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






# PROBLEMS OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN COLONIES

*A Report prepared by the Hansard Society on  
some of the problems involved in developing  
parliamentary institutions in colonial territories*



THE HANSARD SOCIETY  
39 MILLBANK, LONDON, S.W.1

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THE ARTHUR McDougall TRUST was formed from a bequest made by the late Sir Robert McDougall, LL.D., B.Sc., J.P., who was born in 1871 and died in 1938. He was head of the well-known firm of flour millers and was a man of wide general sympathies; he gave land to the nation and was a strong supporter of the National Trust. He was deeply interested in national and world politics. He took part himself in the campaign for Proportional Representation, and only a month before he died, wrote: "Democracy should have the fairest and most efficient means of expressing public opinion". By his Will he gave part of his estate to the Proportional Representation Society after the death of his wife, Lady McDougall, and requested that the fund should be known as "The Arthur McDougall Fund" in memory of his father. Lady McDougall died in 1945. The Proportional Representation Society decided in 1948 that the Testator's memory and intentions would be best served by creating a charitable Trust. The Trust in general exists to "advance and encourage education in connection with the art or science of government or other branches of political or economic science and to encourage the study of methods of government or civic, commercial or social organizations". Secretary: Robert S. W. Pollard, 17 Victoria Street, London, S.W.1.

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## FOREWORD

**T**HIS report has been prepared by the Hansard Society with the help of a grant from the Arthur McDougall Trust. It is of an interim character and does not claim to be research in the strict sense of the word. At the most it is a study of a limited character into the results of disconnected research which has been made into various facets of the problem. It is not a full-dress research project because this would take a very long time, involving first-hand investigation all over the world, and such research would require more money than the sum generously provided by the McDougall Trust. Nevertheless, research of this nature—prolonged, original and basic—is needed, and the Hansard Society would be glad to hear from any person or organization willing to finance a major study of the problem dealt with in interim form in this report.

All that this report sets out to do is, first, to describe and explain various aspects of the problem, and then to set down an account of some of the more significant ideas which either are being tried or are under consideration.

The method of work was as follows: Mr. Sydney D. Bailey, the Assistant Director of the Hansard Society, drafted the report and organized the general progress of the study. He was assisted by Miss Elspet M. Younie. Members of an advisory committee, whose names are set forth on page viii, accepted an invitation to prepare certain memoranda and to examine the draft prepared by Mr. Bailey. The committee met on several occasions at Hansard House, and the lengthy and informed comments of its members were of inestimable value. To this committee the Council of the Hansard Society tenders its sincere thanks.

**Advisory Committee**

Ivor Bulmer-Thomas  
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In addition, the Hansard Society has been in correspondence with upwards of one hundred persons in all parts of the world in connection with this report, and many of them have sent in useful contributions and criticisms. Some of these consultants must necessarily remain anonymous, but a list of those whose names can be made public appears on page x. The work has also enjoyed the good will and assistance of government departments concerned with dependencies in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.A. To all these bodies and persons the Council tenders its thanks. In a co-operative work of this nature it is impossible to give to all the collaborators the precise degree of credit which is their due. In one or two instances passages have been lifted from memoranda or letters and incorporated in the report; in others the sense of a passage has been retained in new wording, designed to give the report a unity of style. Nevertheless, the special thanks of the Council of the Hansard Society are due to certain persons who desire to remain anonymous for the substantial contributions they have made to this study.

As regards responsibility for the contents of the report, the position is as follows. It has been the aim of the Society to bring together within two covers a report which will be generally accepted as an objective but worthwhile contribution to the literature on the subject, which will prove useful to the general reader, and may also be a convenience to the expert. So far as there are any expressions of opinion in the

report, the Council accept responsibility for the decision that their omission would detract from the purpose of making the report as comprehensive a picture of the problem as space and time permit. The opinions *qua* opinions are not those of the Hansard Society, which by its rules can express no opinion on political questions. Nor does the inclusion in the report of the names of our distinguished advisory committee or consultants mean anything more than that—as already implied—the report could not have been drafted without their help and that, without committing themselves to a support of all the statements contained therein, they are agreed that the report is worthy of attention by all those concerned with this subject.

The report is concerned with the development of parliamentary institutions in colonies in general. Though the main emphasis has inevitably been on British colonies, most of the study is equally applicable to non-British colonies.

As Chairman of the Council of the Hansard Society, I wish to thank the McDougall Trust for their help in financing the preparation of this report.

1st October, 1952.

STEPHEN KING-HALL.

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## CHAPTER I

### THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

#### What is meant by "Colonies"?

IT may be as well at the outset to say as precisely as possible what is meant in this report by a "Colony". The word *colony* itself is derived from a Latin word meaning "to cultivate", and *colony* originally referred to people rather than to the land on which they settled. This use of the word is retained in such phrases as "a nudist colony", "the Greek colony in London", or "a colony of ants". But nowadays the word *colony* usually refers to a territory which has been annexed by another country. For the purposes of this report, "colony" means any dependent territory which is not fully self-governing, and the term therefore includes protectorates, protected States, trust territories, and other overseas possessions and dependencies.<sup>1</sup> It excludes, of course, the fully self-governing countries of the Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, and South Africa)<sup>2</sup>, countries like Burma and the Irish Republic which were formerly within the Commonwealth, countries like Iraq and Syria which were formerly mandated territories under the League of Nations, and independent States like the

<sup>1</sup> The difficulty of defining a "non-self-governing territory" has been encountered in the United Nations. Appendix A of this report, pp. 107-109, lists some factors which the General Assembly agreed (18th January, 1952) should be taken into account in deciding whether a territory has attained a full measure of self-government. The following territories, though they are described as "Non-Self-Governing Territories" in the *United Nations Demographic Year Book* and other reference books, are excluded from the scope of this report: The Channel Islands and the Isle of Man (United Kingdom), Greenland (Denmark), Svalbard (Spitzbergen and Bear Island) and Jan Mayen Land (Norway), and the Free Territory of Trieste (international administration).

<sup>2</sup> Southern Rhodesia has been fully self-governing since 1923, except that discriminatory legislation affecting native interests and a number of other matters are reserved to the Secretary of State.

Republic of Indonesia and the Philippines which were formerly dependencies of the Netherlands and the United States of America respectively. It also excludes territories like South-West Africa,<sup>1</sup> the Canadian Yukon, and the Soviet Asian Republics which have been absorbed within a State by the extension of land frontiers.

### **What is meant by "parliamentary government"?**

It is said that a school child was once asked to write an essay describing an elephant. After a number of attempts he handed in a sheet of paper on which was written: "It is impossible to describe an elephant, but any fool knows one when he sees one."

This is the sort of answer one might be inclined to give when asked to define "parliamentary government". No simple definition is satisfactory. This is partly because parliamentary government is not a static piece of constitutional machinery but a dynamic process, partly because any statement about parliamentary government is likely to raise more questions than it answers.

The difficulty can be illustrated by reference to the British Parliament at Westminster. When did parliamentary government begin in Britain? With the calling of the Model Parliament in 1295? With the beginning of Cabinet Government in the first half of the 18th century? With the passing of the first Reform Act in 1832? With the attainment of adult suffrage in 1928? It is only necessary to pose these questions to demonstrate the impossibility of a precise and rigid definition. Parliamentary government, in Britain as elsewhere, has not reached a final form. It probably never will.

Another difficulty is that any definition inevitably tends to be about the formal machinery of government rather than

<sup>1</sup> The present status of South-West Africa is in dispute. The view of the Government of South Africa is that South-West Africa, a former League of Nations mandated territory, is to all intents and purposes part of the Union of South Africa. The International Court of Justice, however, ruled in an advisory opinion in July, 1950, that the international status of South-West Africa continues to be that of a territory under the international mandate assumed by the Union of South Africa in 1920.

about the informal spirit and customs which form the lubricant that enables the machine to operate. As the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform emphasized in 1934: "the student of government who assumes that British Constitutional theory can be applied at will in any country misses the fact that it could not be successfully applied even in Great Britain if it were not modified in a hundred ways by unwritten laws and tacit conventions". To say that a particular country is a republic or has a bicameral legislature is interesting information: but it says little about the essentials of government.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to indicate to the reader something of what is meant in this report by the words "parliamentary government". This is done not by providing a precise definition but by describing what, it is suggested, are some of the characteristics and aims of parliamentary government:

- (a) The executive government should be answerable to and dismissible by the people or their chosen representatives, and should be subject to the law as interpreted by the judiciary.
- (b) Laws should be enacted by a legislature of one or more chambers in which members elected by the citizens at regular intervals should exercise a preponderance of power.
- (c) The judiciary should be independent.
- (d) Citizens should be free to hold opinions without interference and to organize themselves into groups or parties so long as their purposes are not subversive or treasonable, and it should be for the judiciary to decide what constitutes subversive or treasonable activity under the law; citizens should also be free to criticize government policy or administration, and to offer themselves as an alternative government.
- (e) Elections should be freely conducted by impartial officials; there should be no discrimination against a candidate for election because of any views he may hold.
- (f) The public service should be open to all, on the basis of merit; its task should not be to formulate policy

but to advise the government of the day and implement the policy approved by the legislature.

- (g) No person should be imprisoned or detained without a speedy and public trial, and no person should be punished except for a breach of a properly-enacted law, in force at the time the offence was committed. Persons should be as free to institute legal proceedings against public servants as against private citizens.

### **Why is there a problem?**

A vital question which must be considered is whether parliamentary government, as we know it, is suitable for colonial territories whose background, traditions, and social structure may provide infertile soil for the growth of such a tender plant. "Institutions and methods", wrote the late Lord Lugard, "in order to command success and promote the happiness and welfare of the people, must be deep-rooted in their traditions and prejudices. . . . A slavish adherence to any particular type [of administration], however successful it may have proved elsewhere, may, if unadapted to local environment, be as ill-suited and as foreign to its conceptions as direct British rule would be."<sup>1</sup>

There are some who seriously question whether parliamentary institutions are suited to most of the colonies with which this report deals. "We have hitherto followed the model of our own parliamentary institutions", Lord Hailey has written, "but it is by no means certain that we have here the pattern of government best suited to colonial conditions."<sup>2</sup>

It must, however, be recognized that leaders of opinion in most colonial territories demand some form of parliamentary government for their people, and in many cases a system of parliamentary government has already been initiated. It is, moreover, a system which is usually praised and respected by the representatives of the imperial power with whom the leaders of opinion have come in contact.

<sup>1</sup> Lugard, Sir F. D., *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, 1922.

<sup>2</sup> "British Colonial Policy", in *Colonial Administration by European Powers*, a symposium, 1947.

Colonial nationalists, in most cases, strive for parliamentary institutions along with roads and a medical service and the rest of the paraphernalia of Western civilization. To suggest any alternative system would probably be regarded as an attempt to fob them off with an inferior article; this was, indeed, the view of the Ceylonese when their system of government was once described in a British White Paper as being "based on the Executive Committee system of the London County Council".

Leaders of opinion in British colonies seek the extension of their political rights through the development of institutions based on the British model: those in French colonies seek political advance through French institutions; and so on. It will be for the colonies themselves, when they have attained a full measure of self-government, to decide to what extent these institutions require adaptation to local circumstances.

It is as well that the difficulties should be admitted and faced. In Britain, parliamentary institutions have been developing for, let us say, seven hundred years. In many colonies an attempt is being made to cover the same ground in a generation. Territories like Indonesia and the Gold Coast, which even a decade ago were regarded by many people as still in the early stages of the journey, have reached or are in sight of the goal. Moreover, as the pace quickens, success imposes increasingly onerous burdens.

It is difficult to see how it is possible to avoid this rapid transition. "We have suddenly arrived at a stage when we have to run", said Pandit Nehru recently. "Walking is not enough—and in running we tumble and fall and we try to get up again. It is no good anybody telling us to walk slowly. . . . It involves risks and dangers but there is no help and no choice for it, for there is a torment in our minds. . . ." <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Speech at the eleventh conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Lucknow, 3 October, 1950.

## CHAPTER II

### THE CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES

**T**HE evolution of institutions of government is influenced by the political, social, and cultural ideas which exist in the minds of people. In colonial territories today a variety of ideas jostle for supremacy. This chapter is concerned with six of the modern secular ideologies which influence political developments in colonial territories.

#### **Imperialism**

The word "imperialism" is here used in an entirely neutral sense and is not intended to have any moral or immoral attributes. It describes the process which may begin when adventurous souls leave their home-land to trade or preach in far countries. If they go to countries with a roughly similar standard of living and where political conditions are relatively stable, then relations between the country from which they have come and the country in which they have settled probably remain on the basis which is traditional between sovereign states. If, on the other hand, they go to countries less advanced than their own, if political conditions are unstable, if trading or preaching is impossible because of the arbitrary acts of local pirates or potentates, then the process of imperialism may begin. Agents of the imperial country (as we may conveniently describe the home-land of the settlers) may demand certain extra-territorial rights, or request permission to build forts, or seek privileges of some kind or another; they may persuade or compel the rulers of the foreign country to accept protection from external attack or security from internal disorder on certain conditions; or they may subdue and annex the foreign country. But whatever form the next stage takes, it involves some loss by the inhabitants of the colonial territory (as it may be called) of their freedom of action.

The next stage can take one of two forms. There may begin a process of assimilation which ends when the colonial territory is finally and completely absorbed into the imperial country; this has usually been successful only when the colonial territory is geographically contiguous with the Mother Country, though attempts to secure this result have been made in other circumstances—notably by the United States, France, Spain, and Portugal. Or the next stage may take the form of a development towards independence which ends when the colonial territory gains its complete freedom of action.

Imperialism gives rise to many conflicts of ideas and interests. In the popular mind, the conflict between imperial governments and peoples on the one hand and colonial peoples on the other, probably appears the most difficult to resolve. But this is not the only nor always the most intractable problem. There are many other considerations—political, strategic, economic—a few of which are mentioned or hinted at in this report. Here it is only necessary to refer to the obligations of an imperial government to its own citizens who have settled in colonial territories. Many of these colonial settlers will have helped to bring to the peoples of the land of their adoption a degree of prosperity and happiness which they would not otherwise have attained. The imperial government cannot ignore its obligations to these settlers.

“In any constitutional changes in the direction of self-government”, said Mr. James Griffiths when he was Secretary of State for the Colonies (13th December, 1950), “care must be taken to safeguard the proper rights and interests of all the different communities”. The difficulty is to know what meaning to attach to the word *proper*. The official British view in 1923 was that if the interests of Natives and immigrants should clash, the interests of Natives should prevail. “His Majesty’s Government think it necessary to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives [in Kenya] must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail. . . . His Majesty’s Government regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African

population, and they are unable to delegate or share this trust, the object of which may be defined as the protection and advancement of the native races”.

The late Field-Marshal Smuts held that the important statement of policy quoted in the last paragraph contained the false implication that clashes of interest are inevitable.

The underlying assumption of this view is that there is an essential incompatibility between white and native interests, that the promotion of white settlement must necessarily or usually run counter to native rights and interests. . . . There is no such inherent and inevitable clash of interests between the two. . . . Any policy which (without manifest injustice or unfairness to any particular section) promotes most effectively African development as a whole will at the same time be most in the interest of the natives as well as of the whites. That is good political philosophy as well as sound common sense.<sup>1</sup>

Certainly the emphasis of British colonial policy is today on “partnership” rather than “paramountcy”. It has not always been clear what is implied by the word *partnership*, and a note on this subject is printed as Appendix D of this report (pages 132-4).

### Nationalism

Another great force which is at work among colonial peoples is nationalism. The idea of nationalism, as it was expounded in Europe in the nineteenth century, was that men had the right not only to choose the form of government under which they desired to live but also the political unit to which they wished to belong. It was a policy advocated by Woodrow Wilson, and given formal expression in the Atlantic Charter. During the nineteenth century the idea was virtually confined to the continent of Europe, but during the last third of the century its genesis was apparent in Asia, and during the twentieth century it has spread to Africa. It erupted in Japan at the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868; its appearance

<sup>1</sup> Smuts, J. C., *Africa and Some World Problems*, 1930.

in India may be dated from 1885 when the Congress Party was created; and within a few years it was at work in China where, in 1892, Sun Yat-sen had founded the China Revival Society.

Nationalism is a complex and in many ways an irrational force, compounded of diverse elements. Sometimes the main emphasis is on bonds of race, sometimes on religion, sometimes on language, occasionally on the existence of a "home-land" or common political and cultural traditions. Any of these elements may be present in nationalism, though none is essential. "What constitutes a nation", wrote Ernest Renan, "is not speaking the same tongue or belonging to the same ethnic group, but having accomplished great things in common in the past, and the wish to accomplish them in the future".<sup>1</sup>

It is only by detaching nationalism from ethnic, religious, linguistic, or similar concepts that the nationalist idea in many colonies makes sense. A Nigerian who calls himself a nationalist does not imply that all Nigerians form one nationality. Indeed, an eminent Nigerian, Obafemi Awolowo, has pointed out that "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. . . . The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not".<sup>2</sup>

The difficulty of understanding what nationalism means is in part a linguistic one. "Nationalism" is used in English to translate the Chinese words *min-tsu*, literally, "people-race". The Indian words *Swaraj*, which really mean "self-rule", were often translated into English as "nationalism". This, in fact, is what most colonial nationalists mean when they talk of nationalism—independence from alien rule. They do not mean that the people for whom they speak form a nationality.

It is sometimes said that the demands of colonial nationalism can never be satisfied if they are expressed in vague and general slogans, that unless they are precisely formulated their effect is merely to create confusion. This is an understandable view, but it seems to assume that human beings the world

<sup>1</sup> Renan, Ernest, *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation*, Paris, 1882.

<sup>2</sup> Awolowo, Obafemi, *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, 1947.

over are more rational than in fact they are. It should not be forgotten that the colonial nationalist is often forced into the position of having to play a critical rather than a constructive role. In any country, where criticism is allowed, there are few who are not dissatisfied with some aspect of official policy; dissatisfaction is likely to be greater if the government is "foreign". The main difficulty during the transition from authoritarian to democratic government is that political leaders may have the opportunity of criticizing without the responsibility of governing. The Commissioners who examined the Ceylon Constitution in 1927-1928 regarded the divorce of power from responsibility as the most striking feature of the Constitution of Ceylon at that time.

The unofficial members, who are not responsible for the conduct of public business, enjoy an overwhelming majority in the Legislative Council. . . . The unofficial members, though in complete control in the Council, are denied the prospect of assuming office themselves. Thus, on a counting of heads, those who have the controlling votes in the Council are not called upon to bear the responsibility for their decisions. . . . Thus in an atmosphere of uncertainty and instability the only constant factor was the general desire to make political capital out of the shortcomings of the Government and to add to its embarrassment.

Denied all prospect of office, the unofficial members were in no danger of being called upon to translate their criticisms into action and to execute in practice the measures which they advocated. . . . It is then no matter for surprise that the launching of continuous and irresponsible attacks on the members of the Government collectively and individually became the distinctive feature of their policy.<sup>1</sup>

### **Internationalism**

A sense of *responsibility* for the welfare of colonial peoples has been evident in national thinking from the early days of

<sup>1</sup> *Ceylon: Report of the Special Commission on the Constitution* (the Donoughmore Commission), 1928.

colonial expansion, but this sense of responsibility was often advocated by thinkers who were critical of such expansion, or of particular aspects of it. In recent decades, however, doctrines of the sacred trust, the paramountcy of Native interests, trusteeship, the dual mandate, and partnership have been more widely accepted, and they are symptomatic of new approaches to national responsibilities for the administration of colonies. Their importance is not lessened by the somewhat sterile debates which have taken place on the precise meaning of the concepts or by the scepticism with which whatever phrase is fashionable at the moment has been received in colonial circles.

The doctrine that the welfare of colonial peoples is a matter of international *accountability* is of more recent date. Its origins may be found in the abolition of the slave trade and in the Congo Basin Treaties, and it took a precise form in the case of those territories that were placed under the mandates system of the League of Nations after the first world war. These provisions were amplified towards the end of the second world war in Chapters XII and XIII of the United Nations Charter. These chapters set up the trusteeship system, and the responsible Powers undertake to render an annual report to the Trusteeship Council on territories that they place under the trusteeship system, and to accept visits from the Trusteeship Council.

The trusteeship system applies to such of the territories formerly under mandate as may have been placed under trusteeship, and to other territories that may be placed under it. It is a development of the mandates system and does not mark a new departure. Such a new departure is, however, contained in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter, which is headed "Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories". This is a public declaration that "Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obliga-

tion to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories". The declaration does not give the United Nations any rights of investigation into or supervision over non-self-governing territories, and the only specific obligation towards the United Nations organization assumed by the colonial powers is "to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible". Attempts have been made in the United Nations to stretch this undertaking so as to include within it political developments in the territories, and to enable the General Assembly, by means of an *ad hoc* committee, to examine and debate the information and thereby to exercise some supervision over non-self-governing territories outside the trusteeship system.

The controversies which have taken place in the United Nations on the question of Chapter XI have so far been met by compromise and it is unlikely that differences of opinion will lead to a major crisis. The chapter specifically pledges the colonial administering Powers "to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement". It may sometimes be represented that such a requirement conflicts with another principle embodied in the Charter, i.e., respect for national sovereignty. But it should be emphasized that the charter does not require transmission to the United Nations, for information purposes, of statistical and technical information relating to political matters. Chapter XI is a declaration by the administering Powers of the principles on which they administer their colonies. This should not be stretched to mean more than it says, though it is a novel departure of some interest and importance.

Usually any differences which arise between a Member country and its colonies on the nature and rate of constitutional reform will be settled directly between the parties concerned, and any outside intervention would probably be resented by both parties. Nevertheless, the possibility of an appeal to the United Nations exercises a profound effect on public thinking. Recent examples of this are provided by the cases of Morocco and Tunisia. In spite of the efforts of Arab States, the General Assembly in 1951 refused to place the question of Morocco on its agenda, and in 1952 the proposal to place the question of Tunisia on the agenda of the Security Council failed to secure the necessary number of votes. The international discussion of questions such as these, however, can be finally closed only by the settlement of the questions themselves. Continuously and, it may be said, sometimes inappropriately, the colonial issue arises in many of the organs of the United Nations, including the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and its subsidiary organs. The granting of independence to Libya cannot but affect the situation in the more advanced territories of North Africa; the promise of independence to Italian Somaliland within a period of ten years will have important repercussions on the whole of Africa. At the other extreme, the policies which are at present being followed in the Union of South Africa inevitably strengthen the criticisms of colonial rule. There is a strong world current in favour of the ending of colonial régimes, and the resulting ideology will persist whatever may be the international instrument for the expression of world public opinion and the maintenance of world collaboration.

The influence of internationalism is not only a question of the pacific settlement of disputes. Colonies, as they become self-governing, will require to develop closer contacts with foreign countries and with international agencies. Recognition of this in technical matters is already implicit in the provisions which have been made for the admission of colonial territories as associate members of certain of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. In the Agreements for tech-

nical assistance to Non-Self-Governing Territories reached in 1951 between the United Kingdom and the United Nations and between the United Kingdom and the United States of America, it was provided that supplementary agreements might be entered into *directly* between the separate territories and the United Nations. Whatever may be the developments in the French Union or in the American overseas territories, the principles of British parliamentary government indicate that British colonies, even before they become fully self-governing, may attain the right to exercise a wide degree of freedom in their economic and cultural relations with other countries.

### Race

The problem of race relations in colonial affairs has not always in the past received sufficient attention. "The most important problem in colonial administration", states Dr. A. M. Joeke, a distinguished Dutch Member of Parliament, "is the relationship between Europeans and the native population".<sup>1</sup>

A statement on the Race Question, prepared by an international group of scientists and issued by UNESCO, includes these words: "For all practical social purposes 'race' is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth".<sup>2</sup> Yet social myths can be more troublesome and more difficult to eradicate than tangible social realities like poverty and disease. The anthropologist and the sociologist may confidently assert that the word 'race' is meaningless, but the colour bar and other manifestations of racial prejudice remain.

Racial discrimination, effected by legislative enactment or social custom, is found in many colonies. Race prejudice, like nationalism, tends to be irrational and is more often defended than explained. It may arise when men and women associate certain ideals and values with particular ethnic groups. From this it is easy to pass to the notion that these ideals and values are the monopoly of a particular

<sup>1</sup> "Developments in the Administration of Indonesia", in *Colonial Administration by European Powers*, a symposium, 1947.

<sup>2</sup> Statement on the Race Question, issued by UNESCO, 18th July, 1950.

ethnic group, and, moreover, that they can only be preserved if that ethnic group maintains its social and political supremacy. If, as sometimes happens, a "white" minority in a colony believes that its own survival as a cultural group depends on its own supremacy as a social and political group, then the question of political advance becomes complicated by irrational ethnic theories, hypotheses, and deductions.

Dr. D. F. Malan, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, has expressed with persistence the view that "white" cultural values can only be preserved by a continuance of "white" social and political supremacy. Speaking about political developments in British West Africa, Dr. Malan said in an interview with *Die Burger* of Cape Town (24th February, 1951):

Whatever happens in West Africa must, therefore, almost inevitably affect all the other Native territories and indirectly also our own South Africa. And if those other territories are now equally successfully going to demand what the Negroes of West Africa have obtained, it will mean nothing less than the expulsion of the white man from virtually all that lies between us and the Sahara. The white man's civilizing work and leadership, which has only recently begun and which for generations to come will remain indispensable, is then at an end.

Racial prejudice is not, as is sometimes assumed, a phenomenon confined to the "white" communities. A distinguished French colonial administrator, Robert Delavignette, emphasizes that "the racial problem . . . no longer operates in one direction only. There are educated Africans now who are proud of their colour".<sup>1</sup>

There is, moreover, a further problem. In some territories the major clash of interest may not be between a "white" (caucasoid) minority which wields a preponderance of political power and a "black" (negroid) or "yellow" (mongoloid) majority which is virtually without political power; the clash is often between different non-"white" communities

<sup>1</sup> Delavignette, Robert Louis, *Freedom and Authority in French West Africa*, 1950.

which claim, or are alleged, to be ethnically distinct and which strive to secure a privileged position in the exercise of political power. "One man (or woman), one vote" may be a popular slogan in Britain or France where society is relatively homogeneous and cohesive; in Malaya, Fiji, or Kenya it would be charged with highly controversial political implications. Some aspects of this problem are discussed in Chapter 5. It need hardly be stressed, however, that parliamentary institutions cannot work successfully in a multi-racial society unless there is a determination among all elements to abolish racial discrimination, while respecting cultural differences. Unity can be achieved without uniformity.

### **Communism**

The "colonial question" has received the special attention of Communists since the time of Marx. All the three classic "contradictions" which the modern Marxist sees in capitalist society are related directly or indirectly to the colonial question. These "contradictions" were defined by Stalin in some lectures he delivered at Sverdlov University in 1924:

The *first contradiction* is the contradiction between labour and capital. Imperialism is the omnipotence of the monopolist trusts. . . . Imperialism brings the working class to revolution. The *second contradiction* is the contradiction among the various financial groups and imperialist Powers in their struggle for sources of raw materials, for foreign territory. Imperialism is the export of capital to the sources of raw materials, the frenzied struggle for monopolist possession of these sources. . . . This frenzied struggle . . . includes as an inevitable element imperialist wars, wars for the annexation of foreign territories. This circumstance leads to the mutual weakening of the imperialists, to the weakening of the position of capitalism in general, to the acceleration of the advent of the proletarian revolution.

The *third contradiction* is the contradiction between the handful of ruling, "civilized" nations and the hundreds of millions of the colonial and dependent peoples of the world. Imperialism is the most barefaced exploitation and

the most inhuman oppression. . . . The purpose of this exploitation and of this oppression is to squeeze out super-profits. . . . The awakening of national consciousness, the growth of the movement for emancipation—such are the inevitable results of this “policy”. . . . This circumstance is of importance for the proletariat in that it inevitably undermines the position of capitalism by converting the colonies and dependent territories from reserves of imperialism into reserves of the proletarian revolution.<sup>1</sup>

Although these “contradictions” are supposed to lead inevitably to the destruction of the bourgeois system, the faithful Communist does not sit idly by, merely observing the suicide of bourgeois society. He should assist the inevitable process of history. Efforts to destroy the existing order, from whatever quarter they may be organized and whatever their ultimate object, should be encouraged. “Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things”, wrote Marx and Engels in *The Communist Manifesto*. Communists, Stalin has said, must recognize the latent revolutionary capabilities of nationalist movements among oppressed peoples. They must utilize these movements if by doing so they weaken or overthrow imperialism.<sup>2</sup>

The programme adopted by the sixth world congress of the Comintern in 1928 laid considerable stress on Communist activity in colonial nationalist movements.

Colonial revolutions and movements for national liberation play an extremely important part in the struggle against imperialism and in the struggle for the conquest of power by the working class. . . . The establishment of a fraternal, militant alliance with the masses of the toilers in the colonies represents one of the principal tasks the world industrial proletariat must fulfil . . . Communist Parties must openly recognize the right of the colonies to separation . . . their right of armed defence against

<sup>1</sup> Stalin, J., *Foundations of Leninism*, quoted from the English translation published in Moscow, 1947.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

imperialism . . . and advocate and give active support to this defence by all the means in their power.

There seems to be only one exception to the general rule that Communists should support national movements. Stalin, in the lectures which have already been quoted, makes the significant proviso—which Marx and Engels had not mentioned in *The Communist Manifesto*—that the Communist must not in all circumstances support every national movement. The point is not elaborated, but Stalin no doubt had in mind Lenin's statement that "every Marxist, if he is not a renegade, must put the interests of socialism above the right of nations to self-determination. . . . If the situation demands a choice between the existence of the Socialist Republic [i.e., the Soviet Union], which is being endangered, and the right of self-determination of several nations, it is clear that the conservation of the Socialist Republic is predominant".<sup>1</sup> This Leninist dictum has taken on a new significance since the emergence of the Titoist heresy.

That these quotations from Marxist literature are of more than academic interest can be seen in the disruptive role which Communists have played within colonial nationalist movements in the past, and the subversive role they are playing today in Viet-Nam, Malaya, and elsewhere.

It is not, of course, suggested that all movements for national liberation are controlled by Communists. Indeed, the main opposition to the nationalist movement in Ceylon has come from several rival Marxist groups. Thousands of Communists in India and Pakistan have been in detention because their activities were regarded as subversive. The Governments of Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines have conducted military operations against Communist rebels. Indeed, in spite of the intense efforts which have been and are being made by the leaders of world Communism to foster discontent and disorder in colonial territories, it is probably true that the extent of Communist influence and control is often exaggerated, at any rate so far as British colonies are concerned.

It should, however, be remembered that the Communists,

<sup>1</sup> Lenin, V. I., article in *Pravda*, 20th January, 1918.

by deliberately breaking down racial, religious and social differences and creating a new ruling class on an ideological basis, seem to by-pass many of the problems which perplex those who believe in parliamentary democracy. It is also as well to recognize that there is some truth in the Communist allegation that colonial countries and backward territories have sometimes been exploited and their development retarded by commercial interests. Perhaps the greatest danger does not come from Soviet Russia's endeavour to enlist colonial nationalism in the cause of world revolution, but from the poverty of the people in colonial territories, and from the difficulties of fitting such people into a democratic system.

### **Democracy**

In the welter of secular creeds and ideologies which struggle to capture the minds of men and women in colonial territories, the democratic idea is considered last. In this matter there is the greatest need to use words with care and precision. The question is sometimes asked whether good government is preferable to self-government. Often the question is posed in such a way as to imply that government cannot be good if it is not self-government. Manuel L. Quezon, the Filipino politician, once said that he preferred a government run like hell by Filipinos to a government run like heaven by Americans. That is a legitimate and understandable point of view. But too often it is assumed that self-government inevitably results in good government, and by "self-government" is meant "independence from alien control". It is necessary to realize that political independence and democratic self-government are not the same thing. A colony may become independent of imperial authority, only to fall under the sway of local demagogues or tyrants, or become disturbed by internal disorder or insurrection which the Government cannot control. This is not just a theoretical possibility: trends have been discernable in the Philippines and in Burma, to name only two former dependent territories, which arouse disquiet on this score. Indeed, Dr. J. B. Danquah, a leading politician in the Gold Coast, is reported as having

said that the choice in Africa today is between white imperialism and black dictatorship.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore—and the point cannot be emphasized too strongly—democracy is not solely a matter of the machinery of government.

Democracy is not merely a matter of political institutions, but of the spirit in which they are worked; democracy must arise from within, and cannot be imposed—though it may be helped or hindered—from without. . . . Unless the true democratic temper is present, the most beautifully devised political or economic machinery will result in nothing but slavery. If this temper is present, details of machinery matter little.<sup>2</sup>

This report is concerned with problems of machinery and problems of spirit. The sentences just quoted draw attention to the interdependence of the two elements. Occasionally, it is true, the existence of appropriate constitutional machinery helps to develop the democratic temper. Certainly it would be fatal to separate the two ideas, for they usually grow and flourish together.

What are the basic requirements for effective self-government? A recent report of the British Colonial Office reduces the requirements to five. "You must be strong, energetic and vigorous. You must have knowledge. You must be able to grow, dig and make all you possibly can for your own needs. You must have something to sell to the outside world in exchange for the things you need but cannot produce yourself. And you must be able to govern and administer your affairs honestly and efficiently (involving, not least, a readiness to take the odium for unpalatable decisions which under a colonial régime can conveniently be blamed on the metropolitan power)."<sup>3</sup>

The first two requirements are mainly sociological in character, the next two mainly economic. It is the last re-

<sup>1</sup> Report in the *Manchester Guardian*, 11th July, 1950.

<sup>2</sup> *Education for Citizenship in Africa*, a report of a sub-committee of the [British] Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, 1948.

<sup>3</sup> *The Colonial Territories* (1949-50), 1950.

quirement which is political and which perhaps raises the most difficult problems of all. In a society where the strongest loyalty is to the family or clan, the most "honourable" conduct may be conceived as being to better the material conditions of one's relations. Nepotism, far from being a crime, may seem a virtue. Confucius was once approached by the Duke of She, who said to him: "In my part of the country there is a man so honest that when his father appropriated a sheep, he bore witness to it". Confucius replied: "The honest in my part of the country are different from that, for a father will screen his son, and a son his father. That is honesty indeed".<sup>1</sup>

It is only a century since a start was made in Britain with recruiting civil servants by open competition, and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury is still often known by his old title of "Patronage Secretary". Although it is now taken for granted that ability should be the sole criterion of entry into, and a major factor in promotion in, the British civil service, this conception seems absurd to large numbers of people in many colonial territories. To them their first duty is towards their family, and if they find themselves in a position of authority and responsibility, it seems natural to take advantage of this circumstance to secure employment for those near in blood to them.

The need for honesty and efficiency in colonial government is, moreover, not simply a matter of the existence of a handful of honest and efficient leaders. While it is true that in any country there is an elite of specially-gifted persons on whom much of the responsibility of government falls, it is equally true that democracy is only real if citizens as a whole understand the purposes and methods which underlie the machinery of government. "Liberty", wrote C. C. Coulton, "will not descend to a people, a people must rise to liberty; it is a blessing which must be earned before it can be enjoyed". John Stuart Mill, whose devotion to liberty cannot be doubted, was clear that a people might desire liberty and yet be unable or unwilling to fulfil its conditions:

<sup>1</sup> *The Analects of Confucius.*

There are also cases in which, though not averse to a form of government—possibly even desiring it—a people may be unwilling or unable to fulfil its conditions. They may be incapable of fulfilling such of them as are necessary to keep the government even in nominal existence. Thus a people may prefer a free government, but if, from indolence, or carelessness, or cowardice, or want of public spirit, they are unequal to the exertions necessary for preserving it; if they will not fight for it when it is directly attacked; if they can be deluded by the artifices used to cheat them out of it; if by momentary discouragement, or temporary panic, or a fit of enthusiasm for an individual, they can be induced to lay their liberties at the feet even of a great man, or trust him with powers which enable him to subvert their institutions; in all these cases they are more or less unfit for liberty: and though it may be for their good to have had it even for a short time, they are unlikely long to enjoy it. Again, a people may be unwilling or unable to fulfil the duties which a particular form of government requires of them. A rude people, though in some degree alive to the benefits of civilized society, may be unable to practise the forbearance which it demands: their passions may be too violent, or their personal pride too exacting, to forgo private conflict, and leave to the laws the avenging of their real or supposed wrongs . . . Again, a people must be considered unfit for more than a limited and qualified freedom, who will not co-operate actively with the law and the public authorities in the repression of evil-doers . . . Again, representative institutions are of little value, and may be a mere instrument of tyranny or intrigue, when the generality of electors are not sufficiently interested in their own government to give their vote, or, if they vote at all, do not bestow their suffrages on public grounds, but sell them for money, or vote at the beck of some one who has control over them, or whom for private reasons they desire to propitiate.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mill, John Stuart, *Considerations on Representative Government*, 1861.

## THE CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES

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### CHAPTER III

## COLONIAL POLICIES

ONE day in the year 1505, a Portuguese fleet driven off course in a gale took refuge near Colombo in Ceylon. The captain of the Portuguese ships, being a man of enterprise and vision, thought it would improve his standing with his Government if he were to use the opportunity to discuss the possibility of trade with the king of Ceylon. After some discussion an agreement was concluded, though in fact very little trade was conducted. Twelve years later a Portuguese fleet again visited Colombo, and while renewed discussions were taking place, a chance incident led to a riot in the streets of Colombo. The Portuguese captain jumped to the conclusion that the Ceylonese were about to attack his men, so he hastily landed some soldiers, set fire to the town, and erected a fort. Thus began a process which reached its climax some eighty-five years later when Ceylon was formally incorporated in the Portuguese Empire.

Portugal was at this time quarrelling with the Netherlands in Europe, and Dutch agents in the East made secret contact with a Ceylonese ruler who had maintained a precarious independence in the interior of the island. An alliance was formed which led, in 1656, to the expulsion of the Portuguese and their replacement by the Dutch. And in 1793, when the Napoleonic armies occupied Holland, some Swiss mercenaries in Colombo deserted to the British, and this enabled the British to seize Ceylon in order to prevent the French from doing the same. For nearly five hundred years Ceylon, or the major part of it, was a European colony.

\* \* \* \*

It is well to remember that great empires are not always founded by men of vision and enterprise who translate dreams into reality. It is often much more haphazard and prosaic

than that—a ship driven off course in a storm, a riot mistaken for an armed rising, an intrigue in one part of the world in the interests of a quarrel 7,000 miles away, the disloyalty of mercenary soldiers—this is the stuff of which Empires are often made. Sir John Seeley said of the British that they “seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind”.<sup>1</sup>

But if Empires are made by chance happenings, they are not administered or maintained that way. For a people to govern themselves successfully requires skill, but nothing like the skill required to govern other people successfully. And even governing other people is much less difficult than knowing when and how to relinquish that government.

The crux of the colonial problem is this process of control and the relinquishing of control. It is a problem with which parents are familiar. Its solution demands patience, imagination, restraint, and tolerance. If the final removal of control takes place too soon, the territory newly-liberated is likely to collapse through lack of maturity; if the removal of control is too long delayed, there will be explosive, irrational, and probably violent outbursts. And such outbursts are infectious.

The task of statesmanship is to judge the right moment for change, and in particular to anticipate local demands before they are formulated.

★            ★            ★            ★            ★

### **The United Kingdom**

The aim of British colonial policy has been defined by successive Secretaries of State as being self-government within the Commonwealth. This is a general statement which, it is sometimes inferred, applies equally to all colonial territories. But British colonies vary greatly in size, status, and the aptitude of their inhabitants for political advance. Some territories are within sight of the goal; others have only just started on the journey.

Two points require special emphasis. The first is that though the aim of self-government is apparently limited by the phrase

<sup>1</sup> Seeley, Sir John, *The Expansion of England*, 1895.

“within the Commonwealth”, this is, in fact, an unreal limitation. Once a territory has achieved complete self-government, it can constitutionally secede from the Commonwealth. Sir Stafford Cripps made this clear in India in 1942, and Burma did indeed secede in 1948. And even if secession were not “constitutional”, it could in practice only be prevented by forcible measures at variance with the spirit of the Commonwealth.

The second point is that if the imperial government is for one reason or another unwilling to permit any particular territory to secede, it would be desirable to make it clear that, in that particular case, complete self-government is not the aim. It may be that the imperial government would be unwilling to permit Cyprus, for example, when it attains the objective of self-government, to withdraw from the Commonwealth. If that is so, it might be better to use the phrase “internal self-government”.

Every imperial power, whether it does so deliberately or not, tends to transmit to its overseas territories its own political ideas and methods. Thus it is that in most British colonies the basic structure of government is the same as in the United Kingdom. Occasionally, it is true, an attempt is made to adapt British experience to suit local conditions. The Donoughmore Constitution of Ceylon was a notable example of this. But such cases are exceptions to the general practice. In the ordinary way the modern British Constitution is the model, and it is restricted in various ways. Every feature in a British colonial constitution has its counterpart in British history. Thus the Governor is in many ways like the Sovereign—not a twentieth century monarch but one of the Tudor period. The Executive Council corresponds to the Cabinet—not, in the majority of cases, a modern British Cabinet, but one of, say, the late Stuart period. The legislature may consist of one or two chambers and the lower house may (as in the case of the West Indian Colonies) be elected by universal franchise or in some colonies the franchise may be restricted as it was in the United Kingdom at one time. Political progress tends to be conceived in terms of removing the restrictions—limiting the

veto power of the Governor, increasing the representative character of the Executive and Legislative Councils, reducing the minimum qualifications for voting, and so on.

Changes of this kind take place within a certain framework. In the last resort, responsibility for the government of a Colony rests with the Secretary of State for the Colonies who, with his other Cabinet colleagues, is answerable to the Parliament at Westminster. This does not alter the fact that in each colony the major source of law has been local and not imperial legislation. Law has emanated, not from the imperial parliament, but at the outset from the Governor, next from the Governor with the advice of his council, finally by the legislature with the assent of the Governor. In practice, the Secretary of State can no more know and approve of every act of every Colonial Officer than can the Postmaster General know and approve of every act of every postman. But constitutionally the Secretary of State is responsible for the government of colonial territories and for determining what general line of colonial policy shall be submitted to Parliament.

In the actual task of administration, British policy in the inter-war period laid considerable stress on the system of Indirect Rule, said to have been evolved by the late Lord Lugard in Nigeria (see pp. 78-9). The essence of this system was to give official recognition to traditional chiefs and councils, which, for certain purposes, acted as agents of the Colonial Government. With the spread of education and literacy, some of these chiefs and councils are losing the authority and respect which they formerly possessed, and are being replaced by organs of representative local government modelled on those of the United Kingdom.

"All political power which is set over men . . .", said Burke "ought to be in some way or other exercised ultimately for their benefit".<sup>1</sup> This is the foundation on which British policy is conducted. The imperial government is a trustee for "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the stren-

<sup>1</sup> Speech in the House of Commons (debate on India), 1st December, 1783.

uous conditions of the modern world".<sup>1</sup> The long-term aim is to eliminate the need for trusteeship.

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### France

The French mind tends to consider all men as being alike and to stress their points of similarity rather than their differences. This attitude is expressed, in the French overseas possessions, in the policy of social assimilation.

The policy of assimilation was attempted in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, only to be obscured by the cloud of the slave-trade. But it triumphed with the Revolution, which saw the emancipation of slaves, who became citizens, and the turning of colonies into *Départements* (administrative regions) of Metropolitan France. Though the policy of assimilation was again obscured after the Revolution, it was revived by the Republic of 1848 for all the former colonies. But although indigenous inhabitants were declared French subjects, they preserved their own customs and took virtually no part in political life. Nevertheless the French temperament clung to the idea of assimilation.

The French Union consists of the French Republic itself and the Associated States. The latter are autonomous States, though they participate in the Assembly of the Union (which is a purely consultative body) and the Higher Council (a sort of intermittent Imperial Conference).

All the other overseas regions are integrated in varying degrees with Metropolitan France. The Metropolitan and Overseas *Départements* are governed by the Metropolitan Ministries and have virtually no autonomy. The Overseas Territories (which include all the tropical countries except Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana and Réunion, which are now *Départements* of Metropolitan France) come under the administration of the Minister of Overseas France, though they have territorial assemblies which vote on budgets and local taxes, and which advise the Governor on administration. The territorial assemblies are mostly elected by two separate

<sup>1</sup> Article 22 (i), Covenant of the League of Nations.

electoral colleges, one consisting almost exclusively of "Frenchmen" and the other of indigenous inhabitants. All the inhabitants of the Territories and *Départements* are "French citizens"; they elect to the French Parliament representatives who take part in making laws for France and the overseas regions. As these laws are not generally applicable to overseas territories, it is sometimes necessary to have recourse to rule by decree. Decrees must first be submitted to the Assembly of the Union whose representatives are half from Metropolitan France and half from overseas, including the Associated States.

The French system is thus a compromise between tendencies towards unity and federalism. But federation is only extended to the Associated States and still only in tentative form; it is the one concession to nationalism based on racial differences. The dominant tendency in the *Départements* and the Territories still corresponds to the universalism and anti-racialism of the French temperament. It is an attempt to integrate different peoples into one vast fatherland; it is intended as a step towards the freedom of the individual through brotherly intermingling on an equal footing.

★       ★       ★       ★       ★

### **The Netherlands**

The aim of Dutch policy has been to develop her colonies into self-governing territories, united with the Mother Country in some kind of federal relationship under the Crown. At one time consideration was given to the possible establishment of an imperial cabinet and perhaps an imperial parliament representing the Mother Country and the overseas territories, but with the achievement of independence by Indonesia this idea has been dropped.

The Republic of Indonesia is now a sovereign state, united by treaty with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, with the Queen of the Netherlands as Head of the Union. This relationship is similar to (though not, of course, identical with) that between the Republic of India and the United Kingdom. The purpose of the Union has been defined in the Constitution of the Netherlands as "to effectuate co-operation . . . with

regard to foreign relations, defence and, in so far as necessary, the finances and also matters of an economic and cultural nature". At the time of writing, however, negotiations are in progress which may lead to a further loosening of ties; the Republic of Indonesia may thus become completely dissociated from the Netherlands, as Burma in 1948 formally dissociated itself from the British Commonwealth.

The exact status of Dutch New Guinea is a matter of dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands, but its present position is analogous to that of a British Crown Colony. The Netherlands Government and Parliament are at present constitutionally responsible for the administration of the territory, but considerable authority has been delegated to a Governor and a Court of Directors in New Guinea. A partly-elected Assembly, with authority in matters of internal administration, is to be set up when circumstances permit.

The Dutch West Indian territories have recently been granted internal self-government. The Netherlands Government and Parliament retain responsibility for matters of imperial concern, such as defence and external relations, but the possibility of giving the West Indian territories a fair say in imperial matters is under discussion. The new Constitutions of the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam provide, on the model of the Netherlands Constitution, an important place for the Crown, represented by the colonial governors. A major constitutional problem will be the extent to which the powers of the governors are effectively controlled by the local institutions of self-government.

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### **Belgium**

The Kingdom of Belgium only came into existence in 1830 and it was not until 1908 that Belgium took over responsibility for administering the African territory formerly called the "Congo Free State". Belgium thus entered the colonial field later than other neighbouring powers in Europe, and Belgian colonial policy has never been precisely formulated. There is a Minister for the Colonies

with a seat in the Belgian Cabinet, and there is a Governor-General in the Congo. Colonial legislation is normally enacted by the Belgian Parliament and approved by the King, but the law of 18th October, 1908 (commonly called the Colonial Charter) reserves to the King (and, in urgent cases, the Governor-General) a substantial delegation of legislative power. The Budget of the Belgian Congo has to be approved by the Belgian Parliament.

A central consultative council in the Belgian Congo, appointed by the Governor-General, advises on administrative questions, and similar councils exist in the six provinces of the Congo. There are in these councils, in addition to a few officials, magistrates and others who are *ex officio* members, a number of persons nominated by the Governor-General or the Provincial Governor, among whom are included Africans who are sufficiently educated and advanced to be useful on these councils. Traditional Native Authorities act as agents of the government, notably for tax-collecting, and also have certain responsibilities for local administration.

The Belgian Government, believing that economic progress is a necessary condition of social and political progress, is encouraging economic development, in which the state is playing a large part. Schools are maintained in the main by Christian missions. The language used in primary schools is the Native language of the locality; in secondary schools it is French. Among roughly 9,000 schools which are official or government-subsidized, there are seventeen secondary schools and only one for higher learning. There is little political progress of the kind taking place in British African territories. Neither Africans nor Europeans enjoy what would be regarded in Western Europe as essential political rights. Although steps are being taken to grant Africans a status similar to that of Europeans, the lack of provision for higher education may prove a severe test as the economic development of the Belgian Congo creates conditions which will lead to demands for political emancipation.

### Portugal

Portuguese overseas possessions are constitutionally part of the Portuguese nation, and the aim is the integration of all the territories into a unitary government, centralized at Lisbon. The mission of Portugal in her colonies is conceived in terms of spiritual assimilation. Portugal has the longest colonial experience of any nation, and Portuguese expansion originally had a large religious element in it. Although Church and State are technically separate in Portugal itself, the Constitution provides that "Portuguese Catholic missions overseas, being an instrument of civilization and national influence . . . shall be protected and assisted by the State as educational institutions". The Constitution defines Portuguese colonial policy as being "to fulfil the historic function of possessing and colonizing overseas dominions and of civilizing the native populations inhabiting them".

There is a Minister for the Colonies at Lisbon, and a Governor or Governor-General in each colony. Laws altering the form of government of a colony, or affecting Portuguese foreign relations, or authorizing public loans, are within the exclusive competence of the National Assembly at Lisbon. Legislation on other matters, which may originate in the legislative organs of the colonies, is promulgated by decree.

The indigenous inhabitants in the overseas territories are classed as "citizens" or as "aborigines". The latter, who form the vast majority, are those who have not yet acquired a "European" outlook, and are without political rights. The task of "civilizing" the indigenous people is left, to a considerable extent, to Roman Catholic Missions: teaching the Portuguese language is the first stage of this task. Traditional institutions and customs are preserved by a system of Indirect Rule, but in this matter Portuguese administration is not analogous to the former British system of Indirect Rule, for the Portuguese, while making full use of existing Native Authorities, exercise close control over the social life of the indigenous peoples. Although they have hitherto avoided the breakdown of tribal organizations, they are prepared to accept this if it will help spiritual assimilation.

It is maintained by the Portuguese that the law distinguishes between civilized and non-civilized natives, refusing to the natives who remain attached to ancestral traditions the exercise of political rights characteristic of the institutions which are typically European. It is pointed out that in European Portugal, similarly, the right to vote is refused to the illiterates who are not heads of families. It may however, be doubted whether the comparison is valid and whether the position of the Portuguese overseas territories as constitutionally part of the Portuguese nation can be maintained unless citizenship rights are far more rapidly extended to indigenous peoples.

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### Spain

Spanish colonial policy was traditionally similar to that of Portugal. The aim was to assimilate and integrate the peoples of Spanish overseas territories with those of the homeland. This policy of assimilation has been expressed in various ways. The mayors of Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish *Presidios* in Morocco, are *ex officio* members of the Spanish *Cortes*, "the principal mission of [which] . . . consists in the preparation and elaboration of laws, subject to the concurrence of the Chief of State" (Act creating the *Cortes*, Art. I). The Canary Islands form two administrative districts of Metropolitan Spain, and the Spanish Sahara is under the control of the Captain-General of the Canaries.

In Spanish Morocco, a representative nominated by the Spanish Government is High Commissioner for the Protectorate and Governor-General of the Spanish *Presidios*; he is also, at the present time, Commander in Chief of Spanish troops and Inspector of the Moorish forces. The Caliph has authority in internal civil and religious matters, and his administration (*Majzen*) consists of a Prime Minister (Grand Vizier) and other Ministers (Viziers) selected by him. There is also a Privy Council which advises the Caliph on political and administrative matters. Decrees (*Dahires*) of the Caliph are promulgated by the High Commissioner. Events in French Morocco

have had repercussions in the Spanish zone, and there have been indications within recent months that the Spanish Government has adopted a conciliatory attitude to Moroccan nationalist leaders.

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### **The United States**

Most American citizens would deny that there are such things as American colonies, but the word *colony*, in the sense in which it has been used in this report, does apply to American overseas territories. The United States acquired much of its overseas empire in that absent-minded manner which has characterized the acquisition of other empires. Yet it should be said at once that a large part of American opinion has always been critical of imperialist expansionism and exploitation, and, indeed, it would come as a shock to most Americans to learn that Europeans consider such territories as Hawaii and Puerto Rico as colonies.

The forces which between 1500 and 1900 drove European nations to acquire overseas empires, in America drove men westwards. The extension of the American frontier was analogous to the expansion of European Empires, though with two qualifications. First, the expansion was effected without crossing the sea, so that newly-acquired territory seemed a legitimate accretion to the existing nation. Secondly, the number of indigenous inhabitants who were displaced or exterminated by the process of expansion was relatively small compared with the number of indigenous inhabitants affected by European acquisition of colonial possessions.

American solutions to any problems that have arisen in the colonial field have been largely empirical. The Philippines passed through what could be described as "semi-dominion status" to qualified independence. Both Hawaii and Alaska, on the other hand, have expressed the desire to become States within the American Union. Bills granting Statehood to Alaska and to Hawaii have failed to pass in the Senate, though the House of Representatives has approved them. It seems very likely, however, that eventually these territories will

become States, having full equality of status with those in the Union today. Hawaii and Puerto Rico are represented in the United States Congress, though the representatives do not have voting rights. The granting of Statehood to these territories would mark a new departure in American policy, since no non-contiguous territory has yet been admitted as a State.

It is not yet clear whether, should Alaska and Hawaii succeed in their aim, pressure would be brought to give Statehood to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands or whether the emphasis would be on some form of "dominion status". It seems that an intermediate solution is being sought in the case of Puerto Rico, where a new constitution has been adopted which gives the territory internal self-government, without actual membership of the American Union as a State. Nevertheless, the powers of the United States Congress in respect to Puerto Rico remain considerable, and Puerto Rico is integrated within the United States economic and trade system.

## COLONIAL POLICIES

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## CHAPTER IV

### SOME OBSTACLES AND SOME HOPEFUL SIGNS

#### **The Extent of Parliamentary Democracy**

**T**HIS chapter is concerned with considering in general terms some of the essential conditions for the effective working of parliamentary government. It is not, perhaps, always realized how few are the countries in which parliamentary government even approaches effectiveness. There are, roughly speaking, some 2,400 million people in the world today. More than half these people live in countries where parliamentary government either is repudiated or not practised or functions ineffectively or incompletely. Included in this group are Soviet Russia, China, the "People's Democracies" of Eastern Europe, Spain, Ethiopia, Tibet, Liberia, Afghanistan, Korea, and most colonies.

Of the remaining 1,200 million people in the world, three-quarters live either in countries like Germany, Italy, Japan and a number of South and Central American Republics where for one reason or another parliamentary government has proved unstable, or in the new parliamentary democracies of Asia where the strength of the parliamentary system still remains to be tested. Most of the latter group are former dependencies of Western nations (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines).

There remain about 300 million people living in the United States, the United Kingdom and the older Dominions, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, and Switzerland. Here one finds parliamentary democracy strongest and most secure, but even so one could not assert unreservedly that parliamentary government functions "effectively". In one country in this group women are without the vote, and in two others it is much easier for "white" people than for "black"

or "yellow" people to vote. In all these countries there are weaknesses and defects. In one country the problem may be the instability of governments, in another the growing power of officials, in another the ineffectiveness of the second chamber, and in another the relationship between the federal government and the unit governments.

It is not proposed in this report to consider the problems involved in establishing a "perfect" or an "ideal" parliamentary system. It is assumed that in most of the colonies with which this report is concerned the imperial power is concerned to foster and develop the parliamentary idea, and that the leaders of the indigenous people desire some such system. It is recognized that human institutions reflect the weaknesses and limitations of human beings, and that in politics perfection is unattainable. And it is in the light of these considerations that some of the problems which are encountered in developing and strengthening the parliamentary idea in colonies are examined. It should be emphasized that in doing so it is not suggested that colonies are more "backward" than other territories. The problem in Liberia may be in many ways very similar to the problem in the neighbouring colonies of Sierra Leone, French Guinea, or the Ivory Coast.

### National Unity

Reference has been made in Chapter II (pp. 8-10 and 14-16) to nationalism and race, and here it is necessary to emphasize the importance of a sense of national unity as a condition for the effective working of parliamentary government. "Can there be any greater evil", asked Plato, "than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign, or any greater good than the bond of unity?"<sup>1</sup> No form of democratic government can work except among people of whom a sufficient number desire to live in unity. This is true even if the unity is that of a federation.

Here one meets the difficulty which was referred to earlier, the question of speed. The development by which the colonial

<sup>1</sup> *The Republic*, book V.

peoples, especially in Africa, have been brought to the point of asking through their leaders for democratic self-government is one that has no precedent. It is so unlike the processes by which Britain and other parliamentary democracies built up the parliamentary system, that an analysis of the contrast may throw some light on colonial difficulties in this matter.

In the history of Britain and of other democratic nations, three stages can usually be distinguished. First there emerged, from the almost unrecorded and fluid movement of clans and tribes, a group of settled societies sufficiently alike in culture to feel a sense of mutual kinship and of differentiation from other groups. This coagulation was generally a slow process, sometimes helped by outside pressures or foreign conquerors. It allowed of a gradual growth, sometimes over many centuries, of common interests and habits of association. The next stage was the development of a central government of increasing effectiveness, built round a monarchy. The personal leadership of kings, exalted by the needs of a still half-formed and vulnerable people, at once expressed and fostered the sense of unity, promoted a common culture and religion, hammered dissidents into submission, and sometimes incorporated frontier regions. This period of royal discipline lasted in Britain for some five centuries, during which time the king increasingly shared his power with an oligarchy and they, in turn, with the new middle-classes bred by the Industrial Revolution. Not until the period between the two world wars was parliamentary democracy at last attained in Britain in that full form which the colonial people are now adopting. And in Britain universal suffrage *followed* universal education and the achievement of what was then almost the highest and most equally diffused standard of living in the world.

These well known facts have been summarized only to bring out the colonial contrast. In British West Africa, the three processes which in Britain were strung out over a thousand years or more have been telescoped into two generations. And such unity as exists has not come about from within, but has been artificially imposed from without by a mere handful of strangers from another continent. Colonial boun-

daries do not necessarily follow tribal, racial, religious, linguistic, cultural or geographical divisions; the separation of Togoland and the Cameroons into British and French mandates after the first world war is just one example of the arbitrary nature of colonial frontiers and of the consequent difficulty of fostering a sense of territorial unity. Before there had been any natural unification of tribal cultures, and while the many groups brought together within the boundary drawn by an alien power were still divided in language, customs and religion, a small minority which has become, as it were, "centrally-minded"—partly as a result of being centrally-employed—is demanding to take over the state system of the foreign imperial rulers and turn it at a stroke of the pen into a parliamentary democracy.

It is, of course, easy to exaggerate the divisive forces within a colony which is struggling for self-government. Furthermore, there is often some truth in the claim of colonial nationalists that the imperial power has not been sufficiently alert in seeking to reduce internal disunity. It is too simple to ascribe this to a policy of *divide et impera*. But it is of the nature of colonial administration that internal divisions tend to increase unless positive measures are fostered to prevent this happening. The British did not create the communal problem in India; but in the light of what has happened, it is possible to see how communal antagonisms were hardened by mistakes of omission and commission which might have been avoided if the imperial government had been more fully aware of the underlying problem.

In many colonies today there seem to be four forces which are potentially divisive but which, if properly handled, can be canalized into constructive channels. These forces are tribe, race, religion, and culture, and they are often inter-related.

(1) *Tribe*. What is said in this paragraph refers particularly to African, and to a lesser extent Asian, colonies; it is not relevant to most colonies in the Western hemisphere. It is possible, in Africa, to travel through a dozen different tribal areas in a day and to notice all the obvious differences—

language, dress, hair-styles, type of huts, weapons, and even methods of cultivation. The anthropologist would, of course, discover many more distinctions, though the width of the separation varies. Stay-at-home tribesmen, and certainly the older men and women, as far as can be judged, often feel no sense of social obligation to, or common citizenship with, neighbouring tribes. In a large territory like Nigeria or the Belgian Congo, they probably hardly know of the existence of the scores of more distant tribes who are included within the boundaries of that region which a few leaders in the capital are calling a nation. Tribal separatism and ignorance are not, of course, an organized force *against* the idea of unity: they simply represent an inert mass which it will take time and much determined effort to awaken to any knowledge of a wider citizenship, and still more before the people are able to undertake the duties and accept the obligations which belong to that citizenship in the modern world.

(2) *Race*. This word, since the ethnologists have warned against its common and widespread misuse, must be used with care. One can, however, discern some divisions within colonies which are deeper than those of the tribe and which reinforce the generally even more important cultural causes for division.<sup>1</sup> In Malaya there are as many Chinese as Malays, and there is a substantial Indian minority.<sup>2</sup> Indians form the majority of the population in Fiji and Mauritius,<sup>2</sup> 43 per cent of the population in British Guiana, and an important minority in Trinidad, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. There are substantial Arab groups in Kenya and Zanzibar, and substantial Chinese groups in many Pacific colonies. In the Sudan there is a largely Arab population in the northern provinces while Negro or Negroid tribes inhabit the southern provinces.

(3) *Religion*. The importance of this as a dividing factor varies according to historical and other circumstances. In the West Indies it reinforces other causes for division between

<sup>1</sup> The striking racial difference between the indigenous peoples and the imperial settlers is considered in chapter 5.

<sup>2</sup> Separate notes about Malaya and Mauritius will be found on pages 137-8 and 139-144 respectively.

Indian and Negro. Sometimes it causes a division amongst Indians themselves as between Moslem and Hindu, and this has weakened the Indians as political groups and has necessitated special electoral arrangements in Kenya. In Cyprus the division between Moslem and Orthodox Christian strengthens other differences. But perhaps the most important divisions of this kind are found in Nigeria and the Sudan where the Moslem groups of the northern regions, long superior in political organization and mobility, raided and enslaved the pagan Negroid peoples and left a heritage of suspicion and enmity which fifty years of peace have done much, but not everything, to heal.

(4) *Culture*. Within nearly all nations there are cultural differences which could be regarded also as a source of disunity, but in many of the colonies which are being considered such differences are very marked. In Uganda, a very wide gap has divided the pygmy and half-pygmy tribes or even the pastoral groups of the north from the people of the kingdom of Buganda, who so much impressed the first travellers with their centralized monarchy, their roads and houses, their dress and courteous manners. Nigeria, again, contains the ancient and elaborate Moslem principalities of the north, and those of the Yoruba in the south-west, both long in touch by different routes with the civilized world: in startling contrast are the comparatively primitive pagan people living in the hills and forests. These contrasts have not been eliminated by half a century of British rule, though they may have been softened. From a political standpoint they have the significance that the more advanced units were accustomed to living in a larger society, with all the ideas and methods of government which this necessitated, while the more primitive peoples, generally enclosed in small patriarchal groups, tended to be shy and suspicious but more independent of spirit and less hierarchical.

These contrasts have been mentioned not as an argument against political advance, but to indicate where effort is needed if progress is to take place. Where the people of a territory are irreconcilably divided by race, religion, or some

other force, the democratic system will be severely tested. Government by majority rule tends to become the oligarchy of the most powerful community. Experience shows that, given plenty of time and favourable circumstances, differences of race, language, religion and culture need not prevent the growth of a feeling of national unity. But it must be emphasized that, in many colonies, time may not be plentiful nor circumstances favourable. Again the question of speed arises—the need to telescope into a few decades what elsewhere has been spread over many centuries.

### **Economic Factors**

It is not proposed to say a great deal about this important matter, which many people believe is at the heart of the problem. The economic position of the entire world is uncertain, and the interdependence of national units is recognized with increasing clearness. Nations must learn to help themselves before they can expect help from others. Yet economic assistance, international or by group arrangement, or from the United States, is in being or is planned for most of the nations outside the Iron Curtain. The situation has changed from the period when Britain's "white" colonies set up house on their own upon a modest but financially-independent basis. Now, when the Mother Nation of the Commonwealth is herself in economic difficulties and is receiving assistance from nations which were once her colonies, it has become difficult to lay down economic or financial tests for democratic independence.

Yet there are some general considerations to bring forward under this heading. It seems that constitutionally-mature countries, with highly-developed economies, can accept outside aid with only minor embarrassment. But weak, poor, and newly-constituted nations, with electorates conscious of what they regard as past "imperial exploitation", and sensitive about the appearance as well as the reality of independence, find it difficult to accept external assistance. They need foreign capital, but dislike foreign control of the way the capital is used. Their simultaneous needs for economic aid and

political self-assertion are in conflict so that they may have to be coaxed into accepting help.

In some colonies this natural reluctance to accept foreign aid or to take part in plans for regional economic development is being exploited by a minority, who deliberately foster hostility towards the nations from whom help is needed. The sudden enfranchisement of peoples not versed in the intricacies of international finance, suspicious of foreign economic interests, and open to emotional and xenophobic appeals, produces a situation unfavourable to economic development.

During the period when this report was being prepared (1952), several nations have refused United States or international assistance. At the moment of writing, India is anxious to secure substantial United States financial assistance to make it possible to embark on an ambitious five-year plan of economic development. But in order to avoid being embarrassed by accusations from critics at home and abroad that Indian independence is endangered, the Indian Government has not advertised the fact that aid is being sought. There is nothing particularly disreputable or sinister about this: it is likely that the majority of people in nations which received Lend-Lease assistance during the second world war were unaware of the extent to which the U.S. Government provided its allies with the means of survival. The Indian attitude is symptomatic of the reluctance of people everywhere to be recipients of the generosity of others if there is any possibility that this confers, implicitly or explicitly, obligations on the part of the recipient.

It is certain, however, that colonial governments, modelled as they are upon the "welfare" as well as upon the parliamentary principle, cannot succeed unless they can set about raising standards of living. In the past, states could maintain life at a low level for centuries, even millennia. But today, the parliamentary state which cannot offer its citizens the fact, or at least the firm hope, of a better standard of living, may be thought to discredit democracy and open it to the immediate attack either of Communism or of Fascism. Clearly, the

simultaneous creation of a parliamentary government and of a "welfare" state is a hard task, since it demands at once a large and trained civil service and a population united, intelligent, disciplined, and with a high sense of civic obligation. It must be admitted that many colonies are far from possessing these characteristics.

Not enough is known in the West about the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, or of such regional schemes of economic co-operation and development as the Colombo Plan. There are limits to such arrangements and in many ways early hopes have been disappointed. Technical assistance agencies cannot function easily in countries with inferior standards of public administration. The practices of western technology must be adapted to the different conditions which so often exist in under-developed countries. Nevertheless, it seems clear that arrangements of this kind enable practical foreign help to be provided with a minimum of embarrassment.

### **Education**

In 1952, a general election based on universal suffrage was held in India. One hundred million men and women, the majority of them illiterate, voted by secret ballot to choose the members of the central and provincial parliaments. This was rightly regarded as a great achievement. To conduct elections on a large scale amongst unsophisticated peasant people, at a time when political and communal feelings were high, can have been no easy task. The Indian experience has been a source of encouragement to those who believe in parliamentary democracy, and shows that literacy is not an essential qualification for voting. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that literacy and education *are* necessary for the proper exercise of the rights and duties of citizenship in a parliamentary democracy in the modern world. A primary task, in many colonies, is to educate virtually a whole people, children and adults, in and out of school. The main justification for the present policy of colonial enfranchisement is that the peoples will learn by experience, and there is every sign

so far that some, at least, of the lessons of democracy are being learned more quickly and peacefully than the majority of those concerned with the colonies would have imagined possible even ten years ago. But some hazardous years lie ahead, especially as the period of tutelage ends and, perhaps, European cultural influence diminishes.

During the transitional period there may be something to be said for the indirect method of election. Illiterate or semi-literate voters may be well able to choose a local man to act on their behalf in an electoral college. This subject is referred to again on pages 83-4.

It should, however, be stressed that the simple act of voting, important though it is, is not all there is to parliamentary democracy. The Indian peasant may have a shrewd political sense in matters that concern his village; he may be able to distinguish between rival political programmes or candidates for office. But the need in the contemporary world is to see beyond the interests of one locality. In any case, elections are useless without a core of honest and efficient administrators and technicians to carry out the wishes of the elected assembly. Behind the one hundred million Indian voters stood a million men of sophisticated and mature outlook, many of them university-educated, imbued with the ideals of parliamentary democracy, trained under the guidance of experienced British officials, and with a knowledge of administrative techniques or with experience and skill in some practical field. These people—politicians, officials, and technicians—are as necessary, even if not so numerous, as the mass electorate.

Left alone, in isolation from the world, an African tribe, or even a nation like Ethiopia or Tibet, can manage its own affairs according to traditional standards, century after century. But the colonial peoples of today aspire to the forms and standards of advanced nations; to conduct active foreign relations; to develop resources with the help of modern science; to apply the methods of modern public finance; and to harness the will of its people, through central and local legislative and administrative institutions, to a deliberate and urgent policy

of social betterment. This attempt requires not only informed and intelligent action at the highest level by a few ministers and departmental heads, but also—looking at the technical side alone—large numbers of clerks, accountants, engineers, surveyors, doctors, agriculturalists, and, of course, teachers in all subjects. It is a long and expensive process to educate these groups even if they are not trained to the full standards of the West. The decisive moments in the transfer of power are when highly-trained foreign experts of every kind are asked to make a quick change, first from directing to advising, then from advising to serving, and perhaps finally are asked to leave altogether. It is possible that some of these experts will not find it easy to change from directing to serving, even if the new political leaders are themselves in the mood to desire their services or to use them properly.

If it had been possible to foresee the pace of political development, an energetic policy of training in readiness for the future might have been followed. The need is now known, and, because such training cannot be successfully carried out at high speed, plans should be drawn up now for all colonial peoples and, of course, most urgently for those more advanced constitutionally. The admission of colonial students to Western universities should be accompanied by long-term plans for the establishment or the strengthening of universities, colleges, and other institutions of higher learning in colonies themselves. The establishment of institutions of higher learning in British Colonies since the war is a step in the right direction. The students of today may too often engage in irresponsible agitation, but it should not be forgotten that they are the leaders of tomorrow.

Allied to the educational problem is an economic problem. The educated élite will come largely from a "middle class" which barely exists in many colonies. What is required is a programme of economic development which few colonies can undertake without outside help. This problem has been referred to earlier in this chapter.

Having said all this, it is necessary to refer to a real difficulty which, even if it is sometimes exaggerated by imperial govern-

ments, is often minimized by colonial nationalists. Education, though it is to be counted a qualification for self-government, often tends in its first effects to be a disruptive influence, sometimes deepening existing differences of culture. The men and women (though there are still few of the latter) who have had higher education abroad, and have consequently commanded a relatively large salary and have been engaged at the highest level of activities in the capital city—civilized and highly-trained persons, fully in contact with the world around them—inhabit in their way of life, their knowledge, their capacity, and their hopes, a world apart from the majority of their fellows. In many colonies a few dozen or score of men at the top are the only ones with anything like a full understanding of the constitution they are demanding, or the political and technical capacity to conduct its affairs. They are isolated, on the one hand from the old tribal chiefs and leaders who fear that their privileges are to be progressively withdrawn, on the other hand from the mass of the illiterate or semi-literate peasantry who have barely made contact with the modern world. They are inspired by ideals which are only imperfectly understood by the mass of their countrymen.

In most colonies one would expect to find, at least during the period of transition to self-government, some tension between the minority of Western-educated men and the traditional rulers and those grouped around them. The two often find themselves in conflict. The first tend to be ambitious, energetic men who have won for themselves the qualifications by which they have pulled themselves up out of the life of the masses. They are forced by the circumstances of their position to bid for power upon a national scale and upon democratic principles. This power they aim to take not only from the imperial government but also from the chiefs who have used their traditional authority, generally on a local and tribal level, as junior partners, sometimes almost as agents, of the imperial government. Colonial officials have often tended to be biased in favour of this more conservative group, with whom they have long worked and whose interests have been bound up with the imperial system. Democratic ideas and practices, however,

especially when rapidly introduced as the complement of independence, tend to push to the side the traditional rulers, thus tainted by alleged complicity in imperialism, in order to make way for the direct link between the mass electorate and the new leaders. This is disturbing alike to officials of the imperial government, to the rulers, and to the more conservative sections of the people who still feel the powerful ties of ancient custom binding them to their chiefs.

As much as possible must be done to encourage the traditional leaders to bring their experience and influence into harmony with the new institutions, local and central, and with the new influences at work. Their opposition would only aggravate the bitterness and impatience of the new ruling-class and confuse the inexperienced electorate.

A special problem in some colonies is that the tendency to hostility just described is reinforced by a division between town and country elements. The association of rural chieftainship with conservatism is illustrated clearly by an examination of the parties, the voting, or the discussion about electoral law in the Sudan, Libya and Nigeria during the past twelve months, and more recent events in Morocco bring it out very clearly. It might be said that this is a natural expression of divergent interests and attitudes common in many advanced countries. In colonial conditions, however, where the leaders and pace-makers are a small minority who may find themselves relegated to electoral insignificance under the constitution they have done most to win, it is not easy to see how this situation can be met. The dangers are obvious. In the Sudan and elsewhere it led to acceptance of the idea of special additional representation for the "educated class".

The sense of frustration which this problem can produce may lead, in some colonies, to serious abuses of the democratic system. To enfranchise ignorant and disunited masses upon the scale now being attempted inevitably opens them to the influences of corruption, intimidation, and misdirection. Colonial leaders have not so far had much time to perfect improper methods, but a study of recent elections in Persia, Egypt, and even in Libya, would fully illustrate the dangerous

possibilities. An important question, therefore, must be whether the new leaders are likely to give way to the temptation to use improper methods, and what means could be taken to encourage responsible leadership among the "new men" who spring so quickly to the front at the prospect of self-government.

No effort should be spared to deepen their education as preparation for their great new responsibilities. This applies firstly to the education, in the formal sense, of those who will assist or replace the first small generation of leaders. Much is being done in some parts of the world, but ways should be sought by which this education could be further adapted as a training for democratic leadership and made more widely accessible to the lower ranks of the active politicians.

An even more urgent and difficult task is the education of democratic leaders already in power or in opposition. The main responsibility must lie with the colonial governors and senior officials associated closely with the new leaders, and the former should be deliberately selected or promoted for their possession of the exceptional qualities of tact, imagination, and sympathy for democratic ideals which this task demands.

Another method must be to maintain the closest possible association between the new leaders and those with practical or theoretical knowledge of democracy in other parts of the world, through contact and communication of all kinds. Suitable literature about the parliamentary system should be made available, but it is even more important to enable these men to see at first-hand how the parliamentary system works in other countries. There is a further reference to this point on pp. 103-4 of the concluding chapter. Suffice it to say here that it means a great deal to colonial people, who know themselves to be apprentices to the arts of the Western world, to be convinced of the interest, the moral support, and, when it is deserved, the appreciation of their opposite numbers in other countries—but without a trace of that attitude of superiority or patronage, the appearance of which is so hard to avoid and so certain to antagonize.

To what extent can the educated minority be said to speak

for the people they claim to represent? This, it is suggested, is an almost meaningless question which is not susceptible of a simple answer. In all countries it is a minority who keep the political wheels turning. Certainly there is evidence from those British colonies which are nearest to independence that the educated minority is, in the political sense of the term, "representative" of the people as a whole. Whether or not the people understand the programmes of the intelligentsia, the fact remains that it is this section of the population which acquires a natural leadership; if their aspirations to be the leaders of tomorrow are disregarded or frustrated, discontent may be driven underground.

### **Some Hopeful Signs**

This chapter has necessarily discussed some of the hurdles which must be surmounted; this is because the secret of finishing the course without disaster is to know where the hurdles are placed. But it is important to conclude by emphasizing some of the hopeful signs.

First, there is the strong attraction which parliamentary democracy seems to hold for the majority of leaders of opinion in colonies. It is taken for granted in the West that parliamentary government is, as Winston Churchill once put it, "the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time". It is assumed as self-evident in the West that parliamentary democracy is more humane and more efficient than autocratic rule.

Colonial leaders might well have rejected this view and favoured some other system. The fact that (with very few exceptions) they have not done so, the fact that they ask for the parliamentary system that has stood the test of time, is an encouraging sign.

In so far as there has been any political development in British colonial territories, it has been mainly according to the forms and in the spirit of Western democracy. Administrative officers, consciously and unconsciously, have used their influence in this direction. Legislative councils, some of them long established, have been conducted upon quasi-parliamentary

lines. Local government, for several reasons, may not yet be a very promising school for central government, but it is at least now taking a democratic direction. The educated, and especially that most influential group among them, the lawyers, have absorbed the teachings of Western constitutional law and history, for which indeed, they show an easily explicable devotion. In most British colonies, however limited the influence of British democracy may be both in depth and width, there is at least no competing system, only a political vacuum which it could continue gradually to fill. It is true that in many colonies its character is little understood by the people as a whole, but the leaders seem to be genuinely anxious to learn about it and to adopt it in full. Paradoxically, the danger may be a wholesale and uncritical adoption of the system, but at least this strong determination to adopt parliamentary government promises well for the future, if sufficient help and understanding can be given to colonial societies through the difficult period of initiation and adjustment. It is certainly striking that alongside a rejection of Western imperialism, there is a generally wholehearted acceptance of Western constitutional examples.

It may be that the adoption of a democratic constitution, even where there is little hope at first of its being fully understood or properly worked, sets up a standard and creates an influence upon political life. It is worth consideration whether, in the special dangers of colonial society, a written and fairly rigid constitution, and even one containing a declaration of civil rights, might not be more of a safeguard for democracy than an attempt to follow British precedents in these matters.

When we look beneath the surface presented by imported institutions we find that colonial society, both in Africa and Asia, often presents raw material that is not unfavourable to democracy. With a few notable exceptions, there is little in the way of hereditary, princely or aristocratic castes. Even where relatively large chieftainships existed, there was in the past a strong element of tribal democracy. Its forms and spirit may bear little resemblance to modern Western democracy and cannot easily be carried directly across into the much larger

political societies which are being formed, but it can be assumed that there is little in Native forms, once tribal disunity is overcome, that is antagonistic to the development of democracy. What is best in indigenous democracy can be preserved. What may be described as traditional democracy was essentially collectivist rather than individual. What is now needed is to develop individual initiative and judgment.

On the economic side there is as yet no glaring inequality of the kind that exists, for example, in Egypt. With few exceptions no important landlord class has emerged. There are, however, in all the more prosperous regions, the beginnings of a middle-class of farmers, traders, brokers, money-lenders, etc. And in the West Indies, above a fairly general level of equality in poverty among the predominantly Negro population, there is a middle-class composed of people of mixed blood.

There is little doubt that, with all the difficulties, there are many signs favourable to the success of the parliamentary system in the colonial world. There are manifold problems, one of which—that presented by the plural society—is considered in more detail in the next chapter. The transition from imperial control to self-government will not be easy for either the imperial powers or the colonial peoples.

## CHAPTER V

### THE PLURAL SOCIETY

SO far this discussion has been concerned with colonies in which the inhabitants already have, or can be expected to develop in a fairly short period of time, a sense of national cohesion and unity. There are, however, certain colonies where the creation of a sense of national unity, a common social will, is proving so baffling and intractable a problem that it is necessary to devote a separate chapter to a consideration of these colonies. As far as British colonies are concerned, many people have the impression that the objective of "self-government within the Commonwealth" is being successfully pursued except in the colonies which form plural societies; in these, it is said, there seems to be no consistent policy, no clear line of advance, no agreement on how the ideals of British colonial policy can be implemented.

The term *plural society* seems to have been coined by Dr. J. S. Furnivall to describe a society comprising two or more elements or social orders which live side by side within the same political unit yet without mingling: warning must be given that the term is used slightly differently on the Continent of Europe.<sup>1</sup> It can be argued that the problem in the plural society is not different in kind but only in degree from the problem elsewhere. It is always necessary for a state, if it is to be stable and secure, to be based on a fair degree of agreement on the part of its citizens on essential principles, for them to possess a sense of solidarity and common interests, an agreement on a few fundamental matters so strong that it allows differences of view on matters less fundamental. This is possible even if the citizens are drawn from different ethnic groups, speak different languages, or worship at different

<sup>1</sup> The word *segmentation* is often used on the Continent to describe the phenomenon which is discussed in this chapter.

churches. In Canada, for example, the English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians are different in national origin, language, and religion. In the territories with which this report is concerned, however, the problems are so much more acute in degree than in Canada that many people would say that they are different in kind.

### **Self-Government for Whom?**

The application of the objective of self-government in a relatively homogeneous colony like the Gold Coast or Puerto Rico may be a delicate process demanding unusual qualities of statesmanship and forbearance from colonial nationalists and imperial officials alike; but the general direction of advance is clear. There may be differences of view about the proper speed of progress or the right steps to be taken at any particular period of time. Such differences are no doubt inevitable and do not obscure the final goal. But in a colony where two or more groups, differing in race, language, religion, or in some other way, live side by side without mixing, how can self-government be conferred in such a way as to inflict no injustice or hardship on any one group? "The case most requiring consideration . . . is the not very uncommon one in which a small but leading portion of the population, from difference of race, more civilized origin, or other peculiarities of circumstance, are markedly superior in civilization and general character to the remainder".<sup>1</sup> If, for example, one community consists of several million indigenous people still living under a tribal form of organization and the other community consists of ten or twenty thousand settlers from another continent, highly-educated, politically-mature, and economically-powerful, how can political power be distributed in such a way that the rights of all are respected? And what if the position is complicated by the presence of other immigrant communities?

The problem is illustrated in an acute form in Kenya where the population, in round figures, is as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Mill, John Stuart, *Considerations on Representative Government*, 1861.

|                           |           |
|---------------------------|-----------|
| Africans .. .. .          | 5,250,000 |
| Indians and Pakistanis .. | 90,000    |
| Europeans .. .. .         | 30,000    |
| Arabs .. .. .             | 24,000    |
| Goans .. .. .             | 7,000     |
| Others .. .. .            | 3,000     |

The basic problem here is that the vast majority of the Africans, who form 97 per cent. of the population, are not yet capable of exercising to the full the rights and duties of citizenship of the kind required in the modern state. Nobody can say for certain how long must elapse before the majority of Africans in Kenya will have reached the necessary standard. Africans tend to minimize, Europeans to exaggerate, the length of time required. But whether it is ten years or a hundred years, the imperial government is constitutionally responsible for deciding the form of government during the transition period. The "white" settlers will say: "We cannot be expected to wait for an indefinite period before we are allowed full freedom to administer our own affairs". The spokesmen of the Africans will say: "We are afraid that if power is transferred to the settlers now, we shall never be allowed to exercise political rights and responsibilities; we fear we may be forced into a position of permanent inferiority."

### **The Point of View of the Settlers**

Let us consider first the position of the "white" settlers who, in British colonies in East and Central Africa, are numerically insignificant but are economically highly-developed and are asking for democratic institutions.

The fundamental ideas of the Commonwealth are rooted and grounded in principles of English law. . . . It is one of those principles that any man born in the allegiance of the King carries that allegiance with him wherever he may go. . . . If Englishmen could not settle abroad without carrying the King and the duty of allegiance to the King, neither could they settle without carrying a Parliament and the right to assemble and vote taxes in that Parliament . . . Settlers from other countries

(Spain, for example, or Portugal) might carry their King with them. The peculiar thing about settlers from England was that they also carried a parliament with them.<sup>1</sup>

At first little conflict on this score arose, but the parliaments were notably the perquisite of the European, of the "white" man, and if by any chance a place of settlement contained other inhabitants, either indigenous people who had survived extermination or sprung from imported labour from another race or continent, these others were regarded as politically silent.

In the early years of imperial settlement, it seemed natural and inevitable that Parliaments, if they were elected at all, should be elected by an élite minority. Only one in twenty of the adult population of Britain enjoyed the franchise before 1832. It seemed proper, therefore, that the parliaments established overseas should be elected by only the most advanced inhabitants.

In our day, universal suffrage is regarded as an essential aim of the parliamentary system, even though it has been in operation in the United Kingdom for less than twenty-five years. Few people in Britain question the rightness of progressing towards universal suffrage in colonies where it is desired and where the inhabitants have shown some aptitude in the operation of democratic institutions. "Universal adult suffrage . . . has long been regarded as a privilege of citizenship which distinguishes a politically mature people", state the authors of a recent report on the Constitution of British Guiana.<sup>2</sup>

On the idea of parliamentary government has been imposed the idea of democracy, which is taken to mean universal suffrage. Every man or woman, it is said, should have one vote, and one vote only; and no man's vote should be worth more than his neighbour's.

Are these ideas to be applied universally? Before answering this question, the reader might reflect on the application of

<sup>1</sup> Barker, Sir Ernest, "The Ideals of the Commonwealth", in *Parliamentary Government in the Commonwealth*, edited by Sydney D. Bailey, 1951.

<sup>2</sup> *British Guiana: Report of the Constitutional Commission*, 1950-1, 1951.

these ideas to a World Parliament. How many people would be prepared to grant full sovereignty to a World Parliament elected by universal suffrage, a Parliament of 250 members of whom fifty were Chinese, forty were Indians, twenty Russians, but of whom only five came from the United Kingdom or France and only about fifteen from the United States? It is by posing the question in this way that it is possible to see the limitations to the way universal suffrage can be applied. Universal suffrage can only work successfully if the unit to which it is applied is of such a size and kind that all who vote share certain common *ideals, values and traditions* which transcend differences of *opinion*. It may break down completely where two or more social groups live side by side in the same political unit without mixing.

The European living in a colony is well aware of this. He no doubt wants a parliament, but not necessarily a parliament elected by universal suffrage. He wants to vote himself, and to allow others to vote if they share his standards and fundamental ideals about society. He quotes with approval the dictum of Cecil Rhodes: "Equal rights for every civilized man", but may leave unanswered the question as to what constitutes civilization.<sup>1</sup>

### **The Point of View of the Indigenous Inhabitants**

Now let us look at the matter from the point of the educated indigenous citizen. He sees his country governed by an alien people who speak a strange tongue and worship a different god. These people may rule his country justly and efficiently. They may have imposed law and order, brought an increasing degree of economic prosperity, established hospitals and schools, and spoken with respect of the ideals of freedom.

The life of these foreigners is apart from the life of the mass of the indigenous people. They live in foreign-style houses, eat foreign-style food, and dress for dinner. They send their

<sup>1</sup> "My motto is, equal rights for every civilized man south of the Zambesi. What is a civilized man? A man, whether white or black, who has sufficient intelligence to write his name, has some property or work, in fact is not a loafer." Quoted by W. K. Hancock in *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, Vol. I, 1937.

children to be educated in the homeland, and they read newspapers and books sent from the homeland. The land in which they have settled never quite becomes "home" however long they stay there.

The educated indigenous citizen reads in the history books of the foreigner how this process began and how it has continued, and in reading the tale he often finds it most easy to remember the instances in which the foreigner was unjust or greedy or cruel. He reads how in other lands the indigenous people were exterminated or driven away or sold into slavery. He may contrast his own poverty with the opulence of the foreigner, and—quite incorrectly—ascribe this to the evil machinations of the foreigner.

His attitude to the foreigner is a mixture of respect and dislike and fear. He respects the technological and moral achievements of the foreigner, dislikes the foreigner's condescension, and fears that the foreigner's position of superiority is permanent.

He determines that one day his people will attain the skill of the foreigner, and when that day comes they will compete on equal terms.

He adopts the political technique of the foreigner, taking one step at a time. A concession is asked for, eventually secured, and immediately denounced as inadequate. He asks that in the legislative assembly Native interests shall be watched by a foreigner, then by a member of his own community, then by a number of members of his own community. After a generation he asks for "parity", an assembly in which all communities have equality of representation irrespective of numbers. But his final objective is to raise his people to such a standard that eventually there will be a parliament elected by universal suffrage.

### **A Further Complication**

A further complication arises if there exist in a colony not two socially-distinct groups, but three or even more. It will be remembered that this is the position in many African colonies, and it also applies in other British colonies, notably

British Guiana, Cyprus, Fiji, Malaya, Mauritius, Singapore, Trinidad.

In Britain, in spite of differences of culture and tradition, there is a united kingdom, socially-cohesive and homogeneous, small in size, under one unitary government. All British citizens, or most of them, speak the same language. They are racially akin, and share a common cultural heritage. They nearly all believe in the same religion or are so indifferent as not to care. The most important newspapers are national newspapers; and radio and television programmes are provided by a national corporation.

It is difficult for the British citizen, unless he has experienced them at first hand, to understand the problems which exist in countries where community antagonisms are acute. The difficulties are broadly of two kinds—the long-term effort needed to create a sense of solidarity and social cohesion, and short-term measures needed to safeguard the rights of all communities while the other process is going on. The trouble is that these two aims often conflict, and it only seems possible to pursue one at the expense of the other. Measures like communal representation, which are intended as an interim measure to guarantee the rights of all communities, often have the effect of delaying indefinitely the creation of a sense of unity.

### **A Note on the Caribbean Area**

It is sometimes said that the problems of the plural society have been solved in Caribbean colonies, and it may be as well to look more closely at conditions in that part of the world. All generalizations about the problems of plural societies are dangerous, none more so than those based upon Caribbean experience.

The recent Commission on the Constitution of British Guiana found that life in British Guiana was not dominated by racial tension and that there were many heartening signs of the development of a genuine Guianese outlook. The Commission was impressed by the amity with which peoples of all races lived side by side in the villages and found that

"racialism spoke with a hesitant voice in public". Virtually no proposals were received for communal representation. In Trinidad, although in the 1951 elections attempts were made in some quarters to rouse racial feelings, none of the parties are racial in origin or policy, and problems of "white-coloured-black" relations are at least as important as those between East Indian and "African".

These latter problems are common to all Caribbean colonies, though to varying degrees. They are concerned with race relations in a less well-defined and probably less acute way than in truly plural societies elsewhere. The "African" has no tribal organization; he has imbibed since slave days a Western civilization which has been little, if at all, modified by his racial origin. His aim is not to preserve a culture but to gain full entry, as a right not a privilege, to Western culture (though if for too long frustrated he may end by despising that culture). There is, too, every gradation of colour from "black" to "white" and the latter term has as much an economic as a racial significance. The large coloured middle-class has long enjoyed political and economic influence. If it is divided socially from the "white" minority, it is also divided economically from the mass of the people. As the French middle-class used the peasant at the time of the Revolution, so the Caribbean middle-class has aroused the "barefooted man" in support of the idea of self-government. The fundamental problem of the Caribbean area will be that of middle-class attitudes to the under-privileged. This economic cleavage may often be expressed in terms of colour, but it will in fact bear little relationship to pigmentation and even less to basic cultural differences.

In so far as the "white" minority (which must be taken to include those coloured people who by education, political advantage and economic superiority regard themselves or are regarded as "whites") seeks to protect itself against the consequences of universal suffrage and responsible government, it will continue to operate within a political framework which takes no account of racial differences. Big business ("white" or "coloured") may seek to come to an arrangement with

political leaders, but nowhere will a party of the "whites" achieve political power under modern constitutions. Nor would such a party demand or receive communal representation, reserved seats, or even the Cumulative Vote on the lines of that established in Ceylon for the benefit of the minorities. The "white" community is in any case less than one per cent. in Jamaica and six per cent. in Barbados and does not occupy positions of political and economic strength like those of the European settlers in East and Central Africa. Even in Barbados, where the caste system still exists and where the number of "poor whites" complicates the issue, racial issues though important, are unlikely to form the basis of party organization or overt political rivalry. In so far as a genuine "white" minority, mindful of past power and privilege, cannot preserve those advantages within the present political framework, it seems doomed to sulk in its tents.

The nature of the racial problem in the Caribbean, therefore, is so radically different from that elsewhere that valid comparisons are difficult. The problem is certainly not solved; if race relations are on a sounder basis than in other tropical regions, this is not due to factors which can be expected to emerge elsewhere.

### **Approaches to a Solution**

It is not the purpose of this report to advocate any clear-cut solution to the problem of the plural society or any other problem. It may, however, be useful to indicate some of the courses of action which have been proposed.

#### *(i) Partition*

It is necessary to mention partition as a theoretically possible solution, but only to reject it decisively for most of the territories with which this report is concerned. The communities may exist side by side without mixing, but the fact that they do exist side by side, and are dependent on each other, rules out partition as impracticable. Partition has been adopted elsewhere, notably in India, Palestine, and Ireland, but it is a solution to be avoided if possible, if for no other reason than

that it is rarely accepted by everyone as a final solution. Irridentist claims are inevitable, and there are nearly always those who resent the division and work for a restoration of unity. And it is a solution usually reached at the cost of great human suffering.

(ii) *Federal Government*

Federal government is usually no easier to enforce than partition since the different communities rarely live in self-contained territorial units. Nevertheless, it has been advocated for adoption in a few colonies.

The late Lord Lugard suggested a variant of the federal idea for adoption in Kenya, and his proposal was examined by the Hilton-Young Commission on Closer Union:

The Colony would be divided into two areas, one for occupation by Europeans and such non-Europeans as desired to accept the Parliamentary system of government or were employed as labourers or domestic servants; the other, exclusive of small sites for Missions or trading purposes, would be mainly for occupation by the African population.

The area occupied by each section would be proportionate to its present and prospective economic and social requirements. The Governor would function in a separate capacity over each section. The laws passed "by and with the consent of the Legislative Council" of the English-speaking section would be applied by the Governor wholly or in part, or a separate law would be enacted by him, for the native section, pending their progressive ability to advise on legislation affecting their interests. A Joint Advisory Council, on which the Native Councils and every section would be represented would be summoned when required for the discussion of common interests or the determination of matters in which the separate interests appeared to be divergent or in conflict. The technical departments would generally be common to both. Each section would frame its own budget and expend its own contribution to the public revenue, and

bear an equitable share of the cost of common services. The progress of each towards self-government would be limited only by its competence. The Kenya-Uganda railway would be managed by a public utility "Controlled Company".

Only by such a plan did it seem possible to meet the natural demand of the European minority for progress towards self-government on the British model, and at the same time to govern with the willing consent and understanding of the great majority to whom that model is quite unsuited, or to fulfil the pledge to train them for eventual self-government which would conflict with the "self-government" (viz., universal control) desired by the Europeans.<sup>1</sup>

One serious difficulty about implementing this proposal is that it would hardly be possible in most colonies to demarcate "white" and "black" areas along the lines proposed by Lord Lugard. Indeed, few people can be found who really like the scheme. Though interest in the proposal has recently revived, most European settlers do not favour it, and to the Africans it smacks of *apartheid*.

### (iii) *Communal Representation*

This device requires careful consideration because, in its various forms, it has been widely used by nearly all colonial powers.

Communal representation is a method of ensuring that different "communities" in a country are represented in the national assembly. The British House of Commons has, as its name implies, represented "communities", in the sense of the inhabitants of geographical areas. But geographical communities are not the only forms of division. Racial, religious, linguistic or occupational communities have often been separately represented in British colonial legislative assemblies.<sup>2</sup> The system of communal representation in this sense could

<sup>1</sup> Introduction by Lord Lugard to *Race and Politics in Kenya*, a correspondence between Elspeth Huxley and Margery Perham, 1944.

<sup>2</sup> See Wight, Martin, *The Development of the Legislative Council*, 1606-1945, 1947, pages 85-90.

easily be applied in the United Kingdom. It would, for example, be possible to maintain separate registers of voters for men and women and to provide that men could only vote for male candidates and women for female candidates; or the "communities" could be religious, with Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists, Quakers, Jews, etc., voting on separate registers. But in Britain the population is sufficiently homogeneous to make such an idea seem absurd, though for more than three centuries the University seats did in fact provide a form of communal representation.

It is easy to see how communal representation has come into existence. In the early days of colonial rule a governor would set up an advisory council consisting of official and unofficial persons nominated by him. In choosing the unofficial persons, the governor would no doubt try to ensure that each community was represented, and probably the amount of the representation would bear some relation to the size and importance of each community. Then this procedure would become fixed, either explicitly or by convention. As the transition from a nominated to a mixed and later to a wholly elected council took place, the system of communal representation would be retained. This method has been followed in many colonies, and it may be worth examining in some detail its history in Ceylon, where it was finally abolished in 1931.

### **The Experience of Ceylon**

Communal representation was introduced in Ceylon in 1845. A Legislative Council consisting of the Governor and nine officials had been set up in 1833, following the report of the Colebrooke Commission. Four years later the Council was enlarged by the addition of two English-speaking unofficial members nominated by the Governor. In 1845 the number of nominated unofficial members was increased to six, and it was provided that these should consist of three Europeans, one Burgher, one Low Country Sinhalese, and one Tamil. Communal representation, begun under the system of gubernatorial nomination, was continued when the elective principle

was introduced in 1911. Successive forms of the Constitution maintained the system until its abolition in 1931, following the report of the Donoughmore Commission.

The Donoughmore Commissioners, who visited Ceylon in 1927-8, noted that an orthodox party system was lacking, and this they ascribed to the spirit of communalism. "The parliamentary system of government", they wrote, "is essentially dependent for its success on combined as opposed to individual efforts, on the existence of parties whose representatives agree on a common policy, work together in support of their party's aims, are loyal to each other and to their party's decisions and preserve on all major issues a united front. . . ."<sup>1</sup> In Ceylon, however, the member elected to the Legislative Council "is forced frequently to conceive of himself as the champion of his own community or race. . . ." Communal representation had been introduced "in the hope of eliminating the clash of these various interests" and it was expected that it would "tend to promote unity". But the result had been the reverse of what had been hoped. "The evils of communal representation have accentuated rather than diminished racial differences. . . ."

The Commissioners therefore decided to recommend its abolition. The system had "no great antiquity to commend it, and its introduction into the constitution with good intention" had had unfortunate results. In a striking passage the Commissioners described these results:

We have come unhesitatingly to the conclusion that communal representation is, as it were, a canker on the body politic, eating deeper and deeper into the vital energies of the people, breeding self-interest, suspicion and animosity, poisoning the new growth of political consciousness, and effectively preventing the development of a national or corporate spirit. . . . There can be no hope of binding together the diverse elements of the population in a realization of their own common kinship and an acknowledgment of common obligations to the country of which they are all citizens so long as the system of communal repre-

<sup>1</sup> *Ceylon: Report of the Special Commission on the Constitution, 1928.*

sentation, with all its disintegrating influences, remains a distinctive feature of the constitution.<sup>1</sup>

The proposal to abolish communal representation was, as might be expected, welcomed by the Sinhalese, who formed the most numerous community. As the Governor, Sir Herbert Stanley, pointed out in a despatch to the Secretary of State, the Sinhalese were the one community who had gained nothing from the system and were liable to lose if it were continued. The minorities, however, were apprehensive. "The Ceylon Tamils", wrote the Governor, "are concerned lest they should suffer some diminution of their political influence". The Moslem communities and the Burghers had considered communal representation "their only assured safeguard against the risk of political submersion". Nevertheless, the Governor agreed that the system should be discontinued. The Secretary of State, Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb), decided to accept the recommendation of the Donoughmore Commission and the advice of the Governor, and communal representation was accordingly abolished.

The abolition of communal representation did not lead to an immediate diminution of communalism. Indeed, in the view of many people, communal feeling tended to increase. This, however, was probably due in part to an astute but unwise manoeuvre on the part of the Sinhalese who, to demonstrate that the Donoughmore Constitution was unsatisfactory, had in 1936 arranged that the minority communities should be excluded from the Ministry. Nevertheless, when in 1938 the Governor of Ceylon, Sir Andrew Caldecott, wrote to the Secretary of State about the possible revision of the Donoughmore Constitution, he did not recommend the re-introduction of communal representation. "Any concession to the principle of communal representation would perpetuate sectionalism (which I believe to be anathema to thinking people in Ceylon of all races) and preclude the emergence of true political issues."

When the Soulbury Commission visited Ceylon in 1944-45, the Donoughmore Constitution had been in full operation for

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*

nearly fourteen years and it was possible to assess the consequences of the abandonment of communal representation. The Soulbury Commission reported that the elimination of communalism from political life in Ceylon was purely formal. "When political issues arise, the populace as a whole tends to divide, not according to the economic and social issues which in the West would ordinarily unite individuals belonging to a particular class, but on communal lines. . . . The hopes of the Donoughmore Commission, that communal representation would eventually disappear as a result of territorial representation, have so far not been realized."<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, the Soulbury Commission decided to "reject any proposal calculated to reinforce the communal basis of election". They also recommended that an orthodox form of parliamentary government, with a legislature of two chambers and a cabinet responsible to the legislature, should be introduced.

It should be noted, however, that the Ceylon Constitution provided an important safeguard to minorities, and in addition there have been certain electoral concessions to the minorities. The safeguard is a clause in the Constitution which declares void any law which imposes on persons of any community or religion disabilities or restrictions which persons of other communities or religions are not made liable to, or which confers on persons of any community or religion any privilege or advantage which is not conferred on persons of other communities or religions.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ceylon: Report of the Commission on Constitutional Reform, 1945.*

<sup>2</sup> There are similar and more elaborate safeguards in the new Indian Constitution. It is interesting in this connection to note a recommendation of the Commission on the Constitution of British Guiana: "It is imperative—and fundamental to the beliefs that inspire our constitutional proposals—that racial preoccupations should be banished if British Guiana is to make real progress. Legislation alone cannot, of course, remedy an attitude of mind, but we believe that it would be helpful to British Guiana, provided that the law officers consider the suggestion to be practicable, if it could be made an offence for anyone to refer in an election speech to the racial origin of any candidate." The Secretary of State commented as follows: "I do not consider that a legislative provision on these lines could be effectively enforced or that it is, indeed, desirable. While I entirely share the Commission's anxiety that racial issues shall not be permitted to imperil the success of the new constitution"  
*[continued at foot of next page]*

The concessions to minorities were:

- (a) an increase in the number of seats in areas where minority communities predominate: this was possible because one important minority community is largely concentrated in certain areas;
- (b) the creation of multi-member constituencies and the use of the Cumulative Vote (see Appendix H, paragraph 5 (a) page 146). Thus in a three-member constituency with 150,000 electors belonging to community A and 75,000 belonging to community B, if voting follows communal lines community B is likely to have one member elected.
- (c) the "weighting" of votes by providing extra representation for rural areas.

Since the introduction of responsible government it seems that there has been a diminution of communalism in Ceylon. The first indication of this trend came in 1946 when a Buddhist party, a Moslem party, the Ceylon National Congress and some independent politicians merged to form the United National Party. A coalition inter-communal government took office, later to be joined by representatives of the Ceylon Tamil Congress.

It seems that there were two stages which led to a diminution of communalism in Ceylon. The first was the implementation of the Donoughmore Report in 1931. Communal representation was abolished and at the same time universal suffrage was introduced, the electorate being thereby increased from 205,000 in 1924 to over one and a half million in 1931 and about two and a half millions five years later. The second event was the attainment of responsible government after the second world war.

It is not suggested that what has happened in Ceylon will necessarily happen in other plural societies. Indeed, one of the points that requires stressing is that the term *plural society*

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tution—and indeed I am confident that this anxiety is shared by all the people of British Guiana—I consider that this can best be secured by the influence of enlightened public opinion, and a general realization that the future of the Colony depends on the mutual co-operation and toleration of members of all communities."

is in danger of becoming a catch phrase to describe territories as different as Cyprus, Kenya, and Trinidad. There is no standard pattern of plural society and no solution which applies universally. Nevertheless, it seems that there are lessons to be learned from Ceylon, and that in territories where conditions are analogous, it is likely that the abolition of communal representation would, in time, lessen communal antagonisms. Communal representation is one of those devices which may be required to safeguard the position of minorities during a transition period; but it is a system which runs counter to the trend of modern government, which needs unified action for social and economic purposes, and the sooner it can be dispensed with or replaced by other safeguards for the protection of minorities, the sooner a sense of social and political cohesion is likely to emerge.<sup>1</sup>

(iv) *The Cumulative Vote*

Reference has already been made to the use of the Cumulative Vote in Ceylon. This system has the merit of ensuring that substantial minorities, even if evenly spread over the country as a whole, can secure some representation in parliament. It is, moreover, easy to understand and simple to operate. It may be that it could be adopted with advantage in colonies where there is some hesitation in dispensing altogether with communal representation and yet a desire to make some progress in obliterating communal differences.

(v) *Proportional Representation*

Two kinds of P.R. (proportional representation) are described in Appendix H (paragraph 4) pages 145-6. The "list" system, though often favoured on the Continent of Europe, finds little support in Britain. If introduced in plural societies, it would almost certainly encourage the tendency to create parties on strictly communal lines and the parties would probably submit strictly communal lists of candidates.

The other system of P.R. is known as the Single Transferable

<sup>1</sup> A useful discussion of this problem is *Self-Government and the Communal Problem* by Marjorie Nicholson, 1944. Miss Nicholson believes that minorities cannot find salvation through communal programmes.

Vote (S.T.V.), the operation of which is described in Appendix H, (paragraph 4 (a), page 145.

The S.T.V. system is usually applied to constituencies returning about five members each, the size varying according to local conditions. The constituencies should be large enough to allow representation of all the major groups, but small enough to allow the voters to know something about each candidate; they should preferably coincide with natural units such as, for example, a town of fair size or a reasonably well-defined group of villages.

Under the S.T.V. system any solid group of voters numbering one "quota" is bound to get one representative by the transfer of votes from the less popular candidates of the group until the whole "quota" accumulates on the most popular. The solidity of the group may be communal or ideological in origin; the group is simply an expression of the voters' feelings at that time, and may disappear and be replaced by other groups as circumstances change. Ideological parties can develop naturally across communal divisions, for if an elector votes "1" for whichever of the candidates of his own community best accords with his political ideas, he may then vote "2" either for another candidate of the same community or for one of a different community whose politics he prefers.

A possible objection to the S.T.V. system is that it is too much to expect illiterate or semi-literate people to be able to number several candidates, perhaps fifteen or even twenty, in order of preference. However, illiteracy has in certain notable cases caused less difficulty than might have been expected: about forty per cent of Maltese voters are illiterate but vote in this way quite satisfactorily with the help of the Presiding Officer. Many of them might be able to vote unaided if symbols were used in addition to the names of the candidates. Moreover, the system will still work reasonably well even if a large proportion of the voters are only able to mark the *one* candidate they like best. A start could be made on this basis, encouraging all to mark one candidate, and those who can to continue with the figures 2, 3, etc. for other candidates. The latter votes will be more certain than the former to be effective,

and this advantage to the more educated voters might be desirable.

It is clear that very small minorities will not automatically secure representation by this method (if a constituency returns, say, five members, a group must exceed one-sixth of the voters to secure a representative). If there are compelling reasons why a small minority should be represented, the rules could be modified to reserve one seat for that minority if none of its candidates succeeds on his own merits. The candidate filling this seat would be the one who obtains most votes from the minority, not the one preferred by the majority.

Those who are opposed to the adoption of the S.T.V. system argue that:

- (i) It is too complicated and that experience in Malta is no guide to what might happen elsewhere. Most voters in an African or Asian colony are much less sophisticated than the voters of Malta.
  - (ii) It preserves a multiplicity of parties and fosters splinter movements, and that this is just what is to be avoided in a plural society where the forces of disintegration are already powerful.
  - (iii) It tends to separate the member of parliament from his constituents.<sup>1</sup>
- (vi) *Bicameralism as a safeguard of minority rights*

The fact that the British Parliament consists of two chambers is not due primarily to considerations of political theory. While it may be true to say that the House of Lords exercises valuable functions as a revisory body and as a forum for the discussion of important questions, this is a description of what it does rather than an explanation of why it came into existence.

In a federal system of government, the existence of a second chamber is regarded as an essential method of safeguarding the rights of the federating units. If one chamber is elected on a strict population basis, the less populous units may find themselves swamped by one or two large units. A second chamber, created on the basis of equality from the federating

<sup>1</sup>For the development of the case in favour of P.R. see pp. 147-9

units, forms a protection of the smaller units even if this is considered by the larger units to be an irksome and frustrating restriction.

The use of a second chamber which could, amongst other functions, protect minority rights was recently proposed by two members of the Commission on the Constitution of British Guiana, and the proposal was accepted by the Secretary of State. It remains to be seen how effectively the upper chamber in British Guiana will fulfil this particular function, but it has seemed right to draw attention to this device for possible adoption in plural societies.

(vii) *An elected Executive*

Mr. L. S. Amery has suggested that the Swiss method of an executive elected by the legislature by P.R. might be suitable for some plural societies. The essence of the system is that the Cabinet is elected by both houses of the legislature by the S.T.V., and consequently is necessarily a coalition containing, on the whole, moderate people of the different elements. There is no Prime Minister, but the Presidency of the Cabinet goes round by annual rotation. Once elected, the Cabinet cannot be dismissed by an adverse parliamentary vote, and this means that a member of the Cabinet has no reason to be subject to the pull of his own community. The Cabinet, which is thus not responsible to the legislature, tends to be an administrative rather than a political body.

(viii) *Independence as a "Catalyst"*

It is common for commissions of enquiry into the constitutions of British colonies to deplore the absence of a party system on ideological lines. In a homogeneous colony, political parties usually have as their main, perhaps their only, aim the achievement of self-government. Party differences are about the speed of advance, about the appropriate tactics to achieve a greater measure of self-government at any particular moment. It is usually only when self-government is imminent or achieved that ideological parties emerge.

In a plural society it is almost inevitable that parties should be formed on communal lines so long as the imperial

power is prepared to hold the ring. Once independence is achieved, however, communal parties tend to disintegrate and ideological parties to emerge. This is not an "iron law" but a tendency, the strength of which is influenced by local circumstances.

Self-government is often thought of as a concession wrung from a reluctant imperial government: but there may be circumstances in which self-government could be used as a "threat" by an imperial government. The imperial government may decide to gamble with the "threat" of self-government as a catalyst<sup>1</sup> to force the different communities in a plural society to come together. Communal parties may decide to sink their differences once self-government seems on the point of being achieved. To some extent this happened in Ceylon as self-government became imminent.

The "threat" of self-government can be regarded either as a gamble or an act of faith. Certainly, people rarely behave responsibly unless given responsibility. Although it is not suggested that the "threat" of self-government is a weapon to use lightly, circumstances may conceivably arise in which no other course is possible.

(ix) *Continuance of "trusteeship"*

In the context of this chapter "trusteeship" does not mean the formal Trusteeship System of the United Nations, but the concept of guarding the interests of someone else. In colonies which form plural societies, this means in practice the responsibility of the imperial power to protect, in a political sense, those of any community who are not yet able to look after themselves. This responsibility involves both efforts to teach and inspire the ward and thus eliminate the need for a guardian, and in the meantime measures to ensure that this process is not endangered by the natural aspirations of others more fortunate.

In some plural societies, particularly in East and Central Africa, this may have the unfortunate effect of denying to the advanced communities the democratic institutions which they

<sup>1</sup> A catalyst is something which effects the speed of change without itself undergoing change.

naturally strive for, because to grant democracy to a few may delay, or may be feared to delay, the grant of democracy to all.

It may be that for many plural societies, there is no alternative to a more or less indefinite prolongation of imperial control—in British terms, of Crown Colony status. To those who wish to bring colonial régimes to an end as quickly as possible, this may be a distasteful conclusion. It may, indeed, be found to be politically impossible.

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This chapter has been devoted to a consideration of the problems of the plural society and to a number of possible courses of action. One thing that seems to have emerged is the danger of treating the term *plural society* as a label which, once attached to a colony, indicates precisely what is wrong. *Plural society* is not so much a diagnosis as an admission that there is a condition to be remedied. Plural societies are not identical in character, and there is no standard prescription to be applied in all cases.

Though this chapter has included an examination of various constitutional devices which have been proposed for the plural society, it should not be thought that the answer lies solely in the construction of appropriate constitutional machinery. The problem is also in part economic in character, in part educational—some would say spiritual—in character. It is not necessary to accept the Marxist thesis to see the relation between economic conditions and social, cultural, and political conditions. An improvement in the political aptitudes of under-developed communities must be accompanied by an improvement in their material standards of living.

There is much to do in dispelling the clouds of ignorance which surround the communal problem, whether it is racial, religious, or cultural in origin. Even the wise use of words may help. A migrant to the United States, if he wishes to partake in the political life of his new home, must become an American citizen, must become—whatever his origin—an “American”. Is there anything to be said for the view that, at least in official documents, the same policy be adopted in colonial territories? A “white” child born in Kenya or Malaya of

parents who have settled and made their home there is as much a Kenyan or Malayan as the child of "indigenous" parents; the same is true of a child of erstwhile Indian parentage. The use of the terms "European" and "Indian" to refer to the settler communities is an anomaly.

It is often suggested by colonial nationalists that a frank and precise statement of imperial intentions might do much to restore confidence in colonial territories. It should, however, be emphasized that nobody can foresee the precise rate of progress. It would surely be a mistake for an imperial power to commit itself in advance to an exact time-table which might in practice prove to be spread over too long or too short a period. Moreover, verbal declarations of intentions are less important than practical achievements.

It is well to remember that political developments in plural societies take place within the framework of the larger world. The African in Kenya has one eye on Accra and Lagos and the other on Capetown and Pretoria. The Indian tends to look to Delhi, the Pakistani to Karachi, the British settler to London. The different communities in a plural society cannot isolate themselves from the larger world, but they should remember that a runner who constantly looks over his shoulder rarely wins the race.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

#### **Forms of Local Government**

**L**OCAL government in colonies is not an invention of the second half of the twentieth century. There has always been local government of some sort, even though it may have been nothing more than the personal instructions of a military officer or government agent. Imperial governments had to see that the territories they acquired were administered, and local administration usually took one of three forms:

- (i) direct rule by officials of the imperial government.
- (ii) local *self*-government
- (iii) government by means of indigenous institutions.

Local *self*-government, like parliamentary self-government, tended to be thought of as the privilege of "white" settlers, at any rate in the early days in British colonies. Institutions of local self-government in the British Empire were usually modelled on those of the United Kingdom and took over British terminology.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps this was an example of misplaced flattery. British local government was not then, and is not today, a particularly logical or coherent system, to be copied blindly; it is a collection of expedients adopted during the past 120 years and imposed on medieval institutions which were in part ecclesiastical in origin. The adoption of British local government institutions which were beginning to be obsolete when they were adopted, has had some unfortunate consequences in a number of colonies.

Government by means of indigenous institutions is often

<sup>1</sup> Local government areas in Jamaica are called parishes; the chief magistrate is known as the *Custos Rotulorum*; and the three counties are named Surrey, Cornwall, and Middlesex.

called Indirect Rule. It is usually thought of as the system first developed in Nigeria by the late Lord Lugard, but it was in fact adopted much earlier in a slightly different form in India, Burma, and Ceylon, and by other imperial powers in their colonies. The essence of the system is that traditional rulers and councils are recognized by the colonial government as agents for certain purposes, and given limited authority in a number of fields. The system had at least three merits—it was a gesture of conciliation to traditional spokesmen and leaders who, had they adopted an attitude of opposition, might have become a source of embarrassment to the imperial power, it was a system understood by the people, and it was cheap.

Some, but by no means all, of these traditional Native Authorities have functioned effectively. "Looking at the picture as a whole", writes Lord Hailey in a recent report on British African colonies, "it reveals a certain number of Native Authorities which have made a noteworthy contribution in the discharge of local government functions. But it reveals also that there are a considerable proportion which are only partially effective or, it must be admitted, entirely ineffective in that capacity."<sup>1</sup> The situation is much the same in many non-British colonies.

There are a number of reasons why a considerable proportion of the traditional Native Authorities have been only partially effective or entirely ineffective. Some of the difficulties could be removed in time if it were thought desirable to maintain these traditional institutions. There is, however, a growing feeling amongst the educated classes in the colonies that the traditional authorities, even though they often include a proportion of elected members, are becoming an anachronism and should be replaced by institutions of a more democratic character. The Earl of Listowel, when he was British Minister of State for the Colonies, emphasized the need for a continuous adjustment of local government policy in British Africa in this direction:

<sup>1</sup> Hailey, *Lord*, *Native Administration in the British African Territories*, Vol. IV, 1951.

We are already in a position in which constitutional reform is not merely a matter for the educated element of the population, or for the chiefs and Native Authorities, but one which closely concerns the ordinary people who form the bulk of the population of each territory. This leads naturally to the conception of sound local government institutions in Africa as *the only healthy basis* for political advance. The aim is to secure an effective system of local government not only in the towns but in the rural areas and representative *not only of the traditional elements* of the population but also of the rising middle classes, the farmers, industrial workers and the educated minority, all of whom have an important part to play in the growth of these institutions in their home areas. This will give us a pyramid of African Councils representing both traditional and non-traditional elements, and chosen increasingly by forms of popular election. . . . The liberalization of representation on local authorities widens the opportunities for participation far beyond the traditional leaders, and thus opens a wider field for talent and skill for local government work, especially among the better educated and more progressive.<sup>1</sup>

A major emphasis today, especially in British colonies, is on the development of representative local government institutions on Western lines. It is as natural that the educated citizens of the colonies should want these as that they should want their own parliaments. Colonial nationalists will, however, be on guard lest modern local government institutions be offered as a substitute for progress in the development of parliamentary institutions.

### **Local Government as a school for parliamentary government**

In the United Kingdom and other Western countries, participation in local government is often regarded as a sort of apprenticeship for service in the central parliament. In the

<sup>1</sup> Address delivered to the Royal Empire and Royal African Societies, April, 1949. Published in *The Journal of African Administration*, Vol. I, No. 3, July, 1949. (Italics inserted.).

1945-50 House of Commons 56 per cent. of Labour M.P.s and 25 per cent. of Conservative and Liberal M.P.s possessed personal experience of local government,<sup>1</sup> and the late Professor Laski even went so far as to suggest that three years' service on a local authority should be a condition of eligibility for a parliamentary candidate.<sup>2</sup> He was concerned that candidates should have proved both their seriousness and their competence in public affairs, and he could think of no better school than that of local government. Many people who would not go so far as Professor Laski would wholeheartedly support his general contention. "I do not believe there is any better training for the art of government than participation in local administration", said Colonel Oliver Stanley, when he was Secretary of State for the Colonies. "I regard the extension of local government as one of the quickest and certainly the surest methods of making certain of the extension of central government."<sup>3</sup>

It is natural that people in the West should think of local government as a suitable training-ground for parliament, because local authorities have been charged with important duties, have enjoyed considerable discretion and independence, and have administered many of the important services of a modern democratic state.

In many colonies, including those that have made the greatest progress in developing local government institutions on Western lines, local government is often not taken seriously by ambitious or public-spirited men, if they are people of any considerable ability. Their thoughts tend to centre on the central legislature.

This state of affairs is natural enough. Colonial people cannot help but regard as important those activities in which "white" men have engaged, and as relatively unimportant those which he has left to the Native people. The "white" administrator is an official of the central government; the

<sup>1</sup> Ross, J. F. S., *Parliamentary Representation*, Second edition, 1948.

<sup>2</sup> In September, 1952, the Prime Minister of Egypt, Aly Maher, proposed that at least three years' service in a village or provincial council should be required of all parliamentary candidates.

<sup>3</sup> Speech in the House of Commons, 13th July, 1943.

"white" technician an official of a central department. Their counterparts in the Native Authorities are often men of little consequence—unqualified, inefficient, perhaps semi-literate, and above all paid the merest pittance. The responsibilities of local bodies have been relatively unimportant, and as if to emphasize the insignificance of local government, there are discrepancies in salaries, not only between a District Officer and the Clerk of a Native Authority (for here there is no real comparison), but between the latter and a government clerk of junior position and little responsibility. This is often because central government employees may have to live away from home and thus have higher expenses, though this fact is often overlooked.

Bred in this tradition, and unable to visualize what local government could mean, and does in fact mean elsewhere, colonial citizens do not always take very seriously exhortations that local government is a matter of great significance and worthy of the attention of the most able. If they are to take a responsible part in government, they want to be District Commissioners (if they are professionals) or members of the central legislature (if amateurs).

The ambition of colonial citizens to become District Commissioners is an odd and significant thing and is worth some consideration. The classic theory about District Commissioners—as the political officers of the British Colonial Service are called—was that they were scaffolding erected while the building of a self-governing state was in progress. Little by little the scaffolding would be taken down as the building grew inside it. The network of political officers, employed by the government and subject to no local control, would gradually give way to one of representative local authorities employing their own staff. The process would be gradual, and the District Commissioner would remain for a long time as guide, philosopher and friend; but he would gradually cease to be a dominant influence and in time would disappear altogether.

What is in fact happening in Africa and elsewhere is that "white" scaffolding is being replaced by "black" scaffolding,

and D.C.s are becoming sort of Regional Commissioners responsible to the Home Department for the preservation of order. The African does not want to be denied the prestige and salary traditionally associated with the D.C. He can hardly be expected to be wildly enthusiastic over the alternative of being Clerk to a newly-constituted District Council (under whatever name) at about a third of the salary and a tenth of the prestige. In any case—the colonial citizen argues—the country has not changed overnight, and if the D.C. was needed in the past he will be needed for some considerable time to come.

The arguments being intelligible and in practice irresistible, the theory must be modified. But viewed objectively it is still a valid one, since for an indigenous person to become associated with a system of direct administration evolved as part of a colonial régime, is an odd paradox. This practice has already produced signs of the strain of divided loyalties, and will probably continue to do so. We may eventually have the picture of a sovereign state administered internally like a colonial dependency, a situation offering unpleasant possibilities.

So much for the paid servant of government. But it is no less true of the ordinary man—the school-teacher, the trader, the farmer—whom many would like to see as an eager councillor, learning the pitfalls of public administration in his district council so that he may place the experience so learned at the service of his country. By and large, he is not interested; he wants to join battle at the centre.

Local government is not then in practice, nor in the minds of many intelligent colonial citizens, a necessary training-ground for parliamentary responsibility; though it can, in so far as a parliament is chosen by indirect election, be a stepping stone, and may increasingly be used as a stepping stone if party politics take firm hold of local government elections. Indeed, training in the conduct of local elections is itself a valuable preliminary to full parliamentary government.

This brings out clearly the vital importance to this discussion of the method of election to the parliamentary body.

Where its members are elected from constituencies which have no necessary relation to local government areas (as in the Gold Coast), it is difficult to see how local authorities can be used as a training-ground for Parliament except by some such rule as Professor Laski suggested. There is, however, much to be said for making parliamentary constituencies correspond with local government areas. Moreover, in colonies which are only just beginning to experiment with universal suffrage, the method of indirect elections has much to commend it. People with little experience or knowledge of national and international political issues may well be able to choose one or more local men and women, and the people so chosen could sit in a number of electoral colleges to elect the members of a central parliament. Moreover, electoral abuses are easier to detect under this system. In colonies where representative local government institutions already exist, it might be possible for the members of local authorities to choose from their own members the members of electoral colleges. Such a method would probably have to be of a transitional kind as it would be increasingly difficult to operate in a colony where a rigid party system had developed.

Another practice which might usefully develop by means of local custom would be that in colonies where some unofficial members of the central legislature are nominated by the Governor, such members should be selected from panels of names submitted by local authorities.

The question, however, is not only whether some means can be devised to bring local and parliamentary government into relationship, but whether it is a proper aim to do so. All one can say about this with confidence is that the more experience of public affairs that is possessed by members of the central parliament, the better it will be for that body. It is not possible to go further and say that the best or only training-ground in public affairs here and now is provided by local government—for this would be manifestly untrue. Business, the law and the public service endow a man with as much or more financial wisdom, rapid perception, and experience of negotiation than membership of a typical Native Authority,

and this is likely to be so for a long time to come. Near-parliamentary government has not waited in the Gold Coast, and will not wait elsewhere, for a system of efficient local government. We cannot, in the short run, look to local government as a school for Parliament. Rather must we look for means of enlarging the potentialities of local government, so that in the long run it will serve this purpose.

### **Local Government Finance**

A difficulty which is encountered in many colonies is that the local authorities (under whatever name they go) are too poor to do anything effective. The amount of money they can raise by local taxation is not enough to finance the provision of those public services and amenities which in the West are regarded as a responsibility of local government. This shortage of money is one reason for the difficulty of creating a sense of importance and prestige in local authorities, and the consequent failure in many cases to attract first-rate men as elected members or officials.

This is, moreover, a problem which will continue for some time to come in many colonies unless positive measures are taken to change the situation. Many services are centrally administered, and the new development and welfare projects in British and other colonies are often the responsibility either of independent public boards or of the central governments of the colonies concerned or perhaps even of some international agency.

The main sources of revenue open to local authorities, apart from loans and grants, are:

- (i) direct local rates or taxes. Various methods of assessment are used, including the house or hut tax, the poll tax, the plural wives tax, the cattle tax, and the crop tax;
- (ii) indirect taxes, fees and licences (e.g., trading licences, marriage registration fees, mining royalties);
- (iii) Native Court fines.

In urban areas these sources of revenue may produce a sizeable sum, and it is these areas which on the whole have the more advanced and representative forms of local government. This is one of the reasons why colonial local government tends to be most healthy in the municipalities. It is in the rural areas, where the people are more backward and perhaps even nomadic, that local authorities tend to have least money and to be least effective.

In Britain and many other countries, local authorities receive subsidies of various kinds from the central government. This is considered necessary because—as a general rule—the poorer areas need to spend more money than the richer areas on many of the services they are expected to provide.

A system of central subsidies is in force in many colonies, but it has been suggested that it should be steadily extended. Such a policy undoubtedly has its dangers. In rural areas in many colonies, the people as a whole are hardly able to cope with modern methods of accounting and book-keeping. The conventional checks on public expenditure cannot operate completely effectively in the more primitive areas. There would probably be cases in which grants from the central government of the colony were unwisely spent or perhaps misappropriated. But it may be that these are risks that should be taken in an effort to give increased vitality and effectiveness to local government.

### **Local and Central Government**

In many parts of the world the proper allocation of functions between local and central government is a matter of controversy. There is no completely logical way of deciding which functions should properly be exercised by local authorities, since almost all acts of government have both a local and a national significance. While it is important that the allocation of functions should be intelligent, it is even more important that they should be intelligible. This does not seem to be the case in many colonies. Local authorities often act not only as agents of the central government for administering certain local services, but also as agents of the central government for

collecting taxes which are spent centrally. Where this is done it is important that the man who pays his tax to the local authority should know how much of it is being retained for local purposes.

It must also be recognized in this connection that the functions of local authorities are not always adequately understood in many of the more backward colonies. In the West it is usual to distinguish three functions of government—the enactment of law, the implementation of law, and the interpretation and enforcement of law. In Britain law is enacted by “the Queen in Parliament”, implemented by the Civil Service under the direction of Her Majesty’s Ministers, and interpreted and enforced in courts of law by Her Majesty’s Judges. Although the same people sometimes perform more than one function, this does not alter the fact that the functions are distinct. In the United States the three functions are separated even more rigidly than in the United Kingdom.

In more primitive societies, these distinctions are often not made. Government has until recently consisted of the enforcement of traditional custom in such matters as marriage and land tenure, and the means of ensuring safety from external attack. Many people who have been brought up under such a system are now encountering for the first time the complexities of Western representative democracy. The district commissioner, the administrative officer, the judge, the magistrate, the local government council, the marketing board, the agricultural co-operative, the recruiting bureau, the missionary—all these may be lumped together in the mind of the citizen as “the Government”. It may be difficult for him to believe that a colonial development project is not under the direct control of the colonial government, but that the administration of the railways is. It may seem odd that the Governor is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. It may be confusing to discover that though the local Bishop happens to be a nominated member of the legislative assembly, the Church is not a Government Department. The subtleties and complexities of Western democracy no doubt appear strange at first sight.

An effort is needed in some colonies to explain to those who pay taxes and are affected by local government decisions that local government (and the same applies to central government) is not just an instrument of imperial policy but an institution which is becoming progressively more representative and democratic, and whose purpose it is to do for the community what individual citizens desire but cannot do for themselves.

### **Regional Authorities**

In some colonies which operate on a federal or quasi-federal basis, regional assemblies of various kinds are being set up, and some of these may prove more effective training grounds for parliamentary government than will local authorities. These regional assemblies are elected and function in much the same way as parliamentary assemblies. They have a certain prestige and status, and have definite functions to perform. The existence of several tiers of government may lead to duplication of effort and a certain amount of confusion, but particularly in areas where local government has been weak, there may be a case for setting up regional legislatures with clearly defined functions. It is significant that, because of a wish to improve local government in the region, one leading politician in Nigeria has decided to remain in the regional assembly and not to serve on the central Cabinet.

### **The Future of Native Authorities**

Considerable controversy has centred round the question of what place the traditional Native Authorities should play as progress towards democratic self-government takes place. The Authorities vary a great deal in size, importance, and effectiveness. A few Authorities have failed so dismally that little effort is likely to be expended in resurrecting them. Others labour under disabilities of various kinds, and it is not easy to decide whether it is wise to attempt to remedy the defects or whether it would be preferable to replace these Native Authorities with modern elected local authorities. But the most difficult problem, paradoxically, concerns the most successful Native Authorities. It is said, on the one hand, that

while these traditional bodies may have functioned effectively in the past, they are out of keeping with modern democratic ideas. On the other hand, it is argued that they should be retained so long as they operate successfully and in accordance with public opinion.

British people, who have tended to modify existing institutions rather than to create new ones, often favour the second view. Colonial nationalists, imbued with noble theories of representative democracy, are more likely to hold the first view.

It seems probable that in practice neither view will prevail in its entirety. Where tribal authority is disintegrating, there is little that can be done to preserve Native Authorities unless their character is changed. In some colonies, it may be desirable to establish new local government bodies, with the tribal chiefs forming a sort of aldermanic element for a transitional period. In the end, no doubt, the traditional leaders will either sink into honourable obscurity or exercise public functions as a result of ability and character rather than by accident of birth.

### **Two Pitfalls**

It is suggested that there are two pitfalls to be avoided, one waiting for the imperial power and the other for the colonial nationalist. Both seem to be walking unhesitatingly towards the pitfalls at the moment.

The difficulty of the imperial power is to believe that what is happening is true. Although the British aim of self-government for the colonies, preceded (in theory) by the establishment of responsible local government, is without question sincere, the administrator has been caught up in a gale of political development the force of which he could hardly have anticipated. At the centre—in the most advanced territories—the situation is hardly any longer in his control. He can exert his influence, assist the inexperienced, and try to curb excesses. But he can no longer govern, save by persuasion and consent. Elsewhere he tends to become entangled in central or national questions of high complexity (represen-

tation of the different communities, for example, or closer union of adjacent territories) and these occupy more effort and attention than local councils. This makes it difficult for the educated colonial citizen to appreciate that local government can be a training ground for great affairs, and it means that local political advance tends to be proportionately slower than central. It easily happens also that the old habits of mind—of paternalism, of slow progress under a guiding hand, of checks and safeguards—no longer possible in central politics—continue to assert themselves in local affairs. Elected local authorities are set up to replace Native Authorities, but central controls are powerful and irksome. These controls are entirely proper in terms of a previous age of administration, but their object is to minimize risk and irresponsibility in a total situation which is itself a wild gamble—or a glorious act of faith. To the local administrator, faced with a dearth of competent staff, with local quarrels, and with widespread misunderstanding of the whole enterprise, this may seem the most unhelpful sort of criticism. It is made with some appreciation of the problems (though it is no doubt a counsel of perfection), and its sole object is to suggest that the risks taken in giving responsibility to local councillors and staff should be comparable in degree with the risks which circumstances have dictated at the centre. This is the pitfall of giving the shadow of local government without its substance.

The pitfall awaiting the colonial nationalist is a rush of party politics to the head. Party political warfare in British West Africa has been confused and fluid, but of surprising bitterness. It seems to many detached observers to be premature, for there is as yet no party *system* of government. Moreover, party differences seem to be largely about constitutional questions, sharpened and embittered, regrettably, by tribal or regional loyalties in some colonies. They are not as yet concerned with economic or social issues. It is perhaps not for the British, who fought each other on the field of battle over constitutional questions in the seventeenth century, to assume superior wisdom. Yet if history can be telescoped, if men are capable of learning from the mistakes and achieve-

ment of others, it might have been hoped that matters of this kind would have been settled by parties in collaboration, rather than, as has happened in some colonies, by forcing many of the country's ablest men into comparative obscurity because they did not hold the right party ticket.

Perhaps this is unavoidable. There is, however, a real danger that parties in some of the more advanced colonies may take too firm a hold on the new local authorities in their most delicate stage of development, and involve them in political argument instead of attention to the local drains. The question of party politics in local government is controversial, and decision rests on a fairly delicate balance of argument; it is also affected by the type of local authority and the work it has to do. In colonial local government it will for some years to come be largely an irrelevance. The local authorities have almost everything to learn—the control of expenditure, the efficient discharge of elementary business, the give and take of committee work, the establishing of confidence. A strong infusion of political doctrine would add to the volume of polemics but not to the art of administration. All this, of course, is conjecture. It may not happen; but the signs are ominous and the pitfall is a large one.

### **Local Government and the Public Service**

Another and possibly more serious reason for apprehension is that if local authorities are to become part of the party political arena, members of the public service will be inhibited—indeed prevented—from taking part in local government. Public officials in the colonies are not, as in Western countries, a small section of the educated class—they are about three-quarters of it. It is said that the 300 students who left the University College of the Gold Coast in 1952 were *all* destined for government employment. Unless the code governing the participation of civil servants in local government is greatly relaxed—even from the liberal conventions of the Masterman Report<sup>1</sup> which is accepted practice in most British colonies—

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix I, pages 146-7, for some extracts from the recommendations of the Masterman Committee.

this is a terrifying thought. It means that the best younger brains in the country are excluded from political affairs, and the way left open for the demagogue and the agitator. This has in fact already happened in some colonies, and one reason why moderate parties cannot easily be organized is that the people who could best organize them are largely prevented from doing so.

This is admittedly a controversial issue, and it is natural that people bred in the Western democratic tradition should regard with apprehension any suggestion of allowing party politics to get a grip of the Civil Service. The authors of the recent report on the Constitution of British Guiana write: "A democratic form of government cannot be sustained unless both the judiciary and the civil service function independently of the Legislature. If a civil servant is to work honestly and effectively under the direction of a succession of ministers of contrasting policies, he must be able to give loyal service to each without fear of subsequent disfavour. . . . There can be no question that a civil servant should be free to express his political views through the ballot, but active participation in the political arena is a different matter, and we regard the barriers against it as essential"<sup>1</sup>.

It should, however, be remembered that appointment by merit and without reference to political convictions is only a century old in the British Civil Service. Sir James Graham was a pioneer in trying to rid the Civil Service of party politics. When he was First Lord of the Admiralty he had occasion to write to a Member of Parliament (25th September, 1832) who was pestering him to find a job for a political friend: "You cannot doubt my sincere and anxious wish to do everything fairly within my power to uphold your interest, and to give you efficient assistance and support. But I am not at liberty to set aside professional claims on account of political differences. In my opinion the Government is best served, and its real interests best supported, by perfect fairness and strict impartiality in the distribution of professional awards. All promotion in the Dockyard will henceforth be given as a

<sup>1</sup> *British Guiana: Report of the Constitutional Commission, 1950-1, 1951.*

reward for merit".<sup>1</sup> Graham was ahead of his time, and cannot have been surprised to receive from an astonished "Patronage Secretary" a letter informing him that "the Tories are at a loss to divine any other motive for your recent dispensation of the patronage at the Admiralty than a desire to conciliate and cultivate the Conservative Party". "It is quite time", he added, "you should be made acquainted with the murmurs of your friends, and the jeers of the enemy".<sup>2</sup>

It will be said that Graham was right and his critics wrong, that the colonies should be able to learn from the experience of others. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that conditions vary, and what is desirable in one country may be disastrous in another. It may well be that a relaxation of the restrictions on the political activities of public servants may be necessary in some colonies during the difficult transition period.

It has been suggested, furthermore, that members of colonial local government bodies should receive some remuneration. The amount should probably be less than the normal salary of a member of the central legislature of the colony, but more than a mere payment of out-of-pocket expenses. There are objections to the payment of salaries to local government councillors, but this may be one of those cases where the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.

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It would be wrong to conceive of local self-government as a substitute for parliamentary self-government, and equally it would be wrong to regard local government experience as the only training-ground for parliamentary responsibility. In some countries, representative institutions have started on the local level and radiated to the centre; elsewhere they have started at the centre and been extended to the local level. In some colonies efforts should be directed to strengthening the system of local government, in others the central government. The two are complementary.

<sup>1</sup> Parker, C. S., *Life and Letters of Sir James Graham*, 1907.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER VII

### FUNCTIONAL CO-OPERATION

#### Unofficial Agencies

**G**OVERNMENT has been described as "the art of corporate decision". In this sense there are many training-grounds for parliamentary government. Most of the social groups or organizations to which the citizen belongs by birth or choice may provide valuable experience for parliamentary responsibility. The family, the clan, the tribe, the trade union, the political party, the religious organization, the co-operative society, the sports club, the ex-serviceman's association—all these units of human society demand of the participants some of the qualities of citizenship which are needed if the parliamentary system is to function effectively.

In colonies where there is tension between communities, it has often been found that fruitful co-operation is possible in unofficial groups and organizations of the kind mentioned, but there is always the danger that such voluntary organizations will develop along communal lines. It is, of course, inevitable that certain types of organization will tend to have a racial or religious basis, but this is to be avoided where possible. Inter-communal co-operation in matters on which political issues are unlikely to arise is an invaluable preliminary to inter-communal co-operation on political matters.

There is one special danger in trade union affairs which merits consideration. The ignorance and disunity of the electorate and especially of the rural masses in some colonies put a great temptation before organized labour. Trade unions may still be small in numbers and inexperienced, but they generally contain men whose minds are open to a sense of economic discontent and also to ideas upon the rights of

labour and the evils of a capitalism which may appear indistinguishable from imperialism. A federation of trade unions in a colonial territory has powerful weapons in its hands. By its action, and still more by calling upon the irresponsible elements which can be found in most large colonial centres, it can bring the life of the capital city, perhaps the one nerve-centre of the whole colony, to a standstill. The special danger lies in the inexperience of the wage-earners—their deep social stress under the impact of new and bewildering conditions of their life, their association of anti-foreign with anti-employer antagonisms, and the lack of a public opinion which can either judge or influence their behaviour.

### **Official Agencies**

In addition to the unofficial organizations already referred to, there are three main types of official functional agency which are potentially important as training-grounds for parliamentary responsibility:

- (i) Inter-territorial bodies, such as the Caribbean Commission and the East African High Commission.
- (ii) Autonomous bodies like the British Colonial Development Corporation, and similar organs which have been set up by other imperial powers, entrusted with the task of initiating, managing or sponsoring certain projects.
- (iii) Autonomous boards and committees set up by colonial governments to administer or co-ordinate certain internal services.

The first two kinds of functional body mentioned above have only a limited value for the purposes with which this report is concerned. They are primarily the tools of governments, and participation in the making of decisions is very largely confined to officials of governments. Where unofficial persons participate, this is usually because a good deal of progress towards parliamentary democracy has already taken place. This is not to belittle these organizations, but to indicate their limitations for the purposes of this study.

In some cases more could be done to associate unofficial colonial opinion in the work of inter-territorial and international agencies. Although the external relations of colonies like the Netherlands Antilles or Jamaica are conducted by the imperial government, there is an obvious value in drawing unofficial colonial opinion into the work of such bodies as the Caribbean Commission. Mr. Norman Manley's association with this organization is a good example of the benefit to be derived from arrangements of this kind. Further, the recent experiment of including colonial representatives in British delegations to the U.N. Assembly and the specialized agencies has been fully justified. There will be an increasing number of occasions in which particular colonies will have a direct interest in negotiations on technical matters, and moreover some of the specialized agencies of the U.N. provide for the associate membership of non-self-governing territories. Malaya is associated in this way with the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

### **Inter-territorial Agencies**

A great variety of inter-territorial agencies have been set up in recent years, and these may be of importance in fostering economic development and thus facilitating the growth of parliamentary institutions. Some of these agencies, such as the East Africa High Commission, have been set up to co-ordinate specified activities in adjacent colonies of one imperial power; others, such as the Caribbean Commission and the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa south of the Sahara, include within their scope colonies of more than one power.

Arrangements of the first kind are often regarded as a preliminary step to some form of closer political association, federation, or even complete integration. While closer union of adjacent colonies may be desirable on many grounds, it should be recognized that there are dangers in pushing ahead too quickly, especially in areas where the mass of the people are still politically inarticulate. In the Caribbean area, the U.K. Government has advocated the closer association of British territories for half a century or more, and from time

to time has taken the initiative in encouraging local discussion of the matter. In 1905, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (whose son was to occupy the same office in 1952) told the House of Commons: "Union is the policy of His Majesty's Government; a union, however, not forced upon the Colonies, but one which we hope will come from within". The imperial government can encourage closer union, but has recognized that in the last resort the inspiration and impetus for British Caribbean federation must come from the territories themselves.

The problem in East and Central Africa is rather different. Closer union of territories need not prevent the development of democratic parliamentary institutions, but there are clear dangers in the precipitate union of territories where the mass of the people are as yet politically-immature; and the dangers are increased if the spokesmen of the majority believe (with or without justification) that closer union would be detrimental to the interests of their own community.

### **The Colonial Development Corporation**

The British Colonial Development Corporation corresponds in many ways to the public corporations set up in the United Kingdom to administer nationalized industries and services, with three important exceptions:

- (i) It was not set up to administer an enterprise which was previously owned by private individuals or municipalities, but it has sponsored completely new development projects.
- (ii) The Corporation is concerned not only with projects which it initiates itself but also with projects in which it co-operates with colonial governments or private commercial concerns.
- (iii) The Corporation draws its initial capital from the U.K. Treasury and is expected eventually to repay both capital and interest. Its actual operations, however, are conducted overseas rather than among the U.K. citizens who have provided the capital. Its functions, in this respect, very much like a private investment corporation except that its capital is

derived from the Treasury (and ultimately of course from the U.K. taxpayers) rather than from private investors. It should, perhaps, be added that the Colonial Development Corporation was not responsible for the groundnuts and other schemes started by the Overseas Food Corporation.

The value of the work being done by the Colonial Development Corporation is probably insufficiently appreciated in the United Kingdom, whose citizens are providing the investment capital to make its work possible. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that in course of time its operations may evoke a growing volume of criticism from colonial citizens who see it at work in their own country and yet are unable to exercise any direct control over its operations.

### **Public Boards and Committees**

Autonomous public boards for managing publicly-owned enterprises of a commercial nature have been used in the United Kingdom ever since a Conservative Government established the Metropolitan Water Board 50 years ago. It is said that these boards enable a public service or industry to be conducted on commercial lines without parliamentary or ministerial interference on questions of day-to-day administration. The Minister usually appoints the members of each board and may, after consulting the board, give to it directions of a general character.

The proper relation of these public boards to Parliament and to Ministers of the Crown is a matter of controversy in the United Kingdom, and it would be improper to express any opinion on this question here. It is, however, worth considering whether autonomous public boards and committees in colonies can provide an effective administration and also serve as a training-ground for parliamentary responsibility. It is not, of course, suggested that a network of functional agencies can or should become a substitute for parliamentary government; the question is whether in some colonies an increased emphasis on the practical performance of non-party and non-communal public tasks may not usefully prepare the way for

harmonious inter-party and inter-communal co-operation in a future democratic parliament.

In several British colonies these public boards exist and perform useful functions in an atmosphere hitherto detached from party politics. There is, however, no uniformity in the method of appointment to, or the chain of responsibility of, these boards. While there is no great merit in uniformity, it must be recognized that a major weakness of many of these boards is that, in a purely technical sense, they are "irresponsible". This is no reflection on the way they carry out their social and economic functions, but it raises the question whether or not they should not be more closely linked with the governments or parliaments or local authorities of the areas in which they operate. The production development and marketing boards in British West Africa, for example, are under only tenuous public control as regards their operations and the use of their funds. They have accumulated enormous financial reserves which have in some cases been used at the discretion of the boards for purposes (such as the endowment of universities and the construction of roads) no doubt desirable in themselves but not directly connected with the objects for which the boards were created. The new Gold Coast Government has recently reorganized the Cocoa Marketing Board and arranged for a representative of the Ministry of Finance to sit on the Board and for its financial operations to come more closely under the control of that Ministry.

### **Practical Co-operation in Local Affairs**

It has been suggested earlier that institutions of government and administration in colonies have, in the main, followed the patterns established by the imperial powers, but that a blind imitation of Western institutions is not desirable. This is, perhaps, particularly the case at the local level. In Britain a great deal of the essential work of the community is done by a host of voluntary and private associations of all kinds. Apart from the inherent importance of the services actually performed, these associations are of great value in fostering a

sense of civic solidarity and sympathy and in strengthening a spirit of initiative and tolerance.

In some colonies, there is a strong tradition of voluntary service; in others, there is as yet no developed concept of non-official public work. In colonies of the latter type, there has inevitably been a tendency to expect that the government, either central or local, will do what elsewhere is done by voluntary effort. There is, however, a growing realization that there is a place for unofficial activity, encouraged and perhaps even subsidized or financed by official organs of government.

In some colonies, unofficial community development committees have been formed but are hampered by lack of funds. In cases where unofficial effort will provide money or materials or labour, there is a good deal to be said for providing additional financial assistance from local or central sources. Officials in some colonies are provided with "block votes" for this sort of eventuality, but often annual budgets are compiled on the basis of estimated needs and revenue so that there are no unallocated funds which can be used to encourage voluntary effort in this way.

In the same way financial assistance, either local or central, could be provided for properly run co-operative societies and other unofficial ventures. The use of public money for assisting ordinary commercial enterprises raises certain difficulties, but these do not normally arise in the case of co-operative societies.

A different problem arises in cases where a central government of a colony is sponsoring an agricultural settlement project, and consideration could be given to ways of associating both local authorities and unofficial organizations in the administration of such projects.

### **The Need for Balanced Development**

It should not be thought that the sort of practical co-operation, official and unofficial, which has been discussed in this chapter should ever become a substitute for effective parliamentary or local government institutions. It must, however, be recognized that during a time when attention is focused on the political sector of life, other equally important

sectors may be neglected. It may perhaps be said that there are no non-political activities, and that it is useless to pretend that functional agencies can operate in a vacuum, ignoring the hurly-burly of politics. It may be said that public functional bodies cannot continue as autonomous organs without supervision, and that one day they must become subordinate to democratic parliaments. It may be said that the more efficiently these agencies operate, the more they will evoke the hostility of political leaders, whose activities are subject to the pressures of public opinion. It may be said that some functional experiments are weakening the parliamentary system by creating autonomous agencies accountable to nobody but themselves. It may be said that one of the major reasons why these bodies have been created in the West is that parliaments suffer from the enormous pressure of public business, and that this is not a problem in most colonies. It may be said that the proliferation of functional bodies will lead to government by technical experts—James Burnham's "managerial revolution" or Frederick Engels' "government of persons" replaced by the "administration of things".

All this may be in part true, but it misses the point. The purpose of this chapter is not to divert attention from what most people regard as the central problem, but to suggest that obsession with it results in other important matters being neglected. The use of functional bodies is inevitable as the emphasis moves from the political right of the ballot box to the social right of a decent standard of living.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE PATH OF PROGRESS

**H**UMAN progress is rarely achieved without a certain tension. It would be foolish to pretend that the problems which have been discussed in this report can be solved without the exercise of rare qualities of statesmanship and vision. The present situation can probably be described best as one of challenge. The actors in the great drama of history will no doubt make mistakes and suffer disappointments. Imperial governments and peoples may be reluctant to transfer power to new colonial leaders, or may fail to discharge their existing obligations to the full, or may divest themselves too soon of the responsibilities of trusteeship which they have assumed. Colonial leaders may demand too much too soon, or may abuse the opportunities open to them. Colonial peoples may fail to see that there are no civic rights without civic duties, that liberty can only be earned.

There is danger in thinking that history is made by governments alone. In colonies and imperial countries alike there is need for a more informed, enlightened and imaginative public opinion on the questions discussed in this report.

It should be recognized that there is no such thing as *the* colonial problem: there are a thousand colonial problems. And just as it is misleading to talk of one problem, it is dangerous to talk of one solution. There is no panacea for the problems man creates for himself.

Political progress cannot be isolated from economic, social, cultural, and spiritual progress. Undue concentration on one department of human activity, to the neglect of others, will produce a deformed society.

While it is true that people can learn from the mistakes and achievements of others, it is also true that there is no substitute for experience. Colonial peoples, in their struggle for parliamentary democracy, have the advantage of being able to

study the history of other nations. They can thus hope to avoid the set-backs which others encountered and in this way compress into decades what elsewhere took centuries. The difficulty is to keep the distant goal firmly in mind, without at the same time ignoring the obstacles immediately ahead.

It must, in any case, be remembered that institutions cannot easily be transplanted from one part of the world to another. Every people adapts institutions to conform to its history and traditions. Colonial peoples will prove no exception to this rule. The machinery of parliamentary government takes many forms, even within such a close family as the British Commonwealth, and the machinery is, moreover, constantly changing and developing.

It has been emphasized, especially in the chapter on the problems of the plural society, that constitutional machinery will provide no solution unless inspired by the right spirit. Appropriate "devices" of government and administration can facilitate the achievement of the ideal of parliamentary government, but they cannot guarantee it. This point cannot be emphasized too strongly.

On the other hand, there should undoubtedly be a willingness to experiment with new constitutional techniques and to adapt existing techniques in the light of experience. A number of suggestions have emerged during the course of this study and are mentioned in this report. It should be emphasized that these are not the "recommendations" of the McDougall Trust, the Hansard Society or of those who have been associated in an advisory capacity with the preparation of this report. It has, however, seemed right to refer to some of the proposals which others have advanced.

One point of special importance has been mentioned on page 51. Leaders and potential leaders of colonial opinion are eager to witness at first hand how the parliamentary system works in other countries. Literature about parliamentary government, films, exhibitions, lectures—all these have their place. But they are no substitute for personal observation. Useful work in encouraging and facilitating visits to and from British Colonies is already being undertaken

by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the British Council, and other bodies, and no doubt similar arrangements are in operation in other countries. But it has been stressed, especially by those living in colonies, that much more could be done in this matter if only funds were available.

Such work will be doubly valuable if it is undertaken by non-official agencies. Governments, rightly or wrongly, are suspected of concealing the seamy side of things at home. Visitors from overseas are more likely to benefit from seeing what is good if they are not prevented from also seeing what needs improvement.

The need to strengthen and develop institutions of higher learning in colonies has been mentioned (page 48) and here it is only necessary to stress that it is important to anticipate the needs of the future as well as to satisfy those of the present.

An idea which seems to deserve consideration in British Colonies is the possibility of developing more fully the conception of a *Commonwealth* Colonial Service, drawn from the U.K., the Commonwealth countries, and the colonies. Recruitment to the Colonial Service already takes place in some Commonwealth countries and, of course, locally in the different Colonies. But the conception of a Commonwealth Service would serve as a symbol of the idea of unity. One of the greatest obstacles is that the Asian Commonwealth countries, in which recruitment does not at present take place, are themselves short of skilled administrators and technicians. This is a complicated issue about which few people would wish to be dogmatic. It has, nevertheless, seemed right to refer to the question, even if hesitantly and in brief terms.

A related matter is the need to increase co-operation in technical matters between imperial powers and, perhaps, even if only in a limited way, to encourage some interchange of officials.

As far as British colonies are concerned, consideration might well be given to the proposal (outlined by Miss Perham in an article in *The Times*, 28 October, 1952), for the amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations and Colonial Offices. Miss

Perham points out that as the more advanced territories achieve full self-government, the remaining dependent territories would, "with each departure, more deeply resent their continuing public tutelage. If the departments were reunited, then, within the four walls of a single great Commonwealth ministry, each member, irrespective of status, could maintain its appropriate relationships with Britain."

A danger which must be guarded against in the colonies is the identification of the parliamentary system with the material achievements of Western civilization. There is a tendency in newly-independent countries to judge the parliamentary system too subjectively, to welcome the parliamentary idea when material conditions are improving and to condemn it when they are not. The author of an article in *Parliamentary Affairs* (Vol. V, No. 2) on the Indian general election in 1951-2, concluded: "If the Congress Party fails to act sharply and quickly in raising the standard of living . . . it is doubtful if even Mr. Nehru will be able to prevent its debacle". This is no doubt a true statement of what may happen, but is a disturbing picture. It is not the job of Mr. Nehru or the Congress Party or the Indian Parliament to grow more food. The parliamentary system should not be censured for failing to do what it is not its purpose to do.

A danger for imperial governments and peoples is to be dominated by the thinking and traditions of an earlier generation, however noble these may have been. Respect and gratitude for the achievements of a former age must be combined with a recognition of new forces and an acceptance of different responsibilities in the contemporary world. It is easier to quote what Cecil Rhodes said a half a century ago than to decide how to face the complex problems of tomorrow.

In conclusion it should be said again that it is not enough to enunciate noble principles or to pay lip-service to high ideals. A great responsibility rests on leaders of opinion in imperial countries and colonies alike. The swift advance of colonial peoples is one of the most striking features of the contemporary world. Man faces a challenge unprecedented in history. The development and strengthening of parliamentary

institutions in colonies will not be easy, but the process is under way. Machinery is being evolved, not to solve the variety of complex problems which arise in modern society, but to provide a platform on which divergent ideals and interests can be examined and a policy agreed upon which is more than just the will of the majority. A great merit of the parliamentary system is that its influence radiates from the centre and pervades all aspects of life. A real parliament is not something remote from the common people: it is part of them. The goal to be reached is a noble one, but there are many obstacles which will be encountered on the journey.

## APPENDIX A

"FACTORS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DECIDING WHETHER A TERRITORY IS OR IS NOT A TERRITORY WHOSE PEOPLE HAVE NOT YET ATTAINED A FULL MEASURE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT."

*The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution on 18th January, 1952 (Resolution 567(vi), Document A/L. 53), in connexion with the above question. Attached to the resolution was the following Annexe which the Assembly agreed should be taken as a basis for further study.*

1. The territories which are covered by Chapter XI of the Charter are those territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government. It may be noted that the expression "self-government" is qualified in the Charter by the words "full measure" in the English text, "*complètement*" in the French text, and "*plenitud*" in the Spanish text.

2. The task of the General Assembly, at present, is to indicate the factors which should be taken into account in determining whether the result of the advancement of the people of any given territory is such that the territory has reached a stage of self-government where it falls outside the scope of Article 73c of the Charter. . . .

5. Accordingly, the General Assembly lists under two separate headings below the factors to be taken into account, stressing that the list cannot be regarded as exhaustive or definitive, and that a single factor or particular combination of factors cannot be regarded as decisive in every case. . . .

6. Nevertheless, the General Assembly considers that the essential factors to be taken into account in deciding whether a Non-Self-Governing Territory has attained a full measure of self-government are the following:

(i) *Political advancement*: Political advancement of the population sufficient to enable them to decide upon the future destiny of the territory with due knowledge.

(ii) *Opinion of the population*: The opinion of the population of the territory, freely expressed by informed and democratic processes, as to the status or change in status which they desire.

7. These factors apply both to Non-Self-Governing Territories which have achieved independence and to Non-Self-Governing Territories which have freely united or associated themselves on a footing of equal status with other component parts of the metropolitan or other country or countries. In the latter case, however, the following factors are also essential and should be taken into account:

(i) *Legislative representation*: Representation without discrimination in the central legislative organs on the same basis as other inhabitants and regions.

(ii) *Citizenship*: Citizenship without discrimination on the same basis as other inhabitants.

## I. FACTORS INDICATIVE OF THE ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE OR OTHER SEPARATE SYSTEM OF SELF-GOVERNMENT

### A. General

1. *Political advancement*: Political advancement of the population sufficient to enable them to decide upon the future destiny of the territory with due knowledge.

2. *Opinion of the population*: The opinion of the population of the territory, freely expressed by informed and democratic processes, as to the status or change in status which they desire.

### B. International status

1. *Independence*: The attainment of independence by the territory, or complete control over its external relations and internal affairs.

2. *Eligibility for membership in international organizations*: Eligibility for membership in the United Nations or for membership or associate membership in other international organizations; representation by delegates selected by the territorial government.

3. *General international relations*: Power to enter into direct relations of every kind with other governments and with international institutions, and to negotiate, sign and ratify international conventions.

4. *Voluntary limitation of sovereignty*: Degree to which the sovereignty of the territory is limited by its own free will when that territory has attained independence or other separate system of self-government.

### C. Internal self-government

1. *Territorial government*: Freedom from control or interference by the government of another state in respect of the internal government (legislature, executive, judiciary) and administration of the territory.

2. *Participation of the population*: Effective participation of the population in the government of the territory by means of an adequate electoral and representative system.

3. *Economic and social jurisdiction*: Complete autonomy in respect of economic and social affairs.

## II. FACTORS INDICATIVE OF THE FREE ASSOCIATION (WHETHER IN A FEDERAL OR UNITARY RELATIONSHIP) OF A TERRITORY ON EQUAL STATUS WITH OTHER COMPONENT PARTS OF THE METROPOLITAN OR OTHER COUNTRY

### A. General

1. *Political advancement*: Political advancement of the population sufficient to enable them to decide upon the future destiny of the territory with due knowledge.

2. *Opinion of the population*: The opinion of the population of the territory, freely expressed by informed and democratic processes, as to the status or change in status which they desire.

3. *Geographical considerations*: Extent to which the relations of the territory with the capital of the central government may be affected by circumstances arising out of their respective geographical positions, such as separation by land, sea or other natural obstacles.

4. *Ethnic and cultural considerations*: Extent to which the population are of different race, language or religion or have a distinct cultural heritage, interests or aspirations distinguishing them from the peoples of the country with which they freely associate themselves.

5. *Constitutional considerations*: Association (a) by virtue of the consti-

tution of the metropolitan country or (b) by virtue of a treaty or bilateral agreement affecting the status of the territory, taking into account (i) whether the constitutional guarantees extend equally to the associated territory, (ii) whether there are constitutional fields reserved to the territory, and (iii) whether there is provision for the participation of the territory on a basis of equality in any changes in the constitutional system of the State.

**B. Status**

1. *Legislative representation*: Representation without discrimination in the central legislative organs on the same basis as other inhabitants and regions.

2. *Citizenship*: Citizenship without discrimination on the same basis as other inhabitants.

3. *Government officials*: Appointment or election of officials from the territory on the same basis as those from other parts of the country.

**C. Internal constitutional conditions**

1. *Suffrage*: Universal and equal suffrage, free periodic elections by secret ballot, freedom of choice of electoral candidates.

2. *Local rights and status*: Equal rights and status for the inhabitants and local bodies of the territory as enjoyed by inhabitants and local bodies of other parts of the country.

3. *Local officials*: Appointment or election of officials in the territory on the same basis as those in other parts of the country.

4. *Internal legislation*: Complete legislative autonomy of the territory by means of electoral and representative systems, in all matters which in accordance with the normal terms of association are, in the case of non-unitary systems, not reserved to the central government.

APPENDIX B<sup>1</sup>

| COLONIES, INCLUDING DEPENDENCIES, TRUST TERRITORIES, PROTECTED STATES, AND OTHER NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES                                | ESTIMATED POPULATION (1950 unless otherwise stated) | AREA square miles |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN</b><br>(Condominium of Egypt and the United Kingdom)                                                                   | 8,350,000                                           | 967,500           |
| <b>AUSTRALIA</b>                                                                                                                               |                                                     |                   |
| Norfolk Island                                                                                                                                 | 1,148<br>(1949)                                     | 14                |
| Nauru (Trust Territory of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, administered by Australia)                                            | 3,434<br>(1951)                                     | 8                 |
| Papua (Protectorate) and New Guinea (Trust Territory)                                                                                          | 1,440,000                                           | 194,000           |
| <b>BELGIUM</b>                                                                                                                                 |                                                     |                   |
| Belgian Congo                                                                                                                                  | 11,728,776<br>(1951)                                | 904,755           |
| Ruanda-Urundi (Trust Territory)                                                                                                                | 3,964,697                                           | 20,916            |
| <b>EGYPT</b><br>(See under "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan" above)                                                                                       |                                                     |                   |
| <b>FRANCE</b>                                                                                                                                  |                                                     |                   |
| <b>Ministry of the Interior</b>                                                                                                                |                                                     |                   |
| Algeria<br>(Three <i>Départements</i> forming part of Metropolitan France, together with the Southern Territories, which form a French Colony) | 8,876,016<br>(1948)                                 | 847,500           |
| Guadeloupe and dependencies<br>( <i>Département</i> of Metropolitan France)                                                                    | 278,864<br>(1951)                                   | 688               |
| Martinique                   "       "       "                                                                                                 | 273,000                                             | 385               |
| Ile de la Réunion           "       "       "                                                                                                  | 261,647                                             | 970               |
| French Guiana,<br>including Inini               "       "       "                                                                              | 33,561<br>(1946)                                    | 35,000            |
| <b>Ministry of Overseas France</b>                                                                                                             |                                                     |                   |
| (a) <i>East Africa</i><br>French Somaliland                                                                                                    | 56,000<br>(1948)                                    | 9,071             |

<sup>1</sup> Apart from certain uninhabited islands, the following territories, though described as "Non-Self-Governing" in the *United Nations Demographic Year Book* or other reference books, are excluded from this list: South-West Africa (South Africa), Channel Islands and the Isle of Man (United Kingdom), Greenland (Denmark), Svalbard (Spitzbergen and Bear Island) and Jan Mayen Land (Norway), and the Free Territory of Trieste (international administration).

FRANCE (*continued*)(b) *French West Africa*

|                                           |                     |         |
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|
| Dahomey                                   | 1,505,000<br>(1948) | 43,232  |
| French Cameroons<br>(Trust Territory)     | 3,076,568<br>(1951) | 143,415 |
| French Guinea                             | 2,262,000<br>(1951) | 96,886  |
| French Sudan                              | 3,350,000<br>(1951) | 590,966 |
| French Togoland<br>(Trust Territory)      | 1,014,669<br>(1951) | 21,494  |
| Ivory Coast                               | 2,064,000           | 184,174 |
| Mauritania                                | 522,559<br>(1949)   | 323,310 |
| Niger                                     | 2,041,050<br>(1949) | 499,410 |
| Senegal, including Dakar and dependencies | 1,999,000<br>(1951) | 77,730  |
| Upper Volta                               | 3,217,000           | 109,940 |

(c) *French Equatorial Africa*

|              |           |         |
|--------------|-----------|---------|
| Chad         | 2,242,000 | 481,000 |
| Gabun        | 409,000   | 106,181 |
| Middle Congo | 684,000   | 160,000 |
| Ubangi Shari | 1,072,000 | 230,000 |

(d) *Indian Ocean*

|                             |           |         |
|-----------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Madagascar and dependencies | 4,200,000 | 228,000 |
| Comoro Archipelago          | 168,890   | 650     |

(e) *Asia and the Pacific area*

|                                |                  |       |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------|
| French Settlements in India    | 317,000          | 196   |
| New Caledonia and dependencies | 61,250<br>(1948) | 8,548 |

## New Hebrides

*see under "New Hebrides," page 112*

|                               |        |       |
|-------------------------------|--------|-------|
| French Settlements in Oceania | 60,000 | 1,520 |
|-------------------------------|--------|-------|

(f) *Western Hemisphere*

|                         |       |    |
|-------------------------|-------|----|
| St. Pierre and Miquelon | 5,000 | 93 |
|-------------------------|-------|----|

**Ministry for Foreign Affairs**

|                               |                     |         |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------|
| French Morocco (Protectorate) | 8,563,117<br>(1951) | 153,870 |
| Tunisia (Protectorate)        | 3,470,000           | 48,195  |

**Ministry for Associated States**

|                                               |                     |         |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|
| Viet-Nam (Tonkin, Annam, and<br>Cochin-China) | 22,812,000          | 127,000 |
| Cambodia (Protectorate)                       | 3,748,000<br>(1948) | 70,000  |
| Laos (Protectorate)                           | 1,169,000<br>(1947) | 91,405  |

## INTERNATIONAL ZONE OF TANGIER

|                                |         |     |
|--------------------------------|---------|-----|
| (International administration) | 111,000 | 225 |
|--------------------------------|---------|-----|

## ITALY

|                              |                     |         |
|------------------------------|---------------------|---------|
| Somaliland (Trust Territory) | 1,270,943<br>(1951) | 216,310 |
|------------------------------|---------------------|---------|

## NETHERLANDS

|                                                                   |                   |         |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|---------|
| Netherlands Antilles                                              | 164,073<br>(1951) | 436     |
| Surinam (Netherlands Guiana)                                      | 221,000           | 54,000  |
| New Guinea (Irian) (future status in dispute, <i>see</i> page 31) | 1,018,000         | 101,000 |

## NEW HEBRIDES (Anglo-French Condominium)

|        |       |
|--------|-------|
| 48,538 | 5,700 |
|--------|-------|

## NEW ZEALAND

|                              |                  |     |
|------------------------------|------------------|-----|
| Cook Islands, including Niue | 19,860<br>(1951) | 199 |
|------------------------------|------------------|-----|

Nauru *see under* "Australia" page 110

Tokelau or Union Islands (administered by New Zealand for the United Kingdom)

|                                 |                           |            |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|
| Western Samoa (Trust Territory) | 1,534<br>83,128<br>(1951) | 4<br>1,133 |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|

## PORTUGAL

*Atlantic Ocean*

|                               |         |       |
|-------------------------------|---------|-------|
| Azores                        | 290,000 | 922   |
| Cape Verde Islands            | 147,097 | 1,557 |
| Madeira Archipelago (Funchal) | 255,000 | 314   |
| São Tomé and Príncipe         | 60,159  | 372   |

*Africa*

## Portuguese West Africa:

|                   |           |         |
|-------------------|-----------|---------|
| Angola            | 4,111,796 | 481,351 |
| Portuguese Guinea | 517,249   | 13,948  |

## Portuguese East Africa:

|              |           |         |
|--------------|-----------|---------|
| (Mozambique) | 5,732,767 | 297,731 |
|--------------|-----------|---------|

*Asia and the Pacific*

|                                               |               |       |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------|-------|
| Goa and other Portuguese Settlements in India | 637,846       | 1,537 |
| Macau                                         | about 500,000 | 6     |
| Portuguese Timor                              | 442,378       | 7,330 |

## SPAIN

|                                                                        |           |         |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Spanish Morocco (Protectorate)                                         | 1,200,000 | 17,631  |
| Alhucemas, Ceuta, Chafarinas, Melilla, and Peñon de Velez de la Gomera | 164,000   | 82      |
| Canary Islands                                                         | 818,326   | 2,807   |
| Ifni                                                                   | 43,000    | 741     |
| Spanish Sahara                                                         |           |         |
| (Rio de Oro and Saguia el Hamra)                                       | 37,000    | 105,409 |
| Spanish Guinea (Annobon, Corisco, Elobays, Fernando Po, and Rio Muni)  | 170,582   | 10,852  |

TANGIER—*See under* "International Zone of  
Tangier" page 112

## UNITED KINGDOM

*Caribbean and adjacent territories*

|                                                                       |                     |         |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------|
| Bahamas                                                               | 79,664              | 4,404   |
| Barbados                                                              | 211,682             | 166     |
| Bermuda                                                               | 37,403              | 21      |
| British Guiana                                                        | 425,156             | 83,000  |
| British Honduras                                                      | 69,644<br>(1951)    | 8,867   |
| Jamaica                                                               | 1,430,000<br>(1951) | 4,411   |
| Cayman Islands (dependency of<br>Jamaica)                             | 7,000               | 93      |
| Turks and Caicos Islands, etc.<br>(dependency of Jamaica)             | 6,600               | 202     |
| Leeward Islands                                                       |                     |         |
| Antigua, with Barbuda and Redonda<br>(Presidency of Leeward Islands)  | 45,611              | 171     |
| Montserrat                                                            | 13,535              | 32      |
| St. Christopher-Nevis and Anguilla<br>(Presidency of Leeward Islands) | 48,501              | 153     |
| British Virgin Islands (Presidency of<br>Leeward Islands)             | 7,000               | 67      |
| Trinidad and Tobago                                                   | 656,300<br>(1951)   | 1,980   |
| Windward Islands                                                      |                     |         |
| Dominica                                                              | 54,577              | 305     |
| Grenada                                                               | 77,000              | 133     |
| St. Lucia                                                             | 79,000              | 233     |
| St. Vincent                                                           | 67,000              | 150     |
| <i>Africa</i>                                                         |                     |         |
| Basutoland                                                            | 574,000             | 11,716  |
| Bechuanaland (Protectorate)                                           | 296,310<br>(1946)   | 275,000 |
| Gambia                                                                | 273,000             | 4,003   |
| Gold Coast (Colony and Protectorate)                                  | 3,929,000<br>(1951) | 78,802  |
| Togoland under United Kingdom<br>Trusteeship (Trust Territory)        | 404,000<br>(1951)   | 13,041  |
| Kenya (Colony and Protectorate)                                       | 5,635,000           | 224,960 |
| Mauritius and dependencies                                            | 516,000             | 809     |
| Nigeria (Colony and Protectorate)                                     | 24,300,000          | 338,593 |
| Cameroons under United Kingdom<br>Trusteeship (Trust Territory)       | 1,083,000<br>(1951) | 34,081  |
| Northern Rhodesia (Protectorate)                                      | 1,949,000<br>(1951) | 288,130 |
| Nyasaland (Protectorate)                                              | 2,349,000           | 48,444  |
| Seychelles                                                            | 36,000              | 156     |
| Sierra Leone (Colony and Protectorate)                                | 1,975,000           | 27,925  |

UNITED KINGDOM (*continued*)

|                                                                                       |                     |          |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------|
| Somaliland Protectorate                                                               | about 640,000       | 68,000   |
| Southern Rhodesia (Colony having<br>self-government: <i>see</i> footnote 2 on page 1) | 2,162,000<br>(1951) | 150,300  |
| Sudan <i>see under</i> "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan"                                         |                     |          |
| page 110                                                                              |                     |          |
| Swaziland                                                                             | 197,000             | 6,704    |
| Tanganyika (Trust Territory)                                                          | 7,787,000<br>(1951) | 362,688  |
| Uganda (Protectorate)                                                                 | 5,147,000           | 93,981   |
| Zanzibar and Pemba (Protectorate)                                                     | 269,000             | 1,020    |
| <i>Asia and the Pacific area</i>                                                      |                     |          |
| Brunei (Protected State)                                                              | 46,000              | 2,226    |
| Fiji (Colony)                                                                         | 293,764             | 7,040    |
| Pitcairn (Dependency of Fiji)                                                         | 134                 | 2        |
| Rotuma                                                                                | 3,000               | 18       |
| Hongkong (Colony and "Leased" Territories)                                            | 2,030,000<br>(1951) | 391      |
| Malaya, Federation of (comprising<br>nine Protected States and two<br>Settlements)    | 5,420,738<br>(1951) | 50,690   |
| Maldiv Islands (Protected State)                                                      | 93,000              | 115      |
| Nauru <i>see under</i> "Australia," page 110                                          |                     |          |
| North Borneo                                                                          | 334,141<br>(1951)   | 29,387   |
| Sarawak                                                                               | 562,000             | 47,071   |
| Singapore                                                                             | 1,041,933<br>(1951) | 224      |
| Christmas Island                                                                      | 1,500               | 62       |
| (Dependency of Singapore)                                                             | (1951)              |          |
| Cocos-Keeling Islands                                                                 | 1,217               | 5        |
| (Dependency of Singapore)                                                             | (1951)              |          |
| Tonga (Protected State)                                                               | 49,667<br>(1951)    | 269      |
| Western Pacific High Commission<br>Territories:                                       |                     |          |
| British Solomon Islands (Protectorate)                                                | 100,000             | 11,500   |
| Gilbert and Ellice Islands <sup>1</sup>                                               | 39,000<br>(1951)    | 369      |
| New Hebrides <i>see under</i> "New Hebrides,"<br>page 112                             |                     |          |
| Southern Line Islands <sup>2</sup>                                                    | about 50            | about 40 |
| <i>Miscellaneous</i>                                                                  |                     |          |
| <i>Atlantic Ocean</i>                                                                 |                     |          |
| Falkland Islands                                                                      | 2,280<br>(1951)     | 4,618    |

<sup>1</sup> Canton and Enderbury Islands, which are part of this colony, are administered as an Anglo-American Condominium under a 50-year agreement, having effect from 1939.

<sup>2</sup> The sovereignty of these islands, atolls and rocks, most of which are uninhabited, is in dispute. It is the British view that they have been British dependencies for many years, but in 1936 the United States Government declared that it had annexed them.

UNITED KINGDOM (*continued*)

|                                                              |                   |                       |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Falkland Islands dependencies                                | a few hundred     | exact area<br>unknown |
| St. Helena                                                   | 4,748<br>(1951)   | 47                    |
| Ascension Island (Dependency of<br>St. Helena)               | 175<br>(1951)     | 34                    |
| Tristan da Cunha (Dependency of<br>St. Helena)               | 267               | 38                    |
| <i>Mediterranean</i>                                         |                   |                       |
| Cyprus                                                       | 492,297<br>(1951) | 3,572                 |
| Gibraltar                                                    | 23,232<br>(1951)  | 2                     |
| Malta and Gozo (Colony having inter-<br>nal self-government) | 312,447           | 122                   |
| <i>Persian Gulf</i>                                          |                   |                       |
| Aden, including Perim                                        | about 100,000     | 80                    |
| Kamaran Island (Dependency)                                  | 2,200             | 22                    |
| Kuria Muria Islands (Dependency of Aden)                     | 70<br>(1947)      | 28                    |
| Aden Protectorate                                            | about 650,000     | 112,000               |
| Bahrain (Protected State)                                    | 110,000           | 213                   |
| Kuwait (Protected State)                                     | 160,000           | 2,000                 |
| Trucial Shaikhdoms and Qatar<br>(Protected State)            | 113,000           | 14,000                |

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

|                                                                                                                                          |                  |         |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|---------|
| Alaska, including the Aleutian Islands                                                                                                   | 136,000          | 571,065 |
| American Samoa, including Tutuila, the<br>Manua Islands, and Swain's Island                                                              | 18,937           | 76      |
| Bonin Islands (Military Government)                                                                                                      | 148              | 40      |
| Canal Zone (Leased Territory)                                                                                                            | 52,822<br>(1951) | 553     |
| Canton and Enderbery Islands— <i>see</i> foot-<br>note 1, page 114                                                                       |                  |         |
| Guam                                                                                                                                     | 59,498           | 206     |
| Hawaii                                                                                                                                   | 499,794          | 6,435   |
| Midway Island                                                                                                                            | 437<br>(1940)    | 22      |
| Pacific Islands (Mariana, Caroline and<br>Marshall Islands but excluding Guam)<br>(Trust Territories designated as Strate-<br>gic Areas) | 54,843           | 687     |
| Puerto Rico                                                                                                                              | 2,210,703        | 3,423   |
| Ryukyu Islands south of the 30th parallel<br>(Military Government)                                                                       | 917,000          | 960     |
| Southern Line Islands— <i>see</i> footnote 2, page 114                                                                                   |                  |         |
| Virgin Islands of the United States                                                                                                      | 26,660           | 133     |
| Wake Island, with Peal and Wilkes Islands                                                                                                | 349              | 4       |

## APPENDIX C

## BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY:

A selection of representative statements.

Instructions to the Governor of New York, 1692.

. . . You are from time to time to send to us and our committee of trade and plantations the names and qualities of any members by you put into our said council by the first conveniency after your so doing. In the choice and nomination of members of our council, as also of the principal officers, judges, assistants, justices, and sheriffs, you are always to take care that they be men of estate and ability, and not necessitous people or much in debt; and that they be persons well affected to our government. You are not to suspend the members of our council without good and sufficient cause; and in case of suspension of any of them, you are forthwith to transmit unto us and to our said committee your reasons for so doing, together with the charge and proof against the said persons and their answers thereunto.

. . . You shall not suffer any public money whatsoever to be issued or disposed of otherwise than by warrant under your hand by and with the advice and consent of the council. You are to cause the accounts of all such money or value of money, attested by you, to be transmitted every half-year to our committee of trade and foreign plantations and to our commissioners of our treasury. . . . And you are particularly not to pass any law or do any act . . . whereby our revenue may be lessened or impaired, without our especial leave or command therein. . . .

. . . You are to take care that no man's life, manor, freehold, or goods be taken away or harmed . . . otherwise than by established and known laws, not repugnant to but—as much as may conveniently be—agreeable to the laws of this our kingdom of England. . . . And you are to permit a liberty of conscience to all persons, except papists, so they be contented with a quiet and peaceable enjoyment of the same, not giving offence or scandal to the government. . . .

EDMUND BURKE, speech in the House of Commons, 19th April, 1774.

The parliament of Great Britain sits at the head of her extensive Empire in two capacities. One as the local legislature of this island, providing for all things at home, immediately, and by no other instrument than the executive power. The other and I think her nobler capacity is what I call her imperial character; in which, as from the throne of heaven, she superintends all the several inferior legislatures, and guides and controls them all without annihilating any. As all these provincial legislatures are only co-ordinate to each other, they ought all to be subordinate to her, else they can neither preserve mutual peace, nor hope for mutual justice, nor effectually afford mutual assistance. It is necessary to coerce the negligent, to restrain the violent, and to aid the weak and deficient, by the overruling plenitude of her power. She is never to intrude into the place of the others, whilst they are equal to the common ends of their institution. But in order to enable parliament to answer all these ends of provident and beneficent superintendence, her powers must be boundless. . . .

Such is my idea of the constitution of the British Empire, as distinguished from the constitution of Britain, and on these grounds I think

subordination and liberty may be sufficiently reconciled through the whole. . . .

WILLIAM PITT, Earl of Chatham, speech in the House of Lords, 20th January, 1775.

. . . Of this spirit of independence, animating the nation of America, I have the most authentic information. It is not new among them; it is, and has ever been, their established principle, their confirmed persuasion: it is their nature and their doctrine . . .

This resistance to your arbitrary system of taxation might have been foreseen: it was obvious from the nature of things, and of mankind; and above all from the Whiggish spirit flourishing in that country. The spirit which now resists your taxation in America is the same which formerly opposed loans, benevolences, and ship-money, in England: the same spirit which called all England on its legs and by the Bill of Rights vindicated the English constitution: the same spirit which established the great fundamental, essential maxim of your liberties—that no subject of England shall be taxed but by his own consent.

This glorious spirit of Whiggism animates three millions in America; who prefer poverty with liberty, to gilded chains and sordid affluence; and who will die in defence of their rights as men, as freemen. . . .

CHARLES JAMES FOX, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speech in the House of Commons, 17th May, 1782.

. . . It has always been my opinion out of office, that it is downright tyranny to make laws for the internal government of a people who are not represented among those by whom such laws are made. This is an opinion so founded in justice, in reason, and in equity, that in no situation have I, or will I, ever depart from it. . . . I have always made a distinction between internal and external legislation: and though it would be tyranny to attempt to enforce the former in countries not represented in the British parliament, yet I am clear that the latter is, in reason and in policy, annexed to the British legislature; this right of prerogative or supremacy, I am convinced, would never have given umbrage to any part of the British Empire if it had been used solely for the general good of the Empire; but when it is made an instrument of tyranny and oppression, it is not to be thought wonderful that it should excite discontents, murmurings, and opposition.

EDMUND BURKE, speech in the House of Commons, 1st December, 1783.

. . . There may be and there are charters, not only different in nature, but formed on principles the very reverse of those of the Great Charter. Of this kind is the charter of the East India Company. Magna Charta is a charter to restrain power and to destroy monopoly. The East India Charter is a charter to establish monopoly and to create power. . . .

. . . I, therefore, freely admit to the East India Company their claim to exclude their fellow-subjects from the commerce of half the globe. I admit their claim to administer an annual territorial revenue of seven millions sterling; to command an army of 60,000 men; and to dispose (under the control of a sovereign imperial discretion, and with the due observance of the natural and local law) of the lives and fortunes of thirty millions of their fellow-creatures. All this they possess by charter and by acts of parliament, in my opinion, without a shadow of controversy.

Those who carry the rights and claims of the Company the furthest, do not contend for more than this; and all this I freely grant. But granting all this, they must grant to me in my turn, that all political power which is set over men, and that all privilege claimed or exercised in exclusion of them, being wholly artificial, and for so much a derogation from the natural equality of mankind at large, ought to be some way or other exercised ultimately for their benefit.

If this is true with regard to every species of political dominion and every description of commercial privilege, none of which can be original self-derived rights or grants for the mere private benefit of the holders, then such rights or privileges, or whatever else you choose to call them, are all in the strictest sense a trust; and it is of the very essence of every trust to be rendered accountable; and even totally to cease, when it substantially varies from the purposes for which alone it could have a lawful existence.

LORD GRENVILLE, speech in the House of Lords, 9th April, 1813.

. . . But the strong impression of my mind is that, after having first asserted the sovereignty of the crown over India, our next step should be this—to separate its government from all inter-mixture with mercantile interests or mercantile transactions.

The very existence of this blended character of merchant and sovereign, on which our whole Indian system is now built up, appears to me an anomaly inconsistent with all true principles of government, reprobated by all authority, and condemned by all experience. No sovereign, I confidently believe, has ever yet traded to profit; no trading company, I greatly fear, has ever yet administered government for the happiness of its subjects. . . .

SIR THOMAS MUNRO, Governor of Madras, Minute of 31st December, 1824.

. . . It ought undoubtedly to be our aim to raise the minds of the natives, and to take care that whenever our connection with India might cease, it did not appear that the only fruit of our dominion there had been to leave the people more abject and less able to govern themselves than when we found them. . . .

Liberal treatment has always been found the most effectual way of elevating the character of any people, and we may be sure that it will produce a similar effect on that of the people of India. The change will no doubt be slow; but that is the very reason why no time should be lost in commencing the work. We should not be discouraged by difficulties; nor, because little progress may be made in our own time, abandon the enterprise as hopeless, and charge upon the obstinacy and bigotry of the natives the failure which has been occasioned solely by our own fickleness, in not pursuing steadily the only line of conduct on which any hope of success could be reasonably founded. . . .

We should look upon India, not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until the natives shall in some future age have abandoned most of their superstitions and prejudices, and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it. Whenever such a time shall arrive, it will probably be best for both countries that the British control

over India should be gradually withdrawn. That the desirable change contemplated may in some after age be effected in India, there is no cause to despair.

T. B. MACAULAY, speech in the House of Commons, 10th July, 1833.

... We have to frame a good government for a country into which, by universal acknowledgment, we cannot introduce those institutions which all our habits—which all the reasonings of European philosophers—which all the history of our own part of the world—would lead us to consider as the one great security for good government. We have to engraft on despotism those blessings which are the natural fruits of liberty. In these circumstances, it behoves us to be cautious, even to the verge of timidity. . . .

No nation can be perfectly well governed till it is competent to govern itself. I compare the Indian government with other governments of the same class, with despotisms, with military despotisms, with foreign military despotisms; and I find none that approaches it in excellence. . . .

... The destinies of our Indian empire are covered with thick darkness. It is difficult to form any conjecture as to the fate reserved for a State which resembles no other in history, and which forms by itself a separate class of political phenomena. The laws which regulate its growth and its decay are still unknown to us. It may be that the public mind of India may expand under our system till it has outgrown that system; that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government; that, having become instructed in European knowledge, they may, in some future age, demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or to retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history. . . .

LORD DURHAM, Governor-General and Lord High Commissioner of Canada, extracts from *Report on the Affairs of British North America*, presented to Parliament, 31st January, 1839.

... The preceding pages have sufficiently pointed out the nature of those evils, to the extensive operation of which, I attribute the various practical grievances, and the present unsatisfactory condition of the North American Colonies. It is not by weakening, but strengthening the influence of the people on its Government; by confining within much narrower bounds than those hitherto allotted to it, and not by extending the interference of the imperial authorities in the details of colonial affairs, that I believe that harmony is to be restored, where dissension has so long prevailed; and a regularity and vigour hitherto unknown, introduced into the administration of these Provinces. It needs no change in the principles of government, no invention of a new constitutional theory, to supply the remedy which would, in my opinion, completely remove the existing political disorders. It needs but to follow out consistently the principles of the British constitution, and introduce into the Government of these great Colonies those wise provisions, by which alone the working of the representative system can in any country be rendered harmonious and efficient. We are not now to consider the policy of establishing representative government in the North American Colonies. That has been irrevocably done; and the experiment of depriving the people of their present constitutional power, is not to be thought of. To

conduct their government harmoniously, in accordance with its established principles, is now the business of its rulers; and I know not how it is possible to secure that harmony in any other way, than by administering the Government on those principles which have been found perfectly efficacious in Great Britain. . . .

I know that it has been urged that the principles, which are productive of harmony and good government in the mother country, are by no means applicable to a colonial dependency. It is said that it is necessary that the administration of a colony should be carried on by persons nominated without any reference to the wishes of its people; that they have to carry into effect the policy, not of that people, but of the authorities at home; and that a colony which should name all its own administrative functionaries, would, in fact, cease to be dependent. I admit that the system which I propose would, in fact, place the internal government of the colony in the hands of the colonists themselves; and that we should thus leave to them the execution of the laws, of which we have long entrusted the making solely to them. Perfectly aware of the value of our colonial possessions, and strongly impressed with the necessity of maintaining our connexion with them, I know not in what respect it can be desirable that we should interfere with their internal legislation in matters which do not affect their relations with the mother country. . . .

LORD JOHN RUSSELL, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, to CHARLES POULETT THOMSON, Governor General of Canada, 14th October, 1839.

. . . The Queen's government have no desire to thwart the representative assemblies of British North America in their measures of reform and improvement. They have no wish to make those provinces the resource for patronage at home. They are earnestly intent on giving to the talent and character of leading persons in the colonies, advantages similar to those which talent and character, employed in the public service, obtain in the United Kingdom. Her Majesty has no desire to maintain any system of policy among her North American subjects which opinion condemns. In receiving the Queen's commands, therefore, to protest against any declaration at variance with the honour of the Crown, and the unity of the empire, I am at the same time instructed to announce her Majesty's gracious intention to look to the affectionate attachment of her people in North America, as the best security for permanent dominion. . . .

EARL GREY, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, to SIR JOHN HARVEY, Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia, 3rd November, 1846.

. . . Of whatsoever party your council may be composed, it will be your duty to act strictly upon the principle you have yourself laid down in the memorandum delivered to the gentlemen with whom you have communicated—that, namely, “of not identifying yourself with any one party”, but, instead of this, “making yourself both a mediator and a moderator between the influential of all parties”. In giving, therefore, all fair and proper support to your council for the time being, you will carefully avoid any acts which can possibly be supposed to imply the slightest personal objection to their opponents, and also refuse to assent to any measures which may be proposed to you by your council, which may appear to you to involve an improper exercise of the authority of

the crown for party rather than for public objects. In exercising, however, this power of refusing to sanction measures which may be submitted to you by your council, you must recollect that this power of opposing a check upon extreme measures proposed by the party for the time in the government depends entirely for its efficacy upon its being used sparingly and with the greatest possible discretion. A refusal to accept advice tendered to you by your council is a legitimate ground for its members to tender to you their resignations—a course they would doubtless adopt, should they feel that the subject on which a difference had arisen between you and themselves was one upon which public opinion would be in their favour. Should it prove to be so, concession to their views must sooner or later become inevitable; since it cannot be too distinctly acknowledged that it is neither possible nor desirable to carry on the government of any of the British provinces in North America in opposition to the opinion of the inhabitants.

Clearly understanding, therefore, that refusing to accede to the advice of your council for the time being, upon a point on which they consider it their duty to insist, must lead to the question at issue being brought ultimately under the decision of public opinion, you will carefully avoid allowing any matter not of very grave concern, or upon which you cannot reasonably calculate upon being in the end supported by that opinion, to be made the subject of such a difference. And if, unfortunately, such a difference should arise, you will take equal care that its cause and the grounds of your own decision are made clearly to appear in written documents capable of being publicly quoted.

SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, speech in the House of Commons, 8th February, 1850.

... It appears to me, that neither Parliament nor the Colonial Office has been very successful in devising constitutions for the colonies. In fact, all the attempts of late years at constitution making have failed. ... It is not sufficient to ascertain the opinions of a governor, or to refer to the sentiments of one or two newspapers, or the expressions of one or two public meetings. A constituent assembly composed of the representatives of the people should be summoned, and to them should be delegated the power of determining the form of their constitution.

Next, I ask, what are the powers which ought to be delegated to the colonial authorities? That appears to me to be a far more important question than the mere question of a colonial constitution. I am sorry to find, from the statement of the noble Lord, that he intends to retain to the Colonial Office its present arbitrary power of disallowing all acts of the colonial legislatures, and thus of interfering in the internal affairs of the colonies. Now, this arbitrary power has been, and as long as it exists will continue to be, a perpetual cause of colonial discontent and of never-ending discord between the colonies and the Imperial Government. All the colonies complain of the arbitrary power of the Colonial Office. Those complaints are frequently but too well founded. How is it possible they can be otherwise than well founded? Consider who are the persons who are entrusted with this arbitrary power. The heads of the Colonial Office change with every change of government. They are absentee rulers, living at the distance of many thousands of miles from their subjects. They never have ocular experience of the condition of the

colonies. They have no personal interest in the well-being of the colonists. They are always obliged to trust to second-hand and partial information with regard to the colonies. They are therefore generally ignorant, and, worse than ignorant—they are generally misinformed about colonial questions. They are said to be responsible to Parliament: that responsibility is a farce; for we cannot spare time to attend to colonial affairs; we cannot obtain accurate and impartial information about the colonies; we are necessarily ignorant; and our system of colonial government may with accuracy be described as government by the misinformed, with responsibility to the ignorant. This kind of government is most bitterly distasteful to men of our race and habits.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL, speech in the House of Commons, 30th June, 1853.  
 ... Are there no monuments which we should leave behind us? Will history tell no tale as regards the last seventy years of our government in India? Will it not be recorded that in that time we have put an end to those devastating wars in India in which the neighbouring princes attacked and destroyed each other to the total ruin of the people, and that the scene of the ravages of the Carnatic, so eloquently described by Mr. Burke, has not been repeated during our time? Will it not be told that, instead of this, our language has been introduced, that better notions of law and justice have been spread among the people of India, and that if we have not done what one hon. Member seemed to think, strangely enough, it was the duty of the East India Company to have done in less than a single century, and changed the whole character of the people, we have at least laid the foundations for that change of character by which the people will learn that in English estimation truth and justice are to take the place of falsehood and venality? We have introduced to the cultivated minds of India a knowledge of the science and literature of Europe, and we have thereby enabled them in future, whether they may be governed by Hindus, by English, or by any other authority, to judge that Government by a better test than by the old barbarous rules by which one perfidious conqueror was wont to estimate another. My belief is that if our rule in India were to be destroyed, we should possess that consolation—a consolation better than that of having built any of those palaces or having raised any of those stately works which sovereigns formerly erected in India.

SIR GEORGE GREY, Secretary of State for the Colonies, speech in the House of Commons, 4th August, 1854.

... The real question before the House is whether Canada having made the immense progress she has made in wealth, population, and fitness for self-government, there is any valid reason for withholding from her those privileges which are enjoyed by almost every other British colony of altering her own constitution, with the concurrence and consent of the Crown? Canada is now the only important British colony which does not possess this privilege. Is the House prepared to withhold the concession from Canada? In Australia our colonists know how to exercise the privileges which Parliament has conferred upon them, and have you any more reason to distrust the Canadian colonists than to distrust the Australians? ...

The question is whether, by the change proposed, the Executive Council will secure that respect and weight and confidence with the

people which the nominated Council has failed to secure, or which will enable it to operate more effectually as a real and valid check against inconsiderate popular impulses and hasty legislation? This end obtained, the mode is matter of less moment, and may safely be left to the good sense of the colonists. The feeling of Parliament has long been in this direction, and the effect upon our Australian Colonies and upon our North American Colonies of such principles has been most beneficial. I believe that the change, so far from tending to the separation of our Colonies from the British Crown—a separation which none could more earnestly deprecate than myself—will, on the contrary, tend to cement the attachment of the Colonies to the Crown, and to render the connection between them of far greater interest and value to both.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON, Prime Minister, speech in the House of Commons, 12th February, 1858.

... The principle of our political system is that all administrative functions should be accompanied by Ministerial responsibility—responsibility to Parliament, responsibility to public opinion, responsibility to the Crown; but in this case the chief functions in the government of India are committed to a body not responsible to Parliament, not appointed by the Crown, but elected by persons who have no more connection with India than consists in the simple possession of so much India Stock. . . . I say, then, that as far as regards the executive functions of the Indian Government at home, it is of the greatest importance to vest complete authority where the public have a right to think that complete responsibility should rest, and that whereas in this country there can be but one governing body responsible to the Crown, to Parliament, and to public opinion, consisting of the constitutional advisers of the Crown for the time being, so it is in accordance with the principles and practice of our constitution, as it would be in accordance with the best interests of the nation, that India, with all its vast and important interests, should be placed under the direct authority of the Crown, to be governed in the name of the Crown by the responsible Ministers of the Crown sitting in Parliament, and responsible to Parliament and the public for every part of their public conduct, instead of being, as now, mainly administered by a set of gentlemen who, however respectable, however competent for the discharge of the functions entrusted to them, are yet a totally irresponsible body, whose views and acts are seldom known to the public, and whether known or unknown, whether approved or disapproved, unless one of the Directors happens to have a seat in this House, are out of the range of Parliamentary discussion.

JOHN STUART MILL, *Considerations on Representative Government*, Chapter XVIII, 1861.

England has always felt under a certain degree of obligation to bestow on such of her outlying populations as were of her own blood and language, and on some who were not, representative institutions formed in imitation of her own: but until the present generation, she has been on the same bad level with other countries as to the amount of self-government which she allowed them to exercise through the representative institutions that she conceded to them. She claimed to be the supreme arbiter even of their purely internal concerns, according to her own, not their, ideas of how those concerns could be best regulated. . . .

It is now a fixed principle of the policy of Great Britain, professed in theory and faithfully adhered to in practice, that her colonies of European race, equally with the parent country, possess the fullest measure of internal self-government. They have been allowed to make their own free representative constitutions by altering in any manner they thought fit the already very popular constitutions which we had given them. Each is governed by its own legislature and executive, constituted on highly democratic principles. The veto of the Crown and of Parliament, though nominally reserved, is only exercised (and that very rarely) on questions which concern the empire, and not solely the particular colony. . . .

But though Great Britain could do perfectly well without her colonies, and though on every principle of morality and justice she ought to consent to their separation, should the time come when, after full trial of the best form of union, they deliberately desire to be dissevered—there are strong reasons for maintaining the present slight bond of connection, so long as not disagreeable to the feelings of either party. It is a step, as far as it goes, towards universal peace, and general friendly co-operation among nations. It renders war impossible among a large number of otherwise independent communities; and moreover hinders any of them from being absorbed into a foreign state, and becoming a source of additional aggressive strength to some rival power, either more despotic or closer at hand, which might not always be so unambitious or so pacific as Great Britain. . . . And in the case of the British possessions it has the advantage, especially valuable at the present time, of adding to the moral influence, and weight in the councils of the world, of the Power which, of all in existence, best understands liberty—and whatever may have been its errors in the past, has attained to more of conscience and moral principle in its dealings with foreigners than any other great nation seems either to conceive as possible or recognize as desirable.

C. B. ADDERLEY (later Lord Norton), speech in the House of Commons, 28th April, 1863.

. . . We have at length come to the end of the third phase of Colonial government. At first we left the Colonies very much to themselves, only imposing restrictions upon their commerce, for a supposed advantage to the mother country. These two things did not agree with each other, freedom and subserviency; and when we attempted to tax the Colonies in the Imperial Parliament, they separated themselves from the mother country on that ground. We attempted to govern the next Colonies from Downing Street, and for many years there was constant interference from that quarter. . . . Such a system could not last, and eventually it broke down completely. About thirty years ago England entered upon the third phase of Colonial government, extending to her Colonies the privilege of self-government—nay, more, stimulating their adoption of constitutions far more democratic than her own—and yet, at the same time, retaining in her own hands their protection and defence. We now see the end of this confusion of two principles. The Colonial authorities, who represent the principle of self-government, and the Colonial Minister at home, who represents the principle of external defence, are diametrically opposed to each other, and the incongruous system is working out another change in the relations between the Colonies and the mother country.

W. E. GLADSTONE, Prime Minister, speech in the House of Commons, 26th April, 1870.

... If you look back to the history of the colonial connection between European Powers and trans-Atlantic possessions you find that it is the nature of those possessions to grow, and so to grow as to alter essentially, in obedience to laws stronger than the will of man, the conditions of their relation to the countries with which they were originally connected, until they arrive at that stage of their progress in which separation from the mother country inevitably takes place. It is impossible, however, to look back with satisfaction to the mode in which that separation has occurred. In every instance it has been brought about by war and bloodshed, involving an inheritance of pain, hatred, and shame; whereas in reason there ought to be nothing to preclude the hope, when the growth of a colonial possession is such as to make separation from the mother country a natural and beneficial result, that that separation, so far from being effected by violence and bloodshed, might be the result of a peaceable and friendly transaction. Surely it is a great object to place, if possible, our colonial policy on such a footing, not for the purpose of bringing about a separation, but of providing a guarantee that, if separation should occur, it should be in a friendly way. That is the sense, the principle, and the secret of our policy with regard to colonial reform. . . .

THE MARQUESS OF RIPON, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the Earl of Glasgow, Governor of New Zealand, 26th September, 1892.

... When questions of a constitutional character are involved it is especially, I conceive, the right of the Governor fully to discuss with his Ministers the desirability of any particular course that may be pressed upon him for his adoption. He should frankly state the objections, if any, which may occur to him; but if, after full discussion, Ministers determine to press upon him the advice which they have already tendered, the Governor should, as a general rule, and when Imperial interests are not affected, accept that advice, bearing in mind that the responsibility rests with the Ministers, who are answerable to the Legislature, and, in the last resort, to the country.

A Governor would, however, be justified in taking another course if he should be satisfied that the policy recommended to him is not only, in his view, erroneous in itself, but such as he has solid grounds for believing, from his local knowledge, would not be endorsed by the Legislature or by the Constituencies.

In so extreme a case as this, he must be prepared to accept the grave responsibility of seeking other advisers; and I need hardly add, very strong reasons would be necessary to justify so exceptional a course on the part of the Governor.

WINSTON CHURCHILL, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, speech in the House of Commons, 31st July, 1906.

... One guiding principle has animated His Majesty's Government in their policy—to make no difference . . . between Boer and Briton in South Africa. We propose to extend to both races the fullest privileges and rights of British citizenship; and we intend to make no discrimination in the grant of that great boon between the men who have fought most loyally for us and those who have resisted the British arms with the most

desperate courage. By the Treaty of Vereeniging, in which the peace between the Dutch and British races was declared for ever, by Article 1 of that treaty the flower of the Boer nation and its most renowned leaders recognized the lawful authority of His Majesty King Edward VII, and henceforth, from that moment, British supremacy in South Africa stood on the sure foundations of military honour and warlike achievement, far beyond the reach of any transference of one or two seats, this way or that way, in a local Parliament. This decision in favour of even-handed dealing arises from no ingratitude on our part towards those who have nobly sustained the British cause in years gone by. It involves no injustice to the British population of the Transvaal. As will be seen from the statement I am about to make, we have been careful at every point of this constitutional settlement to secure for the British every advantage that they may justly claim. But the future of South Africa, and, I will add, its permanent inclusion in the British Empire, demand that the King should be equally Sovereign of both races, and that both races should learn to look upon this country as their friend.

ALFRED LYTTELTON, speech in the House of Commons, 29th June, 1910.  
 . . . The Imperial Government makes no claim whatever to interfere in the internal affairs of self-governing Dominions, or to veto any measure affecting their local or internal affairs, even if that measure be entirely repugnant to their views, provided it is passed according to law. . . . As I have said before, the Governor is bound to take the advice of his Ministers. . . .

LEWIS HARCOURT (later Viscount Harcourt), Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Sir William Ellison-Macartney, Governor of Tasmania, 5th June, 1914.

The observance of the principles of Responsible Government requires that a Governor must be clothed with Ministerial responsibility for all acts in relation to public affairs to which he is a party as head of the Executive. He cannot, therefore, perform any such act except on the advice of his Ministers, and for performing it on such advice no political responsibility attaches to him personally. The question whether or not a dissolution should be granted is a purely internal affair and is thus regulated by the general rule. A Governor, therefore, cannot dissolve the Legislature except on the advice of his Ministers. There have, of course, been not a few cases in which Governors have rejected advice tendered to them by their Ministers that the Legislature should be dissolved. These do not, however, stand on a different constitutional footing from any other case in which a Governor may have found himself unable to accept the advice of his Ministers. In all such cases the Ministers either acquiesce in the Governor's action, in which event they accept responsibility for it, or leave the Governor to find new Ministers who will accept the responsibility.

E. S. MONTAGU, Secretary of State for India, statement in the House of Commons, 20th August, 1917.

. . . The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. They have decided that substantial steps in this direction should

be taken as soon as possible, and that it is of the highest importance, as a preliminary to considering what these steps should be, that there should be a free and informal exchange of opinion between those in authority at home and in India. . . .

I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages. The British Government and the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred, and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility.

GENERAL J. C. SMUTS, speech at Imperial Conference, 16th April, 1917.

. . . The British Empire is the most important and fascinating problem in political and constitutional government which the world has ever seen. Whenever we come to this question of a proper constitution for this Empire we touch on the very gravest and most important issues. As a matter of fact we are the only group of nations that has ever successfully existed. People talk about a league of nations and international government, but the only successful experiment in international government that has ever been made is the British Empire, founded on principles which appeal to the highest political ideals of mankind. Founded on liberal principles, and principles of freedom and equality, it has continued to exist for a good time now, and our hope is that the basis may be so laid for the future that it may become an instrument for good, not only in the Empire but in the whole world. . . .

. . . So far the British Empire has developed along natural lines. The Dominions started as Colonies and as settlements of the Mother Country and of the British Isles. They started as Crown Colonies; they developed into self-governing Colonies; and now they have become the present Dominions. Other parts of the world have been added to the Empire, until to-day we have really a congeries of nations. These old Colonies and the present Dominions have in course of time increased in importance, increased in population, and in economic importance, and are to-day already playing a part in the world which seems to my mind to make it very necessary that their status should be very seriously considered, and should be improved. Too much, if I may say so, of the old ideas still clings to the new organism which is growing. . . .

GENERAL J. C. SMUTS, speech at a banquet given in his honour in the Royal Gallery at the House of Lords, 15th May, 1917.

I think that we are inclined to make mistakes in thinking about this group of nations to which we belong, because too often we think about it as one State. We are not a State. The British Empire is much more than a State. I think the very expression "Empire" is misleading, because it makes people think that we are one community, to which the word "Empire" can appropriately be applied. Germany is an Empire. Rome was an Empire. India is an Empire. But we are a system of nations. We are not a State, but a community of States and nations. We are far greater than any Empire which has ever existed, and by using this ancient expression we really disguise the main fact that our whole position is different, and that we are not one State or nation or empire,

but a whole world by ourselves, consisting of many nations, of many States, and all sorts of communities, under one flag.

We are a system of States, and not a stationary system, but a dynamic evolving system, always going forward to new destinies. Take the position of that system to-day. Here you have the United Kingdom with a number of Crown colonies. Besides that you have a large protectorate like Egypt, an Empire by itself. Then you have a great dependency like India, also an Empire by itself, where civilization has existed from time immemorial, where we are trying to see how East and West can work together. These are enormous problems; but beyond them we come to the so-called Dominions, independent in their government, which have been evolved on the principles of your free constitutional system into almost independent States, which all belong to this community of nations, and which I prefer to call "the British Commonwealth of Nations".

L. S. AMERY, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, speech in the House of Commons, 30th July, 1919.

... The essence of our principle of government in the vast areas under our charge is to govern in the interest of the native inhabitants and for their welfare. . . Our object in bringing about development is to raise the condition of the inhabitants and provide opportunities for a better and a higher scale of living. We want reconstruction in regard to health, in regard to liquor, in regard to education, in regard to all the things which will make those countries better worth living in for their inhabitants. But in doing so there is undoubtedly an overflow of benefit and wealth and opportunity for the people of this country. I do not see how you can create wealth and prosperity in one part of the Empire without creating it in another, and I am not prepared to accept in the least the doctrine that there is a diametric opposition in governing in the interests of the natives, and attempting to develop the country from the Imperial point of view.

E. F. L. WOOD (now Viscount Halifax), Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, speech in the House of Commons, 14th July, 1921.

... Whatever you may be able to do in this direction of developing human resources and natural resources, none of these things will really mature, in my judgment, to their full value unless at the same time we are able to secure wisely-ordered institutions to act as the instruments of political expression. I would postulate three conditions on the successful fulfilment of which I believe the future of the British Empire principally to depend. The first is co-operation between ourselves and the self-governing Dominions and India. . . Next is the wisdom with which we in England and this House may be able to guide those communities, not yet self-governing, along the path of constitutional development, and the third is the measure of harmony that we are able to achieve between the diversity of civilizations, races, creeds, colours, and traditions, that compose our commonwealth.

W. ORMSBY-GORE (later Lord Harlech), Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, speech in the House of Commons, 25th July, 1923.

... The British Commonwealth is an association of men of every race and of every colour scattered in every continent, based on a common loyalty to the Crown, not on any hierarchy of rights, but on a common spirit of service which transcends all narrow racial interests. After all, if

European civilization is menaced by the clash of mutually antagonistic nationalisms, there is an even greater peril in the clash of races, and if there is one duty which the British Empire, far flung as it is, has to civilization as a whole it is the duty of reconciling such dangerous forces.

In Kenya we have Europeans, Africans, Indians and Arabs living together, and I feel that the only thing that can be said is that it is the common duty of all to subordinate the narrow conceptions of racial consciousness to the higher ideal of working together for the Colony and for the Commonwealth as a whole. . . . We are the trustees of many great African Dependencies, of which Kenya is one, and our duty is to do justice and right between the various races and interests, remembering, above all, that we are the trustees before the world for the African population. . . .

REPORT of the Imperial Conference, 1926.

. . . The committee are of opinion that nothing would be gained by attempting to lay down a constitution for the British Empire. Its widely scattered parts have very different characteristics, very different histories, and are at very different stages of evolution; while, considered as a whole, it defies classification and bears no real resemblance to any other political organization which now exists or has ever yet been tried. There is, however, one most important element in it which, from a strictly constitutional point of view, has now, as regards all vital matters, reached its full development—we refer to the group of self-governing communities composed of Great Britain and the dominions. Their position and mutual relation may be readily defined. They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

A foreigner endeavouring to understand the true character of the British Empire by the aid of this formula alone would be tempted to think that it was devised rather to make mutual interference impossible than to make mutual co-operation easy. Such a criticism, however, completely ignores the historic situation. The rapid evolution of the overseas dominions during the last fifty years has involved many complicated adjustments of old political machinery to changing conditions. The tendency towards equality of status was both right and inevitable. Geographical and other conditions made this impossible of attainment by the way of federation. The only alternative was by the way of autonomy; and along this road it has been steadily sought. Every self-governing member of the empire is now the master of its destiny. In fact, if not always in form, it is subject to no compulsion whatever.

But no account, however accurate, of the negative relations in which Great Britain and the dominions stand to each other can do more than express a portion of the truth. The British Empire is not founded upon negations. It depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life-blood. Free co-operation is its instrument. Peace, security, and progress are among its objects. Aspects of all these great themes have been discussed at the present conference; excellent results have been thereby obtained. And, though every dominion is now and must always remain the sole judge of the nature and extent of its co-operation, no common cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperilled. . . .

MALCOLM MACDONALD, Secretary of State for the Colonies, speech in the House of Commons, 7th December, 1938.

... It is quite true that sometimes the interests of one community come into conflict with the interests of another; and then adjustments have to be made, so that those interests can be reconciled. But I do not believe there is any fundamental conflict of interest between these immigrant communities that have settled more lately in the colonies, and the interests of the indigenous native populations... The primary purpose of Colonial policy is the welfare and progress of all the inhabitants of colonial territories. They have a common interest in the development of these territories, and that policy of fostering the interests of all the peoples of these colonies is a policy which has been accepted by this Government for decades past. . . .

Having made the point, I would emphasize the great importance of our duty to the natives. I think that our first duty is always to them. We have to foster their material well-being and to see that they get fair play in the complicated economic system of the modern world. . . .

Above all, there is another objective which we keep constantly in view. The great purpose of the British Empire is the gradual spread of freedom among all His Majesty's subjects in whatever part of the world they live. That spread of freedom is a slow, evolutionary process. In some countries it is more rapid than in others. . . . It may take generations, or even centuries, for the peoples in some parts of the Colonial Empire to achieve self-government. But it is a major part of our policy, even among the most backward peoples of Africa, to teach them and to encourage them always to be able to stand a little more on their own feet. That love of ours of freedom not only for ourselves but for others, inspires policy right through the Colonial Empire, and I believe that the best assurance that these peoples can have that that spirit will continue to be a guide in their affairs is that they should continue their association with the British Empire.

OLIVER STANLEY, Secretary of State for the Colonies, speech in the House of Commons, 13th July, 1943.

... The central purpose of our Colonial administration has often been proclaimed. It has been called the doctrine of trusteeship, although I think some of us feel now that that word "trustee" is rather too static in its connotation and that we should prefer to combine with the status of trustee the position also of partner. But we are pledged to guide Colonial people along the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire. We are pledged to build up their social and economic institutions, and we are pledged to develop their natural resources. Those objects have often been proclaimed, and for me to proclaim them again today would be one more speech in a world where speeches now are rather at a discount and it is more deeds that count. . . . It is no part of our policy to confer political advances which are unjustified by circumstances, or to grant self-government to those who are not yet trained in its use, but if we really mean as soon as practicable to develop self-government in these territories, it is up to us to see that circumstances as soon as possible justify political advances and to ensure that as quickly as possible people are trained and equipped for eventual self-government. Therefore, to my mind, the real test of the sincerity and success of our Colonial policy is two-fold. It is not only the actual

political advances that we make, but it is also, and I think more important, the steps that we are taking, economic and social as well as political, to prepare the people for further and future responsibilities. . . .

JAMES GRIFFITHS, Secretary of State for the Colonies, statement in the House of Commons, 13th December, 1950.

. . . It may be useful if I make clear certain basic principles of policy which must be observed:

- (i) As has been repeatedly stated by His Majesty's Government with the assent of all parties, our objective is self-government within the Commonwealth.
- (ii) Self-government must include proper provision for all the main communities which have made their home in East Africa, but in the long run their security and well-being must rest on their good relations with each other. Good relations cannot flourish while there is fear and suspicion between the communities; it must therefore be our task to create conditions where that fear and suspicion disappear. In any constitutional changes in the direction of self-government, care must be taken to safeguard the proper rights and interests of all the different communities. Future policy must be worked out in full consultation with those who belong to the territories.
- (iii) By our presence in these territories and by the assistance which we have given them in developing their resources we have set Africans on the path of political, social and economic progress and it is our task to help them forward in that development, so that they may take their full part, with the other sections of the community, in the political and economic life of the territories.
- (iv) When Africans have reached that stage and the other communities feel secure as regards their future in East Africa, we can hope for a state of mutual confidence and harmony; that will be a sound basis for a Government in which all sections participate. It will be some time before that stage is reached and meanwhile it is essential that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom should continue to exercise their ultimate control in the East African territories. It is their firm intention to do so, while encouraging all reasonable freedom of action by the local Governments.

## APPENDIX D

## PARAMOUNTCY AND PARTNERSHIP

The words "Paramountcy" and "Partnership", and the conceptions underlying them, go to the root of the problems of the plural society. The doctrine of paramountcy was formulated in 1923, and applied specifically to Kenya.

His Majesty's Government think it necessary to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races conflict, the former should prevail. . . . His Majesty's Government regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population, and they are unable to delegate or share this trust, the object of which may be defined as the protection and advancement of the native races.

This doctrine was given a new slant in 1931 in a statement by a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament, and the new definition was accepted thereafter as official British policy.

The doctrine of Paramountcy means no more than that the interests of the overwhelming majority of the indigenous population should not be subordinated to those of a minority belonging to another race however important in itself.

This statement was apparently intended at the time to be a re-definition of the doctrine of paramountcy rather than the enunciation of a new policy. Nevertheless, it was widely regarded in African circles as being an abrogation of the former policy. This was understandable for there is clearly a difference of emphasis between the positive assertion that African interests must be paramount and the negative statement that African interests should not be subordinated to other interests. Many Africans believed that the doctrine of paramountcy, as defined in 1923, was dying.

By 1948 it was dead. The Secretary for Native Affairs in Northern Rhodesia said as much in a speech in the Northern Rhodesian Representative Council on 16th August, 1948; and on 22nd September, 1948, the Secretary of State (Mr. Creech Jones), affirmed in Parliament that the 1931 statement, which Parliament had accepted at the time, was not an interpretation or elaboration of the 1923 statement but a supersession of it. At the Victoria Falls Conference held in September, 1951, to discuss the closer association of British Central African territories, the African representatives asked that the policy of partnership should be defined and put into progressive operation. Discussions took place, and in April, 1952, the Government of Northern Rhodesia issued the following statement as a basis for discussion.

1. The ultimate political objective for the people of Northern Rhodesia is self-government within the British Commonwealth; self-government must take full account of the rights and interests of both Europeans and Africans and include proper provision for both.

2. The only satisfactory basis on which such provision can be secured is economic and political partnership between the races. . . .

3. The application of such partnership in practice must ensure that Africans are helped forward along the path of economic, social,

and political progress on which their feet have already been set, so that they may take their full part with the rest of the community in the economic and political life of the territory. Africans, for their part, must be willing to accept the responsibilities, as well as the privileges, which such advancement entails.

There can be no question of . . . subordinating the interests of any section of the community to those of any other section.

The application of the policy of partnership is not in any way inconsistent with, and does not in any way interfere with, the territory's present protectorate status. It imposes on each of the two sections (Europeans and Africans) an obligation to recognize the right of the other section to a permanent home in Northern Rhodesia.

4. In the political sphere partnership implies that any constitutional arrangement must include proper provision for both Europeans and Africans, and proper safeguards for their rights and interests.

5. Generally partnership implies that Europeans and Africans will pay due regard to each other's outlook, beliefs, customs, and legitimate aspirations and anxieties.

6. In the political sphere, Africans will be able to advance until ultimately (so long as representation on racial grounds remains) they have the same number of representatives as the Europeans in both the Legislative and Executive Council, when they are fit for this. . . .

7. In the economic field, every individual must be free to rise to the level that his ability, energy, qualifications, and character permit. In accordance with its declared policy that Africans . . . should be afforded opportunities for employment in more responsible work as and when they are qualified to undertake it, the Government will continue to provide more and better facilities for the training of Africans for such work.

8. In the educational field, the Government will, in co-operation with Native Authorities and missions, continue to work steadily towards universal literacy for all African children of school-going age and it will, in accordance with long-term plans already made, provide expanded facilities for both secondary education and vocational training. . . .

9. In the field of local government the Government is training Africans to take a larger and a more effective part in the administration of rural areas. In the towns, African membership of African Affairs sub-committees of municipal councils and township management boards is extending, and it is to be expected that as Africans gain the necessary knowledge and experience they will become members of such councils and boards.

10. In the Government service, Africans are being trained for, and promoted to, more responsible positions as they show themselves capable of assuming heavier duties and increased responsibility.

11. At the present state of development of Africans, repeal of all differential legislation would not be in their best interests; much of it is designed to protect them and some of it grants them special privileges. It has been the policy of the Government to remove or relax the differential provisions in legislation as the advancement of the Africans renders such provisions no longer necessary. The Govern-

ment will keep this matter under close review and propose to the Legislature, from time to time, such further amendments as it may consider appropriate.

12. As regards discriminatory practices based on racial distinctions, these are incompatible with the policy of partnership and the trend of public opinion . . . is towards a clearer recognition of this fact. Such practices are diminishing . . . and will diminish still more rapidly as Europeans and Africans recognize each other's needs as well as their own obligations in this matter. The Government has taken and is taking steps to encourage, in both races, a sympathetic and helpful approach to this problem.

## APPENDIX E

### PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN THE BELGIAN CONGO: PREPARING THE AFRICAN ÉLITE.

By Lieutenant-General P. Ermens,  
*Honorary Vice-Governor General of the Belgian Congo.*

As chapter viii of this report so rightly says, there is not *one* colonial problem, but several. In the same way, one is faced with an equally large number of solutions.

For those who are not content with a parody, and for those who refuse to impose on the indigenous peoples of the Belgian Congo, and even of the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, a political system for which they are not yet prepared, about which they understand nothing, and to which, with the exception, perhaps, of a very small number of sufficiently educated and civilized inhabitants, they do not aspire, the prospect of introducing and developing parliamentary institutions remains remote.

It is one thing to call a number of Africans into consultation on government councils, and quite another to establish democratic parliamentary government, based on the consent of a people versed in its functions and interests, who are able and anxious to express a sovereign will. This is a stage which, it must be realized, the Belgian Congo and even Ruanda-Urundi are far from achieving. The Belgian administration, however, must not be criticized for this, but rather praised for having shown itself neither unaware of existing facts nor impatient of results.

Political progress is necessary and political emancipation of dependent territories legitimate, but it is wise to heed the successive stages of the journey; before the inhabitants of Central Africa can govern themselves democratically as free, civilized peoples, they ask to be protected from poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance. Their increasing demands for learning denote particularly their desire to improve their material conditions of life. On bringing its attention to bear—as it has done—on the economic and social aspects of the colonial problem, the Belgian Government has certainly responded to the most pressing needs and immediate wishes of the African population under its protection.

But this economic development of the Belgian Congo has led to an ever increasing flow of young Africans towards the urban agglomerations and industrial centres. Here they receive salaries and acquire tastes

never hoped for nor dreamt of before leaving their home villages. When these uprooted people come in contact with the life of the Europeans, they begin to desire for themselves the form of civilization which these Europeans represent; the quality of this desire is debatable: with most of the more educated Africans it is only a desire, understandably enough, for material improvement; with a very few it is a desire for spiritual advance; the number of Africans who are intellectually and morally capable of being assimilated with the Europeans, and desire it, is very small indeed.

On the other hand, the exodus from the villages to the towns, and the rumours of prosperity which have spread abroad from the latter, have made life in the rural areas increasingly difficult for the young people. They become more conscious and more impatient of the obstacles which tradition and especially the traditional authorities put in the path of their more modest and legitimate ambitions: to found a home, which involves the payment of the usual dowry too heavy for their means; to preserve the fruit of their labour for themselves, which is opposed by the traditional authorities who greedily demand it for themselves.

Most observers agree that the "traditional" framework is breaking up and the question is whether to strengthen or replace it. It would, at any rate, be unforgivable to pull it down without having first established the foundation for a substitute.

Considering the African population of the Belgian Congo as a whole, and taking into account the different customs, aptitudes and needs which distinguish its ethnic groups, it is made up of a minority of detribalized elements, and a majority (at least four-fifths of the total) of individuals living in the rural areas ruled by their own traditional law.

To the first group belong most of the advanced or civilized Africans who are making themselves heard and claim, if not the right of self-administration, at least the right to be consulted, and especially the right to be treated with more consideration.

The more intelligent of them realize and do not hesitate to point out that the presence of the white man is still necessary for the public peace and for the economic and social progress of their country. But how many of this élite think of more than improving their own personal status? How many of them care to think of the fate of their fellow countrymen in the bush? How many are qualified to be the spokesmen of the masses? Certainly very few.

This does not mean that the present political and administrative structure must remain quite unchanged. It is only wise and just that the Africans who are capable of holding certain positions, which have until now been reserved for Europeans, should be admitted more easily to public services, and the African élite should be invited to play an increasingly large part in the administration of the urban centres. I am aware that this participation has been foreseen and is put into effect in theory in most urban parts of the Congo, but the role of the African élite is purely consultative and involves little responsibility; a step forward must be taken to give these councillors a deliberative voice.

In the traditional rural areas, political progress is more difficult, but not impossible. The traditional authorities, with very few exceptions, all vow that they are neither willing nor able to collaborate. It will be the difficult but necessary task of the Territorial Administrators and District Commissioners to conquer the ill-will and reluctance of the

tribal chiefs and to persuade them that, unless they wish to see the worm-eaten structure of the tribal system collapse about them, they must consent to certain reforms. These reforms would strengthen the chiefdoms—which would henceforth be comparable with the Belgian parishes—and make them the centre of the young people's interest (reserved until now for the clan), and the goal of their ambition (now turned, willy-nilly, towards the huge, enticing cities). For it is far more urgent and useful to initiate the African élite into the management of chiefdoms than to invite them to sit on Provincial and general Government councils.<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

The considerations I have outlined lead me to the conclusion that the mass of the people in the Belgian Congo have not acquired, and are still far from acquiring, the political maturity which would permit and justify the introduction of parliamentary government in the colony, and that the African élite is neither large enough nor sufficiently prepared for the responsibilities of political power to be able to provide the deliberative personnel of a Legislative Council having authority over the whole of the Congo.

My second conclusion is that it is not too late to prepare the African élite for the exercise of those rights and duties which will imply—in a still far off future—the establishment of a parliamentary régime. But one must begin at the beginning, initiating them progressively into the management of elementary political and administrative entities—the traditional chiefdoms, the detribalized centres, the towns. It is in their capacity as delegates summoned from the districts, parishes, etc., that the sufficiently cultivated Africans are or will be called to sit most usefully on government councils, at the level of the District, Provincial or Central councils.

Finally, and independently of their participation in the administration of local and regional affairs, Africans who have the required intellectual and moral capabilities, and wish to be employed in public administration, must be admitted.

Here too it is wise to begin at the beginning: before making them District Commissioners, it is advisable to try them out as territorial agents; before making them heads of departments, it is better to give them more modest and less responsible positions. It is essential that they should realize, and that it should be proved to them, that there is no colour bar to prevent their progressing according to their merits.

This progress must be made possible by the organization of educational establishments and a programme of education. As far as this is concerned, the progress achieved up to the present by Belgium in the Congo augurs well for what will be done in the future to promote equally the education of the mass and the education of the élite.

<sup>1</sup> I refer the reader to an article published on this subject in the *Revue Nouvelle* of 15 June, 1952, by Antoine Rubbens, under the title "A Political Organization in the Belgian Congo".

## APPENDIX F

## MALAYA

A note by Victor Purcell, C.M.G.

In considering this report from a Malayan angle, I have been struck by the fact that Malaya is very much *sui generis* and therefore requires a note on its own. For one thing, though many of the generalizations apply to all territories where parliamentary government exists or is proposed, the report (to Malayan eyes) is impregnated with experience of countries outside Malaya.

## SINGAPORE

In Singapore (a "Colony" in the exact sense) the progress towards parliamentary government is greater than in the Federation, but it cannot be said to be more than in the elementary stages. So far the greatest obstacle has been the apathy of the Chinese who form the bulk of the population, due partly to inexperience of representative government and partly to the feeling of resentment caused by the discriminatory nature of the Federal constitution and citizenship proposals. Communist propaganda has also urged the boycotting of the polls.

The position recently, however, has improved, and nearly half of those qualified to vote in the Legislative Council elections are now enrolled. At the Municipal elections held in December, 1951, only 58 per cent of those registered went to the polls, which, however, was an improvement of 4 per cent on the preceding year. (The Labour Party won 3 seats, the Progressive 2, and an Independent 1.) In Penang, where Municipal elections were also held, the response was not very much greater. So far the Indians in Singapore have availed themselves of their voting privileges to a greater extent than have the Chinese with the result that Indian representation is greater proportionately than Chinese. (One notable feature of the last elections for the Legislative Council was the election of a European to a constituency predominantly Chinese and against a Chinese candidate—a welcome sign of a departure from communalism.)

Advance towards a sense of democracy will obviously be slow in Singapore though some progress is being made. The real problem, however, is that of the Federation whose population is five times that of Singapore and where the Treaties with the Sultans are a complicating factor which does not exist in the Colony.

## THE FEDERATION

Before the second world war, Malaya (about the size of England without Wales) had seven separate governments. (The Straits Settlements, comprising Singapore, Penang, and Malacca; the four Federated Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang; and the unfederated Malay States of Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, Johore, and Perlis). On 1st April, 1946, a Malayan Union was created comprising all the Malay States and the Settlements of Penang and Malacca. The intention was to give Malaya (excluding Singapore) a constitutional unity and an equality of citizenship of all races. The objectives were a strong central government in Malaya and common citizenship for its population. However, strong reaction against the Union on the part of the Malays induced the British Government to modify it and shape constitutional arrangements more on federation lines while establishing substantial powers in the central government. This new plan operated from 1st February, 1948. The new citizenship rules, which were sub-

mitted to all communities, gave automatic citizenship to all Malays, but in the case of non-Malays (notably the Chinese who number about 2 million as against the 2½ million Malays of the Federation) they were not automatically Federal citizens even when they were born within the Federation. In June, 1948, bandits and Communist guerrillas (mostly Chinese) began the shooting and destruction which still continues. The attempt to sabotage the administration and industry was begun for reasons external to Malaya and its domestic politics, but it is against this background that the constitutional question must be seen.

The "Emergency" (as the operations against the Communist guerrillas are officially termed) has undoubtedly slowed down the progress of Malaya towards representative government. Nevertheless British official policy is that measures designed to fit the country for self-government must go hand in hand with those for suppressing the terrorists. As a measure for extending the number of Chinese who are automatically Malayan Federal Citizens by operation of law, legislation has been passed in the Legislative Council and in the State legislatures whereby about 200,000 more Chinese will become "subjects of the Sultans" and therefore automatically Malayan Federal Citizens at the same time. These measures by no means satisfy Chinese aspirations and have given rise to the criticism that they tend to perpetuate and strengthen State frontiers by creating nine separate nationalities in a country the size of England, but the gesture has been accepted by the Chinese, at least temporarily, as an earnest of the Government's future intentions.

Although efforts were made to make the first Legislative Council in the Federation representative of all States, societies and communities, it has not been possible so far to arrange elections. The first local government elections were held in Kuala Lumpur in January, 1952. The electorate was greatly restricted by citizenship requirements so that it is believed that less than 16,000 persons voted out of a population of more than 1,76,000, 1,12,000 of them Chinese. The feature of the elections was the defeat of Dato Onn's Independence of Malaya Party (I.M.P.) by a coalition of the United Malay National Organization (U.M.N.O.) and the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.) Though politically opposed, the two parties decided for reasons of expediency to combine. No doubt the highly restricted voting was responsible for the general public apathy. At the same time this was the first example of popular suffrage in the history of the Malay States.

Stated briefly, the obstacles to the rapid extension of representative government in Malaya are (a) the fact that the Chinese approach the Malays in numbers in the Federation as a whole and in some States actually outnumber them (this means that the Malays are afraid of being swamped politically by the Chinese, a fear enhanced by the fact that the Chinese are economically predominant in Malaya and increasingly so), and (b) because Malaya, in its present racial pattern, is a new country and, unlike India and Pakistan, has not had time to become accustomed to using the machinery of self-rule. The existence of the "Emergency" and the proximity of China, a huge Communist country, greatly complicate the problem. Nevertheless, Malaya will make no progress towards non-communal association until elections are held and the people are given an opportunity to align themselves according to their economic interests. At present Malaya is constitutionally arrested.

## APPENDIX G

## NOTE ON NATIONALISM, RACE, AND THE PLURAL SOCIETY IN MAURITIUS

The population of Mauritius is estimated as being 494,519 (excluding 5,500 male persons serving overseas) on 31st December, 1951. This figure may be broken up as follows:

|                     |         |
|---------------------|---------|
| General population  | 162,466 |
| Indian           ,, | 316,402 |
| Chinese         ,,  | 15,651  |

A further breakdown based on less accurate figures is:

|                                         |                                          |         |
|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------|
| General population                      | { Franco-Mauritian                       | 12,000  |
|                                         | { Coloured                               | 150,066 |
|                                         | { British (excluding military personnel) | 400     |
| Indian population<br>(Indo-Mauritians)  | { Hindu                                  | 243,402 |
|                                         | { Moslem                                 | 69,000  |
|                                         | { Christian                              | 4,000   |
| Chinese population<br>(Sino-Mauritians) | { Nationalist                            | 12,151  |
|                                         | { Peoples party                          | 3,500   |
|                                         | { (Communist)                            |         |

Mauritius was uninhabited when it became known to the Arabs, and in the sixteenth century to the Portuguese. It was first settled by the Dutch in the seventeenth century: but after they abandoned the island, it was again virtually uninhabited until the French occupation in the eighteenth century. The French used slave labour, drawn from Madagascar and Africa, for their plantations, etc. The island became a British possession in 1810 and, on the release of the slaves, indentured labour was introduced from India. The British have never *settled* in Mauritius, and British persons living there are officials who serve for comparatively short periods, employees of The Anglo-Ceylon Estates Ltd., members of the garrison, and a handful of others.

The Franco-Mauritian section of the community are the descendants of the original French settlers, and of later importations from France. They are now the original inhabitants of the island. Their culture is very largely derived from France, and they are mostly Roman Catholics. They are the land-owning and well-to-do class of planters, professional and business men, civil servants, etc.

The coloured section of the community are, for the most part, the descendants of the released slaves. Their origin is Malgash or African, sometimes mixed with white and occasionally with Indian blood. Their culture has been to some small extent affected by England but is very largely French, and the great majority are Roman Catholic. They include business and professional men, civil servants, teachers, artisans, domestic servants, fishermen, and the like.

The Hindu section of the community are the descendants of the indentured labour. They provide the greater part of the unskilled labour of the island. Many are largely or wholly illiterate, but their members include small planters, doctors, teachers, and civil servants.

The Moslem section of the community are mostly traders, more important small planters, and one or two professional men.

The Chinese section of the community are mostly small shopkeepers and traders, though there are a few doctors, teachers, and professional men.

In the last hundred years or so the total population has increased threefold:

| Year          | General                          | Indian | Chinese |
|---------------|----------------------------------|--------|---------|
|               | (Percentage of total population) |        |         |
| 1846          | 64.5%                            | 35.5%  | 0.0%    |
| 1951          | 32.9%                            | 64.0%  | 3.1%    |
| 1976 Estimate | 28.6%                            | 65.6%  | 5.8%    |

The plurality of the community is emphasized and underscored in many ways. Sir Donald Mackenzie-Kennedy described Mauritius as being divided vertically by race and horizontally by class: others see it as containing islands of population inspired by different religions, ideals, and aims, looking at each other across a sea of prejudice and suspicion.

\*             \*             \*             \*             \*

*Franco-Mauritian.* The Franco-Mauritian section regard Mauritius as "theirs" by right of original settlement. They observe a strict social and racial colour bar. Until 1948 they held the highest posts open to Mauritians in the Government service, and a restricted franchise gave them a majority in the Council of Government. Not only was Mauritius run for their benefit but they acknowledged this and thought it right that matters should be so arranged. Now they are faced with a wide-franchise legislature, in which the largest party is Indian, and to which they did not succeed in electing a single member holding their own views.<sup>1</sup> They see Indians and coloured men appointed to posts to which they alone had aspired in the past: and they are very conscious of the population trend which must swamp them numerically as the years go by. The country is no longer run by them and for them. Franco-Mauritian reactions to this revolutionary change are varied. Some do realize that changes must come and that there can be no putting the clock back. They are concerned to see if political and social development—however distasteful to them—can be so directed that the country still has readily available, and may make use of, the brains, energy, and money, which their section of the community possesses in abundance.

But the sage councils of these more thoughtful Franco-Mauritians are at present of little avail against the ultra-conservative and bellicose attitude of their community as a whole; their wise words are drowned by the frenzied screams of reactionaries who are concerned only to perpetuate an almost pre-French Revolution way of life.

If the politically conscious Hindu is public enemy No. 1, as the *Cernéen*<sup>2</sup> repeats *ad nauseam*, one would expect to find an attempt to create a Franco-Mauritian—Coloured—Moslem bloc as a counter-move. Certain Franco-Mauritians see the need for this, but the majority of this section of the community will not "descend" to any such alliance and still expect the Government to pick their chestnuts out of the fire.

<sup>1</sup> One Franco-Mauritian was elected. He is not regarded by his own community as one of themselves.

<sup>2</sup> The newspaper regarded as the white man's paper.

At the present stage this island of population is thrown more and more in upon itself—French culture, the Christian religion as expounded by the Church of Rome, the occidental way of life, are held up as the proper and only pattern for the Mauritius of the future, and there is no attempt by Franco-Mauritians, as a whole, to seek a Mauritian way of life which could result from a synthesis of the plural population.

*Coloured.* The coloured section of the community is caught between the upper millstone of what it regards as white oppression and the lower millstone of increasing Hindu numerical strength and political power. Its isolationism is well illustrated by the "*Cercle de Rose-Hill*", a flourishing coloured men's Club, numbering among its members doctors, professional men, civil servants, and politicians. No Indian is allowed to become a member, and if white guests are invited to the annual dinner they are imported English officials and not Franco-Mauritians.

One would expect this section of the community to form its own political party between the Franco-Mauritian right and the Indian left, and many of the coloured people do in fact correspond, in some degree, with the old Liberal Party in England. But the centuries-long division of Mauritius into white and black, into "haves" and "have-nots", has driven the coloured man further to the left than he really belongs, and he makes common cause politically with the Indians to form the local so-called Labour Party under the leadership of the Hon. Mr. G. Rozemont, himself a coloured man. There are remarkable exceptions to this generalization—Dr. the Hon. E. Millien is one—but it is generally true.

But when coloured and Indian interests clash, as for example over appointments or promotions to the Government service, it is another matter. While there is a common enemy—the white population, or "the Government", so long, in coloured minds, the symbol of white supremacy in the island—coloured and Indian will join. Remove that unifying force and the division will be as marked and sharp as any that at present exists. It will be interesting to see how many coloured men are successful in the next election, and whether those who are elected come in on the Labour ticket and so gain Indian votes.

Socially and racially the coloured section of the community keeps as much to itself as does the Franco-Mauritian section. It is divided by shades of colour and by diverse allegiances, and united in its opposition to white supremacy. But political groupings with the Indian section occur on the extreme left, and there are certain openly professed non-Labour interests on the right which occasionally see eye to eye with the Franco-Mauritian interests in political matters only.

*British.* The British are the least colour-, race-, and religious-conscious section of the community. Senior officials, accustomed by training to assume their social responsibilities to other races and colours, observe no colour bar, and frequent changes in personnel prevent the official outlook from becoming ingrowing. In the case of planters, merchants and other British persons long resident in the Island—in certain cases for several generations—racial and social outlook approximates to some extent to that of the Franco-Mauritian section. But relationships with Indians and coloured men are easier and more cordial. This section of the community is not large enough—nor, in the case of officials, sufficiently well paid—to make any great impact on the general pattern of life: nor can it act as a general solvent of inter-racial troubles.

*Hindu.* Broadly the Hindu's hand is against every one because he believes, and is taught by his leaders to believe, that everyone's hand is against him. In the early days of Indian immigration, estate-owners made little change in their treatment of indentured labour from that accorded to slave labour. The wounds and scars so caused have never healed, and to this day some Franco-Mauritians look on the Indian unskilled worker as little better than his cow. Everything has conspired to retain an unbridgeable gulf between the "grand seigneur" and the "serf"—race, colour, religion, politics, and economic status. And the more the Franco-Mauritian tries to buttress his waning political influence by boosting his religion and culture, the more inflamed becomes Hindu feeling for him. Further, the Hindu feels that his growing political power will make it possible for him to get back at the white man, to enjoy the privileges he has so long seen as the perquisites of another race, and to destroy the vested interests.

Much of the incredible bitterness which exists is fostered by rival press organs, and it is distressing to find that the *Cernéen*, as at present managed and edited, has in the past year or so increased the bad feeling. The paper is at times pernicious, disruptive and evil: it not only fails to set a good example to the press of the island, it sets the worst possible example.

Although the *Cernéen* likes to pretend otherwise, there is little evidence now of any strong urge on the part of the Indians to enjoy closer relationship with India. The surge of feeling called into existence by Hindu success in the last elections, by the attainment of independence by India, and by the appointment of the first Indian Commissioner, has ebbed: it is convenient to have India in the background as an example, but not as a motherland to be annexed to—or even to return to.

It should be added there are a few wealthy Hindus who would be glad to form political links with the Franco-Mauritian community: they have had a minimum of encouragement.

*Moslem.* The Moslem in Mauritius, as elsewhere, has a natural dignity and courtesy, and no inferiority complex. This makes him socially the easiest of the non-European sections of the population. The sharp divisions which exist in the sub-continent of India between the Moslem population and the rest are less noticeable here. The Moslem section of the community is less assertive than others: they do not have years of insult and ill-treatment to look back on, nor have they any desire to "achieve whiteness". Many of them are well-to-do and the spur of poverty is lacking in their political activities. They might well be among the first to join in some political allegiance, cutting across race and creed.

*Indian Christians.* The Christian Indian section is so small and unimportant as to be negligible as a separate unit.

*Chinese.* Both parts of the Chinese section keep themselves very much aloof: they are good citizens on the whole, serving the country as shopkeepers and traders. They do not wish to be integrated any more fully into public life and, at present, they are almost entirely non-vocal politically.

\*             \*             \*             \*             \*

Here then are the elements of which the plural society of Mauritius is built up. Class and conflicting economic interests are underlined by

race and religious differences. What can be done to get these islands of population closer together, at least to induce them to throw out bridges over which members of each race can cross the sea of suspicion and mistrust? Must orientalism and occidentalism, and all the other -isms, continue their disjunctive influences, and can they ever join up in the only -ism that matters—Mauritianism? What can be done to simplify conditions so that the individual may give his primary loyalty to his political unit and not to his group?

This is no straight issue of white versus black or English versus native. It is as complex and difficult a problem as can be set, but it has not yet received any scientific study. Senior British officials, trained in similar problems elsewhere in the Colonial Empire, regard it with interest, alarm or despondency as the case may be: but preoccupation with the day-to-day business of running the affairs of the country, complicated at every turn by sharp and conflicting interests, leaves little time for scientific study and small opportunity to see the whole problem in any perspective.

In the long discussions with the representatives of various sections of the community which led up to the constitutional changes of 1948, the problem was ignored—or perhaps it would be fairer to say that there was a tacit assumption that a generally acceptable political framework would solve the problem. Communal franchise was discussed and rejected; so were proposals that nominated members should be selected on the basis of representation by specific interests or groups. But the creation of a “common social mind” was left to natural evolution from the new constitutional arrangements.

The new constitution followed the conventional Crown Colony pattern, and its main features are as follows.

The legislature is unicameral. It consists of a Legislative Council comprising the Governor as president; three *ex officio* members (the Colonial Secretary, the Procureur General, and the Financial Secretary); twelve members nominated by the Governor; and nineteen members elected for six constituencies on a fairly wide franchise. The Executive Council consists of the Governor, the three *ex officio* members who belong to the Legislative Council, four members selected by the Legislative Council to sit in the Executive Council, and such other members as may be appointed by the Crown on the Governor's advice. The Governor has the usual negative powers: he also has reserved powers by which he can in certain circumstances certify bills, motions or resolutions, in which case they have effect as though approved by the Legislative Council. Recently a system of “Liaison Officers” has been introduced. This consists in giving to certain unofficial members of the Executive Council duties, but not executive powers, *vis-à-vis* various departments.

Three years' experience of these arrangements provides little encouragement. To take a simple example—within the last few months the appointment of an English judge has caused an outcry from coloured and Indian representatives; the selection of three coloured local government officers has met with an outburst from the Indians; and the selection of a Hindu inspector of schools has roused the wrath of coloured members.

If it is possible that a solution can be imposed on a plural society from the outside, and if constitutional reform is that solution, it may be that the new constitution does not go far enough. It may be that so long as any section of the community feels that intervention by the Governor

or the Secretary of State can protect its interests, it will not seek to adjust itself by negotiation and compromise. Should a further step be taken, even if at worst it means the exchange of the old white oligarchy for Hindu hegemony?

Should H.M.G. in effect say: "You cannot for obvious reasons be a Dominion and so we must continue to control your finance, security and foreign affairs: but you must learn to run your own internal affairs. To do this you will have to come to some working arrangements which follow political rather than racial and religious lines, and the sooner you get down to this yourselves the better". This is a tempting possible solution.<sup>1</sup> The main difficulty lies in the fact that while there are Mauritians quite capable of running the internal affairs of the Island it does not follow that they would be the persons selected by the Legislature to perform this task. The field of suitable candidates thrown up by popular election is limited because there have not been the years of training in local self-government, on committees etc., which provide the necessary ministerial material elsewhere.

Should we, then, proceed more slowly and patiently, accepting the difficulties and the, at times, almost unbearable interference with the administrative machinery, as evils to be endured while the possibilities and limitations of the present constitution are more fully understood and the ministers of the future learn their jobs?

The "Liaison Officer" system, now over a year old, is affording opportunities for training in responsible administration and we now occasionally see unofficial members defending official action as well as criticizing it. We also see week-by-week round the Executive Council table Hindu, Moslem, Coloured, Franco-Mauritian and British taking council together and reaching unanimously by far the greater part of their decisions. Certainly this is all to the good but it does not take us far or fast.

Perhaps the best solution would be the creation of an "All-Mauritius" political party, sponsored and financed originally by Franco-Mauritians and English, but containing as members with equal rights members of all other communities who are prepared to subscribe to a simple political formula and to renounce claims of race and religion. The Franco-Mauritian section of the community made a tentative move in this direction some time ago but it failed because the Franco-Mauritians were afraid of being swamped by colour, and the hot-heads of the new party designed to effect unity in Mauritius have only succeeded in driving a wedge into the white community and splintering rather than uniting their friends.

The creation of an "All-Mauritius" party would involve a great renunciation on the part of the white persons who adhered to it, but there are wise and generously minded Franco-Mauritians who could, for the sake of Mauritius, make the sacrifice. Certain influential Hindus, and many Moslems, would join them at once and there would be a nucleus of Coloured people who would come in. The Chinese nationalists might be interested.

If political adherence rather than racial or religious adherence is the cure for pluralism, some action on these lines seems to hold the best chance of success.

<sup>1</sup> See pp. 74-5 of the main report.

## APPENDIX H

### ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

*The following notes on electoral systems are based on the Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems (Cd. 5163, 1910) and are printed with the permission of the Controller, Her Majesty's Stationery Office.*

The main types of electoral system are as follows:

1. *Simple Majority with one ballot*<sup>1</sup>. To secure election it is not necessary to obtain more than half the valid votes cast, but only more votes than any other candidate.

2. *The Second Ballot*. A candidate, to be returned at the first election, must receive an absolute majority of the valid votes cast. If no candidate obtains such a majority, a second election is held, at which (in the most usual form of the system) only the two candidates compete who received most votes at the first election.

3. *The Alternative Vote*. The voter is invited to arrange the candidates in order of his choice by placing the figures 1, 2, 3 against their names. At the first count only first preferences are reckoned. If then no candidate is found to have obtained an absolute majority, the candidate who has received the smallest number of first votes is regarded as eliminated, and his voting papers are distributed according to the names, if any, marked 2 on them. The papers on which no second preference is marked are regarded as "exhausted", and their number is deducted from the total for the purpose of calculating the absolute majority at the second count. If still no candidate has received such a majority (which of course, could only happen if more than three candidates originally stood) the process is repeated as often as necessary until the desired result is obtained.

4. *Proportional Representation*

(a) *The Single Transferable Vote*. Constituencies return several members and the elector votes as described in paragraph 3 above (the Alternative Vote). To ensure election a candidate need not obtain a majority of the votes polled, but only the smallest number of votes that can be obtained by a number of candidates equal to the number of seats to be filled, but by no more. This number of votes is called the "quota". At the first count first preferences only are reckoned, and those candidates who have received a quota, or more, are declared elected. If all the seats have not then been filled, the surplus votes of those candidates who have received more than a quota are transferred according to the names marked 2 on them. This process is continued until all the seats are filled.

(b) *The List System*. Candidates group themselves in lists, and the seats available are divided among these lists in proportion to the total numbers of votes obtained by their candidates. In the simplest form of this method, votes are cast for a list—and for individual candidates on it—and the seats won by that list are filled by its candi-

<sup>1</sup>This is the system used in parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom. It is often described as the "first-past-the-post" system, though the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems called it "relative majority", and others refer to it as "simple majority vote with only one ballot" or the "plurality" system.

dates in the order in which they appear on the ballot paper. Sometimes the method is modified to a greater or less extent to enable supporters of a list to indicate which of its candidates they prefer to see elected.

#### 5. *Minority Representation*

(a) *The Cumulative Vote.* The voter is given as many votes as there are seats to be filled, but he may spread them over several candidates or accumulate them on one, according to his preference. The power of accumulation enables a numerically weak party, by the concentration of its voting power on its own candidate, to secure at least one seat against far more powerful opponents.

(b) *The Limited Vote.* The elector is only allowed to vote for a limited number of candidates, i.e., a number less than that of the seats to be filled. A party cannot then monopolize the representation of a constituency unless it has a very considerable majority.

## APPENDIX I

### POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF CIVIL SERVANTS

*The following extracts from the Summary of Conclusions of the Report of the Committee on the Political Activities of Civil Servants (the Masterman Committee), (Cmd. 7718, 1949), are printed with the permission of the Controller, Her Majesty's Stationery Office.*

1. The political neutrality of the Civil Service is a fundamental feature of British democratic government and is essential for its efficient operation. It must be maintained even at the cost of some loss of political liberty by certain of those who elect to enter the Service. Our problem has been to reconcile the preservation of the existing confidence in the traditional impartiality of the Service with the grant of freedom to exercise ordinary citizen rights to as many employees of the State as is compatible with the reputation of the Service for political impartiality.

2. We think that a distinction can be made for this purpose between those grades whose participation in political activities might imperil public confidence and the efficiency of the Service, and those whose activities would involve no such risk.

3. We accordingly recommend that a line of demarcation be drawn below the Administrative, Professional, Scientific, Technical, Executive, Clerical and Typing grades and, apart from certain exceptions, above the Minor and Manipulative and the Industrial grades. Those below the line would be permitted greater liberty than those above it. . . .

5. All members of the grades "below the line" should be permitted to stand for parliament without resignation unless they are elected, and one month's special leave should be granted for the period of candidature. We also recommend that civil servants "below the line" who become Members of Parliament should be entitled to reinstatement if they cease to be M.P.s after an absence not exceeding five years and if they have had not less than ten years of service prior to their election; in other cases applications from civil servants "below the line" for permission to return should wherever possible be sympathetically considered.

The existing ban upon Parliamentary candidature should continue to apply to civil servants "above the line". The rule under which civil servants who are peers of Parliament may attend in their place when their official duties permit but may not vote or take part in debate should also be maintained.

6. All grades of the Civil Service "below the line" should be completely free to engage in all other forms of political activity, both national and local, subject only to the maintenance of overriding considerations such as the Official Secrets Acts and the ban on political activities while on duty or in official premises.

7. All the grades "above the line" should continue to maintain a reserve in political matters. In national politics they should abstain from any public manifestation of their views which might associate them prominently with a political party. They should not (a) hold office in any party political organization; (b) speak in public on matters of party political controversy; (c) write letters to the Press, publish books or articles, or circulate leaflets setting forth their views on party political matters; (d) canvass in support of political candidatures.

8. In the sphere of public affairs which are not matters of party controversy, civil servants should be given more latitude to play their part in the normal activities of citizenship, so long as they do so in an unofficial capacity and observe the code of reserve. . . .

10. Despite the growing tendency of local government to be run on party political lines we are averse from treating it at present in the same way as national politics. We recommend the substitution of a general rule in place of varying departmental regulations. Civil servants "above the line" wishing to stand for local office should seek the permission of their Department. Permission should be granted wherever possible, subject to the applicant being able to comply with the convention requiring a reserve in political matters and avoid becoming involved in national party political controversy; this does not, however, preclude him from speaking in public, writing to the Press, or circulating leaflets setting forth his views, so long as he confines himself to local issues and acts with moderation.

## APPENDIX J

### PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

A note by John Fitzgerald

In colonial territories election by simple majority systems, even after their use for many years in some cases, and whether with or without communal constituencies, fails to secure between those politically-active in the racial and religious groups the measure of goodwill necessary if progress towards partnership in democratic government is to continue peacefully in these mixed communities. There is, I suggest, a very strong case for the introduction of the Single Transferable Vote.

The widespread illiteracy in these territories presents a serious problem. In similar circumstances what the elector has to do in recording his vote has been explained in talks over the radio; by public address equipment touring the outlying areas; by cinema slides; by the candidates at their public meetings. The contents of official notices and articles in newspapers

giving similar information have been passed on to others by those able to read. In Atri (Italy), Gibraltar and Malta, with illiteracy up to 40 or 50 per cent. such methods secured in S.T.V. elections polls of from 50 to 75 per cent., with not more than 3 per cent. spoilt papers. Uneducated women, voting for the first time in any election, polled over 50 per cent., with only 1½ per cent. spoilt papers in one S.T.V. election. Public education by similar methods on the much larger scale required in many of these territories would entail expenditure, as well as time and energy, but would be well worth while for the early improvement it would secure in the representative character and functioning of the elected bodies concerned.

I consider that the idea that the S.T.V. creates or preserves a number of parties, or fosters splinter groups, is disproved in practice. In practically all the countries now using P.R. it was the appearance and development of various new parties under majority systems of election which led to their introducing P.R. Experience shows that attempts to keep down artificially the number of parties are unwise. Those attempts embitter political differences, by leading to election pacts and unseemly squabbles over the sharing of constituencies amongst the alliance. Such arrangements are unnecessary under the S.T.V., and when circumstances arise which lead to the eruption of a new group within a party or to the formation of a new party, the S.T.V. ensures that the situation shall be dealt with successfully. Eire has used the S.T.V. since 1922; a new party in 1948 put up candidates in every constituency there. Under any majority system that would have led to very distorted representation, with many members elected on minority votes. With the S.T.V., the new party secured 14 per cent. of the total first preferences but only 7 per cent. of the seats. In many constituencies its candidates between them failed to secure a quota of votes and thus no representation, and the *Irish Times* commented, "The results have proved that the *S.T.V. makes for stability rather than chaos*. . . . The threat to political and economic orthodoxy [by the new party] has been largely removed *by the electorate*."

In colonial territories the advantages which would be secured by introducing the S.T.V. are:

(1) Each elector would vote for *persons*, whom he himself would be free to choose, with or without regard to their racial, religious, or political attachments.

In practice, most voters use their preferences on group or party lines. But they are not obliged to do so, and this freedom makes possible cross-voting by members of the various communities. Thus a Conservative (or Socialist) Hindu voter could mark his first and subsequent preferences for Hindu candidates and stop there, or, should he so wish, could give his first preference to his favourite amongst the Hindu candidates and his second and later preferences to Moslem, African, or European Conservative (or Socialist) candidates. Political opinion would thus be enabled to join hands across the boundaries of race or religion; such inter-mingling would have the opportunity of natural growth. Experience in S.T.V. elections shows that this does in fact happen, with the result that division on racial or religious lines, sharpened under majority elections, ceases to be of paramount importance in bodies where co-operation in making and operating political decisions is required.

The S.T.V. secures not only fair representation for each group, but also within each representation of their own Right, Left and Moderate strains of opinion.

(2) Each elector could always vote honestly, without any need to have regard to the way in which other electors, either of his own or of any other group, may vote.

(3) The vote can be transferred only just so far as and in the order in which the elector marks his preferences. Therefore, the nomination of an Independent candidate presents no difficulty, and the number of candidates for any group or party need not be restricted. Thus no group or party organization can impose a candidate on any constituency; the local people can always put up their own candidate in addition if they so wish, without any fear of loss of representation arising from "splitting the vote".

(4) Group or party representation generally approximates fairly closely to the total of first preferences secured by the group's candidates. Since no group or party, or Independent candidate, can obtain a seat in any constituency without securing a quota of the votes cast, there is no multiplication of parties securing representation, but the votes for smaller parties are not wasted. "Freak" candidates fail to secure this quota, and therefore do not secure election.

The constituencies would necessarily be large, but, again, experience of the S.T.V. in use shows that these larger constituencies do not mean any real loss of contact between the member and his constituents. A far larger proportion of the voters are conscious of having a representative to whose election their vote has directly contributed, and whose views and policy are in general accord with their own.

The regulations under which the counting and the transferring of the votes in an S.T.V. election are carried out have been tested for more than forty years, in every manner of election, and in practically every part of the world, but no case is known of Returning Officers having been unable to carry out their duties satisfactorily. In some cases, those staffs have not only been without experience in dealing with the S.T.V. regulations but have not had any previous experience in counting under any other method of election.

In all colonial territories the representative bodies if they are to function effectively, require the utmost measure of tolerance in debate and readiness to "give and take" in political administration. The S.T.V. in other places has proved itself "a healing and a unifying force", leading to public spirit in place of faction, very keen but good-humoured conduct of election campaigns, and in the elected body contented and loyal minorities, who because of their ability to express their views through their own representatives are ready to co-operate in making the elected body function efficiently. Other systems of election accentuate the differences between the majority and minority and deepen their antagonisms. As Lord Courtney of Penwith expressed it in the early 1900's, "You can have electoral machinery which deadens political life, or electoral machinery which lets political life live." The S.T.V. enables political life to live, and to develop in a healthy fashion.

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