

The failure of the revivalist movements in religion to achieve the moral elevation of man should provide the discerning with food for serious thought. Does it mean that religion is really an old-world affair, unsuitable for modern life ? Or does it mean that our approach to the question of religion has been faulty ? The first view is obviously superficial as even atheistic communism—a significant phenomenon of our time—has almost become a new faith. The question of a new approach to religion should therefore be taken up in all seriousness.

We have incidentally referred to communism. If we are honestly of opinion that it is failing to assure real good for man because of its questionable methods

we have then perhaps no other alternative except to take recourse afresh to liberalism and its allies rationalism and humanism with a changed attitude. In the past our attitude to these three had been only partly serious. We recognized their great need in modern life, but somehow they got mixed up with our desire for enjoyment of life—and that too in respect of a limited few—the question of their vital need for all in the new world and in the new civilization into which we have entered escaped our attention. It is time the mistake was rectified.

New world and new civilization—we should try to have a clear idea about them. The great truth about the modern world is that it has become much smaller, so much so that the different nations of the world are now-a-days mere parishioners intimately connected with one another in their joys and sorrows, particularly in sorrows as proved so conclusively in the last two world wars. And the great truth about the modern civilization is that the demand of all to be well-cared-for, at least none to have preferential treatment, has been accepted by the human conscience as legitimate. Liberalism, rationalism and humanism in such a context can only mean utmost devotion on the part of our intellectuals at least to the cause of social justice and constant endeavour on their part towards the removal of useless and injurious ideas from the minds of men and women ; but the intellectuals failed to rise to the occasion. And the failure is threatening to-day almost their existence. The coming closer together of so many people has generated a power at once formidable and tempting ; and this formidable power is being utilized by unscrupulous men to bring about violent changes which may or may not end in what is good for man. The many, uncared-for so long and now massed together, will perhaps not rest till they have pulled down much for the mere satisfaction of pulling down.

But responsible people, if they are worth anything, must behave in a responsible manner even in the hour of their peril ; so our intellectuals must prove true to their vocation of serving the cause of truth and human welfare at all costs. The implications are of course profound : in the cause of serving truth and human good they are to keep clear of all frowns and favours, political or otherwise—that being the one sign of their true devotion to their call. The sad discomfiture of the intellectuals of our country is perhaps largely due to their being politicians at heart and not genuine intellectuals—the enslaved condition of their motherland was perhaps largely responsible for their inclination towards expediency—but, all the same, politicians can never be earnest thinkers, they are eternally condemned to opportunism and futility. And if our intellectuals can prove true to their vocation we may hope for the return of sanity and the sense of justice over a wide field of our life. The remedy may seem to be too simple to be worth anything. But it is not so. The power of sincere and earnest thought has been found to be incalculable many a time.

The question may be asked : is religious orthodoxy which is leviathanian in extent and adamantine in obduracy capable of outgrowing itself into any sufficiently elastic mould maintaining at the same time the characteristic devotion and earnestness of religion ? We have demanded something like religious devotion to the cause of truth and human welfare in our intellectuals. Such earnestness in them is bound to have beneficial effect on religious orthodoxy and its aversion to reasonableness. Besides, nothing is unrelated : orthodoxy thrives in an environment of mutually exclusive societies ; our awareness of the changed condition of the modern world and civilization cannot fail to affect the isolation of orthodoxy substantially. Further, there is good reason to believe that every great religion as originally conceived had in it possibilities of growth and fresh adjustment to environment. Let me cast a glance at Islam to see if the contention can be maintained.

We have referred to the orthodox standpoint in Islam. Much emphasis has undoubtedly been placed on ' following in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad ', but there are verses in the Quran in which much more stress has been laid on belief in God and the doing of good deeds ; and in inter-social or international relations the emphasis is on good deeds and power of discrimination between right and wrong :

> .... And if Allah had pleased he would have made you (all) a single nation, but that he might try you in what he gave you (discretionary powers), therefore strive with one another to hasten to good deeds........(5 : 48)

In respect of propagation of Islam the following verses of the Quran advocate a view fundamentally opposed to that indulged in by conquerors like Sultan Mahmud :

> .... And do not abuse those whom they call upon besides Allah, lest exceeding the limits they should abuse Allah out of ignorance (6 : 109)
>
> And say to My servants (that) they speak what is best. (17 : 53)
>
> And the Servants of the Beneficent God are they who walk on the earth in humbleness, and when the ignorant address them, they say, Peace. (25 : 63)

It should however be admitted that Sultan Mahmud had the support of the general body of Mussalmans of his time in his so-called religious expeditions though not of the elite among Muslims like Al-Beruni.

Some historians have maintained that of the Muslim conquerors the Arabs were much more generous to non-Muslims than the Turks. The view appears to have an element of truth in it; at least, it is a fact that the Hindus of Sind

enjoyed full religious freedom after the payment of *jizyah* ; but later theologians while allowing the maintenance of old temples in a Muslim State did not permit the building of new ones. It was on this plea that the emperor Aurangzib pulled down many a new temple.

Some laws of Islam, as we have got them, do not partake of the spirit of the Quranic injunctions, e.g., the law of apostasy as recorded in the Hidaya. The tradition on which the law has been based runs as follows : some people accepted Islam, but later on they renounced it, did some damage to the State property and went over to the opposition. They were caught and put to death. It is clearly a case of desertion under martial law and the penalty of death is in keeping with that law in all civilized lands, even now. Its application in a simple and honest case of apostasy cannot hold good in the face of the Quranic injunction : There is no compulsion in religion (2 : 256).

The following well-known tradition of the Prophet throws considerable light on his vision of the future of Islam. Maad was appointed ruler of Yemen and when he proceeded on his journey the Prophet stopped him and enquired how he would decide matters coming up before him. ' I will decide matters according to the book of God ', said Maad. ' But if the book of God contains nothing to guide you ? ' ' Then I will act on the examples of the Prophet of God '. ' But if there are no such examples ? ' ' Then I will act according to my own light.' The Prophet is reported to have said that Maad was on the right path. The tradition embodies two principles of outstanding importance : viz., (1) that there may be cases which are not covered by the Quran, that (2) there is sufficient scope for private judgment in the development of Islamic law. But in actual practice among Mussalmans the principles were not developed. The view that the Quran is not only a book of moral guidance for man but the source of all possible laws for him gained wide popularity among Muslim theologians with the result that the scope of private judgment, however honest and well informed, was practically eliminated.

To go back to our principal contention. While we should have full comprehension of the state of things that have happened our vision of the fundamental principles requisite for good life should never get blurred or clouded. The Quran, as every student of it knows, is never inelastic and frigid. It contains clear commandments, exhortations and regulations of course; but it never forgets to lay stress on the attitude in which these commandments, exhortations and regulations are to be approached. This elasticity of the Quran has in practice been allowed to be made ineffective by the traditions of the Prophet, some of doubtful authority.

This rigidity of Muslim attitude towards religion may be rectified to a large extent by a fresh acceptance of the principle that the injunctions and the spirit of the Quran should never be rendered ineffective. Every Mussalman is bound by his religion to see to it.

But the supreme question remains : on what fundamental principle should the Quran be interpreted ? Should the principle be that what is recorded in the Quran is unquestionable and should be followed even if it militates against normal human reason ? Or should the principle be—the Quran cannot and should not contain anything that is repugnant to human reason and conscience ? [1] A great Muslim of India—Sir Syed Ahmad Khan—laid stress on the latter view in regard to the interpretation of the Quran, and admittedly it is the soundest view not only in respect of interpreting the Quran but in interpreting all religious books or rather all human efforts that have the welfare of man at heart. Mahatma Gandhi maintained the same principle in respect of the interpretation of Hindu religion when he said : the recorded religious laws are not the only laws of religion ; religion is another name for eternal human conscience. [2]

The Quran with its emphasis on the goodness and the welfare of all [3] will be found to support the same view in the eyes of all except those who avoid apprehending truth with their own minds. " Creation ", says the Prophet, "is the family of Allah—the dearest to Allah of His creation is he who is kindest to His creation." " He does not truly believe in Allah, he does not truly believe in Allah, he does not truly believe in Allah whose neighbour is not safe from his injuries ". " You are certainly in an age in which anybody among you who gives up one-tenth of what he has been ordered (to do), will perish : but after that there will come a time when anybody among them doing one-tenth of what he has been ordered will be saved." These are famous traditions of the Prophet in which liberalism, rationalism and humanism of the noblest kind find support—nay, encouragement. It is up to the Mussalmans of the present day—Mussalmans of India and Pakistan particularly—to see for themselves if they will have their religion as a living force among them helping effectively their noble fruition and that of all around them, or if they will make their religion, as they—I mean the vast majority of them—have done so far, a sorry thing indeed—an object of pity and sometimes of manipulation by designing men. Allah does not help a people till they help themselves—says the Quran (13 : 11). May Mussalmans have the determination to end all that is unseemly about them and be worthy representatives of God on earth as envisaged in the Quran (2 : 30).

1 Then set your face upright for religion in the right state—the nature made by Allah in which He has made men ; there is no altering of Allah's creation : that is the right religion, but most people do not know. (30 : 30).

He grants wisdom to whom He pleases, and whoever is granted wisdom, he indeed is given a great good, and none but men of understanding mind. (2 : 269).

2 News-paper report (1945).

3 Your Lord has ordained mercy on Himself. (6 : 54).

Whoever slays a soul unless it be for man-slaughter or for mischief in the land, it is as though he slew all men : and whoever keeps it alive, it is as though he kept alive all men (5 : 32)..... and give full measure and weight with justice.... and when you speak, then be just though it be against a relative.. (6 : 163).

Whoever brings a good deed, he shall have ten like it, and whoever brings an evil deed, he shall be recompensed only with the like of it, and they shall not be dealt with unjustly. (6 : 161).

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CONTRIBUTED PAPERS

THE INDIAN CONCEPTION OF LIFE

by

SRI AUROBINDO

Three powers we must seize in order to judge the life-value of a culture; the power of the conception of life, the power of the forms, types, rhythms given to life, the inspiration, vigour, vital execution of the power in the actual lives of men and the life of the community. The European conception of life is one with which we in India are now very familiar, because our present thought and effort are filled and obscured with its presence or its shadow; we have been trying to assimilate it, even to shape ourselves,—our political, our economical, outward self has been especially dominated,—into some imitation of its form and rhythm. The European idea is the conception of a Force manifesting itself in the material universe and a life in it of which man is almost the whole meaning,—in spite of the recent stress of Science on a mechanical Nature,—and in man an effort to arrive at some light and harmony of understanding and ordering reason, efficient power, adorning beauty, strong utility, economical well-being. The free power of the individual ego and the organized will of the corporate ego are the great forces which this life needs for its flowering; therefore the development of individual personality and organized efficient national individuality are of the first importance to the European ideal. They have sometimes run riot and much of the restless and often violent vividness of the historic stir and literary and artistic vivacity of Europe is due to their powerful colours. The enjoyment of life and force and egoistic passion and satisfaction is a constant motive, a loud and insistent strain. But there is the other opposite effort to govern life by reason, science, ethics, art, a restraining and harmonizing utility. At different times different powers have taken the lead. Christian religiosity has come in and added new tones, modified some, deepened other tendencies. Each age and period has increased the wealth and helped the complexity and greatness of the conception. At present the sense of the corporate being dominates, the idea of a great intellectual and material progress, an ameliorated state of the political and social human being governed by science, intelligent utility, liberty, equality, organization, efficiency, general well-being. The endeavour has become too outward and mechanical, but some renewed power of a more humanistic idea is trying to beat its way in and man may perhaps before long refuse to be conquered by his apparatus and tied on the wheel of his own triumphant machinery: we must not lay too much emphasis on what may be a passing phase. The broad permanent conception of life remains and it is in its own limits a great and invigorating conception.

But the Indian conception of life starts from a deeper centre and moves on less external lines to a very different objective. The peculiarity of the Indian eye of thought is that it sees or searches everywhere for the Spirit, and the peculiarity of the Indian will in life is that it feels itself to be still unfulfilled, not in touch with perfection, not justified in any intermediate satisfaction so long as it has not found and does not live in the truth of the Spirit. Its idea of the world, of Nature, of existence is not physical, but psychological and spiritual; Spirit, soul, consciousness are not only greater than inconscient matter and force, but they precede and originate, and force and matter cannot exist without them. The Force that creates the world is a conscious will or an executive power of the Spirit; the material universe is only a form and movement of the Spirit. Man himself is not a life and mind born of and eternally subject to physical Nature, but a spirit using life and body. It is an understanding faith in this conception of existence and the attempt to live it out and get from the materialized and enter into a spiritual consciousness which constitutes the much-talked of Indian spirituality. It is evidently very different from the European idea, different even from the form given by Europe to the Christian conception of life. But it does not mean that Indian culture concedes no reality to life and follows no material or vital aims and satisfactions. Nor can it be contended that such a conception of existence can give no powerful and inspiring motive to the human effort of man. If matter, mind, life, reason, form are only powers of the spirit and valuable not for their own sake, but because of the Spirit within them,—*ātmārtham*, for the sake of the Self, says the Upaniṣad, and this is certainly the Indian attitude to these things,—that does not depreciate them or deprive them of their value. On the contrary it enhances and increases a hundredfold their significance. Form and body become of an immense importance when they are felt to be instinct with the life of the Spirit and a support for the rhythm of its workings. And human life was held by ancient Indian thought to be no vile and unworthy existence, but the greatest thing known to us, desired even, the Purāṇa boldly says, by the gods in heaven. The deepening and raising of its richest or its most potent energies is the means by which the spirit proceeds to its own self-discovery. Mind and reason heightening to their greatest lights and powers make embodied life capable of opening to all the greatest light and power of the individual, universal and transcendent being. These are no sterilizing and depressing ideas; they exalt and divinize the life of man.

The dignity of human existence, given to it by the thought of the Vedāntic and the classical ages of Indian culture, exceeded anything conceived by the noblest Western idea of humanity. Man is a spirit veiled in the works of energy and moving to self-discovery. He is a soul growing in Nature to self, a divinity and eternal existence, a wave of the God-ocean, an inextinguishable spark of the supreme Fire, identical even in reality with the ineffable Transcendence from which he came, greater even than the godheads he worships. The natural half-animal

being which he chooses for a while to seem, is not his whole or his real being. To find his real and divine Self, to exceed his outward, apparent, natural self, is the greatness of which he alone of beings is capable. He has the spiritual capacity to pass to a supreme and extraordinary pitch of manhood, and that is the first aim which Indian culture proposes to him, to live no more in the first crude type of an undeveloped humanity, *na yathā prākṛto janah*; but to become a perfected semi-divine man. But he can do more, become one with God, one self with the Spirit of the universe, one with a Self that transcends the universe. To be shut up in his ego is not his perfection; he can become one with others, with all beings, a universal soul, one with the supreme Unity. To aspire to that perfection and transcendence through his mind, reason, thought and their illuminations, his heart and its unlimited power of love and sympathy, his will, his ethical and dynamic being, his aesthetic sense of delight and beauty or through an absolute spiritual calm, largeness and peace, is the high ultimate sense of his humanity. This is that spiritual liberation and perfection of which Indian thought is so full and which appears to it, however high and arduous, yet in a way quite near, possible and normal to spiritual realization, but of which the positivist Western mind finds it difficult to form a living and intellgible idea,—the status of the *siddha, bhāgavata, mukta*. In ancient Europe there was some approach made to it by the Stoics, Platonists, Pythagoreans; it has often been envisaged or pursued by a few rare souls; it is now percolating into the Western imagination, but more as yet by poetry and certain aspects of general thought than by philosophy and religion. But the distinction of Indian culture is to have seized on it, kept it a living and practicable thing, sounded all the ways to this spiritual way of perfect existence and made it the common highest aim and universal spiritual destiny of every human being.

The value of the Indian conception for life must depend on the relations and gradations by which this perfection is connected with our normal living. Put over against the latter without any connection, without any gradations leading up to it, it would either be a high unattainable ideal or the detached remote passion of a few exceptional spirits, or discourage the springs of our natural life by the too great contrast between this spiritual being and natural being. Something of the kind has happened in later times and given some room for the current Western impression about the exaggerated asceticism and other-worldliness of Indian religion and philosophy. But we must not be misled by the extreme over-emphasis of certain tendencies. To get to the real meaning of the Indian idea of life we must go back to its best times and look not at this or that school of philosophy or at some side of it, but at the totality of the ancient philosophical thinking, religion, literature, art, society. The Indian conception in its soundness made no such mistake; it did not imagine that this great thing can or even ought to be done by some violent, intolerant, immediate leap. Even the most extreme philosophies do not go so far. Whether the workings of the Spirit

in the universe are a reality or only a half reality, self-descriptive *Līlā* or illusory *Māyā*, whether it be an action of the Infinite Energy, *Śakti*, or a figment of some secondary paradoxical consciousness in the Eternal, *Māyā*, life as an intermediate reality is nowhere denied by any school of Indian thinking. Indian thought recognized that the normal life of man has to be passed through conscientiously, developed with knowledge, its forms perused, interpreted, fathomed, its values worked out, possessed and lived, its enjoyments taken on their own level, before we can go on to self-existence or a supra-existence. The spiritual perfection which opens before man is the crown of a long, patient, millennial outflowering of the spirit in life and nature. This belief in a gradual spiritual progress and evolution is the secret of the almost universal Indian acceptance of the truth of reincarnation. By millions of lives in inferior forms the secret soul in the universe, conscious even in the inconscient, *cetano acetaneṣu*, has arrived at humanity: by hundreds, thousands, perhaps millions of lives man grows into his divine self-existence. Every life is a step which he can take backward or forward; by his action, his will in life, by the thought and knowledge that governs it, he determines what he is yet to be, *yathā karma yathā śrutam.*

This conception of a spiritual evolution with a final spiritual perfection or transcendence of which human life is the means and an often repeated opportunity, is the pivot of the Indian conception of existence. It gives to our life a figure of ascent, in spirals or circles, which has to be filled in with knowledge and action and experience. There is room within it for all human aims, activities and aspirations; there is place in the ascent for all types of human character and nature. The spirit in the world assumes hundreds of forms, follows many tendencies, gives many shapes to his play or *līlā*, and all are part of the mass of necessary experience; each has its justification, its law, its reason of being, its utility. The claim of sense satisfaction is not ignored, nor the soul's need of labour and heroic action, nor the hundred forms of the pursuit of knowledge, nor the play of the emotions or the demand of the aesthetic faculties. Indian culture did not deface nor impoverish the richness of the grand game of human life or depress or mutilate the activities of our nature. On the contrary it gave them, subject to a certain principle of harmony and government, their full, often their extreme value; it bade man fathom on his way all experience, fill in life opulently with colour and beauty and enjoyment and give to his character and action a large rein and heroic proportions. This side of the Indian idea is stamped in strong relief over the epic and the classical literature, and to have read the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata*, the dramas, the literary epics, the romances, the lyric and the great abundance of gnomic poetry, to say nothing of the massive remains of other cultural work and social and political system and speculation without perceiving this breadth, wealth and greatness, one must have read without eyes to see or without a mind to understand. But while the generous office of culture is to enrich, enlarge and encourage human life, it must also find in it a clue, give it a

guiding law and subject it to some spiritual, moral and rational government. The greatness of the ancient Indian civilization consists in the power with which it did this work and the high and profound wisdom and skill with which, while basing society, ordering the individual life, encouraging and guiding human nature and propensity, it turned them all towards the realization of its master idea and never allowed the mind it was training to lose sight of the use of life as a passage to the Infinite and a discipline for spiritual perfection.

Two main truths are always kept in sight by the Indian mind whether in the government of life or in the discipline of spirituality. First, our being in its growth has stages through which it must pass. Then again, life is complex, the nature of man is complex, and in each life man has to figure a certain sum of its complexity. The initial movement of life is that form of it which develops the powers of the ego in man; *kāma*, *artha*, self interest and desire are the original human motives. Indian culture gave a large recognition to this primary turn of our nature. These powers have to be accepted; the ego-life must be lived and the forces it evolves in the human being brought to fullness. But to get its full results and inspire it eventually to go beyond itself, it must be kept from making any too unbridled claim or heading furiously towards its satisfaction. There must be no internal or external anarchy. A life governed in any absolute or excessive degree by self-will, by passion, sense-attraction, self-interest, desire cannot be the whole natural rule of a human or a humane existence. The tempting imagination that it can, with which the Western mind has played in leanings or outbursts of what has been called Paganism, not at all justly, for the Greek or Pagan intelligence had a noble thought for self-rule, law and harmony,—is alien to the Indian mentality. It perceived very well the possibility of a materialistic life and its attraction worked on certain minds and gave birth to the Cārvāka philosophy ; but this could not take hold or stay. Even it allowed to it when lived on a grand scale a certain perverse greatness, but a colossal egoism was regarded as the nature of the Asura and Rākṣasa, the Titanic, gigantic or demoniac type of spirit, not the proper life for man. Another power claims man, overtopping desire and self-interest and self-will, the power of the Dharma.

The Dharma, religious law of action, is not as in the Western idea, only a religious creed and cult inspiring an ethical and social rule, but the complete rule of our life, the harmony of the whole tendency of man to find a right and just law of his living. Every thing has its dharma, its law of life imposed on it by its nature, but the dharma for a man is a conscious imposition of a rule of ideal living on all his members. This Dharma develops, evolves, has stages, gradations of spiritual and ethical ascension. All men cannot follow in all things one common and invariable rule of action. Nature, the position, the work, aim and bent, the call of life, the call of the spirit within, the degree and turn of development, the *adhikāra* or capacity differ too much in different men ; life is too complex to admit

of such an ideal simplicity. Man lives in society and by society, and every society has its own general dharma, its law of right stability and right functioning, and into this law the individual life must be fitted ; but the individual's part in society, his own nature, the needs of his capacity and temperament all vary, and the social law on its side must make room for this variety. The man of knowledge, the man of power, the productive and acquisitive man, the priest, scholar, poet, artist, ruler, fighter, trader, tiller of the soil, craftsman, labourer, servant cannot all have the same training, be shaped in the same pattern, follow the same way of living or be all put under the same tables of the law. Each has his type of nature and there must be a rule for the perfection of that type, or each his function and there must be a canon and ideal of the function. The main necessity is that, that there must be in all things some wise and understanding canon and ideal; a lawless impulse of desire and interest and propensity cannot be allowed ; even in the frankest following of desire and interest and propensity there must be a rule, a guidance, an ethic and science arising from and answering to some truth of the thing sought, a restraint, an order, a standard of perfection. The rule and training and result differ with the type of the man and the type of the function. The idea of the Indian social system was a harmony of this complexity of *artha*, *kāma* and *dharma*.

At the same time there is a universal embracing dharma, but this is a law of perfection of the human soul ; it is a growth of the developing mind and spirit of man into the power and force of certain universally ideal qualities which make up in their harmony the highest type of manhood. This was the ideal of the best, the good or noble man, the self-perfecting individual, *ārya*, *śreṣṭha*, *sajjana*, *sādhu*. The ideal was, if preponderatingly, by no means purely an ethical conception, but also intellectual, social, sympathetic, religious, the flowering of the whole ideal nature of man. The most various qualities met in the best, the good and noble man. Benevolence, beneficence, love, compassion, altruism, patience, kindliness, long-suffering, liberality ; courage, heroism, energy, loyalty, continence, truth, honour, justice, faith, obedience and reverence where these were due, but power to govern and direct, a fine modesty and yet a certain strong independence and noble pride ; wisdom, intelligence, love of learning, knowledge of all the best thought, an openness to poetry, art and beauty, an educated capacity and skill in works ; a strong religious sense, piety, the spiritual turn, in social relations a strict observance of all the dharma, as father, son, husband, brother, kinsman, friend, ruler or subject, master or servant, priest or warrior or worker, king or sage, member of clan or caste ; this is the total ideal of the Ārya, the man of noble nature and upbringing, which disengages itself and indeed is clearly portrayed in the written records of ancient India during two millenniums. An ideal and rational, a spirit-wise and wordly-wise, a deeply religious, nobly ethical, a firmly yet inflexibly intellectual, a scientific and aesthetic, a

patient and tolerant, but an arduously self-disciplining culture with a strong eugenistic element was the base of Indian civilization.

But all this was only foundation and preparation for that highest thing by whose presence human life is exalted beyond itself into something spiritual and divine. As Indian culture raised the crude human life of desire, self-interest and satisfied propensity beyond its first intention to a noble self-exceeding and shapeliness by infusing into it the order and high aims of the Dharma, so it raised the nobler life of the self-perfecting human being beyond its own intention to a mightier self-exceeding and freedom by infusing into it the great aim of liberation, *mukti, mokṣa*. The Law and its observance is neither the beginning nor the end of man ; for beyond the law he climbs to a great spiritual freedom. Not a noble but ever death-bound manhood, but immortality, freedom, divinity are the highest height of man's perfection. Indian culture held always this highest aim constantly before the eye and insistently inspired with its prospect and light the whole conception of existence, ennobled with its aim the whole life of the individual and cast into a scale of ascension to it the whole ordering of society. The well-governed system of the individual and communal existence, which is always in the first instance a natural functioning, a pursuit of interest, a satisfaction of desire and human need, a combination of knowledge and labour with these ends, but must be controlled and uplifted by the ideals of the Dharma, was founded on an education which, while it fitted man for his role in life, while it stamped on his mind a generous ideal of an accomplished humanity, gave him at the same time the theory of the highest liberating knowledge and familiarized him with the conditions of a spiritual existence. The symbols of his religion were filled with suggestions which led towards it ; at every step he was reminded of lives behind and in front and worlds beyond the material existence, of the Spirit who is greater than the life he informs, of the final goal, of the high immortal freedom. He was not allowed to forget that he had a highest self and that always he was living, moving and had his being in God, in the Spirit, he knew that there were systems and disciplines provided by which the great liberating truth could be realized and to which he could turn and follow them according to his *adhikāra*, the claim of his nature and his capacity, he saw around him and revered the practicants and the mighty masters of these disciplines. They were the teachers of youth, the summits of his society, the great lights of his culture, the inspirers and fountain-heads of his civilization. Spiritual freedom and perfection were not figured as a high and far-off ideal, but presented as the common human necessity, a thing for all to grow into, made possible to all on the basis of life and the Dharma, and the spiritual idea governed, enlightened and gathered towards itself all the other life-motives of a great civilized community.

THE PROBLEM OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE

by

N. V. BANERJEE

The term ' self-knowledge ' really means the self's apprehension of itself or its activities, states or processes held to be co-ordinate with its apprehension of the external world, no matter whether apprehension as a so-called psychological process is alike or different in nature in the two cases. Any sense of the term ' knowledge ' in which self-knowledge would not have this meaning is inappropriate in this connection. In particular, that sense of the term ' knowledge ' is definitely out of place here, which is involved in those instances of our knowledge in which we cannot, strictly speaking, be said to apprehend a thing, that is, know it as an *object* and yet can, on some ground or another, affirm that thing's existence and may even be able to ascertain its nature. Knowledge in this sense should be clearly distinguished from knowledge in the sense of apprehension, and their distinction may be expressed by calling the former transcendental awareness and the latter empirical apprehension. Self-knowledge as it is ordinarily understood and also in the sense which is current in epistemological literature is a form of empirical apprehension and not transcendental awareness.

There is still another sense of the term ' self-knowledge ' which should also be excluded in the present context. In this sense of the term, the self neither apprehends itself empirically nor is transcendentally aware of its own existence but merely is a self-luminous or self-revealed existence. In other words, self-knowledge in this sense merely expresses a supposed distinctive peculiarity of the nature of the self by pointing to the fact that the self, unlike physical things which are revealed only as *objects* of the self's apprehension, is revealed in itself. Self-knowledge may thus be understood as merely metaphysically significant with no obvious epistemological bearing.

The term ' self-knowledge ' is not free from ambiguity even in the sense of the self's apprehension of its own acts, states or processes. For this sense admits of interpretation in either of two ways. First, it may be held that no matter whether our apprehension of the external world be said to take place directly and immediately or indirectly and mediately, our apprehension of the acts, states or processes of our mind is peculiar in that it is direct and immediate. Secondly, our apprehension of the external world may be held to take place only indirectly and mediately through the impressions which the external world produces in our mind, and the nature of self-knowledge may be understood on the analogy of external knowledge thus conceived, by holding that it takes place indirectly and mediately in virtue of the impressions which may be produced in the mind by its

own activities. A further complication would arise in connection with the question as to whether the self is identical with, or distinct from, the mental acts, states or processes. If it be held, as the empiricists in general hold, that the two are identical, then those who admit the directness and immediacy of our knowledge of our mental acts or states or processes would evidently be in a position to affirm that the self as known is identical with the self in itself, whereas those who deny the directness and immediacy of this kind of knowledge would undoubtedly be in a difficulty in regard to the possibility of our knowledge of the self in itself. This difficulty, it is needless to point out, would be still more serious on the understanding of the self as distinct from mental acts, states or processes, no matter whether our knowledge of them be held to be direct and immediate or indirect and mediate.

Of the realists of recent times some, e.g. Alexander, hold that our knowledge of our mental acts is direct and immediate whereas some others, e.g. the Critical Realists, are of the view that this kind of knowledge as well as our knowledge of the external world are indirect and mediate. This is not, however, the only difference between the two lines of thought on the question of the nature of self-knowledge. The Critical Realists add that our apprehension of our mental acts is strictly parallel to our apprehension of outer objects in another respect, viz., in that it involves, like the latter, the subject-object relation. But Alexander differs in stating that while our apprehension, or, to use his own word, ' contemplation ' of physical things involves the subject-object relation, our apprehension of our mental acts which he calls ' enjoyment ' is the same thing as our living them or their being, as it were, immanent in ourselves or our minds, and so does not involve the subject-object relation. " My self-knowledge is knowledge consisting in myself ", says Alexander.

Drake, the leading Critical Realist, observes that ' introspection, like outer perception, gives us, strictly, merely a show of appearances, which may or may not be the actual character of mental states introspected '.[1] In thus viewing introspection on the analogy of outer perception he must be implying that just as in the case of our outer perception we pass on, according to him, from sense-data empirically apprehended to physical things in themselves by means of the non-empirical act of ' imagination ', ' projection ' or ' belief ', so in the case of self-knowledge there is a similar transition from empirically apprehended appearances of mental acts to mental acts themselves. Drake's position in regard to the possibility of our knowledge of our mental acts themselves being thus analogous to his position in regard to that of our knowledge of physical things themselves, the difficulties of the former are bound to be similar to those of the latter. It is not, however, possible to deal with these difficulties within the short space of this essay. We can only point out the fundamental difficulty to which Drake has laid himself open in connection with his treatment of empirical knowledge,

1 Drake, etc., *Essays in Critical Realism*, p. 31.

whether of the external world or the self. Since empirical knowledge is, for him, confined within appearances, he has no means of recognizing the distinction, even if it really exists, between the appearances of physical things and those of mental acts and, consequently, of speaking of self-knowledge as distinguished from outer perception or of the latter as distinguished from the former.

Nevertheless, it goes to the credit of the Critical Realists to have realized the truth that knowledge must involve the subject-object relation, and that self-knowledge, if it must be regarded as a form of knowledge, cannot be an exception to the rule. The following observation of Drake, indeed, throws out a challenge to which Alexander and those who agree with him on the point at issue seem to have no reply : " In so far, however, as we cease turning the opera-glass upon our own minds, and just sink into the momentary feeling, we cease knowing our mental states, we just are mental states ".[2] In fact, to live or to ' enjoy ' mental states is the same thing as to *be* those states and not, as Alexander holds, to *know* them. Self-knowledge as conceived by Alexander, really, points to the self's *being* rather than its *being known*. By regarding self-knowledge as direct and immediate Alexander, indeed, finds himself in a position to avoid those difficulties which arise in connection with any attempt such as the one made by the Critical Realists to extend representationism to self-knowledge. But he thereby cuts the ground from beneath his feet in making self-knowledge lose altogether the sense of knowledge.

The fact is that knowledge as such, no matter whether it is held to be direct or indirect, involves two terms, the subject and the object. But Alexander in his anxiety to vindicate the directness and immediacy of self-knowledge has reduced it to one single term, which he has done obviously on the erroneous assumption that knowledge cannot involve two terms and be direct and immediate at the same time. Nevertheless, he may be said to have hit upon a truth in his view that self-knowledge cannot be held to involve more than one term or that in its case not more than one term are available. But this really means that self-knowledge is not knowledge in the proper sense of the term and not what Alexander takes it to mean, viz., that self-knowledge is a form of knowledge proper, involving one term and one term only. Critical Realism cannot, however, be said to have established the possibility of self-knowledge merely by stating that this form of knowledge, like outer perception, involves not one, but two terms. For, to the question as to what the two terms are which can respectively be called the subject and the object in self-knowledge Critical Realism has no reply except that in a given instance of self-knowledge one and the same mental act is at once the subject and the object, that is, both itself and something other than itself. This position which, really, amounts to holding that in the case of self-knowledge one and the same thing is two distinct terms is, in fact, no less absurd than Alexander's position

2 *Essays in Critical Realism* ; p. 31.

which affirms that self-knowledge regarded as involving one term only is a form of knowledge proper. Neither Alexander nor Critical Realism can, therefore, be said to have established the possibility of self-knowledge.

When Moore refers to the 'diaphaneity' of the mental act he indeed draws our attention to the real difficulty that there is in regard to the possibility of self-knowledge. But he has made no attempt to show how the difficulty can be removed nor even discussed whether or not it can be avoided. He only affirms, obviously without justification, that self-knowledge is a fact. Broad has, however, made an attempt to explain how it is a fact that we know our own mental acts. He states that just as we can have a direct non-inferential knowledge of the relating relation of 'between' when a pattern of three dots in a line is presented to our inspection, so we can be said to apprehend a mental act in the sense that we have a direct non-inferential knowledge of the relating relation of a 'complex' which is constituted by such terms as tooth-ache, etc. and which is, in fact, a mental act.[3]

The difficulties of this position of Broad we need not go far to seek. He is indeed right in holding that mental acts such as 'sensing a noise', 'feeling a tooth-ache', etc. are not entities but 'relating relations'. And since a relation necessarily presupposes two or more terms of which it is the relation or, let us say, presupposes a 'complex' of two or more terms which are related, he is also right in speaking of the 'complex' in connection with his understanding of the nature of mental acts. But he is required to answer the question : what are the terms within the complex in which the sensing of a noise or the feeling of a tooth-ache is a relating relation. In reply Broad cannot perhaps tell us anything more than this, that in the case of our sensing a noise the term is the 'noise', in that of feeling a tooth-ache it is the 'tooth-ache', and so on. He can thus recognize only one term, while he speaks, obviously without justification, of a 'complex' with a view to recognizing the essential relational character of the so-called mental acts.

The fact is that the complex in the case of which the relating relation is the so-called mental act is unique and differs from those complexes which are purely physical and in the case of which the relating relation is spatial or temporal. Its uniqueness consists in that one of its terms is invariably a percipient. Thus in the case of the sensing of a noise the complex consists of a percipient and a noise; similarly in that of the feeling of a tooth-ache one term is again a percipient and the other the tooth-ache. But Broad makes no reference to the percipient in the present context ; and in this he is perhaps under the influence of Moore's erroneous view that the so-called mental act as a relating relation has no peculiarity of its own, being of the same kind as the relation between the 'table and the floor'. Neither Broad nor Moore can, therefore, be said to recognize any such thing as our sensing a noise as distinguished from the noise itself.

3 Vide C. D. Broad, *The Mind and Its Place in Nature* ; pp. 308-309.

The question, then, remains : How are we to account for the possibility of our knowledge of our mental acts which is the so-called self-knowledge ? As regards this question, all philosophers since the time of Kant have found it to be perplexing and, in fact, felt greater difficulty in dealing with it than with the question relating to the possibility of our knowledge of the external world. But Broad holds in common with Moore that a mental act as a relating relation stands on the same footing as spatial and temporal relations. In consequence, they have found themselves in a position to assure themselves that the difficulty in regard to the possibility of our knowledge of our mental acts, that is, self-knowledge, if there be any, cannot be greater than whatever difficulty there may be in regard to the possibility of our knowledge of spatial and temporal relations obtaining in the external world. But what was further necessary for them to have done was to *show* that the former kind of knowledge as well as the latter are actual facts or free from difficulty with regard to their possibility or that the difficulty in regard to the possibility of the one is not greater nor less than that in regard to the possibility of the other. So far as Broad is concerned, he, however, realizes, in common with Moore, that outer knowledge is more obviously a fact and less open to difficulty than self-knowledge. " I cannot, of course, prove ", says Broad, " that we have knowledge of such situations as sensing a noise or feeling a tooth-ache, besides inspective knowledge of the noise or tooth-ache itself ". But curiously enough, he, like Moore, affirms in the end, in the absence of proof, that self-knowledge is a fact. " I can only say that it seems to me that I have it (that is, knowledge of sensing a noise or feeling a tooth-ache) ", says he.

It may, therefore, be concluded that self-knowledge or knowledge of the so-called mental acts cannot be established to be a fact, no matter whether it be held to take place directly and immediately or indirectly and mediately. But even granted that we can somehow know such things as mental acts, that knowledge can no more be called self-knowledge than outer knowledge. For the so-called mental act is not really an entity but, as some of the realists of recent times have realized, a relating relation subsisting between two terms one of which is the self or the percipient and the other something other than the self. Hence knowledge of a mental act is neither knowledge of the self nor of the not-self but of the relation between the two which cannot certainly be called the self. If self-knowledge in the sense of knowledge of mental acts (or mental states or processes) is thus an impossibility, it is equally so in the sense of the self's knowledge of itself. For in the latter sense it demands the self's being both itself and something other than itself at the same time, which is absurd.

What follows is not, however, that we have no means of affirming the existence of the self or that self-knowledge, while it undoubtedly lacks literal significance, is altogether meaningless. Strictly speaking, the self is just the thing whose exis-

tence can be affirmed on a ground other than empirical apprehension which is necessarily object-consciousness. The ground in question may be called transcendental awareness which is the pure I-consciousness logically or transcendentally implied by the fact of our empirical apprehension of outer objects, that is, object-consciousness.

FAITH, HOPE AND LOVE IN THE CHRISTIAN APPREHENSION OF GOD IN TIME [1]

by

J. F. BUTLER

I Cor. 13 : 13.—*But now abideth faith, hope, love, these three ; and the greatest of these is love.*

In dealing with any terms in philosophy, we do well to begin from the popular usage of them. In that way we defend ourselves from unnecessary jargon, and, when we do have to define and insist on a special technical sense for a word, we know where are the ' pulls ' towards ambiguity as regards it. I want us, then, to begin with the everyday senses of the words ' faith ', ' hope ' and ' love ' : [2] however, we shall find that in their long and distinguished history they have been far from univocal.

For reasons which I hope the development of my argument will both make apparent and justify, I want us to start by considering ' faith '.

Well then.—In ordinary, untechnical English ' faith ' is usually taken as a type of knowledge based on a faculty closer akin to emotion or will than to reason. Thus, a man would say that he *knows* that the sun is about ninety-six million miles from the earth, or that the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides: whereas, if he said that he knew his wife was chaste, he would, under criticism, go on to explain that he meant that he *trusted* her or *believed in* her chastity or *had faith in* it.

And ' faith ' in this ordinary, non-technical sense is generally felt to be a somewhat inferior mode of apprehension of reality. Reason may be attacked from all sides today, and physics may disappoint men's social hopes or fly off into oddities about curved space and the like : nevertheless, logic and science still have high prestige as regards the stability of their type of knowledge. A man might, indeed, at first resent a suggestion that he was more sure of the sun or of Euclid than he was about his wife or his country : but he would on reflection

1 This essay will form the closing chapter in a forthcoming book on *The Philosophy of History*.

All Biblical quotations in it are, unless otherwise stated, from the Revised Version.

2 I take these words as covering also their equivalents in sundry Western languages, which have a certain degree of cultural homogeneity. The English usage both continues a ' classical ' tradition of Hebrew, Greek and Latin, and also is closely paralleled in the other ' vernaculars ' of the West.

admit that there have been a considerable number of adulterous wives whom their husbands trusted, and that perhaps so far more countries have betrayed their sons' aspirations than have fulfilled them; whereas he does not expect ever to have to make so drastic a revision of his confidence in Euclid and the astronomers.[3]

This popular sense of ' faith ' has been taken over, with little change, into a good deal of Christian and semi-Christian thinking in the West. (That is not surprising, because, although the West has never been fully Christian and has today strayed far from Christianity, and although, also, Christianity is not of Western origin and is capable of non-Western interpretations, nevertheless the Western culture and Western Christianity have grown up together and are largely intertwined ; and in particular the English language has been largely formed by the Authorized Version of the Bible.) Hence, there is a strong tradition in Christian theology that we apprehend God by ' faith ', that is, by a more emotional and volitional faculty than reason, and one inferior to it.

There is, indeed, a tradition to the contrary, according to which God is (so far as the central doctrines as to His existence and nature go) an object of full-fledged scientific knowledge : this tradition stems from the first Christian Aristotelians, culminates in St Thomas Aquinas and is ably continued today by the neo-Thomists. It may, indeed be accounted from one point of view the main form of the Christian tradition during the last eight centuries or so. But there is also a strong tradition—and one which, since the reaction of most of the West against Scholasticism, has been the most influential outside a small circle of specialists—that God is known by ' faith ', other than (sometimes even opposed to) reason ; this succession runs from the early Christian mystics through Bonaventura and Duns Scotus[4] and one line of the Scholastics, through the Reformers, to Kant,[5] Schleiermacher,[6] Mansel,[7] Vaihinger[8] and a host of modern ' theologians ' (in the more technical sense of that word).

In this usage of ' faith ', and in the connected usages of our other terms as they occur in this system, there are three points to notice as important for our subject :

(i) ' Faith ' here has no special temporal reference. Its main objects are God and other eternal entities. In so far as it is concerned with time, it can be had of the past, *e.g.*, faith in the Incarnation of Jesus ; or of the present, *e.g.*,

3 Einstein has indeed seemed to demand such a revision ; in so far as this is so, he must be accounted one of the principal causes of modern scepticism. But actually Einstein deals very tenderly with the theorem of Pythagoras and the solar system and the like—he wants only the minutest modifications in the statements about them; and this is really a great moral victory for ' reason ', and should help to maintain its prestige.

4 *V.* esp. *In Sent.*, III. 22 : ' *Nec fides excludit omnem dubitationem, sed dubitationem vincentem* ' (' Faith does not exclude all doubt, but only victorious doubt ').

5 Esp. in the *Opus Postumum.*

6 *Discourses.*

7 *The Limits of Religious Thought.*

8 *The Philosophy of 'As If'.*

faith in one's own salvation-state ; or of the future, *e.g.*, faith in the Consummation of the Age. But primarily it is concerned with the timeless.

(ii) ' Hope ' is concerned only with the future, and is vaguer, less sure of itself, than that part of ' faith ' which deals also with the future. One ' hopes ' where one cannot quite ' believe ' : one's ' hopes ' are one's fond aspirations, one's wishes.

(iii) ' Love ' has no cognitive significance at all. It is a way in which one can feel about what one already knows by science or by faith.

I would not for a moment be taken as denying the validity and value of this line of thought. The doctrine indeed needs very careful statement, if it is both to be distinguished from mere ' wishful thinking ', and also to avoid being ruled out by a demonstration that knowledge itself rests on faith. But I think that such a careful statement can be given, indeed has been given,[9] and that a doctrine of faith, thus stated, is the answer to many important philosophical problems. ' Faith ', thus understood, is often sneered at in the name of science, or as being mere ' compensation ' thought ; but this attitude betrays ignorance of the doctrine's classical expositions, which do avoid the difficulties raised. It is also sometimes sneered at by the religious, as a mere device of human speculation as distinct from saving and God-given ' Biblical ' faith; but this attitude is simply a confession that certain very proper philosophical questions are not being taken seriously—a confession which at its best is unsophisticated, at its worst is anti-civilized.

Nevertheless, the distinction between ' faith ' in this sense, the sense of the post-Biblical Christian tradition, and 'faith' in the Biblical sense[10] is a very real one. I do not think there is any contradiction between them : it is simply that in the two contexts the term is really two terms which crystallize the answers to quite different problems. But different they are—different in problems, different in answers, different in all but the unhappily ambiguous language.

In speaking, as I shall now go on to do, of the ' Biblical ' sense of ' faith ', I must first note that there is one exception to the distinctiveness of the Biblical usage. The modern use of ' faith ', which I have just declared ' un-Biblical', is identical with, or at any rate not far distant from, that of the Epistle to the Hebrews [11]—which incidentally contains the only *definition* of ' faith ' in the

9 Both Clement of Alexandria, near the beginning of Christian thought, and Lord Balfour, in recent days, have worked out a doctrine of faith which explicitly faces and allows for these two problems. See Clement, *Strom.*, II. iv, VIII. iii, on the faith-element in all knowledge ; and *ib.*, I. i. 8, 18-21, v-vii, ix, xi, xvii-xviii, xix. 94, II. ii, 8, iv. 16. 2, v. i. 11. 1, 4, VI. vi, viii, x. 80, xi. 89, 93, VII. i. 1, x, xi. 60. 2, VIII. i, on the distinction of true 'faith' (' *pistis* ') from ' blind faith ' (' *psile pistis*').

10 *V.* the references in the standard Biblical lexicons and encyclopedias ; also in W. R. Inge, *Faith and its Psychology*, chap. i.

A selection of these references is dealt with in the following pages. They cover the whole of the New Testament usage, except for the ' freak ' uses of the noun ' *pistis* ' in Matt. 23 : 23 (' integrity ') and Luke 18 : 8 (almost ' the Church '). I here pass over the Old Testament : it will be clear from the [sequel that the New Testament on ' faith ' expresses ideas taken largely from the Old Testament, but the Old Testament doctrine of a Covenant God of the nation's history never found expression in these terms, except for a few passages such as Gen. 15 : 6, Exod. 4 : 5, 19 : 9, Num. 14 : 11, 2 Chron. 20 : 20, Isa. 43: 10 (the famous Hab. 2 : 4 is a mistranslation).

11 Modern scholars are agreed that this Epistle, though early, is not by St Paul.

Bible : ' Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the proving of things not seen '[12] : 'Now faith means that we are confident of what we hope for, convinced of what we do not see.'[13] Every word in that definition bristles with difficulties of interpretation ;[14] but broadly one may say that in it,[15] as regards the future, ' hope ' posits (? humanistically) some ideals as objects of longing,[16] and then ' faith ' (religiously) adds a subjective conviction that these are objective realities. Both ' faith ' and ' hope ' thus have primary reference to the future, and ' hope ' is a mere poor relation of ' faith '.

That is close to the modern usage, and is more or less confined to the Epistle to the Hebrews.[17] What of the rest of the New Testament ?

' Faith ' in the Gospels (here following one of the main lines of thought in the Old Testament, though much developing its language) is *personal acceptance of acts or persons as the deeds or representatives of God.* It is accordingly for the most part concerned with a recognition of Jesus for what He (on the Christian view) was—either theologically (as notably in Peter's Confession,[18] though neither the word nor its cognates are used in the texts about it),[19] or in the more limited context of miracle-working.[20] In either case, because of the sheer fact that Jesus was then physically present, the reference of the word is to a *present* experience.

The apostolic period saw a change in the reference of ' faith '—a change of importance for us, since it was caused by another change, whose consequences abide till this day, *viz.*, the withdrawal of Jesus ' immediate physical presence. It is true that before and after that change, now and always, religion was and is a present reality, with a concern about the future, and rooted in the eternals. But after that change, as not before it, there began for Christians a state in which much of the reference of faith, as the apprehension of God's decisive deeds, is to the *past*. To the Christian, the most decisive acts of God are those in Christ Jesus : the prophets had foretold them, the evangelists had narrated them of

12 Heb. 11 : 1 ; *cf.* 11 : 6.

13 Heb. 11 : 1, trans. J. Moffatt.

14 *V.* J. Moffatt *ad loc.*, in *The International Critical Commentary.*

15 The usage seems to be derived from Philo (*De Migr. Abr.*).

16 So 11 : 1 ; the usage elsewhere is vague ; *v.* 3 : 6, 6 : 11, 18, 7 : 19.

17 *V.*, however, *infr.*, note 23.

18 Matt. 16 : 13-16=Mark 8 : 27-29=Luke 9 : 18-20.

19 The word thus does, even at this stage, have a definite cognitive element in it. The fact that the main stress is dynamic, active, does not mean that there is no other element in it, and certainly does not justify Prof. J. MacMurray (in chap. ii (pp. 38-44) of B. H. Streeter's symposium *Adventure*) in a sweeping denial of the cognitive element, which appears quite definitely in, *e.g.*, Mark 1 : 15, John 5 : 47, : 13 : 19, 20 : 27.

20 *E.g.*, Matt. 17 : 20 (*cf.* Matt. 21 : 21-22=Mark 11 : 22-24, Mark 9 : 23, Luke 17 : 6), Matt. 8 : 10=Luke 7 : 9, Matt. 9 : 2 = Mark 2 : 5 = Luke 5 : 20, Matt. 9 : 22 = Mark 5 : 34 = Luke 8 : 48, Matt. 9 : 27-30, 15 : 22-28 (Mark 7 : 25-30 differs on what is in this context the crucial point), Mark 5 : 36 = Luke 8 : 50, Mark 10 : 52 = Luke 18 : 42 ; and, in later writings, Jas. 1 : 6, 5 : 15.

The faith called for is usually expected to be in the patient ; but in Matt. 17 : 20 it is required for the disciples who are to perform the miracle, and in Matt. 8 : 10, 9 : 2, Mark 5 : 36 (and parallels) even of a third party.

In the Johannine writings, including the Gospel ' of St John ', faith is primarily the gate of ' eternal life ' (John 1 : 12, 5 : 24, 1 John 5 : 4-5) ; it does not so much work miracles as follow (in an inferior form) upon miracles (John 14 : 11, 20: 28-9).

their present, now for the apostles and the apostolic Church they were *history*. ' Faith ' still had the fundamental Gospel meaning of personal acceptance of God's acts and God's Man ; but Jesus *had* come, *had* died, *had* risen. Hence ' faith ' now became primarily *the present acceptance of the past Jesus as the Messiah.* Thus, in Paul ' faith ' is, for the most part, *our mode of apprehending God in His past acts.*[21] One perhaps ought to add that this continues to be the vital sense of ' faith ' for Christians, since Christianity is in essence a *historical* religion.[22]

In the apostolic usage, therefore, the word ' faith ' was thus more or less confined to the past ; but of course the religious interest could not be so confined. Much, indeed, of what the prophets had foretold God would do was now done ; the *decisive* deed was now done—but much yet remained to be done. And interest in what was yet to be done was literally *forced* on the Christians of that age: the Christian community *had* to think about God's remaining work, since they felt that it needed so desperately to be done. It was not merely that, in general terms, the theistic mind cannot face the problem of evil without a vision of future right ; it was not even, more concretely, that the prophets and Jesus Himself had promised a Consummation ; but it was that *the Church was facing persecution.* For this, it needed what it called ' *hypomenē* '—a word which the old standard Bible translators rendered by ' patience ', but which is much better translated ' endurance '. And ' endurance ' called for *a grasp of God's future mighty acts* ; and this was to be had by something which Paul constantly wrote of under the name of ' *elpis* ', ' hope '.[23]

21 The transition from the ' faith ' demanded by Jesus of those whom He was to heal, to the ' faith ' of Paul which works for salvation and also has a credal aspect, is beautifully shown in Acts 3—the miracle-story and the sermon taken together.

From the nature of Pauline ' faith ', as defined in the text, naturally stems Paul's whole teaching on ' justifying faith ', which replaces (in one sense) obedience as the means of salvation, of entry into the ' Covenant '-relation (*e.g.*, Rom. 3 : 21-5 : 2, Gal. 3 ; *cf.* Mark 16 : 16 (a later addition), Acts 16 : 31), but which also leads to power and good works (*e.g.*, Rom., 3 : 31, 5 : 1-5, 6, Gal. 5 : 6) and ' life in Christ ' (*e.g.*, Gal. 2 : 20, Col. 2 : 6-7 ; like the Johannine ' eternal life '). Similarly Jas. 2 : 5 (the famous ' contradiction of Paul ' in Jas. 2 : 14-26 is purely verbal). But the cognitive element in Pauline faith appears very clearly in, *e.g.*, Rom. 10 : 9, 2 Thess. 2 : 13 ; *cf.* 1 Tim. 4 : 6 (probably post-Pauline), Jas. 2 : 19, Jude 3.

22 There is a good deal of misunderstanding on this matter, especially among those, both in India and elsewhere, who are not well-versed in the Christian Scriptures *as a whole*. It needs therefore to be emphasized that for Christianity *the Sermon on the Mount is quite peripheral* ; it is merely a convenient summary of some aspects of the ethics which flow from the religion. What is central is the Passion Narrative read in the light of the first eleven chapters of the Epistle to the Romans. People are of course entitled to pick out what they will for personal acceptance or commendation to others ; what they are not entitled to do is to call their selection ' Christianity ', when that name historically belongs to the story of the Biblical acts of God and the theology about them.

23 On the connection of ' *elpis* ' with ' *hypomenē* ', *v.*, *e.g.*, Rom. 5 : 3-5, 8 : 23-25, 12 : 12, 1 Cor. 13 : 7, 1 Thess. 1 : 3, and (if it be recognized that the ' faith ' of ' Hebrews ' is the Pauline ' hope '; *v. infr.*) Heb. 6 : 12, 10 : 36-39.

To revert to ' Hebrews '.—The ' faith ' of ' Hebrews ' is largely identical with the Pauline ' hope ' ; *cf.* Heb. 11 : 11 with Rom. 4 : 18, and see W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam on Rom. 4 : 18 in *The International Critical Commentary*. (Paul seems to follow the usage of ' Hebrews ' in 2 Cor. 5 : 7 ; *cf.* also 1 Pet. 1 : 9 ; and ' *hypomenē* ' is grounded in ' *pistis* ' rather than in ' *elpis* ' in Jas. 1 : 3, Rev. 14 : 12.)

The future reference of the Pauline ' hope ' is clear in, *e.g.*, Rom. 5 : 2, 8 : 20-24, Col. 1 : 5, Tit. 2 : 13 ; *cf.* Acts 26 : 6-7, 1 Pet. 1 : 13, 1 John 3 : 2-3.

Dr John Baillie, in his *The Belief in Progress*, has some excellent discussions of the Christian doctrine of hope. Especially valuable are his and Dr Cullmann's distinction between Christian and Jewish hope, the Christian hope being based on a partial fulfilment already in Christ (*op. cit.*, 61-5, 71-2; *cf.* 1 Pet. 1 : 3)—though these together are contrasted with ' classical ' hopelessness (*ib.*, 50-1, 64-5, 71, 94, 186; *cf.* Eph. 2 : 11-12). He is also excellent in the way he points out (*op. cit.*, 190, 207, 210-20) that the New Testament doctrine of an ultimate righting by God's irruption into the world does not (as so many Christian thinkers seem to assume) rule out a Christian hope of progress within the world.

To sum up, then, the Biblical position.—Christianity is the acceptance of God in Christ, with the whole personality. The Christian God is essentially an *acting* God. God's acts in the past are accepted as His, are 'believed in', by '*faith*' : God's acts in the future are believed in, by one who has 'faith', by '*hope*'.[24] And our present grasp of God (or rather, God's grasp of us, which is far the more important aspect of the matter) is by '*agapē*', '*love*'.[25]

Thus we get the triad of faith, hope, love, as the three means of the Christian personality's apprehension of God. The mediaeval systematizers, with a more poetic insight than they usually achieved, recognized this affinity, and its ground, by grouping them together as the three 'theological virtues'—for they are virtues, *i.e.*, ethically proper dispositions of the soul, each towards its own type of situation ; and they are theological, having as their object primarily God and being means whereby He is known.

But among these three love has the primacy. God's great acts of the past and the future were and will be the deeds of His seeking love.[26] And our acceptance of them, though ours, is enabled by His grace—His love.[27] And, while faith and hope are merely human virtues, intended to meet the needs caused by certain human limitations, and which thus God by the very fullness of His nature cannot have, yet God Himself *is* love.[28] So, though faith and hope as well as love abide,[29] the greatest of them is love.

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There is, I think, a philosophical lesson to be gathered out of this largely philological discussion. It is, not any pronouncement as to the rightness or wrongness of any particular doctrines—I am not concerned with such issues now—but a general truth about philosophical language : *Each system of thought has its own basic problems, and these peculiarities are for each system crystallized out into a unique terminology.*

Thus, I think that the terminology, which we have been analysing above, of the Christian apprehension of God in time,[30] is what it is because Christianity is a specially historical religion. I am not now claiming that Christianity is either

24 The relationship of 'faith' to 'hope' in Paul, in passages where they occur together, is worth studying: *v., e.g.*, Rom. 4 : 18-21, 5 : 2, 15 : 13, 1 Cor. 13 : 7, 1 Thess. 1 : 3.

25 The cognitive aspect of Christian 'love' is only implicit for the most part ; but it becomes explicit at any rate in 1 John 4 : 7-8 ; *cf.* John 7 : 17, 1 Cor. 8 : 3.

26 Take such a passage on the theology of love as Luke 15 together with such passages on the history of divine love as Deut. 7 : 8, Hos. 11 : 1, John 3 : 16.

27 *E.g.*, John 15 : 16, Rom. 9, 1 John 4 : 10, 19.

28 1 John 4 : 8.

V. A. Robertson and A. Plummer, in *The International Critical Commentary, ad* 1 Cor. 13 : 13, for an explanation of love's supremacy, summarized in the last clause of the text.

29 In spite of the preceding verse, in 1 Cor. 13 : 13 Paul seems to have comtemplated a state of the after-life in which there would be not only love, but also faith (which seems surprising) and also hope (which seems even more surprising). But speculation on this would take us into deep waters.

30 In this paper I have deliberately restricted the discussion to the apprehension of God in time. The apprehension of Him in eternity (see Dante, *Paradiso*, the last three cantos), and any anticipations of this state that there may be in mystic experience, are matters for another discussion. These problems certainly do not bulk so large in Christianity as in some other religions : I would even be prepared to defend the thesis that there is no such thing as Christian mysticism.

better or worse for this special historicity ; I am not arguing as to whether such anchorage to particular and allegedly unique events in time and space serves to objectify it or merely to narrow it. Plenty of controversy has raged on such points ; but they are not my concern at present. My concern now is with the consequences for philosophical language of the simple factual, non-valuing proposition that Christianity *is specially historical.*

I am not thereby intending to deny the existence of important historical elements and emphases in other religions. For instance, Islam, even in its simplest creed, publicized daily, maintains : 'There is no God but Allah' (theology) 'and Muhammed is His Prophet' (theologized history) : and in more detailed expositions of the Islamic faith there is copious reference to historical authority. All the branches of Hinduism, even those which most explicitly seek the Timeless One, are anchored, to some extent, to particular historical happenings by their respect for the authority of the *Vedas* and of the *guru* : and some branches—in further doctrines of creation, evolution, *avataraṇa*, the authority of sectarian Scriptures and of the teachings and lives of ancient Saints and bards, and the action of God's grace—in various manners and degrees have increased this involvement in history. Corresponding to the existence of these historical beliefs, the words which for Islam and Hinduism most nearly correspond to 'faith'—'*īmān*'[31] and '*śraddhā*' (and vernacular cognates like '*uṛuti*')—act in some degree as words for the apprehension of God through the medium of historical fact.

But I submit that this is in a *lesser* degree than that in which Christianity (once again—rightly or wrongly, wisely or unwisely) claims to be a historical religion. It is, for the most part, analogous to the way in which the Christian regards the Sermon on the Mount, whose truth was indeed imparted by a particular Person, and is (to the believer) guaranteed by the authority of that Person, but which nevertheless is in essence a setting-forth of eternal truths that *in principle* might have been proclaimed by anyone else. Once the truth is grasped, then—if (and only if) the crucial thing is grasp of the true doctrine, or effects flowing from it—it is comparatively accidental through whom the truth came, though religious sentiment may of course rightly continue to rejoice in acknowledging its debt to the past.

But the Christian world-view contains, besides the Sermon on the Mount, other elements of a much more deeply historical nature. In the (so-called) 'Apostles' Creed', after the articles of general theistic import ('I believe in God the Father Almighty', etc.), come a set of historical statements—'And in Jesus Christ His only Son our Lord, Who was conceived of the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried : He descended into hell ; the third day He rose again from the dead ; He ascended

31 *V.* on this J. Windrow Sweetman, *Islam and Christian Theology*, I. ii. 205-7.

into heaven.'[32] I would not say that all these clauses are quite on a par as proven history; also they involve some element of historical interpretation (*e.g.*, 'His Son'); moreover, it is true that they imply eternal doctrines as to the nature of God (*i.e.*, 'God is such that His Son.... '); thus they cannot be said to be *pure* history. Nevertheless they are much more deeply historical than any sheer *doctrine* could be, for they relate *crucial acts of salvation.* They teach, not primarily that God *is a saving God*, but that God, in the governorship of Pontius Pilate in Judaea, *has wrought salvation.* The redemptiveness of God could have been taught, in principle, by anyone : it has, in fact, been taught by many, including many non-Christians : it is the claim made for the existence and unique significance of a particular set of historical acts that makes the distinctiveness. To put it in another way, the Sermon on the Mount, if true, would still be true even if Christ were proved to be, as some extremists would have Him, a sun-myth; likewise the *Gītā*, if true theology and ethics, is still such even if its historical setting in the *Mahābhārata* be taken as pure fiction : but without a historical, factual life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ Christianity as such would collapse ; it is concerned mainly to proclaim not that Jesus' way of life was a good one or that God is, poetically speaking, like Jesus, but that in Jesus Christ certain decisive and unique acts of salvation were wrought.

I am not here arguing that this distinctiveness of affirmation is correct; I am only pointing out that it is there. Being there, it is reflected in the language of Christian epistemology. Christianity, being highly historical, has a highly historical usage of 'faith'—a usage which perhaps I may be allowed to call comparatively precise and rich—such virtues having come to attach to it simply because the words express a doctrine of central concern to that religion. (In the same way, *Advaita* has a language about divine union which is precise and rich compared with what the *Advaitin* must feel to be the fragmentary and vague and even irritating echoes of it in Christian Scriptures : for that doctrine is where the *Advaitin's* heart is, and therefore it is that doctrine which has come to have the copious, deep vocabulary developed for it. By comparison, the doctrine of *śraddhā* within Hinduism is infrequent and vague[33]—but it becomes both more frequent and more warm in proportion as stress is laid in any Hindu system on doctrines of grace (God's historical action in repeatable modes), and still more when there is a high development of the doctrine of *avataraṇa* (God's fuller, more concentrated self-revelations in history).)

And this example of 'faith' and '*śraddhā*' is one that can be generalized from. The comparison of ideas in different systems is indeed an enlightening and cleansing discipline ; our ideas lose their provinciality when set in relation with

32 I have not gone on to quote the article which is concerned with 'the history of the future' (*pace* Croce) : 'From thence He shall come to judge both the quick and the dead', as in this closing section I am simplifying the discussion by treating solely of 'faith'. Anything said here of 'faith' can be applied also to 'hope', *mutatis mutandis*.

33 Very vague indeed, if Dr S. Radhakrishnan's notes to *Gītā*, iv. 39 ; xvii. 3 (pp. 171-2 and 343 of his edition) are an accurate interpretation. The language used there of 'faith' would be, from the Christian point of view, much more appropriately applied to 'grace'. This is all of a piece with Dr Radhakrishnan's de-historicizing of Christian doctrine : *e.g.*, p. 36 of his *Gītā*.

kindred ideas from other civilizations, and our insights are sharpened when we trace out how concepts not unlike our own have in other contexts developed ramifications and significances that had not occurred to us. But there is a danger in these fascinating and helpful comparisons—the danger of over-facile identifications. Bradley, for instance, was not a *Vedāntin*,—neither was Schopenhauer, though he thought he was—nor was Śaṅkara an Oxford or a Dresden idealist : '*bhakti*' has no exact equivalent in English, nor has 'Church' in Sanskrit : indeed, no Hindu and Christian words can be exact equivalents, for the one has, and the other has not, a context of ideas among which are some entirely distinctive ones like *karma*. If, then, we strive, as strive we should, for a philosophic view-point that is poised above our man-made barriers of differing civilizations, we must not try any short cuts that confuse concepts which are really distinct. The foundations of any enduring road to a universal outlook must be sound scholarship ; and sound scholarship will recognize to the full both the identities of purpose and longing that stir all human hearts alike, and also the differences—wide divergencies sometimes, and sometimes subtle nuances which distinguish the words and concepts in which men enshrine such vision of the truth as they have attained to.

THE NATURE OF TRUTH

by

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In discussing the nature of Truth, we have to realize that " Truth " does not mean the same thing on all occasions that the word is used. The meaning of " Truth " is determined in the context of our search for Truth, that is, it depends on the nature and purpose of our enquiry, on the type of result or satisfaction that we seek, the kind of value that we are trying to embody in our experience. " Truth " in metaphysics must, therefore, *prima facie* have a different connotation from " Truth " in science or in the popular usage. " Truth " in the latter case means correspondence or acccordance with facts. What we *mean* when we say that a given assertion is true is that things are as we assert them to be. There is of course the familiar distinction between the meaning and the criterion of Truth to be considered. The question of the criterion is concerned not directly with the nature of Truth, but with the method or methods employed to obtain it. It deals with the question, by what sign do we come to know or are reasonably assured that a particular belief may be taken as true, i.e., as in accordance with things as they are ? I do not wish to discuss the problem of the criterion, since in this paper I am concerned with the nature of Truth as it should be understood in metaphysics and in spiritual experience.

It may be a strange thing to say, but I believe the logical positivists have shown a certain amount of insight in their negative attitude towards metaphysics, in so far as they hold that metaphysical statements are unlike scientific statements though bearing a syntactical resemblance to them. Their position is that metaphysicians who believe that their statements are like scientific statements though about a higher or trans-empirical Reality, that metaphysics is, in other words, a super-science, are merely the dupes of language ; and they go on to dismiss metaphysics as ' nonsense ' or as serving the very limited purpose of teaching us the use of words. I do not wish to examine logical positivism in this paper. I certainly think they are talking nonsense (both in their technical as well as in the popular sense of the word) when they dismiss metaphysics as nonsense, and are being rather foolish when they assert with condescension that metaphysicians do not always talk nonsense, but occasionally, though unconsciously, show a certain amount of " linguistic penetration " and should be read for the lessons we can learn from their writings about the use of words.[1] I am concerned with

1 The philosopher who holds this view is, by a strange irony, named " Wisdom "!

the only genuine, though partial penetration they have shown, *viz.*, that metaphysical propositions are not like scientific propositions, differing from them only in that they are about a super-sensible reality. As to what they actually are, however, I do not think they have any idea at all.

Let us return to the question of the meaning of 'Truth'. The truth of a scientific proposition consists in its correspondence or accordance with a fact other than and outside itself. My contention is that a proposition like 'God exists' or 'Reality is timeless' is very different in kind from a proposition like 'Sea monsters exist' or 'Camels are herbivorous'. The logical positivist asserts that the proposition 'Reality is timeless' resembles, syntactically, the proposition 'Camels are herbivorous' and thus creates the illusion that there is something corresponding to the word Reality, about which we predicate timelessness just as there is something corresponding to the word camel, of which we predicate herbivorousness. But in what sense, he asks, can the former proposition 'Reality is timeless' be said to be significant? With what experience or fact does it correspond? The significance of a proposition like 'Camels are herbivorous' lies in the fact that we can put it to the test. It has the power to carry us beyond itself to some discoverable fact. Can we show in a similar way, that the proposition 'Reality is timeless' is significant? It is not enough that we should understand the words which we use in the proposition. It seems to me that the nerve of the logical positivist's critique of metaphysics is that metaphysical statements appear to end in themselves, and lack the power to carry us beyond themselves or to suggest a way whereby we may go beyond them and confront an actual situation which they purport to describe. It would perhaps have brought out the real point of their criticism, if the logical positivists had described metaphysical statements not as meaningless, but as barren or futile, unless they had intended to identify the significant with the useful. The question therefore hinges on this point. Are metaphysical statements self-enclosed, i.e., does all their significance begin and end in themselves? Or are they dynamic in carrying us beyond themselves to the Reality which they claim to describe? In other words are we confined within the circle of ideas or is it possible to pass from ideas to existence? Kant, it may be recalled, rejected the possibility of metaphysics, because he thought that in metaphysics we could not pass beyond the charmed circle of ideas, in the same way as the ideas of a hundred dollars in our pocket cannot magically produce its actual existence therein. The Idealists, joining issue here, would answer that Truth is always ideal, that being its essential nature and that the truth as well as the significance of an idea consists in its self-consistency, there being no further need for establishing a bridge between the ideal and the real.

The position which I have taken in this paper differs both from Idealism on the one hand and the Kantian and Positivistic critique of metaphysics on the

other. On this view, to be truly significant, a metaphysical proposition implies a bridge from idea to existence, but this transition from idea to existence . . . the relation between the actual situation or reality described and the description of it are radically different in the case of metaphysical propositions from what they are in the case of scientific propositions. The difference may be expressed by saying that the truth of scientific propositions is verifiable, whereas that of metaphysical propositions is *to be realized.* Thus the sphere of the meaningful or the significant should be extended beyond that of the verifiable and include also the realizable. If it can be shown that a metaphysical proposition does not terminate within itself but points to a Reality which is to be realized, then it seems to me that the main Positivistic objection to metaphysics would be removed. Propositions like ' Reality is timeless ' would cease to be a jumble of words with an illusory glow of meaning imparted to it by the meaningfulness of its separate elements, but would possess a vibrant significance far richer than that contained by empirically verifiable propositions.

We must now consider the difference between the ' verifiable ' and the ' to be realized ' as two species of the significant. The main differences are two : (1) In the case of the verifiable the situation described is on the same level as the description ; in the case of the realizable the situation and the description are on totally different levels. (2) In the former case there is no fundamental change in the tone and structure of consciousness when we pass from description to fact or from idea to existence. In the latter case the passage is made possible only through a radical transformation of consciousness. In verification the self discovers a fact comparable to the other facts already within its own experience ; while in the latter case the self discovers, not a new fact, but *itself.* Further, this self-revelation is absolute and unique, with which no part of the experience of the natural self, even when taken at its highest and best, is comparable. The second point needs no explanation to those who are acquainted with the mystical and religious tradition in philosophy. The perception of absolute truth is possible only through a complete transformation or regeneration of consciousness, the reason being that the knowledge of the ultimately real is synonymous with the discovery or revelation of the self to itself. This is I think the significance of the Upaniṣadic saying, " To know Brahman is to become Brahman ". This means that the knowledge of Truth is in the end Self-knowledge.

I shall explain the first point, *viz.*, that in metaphysics the Reality described is not on a level with the description of it. This point may be made clear by an analogy. It is possible to explain what a poem means by giving a prose paraphrase of it, but the paraphrase itself is not poetry. The poem and its paraphrase are clearly not on the same level. To one who does not know at all what poetry is the paraphrase may kindle the desire to read and appreciate the poem *as a poem.* Assuming that his desire is satisfied, the poem will come to him as a

revelation, as something not experienced before, and not merely as a confirmation or verification of what he had already grasped in and through the prose-paraphrase. We do not therefore state the essential truth of the relation between the paraphrase and the poem if we say that the former corresponds to or accords with the latter. At the level of the paraphrase the poem should be regarded not as something that is to be verified, but more adequately as something that is to be realized.

A similar relation holds between a metaphysical statement like 'Reality is timeless' and the actual fact which it claims to describe and which is discoverable only through a total regeneration of consciousness. The passage from the mere description to the actual fact (discovered in mystical or spiritual experience) is always accompanied by a sense of novelty, of uniqueness and of indescribability. Though in a sense the mystical experience is a confirmation of the metaphysical judgment, and so to that extent corresponds with it, we cannot say that the truth of the metaphysical judgment means correspondence. The mystical experience is at the same time a confirmation as well as a denial of the corresponding metaphysical judgment. Just as the actual experience of the poem *qua* poem confirms the prose paraphrase and at the same time cancels the anticipated idea, formed by a reading of the paraphrase alone, of what poetry is, in the same way, though in a much more radical sense, the mystical experience confirms and cancels the anticipation of Truth generated by metaphysical speculation alone. "The Tao that is the subject of discussion," says Laotze, "is not the true Tao."[2]

What then is meant by saying that the metaphysical judgment is true? Truth here is not correspondence, though this does not mean either, lack of correspondence. The notion of correspondence and its opposite ceases in this case to be adequate. Truth in the case of metaphysics means adequate symbolization. I shall explain what this means.

A metaphysical judgment is the result of thinking. Now in thinking we may make assertions that are intended to be taken literally or assertions that state a truth in a symbolic or analogical form. One thought content is here symbolic of another. The point which I wish to make is that thinking itself as an experience may be symbolic of a higher experience, and that just as one thought content is symbolized as another, so in metaphysics the higher or spiritual experience is symbolized as a thought process or a judgment. To put it differently, Reality which is a Presence and is realized as such in mystic experience is at the metaphysical level symbolized as a Problem to be resolved. Union with a living Reality can be understood only by those who have achieved it, but to others it may be presented *as if* it were the solution of a problem. To turn Reality into a problem and then attempt a solution of the problem is the result of the intellect's way of

2 *cf.* also St Thomas. After receiving the beatific vision he described the wisdom contained in all his writings as foolishness.

dealing with and paraphrasing in its own terms a Reality that can only be known in a supra-intellectual experience. This I think, though I am not sure, is the significance of the Christian doctrine that our knowledge of God is *analogical.* Thought is capable of paraphrasing at its own level, but never of grasping the essential nature of God's Being. The Truth of metaphysics then is the truth that is contained in an adequate paraphrase, adequate here meaning in accordance with the laws and conditions that govern the thinking mind and in conformity with the *śāstra* (understood either as revealed literature or as the word of a living Guru).

We have discussed the meaning of Truth at the level of metaphysics, but since metaphysical judgments are only a symbolic form of a higher experience, they do not contain in themselves Truth *per se.* They contain, as Śrī Aurobindo says, not the substance but the figure of Truth. St Thomas expresses this by saying that in philosophy we know God in essence but not essentially. Truth in its essential nature, therefore, is not found at the level of metaphysics. We have then yet to ask what Truth essentially is, the meaning of Truth as Truth, not as coloured and distorted by the limitations of the unregenerated mind. This implies a discussion of Truth at the level of a direct supra-rational experience.

First a word about the relation between Truth and Reality. Essentially they are identical. Truth is the verbalized but direct experience of Reality. As an instance we may take the statement ' All this is Brahman '. In asking in what sense this statement is true we must remember that we are now discussing the matter from the point of view of one who no longer needs to speculate but gives direct utterance to a directly perceived Truth. Obviously then Truth cannot here mean correspondence, because the direct experience is not so much an experience of what is true as itself a Truth-experience, even as the experience of pain is itself a painful experience.

In scientific and metaphysical knowledge there is a process of objectification —the knowledge is about an *object,* about something other than the process of knowing. But the knowledge of Truth is the knowledge of the Spirit, that which is ever the Subject. The Spirit can never be known through a process of objectification, otherwise it is not the Spirit that we know but some object that falls short of the absolute Subject. In true knowledge, the knower, the knowing and the known (jñātā, jñāna, jñeya) must be one. Knowledge of the Spirit must be self-luminous, or as Śrī Aurobindo puts it, it must be " knowledge by identity," otherwise it is not knowledge but only opinion or belief, or rather the paraphrase and reduction of knowledge to the level of belief.

Since here the knowledge and the known are identical, the Truth of the knowledge cannot be said to consist in a relation of correspondence. What then does Truth mean from the point of view of one who knows Truth as Spirit and not

as Object ? At this, the highest level, the meaning of Truth changes completely. In order to understand what Truth means we have to ask why at this level there is Truth at all. We have to enquire into the function it performs or the purpose it serves. Why does the sage give utterance to his experience and so convert Reality into Truth ? The spiritual experience being self-contained, does not need to be expressed in order to complete itself. It is full and complete without the verbal expression. Obviously the verbal form serves the purpose of establishing communication between the enlightened and the unenlightened. The sage speaks, not to fulfil himself or satisfy an inner need, but in someway to establish contact between himself and those who are conditioned by Ignorance (Avidyā). What is the function of speech at this level of consciousness ? It cannot be to communicate knowledge, because knowledge cannot be communicated through words or through a thought process, however subtle. Had this been possible, enlightenment would have been within the reach of those with the capacity for merely listening to the words of the enlightened, or at best of understanding with sufficient intellectual clarity the meaning and implications of the spoken words. Nor can the purpose of speech at this level be merely to give delight. Language at this level has a totally new function to perform. It is neither to instruct nor to delight but to awaken. In other words language here is pure *mantra*. The function of *mantra* in the proper sense of the word is precisely this : to build a bridge between one level of experience and another or to make possible a transition from the lower to a higher level. It is the first stage in the process of reaching the Truth, for without it the mind cannot conceive the possibility of an experience transcending mind or be seized with an aspiration to reach out to that which transcends its own nature. In the Indian tradition thinking (manana) must, to be fruitful, be preceded by the hearing of the inspired word (śravaṇa). And it is precisely because the word thought about is a *mantra* that the process of inquiry into Truth does not stop at the level of thinking but passes into the next higher stage of meditation (nididhyāsana). The *mantra* performs a function similar to that of the *avatāra*. It descends to a lower level in order to help the beings conditioned to that level, to rise to its own. Truth therefore, in its essential nature, is a *mantra* or an *avatāra* of the Reality, whose function is to knock at the doors of our flesh-bound consciousness and convey to it a suggestion or a whisper of the Reality beyond. A consequence of great importance for philosophy, regarded as systematic thinking, follows from this view of Truth. It is taken for granted and followed universally in practice even in India, where the importance of spiritual experience is so clearly recognized, that philosophy is by its very nature polemical, and that to establish a philosophical system carries with it the obligation of refuting other rival philosophical systems. The great Ācāryas of this country, for instance, have carried on a wordy warfare against each other or their disciples. Evidently they believed that there is only one true way of systematic presentation, at the intellectual level, of the contents of spiritual experience. I wish to suggest that

this uncompromising dialectical warfare among the Ācāryas is not in keeping with the real spirit of Indian philosophy. If, as I said, the essential nature of Truth is *mantra*, then the very notion of Truth alters radically and passes beyond the sphere of controversy and debate. Truth is *mantra* and so the truth of a *mantra* consists in its efficacy to awaken ignorant souls to the Reality concealed within themselves. It is conceivable that different people may need to be awakened by the use of different *mantras*. Not only is it conceivable but actual practice of *sādhana* for the realization of Truth demonstrates and confirms the need for more than one *mantra*. Fundamentally there are three supreme *mantras* though each may have an indefinite number of subordinate modes. They are (1) Reality is transcendental and ineffable (neti neti), (2) Reality is impersonal (nirguṇa), (3) Reality is personal (saguṇa). What they have in common is the understood or expressed condition that this Reality is yet *to be realized*. What we call a philosophical system, e.g., Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, etc., is merely an intellectual paraphrase of one of these three mantras. If this is clearly understood, then the harmony that holds the three mantras together as alternative ways of accomplishing the same result, viz. the awakening from ignorance, should descend also into their intellectual counterparts and make them tolerant of each other. It may still be asked whether the two *mantras*, Reality is personal and Reality is impersonal do not contradict each other, or at least precipitate a conflict at the level of the intellect ; or if they do not do even this, whether they are not both mere aspects of a Truth that includes and goes beyond them, in which case, each being incomplete, can be contradicted and corrected in a more complete philosophical system. Ths question raises a very large issue and at the close of this paper I can only indicate where I think the true answer lies. The answer I think is that in the ultimate vision of things the notion of whole and parts, or aspects has no application as we understand it. In relation to the whole presented to or constructed by the mind we may still for the sake of convenience talk of the personal and impersonal as being aspects of Reality. But the truth is that the Transcendent or the Ineffable which is *indivisible*, may reveal itself either as a personal or as an impersonal reality, or as both. Each revelation contains the whole Reality, and not a part or aspect thereof. One who has received the revelation of Reality only as personal, will, if he turns philosopher, construct a theistic system. One who has experienced the impersonal alone, will, like Śaṅkara, become a Māyāvādin. As each revelation contains the indivisible Transcendent, the logic of each system will also be correspondingly complete and self-contained. That is why, as centuries of polemical literature has shown, no system of thought based on Spiritual experience, i.e., no *Darśana*, can be refuted at the level of logic. The mistake of the Ācāryas consisted, not in thinking that their particular system presented the complete Truth, albeit at the considerably impoverished level of ideas, but in refusing to recognize that the complete, i.e., indivisible Truth

could also be presented as an alternative system of ideas. It is at this level of understanding and not at the level of polemical logic that the limitations of the different Ācāryas can be corrected and overcome. This, I believe, is the method and approach adopted by Śrī Aurobindo in his dealing with different and seemingly conflicting systems of philosophy.

PHILOSOPHY AS AN AUTONOMOUS SPIRITUAL ACTIVITY

by

R. DAS

In this paper I wish to maintain that philosophy is an autonomous spiritual activity. In order to make my position fairly plausible or even generally intelligible, I should make clear what I understand by the terms ' philosophy ', ' autonomous ' and ' spiritual activity '.

It may seem strange to outsiders, i.e. non-philosophers, that there is no general agreement among accredited philosophers as to the meaning of the term ' philosophy '. This arises from the fact that ' what is philosophy ' is itself a philosophical problem which may be solved differently by different philosophers according to their light. I shall not attempt here to give a reasoned solution of this problem but shall be content with stating, more or less dogmatically, my view of what philosophy is. I only hope that I am not quite singular in holding this view.

Philosophy, for me, essentially is philosophizing. It is something that one does and in virtue of which one is called a philosopher. It is a reflective activity of our mind or spirit, exercised, of course, upon experience, with a view to its clarification or removal of doubt and confusion. In ordinary experience, our mind is simply forward-moving, we are not reflective. If, for some reason or other, our mind is forced to turn backward, to fall back upon itself, then we are said to reflect, and, if we are made that way, we may begin to philosophize.

Two or three points may be noted here. First, our common experience is the only basis for philosophy. We can neither assume a position prior to or beyond our common experience, in order to start philosophizing in the right way, nor do we need any special kind of experience, religious or scientific, to provide a proper field for our philosophic activity. Secondly, it seems necessary that there should be some failure and disappointment, in one field or another, in the sphere of knowledge, volition or emotion, if the genial current of our soul is to receive a check and become reflective. Naturally we are not reflective and we do not become reflective out of mere fun. To reflect is really to turn back upon oneself, and this turning back upon oneself takes place only when the normal activity of one's mind is thwarted in some sense. We do not get what we want and our soul cries out in anguish ' why ?'. Most probably the disappointment or failure occurs first in the field of emotion or volition, and then it spreads over the field of knowledge as well. At any rate some painful experience, accompanied by a

serious sense of ignorance, seems necessary to start us in the voyage of philosophic discovery, to make us brood over the mysteries of the world. Since the origin of philosophizing lies in some painful experience, the world for the philosopher, at least in his primitive outlook, assumes the form of pain.

Pain is not a self-justifying experience. It demands a reason and when the reason is not at once evident, we begin to philosophize. Any kind of pain would not make the experient subject a philosopher. The mere physical pain of an animal does not lead it to any philosophic activity. The pain which leads to philosophical thinking must itself be of the mental level. It can arise, as it seems to me, only through some volitional or emotional failure. The philosopher is a defeated and disappointed man at some level of experience. Failure and disappointment does not appear to be an accidental factor in our experience. Failure and death, as Conrad says, are the inevitable lot of every individual.

If failure is so universal, and if failure made one a philosopher, the world would be full of philosophers. But this is not so. This is because mere failure does not suffice to make one a philosopher unless one possesses the right kind of mind necessary for philosophic activity. The capacity for reflection is not shared by all in the same degree and there are also different levels of reflection. The kind of reflection which makes philosophy possible is not so common or widespread as one might think or wish.

Self-consciousness is supposed to distinguish men from animals and self-consciousness involves some kind of reflection. All men are, therefore, to some extent reflective. Our common experience too involves some reflection. We can affirm the world of ordinary perception only as a result of reflection on sense experience. Science, too, which is only systematized common experience, arises from the same kind of reflection. Reflection on common experience, which is involved in philosophizing, is a higher kind of reflection than the reflection involved in common experience or science. We cannot reflect on or criticize common experience unless we are able to rise to a higher level of consciousness. Although as men, we are all potentially capable of raising ourselves to this higher level, in actual fact, we find some are naturally averse to making any effort in this direction (and without an effort we cannot raise ourselves thus), while others are equally naturally prone to making this effort and find the fulfilment of their being in it. These we call philosophers. In this sense, philosophers, like poets, are born and not made.

I have implied that philosophical thought is different from scientific thought and so philosophy is altogether different from science. This runs counter to a current view which says that science and philosophy are not different in kind, since both are concerned to give us knowledge of reality. If they differ at all,

it is only in their method and scope. I cannot enter here into an examination of this view which I myself held for long. My present point seems simple and clear. I now regard science as an object of philosophy, at least, of that part of philosophy, which is called philosophy of science. And since the subjective activity (here philosophy) must be distinct and different in kind from the object (even though the object be itself a mental activity, e.g. science), to which it is directed, I am bound to recognize that philosophy must be distinct from science. And if it is the business of science to give us knowledge, we may even say, philosophy does not give us knowledge at all, but clarification or insight. If this appears to be an extreme view and if words like clarification and insight carry no definite sense, we may at least hold that the kind of knowledge which science gives is different from the kind of knowledge which philosophy seeks to provide.

Whether there are different kinds of knowledge apart from difference in the object may be an open question; but I am inclined to hold that in regard to one and the same object it is possible to have different sorts of knowledge. For instance unreflective knowledge of an object is different from reflective knowledge of the same object. In the latter kind of knowledge, we do not have, on the objective side, the actual object and something else, but, metaphorically speaking, only a deepening of knowledge or a rise in the level of consciousness. When I say 'I know that I know the table', 'that I know the table' does not itself become an enlarged object, having the primary object (the table) within it. 'That I know the table', I suggest, is no object at all. The only available object here is the table and the repetitious language used only helps to bring out a peculiarity in the manner of knowing and does not mean any duplication of the object. At most we can say that in one case we know the table as table and in the other case we know the table as known. But can we really distinguish the object as known from the object itself ? If we cannot, then we may well say that the difference lies in the manner of knowing and not in the object known. In one case we know self-consciously and not so in the other.

My main point here, however, is not an analysis of self-conscious knowledge. I shall be content if it is granted that philosophical knowledge is different from scientific knowledge in some sense. Scientific knowledge, or, as it is sometimes said, knowledge proper, must be rich in content. In fact, when we speak of any progress in knowledge, we mean by this progress only some addition in the content of knowledge or modification in the determination of the object known. But progress in philosophical knowledge does not seem always to result in any addition in the content or object of our knowledge. Many of our genuine philosophers have been sceptics and agnostics and we cannot pretend that their researches made any addition to the content of our knowledge. At best they chastened our beliefs and relieved us of many prejudices and when these could not be abandoned, made us self-conscious in regard to them. Such growth in self-consciousness,

correction of erroneous notions and chastening of beliefs are some of the things which I wish to understand by clarification and enlightenment for the sake of which alone philosophy, in my opinion, should be seriously pursued.

It is clear that by philosophy I do not understand any system of thought constructed by a philosopher. Various systems are no doubt offered in the name of philosophy and they differ very widely among themselves. If any one of them defined the nature or work of philosophy as such, the others would not, and there would be thus but one philosopher in the world. Moreover there are many recognized philosophers who do not succeed in, and may not even aim at, constructing any system at all. Systems are valuable only as helpful guides in reflective analysis. As items of knowledge they are all very dubious and cannot for long engage the attention of any serious student.

We may grant that philosophizing involves systematic thinking. By systematic thinking I do not understand thinking with a view to the construction of a system, but only coherent, self-consistent thinking. Such thinking is also available in any department of knowledge, e.g., science and mathematics. But philosophical thinking is thinking at a higher level and more reflective than scientific thinking. In non-philosophical thinking we are more nearly concerned with the *object* than in philosophical thinking which is concerned with our *understanding* of the object, an understanding in which the object functions in an attenuated form and, in certain cases, may even wholly disappear. I do not personally think that the object can ever be wholly eliminated, but I can well conceive the possibility that in certain cases of philosophical understanding the object should so far lose its objectivity or opposition to the subject, that it vanishes altogether from the philosopher's view. Modestly put, philosophical attempts are attempts at the clarification of our ideas. And if ideas are part of the self, then the clarification of ideas is also, and in a sense, purification of the self (especially if ideas are taken in a wide sense as inclusive of our emotional and volitional attitudes).

So much about philosophy. I must now try to explain what I understand by spiritual activity. I have used the term ' activity ' in the course of my essay and have taken it to be generally intelligible without any definition or explanation. I think it is a simple elementary notion ; and I shall not attempt to explain it here. I may however remark that it involves the idea of a process initiated and maintained in being by the agent himself who undergoes the process. The word ' spiritual ' does not signify for me anything mystical, religious or other-worldly in the ordinary sense. Anything mental, i.e., intellectual, volitional, etc., would be spiritual in my sense. I am using the term in the wide sense in which the German word *geistig* is generally used. In Indian tradition the mind is generally regarded as an instrument of the self or spirit. I am following the European tradition in thinking of the mind and spirit as one.

I, therefore, regard art and science as well as religion as expressions or forms of spiritual activity. Our mind or spirit has to be characteristically active in them all, so that it may well be said that each one of them expresses a particular form of spiritual activity.

I should say any kind of thinking or even perceiving involves some spiritual activity. One might even go further and maintain that all activity is spiritual activity, since what we mean by activity can be experienced and found only in ourselves and not in any outward object.

Even if all activity is spiritual in this way, we may still speak only of some kinds of activity as spiritual. Nobody is wholly devoid of strength, but a person is called strong only when he possesses strength in a marked degree. Similarly we may use the term ' spiritual ' only in a relative sense. An activity is spiritual in the sense and to the extent that it is concerned less with the body or matter than with mind or spirit. The less we are concerned with matter or any sensible content, the more we rise in the scale of spirituality. It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that our spirit is entangled in the body, so that no activity however spiritual, can be altogether dissociated from all bodily functions. An attempt to solve an abstract mathematical problem occasions a rise in our blood pressure. Still as the attempt has no direct reference to anything material, it will be understood as a higher spiritual activity than any act of sensation or perception which is directly concerned with some sensible content.

In artistic creation, although we may be working with a brush or a chisel on some material stuff, our activity is spiritual, because the guiding vision is that of an idea of beauty, which is nothing material. Similarly religious worship is a highly spiritual activity, although, while engaged in it, we may be burning some material incense or bend our body before an idol, because our principal concern is with God who is supposed to transcend all materiality.

We are however never so spiritual as when we are concerned with our spirit or the spiritual side of our being. In science we are concerned, it is true, with general laws or principles which are not material, but these are sought only in their application to material bodies, which are never out of our view. In art, our guiding vision is that of an ideal, but we always seek to embody it in a material or sensible object. In religion, especially in its non-ritualistic form, we may not be concerned with anything material, but I am doubtful whether we can get rid of all kinds of imagery, and imagery seems to be a kind of replica of sensible experience. We reach the highest level of spirituality, humanly possible, in philosophy where we are concerned with understanding or inner enlightenment, which is part (and may even be said to define the core) of our spiritual being. Philosophy is the highest reach of our spirituality because all other levels of spiritual experience, art, science, religion, etc., are made objects of its reflection and we

cannot reflect on them unless we rise above them. It is true that we can and do reflect upon philosophic activity itself, but such reflection, it should be remembered, is part of philosophy itself.

It now remains to see why and in what sense we should regard philosophy as completely autonomous. By 'autonomous' I do not mean 'independent'. Philosophy is not independent, because, being a reflective activity, it certainly depends on the experiences, supplied by non-philosophical sources, on which it reflects. It thus depends on common everyday experience, as well as scientific experience, no less than on religious and artistic experiences, because all these experiences fall under the scope of its reflection. By 'autonomous', I mean, in the first place, self-legislative. Philosophy gives law (*nomos*) to itself (*auto*). It has not to follow in its own field rules or laws taken from or dictated by mathematics or science. The rules of philosophizing, if there be any, must issue from itself They cannot be externally determined.

In the second place, —and this is my principal point here,—by 'autonomous' I mean 'self-justifying'. There was a time in the European tradition when philosophy was looked upon as the hand-maid of theology. That phase is now over. Philosophy no longer addresses itself to the task of justifying any theological dogmas. Her new mistress appears to be science, and in many quarters now it is held to be the sole business of philosophy to examine and explain the presuppositions of science and thus, in a sense, to be of service to science. In India, too, philosophy used to be pursued mainly in the interest of a religious life and the position is not very different even today. The idea that philosophy has to serve some mistress other than itself is highly repugnant to my view. At one time art and even science were subservient to religion. These have now achieved their freedom and are growing independently. I believe the time is now ripe, even in this country, to declare unequivocally that philosophy exists for itself and does not need to justify itself by any service it may possibly render either to science or to religion. I do not mean to deny that science and religion may be helped by philosophy. I only maintain that the avowed end of philosophical thinking can never be to help forward scientific work or religious life.

To prescribe an external end is to limit freedom. Philosophy is thinking and reflective thinking at that, and there can be no thinking in the true sense of the term unless there is complete freedom.

Plato taught that the end of true education is to turn the eye of the mind towards light. He appears certainly to have recognized that to see light is something valuable in itself. We have seen that philosophy is a resolute attempt to gain light or enlightenment. It is inconsistent with our nature as rational beings to be content with ignorance, confusion and error, and therefore we seek light,

and thus in philosophizing we merely fulfil the law of our rational nature and serve no ulterior purpose. We do philosophy for its own sake.

We should understand that philosophy is not possible for God who is completely enlightened nor for brutes who are never reflective enough to be conscious of their error or ignorance. Only we men, who are partially enlightened, can seek light and philosophize. But in our human condition perfect light or complete enlightenment does not seem to be possible. What we can achieve is only gradual realization of more and more light. We have no acquaintance with light apart from spiritual activity. We seek and find whatever light is possible for us in and through spiritual activity alone, which we have named philosophy. It may thus be said quite truly that philosophy is an end in itself.

A FREE MAN'S WORSHIP

BERTRAND RUSSELL *versus* JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

by

S. K. DAS

In his illuminating *Discovery of India*, which is incidentally his art of self-discovery, Sri Jawaharlal Nehru observes, assuredly, with autobiographical effect that " some vague or precise *philosophy of life* we all have though most of us accept unthinkingly the general attitude which is characteristic of our generation and environment ". The observation records one of those flashes of luminous insight with which the *Discovery*, justly so called, abounds; and, coming as it does, from one who is, by training and temperament, a votary of the Scientific Method of Cambridge tradition, the pronouncement has an added authority withal. With the characteristic habit of assessing the experience of life, all and sundry, in the dry light of reason, Nehru has happily that breadth of vision which affords an enlightened testimony to this effect : " Life does not consist entirely of what we see and hear and feel, the visible world which is undergoing change in time and space. It is continually touching an invisible world of ether, and possibly more stable or equally changeable elements, and no thinking person can ignore this invisible world ". Thus and thus alone does the ingrained realism of the scientific outlook acquire a redemptive grace about it ; and the resolute thinker, with all his idolatry of ' facts ' and ' the scientific method ', has to acknowledge in the end that sense has no monopoly of reality. Paradoxical as it may sound, it is the reality of the Unseen that is ' the master-light of all our seeing ', the abiding source of inspiration for all our pursuits, scientific as well as philosophical. It is too late in the day to learn that it is not *facts as such*, but always the *meaning of facts* that is the engrossing concern of the scientist, as much as of the philosopher. For, fact, to quote an instructive simile from Tagore, is like a blind lane that closes upon itself ; it cannot by itself command a full vision of truth. In short, science, no less than philosophy, is ' a thinking consideration of things ' : only where science seeks to think the facts, philosophy seeks to think them out,—the distinction between them being not one of *kind* but only one of *degree* in the process of unification of experience, aimed at by each alike. In the cinematographic existence of to-day, it is worth our while to look across the endless shiftings of the cosmic dust to those eternal verities and values that alone make life worth living. What we need, after all, is not the will to *believe* but the will to *seek* and *find*—a persistent effort, that is, ' to see life steadily and see it whole '. Let us not, therefore, like perverse children, first raise the dust and then complain that we cannot see !

Life, like thought, is the standing refutation of absolute scepticism. In literalness of fact we live *by* faith. The very effort to live, at least for a rational being, is a clear testimony to the conviction that life *is* worth living, that there is some supreme object or sovereign good for man—*paramapuruṣārtha* as Indian thinkers would characterize it. *That* life is worth living is thus the postulate or presupposition of life itself ; *why* it is worth living is the problem of reflective analysis or a philosophical inquiry. Even philosophy, in a sense, rests on what may fairly be termed faith. It has, for aught we can say, to presuppose its conclusion in order to prove it. It tacitly assumes something in general to be true in order to carry this general truth out in detail. Was not this very truth vouchsafed to the ancient seer of the *Upaniṣads* in the significant query—" *kohy evānyāt kah prānyāt yad eṣa ākāśā ānando na syāt*"—" who would have cared to breathe, or to live on earth, had there been not this abounding Joy or Bliss permeating the heavens above ? " Such an abiding faith may be summarily dismissed as a blind, irrational craving, as a sick man's dream or even as a case of the Freudian " wish " ! An absolute pessimism regarding this will-to-live (*Wille zur leben*), whether temperamental or doctrinal, is bound to prove dogmatic and shallow, for this abiding faith is deep almost as life. This is clearly evident from the verdict of the prince of pessimists, Arthur Schopenhauer, who has consistently preached that this " boundless clinging to life cannot be attributed to knowledge and reflection : in the view of these it is an insanity ; for the objective value of life is a very dubious affair, and it is questionable, at least, whether it is preferable to non-existence : nay, if experience and reflection are called to council, non-existence can hardly fail to win. Knock at the graves, and ask the dead whether they would rise again ; they will shake their heads ". Would it be, however, a matter of surprise if some hardened criminal from underneath the tombstone were to cry out : ' Yes, do for heaven's sake, try me again, and I will do better '; or the disconsolate mother to plead: ' Let me only come back till my wandering boy's return ' or even Schopenhauer himself to exclaim ' A little more time I did certainly want to finish my proof that life is an empty dream ' ?

The prolific source of misdirection in this regard lies in the age-long confusion between *Ends* and *Means*, the intrinsic and the instrumental values, the passing and the abiding interests of life. Coupled herewith is the insensate craze for ' objectivity ', ' realism ' and a ' disinterested intellectual curiosity ' associated with the scientific method of approach to the larger issues of life. What is needed here is a radical, and not merely symptomatic, treatment of the *malaise* that originates from a misplaced accent upon the nature and function of knowledge. Nothing is more pernicious than the solgan—" Knowledge for the sake of knowledge "—which is at best a half-truth ; and a half-truth is converted into untruth when it is taken for the whole truth. We moderns swear by Knowledge which is Power, indeed ; but the ancients would go in for knowledge, *not* for the sake

of Knowledge but of Wisdom—Wisdom being the way in which knowledge is used. It is Wisdom as the *good* of Knowledge that moves or inspires us. As we have learnt from the instructive errors of the past, knowledge taken apart from being, has no goodness or reality at all, and hence our knowledge cannot satisfy even itself, and much less the whole man. Taking stock of our achievements we are painfully conscious of the fact, driven home by Will Durant that because in these days our *means* and *instruments* have multiplied beyond our interpretation and synthesis of *ideals* and *ends*, our life is " full of sound and fury signifying nothing ". Is that the reason why the 19th Century English poet makes the suggestive hint :—" Knowledge comes but Wisdom lingers " ?

Again, this so-called ' disinterested intellectual curiosity ', be it further remembered, is itself an interest, and unless provided with safe-guards, it is too apt to degenerate into an obsession. Nowhere does this fixation reveal itself in a more acute form than in a " Free Man's Worship ", which, according to Bertrand Russell should draw its inspiration from what he terms, with the force of an epigram, the ' gospel of unyielding despair ' ! Whatever we may choose to think of its merits as a philosophical dissertation, there is no denying the point that it is destined to rank, by the sheer force of its ' austere beauty ' and stylistic charm, as one of the masterpieces of English literature, and, surely as one of the philosophical classics of our age. There is, however, no justification for that sorry exhibition, and that in the name of scientific objectivity and disinterestedness, of that spirit of bravado and sham heroism that lie on the surface of the Russellian ' gospel '. For, bravery is one thing, while bravado is quite another. There is evidently more wisdom in the sage counsel : " Because thou must not dream, thou need'st not then despair " ! The emancipation of the intellect from ' desire ', its ' last prison-house ', is, admittedly, a salutary advice so far as it goes, but one has to see that it does not go too far and *end* by throwing away the baby along with the bath ! There is surely no heroism in renouncing things which a man has no right to renounce ; nor is there any moral grandeur about a martyrdom that is as gratuitous as it is foolhardy. If we care to read between the lines of " A Free Man's Worship ", we are sure to detect in it a morbid passion for passionlessness, a sentimental yearning for martyrdom for its own sake, which has neither sanity nor seemliness about it. Indeed it is only by straining the resources of language—of the words ' gospel ' and ' worship '—that ' the gospel of unyielding despair ' can be made to serve as the keynote of a ' Free Man's Worship '. On the one hand, ' the proud defiance ' inherent herein is at the farthest remove from the attitude of worship : on the other, a stupefying admiration for, and slavish submission to, an ' unconscious power ', trampling on our cherished ideals, give the lie direct to the spirit of worship, and that of a ' free man '. Here the proud defiance is but the paralysing fear turned inside out. We turn, therefore, with a sigh of relief from this ' gospel of unyielding despair ' to that of undying hope as it breathes through Nehru's concluding reflection on the point : " As I look at

this world, I have a sense of mysteries, of unknown depths. The urge to understand it, in so far as I can, comes to me ; to be in tune with it and to experience it in its fullness. But the way to that understanding seems to me essentially the way of science, the way of objective approach though I realize that there can be *no such thing as true objectiveness* ". Here is to be found the keynote of a Free Man's Worship, in the truer sense of the term, and a Philosophy of Life that will not fail nor falter in the storm and stress of our work-a-day life.

Following the lead of this negative prescript we are left to surmise, perchance, to accept on conjectural considerations what measure of subjectivity Nehru would have bargained for in a perennial philosophy of life. To that end nothing is more persuasively adapted than his inspiring pen-portrait of the " Conception of Buddha, to which innumerable loving hands have given shape in carven stone and marble and bronze, seems to symbolize the whole spirit of Indian thought, at least vital aspect of it. Seated on the lotus flower, calm and impassive, above passion and desire, beyond the storm and strife of the world, so far away he seems, out of reach, unattainable....The ages roll by and Buddha seems not so far away after all, his voice whispers in our ears and tells us not to run away from the struggle but, calm-eyed, to face it, and to see in life ever greater opportunities for growth and advancement....so that even to-day there is something living and vibrant about the thought of him who was the finished model of calm and sweet majesty, of infinite tenderness for *all that breathes* and compassion for *all that suffers*, of perfect moral freedom and exemption from every prejudice."

This was just the impression that was borne in upon me, as I entered for the first time the Ethical Church at Bayswater in London twenty years ago. On my stepping inside the church, what first greeted my eyes was the pulpit of the Ethical Church, sanctified by the life-size representation in bronze of two of the noblest samples of humanity—of Jesus the Christ, and Gautama the Buddha. Right overhead of the pulpit the rich symbolism of Walter Crane's painting of " The Torch-Bearers " in adaptation of the two well-known lines of Charles Kingsley :—

> " Still the race of hero-spirits
> Pass the torch from hand to hand "—

the transcription, on the upper part of the large pulpit of Wordsworth's famous line from the " Intimations "—" Thanks to the human heart by which we live " —and the alabaster-white altar, in the centre, bearing the inscription on its four sides :

" An altar to the Ideal : The True: the Beautiful: the Good: " all these conspired to create just that spiritual *milieu* which furnished the best commentary upon the text of world-wide Ethical Fellowship of the human race. From this pulpit I had the privilege of addressing the congregation at a Sunday morning

service in January 1928, one of my predecessors in this context and function in 1926 was Professor Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan whose address on Gautama Buddha under the Hertz Trust, had been deservedly acclaimed as the edifying ministration of 'a master-mind discoursing about another master-mind'. The contributions of these two noble sons of Mother India—one, the apostle of World-loyalty, that is, Nehru and the other, the prophet of 'the World's unborn Soul', namely Radhakrishnan--stand out against the inspiring back-ground of an Over-soul, Mahātmā Gandhi of blessed memory, in whom was reincarnated, as it were, the Life and Light of Asia—one that in the midst of 'encircling gloom' exclaimed with oracular effect :—" Truth is God . . . Denial of God we have known. Denial of truth we have not known."

It is this very conception of the Church Invisible that alone can guarantee the realization of the cult of Internationalism, the pathway to which lies not along the road of nationalism or consolidation of national or exclusive interests. A Parliament or a Federation of Mankind must remain an idle dream, until and unless the making of the international mind is an accomplished fact: and this can only come about under the perpetual inspiration and watchful care of a Church Invisible. Admittedly, it comes as an alien note, if not as an empty mockery, to the distracted world to-day, distracted by the clash of ideals and conflict of loyalties—when ideals are conceived in the abstract and worshipped *en masse*, but resented in the particular and the concrete. We have been taught to think of man as a social unit, as a civic unit, or even as a denominational or political unit, but scarcely to think of man in the integrity of his being—man as a moral individual. Must we not, therefore, go back to the classical ideal of the State as resting on an ethical foundation, in all its bearings on our present-day life? The tragic failure of the mission of so-called 'Universality' has been brought about so far by the peoples of the world, following the cult of 'particularity' in the abstract without its saving grace, in studied ignorance of the luminous insight of the poet—

> " A people is but the attempt of many
> To rise to the completer life of one "—

and, as we may add, through all the ascending spires of social existence to that integrated life, that World-loyalty which is evermore about to be.

As an apostle of the Church Invisible, to wit, an Ethical Church, Mahātmā Gandhi has given the redemptive warning that religion, in the name of loyalty to a visible church, borders on irreligion; that patriotism, local or communal, is not enough; and that " the very right to live accrues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship of the world " to quote from his concluding reflection on the " world-charter of human rights ", in response to Dr Julian Huxley's invitation for his gift of ideas to UNESCO—verily his last will and testament, (a testament, withal, of beauty that is native to the magnanimity of a noble soul, such as was

his) to the disunited and distracted nations of the world. Herein he is in the honoured company of the Teachers of mankind, preaching at Galilee or at Kushīnara, and drawing men away from the worship of false 'gods' with the perpetual reminder : " My Kingdom is not of this world! "

But this is no mere negative prescript landing us in sheer emptiness. The negative direction has for its positive counterpart the life-giving message : " I am the Way, the Truth and the Life ". That is why Harnack once said that " Christ could think of no higher task than to point men to Himself ". Parenthetically, we may note that this is exactly what could be in all its literalness said of the other World-Teacher, Gautama the Buddha. Institutional Christianity, however, has somehow missed the point altogether in as much as we find Dr Inge, the erstwhile Dean of St Pauls' protesting against the excesses and " aberrations of institutionalism " and Dr L. P. Jacks, the late reputed editor of the " Hibbert Journal " and Principal, Manchester College, Oxford, tracing the " lost radiance of Christianity " to that " institutional selfishness " which stands redeemed only in our loyalty to what Josiah Royce, the American idealist philosopher, happily called " the Universal and Beloved Community ", of saints and prophets, of all lands and all ages, the Church Invisible, the *Samgham* to which the loyal devotee betakes himself (*samgham śaraṇam gacchāmi*). Call it idealism or call it realism—it does not matter. If it is attuned to an ideal at all, it thrives on its stark reality and not on something contingent or problematical. For, to stake the ideal on the future is the death of all sane idealism. The pathway to it may be difficult and tortuous, but there is no short cut to the Promised Land. It is, in the inspiring language of the mystics, 'a flight of the alone to the Alone '. No Mediator, no Redeemer, no *Guru* can achieve that end vicariously. The days of discipleship and vicarious redemption, let us not forget, are gone—perhaps for ever. What would be appropriate, therefore, to the needs of the hour is the prayer of the poet-philosopher:

" Make no more giants, God, but elevate the race at once "!

SYMBOLISM IN RELIGION

by

D. M. DATTA

I

Signs and meanings pervade the whole realm of human experience ; they also play an important part in the life of lower animals. Observation of animal behaviour in nature and experiments with animals like those performed by Pavlov clearly show how lower animals gradually learn and develop conditioned reflexes by complicated chains of signs and meanings. A raised stick means nothing to a new-born pup ; but after some beatings with a stick, it becomes a *sign* of danger ; it *means* a source of pain. Similarly the reflex action of salivation primarily caused by the placing of food on the dog's tongue, may be caused by the sight of the dish or of the feeder, or by the sound of the dinner bell and so on. All of these latter can become, therefore, *signs* of ' food ' and may thus *mean* its advent. Learning by experience involves the capacity for taking something as the sign of some other thing. Without this capacity for attaching meanings to events, anticipation of the future, or preparation for it, would have been impossible and there would have been no difference between the behaviour of the new-born pup and the experienced dog.

What is true of lower animals is much more true of men. It is a commonplace of psychology that an uninterpreted sensation does not amount to any perception. The sensation of one quality, say, a round patch of orange colour, is taken by the new-born baby just as such ; but the adult attaches *meaning* to it ; and it becomes for him a sign for the existence of all other qualities like soft touch, sweet smell, sweetish-acid taste, some weight, etc. The anticipation of these other qualities carries with it also the belief that it is a substance. Similarly a sensed surface comes to *mean* the presence of an interior ; a part (e.g. a face) signifies the presence of a whole (the entire man). The passage of the mind from the sensed aspect to the unsensed becomes so deep-rooted and automatic with the growth of experience that it requires a little psychological training to be able to distinguish between the given and the not-given, the sign and what it means or represents. A man in the street scarcely suspects that while he is seeing only a patch of orange colour he is *not* really seeing the entire orange fruit, having all other qualities and all other parts (back, bottom and interior). Repeated experience often leads to a kind of *identity* between the immediately presented and the unpresented, the sign and what it only means. It is thus that cotton can *look* soft, ice can *look* cold, a razor can *look* sharp, a man can *look* angry or pleased. In the first three cases sight does not simply *lead* the mind to touch ; the look itself becomes soft, cold, sharp ; in the last case the look does

not simply make the mind think of or infer anger as its cause, but the look itself becomes angry. The sign and the signified become one, the mind does not feel that it is passing *from* the one *to* the other ; but it finds the second *in* the first.

In memory the story of perception is repeated. The image of one particular aspect of a thing or an event stands for the whole. But in addition to this there is the further point that in order that a memory image may take the mind back to the past object and make it *believe* in the past, there must be a kind of *identity* between the *present* image and the *past* object. Here again we find the fusion of the sign and the signified.

In conception (or the formation of a general idea) we have either an abstract idea containing the common and esssential elements of all members (as conceptualists think) or the image of a particular member *standing for* the whole class (as nominalists hold). In the former case the general idea devoid of the ideas of individual peculiarities can *stand for* each member possessed of *both* general and peculiar characters only by some process of symbolic substitution since the two are not identical. In the latter case also one particular member can *stand for* other particular members of the class by a similar process. In both cases we find then the sign-signified kind of relation.

Thinking, as a preparation for meeting future situations, is the mental rehearsal of possible future situations and possible reactions to find out the best possible course of action. As it is carried through concepts which have been just shown to be of the nature of some signs having meanings, thinking is described by some thinkers, like Dewey, as a symbolic operation.

In syllogistic inference we can pass from the known to the unknown only through some middle term which has been found, in past experience, to be so related to what is not given (here) or the unknown, that it can stand as a sign and guarantee of the presence of it in other unobserved cases. So in Indian Logic the middle term is described as the mark or sign (*liṅga*) and inference is sometimes described as a kind of knowledge obtained through a sign.

This brief consideration of the different stages and aspects of human knowledge and animal behaviour would clearly show the extensive *role* played by signs and meanings in human and animal life. The basis of the relation between a sign and what it means lies in the possibility of one thing standing for another ; and we have found that in some cases the relation between the sign and the signified can mature into one of identity.

But signs can be either natural or arbitrary. The examples cited so far are those of natural signs, that is signs which are not consciously or voluntarily chosen by any animal or man. In some cases, owing to some natural affinities one thing automatically becomes a sign of some other thing by the laws of conditioned reflex or association of ideas. But there are other cases where signs are

adopted consciously, by a human individual or a group of such individuals, to represent certain other things for the sake of convenience or on any other ground. The word 'symbol' is generally used for such an adopted or conventional sign, though it is sometimes used in a wider sense also as a synonym for sign. The words of a language, the letters of an alphabet, the signs of algebra and other sciences, the abbreviations used in any kind of literature are symbols in the narrower sense of the term.

The process by which in such cases the human mind can treat something as a symbol of another is one of *repeated thinking of the one as the other.* As this process matures more and more the symbol becomes more and more of a symbol and less and less of what it is as such. To take an example, the letters m a n would appear to be mere black marks of particular shapes to the illiterate, to the newly initiated they will appear as such marks and shapes *with* some meaning, but to the adept deeply absorbed in reading a book in which this word occurs the letters as black marks with shapes will scarcely make their appearance ; they will be nearly all meaning. The process of converting something into a symbol is, therefore, a training in attention. Attention may be fixed on the thing itself and it is then no symbol. It may swing between the thing and what it stands for. There is then a *partial symbol.* Finally attention may be fully shifted to the symbolized, then there is a *full symbol.* When this training in attention is complete the symbol will no longer attract any attention to itself ; it will become thoroughly transparent, or, in the words of Bradley, it will forgo "individuality and self-existence". Such is the case when we read a book with rapt attention and find in the written words nothing but ideas. As soon as attention is shifted back to the letters the links of thought are snapped by the opaque marks on paper.

II

We shall briefly examine in this paper the *role* of symbolism in Religion in the light of facts disclosed in the foregoing discussion. As Religion is a human affair involving feeling, perception, memory, conception, reasoning and language, it can be deduced *a priori* that it cannot be free from the use of signs which, we have seen, pervade these different aspects of human life. Some of the signs found in Religion are natural and some are more or less arbitrary. The former are common to almost all religions and the latter are peculiar to particular religions.

Let us examine first the different conceptions of God. The idea of God in the mind of a pluralistic animist does not seem to involve any more use of signs than what we have found previously to be present in ordinary cases of perception. A tree or a stone as perceived by the animist is a deity, a spirit dwelling in a body, like a human being. Such a visible object of 'worship' makes mediate approach through any sign unnecessary, except that the material body of the deity is taken as a sign and guarantee of the indwelling spirit which as such cannot be perceived. There is thus a partial symbolism here.

Deism, theism and pantheism all conceive God as a Spirit. But while according to deism the Divine is wholly transcendent, according to some forms of theism God is also immanent in the world, and according to some forms of pantheism God is wholly immanent. The conception of the divine spirit being nearly unintelligible except through something of which we have a direct consciousness, all these theories of God take the help of our own spirit for understanding God. As a result of this the conception of God becomes anthropomorphic. God is described in terms of man, the embodied spirit. These descriptions are drawn from the qualities of the human spirit and sometimes mixed up with those of the human body. Examples of these we find in the conceptions of God as father, son, ruler, maker, friend, companion, lover, judge, etc. as denotable by masculine nouns and pronouns, and as capable of being enraged or propitiated, as having purpose and will, and so on. Most of these anthropomorphic descriptions cannot be taken at their face values because they cannot be applied literally to the perfect and bodiless spirit. In these circumstances they have to be taken as symbolic descriptions standing for meanings other than what they apparently are. Anthropomorphism thus entails symbolism.

In a similar manner if God is *really* believed to be spiritual and at the same time He is described to be ' all-pervasive ' it is necessary to give up the ordinary meaning of ' pervasion ' (which implies extension in space like a material substance) and take it as *standing for* some other meaning compatible with the immaterial nature of a spirit. If again God is believed to be infinite then the description of Him as one has also to be taken in some non-literal or symbolic sense, since the question of numbering can strictly apply only to what can be measured with some unit, and not to the immeasurable. Presence of symbolism can be traced similarly in many other attributes of God.

Turning from the conceptions of God to other religious phenomena also we can find a great many examples of symbolism. Consider, for instance, the different physical postures like bowing, bending, kneeling, falling prostrate, folding the palms, touching the ears which are found in the different religions of the world. These physical operations may be taken by some religions to have some magical influence or physiological efficacy. But in most of the advanced religions they are but symbolic expressions of mental attitudes towards God. Take again the rituals and ceremonies of different kinds which consist of certain physical operations with or on different kinds of materials—sacrifice, oblation, burning of lights and incense, ablution, tonsure, circumcision, eucharist and endless other performances. In religions which inculcate them not for any magical virtue, there must be some spiritual meanings for which these material operations stand. So these ceremonies must have to be taken as material symbols aiming at spiritual purposes. We cannot, again, understand why temples, churches, tabernacles, crosses, crescents, swastikas, particular places and rivers can be treated as sacred,

and can claim veneration from devotees who believe only in One Spiritual Being, called God, unless these are treated as *symbols* possessing some *spiritual meanings.*

It is found, therefore, that use of symbols is not by any means confined to the worshippers of idols, but, on the contrary, that it is present in various forms among the followers of other faiths too.

III

Among the Hindus the use of different kinds of symbols for the meditation on God is prevalent. Natural phenomena like the sun, fire, parts of the body, mental faculties, mystic letters, prepared images, etc., are used for various kinds of worship. But all of these are *consciously* adopted *as* symbols. This is obvious from the *mantras* which are cited for invoking the Deity into the symbol, and for bidding farewell to Him and discarding the symbol when the worship is over. In fact in one of the *mantras* cited for such farewell the worshipper expressly begs to be pardoned for imparting finite form to the formless Infinite, for ascribing qualities to that which transcends all assignable qualities, and so on. In spite of the conception of God as a pure infinite and formless spirit symbols are chosen for aiding meditation.

Though the monistic school of Vedānta does not only hold like the other Indian theists that God is a pure, infinite spirit, but also contends that in His true aspect God is beyond the reach of any attribute that the mind may predicate of Him, yet it recognizes the utility of meditation through finite symbols. The fact is that all Indian schools of religion and philosophy unanimously recognize that men differ in tastes, aptitudes and abilities and that all things are not suitable for all persons. In all Indian systems of training,—philosophical, religious and of other kinds,—there are graduated courses consisting of successive stages suited to different individuals. The attempt always is to lead the aspirant step by step to the highest realization of truth, or to the highest perfection of the self.

It is found, therefore, that the Upaniṣadic teachers impart the knowledge of the highest Absolute by successively asking the pupil to think of it as the body, as vitality, as sensitivity, as thought and as bliss or joy. Similarly for the realization of the Absolute which, according to them, is the only reality underlying all phenomena the disciple is asked to think of the sun as the Absolute, the mind as the Absolute and so on. Even Śaṅkara, who is unwilling to concede that the Absolute can really possess any form or attribute, recognizes that the worship through the medium of an image is useful for a person of a lower stage.

But a vital distinction is made by Śaṅkara and others between two possible attitudes with which a worshipper can treat a symbol, say the sun. The sun may be contemplated as Brahman, or Brahman may be contemplated as the sun. The former alone is commended as the right attitude since it can gradually elevate the mind from the sun (or the world), the manifestation of the Absolute, to the

Absolute, whereas the latter drags the mind down from the Absolute to the manifestation.

Symbolism can, therefore, be both elevating and degrading, and it depends on the attitude. Worship through image may degenerate into idolatry, if *God* is contemplated as the image instead of contemplating the *image* as God. From the stand-point of monistic Vedānta contemplation of God as endowed with human qualities like will, mercy, justice and the like is a kind of subtle idolatry which drags the attributeless to the level of its manifestations. The goal must be to reduce by repeated contemplation the phenomenal world into God, and not God to the world.

The possibility of reducing the symbol to the symbolized has already been pointed out in the previous sections with the help of examples like written letters. In reading a book the trained reader does not attend to the letters but the ideas which they signify. The letters become complete symbols by sacrificing their private existence for the sake of their meanings. They become transparent and let the ideas shine forth through them. It is quite possible, therefore, that by repeated contemplation the devotee can reduce his chosen symbol to a full symbol, so that it may fully abnegate its private existence, cease to attract any attention to itself and stand transparent before the worshipper to let the idea of God alone shine through it. The Idol made of matter can thus be idealized completely into God. As Rāmakṛṣṇa used to say, " The image of clay (mṛṇmayī) is the Mother Spiritual (cinmayī) ". Extension of this practice to other objects of the world can, if successful, make it possible for the world as a whole to act as a symbol of God.

Symbolic worship of this kind is not however taken by the monistic Vedānta as the only spiritual discipline necessary for the perfect realization of the Absolute. It is *one* of the methods calculated to remove the obstacle to perfection arising out of a wrong belief in the absolute reality of the world, and the consequent attachment to its objects. But it must be supplemented by other methods which fall outside the scope of our present discussion.

We may sum up now the salient points emerging out of this brief discussion. Signs and meanings play an important part in the development of learning and knowledge in men, and even in lower animals. Every form of religion from animism to Absolute monism, abounds with different kinds of symbolism, which is not, therefore, confined only to idol-worship. Symbolism can elevate as well as degrade the devotee according as the symbol is mentally reduced to God or God is reduced to the symbol. The Vedānta makes this explicit distinction and commends the elevating type of symbolism. Anthropomorphism, present in most other religions, encourages the other type. From different examples of ordinary life it is reasonable to suppose that a material symbol can be wholly reduced to its spiritual meaning.

A NEGLECTED IDEAL OF LIFE

(*nivṛttistu mahāphalā*)

by

M. HIRIYANNA

In the beginning of his commentary on the Gītā, Śaṅkara mentions, as known from immemorial time, two types of discipline for attaining the goal of life, viz. *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*. These two kinds of discipline, which correspond to what are described in English as 'activism' and 'asceticism', may be predominantly associated with the life of the householder (*gṛhastha*) and that of the recluse (*saṁnyāsin*). But these represent extreme positions ; and, speaking generally, what is now commended is only a combination of them resulting in a well balanced life. It shows that, according to the final Indian view, the opposition between *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*, as indicated by their names, is only apparent and that there is no unbridgeable gulf between them. Kālidāsa who, as the classic poet of India, may be taken to give expression to its best and highest ideal of life, beautifully suggests the inner harmony between them by describing in parallel terms in a series of stanzas the active and ascetic lives respectively of king Aja and his father, Raghu.[1] But this harmony is not merely a matter of poetic analogy. The Dharma-sūtra-kāras or Indian moralists also try to reconcile these *āśramas*, though there is considerable divergence of opinion among them in this respect.[2] It will suffice for our purpose to refer to only one of these views—the one that is generally followed even at the present time.

This view commends the adoption, after completing Vedic study, of the *āśramas* one after another, in the order in which they are commonly enumerated, viz., *gārhasthya*, *vānaprastha* and *saṁnyāsa*, the training of each being regarded as essential for assuming the next. This is known as 'the standpoint of combination' (*samuccaya-pakṣa*), for it utilizes the training of *all* the stages. There is evidence to show that this practice was known in the age of the Upaniṣads. Yāñjavalkya, we know, from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad,[3] had for long been a householder before he became a *saṁnyāsin*. Here is an attempt made to reconcile the activistic with the ascetic ideal ; but the one is subordinated to the other, for the active life of the earlier *āśramas* is conceived as finally qualifying

1 *Raghu-vaṁśa*, viii. 16-23.
2. See e.g. *Gautama-dharma-sūtra* (Mysore Oriental Library Edn.) iii. 1. (com.).
3 II. v.

for the ascetic life of the last. That is to say, the relation between the two is external, since the life of total self-denial is to begin only *after* the stage of active life.

We are not, however, concerned now so much with this general reconciliation of the ideals of the several *āśramas*, but with the life of the householder in its relation to *nivṛtti*. But before dealing with it, it is desirable to refer to an important point, viz., the exact significance of the term *nivṛtti* as used here. It is well known that even the life of a householder involves numerous checks on natural impulses, and therefore implies the necessity for exercising a good deal of self-denial and self-control. In fact, no virtue is conceivable without resistance to desire ; and, so far, *pravṛtti* necessarily includes *nivṛtti*. But what is meant by the latter term here is very much more; it is not partial, but complete abnegation. It stands for the spirit of *saṁnyāsa*, though it may not wear its form. It is in reference to such total self-abnegation that we have now to consider the life of the householder. *Nivṛtti*, in this absolute sense, has no place, according to the above view, *within* the householder's life ; and no attempt is made to synthesize the principle of active life as a whole with the principle of asceticism. It merely represents an attempt to correlate the different orders of life.

The question that we have to ask is whether any attempt at such a synthesis was at all made in ancient India. The answer that springs at once to our mind is that it has been effected in the Gītā teaching of *niṣkāma-karma* or ' disinterested activity '. That teaching, no doubt, is not meant to be applicable specifically to the householder's life ; it applies to all the *āśramas*, and therefore to *gārhasthya* also. As in the case of the other *āśramas*, the householder also is here bidden to engage himself in his activities without any desire whatsoever for their fruit. That is absolute self-denial, blending and interfusing with active life—an ideal whose formulation is one of India's most signal contributions to world thought. The teaching, however, is so familiar that it is scarcely necessary to dwell upon it at any length. There is another which is similar, but not commonly known ; and our chief purpose here is to draw attention to this forgotten teaching. It is compendiously indicated in the following quotation from Manu Smṛti :[4]

pravṛttireṣā bhūtānām ; nivṛttis tu mahāphalā.

(" To act thus is natural to man; but conscious restraint leads to a higher goal ".)

This half-stanza occurs in the section devoted to the elucidation of the duties of a householder.[5] The immediate context in which it appears is that of

4 v. 56.

5 Chap. iii—v.

food, permitted and forbidden ; but, as commentators point out,[6] it is to be understood as referring not merely to the partaking of food, but to a whole class of actions of which it is only a sample. In order to know what these actions are, it is necessary first to distinguish between those that are prescribed (*vihita*) and those that are not. If we exclude the former, which are a matter of obligation and should in any case be done, we are left with activities, all of which issue from pure inclination. Of them again, some are explicitly prohibited (*pratiṣiddha*), and are therefore to be abstained from. It is to the remaining sphere of actions that the above rule of Manu applies. He regards it as permissible for the householder to engage himself in them; only he adds that turning away from them is a *greater* merit. That is, he places *nivṛtti* higher : *nivṛttistu mahāphalā*. It is well known that the Gītā is averse to all attempts at the gratification of selfish desire (*kāma-cāra*) ; and its teaching may, for that reason, be described as much too rigorous. Manu is more considerate in this respect. Like all moral teachers, he also is quite strict in regard to desistance from prohibited deeds ; but he does not impose the same restriction on other activities. That is, he finds room for what is now called ' enlightened self-interest ' or ' reasonable self-love ' in the life of a householder, on the principle that it is natural for him to seek after it : *pravṛttireṣā bhūtānām*. Instead of prescribing a uniform course of discipline for *all* men, as the Gītā does, Manu recognizes a distinction of moral capacity among them, and adjusts his teaching accordingly.[7]

We may thus speak, according to Manu, of a higher and a lower morality in reference to the householder—the latter being meant for average men, the former for those who are ethically more advanced among householders. The path of complete *nivṛtti* may suit the few ; it is the path of *pravṛtti* that fits the many. But we should add that the latter is described as ' lower ' in no derogatory sense. It has its own excellence which is, by no means, small ; and there is hardly any society that will not be immeasurably better, if its members follow it strictly. In fact, it is the only kind of morality that is recognized in many communities. But from the Indian standpoint, it is not perfect or complete, and will not become that, until it is integrated with the principle of total unselfishness. It is with reference to such a standard that common morality is represented as ' lower '. The distinction is not thus one of bad and good, but one of good and better or, perhaps we should say, good and very much better.

It will be noticed that this combined discipline, or the complete adoption by the householder of the ascetic way of life, is represented as the means to a ' greater end ' (*mahāphalā*). What is that end ? Its nature is not determinable from the context, and commentators generally explain it as *śreyas* whose connotation, unfortunately, is not fixed. But we may well take it to signify, especially in

6 *pradarśanārtham etat. aśiṣṭāpratiṣiddha-viṣayānām anyāsāmapi nivṛttīnām evameva.* (*Medhātithi*).

7 Commentators differ in the explanation of this stanza. The above interpretation is based chiefly upon the *Kullūka-bhaṭṭīya*. *Cf. Kumārila's Tantra-vārttika*, I. iii. 4.

view of what Manu says elsewhere,[8] perfection of character (*sattva-śuddhi*)—the same as it is in the teaching of the Gītā—which will, in its turn, serve as the means to the attainment of the final goal of existence.

There are accordingly two ways of synthesizing the principle of active life with that of complete asceticism—one as set forth in the Gītā, and the other as set forth in the Smṛti of Manu.[9] The principle of *niṣkāma-karma* is common to both, but they differ in the extent of its application. The one is ethically more excellent ; the other seems better fitted to the psychological nature of man. It would be interesting to find out which of these gospels of life is the older ; but our knowledge of the history of ancient Indian thought is, regrettably, too imperfect for it. We have therefore to content ourselves with only noting their logical relation. If we assume that the Gītā is later than the Smṛti of Manu, it is clear that, on considerations that are chiefly ethical, it has extended the earlier idea of absolutely disinterested activity to the moral life as a whole. If, on the other hand, we assume the reverse to have been the case, it is equally clear that the sphere of application of this idea has been narrowed down considerably, for reasons that are mainly psychological.

We can clearly trace, in the works of some of our great poets, the influence of this ancient belief in two levels of *gārhasthya* or active life of which, though both are excellent, one is by far superior to the other. We see it, for instance, in the *Kumāra-saṁbhava* of Kālidāsa where he describes *kāma* or love just in this twofold form. In one, it is relatively lower because it manifests itself as the impulse of an unguarded moment ; and, as may be expected, it is soon repressed. But the repression is not the end of the matter here as it is, for instance, in Aśvaghoṣa's description in the *Buddha-carita* of Gautama's triumph over Māra or Death, as *kāma* is called there.[10] Kālidāsa knows that love is the law of life, but only when it is of the higher type. So *kāma* is revived here in a purified form; and then, as the poet has shown in his masterly manner, it becomes the means of saving the whole world from the tyranny of the cruel demon, Tāraka. But the characters chosen here for illustrating this distinction of levels in active life are divine. They are no less than Śiva and Pārvatī. It would therefore be preferable to take another illustration, and we have it in the same poet's *Śākuntalam* where the characters are human.

The heroine of this drama possesses all the qualities, like beauty, grace and innocence, which we associate with maidenly excellence. The very first scene of the Play shows her in the practice of virtues, such as compassion, friendship and joyful service to others. But her character is not perfect, in that the element of *nivṛtti* is not fully developed in her ; and the occasion for this defect to manifest

8 *Cf. tapasā kilbiṣam hanti vidyayāmṛtam aśnute.* (xii. 104). See also ii. 2-5.

9 *Cf.* in this connection *Yoga-sūtra*, ii. 31.

10 The whole of this topic as well as the distinction between the two ideals has been dwelt upon at greater length in the writer's Presidential address to the 'Philosophy' section of the All-India Oriental Conference that met at Mysore in 1935.

its consequences soon presents itself. King Duṣyanta, while on a hunting expedition, casually visits Kaṇva's hermitage. He meets Śakuntalā there, makes love to her ; and she accepts it. There is nothing here, let us not forget, that is lacking in decorum or dignity. But it still leaves something to be desired. It shows that, speaking on the whole, it is not Śakuntalā who masters her feelings ; it is rather they that master her. She ignores, for instance, the duty she owes to Kaṇva, who is not only her foster-father, but is also the ***kula-pati*** or the head of the entire hermitage. Disappointment and distress follow ; and it is this spiritual lapse, as we might term it, that the curse of Dūrvāsas probably signifies. But the disappointment and the distress do not desiccate her nature, as they might one of a lower type. She utilizes them to the utmost towards perfecting her character; and she emerges from the trial as perfect in character as she has always been perfect in beauty of form. The profound change that has been wrought in her is very well indicated, for example, in one of the last scenes where Duṣyanta tries to put the wedding ring again on her finger—the ring which symbolizes to her all her past ordeals. Śakuntalā gently, but firmly, declines it, adding at the same time that she would rather *he* wore it. The contrast between the hero and the heroine is here specially noticeable. Duṣyanta also is portrayed in the Play as a great hero. He is an ideal king who ever devotes himself to the welfare of his subjects ; and, in his private life, he is represented as never indulging in anything which is out of accord, even in the least, with his Āryan instincts.[11] But we see, in the course of the dramatic action, no such metamorphosis of character in him as we do in Śakuntalā.

It is not merely indirectly that Kālidāsa commends the gradation of self-discipline on a voluntary basis; he expressly refers to it in the well-known stanza[12] in which, pointing to the sages of Mārīca's hermitage, he says ' These are doing penance where others strive to reach '. But the present generation has no need to go to old literature to find an illustration of the higher form of *gārhasthya* life. It had, till the other day, an illustrious example of the absolutely selfless life in Mahātmā Gandhi. To quote only a single saying of his, which will throw light on the whole of this ideal, ' Marriage need not conflict with the practice of celibacy '.

There is one other point about the two types of morality that should have been mentioned earlier but was not, because without illustrations like the above, it might not be clearly understood. We should not think, as we are apt to do from the description of the two types as ' lower ' and ' higher ', that the distinction between them is one of mere degree ; they are, as a matter of fact, different in kind. We cannot accordingly expect that there is a natural and necessary transition from the one to the other. A person may lead a life of common morality

11 See e.g. Act. i. st. 22 and act. v. St. 28.

12 Act. vii. st. 12.

ever so long ; there is no guarantee that he will pass on, at some stage, to the higher. Ordinarily the transformation does not take place without a crisis in the moral life of a person, which stirs his whole being. But even then it is not all that change, but only those in whom there is a unique moral capacity which, for some reason, was lying latent till then. In brief, the change corresponds to what, in the language of religion, is termed ' conversion '.

THE GIVEN AND ITS APPEARANCES

by

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

I

Mere reception of the given, though incommensurate with reason, is an unavoidable stage of knowledge. It has been understood in three ways :—

(1) As a feeling of forced passivity that immediately guarantees to us the existence of something foreign (non-reason). This is from the normal Realistic standpoint.

(2) As an active process of welcome or self-surrender. This is from a quasi-religious standpoint. The existence of the foreign element is not denied. Only while in (1) it is known immediately as an autonomous being, here it is felt as a postulate of our activity, in other words, as indefinitely that-which-is-welcome.

(3) Idealistically, as either being swayed by or surrendering to an intrinsic irrationality in ourselves. The only difference between this (3) and the other two views is that extrinsic foreignness is here replaced by intrinsic irrationality.

In all these three forms the given, as the correlate of reception, is the non-reason. Realistically it is a non-subjective entity, autonomous or postulated, and idealistically it is only the irrational side of our subjectivity.

This non-reason is called 'given', because it is that much of a knowledge-content which is not felt as having in any way changed on account of the knowledge attitude. Even when it is a postulate it is postulated that way, and when it is only our irrational side it is equally felt as given or unmanipulated.

II

How much of a knowledge-content is *given* ? A quality (colour, taste, etc.) is so. Received separately or not, its givenness is assured. Even if it is always found in a context this does not mean that apart from the context, i.e., in its so-called separateness, it might have been different from how it has appeared in the context. Mere non-assurance of non-change proves nothing, and therefore if now a quality appears as given it has to be so taken.

So, sense-qualities are given. What now about the content of *perception* where representative elements are said to be involved ? All depends on how the representative elements are understood. If in perception they stand *as representations* there is no difficulty. Perception would not in that case merely reveal

the given ; as involving representations it would be manipulative also. As a matter of fact, however, the representative elements stand as *presentations*,[1] and therefore the question of manipulation stands at a discount.

We do not deny that these secondary presentations are possible only because they had already been primary presentations. Our point is that the passage from the primary to the secondary presentation has to be properly understood. Any activity involved would only be unconscious, and that too in a restricted sense. Ordinarily where the unconscious puts forward a content at the conscious level it is a representation, not a presentation, and the presence there of the unconscious is actually felt in the sense that the representation is felt as a *re*-presentation, not as a presentation. We are, in other words, conscious that the content has not been entirely given, but that *we* had done something, although the *modus operandi* is not felt, so that, in effect, we feel that in some unfathomable way we had been active ; and this is the only direct consciousness we can have of the unconscious. But when in perception the unconscious is said to be operative it is not felt that way. It is only inferred, and even this inferred unconscious is qualitatively different from any unconscious that may be directly felt, for its function is different—it does not re-present, it only presents. The maximum that can be said inferentially about this unconscious is that *in its presence a presentation occurs*. We do not *feel* any passage from the unconscious to the presentation. There is thus no question of manipulation or activity.

The situation then is this :—Some elements of reality are revealed to us automatically, and some other elements are revealed when unconscious dispositions are present. Only a fuller presentation of reality depends in a distant but unmanipulative way on this unconscious. In perception, therefore, there is a correct presentation of the real, and so the content is *given*. This is confirmed by the fact that below perception there is no felt level qualitatively different from it. One of the reasons why imagination and thought are said to distort the real is that below them there is the perceptual level with the contents of which those of the higher two may be compared, and it is discovered that the manipulative process in the latter two has changed the content of the former. But below perception there is no felt level with the contents of which that of perception may be compared. If there is any mere sensation-level it is not qualitatively different from the level of perception : both are equally concerned with presentations.

Perception, thus, is a mere revelation of the given, and therefore completely reliable. This claim to complete reliability does not clash with the possibility of illusion. What much has been shown is that perception has a natural truth-

1 For, otherwise, 'perception' would be a too wide term covering all cognitive processes (perhaps non-cognitive processes also) except sensation. Physiologists may argue that sometimes a certain felt presentation to a certain sense-organ may be physiologically impossible. But that is a question of theory. A theory should not dictate, it has to adapt itself to facts properly recorded.

claim—whatever is perceived is taken as real—a claim which imagination and thought cannot always put forward, as these processes are felt from the beginning as, to whatever extent, free and manipulative.

Every cognitive act is either *discovering* the real or *confirming* a discovered content. The problem of error from one of these standpoints is different from what it is from the other. Imagination and thought may be erroneous from both these standpoints—(i) they may distort the real on account of their conscious freedom to manipulate, or (ii) even where there is no feeling of manipulation the discovered content may yet fail of confirmation. But all errors in perception are from the point of view of confirmation only. As *discovery* perception is reliable all through. The so-called mis-discovery of a rope as a snake is either super-perceptual or only a process of confirmation supervening on correct perceptual discoveries.

III

Though sensing and perception are passive revelation of the given, and therefore completely reliable, memory and thought are not so. That memory cannot reveal the unadulterated given can be shown in two ways : (i) perception can so reveal the given,[2] but image is qualitatively different from percept, and (ii) memory as a form of imagination is, though to a small extent, a free manipulative process.

To clarify :—

Some believe that there is no image ; memory, according to them, refers directly to the past percept. Some, again, hold that though there is image it is not qualitatively different from percept. But the fact is this : though memory may refer to a percept its immediate content is not the *datum* that was perceived, but the *datum-as-perceived-in-the-past*. With this additional qualification *as-perceived-in-the-past* the immediate content of memory differs from that of perception (which is the datum as such), almost as the content of introspection (into a perception)—the content is ' X as being perceived '—differs from that of perception where the content is mere X. This manifest inevitable relation to a past (or present) subjective context is the only reason why the content of memory (or introspection) is commonly taken as itself subjective and called image (or percept). In the case of memory this relation to subjectivity is felt in different degrees of definiteness, the lowest being a vague *sense of familiarity*.

The memory-content thus differs from a percept ; and the difference is qualitative. Increase the intensity, clarity, stability, etc. of an image to the maximum, it still falls short of a percept ; and conversely decrease these characters of a percept, it is still different from an image. This alone proves that image and percept do not differ in degree only. As for illusion, hallucination and dream,

2 The words ' given ', ' datum ', ' real ' and ' fact ' have often been used interchangeably in this essay, all meaning the *unadulterated given*. Often we have even used the word ' percept ' in this sense, and this is not unjustified, for, according to us, perception alone reveals such given datum.

these are only *initiated* by images, there is no evidence that those images, passing through a continuous series of changes, have themselves turned into percepts.

Image as object-as-perceived-in-the-past is qualitatively different from percept. This means that *as-perceived-in-the-past* is no loose adjunct, but has actually affected the past datum and introduced a qualitative difference, although amidst such differences the datum as such has in different degrees of definiteness continued.

Memory affects the old datum. This affecting is neither an unconscious process nor conscious in the sense of being deliberate. Had it been an unconscious process we could never have felt the past perceivedness of the datum, even the lowest sense of familiarity would not have emerged ; and it is also evident that we do not feel we have in memory modified the datum deliberately. Yet we feel that some modification has taken place, for in memory we not merely feel the image (datum-as-already-perceived), but also, to whatever extent, recognize in it the old datum. It is not impossible that the datum changed of itself into an image in the presence of memory, but it is easier to hold that my memory changed it : and even if the datum had of itself changed, the change is equally felt as due to my memory, like the feeling we have when on account of my attention a thing changes its look.

But though there is this modification memory, as a matter of fact, is not wholly unreliable. All depends on the amount of freedom involved or its mode of operation. In memory freedom behaves decently ; it moves round an old datum and only refracts it to some extent—the datum is not lost in the refracting mist. Where, however, the refraction goes beyond all bounds, and there is deliberate misrepresentation through riotous freedom, that faith in imagination ceases. Such misrepresentation we find in constructive imagination where in the total representation we fail to recognize the core. Freedom here is at its maximum. There is freedom in all forms of imagination—memory or construction, and though it behaves decently in many cases it is always capable of running riot. This is why imagination, even as a method of discovery, is unreliable, though, as a matter of fact, we rely on it when it is memory, because there, inspite of misrepresentation, the real core is, to whatever extent, recognized. Incomplete recognition, in memory, does not stand in the way of our belief, for though the datum as incompletely recognized is so far indeterminate there is throughout a persisting hope that its determinate character may be gathered from a retrospection into our old perception ; or perhaps that retrospection occurs simultaneously with the memory. Retrospection into an old perception is not remembering its datum. In memory the old datum always appears as at least to some extent indeterminate, but this is never the case with introspection or retrospection.

IV

Thought is different from both perception and imagination. It is of four kinds:- (a) conception, (b) judgment, (c) anticipation of something explicitly on the basis of a knowledge we already possess and (d) inferential confirmation, i.e., explicit and detailed confirmation of something in the context of a possible or actual doubt.[3] To thought as conception the immediate content is an atomic (or molecular) meaning, i.e., the meaning of a word or like symbol ; to thought as judgment the immediate content is a proposition, to thought as anticipation of the as yet unpresented the immediate content is 'a possible fact', and to thought as confirmation the immediate content is 'the actual in the light of the possible'. Of these the atomic meanings are most fundamental as they constitute the elements of 'proposition' and are presupposed in any explicit awareness of 'possible fact' and 'actual fact in the light of the possible'. As atomic meanings are so fundamental the entire region of thought may be called 'kingdom of meaning', and the apprehension of meaning may be taken as the only common element in all forms of thought, though it must not be overlooked that the additional features in the last three forms are in no way less essential to them.

Image, we have seen, is not the given as such. More so is the case with meaning. There are people who identify meaning with the given. A word or symbol, they hold, refers immediately to a fact (= the given), and there is no third thing called meaning. Even fictitious meanings are facts, according to them. A fictitious meaning is composed of elementary meanings and their unity. That the elementary meanings are facts they take for granted ; the novelty in their doctrine is that the unity also is a fact. They only hold that this unity is no fact *other than* the elements—although the elements are *really* unified the unity is no *additional* fact.

But, so we reply, there is no evidence that fictitiousness can be so easily reduced to the non-additionality of the unity. How is this non-additionality known ? Introspection does not tell us that the fictitious unity alone is felt as non-additional. If non-additionality is felt anywhere it can be felt as much in some fictitious as in many other complex meanings. The only difference we actually feel between a fairy and a table is that while the former is fictitious the latter is not, we feel no difference about the additionality or not of the unity.

So fictitious meanings cannot be identified with facts. Nor can even non-fictitious meanings be so identified. When I hear the sentence 'Man behind !' it is true I naturally turn round to find a real man, and this may tempt one to hold that meaning is equal to fact. But if I hear the word 'fairy' I do not expect

3 (c) and (d) are often designated indiscriminately by the word 'inference'.
There may be other forms of thought than the above four. Doubt, *e.g.*, may be one such. But it will be enough to examine these four.

a fact fairy, though I understand the meaning of the word. This strongly suggests that if in the case of 'fairy' meaning has an autonomous status this should also be the case with 'man'; only in this latter case meaning has happened to coincide with fact.

If it be objected that on the same ground the possibility of illusion would do away with the identity, already established, between percept and fact, we would only reply that the two cases are fundamentally different. While in illusion the content, when the illusion is detected, disappears there is no such disappearance in the case of fairy-meaning. Although we know that it is a fictitious meaning it as meaning yet continues to stand—though we do not expect an actual fairy we yet continue to understand the meaning.

So, the possibility of fictitious meaning can validly suggest the autonomy of meaning. The suggestion can be further strengthened. Where instead of *hearing* we *speak out* a word or a sentence we clearly feel a distinction in status between meaning and fact. We intend only that the spoken coincides with fact, but intention always allows the possibility that what is intended may not happen.

Meaning, thus, is categorially different from fact. But this is only one side of meaning. There is an equally important other side—meaning refers to fact and the reference is so close that normally when a word or a sentence is heard we turn from it immediately to fact and do not halt midway to greet a ghostly thing called meaning. Except where a meaning is known to be fictitious, we immediately anticipate facts; and fictitious meanings not known as fictitious are no exceptions. Even where a word is spoken the meaning, to the speaker, is intended to be a fact.

It follows that meaning is both different from and identical with fact. It is different from fact categorially, i.e., qualitatively. Yet it is also identical with fact. This identity has to be properly understood. All the properties of the fact are not manifest in the meaning. None of those properties which constitute the individuality or uniqueness of the fact—properties which are revealed in perception—stand mainfest. Meaning is the representation of a fact through a generality. Whether generalities themselves are facts or not is not the question here. Our point is that even where a meaning refers to a particular fact it represents it through a generality. Not that it is therefore represented in the form of a proposition. The form of representation here is '*any* X' where X stands for a generality. If on hearing the word 'man' we turn round and perceive a particular definite man Ram, what is really apprehended *through the word 'man'* is not Ram in his unique individuality, but just Ram *as an example of man-in-general.*

Where, again, a meaning refers not to a definite particular fact, but to a generality it is not impossible that it represents the generality (universal) as a fact. But even there the formula '*any* X' is sufficient. It would be sufficient

to hold that the word ' man ' represents ' *any* man '. Meaning may, therefore, be taken as standing for ' *any* fact of a type '.

Meaning stands to fact almost in the same manner in which image stands to fact. The immediate content of memory does not exclude fact and is yet qualitatively different from it. So is the case with meaning. It also does not exclude fact and is yet qualitatively (categorially) different from it. This *qualitative* difference shows that a meaning is no mere *portion* of a fact. The fact has been modified into meaning. When a fact is perceived it is presented as it is, when it is remembered it is changed into an image, and when it is apprehended through language (or like symbol) it is changed into meaning.

This modification of fact into meaning is neither an unconscious process nor deliberate. Nor is it a purely objective change of the fact. Such change occurs only in the context of our apprehension through language ; hence, as in the case of attention, the contribution of the subjective process cannot be denied. And yet the contribution is not deliberate, unless in the case of deliberately constructed fictitious meanings. Nor is the contribution an unconscious process, for then the qualitative alteration of the fact in meaning could not be accounted for.

This conscious (though not deliberate) modification shows the presence of freedom in our apprehension through language. This freedom in the case of ordinary meanings behaves decently. It centres round a fact and creates a film through which that fact is refracted in a particular way ; and yet in the resulting representation the fact-core stands, to whatever extent, recognized. This is why such meanings are taken as valid. Even fictitious meanings come under this category so long as their fictitious character is not detected. It is only when a fictitious meaning is deliberately constructed that the freedom is manifest riotously. It can even run to the extreme stage of positing impossible meanings like ' circular square '.

A meaning may be simple or complex. The red-meaning is simple, but the flower-meaning is complex. The meaning ' red flower ' is more complex. The flower (we are here concerned with a given red flower, corresponding to which the meaning should properly be ' this red flower ') is already red, yet the meaning ' this flower ', though in a sense it already comprehends the meaning ' red ', refers only to the flower as flower, not to the flower as red. The meaning ' red flower ', on the other hand, refers to the flower as red.

But the complexity in the *proposition* 'This flower is red' differs *qualitatively*. Here new factors are introduced, the given is modified into a new relational complex, and these relations are none of them given. The ' is ' in ' This flower is red ' does not stand for any factual relation between the flower and the red. It is the

relation of predication, and its freedom from facts is manifest beyond doubt in other predicational relations like 'if-then', 'either-or', etc. In spite, however, of these predicational relations introduced there is yet, as in memory and conception, a trust in our judgment attitude, so that the freedom, manifest or not, is yet centring round some 'given'. In different stages of judgment, however, the given progressively recedes. In the judgment 'This flower is red' it is most manifest. This progressive recession of the given, and yet the maintenance of trust in judgment attitude all through is a peculiar problem for Logic. It is not our concern here.

Judgment, like conception or memory, ought to be unreliable because of the freedom involved. But like the latter two it is also in most cases actually relied on, because it reveals, however manipulatively, a given core. After all a *given* red flower is somehow revealed through the judgment 'This flower is red'; and in higher and higher forms of judgment this given core recedes more and more. Proposition is a modification of some given fact by the freedom involved in our judging attitude, and through that modification the given fact somehow manifests itself, though to an extent indeterminately. Or it might be said that simultaneously with perceptive judgment occurs perception also as revealing the given (that is why we trust perceptive judgment), and simultaneously with other higher forms of judgment occurs memory or retrospection, each in its turn revealing the given in the appropriate way.

In thought as *the anticipation of the as yet unpresented* this freedom is very manifest. Corresponding to the passage from the premise to the conclusion, corresponding, in other words, to the 'therefore', there is no passage in the world of facts. The whole passage looks like a way of subjective manipulation. Not indeed subjective in the sense of *arbitrary*. There is undoubtedly a necessity felt in the passage, much as in propositional forms like 'if-then', and 'either-or'. But it would be equally wrong to take these as factual (i.e., unadulteratedly given) therefor. The 'therefore', much as the propositional forms, is the manifest form of the freedom involved in all explicit anticipation through language. This freedom modifies the actual fact into a possibility, though at the centre of this possibility there still stands the actual half-recognized.

Inferential confirmation is a peculiar attitude. That to which it refers may be a brute fact, a meaning, a proposition or a fact as explicitly anticipated. The only novelty in this attitude is that such a referendum—either the actual that is given or its modification in some manner—is again viewed in the light of the possible. The possible, as just shown, is a modification of the actual, and therefore both actual and non-actual; only the non-actuality imposed by our freedom

stands as a fringe round the actual. But in confirmation this non-actuality stands as a most manifest context ; and that which is directly (as the unadulterated given) or indirectly (as a modification of the given in some subjective context) actual is in confirmation viewed in the light of this manifest context of possibility. In other words, in confirmation the actual and the possible are equally manifest. The confirmed is of the form ' A as actual (directly or indirectly) is also possible '. It is doubtful if any *chemical* combination here takes place, except when the details of confirmation are ignored and the whole thing is put in a general modal form like ' A *must be* '.

GURU-CULT

by

K. G. MASHRUWALA

In a note on Shri Ramana Maharshi's *Nirvana* I wrote in *Harijan* (23-4-50)—

" There are several disciples who worship him as God in human form and there is a danger that they might establish a regular religious sect in his name. This is an unhappy development of the Hindu religious movement. Gandhiji resisted such deification of himself.

" Now after Shri Ramana Maharshi's immersion in the Infinite Life, I hope his disciples will study him and try to attain the same realization which he had, rather than spend their energies in deifying him. Let us remember that *to deify a jñanī is to defy jñāna.*"

A correspondent took objection against the last sentence. He cited the authority of scriptures and celebrated *jñānīs* (seers) and devotees to show that my criticism was against the doctrines of Vedānta and betrayed my ignorance of the system of discipline (sādhana) for self-realization. He contended that my statement would have been objected to even by Gandhiji, whose morning prayer included the famous verse

gurur brahmā gurur viṣṇuḥ
gurur devo maheśvaraḥ,
guruḥ sākṣāt param brahma
tasmai śrī gurave namaḥ.

It is probable that there are several others, who hold the same views as my correspondent. For, it is clear that my view does not accord with the traditional Hindu attitude towards the Guru. It is proposed to discuss this question here at some length. I request the reader to regard the reference to Śrī Ramana Maharshi as just casual. For that eminent sage, I always entertained high personal respect, and regarded him as a great and noble seer of our times. The present discussion is general and irrespective of any particular person.

Hindu religious literature is full of such aphorisms as ' there is no higher deity than the Guru ', ' the Guru is the ultimate Truth and Deity '; ' God and *Avatārs* (incarnations) are secondary to the Guru in importance '; ' there is no higher refuge, no higher target, no higher destination than the Guru '; ' the Guru is God Himself ' ; ' God and the Guru are one '; ' he who makes a distinction between the Guru and God is ignorant and stupid ' ; and scores of

similar others. They abound both in Sanskrit and in modern Indian languages. Among their authors could be included some celebrated philosopher-saints also. Jñāndev, Eknāth and so many others all over India have offered their first salutations to the Guru in their various books.

I myself was brought up in the same traditions. I was born in the Svāminārāyaṇa sect and remained its follower for thirty years. It is a Guru Cult, i.e. believes in the worship of the Guru as the Supreme Deity. Indeed, formally, the books of the sect put forth Kṛṣṇa as the recognized Deity for its followers and its temples are dedicated to the idols of Lakṣmī-Nārāyāṇā, Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa, etc. But along with these deities there will always be found also idols of Svāmī Sahajānanda, the founder of the sect, and the truly faithful followers of the sect will always declare that Kṛṣṇa and others were only secondary in importance to Svāminārāyaṇa himself. Svāminārāyana is addressed and looked upon as the *Avatārī* of all *Avatārs* (the Causer of incarnations), the Puruṣottama beyond the perishable (*kṣara*) and the imperishable (*akṣara*), and the lord of *Akṣara Dhāmā* (the Imperishable Abode). This creed is not a peculiarity of the Svāminārāyaṇa sect only. There might be in India at least a score of similar sects of fairly good size and more than a hundred small ones.

When I could not get full enlightenment from the contemporary divines of the Svāminārāyaṇa sect I contacted one who enlightened me further, cleared the cobwebs of my understanding and guided my progress. But tradition-bound that my mind was, I put my Guru's photo in place of Svāminārāyāṇa's picture and began to worship it. He did not suggest or encourage this, but he had to put up with my practice for some time. Later, with better understanding I gave it up. Till this day I have the highest regard and devotion towards my Guru and our relations are as cordial as they ought to be between a Guru and his grateful disciple. It is not thus difficult for me to understand such texts as, "God, Guru and the Self are one." But with all that in the background I raise my voice against the practice of deifying the Guru. I do so after mature deliberation.

A very peculiar feature has developed in the Hindu Vedānta. I regard it as an unhealthy and disfiguring pathological change in its constitution. If a person, who can induce himself to feel convinced that he has realized the Self, or has an admirer who believes that he has done so, the Hindu Vedānta opens up for him the way for the founding of a new sect based on Guru-worship. Our masses, too, have developed curious credulousness. Often they would install an earnest seeker and devotee, or a pious saint, on the throne of God and begin to offer him worship and homage even if he protested and resisted such acts. They would lie prostrate, sing hymns, wave lights (*ārati*) and burn incense before him, present to him food which was to be returned by him as *prasāda*, wash his toes and sip the wash. At times the disciple would go to the length of getting food, fruit or a betel-nut leaf chewed by him, and taking the morsel back from

him. They would place his photo in the private temples of their homes and perform all these rites and ceremonies which are usually offered to temple-idols. In this way there might be at present in our country scores of individuals who are worshipped as living God, with a following varying from ten to a lakh.

Parallel to the Guru-cult is the Avatāra-cult, also a feature peculiar to Hinduism. The basis for the Guru-cult is a person's *jñāna* (spiritual realization), that for the *avatāra* his uncommon heroic leadership of the people. The *Gītā* having specifically laid down that it is one of the functions of God to take human (or other) form for the rescue of the world against evil forces, a great and successful leader of the people at a time of depression and distress is looked upon as such *avatāra*.

The deification of the Guru or the *Avatāra* in this manner is not to be found in any other religion. It does not mean that no follower of other religions has ever perceived the Truth proclaimed by the *Advaita Vedānta*. And, as to heroes, who will doubt that every country has produced as great saviours of the people as India ? There have been many *Sufis* in Islam, who have been perfect *advaitins* In Christianity, too, there have been as many schools of philosophy as in the *Vedānta* on the question of the nature of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost and their relations *inter se*. But Christianity seems to have accepted a convention that barring Jesus Christ, no other individual was to be recognized as the Son of God or his equal. Islam rejects the Son, but recognizes prophets. Past prophets could not be rejected because of the previous scriptures and traditions and, theoretically, prophets might be born in every age and country. But there appears to be an unwritten tacit understanding in Islam, that the status of the prophet was not to be extended to any individual after Mohammad, the last prophet. Similarly, the Parsis have not had a prophet since Zarathushtra, the Buddhists, a Buddha since Siddhārtha, and the Jains, a Tīrthaṅkara since Mahāvīra.[1]

All these religions have produced a great many saints, *mahātmās* and *jñānīs*. If they had been born in Vedic Hinduism, in all probability they would have been deified in the same way as the founders of several Vedic sects.

For, in this respect, a good deal of chaos prevails in Vedic Hindiusm. It has an ever increasing number of *Avatāras* and Gurus installed as God Himself, with the support and sanction of scriptures and teachings of saints and *jñānīs*. My denunciation of the practice might, therefore, be considered as rashness bordering upon heresy. It might also be regarded as harmful, as it might cause doubt and confusion in the minds of some seekers (Sādhakas), who strive with simple faith and earnestness to practise the discipline for enlightenment and self-development. Nevertheless, humbly, seriously and definitely, I submit that

1 I am aware that Sri Rajachandra of Gujarat, a modern Jain seer, is looked upon by a few followers as a new Tīrthankara. I doubt he will be given that recognition by Jains in general.

this application of the Vedānta philosophy is erroneous and improper. It has been instrumental in spreading sophistry and delusion in the guise of philosophy and direct realization, and must be abandoned. I would like to apply here the *mantra* of the *Īśopaniṣad,* which says :

andhaṁ tamaḥ praviśanti ye 'vidyām upāsate,
tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u vidyāyāṁ ratāḥ.

" Into blinding darkness enter those who cling to ignorance, but into still deeper darkness go those, who flirt with knowledge." It is promotion of nescience with the help of scholarship to justify the worship of a mortal in lieu of God. It makes no difference whether God is conceived as clothed with attributes (*saguṇa*) or as absolute attributeless existence (*nirguṇa*).

' Jīvo brahmaiva kevalam ' (The soul is verily Brahma itself)—is a true statement indeed ; but it is true in respect of every being and not only in the case of him who has realized the truth of it. That is to say, the *ajñānī* (unawakened) and the *jñānī* are both Brahman. But no one worships an unawakened person as God. An earnest devotee might bow to every being, respect it in the name of God, regard it as a form of the Lord and serve it. But he does not make it the object of his worship and meditation. He makes a distinction between an object of respect and service and an object of worship and meditation. Even so we should discriminate between a *jñānī Guru* and God ; and also between a hero (*avatāra*) and God. This distinction has been lost sight of in Vedic Hinduism.

There are two reasons for this : *Saguṇa Upāsanā* (contemplation of the Divine as clothed with attributes) is found in all religions, including the non-theistic ones. Some of them clothe it even with a form. But the opposite word *nirguṇa* (attribute-less), which is used in Vedānta for suggesting the *Absolute* (devoid of form and attributes) is not employed in any other religious philosophy. I feel that the use of the word *Nirguṇa* in the Vedānta philosophy has given rise to much misunderstanding. Instead of characterizing *Brahman* by negative terms, as devoid of form, attributes or activity, it would have been better and truer if it were said that It is sarva-guṇa-bīja or sarva-guṇa-āśraya, the seed, source, nucleus or foundation of all forms, attributes, activities and specific awareness or knowledge. Because, in truth, Brahman *is* the support and substratum of the infinite and innumerable forms, forces and energies—spiritual as well as the so-called material—which have been, are, or will come into existence in this vast universe. Brahman is greater than all Its animate, inanimate, tangible and intangible manifestations put together, along with their powers and potentialities. It is not only the sum total of all the powers and forms that are at this moment, but also those which might be still latent and unmanifested. We do not know even all those which may be in existence but are not discovered by man. Much less can we guess those which might have been concealed in Its womb.

Seen thus, the greatest of the *jñānī*, *mahātmā*, or *avatāra*, is only a tiny ray or a faint glimpse of God. Thus, we can understand with greater clarity the following verses of the Gītā :

" Whatever is glorious, beautiful and mighty, know thou, that all such has issued from a fragment of my splendour....with but a part of Myself, I stand upholding this universe " (X,41-42).

Any concrete manifestation of Brahman, any name or form perceivable by our senses, or conceivable by the mind, is indeed God, i.e., wholly and fully Brahman, but what we perceive is only an infinitesimal part of Its revealed powers and what we conceive is a tiny fragment of Its infinite potentialities. In this sense, no being, however, enlightened is the whole of It. To worship a part as the whole is not correct.

Let us consider this from the point of view of human perfection also. We cannot say of any individual that humanity has attained in him such acme of perfection as was, is, or will be never reached by any other human being. There is an anecdote of Buddha that once the disciple Ānanda told him that he was certain that none of the past Buddhas had attained, none of his own time possessed, and none in future will reach the perfection of Siddhārtha Gautama. Thereupon the Buddha smiled and said that since Ānanda could measure the degrees of perfection of all the present, past and future Buddhas, the *prajñā* (power of judgment) of Ānanda himself must be higher than his (Buddha's) own and, consequently, that of all the Buddhas ! The reproach is very apposite.

But the worship of the Guru as God requires the devotee to attribute all such perfection to him, so that his faith in him might remain unshakable and strong. But this attribution is unnatural and not based on truth. At one instant the disciple contemplates that aspect of the Guru, which is absolute and beyond his body; at another moment he worships, eulogizes and contemplates his physical form, earthly life, actions, behaviour, etc. This double worship has to be resorted to because the books of Vedānta and the sayings and hymns of saints, gurus and disciples ask us not to make any distinction between God and Guru, and between *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*. They teach that without belief in the complete identity of God and the Guru, there can be no perfect devotion in the latter; without such devotion, one cannot be the recipient of the ' Guru's grace ' ; without grace, one cannot attain *jñāna* ; without *jñāna*, no salvation ; and without salvation, no liberation from the cycle of births and deaths.

All these teachings are partly sound and partly not so. There are two ways of regarding the nature and function of Brahman. One is that it is the essential nature of *Brahman* to eternally exist and manifest Itself continually in manifold and diverse forms or energies, and if the individual being is Brahman Itself, who

is to be liberated from the cycle of births and deaths ? And how ? If it is an eternal truth that Brahman and I are one, it does not matter in the least whether I have known—discovered within myself that truth or not—so far as liberation from births and deaths is concerned. My realization—discovery—will change my attitude towards life and universe and towards the phenomena of births and deaths, and make me indifferent towards the latter. It should also relax my attachment for my individuality and of the fond desire and belief generally found among human beings that their individuality should be or is maintained after death. The knowledge of truth would change also the course of evolution of the faculties of intellect and higher sentiments in me. But so far as the Law of births and deaths is concerned, there cannot be any difference between an unrealized being and me. The function of the Guru is to enable me to discover for myself the truth of the identity of Brahman and ' I '.

The other way of looking at the nature of Brahman is, in appearance, diametrically opposite to the above. According to it, Brahman has nothing to do with the manifestation of the Universe, which is only a play of *Prakṛti* (Nature), as the Sāṅkhyas say, or of *Māyā* (a mysterious illusion), as the Vedāntins maintain. Brahman comes in as the inactive, unattached attributeless witness in the play of Prakṛti. The function of the Guru is to lead the disciple to the realization—self-discovery—of this absolute and detached existence of the Spirit within him and his own identity with It, and to bring about the dissolution of the false identity which has got established between Prakṛti or Māyā and his true self. This dissolution is necessary for ending the play of Prakṛti, which enacts the cycle of births and deaths.

Whichever may be the approach, it is clear that the function of the Guru is to enable the disciple to make certain discoveries for himself. It involves not only clear and fine thinking, but purity of mind, development of virtues and noble sentiments, and some kind of *sādhana* or practice of *yoga*. Not all are qualified for it. For this the disciple stays under the eyes of the Guru. And one day he finds himself and the Guru at that psychological juncture when some utterance or gesture of the Guru, which he had often known before, takes a new meaning, gives him a new flash of light and takes him at once to the point of self-discovery. This he naturally hails as the descent of the ' Guru's grace '. It might happen that the disciple might have already acquired the previous qualifications elsewhere, before he found his final Guru. It might also happen that unknown to himself he had already discovered the Truth, and it might have been left to the Guru to only confirm his discovery. To such disciples the moment of discovery is also the descent of the grace.

But, normally, and in its full course, " to receive the grace " of the Guru is to receive instructions and guidance from him from time to time in the practice of

sādhana for the realization of the Truth, and to get a solution of one's difficulties and doubts encountered by him in his endeavours. The Guru can "bestow this grace"—that is, undertake to instruct and guide the disciple and to take interest in him—only if the latter proves his worth for it, by his faith, service, keen spirit of enquiry, diligence, humility, self-restraint and other sterling virtues of the head and the heart.

"The masters of knowledge who have seen the Truth will impart to thee this knowledge ; learn it by humble salutation, repeated questioning and *Sevā* i.e., service of the Master and constant practice of his instructions". [*Gītā*, IV, 34]. It does not mean a magical touch of the Guru transforming the disciple into a *jñānī* "in less time", as is often said, "than what would take an expert horseman to put his first leg into the stirrup". The proving of the worth does not involve the worship and devotion in the form of offering flowers, incense, hymns of praise, etc., to his body or image. Serving a Master with faith and devotion is not the same thing as worshipping him or his picture with ritualistic ceremonies. Upāsanā (literally, sitting near)—discipleship—of the Guru consists in attentively and intelligently listening to his teachings, demonstrating a relentless quest of truth, meticulously obeying his instructions and commands, getting clarification of one's doubts, rendering such personal service to him as, for instance, a dutiful son would render to his father and, if he has a mission, taking a full part therein as his assistant. It is this *upāsanā* which qualifies a disciple to take a seat near the Guru. It is only through such *upāsanā* that an aspirant may attain the same realization as the Guru. This *upāsanā* is quite different from the *upāsanā* of the Guru by worshipping him like a temple-god, propagating a new faith in his name, and putting him forth as a divine incarnation. The way to Truth requires abandonment of preconceptions and prejudices, and the readiness to receive unexpected shocks on some of the fondly held beliefs. It does not consist in transferring worship and loyalty from a former God to a new man-God.

The replacement of the formless God by the Sun, of the Sun by an image of Viṣṇu, this in turn by that of Nārāyaṇa, Rāma, Kṛṣṇa and others, and then the abandonment of these in favour of the original founder of one's religious sect, and of him in favour of the new Guru or his image, and working for the spread of his cult does not help a devotee to achieve spiritual progress. It only adds to the number of sects, each feeling jealous of the others.

From activities like these arise fruitless discussions about the relative values of each avatāra, some being classed full avatāras and others partial, and of Gurus, each sect regarding its own Guru to have reached the seventh stage which others had failed to attain. At times followers of the same Guru start more than one sect. This activity has proved a great disintegrating force in the Indian society dividing it into small groups. The same mentality has worked in the sphere of political and social activities.

But my objection to this form of worship is not on the ground that it results into the disintegration of society, but because at its base there is a misinterpretation and mis-apprehension of *jñāna*.

There is an additional cause for the spread of this indiscriminate practice. It is usual among Hindus to christen individuals after the name of gods and avatāras. For instance, Īśvara, Bhagavān, Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Nārāyaṇa, Śaṅkara, Śambhu, etc. are not names of Brahman and recognized avatāras or gods only. Any person may be so named. Among Christians, I believe, no one may be christened Jesus, and in Islam Allah or Khuda. Consequently, in a nāma-smaraṇa or dhun (repetition of holy names) where words like Allah, Khuda, Jehovah, Lord, God, etc., are uttered, it is not difficult to understand that the name uttered refers to God and none else. If Jesus and Mahommad are mentioned, they could not be understood as synonyms of God. But when names like Raghupati, Rāghava, Rājārāma, Sītārāma, Kṛṣṇa, Mohana, Murāri, Rādhākṛṣṇa, Sāmba, Sadāśiva are uttered and to them are added names of Lakṣmaṇa, Hanumān and others, not only Christians and Muslims but even Ārya Samājis hesitate to participate in such dhuns. Questions are raised as to whom these names stand for, and they are attempted to be answered by a double clarification. Christians, Muslims, Ārya Samājiṣ and the like would be told that the words Raghupati, Sītārāma, Rādhākṛṣṇa, etc., should not be taken as referring to the historical or purāṇic figures known by those names but as just synonyms of Allah, God, Brahman, Paramātmā and the like. But orthodox followers with deep devotion towards these *avatāras*, would be told that they certainly refer to the traditional Rāma, Kṛṣṇa and others, whose worship in lieu of God is not tabooed.

Devotees do not recite *dhuns*, in which names like Nivṛtti, Jñāndev, Sopān, Tukārām, etc., occur and those, in which names like Raghupati, Rāghava, Rājārāma, etc. do, with the same understanding. They know full well that in the first type there is an enumeration of saints, but in the other series, they associate God with those names because, according to them, the personages representing those names were incarnations of God. But as this belief is not shared by others, an intellectual gymnastics has to be resorted to to satisfy the latter. They, however, remain unconvinced and hesitate to join in the recital of Hindu nam dhuns.

Possibly, originally, the word 'Om' represented and was repeated as the symbol of the Absolute (*nirguṇa*) Brahman, and the Sun as Its best concrete (*saguṇa*) form. From these developed, in course of time, two branches of worship. In one *Om*, though originally *nirguṇa* got transformed one after the other into concrete (*saguṇa*) conceptions of Brahmā, Śiva, Gaṇapati and other Smārta forms. In the other, the worship of the Sun got transformed into that of Indra, Viṣṇu, Vāmana, Virāṭa (Trivikrama) and other Vaiṣṇava forms. Later on rulers were also given epithets such as Indra, Viṣṇu, etc. Great personalities came to be worshipped as incarnations of Śiva or Viṣṇu. Then came the discovery

of non-duality of the Individual Spirit and Paramātmā as indicated by the great aphorisms, ' Thou art That ', ' I am Brahman ', etc. This led to the worship of the Guru. Thus one conception led to another, along with various gradations and hypotheses regarding life after death, and the heavenly abode, etc.

This has led to chaos to such an extent that it enables a person who can manage to secure a few disciples and can talk about ' Thou art That ' and ' I am Brahman ', to install himself as ' God Incarnate '.

The habit of deifying the Guru should stop. I say this as one who himself respects his Guru as any disciples should, and who holds Gandhiji in no less estimate than Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, Christ or Mahommad.

Our faith, allegiance and worship should be restricted to God alone. No symbol and no manifestation may represent Him. He is the subject of a creed, a faith. The faith is based on a supreme realization, potentially available to everyone. But it is actually not clear to every one, and so to them it is a creed accepted on simple faith. Moreover, the realization is not perfectly explicable by words, symbols or analogy even by those who realize it, whether clearly or faintly. No imagined God or image may represent or stand for Him. None may be regarded as His incarnation, or son, or messenger, however greatly he may enlighten the path leading to Him. All such are only Buddhas, Tīrthaṅkaras, Gurus, i.e., seers and teachers ; but none may be regarded omniscient and infallible, or as representing in their own person God fully and perfectly.

A NOTE ON THE OBSERVER AND THE OBSERVED IN MODERN SCIENCE

by

NOLINI KANTA GUPTA

I

Science means objectivity, that is to say, elimination of the personal element —truth as pure fact without being distorted or coloured by the feelings and impressions and notions of the observer. It is the very opposite of the philosopher's standpoint who says that a thing exists because (and so long as) it is perceived. The scientist swears that a thing exists whether you perceive it or not, perception is possible because it exists, not the other way. And yet Descartes is considered not only as the father of modern philosophy, but also as the founder of modern mathematical science. But more of that anon. The scientific observer observes as a witness impartial and aloof : he is nothing more than a recording machine, a sort of passive mirror reflecting accurately and faithfully what is presented to it. This is indeed the great revolution brought about by science in the world of human inquiry and in human consciousness, viz., the isolation of the observer from the observed.

In the old world, before science was born, sufficient distinction or discrimination was not made between the observer and the observed. The observer mixed himself up or identified himself with what he observed and the result was not a scientific statement but a poetic description. Personal feelings, ideas, judgments entered into the presentation of facts and the whole mass passed as truth, the process often being given the high-sounding name of Intuition, Vision or Revelation but whose real name is fancy. And if there happened to be truth of fact somewhere, it was almost by chance. Once we thought of the eclipse being due to the greed of a demon, and pestilence due to the evil eye of a wicked goddess. The universe was born out of an egg, the cosmos consisted of concentric circles of worlds that were meant to reward the virtuous and punish the sinner in graded degrees. These are some of the very well-known instances of pathetic fallacy, that is to say, introducing the element of personal sentiment in our appreciation of events and objects. Even today Nazi race history and Soviet Genetics carry that unscientific prescientific tradition.

Science was born the day when the observer cut himself aloof from the observed. Not only so, not only he is to stand aside, outside the field of observation and be a bare recorder, but that he must let the observed record itself, that is, be its own observer. Modern science means not so much the observer narrating the story of the observed but the observed telling its own story. The first step is well exemplified in the story of Galileo. When hot discussion was going on and people insisted on saying—as Aristotle decided and common sense declared—that heavier bodies must naturally fall quicker from a height, it was this prince of experimenters who straightaway took two different weights, went up the tower of Pisa and let them drop and astounded the people by showing that both travel with equal speed and fall to the ground at the same time.

Science also declared that it is not the observation of one person, however qualified, that determines the truth or otherwise of a fact, but the observation of many persons and the possibility of observations of all persons converging, coinciding, corroborating. It is only when observation has thus been tested and checked that one can be sure that the personal element has been eliminated. Indeed the ideal condition would be if the observer, the scientist himself, could act as part of the machine for observation : at the most he should be a mere assembler of the parts of the machine that would record itself, impersonally, automatically. The rocket instruments that are sent high up in the sky that record the temperature, pressure or other weather condition in the stratosphere or deep sea recording machines are ingenious inventions in that line. The wizard Jagadish Chandra Bose showed his genius precisely in the way he made the plant itself declare its life-story : it is not what the scientist thinks or feels about the plant, but what the plant has to say of its own accord, as it were—its own tale of growth and decay, of suffering, spasm, swoon, suffocation or death under given conditions. This is the second step that science took in the direction of impersonal and objective inquiry.

It was thought for long a very easy matter—at least not extraordinarily difficult—to eliminate the observer and keep only to the observed. It was always known how the view of the observer, that is to say, his observation changed in respect of the observed fact with his change of position. The sun rises and sets to the observer on earth : to an observer on Mars, for example, the sun would rise and set, no doubt, but earth too along with, in the same way as Mars and sun appear to us now, while to an observer on the sun, the sun would seem fixed while the planets would be seen moving round. Again, we all know the observer in a moving train sees things outside the train moving past and himself at stand-still ; the same observer would see another train moving alongside in the same direction and with the same speed as stuck to it and at stand-still, but moving with double the speed if going in the contrary direction : and so on.

The method proposed for eliminating the observer was observation, more and more observation, and experiment, testing the observation under given conditions. I observe and record a series of facts and when I have found a sufficient number of them I see I am able to put them all together under a general title, a law of occurrence or pattern of the objects observed. Further, it is not I alone who can do it in any peculiar way personal to me, but that everybody else can do the same thing and arrive at the same series of facts leading to the same conclusion. I note, for example, the sun's path from day to day in the sky ; soon we find that the curves described by the sun are shifted along the curve of an ellipse (that is to say, their locus is an ellipse). The ecliptic is thus found to be an ellipse which means that the earth moves round the sun in an ellipse.

But in the end a difficulty arose in the operation of observation. It proved to be not a simple process. The scientific observer requires for his observation the yard-stick and the time-piece. Now, we have been pushed to admit a queer phenomenon (partly by observation and partly by a compelling deduction) that these two measuring units are not constant ; they change with the change of system, that is to say, according to the velocity of the system. In other words, each observer has his own unit of space and time measure. So the elimination of the personal element of the observer has become a complicated mathematical problem, even if one is sure of it finally.

There is still something more. The matter of calculating and measuring objectively was comparatively easy when the object in view was of medium size, neither too big nor too small. But in the field of the infinite and the infinitesimal, when from the domain of mechanical forces we enter into the region of electric and radiant energy, we find our normal measuring apparatus almost breaks down. Here accurate observation cannot be made because of the very presence of the observer, because of the very fact of observation. The ultimates that are observed are trails of light particles : now when the observer directs his eye (or the beam of light replacing the eye) upon the light particle, its direction and velocity are interfered with : the photon is such a tiny infinitesimal that a ray from the observer's eye is sufficient to deflect and modify its movement. And there is no way of determining or eliminating this element of deflection or interference. The old science knew certainly that a thermometer dipped in the water whose temperature it is to measure itself changes the initial temperature. But that was something calculable and objective. Here the position of the observer is something like a " possession ", imbedded, ingrained, involved in the observed itself.

The crux of the difficulty is this. We say the observing eye, or whatever mechanism is made to function for it, disturbs the process of observation. Now to calculate that degree or measure of disturbance one has to fall back upon another observing eye, and this again has to depend upon yet another behind. Thus there is an infinite regress and no final solution. So, it has been declared, in the

ultimate analysis, scientific calculation gives us only the average result, and it is only average calculations that are possible.

Now we come to the sanctum, the Shakinah, of the problem. For there is a still deeper mystery. And preeminently it is an Einsteinian discovery. It is not merely the measuring ray of light, not merely the beam in the eye of the observer that is the cause of interference : the very mind behind the eye is involved in a strange manner. The mind is not a *tabula rasa*, it comes into the field with certain presuppositions—axioms and postulates, as it calls them—due to its angle of vision and perhaps to the influence upon it of immediate sense perception. It takes for granted, for example, that light travels in a straight line, that parallels do not meet, indeed all the theorems and deductions of Euclidean geometry. There is a strong inclination in the mind to view things as arranged according to that pattern. Einstein has suggested that the spherical scheme can serve as well or even better our observations. Riemann's non-Euclidean geometry has assumed momentous importance in contemporary scientific enquiry. It is through this scheme that Einstein proposes to find the equation which will subsume the largest number of actual and possible or potential facts and bring about the reconciliation of such irreconcilables as wave and particle, gravitation and electricity.

In any case, at the end of all our peregrinations we seem to circle back to our original Cartesian-cum-Barkeleyean position ; we discover that it is not easy to extricate the observed from the observer : the observer is so deep set in the observed, part and parcel of it that there are scientists who consider their whole scientific scheme of the world as only a mental set-up, we may replace it very soon by another scheme equally cogent, subjective all the same. The subject has entered into all objects and any definition of the object must necessarily depend upon the particular poise of the subject. That is the cosmic immanence of the Puruṣa spoken of in the Upaniṣads—the one Puruṣa become many and installed in the heart of each and every object. There is indeed a status of the Subject in which the subject and the object are gathered into or form one reality. The observer and the observed are the two ends, the polarization of a single entity : and all are reals at that level. But the scientific observer is only the mental Puruṣa and in his observation the absolute objectivization is not possible. The Einsteinian equations that purport to rule out all local view-points can hardly be said to have transcended the coordinates of the subject. That is possible only to the consciousness of the cosmic Puruṣa.

II

Is it then to say that science is no longer science, it has now been converted into philosophy, even into idealistic philosophy ?

In spite of Russell and Eddington who may be considered in this respect as counsellors of despair, the objective reality of the scientific fields stands, it is asserted, although somewhat changed.

Now, there are four positions possible with regard to the world and reality, depending on the relation between the observer and the observed, the subject and object. They are : (1) subjective, (2) objective, (3) subjective objective, and (4) objective subjective. The first two are extreme positions, one holding the subject as the sole or absolute reality, the object being a pure fabrication of its will and idea, an illusion, and the other considering the object as the true reality, the subject being an outcome, an epiphenomenon of the object itself, an illusion after all. The first leads to radical or as it is called monistic spirituality the type of which is Māyāvāda : the second is the highway of materialism, the various avatāras of which are Marxism, Pragmatism, Behaviourism, etc. In between lie the other two intermediate positions according to the stress or value given to either of the two extremes. The first of the intermediates is the position held generally by the idealists, by many schools of spirituality : it is a major Vedāntic position. It says that the outside world, the objective, is not an illusion, a mere fabrication of the mind or consciousness of the subject, but that it exists and is as real as the subject : it is dovetailed into the subject which is a kind of linchpin, holding together and even energizing the objects. The object can further be considered as an expression or embodiment of the subject. Both the subject and the object are made of the same stuff of consciousness—the ultimate reality being consciousness. The subject is the consciousness turned on itself and the object is consciousness turned outside or going abroad. This is pre-eminently the Upaniṣadic position. In Europe Kant holds a key position in this line : and on the whole idealists from Plato to Bradley and Bosanquet can be said more or less to belong to the category. The second intermediate position views the subject as imbedded into the object, not the object into the subject as in the first one : the subject itself is part of the object something like its self-regarding or self-recording function. In Europe apart possibly from some of the early Greek thinkers (Anaxagoras or Democritus, for example), coming to more recent times, we can say that line runs fairly well-represented from Leibniz to Bergson. In India the Sāṅkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas move towards and approach the position ; the Tāntrikas make a still more near approach.

Once again, to repeat in other terms the distinction which may sometimes appear to carry no difference. First, the subjective objective in which the subject assumes the preponderant position, not denying or minimizing the reality of the object. The external world, in this view, is a movement in and of the consciousness of a universal subject. It is subjective in the sense that it is essentially a function of the subject and does not exist apart from it or outside it ; it is objective in the sense that it exists really and is not a figment or imaginative construction of any individual consciousness, although it exists in and through the individual consciousness in so far as that consciousness is universalized, is one with the universal consciousness (or the transcendental, the two can be taken together in the present connection). Instead of the Kantian transcendental idealism we can name it transcendental realism.

In the other case the world exists here below in its own reality, outside all apprehending subject ; even the universal subject is in a sense part of it, immanent in it—it embraces the subject in its comprehending consciousness and posits it as part of itself or a function of its apprehension. The many Puruṣas (conscious beings or subjects) are embedded in the universal Nature, say the Sāṅkhyas. Kālī, Divine Nature, is the manifest omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent reality holding within her the transcendent divine Puruṣa who supports, sanctions and inspires secretly, yet is dependent on the Mahāśakti and without her is nothing, *śūnyam*. That is how the Tāntrikas put it. We may mention here, among European philosophers, the rather interesting conclusion of Leibniz (to which Russell draws our attention) : space is subjective to the view of each monad (subject unit) separately, it is objective when it consists of the assemblage of the view-points of all the monads.

The scientific outlook was a protest against the extreme subjective view : it started with the extreme objective standpoint and that remained the fundamental note till the other day, till the fissure of the nucleus opened new horizons to our somewhat bewildered mentality. We seem to have entered into a region where we still hold to the objective, no doubt, but not absolutely free from an insistent presence of the subjective. It is the second of the intermediate positions we have tried to describe. Science has yet to decide the implications of that position ; whether it will try to entrench itself as much as possible on this side of the subjective or it can yield further and go over to or link itself with the deeper subjective position.

The distinction between the two may after all be found to be a matter of stress only, involving no fundamental difference, especially as there are sure to be gradations from the one to the other. The most important landmark, however, the most revolutionary step in modern science would be the discovery of the eternal observer, of some sign or image of the being seated within the observed phenomena of moving things—*puruṣaḥ prakṛtistho hi*, as the Gītā says.

BRADLEY AND BHASKARA

by

P. N. SRINIVASACHARI

Bradley is the ablest exponent of absolute idealism in modern times. His system is developed in his notable work *Appearance and Reality*. Eminent Advaitins who are authorities in the comparative and critical study of Western and Eastern philosophy refer to a striking similarity between Bradley, the champion of Western idealism and Śaṅkara, the classical teacher of Advaita. They interpret Bradley in terms of Śaṅkara and Śaṅkara in terms of Bradley and conclude that the theory of the Absolute of Bradley as expounded in his metaphysics is very much like the theory of Nirguṇa Brahman as deduced from Advaita jñāna. Bradley's methods are based on the principle of non-contradiction as the criterion of Reality freed from passion and prejudice and, applying it rigorously to a dialectic criticism of the categories of existence, he brings to light the discrepancies involved in theism and thought leading to self-transcendence in the Absolute as the all-inclusive one. Śaṅkara's method is a philosophic deduction from the Upaniṣads of the self-identity of the Absolute or Brahman laying bare the contradictions of difference and duality. According to certain interpreters of Advaita the Absolute is not bare identity or an abstract Universal arrived at by the method of formal consistency but is a concrete Universal or an identity that is presupposed in difference. If this interpretation is true, then it is clear that there is more similarity between Bradley's view and the Bhedābheda view of Bhāskara than between Bradley and Śaṅkara. It is the theme of this short article to summarise the teachings of the three philosophers and point out the resemblances between Bradley and Bhāskara.

According to Bradley, metaphysics is the attempt made by the searchlight of reason to know reality as a whole by the removal of the contradictions involved in finite experience or relational knowledge. Relations are between two terms; if they are external to the relata we cannot know them, but if they are mere relations they are abstractions. Relations relate and yet they are apart and are therefore self-discrepant. Every relation between substance and qualities, whole and part, cause and effect, subject and object, self and non-self can be shown to be self-contradictory. For example, there is no substance apart from the qualities and yet it is different from the quality. Likewise the concepts of space, time, self and God are self-discrepant and unintelligible. Thought is finite and relational and in the very judgement as the unit of thought there is self-contradiction between the subject as the 'that' and the predicate as the 'what'. The 'what' is thought or idea and it is finite and the 'that' is reality as a whole.

Thought as such points to a reality which it does not attain. The 'that' and the 'what' are sundered in finite experience and therefore thought is relational and only an appearance of reality and not reality itself. To know the limits of knowledge is to transcend them and the self-contradiction is resolved in the Absolute. Non-contradiction is the criterion of truth and reality. All the contradictions of finite experience are resolved in the Absolute. The Absolute is the real-in-itself and not the real for thought, feeling and will which are relational and self-discrepant. It is the non-relational, all-inclusive and harmonious; it has no other beyond itself and is therefore unconditioned within the finite which is cribbed and cabined owing to the fissure between form and content. Non-contradiction is to be distinguished from bare negation or nothingness and formal consistency or bare identity. Thought as ideal content is fulfilled when it transcends itself and is resolved or transformed in the Absolute. The distinction drawn between idea as a particular, perishing, psychical presentation and idea as refering to reality is artificial and untrue. Every idea claims to be true or real and the claim is fulfilled when it is consistent with the whole of reality. Then it is not annulled or shut out at the entrance to the harbour of the Absolute but is self-transcended and harmonized. Thought is no longer exclusive or self-discordant, but it becomes all-inclusive and comprehensive.

At the finite level reality only *appears* and the appearances are due to the limitations of finitude and the self-discrepancy of relational thinking. Appearances are as it were real and not-real; the parts pose as a whole and pass off as the real. They are not however illusions or phantoms, but are partially real owing to the limitations of finitude; they are conditioned reals like ether in a jar. They are neither wholly real nor wholly unreal as they are not a whole. Truth, goodness and beauty are appearances in varying degrees of coherence and comprehensiveness. The Copernican theory for example is more true than the Ptolemaic theory as it is more consistent with Reality. Good and evil are relative and the moral ideas are themselves self-discrepant and transcended in the Absolute. Pleasure and pain are also relative and in the Absolute there is no balance of pleasure or pain. As knowledge increases, there is more consistency and co-ordination. Progress is in and not of the Absolute. The self as a centre of experience has no finality and the personal identity based on memory is only partially true as experience occurs and does not recur. The God of religion is more real than other entities; but He also suffers as the finite-infinite and should be characterised as an appearance. The waking state is not unreal like the dreams and the dreams too are real like the waking state and they have their own content and continuity. Thus there are degrees or stages in the development or self-expansion of experience. Reality is the Absolute which is all-inclusive. It appears as the many and the appearances are of varying degrees. It is the unity in diversity of appearances. The one lives in and through the many. Identity is intelligible only when it works in and through difference in different stages. In the earliest

state of development, experience is the immediacy of feeling and it is infra-relational. The immediate becomes the mediate when feeling extends into relational thought and the highest stage is reached in the supra-relational experience of the Absolute which is the real immediate nature of Reality. The subject-object relation is then absorbed in the Absolute and not abolished and it is beyond the distinctions of finitude and the discursive intellect. The highest values of life are reached in the Absolute which may be called supra-personal and not personal. It is all-inclusive and harmonious and is the true concrete Universal or the identity that is in difference.

Vedānta is not merely a view but a way of life, and it is more a spiritual enquiry into the value of the Absolute or Brahman than a mere metaphysical speculation. The mumukṣu who seeks Brahman is well-equipped with the spiritual qualities of self-renouncement and introspection, and when he realizes Brahman, he is known as a mukta freed from the triple imperfections of error, evil and misery. Śaṅkara is the well-known expositor of Advaita and Bhāskara is a great teacher of one of the schools of Bhedābheda. In a critical study of Bradley and the Vedāntic teachers, it is essential that the metaphysical aspect is disentangled from textual criticism and theology. Advaitic experience of the *Sat* without a second is one but the philosophic exposition is varied. The modern exponents of Bradley and Śaṅkara referred to already interpret the Advaitic truth, ' Brahman is real and the Jagat is unreal or mithya ' in terms of appearance rather than illusion or adhyāsa. The theory of adhyāsa refers to the superimposition of the non-self on the self owing to avidyā like the rope mistaken for the snake.

Brahman is the Absolute that is unconditioned, eternal and transcendental. It is indeterminate (nirguṇa) and formless (niravayava) and is self-accomplished and not some far off end to be attained. It is not the Personal God of religion as Personality is limited and suffers from the imperfections of the finite self. The Absolute is amoral transcending the distinctions of good and evil as puṇya and pāpa in the sense that is supra-moral. It is not the universal emptied of content or bare identity devoid of difference. The mere universal abstracted from the particulars of finite experience is empty and the mere particular without the universal is blind. The self-identity of the Absolute deduced syllogistically by the principle of formal consistency is abstract and unintelligible and inexplicable. Brahman is Bhumā the infinite, Purṇa the Perfect and Ananda the blissful. It is advitīyam, the Integral one, or the *Sat* without a Second. It is the concrete Universal that pervades the particulars without in any way perverting their value. It is coherent and comprehensive and the negative *neti neti* employed in defining Brahman denies the finitude of reality and not the finite self. Negation is not bare denial as it implies the positive nature of Reality. Owing to avidyā the subjective side of Māyā, the secondless one appears as it

were the many, as the pluralistic universe in varying degrees of truth or reality. The theory of Māyā is the statement of the self-contradictions of empirical life which conditions the Absolute or Brahman and makes it appear as the manifold. The Absolute is presupposed in the appearances which are a Vikāra rather than a vivarta. Manyness admits of varying degrees and they are more real in which Brahman is more manifest. The phenomenal or the vyāvahārika is more true than the illusory and the Absolute is the real-in-itself. The three states of consciousness are not illusory, but have relative reality and even the dream world has its contents and continuity. The three guṇas likewise condition the Absolute and there is a gradual development of goodness from tamas to sattva. Even Saguṇa Brahman is less than the Absolute and is finite-infinite though the God of religion is the highest truth. Though Reality is Truth, truth is not the whole of Reality. Both Bradley and Śaṅkara agree in the method of non-contradiction or identity as the starting point of monism. While advaitic philosophy is deduced from the axiom of the self-identity of Brahman, Bradley's view is based on the principle of non-contradiction as the criterion of Reality which is only the negative way of stating the same axiom. To both Reality is not an abstract indentity based on formal consistency, but it is an identity that is the prius and presupposition of philosophy. Advaitic experience is not abolition of appearances, but appearances are self-transcended in the Absolute. Mukti is freedom in embodiment and not from embodiment and it is intuition of the Absolute as fulfilment of the logical highest. It is neither bare identity nor bare difference, but the integral knowledge of the Absolute as identity in difference. It is the amoral or supramoral state in which the mukti follows the moral habits formed in the sādhana stages. Mukti is freedom from ahaṅkāra which includes the removal of avidyā or ignorance of the true aham and the egoity resulting from ignorance. He is the jñānī who knows Brahman; and he is the moral exemplar who embodies goodness and follows the middle course between quietness and action.

The points of similarity between Bradley and Śaṅkara as summarized in the above sketch tend to show that Bradely has more affinities with Bhāskara the Bhedābhedavādin than with Śaṅkara in spite of the Bradleyan interpretation of Śaṅkara. Bhāskara formulates in a clear and consistent way the philosophy of Bhedābheda or identity-in-difference, establishes his conclusion that Brahman is identical with the world and different from it. Reality is both one and many and unity is presupposed in difference and it is the unconditioned that becomes the conditioned owing to the influence of the upādhi or the real factors of individuation. The upādhis are real and not false or illusory. Self-contradiction is sublated and negation of difference leads to the affirmation of identity. The question of degrees of truth has no meaning. The logical problem of degrees of truth is therefore interpreted as the Vedāntic theory of yogas or sādhanas and the progressive attainment of the Absolute or Brahman. Bhāskara, therefore, posits the reality of bheda and abheda as the two moments of reality. Like the

ether in the jar, the snake and its coil, and the waves of the sea, the infinite or the unconditioned assumes the form and function of the finite as the conditioned and the two coexist as identity-in-difference.

Bhāskara refutes the theory of Nirguṇa Brahman on the ground that negation is determination and is positive. Negation denies the finitude of Brahman and not the finite itself. He rejects the theistic idea of a personal God different from the finite self. Brahman is supra-personal and not the impersonal. He has the perfections like truth, goodness, satyam, jñānam, self-consciousness, purity (amalatva) and bliss (ānanda). He emanates into the pluralistic universe of nāma-rūpa, names and forms, impelled by the upādhis. The one is in the many and becomes the manifold. While Brahman and the world are identical and different, the finite self or jīva is a fulguration of the infinite Brahman and is in a bhedābheda relation with Brahman in samsāra, and it becomes one with Brahman in mukti. But, according to Yādava the relation between Brahman and nature and the self is essential as well as eternal.

Bhāskara coordinates the intellect and will, jñāna and karma in terms of jñāna-karma-samuccaya and rejects the one-sided view of jñāna or karma or mere intellectualism or activism. The exclusiveness of the jīva is in collision with the all-inclusiveness of Brahman. From between externality and bare unity, it seeks Brahman and the attainment of mukti. Its desires for the objects of sense and sensibility are transfigured into the desire for apprehension and attainment of Brahman. The jīva longs to transcend the limitations of duality and distinction and become one with Brahman. The jīva with its transcendental nature awakened expands into the infinite and is transfigured into unity or ekībhāva. Mukti is not the self-identity of the Absolute or harmony with it. By a process of spiritual induction, the empirical self frees itself from finitude and the complex of avdiyā, kāma and karma and ascends to the Absolute and, by uniting with the Whole, it becomes the Whole and is fully immersed in eternal bliss.

In summing up the conclusions of Bradley and Bhāskara, it is necessary to distinguish between the metaphysical Absolute of Bradley as absolute idealist and the Vedāntic view that Brahman is to be metaphysically known and mystically realized. According to Bradley, non-contradiction is the criterion of truth and is known in experience and not from experience. The finite as such is self-discrepant and conditioned and finitude is self-transcended in the Absolute. The Absolute is pre-supposed in the appearances which admit of degrees and it is all-inclusive and harmonious. The Absolute is not bare identity as an abstract Universal, but is a concrete Universal as identity involved in appearance or difference. Śaṅkara is interpreted (in a heterodox way) as an advaitin who, like Bradley employed the method of non-contradiction and affirms the reality of appearances as opposed to the illusion theory and their self-transcendence in the

Absolute of Brahman in which all distinctions or differences are resolved and not dissolved or destroyed. The implications of Bradley and Śaṅkara interpreted in terms of the Bradleyan method are well brought out in Bhedābheda which, if fully known, will throw a flood of light on the aching problems, Eastern and Western. Bhedābheda is a meeting of the extremes in realism and idealism in epistemology, of nirguṇa Brahman or the contentless Absolute and Saguṇa Brahman as the supra-personal in ontology, of the illusion theory and the emanation theory in cosmology, of jñāna and karma or intellectualism and activism as sādhanas, and of identity and unity as the ideals of mukti or the destiny of the individual.

Western absolutism will gain in spiritual comprehensiveness if it synthesizes philosophy and ethical religion and assimilates the theory of the yogas and mukti. Vedānta will be widened by including the truths of social philosophy and stressing also the individualistic note. The chief value of Bhedābheda consists in its being a transition from monism to supra-Personalism. It is a synthesis of metaphysical, moral and religious aspects. It equates existence and value and recognizes the value of the Absolute not only as the whole of reality but also as the home of eternal values of truth, goodness and bliss, derived from Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics.

MESSAGES

MESSAGES

The Hon'ble Dr Rajendra Prasad, President of India, New Delhi

India has been the home of philosophy for ages. In recent times she had the privilege of placing before Humanity the great philosophy of *Satyagraha* under the inspiration of Mahatmaji. The world has witnessed it in action and the miracle wrought by it. Its social dynamics and creative activity have not yet found adequate scope and its rich implications in all walks of life have yet to be worked out and systematically explained to the world. I hope that the Indian Philosophical Congress which is now celebrating its Silver Jubilee would encourage Indian philosophers to undertake this sacred task so important to the well-being of India and the world.

The Hon'ble Sri Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, New Delhi

I have your letter of the 5th August. You ask me for a message for your Silver Jubilee Volume. I confess that I find it very difficult to send any message, because I have no message to give. Philosophy ought to play an important part in helping us to solve the world's problems. But in fact there is little of philosophy or of logical thinking or humanity in the world's dealings. All of us, in whatever group or nation we may be, seem to move in their own grooves of thought and action and thus fail to help in producing that integration, which has become so essential in life today. Some of us try to grope in the dark to find a way out. But this does not seem to hold out much promise. Still I suppose we must continue doing our best. I hope the philosophers will bring their philosophy in touch with the vital problems which overwhelm us in our lives today. There is little room for the ivory tower outlook at present or, at any rate, it does not help.

I hope the Indian Philosophical Congress will throw some light in the general gloom that surrounds us. In that hope, I send you greetings and good wishes.

The Hon'ble Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Minister for Education, Government of India New Delhi

I am glad to learn that the Indian Philosophical Congress is celebrating its Silver Jubilee Session in December this year. The Congress has done valuable work in maintaining and developing interest in Philosophy and serving as a forum where different schools of thought could meet and discuss common problems.

India has always had a rich legacy of philosophical speculation and achievement. It has been one of our greatest gifts to the world and I feel that every effort should be made to foster the philosophical spirit so that we can make still greater contributions in the future.

One drawback from which philosophy has suffered has been that, in the absence of mutual contacts independent systems of thought have grown up in different parts of the world. With increasing facilities of communication, it is inevitable that philosophies of different regions must interpenetrate and build up one common philosophy of the mankind. I have no doubt that the Indian Philosophical Congress' efforts will be directed towards this end.

The essence of the philosophical spirit is one of critical enquiry and broad toleration. This has also been the spirit of Indian civilization and culture. May the Philosophical Congress maintain this tradition of Indian philosophy and civilization and render even greater service to the cause of truth and international understanding at this critical time of human history.

The Hon'ble Sri C. Rajagopalachari, Minister, Government of India, New Delhi

Your letter of 21st August. My best wishes to the Philosophical Congress. I am unable to see that any useful purpose will be served by my stringing together any words for the occasion.

His Highness the Maharaja Jaya Chamaraja Wadiyar, Rajpramukh of Mysore

I am indeed happy to have this opportunity of conveying my hearty greetings to the Indian Philosophical Congress on its Silver Jubilee and of sending my best wishes for many, many, happy jubilees to come. It is but natural that I should take a personal interest in the success of the Indian Philosophical Congress and in its future, as there has been intimate connection extending over a quarter of a century between it and the Mysore University. One of its former Professors, Dr S. Radhakrishnan, the President of this Jubilee Session, was Chairman of your Executive Committee for twelve years from 1925 to 1937; and since 1937 that responsible position has been occupied by another Ex-Professor of the Mysore University, Mr A. R. Wadia. As Chancellor of the Mysore University, I naturally take special pride and pleasure in this close connection between the University of Mysore and the Indian Philosophical Congress. I trust that, with the passing of years, this cordial relationship will grow closer and mutually more beneficial.

The Congress is meeting at Calcutta, a Centre from which much valuable research has been done in the ancient culture and civilization of our country. It is meeting at the right place and at the right time.

It meets at a time of tragic import for the world. It is only five years since the Second World War came to a formal end. The Peace Treaties that should have marked its definitive, and as we hoped, permanent end, have yet to be negotiated with Germany and Japan. Even before the shadows cast by the War lifted fully, the skies have become overcast with dark, threatening clouds. The world hungers for peace, the peace of reconciliation and harmony ; but is not fed. Religious Leaders and Philosophers have a sacred task before them. They have to rescue and redeem humanity from the horrors of future World Wars, if they at all could.

More especially the Indian Philosophical Congress has, I think, a special mission to fulfil. In two respects, broadly speaking, I venture to think that our life and culture differ from those of the West. Speaking as a servant of humanity, and, as I trust, without racial vanity, I venture also to think that if the West would remodel its civilization on these features of ours, it would go a long way to achieve the purpose that all of us without exception profess, namely, of leading the World into a glorious era of permanent peace and harmony.

What are these features? Firstly, with the Hindus, philosophy has never been a mere intellectual performance, an exercise in subtleties of thought and logic. It was also a discipline and a way of life, an illustration of its doctrines and precepts. The Philosopher in India not merely thought and taught, but he lived a higher life than the average, personifying in a way his teachings in himself. Our Philosophy was intertwined with our religion. It, too, was a Sadhana, a way of realization.

The second feature of Hindu life, which broadly distinguishes it from the life of Western Nations, is that with us time has, as it were, always been tempered by eternity. The transitoriness of earthly existence is with us not just a mere idea, but a deep feeling, " felt in the blood and felt in the heart," which influences our attitude towards life and its needs, necessities, appetites, desires and motives and strifes. We subordinate these to what we regard as the higher values and beckonings of the eternal life. This spiritual factor, if realized by the West, may moderate the force and frenzy of its struggle for earthly power and domination and afford a basis for a higher life, in which the disastrous conflicts, now in so much tragic evidence, would be moderated, if not eliminated altogether.

I do not see how the One World, in which racial and national antagonisms would be reconciled, could become possible unless Religion and Philosophy become, in sufficient measure and unison, actual life and conduct, instead of being just theories and doctrines; and unless we subordinate our temporal ambitions to the beatific values of eternity.

I hope I shall be pardoned for trespassing into fields peculiarly your own. But I could not resist the temptation of mentioning what I consider to be the distinguishing features of our culture and life which, I think, have a value for all humanity.

Let me conclude by wishing the Indian Philosophical Congress a successful jubilee session and a future that would light up the path of struggling, sorrowing humanity to perpetual peace, happiness and co-operative prosperity.

His Highness Maharaja Yeshwant Rao Holkar, Maharaja of Indore

I am delighted to hear that the Indian Philosophical Congress is celebrating its Silver Jubilee this December, under the presidentship of Dr Radhakrishnan. On behalf of the Madhya Bharat University, I wish to extend our best wishes for the success of this session. In these volcanic times the place of the thinker and the philosopher might be under-estimated. It is perhaps just for this reason that we must not forget that in the history of the world great actions and achievements have so often been motivated by philosophical thought based on what is plainly right as against what is plainly wrong. That our country has a positive contribution immediately to make in this sphere is now being increasingly realized. The Conference could not have a more illustrious and inspiring lead than Dr Radhakrishnan is likely to give it.

His Excellency Sri Chandulal Trivedi, Governor of Punjab, Simla

I am delighted to learn that the Indian Philosophical Congress will be celebrating its Silver Jubilee at Calcutta next December under the auspices of the Calcutta University. During the twenty-five years of its existence the Indian Philosophical Congress has done sterling work for the development of philosophical studies in India. I send my felicitations to the Congress on its Silver Jubilee, and wish it a career of increasing usefulness.

His Excellency Sri H. P. Mody, Governor, Uttar Pradesh

I desire to convey my greetings to the Indian Philosophical Congress on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee.

India has been the cradle of philosophical thought which has profoundly influenced the outlook on life of her people and contributed to the advancement of human knowledge. She has produced eminent ' Savants ' as well as a vast body of literature in this field. The Congress has done invaluable work for the last twenty-five years for the promotion of philosophical study, and I wish it an increasing measure of recognition and support in the future.

His Excellency Sri M. S. Aney, Governor of Bihar, Ranchi

Indian Philosophical Congress will complete its twenty-fifth year by the end of this year and it is very proper that this happy event in the life of the institution should be celebrated with due ceremony and solemnity. Calcutta University is the premier Indian university and it is the Alma Mater of a large number of eminent thinkers and writers who have stimulated the modern philosophical thought in India. It is also a university which is more widely known among the literary circles of the world than any other university in India. The jubilee of the Indian Philosophical Congress, celebrated under the auspices of the Calcutta University, will therefore attract the attention of the philosophers in the whole world. Of all branches of knowledge, philosophy is universal in the true

sense of the term. It attempts to tackle problems which are common to all human beings, nay, to creation itself in all its aspects. It is speculation in search of ultimate truth. India has a rich heritage of philosophical knowledge. Indian Philosophical Congress represents a group of philosophers somewhat different from their co-workers in the field in other parts of the world. They have an advantage in their favour which is perhaps not available to others, at least to the same extent. Yet there is much in the method and approach of the Western philosophers which the Indian philosophers stand in need of. The old style of presentation of the philosophical truths discovered and discussed in the Indian classics have to be interpreted and presented afresh. It is therefore highly desirable that the philosophers of the East and West should meet together to understand each other and ascertain how much had already been achieved and what remains to be pursued by both together in the future. The Jubilee of the Indian Philosophical Congress is the most fitting occasion for publication of a volume which shall amount to a survey of the work hitherto done and which will also draw up a plan to pursue what remains to be done.

I wish the jubilee celebration a great success.

His Excellency Sri Prakasa, Governor of Assam, Shillong

I would like to offer my hearty congratulations to all those who have served the good cause through the last many years. It is but right that philosophy should find a prominent place in the active thought of the learned even to-day; for it is the heritage of philosophy that has enabled us to keep our head high even in the darkest days of our political dependence. To-day when we are free and are coming to our own, it is but right that the message of the ancients should be remembered and repeated so that the main stream of our culture may not be lost in the arid deserts of conflicts and controversies of to-day.

I am sure your Congress will have the support and sympathy of all persons in the land; and that with your labours, philosophy will be enriched in all its many facets and will be a source of comfort and inspiration to us all.

His Excellency Sri Mangaldas Pakvasa, Governor of Madhya Pradesh, Pachmarhi

It is with great pleasure that I send my best wishes for the successful celebration of its silver jubilee by the Indian Philosophical Congress at Calcutta in December. In India philosophy has reached its sublime heights and it is here that the great sacrifices have been made by the seekers in their search for the eternal verities and the spirit that animates both the godhead and creation and its relation to the spirit of man. In their concentration and meditation they have achieved surprising control of the material vestments of the spirit, and I am certain that the Indian Philosophical Congress will keep alive the spirit of this quest and maintain the great reputation of our country for philosophical learning and philosophical truth.

His Excellency Sri Maharaj Singh, Governor of Bombay, Bombay

I have great pleasure in sending my good wishes to the Indian Philosophical Congress on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee. India may justifiably feel proud of her contribution in the field of philosophy and I hope that the Indian Philosophical Congress will endeavour to sustain that great tradition.

I wish all success to the celebrations in December 1950.

His Excellency Mr Asaf Ali, Governor of Orissa

I have the greatest pleasure in extending to the Indian Philosophical Congress greetings on my own behalf and on behalf of my State on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee.

The Hon'ble Sri Sampurnand, Minister for Education, Finance and Labour, U.P., Lucknow

India is pre-eminently a land which has been interested in the study of philosophy during every period of her long and chequered history and her contributions to philosophic thought and technique are unique. It is in the fitness of things, therefore, that a body like the Indian Philosophical Congress should occupy a prominent place in our intellectual life. The congress will soon be celebrating its Silver Jubilee and this Volume is being brought out to commemorate the occasion. I hasten to offer my most sincere congratulations to the authorities of the Congress and the editors of the Commemoration Volume.

The Hon'ble Sri T. Siddalingaya
Minister for Education and Public Health, Government of Mysore, Bangalore

The purpose of all philosophy is, I presume, rational behaviour. Today, it looks as if philosophy is a rationalistic thinking divorced from life. The nations of the world are lost in a keen competition, each one for a place in the sun, and heading to a disaster. Cannot humanity know what is good for all? It is the simplest thing, yet avoids the grip of the leaders of the world. Books like ' One world ' are published and read widely, but the prospect of realization of oneness of the world is ever receding. The more the search for unity, the less the prospects of unity. Is there no cure for this impending tragedy?

Oneness is attained not by research into the depth of thinking but by feeling and living oneness. It has not been possible to convince the leading public men of the nations and to induce them for their acceptance, the simple law of Great Teachers. Hence, the failure of humanity to discover a way of universal happiness. At the present standard of ethical living, there seems to be no hope. Because of this despair, all the more I welcome the efforts of Philosophical Congress and pray for its all-round efforts for the fruitful success of the great purpose of philosophy.

Sri Aurobindo
Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry

Send my blessings for the success of the Session.

Sri Swami Ramdas
Anandashram, Kanhangad

The entire philosophy of life can be expressed in one line—Realize Love in your heart and pour it out on all alike.

There may be various ways of approaching this blessed state.

But Love alone counts.

The philosophy of Love is simple, because Truth is simple. By laying your intellect, heart and will at the feet of God, you will be able to solve all problems relating to the individual and the universe.

So Love should be our guiding star. Love should be our goal. And into Love we should ultimately merge. For, Love is our true and eternal being.

Where Love is, there is real freedom and peace.

All philosophies find their fulfilment here. All the rivers of thought ultimately reach this ocean of Love.

May all people be blessed with this Love, and may they establish peace and good-will on the earth.

Sachivottama Dr C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer, Delisle, Ootacamund

On the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the Indian Philosophical Congress I extend to the organization my hearty congratulations and my best wishes for many years of continued and formative and creative activity. The Congress serves as an invaluable clearing-house of research and speculation on topics of the utmost moment to our race. Especially, at this juncture when opposing ideals of life club with each other is the message of the East most vital and most timely. May the Congress interpret it to the world in no partisan or controversial spirit but in accordance with our age-long traditions of courage, comprehension, and tolerance!

Sri Mirza M. Ismail, Ex-Dewan, Mysore State

I send my best wishes for the success of the Indian Philosophical Congress which is to be held in Calcutta in December under the presidentship of a very distinguished philosopher.

Philosophy can play a most useful part in the troubled world of to-day by bringing together persons of various creeds and beliefs on a common platform. True philosophy transcends all religious and national barriers and looks at human problems from a detached and lofty pedestal. If, in its quest of the Ultimate Reality, it brings home to man his ignorance and his impotence and inculcates in him a spirit of humility and reverence in face of the Unknown and Unfathomable, it will have accomplished all that one can reasonably expect of it.

Nawab A. Y. Jung, Vice-Chancellor, Osmania University

Philosophy has always been held to be one of the lasting monuments of India's genius and it is a matter of great satisfaction that it is coming into its own in a free and independent India. Philosophy in India has never been divorced from life and has always been a source of inspiration to millions in this country. A realization of the higher values in life alone can bring real peace and security to the world and the philosophers of India who will be assembling together on this occasion can give a lead to the rest of the world by their message of peace, hope and brotherhood to their own and other people.

Osmania University wishes all success to your Congress on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee.

Sri C. V. Mahajan, Vice-Chancellor, Agra University

On the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the Indian Philosophical Congress to be celebrated in Calcutta in December 1950, I, on behalf of the Agra University, convey our greetings to the Philosophical Congress and wish all success to the Jubilee Celebrations.

The Rt. Hon'ble Dr M. R. Jayakar, Vice-Chancellor, University of Poona, Poona

On behalf of the University of Poona, I have great pleasure in conveying our most sincere congratulations and good wishes to the Indian Philosophical Congress on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee Session.

The devoted pursuit of philosophical studies carried on in this country from times immemorial and the brilliant and daring philosophical speculations of our ancient seers have evoked admiration and respect all over the world. Realizing that on foundations such as these, it should be our endeavour, in our own time, to build a lofty superstructure of philosophical ideas which would do justice to the manifold problems of the modern world, the Indian Philosophical Congress, during these twenty-five years, has been making continuous and valiant efforts to encourage philosophical studies in Modern India. The task has by no means been easy and hence the progress could only be slow. We have been passing through times when all over the world, there has persisted a lack of faith in

the need and value of true philosophy in human life. It is however fortunate that there is at present a growing realization that a nation can neglect philosophical studies only at its peril. We have therefore every reason to hope that in the years to come, more solid progress may be achieved and that we may be able in New India to build a magnificent superstructure on the ancient foundations of philosophical speculation.

And when and to the extent it happens, we shall find that the ills of our practical, life also are softened since philosophy has always been also a way of life.

The Indian Philosophical Congress has been a major instrument in fostering philosophical studies particularly among the university students. Its founders and organizers who have laboured hard for its success during these twenty-five years deserve most sincere congratulations.

On behalf of this University, I assure the organizers of the Congress that this University, would do everything possible to encourage the study of Philosophy among its students and through them among the people of this country.

Dr C. R. Reddy, Pro-Chancellor, University of Mysore

I am happy to learn that the Indian Philosophical Congress will be celebrating its Silver Jubilee in December at Calcutta under the auspices of the Calcutta University.

I am particularly pleased that the venue of the celebrations is in Bengal, which has produced so many leaders of Indian thought.

The world is tending to become a single neighbourhood; and it is significant that the Indian Philosophical Congress is having its Jubilee at a time when we hope that Indian Philosophy will spread abroad and bring about an equality in spirit and thought between the militant West and the pacific East.

I wish the celebrations every success.

Sri K. V. Dube, Vice-Chancellor, Nagpur University, Nagpur

I convey my warm greetings to the Indian Philosophical Congress on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee. The Congress has done much valuable work in directing peoples' minds to the critical examination of the deeper problems that face men and I am confident that in the near future it will give a lead to the free nation of India, both in presenting the diverse problems of thought and action before it and in making a constructive approach to their solution.

Srimati Hansa Mehta, Vice-Chancellor,
The Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, Baroda

On the occasion of the Silver Jubilee celebrations of the Indian Philosophical Congress I send you my felicitations and hope that the Indian Philosophical Congress will continue its career of usefulness for a long time to come. At no period of human history man was in need of a sound philosophy to guide him, as to-day. The Indian Philosophical Congress will, I hope, give thought to the problems of the day which are overwhelming and driving mankind to despair. India has been foremost in the field of philosophy and she must prove once again her leadership by showing the light of her wisdom. The Indian Philosophical Congress must see to this.

S. M. Hossain Esq., Vice-Chancellor, University of Dacca, Ramna, Dacca

It gives me much pleasure to note that the Silver Jubilee of the Indian Philosophical Congress is going to be celebrated in Calcutta, where it had its birth 25 years ago under the presidency of Rabindranath Tagore.

The Congress has been a fruitful source of inspiration to all philosophers and scholars for quarter of a century and I take this opportunity of acknowledging, on my own behalf and on behalf of the University of Dacca, the inestimable service which it has been rendering to the cause of Philosophy and Religion. It has provided a forum for the discussion of Socio-religious questions by a gathering of the best intellectuals of the land. May its future activities outshine those of its past and may it be helpful in relieving the distress and the sufferings of all mankind.

Sri B. L. Manjunath, Vice-Chancellor, University of Mysore

On behalf of the University of Mysore, I send my warmest greetings to the Indian Philosophical Congress on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee. The Mysore University takes a justifiable pride in the work and achievements of the Congress. Two of its foremost scholars Professors S. Radhakrishnan and M. Hiriyanna, were teachers of Philosophy in this University, and their work has contributed to the revival of a vital interest in the study of Indian Philosophy.

Indian Philosophy is the story of our " experiments with Truth ", and the Truth which India has always sought after is Harmony, Synthesis, Peace and Oneness of all Life. May the Indian Philosophical Congress transmit this Ancient Wisdom to the World in its present Crisis.

Sri N. H. Bhagwati, Vice-Chancellor, University of Bombay, Bombay

It gives me great pleasure, indeed, to send a message on this auspicious occasion when philosophers, scholars and others interested in Philosophy will be for gathering in Calcutta to celebrate the 25th Anniversary of the Congress. I am sure that the commemoration volume which the Congress proposes to issue on the occasion will be a valuable addition to Philosophical literature.

It is unfortunate that Philosophy as a subject of study in Universities of India has not attracted a large number of students. Perhaps, this is due to the fact that the study of the ' Humanities ' in general and of Philosophy in particular is apt to be regarded as not yielding a satisfactory return in the shape of profitable employment as compared with subjects of pure Science and Technology. At the same time, it must be remembered that in a country like ours with a civilization which has always attached importance to spiritual values, the study of Philosophy cannot be neglected without running the risk of neglecting the great inheritence in the shape of philosophical literature produced in this country from the most ancient times. From this point of view, one must welcome every effort that is made in our country to encourage the study of Philosophy in general and of the philosophical systems of this ancient land in particular, not only by our students who have a special aptitude for the subject but also by the average citizen, in order that the torch of learning which was burning bright in this country when many other parts of the world were plunged in the darkness of ignorance, should be kept aflame and that independent India which has entered the comity of free and independent nations only recently may still continue to lead in philosophical thought in keeping with her glorious traditions. It would be unfortunate for India, if her young men and women grew up in ignorance of the invaluable treasures of thought that lie buried in her vast philosophical literature which includes the Upanisads and philosophical teachings such as those of Sankaracarya and Ramanujacarya, not to mention the philosophical writings of Buddhist and Jain savants!

Sri S. N. Sen, Vice-Chancellor, University of Delhi, Delhi

I am delighted to hear that the Indian Philosophical Congress is celebrating its Silver Jubilee this year. For 25 years the Congress has been rendering an invaluable service to the country. The Congress has been an efficient exponent of Indian Philosophy and culture and has not done a little to interpret India to the rest of the World. The World is today passing through a great crisis involving the future of humanity. Our Philosophers can do much to solve the difficult problems that confront human society and civilization. I wish the Congress a brilliant success.

Sri P. R. Parameswara Panikkar, Registrar, University of Travancore, Trivandrum

On behalf of the University of Travancore I wish the Silver Jubilee Celebration of the Indian Philosophy Congress every success.

Sri S. G. Manavala Ramanujam, Vice-Chancellor, Annamalai University Annamalainagar

On behalf of the Annamalai University, I wish this Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress signal success. The Congress which was inaugurated quarter of a century ago by our celebrated poet, Rabindranath Tagore, has since been rendering very useful work. I have no doubt that the delegates coming from the different parts of India and from abroad and bringing with them a rich variety of philosophical knowledge to this Session of the Congress will evolve a comprehensive philosophic view which the world needs to-day. It is up to you, the thinkers of this land of philosophy, to supply the world with the much-needed knowledge that drives out enmity from our hearts, which creates the sympathy which enables us to see ourselves in others and which brings the illumination that reveals the presence of God in all creation and the peace in which alone true happiness can flourish.

Sri R. A. Jahagirdar, Vice-Chancellor, Karnatak University, Dharwar

I congratulate the Indian Philosophical Congress on their Silver Jubilee Session. The pioneers and men behind the institution equally deserve every credit for bringing up the Congress to manhood. Now that India is a free nation, its voice can be heard in every corner on this earth. It is up to this Congress to propagate the unique and special features of Indian philosophy in the war-ridden world and show the high way for Peace, and I am sure, under the able guidance of your President, Dr Radhakrishnan, the Congress will acquit themselves well in days to come.

Sri B. Mukherji, General Secretary, The Indian Science Congress Association

The Indian Science Congress Association extends to the Indian Philosophical Congress its heartiest felicitations and warmest greetings on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee celebration of that Congress in December in Calcutta. The Indian Science Congress Association acknowledges with gratitude the active Part played by the Indian Philosophical Congress in the development of philosophical science. Let us hope that the activities of the Congress grow day by day continue to exert its influence on the public at large. The Association wishes the Congress every success.

Dr Bisheshwar Prasad, General Secretary, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section Indian History Congress, Simla

The Indian History Congress notes with satisfaction that the Silver Jubilee of the Indian Philosophical Congress will be celebrated in December 1950. The Indian Philosophical Congress during its existence for the last 25 years has made a definite contribution to the study of Indian philosophy, and it is hoped it will continue in future to unravel the many trends of philosophy and knowledge which were an achievement of the Indian people in the past. As one interested in the history of the glorious days of the Motherland, the Indian History Congress greets the Indian Philosophical Congress and wishes it a bright future of service and usefulness.

Sri Devapriya Valisinha, General Secretary, Mahabodhi Society of India

The Mahabodhi Society of India sends its greetings and congratulations to you, Mr President, and the members of the Indian Philosophical Congress on the occasion of your Silver Jubilee.

As you are only too well aware the philosophy of Buddhism is a very profound one, as there is little doubt that the Lord Buddha was one of the greatest Philosophers of all times. His teachings

and the message they conveyed to the world are as valuable today, as when he first uttered them 25 centuries ago. Perhaps more so in these troublous times through which we are passing, when this war-weary world is facing yet another conflagration at any moment, and all hearts are yearning for that PEACE which the Master so ardently attempted to establish in the world.

It is the duty of the thinking peoples of the World of today to ensure that we build a worthy superstructure for the coming generations. It is for us, members of such organizations as yours and ours, to concentrate all our efforts towards the cause of Unity and Love. Let us lay aside petty differences, personal avariciousness and other unbecoming thoughts and actions which tend to make us deviate from the Noble Path of Truth, and by joining hands in a common cause, go on to the establishment of a happier and better universe, an Utopia in which all peoples can live in true brotherly love and lasting Peace.

Srimati Sophia Wadia, The P.E.N. (A World Association of Writers), All-India Centre, Bombay

On behalf of the All-India Centre of the P.E.N., I send my most sincere greetings and good wishes to the Indian Philosophical Congress on the happy occasion of its Silver Jubilee Session.

The Congress can rejoice justifiably, indeed, at its record of service, during the last twenty-five years, to the cause of Philosophy. And it is my earnest hope that the Congress will continue to keep alight the lamp of philosophic inquiry and thought so that it may help usher in One World without any distinction of race, class or nation. And in this noble task who else could be a better guide than our own Gandhiji who embodied in his own person and philosophy the best that there is in the world's thought to enable one to be a shining citizen of the world. His was a true Philosophy which can lead us on the way to Peace through Non-Violence. Let us study, apply and disseminate the Gandhian psycho-philosophy that we may serve the Cause of Human Brotherhood.

One word about our P.E.N. Many of you are also our Members. We are privileged to have as the President of our All-India Centre Professor S. Radhakrishnan. Not only have we many common members, we also share common Ideals. As affirmed in our P.E.N. Charter, the Members of the P.E.N. are pledged themselves to do their utmost to dispel race, class and national hatreds and to champion the ideal of one humanity living in peace in one world.

May we all increase our efforts towards the fulfilment of our aims and may the Light and Peace and Power of Truth illuminate and guide our steps for the benefit of our India and of the World!

Sri L. S. Doraswami, Honorary Secretary, Indian Institute of Culture, Bangalore

In response to your request, I am sending you, on behalf of the Indian Institute of Culture, our best wishes for the success of the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

We thank you for inviting the Institute to send a representative and we are fortunate and happy that one of your Delegates, Shrimati Sophia Wadia, who is one of our intimate helpers, will fulfil that task.

In greeting the Delegates assembled and in congratulating them on past achievements, may I express the hope of the Institute that the Indian Philosophical Congress may grow to its full stature, serving the nation in ways truly worthy of the Lovers of Wisdom.

Our Institute would welcome the help of the members, friends and admirers of the Indian Philosophical Congress in educating the Man in the Street of Humdrum Life so as to enable him to leave it and take to the Highway of Purposeful Living, founded upon Wisdom and reared upon Service.

Greetings of congratulations for the past, of wishes for the success of the present sessions, and of hopes for the future.

H. E. Lieut.-General Sir Archibald Nye, GCSI., GCIE., KCB., KBE., MC. High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in India

I have much pleasure in sending to the Indian Philosophical Congress, my congratulations on its attainment of its Silver Jubilee, and my best wishes for the success of its Jubilee celebrations.

In times such as these when great stress is laid on the material aspect of life, there is need to encourage by every means the development of the individual and philosophical mind, and I wish the Indian Philosophical Congress well in its work in the future.

H.E. Prince De Ligne Belgian Ambassador, Ambassade De Belgique, New Delhi

On behalf of my country, I would like to extend the most cordial greetings to the Indian Philosophical Congress and to send my very best wishes for its success on the commemorable occasion of its Silver Jubilee.

H. E. Warwick Chipman, High Commissioner for Canada, Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi

The celebration next December of the Silver Jubilee of the Indian Philosophical Conference is a reminder to the world of India's historic leadership in philosophic thought.

The reminder comes in the same year as the announcement of a History of Philosophy under the auspices of the Government of India, the chairman of the Board of Editors being Dr Radhakrishnan. Many of us will look forward with eagerness to this work, and with gratitude to the Government that is sponsoring it.

Politics, economics, and even science create and will go on creating for us more problems than they solve if we fail to replenish our spiritual resources.

Without the constant search for wisdom and its discipline our energies and our intelligence will not be truly serving us. They will largely be making things more complicated for us giving us not freedom but merely new anxieties for old.

It is for the philosophers now to help us, not by counselling a fugitive and cloistered virtue but, by pointing the way and our part in it, to refresh us, enrich us, set us free, and send us forward to the things that belong to our peace.

I wish for this important Jubilee every possible success.

H.E. Dr Najib-Ullah, Afgan Ambassador in India, Royal Afgan Embassy, New Delhi

My best wishes and congratulations to the Indian Philosophical Congress.

H.E. Mr H. R. Gollan, High Commissioner for Australia, New Delhi

In reciprocating the greetings of the President and members of the Indian Philosophical Congress, I take comfort in the knowledge that, despite the fierce storms of contemporary controversy, there are men in this country and in other countries who are devoted to the calm, steady progress of philosophic thought. Without an underlying basis of philosophy our contemporary thinking, applied as it must be to the ever changing problems of our society, would be even more hesitant and changeable than it is.

Philosophers, it is true, have their own differences and controversies, perhaps even their own fashions in thought. But philosophers are among the few men who are able to close their ears to

arguments which are opportunist, selfish or merely propagandist. They are devoted to the ideal of seeking out truth in its simple, universal form. They have striven long, and will continue to strive towards this ideal of understanding man in relation to his physical and spiritual environment. So long as there are such men in all countries, devoted to such an ideal, we may yet have hope of solving our human problems both of the individual and of the group.

To the Indian Philosophical Congress I have pleasure in offering my best wishes for a successful and a fruitful Silver Jubilee Session, 1950.

S. A. Rahaman Esq., First Secretary (For High Commissioner for Pakistan in India) Office of the High Commissioner for Pakistan in India, New Delhi

On behalf of the Government and people of Pakistan I wish to convey greetings and good wishes to the Indian Philosophical Congress and its members on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the Congress.

H.E. Field Marshal P. Pibulsonggram, President, Council of Ministers of Thailand through The Royal Thai Legation, New Delhi

It gives me great pleasure to send my cordial greetings to the Indian Philosophical Congress on the occasion of the celebration of its Silver Jubilee in December, 1950.

The influence of Indian philosophy with her art and culture is so well recognised throughout the world and I have no doubt that your great organization will continue to perpetuate it for the benefit of mankind. I, therefore, express my best wishes for the increasing success and prosperity of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

H.E. Gunnar Jarring, Sweedish Minister, Royal Sweedish Legation, New Delhi

I have been directed by my government to send on their behalf their most sincere greetings to your celebrations expressing the belief that the old and proud traditions of Indian Philosophy will be upheld by you also in the future.

H.E. Dr Juan Marin, Legation De Chile, New Delhi

For the students of Indian Philosophy existing all-over the World, the Silver Jubilee of the Indian Philosophical Congress signifies an event of first magnitude: its importance cannot be ignored, particularly in Chile, my country, where hundreds of writers and thinkers are following with increased interest the teachings of the Vedas and the Upanisads and the researches of modern Indian Philosophers. It is on behalf of Chile, their philosophers and scholars, their students and people, that I enjov this opportunity to present my Greetings and best wishes to the Indian Philosophical Congress on the solemn occasion of the Silver Jubilee.

Wisaksono Wirjodihardjo Esq., Acting President, University of United States of Indonesia (Balai Perguruan Tinggi Republik Indonesia Serikat), Djakarta

As acting president of the University of the United States of Indonesia, I am happy to send a congratulation message to the Indian Philosophical Congress, to be convened at Calcutta in Decembeı 1950 in honour of its Silver Jubilee.

The Indonesian Academic World is aware of the great importance of this congress. It may give a new impetus to Indonesians to study their own philosophies of life as contained in Javanese and other Indonesian scriptures. Formerly in this country there was no systematic study of philosophy. Yet, philosophical wisdom permeated family and social life. Those members of the family who had

a special inclination towards philosophy would impart their knowledge and experience to the wider circle of their relatives. However, no facilities for systematic—methodical—study were available. Consequently, mainly owing to the impact of Western education, the study and knowledge of the Indonesian forms of philosophy declined. Today, among the educated younger generation, Indonesian philosophy is virtually non-existent. This younger generation obtains its philosophical knowledge exclusively from European books written in European languages. The young people today study the Western philosophical systems, neglecting the manifestations of thinking as contained in old-and new Javanese literature. Moreover, there is a certain interest on their part in the new science of technology.

The Calcutta philosophical congress is devoted to both Oriental and Occidental thought, tending to bring about a better mutual understanding. So, we in Indonesia hope that it will stimulate us to penetrate once more the wisdom of Javanese philosophy, theology and mysticism. The essence of true philosophy i.e., the expression of the eternal unknown in terms of human reasoning-- is the same everywhere, even if it manifests itself in innumerable forms. Once, Indonesia and India were united in one common world of spiritual ideas and values. The ancient Hindu-Javanese monuments and scriptures are a silent, though still living witness of this spiritual bond. The new Indonesia of today expresses the ardent wish that these ties of yore will be re-established and intensified for the welfare of both countries, nay, of humanity.

Leon Roth Esq., Ahad Haam Professor of Philosophy Hebrew University and Fellow of the British Academy, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Please accept the heartiest congratulations of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and its Philosophy Department on the coming Silver Jubilee celebration of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

A philosophical congress in India has a lofty function to serve. Like any other philosophical congress it has a duty to analyse current values and to interpret them with the help of the best of modern thought. But it is a question whether analysis and interpretation are enough even elsewhere: they are certainly not enough for India. India has always implied for the world at large the inward light of the spirit; and this light is the more needed today because of the dark mists of scientific barbarism which seem to be closing in upon the world from all sides. Your Congress could aid in the salvation of humanity by shedding on it some of the light of your truth. In this high task you have our heartiest good wishes.

My colleagues Professor Bergmann, Professor Martin Buber and Dr Rotenstriech join with me in this greeting.

Prof. Charles A. Moore, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii

The Silver Jubilee meeting of the Indian Philosophical Congress provides the pleasant opportunity to extend sincere congratulations to the Congress on its notable achievements during the quarter-century of its very active life, and the opportunity also to express hope and confidence that its success in the service of philosophy in coming years will be even greater.

The Congress can make two significant contributions to the development of philosophy at the present very important juncture in its age-old history. First, the essential greatness of the ancient wisdom of India, the mother of philosophy, must be revived and restored to the high stature it so deservedly maintained prior to the externally forced decline of recent centuries. It is to be hoped that the Congress and its members will continue to bring this significant message of ancient India not only to modern India but also to all the world. The world needs the spiritual wisdom developed so deeply and so comprehensively through the many centuries of profound philosophizing and high spiritual insight in India.

It is to be hoped, also, that the Congress and its members will in the years to come attend diligently to the crucial need of the age, namely, the development of greater mutual understanding and appreciation of philosophy in East and West, and the search for a synthesis of the ideas and ideals of these two great philosophical traditions. If the philosophers of present-day India will join hands with the ever-increasing group of Westerners who are becoming conscious of the need for a harmonization of Eastern and Western philosophy, the future holds greater promise for a meeting of the minds of our two traditions than has ever existed in the history of thought. The members of the Indian Philosophical Congress have the tremendous advantage of thoroughgoing knowledge of both traditions, and they therefore have the capacity to lead the world closer to philosophical unity.

A quarter of a century is as nothing compared to the thousands of years of sustained philosophical activity in India, but the work accomplished in those few years and the progress made in philosophy—as well as the prospect for significant advance in the future—serve to mark this period as a justifiable source of pride to the Congress. Representing the recent East-West Philosophers' Conference and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii, I am honoured to join philosophers and teachers of philosophy throughout the world in paying homage to Indian philosophy and philosophers past and present in sincere recognition of their greatness and importance for the entire philosophical world.

Let us hope that the Indian conviction that philosophy is no mere academic exercise but is, rather, the only sound guide to life will continue to dominate the Indian mind, and that other philosophical traditions will be convinced of this great truth. Only in this way is there hope of world peace which will be based upon the lone sure foundation—the truth. The spiritual wisdom of traditional Indian philosophy and the practical significance of philosophy are messages which the world must hear and heed or collapse. The members of the Indian Philosophical Congress have it in their power to lead the way to this all important philosophical renaissance.

U. Yu Kin Esq., Registrar, University of Rangoon

The greetings and wishes of the University for the success of the celebration may kindly be conveyed to the Chairman of the Celebration.

Saint John's College, Cambridge

The Master, Fellows and Scholars of the College of St John the Evangelist in the University of Cambridge send their amplest greetings to the Indian Philosophical Congress.

It is with great joy and gladness that we have heard how you will soon be meeting in solemn assembly to celebrate that day when, twenty-five years ago, your Congress was so happily founded. With great joy and gladness we heard it—for these philosophic studies, fitting and proper as they are only for free men and free peoples, hold you and us coupled and associated together in a common bond. Therefore in gladness and harmony of heart we heartily wish and predict, to you and to your members, a hundred years of life.

Mr Federico A. Daus, Dean ; Mr Roberto Combetto, Secretary, Year of the Liberator, General San Martin, Buenos Aires

It gives me pleasure to address myself to you Mr Secretary, acknowledging receipt of your letter of 2nd March just passed, which has served to invite this educational institution to participate in the celebration of the Silver Jubilee which is to be commemorated in Calcutta during the month of December next.

In an effort to accept this very kind invitation and taking into consideration particularly the cordial relations which exist between both countries, this faculty tried to arrange to send a delegation of members of its teaching staff, but very much to our regret it has not been possible to finalize these efforts because of a series of unexpected difficulties.

For this reason this educational institution finds it necessary to decline the kind invitation which it so deeply appreciates but not without expressing our most cordial and sincere wishes for the success of the Congress.

I take advantage of this opportunity to extend my greetings to you Mr Secretary, together with expressions of my very highest regards.

Professor Alban G. Widgery, Duke University, Durham, N.C., U.S.A.

Please allow me to express my profoundest greetings on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Indian Philosophical Congress. My thoughts go back to a time before its origin: to 1917, when with Professor Ranade and the support of A. R. Wadia, S. Radhakrishnan, and the venerable V. Subramanya Iyer, we established " The Indian Philosophical Review ". Though, as I had myself financial responsibility for the Review, it ceased publication on my leaving India in 1922, Professor Ranade later began The Review of Philosophy and Religion. My debts to the philosophies of India, and to the thinkers of India, Hindu, Jain, Zoroastrian and Muslim, have been of inestimable value. I wish more western thinkers could spend not a few months—but years with you as I did. Without any doubt they were religiously and philosophically among the most fruitful of my life, broadening my intellectual vision and deepening my emotional sympathies.

No country has been richer in the variety of its philosophies than India. Yet the West is too often presented with accounts merely of Advaitism, and those mostly superficial. May I urge some of the younger scholars to give us translations of and systematic works on some of the many non-Advaitist forms of thought. Along with others I am overwhelmingly impressed by the four volumes of Dr Das Gupta on the History of Indian Philosophy, and I pray that he may be able to complete the fifth. His work stands out as the most pre-eminent on Indian Philosophy for the past twenty-five years. I would salute him with my admiration and thanks. May he be an inspiration to your younger members. They will realize as I do that Dr Das Gupta has left much to be done, but he has pointed the way, and he has used the methods which arouse the respect of western scholars.

For many years I have been one of the few university professors in the occident giving courses in the Philosophies of India. What they have to teach us is of the utmost significance. Your Congress should stimulate enlightened interest in them, and help in their dissemination. In congratulating you on your past twentyfive years, I wish you wider and wider influence in the years to come.

Professor Cornelius Kruse (Wesleyan University), Chairman of the Committee of International Cultural Co-operation of the American Philosophical Association

Please permit me as Chairman of the Committee on International Cultural Co-operation of the American Philosophical Association to convey to you the most cordial greetings of the members of our Association to the members of the Indian Philosophical Congress on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee. Representatives of our Association hope to be with you in person, and will address the Jubilee Session and convey our best wishes and greetings personally. But I want you to know how much importance your American colleagues attach to every effort at better understanding and closer co-operation with our colleagues in other lands. A great responsibility rests on us philosophers to make nations and peoples aware of how great can be the contribution of philosophy to world understanding and the building of the great commonwealth of humanity. Our wish for the future of the Indian Philosophical Congress can perhaps best be expressed in terms of the familiar Latin salutation: Vivat! crescat! floreat!

Prof. Paul Weiss, Editor, the Review of Metaphysics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, U.S.A.

Greetings from the *Review of Metaphysics*. Our good wishes to you on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the Indian Philosophical Congress. Indian philosophers have such a magnificent sense of what is important, and such an appetite for metaphysics that we find ourselves related to you with an immediacy and good will which is in no way affected by our geographical distance.

We trust this will prove to be but the first of a long series of major distinguished celebrations of the Indian Philosophical Congress, and that we here, in ever increasing numbers, shall have the pleasure of joining you in them.

Dr Georgi Schischkoff, Journal for Philosophical Research, Schlehdorf

On the occasion of the Silver Jubilee Meeting of the Indian Philosophical Congress in December 1950, permit me to send you and the members of the Indian Philosophical Congress our best wishes in the name of all our co-workers of our editorial staff. It is a most gratifying fact that in spite of the political and economical troubles of our times, spiritual efforts are being kept up, and that these efforts can still find their expression in such great and solemn meetings as the Jubilee Session of your Congress, demonstrating the powers of the pure spirit.

We wish at the same time to express our deepest regret for not being able to send a representative of our journal, or of today's German Philosophy in general, in the very centre of which our journal is rooted.

In order however to give expression to our friendly association and our readiness for closer co-operation with the learned efforts of the philosophy of your country, we venture to send a copy each for you and for the library of the Indian Philosophical Congress, of the Report on the last General Congress in Germany which took place in Mainz in 1948, and for which all arrangements were made by our office. We are sending these separately by book-post. This report will give you an insight into the whole of present day German and European Philosophy, and there do appear in it signs of a beginning of international co-operation in the field of philosophy. We should be very glad if you too would find in it points of contact between the philosophies of our two countries from which a lasting co-operation between members of the Indian Philosophical Congress and representatives of German Philosophy may result. We should be also most willing to arrange for a regular exchange of journals and periodicals. It would also be possible for our Publishing House to let the members of your Congress—on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee—have the journals at a reduced price, if they could be paid in, say, Dollars. In any case, we shall be most willing to do our utmost towards giving expression to our friendly association and readiness for closer co-operation with the philosophers of your country and eventually the whole of Eastern Asia.

I close with my best personal wishes for the success of the Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

The United Lodge of Theosophists

The United Lodge of Theosophists gladly responds to your invitation and very heartily wishes the Indian Philosophical Congress, assembled at its Silver Jubilee Sessions, a great success.

The world is on its way to become one on the plane of knowledge and different schools of learning will be knit together more than ever. We will be able at last to demonstrate that philosophy is neither Continental nor National. The division of outlook now existing between Eastern and Western Philosophy must vanish. And like the Indian Darsanas, Philosophy must present different view-points of but one and indivisible Truth.

Wisdom, according to our great instructor, H.P. Blavatsky, is the Energy which works in all Nature. She states that Nature is Wise and so Theosophy puts forward the doctrine of Pansophia which is fully expounded in H.P.B.'s monumental works, *Isis Unveiled* and *The Secret Doctrine*.

The Love of Truth and Wisdom is not an abstraction, as modern speculative philosophers assume. There is a Power in Nature, and so in Man too, which is the very soul of mind and which is named Compassion. True Philosophy is the study of that Principle, the Wisdom of Love, that Love which unites the many in the one. It is written:—

"Compassion is no attribute. It is the Law of Laws—eternal Harmony, Alaya's Self; a shoreless universal essence, the light of everlasting right, and fitness of all things, the law of Love eternal."

"The more thou dost become at one with it, thy being melted in its Being, the more thy Soul unites with that which Is, the more thou wilt become COMPASSION ABSOLUTE."

May the future years enable the Indian Philosophical Congress to unearth the precious stones of Wisdom which is Compassion and which will unite the present divided world and usher in Peace, abolishing wars and even the rumours of wars.

The Rt. Hon. Viscount Samuel, President, The Royal Institute of Philosophy University Hall, London

The Committee of the Royal Institute of Philosophy have learnt with great interest of the celebration of the Silver Jubilee of the Indian Philosophical Congress which is to take place under the auspices of the Calcutta University next December. They have asked me to send in their name a message of cordial congratulation on the work of the past and warmest good wishes for the future.

In this age of moral confusion, with the consequent conflicts of races, states, classes, parties and creeds, there is need for some influence which can survey the whole scene; which may persuade the contending forces to pause and consider yet again; which may propose a new approach and point out the right paths towards the goal of human welfare. Where can that influence be found but in the power of human reason? And how can reason best express itself but in "divine Philosophy"?

Great, therefore, is the responsibility, in this seething troubled age, that rests upon the intellectual leaders of the peoples. But great also is the opportunity: for in the long run it is always ideas and not things, philosophy and religion and not technology and economics, which decide the welfare or the ruin, the happiness or the misery of mankind.

Let philosophers therefore draw together, and gain mutual support and encouragement in this inspiring but arduous task, in mutual co-operation. Let them maintain and strengthen their organisations, their Institutes and Congresses. Let these Associations join hands with one another, and not only within each country, but also across the frontiers and the oceans.

The ending of the two centuries of British rule in India, happily without bloodshed—a peace treaty without a war—might perhaps have been expected to lessen the interest of the British and Indian peoples in each others' doings. But that is proving not to be so. We have learnt too much of one another during that long time to allow us to become indifferent. On the contrary, the ending of political antagonisms has released the underlying goodwill that was always there. In the cultural sphere especially it is fostering a sympathy that is no longer inhibited and qualified by political conflicts. Certainly British philosophers watch with close interest the trend of thought among their Indian colleagues, and through this Institute are glad to take the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the Indian Philosophical Congress to send their fraternal greetings.

Prof. A. H. Hannay, Hony. Secretary, Aristotalian Society, London

The Aristotalian Society congratulates the Indian Philosophical Congress on its Silver Jubilee Session and sends all good wishes for a successful meeting in December.

Prof. G. C. Field, President, Mind Association, University of Bristol

The President of the Mind Association congratulates the President and the members of the Indian Philosophical Congress on the 25th anniversary of its foundation.

We on our side are aware of the great advances made in Philosophical studies in India during this quarter-century; and of the new epoch which has begun in the relations between India and Britain. It is a matter of the greatest satisfaction that the year 1950 sees unimpaired the friendly relations which have so long united the scholars and Philosophers of our two countries. We are united to you by our common interest in the perennial problems of Philosophy, in ideals of scholarship, and in aims of reflection. We realise the great work still to be done in the interpretation of the Indian Philosophical heritage; and in the exchange of the contemporary doctrines and points of view of India and the West; in this task we hope that the members of our two societies will continue to share. We send you our sincere good wishes both for your Jubilee gathering and for the years that lie ahead.

Prof. Raymond Bayer, Professor at the Sorbonne, Permanent Director (Curator) of the International Philosophical Institute, General Secretary of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies, Paris

The International Institute of Philosophy have pleasure in sending you through me their warm and sincere fraternal wishes for the whole of Asia's wisdom, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Indian Philosophical Congress. Its members deeply regret not being able to be represented by one of its office-bearers, at Calcutta, at that Christmas Meeting which will doubtlessly prove a great date.

Our Institute has from its very beginnings had the most cordial and friendly relations with Indian philosophers: its members have not forgotten the Indian delegation who, under the leadership of the venerable Subrahmanya Iyer, attended the Descartes Congress in Paris, in 1937, and they remember the great interest these philosophers of the East showed towards acquiring a more profound knowledge of Western thought. Those men who had come to us from Asia, brought us greetings from Colleagues about whose work most of us knew little, and they keenly wished for more frequent contact to be established between our widely separated countries. So they were immediately in favour of the foundation of our International Institute which came into existence at that congress and was meant to bring closer to each other the philosophers of the whole world. India's participation in the various enterprises of the Institute was immediately gained, and the International Philosophical Bibliography, the first and most important of our publications which is now in correspondence with 38 nations, was being constantly kept advised of the philosophical works appearing in India.

The war, unfortunately, interrupted these excellent relations; but they were quickly renewed, at the end of the war, thanks to Dr Londhey, Director of the National College at Nagpur, who became our national correspondent for India. And in 1948 the International Philosophical Institute, desirous of establishing new bonds of friendship all over the philosophical world, with the help of Unesco, at the 10th International Philosophical Congress at Amsterdam, (raised the question of the) foundation of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies, in which effort one of you took active part, i.e. Prof. Atreya of Benares University, who was nominated member of the Council of Directors of the Federation, as representative of Indian Philosophers.

Thus India is a member of our international philosophical institutes, and so we heartily wish that your Philosophical Societies which are so far outside the Federation should join it in large numbers. This is a question which we would ask you kindly to go into at your congress, as well as the possibilities of distributing our Bibliography to your Universities, Colleges and Libraries.

By contributing to a better knowledge of the possibilities of contact between the philosophers of the whole world, your Congress which has our best wishes for complete success and fruitful work, will help the mutual understanding of the Fastern and Western mentalities, and so India, faithful to her ancient tradition of wisdom, would give an important contribution towards establishing peaceful relationships between minds and peoples.

Sri R. Panikker

I am sending to you cordial greetings in my own name and in the name of the society known as the " LUIS VIVES " Institute of Philosophy of " CONSEJO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGATIONS CIEN TIFICAS " (Superior Council of Scientific Investigations) in Spain. Our message comes from the most distant nation in the West of Europe to you far in the East; but from the nearest one in the opposite direction.

My message to Indian Philosophy is that it should not merely fall in love with its own past, and thus become a matter of mere archaeological interest. It is true that the past has its value and any good tradition deserves our respect. The river of the past flows into the present, because man is a historical being, and *tradition* weighs on history, even when history attempts to discard it; man is led and even misled by his inherited training, and we reap the fruits of the past. The starting point of whatever activity is always a given situation, *tradita*.

I would however say, and say it with great stress, that Indian thought should not yield to the pressure of Western modern ideas, nor allow itself to be misled by the mirage of European Philosophy.

We should thus have neither archaeological thought nor mere fashionable imitation. Indian Philosophy may need the vitalizing influence of Western Philosophy, but it need not surrender to it its own life.

Prof. Arthur E. Murphy, Chairman, American Philosophical Association
Goldwin Smith Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.

I am happy to send the fraternal greetings of the *American Philosophical Association* to the *Indian Philosophical Congress* on the occasion of its Jubilee Meeting, and to extend our best wishes to the Congress on passing this milestone in its career.

Indian and American philosophers are pursuing their activities on opposite sides of the globe, and with different traditions behind them but with a common concern for philosophic truth. We hope very much that contacts between Indian and American philosophers will in future be much more frequent than they have been in the past, and that philosophizing in terms of a world perspective rather than in terms of our limited traditions will become more and more possible.

May this session of your Congress be an especially hopeful and significant one to all who participate.

Our heartiest congratulations.

The Metaphysical Society of America, 201, Linsly Hall—Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut

The Metaphysical Society of America, just born, greets its elder and wiser brother across the seas. It looks to you for hope and inspiration. Our best wishes to you on the occasion of your Jubilee Celebration.

Mrs. G. J. Watumull, Chairman, Watumull Foundation, Los Angeles

Mr Watumull and I both wish great success to your Conference.

Prof. Clement C. J. Webb, England

I most willingly send a message of greeting and cordial goodwill to the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress which is to meet at Calcutta in December under the Presidency of my old friend and valued colleague Professor A. R. Wadia. I do not the less appreciate your invitation to take part in it that at the age of eighty-five, I cannot contemplate a journey to India for the purpose.

Prof. Wm. Pepperell Montague, New York, N.Y.

I am very sorry indeed to have to decline your kind invitation to the forthcoming Indian Philosophical Congress which I hope will be a great success.

The philosophers of India in general have always defended the ideal of some sort of spiritual power being fundamental in the universe. As I have recently set forth in my just-published book, *Great Visions of Philosophy*, I think that there is a new opportunity for defending that faith if, and only if, it can in some way be combined with the Occidental belief in the world and worldly life as essentially worthwhile and demanding of us increased devotion rather than abandonment. If I could be present at your congress it would be my pleasure to develop this topic. I can now only express the hope that you in India will realize the desirability, and indeed the necessity of freeing your philosophy of its traditional asceticism and thus make possible a closer co-operation with us in the west.

Prof. A. J. Ayer, University College, London

I am much honoured by your invitation to participate in the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress and greatly regret that my engagements here will not make it possible for me to come. You have my very best wishes for the success of the Congress.

Prof. Charles Morris, The University of Chicago

I shall not be able to attend the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress in Calcutta next December. I am glad that some of my countrymen will be with you. Prof. F. S. C. Northrop (Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut) writes me that he is to be in India for some months; and I have heard that Prof. George Conger (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota) and Prof. Paul A. Schillp (North Western University, Evanston, Illinois) are hoping to arrange trips to India. Prof. Schillp, you may know, is preparing now the volume on Radhakrishnan for the Library of Living Philosophers.

As a word to the Congress, let me say that I believe that Philosophy is again to assume high importance in the affairs of man. India today is at the cross-roads of human thought. This gives to her philosophers the opportunity, and the responsibility, of greatness.

Prof. Rudolf Carnap, Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago, Chicago

Thank you for your kind invitation to participate in the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress in December 1950. I regret very much that I shall not be able to attend. It would have been a great pleasure for me to exchange ideas with the participants of the meeting.

Let me send my warmest wishes, though, to the Congress for a very fruitful meeting! Now, when India has finally achieved her independence, the intellectual achievements of her learned men seem of higher importance than ever. I hope that many Western Philosophers will be able to attend the meeting, because I believe that we could learn much from each other, and that the thinking about philosophical problems would be greatly benefited by such personal contact.

Prof. H. J. Paton, Corpus Christi College, Oxford

I regret that I am unable to accept your kind invitation to attend the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress in December. I wish your meeting every success.

Prof. N. Kemp Smith, The University of Edinburgh

Cordial greetings and all good wishes for the success of the Silver Jubilee Session of your Philosophical Congress, and kind remembrances also to those of you who have visited us at Edinburgh.

Prof. Alexander Maslow, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

I shall particularly miss the personal contact with the Indian Philosophers. One thing particularly always impressed me in the Indian philosophers, and that is that their philosophy is not merely an intellectual or professional pursuit but is also a way of life. In this respect they seem to be closer to the ancient tradition than we Western philosophers.

I wish a pleasant and successful Session.

Prof. Jorgen Jorgensen, Professor, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

I regret indeed, that I am not able to come, but I send you and your Indian colleagues my best greetings and best wishes for the Congress which, I hope, will be a great success.

Prof. E. A. Burtt, Goldwin Smith Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., U.S.A.

The American Philosophical Association has appointed two philosophers who expect to represent it on that occasion. They are Prof. F. S. C. Northrop of Yale University and Prof. George P. Conger of the University of Minnesota.

Prof. Murphy has already conveyed to you the greetings and good wishes of the American Philosophical Association on the occasion of this twenty-fifth anniversary of the Indian Philosophical Congress. May I add my own best wishes and my hope that I may have another opportunity to visit India in the near future.

Prof. Y. P. Mei, The University of Chicago, Chicago

In response to your kind invitation of June 8 to me to attend the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress to be held in Calcutta next December, I wish to thank you for the honour thus shown me but regret to have to say that my teaching duties will not permit such a trip.

You are doubtlessly aware, as we do, that there have been periods in the long histories of India and China when intellectual and cultural communications between the two countries have been most vigorous and fruitful. It is only in comparatively recent times that the intercultural contacts of both countries, first of India and then of China, have been orientated towards the West. While this East-West cultural relationship should by all means be maintained and strengthened, is it too much to hope that the mutual understanding and appreciation between minds of India and China may be revived? It is also believed that a revived India-China rapport on the philosophical plane will not only result in the enrichment of the thought-life of these two peoples, but also possibly throw a considerable amount of light on a world situation that is characterized by bewilderment and confusion.

With this earnest idea I wish humbly to send my congratulations to you on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the Indian Philosophical Congress and my best wishes for a fruitful Session.

P.S.—We enjoyed Profs. Datta, Raju, Mahadevan at Hawaii last summer greatly. It was a rare fortune to know these Indian scholars and gentlemen.

Prof. Gilbert Ryle, Editor of ' Mind ', Magdalen College, Oxford

Please give my greetings, as Editor of 'Mind', to the members attending the Indian Philosophical Congress, and tell them that I wish the Session all possible success.

Prof. R. I. Aaron, Department of Philosophy, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth

My very best wishes for a successful meeting. I have much pleasure in sending you a Message of Greetings from the philosophers of Wales, in congratulating you on attaining the Jubilee and in wishing you well for the future.

Prof. Daisetz T. Suzuki, Los Angeles, 33, California, U.S.A.

Thank you for your letter enclosing another letter, inviting me to the Indian Philosophical Congress which will take place in December this year. I regret to say that I find myself busy lecturing in various universities in the East coast until March 1951. And then I am afraid that I am too old to attempt a long trip over to India.

Last year I was fortunate to meet with some of the eminent thinkers from your country at the East and West Philosophers' Conference in Honolulu. If Japan were not suffering from one of the most disastrous warfares undertaken by the militarist party, I thought that we might have something like the Hawaii Conference in Japan in the near future. But this would be impracticable until Japan had concluded a peace treaty with the allied forces.

We have many things to learn from the West, but at the same time we have something to tell the latter concerning our way of viewing the world and life. Cannot you think of inviting some of the Western philosophers to the Orient?

All good wishes for the Congress.

Prof. Bertrand Russell, Through the British Council, The Mall, Agra

My congratulations to the Indian Philosophical Congress on its Jubilee and best wishes for a long and fruitful future.

Prof. G. E. Moore, 86, Chesterton Road, Cambridge

I feel greatly honoured to have been asked to send a message of greeting to the Indian Philosophical Congress on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee. I heartily wish for the Congress every kind of success. In spite of all the pains which have been devoted to them by men of genius and men of first-rate ability, there are still, it seems to me, very many philosophical problems, the correct solution of which is far from clear. May the philosophers of India make a great contribution towards their definitive solution!

Prof. C. D. Broad, Trinity College, Cambridge, England

Prof. Broad, who is unfortunately prevented by his duties in Cambridge from accepting the kind invitation to be present at the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress in December 1950, takes this opportunity to send his greetings and best wishes. May the Indian Philosophical Congress have a happy and fruitful meeting, and may it grow and flourish in future, and may Indian and English Philosophy co-operate and stimulate each other to an even greater extent in the years to come.

Prof. Wing-Tsit Chan, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.A.

I wish to thank you for your invitation to attend the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress. It is an honour to be asked. I wish I could attend and drink in the fountain of your wisdom. Please convey my heartiest greetings to your colleagues.

Prof. H. H. Price, New College, Oxford, England

May I send my warmest good wishes to the Congress and my most hearty congratulations on its Silver Jubilee!

Prof. A. C. Ewing

I am writing to thank you for your very kind invitation to the Indian Philosophical Congress and to give the Congress the heartiest goodwill message from me on the occasion of its Jubilee.

Prof. Arthur N. Prior, Canterbury University College, Christchurch, New Zealand

Thank you for your most kind invitation to attend the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress in Calcutta next December. I am sorry that I shall not be able to be present, but I shall be very interested to see a copy of your programme, and hope that your session will prove a most fruitful one.

I am afraid I have never been a very close student of Indian Philosophy, though I have lately been tracing out some of the repercussions in formal Logic of that remarkable discovery which I believe the world owes to the early mathematicians of your country—the discovery, I mean, that *zero* may be treated as a number. I once also had the privilege of hearing your present Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, address a meeting in London; and in the past months. I have been following with great interest and sympathy his attempt to find a " middle way " between the rival political fanaticisms which are at present tearing the world apart.

Prof. W. D. Ross, Oxford

I much regret to say that the state of my health makes it impossible for me to accept the kind invitation to attend the Silver Jubilee Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

I have a very close link with India, in that my father was for many years Principal of the Maharajah's College in Trivandrum, now the University of Trivandrum. Hence it is with interest and real emotion that I send my greetings and wish all success to the Congress.

Prof. C. E. M. Joad, M.A., D.Litt.

Thank you for your letter inviting me to attend the Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress to be held in Calcutta next Christmas. I am afraid, however, that the fare is prohibitive and that I have not the time to spare.

I have pleasure, however, in sending you my best wishes for the success of the Congress and to express the hope that the philosophers may succeed in the task which the politicians have so often bungled, that of building a bridge between east and west. It is high time that we knew more about one another's philosophies and to succeed in facilitating the interchange of ideas would be a very great achievement on the part of the Congress.

Prof. John Mackenzie, Edinburgh

I send my hearty congratulations to the Indian Philosophical Congress on the completion of twenty-five years' service to the cause of philosophy.

I was present at the Inaugural session and at many succeeding sessions, and I have happy and grateful memories of them all. There was need of a Society to unite teachers and students of philosophy throughout India with each other, and the Congress has richly supplied that need. I recall valuable papers, addresses and discussions which found a place in its programmes. I have still more abiding memories of the formation of friendships, many of which I still cherish.

I believe the Congress has done much to keep alive interest in philosophy in India at a time when other subjects with a higher utilitarian value have threatened to supplant it. Whatever place formal philosophical studies may have in our University curricula, men will never cease to pass judgements on questions which are essentially philosophical. The important thing is that they should do so with the fullest understanding of the questions themselves and of the relevance of the solutions which they offer. The Congress has done much to direct men's thinking toward this end. It has kept before the public the importance of philosophical studies. It has also provided a meeting place, where leaders of philosophical thought have had opportunities of undertaking co-operative thinking, and where teachers and students from the more remote Colleges have had opportunities of meeting these leaders, of drawing inspiration from them, and of making their own contribution to philosophical discussion.

May the Indian Philosophical Congress go from strength to strength in the years to come, and may it never lack able and enthusiastic members, who shall maintain and advance the high standard of philosophical thinking which has characterized it in the past.

Prof. G. H. Langley, Surrery

It gives me genuine pleasure to send my greetings to the members of this session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, and to convey my sincere wishes for the success of their deliberations. Since I arrived in India in 1913 I have enjoyed the friendship of many Indian speculative thinkers and have gained much from the intercourse I have been privileged to have with them. And this Congress should be a gathering of special significance and importance. It is not only the occasion of our Silver Jubilee, but is also held at a time when India is entering upon a new period in her history. The Republic of India is inevitably a centre of world influence, and is directly participating in the movements of thought and of action that are powerfully affecting the peoples of the world and their relations in this generation. In addition India's leaders are planning to promote educational, social and economic developments that must later radically change the general outlook of her peoples, and make possible for the majority a higher standard of living. I know that the thought of India's philosophers will be deeply and radically influenced by the impact of these events, and shall look forward to perusing the account of the Proceedings of your Congress at this time with more than usual interest.

Prof. Fung Yu-Lan, National Tsing Hua University (Peiping, China)

I am writing with great pleasure to greet the Silver Jubilee of the Indian Philosophical Congress. Since the first century of the Christian era, Indian philosophy, religion, literature and fine art continued to be a source of inspiration to the Chinese. It is a rare example in world history that the relations between our two countries have always been friendly and never otherwise. It is so because, I think, we are related not by the gain of profit of any kind, but by a philosophy the principal idea of which is that of peace.

In recent times, we two countries both suffered from the oppression of Western imperialism and through bitter struggle we both gained freedom and independence in different ways and to different degrees. But the peace of the whole world is still to be fought for. We as students of philosophy have the duty to uphold the best philosophical traditions of our two countries to fight for world peace.

Let us work together for the common task.

Message from Mr Jaime Torres Bodet, Director-General of UNESCO to The Indian Philosophical Congress

Now that the Indian Philosophical Congress is holding its Silver Jubilee Session I am specially anxious to send Unesco's greetings and good wishes. You know how gladly I would have attended your proceedings, had I been able; at any rate, I have the great satisfaction of seeing a policy of co-operation between your Congress and our Organization take shape, which will, I am sure, produce many valuable results.

For you, 1950 is an anniversary of special solemnity. Sustained by a long tradition and strong in the experience won by twenty-five years devoted to the task of exploring and expressing Indian philosophy, your Congress seeks by its choice of programme to bring out the threefold nature of its activities—a clear-sighted concern with the problems of contemporary man, the dynamic re-exploitation of India's intellectual past and, lastly, eager investigation of the noblest forms of spirituality. The presence of philosophers from the western nations, invited by the Congress to take part in its proceedings this year, will extend the scope of your discussions and give them a universal bearing.

It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the close kinship between what you and Unesco are severally seeking to do. The very fact that a colloquy is being begun between thinkers from regions as widely separated as Western Europe, the United States of America, and Asia is a significant example of the trend which is bringing the intellectual leaders of all countries to understand each other better and thereby help, in their own sphere, to establish lasting peace. From Unesco's point of view, however, the international meeting gains even deeper significance from the fact that its occasion is a philosophical congress. Philosophy clearly cannot prescribe the means by which Unesco strives to promote the well-being of mankind, but it can throw light on the ends to be pursued, and ensure that our choice of means does not imperil the very ends we seek.

Our Organization has to carry out certain purely practical tasks of international co-ordination to afford all men access to culture and to maintain peace in the minds of men. We cannot, however, forget what hopes accompanied our foundation nor what ideals were embodied in our Constitution. Our subject-matter is man in his most purely human aspects; the obstacles we meet with are the discords of a critical period when mankind needs help to grasp its own essential oneness; our final objective is the promotion of values which can save civilization and give the impetus for a new advance. Thus we cannot content ourselves with mere administration; spiritual ideals are as properly our concern as hard facts. Of course, it is not for Unesco itself to embark on the study of the philosophic doctrines claiming, in this fateful hour, to answer the questionings of Man. Still less is it our task to put forth a philosophy of our own, to become a subject of dispute among the learned; there is no specific " Unesco philosophy " apart from an affirmation of the broad principles underlying civilization and of that tolerance which allows philosophers to develop those principles in a climate of full intellectual freedom.

Hence philosophers are among the chief of the intellectuals whom Unesco seeks to associate intimately in its work for the peoples of the world. Without their enlightened counsel Unesco would be in danger of working in the dark, for they are men who have made clear thinking, objectivity and loftiness of mind their profession—whose function is to reveal the ideals, the sense in life, which our age seeks. Nothing could be further from the whole spirit of Unesco than to ask philosophers to think along lines of its choosing: it is rather because their minds are free that they have a part of primary importance to play in guiding our activities. That is why Unesco has sought to encourage the holding of round-table discussions and the publication of symposia in which ideas are compared for the sole object of attaining better mutual understanding.

The philosophers whom we have associated in our work have never grudged us their enthusiastic aid; at the round-tables arranged as part of great international congresses, in the enquiries

conducted by Unesco into the philosophic bases of human rights, the relations between cultures and the concept of democracy, philosophers have shown how central to their thinking was the postulate of fundamental mutual agreement, and how well fitted philosophy is to direct man's steps towards a unity wherein all legitimate diversities shall be respected. Practising philosophy means seeking to understand oneself not only as an individual but as a unit of mankind—and hence seeking a basis for world-wide understanding. Hence philosophy tends to promote the values which give its substance to the ideal of a human society. True peace—of the kind Unesco seeks to establish—finds its best symbol in the society which thinkers constitute when the sole object of their colloquy is to arrive together at the truth. Through the example they offer us of continual triumph over lack of understanding and blind passion, philosophers can be the teachers of mankind and pave the way for the attainment of an ideal unhappily still distant, of a great human republic in which hatred has no place. Indeed, it is my belief that man will only surmount the crisis through which he is now passing by an ever fuller and more considered realization of his condition, his destiny, and the meaning of his existence.

It follows then, that the philosopher has a necessary task in the world of today and his own place in society. How is he to play his part towards his fellows and yet remain truly a philosopher? That is the problem you have selected as the theme of your first symposium, " The Place of the Philosopher in Modern Society ". In that subject I am glad to note a convergence between your thinking and Unesco's interests. Nor is it surprising that that should be so, for is not India by tradition the country in which the loftiest spirituality is joined with the most scrupulous sense of social duty? Is she not also the country in which the idea of transcending personality for the achievement of higher values has known its finest flowering, and the motherland of Mahatma Gandhi, whose life and teaching make him the new India's father—Gandhi who wrote to my predecessor, in reply to an enquiry by Unesco, that the true foundation of human rights lies in the performance of one's duty? In Gandhi we had a philosopher whose thought transcended the limits of academic studies, and by his example he proved to us that the man with a calling to meditation need abdicate no tittle of his humanity, still less hold aloof from his kind, but rather that his thought should find immediate expression in action, disinterested action.

I am sure that from your proceedings will emerge truth, which will be of great value to Unesco; it is specially significant that that the teaching should come to us from the ancient wisdom of India, applied to the facts of the world today. For its own part our Organization attaches the greatest importance to the extension of the exchanges already begun between the philosophers of your country and of the Occident, and to that end Unesco will be organizing, towards the end of 1951, a round-table discussion on the cultural and philosophic relations between East and West. We hope to convene this meeting in India, with the help of your country's National Commission; it will last a week and will consist of a few members only. The idea was first suggested to Unesco by your Chairman himself, Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, and in the discussions Indian thought will play a leading part. In this way Unesco is seeking to help the formation of spiritual movement uniting all the great forces which can ensure the moral solidarity of mankind, and to assist the maintenance and the development of a civilization threatened today by increasing confusion and danger in the face of the material problems born of man's technological achievements.

It is the fact that philosophy is absolutely essential to the education and training of man which has led Unesco, also, to decide on an enquiry in 1951, into the organization of the teaching of philosophy and into the objects prescribed for it in certain selected countries—of which India is naturally one. The results of the enquiry will be communicated to governments, National Commissions and philosophical societies in 1952. You will have occasion now, during your discussion on the place of the philosopher in modern society, to touch usefully on the role of the philosopher as the teacher of men and nations.

I am counting greatly on the results of your work to assist us in the accomplishment of our programme.

What would the philosopher become if he shut himself up in an ivory tower, if he ignored the realities of life and society, if he never reflected on the underlying human conditions of his work, and on the duties which his work imposes on him? His thought would lose all importance, all relevance, and would become no more than juggling with empty abstractions. However, there is no need to remind your country of that truth, and I offer my hearty thanks to your organizing committee for inviting Unesco to attend a discussion so full of significance for it. Our Organization could have found no better representative than Mr. Olivier Lacombe, the eminent French professor, who, despite his numerous commitments, has been kind enough to travel to Calcutta as Unesco's spokesman and to share in his own name in your work. I send my greetings to all members of the Congress, in particular to its Chairman, that great Indian philosopher, Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, whom Unesco is privileged to have had as one of its moving spirits since its foundation, and I offer the Indian Philosophic Congress my sincerest wishes for its success.

CONTRIBUTORS

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APPENDIX

RABINDRANATH TAGORE'S PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE FIRST SESSION 1925

My timidity makes it difficult for me properly to enjoy the honour you have done me to-day by offering a chair which I cannot legitimately claim as my own. It has often made me wonder, since I had my invitation, whether it would suit my dignity to occupy such a precarious position on an ephemeral eminence, deservedly incurring anger from some and ridicule from others. While debating in my mind as to whether I should avoid this risk with the help of the doctor's certificate, it occurred to me that possibly my ignorance of philosophy was the best recommendation for this place in a philosophers' meeting,—that you wanted for your president a man who was blankly neutral and who consciously owed no allegiance to any particular system of metaphysics, being impartially innocent of them all. The most convenient thing about me is that the degree of my qualification is beyond the range of a comparative discussion,—it is so utterly negative. In my present situation, I may be compared to a candlestick that has none of the luminous qualities of a candle and, therefore, suitable for its allotted function, which is to remain darkly inactive.

But, unfortunately, you do not allow me to remain silent even in the circumstance when silence was declared to be prudent by one of our ancient sages. The only thing which encourages me to overcome my diffidence, and give expression in a speech to my unsophisticated mind, is the fact that in India all the *vidyās*,—poesy as well as philosophy,—live in a joint family. They never have the jealous sense of individualism maintaining the punitive regulations against trespass that seem to be so rife in the West.

Plato as a philosopher decreed the banishment of poets from his ideal Republic. But, in India, philosophy ever sought alliance with poetry, because its mission was to occupy the people's life and not merely the learned seclusion of scholarship. Therefore, our tradition, though unsupported by historical evidence, has no hesitation in ascribing numerous verses to the great Śaṅkarāchārya, a metaphysician whom Plato would find it extremely difficult to exclude from his Utopia with the help of any inhospitable Immigration Law. Many of these poems may not have high poetical value, but no lover of literature ever blames the sage for infringement of propriety in condescending to manufacture verse.

According to our people, poetry naturally falls within the scope of a philosopher, when his reason is illumined into a vision. We have our great epic Mahābhārata, which is unique in world literature, not only because of the marvellous variety of human characters, great and small, discussed in its pages in all variety of psychological circumstances, but because of the ease with which it carries in

its comprehensive capaciousness all kinds of speculation about ethics, politics and philosophy of life. Such an improvident generosity on the part of poesy, at the risk of exceeding its own proper limits of accommodation, has only been possible in India where a spirit of communism prevails in the different individual groups of literature. In fact, the Mahābhārata is a universe in itself in which various spheres of mind's creation find ample space for their complex dance-rhythm. It does not represent the idiosyncrasy of a particular poet but the normal mentality of the people who are willing to be led along the many branched path of a whole world of thoughts, held together in a gigantic orb of narrative surrounded by innumerable satellites of episodes.

The numerous saints that India successively produced during the Mahomedan rule have all been singers whose verses are aflame with the fire of imagination. Their religious emotion had its spring in the depth of a philosophy that deals with fundamental questions,—with the ultimate meaning of existence. That may not be remarkable in itself; but when we find that these songs are not specially meant for some exclusive pandits' gathering, but that they are sung in villages and listened to by men and women who are illiterate, we realize how philosophy has permeated the life of the people in India, how it has sunk deep into the subconscious mind of the country.

In my childhood I once heard from a singer, who was a devout Hindu, the following song of Kabir:

When I hear of a fish in the water dying of thirst, it makes me laugh.
If it be true that the infinite Brahma pervades all space,
What is the meaning of the places of pilgrimage like Mathura or Kasii?

This laughter of Kabir did not hurt in the least the pious susceptibilities of the Hindu singer; on the contrary, he was ready to join the poet with his own. For he, by the philosophical freedom of his mind, was fully aware that Mathurā or Kāśī, as sites of God, did not have an absolute value of truth, though they had their symbolical importance. Therefore, while he himself was eager to make a pilgrimage to those places, he had no doubt in his mind that, if it were in his power directly to realize Brahma as an all-pervading reality, there would have been no necessity for him to visit any particular place for the quickening of his spiritual consciousness. He acknowledged the psychological necessity for such shrines, where generations of devotees have chosen to gather for the purpose of worship, in the same way as he felt the special efficacy for our mind of the time-honoured sacred texts made living by the voice of ages.

It is a village poet of East Bengal who in his songs preaches the philosophical doctrine that the universe has its reality in its relation to the Person. He sings:

The sky and the earth are born of mine own eyes.

The hardness and softness, the cold and the heat
are the products of mine own body;
The sweet smell and the bad are of mine own nose.

This poet sings of the Eternal Person within him, coming out and appearing before his eyes just as the Vedic Rishi speaks of the Person, who is in him, dwelling also in the heart of the Sun.

I have seen the vision,
The vision of mine own revealing itself,
Coming out from within me.

The significant fact about these philosophical poems is that they are of rude construction, written in a popular dialect and disclaimed by the academic literature; they are sung to the people, as composed by one of them who is dead, but whose songs have not followed him. Yet these singers almost arrogantly disown their direct obligation to philosophy, and there is a story of one of our rural poets who, after some learned text of the Vaiṣṇava philosophy of emotion was explained to him, composed a song containing the following lines:

Alas, a jeweller has come into the flower garden! –
He wants to appraise the truth of a lotus by rubbing it
against his touchstone.

The members of the *Bāul* sect belong to that class of the people in Bengal who are not educated in the prevalent sense of the word. I remember how troubled they were, when I asked some of them to write down for me a collection of their songs. When they *did* venture to attempt it, I found it almost impossible to decipher their writing—the spelling and lettering were so outrageously unconventional. Yet their spiritual practices are founded upon a mystic philosophy of the human body, abstrusely technical. These people roam about singing their songs, one of which I heard years ago from my roadside window, the first two lines remaining inscribed in my memory.

Nobody can tell whence the bird unknown
Comes into the cage and goes out.
I would feign put round its feet the fetter of my mind,
Could I but capture it.

This village poet evidently agrees with our sage of the Upaniṣad who says that our mind comes back baffled in its attempt to reach the Unknown Being; and yet this poet like the ancient sage does not give up his adventure of the infinite, thus implying that there is a way to its realization. It reminds me of Shelley's poem in which he sings of the mystical spirit of Beauty:

The awful shadow of some unseen Power
Floats, though unseen, among us; visiting
This various world with as inconstant wing
As summer winds that creep from flower to flower.
Like moonbeams that behind some piny mountain shower,
It visits with inconstant glance
Each human heart and countenance.

That this Unknown is the profoundest reality, though difficult of comprehension, is equally admitted by the English poet as by the nameless village singer of Bengal in whose music vibrate the wing-beats of the unknown bird,—only Shelley's utterance is for the cultured few, while the *Bāul* song is for the tillers of the soil, for the simple folk of our village households, who are never bored by its mystic transcendentalism.

All this is owing to the wonderful system of mass education which has prevailed for ages in India, and which to-day is in danger of becoming extinct. We have our academic seats of learning where students flock round their famous teachers from distant parts of the country. These places are like lakes, full of deep but still water, which have to be approached through difficult paths. But the constant evaporation from them, forming clouds, is carried by the wind from field to field, across hills and dales and through all the different divisions of the land. Operas based upon legendary poems, recitations and story-telling by trained men, the lyrical wealth of the popular literature distributed far and wide by the agency of mendicant singers,—these are the clouds that help to irrigate the minds of the people with the ideas which in their original form belonged to difficult doctrines of metaphysics. Profound speculations contained in the systems of Sāṅkhya, Vedānta and Yoga are transformed into the living harvest of the people's literature, brought to the door of those who can never have the leisure and training to pursue these thoughts to their fountain-head.

In order to enable a civilized community to carry on its complex functions, there must be a large number of men who have to take charge of its material needs, however onerous such task may be. Their vocation gives them no opportunity to cultivate their mind. Yet they form the vast multitude, compelled to turn themselves into unthinking machines of production, so that a few may have the time to think great thoughts, create immortal forms of art and to lead humanity to spiritual altitudes.

India has never neglected these social martyrs, but has tried to bring light into the grim obscurity of their life-long toil, and has always acknowledged its duty to supply them with mental and spiritual food in assimilable form through the medium of a variety of ceremonies. This process is not carried on by any specially organized association of public service, but by a spontaneous social adjustment which acts like circulation of blood in our bodily system. Because of this, the work continues even when the original purpose ceases to exist.

Once when I was on a visit to a small Bengal village, mostly inhabited by Mahomedan cultivators, the villagers entertained me with an opera performance the literature of which belonged to an obsolete religious sect that had wide influence centuries ago. Though the religion itself is dead, its voice still continues preaching its philosophy to a people who in spite of their different culture are not

tired of listening. It discussed according to its own doctrine the different elements, material and transcendental, that constitute human personality, comprehending the body, the self and the soul. Then came a dialogue during the course of which was related the incident of a person who wanted to make a journey to *Brindāvan*, the Garden of Bliss, but was prevented by a watchman who startled him with an accusation of theft. The thieving was proved when it was shown that inside his clothes he was secretly trying to smuggle into the garden the *self*, passing it on as his own and not admitting that it is for his master. The culprit was caught with the incriminating bundle in his possession which barred for him his passage to the supreme goal. Under a tattered canopy held on bamboo poles and lighted by a few smoking kerosene lamps, the village crowd, occasionally interrupted by howls of jackals in the neighbouring paddy fields, attended with untired interest, till the small hours of the morning, the performance of a drama, that discussed the ultimate meaning of all things in a seemingly incongruous setting of dance, music and humorous dialogue.

These illustrations will show how naturally, in India, poetry and philosophy have walked hand in hand, only because the latter has claimed its right to guide men to the practical path of their life's fulfilment. What is that fulfilment? It is our freedom in truth, which has for its prayer.

Lead us from the unreal to Reality.

For *satyam* is *ānandam*, the real is joy.

From my vocation as an artist in verse, I have come to my own idea about the joy of the real. For to give us the taste of reality through freedom of mind is the nature of all arts. When in relation to them we talk of aesthetics we must know that it is not about beauty in its ordinary meaning, but in that deeper meaning which a poet has expressed in his utterance : " Truth is beauty, beauty truth." An artist may paint a picture of a decrepit person not pleasant to look at, and yet we call it perfect when we become intensely conscious of its reality. The mind of the jealous woman in Browning's poem, watching the preparation of poison and in imagination gloating over its possible effect upon her rival, is not beautiful; but when it stands vividly real before our consciousness, through the unity of consistency in its idea and form, we have our enjoyment. The character of Karna, the great warrior of the Mahābhārata, gives us a deeper delight through its occasional outbursts of meanness, than it would if it were a model picture of unadulterated magnanimity. The very contradictions which hurt the completeness of a moral ideal have helped us to feel the reality of the character, and this gives us joy, not because it is pleasant in itself, but because it is definite in its creation.

It is not wholly true that art has its value for us because in it we realize all that we fail to attain in our life; but the fact is that the function of art is to bring

us, with its creations, into immediate touch with reality. These need not resemble actual facts of our experience, and yet they do delight our heart because they are made true to us. In the world of art, our consciousness being freed from the tangle of self-interest, we gain an unobstructed vision of unity, the incarnation of the real which is a joy for ever.

As in the world of art, so in God's world, our soul waits for its freedom from the ego to reach that disinterested joy which is the source and goal of creation. It cries for its *mukti* into the unity of truth from the mirage of appearances endlessly pursued by the thirsty self. This idea of *mukti*, based upon metaphysics, has affected our life in India, touched the springs of our emotions, and supplications for it soar heavenward on the wings of poesy. We constantly hear men of scanty learning and simple faith singing in their prayer to Tārā, the Goddess Redeemer:

For what sin should I be compelled to remain in this dungeon of the world of appearances?

They are afraid of being alienated from the world of truth, afraid of their perpetual drifting amidst the froth and foam of things, of being tossed about by the tidal waves of pleasure and pain and never reaching the ultimate meaning of life. Of these men, one may be a carter driving his cart to market, another a fisherman plying his net. They may not be prompt with an intelligent answer, if questioned about the deeper import of the song they sing, but they have no doubt in their mind, that the abiding cause of all misery is not so much in the lack of life's furniture as in the obscurity of life's significance. It is a common topic with such to decry an undue emphasis upon *me* and *mine*, which falsifies the perspective of truth. For, have they not often seen men, who are not above their own level in social position or intellectual acquirement, going out to seek Truth, leaving everything that they have behind them?

They know that the object of these adventurers is not betterment in worldly wealth and power,—it is *mukti*, freedom. They possibly know some poor fellow villager of their own craft, who remains in the world carrying on his daily vocation, and yet has the reputation of being emancipated in the heart of the Eternal. I myself have come across a fisherman singing with an inward absorption of mind, while fishing all day in the Ganges, who was pointed out to me by my boatmen, with awe, as a man of liberated spirit. He is out of reach of the conventional prices which are set upon men by society, and which classify them like toys arranged in the shop-windows according to the market standard of value.

When the figure of this fisherman comes to my mind, I cannot but think that their number is not small who with their lives sing the epic of the unfettered soul, but will never be known in history. These unsophisticated Indian peasants know that an Emperor is a decorated slave remaining chained to his Empire, that a millionaire is kept pilloried by his fate in the golden cage of his wealth,

while this fisherman is free in the realm of light. When, groping in the dark, we stumble against objects, we cling to them believing them to be our only hope. When light comes we slacken our hold, finding them to be mere parts of the all to which we are related. The simple man of the village knows what freedom is—freedom from the isolation of self, from the isolation of things which imparts a fierce intensity to our sense of possession. He knows that this freedom is not in the mere negation of bondage, in the bareness of belongings, but in some positive realisation which gives pure joy to our being, and he sings:

To him who sinks into the deep, nothing remains unattained.

He sings:

Let my two minds meet and combine
And lead me to the City Wonderful.

When the one mind of ours which wanders in search of things in the outer region of the varied, and the other which seeks the inward vision of unity, are no longer in conflict, they help us to realise the *ājab*, the *anirvacanīya*, the ineffable. The poet saint Kabir has also the same message when he sings :

By saying that Supreme Reality only dwells in the inner realm of spirit we shame the outer world of matter and also when we say that he is only in the outside we do not speak the truth.

According to these singers, truth is in unity and therefore freedom is in its realization. The texts of our daily worship and meditation are for training our mind to overcome the barrier of separateness from the rest of existence and to realize *advaitam*, the Supreme Unity which is *anantam*, infinitude. It is philosophical wisdom having its universal radiation in the popular mind in India that inspires our prayer, our daily spiritual practices. It has its constant urging for us to go beyond the world of appearances in which facts as facts are alien to us, like the mere sounds of a foreign music; it speaks to us of an emancipation in the inner truth of all things in which the endless *Many* reveals the *One*, as the multitude of notes, when we understand them, reveal to us the inner unity which is music.

But because this freedom is in truth itself and not in an appearance of it, no hurried path of success, forcibly cut out by the greed of result, can be a true path. And an obscure village poet, unknown to the world of recognized respectability, untrammelled by the standardised learning of the Education Department, sings:

O cruel man of urgent need, must you scorch with fire the mind which still is a bud? You want to make the bud bloom into a flower and scatter its perfume without waiting! Do you not see that my lord, the Supreme Teacher, takes ages to perfect the flower and never is in a fury of haste? But because of your terrible greed you only rely on force, and what hope is there for you, O man of urgent need? Prithee, says Madan the poet, Hurt not the mind of my Teacher. Lose thyself in the simple current, after hearing his voice, O man of urgent need.

This poet knows that there is no external means of taking freedom by the throat. It is the inward process of losing ourselves that leads us to it. Bondage in all its forms has its stronghold in the inner self and not in the outside world; it is in the dimming of our consciousness, in the narrowing of our perspective, in the wrong valuation of things.

The proof of this we find in the modern civilization whose motive force has become a ceaseless urgency of need. Its freedom is only the apparent freedom of inertia which does not know how and where to stop. There are some primitive people who have put an artificial value on human scalps and they develop an arithmetical fury which does not allow them to stop in the gathering of their trophies. They are driven by some cruel fate into an endless exaggeration which makes them ceaselessly run on an interminable path of addition. Such a freedom in their wild course of collection is the worst form of bondage. The cruel urgency of need is all the more aggravated in their case because of the lack of truth in its object. Similarly it should be realized that a mere addition to the rate of speed, to the paraphernalia of fat living and display of furniture, to the frightfulness of destructive armaments, only leads to an insensate orgy of a caricature of bigness. The links of bondage go on multiplying themselves, threatening to shackle the whole world with the chain forged by such unmeaning and unending urgency of need.

The idea of *mukti* in Christian theology is liberation from a punishment which we carry with our birth. In India it is from the dark enclosure of ignorance which causes the illusion of a self that seems final. But the enlightenment which frees us from this ignorance must not merely be negative. Freedom is not in an emptiness of its contents, it is in the harmony of communication through which we find no obstruction in realizing our own being in the surrounding world. It is of this harmony, and not of a bare and barren isolation, that the Upaniṣad, speaks, when it says that the truth no longer remains hidden in him who finds himself in the All.

Freedom in the material world has also the same meaning expressed in its own language. When nature's phenomena appeared to us as manifestations of an obscure and irrational caprice, we lived in an alien world never dreaming of our *svarāj* within its territory. With the discovery of the harmony of its working with that of our reason, we realize our unity with it and, therefore, freedom. It is *avidyā*, ignorance, which causes our disunion with our surroundings. It is *vidyā*, the knowledge of the Brahma manifested in the material universe that makes us realize *advaitam*, the spirit of unity in the world of matter.

Those who have been brought up in a misunderstanding of this world's process, not knowing that it is his by his right of intelligence, are trained as cowards by a hopeless faith in the ordinance of a destiny darkly dealing its blows, offering

no room for appeal. They submit without struggle when human rights are denied them, being accustomed to imagine themselves born as outlaws in a world constantly thrusting upon them incomprehensible surprises of accidents.

Also in the social or political field, the lack of freedom is based upon the spirit of alienation, on the imperfect realization of *advaitam*. There our bondage is in the tortured link of union. One may imagine that an individual who succeeds in dissociating himself from his fellows attains real freedom, inasmuch as all ties of relationship imply obligation to others. But we know that, though it may sound paradoxical, it is true that in the human world only a perfect arrangement of interdependence gives rise to freedom. The most individualistic of human beings, who own no responsibility, are the savages who fail to attain their fulness of manifestation. They live immersed in obscurity, like an ill-lighted fire that cannot liberate itself from its envelope of smoke. Only those may attain their freedom from the segregation of an eclipsed life, who have the power to cultivate mutual understanding and co-operation. The history of the growth of freedom is the history of the perfection of human relationship.

The strongest barrier against freedom in all departments of life is the selfishness of individuals or groups. Civilization, whose object is to afford humanity its greatest possible opportunity of complete manifestation, perishes when some selfish passion, in place of a moral ideal, is allowed to exploit its resources unopposed, for its own purposes. For the greed of acquisition and the living principle of creation are antagonistic to each other. Life has brought with it the first triumph of freedom in the world of the inert, because it is an inner expression and not merely an external fact, because it must always exceed the limits of its substance, never allowing its materials to clog its spirit, and yet ever keeping to the limits of its truth. Its accumulation must not suppress its harmony of growth, the harmony that unites the *in* and the *out*, the end and the means, the *what is* and the *what is to come*.

Life does not store up but assimilates; its spirit and its substance, its work and itself, are intimately united. When the non-living elements of our surroundings are stupendously disproportionate, when they are mechanical system and hoarded possessions, then the mutual discord between our life and our world ends in the defeat of the former. The gulf thus created by the receding stream of soul we try to replenish with a continuous shower of wealth which may have the power to fill but not the power to unite. Therefore the gap is dangerously concealed under the glittering quicksands of things which by their own accumulating weight cause a sudden subsidence, while we are in the depth of our sleep.

But the real tragedy does not lie in the destruction of our material security, it is in the obscuration of man himself in the human world. In his creative activities man makes his surroundings instinct with his own life and love. But

in his utilitarian ambition he deforms and defiles it with the callous handling of his voracity. This world of man's manufacture with its discordant shrieks and mechanical movements, reacts upon his own nature, incessantly suggesting to him a scheme of universe which is an abstract system. In such a world there can be no question of *mukti*, because it is a solidly solitary fact, because the cage is all that we have, and no sky beyond it. In all appearance the world to us *is* a closed world, like a seed within its hard cover. But in the core of the seed there is the cry of Life for *mukti* even when the proof of its possibility is darkly silent. When some huge temptation tramples into stillness this living aspiration after *mukti*, then does civilization die like a seed that has lost its urging for germination.

It is not altogether true that the ideal of *mukti* in India is based upon a philosophy of passivity. The Iśopaniṣad has strongly asserted that man must wish to live a hundred years and go on doing his work; for, according to it, the complete truth is in the harmony of the infinite and the finite, the passive ideal of perfection and the active process of its revealment; according to it, he who pursues the knowledge of the infinite as an absolute truth sinks even into a deeper darkness than he who pursues the cult of the finite as complete in itself. He who thinks that a mere aggregation of changing notes has the ultimate value of unchanging music, is no doubt foolish; but his foolishness is exceeded by that of one who thinks that true music is devoid of all notes. But where is the reconciliation? Through what means does the music which is transcendental turn the facts of the detached notes into a vehicle of its expression? It is through the rhythm, the very limit of its composition. We reach the infinite through crossing the path that is definte. It is this that is meant in the following verse of the Iśa:

He who knows the truth of the infinite and that of the finite both united together, crosses death by the help of avidya, *and by the help of* vidya *reaches immortality.*

The regulated life is the rhythm of the finite through whose very restrictions we pass to the immortal life. This *amṛtam* the immortal life, is not a mere prolongation of physical existence, it is in the realization of the perfect, it is in the well-proportioned beautiful definition of life which every moment surpasses its own limits and expresses the Eternal. In the very first verse of the Iśa, the injunction is given to us: *mā gṛdhaḥ*; *Thou shalt not covet.* But why should we not? Because greed, having no limit, smothers the rhythm of life—the rhythm which is expressive of the limitless.

The modern civilization is largely composed of *ātmahano janāh* who are spiritual suicides. It has lost its will for limiting its desires, for restraining its perpetual self-exaggeration. Because it has lost its philosophy of life, it loses its art of living. Like poetasters it mistakes skill for power and realism for reality. In the Middle Ages when Europe believed in the kingdom of heaven, she struggled

to modulate her life's forces to effect their harmonious relation to this ideal, which always sent its call to her activities in the midst of the boisterous conflict of her passions. There was in this endeavour an ever present scheme of creation, something which was positive, which had the authority to say: *Thou shalt not covet, thou must find thy true limits*. To-day there is only a furious rage for raising numberless brick-kilns in place of buildings. The great scheme of the master-builder has been smothered under the heaps of brick-dust. It proves the severance of *avidyā* from her union with *vidyā* giving rise to an unrhythmic power, ignoring all creative plan, igniting a flame that has heat but no light.

Creation is in rhythm,—the rhythm which is the border on which *vidyāmca avidyāmca*, the infinite and the finite, meet. We do not know how, from the indeterminate, the lotus flower finds its being. So long as it is merged in the vague it is nothing to us, and yet it must have been everywhere. Somehow from the vast it has been captured in a perfect rhythmical limit, forming an eddy in our consciousness, arousing within us a recognition of delight at the touch of the infinite which finitude gives. It is the limiting process which is the work of a creator, who finds his freedom through his restraints, the truth of the boundless through the reality of the bounds. The insatiable idolatry of material, that runs along an ever-lengthening line of extravagance, is inexpressive; it belongs to those regions which are *andhena tamasāvṛtāḥ*, enveloped in darkness, which ever carry the load of their inarticulate bulk. The true prayer of man is for the Real not for the big, for the Light which is not in incendiarism but in illumination, for Immortality which is not in duration of time, but in the eternity of the perfect.

Only because we have closed our path to the inner world of *mukti*, has the outer world become terrible in its exactions. It is a slavery to continue to live in a sphere where things are, yet where their meaning is obstructed. It has become possible for men to say that existence is evil, only because in our blindness we have missed something in which our existence has its truth. If a bird tries to soar in the sky with only one of its wings, it is offended with the wind for buffeting it down to the dust. All broken truths are evil. They hurt because they suggest something which they do not offer. Death does not hurt us, but disease does, because disease constantly reminds us of health and yet withholds it from us. And life in a half world is evil, because it feigns finality when it is obviously incomplete, giving us the cup, but not the draught of life. All tragedies consist in truth remaining a fragment, its cycle not being completed.

Let me close with a *Bāul* song, over a century old, in which the poet sings of the eternal bond of union between the infinite and the finite soul, from which there can be no *mukti*, because it is an interrelation which makes truth complete, because love is ultimate, because absolute independence is the blackness of utter sterility. The idea in it is the same as we have in the Upaniṣad, that truth is neither in pure *vidyā* nor in *avidyā*, but in their union:

It goes on blossoming for ages, the soul-lotus in which I am bound, as well as thou, without escape. There is no end to the opening of its petals, and the honey in it has such sweetness that thou like an enchanted bee canst never desert it, and therefore thou art bound, and I am, and mukti is nowhere.