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SOCIOLOGY
For a Democratic Society

SOCIOLOGY

For a Democratic Society

by

Raymond W. Murray

PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME



New York

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To
ANNIE, MOLLIE, AND IRENE

Preface

Sociology for a Democratic Society, designed as a textbook for use in a single-semester college course in sociology for beginners, is a brief outline of the material usually covered in a longer introductory sociology course. This book is unique in its emphasis upon what may be described as the democratic approach.

During the last thirty years the Soviet Union has arisen to challenge Western democracy. Many believe that Soviet influence has resulted largely from democracy's failure to stand militantly for the principles upon which it was founded. As John Foster Dulles pointed out recently in *Presbyterian Life*, communism has moved into a "moral vacuum" which the democracies have allowed to develop in the Western world. Soviet leaders have been smart enough to realize that the way to win friends and influence people is to seem to sponsor great moral principles. They are using clever slogans as Trojan horses to penetrate our society. Yet these deceptive slogans, Dulles observes, are merely expressions of beliefs for which America has always stood.

Our form of government involves much more than a system of checks and balances, free play of conflicting opinions, and majority determination. Democracy, as reflected in our corner-stone, the Declaration of Independence, recognizes the natural rights of the governed. The Bill of Rights reiterates this concept. This principle has its source in the Jewish-Christian faith and in the insights of the Greek philosophers. Communism denies it.

The writer assumes that most Americans are seriously concerned right now about the preservation of democracy. He believes that this objective can be best achieved through a departure from the recent secular drift in our social and political life and by a return to the Judaeo-Christian tradition upon which our democracy was founded.

The present clash between communism and democracy cannot be understood without recourse to philosophical backgrounds. The philosophical assault upon democratic dogma long antedated Marx. This assault came from both individualists and collectivists. Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, the French Physiocrats, Adam Smith, and Herbert Spencer may be grouped among the former. As a reaction to the individualists came the German idealists, principally Fichte and Hegel. The latter, with his deification of the state, suggested to Marx the idea of a class struggle which would ultimately result in a classless society. Positivism in sociology has at various times reflected both of these assaults upon democratic ideals.

Sociology, unwittingly perhaps, has also made a separate assault upon democracy. Many sociologists, inspired by Comte, have asserted that demonstrable truth and certainty are found exclusively in the physical sciences or at least in those sciences which establish their conclusions only by the aid of mathematics. In their so-called naturalistic approach to sociology these sociologists have maintained that no one can be certain of any suprasensible truth, thereby denying the validity of both the philosophical and religious principles upon which our government was founded. Such an approach, we hold, is undemocratic.

The writer believes that modern sociology has weakened its own position by attempting to copy blindly the methods of the physical sciences. He grants that value-judgments involving philosophy and religion may be ignored in many of the narrower phases of sociological research. This is not possible, however, in a textbook such as this which deals with the more general aspects of sociology. The sociologist, after all, has obligations as educator and citizen. As Ordway Tead said recently in the Aydelotte Lecture at Swarthmore College, the college teacher should not be "neutral, impassive, uncommitted, and tentative about the basic tenets of living." Such an effort is philosophic in essence. Sociology, dealing with man and human society, cannot be divorced completely from philosophy. Even when a positivistic-naturalistic approach is followed and man is considered a mere animal, materialism is thereby adopted as its philosophy.

Sociology for a Democratic Society is an attempt to present sociology within the framework of our basic Judaeo-Christian tradi-

tion. Since it is recognized that not even Christians are in agreement on some values which are associated with sociology, room is left for denominational differences. The writer believes that in the present crisis at least a sociology equated to a common denominator made up of the basic or core-values underlying America's democratic tradition will have considerable appeal.

The book is divided into two parts. The first, *Man and Society*, emphasizes organic and sociocultural elements which have their roots in biology, anthropology, and psychology. The second, *Principles of Sociology*, emphasizes "men in interdependence" and deals with what some regard as the core questions of sociology. The arrangement of the sections, chapters, and selected reading lists should make it easy for the student or instructor to locate quickly additional material in the larger introductory textbooks and in books of readings as well as in special treatises. Footnotes, which usually distract rather than enlighten the beginner, have been minimized.

In the preparation of the manuscript and proofs the writer has received valuable assistance from John J. Kane of the sociology faculty and Marie K. Lawrence of the College of Law for which he is deeply grateful.

R. W. M.

Notre Dame, Indiana

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SOCIOLOGY

For a Democratic Society

Part One

MAN AND SOCIETY

Through the medium of an academic discipline described for the last hundred years as "sociology" we are about to take up the study of human society. Sociology has been defined briefly as "the science of society and social behavior." Yet biology is defined as "the science of life," anthropology as "the study of man," and psychology as "the science of behavior." Obviously, then, there must be considerable overlapping among these four disciplines. Perhaps it may be said that the chief difference among them is found in the focus of attention.

In Part One we shall deal with areas marginal among these fields with emphasis upon sociology. Although it is generally recognized that such topics as heredity and environment, race, culture, and the determinants of personality fall within the pale of sociology, an analysis of them inevitably leads to "backgrounds" in the fields of biology, anthropology, and psychology. Even the answer to a simple question such as "Is the human personality a social product?" involves the use of data from these three fields as well as sociology. In Part Two, Principles of Sociology, we shall deal more directly with social relationships or "men in interdependence."

I. MAN'S BIOLOGICAL HERITAGE

1

Family Traits

Before a student can consider intelligently the principles of sociology he must possess certain background information derived from related branches of knowledge. He must understand, first of all, man's biological and cultural heritage and his social nature. To do this he has to dip into the fields of biology, anthropology, and psychology. Section I considers man's biological heritage. It describes what a person inherits both as a member of an American family and a particular race. Chapter 1 deals with family or individual heredity. It explains in simple terms the general laws of human heredity. This knowledge is necessary for consideration of such important matters as the place of environment in human affairs, the possible effects of atomic radiation, and the effectiveness of eugenic policies taken up in the next chapter. Chapters 3 and 4 treat racial heredity. Man's cultural heritage will be considered in Section II, followed by an analysis of man's social nature in Section III.

I. THE MECHANICS OF HEREDITY

The Warfare of Tomorrow. Future history may relate that the two most significant discoveries of the first half of the twentieth century were bacteriological and atomic warfare. The destructive powers of these two new weapons are so great that the military side of our government has recently been playing down their possible effects lest panic should prevail here at the mere threat of their use by an unfriendly power. The atomic will lead to even deadlier bombs.

Although the terrible effects of the atomic bombs exploded at Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been widely publicized (one small bomb at Hiroshima killed 78,150 people), many experts regard the immediate consequences of bacteriological warfare as equally dangerous.

Through sabotage and bacteriological warfare water-supplies may be poisoned. Live stock and crops can be infected with killing diseases previously unknown here. Finally a series of epidemics may be started suddenly which will either kill off the civilian population or so weaken it that the industrial machine, so necessary for the conduct of modern warfare, will slow down to a crawl. It is said that the only real defense would be retaliation or the fear of it.¹ With each side making use of these weapons it may be that no one can win a war. We shall consider the prospect of preventing war in another chapter.

We are concerned here with atomic warfare. More precisely we are concerned with the effects of atomic radiation upon human heredity. The explosion of an atomic bomb can produce more than one type of catastrophe. First there is the blast effect which is equivalent to the force of thousands of tons of TNT. Then there is the effect produced by the enormous heat of an atomic bomb. This burns buildings and people over an extensive area. These fires are fanned by winds of hurricane velocity created by the pressure of the blast. Radiation is the third effect of the bomb. There are, in fact, two types of radiation. First, there is prompt radiation which hits like a bolt of lightning, killing and maiming but vanishing instantly. The other type, produced by the fission products, may be deposited on the ground where it can render an area uninhabitable for months or years.

The bombs exploded over the two Japanese cities were aimed to produce their greatest effect through blast and fire. For this reason they were detonated at a considerable height. Under such conditions most radioactive fission fragments are dispersed in the upper atmosphere. It was on this account that the cities did not have to be evacuated. Had a bomb been exploded in a near-by body of water when a strong wind was blowing into the city the effects of radiation would have been more obvious. What effect radiation-induced changes will have upon human heredity is a matter of dispute. It is much too soon to know what the hereditary effects in Japan will be. If the genes of living Japanese victims were injured everyone now alive may be dead before it is definitely known whether the descendants of these Japanese will be deformed or abnormal.

Radiation and Social Biology. The atomic bomb has given a new impetus to the study of social biology. Regardless of whatever the future may have in store in the way of atomic warfare, we know

that the increased peace-time use of radioactive substances makes it necessary for us to learn quickly how to live with radiation. Early in 1949 the Atomic Energy Commission called a conference of sanitary and water-supply experts from all over the nation to consider this problem. It was pointed out that public health authorities must learn how to test rivers, sewers, and water supplies to make sure that they have not become radioactive. Even mollusks and fish taken from contaminated waters will be dangerous. Geiger counters may become standard household equipment.

The possible effects of radiation upon human heredity were suggested by the Bikini bomb tests. Corn seed exposed to radioactivity there produced a large percentage of abnormal offspring in the second generation. There was evidence of similar changes in lower animals. It will be a long time before we can be sure of the effects of radiation upon the Japanese people because the changes or mutations which irradiation effects are in most cases recessive. They may remain hidden in the genes for several generations. Theoretically, irradiation could kill off the human species.²

To understand how genetic catastrophes may occur through radioactivity we must turn to the science of genetics. This branch of biology furnishes us with additional facts about human heredity which are of importance to the student of sociology. It helps us also to estimate the possible rôle of environment in human affairs. Most of the genetics considered here may be classified under the heading of social biology.

Modern Genetics. Modern genetics, the science which deals with heredity and variation, goes back only to the year 1902, the year that Gregor Mendel's earlier paper, "Research on Plant Hybrids," was discovered. Mendel, working with garden peas, had found the underlying genetic principles. In 1910 T. H. Morgan, experimenting with fruit flies, localized the Mendelian hereditary process inside of the chromosome in the cell nucleus. In 1927 H. J. Muller followed up Morgan's laboratory discovery of mutations by showing that such changes can be produced quickly by X-rays. These discoveries enable us to understand the possible effects of atomic radiation.

Today we regard the gene as the fundamental unit of genetics. These submicroscopic particles are located in threads called chromosomes, which are found in the nuclei of cells. Each human body cell

contains a nucleus. When cells divide, the chromosomes do likewise and carry with them a copy of each gene. Each human reproductive cell contains genes. These pass hereditary characteristics from one generation to another. When a gene is altered or damaged a mutation results. These sudden changes are said to be dominant if they affect the next generation. Usually mutations are recessive, lurking in the germ plasm for several generations until joined finally by a similar gene from a cell of the opposite sex. Only then do they manifest themselves. Thus we see why it is that mutations caused by radioactivity may remain hidden for years.

Sex and Twins. In order to understand certain other aspects of social biology, we must consider the operation of cells a bit further. Man's physical existence starts with the union of reproductive cells from his parents. Each parent contributes a reproductive cell containing 23 chromosomes plus either an x or a y chromosome to make up the 48 necessary for the first body cell of their offspring. According to orthodox Mendelian genetics, it is generally said that the x and y , the "sex chromosomes," determine sex. Female offspring results when both parents contribute x chromosomes, male offspring when the mother contributes an x and the father a y . (A new theory disputes orthodox Mendelian biology by proposing that genes alone do not determine heredity. "Partial replicas" of genes, known as plasmagenes, are said to compete as influences. We need not go into this controversy here.)

The sex genes carried in the x chromosomes regulate sex by determining whether the gonads, the essential sexual glands, shall develop as testes or ovaries. The early fetus has the rudiments of each sex. In the hermaphrodite, a condition which is usually subject to surgical correction, the generative organs combine those of both sexes. Once sex is finally determined, hormones affect the growth and development of secondary sexual characteristics, especially at the time of puberty. The autosomes—the non-sex chromosomes inherited from parents—also have an effect upon the later or secondary developments of sex. Little is known about the causes of physical aberrations of sex. (In fruit flies genes in the autosomes also affect primary sex determination.)

Once the initial body cell has been formed it proceeds to divide and re-divide immediately until the millions of cells necessary for

the human body have been produced. Occasionally the initial body cell separates into two free cells unattached to each other at the time of the first cell division. This produces offspring commonly known as one-egg or identical twins. They are of the same sex and have similar hereditary qualities which cause them to look alike. Ordinary twins, derived from two independent initial body cells, differ from other siblings only in that they are born at the same time. Studies of identical twins reared apart give us an excellent opportunity to weigh the effect of environment.

There are a few human qualities which are known to be sex-linked. Hemophilia, a rare blood disorder which afflicts only males, is one. Yet men inherit it only through their mothers. The British queen Victoria transmitted this defect to Russian and Spanish royalty. It is the result of a mutation. This suggests some of the difficulties involved in tracing the effects of mutations caused by radiation. A hemophiliac lacks a quality or substance necessary to make blood clot when it is shed. The type of blood we have (A, B, AB, or O) is also gene-determined. This fact is helpful in deciding disputed parentage.

The Rh Factor. Recently subgroups of some of the original blood groups have been discovered, also a new type known as the Rh factor. The Rh factor is an unknown substance which about 85 per cent of all human beings, identified as Rh+, have in their blood. Those whose blood does not contain this factor are known as Rh negatives (Rh-). The Rh factor causes trouble only in pregnancies. Blood transfusions, so common in modern medical practice, have made this a greater problem than it was in the past.

When an Rh-negative woman receives a transfusion from an Rh-positive donor she develops antibodies against Rh-positive blood cells. Then if she subsequently marries an Rh-positive and becomes pregnant, the blood cells of her Rh-positive fetus (Rh-positive is dominant) may be attacked by these antibodies. This may cause either a stillbirth or erythroblastosis, a combination of jaundice and anemia, in her baby. The antibodies may even injure the brain tissue and the hearing of the baby.

Pregnancy may present similar complications for an Rh-negative woman married to an Rh-positive male even when there has been no previous blood transfusion. Subsequent ill effects may occur if

the red cells from her first Rh-positive fetus pass into her blood stream through an accidental break in the placenta, the vascular structure by which the fetus is nourished in the uterus. This likewise would cause the mother to develop injurious antibodies which might last for years. Her first child might not be affected but subsequent ones might receive these antibodies and so suffer injuries.

Although the Rh factor was not discovered until 1940, some progress has been made already in dealing with the problems which it presents. A rather drastic treatment for a baby endangered by Rh antibodies calls for a complete transfusion of Rh-negative blood to displace its Rh-positive blood. In 1946 a further advance was made through the discovery of a neutralizing agent which may be injected into women in order to bring about a normal baby. In 1949 the successful synthesis of specific compounds which would end dependence upon human blood in the treatment of potential victims of Rh diseases was announced. With the perfection of these three discoveries, along with possible new ones, such as the superiority of woman's blood in replacing that of infants, the Rh problem should assume lesser proportions.

Right now there would seem to be reasonable cause for public concern about Rh diseases. Measures have been introduced in some states requiring that Rh blood tests be made in all pregnancies. Another proposal is that Rh-negative blood banks be maintained and that only Rh-negative blood transfusions be given to women in emergencies when there is no time to test their blood. There would seem to be no reason, however, for panic over this problem, even if new remedies are not immediately forthcoming. One study has indicated that while possibly 12 per cent of marriages in the United States unite Rh-positive men and Rh-negative women, only one out of 18 such marriages develops Rh complications of any kind. Yet the fact that about 8,000 babies die of erythroblastosis each year here makes the Rh factor a matter of serious concern.

Although considerable space has been given to the Rh factor, the rôle of blood in human heredity is not otherwise of great importance. Contrary to the popular impression, it is not true that "blood will tell." What does tell is the gene. In general it may be said that all that an individual inherits is contained in the genes of his parents &t

the time of conception. So much for the "mechanics" of human heredity. Let us see now just what is inherited and what is not.

II. WHAT DO WE INHERIT?

Knowledge of Human Heredity Is Still Incomplete. The first fact to be learned about human heredity is that we know far less about it than we do about heredity in plants and animals. The rediscovery of Mendel's laws at the start of the century and the experimental recognition of their operation in plants and animals misled many excited biologists. Recognition of hereditary qualities on these lower levels prompted the hasty conclusion that similar conditions prevail in mankind. But the last two decades have revealed that this lower-level information seldom applies to man. The simple Mendelian three-to-one formula for dominant and recessive qualities explains the regular appearance of unit characters on lower levels. As a result, plant and animal breeding have been reduced almost to an exact science. But this formula seems to operate rarely in human heredity. Most human qualities are said to be due to "multiple" gene combinations rather than to the combination of a single pair. This makes estimates of the statistical rôle of heredity in human affairs extremely hazardous, even when it is known that "heredity plays an important part" in the origin of certain physical and mental characteristics.

It may be said in general that the recent tendency has been to reduce the number of things formerly regarded as hereditary. This is partly the result of new understandings of the causes of many somatic conditions. In the past, when the cause of a defect or ailment was unknown, it was automatically attributed to heredity. Yet there still remain many physical and mental characteristics whose origin is definitely genetic. For our purposes these can be summed up briefly.

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Physical Defects and Diseases. It is obvious that man inherits certain racial traits. It is just as obvious that he inherits a number of physical traits peculiar to his parents or "family stock." Qualities

such as stature, eye and hair color, and shape of facial features stand out in individual heredity. We are quite certain that many physical defects and diseases are likewise fruits of the individual's family tree. Lists of such qualities have been compiled.³ Many of these conditions, such as baldness, are of minor importance. We shall be concerned here only with those inherited physical qualities which have considerable sociological significance.

Diseases may be either exogenous or endogenous. The former are caused by some outside agency like germs, parasites, or poisons. They include ailments such as diphtheria, typhoid, tuberculosis, syphilis, hookworm, and common colds. Since all are "acquired," they cannot be inherited. (We shall consider this principle of orthodox genetics in the next chapter.) When children are born with tuberculosis or syphilis, this is the result of prenatal infection. The condition is described as congenital. It might be pointed out that these congenital diseases can now be prevented through proper prenatal examinations and treatments.

Endogenous diseases have their origin within the human body cells. Two important endogenous disorders, diabetes and cancer, appear in some instances to be related to an inherited cellular weakness. This means that a "tendency" towards these conditions may be inherited. In other words, under certain aggravating conditions the disorder is more likely to appear in some families than in others. Although the rôle of heredity in cancer is by no means clear, a predisposition for some types of cancer seems to exist. This may be due to the fact that in some families there is a lowered resistance on the part of certain tissues or organs to the factors which favor the development of cancer. If so, the best way to prevent cancer is to avoid ultra-violet rays and other cancer-producing agents.

We know that the marriage of two true diabetics may create a situation favorable for the development of diabetes. Yet it is believed that diabetes may also be acquired. It may result from such exogene factors as infection, pathology of pancreas, skull injury, arteriosclerosis, alimentary habits, and even a sedentary life. Diabetes at any rate is primarily a disease of later life. Women approaching the menopause seem to be particularly susceptible to it. In later life sedentary habits and food consumption beyond physical requirements, things which may "run in families," may operate to create

the false impression that the diabetes itself is hereditary. At any rate with the ever increasing proportion of older people in our population and with the more rapid increase in the ratio of women we may expect more and more diabetes.

Environment, Race, and Immunity. Heart disease is our greatest killer. A considerable portion is due to childhood rheumatism, which is apt to injure the heart. For some unknown reason this childhood disorder appears to be inherited only in certain geographical areas and in groups where a previous resistance has not been built up. More knowledge about the causes of this childhood disorder may help us to reduce the cardiac death rate. Many other diseases vary locally, depending evidently upon the amount of immunity which has been established. We know, for example, that the American Indians and the Polynesians were decimated by the measles which Europeans first brought to their shores. Biological or bacteriological war, it might be observed, will attempt to introduce epidemic diseases into areas having no previous immunity.

At one time it was thought that there were innate racial immunities to certain diseases. Locality and social conditions are now recognized as the important factors. As members of different races spread to new areas immunities are gradually developed. Other factors also help to explain "racial immunities." The low death rate from heart disease in Japan is explained by the fact that relatively few live to the ages when this disorder takes its toll. It is said that the relatively low rate of tuberculosis among modern Jews can be attributed to urbanization, which has gradually eliminated the susceptible. With the exception of certain skin diseases in the heavily pigmented Negro, race appears to be an unimportant factor in disease.

MENTAL CHARACTERISTICS

Although students of sociology are concerned about the causes of some somatic diseases and disorders they are much more interested in mental factors. In either case sociological attitudes and remedies are influenced by prevailing viewpoints in genetics. Nowhere are conflicting viewpoints concerning the importance of the rôle of heredity more evident than in the study of mental characteristics. We shall consider here chiefly the recent shift in estimates of the

weight of the hereditary factor in feeble-mindedness and insanity. The first condition, also called mental deficiency, is generally said to be the result of arrested brain development. Insanity or psychosis involves the aberrations of a normally developed brain. The two contrasting present-century genetic viewpoints towards these mental conditions may be described respectively as that of the "1915 alarmist era" and that of the modern era.

The Alarmist and the Modern Era in Genetics. The so-called alarmist era in genetics was the product of three different contemporaneous influences. First came renewed interest in the rôle of heredity following the rediscovery of Mendel's paper. Closely afterwards came announcements of the alarming results of the first mental tests. Finally several dramatic "horrible example" family studies in which bad heredity was spotlighted were given wide publicity. As a result of these three influences, it came to be widely believed, along about 1915, that faulty heredity was responsible for most of our social problems.

Attitude Towards Feeble-mindedness in the Alarmist Era. We have seen that in the enthusiasm which followed the rediscovery of Mendel's principles it was assumed that human defects, like dominant and recessive characteristics in flowers, followed the simple Mendelian 3 to 1 ratio. At that time most mental defects were regarded as hereditary anyway. The new Mendelian principles seemed to indicate that these defects could now be eliminated through drastic selective breeding. Otherwise, it was suggested, the fruit of the human family tree would be blighted in ever larger proportions.

Some of the biological alarmists said that feeble-mindedness was inherited as a dominant factor; others claimed that it was at least a recessive one which would never disappear short of rigid selective breeding. Existing humane measures which prevented the elimination of the feeble-minded through the old law of "the survival of the fittest" were now described as dysgenic or detrimental to the human stock.

The early mental tests, given chiefly to paupers, prisoners, and prostitutes, showed that a large proportion of these problem groups was feeble-minded. This was added ammunition for biological alarmists. The Kallikak and other studies of "problem" family trees seemed to indicate that hereditary feeble-mindedness, as well as mental con-

ditions due to "black genes," was responsible for most shiftlessness, incompetence, and antisocial conduct. In such studies it was commonly estimated that over 90 per cent of feeble-mindedness is caused by heredity. By way of contrast, studies of "illustrious" families, like that of colonial New England's Jonathan Edwards, seemed to show the operation of "good" genes. Biology, it now seemed, had found the key to world progress.

Attitude Towards Feeble-mindedness Today. Nearly all of the above ideas of the 1915 alarmists have since been disproved. First it was learned that very few human defects, and certainly not mental deficiency, are unit characters which follow the 3 to 1 Mendelian formula. This knocked a big prop from under the selective breeding measures advocated by biological alarmists. Discovery of the fact that a considerable proportion of mental deficiency is not hereditary also weakened the appeal of the alarmist biology.

Next it was realized that the early mental testers had blundered badly. They had announced the results of tests given to problem groups before giving these same tests to obviously normal or "control" groups. Later when this was done it was found that the control group showed the same high percentage of "feeble-mindedness" as the earlier problem groups. It then became evident to everyone that the standards used in these early tests were much too high. Improved mental tests fail to show much difference between problem groups such as those used in the early tests and control groups.

It is recognized now that the reliability of all intelligence tests is reduced by many factors, such as differences in the social backgrounds of those being tested. The scientific attitude towards the "menace" of the feeble-minded has also undergone a change. It is realized now that the upper-level feeble-minded, who make up most of this group, are on this account neither shiftless, incompetent, nor dangerous. They may be ambitious or lazy, moral or immoral, just as those whose I.Q.'s are normal.

The various alarmist-era family studies are viewed quite differently today. Reconsideration has shown that all were based largely upon hearsay and prejudiced evidence. The worst was seen in the blighted families and only the best in the "blue bloods." In both the advantages of a favorable social environment were overlooked. The authors of the alarmist family studies were too intent upon emphasizing the rôle

of heredity to see its effects objectively. They told us, for example, that the feeble-minded "breed like rabbits" and so tend to outnumber the normal. Yet Massachusetts statistics show the opposite. Of 1,000 moron females born, only 685 live long enough to produce offspring; of the same number of normal females, 809 live to the productive period. Among the lower-level feeble-minded the contrast is even greater: only 338 per 1000 live to the reproductive age among imbeciles and 193 among idiots.⁴ It is well known that members of the two last groups, even when not segregated in institutions, almost never marry.

The modern attitude towards feeble-mindedness has shifted for an additional reason. It has been learned that a considerable amount of mental deficiency is the result of conditions other than "bad genes." There are at least five non-hereditary causes. They include (1) brain injuries before and during birth and in early infancy; (2) whooping cough and occasionally other rather common childhood diseases; (3) diseases such as meningitis and sleeping sickness which may affect a child's nervous system; (4) malfunctioning of a child's endocrine glands; and (5) toxins acquired from a pregnant mother who is a victim of alcoholism, syphilis, tuberculosis, German measles, Rh blood complications, and perhaps even malnutrition. As a result of this new information many experts now place the amount of feeble-mindedness due to heredity at well below 50 per cent of the total.

Any measures which reduce the incidence of the above non-hereditary causes will reduce the present amount of mental deficiency. There is good reason to believe that a considerable reduction may be expected. New surgical techniques now prevent many babies with head injuries from becoming feeble-minded. Better obstetrical procedures reduce the number of such injuries. Reduction of the amount of rickets, a condition which may cause an under-developed pelvis in the female, also eliminates a cause of head injuries. Immunization of expectant mothers against whooping cough and diphtheria renders offspring immune for the first few months of infancy, after which a child can be actively immunized. A similar attack is being worked out for German measles. We have already seen that progress is being made in eliminating the dangers associated with the Rh blood factor.

Changed Attitude Towards Other Conditions. The contrast be-

tween modern genetics and that of the alarmist era may be pointed out also with reference to insanity, epilepsy, drunkenness, and crime. If we leave out Huntington's chorea, a very rare disease, it may be said that most insanity is now believed to be caused either by faulty mental hygiene, infection, or a general breaking down of the human machine rather than by heredity. Epilepsy likewise is now regarded as much less hereditary than was formerly believed. It has been estimated that the chance that any given child of an average epileptic parent will also be epileptic is about 1 in 40. Drunkenness today is regarded more as the result of bad mental and emotional habits than heredity. Finally, practically all modern criminologists reject the old Lombrosian theory which attributed a considerable percentage of crime to bad heredity.

Much of the alarmist-era confusion about feeble-mindedness, insanity, epilepsy, drunkenness, and crime was brought about by the acceptance of a then current biological theory known as polymorphism. This assumed the existence of a broad general weakness or "mental degeneration" which was the thing actually inherited. This "central weakness" was supposed to manifest itself in various ways in different members of a family tree. Some might be feeble-minded, insane, or epileptic. Others instead might be alcoholics or criminals. Even such things as chronic headaches and fainting spells were thought to be the results of this same central "hereditary weakness." In tracing the family history of a victim of any of these afflictions the cause was put down as "hereditary" if some ancestor had a single one of them.

Modern genetics recognizes no such central "degeneration" trait. The rejection of polymorphism has made it much more difficult to say that mental afflictions are due to heredity. Greater knowledge of the possible influence of environment has also helped to change former opinions about heredity. We shall consider this influence next.

NOTES

1. Theodor Rosebury, *Peace or Pestilence*, 1949.
2. For an analysis of atomic warfare and the effects of radiation see R. E. Lapp, *Must We Hide?*, 1949, and David Bradley, *No Place to Hide*, 1949.
3. See Amram Scheinfeld, *You and Heredity*, 1939, Chapter 27. The earlier chapters explain the mechanics of heredity in the language of the layman. See also John P. Gillin, *The Ways of Men*, 1948, pp. 97-106.
4. Cited by Paul H. Landis, *Population Problems*, 1948, p. 241.

2

Heredity, Environment, and Eugenics

“Heredity versus Environment.” The heredity-environment controversy is an old one. Popular adages over the centuries have given precedence either to one or the other. “You can’t change a sow’s ear into a silk purse” was matched by “Give me the child until he is seven and I don’t care what you do with him afterwards.” This controversy was also reflected in the various theories advanced to explain evolution. It even provided a background for our earlier eugenic theories and programs.

In this chapter we shall attempt to throw some light upon the issues involved in the ancient controversy. First some of the explanations for evolution will be considered. Modern evidence which suggests the relative importance and the proper relationship of these two influences will be given next. After this some of the attempts which have been made to apply knowledge of heredity and environment in the practical field of eugenics will be described and evaluated.

I. LAMARCK, DARWIN, MENDEL, AND LYSENKO

Progress Through Acquired Characteristics. In 1809 J. B. P. de Lamarck, a French zoölogist, proposed the first comprehensive theory of evolution. It was based upon the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Lamarck assumed that qualities acquired by a parent during his lifetime are passed on gradually to offspring. This idea appealed to contemporaneous social reformers. They argued that by giving educational opportunities to all children social progress would be speeded up, since these advantages would be passed on by heredity as well as through association to the next generation.

Thus the gap between the underprivileged and the more fortunate could be closed up more quickly.

In spite of its popular appeal, Lamarck's theory ran into obstacles. For one thing it could not be proved even on the animal level through experiments. It had commenced to lose out in scientific circles even before 1892 when A. Weismann proposed that the only influences which count in hereditary transmission are located in the germ cells of the body. Hugo de Vries scored a more direct hit on the Lamarck citadel in 1902 when he announced his mutation theory.

De Vries proposed that the progressive changes in the animal kingdom have followed upon sudden small hereditary changes, called sports or mutations, in the germ plasm. In this way new species had arisen. Lamarck had said that the giraffe's neck had grown longer gradually through constant stretching for tree-top leaves. This acquired growth was passed on to offspring. De Vries claimed that a mutation produced the long neck. Lamarck's theory, however, had influenced Darwin, a fact which helped to keep it alive.

Progress Through Natural Selection. Charles Darwin, along with Herbert Spencer and Alfred Wallace, is generally regarded as the author of the "natural selection" theory of progress. Darwin started out by accepting Lamarck's explanation for the origin of change. Darwin himself, however, was more concerned about an explanation for the fact that some qualities survived whereas others disappeared. In 1859 he proposed that the qualities "most fit" for the existing environment survived while the least fit are eliminated. Nature did the selecting.

Darwin claimed that those animals were most fit that proved by physical strength, mental keenness, speed, or other qualities that they could survive. "Sexual selection" also figured in the competition between the new and old models. Those whose traits made it easiest for them to get mates outproduced the others and survived. Natural selection or "the survival of the fittest" has made Darwin practically synonymous with evolution in the Western mind. Yet "Darwinism," as we shall see, does not always mean the same thing to different people.

Progress Through Mutations and Other Factors. Although practically all scientists have accepted organic evolution, there are many details of the transformism process which are still controversial.

Much new light was thrown upon this process by the rediscovery of Mendel's principles at the start of the present century. Only then was it realized that hereditary factors might unite in a germ plasm for a single generation only to separate pure and unmodified in the next. This is what is known in genetics as "segregation." Knowledge of the principle of segregation, along with Mendel's second principle, that of dominant and recessive characteristics, had made it possible for de Vries to show the rôle of mutations in evolution. More light was provided in 1910 by T. H. Morgan's revelation of the exact rôle of genes, referred to only as "factors" by Mendel.

Today most explanations of evolutionary changes commence with gene mutations. Afterwards isolation, inbreeding, migration, and natural selection commence to operate. It is generally believed that, as far as mankind is concerned, there have been no significant evolutionary changes in the last ten thousand years. This explains why controversies about human evolution usually revolve around pre-historic evidence.¹

Progress Through Five-Year Plans. Nationalism over the years has given us many headaches. Science, however, has managed for the most part to avoid its poisonous kiss. Not so in modern Soviet Russia, however. There scientists must follow the Communist Party line in biology as well as in other matters. Outside of Soviet-dominated lands biologists generally agree that the mutation-isolation-inbreeding-migration-natural selection explanation is the best we have for the evolutionary riddle. No Soviet scientist who values his neck dares make this claim.

Soviet biologists are told to "follow Darwin." This is not Darwin as understood by the modern Western world but rather a Russian-grown variety of Darwinism which is more heavily weighted with Lamarckian concepts. Darwin was uncertain as to the precise manner through which a particular environment affected variability. He was inclined to suspect that an excess of food might be the most powerful influence. In official Soviet "scientific" thinking there is no doubt about this. Nutrition and other environmental factors alone explain progress. Heredity, as scientists elsewhere understand the term, means little or nothing. Soviets preach both economic and biological equality.

It is easy to understand why Marxists everywhere must take the

unique position that adequate food, better economic conditions, and schools will eventually raise everyone to the same biological level. (Those who "adhere to the line" have even dared to propose it in a few American and British universities. Julian Huxley and J. B. S. Haldane finally turned against Soviet biology in 1949.) This idea not only fits in beautifully with Marxian philosophy but as export propaganda it makes a powerful appeal to peasants and backward peoples everywhere. At home it makes Five-Year Plans the short road to biological as well as sociological Utopias. Genetic principles accepted by non-Soviet scientists will not admit the possibility of such Utopias. Modern genetics therefore is condemned in Russia as a bourgeois invention to make the well-to-do classes seem superior. The fact that it was founded by a Catholic priest and further advanced by Morgan, an American, they say, proves that it is capitalistic!

The present official oracle of Soviet biology is T. D. Lysenko, formerly an obscure plant-breeder. Hereditary characters, he said, are transmitted not by genes but through the sap of a stock to scions in grafts. By adopting Darwin's suggestion about the influence of food he went on to make nutrition and other environmental factors serve as a complete explanation for human heredity; genes are unimportant. As might be expected, no Western geneticist has been able to duplicate the experiments which Lysenko cites in support of the Soviet theory. H. J. Muller, a Nobel Prize winning geneticist, says Lysenko is a charlatan. Waldemar Kaempffert, science editor of the *New York Times*, after reading Lysenko's *Heredity and Variability* (1946), described him as a crackpot. Yet Lysenko has been enthroned as absolute boss of Soviet biology. Scientists in the U.S.S.R. must seek only that "truth" which pleases the Communist hierarchy.

Even Russian biologists get into trouble occasionally by daring to question Lysenko's theories or to point out weaknesses in his so-called experiments. The recent sad fate of three of Russia's better biologists, Vavilov, Zhebrak, and Orbeli, has already penetrated beyond the Iron Curtain. Political rather than scientific biology must be taught in all Soviet schools. Here as in many other respects Stalin has sought to outdo even Hitler. All of which serves to show that the "heredity versus environment" era is not entirely ended.

II. HEREDITY, ENVIRONMENT, AND MODERN RESEARCH

Environment. We shall see that the free scientist no longer discusses heredity and environment as opposite forces. They are now regarded as complementary. It is a matter of heredity *and* environment. Environment, moreover, is a broad term which may be broken down into many parts. In general *environment* is the sum total of all the agencies from without which influence man. Broadest in its influence is the *geographic environment*, which includes such natural phenomena as temperature, climate, rainfall, soil, and topography. We shall consider this aspect of environment, also referred to as the physical environment, in Chapter 12. Here we are concerned chiefly with a limited aspect of the "outside agencies" affecting man known as the "social environment."

The *social environment* is the sum total of the social institutions, patterns of culture, and social processes that impinge directly or indirectly upon the individual. This environment includes not only the impacts from one's larger social world but also those from the immediate family, neighborhood, and recreational groups. The latter areas of influence are sometimes referred to also as the personal-social environment. The study of the social environment makes up a large part of sociology. It is chiefly this aspect of environment which is weighed in modern research dealing with heredity and environment. This is brought out in studies of identical twins.

Research on Identical Twins. Experimental biologists have divided the roots of plants into halves and then planted the halves in widely different environments. Subsequent study of the plants which grew from these roots provided an accurate estimate of the influence of different external conditions upon the same plant. Thanks to the occasional occurrence of monozygotic or so-called identical twins, we are able to carry out substantially the same experiment with human beings. We have seen that identical twins are the halves of a single fertilized egg; they have the same heredity. The records of such twins reared apart provide the best known evidence of the relationship between heredity and the social environment.

The best study so far of identical twins was made several years ago by H. H. Newman and his associates at the University of Chicago.

Twenty pairs of identical twins reared apart since infancy were compared with a control group of such twins reared together. It was found that physical features had undergone little or no change. As might be expected with variations in diet and living conditions, there was a difference in weight. Yet in other respects—hair and eye color, height, head shape, and finger-print pattern—the twins had remained extremely alike. (Finger-prints of identical twins are similar but not so much alike as to baffle an expert.)

When it came to mental and emotional qualities the situation was quite different. One-egg twins reared together are always much more alike in these features than two-egg twins. Usually they are almost identical. But the one-egg twins reared apart showed considerable difference in mental-test scores, educational achievement, and in personality. Here obviously was the imprint of environment. Where the differences in environmental conditions were most marked the mental and emotional qualities differed most.

Unfortunately the social environments of the separately-reared twins studied by Newman were not vastly different. Yet even these differences showed up in tests. The urban-reared twin, for instance, exceeded in intelligence score his mate reared in the country. Here, of course, there is room for a difference of opinion about the validity of the tests. Thus we see that progress in measuring environmental influences upon heredity must go hand in hand with progress in perfecting intelligence and other tests.

Limitations of Twins Studies. Although studies of one-egg twins reared apart would seem to be our best approach to an empirical solution to the age-old heredity versus environment debate it must be recognized that even with perfected tests these studies will still have rather important limitations. Such twins are rarely if ever actually identical. Environmental factors which cannot be measured influence them during prenatal development. One twin may occupy a preferred position or receive more nourishment. One may suffer more than the other from some maternal toxic condition. Such differences in the prenatal environment may express themselves not only in physical conditions but, as Newman points out, even in the "organic substrate" of mental abilities and personality.

It has been claimed that identical-twin studies show that heredity is more important than environment. L. C. Dunn and T. Dobzhansky

deny it. They say that in order to establish this the weight of the two factors must be measured with respect to *each* physical and mental trait. No over-all answer is as yet available. Although it might seem as though these two Columbia University zoölogists would be apt to favor the biological rather than the social sciences, they conclude that "On the whole, modern biology has strengthened the hands of those who try to improve the minds and bodies of men by improving the conditions in which they live." ² Similar encouragement for the social scientist is given by Ashley Montagu, a physical anthropologist who suggests that in our population at the present time "the environmental factors are the most important, in the sense that they produce the most important effects upon the organism." ³

Conclusions. The above considerations suggest that even with the aid of identical-twin studies no final answer to the heredity versus environment debate is in sight. Two extreme positions, however, are ruled out. The claims of the 1915 biological alarmists were unwarranted. Equally extreme is the behavioristic and Soviet attitude which makes environment everything. The final answer is somewhere between these extremes. The generally favored approach to the question today assumes that heredity and environment are complementary forces.

Most students of the heredity-environment equation now agree that heredity furnishes the materials and one's experience decides the way in which they will be developed. In other words, environment or nurture provides the opportunities for the development of innate potentialities outlined by heredity or nature. Thus considered, heredity and environment are closely interrelated factors. In measuring the "orbit of plasticity" in human beings, then, it is not a question of heredity versus environment but rather a case of heredity and environment. It is important to keep this conclusion in mind when considering modern eugenic problems and proposed solutions.

III. EUGENICS

Eugenics is the science which attempts to improve the human race through the application of the principles of heredity. The name is new but the idea is an old one. The Spartans had it in mind when

they killed off their weaklings. Modern eugenics started in England with Francis Galton, a relative of Darwin, in the middle of the last century. His famous study, *Hereditary Genius* (1869), is said to have inspired the Kallikak and other family studies here at the start of the present century. Eugenics has both a positive and negative aspect. *Positive eugenics* seeks to improve the quality of a stock by mating only the biologically superior. *Negative eugenics* seeks to eliminate the unfit by preventing their procreation.

Positive Eugenics. The remarkable success of stock breeders in developing faster race horses and better milch cows suggested a practical approach to improving human stock. The recent development of artificial insemination on stock farms has created renewed interest in this approach. Theoretically it should be possible to improve the human stock by breeding only the "fittest."

In practice, however, positive eugenics runs into many difficulties. For one thing our mores, or more specifically the moral teachings founded upon our Judaco-Christian tradition, prohibit the mating of close relatives required in scientific animal breeding. These traditions, founded upon social as well as practical biological reasons, are incorporated into our laws. Sentimental ideas provide another barrier, particularly in the United States where marriage has come to be associated so closely with romance rather than cold practical considerations. Sentimental as well as moral ideas also raise a barrier against most human artificial insemination.

Even if we should take a merely naturalistic attitude towards race betterment there still would be difficulties in the way of a positive eugenic program. What qualities, for instance, should be bred? Should we breed soldiers or scholars? Even military authorities would probably disagree on the type of fighting man to favor. After all the small-bodied Japanese were quite efficient as jungle fighters. They could get along with less food than big-bodied Americans. Housing experts might point out too that smaller rooms with resulting economies would be possible if Americans were smaller. Yet we are growing taller each generation and we appear to be proud of it. Finally there is the basic difficulty that runs through all eugenic programs, that of knowing what kind of genes the average person carries. We shall see more about this difficulty in considering negative eugenics.

Negative Eugenics. In recent times at least the moral and legal codes

of most Western countries have prohibited some people from marrying. The insane as well as idiots and imbeciles are everywhere denied this right. But the motives here are not necessarily eugenic. Such people are mentally unable to make the contract necessary for wedlock. They are also incapable of assuming the responsibilities of family life. Similarly recent "hygienic" marriage laws are not necessarily eugenic. They prohibit the marriage of the venereally diseased lest these infections be spread. Laws which provide that inmates of mental hospitals be segregated lest illicit breeding should take place might possibly be regarded as eugenic, although their chief purpose would seem to be the moral and economic welfare of the community. Outright negative eugenics is rather new in modern Western civilization.

Eugenic Sterilization. The best-known example of negative eugenics and certainly the most debated phase of eugenics today is eugenic sterilization. This, of course, does not include therapeutic sterilization prescribed for the health of an individual. Neither does it include punitive sterilization prescribed as a legal punishment. The sole purpose of eugenic sterilization is race betterment. It usually refers to the compulsory sterilization of those judged to be biologically unfit. Such legislation has been enacted in a little more than half of our states, although it is actually enforced in only a few. The sterilization operation is a simple one in the male; somewhat more complicated in the female. In neither case does it interfere with the sex urge or the ability to satisfy it. Once the operation has been performed it is difficult to correct. The operation has been advocated chiefly in the case of mental defectives.

Sterilization in a Democracy. Several arguments have been advanced against eugenic sterilization. First of all there is the moral argument. It is said that such sterilization can be carried out only at the expense of a higher value which has been built up in our Western culture by religion. This is the intrinsic valuation of the person which forbids physical as well as moral damage. In explaining the origin and importance of this value, E. T. Hiller says that it is also the basis for our democratic political institutions. It stems from the ethical worth of the human soul in the Judaeo-Christian tradition.⁴

It must be admitted that before Hitler and Stalin made us more conscious of natural rights many American sociologists favored com-

pulsory sterilization. Some who favor a naturalistic approach to sociology still do. Yet Hiller points out that when naturalism denies the principle of equal intrinsic worth democracy itself is rejected. Communism with its denial of the principle of high personal worth made the moral issue clearer to many Americans who were content to abide by the "efficiency" argument for sterilization in the past. Hitler with his mass sterilizations showed us the possibilities inherent in any sterilization program. Genocide or the mass murder of racial, religious, or national groups is based upon the same "efficiency" philosophy as sterilization. Hitler and Stalin demonstrated this for us also.

The so-called moral case against negative eugenics rests upon metaphysical principles. Not everyone is able to grasp it. Until the Soviet rule by force, terrorism, and oppression provided a new and more tangible argument against mere efficiency, even those who saw the moral argument very often had for practical reasons to use a different one. They argued that the presence of the handicapped is a constant challenge to man's ingenuity. They said that the preservation of our essential values will in the long run bring greater material benefits to society than the sacrifice of these values for a present temporary gain. It was owing to the Christian objection to craniotomy, they recalled, that the Caesarian section was developed. Likewise the discovery of the insulin treatment changed our whole attitude towards diabetes. Would it be selfish or rash, they asked, for us to assume that posterity may have better means for tackling its own problems than we have today?

Most of our sterilization laws were enacted by "efficiency-minded" legislators under the influence of the "fear" psychology generated by the 1915 biological alarmists. We have seen that during that era the alleged "menace" of the feeble-minded in the community was greatly exaggerated. The rôle of heredity in feeble-mindedness as well as in insanity, epilepsy, and other conditions for which sterilization was advocated, was likewise overemphasized.

There are "efficiency" arguments against sterilization, for that matter. The mere facts that normal people may be carriers of hereditary feeble-mindedness and that this gene condition is difficult to identify would permit a large percentage of the bearers of defective genes in each generation to escape the sterilizer's knife. Last but not

least, it is pointed out that even with a ruthless sterilization program it would probably take well over a thousand years before any appreciable change could be noticed in our population.

New Attitudes and Policies Replace Sterilization. With our improved knowledge of genetics and the nature of feeble-mindedness and other mental disorders there is less interest in compulsory sterilization. Recognition of the fact that heredity plays a smaller rôle than was formerly believed is chiefly responsible for this change. Even the traditional definition of mental deficiency is being questioned. Some now regard it as a "symptom complex" rather than a disease. It is seen as a state of retarded mental functioning which in many instances may be capable of stimulation. The high-grade defective who cannot get along in the community is regarded as a psychiatric problem, since the great majority of this group manage to get along. Most of them are never identified as defectives.

Even in those cases where there is a definite organic deficiency improvement may be possible. This is illustrated by the cerebral palsied or "spastics," as they are often called. The sufferers from this disease, almost as common as infantile paralysis in the United States, were until recently regarded as feeble-minded. Yet it has been found that through careful training other parts of the brain can be made to take over the duties usually performed by the injured parts. It is estimated that 75 per cent of these victims can be rehabilitated. After such treatment many are above normal in intelligence.

The new approach to the problem of the feeble-minded emphasizes an integrated program which starts with early diagnosis of mental aberrations in the elementary schools. In this way steps may be taken either to overcome the "deficiency" recorded by ordinary intelligence tests or to adapt the child to his deficiency. Special instruction is provided through the school system or if necessary in a state industrial school. It has been found that girls of this type can be trained to do housework. Now that farm work has become so complicated boys do best in factory and restaurant jobs. Both may be made self-supporting. After such training follow-up visits by social workers see to it that they are not exploited by employers or associates. Only the helpless idiots and imbeciles, by far the smallest segment of the feeble-minded group, usually require permanent segregation in institutions.⁹

Eugenics started out as a "class" program. Galton believed that most of the poor are biological misfits. Modern geneticists are more inclined to blame social conditions for poverty. They would improve the general living conditions of the "lower classes" and so gradually help the race as well. Although modern geneticists do not ignore the rôle of heredity in human affairs, they refuse to overemphasize its importance. This policy reflects the present scientific conviction that heredity and environment are complementary factors.

NOTES

1. For a popular explanation of the theories of evolutionary progress see Amram Scheinfeld, *You and Heredity*, 1939, Chapter 37. For a more detailed treatment of theories on the causes of transformism as well as consideration of evolution as a philosophy of life see U. A. Hauber, *Essentials of Zoology*, 1949, pp. 317-31.
2. *Heredity, Race and Society* (Penguin Books edition), 1946, p. 25.
3. *An Introduction to Physical Anthropology*, 1945, p. 224. Studies of foster children have also attempted to weigh heredity and environment. The results of such studies are summarized by Otto Klinenberg, *Social Psychology*, 1940, pp. 242-53.
4. *Social Relations and Structures*, 1947, p. 199.
5. The negative eugenics program is analyzed by Scheinfeld, *op. cit.*, Chapter 41.

3

Racial Traits

To what extent does one's racial heredity determine his ability? Up to World War I it was commonly argued in the United States that Negroes are an inferior race and that the so-called Negro problem cannot be solved in accordance with a strict interpretation of our democratic tradition. It was even said that the "tenth man" was congenitally unable to assimilate American culture. As late as 1924, when our present immigration law was passed, the Nordic variety of the white race was regarded as innately superior to the Mediterranean type by most Congressmen. For years, to say the least, mongrels and half-breeds everywhere have been described as inheriting only the worst qualities of their ancestors. Finally in World War II Hitler made *racism*, or race prejudice based upon a belief in race superiority, a battlecry.

From the above it should be obvious that a study of man's biological heritage must also include an examination of scientific information concerning race. In this chapter we shall consider chiefly the nature and history of races and the evidence bearing upon the question of superior and inferior races. In the chapter which follows we shall take up race purity and the effects of race mixture along with some observations upon the race problem in the United States.

I. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF RACES

The Homo Sapiens Species. *Homo sapiens*, the existing physical type of man, has had a history of at least 20,000 years. In a later chapter we shall consider his progressive development from earlier physical types whose history has been traced back almost a million

years. In terms of the modern races we are not sure how the large-sized European Cro-Magnon men of 20,000 years ago should be classified. The same may be said about the contemporaneous fossil men of other continents. Although they were all "less gorilloid" in their physical features than earlier types or species of men, we can only speculate as to whether they were Caucasoid, Mongoloid, Negroid, or Australoid. It is only during the last 10,000 years that we are able to identify with certainty most of the races and subraces of today.

A *race* is a large and relatively permanent variety of mankind possessing similar hereditary physical characteristics. Races are sometimes spoken of as ethnic groups. The races of today are commonly divided into four groups: Caucasoids, Mongoloids, Negroids, and Australoids. Most of these have several subdivisions or subraces. The European Caucasoids, for example, are divided into Nordics, Alpines, and Mediterraneans. A fourth subrace of the Caucasoids, the hooked-nosed Iranian Plateau type, is found in Persia, Mesopotamia, and northwestern India.

The Physical Marks of Race. When called upon to identify races the layman usually makes skin color the sole criterion. But the physical anthropologist says that this is only one of the marks of race. It is, moreover, rather deceptive. Most of the "black" natives of India, for example, are classified as Caucasoid because of nose, hair shape, and other physical features regarded as important marks by the anthropologist. The layman also thinks that body odors distinguish races. Anthropologists say that the vapors given off through the skin are due primarily to foods and other cultural factors rather than to hereditary racial differences. It is pointed out too that the races do not differ either in blood composition, body temperature, or pulse.

Through the use of an ensemble of physical characteristics (chiefly hair texture, nose and head shape, and skin color) anthropologists are able to classify about 90 per cent of the world's population into definite racial or ethnic groups. Some population groups, such as the Ainus of northern Japan and the Polynesians, both of which appear to belong equally well in two or more racial groups, are difficult to classify. The Ainus, for instance, have white skin, yet the general cast of their features is Mongoloid.

Origin of the Races. We have already noted the uncertainty about

racial classifications of peoples of 20,000 years ago. We know even less about the distinctive physical marks of earlier people. Paleontology tells us nothing about their hair texture, skin color, and very little about nose shape. From what we know of evolutionary processes generally the opinion has been ventured that our earliest ancestors were of an intermediate skin pigmentation, perhaps a medium brown or yellow-brown shade. It is sometimes suggested that the hairy, red-brown to dark chocolate brown-skinned Australoids, still found in the Australian bush, may be replicas of early prehistoric man. We shall probably never know.

Not so long ago there was a tendency to trace the origin of the various living races back to different kinds of anthropoids. R. Ruggles Gates (*Human Ancestry*, 1948) still reflects this polygenesis viewpoint. Most authorities today, however, seem to favor monogenesis or the oneness of origin of the human race. They favor a viewpoint such as that expressed by M. F. Ashley Montagu which holds that the living races and subraces are all descended from a common prehistoric ancestor, even though this ancestor still remains to be identified.¹ Most anthropologists believe that man originated either in Asia or in the neighboring parts of Africa. But here also there is no certainty.

Origin of Skin Color. Up until the middle of the last century most scientists used a three-fold racial classification. They assumed that the "white," "yellow," and "black" races started with the three sons of Noah after the Flood. Many laymen still cling to this idea. It is easy to understand why these scientists took their ideas about the physical aspects of early man from the Bible. Up to that time there was no science of anthropology. Consequently there was no widely known evidence which conflicted with the existing popular notions of man's physical origin and early history. Later, with the rise of anthropology, it gradually came to be recognized that many of the older ideas, concepts still reflected in Christian art, were actually "read into" the Bible. The Bible as such said nothing about the color of Adam. The popular idea that the black skin of the Negro resulted from a curse had originated in an erroneous translation of Luther's commentary on Genesis in 1677.²

Although modern anthropologists and geneticists are by no means certain how different skin colors developed, at least one rather plaus-

ible theory has been proposed. It is suggested that thousands of years ago cosmic rays or some other influence produced a slight mutation in the genes of members of a medium brown group. Following this some of their offspring were lighter skinned and some darker. After various migrations along with generations of inbreeding it was found that some skins were better adapted to particular climates than others. Those with lighter skins did best in northern zones where their fair skins permitted the proper amount of the actinic rays of the sun to penetrate. People with darker skins in northern climes probably suffered from rickets, which made child-bearing more difficult, unless, as in the case of the Eskimo, the vitamins which actinic rays help to produce were supplied by a raw fish diet. Too much of these rays is also injurious. Darker-hued groups with more melanin in their skin therefore were better adapted to the sun of the tropics. Thus in the course of time natural selection operated to make the Negro the chief resident of Africa, with the lighter colored races and subraces extending gradually upwards to the Baltic.

Social and sexual selection also contributed to the fixation of particular varieties of skin color and other features. A group's preference for a particular physical quality gradually resulted in the elimination of variants. Primitive cultures operated to limit the orbit of gene plasticity just as technological advances interfere with natural selection in many parts of the world today. It is said that the large amount of albinism among the San Blas Cuna, the so-called "white Indians" of Panama, is the result of culturally encouraged inbreeding following an original mutation which had produced an albino. Similar culturally dictated "eugenic" policies may have operated everywhere in prehistoric times to produce the racial types and subtypes which prevailed at the dawn of history.

Anthropologists ridicule the idea of race purity. They say that the population of Europe and the other continents is thoroughly mongrelized. There were many migrations and mixtures of unidentified races and subraces long before the dawn of history. Since then at various times Mongoloid Huns and other Asiatic tribes sallied forth into Europe. Mohammedan invaders of Spain and southern Italy contributed Negroid traits. Thus even in Europe the "yellow" and "black" races blended with the "white." When we speak of

characteristic Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean types in particular areas of Europe today therefore we refer to statistical averages and not to pure races. These types do not even conform to national boundaries. Northern Germany is mostly Nordic, but southern Germany is prevailingly Alpine; Northern Italy is largely Alpine, but the rest of the peninsula is chiefly Mediterranean.

Race and Culture. Race is frequently confused with culture. Expressions such as the "Aryan race," the "Italian race," and the "Jewish race" illustrate this confusion. Aryan refers to a language group, Italian to a national group, and it seems that Jewish describes mostly a religio-social group. *Culture*, to be considered in the following section of this book, may be defined briefly as the total community heritage. It includes everything that is socially transmitted.

The ease with which race and culture may be confused is illustrated by the Jew. Although anthropologists are generally agreed that Jews do not constitute a race, their proper classification is still somewhat controversial. The establishment of the new state of Israel has added to this confusion. It is said that the popular concept of Jews as a racial group, however, is only a century old.³ Although there are a few anthropologists who believe that Jews still show some evidence of pre-Christian Palestinian genes, even this, if true, would not make them a separate race or subrace.

The pre-Christian Jews were a mixture of several groups of eastern Mediterranean Caucasoids. They were not even a subrace. During the centuries which followed the start of the Christian era Jews traveled, settled, and intermarried among the peoples of a large part of Europe until they were in the process of becoming physically indistinguishable from their neighbors. In most of Europe, however, this amalgamation process was halted rather suddenly shortly after the start of the second millenium by the establishment of ghettos.

Urban ghetto culture which continued down to the last century seems to have had an effect upon the physical make-up of Jews. We have seen that the Jew even now has an unusual resistance to tuberculosis. It may also be that centuries of urban living have prompted a peculiar development of original genetic qualities. It is sometimes said that centuries of urban alertness and fear of persecution established a special Jewish culture which goes so far as to put a characteristic expression on the countenance of many Jews in each gen-

eration. Yet Jews who have come here recently from Europe usually tend to resemble the people of the countries from which they come. Although they, like the "hot-tempered Irish," may have their own culturally-conditioned Jewish mannerisms, these habits cannot be called racial characteristics.

The disproportionate number of Jews of outstanding achievement in nearly every country is also attributed to "race" by advocates of racial determinism. Most anthropologists believe that this can be explained best by cultural factors. Social opposition has taught Jews that they must be better than others if they are to get ahead. It has placed a special premium upon education as a means to achievement. The "need to be better" is drummed into youth from early childhood, a special stimulus which other groups lack. Some regard the great amount of religious teaching that must be memorized by the young Jew as an added educational advantage. Others have suggested that centuries of close association with business and finance in cities gives Jews an advantage, especially in a capitalistic society where "money makes money."

The establishment of the new state of Israel in 1949 started a new controversy about the classification of Jews. So far this appears to be confined to Jewish groups alone. Some Zionists claim that Jews everywhere are now members of a separate nation centered in the Jewish state in Palestine. "Jewish nationalism," they say, obliges Jews everywhere to finance and assist the state of Israel. The American Council for Judaism, on the other hand, repudiates the idea of a "Jewish nationalism" extending beyond the borders of Israel. It insists that American Jews are Jews by religion and Americans by nationality. "This is our homeland," its members say, "and we seek none other." Zionists, it is charged, unconsciously play into the hands of anti-Semites who make absurd accusations of Jewish international solidarity.

In popular discussions there is often considerable confusion over the words Jew, Hebrew, and Israel. The name Jew comes from the tribe of Juda and is found in the Old Testament. Because the people who returned to Jerusalem after the great captivity were mostly Judeans with a common religion, their followers everywhere came to be known as Jews. Throughout history Jews have also been known as Hebrews. *Hebrew* appears in the Old Testament but the origin

of the word is not clear. Hebrew is also the name given to the ancient language of the Jews. It is a branch of the Semitic tongue. Hebrew should not be confused with Yiddish, which is Low German mixed with Hebrew and Slav words, though written in Hebrew characters. Although Hebrew, a dead language, has been limited to scholarship and religious liturgy now for centuries, it has been made the official language in Israel. It is believed that this bond will help to hold the Israeli together. Some Jewish observers say that religion will not be able to operate as an integrating force today in Israel.⁴

In the Old Testament the name *Israel* was first applied to Jacob after a wrestling match with an angel, which was designed to show that with God's aid he need not fear enemies. Literally it seems to mean "contender with God." Later it came to be the name of the Twelve Tribes. The Kingdom of Israel lasted from 937 B.C. to 721 B.C., when it was overthrown by the Assyrians. Not until 1949 did the Jews again become recognized as a distinct nation. It remains to be seen whether the new Israel will be merely another nation or rather as of old a nation based upon a religion. One thing is impressive as efforts are being made to find a basis for unity in this area of Palestine settled by peoples who have migrated there from all over the world: no one in authority there is claiming that the Jews constitute a race.

II. THE QUALITY OF RACES

Feelings About Race. It seems natural to us that people should be conscious of their racial origin. We are apt to take it for granted, moreover, that ours is the superior race. Perhaps we have heard that members of other races feel the same about their stock. Yet in spite of its extensiveness today race consciousness is said to be a relatively recent thing. Even in the days of Old World slavery race was not important. In the small ancient world slaves were usually taken from relatively near-by regions where differences in physical types were scarcely noticeable. At any rate these differences were not matters of social significance. The only Negroes known to classical peoples were those of the Nile Valley. The attitude towards them was neutral. Even the new vistas opened up to Europeans by the Crusades failed to arouse race consciousness as we know it.

Modern race consciousness began with the discovery of the New World and with the policies of conquest and imperialism which soon followed. When Europeans suddenly found themselves the masters of large groups of peoples of a vastly different physical type, race and social status became associated for the first time. The subsequent rise of the African slave-trade accentuated this association. Once European whites had commenced to exploit other races they tried to justify their predatory behavior by rationalizing the situation. Rationalization is a psychological process in which a plausible explanation is invented to account for behavior or belief motivated from unconscious sources. Possibly the European Christian conscience, shaped by the democratic human right's tradition, needed a prop to justify its return to ruthless Pagan conduct towards fellow men.

The "curse of Cham" myth which was now read into the Bible was one attempt to justify the new situation. Herbert Spencer's proposed "evolutionary lag" theory was another. But the Cham canard went back only to 1677. Spencer's last-century proposal that Negro physical characteristics are less advanced than those of whites backfired later when it was pointed out that in such things as body hair and thin lips the white race is more apelike than the Negro. The sixteenth-century attempt to regard Amerinds in South and Central America as "pre-Adamites" who were not really members of the human race was promptly rejected by ecclesiastical authorities. Thus after many attempts none of the "plausible" explanations for innate Caucasoid supremacy had proved to be convincing. As a result nascent racism was on the decline and probably would have vanished had it not been for the sudden stimulus it received from a new source in 1853. Modern racism springs from this source.

The Genesis of Modern Racism. Most of our existing beliefs about superior and inferior races can be traced back to the publication of a book by Count A. de Gobineau in 1853 in which a hierarchy of races was described. This book found a sympathetic audience at once among harassed American pro-slavery groups. It was ignored for the most part in Europe until near the end of the century when it was suddenly discovered in Germany. Here it later became the source of Hitler's racism. About the same time it played a part in shaping immigration policies in the United States.

We need not delay here by explaining Gobineau's arguments. It

should be sufficient to say that all of his claims—white superiority, Negro inferiority, Nordic superiority, and Mediterranean inferiority—have been disproved by anthropologists. Hitler recognized this when he ordered the public burning of anthropology books. Instead we shall present briefly the case against racism, emphasizing first the answer to the “testimony of history” argument advanced by modern followers of Gobineau and finally the evidence on race equality discovered by cultural anthropology and comparative anatomy, and through the use of psychological and intelligence tests.

Racism and the Testimony of History. Racists point out as evidence of innate mental differences in races and subraces the superiority of northern Europeans over southern Europeans in recent times and the failure of the Negro ever to develop a great civilization. Anthropologists answer this by emphasizing the cultural advantages that benefited favorably situated nations particularly with reference to the Industrial Revolution. At the time of the Industrial Revolution the nations of northwestern Europe were favored by the fact that they were already actively engaged in foreign commerce. The new factory system demanded raw materials and foreign markets. Thus these nations were able to jump into the lead in foreign expansion and imperialism. Soon it became impossible for nations less favorably situated to catch up with them. Yet several centuries before these same northern nations were barbarians, whereas southern Europeans, because of a different combination of cultural circumstances, were highly civilized and prosperous.

In terms of what we call civilization it is true that the Negro has never produced a great civilization. Up until the start of the slave trade Negro tribes in Africa and elsewhere lived in simple hunting or agricultural societies. Their geographic isolation deprived them of the cultural advantages and stimulation which might have come from constant friendly contacts with higher cultures. When the European finally did arrive he came as a greedy conquerer and slave trader. The natives were helpless before his superior military equipment. Yet it has been said that Negro tribes in Africa practised domestic agriculture at a time when nomadic tribesmen in northern and central European forests had not yet learned the elementary secrets of agriculture.

What might have happened in the case of the Negro, had his cul-

tural contacts with a more advanced people been more gradual and friendly, is illustrated by the Japanese. In 1853—curiously enough the year when Gobineau published his racism thesis—the Japanese were paid a visit by the American Commodore Matthew Perry. This historic event suddenly opened up the Western world to a slumbering backward nation. What these Mongoloids did in copying and catching up with the West in less than a century suggests that the Negro may yet produce a great civilization. Recent medical discoveries which promise to conquer the chief diseases of man and beast in tropical Africa may help to bring this about sooner than we think.⁵ At any rate as far as modern races and subraces are concerned anthropologists see nothing in past history which proves the existence of innate mental differences in races.

Recent Evidence on Racial Abilities. If there are any innate differences in ability among the races and subraces, modern objective studies in the fields of cultural anthropology, comparative anatomy, and mental testing should have uncovered them by now. The evidence from these three fields may be summarized briefly.

1. Cultural anthropologists have studied the daily life of primitive tribes representing all races. These close-up studies have failed to reveal any racial differences in native ability. Time and again it has been found that the evidence to the contrary cited by last-century "armchair ethnologists" and utilized by advocates of racism was based upon travelers' tales and an incomplete knowledge of the language and customs of a primitive tribe.

2. In the days when phrenology was taken seriously it was assumed that significant differences existed in the brain structure of the Negro compared to the white. Modern comparative anatomy has failed to find such differences. The slight anatomical differences which do exist between the Negroid and the Caucasoid seem to have no relationship whatsoever to mental or emotional qualities or to conduct.

3. Tests devised to ascertain possible innate racial differences may be classified generally as either psychological or mental. Many psychological tests have been given in an attempt to see if there is any basis for the popular beliefs that Negroes are naturally musical, constitutionally different in their sex urge, and innately lazy. Similar tests have been conducted to find out if northern subraces are innately

phlegmatic and southern ones "hot-blooded." In each instance the results fail to confirm popular beliefs. Every indication points to the conclusion that such personality qualities, where they exist, are culturally and not genetically induced.

Criminologists now confirm this conclusion. They show that the high crime rate of American Negroes is the product of inadequate wages, slum conditions, weakened family bonds, and other social handicaps for which the Negro usually is not responsible. Even his greatly over-publicized sex offenses are merely a phase of the general Negro crime situation.

We have already seen that mental or intelligence tests have been widely misinterpreted and misunderstood. Such things as the degree of *rapport* existing between tester and testee, the amount of competition in a social group, and the extent to which they are accustomed to "live by the clock" have an important influence upon the results of tests. Where these factors have not been taken into account Negroes, especially those living in rural environments, have been scored too low. Inadequate school facilities so characteristic of Negro education in the South also affect mental-test scores. It is claimed too that the various social classes deeply affect ways of learning, another factor overlooked by present tests.⁶

Franz Boas, dean of American anthropologists, considered the results of tests of every description which might throw light upon innate racial abilities. His *The Mind of Primitive Man* (revised edition, 1938) may well be regarded as the definitive answer to Gobineauism. The preponderance of the evidence cited by Boas as well as other modern anthropologists points to the conclusion that race is an accidental and not a causal factor in the cultural achievements of any human group.

NOTES

1. *An Introduction to Physical Anthropology*, 1945, p. 90.
2. See Raymond W. Murray, *Man's Unknown Ancestors*, second printing, 1948, pp. 326-27.
3. Melville Jacobs and Bernhard J. Stern, *Outline of Anthropology*, 1947, pp. 69-72.
4. *Time*, August 16, 1948, p. 27.
5. George Kinnear, "War in Africa—On the Tsetse Fly," *The New York Times Magazine*, May 29, 1949, pp. 12 ff.
6. Allison Davis, *Social-Class Influences Upon Learning*, 1949.

4

The American Dilemma

Our Undemocratic Tradition. A few years ago Gunnar Myrdal, Sweden's leading sociologist, was brought to the United States to make an objective study of the Negro in American life. His report is generally regarded as the finest study on this subject ever made. After observing the way we treat the Negro, depriving him of civil rights in the South and subjecting him to humiliating injustices everywhere, Myrdal called his report which appeared in 1944 *An American Dilemma*. By this title he sought to call attention to the fact that our treatment of the Negro represents a "dilemma." The basic tenets of our democratic creed, he points out, make all men free and equal in rights. Yet in practice we deny equal rights to the Negro. We enforce a caste system which we not only criticize in other nations but gradually refuse to defend ourselves. This, he says, makes us not only living liars but a sort of psychotic case among the nations.

We need not emphasize Myrdal's observations. Any American knows that the dilemma is an inconsistent part of our tradition. We are concerned here chiefly with the biological foundations upon which this dilemma is to a considerable extent founded. Logic suggests that intermarriage between the two races would soon settle the so-called American Negro problem and so end the dilemma. Yet most Americans would regard such a proposal as either shocking, innately repugnant, or biologically dangerous. Myrdal found that fear of miscegenation is the greatest single concern of white Southerners. "Racial purity," they say, must be preserved here at all costs. Even those who are willing to admit that it cannot be proved that the Negro is inferior to the white fear that a mongrel or half-breed population here in itself would somehow be biologically dysgenic. The facts about miscegenation do not support these fears.

I. MISCEGENATION IN THE AMERICAS

Our Mongrel Backgrounds. If we are honest in examining the facts concerning miscegenation in the Americas we must admit that race-crossing played an important part in our biological heritage. It has already been pointed out that white Europeans were mongrels when they came here. During both the prehistoric and historic periods there was a blending of many different physical types including a dash of Mongoloid and Negroid. The Negroes who came from Africa were likewise a mixture of many physical types. The great majority of the slaves came here from the Gulf of Guinea. Yet others came from the Congo, Angola, and other areas of Africa. Thus there were subracial types among the slaves just as there were Nordic, Alpines, and Mediterrancans among the whites. Neither race can claim that it arrived here as "pure stock."

Once here the process of mongrelization continued. Starting in 1619 in the United States and 1628 in Canada, the dates of the arrival of the first Negro slaves, Negroes, whites, and Indians commenced to interbreed. White men in all of the colonies were attracted to Negro women, differing only in their attitudes towards resulting offspring. The French and Spanish tended to recognize their half-breed children and generally absorbed them into the white population. The English usually sold their mulatto offspring back into slavery.

It has been estimated that as a result of earlier mingling with white and Indian stock here the Negro in the United States today is 80 per cent mixed blood. Some suggest that he should be regarded as a member of a new and predominantly brown race rather than a black one. It stands to reason that the white race here must likewise have undergone considerable change even though there is probably less conscious race-crossing in the United States today. Light-skinned mulattoes have always been able to pass over to the white race in areas where family backgrounds were not generally known. Migration makes this easy today.

Estimates vary as to the number of mulattoes who go over to the white side. Census Bureau figures do not cover this point but guesses run from 2,750 to 30,000 a year. It is said that nearly every Negro in the United States knows at least one former member of his race

who is "passing"—the magic word which means that they get by as whites. This was dramatized late in 1948 when a white war veteran who had married a white girl was imprisoned in Mississippi for "racial intermarriage" following a revengeful relative's disclosure that his great-grandmother was a Negress. (It might be observed here that the skin color of the offspring of white and Negro parents is blended. A truly black-skinned child can be produced only when both parents carry Negro genes.)

Race Relations in Two Continents. In these days of closer Pan-American relations the history of race relations in South as well as North America should be better known. Frank Tannenbaum claims that the key to an understanding of the different treatment of the Negro and Indian south of the Rio Grande lies in the fact that the laws and customs there were Spanish and Portuguese.¹ North of the Rio Grande these influences were for the most part English. Most North American students have been prejudiced against Spanish colonial behavior through acceptance of the "black legend," until recently fostered by many British and American historians. Anthropologists now say that the treatment of Negroes and Indians by colonists from the Iberian Peninsula was far more humane than that which characterized the colonists from the British Isles.

The fact that slavery was not new to the Spanish and Portuguese colonists helps to explain this difference. In their eyes slavery had nothing to do with race or color. It was regarded, moreover, as a misfortune rather than a disgrace. Furthermore, both state and church in these two countries insisted that slaves had inalienable rights as men which must be respected. There were, in addition, many legal and social devices aimed at encouraging masters to release their slaves.

English law, Tannenbaum points out, had made no provision for a slave. Since he was neither a freeman nor an indentured servant, the only other legal pigeon-hole the law knew was that of chattel—a moveable thing which could be bought and sold. The law gave no protection to his humanity and the English church was slow in insisting upon his moral status. No legal provision was made for freeing him. In a secularized culture where all slaves happened to be black it was easy, therefore, to make blackness synonymous with a subhuman chattel. Such an association would have been unthinkable

among the Spanish and Portuguese long accustomed to living with dark-skinned Moors.

Caste and Class in South America. Even though the children of Negro-white marriages were accepted by the white population in South America, caste and class lines based upon racial backgrounds soon developed. As might be expected, those born of European parentage looked down upon *criollos*, those born of mixed stock in the New World. The latter were divided into *mestizos* (children of Europeans and Indians), *mulatos* (children of Europeans and Negroes), and *zambos* (children of Indians and Negroes). It is generally said, however, that the war for independence in South America which united the population also went a long way towards obliterating these caste and class lines. Continued amalgamation is not only eliminating any remaining prejudice based upon racial backgrounds but actually producing a new racial type which is neither Iberian, Indian, or Negro but rather "South American."

What has been happening in South America during the last few centuries gives us a picture in miniature of what has probably been taking place constantly during man's history. In South America white Europeans have mixed with Mongoloids (Amerinds) and Negroids to form a new racial type. Even this new racial type is now in process of change as a result of recent immigration from parts of Europe not previously represented there. So it has been in the long history of the Old World. "Temporary eddies" in the human racial stream (Neanderthals, Cro-Magnons, Caucasoids, Mongoloids, and Negroids) form and stand relatively unchanged for a time and then disappear gradually, with a change in events, in the great main stream—the one human race.

Rationalization and Miscegenation. In the United States we have attempted to change the normal course of racial history. Thirty of our states prohibit interracial marriage. In spite of what has taken place in South America, many North Americans still assert that race-crossing is "contrary to nature." There is a popular belief here also that miscegenation has unfortunate biological effects. This idea no doubt has its basis in the lowly social status of half-breeds in most colonial areas. Yet geneticists are unable to confirm this belief. There is good evidence that the contrary is true; in the animal kingdom crossing of widely different stocks results in increased fertility. John

P. Gillin went over all the facts on the biological effects of miscegenation recently and found no evidence of unfortunate results. It may even be, he suggests, that the recent increase in the weight and stature of Americans is due in part to "hybrid vigor" caused by the rapid mixture here of white groups formerly isolated.²

In view of what we have seen, it would appear that the arguments usually advanced against miscegenation are mere rationalizations. What is the real reason, then, why there is so much objection to intermarriage, the logical solution to our racial problem? It would seem to be this: *approved miscegenation would undermine a profitable policy of "white supremacy."* North of the Rio Grande the dominant white group has made color a badge of privilege. Both in Canada where there are about 16,000 Negroes (compared to about 13 million here) and in the United States Negroes regardless of ability are restricted largely to menial jobs. Whites profit economically as well as psychologically by denying equal opportunities to the Negro. They do not have to compete with Negroes of equal ability for the same job. Shallow personalities profit emotionally by segregation policies which make it appear that whites are innately superior. Since both of these "profits" lack scientific justification they must be protected constantly by intimidation, brutality, and rationalization.

II. SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM

The Selfish Approach. We hope we are wrong. Yet it would appear that existing prejudice is so strong in the United States that approved miscegenation, the only logical solution to our race problem, is temporarily impractical. Under such conditions a more gradual approach would seem to be in order. Negro education alone is not the answer. Education makes the Negro more aware of the conflict between our democratic principles and the treatment we give him. Education of whites relative to the Negro is much more important.

First of all, we must realize that the "Negro problem" is no longer chiefly a Southern one. With the heavy migration of Negroes to northern cities in recent decades our race problem has become national in scope. The American dilemma has spread to the North along with the migrating Negro. Attempts to preserve the status quo which pays economic and psychological dividends to whites in

the North as well as the South have resulted in race riots. Twenty-five people were killed in the Detroit riot of 1943 and about the same number in Chicago a few years before. Whites as well as Negroes suffered losses in these riots. Studies of the causes of such riots provide us with information which at least should make them less frequent in the future. Although the desire to prevent race riots is a selfish motive, it is perhaps the best place to start a new program of white education. This is not to say that the Negroes have not at times contributed to the "Negro problem." Yet historically at least whites are responsible for most of the present evils.

The Lesson of Race Riots. Numerous studies of recent race riots have shown that the cause is not to be sought in the isolated and sometimes relatively insignificant incidents which seem to set them off. It lies rather in the growing tension between the races which can always be recognized long before the clash takes place. One of the most common causes of growing local tension has been the woeful inadequacy of Negro housing.

In many northern cities Negro residence zones were established long before Negroes commenced to arrive in large numbers. When increased migration overcrowded these zones the subsequent "invasion" of white zones was resisted. As a result of this ghetto policy "incidents" occurred and tension began to mount between the races. In every instance where riots have occurred this tension could have been relieved if courageous public officials had taken immediate steps to prevent disproportionate overcrowding in Negro areas.

Studies of race riots show also that whatever the initial cause may be, once growing racial tension is recognized in a community responsible citizens of both races must get together and take practical means to reduce it. Newspapers must be careful not to play up Negro crimes. Both labor unions and employers must take an active part in preventing discrimination against Negroes in employment. Educators must be alert to prevent anti-Negro prejudice from cropping out in the schools. These steps can best be taken when interracial committees already exist in the community.

The Job Equality Approach. In his study of the specific problems involved in Negro-white relationships in the United States Myrdal found that the two races differed in an inverse order in the sequence of demands made upon each other. Thus white Southerners were

violently opposed to intermarriage. But the Negro was not interested in such marriages. His chief desire was job equality. Job equality, on the other hand, was down at the bottom of the list of things that whites were reluctant to grant Negroes. Myrdal concluded therefore that job equality would seem to be the point where the two races can most easily get together and agree.

Fair Employment Practice Committee legislation is an attempt to eliminate friction between the races at the very point recommended by Myrdal. Such laws, now in force in several states, are patterned after 1945 New York F.E.P.C. legislation. Commenting on the New York law, Governor Thomas Dewey said the act "translates into law what is inherent in our Constitution and is the very essence of our free society." It should be emphasized that such measures do not attempt to legislate against prejudice, which is an attitude, but rather against an outward effect of such prejudice, namely, discrimination in employment on racial, religious, or national grounds.

It has been found that when fair-employment laws are in force unions as well as employers can be induced to abandon discrimination. The chief organized resistance to such laws at present comes from Southerners and from some large manufacturers. The latter somehow claim to see in such legislation a threat to the "free enterprise" system. Southerners have resisted the attempts of both Presidents Roosevelt and Truman to make such legislation national.

Experience in enforcing the New York fair-employment law has shown that fear is the cause of most discrimination. Employers feared that workers would quit if one of a different color or religion was hired; union leaders feared that members of other races would fail to stick by the union in time of crisis; theatre and store owners feared that customers would object if they hired Negroes; some feared that members of other races would prove to be incompetent workers; finally, some employers simply feared to be different or they feared censure from prejudiced friends.

The commission charged with the enforcement of the law found that once the fear was identified (usually it was rationalized) it could easily be allayed. Usually mere factual information sufficed to do this. It was found, moreover, that the existence of anti-discrimination legislation created a climate which made it easier to allay these fears. Court action against offenders was rarely necessary. Offenders were

usually ashamed of their prejudices once they were bared.⁸ College students will recall that Negroes are still barred from certain educational institutions because cautious administrators fear that white students will leave. Recent experience has usually shown that this does not happen.

The College Student and the Negro. It is difficult for most sociology students to be patient with what they regard as shocking lethargy on the part of elders in not removing present barriers confronting the American Negro. Such students should remember that the majority of the white population has no adequate knowledge of the scientific facts about race. Even after this scientific information seeps down to the general public it usually takes considerable time to recondition the emotions to the point where the Negro can be viewed objectively. While in college white students can probably do very little to speed up this process or to help bring about housing and civil rights legislation.

Students can contribute effectively, however, in helping to raise the Negro from his second-class citizenship even while in college. They may do this by remembering certain truths about the Negro in their daily conduct and conversation and especially when dealing with Negroes. They can indicate by word and example to fellow-students who have not studied sociology that such terms as "nigger" and "darky" are offensive. They can point out that even the Negro menial resents being addressed as "George" or "you," and that he expects the usual titles used in polite society. Finally the Negro does not want to be treated with a patronizing paternalism. Students might remember that they had no racial prejudice as children. Whatever they now have was acquired later from their culture. One of the responsibilities of a college education is to bring truth back to that culture.

There are many growing indications that college students are ahead of their elders in thinking about the Negro even in the South. The experience with Jim Crow education at one of the state universities there in 1948 illustrates this. After a Negro had finally forced the university to accept him at the law school its trustees put him in a separate classroom. Several white students immediately sought permission to join him. Thus embarrassed, school officials permitted the Negro to attend white classes but put a railing around his chair.

Finally when students scoffed at this pretense the barrier was removed.

Southern students usually find that political demagogues provide a constant barrier to racial understanding. Through their deliberate appeals to ancient prejudices they rouse the rabble and get into office. It would appear then that a higher percentage of college students informed on race problems should plan on seeking these political positions even though they foresee that they may have to compete with demagogues in order to do so.

The American Dilemma and American Values. Nearly every patriotic speech makes reference to our democratic traditions. In both of our World Wars we posed as crusaders for democracy. In World War II, however, our propaganda backfired. The Japanese called the attention of Orientals to the "white-supremacy" policy in the United States which belied our democratic claims abroad. Even in the "cold war" with Russia, which followed the termination of the major conflict, Communist agents in this country tried to arouse sympathy among our Negroes by calling attention to their second-class citizenship. Dark-skinned peoples of other continents and democrats everywhere now are said to doubt the sincerity of American declarations about democracy. John Foster Dulles said recently that the existence of undemocratic discrimination here is "our weakest point" in our relations in the United Nations.

Our present treatment of the Negro also conflicts with the Judaeo-Christian values upon which America's democratic tradition is based. The modern democratic tradition rests upon the doctrines of the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, and the innate dignity and worth of the human person. Myrdal could not help but be amazed at our "compartmentalized" Christianity which permitted us to ignore the moral aspects involved in our treatment of the Negro. Even those American sociologists who have attempted to avoid value considerations in other matters have been forced to recognize the value-conflict inherent in our treatment of the Negro. R. M. MacIver would have us close the breach between our concept of fair play and the practice of discrimination through immediate legal action.⁴

Progress and the Present Crisis. Even our courts have reflected compartmentalized democracy. Advantage has been taken of ambiguous wording, legalisms, and technicalities in order to uphold the

constitutionality of legislation aimed at maintaining various types of discrimination. Recently, however, humanistic legal interpretations in the federal courts at least have commenced to make it more difficult to maintain devices aimed at retaining undemocratic white supremacy. Courts are now going beyond the literal meanings of such laws by seeking to find out what they are really supposed to do. With this trend towards humanism and its concern with people rather than legalism and its concern with words, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain devices which prevent Negroes from voting in the South.

In 1948 the Supreme Court of California reversed the American legal tradition which has upheld laws forbidding interracial marriages. Such laws, the court declared, are contrary "to the fundamental principles of Christianity." Lynching, the most barbarous expression of both legal injustice and the general conflict between American values and action, has notably decreased. In 1900 an average of two Negroes a week were lynched; in 1947 there was only one lynching reported for the entire year.

If we consider absolute Negro progress, his advancement in recent years has been impressive. But when his status is compared with the condition of the mass of Americans there is still an ominous lag. Up to now the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Urban League have carried most of the burden in seeking democratic justice for Negroes. These two Negro organizations have been aided recently by race-relations commissions of churches and labor unions. Foundations have also assisted. Communists usually make a great show of concern when the rights of Negroes are violated, but there is a growing impression that this is merely an aspect of their "fish in troubled waters" technique rather than a manifestation of a sincere desire to help the Negro. With the rapid increase in Negro voters it can be taken for granted that in the future the cause of the Negro will be considered more seriously by our two major parties.

In the final chapter of Arnold Rose's *The Negro in America* (1948) attention is called to the hatred of the white race which now exists in Africa and Asia. Yet there is a divided feeling there about Americans, he says. This is due to the fact that we have not followed the European policy of colonial exploitation. Asia, with its large

population, is to be more important in the future. Both Russia and the United States, competing for world leadership, are fully aware of this fact. Russia, moreover, has no color prejudices, a circumstance which has a strong appeal among Asiatics.

With America spending billions abroad to strengthen the cause of democracy, it is nothing short of tragic for us to continue discriminatory practices against Negroes (as well as against Mexicans in the Southwest and against Orientals on the West Coast) which can only go to strengthen the appeal of world communism. The American dilemma today is the Achilles heel of Western democracy.

From Biological to Cultural Heritage. This chapter completes Section I, Man's Biological Heritage. In the next chapter we shall commence the study of Man's Cultural Heritage. In a way, the present chapter constituted a bridge between the two heritages. While it focussed attention upon a phase of our cultural heritage which has been described as the "American dilemma," it also examined the biological and anthropological backgrounds of this dilemma. Americans cannot escape from the horns of this dilemma until they are willing to face frankly the biological fallacy upon which it rests.

NOTES

1. *Slave and Citizen*, 1947.
2. *The Ways of Men*, 1948, pp. 125-34.
3. Caroline K. Simon, "Causes and Cure of Discrimination," *The New York Times Magazine*, May 29, 1949, pp. 10 ff.
4. *The More Perfect Union*, 1948.

II. MAN'S CULTURAL HERITAGE

5

Prehistoric Backgrounds

From Biology to Anthropology. In the last two chapters we saw that race is a biological fact; in previous ones we saw that intelligence is basically a biological contribution. Yet in each instance we saw that "environmental" factors also operated. Certain racial groups are backward because of social handicaps. Some individuals are retarded through lack of educational and other opportunities. A considerable part of man's environment is a heritage.

Man has a triple heritage. Compare two individuals of different races. First one sees evidence of racial background. In addition there are "family traits" or the physical features which mark individual heredity. Finally there are contrasts which have resulted largely from differences in the non-biological heritage. This third heritage, the social or cultural, is the subject of present consideration. At this point our emphasis shifts from biology to anthropology.

Sociology and Anthropology. Sociology has borrowed much from anthropology. This is particularly true in English-speaking countries where for a considerable period Herbert Spencer was the only well-known sociologist. Spencer drew most of his material and inspiration from anthropological sources. So did W. G. Sumner, one of the most influential early American sociologists. Because of the close relationship between the two fields, the student of sociology must know something also of the nature and divisions of anthropology.

Anthropology or the "science of man" is an over-all science which studies peoples and their cultures. It has several branches. *Physical anthropology*, a branch of biology, is concerned with the measurement and classification of living populations and the processes of physical growth. Another branch of biology, *human paleontology*, studies human fossils in their geological setting. *Archeology*, which is closely related to history, studies ancient material cultures, either

historic, protohistoric, or prehistoric. It is chiefly concerned with "artifacts." These are tools, weapons, and other man-made relics. They constitute the "documents" that make possible the reconstruction of past cultures. When archeologists and paleontologists join forces in studying man's prehistoric past they are sometimes referred to as "prehistorians."

Social Origins. What about the beginnings of culture? When did social life commence? Did many culture changes take place before the dawn of history? These are a few of the questions we wish to consider at this point. Information about social origins has been made available to sociologists as a result of two developments: the research of cultural anthropologists working among living primitives and that of archeologists and paleontologists in the field of prehistory. We shall consider the evidence from prehistory in this chapter. The three chapters that follow will deal with cultural anthropology.

First Evidence of Social Life. "Social" life in the broad sense has been traced back to the Oligocene period of the Tertiary era of geological time, around forty million years ago. (See Figure I, "Geological Time.") Fossils indicate that the "social ants" of today already existed at that date. These insects, whose "social" organization is believed to be the same today as it was millions of years ago, follow an inborn, gene-carried design for living. Provided that no change takes place in their species, we may safely predict that their instinctively-shaped social life will be substantially the same a million years hence. The social ant of today does not have to wonder how he shall approach life's problems. His nature compels him to do just what his Oligocene ancestors did. We shall consider the nature of the social life of insects and animals in Chapter 15. We are concerned here with social life in the strict sense, or at any rate, with the earliest evidence of sociocultural relations among men.

Man Needs Society and Culture. Before we consider the first evidence of culture in prehistoric times it will be well to stop and recall briefly the relationship of man to society and culture. Man, it seems, is not a social animal by instinct. Neither is he so altogether by choice. First of all, as John P. Gillin has pointed out, man has physical characteristics which thrust social life upon him. Upright posture and the large skull of the human infant make birth itself somewhat hazardous. At birth the human infant is relatively immature com-

Figure I
GEOLOGICAL TIME *

<i>Era and Period</i>	<i>Life Record</i>
PRE-CAMBRIAN Era (Over a billion years ago)	LIFELESS AGE Marine plants and obscure invertebrates.
PRIMARY Era (Paleozoic) (About 500 million years ago)	AGE OF FISHES Worms, mollusks, starfish, and trilobites followed by lungfishes, first land plants, and insects. Hot climate continues as much of earth's coal and oil supply is being formed during Carboniferous period. Reptiles begin to appear as climate cools at end of age.
SECONDARY Era (Mesozoic)	AGE OF REPTILES Dinosaurs and other giant reptiles appear, only to disappear forever at the end of this age. Flying reptiles, birds, many modern trees and plants develop. Archaic mammals appear near end of age.
TERTIARY Era (Lower Cenozoic) Eocene Period Oligocene Period Miocene Period Pliocene Period	AGE OF MAMMALS Archaic mammals gradually succeeded by modern types including primates. Giant elephant and rhinoceros types, such as mastodons, mammoths, and baluchitherium appear. <i>Evidence of man may have appeared as early as Miocene period.</i> Elevation of most of world's mountain ranges during this age.
QUATERNARY Era (Upper Cenozoic) (Started about a million years ago) Pleistocene Period Recent Period	AGE OF MAN During cold stages woolly rhinoceros, woolly elephant, musk oxen, and reindeer found as far south as France and Kentucky. Americas inhabited also by giant ground sloth, primitive horses, camel, and saber-tooth tiger. Early man in Europe and America contemporaneous with many of these animals. Most of the giant mammals disappeared soon after man's arrival, except in parts of Asia and Africa.

* In order to suggest depth and related antiquity most geological, archeological, and paleontological tables are arranged to read upwards. The beginner is more accustomed to tables that read downwards, hence the arrangement in this book. The sociology student is not expected to be familiar with all of the details of this chart, especially those which precede the Miocene period. Occasional reference to it, however, should help him to see Figure II and Figure III in their proper perspective. Adapted from the author's *Man's Unknown Ancestors*.

pared with other animals. Not only is the mother incapacitated for a longer period but the infant is completely helpless for a relatively longer time than other animals. Without some sort of family organization for at least a part of man's existence therefore the human species could not survive.¹

Again, man needs guidance if he is to survive. Except for a few

simple reflexes and instincts he lacks a gene-written book to tell him "what to do." He finds this book in his culture. This "patterned" activity, invented or discovered and tested by his predecessors, is taught to him in each generation. From this social heritage he gradually learns how to live and how to live with others. These reflections about the nature of man, society, and culture suggest that man, human social life, and culture began practically together. We shall consider possible subhuman foundations for social processes and culture in Chapter 15.

I. OLD WORLD BEGINNINGS

First Cultural Evidence of Man. Archeology claims to have discovered the first evidence of man's existence. This is contained in artifacts or man-made objects found in Europe which date back to the start of the Paleolithic or Old Stone Age. The date corresponds with that of the start of the Ice Ages in west central Europe. Geologists estimate that this was somewhere between 500,000 and 1,000,000 years ago; it was the beginning of the Pleistocene period of geological time.

The first definite evidence of man's residence is restricted to crude pointed flakes and sharp splinters made from lumps of flint. These Pre-Chellean tools might have been used as knives, scrapers, and perforators. Eoliths ("dawn stones") were found in earlier stratum, but their human origin is disputed. There is dispute likewise about possible cultural evidence of man in South Africa at an earlier date.

First Skeletal Evidence of Man. The oldest generally accepted skeletal remains of man were found in Asia. They are commonly estimated to be around 500,000 years old. These remains, the bones of several individuals called *Pithecanthropus erectus*, were found in Java. They were deposited while Java was still part of the Asiatic mainland. No definite evidence of a contemporaneous culture was found with them, just as no contemporaneous human fossils were found with the Pre-Chellean artifacts in western Europe. In a geological period which is only slightly later than that of the Java fossils, however, both artifacts and human fossils appear together in China. This is at the site of Peking Man or *Sinanthropus*, first discovered in 1926. *Sinanthropus* and *Pithecanthropus* were of the same

physical type. The nature and age of the recently publicized fossils (*Australopithecus*, *Plesianthropus*, *Paranthropus*, and *Swartkrans*) found since 1924 in South Africa are still highly controversial.² The same may be said about the Piltdown and Swanscombe fossils in England.

It is rather generally accepted today that man has existed for about 500,000 years. Prehistoric men, according to the late Franz Weidenreich, were of three physical types: *Pithecanthropus* (*Homo erectus*), Neanderthal (*Homo neanderthalensis*), and recent (*Homo sapiens*). All were "thinking men" and so might well have been classified in a single species, he says. Regardless of its original association or etymological meaning, when "*sapiens*" is used with reference to "*Homo*" in modern zoölogical classifications it refers only to physical type.³

In addition to the Pre-Chellean artifacts we have evidence also of two other cultures of this early period in Europe, the Chellean and Acheulian, which closely followed the Pre-Chellean. Our earliest fairly complete culture is not found until the last Ice Age. This is the Mousterian culture of Neanderthal man. (See Figure II, "Pre-historic European Cultures and Contemporaneous Fossil Men.")

It should be emphasized that no prehistoric culture is completely represented by its archeological material. Our knowledge of these early cultures is limited to objects which somehow have managed to resist the corroding effects of time. Perishable objects, such as clothing made of hides or grass and utensils made of wood, have long since disappeared. Objects made of stone make up the major part of the existing evidence. We refer to these early periods as Stone Ages only because people of those days used stone for those purposes for which we now use metals. From the material objects found attempts are made to draw legitimate inferences regarding non-material culture.

The Life and Times of Neanderthal Man. Neanderthal man lived in the Fourth Ice Age during a period which extends from about 75,000 to 20,000 years ago. He lived in a wide area which runs south-eastward in Europe from the Channel Islands through Belgium, France, Germany and Spain, then along the Mediterranean coast into Asia and Siberia. He is named after the Neander Valley in Germany where the first skeletal parts were found in 1856. His

PREHISTORIC BAC

Figure II
PREHISTORIC EUROPEAN CULTURES AND
CONTEMPORANEOUS FOSSIL MEN

<i>Geological Time</i>	<i>Glacial Epoch</i>	<i>West Central European Culture Periods</i>	<i>Physical Types of Fossil Men</i>
(Tertiary) Miocene Pliocene		Eolithic stage	
Quaternary Pleistocene	First Three Glaciers	LOWER PALEOLITHIC (Over 500,000 years ago) Pre-Chellean Chellean Acheulian	Pre-modern types: <i>Homo erectus</i>
	Fourth	Mousterian (Extended from about 75,000 to 20,000 years ago)	<i>Homo neanderthalensis</i>
Recent		UPPER PALEOLITHIC Aurignacian Solutrian Magdalenian MESOLITHIC (7500 to 4000 B.C.) NEOLITHIC COPPER-BRONZE (About 2000 B.C.) IRON (About 1000 B.C.)	Modern Type: <i>Homo sapiens</i> (All modern races exist)

culture, the Mousterian, is named after the town of Le Moustier in France where it was first identified.

Archeologists have collected the following relics of Mousterian culture: stone knives, saws, hammers, disks, drills, scrapers, and planing tools. Some bone artifacts have also survived. We presume that most of these implements were used for hunting or dressing meat and hides. Contemporaneous animals which he may have hunted, say paleontologists, included the mammoth, woolly rhinoceros, cave bear, wild horse, musk ox, reindeer, Arctic fox, hare, and ptarmigan.

In some areas of Europe Neanderthal man lived in caves. Fire hearths found at the entrance of these caves may have been used to ward off animals who would have competed with him for the protection of these sheltered spots during the cold sub-Arctic winters. Some of the Mousterian tools were adapted to piecing hides together. It appears likely that he used furs and hides for warmth and clothing.

Last-century descriptions of Neanderthal man pictured him as a

crude and rather apelike creature who clubbed his women and dragged them about by the hair. This supposition about his appearance and conduct was based upon a combination of vivid imagination and faulty reconstructions of his skeleton. We shall see that what is known now as evolutionism was in the saddle at that time. As a result of this influence many of the early prehistorians, like the early ethnologists, went far beyond available evidence and pictured man as they thought he *ought* to be.

We have a much kindlier attitude towards our Neanderthal ancestor today. His practice of ceremonial burial suggests that he was something of a philosopher. Time and again we find his remains carefully interred with valuable tools and weapons. Whenever we find a similar practice among living primitives it indicates belief in a future life. The care given to the details of burial also indicates that he lived in a group of some sort. His material culture was more advanced than that of some primitive tribes of today. It does not seem unreasonable then to visualize Neanderthal man living in a manner similar to that of existing food-gathering tribes. In Chapter 7 we shall see that the habits of men in such tribes in no way conform to the "cave man" conduct formerly attributed to Neanderthal man.

From the end of the Fourth Ice Age down to the dawn of civilization and the Age of Metals there were several other distinct European cultures. We know considerably more about the material aspects of most of these later cultures. We know too that there were cultural advances and recessions similar to those which took place after the dawn of history. The advanced Aurignacian culture was followed by a decadent Solutrian; a flourishing Magdalenian was succeeded by an inferior Mesolithic. Then came a brilliant Neolithic culture. We shall consider each of these in turn.

The Modern Type of Man and Aurignacian Culture. The Aurignacian culture followed the Mousterian in Europe at the end of the Fourth or "last" (we hope!) Ice Age. From this point on, starting about 20,000 years ago, we find only the modern or *Homo sapiens* physical type of man. During the Aurignacian period the large Cro-Magnon variety, commonly regarded as ancestral to European Caucasoids of historic times, prevailed. Smaller varieties appeared immediately after the Aurignacian period. The Cro-Magnon variety is named after a rock shelter near a French village where the first

skeletons were found. We shall see that Cro-Magnon man, discovered in 1868, was the first "fossil man" to be accepted by all scientists, even though paleontologists and archeologists had argued for the recognition of prehistoric human fossils some years before 1868.

During the cold dry period which followed the retreat of the last great ice age in west central Europe the Aurignacians built carefully upon Mousterian foundations. Continued improvements were made in stone implements. In addition bone awls, pins, and needles appeared for the first time. Reindeer antlers were now used in toolmaking. The dead were adorned with necklaces of beads made of mammoth-tusk ivory, seashells, and reindeer teeth.

Prehistoric Art. The Aurignacians seem to have been the world's first artists. Here, at any rate, we find the beginnings of engraving and painting, the former on elephant's tusks and the latter on cave walls. Five thousand years later the Magdalenian artists picked up where the Aurignacians had left off and brought about the Golden Age of prehistoric art.

The quality of Aurignacian and Magdalenian art indicates not only the skill of master craftsmen but also a highly developed sense of beauty. Yet for colors these artists were limited to colored earth which they ground up for reds and yellows, manganese oxide for green, and soot for black. These colors were mixed with oil and grease. Even so they are more permanent than modern paints.

If tattooing and scarification can be classified as art, it would appear that this type of personal adornment also existed as early as the Aurignacian period. At any rate we find evidence of scarification on a small female statuette of this period. On several Aurignacian cave walls we find colored imprints of human hands from which fingers had been amputated. It may be that the desire for prestige which prompts civilized man as well as living primitives to endure minor mutilations dictated finger amputation at this early date.

Religion and Magic. We have already considered evidence of religious belief back in Mousterian times. It may well be that finger-amputation was a form of religious sacrifice. Primitives have been known to offer even their lives as religious sacrifices. Other practices among prehistoric people and living primitives, however, indicate that amputations may have been connected with magic. Magic, at any rate, seems to have existed. We infer this from their art for one thing

Nowhere do they represent the human face. Even the human form is often a caricature. This practice among artists who were certainly capable of depicting human features accurately suggests similar restraints among living primitives, who fear that by possession of a good replica one may bring magic to bear upon an enemy.

Other features of Aurignacian and Magdalenian art also insinuate the practice of magic. Most of the animals are pregnant females. Statuettes accentuate features suggestive of maternity. These may have been involved in some magical rite regarding fecundity. Finally, many of the animal pictures are mutilated in ways which intimate a ceremony in which sympathetic magic was resorted to before a hunt.

The Magdalenian and Mesolithic Cultures. Although the ice ages had ended some thousands of years before, a series of minor glaciations gave west-central Europe a sub-Arctic climate again during the Magdalenian period. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the new artifacts of this period, including such things as detachable barbed-harpoon points, spear throwers, lamps, fish hooks, perforated needles and hollow-bone needlecases, bear a striking resemblance to those of modern Eskimos. Yet Magdalenian art was superior to that of any living primitives.

From the end of the Magdalenian period in Europe down to the start of the Neolithic, roughly from about 7,500 down to 4,000 B.C., there is not only a poverty of invention and discovery but an actual period of decadence. During this, the Mesolithic period, a contemporaneous Spengler might well have predicted the "decline of the west." Although the climate of central and southern Europe was already much like that of today, the old hunting and fishing culture had evidently exhausted itself. A contemporaneous Neo-Malthusian, noting the diminishing return from hunting, might have warned that the earth had reached the point where it could not support any more people. A contemporaneous Toynbee might have lamented that after nearly half a million years Europeans were still living in small bands without permanent settlements and with scarcely any of the technological procedures which are basic to civilization.

A Mesolithic sociologist might have found consolation, however, in the fact that great migrations of people were now taking place. People in the south of Europe were moving northward. Best of all,

Europe was not isolated. People from the Asiatic end of the Mediterranean were moving into the west. These migrations, along with the changes which had been taking place at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, were to alter the course of European prehistory. These changes need to be considered in some detail.

Inventions East of Suez. While the various ice ages were coming and going in central and northern Europe long rainy periods followed by dry ones were taking place in the areas south and south-east of Europe. Although man had discovered how to use fire and how to make weapons and tools out of stone and bone under the adverse ice-age climatic conditions of Europe, a series of inventions or discoveries made in the milder climates "east of Suez" while Europe was going through its Mesolithic stage was destined to change the whole course of man's history. These innovations took place in the Neolithic period of this eastern area which occurred about 5,000 B.C. They did not reach southern Europe until a thousand years later. Four innovations were of supreme importance: cultivation of crops, domestication of animals, weaving, and pottery.

The cultivation of crops and the domestication of animals are believed to have started in the now-desert highland region between the Nile, Tigris-Euphrates, and Indus valleys. During this period the area which stretches from Anatolia to the Indus was a fertile region. Once someone there had learned how to till the soil his discovery fanned out rapidly over the region of the three great valleys. The cereal crops which now developed—wheat, oats, barley, and rye—were destined henceforth to become the basic food for most of the world.

Up to this point the dog seems to have been the only domesticated animal. With improvements in plant cultivation there was need of traction power. Oxen, camels, horses, and mules were domesticated therefore to meet this need. Soon afterwards the list of domesticated animals also included milch cattle, sheep, goats, and poultry.

Although crude weaving and pottery had appeared earlier they underwent such great improvements at this time that we describe them as Neolithic innovations. The domestication of plants and animals furnished new materials, such as cotton, wool, and flax, which could be woven easily into fabrics for clothing and other purposes. Pottery could be used now to store the new cereals against bad years.

More important, it could be used to boil not only the new foods but meat as well.

The Neolithic Revolution. The new inventions provided Neolithic Age people with a larger as well as a steady supply of food. With less time devoted to getting food the more gifted could specialize and so contribute to the further advancement of the arts and sciences. Even the aged and the physical weakling, of little value in a robust hunting régime, were now able to make contributions to society. With plenty of food populations began to increase. We can easily imagine some hairy-chested Neolithic eugenicist lamenting the softness of the new life which now permitted the "weak" to live.

Other inventions too numerous to mention here now took place. The wheel, so important in modern industrial civilization, first came into use. Likewise the bow and arrow, the basis for later propulsive weapons. Flint working became a fine art; stone implements were now shaped and smoothed by rubbing and whetting. It is unfortunate that this period was named after the "new" polished stone implements. This was much more than a Neolithic (New Stone) Age. It was actually a New Age.

The new sources of food compelled Neolithic people to adopt a settled mode of life. Houses of wood, stone, and brick appear in archeological remains from now on. In some areas whole villages were built on piles over lakes, evidently for protection. Man's continued interest in the supramundane world is indicated by huge stones (megaliths) arranged in geometric patterns near permanent villages.

It would seem that permanent villages and an increased population must have made new systems of social organization and control necessary. In the smaller pre-Neolithic settlements society was probably organized on a kinship basis as it is today among most primitive tribes. No doubt new patterns of human relationships with councils and other governmental mechanisms extending out beyond the family were now perfected. In other words groups now became organized politically on a "civil" basis. Here we have the derivation of the word *civilization*, even though civilization in the anthropological sense did not come until the invention of writing later on.

Although most of the Neolithic inventions of the eastern Mediterranean area would no doubt have reached Europe eventually by

foot travel, the speeding up of transportation at this time diffused these innovations much sooner. Dugout boats propelled by poles, paddles, and oars now appear. These were soon succeeded by sail-boats. Thus large and varied cargoes could be transported over lakes and seas. With man as the only "pack animal," trade in Old Stone Age Europe had been limited mostly to flint and obsidian cores for tool-making along with beads and shells for decoration. Amber, which may have had some religious significance, was imported from the Baltic. Domesticated pack animals and finally the ox cart now began to bring the Neolithic inventions to the remote parts of Europe.

From this brief description of Neolithic changes we see that they produced what really amounted to a social revolution. In all probability they were more far-reaching than the changes brought about in modern times by the Industrial Revolution. From what we know about these two revolutions one can understand why it has been claimed that they involved the most important changes in man's way of living during his half-million or so years on earth.

The Dawn of Civilization. The Neolithic revolution began in southern Europe about 4000 B.C. It soon spread over most of the continent. Meanwhile two more of man's greatest inventions, the use of metal and writing, took place in the eastern Mediterranean area. Copper, the first metal to be used, dates back to about 4000 B.C. Writing was discovered about the same time. In less than two thousand years they had been introduced into Europe.

It was not until 1853, when evidence of Neolithic pile villages was discovered on the shores of a Swiss lake, that the world began to take seriously the descriptions of these villages given by the ancient classical writers. Recent archeological reconstructions also indicate that years ago we had an accurate picture of the dawn of civilization in Egypt and Babylonia in the books of the Old Testament. The first Egyptian pyramids and the city of Troy were built considerably later. The glamorous civilization revealed in the tomb of "King Tut" goes back only to 1362 B.C. The beginning of written records marks the start of civilization for the anthropologist. At this point in any area he turns the story of man's past over to the historian.

II. NEW WORLD BEGINNINGS

The New World also had a prehistoric past. In some ways it rivaled contemporaneous Old World cultures. At any rate borrowing from America did not start with World War II "lend-lease" and the Marshall Plan. Heavy borrowing from the prehistoric culture of the Americas began immediately after Columbus' discovery.

The First Americans. America was first settled by Asiatics of the *Homo sapiens* type who entered Alaska near the end of the Fourth Ice Age. These Mongoloid pioneers came in successive waves from different parts of adjacent areas in Asia. Once here they migrated generally southward, some reaching the southern tip of South America before the start of the Christian era in Europe. The early European reports erroneously described the descendants of these first Americans as Indians. Sometimes they are described today as Amerinds to distinguish them from natives of India.

The oldest known American skeletal remains were deposited in Minnesota about 20,000 years ago. Another skeleton, believed to be close to 15,000 years old, was found recently at Tepexpan, Mexico. Other skeletal material of approximately 10,000 years ago has been found in Minnesota, Florida, Patagonia, and possibly other places. In some instances evidence of a contemporaneous culture was found along with these latter fossils.

The oldest archeological evidence in the United States, found in the Sandia Mountains of New Mexico, appears to be more than 25,000 years old. The best-known ancient sites are associated with the Folsom culture, named after the town of Folsom, New Mexico, near which the first trace of this culture was discovered in 1926. These and other sites in the Southwest, including one announced at Lime Creek in southwestern Nebraska in 1947, assure us that Amerinds resided in a wide area in the Southwest about 20,000 years ago. Much of the early American evidence is found in association with the bones of the prehistoric horse, bison, camel, mastodon, and mammoth, all of which had become extinct long before the arrival of Europeans. (See Figure III, "Prehistoric American Cultures and Contemporaneous Fossil Men.")

Although we have many of the stone tools and weapons used by the earliest Americans we know very little about their social organiza-

tion. More than likely they were simple food-gatherers who lived by hunting and gathering edible wild plants. They had not advanced to the agricultural stage nor did they have fixed habitations. Evidently they came here at a late Paleolithic stage of cultural development.

We have comparatively little information as yet about the stages of cultural development which took place in the New World between the Sandia-Folsom stage and 1 A.D. Between 20,000 and 5000 B.C. several different cultures arose and then died out in the Northwest, Southwest, and in South America. As yet we know little about them. By the time the Spanish arrived in the Southwest, around 1540, the

Figure III
 PREHISTORIC AMERICAN CULTURES AND
 CONTEMPORANEOUS FOSSIL MEN *

<i>Geological Time</i>	<i>Glacial Epoch</i>	<i>Sites of Chief Cultures</i>	<i>Sites of Chief Fossil Men. (All Homo sapiens.)</i>
Quaternary	First Three Glaciers	Eolithic Stage	Minnesota Tepexpan Florida Patagonia
Pleistocene	Fourth Glacier	Sandia (New Mexico) (25,000-30,000 years ago)	
Recent	Post-glacial	Folsom (Southwest) (20,000 years ago)	
	15,000-5,000 years ago	(Several local cultures in Northwest, Southwest and in Patagonia)	
	A.D. 1	Archaic (Mexico) Eskimo and Ipiutak (Alaska) Mound Builder (East of Mississippi) Woodland Tribes (" " " Basket Maker, Mogollon, and Hohokam (Southwest) Maya (Central America) Nazca, Chimu, and Tiahuanaco (Peru)	
	700	Pueblo (Southwest) Toltec (Mexico)	
	1100	Aztec (Mexico) Inca (Andes Region)	

* Adapted from the author's *Man's Unknown Ancestors*.

then-resident Pueblo tribes had become agriculturalists as well as skillful architects and builders.

If one looked at the Americas about 1 A.D. he would find Eskimos who had recently migrated from Siberia occupying the coastal regions of Alaska on their way eastward to Greenland. The recently discovered Ipiutaks also occupied Alaska. Amerinds who raised crops and buried their dead in mounds lived in a wide area east of the Mississippi. Basket Maker and other pre-Pueblo Amerinds were farming by means of irrigation in the Southwest. Eastern Woodland tribes hunted, fished, and farmed. Some, no doubt, still caught codfish in weirs as their ancestors had done at the present site of Boston over a thousand years before. The most advanced Amerind cultures were in Central America and Peru although the Toltec, Aztec, and Inca cultures were not to appear there for hundreds of years.⁴

The Advanced Amerind Cultures. About 1 A.D. the Nasca, Chimu, and Tiahuanaco cultures flourished in Peru. These people were not only agriculturalists and weavers but makers of some of the world's most beautifully decorated pottery. They also developed a massive architecture in adobe and stone, some of which still stands. Contemporaneous neighbors as well as tribes further north erected massive stone idols. A gigantic stone head weighing fifty tons, found recently at Vera Cruz, Mexico, evidently belonged to the La Venta culture of this period.

The Mayan culture of what is now British Honduras, South Yucatan, and the republics of Honduras and Guatemala reached its peak during the early centuries of the Christian era. It had already started to decline before the arrival of the Spanish discoverers. Even so, if Columbus had only sailed further west and discovered it his reports would have caused much more excitement in Europe. This, the most advanced of the pre-Columbian cultures, equaled in many respects the civilizations of contemporaneous Europe. There were cities with buildings of stone, paved roads, and a system of writing, a part of which we have been able to decipher. The Mayans worked out a 365 day calendar which was more accurate than that then in use in the Old World. They wove beautiful linen into clothing and recorded their history and religious ceremonials together in fiber-paper books.

We would know far more about the Mayans if the Spanish had

not destroyed most of their records. We should remember, however, that this took place during an era when heresy was a crime in both Catholic and Protestant countries. The Spanish also hoped to convert these people to Christianity. This helps to explain the destruction not only of the Mayan books which combined history and pagan ceremonial but also that of the Aztec and Inca temples of a later period. Religion had a very important place in all of these advanced cultures. Human sacrifice was commonly a part of it. At the dedication of one Aztec temple shortly before the Spanish arrived tens of thousands of men and women were sacrificed.

The Toltec culture of the central plateau of Mexico straddled 1000 A.D. The Toltecs are responsible for the cult of the Feathered Serpent which inspired massive stone temples built high upon pyramids. Around 1200 the Toltecs gave way to the Aztecs, who occupied this region at the time of the Spanish invasion. The Inca culture was contemporaneous with that of the Aztecs. Archeology blends into history at this point. For the story of the Aztecs as well as the South American Incas, who might be described as the first "Socialists" of the New World, we are able to turn to the historians. It might be observed here, however, that the Incas had a regimented society in which the individual counted but little. Once the Spanish captured their leaders in 1532 there was little difficulty in subduing the entire nation.⁸

The Typical Indian. Most of us are surprised when we first learn of the South and Central American Indians whose urban culture advanced to the point where they had writing, worked in gold and silver, and used bronze tools. We are more apt to think of the mounted befeathered warriors of our western plains and the Wild West films when "Indian" is mentioned. Yet neither of these types of Amerinds were typical Indians. The Indian was for the most part a rather colorless farmer. Although it is generally known that he added maize or Indian corn to the world's cereal supply, it is not so widely recognized that he was one of the world's greatest farmers.

So many foods discovered by the Amerinds have since become so closely associated with the diets of Europeans that we are apt to forget their American origin. The Irish potato, Turkish tobacco, and the tomato that figures so prominently in Italian dishes were unknown in Europe until after the voyages of Columbus. The same is

true of cocoa, squash, pumpkin, vanilla, several types of beans, the sweet potato, as well as peanuts, popcorn, and chewing gum. Drugs which are 100 per cent American include quinine, cascara, cocaine, arnica, and witch hazel.

There has been considerable speculation among prehistorians as to what the fate of America might have been had there been no European blitzkrieg. Some believe that eventually native American culture might have caught up with that of the Old World. America lacked at least three things, however, which would have greatly hastened progress. There were no good power animals, nor were there wheeled vehicles. Most important of all there was a lack of communication with outside sources of culture.

Except for the llama, which was used as a pack animal in the Andes, and the dog, used to pull light loads by the Eskimos and some of the Plains tribes, the New World had no animals comparable to the ox, ass, camel, and horse of the Old World. The lack of an animal-drawn plow must have been a serious handicap to New World farmers. It may be that the lack of native animals suitable for domestication explains the failure to develop the wheel on this continent. Lack of experimentation with the wheel also delayed the use of water power for grinding grain.

The absence of transport animals and wheeled vehicles prevented extensive trade over wide areas. The fact that there were no easily-traveled land or water routes to sources of Old World culture was the Indian's greatest handicap. We have seen how Europe profited by the inventions of the Near East. Prehistory teaches us among other things that communication is an extremely important factor in human progress.

NOTES

1. *The Ways of Men*, 1948, pp. 164, 175-7.
2. Raymond W. Murray, *Man's Unknown Ancestors*, second printing, 1948, pp. 118-20. See also A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, revised edition, 1948, pp. 81-93.
3. *Apes, Giants, and Man*, 1946, pp. 2-3. See also *Man's Unknown Ancestors*, Chapter III.
4. Raymond W. Murray, *op. cit.*, Part IV, "Prehistoric Man in the New World."
5. For a scientific analysis of Inca culture see John P. Gillin, *The Ways of Men*, 1948, pp. 500-507.

7

The Culture of Primitives

The Diversity of Culture. The first thing that impresses us in the study of "primitives," the living members of backward tribes, is the great variety of cultures found among them. While they are obviously inferior in the production of food and artifacts—and it is on account of this inferior material culture that they are called primitives—no two primitive cultures are alike. Commenting upon this diversity, Ruth Benedict compared the selection which takes place in cultural life to speech. The number of possible sounds which a language might include is practically unlimited. Each language therefore selects only a few. So too with culture. There is an almost infinite number of ways in which cultures may be built up upon the "hints" provided by man's physical and spiritual necessities and environment. Each society selects only a few. The choices which one society makes seem strange to others. Ethnocentrism makes each society believe that its choices are best.

The Most Cherished Values. Since culture is the total community heritage, it would be impossible to describe in detail the culture of even a single primitive tribe in the space available here. Even a panorama of the technological, social, ideological, religious, and artistic forms found in most primitive societies would take more space than we can afford. We shall confine ourselves, therefore, chiefly to a brief analysis of the values which are cherished most in any culture. These are contained in its social institutions. *Institutions* may be regarded as prescribed and relatively permanent usages governing human behavior and standardizing practices in regard to values considered essential to group welfare. Institutions are organized methods of satisfying human needs. They include the family as well as those aspects of living which come under the head of eco-

conomic, governmental, and religious activities. We shall consider these basic institutions here "historically," or from the viewpoint of cultural anthropology. In Chapters 19 and 20 we shall study them "comparatively," examining the institutions of modern society from the viewpoint of modern sociology.

I. PRIMITIVE ECONOMICS

The Food-gatherers and the Productive Workers. There are two chief types of economic systems among primitives: the food-gatherers and the productive workers. In each group some societies are more advanced than others. The food-gatherers live chiefly by hunting and fishing. The productive workers are either agricultural or pastoral or both. The food-gatherers, usually located out on the "margins" of the globe or isolated at any rate from the currents of world trade, are also called marginals, lower hunters, and savages. The more advanced productive workers are sometimes referred to as intramarginal people, higher hunters, and barbarians. Although for the sake of brevity frequently we shall use the older savage-barbarian dichotomy, this will be done without the connotations of the evolutionary ethnologists.

Distribution of Primitives. When first visited by whites over 95 per cent of primitives were already at the productive or barbarian stage. Even the majority of African tribes belonged to this group. So did most of the Melanesian and Malaysian peoples and the residents of the Polynesian-Micronesian Islands. Probably most of the Amerinds were also at this stage.

The savages or food-gatherers included most of the primitives who resided in the narrow area which extended from southern California up to Alaska and eastward through Canada. These North Americans consisted of Eskimos and Aleuts as well as Amerinds. The Amerinds of southern Chile and Argentina were also at this cultural level when discovered. So too were the Australian natives, the Tasmanians, the Malay, Filipino, and African Pygmies, the Toala of Celebes, the Andaman Islanders, the Veddas of Ceylon, the Ainus of northern Japan, some tribes of the Siberian Arctic, and the Bushmen of Africa. Although many of these groups have recently moved up to a higher

level of material culture, fortunately they were studied before this change took place.

Aspects of Primitive Economics. It is difficult to evaluate any aspect of primitive economics on the basis of what we see today. The impact of European influence caused most primitive economies to crumble. This happened first when Europeans began to place greatly increased values upon the furs, coconut kernels, ivory, whalebone, rubber, and other trade objects of primitives. The subsequent arrival of colonists and the continued expansion of European influence have by now reduced most peoples of primitive economics to the cheap-labor class. In many instances their entire culture has been corrupted by this contact with civilization. Yet from the descriptions of primitive economies made by anthropologists before many of these cultures were overwhelmed by white influence we are able to present definite information about such things as their community organization, ownership of property, sexual division of labor, specialization, and trade. We shall consider primitive economics here under these convenient headings.

Community Organization. The type of primitive economy largely determines the form of community organization. Among savages, who must move seasonally to hunt, fish, or gather food, the most typical community unit is the *band*. The band is usually made up of from 50 to 150 individuals. Only under exceptional circumstances can a larger unit exploit a territory without destroying it. While bands move about they usually follow a circuit made up of campsites or temporary centers convenient to the seasonal presence of fish, game, and gatherable natural products.

The growth of population within a band usually results in the creation of new band-type groups which move off into more distant territory. In the course of time these new bands tend to develop a somewhat different culture of their own as a result of isolation. New linguistic groups gradually develop in this way. Eskimos to a considerable extent still live in mobile bands. Eskimo bands are unique, however, in that they have been able to maintain some contacts through dog sleds in winter and walrus skin boats in the summer. This fact, along with the uniqueness of their environment, helps to explain the general uniformity of Eskimo culture and language all

the way from Siberia to Greenland. A similar degree of uniformity was not found among the Amerinds.

When primitive economies advance to the stage of barbarism the small *village* becomes the usual form of community. Agriculture and pastoralism now make it possible for the band to become sedentary. They also provide a surplus of goods which can be exchanged with other villages. Thus intercommunity economic ties develop. A cluster of such communities economically interwoven and sharing a common language and culture and sometimes even a political organization is described as a *tribe* or *nation*. The Amerind mound-builders lived in villages, the Iroquois in a nation.

Ownership of Property. Subjective judgments frequently color interpretations of foreign cultures. George P. Murdock observes that "communism" has often been seen among the Ainus occupying Yezo and other islands just north of Japan as well as among the Nama Hottentots of Southwest Africa. Yet, as he shows, both of these food-gathering societies recognize the institution of private property in many ways and so cannot be called communistic.¹

When the evolutionary ethnologists claimed that private property was a late development, contemporary Socialists, the predecessors of our Communists, argued that this bolstered their own thesis that private property was merely a machination introduced by the capitalistic system. With the possible exception of one recent text in anthropology whose authors have been accused of Communist sympathies it can be said that modern cultural anthropologists ridicule this claim of last-century armchair ethnologists.

Before considering the evidence of modern cultural anthropology, the observation might be made that the consensus of human experience suggests that the incentive to work for something which one can call his own must be recognized in any society that is to function effectively over a considerable period of time. If we can find good evidence of private ownership among food gatherers this should help to confirm the belief that from the beginning man has considered this a natural right and not one conferred by his community.

At the savage or food-gathering level, private ownership is generally recognized in houses, ornaments, and in hunting, fishing, and cooking utensils. In many bands individual ownership is recognized also in intangible or noncorporeal property such as songs, dances,

and processes for manufacturing medicinal and cosmetic compounds. Titles to property are often hereditary.

It is true that hunting and fishing areas are usually owned by the community. One would hardly expect individuals or families in bands to "fence off" for personal use areas of large forests or seas which contain food enough for all. What is important, with reference to the claims of modern Communists, is that the individual owns his own hunting and fishing gear, the chief means of producing wealth.

At the barbarian or food-producing stage private ownership in land becomes more evident. In the early stages of agriculture the community may assign plots of land temporarily to families. When the land is exhausted the community moves elsewhere. But when permanent residence in an area takes place, following the discovery of crop rotation and artificial fertilization, these plots usually become the permanent possession of families or individuals, since they may put values back into a piece of land through energy and foresight.

Sexual Division of Labor. The recent entry of women into nearly every phase of modern military and civilian life raises questions about the nature of "women's work." In practically every primitive society all important work is definitely assigned either to men or to women. But which tasks are conventionally regarded as "men's work" and which are assigned to women vary widely according to group and locality.

Ralph Linton shows that in some primitive societies women do most of the manual labor. Among the Arapesh they carry the heavier loads and among the Tasmanians they did the seal-hunting. In the Marquesas the men do the baby-tending, housekeeping, and cooking. Where the element of mobility is not involved in a primitive culture, particular tasks may be assigned to either sex.²

Among most food-gatherers mobility is necessary in hunting and fishing. Since women are more restricted in this respect because of pregnancy and child care, it usually happens that hunting and fishing are regarded as men's work. In these societies women are usually expected to care for the children, cook, bring in water and firewood, and gather near-by edible wild plants.

In those tasks of primitive societies where mobility or strength is not a factor there seems to be no set criterion for determining the

sexual division of labor, Accidental circumstances, rather than any belief that certain tasks are "naturally" the work of one sex or the other, seem to determine which jobs will be regarded as men's and which as women's work.

Specialization. Specialized labor becomes more conspicuous at the food-producing stage. With permanently settled villages and large surpluses of food it is possible for many workers to devote all their time to those specialties in which they are most proficient. At this stage entire villages or regions may decide to make the most of certain environmental advantages by concentrating on a few profitable occupations. They trade their surplus to other groups in order to balance their specialized economy.

Less specialization is possible among food-gatherers where all able adults must work at a limited number of tasks. Yet even here there are "trade secrets" which are known only to a few. Some hunters or fishers develop special skills which give them advantages over others. Because of particular skills they are assigned special tasks in a hunting or fishing party. Some women become so proficient at mixing herbs that they perform this task for the whole band. Finally there are religious leaders at all levels of culture.

The special knowledge which may be possessed even by one or a few members of a band prompted Linton to point out the absurdity of the observation that Aristotle was the last individual in history who was familiar with "all" of human knowledge. Linton doubts the ability of any individual at any time to possess a complete knowledge of the culture of his society. Even among food-gatherers each person needed to know only as much of the total culture as was needed to fit him for his particular rôle in the community.

To an outsider, the apparent simplicity of occupations among food-gatherers at first sight might suggest that the members of these societies are all at a dead level of cultural uniformity if not innate ability. Such is far from the truth. Society at every economic level is made up of what might be called specialists. Specialization makes for economic organization. The natural effect of localized specialization is intensive trading.

Trade. Even in Paleolithic times there was some trading. In prehistoric America native copper and obsidian were traded with tribes living at great distances from the natural sources of these materials.

When the first white man visited Point Barrow Eskimos in 1826 he found them using tobacco and copper kettles obtained from Siberia through intermediate groups that must have extended ultimately back over Asia and Europe to the Atlantic seaboard.

Primitive societies everywhere exchange goods with others to secure things they lack. Most of them also attach great importance to the social contacts made through trading. The profit motive is seldom as keen as among ourselves. In many instances profit is sought chiefly for the prestige which it brings its owner. Uncivilized man has no great field for capital investment. Except for the ability to wear better ornaments the rich usually live very much the same as others. As a rule, all work and have the same kinds of food and comforts.

The potlatch is an example of the importance which is sometimes attached to prestige. This strange festival is found among the Amerinds on the coast of British Columbia. On such occasions a prominent man may add to his social stature according to the amount of property he gives to his guests or destroys. To this end he saves up blankets, oil, and other valuables over a long period. At the potlatch ceremony his guests must accept these gifts. Later they in turn are expected to duplicate these gifts with interest at another potlatch or else admit their social inferiority.

Although this method of enhancing one's social prestige seems ridiculous to us, it may not be so different from our "coming out" parties for debutantes in the "400" groups. Very often these parties likewise are aimed at crushing competitors in the contest for social prestige. With our near-confiscatory income taxes in the higher brackets, perhaps it may be said that after a certain point has been reached Americans now work for prestige rather than any substantial additional benefit which may come from increased income. This assumes that legal devices are not resorted to which partially circumvent income-tax regulations.

Where trade is not limited to barter, primitives use whale teeth, feathers, stone axes, mats, shells, strings of beads, and many other objects as currency. At the pastoral stage cattle are often the unit of exchange. It is interesting to find that the earliest Egyptian metal coin was in the form of a cow's head. The word *pecuniary* also suggests the early use of live stock for currency. It is derived from the Latin *pecus*, meaning "flock." Another influence of the food-produc-

ing stage is seen in the word *stipend*. It comes from *stipendium* ("stips, fruit of the stalk") and *pendere* ("to weigh out"). It would appear that man is not only a long-time property owner but an old hand at trading it.

II. GOVERNMENT AND LAW

The Form of Government. The modern historical school blasted two of the pet ideas of evolutionary ethnologists when it showed that there is no direct relationship between the form of government and the stage of economic development and that government in food-gathering cultures is usually democratic. In the savage tribes of North America and Australia power was usually in the hands either of elders or a council selected by the band. It is said that the early American colonists, accustomed to the idea of royalty, were greatly confused when they failed to find a royal personage with whom they could deal. Primitives recognize superior ability in the selection of their councils.

In Africa, where the majority of tribes are at the food-producing stage, the most characteristic form of government is a monarchy. Yet even here outstanding ability is usually the main factor in the selection of a chief. Usually the chieftainship is not inheritable. Other factors may figure in the choice of a chief. There may be a popular belief that his actions have supernatural sanction. Or his greater material possessions may give him preëminence. Warlike prowess is a factor as a rule only among tribes with a well-developed food-producing economy.

Warfare among food-gathering bands usually takes the form of a feud or vendetta, characterized by an occasional retaliatory death. Among our Plains tribes war raids were often made also to bolster the vanity of a brave. Only at advanced stages of food-producing do we find anything approaching the organized wars of civilization.

Law and Law Enforcement. Law is found in every society. Each has its own customs and legal heritage as well as an enforcement machinery to deal with those who defy cultural imperatives. We should be apt to say that many of the traditions behind primitive regulations are based upon myths. In their eyes, however, these traditions are important.

Among most food-gatherers there is very little outward evidence of governmental machinery. This misled early ethnologists who supposed that something close to anarchy prevailed. Public opinion is so strong among savages that only very informal social machinery is needed to enforce laws. Usually a tribal council which combines the legislative, executive, and judicial departments makes needed new laws and punishes the few who do not bow to public opinion.

The savage has very little privacy. Everyone knows what others say and do. Since no one lives to himself alone, no one is free from the pressure inherent in the opinion of his fellows. It is for this reason that a primitive cannot long endure the adverse judgment of his group. The initiation ceremony which takes place at puberty in many tribes impresses upon youth the importance of observing the tribal code.

Even with young children folklore and supernatural sanctions are constantly used to show the necessity of observing customs and beliefs. Although education is informal, respect for elders and for public opinion is taught from the start. It is largely on these accounts that punishment of the young is seldom necessary in primitive societies.

We are inclined to ridicule the magico-religious trials which some primitives arrange to determine the guilt of alleged offenders. Yet through suggestion such ordeals are often effective in revealing guilt or innocence, since everyone believes that the gods cooperate in these trials. In a sense, the oath administered in Christian courts was originally something of an ordeal, since everyone believed that God would punish a perjurer. Perhaps decreased belief in God, as indicated by widespread perjury in criminal procedure, now makes our own trials somewhat ridiculous.

III. RELIGION AND MORALITY

Commenting upon the "trial" of Hungary's Cardinal Mindszenty in February, 1949, *Time* observed that "the Communist state is the instrument of a church—the secular church of international Communism. It teaches a system of ethics directly opposed to Mindszenty's. It actively seeks to turn as many men as it can away from God. It uses the full force of its police power, its educational system,

and its socialized economy to make its converts and to destroy its religious rivals." ⁸ With secularism, both of the violent Russian and the more subtle Western type, now seeking to undermine Judaeo-Christian religion and morality in the United States there should be more than usual interest in the early history of religious institutions. First we shall consider religious origins, then morality.

PRIMITIVE RELIGION

Superhumanism. Religion and magic, the two chief attitudes of primitives towards the supernatural or supramundane world, may be combined under the heading of superhumanism. Religion includes all activities characterized by a propitiatory or persuasive attitude. Magic refers to activities characterized by a compulsive or coercive attitude. Religion and magic, then, differ chiefly in their attitudes towards the supernatural world. Superhumanism, as considered here, involves emotion and volitional, as well as intellectual elements pertaining to the supramundane world. It is thereby distinguished from a philosophy or science, both of which lack the first two elements.

Natural and Supernatural Religion. The Judaeo-Christian religion is revealed or supernatural. The Bible symbolizes this supernatural source of the religion of most of the Western world. Primitives, presumed to have had no contact with either the Old or the New Testament books, also have a religion. In some instances their religious ideas and practices are remarkably like our own. We describe theirs, however, as a "natural" religion.

Superstition has always existed along side of supernatural religion. Among primitives it is even more pronounced. Monotheists are apt to classify much of primitive religion and all magic as superstition. Because of the frank mixture of the high and the low primitive religion is one of the most difficult phases of the study of comparative religion.

There are four great types of religion. *Manism* is the worship of supernatural forces that once lived upon earth as human beings. It is also called ancestor worship. *Animism* is the worship of lesser spirits who were never human. *Polytheism* is the worship of a few outstanding spirits. Sometimes polytheism is included under the heading of either manism or animism. *Monotheism* is the worship of a Supreme Being. "Strict" monotheism excludes worship of lesser

beings or forces. In "ethical" monotheism the Supreme Being is also the author and upholder of the moral law. Worship of a near-Supreme Being who tolerates worship of lesser beings (henotheism) is usually included also under the head of monotheism.

Distribution of Superhumanism. No primitive group has ever been found without some form of superhumanism. Some form of monotheism is found among upwards to three-quarters of primitives. Strict ethical monotheism which bars all magic or other religious worship is seldom found, a fact which encourages modern missionary endeavor. With regard to the distribution of various forms of superhumanism among food-gatherers and food-producers, it has been found that "the lower one goes down in the scale of material culture the less does he find of the three elements of magic, manism, and animism." ⁴ On the other hand there seems to be more monotheism among food-gatherers than among food-producers.

Primitives at each cultural level often attribute their misfortunes to the infraction of some taboo by a member of the group. A *taboo* is a prohibition against the use of something, frequently the use of a certain animal for food. Various explanations have been given for the origin of taboos. Frazer regarded them as a kind of negative magic. Marett tied them up with the idea of *mana*. The latter is a Melanesian word meaning "power." Many primitives believe in an impersonal, all-pervasive supernatural power which they call *mana*. A chief may be feared because he has "*mana*." Whatever its origin may be, a taboo is scrupulously observed by primitives. Belief in the unerring punishment of violators of taboos is so strong that through suggestion many primitives have been known to become ill and die upon realizing that they have violated a taboo.

Religion and Evolutionary Ethnology. Last-century ethnologists appear to have been more concerned about the religion of primitive man than about any other aspect of his culture. This was a by-product of prevailing naturalism. It was widely assumed that whereas philosophy had failed over the centuries to "annihilate" the foundations of the Judaeo-Christian religions, ethnology could do so now by scientific evidence. Almost everyone who ventured into this field came back with an elaborate theory of his own which explained not only the various upward stages in the development of religion but even the very origin of religion in the human race. From the viewpoint

of superficial scholarship some of these explanations were quite impressive, especially one of the last, that proposed by Sir James G. Frazer.

Frazer claimed that religion originated in magic. This theory was developed in his *The Golden Bough*, the first of whose twelve volumes appeared in 1894. Prior to Frazer, several other beginnings of religion had been proposed. Herbert Spencer said it started with animism. E. B. Tylor proposed animism. Other less widely-read theories claimed such origins as fetishism and totemism. Freudian psychoanalysis spun out an additional source. Curiously enough, about all they agreed upon was that monotheism was the final stage of evolution and that man had started with an animal-like total lack of superhumanism. The Bible was generally described as a book of myths by the sponsors of these various theories.

Religion and Modern Ethnology. Modern ethnology rejects all of these evolutionary theories. Not only are they regarded as mutually contradictory, but they are seen now as essentially nothing more than reflections of the speculative philosophy of a particular author. Each writer attempted to make his case appear scientific through the use of only that ethnological evidence which fitted his a priori thesis. In the use of evidence all failed to make a proper distinction between food-gatherers and food-producers. One might say of each of these writers what William Howells (*The Heathens*, 1948) observed when commenting upon Sigmund Freud's theory of the origin of religion. It "may be good Freud—but it is wretched anthropology." We may epitomize all the evolutionary arguments for the origin of religion in the conclusion which R. H. Lowie drew after considering the case of Frazer, probably the best of the evolutionary theorists. "Frazer's argument," he said, "breaks down at every point."⁵

Modern ethnologists are content to restrict themselves to what at best may be called the "early history" of religion. They feel now that the "origin" of religion is a matter to be decided by students outside the field of anthropology. Anyone who subscribes to the Judaeo-Christian tradition, according to which monotheism was the origin of religion, should find considerable satisfaction in the modern ethnological evidence bearing upon the early history of religion. This shows at least a tendency or "drift" towards an original monotheism as we go back down the steps of the cultural ladder. This indicated

tendency, at any rate, flatly contradicts the ideas proposed by all the evolutionary ethnologists.

PRIMITIVE MORALITY

The Evolutionist's "Lawless Primitive." Spencer, Sumner, and the evolutionary ethnologists generally emphasized an alleged complete lack of uniformity in the moral codes of primitives. Primitive conduct, moreover, was generally described as debauched. This, of course, fitted the prevailing "Darwinian" philosophy of the day in which man's future progress and moral perfection were considered inevitable. It jibed too with the prevailing impression that there had been a break in the moral consciousness of the human race with conscience and a sense of justice on one side of this line and lawless license on the other.

Modern ethnologists have pointed out certain striking uniformities in the moral codes of primitives. Unlike last-century students, the modern ethnologist does not judge the conduct of primitive tribes by that of those members who are usually seen hanging around wharves, railroad stations, and trading posts. Modern ethnologists warn people who crave for a society of "lawless savages" in which they can "do as they please" to shun primitive society lest they encounter more restrictions than they experience in civilized society.

Modern cultural anthropologists have also dealt a severe blow to theorists who cited last-century ethnological evidence in an attempt to prove that there are no absolute standards of morality. It has recently been found that in the moral codes of primitives the world over there is a certain fundamental order and uniformity. The late John M. Cooper said that this "universal moral code agrees rather closely with our own Decalogue understood in a strictly literal sense." ⁶ A. M. Tozzer expressed a similar viewpoint: "We find that certain acts have always been repugnant in all stages of society, such as murder, theft, and want of hospitality." ⁷ Franz Boas likewise observed that the "code of ethics for the closed social group to which a person belongs is everywhere the same: murder, theft, lying, rape are condemned." ⁸ Incest is included in the lists of many other ethnologists.

Sumner and the Sociology of Custom. The philosophy which claims there are no absolute moral standards antedates sociology.

The injection of this idea into American sociology, however, is largely the result of the influence of William G. Sumner, professor of sociology at Yale from 1873 to 1910. Sumner was both a philosopher and a sociologist. His sociological analysis of the genesis of custom in society is still timely. We shall consider this now, turning later to his philosophy.

Sumner described how customs gradually grow up through trial and error until they finally reach a point where the controlling group insists upon their observance. In the first stage of this process, there are many wholly indifferent acts about which society has no concern. Gradually the social group expresses preferences with respect to some of these formerly indifferent actions. They then become customs backed by a mild degree of compulsion. Sumner described such customs as *folkways*.

Sumner went on to show how some folkways gradually attain special prestige. They are believed to involve standards of conduct which are essential to group welfare. These ways, which cannot easily be ignored, he called *mores*, the plural of the Latin word (*mos*) for custom. People may defy the folkways without suffering disprivilege. Not so with regard to the mores. In our society one may ignore folkways governing the style of dress, number of meals a day, and the form of greeting rather easily. But usually he cannot become a nudist without feeling the strong impact of adverse public opinion.

Some of the mores are incorporated into legislation to make sure that people will not violate them. In time society may even forge the origin of its mores and laws, yet continue to enforce them. It may also abandon them. As a sociologist Sumner made a significant contribution to knowledge by his detailed exposition of these three stages in the development of cultural imperatives.

Sumner and the Philosophy of Custom. Sumner was not satisfied to describe the evolution of merely amoral customs. He went on to speculate about fundamental Judaeo-Christian morality. The mores, he claimed, now include *all* of society's conduct imperatives. All, moreover, developed through the same three stages. The so-called "basic moral principles" of other philosophers, he said, are nothing more than the results of an early pragmatic morality. Here he too spoke as a philosopher.

Sumner said that trial-and-error experience in the past proved that certain practices were currently socially beneficial. As a result they came to be regarded as moral imperatives. Thus they became a part of the Judaeo-Christian heritage, not because man has a basic concept of good and evil as most other philosophers had maintained, but simply because experience had proved that certain types of conduct paid.

It followed logically from Sumner's thesis that a change in social custom can make anything right. Since, according to Sumner, the idea of what is right is always in flux, "might makes right." Hence society alone makes sin. Thus Sumner contradicted the traditional philosophy which regards the basic principles of right and wrong as eternal and immutable. Traditional philosophy holds that man's God-given conscience indicates basic ideas of right and wrong. From its dictates man acquires a sense of what we call "fair play" or "decency." Cicero alluded to this when he spoke of the law that nature has engraved in our hearts. Christian philosophers said that this "natural law" was made clearer to man by God's revelation in the Ten Commandments, the Sermon on the Mount, and elsewhere in Scripture.

Although many of Sumner's associates at Yale objected strenuously to the personal philosophy which he injected into sociology, even going to the extent of calling him an atheist, this philosophy has since permeated much of American sociology. As a result "new" or "modern" morality is frequently approved by sociologists with the off-hand assurance that, after all, "scientific evidence" has proved that both basic morality and conscience are not inherent in mankind but only culturally created. Philosophers sometimes refer to this system as "sociological ethics."

Sumner's idea of "custom-made morality" has influenced our secular thinking generally. It has even invaded some religious groups. Quantity has been made a moral value and sanction of conduct in large sectors of American life. Ashley Montagu criticizes the operation of this "implied assumption" as it is found in the Kinsey Report, blatantly advertised as "the most remarkable book on sex of all time." He points out the "stupendous fallacy" of the book which assumes that abnormal behavior which has been found to be more frequent than formerly supposed must therefore be "normal." This

line of reasoning, he says, could make crime both acceptable and normal, "since, in America, *quantity* is a moral value which makes acceptable and normalizes . . ." ⁹ Reinhold Niebuhr observed that the Kinsey assumption that new norms of morality can be created by a statistical study of today's sex practices is an example of the modern sociological approach to the norms of morality "reduced to its final absurdity."

"*Sociological Morality and Modern Ethnology*. In spite of the above observations, we are not here concerned about ethical systems. For all we know the advocates of "custom-made" morality may have other and better arguments for their theory of ethics. We are concerned here, however, with the attempt which has been made to establish this theory of ethics on the basis of the evidence of last-century ethnology. Similarly, while we believe that modern ethnology has greatly strengthened the arguments for the existence of a natural law, we do not believe that any Judaeo-Christian philosopher would limit his case to this evidence alone.

The Sumner case for pragmatic morality was built upon the assumption that there was neither system or order nor rhyme or reason among the moral concepts of primitives. This conviction of evolutionary ethnology prompted Frazer to state in the preface to *The Golden Bough* that "The old view that principles of right and wrong are immutable and eternal is no longer tenable." We have already seen that modern ethnology has abandoned the idea of a lawless primitive given over to sheer impulse. Evidence already mentioned shows that there are basic precepts of right and wrong running through almost all primitive codes of conduct.

Many cultural anthropologists now recognize that some of the examples formerly cited of the "complete absence" of basic moral principles among certain primitives were based upon hasty or unfair generalizations. Take, for instance, the oft-cited custom of certain Eskimo groups which dictates that a son shall expose his elderly father to death when the latter is too old to hunt and the food supply is nearly exhausted. Let us grant that this is murder and ethically unexcused even by extenuating circumstances. Yet in saying that a moral principle is flaunted it is unfair to the Eskimo for us to ignore the emotional pressures—the probable starvation of the rest of his family—which prompts the son to commit patricide. The very

fact that the Eskimo will try to "justify" this custom when it is mentioned by outsiders suggests that he feels it to be a necessary exception to a basic moral law.

Morality and Religion. The last-century ethnologists maintained that morality and religion were originally disassociated and that they came together only at a very late stage in the evolution of religion. Strangely enough, an occasional modern ethnologist who criticizes evolutionary ethnology will still cling to this old idea. Melville Jacobs and Bernhard Stern, for instance, say that ethics among primitives is made up of "secular" customs which have "little or nothing to do with religion or supernatural admonitions."¹⁰ Sociologists who accept Sumner's philosophy assert that a change of custom can again disassociate anything from religion.

It is easy to see how last-century ethnologists arrived at their conclusion about the original disassociation of religion and ethics. There are many primitive tribes in which a connection between the two is now scarcely discernible. In fact religion, in some instances, is degraded into the very service of immorality. But modern ethnology has shown that tribes of this kind are always at the higher food-producing stage. If the classical ethnologists had only thought to distinguish between the levels of cultural development in primitive society in this matter they might have arrived at an opposite conclusion.

While it is probably too much to say that modern cultural anthropology has proved that there was an original association between religion and morality, there is nevertheless considerable factual evidence which suggests that this was probably true. Cooper points out that "Among some of the most primitive nomad marginals duties of man to man are conceived as the will of a Supreme Being or of superior beings." He at any rate believed that "the evidence points convincingly toward aboriginal origin of the conception," rather than to white influence.¹¹

The widespread collapse of moral standards so characteristic of tribes just arriving at the food-producing stage has been the source of considerable anthropological speculation. Some writers describe this as a kind of "second fall" of man. No one knows just why it takes place. One suggestion reminds us that when individuals and societies first begin to feel a new sense of power they tend to feel less de-

pendent upon God. It may be that primitives arriving at the food-producing stage had this experience and it led them to ignore the conduct imperatives required by their former religion. Whatever the actual reason may be, among primitive tribes the deepest moral degradation appears to coincide with the greatest obscuration of the idea of a Supreme Being.

When the sociologist attempts to make basic morality indiscernible from custom and as devoid of meaning as silly hats, he flies in the face of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. George Washington referred to this American tradition in his *Farewell Address* when he said that morality cannot exist apart from religion. Sumner and the last-century ethnologists claimed that ethnological "evidence" undermined this tradition. It would now appear that the "undermining," if any, was done only by the a priori philosophy of armchair observers and not by factual data.

IV. THE FAMILY

The "Brute Beginnings" of Marriage. The year 1861 marked the start of an intense curiosity about the early history of the family. In that year Sir Henry Maine, an English student of the history of law, published his *Ancient Law*, in which an attempt was made to prove that human family life started with the patriarchal family. Maine's interest was confined to the peoples of classical antiquity, particularly the Romans. He ignored primitive peoples. In the same year J. J. Bachofen, a Swiss legal historian, published a book which asserted that the matriarchal family came first.

We now regard Bachofen as the first of a line of cultural evolutionists whose opinions on the history of marriage dominated the social sciences for the remainder of the century. They described an initial stage of promiscuity in primitive society. This made matriarchy a necessary second stage, since the male parent was usually unknown. The relations between the sexes in early society, wrote Spencer, were "scarcely above those of brutes." Monogamy came only after a long upward evolutionary development.

It would be a waste of time to consider the controversies waged over the various stages which allegedly intervened between matriarchy and monogamy. We need only to point out that, except for

R. Briffault's anachronistic return to these theories in *The Mothers* (1927), practically every important writer on the history of the family in the last quarter of a century has abandoned them. Once again the evidence of modern cultural anthropology has made former evolutionary theories untenable.

Modern evidence shows that even at the food-producing stage "prevalent monogamy" in which the majority have only one mate is the rule. Going back to the food-gathering stage, strict monogamy is more, rather than less, prevalent than at the higher stage. The Bushmen, Adamanese, Veddahs, and several other tribes at the savage stage are strictly monogamous. Lowie summed up the present viewpoint on promiscuity in his *Primitive Society* (1920) when he asserted that it "exists nowhere at the present time."

Family life among food-gathering groups is anything but "brutish." Modern studies show that there is often a free choice of partners with marriage based upon love. Conjugal infidelity and divorce are rare. Men and women have equal rights. Love of children and love of parents is universal.¹² The progressive evolutionist's description of early marriage corresponded with last-century pictures of the manners and morals of Neanderthal man. Both pictures were largely imaginary. Since the living primitive is so like ourselves in so many of his cultural ways perhaps, after all, he was not the brute-by-nature that last-century ethnology pictured him. We shall take up this matter in the next chapter.

In this chapter we have focussed attention upon the culture of primitive man. Since man and culture are so interrelated, we have of necessity thrown some light upon the very nature of primitive man. In the next chapter we shall shift the emphasis and consider more directly the quality of human nature as it is found in primitive man. We shall examine the operation of so-called instinctive and other basic tendencies to see the extent to which they function irrespective of surrounding cultures. This, needless to say, should help to prepare us for further exploration concerning "the nature of human nature."

NOTES

1. *Our Primitive Contemporaries*, 1934, pp. 177 and 488.
2. *The Study of Man*, 1936, pp. 116-17.
3. February 14, 1949, p. 30.

4. John M. Cooper, "The Origin and Early History of Religion," *Primitive Man*, Volume II (1929), p. 41.
5. *Primitive Religion*, 1924, p. 147.
6. "The Relation Between Religion and Morality in Primitive Culture," *Primitive Man*, Volume IV (1931), p. 36.
7. *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, 1926, p. 237.
8. *The Mind of Primitive Man*, 1938, p. 205.
9. "What Is Normal?" *About the Kinsey Report* (edited by D. P. Geddes and Enid Curie), 1948, p. 63. For a criticism of this misleading report (*Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* by Alfred C. Kinsey and others, 1948) see Paul Wallin, "An Appraisal of Some Methodological Aspects of the Kinsey Report," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1949, pp. 197-210.
10. *Outline of Anthropology*, 1947, p. 187.
11. See Note 6 above, p. 47.
12. S. A. Sieber and Franz Mueller, *The Social Life of Primitive Man*, 1941, Chapter 2.

8

The Nature of Primitive Man and Human Nature

I. HUMAN NATURE IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES

The Primitive Man of the Cultural Evolutionists. According to the viewpoint which prevailed at the end of the last century and during the first decade or so of the present one, the primitive is only slightly removed from the higher animals. The less advanced primitives, it was said, constituted a "horde" of identical creatures. Human nature was only in an incipient stage. This, the viewpoint of the cultural evolutionists, became the basis for theories concerning the development of human nature and social institutions in the social sciences generally. This viewpoint, for instance, prompted A. M. Carr-Saunders, a writer on population problems, to suggest that primitive man had a mating season and that sexual activity was confined to such periods.

From our brief survey of the development of cultural anthropology we have already learned that most of the generalizations of the cultural evolutionists are no longer tenable. But retraction rarely catches up with the lie. Accordingly we believe that what Franz Boas observed in 1938 is still true. In spite of the recent progress made in cultural anthropology, "it is necessary to discuss some of the views regarding the psychology of primitive people that are widely held and according to which there are striking differences between the mental processes of culturally primitive tribes and civilized man."¹ We shall consider here, therefore, the following aspects of the psychology of primitive people: instincts, senses, concentration, reasoning power, emotions, and personality types. This should clear the ground of many popular misconceptions about the nature of per-

sonality before we take up the study of man's social nature in Section Three.

INSTINCTS

The "Unbridled Savage." Until rather recently it was customary to describe primitive man as an unbridled person with animal-like inability to control his instincts. Reported orgies of lust and gluttony seemed to bear out this indictment. Yet modern cultural anthropologists point out many remarkable instances of the ability of primitive man to control his innate drives. It has been found, for instance, that in some tribes male continence is prescribed at many times, such as during pregnancy and before battles and religious festivals. The prohibition of adultery and incest in most simple societies suggests a similar restraint. The so-called Kinsey Report maintains that man's sexual drive is culturally conditioned in our society. It may be said likewise that primitives, like moderns, are seldom impelled by a crude sex drive.

Food taboos which require an extreme degree of self-control are common in primitive societies. Because of a religious taboo some Eskimos will not kill available seals even though they may be on the point of starvation. Youths in many tribes are required to undergo long fasts as a part of their initiation ceremony. Among the Papagos of our Southwest a warrior who has killed a man while on a raid is required to fast for sixteen days. Many more instances might be cited to show that primitive man is no mere creature of his "instinctive tendencies." The prevailing opinion in cultural anthropology has it that these native tendencies are everywhere the same. Once we remove the cultural garment the primitive is the same as his civilized brother as far as native drives or so-called instincts are concerned.

SENSES

"Animal-like Sensory Development." Travelers' tales are filled with descriptions of incidents which show that primitives far exceed civilized man when it comes to the use of the senses of sight, hearing, and smell. Formerly it was assumed that this unusual ability was innate. More objective analysis indicates that this superiority is merely a matter of training. When the sight of civilized man is not

injured by fine print and when his hearing and smell are not conditioned solely by the noises and gases of urban life he can train these senses to do anything the primitive does.

Pain and the Web of Culture. Stories about primitives also describe their apparent indifference to torture and other tests which would be extremely painful experiences to modern man. But here again nature is caught in the "web of culture." Christian martyrs and even military heroes of our own day have shown similar self-control under torture. In an effort to prevent the creation of such heroes and to defeat justice the Soviets seem to have devised some hideous "treatment" which so breaks down the victim's nervous system that for a limited period at least he is no longer capable of free action.

The primitive usually endures great pain without wincing in order to gain prestige. American women of the last century pierced their ears and laced themselves into uncomfortable corsets for a similar reason. The same motive prompted upper-class Chinese girls to deform their feet. Although pain-avoidance is generally said to be the most motivating of all man's drives, in every age and society culture patterns have dictated to a considerable extent the strength of the pain-avoiding reflex.

In some primitive tribes women lose prestige if they give any audible sign of pain at the time of childbirth. It is said that in our society the pains to be expected at this time have been grossly exaggerated, arousing unnecessary anticipatory fear. This causes a subconscious muscular reaction which actually inhibits the normal delivery process even when the best of anesthetics is used. As a result of the campaign for "natural" childbirth initiated by Dr. Grantly Dick Read, a British obstetrician, many American women are now being educated to belittle the pains of childbirth. It would appear from this that the cultural web is so strong that it may operate upon the senses even when one is under the partial influence of an anesthetic.

CONCENTRATION

Spencer versus Boas. Herbert Spencer, who is responsible for many of the misconceptions about primitives still prevalent in English-speaking countries, quoted with approval a traveler's description of the mentality of Indians of the west coast of Vancouver Island. These natives, it was said, showed clearly a "characteristic"

inability of primitive man to concentrate on a single line of thought. His mind seemed to be "asleep," it was said, when compared with that of the civilized. Even a short conversation which required efforts of thought and memory was said to weary him.

Later Franz Boas visited these natives. He found, by contrast, that they were most alert in matters that interested them; they even wearied him with their continued line of questions. Like anyone else, they appeared bored by questions which they regarded as trifling, especially when advanced by a stranger whom they had difficulty in understanding. Many factors must be considered in evaluating the operation of the primitive mind. A culturally sanctioned etiquette in some tribes disapproves of rapid oral responses. Alien physique, speech, and dress, moreover, may distract the primitive being interviewed. Modern ethnologists are generally agreed that primitives are in no way inferior to ourselves in their ability to concentrate.

Students of comparative linguistics tell us that the grammar of any language contains in crystalized form a people's accumulated experience. Thoughts, moreover, tend to run along the "grooves" of grammar. It is for this reason that linguistic groups tend to differ in what they notice, talk about, and regard as important. Language is one aspect of a culture. Our Indo-European tongues have been moulded to a considerable extent by the abstract thought of philosophers. The languages of many primitives lack words through which an abstract idea can be expressed, a fact which is particularly annoying to Christian missionaries. If we did not recognize this, as well as the fact that primitive languages sometimes do not express time-relationships and numbers beyond three or four, it would be easy to conclude as evolutionary ethnologists did, that "primitives can't concentrate."

REASONING

The "Prelogical" Primitive. Spencer claimed that the primitive mind is not only incapable of concentrating and selecting the facts from which correct conclusions may be drawn but that it is also lacking in ingenuity and constructive imagination. In his *Primitive Mentality* (1923) L. Levy-Bruhl, a French philosopher who also influenced early American sociology, said that primitives are still at a "prelogical" stage of mental development. From these twin influ-

ences, to say nothing of that of evolutionary ethnologists generally, the idea has spread that there is a special "primitive mind" which is different from our own.

Since we lack "culture-free" intelligence tests which might settle the question our best index of primitive mentality would seem to be a study of the achievements of primitives. Reports of modern cultural anthropologists who have lived with primitive peoples indicate that in achievements they compare favorably with the uneducated and illiterate peoples of Western culture. We need not add here that there is no necessary relationship between illiteracy and intelligence. Melville Jacobs and Bernhard J. Stern have summarized this evidence under the headings of technological knowledge, knowledge of materials, knowledge of crafts, mathematical knowledge, astronomical knowledge, philosophical and psychological knowledge, medical knowledge, and knowledge of history. They show that primitives have achieved a great deal in each of these fields.²

A little reflection should remind us that primitives have made great achievements. When white men first attempted to live in the Arctic they found it was difficult to improve upon the Eskimo ways of adjusting to this environment. Likewise, wherever civilized man has invaded a new area he has found it important to learn the knowledge of wood, foods, and other materials possessed by natives. Primitive craftsmanship still challenges modern man when it comes to making baskets and pottery. Modern medical knowledge also owes a considerable debt to the primitive. He taught us the use of quinine and cocaine as well as many poisons. Without our assistance the primitive learned to use splints for broken bones as well as sweat baths, emetics, cauterization, and massage. Most primitives have a philosophical curiosity and reflectiveness as well as a sharp insight into human nature. We have every reason to believe, therefore, that with leisure and writing they could have developed a formal philosophy.

Some modern anthropologists have suggested that the Australian aborigines may be innately inferior to other primitives in mental ability. The material culture of these natives is inferior in some ways to that of Neanderthal man. Yet the fact remains that these primitives have a marriage system which they understand but which is extremely complex even to anthropologists who have studied it. It may well be that on account of an environment which is unfavorable to

progress along material lines these primitives have specialized in one direction. We have already considered the handicap of isolation which prevented diffusion from operating effectively among African primitives. Very likely the Australians were more isolated than most primitives.

According to Levy-Bruhl's hypothesis, the "prelogical" primitive was a herd-animal who could not venture beyond the procedures already sanctioned by his group. Because of this limitation caused, it was said, by his "social mind," the individual primitive was powerless to think by himself. The "social mind" was supposed to be the result of the fusion of individual minds in the primitive crowd. Scarcely any modern sociologist accepts the "social mind" concept today. The achievements of individual primitives, as reported by modern cultural anthropology, indicate that the primitive, like civilized man, is capable of individual thought and decision. Otherwise there would have been no primitive inventions.

"Mystical Participation" and the Primitive Mind. Levy-Bruhl also claimed that the primitive is unable to see things in the natural world objectively as we do. Instead everything in it is "saturated" with inseparable magical and religious associations. Because of this "mystical participation" the primitive often regards animals as more powerful than man. Likewise trees, mountains, and even stones may be endowed with special virtues and the heavenly orbs may be regarded as animate beings governing man's affairs. Thus, he said, because of the "prelogical" primitive mind no distinction is made between logically unrelated subjects.

Boas has a different explanation for this so-called "mystical participation" of the primitive mind.⁸ He says that it is the primitive's fund of inherited knowledge and not his logic that is defective. The traditional ideas handed down to the primitive—the social heredity which colors each new perception—rather than inherent mental qualities mislead the primitive. Educationalists would probably say that the "apperceptive mass" of the primitive is defective. The place of background information in the operation of logical processes is constantly manifested in the way people arrive at conclusions in our own society. Social scientists frequently find good philosophers who argue quite logically against social security, "dangerous socialistic trends" in modern life, and so on but from an inadequate premise of

sociological information. Christians would say that primitives who lack the solid facts of modern science and Biblical revelation cannot help being confused about the supramundane world.

If the failure of many primitives to disassociate objective reality from magical and religious influences is to be taken as evidence of a prelogical stage of mental development, as Levy-Bruhl alleged, then what is to be said of the existence of superstition among modern Christians? Take astrology, for instance. Those who follow this cult believe that the character and conduct of an individual are determined by the position of the stars at the time of his birth. Reputable scientists say this is plain nonsense. Long ago Christianity branded it as a superstition. Yet this superstition, which goes back to pre-Christian times, is estimated to have three million followers in the United States alone.

Superstitions among farmers are commonplace. The United States Department of Agriculture is constantly trying to eradicate them. The ancient art of "divining" or "dowsing" is so prevalent in some rural areas that the United States Geological Survey recently issued a booklet in an attempt to protect our rural landowners from small-time swindlers and "water witches" who professed to find underground water by means of various kinds of "divining rods."

Everyone is familiar with the picturesque superstitions of European peasants. Traditional folk beliefs in spirits, fairies, ghosts, dreams, and omens continue to hold sway in spite of the attempts of Christian educators to eradicate them. In their *Think and Live* (1937) Bakewell Morrison and Stephen J. Rueve point out how a superstitious attitude which has long prevailed among Russian Orthodox peasants contributed to the present hold which communism appears to have upon this group. For centuries these peasants have believed that after death God preserves uncorrupted the bodies of those who lived holy lives. They regarded all such preservation as miraculous. When, therefore, the Russian peasant sees Lenin's body so perfectly embalmed today it is easy to convince him that the Soviet is greater than God.⁴

One might expect that at least sophisticated American collegians would be free of superstition. Yet several investigations have shown that this is far from true. While teaching anthropology at Barnard not long ago, Goldenweiser found that about half of his students

admitted carrying rings, locket, necklaces and the like to which they ascribed magic-working properties. Tozzer found similar practices at a men's college. Although it may be granted that most of these collegiate superstitions are harmless, they are nonetheless inconsistent with both science and the Bible, sources of information denied to primitives. In their search for security many modern Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, like the Jews of the Old Testament, seem to insist upon mixing a bit of superstition with their religion. Evidently God had in mind this common weakness of mankind, civilized as well as primitive, when He dictated the First Commandment.

Levy-Bruhl, witnessing the gradual delimiting of the old concept of the domain of divine providence with the growth of new scientific explanations, predicted that sociology would eventually replace religion. For those whose perceptions have become "saturated" with the materialistic philosophy of much of recent science this replacement seems to have already taken place. They have reasoned to a scientific naturalism or materialistic humanism in which supernatural explanations are eliminated not merely for some but for all phenomena. In direct contrast with the law of "mystical participation" which was supposed to govern the mind of the primitive theirs is "saturated" only with the material. Hence they refuse to consider any non-material values. Those who accept the tradition upon which our democracy is founded would say that these materialists, like many primitives, have become distorted in their thinking through unfortunate cultural influences.

EMOTIONS

The "Child-like" Primitive. Last-century observers reported that the primitive is fickle, impulsive, and given to child-like outbursts of emotion. The obvious success of primitive shamans and medicine men in effecting cures through deceit and trickery seemed to show also that he was a child of suggestion. Similarly the effectiveness of suggestion and emotional appeals in crowd manipulation bore out the impression that the primitive represented the "childhood" of the race. All of these ideas can now be dismissed briefly.

Boas pointed out that most of the above ideas are the result of attempts to evaluate the conduct of primitives according to European standards. The savage has his own code of etiquette. To the savage,

for instance, time is not important. The savage, in turn, might well evaluate the conduct of the impatient European traveler who fumes at delays by describing civilized man as fickle and child-like. We have seen that the observance of many primitive taboos requires more emotional control than most of the prescriptions of our code. Tozzer said that primitive people control their feelings better than the "ignorant" among the civilized. Some of the latter, we know, assume that bursts of temper are signs of strength of character.

The success of the primitive medicine man is matched by that of Christian Science, New Thought, and other healing cults in civilized countries. These too operate by suggestion. Nor need we dwell upon the successful use of suggestion in modern advertising and propaganda campaigns. Most of us are probably classified as children emotionally by modern manipulators of propaganda. It is a mistake to assume that man in any society is entirely a creature of logical processes.

When we pass in review the various mistaken ideas about human nature in primitive society which were accepted as true until quite recently, we realize that at least two false premises accounted for most of these beliefs. One was the assumption that people at the lowest stage of material culture were intermediate human beings, half-human and half-animal. This a priori idea colored many early observations of the conduct of primitives. The other false premise involved a gross underestimation of the influence of culture in shaping personality types and human conduct.

In the next part of the chapter we shall consider in some detail this influence of culture. It might be said here that in every society a child's perceptions are colored and interpreted by the thought and observations of past generations. If the conduct of modern civilized man seems superior this is largely because our culture contains not only the crude experience of past generations but also the benefits of perhaps three centuries of scientific experimentation. It is the addition of science to common-sense knowledge that makes our conclusions seem so much more logical. If we grant the premises of the primitive his conclusions are just as logical. Modern scientific anthropology has shown that "Primitive men reason as other men: their sentiments are the same; their moral sense and effort are the same as those of civilized man."⁵ It may well be that since the fall

of Adam human nature everywhere has been the same. Only human behavior has changed.

II. CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

In *The Ways of Men* (1948) John P. Gillin says that the content and organization of the human personality or the individual's "style of life" is derived from three general sources. The first two may be dismissed briefly here. They are the "constitutional" or raw material, which probably goes back to germ plasm, and "unpatterned life experiences." We shall consider the former in Chapter 9. The latter include what Kimball Young describes as the "personal-social" sources of personality. These consist of those personal experiences which, except in the actuarial sense, are not ordinarily expected within the framework of a particular culture. Such experiences in childhood explain much of the uniqueness and originality of the individual personality in any culture. These influences, which are the chief concern of sociologists and social psychologists, will be treated in Chapters 10 and 11.

The third source of personality, known as "patterned experiences," is of most concern to the student of cultural anthropology. Patterned experiences or the experiences of the individual which are governed by the over-all pattern of his culture are generally regarded as the most important influences in shaping the personality of the average person in any culture. The general cultural background operates as an influence from the cradle to the grave. It is this which produces similarities which we describe as "national characteristics." In his description of the operation of this influence Gillin develops three propositions.⁸ We shall consider each briefly.

1. *Well-integrated cultures produce a general personality type in most members of the group.* This is especially true when the culture is accompanied by consistent social pressures. The approved personality type of one culture may be regarded unfavorably in another society. In *Patterns of Culture* Ruth Benedict showed that the culture of most of the North American Indian tribes, excepting the Pueblos, generally produced a "Dionysian" type of personality. This type, which exhibits violent emotional experiences, inclines towards war and the use of drugs. The Pueblo culture developed an "Apolonian" personality. This is characterized by formality, orderliness,

modesty, sobriety, emotional stability, and a dislike for excess. The Dobu culture of Melanesia developed a suspicious type which trusted nobody.

It is true that as a result of his "constitutional set" and "unpatterned life experiences" each member of these tribes had an individual or "core personality" which distinguished him from everyone else. The particular social rôle of the individual may have engendered in addition a special "status personality." Yet over and above each "core" and "rôle" personality there existed in every socially adjusted tribe member the type of general, public, or "social" personality approved by the prevailing culture.

2. *Cultures which encourage a consistent and continuous type of child training develop better integrated adult personalities.* It is generally recognized now that personality integration commences in infancy. Feelings of security or insecurity generated during this period seem to be related to different methods of infant care. Capricious care develops insecurity. Some cultures create more frustrations during infancy and childhood than others. These factors may play an important part later in the integration of the adult personality. Finally the ease with which a child makes transitions to adult rôles differs in various cultures. Where transitions are gradual there is less personality disintegration.

Contrasts pointed out between our culture and that of the Samoans and Puebloans suggest sources of adult personality disintegration in modern America. The Samoan child passes almost imperceptibly from childhood rôles to those of the adult. As a result there are no emotional upsets such as we usually associate with our more abrupt period of adolescence. The Pueblo child is taught to assume responsibilities at an early age; these are gradually increased as he is physically able to assume them. In tribes with an initiation ceremony at adolescence a whole age group goes through this experience together. In this way the individual's security is increased by the presence of others in the same predicament.

In most primitive tribes an infant is kept close to its mother's body and nursed whenever it so desires. It is said that this practice develops feelings of security and a minimum of frustrations. Present practices in our sophisticated civilization whereby mothers and infants are kept in separate hospital rooms with nursing only at scheduled hours

are said to develop feelings of insecurity and frustration. It is believed that these feelings are often carried in the subconscious mind into adult life. Hence the claim that the system of child-training in a culture is reflected in personality integration.

3. *Cultural influences are reflected also in the personality maladjustments of a society.* Although many different factors are involved in mental abnormalities, the prevailing culture is an important part of the fabric. "Running amuck" is found chiefly among the Malays. "Arctic hysteria," marked by extreme suggestibility and suppressed anxiety, is found in Siberia and parts of Alaska. Yet people with the same racial backgrounds living in similar environments develop neither amuck nor Arctic hysteria. Both are products of particular cultures. Other primitive societies develop different abnormalities which in some respects are also peculiar to themselves.

In our culture schizophrenia appears to be more prevalent in urban areas. It is believed that the "withdrawal from reality" which characterizes this psychosis is an unconscious adaptation to the stresses, strains, and rush of highly competitive urban life. Manic-depressive psychosis is said to be more common in rural areas. The alternating episodes of hyperactivity and depression in this disorder may be a similar adaptation to the monotony of rural life. Even the content of the delusions which persons suffering from "standard" psychoses manifest reflects the prevailing culture.

Subcultures within our society may also be reflected in personality in special ways. Recent wars have dramatized the form which hysteria is likely to take among men under the tensions of military life. Gillin describes a member of an obscure highly emotional "shouting" religious sect who was regarded as psychotic by a psychiatrist unfamiliar with the religious code of this group. In reality the patient was suffering only from a mild neurosis which would not have been disapproved by members of his own group.⁷

Even the answer to the question, "Who is feeble-minded?" is in most instances a cultural definition. Most of the mentally deficient belong to the moron, rather than the lower idiot or imbecile class. Although it is true that those who make up the majority class of the feeble-minded have low I.Q.'s according to modern tests, it must be remembered that these tests are not culture free. Yet there are many rôles which those classified as feeble-minded by intelligence tests can fill in a satisfactory manner even in our society.

Controversy about the Oedipus complex also underlines the rôle of culture in personality maladjustments. Freud studied the ancient myth and came to the conclusion that Oedipus was in love with his mother and killed his father to get her. Freud said this is a universal male urge. Since our culture does not tolerate expression of this "natural" sex desire, a subconscious conflict results. This, said Freud, is the source of many neuroses. Yet in his study of the Trobriand Islanders Malinowski found that in a matrilineal society repressed sexual love is more apt to occur between brother and sister and a boy's hatred is more apt to be directed towards his maternal uncle.

Erich Fromm now says that Freud misinterpreted the Oedipus myth and there is no good evidence that Oedipus was in love with his mother. He murdered his father and so was made king because of a feeling of rebellion against paternal authority. He married his mother (without knowing their relationship) simply because she went with the throne. The real "Oedipus complex," says Fromm, is rebellion against patriarchal authority. It is not inevitable, as Freud said. If parents are less domineering this may be avoided.⁸ We need go no further here in attempting to show, as Gillin does so well, that "patterned experiences" are extremely important in shaping both the normal and abnormal personality.

From the Nature of the Primitive to the Nature of Human Nature. We have seen that the new cultural anthropology, having cut its baby teeth on the Marquesans, Trobriand Islanders, Zuni, Dobuans, and the natives of New Guinea, is now striking out into broader and richer fields. Ruth Benedict, for instance, in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946) subjected the Japanese personality to a similar analysis. After revealing the innermost motivations of Japanese behavior she showed that many things in their conduct which do not make sense to the American, who falsely assumes that his motivations are theirs likewise, are perfectly consistent. Our culture is moulded by overemphasis upon competition. The Japanese culture, she said, is characterized by over-preoccupation with the exact fulfillment of obligations.

European travelers, essayists, and historians have vied with each other in attempts to describe Americans. Henry S. Commager (*America in Perspective*, 1947) has given us a collection of these impressions. In *The American People* (1948) Geoffrey Gorer makes an analysis from the viewpoint of a British cultural anthropologist. He

describes our eating habits, comic strips, dating, bull sessions, women, games, and attitudes towards foreigners with the poker-faced detachment of the anthropologist recording the customs and ceremonies of a primitive tribe. The personality of most Americans, he says, is haunted by a dread of loneliness. He cites as evidence our innumerable fraternal organizations, clubs, conventions, and the "absence of doors in all but the most private parts of most houses." Our impatience with governmental authority, contempt for politicians, and rejection of Europe, he says, can be explained by Freud's parable of the rejected father.

Until recently most of our knowledge of human nature was inherited from the Graeco-European tradition. We realize now that this tradition was provincial and based chiefly on the peculiar local influences of European cultures. Someday when many more anthropological studies have been made of modern nations we may learn to understand and respect our cultural differences and so live in peace. Tozzer said that modern cultural anthropology has already made us change the adage "man is many, and civilization one" to read "man is one, civilizations are many."

The cultural anthropologist who started out by making an analysis of the nature of primitive man is now said to be the most completely extensional of contemporary students of what we call human nature. He is constantly adding new dimensions to our knowledge of the plasticity, richness, and complexity of this human nature. To this end psychology, social psychology, and psychiatry have become especially important adjuncts to his study. In Section III, Man's Social Nature, we shall consider some of the special contributions of these three branches of knowledge.

NOTES

1. *The Mind of Primitive Man*, revised edition, p. 130.
2. *Outline of Anthropology*, 1947, Chapter 15.
3. *Op. cit.*, pp. 220-22.
4. Pp. 144-45.
5. Albert Muntzsch, *Cultural Anthropology*, 1933, p. 46.
6. Chapter 27, "The Person and His Culture."
7. P. 577.
8. *The Family: Its Function and Destiny* (1949), an anthology edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen.

III. MAN'S SOCIAL NATURE

9

The Physical Basis of Personality

Sociology and Human Relations. Advertisements for "Build a Successful Personality" and "How to Make Friends" books usually claim that such books show how anyone can easily establish and maintain pleasant and profitable human relations. Unctious radio salesmen encourage the unhappy to air their intimate troubles before self-appointed "happiness doctors" who promise quick, sure remedies. Even tough-skinned big business now employs psychologists to reveal simple approaches which will enable salespeople to placate and at the same time brow-beat customers. Human relations, it might appear at first sight, has now become an easy-to-learn science.

On the other hand there is the recollection of two recent World Wars and the threat of a third. Even the sessions of the United Nations sometimes appear to produce only rancor and violent disagreement rather than possible foundations for world peace. Within our own borders management and labor are constantly at odds. Here likewise Christian sects which should be united against a common Soviet foe are still divided by traditional bigotry. Meanwhile we continue to lead the world in divorce, while the demand for psychiatric attention so far exceeds the supply of psychiatrists that quacks find this a lucrative field. If there is an easy-to-learn science of successful human relations it would appear that most of us are ignoring it.

In the pursuit of its main objective, that of giving the student an understanding of the fundamental facts and principles involved in the origin and development of society, sociology is also a study of human relations. It points out that since every individual in a complex society must adapt himself to a variety of social relationships it becomes essential that he understands thoroughly both himself and the social groups in which he must live. Thus sociology also tries

to equip the student with knowledge-for-living so that the advantages of education and effort will not be lost through inability to adapt himself. But sociologists do not believe that there is as yet any simple, easy-to-learn, science of human relations.

In this section, *Man's Social Nature*, we shall attempt to bring together some of the more technical information about human relations. In this and in the following chapter we shall draw heavily upon the fields of general and social psychology; in Chapter 11 we shall turn to abnormal psychology and psychiatry. Finally, in Section V, *Collective Behavior*, we shall consider the more strictly sociological processes involved in human relations. The information given in these various chapters should afford considerable protection to the student against those who attempt to exploit the present widespread interest in human relations.

The Origins of Personality. "Personality" is used here in the broad sense according to which everyone is said to have a personality. Although the term will be considered at greater length later on it may be said here that *personality* is the dynamic organization of ideas, attitudes, and habits which gives each person his distinctive quality. It is the sum-total of one's observed or observable characteristics.

It is believed that the basis for some personality characteristics can be traced all the way back to genes. During the period of foetal development other characteristics may originate as a result of pre-natal environment. At birth, when the learning process commences, personality characteristics which distinguish every person from his neighbor increase with the years in geometric progression. But the learning process must always draw upon certain "reservoirs of potentials" which have been aptly described as "the foundation stones of personality." These reservoirs, which like bodily structure and organic processes are a part of man's original nature, may be described as (1) reflexes, (2) drives, (3) temperament, and (4) capacities.

I. REFLEXES AND DRIVES

Man's Basic Organism-centered Activities. While man sleeps his circulatory, respiratory, and digestive systems operate automatically.

While he is awake certain types of muscular behavior take place even though his brain is "asleep" or occupied with other matters. Thus under proper stimulation his knee will jerk, his eye will blink, and he will swallow or withdraw from pain. These activities or native, involuntary, and relatively invariable forms of responses of specific muscle groups are called *reflexes*. We shall consider other rôles of reflexes in man and animal shortly.

Unlearned behavior which is something more than mere reflexive motion is easily observed in many animals. Thus nest-building, care of the young, and group organization are generally regarded as unlearned and structurally determined. We say that such conduct is instinctive. Provided the organism is in a receptive state, both animals and man show from birth a native tendency to act in particular ways in certain situations. The older writers described any organism-centered bias in man which was more than a reflex as an *instinct*. The delayed unfolding of an inborn potentiality is described as *maturation*.

Instinct and Drive. In the last few years "instinct" has become a "fighting word" in psychology. One hesitates to use this term today with reference to human conduct. Such a state of affairs is the result of a quarter of a century of controversy during which the rôle of instincts in human conduct has gradually been played down. The behaviorists are partly responsible for the present unpopularity of the term. They recognized no instincts at all in man, referring instead to what they called "prepotent reflexes."

Most modern sociologists have sought to avoid the extremes of the "instinct" controversy through the use of such terms as impulses, needs, and drives. The last is probably the most widely used. *Drives* are defined as organically stimulated motivations towards particular types of conduct. They are based upon biological capacities and their satisfaction results in the reduction of tension. Although it is usually asserted that "drive" is not a mere substitute for "instinct," this would seem to depend somewhat upon one's idea of an instinct. Thus John F. Cuber (*Sociology*, 1947) recognizes four drives: those for food, sex expression, activity, and constant body temperature.¹ Some would say that he is merely avoiding the older term.

Cultural anthropology has also helped to weaken the position of those who made instincts all-important in our conduct. Its study of

different cultures has shown that such things as the "fighting instinct," the "hoarding instinct," and evidently even the "maternal instinct" are not universal. These three tendencies and many others may be regarded as "natural" in a particular culture chiefly because this culture places a special value upon them. Yet such conduct is really learned rather than inherited. It is difficult to say which motivations are inherited. Since research in this field is still far from complete, not every recent sociology text gives the same list of drives. Cuber's is probably as good as any.

The controversy among the instinctive psychologists, the behaviorists, and the cultural anthropologists has made all of the older lists of basic emotions likewise suspect. *Emotions* are states of excitement which produce changes in bodily behavior following the perception of a stimulating situation. *Feelings* are the experiences of satisfaction or dissatisfaction that accompany conscious activity. In the past, feelings, emotions, and instincts were regarded as closely associated. It is realized now that many "emotional" reactions in adults are produced not automatically as formerly supposed, but rather through the intelligent recognition of specific stimulating situations. Even in the infant we are not quite sure which emotions are inborn. Adults tend to interpret the rudimentary emotions of infants. It may be that specific emotions come later. Perhaps one might still venture the statement that there are certain primitive emotions common to man and brute which seem to have an organic origin. But at any rate man alone seems to possess certain higher emotions and sentiments.

Whatever their source may be, emotions have important social significance. They need to be properly guided both for individual and social welfare. Improperly directed fear and anger, for instance, may lead to both personal and social disorganization. Hatred and cynicism may even engender stomach ulcers and other physical ailments as well as dangerous antisocial attitudes. Sympathy, love, and enthusiasm, on the other hand, may contribute to both physical and social well-being. The emotions as energizing forces may be harnessed for the breaking of bad habits and for the attainment of great social achievement. The intelligent direction of emotions and drives therefore is important to both man and society.

Conditioning. The conditioning of simple reflexes has been de-

scribed as one of the most elementary types of learning. It is common to man and many animals. The "*conditioned reflex*" may be defined as a physiological response to a non-specific stimulus as a result of training or experience. It is a response to a biologically inadequate stimulus. In its simplest form it is illustrated by Pavlov's famous dog experiment. When meat, the original or unconditioned stimulus (S_1), was presented it evoked (R) salivation in the dog. Later, after S_1 (meat) and the sound of a bell (S_2) were presented together over and over again, it was found that S_2 alone (the non-specific stimulus) became sufficient to cause salivation.

The attempt of Pavlov and his followers among the behaviorists to reduce all human conduct to pure physiology which differs only in degree from that of animals has been widely challenged. Even Pavlov's interpretation of the S_2 R activity in the dog experiment is now disputed. Some profess to see little more in this experiment than that which Aristotle described as the "association of ideas." We need not go into the details of this controversy over the essential nature of conditioning here.

Even those who follow a conservative tendency in psychology usually admit that something approaching "conditioning" in a purely physiological sense may operate in shaping the conduct of infants and very young children. An infant may associate feeling-states of pleasantness or unpleasantness with certain sounds or situations so as to react favorably or unfavorably to them. Subsequently these same responses may be elicited by a substitute (S_2) stimulus. Sucking reactions, elicited at first by the sight of a bottle of milk, may be produced later by the rattle of dishes. Faulty conditioning it is said may produce an emotionally "spoiled child" even by the end of the first year. But conservatives object to the application of this concept in explaining most adult conduct. Since drives involve much more than mere reflexes, most psychologists now prefer to speak of a "conditioned response" rather than a "conditioned reflex" anyway when referring to complex human reactions.

Conditioning and Accountability. The controversy over the nature and extent of conditioned responses raised an issue which had become somewhat dormant since it was first injected into American sociology by Herbert Spencer. Spencer denied free will. In recent decades the "naturalistic approach," in which man is studied as a

mere animal, has attempted to revive this viewpoint. Belief in free will on the other hand assumes the existence of a spiritual principle in man whose operation cannot be explained by the mere pull and tug of animal-level material forces.

The Judaeo-Christian tradition as well as our legal system invests man with accountability. Within limits they regard him as an agent who is not only conscious of his intentions but capable of self-direction. Hence a person is expected to assume the reasonable consequences of his choices and actions. After pointing out that accountability has its roots "in the religious teachings of the individual's responsibility for his own salvation" E. T. Hiller observes that it receives its political application "in the declaration of the inalienable right of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Without respect, accountability, and inviolability—all intrinsic valuations of the person—"there can be no democracy." Naturalism, he adds, denies the intrinsic valuation of the person and so logically really rejects democracy.² Thus it would appear that the naturalistic approach to sociology has political implications which cannot be regarded as unimportant in this present world crisis.

Although there are some sociologists who seem to regard man as no more accountable than an animal, much of the recent controversy about accountability or free will has resulted from the failure of many social scientists to understand the nature of the religious teaching in this matter. Analysis will show that the opposition of most psychologists and sociologists is not so much to free will as to its caricatures. The Judaeo-Christian tradition never denied that culture and a person's social environment have an effect upon conduct. The ancient admonitions to avoid "bad company" and the civil laws passed in Christian countries to regulate immoral influences indicate definite recognition of environmental and other "conditioning" factors. Even medieval theology recognized the weight of extraneous influences when it specified that for a serious sin there must be not only "grave matter" but also "full advertence" and "full consent." The philosophers and theologians of those days, like the psychologists and sociologists of today, differed rather widely in their personal estimates of the precise weight of extraneous influences upon an individual's accountability in particular situations. Some claimed that in the eyes of God, Who alone is able to estimate correctly the

strength of "environment" in a particular act, very few grave sins are committed.

It is to be expected that there will be wide differences of opinion among social scientists today in estimating the extent of conditioned responses in adult behavior. The materialistic or naturalistic position which recognizes no personal responsibility is, of course, one extreme. Yet it would seem reasonable to admit with Vincent V. Herr the possibility that some adult habits may be acquired "in the unintentional, mechanical fashion which we call being conditioned."³ It would seem reasonable to admit also with the psychiatrists that our emotional states are the result of unconscious "conditioning" rather than rational direction more often than we realize. So too with regard to many of our irrational attitudes and prejudices. But confusion marks most discussions of these things because "conditioning" is used today in a broad as well as a narrow sense. In using this term some give much more emphasis to the rôle of accountability than others.

In this brief consideration of reflexes and drives, we have been dealing only with the dynamic side of human nature. Yet this is extremely important. Psychologists say that the ideal pattern of adult conduct is neither apathetic nor over-emotional. Maturity is characterized by conduct based primarily on a logical basis. Yet as students of society we must accept the fact that this type of adult conduct is far less common than we like to admit. Although by definition man is a rational animal in practice he is a highly emotional drive-influenced creature also.

II. TEMPERAMENT

Are There "Born Optimists"? We can probably card-index the temperaments of most of our close associates. Each has his norm of dynamic behavior. We usually recognize any variation from that habitual personal norm and describe it as unusual. Some are habitual optimists; some pessimists. There are cynics and a dozen or more other types. Long-time association with people indicates that their temperaments usually remain about the same. Parents claim that even as infants children begin to manifest temperaments of one kind or another. Willie, perhaps like his Uncle Bill, is described as a "born

optimist." Our problem here is to determine to what extent temperaments have a physical foundation.

Daily experience tells us that physical well-being affects our conduct. Lawyers sometimes inquire about the digestion of a judge before bringing a case into court. Chronic illness is apt to produce an unpleasant disposition. Even a cranky baby may be suffering from an unidentified allergy. Ill health, however, is usually a temporary affair. At any rate we are more concerned here with physical factors such as glands, body build, and sex which, it is claimed, may have a permanent influence upon temperament.

Temperament, Character, and Personality. Words take on new meanings according to time and place. People have always talked about temperament, character, and personality. Sometimes the words are used synonymously; at other times they have distinct meanings. Herr uses the traditional terminology in describing the conduct of a person suddenly called upon to remove an unexploded bomb from a doorstep. His "nervousness" or calmness would be a reflection of *temperament*. His decision to attempt this dangerous task would indicate *character*. Finally the action itself would involve his total *personality*.⁴ Character, according to this usage, is a disposition to act according to regulative principles. As a rule, however, character is used in modern social psychology as a synonym for personality. Temperament, on the other hand, more often retains its traditional meaning although it too is frequently confused with personality. Whereas *moods* are temporary feelings, temperament is usually regarded as a "persistent disposition" or emotional tone in the make-up of an individual. What then is to be said about the physical basis of temperament?

Are We What Our Glands Make Us? The endocrine or ductless glands discharge secretions, called hormones, into the blood stream. These glands of internal secretion have been described as the "tides of life." The gonads or sex glands, for example, become very active at adolescence and recede in late middle age. These, as well as unnatural changes in gonad functioning, usually register in one's temperament. Even mild thyroid and parathyroid malfunctioning may produce noticeable emotional instability.

In some instances malfunctioning of the endocrines may also produce obvious bodily or somatic changes. The condition of the eunuch

is well-known. The pituitary gland is the most common offender in modern life. Its gyrations may produce acromegaly, giants, dwarfs, and possibly steatopygia. Persons whose bodies have been so affected may become unduly self-conscious and so indirectly acquire temperaments which they might not have otherwise. Even more important is the fact that in two rare thyroid disorders, cretinism and myxedema, temperament is affected directly by accompanying mental retardation.

The rôle of heredity and pre-natal influences in determining later glandular tone is as yet only imperfectly understood. Post-natal factors certainly have an influence. It is usually said that inadequate iodine in soil or water affects thyroid functioning. Less tangible post-natal cultural factors are also regarded as influences. Even faulty mental hygiene may result in glandular malfunctioning.

Students of the behavior sciences generally say now that endocrinologists have greatly exaggerated the importance of glandular gyrations. Outside of the rare disorders just mentioned these glands do not "determine" temperament even though they may create tendencies. Certainly they do not "mould" us in the finer aspects of human conduct which we used to speak of as "character." While it is true that the endocrines influence our "emotional potential," in the great majority of human beings the endocrine balance is proper and relatively constant. Glandular determinism as an explanation for "native temperament" therefore now appears to be just another inaccurate attempt at simplification. We must search further for an adequate explanation of this phase of human nature. Before attempting to do so consideration should be given to a description of some of the different types of temperament.

Types of Temperament. One of the oldest known classifications of temperament reduced them to four: the sanguine or happy, the melancholic or sad, the choleric or excitable, and the phlegmatic or dull. This classification, favored by Hippocrates and Galen, was based upon a former belief that certain mysterious "body humors" affected temperament. In the last century Gall and Lombroso emphasized other physiological bases for temperament. The former considered the shape or "bumps" of the head. Lombroso thought that certain inherited physical marks identified criminal types. With the possible exception of Earnest A. Hooton, who still leans towards Lombroso,

no one takes either phrenology or Lombrosian criminology seriously today. The ancient four-fold classification is still used, however, even though belief in body humors has long since been abandoned.

C. G. Jung divided people into introverts and extroverts. He believed that these opposite tendencies are inherited. People of the former type are concerned with ideas and their own psychological processes. Extroverts face outward and are interested in objects and other persons. Even Jung admitted, however, that pure types seldom occur. Critics of Jung claim that environmental factors are at least as important as inheritance in producing these types of temperament. His theory somewhat resembles an earlier one proposed by William James, who divided people into "tender-minded" (governed by ideas) and "tough minded" (governed by facts) types. Except for those of the "constitutionalist" school most of the more recent classifications of temperament and personality emphasize cultural rather than physical causation. At any rate it would appear that all known classifications of temperament are tentative and so should be used with caution. This, we shall see, is particularly true of the classifications of the "constitutionalists."

Body Build and Temperament. Hippocrates was the first known "constitutionalist." He observed that different physical types were often associated with certain diseases. Centuries later Shakespeare reflected a popularly accepted correlation between body-types and temperament when he referred to "lean and hungry" Cassius who "thought too much." In 1921 Ernst Kretschmer, a German psychiatrist, proposed a new classification in which there were supposed to be definite and predictable correlations between body build and temperament.

Kretschmer divided constitutions into three chief types: the *asthenic*, *athletic*, and *pyknic*, attributing special mental tendencies, both normal and abnormal, to members of each group. The *asthenic* is tall, thin, and long-armed; the *athletic* thick-chested with broad shoulders and heavy muscles; and the *pyknic* is relatively short and fat. The *asthenic* and *athletic* types, he said, have a reserved "schizoid" temperament much like that of Jung's introvert. The *pyknic* is "cycloid" in his emotional expression and more of the sociable type. Each likewise is inclined towards a special kind of psychosis.

Although Kretschmer's theory was received at first with enthusiasm in scientific circles, since it seemed to indicate a positivistic approach to understanding human conduct, like most other "short-cut" explanations of human nature it has failed to stand up under the criticism of independent investigators. It has been pointed out that for one thing Kretschmer failed to consider the age factor as it affects body types. As people grow older they tend to become heavier and more pyknic. The relative frequency of exceptions to his rules is another objection. Probably the greatest mistake was his pre-Mendelian assumption that the human structure is transmitted to offspring as a single morphologic block.

Sheldon's Somatotypes. William H. Sheldon and his co-workers at Harvard are engaged in what amounts to a refinement of Kretschmer's theory. Sheldon assumes that the human structure is made up of a variety of distinct units which may be inherited in various combinations. These units or "components" and their interrelation are analyzed and interpreted. The three basic components or types of physique are the *endomorphie* or "lateral," the *mesomorphie* or "muscular," and the *ectomorphie* or "linear." The first is characterized by relatively soft roundness throughout various regions of the body; it corresponds roughly to Kretschmer's pyknic type. The digestive viscera are massive. (These are derived chiefly from the endodermal embryonic layer, hence the term *endomorphy*.) The mesomorphic component is hard and rectangular in outline with a predominance of bone and muscle; it corresponds to the athletic type. The ectomorphic is characterized by tallness; it corresponds to the asthenic type of the older classification.*

Sheldon is now attempting to work out correlations between his different somatotypes and temperament. He believes that the extreme endomorphic has a *viscerotonic* temperament which makes him tolerant, relaxed, and easy-going. The mesomorphic has a *somatotonic* temperament which makes him energetic, tireless, and dominating. Where the viscerotonic person is extravertive in his emotions, the somatotonic is extravertive in actions. The ectomorphic, with a *cerebrotonic* temperament, is an introvert. In this new "constitutional psychology" personality is regarded as a product of the interplay of environmental pressures upon organisms carrying innately determined constitutional patterning. For the most part tempera-

ment depends upon which of the three layers of the embryo is most prominent in one's make-up.

It may be too soon to pass final judgment upon Sheldon's attempt to find precise correlations between body types and temperament. It is significant, however, that psychologists and sociologists have already expressed serious doubts about the value of his present correlations. Gillin observes that there are too many exceptions to Sheldon's correlations, such as introverted fat men and extraverted thin men. He also suggests that a culture may "take advantage" of physical differences. Thus ectomorphs may become college professors more often than mesomorphs, not because of any innate temperamental tendency but simply because this profession is more rewarding for men of this physical type. They would be less successful in skills requiring great muscular activity. It might be pointed out also that once an occupation is chosen it gradually tends to shape temperament and personality. Endocrinologists, objecting to Sheldon, have preferred to attribute his extreme body types to post-natal glandular gyrations rather than to the inheritance of a particular shape of body.

To date there have not been many tests of Sheldon's correlations by independent investigators. Yet in at least two studies which compare personality diagnosis by Sheldon's method with diagnosis arrived at by ordinary psychological tests the correlations were insignificant. After reviewing these and other studies Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray conclude: "Present evidence indicates that the more extreme and clear-cut somatotypes show a close association with temperament but that prediction based on the mixed types is of dubious value." ⁵

It seems to be agreed that Sheldon will probably succeed in establishing definite correlations between somatic types and certain physical diseases. George Draper and others (*The Human Constitution in Clinical Medicine*, 1944) have already established a high degree of probability between certain morphological variations and such things as gastric ulcer, gall bladder disorders, and even infantile paralysis. Sheldon may well perfect this approach to ailments and so enable physicians and psychiatrists to "size up" people more quickly.

Sex and Temperament. The average person is apt to say that men and women must have different temperaments simply because they

are constitutionally different. Sociologists say this conclusion is plausible but unproved. They admit that we usually see "masculine" and "feminine" characteristics in the temperaments and personalities of those about us. But when it comes to explaining the reason for these temperaments they remind us of the dictum of modern cultural anthropologists who say that "personality is the subjective aspect of culture." It may well be that cultural factors operating from infancy to senility explain the distinctive temperaments of the sexes in our society. Even if nature lays down a sexually determined "personality potential," culture could mould it in strange ways.

Cultural anthropology provides impressive evidence of the manner in which the attitudes and activities socially prescribed for the two sexes in primitive societies affect personalities and temperaments. Ralph Linton reminds us that the "ministering angel" concept of women which we emphasize in our society does not jibe with the rôle which women played as sadistic torturers among the Iroquois. While we are apt to think that nature dictates characteristic occupations and activities for men and women in our society, we must remember that in some primitive tribes women do the heavy work and men the housekeeping, primping, and baby-tending. Even today most American girls leave the farm for clerical jobs in the city whereas their Russian sisters remain and do what we regard as "men's work" on the farms. Margaret Mead described a tribe in New Guinea where the women were aggressive, practical, and domineering, whereas men were "effeminate" and artistic. Yet in neighboring tribes there were entirely different masculine and feminine patterns of temperament.⁶ Some psychiatrists, by the way, say that in our own culture homosexuality in a male is sometimes the result of "being brought up as a girl."

We may find many instances of culturally-dictated rôles shaping "sex-temperament" without going back to primitive societies. Although men are everywhere stronger than women, the respective rôles which society prescribes for each sex commence to mould temperaments as such an early age that even in childhood it is difficult to identify definite biologically-determined "sex-temperaments." Boys are expected to act in a certain way in our society and girls in another. Even in early childhood the nonconformist is usually

penalized. Adult conduct also tends to conform, even to changing patterns. The "delicate" female who fainted at the least provocation in the 1890's has no counterpart among non-neurotics today.

Even in so-called "woman's intuition" and her "greater tactfulness," as in other phases of temperament, it is difficult to mark the point where original nature and maturation leave off and where social experience becomes dominant. Our culture requires that girls, often entrusted with the care of babies at an early age, be more observant and conscious of people. Like good detectives and court-room lawyers they soon learn to "sense" things which ordinary males fail to notice. This might well account for women's alleged special "intuition." Such social conditioning, along with living in a "man's world," may account for her greater tactfulness. Psychiatrists say that the greater aggressiveness of males in our culture may even be the result of a transfer of frustrations produced by a highly competitive business world.

It may be too soon to give a final and categorical answer to such questions as, "Are there born optimists?" Yet when the sociologist reviews the evidence of modern psychology and anthropology in such matters he is inclined to rate cultural factors as normally greater influences than the physical. Certainly the tendency of "hot-headedness" and other characteristic nervous responses to "run in families" does not prove that they are hereditary. Imitation and other non-biological factors offer just as plausible an explanation. The growing tendency in the behavior sciences is to attribute more weight to social factors in the formation of temperament and personality, and so to increase the possibility of change.

III. CAPACITIES

"It's a Gift!" We all know of people who have become fairly accomplished piano players without going through the usual grind of "taking lessons." On the other hand we probably know of many more who took piano lessons as children, probably because their social class tradition so dictated, without achieving appreciable results. We usually conclude that the latter "lacked talent," whereas it just "came natural" to the former. In this instance at least the popular conclusion seems to be a scientific one. Psychologists now agree that the talent

which some people display in certain fields of endeavor, especially those involving musical, mechanical, and athletic ability, is based upon an unlearned foundation. This innate quality may be described as a capacity. *Capacities* are native aptitudes which enable people to do certain things particularly well.

Psychologists also agree with the popular belief that people differ in native mental ability, generally referred to as intelligence. There have been many attempts to describe *intelligence*. For our purposes it may be defined as the ability to profit by present and past experience in adjusting to present and future conditions with a minimum expenditure of time and energy. This generalized quality is presumed to be genetic in origin. It develops with chronological age up to perhaps fourteen or sixteen. Afterwards special applications are made of general intelligence.

Tests and Inmate Capacities. Many carefully devised tests are now available for identifying special aptitudes, personality characteristics, and intelligence. These are very helpful in guidance programs which try to avoid futile attempts to place "square pegs in round holes." But it must be admitted that progress in perfecting tests has not been accompanied by a corresponding advance in identifying basic capacities or the genetic foundations of aptitudes, personality characteristics, and intelligence. Whatever progress has been made here, however, indicates that fewer things are determined by genetic factors than was formerly supposed.

A few aptitudes—musical, mechanical, and athletic ability—still seem to have an unlearned foundation. But the list stops here. Many more special abilities formerly attributed to heredity are now regarded as the result of socialization. Although some psychologists still regard mathematical ability as "natural," others now say that interest and effective teaching determine this quality. Even such a subtle factor as a youth's dislike for a particular mathematics teacher may lead him to believe thereafter that he is "naturally poor" at mathematics. The long controversy over what intelligence tests actually measure illustrates the rôles of environment, experience, and education even in this basic quality.

Intelligence Tests. Mental, psychological, or intelligence tests are of two general types: group and individual. Group tests are given to several people at one time. The famous tests given to American sol-

diers in World War I were of this type. Individual tests, the kind usually given to children, are much more accurate. Unless otherwise specified it is these that are meant when mental or intelligence tests are mentioned in this book.

A child's "mental age" is determined by a series of questions and tasks which have been devised after previous testing of large numbers of children of various chronological ages. Once this has been obtained it is compared with his chronological age. The numerical ratio between the chronological age of a person and his mental age, multiplied by 100 in order to give a whole number, is his intelligence quotient or I.Q. A person whose I.Q. is anywhere between 90 and 110 is classified as normal or average. This simply means that on the basis of the achievements of those persons who have previously taken the tests he is neither below nor above the average in ability. Those who rate higher than normal are regarded as either superior, very superior, or genius; those who fall below are described as either dull, borderline, or feeble-minded.

If we leave out two extremes—certain types of feeble-mindedness where there is deficiency of "gray matter" and the rare genius who may be the result of a fortunate combination of genes—it may be said that no test so far devised unequivocally measures innate as distinguished from acquired capacity. Intelligence tests furnish only a practical working measure of the ability of the subject to function in his own social environment. They measure intelligence in terms of the cultural patterns with which a person is familiar. Tests devised for Americans are not fair to most peoples in other lands. Frequently they are unfair to fellow-Americans whose cultural backgrounds differ considerably from those assumed in making up the original tests.

Even the tests which have been used for some years now to determine the I.Q.'s of American school children are under fire. These tests suggest that children in low-income groups are innately inferior to those in upper-income brackets. They also stamp the rural group as inferior to the urban group, Southern children as inferior to Northern, and those of foreign-born parents as inferior to those of the native population. These lower I.Q. ratings, according to Professor Allison Davis of the Department of Education at the Uni-

versity of Chicago, are due to flaws in the tests. He says the tests now in use place too much emphasis upon "trite academic problems" emphasized in a school curriculum set up years ago. They favor children who have the most interest in such school work and those who have had the most academic training at home.⁷

Sociologists and anthropologists have always tended to dispute the claims of educationalists concerning the validity of existing intelligence tests. They maintain that even a properly conducted mental test may reflect the effects of inadequate educational opportunities, poor health, lack of incentive, or emotional upsets. Even such a factor as an unhappy home may be recorded in a child's low I.Q., as well as in his school grades. It has been found too that an I.Q. may change as a result of a more stimulating environment. Anthropologists claim that it is unlikely that "culture-free" tests which equate motivation, attitudes towards tester and competition, and speed of getting things done will ever be devised. Needless to say, personality, character, will power, and special talents which are important in real life are not recorded in an intelligence test.

The Mental Profile. In the work-a-day world there is need of tests of present abilities regardless of the source of these qualities. In personnel administration and vocational guidance it is important to know what a person can do well. Tests therefore are being constantly improved. Louis L. Thurstone has devised a series of tests which attempt to break down the vague entity referred to as "intelligence" in an I.Q. They search out "basic" mental abilities and are said to give a "mental profile" which will show graphically both the strong and weak points of a person's mental endowment. The nature of the tests seems to throw additional light upon what we mean by general intelligence along with revealing special aptitudes.

The Thurstone tests attempt to identify such distinct qualities as verbal understanding, word fluency, number facility, perception, reasoning, shape recognition, and space thinking. Separate tests are given for each of these abilities. Take space thinking for instance. This is described as the ability to visualize solid objects and to see quickly their relationship to each other. In testing for this ability several drawings of right hands and left hands are presented for quick identification. Space thinking is of special importance to those who

wish to be engineers and architects. Many of the other qualities which the Thurstone tests reveal are of special value in other trades and professions.

Projection Tests. Projection tests attempt to determine the personality composition or the "total personality" of a subject. They present an unfamiliar task which the subject must approach as he would a new situation in life. Such tests include thematic apperception tests, picture association, and blot tests.

In the thematic apperception test a person is given a picture without a title and asked to invent a story about it. In the picture association test he may be presented with an amusing cartoon of a social situation and asked to fill in appropriate dialog. In the blot test, invented by Hermann Rohrschach, a Swiss psychiatrist, he is given a meaningless "picture" made by folding a piece of paper through a blob of ink and asked to tell what he "sees" in it. In all three tests it is believed that the personality is "projected" so that the trained tester may identify its predominant characteristics.

The Szondi test, invented by a Hungarian psychiatrist, is one of the strangest of the new projection tests. It is based upon the use of a set of so-called "typical" photographs showing the tense faces of the mentally ill. Szondi believes that the person being tested reveals his unconscious mind through his choice of faces that seem "most attractive" and "most repellent." Curiously enough, he also claims that unconscious impulses are inherited like physical characteristics, a conclusion which is at variance with the results of studies of identical twins as well as scientific opinion generally.

In this chapter we have seen that each of the four foundation-stones of personality or the "personality potentials"—reflexes, drives, temperament, and capacity—involves some genetic factors. Yet in each instance we have found that "basic human nature" is a much more limited entity than is generally supposed. Culture and the learning process appear to have more to do with man's personality and actual conduct than innate physical factors. Although nature lays down certain broad foundations it is man's response and his socialization in a particular cultural world that really shapes his personality. In the following chapter we shall want to consider some of the "machinery" of this socialization process.

NOTES

* Since each of these components exists to some degree in everyone Sheldon divides the body into five regions and determines by exact measurement the proportional representation of the three components in each region. The component values are then assigned on a sliding scale from (1) very low to (7) very high. In this way a large number of "basic somatotypes" has been classified. Thus in the "first region" (the head, face, and neck) a person might be 5/7 endomorphic, 2/7 mesomorphic, and 3/7 ectomorphic with a resulting somatype of 523 for this region. In his original study Sheldon distinguished 76 different somatypes. The "ideal" or extreme endomorph would receive a 711, an extreme mesomorph a 171, and an extreme ectomorph a 117 classification. These ideal types seldom exist since body structure is seldom unmixed. For brief summaries of Sheldon's theory see M. F. Ashley Montagu, *An Introduction to Physical Anthropology* (1945), p. 235 and John P. Gillin, *The Ways of Men* (1948), pp. 135-38.

1. Pp. 165-66. The changed emphasis in the study of drives, impulses, and needs is described in Part I of Herbert Goldhamer's "Recent Developments in Personality Studies," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1948, pp. 555-65.
2. *Social Relations and Structures*, 1947, pp. 195-96, 199.
3. *How We Influence One Another*, 1945, p. 64.
4. *Ibid.*, 127.
5. *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture*, 1948, p. 132.
6. Linton, *The Study of Man*, 1936, pp. 116-18; Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, 1935. See also S. H. Britt, *Social Psychology of Modern Life*, revised edition, 1949, Chapter 13, "Sex, Dominance, and Prestige." For a criticism of Mead see Jessie Bernard, "Observation and Generalization in Cultural Anthropology," *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1945.
7. See Allison Davis and Robert D. Hess, "What About IQ's?" *NEA Journal*, November, 1949; also Benjamin Fine, "More and More, the IQ Idea Is Questioned," *The New York Times Magazine*, September 18, 1949.

10

Group Interaction and Personality

General Psychology to Social Psychology. In the consideration of reflexes, drives, temperament, and capacities—the physical basis of personality—in the last chapter we dealt with background material taken chiefly from the field of general psychology. In this chapter the emphasis shifts to social psychology. In the last chapter we were concerned mostly with the individual as such; here we study his behavior as related to other individuals. This shift in emphasis may well raise the question: “Where does sociology proper come in?”

Social psychology is chiefly concerned with the behavior of the individual in a group situation, whereas the primary concern of sociology is group behavior itself. In practice the two fields overlap at so many points that it is almost impossible at times to say where one leaves off and the other begins. In this connection it might be observed that a similar overlapping takes place in many other branches of study today. Just why this overlapping has taken place in the two fields under consideration will be made clearer when we consider some of the recent developments in psychology.

I. PERSONALITY AND SOCIALIZATION

Recent Developments in Psychology. Psychology by traditional definition is “the study of the soul.” Its original association was with philosophy and religion. Yet the new empiric psychology is more closely related to biology. It is concerned with immediate causes rather than the fundamental causes of man’s actions. This shift in emphasis has divided psychology into a number of different branches of study. General psychology is the basic course and usually the

only one taken today by most college students. (Frequently, however, it is not taken until after the completion of a sociology course.) It is concerned chiefly with the external senses, the imagination, the memory, the intellect, emotions, and will. The former study of the nature, origin, and faculties of the human soul is relegated to what is described as rational, scholastic, or philosophical psychology.

The shift in emphasis in psychology has also produced a new terminology. At one time "person" was regarded as a metaphysical concept. It was defined as "the individual substance of rational nature." Personality was defined as "that dynamic organization of all the various powers of man—his tendencies, impulses, and habits—which under the influence of intellect and will, characterizes his particular adjustment to his environment here and now."¹ Today in social psychology and sociology "person" is usually defined as an individual who has status. In modern empiric psychology it is usually assumed that the person is merely a passive recipient of his culture. G. W. Allport has made a list of fifty different ways in which the words *person* and *personality* are now used. Definitions of personality vary according to one's values or philosophy. Kimball Young's is a typical definition of *personality* by a social psychologist-sociologist who emphasizes the modern empiric viewpoint: "The totality of habits, attitudes, ideas, and characteristics of an individual which grow out of his rôle and status in the various groups of which he is a member."²

Modern empiric psychology is often defined briefly and perhaps somewhat ambitiously as "the scientific study of human nature." Although it has been closely associated with behaviorism in the United States, the two are not necessarily connected. The sociologist is concerned with all contributions of empiric psychology which throw light upon man's social nature. In the use which he makes of these contributions the sociologist may adopt either the mechanistic-materialistic ("naturalistic") viewpoint of the behaviorist or the traditional Judæo-Christian one in which there is a presumption that man is responsible for his actions. His choice in either case is a matter of philosophy or values; neither philosophy can be proved by experimental methods.

The Study of Personality. For several years now various popular books on "personality development" have been appearing in every

best-seller list. From this fact one might be led to believe that an intense "personality-quest" is something peculiar to our times. Since there has always been a keen interest in personality, it may be well to recall briefly the main trends of this interest over the years. Five stand out. For many centuries the study of personality was largely introspective and confined to religion and philosophy. Towards the end of the last century two new groups, the introspectionists and the experimental psychologists, became concerned about personality. They produced William James and Mark Baldwin among the psychologists and Charles H. Cooley and G. H. Mead among the sociologists. This era also provided the foundations for the social psychology of the present century.

The start of the century marked a third trend in which knowledge about personality was sought in the fields of medicine and biology. This became best known through the theories of Lombroso, Kretschmer, and the phrenologists. A fourth trend, behaviorism, soon brought this mechanistic approach more directly into the field of psychology. Behaviorists regarded human conduct as differing from that of animals in degree but not in kind. It was during this fourth period that modern empiric psychology and sociology had their greatest development. Psychology now came to be divided into many branches such as genetic, child, adolescent, abnormal, and industrial psychology.

The popularization of psychology for the general public is the latest trend in the study of personality. Few psychologists and psychiatrists have been able to resist the financial returns to be found now in the newspaper, magazine, and popular-book market. Others who for want of a better term might be described as journalists have also invaded this field with success. Witness for instance the amazing sales of the Dale Carnegie books. The full swing of the circle was registered by the publication of Joshua L. Liebman's *Peace of Mind* (1947), in which a Jewish rabbi integrated an extremely liberal religious philosophy with modern psychology and psychiatry.

So much by way of orientation to this chapter. It should be evident by now that the study of personality is nothing new. We may find that much of what was learned in past centuries is still true. We are ready now to consider what social psychology has to say about the

nature and development of personality. It would seem that one of the best points to start our study would be feral children.

Feral Children and Socialization. The "biological-organism-plus-culture-equals-you" viewpoint which characterizes so much of modern empiric psychology, sociology, and cultural anthropology appears to be endorsed by stories of feral children, human beings reared for a time in complete isolation from human contacts. These stories involve several spectacular cases of "baboon-boys," "wild boys," and even "wolf-girls" collected from all over the world. The experience of these unfortunate children, brought up with animals, hints that the human being when deprived of interpersonal and cultural influences is little more than a beast. As such he may not only walk on all fours but thereafter be incapable in almost every respect of measuring up to what we regard as human standards.

The authenticity of many reports of feral children is open to question. Some regard all as semi-fictional legends. Even the case histories of Amala and Kamala, the famous wolf-girls of Midnapore, India, regarded as authoritative by many sociologists a few years ago, are still dubious. In this instance the narrators may have betrayed themselves by what they cited as corroborative details. They said that these two girls, reared for a time by wolves, howled exactly at ten, one, and three each night after their capture "just as the wolves do." But wolves do not behave in this way.

Some of the stories of feral children are plausible enough if we regard them as idiots or imbeciles abandoned as infants by their parents. It is well known that many mammals suddenly deprived of their young may adopt for a time the young of another species. If a mentally defective child was mothered by an animal for a while one would expect it to be even more retarded in its later development. For that matter, some idiots and imbeciles reared in our own society seem to differ little from animals in their conduct. Although we can hardly expect to determine essential human nature from the study of defective children we do know that under capable direction even such children develop far beyond animal horizons.

Stories of ferals at any rate emphasize the fact that both man and many of the animals require a period of group living in order to survive infancy. During this period in the life of an animal instincts

need either to be "primed" by parental suggestion or to await maturation. Man must in addition start to acquire his habits of bodily care, language, and the basic skills at this time. Thus we say that man takes his first steps in socialization in infancy. *Socialization* is the process through which the individual learns to adjust himself to living in his society.

Since socialization starts with man's first human associations, sociologists would describe a child who passed through his early years solely in the company of animals as an "individual" but not yet a sociological "person." Some sociologists say that all of the changes which take place in a person's conduct from birth to death may be explained in terms of either maturation or socialization. Analysis will show at any rate that socialization is in a large measure a process of habit formation in accordance with group standards.

Habits Make the Man. A *habit* may be defined as a facility of action acquired by repetition. Most of man's behavior is a matter of habit. This does not mean that man is merely a product of conditioned reflexes as the behaviorists viewed him. Habit also takes into account intentionality or purposiveness of action. But even the psychologist who conceives of human behavior as normally free and responsible will admit that once man learns to do things according to the patterns of his culture his thinking and volitional faculties are used relatively little except in the face of new situations. Through inertia man usually becomes a creature of habit.

We have seen that man begins to mould his habits according to the culture of his particular group at such an early age that it is often difficult to distinguish between the operation of culture and man's basic organic nature. Habits gradually come to govern not only his physical acts but even man's ways of thinking and feeling. Racial and religious prejudices are usually habits of thinking and feeling formed in childhood. We have seen that what we regard as native temperament is likewise very often the result of early habits. It is said that the success of Scotland Yard inspectors is due largely to their complete records which contain a detailed account of the daily habits of every former convict. These habits are regarded as "psychological finger-prints." Neither habits nor finger-prints can be so completely eradicated as to fool an expert.

The difficulty which man experiences in breaking long-established

habits makes the strategy of "habit-planning" extremely important. Most parents, to the best of their ability, "plan" and so help to form the habits of young children. To this end they also try to select proper interpersonal and cultural environments for them. Adults, through a similar strategy, are usually capable of making and breaking their own habits. Yet even during the centuries when the study of personality development was confined to the fields of religion and philosophy it was generally recognized that some social situations make the formation of good habits and the breaking of bad ones extremely difficult. People were urged therefore to "avoid bad companions." Social reformers advocated the elimination of undesirable social conditions for a similar reason. Analysis of socialization, "habit-planning," and the sociological "person" leads to consideration of the learning process itself.

II. THE LEARNING PROCESS

The Mechanics of Learning. An analysis of habit formation shows that some of our habits are acquired in the same way as animal habits. On the lowest level of learning man may develop habits by conditioned responses and through mere trial-and-error experiences, without making use of his higher faculties, much as animals do in problem-box and maze experiments. The extent to which this may be true even in higher forms of learning, as well as the differences between animal-training and human education, will be brought out by an examination of the learning process itself. This process may be reduced to three phases: learning by imitation, learning by suggestion, and learning through symbolic intercommunication.

Learning by Imitation. The learning process focusses attention on some of the ways in which behavior is altered by the presence of others. The most obvious example is imitation. There has been considerable controversy about the nature and rôle of imitation in society. James and Baldwin, for instance, regarded imitation in both animals and man as instinctive.

Most animal conduct is believed to be instinctive. Yet even here we find instances of the operation of what at first sight seems to have some of the aspects of a social heredity. Although cats have a hereditary tendency to kill rats, it has been demonstrated experi-

mentally that this instinct in kittens can be "primed" or brought out more effectively when an opportunity is provided to imitate a cat. Kittens that witnessed their mothers killing rats became more effective rat-killers than those deprived of this experience. A human observer might easily conclude from this that the mother-cat deliberately "instructed" her young. Yet it was obvious that the mother seemed totally indifferent to the fact that she was being imitated in her own instinctive action. While it is true that we can understand only very imperfectly the process by which animals "instruct" each other, it is generally believed that deliberate or purposive instruction is very rare.

We saw that the human tendency to copy others was formerly described as an instinct. Nowadays on the human level of learning this tendency is usually explained in either of two ways. What is regarded as imitation may be the result of several persons' responding in the same way to the same stimulus. When one guest leaves a party others may consult their watches and immediately follow, not through mechanical imitation but through a similar belief that it is time to go. Finally in true human imitation the copied action follows because it appears to be a desirable course of action. The hair-do of the latest movie star may be copied by the office worker because she visualizes it as a means of achieving the type of life portrayed by her heroine. At any rate the imitation is a means to an end prompted by an ascribed value. Thus there appears to be little need to attribute most imitation in human affairs to instinct.

Gabriel Tarde, sometimes described as the father of social psychology, built a whole theory of human society upon the idea of imitation. He regarded it as the cause of so-called "crime waves" and many other forms of social behavior. Social change took place because people also imitated the new and novel. Today it is more common to regard imitation as a mental habit acquired by the individual from his early experience in group living. Such experience usually teaches the wisdom of conformity. As a result of this experience, mere observation of an activity in others may create a desire to attempt to do the same thing.

Regardless of the precise nature or origin of the process imitation is an important phase of learning. Young children tend to imitate not only the conduct of their parents but even their mannerisms and

patterns of feeling and thinking. It is on this account that the educated adult very often has to change so many of his habits and attitudes when he becomes more critical of his former imitation patterns. To the extent that education has trained him in critical thinking he tends also to restrain gradually even his acquired mental habit of imitating. Even so, imitation is usually such a common and safe procedure in human affairs that a nonconformer who habitually refuses to follow is soon regarded as an eccentric.

Learning by Suggestion. *Suggestion* is a stimulus which results in an uncritical release of a behavior pattern already learned. Suggestion results in immediate action relatively un-influenced by thought. Tarde's emphasis upon the rôle of imitation in social life was prompted by Charcot's studies of suggestion and hypnosis. The hypnotic trance represents an extreme form of suggestion. Yet it seems to explain many phenomena in normal conduct. In a trance the subject is willing to accept another's ideas. The same is true of what is called "prestige suggestion," in which there is a tendency to accept blindly what we are told. Very often we are uncritical in evaluating the competence of a "name" in the particular field where suggestion is expected to operate. Witness the wide use of the names of well-known persons in modern advertising. The "leading question," ruled out in most courts of law, is also based upon suggestion. So too are much modern propaganda and salesmanship. Here the prestige of large numbers and eminence are utilized in an attempt to induce a quick line of conduct. Yet the objective is essentially the same as that of the hypnotist: unreasoned acceptance of an idea.

Suggestion also explains many otherwise mysterious phenomena. The primitive who dies when he realizes he has violated a powerful tribal taboo is a victim of suggestion. So too are many victims of incapacitating ailments in every society. The suggestion in these two instances is usually described as auto-suggestion. (We shall consider its operation in more detail in the next chapter in connection with hysteria.) Although the exact nature of the hook-up between beliefs, emotions, and the nervous system in auto-suggestion is not clearly understood as yet, the process illustrates the adage that mind has an effect upon body.

Most hypnotists admit that some people may not be hypnotized. The same is true of suggestion. Some people react in a manner exactly

the opposite to that normally anticipated. We often see this demonstrated in the conduct of a child. Somewhere between three and four years of age it is said to be quite normal for a child to do just the opposite to what he is told. Possibly this is a result of the first conscious realization of his own independence. Possibly it is a reaction to sudden realization that he has been all too often the tool of suggestion. Adults very often show a similar perverse disposition especially when direct suggestion is applied. Tactful people therefore frequently resort to indirect suggestion. It has been said that the successful wife soon learns to obtain desired objectives from a contrary husband in his way. Seeking a holiday she will ask, "You are not planning on our taking a trip over the holidays are you, dear?"³

Learning by Symbolic Intercommunication. Here we consider the rôle of language in learning. A distinction is usually made between active and passive language. Active language is the ability to make sounds which communicate ideas to others. Passive language is the ability to understand the messages of others. Dogs and chimpanzees and perhaps other animals can be taught to "understand" many words and phrases used by man. Many animals also have an active language of their own. It is extremely limited, however, in its objectives. Through "signaling reflexes" they elicit responses in other animals of their species. Strangely enough, the chimpanzee is fully equipped for articulate speech as far as mouth, vocal cords, and larynx are concerned. There is no organic reason why he cannot speak as man does. Yet no animal, even when carefully trained by man, has ever developed active language on the human plane.

Otto Klineberg points out that communication among animals has three characteristics. Animals can express only what is present at the time; they cannot describe the past or future. Animal language expresses only emotions and desires. Finally subhuman language has no abstract or symbolic meanings.⁴ It may be said in brief that animals communicate with each other through calls, cries, odors, and gestures which convey existing feelings. Man may do this but he learns also by symbolic intercommunication.

Man learns chiefly through symbolic intercommunication. The human infant communicates at first through voice tones on an ani-

mal level. Then he learns to interpret gestures and facial expressions. He crosses the barrier into the rational world when he begins to understand and express spoken or symbolic language. When as a young child he learns to distinguish between man and "a man" he takes another giant stride away from his merely animal nature. We have already seen that the particular language spoken is determined by the surrounding culture. Unlike the animal heredity has nothing to do with it. Back of the three-fold aspects of the human learning process lies motivation. Here wishes are important.

III. WISHES

What Makes Sammy Run? Man is characteristically a future-seeking animal. Present discomforts are ignored while he plans for a more satisfying future. Everyone has hopes, plans, and ambitions for some better future state of affairs. Many animals and insects appear at first sight to have a similar tendency. But theirs is instinctive. Perhaps it might be advantageous if some men had a similar instinctive tendency to store food for the winter. Yet nature seems to have left man free in this matter.

There has been constant speculation over the centuries about the motives which impel men towards future goals. Whatever their characteristics may be, these forces seem to go far beyond mere organic drives of physical nature. Ben Hecht was searching for these motives in *A Guide for the Bedevilled* (1944) when he observed, "Deeper than our lusts and all our other good and bad hungers is the obsession we have to be Some One." Yet, strangely enough, men are seldom clearly aware of the goals or wishes which drive them on. Stranger still usually they experience more satisfaction in the quest than in the achievement of the goal.

Philosophers and theologians over the ages have speculated about this human quest. Philosophers have generally said that man seeks "happiness." Theologians have added that complete happiness is to be expected only in a future life. More recently psychologists and sociologists have attempted to identify and classify the various superorganic motives which impel men towards future goals. They have called them by such names as desires, urges, interests, and wishes.

The particular label given seems to matter little. No classification is complete and many overlap. Yet as we shall see nearly all are helpful.

Two out of the many such classifications made by American sociologists have had rather wide acceptance. In the first quarter of the century Albion W. Small's six-fold set of motivating "interests"—health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness—was popular. Today the four "wishes" of William I. Thomas—new experience, security, recognition, and response—are in greater favor. An analysis of the operation of each should throw considerable light upon the factors, other than drives, which motivate everyday human activities.

The Wish for New Experience. It is said that a considerable proportion of men and women who served in World War II resolved to take up different vocations upon their return to civilian life. Government grants for veterans' education enabled some to do so. Yet in spite of their resolutions inertia, family ties, the need of an immediate income, and other factors probably induced the majority of veterans to return to what seemed to be "ruts" at the time they entered the services. The war merely served to focus attention upon a desire for change which exists at all times in many members of every society.

A wish for new experience is aroused in everyone at some time or other. Monotony, discouragements, frustrations, or disillusionment make "distant pastures" look more green. We see this illustrated very often when fathers who have been reasonably successful urge their sons to take up almost any vocation except their own. We see this wish especially in the lives of restless individuals who are unable to remain long in one position or locality. For most people travel, "escape" literature, and motion pictures serve as "moral equivalents" which satisfy this wish. It may well be that war provides much sought-for new experience to youth in nearly every generation. Perhaps mankind will someday work out a moral equivalent for war and so reduce the propensity of youth to follow a military band.

The Wish for Security. Child psychologists say now that infants need affection. Without it a feeling of insecurity can develop which may last for life. This realization has prompted some maternity hospitals to institute a practice known as "rooming-in" which is con-

trary to the former almost universal practice of separating a baby from its mother at birth. Where "rooming-in" has been adopted, the newborn baby is put in a bassinet beside his mother's bed just as used to be done when most American babies were born at home. This encourages breast feeding which, it is said, may be even more important psychologically than it is physically.

When a child feels unloved he is unhappy and insecure. This may provide a subconscious background for many subsequent conduct problems. In one study of a series of cases of stuttering two groups of factors were described, the proximate and remote. The proximate or immediate factors included incidents which produced fear and anxiety, such as an accident or sudden fright. Even conversion from left to right-handedness was sometimes such a factor. But in all of these cases there was also a predisposing earlier background which included a parent-child relationship lacking in warmth and affection. The remote factor was insecurity.

It is known that many strikes and industrial disputes are not based upon economic factors alone. In Warner and Low's study of social aspects of industrial life (*The Social System of the Modern Factory*, 1947) one factor in an unorganized strike in a large New England shoe factory was psychological. It was found that technological progress had destroyed old skills and with it the sense of security formerly enjoyed by the trained worker. When a new machine finally made it possible to train a replacement in two or three days no one felt secure in his job or status even though wages were unchanged. Here human dignity rather than wages was said to be an important factor in the strike.

Although the ability of anyone to enjoy complete security for any length of time may be questioned, everyone needs a reasonable amount of security for happiness. Modern social security laws convey considerable assurance of freedom from unemployment without compensation and from the dangers of penniless old age. Socialism and communism make their appeal to the proletariat by promising much more economic security in exchange for political freedom.

In almost every part of the globe the insecure propertyless people who form the "mass" base of the social hierarchy are becoming increasingly aware of their ability to organize and agitate for greater economic concessions. It would appear then that the best defense

which we can offer to radical isms at home and abroad now is to provide at long last the economic securities which have always been dictated by the Social Gospel in our spiritual tradition. President Truman's plan to assist underdeveloped areas of the world would also appear to be good social psychology. Without a feeling of reasonable security man is restless for change—any change.

The Wish for Recognition. Many people find it extremely difficult to accept the fact that the great majority of us are "condemned" to mediocrity. They burn with an intense desire for recognition. Perhaps Horatio Alger literature and "you-too-can-be-a-success" advertisements have engendered in them a wish for public esteem which is abnormal. Or perhaps they are just good Americans steeped in Lincolnian tradition. At any rate they feel that to seem to rest upon anything but the top rung of the ladder of achievement is to confess weakness. It stands to reason that such an estimation of success in life is bound to bring disappointment.

It must be admitted that a wish for recognition is in itself normal and natural. Our educational machine makes use of it from pre-kindergarten onward. Military machines have always leaned heavily upon it. Some say that its rôle in getting youth to go to war is of equal importance with the wish for new experience. At any rate war has always offered abundant opportunities for quick success and glory.

The wish for recognition has been described also under other names. Rudolph Allers (*Psychology of Character*, 1939) seems to refer to it when he speaks of a "will to power." William James likewise recognized some such wish when he observed that "the deepest principle of human nature is the desire to be appreciated." In every person there is a "want for a feeling of personal worth," whatever we may choose to call it. Dale Carnegie has said that the "big secret" in dealing successfully with people is a realization that the "desire for a feeling of importance" motivates everyone. Failure to recognize some such wish in everyday personal relations leads to much unnecessary contentiousness and ill-feeling. The law of Christian charity, for that matter, demands that we recognize each individual as important.

The Wish for Response. The wish for response is similar in many ways to the wish for recognition. In each there is a desire for ap-

preciation. But in the wish for recognition large-group approval is sought, whereas in the wish for response the more intimate appreciation of another or of a small circle of friends is sought. Allers seems to describe this wish in his "will to community." He says that we have a deep need of "belonging to" or "being at home with" our fellow-men.

Liebman no doubt had the wish for response in mind when he referred to "acceptance, approval, the sense of appreciation and companionship" as the "primary joy of life." This need, he said, is as deep as the need for food. Modern Don Juans seeking new objects of passion, alcoholics desperately trying to lose themselves in drink, and men ruthlessly seeking for power, he believed, are very often merely instances of people vainly "fleeing from loneliness to loneliness." Modern urban life very often seems to provide for just about every human need except the basic need for response.

Henry Varnum Poor, head of the War Department unit for artists in the Alaskan theatre of World War II, was both impressed and puzzled by the vulgarity of most American soldier conversations. Vulgarity was so universal, both in American training camps and on the war fronts, that it appeared to be something "put on" with the uniform. He finally decided that this tendency of soldiers to reduce themselves to the lowest common level was prompted by a feeling of insecurity. Only on this "most animal basis" did they feel at rest with other soldiers. Here the average soldier felt that he could at last establish his likeness and oneness to all his companions. "Anything else is subject to suspicion, to misunderstanding. . . . The burden of being something other than common and general is too great for any but a brave and really cultured mind to carry." ⁵

Some might say that if Poor's observation about vulgarity was correct the soldier's motive was more likely a wish for response than, as he suggests, a wish for security. The wish for recognition might also have figured in the motivation. All of which serve to emphasize the fact that wishes often overlap and so are usually difficult to identify in the conduct of others. We have to be clever to recognize even our own predominant wish.

The conduct of most people is motivated by a predominant wish. This varies in different people and changes from time to time in every individual. It usually changes in the individual with age and

circumstance as Shakespeare pointed out long ago. Sometimes our friends are more aware of our predominating wish than we are. Our actions may reveal our secret motives. Knowledge of the currently dominating wishes of others helps us to understand people and sometimes even to predict their behavior. Yet knowledge of wishes alone is not enough. If we are to understand the dynamic aspects of personality we must also consider attitudes.

IV. ATTITUDES

Attitudes and Opinions. We say and do what we "like" rather than what we believe to be right more often than we realize. In sociological terminology, we constantly reflect our attitudes in overt behavior. It is difficult not to do so since attitudes involve both mental sets and strong emotional attachments. *Attitudes* may be defined as acquired and constant tendencies to react toward or against something or somebody. They are dynamic ever-present potentialities for a certain type of overt behavior. Attitudes are reflected in our attractions and repulsions and in our interests and apathies.

Attitudes often seem so natural that we regard them as instinctive. Yet they are learned. We acquire them from group experiences and most of all from our culture. Attitudes toward miscegenation illustrate this. If we have been reared in a culture that prohibits interracial marriage we usually acquire a hostile feeling or social attitude towards miscegenation which we are very apt to regard as "natural" to members of our race. In reality we have accepted without examining its logical basis a value established by our group.

Group participation tends to set up values and so to standardize attitudes for members. Here we see again what the sociologist has in mind when he makes a distinction between individual and person. As sociological persons we are indoctrinated with attitudes. Through continued habits of thought, feeling, and action they become woven into what we erroneously come to regard as our human nature. Thus each culture conditions the attitudes of the individual human being according to its values.

An opinion is a judgment arrived at by intellectual processes. Frequently we mistake our attitudes for opinions. On the other hand, we often realize that our attitudes are unbecoming. In this case we

may express opinions which conflict with our actual attitudes. Unless we strive to make our attitudes conform to our opinions we are apt to express the former when an action-situation suddenly presents itself. It is on this account that we are sometimes "caught off guard" to the extent that we say or do things that embarrass us.

Measuring and Changing Attitudes. Since attitudes are such dynamic influences in human affairs it would be helpful if we could identify and measure them by objective tests. An accurate picture of the attitudes of groups would help us to know the extent of many of the problems confronting education. Some progress has been made in devising such tests. In one type test a series of propositions is rated with reference to the degree of antagonism expressed by the subject. In this way attitude scales are made up. The deep-seated source of attitudes makes exact measurement difficult. It is on this account that some of the best "opinion" polls have proved to be misleading. A person may express an opinion, which is all such polls attempt to gauge, to a poll-taker but actually vote his attitude.

Attitudes, like all other habits acquired in youth, tend to persist and to resist change. Education and religion attempt to change irrational and unethical attitudes. But since so many of man's attitudes are reflections of older group values the ordinary educational processes, as they affect the individual, must of necessity be slow. It is on this account that some educators are pessimistic about the chances of immediate social reforms involving race relations, religious prejudice, and even economic changes. All of these have emotional roots in existing group values.

Dictators spurn the slow but surer process of education in favor of controlled speed-up methods of shaping group attitudes. They prefer manipulated mass propaganda. Hitler had considerable success with this approach. Russia is attempting to do the same now in large areas taken over by infiltration and force in Europe and Asia. To this end the Voice of America radio is jammed and many other means are used to prevent truth from reaching the people. Here we see again the essential conflict between democracy and communism. Democracy must move slowly because it recognizes the dignity of the person. Totalitarians regard man merely as a member of a herd which they seek to corral quickly by fair means or foul.

V. SELF AND SOCIETY

Self Psychology. The ancients speculated at great length about the religious needs and yearnings of the soul. So have Jewish and Christian writers down through the ages. Yet if we judge by the pomposity of many psychoanalysts we might conclude that Freud had suddenly discovered the vast hinterland of the soul. As a matter of fact, the famous philosopher-psychologists, James and Baldwin, directed attention to the ego or self in psychology some fifty years ago. Soon afterwards Charles H. Cooley did the same in sociology. More recently the cultural anthropologists have taken up this quest. Thus it happens that the study of "I," "me," and "mine" experiences now straddles the fields of religion, philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and psychiatry.

Sociologists and anthropologists criticize the psychoanalysts for their failure to consider the weight of social dynamics. Their intense concern about the ego has tended to make the weight of social conditions, social relationships, and culture seem unimportant. The sociologist and anthropologist weigh all of these factors. They point out that the ego gradually takes shape through early childhood primary contacts in family, play, school, and church groups. They show how self undergoes additional change at adolescence when adult standards are gradually assimilated and alliances are made with new social groups. Finally they describe the important rôle which social disorganization may play in personality disorganization.

Cooley was the first to analyze self in terms of social dynamics. He gave us the term "looking-glass self." This is a tendency to modify ourselves according to the estimate which we believe others are making of us. He regarded this as an essential mechanism in the development of personality. Through this "mirroring process," commenced in childhood, we develop actual consciousness of self. Cooley divided this process into three stages. First we imagine what other persons perceive in our personality. Then we estimate their evaluations of us. Finally, on the basis of these two norms we derive feelings either of satisfaction or disgust about ourselves. The looking-glass self therefore might well be called the social self.

Sociologists say that it is absurd for anyone to claim that he does not care about the mirrored evaluations of others. Man is a social

animal and one of his greatest satisfactions is found in the feeling that he enjoys the approval of others. The constant demand for how-to-be-popular books would seem to underline this observation. Even the eccentric and the criminal are usually seeking the esteem of some person or persons, however perverse this evaluation may be. No sane person is a complete social isolationist.

Rôle and Self. Although the nucleus of what we call self in psychology may develop through the mirroring process, the integration of personality is delayed by the fact that we belong to many groups. In each group we are judged by different standards. Thus each group imposes special patterns of conduct to which we are expected to conform. The result is that even in the course of a single day the average adult must play several different social rôles in rapid succession. Although the term has different meanings in sociology, a *rôle* may be defined here as a pattern of conduct which a person occupying a specific position in society is expected to observe.

The young female child is suddenly made aware of rôles when she is reminded that "she is a girl" and that she cannot play as her brothers do. Later she is forced to accept the rôle ascribed to her as a woman in a man's world. As a member of the teaching profession she assumes a different rôle. Marriage will provide a new rôle and parenthood still another. Thus from adolescence onward a person is confronted with the problem of integrating the several different selves required by new and often conflicting rôles.

Rôles standardize behavior. A rapid shift in rôles requires a quick change not only in habits but very often in attitudes and values as well. Since rôles tend to become self, the adjustments to the requirements of changed rôles are usually difficult. Many who served as officers in World War II found considerable difficulty in readjusting themselves to humbler rôles in civilian life. Oftentimes a change in rôles involves frustrations. Frustrations may lead to personality maladjustments.

Frustrations and Self. A considerable part of the study of self psychology today consists in the analysis of frustrations. *Frustrations* are emotional experiences in which a person feels that his wish-goal has been blocked. Adjustments to frustrations follow rather definite patterns to which modern social psychology and psychoanalysis have attached specific names. S. H. Britt, upon whom we

have leaned rather heavily for material at this point, claims that in dealing with frustrations people compensate, rationalize, project, displace, repress, sublimate, and regress.⁶

Compensation. When a person is frustrated in the attainment of a wish he may try to forget the sting of defeat by concentrating his efforts upon the attainment of some substitute goal. This mechanism is known as *compensation*. In well-adjusted persons restoration of status through compensation is beneficial both to self and society. Even when compensation is sought in *fantasy* there need be no bad results. Adults as well as children occasionally need the cushion of daydreams for bruised emotions. Likewise, putting oneself emotionally in the place of another, if not carried to extreme, may be psychologically beneficial and otherwise unobjectionable. Parents resort to this form of compensation, known as *identification*, very often after their own ambitions have been thwarted. They identify themselves with their children's achievements. A similar process, usually described as *empathy*, takes place in the motion picture audience. People find an escape from frustrations by secretly identifying themselves with characters on the screen.

In many instances, however, compensations are objectionable. A man whose "will to power" urge is constantly frustrated at the office may unconsciously "take it out" upon his family later. Or conversely, a man who is dominated at home by a wife or mother-in-law may unwittingly become a tyrant in dealing with his female office help. Fantasy, if regarded as reality, leads to hallucinations. Through identification (or projection) parents may attempt to force children into rôles for which they are not fitted. The shop-girl's empathy, carried to extreme, may cause her to believe that she really looks and acts like her favorite movie-star. A boy with mediocre baseball ability may come to feel that he is the reincarnation of Babe Ruth.

The *inferiority complex*, a resented "feeling of inferiority," is a rather common cause of objectionable compensation. In this instance the compensation is mixed with inordinate pride, a quality which distinguishes it from true humility. Usually some camouflage is adopted in an attempt to disguise a felt weakness. Some assume an air of great pomposity. Others may make such a strained attempt ("over-compensation") to seek recognition in another field of en-

deavor, frequently one in which there is little competition, that their conduct becomes ridiculous. Thus, the flagpole sitters of the 1930's achieved sudden notoriety in what up to that time had been a non-competitive activity. It is believed that some chronic narrators of obscene stories belong in this same category.

Rationalization is another common mechanism resorted to in the face of frustrations. Here a socially acceptable reason is given for one's conduct when the truth would seem to result in humiliation. Very often this is a subconscious device utilized to avoid facing one's shortcomings. Friends who are brutally frank sometimes attempt to puncture obvious rationalizations by asking, "Now what is the *real* reason?" We find examples of rationalization all around us. The cynical critic of another's successful achievement, without being aware of the unconscious process, may be using this "sour grapes" mechanism to belittle his own failures. Only a strong character will admit weakness or outright defeat. That is why the world admires the humble man and the good loser as well as good winners.

Projection. Projection, like rationalization, is a "face-saving" device. *Projection* is a psychological means by which we "throw or cast forward" upon someone else the blame for our own deficiencies or delinquencies. Parents are often to blame for the development of this habit in children when they allow offspring to attribute school failures to "unfair teachers." Subsequently the frustrations of these children may be projected in the form of aggression. Social groups (and even nations likewise) seek scapegoats and whipping boys in order to relieve their frustrated aggressive feelings. Religious and racial prejudice can be explained oftentimes in this way. Demagogues utilize these projections in order to foster their own political ambitions.

Displacement. Rationalization, projection, and displacement are closely related. *Displacement* is an unconscious mechanism by which an emotion appropriate to one group of ideas gradually becomes attached to something else. Thus a child who has been subjected to over-strict parental discipline which he inwardly deeply resents may grow up to hate all authority. It is believed that some cases of kleptomania and pyromania have their basis in just such an experience. The attachment of the frustrated emotion to the new idea is logically inappropriate yet evidently quite appropriate as seen in the unconscious. This is one reason why the brutal treatment of prisoners is

frowned upon today. Later the victim of such treatment may through unconscious displacement vent his repressed emotions upon some innocent citizen.

Repression. None of man's drives or instincts is wrong in itself. Yet all must be restrained at times either for personal or social well-being. Everyone, therefore, must learn to inhibit impulses. In the exercise of self-restraint, however, there are two alternates. One may face a situation squarely, weigh impulse against ideal, and then choose and remain reasonably satisfied with a course of action in which the impulse is inhibited. This policy usually pays dividends in both mental and moral health.

Repression, the second course of action in exercising self-restraint, sometimes may be injurious to mental health. *Repression* consists in rejecting the conflict situation from consciousness without having faced it squarely. This is done as a rule because the original perception or impulse was either shame-provoking or painful. This choice lacks the courage and honesty of the first alternate. It is the refusal to recognize the existence of the impulse and conflict, together with the blind attempt to force it out of consciousness, that may cause harm. Where this is done the original conflict becomes submerged as a "complex" in the so-called unconscious mind. Here it continues to be dynamic, seeking another outlet. Thus an emotional tension dangerous to mental health may be established.

There has been much loose thinking and writing on the subject of inhibition and repression. Harmon makes sense when he points out that the mistaken notion that "all inhibiting is harmful" is itself an example of rationalization. People who propose this false interpretation of Freud, he says, are usually trying to circumvent moral issues.⁷

Edward A. Strecker says that the not-conscious mind is filled with complexes. *Complexes* are groups of ideas held together in the not-conscious mind by strong emotional bonds. Where they are kept irrationally repressed instead of being rationally analyzed, expressed directly, or sublimated, they may eventually express themselves in an undesirable or camouflaged manner. Neuroses and psychoses are often the end result. Complexes usually have their origin in such things as habits of envy, suspicion, hate, fear, resentment, and anxiety, as well as in sex desires. No one is free from them. They have enor-

mous powers of assimilation. Thus a complex based upon envy or hatred of another person will gather momentum as every action of the disliked one is interpreted unfavorably.⁸ Through association a properly guided psychoanalytic "confession" may reveal the complexes and repressions of the non-conscious mind which are causing a neurotic disorder. Religious confession is ordinarily a revelation of only the conscious mind.

Sublimation and Regression. The possible dangers of repression may be avoided through *sublimation* or the expression of some objectionable emotional force at a more desirable social or moral level. By this process, also known as *substitution*, frustrated impulses are detoured to a consciously chosen substitute objective. Thus competitive games may sometimes be substituted for the expression of an emotional force which has its origin in anger, envy, or an unsatisfied sex urge.

Where the substituted goal involves a return to a less mature level of conduct the mechanism is called *regression*. Here it is said that the person reverts to a pattern of behavior analogous to that of some earlier period of life (to an early "fixation") because he is emotionally unable to function at a higher level. Sometimes bed-wetting in an older child and "second childhood" in the aged are forms of regression. So is the temper tantrum of an adult. For that matter, the conduct of most Americans at a college football game or when witnessing a slapstick motion picture or television program might be described as harmless regression.

The "Personality Quest": Retrospect and Prospect. This chapter commenced with an analysis of the genesis of the sociological person. It was shown that the development of personality takes place through the interactions of group living. It was found that such interaction also provides obstacles to personality integration. Frustrations, for instance, are so universal that everyone must learn to cope with them. Unwise reactions to frustrations may be recognized not only in neurotics and psychotics but also in those of us who by courtesy are described as normal.

We saw that modern psychology and psychoanalysis have given impressive names to the various reactions to frustrations. The sociology student must be familiar with some of these terms. It should be added here, however, that this new terminology is not definitive. It

has been proposed chiefly for purposes of description. Even the experts do not always agree either in the use of this terminology or in their analyses of the mechanisms involved. Moreover, many of these categories overlap. In brief it can be said that self psychology has not as yet been reduced to a science.

It should be consoling to know that even the experts admit that most of us can deal with our frustrations and other personality problems without their assistance. It is well to know also that the experts can do much less for us than we are likely to suspect. The popularization and over-simplification of psychoanalysis and psychiatry on the screen have given the false impression that doctors in such fields prescribe short-cuts to personality integration that border on the magical.

There is no easy, royal road to an ideal personality. There is no successful approach which does not involve self-discipline. A deeper analysis of self psychology suggests that the old philosophic-religious approach with its simple sin-versus-virtue terminology and its emphasis upon habit formation had nevertheless much to offer. This is not so surprising when we stop to consider that human nature does not change even though human behavior changes with changed conditions.

Followers of the Judaeo-Christian tradition at any rate should not become too upset by occasional faulty adjustments to frustrations. Their concept of original sin and man's fallen nature should be a constant reminder that perfection cannot be expected in the conduct of human beings. Both religion and mental hygiene set up rules which if observed would lead to perfection, but no expert believes that these rules will not be broken.

It is only in unusual situations that hidden frustrations seriously upset personality organization. We shall consider some of these in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. V. V. Herr, *How We Influence One Another*, 1945, p. 127.
2. *An Introduction to Sociology*, 1939, p. 598.
3. See Wendell White, *The Psychology of Dealing with People*, 1946 revision.
4. *Social Psychology*, 1940, p. 31.
5. *An Artist Sees Alaska*, 1945, pp. 38-39.
6. *Social Psychology of Modern Life*, revised edition, 1949, pp. 239-51. See also Norman Cameron, *The Psychology of Behavior Disorders*, 1947, Chapter 6.
7. Francis L. Harmon, *Principles of Psychology*, 1938, pp. 443-44. See also Cameron, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-81.
8. *Fundamentals of Psychiatry*, 1943, pp. 91-4.

11

Personality Disorganization

The Problem. The United States Army Surgeon General has tabulated statistics on the 5,000,000 men aged 18-37 whom the World War II draft boards passed up as unfit for service—the 4-F's. About 500,000 of these had such outstanding physical or mental disqualifications that local boards did not even examine them. A partial tabulation of the remaining 4,500,000 shows that approximately a third were rejected on mental grounds. They were either deficient in intelligence or plainly neuropsychiatric.¹

The Army's problem did not end with the draft boards. Many who had been accepted by local boards broke down either in camp or in combat. So many developed nervous disorders in camp or at embarkation points that it was suspected that some local boards had deliberately passed on their mental cases so that the federal government would support them later. In this connection it was recalled that the neuropsychiatric patients of World War I had already cost the federal government over a billion dollars.

Under the strain of combat many more men became mental cases. In the Fifth Army in Italy, which sustained the highest casualty rate of World War II, between 15 and 20 per cent became neuropsychiatric patients. Surely then personality disorganization must be considered when we weigh our war potential. "Preparedness" demands that we give this matter serious attention.

Personality disorganization is by no means a mere wartime problem. At the American Psychiatric Association's annual meeting in 1947 it was estimated that there were between eight and nine million psychoneurotics in the United States. When we add to these the victims of ulcers and other psychosomatic disorders whose ailments are caused by emotional stress the civilian problem assumes enormous

proportions. Finally there is the bald fact that the number of persons admitted to mental institutions each year in the United States is as large as the number who are graduated from colleges.

The problem is only half stated when the extent of ailments is described. Expert care for the mentally disordered is far, very far, from adequate. In 1947 there were only 4,000 psychiatrists in the United States, far short of the total needed. Only 4 per cent of the present medical-training curriculum for general practitioners is devoted to psychiatry. Physicians who were graduated ten or more years ago received much less instruction. Scarcely anything has been spent for research on psychoneuroses compared to the outlays for physical disorders. Furthermore, as William C. Menninger pointed out while president of the American Psychiatric Association, psychiatrists today pay far too much attention to "rich ladies with imaginary complaints" and not enough to the unhappy man in the street.

The above facts point up another problem: that of providing the public with information on mental hygiene which will make much psychiatric care unnecessary. Fortunately, the prospect is much more hopeful here, especially with regard to the college student.

Terminology. At first sight the jargon of psychiatry seems forbidding to the layman. It need not be so. Only a few basic terms and divisions of the field need be learned. A *psychosis* is a relatively severe mental disease in which a decided and usually a progressively disintegrating change has taken place in the personality. The disorder may be either organic or functional. A *neurosis* is a relatively minor functional mental disorder. For convenience certain other conditions which are neither psychoses nor neuroses are usually considered under the general heading of personality disorders. These include mental deficiency and epilepsy. Perhaps it should be pointed out that neuritis does not come under this heading. Neural disorders in this group are caused by an injury or inflammation affecting some part of the organic nervous system. Such ailments, which do not involve personality, are treated by neurologists.

A *psychiatrist* is a physician who has taken additional courses and a special internship which qualify him to act as an expert in the diagnosis and treatment of all types of personality disorders. Personality disorders which have only a physical basis are described as organic. Those whose basis is psychological are called functional.

A *psychoanalyst* is a psychiatrist who specializes in the diagnosis and treatment of functional disorders. *Psychoanalysis* is a method of exploring the unconscious mental processes. It was invented and given a distinctive philosophy by Sigmund Freud. Not all of those who use this method today, however, subscribe to the philosophy of Freud. The old legal term, insanity, corresponds generally to psychosis. Even in legal terminology, however, insane asylum has now been replaced by state hospital.

We are ready now to consider the basic facts of abnormal psychology and psychiatry. This knowledge should end the mystery and fear frequently associated with mental disorders. Sometimes this leads even to a reluctance to take up the study of such matters. For our purposes personality disorders may be divided roughly into four groups: the organic psychoses, other organic conditions, functional conditions, and what we may describe as borderline conditions. Having considered these groups we shall take up personality reorganization in the last part of the chapter.

I. ORGANIC PSYCHOSES

The organic psychoses are divided into two main groups: (1) those caused by structural damage to the brain, and (2) those brought about by toxi-infectious conditions.

1. *Structural Defects.* Psychoses caused by damage to the brain or higher nervous system may be grouped under four sub-headings: traumatic psychosis, senile psychosis, paresis, and miscellaneous organic disorders.

Traumatic psychosis is caused by a brain wound or lesion. Although there is a popular impression that much "insanity" is caused by head injuries, in reality traumatic psychosis is relatively rare. This ailment should not be confused with temporary episodes marked by unconsciousness or bewilderment resulting from brain injuries. Frequent concussion impacts, however, may eventually damage the brain so that a condition somewhat resembling traumatic psychosis eventually develops. Such a condition is sometimes found among ex-prize fighters. When so afflicted they are commonly described as being "punch drunk."

Senile psychosis or senile dementia is a pathological condition

resulting usually from degeneration of brain tissue. It is frequently found in connection with cerebral arteriosclerosis or hardening of the walls of the cerebral arteries. With the increase in the number of people living to ripe old age it is rapidly becoming America's number-one psychosis.

Paresis is caused by syphilis in its third stage. At this point syphilis attacks the spinal cord and brain. In its earlier or second stage the disease may reach into and injure the brain through the blood stream. It is not described as paresis, however, until the third stage.

Other "miscellaneous organic disorders" which are capable of producing a psychosis include encephalitis ("sleeping sickness"), meningitis, brain tumors, and a rare disease known as Huntington's chorea. Some varieties of paralysis agitans, sometimes called Parkinson's disease or shaking palsy, also seem to be accompanied by a mild psychosis.

2. *Toxi-infectious Conditions.* The psychoses in this group are caused by various toxins (poisons) which have invaded and injured the brain area. In the days when mercury was used in hat-making the "mad hatter," characterized by mental disturbances and the "shakes," dramatized this condition. Nearly every new industrial process is said to present possible hazards to workers' mental health. The excessive use of allegedly "harmless" drugs and sleeping pills may have a similar toxic effect, to say nothing of the mental disturbances which can be produced by the use of opium, cocaine, morphine, and marihuana.

The delirium tremens of the chronic alcoholic is a dramatic instance of mental disturbance caused likewise by a poison. It is said that toxins from badly infected teeth, tonsils, and sinuses occasionally cause mental disturbances also. Brief mental upsets, referred to usually as simple delirium rather than psychoses, sometimes accompany high fevers, diabetic or other common somatic (bodily) diseases. They too are believed to be caused by toxins.

II. OTHER ORGANIC CONDITIONS

It will be convenient to consider epilepsy and mental deficiency under this heading. Strictly speaking neither is a psychosis or neu-

rosis. Yet both are commonly associated with mental disorders. Both have organic causes.

Epilepsy. This is primarily a disorder of the brain. Tests show that the epileptic usually has a characteristic brain-wave record. There are two chief varieties of this ailment. In the major type, called *grand mal*, during an attack there is marked loss of consciousness accompanied by convulsions. In the less common *petit mal* form there may be only a momentary loss of consciousness and no convulsions. Some famous names in history were epileptics. Until recently, however, life for the average epileptic was more apt to be a story of social isolation, frequent loss of jobs, and consequent discouragement and embitterment.

It is believed that certain psychological manifestations take the place of convulsions in some epileptics. These may take the form of amnesia, dipsomania (impulsive alcoholism), or spells of intense irritability. In some of these "epileptic equivalent" manifestations the epileptic may be irresponsible. Sometimes it is difficult to differentiate between epilepsy and a neurosis known as hysteria.

Mental Deficiency. This disorder, also known as feeble-mindedness, was considered at some length in Chapter 1 in connection with heredity. It is the result of arrested brain development in early years. A psychosis, by way of contrast, involves a decline of earlier mental or emotional development. Strictly speaking, there are two major types of mental deficiency, the pathological and the subcultural. Pathological types include cretinism, Mongolian imbecility, and certain abnormal conditions which come either from heredity, prenatal or later brain injuries, or from diseases of infancy and early childhood.

Subcultural mental deficiency has no history of the above pathological causes. Although it is suspected that in most cases there is some hidden organic weakness in the brain, inferior cultural influences appear to be the chief factor. Some believe that on this account the condition should be called simply "mental retardation" on the assumption that theoretically at least it can be corrected. In most instances pathological mental deficiency cannot be remedied.

We have seen that the feeble-minded are divided into three classes: idiots, imbeciles, and morons. The last-named make up by far the largest group. The two lower grades are usually segregated in in-

stitutions for life. Morons can usually be trained to be self-supporting. If so they can be distinguished from mentally normal manual or unskilled laborers as a rule only when given intelligence tests. Like normal workers they may either possess or lack a sense of social responsibility. Likewise they may be either good or bad morally. Finally, under suitable conditions, like other people they may develop either a psychosis or a neurosis.

III. FUNCTIONAL CONDITIONS

Functional Psychoses and Neuroses. A crude analogy may help to illustrate the difference between an organic and a functional mental disorder. Consider two watches, one with a broken main spring and the other in perfect condition but keeping poor time because of the proximity of a powerful magnet. The first watch might be described as being organically defective; the second as functionally so. In the organic mental disorders either the brain or the upper level of the nervous system is imperfect. There is no known physical imperfection in functional disorders. A functional disorder may be either a psychosis or a neurosis. Sometimes but not always the latter precedes the former. Most of the latter never develop into psychoses.

Functional conditions classified as psychoses include dementia praecox, manic-depressive psychosis, and paranoia. The neuroses, also called psychoneuroses, include hysteria, psychasthenia, and neurasthenia. A functional condition is sometimes described as an "emotion gone wrong." Most of them are attributed to uncorrected faulty emotional habits commenced in childhood.

At the risk of oversimplification it may be said that faulty emotional habits are apt to follow either of two patterns. Some may incline towards the over-seclusive, self-conscious, sensitive, or introverted pattern. Others may veer in the direction of the thick-skinned, uninhibited, over-stimulated, or extroverted type. Both the introvert and extrovert are normal and most people show a mixture of these tendencies. Personality disorganization takes place usually only after the exclusive adoption of extreme tendencies in either of these directions over a long period of years. An uncorrected tendency towards extreme introversion might result in dementia praecox, paranoia,

psychasthenia, or neurasthenia. Uninhibited emotional tendencies in the opposite direction would be more likely to lead to manic-depressive psychosis or perhaps to hysteria.

The above two-fold classification of faulty emotional patterns underlines the important fact that explanations for the appearance of functional disorders are not to be sought in the immediate occasion which seems to precipitate them. The cause of these breakdowns is not, as commonly alleged, the death of a loved one, business failure, overwork, or even ordeals which "turn the hair white over night." The hair, by the way, never performs in this manner from internal causes. The cause of functional disorders is to be sought in faulty emotional habits engaged in over a considerable time before these dramatic incidents take place. First we shall consider the functional disorders, the majority, which seem to be most closely associated with extreme introversion.

Dementia praecox. This disorder, also known as schizophrenic psychosis, ranks close to senile psychosis in importance in most statistical reports. Usually the victims of these two disorders make up the majority of the inmates of state hospitals. Both are mental afflictions of a special age group, schizophrenia being associated with early maturity. It usually manifests itself between 18 and 35.

The Greek word *schizo* (to split or cleave) gives us the clue to the nature of this disorder. The victim appears to have cut himself off completely from his surroundings. After a number of years of living in a world of his own creation he has found it impossible to make the adjustments required by the ordinary give and take of group living. He has come to regard his day dreams as reality. He eventually reacts to his delusions as if they were true. At this stage it becomes evident that faulty emotional habits have figuratively forced the thinking process "out of gear." An actual "splitting" of the mind seems to have taken place.

Paranoia. Although this psychosis is often combined with some other mental disorder by itself it is rather uncommon. Very often the paranoiac appears to be normal except for his "pet subject." But his feelings about this central idea may be so violent that he becomes dangerous. Because of this, paranoia was formerly known as monomania. Some describe it as the psychosis of pride and hatred. It seems to evolve gradually from an uncorrected chronic introverted child-

hood attitude of conceit and suspicion. In its more advanced stages it is characterized by delusions of persecution or even of grandeur. It provides the most colorful of state hospital inmates, the type that uninformed visitors usually expect to see in larger numbers.

Psychasthenia. This psychoneurosis, also known as obsessive-compulsive neurosis, is usually characterized by inner feelings of inadequacy, morbid doubts, and anxiety. It expresses itself in many different forms varying from a relatively harmless and fairly common dread of closed places (claustrophobia) to more spectacular compulsions such as kleptomania and pyromania. The exact sequences which produce the mental conflicts and compulsions of this ailment are difficult to trace. It is believed, however, that emotional habits and experiences of childhood provide its subconscious background.

Neurasthenia. This neurosis is also characterized by feelings of inadequacy and anxiety. But where the fears and anxieties of the psychasthenic are specific ones which may lead to peculiar obsessions, those of the neurasthenic are more generalized. They manifest themselves in somatic ailments such as extreme fatigue, headaches, indigestion, dizziness, and insomnia. Neurasthenia is popularly known as "nervous exhaustion" or "nervous breakdown." Constant tiredness, characteristic of all neurasthenia, is caused by mental conflicts and frustrations. It is by far the most common of functional disorders. Most of the popular books on mental health are written for its victims.

In modern urban life few of us escape without a touch of what seems to be neurasthenia at some time or other. There is a growing tendency to make a distinction between true neurasthenia and what might be called "benign nervousness." The latter might be described as a temporary subneurotic condition. It is said to afflict nearly every white-collar worker in our society at some time or other. The two types can be identified by the reaction to diagnosis. The benign type is pleased when he learns there is nothing physically wrong with him; the true neurotic is disappointed.

Although the neurasthenic usually reports to a general practitioner for an imagined physical ailment, his difficulty is mental. Yet he seldom needs the expert attention of a psychiatrist. He suffers chiefly because he has failed to exercise proper emotional control. He has permitted ordinary prudent and necessary constructive anticipation of

future situations to degenerate into constant and fruitless worry. Worry is a type of fear. The close relationship between the tension brought about by prolonged worry and the functioning of the body is illustrated in many cases of peptic ulcer, mucous colitis, high blood pressure, and some forms of heart disease. In neurasthenia the physical ailment is much less serious than in these psychosomatic conditions and is often merely imagined. Like the other functional disorders considered up to this point, neurasthenia appears to afflict introverted personalities more often than extroverts. We shall turn now to disorders more closely allied with extroverted tendencies.

Manic-depressive psychosis. This psychosis seems to be associated more often with the extrovert. Manic-depressive psychosis may be characterized either by excitement, with overactivity; by depression, with psychomotor retardation; or finally by a mixture of these two emotional extremes. At one time it was called "circular insanity" because of sudden pendulum-like emotional shifts which sometimes take place. While in the depressive phase the victim often resembles the seclusive dementia-*praecox* patient. Yet for no apparent reason his mood may swing suddenly into the excited phase. While in this latter stage the patient was formerly known as a "raving maniac."

In those instances where this disorder first manifests itself at the time of the menopause or decline of the sex function in women it is described as involuntional melancholia. In such cases there may be an unusual endocrine imbalance which contributes to the depression. Usually, however, mental hygiene aspects are more important. It may be, for instance, that the patient has placed far too much emphasis upon physical attractiveness and romance in her philosophy of life. Back of this at any rate there is likely to be a long history of inadequate emotional control.

Hysteria. This, the last of the functional disorders to be considered here, is also known as "conversion neurosis." In hysteria some hidden emotional conflict is "converted" into the symptom of a physical ailment. In this psychoneurosis there was first of all a conflict between a person's ego and one of his basic drives. Through faulty repression a complex developed. Later this complex found an outlet from the not-conscious mind through some indirect somatic pathway, appearing, camouflaged and distorted, as a physical disorder. Yet the

victim is not malingering. He is totally unaware that his "ailment" lacks an organic basis. Neither does he suspect that his simulated disorder is usually the result of an unconscious attempt to escape reality.

Almost any conceivable physical or psychic ailment or condition may be simulated in hysteria. Partial paralysis, speech and sensory disturbances, and tics are among the most common manifestations. Tics are intermittent spasmodic or jerky movements which the individual seems helpless to control. Although some tics have an organic basis, this is not true when they are the result of hysteria.

Stupor and amnesia likewise may be of hysterical origin. (People commonly described as "hysterical" because of a sudden wild emotional demonstration are not victims of hysteria in the sense of the term as used here.) Amnesia or loss of memory for events of a circumscribed period of time is sometimes called "civilian shell shock" because of its frequent association with hysteria. It is a protective mechanism through which the mind sometimes attempts to make a subconscious detour when confronted with a very painful emotional conflict.

Hysteria in warfare. Shell shock was common during the early months of World War I. This term was applied to casualties which did not respond to the usual medical or surgical treatments for what then appeared to be serious physical ailments. Because of this it was assumed that reverberations caused by the heavy shells used for the first time in this war had somehow injured the physical structure of the nervous system. Yet in many instances there was no evidence of an exterior injury. At last psychiatrists were called into consultation and it was learned that these were actually "mental" cases or hysteria.

In the First World War it was found that the longer these patients were treated in base hospitals as non-neurotic patients the longer their apparent ailments lasted. Although most recovered when the war ended some never did get well. In World War II a new approach was adopted. "Shell shock," which was still associated with a mysterious or a serious ailment in the popular mind, was dropped. Such casualties were described instead merely as victims of "battle fatigue" or "combat exhaustion," far less impressive and mysterious labels. Furthermore, instead of being brought back to base hospitals they

were treated on the spot. As a result the number of cases of full-blown conversion hysteria was greatly reduced.

The cause of the inner emotional conflict which produces hysteria in military personnel is obvious. It is self-preservation competing with natural fear, horror, and revulsion. In civilian life the cause of the conflict is more difficult to identify. It may involve such matters as love, family responsibilities, fear of failure, and business worries. Although anyone may become temporarily emotionally unstrung as a result of some terrifying war or civilian experience, psychiatrists say that hysteria does not follow unless there is a previous background of faulty mental hygiene.

IV. BORDERLINE CONDITIONS

There are two rather common types of disorganized personality, the psychopathic personality and the alcoholic, that are difficult to pigeonhole. Sometimes they are classified simply as emotionally unstable or immature. Future research may suggest more exact categories. Since they do not seem to fit into any of the three divisions already considered we shall regard them as borderline conditions.

The Psychopathic Personality. There are some people who find unusual difficulty in resisting impulses and in learning from experience. They are selfish, often heartless, and lack a sense of family or social responsibility. Because of their general intractableness in conforming to conventional modes of behavior they are frequently in trouble. Yet they are not psychotic nor do they seem to fit into the categories of the neurotic or feebleminded. Lacking a better definition, we put them in a "grab bag" classification known as psychopathic personality.

Some psychopathic personalities who seem to be inferior also in their physical development are described as "constitutionally psychopathic inferiors." In all probability some sex perverts who are also either invert or hermaphrodites should, because of their somatic anomalies, be put in this subgroup. Yet most sex perverts are heterosexual and there appears to be no organic basis for their behavior. These, together with so-called pathological liars, appear to belong in the general psychopathic personality group. This group presents one of the chief problems faced by criminologists. They seem to be-

long in that twilight zone where psychiatry fades out and where religious and other character-building agencies must take over.

Alcoholism. We have seen that delirium tremens is a temporary mental aberration which sometimes develops in chronic drinkers. It is a toxi-infectious condition caused by a narcotic. Unfortunately, alcohol is widely regarded as a stimulant rather than a narcotic, probably because it either releases tensions or makes people forget that they are tired. The excessive use of alcohol, even though it never results in delirium tremens, is the cause of alcoholism. Drunkenness and alcoholism are not the same thing. Most people who get drunk occasionally are not alcoholics.

Alcoholics are "compulsive" drinkers. Their abuse of alcohol is brought about by some chronic inner emotional need or unresolved conflict. Their drinking is as compulsive as the terror of the enclosed victim of claustrophobia or the stealing of a kleptomaniac. In each instance the abnormal conduct is a symptom of some inner emotional maladjustment which the victim either does not understand or cannot easily control. It is on this account that it is said that every alcoholic is first of all a neurotic. In the sense that any functional neurosis is a disease alcoholism may be called a disease. Its source is emotional, however, rather than somatic. It is expected that now that more people are living longer the statistical curve of alcoholism, like that of cancer, heart disease, and other middle-life disorders, will go up.

Who Is Normal? The study of borderline conditions and neuroses raises the question, "Who is normal?" Psychiatrists reply that almost everyone at times is a bit neurotic. Perfectly "normal" people who have no anxieties, fears, prejudices or vices, or who are not over-sensitive, over-conscientious or plagued by occasional feelings of inferiority are extremely rare, to say the least. According to the Christian concept of original sin there is no such person. The anonymous sage must have observed this when he said to his wife, "All the world is queer but me and thee, dear; and sometimes I think thee a little queer." If the student looking into this subject for the first time fails to find some "abnormal trends" in his own make-up he is a very unusual person. This in fact may be a good indication that he needs the attention of a psychiatrist!

"Schizoid maneuvers," or mental dodges to escape reality, as well as moody gyrations suggestive of manic-depressive psychosis, have

been pointed out many times in normal personalities. So too have "paranoid" temperaments which are reflected by chronic fault-finding. Many reformers are said to manifest this temperament. Martin Ebon (*World Communism Today*, 1948) found paranoid characteristics in much of the writing and talking of Communists. Such being the case it would seem best to describe the "normal" individual simply as one who makes a reasonably satisfactory adjustment to his environment. It need not be a perfect adjustment. In Elton Mayo's *Some Notes on the Psychology of Pierre Janet* (1948) it is further observed that the normal person keeps in touch with both reality and experience. He can turn his attention easily to any object or topic which the environment presents. He engages in "reflective thinking," constantly rearranging his knowledge in the light of experience.

V. SOCIAL CAUSES OF FUNCTIONAL DISORDERS

Common sense dictates that personality integration cannot but be upset at times in our present society with its international tensions, economic worries, strikes, housing crises, and rising divorce rate. With frantic radio newscasters shrieking "crisis" at almost every hour of the day it would appear that emotional calm is now possible only on a Trappist mountain. In addition to these general influences there are specific factors which have been singled out as noteworthy influences in the production of many functional disorders. It is often difficult to say which factors are more important. We shall consider three general influences which are typically American: modern mobility, "momism," and the "American Way." Since these influences extend beyond the threshold of individual families, they may be described as social causes.

1. *Modern Mobility.* Ours has become a population literally "on the move." Youth shifts from country to city. Urban dwellers move not only from one part of town to another but with almost equal facility to far distant cities. Members of the family leave each morning and travel long distances to work. Both family and community ties are broken down in these various migrations. Gradually local controls cease to exist. The neighborhood becomes nothing more than a geographical area. Its social significance is lost.

Mobility of this sort is new to mankind. We may learn to adjust to it. Meanwhile school, church, and recreational-group influences on the individual are greatly weakened. Both families and individuals become anonymous. The child, intended by nature to have the influence of two parents, sees his father only evenings and week-ends. Perhaps his mother is also employed outside the home. Both parents and children suffer emotionally from this modern mobility. Insecurities result which sometimes play a part in the development of functional personality disorders. We shall consider mobility again in Chapter 14, Rural and Urban Factors.

2. "*Momism.*" In his *Their Mothers' Sons* (1946) Edward A. Strecker attributed a large percentage of psychoneuroses to American mothers who refuse to let their children "grow up." This failure, he says, is due to the emotional insecurity of mothers. Ferdinand Lundberg and Marynia F. Farnum make a similar charge. They attribute this insecurity and its consequent neuroses largely to the fact that motherhood now has little prestige in our society. They claim that the valued woman is the childless one who takes up a career. "Despite the supreme importance placed today upon motherhood, in theory," they say, "it has long been the prevailing mood of the intelligentsia, which establishes patterns of thinking, to look upon it with scorn."² If these writers are correct in their analysis of the current evaluation and security of mothers we have here a possible social cause of emotional disorders which is probably new in world history.

3. *The "American Way."* The American free-competition "success" tradition also contributes to unhappiness and neuroses. The Horatio Alger rags-to-riches theme is usually presented to youth with little regard for blunt realities. Parents, particularly middle-class folks, often make youth's problem even more complicated by constantly exerting pressure upon him to achieve their frustrated wish for some "higher" calling. Yet there are not enough white-collar positions to go around; occupational frustration must follow.

We pay a high personal price for our competitive individualistic culture. Competition pervades almost every detail of our personal lives. Brothers and sisters compete and husbands and wives often engage in an endless battle for supremacy. The effect of all this competition, says Karen Horney, is to create contempt for the unsuccess-

cessful, envy of the successful, and distrust of everyone. A considerable amount of aggressiveness is required in the competitive struggle. Yet our religious tradition dictates that we be modest and unselfish. An emotional conflict is bound to result.

Horney believes that we are too prone to attribute success to personal qualities such as ability, energy, and courage which loomed large in America's pioneer days of unlimited natural resources. We fail to admit that regardless of personal qualities under modern conditions only a comparatively few can hope to rise above mediocrity. Chance and other factors may be more important today than the qualities that brought success on the frontier. One does not have to be a cynic to recognize the fact that even asocial personal qualities may play a considerable part in "success" today.³

VI. PERSONALITY REORGANIZATION

From Etiology to Therapy. Our study of the nature and causes of personality disorganization should have eliminated by now most of the shroud of mystery that so often surrounds these conditions in the student's mind. Brief consideration of the therapy used in treating mental disorders should dispel any remaining mystery. The measures which are used in the modern attack on these conditions are relatively easy to comprehend. Many of them involve matters about which sociologists are vitally concerned. We have already considered the attack upon feeble-mindedness. We shall take up first here the therapy used in dealing with three other important conditions with an organic basis: senile psychosis, paresis, and epilepsy.

Senile Psychosis. We shall start with the disorder for which the least can be done. People must die some time. The human machine must wear out eventually. Since senile psychosis is a phase of bodily deterioration, evidently it cannot be corrected any more than old age can be "cured." Yet there is some reasonable expectation, however, that a considerable amount of senile psychosis may be prevented in the near future. This hope springs from the recent development of geriatrics, a new branch of medicine in which attention is focussed upon the special needs of the aged.

It may well be that means will be found to prevent hardening of the arteries. Such an achievement would be reflected in a reduction

of senile psychosis, since it has been found that this disorder does not depend upon the degeneration of brain cells alone. Circulatory and metabolic deficiencies also play a part. Mental hygiene also seems to figure somewhat in the incidence of this organic psychosis. It has been observed that stable personalities are able to withstand a considerable amount of cerebral damage without developing a frank psychosis. Even sociological factors are related to this condition. Where society denies status to the aged as it does in urban United States it adds to the stress and strain of that period of life. Under urban conditions, moreover, institutional care must be provided for most of those afflicted with this psychosis.

Paresis. A generation ago the prospect for paretics was even less favorable than it was for senile conditions. With the development of fever therapy and penicillin in the treatment of syphilis the prospect changed almost over night. Paretics, formerly institutional cases for life, may now be released if their mental deterioration has not progressed too far. Theoretically it is now possible to make syphilis a thing of the past. But to our surprise and sorrow, knowledge of the new treatments for syphilis appears to have boomeranged. It has caused people to become more careless in exposing themselves to infection. Recently our military authorities recognized this by pointing out that control of venereal diseases depends more upon character building than medication.

Epilepsy. Although this is one of the oldest known diseases of mankind it is still referred to as the "forgotten disorder." Even so, recently considerable progress has been made in treating epilepsy. Although modern medical treatments do not bring about a complete cure, they enable most victims to control fits and seizures. Through the use of new drugs the burden of the epileptic has been lightened. Only a small percentage needs custodial care. It has been estimated that four-fifths of epileptics can now lead normal lives.

Treatment of Functional Conditions. We shall consider first the therapy for psychotic patients and some of the somewhat spectacular treatments used for both psychotics and neurotics. Later we shall refer to the ordinary treatments for neuroses. At this point then we shall take up institutional treatment, shock treatments, surgery, and finally the use of narcotics and hypnotism.

Institutional Care of the Mentally Deranged. Recent movies, books,

and "exposure" literature have focussed attention upon "sensational" conditions in many state institutions for the care of psychotics. In so far as this excitement prompts taxpayers to favor more adequate government appropriations for the upkeep of mental hospitals, it serves a valuable purpose. All too often, however, it creates a sympathy for patients and a fear of institutional treatment without adequate concern for the staff forced to maintain these institutions under present conditions. Although we cry "shame" at the pictures of conditions in these "Snake Pits" the shame is on ourselves as taxpayers.

There is nothing mysterious about the treatments used in hospitals for the mentally ill. For those who are regarded as incurable, and the aged make up a large portion of this group, mere custodial care is required. Many need to be provided for as children with more emphasis upon nursing care than restraint. The treatment prescribed for the second group, those whose mental condition may be improved, is largely a matter of the use of common-sense therapies which leave the patients no time to retreat into their own sick fancies. This may be described briefly as emotional reëducation. The care of both groups suffers when institutions are overcrowded and poorly equipped. The various programs and procedures followed in institutional care are fully described in non-technical books such as Edith M. Stern's: *Mental Illness: A Guide for the Family* (1942).

Shock Treatments. The ordinary process of emotional reëducation must of necessity take time, since it now appears that the majority of functional disorders are the result of years of faulty mental hygiene. In the treatment of some disorders this educational process has been speeded up by shock therapy. Shocks induced by insulin, metrazol, and electricity have been effective in many cases of manic-depressive psychosis and schizophrenia. Some success has followed such therapy in treating hysteria also. It is believed that with the further development of electric treatments which may be given quickly and without injury to the patient the use of this therapy will be extended.

No one knows exactly how shock therapy works. There appears to be no organic change. Possibly the violence of the experience and the brief coma somehow have the effect of literally "jarring" a disordered mind out of its pathologic mood. Maybe we have a rough parallel in a neurasthenic who temporarily forgets his ailments at

a time of great excitement or when on vacation. The shocked patient usually expresses his deeper conflicts at the moment of returning to consciousness. This knowledge provides his psychiatrist with information which may help further in speeding up reëducation. At present, however, these treatments involve certain dangers, particularly the loss of recent memory.

Surgery. Surgery has long been used in the treatment of traumatic psychoses. Recently a new type has been introduced for functional psychoses. Prefrontal lobotomy, in gradual use since 1935, is beneficial in certain types of aggravated conditions, particularly schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis. This operation is dangerous and is restricted therefore to patients who otherwise would be incurable. It consists in cutting part of the frontal lobes of the brain.

The operation seems to cut off certain emotional phases of the personality from conscious drives. Although it is claimed that intelligence is not impaired, it has been found that there is a marked diminution of foresight and initiative. Even the advocates of this operation admit that only about 30 per cent of lobotomized patients are able to leave institutions and return to productive lives. About an equal number are said to improve to such an extent that their hospital care is less of a problem.

Narcosynthesis and Hypnotism. We saw that the use of a new on-the-spot therapy for hysteria greatly reduced the incidence of this disorder in World War II. A part of this therapy consisted in the immediate use of a narcotic drug (some "truth serum" such as sodium amytal) which encouraged the emotionally-upset victim to relax and "talk out" his inner emotional conflict. It has long been known that an emotional catharsis relieves tension in any mental crisis and so reduces the danger of an emotional crash. It is not surprising then that wartime narcosynthesis has since proved successful in the treatment of amnesia and other manifestations of "civilian shell shock."

Jean Charcot, Freud's teacher, showed that hypnotism is effective in the treatment of psychoneuroses. But hypnotism has been associated so often with quackery that most psychiatrists have hesitated to use it. Some success has been reported recently, however, in the use of hypnotism by psychiatrists in treating hysteria. Many psychiatrists put cures through hypnotism in the same class as suggestion or "faith" cures. It has long been known that many of man's

ailments have a psychogenetic basis and so are amenable to cures that operate through the mind.

Franz Werfel's *Song of Bernadette* (1942) directed world attention to cures taking place at the French shrine at Lourdes. Although it is admitted by officials at the shrine that the great majority of cures, involving functional disorders, may be due to suggestion, there are a few—an average of perhaps fifteen a year—which are so remarkable that there is no known medical explanation for them. Many Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic visitors who have examined the medical records and X-ray pictures of these suddenly cured organic conditions regard them as miraculous. This should not be so surprising to those who accept the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Although modern materialists scoff at the idea, believers have asked for divine favors in every age and culture. Who knows but what major or minor miracles take place frequently in response to simple bed-side prayers?

Character Education and Personality Reorganization. Most of the treatments for functional disorders, whether given inside or outside of institutions, might well be classified under the head of character education. This is especially true of treatments for neuroses and borderline conditions. Fulton Oursler describes a famous psychiatrist who used to tell his patients that more diseases are caused by grudges, hates, and brooding over slights than by germs. He claimed that a person's attitude very often determined both his physical and mental health. His best prescription for health was to learn to see things "as they are." This therapy is reflected in an old prayer, recommended by Oursler, which goes: "God grant me the courage to change the things I can change, the serenity to accept those I cannot change, and the wisdom to know the difference."⁴

The remarkable success of Alcoholics Anonymous recently in helping compulsive drinkers to change their ways has aroused new interest in the place of old-fashioned character education in personality reorganization. The admission by military authorities that medical means alone cannot solve the venereal disease problem is another indication of this trend.

Alcoholics Anonymous is an organization of ex-drinkers founded only a little over a dozen years ago. It now includes thousands of members. While its therapy rests upon an ultimate appeal to a Higher Power (God, or whatever Force the member prefers) for strength

to resist the urge to drink the organization has no connection with any religious group. Yet its success has won the praise of all, including the medical profession. Its fame, moreover, has stimulated new interest in the problem of alcoholism.

One of the developments which followed the success of the Alcoholics Anonymous method was the establishment of a research and treatment clinic at Yale University. Here it has been found that compulsive drinking is not a mere medical problem, but one involving important psychiatric, psychological, and social aspects as well. Treatment at clinics following the Yale technique is aimed at enabling the former alcoholic to live acceptably without alcohol. It is pointed out that there is no known "cure" for a compulsive drinker, if by cure it is meant that following treatment alcohol can be used safely thereafter. Treatment is based on the idea that alcoholics are persons who are psychologically maladjusted to group living. They must be taught how to live in normal social units with others. Institutional treatments often fail, it is said, because they teach how to live only in an artificial institutional world.

Alcoholics Anonymous likewise has been successful partly because it directs its treatment at the psychological and social maladjustments which cause compulsive drinking. First of all it provides the alcoholic with a social group which does not increase his feeling of guilt. As he forms contacts within the group he begins to take an objective interest in its members. Eventually as he makes progress in self-control he finds someone below him whom he can help. The organization regards this "giving of self" (which corresponds to fraternal charity in the Christian tradition) an important part of the cure. Thus we find practical confirmation of the adage that psychiatric information alone, like sex education alone, cannot solve man's personality problems.

The success of the Alcoholics Anonymous approach has encouraged the development of a somewhat similar "group psychotherapy" for the treatment of non-alcoholics who nevertheless may be suffering from somewhat similar emotional ills. Practical considerations such as the shortage of psychiatrists and the great expense of private treatment have fostered this trend. It is said that in private practice it sometimes takes daily interviews with a psychiatrist over a period of three years before a cure can be effected. Few patients have time

or money for such care. In group psychotherapy a dozen or more patients gather at regular intervals under the leadership of a psychiatrist and discuss personal problems of mental health. Each is helped by listening to and making suggestions about the difficulties of the others. Where disorders are not too far advanced this therapy is said to bring excellent results with little cost.

Character education, whether utilized in ordinary institutional treatment, in private psychiatric practice, or in connection with Alcoholics Anonymous or group therapy, must be based upon some sort of values. Up to now in the United States at least the ultimate values utilized in character education have been those contained in the Judaeo-Christian tradition and reflected in Thanksgiving Day proclamations and in the prayers which open the sessions of Congress. These values have given us a Christian philosophy. It will be important then to consider briefly the nature of the philosophy of modern psychiatry.

The Philosophy of Psychiatry. Sigmund Freud, an Austrian neurologist who is widely regarded as the founder of psychiatry, was a militant atheist. While clinging loyally to his social position as a Jew he scorned the Jewish faith as he did all religion. He even developed a "Messianic conviction" that his psychoanalysis made him the prophet of a new substitute for religion. Freud at any rate founded psychoanalysis. He developed it out of an older treatment of hysteria.

Freud replaced hypnosis as a method by what is now called the "free association of ideas." This, the method of psychoanalysis, is based upon the "calling up" of one idea by means of another previously linked to it. This approach to the not-conscious mind assumes that a complex of repressed impressions underlies all personality disorders. A cure can be effected frequently merely by having a psychoanalyst help in bringing these impressions back to the conscious mind. The most widely publicized use of this method requires that the patient lie prone on a couch and while relaxed talk at random. This, the "cathartic method" or "talking cure" used by all Freudians, assumes that the troublesome strangulated emotions buried in the subconscious were originally disagreeable and usually of a sexual nature.

"Freud" then means both a philosophy and a method of treat-

ment. The philosophy of Freud has aroused so much opposition both inside and outside of the medical profession that today most psychoanalysts prefer to call themselves psychiatrists. It is said that only a small percentage of some 4,000 psychiatrists in the United States are now Freudian "couch psychiatrists" such as we usually see featured in the movies.

Carl G. Jung is generally regarded today as the world's outstanding psychotherapist. His philosophy is so diametrically opposed to that of Freud that it is hard to realize that both belong to the same profession. In his *The Integration of the Personality* (1940) he not only finds a place for but a tremendous need for religion. Unlike Freud he is not preoccupied with sex. Unfortunately, many of the prominent names in American psychiatry, including the Menningers, are associated with at least earlier endorsements of the philosophy of Freud. Of late, however, most of our psychiatrists have been quietly dropping off the Freud band-wagon.

Most psychiatrists have come to recognize that a large part of their therapy is fundamentally character education. Instead of attempting either to set up a substitute "religion" or to take a detached Olympian position with regard to morals they are more inclined now to accept the philosophy and values which have been tested through the ages of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Dr. William C. Menninger, president of the American Psychiatric Association, recognized this recently when he pointed out that while the minister of religion deals with *real* guilt over transgression of moral laws the psychiatrist deals with the irrational guilt of the emotionally disturbed.⁵ Some observers of this recent trend have said that it indicates that psychiatry, not yet sixty years old, is at last coming of age.

With this chapter we conclude Part One, Man and Society. Having considered basic information about the nature of man and society from the fields of biology, anthropology, and psychology we should be prepared now to approach more intelligently the study of his group behavior in Part Two, The Principles of Sociology.

NOTES

1. Editorial, *Collier's*, March 29, 1947.
2. *Modern Woman: the Lost Sex*, 1947, p. 124.
3. "Culture and Neurosis," *American Sociological Review*, Volume I (1936), pp. 221-30. For additional material bearing on social psychiatry see articles

- by Gillin, Alexander, Fromm, Benedict, and Mead in Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray, *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture*, 1948; also H. Warren Dunham, "Social Psychiatry," *American Sociological Review*, Volume XIII (1948), pp. 183-97.
4. "The Way You Look at It," *Reader's Digest*, April, 1948.
 5. "Are You Always Worrying?" *Time*, October 25, 1948, pp. 64 ff. For a brief description of some of the limitations of modern psychiatry and mental hygiene see Leslie B. Hohman, "We Need Facts in Psychiatry," *The Child*, August, 1948, pp. 25-6.

Part Two

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY

In Part Two emphasis will shift from marginal areas of study to the analysis of society as a going concern. Here we shall deal more directly with social relationships or "men in interdependence." We shall be concerned with such core topics of sociology as the social structure, social functions, social interaction, and social change. A knowledge of man's social nature and his heritages will be assumed.

In the study of man's group relationships certain basic ideas are gradually emerging. In so far as these are scientifically demonstrated explanations of social relationships they may be described as "principles of sociology."

IV. THE COMMUNITY

12

Geographical and Ecological Factors

I. SOCIOLOGY AND COMMUNITY STUDIES

From Backgrounds to Principles. In Part One, Man and Society, the emphasis was chiefly upon man. We considered in particular his biological and cultural heritage and social nature. Since man is so closely tied up with society, we could not avoid touching upon the nature of society also. In Part Two, Principles of Sociology, the emphasis will be chiefly on society. The principles of sociology will be found to be fundamental truths which have been observed in the study of group relations of human beings. In most instances they refer to the relationships themselves. This will be especially true with respect to the social processes. In other instances principles of sociology will be drawn from the study of personal rôles in society. In any event, these principles may be regarded as statements of what we may expect to happen under given conditions.

Although the nature of sociology will be considered at some length in Chapter 22, Sociology and Social Thought, it will be well to define it briefly here. Then we shall consider in more detail what is meant by society, neighborhood, community, and community research. This will put us in a position to understand the treatment of geographical, ecological, demographic, rural, and urban factors in the pages which follow.

Sociology is defined in E. B. Reuter's *Handbook of Sociology* (1941) as "the discipline that undertakes to isolate and define the processes of social interaction that result in human personality and social organization." Although there are various definitions of sociology the beginner should remember that all agree that sociology is a branch of knowledge and not a therapy.

Society. Thoreau, a lover of solitude, said "We live thick and

stumble over one another." To make social life tolerable, he said, "We have had to agree on a certain set of rules, called etiquette and politeness." This observation focusses attention upon organization, the essential element in social life. When a group of people become organized and consider themselves as a distinct unit a society is born.

Unfortunately, the word *society* is used in more than one sense. In sociology, which etymologically is the "study of society," the emphasis is chiefly upon social relationships or processes rather than persons. Sociology is concerned with the nature of the abstract pattern of social interaction that exists among members of a social group. In his *The Social Process* (1918), Charles H. Cooley defined *society* as "a complex of forms or processes each of which is living and growing by interaction with the others, the whole being so unified that what takes place in one part affects all the rest."

Neighborhood and Community. In his analysis of the special pattern of interaction which takes place in the neighborhood Cooley directed attention to the intimate or primary-group nature of these personal contacts. Here we see the chief difference between the neighborhood and the community. Both are geographical or locality groups, in addition to being social units, but they differ in size and especially in their degree of formal organization. A *neighborhood* is a small, informally organized local area of personal relations and primary contacts.

A *community*, according to one definition, is a local area, larger and more formally organized than a neighborhood, in which people share common experiences and have a sense of belonging together. A community may be made up of clusters of neighborhoods. It is served and to a considerable extent united by common schools, churches, and stores. We shall see that while the names continue to be used, in some areas of our cities relationships have become so impersonal that both communities and neighborhoods are now little more than mere "locality" groups. Community, according to a broader definition, is the total organization of social life in a limited area.

Types of Communities. Communities may be classified in at least two ways. First their major activity or economic interest may be emphasized. Thus we speak of farming, lumbering, mining, manufacturing, resort, and college communities. Communities may be

regarded also as population aggregates. In Western civilization the five most important communities of this type are the village, open-country neighborhood, towns and cities, the metropolis, and the region. Villages range from 250 to 2,500 in population. Centers with fewer than 250 inhabitants are usually called hamlets. Villages may be of the farming, rural non-farm, industrial, or suburban type. The open-country neighborhood is a survival from the American frontier. It is made up of individual families separated by some distance but united in their social organization through a hamlet with its general store and church at the crossroads.

Urban communities, according to the United States Census, are those with a population of 2,500 or more. Towns range from 2,500 to 5,000. The larger areas by state charter are known as cities. The metropolis is a city with a total population of 100,000 or more living either in its center or in contiguous minor political areas.

We are accustomed to "sectionalism" in American politics. It is recognized that different areas, such as the North and South, have very divergent interests. Sociologists have further divided the United States into cultural areas or regions. Howard W. Odum describes six regions—the Northeast, Middle States, Southeast, Southwest, Northwest, and Far West. Each region is said to have fairly homogeneous physical characteristics, economic factors, cultural developments, and population trends. Odum, more than anyone else, has fostered the study of regional sociology.

Early Community Research. The period from 1895 to 1915 in American sociology was marked by a normative-meliorative approach to the study of communities. Social actionists studied city, village, and farm with the idea of correcting existing evils. Broad surveys were made in addition to a few narrower analytical studies. During the period from 1915 to 1930 the study of the community was gradually geared to what has come to be regarded as a "sociological," in contradistinction to the social action, viewpoint. At first there was "an assiduous accumulation of multitudinous facts." Gradually, however, hypotheses came to be formulated and attempts were made to generalize about this new welter of facts. The most notable example of this trend was the development of human ecology with its zonal hypothesis of city growth.

Recent Community Research. Although there has been a continua-

tion of ecological studies since 1930, two new types of studies, the structural and the typological, have tended to overshadow them. The *structural*, also called the stratification approach, was ushered in by the Lynd's two *Middletown* studies. This approach directs attention to the close interrelations between the social or class structure of a town and the daily life of the people. It is the approach of social anthropology. The more recent Warner *Yankee City* series follows the same approach. The *Middletown* studies emphasized a working class-business class dichotomy. Later ones utilize additional class divisions. All assume that membership in a particular social class greatly influences what a person does daily and throughout his life.

The *typological* approach seeks to isolate particular forms of social organization and to construct either typical personality types or characteristic ways of life which are supposed to be directly associated with them.¹ The idea of "typing" communities has a precedent in what we call "folk sociology," the current body of social wisdom at the common-sense level. Here, for example, we find reference to distinct city and country types of personalities and ways of acting. We shall consider structural and typological studies in subsequent chapters. The remainder of this one will deal with geographical and ecological social thought.

II. MAN AND HIS PHYSICAL HABITAT

Geographic and Ecological Viewpoints. Environment includes all the agencies from without which influence man. We have seen that there are two chief kinds of environment, the social and the physical. The social environment is the sum total of the patterns of culture, social processes, and social institutions that impinge directly upon the individual. The study of sociology is largely the consideration of man and his reaction to his social environment. But if the picture is to be rounded out sociology must also consider the relationship between man and his physical surroundings.

The folklore of all peoples is filled with theories about the influence of physical surroundings or "natural" features such as topography, physiography, flora, fauna, weather, soil, geology, and natural resources upon man and his culture. Aristotle, Hippocrates, Cicero, and Confucius wrote about it. So did Bodin, Montesquieu, and

especially Buckle. It remained for a German, Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), to make these so-called geographical influences the subject of special study. He called this anthropogeography. We shall consider this older field of thought before taking up ecology. But a few brief observations about the nature of ecology and its relation to geographic social thought are in order here.

The term *ecology* was coined by Hacckel in 1869 to describe the study of the relationships existing between plant and animal organisms and their habitats. Long before this, of course, it had been observed that it is necessary for one plant or animal to suffer if another is to live. Competition and conflict resulting from relative scarcity usually characterize the interdependencies among these organisms, sometimes described as the "web of life" or "balance of nature." Thus the emphasis in ecology is more upon biology and biological analogies than upon geography proper.

The special study of human ecology commenced about twenty-five years ago. It focussed attention upon man's place in a complex network of interconnected organisms. But long before this there had been speculation about the influence of the biological habitat upon man. The debilitating effect of swamp-born malaria upon the Sumerian and Roman civilizations was pointed out by early historians. This at least was recognition of man's place in the web of organic life.

Modern human ecology may be regarded as a later development of geographic social thought. Very often it is difficult to distinguish between geographical and ecological factors in modern sociological studies. Bogardus says, "Within recent years anthropo-geographic thought has appeared in a new form with new tendencies. Human ecology is the new name."² We shall examine these "new tendencies" after first considering the older ones in this field of social thought.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL HABITAT

Buckle and Geographical Determinism. H. T. Buckle (1821-1862), an English historian, thought that a knowledge of the influence of physical forces such as climate, food, soil, and the general aspects of nature was a prerequisite for an understanding of history. In his *History of Civilization in England* these forces were regarded not only as "keys to the world's progress" but as actually deterministic.

Climate determined the energy and regularity of man's labor. The quality of the soil regulated the returns made to labor. The birth rate was dependent upon the food supply. Even man's imagination and his various intellectual activities, he said, are regulated by certain general aspects of nature. Buckle believed, for instance, that in areas where nature inspires terror, man seems so inferior by comparison that he "feels" rather than "thinks" about things. On the other hand, in more placid settings where hurricanes, pestilences and earthquakes do not occur, man, more confident, dares to assert his reason. He may even attempt to dominate nature. Thus geographic factors were described by Buckle as determining the course of civilization.

Toynbee and the Stimulus of Hard Countries. It has been said that all English social thought during the last hundred years has tended to emphasize either the cultural evolution theory of Herbert Spencer or some variation of Buckle's geographic determinism. In the six volumes of Arnold J. Toynbee's *A Study of History* so far published there is considerable evidence of unusual concern about geographic influences. Although Toynbee does not go to the extremes of Buckle, the importance which he gives to the "challenge" of the "stimulus of hard countries" in the cyclical rise and fall of peoples reflects a similar respect for geographic influences.

Toynbee gives as one example of the "hard country" challenge the plight of the primitive hunters of North Africa at the end of Europe's last Ice Age. With the change in climate in North Africa what was once a grassy plain now became a desert. The ways in which different groups of people responded to this challenge determined not only their future history but that of the world. Two groups simply drifted, failing to meet the challenge. One of these remained in the desert and became the nomadic herdsmen of modern times. The other drifted southward with the supply of game. There, in a moist climate, they became the ancestors of the primitive hunters of Central and South Africa. A third group actually met the challenge. They moved into the previously uninhabited Nile swamplands and undertook to drain and cultivate the fertile land. In so doing they laid the foundations for later Egyptian civilization. Similar "challenges" to geographical factors, says Toynbee, mark the course of civilization. They provided the background for the "cycles" of history.

The Study of Human Geography. The viewpoint of the old Ger-

man school of anthropogeography started by Ratzel is found in the United States today in the study of what is called human geography. It is reflected to a considerable extent also in modern geopolitics. This latter study considers government policies in the light of the resources of the earth and the size of population. It assumed great importance in Nazi Germany. Ellsworth Huntington (1876–1947) was America's best-known exponent of human geography. His *Mainsprings of Civilization* (1945), much like Buckle's and Toynbee's works, gave great emphasis to the rôle of physical environment in influencing history.

Huntington emphasized especially the influence of climate upon civilization. He showed that the earliest civilizations of the West remained in warm areas adjacent to the Mediterranean because their technique of life could not cope with cold weather. Later, with new techniques, civilization moved northward. Most modern centers of culture are located in areas of periodic storms which, he said, stimulate mental activity. Huntington suggested that in Russia, where the technique of keeping warm is just now catching up with an overstimulating cold climate, the next great extension of civilization may take place.

Topography, another aspect of the geographical environment, figures in folk speculations as well as in the theses of historians. Such words as *hillbilly* and *urbanity* attest to the recognized influence of topographical characteristics upon man's conduct. It is rather obvious that physical isolation encourages social isolation, whereas physical accessibility fosters social contacts. Very often the character of nations and tribes appears to be explainable in terms of the location of mountainous terrains, coastal plains, and river valleys. Yet topography is subject to cultural modifications. Each new improvement in transportation and communication modifies the significance of what previously constituted natural barriers. It is said that the average New York commuter travels further in a day than the average Chinese peasant does in a lifetime.

Myopic Viewpoint of Geographical Interpretations. Sweeping generalizations based upon the alleged determining influence of geographical factors, or the "fundament" as they are called, usually underestimate other factors. Technology regulates the economic importance of particular natural resources. Thus it is that the pres-

sure of physical environment is especially strong among primitive people, whereas it diminishes on higher cultural levels. Contacts between societies and the resulting diffusion of ideas are important to social progress, but culture may be transmitted in spite of physical barriers. It is generally said today that natural factors may place limitations upon the development of culture, but they do not determine culture in detail. Any physical environment permits a number of alternate cultural adaptations. With further advances in man's culture many relatively undeveloped tropical and arctic regions may yet prove to be as hospitable to civilization as the temperate zone.

The tendency of some historians, philosophers, and geographers to draw broad conclusions based upon the apparent influence of the physical environment is easy to understand. Many of these conclusions seem to reveal startling "keys to world progress." Yet almost all of these ambitious projects have a common weakness. They assume, more or less, that all correlations between the fundement and culture mean something. They may not. MacIver emphasizes this error when he points out that "correlation is not explanation . . . a perfect correlation would not establish causation."³

It is now believed that more exact evaluations of the influence of physical factors can come only from research which greatly restricts the field of observation. In recent years there has been a number of such studies in which the orbit of possible geographical influence has been considerably limited. These narrower projects provide a better chance for eliminating some of the variables that have made most of the broader observations suspect. We shall select a few of the most significant ones. The studies will be reported first, followed by an interpretation of them.

Restricted Measurements of Geographical Influence. Huntington said that human inheritance, growth, and function are directly related to sun spots and weather cycles. In the north temperate zone those who are the most vigorous physically and mentally tend to be born in February or March. Such people, conceived in June, benefit throughout life from the favorable climatic conditions prevailing at the time of the union of the spermatozoa and ova. Thus man is largely the product of his meteorological environment. Let us see to what extent this estimate has been verified by narrower studies.

W. G. Bowerman's *Studies in Genius* (1947), based upon statistical

analysis, found that the largest percentage of American geniuses was born in January. This nearly corroborated Huntington's estimate. But the estimates of two prominent American bioclimaticians, Drs. W. F. Peterson and C. A. Mills, do not coincide so closely with Huntington's conclusion. They favor "first half of the year" conceptions. Peterson regards offspring conceived anytime during the first half of the year as superior, while Mills favors especially January to March conceptions.

Peterson (*The Patient and the Weather*, 1946) was also concerned about the continuing relationship between meteorological environment and postnatal growth and function. He found that in the north temperate zone spring is a dangerous period of development. In March and April the low ebb of vitality is reached, after which the body undergoes a jerky, uphill climb to summer's well-being. "Spring fever" is an irregular cycle of alternating days of elation and fatigue which is recorded in human conduct. This period was said to produce most deaths and mental disorders. Peterson's observations are not new. Volumes have been written by physicians and scientists on the influence of climate upon the human organism. Astrology is notorious for its meteorological determinism.

Biologists have speculated also about the effect of climate on fertility. Some have suggested that the increase in warmth which accompanied the recession of the glaciers may by now be gradually decreasing human fertility. Studies of animal life indicate that the cells which produce the male sperms will not tolerate as much heat as the somatic or body cells. It has even been proposed that with our increasing warmth some species will gradually die off, unless nature evolves some air-conditioning process for them. The dinosaur, they say, may have died out because a cycle of warm weather made it sterile. Some of the older studies which claimed that the age at menarche (the first menstruation) is earlier in the tropics reflected a somewhat similar attempt to find a relationship between climate and human fertility.

Physicians from time to time have maintained that not only infectious diseases and body resistance but even failure in the circulatory system, defective metabolism, and dental caries are influenced by climatic factors. Recently Peterson and a few others even proposed that there is a mysterious "atmospheric substance"—a gas perhaps—the

amount of which fluctuates and so has a definite effect upon disease. Certainly there has been no dearth of effort to prove a possible relationship between the physical environment and body functions.

At the end of the last century, European criminologists attempted to show that there is a direct causal relationship between crime and the physical environment. Cesare Lombroso cited statistics which indicated a maximum of crimes against persons in the mountainous districts, whereas the level countries had a higher percentage of crimes against property. The mountains, argued Lombroso, offered more opportunities for ambushes; level regions make for larger aggregations of population and so for a higher percentage of crimes against property. Certain other European criminologists went even further in alleging geographical determinism. They said that crimes against persons are greater in warm countries because heat stimulates the emotions and so increases irritability.

Weaknesses in Restricted Studies. Even the above studies, based more upon restricted measurements of geographical influence than those of Huntington, are subject to criticism. Most of the "best time to be born" predictions are based upon studies of famous men and women of the past. In the past, and even as recently as a generation ago, summer was the dangerous season for birth because of the high death rate from hot-weather ailments, especially diarrhea and enteritis. Spring was a much safer period. But with both of these intestinal disorders conquered as a result of medical progress today, most physicians say now that summer is the best time to be born. From this we see that progress of medical science is a cultural variable that must be considered in measuring the effect of meteorological environment. Perhaps there are other variables equally subject to change and equally important.

It may be granted that even now there are infectious diseases and disorders related to faulty endocrine gland functioning which appear to be associated with such things as temperature fluctuations, humidity, and seasonal foods. Yet past progress in medical science and allied fields suggests that these correlations will be upset also. A generation ago most people had distinct winter and summer diets. But progress in refrigeration and transportation, along with the introduction of vitamin-fortified foods, now enables man to maintain

a balanced diet the year around. We are making rapid progress, moreover, in the direction of a constant indoor climate.

Even if we ignore the effect of the present widespread knowledge of contraceptives, other cultural factors, rather than increasing warmth since the Ice Ages, may be of importance as causes of sterility. Some have suggested that frequent hot baths decrease fertility. Others regard our noisy, high-strung, competitive economic and social life as a cause. Finally there are those who say that so many variables appear to be involved that all these estimates may be little better than guesses.

Mills now challenges the widespread belief that female sex maturity is reached earlier in the tropics. Early female puberty, he says, depends upon favorable socio-economic conditions. Race and climate are unimportant.⁴ So here again culture seems to be the most important influence. A few years ago appendicitis was regarded as a seasonal affair related to diet. Yet recent studies indicate that the distribution of cases in all months now is about the same.

American criminologists point out that people in mountainous areas will not resort to feuds and crimes against persons when educational forces intervene to reduce suspicions and hatreds that grow out of ignorance. Nor need the combination of warm weather and open country, which encourages people to gather in large numbers, result either in crimes against property or rape if recreational facilities, police protection, and other measures are taken to reduce the temptation to commit such crimes. It is true that certain types of weather may accelerate the process of oxidation and stimulate energy, but it does not follow that this must be reflected in criminal conduct. In some cold countries of Europe alcoholism is common. Yet the Eskimos of St. Lawrence Island, having had an experience with alcoholism, are now teetotalers.

Geographic Social Thought and Overlooked Variables. The history of social theory is strewn with abandoned, easy, "short-cut" explanations for human conduct and social phenomena. It would appear that geographic determinism as a simple explanation for man's conduct and culture must likewise fall by the wayside. Whether we consider the sweeping conclusions of the historians and geographers or the more limited deductions of biologists, physicians, and criminologists, we find that overlooked variables constantly upset otherwise

plausible relationships. It would be an insult to the intelligence of the college student to dignify astrology by an evaluation here.

A mere change in the accuracy with which vital statistics are compiled and the advance in statistical science itself have upset some of the older geographic studies. Other variables include such things as the effects of war and migration and changes in social and eugenic policies. Even a change in values may upset what previously was regarded as a certain geographic influence. Recognition of the social effects of hookworm, along with the determination to curb this parasite through public health measures, has already reduced the effect of this "climatic" factor as an enervating influence in many parts of our South. It now appears to be possible to offset the influence of malaria by similar measures in other countries.

The present determination to improve the living conditions of peoples throughout the world may change many more variables in the future and so reduce the number of things now attributed to the influence of the physical habitat. It is true that man, like other organisms, must be adapted to nature. But although geographical conditions set certain limits to his development, man, unlike the other animals, is no slave to his natural environment. His cultural development not only enables him to escape many of the controls of physical environment but gradually even to substitute environments of his own making. Geography is not the key to an exact social science.

THE ECOLOGICAL HABITAT

Symbiotic Relationships. There are some remarkable sustenance interrelationships in plant and animal communities. Trees shade certain plants which can grow only with such protection; these plants in turn conserve necessary moisture for the trees. Closer to home, the aphid, or plant louse, feeds on tomato leaves in our gardens. In order to secure a constant supply of the sweet liquid which aphids secrete, ants keep herds of these insects, milking them daily. In return the ants carry aphids to new pastures and guard their eggs. Such relationships in plant and animal communities are called "symbiotic."

The botanist or zoologist who has studied symbiotic relationships knows in advance where to look for many types of plant and animal life. He knows that geographic factors and symbiotic relationships

usually determine "position" or the community organization of these societies. He realizes also that sustenance interdependence dictates not only the spatial patterns but also the size of plant and animal groups. The number of wild animals is limited by the amount of edible foliage in an area. Thus through his knowledge of symbiotic relationships the natural scientist may have exact information about lower forms of community life.

Symbiotic Relationships in the Human Community. The recent search for a more exact social science has led sociologists to consider possible applications of ecological viewpoints to human society. It has led to the introduction of human ecology as a part of sociology. *Human ecology* is the study of the adjustment of man to his habitat. The human ecologist attempts to discover how a population organizes to maintain itself in a given area. Human ecology identifies and analyzes so-called symbiotic or sustenance interdependence in human communities. It searches for the characteristic "spatial patterns" of the human community.

The "web of life" in human ecology is confined to competing members of the same rather than different species. Symbiosis, therefore, is based upon occupational or economic rather than species interrelationships. Sustenance relationships are found in the divisions of labor which mark human competition for economic needs. "Position" and community organization are supposed to result from this symbiosis. As a result of the division of labor people tend to live in certain types of areas. These symbiotic positions in turn affect the character of human and institutional behavior. It must be admitted that such biological analogies often seem forced. Sometimes the use of ecological terminology has been confusing rather than enlightening. Nevertheless, the approach of human ecology has thrown considerable light upon community organization, particularly that of the city.

Urban Ecology. The study of human or social ecology up to now has been confined largely to an analysis of the factors that influence the location, size, and physical organization of the modern city. Every tourist is aware of similarities in the spatial patterns of our cities. In some instances a stranger can locate the site of certain industries, occupations, or services without inquiry. He knows too where people on different economic levels are apt to reside. The average

citizen is aware of some of the competitions, conflicts, and interdependencies which result from limited supplies of things people need, to be found in any town. In brief, it is common knowledge that most cities have a similar spatial pattern.

About twenty-five years ago Ernest W. Burgess, R. E. Park, and R. D. McKenzie took the lead in directing the attention of sociologists to the study of the ecology of human communities, particularly the city. Making use of ecological analogies, they emphasized the competitive "biotic" struggle for economically desirable situations as the determinant not only of spatial distribution but of a basic "symbiotic" urban pattern as well.

In the modern city, however, "competition for sustenance" does not operate ruthlessly. Humanitarian considerations protect the weak. Organization and migration, moreover, prevent overcrowding in many occupations. Some aspects of urban organization are actually inefficient as far as "competition for sustenance" or occupational competition is concerned. Nature would not tolerate them in the plant and animal world. But man's higher values, traditions, and sentiments—in other words, his culture—determine that such inefficient economic relationships are the superior ones. Thus in human ecology the cultural heritage replaces in a large measure the "web of life" of nature.

City Structure. We shall consider first what ecologists describe as the basic zonal pattern of the city. Afterwards we shall examine the ecological processes which are said to operate within these zones. Human competition for survival, modified somewhat by cultural and geographical factors, usually determines the original location of cities as well as the position of business and other areas within the city. The ecologist would say that the average industrial city, as a result of competition for limited space and advantageous position, gradually divides itself into specific "natural areas" or zones. These are called *natural areas* because they have become differentiated not as the result of legislation or planning, but solely through ecological process. Each of these districts develops its own peculiar physical characteristics. Each is also a cultural district which draws special competitive functions and specific population elements into its orbit.

Burgess claimed that the natural competition of industries, institutions, and social classes for preferred spatial positions has divided the

average industrial city into five zones. For purposes of easy visual description these zones are usually placed within a series of concentric circles surrounding a central down-town business district. Local geographic conditions and other factors often change the actual shape of this arrangement, so that in practice it more nearly resembles either a semi-circle or a star rather than a circle.

Center of Dominance. Zone one, the down-town or central business district, is located at the center of the circle. This headquarters area contains the chief municipal, financial, and business offices. Here are found also the retail and wholesale districts and the transportation centers. Newspaper offices, hotels, and theatres are likewise located here. Grocery stores are infrequent, for except for transients who live in the hotels few reside in this high rent area. Local transportation lines and the chief streets radiate out from this area so as to bring the major part of the working population as well as shoppers back to their homes outside of this zone each night. Since this is a center of dominance, any change in its location is apt to affect the location of other zones.

The Transition Area. Zone two constitutes what is described as an "interstitial area." Architecturally it still contains some of the best residences of the horse and buggy days. With the gradual expansion of growing business activities of the city out beyond the original limits of zone one the former occupants of these private dwellings moved further away. Today these buildings are either made-over commercial structures or they are occupied in a run-down condition by several low-income families, if not by roomers. The status of these old buildings is temporary pending either their remodeling for business use or ultimate destruction.

This slum area of transition is "low class" in nearly every respect. It is the chief area of delinquency, crime, poverty, vice, and disease. All types of mental disorders show a high rate of concentration here, declining towards the periphery. In zone two, therefore, are located symbiotic institutions such as police stations, missions, settlements, and social agencies. Even the business activities located here are usually second-rate, consisting largely of pawnbrokers, taverns, inferior restaurants, and small stores. Smaller manufacturing establishments are located here also, and the poorest paid factory workers usually live close by. Both the low and the better-paid Negro usually

live here, the latter because of segregation policies, a cultural factor, rather than because of inability to pay for residence in better zones.

Main Residential Areas. Economic factors determine the spatial and social gradations of urban residences also. Most of the factory and store, as well as many office, workers reside in zone three. Usually the working-men's homes are either flats or box-type single dwellings which extend nearly to the limits of the building line, leaving little or no play space for children. Yet this is the area of the largest families. The homes of this area, like those in zone four, are serviced by small retail stores, shops, and neighborhood theatres.

Middle-class homes and high-class apartments are located in zone four. This might be called the area of better workingmen's homes. The managerial and professional classes who do not need to live so close to their jobs usually reside here also. Here are found bigger and better houses and yards but smaller families.

Outer Residential Zone. The fifth or outer residential zone is divided into several distinct districts. Here, first of all, are the palatial residences of the wealthy. So too are those of the middle-class commuters who are willing to travel many miles daily in order to have larger homes and yards for their families. The necessary service stores are found on the edge of these residential areas.

In another part of this zone are found the heavy industrial plants surrounded frequently by recently constructed workers' dwellings. The railroad yards, lumber and brick yards, and truck farms which supply the city are also in this zone of subcommunities.

On the far limits of this zone there is a beginning of what might be called a rural interstitial area. Here the old rural area shows marks of the gradual invasion of city workers and of commercial activities with urban roots. This invasion first appears along the edge of arterial highways radiating out from the center of the city. Gradually the entire length of these highways into the city tends to be taken over by commercial activities.

Ecological Processes in City Life. The ecological pattern of the city, just considered, is determined largely by land values. The location of the various zones is chiefly the result of competition for favorable location. In his study of the spatial and temporal arrangements of the dynamic modern city R. D. McKenzie pointed out five specialized forms of this competition. These "ecological processes" which

operate continuously within the urban community are concentration, centralization, segregation, invasion, and succession.

Concentration is the increased massing of a population within a given area. The city itself is the result of concentration. *Centralization* is the community-forming process which integrates people and utilities around focal centers within areas of concentration. Community activities, whether economic or social, are always associated with certain pivotal points. As new and speedier means of transportation or cheaper power are developed in a large city new pivotal points or sub-centers spring up. People as well as industrial and commercial facilities may even move out boldly to new pivotal points on the outskirts of the city where land is cheaper. Usually this results in decentralization in the original center.

Segregation describes the tendency of like population and economic units to cluster about certain centers. This tendency helps to explain the existence of gold coasts and slums, automobile rows, and "black belts." Once competitive selection has operated to start such a cluster, like persons and facilities tend to be attracted to it. *Invasion* is a process through which new population groups or institutional functions expand into an already occupied territory. The constant operation of this process in city growth spells either the gains or losses of owners of real estate. *Succession* describes the end of the invasion cycle. It is said to have taken place when invasion is so successful and complete that the former population or institutional characteristics of the older area have been displaced. This process is also known as displacement.

Recent Trends in Human Ecology. We have presented for the most part what might be called classical human ecology, even though some of the limitations of this viewpoint were also suggested. Some generalizations about the present ecological viewpoint in sociology are in order at this point.

Human or social ecology directs attention to the natural competitive struggle for existence. Of late this study is tending more and more to recognize also the operation of non-biological or cultural forces in community life which were largely overlooked by the early ecologists. Even the zonal hypothesis of city growth is being questioned. It has been found, for instance, that it does not apply everywhere. Not only do local topography and the street plan of some

cities interfere with the Burgess theory of growth, but zoning ordinances and housing projects now operate to restrict the original "biotic" tendency. Competition on the human level for that which is limited is now recognized as something considerably different from competition in the plant and animal world. Man's social system very largely determines who shall survive. Competition at the human level, moreover, is in a large measure a struggle for what is socially defined as desirable.⁵

Extreme biological interpretations of the history of human community growth are now seen to be as unsound as extreme geographic ones. Both interpretations have resulted from over-enthusiastic attempts to apply scientific method to the study of human society. In human ecology, as in all other fields of sociology, overemphasis upon the animal to the exclusion of the human in man only results in strained analogies and confusion. Man is both an animal and a responsible member of a socio-cultural community. In modern democratic sociology any particularistic explanation, whether it be geographical or ecological, which excludes society, culture, and the purposeful individual is untenable.

NOTES

1. A. B. Hollingshead, "Community Research: Development and Present Condition," *American Sociological Review*, April 1948, pp. 136-56. For a description of some of the recent community studies see Chapter 12 of Stuart Chase's *The Proper Study of Mankind*, 1948.
2. Emory S. Bogardus, *The Development of Social Thought*, 1940, p. 286.
3. R. M. Maclver, *Society: A Textbook of Sociology*, 1937, p. 93.
4. "They Mature Later in the Tropics," *Harper's*, February, 1942, pp. 294-98.
5. For a criticism of classical ecology see Hollingshead, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-41.

13

Demographic Factors

Demography, the study of birth rates, death rates, and other vital statistics, is not new. Statistical science, however, has made so much progress in recent years that we are justified in calling the modern study of population figures the "new" demography. The Roman tax-collectors watched population figures in the pre-Christian era. Their motive was political. The early sociologists in England and the United States, influenced by Malthus, also studied such figures. Their statistical methods were so faulty, however, that we are apt to say now that they were philosophers rather than demographers. The original emphasis upon demography in sociology was largely pathological. It was concerned with "population problems." The chief problem was the alleged danger of overpopulation. This was a matter of grave concern in England during the greater part of the last century. Even as late as twenty-five years ago American sociologists warned that we too were "at the crossroads" and that soon there would be "standing room only" here because of overpopulation.

Most modern sociologists have ceased to fear overpopulation, at least in either northwestern Europe or the United States. Many, in fact, now point out that the possibility of *under*population in the near future should cause us concern. We shall see that the new American demographers were the first to point out this trend. They thereby deflated the prestige of the older demographers. They likewise weakened the case of the neo-Malthusians. To get the complete picture we must go back to Malthus.¹

I. OVERPOPULATION AND UNDERPOPULATION

Reactions to the Specter of Overpopulation. In 1798 Thomas Malthus, a British clergyman, predicted that at some future date the

world's population would outgrow its food supply. Unless people took measures to keep down the birth rate, nature would reduce the population by such measures as famine, pestilence, and war. Although Malthus was greatly alarmed, the "foresight" which he urged to prevent too many people consisted of increased celibacy, delayed marriage, and periodic continence within marriage. These were the only means which, up to that time, were permitted by the Judaeo-Christian tradition.

Growing fear of future overpopulation soon led the followers of Malthus to speculate about the validity of the existing religious teaching concerning the union of sperm and ovum. It had always been taught that onanism or uncompleted coition was sinful. True, for good reasons it was permissible to limit the marriage act to the period during which conception could not take place. But this period in the female monthly cycle was not identified with any degree of accuracy until 1930. Until that date it was an impractical method of controlling conception, to say the least.

In 1822 Francis Place shocked the Judaeo-Christian world by urging fellow-Englishmen to use contraceptives to prevent conception. Later this long-known means of preventing conception came to be called by the more euphonious name of birth control. Those who advocated this method of reducing the population were described as neo-Malthusians. For the balance of the century controversy raged over the morality and the legality of contraception.

At first religious groups in western Europe and the United States tried to prohibit the practice of contraception by law. In the United States, commencing in 1873, both federal and state laws against the sale of contraceptives were passed under Protestant sponsorship. With the inroads of modernism, Protestant and Jewish opinion began to change. Finally, in the present century, these laws, sometimes described as the "Comstock laws" after the social reformer who pushed their passage, began to be repealed. Today the repeal of such laws is opposed chiefly by Catholics. The federal law was nullified by court decision in 1936. Only a few state prohibitions remain.

Several influences combined to bring about a changed sentiment towards contraception. Considerable impetus was given to the movement by eugenicists who regarded it as a means of eliminating the unfit. Feminists, who viewed birth control as a means to new freedom

for women, also aided the cause. Employers who hoped that birth control would make laborers satisfied with existing wages helped to finance the movement as did peace-lovers who regarded overpopulation as the chief cause of war. The plainly selfish who just did not want children needed no argument. The chief influence responsible for the present-century favorable public attitude towards birth control, however, seems to have been the dreaded specter of overpopulation. This argument, which appeared to be a scientific one, gave dignity to the cause. It had, in addition, a humanitarian appeal. The birth control movement was well financed almost from the start.

By the end of the first quarter of the present century nearly every American sociologist and economist had taken up the "standing room only" cry of Harvard's professor Edward M. East and Wisconsin's Edward A. Ross. This was echoed and emphasized in general conferences of religious bodies dealing with the morality of contraception. Although there were other motives which prompted a growing demand for a changed morality in this matter, overpopulation at any rate appeared to be a convincing one. At present Protestant and Jewish disapproval of contraception has been largely withdrawn.

Although Malthus was a Protestant, it is interesting to recall that the remedies which he proposed were actually tried out first in Catholic Ireland. This country, reduced to poverty at the start of the last century largely through exploitation by absentee landlords, soon experienced serious overpopulation. To meet this situation extensive migration, celibacy, and late marriage were encouraged. These measures appear to be the chief explanation for a population decline from about six and one-half million in 1840 to about three million in 1940. As a matter of fact, the late-marriage tradition still persists there, evidently far beyond its former need. According to figures cited by Clement S. Mihanovich, 80 per cent of Irish men in the 25-29 age group are unmarried (compared with only 39 per cent in the United States); 62 per cent of Irish women in this age group are also unmarried (compared with 26 per cent in the United States).²

The New Demography and the Overpopulation Specter. Shortly after the end of the first quarter of the present century a group of American statisticians, chiefly insurance actuaries, began to report on international population trends. At first economists and sociologists ignored them. It seemed ridiculous that these "unknown" stat-

isticians should dare to deny the danger of overpopulation about which famous college professors and nearly every other literate person now appeared to be so certain. Yet these reports predicted that in northwestern Europe and the United States there was an approaching danger of a stationary population and ultimately of underpopulation. This shift in authorities marked the start of the new demography.

It was not until 1937, when our National Resources Committee published a study (*The Problems of a Changing Population*) which verified the earlier actuarial estimates, that the American public became generally concerned about the warnings of the new demography. In 1944 Frank W. Notestein and others (*Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union*) showed that seven European countries were also on a definite downward trend and that eleven already had approximately a stationary population. Even Italy, Notestein believed, would not be able to stave off a population decline for more than a decade. Today it is obvious to all that the overpopulation specter is a thing of the past as far as the United States and northwestern Europe are concerned.

By 1937 most of the textbooks in economics and sociology which had formerly warned about the specter of overpopulation had done a sudden about face. In 1942 even the Birth Control Federation of America recognized the trend and hurriedly changed its name to the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. The title of its official publication was changed appropriately from the *Journal of Contraception* to *Human Fertility*. Thus "overpopulation," the shibboleth around which Margaret Sanger had organized the American birth control movement, was dropped as far as the United States was concerned.

With the public acceptance of the estimates of the new demography the announced objective of the Planned Parenthood Federation was switched from that of not having children to "child spacing," with emphasis upon healthier children to be obtained through at least two-year spacing periods. In 1944, when the Eastman study showed that a baby born only twelve months after a previous birth, which is about nature's spacing, had just as good a chance to be born healthy as one that had to wait longer, the emphasis in the federation literature had to be quickly changed again. Now it is claimed that

one of the chief purposes of birth control clinics (presently being described as "fertility clinics") is to aid parents to *have* children. The original purpose of the federation, that of fostering the use of contraceptives, is now said to be directed chiefly at other nations. We shall consider the overpopulation argument as it is applied to certain other countries later.

Three Factors Behind Population Figures. Three statistical factors explain the sudden collapse of the overpopulation specter in the western countries. These are (1) migration, (2) the death rate, and (3) the birth rate. Until the last two decades all three favored a population increase in the United States. Although the new population trend started earlier in northwestern Europe, the same factors were generally involved.

Migration. It must be admitted that migration has played an important part in our population growth. But since 1924 we have restricted immigration to small annual quotas. Furthermore, as a result of our long business depression, followed by World War II, for many years even these quotas were not filled. It appears now that we shall not liberalize our immigration laws in the near future. Political and economic reasons, some good and some specious, seem to have crystallized American public opinion against increased immigration. Our long delay in admitting even a small percentage of the victims of Nazi persecution after World War II reflected this attitude. We shall consider some of these reasons shortly.

Even if large numbers of Europeans should want to come here in the future, it is doubtful if their governments will permit such migrations. Protests have already arisen in Britain against the exodus of emigrants to the Dominions. It is argued that Britain should not become the blood donor of the Commonwealth when she is already suffering from anemia. Population decreases seem to be the subject of more concern in most European countries than they are as yet in the United States. America can hardly hope to continue to increase as in the past through immigration.

The Death Rate. Reduction of the death rate, particularly that of infants and young children, is probably the chief reason for the rapid growth of the white race in Europe and the Americas during the last two centuries. But experts tell us that the death rate cannot be reduced indefinitely, since people must die some time. For many

years, moreover, the death rate in the United States has been kept low partly because of the relative youthfulness of our population. This accent upon youth in the age-distribution of our population is ending now that immigration, which is made up chiefly of younger persons, has been almost eliminated.

Our population is definitely getting older. During the sixty years between 1880 and 1940 the proportion of our population 65 years of age or over more than doubled. Furthermore, according to a United States Bureau of the Census prediction, the 1940 per cent (6.9) again will be more than doubled (14.4) by 1980. It appears doubtful that further reductions in the general death rate can offset the inevitable increase in deaths to be brought about by this increased aging of the population. Such a reduction would have to include effective cures for cancer, heart diseases, and other afflictions of later years.

The Birth Rate. For several decades both death and birth rates have been declining in northwestern Europe and the United States. The birth rate is now falling much faster than the death rate. Because of low birth rates a population decline has already set in in France and Belgium. For the same reason most of their neighbors are on the verge of a decline. In the United States, with its favorable age-distribution of former years, this decline has been somewhat delayed. Yet even before World War II the prospect of an approaching stationary population here was evident.

In the United States just before World War II the death rate, if unaffected by immigration or emigration, required an average of at least 2.6 children per family for all marriages merely to maintain a stationary population. At that time the average wife produced only 2.9 children and a continued trend toward an even smaller family was evident. Later, in 1940, census figures showed for the first time that our reproduction or replacement index had finally slipped below the point which promised even the mere replacement of the existing population in the next generation or so. We shall consider some more recent and more detailed estimates, including the deceptive wartime increase in babies, shortly. The above observations on the three factors behind population figures should suffice to allay any remaining Malthusian fears about overpopulation either in northwestern Europe or the United States.

The Future Population of the United States. Many attempts have

been made in recent years to forecast the future size of our population. Nearly all have indicated a future peak of population to be followed by a downward trend before the end of the century. Estimates vary as to the date and size of this peak. One of the most important projections of population trends (*Forecasts of the Population of the United States: 1945-1975* by P. K. Whelpton and others) was issued by the United States Census Bureau in March, 1948. It predicted that we shall probably reach a population peak of a little over 166,000,000 (as against 145,000,000 in 1948) along about 1975. This forecast assumed "medium" decreases in birth and death rates and a net immigration of 100,000 a year. It took into consideration the post-war baby boom.

The unexpected baby boom which followed World War II has already delayed the date formerly predicted for our population peak. During the first year of the war the percentage of our population marrying was the largest in our history. The rate continued to be above normal all during the war. More babies were born here in 1947 than in any previous year in our history. The prospective lifetime of these babies was also at a new high. Their predicted average length of life was about 66½ years. If they had been born at the start of the century and subject to mortality conditions then prevailing their predicted average length of life would have been only 49½ years.

Statisticians are not much impressed, however, with the effects of the wartime baby boom. They regard it as a temporary thing. It did help to offset war losses. About one and three-quarter million children were added during the war years. The loss of life here because of the war was about one-third of a million. A somewhat similar wave of babies occurred in 1942 when thousands of marriages which had been deferred during the depression took place. Demographers say that these temporary booms change future population peak dates somewhat but do not alter long-time trends.

The 1948 Census Bureau report estimated that in spite of the baby boom of that period there will be a smaller percentage of persons under 19 years of age in 1975 than there is today. The proportion of adults 20 to 44 will also decline. On the other hand, there will be a large increase in the proportion of those 45 to 64, as well as those over 65. The average age of our population was 16 in 1800; a century later

it was 23, and about 30 years in 1945. In 1975 it is expected to be 34. Such figures cannot but lead to speculation about economic, political, and social ramifications.

Possible Effects of Present Population Trends. The 1948 Census Bureau forecast pointed out some possible implications of the predicted general population trends. The increase in the proportion of elders 65 or over will probably pile up the social security load as well as the need for institutional care for the aged. Both will add to the general tax burden. At the same time the most productive part of the population, those between 18 and 44 who will be expected to assume the brunt of the tax load, will be declining. This trend will mean an increasing market only for things used chiefly by older persons. American business has been geared to an ever increasing population and market. As we approach the population peak both business psychology and methods will have to be changed. It may be that the national psychology will also become more conservative as elders dominate the scene.

Even before World War II the new population trend had already commenced to make itself felt in education. There were one million fewer children in 1938 than in 1930, with the result that fewer class rooms and elementary teachers were necessary. The post-war baby boom temporarily changed the picture. In 1948 there existed a great shortage of schools and teachers for the lower grades, although a surplus existed on the high school level. The effect of this wartime boom is expected to reach the junior high school level about 1959. In the meantime the high schools will experience a continued falling off in enrollment unless a much larger percentage attends. The same will be true of the colleges, once the backlog of veterans has been cleared up.

One of the props under the unexpected business boom which followed World War II was the "baby boom," with its sudden demand for children's clothing, food, toys, and other goods. This, of course, was greatly aided by the sudden rise in marriages and the increased demands for housing and furniture for new post-war families. Demographers warn businessmen that in planning for the future they should consider the recent marriage and baby booms as only temporary episodes.

The international effects of our general population trend are not

pleasant to consider unless one is optimistic about the ability of the United Nations or some other force to restrain the present imperialistic ambitions of the Soviet Union. If manpower in combat and in the factories and fields is to be important in future wars the position of the Western nations is nothing to enthuse about. We have seen that America is expected to reach a population peak of around 166,000,000 about 1975. In northwestern and central Europe, according to Warren S. Thompson's *Plenty of People* (1944), there will be a decline from a maximum of 237 million in 1950 to 225 million in 1975. Meanwhile Russia will grow from 174 to 251 million. This does not include the populations of the nations which Russia took over after World War II.

Why We Diminish. Before considering the merits or need of a nationally planned population policy for the United States we might examine some of the reasons given for the predicted future decline in our numbers. Most of these reasons focus attention upon the generally downward trend of our birth rate. Does this mean that we are becoming sterile or does it merely indicate a desire for fewer children?

The possibility that modern civilization itself or climatic factors may be reducing human fertility has already been considered. Many other possible causes of sterility are mentioned. Lack of outdoor work and exercise along with greater emotional strain might be a factor. Gonorrhoea is another. Recently attention has been directed to endometriosis as an increasing cause of sterility. This sterilizing female disorder, consisting of the abnormal occurrence of membrane from the uterus in other organs, is said to be associated with the practices of late marriage, delayed child-bearing, and contraception.

Although they recognize the above sterilizing factors in modern life demographers are almost unanimous in regarding the attitude of married couples as the chief cause of our falling birth rate. They say that we shall understand the main reason for our decline in numbers when we find out why parents, regardless of the means used, deliberately restrict the number of their offspring. Since the birth rate in rural areas is much higher than that of cities, it is believed that the reasons why we diminish must be sought among urban parents.

What element in modern urban living explains the declining birth rate? T. Lynn Smith concludes that it is not possible to single out any

one or two traits that will give a complete explanation. Several factors are of importance. Among these he mentions the fact that children, usually an economic asset on the farm, are now a liability in the city. Individualism and ambition to climb the social ladder, more characteristic of the city-dweller, are other factors. The greater freedom of women in the city is also important. A final factor, Smith observes, is the "decreasing importance given to traditional religious beliefs and mores" in the city.³

The last-named factor is regarded as of great importance by Paul H. Landis. He points out that religion stresses duty, unselfishness, self-sacrifice, and other values which are reflected in family reproductive behavior. From this it follows that the increasing secularization of the United States must of necessity be reflected in the birth rate. Landis believes "there is little doubt that the decline in religion has been a factor in the spread of birth control practice," as well as in abortion, divorce, and "the growing selfishness" of childless couples.⁴

From the above observations it would seem that there must be a decided change in the attitudes and values of urban dwellers if we are to curb the downward population trend. Landis may have probed the heart of the problem when he wondered if a people with our present attitudes and knowledge of birth control can be "persuaded" by *any* means to have larger families. Certainly strong arguments would seem to be needed.

Secular Reasons for Good-sized Families. We have already mentioned the brutally realistic national argument for large families, the "cannon-fodder" argument as it is sometimes called. Yet history has shown that nations have to be able to defend themselves and that manpower is usually an essential part of this defense. Other civic reasons may be cited. We have seen that it is in the reasonably good-sized family that the individual becomes socialized and acquires "personality" in the sociological sense. In this primary group experience he learns the give-and-take so necessary for getting along with others. Here too he learns loyalty, unselfishness, and a willingness to suffer for the common good. All of these qualities contribute ultimately to public welfare.

Some maintain that children in the family contribute to domestic morality and hence to civic morality as well. Whatever the impelling

reasons may be, it is generally agreed that there are numerous couples in every generation who will have reasonably good-sized families provided that too many handicaps do not have to be overcome. Most European nations faced with a declining population are now showing a concern for the welfare of such married people and a desire to remove some of their present handicaps.

European Attempts to Increase Birth Rates. Since the middle of the last century, various European countries have experimented rather cautiously with means to increase the birth rate. France, Belgium, and a few other nations adopted a family wage system in which a small bonus was paid for each child. More recently Sweden provided more favorable food and rent prices for families with children and decreed that employed married women should be allowed to bear children without losing their jobs. Germany arranged marriage loans which were gradually cancelled as subsequent children were born. Italy restricted the migration of rural families to the city. Both of the two latter countries also taxed bachelors and tried to restrict the practices of birth control and abortion. Russia not only reversed an earlier easy-divorce policy but provided graduated financial aid for each child beginning with the third.

It is difficult to determine the effectiveness of the European pronatal programs. Many of them were not instituted until shortly before the Second World War. By then small families had become fashionable. Most of the earlier programs were not sufficiently attractive to encourage large families. Many observers believe, however, that the German loans were effective. At any rate there were increases in the birth rates in Germany and Italy. Yet it might be that the general optimism which accompanied the revival of nationalism under Hitler and Mussolini in these countries was as important as the pronatal programs. No doubt the results of these programs will be studied more carefully here if it is decided to do something to prevent a future decline in our population.

An American Pronatal Program. Landis has suggested a broad population-stimulating program for consideration should the United States decide to take a step in this direction. This program includes (1) economic policies, (2) education, and (3) a far-sighted "general social policy."⁵

Landis' economic policy would involve something more than the

present ideal of a general living wage for all workers. It would face frankly the present inequalities of the family with several children. Through a national wage-salary system, subsidies would be provided to meet the various added costs of children. He believes that such a family-wage would encourage middle-class parents to rear the families of three, four, and five or more children now regarded as necessary if we are to grow. Katherine F. Lenroot, chief of the United States Children's Bureau, came out for a family allowance system in 1949. Canada has already inaugurated such a system.

Many students of the family have urged that education be made more family-centered. It is pointed out that even such things as education for farming and the professions are no more important, even to the individual, than his ability to live a happy family life. To ignore preparation for family life in education, says Landis, has the effect of making youth feel that the family is "something unessential." He would have such preparation start with the young pupil and extend through college. Such education would be orientated around a basic desire for offspring. By establishing proper values it would attempt to eliminate some of the "competitions" which now reduce the prestige of the family.

It is believed that a far-sighted "general social policy" would be particularly helpful to middle-class families. This group at present is neglected. Take present medical economics, for instance. The poor are willing and usually able to use free clinics and public medical services. The rich are able to pay for the best of private medical care. But middle-class couples with children are often unable to purchase without great sacrifice the private medical care which physicians now regard as necessary. They are unwilling to suffer the stigma still associated with public care now provided "for the poor." The condition is somewhat analogous to that which prevailed in the United States a little over a century ago when schools supported by taxation were only for the poor. A national public health insurance program which would provide medical care for everyone would remedy this. In lieu of this and other general reform measures, it has been suggested that babies, like crops, might be subsidized by the government.

Subsidies for Human Crops. A limited social policy weighted in favor of child-bearing and child-rearing would merely be an ex-

tension of the family-favoring general economic policy just considered. It would attempt to remove some of the economic advantages now enjoyed by couples who have few or no children. To this end, subsidies could be provided for child-bearing families to reduce the burdens of obstetrical and medical care. A realistic housing program in which tax concessions would be granted to landlords when real estate is occupied by families with children might be another subsidy. This would make it easier for large families to find rents.

Subsidies for child-rearing could also be provided indirectly through income-tax deductions which would actually recognize the costs of bearing and rearing a child. In this connection it has been estimated that the cost of having a baby where the husband earns \$2,500 a year ranges from \$185 to \$450. The average cost of raising a child to 18 in the same income group is around \$7,760. The figures are much higher when the husband's income is greater.⁶ These estimates are based on prewar wages and prices. Such figures also suggest an argument for providing free school books, school lunches, and other services to reduce the burden of parents.

Marriage loans to heads of families who wish to complete college and professional training should be especially desirable. Such loans would help to correct the existing "differential birth rate" in which educated parents make a poor showing when compared with couples who reach educational and economic maturity sooner. It might well be that the policy of giving government aid to married veterans who wished to complete their education following the Second World War will provide a pattern for future college and professional education.

It would seem to be easy enough to devise ways and means of reducing the present handicaps of American parents. First of all, however, there must be a motive; it must be frankly recognized that parents perform a special social function. Most of the policies suggested above should be all the more desirable because they promote social justice in addition to whatever effect they may have in stimulating the birth rate. This fact should be of special importance in these days of Communist agitation. Unfortunately, our socio-economic system is still geared in a large measure to a philosophy of laissez-faire as well as to a policy based on a fear of overpopulation. As a result, sterility is actually encouraged by our mores.

Marshall and Malthus. Some might say that the establishment of the Marshall Plan to feed the nations of Europe following World War II was in itself an endorsement of Malthus. Many neo-Malthusians claimed as much. Mrs. Sanger urged Europeans to declare a ten-year embargo on babies. Vogt suggested a bonus to males in Marshall-aid countries who allowed themselves to be sterilized. Surely there was not enough food to go around. The situation was worse in China. China could not begin to feed its starving population even with the aid which we were able to supply.

It should be recognized that the post-war food-shortage was clearly man-made. Years devoted to war, combined with a series of bad seasons for crops in some European countries, made it necessary for the United States to supplement the world food larder. It will probably be a matter of years before the world food supply is properly adjusted again even under the most favorable conditions. If in the meantime we experience food shortages because of Marshall aid, we should remember that it was only a few years ago that we paid farmers to "plow under" both crops and pigs. More recently we destroyed a considerable part of our potato crop.

In nearly every major crisis the Malthusian ghost is resurrected. During the 1930 depression neo-Malthusians argued that we were already overpopulated. Overpopulation in "danger spots" throughout the world has often been cited as the chief cause of war. Guy Irving Burch and Elmer Pendell have recently attempted to revive this bogey. Neo-Malthusians usually run to oversimplified solutions of complex problems, a thing which gives them a popular following. They fail to realize, for instance, that complex cultural factors produce depressions and that national philosophies and power politics have been chiefly instrumental in the wars of recent history. As Landis observes, population pressure alone as an alleged cause of war "will not bear the scrutiny of logical analysis."⁷ The history of social reform is strewn with the wreckage of abandoned oversimplified solutions to complex problems. Such "solutions" usually delay genuine remedies.

It must be admitted that there are countries such as China and India where chronic food shortages take place and where no ready solution to the difficulty is in sight. In these eastern countries we see the effects of primitive agricultural methods combined with a lack

of effective leadership in government. The solution to their food problem would seem to lie in such measures as the adoption of machine technology, control of erosion, and effective government controls. A few T.V.A.'s to control floods and provide power, fertilizer, and other resources would do wonders for China.

Nature is not punishing China and India; they are the victims of human avarice and stupidity. China uses its hillsides chiefly to grow brush and grass for fuel. It has been estimated that if they mined and distributed their coal and farmed the hillsides they would increase their food supply by 10 per cent. India likewise is a victim of social disorganization. The yields from its potentially good land are pathetically low compared with other countries. Fertilizer and improved agricultural technique would vastly increase its food supply.

Sir John Boyd Orr, first director of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, believed that it is possible to improve and expand known sources of food, without relying on new sources, so as to produce the food that the world will need even during the critical period immediately ahead. The FAO mission to Greece illustrated what can be done even under present world organization. It was found that Greek farmers were still using wooden implements. The mission arranged for the introduction of the steel tools that are commonplace on every American farm. It also introduced fertilizers and hybrid seeds from outside. It was predicted that these improvements would double, if not triple, Greek farm production. Orr, an authority on world food supply, has said that if man will but use his God-given mind and brawn the earth will yield much more than his bare food necessities. If the enfeebled United Nations in the dark early days of its career could effect changes in Greece what could it do on a world-scale with effective organization?

Planning for the "Plundered Planet." Estimates which suggest that the world food supply will ultimately be insufficient to feed mankind, like all "alarm" news, are apt to be featured. Recently two new Malthusian Jeremiahs made the headlines. Fairfield Osborn's *Our Plundered Planet* (1948) predicted that the mistreated earth will soon be unable to feed the billions who will swarm over it. The soil is being depleted through "soil-mining," erosion, and deforestation. William Vogt's *Road to Survival* (1948) claimed that "soil cannot be stretched," that topsoil cannot be replaced, and that the world

now faces a food crisis. C. Lester Walker struck a similar note in an article in *Harper's* for February, 1948. He, like Vogt, concluded that our only salvation now lies in getting the whole world to practise contraception.

Alarmists ever since the days of Malthus have underestimated the ability of agriculturalists to revive mistreated soil as well as the ability of far-seeing governments to control erosion. Today they either ignore or underestimate the possibilities of new agricultural discoveries such as cold and drought-resistant grains, hydroponic farming in which plants are raised without soil, and the opening up of new areas to efficient cultivation through invention. Refrigerated ships, we might recall, suddenly turned New Zealand into a great meat, butter, and cheese exporting nation.

So many variables are involved in estimates of the amount of arable land in the future that predictions are apt to be little better than guesses. Kirtley F. Mather (*Enough and to Spare*, 1944) and many others take a viewpoint directly opposite to that of the recent alarmists. *Time*, after a lengthy analysis of the food problem, ridiculed the Osborn-Vogt "scare books," pointing out also that such neo-Malthusian propaganda may encourage some nations to go out and "grab more land, clearing it, if necessary, of its present population."⁸

Even American farming is still far from maximum efficiency. It has been estimated that nearly 70 per cent of American land suffers from some degree of erosion. The present over-diversified pattern of production on the family-sized farm is also wasteful. It prevents efficient mechanization and so reduces the nation's food supply. Louis Bromfield, while favoring the family-sized farm, is of the opinion that the day of the general farm is ended. The efficient farmer must concentrate on one or more projects and buy additional farm products from other farmers. In *Malabar Farm* (1948) he demonstrates possible efficiencies which may be achieved over present methods as well as the speed with which nature responds when erosion is corrected.

A little-known project undertaken by the UNESCO conference in December, 1947, suggests startling possibilities in the ultimate use of fertile tropical soils for supplementing the world food supply. An international institute financed jointly by this agency of the United Nations and several South American governments is now

exploring the agricultural possibilities of the Amazon basin, a jungle area twice as vast as the Mississippi basin. Atabrine, DDT, and scientific knowledge of soil analysis have made possible this investigation which otherwise would have seemed both dangerous and fantastic a few years ago.

Everyone is familiar with what has been done by irrigation in making deserts productive. It may be that even the sea is capable of harvest. University of California chemists claimed in 1948 that through "photosynthesis," made possible by the use of atomic energy, the day may come when oceanic plant life can feed the world. Chemists in other fields likewise visualize revolutionary developments in food production. Another product of wartime experimentation, aerial warfare, may aid in opening up a vast area of 4,500,000 square miles in Africa to food production and habitation. This virgin territory, rich in resources and fair in climate, is at present a no-man's land because of the tsetse fly which transmits African sleeping sickness. Yet it is estimated that this pest can be eliminated by modern insecticides sprayed by low-flying airplanes.

Robert M. Salter, Chief of the Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engineering Bureau of the United States Department of Agriculture, has estimated that 52 per cent of the world's land area could be made productive. Only 7-10 per cent is now cultivated. He points out that there are ample natural resources to meet future world food needs. This goal can be achieved, he says, if the people of the world "are willing to extend a small part of the energy and capital poured into World War II." 9

II. MIGRATION AND POPULATION GROWTH

America's Early Growth Through Immigration. We have seen that three factors are involved in population growth: the death rate, the birth rate, and migration. The New World has been one of the principle takers of international migrants. According to *Forecasts of the Population of the United States, 1945-1975*, over 25 per cent of the increase in the white population of the United States from 1840 to 1910 came from the excess of persons entering this nation over those who departed. Even as late as the 1920's over 20 per cent of our increase was due to immigration. Our growth from less than 4,000,000

at the time of the first census in 1790 to more than 140,000,000 inhabitants of the continental United States by 1946 is one of the demographic wonders of recent history. Before the Civil War we doubled every twenty-five years.

It was not until 1825, however, that the number of immigrants arriving in the United States reached 10,000 a year. The era of really heavy immigration did not begin until about 1840. Those who came from this date until about 1890 (1882 to be exact) are usually spoken of as the "old immigration." The composition of the foreign-born white population in 1890 gives a fairly accurate picture of the national make-up of the old immigration. In round numbers, 30 per cent were Germans, 20 per cent were Irish, 10 per cent Canadians, 10 per cent English, and 9 per cent were from Sweden and Norway. Other nationalities numbering over 150,000 ranked in this order: Scotch, Austrians, Russians, and finally Italians. Our foreign-born population in 1890 and again in 1910 made up about 15 per cent of the total population. By 1940 this percentage had dropped to 8.8.

The New Immigration. The immigration from shortly before 1890 up to the start of the First World War is usually described as the "new immigration." The changed make-up of immigration during this period is reflected in the altered percentages of the foreign-born in the 1930 census. By 1930 Germans had dropped to second place (11 per cent), being replaced by the Italians (nearly 13 per cent). Russians and Baltic States people took third place (10 per cent) while Canadians only slightly outnumbered Poles (both about 9 per cent) in fourth place. It should be observed, however, that American immigration figures are very inaccurate, a fact which makes it difficult to determine the national derivation of our present population. It is usually said that the British and Germans made the greatest contribution, with the Irish ranking next. Yet T. Lynn Smith disputes this. He estimates that while more Germans have come to our shores over the life span of the republic than any other nationals, the Irish, because of their earlier arrival in large numbers, probably occupy the primary place in the ethnic composition of the United States.¹⁰

Immigration Restriction. Following World War I, when it was feared that large numbers of discontented Europeans might flock to our shores, a series of restrictive laws was enacted. These culminated

in the Immigration Act of 1924, in effect since 1929, which has been our basic law ever since. This law limits immigration to a little over 150,000 persons per year. Except for migrants from the countries of the Western Hemisphere immigration is now restricted to set annual quotas. Unused quotas do not carry over from year to year. Immigration is prohibited from Japan, Korea, Malaya, Siam, British and French Pacific Islands, Guam, Java, Netherlands Indies, Samoa, and Sumatra. Only one hundred a year may come from China, India, and the Philippines.

Immigration Discrimination. The Chinese and certain other eastern groups were barred from coming here at an early date. Complaints about such discrimination in our immigration legislation did not become conspicuous, however, until the passage of the 1924 law. The fact that the advocates of this measure, known as the National Origins law, believed in Nordic supremacy will always make it suspect. The law was supposed to "freeze" the "national origins" of our population at the ratios which prevailed here in 1920. Yet our lack of adequate immigration records made it necessary to resort to arbitrary choices in setting quotas. This fact makes it difficult to disprove the charge that the quotas assigned to the various European countries in the law discriminated against eastern, central, and especially southern Europeans in favor of people from so-called Nordic or northern countries. The complete exclusion of the Japanese in this law, a public insult which many believed was unnecessary since the two governments had practically achieved this objective by quiet agreement, aroused bitter criticism in Japan, a nation which hitherto had looked up to the United States.

Few object now to immigration restriction. Discrimination is another thing. Most authorities argue that immigrants should be selected on the basis of individual worth and our shifting labor needs rather than according to national origin. They refuse to believe that the earlier immigrants had superior qualities and that the modern ones are "the unsuccessful, the weak, and the dependent," as one prominent writer on this subject said recently. At present prospective immigrants who possess knowledge, occupations, and skills which we sorely need are arbitrarily excluded, whereas many not needed are admitted simply because they come from favored countries. The announcement of the quotas assigned by the 1924 law aroused so many

bitter national, racial, and religious rivalries at the time that Congress has tried to avoid tampering with immigration legislation ever since, even though both major parties have gone on record against the present law. Yet discrimination contradicts democratic ideals.

Displaced Persons. It was well that immigration bars existed at the end of the Second World War. Immigration officials estimated in 1947 that 14,000,000 Italians would have come here if they could. The situation was almost as bad in several other war-torn countries. So many wanted to get into the annual quotas that the wait was three years in Austria, eight in Ireland, and ten in Portugal. Our embassy had enough applications in Greece to fill the 307-a-year quota for the next 99 years.

In spite of the above facts, many believe that we were shockingly slow in 1948 in deciding to admit only 200,000 "displaced persons" over a period of two years. These were people confined in European prison camps who could not be returned to their native countries at the end of the war. At the very time we debated this measure there was a labor shortage here. Moreover, there was a total backlog of over two million "unused" quota entries by 1946 as a result of the depression and the war which followed. Our continued caution over displaced persons would seem to indicate at any rate that the United States will not decide to increase its immigration quotas for some time to come.

It may be that our present experience with displaced persons someday will provide a pattern for a new immigration law. These migrants are screened and selected by American authorities in Europe before being allowed to come here. An attempt is also made to place them only in jobs here not being filled by American citizens and in neighborhoods where they will be welcome. As a result of this experience the immigrant of the future may be more closely scrutinized on the basis of individual worth and national need. Once here, moreover, he will not be required or even allowed to shift for himself as in the past.

Our Puerto Rican Problem. Many of the population issues which confronted last-century America may be seen in miniature in our present Puerto Rican immigration problem. Puerto Ricans are coming here at a rate that is causing considerable concern in New York City. Evidently nothing can be done to stop them under present laws,

since they are American citizens. Some estimate the number now coming here to be as high as 30,000 annually. Many settle in New York's overcrowded East Harlem where they provide a health problem. A large percentage of the children are unable to speak English, thus providing a special school problem. The language handicap, along with the fact that most of these immigrants are farm laborers, prevents many from getting work in New York. A considerable number drifts to welfare offices for public relief.

Although a reduced death rate has caused Puerto Rico to become overcrowded, this is made more acute by the fact that the country has been exploited for generations by absentee landowners. Until 1898 they lived in Madrid; since then mostly in the United States. These absentee rulers of the Island have dictated the cultivation of single crops under a semi-feudal system of corporate farming. Former United States Governor Rexford G. Tugwell provoked the wrath of American sugar interests with large investments in the Island in 1943 when he declared to a Senate committee that "Puerto Rico today is in no better condition than it was in 1898." Although it is true that the average income has more than doubled in the last decade, it is still said to be only about \$600.

The present American policy in Puerto Rico follows the neo-Malthusian line. It hopes to effect a short-cut easy solution by encouraging birth control and sterilization. But the natives resent this and demand what they regard as a more humane and far-reaching solution. This was expressed in a statement of the leader of the Popular Democratic party. "We have no intention of 'plowing under' our crop of babies," he said. "The solution of our problem rests in higher incomes, crop diversification, higher production of goods, and industrialization."¹¹

Migration and the Future. Evidently some Puerto Rican leaders foresee that in the long run industrialization, urbanization, higher standards, increased literacy, and higher education eventually will automatically lower the high birth rate there as they have elsewhere and so make mass emigration unnecessary. John Stuart Mill observed many years ago that oppressive poverty usually does not encourage people to delay marriage or sex and other gratifications in anticipation of a better future. It crushes all hope. It is on this account that the poor often seem so shiftless to upper classes. Education and eco-

conomic opportunities, on the other hand, stimulate people to better themselves and so to postpone gratifications. Mill wrote: "As long as masses have little opportunity to cultivate their minds and as long as they suffer from oppression of poverty they will have . . . neither the fear of worse nor the smallest hope of better."

If Americans feel that present immigration from Puerto Rico constitutes a national problem or if we fear that other countries to the north and south of us might decide in the future to send waves of migrants here we could probably curtail this migration by law or treaty. But such action alone would only increase the home problems of the nations from which these migrants might otherwise come. Thus we would help to create the sort of troubled waters in which Communists love to fish. We may be sure that they would tell these people that their capitalistic economic system could not work and that they were also victims of "American imperialism."

It may be that the United Nations or some new world or western federation of nations can help to solve the problems of such "trouble spots" as Puerto Rico. Since over the years the United States has been the country most sought out by immigrants from every nation, it would seem as if we should take the lead now in assisting this and other countries to meet their problems without recourse to migration. President Truman's "Point Four" in his Inaugural Address in January, 1949, may provide a pattern if we have to act independently of the U.N. This program calls for the development of countries with under-developed economies, chiefly through the investment of outside private capital. It differs, however, from the old imperialism.

In the modern Two World organization it would appear that every democracy may be driven to consider the economic, agricultural, health, and educational problems of other democracies. It is conceivable that such consideration might lead to free trade and economic coöperation in which each country would develop those resources for which it is best equipped. Thus eventually there might evolve a new democratic world freed of national selfishness, exploitation, and imperialism. Carlos Davila (*We of the Americas*, 1949) suggests instead a Three World organization made up of the Soviet Communist world, a socialistic world of managed economies in Western Europe, and a third or democratic world in the Western Hemisphere. Mutual aid among non-Soviet nations is imperative.

Those who are pessimistic about man's ability to deal with world population problems reflect the mood of Malthus. Malthus underestimated man's ability to change his culture as well as his ability to move both people and goods.¹² Much population theory ever since Malthus has unfortunately reflected his fatalism.

NOTES

1. For a description of the methods, theories, problems, and future of demography see Philip M. Hauser, "Present Status and Prospects of Research in Population," *American Sociological Review*, August, 1948, pp. 371-82.
2. *America*, April 12, 1947, p. 42. For a criticism of these conclusions as they apply to Catholics in the United States see C. J. Nuesse, *American Catholic Sociological Review*, March, 1949, pp. 76-8.
3. *Population Analysis*, 1948, p. 232.
4. *Social Policies in the Making*, 1947, p. 262. (Also in his *Population Problems*, 1948, pp. 71-81.)
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 478-84. (In *Population Problems* he analyzes European pronatal policies and comments further on a possible American policy, pp. 164-69 and Chapter 25.)
6. *Statistical Bulletin*, July and November, 1943.
7. *Population Problems*, p. 12.
8. *Time*, November 8, 1948, pp. 27-31.
9. "World Soil and Fertilizer Resources in Relation to Food Needs," *Science*, May 23, 1947, pp. 533-38. For additional evidence against the Vogt-Osborn viewpoint see articles in *The Scientific Monthly* and *The Farm Policy Forum* for January, 1949. Vogt's book was digested in *The Reader's Digest* for January, 1949.
10. T. Lynn Smith, *Population Analysis*, 1948, p. 322.
11. *New York Times*, March 29, 1948.
12. Paul H. Landis, *Population Problems*, pp. 38-40.

(For a criticism of the widely accepted forecasts of Thompson, Whelpton, and others, followed in this chapter, see Joseph S. Davis, *The Population Upsurge in the United States*, Food Research Institute Pamphlet, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1949.)

14

Rural and Urban Factors

The Selected Problem Approach. The older books on rural sociology, reflecting the normative-ameliorative period in sociology, were orientated towards the solution of contemporaneous practical "problems." Social processes were ignored. The superiority of rural to urban life was taken for granted and remedies were proposed for the decadence of rural church, school, and recreational facilities. The emphasis was largely upon rural economics. A possible rapprochement between rural and urban interests was seldom considered.

Early urban sociology tended likewise to follow a "problem" approach. Consideration was given to isolated aspects of urban life, especially those not emphasized in the usual social problems course. Such problems as health, housing, recreation, government, police and fire protection, sanitation, transportation, and city planning were studied. Little reference was made to basic sociological processes or to the city's relationship to rural life.

The Synthetic Approach. The present tendency in sociology is to study rural and urban life in relation to the total cultural landscape. It is recognized that our American culture, in spite of its diversities, is a functioning unit in which neither rural nor urban elements are entirely independent. Contrasts between rural and urban life are still pointed out, but each area is regarded only as a pole of a continuum. The viewpoint in the newer studies of these two types of communities, then, is neither rigidly rural nor strictly urban. It is more of a synthesis. On this account the term *rurban* has come to be used.

Limitations of space prevent anything like a complete treatment of rurban sociology here. Consideration will be confined therefore to three aspects of this new sociology: the growth of the city to its position of dominance in American society, the advantages and dis-

advantages of both rural and urban life, and the future of city and country.

The Nation Becomes Urban. When the first census was taken in 1790 about 95 per cent of the population lived in rural areas. There were only twenty-four cities. Thomas Jefferson believed that democracy would not work in large cities; he proposed that we keep America rural. Even as late as 1870 three-fourths of the population was rural. The nation first became urban (51 per cent) in 1920. But at the time of the 1940 census the percentage of rural dwellers had dropped to 43, while nearly 30 per cent of our population lived in cities of 100,000 or more. The farm population has decreased considerably since 1940. As far as residence is concerned we are definitely an urban nation now. But this does not tell all the story of the growth of urban influence in the United States.

The Farmer Goes to Town. Transportation by rail and water built up our cities. Sudden changes in transportation, combined with the influence of World War I, projected urbanism into the country during the decade from 1910 to 1920. It was at this time that the automobile and the development of surfaced roads broadened the horizon of the rural dweller. With cheap quick transportation he could now by-pass the hamlet and village of horse and buggy days in order to trade and attend motion pictures in the city. It is estimated that more than three-fourths of our population now are either in or within an hour's driving distance of the city.

With the increased European demand for agricultural products during World War I our agricultural worker enjoyed a new prosperity and so had more to spend in the city. His tastes became urban as he utilized city stores. He began to buy city clothes, baked bread, and canned goods. His women folks adopted the styles they saw in the city. It soon became difficult to identify the rural dweller in a social gathering or on city streets. Thus a revolution in rural ways took place which was further advanced by the benefits which farmers derived during World War II and the period of Marshall Plan aid.

As a result of the revolution which commenced in 1910 the small churches and one-room schools of the open-country were no longer regarded as adequate. As the farmer's life became orientated around larger communities some hamlets and small villages disappeared entirely. Motor trucks from the city now made quick daily deliveries

in the surrounding rural area. Thus in many ways the city and the country began to merge. Even the distinctive attitudes and linguistic characteristics of rural dwellers began to disappear. With the spread of radio, television, and electric power this assimilation process was nearly completed.

Within the last forty years it has been estimated that millions of Americans have changed from rural to urban ways. This has led to considerable speculation about the gains and losses of this process and its long-run effect on the nation. In the past rural leaders, alarmed at the continued migration of youth to the cities, have tried to focus attention upon the disadvantages of urban life and the corresponding benefits of rural life. Many impartial observers still fear that in the present urban drift the social losses to the nation will outweigh the possible gains.

Work and Character. It is generally admitted that the kind of work a person does has an influence upon his character. Many claim that the work of the farmer is to be preferred in this respect. The work of the farmer keeps him close to nature. The city dweller's work environment, on the other hand, is artificial. Whereas the farmer's character and values are influenced by the realities of rural life, the city worker reflects the superficialities of his environment. Some think the fact that mankind has lived close to nature for most of its existence is important.

The work of the farmer also requires a wide range of knowledge and skills. This broadens his mental development where the narrow specialization demanded of most city workers stultifies. The farmer must exercise foresight and managerial ability; the modern factory-worker usually has little opportunity for initiative. The farmer takes pride in his work and gains prestige through well-kept fields. The factory-worker can make no such display. Usually his personal contribution to a manufactured article seems insignificant. It is said that on this account he is more likely to seek prestige through conspicuous spending. Money at any rate becomes the mark of success.

Finally it is pointed out that farming is a family enterprise, a fact which gives the rural family solidarity. The farm family is constantly concerned about the progress of crops. The city-worker's family often has neither knowledge nor interest in the nature of his job. Usually the city-worker's job is separated by considerable distance

from the home. All of these work factors are said to have an effect upon the character of rural and urban dwellers.

Social Relations in Town and Country. Differences in population density also produce basic differences in the urban and rural designs for living. Primary-group relationships characterize rural life; secondary contacts mark the city. The farmer knows his neighbors intimately. All are engaged in the same occupation. In time of need each helps the other. Personal qualities are more accurately assessed under such conditions. The result is that there is little or no social stratification based upon income or class consciousness.

The city-dweller may have more social contacts but they are chiefly of the touch-and-go variety. As a result, in time of need he must rely upon public aid for assistance. It is difficult to assess properly the personal worth of a fellow city dweller. As a consequence, urban society is stratified chiefly on the basis of income and occupation.

The primary-group character of rural life makes it possible to maintain order chiefly through local opinion and gossip. In the anonymity of the city law becomes the major means of social control. It is largely because of the inferiority of law as a control that cities have always been regarded as sources of crime and other social problems. Today they are also noisy and dirty and traffic congestion is becoming an ever increasing problem. In fact laws never seem to catch up with the problems of urbanites. So many regulations must be observed in order to make the modern city endurable that some think city dwellers are rapidly becoming mere robots who could easily be fitted into a totalitarian régime.

Migration and Urban Superiority. The heavy migration to the city in recent years might at first sight seem to prove that in the minds of migrants at least the arguments in favor of the city must outweigh those against it. A large part of this migration, however, was through necessity rather than choice. It is said that 300,000 youths must now leave farms each year. Technological changes in agriculture—the introduction of tractors and other labor-saving machines, the development of higher yielding crops and breeds of livestock—each year make it possible for relatively fewer farm workers to produce the nation's food. It is estimated that the wider use of the mechanical cotton picker, which can pick as much in a day as forty to sixty

laborers, will soon enable planters to reduce their former labor population by 75 per cent. No doubt most of these displaced workers will be forced to seek city employment. This is only one example of the influence of mechanization.¹

The city has a special appeal, however, as far as youth is concerned. Whereas few young people in cities express dissatisfaction with the place they live, polls show that a considerable proportion of youth on farms and more particularly in villages and small towns is anxious to escape to new surroundings. The city attracts people for various reasons. To many people it is synonymous with civilization. In the city there is centralization not only in trade and industry but in literature, art, and science as well. It has the best schools and libraries as well as superior medical facilities. Here too are more conveniences, recreational activities, and luxuries. Finally, the city offers greater opportunities for those with special talents.

It is sometimes said that the most capable country youths migrate to the city. A prominent American sociologist once said that the double pull of the frontier and the city left only "the coarse, dull, and hidebound" in the rural population. T. Lynn Smith denies this, maintaining that the conventional intelligence tests which appear to prove the superiority of urban intelligence are biased in favor of urbanites. Among other inequalities these tests overlook the fact that rural people acquire a large part of their mental baggage from direct experience. The tests are based chiefly upon one's indirect experience ("book learning"), and so necessarily favor the urban population. Landis, after weighing many factors involved in this question, concludes that it is not possible to give a conclusive answer at present.²

The City in Transition. The city as well as the country is now in a process of transition. The city need not remain as it is. City planning is already eliminating many of the objections raised against urban life. City government is admittedly bad, probably America's most conspicuous failure of democracy. Yet experiments are being made to remedy this. City-manager and other plans of government are being tried out in order to eliminate crude ward politics, inefficiency, and corruption. Anti-smoke and anti-noise ordinances have proved that these two evils are largely remedial. Streets are being rebuilt and traffic re-routed in order to relieve congestion. It is rec-

ognized that with honest government gambling, vice, and many of the other evils of the modern city can be nearly eliminated.

The past dictatorship of industry and commerce in the growth of cities is now being challenged. It has been found that deliberate long-time community planning can create neighborhood units in which everyone, particularly children, may enjoy decent living conditions. It may yet be possible through such means to revive neighborly primary-group contacts with all that they imply. We know now that slums can be removed and that the city can be made as healthy as the country.

The initiation of these reforms rests with the residents of the city. In the past there has been a fatalistic urban tendency to put up with these evils and to leave the management of the city to politicians. It is believed that civic education in the schools which points out that the neighborhood, next to one's family, is a person's chief social responsibility will help to arouse a desire for change both in living conditions and in present leadership.

What is possible through group effort in the way of improving the world of one's own neighborhood is illustrated by the achievements of the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council in Chicago. Through the use of such local groups as churches, nationality clubs, boys' athletic teams, and the chamber of commerce the Council has been able to bring about important reforms in housing, health, race relations, and youth activities. The chief significance of the Council, however, is not so much what it has done as the fact that it represents a new expression of neighborhood interest in local problems.⁸

Some of the new housing projects of metropolitan cities are also eliminating many of the evils of urban life. In the past city neighborhoods used to expand a house at a time at the caprice of landlords with little concern about the ultimate welfare of the neighborhood in general. Buildings arose shoulder to shoulder with as little as the law allowed "wasted" on breathing space and yards. Frequently these neighborhoods were occupied by people of similar national backgrounds whose position near the bottom of the economic ladder left them no choice but the poorest quarters.

New housing projects, planned by socially-minded civic leaders with only moderate profits in mind, make better use of building space either by building upwards and providing elevators or by merging

backyards into semi-parks. In either case provision is made for sunshine and fresh air. Play arcas for young and old, lawns and flower gardens kept up by the housing authority, paths for walks, and places both indoors and outside where people can meet and form friendships are provided in some of the larger housing projects.

It has been found that residents respond to improvements and decent living conditions by teaching children to respect property and the rights of others. In such housing projects people of all nationalities, creeds, and races get acquainted, thus creating something of the old neighborhood spirit. Even though it is true that the rents prescribed for these various projects tend to limit them to one class and so to encourage social stratification, neighborhood spirit not found otherwise in the large city is stimulated. Some projects attempt to prevent this stratification by providing differently priced rents in the same area. Tax-reductions, prompted by the fact that projects are geared to a limited profit, make it possible to provide better facilities than under the old "sky is the limit" policy of rent fees.

Making the Metropolis a Place to Live. Visitors to New York City frequently remark that it is a fine place to visit but that they would not want to live there. The City Planning Commission, which is planning a broad re-zoning and re-development for New York, hopes to make it a desirable place to live also. A new plan worked out for the commission by the Community Service Society will, if carried out, provide an entirely new concept of metropolitan life and growth. With over 12 per cent of our population now living in metropolises of over a million population such plans merit serious consideration.

The New York plan calls for the establishment of community "islands" for happy family life. It would attempt to capture some of the advantages of the small town and suburb for families whose homes are within the shadows of the skyscrapers. Each planned neighborhood would provide not only schools, libraries, playgrounds and other facilities for children but amenities and attractions for adults as well. If this plan is adopted a frank attempt will be made to develop neighborly pride and civic consciousness. The major traffic arteries, so dangerous to children, will be routed around these new centers of neighborhood life. In this way noise and crowds can be eliminated without sacrificing the advantages to be found in a populous urban setting.

It has been said that New York's sudden interest in "community islands" within its borders is prompted by the fact that in recent years hundreds of its workers have been moving out beyond city limits. This, however, need not detract from the merits of the project itself. It may well be that the ability of Communists to make converts in city slums and even to elect public officials in some instances may prompt us to further zeal in correcting the evils of city life. Whatever the incentive may be, democracy needs to be rejuvenated in our cities.

The Decentralized City. The lessons of two crises of the last twenty years, the 1930 depression and World War II, may prove to be instrumental in bringing about a greater merging of city and country life. The depression inspired several experiments in moving large groups of city workers out into newly constructed country areas surrounding the city. These experiments showed that with modern quick transportation such "greenbelt" cities, designed primarily for wholesome family life, are practical for city workers in the lower middle-class income bracket. Small gardens, poultry, and even livestock can be raised by city workers and their families under such conditions, especially as city working hours continue to be reduced. Through tax benefits and other aids many low-wage city workers might also be encouraged to live in similar "rural" areas where they could enjoy the advantages of both city and rural life.

World War II introduced the large bomber and the "block-buster." It also unveiled the atom bomb, which may be the nemesis of city dwellers in a future war. Even without this bomb the widespread destruction of European cities raised a serious question as to the wisdom of continuing to locate war industries in such bombing targets. Military experts now urge that we prepare for tomorrow's wars by decentralization. It is argued that factories producing key military supplies be built underground. According to reports, some factories have already been moved to less congested areas at government suggestion. It is expected that should we undertake large-scale decentralization the new areas will be planned for living rather than just "growing up" as most of our present cities have done under a *laissez-faire* régime.

Regional Planning. Long-range regional planning for human needs may bring about future changes in rural areas also. Five of our states (North and South Dakota, Montana, Kansas, and Nebraska) are

now "dying" chiefly because of land deterioration. It is estimated that over 400,000 people have left this area in the last seventeen years. Yet it is said that the area can be saved by regional planning and control of the waters of the Missouri Valley. The beneficent influence of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is indicated by the fact that for the first time in sixty years the exodus of youth from this region has slowed down.

Regional planning in the Tennessee Valley and in the Northwest has also succeeded in breaking down many of the local political boundaries of the horse and buggy days. Many of our overlapping city and county governmental institutions are ridiculous in this era of shortened distances. Regional planning commissions provide not only for power development and erosion control but for the more efficient organization of economic and social interests as well. With low-priced electric power, the rural home can be made as attractive as that of the urbanite.

Regional planning is possible only when it has been decided that human rights have priority over private profits. It may be necessary to take a stand on this same policy soon relative to the future of corporation farming. The large-scale "big business" farm is admittedly more efficient. If it continues to be allowed to develop here without restriction, however, a considerable part of our rural areas may be turned into "factories in the fields." Rural sociologists point out that the democratic family-sized farm contributes social benefits to the nation which are more important than the economic "efficiency" of the corporation farm. Rural sociologists also point to the "land problem" of many other nations where benevolent and not so benevolent large-scale landowners have made family holdings in land almost impossible. The result in either case has been a rural proletariat. By way of contrast, the family-sized independent farm has been the traditional one in America. Russia, for obvious reasons, quickly liquidates the independent family-sized farm in the countries it takes over.

The Urban "Communalism." After pointing out that a true community is a cohesive locality group, some sociologists suggest that this is found now only in small rural aggregates. In some of our larger cities the community has been replaced by what has been called the *communalism*. The latter is made up of people who have a true com-

munity feeling but who are widely separated physically. By means of the automobile they may come together in almost any part of the city. They have solidarity and common interests. They may even enjoy frequent face-to-face contacts usually associated with neighborliness. But these characteristics are not identified with their area of residence. Theirs is not a home community. It is a relatively new development in human relationships.⁴ Whatever its limitations may be, it is superior at any rate to an arrangement where no community feeling at all exists.

Many believe that the breakdown of the community based upon locality is bound to have important unfortunate social and political results. With loss of "pride of place" adults tend to lose interest not only in the appearance of their homes and yards, but even in the conduct of their children. Children, no longer taught to respect neighbors' property, become destructive and devoid of respect for property rights in general. Both adults and children tend to show less concern about good manners and the traditional moral code when the good name of the community is no longer a matter of serious concern. Frequently the only restraints which operate under such conditions are apt to be the legal ones. This is especially the case when church-going is regarded as unimportant.

The traditional concept and machinery of democratic government also break down with the disappearance of the true community. Our existing political system was founded upon the local community. It is still assumed that most members of the community will take an interest in ward and precinct affairs as well as taking time to vote for representatives of known merit. Yet in most cities there is little public discussion of local affairs other than crime, and attendance at local political meetings and primary elections is small. This is just what the professional politician wants. Under such conditions he and his coterie of henchmen, rather than more representative local residents, become the foundation stones of the democratic process. These politicians then select those who will run for the higher offices, thus narrowly restricting the choice of those who say they vote only in the "important" elections.

It would seem that one of the problems of the city of the future will be either the restoration of the community as a functioning social and political unit or the substitution of some new American political

process. It would be unfortunate if the present projection of urban influence into the country should likewise break down rural community spirit. Democracy in the United States assumes the existence of local areas in which people have common interests and a sense of belonging together. When seen in this light, concern about community organization and regional planning, whether local or urban, becomes a patriotic duty.

With this chapter we conclude Section IV. We have seen here that whether it is looked at from the geographical, ecological, demographical, or strictly sociological viewpoint the average American community is in need of some reorganization. This area, sometimes local and increasingly national and international, in which people share common experiences and have a sense of belonging together is so important socially and politically that Americans cannot afford to let it drift. In all of these areas of group living, therefore, we must resort to democratic social planning.

In Section V the ways in which people in groups share common experiences and build socialized personalities will be analyzed. This knowledge of collective behavior, together with that concerning community organization, should help to equip the student to take a leading rôle as citizen in the all-important social engineering anticipated for the future.

NOTES

1. For other effects see S. Giedion, *Mechanization Takes Command*, 1948.
2. T. Lynn Smith, *Population Analysis*, 1948, pp. 365-68; Paul H. Landis, *Population Problems*, 1948, pp. 442-48.
3. Saul D. Alinsky, *Reveille for Radicals*, 1945.
4. See John F. Cuber, *Sociology*, 1947, pp. 354-5.

V. COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

15

The Bases for the Social Processes

I. SOCIAL INTERACTION AND SOCIAL PROCESSES

Social Interaction. Whatever truth there may be in the stories of feral children, they at least serve to bring out the importance of social interaction. Certainly an individual brought up without contacts with other individuals would be a social monstrosity. He would lack most of those qualities which we ordinarily ascribe to persons. While he might have contacts and interaction with his animal associates, he would suffer from a lack of social contacts and social interaction. *Social contacts* are relationships which initiate responses or interactions among human beings. Social interaction presumes both social contact and a language or means of communication.

Social interaction may be defined as the process of reciprocal relations and influences that exist among members of a human group. It may take place on various levels. Most of our social interaction is said to take place on a conventional level; some takes place on a higher or critical level. Social interaction at the conventional level is limited largely to small talk and pleasantries, the "meetings and greetings" of everyday life. Social interaction at the critical level consists of the exchange of thoughts and ideas. Social interaction at either level usually follows the patterns provided by the culture of a society. Students accustomed to the tempo of "bull sessions," where loudness and vigorous emotional display often substitute for logic, sometimes find it difficult to adjust to the standards of critical discussion where challenges must be met calmly. At either level of social interaction the behavior of each participant is modified since social interaction is a dynamic interplay of forces.

Social Processes. Social thinkers, probing into the meaning of life about them, have long sought for the basic mechanisms of social

life. Towards the end of the last century the idea prevailed that conflict was the answer. This belief came from Darwinian social thought. The belief was challenged, however, by others who regarded cooperation as more fundamental. In the discussions which ensued these two mechanisms came to be referred to as "social processes." A process is a series of actions or operations definitely conducting to an end. We commonly speak of biological, chemical, and manufacturing processes. A *social process* may be defined briefly as any social interaction which has a specific quality to which a class-name may be given. By 1921, when Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess published their *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, it was said that there were four stages of the social process: competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. The list of social processes is much longer today. We shall consider them in the next three chapters.

The amount of space devoted to the study of social processes in modern sociology sometimes leads the beginning student to think that there is something profound about them. The rather abstruse definitions given to these processes contribute to this impression. The opposite is true. The great amount of attention given to these processes springs from the conviction that in the past we have been taking the mechanics of living too much for granted. We have devoted great attention to the application of physical science to modern life but very little to social engineering. The present world, national, and local discords suggest that we must pay more attention to such things as the social processes. These processes have always been observed by the layman. Actually the sociological terminology describes in most instances nothing more than that which laymen have always had in mind.

In this chapter we shall take up some preliminary considerations which would seem to be necessary for an adequate discussion of the social processes. We shall consider, for instance, social groups. These may be described as the locale of social processes. Finally we shall see to what extent social processes may be observed on subhuman levels.

II. SOCIAL GROUPS: THE LOCALE OF THE SOCIAL PROCESSES

Nature of a Social Group. A *social group* may be defined as any number of people in reciprocal communication. One-way communication does not make a group, nor does mere physical closeness of human beings without communication. From "reciprocal communication" there arise two features of a social group, namely, consciousness of likeness or of a common interest and finally a group structure regarded as essential to its continued existence.

A social group differs from an aggregation and a category. An *aggregation* is a mere assemblage of individuals in spatial proximity. A *category* is a number of people who are merely thought of as a unit. Married women in industry and veterans in colleges are categories. They lack personal propinquity. Sociology is essentially the study of social groups. Some of these groups are established, others are casual. Established social groups generally fall under the following chief headings: vertical and horizontal groups, in-groups and out-groups, and primary and secondary groups.

The members of a *vertical group* are chosen from two or more social strata. A *horizontal group* is made up of people belonging to the same social or economic stratum. An A.F.L. craft union is a horizontal group, whereas a C.I.O. union which includes an entire industry is more likely to be vertical. We shall consider these two group relationships in greater detail later in connection with social stratification.

In-groups and Out-groups. Human beings everywhere have a tendency to form "we-groups" marked by a strong sense of "belongingness" and then to view outsiders as members of "others-groups." As group solidarity increases, any group set apart from the "we-group" comes to be regarded as an opposition group. Thus there arises in society a series of in-groups made up of those who are identified with us sentimentally and out-groups made up of those regarded as opposed to us. Usually each in-group regards itself as the upholder of all that is good; the other groups are associated with evil.

The ego-gratifying tendency to overvalue the qualities of the in-group is called *ethnocentrism* when it refers to one's own race

or culture. We have seen that ethnocentrism is practically universal. It tends to insulate the thoughts and feelings of a people from those of others, thus hindering intercultural relations. Perhaps it was recognition of this human tendency which caused the Founder of Christianity to place so much emphasis upon the need of fraternal charity. He made charity the greatest of the Commandments.

It has been suggested that man's innate ability to form harmonious associations appears to have reached a certain point in the history of mankind after which it atrophied. The rise of nationalism and economically profitable race prejudice may have caused this atrophy. At any rate, it is extremely difficult today to get the average man to think of himself as an equal partner with people of other races and cultures. It may well be that if a revived democratic spirit does not get him to move beyond his present point of "atrophy" very soon, atomic and biological warfare will reduce what is left of the civilized world to a lower level of culture. The amelioration of feelings towards out-groups is one of the important tasks of applied sociology.

Primary and Secondary Groups. Charles H. Cooley, one of the founders of American sociology, popularized the primary and secondary group concepts. By *primary groups* he meant relatively small ones characterized by intimate face-to-face associations. He showed that such groups are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. Three such groups are practically universal in human societies. They are the family, the play-group of children, and the neighborhood group of elders.

In *secondary groups* contacts or associations take place only on the basis of certain conscious common interests. In contrast with primary groups, these contacts involve only a segment of rather than the entire personality of each member. It might be said then that the two groups differ chiefly in the degree of intimacy and sympathy found among members. In intimate primary contacts there is a considerable fusion of individualities. Secondary relations are more formal, casual, and impermanent.

There are few groups that qualify as exclusively of one type. Groups tend to lie along a continuum of which the primary and secondary are at opposite extremes. The more secondary a group is, the smaller is the fragment of personality displayed by each member. This may be limited to a special phase or rôle of personality.

One may even be known to his associates as a functionary rather than as a person. In many occupational and educational groups today contacts are segmental rather than broad or intimate.

We have seen that in modern urban society secondary-group contacts are rapidly replacing primary-group participation. As a nation we are rapidly becoming a secondary-group society. Serious speculation has arisen as to the ultimate psychological, social, and political consequences of this shift. What, for instance, will be the effect upon the child of the substitution of the casual contacts of hired baby-sitters, nursery schools, pre-kindergartens, and kindergartens for the former primary contacts of the family and the neighborhood play group? Can representative government, founded when America was characterized by primary community contacts, function successfully when public officials are elected by people whose contacts with each other are only of a secondary nature? Many believe that mental as well as political health demands that we foster a renaissance of primary groups. We have seen that some city planners hope to do this.

In addition to the established groups just considered, society is made up of casual groups such as crowds, mobs, and assemblages. Finally there are related types of group behavior such as social movements, social epidemics, fashions, fads, and crazes. We shall consider these aspects of group behavior next.

The Genesis of a Crowd. A crowd is a fairly large group of people in psychological as well as physical contiguity. It develops out of an aggregation through two stages. First comes an event or object which arouses the interest and feelings of members of the group. Then follows a process of social interaction known as *circular stimulation*. In this process, interstimulation assumes a "circular" form so that each member of the group not only reflects the other's feelings but in so doing intensifies his own. It corresponds somewhat to the early stages of the "milling" process seen among cattle just prior to a stampede.

In ordinary social interaction people interpret each other's actions or observations only after deliberation. In circular reactions their attention has become so preoccupied with the object of common interest and the conduct of other members of the group that they respond quickly and less critically. As a result, members of a crowd

are inclined to act under the influence of a common mood or feeling. There are two kinds of crowds: audiences and acting crowds. They represent opposite extremes of crowd conduct. Each has its subtypes.

An *audience* is a loosely organized crowd in which there is a minimum of circular stimulation. It may take the form of a momentary association of shoppers watching a sidewalk pitchman or it may be a conventionalized theatre assemblage whose conduct is governed somewhat by established etiquette. In either case there is a polarization of attention towards the performer rather than towards fellow crowd-members.

At the opposite extreme of crowd conduct there is the mob. The mob is a type of acting crowd. The *acting crowd* is characterized by increasing circular stimulation and an aggressive attitude towards a common object. This objective is frequently a crisis involving a threat to group security. Unlike a theatre audience, the acting crowd is bound by no conventions or rules. It acts solely on the basis of aroused feelings. The individual member of such a crowd gradually abandons critical understanding while sharing the collective excitement of the group.

Heightened suggestibility to fellow crowd-members, when directed towards seeking revenge for a supposed wrong, may lead to what is commonly described as mob violence. In such conduct the more violent and destructive impulses of the individual receive a sanction in the expressed feelings of others. In this way each crowd member experiences a new sense of power and righteousness. Cowards feel brave in a mob.

Gustave Le Bon, a last-century French sociologist, was one of the first to study crowd behavior. Today the technique of crowd behavior is studied by advertisers, propagandists, and Communists, who wish to utilize crowds for their own advantages, as well as by the police, who must know how to control them. The latter have observed that the force of a mob can be broken up best by directing the attention of its members away from the common objective. If the crowd members can be made to argue with one another or to commence to fear for their individual welfare, the intimate rapport which had made them an acting crowd is quickly disintegrated.

Some sociologists make a distinction between an acting crowd and what they call an expressive crowd. They regard an *expressive*

crowd as one marked by the expression of excitement through weeping, laughing, or dancing. It is typified by the violent antics still found in some of the smaller American religious sects. The expressive crowd is said to be introverted. Since it usually lacks the objective of an active crowd, its feelings are spent in individualized expressive actions. These acts, by releasing tensions created by circular stimulation, are "cathartic" in nature.

Mass expression of religious ecstasy frequently accompanied fervent post-Reformation evangelical preaching. During such manifestations of contagious emotional expression, congregations sometimes burst forth in incoherent speech, jerks, and even barking. As the major sects of Protestantism acquired a ritual and discipline, these emotional manifestations were gradually curbed. A somewhat similar type of expressive crowd conduct will come to the mind of anyone who participated in the crowds which formed upon reception of the news that World War II had ended. They too marked the sudden release of tension.

Both acting and expressive crowds arise out of the milling of excited individuals. In both there is said to be *rapport* or a state of mutual responsiveness. The conduct of each is influenced somewhat by the cultural backgrounds of the members who make up the crowd. It is on this account that crowd conduct differs according to time and place. Yet the machinery which makes the crowd go is always essentially the same. Although they are commonly regarded as types of crowds, the mass, public, and following have unique characteristics.

Mass, Public, and Following. The terms *mass*, *public*, and *following* are often used loosely and with shifting meanings even in sociological literature. Herbert Blumer gives them more precise meanings.¹ The *mass* is a large aggregation of anonymous individuals engaged in similar and simultaneous behavior, but among whom very little interaction or organization exists. Usually members of a mass are isolated to the extent that milling is impossible. This permits the individual to retain his self-awareness. The mass is also represented by people engaged in what is referred to as a mass movement. A gold rush or a large migration where each seeks his own objective would be a good example. The mass is characterized by the lowest degree of "we" feeling.

Public is used in many senses. Usually it refers to people generally outside of the family circle. Often it is limited to the people of a particular nation or territory, as the American public. Recently it has come to be used rather loosely when reference is made to the "public" or following of a stage or moving-picture star. In its strict sociological sense, the *public* is a non-contiguous group in which corporate unity is achieved through critical discussion. In this sense it is an area of social interaction. Blumer restricts the term to a group of people divided in their ideas as to how an issue which confronts them should be decided. There are as many publics in the nation at any time as there are distinct issues. The size of the particular public depends upon the issue. The baseball public concerned about a change in the rules is apt to be a large one; the chess public is more limited.

In the public, critical faculties are sharpened. Rational considerations and facts are emphasized. In a crowd, on the other hand, rapport develops and action follows without this exchange of ideas. Feelings outweigh rational considerations. It is on this account that the public lacks the unanimity which characterizes a crowd. The public acquires unity and is able to act only after arriving at a collective opinion. The mass, by way of contrast, is said to act differently from either the crowd or public; it acts through the convergence of individual selections. Since there are many publics, depending upon the various interests of groups of individuals, there are many public opinions. In Chapter 18 we shall see how propaganda seeks to convert publics into crowds in order to forge opinions more quickly.

Social Movements. A *social movement* may be defined as a collective enterprise designed to change existing social practices or institutions. It is a general term for collective behavior in which participants work out a course of action leading towards a defined goal. It is based upon dissatisfaction with some phase of the existing social organization. A social movement may be either general or specific. Usually one based upon shifting cultural values is a general movement. The American labor movement, based upon changing ideas concerning the dignity of the common man and general dissatisfaction over the abuses sanctioned by vested interests, was of this type.

As general social movements grow, they give rise to specific ones.

The latter have from the start clearly defined objectives along with an organization, structure, and recognized leaders. The A.F.L. and C.I.O. unions were the result of such a crystallization of the unrest reflected in the general labor movement. Political leaders must keep informed about the growth of specific movements, since any one of them may suddenly become a political force. At one time it may be a youth movement. In America's future old-age movements are more likely to become political factors. With the increasing percentage of the aged in our population and the present tendency of the aged to form a pressure group for utopian schemes a new problem has arisen in American political life. Paul H. Landis says it would not be surprising to see counter movements start to "disfranchise those who reach retirement age in order to protect the interests of other age groups."² Thus, one special social movement may lead to the establishment of others in opposition.

Blumer describes five mechanisms in the organization of specific social movements.³ First there is agitation to arouse interest and make recruits. This is followed by the development of an *esprit de corps* in which feelings are organized on behalf of the movement. The third stage involves the forging of a morale or group-will which can endure in the face of expected adversity. A group ideology is next worked out. This consists of both scholarly doctrines and popular emotional symbols which summarize the tenets of the movement. Finally, flexible tactics adaptable to particular situations and cultural settings are evolved.

All of the above mechanisms are evident in Communist organization. Communism has an ideology for intellectuals as well as one for the masses. No movement has been more flexible in adapting itself. In a country where religious or democratic influence is strong it pretends at first to be friendly to these interests, thus enticing starry-eyed liberals. Much of this unusual flexibility springs from the fact that communism recognizes none of the fixed moral principles which have prevailed in the peace-time negotiations of Western peoples in the past. Communist leaders feel that their ultimate objective—violent revolution to be carried out against the existing state government by bands of armed workers—permits the adoption of any tactic, however cruel or dishonest, that contributes to this end. The non-elect are regarded as inferior beings. In the United

States Communists despise our laws and courts. The morale and rigid discipline of Communists are comparable to that of an army already at war. This enables them not only to shift tactics suddenly but to act quickly in making any current difficulty in a democracy an occasion for agitation and recruiting.

Fashion Movements. Unlike custom, which is static, fashion is a movement characterized by vertical descent through social classes. As a result of a fashion movement, a new pattern of clothing, manners, art, or ideas initiated among the élite is soon imitated by groups lower in the social structure. A fashion movement is unique in that it has none of the mechanisms which characterize other types of crowd behavior. A fashion is accepted not only because of the prestige of its sponsors but also because it expresses widespread individual desires. Among the latter are urges for distinction, novel experience, and conformity.

Fads, crazes, and social epidemics are varieties of fashion movements. They differ in that they are more eccentric, of local incidence, and of relatively short duration. Fads and crazes sometimes represent the more superficial aspect of a fashion movement. Social or "mental epidemics," such as epidemics of fear, spread by psychic contagion and sometimes do serious harm. Psychological warfare makes use of this device. As a rule, however, fads, crazes, and social epidemics involve frivolous things and may be regarded as temporary "escapes" from routine habits.

Group Morale and Esprit de Corps. We have seen that Blumer makes a distinction between morale and *esprit de corps*, both of which are regarded as important mechanisms in the organization of a specific social movement. *Morale* may be defined as the collective will of a group to succeed. It is based upon a serious, sober, and persistent determination to overcome obstacles in the pursuit of an objective. Blumer points out three convictions which are found in any social movement characterized by a high degree of morale. There is belief in the absolute rectitude of its purpose and in the ultimate attainment of the goal of the movement. Finally there is the conviction that the movement has a sacred mission.

Members of a social movement with these convictions usually see everything as either black or white. All that is opposed is evil which will be eliminated by the attainment of their objective. The objec-

tive is so right and necessary that it cannot possibly fail. Since the movement is regarded as fostering higher moral values, it follows that its mission must be sacred. This conviction leads to the emergence of "saints" and "martyrs." Hitler, Lenin, and Marx were deified by the members of their movement and *Mein Kampf* and *Das Kapital* were regarded as bibles. Thus the spirit of their followers might well be described as having something of a religious nature.

Esprit de corps also involves the organization of feelings on behalf of a movement. It is the sense of "belonging together." It gives people engaged in a social movement the feeling that they form a select group. But while *esprit de corps* is a form of group enthusiasm which gives life to a movement it does not have the persistency of morale. It may collapse in the face of adversity. New members of the Communist Party, therefore, are not trusted with the secrets of the group until their enthusiasm has been tested by adversity.

Esprit de corps in a social movement, according to Blumer, is also developed in three chief ways. In-group-out-group relations must be built up first of all. With the "enemy" thus determined, attention is given to the development of informal fellowship among members. Thus, social acceptance may replace a person's former feeling of rejection. The third step is participation in formal ceremonials. Parades, rallies, and huge "pep meetings" provide ceremonial behavior and ritual. A feeling of personal expansion comes from being a member of such assemblages. Special uniforms, slogans, hymns, and gestures not only give new importance to a movement but sentimental significance as well. Thus group enthusiasm is whipped up to the point where it is ready for the development of the final convictions that go to make morale.

III. SUBHUMAN FOUNDATIONS FOR SOCIAL PROCESSES

A Laboratory for the Study of Social Processes. The Judaeo-Christian tradition so emphasized man's superiority over the animals that there was a tendency very often to forget man's resemblance to them. The recent discovery that many animals have a social life and an embryonic learning process which in many respects are like our own prompted some social scientists to go to the opposite extreme by claiming that in insect and animal society we may study man's

social life in miniature. This prospect was attractive, for it also promised to provide a needed laboratory for controlled experiments. If social life below man is characterized by competition, coöperation, and the other social processes, we should be able to learn something about these processes on this subhuman level.

Many attempts have been made to measure the distance between human and animal group life. Nearly every textbook on cultural anthropology and social psychology cites this evidence. We shall lean heavily here on Otto Klineberg's statement and interpretation of the evidence relative to group behavior, in-groups and out-groups, leadership and domination, and "culture" among the animals.⁴

Social Life of Insects and Animals. It has been said that insects are the only form of life capable of competing on fairly even terms with man today. The amount of time and money spent upon the extermination of insects on the farm alone is enormous. We are concerned here with the "social insects," which include bees, wasps, ants, and termites. All have a group life which is characterized by intricate organization. Termite society, for example, is made up of specialists—reproducers, soldiers, and workers—each of which plays a distinct rôle in the group. Although these so-called white ants individually are little more than dull automata, they carry on an organized destructive campaign which costs Americans annually millions of dollars.

In the tropics there are other types of ants which march like well-trained armies. They send scouts out ahead to bring back information and maintain deployed rear and flank guards as they advance. They have been known to devastate a path through the heart of a jungle, killing every living creature and driving out the panic-stricken inhabitants of villages. Their strength comes from one thing—intricate organization. It is no wonder that some social scientists have suggested that we have here a subhuman pattern for human social group behavior.

Other examples of subhuman patterns for social life have been cited. Everyone knows that organized group behavior is found among many birds and mammals, particularly those that travel in flocks or packs. In-group and out-group relationships are also strong among most insects, birds, and mammals. Ants have been known to kill members of their own group that had been touched with the juice and

odor of an outside group. New members introduced into bird and animal groups in our zoos are usually greeted with a hostility that has something of a parallel in the common human attitude towards the stranger.

Leadership and dominance relationships are especially characteristic of bird and higher vertebrate groups. Among some birds there is a pecking order which is decided at first meeting and seldom changed thereafter. Such a social hierarchy, rigid as that of an Army post, may be seen in any chicken yard. The hen at the bottom of the social order is pecked by all and pecks none. She must defer to her superiors at the feeding and roosting box. It is for these privileges, evidently, that the social order is established. Goats and cows likewise are said to have a rigid social hierarchy. Similar dominance and submissive behavior prevail among baboons. Although earlier observers thought they saw evidence even of coöperation and altruism in monkey and ape society, S. Zuckerman maintains that these animals are notoriously selfish, coöperating rarely and then only when in danger of attack.

Interpretations of Animal Social Psychology. What are we to say of this apparent "supra-animal" conduct in the kingdom below us? If a man could become an insect, bird, or ape for a few moments we might have all the answers. Lacking this insight we can only speculate. This leaves room for a variety of opinions. The conclusions of two authorities on the social life of insects illustrate this. W. M. Wheeler says there is no fundamental difference between their society and man's. Yet C. J. Warden regards the differences between the two societies as so great that by comparison the similarities seem trivial and superficial. In view of this difference of opinion about animal social life we may find the answer to our problem through an analysis of the psychological mechanism of animals.

In man, the rational animal, it is commonly said that behavior consists of four kinds of action: reflexes, instincts or drives, learned behavior, and insight or intelligence. There is no question about the operation of the first three in lower animals. We need not pause here to consider reflexes. These quick physical reactions, like the wink of an eye, are obviously below the threshold of intelligence. Although, as we have seen, there is room for differences of opinion regarding the extent of instinctive action in man, it is agreed that instinct gov-

erns most of the actions of lower animals. These inherited patterns, located in the nervous system, are automatic and unthinking. Instinct seems to explain practically every phase of insect society. Where they adapt to a different environment this appears to be explainable on the basis of biological mutation and selection. They reproduce in such enormous numbers and are so short-lived that the individual's experience can count for little in the continuation of social patterns.

The follow-the-leader and the food-hoarding habits of some animals appear to us at first sight to indicate learned behavior, if not reasoning power. Yet their ineffectual use in unusual situations suggests that these habits are largely automatic. The follow-the-leader tendency will cause sheep to trail a "Judas" goat to the slaughterhouse. A squirrel reared in captivity with a constant supply of food will nevertheless store food as if in conscious preparation for winter. It is believed that birds build nests without any knowledge of the nest's eventual purpose.

Birds, however, undoubtedly learn some things from imitating each other. Yet there is no objective proof that deliberate "teaching" of the young occurs. Parents evidently carry out instinctively certain functions which the young are prompted to follow through similar instinctive propulsion. Our increased knowledge of the intricate mechanism of bodily chemistry has changed many former explanations for animal conduct. Once it was thought that birds, like farmers, became consciously aware of lengthening daylight hours and governed their seasonal activities accordingly. But now it is believed that the changing daily doses of light change the internal chemistry of birds' bodies, thus arousing automatically migratory as well as other instincts. If the swallows of Mission San Juan Capistrano return each spring with more clocklike punctuality than swallows elsewhere, it is probably because of California's more dependable, stormless spring weather.

Intelligence in Animal and Man. All animals can learn. They do this mostly either by trial and error or by conditioning. Some learn also by imitation. Even worms profit by experience. The extent to which an animal may learn and so improve its instinctive equipment depends upon the physical construction of its nervous system. Laboratory maze tests, in which an animal is required to find its way

past several blind alleys to food, show that some animals learn by experience more quickly than others of the same species. Animal trainers observed this fact long ago. Most instances of so-called "intelligent" behavior in animals, however, are merely combinations of instinctive and learned behavior.

Offhand one might expect that some of the larger land-living vertebrates would possess not only ability to learn from each other but even to pass this accumulated learned behavior (a "culture") on to the next generation. We might expect this because they are relatively long-lived, slow-breeding, and remain longer with their young. Do any of them have a culture? R. M. and A. W. Yerkes who have made extensive studies of chimpanzees in captivity say that they reason and may even pass on a changed culture. There are numerous unauthenticated stories about animals in the wild doing this. Nonetheless, most authorities are inclined to believe that culture, if we may use this term here, is not transmitted on subhuman levels. To do so would involve communicating a new form of behavior which would later become a habit common to a large number of the same animal species.

To start with, culture presumes more than mere "practical" reasoning power. The Yerkes' chimpanzee can put two sticks together and by means of their increased length pull in a banana from outside the cage. Thus it may be said to construct means to realize an end. This is "reasoning," but on the merely practical level. It is sometimes called instrumental reasoning. Although man reasons on this level too, he also engages in normative or theoretical reasoning. Man, after obtaining a banana, may suppress his urge to eat it because of some higher abstract value inconceivable to an ape. The Yerkes' critics emphasize the point that man alone engages in reflective thinking. They say that animals, restricted at best to instrumental reasoning, are capable of developing only what may be described as the "crude foreshadowings" of a culture. Man's closest relatives, the monkeys and great apes, at any rate are the only non-human creatures that give undisputed evidence of even elementary intelligent processes.

The above considerations would seem to suggest the following conclusions about social and mental activities on subhuman levels: there are only the crudest foreshadowings of culture; even in man's

closest relatives we find only the most elementary mental processes; instinct for the most part rules the subhuman world. These conclusions would suggest that it is futile to attempt to study the social processes on the subhuman level. This appears to be the attitude of modern sociologists. It is a reaction against the contrary impression that arose following the enthusiastic reception of the first studies of insect and animal social life. It may be significant that more recent studies of insect and animal group organization tend to emphasize the differences rather than the likenesses between animal and human behavior.

NOTES

1. *New Outline of the Principles of Sociology* (1946), edited by Alfred McClung Lee, pp. 185-91. See also R. L. Sutherland and J. L. Woodward, *Introductory Sociology*, 3d edition, 1948, pp. 340-44.
2. *Population Problems*, 1948, p. 295.
3. *New Outline of the Principles of Sociology* (1946), edited by Alfred McClung Lee, pp. 203-11.
4. *Social Psychology*, 1940, Chapter 2.

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Competition, Conflict, and Coöperation

Having considered the locale of the social processes and having eliminated subhuman groups as sources of practical information, we turn now to a detailed analysis of these mechanisms of social interaction in human groups. Competition, conflict, coöperation, and the rest are merely special types of interaction among people in relationship. Some societies or cultures emphasize one, others another. Yet no society is characterized by the exclusive adoption of only one of these mechanisms. On the other hand, some societies seem to suffer in their social relationships because they overemphasize some one of these mechanisms. We shall be especially interested in the way in which these processes operate in our own society.

I. COMPETITION

Nature and Extent of Competition. Competition is generally said to be the most elementary and universal of the various types of interaction. At the human level the more strictly social forms of interaction are derived from it. Competition of a kind is common also to plants and animals. It is involved in the "struggle for existence." The term is used so widely that a definition seems superfluous. *Competition*, in brief, is the struggle for limited goods.

Competition at the human level differs from that on lower levels. In the subhuman realms competition is chiefly for existence. With man the objects sought go far beyond immediate or instinctive goals. Thus man may compete for wealth beyond his ordinary needs and comforts. He may compete for intangible objects such as prestige. Man, in brief, competes for society-made goals as well as for those

set up by his nature. Thus it is that culture influences the human competitive process.

In the United States, for the most part, we have a highly competitive culture. Having been reared in it we are apt to assume that life is this way everywhere. Yet there is ample evidence which shows that intense competition is inherent neither in human nature nor in all other cultures. We have already seen that in the plantation system of our rural South the Negro does not live under a competitive wage system. Ruth Benedict has shown that among the Pueblo Indians the "go-getter" is actually despised. The ideal person there is one "of dignity and affability who has never tried to lead, and who has never called forth comment from his neighbors."¹ In order to get Pueblo men to take offices of authority they are imprisoned until all their modest excuses have been "battered down." The plantation Negro and the Pueblo Indian experience considerable difficulty when called upon to adjust themselves in areas with the characteristic competitive American culture. It would be easy to cite much more evidence of non-competitive cultures on other continents.

Even in competitive cultures the form which competition takes varies widely. Among the highly competitive Kwakiutl tribes in the area extending from Puget Sound to Southeastern Alaska prestige is achieved not by the accumulation of wealth but rather by the conspicuous wasteful distribution of one's property. In the potlatch feasts and other rites of these tribes a man destroys his goods to secure distinction and at the same time to humiliate his rivals.

Economic Competition. Economic competition, or the independent efforts of two or more persons or groups to secure the business patronage of a third person or group, might be described briefly as the struggle for customers. It is in this field, probably more than in any other, that Western industrialized civilization tends to retain many aspects of the cultureless "struggle for existence" of the animal world. This lower type of struggle which implies conduct without principle has been described as naturalism. It is a struggle which is not subordinated to ethical norms.

E. T. Hiller believes that the "cultureless" struggle which unfortunately characterizes much of our business world is an outgrowth from earlier European backgrounds when the trader was a stranger.

Under such conditions it was felt that the mores and ideas of social solidarity of the local group did not apply to dealings with traders. The growth of nineteenth-century indirect markets encouraged this attitude towards the "stranger" in trade relations. Ruthless competition came to be accepted as natural and normal. P. T. Barnum of circus fame expressed the attitude in his famous "one born every minute" slogan.

Our present naturalistic concept of business, says Hiller, "rests on distorted reasoning." Reason can build up just as good a case to show that coöperation rather than competition is the normal condition in economic society. At any rate, the present concept disrupts the normal moral social order. It results in power-dictated transactions in which hard bargains are driven. If the parties to the transaction are of unequal strength, as frequently happens, it leads to exploitation, depredation, and the concentration of wealth into the hands of a few.²

The "American Way." There are some businessmen who regard all social legislation aimed at regulating competition in business as un-American and even un-Christian. First they ascribe human freedom and dignity to man's divine origin and destiny, finding due authority for this in the Declaration of Independence. Then they attempt to read a sanction of laissez-faire individualism into this document. From this they argue that since Soviet philosophy and practice deny both the freedom and dignity of man the only choice for Americans in the present crisis lies between individualism as reflected in the modern capitalistic system and communism. This specious argument in favor of relatively unrestricted competition is reflected in the National Association of Manufacturers' current campaign against communism. Some politicians subscribe to the same belief. Occasionally a political scientist likewise endorses this concept of the American way.

Political scientists do not all agree that laissez-faire individualism is enshrined in our institutions. Neither does the present Supreme Court, as compared with that of the "nine old men" who opposed New Deal measures. Legal students and political scientists who disagree with the nineteenth-century legal concept point out that some of the European writers who influenced the founders of our republic laid much stress on an anti-individualism philosophy which

they called the principle of "sociality" in government. Although, as we shall see, there have been some religious leaders who have attempted likewise to give a religious sanction to individualism in government, there are many others today who deny this association. The latter point out that the state has not only the obligation but even a divine authority to regulate social life for the common good, citing the thirteenth chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans as evidence. It has been observed that so-called "social Christianity" has become so widely recognized today that it is common to find mere humanitarian objectives stated in religious terms.

During the last century a one-sided concern for freedom in government gave us a long period of almost unregulated competition. It was an application of the naturalistic concept which, as Hiller observes, disrupted the normal moral order. It led to the near-exhaustion of our mines, oil reserves, and forests. It produced intolerable inequalities which have actually prepared the ground for communism. It was only when this individualism collapsed temporarily as a force in the depression of the 1930's that moral forces were finally able to assert themselves more emphatically in our economic life. Through what amounted to a peaceful political revolution, legislative controls for the common good began to be placed upon naturalistic economic competition.

Restraint of Competition. If state control seems to be quietly replacing free competition in the so-called American Way, it can be said that big business unwittingly set the pattern. The past efforts of corporations to secure high protective tariffs and combinations in restraint of trade were aimed at restricting competition. When monopoly agreements are made today to keep up prices competition is further strangled. Yet when the government attempts to copy this pattern and regulate competition for the common good business forgets the source of this pattern in its protests. Many observers of recent trends believe that the days of relatively free competition are over here forever now that government controls are being proposed so widely.

There has been much speculation about the extent to which government controls will go in America's future. It may be that the Tennessee Valley Authority will provide a pattern for democratic controls on a scale which will far exceed anything which we have

yet seen. Although this project was opposed as "socialistic" by a large sector of American business, its success has been so remarkable that demands have arisen for similar water-control and power projects elsewhere in the nation. David Lilienthal, after his experience as chairman of the Authority, suggested that we should have T.V.A.'s on a world-wide scale. President Truman seemed to endorse the idea in his "Point Four" program for under-developed areas of the world in his first message to the 81st Congress. The plan for the development of the untapped resources of the Amazon River valley under the auspices of the United Nations has been described as a step in this same direction.

In their vain attempt to retain the old ruthless competitive economic system in the face of growing popular discontent, leaders of American business have often shown incredible blindness and stupidity. Time and again they have waged extensive advertising campaigns to warn the nation that some proposed reform measure is "socialistic." Subsequent public satisfaction with the results of many of these measures must have had the indirect effect of making "socialism" seem somewhat attractive to many Americans, even though we are still far from socialism. The present tendency to brand progressive measures as "communistic" may have an even more dangerous indirect effect. Unfortunately, big business seems to be the last to realize that unregulated competition is not going to be the American Way in the future.

Economic Competition and Religion. Most of the ideological disputes on the merits of the capitalistic system today center about the proper division of the rewards which should accrue respectively to capital, management, and labor. In the background of this controversy which is racking the nations of the West there are religious influences which are frequently misunderstood. Most of us know that the Reformation somehow had an influence upon economic theories. We realize too that it was tragic that a new economic order swept over Europe and the United States at a time when Christianity was torn asunder more acutely than ever before. But it remained for R. H. Tawney to point out how Protestantism unwittingly fostered many of the evils of the existing economic order.

In his *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* Tawney shows that the early reformers in Germany and England were unanimous in re-

taining the medieval teaching that religion had a social content and that there were moral aspects of economics. No Schoolman denounced covetousness in business with more invective than Luther. "Where questions of social morality were involved, men whose names are a symbol of religious revolution stood, with hardly an exception, on the ancient ways, appealed to medieval authorities, and reproduced in popular language the doctrines of the Schoolmen."⁸ Thus, no matter how much early Protestants and Catholics differed in religious dogmas, they agreed on the need of moral restraints to economic competition.

It was only at a much later period when the spirit of Calvinism became dominant in Protestantism, says Tawney, that the full implications of religious individualism were realized and religion was emptied of its social content. Secular activities were not only divorced from spiritual restraints but laissez-faire industrialism was actually given the blessing of religion. Even in fairly recent times apologists for the Reformation not only identified economic liberalism with Protestantism but even argued that the industrial superiority of the dominantly Protestant countries over Catholic nations proved the superiority of the new religion over the old. Many followers of Calvin regarded material prosperity, even though achieved through ruthless competition, as a special sign of divine predilection. It need not be pointed out here that these practices of economic liberalism have been the cause of most of our present economic discontent.

The Protestant leaders at the World Council of Churches at Amsterdam in September, 1948, appear to have made amends for the aberration of their predecessors. Judging from the report on economic matters, they have gone back to the social teachings of the early reformers, just as most American Protestant groups have in recent years. They deplore the secularism of the age, reject excessive individualism, and find both laissez-faire capitalism and communism repugnant to Christianity. In many respects this report coincides with the social encyclicals of the Catholic Church and the teachings of Jewish bodies. If the Amsterdam report reflects the present thinking of all Protestant leaders on economic matters, it may be a sign that the time has arrived at last when Christians and Jews can present a united front to the naturalism which has so long infected and blighted our competitive social order.

II. CONFLICT

From Competition to Conflict. Competition is usually impersonal and unconscious. It may exist without awareness or personal contacts. It is lacking in emotional content. People are seldom consciously aware that their success usually deprives some other person of a similar goal. When competition becomes a conscious process it changes to conflict. *Conflict* may be defined as a form of competition in which there is an intensification of effort accompanied by antagonistic behavior.

It is not always easy in specific instances to distinguish between competition and conflict. John F. Cuber classifies the more orderly rivalries as competition. Rivalries carried out with a relative absence of socially established rules are defined as conflict. The distinction lies in the regulation of rivalry by society. In interracial, capital-labor, and business-government rivalries Cuber finds aspects of both competition and conflict.⁴ Competition and conflict at any rate are closely associated.

Conflicts Within the Personality. We have already considered internal personality conflicts, such as those brought about by a clash between the ego and the subconscious mind. These are psychological rather than sociological processes. They concern the psychiatrist and psychologist. Sociologists point out, however, that such internal conflicts may arise because a person is a member of groups with different ideals or values. If there is a strong emotional attachment to both groups, the resulting dilemma may disorganize the personality.

As our society becomes more complex, so that people belong to more and more groups with conflicting values, the possibility of conflicts within the personality is increased. In such instances it may be said that individual disorganization takes place because of conflicts within the culture. A new borderline field of study, called social psychiatry, attempts to consider the rôle of these social factors and to suggest ways to manipulate our social life so as to eliminate or ameliorate irritating factors.

Conflicts with Persons. Conflicts between persons occur in business, in college, and even in the best of families. Even in family relationships alone the sources of conflict may vary widely. Frequently the source of conflict is the spending of the family income. At other

times it may be an unconscious struggle for authority, affection, or perhaps only for some "insignificant supremacy." Among newly-weds conflict may spring from irritation suddenly experienced by the necessity of having to sacrifice individual freedom of choice in so many matters.

Frequently marital conflict results from tensions created by a sudden clash of two different cultures. Although personality differences are usually recognized and evaluated during the dating period, the importance of cultural differences in marriage is frequently underestimated. Yet in a study of 1,000 couples it was found that "cultural likenesses" involving such things as religious affiliation, conceptions of marriage, and general cultural backgrounds were more important in successful marital selection than "temperamental or personality similarity."⁵ Conflicts are bound to arise in marriage also when partners "inherit" from their family backgrounds widely different ideas of the social rôles of each spouse. Finally, personality clashes may occur merely from a conflict between the realities of married life and a previous unrealistic romantic concept of marriage.

Any prolonged, close association of human beings, whether it be in marriage or in the office or shop, results in aversions which may become sources of conflict. Human nature, like most diamonds, shows imperfections when viewed too closely. In the home the possibilities of conflict are increased because the worst side of one's nature is frequently and thoughtlessly reserved for intimates. People usually try to be agreeable and courteous with strangers and casual business associates. To this end they purchase "How to Win Friends" books which are often little more than expositions of Christian charity in modern dress, yet at the same time they may ignore the dignity of their intimates' personalities. Furthermore, the tensions that arise from frustrations in the work-a-day world are sometimes unconsciously transferred to those at home.

The Reduction of Person-to-Person Conflicts. Everyone has idiosyncracies which are bound to appear in intimate association and possibly "rub others the wrong way." In a sense we are all "peculiar." To start with, we have deep-seated physiological differences. Tests show that there are wide differences in our sense of taste and in the rest of our senses. "*De gustibus non est disputandum.*" Bodily reactions also differ widely. Some people are affected by caffeine and

nicotine and others are not. Some want lots of fresh air while working and others do not. We differ widely too in mental abilities. Some rate high in general intelligence but low in mechanical aptitude. Even those with high I.Q.'s may be brilliant in one phase of mental activity but weak in another. The mere fact that we often start with a different premise causes us to differ in our logical conclusions, another thing which makes us seem strange and irritating at times to associates.

We might add indefinitely to the list of differences which cause discord in person-to-person conflicts. Even in the same family children rarely have an identical background of social experience. Yet everyone is apt to think that he is an "average" person with no irritating idiosyncracies. There is no such person. Once we realize this we have taken the first step in avoiding conflicts. The next step is to cease criticizing and start making allowances for others as they do for us. Although it is said that a fixed regular institutional routine helps to prevent neuroses, evidently even prisoners have their problems of social adjustment. Recently a long-time prisoner at the Southern Michigan State Prison wrote a book entitled *How to Do Time*. The only words on each of the 300 pages are "Mind Your Own Business."

The amazing sale of Dale Carnegie's *How to Win Friends and Influence People* (1936) would seem to be a matter of social significance. It was reported in 1948 that this book, which deals largely with ways to meet conflict situations, was the only American non-fiction work that ever sold over three million copies. Even when allowance is made for the advertising build-up for this book, its popularity would seem to indicate that there are thousands of Americans in quest of ways to make constructive solutions of the conflicts that arise in everyday living.

We have heard much in recent years about sex conflicts in marriage. The first impact of Freudian psychoanalysis created the impression that sex maladjustment in marriage is one of the major causes of domestic discord. Some "advanced thinkers" even suggested that couples should engage in sexual relations before marriage just to make sure that they were "adjusted." Bernard Shaw, who has never been accused of being a prude, seems to have given the answer to those who place such a high value on sex adjustment in marriage. In

his *Sixteen Self Sketches* (1949) he declares that the sex relation is not a "personal relation" at all. It may be "rapturously consummated," he says, between persons who could not endure each other in any other association. It would be trite to point out here that marriage is much more than sex. It is above all a personal relationship. Happiness in marriage has to be learned; it does not come instinctively or immediately. Marriage is a lifetime school for adult education in which learning how to deal with conflict situations is a major course. Marriage counselors say that it is foolish to expect that either perfect sexual or personality adjustments will be made immediately in any marriage.

Group Conflicts. We have already seen that personality conflicts may result from the mere fact that people are members of various groups with incompatible ideals and objectives. Groups, like individuals, compete for limited goods, whether it be political power, economic and social status, or other objectives. Within our national borders regional, religious, and racial groups are constantly in competition. Conflict frequently develops. Frustrations and resentments follow. Yet these tensions rarely result in violence, bloodshed, or resort to court action. Groups learn to get along, to live and let live, in spite of conflicts.

One reason that our conflicting groups manage to live together in reasonable harmony is to be found in the fact that all accept the basic American culture pattern which frowns upon violence. Each organized group has its distinctive culture, but over and above this is loyalty to national authority and respect for its institutions. This is why the conduct of Communists in our midst often seems so strange to Americans. Many of our citizens have been slow to realize that the basic loyalty of Communists is to Soviet Russia. In the United States they seek only to confuse and divide. If the conduct of Communist leaders in their long 1949 trial in New York City was insolent by our standards, we should remember that their standards were those of Russia, where important trials are regarded as "demonstration processes" for propaganda purposes. Communist groups reflect an un-American culture.

International Conflicts. Communists throughout the world say they are working for peace. In a sense they are. Following either bloody or peaceful revolution in every country they would make all peoples peaceful subjects to the rule of Moscow. Thereafter secret

police, "trials" based upon "confessed" guilt, the Red army, and slave-labor battalions would keep malcontents in line. But most free-men object to the costs to body and soul of the Russian "peace" plan.

Even though the true nature of the Russian program is becoming better known each day, it is rather easy to understand why so many idealists are still attracted by Soviet utopian promises. Two world wars in close succession raise a reasonable doubt about the ability of Western nations to live in peace. At any rate it must be admitted that we are still a long ways from knowing how to handle international conflicts. The mere thought of the even greater conflicts that may be ahead in this world that is getting smaller and smaller is frightening. In touching upon this gigantic problem here we can afford only to deal with a few fundamentals. Perhaps the first thing to be considered is the old question, "Is war inevitable because of man's nature?"

During the last part of the last century it was said quite generally that war is instinctive and necessary. This belief had its roots in social Darwinism. Yet this idea is held by few educated people today. Cultural anthropologists were shocked in 1947 when Sir Arthur Keith, a famous physical anthropologist, endorsed the old idea in his *Evolution and Ethics*. He claimed that the "law of evolution" not only requires warfare but that the law of tooth and claw is also the "life preserver of nations." If national and tribal hatreds should eventually dissolve "under the sunshine of Christ's teaching," he said, the world would stagnate. Some of Keith's critics pointed out that the octogenarian's plea for the "blessings" of war was an attempt to prolong in international relations a naturalistic philosophy that is gradually being abandoned now even in the business world.

War and Culture. Cultural anthropologists regard warfare as a *cultural* trait rather than as an innate, inherited one. They remind us that some primitive tribes are unable to conceive of organized warfare. The writer recalls an embarrassing half-hour trying to explain to a group of Eskimos why we go to war when word arrived that hostilities had broken out between the Chinese and Japanese a few years ago. Modern psychologists agree that there is no "fighting instinct" in man which makes war necessary. Yet we have had a fatalism about warfare ever since Darwin's time. Now that psychologists and sociologists are coming to recognize that we cannot seek patterns for human group conduct in the animal world, more atten-

tion may be given to seeking the causes of war in man's culture. The task of preventing war should not be insurmountable once it is realized more widely that it is only human behavior, not human nature, that needs to be altered.

In many of our group relationships we have learned to substitute higher values for those which formerly caused conflict situations to result in violence. With the present threat of well-nigh general extinction through atomic and biological warfare, it should not be too difficult for people the world over to find higher values which will make war less desirable. Many who adhere to the Judaeo-Christian tradition say that this value has always been contained in the "sunshine of Christ's teaching" and that it would have greater effectiveness today had it not been for the rise of secularism, nationalism, and religious dissensions during the last three centuries.

Although most sensible people believe that warfare will someday be eliminated, it would seem to be too much to hope that conflict itself in international relations can ever be abolished. Walter Lippmann suggests that failure to recognize this was the cause of most of America's diplomatic fiascos following the first and second world wars. Most Americans fail to recognize that conflict among nations is a normal condition in world society. This mistaken idea stems from our long background of isolationism. Lippmann says that we have an impatient "all or nothing" attitude in dealing with international conflict situations which causes our diplomacy to miscarry. If we are to be effective in dealing with other nations we must realize that differences, disagreements, and truces are normal processes in the modern competitive world society. Once this is realized we shall be satisfied, as most parents are in family disputes for that matter, with the adoption of limited ends or means.⁶ Our study of some of the other social processes, especially coöperation, accommodation, assimilation, and social control should suggest how nations, like other groups, may learn to live in reasonable harmony.

III. COÖPERATION

Nature of Coöperation. Coöperation may be defined as a social process in which two or more persons work together in mutual helpfulness. It is easy to understand for we see it constantly all around

us. One can scarcely walk down a city street or cross a college campus without witnessing many examples of coöperation. Men at work coöperate in the accomplishment of a task. Most people coöperate in observing the rules of conduct that society has laid down for the welfare of the group. Even when we consider the broader aspects of our industrial order we find a coöperative arrangement in which management directs labor in projects made possible by the investment of capital. Yet we know that there is also intense competition among capital, labor, and management with respect to the division of profits. It is the same in nearly every other aspect of coöperative social relationships: the relationship cannot long be considered without making reference to competition.

All through this study we have been conscious of an academic background in which social theorists have labored over concepts. A considerable part of the history of social thought has involved disputes over the relative importance of coöperation and competition. Chapters are devoted to this controversy in many books on social theory and reference is made to it in all text books on general sociology. We shall not attempt to consider the historical aspects of the controversy here. Instead we shall limit ourselves to reporting some general observations with which most sociologists now agree.

Competition and Coöperation. In one of the most recent introductory general sociology texts,⁷ John W. Bennett and Melvin M. Tumin sum up the competition versus coöperation controversy in six observations. Briefly they are as follows. (1) Although society is at bottom a coöperative venture, neither coöperation nor competition can be said to be more natural to man. People can be taught to function equally well in either a coöperative or competitive situation. (2) All economies incorporate both coöperation and competition. (3) Most social situations involve both coöperation and competition even though some involve more of one than the other. (4) "Perfect" coöperation or competition never occurs in real life. (5) We know very little about the relative efficiency of these two modes of interaction. (6) It is foolish to favor one of these as superior to the other until we know more about the effects of both coöperation and competition upon individuals and groups. We do know, however, that unrestricted competition is not fair, since people start from unequal beginnings. We know too that such competition produces

frustration and other problems. But we need to know more about regulated competition and various forms of coöperation before a final choice can be made.

It appears that culture determines whether the conduct of members of a group is to be characterized by competition, rivalry, and conflict or by coöperation. We have seen that the conduct of the Indians of our Pacific Northwest is shaped by their highly competitive culture, whereas that of the Zuni of the Southwest is moulded by a coöperative system. Both competitive and coöperative ways have to be learned by the individual but society decides which shall prevail. Technology appears to have little relationship to the rating given to these social processes among primitive people. Examples of both competitive and coöperative societies may be found among hunters and agriculturalists.

Whether competition or coöperation is to prevail in a particular primitive society appears to be a matter of historical accident. It remains to be seen whether or not the same rule applies to industrialized cultures. We know that our own culture is rapidly changing from unrestricted to regulated competition. We know too that while coöperative ways are making inroads here, other industrialized nations have made far more progress in this direction than we.

NOTES

1. *Patterns of Culture*, 1946 Pelican edition, p. 90.
2. *Social Relations and Structures*, 1947, pp. 169-70.
3. P. 75, 1947 Pelican Edition.
4. *Sociology*, 1947, pp. 546-8.
5. E. W. Burgess and P. Wallin, "Homogamy in Personality Characteristics," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Volume 39, 1944, pp. 475-81.
6. "The Rivalry of Nations," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Volume 181 (1948), pp. 17-20.
7. *Social Life*, 1948, pp. 123-5.

Accommodation, Assimilation, and Stratification

Associative and Dissociative Tendencies. Social interaction tends to operate in either of two directions. The individuals involved may gravitate closer together. This may be described as an "associative" tendency. Interaction may also cause participants to draw further apart, a "dissociative" tendency. In between these opposite poles there are several different degrees of association and dissociation.

The terms most commonly used in sociology to describe the poles of the associative and dissociative processes are respectively *amalgamation* and *social isolation*. In between these two opposites fall such processes as accommodation and assimilation. Some regard "differentiation" or the internal arrangement among group members as the general result of the process of social interaction. One aspect of differentiation or the "sorting out" process is stratification. In this chapter we shall consider accommodation, assimilation, and stratification.

I. ACCOMMODATION

Nature and Forms of Accommodation. Conflict is usually described as an intermittent rather than a continuous process in social interaction. Since life must go on in spite of conflicts, necessary social equilibrium is usually achieved in periods of conflict by means of some form of accommodation. In the last chapter accommodation was described many times without naming it. Now we wish to analyze this important conflict-reducing process in some detail. *Accommodation* may be defined as either a temporary or permanent

adjustment of a conflict situation which, in some respects at least, permits individuals or groups to function harmoniously with reference to each other. The chief forms of accommodation are coercion, compromise, toleration, and conversion.

COERCION

The Lowest Level of Accommodation. Coercion, or forcing people to act contrary to their wishes, is the lowest level of accommodation. It involves at least outer conformity to domination along with unwilling acceptance of a position of subordination. The coerced status is accepted in order to escape an alternate penalty regarded as even worse. Although coercion marks almost every page of history, we liked to believe until recently that with the fall of Hitler and his allies the day of mass coercion among civilized peoples was about over. Russia disillusioned us. Russia's march to the west, following World War II, gave the world an example of coercion unmatched in modern times. As Russia took over one country after another in Europe and then Asia the insidious pattern for her coercive policy soon revealed itself.

The Russian Pattern of Conquest. From the many "Inside Russia" books now available the Russian pattern of conquest is clear. In practically all of the countries taken over by the Communists the coup d'état which placed them in control was not, as American fellow-travelers alleged, a mere domestic upheaval. It was a coldly planned process directed from Moscow. Frequently the leaders utilized in these countries had been trained months before in Moscow. The basic pattern of conquest follows through two stages of manipulation.

When Party leaders in the latest country singled out for Soviet aggression decide that conditions are right the first step is to work into and coöperate actively with the non-Communist local government. The objective at this "loyalty" stage is gradually to gain control of the trade unions, police, army, press and radio, and even the clergy.

The second step in the usual aggression pattern takes place after most of the initial objectives have been achieved. An artificial crisis is created. Its nature varies according to time, place, and circumstance, but it is usually described to the public as a suddenly discovered plot against the state. At this point the well-disciplined Communists

strike quickly and boldly. The chief opponents to the Party in the government or church are described as disloyal to the nation. Carefully planned police and army maneuvers quickly eject them from office, supplanting them with those who will follow the Communist line.

The people, stunned by the suddenness of the coup, are then told that these "disloyal" leaders who were "plotting with foreign agents" have been imprisoned or liquidated. "Confessions" extracted by intimidation, drugs, and torture, along with forged documents or photographs, are displayed as evidence.¹ Sometimes the "suicide" of these former leaders is reported as proof. In any event the masses are assured that the "people's democracy" has at last triumphed and that the new régime will be protected henceforth by a benign Soviet Union. A controlled press and radio extol the virtues of the new order and Russian secret police prevent criticism, thus eliminating effective resistance. Finally, the loyal workers for the new "people's democracy" are paid off from the spoils taken from former property holders which have not been shipped already to Russia. The massed Russian army in the background of this picture makes the whole process effective. Altogether, essentially it is the Hitler totalitarian occupation pattern without the Blitzkrieg.

During the waiting period between the first and second stages of the Communist coup various devices may be used. Where the Party is unable to gain representation in the government it may foster armed rebellion in order to drain the country's morale and economy. The objective is to disrupt the nation so that any group promising a stable government and a sound economy will ultimately get a hearing. This for a considerable period was the policy followed in Greece and China. Under other conditions general strikes and civil disorder are fostered. This was the policy adopted in France and Italy.

Whatever the tactics, chaos must be created as the necessary setting for the second or final stage of Soviet aggression. While the two stages of manipulation are in progress in one nation, secret agents in every part of the world—a sort of international Pinkerton detective agency—keep Moscow informed on existing local conditions and the zeal of local fifth columnists who will be looking forward to the "pay off" when the Party takes over. Our Prohibition-period gangsters would be right at home in such a machine. Accommoda-

tion of this sort rests upon the continued threat of force by the dominant group.

COMPROMISE

Nature and Extent of Compromise. *Compromise* is a form of accommodation in which each of two conflicting groups or interests agrees to take losses. Where fundamental principles are not involved in a conflict situation most civilized people today feel that it is better in the long run to make concessions to a rival than to attempt to coerce him. This process is found in successful family relations and in committee meetings all the way from the President's Cabinet down to the college dance committee. Such action presumes an adult viewpoint in which concessions are not regarded as indications of weakness. Boys' gangs often illustrate the opposite immature "chip-on-the-shoulder" approach to the settlement of difficulties.

In making mutual concessions adults recognize not only the existence of conflicting interests but also the fact that there are usually two sides to a question. They admit that in controversial matters emotions tend to become so entwined with logic that the latter is often obscured. Democratic administration and legislation are characterized by constant compromise. Yet usually most of the conflicting parties are better satisfied afterwards than they were before the exchange.

In conflict situations involving large groups, especially when emotions have been aroused, compromise often takes place by means of three steps: conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. Provisions for a "cooling off" period during which emotions may be brought under control and for formulas whereby each side may "save face" usually accompany these steps. Thus emotional tensions are reduced with the result that objective judgments tend to succeed subjective ones. In private disputes these three steps are often followed without being identified as such. Yet each step involves a new process.

Conciliation is a process of give-and-take bargaining carried on by two parties to a dispute or their representatives without outside help or authority. *Mediation* involves the services of an impartial person or agency acting merely as advisor in an attempt to settle a conflict. *Arbitration* differs from mediation in that the outsider has the authority to make a decision which is binding on both parties. Arbi-

tration may be either voluntary or compulsory. The awards of arbitrators are generally recognized by law. The federal government provides mediation boards whose technical knowledge and experience often carry much weight in helping to bring about the settlement of labor disputes. Organized labor is generally opposed to compulsory arbitration, regarding it as incompatible with a free labor system.

Compromise in Industrial Disputes. Arrangements which provide for compromise in industrial disputes have increased in recent years as unions have grown to the point where they match employers in power. One such arrangement is the umpire system. Many large industries and unions have agreed on permanent umpires whose decisions in the thousands of grievances that arise in daily life within a factory are accepted as final. Such umpires, hired and paid equally by both union and company, can be dismissed by either party. It is their job to prevent grievances from becoming issues from which neither side will retreat. Very often the umpire is also called upon to interpret the terms of labor contracts.

The umpire system, which might be described as a form of voluntary arbitration, is effective only when both parties are anxious to cooperate to make it work. It has been successful in the clothing industry for some time and has recently been adopted in some branches of the automotive industry. The umpire between the Ford Motor Company and the United Automobile Workers, who also doubles as a law-school instructor, has settled thousands of grievances. Many believe that this system should be adopted more widely as a means to industrial peace.

With the public becoming more and more impatient with delays and inconveniences caused by industrial disputes, both labor and management recognize that government will soon be forced to interfere. Both sides as a rule object to government intervention. Yet periodically headstrong individuals or groups on each side block steps aimed at voluntary compromise. Wilbert E. Moore ventures the prediction that in response to public opinion the future will see a gradual acceptance of "compulsory adjudication."² If such a policy is forced upon union and management it will only be because they have failed to accept voluntary compromise in reducing conflicts.

Compromise in International Disputes. Large-scale industrial dis-

putes go back only to the time of the Industrial Revolution, whereas war goes back at least to the dawn of history. In view of the terrific losses and the futility of wars one might expect that by now we should know far more about settling disputes that lead to war than we do about settling industrial disputes. Yet the opposite is true. After the first two world wars new plans for future world peace gave temporary promise of success. First it was the League of Nations. Following the second war came the United Nations. By 1949 most Americans, if not the world generally, had nearly lost confidence in this body also.

As we look back now at the gradual collapse of confidence in the United Nations, it is clear that this was due partly to our failure to understand Russia. Perhaps we were all misled by the "hunch" which President Roosevelt is said to have played up to the time of his death. The President, according to William C. Bullitt, former ambassador to the Soviet Union, had the feeling that if he gave Stalin everything that he wanted and asked nothing in return the Soviet dictator would work with him for world peace. Mr. Roosevelt started waves of propaganda to convince the nation that this was the proper course in spite of the misgivings of certain high government officials. Gradually the latter either resigned or were moved to unimportant posts.³

We realize now that neither *noblesse oblige* nor an honest desire for world peace has influenced Russia's conduct towards the United Nations. From the start she used the U.N. as a mere sounding board for propaganda against the United States. Her policy of crippling the Security Council by the misuse of the veto and of participating in U.N. activities only when this seemed convenient did not fit in with the concept of this organization held by the non-Soviet nations. To those who had not accepted Roosevelt's "hunch" it seemed from the start that Russia was using the U.N. chiefly as a means of diverting attention and delaying effective opposition while she consolidated her successive territorial grabs in Central Europe and Asia.

The Communist mask was dropped finally in February and March of 1949 when its party leaders in France, Italy, and the United States, acting upon orders from Moscow, announced that in case of war involving any of these countries and Russia Communists would side with the Soviet. All former wartime pretenses that Russia had aban-

doned her original plan of world revolution were now openly disavowed. Communists everywhere were revealed as Russian fifth columns rather than, as they had claimed, domestic or "democratic" reformers. Such being the case, satisfactory international compromises could hardly be expected in the U.N. or any similar organization. Stalinites have constantly revealed themselves as diplomats who cannot be trusted.

In appraising the duplicity of Russian leaders we are handicapped by our inability to learn just what is going on behind the Iron Curtain. Early in 1949 Russia was believed to have 165 combat divisions ready to march. The United Kingdom had two. Between them the Western European powers had only a dozen. Outwardly the Russians gave the impression that they were preparing to make war upon the West. Fear of this prompted our House of Representatives to approve a defense bill in April, 1949, which was almost four times Franklin D. Roosevelt's entire first budget. The same fear led to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty which seems to pledge us to war if the Red army tries to invade Western Europe. But no one is quite sure that Russian leaders are as hostile as they pretend. They may be fearful of domestic uprisings. If we were permitted to see what is really going on inside Russia, we would know why that nation is still kept on a war basis.

The action of Soviet officials in accusing the United States of warmongering suggests an old trick of dictators. When affairs are none too prosperous at home and there is fear of domestic unrest they scream about the national danger from outside enemy Number One, thus drawing attention away from conditions at home. It may well be that Russia's thunderous propaganda carried on against "imperialistic America" in its state-controlled press and radio is chiefly for home consumption. In brief, we may not be on the brink of war, after all, and it still may not be too late to try to make some sort of a peace-producing United Nations workable.

United Nations Achievements and the Future. In view of Russia's intransigence, some might suggest that the "achievements" of the U.N. are close to zero. Lest we become too pessimistic about this organization, however, it should be pointed out that the U.N. was set up to maintain peace and that up to 1949 at least there was no peace to maintain. The U.N. was supposed to take over only after

the peace treaties were signed. The delay of the victorious Allies in agreeing to the terms of these treaties forced the U.N. to try to do something in the meantime.

In spite of the above-mentioned delay and the evident attempts of Russia to embarrass the organization from the start, the U.N. has made some advances. That U.N. commissions were able to visit Korea, the Balkans, and Palestine was at least an admission that the family of nations had a concern in the trouble brewing in these areas. Even if we admit that so far the U.N. has turned out to be little more than a "town meeting of the world," it must be granted that a forum for open discussion may contribute to general enlightenment and so pave the way for future compromises.

The establishment of the Interim Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, popularly known as the "Little Assembly," in late 1947 may yet prove to be a big step towards solving collectively the problems of peace and security. The Little Assembly is made up of one representative from only those member states that choose to be represented (the Soviet group refused to participate) and has only moral authority and a limited field of activity. By bringing together the great majority who want to work constructively and in a spirit of fellowship and conciliation it may yet help the General Assembly to carry out its Charter responsibilities. At any rate, should the Soviet group withdraw or be dropped from the U.N. the pattern for a future organization made up of willing-to-compromise members is now at hand.

Whatever the name and membership of the international peace organization of the future are to be, Americans will have to adjust themselves to compromise if the project is to succeed. We have already considered Lippmann's criticism of the "all or nothing" attitude that many Americans seem to have where international agreements are involved. It is somewhat disturbing to find Americans who take "horse-trading" and compromise among Congressmen for granted being scandalized at similar bloc-maneuvers in the United Nations. Every educated American knows that government in Washington and in our states is accomplished only by "agreements" made among many sections or schools of thought. It is ridiculous to assume that this policy should not prevail in international government.

Our national government suggests another parallel which gets to

the very heart of the problem of international peace. Federal government became possible only when the states gave up a part of their sovereignty. Common sense and experience tell us that this must be true of international government. It is their failure to face this issue squarely that has prompted Robert M. MacIver to reject the majority of the books so far written on the "causes" of war. In his *The Web of Government* (1947) he sees two "myths" now blocking the way to peace. One is the myth of national sovereignty which prevents a state from accepting an obligation with respect to others that it cannot later reject. The other is the idea of the "exclusive character of national interest." The real cause of war, he says, is the present institution of uncontrolled sovereignty reflected by these myths.

No group is more vividly aware of the futility of uncontrolled sovereignty today than the atomic scientists. They realize what future atomic war may do to the world. It was this knowledge which prompted the American scientists who made up the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists to say in June, 1947, that recent scientific developments have determined that people cannot any longer live under a system of competing national sovereignties with war as the final arbitrator. The only hope for the future, the report said, lies in "the creation of a supranational government with powers adequate to the responsibility of maintaining the peace." Although originally the charter of the U.N. called for a limitation of national sovereignties, this idea was not carried out.

Compromise Among Christians. For several centuries now the world has been dismayed at the conflicts existing among Christian sects. Many people have urged that all Christians gather at a round table and discuss, yield, and compromise until a "least common denominator" religion is devised. Protestantism has already taken some giant strides in this direction. In 1947 most of South India's several sects of Protestantism united to form a new church. In what one prominent American Protestant leader described as "the most significant event in ecclesiastical history since the Reformation" Methodists, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Reformed united in a common church, common canons, and a common clergy. This move to blur denominational differences appears to be regarded favorably by many Protestant groups in the United

States and elsewhere. The Church of South India was accepted in the new International Council of Congregational Churches which was formed at Wellesley College in June 1949.

There are several reasons which should make religious mergers more common in the future. Historians say that most of the existing sects owe their origin to nationalistic, economic, and class differences more than to serious differences over creed. Dogmas were often excuses for the breaches that tore sects away from older churches. Cultural rather than doctrinal differences, along with abuses that were not quickly corrected, underlie many of America's religious antipathies. Time and cultural changes have healed many of these wounds. American respect for efficiency and economy, along with the growing philosophy among liberal Protestants that "one religion is as good as another," should give added force to future drives towards credal unity.

The possibility of additional credal compromises is also suggested by the fact that Protestants today seldom talk about heresy in their ministry. Many opinion surveys have indicated a "broadmindedness" among ministers that would have shocked our grandparents. Typical is that reported in the *Christian Century* in November, 1947. A questionnaire submitted to 50 Chicago Congregational ministers showed that the following traditional Congregational beliefs are now denied by some members of this group: original sin, the Resurrection, the authority of the Bible in matters of faith, and even the fact that Christ ever lived on the earth. About the only thing that all accepted was belief in God. Compromise should present even fewer difficulties for Unitarians and for the Buchmanite "Moral Re-Armament" group, neither of which requires even so much as a creed. "The humanist group within the Unitarian Church in the United States," according to Marshall E. Jones, "does not require of its members a belief in God. . . . In some other liberal branches of more orthodox denominations the articles of the Christian creed have been taken as metaphor rather than as strict statement of fact." *

There are obstacles to religious compromise which also must be recognized. Even in South India the Baptists and Lutherans refused to join the new United Church. Probably most Protestant groups in the United States still shy at such an extreme compromise, in spite of the American bent towards pragmatism. Roman Catholics, who

have always rejected the two key doctrines of the reformers (the invisible church and private interpretation), can be expected to resist any move to compromise these principles.⁵ Since a "return to Rome" movement is scarcely evident in Protestantism today, it would seem as if the most that may be expected in the way of religious unity and harmony in the near future is a united Protestantism working with Catholicism for the achievement of common social objectives. It may well be that the establishment of the new state of Israel will bring about a more united Judaism (now divided into three branches—Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform) which can cooperate effectively with the two Christian groups. Something of a pattern for such collaboration is suggested by the existing National Conference of Christians and Jews.

Even without a common-denominator religion, Christian and Jewish groups have common interests which at least should prompt the mitigation of antipathies that formerly kept them from working together. World peace is one such common interest. Resistance to communism would seem to be another. Practically all churchmen seem to recognize now that communism and religion are irreconcilable. Among other motives for united-front action might be mentioned the need of combating a growing secularism and the need of social reforms which will make the appeal of communism less attractive to underprivileged groups. Finally, there is the scandalous disunion among the religions of the West which weakens the appeal of missionaries who might otherwise help to halt the march of communism in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. Such considerations seem to lead naturally to another phase of accommodation, namely, toleration.

TOLERATION

Where compromise is out of the question, groups with divergent values and attitudes may still work together through toleration. *Toleration* is a form of accommodation in which differences are faced squarely, accepted for what they are, but not permitted to upset the social equilibrium. With toleration differences continue to exist but an effort is made to subordinate them to mutual participation. Democratic government presumes the toleration of minority viewpoints. Toleration of minority religious, national, and racial groups

is an ideal in American society even though in practice this ideal is still marked by many inconsistencies.

Religious Toleration. We have already seen that the "mixed marriage," where husband and wife have different religions and where each takes his religion seriously, frequently fails. It is at any rate one of the most difficult tests of toleration. Toleration likewise is often difficult in closely knit community groups where there are competing religious denominations. Since religious beliefs translate themselves into activities, occasional clashes over "your ways and my ways" are bound to arise in almost every American community. Catholics, Protestants, and Jews have been guilty of intolerance in the past. Yet centuries of discord and bloodshed have taught these groups that toleration is the only sane process for avoiding acrimonious strife.

In actual practice religious intolerance is not always easy to distinguish from legitimate religious zeal. In the United States, for instance, up until World War I there was a tradition of violent Pope-hating among many Protestants. This tradition spawned such typical delusions as salacious goings-on-behind "convent bars," arsenals for the slaughter of Protestants secreted in Catholic churches, and the civil disobedience of Catholics. When the war brought many Catholics and Protestants close together for the first time in the armed services anti-Catholic prejudice temporarily subsided. Although there was a sudden and unexpected revival of intolerance in the form of Ku Klux Klan activities at the end of the war, this demonstration was much less violent than many which had taken place in the past.

A similar pattern of tolerance during hostilities followed by a quick post-war revival of anti-Catholic sentiment marked the Second World War. Yet, it is important to note that from the Catholic viewpoint here again the pattern of intolerance was less rugged than it had been before. This time practically all Protestant leaders shunned Klanism. Even the clichés of earlier anti-Catholicism were in a large measure abandoned. The new pattern for a Protestant drive against Catholicism was described in a national magazine by a Methodist minister. The "case" against Catholics was to rest on four points: the new activity of Catholics among Negroes and in rural areas, Catholic opposition to artificial birth control, existing American representation at the Vatican, and the Catholic demand that where free bus

transportation for school children is provided it should not be denied to those who attend parochial schools. The author of the article took pains to point out that this "new anti-Catholicism" was not the same as the "traditional Pope-hating of the ignorant Protestant bigot" of America's past.⁶ This tempered statement of the so-called "case" against Catholics as well as the author's indirect apology for past "cases," if representative, would seem to indicate a trend in the direction of greater religious toleration in America.

Racial Toleration. Racial intolerance, especially as it affects the American Negro, was considered in Chapter 4. Discrimination against Jews and immigrants, although not strictly a racial issue, was considered along with race also. In each instance it was learned that economic factors rank high as causes of conflict even though religious and other cultural factors also play a part. Yet, with respect to all three forms of intolerance, intelligent forces have made much progress in recent years. Negroes, Jews, and immigrants enjoy more security here than in the past. In the North at least much of this is made possible by anti-discrimination legislation. The fear of such legislation nationally is said to make Southerners more tolerant in dealing with the Negro.

In New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts pioneer fair-employment laws make it unlawful practice: (1) for an employer to discriminate because of race, color, creed or national origin in hiring, discharging, or in the conditions of employment; (2) for a labor organization to discriminate in its membership or practices; (3) for an employer to advertise or use an application form which implies any such discrimination. Following a complaint of unlawful discrimination in these three states a special enforcement agency of the state makes an investigation. If the enforcement agency finds actual discrimination it first tries to eliminate it by conference and conciliation. Failing in this it may hold a formal hearing and make a decision. If necessary a court order can be applied for in order to enforce a decision.

It is interesting to note that the courts are rarely called upon to enforce the penalties of these laws. Under the New York law, passed in 1945, several thousand complaints were filed with the commission. Yet up to January, 1948, none even reached the hearing stage. In every instance where there was a violation the commission was able

to obtain compliance through conference and conciliation procedure.

Americans in greater numbers are now insisting upon the elimination of all forms of intolerance. Many states are showing an increasing interest in fair-employment legislation. Even in the South interracial committees are working to eliminate conflict. The Ku Klux Klan suffered a setback in June, 1949 when Alabama passed the first anti-masking law enacted in the deep South since reconstruction days. Educational forces, spurred on by legitimate Communist criticism of American intolerance, are converging to bring about the end of racial discrimination.

The report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights in October, 1947 (*To Secure These Rights*), made many specific recommendations which would go a long way towards ending discriminations which still stand out as blights upon American democracy. It set forth four basic rights essential to the well-being of the individual: (1) the right to safety and security of person, (2) the right to citizenship and its privileges, (3) the right to freedom of conscience and expression, and (4) the right to equality of opportunity. This lengthy report, described as a new American charter of toleration, will probably be quoted frequently in the future. Every present indication points to a gradual American advance towards human freedom. Yet the bitter political opposition to President Truman which arose in the South on account of this report reminds us that we still have a considerable way to go before the practice of toleration catches up with our democratic ideals.

CONVERSION

A Personal "Mutation." Conversion may be defined as a process which involves a complete voluntary shifting of a person's deepest beliefs, loyalties, and emotional attachments. It has a characteristic common to all forms of accommodation in that it represents the settlement of a conflict situation. Frequently conversion involves a large group. This is called mass conversion.

Social psychologists have studied conversion as an aspect of crowd behavior. They have been concerned chiefly with the dramatic types of religious conversion usually associated with revival meetings. We have touched upon this type of conduct elsewhere. But conversion of this type is a sudden emotional experience conditioned

by crowd associations. Religious conversion in the proper sense of the term is a more rational individual decision characterized by a previous period of ambivalence. Finally an attitude previously latent becomes dominant.

Conversion, strictly speaking, is not limited to religious experience. The essence of the concept is "being born" again in the sense that a transforming experience has taken place. This was illustrated in the career of Mahatma Gandhi. In his youth he was just another smartly dressed man about town in London. His chief concern seemed to be music and dancing. Then something happened and he experienced a sudden sense of vocation to return to India and devote his life to helping his countrymen. St. Paul and St. Augustine likewise illustrated this process, as did Robert Louis Stevenson when he found his religion again in the South Sea Islands after having turned against it in his youth.

Conversion is often associated with some great transforming experience. It need not be dramatic, however, even though the resulting change which takes place in the individual usually is. It may follow from gradual disillusionment or from contact with another person or from reading a book or merely from having the time to consider seriously a change in one's philosophy and manner of living. When conversion is regarded as a social process it is classified as a form of accommodation. Since in some ways at least it involves the adoption of a different culture, it is also related to the processes of acculturation and assimilation.

II. ASSIMILATION AND AMALGAMATION

Assimilation. This process is analogous to the biological one in which external matter is ingested by a living body. Social *assimilation* is a process through which persons or groups acquire the habits and sentiments of other persons or groups and so become incorporated into a common system of life. As a rule, this process takes place more gradually than accommodation. The experience of a migrant as he slowly develops a feeling of "belonging" in a new group illustrates this process. We have seen that cultural anthropologists use the term *acculturation* to describe a somewhat similar process involving two or more cultures.

In the United States assimilation has come to be practically synonymous with *Americanization*. In no other country has assimilation taken place as rapidly and as extensively. Some nationalities have been assimilated more quickly than others, but usually all are finally assimilated into the American main stream within two or three generations. Frequently observers of the Americanization process fail to see that this assimilation is a reciprocal process in which neither group is the same as before. Although it is reasonably expected that the native culture will predominate here, it must be recognized that our "native" culture is a stream which takes over something from each succeeding "Americanized" group. With the rapid spread of communication and transportation assimilation problems are becoming world-wide.

American sociologists of late have made considerable use of the term *marginal man*. This concept is related to both assimilation and amalgamation. A *marginal man* is a person who does not fully participate as a member of a social group. Usually he is marginal to two different groups. J. Weldon Johnson's *Autobiography of An Ex-Coloured Man* (1912) was one of the first widely-read books dealing with the plight of the mulatto, a common type of marginal man in the United States. John F. Cuber says that large numbers of marginal men are to be found among such American groups as second-generation immigrants and "Jews who do not observe the traditions of the traditional Jewish religion." ⁷

Insecurity usually develops as the marginal man attempts to reconcile two different group standards in his conduct. This is aggravated by the fact that he is accepted fully by neither his new or the old group. As a result of this insecurity the marginal man may become either over-sensitive or over-compensatory in his behavior.

Amalgamation. *Amalgamation* is the biological process whereby races are fused through intermarriage. Since we considered both the biological and social aspects of miscegenation in Chapter 4, we need not dwell upon the latter here. Sometimes amalgamation is used loosely and by way of analogy to describe the harmonious union of two groups with diverse interests or traits. Amalgamation usually speeds up assimilation. It is generally said that ethnocentrism, caste systems, and the stratification of fixed class groups are the chief

barriers to amalgamation. Democracy, if carried out in practice, favors amalgamation.

III. STRATIFICATION

Stratification may be defined as the process which forms status-giving groups within a society. Every society is made up of groups arranged on different horizontal levels. In some societies these superior-inferior relationships have become institutionalized into rigid social classes such as slavery and caste. In nearly every society differential privileges and opportunities are accorded persons on the basis of their special group affiliation. Usually there is little stratification in primitive societies, more in Occidental, and the greatest amount in Oriental societies. We shall consider here four important forms of social stratification: caste, class, sex, and age.

Caste Stratification. A *caste* is an endogamous and hereditary class of persons occupying superior or inferior ranks in comparison with others. Over a thousand years ago Rig-Veda, the bible of Hindu religion, defined four divisions of humanity. Since then social and economic life in India has been governed by these scriptural laws. Its 225 million Hindus observe a caste system which is headed by 15 million Brahmans, made up of priests, statesmen, and others who have ruled India and preserved the caste system down through the centuries. Next in caste order come the Kshatriyas, made up mostly of princes and warriors. Then follow the Vaisyas, the last and biggest of the three superior castes. They are chiefly merchants and independent farmers. Mahatma Gandhi belonged to this caste. At the foot of the caste ladder are the Sudras, made up of servants, agricultural workers, and laborers. They constitute the largest caste and are divided into innumerable subcastes according to occupation.

India's Untouchables are a lowly group with no caste at all. Many of them, like all of the Sudras, are descendants of the conquered aborigines of India. The three superior castes are made up of descendants of the white Indo-European invaders who conquered India at the time when the Rig-Veda was written. The Untouchables do India's most menial work and are not allowed to attend school. They are supposed to be expiating for the sinfulness of former lives and can hope only for reincarnation on a higher level.

Nowhere in the world has a caste system remained as long with so few changes as in India. Although Untouchability was outlawed by the Indian Constituent Assembly in December, 1948, it is generally believed that it will take a long time before this change is generally effective. At that time it was estimated officially that there were 45 million Untouchables in India and almost 3 million in Pakistan. Through its resistance to progress the caste system has been the curse of India. A man's social status and that of his descendants is irrevocably classified forever in India according to the work he does. He is even required to marry within his subcaste. Intricate laws govern the relations between castes. Any failure to observe these regulations results in pollution.

It is said that until very recently Indians spent much of their time either avoiding pollution or taking precautions lest they pollute others. They had to remain a certain number of paces away from lesser or higher castes or subcastes. Sometimes pollution took place even on sight. Recently changed living conditions and industrialization have broken down some caste regulations. The use of trains, busses, airplanes, and metropolitan hotels made it almost impossible to observe many pollution rules. Where modern industry has been introduced Indians have balked at forming subcastes for the new occupations called for in the large mills, founderies, and factories.

Of all the crimes against humanity committed in the name of religion, few exceed those which Brahmanism has inflicted upon India. The British maintained a strict hands-off policy. The growing influence of communism among the restless Sudras and Untouchables may lead in the near future to even greater changes in the caste system under the new Dominion of India government.

Class Stratification. When we turn from India to the Western world, stratification takes on an entirely different aspect. In Europe revolution and evolution have erased not only caste lines but even most of the rigid class lines which characterized the ancient and medieval roots of our society. Even the estate system of European feudalism which left its imprint upon our common law has nearly vanished. In Italy, for example, the de Gasperi Government announced at Easter, 1949, that 3 million acres, owned chiefly by 8,000 private landowners, would be purchased by the government at a fair rate and distributed upon terms which they can meet to some 120,000 peasant families.

In England near-confiscatory taxes have reduced many of the titled families to the level of thread-bare aristocracy.

In white society in the United States it is generally said that ours is an "open-class" system. We have seen elsewhere that the Negro is still the victim of an antiquated quasi-caste system. For the American white ours is supposed to be a democratic system in which status depends upon ability. This does not mean, however, that the individual's opportunities are unrelated to his original class status. It means simply that change of class is always possible. A *social class* may be defined as a division of society which is differentiated from another by relatively persistent dissimilarities in rank. It is a stratum of society made up of families of equal social standing.

Class consciousness is the awareness of common interests felt by members of the same class position. It is found in open as well as closed class systems and is as old as social stratification itself. Marxists everywhere try to foster a class consciousness based upon a dichotomy which divides people into either capitalists or workers. They regard these two classes as irrevocably separated and in constant conflict. The Marxian formula calls for the rise of the workers in a struggle for power against the capitalist class in every country. In each country the worker's chief loyalty is supposed to be to his class. They are told that they must rise or fall together.

Marxists cannot understand the relative lack of class consciousness and sense of "class struggle" among American workers. This is partly because so many of our workers, especially the "white-collar class," regard themselves as middle class. At any rate they do not regard themselves as the oppressed victims of capitalists as Communists would have it. This does not mean, however, that class lines do not exist here or that they may not be drawn more closely in the future.

There is no general accord as to the exact pattern of stratification in white American society. The *Middletown* studies of a middle-sized city popularized for a time the business class-working class two-fold division used by the Lynds. Yet their business class included professional people as well as those engaged in commerce or in the management of industry. This division, moreover, is not adaptable to the study of a rural community. Until rather recently at least the business class, though numerically smaller, has been the more powerful in American life. It has possessed not only capital but the ability

to shape public opinion and legislation. The recent effective organization of the working class is changing this. Added strength is being given to the working class also through the gradual incorporation of white-collar clerical workers, teachers, and musicians into labor unions.

W. Lloyd Warner divides each of the commonly described American classes (lower, middle, upper) into subclasses in the belief that our social structure is too complex and mobile to be fitted into three groups. He divides the residents of his typical but hypothetical Jonesville (*Social Classes in America*, 1949) into lower-lower, upper-lower, lower-middle, upper-middle, lower-upper, and upper-upper classes. The operation of this class system in Rockford, Illinois, was shown graphically in a recent issue of *Life*.⁸

Rivalries between classes have marked the course of history. It would seem plausible to expect that such struggles will continue in the future. Any class may abuse its power and so start the pendulum swinging in the opposite direction. Fascism in Germany, Italy, and Japan gave us an example of abuse of power by the "élite." Fascism in Spain has met constant resistance. The trend today in the Western nations is toward popular authority. Yet we know that unless this authority is responsible it will lead to mob rule and anarchy and that the recoil from this is apt to be dictatorship. When such dictatorship is free from ethical discipline, as happened in Nazi Germany, there may even be a return to slavery. The same thing has taken place in Russia. Hoffman Nickerson (*The New Slavery*, 1947) says that the present Soviet Russian system of forced or conscripted labor is nothing short of slavery. At the U.N. in February, 1949, the United States charged that 8,000,000 to 14,000,000 persons were in chains and dying in tragic numbers in Russia's slave labor camps. This is not so surprising in a country which does not recognize human dignity, since actions always tend to follow philosophies.

The myth of Soviet Russia's "classless" society is being gradually exposed in spite of Iron Curtain barriers. First came news of the acceptance of military ranks. Then the special privileges of Communist Party members and government officials became increasingly evident. It is said that the concentration of the latter in Moscow has given this city a façade of prosperity and refinement which explains the reluctance of Soviet officials to permit foreign observers to visit

the "lower class" cities and towns elsewhere in Russia. No foreigner, of course, is allowed to get near the millions of enslaved workers in this allegedly "classless" society.

Sex and Age Stratification. In most societies, there are strata in addition to those already considered. The recent "revolutionary" change that brought about sex equality in Japan under General MacArthur's administration reminded the world that the Orient still retains the tradition of masculine superiority. The coming of democracy in Japan has enabled women to own property, vote, attend co-educational schools, and to walk beside their husbands on the street rather than behind him. Sex stratification has nearly disappeared, however, in the Western world.

Age stratification, which still gives prestige and power to the elder members of many societies, is likewise disintegrating in our industrialized society. The high-speed machine has not only enhanced the deftness of youth and women but it has also eliminated many of the skills and crafts which formerly required long training. In recognition of the increasing problem which those over 45 have to face in seeking new employment, a campaign has now been started to re-establish the status of this group. A recent New York State Legislative Committee study which found that older employees are "more stable," since their family responsibilities and settled habits reduce labor turnovers and industrial accidents, is being widely quoted. Forty Plus Clubs, recently organized in the interests of this group, have as their slogan, "Experience, loyalty, and skill come with age."

It may be said that stratification is largely an end result of competition, conflict, coöperation, and accommodation. Social stratifications are maintained in society both by law and public opinion. The study of the operation of these latter influences is taken up under the heading of social control.

NOTES

1. See W. H. Lawrence, "Why Do They Confess?—A Communist Enigma," *New York Times Magazine*, May 8, 1949, pp. 7 ff.
2. *Industrial Relations and the Social Order*, 1946, p. 448.
3. "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace," *Life*, August 30, 1948.
4. *Basic Sociological Principles*, 1949, p. 275.
5. For an explanation of the Catholic position on intercredalism see articles by Paul H. Furfey in *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, Vol. 111, pp. 161-75 and Vol. 112, pp. 364-74.

6. Alson S. Smith, "The Catholic-Protestant Feud," *The American Mercury*, November, 1947, pp. 536-42.
7. *Sociology*, 1947, p. 554. See also Paul H. Landis, *Social Policies in the Making*, 1947, Chapter 8, "The Marginal Man." For an analysis of studies of "ethnic" groups set off from the rest of the population on the basis of race, religion, nationality or cultural attributes see Leonard Bloom, "Concerning Ethnic Research," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1948, pp. 171-82.
8. September 12, 1949, pp. 108-19.

18

Social Control

Nature and Need of Social Control. Almost anyone will agree that a certain amount of social solidarity is necessary for the existence of any society. Unless the ordinary behavior of most citizens is predictable general confusion will result. Unless we know that the man coming in the opposite direction will drive on the right side of the road and stop at red lights everyone's safety is jeopardized. So too with other customs. Each social group expects, demands in fact, reasonable uniformity in conduct. Timasheff and Facey observe: "the total social process goes on in a situation in which there are general expectations that the participants will follow certain lines of action. The total social process is, accordingly, coördinated."¹

Study of the ways in which society achieves the social integration of the individual and coördination in the group makes up a large part of sociology. Thus, in Sections II and III we considered the influence of culture and certain group interactions in the development of man's social or "conforming" nature. Our study of social processes has already touched upon other group ways of bringing about uniformity of attitude and action. Finally, in Section VI, the study of social institutions will show us how church, home, government, and employment contribute to social solidarity.

(At this point we are concerned with certain other specific measures, techniques, means, or pressures by which society brings its individual members or subgroups into conformity. These are known as means of social control.) The law is the most obvious of these means or instruments. It is society's last resort. Yet the less obvious and more informal means are often more powerful. They are certainly much more extensive in their influence. Those pressures include such things as public opinion, art, ceremony, praise, flattery, rewards,

gossip, and ridicule. We shall consider all of them here, giving special emphasis to public opinion. *Social control* may be defined briefly as the sum total of the processes by which groups secure conformity to prevailing standards.

I. PUBLIC OPINION

The Theory of Public Opinion. For our purposes *public opinion* may be defined simply as the opinion of a considerable portion of the population upon some issue which is of general interest to them. It should be pointed out, however, that there has been considerable speculation not only regarding the exact nature of a public but also, as one might expect, concerning the nature of public opinion. While it is quite generally agreed that public opinion is based upon public discussion and that it is the result of deliberation, there are wide differences among scholars in the estimates of the amount of agreement necessary for a public opinion. Some say that public opinion is crystallized when the majority agree. Others claim that public opinion is either an aggregate of views, a central tendency, a consensus, or a composite opinion. We need not delay over these differences here.²

Anyone who has ever lived in a rural community, a small town, or in a closely-knit neighborhood knows what public opinion is. In such areas there are definite norms of personal conduct which all residents are expected to observe. Failure to do so brings subtle pressures which usually lead to eventual conformity. Even in our loosely organized national life men have sometimes been forced to resign from public office because of an adverse public opinion.

Public opinion usually operates to conserve existing mores. On occasion, however, it may function to bring about change as happens when existing customs or institutions fail to satisfy. Finally in a dynamic society such as our own new conditions often arise for which there are no cultural definitions. In these situations there is first of all an exchange of ideas and experiences. Out of this discussion a norm or policy of proper social conduct eventually is formulated. We may say then that the norm has the backing of public opinion.

In rural areas and small towns of a century ago, as well as in pre-literate groups, public opinion usually followed the "talking-over"

process. People were able to exchange ideas on the primary-group level of the neighborhood. Everyone was a member of the public and could get into the discussion, since it was limited spatially to the range of the human voice. With the coming of the electro-machine culture much of this changed. Modern communication has made it possible to extend the area of discussion far beyond the neighborhood. Each new invention creates a larger universe of discussion. The public, spread over a wide area, has now become a highly impersonal group. It has become much more difficult to measure public opinion. New ways of forming public opinion have also evolved. We see then why sociologists today have to wrestle with new definitions of "public" and new methods and standards for measuring public opinion.

Public Opinion and Public Sentiment. In recent years there has been a tendency for newspapers to report polls of "public opinion" almost as soon as a new topic comes up for general discussion. The very prematurity of these polls suggests that they record at best only a public impression or sentiment rather than public opinion. *Public sentiment* is a fairly standardized attitude of a considerable portion of the population based upon a mixture of partial information, inadequate rational discussion, and popular prejudice. Thus it is more emotional than logical. Unlike public opinion it lacks the elements of adequate facts and reflection.

Even where there has been sufficient time for the formation of a public opinion through rational processes there is a great likelihood today that the ordinary citizen will be able to contribute only to a public sentiment on most national issues. In many such matters where an enlightened public opinion is presumed to exist, the ordinary citizen lacks either interest, information, or both. The Sunday editor of the *New York Times* estimated recently that only 25 per cent of the voting population have accurate information. Another 25 per cent are hopelessly uninformed and there is a group of 50 per cent who could be informed but who are not. Under such conditions it would seem that public judgments expressed even in the ballot rarely record the previous "searching of informed minds" presumed in a true public opinion. If this is so it would seem to have rather serious implications.

Walter Lippmann gave considerable thought to this problem of modern democratic government in his *Public Opinion* (1922). He

believes that the individual is called upon today to form opinions concerning too many matters far beyond his immediate or personal experience. Even when the voter attempts to get an accurate picture of the "world outside" he is very often frustrated. Many factors combine to distort the individual's concept of his present expanded unseen environment.

The individual's approach to the "world outside," says Lippmann, is blocked first of all by a limited access to the facts. Here many factors are involved. For one thing, the individual rarely has time to keep informed on all matters concerning which he is expected to have an opinion. Even if he does, the many means of diffusing conflicting ideas in our rapid-fire civilization may leave him bewildered. Then through the use of sentiment-symbols or even downright deception a vested interest may push him to a quick decision. A person's decision under such conditions is apt to reflect public sentiment rather than public opinion.

Lippmann thinks it is ridiculous to presume that every citizen through his own efforts under present conditions will acquire a competent opinion on all public issues. He urges therefore the development of an impartial and respected social science for the purpose of studying issues and supplying accurate information about them to public officials as well as to the general public. Since both citizens and officials would respect such information, he believes this would strengthen democracy.³ Political theorists elsewhere recognize this weakness in modern democracy. Communists and Fascists would abolish democracy by turning the reins of government over to the "élite" few. Like all totalitarians they scorn the value of public opinion. The Politburo gives orders; it does not await the formation of either a public sentiment or a public opinion. Those who dare to disagree are effectively silenced.

Public Opinion and Representative Government. Should members of Congress and other legislative bodies merely mirror what they regard as public opinion or should they take the lead in helping to shape it? Both schools of thought are found in Washington. Some Congressmen are quite frank in admitting that their chief concern is to study polls of opinion, letter and telegram barrages, and particularly spontaneous expressions of sentiment from their own districts. They feel that it is their duty to follow the "will of the majority." Others

regard this "rubber-stamp" theory of representative government as woefully inadequate today. By way of contrast they point to the careers of statesmen like George W. Norris of Nebraska who consistently led the people's thinking. Many times Senator Norris challenged the voters of his district to uphold the reform measures which he initiated. Yet he commanded their respect and was reelected again and again. Some would say that members of the first school are mere politicians.

Jerry Voorhis (*Confessions of a Congressman*, 1947) believes that the only valid conception of representative government under modern conditions is that which holds that people elect representatives because they expect them to be more far-sighted than the voters in public affairs. He claims that Congressmen are supposed to be leaders who will serve and so "represent" the best long-run interests of the people. The position of representatives who merely echo "public opinion" appears untenable when we consider the possible abuse of slogans, stereotypes, and propaganda used in modern attempts to shape public opinion.

Slogans, Stereotypes, and Public Opinion. Slogans are "battle cries" or catchwords which unite people through a sentimental rather than a logical appeal. They are used in every war and political campaign. These terse, catchy phrases or statements, such as "Remember Pearl Harbor," are usually accepted without question by the public. By repetition they gather strength, even though their meanings may be vague when subjected to logical analysis. As substitutes for thought they are apt to be deceptive. Yet the majority of those who repeat slogans never pause to analyze their meanings. American advertisers have used slogans at times which were so misleading that the Federal Trade Commission finally prohibited their use. Unfortunately, neither this commission nor any other body has jurisdiction over political advertising. The voting public is left to the mercy of the slogan-makers.

Stereotypes may be defined as the preconceived notions of persons or groups which tend to define perceptions. Social psychologists say that only a part of a person's concept of an object consists of his immediate sense impressions. The rest is "filled in" by preëxistent or stored ideas, the "colored spectacles" through which he sees. The total picture, therefore, is apt to be a distorted composite rather than

a true one. That part which is "filled in" is the stereotype. Stereotypes are also described as the expectations which dominate perception, or as Lippmann says, the "pictures in our heads."

The "pictures in our heads" are acquired as a part of our culture. They are group-accepted images which are more often caricatures than true images. Frequently they are emotionally-charged folk-beliefs. Because of the large number of stereotypes in our culture, very often the opponents in a public discussion do not merely "judge" the same facts differently; they actually *see* different facts. It follows, then, that these hidden "definers of the facts" must be properly identified before there can be a rational public opinion.

Education seeks to expose erroneous "definers of the facts." Propaganda and advertising on the other hand make deliberate use of them. Propagandists are often quite frank in saying that it is useless to present the general public with a reasoned argument on a complex issue. Instead a dash of information must be blended with a large dose of word-slogans and stereotypes. The objective of such tactics can only be the forging of a public sentiment which they hope to pass off as public opinion.

ADVERTISING, PROPAGANDA, AND PUBLIC OPINION

Advertising and Public Opinion. Advertising seeks to shape public opinion in order to control purchasing habits. Modern advertising has been reduced almost to a science. Every known psychological device is used to attract attention, arouse interest, and elicit a favorable response. The public on the other hand has not been trained to recognize and resist such devices. The experience of the Federal Trade Commission shows that the buying public is often the victim of down-right dishonest advertising claims.

Much of the difficulty which the public experiences today with regard to advertising practices stems from an outmoded legal principle. The basic principle of American law governing buying and selling is expressed in the legal maxim *caveat emptor*, "let the buyer beware." This principle of law was formulated centuries ago when it was presumed that there was an equality between buyer and seller. Under such conditions it was expected that the average purchaser could easily discover defects either in goods offered for sale or in the claims made by the seller. It was a fairly equitable principle in

the early horse and buggy days when household purchases were confined largely to a few simple staples which never changed and when advertising had little influence on such sales.

Today the number of alternate choices in home purchases has increased enormously. Instead of buying ordinary staples the purchaser must decide between goods that may be either sanforized, duralized, salinsized, bellmanized, martinized or superized. Thus the "world outside" the ordinary citizen's immediate personal experience has been so expanded that here again he has only limited access to the facts. To make really intelligent choices the modern buyer for the home should have a knowledge of chemistry and engineering or access at any rate to the information about modern industrial processes known to such experts. Thus there is a decided inequality between buyer and seller. Advertisers not only exploit this advantage but even conspire with manufacturers, retailers, and newspaper and magazine editors to keep buyers from learning the truth.

Protecting the Buying Public Through Education. Several private research agencies have been organized to enable subscribers to overcome some of the "illiteracies" of the modern amateur purchaser. These agencies send out regular reports which indicate the best "buys" on the basis of chemical, engineering, and other laboratory tests. But only a small percentage of buyers seems to be aware of such services. This percentage as a rule does not include the low-income purchaser for whom even small savings are of the greatest importance.

One might expect that our public educational system would supply information of this sort to students of home economics and in adult education classes. This is rarely done. Similarly our federal bureaus, although in possession of such information, do not distribute it. In both instances the reason is the same. Organized business interests would object. The public must be kept ignorant lest "the American way" be jeopardized! Instead harmless "information for buyers" which does not even attempt to analyze advertising claims is sent out from Washington and made available in high school home economics and social science classes. An occasional teacher who dares to go further is usually brought back into line through the pressure of business interests upon local boards of education.

A consumer's movement, organized nationally, is attempting to correct some of the present inequalities between buyer and seller.

It seeks to develop solidarity and leadership among purchasers so as to offset the cohesion and resulting economic and political strength enjoyed by producers. Some years ago this movement inspired Stuart Chase and F. J. Schlink's *Your Money's Worth* (1927) and Arthur Kallet and F. J. Schlink's *100,000,000 Guinea Pigs* (1933). In these and in more recent books of the same type the need of legislation to protect the ordinary purchaser is made clear.

Protecting the Buying Public Through Legislation. The consumers' movement has already made its protests felt in the field of legislation. The first important achievement on a national scale was the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act in 1906. This law was amended and strengthened by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. The effect of these two attacks upon the old *caveat emptor* doctrine was to make it unlawful to manufacture or introduce into interstate commerce adulterated or misbranded foods and drugs or dangerous cosmetic preparations. The Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1938 provided protection against some of the more flagrant abuses in advertising.

Although these three laws were important steps in correcting abuses which had developed under the old *caveat emptor* doctrine, in practice they have failed to become giant strides. The pressure of business interests introduced so many compromises in the 1906 law that its inadequacy was recognized from the start. Yet in spite of the annual demands of consumer groups it took more than thirty years before an amendment could be passed over the opposition of organized manufacturers. The 1938 amendment squeezed by only because business interests at that time were fearful that a type of state legislation more injurious to their interests than a new federal law might become general. This fear was augmented by growing public alarm which had followed the sudden death of a number of persons from the sale of a poisonous drug not prohibited by existing federal legislation. This incident dramatized the issue and gave the final impetus needed for the passage of the amendment. In this instance death came to the aid of democracy.

Even the measure which gave the Federal Trade Commission authority to restrict dishonest and misleading advertising was partially vitiated by cumbersome enforcement procedure. The law makes it necessary for a period of from six to eighteen months to elapse be-

fore an advertiser can be made to drop objectionable claims that are being made for his product. By that time the advertiser has probably exhausted the possibilities of this particular sales campaign anyway and is ready to launch out on a new one. Finally it should be observed that the enforcement of all three of the above laws has been handicapped by grossly inadequate appropriations. All of this would seem to suggest that the "business class," so dominant in *Middletown* affairs, is likewise much too influential nationally for the common good.

Consumers' groups are constantly agitating to curb certain advertising abuses. In some areas they are getting canners to adopt grade labeling in place of present ambiguous and misleading trademarks. As might be expected newspapers, magazines, and the radio, which stand to profit indirectly by exaggerated advertising claims, try to belittle the value of grade labeling. During World War II considerable consumer protection was provided also by price and rent control measures. The achievements of consumer groups not only undermine the grip of a laissez-faire economy but they also help to make democracy workable. Measures such as these are much more likely to be effective in stopping the progress of communism here than the usual advertisements to "preserve the American way" paid for by business interests.

Propaganda and Public Opinion. Propaganda differs from advertising chiefly in the fact that it tries to produce collective action, whereas advertising is usually aimed at the individual. Propaganda also differs from education. Education supplies complete information and seeks to influence the individual through logical processes. Propaganda supplies either partial or false information and seeks to influence chiefly through suggestion and the emotional processes. Propaganda, in brief, tries to by-pass the ordinary process of deliberation and discussion. *Propaganda* may be defined as a planned and systematic technique aimed at controlling the attitudes of groups through the manipulation of representation.

In its etymological origin and original usage the term *propaganda* ("to propagate or reproduce") was respectable. Today the term has a bad connotation. Yet students of the subject maintain that propaganda may be good provided its end is good and its means are not dishonest. By good propaganda, they say, a public sentiment may be

created in opposition to one developed by previous bad propaganda. Out of the conflict between the two a genuine public opinion may gradually emerge. There is always a danger, however, that good propaganda will never quite catch up with bad propaganda. Propaganda, moreover, converts publics into crowds. Crowds reach unanimity quickly and can be moved immediately to action. Good propaganda under such circumstances may be too late to be effective.

Propaganda Technique. Propaganda technique has been known in a general way for centuries. In *The Mysterious Stranger* (1922) Mark Twain gave a description of its use in developing war hysteria which is good even today. Two recent developments, however, have made propaganda far more important now than in the past. One is the continued expansion of the individual's "world outside," brought about by modern communication. The other is the rapid growth of a detailed technique of crowd manipulation through the use of knowledge derived from the science of psychology. As a result the individual who is confused by the complex issues of his greatly expanded environment can easily be tricked into making decisions through the use of modern propaganda technique.

Many different elements are contained in modern propaganda technique. How they are stated matters little. For convenience these are summed up here under four headings: the bandwagon, card-stacking, emotional symbols, and name-calling. The nature of and the recommended use of each technique will be stated very briefly.

1. "Start the bandwagon." Attract immediate attention to your cause by producing prestige-bearing testimonials before the other side can get organized. The average person will be impressed. He will want to follow the crowd and "jump on the bandwagon." Once there he will not want to be bothered by arguments which might make him change his mind.

2. "Stack your cards." Present only that evidence which will favor your case. Never argue or seem to admit that an intelligent person could hold an opposite viewpoint. Persistence and repetition are more important than logic.

3. "Use favorable emotional symbols." Use glittering generalities, slogans, and stereotypes that will connect your side of the case with the known desires and established favorable emotional symbols of

your audience. Associate your cause with attractive symbols such as "democracy," "Americanism," and "plain folks."

4. "Resort to name-calling." Cast the opposition in the rôle of a villain. Give his cause a bad name. If necessary smear the personal reputations of those who advocate the opposition cause. At any rate associate the other side with established unfavorable emotional symbols such as "Fascist," "un-American," and "Red."

The Propaganda Menace. Some students of government are concerned about the ability of democratic government to function in this propaganda age. They fear that the increasing use of propaganda may give us a government not "by the people" but by propagandists. Some assert that propaganda got us into the first two world wars. It is generally agreed, at any rate, that propaganda when properly organized and financed can make most people believe that black is white. Under such conditions "popular government" is apt to be government for the benefit of special interests by those who control propaganda rather than government "for the people."

Some are so discouraged by the propaganda menace that they regard a benevolent dictatorship as the only answer. They doubt our ability to reorganize our system of government to meet the challenge of propaganda. Others believe that we can do this and so save democracy. Arthur C. Millspaugh (*Towards Efficient Democracy*, 1949) compares our present national government to an eighteenth-century stage coach. It will not do in this age of the automobile and airplane. He would abolish the House of Representatives and keep the Senate only as a reviewing body. Supreme power would be given to an elected National Council of twenty-one members. They would choose the President who would function only as a sort of national city-manager.

World War II made us realize the need to control propaganda which fosters racial and religious prejudice. We are not quite sure yet that large areas of Europe are free of Hitler's toxin. Right now there is even graver concern about Communist propaganda. Since Communists are carefully trained in all phases of propaganda technique and crowd manipulation, it would seem as if Americans must now consider ways and means of controlling propaganda if our form of government, however much it may be reorganized, is to survive. It must be admitted that there is at present no simple solution for

meeting the propaganda menace. Two chief approaches have been suggested: counter-propaganda and education against propaganda.⁴

Counter-Propaganda. Some say that the most effective way to combat propaganda is through propaganda on behalf of an alternate. An opposite current of propaganda must be set in motion immediately as an antidote to the existing one. Somewhat belatedly we adopted a counter-propaganda policy in our international affairs in 1948 in an attempt to offset the anti-American propaganda of Russia in countries behind the Iron Curtain. The Voice of America radio programs were partially effective, if we are to judge by the strenuous efforts made by Communists to prevent their reception. It is assumed that counter-propaganda brings about a clash of issues and so starts the discussional process necessary for formation of a true public opinion.

Education Against Propaganda. Education is urged as a second antidote to propaganda. As a first step in this process it is suggested that everyone be made aware of the nature of propaganda technique. In this way immunity may be developed. It is pointed out, by way of analogy, that where better-business bureaus educate a community to spot the tricks used by sharpers fewer swindles take place.

Along with this first step today it is urged that Americans be educated to refute Communist propaganda and that they be taught also why our system is superior to the Soviet system. Our Commissioner of Education had this in mind in 1948 when he urged that all college and high school students henceforth be required to take a sequence of social science courses in order to prepare themselves to be "wise and skilled defenders of a free society."

The writer believes that really effective education against communism should go much further. It should point out that Communists often win followers because they succeed in identifying their movement with the hopes and aspirations of the millions who seek a more adequate existence for themselves and their children. Such being the case Americans should be taught the need of correcting abuses which now provide favorable soil for Moscow-directed propaganda. Defenders of democracy must realize that we need an appealing program *for* something as well as mere arguments against communism. Education which will help to correct existing social and economic abuses will in this instance be effective education against propaganda.

Pressure Groups and Public Opinion. If education is to be used as a partial antidote to propaganda it should inform the public also of the devices used by some pressure groups to organize public opinion even against its own interests. *Pressure groups* are associations of people with a common interest which they seek to advance either indirectly by influencing public opinion or by influencing legislators directly. They are seekers of special privilege even though such objectives at times may coincide with the general welfare. Most sociologists would say that the objectives of the Consumers' League and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, for example, are concerned with the general public interest. Both organizations, like hundreds of others both good and bad, maintain public relations departments which seek to influence public opinion in favor of their special objectives. When threatened with unfavorable legislation they act as pressure groups and bring influence to bear upon legislators.

Where the interest of pressure groups is compatible with that of the general public there can be no legitimate objection to their activities. After all, the concept of trying to influence legislation stems directly from the right of petition which is a fundamental right in democracy. There are many pressure groups, however, whose objectives are often inimical to the interests of the unorganized public. Frequently they have almost unlimited funds with which to maintain public relations experts and lobbyists. They bring secret pressure to bear upon legislators, administrative authorities, and sometimes even the courts. Bribery and blackmail are occasionally resorted to. Needless to say such pressure groups threaten the foundations of democratic government. Any student of American history can name some prominent offenders.

Lobbying with respect to federal legislation is now a multi-million-dollar enterprise. Recent legislation requiring the registration of professional lobbyists and regular reports on their expenditures has not curtailed the practice. Although the elements of secrecy and conniving which surround most lobbying have given the term a bad connotation, there are some good reasons why lobbying persists. One is the need of counter-lobbies to offset those already set up.

Another justification for lobbies and their public relations bureaus is found in the fact that Congress and most state legislatures, as

presently organized, must depend upon lobbies for much of their technical information. This difficulty recalls Lippmann's plea for the establishment of bureaus manned by trained social scientists for the purpose of supplying information to both legislators and the public. An effort was made to supply this need in our government structure recently in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 which provided for the employment of expert help to committees. But unfortunately in the next Congress these new jobs became patronage, thus defeating the purpose of the measure. The objective of the law requiring the registration of lobbyists has been blocked somewhat by its failure to define clearly what lobbying is. "Making democracy work" is a task which requires the eternal vigilance of an educated citizenry. It requires most of all public officials who are seriously motivated by this desire.

II. OTHER MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

Law and Social Control. Law is the expressed will of the state. In the United States it consists chiefly of the common law, statutory law, and court decisions. Our common law had its origin in the ideals and customs which prevailed in ninth- and tenth-century England. These were recognized in contemporaneous judicial decisions. The principles upon which the subsequent leading cases of English and American law were decided were not the creation of the judges themselves. The judges did not pretend to make the law. Such a policy would be undemocratic. They attempted merely to expound it on the continued assumption that there are fixed principles of right and wrong which every man and every society are bound to obey. This is what is meant by the Natural Law foundations for our common law. Statutory law in most states has either defined or modified the common law.

The prohibitions of law are usually an index of the forms of behavior which a public regards as inimical to its welfare. Law is society's last resort in the effort to control the conduct of members. Its effectiveness in modern secular society lies in the threat of punishment. For this reason it is said that without a penalty there is no law. Penalties, like the laws they back up, also reflect shifting stand-

ards of public opinion. The history of penology reflects constant experimentation with different kinds of punishments.

Relatively few laws are needed in a culturally homogeneous society where everyone respects the existing mores. This is especially true when there is little spatial and social mobility. In a culturally heterogeneous country like our own where there is so much shifting from one area and social status to another many laws are required. The trend towards legal controls increases also as basic institutional means of control such as the family and church lose their effectiveness. Law enforcement becomes a bigger problem each year in the United States as we become more and more secularized.

Miscellaneous Means of Social Control. There are several other means of social control which, like law, are coercive and unpleasant. Among these negative means of control are gossip, ridicule, and name-calling. These threaten to lower a person's prestige, social status, and his sense of belonging to a group. In a closely-knit society they act most effectively in forcing individuals to conform to group standards.

With the gradual breaking down of caste and class lines, along with the authority which they possessed, commands are more openly resented. The trend towards democracy has made the word *obey* unpopular even in the family. Our military services have been forced to tone down displays of authority, especially in peace times. The result is that in business relations and in ordinary social contacts much more use is made now of positive means of social control. Among these praise, flattery, and especially tact are important. Even art and ceremony, either through their appeal to the beautiful or to the feeling of "belonging," may arouse emotions which help to bring about social solidarity.

Leadership and Social Control. Evidently the rôle of leadership in social control will always be important. There has been considerable controversy, however, regarding the nature of a leader. The question has even been raised as to whether there are such things as leaders. It has been asserted that so-called leaders are merely spearheads of inevitable social movements. Most social psychologists seem to feel, however, that while a dominant personality may express a current social tendency it also crystallizes and directs that tendency.

If we assume then that there are such things as leaders, *leadership* may be defined as that ability to direct people which is based upon personal characteristics of the individual rather than upon the prestige of his office.

A dictator is not necessarily a leader. His relationship to followers may be based entirely upon domination; he is followed because it is strategically prudent to do so. A true leader develops coöperation and voluntary approval of his objectives. In almost every community there are at least two types of leadership: conservative and progressive. The former leans towards maintenance of the status quo; the latter is concerned about changing the existing social order. Psychoanalysts say that these opposite tendencies have their origin in the personality of the leader.

One theory has it that the true leader is a simplifier. He is able to make complex public issues seem easy to understand. He may do this either through the clever use of slogans and striking expressions or indirectly merely through the confidence which he manages to build up in the minds of his followers. Both friend and foe admitted that Franklin D. Roosevelt was an expert in both of these means of influencing voters.

The personality of a leader is important to followers. It has been suggested that the average person has a certain shrewdness in judging human nature. This arises from the fact that most people deal with people rather than with ideas in their daily life. At any rate the average man is much more likely to judge issues by the persons who advocate them than by the merits of the issue itself. The masses find it difficult to think on abstract questions. On this account they "react to ideas as refracted by personality rather than to ideas as such." ⁵

Modern Problems of Leadership. Although confidence in the ability and integrity of a leader who is a "simplifier" may suffice in a small community where the voter is able to get close to his representative there are grounds for doubting the validity of this method of judging issues in national affairs today. Almost all who aspire to national leadership now employ public relations experts, a part of whose job it is to build up a favorable "public personality" for their employer. These public personalities may be quite different from the real ones. This practice results in considerable political hokum, such

as the continued fostering of the idea that a presidential candidate must be a fisherman. It also encourages whispering campaigns through which rivals pretend to reveal the true personality of the candidate. Thus issues are eclipsed by the shadow of a personality, real or fictitious.

The prestige of leadership is often abused. Take "scientists say," for example. The American public has what amounts to a reverence for scientists. It will accept almost anything if it believes that the idea has the backing of science. This confidence often tempts scientists and would-be scientists to make pronouncements upon matters entirely beyond their field of competence. Few scientists are competent in more than one branch of science. Today no one is qualified to be a leader in every avenue of life.

People tend not only to think in terms of stereotypes but they form stereotypes of the kinds of persons they like as leaders. Popular leaders at least must conform to the approved stereotype. It is for this reason that political leaders must create the impression that they are men of power and action and that they are sincere. A "plain folks" background is also an asset. This probably explains the amazing situation in the United States which still permits a man with less than a college education to be President at the same time that civil service jobs requiring far less knowledge and ability have a college degree as prerequisite.

Regardless of stereotypes, political bosses demand that candidates for office have a sympathetic insight which will enable them to keep in touch with fellow-men. This is one reason why party leaders usually seek candidates who have been through the doorbell-ringing stage. It is on the lower rungs of the political ladder that a candidate learns to know human nature and how to be liked by people. Here too he usually learns how to avoid embarrassing issues, how to put an opponent on the defensive, how to use flattery and ethnocentric appeals in dealing with various groups, as well as other "tricks of the trade."

Whether democracy as we have known it in the past can survive in our modern complex and rapidly changing society remains to be seen. The quality of our political leadership will play a large part in this decision. Without attempting to anticipate the message of the Commencement Day orator we venture to predict that the responsi-

bility of the present college student in America's future is going to be an important one.

NOTES

1. Nicholas S. Timasheff and Paul W. Facey, *Sociology* (1949), p. 270.
2. For an analysis of the factors that make up public opinion see Leonard W. Doob, *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, 1948.
3. Chapters I and XXII.
4. Robert L. Sutherland and Julian L. Woodward, *Introductory Sociology*, third edition, 1948, pp. 792-3. See also Leonard W. Doob, *op. cit.*
5. C. H. Cooley, R. C. Angell, and L. J. Carr, *Introductory Sociology*, 1933, p. 374.

VI. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND DISORGANIZATION

19

Social Organization, Social Institutions, and the Family

Sociological Perspectives. There are two chief ways of looking at society. We may focus attention upon the functional aspects or we may direct attention to the structural characteristics of society. Both of these approaches to social analysis have been used in the chapters already seen. In Section V, Collective Behavior, the functional was emphasized. The ways in which people react to each other and influence each other's behavior were considered. This analysis was partly from the viewpoint of social psychology. The structural characteristics or conventional forms of human relationships, especially urban and rural factors, were examined in Section IV, The Community. Structural characteristics will be emphasized also in the present section.

A part of this chapter and all of the next will be devoted to the study of our basic social institutions: the family, economic, governmental, and religious institutions. Each of these has been touched upon elsewhere, chiefly from the functional viewpoint. We see then that the structural and functional approaches are merely different ways of looking at the same thing.

I. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Accommodation and Social Organization. Our study of social institutions falls under the general heading of social organization. *Social organization* may be defined as the ordered or patterned relationships of the members of a society. "The study of social organiza-

tion deals primarily with the significant grouping of individuals.”¹ Social organization is manifested objectively by a vast network of patterns of activity woven together in a coördinated relationship. The individual is seldom aware of this over-all system of relationships which we call the social system. He is usually aware of only those patterns which concern him. These differ according to his rôle or status in society. So long as his particular patterns of relationships function with a minimum of frustrations he is unconcerned. Only the scientific investigator is concerned about the social system as a whole.

In Chapter 17 we studied accommodation. This social process is a good starting point for the study of social organization. The social heritage is made up of forms or structures of enduring relationships which have developed out of accommodation to past situations. New accommodations arise constantly so long as people are in contact with one another. Social organization may be regarded as the sum total of accommodations.

Dynamic Social Structures. When the structural characteristics of society are mentioned we are apt to think of something stable. The structure of a building is something fixed. But when “structure” is applied to society this analogy limps. Consider, for example, the changes that have taken place in the structure of American society in the last two decades. It is still a question as to whether or not we have completely adjusted ourselves to the automobile. In the use of atomic power we see ahead what may be an even greater challenge to our social structure. Even Western civilization itself, based upon a spiritual foundation, is confronted with materialistic trends which are shattering this foundation. Ours at least is a dynamic social structure.

We are often tempted to think that primitive society is stable. Although such societies are much more stable than our own, cultural anthropologists find that there is no such thing as a completely stable social structure. History itself is a record of changing social organization. Prehistory suggests the same flux. Yet most societies in the past underwent revolutionary changes only after long periods of relative social stability, whereas we seem to proceed from one revolutionary change to another without an intervening period of stability. This is one reason why it is difficult for us to say when our

society is disorganized. This is why it is said that to understand social organization we must also understand the nature of social disorganization. In either case we must study the processes or principles involved in social change.

Many different explanations have been offered for the rapid social changes which characterize modern life. Elliott and Merrill consider three. Two of these, the "processual" and the "cultural," have already been considered elsewhere in our study. We have seen for instance that conflict, competition, accommodation, and assimilation keep society in a state of flux. We have seen too that culture changes, whether brought about by invention or borrowing, constantly introduce new traits which have a similar disrupting effect. We shall consider the third possible explanation now, not because we regard it as important or even plausible, but simply because the spread of communism has focussed attention on it. This is the "dialectical."²

Changing Social Systems and the Dialectic. According to the Marxists, mechanical material forces rather than man himself (or social processes or invention and borrowing) bring about inevitable changes in economic systems. The economic system in turn determines both the ideals and the form of the other institutions of society. History, they say, is merely the record of successive changes in economic systems. These changes always followed a struggle or contradiction and something better usually resulted. Man's earlier "contradictions" brought economic society up through the successive stages of primitive communism, slavery, and serfdom. This struggle still goes on; the present contradiction is between capitalism and communism. The same blind materialistic force that brought about the earlier changes in economic systems has now determined that universal communism is to be the next stage. This is inevitable. Nothing can stop it. This, in brief, is what is called Marx's materialistic interpretation of history or "dialectical historical materialism." If we are to attempt to understand the theory we must consider first the term *dialectic*.

"Dialectic" has had many meanings. Among the Greeks it meant "conversation." Later, when the Sophists developed argumentative conversation into what might be described as a fashionable parlor game, dialectic was used to describe the rules of this game. Finally

after taking on various other meanings the term left the field of formal philosophy, where it had assumed a very distinct meaning in Hegel's philosophy, and turned up in the writing of Karl Marx (1818-1883). George W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), the famous German philosopher, had a great influence upon Western social thought. This may be seen in such diverse fields as Spengler's cyclical theory of progress, as well as in fascism and communism.

The dialectic materialism of Marxian philosophy is an adaptation or corruption of Hegel's dialectic theory of the "law of development." Hegel maintained that all ideas pass through three stages: the thesis, antithesis, and finally the synthesis. A concept realizes itself by "dying to live," that is, by going out from itself and then returning to itself. Philosophy must pursue an object from its immediate unity into the divergence of opposites so as to arrive finally at the full truth (synthesis) which is found in the reconciliation of opposites. Thus, for those who are able to follow the reasoning of Hegel's abstruse philosophy, in the dialectical process the "thesis" is a phenomenon at any one stage of development, the "antithesis" is its opposite, and the "synthesis" is a new phenomenon formed from the above interrelationships.

The Marxian Dialectic. Marx contended that each form of economic life which collapsed in the past represented a "thesis." In each case a class struggle brought about an "antithesis" and eventually a "synthesis" in the form of a new economic order. From the next antithesis a final synthesis is to result: the classless economic millennium. In this Marxian paradise the state, which up to now has existed only to protect the ruling class, will disappear. Finally, under world communism, the present world states will disappear. In the new synthesis capitalism, which Marx regarded as a system to exploit the worker (the proletariat), will be forever annihilated.

It has been said that Marx merely presented the standard ideas of contemporary socialism in a new and novel way. It would seem safe to say that to most people today Marx's awkward effort to draw a parallel between Hegel's dialectical method and economic life is to say the least, obscure. One may reasonably doubt the ability of the average card-carrying American Communist to understand the dialectic. It has been suggested that this is one of the "mysteries"

of the Communist "religion." They accept it as faith. Yet in an era when Hegelian philosophy was popular and when economic injustice was everywhere conspicuous Marx's adaptation of Hegel, in which a new economic millennium was made inevitable, could not but be attractive to the oppressed.⁸

Dialectical Materialism and Cultural Evolutionism. The Marxian philosophy has a naïve note which should remind sociology students of last-century cultural evolutionism. It will be recalled that the arm-chair ethnologists assumed that the inevitable evolutionary process had finally resulted in the ultimate or millennium stage which was represented by most nineteenth-century Western social institutions. A similar faith in an inevitable mechanical law of "contradictions" prompts Communists to believe that a millennium marked by the dictatorship of the proletariat must of necessity appear in the future. This is true in spite of Communist opportunism which at times might seem to reflect a lack of confidence in the operation of this mechanical law. The world-revolution objective is never lost sight of.

Both of these theories reflect two similar assumptions. First it is taken for granted that a blind mechanical force rules the destiny of society. Man can do little more than hasten the process. Next it is assumed that at a certain point all change will cease and there will be a stable ideal social organization thereafter. Both theories are a priori.

Modern cultural anthropologists finally presented evidence which annihilated the theories of the cultural evolutionists. They, along with recent sociologists, have shown that social organization and social institutions constantly undergo changes and show no tendency to arrive at or stop at a utopian stage. Time, we suspect, will soon reveal the flaws in the Soviet utopian dream. Although it may be true that a few sociologists have been fascinated by certain aspects of Marxism, the great majority seem to believe that an understanding of social change and social organization and disorganization must be sought in processual and cultural rather than in the dialectical explanation. This is evident when we study social institutions themselves.

II. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

What Is an Institution? *Institution* is one of those words for which the dictionary supplies more than one definition. It is a word which most of us use frequently in different senses. People who live near a large state hospital, for instance, may refer to it simply as "the institution." Within it there may be a long-time resident whose bizarre conduct always attracts the attention of visitors. He is probably spoken of as "an institution." The superintendent of the hospital may be listed in *Who's Who In America*, a book which some would call an American institution. Lawyers and theologians use the word in yet a different sense. The best approach to an understanding of the use of the term by sociologists is the alternate dictionary meaning which suggests "an established practice."

In sociology an institution is an abstraction rather than a tangible entity. Sumner described it as a concept plus a structure. The "concept" is some value considered essential to group welfare and survival. The "structure" is an organized system of practices together with machinery to enforce these practices. In this sense the family is an institution. To start with a simple definition we may say that a *social institution* is a prescribed and relatively permanent usage governing human behavior and standardizing practices in regard to values considered essential to group welfare. It is usually said that the family together with economic, governmental, and religious institutions are the basic ones. In the United States education is also regarded as a major institution.

The Elements or Structure of an Institution. F. S. Chapin has pointed out four structural elements common to all institutions: (1) attitudes and behavior patterns, (2) symbolic culture traits, (3) utilitarian culture traits, and (4) oral or written specifications. In the process of interaction in social institutions common reciprocating attitudes and conventionalized patterns of behavior gradually develop. In the family there are such attitudes and behavior patterns as love and loyalty; in the church reverence and devotion; and in government domination and subordination.

In each social institution certain material objects become charged with symbolic or sentimental meanings. In the family the marriage ring and heirlooms embody symbolic values. In the church it may be

certain hymns or the cross, and in government the flag or national anthem. Utilitarian culture traits for satisfying creature wants also become a part of each institution. Thus the family comes to possess its dwelling and furniture, the church its edifice, and the government its public buildings.

Finally each institution is characterized by an oral or written description and specification of its patterns of interrelationship which may be preserved and handed down to the next generation. The family may pass on its "specifications" in the form of a will, marriage license, or code of conduct. The church may pass on its creed and Bible, the government its constitution, laws, and treaties. Chapin says that these four elements or parts of an institution appear in combination and are always interdependent.⁴

The Functions of Institutions. A social institution may be regarded also as a cluster of social usages. Each institution has either an implied or expressed idea of social purpose. To perform its necessary functions certain rules must be observed. Institutions also have subsidiary functions. A single function, moreover, may be performed by more than one institution. Institutions are distinguished from folkways, according to Sumner, in that they require more conscious and formal coöperation. The nature of an institution is brought out more clearly by consideration of its chief functions. The various functions of institutions may be considered under three headings: (1) the satisfaction of human needs. (2) the simplification of individual actions, and (3) the provision of means of social control.

Institutions Satisfy Human Needs. Among all peoples there are natural and acquired wants, desires, interests, and urges. The desires for food, shelter, sex-gratification, security, health, association, and worship appear to be bound up with individual and race survival. In every culture social institutions are created to satisfy these needs in a socially acceptable manner. The family governs relations between the sexes and provides for group survival. Religious and economic institutions provide for worship, security, food, and shelter. Government maintains internal order, protects against external aggression, and safeguards the health of all. Because of the importance of these particular clusters of functions, the four institutions which satisfy them are called basic. They are found in every culture.

Institutions Simplify Individual Action. If any of the basic institu-

tions collapse life becomes confusing, if not intolerable, for the individual. These institutions provide the mechanism for community existence. Each institution unifies a particular area of human relationships. Each provides ready-made solutions or formulas for meeting the critical events of the individual life-cycle. Institutions make it unnecessary for the individual to work out a personal solution to most of life's crises.

Institutions serve as buffers between the individual and his environment. In youth each member of society is introduced gradually to his institutional rôle. The institution provides both rôle and status. Because of the existence of institutions, little hard thinking is required of new members of society. Take away the institutions of a community and it becomes a disorderly mass of confused individuals.

Institutions Are Means of Social Control. If there is to be an orderly social life certain basic rules of individual conduct which the majority regard as right must be observed. This common will is expressed by various means of social control. We have already considered the non-institutional means of social control. Institutions are also means of social control. Through the pressure exerted by social institutions shortsighted individuals who might otherwise act only with reference to themselves are compelled to recognize their obligations to others.

Since institutions protect values held dear by society, they are conservative and tend to resist change. In a relatively static society like that of the Middle Ages or last-century China and India each institution becomes nicely adjusted to others so that few individuals feel constrained. But in a rapidly changing society like our own institutional inconsistencies are constantly appearing. The slowness with which institutions adjust to change places a severe strain upon individuals temporarily caught in the mesh of inconsistencies. Yet it appears that the relative rigidity of institutions is a necessary evil if social values are to be preserved under the impact of new conditions.

Some sociologists believe that the study of social organization can best be approached through the study of institutions. In the institutions of a society one finds the enduring relationships or the form and structure of group life which has grown up out of social

interaction. It has been said that social organization is the form or structure in which people arrange themselves in order to achieve the purposes of their institutions.

The Growth of Institutions. Although cultural anthropology has thrown much light upon the early history of the basic institutions, it can only speculate about their origin. Observation about the "beginnings" of human family life among animals is likewise a matter of speculation. The basic institutions have existed so long that their origins are lost. In the absence of objective evidence we are probably justified in assuming that these institutions, which are centered around the basic human needs, have their origin in human nature itself. They are as old as man.

It is different with the so-called subsidiary institutions. These, which are not quite so necessary for the maintenance of the social order, appear to originate in either of two ways. Some subsidiary institutions are consciously enacted. A group of interested persons may deliberately plan a needed institution. Thus business and educational institutions are largely enacted for definite purposes.

Other institutions arise gradually out of social movements. Such movements start in a stage of unrest. As social unrest spreads, attention gradually becomes fixed upon some particular phase of the existing social organization which appears to be the chief cause of tension. Agitators rally recruits to the cause and discussion becomes more pointed. Finally a definite program of attack is drawn up. Once its concept has been defined and its functionaries elected a social movement may evolve into an incipient institution with a structure. Many recreational, educational, scientific, aesthetic, health, and other subsidiary institutions have evolved in this way and taken their place among the older institutions of our society.

Institutions and Associations. Although the terms are often confused, even in sociology, an institution differs from an association. An *association* is a group of persons united and organized by some common interest or specific purpose and having appropriate administrative machinery. Associations have been described as the organized parts of institutions and not the institutions themselves. J. O. Hertzler calls them the "perceptible machine of the institution." This "machinery" is said to carry out the underlying idea of the institution. R. M. MacIver says that associations are bodies of human

beings, whereas institutions are "the established forms or conditions of procedure" linked with group action.

People belong to associations rather than to institutions. Associations satisfy chiefly political, economic, and cultural needs. No single association embraces all the persons functioning in a given institution. Legislative bodies, courts, police departments, and political parties are a few of the associations or minor organized parts or machinery through which the functions of the governmental institution are expressed. Associations may change and disappear, but the major institutions appear to go on forever.

Associations come into existence as expressions of specific or specialized interests. The idea of "getting something done" through collective effort usually precedes their formation. Although they are held together by this primary bond, they usually have secondary interests also. It has been said that the tendency to "join" or to form associations is particularly characteristic of our American culture. Frequently these associations are service agencies supporting the larger institutions. Their growth would seem to indicate that they are efficient.

III. THE FAMILY

One of the best ways to understand the nature and functions of social institutions is to start with an analysis of one with which practically every student is familiar, the family.

Marriage and the Family. Many sociologists regard marriage and the family as distinct though closely related institutions. Marriage is described biologically as a social or legal arrangement for regulating and stabilizing sexual intercourse. Psychologically it is described as a functional relationship between two personalities. Where the Judaeo-Christian tradition still operates as an influence upon attitudes and values marriage possesses a character over and above that dictated by physical and psychological needs. According to this, the sacramental aspect, marriage is also regarded as a "holy" thing. Even the marriage records furnished at our civil or city-hall ceremonies usually state that the parties were united in "holy matrimony."

Sometimes marriages remain merely marriages. In most cases, however, the family is the fulfillment of marriage. The *family* is an

interrelated group consisting of husband, wife, and their children. In sociology the family may be considered in either its historical, primary-group, or institutional aspects. The first aspect was treated in Chapter 7 in connection with the culture of primitive society. The primary-group function was considered in Chapter 15, The Bases for the Social Processes, and elsewhere. Here we shall dwell upon the institutional aspect of the American family.

Basic Functions of the Family Institution. The institutional functions of the family are sometimes classified under two headings: (1) basic and (2) secondary. Basically the family is not only the unit of biological inheritance but also the "social cell" which transmits man's social heritage. Hertzler has said that it is "the portal through which human beings enter life, both physical and social." Thus the family not only rears children; it also shapes their ideals, aims, and social attitudes. The family trains youth in manners and morals, and through them it transmits the culture of the past and present. All of this is in addition to the fact that the family more than any other group contributes to the shape of the individual's personality.

Secondary Functions of the Family Institution. The secondary functions of the family are usually described as economic, protective, educational, religious, and recreational. All of these have been profoundly affected by the stupendous social changes which have taken place in the United States since just before the Civil War. These changes include such things as the rise of the machine age, the rapid growth of cities, increased mobility, rising standards of living, reduction of primary-group contacts, and new standards of values.

The economic functions of the family have been greatly decreased. Many have been taken over by the ever expanding industrial organization. Canning, baking, sewing, laundering, dyeing, cleaning, soap-making, weaving, and rug-making which were formerly "woman's work" in the home have now been assigned to outside agencies. Unable to make an effective economic contribution through these services, many married women have found it necessary to seek gainful employment outside the home. Although men's wages have gone up, this has been on an individual basis rather than on the basis of marital status and actual family needs.

Many of the protective functions of the family have been trans-

ferred to other agencies as a result of inadequate wages, reduced living-space, congestion, and other changes of city life. The aged, for instance, are now provided for largely by old-age pensions and social insurance instead of being cared for as formerly at the expense of their children. The state reaches into the family circle also by regulating child labor, preventing delinquency, and protecting the health of family members. Institutional care is provided for dependent children as well as the mentally and physically handicapped. Most of these changes have had the effect of reducing the importance of the family to the individual.

America's democratic tradition makes parents primarily responsible for the education of their children. Yet the educational functions of the family are constantly being reduced as the school takes over not only the kindergarten but even the pre-kindergarten child. In the transfer of functions friction frequently develops, as sometimes happens when the school attempts to give sex-education. With the present decline of moral education in the home the school is faced with the fact that moral education usually cannot be given effectively without religious instruction. Here the school is faced by traditions, if not legal precedents, established in former times when the typical American family was able to provide both effective moral and religious education. We shall consider this problem in the next chapter. Finally, the recreational functions of the family are restricted through the growth of public parks and playgrounds, along with the increase in commercial amusement.

Although there are some sociologists who claim that the American family is not disintegrating but only changing its form, perhaps for the better, most informed observers view the present situation with some alarm. They claim that outside of rural areas the secondary functions of the family have so declined that the home now is merely a "residential retreat" for its members whose work, play, and other interests are largely beyond its boundaries. With one out of every four marriages ending in divorce in 1946, they claim that even the basic functions of the family are now jeopardized.

The Family Crisis. Sociologist C. C. Zimmerman believes that the American family is disintegrating and that our society will go the dismal way of ancient Greece and Rome unless we are able to stem the present tide. In his *Family and Civilization* (1947) he traces

the form of the American family through three stages. Before the impact of industrialization most Americans lived in the "trustee" family. Families were large and there was economic interdependence as well as common interests. This closely-knit type of family is still found in many rural areas where the farm is lived upon and then passed on to offspring in typical trustee fashion. With the coming of large cities a "domestic" family developed. Although this was smaller and no longer self-sufficient it still remained closely-knit.

Zimmerman is alarmed by the disintegrating forces already at work in the family at its third or "atomistic" stage. He says that most American families are now of the atomistic type. They have been largely shorn of former secondary functions. Each member tends to regard himself as an individualized fragment so that little family unity remains. If the atomistic trend continues chaos will follow as it did in Greece and Rome. If we are to survive Zimmerman believes that steps must be taken to peg the family back at the "domestic" level. Present "nihilism" in family behavior must be curbed. The learned and leadership classes must take the lead in an attempt to revive family spirit. The idealistic belief in romantic love as the chief basis of marriage should be changed. Most important of all, he says, the average family must have more children.⁵

Sociologist Robert M. MacIver believes that the romantic-love conception of marriage has been an important factor in developing a shortsighted sentimental attitude towards marriage which is peculiar to the United States. This attitude "which makes the marriage relation simply a troth dependent on unbroken loyalty" totally ignores the social functions of marriage. It is this attitude, rather than modern industrialization, which he regards as the chief cause of divorce. He points out that the divorce rate of other industrialized countries does not compare with our own and that several of our Eastern states have a lower rate than less-industrialized Western ones. As a result of the overemphasis upon "love" in the prevailing American attitude towards sex and marriage MacIver says that the marital union is peculiarly brittle here. Our divorce laws reflect this attitude in that they are not only unrealistic about sex ("a single instance of 'unfaithfulness' . . . is accounted a mortal blow to the marital union") but oblivious to the social costs of divorce. MacIver suggests that men and women entering marriage should be reminded that its "eternal func-

tion" is to be a home for children and that its social functions are "the primary ground for its existence." ⁶

Some years ago in a discussion of the divorce problem a president of Yale University observed that when the conception that marriage is "a thing to be made and unmade for purely selfish reasons" takes root "the days of a nation are numbered." Because of a similar conviction that the family is the foundation of society many sociologists are now concerned not merely about legislative changes which will ameliorate more of the effects of industrialization and urbanization upon the family but about the reform of value-teaching institutions as well.⁷

NOTES

1. Robert H. Lowie, *Social Organization*, 1948, p. 3.
2. M. A. Elliott and F. E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization*, revised edition, 1941, pp. 5-13.
3. *Ibid.* See also Max Eastman, "The Marxian Philosophy" in *The Making of Society*, 1937, edited by V. F. Calverton, pp. 833-50; and "Stalin on Revolution" by "Historicus," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1949, pp. 175-214. (A two-page digest of the latter appeared in *Time*, December 27, 1948.)
4. *Contemporary American Institutions*, 1935, p. 16.
5. Zimmerman's stages of family life and present disintegration are presented graphically in "The American Family in Trouble," *Life*, July 26, 1948.
6. Taken from his "Sex and Social Attitudes" in *About the Kinsey Report*, edited by D. P. Geddes and E. Curie, 1948, pp. 91-94.
7. For an appraisal of the status of research on the family see Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., "The Present Status and Future Orientation of Research on the Family," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1948, pp. 123-36.

Economic, Governmental, and Religious Institutions

In the study of the family we considered what is universally recognized as man's basic social institution. Three other institutions, the economic, governmental, and religious, are also regarded as basic. We shall see that these three institutions are more closely interrelated than most people suspect.

I. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

Earning and Owning Through the Ages. We have already considered the early history of economic institutions among primitives. At the food-gathering level economics was direct. There was no standardized medium of exchange. Usually there was no great desire for profits either from production or exchange. In some of the more advanced tribes individuals sometimes sought to accumulate more than they needed not for "profit" as we know it but for prestige.

Private property seems to have existed among all primitives. At any rate communism, in the modern sense of the term, was not perceptible, even though families, clans, and villages rather than individuals often owned hunting and fishing areas. In such cases individuals still owned their own hunting and fishing "means of production" as well as boats, houses, and other articles. With the gradual development of technology there were more tools and other things to be owned and so naturally an increase in the amount of private property. With specialization of labor and extensive trading shells, animals, and finally money came into use as standard measures of value.

The Neolithic revolution established basic patterns of earning

a living which were to extend down through the centuries into medieval Europe. Out of the manorial system of the feudalistic Middle Ages there gradually developed a "commercial" or "financial" capitalism and a "domestic" system of industry restrained to a considerable extent by guild influence. Finally, in the period of the Industrial Revolution, modern or "industrial" capitalism with greatly increased division of labor evolved.

As machines and factories became more and more expensive, ownership was diffused in large corporations. Thus a materialistic, impersonal employer-employee relationship developed in which direct responsibility for the abuses of management could easily be avoided. Workers, in turn, next organized similar "corporations" or unions in an attempt to match the force of organization against organized wealth. The demands of organized labor for social legislation gradually brought about changes in the laissez-faire philosophy which had enabled industrial capitalism to expand with a minimum of legal control. Unions have now become so powerful that legislation, such as the Taft-Hartley Act of the 80th Congress, has been passed to curb their strength.

The Complexity of Modern Economic Institutions. Modern economic institutions include private property, production, distribution, consumption, markets, money, credit, banks, transportation, labor organization, and other features too numerous to mention. Thus from the simple, direct economics of primitive self-sufficient societies we have gradually arrived at a complex battery of economic institutions so interdependent that they extend far beyond national borders. The smooth functioning of modern economic institutions depends upon the perfect synchronization of many parts, a condition which seldom exists.

The complexity of modern economic life has raised many questions about private ownership. Industry, with its concentration of economic power in trusts and monopolies (a system which is sometimes referred to as "private collectivism"), was the first to move away from private ownership as it had operated in primitive and pre-Industrial-Revolution societies. Today millions of American workers are sometimes described as the "proletariat" because they own nothing but personal property and are dependent almost entirely upon the

contents of a weekly pay-envelope for food and other necessities. Nothing like this existed prior to the Industrial Revolution.

We have already seen that the attempt to establish the Tennessee Valley Authority a few years ago aroused fierce opposition from big business. It was described as contrary to "free enterprise" and "the American way." Although the term had lost much of its sting since business started flinging it at workmen's compensation and almost every other reform measure nearly fifty years ago, the T.V.A. was described as "socialistic." The rapid trend towards the nationalization of key industries in European countries not under the domination of the Soviet in recent years has made socialism and the "right to own" one of the major problems of modern economic life. This has put capitalism in the spotlight.

Capitalism and Private Ownership. Capitalism is an economic system based upon the private ownership of the means of production. But capitalism is only one form of private ownership. Moreover, there are different forms of capitalism. Private ownership does not of necessity imply capitalism. These distinctions are important today when Communists and extreme Socialists are making it appear that the institution of private property itself must fall if "American capitalism" fails. Even if our present form of capitalism is abandoned there could be still another form. The economic issue between Americans and the Soviet should be stated as essentially a clash between limited private ownership of productive goods and complete state ownership. We might go a long ways in limiting the ownership of productive goods and at the same time retain a form of capitalism.

Communism, Socialism, and Socialization. With the recent trend towards the nationalization of industries under the British Labor Party more and more Americans are commencing to wonder about the definitions of the major politico-economic systems. The reactionaries in our own country stigmatize nearly every liberal proposal as either "socialistic" or "communitic," thus making further confusion. In their relationship to private ownership communism, socialism, and socialization are not the same.

Communism has as its economic objective the complete control and operation of all the economic resources of the nation by the government and its agencies. *Socialism* in the strict sense is a theory

which advocates that the state should take over and operate the entire machinery of production, distribution, and exchange. It differs essentially from communism in the fact that its adherents wish to achieve this goal by peaceful rather than violent means. We have seen that Marx merely added two features to socialism: violent means and the dialectic philosophy of social change. Where *socialization* is not used as a synonym for socialism (or in the sociological sense considered earlier) it means state ownership of certain public utilities such as electric supply and railroads, and state ownership or control of only those basic industries and monopolies which experience has shown cannot safely be left in private hands. This is the sense in which it is used by most American liberals.

Most of the leaders in the British Labor Party classify their reforms under the head of socialization as we use the term. They recognize that communism and socialism conflict with the concept of a righteous social order in conformity with the dignity of man as contained in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The British reforms, they say, reflect at the most only a modified or "limited" form of socialism which is not in conflict with the democratic tradition. Sometimes they call themselves "Democratic Socialists." Most English Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish churchmen seem to regard these reforms as neither communistic nor socialistic.

Britain has produced a new type of economic society. Some refer to it as "the welfare state." This term, like the three just considered, is ambiguous. In the strict sense a "welfare state" would be a communist or socialist state in which government agencies would replace private ones. This has not taken place as yet in Britain. Those who oppose both of these isms maintain that non-public social units should normally predominate in a society. The state's duty is to protect, encourage, and direct their operation, the general principle being that people's needs should be met normally through social organizations which stand between them and the state.

Americans will probably have occasion to consider these definitions much more carefully in the near future. President Truman has already suggested measures which might well be interpreted as involving the socialization of the steel industry. National health insurance or "socialized medicine" under the Social Security Act is now being stigmatized as both "socialistic" and "communistic" in

the current campaign of the American Medical Association against this proposed measure. With the growing impression here that the English people have no desire to give up their "socialized medicine," this "alarm" campaign, like many before it, may have the unforeseen effect here of softening public resistance to socialism itself. Americans have undergone a considerable change already in their attitude towards individualism and private ownership. Many of the changes advocated in *The Communist Manifesto* have already been made in the United States. Churches advocated these same reforms.

Irresponsibility and Concentration of Power. Even in the short period since the Civil War we have witnessed a profound change in the form of private ownership in American business. At the start of this period we had capitalism based upon private individual property; today we have capitalism based upon private corporate property. In the former period the "rugged individualists" had control over their property as well as responsibility for its use. These two attributes of ownership have nearly disappeared in American big business.

Today a multitude of stockholders who "own" a corporation give control to a group of directors. Loss of control by the real owners results in irresponsibility. So long as stockholders receive a return on their investment they evade responsibility for antisocial company practices. The officers of the corporation in turn may blame the board of directors. In this vicious circle no one appears to be responsible. The point is that with the owner shorn of control and responsibility the old American form of capitalism has changed. We had one form before the Civil War and quite another now. Many would say that neither is the ideal form of capitalism.

Another aspect of the modern form of capitalism is the concentration of wealth and the consolidation of economic power. In *Quadragesimo Anno*, one of a number of encyclicals on the evils of modern capitalism addressed to the Catholic world, Pope Pius XI referred to this "concentration of power and might" as the "characteristic mark" of modern economic organization. This he regarded as a moral evil. Many Protestant and Jewish groups have expressed a similar viewpoint. Those American sociologists who still believe that they should study society as it is in relation to what it ought to be usually agree that this is also a social evil. Yet if we are to believe

competent observers, such as the annual report of the Council of Economic Advisers made to the President of the United States in 1948, each year "the process of expansion of large corporations by swallowing the smaller continues, and the concentration of economic power becomes more intense."

Ownership and the Common Good. It would seem that Socialists and Communists are right in lamenting the present concentration of wealth and the separation of ownership and control in large areas of American economic life. It would seem too that those advocates of modern capitalism who attempt either to justify or to deny these facts are unwittingly playing into the hands of the leftist extreme. When it comes to remedies the basic question seems to be this: how best can the private right to own be exercised in subordination to the common good? The correct answer to this question would solve the major economic problem of American democracy.

It would seem to be unnecessary to convince Americans that the right to own, declared to be an "inalienable right" in the Declaration of Independence, should be preserved. Both history and logic sanction this democratic ideal. Private ownership appears to be one of man's oldest institutions, older even than the formation of the state. Logically one might well say that the concept of ownership springs from man's very nature, for man, unlike the brute, is able to reason and so to provide necessities for his future. Usually he can do this only by obtaining property. Logic would also suggest that private ownership is necessary to stimulate initiative and keep peace and order. Similarly it would seem that some inequality in the division of the world's goods appears to be inevitable because of differences in individual abilities and national resources.

But neither history nor logic can justify the abuses of ownership that have developed under modern capitalism. Although the Judaeo-Christian tradition, incorporated into American law, regards the right to own as a natural right this does not mean that it is an unlimited right. Many of our religious leaders now believe that the right to own must be pegged somewhere between two opposite and illogical extremes, that is, between the practically unlimited ownership advocated by modern capitalism and ownership in practically nothing advocated by Communists and extreme Socialists. If modern capitalism of its own accord is unable or unwilling to work towards such

a middle ground it would appear that the state, in order to provide for the general welfare, will be called upon more and more to decide what owners may do with their property.

The Future "American Way." Within the limits of private enterprise drastic changes could be made in the present economic order. For one thing there might be a system of widespread coöperatives. Or there might be a type of modified or democratic socialism somewhat like that in England or even perhaps the more daring form found in Saskatchewan. To those whose thinking is shaped by reactionary newspapers we have been living under socialism ever since the introduction of the New Deal reforms.

Our economic royalists usually tremble at the idea of "government planning." Yet it would seem that if big business and big labor are to continue to fight it out the government will be forced to take over more and more control of economic life. Talk of union-management coöperation is all right, but so far it has been a sort of suggestion-box proposition which has gotten nowhere. Planning by collective bargaining as now practiced is largely a test of economic power. It may be that some fundamental change in economic organization, such as the Industry Council Plan advocated by the CIO since 1940, will provide the blueprint for the future American Way.

The Industry Council Plan is a program for national industrial planning through the basic industries which would tend to eliminate tests of economic power. Under the program representatives of management, labor, and government would set up a council for each industry. The industries thus organized would federate by regions and would choose a national economic council likewise representing capital, labor, and government. Curiously enough, Communists are lined up with the reactionary segment of big business in opposition to this program of social reconstruction. Liberals who regard the council plan as a practical way of "putting into practice the principles of social justice" say that it is a truly radical program in the best sense of the word. They say Communists fear that the program might work. Communists are opposed to a smooth-working private enterprise economy; they prefer to fish in troubled waters.

In considering various proposals for the reform of our economic system and in trying at the same time to preserve the natural right to

own, it should be kept in mind that purely selfish, irresponsible use of the right to own will ultimately destroy it. We might not be called upon to decide so many of these issues today if in the past it had been remembered that the traditional democratic right to own is not an absolute one. According to the idea of "stewardship" described in the Gospel, there is an obligation to use private property to promote the common welfare. It may well be that the Judaeo-Christian tradition still has principles that are more radical than *The Communist Manifesto*. So long as the democratic right to ownership continues to be recognized in a practical way it is difficult for Americans to say just where restrictions on ownership must cease.

II. GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS

From Primitive Government to National State. Although cultural anthropology knows nothing about the origin of government, it would seem safe to say that man's nature accounts for the existence of government. Men are naturally drawn to mutual companionship and association. But societies thus formed can exist only with leadership and authority. Thus government is inseparable from society. Aristotle described this relationship when he called man a "political animal."

Our study of primitive culture seemed to vindicate the above reasoning. In the small band authority rests in the family. But with the formation of tribes authority is delegated to some sort of a civil government. No primitive group larger than a family exists without some form of government.

The national state as we conceive it today is made up of three elements: extensive territory, large population, and government located at a capital city. It is of recent origin. Until the sixteenth or seventeenth century civil power in Europe was held partly by barons and free cities and partly by the emperor. Then occurred a series of inventions and discoveries which greatly changed social life. Changed conditions included such things as the growth of international trade, large armies and navies along with the treasuries to support them, colonization and foreign investments, and finally, in the nineteenth century, steam-driven machinery and the other inventions of the Industrial Revolution. These changes created a demand for power-

ful kings and strong centralized powers. They made industrial organization the chief problem of government.

Adjustments of Government to the Machine Age. We have seen that neither the family nor modern economic society has as yet completely adjusted to the changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution. The same may be said for government. We are still trying to adjust the ruling of men to what, in many instances, has amounted to rule by the machine.

Last-century rugged individualism, sometimes referred to as Liberalism, made the state a mere custodian of law and order. We have seen that under the reign of this political philosophy Americans have become the victims of concentrated economic power. In an attempt to control the excess of economic giants we have been forced to adopt a new philosophy of government.

The new American policy is a reaction against the abuses of economic power which prevailed in the 1920's and which led finally to the great depression at the end of that decade. During the twenties business dictated to government, blocked the right of labor to organize in mass production industries, and defrauded investors. The shock of the depression aroused public opinion and brought about a series of reform measures aimed at breaking the previous autonomy of business. These included the Securities Act, new banking regulations, the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, the Fair Labor Standards (Wages and Hours) Act, and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. These are monuments to a changed philosophy of government. Each marks a departure from last-century Liberalism. Liberalism as a philosophy of government should not be confused with the attitudes of liberals in socio-economic affairs. The latter would make wide use of legislation to correct abuses which developed under Liberalism.

Domestic Government at the Crossroads. With regard to the regulation of private enterprise, right now our government seems to be in an intermediate stage. At one extreme we have reactionaries who would emasculate even the reform measures of the 1930's. At the other there are the Communists and Socialists who would abolish all private enterprise. In between are middle-of-the-road liberals who are willing to swing considerably more to the left in an attempt to make capitalism work for the common good. The latter are unim-

pressed by National Association of Manufacturers' propaganda which seeks to divert attention from the core issues by focussing attention upon the superior status of American workers compared to those of other countries. Liberals believe that in view of our resources and present distribution of wealth there is still a need for a fairer distribution of wealth and power. They advocate legal measures to achieve this objective.

Many liberals feel that until some basic reform of capitalism along new lines can be effected under the Constitution all we can do is to muddle along. Yet there is danger that a haphazard growth of government may in the future endanger our liberties. Irving Ross (*Strategy for Liberals*, 1949) believes that no far-reaching plan can be put in force until the next depression at which time both New Deal and Fair Deal reforms will be regarded as too conservative. He believes that democratic liberals should agree upon a plan for a new "mixed economy" now in preparation for this crisis.

International Government at the Crossroads. There is a rough parallel between domestic problems involving government and business and those which prevail in international relations. In viewing our domestic problems many business men seem to lack a sense of social consciousness. They have little concern about the common good. International affairs are characterized by a similar self-centeredness. Each nation is jealous of its sovereignty. Few are willing to consider other than their own national interests. Even in the burst of idealism which characterized the period of the formation of the United Nations few nations were willing to yield a part of their sovereignty to the new organization which then appeared to be the only effective barrier against World War III. A chauvinistic press in each important country made selfish nationalism synonymous with patriotism or reasonable love of country.

Economic matters, the chief problems in domestic government, are foremost in international relations also. Experience has proved that in the modern economic world the pursuit of selfish interests by one nation or group of nations results in large-scale unemployment and consequent political unrest in other parts of the world. It would appear now that we can expect permanent peace and a meaningful international law only when the powerful nations trust one another to the extent that they are ready to surrender a part of their sov-

ereignty to some world organization. Such a policy would involve "government regulation" by an international body in world economic affairs.

Present hopes for a successful organization of the family of nations appear to be blocked at the crossroads by the conduct of Russia. Even U.N. Delegate Eleanor Roosevelt, long-time advocate of patience with the Russians, finally expressed exasperation in January, 1949. She confessed that her attempts to work out compromises in the United Nations in order to win Soviet support were useless. The Soviets looked upon compromise, even in words, "as evidence of weakness rather than as a gesture of good will," she said. It is chiefly because of the inability of the Western nations to find a better formula for getting along with Russia that we were forced to promote the Marshall Plan and sign the North Atlantic Treaty. These measures were aimed chiefly at stopping the military progress of Stalin.

Russia and the Community of Nations. During World War II it was commonly said that the attempt of Allied diplomats to do business with Hitler at Munich instead of taking a firm stand there against him brought on the war. If World War III takes place it will probably be said that its "Munichs" took place at Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, and possibly San Francisco. At these meetings the Western powers gave Stalin what he wanted, hoping in this way to make him amiable and peace-loving.

Credit must be given to William C. Bullitt, former ambassador to Soviet Russia, for being one of the first to point out both the mistake of capitulating to Russian demands and the probable consequences of such a move. In his *The Great Globe Itself: A Preface to World Affairs* Bullitt warned in 1946 that the Soviet Union was a predatory imperialistic power which threatened the world. A United Nations with a veto clause in its charter would, he said, be helpless to cope with Soviet aggression. At the very time when our State Department still believed that we could expect cooperation from Russia Mr. Bullitt described this naïveté in dealing with a modern Ivan the Terrible as astonishing.

We need not dwell now upon the consequences of our failure to recognize sooner the true nature of Soviet imperialism. The map of eastern Europe, Asia, and the terror prevailing in western Europe record this. Since 1947 a deluge of books has gradually exposed to

the world the true character and tactics of the Soviet police state. In his *I Saw Poland Betrayed* Arthur B. Lane, United States ambassador to Poland until September, 1947, attributed a considerable part of our post-World War II diplomatic fiascos to the unbounded optimism of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Lane says that the President felt the power of his personal charm would suffice to wring concessions from the cold, cynical Stalin. Freda Utley, in her *Last Chance in China*, asserted in 1947 that the President at Yalta had "sold out" China, the first nation to resist Axis aggression in Asia, just as he did Poland, in a vain attempt to win over the realistic Stalin. Surely it would seem futile to go further in any attempt to "win over the Russians."

With the exception of the ever-unpredictable Henry Wallace, the position of President Roosevelt, who regarded the Soviets as distrustful children who needed a demonstration of our kindness, appears now to have been abandoned by all his former associates. Most loyal Americans will now admit that a bold lie was perpetrated when, towards the end of World War II, we were assured by Russia that the former Communist world-revolution objective had been abandoned. We were caught sleeping at that time partly because official home-front propaganda here during the war dictated a somewhat tolerant attitude towards communism.

Today it is no longer necessary for us to speculate about the theoretical nature of communism. We can judge it by its works in Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and other countries. In spite of Iron Curtain censorship, we know enough of life under the Reds to realize that Ambassador Bullitt was right. So long as Russia is under the present régime it is futile to regard her as a coöperating member of the community of nations. Instead of trying to work with the Russians it may be more important for us to keep in mind the Russian pattern of conquest already pointed out here. We should know now that somewhere on her list we are to be "next." One of our chief government problems right now is a defense against communism in our midst.

The Defense Against Communism. Now that most Americans seem at last to realize that Communists are merely Nazis using a slightly different but more effective technique, there is a danger that we may react emotionally against communism and in such a way as ultimately

to play into their hands. The conduct of certain members of "un-American activities" committees of Congress who have ignored constitutional rights and customary legal rules of evidence illustrates this danger. Even worse is the conduct of a few reactionaries who think that legislation to "crush labor unions" is the way to fight communism. Since the second stage of the Communist coup takes place suddenly, it would seem that our best defense against this world menace is to stop it by intelligent and positive means before the first stage can get under way.

It would seem that the first principle which should be recognized in an intelligent and positive attack upon communism in the United States is this: no segment of the American people should be made to choose between grave abuses on the one hand and communism on the other. In other words, to ward off an ultimate Communist coup we must recognize and correct existing social abuses now. If patriotic Americans do not take the lead in attempting to correct economic injustices and the denial of civil rights Communists will take the lead in seeming to do so. Experience elsewhere has shown that most victims of long continued suffering or injustice will not be careful in examining the credentials of their apparent benefactors.

The Communist Appeal to the Naïve. Americans are commonly said to be preoccupied with money-making. Yet many of us believe that Americans in general and her liberals in particular are more idealistic in their general attitude towards life than most foreign critics will admit. At any rate most Americans seem to love a crusade. It is largely on this account that Communists, pretending to be leading a crusade for the rights of the oppressed, have up to now been able to find considerable sympathy in high places in American educational, political, and social life.

In the recent past many honest and sincere idealists who assumed that Communists were of the same fibre joined them in reform movements without realizing that they were thereby helping indirectly to undermine American democracy. In their naïveté Americans have also allowed Communists to penetrate and gradually take over not only a few labor unions but some peace, youth, and even religious organizations as well. Very often after Communists gained effective control of such organizations they left these liberals at the head as "fronts" to deceive others.

Even the naïve among us are learning that the modern Machiavelians, the Communists, are utterly unscrupulous. The only principle to which they adhere in dealing with non-Communists is expediency. Diplomats now are thoroughly aware of this.¹ The penetration tactics of Communists demonstrate this duplicity. Communists first join existing "neutral" organizations working for the promotion of worth-while causes. Then, if they are not elected to office on the strength of zealous activity, either of two tactics may be adopted. They may proceed to "smear" the character of existing officers so as to undermine confidence in them. If character-assassination is not feasible they will make meetings controversial, acrimonious, and long-drawn out so that other members in disgust will gradually avoid meetings. This will leave the field to the organized zealous Communist minority who are willing to come early and vote late at such meetings. It was only through recognition of these tactics that Communists have been ejected finally from certain labor unions which they had succeeded in taking over.

Communism and Religion. It is impossible to discuss communism without touching upon religion. In this matter American liberals who have become fellow-travelers, if not card-holding members of the Communist Party, seem to fall into either of two classes. Some profess to see no antagonism between communism and their Judaeo-Christian ideals. They point out that the early Christians were characterized by a kind of "communism." They seem to forget one important difference: the early Christians said "What is mine is thine"; Communists say "What is thine is mine." Such liberals fail to understand the basic philosophy of communism. They are blinded by their realization of the need of social reform.

There are other liberals who are not much concerned about the religious aspect of communism because they are either atheists or complete materialists themselves. It matters little to them that communism is essentially atheistic. They may in fact agree with Marxists that the chief function of religion down through the ages has been to uphold property rights by inducing the proletariat to accept their miseries with a "pie in the sky" philosophy, to use the expression of American Communists. It is hard to see how such liberals can be much concerned about the preservation of America's democratic ideals.

As the lines between communism and democracy become more

closely drawn in the United States and as the policy of European Communists towards religion is daily made more evident, many Americans are coming to believe that the only effective opposition to communism, as to nazism in the past, is to be found in a humanism based upon the moral and supernatural order. Any other form of humanism or idealism is like a plant cut off from its roots. Mildred McAfee Horton, president of Wellesley college, expressed this simile at the World Church Conference at Amsterdam: "It is often hard to see the difference between idealism rooted in religion, and that cut off from its source. Cut flowers bear marked resemblance to those growing in rich soil; but ideas like flowers wither without roots, and new growth comes only to the rooted plant." We have in our Declaration of Independence the expression of a humanism with its roots in religion:

We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

III. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

Religion and American Democracy. The American Declaration of Independence registered belief not only in God and natural rights but also in the primacy of the moral law. The Bills of Rights in our constitutions did not attempt to create, they merely recognized certain preëxisting natural rights such as the right to live, marry, and to be free in religious worship. These rights, according to the Judæo-Christian philosophy, are derived from man's nature. The source of the belief in these inalienable rights is in the last analysis the religious conviction that men are created in the image of God.

For the practical administration of the American form of democracy a system of checks and balances was provided as additional protection for the rights of minorities. As General George Marshall pointed out in a speech at Moscow in March, 1947, the American concept of democracy is not mere "majority rule" but the idea that human beings have certain inalienable rights which the state may neither give nor take away. This, of course, is diametrically opposed to the totalitarian concept of rights. The essence of totalitarianism

is that the ruling party, possessing a monopoly of police power, imposes its will upon the totality of society. The atheistic Communist is a citizen of only one world, the state. From this he receives all his rights. According to the American democratic tradition, man is a citizen of two worlds, and in virtue of future citizenship in an eternal one he possesses certain rights which no state can take from him.

American traditions place us firmly on the side of religion. Four references are made to God in the Declaration of Independence. Blasphemy is a crime. The oath in legal proceedings concludes with an appeal to the Almighty. Sunday observance is required. Each session of Congress opens with a prayer. "In God We Trust" appears on some of our coins. Numerous court decisions have held that this is a religious nation. The Supreme Court declared in 1892 (*Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States*, 143 U.S. 457, 465) that "no purpose of action against religion can be imputed to any *legislation*, State or Nation, because this is a religious people." As recently as 1947 President Truman observed that "this is a Christian nation."

On more than one occasion President Washington recalled our religious foundations. He merely reflected the viewpoint of the founders of the nation when in his Farewell Address he declared: "Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensable supports. And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be retained without religion . . . reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle."

It may well be that it is just because religion has had such a firm place in the American tradition that occasional "jurisdictional disputes" have arisen over the relative spheres of influence of church and state. To understand the Christian viewpoint concerning the rôles of these two institutions it will be well to go back and consider the analysis made by the Founder of Christianity. He enunciated a doctrine that was new to the pagan world.

Church and State: Basic Principles. In many respects Christ was a radical. His teaching with respect to church and state relationship was revolutionary. To political leaders of the ancient world the teaching, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's" amounted to anarchy. By this teaching

boundaries were set to the authority of states over their subjects. Christ set aside a region of human activity in which government had no competence.

This teaching of Christ brought real freedom into the world. Before this the state was all and the individual was nothing. According to pagan political theory men, being the creatures of the state, could have no opinions contrary to state policy. Christ challenged this. The ancient pagan concept of the power of the state was revived by Hitler and Lenin. The founders of these police-states likewise recognized no boundaries to their authority.

Human nature being what it is, it is never easy to define the limits of competing authority. This occurs almost daily in the average American home. Parents are not always in agreement in deciding whose ideas shall prevail in rearing children, spending the family income, and in other matters. Although the church-state principle laid down by Christ was clear enough, its application down through the ages has been the source of considerable controversy. Since the same person is both citizen and church-member, state-church conflicts appear to be inevitable. When these two institutions are friendly to each other, however, differences can usually be ironed out without serious discord, just as takes place in the family.

The First Amendment and "Establishment." The founders of our nation were vividly aware of the conflicts over church-state authority which had occurred in Christian Europe. Some of them had come here in search of religious freedom. Hence, when they drew up the First Amendment to the Constitution in 1791 ("Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof") they meant first of all to forbid a national church, such as one sees today in England, Norway, Sweden, Spain, perhaps Israel, and certain other countries. In these countries one faith is "established," or in other words singled out and given special preferences and privileges not accorded to others.

The American founders feared that some one of the already established colonial churches here, such as the Episcopalians, Congregationalists, or Quakers, might try to impose their faith on the new nation. Even as late as 1791 "established" churches still existed in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina. Massachusetts retained Congregational establishment until 1833. Finally the Four-

teenth Amendment made the First Amendment applicable likewise to the states.

There is little question about the fact that the founding fathers wished to favor religion in the new nation. It was special privilege to a particular sect that they objected to. But even their "no establishment" formula did not succeed in bringing about complete harmony in church-state relations. Conflict has arisen frequently over the years, particularly in the field of education. The 1948 decision of the Supreme Court against the "released time" religious education program for public school children in Champaign, Illinois, aroused new interest in this aspect of church-state relations. Some believe that this decision may go down in history as an about-face in our former state policy towards religion.

The "Released-Time" Issue. The so-called "released-time" religious instruction program was first suggested by Protestant religious and educational leaders. The late Nicholas Murray Butler, long-time President of Columbia University, was one of the early advocates of some such program. In his annual report for 1935, for instance, he pointed out that both the family and church had largely broken down as shaping and directing educational forces in a large sector of American life. He regarded the growing lack of religious instruction of youth and the increase in juvenile crime as directly related.

Butler maintained that the existing state policy which barred religious instruction from public education "put the whole force and influence of the tax-supported school on the side of one element of the population, namely, that which is pagan and believes in no religion whatever." This policy, by the way, was not adopted here until shortly before 1850. Great waves of immigrants with a variety of religious faiths coming here at that time made it awkward to teach, however indirectly, the particular sect of Protestantism which had previously been favored in the public schools of each locality. Butler believed that by going to the extreme of attempting to give no religious instruction, in meeting this new situation with a "practical policy," we violated the spirit of the Constitution. Dean Luther Weigle of Yale reflected a similar sentiment when he observed more recently that "When the public schools ignore religion, it conveys to our children the suggestion that religion is without truth or value."

The decision of the Supreme Court in the Champaign, Illinois case (*McCullum v. Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203), together with the doctrine it had expressed shortly before in a New Jersey case (*Everson v. Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1), seems to have established an entirely new interpretation of the First Amendment. The "practical" policy which had started in 1848 was now extended and "read into" the Constitution. In other words the court seems to have taken the position that the First Amendment not only prevents "establishment" or the favoring of one religion but it even prohibits equal aid to all religions.

Implications of the McCullum Case. Although called upon only to determine the legality of "released time" religious education given in public school buildings, the Supreme Court in the Illinois decision enunciated principles which if carried out will have much deeper implications. Perhaps it should be explained here that the "released time" arrangement, first adopted in Gary, Indiana, in 1913-14, provided that students might be released from class in public schools one period each week in order to attend religious classes conducted by teachers supplied and paid by various religious groups. A period was set aside within the regular school day and children not attending such classes had to attend public-school classes. Should the logic of the *McCullum* decision be carried out, and free-thinkers as well as other organized groups in several states are attempting to see that it is, eventually neither the state nor the federal government will be allowed to aid religion in any way. Should this come to pass we shall have complete secularization, something new in American public policy.

Complete secularization, as Justice Jackson regretfully observed while concurring with the majority opinion in the *McCullum* case, may mean that "nearly everything in our culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life" will have to be omitted from public instruction, since these things are "saturated with religious influences." He feared that the decision may lead eventually even to "a discrediting of the public-school system." He wondered if many courses outside of mathematics, physics, or chemistry can be completely secularized or rendered godless.

Justice Reed in his dissenting opinion maintained that the Constitutional prohibitions of enactments respecting the "establishment"

of religion "do not bar every friendly gesture between church and state." He cited a list of practices indicative of church-government coöperation "embedded in our society by many years of experience." Among these are church freedom from taxation, the provision for chaplains in the armed forces and in each House of Congress, the training of veterans at government expense in denominational schools, and compulsory attendance at church services at the United States naval and military academies. But Reed was outvoted eight to one.

Is Ours Also to Be a Godless State? The Illinois decision by its ambiguity as well as by the new interpretation which it seems to have given to the First Amendment has directed attention anew to church-state relationships. Whether our nation is to continue to be one in which there shall be neighborly coöperation between these two institutions as has existed in the past remains to be seen. If the decision is not reversed it may mark the beginning of an unneighborly "wall" of separation which will gradually extend to other relationships and which will lead ultimately to a completely godless state.

As a result of this decision it has been suggested that eventually Protestant and Jewish groups may have to copy Catholics and a few others in establishing non-profit, semi-public schools under religious auspices. This in effect would mean "double taxation" for those parents who felt that religious instruction was really important. Yet the ambiguity of the decision permits little assurance that the new legal trend will not lead later to state levies even on such schools, a thing which would probably make them too expensive to maintain. The new trend might lead also to depriving children attending church-related schools of the benefits of mere public welfare legislation including such things as vaccination, dental inspection, hot lunches, nurses' inspection, and school bus transportation.

It has even been suggested that if the courts follow the *McColum* case trend to its logical conclusion we shall have to remove "In God We Trust" from coins, strike out the four references to the Creator from the Declaration of Independence, and stop printing at public expense the annual Thanksgiving Day proclamations of the President and state governors, lest some atheist or secularist be embarrassed. In view of the march of atheistic communism across Europe and Asia our own trend towards complete secularization if

not towards an actual anti-God public policy cannot but be a matter of sociological concern. There are some who say that the doctrine laid down in these recent cases must be changed if we expect to preserve democracy in the face of communism.

Institutional Functions in a Changing World. The arguments advanced for released-time religious education bring out the interrelationship among the family, church, and school. The school has been forced to take over so many outside functions in our society that many now regard it as a major social institution.

Each year the school has assumed new responsibilities. Its art, dance, music, and drama classes provide for aesthetic needs. Recreational needs are taken care of by gymnasias and playgrounds. Its health services protect the community against epidemics and general physical and mental deterioration. When it is recalled that all of these functions were formerly provided by the home we see how institutions may change in a dynamic social order.

We have observed that individuals who are unable to adjust themselves to changed conditions are apt to suffer a neurosis. Institutions likewise may become "ill" when they are unable to make needed adaptations. Since institutions, naturally conservative, tend to resist change, the rapid shifts which take place in our society place them under constant strains. Religious institutions right now are finding it difficult to adjust to the secular trend in American life.

The Rise of Secularism. Although some churchmen applauded when the Supreme Court ruled against religious education on public school property in the McCollum case, others protested. Twenty-eight top Protestant leaders issued a joint protest charging that the decision would "greatly accelerate the trend toward the secularization of our culture." In *Christianity and Crisis* a Union Theological Seminary professor pointed out that as a result of this new doctrine we are moving from the original Constitutional idea that the state should be neutral where different religions are concerned to the position that it must be neutral between religion on the one side and an aggressive secularism on the other. Nearly all Protestant leaders admit that secularism is a cause for alarm here.

Secularism, according to dictionary definition, is a system of social ethics which maintains that ethical standards and conduct are to be judged exclusively with reference to the present life and social well-

being. It is a philosophy of life based on the premise that religion should be ignored or excluded in practical affairs. The present spread of secularism could not have taken place here had there not been a decline in the former Judaeo-Christian tradition in American life. Because of America's strong Protestant background, some see a source of secularism in changes which have taken place in Protestantism itself.

Secularism and Protestantism. For one thing Protestantism has been unable to present a solid front against the rise of secularism. Always beset by differences, American Protestantism was split asunder by the fundamentalist-modernist controversy shortly after the middle of the last century. In Carlton J. H. Hayes' *A Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe* (1935) this controversy is described as "far more revolutionary" than the religious upheaval which produced Protestantism itself. Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr says that the religious vitality of Protestantism in America began to wane after 1850.

Both fundamentalists and modernists, Niebuhr claims, have failed to meet the challenge of secularism. Fundamentalists have gone to one extreme by attempting to deny almost every achievement of science in an effort to preserve the "literal" Protestant heritage. Modernist ("liberal Protestants"), he says, have gone to the other extreme by being so "pathetically eager" to prove themselves intellectually respectable that they have tended to sacrifice essential Christian beliefs.² Under such conditions it is easy to understand why secularism could make headway in the United States.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the recent tendency back towards unity in Protestantism has in some instances led to an even greater trend to secularism. We have seen that in an attempt to counteract last-century rifts involving doctrinal conflicts (it was estimated in 1948 that there were 256 separate and substantial religious bodies in continental United States) efforts are being made to bring about church mergers. Religious dogmas are played down and "community" churches emphasized instead.

In the "community" church secondary values of religion are apt to be put first. A midwestern state university leader in this movement has described its philosophy as one in which worship and salvation are replaced by "active concern for the furtherance of human

values with clear-eyed appraisal of the human situation." This is nothing more than the philosophy of secularism.

Critics say that the community church, advocated in so many sociology books, tends to undermine faith and to make religion nothing more than a combination of psychological therapy and social service. Its "religion" in some instances is little more than a technique for escaping reality and for finding compensations for the discomforts and frustrations of life. Critics point out that from an original concept of toleration which said that one religion is as good as another the community church is putting us in a position where, with increased knowledge of mental hygiene, we may yet sanction the idea that no religion is really very important. We have already seen that some psychiatrists believe that their field will eventually absorb religion.

Communism as a Religion. In connection with the recognized drift from a God-centered to a man-centered religion in community churches, the observation of Martin Ebon in *World Communism Today* (1948) may be significant. He describes communism as a modern "cult" which has filled the "vacuum of faith" caused by the waning of established religion. He believes that its growth is attributable in part to "the hope to discover a short cut to salvation from misery and want, . . . the desperate wish to find a purpose in what seems confusion and emptiness." Could it be that the path which some Americans have followed to communism has been away from an unsatisfactory "vacuum of faith" in what they regarded as religion?

It is true that militant atheism is of the essence of communism. Yet the fact that communism has retained many of the psychological and social aspects of religion may account for much of the zeal of Party members. Communism transfers faith and worship from a Supreme Being to a mysterious dialectic and to new "plans" and the planners. It promises a paradise in this world. In the spread of this new hope and faith it even has an inquisition to punish heresy. The writings of Marx are its scriptures and Lenin is his chief prophet. This new secular faith follows the principle of morality expressed by Hobbes in *Leviathan*, "Justice is what the States say it is."

Philosophically the Marxist faith has its roots in Hobbes, Spinoza, Bentham, and especially Hegel. Hegel taught that the state is an

impersonal supreme being possessing absolute power. It is the origin of all the rights of its citizens who must therefore live according to its demands. The slave state theory of Hegel makes no distinction between civil rights, like the right to vote and hold office, which are established by the state, and natural rights.

Communism has managed so far to escape effective evaluation. Russians, kept in ignorance of what is going on, are constantly told that the real benefits of the new order will come after the completion of the *next* "Five Year Plan." The impatient or dubious dare not criticize. Outside observers are not allowed to see failures. Meanwhile every real or imagined flaw in democratic government elsewhere is magnified. Thus communism manages to keep its messianic status.

Religion and Western Culture. Pitirim A. Sorokin describes the present materialistic culture of the West as a "sensate" culture. In *The Crisis of Our Age* (1941) he questions the propriety of calling any of our contemporary troubles "crises." They are in reality only "symptoms" of a universal and underlying cause which itself is the real crisis. This real crisis, he claims, is the present bankruptcy of our sensate culture. Our "materialistic" culture, he says, with its atheism in religion, anarchy in morals, statism in politics, and vocationalism in education has failed us. If we are to continue to live we must retreat to a spiritual culture.

Sorokin wonders whether our retreat from materialism now will be swift enough to reach solid ground before the flood of atheistic communism engulfs the land. The outcome of this race, he feels, is the only "crisis" we need to fear. Christopher Dawson, English philosopher of history, has expressed a similar viewpoint. He describes our present culture as a sort of "social schizophrenia." If mankind is to survive, he says, there must be a spiritual integration of culture. "The whole history of culture shows that man has a natural tendency to seek a religious foundation for his social way of life and that when culture loses its spiritual basis it becomes unstable."⁸

Some students of the present American scene see evidence already of a return to our former spiritual culture. Science and progress, they say, have been the real religion of Europe and America for over a century. Science was valued because it speeded up progress; progress was regarded as a steady march towards Utopia. But recent events—two world wars, at least two types of totalitarianism, and

two atom bomb slaughters—have changed Science from a good genie to a symbol of terror. Disillusionment has followed.

A trend back towards the spiritual culture which underlies America's democratic tradition may be reflected in the present popularity of books by such writers as Arnold J. Toynbee, Lecomte du Nouy, Joshua Liebman, Evelyn Waugh, Graham Greene, Bruce Marshall, Franz Werfel, Fulton Sheen, Thomas Merton, Lloyd Douglas, and others. Even if this new type of "best-seller" literature does not provide a blueprint for a new non-sensate culture, it at least suggests that a great many Americans, like Sorokin, are questioning materialism.

Culture Lag and Religion. All institutions are slow in adjusting to new conditions. Religious institutions, administered by man, are subject to the weaknesses of institutions as well as those of human nature. Even though they are based ultimately upon divine revelation, human stupidity, lethargy, and waywardness often obscure the divine pattern. The slow adjustment of the Christian and Jewish churches to the Industrial Revolution was an example of human weaknesses as well as institutional inertia. This delay was the cause of most of the issues which divide Communists and non-Communists today. As we look back now we see that it was largely a case of culture lag. If the Social Gospel had been applied at the start of the Industrial Revolution in England these issues need never have arisen.

In the early days of the Industrial Revolution Socialists (the Communists of those days) agitated against the sins of the new economic order. Individual leaders in all churches pleaded just as earnestly for a reform of these injustices. Yet, like all institutions, the churches themselves were slow in organizing to meet a new situation. Bewildered by the complexity of the new economic order and frightened by the radical remedies urged by Socialists, they adopted a reactionary tendency to make idols out of private property and the status quo. Under the influence of contemporary economic theory even the "enslavement of the proletariat" was accepted by some churchmen as a necessary phase of social progress justified by Providence. Small wonder that many workers rejected religion.

Even in the face of the threat of atheistic world communism today religion seems to be painfully slow in girding for the combat. While it is true that official church pronouncements since the last decade of the nineteenth century finally took up the slack between

the Social Gospel and the new economic order, in many places lethargy has marked the preaching of this Gospel. A lag is evident in other aspects of religion as well. "Civil rights" of minority groups have been winked at in many areas as if they were merely "civil" and not natural rights also. The attitude of some religious leaders towards marriage and even towards the ministry itself has often suggested the secular more than the sacred. Recently in California a five-year-old minister, assisted by his two-year-old brother, performed a marriage ceremony (and then turned appropriately to beating his toy drum). In such "stunts" as these irreverent inroads are made not only upon the sanctity of marriage but upon the ministerial calling as well. Unless religious leaders are willing to take their calling seriously and work together for socio-economic reforms dictated by the Social Gospel the remnant of Christianity may have to return to the catacombs.

It may be that we have presented too gloomy a picture. The present challenge to religion may shortly bring all true Americans back to a reconsideration of their Judaeo-Christian tradition. Already there are many indications of a desire to eliminate present culture lags in religion. The pressure of communism may speed up this process. It may be well to recall here that religion is one of man's oldest institutions. It preceded the state in primitive society. Attempts to throttle it are not new. It has been under constant fire down through the centuries. The Jews were all but exterminated by pagan nations that attempted to stamp out monotheism in the pre-Christian centuries. From the start of Christianity hostile philosophers and ambitious national leaders sought either to abolish or control it. But religion has withstood all of these attacks, to say nothing of sabotage from within. Neither we nor its enemies today should underestimate its strength.

NOTES

1. See Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*, Volume II: 1936-41 (1949). In an exclusive interview which appeared in the *New York Times* late in February, 1950, President Truman said that the promise to enter the war against Japan, made at Yalta, was the only one out of nearly forty that the Russians kept.
2. "Impact of Protestantism Today," *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1948, pp. 57-62.
3. *Religion and Culture* (1948), p. 217.

21

An Approach to the Problems of American Society

Social Problems and Social Pathology. The term *social problems* suggests to most Americans such undesirable conditions as poverty, unemployment, slums, delinquency, crime, prostitution, mental disorders, divorce, and domestic discord. Although certain phases of these conditions are dealt with in the study of economics, politics, abnormal psychology, and religion, they are usually associated with the study of sociology. The impulse to social betterment was one of the most important influences in the early development of sociology.

Whereas the study of social problems is still regarded primarily as the task of the sociologist, the actual solution of social problems has in a large measure been passed on to others. Social work, for instance, emphasizes the remedial phase of many social problems. In its case-work aspect it deals chiefly with the individual victim of a problem situation. In its group-work phase it deals with such things as the operation of leisure-time activities in which the victim, among others, may participate.

Before the development of modern sociology and social work social problems were dealt with chiefly by philanthropists or social reformers. Usually they dealt only with the symptoms of social maladjustments rather than with the deeper causes which produced these symptoms or problems. The rash on the social order was treated rather than the underlying allergy that caused it. The same tendency marked the early stages of sociology. Social problems were regarded as "pathological" conditions comparable to diseases of the human body. Hence the term *social pathology*. Immediate treatment was the objective.

Social Action and Sociology. Sociologists, social workers, politicians, religious leaders, public relations experts, and others interested in community welfare often combine today in an attempt to ameliorate a particular social problem. Activity of this sort is called *social action*. Usually it is based upon a study or survey of the problem and includes the formulation of a new social policy together with appropriate legislation to implement this policy.

The early sociologists, following the social reformers, tended to give "particularistic" explanations for social problems. Because of inadequate knowledge of the basic causes of these conditions, problems were usually oversimplified by attributing them to some single cause. Particularistic explanations of social problems such as faulty heredity, mental deviations, and the use of alcohol often found their way into legislation.

The realization that many of the older superficial explanations of social problems were wrong and that social reform was delayed on this account has caused the modern sociologist to direct attention almost exclusively to the study of causes. In his attempt to get at the fundamental nature of these problems the sociologist sometimes compares his task with that of the pure physicist or chemist who discovers basic theories and principles and leaves their application to others. While there is a difference of opinion as to the ability and propriety of attempting to maintain such an ivory-tower attitude in a field dealing so directly with human welfare, at any rate the cleavage between social action and sociology is quite clear today.

Dynamic Processes and Social Maladjustments. The intensive study of the causes of social problems has focussed attention upon the dynamic processes of our society. It has also led to attempts to integrate the study of the various social problems, formerly considered as separate entities. Paul H. Landis, for example, attempts to integrate the study of the various social problems through a "socio-cultural" viewpoint which considers the dynamic forces most immediately connected with the maladjustments of American society. He believes that these forces or processes can be reduced to five: (1) secularization, (2) the change from primary to secondary-group relationships, (3) mobility, (4) urbanization, and (5) culture change.¹ We believe that this division, in the order we have presented it, will prove helpful here.

Secularization and Social Maladjustment. Landis describes secularization as the trend towards a "rational" interpretation of life and away from former "sacred" interpretations. In keeping with this trend, man conceives of the universe and his place in it solely from the viewpoint of physical science. Morality is regarded as pragmatic and entirely man-made. It has no relationship to the supernatural or to old-fashioned virtue. Although it is not clear that Landis entirely disapproves of the secularization trend, he admits that our present culture is maladjusted because of it. He points out many unfortunate results of this trend, such as a widespread disrespect for government, "gin-marriages" based chiefly upon romantic love and hedonism, and personality disorganization.

Many other writers are gravely concerned about the effects of secularization in our society. Arnold Toynbee (*Civilization on Trial*, 1948) would put the present secular superstructure of modern society back onto its religious foundations. Richard M. Weaver (*Ideas Have Consequences*, 1948) would provide as antidote for this pernicious anemia of our sick secular society a return to "spirituality" and "metaphysical certitudes." Many psychiatrists and psychologists, particularly those of the Jungian school, stress the loss of religious convictions as the cause of many psychoneuroses. Henry C. Link (*The Return to Religion*, 1936) and Fritz Kunkel (*In Search of Maturity*, 1943) show that the loss of religion, which has traditionally provided an underlying meaning to life, is causing widespread anxiety, tension, and personality maladjustment. Secularization therefore seems to have personal as well as political and social implications.

The Shift from Primary to Secondary Contacts. The gradual shift from the intimate, primary-group experiences which formerly characterized man's associations to groups in which secondary, impersonal experiences predominate is another organic disturbance reflected in some of the "social rashes" which we describe as social problems.¹ Formerly our society was made up of small intimate groups in which local opinion and gossip based upon an interest in and a knowledge of one's neighbor's conduct operated as an effective control. In the relative anonymity of modern urban life a person is apt to feel that he is released from all former neighborhood and community group controls.

Recent social trends in the United States have been characterized

by a shift to life in larger social aggregates where contacts are chiefly casual and where a person can easily lose his past. Human nature being what it is, unless some new controls can be established it would seem as if social maladjustments are bound to increase. The decrease in religious controls accentuates this difficulty. Law at best is an inefficient control; when the religious foundation for law is removed it sometimes becomes well-nigh impotent.

The Increase in Social Mobility. The shift from primary to secondary contacts is closely related to the increase in social mobility in the United States. Such mobility may be either horizontal, involving change of locality, or vertical, which consists of a changed position on the social ladder. Both are peculiarly characteristic of American life. Migration, which releases people from the claims of locality and increases anonymity, has magnified our crime problem, to take but one illustration. Many believe that the personality stresses, strains, and frustrations involved in both horizontal and vertical mobility have also increased our percentage of mental disorders. Thus it would seem that social mobility is another force connected with social maladjustments in our society.

Urbanization. In the city the three forces just enumerated reach their maximum intensity. There secularism is most advanced. There too the shift from primary to secondary contacts is most pronounced. It is in the city likewise that social mobility is most noticeable. We need not mention here housing, recreational, and other problems of the city.

In the Europe of our immigrant past and even in pre-Civil-War American society most people lived in small town or open-country settings. The modern American is predominantly a city-dweller. We have seen that the influence of city ways, moreover, is now rapidly extending out even to the small town and open-country community. With this increasing trend towards an urbanized society law is forced more and more to take over the voids created by the breakdown of former local controls.

Culture Change and Social Maladjustment. Landis, like most other sociologists, attaches considerable importance to culture change as a cause of social problems. W. F. Ogburn (*Social Change*, 1922) showed that changes in our material culture brought about by modern technological developments often disrupt the entire social organization.

They do this, he said, because non-material culture usually fails to adjust quickly to these changed conditions. We have considered this viewpoint elsewhere in connection with Ogburn's "culture lag" concept.

Many examples of culture lag followed by social maladjustments in present-day society might be given. The social problems associated with the recent immigrant in our cities, for instance, are partly due to his delay in changing a European non-material or adaptive culture to correspond with the new material culture here. Communists, in so far as they would jockey the free societies into the position of being the defenders of the status quo, would make us all victims of culture lag at the same time that they appear as the sole proponents of needed social changes. The success of free societies in the past has been partly due to an ability to bring about social and economic changes through democratic procedures as they are needed.

In their *Sociology*, Ogburn and Nimkoff give several illustrations of "social disorganization" caused by culture lag. The different parts of a well-organized society are in harmonious adjustment. "Imbalance," they say, represents improper coordination, and social disorganization exists when this imbalance is "great and the strain tense." Such imbalance between former controls and changed social conditions is pointed out in modern unemployment, crime, and domestic discord. These authors believe that evidence of irregular rates of change which constantly produce lags in correlated parts of our culture must be sought likewise in studying most other instances of social disorganization which are commonly described as social problems.²

Ogburn and Nimkoff claim that technology is the chief cause of the imbalance in the various parts of our society; this is because of the important place which technological changes have in American life. Landis and others believe that this viewpoint as well as the idea that culture change is the sole force which causes social maladjustments has been somewhat overemphasized. It would appear that culture lag, caused by the impact of modern inventive techniques, is but one of the dynamic forces producing social problems. Such things as secularization, the shift from primary to secondary contacts, the increase in social mobility, and urbanization appear to be of equal importance.

"*Social Disorganization*" versus "*Social Problems*" and "*Social Pathology*." The attempt to integrate the study of the various problems of American society led to the adoption of the social disorganization concept. We have seen that Ogburn and Nimkoff say that social disorganization exists when the imbalance in a society is great and the resulting strain is tense. W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, who appear to have been the first to use this term (*The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 1918-20), defined social disorganization as the decrease in the influence of existing social rules of behavior upon individual members of the group. Personal disorganization was regarded as a frequent complement.

Thomas and Znaniecki showed that many of the social problems created by the settlement of the Polish, our most recent immigrants, in large American cities were due to changes which occurred differentially after leaving Europe. In Europe there was a "consensus" or an agreement in definitions of situations which had gone on relatively unchanged for generations. Individual attitudes and social values harmonized. Transferred to urban America, the peasant found himself no longer either a farmer or a member of an authoritarian large-family group. With strange new divisions of labor and widely different living conditions the definitions of the old consensus seemed wholly inadequate. Individual attitudes and social values became discordant. In other words, the folkways which had been accepted for generations in rural Poland clashed with the new technology (described by Howard W. Odum, *Understanding Society*, 1947, as the "technicways") of a machine-age civilization.

Trends in the Use of the Social Disorganization Concept. In recent years "social disorganization" has tended to replace "social problems" in textbook titles. In M. A. Elliott's and F. E. Merrill's *Social Disorganization* (1941) the problems usually treated under the older title are described as functions of the breakdown of traditional behavior patterns which once acted as social controls over individual conduct. When traditional behavior patterns no longer prevail confusion and social disorganization result, they say. Robert E. L. Faris' *Social Disorganization* (1948) expresses a similar viewpoint.

In spite of this trend, it appears that the social disorganization concept still has converts to make. John F. Cuber and Robert A. Harper (*Problems of American Society: Values in Conflict*, 1948) question

the usefulness of the concept on at least two counts: its lack of objectivity and its failure to distinguish clearly between "disorganizing" and other kinds of social change. Cuber had already registered his objection in *Sociology* (1947) when he suggested that "social disorganization" be limited to crises of short duration which are usually followed by a return to conditions which formerly prevailed.

Temporary crises would seem to be clear-cut cases of disorganization by any standard. Floods, fires, droughts, earthquakes, accidents, crop failures, wars, and epidemics create situations in which there is a serious disturbance of the customs and habits of the group. In these situations the already existing tensions of culture lags are heightened. As a result there is apt to be a demand for immediate action which will overcome previous inertia. Thus crises speed up needed social changes. Floods and droughts may focus attention on long-continued exploitation of the soil and so lead to more adequate control measures. Crises frequently require strong government controls to restore order. The French word *anomie* ("normlessness") is sometimes used to describe a society which has reached a state of disintegration.

The Definition of a Social Problem. The attempt to find an integrating framework for the study of the various social problems called attention to the need of a more precise definition of a social problem. Definition, classification, and demarcation characterize the early stage of any science. Sociology for the most part has already passed through this stage. But on account of the earlier concern of social reformers with social problems, precise definition lagged in this phase of sociology. Until rather recently "social problems" were taken for granted.

Paul H. Furfey (*The Mystery of Iniquity*, 1944) and others have called attention to the various conflicting definitions of social problems. A quick survey of some of the best-known textbooks in this field shows that there is no uniform definition. Mangold (*Social Pathology*, 1932), Gillin, Dittmer, Colbert, and Kastler (*Social Problems*, 1943), and Ogburn and Nimkoff (*Sociology*, 1946) define social problems in terms of social change. Phelps (*Contemporary Social Problems*, 1938) describes them as "hindrances and obstructions" that handicap a person in "the achievement of that which a society chooses to call 'normal social life.'" Bossard (*Social Change and Social Problems*, 1938) believes that there is substantial agreement in the

viewpoint that social problems are a "threat to social well-being as defined by the mores of the group." La Piere (*Sociology*, 1946) suggests a new trend when he defines them in terms of social equilibrium and disequilibrium.

Cuber (*Sociology*, 1947) concluded that most sociologists consider a social problem to be something which is "harmful" but that they do not agree in their choice of the arbiter of harmfulness. Some feel that this is an obvious condition which the average citizen can determine. Others believe that social scientists alone should decide. Cuber, subscribing to the theory proposed by Richard C. Fuller, takes a different viewpoint. To him the essence of a social problem is not actual "harmfulness" but rather a "clash of value judgments." A thing is a social problem because present values of a culture are contrary to existing conditions.

Social Problems and Values. Although there appears to be no consistent frame of reference in the treatment of social problems, Cuber and Harper believe that existing textbooks in this field can be roughly divided in their orientation to values. These books are inclined either towards "value espousal" or "value analysis." The earlier texts espoused a particular value or set of values. They at least recommended one value position in preference to some other. The claim which several recent textbooks have made, namely, that they are "ethically neutral," is questioned.

Cuber and Harper favor the adoption of a new "value analysis" frame of reference. Although Myrdal used this in *An American Dilemma*, they claim to be the first to adopt this frame of reference in an over-all treatment of social problems. The "value analysis" frame of reference treats values as existing data without necessarily advocating them. Thus in Myrdal's study it was pointed out that the American race problem is the result of a conflict between preëxisting authoritarian values and present democratic values. This approach is said to make the sociologist an impartial *interpreter* of values rather than an *advocate* of any particular values. He seeks to understand social problems only "from the point of view of their relation to group-related values." Thus it is said that he really can be ethically neutral.³

These authors claim that writers on social problems very often disclaim their advocacy of particular values, whereas in practice they

espouse them. While this inconsistency is objectionable, one cannot but wonder if it is entirely reasonable to require a sociologist to be ethically neutral in dealing with all social problems. Can he in practice always maintain the nice distinction between pure and applied science? He may gather and check his data in accordance with cold scientific practices, but to begin with will he not be inclined by the ethical values of his culture to select for study certain "problems" rather than other situations? Failure to do so might put him in the position of actually favoring the continuance of an existing "problem" situation. If nothing "ought to be done" about a situation then it might be said that there is no social problem. Might it not be also that ethical standards which bind him as a man would very properly operate to influence what he does in his rôle as social scientist? The analogy between the methods of the physical and the social scientist can be carried too far.

The advocates of the social disorganization concept claimed at first that this concept had less reference to values than the "social problems" concept. They even proposed "exact" measures of social disorganization, such as statistics of crime, venereal disease, divorce and poverty. But each of these is not only affected by other conditions which fluctuate in community life but each reflects "disorganization" only because somebody's standard of values says so. Measurements of poverty, for instance, depend upon the particular standard of living selected as a norm. It is on this account that Cuber and Harper describe "social disorganization" as a "shroud for moralizing."

The Treatment of Social Problems. Regardless of the factors involved in the study of social problems, Cuber and Harper believe that values cannot be avoided in the treatment of social problems. The most important value distinction involved here is that between laissez faire and directed social change. Four other ideologies or more or less integrated systems of "ideas and values" which characterize American thinking about the treatment of social problems are described. These are: (1) the ameliorative versus the curative, (2) the coercive versus the educative-permissive, (3) the evolutionary versus the revolutionary, and (4) the piecemeal versus the total attack.⁴

The ameliorative treatment of a social problem appears to be the less expensive. Yet it is only palliative and does not touch the source.

The curative approach goes to the heart of the problem. In the long run it is the cheaper. The two are illustrated to some extent by a recent report on delinquency in New York City's Harlem area. It was found that the city was maintaining each delinquent youth from this area in a state institution at a cost of over \$2,000 a year. Yet at the same time it neglected to provide the area with critically needed play-space. In dealing with social problems such as this it is necessary to use both types of treatment. Only the ameliorative can be used, of course, when the cure or a part of the cure is unknown.

In the treatment of a social problem it is sometimes difficult to determine whether "coercive" or "persuasive" procedures should be used. A law may be passed to correct an evil or an attempt may be made to educate people in regard to it. Both approaches have been tried unsuccessfully in dealing with the liquor problem in the United States. We have seen that eugenic legislation has usually reflected an impatient "pass a law" attitude towards social problems which is rather common among Americans. Experience has shown that legislative short-cuts are apt to be futile unless they are based upon accurate knowledge of a problem and backed by public opinion.

Cuber and Harper point out that it is sometimes difficult to tell whether a particular change in dealing with a social problem is evolutionary or revolutionary. Some say that the Roosevelt New Deal social reforms were evolutionary, since they had long been advocated by social scientists. They had been delayed by entrenched reactionary influences. Others claim that these reforms were revolutionary, being "put over" on the public by a small group of liberals who took advantage of a social crisis. At any rate it is believed that because of public inertia outside of a crisis sudden or revolutionary changes are difficult to bring about in a democracy.

It has been said that the American public tends towards piecemeal attacks upon social problems, whereas experts prefer more inclusive programs. Perhaps this is why politics has been described as "the art of compromise." Reform groups are seldom satisfied with the legislation that flows from our assemblies. They claim that the total attack, although more expensive at the time, is usually much cheaper in the long run. Take the Harlem situation cited above. A total attack would also eliminate slum dwellings, said to be the root problem of this area. Piecemeal attacks which include separate and unrelated

provisions for recreation, health, and increased police protection only delay the solution to this problem.

Social Planning. We have seen that the initial attack upon social problems was made by social reformers. Today we distinguish between social reform and social planning. The former is remedial and corrective, whereas the latter is preventive and constructive. The latter, moreover, is supposed to be based upon a more complete knowledge of the causes of social evils. We saw that in social planning for the cities of tomorrow, for example, provisions are made which will prevent overcrowding and many other evils of modern urban life. Social planning is a modern expression of what America's first sociologist, Lester Ward, had in mind when he spoke of "social telosis" or societal self-direction.

Social planning is opposed by advocates of laissez faire. Frequently they attempt to identify "planners" with socialism and communism, even though they do not hesitate to plan for the future development of their own business. Their slogan is, "That government governs best which governs least." Yet no one but an anarchist argues for individual freedom in the absolute sense. It is generally recognized that government must keep order in society. Our government is authorized to carry out many functions, many of which protect vested interests. Any change in the duties of government which threatens to restrict "free enterprise," however, brings a protest from organized business interests. This was illustrated by the fierce resistance of private interests to the TVA. Yet as David E. Lilienthal points out in *TVA—Democracy on the March* (1944), this great planning agency for the Tennessee Valley was brought about by modern democratic planning.

Government Controls and the Future. Both social reform and social planning usually involve government controls restricting someone's former liberty. During World War II many new government controls were accepted, but except for rent control they were practically all abolished in the spring of 1946. Eighteen months later the inflationary spirals prompted President Truman to advocate the reestablishment of government credit and price controls along with control of the allocation of key items. The 80th Congress which he berated in the election which followed turned down most of his requests. Some of his opponents charged that these proposals in peace-

time were steps towards a totalitarian state. Advocates of the proposals argued that such controls are necessary in a democracy whenever the economic security of the many is threatened by economic forces or the selfish activities of the few.

The debate over government controls and socialization is by no means ended. We considered several aspects of this controversy in Chapter 20. In a way this controversy is but a continuation of the Hamilton-Jefferson debate which has gone on in Congress for the last 150 years. The Hamiltonian theory, that it is dangerous to put great power into the hands of the people, received its first major setback in the 1820's when Andrew Jackson took our banking system out of the ownership and control of a Philadelphia family. At the end of the century the interests of the many were again strengthened against monopolies through the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Both of these measures were passed only after bitter debates over the question of what freedom really means in a democracy.

The advocates and the opponents of government action tussled again in the present century over such things as the Federal Reserve System, income tax, the Pure Food and Drug Act, and child-labor regulations. The opponents of these reforms claimed that inviolable individual rights were at stake, that private incentive was being stifled, and that by restricting personal liberties the nation was headed for autocracy. The same charges were made later against the New Deal measures of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

So many changes have now been brought about in the United States through collective societal action that it seems safe to say that, although it still operates, *laissez faire* as a respectable social philosophy is now defunct. As a result of this new attitude we have come to accept fewer and fewer unpleasant social conditions as inevitable. For that matter, in recent generations there have been movements against inherited privilege and unjust social structures in other lands also. Through newly won political and social power, exploited and neglected races and classes are now able to challenge the pretensions that usually accompany use of power over others. The disprivileged, moreover, are daily growing more conscious of the power that is possible through organized group action. The fight today is not so much over whether there shall be a "planned" or a "free" society but over the extent of planning and by whom it should be done.

Planning in a Police and in a Democratic State. In a democracy social planning is one of the ways of bringing about needed social changes. All of the reforms mentioned above were enacted in the democratic way, that is, only after long Congressional debates and public hearings. This spotlights a difference between our form of government and that of police states.

In the United States it is recognized also that even popular rule without recognition of moral obligation may be just as dangerous as unregulated totalitarian dictatorship. America is founded upon a tradition which holds that the state has divine authority, arising out of its obligation to regulate social life to whatever extent is necessary for the common welfare. According to the same Judaeo-Christian tradition, written into our Declaration of Independence and Constitution, there are certain natural or God-given rights of the individual with which government cannot interfere. Democratic planning must recognize the rights of minorities as well as individuals. Totalitarian planners have neither of these restrictions.

In our rapidly changing times it is difficult to lay down a fixed rule which will indicate just how far a democracy can go in planning for human welfare or how far the nations in union should go in world planning. Older forms of government are crashing all around us. Most of our churches, in rejecting both laissez-faire capitalism and communism, have also pointed out that it is a false assumption to regard these extremes as the only alternatives. Most Americans probably want a minimum of government yet they do not want an impotent government.

Much planning is handicapped also by our inadequate knowledge of human nature and culture. There is always a human tendency, moreover, for the group in power to try to mould all others to its likeness. Anthropologist John P. Gillin recognizes these limitations in planning. He believes, however, that we already know enough about human nature and culture to eliminate many of the maladjustments of the present world. He has proposed the following basic general goals not only for our own country but for Western civilization: provision should be made for the highest degree of physical and mental health; opportunities should be open to all on the basis of ability; changes should be made as needed but the human being must always be regarded as more important than the state.⁵ This

would appear to be a safe minimum standard today for planning in a democracy.

NOTES

1. *Social Policies in the Making*, 1947, Chapters 1-5.
2. William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, *Sociology*, new impression, 1946, pp. 893-98.
3. John F. Cuber and Robert A. Harper, *Problems of American Society: Values in Conflict*, 1948, Introduction.
4. *Ibid.*, Chapter 4. See also Francis E. Merrill, "The Study of Social Problems," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1948, pp. 251-62.
5. *The Ways of Men*, 1947, pp. 613-14.

Sociology and Social Thought

Social Thought Backgrounds of Sociology. We know that since the beginning of writing at least people have thought about social problems and social relations. Such considerations are found in the writings of the ancient Greeks and Romans as well as the early Christians. Before the modern field of sociology was finally staked off from other disciplines "sociology" was treated as a part of philosophy, history, biology, and anthropology. We traced the gradual development of sociology from these backgrounds in the course of our consideration of man's biological, cultural, and social heritage in Part One.

Throughout this book many brief references have been made to various schools of thought that run through sociology. But up to this point no serious attempt has been made to define sociology or to explain its nature and method for the simple reason that no such analysis can mean much to the beginner. Now that the student is familiar with such sociological concepts as "social processes," "social interaction," "personality," and "social organization," it may mean something when we point out that E. B. Reuter's *Handbook of Sociology* (1941) defines *sociology* as "the discipline that undertakes to isolate and define the processes of social interaction that result in human personality and social organization." We shall consider other viewpoints about the nature of sociology shortly.

It is generally said that sociology started in France with the writings of Auguste Comte (1798-1857), a little over a century ago. That there were many important social theorists before this date is suggested by the fact that Emory S. Bogardus does not consider Comte in *The Development of Social Thought* (1940) until his sixteenth chapter. We shall not attempt to describe here either the history of sociology

or the history of social thought. Instead we shall merely attempt to indicate some of the more important isms and philosophies which have influenced modern academic sociology. In a large measure this will amount to an analysis of the nature, backgrounds, and recent developments of Comte's positivism.

I. THE EARLY INFLUENCE OF POSITIVISM UPON SOCIOLOGY

Sociology and Five Contemporaneous Isms. Every new branch of knowledge is influenced by contemporaneous movements and isms. Sociology was affected especially by five different isms. As sociology started on its academic career the social effects of industrialism were already commencing to be felt throughout Europe. This period of economic changes had upset a social order whose roots extended all the way back to the New Stone Age. The Industrial Revolution soon spawned Marxism and rugged individualism, twin but opposite evils which are still with us. Both of these, like industrialism itself, affected sociology. The nascent sociology was affected also by contemporaneous secularism and nationalism, both of which reduced the influence of religious and ethical values in social and political life. In previous chapters we have touched upon the evils of industrialism, Marxism, rugged individualism, secularism, and nationalism. These five isms in one way or another helped Comte's positivism to win supporters.

Positivism and Comte. Comte gave sociology its name and described its field. But he did more; he tried to make positivism its guiding spirit. Positivism, as he conceived it, is a system which excludes everything but the natural phenomena or properties of knowable things together with their relations of coexistence and succession. Although some modern sociologists refer to Comte's positivism as if it were a mere research method, others recognize that it is also a system of philosophy.

It must be admitted that at first sight most of the observations that sociologists have made about positivism suggest that it has no sinister philosophical implications. It sounds innocent enough, for example, when it is said that Comte favored the inductive method of the natural sciences. Likewise, as it stands, there can be little objection to his admonition that the new social science should be based upon the

investigation, observation, tabulation, and classification of social facts. This is ordinary research procedure. But some of the deeper implications of positivism begin to appear when it is stated that in the method of sociology Comte insisted that all knowledge about man and society obtained through deduction or from any other source is to be ignored. This means that acceptance of Judaeo-Christian philosophical or theological principles and premises about the nature of man or the conditions of his social relations is forbidden. This, if carried to its logical conclusion, would bar a democratic approach to sociology in America.

It cannot be presumed that Comte failed to see the full implications of positivism. He was frank in his opposition to what we know as religion. He even proposed a new universal "religion" of humanity, a brotherhood of man divorced from the fatherhood of God, to replace existing religion as a socializing force in society. In order to understand the metaphysical implications of Comte's positivism one must consider some of its antecedents, particularly naturalism.

Naturalism and Its Influence on Positivism. Comte's positivism had its roots in the epoch-making developments in the natural sciences which had started as far back as 1543. That year marked the appearance of two great scientific treatises, Copernicus' on astronomy and Versalius' on anatomy. A number of equally revolutionary developments soon followed in physics, biology, and mathematics. During the next century and a half science was to learn for the first time what we regard as its basic principles. It was upon this knowledge that the technology of the Industrial Revolution was later to be constructed.

The impact of this new scientific knowledge upon sixteenth- and seventeenth-century thought was revolutionary. It might be recalled in this connection that in spite of the attempts of great minds of the past to fathom the laws of the universe these laws had up to this time remained almost inscrutable. Meanwhile nature had appeared to be capricious and unpredictable. Only two explanations of the universe, either the constant and direct intervention of divine Providence or mythology, seemed to make sense. Now it appeared that science had suddenly provided a new key which explained the mysteries of the ages. It could even predict the future course of the universe.

It is true that, starting in 1517, the Reformation had already weak-

ened the authority of tradition. Yet the reformers had always retained the traditional concepts of the universe. With the progress of science these explanations also appeared to collapse. To many observers it now looked as if not only Catholicism and mythology but all religion had suddenly disintegrated in Western civilization. "From seeing the direct action of God everywhere," says Paul H. Furfey, "men rushed to the opposite extreme and could see no place at all in the universe for a personal God." ¹ Out of this general confusion a new philosophy, sometimes described as naturalism, was spawned. According to this system of thought, scientific laws could account for all phenomena. The universe, for instance, was now regarded as nothing more than a great machine without either a Maker or a Governor.

The Age of Reason, which characterized the first two-thirds of the eighteenth century, was the logical development of the naturalism of the preceding period. During the period of the Enlightenment an attempt was made to find a complete philosophy of life in science. This materialistic viewpoint was fostered by the direct or indirect effects of the five great isms mentioned above. Each in turn tended in some way to weaken the former supernatural world-view. In the nineteenth century, therefore, when Comte in his sociology rejected all metaphysical speculation and any consideration of final causes and the Absolute, he likewise merely reflected a viewpoint which had its roots in the naturalism of the earlier period. Positivism was in a large measure only a new name for or a new phase of naturalism. Like its predecessor in the eighteenth century, it apotheosized "Science," spelled with a capital letter. For educated people the worship of Science, although a philosophy if not a religion itself, was now expected to replace both the religion and philosophy of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.

The Rise of Evolutionism. The rise of evolutionism shortly after Comte's death contributed to the spread of positivism as the philosophy of sociology. The materialistic interpretation of evolution advanced by the early popularizers of Darwin fitted in perfectly with Comte's own philosophy. A few observations about the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century developments of biology and certain allied sciences should make this clear.

Aristotle classified man as one of the animals and also anticipated the concept of species. A few subsequent writers toyed with similar ideas including even the possibility of evolution. Yet for the most part emphasis upon the animal side of man was practically forgotten in Western thought until 1735. In that year Linnaeus, the great Swedish naturalist, made his famous classification of living creatures and included man among the animals.

About a century later geologists and paleontologists suggested rather cautiously that both man and animal had experienced a much longer period of development than the Bible, as then interpreted, seemed to permit. Archeology added to this belief after Boucher de Perthes in France and Father John MacEnery in England announced discoveries of prehistoric implements which indicated an immense antiquity for man. Several important discoveries of fossilized human skeletons made soon afterwards, at Neanderthal Cave in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, confirmed this evidence. All of this seemed to contradict the authority of Genesis, the first book of the Bible.

In 1859 Charles Darwin published *The Origin of Species*. This epoch-making treatise proposed a plausible theory of evolution which amounted to a new explanation for the development of life. The evidence which he marshaled made it appear that man and the other living animals had evolved gradually over a long period of time from simpler forms of life. Evolutionism, as this theory is sometimes called, fitted in perfectly with the conclusions arrived at earlier by Linnaeus and by geologists, archeologists, and paleontologists. Altogether it now appeared certain that both man and animal had gone through a long period of evolutionary development.

Evolutionism and World Religious Thought. In order to appreciate the force of the impact of evolutionism upon the thought of Western civilization it is necessary to recall the belief about man's past which generally prevailed prior to the nineteenth century.

Even up to the middle of the last century most reasonably well informed people had little reason to question the traditional belief that man had first appeared upon earth only a few thousand years ago. Early Protestantism had estimated the date to be 4004 B.C. Since there was then no well-known evidence to the contrary even those who accepted the philosophy of naturalism were usually content to

follow Genesis in this matter. Darwin's proposal suddenly brought into focus the mass of evidence which had recently developed against the traditional viewpoint.

Although the new converging evidence for man's longer antiquity was in itself a challenge to Biblical scholars, most of Darwin's early popularizers, followers of naturalism to start with, refused to await a possible exegetical solution of this difficulty. They immediately proclaimed that these new scientific ideas contradicted not merely the generally accepted Biblical chronology but the Bible itself, the chief foundation of Western religious belief. Thomas Huxley and Ernst Haeckel, for instance, went beyond Darwin and represented evolution as necessarily materialistic and mechanistic. Haeckel said that evolution had reduced the concepts of the existence of God, immortality, and freedom of the will to the level of "childish fables."

Evolutionism and Sociology. The impact of evolutionism upon some of the disciplines has been either slow or subtle. But sociology, so closely allied to both biology and anthropology, felt the force immediately and directly. Evolutionism, moreover, fitted in perfectly with naturalism and positivism. To Comte's followers it even seemed that the recent appearance of materialistic evolution endorsed his theory of the three stages of knowledge.

Comte had said that as man first tries to pierce the veil of the unknown he explains phenomena as due to the immediate action of supernatural forces. Following this "supernatural" stage there comes a "metaphysical" one, during which explanations are made instead in terms of inherent abstract forces. Finally man arrives at the "positive" stage. In this third stage, which Comte said was only now dawning, theological and philosophical explanations are dropped and answers are sought only in sense knowledge of facts and relationships of facts.

Thanks to materialistic evolution, it now seemed to European positivistic sociologists that a giant stride had just been made away from both the supernatural and metaphysical stages of knowledge. Materialistic evolution combined with the evidence of prehistorians undermined not only the Bible, they said, but it even eliminated the need of a divine architect or personal force demanded by most of the ancient philosophers. Purely materialistic and mechanical explanations now sufficed for everything. Science had or at any rate

soon would have all the answers. There was no longer any place for such concepts as a Creator or a soul. This was the underlying philosophy of European positivistic sociology at the end of the last century. It entered the United States chiefly through the sociology of Herbert Spencer.

It was a positivistic sociology which had only a short time before felt the impact of evolutionism that first invaded the United States. We shall consider next the rôle of positivism in American sociology. This can be observed best by considering first the so-called pioneer and then the modern period of development of this subject in the United States. Talcott Parsons has described the pioneer period as that of "proto-sociology."

II. POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY

The Pioneer Period. Most of the pioneer American sociologists, including such men as Lester F. Ward, William G. Sumner, Franklin H. Giddings, and Albion W. Small, described their sociology as positivistic. Yet when their works are studied now there is little evidence of what modern sociologists would call positivism. Commencing with Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* (1883) each of these writers followed a similar pattern; each in turn attempted to establish some preconceived theory of sociology based upon his own peculiar philosophical world view. Even in the use of data they were often uncritical. Each founded a speculative system of sociology.

Although the early American sociologists expressed many ideas which were contrary to prevailing religious standards, for the most part they do not appear to have realized the full philosophical implications of positivism. Perhaps they were deterred from doing so by the strong fundamentalist tradition of contemporaneous American Protestantism. The fact that some of these sociologists were former ministers may have been another influence. Or finally it may be that their myopic search for "social forces" comparable to the natural forces described by the early physical scientists kept them from getting too deep into Comtean positivism. The universities in which they taught, moreover, still took rather seriously the religious creeds described in their charters.

As we look back it is rather clear now that the early American

sociologists were essentially social philosophers who actually eschewed the inductive method. While it is true that their analyses of society were far superior to the rule-of-thumb observations of the man in the street, their method at best can only be described by modern standards as "philosophico-scientific." Although they advocated positivism, they were inconsistent in neglecting to apply it. Perhaps this inconsistency was typified in the life of William G. Sumner at Yale. His biographer says that Sumner considered God as an "unnecessary hypothesis." Sumner himself admitted that his former religious beliefs had disappeared. Yet he is said to have exercised official religious functions occasionally up to the time of his death. He even made regular annual reports as an Episcopal minister.

Recent American Sociology. Along about 1920 a new leadership began to assert itself in American sociology. It was largely a reaction against the methods of the older writers who obviously had failed to establish sociology as a science. In an attempt to get back more closely to the positivism of Comte and to the methods of the natural sciences greater emphasis began to be given at this time to the gathering of facts. Objective descriptions of social life now became all-important, whereas generalizations, so characteristic of the pioneers, were actually discouraged. The gap between the old and the new sociology has broadened each year since 1920.

Value-standards and "moralizing" are generally regarded as out of place in the new "pure sociology." As we have already seen, even the use of such older concepts as "social progress," "social pathology," "social problems," and "social disorganization" is now frowned upon since they involve judgments as to what "ought to be." The pure sociologist is not supposed to be contaminated either by practical considerations or value estimates. Since its attention is directed chiefly to descriptions of external behavior, a method made fashionable by behavioristic psychology, the new sociology is sometimes described as "behavioristic sociology." It is pragmatic empiricism.

Even though "behavioristic sociology" is much closer to the Comtean ideal than that which preceded, so far only a few of our sociologists seem to have had either the insight or the courage to face frankly the full implications of positivism. Logically positivism says that since the soul and its faculties cannot be discerned by the methods of the natural sciences, the soul does not exist. Certain mod-

ern psychologists have expressed the philosophy of naturalism as it applies in their field this way: the human personality is a succession of states acted upon by various social and biological forces; since responsibility is attached only to states and not to the person who passes through them, the individual is no longer accountable for his actions. Whatever the naturalistic reasoning may be in modern positivistic sociology, free will, responsibility, and objective morality are ruled out. Yet many modern sociologists, while claiming to be pure positivists, seem to hesitate when it comes to stating frankly their acceptance of these implications of positivism. In this respect they continue to reflect the inconsistency of Sumner and the other pioneers.

There are some exceptions to this tendency to be cautious about positivism. Two stand out: George A. Lundberg and Harry Elmer Barnes. Lundberg has taken the lead recently in urging that we study human behavior and social life by practically the same methods used in studying the physical world. He replies to the objection that the concept of man as a free agent makes this impossible by belittling this belief as only a "quaint metaphysical survival." He seems to admit, as well as to recognize, that positivistic sociology involves much more than what the college student might ordinarily think of as "good research methods." He evidently recognizes the inherent clash between positivism and the core values of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.

Harry Elmer Barnes over the years has been the most outspoken of our sociologists in expressing positivistic opposition to the Judaeo-Christian tradition. While teaching at Smith College he even went so far as to assail Christianity as the "source" of most of our social evils. In his *Twilight of Christianity* (1929) he castigated such ideas as the soul, heaven, hell, immortality, sin, and prayer as "cultural fossils in orthodoxy."

Many other modern sociologists have implied as much as Lundberg and Barnes have had the honesty to express. They have not only damned religion by faint praise but asserted quite generally that morality has no objective basis, being founded merely upon the prevailing custom. Warren S. Thompson seems to challenge the right of the Bible or any church to interpret the will of God for modern man. Perhaps he gives us the key to the positivistic viewpoint when,

with reference to a particular Biblical moral tenet, he makes the general observation, "Surely it is only scientific common sense to ask how it happens that the injunction of a tribal god (*sic*) issued some ages ago has any validity for man in the twentieth century in the Western world."² These sociologists argue frankly for not merely a methodological but a philosophical positivism.

III. DEMOCRATIC VALUES AMONG MODERN SOCIOLOGISTS

Critics of the positivistic trend which characterizes much of modern sociology are to be found both inside and outside of sociological circles. The academic sociologists who object to the present trend may be grouped roughly under two headings: (1) the Sorokin and Dilthey schools, and (2) the Myrdal and Lynd group. At the outset it might be observed that none of these sociologists would go back to the philosophical patterns followed by the American pioneer sociologists. All would make use of empirical and inductive procedures and methodology. The objection as we shall see is chiefly to the extremes of positivism.

Pitirim Sorokin and Positivism. Professor Sorokin of Harvard is a strong advocate of values in sociology. He fears that the "fact-finding" trend has emasculated sociology in that it has caused modern sociologists to regard "pure thought" with suspicion. In our present "thoughtless" sociology, he says, the tabulating machine, the coefficient of correlation, and mental tests are erroneously regarded as constituting the sole road to truth. The basic principles concerning man and society, derived partly from "pure thought," are thereby ignored.

Sorokin believes that our sociology merely reflects instead of attempting to correct the "sensate culture" which, he believes, is everywhere leading to the collapse of Western civilization. In *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (1937-41), his four-volume analysis of Western society, he says that this sensate culture is "degrading man to the level of a mere reflex mechanism . . . devoid . . . of any absolute value of anything noble and sacred."³ Sorokin stands at least for absolute, eternal values. He accuses other American sociologists of contributing to the modern destruction of the dignity and rights of the human person.

Some of Sorokin's followers, as well as others who agree with him only in the matter of absolute values, have also pointed out that if man is regarded merely as society's creature, as the logic of most modern sociology would have it, then extreme collectivistic theories should be as acceptable here as they appear to be in Soviet Russia. The Judaeo-Christian concept of the dignity and value of the human personality, they say, is now as foreign to many American sociologists as it is to Soviet ideology.

Wilhelm Dilthey and Positivism. Positivism characterizes a considerable part of modern European sociology also. Yet here too there are those who protest. In Germany many of the critics of positivistic sociology are followers of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). Dilthey insisted upon a clear-cut distinction between the methodology of the natural and the social or behavior sciences. Of necessity the latter must differ in method, he said, because of man's free will and ability to introspect. These faculties give man a special ability to "understand" (*verstehen*) social phenomena. Furthermore, sociologists have a direct insight denied to the physical scientists because they also participate in the experiences they observe. Max Weber (1864-1920) and Werner Sombart (1863-1941) are usually associated with this "understanding" school of sociology in Germany.

Myrdal and Lynd on Modern Sociology. Gunnar Myrdal, the great Swedish sociologist, challenges the claim to objectivity made by modern positivists. He questions the ability of any sociologist to be entirely objective about his material, since all social studies of necessity involve value assumptions. He suggests that the sociologist should state his "values" or "biases" frankly rather than pretend that none exist.

In the first chapter of *An American Dilemma* (1944), his monumental study of the Negro in America, Myrdal frankly takes the "American Creed" as his value premise. The lag between this Creed and the actual position of the Negro in America represents not only a "problem," he says, but also a lag in public morals. Myrdal observes incidentally that the American Creed is only the common democratic creed of humane ideals which has grown up in Western civilization upon the foundation of Judaism and Christianity.

American sociologist Robert S. Lynd goes even further than Myrdal in emphasizing the importance of value assumption in so-

ciology. In *Knowledge for What* (1939) he says that sociologists have a duty to advocate proper courses of action. It is folly to assume the scientific other-world aloofness of the "pure" physical scientist, he says, when dealing with sociological information. This viewpoint, long emphasized among Catholic sociologists by Paul H. Furfey, assumes that knowledge brings responsibility. Talcott Parsons and a few others have also criticized pragmatic empiricism in our sociology.

Whatever one may think about positivistic sociology it must be admitted that as far as academic sociology is concerned in the United States today, so far its critics appear to be in the minority. Both the "evaluative" and the "responsibility" position stated above were vigorously attacked recently by Gwynne Nettler in an article which probably reflected the majority viewpoint among modern American sociologists.⁴

IV. POPULAR CRITICISM OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY

In a country such as ours, with a strong Christian tradition, it might well be expected that moralists and philosophers would object to the philosophy of positivistic sociology. In a country where the legal system is based upon the idea of responsibility and where court procedure involves an oath sworn upon the Bible it is not surprising that religious leaders should protest against sociologists who seem to regard man as an animated machine or superanimal devoid of intrinsic worth or dignity. We shall not pause to repeat these criticisms here, not because they are unimportant but because they could easily be predicted.

It is somewhat surprising, however, when we find *Life*, one of America's most widely circulated popular magazines, suddenly getting alarmed about positivistic sociology and taking up the cudgel of the moralists. One can only wonder to what extent this reflects a popular distrust of modern sociology. It suggests at least that the public is concerned about positivism. A full-page editorial in *Life* recently accused sociologists, described as the Johnny-come-latelys to the scientific movement, of ignoring the new "marked trend" of true scientists, especially the physicists, back towards religion. It frankly disagreed with the affirmative answer which Lundberg had just given in his *Can Science Save Us?* (1947). The editor accused

sociologists and psychologists of trying to "keep God out of science's back door" at the same time that the somewhat repentant natural sciences "are welcoming Him in at the front." Viewing the post-war troubled state of world affairs, the editorial concluded: "Since belief in God is the only source of values man is sure of, it is a peculiarly bad time for these newer sciences to ask us to suspend that belief while they experiment." ⁵

Some of our leading physical scientists maintain that the good as well as the true should be the objective of the social sciences. Evidently even President James B. Conant of Harvard, who has been accused in the past of ignoring values in education, now takes this position. In his paper "The Rôle of Science in Our Unique Society," which *Time* described as the high spot of the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in January, 1948, Conant observed that medicine openly takes a stand that life is better than death, health better than sickness, and that the well-being of people is important. He advocated a "Hippocratic oath" for social scientists, to be based upon a frank recognition of moral standards. In a police state it might be all right for a social scientist to remain coldly neutral towards "value judgments," he said, but not so in "an open society with our ideals."

Positivism in the World Crisis. The present world crisis is spotlighting the difference between communist and democratic philosophies. It is making Americans more conscious of their traditional ideals and values. This trend may lead to even greater public criticism of positivism in sociology. It is conceivable that the fear of communism might even lead to a demand that sociologists in state-supported universities who find too great a discrepancy between their personal values and the core values of the American Creed should resign.

The American Creed, based upon the Judæo-Christian tradition, is now being challenged at every point by the philosophy of totalitarianism. Although the matter has been touched upon in many places in this book, a brief paragraph summary which underlines the difference between the democratic and the communist philosophy may not be out of order by way of a conclusion here.

Democracy insists upon certain inalienable rights of the individual, a concept derived from the humanistic religious tradition of Western civilization. Communists deny the existence of any such rights; the

state is supreme. In his *Das Kapital* Karl Marx wrote, "The democratic concept of man is false, because it is Christian. The democratic concept holds that . . . each man is a sovereign being. This is the illusion, dream, and postulate of Christianity." Hitler, who integrated many Marxian ideas into his Nazi philosophy, had a similar contempt for Judaeo-Christian ideals. He is quoted by Hermann Rauschnig as saying, "To the Christian doctrine of the infinite significance of the individual human soul . . . I oppose with icy clarity the saving doctrine of the nothingness and insignificance of the human being."⁶

The writer believes that in the present crisis American educators must propose with clarity a sociology which recognizes the intrinsic worth of the person—the very basis of our democracy. Since sociology deals with individual and collective human welfare it cannot escape from the philosophical implications of man's nature and destiny.

NOTES

1. *A History of Social Thought*, 1942, p. 209.
2. *Population Problems*, second edition, 1935, p. 439.
3. Volume 3, p. 539.
4. "Toward a Definition of the Sociologist," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1947, pp. 553-60. See also Talcott Parsons, "The Position of Sociological Theory," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1948, pp. 156-71.
5. June 23, 1947.
6. *Das Kapital*, first edition, ME, I, 1, p. 580; Herman Rauschnig, *The Voice of Destruction*, 1940, p. 225. Contrast this totalitarian philosophy with that expressed by President Truman, February 15, 1950, before a meeting of federal state, and local law-enforcement officers in Washington: "The fundamental basis of this nation's law was given to Moses on the Mount. The fundamental basis of our Bill of Rights comes from the teachings which we get from Exodus and St. Matthew, from Isaiah and St. Paul. I don't think we emphasize that enough these days. If we don't have the proper fundamental moral background, we will finally wind up with a totalitarian government which does not believe in rights for anybody but the state."

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