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HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY OF RUSSIA

to the 1917 Revolution

WORKS TRANSLATED UNDER THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES, AND PUBLISHED BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

W. CHAPIN HUNTINGTON, EDITOR

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HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY OF RUSSIA

to the 1917 Revolution

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THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
New York : 1949

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First Printing

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOREWORD

THE Russian Translation Project of the American Council of Learned Societies was organized in 1944 with the aid of a subsidy from the Humanities Division of the Rockefeller Foundation. The aim of the Project is the translation into English of significant Russian works in the fields of the humanities and the social sciences which provide an insight into Russian life and thought.

In the difficult problem of the selection of books for translation, the Administrative Committee has had the counsel and cooperation of Slavic scholars throughout the United States and Great Britain. It is thought that the books chosen will be useful to general readers interested in world affairs, and will also serve as collateral reading material for the large number of courses on Russia in our colleges and universities.

Since Russian history is a continuum, the volumes translated are of various dates and have been drawn from both the prerevolutionary and postrevolutionary periods, from writings published inside and outside of Russia, the choice depending solely on their value to the fundamental aim of the Project. Translations are presented in authentic and unabridged English versions of the original text. Only in this way, it is believed, can American readers be made aware of the traditions, concepts, and ideologies by which the thinking and attitudes of the people of Russia are molded.

It should, of course, be clearly understood that the views expressed in the works translated are not to be identified in any way with those of the Administrative Committee or of the Council.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE
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INTRODUCTION

THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION PROJECT sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies has for its major purpose helping to close the intellectual gap between the English-speaking peoples and the Russian people for which the basic difference in language has been so largely responsible. In translating Lyashchenko's *History of the National Economy of Russia,* the Russian Translation Project has made a most valuable and solid contribution toward its goal of making available in translation a substantial number of significant Russian works in the fields of the humanities and social sciences.

It is noteworthy that we have in this work the fruits of the intellectual labor of a man whose productive life as a scholar spans not only the period from the revolution to the present time but includes even the prerevolutionary period. Peter Ivanovich Lyashchenko was born in Saratov on October 21, 1876. He has written, among other works, *Essays on the Agrarian Evolution of Russia,* published in 1908; *The Peasant Problem and the Post-Emancipation Land Policy,* published in two parts, the first in 1913 and the second in 1917; *The Grain-Farming and the Grain-Trading Relations of Russia and Germany in Connection with the Tariff,* in 1915; and *Russian Grain Farming in the System of World Economy,* in 1927.

No doubt the circumstance that Lyashchenko wrote as a Marxist, albeit a "legal Marxist" rather than as a revolutionist, even in tsarist days, has made it possible for this leading economic historian of Russia to prolong his scholarly work to the present day. The present work, covering the period up to the advent of the Soviet regime, was published in 1939. The volume was issued by the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and approved for use as a textbook of economics by the All-Union Committee on Higher Educational Institutions of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. This English translation has been prepared by L. M. Herman and edited by Ellsworth L. Raymond.

There can be no question of the usefulness of this translation to the wide range of persons interested in Russian history and economics. We have here a vast compendium of historical economic data, analysis of these data and their theoretical interpretation, and we have, as well, an excellent example of the effect upon a scholar, trained under the old technique, of living and writing under the Soviet regime. Lyashchenko not only avoids any conflict

with the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist economic and political doctrine but he is also careful to state his orthodoxy both in the beginning of his book and in well sprinkled comments throughout the text. Yet the work is far removed from being written expressly to prove orthodox doctrine. Here is neither Party tract nor grandiose economic interpretation of history supported by factual illustrations. Instead, Lyashchenko has covered a vast area of space and time in meticulous detail and with very much the kind of documentation which would be expected of a distinguished bourgeois economic historian writing a textbook for use in advanced classes.

In covering a period beginning so early that he must rely upon archaeological evidence together with the meager references to be found in the literature of adjoining and more advanced peoples, Lyashchenko is careful to avoid the error of trying to write one economic account for all the areas and peoples which make up the vast Soviet Empire. There is the added value to his work which comes from particularity of treatment for areas such as Georgia, Bashkiria, and Turkestan, as well as for the Ukraine and Great Russia. Lyashchenko places at our disposal factual material not otherwise readily available to facilitate the understanding of just how the process of economic development varied from area to area and from time to time. As one example of this particularity of treatment, Lyashchenko sets forth a detailed analysis of the economic consequences of the abolition of serfdom to the peasantry and to the landlords. His basic thesis is that, from the strictly economic point of view, the former serf was victimized by his liberation. In setting forth this thesis, however, he shows in detail for the various areas how differently the peasants fared. In countless other instances Lyashchenko illustrates the principle of unevenness of the rate of economic development in different areas.

This contribution of the Russian Translation Project goes far to fill a long standing need. It will be a fortunate time when it becomes possible for some equally distinguished Russian to write a work of comparable quality covering the period from the beginning of the 1917 Revolution, where Lyashchenko's book ends, down to the present time. It would also be fortunate if, at that time, as faithful and competent a translator could be found as is L. M. Herman.

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

SINCE THE completion of the present translation, the State Publishing Board for Political Literature has brought out a new edition of Lyashchenko's *History of the Russian National Economy*. The new edition, covering the same material as the 1939 volume, appeared in two volumes, the first having been published in 1947 and the second in 1948. In contrast with the 1939 edition, which was described as a study of the Institute of Economics (Academy of Science of the USSR), the two new volumes bear no evidence of sponsorship by any scientific institution. They are described as approved by the Ministry of Higher Education for use in general institutions of higher learning, whereas the earlier volume was designed specifically for schools of economics. Furthermore, the new edition does not bear the mark of the kind of editorial supervision indicated for the 1939 volume by the appearance of the name of Academician S. Strumilin.

The new two-volume edition covers its material in fifty chapters, grouped into ten sections, as compared with thirty-seven chapters, grouped into seven sections, devoted to the 1939 edition. Since there is no foreword to the new edition, it is impossible to determine precisely the author's motivation in bringing out the new edition. Two historical periods seem to have gained additional emphasis through expanded treatment; namely, the reign of Peter I and World War I. This expansion appears, however, to have been prompted by considerations of the importance of the two periods concerned rather than by the discovery of new historical data. Except for some regrouping of the material and a more elaborate treatment of a few selected periods, the new 1947–1948 edition represents a routine revision of a fairly definitive work, such as the 1939 volume of Lyashchenko's *History of the Russian National Economy* was.

The new edition carries three appendices, including a bibliographical index of the most important economic literature and sources in the development of the national economy (similar to the index contained in the 1939 volume), as well as a useful chronological index (*cf.* page 829 of this work) of major economic events of the period covered, and a rudimentary index of subjects and names. It lacks, however, the invaluable collection of twenty-two maps appended to the 1939 volume.

L. M. HERMAN

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AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION

Tasks, Content, and Method in the History of National Economy

AS A SCIENCE, the history of the national economy in its content and method must obviously be closely related to two groups of scientific studies: the historical and the economic.

Historical study of the social and economic life of mankind, like all other scientific studies, results from thoroughly concrete and practical requirements of society which it must fulfill.

At every stage of social development, as soon as society has reached a definite level of self-consciousness and class differentiation, the need arises for diversified information not only about the current status of society but about its historical past as well. In studying this historical past, each social class of the various eras seeks not only historical comprehenion and clarification of its social position and relations toward other classes, but also historical prognosis of its future historic destiny in social development. Knowledge of the past is necessary in order to understand the present and foresee the future.

This is the reason why in our time of socialist reorganization of all society, the working class of the USSR, while engaged in the construction of socialism in place of the completely demolished bourgeois economy of prerevolutionary Russia, must attentively study the history of bourgeois society and particularly the history of its economic life. Such historical study leads to comprehension of the social forces of society, its course of development, and the ways and methods for revolutionary annihilation of the exploiting classes. Knowledge about the laws of social development of socialist construction of socialism, "the practical actions of the party of the proletariat must be based . . . on the laws of the development of society, and on the study of these laws."[1]

This is why the latest instructions from the Party and the government assign such an important position to historical study in general and to economic history in particular.

Of course, for a correct understanding and explanation of historical events and facts, it is necessary that the study of history should actually attain the level of an objective social science. The very class character of bourgeois society and bourgeois science has been the greatest insurmountable obstacle to attainment by bourgeois historical-economic science of a scientific understanding of the objective historical process. "So-called 'historical' development is generally content," says Marx in this connection, "that the subsequent form views its preceding form as a stage toward itself and always understands it one-sidedly, because only very rarely and under quite specific conditions is it capable of self-criticism. . . . Bourgeois economy only began to understand feudal, ancient, and Oriental society when self-criticism of bourgeois society commenced."[2] Hence, regardless of the high level of development of historical studies in bourgeois society, its historical science cannot achieve objective inquiry into the laws governing the process of social-economic development, and takes the route of a justification and apology for bourgeois society.

This character of bourgeois historical science has been repeatedly criticized by progressive representatives of philosophical and economic thought, especially the socialist-utopians Fourier, Saint-Simon, and others. But only Marx has exposed conclusively the apologetic character of bourgeois economic and historical science, and revealed the class roots of these apologies.

The materialistic understanding of history and Marx's adaptation of materialist dialectics to the analysis of social-economic and historical development, particularly of bourgeois society, blazed a trail for the present science of history even within the framework of bourgeois society.

Lenin says about the historical method of Marx:

The discovery of the materialistic understanding of history, or, more correctly, the logical extension and expansion of materialism into the field of social phenomena, eliminated two major shortcomings of earlier historical theories. First, they had examined at best only the ideological motives of human activity in history without investigating the causes behind these motives, without discerning the objective laws governing the development of the system of social relationships, and without discovering the roots of these relationships in the stages of development of material productions. Secondly, earlier theories did not properly cover the activity of the masses of the population, while historical materialism was first to make possible an investigation of social conditions in the life of the masses, as well as changes in these conditions, with the accuracy of natural history. Pre-Marxian "sociology" and historiography *at best* yielded an accumulation of raw facts haphazardly collected, and a picture of individual phases of the historical process. Marxism showed the way for all-embracing, every-sided study of the process of the origin, development, and decline of social-economic structures, examining the *totality* of all conflicting tendencies and reducing them to accurately defined conditions of life and produc-

tion in different *classes* of society; eliminating subjectivism and arbitrariness in the selection of various "guiding" ideas or in their interpretation; revealing the roots of all ideas without exception, and of all the various tendencies in the composition of material production forces.[3]

Thus materialistic understanding of history requires "particularly careful study of economic history, the history of national economy. Study of economic history becomes the key to understanding the whole process of social development, not only past but present. The history of social development is primarily the history of the development of production, history of the means of production . . . and history of the development of the productive forces and production relationships of mankind."[4] Under the circumstances of the proletariat constructing a socialist economy, "the party of the proletariat . . . must above all possess knowledge of the laws of development of production, and knowledge of the laws of the economic development of society."[5]

The above statement defines the basic tasks and aims of a general course in economic history.

1. The basic and most important general aim of our course should be the *study of the development of industry* and the history of the production methods used by society in each given historical period and throughout all of history. While remaining a concrete historical-economic study, the course in history of national economy must present a developed concrete historical picture of the laws governing progress in production and all social economy in general, which laws provide a factual basis for understanding the laws of social development postulated in the theoretical sciences—in political economy and in the study of dialectical and historical materialism. And, in turn, a course in the history of national economic life must throw light upon all facts and explanations from the standpoint of these general laws of political economy and historical materialism.

From this basic aim in the study of economic history ensue the ways and means we must apply for its attainment, as well as the tasks we must set for this purpose.

2. The basic and primary means for achieving our goal is *the study of concrete historical facts* in the field of economic development of a particular country and era. The patterns and paths of economic development of various countries during various periods all have laws and traits in common, but at the same time are so different and individualized in each case that it is impossible to be limited to the study of economics "in general" to know them correctly, and it is necessary to analyze all concrete and individual characteristics of each country and each era.

It is unnecessary to dwell in detail on proof of the importance of factual

study of economic history. Let us refer to Marx and Lenin, for whom concrete economic history and the study of the factual side of economic development underlay all their brilliant political and economic generalizations. The latter were made possible only through that wealth of factual, historical material used by Marx as a basis for his *Capital* and other works, and by Lenin as the basis for his writings.

3. But study of economic development must not be limited to compilation of raw historical facts alone, and must not turn into mere description. In studying economic history, we need *scientific criticism and interpretation* of all written and physical (archaeological and other) monuments from the standpoint of the Marxist conception of the process of social-economic development.

In addition it should be noted that in Old Russian historiography many, and sometimes the most basic, problems of general history (concerning the time and character of settlement of the Slavs on the eastern plain, the origin of the Russian state, feudalism, and others), partly because of inadequate material and partly because of incorrect methodology, were solved by various authors in various ways and remained matters of dispute. Economic history itself remained the most backward sector even in the sense of purely factual study, to say nothing of a complete absence of Marxist methodology in its interpretation and explanation. Hence, frequently very important and pivotal factors in economic development, as, for example, the problems of feudalism, of its economic system, and so forth, long remained in the dark.

Marx and Engels, who studied intently the general and the economic history of Russia, have already established a number of its most important factors and characteristics, particularly in the origin and development of capitalism.[6] These questions also engaged the attention of Plekhanov.[7]

Even the epoch-making prerevolutionary works of Lenin, in particular his "What Are These 'Friends of the People' and How Do They Fight the Social Democrats?" *The Development of Capitalism in Russia,* and a number of other critical works, served as models for Marxist study of Russia's economic development.

4. From all the foregoing, the following task emerges for our historical-economic study: all concrete historical facts collected and studied by us must be united for each epoch into an *integral picture* of economic development as a definite system and as a special type of production relationships characterizing precisely the given historical epoch in their logical historical development as a whole.

Analysis of material social relations immediately created the possibility of observing their recurrence and their accuracy, and of generalizing the systems of various countries into one basic concept of "social structure." Only a generalization

of this type made it possible to change from description (and evaluation from the point of view of an ideal) of social events to a strictly scientific analysis of them which identifies, let us say, for example, "that" which distinguishes one capitalist country from another and explores "that" which is common to them all.[8]

In studying historical-economic facts and events, we must explain them "from the standpoint of those conditions within which the historical events occurred."[9] Only thus will we be able, as shown above, to grasp the objective laws governing the development of the system of social relations and find "the way to an all-embracing, comprehensive study of the process of the origin, development, and decline of social-economic structures" (Lenin).

Lenin spoke about essentially the same subject at another point and in another connection; namely, in his criticism of the Populists Lenin also presents his general observations on the content and method for the study of Russia's national economy. In his work "What Are These 'Friends of the People' and How Do They Fight the Social Democrats?" Lenin exposes the distortions of the Populists in their representation of Russian economic actuality, and cites the tasks of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia in the study of concrete economic reality. Lenin said:

> Its [intelligentsia's—ED.] theoretical work, must here be directed toward the *concrete study of all forms of economic conflict in Russia, and study of their interconnection and logical development;* it must *expose this antagonism wherever it is obscured by political history, by peculiarities of legal systems, and by prejudices of established theory.* It must *present a complete picture of our reality as a definite system of production relationships, indicate the necessity of exploitation and expropriation of the toilers under that system, and show the way out from these systems as indicated by economic development.*[10]

These instructions of Lenin also are of general methodological importance, and the tasks he set for the study of social-economic development still confront historical science in the USSR today: the examination of each epoch in the development of class society as a definite system of production relationships, exposure of their unharmonious and contradictory character, and indication of the inevitability of a revolutionary solution of these contradictions.

Since "the history of all preceding society is a history of class struggle," and since "bourgeois production relationships are the final unharmonious form of the social process of production,"[11] in our historical exposition of the development of national economy the greatest space must be devoted to the study of class, and particularly of bourgeois, society in its origin, development, and ruin.

TASKS OF ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR From the above it follows that for a contemporary course in economic history which is not limited to precapitalist and capitalist Russia alone, but includes the history of socialist economy in the USSR, special tasks must be set besides the aforesaid general methodological requirements.

First, in development of the national economy in the class society of Russia at its various stages from feudalism to advanced capitalism, each transition from old to new production relationships "occurs usually by revolutionary overthrow of the old production relationships and establishment of new." [12] But within the framework of class society, only a change in the form of exploitation takes place at these moments, while the antagonistic character of the production relationships remains. When we pass to the study of the economic history of the USSR, however, we have a completely new basis for production relationships, that is, a public, socialist ownership of the means of production. With the public character of production and the absence of exploitation, "production relationships are in full conformity with the status of the production forces." [13] Therefore all elements of the national economy of the USSR—the general growth of its production forces, the productivity of its labor, its technology, and so forth—are no longer a direct and simple continuation of the development of these same elements within capitalist economy. They differ from them both qualitatively and in principle. In this connection study of the history of capitalist economy is important as a historic premise determining dialectically the preparation and the concrete circumstances for collapse of the old social relationships, for realization of the socialist revolution, and for incorporation of the heritage of capitalism within socialist construction.

> Capitalism has accumulated many material and cultural valuables, but is no longer capable of utilizing them even in its own interests. In many instances it has already become the strangler of progress in science, art, and culture. . . . Now we have someone capable of taking up the heritage of capitalism. Communism grows from that which capitalism has created, and from the latter's best and numerous achievements in the economic field, in material life, and culture. Communism transforms all these values and achievements in its own manner, not in the interest of the upper social level but in the interest of the whole nation and of mankind.[14]

Secondly, in the history of the economic development of Russia, one important circumstance takes on special significance; namely, the multinational character of its state-political and economic federation. Even tsarist Muscovite Rus, and still more imperial Russia, in uniting within its body politic many previously independent nationalities, not only subjugated them politically, but also united them by a single, although unharmonious, national

economic system. Some of these nationalities were backward in their social-economic conditions, others possessed an advanced and original national-historical culture, as, for example, Georgia (Gruzia) and Central Asia. Several parts of this federation were even on a higher economic and technical level than Russian capitalism proper (the Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states). The degree and forms of their fusion with Russian capitalism varied from complete union (Ukraine, Baltics) to a certain degree of independence (Poland) and almost complete separation (Finland).

All these nationalities and countries had their own long social-political and economic history. Having annexed them, Russian capitalism raised the economies of several backward parts of the empire to a new and higher economic level compared with the past, but at the same time the tsarist government "fought against the development of statehood in the 'borderlands' as well as against their cultural development, attempting to assimilate the indigenous population by force." [15]

Besides all else, the penetration of capitalist relationships into these "internal colonies" intensified class differentiation there, the growth of class consciousness among the toilers, and the class struggle. Therefore, in several national "borderlands," especially where the proletariat had come under the ideological influence and political leadership of that vanguard of the working class, the Bolshevik Party (as was the case in Transcaucasia) the revolutionary workers' movement, regardless of the negligible size of the local labor force, acquired broad scope and profound general importance. With the aid of the Russian proletariat, all this also prepared for consolidation of the entire proletariat of all minor nationalities of the former empire as a class for the struggle not only against the autocratic landowner government but also against capitalism as a whole.

Examining the history of the construction of the socialist economy of the USSR, we see not only rapid quantitative successes in the economic development of the various nationalities forming the USSR, but also their transformation from a previous sometimes colonial or semicolonial economy into part of a single socialist economy. The liquidation of capitalism and establishment of the Soviet system have determined the socialist character of the national economy of the various republics as a result of the remarkable organization of cooperation among the peoples of the USSR "which is a living model for the future federation of nations in a single world economy." [16]

A contemporary course in economic history of the peoples of the USSR should trace the historical preparation of the building of that remarkable organization of socialist economic cooperation among the peoples of the USSR, who had traversed the long road of economic development within the framework of precapitalist and capitalist Russia. These tasks were ex-

pressed with particular clarity in the well known remarks of comrades Stalin, Zhdanov, and Kirov on textbooks for Soviet and modern history. "We need a textbook for history of the USSR in which, first, the history of Great Russia is not divorced from the history of the other peoples of the USSR, and, secondly, in which the history of the peoples of the USSR is not divorced from the history of Europe and of the world in general." [17]

These remarks fully apply to a course in economic history as well. Naturally, in a general course we cannot aim at presenting an exhaustive economic history of each of all the Union and autonomous socialist republics, provinces, and nationalities (Georgia, Armenia, the Central Asiatic Republics, and so forth); this should be the task of special courses about the economic history of these republics.

In this general course we shall examine them as component parts of the economic system of the past, that is, of capitalist Russia, and of the single socialist economy of the USSR in the present.

Similarly, both the economic development of other countries and world economy as a whole are briefly taken up as aspects of comparative historical study and of statistical-economic comparative examples.

Finally, as a prerequisite condition for study of the history of national economy, we assume a familiarity on the part of the reader with the general history of the USSR and of other countries.

THE PROBLEM OF HISTORICAL PERIODIZATION Historical study cannot be confined to a recital of historical facts alone, or even to summarization of these facts as a complete picture of historical development. The historian must establish within this general picture the exact historical time limits, as well as the precise and distinct stages of historical development. The principles and indications basic for the characteristics of these stages assume a very great and decisive methodological importance in understanding the essence and laws of economic development.

Not based on the materialist conception of history, bourgeois historical science could not create a definitive and scientific system of historical periodization.

Only among the representatives of scientific socialism, and, above all, Karl Marx, is the depth of theoretical understanding of economic problems combined with the widest historical grasp of the concrete history of economic development. Upon this foundation Marxism-Leninism has worked out the theory of social-economic development. At the basis of the definition and classification of social-economic structures, Marx places the "method-of-production" concept and the social relationships of production arising therefrom.

The direct relation of the masters of circumstances of production to the direct producers—a relation each given form of which naturally corresponds always to a definite stage in the development of the method of labor, and therefore also to the social productive power of the latter—this is where we always reveal the deep secret and the hidden basis of the whole social order.[18]

And in another connection, Marx, speaking on the same subject, says:

Economic epochs are distinguishable not by what is produced but by how it is produced, and by the specific means of work. Methods of labor are not only a measure of the development of human labor power, but also an index of the social conditions under which the labor is performed.[19]

The teachings of Marx about social-economic structures founded on the basis of his materialist conception of history are a mighty theoretical and methodological weapon that enables us to understand and depict in full the entire course of social development not only with its economic base but with all its social-political superstructure as well. Concretely, for the historical development of contemporary class society, Marx noted the following stages and structures: slaveowning (Ancient and Asiatic), feudal, and bourgeois methods of production.[20] At the same time, having marked "in general outline" these stages in the development of contemporary society, Marx was far from regarding them as any arbitrary pattern which all countries and nations must uniformly traverse. Even if the social-historical development of society as a whole has gone through these stages, they did not have the same weight and significance in the development of various countries. Marx says in this connection:

Events strikingly analogous, but occurring in a different historical environment, will lead to entirely different results. By studying each of these evolutions separately and then comparing them, we may easily find the key to understanding this phenomenon; but it is never possible to achieve such understanding by using any universal master key of general historical philosophic theory . . . the highest virtue of which lies in its superhistoricalness.[21]

In their other works Marx and Engels speak of a stage of preclass society and of primitive-communal, clan economy. After the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the destruction of capitalist society, mankind will enter upon a new period of social development, that is, socialist society and economy. Generalizing these teachings of Marx, *The History of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), A Short Course,* that veritable encyclopaedia of the theory of Marxism-Leninism, notes the following five *basic* types of production relationships: primitive-communal, slaveowning, feudal, capitalist, and socialist.[22]

But, going into further exposition of the social-economic development of the peoples of the USSR according to the above stages of development of production forces and their corresponding types of production relationships, we must remember that concrete historical reality, at different epochs in different nationalities under the various social, political, and economic conditions of their life and within their various environments, have produced very complex historical combinations of the paths and destinies of the social-economic development of these nationalities.

Some nationalities that were the earliest to enter the historical arena, reached the stage of clan structure and primitive nomad economy, sometimes even achieved a semblance of state organization, but subsequently disappeared without trace from the historical scene (the Scythians of the seventh to the fifth centuries B.C., the Khazars, and Polovtsy). Others, on the contrary, maintained their national existence and their system of patriarchal-clan and tribal relationships in conjunction with the existence of primitive slavery, a backward material culture and a primitive hunter-herdsman nomad economy for a long period up to the capitalist era of the nineteenth century (for example, numerous nationalities of Siberia and Central Asia, the mountaineer nationalities of the Caucasus, and others).

Further, several of the most ancient nationalities were involved much earlier, even several centuries before our era, in political and economic intercourse with the then civilized Greco-Roman and Asiatic slaveowning world, and, at the same time, while not having fully outlived their patriarchal mode of life and primitive-communal economy, endured the full burden of the ancient and Asiatic slaveowning economy (e.g., the ancient peoples and tribes of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. and fourth and fifth centuries after Christ). But afterward, upon the collapse of the ancient slaveowning world, they began an early transition to the more complex feudal relationships with attempts to form national-feudal states (Georgia and Armenia of the seventh and eighth centuries after Christ). Later, having reached a relatively high level of development of their production forces and a zenith in feudal relations (Georgia of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries), these nationalities, under the pressure of unfavorable political conditions (invasions by foreign conquerors—Persians, Mongols, and Turks), were unable to liquidate their feudal disunity and form a large national state and, instead, passed through a long period of feudal decline and the loss of their national independence (Gruzia and Armenia in the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries).

Finally, some nationalities, although they had passed through their patriarchal-clan and primitive-communal phase much later (like the eastern Slavs of the eighth and ninth centuries), were able afterward, having survived

the epoch of feudal decentralization, to overcome their disunity in struggle against foreign conquerors (Mongols) and to organize stable political, national, and economic unity in the form of a centralized Russian state based upon a feudal-serf system (the Moscow state of the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries). This circumstance was of decisive and leading importance for the entire subsequent social-economic development, inasmuch as the great multinational state which was assembled was the basis not only of the future development of capitalism throughout the country, but also of the "superstructure imposed from above" of capitalist relationships among the backward nationalities, which still had not outlived the precapitalist, patriarchal-clan stages (Azerbaijan and others).

After the great October Socialist Revolution and after the overthrow of capitalism, all these nationalities, which had still not reached the stage of industrial capitalism, received the opportunity "to change from primitive forms of economy to the stage of Soviet economy, by-passing industrial capitalism." [23]

The application of the Marxist-Leninist method and its historical periodization of social-economic development to the concrete history of the economic development of the peoples of the USSR is the basis for the subsequent presentation of our course of study.

Notes

1. *Istoriya VKP (b)* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks], A Short Course), p. 109.
2. Marx, *K kritike politicheskoi ekonomii* (Toward a Critique of Political Economy) (Gospolitizdat,* 1939), p. 152.
3. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XVIII, p. 13.
4. *Istoriya VKP (b)*, p. 116.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
6. In numerous articles and letters on the social-economic development of Russia, see Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya,* Vols. IX, XI, XV, XXVII.
7. Plekhanov, *Nashi raznoglasiya* (Our Disagreements), in his *Sochineniya,* Vol. II.
8. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. I, p. 61.
9. "O postanovke partiinoi propagandy v svyazi s vypuskom 'Kratkogo kursa istorii VKP (b)'" (On the Formulation of Party Propaganda in Connection with the Publication of the Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks]) (Gospolitizdat, 1938), p. 5.
10. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. I, p. 19.
11. Marx, *K kritike politicheskoi ekonomii* (Gospolitizdat, 1939), p. 7.
12. *Istoriya VKP (b)*, p. 125.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

* State Political Press, hereinafter referred to as Gospolitizdat.

14. Molotov, *Tretii pyatiletnii plan razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR* (The Third Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR—report and concluding address before the 18th convention of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks]) (1939), p. 5.
15. Stalin, *Marksizm i natsionalno-kolonyalnyi vopros* (Marxism and the National-Colonial Problem) (1937), p. 76.
16. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed., p. 49.
17. *K izucheniyu istorii* (Toward the Study of History—an anthology) (Party Press, 1937), p. 24.
18. Marx, *Kapital* (1938), Vol. III, p. 2, pp. 696-697.
19. *Ibid.*, (1935), Vol. I, p. 121.
20. Marx, *K kritike politicheskoi ekonomii* (Gospolitizdat, 1939), p. 7.
21. Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XV, p. 378. On the same letter see Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. I, pp. 180-181.
22. *Istoriya VKP (b)*, p. 119.
23. Stalin, *Marksizm i natsionalno-kolonyalnyi vopros* (1937), p. 77.

PART I

PRECAPITALIST STRUCTURES

PRIMITIVE ECONOMY AND ITS DECLINE

(I)

The Prehistoric Period of the Social Development of the Nationalities of the Eastern Plain (to the Fifth and Sixth Centuries)

THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, the history of which we will study, was founded many centuries ago on the territory of eastern Europe by the eastern branch of the Slavic race, the Russian Slavs, in complex historical interaction with other nationalities inhabiting that land, passing through it, or bordering upon it.

When and how were the initial forms of this structure founded? When and how did the primitive economic appropriation of the territory of the USSR by primitive nationalities, and the Slavs in particular, take place? Were the Slavs autochthonic (primitive inhabitants) to the East European plain? Did they live here together with other nationalities, or did they come from some other place and crowd out or assimilate the former inhabitants of the land? On what level of material productive forces and social-economic conditions were they during the first stage of their historical existence?

MARXIST-LENINIST CLASSICS ON PRIMITIVE SOCIETY In order to answer all these highly complex historical questions, we must, first, turn to an examination of the teachings of the classics of Marxism-Leninism on the origin and development of primitive, preclass society and economy in general. Secondly, we must study the concrete patterns and conditions of the origin and development of primitive society and economy within the territory of the USSR in the light of the latest historical data and their Marxist interpretation.

Marx, in developing his study of historical materialism and establishing the laws of the development of society, attached very great significance to the study of its genesis as well, that is, to the study of the early stages of the existence of prehistoric man and the origin of primitive society. Not having succeeded in completing this work himself, he "bequeathed" the task, in the words of Engels, to the latter, chiefly on the basis of the research work of Morgan, who "in America in his own manner discovered anew the mate-

rialist conception of history which had been discovered by Marx forty years earlier."[1] This "bequest" was in fact fulfilled by Engels in his work *Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State.*

Having already established in his earlier works the role of labor in "creation of man himself" and in his social development, Engels, on the basis of Morgan's investigations, subsequently ascertained the character of the development of material production forces and of their accompanying production relationship throughout the earliest stages in the history of human society, that is, "savagery," "barbarism," and the transition to "civilization."[2]

The lowest level of savagery is "the childhood of the human race" and the first transitional stage from a herd of anthropomorphic apes to human society of the most primitive preclan life and nomad existence. The middle and upper stages of savagery are characterized by the use of tools, at first rudely made, unpolished stone (flint) tools, and later, polished stone tools, and, finally, the bow and arrow, which made hunting "one of the normal branches of labor." Changes in the conditions of obtaining means of subsistence and of self-defense allowed man to settle on new expanses of territory, not singly, but in compact groups connected by blood relationship, that is, in clans. "Stone tools and the bow and arrow, which appeared later, excluded the possibility of a struggle by single individuals against the forces of nature and carnivorous animals. In order to gather fruit in the forest, catch fish in the water, and build some dwelling, men had to work together if they did not want to fall prey to starvation, carnivorous animals or neighboring groups."[3] Later, the invention of pottery, according to Morgan and Engels, was a stage in the transition to "barbarism" at its lowest level. The transition from stone to metal tools (the iron ax, the plow with an iron share) led to a change from the hunter's mode of life to the domestication of animals, to primitive animal husbandry (the middle stage of barbarism according to Morgan and Engels), and later—to agriculture, to sedentary forms of life, and to habitation in villages and clan communities. Thus began a primitive-communal economy and the type of production relationships under which "the foundation of production relationships is communal ownership as the means of production. . . . Communal labor leads to joint ownership of the means as well as the output of production. Here, as yet, no concept of private ownership of means of production existed. . . . Here there was no exploitation and no classes."[4]

Let us now see to what extent we can trace in the concrete history of primitive economy of the peoples of the USSR, the character of the material productive forces and productive relationships of primitive society which has been outlined, in its origin and in the early stages of its development.

SOURCES FOR THE STUDY OF PRIMITIVE ECONOMY Our early historical documents do not of themselves provide material for the solution of these problems. But we may draw upon three other sources for help: first, the historical testimony of foreign writers and, in general, the history of other countries which came in contact with the peoples of the USSR; secondly, philology, and thirdly, archaeology. Even these sources, however, still do not solve all these problems completely and harmoniously. The development of such relatively new sciences as linguistics and archaeology, the discovery of new materials, and the changes in scientific linguistic and archaeological methodology all frequently change the results and conclusions of researchers and compel reexamination of problems which seemed already solved.

Thus, our information about the ancient history of the nationalities inhabiting the eastern plain during the era from which no written monuments have come down to us, we obtain primarily *from historical documents* of the more cultured nations of the East and West, that is, the Romans, the Greeks, and the Arabs. These advanced peoples of that period, already possessing written monuments and coming into military and cultural contact with the peoples of the USSR, give some, although fragmentary, descriptions of the then existing nationalities of the eastern plain. The earliest indications we have are from the Greek historian Herodotus (fifth century B.C.) concerning the nationalities inhabiting the East European lowlands (the Scythians, Sarmatians, and so forth). More exact references to the Slav peoples appear in the Roman and Greek writers of the first and second centuries after Christ: Pliny, Tacitus, and Ptolemy. Later detailed descriptions of the Slavs, their mode of life, and so forth, are obtained from the Byzantine emperors Constantine Porphyrogenitus and Mauricius, and from the Gothic historian of the sixth century, Jordanes. As to folkways and the economic aspect, of greater importance are the numerous historical attestations of the Arab writers of the ninth and tenth centuries: ibn-Dasta, ibn-Qutaiba, ibn-Fadlan, ibn-Hawqal, and so forth. Naturally, these fragmentary and frequently contradictory bits of evidence and descriptions are still insufficient for any accurate and full reconstruction of the mode of life and economy of the ancient peoples. Nevertheless, they do shed some light on many phases of the economy and social order of that time.

Another source revealing the life, economy, and character of the prehistoric—that is, prewritten—era is *philology*. Linguistics, the study of the language of various nationalities or various branches of the same nationality, enables us to discover identical roots and even identical words in various languages and dialects for designating the same concept.

According to the old, and until recently the dominant, so-called "Indo-

European" theory of linguistics, the presence of the same root or word in the languages of various nationalities indicates that a given phenomenon or concept was possessed by these nationalities before these peoples and their languages and dialects had yet succeeded in becoming individualized. For example, if we find a number of identical words and roots among all European nationalities, we can ascribe the origin of those words to the Indo-European parent language which was once spoken by all these nationalities. Similarly, in all the Slavic languages of the three basic groups of Slav peoples (western—Czech and Polish; southern—Serbo-Bulgarian; and eastern—Russian) we frequently find the same words for expressing some concepts. Hence it may be assumed that these words (and consequently the phenomena which they depicted as well) originated during that time when the individual Slav peoples and their language groups had not yet become separated. Thus, for example, if in such a parent language we come upon a rich lexicon of common words relating to agriculture and animal husbandry, but far fewer words on hunting and still less concerning manufacturing, this indicates that these peoples prior to settlement were predominantly engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry, to a lesser extent in hunting, and still less in processing industries. And, vice versa, the absence of independent roots and words in the language for denoting certain concepts, and the borrowing of these words from the language of other nationalities indicate the absence of these phenomena and concepts on the part of the given nationality during the period of formation of its language. Thus, for example, the absence in the ancient Slavic dialect of such words as "brick" and "lime," and the later borrowing of these words from the Turkish and Greek languages shows that the Slavs of that period were unfamiliar with stone construction and borrowed it later from Byzantium and the Greeks, a fact which is confirmed by historical evidence.

Such analysis of Indo-European linguistics is based upon the assumption of the existence in the history of a language of stable, fully formed, and independent linguistic groups with their distinctive language roots, and of language structures united by their parent language.

However, new tendencies in linguistics, as in the "Japhetic" theory of Academician N. YA. Marr, have radically changed such formulation of the problem of Indo-European linguistics. Denying the individuality and permanence of language groups, the Japhetic theory presents the doctrine of the "stagial" development of language and of linguistic "stages." These stages in the development of language are explained not by consecutive changes in the ethnic composition of the population, each bringing its own system of speech (as according to the Indo-European theory during the "Aryan invasion" of Europe by Asiatic peoples), but by language changes in the form

of a crossbreeding within it of various "structures" (for example, of the early, simple, popular, and more complex written feudal "structures" in the Armenian language) in connection with changes in the social-economic and production system among these peoples. Marr's theory makes it possible to draw broad general-economic and sociological conclusions about the early historical stages of various nationalities. It impels us to reexamine our old conclusions on all these problems along the line of seeking new connections; for example, between the old Slavic culture and economy with that of the Scythians, and so forth. However, regardless of the all-decisive importance of this theory, its concrete application to the study of the history of the society and economics of the numerous nationalities inhabiting the East European plain is still inadequately developed and supported by concrete historical material, either by linguists following the theories of Marr or by historians. Therefore we are forced to continue to use the data of Indo-European linguistics as well.

Finally, important assistance to the study of prehistoric—that is, prewritten—eras of economy and life is rendered by the science of archaeology. Archaeological monuments preserve for us the features of the life and economy of the more remote primitive eras of mankind in the remains of ruined and buried cities and settlements, in articles accidentally abandoned and preserved underground, in the treasures hidden in the earth, and in the household articles, weapons, and so forth, buried with the dead. Excavation of entire ruined ancient cities (among us, for example, the Greek colony Chersonese, and others) reconstructs completely and in full detail the entire mode of life and economy of ancient times. By investigating, for example, burial mounds with their remains of food, weapons, and clothing, we can prove there existed, during a definite historical period, the cultivation and use for food of certain grains, the working of metals, clay articles, and so forth. Thus, excavations of the Neolithic period show that metal-working was still unknown at that time, since the weapons found in the excavations of that period are only of stone. But at the same time these excavations have uncovered evidence of the cultivation of cereal grains, which prove the familiarity of European nationalities with agriculture as long ago as that period. Excavations of later periods yield especially rich and valuable, and even quite precise, material.

Of particular value are the various unearthed hoards of money, which are found in abundance throughout the entire Russian plain from the southeast to the Dnepr, Novgorod, the Dvina, Oka, and Kama rivers. The money hoards offer precise historical evidence by virtue of the fact that the money bears historical dates of coinage during a definite reign. The discovery, for example, of Arabian coins of the seventh and eighth centuries somewhere

in Novgorod province or on the island of Gotland is evidence that during those centuries these provinces maintained trade relations with the Arabian East. And inasmuch as along with these Arabian coins are found, for example, various Arabian articles—beads, silverware, and so forth—an opportunity is presented to reconstruct the wares of that trade as well.

However, with regard to archaeological memorials as a source for economic history of the early stages of social development, it must also be noted that our old archaeology inadequately utilized its material for social-economic study and deduction. It devoted its attention chiefly to the purely material interpretation of archaeological memorials and discoveries (stone and iron tools, various types of pottery, and remains of agricultural and animal products as indications of the material processes of production) although they can frequently serve as material for important economic and sociological conclusions as well. Thus the character of the Slav individual dwelling dugouts, enclosed by a fence, provided with a fireplace, and containing tools of bone, crucibles for smelting copper, tools for the hoe type of agriculture, and so forth, which were uncovered in many localities along the Oka, the lower and upper Volga, the Sheksna, and elsewhere, indicates not only the contemporary method of production but also the existence during that early period (considerably earlier than the seventh and eighth centuries) of the remnants of matriarchal or of patriarchal clan mode of life, the domestic character of production, the existence of slaves, and so forth. In the ninth and eleventh centuries the "large-family" character of Slav towns is replaced by new forms of settlement in open villages, thus indicating disruption of the family clan system, new forms of social differentiation, and so forth.

Having compared the historical, linguistic, and archaeological data, we can, despite their incompleteness, establish more or less approximately those primal prehistoric and historical stages in the origin of social life, and of the social and economic relations which were taking form among the nationalities inhabiting the East European lowland for many thousands of years before the final evolution of the stable historical, economic, and political forms of a more highly developed society.

SURFACE STRUCTURE AND NATURAL CONDITIONS OF THE EASTERN PLAIN · If "labor is primarily a process effected between man and nature,"[5] then it is clear how important an element in economic and social life were the natural conditions during the early prehistoric stages in the development of man when he was just learning to master them. "Geographical surroundings cannot serve as the main cause or as the determining cause of social development," but at the same time it "is indisputably one of the permanent and necessary conditions for the development of society."[6]

It is precisely from this point of view that we must clarify the basic traits of that physical-geographic milieu, in struggle with which, and in adaptation to and mastery of which, the forms of human life originated, if we are to understand the conditions of existence of economic and social life, particularly during the early stages of development.

The vast plain of eastern Europe in a geological sense represents predominantly one of the last geological formations, the so-called "Tertiary," and also the post-Tertiary alluvial and diluvial (Quaternary) deposits, resulting from many centuries of glacial formations.

In the post-Tertiary era, with its mild climate and rich flora and fauna, a sharp and prolonged drop in temperature took place in the north, as a result of which a considerable part of the territory was engulfed by huge glacial formations periodically recurring over many centuries. The last (the fourth, so-called "Würm") glaciation, commencing from the Finnish-Scandinavian highland, covered the entire extent of the basins of the Vistula, the Niemen, and the Prypeć, and reached into the south with two enormous tongues: one almost to the Dnepr rapids, and the other to the middle course of the Don, the Khoper, and the Medveditsa. The remains of these glacial movements have been preserved here to the present time in the form of marine deposits scattered within the above limits throughout the territory of the eastern plain. Frequently changing their southern boundaries, the glaciers served as the cause for the formation here of wide and deep river valleys and loess deposits, the basic subsoil of our black soils.

The periodic retreats and advances of the glaciers were accompanied by sharp changes in the climate, flora, and fauna of the localities involved. After dominance during interglacial periods of a mild, subtropical climate, of southern flora and southern types of animal life (the mammoth, the rhinoceros, and others), Europe and its eastern plain experienced prolonged periods of extreme cold, ending in the last, fourth, or Würm glaciation. After its retreat Europe received approximately its present-day climate, flora, and fauna.

In the history of mankind the glacial and interglacial periods are remarkable because to this era belongs the unmistakable and proven existence of man. To the preglacial period (on the margin of the Tertiary and Quaternary geological periods) belongs the appearance of the first types of prehistoric man, some of which were beings of a rather transitional type, although already the first to utilize tools, while others were already unmistakable types of man. Such were the remains found of the most ancient man—the Pithecanthropus (Java) and Piltdown (southern England) men, living, evidently, as early as the time of the first Günz glaciation, at the end of the Pliocene Age ("the lowest stage of savagery," according to Engels). In the intergla-

cial Mindel-Riss period occurred the unmistakable appearance in Europe of man in the form of his early European race, the so-called "Heidelberg" man. For the East European plain proof has also been found of the existence at a somewhat later time of the prehistoric "Neanderthal" man belonging to the middle Paleolithic epoch which coincided with the greatest development of glacial formation of the penultimate Riss glaciation. In the last interglacial Riss-Würm epoch man of the type of Homo sapiens (Aurignacian, Cro-Magnon) appeared, and after the Würm (the last) glaciation—the Mediterranean type of modern man.

The character of the geological processes and of the formations on the East European plain was the cause of its important mineral wealth. Deposits of cooking salt, one of the mineral products and consumption articles most necessary to man, were distributed, if not everywhere then, at least in very large deposits in the northeast and on the lakes of the southeast and south, where it has been extracted since ancient times. As to mineral wealth, while copper was relatively less prevalent, large and long-utilized deposits of iron were found in the Urals and the Ugor. The iron deposits of the present Tula district began to be worked comparatively early. But for the ancient economy, to be sure, the more accessible and widely distributed local "bog" iron ores were more important. Of course, for the ancient inhabitant of the country, the hidden, deeply buried and rich deposits of ores, salt, and coal of the Donets Basin and elsewhere were inaccessible.

The territory of the country, which even since the glacial period began to be settled by primitive prehistoric man, was a vast and open plain with a uniform surface, bounded on the east, south, and west by the mountain ranges of the Urals, Caucasus (called in the chronicles the Cherkass or Yass Mountains), and the Carpathians with their spurs (Ugor Mountains); and on the north and northwest, as well as the south and southwest by the northern and southern seas: the Arctic Ocean and the White Sea (called in the chronicles the Ocean-Sea), the Baltic (Varangian) Sea, the Black (Russian or Pontus) Sea, and the Caspian (Khvaliss, Khvalyn, or Derben) Sea.

Within these boundaries the broad East European plain is subdivided into several systems of flat uplands and hills of small height 150 to 200 meters and not more than 400 meters. These uplands are the watersheds of the important river systems. Such in the west and northwest (part of present White Russia and the western province) are the Valdai Hills, serving as the watershed of the most important historical river outlets, the Volga, Dnepr, and western Dvina.

Another important range was the southwestern uplands, beginning at the Carpathians and extending to the lowlands of the basin of the Dnepr and its tributaries, the most important historical waterway to the Black Sea. Of

the other broad ranges of uplands, the more important is the central Russian, which runs eastward to the Moskva Valley, and the systems of the cis-Volga and trans-Volga highlands, the *Obshchi Syrt.*

None of these uplands is of sufficient height to be any natural boundary of a climatic type. The highest Ural Mountains, with a maximum height for several peaks of 1,600 meters (which to the chronicler seemed so high that "their peaks reached up to heaven"), do not sharply divide the European plain climatically from the Asiatic-Siberian because the latter is a direct continuation of the European plain. Finally, the huge Caspian depression, open in the east and lying between the southern end of the Urals and the Caucasian mountain range, is, by climate, soil, and vegetation, simply a continuation of the arid and sandy Asiatic steppes, and the most convenient route for movement from Asia into Europe.

The climate of the eastern plain is distinctly severe and continental, with low average annual temperatures and particularly low winter temperature, sharp fluctuations of cold and warmth, and inadequate precipitation, especially in its southeastern half. It may be presumed that in very remote historical, and more likely prehistorical, times the winters here were characterized by even greater severity inherited from the recent glacial period. At least descriptions (possibly somewhat exaggerated) by foreigners as late as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries speak of the extraordinary cold in Muscovy from the viewpoint of the European. Only in the south was the climate milder and warmer.

The prehistoric glacial and interglacial periods left mankind a rich heritage in the form of fertile interglacial deposits, such as the southern black soils, and rich subsoil, loess glacial deposits. Black soils of exceptionally high fertility lie almost in a continuous zone throughout the south (except for the Caspian steppes), up to its northern boundary, approximately along the line of Kiev-Ryazan-Kazan-Kama. North of this line are the less fertile podsol soils with an abundance of glacial boulders and frequent marshland.

As a result of these natural conditions, the entire East European plain in climate, vegetation, and animal life is very sharply divided into two parts: the southern, steppe-like and arid, and the northern, full-watered and wooded. The Asiatic and Caspian desert and semidesert arid, sandy steppes in the south of the European part of the USSR, change into the Pontic, Don, and Dnepr steppes, rich in vegetation, water, and fertile black soil. Further to the north begin the areas of transitional character with more frequently encountered glades and forests, the poorer podsol soils, an abundance of rivers and lakes rich in fish, and large marshlands. Finally, in the north enormous expanses are completely covered by forests with inexhaustible numbers of the wild animals most valuable for hunting, food, and clothing.

In addition, in the prehistoric and remote historical periods, the expanse of forests extended much further to the south than at present, and even in the ninth and tenth centuries the area around Kiev (which is now located in the steppe zone) was covered with woods: "And there was near the city great forest and pine woods," says the chronicler about Kiev of that time.[7]

All these parts of the vast territory were interconnected, almost without gaps, through the river systems of the Volga, Don, Dnepr, Dvina, Vistula, and others, while by way of the sea they had access to the remote countries of the West, Southwest, and East. The main mass of the territory was embraced from the east and northeast by the Volga system connecting with the remote lands of Asia; from the west and south by the Dnepr system, uniting this territory with the Near East and Byzantium; and, finally, from the northwest by the Dvina system and the lakes. All these systems closely approached each other in the northwest in the area of the northern Ladoga and Onega lakes—so closely that communication in all directions by means of short overland hauls presented no difficulties whatever.

The waterways as well as the forests were highly important factors in guiding the economic activity of the population and its settlement over that territory. In the fertile agricultural southern parts agricultural pursuits must have appeared first among the population: in the southeast, those of a steppe, nomad shepherd economy, and in the north, artisan-woodsman occupations. Along the waterways took place not only settlement of the territory and its economic mastery, but also tribal and, subsequently, state unification. Here, too, trade movement spread, cities emerged, authority became consolidated, and with it the first beginnings of a developed and more cultured economy.

Let us see now how and by whom this country was settled, and how it was mastered economically during the prehistoric and the earliest historical stages.

PRETRIBAL SOCIETY AND THE "SAVAGERY" STATE. LOWER PALEOLITHIC AGE Written historical monuments appear in the history of mankind generally quite late. "Historic" man everywhere has had a large inheritance from his numerous "prehistoric" ancestors. And in the early stages of the existence of human society, archaeology frequently presents more accurate and dependable material than do early written historical monuments. In the East European plain archaeology discloses unmistakable signs of the existence of early types of prehistoric man and reveals the characteristic features of his mode of life and economy. The earliest traces of prehistoric man belong generally to the Paleolithic or Old Stone culture in its lower and middle divisions; that is, according to certain calculations, approximately 30,000 to 40,000 years before our era, or even earlier. The more ancient archaeological epochs of the Paleolithic Age (Chellean and early

Acheulean) belong to the geological Mindel-Riss interglacial period, when Europe possessed a mild humid climate with a Mediterranean type of vegetation, a fauna of hippopotamus and the southern elephant and, later, the mammoth. During this period one of the earlier types of prehistoric man, the Heidelberg man appeared in Europe. Of him we have archaeological remains in the form of a single implement of stone, a rude flint hand-cleaver, roughhewn with large chips on both sides; later (in the Acheulean archaeological epoch) there appear more delicately made hand-cleavers, smaller in size. In his social relations the Heidelberg man still lived not so much in an organized and complex society as in a primitive herd. This was, according to Engels, the "lower stage of savagery" and of pretribal society in the existence of prehistoric man. His rough flint axes were weapons for hunting animals. No archaeological remains of dwellings of the Acheulean epoch have been found in the USSR, if we exclude several controversial discoveries along the Black Sea coast near Sukhumi.

THE NEANDERTHAL MAN AND THE MIDDLE PALEOLITHIC AGE The periodic advance and retreat of glaciers caused extreme fluctuations of climate and changes in the living conditions of prehistoric man. Extreme glaciation by the time of the Middle Paleolithic Age (the Mousterian archaeological epoch) led man from his former open dwellings into caves and dugouts where, dressed in the skins of animals, he took shelter from the cold. The objectives of his hunting included such large animals as the mammoth, the cave bear, and, later, the northern deer. His hunting weapons were the same primitive, rough flint implements, although already somewhat improved, in the form of broad massive pieces, sharp-pointed hand implements with a *retouche* for sharpening the upper part of the weapon, and so forth. To this epoch belongs the appearance of the more perfected type of man, the Neanderthal type. His dwellings were found in the Crimea (Kyik-Koba, end of the Mousterian epoch), in the Kuban (the Ilo dwelling of the Solutrean and the Magdalenian ages), and along the Donets and the Dnepr.[8] In the summer of 1938 dwellings of the Old Stone Age (the Mousterian archaeological epoch) were also discovered in Central Asia near the town of Baysun in the Teshik-Tash cave.

These dwellings of the Neanderthal man portray the character of the life and habits of the ancient inhabitants of the eastern plain and adjacent parts of Asia. The Neanderthal man lived, according to the classification of Engels, in the middle stage of "savagery," somewhat above the Heidelberg man. He was a savage hunter and animal trapper who knew how to use primitive hunting weapons in the form of stone-sharpened spearheads and of some bone articles, and who had already adopted a ritual of burial; that is, having

some kind of religious belief and ritual. His social habits were still pretribal. The fairly large dwellings used by the Neanderthal men indicate that their hunting groups and settlements included large numbers of participants and their families. In this connection should be noted the origin of the "natural" (as between the sexes) division of labor (discoveries of "men's" and "women's" knives).

THE UPPER PALEOLITHIC AGE AND THE CRO-MAGNON MAN Later epochs of the so-called "Upper Paleolithic" (Solutrean and Magdalenian archaeological epochs) are characterized by the gradual retreat of the glaciers, gradual amelioration of the climate, prevalence of larch forests, a gradual extinction of the mammoth and retirement of the northern deer to the north. The Cro-Magnon and other types of men of this epoch already constitute men of higher type (Homo sapiens) compared with the Neanderthal man, although in his social and cultural development still not above the stage of "savagery" at its highest phase, according to the classification of Engels. His technique and implements of production were still all of stone but already of a more perfect workmanship: there appear stone trowels, spearheads with a side groove for attachment to the spear; stone was shaped by means of twisting. Alongside of stone implements appear weapons and articles of bone and horn. The objectives of hunting were the vanishing mammoth, the deer, and wild horse. Dwellings assume the character of permanent quarters, sometimes with heated compartments for the winter, which indicates a sedentary form of life. Art makes its appearance in the form of drawings of animals on stone, and statuettes. In social respects the tribe receives its start in the form of the matriarchal tribe. The natural division of labor is expanding.

A number of dwellings belonging to this type have been found on the territory of the USSR in the areas of Poltava, Kiev, and Chernigov, along the Dnepr, Voronezh, and Oka rivers, in the North Caucasus, in the Crimea, and elsewhere. In the earlier Kiev dwelling (the Kirillov in Kiev proper) and in the later dwellings—the Gonets near Luben, the Mezin on the Desna, the Kostenkov near Voronezh, the Gagarin and the Berdyzh (in White Russia), the Borshevo, and so forth, the same picture of life and economy of prehistoric man is revealed, that of a more perfect physical type with a primitive, although still somewhat higher, culture. Thus we find here remains of the mammoth, his tusks decorated with skillful carvings, remains of the cave bear, unpolished flint implements without drilled openings, and traces of the use of fire (coal, charred bones). Judging by the number and geography of the discoveries, the location of this type of prehistoric man and his settlements already extended over a vast area.[9]

TRANSITION TO "BARBARISM" AND NEOLITHIC CULTURE A new, still higher stage of cultural development of prehistoric man appears, by the classification of Engels, during the transition from "savagery" to "barbarism." By the character of its means of production, the development of the new *Neolithic,* or *New Stone* culture is placed approximately within the period of from 10,000 years to 5,000 to 3,000 years before our era. The material culture of this period is distinguished from the preceding ages by the appearance of pottery, the ability to polish stone and, toward the end of the epoch, to drill it as well, which was a great technical achievement, improving considerably the quality of this primitive weapon of hunting and of the struggle for existence. Climatic conditions during this epoch were already considerably milder than during the Paleolithic Age, and closer to modern times. Agriculture and the domestication of animals had already become possible instead of the former hunting for the now extinct representatives of the prehistoric fauna of the Paleolithic Age. In the Neolithic dwellings are found numerous flint weapons of improved workmanship and of various types and purposes, both military (spears) and economic (hoes, grain grinders). Here, too, were preserved the remains of vegetable and animal food in the form of grains of wheat and oats with grinders for milling them, and also flax for making cloth and fishing nets. There are also numerous skeletal remains of domestic animals, cattle, horses, sheep, hogs, and dogs. A characteristic sign of Neolithic dwellings are the remains of charred clay dishes of a great variety of forms and purposes, with skillful ornamentation and sometimes with paintings.

All this bespeaks a relatively higher level of general culture, sedentary agricultural occupations and tribal customs of the population, which already belonged, according to the classification of Engels, to the "barbarism" phase. This is further indicated by the "village" type of settlement and the location of dwellings sometimes with large human groups present instead of the smaller and isolated settlements of the previous epochs.

The tribe and the primitive blood-relationship commune become the basic form of life and social relations with preservation of common ownership of means of production. In several dwellings were found large collections of stone implements, and so-called "shops" where these weapons were produced collectively. These new forms of labor organization required a new technique of production: the preparation of improved, polished weapons and tools with holes bored through them. According to the observations of some investigators among contemporary savage peoples, the primitive method of drilling and polishing each piece of stone requires many years of work. In their social relations the complex ritual of some burials indicates the emergence in Neolithic society of various leading, military, highly respected, and

wealthy groups. Finally, during this epoch, for the first time water routes are used for barter trade, as a result of which there have been frequently found in Neolithic dwellings articles from remote localities whence they were brought by river (for example, to the upper Volga from the northern Caucasus).

THE NEOLITHIC AGE IN THE USSR Archaeological discoveries of the Neolithic period in the USSR are of great significance because they enable us to clarify very important questions about the initial settlement of the country by the peoples of the USSR and about their customs. Numerous remains of this period are found in many localities of the Kiev area, along the Dnepr, Dnestr, Bug, Desna, Donets, and Oka rivers, in the Volga basin, in the Lake Ladoga area, and so forth. The wide geographic distribution of Neolithic discoveries in the USSR indicates that Neolithic man was no longer confined to settling the southern and central zone, but lived throughout the vast territory as far as the cis-Urals, cis-Caucasus, the Volga basin, and other localities.

TRANSITION TO CIVILIZATION AND THE PALEOMETALLIC EPOCH By the end of the Neolithic epoch, prehistoric man had already learned to extract and utilize some of the more easily smelted metals (copper). The new Paleometallic epoch is characterized precisely by this utilization of metals (at first copper, then bronze, and finally iron). The use of metal marked a great advance in the development of the productive forces of prehistoric society. Stone implements recede into the background. By his ability to forge metals, prehistoric man takes the first step toward a completely new culture, which he transmits as a legacy to the historic epochs and "civilization." In its social relations the Paleometallic epoch is characterized by the transition from matriarchy to patriarchy, that is, to the paternal clan.

Depending upon the metal predominantly used, the entire metal age is usually divided into the *Bronze* and *Iron* ages, which are the last prehistoric epochs, followed directly by the historic.

The penetration of metals into Europe belongs approximately to the period of 4,000 to 3,000 years before our era. Since the bronze culture evidently arose in the east, it spread into the East European plain (not later than 3,000 to 2,000 B.C.) primarily by way of the Caspian Sea, the North Caucasus, and Transcaucasia. In the opinion of several authors the Transcaucasus was one of the first historical cradles of the bronze culture of western Europe.[10] At first the use of metals existed alongside of stone implements, indicating the origin of the new metal culture still during the Neolithic age. However,

articles of the bronze culture are found dispersed not only through the southern districts, but in the more northern areas as well, as far as the Kama (the Ananyin cemetery near Yelabuga) and Siberia. In most cases the existence of remains of articles of the bronze culture denotes widespread trade relations, since these objects are obviously of an imported type. For example, in the far north and along the Kama are found bronze objects of obviously distant origin. The relatively high level of social differentiation in this epoch is revealed, for example, by the rich hoards and burial mounds near Maikop in the North Caucasus, in several cases with the remains of some rich ritual burials, apparently of persons from the ruling classes (for example, masters with their slaves, horses, and costly weapons). It must be observed, however, that the bronze culture was of relatively minor importance in the historical development of the society of the East European plain as a result of the scant deposits in that area of the basic metal, copper.

TRIPOLYE CULTURE OF THE USSR Of particularly great significance for the history of the ancient ancestors of the Slavs are the remains of the later Paleometallic, the so-called "Tripolye" culture (named after the first discoveries outside Tripolye in the Kiev area). The area of extension of this culture occupies a vast expanse from the middle Dnepr, the Upper Dnestr, and Bug to the Carpathian foothills and the Danube. In character of material culture, Tripolye represents the survival of a mixed stone and bronze culture with an unmistakable diffusion of metals, but still containing considerable remnants of the Neolithic Age.

The beginning of the use of metals in the form of bronze is combined here with the remains of stone implements. Thus, in some clay huts of Tripolye have been found metal articles (copper hatchets). Along the Dnepr not only finished articles have been found, but also stone forms for casting bronze objects, scythes, sickles, and so forth. The Neolithic man here no longer lived in caves, but in artificially built quarters, semidugouts roofed with clay and straw. Near them already are permanent plots for burials. The sedentary agricultural character of the population is already well expressed.[11] Somewhat more primitive hunter-fisherman type of Stone and Bronze Age dwellings, similar to the Tripolye but in a more northerly location, were found in the Lake Ladoga and other areas.

The remains of the Tripolye and related cultures, especially those along the Dnepr banks and near Lake Ladoga, are important because they enable us to reconstruct the traces of existence in these regions of the more ancient ancestors of the Slavs, ancestors who dwelled here for many thousands of years before our era, engaged in agriculture and attained a high level of culture for that period.

IRON CULTURE Much more significant and widely distributed was the so-called "iron" culture which began in western Europe in Greece about a thousand years before our era, and spread through Greek colonies to the Black Sea shores. It spread somewhat later to the other areas of the East European plain. During the Slav epoch, in the sixth and seventh centuries, it had already become the dominant element in economy, completely displacing other cultures. The iron culture, in the classification of Engels, serves as the culmination of the highest stage of "barbarism," leading directly to the epoch of "civilization." The Iron Age as a whole in the eastern plain is sometimes divided, in its early stages, into the Scythian and the Slavic cultures. Countless monuments of Scythian culture are scattered through our southern steppes in the form of burial mounds, gravestones, buried treasure, interments, and so forth.

The level of prehistoric iron culture differs little from that of the historical eras. The importance of iron in preparing means of production becomes decisive for all subsequent historical development of production up to modern times. Within the time limits of the prehistoric eras, the Iron Age had already become the age of varied and relatively improved implements of production likewise of a mass character, an age of sedentary agricultural occupations, of sizable human groups, and rather profound social and economic differentiations. This was already an age of quite widely developed barter and trade with distant countries, and of increasingly perfected military weapons for defense and conquest.

The remains of the iron culture, this last prehistoric stage, are in their content very rich and of great variety on the East European plain. In the excavations have been found mostly objects of the iron culture together with those of bronze and sometimes also with stone weapons; richly ornamented and well made dishes together with primitive pottery and so forth, numerous articles of luxury and military equipment, frequently of fine workmanship. In the very character of many of these objects various influences are revealed: ancient, Greek, Roman, Asiatic, Scythian-Sarmatian, and West-Gothic. Various types of wares and interments have been found in a variety of localities from the southern Dnepr area and the Black Sea littoral to the middle Volga, the lake regions, and so forth. The rich contents of the Scythian burial mounds and hoards—the gold objects and decorations, the rich bronze of delicate ancient and Asiatic workmanship, the inlays and enameled decorations of West-Gothic style—all suggest comparative wealth on the part of certain strata of the society of that time, and a relatively great social-economic differentiation. In the poorer Scythian graves only iron and copper objects have been found. But all graves alike contain arrows with iron heads as a basic sign of Scythian culture and folk life. Later graves of the Slavic type

have a somewhat different character. They show a great predominance of silver over gold, with different ornamentation and style, varied burial monuments (roughhewn stone statues) and different burial rituals (the corpse along with his horse), but they attest to a related social structure.

This last phase of prehistoric monuments leads us directly into the early historical epoch, into the period in which we become acquainted with the population of the country, its ethnic composition, economic and social history, through historical monuments.

THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE AUTOCHTHONS OF THE EASTERN PLAIN Archaeology, while yielding a wealth of material for identifying the economy and mode of life during prehistoric epochs, presents little data for solving the problem of the ethnic composition of the nationalities participating in the described prehistoric processes of economic life and settlement of the territory of the East European plain. With respect to the earlier prehistoric epochs, it is impossible to speak of any kind of formation or detachment of individual ethnic groups and nationalities.[12] For these prehistoric epochs we have no data for answering the main questions about the participation and role of various nationalities in these processes and in the subsequent economic and social structure. Therefore we must turn in our analysis of these problems to historical and linguistic evidence.

By the beginning of the metal age the tribal identity of various European nationalities becomes more or less accurately ascertainable. By this period south Europe within the Mediterranean basin had been settled by peoples of the Japhetic group, with overwhelming predominance among them of their Etruscan branch. In middle Europe the ancestors of the future nationalities—the Celts, Germans, and Slavs—began to take form. In the north various Ugro-Finnish tribes are settling. The south of the East European plain in this period, as well as for a long time during the subsequent historical period, served as a broad corridor for repeated invasions of Europe by a great variety of Asiatic peoples of Mongol origin. The prehistoric ancestors of present-day Mongols appeared in Siberia evidently as long ago as the Würm epoch.

Historical knowledge in the ancient Western and more cultured world about the nationalities then inhabiting the south of eastern Europe was recorded by the first Greek writers and historians from about the eighth century B.C. Among these numerous and distinct nationalities there had evidently long existed a sprinkling of the ethnic forefathers of the future Slavs.

One of the first nationalities known in history, or rather one of the first conglomerations of several ethnic groups of Asiatic origin, who settled on the eastern plain and there constituted a fairly stable political structure, were

the Scythians. Having arrived in the southern and southeastern steppes, they crowded out, around the eighth century B.C., the dominant agricultural nationality there (whose historical origin is not entirely clear), the Cimmerians, who moved far to the west into Thrace. Compared with other nationalities, the Scythians remained longest in the southern steppes. By the time of the description of the Scythians by the Greek historian Herodotus (in the second half of the fifth century B.C.), they occupied a vast expanse of the southeastern and eastern steppes from the Don-Donets in the east to the mouth of the Danube and the lower Dnepr in the west, that is, a considerable part of the Ukraine's present steppe, part of its forest steppe and the land west of the Dnepr. Describing the population of Scythia, Herodotus names its various peoples and tribes as: Callippidae and Alazones, who settled and lived near the Greek colonies and were Hellenized by them; Scythian plowmen (agriculturists), who lived along the Dnepr and west of it; Scythian nomad herdsmen living in the southern steppes, and, finally, the "royal" Scythians living east of the Dnepr and considering the other Scythians as their slaves. Evidently all these peoples were in different stages of culture and economy, and belonged to various ethnic groups. Social differentiation, at least among several Scythian peoples, had attained considerable proportions.

Slavery was widespread and of a patriarchal character among some peoples, but among the Hellenized Scythians, apparently of an ancient type. In economic life all these peoples were predominantly farmer herdsmen, partly nomad and partly sedentary. Several of them not only engaged in agriculture but also sold the products of their agriculture, animal husbandry, bee-raising, and so forth, to the Greek colonies, where Scythia was considered to be their "granary." In his description of the agriculture of the Scythians, Herodotus speaks of fields of cereal grains, lentils, onions, millet, and flax; of the domestic animals, horses, cattle, and sheep; and of bee raising. According to Herodotus, the Scythians occupied the southern steppes west of the Dnepr and as far as the upper reaches of the Bug and the Dnestr, beyond which lived the non-Scythian peoples: on the southern slopes of the Carpathians, the Agaphirs (apparently the future Goths), and on the north, between the Carpathians and the Dnepr, the Nevrs, who are regarded as the ancestors of the future Slavs.[18]

We have thus arrived at the first traces of the progenitors of the Slav race among the welter of nationalities of the Scythian state considerably earlier than reported by our historical monuments. From the third century B.C., the domination of the Scythian peoples evidently began to decline, and the predominant role passed to another, related nationality—the Sarmatians—who until that time had lived east of the border of the Scythian state beyond the

Don. In the first and second centuries after Christ, among the Greek and Roman writers (Ptolemy, Tacitus, Pliny) the name of Scythians is no longer encountered, and in place of former Scythia we find references to Sarmatia. The borders of the latter are defined as an even larger expanse: almost from the Carpathians, the Vistula, and the Danube to the Don, the Volga, and the Ural Mountains. The Sarmatians, judging by archaeological remains and graves, were less cultured than the Scythians, leading a life of hunters and nomad herdsmen, and rarely that of tillers of the soil. Neither was there any ethnic uniformity in Sarmatia, any more than in Scythia, as there could not have been over so enormous an expanse. Ptolemy, who himself doubted the accuracy and reliability of his historical-geographic information about Sarmatia, which was sometimes quite fantastic, lists the peoples and tribes in its extremely motley and multitribal composition. These were the Getze, Yazygs, Roksolans, Alans, Bastarny, Dacians, and so forth. All these various tribes, who passed through the southern steppes and settled in various localities between the Dnepr and the Danube, toward the existing frontiers of the Roman empire, sometimes rose out of the entire mobile and unstable mass of nationalities. They created temporary and more or less strong state and military organizations, then lost their ascendancy, disappearing almost without trace from the historic scene. Such were the successors of the Sarmatians—the Getze, then the Dacians and the Roksolans to whom the Romans first even paid tribute. The same historical fate also befell the conquerors of Sarmatia, the Goths, as well as the destroyers of the Gothic kingdom, the Huns.

Among the varied composition of the Sarmatian peoples, Ptolemy names a "great people," the Vened-Slavs, who lived on the western borderlands of Sarmatia, along the Vistula River. Across this river lay Germany, which the Roman writers knew much better. Alongside the Vened-Slavs, Ptolemy found on the Vistula a northern people, the Goths, and still further, the Finns.

In the third and fourth centuries after Christ, the rise of the Goths resulted in the formation on the eastern plain of a huge but short-lived Gothic state, and in the conquest of almost all the Sarmatian peoples by them, along with many other peoples on the territory of eastern Europe—the Ests, the Mordvinians, the Meria, and so forth. This ethnic composition of the huge Gothic kingdom of Ermenrich also included the Vened-Slavs. They were even specifically described by the Gothic historian of the sixth century, Jordanes, for the first time under the proper names of their two main branches—the Sclaveni and the Antes. The former inhabited the north as far as the Vistula and the east up to the Dnestr, and the latter, the south, along the Black Sea coast from the Dnestr to the Dnepr.

SETTLEMENT OF THE SLAV TRIBES ON THE EASTERN PLAIN Besides the above evidence from the ancient Western writers about the Slavs, we also have by this time the first knowledge of the Slavs and of their settlement in the eastern plain from our first historical monument—the early chronicle, the *Narrative of Current Years*. The chronicler names the region of the first Slav settlement in Europe (after their arrival, in his historical version, from Asia) as the Danube and the Hungarian and Bulgarian land, where they incorporated into the Dacian kingdom (on the Danube). With the destruction of the Dacian kingdom by the Romans under Emperor Trajan, the Slavs also were attacked by the Romans (the Volokhs, according to our chronicle), who began to press them and, at the beginning of the second century after Christ, compelled them to move from the Danube to the east and north to the Vistula and the region of the Dnepr, where they were described by Roman and Gothic historians.

The treatment of the "ancestral homeland" of the Slavs by the chronicler was evidently prompted by his "Pan-Slavic" ideas and is not in complete accord with the evidence of other historical monuments. Comparing all available information from historical documents in the light of scientific criticism, it may be assumed that the Slavs were among the autochthons (primitive inhabitants) of the eastern plain, especially its western part along the Carpathians in Galicia, Volynia, Podolia, and in the Dnepr region. Here they were first caught by Gothic conquest in the third century, and here, too, they had been described by the historian Jordanes. From the end of the fifth century and during the sixth century, these Carpathian people, with their various tribes (among which the most powerful were the Antes), were known to the Byzantine West under the general proper name of "Slavs." During the sixth century these Slavs repeatedly invaded the frontiers of the Eastern Empire. They formed something in the nature of political and military alliances, occasionally achieving even general, although not truly permanent, political unification (the information of the Arab Masudi about the predominance among the Slavs of the tribe of the Valinan, that is, the Volynians, otherwise known as the Duleby, whose prince led all the Slavs).[14] Other Byzantine writers of the sixth and seventh centuries, who were well acquainted with these trans-Danubian and Carpathian Slavs as warrior bands wandering and constantly attacking the empire, say that they lived in huts scattered singly, and engaged in agriculture and livestock raising. As to social order, they lived in the stage of clan mode of life, but already with considerable indications of the disintegration of the clan and of the formation of a tribal military aristocracy, tribal princes, and warrior bands. There already existed property inequality as well as patriarchal slavery.

During the sixth century these Slavs began a colonization movement to-

ward the east, north, and south. This particularly strengthened from the beginning of the seventh century under pressure from a new eastern people, the Avars, who had formed a strong state organization alongside them inside Hungary. On the other hand the Germans, having thrown themselves into the conquest of Roman provinces, abandoned their northern lands along the banks of the Elbe and the Baltic Sea, in Czechia and Moravia. Therefore, since that time the Slav tribes, in settling, separated into three branches: the *western,* moving in the direction of the localities abandoned by the Germans, toward the Elbe, the Oder, and the lower Vistula; the *southern,* in the direction of the south, across the Carpathians and into the Balkan peninsula; and the *eastern,* to the Dnepr, the shores of lakes Peipus and Ilmen, and further to the east, to the upper Volga and the Oka.

At precisely this time the raids against Byzantium by the trans-Danubian Slavs ended, and all references to them from Byzantine historians cease. But as early as the ninth century, the eastern branch of the Slav tribes made themselves known by their attacks on Byzantium from another direction. These Slavs became known under the general name of Rusi, or Russian Slavs.

Thus, after the first vague historical references and allusions which separated the Slavs from the nationalities who during the second and third centuries after Christ inhabited the eastern part of Europe, from the seventh century the Slavic peoples, in the process of settling the vast expanse of the eastern plain, created branches of the eastern Russian Slavs who gradually colonized the eastern plain as far as the Dnepr area, the lake shores, the Oka, the Volga, and the Vyatka. Here, in settling among other aborigines of this country, becoming partly absorbed by them, and partly assimilating them, the eastern, the Russian, Slavs laid the foundation of their social, economic, and political life.

THE CHARACTER AND DIRECTION OF THE SETTLEMENT

From the above presentation it is obvious that the Slavs did not find the eastern plain a "desert" devoid of any historical, economic, and social legacy. On the contrary they encountered here social conditions and influences with which they were themselves quite familiar—an agricultural, stock-breeding mode of life, a polymetallic culture, tribal relations, barter trade, and so forth. The former prehistoric and historical aborigines of the country left the Slavs a great inheritance in all these respects.

Therefore the depiction by the chronicler of the Slav settlements and their life on the eastern plain, among wild forests and animals, without any elements of culture, appears to be an outright historical simplification, although understandable under the current circumstances.

It would be of course entirely erroneous to see in this depiction of the

Slavs and their culture by the chronicler—as that of a "man-beast," living in complete savagery in the woods "animal style," "like cattle," feeding on "all sorts of dirt"—the reality of that low stage of social development and culture which in the classification of Morgan and Engels is accepted as the lower stage of "savagery" in the prehistorical development of human culture ("a primitive horde," life in the forest on trees, eating on roots and plants, "gathering" (that is, simply appropriating) the produce of nature without any production, group marriage, and so forth).[15]

The words of the chronicler about the "savagery" of the Slavs reflect merely a severe and exaggerated judgment on the linguistic and, of course, relatively low culture of the Slavs by the Christian monks, who were adherents of Western "civilization." Applying that same classification of Morgan and Engels, we may say that the Slavs of that time (sixth and seventh centuries) on the whole lived in the stage of "barbarism" (with the beginnings of production and economic activity in the fields of agriculture, animal husbandry, and the crafts, the use of iron implements, domination by the clan patriarchal system, the transition to monogamous marriage, and so forth). But about the time the chronicler began a dated presentation (by the eighth and ninth centuries), they had already also outlived the clan system and changed to private property, to perfected tools of production (the plow), and to tillage of the soil, that is, to an incipient "civilization." In cultural relations the Slavs ranked not lower but instead above the cultural level of the peoples among whom they settled and to whom they began to transmit their culture, while partly inheriting and assimilating the culture of their neighbors. Introducing their own culture and assimilating with other peoples, the Slavs participated with the latter in the creation of a general culture of the nations of the eastern plain.

Individual tribes of the Slavs settled first of all along the border of the northern part of the steppe zone with its rich black soil, and in the southern part of the forest zone with its poorer clay soils. The main course of their colonization was originally from the middle Dnepr, not across the steppes to the lowlands of the Volga and the Don (although it did partly occur here, as, for example, to Tmutarakan on the east coast of the Azov Sea), but along the forest border to the Oka and to the upper reaches of the Volga. This was due to economic as well as political circumstances. The fertile soils of the black-earth steppes here could have afforded greater advantages to agriculture than the northern forest belt. But these black-earth steppes were then occupied by nomad Asiatic peoples, while the broad wooded expanse in the north and northeast from the middle Dnepr up to the Volga, Vyatka, Dvina and northern lakes, was either partly unsettled, or inhabited along its border by tribes that were easily dislodged further to the northeast.

By the ninth century the eastern Slav tribes had settled and entrenched on a large territory: from the region of the lakes Ladoga and Onega in the north to the Dnepr and Dnestr provinces in the south, and from the Lithuanian and Polish borders in the west to the interriver area between the Oka and the Volga in the east.[16] The Ilmen Slavs "perched" on the Volkhov and the lake shores; south of them, in the upper reaches of the western Dvina and Volga lived the Krivichi; still further south, the Polochne; on the Oka, the Vyatichi; to the east of the Dnepr and on its tributaries, the Severyane and the Radimichi; to the west of the river and on the Prypeć, the Dregovichi and the Drevlyane; on the middle Dnepr, the Polyane; to the west of them, on the upper Vistula and in the Carpathian foothills, the Volynyane (Buzhane); and south of them, along the Dnestr, the Tivertsy. The most highly civilized were evidently the Polyane and the Novgorod (Ilmen) Slavs, who occupied the two terminals of the "great" water route from the Baltic coast to the Black Sea. Hence the chief centers of culture and economic development on the East European plain from the seventh and eighth centuries were first of all the two regions connected by the water route: the middle Dnepr area and the northern lake region. The first, besides its favorable climate and rich soil, was connected by waterways with the contemporary cultural centers of the West. The second, although poor in natural resources, was fully protected against attacks from the East and was closest to the European northwest.

NEIGHBORING PEOPLES The southern steppes have long served as an arena where numerous Asiatic peoples ruled in rapid succession. The Cimmerians, Scythians, Sarmatians, Getze, Dacians, Avars, Hungarians, Pechenegs, Polovtsy, Khazars, and the Tatars passed from the East to the West across the southern steppes, staying there for intervals of varying length, and sometimes founding social and state organizations of varying stability, like the Scythians, Khazars, and Tatars. By the seventh century the southern steppe began to be settled by a new Asiatic people, the Khazars. Nomads of Turkic origin who came to the southeastern steppe, in the lower Volga area and along the Don, the Khazars frequently abandoned their nomad habits here and formed a widespread semisedentary, semiagricultural, and commercial state. With the rich commercial Arab East and its Caliphate of Bagdad at their rear, and contemporary merchant Europe before them in the northwest, the Khazars of the Khazar kingdom, Itil (on the Volga near present-day Astrakhan), became the leading transit-trade center where northern and western trade (furs, wax, and leather) merged with trade from the east and the south (guns, cloth, and so forth).

The Khazars became not only the nearest neighbors but the conquerors

of the Slav tribes who had not yet succeeded in organizing state unity of their own. This conquest, however, in contrast with later occupations, had its advantageous results, inasmuch as the Khazars, although exacting tribute from the Slavs, not only made the latter their trade intermediaries but even opened independent Slav routes to the Far East with which the Khazars themselves conducted trade. As early as the eighth century, that is, one and a half centuries prior to the political unification of the Slavs, their trade with the Khazars and the Arab East had assumed large proportions. The capital of the Khazar state Itil and the city Sarkel (on the Don) both had sizable Slav populations.

In the middle of the ninth century the Khazar kingdom was subjected to military pressure by newcomers from Asia, the Pechenegs. In the tenth century (915) the latter were already in the southern steppes and extended to the Dnepr itself, that is, the very lands occupied by the Slavs. The Khazar kingdom gradually ended, and the neighbors of the Slavs were no longer those commercial and comparatively civilized tribes, but tribes of warring nomad savages. The latter tribes, for the most part dying out rapidly, were succeeded by other, no less militant tribes: in the eleventh and twelfth centuries by the Polovtsy; and from the thirteenth century by the Tatars, who formed a vast and powerful state in Asia and long held Russia in subjection; we shall speak of them later in greater detail.

Another racial and economic influence encountered by the Slavs in the southern steppes was Greco-Roman, emanating from numerous colonies scattered along the shores of the Black and Azov seas. As early as the eighth and ninth centuries B.C. and during the Scythian period, numerous Greek colonies appeared in the Crimea, on the Taman peninsula, and along the lower Don and Bug rivers (Olbia, Chersonesus,* Taurida near Sevastopol, Feodosiya, Surozh or present-day Sudak, Panticapaeum or present-day Kerch, Fanagoria, and others). In the fourth century B.C. many of these colonies united into the large Bosporus kingdom (from Chersonesus to the Don and the Kuban) which economically was a slaveholding state. In the second century B.C. this kingdom was conquered by Rome and in the fourth century after Christ by the Goths, after which it fell apart. All these colonies were advance posts, first of the progressive Greco-Roman slaveowning civilization, and then of such a world commercial center as Byzantium. Later (from the seventh to the ninth centuries) they became intermediaries linking the eastern Slavs by cultural and trade connections with the Christian West.

During the ninth century the Slav tribes, in their movement to the north and northwest, encountered a warrior people of Scandinavian origin who attacked the Slavs from the Baltic Sea and came to be known as the Varan-

* Now Sevastopol.—ED.

gians. But whereas the eastern tribes were countless nomad hordes passing "with fire and sword" along the land routes far into the interior of the country, these western peoples were warlike but small bands of seagoing brigands, who penetrated deep inland along the rivers and in robbing sought not so much for outright conquest as for materials to trade. The southern and eastern Asiatic peoples, who attacked the Slav lands from the steppes, ruined Slavic economy and dislodged the Slavs further to the north. The northern Varangian bands, upon penetrating into the very heart of Slav territory, not only robbed the Slavs but also conducted trade with them,[17] and later settled in the Slav lands and were assimilated by the Slavs. It is possible (as some historians consider) that they gave to the local Slavs the name "Rus," which was the name of one of their own tribes, but it is more likely that they themselves adopted the name of one of the local northern Slav tribes, which name later became general for all Slavs from the Ladoga region to the banks of the Dnepr, when the northern Rus Slavs met and united with the southern Slav tribes.[18] This evidently also explains the perpetual confusion among Arab writers of the ninth and tenth centuries, who in their description of the life, habits, and trade of the people combined the "Varangians-Rus" and the Slavs. In any event, complete assimilation of the incoming Varangians occurred here with the Slavs, their economic system, and later also with a single state organization.

Certainly, such assimilation required a period of more than one century. As early as 839—that is, even before the legendary so-called "invitation to the Varangians"—one of the Latin chroniclers relates that the envoys of the Rus arriving in Constantinople did not wish to return home by their previous route across the steppe for fear of attack by savage peoples who had appeared in the steppes, and the envoys were therefore sent along the northern route to the German emperor, where they were accepted as "Sveons" (Swedes), that is, according to our chronicle, as "Varangians." Thus, even before the final consummation of the unity of the Dnepr and the Novgorod Slavs in the form of the Rus state, an economic assimilation of the newly arrived Varangians with the Slavs had occurred. No wonder our chronicle states that the men of Novgorod were first Slavs, and later became Varangians. Even before the coming of the Varangians, the Slavs were united in large tribes, had their own tribal princes and large, purely Slavic cities along the main river-trading routes, engaged in trade, and repelled invasions of foreign conquerors both from the north and south. Both the military raids of the Varangians and their mythical "invitation" were, in reality, only transitional and external "episodes" in the integration of the Slav tribes into a single nationality and single political state.

The precise nature of these relations, and their development from simple

military raids and trade plunder to political unification, has been described by our chronicler (year 859), who writes that at first the Varangians came from the sea, collected tribute "of one white squirrel per household" from the Slav and Finnish tribes, but were then driven out by the inhabitants. Soon, however, in the chronicler's account (862), the tribes who expelled the Varangians decide to find themselves "a prince, who would rule over us and be our righteous judge." The "invited" princes indeed began to "rule," that is, levy and collect tribute no longer in the form of plunder but "according to law," without ceasing, however, to conquer or plunder other tribes, thereby expanding the sphere of their power. Thus, the warrior Oleg, having conquered the Chuds, Mers, and Ves, and entrenched himself in their cities, levied tribute on the subjugated Slovenes, Krivichi, and Meria, while, "for the sake of peace," he set a tribute of 300 grivny* a year from Novgorod, which was paid until the death of Yaroslav.[19]

Toward the northwest and the Baltic the Slav tribes came in contact with the natives of this region, those numerous small tribes of the Baltic ethnographic group of peoples, the Lithuanians, Letts, Yatvyags, Prussians, and Zhmuds, as well as the Finnish-Estonian tribes the Livs, Kurs, and so forth. In the middle of the seventh century, the majority of these tribes lived in the stage of dissolution of the clan system, and of a nomad hunting economy though with the beginnings of agriculture. The Novgorod Slavs as early as the ninth and tenth centuries began to dislodge several of these tribes from their lands along the Baltic. Then, in the twelfth century, these Baltic tribes were conquered by the Germans, who founded there the Order of the Teutonic Knights that by the thirteenth century extended to the frontiers of Novgorod at Lake Peipus where these "Hound-Knights," as Marx calls them, were stopped by the Russians (the slaughter on the ice and the route of the "Knights" by Alexander Nevsky in 1242). At this time, by the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Lithuanians began to form from their small scattered feudal principalities a single large Lithuanian principality, which played a great role, as we shall see later, in the destinies of White Russia and the Ukraine.

Finally, toward the northeast in the Volga-Oka region, the Slavs encountered numerous local tribes who were mentioned earlier by the Gothic historians of the sixth century under the names of Mers, Ves, and Muroms, and who lived along the Oka, the Moskva River, and in the region of the lakes. They are also mentioned in our chronicles under the general name of "Chuds." With these peoples the Slavs established contact somewhat later when, dislodged from the southwest by the Tatars, they began to migrate toward the northeast. The Chuds, Mordvinians, Ves, and other

* Grivna—ten kopeck piece.—ED.

tribes were conquered and absorbed by the Slavs. Moreover, the influence of the Chuds on the Russian Slavs was revealed more in customs, ethnography, and even language, than in economic respects. Like the Slav population, the Chuds engaged primarily in agriculture. This corner of land between the Oka and the Volga, where historical destiny brought these peoples together, was a remote place, distant from the main trade routes. This circumstance gave the economy of the region a predominantly agricultural character. Thriving commercial wealth as was known in Kiev Rus did not occur here.

Further, beyond the Volga in the extreme north and northeast, lived other aborigines of the country: the northern tribes, the Karelians, Pechors, Permians, throughout the north; the Cheremisy (the Mari people), between the Volga and Vyatka rivers; the Bulgars, beyond the Kama and the Volga. Some of these peoples by that time were forming political unions with developed trade and comparatively stable social and state structures. The northern state of the Karelians, Biarmia, conducted lively trade in fur goods and was renowned for its wealth. The Bulgarian kingdom, with its capital Bulgar on the Volga (not far from its confluence with the Kama), was one of the intermediaries in the development of a Khazar-Slav trade in the tenth century. The Bulgarian kingdom included the lands of the Burtasy, Mordvy, Cheremis (Mari), and others. In addition to trade, the Bulgarians had developed agriculture, handicrafts, and so forth. The commercial influence of these peoples can be observed, for example, in the similarity of the ancient Slav unit of exchange, the *nogata* and the Karelian *Noha*—a whole white squirrel skin, which was the monetary unit for both the Slavs and the Korels. All of these tribes, the Bulgars in particular, were absorbed by Slavdom after the fall of the Khazar kingdom, and at that time the commercial importance of the Bulgars and Biarmia declined. In addition to these nationalities, which the Slavs began to encounter on the eastern plain, and with which they entered into economic relations, many other nationalities inhabited the territory subsequently occupied by the Russian state. Such, for example, were the numerous peoples of the North Caucasus, the Transcaucasus, and Western and Central Asia.

Notes

1. Engels, *Proiskhozhdeniye semyi, chastnoi sobstvennosti i gosudarstva* (Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State) (1938), p. 3; L. Morgan, *Drevnyeye obshchestvo ili issledovaniye linii chelovecheskogo progressa ot dikosti cherez varvarstvo k sivilizatsii* (Ancient Society or the Investigation of the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery Through Barbarism to Civilization) (Russian translation, 1934).

2. Engels, *Dialektika prirody* (The Dialectic of Nature), the article "Rol truda v protsesse ochelovecheniya obyezyany" (The Role of Labor in the Process of the Humanization of the Ape) (Russian translation, 1934), p. 50 and 251. See also Engels, *Anti-Dyuring* (Anti-Dühring), particularly Secs. I, X, and Secs. II, IV.
3. *Istoriya VKP (b)* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks], A Short Course), p. 119.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
5. Marx, *Kapital* (1935), Vol. I, p. 119.
6. *Istoriya VKP (b)*, p. 113.
7. *Polnoye sobraniye russkikh letopisei* (Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles) (1841–1859), pub. by the Archaeographic Commission, *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'* (Laurentian Chronicle), Vol. I, p. 4. Hereafter all references to the chronicles are to this edition, showing only the name of the chronicle and the year (for the chronological presentation).
8. Yefimenko, *Pervobytnoye obshchestvo* (Primitive Society) (1938), pp. 235-255; see also *Paleolit v SSSR* (The Paleolithic Age in the USSR) (1935).
9. Yefimenko, *Pervobytnoye obshchestvo* (Primitive Society) (1938), pp. 437-468, and also Kesnev, *Paleoliticheskiye kukhonnyye ostatki v selye Kostenkakh* (The Paleolithic Kitchen Remains in the Village of Kostenki) in *Drevnosti Moskovskogo Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva* (Antiquities of the Moscow Archaeological Society), Vol. XI.
10. A. Iyessen and B. Degen-Kovalevskii, *Iz istorii drevnyei metallurgii Kavkaza* (Out of the History of Ancient Metallurgy in the Caucasus) (GAIMK,* 1935), V. 120, pp. 8-22.
11. Bogayevskii, *Orudiya proizvodstva i domashniye zhivotnyye Tripolya* (Implements of Production and Domestic Animals of Tripolye) (1937).
12. The first traces of the formation of separate ethnic groups—the distant ancestors of the future Celts, Germans, Finns, and Slavs—in central and northern Europe begin to appear only some 1,000 to 2,000 years before our era.
13. Gerodot (Herodotus), *Istoriya v devyati knigakh* (History in Nine Books—trans. by Mishchenko), (St. Petersburg, 1866–1872), Bk. IV.
14. Garkavi, *Skazaniya mussulmanskikh pisatelyei o slavyanakh i russkikh* (Tales by Moslem Writers about the Slavs and Russians) (1860), p. 135.
15. L. G. Morgan, *Drevnyeye obshchestvo ili issledovaniye linii chelovecheskogo progressa ot dikosti cherez varvarstvo k sivilizatsii*, p. 5; Engels, *Proiskhozhdeniye semyi, chastnoi sobstvennosti i gosudarstva*, pp. 30-32.
16. See Map 2, facing p. 122.
17. It should be recalled that Varangian (*Varyag*) in Slavic means "trader" or "cattle dealer."
18. Grekov, *Feodalnyye otnosheniya v Kiyevskom gosudarstve* (Feudal Relations in the Kiev State), pp. 169-170.
19. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'* (882). Relations similar to those described in ancient Rus were also developing in western Europe where the Scandinavian Vikings and seamen pillaged the shores of the North Sea, Normandy, and Denmark and became the hired protectors, sometimes changing into the ruling classes. "The conduct of war and the organization of their conquests on the part of Rurik's men were in no way different from that type of organization by the Normans throughout the rest of Europe" (Marx).

* State Academy of the History of Material Culture, hereinafter referred to as GAIMK.

(II)

The Nationalities of Transcaucasia and Central Asia in Antiquity (to the Seventh Century)

IN REMOTEST ANTIQUITY, when the East European plain was being settled throughout many centuries by numerous nationalities succeeding each other, a still more prolonged and complex historical process of settlement took place on the vast expanses of Transcaucasia and Central Asia. These regions and the peoples inhabiting them were very early drawn into economic and cultural intercourse with the neighboring peoples and states of the Near East (Assyria-Babylonia, Media, Persia), as well as with the contemporary civilized Hellenistic world—Greece and, later, Rome.

Hence, if among ancient historian-geographers, like Herodotus, knowledge of the East European plain and its nationalities did not extend beyond the southern localities, occupied by the Scythians (beyond which, according to his information, began the "wasteland" inhabited by the mythical Androfags), the nationalities of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, on the other hand, were much better and earlier known to the ancient civilized world. The state Urartu of the Chaldeans, ancient Armenia, ancient Azerbaijan (Albania) in the Transcaucasus, Bactria (Balkh), Sogdiana (Samarkand) in Central Asia, and others were well known to the ancient Assyro-Babylonians and, later, to the Greco-Roman world, having been the object of conquest by Assyrians, Parthians, Persians, the Greeks of Alexander of Macedonia, and the Romans. Later these nationalities were repeatedly subjected to military invasions by the nomad peoples of the East—the Huns, Turks, Arabs, and Mongols. These conquests caused many people, aborigines of the land, to withdraw toward the north to the Caucasus mountains and then, after crossing the mountains, to reach the southeastern steppes of Europe. Meanwhile the nomads of the southeastern steppes (the Cimmerians and Scythians) were moving in the opposite direction across the Caucasian Mountains or the Caspian lowlands, and conquered the tribes and states of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, frequently settling there (the Scythians in Karabakh, the Cimmerians in Armenia) for a long time.

In this manner these regions had long served as a meeting ground and as a place of conflict and of stubborn military struggle for the various nationali-

ties and states of the East and West. The social-economic development of the aborigines of the land, the numerous tribes of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, were influenced during the early period of their historical existence chiefly along two lines.

On the one hand the influence of the slaveowning Asiatic despotisms of Assyria, Babylonia, and Persia, and that of the slaveowning states of Greece and Rome, was revealed in the fact that the tribal and state unions then forming among the peoples of Transcaucasia and Central Asia were early drawn into the orbit of slaveowning economy and society. Very ancient independent state-tribal bodies, like the Chaldeo-Kartvel state Urartu, the Georgian Iberian kingdom, and others (especially after they became satrapies of the Persian state, or provinces of the empire of Alexander of Macedonia or of Rome), changed into slaveowning states and into havens of the then dominant slaveowning economy. This was further abetted by the circumstance that in the primitive-tribal system of these peoples there already existed primitive slavery, which under conquest grew into a full-fledged system of slave economy of the ancient or Asiatic type.

Hence, in the economic history of the peoples of the USSR, it is here that we find the most ancient state organization of the slaveowning type, and a slave-holding structure.

However, it should be noted that from the point of view of the Greco-Roman world the peoples and tribes of Transcaucasia and Central Asia appeared to be "barbarians" from distant provinces. These barbarians not only defended their national existence stubbornly, but also retained very long their communal-clan system and tribal mode of life. Therefore the penetration of slaveowning relationships into the social order of these peoples had not reached the same depth as in the ancient and Asiatic world itself, being confined chiefly to the ruling upper class of these ancient state organizations.

On the other hand continuous wars and conquests, in particular the devastating invasions by nomad peoples of the East, not only brought ruin to the economy of entire tribes and peoples, but also interfered with the creation of stable national state organizations for the struggle against such invasions. Therefore the peoples and the more ancient state-tribal unions of Georgia, Armenia, and so forth, frequently fell under the rule of Persia, Rome, and Byzantium, thus disrupting their own national unity (as in eastern and western Georgia, and in Armenia). "The great states of Cyrus or Alexander could not be called nations, even if they were formed historically from a variety of tribes and races. These were not nations but accidental and poorly related conglomerate groups, falling apart and uniting with the success or defeat of one conqueror or another." [1] This gave rise to conditions unfavorable for overcoming tribal disunity and, consequently, to the prolonged ex-

istence of feudal disunity. Finally, these same invasions and conquests frequently resulted in the extermination of entire tribes, to their dislodgment to distant regions into the mountains or toward the north, or to a compulsory resettlement within other states.

As a result of such circumstances, the history of the peoples of the Caucasus, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia reveals an extremely diverse and complex past, and the ethnic composition of the present-day peoples in these regions is the result of numerous historical stratifications and complex migratory processes over a period of thousands of years.

We will now dwell on the very ancient periods of settlement, the first state organizations, and economic development of the peoples of the Caucasus, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.

1. THE NATIONALITIES OF THE CAUCASUS IN ANTIQUITY: [2]

ETHNIC COMPOSITION According to evidence of a linguistic and archaeological nature, we may assume with confidence that the prehistoric inhabitants of the Transcaucasus appeared here earlier than in other parts of the East European or Asiatic plains. Although the archaeological prehistoric past of Transcaucasia is only now beginning to be studied, several existing archaeological discoveries (for example, the archaeological remains of stone implements of the Neolithic period and of Neanderthal man in the town of Rgan, in Imereti, in the outskirts of Kutais, and so forth) enable us to assume the existence there of settlements of prehistoric man, of the New Stone Age (Neolithic) culture, and possibly also Old Stone Age (Paleolithic) culture (in the outskirts of Sukhumi), that is, approximately twenty thousand to twenty-five thousand years before our era. The settlement of the plains and mountain valleys proceeded here in direct relation to the retreat of the glaciers (previously covering the whole Caucasian mountain massif) higher up the mountains. During this settlement numerous and diverse groups of peoples succeeded and assimilated each other, dislodging one another from former places of settlement to new places, from the valleys to the mountains, and so forth. Therefore it would be utterly erroneous to view any of the more ancient peoples now inhabiting the Caucasus and Transcaucasia, as the adherents of the "racial theory" have done, as direct and "pure" descendants of one "race" (even of, say, the predominant group of the so-called "Japhetic" peoples) of original inhabitants of the land. Later the Transcaucasus began to be settled chiefly by the Japhetic peoples: the Kartvel tribes—the Gruzins, Imertiny, Adzhars, Khevsury, Mingreltsy, Svany, and so forth. Among the more ancient inhabitants of the land may be found also

the Armenians, the Osetians, the Abkhazians, the East-Caucasian Gortsy, the Kurds, and so forth. All these peoples, in the process of settling the Caucasus and of dislodgment from some districts into others by foreign conquests, underwent considerable intermixture among themselves.

The more ancient and now large nationality, the *Kartvely*, with its wide ramifications in the distant past, occupied, prior to the Turkic invasion, considerable areas in the West Caucasus up to the Araks and the Kura. According to some evidence, the Kartvely lived previously in Asia Minor where Kartvel tribes like the Moskhi, Koskhi (Kolkhi), and others are mentioned by ancient Greek authors. Ethnically they were apparently related to the ancient inhabitants of Armenia, the Chaldeo-Urartu tribes. After their encounter with the neighboring Assyrians, they were dislodged into Transcaucasia. Here, approximately in the fourth century B.C. occurred the formation of a separate Georgian nationality with numerous distinct branches. But even from here, after the Macedonian, Persian, and, especially, the Turkic conquests, some tribes began to be dislodged further to the northwest toward the mountains. These were, for example, the Svany, who in the time of Strabo still occupied vast territories and were capable of mustering an army of two hundred thousand men, whereas at present they number altogether twenty thousand people occupying a small area between the Main and the Svanet mountain ranges.

Of the other peoples, the more important are the Armenians, who represent, according to the theory of Marr, the result of the fusion of the ancient Japhetic peoples with the new Aryan conquerors. The Armenians first settled in Transcaucasia in the area of so-called "Turkish Armenia" (Erzerum, Van, and so forth), but were later dislodged from these regions and remained chiefly in the northeastern part of the plateau (Yerivan, Lake Gokcha).

One of the nationalities of Aryan origin that settled in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia at a very early period is the *Osetians*, remnants of the formerly large nationality of *Alans* (Iranian in origin), who led a nomad existence in the steppes of the North Caucasus, formed an extensive state in the first and second centuries between Aral Lake and the Black Sea, and were well known to the Roman historical writers and to the Franciscan travelers (Piano Carpini). In the sixth century the Alans were subjugated by the Huns during the great migrations of peoples, partly scattered through various parts of Europe as far west as the Pyrenees and Gaul, and partly settled (after the Turkic conquest) on a small territory in the central steppe area of the North Caucasus and along the northern as well as the southern slopes of the middle part of the Caucasus range (along the Ardon and Gizeldon rivers, in Digoria, and so forth).

Among the Japhetic nationalities were also to be found some of the more

ancient inhabitants of Transcaucasia, the Abkhazians (in the assumption of some historians the mixed descendants of the autochthons of the land of the Geniokhs), who inhabited the northwest Caucasian shores of the Black Sea (the Colchis) and were well known to the classical world of the Greeks and Romans. Finally, among the Japhetic autochthons of the Caucasus (on the basis of linguistic evidence) were also the Chechens (Nakhchi), a nationality of the eastern mountain group with numerous tribal branches, the largest of which were the Ingush. Prior to Russia's annexation of the Caucasus, they occupied an extensive area between the Main mountain range and the Aksai and Sunzha rivers. After the annexation the bulk of the Chechenians migrated to Turkey, while the rest settled along the mountain valleys and foothills of the North Caucasus and on the Terek River.

In a class by themselves were the *Adygei,* or *Cherkassy* nationalities, who since ancient times had been wandering through the steppes of southern Russia, were known there to the Russian chroniclers under the name "Kosogi," and were later dislodged by other nomads to the northwestern slopes of the Caucasus. Many tribes of their numerous branches (the Abazintsy, Shapsugi, Circassians, Kizilbeki, Dzhigety, and others) after the Russian conquest migrated almost intact to Turkey. The more important tribal union, the Kabardinians, also long known to the Russians (since the tenth century after the campaigns of Svyatoslav), remained in their former localities after the conquest of the Caucasus.

A role of great ethnical, political, and economic importance was played by the settlement in several, chiefly eastern, parts of the Caucasus between the near steppes (Karabakh steppe) and the East Caucasian mountain passes, of peoples of Turkic origin (present-day Azerbaijan). The first appearance of Turkic and related nationalities in the Caucasus is connected by some historians with the invasions by the Cimmerians and, later, the Scythians (seventh and sixth centuries B.C.), part of whom settled in southern Transcaucasia (the Karabakh steppe), where they were known to the Roman writers (Strabo). The larger invasions of the Turkic tribes proper took place at the time of the "great migration of the peoples" in the fifth century after Christ, when these Turkic tribes, along with the Huns, dislodged the aborigines of the land, the Kartvel tribes, toward the northwest. Afterward the invasions of the Khazars from the North also left some groups here to settle in the steppes of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. Finally, the Mongolian invasions of the thirteenth century left in eastern Transcaucasia large and compact masses of peoples, who settled in the steppe and agricultural districts of East Caucasus from the eastern spurs of the Main mountain range and lowlands of the Kura and the Araks to the steppes of Karyaz, Oldar, and Adzhinaur (now Azerbaijan), almost completely dislodging from here the

older inhabitants, the Gruzians and Armenians. Besides this main territory and groups of Turkic peoples, several nationalities living on the northern slopes of the Caucasian range were of similar origin, as, for example, the Balkars (in the assumption of some historians related to the Volga Bulgars), who settled here in the region of present-day Nalchik long ago, partly dislodging the Osetians living here and partly assimilating with them.

Such was the extremely complex ethnical composition of the Caucasus, marked by prolonged, complex, sometimes violent processes of settlement, conquests, and so forth. This influence was still further intensified by the natural, mountainous character of the land, as a result of which various groups of peoples frequently lived in complete isolation and seclusion as well as under backward social-economic systems. All these circumstances in turn exerted a great influence on the conditions of organization and development of political state systems among the peoples of the Caucasus. Tribal consolidation of the ancient autochthons of the land, the Kartvels, Armenians, Abkhazians, and so forth, could only slowly and with great difficulty attain larger unification in the nature of a state. Nevertheless, written historical evidence is available about the formation of independent governments by the more important nationalities, the Kartvels and the Armenians, as early as several centuries before our era.

ARMENIA The earliest historical evidence of the beginning of large tribal and state unification by the peoples of Transcaucasia has been found over a thousand years before our era, in the era of the early Assyrian East. When the Assyrians first invaded the realm of the Armenia of that time, they found there a number of small tribal unions of various nationalities headed by some sixty tribal princes. Due to geographical conditions, all these tribes in turn united into larger groups, bearing the names of Nairi, Dayani, Sukhmi, and Urartu. The first three were located inside the frontiers of future Turkish Armenia, while the last was within the Caucasian plateau proper, the future Armenian SSR. In fact Urartu was not so much a state as a tribal union. Its ethnic composition has been little studied. It apparently consisted on the one hand of the Khati, or Khety, and Chaldeans, an ancient people well known to the ancient world, which the Armenians subsequently dislodged from the valleys to the mountains. On the other hand the autochthons of the land included (according to the Japhetic theory of Marr) a number of nationalities of the Japhetic group: the Kartvels, the Moskhi, the Colchis, and others.

There are very few historical data for forming an opinion on the social-economic order of this oldest state in the USSR. Judging by the preserved cuneiform rock inscriptions, it was a slaveowning state with considerable

slavery. The inscriptions indicate that during conquests about 250,000 prisoners were captured and made slaves, along with the seizure of large numbers of cattle, and so forth. The slaves were used to build towns, fortresses, irrigation canals, and, more infrequently, in agriculture. The ruling classes mainly owned the slaves. Among the mass of the people clan customs were still preserved. The chief occupations of the population were primitive agriculture and crude stock raising, combined with household crafts.

In the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. the Urartu land was conquered by nomads from the South Russian steppes, the Cimmerians, who, after being dislodged thence by the Scythians, crossed the Caucasian range and reached Urartu, Lydia, and Assyria. Following in their wake, the Scythians also moved here later, and partly settled in the same territories. Another part of the Cimmerians moved toward the west, reaching the Danube and Thrace. After capturing several Thracian tribes there, including the Frigians and Armenians, the Cimmerians, according to Herodotus, once again returned to Asia Minor, reached Urartu and Lydia and settled there, appropriating the lands of the former state of Urartu. Thus we have there the first appearance of the Armenians, those "refugees from Frigia" (Herodotus). After mingling there with the natives of the land and with incoming peoples, they formed the Armenian nationality and, later, the Armenian state.

Armenia as a separate state is first mentioned in the well known Behistun cuneiform inscription of the Persian king Darius in the sixth century B.C. At that time the dominant forces within the new Armenian state were still the old elements of the Urartu state. Later the Armenian state was ruled by its own dynasty (the Tigranidy in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C.). In the sixth century B.C., Armenia was conquered by the Persian king Darius, and from that time became a vassal and satrapy of Persia, though retaining its own national dynasty.

The social and economic system of the Armenians in this era may be judged only on the basis of scattered data (Xenophon and Herodotus). From their testimony it appears that the population lived in the stage of the clan system under a simple economy, engaging in agriculture and stock raising. Armenia, in the words of Herodotus, was rich in pasture land and horses. The population lived exclusively in villages, and the level of its civilization was not high. But still, according to some data (Marr for example), the Armenians had already inherited from the natives of the land, the Japhetic people who lived there before the arrival of the Armenians, the ability to extract and work iron, copper, and other metals, which accounted for the early and extensive development of the production of metal articles by the Armenians. Due to the preservation of vestiges of the clan order, local rule was in the hands of clan and village elders. But on the whole, during this

ancient period the tribal order was already changing into a class system of the slaveowning state of the Asiatic type. At the head of the administration of the entire country stood the Persian satrap, although the national royal power was nominally retained. Slavery flourished, but slaveownership was concentrated chiefly in the hands of the upper classes, retaining in large measure its family or domestic character.

After the conquest of Persia by Alexander of Macedonia and under his successors, the Seleucid kings, Armenia fell under the influence of Hellenism and Greek slaveowning civilization. This civilization, however, apparently penetrated and influenced mainly the upper and urban classes. Armenia had by then already been drawn into the world-trade movement between the West and the East by virtue of the caravan trade routes crossing Armenia toward the Black Sea, to the east and toward the south (the "royal highway" through Sophena into Mesopotamia, the "silk road" to China and India and others). Among the mass of the population, vestiges of clan customs still prevailed. The sedentary population lived in villages, and land was considered the property of the clan. Its chief occupation was agriculture, including the cultivation of wheat and oats; stock raising was also developed, especially horse breeding, as well as horticulture. The chief agricultural implement was the wooden plow, already equipped with an iron share.

During the disintegration of the former empire of Alexander into various parts, Armenia, like Persia and Mesopotamia, constituted one of the states of the Seleucid kings. A national movement among the Armenians for unification of the Armenian lands developed, reaching its greatest triumphs under Tigran the Great (95–56 B.C.). By that period Armenia had become a typical slaveowning state. The king himself was the largest owner of latifundia, which were worked by "royal slaves." All other branches of the royal household were likewise maintained with the aid of slaves. The former tribal and clan leaders began to turn into a slaveholding and landowning ruling class, concentrating in their hands large latifundia and great numbers of slaves. From this landowning aristocracy were appointed the governors of various provinces, the *Nakharary,* who gradually assumed a position of local feudal lords almost independent of the central power. The main mass of the agricultural population still remained free, engaging in agriculture and changing from clan into territorial communes. However, as a result of the growth in importance of the landowning aristocracy and their appropriation of large landed estates, the condition of the agricultural population deteriorated, and relationships of landed and personal servitude arose.

Simultaneously Armenia, with its slaveholding economy, continued to be involved in world trade, chiefly as a result of the proximity of the main routes for caravan trade between the West and East. In the words of the ancient

historian of Armenia, Moisey Khorenski,[3] Tigran, that "founder and creator of the world," quite successfully conducted a policy of trade promotion, aided the development of cities and handicrafts, for that purpose attracting artisans from other regions to his land, and so forth. He founded the new capital, Tigranokert, situated on the main trade routes.

Slaveowning economy reached its highest development in Armenia during the first century B.C. But at the same time manifestations marking a transition to new social relationships and to the collapse of the slaveholding state began to be observed. Armenia's geographic position between the Asiatic possessions of mighty Rome and its most stubborn enemy, the Parthian state, involved Armenia in the century-long and ruinous struggle between those two states. The political situation deteriorated still further inasmuch as the trend toward feudal disintegration was by this time definitely ascendant in the country. The *Nakharary* (especially under the Arshakid dynasty in the fourth and fifth centuries after Christ) finally assumed significance not merely as a landowning upper class, but also as independent feudal princes ruling their individual principalities. Around them were grouped the dependent holders of smaller fiefs, the free *Azaty*, who in their turn had slaves and dependent peasants on their lands. Slave labor on the estates of the *Nakharary* and *Azaty* was gradually superseded by the labor of peasant serfs. The peasants were subject to heavy tribute: head, land, crop, and other taxes. They fell into economic and personal bondage under the feudal lords, were compelled to do statute labor on the owners' land, and were converted into serfs. By the fifth century the Armenian state represented a combination of small feudal principalities (about fifty in number) united only nominally by a central royal authority.

As a result of unfavorable external circumstances and internal disintegration, the Armenian state had begun to decline by the fourth century after Christ. In the fifth century Persian conquest was added to internal feudal wars. The country was devastated, with complete destruction of its towns and trading centers. The country literally fell apart: the west fell under the rule of Byzantium, the east, under the authority of Persia. The surviving feudal-prince aristocracy began to play the role of vassals to Byzantium and Persia, while the rural population fell completely into feudal-serf bondage under their owners.

GEORGIA The political history of Georgia during its early stages was in many respects parallel with that of neighboring Armenia. When the Kartvel tribes settled Transcaucasia they retained the agricultural-herdsman character of their economy with vestiges of considerably declining clan customs, with tribal organizations headed by local tribal princelings, and so forth.

As a result of the diversity of the natural environment of the country—differing in its western and eastern parts, in the plain and in the mountain districts—economic and political conditions of life took shape variously. On the fertile lands of the plain of Transcaucasia, tillage, horticulture, and viticulture began to develop early. In the mountainous districts stock breeding predominated. Through the entire land and through its ports on the Black Sea passed the more important caravan routes of contemporary commerce between the West and the East. Georgia, therefore, was involved in world trade at an early period. Towns and large handicraft and trade centers began to arise (Mtskhet, Tbilisi). But at the same time, situated near and between the frontiers of the most powerful states of the time—the Pontus and the Parthian states, Persia, the Roman possessions, and so on—Georgia began to be involved in the struggle among them and to suffer conquest by them.

Georgian sources date the first state organization of the Kartvel tribes in the era of the Greco-Macedonian conquest of the third century B.C. Among Roman historians references to them are found in the description of the campaigns of Pompey in the first century B.C., which opened the age of Roman influence. At that time the overwhelming part of the population was free and engaged in agriculture. In their social relations remained remnants of the patriarchal family-clan mode of life together with tribal organizations, but already with considerably developed social and property inequalities, and the emergence of higher clan and warrior ruling groups. The king and the upper ruling groups concentrated in their hands a large number of slaves. Simultaneously, landed private property was increasing among them. In the first century B.C., Georgia already was a slaveowning class state, although containing considerable vestiges of clan relations along with the persistence of communal land ownership among the mass of the population. The king, or *Mamasakhlisi,* as the elder of the clan and the largest landowner, stood at the head of the state. The royal economy was maintained on the basis of slave labor. There were also found on the royal lands, however, peasants, or *Glekhi,* in servitude, who served their quotas of forced labor and other obligations. Among the upper ruling classes were the leaders of military bands, the tribal rulers and the elders, who also owned lands and slaves.

By the second century after Christ, social-economic differentiation had already so increased that the components of the tribe were sharply divided into freemen (*Aznaury*), who in turn produced the leading aristocracy from their ranks, and the subservient (*Uazno*), the servants, the men in bondage, and the slaves (Nona, Mkhevali).

In various parts of the land, in the Black Sea province of the Colchis (Abkhazia), for example, Greco-Roman colonization began to develop quite early (third century B.C.). Along with it came an extensive export trade in

the products of agriculture and stock raising, timber, slaves, and so forth; and shipbuilding developed rapidly. The largest Greek colony, Dioskuria, according to the evidence of Strabo (first century B.C.), attracted a mass of traders of various nationalities who spoke in three hundred languages. Very early (as far back as 3,000 to 2,000 B.C.) the extraction of copper ore and copper smelting began to develop (in the regions of Batum, Allaverdi, Gandzha, Karabakh, and elsewhere), and later the craft of forging iron.[4] These factors contributed to the decline of the natural economy there, and to the rise of widespread monetary exchange, while at the same time the patriarchal clan and tribal order disintegrated, and slavery and conditions of bondage developed.

In political relations Georgia, being a buffer state between Persia and the Roman-Byzantine possessions, alternately fell under the rule of their power. In the fourth century after Christ, Georgia split into two parts, one falling under the rule of Persia, and the other under Byzantium. In the fifth and sixth centuries after Christ, Georgia became a Persian satrapy, ruled by Georgian kings in a position of vassalage. In the seventh century Georgia became independent for a brief period, but within the same century was again invaded by the Arabs, who occupied eastern Georgia (643–645) and established Arab rule there. Thereafter social-economic changes occurred as a result of which the country entered into a long period of feudal disunity and the rise and development of feudal-serf relationships.

AZERBAIJAN In the historical confusion about the ethnic character of the natives of ancient Azerbaijan (Albania), the first historical information about its settlement dates from the seventh century B.C., when the Scythians in their migrations from beyond the Caspian and from the South Russian steppes made their appearance here (the Massagetae and Scythians of Herodotus and the Saki of Strabo). At the beginning of the Roman era, aside from Armenian national elements found here (in Karabakh), there were also Albanians (apparently a people formed by the mingling of local aborigines and the Scythians), who retained a nomad mode of life and a clan order but did possess towns and trade and had formed an independent state organization—Albania. By the first century after Christ, Persian domination was established in Albania; widespread Persian colonization and Iranization of the inhabitants took place, the nomad Albanian population merging with the mass of new arrivals, Kurds, and so forth. Azerbaijan changed into a Persian province, part of a slaveowning state of the Asiatic type, for many years.

Further conquests by Arabs, Turks, and finally Mongols gave Azerbaijan an even more mixed racial composition, with a preponderance of Turkic

elements. As nomad-herdsmen they introduced dominance of the nomad-herdsman type of economy, but with it long continued the primitive patriarchal-clan relations, including widespread slavery. The depletion of the country by numerous conquests, particularly the Mongolian devastations of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, made it impossible for any sedentary agricultural civilization to gain strength, except in some scattered districts. Furthermore the development of feudal-serf relations proceeded slower, and Azerbaijan retained the patriarchal system and a nomad-herdsman economy longer than the other, more advanced parts of Transcaucasia.

2. THE NATIONALITIES OF CENTRAL ASIA IN ANTIQUITY[5]

Central Asia is a land of a rich, long, unstable historical past. According to some evidence the beginning of its civilized and historical life dates back some seven to eight thousand years before our era. Its geographic frontiers cannot in any way be considered fixed, merging in the west with the Trans-Volga and Trans-Ural Bashkir steppes, passing in the north into the West Siberian steppes and the Ural foothills, and extending in the south to the wastelands and semideserts of Iran, Arabia, and Asia Minor. In the east it merges with the great Chinese-Mongolian deserts of Central Asia: with eastern Turkestan, Mongolia, with the arid expanses of Gobi or Shamo, the Hungry Steppe, the foothills of the Pamid, and Afghanistan.

Within these somewhat vague historical-geographic frontiers of what is usually called Central Asia, we thus include specifically from the present-day USSR the five Soviet republics—the Turkmen, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tadzhik, and Kirghiz SSR's, all analogous in their historical destinies. This historical grouping is also explained by the fact that this huge steppe-like and partly semidesert region was for several thousand years the arena of tremendous and, at that time decisive, world events, frequently disturbing the whole known world of that age for long intervals and producing vast political and social-economic revolutions.

The reason for the above may be found in the circumstance that this territory, as is obvious from its aforesaid frontiers, lay along the great historic routes uniting the Mongol-Chinese and Turko-Tatar peoples of the remote East with the West. Beginning with the appearance of the Huns as early as the first century B.C., then the Turks in the sixth and eighth centuries after Christ, and the Mongols in the twelfth and thirteenth and fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, these routes were successively crossed by the largest historical movements of these peoples from the East to the West, from Central Asia into Europe. Central Asia was the historical and political halting place,

the site of temporary halts in the westward movement of these peoples, who left behind enduring traces of their racial-cultural influences and state-political organizations. On the other hand, the Western nationalities, too, beginning with the Greeks and Romans, in order to control the trade routes crossing there from the West to the East, and to defend themselves against invasion therefrom by the nomad peoples of the Mongolian East, also launched military campaigns and conquests, and left behind the lasting influence of their Hellenistic slaveowning civilization.

The above are highly complex and far from resolved problems of general history and of Eastern studies. Therefore we can in no way aim at presenting even in brief an exhaustive treatment of these exceedingly involved historical events. We shall merely touch upon them enough as is necessary to understand the subsequent presentation of the history of the economic and cultural development of the Central Asiatic republics of the Union.

THE AUTOCHTHONS OF THE LAND AND THEIR ECONOMIC SYSTEM One of the earliest and most trustworthy historical events in the political life of Central Asia, with which historians usually begin its documented history, is the conquest of that territory by the Persians in the sixth century B.C. There is no doubt, however, that even earlier the main part of Central Asia, which was later named Turkestan, represented a civilized region inhabited by Aryan peoples with highly developed irrigation agriculture and with developed cities, trade, and handicrafts.

According to Herodotus, during the fifth century B.C., east of the Caspian (Girkan) Sea and beyond the Aral (Oksian) Sea lived the Massagetae, nomad-herdsmen in the primitive stage of social development. They lived apparently under a primitive system with matriarchy rule (the mother clan) and with group marriage. They had not yet learned the use of iron and their primitive arms were made of copper. South of the Aral Sea lived the Khorezmites, sedentary and semisedentary agricultural tribes under a clan order and having a type of patriarchal slavery. By the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., they had formed a state organization which was conquered by the Persians. Further to the south, in Sogdiana, Bactria, and Margiana, numerous tribes and peoples lived a more advanced, sedentary mode of life, engaging in agriculture. Even at that early age they had artificial installations for irrigation farming. In the sixth century B.C., these peoples still retained their clan system, though with considerable social differentiation. In Bactria, for example, the population was divided in three castes: priests, warriors, and farmers. Slavery of a primitive-patriarchal character was widely prevalent, especially among the privileged castes. Because of the passage of the oldest caravan trade routes to China, Tibet, and India through Bactria and Sogdiana, these

areas began early to play the important role of intermediaries in the expansion of trade and of cultural influence between the East and the West. This has been recently confirmed by the latest archaeological discoveries both within these areas themselves as well as in the neighboring countries of India and Tibet.

Later conquests and military invasions by foreign conquerors profoundly altered the ethnic composition of the most ancient inhabitants of the land. Hence even the most recent ethnic composition of the peoples of Central Asia is distinguished by great complexity and diversity.

THE PERSIAN CONQUEST The Persians, after conquering the peoples of Central Asia in the sixth century and extending their influence as far as the Syr-Darya River, established their own satrapies in Khorezm (the Khiva oasis), Sogdiana (the land between the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya), Bactria (Afghan Turkestan), and Margiana (Merv). The conversion of these areas into satrapies of Persia coincided with the transfer of cultural ascendancy from the Khorezmites to the Bactrians, with intensification of sedentary irrigation agriculture and the beginning of class divisions among the population. The Persians, like many of the later conquerors of Central Asia, did not introduce any radical change in the economic conditions of the subjugated peoples, and were content merely to subjugate and tax the population. This may have been stimulated to a considerable extent by the fact that in districts with artificial irrigation and the cultivation of rice, irrigation was a convenient means for establishing the dependence of the agricultural population on the central authority of the conquerors (the so-called "Asiatic method of production").

CONQUEST BY THE GREEKS The next event of profound effect on the economic welfare of the country of the Central Asiatic peoples was the Greek invasion (conquest by Alexander of Macedonia). The defeat of the Persians by the Greeks and the latters' conquest of Sogdiana (330–327 B.C.) served as the beginning of Greek rule in the former satrapies of the Persian state, accompanied by cruel suppression of all opposition. Alexander founded twelve cities there, resettled Greeks therein, and provided the first impetus for the absorption of Central Asia into the Hellenistic civilization of the slaveowning type. Henceforth slaveowning economy began to strengthen, preserving the special features associated with irrigation agriculture.

After the collapse of Alexander's empire, the power passed to his successors, the Seleucids. Under their rule, in the interest of defense against neighboring nomads, various oases, such as the Merv, for example, were surrounded

by walls especially constructed for that purpose, the first structures of this type in Central Asia. Several new cities were built, including Merv.

The rule of the Seleucids was not lasting, however. In the northeast new states were formed, the Parthian (in Khorassan, 256 B.C.) and the Greco-Bactrian (consisting of Bactria and Sogdiana). The Parthian slaveowning state, inhabited by peoples related to the nomad Iranians, during its most flourishing era extended from the Caspian and the Euphrates to India. In A.D. 226, the Parthian state was in turn conquered by Persia. The new Persian dynasty of the Sassanids (225–651) formed one of the largest Eastern monarchies, which long held within its political orbit Khorezm and Sogdiana. But the economic life of the peoples of these lands, aside from the ruin brought about by each new conquest, underwent very little change.

With regard to the Greco-Bactrian state, since the second century B.C. it suffered repeated invasions by the Scythian nomads from the north, which led to the collapse of the Greco-Bactrian kingdom and Greek civilization (around 90 B.C.), and to the foundation of an Indo-Scythian state that was politically and economically unstable.

Since that time the military movements of Mongol nomads from the East were of major importance in the history of Central Asia. For many centuries these nomads migrated westward from the east and north, conquering and ruining entire countries and nations, forming their own temporary, unstable political organizations there, and then frequently vanishing, often without trace, from the historical arena.

THE HUNS Historians of Central Asia, drawing upon Chinese sources about the nomads known to the Greeks as Scythians, report the following. In the second century B.C., in the western part of present-day Dzhetysuy, lived a people of Aryan origin called Se (Saki, later the Scythians). Somewhat to the east of them lived the Yuechzhi (or Tokhary), a people of Turkic origin. Near them lived the Usuni people, whose origin is not clear. Some historians view them as the ancestors of the Kirghizians and Kazakhs. In the case of all of these peoples, the impetus to migrate southward and to the West was a result of the invasion of Central Asian areas by the Mongol Huns in the first century B.C. Up to that time the Huns had lived in the region of present-day Mongolia, extending from Lake Baikal to the Yenisey River and Tibet. The social basis of their group life was the clan, in an already complex form. Particularly during their campaigns of conquest, a clan aristocracy of military-tribal leaders began to emerge. Slavery was widely practiced. By occupation the Huns were a nomad-herdsman nation. After the invasion of Central Asia by the Huns, part of them settled and merged with the people living there, while part moved to the north and west. In the fifth century

after Christ, under the leadership of Attila (445–453), the Huns moved into Europe, providing the impetus for resettlement of the Western peoples ("the Great Migration of Nations"). Having been beaten (the battle of Chalons, 451) and thrown back to the East, the Huns, after the collapse of their kingdom, organized several separate semisedentary states of nomad tribes on the East European plain and beyond the Volga which became known in history under the names of Khazars, Pechenegs, Polovtsy, and Bulgars.

Invasion by the Huns also caused dislodgment of the Usuni people, and the latter in turn dislodged other tribes and peoples of Central Asia, who, moving with them to the southwest, occupied Sogdiana, Bactria, Margiana, and part of India, and completely intermixed with the local nationalities of Iranian origin. In the fifth and sixth centuries after Christ, under pressure by new nomads migrating from the eastern steppes of Mongolia, changes in political organizations and their dynasties (the states of the Syanbi and Zhuzhani people) occurred in these areas.

CHINESE INFLUENCE Till the end of the sixth century after Christ, Central Asia was under the influence and sometimes also the control of China. This was partly due to the so-called "silk route" from China to the Near East, and farther into Europe. This caravan road, opened in the second century B.C. for the export of Chinese silk to the Greco-Roman world, became the main route between the East and the West. Central Asia became the transit land through which the West shipped its crystal and glass to the East, and the East sent out its silk. Various provinces, as, for example, Khorezm, Sogdiana, Fergana, and Tokharistan, were drawn into world trade by virtue of this "silk route." The Sogdians, with their leading city of Maracanda (Samarkand), controlled the silk trade and founded their colonies in steppe areas of nomadic population. In Fergana with its fertile soil and rich crops, especially in the irrigated areas, agriculture, horticulture, cotton growing, and viticulture were developed. Under the influence of the trade route and to satisfy its needs, horse breeding developed, and lucerne fodder crops were raised. Intensive expansion occurred in urban life and handicrafts, in the manufacture of articles and vessels of gold and silver as well as iron weapons, and later in glass manufacture imported from the West.

THE TURKIC PEOPLES In the sixth century a group of nomad-herdsmen tribes, known collectively under the name of Turks (Torks, or the Berendei of the Russian chronicles) and living in the east in the foothills of the Altay mountains and along the upper Yenisey, began their migration. The Turks at that time were in the stage of clan customs with clan com-

munes, but already with the formation of a clan aristocracy and the prevalence of slavery. The Turkic tribes rapidly gained control over the northern part of Central Asia, penetrated into the south and west as far as the southeastern steppes of Europe, and there organized a vast state, the Turkic Kaganate. The latter was founded on the basis of union of the Turkic tribes: the Oguzy, the Karluk (Altai), the Kirghizians (upper Yenisey), and the Uygury (Semirechie).

At the end of the same sixth century, the Turkic Khanate split into an eastern part (Mongolia) and a western (Semirechie). The center of the latter became the Dzhetysu land belonging to the aforesaid Usuni people, with its chief trading place in the town Suyab on the Chu River. The population, led by their tribal princes the Kagans, engaged in stock raising, agriculture, and trade. And whereas Chinese travelers of the second century B.C., in the eastern part of the former Syr-Darya area, found only nomad life and prevalence of clan customs, the Chinese traveler of the seventh century after Christ, Syuan-Tszyan, everywhere encountered urban life with a developed trade, tilled fields with cultivation of rice, wheat, and millet (in the Zeravshan and Kashka-Darya valleys), a developed silk industry, and small domestic and handicraft industries. Every town and its neighborhood had its own chief, a large landowner-dekhkan,* who lived in a fortified castle like a feudal lord and was subordinate to the alien supreme ruler of the Turks.

With regard to the eastern part of the Turkic Khanate, its power, after uprisings and struggles among its leading tribes, the Yugrians and the Kirghiz, at the beginning of the ninth century, passed to the Kirghiz who took possession of all lands up to Mongolia inclusively. For the Kirghiz the main branch of economy was nomad stock raising; a negligible part of the population engaged in agriculture, and in the arid regions artificial irrigation occurred. Remains of Kirghiz irrigation structures have been preserved to this day in the Minusinsk territory. The chief implement for cultivating the soil was a special Kirghiz plow with iron plowshares. In addition to stock raising and agriculture, handicrafts making metal articles (arms, agricultural implements, and so forth) were quite widely practiced. The basis of Kirghiz social organization of the ninth and tenth centuries was the clan system, which was, however, already in a state of decline with the emergence of a tribal aristocracy, the latter's seizure of huge pastures for its vast herds, and its use of slave labor.

In the period of Turkish rule, Central Asia, especially its agricultural districts, experienced the passing and dissolution of its clan and tribal patriarchal system. Foreign conquest there created a special military-feudal system that had not yet reached an advanced form of feudal-serf relations,

* Peasants in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.—ED.

but nevertheless included sharp division of the population into classes, into an aristocratic "white" and an ordinary "black" caste. The nomad-herdsman character of occupations and habits remained among the bulk of the Turkic population, but agriculture had an ever increasing development in the old settled districts. In place of the former clan system and land commune, there began to arise personal and landed relationships of feudal-type servitude. Simultaneously came the development of commerce by way of the trade routes between the East and the West that crossed the country. All of this contributed to the further disintegration of nomad-clan customs and to the strengthening of the feudal-military system of the Turkic state, with its feudal decentralization into individual parts. Hence the Turkic state proved no more stable than the other states of Central Asia formed by the nomad conquerors.

Divided into a great number of independent feudal possessions headed by their khans, with expansion of the feudal estates of the large landowners-dekhkans, who were only nominally subordinate to their Turkic rulers, the Turkic state, as a result of this feudal disunity, was unable to oppose a new conquest by the Arabs. The Arab conquest of Central Asia at the end of the seventh century caused final consolidation of the feudal system already beginning there.

Notes

1. Stalin, *Marksizm i natsionalno-kolonialnyi vopros* (Marxism and the National-Colonial Problem) (1937), p. 4.
2. See Map 1, facing p. 44.
3. Moisei Khorenskii, *Istoriya Armenii* (History of Armenia—Russian translation by Emin) (1893), Vol. I, p. 24.
4. Iyessen and Degen-Kovalevskii, *Iz istorii drevnyei metallurgii na Kavkaze* (From the History of Ancient Metallurgy in the Caucasus) (1935), pp. 22, 213, 238.
5. See Map 1, facing p. 44.

(III)

The Primitive-Communal Economy of the Slavs and Its Decline (Sixth to Ninth Centuries)

THE EARLY historical stages of the economy and customs of the eastern Slavs at the time they settled the eastern plain are insufficiently disclosed by written records. Therefore, as in the case of the preceding prehistoric period, it becomes necessary for our purposes to utilize not so much literary documentation as archaeology, philology, comparative historical data, and so forth.

"Two facts of elemental origin predominate among all or almost all nations during the dawn of their history: the division of the people on the basis of kinship, and the communal ownership of land."[1] Therefore, we may approach the examination of the early history of Slav society and economy from the point of view of these two problems: their clan customs, and communal landed property.

THE CLAN MODE OF LIFE The most important factor governing the development of primitive economy was the forms of clan life that prevailed among the Slavs by the time of their settlement on the eastern plain.

We have observed how the archaeological evidence of the Tripolye culture enables us to assume the existence of a relatively high level of economy and clan life on the banks of the Dnepr as long ago as several thousand years before the modern era.

Historical and philological data also permit us to assume that the Slavs had lived by clan customs for a long period, that is, that their basic social organization was the primitive clan union. Words like "clan," "tribe," and "governor" (*voyevoda*) are common to all Slavic tongues. This indicates that such phenomena were in existence among all Slavs prior to their settlement in the eastern plain. Each clan was ruled by its elders, who sometimes in the event of war (which was quite often) assumed the function and role of commanders, princes, and petty kings. Military organization necessarily disrupted the clan. The latter implied a primitive and general all-embracing organization of kinsmen living largely in an inseparable mass on a given territory. Military unions, on the other hand, implied a complex, mobile, and

integrated organization of free-lancers of various tribes, sometimes unconnected with each other except by war. Such military organizations evidently did in fact sometimes arise (the description by the Arab Masudi about the king of the Dulebs who ruled over all Slav tribes), but in time of peace they fell apart, being replaced by purely clan organizations. Hence the ancient chronicles describe the order of settlement of the territory by individual Slav tribes (the Polyane, Drevlyane, Severyane, Vyatichi, and others), emphasizing that these tribes "dwelled each with his own clan and on its own plots, each clan ruling itself." [2]

THE LANDED CLAN COMMUNE With the abundance of free land within the primitive-communal economy of the clan and the tribe, regulation of the forms of land relationships and land holdings was unnecessary. The territory occupied by a tribe or clan was considered its rightful property. In support of this right to the land stood the plain fact of possession, or seizure. Each member of a clan occupied land wherever he wished and to the extent of his ability. The right to the land was determined by the generally accepted primary principles: "Wherever the ax and the plow went," "Make a clearing—and it's yours," "That which belonged to this village since olden times," and so forth. The tribe and clan defended their territory against all "strangers" or members of other tribes, even to the extent of committing murder; even hunting in strangers' forests was prosecuted.[3] But no regulation of land seizures within the individual clan existed. There existed no fixed boundaries between tribal holdings, let alone among the individual families and households.

Under the circumstances of a territory's settlement by various clans or "large families," relations between them were limited to intercourse of a social, religious, and similar nature (as, for example, "games among the villages" in the story of the chronicler). No economic or land bonds existed between clans. Each tribe represented a more or less sizable consanguineous as well as working collective, a landed clan commune freely disposing all the land occupied by the clan. The very settlement of individual clans and large families, by virtue of the abundance of land, caused a certain amount of freedom in the use of land by each clan. The areas between the various homesteads and clan settlements consisted of free land, which, with its various grounds (woods, fields, and land suitable for pasture), served for making new homesteads, clearings, bee-keeping "marks," and so forth.

Within each tribe the use of land by a particular clan was determined by its labor resources—by the homesteads built, the clearings, and utilization for hunting and bee-keeping. For the latter, for example, it was only necessary to mark the hive tree (the tree within the hollow of which bees were kept)

with a "sign," that is, a mark of somebody's ownership. But, of course, all these homesteads, occupied lands, and marks could only be maintained through the power of the settlers. Only much later, after the clan commune began to disintegrate, did these signs of seizure by utilization obtain the sanction of law.[4]

THE FORMS OF SETTLEMENT AND THE PRIMITIVE HOUSEHOLD During the earlier centuries of Slav inhabitation of the eastern plain, while the clan still retained its importance as the basic pattern of economy and customs, settlement by clans also took place in the form of "villages," "households," "yards," "small towns," and "hearths"—the various names and forms of clan settlement. Moreover, a village frequently consisted of one or two households of one clan. Clan settlements in households of one "large family" size was the predominant form of land settlement. The primitive household constituted the social basis of the bonds of consanguinity among its members. Such households, yards, or "small towns" were built at close range (four to eight versts*) from one another, and could maintain some social and economic bonds among themselves, although on the whole representing independent economic units.

The level of development of production forces indicated by the archaeological finds of this period was typified by crudely wrought metallic, and even wooden, implements for agriculture and hunting, and by primitive pottery not always made with a potter's wheel.

Our archaeological records of this period of about the eighth and ninth centuries have been found in the so-called "long barrows." "Small towns" of the Dyakov type (near Moscow and Kashira, along the Oka, the middle and upper Volga, the Msta, the Sheksna, the Volkhov and at White Lake) were small inhabited dugouts surrounded by a fence, each with its fireplace, simple molded pottery, bone implements, crucibles for copper smelting, and remains of iron ore. Among agricultural implements found there are hoes and sickles. The remains of domestic animals have likewise been found. Some household domestic weaving evidently existed.

The clan character of such a primitive household and "small town" has been indicated by written records as well as by archaeological evidence. The chronicler, relating the tradition of the founding of Kiev, clearly reproduces for us a picture of precisely such a primitive, ancient household or "small town." Indicating that the Polyane "dwelt each with his tribe and on his lands, each ruling his own clan," the chronicler introduces two versions of the story about the three brothers Kiy, Shchek, and Khoriv, and their sister Lybeda, who "lived on the hill," at first separately, and later "creating a

* An old Russian measure of length. One verst approximately equals 3,500 feet.—ED.

town," that is, founding one "small town." According to another version, the same Kiy previously wished to repeat this along the Danube, "to take a liking to a place, hew out a 'little town,' and live there with his clan." [5]

Thus the "townlet," or "small town," which was being built "for his own clan" on the occupied land, in this instance consisted of only a small family of four people. One may doubt the historical authenticity of this origin, particularly of the future city of Kiev. Archaeological evidence (the Kirillov dwelling in Kiev) has firmly established the fact that human settlements on the location of contemporary Kiev were founded much earlier than the chronicler could remember or know, actually some 1,500 to 1,000 years before the modern era. But the chronicler and the tradition he transmitted evidently reflect merely the old and customary relationships when the clan and family organized their household collectively and built their own clan settlements. In some cases such a "large yard" may actually represent one yard and one large house similar to those found in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Archangel Province in the far north. In other instances, upon further growth, the "large yard" may sometimes represent a quite large, collective economic unit frequently composed of several dozen working people who occupied the land jointly, cultivated it, dug out the roots, cleared the forest, hunted there, engaged in handicrafts, regarded the land as "its own," defended it, and so forth. Therefore the "large yard" consisted of a single but complex economic organization ordinarily embracing the entire primitive economy with all its branches, "with the fields, the meadows, the forests and pine woods, the bee-hive trees, the rivers and lakes, the swamp passages and tunnels, the fish and fowl catches."

THE TREND OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY This ancient historical depiction of the primitive household, along with archaeology and Slavic linguistics, proves that the basic economic pursuit of the population was agriculture. The latter was well known to the Slavs even prior to their settlement throughout the whole eastern plain. "Grain" (*zhito*), based on the word "to live," is an all-Slavic word meaning "bread" and serving as the main food stuff; among the western and eastern Slavs, "rye" (*rozh*), among the southern, "wheat" (*pshenitsa*), similarly of an all-Slavic root. Of equal significance are agricultural terms for "plowing," "plowland," "frozen land," "virgin soil," "fallow land," "harvest," "sheaf." In general the vocabulary of all Slavic (and sometimes even parent European) words covers almost all major concepts of primitive agriculture. All this indicates that agriculture in general, and the cultivation of grain in particular, was widely practiced by the Slavs since very ancient times.

Besides the vocabulary of purely agricultural words, the Slav languages

are equally rich in general pastoral terms: "bull," "ox," "cow," "hog," "lamb," or the names of all domestic animals of parent-European origin. The same is true also of all basic terms of apiculture: "bees," "hives," "drones," and others, and of hunting and fishing: "catch," "net," "seine," and others.

In any event, the earliest accounts by foreign writers about Slavs along the Dnepr speak of them as a people engaged in growing grain. For example, the Byzantine emperor Mauricius writes (in the middle of the sixth century) that among the Slavs may be found "endless quantities of all types of fruits stacked in piles, and above all, millet." The economy of the Slavs is also described by the Arab writer ibn-Dasta (middle of the tenth century), whose testimony is especially interesting since it may be interpreted as indicating the practice of a "fallow-undercut" type of agriculture by the Slavs. "The lands of the Slavs have no plowland . . . they graze hogs like sheep . . . most of all they sow millet." A comparison of the information that the Slavs have no plowland and that they nevertheless plant millet, may only be explained in the sense that they did not have any permanent plowed fields, but planted millet in new places each year. In any event our chronicles, in references to the same century, also record that the Drevlyane in the time of Olga "make their own fields and their own lands."[6]

All the above evidence seems to confirm that the Slav race, even before its settlement on the eastern plain, engaged in grain cultivation, stock breeding, hunting, and apiculture. Having settled the northern edge of the eastern plain and penetrated still further into the forests and swamps, moving ever northward, the Slavs pursued the same type of agricultural practices there. With their clan patriarchal bonds steadily loosening, they settled in small villages in large families and homesteads, establishing agricultural settlements and making new clearings in the heart of the forest. Although they also engaged in hunting and trapping here, they did not turn into roaming hunters-trappers, as did some of their neighbors in the far north. On the contrary, they exerted a civilizing influence on the latter by disseminating agriculture. But the character of their agricultural civilization here was prescribed by new conditions of nature. Tillage of the soil and grain culture could be practiced in the forests under a primitive "undercutting" system, which is relatively unproductive and requires great expenditures of labor and a large labor force. Hence the clan and the large family were preserved much longer in the north than in the rapidly changing south.[7]

But in the north the vast forests naturally provided many other outlets for human labor—the hunting and trapping of valuable fur-bearing animals found in abundance there, the keeping of bees, and other forest occupations. Since the south, too, possessed more forests during that early period than it does at present ("and there were near the town [Kiev] great forests and

pine woods"), even the more civilized Slav tribe, the Polyane, besides agriculture also engaged in hunting. The founders of Kiev, the city of the Polyane, Kiy and his brothers, "were wont to catch beasts"; that is, were animal trappers.[8] Among the more northerly tribes animal trapping was even more widely practiced. The forest was the source of valuable products: furs, wax, and honey.

Therefore, in the chronicle accounts of trade and trade agreements, of conquests and tribute, we always find references to the above products of the forest industries. The Severyane pay tribute to the Khazars at the rate of a squirrel per household; the Drevlyane pay Oleg in black martens;[9] the Drevlyane also promise Oleg tribute in the form of "honey and furs."[10] The same products are mentioned as the leading items of trade and barter between Rus and foreign lands. This has been reported, for example, by an Arab writer of the ninth century, according to whom the Russians exported from their country fur skins of otter and black fox. Svyatoslav, wishing to resettle on the Danube, indicates that he wished to receive from Rus "furs and wax, honey and slaves."[11] The same products again—"furs, slaves, and wax"—are presented by Igor as gifts to the Greek envoys.[12] Olga, after conquering the Drevlyane, began to erect upon their lands, and afterward at Novgorod, "encampments and traps" as well as "exterminators," that is, devices for trapping animals and fowl.[13] In other words, during the reign of Olga the hunt was something like a special branch of the princely household in the conquered lands.

Comparing the above data, we may observe the following characteristic circumstance. On the one hand we have perfectly clear and unimpeachable evidence of the agricultural character of the primitive Slav economy. In the event of conquest it became the specific measure of the tribute levied (the *ralo*). On the other hand the tribute itself was designated and executed not in products of agriculture or stock raising, but of the hunting, forest and beekeeping industries. It was precisely the produce of hunting, animal trapping, and apiculture that circulated primarily into trade by payment of tribute, falling into the hands of princes, mercenaries, and "guests." The products of agriculture proper are not mentioned anywhere either in the form of tribute or as articles of export trade. Thus the incorrect impression was created among many historians that, on the one hand, the primitive Slav economy was almost exclusively of the hunter-trapper type and, on the other hand, that trade had made deep inroads into this economy. Neither assumption was actually correct. The entire system of primitive Slavic economy serves as proof that its main activity was agriculture, since only by the products of agriculture and cattle raising could a natural economy of the type existing at this stage of civilization provide for itself.

THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION AND AGRICULTURAL TECHNIQUE The nature of the technique and of the implements and means used in agricultural production reflected the level of development of the material productive forces which the primitive economy, in its struggle against nature, had at its disposal at the time. The technique was indeed primitive but in some districts, along the Dnepr in particular, was quite advanced for its time.

Soil cultivation in the northern forests on the unproductive, improved, and boulder-strewn lands, or in the heavy soils of the steppe, required special plowing implements. The most ancient agricultural implements of the Slavs and other peoples of the eastern plain was the plow (*ralo*—a word of parent-Slavic and even parent-European derivation). Indeed, this plow had nothing in common with the present-day iron multishare plow. The ancient plow evidently was most often made of wood (in archaeological excavations no iron ends or shares have been found), being frequently a one-tooth wooden tool in the nature of a pointed twig; the plow was pulled by one horse. In the south, where turning the heavy steppe soil required heavier implements, they were also of wood and were drawn by several pair of oxen (the ox *ralo,* and also some implements among the Scythian plowmen). Labor productivity was very low: the one-tooth *ralo,* as well as the wooden *sokha,* plowed shallowly and badly. The wooden plow to turn over the land was drawn by horses, whose use as draft power is mentioned in the early years of our chronicle records, for example, like Monomakh's well known words about the bondsman who plows his field with a horse.[14] In the north, for the purpose of turning the shallow but packed soil full of glacial boulders, a type of light and mobile plowing implement, such as the plow-pole (*sokha-sukovatka*) which was preserved there almost to the nineteenth century, began to come into use about that time. The plow-pole was an ordinary twig of a tree with two bends, one of which was used as a handle and the other as the plowing tool.[15] It is drawn by horse, and sometimes by humans. Labor productivity in using this plow was very low, and the plowing of one *dessyatin* * with a horse required up to 32.5 working days, not counting the clearing of the woods by the "undercutting" system, which required up to 45 working days a year per one *dessyatin.*[16] With so great an expenditure of labor this method of soil cultivation could not be afforded, except by a sizable labor force or large family which remained intact in the north for a longer time.

As for other agricultural implements and devices, archaeology and linguistics provide evidence of the use of almost all other means of peasant agri-

* Acre.—ED.

cultural production (contemporary as well as nineteenth century)—sickles, scythes, axes, flails, rakes, hoes, winnowing shovels, and so forth.

THE NATURAL CHARACTER OF THE ECONOMY The internal system of the household unit—the homestead or the family—was basically of a natural type. Inside the household were raised chiefly the products of agriculture and stock breeding indispensable for life; namely, food and clothing. The forest served as the source for preparing primitive furnishings for the house—the benches, tables, and also wheels, wagons, and boats. Linguistic and archaeological evidence indicates that the basic food of the Slavs was vegetable. This is confirmed by numerous all-Slavic terms for the designation of foodstuffs of vegetable origin, like "grain" (*zhito*), "flour" (*brashno*), "bread," "groats," and also "to bake," "to cook," and so forth. At that time, too, archaeological excavations of funeral rites and sacrificial offerings have revealed cereal grains, pancakes, and similar foods. Words describing the treatment of animal products belong to a somewhat later era—"colostrum," "cheese," "curds," and so forth; the basic product, "meat," is a word of ancient all-Slavic origin. During archaeological excavations the bones of domestic animals, chiefly smaller stock like sheep, hogs, and even domestic fowl, were found frequently. ("They graze hogs like sheep," says ibn-Dasta of the Slavs.)

Regarding the articles of clothing which were produced within the household, the Old Slavic vocabulary for clothing—"overcoat" (*plakhta*), "trousers" (*suknya*)—and leather footwear and garments—"pelisse" (*chereviki*)—indicates that clothing was made of home-woven fabrics and of materials of vegetable or animal origin. The Arab and Byzantine writers (ibn-Dasta, Dzhaigali, and Procopius) describe the simple garments of the Slavs as consisting of plain wide trousers, a short coat, overcoat, socks (*kopytsy*) and boots—all of household origin. Obviously no silks whatever, nor silver bracelets, gold chains, or fur trimmings, such as appear later in the wearing apparel of the princes and the rich, were in evidence among the common people. Warm garments of fur were indispensable for everybody under existing climatic conditions, but among the common people, for ordinary everyday wear, they were of course made not of caracul or silver fox, but of sheepskin and other plain domestic furs.

Thus village economy in the comprehensive sense; namely, agriculture (cultivation of grains and textile fiber plants) and the care of livestock, provided the chief products vitally needed to sustain the life of the mass of the population—food and clothing. The processing of these products by means of primitive handicrafts within the orbit of the natural economy was quite well developed. This is also evident from the adequately developed vocabu-

lary of all-Slavic words referring to objects of this class. Here we have such all-Slavic terms as "hide" (unprocessed skin), "leather" (treated skin), "boots," "cloth," "thread," "tow," "wool," in fact all objects of manufacture from textile fiber plants, of wool and of leather, chiefly apparel; and, in addition, a number of wood articles of daily economic use such as "canoe," "sailboat," "jug," "trough," "wheel," "bucket," "barrel," "spoon," and "bench." Another product of the forestry and apiculture industries frequently used for personal consumption was honey, especially for the preparation of drink. The more valuable products like furs and wax served the purpose of tribute to conquerors, as articles of exchange, or for the purchase of products without which even the most primitive economy could not function, chiefly metal articles and tools.

Consequently the Slavs occupying the territory of eastern Europe were a settled agricultural people, quite familiar with all contemporary methods of an agricultural, livestock-raising economy, as well as with the manufacture of rural household products.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE CLAN MODE OF LIFE AND THE RISE OF NEW FORMS OF ECONOMY Such were the economic setting and the mode of life of the large clan family in the age when traces of the patriarchal clan order still survived, that is, up to the seventh and eighth centuries.

This clan order and large family began to disintegrate toward the ninth century. Its framework had become too narrow for the development of production forces under the new conditions of economic mastery and settlement of a broad territory. Altogether new forms came to be required for the organization of production forces.

The nature of the land itself, which was wooded and swampy and with relatively small areas suitable for soil cultivation, its occupancy in small strips along the river banks—all tended to scatter the formerly compact masses of big clans and to replace them with smaller units, still in similar "large yards" and homesteads but with quite different organization of their production forces. Groups of homesteads begin to assemble no longer on the basis of consanguinity, but as territorial-economic designations, villages, and territorial communes. The composition of the family and the homestead was not always economically advantageous from the standpoint of quality of the production forces. In such events the family had to be supplemented by outside labor power, disrupting the original family by the incorporation of "strangers." The numerical strength of the economic unit—the homestead—also had to be considerable because of the difficulties involved in working the heavy soil, and in struggle against nature and against enemies.

How far economic interest, rather than blood relationship, began to prevail in the organization of the "large yard," is revealed by the fact that a "large yard" could be built by "getting together" or cooperating, that is, by agreement, sometimes for a given period of time. The labor power of one family was inadequate for the erection of a household, the digging of roots, the burning stubble off the fields, and so forth, and hence these household chores were organized by "getting together." Before completing their work, the cooperators all lived in one homestead, but could afterward separate and organize their individual households on the plowlands cleared from the forest.

Along with the emergence of the homestead from its former clan and "large-family" mode of existence, changes in the forms of settlement also became necessary. The old "large-family yards" and "small towns" were disappearing. Economic and social bonds of a territorial nature began to prevail, and the settlement itself was acquiring something of the character of a village.

Some of the newer archaeological excavations enable us not only to establish the existence of settlements of this type, but to retrace their evolution from the erstwhile "large-family homestead" as well. Thus, in the Kovshar "small town" in Smolensk Province, two levels were discovered: on the lower level a typical "large-family small town," and on the upper, a new type of "open" village settlement embracing an area of four to five hectares and yielding utterly different archaeological finds: a more improved type of pottery, remains of a great variety of goods, and so forth. The family homestead, the "big yard" and the "small town," had grown into the territorial-economic unit of the village.

THE RISE OF THE TERRITORIAL COMMUNE The territorial commune emerges in this manner on the basis of the development and growing complexity of economic relationships, and the growth of production forces during the continued economic assimilation of the territory. The former land system of the clan was inadequate for the territorial commune and for the village. As a consequence of the increase in the number of new farms and homesteads, the disappearance of the clan character of these homesteads, the increase in the number of "strangers" in the former homesteads, and the decrease in free areas of land, every group of homesteads becomes interested in its own land-territorial rights and in regulating utilization of land in general. Hence, in place of the former clan land commune, the homestead or the hearth, the new bonds and patterns of the so-called "territorial commune" began to emerge. Sometimes the latter might retain in part a consanguinity basis such as the "hearth" in the north, the "fraternity" (*zadruga*) among the southern Slavs, and even the "shareholding" (*dolevoye*) "comradely"

(*syabrinnoye*) agriculture in the Ukraine.[17] But as a rule its territorial character emphasizes the passing of the clan bonds. Incidentally, the emergence of the territorial commune among the Slavs had significant points of similarity with, for example, the German mark, although in their later development they followed different trends.[18]

THE COMMUNE *VERV* We should note, however, that there are exceedingly meager concrete historical facts and evidence by which to judge the early phases of the birth and development of the Russian land commune before the fifteenth century. The earliest testimony of historical record is contained in the articles of *Russkaya Pravda* concerning the *verv*, interpreted by some historians as a land unit still based on some form of blood kinship. Actually, however, the *Russkaya Pravda* speaks of the *verv* only as a territorial-administrative union of homesteads, connected by joint responsibility for specific legal-administrative affairs. For example, in certain instances the *verv* was charged with responsibility and joint liability for murder as well as for some types of theft.[19] The very name *verv*, or *rope*, as a primitive unit for the measurement of land ("and the plowland there, sire, was five *ropes* long"),[20] indicates that we are dealing here with an age when land usage was "measured" and regulated, and not of a time of free occupation. Thus the very evolution of the communal *verv* suggests that it had in any event dispensed with its clan bonds to become a territorial commune. Regarding the historical period of the primitive economy of the sixth and seventh centuries examined by us, this process of the dissolution of the clan commune and the emergence of the territorial commune had evidently just begun. Within this period the territorial commune had not yet experienced the need of introducing land-equalizing boundaries and, consequently, had not yet been transformed into the boundary-equalizing commune of the fifth century. Similarly, private land ownership had not yet emerged, although land inequality had evidently come into being.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE PRIMITIVE TOWN As indicated above, the household, the village, the hearth, and the "small town" originally served alike as primitive forms of settlement and mastery of the territory. They were all alike the first material cells of primitive economic organization, and all at first basically possessed a single labor collective, predominantly a clan or family, which united the simple branches of the natural economy of that period.

The later development of these forms of settlement, and the emergence of the new forms of "the primitive town" among them, were closely con-

nected with the growth of the production forces of the economy and with the first beginnings of social division of labor. This process evolved neither identically nor homogeneously because of a number of circumstances. Even during the period when, in the description of the chronicler, some of the Slavic tribes lived in clans in the woods "after the fashion of beasts," they did come together for "games among the villages" where pagan religious rites were performed, wives were abducted, and sacrificial offerings made. Here, too, hunters and trappers exchanged their catch for weapons and other articles. Later, during the growth of the population and its concentration in larger settlements, places of this type were gradually transformed into primitive towns, where new forms of economic activity such as primitive crafts and barter trade were established not accidentally or temporarily, as in the case of the games, but in the form of permanent organizations. However, we still speak of the social division of labor during this period in a limited meaning of the term.

Another way in which primitive towns emerged was when a homestead organized by the single family or clan stock, by virtue of its favorable situation, developed into a rudimentary town, as in the case of the above legendary account about Kiev. The same chronicler, continuing his tale of the territory's occupation by the various tribes, names the towns of Smolensk, Novgorod, Beloozero, and others, the dates of origin of which he does not remember, but which evidently arose on a similar basis of clan and tribal roots. Here he also tells of the two brothers Radim and Vyatko, who, like Kiy and his brothers, settled with their clan and were responsible for the rise of the Radimichi and the Vyatichi. These lived in the woods, however, not in towns and in "villages." [21]

Therefore, although the first Varangian newcomers referred to the Slavic lands as "a country of towns" (Gardariki), these were not towns in our sense nor even towns typical of the tenth and twelfth centuries. Even when they occupied a large "enclosed" and fortified territory, they were frequently mere centers of defense and temporary refuge for a population that lived in its own households and hearths. In normal times towns of this sort, with the exception of a few large trading outposts, remained nearly empty.

Ordinarily a district gravitating toward a large town was almost never identical with the territory and the population of one tribe; and, conversely, separate tribes hardly ever belonged to the same town, although in most cases they succeeded in lending it a predominantly tribal character. One of the largest towns was Kiev, the tribal center of the Polyane, but we find gravitating toward it substantial sections of the Drevlyane with their town of Iskorosten, as well as a part of the Dregovichi with their town of Turov. The old

town of Smolensk unified parts of the Krivichi and Radimichi. Furthermore, the conquest of a town often meant also the conquest and subjugation of the entire province gravitating toward it. The town growing out of an earlier "small town," which had represented the household of but one family, changed into a complex social-economic entity possessing a particular population stock with special economic needs and tendencies and special influences on the smaller surrounding settlements, villages, and small towns. The social division of labor and the rise of the town were gradually progressing.

In the south, among the Polyane, who were a more civilized tribe on the one hand and lived close to nomad savages on the other, the town as a form of fortified settlement began to develop earlier. At least our archaeological remains indicate large numbers of small towns within the areas of the erstwhile Kiev (over 400) and Volyn provinces (over 300), with the majority of them actually dating back to the very ancient, preprincely period. In general the first Varangian princes "took their seat" in already existing towns, in Novgorod, Beloozero, and Izborsk, and then bestowed upon their "men" the towns of Polotsk, Rostov, and Murom, all earlier urban centers of the various tribes. They also conquered towns belonging to other tribes.

In the later, or princely, period additional towns arose due to military-administrative needs, as places for the protection of the populace against raids by nomads and other enemies. In the early records of our chronicles concerning the Varangian princes, we find evidence that the Varangian princes began to "erect towns" and "parishes" (*pogosty*)[22] both for military purposes and with the aim of developing trade.

Naturally in the more conveniently located centers, particularly along the river banks, larger areas gravitated toward the towns and the towns' influence over the surrounding villages and settlements was stronger. Small villages and "small towns" were being attracted toward the larger, regular towns. The large towns became centers of tribal life and, simultaneously, the seat of the tribal princes. They also acquired a commercial importance which reached far beyond the prescribed territory of neighboring tribes, while the towns proper became transformed into large trading centers, completely losing their former character. Hence the leading towns of purely Slavic origin, which are known in our chronicles as comparatively large trading centers, were concentrated along the main water-transport artery, the Volkhov-Dnepr route. And the more trade flourished within these centers, even as long ago as the period of Khazar and Slavic trade, the more the importance of these towns continued to grow. In the archaeological excavations of these towns, two levels are frequently found: a lower level dating back to the eighth and ninth centuries, and an upper level belonging to the more recent tenth and

twelfth centuries. The remains of objects found there are partly of Scandinavian and partly of Eastern origin.

TOWN POPULATION AND ITS DIFFERENTIATION The new economic-territorial bonds, which the large towns came to reflect in lieu of the former family bonds of the "small yard," necessarily also created special classes of people there, distinguished from the mass of the provincial or nonurban, agricultural, and hunter population. The town, especially whenever it consisted of a homogenous tribal population, served as the seat of the tribal princelings and administrators (Mal among the Drevlyane, Khodata among the Vyatichi, and others). Inside the town began to arise the social organization of the townspeople—the *veche* (common council), which managed the affairs of the town, the suburban region, and the lands, occasionally inviting princes as their protectors, exiling or even killing them.[23] Within the towns these mercenary protectors found social-economic groups similar to themselves on whom they could rely for support, and whose presence, in effect, made it possible for these hired warriors to evolve into an economic and political ruling class. In the town, faster indeed than in the province and village, came the dissolution and complete disappearance of the vestiges of clan and "large-family" bonds, coupled with the strengthening of new social relationships and the emergence of a ruling military, landowning, and commercial upper social stratum.

The Slavic "guests" and town residents—particularly the latter—were interested in the military defense of their towns, warehouses, and trade routes. To the extent which the Slavs were drawn into trade, even during the earlier Arab-Khazar preprincely period, they took an active part in trade enterprises and in the campaigns of the Varangians, and joined the ranks of the latters' military and commercial battalions. Thus, for example, when we consider that some eighty thousand men participated in Oleg's campaign against Constantinople in 907, we must assume that this army consisted in a large measure of Slavic elements rather than of Varangians alone.

The military-commercial organization of the princely battalions and trading parties thus consisted of the respective classes of the Slavic population in the ancient Slav towns. The towns' "thousand-men," "hundred-men," and "ten-men" constituted the military and ruling urban class; they were the so-called "town elders," that is, the elected town authorities closely associated with the princely battalions and participating, when necessary, in the military-trade campaigns of the princes. This fusion of the incoming and native ruling elements into a political ruling class did not occur at once, however.

We may assume that the princely retinue and the foreign Varangian "guests" were only gradually (by approximately the tenth century) assimi-

lated by the upper Slavic urban classes, the native mercantile elements. What is important is the fact that within these groups, as among the clan and tribal elders of an earlier age, the Varangians found the tribal princelings and the landowning groups to be similar social-economic elements with whose support they could further strengthen their class dominance.

PRIMITIVE SLAVERY Other elements, whose appearance within primitive preclass society tended to quicken its dissolution, were primitive slavery and the seizure of land as private property.

Primitive slavery as a rule developed within the confines of the primitive household and the clan system long before their final collapse. There, however, slavery had assumed a special and largely so-called "domestic" character still devoid of any important production implication.[24] Slaves acquired as prisoners of war usually entered into the slave trade, and were used in domestic service or for harems in the East. Slaves were frequently objects of slave trade also during the periods of the Scythian, Khazar, and the later Varangian trade.

Slavery began to play a much greater role in the dissolution of primitive society among the Slavs when the economic exploitation of the slave was added. Although our written records deal with a later period and thus do not offer any precise evidence on this subject, some records lead us to believe that upon collapse of the clan mode of life, rise of landed inequality within the territorial commune, and seizure of the land by leading clan and tribe groups, a tendency toward their economic utilization of the slave became apparent. In *Russkaya Pravda*[25] we find mention of an ancient Slav privileged class called *ognishchane* who evidently occupied the same position as the later "men of the princes," "boyars," *narochityie,* and "better people," that is, the princely retinue and the upper landowning classes. *Ognishche,* just like *pechishche,* described the household hearth, and with it, in general, the home, the household, and ultimately the domestic servants. The concept of *ognishchane* was thus associated with the independent household and, moreover, the large household maintained with the aid of servants and slaves.

However, the scarcity as well as the controversial nature of our evidence about the *ognishchane* as a landowning and slaveholding social group in ancient Slav society, make it impossible to form any definite conclusions. Since within the territorial commune during the period under discussion, no large-scale private landed property had yet arisen, despite the presence of property and land inequality, it is assumed that the economic exploitation of the slave in early Slav society had not yet succeeded in playing a major part. Nevertheless its existence did have a significant effect on the further development and acceleration of the collapse of primitive economy.

PRIMITIVE TRADE Finally, another element tending to disintegrate primitive economy and to intensify its property inequalities and economic differentiation, was trade.

Primitive trade by its content and significance is sharply distinguished from the later phases of trade development. Having risen during the early stages of primitive economy in the form of occasional exchange or "receptions," trade subsequently evolved, as a result of conquest, trade-plunder, and forcible collection of tribute, into trading in slaves and in valuable plunder—furs, wax, and so forth. With the growth of towns, trade became still more significant as a contributing factor to the dissolution of primitive economy.

Archaeological evidence actually reveals the wide prevalence and ancient origin of trade over eastern Slavic territory. Numerous hoards of Roman and Arab coins of the first and third centuries after Christ and remains of valuable articles of the contemporary trade movement, which are abundantly disseminated over the entire territory from the Caucasus, the Crimea, and the Dnepr to Novgorod, the Oka, and the Kama, along with excavations in the southern Greek colonies, serve as evidence that trade was widely practiced here even during the pre-Slavic period. The Slav era, beginning with the eighth century, continued the development of commerce throughout the country, chiefly by continuing to serve the transit and intermediary trade between the remote Arabian East and Byzantium and the European northwest through the Slavs' nearest neighbors, the Khazars. The Arab period of trade, at its peak during the eighth and ninth centuries, continued up to the end of the tenth century.

But with the beginning of the ninth century, "Russian" trade had already begun to assume the importance of not merely a transit-transfer character between the East and the West, but also that of independent and direct trade with Byzantium. Whereas the ancient type of transit trade moved past the primitive natural economy of the mass of the population, the new trends in trade since the ninth century, gained a foothold within that economy. This combination was not yet decisive. But trade began to be an important factor in the gradual collapse of primitive economy.

TRADE ROUTES The most ancient route of Arab trade passing through ancient Rus was the road from Asia and from the Caspian Sea by way of the Volga and overland to Lake Ladoga and the Western Dvina, and then along the Baltic to the extreme western outpost of Arabian trade, Gotland Island in the Baltic. Evidence of the importance of this terminus of Arab trade is contained in the hoards of Arab coins discovered there along with coins of Western peoples (the Anglo-Saxons), who evidently had come into contact with the Arabs there. Also, Gotland was at that time an important

center of Byzantine trade. Along this route, from its western terminus, the trading and plundering parties of Norsemen-Swedes likewise penetrated into Slavic territory. As merchants of the eighth and tenth centuries, they went there in quest both of trade and plunder. Robbery and conquest were alike a source of trade, with trade supplementing robbery. From the East they obtained silk, silver objects, spices, luxury articles; and sold to the East furs and slaves. This Rus trade has been reported by many Arab writers who, for example, relate that the Russian merchants came with their goods by way of the Volga to the capital of the Khazar kingdom, Itil, where they sold female slaves, sable, and various furs (ibn-Fadlan, beginning of the tenth century). They also reached the Dzhurdzhan (Caspian) Sea, and went by camel as far as Bagdad (ibn-Qutaiba, the end of the ninth century).[26]

Another terminal point, where the eastern routes of the Arab trade joined that of the Normans in the West, was the kingdom of Biarmia, in the extreme northeast, on the banks of the northern Dvina. Here, too, furs (especially squirrel) and slaves were traded. Alongside the Biarmia kingdom lay the territory of the Bulgars (on the Kama) and the town Bulgar, a large trading center, "a fair for the whole territory" (ibn-Hawqal). In the south was the terminus of the Khazar kingdom, Itil. One of the large towns of the Europe and Asia of that time, Itil was exclusively a transit-trade center in Arabian and Norman commerce.

The other ancient trade route was the road "from the Varangians to the Greeks," running from the same points in the northwest, from Lake Ladoga along the Volkhov River (through the future Novgorod), overland to the tributaries of the Dnepr, and thence along the Dnepr to the Black Sea and Byzantium. This route assumed special importance during the period of Byzantine trade (eleventh and twelfth centuries). The change in the direction of trade, however, caused little change in its composition. As before, the East contributed silks, silver, gold, spices, perfumes, and articles of luxury, and to the East went furs, wax, honey, and servants. And again as previously, the pioneers along this waterway traversing the Slavic lands were the Varangian Norsemen. As before, these trading warriors moved across the land and through the interior in search of goods to sell in Byzantium not so much by trading with the Slavs as by conquering, plundering, and enslaving them.

Aside from the great Greek route, trade with Byzantium also proceeded along two additional routes: the Zalozny route running along the Dnestr to the mouth of the Danube, and the Solony route following overland to the Don River and thence to the Crimea from the Azov Sea into the rich Tmutarakan kingdom (conquered by Rus), and further to the Black Sea and into the Greek Black Sea colonies. These colonies were apparently the first points where the Slavs encountered the Western Christian world and came under

its influence (Olga and Vladimir). Only after this stage did the Russians begin to follow the Black Sea further, to the shores of Asia Minor and Byzantium. From that time onward the Black Sea became a truly "Russian" sea, as it was described by our chronicles, where "none but Russians sail," according to the Arab writer Masudi.

Finally, of great importance for the western parts of the land (White Russia and Smolensk) was the water trade route running along the western Dvina, connecting that land with Lithuania and the Baltic Sea.

Thus the primitive economy of the Slavs became involved in the trade between the West and East by the Norsemen-Varangians in the northwest, and by the Khazars in the southeast. For either side the conquest of Slav territory arose as a prime economic necessity since that territory lay athwart the routes of intercourse between the East and the West. But the Khazars could not themselves penetrate enough westward into the interior of the country (they did not go beyond the Kiev and Chernigov lands), partly because penetration from the Asiatic steppes to the northern forests was beset by great difficulties, and partly because their urge to the West encountered another, more powerful Norsemen-Varangian drive toward the East. The same Varangians, these trading warriors who always carried with them their "inseparable sword, knife, and poleax," in the words of the Arab ibn-Fadlan, were then moving across the country of the Slavs from the west to the east and south. Naturally, the sword, poleax, and knife were carried by these merchants not solely for the protection of their persons and their goods, but also for the purpose of procuring goods as tribute from the inhabitants of the Slav lands.

These same trader-warriors were well known to Arab and Byzantine writers both as a mercantile and a military people. They were not, however, a "people," but rather a ruling upper stratum, establishing towns and regulations, fighting, levying tribute, and trading. This was not a people who lived "in the forests," engaged in agriculture or paid tribute, but rather its privileged mercantile and wealthy ruling class. This accounts for the confusion among the Arab writers between the Varangian merchants and the Rus Slavs mentioned above. It was here they obtained the impression that the Rus Slavs were a rich mercantile people. According to ibn-Dasta, the Rus had no immovable property, no villages, no plowland; their sole occupation was the fur trade.[27] In the description of the contemporary land of the Rus in the north, on an island surrounded by swamps and forests, one may easily recognize the original residence of the Varangians somewhere along the Baltic (possibly Gotland Island). These Rus were constantly trading with the Khazars and with Rum (Rome).[28] Their cities were great in number and they lived in plenty. They were rich, "even their men wear gold bracelets," and their

women wore gold chains and expensive bead necklaces.[29] Their household furnishings included pillows, precious rugs, Byzantine fabrics, cloaks with gold buttons, and sable hats.[30] They had a strong military-commercial organization at Itil, where their stores and residences occupied almost half the town. Such was the trade situation between Rus and Byzantium.

The nature of Russian trade with Byzantium is well known through the famous description of the Dnepr trading route by Constantine Porphyrogenitus. "The Slavs paying tribute to them [Varangians] carve their sailboats in their forests during the winter, float them down the Dnepr into Kiev in the spring and sell them to the Rus," apparently in payment of a tribute. Rigged by the Rus and laden with goods by them, the sailing vessels negotiate the long, dangerous, and exhausting trip along the Dnepr, through the falls, past the steppes swarming with Pechenegs, down to the sea, and thence by sea to the Danube and from there into Byzantium. It is interesting to note that the Dnepr falls, listed in detail by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, bear Swedish (Varangian) names.

An inventory of all articles entering into this trade reveals that, while Slavic economy was largely agricultural, producing grain, bread, linen, livestock and their products, it was not these common articles of production and consumption by a natural primitive economy which served as items of trade. The leading articles in the foreign trade were furs, wax, honey, and servants (slaves). These export goods are universally mentioned by all of our oldest available historical evidence. In the above-mentioned description of the Dnepr trade route of the Rus by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, it is stated that along with other goods they carried chained slaves. A special square in Constantinople was used by the Russians for the sale of their slaves. This is also reported by the Arab writer ibn-Fadlan, and further attested to by Svyatoslav in the chronicler's account of his wish to resettle on the Danube.[31] These goods, and almost these exclusively, likewise traveled between Rus and all the neighbors with whom she traded: Constantinople, the Arabs, and the Khazars. Furs and bondsmen were equally valuable commodities for the East and West. Furs were used by the upper social classes of the time for luxury wear, and slaves went to the Eastern harems of the same wealthy classes. The method of obtaining the latter commodity has been picturesquely and accurately told by one of the Arabs, ibn-Rostek. The Rusy, says he, "stage raids against the Slavs, land from their boats, come onto the banks and seize the people, whom they afterward ship to Khozeran and to the Bulgars to be sold. The Rusy possessed no plowland and feed only upon what they can procure in the land of the Slavs."

Turning to the articles imported from Arabia and Byzantium, we discover that the greater part of such imports consisted of luxury articles or arms.

True, these imports were much more diversified than the Russian exports. Archaeological excavation and historical evidence indicate that these imported articles were gold and silver objects and ornaments, valuable silks and velvet cloth, pearls, necklaces, Morocco leather, also spears, swords, and other cold arms, and, finally, spices, including salt, which was most commonly used and came chiefly from the lower Volga and Don salt lakes.

The testimony of ibn-Rostek cited above refers to the period when the Varangians were still common Viking robbers and had not yet turned into a princely dynasty of the Slavs. If we are to believe the chronicler, their violence at first impelled the Slav tribes to offer resistance but afterward, evidently under the menace of new attacks, the Slavs consented to pay tribute "by agreement." But the conversion of outright plunder into the collection of tribute at first brought very little change in the economic relations between the new rulers and their subjects. As previously, tribute consisted of the more valuable products which the princes were able to market abroad. But even the line of demarcation between robbery and "agreement" tribute frequently became obliterated.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION We shall now pause for such summaries and conclusions as may be reached as a result of the examination of the rather inadequate and incomplete historical material on the social-economic development of the primitive economy of ancient Rus during the sixth and ninth centuries.

During the sixth and seventh centuries the Slavs were an agricultural people already acquainted with "plowing" agriculture, with the use of implements for the cultivation of land, the *sokha,* the *ralo* (plow), and in rare instances apparently even including an iron plowshare, with the domestication and employment of animals in agricultural work, and with primitive crafts. In social system they were, during that period, emerging from clan customs and evolving toward the territorial commune.

About this time also, but especially by the eighth and ninth centuries, in an atmosphere of a disintegrating clan system, the social structure began to reveal certain manifestations leading to the birth of a class society. These manifestations were: the emergence within the primitive commune of land and property inequality, primitive slavery, the rise of the primitive town, an early form of division of labor, and the development of primitive trade. External impulses and causes, such as, for example, the conquest and military enslavement of whole masses of the population, hastened this process of dissolution of the primitive society of the day. But evidently these external crises of conquest and military struggle by the various tribes, though unmistakable in their effect, were of less importance in our social and economic history

than in the countries of western Europe, and evolved along a somewhat different course.

Thus, in the ancient lands of the West, in Greece and Rome, the break-up of the clan system and the territorial commune led to the rise of a class type of society and state by the development of an economy based on slavery, which then became the ultimate and universal method of production, in short a slaveowning structure.

In the primitive clan society of ancient Rus, primitive slavery and the economic exploitation of the slave did not attain a sufficiently high degree of development to become eventually the productive base and the exclusive method of production, or the same peculiar and complete slaveowning structure as in the world of antiquity. The Varangians were not numerous enough to change through their conquest the whole economic and social order of the class society prevailing among the Slavs. Rather, they themselves became assimilated among the Slavs.

The social system, into which the disintegration of the primitive society and economy among the Slavs was molded, was the political and economic system of "the Rurik empire" (Marx), or Kiev Rus, with its eventual dissolution into dispersed manorial feudal Rus. We shall now turn to examination of that period.

Notes

1. Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XV, p. 629.
2. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'* (Laurentian Chronicle), p. 8.
3. *Ibid.*, year 975.
4. *Russkaya pravda* (Russian Law), Academy list, p. 3; Troitskii list, pp. 64-66.
5. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, p. 9.
6. *Ibid.*, year 946.
7. Tretyakov, *Podsechnoye zemlyedeliye v Vostochnoi Yevrope* (Fallow Agriculture in Eastern Europe) (GAIMK, 1932), pp. 5-6.
8. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, pp. 8-9.
9. *Ibid.*, year 883.
10. *Ibid.*, year 946.
11. *Ibid.*, year 969.
12. *Ibid.*, year 945.
13. *Ibid.*, years 946 and 947.
14. *Ibid.*, year 1032.
15. Zelenin, *Russkaya sokha, yeyo istoriya i vidy* (The Russian Sokha, Its History and Its Varieties) (1908), p. 13.
16. Tretyakov, *Podsechnoye zemlyedeliye v Vostochnoi Yevrope* (GAIMK, 1932), p. 34.
17. C. F. Yefimenko, *Kresyanskoye zemlyevlavladeniye na Krainem Severye* (Peasant Landholding in the Far North) (1884); Luchitskii, "Syabry i syabrinoye zem-

lyevladeniye" (The Syabry and the Syabry Type of Landholding) in *Severnyi vestnik* (Northern Herald) (1889), Vols. I-II.

18. See Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XV, p. 631. See also Marx's letters to Engels (Nov. 7, 1868): "Everything here," writes Marx about the Russian commune, "is absolutely, *to the most minute detail,* identical with the *primitive German* commune. What is specifically Russian . . . is, in the first place, *not the democratic* but *the patriarchal* character of commune administration, and in the second place, *joint responsibility* in the payment of government taxes." Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XXIV, pp. 126-127.
19. *Russkaya pravda* (Russian Law), Troitskii list, p. 3.
20. Solovyov, *Istoriya Rossii s drevnyeishikh vremyon* (History of Russia Since Ancient Times), Vol. I, p. 232.
21. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis',* p. 13.
22. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis',* years 882 and 947.
23. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis',* years 862, 945, 1097, 1127, 1176; *Ipatyevskaya letopis'* (Ipatyev Chronicle), year 1113, and others.
24. Morgan, *Drevnyeye obshchestvo* (Ancient Society), p. 323; Engels, *Proiskhozhdenie semyi, chastnoi sobstvennosti i gosudarstva* (Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State) (1938), pp. 154, 156.
25. Akademicheskii spisok (Academic list), pp. 18-20, 23.
26. Garkavi, *Skazaniya mussulmanskikh pisatelyei o slavyanakh* (Tales by Moslem Writers About the Slavs) (1870), p. 49.
27. *Ibid.,* p. 267.
28. *Ibid.,* p. 221 (ibn-Hawqal).
29. *Ibid.,* p. 268 (ibn-Dasta).
30. *Ibid.,* p. 85 (ibn-Faalan).
31. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis',* year 969.

FEUDAL-SERF ECONOMY: THE EMERGENCE OF FEUDALISM AND THE PERIOD OF FEUDAL FRAGMENTATION (NINTH TO FOURTEENTH CENTURIES)

(IV)

General Characteristics of Feudal Economy and Its Peculiarities Among the Peoples of the USSR

As becomes apparent from the preceding chapter, the history of our primitive economy and society comes to an end with their gradual dissolution during the eighth and ninth centuries, after which the new social relationships of a class society become more clearly expressed and gradually predominant. But still one or two centuries must pass before it is formed into a definitive social-economic system on a new level of the development of material production forces, and with a new "superstructure."

The new social-economic structure we are about to study bears the name of *feudalism.* On the ruins of that social-economic structure directly arose our contemporary bourgeois society.

It is not part of our objective to undertake an examination of all the complex general problems of feudalism, and we need only dwell on them to the extent necessary for the clarification and the comparative study of the concrete historical problems of feudalism in the economic development of the peoples of the USSR.

We propose to examine here: (1) the problem of the essence and the basic features of the economic system of feudalism as a stage in social relations through which all our people passed; (2) the problem of the genesis of feudalism as the succession of one social-economic structure by another; and (3) the problem of the peculiarities of Russian feudalism and of feudalism among the other nationalities of the USSR.

THE ESSENCE OF THE FEUDAL-SERF ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Feudal-serf economy as an individual system of production relationships and as an individual method of production has been treated exhaustively in the classics of Marxism-Leninism.

The feudal-serf economic system as a whole is distinguished by an underdeveloped social division of labor, by the combination of industrial and agricultural labor, which latter serves as the basis of production. The direct producer is the small individual producer, the small craftsman or peasant who owns his own implements and means of production. But since this peasant possesses no land, he is forced to work on the privately owned land of the feudal lord, paying to the landowner the surplus products of both his agricultural and his handicraft labor. Large feudal landed property exists alongside the petty economy of the direct producer. From these roots arose the relationships of bondage, economic and extraeconomic compulsion, serf dependency, and the "binding" of the peasant to the land. The surplus product, as a rule, was absorbed in its entirety by the feudal lord, which accounted for the fact that the feudal economy was marked by a static rather than a dynamic type of reproduction. For this reason, development of the material production forces proceeded slowly, technical knowledge was of a very low order, and a natural type of economy prevailed.[1]

The unpaid-for surplus product was appropriated by the feudal lord by means of extraeconomic compulsion through the various forms of precapitalist feudal rent. Marx distinguishes three basic forms of feudal rent: labor, products, and money, as the progressive stages in the development of feudal rent. The first two were more typical for feudal economy. Rent in the form of labor (*barshchina*) was the original and simpler form of production. Under this system the labor of the direct producer, in its cruder aspect, is applied in the form of forced labor on behalf of another person: rent and surplus product are completely and directly fused. This type of labor can originate only in extraeconomic compulsion, in serfdom. Rent in the form of products is a derived type of rent in the form of labor, but it affords greater possibilities to the landowner for raising the productivity of labor. Finally, feudal monetary rent is based on the assumption that the direct producer is able to sell some of his product in a market, which in turn is predicated upon the development of trade and towns, and heralds the beginning of the break-up of a natural economy.

Thus, for a typical form of serf *barshchina* economy, and for feudal production, as a whole, Lenin has established the following basic features: (1) the prevalence of a natural economy, (2) the provision of the direct producer with the means of production and with land, frequently along with his attachment to the soil, (3) the peasant's personal dependence on the landowner, (4) an extremely low and routine level of technique, as a result of which the functioning of the economy is concentrated "in the hands of small peasants submerged by squalor and degraded by personal bondage and mental back-

wardness."[2] Such was the content of the feudal economy throughout its existence up to the time of its subversion by the capitalist order.

THE GENESIS OF FEUDALISM IN THE WEST Feudalism as a distinct social-economic structure arose in western Europe on the ruins of the slave system of antiquity, and after the fall of the Roman slaveholding state following the revolt of the slaves and the conquest of the Roman Empire by the Germans. Elements of feudalism had begun to accumulate within the economic system of the later Roman Empire as well as within the social structure of the ancient Germans of the second and third centuries. But feudalism as a dominant type of social relations achieved its full significance only with the fifth and sixth centuries, by virtue of the synthesis of such social-economic conditions as prevailed in the Roman Empire with the new conditions introduced by the conqueror. Marx and Engels, in analyzing the problem of the genesis of western European feudalism, indicate in their joint study *The German Ideology*, that

> the form of society adopted by the settled conquerors had to correspond to the phase in the development of production forces they found in existence, and if that similarity did not originally exist, it was necessary for their social forms to change in accordance with the production forces. . . . Feudalism was not transferred indeed "ready-made" from Germany; its origin was rooted in the military organization of the barbarian troops at the time of the conquest, and only after the conquest, under the impact of the productive forces found in the conquered lands, did it develop into a real feudalism.[3]

In fact the new forms of the social-economic order that arose in lieu of slaveholding Rome had their roots deep within both the ancient society of Rome proper, and that of its barbarian conquerors.

For the Roman Empire the crisis within the large slaveholding latifundia economy reached its full height by the first and second centuries after Christ. By retaining large latifundian property in the hands of a small number of Roman magnates, the latter, because of the extremely low productivity of slave labor, began to break their latifundia into small lots, and to settle it with slaves or free small farmers in the interest of better management. In this manner, instead of the large slave households, the colonate arose as one of the earlier forms of new social relations—small landed producers still retaining some elements of personal and economic freedom as compared with slavery, but attached to the owner's land and paying the owner rent in kind and in labor. In other words the colons* "were the forerunners of the medieval serfs."[4] Following the economic break-up of the slavery economy of Rome, its political and economic system was completely destroyed by the uprisings

* Husbandmen, colonists.—ED.

of the millions of slaves. This made the conquest of the empire by the German "barbarians" easier, putting an end to the power of the slaveholding society. No new forms of social relations, however, were brought "ready-made" by the Germans; on the contrary their "form of society" had to change in accordance with the level of the production forces inside the conquered land.

Among the Germans of the time of Tacitus (first century after Christ), considerable survivals of tribal order still remained. But by the time of their first penetrations into the Roman Empire and their settlement in the territories occupied by them (the Franks of the fourth century), and especially at the time of the final conquest of the empire, the German tribes were abandoning their clan customs and emerging into the territorial commune-mark. The military campaigns and conquests led to the emergence of a military-tribal aristocracy, the formation of military companies, and thence also to the seizure of former communal lands, to the rise of private landed property, and to the exploitation of slaves found settled on the land. These new relations began to consolidate and to be transferred, upon conquest, to Roman soil as the German tribes were settling in the various parts of the former empire. The Germans, "as a reward for having liberated the Romans from their own government," [5] began not only to occupy the free land but also deprived the former Roman owners of two-thirds of their lands. Into their hands fell enormous Roman latifundia with the masses of slaves and colons living on them. The division of the land took place in keeping with the rules of tribal order, including the retention of an undivided portion of the land under the control of the whole tribe, while the remainder (tilled fields and meadows) was distributed among the various members of the tribe. In this manner the German commune-mark was transplanted into new surroundings. But the emergence of a military-tribal aristocracy and military companies, accompanied by the seizure of large land areas and great slaveholding Roman latifundia, contributed toward the collapse of communal ownership of land and to the emergence of large-scale private landed property. At the same time the Roman landed aristocracy proper began to merge with the military aristocracy of the German free-lancers and their leaders. In some parts of the former empire, like the East Gothic kingdom in Italy, this type of assimilation of the conquerors among the vanquished took place on a very large scale, leading to the adoption by the Germans of the social-economic relationships, the early forms of serfdom and latifundian economy of the former empire. In the kingdom of the Franks, where Roman influence was weaker and where the incoming Frank tribes assimilated themselves more rapidly within the Roman Empire, the German conquest for a time left a vast class of free peasantry, and for some time before the development of

feudal relationships, "the free Frankish peasant was between the Roman colon and the new serf." [6] German social customs were preserved more fully in some places where, as in Brittany, the Germans exterminated almost the entire former Celtic population during the conquest, and introduced their own system of land holdings marked, however, by rapidly growing inequality and by the emergence of a tribal aristocracy (*earls*) and common free farmers (*kerls*).

Despite all the subsequent diversity in the development of feudal conditions in the various districts and countries, the process everywhere consisted of the gradual "binding" of the remaining mass of the free peasantry and of the development of the foundations of the feudal economic system. In this manner "the revolution of the slaves liquidated the slaveowners and abolished slavery as a form of the exploitation of the toilers, but instituted in its place serfs and the serfdom method of exploiting the toilers." [7]

With the fall of the slave economy on the one hand and the dissolution of the communal-land system on the other, under the influence of incipient property and land inequality in the commune, and afterward that of personal and economic bondage, and finally of the military seizure of the land by the conquerors, a complex and evolved system of feudal land relationships began to develop in the "barbarian" kingdoms of western Europe. The entire social structure, all social relationships, and the position of each individual person within them ultimately came to be determined on the basis of landownership and land "holding." Beginning with the suzerain, the king, his retainers, and the large and powerful owners, all the vassals depending upon them received land in fief as a lien; that is, in hereditary conditional possession as a grant for service. The complex system of vassalage and vassal dependence and the hierarchy of the upper and "gentle-born" leading classes permeated all society. The whole social-economic foundation of such a system rested on the personal, economic, and land bondage of the direct agricultural producer-serf to his feudal lord-landowner. These feudal relations between the direct producers and their feudal lords received further formal reinforcement by means of a legal pattern of land "holding." But behind this feudal system, even in instances where no personal bondage existed, new relations not only of economic dependence but also of extraeconomic compulsion were taking shape: new methods of production and economy, and new types of feudal manors superseding both the former small free peasantry and the large slave-holding economy. At the basis of this method of production were thus to be found the expropriation of the land from the direct producer by the ruling class, and the economic and extraeconomic compulsion connected with it.

The chief organizational form of such an economy is the natural, closed household economy of both the large feudal manor and the peasant household

in its service. The combination of agriculture with household industry, either within the narrow limits of the peasant household or within the broader framework of the wealthy feudal estate, in either case without any extensive social division of labor and without the production for a market—such were the fundamentals of the economic organization of that system.

The dominant role of landownership and of the owner of feudal land also predetermines the entire political superstructure of this economic system. The whole political structure is determined by landownership, by the position which the landowner occupies in the social hierarchy, depending upon the size.of his landed property and the number of dependents he has among the small landholders. In the absence of a unified political power and its dispersion among the various manorial lords, the feudal landowner becomes the absolute "manorial lord" within the boundaries of his landed property, and the supreme ruler of all bonded peasants residing on his land. The complex relationships of the social hierarchy encompass all social groups and classes alike, all of them being formally required to squire their rights to the use of land, to fiefs, to various privileges connected with its use, and to the right of exploiting bond producers.

The feudal era predominated in western Europe over a period of several centuries, beginning with the fall of the slave system of the ancient world and the Roman slaveowning state during the fifth and sixth centuries after Christ. It begins with the "early feudalism" of the fifth and ninth centuries, when the complete break-up of the old commune took place (differently in the various countries), accompanied by the seizure of communal lands by the feudal lords and the emergence of bondage, when, for example, in the Frankish kingdom the former "free Frankish peasants found themselves in the same position as their predecessors, the Roman colons. . . . They, too, lost their personal freedom little by little; and after the lapse of several generations, a majority of them turned into serfs." [8] During the tenth and fourteenth centuries feudalism in western Europe reached the peak of the development when large feudal landownership, the feudal manor, and the bond peasants living on it served as the underlying primary form of the social organization of feudalism by which the feudal lord extracted from the direct producer the surplus product, feudal rent. Even during this period, however, the first elements in the disintegration of the feudal system began to be apparent: the beginnings of a social division of labor, the emergence of towns, the growth of markets and exchange, and so forth. The rise of a central governmental power led to the gradual overcoming of feudal dispersion. The intensification of the class struggle of the peasantry and the urban population during the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries contributed further to the disruption of the feudal system. Already in the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-

turies, within the confines of feudalism itself, the beginnings of capitalist relationships began to emerge. "The economic structure . . . of capitalist society grew from the economic structure of feudal society. The disintegration of the latter released the elements of the former."[9]

THE ORIGIN AND PECULIARITIES OF FEUDALISM IN ANCIENT RUS Old Russian historiography was long dominated by a tendency to deny altogether the existence in our history of the social and economic relationships that marked the era of feudalism in Europe.[10] At present this tendency has been refuted and, on the contrary, the problem of the existence of feudal relations in Russian history is definitely solved. Pioneer work in this field was done by Lenin, who as early as the 1890's, in his "What Are These 'Friends of the People' and How Do They Fight the Social Democrats?" and especially in his *Development of Capitalism in Russia,* not only traced clearly the historical lines of origin of feudal relations and the "enslavement" of the serfs as far back as the Rus of Kiev during the tenth century, but also contributed a cogent theory on the feudal-serf economic system.

It would be incorrect to speak of the complete identity of the development of Russian feudalism and its political, social, and economic structure with the development of these forms in the West, particularly inasmuch as even among the Western countries a great variety in the types of feudal relationships frequently existed.

As already shown above, by the eighth and ninth centuries the clan order had disappeared among the eastern Slav world. The territorial commune superseding it, by the very nature of its economic relations, afforded some opportunity for the emergence of inequality and differentiation. The new level of development of the forces of production, the transition to "plowed," settled, and mass agriculture, coupled with the rise of personal, economic, and land relationships of dependency, lent the new productive system a feudal character, placing the former ruling groups in the tribal aristocracy, the tribal princelings and military units in the role of large landowners. Slavery, although it existed under the primitive economy, did not subsequently gain in importance as a dominant type of productive relations, failing to provide a production base for a special "slaveowning structure."

The later development of ancient society in Rus therefore proceeded fundamentally not along the path of slavery but in the direction of feudalization. The external impact which here intensified and shaped this process also occasionally bore a military character—the military invasions of the Varangians in the ninth century. But having changed from plundering gangs and robber merchants into a governing, princely, and landowning upper stratum, they

quickly became "Slavonized" and assimilated with Slavic society, finding therein an atmosphere favorable for their own class domination. There occurred, in the expression of Marx, the assimilation of the "social forms" of the settling conquerors with the social forms and production forces found by them in the country. This assimilation proceeded in the course of the ninth and tenth centuries in an atmosphere of the final collapse of the old society, the birth of new forms of a class society, and its feudalization.

Up to this point, in our opinion, this process in its major features repeats the stages in the emergence of feudalism in the West. Henceforth, however, we shall observe their essential differences. First of all, although the permeation of the Slavic lands by the Norsemen, like that of the German barbarians in Rome, was of a military nature, the numerical strength of the conquerors was not sufficiently powerful to combine this conquest with a process of depriving the vanquished of almost all their lands, as was the case in ancient Rome. The Varangians were not, like the Germans, large land-tilling tribes endowed with a complex military tribal organization, who came to conquer and primarily to seize new land. They were small bands of Vikings, half robbers and half merchants, originally interested least of all in land, tillage, or landownership. According to the most recent historian of Russian feudalism, they "could not permeate the vastness of the conquered society and could not shape it, but very soon learned to utilize whatever could not easily be taken away." [11] In addition the very level of development of the productive forces and social conditions of the population on the eastern plain was far from similar to that of ancient Rome.

The barbarians who settled in the territory of the former Roman Empire and its surroundings were confronted with a territory largely inhabited and economically mastered, of course, within the limits of the technical possibilities of the time. The number of the new claimants to the land was great indeed, while free territory for any kind of "free colonization" was generally small. The main process of allotments and grants, therefore, was chiefly in the form of redistribution, dispossession, and partial or complete expropriation of both the former large latifundia owners and the small farmers. Within this atmosphere the process of feudalism moved along with particular ease and rapidity, bringing in its wake all possible forms of personal and economic bondage of the small farmer, as well as of hierarchical relations among the feudal lords.

In ancient Rus this type of forcible mass expropriation of the land by the conquerors did not occur. Even much later the economic appropriation of land by the prince and his warriors frequently came at the expense of the vast open spaces of free, unsettled, and unexploited land. In addition the great mass of the rural population possessed an important weapon for the

preservation of their land rights, under the circumstances of the times, in their land commune. Obviously this could not have served as a complete obstacle against the growth of land dependency and enslavement, inasmuch as the seizure of free and arable lands progressed rapidly, whereas the "free" but helpless serf, who often lacked livestock or implements or any means of subsistence, would be equally incapable of taking up new and unoccupied land or of setting out in search of land unclaimed by the feudal lord.

Hence the state formed by the Slav tribes in the middle of the ninth century, even after a century and a half, had not yet acquired the final features of feudalism. In this connection the opinion of Marx on the significance of the Varangians in the genesis of Russian feudalism is remarkably accurate and profound: its peculiarities, in Marx's view, consisted of the "primitiveness of the organization of the Norsemen-conquerors—a vassalage without a system of fiefs, or fiefs consisting only of tributes." [12]

In other words relations between the Norse invaders and Slav society, as well as internal conditions among the Norse warriors, were responsible at first (during the "conquering" period, in Marx's terminology, of the ninth and tenth centuries) for considerable variation in the tempo and progress of the development of typical feudal relations of vassal dependency and feudal hierarchy rooted in landownership, land fiefs, and so forth. Using Engels's reference to the "free Frank" standing in the way of the feudalization of society in the West, it may be said that the "free Slav" farmer with his peasant land commune limited for a considerable time both the depth and course of the feudalization process. Feudal relations in Slav society during this period were confined to "tribute" for the princes and their warriors.[13]

In the early stages this was revealed by the very slowness with which the feudalization process was completed. Afterward the same circumstance was reflected in less profound political forms of feudalism in Russia, where no transformation of the estate owners into completely self-sufficient and independent local "lords" and barons resulted, as it did in the West. As a consequence the process of the more stable, single, feudal-serf Moscow state occurred more rapidly, a state which always disposed of vast spaces of free lands and was able to regard itself more independent of local estate owners. It accepted them in its "service," thus destroying the isolation of the various parts of the feudal economy.

Naturally the great length of this historical epoch, embracing several centuries, prescribed not only the diversity of the successive forms of state organization in ancient Rus but also the variety of its economic forms. Hence, although in our treatment we combine this whole epoch as the economic system of feudalism-serfdom, with its basic and typical economic form—the closed and isolated economy of the feudal-serf estate, with its

peculiar method of production and the typical lord-serf relationships prevailing around it—we must nevertheless remember that these conditions, in the course of the many centuries of existence, must indeed have witnessed important changes. They differed during the early period of Kiev Rus from the final phases of that state organization, just as they were different in the fief-held Rostov-Suzdal Rus and in the Moscow Rus of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and again assumed their own special forms in the Moscow Russian state of the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries and in the Russia of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

FEUDAL RELATIONS AMONG THE OTHER PEOPLES OF THE USSR Much more difficult and less known, in comparison not only with Western but even with Russian feudalism, is the problem of the genesis and characteristics of the feudalism of the other, especially the eastern, nationalities of the USSR—Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and Siberia. One thing may be considered certain in the Marxist-Leninist view of this problem; namely, that feudalism is a stage in the social-economic development of not only the European West (as was maintained earlier by some Western and a majority of Russian historians), but also of the various lands of the East.[14] Naturally, the extreme heterogeneity of the political, economic, and even natural conditions in the social-economic evolution of these peoples create also a singularity in the development of feudal relations among the nationalities of Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and Siberia, thus making a study of this subject more difficult.

This unique nature of the genesis and essence of feudal development in these areas primarily reflected the fact that many ancient nationalities of Transcaucasia and Central Asia had long existed under the cultural and social influence of the ancient Asiatic and classical world, and had created, as we have seen, states of a slaveowning type (Urartu and Gruzia during the third and second centuries B.C., Sogdiana and Bactria in the age of Hellenism, and so forth). Still, the later birth of feudalism there occurred not solely by virtue of the decline of slavery, as was the case in the ancient world. Slave economy by itself had not achieved any great significance among these peoples, and the overwhelming part of the population retained its freedom and its clan customs up to the time of its final serf age.

Another factor in determining the character of feudal development was the endlessly repeated and successive conquests, particularly since the conquests were chiefly by savage nomad peoples of the East. These conquests not only swept away such incipient state organizations as might have existed in these areas, but also brought utter ruin upon the entire population, frequently destroying all opportunities to develop the material production

forces. Therefore the frequent attempts here at the formation of a feudal system, especially the formation of national states on a feudal-national basis, were wrecked by the conquerors.

Furthermore the existence of irrigated agriculture in these regions, which made necessary large, artificial watering installations by the government, constituted an important element in the development of feudalism in Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and Siberia. To this was added the spread of the Islamic faith among the conquerors, with its formal denial of private landed property. In fact this strengthened the elements of feudalization in society and the emergence of feudal dependency. This prescribed for some districts of Transcaucasia and Central Asia a peculiar direction and form in the rise of land and personal relationships of dependency, a particular variety of "Eastern feudalism." Among other nomad and herdsman peoples (for example the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Kalmyks in the Central Asia steppes, the Buriat-Mongolian tribes of Siberia, and others), the emergence of feudal relationships occurred directly under the circumstances of the dissolution of clan mode of life, the seizure of pasture lands, and so forth, in a form of so-called "nomad feudalism."

In the subsequent chapters we shall examine all these problems with the aid of concrete material, which is, unfortunately, often quite incomplete for an examination of the history of individual nationalities.

Notes

1. For a more developed characterization of the feudal method of production, see Marx, *Kapital*, Vol. III, p. 47; Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III.
2. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. III, p. 141.
3. Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya*, Vol. IV, p. 64.
4. Engels, *Proiskhozhdenie semyi, chastnoi sobstvennosti i gosudarstva* (Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State) (1938), p. 143.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
7. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed., p. 527.
8. Engels, *Proiskhozhdenie semyi, chastnoi sobstvennosti i gosudarstva* (1938), p. 147.
9. Marx, *Kapital* (1935), Vol. I, p. 573.
10. It should be noted here that although a "search for feudal usages" was undertaken in the Old Russian historiography by Solovyov—see his *Istoriya* (History) (1864), Vol. XIII, Book III, and a number of articles, such as "Nablyudeniya nad istoricheskoi zhiznyu narodov" (Observations on the Historic Life of Peoples), and others, and also found expression in the work of Klyuchevskii, who acknowledged "numerous traits similar to feudal relations" *Kurs russkoi istorii* (A Course in Russian History), Vol. I, p. 451—the old Russian historiography in general held to the view

of "peculiarities" and "originality" in Russia's development in this respect, denying the existence of feudalism in ancient Rus. In the prerevolutionary, bourgeois historical literature this problem was treated by N. P. Silvanskii in his work *Feodalizm v drevnyei Rusi* (Feudalism in Ancient Rus) (1907), but very little can be found there for the study of the economic system of feudalism. The latter is still far from being fully covered by historical documents, thus giving rise to a number of disputed questions. In the newest postrevolutionary literature the studies of B. D. Grekov traced the genesis of feudal relations in the Kiev State; see his *Feodalnyye otnosheniya v Kiyevskom gosudarstve* (Feudal Relations in the Kiev State) (1936).

11. Grekov, *Feodalnyye otnosheniya v Kiyevskom gosudarstve* (1936), p. 15.
12. Karl Marx, *Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1899), pp. 75-76.
13. In this respect we cannot agree with the competent historian of Russian feudalism mentioned above who asserts that "vassalage without liens pertains only to the Varangian free-lancers and does not affect local society." See Grekov, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15. On the contrary, the absence of a lien relationship and the existence of liens consisting of tribute only applied most directly to the local agricultural and landowning society as well.
14. For numerous references by Marx and Engels to the conditions of social-economic development in the Asiatic countries and to the origin of feudal relations, see the article "Britanskoye vladychestvo v Indii" (British Rule in India), Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya*, Vol. IX, pp. 347, 351, and also *Anti-Dyuring* (Anti-Dühring) in Engels, *Sochineniya*, Vol. XIV, p. 182; on feudalism in Japan see the observations by Marx, *Kapital*, Vol. I, p. 575. See also references by Lenin in his lecture "On the State," *Sochineniya*, Vol. XXIV.

(V)

Prefeudal Kiev Rus of the Ninth and Tenth Centuries and the Origin of Feudal Relationships During the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries

THE POLITICAL unification of the Slav tribes and their formation of an eastern Slav state in the ninth century was, as we have seen above (Chapter III), one of the later phases in the dissolution of their primitive-communal system and tribal unions during the sixth to the ninth centuries. The disintegration of the primitive, ancient Slavic society, and the formation by the ninth century of new class relationships within it had also fully prepared the formation of the state as the expression of these new conditions within Slavic society. The "conquest" or "invitation" of the Varangians—despite all the historical controversy concerning these events—could only be some of the external episodes in a more profound process of the evolution of a national state. Even the very legendary "invitation of the Varangians" itself, in the middle of the ninth century, could only have been the last stage in the more than a hundred-year-old intercourse between the Norse merchant soldiers and the Slavs, during which the political unification of the Slav tribes and the assimilation and "Slavification" of the Varangian princes were gradually taking place.

Therefore our chronicler, after describing in broad outline and without chronological dates the settlement and customs of the various Slav tribes, begins his "exact" historical description, including a specific chronology, of the origin of the "Russian land" with a prelude—the imposition of a tribute on the various Slav tribes by the Khazars and Varangians. In 859 "tribute was levied by the Varangians from beyond the sea alike on the Chuds and on the Slovenes (men of Novgorod) on the Mers, on the Vesi, the Krivichi; and the Khazars levied on the Polyane, on the Severyane and on the Vyatichi, levying one squirrel per household." [1] And then, three years later, in 862, the chronicler records the most important event in his account—the formation of the Russian state. After driving the Varangians out beyond the sea at first and refusing to pay them tribute, the same Slavic tribes invite these Varangians "by agreement," and since these Varangians "were called the

Varangian Rus . . . from these Varangians came the naming of the Russian land."[2]

We may pass on from here without examination or critique of the chronicler's version of the "invitation of the Varangians" and of the origin of the Russian state inasmuch as this problem has already been examined in its proper place (Chapter I). It is sufficient to note that this version of the Kiev chronicler and historiographer of the prince was apparently evoked by ideological considerations, by a desire to enhance the importance of the Rurik princely dynasty. As a matter of fact, at the basis of the creation of the Russian state lay the unification of the North Russian and South Russian tribes who by the ninth century came together on the main route of their cultural and economic contact, the water route from the region of the lakes by way of the Dnepr to the Black Sea. There from the more advanced Slavic tribes was formed a Slav state. The Varangians, too, had for some time been taking an active part in the political, economic, and cultural life of the Slavs in the role of merchants and mercenary protectors, assimilating and merging with the Slav mass. They had also made their appearance in the form of freelancers, plundering the Slavic population. Thus, in this idyllic description by the chronicler of the "invitation of the Varangians" and the formation of the Russian state, the historical truth is more or less confined to the fact that since the ninth century the Norse princes became the military, ruling upper stratum of Slav society.[3] They subjugated and imposed tribute upon the other tribes whom they found either under the domination of several tribal princelings, like Kiy, Shchek, and Khoriv in Kiev, or under the power of the Khazars—the Drevlyane, Severyane, and Radimichi, who henceforth also began to pay tribute to the princes.[4] The princes themselves and their retinues were rapidly becoming "Slavonized," and the grandson of Rurik already bears the purely Russian name of Svyatoslav.

MARX ON THE FORMATION OF THE KIEV STATE Marx, speaking of the Norse penetration into eastern Europe and of the "Gothic" period in Russian history, indicates that the result was that over this vast territory, from Novgorod to the Kiev Dnepr region and up to the interriver area between the Oka and the Volga, there came into existence a "heterogeneous, disorderly, and immature . . . Gothic empire of the Rurik dynasty . . . created from pieces like other empires of similar origin." At the root of his explanation of the origin and character of the Kiev state of the ninth and tenth centuries and the subsequently evolving feudalism, Marx advances the same considerations by which he explains the emergence of feudalism in the West: the level of development of the production forces within the

country and the state of organization of the conquering barbarian tribes. He says in this connection:

Just as the empire of Charlemagne precedes the formation of contemporary France, Germany, and Italy, so does the empire of Rurik's descendants precede the formation of Poland, Lithuania, the Baltic settlement, Turkey, and the Moscow state itself.[5] The formation, class character, and rapid growth of the national Slav state at Kiev reflected primarily the level of development of existing productive forces in the country, and the nature of the "social forms" of Slavic society of the ninth and tenth centuries. On the other hand the character of the evolving feudal conditions and the emergence of the feudal state were a "natural result of the primitive organization of the Norse conquests—the vassalage without fief relations, and fiefs consisting solely of tribute." [6]

Marx considers the second half of the tenth century and the early eleventh century to be the height of this "Gothic" empire and its prefeudal, "conquering" period. During this period (beginning with the ninth and eleventh centuries) occurred the "uninterrupted" and "viewed-with-alarm" expansion of the empire's frontiers within the country, campaigns of conquest against the West (Byzantium), and the transfer of the capital toward the south, to the old princely-tribal capital of Kiev, which thus became the capital of the state and one of the largest world centers of the time. In other words it was a process of the rapid organization and evolution of an all-Slavic Russian state on the eastern plain. By the middle of the eleventh century the Kiev state included all eastern Slavic lands from Lakes Peipus, Ladoga, and Onega in the north (the Novgorod and Ilmen Slavs) to the upper Volga and the interriver Volga-Oka area in the east (the Vyatichi as well as the conquered tribes of Meria, Murom, and others); further to the south, to the middle Dnepr, with Chernigov-Sever, Kiev, Galicia, and Volyn (the Severyane, Polyane, Drevlyane, Volynyane, and Tivertsy); to the west, along the frontiers of the Polish and Lithuanian lands up to Lake Peipus, including the lands of the White Russian tribes (Dregovichi, Polochane, and Krivichi) and the Smolensk lands (Radimichi).[7]

After the death of Yaroslav (1054), "the conquering tendencies disappear and the decline of Gothic Russia commences," in the words of Marx, while the state "disintegrated into fiefs, was divided and dispersed, torn apart by the feudal warriors, and lost entire provinces through invasion by neighboring people." [8]

We must not, however, exaggerate the significance of the Norse conquest in the formation and development of the Slavic state as was done by several old Russian "Norse" historians (Shletser, Solovyov, and others). The conquest, since it occurred during the process of organization of a united state from the various Slavic tribes, must be understood not as a "conquest" of

all Slavic lands by the Varangians, but merely as a unification by conquest of other Slav and non-Slav tribes by the advanced and more civilized Slavic tribes (the Novgorod and Ilmen Slavs, the Kiev Polyane) with the aid of the Varangian military mercenaries and princes. As we have seen above, the Norse-Varangians themselves were not numerous, and were passing through the Slavic lands as merchant soldiers in quest of tribute and plunder rather than land. There they encountered a settled and numerous agricultural people in possession of vast territories of land, living in a state of dissolving primitive-communal customs, and witnessing the rise of inequality and private property in land. Under such circumstances, and due to the very primitive organization of the Norse military units, no immediate development of feudalism took place in this environment. The primitive nature of the organization of the Norse free-lancers, coupled with their relative numerical weakness before a vast territory and population, made them, in contrast to the "barbarian" conquerors of the West, incapable of "rebuilding local society," and incapable of creating there any new and enduring economic order. On the contrary they "were subordinated to the production conditions within the local society, becoming absorbed by the latter."[9] Conditions within the local society itself, as we have seen above, were appropriately ready for this event.

Naturally this process of assimilation consumed more than one century. Marx dates the beginning of the feudal period of the Kiev state, with its accompanying dispersion and feudal wars, from the middle of the eleventh century. Prior to this time the relationship created between the princely mercenaries and the population was not one of feudalism but of military plunder, tribute, captivity, and so forth.

How this tribute of the princes was collected is evident from the well known account of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, written in the tenth century, a period in which the Varangians had already assumed the position of rulers and military protectors of the land. In November the princes "with all the Rus," that is, with their retinues made up of the same Varangians, went from Kiev "to the people" (among the people, that is, went about the homesteads and villages) to collect the agreed tribute from all the tribes subjugated or conquered by them—the Drevlyane, Dregovichi, Severyane, and so forth. They moved apparently among them all winter. The population was scattered, the towns were without food, and the prince with his retinue received from the population both foodstuffs for their sustenance and tribute for disposal and sale—furs, honey, and so forth. A similar bit of life is also described by the chronicler in his above-mentioned account of the collection of tribute by Igor's mercenaries. Aside from foodstuffs and common materials of dress (we may recall the words of Igor's retinue: "Here the Sveneldzhi

lads provided themselves with weapons and honey, and we got ours"), the population provided furs, honey, and various products of the forest industries. Not quite so "voluntary" a form of tribute were the servants, or slaves, "captured" by princes' retinues from hostile provinces and tribes. The chronicle account of the collection of tribute by Igor and his troop reveals almost the same customary traits of plunder and violence reported by ibn-Rostek. His mercenaries prevailed upon Igor to go along with them "for tribute, so that you will gain, as well as we." Igor listens to them and "goes to Derevo for tribute, and submits it to first tribute and also to violence upon its men." After collecting the tribute, Igor feels an urge for a "large estate," and, announcing to his retinue, "I shall go again," he once more goes out to collect a second tribute.[10]

Tribute was similarly collected by Svyatoslav, Olga, and other early princes. At the same time, in several instances the levy of tribute obviously bore the character of an agreement, as between Oleg and Novgorod and the Radimichi,[11] but for the most part it ensued from the right of conquest. On such occasions military booty consisted not only of martens, foxes, and squirrels, but also of servants carried off by force.

Thus, during this prefeudal period with its system of plunder-trade, tribute, and the forcible seizure of slaves, the "primitive" character of organization of the Norse free-lancers was clearly revealed, along with their fiefs "consisting only of tribute." Naturally these tributes not only served to feed and maintain troops, but also went into trade. Under such circumstances the military-commercial cities of the period, chiefly Kiev, the center of Kiev Rus and one of the largest trade centers of the world, began to play a role of great importance. This extensive development of urban and commercial life in Kiev Rus has led some historians to speak of "the urban period" in the economic history of Kiev Rus and, entirely without foundation, to view commerce as the basis of the economy of Kiev Rus.[12]

In reality this was not true. The most important factor in the dissolution of the old social forms and in the emergence of new productive conditions in Kiev Rus of the ninth and tenth centuries was not the development of trade and the military-commercial town connected with the permeation of Slav society by the Varangians, but the more profound and gradual regeneration of social activities arising from the main production basis of the national economy; namely, agriculture.

AGRICULTURE Before passing to an examination of the social aspect of the new class society and state of the Russian Slavs of the ninth and tenth centuries, we must explore the level of development of the material production forces underlying this society.

The productive basis of the economy of the major part of the country, more and more since the ninth and tenth centuries, was agriculture. Of course this applied primarily to the more southerly parts of the Russian land, particularly Kiev, and in part to the agricultural center where a favorable climate and rich soil offered the best opportunities for developing tillage. Archaeological evidence confirms the existence of tilled cultivation there as early as the ninth and tenth centuries.

In the north, especially the Novgorod land, the natural environment for agriculture was less favorable. The prevalence of swamps and forests on the whole limited the possibility of tilling the soil, which could only be achieved at great costs in labor; an excess of moisture and frost, and a poor soil made this labor still less productive. There were no continuous suitable areas available for land cultivation; plowland perforce had to be cleared from the forest, and invariably after several years the cleared land became exhausted and was abandoned, thus leading to the predominance of a *podsechnoye* * type of agriculture. But here likewise, by the eleventh century, cultivation of the soil had spread to many localities. Naturally, under these circumstances *pritereby* (cultivated earth) and *roschishchy* (clearings) were considered highly valuable since they required no new expenditure of effort for clearing the forest. In the Novgorod land only the western part (the Valdai elevation) was rather fertile and suitable for cultivation; but here again severity of climate and an irregular crop brought meager rewards to the tiller, and compelled him to seek other sources of income.

Thus the center of agricultural civilization and rural progress was from the first located in the Kiev, Chernigov, and other southern lands whence, with the growth of colonization, this culture spread to the north, to the fertile Oka region and toward the land of the Vyatichi. In any event the plow, or *ralo* (wooden plow), which had already replaced the primitive hoe much earlier, became during the tenth and eleventh centuries the universal agricultural implement even in such backward areas as the land of the Vyatichi.[13] In the wooded and nonblack-soil districts the *sokha* remained supreme since the slow-moving and deep-turning plow was unsuitable for tillage in clearings and shallow soil.

In general, toward the twelfth century, we encounter more frequently in our chronicle and other literary records, as well as in folk tales, impressions of a purely agricultural mode of life: plowing with the aid of a horse,[14] sowing wheat, millet, barley, corn, rye, flax, peas, poppies, and so forth. There we also find references to threshing, stacks of hay, horses and oxen and plows and harrows for tilling the soil. Similar scenes are described in such ancient tales as the legend of Mikul Selyaninovich: "And I will raise rye, and bind

* A type of migratory tillage, moving from one clearing to another.—ED.

them in sheaves." The same kind of agricultural picture of threshing grain is presented, for example, by the *Tale of Igor's Expedition:* "They threw sheaves of heads and thresh with flails of Frankish steel; on the threshing floor they lay down life and winnow soul from body." * The granary as an appendage of the farm household was so widely prevalent that it was associated with some sort of religious rites in faraway pagan times. ("To worship fire near the granary," was forbidden by a decree of Vladimir.)

Still agriculture, especially in the north, due to the unfavorable conditions of climate and a primitive technique, was a highly unpredictable branch of economy. Frequently entire provinces—and foremost, of course, the poorer households without reserves—experienced famine. With respect to the development of their production forces and the level of harvest yields, the southern provinces were far better than the north. Provinces with unfertile soils, such as the Rostov-Suzdal and especially the Novgorod lands, suffered frequent crop failures. Novgorod was often compelled to import grain from other parts. This may be the reason why, among other motives, the Novgorod chronicler follows so closely, sometimes year by year, the results of crops and grain prices. Years of failing crops were accompanied by famine and even cannibalism. Thus, in 1230, the famine was so severe that, "like some common beast, they were cutting people alive and eating them; some dead flesh and corpses were cut and eaten; others ate flesh of horse, dog, cat, and others moss, pine, linden bark, elm leaves." [15]

Cattle raising as a branch of economy was closely related to agriculture, even in primitive society, since the Slavs had not passed through a special nomadic "herdsman" period. Livestock, especially the ox and horse, was vital to the household as a source of labor power, and was used as such among the Slavs while still in their original homeland (the chronicles' account of the Avars).

Horses, chief source of draft power in the household, while available, were insufficient in number and, above all, of a poor quality: the chronicler relates that they were at times "nags and jades from Novgorod." [16] Large landowners, princes, and boyars ordered their horses from other lands.[17] As a method of replenishing livestock, besides reproduction within the household, raids were staged against the Polovtsy and Pechenegs, from whom a great deal of livestock was seized in times of war. ("They took cattle, sheep, horses, and camels.") [18] Almost every variety of domestic animal—horses, bulls, cows, oxen, calves, sheep, lamb, goats, and hogs—were known during the tenth and twelfth centuries and mentioned in our records.[19]

As in the primitive household, hunting, trapping, and apiculture played

* English translation by S. H. Cross. Annuaire de l'institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves (New York, 1948), Vol. VIII.—ED.

an important role during this period. Hunting provided the more valuable products used in food and clothing. Among the princes and their retinue the hunt was particularly popular—as a diversion, of course. But the mass of the population obtained from these industries the chief products necessary for tribute, taxes, and the market.

In the more northerly forest provinces hunting, trapping, fishing, and bee raising were vital popular industries. There a poor soil, large wooded areas, and an unfavorable climate presented serious obstacles to the development of agriculture. The immense forests and the abundance of water richly compensated with their own wealth for the poverty of the soil. Thus, in the Novgorod land, the supply of animals in the woods was so great that, in the popular legend as presented by the chronicler, "the young squirrels, just newly born, are brought with the clouds and fall from the sky." [20] Fur-bearing animals were the main wealth of the Novgorod territory, especially in its northerly parts. The Ugra province was famous for sables, the Dvina land for beavers and martens, the Pechora territory for ermine, polar fox, fox, and marten. There were also many squirrels—so many, in fact, that trade in them was conducted in the tens of thousands of skins, and squirrel skins were used as small change. A variety of fishing lots, suitable for exploitation, completed the abundance and wealth of the natural environment.

Under these circumstances hunting as an occupation acquired considerable importance. For this reason the Novgorod people paid close attention to their hunting rights, and protected their hunting preserves against the princes and all other persons who might lay claim to the exploitation of the hunting and fishing trades and privileges. In the agreements between Novgorod and the princes, the question of the hunting trade often comes to the foreground. In 1270 the men of Novgorod charged Prince Yaroslav with having "taken away the Volkhov from the duck hunters, and the fields from the rabbit hunters." [21] In their agreements with other princes, special areas are designated for use by the princes in their hunt: "And the hogs shall be killed at sixty versts from the town . . . and thence by anyone who so desires." "And into Rus the princes shall ride in the fall, shall not ride in the summer, shall ride in Ozvado to chase beasts in the summer." "And as it was in the time of my father and brother, do not go on the Tersk side to the Novgorod men." Citing this testimony of the records, Aristov observes in this respect: "The portion of the catch falling to the share of the princes seems small; the main trade in animals and fowl remained under the control of the people and private individuals." [22]

The same conditions evidently prevailed in fishing, which also constituted a special and fairly widespread industry. Taking part in it were individual persons as well as entire settlements (*isady*), monasteries, and, in Novgorod,

whole "gangs," that is, fishing artels. The right to this occupation was likewise protected against the princes and their industrial companies by special agreements. Fish was used for domestic consumption, and the fish oil, teeth, and blubber for export.

Finally, the same industrial characteristics applied to apiculture, in which, aside from all residents of the forest areas, special persons evidently also sometimes engaged. Special merchants engaged in the honey and wax trade in the towns. Here again agreements with the princes limited the latters' right in the bee-raising industry to specific places, evidently in order to protect the rights of other persons to that industry.[23]

Thus, in the trend of its production, the rural economy of the ninth and eleventh centuries was chiefly along the line of tillage and stock raising together with fair development of hunting and bee keeping, which, in turn, outweighed the others in the more northerly parts of the land. In technique the main branch of rural economy, agriculture, in the south at any rate, was making substantial progress. If the primitive hoe and *sokha* narrowly cramped the framework of agricultural economy within the confines of meager family subsistence, the plow on the other hand offered an opportunity for relatively large-scale production. The technical basis for a type of economy equipped to produce a surplus product ready for appropriation was fully laid.

THE RURAL POPULATION In a national economy exclusively dominated by soil cultivation and related branches, the population of Kiev Rus of the ninth and tenth centuries was overwhelmingly rural. Its bulk during that period, as far as can be judged from the fragmentary evidence of our records, was made up of the *smerd*—the small, self-supporting, free agricultural producer who lived in his own household on his own and communal "black" lands.

As Lenin observed,[24] however, the process of "enslaving" the smerds had already begun as early as the tenth century. As a result of the general reexamination of the problem of feudalism in ancient Rus in recent Russian historiography, the former view held by the old Russian historians regarding the complete freedom of the smerd has given way to an opinion that they were either "half free" (Yushkov) or that they were partly free and partly beginning to fall into bondage to the feudal lord during the eleventh century, and "in their degraded position were quite close to the *kholop*" (Grekov).[25] For our historical analysis of the position of the smerd in the tenth century, the important question becomes not to determine to what extent the smerd had remained free and to what extent he became bonded by that time, but to clarify further the nature and the causes of the process of "enslavement" of these erstwhile free farmers.

We find the earliest reference to the smerd in the chronicles' account of the conversations between Vladimir and Svyatoslav about a campaign against the Polovtsy. Svyatoslav's militia had indicated that the campaign against the Polovtsy could not be undertaken in the spring: "It will be inconvenient to go now in the spring; we might ruin the smerd and their plowland." To which Vladimir answered:

> It seems strange to me, warriors, that you spare your horses to use them for plowing, but this much you did not think, that as soon as the smerd begins to plow, the Polovtsy will come and strike with their arrows, take away his horse and, going into his village, will take his wife, his children, and all his estate.[26]

We see from the above that the smerd was a rural householder, in possession of his own farmstead, his own plowland, his cattle, and his own "estate." Other sources of the same period offer further evidence of the propertied position of the smerd. Aside from tillage he engages in apiculture.[27] The smerds transmitted their property by inheritance, although with some legal restrictions in comparison with the upper classes: "The smerd's property may be inherited only by his sons; otherwise it is inherited by the prince as escheat." [28] In the interpretation of some authors, the smerds also had their own *kholops* ("the *kholop* of the smerds").[29]

Being the main mass of the rural population, the smerds were the chief tribute payers to the princes. Thus, according to the chronicles, during one of the military clashes between the Novgorod and Suzdal, the men of Novgorod "took the whole tribute and from the Suzdal smerds another." [30] On another occasion it is stated: "Do not destroy your smerds and their tribute." Mikhail, upon concluding an agreement with the Novgorod men, "granted to the smerds freedom from paying tribute for five years." [31] The people of Novgorod drove out Vsevolod because he "does not look after the smerds." [32] If we add the fact that the smerds composed the mass of the troops,[33] and that the penalty for offending or killing a smerd was the same as for a free person, but less than a person of the upper classes,[34] we may conclude that the smerds, although largely free, are a lower, taxpaying, and chiefly agricultural class. While the smerd, according to the *Russkaya Pravda,* was evidently a self-supporting rural householder, owning his fields and his horse, his independence was evidently not particularly enduring and his economic well-being never too secure. No wonder Vladimir in his *Precepts* says about himself: "The meager smerd and the wretched widow I did not allow to be offended by the stronger." [35]

It would seem thus that the smerd was a poor, "meager" countryman —in social position standing beside the "wretched widow," who could be "offended" and "enslaved" by powerful persons.

From this juxtaposition of the smerd and the wretched widow we come

quite closely to another term which in the later records supersedes the smerd. These were the "orphans," also a free but insecure sector of the rural population, the village poor. Of them the Bishop Serapion says in one of his sermons that the same "powerful people . . . enslave and sell the free orphans."

The history of the smerds as a free and self-supporting agricultural population is inextricably bound up with the history of the expropriation of the communal land by private landowners and with the further development of feudalism. It leads to the economic differentiation and stratification of the smerd class of independent small rural householders, and to their transformation, chiefly as a result of their lack of land and economical insolvency, into bonded elements of the feudal lord.

OTHER TYPES OF POPULATION Besides the smerds the *Russkaya Pravda* cites other types of rural inhabitants for whom the process of enslavement, economic dependency, and loss of land had evidently progressed even further than for the smerds. They were the *zakup,* or *roleyny zakup.* The latter, in the designation of the *Russkaya Pravda,* was a "hired," landless element of the population, living on other people's land and cultivating it for pay, in debt to the owner and therefore dependent upon him. The *roleyny zakup* cultivated the owner's land with the master's plow and performed other tasks in the household; he lived with the master and was unable voluntarily to leave his work before the end of his term, but still remained legally a free person and only in the event of his flight (that is, without payment of his debt) was he turned into a *kholop.* He owned some kind of household ("his own horse"),[36] and maintained it independently of his master's household ("stores his implements");[37] he worked for some sort of pay, a *kupa* or *kopa* (the meaning of which remains unclear in the records). But at the same time his economic independence was so low that the master provided him with "plow and harrow,"[38] that is, the *zakup* did not possess even the common indispensable agricultural implements. This circumstance also serves to explain the cause of the origin of the *zakup* system: economic insecurity prevented him from maintaining his own farm and compelled him to enter a stranger's household to earn his livelihood. Here the source of his obligations imposed by his being a hireling, in the opinion of a majority of investigators, was a loan, an indebtedness which forced him to discharge his obligation by working in the household of his creditor-master. The *zakup* may be considered as the former smerd who is discharging his crushing debt by working for his master.[39]

Besides the *zakup* the *Russkaya Pravda* also refers to *ryadovichi,* apparently a general name for persons found in feudal bondage according to an agreement by which they are obligated to work for a master.

LAND RELATIONSHIPS We have learned that land relationships during the period of dissolution of the primitive-clan household and the transition to the territorial commune still reflected the existence of abundant free-land areas. Land occupancy, as previously, occurred chiefly in the form of the free appropriation of homesteads, hamlets, and villages of two or three farmsteads with all the appropriate privileges, with "woods and meadows," with bee-hive privileges, and fisheries.

Lands occupied and cultivated by individual persons within the confines of the volost* landed territories were still considered the property of the commune. As a matter of custom, however, the use of land was inherited from father and grandfather by their heirs without passing out of the clan and, ordinarily, without being released to an "outsider"; in such instances they were known as *"votchiny," "otchiny,"* or *"dediny."* Sometimes the owners of allotments made a broad use of their land rights, selling them to others. In this atmosphere began to arise uneven distribution of lands, seizure of communal lands, clash of interests among individual land users, and the origin of private land ownership within the commune. Hence the question necessarily arose of the mutual relationship between the individual rights to the land on the part of the various tenants and owners on the one hand, and on the other, of the rural community proper, that is, the land commune. The former basis of land regulations within the old territorial commune, with its abundance of free land and property held in common, began to disintegrate as a result of the seizure of the communal land by individual persons. The commune was compelled to regulate land tenure and new homesteads, at first on the free and undistributed common lands, and afterward on the lands already in use by its members. Thus, in place of the former territorial commune, emerged new forms of regulated land use in the reallotting and reallotting-equalizing commune. Although the final stage of this process is not fully attained until the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, its inception began much earlier.[40]

Here it should be noted that, simultaneously with the seizure of free land and the formation of large-scale privileged landownership by the princes and boyars, proceeded the seizure and "boyarization" of the former communal lands—a process clearly in evidence as early as the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and one that led to land "crowding" on the communal land where the bulk of the farming population, the smerds, lived. From that time onward two separate types of landownership began to emerge quite distinctly: on the one hand the lands of the small cultivators, the smerds and other groups who lived on the "princified" and "black" land and owed obligations to the prince for the right to land, and whose land tenure dates back to the time of

* A small administrative division including several villages.—ED.

communal land utilization; on the other hand the tax-exempt private manorial "white lands" of the privileged owners. Economically these lands were maintained on the basis of the feudal exploitation of the erstwhile free agriculturists, the smerds, and other groups of rural population now settled on the "boyarized" lands and deprived of their independence.

In other words the beginnings of feudal ties and the foundations of the economic system of feudalism were already in existence in Kiev Rus by the eleventh century. The emergence of large-scale private landownership on the one hand, and the loss of land by the small farmer, the smerd, the former holder of communal lands, and his transformation into a bond "tenant" of his master's land on the other, were among the phenomena of the feudalization of society which manifested themselves quite clearly in Kiev Rus toward the end of its existence in the twelfth century. However, this process was not yet fully consummated, and the final and enduring economic and political consolidation of the new feudal relationships had not yet assumed its ultimate form.

THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE LANDOWNERSHIP Even ancient Slavic society showed signs of the emergence of a privileged agricultural upper class in the form of the *narochity* and "better people," who during the age of the princes had mixed with the upper strata: the Varangians, the princes, their warriors, the "princes' men," and the boyars.

Although during the prefeudal period of the ninth and tenth centuries the princes and their warriors confined themselves to plunder and the collection of tribute from the populace, to trade and, to a lesser extent, to landowning and agriculture ("vassalage without fiefs and fiefs consisting only of tribute"), they did not altogether ignore the economic exploitation of the soil. As the number of people subject to their tribute increased and the territory subjugated by them with its attached population grew, the princes and their retinue began to provide themselves with lands and farmsteads. Their hamlets, inhabited by servants and smerds, became not only places of residences but also large-scale economic enterprises.

The original seizure of new lands by the prince and his retinue yielded not only tribute in the form of furs and other products, but also an opportunity for the independent economic utilization of the land with the aid of the inhabitants living on it—the smerds, servants, *kholops,* and others. Yet, concerning the tenth century, our records contain only quite fragmentary evidence about the estates and hamlets belonging to the princes and their warriors. Thus Olga owned a hamlet called "Olzhichi" ("and there is her hamlet Olzhichi near by"), Vladimir's mother owned the village Budutino, and Vladimir owned the suburban hamlet Berestovo. But beginning with

the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the reports and accounts of princely and boyar hamlets—in the Smolensk principality, among the Severyane, in Chernigov, or belonging to Andrey Bogolyubsky in the Rostov-Suzdal region, and many others—begin more frequently to color our chronicles with many instances of the purchase of "hamlets of the betters," of burning "the hamlets of the boyars," of the release of the warriors to their "hamlets," and so forth.[41] In reference to this specific period of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the chronicler notes with disapproval that the princes and their warriors were beginning to collect "many estates," and to impose unbearable burdens on the population.[42]

By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, in the midst of the predominant free, small type of landownership and cultivation by the smerds, privately owned households using slave or bonded peasant labor were becoming a common occurrence in Kiev Rus.

Hence private landowning economy by the princes and boyars began to arise only after the upper classes had gained control over a sufficient number of working servants by means of "capturing" them, and of a dependent population in general who lived on the land seized by the princes, warriors, and other privileged owners. In Kiev Rus it occurred approximately by the eleventh century.

SLAVERY IN KIEV RUS In the environment of the prefeudal period, when the princes and their warriors were "capturing servants" en masse, slavery had become widely prevalent among the Varangians, who traded in servants. It emerged as a result of direct and forcible seizure into slavery, and it assumed the economic form of selling the slave as chattel rather than utilizing him profitably as an instrument of production. However, the existence of a large quantity of slaves in the hands of the owning classes—the princes, warriors, boyars—assumed great importance in the future development and organization of large-scale, privately owned estates. The slave household of the owning classes, the princes and the boyars, began to expand widely in form (not counting primitive slavery) approximately since the tenth and eleventh centuries, when the former Varangian slave-trading group was transformed into the upper, landowning, princely and boyar class, maintaining its economy by means either of the slave labor of the *kholop* and servant, or the labor of the dependent agricultural population.

Therefore numerous articles in the *Russkaya Pravda,* for example, deal with slaves, their position, the mutual relations between them and their owners, their obligations, and so forth. They also refer to slave *kholops* "either of the princes, or of the boyars, or of the monasteries," that is, belonging not only to the princes and the boyars but also to the monastery.[43] In the records

of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, as mention of hamlets and estates belonging to the princes and the boyars begin to appear, these accounts are almost invariably accompanied by references to slaves, *kholops,* and servants. Whenever hamlets are passed in inheritance to relatives or monasteries, the added remark "including the servants" is almost invariably found.[44] During military attacks against the hamlets we read: "and their hamlets were sold with their servants."[45] The Chernigov prince Svyatoslav owned "up to seven hundred servants."[46] Thus, along with other property (gold, provisions, and livestock), slaves are listed as belonging to the prince and boyar households; they also constituted the labor power there.

Naturally, as soon as the labor of the slave *kholop* began to be applied in the household for productive purposes, a change in the position of the slave necessarily occurred, by which he changed from military booty and a commodity into "an instrument of production." Aside from conquest, other sources for the rise of personal and economic bondage began to emerge. Slavery, as a result of the dissolution of primitive society among the Slavs, arose largely through conquest and captivity. In the *Russkaya Pravda* we find no mention of this common ancient method of the emergence of slavery (although it did naturally exist at the time). Besides slavery through birth ("from the servant, his progeny, or from the cattle"),[47] through marriage and through captivity, we find evidence indicating purely economic causes of the emergence of slavery: fraudulent bankruptcy and the embezzlement of other persons' property, as a result of which the creditor had the right to sell the debtor "in the market";[48] selling one's person as an *obelny* (complete) *kholop,* and, finally, "a bailiff, or steward, without a contract."[49] The *zakup,* who ran away from his master's allotment, became a slave.[50] Nor does this exhaust the ways in which slaves and *kholops* came into existence. For example, it sometimes arose during famines when parents gave away their children as *kholops* without pay. ("For nothing but bread to the guest, their children they gave away for nothing.")[51]

It is obvious from the above example that the economic cause of the origin of the status of the *obelny,* complete *kholop,* or personal slavery, was no longer merely the "captivity" of the free inhabitant of a conquered territory, but also surrender into slavery as a way of discharging a debt, out of economic necessity, for money, or for a service.

Thus, side by side with the extraeconomic means of the establishment of slavery through captivity and conquest (a method which continued to be practiced as late as the sixteenth century), appeared a method of economic compulsion and bondage of greater importance from the standpoint of the economy.

During the peak period of Kiev Rus of the tenth and eleventh centuries,

when some of the princely hamlets contained hundreds of slaves, the slave type of economy was still not of sufficient importance to categorize the entire economic system as a definitive "slaveowning structure." The slaves belonged chiefly to the upper classes of princes and boyars. They were not in evidence among middle-grade owners or within other provinces. For example, it had not developed in Novgorod Province to any extent. Here Nikitsky indicates that, judging by the chronicles' information, the Novgorod landowner Varlam Khutynsky, a property owner of middle rank, possessed only a few slaves in his servants' quarters. Another Novgorod man, Astafy, a rather wealthy landowner, owned only eighteen families of servants.[52] Even if we assume that these facts are somewhat fragmentary and perhaps isolated, we still find no evidence of the development of large landed economies with hundreds of slaves in the Novgorod land, as we did in Kiev.

Slavery played an important role in ancient Rus, particularly during the Kiev period, but still it failed to develop into a special "slaveowning structure."[53] As Engels had stated of the ancient Germans, the Slavs of Kiev Rus had likewise "not developed among themselves an advanced stage of slavery, neither at the level of the labor slavery of antiquity nor that of Eastern domestic slavery."[54] The decisive factor in the process of feudalization proved to be the emergence of private ownership in land and the expropriation of the small farmer, who was turned into a feudal "tenant" of privately owned land, and his exploitation by economic or extraeconomic compulsion.

TOWNS AND INDUSTRY IN KIEV RUS The Kiev state of the ninth and eleventh centuries inherited from the primitive Slav era a number of old Slavic towns located chiefly on the water route from the Baltic area through the Dnepr to the Black Sea. Among them were Novgorod, Izborsk, Smolensk, Kiev, Lyubech, Pereyaslavl, Chernigov, and Rostov. The first Rurik princes undertook to erect new fortified towns both for offensive and defensive purposes as well as for the conduct of trade. In 988, for defense against the raids of the Pechenegs, Vladimir "began to establish towns along the Desna, the Vostra, the Trubezheva, the Sula, and Stuchna."[55] In this manner arose the towns of Ladoga, Beloozero, Izyaslavl, Belgorod, Suzdal (1192), Koporye (1279), Murom, Yaroslavl (1025), Vladimir on the Klyazma (1108), and many others. Within the boundaries of Kiev Rus, up to three hundred towns of all types could be counted during the twelfth century. The new towns as well as the old were inhabited by military and commercial people and, eventually, by people engaged in urban occupations. But, of course, the treatment of Kiev Rus and its national economy by N. N. Pokrovsky as "urban Rus" and as the "era of urban economy" completely distorts the facts of history.[56] While urban handicrafts existed in Kiev and

in other towns, they were still comparatively underdeveloped. Archaeological remains of that period have preserved for us samples of a few primitive articles, and those were chiefly of agricultural use: clay vessels, remnants of cloth, iron parts of plows, sickles, scythes, and so forth.[57]

In any event, during the eleventh and twelfth centuries artisans as special social groups have been noted in the composition of the contemporary society. The *Russkaya Pravda* specifies the exact amount of blood money to be paid for the murder of an artisan—twelve grivny.[58] But the very size of this blood money indicates that the social position of the artisan was not much above that of the bonded servants of the prince, and the economic importance as well as the share of handicrafts in the total output could not have been particularly great under the dominance of a natural economic order.

One of the most indispensable and earliest handicrafts was that of the carpenter, since wooden mansions, cattle sheds, houses, baths, and other necessary appurtenances of city life and economy were built by town carpenters. Therefore the trade of carpentry, chiefly the urban variety, was apparently among the first to come to the forefront, at least as soon as the towns began to show considerable expansion. In 988 Vladimir "ordered a church to be built"—suggesting that there were carpenters in existence at the time. The Kiev people taunted the Novgorod men with being carpenters: "But you are veritable carpenters, and we can force you to build us a mansion."[59] Evidently the inhabitants of Novgorod engaged in carpentry as a "going-away" handicraft, and left their villages for extra earnings in other towns. A good opportunity for work was offered to the Novgorod carpenters in shipbuilding. Naturally the carpenter's trade, which took the peasants away from the villages, by its very character implied an almost complete divorce from any agricultural pursuits which, like building activity, are performed during the summer.

Besides carpentry our earlier chronicle information refers to townbuilders (builders of urban fortifications and city walls), joiners, bridgebuilders, saddlers, coopers, coffinmakers, and others.[60] If the simple village household economy was able to manufacture for itself the numerous articles of daily necessity (vats, carts, wheels, tables, and chairs) for the purposes of city life, on the other hand, and for trade in particular, specialized craftsmen were required who could build the towns, erect the churches, build the boats and the bridges.

We hear later of the appearance of master stonemasons, as the mansions and churches of the cities begin to be built of stone. During the construction of such artistic stone monuments as the Kiev Yaroslav *Sobor*, the master builders were foreigners, but evidently their skill also managed to spread through the population. Stone structures, however, were encountered quite

rarely during the tenth and twelfth centuries or, for that matter, even as late as the fifteenth century.

Although little evidence of pottery making has been preserved, its manufacture and trade were nevertheless quite widespread, judging by the fact that a special pottery area existed in Novgorod.

One of the earliest entries in the chronicle also speaks of the linen industry. Linen (canvas) was used to manufacture the coarse sails of Oleg,[61] tents, and common articles of wear. In the early "code of laws" of Yaroslav issued in 1051, attention is called to the penalty for stealing "white *porty* or linen or *porty* petticoats." Judging by the variety of articles named, the manufacture of linen products was quite varied: there was plain coarse linen (*yarich, ryadnina*), bleached, refined, or dyed, linen, and others. Another textile material was wool, of which coarse fabrics were woven for garments (ibn-Fadlan, 921) called *sermyaga* (peasant coat of drab color), and *zipun* (another type of peasant coat). Most of these articles were evidently produced for consumption within the household where it was prepared with the aid of female labor. Among the upper classes foreign-made fabrics of a higher quality were used.

An important processing trade (partly urban and partly rural) developed in connection with leather. Leather was used alike for military needs for the manufacture of shields and other items of military equipment, and for household needs—for harnesses, footwear, and so forth. The mass of the rural population had long worn a type of footwear apparently made mostly of bast in the form of *lapti*, and only the more substantial classes, particularly the warriors, wore leather boots. The chronicle account dealing with the time of Vladimir records the words of Dobryna: "Looking for convicts, we find them all here in boots; here we shall not find any tribute; let us go and search for men in *lapti*."[62] In other words the men in *lapti* were more complacent in paying their tribute than the men "in boots." True, these *lapti* men were sometimes also poor so that they paid the tribute itself in bast, which is recounted by the same chronicler: "Having conquered them and imposed a tribute on them in the form of bast, *koshnitsa* [sheds for storing corn], and brooms for the bathhouse, since they had no silver nor any other thing of value."[63]

Nevertheless, leatherworking was one of the most ancient trades, as may be seen from the same chronicle account, dating from the age of Vladimir, of the leather dresser Yan Usmoshvets, of whom his father says: "One type he cooks, and another he molds into a bit, then softens somewhat and makes reins with his hands."[64] In other words Yan was a leather craftsman engaged in processing leather (*usnie, cherevi*). How far this occupation had assumed the status of an independent handicraft may be

seen from the fact that it was subject to the collection of a special tax, "as of old times, a leather tub per *sokha*" [wooden plow], that is, a leather tub (under Dmitry Donskoy) was taxable, as was the *sokha,* at the rate of one grivna.[65] Besides footwear the leathermen produced saddles and harnesses, which are also frequently mentioned in the earlier chronicle accounts.

Among the lesser urban occupations we find frequent mention of saddlers, basketweavers, copper workers, fur dressers, tailors, cobblers, hatmakers, fishermen, bakers, millers, and others. By their very nature the majority of these industrial occupations were urban.

Crafts connected with the processing of metal are likewise mentioned in the earlier entries of the chronicle records. One of the purely industrial branches, and one of the first to separate itself from the natural village economy, was the economically important occupation of mining. It was particularly developed in the Novgorod colonies, to which the residents of the city had rushed primarily in quest of iron—along the shores of the White Sea, along the rivers Nenoks, Ustyuzhna, and others. Iron ore was smelted here in special furnaces—*domnitses* (blast furnaces), and afterward the iron was manufactured into various articles of domestic and economic use as well as into military supplies. In connection with the extraction of iron ore, the chronicler recalls in his account of Yugr: "And in that mountain they cut a few openings, and they led to iron."[66] The same sort of ore extraction was performed in other places. The treatment of the ores and the manufacture of various metal articles were performed by the smiths. A great many types of household articles (axes, spades, plows, plowshares, sickles, chisels, frying pans, and locks), weapons as well as bells, and so forth, were produced by special metal-working artisans, boilermen, and smelters. Naturally, as in the case of the iron-ore industry, the processing of iron also required a degree of specialization which led to the separation of special handicraft trades and a special class of artisans.

In any event the share of all these urban industries and handicrafts in the national economy of the tenth and twelfth centuries was rather negligible since the overwhelming part of the population within the framework of a natural economy was engaged in tillage, and in the primary processing of agricultural materials.

TRADE IN KIEV RUS Of considerably greater importance in the economy of Kiev Rus during the ninth and tenth centuries was trade. Internal trade in the large and small centers and in their "markets" served the local population as a means of obtaining those products that were not available within their economy, and as a place for the disposal of surpluses. This was frequently conducted in the form of "barter" trade. Anyone who had a

commodity to sell, and in return for which he wished to procure some other type of goods, went to the market.

Thus the importance played by markets in general, as gathering places for purposes not purely commercial but rather those of general social life, is indicated by the circumstance that, for example, according to the *Russkaya Pravda,* the market is not only a place of trade but also a place where searches for stolen goods are made. "To cry out in the market," that is, the announcement of a search for a lost article, was one of the obligatory court procedures.[67] In addition this type of search (gathering) was largely limited to the territory of "one's own town" and its lands, that is, the districts gravitating toward it. ("And from one's own town into strange land no gatherings are to be made.")[68] In other words the internal trade relations among the various towns were so negligible that the aforesaid search for articles was recognized as pointless.

Clearly some large cities, being the centers of economic and administrative life as well as that of foreign trade, were in quite a different position. Cities like Kiev, Novgorod, Smolensk, and many others possessed extensive and numerous market bazaars (in Kiev, for example, eight special markets) for specialized goods and great numbers of out-of-town merchants. In their turn the Novgorod merchants lived in large numbers (up to several hundreds) in all the rather large commercial towns.

FOREIGN TRADE Still more important for Kiev Rus was foreign trade, serving as an avenue for disposing the "tributes" collected by the princes and their warriors from the population. As cited above (Chapter III, page 61), after the decline of Arabic trade, which came to an end in the tenth century, the greatest progress of foreign trade took place in Kiev Rus. It followed the old Dnepr route "from the Varangians to the Greeks." The famous military campaigns against Tsargrad (old name for Constantinople) by Askold and Dir, by Oleg (in two thousand boats with fifty to eighty thousand men),[69] and, finally, by Igor and Svyatoslav, brought the conquerors not only military glory, but also a stronger position in trade and additional commercial privileges in Byzantium. Military attacks were followed by peace and commercial treaties concluded by Oleg in 907 and 911, by Igor in 945, and by Svyatoslav in 971. In these treaties the rights of the Russian "guests" were regulated: they were to engage in no plunder ("not to commit any depredations"), they are temporarily registered by the Greek authorities ("and they write down their names"), present documents and passports from the princes, are to appear at the market without arms and in bodies of less than fifty men, are to purchase goods for a fixed sum only, and are to spend the winter not inside the city but at the pier of St. Mama.[70]

The commercial ambitions of the first princes also carried them farther toward the West and the East. Svyatoslav aimed at the Danube toward Pereyaslavets "as a place where all blessings meet: the Greeks' gold, *pavoloki* (fine fabrics of silk or cotton), wines, and various vegetables; then from the Czechs and from Ugor (northeastern Hungary) silver and kimonos; from Rus skins and wax, honey and servants." [71] Another drive took them in the direction of the Azov Sea toward rich Tmutorokan, which became a particularly vital outlet to the Far East after the fall of the Khazar kingdom.

During the Kiev period of trade with Byzantium, export articles consisted chiefly of products obtained by plunder, tribute, and hunting (furs, wax, and slaves), while imports consisted of luxury articles of that period (brocades, fabrics, and arms). Kiev's trade with Prague, Krakow, and Regensburg was of a similar composition.

Since the time of the Crusades the importance of the Black Sea-Byzantium trade route began to decline, and with it the role of Kiev, inasmuch as the main highways of world trade began to pass through the Mediterranean Sea by way of the Italian cities of Venice and Genoa, avoiding the Black Sea and Byzantine East. None the less this circumstance alone would obviously have been insufficient to spell the collapse of the whole economic system. We shall see subsequently that the economic system of Moscow Rus, too, evolved at a distance from the main routes of world trade. Yet Moscow succeeded in creating a lasting political and economic system. Consequently, in the case of Kiev Rus as well, despite the profound effect upon her historical destiny exercised by the shifting of the world trade routes, the fundamental causes of her economic decline lay not so much in unfavorable external events as in the internal conditions that prepared her collapse and feudal partitioning.

THE DECLINE OF KIEV RUS The internecine feudal wars, which broke out among the several princes after the feudal disintegration of the Kiev state (1054), profoundly undermined the stability of the country's economic and political existence. The struggle became particularly intense after the rise of the principality of northeastern Rostov-Suzdal Rus, which had been striving for supremacy over Kiev. One of the most important episodes in this struggle was the capture of Kiev "at the shield" by the Suzdal Prince Andrey (1169), when the conquerors, as said by the chronicler, spared neither women nor children, wrecked the temples and the entire city: "There were then in Kiev among all people sighs and groans, unconsolable sorrow, and endless tears." Following this, the capital of the grand principality was transferred to Suzdal.

Another highly important military-political factor in the decline of Kiev Rus were the numerous invasions by eastern nomads (the Pechenegs and

Polovtsy), culminating early in the thirteenth century, in the devastating invasion of the Mongolian Tatars. Unified under the rule of Genghis Khan, the Mongols moved from the Asiatic steppes of Mongolia, traversed and conquered Central Asia and Transcaucasia and, pouring into the South Russian steppes, defeated the poorly organized feudal troops of the Russian princes in 1224. Twelve years later, in 1236, the Tatars under the leadership of Batu Khan again appeared from beyond the Volga. After crossing it they laid waste all of northern, central, and southern Rus, captured and sacked Moscow (1238) and all other centers of northeastern Rus and, finally, in 1240 seized and devastated Kiev.

Whereas for feudal Rus as a whole these events served as the beginning of a heavy "yoke" lasting from 1236 to 1462, which, in the words of Marx, was "not only heavy but dishonorable and consumed the very souls of the people," for Kiev Rus this was the end of her economic and political existence. Kiev Rus of the second half of the twelfth century had already presented an appearance of political and economic decline. As early as 1157 Olga's son Prince Svyatoslav refers to the towns of the Chernigov region as "desolate and inhabited only by dog tenders and Polovtsy." And the Venetian envoy Piano Carpini, passing through Kiev in 1246, says that the whole populace was either exterminated or taken prisoner by the Tatars, while in the steppes he saw only vast quantities of human bones and skulls.[72]

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF KIEV RUS In fact, the extent of the "desolation" of Kiev Rus after her political downfall was subject to differences of opinion among the old Russian historiographers. The problem concerned the political and economic destinies of the Dnepr and western provinces and principalities of former Kiev Rus after her collapse, that is, the principalities and peoples that were later to unite under the general name of the Ukraine on the one hand, and Belorussia on the other.

Pogodin, and Kulish later, as well as the Polish historian Grabowski,[73] began to express the opinion that after the invasion of the Tatars in the thirteenth century and the destruction and capture of Kiev (1240), the economic life of the Dnepr provinces began to decline rapidly, and their population shifted toward the north into the central Russian provinces, or to the west toward Volyn, into Galicia and into Poland. Only much later, beginning with the sixteenth century, did these provinces again begin to be recolonized by Polish emigrants during the rule of the Poles. On the contrary, Ukrainian historians like Maksimovich and Antonovich[74] proved definitely that no wholesale resettlement or utter "desolation" existed, but rather that the Dnepr area, particularly the west bank, suffered less from

the Tatars than the northern Russian provinces, and that the causes of the political decline of Kiev Rus were, as described above, quite different and rather more general.

Whatever the case, this event was of tremendous political and economic consequence in the destiny of the population of not only these provinces, but of the other northwestern principalities as well. Beginning with the period of the economic and political decline of Kiev Rus during the thirteenth century, the main political centers and lines of state and economic development shifted toward the northeast, into Rostov-Suzdal and to the Vladimir and Moscow principalities. The evolution of the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples was severed from them for several centuries.

THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALITY The group of Slavic tribes which lived along the middle courses of the Dnepr, Bug, and Dnestr consisted of the Polyane, Drevlyane, Volynyane, Uglichi, and partly of Severyane. Having outgrown their clan mode of life and tribal and communal customs, as described in the preceding section, these tribes subsequently became part of the state organization of Kiev Rus, changing their former tribal capital of Kiev into the capital of the state. Through numerous wars and resettlements they lost their ethnographic tribal unity and mixed with other peoples, in particular, apparently, with the Turkic nationalities (the Polovtsy). After the collapse of the political unity of Kiev Rus, they formed the feudal principalities of Kiev, Chernigov-Sever, Pereyaslav, Volyn, Galicia, Turov, and Podol, embracing both the west and east banks of the Dnepr. After the fall of the Kiev state in the thirteenth century, part of the population of the east bank, which had suffered more severely at the hands of the Tatars, resettled to the west in Volyn and in the Galician region. Judging by linguistic data, as early as the fourteenth century a separate "Ukrainian" dialect and nationality had already begun to manifest itself distinctly in this area. Having fallen under the rule of Poland and been enslaved by the Polish nobility, the Ukrainian population was subjected to a long period of foreign feudal oppression. Henceforth the history of the Ukraine is full of the struggle for freedom of the Ukrainian people against the Polish lords. As these events belong to another period, we shall examine them later in their appropriate connection.

THE BELORUSSIAN NATIONALITY Another group of Slavic tribes, who lived somewhat to the north, along the Prypeć, the upper reaches of the Dnepr and its tributaries, as well as along the upper tributaries of the Vistula, consisted of the Dregovichi, Polochane, Krivichi, and partly of the Radimichi. By identity of language they formed a separate branch of the

eastern Slavs there—the Belorussians. In the midst of a meager natural environment among forests and swampland, they engaged in primitive tillage, in forest industries, and in hunting. In their economic and cultural level of development they were below the level of the southern provinces. Having outgrown the general process of the disintegrating clan mode of life, and later having constituted part of the all-Slavic state union of Kiev Rus, after the latter's fall these tribes organized the feudal principalities of Polotsk, Vitebsk, Mstislavsk, and Smolensk. Situated on the frontiers of their western and, at that time, more powerful neighbors, the Lithuanian and Polish states, they were the first to fall under the rule of these powers. This event did not destroy the Belorussian civilization and economic system but, on the contrary, led the Lithuanians to adopt Belorussian culture to a considerable extent. This phase of Belorussian history we shall examine later in its appropriate place.

Notes

1. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'* (Laurentian Chronicle), year 859.
2. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, year 862.
3. "The peculiar fact that the Slavic tribes were subdued not only by the sword but also by means of contractual relations," says Marx in this connection in his *Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century*, "may be explained by the exceptional position of these tribes, who, under the threat of invasion from both the north and the south, accepted the former as a release from the second."
4. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, years 882, 884, 885.
5. Karl Marx, *Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century*, p. 75.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
7. See Map 2, facing p. 122.
8. Karl Marx, *Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century*, p. 77.
9. Grekov, *Feodalnyye otnosheniya v Kiyevskom gosudarstve* (Feudal Relations in the Kiev State), pp. 15, 18.
10. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, year 945.
11. *Ibid.*, years 880, 885.
12. This erroneous opinion was shared by such historians as Pokrovsky, *Ocherk istorii russkoi kultury* (An Essay on the History of Russian Culture) (1923), p. 50, as well as Klyuchevskii, *Russkaya istoriya* (Russian History), Vol. I, p. 174.
13. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, year 981.
14. *Ibid.*, year 1103.
15. *Novgorodskaya letopis'* (Novgorod Chronicle), year 1230, Vol. I, p. 47.
16. *Polnoye sobraniye russkikh letopisei* (Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles), year 1471.
17. *Dopolnyeniye k aktam istoricheskim* (Supplement to Historical Deeds), year 1200, Vol. I, p. 8.
18. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, year 1103, and others.
19. *Russkaya Pravda* (Russian Law), Akademicheskii spisok (Academic list), Arts. 11, 12, 25, 26, and others.
20. *Ipatyevskaya letopis'* (Ipatyev Chronicle), year 1114.

21. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, year 1270.
22. Aristov, *Promyshlennost' v drevnyei Rusi* (Industry in Ancient Rus) (1866), p. 17.
23. *Sobraniye gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov* (Collection of State Records and Agreements), Pt. 2, No. 1.
24. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, pp. 150, 242.
25. "There is no doubt as to the existence of so-called 'free' smerds. . . . However, the smerds of the eleventh century were not all free peasants and members of a commune. A part of them, no doubt, had already managed to fall into bondage to the feudal lords." Grekov, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-129. See also Yushkov, *K voprosu o smerdakh* (On the Problem of the Smerds). *Uchyonyye zapiski Saratovskovo universiteta* (Scientific Records of the Saratov University), Vol. I, Issue 4.
26. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, year 1103.
27. *Russkaya Pravda*, Akademicheskii spisok, p. 30.
28. Here are the important and variously interpreted articles, *Russkaya Pravda*, Karamzinskii spisok (Karamzin list), pp. 103-104: "If a smerd should die without children, the inheritance goes to the prince; but, should he have daughters at home, a part should be given to them; if they are married, no part should be given." On the other hand: "In the case of boyars or even the boyar bodyguard, the inheritance shall not go back to the prince." In other words the smerd may bequeath only to his sons and not to the daughters; however, in the absence of any sons, the prince inherits, giving the daughters only their dowry. The property of the boyars after their death is not inherited by the prince but is passed on to his sons and daughters. Cf. Presnyakov, *Knyazhoye pravo v drevnyei Rusi* (Princely Law in Ancient Rus) (1909), p. 279; Nikolskii, *O nachalakh nasledovaniya po drevnerusskomu pravu* (On the Beginning of Inheritance According to Ancient Russian Law) (1859), p. 356.
29. *Russkaya Pravda, Troitskii spisok* (Troitsky list), p. 13, Akademicheskii spisok, p. 23.
30. *Novgorodskaya letopis' po Sinodalnomu spisku* (Novgorod Chronicle According to the Synod List), years 1169, 1193, 1229.
31. Karamzin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. III, Note 327.
32. *Novgorodskaya letopis' po Sinodalnomu spisku*, year 1136.
33. *Ipatyevskaya letopis'*, year 1245.
34. *Russkaya Pravda*, Akademicheskii spisok, pp. 31-32; Troitskii spisok, pp. 71-72.
35. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, year 1096.
36. *Russkaya Pravda, Karamzinskii spisok*, p. 71.
37. *Ibid.*, Troitskii spisok, p. 54.
38. *Ibid.*, Art. 53.
39. Grekov, *op. cit.*, p. 121.
40. We cannot dwell here in greater detail on the literary tendencies and theories of the Old Russian historiography and the variety of ways in which it formulated and solved the problem of the genesis and development of this Russian form of the reallotting and leveling commune (Chernyshevskii, Kavelin, Nikolskii, Belyayev, Blumenfeld, Chicherin, Kaufman, and many others, about whom see the Biographical Index).
41. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, years 946 and 947; *Ipatyevskaya letopis'*, years 1087, 1150, 1146; *Novgorodskaya letopis'*, Vol. I, year 1177, and others.
42. *Novgorodskaya letopis'*, Vol. I, p. 2.
43. *Russkaya Pravda*, Troitskii spisok, Arts. 21, 50, 103, 105; Karamzinskii spisok, Arts. 68, 69, 73, 110, and others.
44. *Ipatyevskaya letopis'*, year 1158.
45. *Ibid.*, year 1159.

46. *Ibid.*, year 1146.
47. *Russkaya Pravda,* Karamzinskii spisok, Art. 111.
48. *Ibid.*, Troitskii spisok, Arts. 50, 51.
49. *Ibid.*, Arts. 102-104.
50. *Ibid.*, Art. 52.
51. *Novgorodskaya letopis'*, year 1215.
52. Nikitskii, *Istoriya ekonomicheskogo byta Velikogo Novgoroda* (History of the Economic Life of Novgorod the Great), p. 62. See also Grekov, *Feodalnyye otnosheniya v Kiyevskom gosudarstve* (Feudal Relations in the Kiev State), pp. 33-37.
53. Hence we cannot consider as correct the all too widespread interpretation of the significance and prevalence of slavery as a special social structure in Kiev Rus, of which "we are fully justified in asserting that we are in the presence of a slave-owning society" (as I. Smirnov says in his study of the genesis of feudalism), or even to consider that all "the forms of feudal dependency are impossible outside of slavery; they all stem from slavery and slavery stands directly behind them," as Tsvibak has done. Cf. I. Smirnov, "O genezise feodalizma" (On the Genesis of Feudalism), *Problemy istorii materialnoy kultury* (Problems in the History of Material Culture) (1933), Nos. 3-4; Tsvibak, "Osnovnyye problemy genezisa i razvitiya feodalnogo obshchestva" (Problems of the Genesis and Development of Feudal Society), *Izvestiya GAIMK* (GAIMK News) (1934), Issue 103.
54. Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XVI, Pt. I, p. 133.
55. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, year 988.
56. M. N. Pokrovskii, *Ocherk istorii russkoi kultury* (Essay on the History of Russian Culture (1923), pp. 50-65.
57. Dovnar-Zapolskii, *Istoriya narodnogo khozyaistva* (History of the National Economy) (1911), p. 266.
58. *Russkaya Pravda,* Karamzinskii spisok, Art. 12.
59. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, year 1016.
60. Aristov, *Promyshlennost' v drevnyei Rusi* (Industry in Ancient Rus), pp. 83-101.
61. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, year 907.
62. *Ibid.*, year 987.
63. *Ibid.*, year 1205.
64. *Ibid.*, year 992.
65. Aristov, *Promyshlennost' v drevnyei Rusi* (Industry in Ancient Rus), p. 150.
66. *Novgorodskaya letopis'*, year 1096.
67. *Russkaya Pravda,* Troitskii spisok, Arts. 26, 28, 32, 51.
68. *Ibid.*, Art. 35.
69. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, years 866, 907.
70. *Ibid.*, year 945.
71. *Ibid.*, year 969.
72. "The Historical Works of Giovanni de Piano Carpini, Whom Pope Innocent IV Sent as Envoy to the Tatars in 1246," published in Russian translation by Yazykov, in *Sobraniye puteshestvii k tataram* (A Collection on Travels to the Tatars) (1825).
73. Pogodin, *Issledovaniya, zamechaniya i lektsii po russkoi istorii* (Studies, Notes, and Lectures in Russian History) (1855–1857), Vols. IV-V; Kulish, *Istoriya vossoyedinyeniya Rusi* (History of the Reunion of Rus) (1874), 2 vols.
74. Maksimovich, *Sobraniye sochinyenyei* (Collected Works) (1876), Vol. I; Antonovich, *Monografii po istorii Zapadnoi i yugo-zapadnoi Rossii* (Monographs in the History of Western and Southwestern Russia) (1885), Vol. I.

(VI)

The Nationalities of Transcaucasia and Central Asia in the Period of Feudal Fragmentation (Seventh to Thirteenth Centuries)

We have already indicated (Chapter II) that the peoples of Transcaucasia and Central Asia by the seventh and eighth centuries had for the most part already passed through the patriarchal family stage and the phase of primitive tribal organization, sometimes uniting in large groups of a political nature, sometimes on a national scale (the Chaldeo-Kartvel state of Urartu, the Georgian, Iberian, and Colchid states), but more frequently by means of foreign conquests. Foreign invasions not only destroyed national states but also contributed to their political dismemberment, disrupting their incipient national unity and converting them into Greco-Roman provinces or Persian satrapies. Inasmuch as the political centers of the conquerors were far removed and communication with them was quite weak, the local authorities were particularly influential, not only the provincial administration or satrap but also the leading national tribal and princely aristocracy, which frequently exercised great power in the administration and in economic life. With the mass of the population economically ruined, and the appearance of private landed property and economic dependency of the small farmers upon the owning classes, and with the age-old existence of slavery, feudal forms of organization and feudal dismemberment were beginning to emerge and gain in growth.

In countries like Georgia, where, against the background of the dissolving clan mode of life, private landed property appeared earlier, and where no religious tenets or political laws erected any formal obstacles, the feudal system developed there most completely. In Moslem and Mohammedanized countries, however, the land (as well as the water) was formally (in accordance with the rules of the Sheriyat) regarded as the property of the sovereign power and could not be acquired as private property. However, the progress of economic life, and especially the need for irrigation installations in many localities, actually concentrated the right of disposal of the land and of the water for irrigating it in the hands of the privileged classes, and served as a

nucleus for the appearance of the personal and economic dependency of the population. Furthermore, in the nomad and cattle-raising districts, particularly in the mountainous areas, due to the scarcity of certain types of pasture, the latter was seized by some of the stronger clans and groups, who subordinated the other less influential clan groups to themselves. Out of this circumstance arose also a form of feudal serf dependence. In this way began the existence of a form of "Eastern" and "nomad" feudalism, varying in accordance with a great number of local conditions.

For the majority of peoples and lands of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, the turning point in the entrenchment and further development of feudalism was the Arab conquest of the seventh and eighth centuries. Although the Arabic caliphate was a typical centralized Eastern despotism which denied the right of private property in accordance with the law of Islam, because of the above-cited causes, the Arabic era on the other hand brought about the intensification and development of feudal relationships and feudal dispersion. Aware of the remoteness and weakness of the central power of the caliphs, the Arab viceroys and emirs began to strive for self-sufficiency and independence, thus preparing the ground for feudal dispersion. The impoverishment of the population and their burdensome taxes contributed to the further intensification of feudal dependency. The post-Arabic conquests (by the Seljuk Turks and Mongols) also failed to create a stable or enduring central power.

Therefore, for the majority of the countries under examination here, as well as for their peoples, the whole era from the eighth to the seventeenth century was an era of continued feudal decentralization and the development of a feudal type of society. In some of the countries such relationships attained a fuller development and were preserved for longer periods of time (as in Gruzia from the ninth to the seventeenth century). In others they began to decline at a relatively early date under the impact of the rise of towns and trade (Armenia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). Finally, in a third class of states, feudal decentralization merged with the surviving political forms of Eastern despotisms, with slavery, and with exploitation of the mass of the toiling population through land use and usury (the Central Asia and Azerbaijan khanates).

Below we shall consider in greater detail the peculiarities of development of feudal-serf relationships among the various nationalities.[1]

GEORGIA Feudalism in Georgia began to take shape as far back as the period of Persian rule, at the beginning of the sixth century, when Georgia split into two independent parts, one under the power of Byzantium (Lazika), and the other—under Persian rule (Kartliya). Due to the weak-

ness of the local Persian authorities and the Byzantine viceroys, the old tribal aristocracy and the large landowning feudal gentry enjoyed great influence. Although the earlier division of society as a whole into freemen (*aznaury*) and bondmen (*uazno*) was preserved intact, it assumed a special significance. The *aznaury* became the privileged landowning class and were in turn divided into a "great," feudal aristocracy and a "small," ordinary gentry. Besides the *aznaury* the freemen also included various groups of "small people" and free "servants." In the household of the *aznaury* bonded peasants, *glekhs*, or slaves, worked alongside of each other.

When Persian rule began to crumble at the end of the sixth century, the seignioral aristocracy of Kartliya succeeded in organizing a feudal Georgian state independent of Persia. But during the seventh century Georgia was subjected to another conquest, this time by the Arabs.

During the seventh century the Arabs conquered eastern Georgia (643–645) and imposed vassalage upon it. Western Georgia still remained nominally under the protection of Byzantium. From the beginning the vassalage of Georgia to the Arabs was expressed, aside from the obligation of military assistance, in the payment of tribute by the population (a gold dinar per household). Subsequently, however, taxation of the non-Moslem population was raised to a more oppressive rate. The resulting uprisings against the Arabs were cruelly suppressed by them. The population sought refuge in the west, in the provinces under Byzantine rule. Politically the Arabs, due to their opposition to a feudal order, divided the country into a number of provinces subject to the authority of the central power, and each province was headed by an Arabic emir. In reality, however, power had passed locally into the hands of the local landowning gentry, which thus led to a quite contrary result—to the intensification of feudalism. Slavery disappeared formally, superseded by feudal types of bondage in practice no less burdensome than slavery. The small working peasants, the *glekhs*, because of their meager supply of land, their economic insolvency, and their indebtedness to the landowner, were falling into bondage to the great nobles by assuming obligations to cultivate the latters' land, to perform forced labor, and to deliver various types of *obrok*. At the same time they were losing their personal freedom and turning into serfs. Because of the frequency of military conflicts and the weakness of the central power, the landowning nobility, in order to strengthen their authority, erected castles and transformed themselves gradually into independent feudal masters over entire territories and the peasants living therein.

After the collapse of the power of the Arabic caliphate in the ninth century, the political unity of Georgia was not restored. The country disintegrated into a number of independent feudal principalities (the Kartalin,

Kakhetin, Abkhaz, and Tao-Klardzhet), each with a preponderance of one ethnical element, but with a similar feudal foundation in general. In the tenth century the Abkhaz state was the most important, including at first Kartalinia and Kakhetia, and afterwards also Tao-Klardzhetia. The national unification movement found support among the minor nobility, the town population, and among a few, small individual Georgian princes who in their inaccessible mountainous localities were able to maintain their independence throughout the period of Arabic rule. On the other hand the great feudal nobility and the hereditary princely aristocracy, supported by the higher representatives of the Church, remained persistently opposed to national unification. At the end of the tenth and during the eleventh century, the drive for national unification was crowned with success (under Bagrat III and his successors), and in the eleventh century (under David) the frontiers of the state extended eastward as far as Derbent and Persian Azerbaijan, embracing Armenia in the south and the whole coastal region in the west.

In its social order Gruzia of the eleventh and twelfth centuries had become a typical feudal state. At the head of the state was the king, who was known as the "king of kings," a title borrowed from the Persians. The component regions were administered by viceroy-governors (*eristavy*) from the ranks of the great feudal aristocracy, in whose hands the whole administration was actually centered. After the king, in the order of feudal hierarchy, followed the owning princes (*batonivili*) and then the almost independent princes (*tavady*). Nominally the great feudal lords were considered vassals of the king (*didebuly*). In their turn the great feudal lords held in vassalage the smaller nobility (*aznaury*), who owed them personal military service. Among the hereditary noble *aznaury* there existed another lower stratum of personal nobility who held their titles only during the time of their service. The upper Church hierarchy also ranked with the higher feudal groups.

The basic and exploited class was the bound, working peasantry. The peasants (*glekhs*) labored under various forms of dependency upon the upper classes, all equally burdensome. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries a majority of the *glekhs* had already fallen into complete serf bondage to the nobility and the feudal gentry, with the customary forms of exploitation—*barshchina, obrok,* and military contributions. Finally, the estates of the seigniors and princes employed large numbers of slaves. In the towns and various settlements that frequently sprang up on the seignioral lands, special classes of artisans were coming into being, also for the most part dependent upon the feudal lord. Only in the larger cities, like Tbilisi, did artisans enjoy a position of greater independence. In these same large cities a merchant class also gradually began to form, while the larger merchant elements (*didvachari*) acquired a number of privileges and rights of self-administration.

In the twelfth century Arab dominion over Georgia finally collapsed. In 1122 the Arab emir was driven out of Tbilisi, which thereupon became the capital of the state.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (especially under Queen Tamara, 1184–1212) the Georgian state attained the peak of its civilization and an economic prosperity rooted in the development of agriculture, a growth of large towns (Kutaisi and Tbilisi), and an increase of handicraft industries and trade. The social-economic foundations of the state remained feudal, and its political integrity was precarious as a result of the feudal dissension between the Abkhaz and Georgian hereditary nobility over the right of leadership. Various feudal lords organized uprisings against the central power. On the other hand the tightening feudal yoke on the bulk of the population ruined the peasant economy and doomed it to a low economic and cultural level. The ground for new feudal dissolution and for the decline of the state was being prepared.

The trend was hastened by the devastating invasion and the Mongol conquests of Genghis Khan: in 1241–1242 the Mongols conquered and razed all eastern Georgia, sacked Tbilisi and subjugated the whole country to a position of vassalage (the payment of heavy tribute, the delivery of large auxiliary troops for future Mongol conquests, and so forth). The devastation of the country brought about a decline in agriculture through entire regions, a collapse of trade, and the economic ruin of the cities and of the artisan population.

After having barely recovered from one disaster, Gruzia in 1395 was subjected to a still more savage invasion by the Mongolian hordes of Tamerlane (Timur). The devastation, the dislocation of the production forces of the country, and its depopulation were so far-reaching that whole provinces lay desolate and the soil remained completely uncultivated. In the face of these circumstances, all attempts to unify the state and restore its national political integrity and independence failed.

ARMENIA Feudal conditions in Armenia began to arise in place of the declining slave forms of organization by the sixth century, at a time when Armenia, although nominally retaining its own national royal power (the *Arshakids*), was ruled by the Persians. Living on the land and furnished with the means of production, the slaves began to approach the economic status of serfs. The peasants, on the other hand, burdened by all sorts of obligations in kind toward the landowners whose land they occupied, fell into personal bondage and were compelled to render compulsory labor services in the fields of the owners. The upper landowning class, with enormous hereditary estates (*votchinas*) at their disposal, came to be distinguished as

the top feudal nobility, the *nakharars*. The latter, the larger ones in particular, became well-nigh independent feudal owners and masters of the entire provinces in their possession: they had their own troops, collected feudal dues, held honorary office at the royal court and in effect functioned as a check on the royal power. The feudal entourage of the *nakharary* consisted of the lesser landowning gentry, the *azats,* who also held slaves and bonded peasants of their own. The *azats* held their lands in ownership, but only as a right of *pomestye;* that is, as a reward for service, chiefly in the royal or *nakharar* cavalry. The mass of peasantry fell more and more into enslavement to the lords both by being deprived of land and through economic indebtedness engendered by heavy feudal obligations. The tax paid by peasantry to the princes, the *nakharars* and *azats,* included head, land, and harvest taxes, while in addition the peasant was subject to compulsory labor.

The *nakharars* waged perpetual wàrfare against the royal power, resorting to aid from Byzantium or Persia, thus falling victim alternately to one or the other. The population fought for its national existence with fortitude, despite the fact that both enemies, the Byzantine emperor Mauricius and the Persian king Khosroy, contemplated the complete destruction of the whole Armenian nationality with their combined power. The issue was settled, however, when Persia itself fell under the domination of the Arabs in the sixth century. In 642 the Arabs occupied Armenia. Henceforth, during the period of the seventh to the tenth centuries, Armenia, along with other lands of the Near East, a part of Europe, and northern Africa, fell into the grip of the vast Arabic caliphate.

Although the feudal order with a feudal aristocracy and serfdom in agriculture were alien to the Arabs, Arab rule nevertheless did not destroy the feudal social-economic structure of Armenia. At first the widespread devastation caused by the Arab conquest led the country into a state of profound and prolonged depression (seventh and eighth centuries). Commercial intercourse with Byzantium stopped and the old trade centers and routes fell into disuse. Yet, being a component part of a single vast caliphate of the East whose trade routes occasionally passed through Armenia, a revival of trade and a renewed participation by Armenia in the movement of world trade resulted. Therefore, when the Arabic caliphate began to disintegrate in the eleventh century, a movement to organize an independent national state in Armenia began to gain. The greatest success in behalf of this movement was achieved under the leadership of the local dynasty of the Bagratids, in the kingdom of Ani. Ani, through which passed the important trade routes between the Arab East, Byzantium, and the Caspian and Trans-Caspian lands, became the capital of the state and a large, rich cultural center of one hundred thousand inhabitants. Other large commercial towns began to rise and

develop, among them Karin, Dvin, Artsn, Van, and Berkri, and afterward Erzerum, one of the largest points along the caravan trade.

Armenia in the tenth century was considered one of the richest parts of the Arabic caliphate. Great fortunes were accumulated not only by the great feudal nobles but also by the urban commercial and artisan classes. Thus Moisey Khorensky (a writer of the seventh century) ranks the townspeople second within the social order of Armenia of that period, directly after the feudal lords, while he assigns the lowest position to the rural population.

The period of Armenian prosperity under the Bagratid dynasty did not, however, last. In 1045 the Ani kingdom of the Bagratids was conquered by Byzantium, and in 1048 Armenia, together with the other countries of Asia Minor, was invaded by the Seljuk Turks, destroyed and dismembered. After desolating the country, the Turks crowded out part of the Armenians toward the west, into Kalikia, where the Armenians organized the Kalikian Armenian state with a purely feudal system, where the feudal Armenian "baron" held sway over the mass of the serf population. The other, northern part of the territory and its population, with its ancient capital Ani, merged with Gruzia. In central and southern Armenia were organized Moslem states under sheddadin, shakharmen, and shahs. Along with the destruction of the country and the inauguration of the laws of the Sheriyat, the national character of private feudal ownership in land was also obliterated, and in its place new forms of feudal exploitation arose, in connection with which whole regions were granted to Turkish *beks* for administration and collection of taxes. At the same time, new forms of enslavement through land use and usury by all sorts of village chieftains and administrators made their appearance.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Armenia, along with its neighbors and with Georgia in particular, was inundated by new waves of invasions of Eastern nomads. The invasions of Genghis Khan (1220), and later of Tamerlane (1395), brought utter desolation to the country and annihilated all urban, commercial, and artisan life. The population was decimated, dispersed, or carried away into captivity. Famous Armenian craftsmen in metal and in other materials were taken to the capital of Tamerlane in Central Asia. The feudal nobility, of which only a small portion escaped into the mountains for self-preservation, was also annihilated. Thereafter, the Armenian nationality and culture, except for the Kalikian state, was preserved chiefly through various colonies scattered in other lands. Living there for the most part in the large commercial centers and towns (the more important of which were Dzhulf, many cities in India, and later Constantinople), the Armenian merchants gained control over large-scale domestic and foreign trade, formed an upper merchant class, and laid the basis for the national

mercantile capitalism of Armenia. The agricultural Armenian population proper, however, of which only negligible remnants were preserved within a small area of southwestern Transcaucasia, remained in feudal bondage to their Turkish and Persian maliks and khans.

AZERBAIJAN As previously stated, by the end of the seventh century, Albania (Azerbaijan) and all eastern Transcaucasia were conquered by the Arabs, who combined Azerbaijan and a part of Armenia into the single province of Arran administered by a viceroy-emir within the customary Arab system. Retaining in their own control the military administration, the Arabs rather ineffectually colonized and "Arabianized" the country. Yet through their military colonization they dislodged the Armenian population and feudal nobility into the upper mountain regions. As in other localities, the Arabs exercised considerable influence on the cultural-economic prosperity of the country, particularly in the development of trade, towns, and handicrafts. In the ninth and tenth centuries the town of Barda (on the Kura) gained importance as a large commercial center where great trade routes to Persia, Trapezus, and the Caspian crossed. After Barda was sacked by the Russians (Svyatoslav) in the ninth century, the city of Gandzha, founded by the Arabs, replaced it (tenth and eleventh centuries) as the commercial and political center.

During the era of the Arabic caliphate's decline in the tenth and eleventh centuries, Turkic elements were gradually gaining in strength, a process completed in the conquest of Azerbaijan by the Seljuk Turks and the adoption of Gandzha as the capital city of the Seljuk Turkish emirs. During this period the indigenous population of Azerbaijan was largely annihilated, dislodged far into the mountains, or, finally and to a lesser extent, assimilated by the conquerors. Only in the region of the Lesser Caucasus Mountains (the Nagorny Karabakh and between the Shakhvag and Murovdag ranges) remnants of the Armenian population, along with strata of Kurds, succeeded in maintaining a firm foothold.

The economy of Azerbaijan, during this age of Turkic supremacy, found itself in substantial measure under the influence which the Turkic people exercised on the agricultural customs of the local population. In its natural environment the country was endowed both with enormous territories of plowland (*gandzha*), and spacious steppes suitable for a herdsman-nomad type of economy (the Mugan and Mil steppes); with arid regions suitable for a highly intensive cultivation of cotton and rice by the aid of irrigation (the Karabakh and Shirvan steppes); with mountainous districts with rich foothill meadows for grazing cattle (the Alpian meadows of the Nagorny Karabakh); and finally with the specially situated petroleum districts of the

Caspian shore (Baku). In the age of the Sassanids, the Arabs, and the Seljuk Turks, a rural type of economy with various branches of agriculture constituted the basic pattern of the national economy. Grain culture was well developed, along with intensive cultivation of cotton and rice, orchards and vineyards. Equally developed and well advanced was the local system of irrigation, traces of which are preserved to this day in the Karabakh, Shirvan, and Mugan steppes.

In the thirteenth century Azerbaijan was invaded by the hordes of Genghis Khan, and afterward, at the end of the fourteenth century, by Tamerlane. These conquests resulted in the full entrenchment of Islam and the rule of Turkic-Mongol elements in Azerbaijan, and also exercised a profound effect on the future development of Azerbaijan economy. The influx of the nomad Mongols not only disrupted the whole intricate system of irrigation agriculture and the installations connected with it, but also wrecked all prospects for agriculture, which henceforth began to decline, being eventually superseded by stock raising. In turn this led to new phases of social organization, to new forms of feudal dependency, and to the decentralization of the country.

The wandering herdsman requires enormous pasture areas unimpeded by irrigation canals or plowed lands which tend to interfere with grazing. Therefore tilled fields and irrigation systems were often completely destroyed. For example, Tamerlane's favorite summer pasture was the once predominantly agricultural Karabakh; the same type of destruction of the irrigation structures was repeated by the Turkic Mongol nomads in the Mugan steppe. The result was a sharp intensification in the conflicting interests of the nomad cattle raising and the land-tilling economy. The situation was still further complicated by savage struggles among the various Mongol units (the Golden Horde and the various khanates), and also between them and Persia. As a consequence Azerbaijan disintegrated into a number of separate feudal khanates—the Shemakhin, Shekin, Gandzhin, Karabakh, and others, with khans of Mongol extraction and mostly in the position of vassalage to Persia.

As for the agricultural population of Azerbaijan, it belonged chiefly to nationalities of non-Turkic origin (Armenians, Georgians, and also Kurds, who for the most part remained nomad herdsmen). Among them survived considerable traces of patriarchal family life. Under the feudal decentralization of the country, the feudal forms of hierarchy and bondage did not develop as much here as they did, for example, in Georgia. With the nominal absence of private property in land and with the formal concentration of all land in the hands of the khans, the latter were surrounded by an official class, *beks* and *agalars,* who had not yet succeeded in attaining a position of independent feudal seigniors. The small manorial gentry was also comparatively few in number. Therefore, among the mass of the population here,

there persisted for a considerably longer time survivals of patriarchal and even clan relationships characterized by nomad customs, a backward civilization, slavery, and so forth.

THE PEOPLES OF ASIA[2] The first signs of the origin of a feudal order among the peoples of Central Asia to appear under the stimulus of the dissolution of the patriarchal family form of life, may be traced as long ago as the end of Turkic rule. Both the level of development of the production forces and the extent of dissolution of the clan order differed greatly in the various regions. In the more northerly steppe areas the population's herdsman character of occupation and customs were still left unchanged, and along with them the clan order. In the settled districts soil cultivation had already begun to develop, often with the aid of irrigation, involving the planting of wheat, millet, rice, as well as orchards, vineyards, and the raising of silk. In the towns of the same regions urban handicrafts were widely developed—silk cloth production, arms making, and others. In political and social organization the Turks had already laid the foundation for feudalism by segregating a large landowning class of *dekhkans,* who administered their various districts by right of vassalage to the sovereign rulers from the Turks, the khans. Within the populace a cleavage began to arise into a well born "white" and a common "black" caste. The toilers were falling deeper into dependency on the upper landowning classes.

The Arab conquest of the end of the seventh and early eighth centuries found in Central Asia, as political organizations, a number of distinct local Turkic khanates of a military-feudal and nomadic type, in part settled by a land-tilling population. The decentralization of the country made conquest all the easier, and conquest brought ruin upon the population and its economy.

Having conquered Bukhara and Samarkand, taken possession of Khorezm and Fergana, the Arabs reached Kashgar and firmly consolidated Arab rule in Central Asia. After putting the conquered areas to fire and sword, converting the Buddhist temples into mosques, destroying and evicting the inhabitants in order to clear the lands and towns for occupancy by the conquerors, the Arabs desolated the country. The Arabian state, spreading through conquest from Kashgar to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, from the Volga banks to India, rapidly united in its grip all the important world caravan and sea trade routes between the East and the West. The exploitation of the native population by the Arabs in the realm of taxation, the framing of new land regulations, commercial exploitation, and so forth, were conducted savagely and intensified by fanatical Mohammedanism. Barbaric methods were adopted for depriving the indigenous population of their lands in order

to award the Arabian viceroys with large landed possessions, and to grant land to Arab and Persian resettlers.

Heavily oppressive taxes and a great variety of obligations constituted a burden on the population. The most oppressive tax of all was the *kheradzh,* a land tax. This fell upon the population as a double burden since the various districts were farmed out to the viceroys and the latter collected it on an arbitrary scale. In addition there existed a double system of levying the *kheradzh:* the *masakha* and the *mukasama.* The *masakha* was a type of land tax collected regardless of whether the land was planted or not; the *mukasama,* on the other hand, was levied on the basis of the sown acreage, a fixed proportion of the crop for a given section. The former was collected largely from lands under the cultivation of grain, and the latter, from lands employed in orchard culture and thus predominantly on irrigated lands. The use of irrigation was regulated by special rules.

The cruel extraction of taxes and various illegal collections from the rural population could not but lead first to the stagnation, and later to the disruption of the production forces of the country. The rural population, in an attempt to reduce the burden of taxes and duties, listed their plots as belonging to some influential personage or large owner whom the administrator-farmer could not tax and rob with impunity. In this manner, however, the inhabitants eventually ended by falling into bondage to the same landowner and becoming his dependent "people."

Nevertheless, despite the development of such forms of semiserf dependency, the existence of a great and powerful Arab state was of intense economic significance in the sense of assuring the safety of the trade routes against nomads, the development of town life, and so forth. Controlling the main commercial routes between the East and the West, the Arabs became the intermediaries in the trade between them, maintaining an enormous trade between India and China at one end and the Slavic lands, Byzantium, and the countries of western Europe on the other. Here they disposed of silk, arms, and paper. From the Slavic lands they carried slaves and furs. The Arabs also drew into this trade the peoples and the countries they had conquered. In the tenth century, under such a stimulus, occurred the political rise and economic regeneration of former Sogdiana (Mezhdurechie), which was now controlled by the vassals of the Bagdad caliphs—the Samanids. The latter made Bukhara the center of political life. Samarkand became the center for the manufacture of rag paper, introduced there by the Chinese and replacing the previously used parchment and papyrus. Simultaneously the making of textiles spread here from Persia, and the city of Vedar became a center for the production of cotton fabrics. This period was also characterized by

the disappearance of the Sogedy language and its replacement by the Tadzhik language, which was barely distinguishable from the Persian.

CONQUEST BY THE SELJUK TURKS The industrial and commercial prosperity attained by the Arabs in Central Asia during the tenth and eleventh centuries could not fail to attract the near-by warlike nomads, who regularly plundered the cities and the trade caravans. As protection against these raids, the Arabs early in the eighth century erected long walls along the valley of the Chirchik River and in Samarkand Province. The Turkic tribes of *oguzy,* or *toguz-oguzy,* wandering through the north of Central Asia, by the eighth century began to resettle into the western part of Central Asia toward the lower Syr-Darya, and there formed a state of their own. Another part of the Turkic tribes who remained in their original location was subsequently absorbed by new arrivals from the Altai—the Karluk Turks. The Arabs at first confined themselves to maintaining trade with these neighbors to the north, involving the exchange of grain, clothing, and other goods for livestock, hides, furs, slaves, and so forth.

The Karluks, in comparison with other Turkic tribes, had attained a high level of economic development. A large part of them engaged in animal husbandry and hunting, while agriculture and town life were also developed. Other Turkic tribes—the Gigels and Yagma—occupied themselves chiefly in nomad stock raising (horses and sheep). By the end of the tenth century the Karluk Turks, together with other tribes, formed a unified state with its capital at Balasagu in the Chu River valley. This Turkic state received the name of the *Karakhanid* or *Ilek-Khan* state, after the name of its ruling dynasty. In the lengthy struggle for the settled regions of Central Asia, the Karakhanids emerged victorious, and with the capture of Bukhara (995) in effect brought an end to the hegemony of the Arabs. The Karakhanid state had already acquired a number of characteristics of the feudal order. Although the great landowning nobility had lost its political importance following the Karakhanid conquest, the role of the smaller feudal landowning groups, the *dekhkans,* increased in turn, and the latter now began to obtain land on the basis of the *ikta,* an institution introduced by the Karakhanids, which resembled the *pomestye.* The owner of an *ikta* received the right to collect a special tax, the *kheradzh,* from the peasants on the settlements within his grant. Subsequently, however, the *ikta* was changed from the right to collect taxes into the feudal right of the *ikta* owners over the peasants.

At the end of the tenth century the dynasty of the Karakhanids was superseded by that of the Gaznevids,[8] with the character of the nomadic feudal system remaining unchanged.

During the twelfth century Central Asia fell under a new conquest by

northern nomads of Turkic extraction known as the Seljuk Turks (so named after their leader, the *bek* Seljuk). In 1130 the Turks captured Samarkand and Khorassan, and moved their residence to Merv. The Seljuks, having become the masters of Central Asia and intent on crushing everything non-Turkic, were at once confronted with the need of breaking the power of the Arabic military-political and economic system. As a nomadic people, among whom the clan mode of life had partly survived but side by side with a developed system of class, tribal, and military hierarchy, the Turks began to introduce a feudal type of organization in lieu of the centralized Arabic system, bestowing whole settled localities and *kishlaks* as "a livelihood" to the various *beks,* leaders of the clans and military commanders, who later acquired the power and position of independent feudal lords. The peasants were drifting into feudal bondage to the *beks.* The growing feudal decentralization of the Turkic state inevitably resulted in weakening its power.

In the middle of the twelfth century the rule of the Seljuk Turks in Central Asia received a crushing blow at the hands of a new group of nomads of Mongolian origin, the Karakidani, or Karakitai. After having formed in the tenth century a vast empire extending from the Pacific Ocean to eastern Turkestan, the nomad Karakitai organized their main strongpoint, Khosun-Orda, on the river Chu, along the important world trade route. Having subjugated Turkestan during the middle of the twelfth century, the Karakitai introduced little change in its social-economic order, which retained the features of its feudal system, although under new suzerains. Administering the country through their viceroys, the Karakitai introduced farmstead taxation; they visited some provinces only for the purpose of collecting the levies. The trade and trade routes to the West and the East continued their usual development under the Karakitai.

THE RISE OF CHERASMIA Under the influence of the continued development of trade during the tenth to the twelfth centuries, the commercial and political importance of Cherasmia, lying along the main trade highways between the East and the West, began its rapid rise. Nearly the entire *Mezhdurechie* region during the eleventh and twelfth centuries conducted its trade with the western part of Central Asia, and with Persia through Cherasmia. The trading vessels of Cherasmia, sailing along the Syr, sometimes went as far as Khodzhent. Occasionally the people of Cherasmia, moving along the land route through Termez, reached India. Through their hands passed nearly all Khorassan trade. Under such circumstances an uprising of the local Cherasmia population, led by the local commercial bourgeoisie, against the Karakitai was inevitable. The uprising of Atsyz, a native of Cherasmia, and the battle on the Talas decided the issue in favor of the

Cherasmia people, who thereupon organized their own state and a new dynasty founded by Atsyz. Arab writers and travelers who visited Cherasmia during that period have described its advanced agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, trade, and handicrafts.

However, the cultural oases of the Cherasmia state remained surrounded by warlike wandering savages. With some of them Cherasmia not only entered into trade relations but also made military alliances for joint struggle against other nomads. Among the latter were the Kipchaks (the Polovtsy in the Russian chronicles), who were at that time wandering across the lower Syr-Darya and through the steppes of the Don, Ural, and lower Volga areas. Roaming through the northeast were the Kirghiz tribes, and further east (approximately on the territory of the present-day Mongolian People's Republic), the Mongols.

THE MONGOLIAN PERIOD[4] By the twelfth century these eastern Mongolian nomad peoples were in movement and, uniting under the authority of a single "all-Mongol kagan," Genghis Khan (1206), and forming a new military-feudal state, began a drive toward the west unprecedented in its military power, engulfing not only Central Asia (1219–1221), Persia, Transcaucasia, and Georgia, but also rolling into the South Russian steppes (the battle near Kalka, 1223), and afterward (the campaign of Batu-Khan, 1236–1242) capturing all of Rostov-Suzdal, Kiev Rus, and Galicia, penetrating into Hungary, Poland, and Czechia, also occupying northern China and Afghanistan and reaching into India.

In 1220 the Khorezm state of Central Asia ceased to exist, and in the following year the Mongols occupied all other regions of Central Asia. The Mongolian conquests were accompanied by the complete destruction of the country, specifically by the pillaging and burning of Bukhara (1220), by the capture of Samarkand, the razing to the ground of Cherasmia's capital, Gurgendzh, by the destruction of the inhabitants of Merv (1221), putting all that opposed the Mongols to fire and sword, and by the abduction of artisans. The whole country was turned into a wasteland. In contrast to other nomadic conquerors, the Mongols did not resettle nor make Central Asia their home. In the course of their 175 years of rule (1220–1395), the Mongols subjected the country to merciless exploitation whose violence, as affecting the population, was intensified by the endless feudal struggles between the descendants of Genghis Khan and the petty native rulers.

THE MIGHT OF TAMERLANE Against the background of this feudal struggle following the disruption of the huge empire of Genghis Khan into numerous parts, during the second half of the fourteenth century, began

the ascendancy of one of the ruling Mongol clans of the Kashka-Darya valley, the patrimonial possession of the feudal lord Turgai. His son Tamerlane launched a second world-conquering movement by the Mongolians. After seizing Samarkand, Termez, Bukhara, eastern Turkestan, and Cherasmia, and following the spectacular conquests of Persia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, southern Russia, Syria, Asia Minor up to the shores of the Mediterranean, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan up to India, Tamerlane created a new Mongol world empire. These conquests, as usual, were accompanied by the ravaging and devastation of the conquered land. For Turkestan, however, the formation of Tamerlane's empire was fraught with great significance, since it became, along with Samarkand, the center of the empire, being the crossroads of all the old and leading world trade routes from India to the Volga, and from the Aegean Sea to China.

After plundering the conquered lands, Tamerlane carried back to his homeland and its capital not only loot but captives as well. He abducted and removed the best silk weavers from Damascus to Turkestan, the wool enterprises of Angora and the jewelers of Georgia, who, as might be expected, served as an impetus for establishing these branches of production in the new country. Samarkand, upon being made the capital, became the center of commercial and industrial life. Here came spices and dyestuffs from India, silk, porcelain, and precious stones from China, and furs from the north. Branching from here went the trade routes connecting the area by way of Khorezm, Astrabad, Novgorod, and Moscow with the Hanseatic League; through Herat, Kazvin, Tabriz, and further by the sea route—with Europe and with the Genoese and the Venetians. The revival of the commercial life of the country, accompanied by the spectacular construction of some of the most remarkable buildings in history, the restoration of towns, villages, and irrigation systems, all were abundantly reflected in the prosperity of economic and cultural life.[5]

Notes

1. See Maps 2 and 3, facing pp. 122 and 130.
2. See Maps 2 and 3, facing pp. 122 and 130.
3. The descendants of Mahmud of Ghazni, with whose name is associated the greatest work of Iranian literature, *Shah Nameh*.
4. See Map 3, facing p. 130.
5. To this period specifically belong the ruins of an observatory at Samarkand, which although built at that time was not discovered until 1908. This is further attested to by the remains of the material culture of that era preserved to this day in Samarkand (mosques, *medresses* [Arab higher schools—Ed.], and the mausoleum of Tamerlane "Gur-emir").

(VII)

Northeastern Feudal Rus of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries and the Emergence of the Feudal Patrimony

THE POLITICAL ORDER OF FEUDAL RUS OF THE ELEVENTH TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURIES After the death of Prince Yaroslav (1054) and the division of his possessions among his numerous sons and grandsons, the erstwhile monarchy finally passed out of existence. Henceforth, in the expression of the chronicler, none of the princes of the Rurik dynasty assumed "rule over all Russia" or became "absolute ruler of the Russian land." The integrated Russian Kiev state had become broken up into feudal possessions with an uncertain and unstable method of transmittal of power in the various provinces.

First, the order of inheritance and transfer of power, although not strictly observed, followed the principle of the indivisibility of princely rule and consequently that of the Russian land as a whole. But afterward, with the increase in the number of branches of the princely line descended from Yaroslav, the confusion of relationship among them, and the later breakup of the inherited lands, all order of inheritance that might have assured the integrity of the state ceased to exist. On the contrary it began to contribute toward "dissension" among the princes and to feudal wars which bled the country and rendered it a victim of military desolation and ravage, especially in the most vulnerable part, the Kiev principality (the Pechenegs, Turks, Polovtsy, and finally the Tatars). As we have seen, this was one of the causes of the fall of Kiev Rus and the loss of its dominant political and economic role.

By the twelfth century the territory of Kiev Rus included twelve distinct feudal principalities, still largely corresponding to the former "lands" and basic provinces (the Kiev, Smolensk, Chernigov, Ryazan, Rostov-Suzdal, and others),[1] but now almost unconnected by a single power. During the period of the most extreme feudal decentralization, in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the political system of northeastern feudal Rus was nominally united in the grand principality of Rostov-Suzdal (or Vladimir). Its political frontiers included only part of the territorial legacy of the former

"empire of the Rurik dynasty." In the southwestern Russian lands another, quite powerful, feudal Galician principality came into being, embracing within its frontiers Podolia, Volyn, and part of the Kiev land. In the northwest the old Russian principality of Polotsk and Pinsk-Turov was absorbed by another feudal confederation, the grand principality of Lithuania. Both of the above-named Russian provinces afterward became part of the Polish state, remaining severed from the main stream of Russian historical life for a long period of time.

Along with the country's decentralization occurred a shift in its political as well as economic centers. With the devastation of Kiev, the loss of its status as the "grand principality," and the "desolation" of the southern land, the main trend of resettlement began to flow northeastward into the Oka-Volga interriver region, which had long been settled by a Slavic tribe, the Vyatichi, and where new leading political centers—of the Suzdal, Rostov, Vladimir, and, later, Moscow Rus—now began to emerge.

Of considerable importance to subsequent social-economic development during this age was the fact that, simultaneously with the process of decentralization in the various principalities, occurred a change in the nature of the relationship between the ruler and his possession. In lieu of the erstwhile political unity of the state and the country, however weak in practice, the various principalities began to change into permanent and hereditary "fiefs," the personal patrimonial possessions of the princely families. As the latter multiplied, new partitions and more divisions into fiefs followed. Thus the older Vladimir principality disintegrated into four fiefs at first: the Rostov, Pereyaslavl, Yuryev, and Starodub, and afterward into three new ones: the Suzdal, Kostroma, and Moscow. The same occurred in all other principalities.

Ceaseless subdivisions led to the point where some fiefs were no larger in size than a small county. As a result these "fief principalities" of the former Rurik dynasty were completely scattered and isolated and all community of political interests was lost. The fief-holding prince became a *votchinnik* over his own holdings, with unlimited authority over its population and territory, bequeathing his fief to his heirs as his private possession, his own *votchina*.

In this manner the Rostov-Suzdal feudal Russian state, partitioned into a number of separate independent feudal principalities and itself a vassal of the Tatar Golden Horde, experienced its most difficult phases of feudal disunion, vassalage, and loss of former national territories during the early fourteenth century.

Economically, two important factors lay at the basis of the feudalization process: the emergence of private landownership by the princes, boyars, and service nobility, the "princification" and "boyarification" of the lands and their transformation into feudal manorial property and, simultaneously, as

the obverse side of the process, the expropriation of the small agricultural producer, the plunder of his common lands, and the change of his status into that of a dependent "tenant" of the private land of the feudal seignior.

The inception of this process occurred in the Kiev state as early as the eleventh or twelfth century. It was interrupted here by the military rout and economic decline of Kiev Rus.

In the northeastern Rostov-Suzdal, Vladimir, and Moscow Rus of the twelfth century, and especially in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, this process of feudalization achieved its final fruition, affecting decisively the entire political and economic order of the land. The endless feudal warfare among the various principalities and the continued subdividing of the feudal principalities reduced the country to a state of impotence against foreign attacks.

THE TATAR CONQUEST AND ITS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES For the partitioned feudal Rus, in a political as well as economic sense, the "burdensome" and "dishonorable" Tatar conquest, "devouring the soul of the nation," was an historic event of great significance. It submitted the entire Russian territory to the vassalage of the Tatar khans for 245 years (1236–1480).

After ravaging the Russian land during 1236–1240, Batu-Khan and his Tatars fell back beyond the Volga and there founded the state of the Golden Horde with its capital at Saray, from which they maintained their dominion and renewed their desolation of Russia. The Tatars, said Marx in *The Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century,* "established a reign of systematic terror based on ravage and mass extermination. . . . Inasmuch as, compared with their colossal conquests, they were not numerous, they succeeded by repeated slaughters in annihilating the nations which arose behind their lines." [2] The economic expression of this rule was a tribute imposed on the Russian population. Originally this tribute—"the Horde's method"—was collected by the Tatars themselves, for which purpose they conducted per capita censuses through their "enumerators" in the course of the first thirty-five years, with the exception of the clergy, which was tax exempt. This frequently provoked new clashes, violence, slaughter and decimation of the populace. Besides the fixed per capita tribute, the *yasak,* the Tatars imposed various other taxes and duties, such as the *tamga* (internal customs duties), *myt,** and others. Afterward, with the rise of Moscow, the Tatars delegated the collection of tribute to the Moscow prince Ivan Kalita (1328–1440).

This circumstance, while it contributed to the ascendancy of Moscow, in

* A tax levied for the transporting of merchandise and the driving of cattle across internal boundaries.—ED.

no way lessened the burden of taxation for the populace. Their load of feudal obligations, indebtedness, and dependency upon the landowner was aggravated further by the burden of oppression, economic ruin, and the devastation of entire districts by external conquest. The peasant "abandoned his home, his native town and hamlet, ran from the Tatar, from Lithuania, ran from the burdensome taxes, ran from the bad governor or scribe." [3]

We shall now pass to an examination of the major events in the development of feudalism in Rus of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. We shall consider first the expropriation of the agricultural population as basic to the process of feudalization.

THE "BLACK LANDS," THEIR APPROPRIATION BY THE PRINCES AND THE BOYARS As we have indicated above, during the original settlement of the land and the hard-earned mastery of the soil, the clearing of the forest by the family, by the household, and so forth, landownership was determined on the basis of utilization: "Clear it—and it's yours," or: "As far as the ax and the plow reached." But even during that period, within the territorial commune composed of such freely acquired homesteads, inequality in land use and ultimately private landownership as well were beginning to emerge.

With the extension of the power of the princes and their appropriation of the provincial and common lands, the mere phenomenon of "princification" did not at once bring any concrete changes in the conditions of the ownership and use of these lands. Hence, at the time when the new formal title to the land—"the land of the Grand Prince" and of "the King"—had already appeared, those who possessed and used these lands added to this title "and my property" or "and our clearings." Still the appearance of a sovereign owner did not long remain a mere empty title. The "black lands" soon became subject to tax obligations, and whoever bought the land was responsible for payment of these taxes. The position of the populace occupying the black lands was thus changed.

If formerly free seizure or the new utilizing homestead was the basis of the right to the land, soon there began to appear new obligations—the payment of a tax on land. At the same time the continued crowding of the land made it necessary to limit not only free seizures altogether but also the right to the utilization of land. In this way there gradually emerged the communal-reallotting systems of land use on these black lands. The main characteristic of the black lands became their liability to tax.

Nevertheless the right of property for a long time remained unconditionally recognized as belonging to the peasants settled on these lands and their communes. Thus, even in the contracts of the various princes, it was noted that

"the black lands are not to be bought," and that should anyone buy them, the owners of the black lands might redeem them, or else the buyer must "bear the burden" (of assessment) together with the other "black" people, "and he who did not wish to bear it" should be deprived of that land which should thereupon be given to the black people free.[4] The same recognition of the property rights of the black people found its way into the *Sudebnik* (Code of Law) of 1497.[5] This circumstance was an extremely important factor in the later evolution of feudal relationships and the role of the peasant land commune within them.

All the same, since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the loss of a large part of the black lands by their owners and their appropriation by various persons proceeded rapidly.

The boyars seized and "boyarized" these lands both by the economic subjugation of the populace through some formal law and by outright force. The monasteries, judging by available documents, were also very active despoilers of the black-soil lands through a variety of methods. The peasants were compelled—largely without success, of course—to prove their rights in court. "And like the masters, so the priests took our bottom land away from us,"[6] complained the peasants. Similar complaints were repeated against the Metropolitan,[7] against the Cyril-Beloozero monastery,[8] against the Simonov monastery,[9] and many others.

As a result of the seizure of such lands by privileged owners, many peasant commune members, erstwhile owners of black land, were deprived of land and became dependent "tenants" of the owners' lands.

THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION As early as the tenth and eleventh centuries the bulk of the rural population consisted mostly of freemen independently engaged in agriculture and living on communal, black lands. These free plowmen were known by the general names of "smerds," "orphans," and other categories of the agricultural population, peasant members of communes. But beginning with the eleventh century, and particularly during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a substantial section of this population, while losing their black communal land, also lost their economic independence and personal freedom. The peasant was falling into economic and personal bondage to the landowner as a result of his being granted loans (in farm implements, seeds, and money), his indebtedness and his inability under the circumstances to quit the land or his owner's employment. This was due to the fact that the economic position of the smerds had grown quite insecure. The impoverished smerds fell irretrievably into economic and personal dependency upon the "mighty people," the large landowning noblemen.

Whereas the very ancient written documents, in reference to the mass of the then free but unprivileged lower population, uses the indefinite term of "people," and whereas up to the eleventh century the lower but still economically independent, agricultural taxpaying class is designated by the characteristic name of smerds, since the thirteenth century, all mention of these small but self-supporting farmers gradually disappears. In the well known *Charter of Regulations* of Metropolitan Cyprian to the Constantinovsky Monastery (1392),[10] first mention appears of the term of the *krestyane* (*khristiane* or Christians) of the monastery, as analogous to "orphans of the monastery," and their compulsory labor obligations to the monastery are determined. From that time on the name of *krestyane* becomes the standard term in the feudal system for designating the bonded rural population.

OTHER TYPES OF THE DEPENDENT POPULATION As we have seen above, the inception of personal and land relationships of dependency was quite clearly in evidence at the time of the *Russkaya Pravda.** Knowing the smerd as a small householder and owner, the *Russkaya Pravda* is also familiar with the *zakup* (bought one) and the *roleyny zakup,* calling him a "hireling."[11] *The Pskov Judiciary Charter* does not mention the smerd, but refers only to *izorniki, ogorodniki,* and *kochetniki.* Like the *roleyny zakup,* these are no longer independent, small landowning householders but a landless population living on outsiders' land and cultivating it by right of renting it, but in reality dependent upon the owner. In a similar position is the Pskov *izornik,* who is a field hand, the *ogorodnik,* a gardener, and the *kochetnik,* a hired hand in the fisheries. Several articles of the *Pskov Charter* specify quite distinctly the particular relationships prevailing between the field laborer and the landowner, the conditions and terms for instituting this type of land utilization, for its termination, remuneration, and so forth.[12] Of particular importance seems to be the size of the tax: the *izornik* pays the landowner one-fourth of the crop, the *ogorodnik,* one-half.

Thus, in form, this was a rent in half of kind, but basically, as in the case of the *zakup* agreement, it often reflected indebtedness to the landowner: the latter lent the tenant money, implements, seeds for planting, and even for food ("edible seeds"). This loan, whether in kind or in money, the so-called *pokruta,* was evidently a quite prevalent and customary accompaniment of enslavement. Obviously the *pokruta,* the loan in kind for maintaining a household and for subsistence until the harvesting of the crop, was a prime necessity for the impoverished farmer. And although the personal dependency of the *izornik* was expressed even more definitely than that of the *zakup,* his eco-

* Russian Law or *Lex Russika,* the first Russian code of laws, compiled in the reign of Yaroslav (1015–1034).—ED.

nomic insecurity was apparently no less harsh. For not fulfilling his obligation and for leaving his allotment, the *izornik* was not, like the *zakup*, turned into a *kholop*. The legally established date for terminating the use of an allotment (Philip's Feast Day, Nov. 14) protected the interests of both the landowner and the tenant with equal formality. But the notably strict rules for exacting the *pokruta*, together with the crushing weight of the debt, created a difficult situation of dependency and indebtedness from which the land tenant could escape only by turning fugitive. In case of nonpayment of his debt, he could, in fact, be degraded to the position of a *kholop*, or become attached to the land through enslaving terms for the repayment of this debt, and thus turn into a serf.

Finally, one other group of the rural population, semifree but in the process of enslavement and known since the times of the *Russkaya Pravda*, assumed considerable importance during the feudal period. They were the *izgoi*. As a common ancient Slavonic term this word generally referred to a man who might have been "beaten from the ways" of his former social position (a priest's son who was illiterate and consequently could not himself serve as a priest; a former *kholop* voluntarily released or a bankrupt merchant excluded from the mercantile guild).[13] In village life apparently all impoverished farmers who lost their lands and their capacity to maintain a household could easily turn into *izgoi*. In such instances they settled on the land of the princes or, more frequently, on Church land, nominally retaining their personal freedom, but in reality becoming dependent upon the owner. The Church in particular was ready to utilize this cheap labor power of "Church poorhouse people," "released people" (those voluntarily set free by a will), and so forth.

What, then, was the economic basis for these emerging relationships if we assume that no shortage of land existed?

ECONOMIC CAUSES OF LAND DEPENDENCY Two circumstances evidently proved to be of decisive effect here: first, the shortage of ready land suitable for agriculture and the necessity for clearing it from the forest, and, secondly, the need for great investment of labor for thus clearing the soil with the primitive working methods and economic helplessness of the direct producer. Since under the rule of the *podsechnaya** or fallow-land systems the cleared and cultivated land had to be abandoned after several years or left to lie fallow, the planted area usually constituted only a negligible part of the cleared land. Each expansion of the sown acreage, therefore, required an enormous expenditure of material, resources, and labor for open-

* The *podsechnaya* system of agriculture: a selective method of agriculture in which arable land is obtained by cutting down the forest on it and, later on, when the soil has been exhausted, is against afforested.—ED.

ing up and cultivating new sections. Under the primitive-communal order the clan and the commune had at its disposal large labor reserves in the form of the whole collective for just that purpose. With the preponderance of individual land use, the small producer was often without the material resources and labor power necessary for turning over virgin soil or making clearings. Instead he sought "soft" and previously cleared or plowed land that would lend itself more easily to cultivation. But such land had already invariably found its way into the hands of private owners. Consequently various forms of economic dependency arose in connection with such instances, by which the peasant received an allotment of land or a loan of money, implements, and seed from a well-to-do landowner for the purpose of raising a crop on a new allotment. Such plots, after being tilled by the peasant over a fixed period of time, still remained the property of the owner. In time this led to the "binding" of the peasant to the owner's land, and to the loss of not only his economic but personal freedom as well.

Here, however, we must reiterate one observation previously made. It would be incorrect to think that the patrimonial feudal landownership of the boyars during this period of its peak development, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, had completely attached to itself the entire free peasantry and all the communal black lands. At this stage the peasant commune in the black lands did begin to undergo an internal decline due to the development of individual land use, as well as to the process of despoilation by the privileged classes at the expense of the communal lands. Nevertheless the black communal lands, now "principled" and subject to taxation by the princes, still provided some refuge to the free rural population during the process of their enserfment and feudalization.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE FEUDAL *VOTCHINA* By the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the growth of privileged, hereditary landownership of the boyar and prince elements, the uninterrupted seizure of communal lands, the expropriation of large masses of the rural populace and their enserfment made it possible for feudal relationships and the feudal method of production to predominate in the social environment.

The princes, their favorites ("the princes' men"), the boyar manorial lords, and the spiritual aristocracy became the leading classes of feudal society. Landownership and an agricultural economy maintained through exploitation of the dependent producer became the economic foundation of social life.

Naturally, in the complex social hierarchy of feudal society, the wealth, power, and influence of the individual landowners varied. All of them, however, had the same basis for their economic and social rights and privileges—the ownership of land and the right of disposition over its occupants in their

capacity as feudal seigniors. The large manorial owner, upon annexing the peasant black lands, "boyarizing" them and transferring the peasants onto his own lands, obtained the right of judging and administering them. Some of the more powerful lords, including the Church and the monasteries, availed themselves of their feudal rights of "immunity," the favors and privileges by which their peasants were exempt from the princes' exactions and billeting, in order to attract peasants to their land. Naturally, however, these seigniors in turn required labor and obligations from the peasants who thus came to them, and thereby acquired the right of economic exploitation over them.

The feudal patrimony became the organizational form of economy, the center of the entire economic system of feudalism. The dependent farmer and the peasant serf became the main and almost exclusive source of labor power within the manorial economy; his implements and agricultural means of production became the implements and means of production of the manor. At the basis of the bondage of the direct producer to the manorial lord lay a variety of economic compulsions created by indebtedness, lack of land, the loss of landed property, and, above all, the extraeconomic compulsion expressed in his attachment to the land and his change from the status of the peasant into that of the serf working on seignioral land.

Therefore the enticement of "people from the volosts," farmers from other estates and other volosts, to their own lands became a matter of great importance for the princes and for all feudal owners as one of the ways in which to replenish the necessary labor force for their manorial economy. Hence the right "to bring people into their volost" became a major issue in the various agreements between princes, manorial lords, and provinces, beginning with the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. To be sure, the issue was settled by the "right of might," inasmuch as an all-powerful feudal lord always had at his disposal the means whereby to attract to his manor peasants from the black communal land as well as from the lands of smaller owners.

PALACE LANDS Alongside and contemporary with the privately owned manorial economy, another and similar type of economy in the form of princely or "palace" landownership came into existence. The fief-holding prince was, in fact, the same type of patrimonial owner in his own fief, indeed, for the most part, the largest and richest in his county. In addition his possessions were frequently scattered through other principalities. These hereditary possessions of the princes were frequently supplemented by outright seizure as well as by purchase from other impoverished princes, or from the clergy, and bestowed as inheritance to their descendants and to members of their families. For example, in the will of Ivan Kalita (1328) reference is made to fifty-four hamlets which he, as patrimonial owner, distributed among

his children. Despite the absence of exact lines of demarcation between the state lands proper and the privately owned lands of the prince, the latter, in the form of palace lands, gradually began to be identified as the patrimonial lands of the princely family.

MONASTERY LANDS Finally, starting with the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, there developed beside the patrimonial private and palace landownership a new type of economy and landownership similar to the patrimonial type—landownership by the monasteries.

Ever since the coming of Christianity to Rus, the Church and the monasteries began rapidly to accumulate vast possessions of land. The "faithful" princes who built churches and monasteries allocated for their purpose and attached to them enormous landed property ("gave it many estates, freedom from tax with the tribute, and the better hamlets and acres for their flocks," says the chronicler about the construction of the Bogoroditsa church by Andrey Bogolyubsky in 1158).[14] For the sake of the blessings of life beyond the grave and "salvation of the soul," devout people willed hamlets and estates to churches and monasteries. Finally, the monasteries themselves, the metropolitans and bishops, increased and rounded out their possessions and hamlets in various ways, by purchase and by means of soliciting all types of grants. Such well known monasteries as the Troitse-Sergiyevsky owned *votchinas* including several hundreds of settlements in thirteen counties. Also, such representatives of the central Church authority as the Moscow metropolitans, afterward the all-Russian patriarchs, owned estates in nearly all principalities and all counties, counting their estates by the hundreds, with many thousands of peasant homesteads and hamlets.[15]

Besides, the Church and the monasteries did not, indeed, confine themselves to the above-cited abundant sources of land acquisition and expansion: they participated actively in the seizure of new holdings, public and "God's" land, which had become an important factor in the realm of original colonization and economic adaptation of the land. The monasteries and the Church, along with the princes and the boyars, took an ever more active and lively part in the land expropriation of the rural populace and in the increase of their landed properties through outright seizure of the peasants' black lands, and by taking the latter from the peasants by litigation and by all sorts of charters.[16]

Peculiar to Church and monastery ownership was the all-important fact that in Russia, as in western Europe, these Church properties were the so-called "mortmain" possessions, that is, they were not generally subject to alienation or reversion. While *votchina* properties could be partitioned, sold, or transferred from hand to hand with the right of being redeemed later by

the *votchina* owner, the lands bequeathed upon or acquired by the Church were secured to it forever. This attachment "in perpetuity" corresponded to the ideological form of attachment for "eternal prayer to the dead," as a result of which even the heirs of a *votchina* granted to the Church lost the right to redeem it from the monastery. As a consequence the landownership and economy of the monasteries became a very important and large factor in the distribution of lands and in agricultural production.

On the basis of such a process of adapting and redistributing the land, there began the development of still more important processes in the redistribution of production forces among the various producers and the expansion of large-scale *votchina* serf economy at the expense of the small independent agricultural household.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE *VOTCHINA* ECONOMY The organizational unit of the feudal *votchina* economy of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was the *selo* (hamlet)—a large household inhabited by servants and other dependents. The hamlets, as these private possessions were then called, with their servants, livestock, and other economic equipment, were the basis of wealth and power, and at the same time the subject of feuds and military struggle. In this vein ran the chronicle accounts of the feuds among the descendants of Olga, who in 1135 "burned the hamlets . . . while the people ran away, and many were taken captive, cattle and horses";[17] the story of the taking of Kiev by Izyaslav, when he plundered Igor's "hamlets and cattle."[18] During the campaign of Andrey Bogolyubsky against Novgorod, his warriors "took the hamlets and slaughtered the men, while the children and goods were taken and the cattle were carried off."[19]

In describing the feuds among the various principalities in 1177, the chronicler remarks time and again about the various princes as follows: "And the hamlets of the boyars were taken, along with the horses and cattle," or: "And they set fire to the whole town and the hamlets," and again: "The boyars' hamlets were burned, and the women and children and goods were taken by the vile ones under escort."[20]

The fact that these hamlets were at times sizable economic enterprises, particularly when they belonged to monasteries or princes, is evident from the numerous accounts of the depredation made against these hamlets as well as from the wills bequeathing them to relatives, monasteries, and so forth. Even in the early chronicle references to the pillaging of the princes' hamlets, mention is made of large stores of goods, wine, honey, money, grain, cattle, and horses. For instance, Izyaslav deprived Svyatoslav simultaneously of his princely rights and of his "farmstead," where he uncovered money,

"goods that could not be moved and in the cellars were found 500 barrels of honey, 80 pitchers of wine . . . and 700 servants." [21]

Quite comparable in size and in wealth were the hamlets and farmsteads of the princes' *druzhina,* where another conqueror "found goods in quantity . . . gold and silver, servants, horses, and cattle." [22]

The landed properties and agricultural enterprises of the monasteries, accumulated through gifts, bequests, grants, and acquisitions by purchase, also recorded substantial progress during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In one of the early accounts of a gift presented by Prince Izyaslav (twelfth century) to the Panteleymon monastery, we read of hamlets with their meadows, "with the land, the people, horses, woods, beehives, and fisheries." Similar accounts are found in the record of a presentation of land made by Izyaslav to the Pechersk monastery,[23] of granting to the Pechersk monastery "hamlets with the servants," [24] and the bequest by the Novgorod citizen Kliment (thirteenth century) to the Yuryev monastery of two hamlets "with many goods, horses, and beehives, and the small hamlets with the nets and the wells," or a donation to the Khutyn monastery consisting of land "with the servants and with the animals," [25] and many others. The Church and the monasteries were the masters of great landed properties.

Obviously, feudal society did not consist exclusively of the large *votchinas* and hamlets of the princes and boyars. Below them could be found owners of middle rank: "all sorts of small people" making up the army of the prince, and so forth. Small hamlets are therefore frequently encountered. In addition hamlets were sometimes partitioned in wills, when bestowed in inheritance, and so forth. In the latter event the heirs frequently received "half a hamlet" or "a third of a hamlet" and, by continuing their joint existence in such a hamlet, formed in this manner a "village" of two, three, or four farmsteads, sometimes with joint use of the various appendages. Occasionally very small hamlets are encountered, the property of the middle classes. For example, the *Dvinsk charters* of the thirteenth century contain accounts of the sale of land allotments of a few *dessyatins* in area by small farmers and artisans for thirty to one hundred and twenty squirrels, that is, between several dozen and several hundred rubles in our money. In the same way private landed property was also acquired by artisans and merchants; the latter frequently bought properties of considerable size. In one instance the chronicle tells of the Novgorod merchant Taras Petrov (1371) that "he ransomed out of captivity many men of various stations with his own treasure and bought himself a *votchina* . . . five villages."

From the point of view of their agricultural economy, the hamlets included a variety of appendages: fields, meadows, bird traps, berry patches, animal traps, fisheries, that is, agricultural, animal-trapping, bird, and fishery privi-

leges. Through some of the ancient testaments in which the donated or bequeathed plots are itemized, it is possible to note the economic content of the hamlet. For example, from the will of a certain Grigory it appears that his hamlet consisted of a yard, three fields, "plowed land," a backyard, a barn, "and meadows, woods, vegetable plots, hunting grounds, and a section of the river for fishing." In another case a hamlet offered for sale is itemized as consisting of seven fields, a share of the woods, the pine wood, and the meadowland.

The hamlet frequently included such hunting grounds as "black-grouse sections," "golden-eye preserves," and beehive privileges, especially in the monastery *votchinas*. Cattle and horse breeding comprised an important branch of the *votchina* economy of the princes and boyars. In the maintenance of this branch of the household were employed grooms (Oleg was reported as having a "master of grooms"), shepherds, stablemen, and stewards. The size of some of the herds was quite large: Igor and Svyatoslav (1145) owned in one of their hamlets "a herd of 3,000 mares and 1,000 horses."

The large household possessed quite an intricate system of management and supervision. It began with the manager, who received his household orders in person or in writing from the feudal owner himself. The direct supervision was entrusted to the hamlet and plowman elders, to the stewards, the bailiffs, the postilions, the warriors,* and the other servants and slaves of the princes. They supervised the performance of the work in the field and in the cattle yard, looked after the condition of the farm buildings and the manner in which the peasants performed their obligations, and directed the storage of the enormous food reserves and the supply of produce for the owner's town residence.

Not on all their estates, however, and not at all times did the princes, boyars, and large landowners maintain a self-supporting economy. Indeed, large landed properties frequently were not just vast estates covering a contiguous territory, but were scattered in the form of several dozens of plots, all of modest size. Thus, from the cadastres of the Derevsky and Votsky oblasts of Novgorod it appears that the property of several owners consisted of twenty separate and comparatively small hamlets. It was therefore more expedient not to operate these distinct holdings as the immediate household of the boyars or princes, but to lease them to small farmers either in return for labor or for rent.† Hence large owners frequently did not maintain economies of their own, but merely collected income and *obrok* from the villagers living on their

* In archaic Russian, *mechnik*.—ED.

† Two principal methods of payment of the serf's dues to the landowner: *obrok* (in money or in kind) and *barshchina* (in labor on the landlord's estate).—ED.

lands. In the course of their own "tours," or through their stewards, they collected the produce required for their own consumption as well as those products that had a "commodity" value (flax, furs, hides, wax, honey, and others). Under such circumstances the concern of the owner for his property was limited to the mere collection of obligations and donations of this type. "And until my son Fyodor shall grow up," writes one such owner in his will, "my brother Grigory shall tour through my villages, direct my men in my place, and will both buy and receive grain as a gift, and that will go to my mother and to my son Fyodor." [26] For this reason the boyars' own plowland in their hamlets was sometimes quite small and frequently not exceeding several dozen *dessyatins;* that is, supplying merely the immediate demands of the family.[27]

The *obrok* method of operating an estate was sometimes also applied on the large monastery possessions. In the monasteries' charters of regulations,[28] besides a schedule of the types of *barshchina* tasks on the monastery's lands and throughout its economy, appears a list of the *obrok* owed to the monastery: a barren cow for the holidays, three lambs, a *zobnya* (basket) of oats for the prior's horses and, in general, various "presentations." ("They come to the prior with all manner of things in their hands.") Toward the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the estates of the monasteries increased substantially, gaining additional property by a great variety of wills, donations by God-fearing persons, by the direct purchase of land, or the appropriation of lands left as collateral in the case of unpaid debts, or else by direct expansion through clearing of new land with the aid of the labor of various persons in the service of the monastery. For all that, the planted fields in use by many monasteries themselves, as in the case of the boyars' own estates, were few in number. Income from them was based on and collected by the same methods—by tours made by the priors and stewards who visited their volosts and hamlets, collecting grain, eggs, fiber, wax, money, and other commodities.

THE NATURAL CHARACTER OF THE FEUDAL *VOTCHINA*

In its economic aspect the large agricultural household, the feudal *votchina,* was typically a "natural" economic organization of the closed variety, that is, one producing the bulk of its output for its own consumption. The major part of its products was raised within this economy by the labor of the small dependent producers, the tenants and holders of the owner's land. In any event the fruits of agriculture, cattle raising, and apiculture, as well as the products prepared from them, the stores of grain, cattle, wool, hides, honey, linen, and so forth, which were found in abundance on the large *votchina* of the boyars and princes, were consumed within this economy proper. The same was true of the grain, flax, linen, eggs, butter, and fish brought into

the economy in the form of *obrok* in kind by the *izorniks, zakups, ogorodniks, kochetniks,* and other tenants.

This natural character of the economy was in no way altered by the circumstance that a certain portion of these products was also put on sale. Despite its need to acquire by purchase such articles as were not produced within the economy, especially luxury articles, and the need to conserve and exchange some of their own products for that purpose, this economy had not yet acquired a commodity character, and its products had not yet become commodities. The very vastness of this economy and its organization, its mass of slaves, persons in a servant capacity, numerous stewards, bailiffs, falconers, managers, and others, implied great productive activity, large reserves, and consumption on a large scale. Naturally the gradation in size was very considerable, beginning with the small yard or petty hamlet and extending to a whole chain of villages linked into one economic organization. But, none the less, they were all of a predominantly natural character.

PRODUCTION METHODS ON THE FEUDAL *VOTCHINA*

Another characteristic feature of the economic organization of the *votchina* was its basic method of production, which consisted of the exploitation of the dependent agricultural producer. The small dependent farmer, maintaining his own individual peasant household, supplied the landowner with his labor power, his working livestock, his implements, his agricultural produce and the products manufactured from them. Clearly, under such circumstances, this economy of the owners, in a technical sense and in its production tendency, remained dependent upon the level of technique and productive tendencies of the small household. The small farmer living on the land of the large owner supported not only his own household, but with his own stock and equipment also plowed the land of the prince and boyar, harvested and stored the grain and hay, fished on the lakes of the prince, and engaged in apiculture and hunting for the benefit of the seignioral household.

Economic exploitation varied in form during the several stages of feudalism, depending on the level attained by the production forces of the feudal economy. The low level of technique prevailing in the rural economy, such as combining agriculture with primitive household handicrafts, the general backwardness of economic activity and the low productivity of labor, compelled the feudal *votchina* economy to adopt such forms of exploitation of the direct producer as would enable extortion of a maximum surplus product. Therefore extraeconomic compulsions assume the utmost importance in the application of the various forms of exploitation. Basically they amounted to three types of feudal rent (applying the terminology of Marx in his analysis of precapitalist forms of rent): 1) rent in the form of labor or *barshchina,* as

the most typical and efficient form of feudal exploitation, 2) rent in kind or *obrok,* which afforded the most economic freedom to the direct producer, and 3) rent in money, which occurred quite rarely at that time. But, in general, all three types of feudal rent had by that time become intertwined in the most varied combinations.

Genetically *obrok,* during the period of the "stabilization" of feudalism in the tenth century, was merely a substitute for the erstwhile "tribute" of the prefeudal period, and almost identical with it. Even in our later records the terms of *obrok* and tribute are often used interchangeably. Thus, in the charter of 1559, we read: "And you, then, peasants of the house of St. Sophia and of our three villages, should still give tribute, bread, and money and all duties as of old."

With the development and consolidation of the feudal institutions and the increase in the exploitation of the peasants following the expansion of arable land and grain culture, the *votchina* owner tended to organize his "seignioral" plowland on the basis of the forced labor system, that is, on *barshchina,* still at first not of the absolute serf type but rather "by agreement" on the basis of "contracts" regulating the work of the peasants in the seignioral economy. To be sure, the *barshchina, obrok,* or slave-labor systems varied in the degree and form of their application. The economy of the smaller owners frequently remained on the basis of *obrok,* whereas the large household of a prince, aside from favoring serf labor in agriculture, long retained in its various branches (in household management, in supervising hunting, arms, and the stables) *kholop* labor as managers, stewards, bailiffs, swordsmen, and postilions.

As the productive forces of the country grew and the seignioral agricultural economy expanded, the forced labor form of exploitation became economically more indispensable. Gradually part-time labor on the lords' land, long before turning into a definitive system of serfdom, became the most prevalent form of feudal agricultural economy.

The *obrok* system, to the extent of the dependency and subjugation of the direct producer, afforded relatively more economic freedom to the tiller, the smerd, the *zakup,* or the *izornik.* This form of exploitation was therefore more productive, but at the same time the *obrok* method put the large manor in a position of dependency upon the small household in the matter of products obtained through *obrok:* the large household received only what the small one produced. Hence *obrok* made its chief contribution to the owner's household in such common articles of consumption as milk, eggs, butter, cheese, or such raw materials as flax, hemp, and wool or, finally, by finished products such as linen, wool cloth, and others. These were the type of products commonly delivered under the *obrok* system of obligations in kind. The

feudal lord became especially interested in them when, in order to cover his other needs, he was forced to sell these articles in the market. But before market relationships had progressed to any extent (as in the case of the feudal *votchina* of the twelfth and fourteenth centuries), the manorial lord remained largely interested in the basic branches and products of his economy; namely, his grain acreage and his grain. But precisely this main branch of the manorial economy could to a much lesser extent and less conveniently be maintained under the *obrok* system, and evolved therefore on the basis of *barshchina.*

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF FEUDALISM On the basis of the feudal method of production described above, the social-political system of feudalism grew up, assuming its final forms in northeastern Rus during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The larger and more influential *votchina* owners—the princes and boyars, along with the large monasteries, protected their exclusive rights to the economic exploitation of the populace by means of special political privileges. Along with their exemption from the payment of taxes and commercial customs duties to the prince, from the various obligations in kind, from billeting, and from carting duties, the *votchina* owners, besides their economic rights to the labor of the peasant, obtained from the prince the right of jurisdiction over the peasants as well as other personal rights, and themselves became the local "sovereign *votchina* owners" with full, supreme political power over all peasants inhabiting their lands.

Ordinarily these privileges and rights were presented by special charters which enumerated in detail the privileges granted. These charters were given alike to the secular feudal boyars and to the Church and monastery estates, and sometimes even to "small" people. Those numerous "charters of grant" that have come down to us, confirming these feudal privileges and immunities, tend to formulate them in the following words:

> They need not give me tribute, pits, carts, *myt, tamga,* nor squirrel for food, no eighths, *kostki, yavka,* nor any other kind of tax, nor to build towns or my courtyard, nor to feed my horse or mow my hay, and likewise not to serve as *sotsky* * or as domestics or *desyatsky,** and not to share the burden with the taxed people in costs or damages of any kind, and no duties of any other kind are necessary, nor any hay duties to pay [1404].[29]

As may be seen from the above inventory of privileges, they were at times quite concrete in their nature. It made it possible for the peasant to run his household, safeguarded against the otherwise unlimited whim of the royal pensioners who ruled the volosts or of their bailiffs. These circumstances gave

* Minor police officials chosen by the peasant commune.—ED.

rise to the institution of "mortgaging," where a peasant "mortgaged" himself to some feudal lord, placing himself under the latter's protection—an institution similar to the feudal patronage of the West.[80] Naturally, inasmuch as he held a charter of privileges and rights, the *votchina* owner himself intensified the economic exploitation of the peasant for his own benefit, binding him to the land in order to expand his own economy, and increased his clearings and new holdings in land with the aid of serf labor.

Of course the large feudal manorial lord, the prince or boyar, held in his power, both economical and political, not only his own peasants, the *zakups*, the *izorniks*, and the serfs, but also the free, smaller and weaker owners and holders, "all kinds of small people," who constituted the entourage and court of the feudal prince or the large boyar, and who, in turn, had other people dependent upon them. From these roots sprang the typical manifestations of feudal hierarchy which, though it did not attain in Russia the political power and importance it won in the West, still created a quite distinct social-political "superstructure" above the production base of the economic system of feudalism.

In feudal Rus of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the process of feudalization and the feudal independence of the individual lords did not sink to the same extreme depths that it did in the West. The individual independent princes of the Rurik line, under the impact of growing nationwide economic ties, and also as a result of the diminishing of their feudal holdings, began, in fact, to lose their feudal isolation and independence. They accepted service as subordinate vassals to the larger lords, especially to the Moscow princes. At the same time the noble "pensioners" of the grand prince, who obtained for their income the administration of towns and volosts, enjoyed these as well as their other privileges and immunities only temporarily, in contrast with the Western provincial administrators and major-domos. The provinces and districts, where they lived by commission of the central power, did not become the property of these boyars. Their political rights of administration and their immunities, however considerable, did not become hereditary. Nor did they themselves turn into petty, yet independent "monarchs," dukes, and barons as occurred in France and Germany. The formation and rise of the central power, dictated by the growth of nationwide economic ties, had succeeded by the fifteenth or sixteenth century in uniting economically and in subordinating politically all these local petty feudal lords.

In order to explain these distinctive features in the development of Russian feudalism as compared with that of western Europe, we must consider one more highly important factor in the social-economic development of feudalism; namely, the feudal town.

Notes

1. See Map 3, facing p. 130.
2. Marx, *Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century*, p. 78.
3. Solovyov, *Istoriya Rossii* (History of Russia) (1893–1895), Vol. XIII, in the "Obshchestvennaya polza" edition.
4. *Sobraniye gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov* (Collection of State Documents and Agreements), Pt. I, No. 33.
5. *Sudebnik* (Code of Law), year 1497, Art. 63.
6. *Akty yuridicheskiye* (Legal Enactments), No. 4.
7. *Ibid.*, Nos. 4, 9.
8. *Akty i gramoty Kirillo-Belozerskogo monastyrya* (Acts and Documents of the Kirillo-Belozersky Monastery) (Debolskii), Nos. 16, 23.
9. *Akty, otnosyaschiesya do yuridicheskogo byta drevnyei Rossii* (Acts Pertaining to the Legal Practices of Ancient Russia) (Archaeographic Commission, 1857), Vol. I, No. 52.
10. *Akty Arkheograficheskoi ekspeditsii* (Acts of the Archaeographic Expedition,*) Vol. I, No. 11.
11. For this reason several authors (Sergeyevich) regard the *zakup* as a hired laborer, a village *batrak*.
12. *Pskovskaya sudnaya gramota* (Court Record of Pskov), Arts. 42, 44, 51, 84-86, and others.
13. *Ustav novgorodskogo knyazya Vsevoloda o tserkovnykh sudakh* (Charter of the Novgorod Prince Vsevolod on Church Courts), years 1125-1136; Vladimirskii-Budanov, *Khrestomatiya* (Anthology), Vol. I, p. 245.
14. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'* (Laurentian Chronicle), year 1158.
15. Gorchakov, *O zemelnykh vladeneyakh vserossiyskikh mitropolitov i patriarkhov* (On the Land Holdings of the All-Russian Metropolitans and Patriarchs), (1871), pp. 52 ff.
16. See the interesting documents on this subject in the appendix of Gorchakov, *op. cit.*
17. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, year 1135.
18. *Ipatyevskaya letopis'* (Ipatyev Chronicle), year 1146.
19. *Ibid.*, year 1173.
20. *Lavrentyevskaya letopis'*, year 1177.
21. *Ipatyevskaya letopis'*, year 1146.
22. *Ibid.*, year 1159.
23. *Polnoye sobraniye russkikh letopisei* (Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles), Vol. I, p. 68.
24. *Ipatyevskaya letopis'*, year 1158.
25. *Dopolneniya k Aktam istoricheskim* (Supplements to the Historical Acts), Vol. I, p. 5.
26. *Akty yuridicheskiye*, No. 430.
27. *Novgorodskiye pistsovyye knigi* (Record Books of Novgorod), Vol. I, p. 83.
28. *Ustavnaya gramota mitropolita Kipriana Konstantinovskomu monastyryu* (Charter Document by Metropolitan Cyprian to the Konstantinovsky Monastery) (*A.A.E.*, 1392), Vol. I, No. 11.
29. *A.A.E.*, Vol. I, No. 46. A number of other documents attest to the same thing in almost identical terms, *A.A.E.*, Vol. I, Nos. 44, 111, 120, 132, and others.
30. Pavlov-Silvanskii, *Feodalism v drevnyei Rusi* (Feudalism in Ancient Rus) (1907), pp. 104-107.

* Hereinafter referred to as *A.A.E.*

(VIII)

The Feudal Town, Its Industry and Trade in Northeastern Rus of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries

THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF DEVELOPMENT In our study of the basic factors of the economic system of feudalism in ancient Rus, we have shown that the process of feudalization followed not only its main course of agrarian development but also the course of origin and evolution of the feudal town. The town of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had already begun to reflect the basic class structure of the society of that time—its feudal structure. Both the feudal town proper in its role of industrial and commercial center, and its social classes, were merely a particular expression of feudal institutions. And inasmuch as the feudal society of the time was composed of two classes—the feudal *votchina* owners and the mass of dependent and landless inhabitants—the class composition of the feudal town basically reflected precisely this feudal class structure.

The owner of the feudal town, particularly in the early period of the evolution of feudalism, was the same noble *votchina* owner, while the artisans, peasants, and traders inhabiting the town were also mostly his serfs. But beginning with the advanced phase of feudalism (which in western Europe occurred during the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, and in feudal Rus in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) occurred the first steps of that process of separation between the town and the village which, in the words of Marx, was "the basis of the entire developed division of labor, accomplished through the exchange of goods," a process in which the whole economic history of society is "summarized." [1] Obviously that process had not fully materialized during the feudal era. But its vital significance to the subsequent development of feudalism was nevertheless considerable. Gradually, in the course of the period of the dissipation of feudalism, and of the later increase in social division of labor in the development of industry and trade, the feudal town began to acquire a more complex social composition, greater independence for its population and its whole economy *vis-à-vis* the feudal *votchina*. In this manner the significance of the town in the development of

feudalism was double: on the one hand it was during the early stages of feudalism primarily an inseparable element as well as a phase of the latter's development; and on the other, during the later era, a factor in feudalism's disintegration.

This development of the town as an industrial center, growing up in the midst of the dissolution of the feudal natural manorial economy, proceeded in feudal Rus at a much slower pace and with less intensity than in the West. In western Europe during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, against the general background of the feudal manorial economy, the towns as independent industrial centers began to stand apart, performing a tremendous historical, economic, and political role in the struggle against the economic exclusiveness and isolationism of feudalism and in the struggle for economic and political independence. In feudal Rus the town as an industrial center played a rather subordinate role. The industrial occupations that had grown up within the natural seignioral economy long remained a part of it, without separating therefrom through social division of labor into special urban industrial trades, aside from those trades not connected with the *votchina.*

The role of the town in Russian economic life, even during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, not to speak of any earlier period, was not only minor in comparison with that of western Europe, but until quite recently was denied any importance whatsoever by many historians. Because of the preponderance of agriculture in our national life, and because of the military nature of our urban colonization, in the south particularly, many historians (Solovyov, Klyuchevsky, Klebnikov, and others) believed that the Russian town was merely a "fortified" and reinforced military hamlet poorly developed in industrial activity and populated almost exclusively by agricultural elements. Other historians, however (Kostomarov), especially on the basis of investigating the urban cadastres (Chechulin), arrived at the conclusion that, notwithstanding the unique nature of the Russian town and the developed urban economy and crafts in the country compared with western Europe, our towns, especially toward the later period of Moscow Rus (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), achieved some significance as centers around which a broader social division of labor and industrial crafts evolved, nurtured by an exchange of goods with the village.

THE RISE OF THE FEUDAL TOWN In their origin and early stages of development not all towns of feudal Rus of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries follow the same pattern. As we have seen above, even during the clan and tribal social stage, the territories of the various clans and tribes possessed a number of small towns (six hundred among the Severyane, more than four hundred among the Polyane), some of which later grew into sizable

tribal centers. In this category were many ancient Slavic towns whose date of origin the chronicler does not remember, or whose history he tends to embellish with such legendary traditions as surround his story of the founding of Kiev. During the age of the princes these towns, when located on the main river and trade routes, often became the seats of the princes and large trading centers in their own right. The princes, moreover, built additional new towns as strong points to garrison their armies and for further campaigns of conquest.

This phase of the early prefeudal development of the town has been adequately traced through archaeological monuments which in some of the old towns (Kiev, Novgorod) revealed two levels, bearing evidence of the birth of the primitive small town as the feudal town of the age of the princes. One inevitable feature of this town was the fortified inner town, the kremlin—the residence of the prince as well as a strong point for storing the prince's treasure, arms, and goods. In some instances these towns rose to a position of great and independent political strength comparable to that of the "free cities" and the medieval city-republics of western Europe. Such were the position and development of the city of Great Novgorod.

Usually, however, a more typical and "organic" way of origin and development for a feudal city was its rise within the bounds of the feudal estate of the prince, boyar, or monastery. The small "towns," urban settlements built by the feudal lords on their *votchinas,* likewise developed into large towns under favorable circumstances. A leading example was Moscow, a feudal town which rose, as we shall see below in greater detail, from the small feudal *votchina* of a vassal prince. Of similar origin were many other feudal cities in existence today and still often bearing the names of their former feudal owners: Novosil, the *votchina* of the former Princes Novosilsky; Odoyev, belonging to the Princes Odoyevsky; Skopin, the old *votchina* of the Romanov family, and many others. Occasionally towns were also "put up" by the lesser nobles on their own estates, like the town of Orlets on the *votchina* of Novgorod Boyar Luka Varfolomeyev. Quite a number of towns sprang up on monastery grounds—Gorokhovets on the Klyazma, Aleksin, and many others. In such feudal *votchina* cities, even at a much later period when they began to acquire independent status, almost all yards and buildings belonged to the seignior, the boyar, or the monastery, and all the town inhabitants were their peasant and artisan serfs.

Under these conditions the feudal town was originally, in an economic as well as a social sense, an inseparable part of the feudal *votchina.* Yet the one basic and new element that the town came to introduce into the manorial economy was, in rudimentary form at least, the social division of labor. Originating in the town, its influence simultaneously began to penetrate the eco-

nomic order of the feudal *votchina.* For some time to come, however, the development of production forces had not outgrown those social relationships engendered by the feudal *votchina,* and the town remained, as before, a feudal town. Its various classes remained basically linked to the classes of feudal society. The laboring mass of its population was made up of the same producers in the service of the lord, merely specializing in the processing of agricultural products (which, for that matter, they had once produced on the *votchina*) or in crafts (in which they had also previously engaged). The leader and head of the feudal town was the same feudal manorial lord of various rank—the prince, boyar, or "pensioner." The very organization of the town at its inception was modeled after the manorial organization.

The social division of labor, which was fundamental to the economic activity of the town, began to alter both the economy and in part also the social structure of the town itself and of the feudal *votchina* as well. Not all feudal lords, by far, erected towns on their *votchinas,* only the larger ones among them and only under the most favorable circumstances. The former tribal and ancient trading towns were located within the domains of the larger feudal princes. Therefore the entire manorial economy became inevitably drawn into the economic and political orbit of the town toward which the *votchina* now began to gravitate. It began to utilize the town as a market for some of its products, as a source of manufactured commodities not produced by itself, and, eventually, the owner himself often began to reside in the town. Within the town itself some groups of the population not personally connected with the manor began to come into existence.

In this manner, and within the confines of feudal society, the feudal town began to emerge and gradually to separate from the *votchina* as a commercial and industrial center.

THE INDUSTRY OF THE FEUDAL TOWN IN THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH CENTURIES The urban trades of the feudal town of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were evidently practiced on a lower industrial level of technique than in the towns of Kiev Rus. After the collapse of a large, urban, commercial-industrial center such as Kiev had been, the feudal town of northeastern feudal Rus of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries did not reach a similar peak of urban life. Yet even here some large and old Slavic towns like Novgorod, Pskov, and Smolensk, along with newer towns of the Rostov-Suzdal land (Suzdal, 1192; Vladimir-on-the-Klyazma, 1108; Yaroslavl, 1025), as the political center shifted to the northeast, began to expand, to be built up, to be inhabited by artisans, and to perform the function of fairly large industrial centers.

Among the new urban occupations, relatively undeveloped in the tenth

to the twelfth centuries, were the stone-building and bricklaying trades, used primarily in the construction of churches. The bricklaying trade, introduced earlier under the reign of Vladimir by foreign master church builders ("he brought masters from the Greeks"), became more prevalent only with the fourteenth century, when stone walls began to be built about the kremlins of the various "capital" towns, stone monastery and diocese buildings, and so forth. In accordance with the *yarlyk* (charter or letter) of the khan Uzbek issued in 1313, "stone builders" of church construction projects were exempt from other obligatory labors.

As a result of this church-building activity, there also developed the icon-painting and glass trades (at first also introduced by foreign masters). The latter came into its own rather late (not before the fourteenth century).

Among other urban occupations of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, there was considerable activity in the metal-working and forging trades, connected with military orders or with the manufacture of luxury articles—arms, trinkets, household utensils, and others. Although the best weapons still came from abroad, either from the West or the East, many large towns had not only common smiths, but also "silversmiths" and "coppersmiths" for more intricate work. They existed, for instance, in Novgorod.[2] Daniel Galitsky, founder of the town of Kholm, invited foreign and out-of-town masters—"Germans and Rus men, foreigners and Poles." Articles of military supply, metal objects, garment trimmings (belts and breastplates), articles for the table (cups and goblets), church plate and decorations were partly made by foreign masters and occasionally by Russian, but always in the towns. Metal implements for agriculture (axes, plows, and scythes) and for ordinary household use (frying pans), besides their manufacture in the city, were also made by village artisans and smiths.

Otherwise the urban handicraft industry differed little from the above-described crafts in the towns of Kiev Rus of the tenth and eleventh centuries. Here were the same carpenters and joiners, builders and bridge workers, coopers and wheelwrights, potters, weavers, and curriers, hatmakers and tailors, bakers, brewers, and others.

Among the other leading branches of industry, iron ore extraction existed as before, chiefly in the Novgorod region. For the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries we have records of the processing of ore in the Novgorod province, on the shores of the White Sea (at the river Nenoks), in Ustyuzhina Zhelezopolskaya, and in the counties of Yamsky, Kopor, and Ladoga. The ore was mined in the same primitive manner. Smelting was done in bloomer furnaces, special installations consisting of one or two furnaces. The iron thus obtained was measured in rods and blooms (the rod was regarded as containing ten blooms, and the weight of the handicraft bloom was apparently about nine

to twelve pounds of pure iron).[3] In general, however, not much iron was available, its processing was quite difficult, and hence, finished iron goods were not at all abundant.

Another branch of the mining industry that originated in the Novgorod region was the extraction of silver, carried on beyond the Kama, in the Yugra, and among the Siberian peoples with whom Novgorod often engaged in wars because of silver and not always successfully, but who nevertheless paid a tribute to Novgorod in silver.

The salt industry was in a class by itself, located chiefly along the shores of the northern seas, in the Dvina district, and in Staraya Russa. Kiev Rus had largely imported its salt from afar—from the Crimea, from the Galician salt mines, and from Peremyshl. From the twelfth century we have exact records of large-scale extraction and boiling of salt in the Novgorod region, at Ustyug, Vologda, and other places. The mining and boiling of salt required large outlays for equipment and boilers and so great an expenditure of labor that it was accessible only to the wealthier owners, the princes, boyars, and monasteries. Salt breweries were found in Galicia on the land of Dmitry Donskoy, at the Troitsky and Simonov monasteries, and on the estate of the boyar Morozov. In the Dvina province, on the river Nenoks, the "salt-boiling places of the Grand Prince and the Unasol, all belonging to the Grand Prince," were located. In 1471 these salt enterprises passed to the prince of Moscow. Thus the salt-boiling industry was associated with the large-scale *votchina* type economy of the princes, boyars, and monasteries.

VILLAGE ENTERPRISES The industrial processing of agricultural raw materials, aside from being conducted in the city, continued to be performed on a large scale in the village. There, however, it was conducted within the framework of the same farm, manorial or peasant household and was not divorced from it as a separate occupation. In this respect the feudal *votchina* and its entire organization, the seignioral economy proper as well as the household of the small producer—the dependent peasant—were similarly responsible for the slow pace at which the social division of labor developed. The large-scale manorial economy retained its natural and personal consumption character with respect to both the produce of agriculture and its secondary products. All products of agriculture, cattle raising, apiculture, and hunting gathered on the boyar lands and appendages, or those brought in as *obrok* by the *zakups* and *izorniks*, went preponderantly for the personal household needs or into the military consumption of the boyar and his servants. A considerable part, indeed the more valuable part, went for sale, although the large-scale seignioral economy did not display any special activity on the market.

The manufacture of agricultural products into consumption goods within the manorial economy required certain skills and technical installations. As these gradually accumulated on the feudal manor, some of the domestics and peasants were turned into special artisans—weavers, smiths, carpenters, and so forth. The treatment of flax and wool, the preparation of linen and coarse wool cloth, the production of primitive wood and iron consumer goods and household articles were performed widely either directly on the manor or in the households of dependent and bonded peasants. When made in the small household, these foods and products went to the manor as rent in kind, as *obrok*, and occasionally were sold at the market in town.

URBAN TRADE The segregation of urban industry and crafts from the village was of great economic significance. It laid the foundation for the development of an internal market, and the market contributed progressively to the further differentiation of the economy.

Indeed, one must not overrate the importance and the scale of the internal local trade of the feudal town. It was small in volume and extremely primitive in the quality of its goods. The town required for its own subsistence a supply of produce from agriculture; it likewise had to offer for sale the products of its own developing handicraft industries. At the primitive urban markets and fairs were sold rather simple goods, articles of household need and of agricultural production: cows, horses, sheep, geese, ducks, fish, honey, wax, incense, wheat, rye, oats, flour, baked bread, salt, vegetables, hay, flax, firewood, ashes, tar, and staves. Here, too, were offered for sale the products of urban crafts: pots, arms, clothing, hats, cloth, shoes, furs, yokes, coffins, and other goods.[4]

The very nature of most of these products, cheap and bulky goods, indicates that the towns were supplied with these from the environs. In turn the rural population around a town was additionally supplied by its own household output of some basic products of general consumption. Moreover, not all towns were necessarily large commercial and industrial centers. In some cases even where a town functioned chiefly as an administrative and military center, it gradually evolved into a trading post and a center for the exchange of goods with the village.

INTERURBAN TRADE In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, besides local, village and town trade, intercity exchange began to develop steadily. It was handicapped by poor transportation routes, especially in view of its bulky goods, and by the low value and lack of variety of its articles of trade. At times, however, a lack of some vital article of consumption in some localities (salt, for example) made it necessary to exchange goods at great distances. Along the water routes intercity exchange was conducted between

distant points; from Novgorod, for example, as far as Tver, the Chernigov lands, Suzdal, and Moscow. The main obstacles against developing intercity exchange, aside from transportation, resulted from the fact that during the period of feudal decentralization in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries each "land" and town functioned as an independent state. At the crossing of such "frontiers" (boundaries) commerce was confronted by great hardships in the aspect of a variety of customs and tax collections, and sometimes by outright prohibitions. Hence, in numerous agreements about internal trade which have come down to us from these several lands, we find frequent mention of the agreement to trade "without frontiers." The agreement between Novgorod and Tver in 1365 granted Novgorod men "a clear road without frontiers through Tfer and the Tfer volost." Novgorod also obtained from the Tatar khans a *yarlyk* (letter) for free trade, "without frontier" with the Suzdal and many other lands.[5] In the fourteenth century the commercial development of Moscow also resulted in a number of agreements between the latter and Tver, Ryazan, and other towns,[6] while Moscow, along with other towns, frequently extended to foreign merchants (to the Dvina salt merchants, for example) the privilege of exemption from any "*tamga,** or *myt,* or *kostki,*† or *gostinoye,*‡ or *yavka,*§ or any other kind of duties."[7]

Among the internal consumption goods in intercity trade, the first in importance was apparently salt, an article of prime necessity not obtainable everywhere. The ancient name for a merchant in the domestic trade, the very word *prasol,* indicates the trade in salt, although eventually the designation *prasol* became general for all small-scale merchants. Salt traveled from the Crimea, from the Galician land, from the north—from the Kama and the lakes—and partly from beyond the Volga. Its transportation from such far-flung territories was sometimes naturally accompanied by difficulties, especially with the frequent outbreak of wars. Thus our records indicate that as a result of war between Kiev and the Galician prince, commerce in salt was discontinued, "and there was no longer salt in all the Russian land."[8] The merchants of Novgorod, Vologda, Ustyug, and Tver had long engaged in the salt and grain trade, supplying their own provinces with the goods in which they were normally deficient. The trade in these commodities of mass consumption required an outlay of capital, and came to arouse the interest of all great traders including the princes, who eagerly took part in the various contemporary "grain" and "salt" speculations. Thus, in 1233, Yaroslav did not allow "guests" (foreign merchants) into Pskov, and raised the price of

* *Tamga:* a customs duty evidently established by the Tatars, based on the value of the goods.—Au.
† *Kostki:* from the person accompanying the goods.—Au.
‡ *Gostinoye:* for storing the goods in a commercial building.—Au.
§ *Yavka:* the declaration of the goods before the authorities.—Au.

salt to "7 grivny a berkovets" (10 poods). He did the same in 1215, when "the frost killed the crop in the volost" and when "the prince [Yaroslav] took grain into Turkey: not to admit one cart into town." [9] But except in years of crop failure, even the northern provinces were more or less provided with their own grain and had no need of any large imports from the grain-producing provinces.

TRADE BY THE MONASTERIES Internal and interurban commerce was carried on in the town markets proper not only by permanent bazaar trade but also at fairs organized by the towns and by the large monasteries. The latter often developed a commercial activity of considerable volume between their own special salesmen, *kupchina* (substantial merchants), and the most remote parts of the country, including in their turnover a great selection of goods (salt, fish, honey, wax, and "sundry goods"). One of the largest trading monasteries, the Troitse-Sergiyevsky near Moscow, traded with Vologda, Kholmgory, and Novgorod, operated its own merchant vessels on the Volga, the northern Dvina, the Ugra, and Beloozero. Through its "merchants," "elders and laymen" the monastery bought salt and fish, and traded in "all goods whatsoever." As stipulated by charter from the grand prince, the commerce and shipping of the Troitse-Sergiyevsky monastery were exempt from payment of any duty.[10] Other monasteries, like the Cyril-Beloozero and the Cherepovetsky, engaged in similar trade, if on a somewhat smaller scale, similarly exempted by special charter from "*myt* and *tamga* and other duties of any kind." [11] In addition to such wholesale purchases (obviously only partly for their own consumption but also partly for sale), trading was practiced at monastery fairs associated by custom with certain holidays. These fairs were visited not only by near-by peasants but also by traders from remote parts.

TRADE DUTIES AND TAXES Trade, foreign and domestic, was subject to a number of collections and duties for the benefit of the prince. Inasmuch as during the period under discussion each small feudal holding constituted an independent principality, excises and taxes fell heavily on contemporary trade. Some privileged trading groups—monasteries primarily —were exempt. Commercial taxes were many and varied: *myt* (from each cart or boatload of goods), *mostovshchina* (for crossing a bridge), *kostki, tamga, veschee* (on the weight), *gostinoye, yavka, pyatno* (for branding), and so forth. These were the princes' customary feudal sources of revenue from trade. The burden of this taxation was great and unfavorable in its effect on the development of trade activity. Therefore numerous princes, by the issue of charters not only to monasteries but whole groups of traders,

released them alike from these onerous duties ("no *tamga*, no *myt*, no *kostki*, no *gostinoye*, no *yavka*," as worded in the charters).

COMPOSITION OF THE TRADER CLASS Before the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries trading in agricultural produce and handicrafts had mostly still not become differentiated into the professional activity of a distinct social class. Trade was one activity in which princes, boyars, clergy, monasteries as well as merchants and the rural and urban producers themselves were engaged. Representatives of the state, the princes and the *volosteli* (provincial administrators) not only actively participated in trade, but used it as the object of a great variety of taxes and duties for their own benefit. Trade was also an interest of the landowning boyars; vice versa, merchants also owned land and sold the products of their economy.

Since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries a fairly significant social differentiation becomes apparent in this respect. Trade, intercity and foreign trade particularly, becomes more and more a professional activity concentrated in the hands of merchants, small or large. The boyars, princes, monasteries, and the clergy frequently transferred to "financing" of trade, advancing money at interest, and commercial deals. In Novgorod, for example, the role of the upper boyars and clergy in this field was not unusual: "And some priors or priests or monks traded first of all or gave silver at interest, and none of them have their place," wrote Metropolitan Fotey to the people of Novgorod.[12]

Novgorod surpassed all other areas and towns in the realm of trade, and even during the thirteenth century it displayed some characteristics that were not to develop in Moscow before the fifteenth or sixteenth century. Large fortunes acquired through commerce were encountered in Novgorod as early as the thirteenth century. The well known account of the chronicler [13] concerning the looting of the home of the burgher Dmitry Miroshkin reports so much money confiscated there that, upon dividing it, every inhabitant of Novgorod received three grivny, that is, forty to sixty rubles, not counting the mass of notes and "tables" from a number of persons.

In this manner trade as a profession became gradually concentrated in the hands of merchant-specialists during the fourteenth century. In order to become an authorized merchant—*poshly*, as it was then called (from the word *poshlo*, meaning "hereditary")—in Novgorod, one had to join the special organization of the merchants housed in the Ivanovskaya church. The entrance fee was fixed at 50 grivny in silver. "And he who wishes to join with the merchants shall put into Ivanovskaya as an authorized merchant a contribution of 50 grivny . . . and he who shall not join the merchants and not give 50 grivny of silver, he is not an authorized merchant." [14] The fee

carried with it the right to engage in trade and in all affairs of a merchant, and the right to be elected to public office and participate in self-government.

CIRCULATION OF MONEY A rudimentary form of currency in ancient Rus was livestock and furs. Livestock (hide money), marten furs, and some smaller units in the shape of "cuts," "feet," squirrels, and others were the main standards of value in ancient trade.[15] But the chronicles and the *Russkaya Pravda* in speaking of livestock and martens have reference to a metal currency which merely retained the old name of "fur" money, and was used in the calculations involved in the exchange of goods, for the payment of tribute, and for the collection of fines. The grivna marten (formerly a whole marten skin) had already become the main metallic monetary bookkeeping unit in trade for the collection of tribute during the ancient period.[16]

The circulation of metal currency began to spread through the use of ingots by weight. Silver as a metallic-weight money in the form of bullion competed with martens as fur money. The attempts to introduce minted metal coins first occurred under the influence of foreign trade during the reign of Vladimir, when silver and gold coin began to be minted according to the Arab system; they had no value, however, in domestic trade. Only much later, under the influence of the Tatars and directly in imitation of their monetary system, an independent Russian currency system and a Russian monetary metallic unit made their appearance. From Tatar *donga* (money) they began to mint Russian "money," equivalent to two-thirds of the Tatar. Instead of the grivny the reckoning unit became the ruble, "the ruble grivna" (originally, apparently, about a half pound of silver), from which two hundred small Russian *dengas* were minted.

The rise of money and metal-currency circulation tended to facilitate movement of trade in general and to contribute toward the commercial accumulation of capital. But we must not overrate the social and economic significance of commercial capital accumulation during this age. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the basic social-economic force was still landownership and agricultural economy—in other words, the feudal lord.

NOVGOROD AND ITS FOREIGN TRADE Of the many cities of ancient Rus during the feudal period with their typical features as described above, we must single out and examine separately one of the largest urban and commercial centers of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, differing considerably both in its social-economic structure and in the character, trend, and volume of its trade from the other Russian towns of that period. Such was Great Novgorod with its vast lands covering the entire northern expanse from the Baltic Sea to the Urals.

A good many special economic, historical, and geographic circumstances enabled the foreign trade of Novgorod to achieve a high level of importance and to become a guiding factor in its economic development. After the decline of the commercial importance of Kiev, and that of Byzantium (Istanbul) later, the main trade routes between the European East and the West began to pass through the Baltic ports. To Russian trade these new trade routes were significant in that they were connected by the very ancient Caspian-Volga route with Arabian trade. And through a number of overland hauls and near-by rivers this route reached further into the Central Russian lands and principalities—to Moscow, Tver, and Ryazan. In the West this route opened an outlet to the sea and, hence, to the Hanseatic League, to Denmark, Sweden, and other countries. This main Baltic Sea route also became the leading artery of Novgorod's foreign trade. In addition, there were the Vyatka, Luga, and Pskov overland trading areas. But inasmuch as Novgorod was not a seaport and did not possess a merchant fleet, the nearest cities with which Novgorod conducted trade were Narva, Dorpat, Riga, and Revel. Through these, Novgorod merchants reached the German cities of Danzig and Lübeck, as well as Gotland, Abo, and Viborg.[17]

The Novgorod people adopted some decisive measures so that all trade between these cities and Novgorod might pass through their hands. German ships, for example, were allowed to sail only along the Neva, Lake Ladoga, and parts of the Volkhov River; beyond that point goods had to be reloaded onto Russian ships. The Germans' trade was exclusively wholesale in character and as such also passed through the hands of the Novgorod merchants. For violating this rule and for concluding transactions with other Russian towns excluding the Novgorod merchants, foreigners were brought to court and subjected to punishment. Even the princes, whom the Novgorod men sought, had the right to engage in trade with foreign merchants only through Novgorod traders, as evidenced in the agreements concluded in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries between Novgorod and its princes.

Naturally, trading in this manner with the more advanced industrial Western countries of the age could not fail to influence in the utmost degree the entire social-economic life of Novgorod. The artisan towns of western Europe required raw materials—furs, wax, hemp, train oil, and so forth. From the West came the imports not only of luxury articles but also of mass consumption goods. The natural environment of the Novgorod lands was unfavorable for the extensive development of agriculture, but the Novgorod boyars, who seized the best appendages and cultivated them with *kholops* and dependent peasant labor, sold the products of their estates, fisheries, and fur-bearing animal preserves (flax, hemp, train oil, wax, and other goods) through Novgorod merchants to foreign lands.

Of special importance to Novgorod and its foreign trade were its enormous territorial annexations throughout the regions of their neighboring tribes: the *Nentsy* (*Samoyedy*) to the north, the *Zyryany* along the northern Dvina, the *Permi* along the Kama, and the *Yugri* in the northern Urals. Sending out their armed expeditions of *ushkuyniki* (in boats called *ushkui*), the Novgorod boyars and merchants subjugated these peoples of the north, plundered them, and levied tribute on them payable in precious fur skins, a commodity that constituted one of the most important items of their trade. They also established salteries, sea fisheries, the mining of silver and iron ores, and other activities.

Under these circumstances the Novgorod boyar class, jointly with the great "substantial" merchants of Novgorod, launched extensive foreign trade with western Europe. Compared with other Russian towns of the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries in this respect, Novgorod advanced far beyond the typical features of the feudal town and occupied a position near the progressive western centers of that period—the "free" cities of the Hanseatic League, with which it maintained trade relations (Lübeck, Visby, Danzig, and others), or the advanced commercial Mediterranean city-republics (Venice and others).

THE FOREIGN TRADE OF NOVGOROD Novgorod's foreign commerce, particularly with Hansa, has been thoroughly studied not only in Russian literature but also in German literature on the basis of Russian literary records and the records of the above-named German towns. The trade of Novgorod represents a very close, although original, copy of those commercial forms that began to be fashioned in the western European medieval commerce of the "free" cities.

At the head of the German merchant group in Novgorod usually stood the alderman elected by all merchants; serving as his assistant was the elected *rathmann* (counselor). After arriving in Novgorod, foreign merchants were obliged to live in special "courts," of which there were two: "the old—Gothic, and the new—German"; they were forbidden to live outside. The regulation and routine of life within the courts were strictly observed: outsiders were forbidden to enter, merchants were obliged to return home by a certain hour, after which the gates were locked and guards stationed. The length of his stay in Novgorod was limited and the merchant, after selling his goods, was expected to return to his country. The commercial transactions proper also had to be concluded within a definite period of time and at a designated place.

The commercial stores in the German court were not large in size, and goods were usually stored either in the warehouses or in the German church of St. Peter.

All general questions of trade and intercourse with the Novgorod authorities were referred to the alderman; on extraordinary occasions a general meeting of the merchants, called a *steven,* was summoned. The rules by which the German merchants had to be guided in their dealings with Novgorod men were promulgated in special statutes called *skra* (apparently after the parchment used in recording these rules). Some compilations of the *skra* in various editions are still extant. The *skra* specified in detail the rules governing the internal organization of the German court, the conduct and life by the whole commune, the election of official persons, its own variety of penal code for various offenses, the rights of trade, regulations on the problems of currency circulation and credit, and so forth. The highest court in all these regulations and in disputes that consequently arose were the merchant organizations of the German towns Gotland, Wisby, and Lübeck. With a view to monopolizing all trade in the hands of the Hanseatic League, they issued a number of general regulations binding upon all members. It was forbidden, for example, to enter into trading companies with the Novgorod people, to carry their cargoes; it was forbidden to accept on commission the goods of other foreign merchants—English, Flemish, or French.

The Novgorod authorities had no right to intervene in the internal affairs of the German mercantile community. In the event of a dispute, or in case of a general problem, the aldermen together with a representative of the Russian merchants, the *tysyatsky,* discussed the controversial issues. A great struggle raged about the issue of the Germans' right to be tried in their own courts and to be exempt from Russian criminal punishment (just as the Russian merchants were exempt in this respect in the German cities).

ARTICLES OF TRADE The chief articles of Novgorod's export trade were furs: sables, beavers, ermine, martens, mink, and other less valuable furs. Among agricultural commodities they exported flax, hemp, wax and, in addition, cod-liver oil and train oil. Part of these products originated in the Novgorod region itself, but they came mostly from neighboring principalities and from lands conquered by Novgorod and subject to plunder by its river pirates and merchants.

From Germany Novgorod mainly received wool cloth, the chief product of the urban artisan industry of the West, and not made in Novgorod. To a lesser degree the Germans also shipped linen fabrics and silk to Novgorod. Another leading branch of imports were the products of the metal-processing industry: iron, copper, tin, lead as well as salt and, finally, several articles of foodstuff: grain, wine, beer, and herring. They likewise imported precious metals, gold, and silver.

It should be noted, moreover, that all these commodities went not only to

satisfy the demands of Novgorod itself, but also as supplies for Rostov, Suzdal, Vladimir, Moscow, and other Russian principalities. Novgorod was the great trading center which supplied all Rus of that period until the time when Moscow gained control over the northern trade route (through Archangel) for intercourse with western Europe.

Notes

1. Marx, *Kapital* (1935), Vol. I, p. 266.
2. Nikitskii, *Istoriya ekonomicheskogo byta Velikogo Novgoroda* (History of the Economic Life of Novgorod the Great), p. 86.
3. Strumilin, *Chyornaya metallurgiya v Rossii i v* SSSR (Ferrous Metallurgy in Russia and in the USSR) (1935), pp. 116 and 119-125.
4. *A.A.E.*, Vol. I, Nos. 94, 52; *Akty istoricheskiye* (Historical Acts), Vol. I, pp. 49, 93, and others; Aristov, *Promyshlyennost' v drevnyei Rusi* (Industry in Ancient Rus), p. 66.
5. *Sobraniye gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov, khranyashchikhsya v Gosud. kollegii inostrannykh dyel* (Collection of State Documents and Agreements Deposited in the State Collegium of Foreign Affairs) (1813–1828), Vol. I, Nos. 3, 6, 15, 28.
6. *A.A.E.*, Vol. I, No. 14.
7. *Ibid.*, No. 13.
8. *Paterik* (Lives of the Fathers), p. 154.
9. *A. I.*, Vol. I, No. 3.
10. *A.A.E.*, Vol. I, Nos. 77, 117.
11. *Ibid.*, No. 116.
12. *Novgorodskaya letopis'* (Novgorod Chronicle), year 1340.
13. *Ibid.*, year 1209.
14. *Dopolneniya k A. I.* (Supplements to the Historical Acts), Vol. I, p. 3.
15. The use of fur skins as currency among the Bolgars is referred to by ibn-Dast: "No minted money is used among them; metal coins are replaced by marten fur skins," from the *Report by ibn-Dast on the Khazars, Burtases, Slavs, and Russians*—translated from the Arabic [into the Russian—ED.] by *Khvolson* (1869), p. 25; Rubrukvis, *Puteshestviye v vostochnyye strany* (Travels in Eastern Lands) (1253—Russian translation, 1910), also speaks of the Russians. The issue over "fur" and metallic money has been debated in Russian historiography for more than a century. See a survey of the controversy in Svyatlovskii, *Primitivno-torgovoye gosudarstvo* (The Primitive Trading State) (1914), pp. 63-93.
16. In 882 in Novgorod Oleg "ordained to pay to the Varangians a tribute of 300 grivny a year." *Novgorodskaya letopis'*, year 882.
17. See Map 4, facing p. 166.

THE FEUDAL ECONOMY OF THE MOSCOW STATE OF THE FIFTEENTH TO SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES AND THE END OF FEUDAL FRAGMENTATION

(IX)

The General Character of Economic Development

We now pass to an examination of the period in our social-economic evolution which constituted an extremely important stage in the economic and political development of all peoples of the USSR. Being in direct sequence to the preceding period of feudal economic development and to the evolution of its various elements, this period, in contrast to the earlier one, is characterized by the end of feudal disintegration, the rise of centralized authority, and the formation of the large, single, national, Russian, feudal-absolutist Moscow state.

In the latter connection, the period of the development of the Russian "Middle Ages" and feudalism we are about to discuss is characterized by the same basic traits as the "later Middle Ages" of western Europe of the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries, the process of the formation of a centralized authority and an absolutist state. At the same time, however, that process in its social content and historical characteristics differed substantially from the comparable process in the West.

In the West this later phase of feudalism and the formation of the feudal-absolutist order was simultaneously the beginning of a period of the ultimate dissipation of the economic system of feudalism and the early phase of the origin of capitalist relationships. "The economic structure . . . of capitalist society," says Marx in this respect, "emerged from the economic structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter released the elements of the former." [1] Lenin also referred to capitalism as an institution that grew from the womb of feudal society; [2] the fact that capitalist forms rise organically from the soil of feudal society was also mentioned by Stalin.[3] The birth of capitalist relationships within the framework of feudalism came fundamentally as a result of the process of the social division of labor, the separation of the town from the village, and the growth of towns and town industry. This was accompanied by the rise of nations and the organization of national states. Speaking of the dissolution of feudalism, the rise of centralized power and

the organization of national states, Engels indicates that "during the fifteenth century the city burghers became more vital to society than the feudal nobility. . . . The townspeople became a class incarnating the future development of production and exchange (Verkehr), education, social and political institutions."[4] "Being still too weak themselves . . . these elements found strong support in the head of the whole feudal order—the king. . . . Nationalities began to evolve into nations."[5] "The combined action of these causes . . . secured a victory over feudalism during the second half of the fifteenth century, though not by the burgher class but rather by the royal power."[6]

The growth of the Russian nation and the organization of the single national Russian Moscow state proceeded under historical circumstances differing conspicuously from those in western Europe. Comrade Stalin, in analyzing the problem of the disintegration of feudalism and the organization of centralized states, indicates that "in the West—in England, France, Italy, and partly in Germany—the period of the liquidation of feudalism and the organization of people into nations in point of time generally and for the most part coincided with the period of emergence of centralized states. . . . In eastern Europe, on the contrary, the process of the organization of nationalities and the liquidation of feudal disintegration did not coincide in time with the process of the formation of centralized states." In Hungary, Austria, and Russia "there existed as yet no capitalist development . . . while the interests of defense against invasion by the Turks, Mongols, and other peoples of the East required the immediate organization of centralized states capable of halting the force of invasion."[7]

The formation in Russia of the centralized Moscow feudal Russian state much earlier than the advent in Russia of capitalist relationships occurred under conditions of its struggle against the Tatar yoke, and demanded the concentration of all the national and economic strength of the country. This, of course, became possible only by putting an end to the economic diffusion and isolation of the various parts of the feudal order and feudal patrimonies, by the continued growth of the social distribution of labor, the separation of the town from the village, and the gradual formation of a single national market. But, as may be seen from the above, within the Moscow state this process occurred under completely different historical circumstances from those in Europe, at a different tempo, and with different results. In the Moscow state the process of terminating the feudal dispersion of the former individual lands and principalities had only just begun in the fifteenth century. In the words of Lenin: "Only the recent period in Russian history (approximately since the seventeenth century) is marked by a real merger of all provinces, lands, and principalities into one entity." This merger was evoked by "the ever growing exchange among the provinces, the gradually

rising turnover of goods, and the concentration of small local markets into a single all-Russian market. Since the leaders and masters of this process were capitalist merchants, the creation of these national ties was nothing more or less than the creation of bourgeois ties." [8] But even in the course of this period the Russian "town burghers" did not become a class which in the West, in the words of Engels, "incarnated the future development of production and exchange (Verkehr), education, social, and political institutions." [9] Social and economic power in the Moscow state remained, as it remained for a long time to come, in the hands of the feudal landowning class, and the state itself completely retained its feudal foundation.

The above are the opinions of the Marxist-Leninist classics concerning the characteristic traits, causes, and peculiarities of the organization of a single, centralized Moscow, feudal Russian state in the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. In our historical study we intend to investigate the manner in which these leading traits and peculiarities of the social-economic order of the Moscow state developed, and the way in which they were historically conditioned.

THE POLITICAL GROWTH OF THE MOSCOW STATE [10] The beginning of the political evolution of the Moscow state goes far back into the recesses of the early phases of the feudal era (twelfth and thirteenth centuries). The final end of feudal disintegration, however, may be considered to have been more or less reached at the time when Moscow Rus attained the size and importance of a fully formed, large, national Russian state union, that is, approximately in the mid-fifteenth century.

At the time of the existence of the Rostov-Suzdal principality, Moscow was still an ordinary, small, feudal patrimonial possession belonging to one of the younger Suzdal princes. The first mention of Moscow dates back to 1147, when one of the Suzdal princes, Yury Dolgoruky, held a "mighty feast" at his Moscow mansion.[11] Afterward, this Moscow *votchina* began to expand, become settled, and grow with new villages, hamlets, buildings, and churches. After the formation of a separate Vladimir principality from the Suzdal principality, Moscow became part of the former as a "suburb" of the capital city of Vladimir, that is, it became a town. It had built an inner fortress, the Kremlin, which was enclosed by a wooden wall. A military garrison was stationed in the town for its guard and defense. For a long time, however, Moscow remained a small holding of the suburban type. As a minor property it passed in inheritance from father to son along the junior line.

In its geographical position Moscow was located along the water and overland commercial routes that had become rather important after the fall of Kiev: toward the west, on the road to Smolensk and farther into Lithuania;

toward the northwest, to Novgorod and the Baltic; toward the east, to the Volga and the Golden Horde; and toward the north, to Yaroslavl and the White Sea. Hence its commercial as well as political significance began to grow apace. When in 1238 Moscow was burned by the Tatars, it had already been surrounded by numerous hamlets, villages, artisan and trading settlements, churches and monasteries, that is, it had already grown into a sizable center. After the Tatar devastation the city of Moscow buried twenty-one thousand corpses, which indicates its substantial population even at that time. In 1252 Moscow, as an independent patrimonial principality, passed to the inheritance of Prince Daniel, who then became the founder of the new Moscow princely dynasty. A new principality, Moscow, was thus added to the other feudal states of the thirteenth century.

A glance at a map showing the erstwhile small princely Moscow *votchina* and the later growth of the territorial annexations of the Moscow principality will reveal how rapidly this process of the "gathering of the Russian lands" had developed. This cartographic picture of the expansion of their feudal possessions by Daniel and Ivan Kalita is strongly reminiscent, among others, of the picture, say, of the similar unification and growth of feudal possessions and royal domains under Hugh Capet in feudal France of the tenth and eleventh centuries. The Moscow feudal lords were, indeed, even more successful and enterprising in "rounding out" their feudal holdings. They disdained no methods to gain their ends. They began to gather into their hands territories and *votchinas* of other princes and at the same time to extend their political power over them, thus undermining their independence. Some principalities were conquered, others had their princes driven into exile while the *votchinas* fell into the possession of the Moscow prince as "escheated property."

Of special importance in this connection were the so-called "khan's *yarlyks*" or letters from the Tatar khans as the supreme sovereigns of the Russian princes, by which, through gifts, bribery, intrigue, and crime, entire principalities were tendered to the Moscow prince. Thus Vasily I acquired a *yarlyk* for the large Nizhny Novgorod principality. Many less successful lords, under the shadow of the political and economic growth of Moscow, began voluntarily to transfer their *votchinas* to the Moscow prince and offer themselves to his "service." Ivan III (1462–1505) introduced a new idea, announcing himself "sovereign of all Rus," that is, not of an individual feudal principality but of all the other states composing Rus, declaring himself the successor of Byzantium and the protagonist of its idea of an Eastern autocracy. Finally, it was he who freed the Moscow state from the humiliating Tatar yoke (1480).

A rapid annexation of land proceeded at the same time. Ivan III annexed

a number of new large principalities—Yaroslavl, Rostov, and Tver. The grandson of Ivan III, Ivan IV (1533–1584), adopted the still more ceremonial title of "Tsar," and annexed additional territories to Moscow: all the Novgorod lands, and the Astrakhan (1556) and Kazan (1552) kingdoms. He brutally crushed the remnants of feudal principalities and of the patrimonial boyars, destroying physically a number of boyar families while their *votchinas*, lands, and holdings were "written over to the lord." The patrimonial estates of the boyar class throughout the wide Novgorod lands were completely abolished.

In this manner the destruction of the political and economic independence not only of the feudal boyars but also of the former fief-holding princes of the Rurik line occurred. All of them gradually passed into the service of the central Moscow authority, and received from it grants of land not as independent feudal lords, but "bestowed with *pomestyes*," that is, received land conditional upon their service to the Moscow central power, the autocrat-seignior of Moscow. The course of future development of the economic and political structure of the feudal state followed along this line. The period of feudal disintegration was superseded in the development of feudalism by the creation of an absolutist, multinational state.

SOCIAL-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE END OF FEUDAL DISINTEGRATION The destruction of the political independence and of the economic isolation of the feudal principalities by the Moscow state set in motion a series of vital social-economic consequences.

In the process of the political and economic unification of the scattered fiefs of Rus into the Moscow state toward the end of the sixteenth century, the large feudal landowning boyar and princely aristocracy largely began to disappear from the political and economic arena. But if a section of the class of feudal lords appeared vanquished both on the political and economic front, the feudal landowning class as a whole, as a result of its prolonged struggle and of its organization, retained its rule. The bitter class struggle in the Moscow state of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries ended in the defeat both of the great feudal seignior and of the serfs engaged in the struggle for the liberation of their land and their persons. The victory fell to another group of that same feudal class, the *pomestye* owner, who organized his economy on the basis of that same method of production and compulsory exploitation of the small producer on his feudal *pomestye*.

For the *pomestye* owner of the new type, the problem was no longer that of the numerical strength of his human feudal entourage, nor that of his feudally complete but economically quite unproductive domestic personnel. His problem did not so much concern itself with the *kholop*, slave, or serf

proper as with the economic efficacy and the productive exploitation of his labor power in general.

In the organization of an estate, the most acute problem involved the methods and forms of disposition of the labor of both the "plow-field" *kholops* and the feudally attached peasants living on the owner's land. Slavery became a more infrequent, unproductive, and expensive form of exploitation. All economic theory of the sixteenth century speaks of the economic urgency of abandoning the use of that unproductive form, slave labor. Ideologically, on the basis of religious ethics, the publicists of that period (for example, Ivan Peresvetov in the sixteenth century) formulated these opinions on the superiority of a free status and on the necessity to abolish slavery and the "feedings" by the governors.[12]

With the abolition of feudal political rights—feudal immunities and privileges secured in the name of the mighty feudal lord—the lesser landowner was left without his chief means for attracting peasants to his land except by "carrying off" and luring away the necessary labor power from his less powerful neighbor. This brought more sharply to the foreground the problem of new methods for securing the necessary labor power for the estates, of new forms for the organization of the entire economy, as well as the problem of intensifying the exploitation of the small producer under these new systems.

For the success of the new system, those relationships of the small producer's economic dependence, relationships which resulted from his economic insolvency and his lowly position in the feudal social hierarchy, proved no longer adequate. In effect the feudal head of a patrimonial estate was himself undergoing a change of position in this hierarchy, becoming dependent upon the central political power. It therefore became imperative to apply extra economic compulsions more intensively, no longer in the previous form of the "fact," the feudal agreement, the peasant "contract," and other comparable ways, but in the form of a statewide and universally obligatory legal standard—a serfdom "law."

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MONEY ECONOMY AND A MARKET At the basis of such changes in the social relationships and in the economics of the serf system of production in the Moscow state lay the growth in the social division of labor, the increasing separation of the town from the village, the development of urban handicrafts, the growth of commodity circulation and of a money economy, and—as a consummation of this whole long process in the seventeenth century—the formation of a single national market.[13]

The market as a focal point of the new relationships of exchange among the

various, previously closed units of the natural-economy order, with the end of feudal decentralization gradually emerged from its erstwhile feudal restrictions of local trade turnover. In Russian economic development this local turnover of goods evidently was even less significant than in western Europe, both as to its material content and as to the volume of exchange between town and village. Surplus production could be marketed only in far-off regions of the country inasmuch as the town often possessed its own agriculture by the tradespeople and the artisans. For the importation of consumers' goods and luxury articles not produced within the manor, however (fabrics, arms, spices, foreign wines, and other luxury articles), even the town could not always be helpful, since it seldom produced such articles. When exchange did occur, therefore, it was frequently not in the nature of local turnover but on a "national" scale, or even on the broader scale of foreign trade.

THE ROLE OF MERCANTILE CAPITAL Under these circumstances of the formation of a large "national market," by the seventeenth century, the "capitalists-merchants," as Lenin called them, played a particularly vital role in the economy of the Moscow feudal *pomestye* state of this period.

As we know, the importance of commercial capital in economic development is expressed in the fact that "since commercial capital does not move outside the realm of circulation and its function consists exclusively in serving the needs of the exchange of goods, it required no other conditions for its existence except such as are indispensable to the ordinary circulation of commodities and money. . . . Whatever was the method of production by which the articles entering into circulation as goods were produced—whether by a primitive communal economy, by production based on slave labor, by small peasant and petty bourgeois or by capitalist production—did not in any way change their character as goods, and in their capacity as goods they all had to undergo the process of exchange and a change of forms accompanying such exchange."[14] In this manner "mercantile capital becomes the historic form of capital long before capital came to dominate production itself,"[15] and a necessary preliminary condition for the accumulation of fortunes. For this reason, therefore,

> the independent and predominant development of capital in the form of mercantile capital is equivalent to the freedom of production from the dominance of capital, that is, equivalent to the development of capital in an atmosphere of social forms of production outside and independent of it. Consequently, the independent development of mercantile capital stands in reverse relationship to the general economic development of society.[16]

The preponderance of the proportion of rural to urban economy in the Moscow state, and the undeveloped industry caught the attention of foreign

observers in the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, who unanimously testified to the backwardness of industrial development in the city of Moscow.[17] At a time when urban industry in the aspect of small-town crafts constituted the productive activity of the lower (and, in contrast to western European handicraft, socially unorganized) urban class and the "tradespeople," the commercial class had not only succeeded in attaining a more solid form of organization but, by its economic and social weight, occupied a prominent place in the social hierarchy of the Moscow state, serving as "royal merchant-counselors and factors" with "the unlimited administration of trade," managing the collection of customs, directing the royal trade monopolies, and so forth.[18]

THE UNIFICATION OF THE OTHER NATIONALITIES The process of feudal disintegration in the Moscow Russian state during the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries was not confined to the unification of the territories and population of the Russian nation. The peoples of the other national parts of the unified Russian state were at that time (as well as much later) living in a stage of clan patriarchal customs and under a nomad or hunting economy (the majority of the Siberian and the far northern people). Others (the nationalities of the West Siberian steppes and Central Asia) were living under the still powerful rule of the eastern Mongol khanates, the successors of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. Furthermore, the states with which Russia undertook various diplomatic negotiations in the sixteenth century such as the Georgian and Armenian states, were surrounded by a hostile world of Mongolian, Persian, and Turkish conquerors and were experiencing a period of extreme feudal dismemberment and the yoke of foreign invasion.

In the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries the strengthened Russian state, particularly after the extermination of the last bulwarks of Mongol rule on its eastern frontier—the kingdoms of Kazan and Astrakhan, energetically began to incorporate within its boundaries the eastern nationalities of the Trans-Volga, Bashkiria, almost all of Siberia, the Don and North Caucasian steppes up to the Terek, thus laying the foundation of its "multinational" character. In the Caucasian states Moscow also discovered one of the avenues through which it might extend its commercial and political influence over the East, an avenue of penetration into India, and so forth. Similar goals were guiding Moscow in its attempts to penetrate into the Trans-Caspian steppes and into Central Asia. Here, however, Moscow was unable to achieve any concrete results.

Nevertheless, by the seventeenth century the Russian Moscow state, having disposed of its feudal disunity, constituted not only a centralized feudal-

absolutist but also a multinational state "with one, advanced nation at the head and the other, less developed nations in a position of political and later of economic subordination to the ruling nation." [19]

Notes

1. Marx, *Kapital* (1935), Vol. I, p. 573.
2. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XXII, p. 315.
3. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed., p. 107.
4. Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya*, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, pp. 440-441.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 443-444.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 449.
7. Stalin, *Marksizm i natsionalno-kolonialnyi vopros* (Marxism and the National-Colonial Problem) (1937), p. 73.
8. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. I, p. 73.
9. Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya*, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, p. 441.
10. See Map 4, facing p. 166.
11. *Ipatyevskaya letopis'* (Ipatyev Chronicle), year 1147.
12. Ivan Peresvyetov, *Epistole k Ioannu IV* (Epistle to Ivan IV), included in Karamzin, *Istoriya* (History), Vol. IX, p. 849.
13. The above characterization by Lenin may be found in his article "Chto takoye 'druzya naroda' i kak oni voyuyut protiv sotsial-demokratov?" (What Are These 'Friends of the People' and How Do They Fight the Social Democrats?), *Sochineniya*, Vol. I, p. 73.
14. Marx, *Kapital* (1938), Vol. III, pp. 291-292.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 293.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 294.
17. Kielburger, *Kratkoye izvestiye o russkoi torgovlye* (Short Report on Russian Trade) (Kurtz, 1915), also reports by De Rodes, Reitenfels, and others.
18. *Ibid.*, Chaps. 3, 9, p. 164.
19. Stalin, *Ocherednyye zadachi partii v natsionalnom voprose* (The Impending Tasks of the Party on the Nationality Problem) (1937), p. 4.

(X)

Agriculture and the Serf Estate in the Moscow State of the Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries

THE AGRARIAN ORDER and rural economy again serve as a key to the understanding of all economic and social relationships within the feudal economy and society of the Moscow state during the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries.

THE TECHNICAL LEVEL OF AGRICULTURE In Moscow Rus of the sixteenth century, agriculture became the principal branch of national economy and the chief occupation of the populace. Regardless of the dense forests still in existence throughout the country, hunting as a source of subsistence and economic activity of the population receded more and more into the background. Foreign travelers visiting Moscow early in the sixteenth century reported that in the outskirts of Moscow they saw burned stumps of what was once a forest, and that the only animals they encountered were rabbits.[1] Even if this observation applies only to the center of the Moscow state, in any event we no longer hear of the erstwhile fabulous wealth of animal life.

As a consequence rural economy in general and agriculture in particular became the predominant branch of national economy. Available historical records do not help to form an authentic opinion of the prevalent system of agriculture. In the wooded north, apparently, the *podsechnaya* system predominated as before, except for the far north (on the Murman and along the Pechora River), where hunting and apiculture were the leading pursuits. In the south of that period (present-day Tula and Oryol districts), "wild fields" and the *perelozhnaya* system of tillage were still the order of the day.[2] Finally, in the Central Moscow districts near the towns, the fallow and three-field grain system came to predominate more and more.

The cadastres, in describing our arable lands, usually apply the following terms in their classification: plowed or living fields, "visited" fields, fallow fields, and fields overgrown with woods. In addition, the plowed or living field was always subdivided into three fields, according to the usual formula: "In one field [so many] quarters, and in the other two the same amount." This

frequent formulation has led some students to assume that in the living fields at least, that is, in the ones near the settlements and regularly cultivated, the three-field grain system was regularly followed. We can scarcely speak of any correct three-field system, of a correct rotation of the winter-spring-fallow order and of three equal sized fields in connection with that period. It would be more accurate to treat this period as a transition to the fallow system, still without the correct three-field practice, and instead in the form of the so-called "mixed field" and an unregulated variety of fallow system.[3] In the more remote sectors, on the other hand, the land was evidently cultivated not as regularly, but by means of "visits," that is, by temporary journeys to till and gather the harvest, after which the land was abandoned for a rather extended period and allowed to return to forest. In other words, not the three-field but the *perelozhnaya* and, in places, the *podsechnaya* system, predominated on these lands. Therefore it is hardly correct to consider that the "visited" arable lands, which in some of our documents are treated as identical with the "waste" lands, are in general a sign of the retrogression of our agricultural economy.[4]

Naturally, under the three-field and the fallow-grain systems of agriculture, the main products of agriculture were the winter grains (rye and, to a lesser extent, wheat) and spring cultures (oats, barley, millet, and buckwheat). In the Pskov and Smolensk provinces there were large plantings of flax, hemp, and other crops.[5]

As regards the technique of agriculture, the chief implement of cultivation was the *sokha*. The plow (*ralo*) of which the chronicles of the Kiev Rus spoke is apparently encountered quite rarely, a fact due, however, not to a decline in agricultural technique but to the nature of a soil that did not require the same deep plowing as the steppe soils of Kiev Rus.

In the rural economy of the nonblack-soil zone during the fourteenth to the fifteenth centuries, that is, first in the Rostov-Suzdal and later in Moscow Rus, there was gradually created that basic technical implement of soil cultivation which afterward, for a period of several centuries, down to the twentieth century, remained predominant in our peasant economy. The technical development of the Russian wooden *sokha* had its origin in the wooden one-tooth *ralo,* the twig *sokha,* which continued in use in places throughout Siberia down to the nineteenth century. The latter was afterward changed by the simple device of doubling the teeth of the *ralo* ("the double-tooth *sokha*") and further improved by adding a cutting edge for slicing the soil and a "shelf," or a moldboard, for turning over the soil, and by introducing metal edges, or plowshares, at the end of the teeth. In the form of their construction, the moldboards, whether they were movable from one plowshare to the other or attached permanently, began to be differentiated as either the

"adjustable" or the "one-sided" plow.[6] These technical features in the construction of the *sokha* indicated a stony, shallow forest soil, and reflected the weak draft power of the main peasant domestic animal—the horse. Therefore the cutting teeth of the *sokha* were kept close together and the plow was incapable of covering a broad strip of land, since that would have been unsuitable for forest soils containing roots. Its plowing was shallow; it did not have a runner like a plow, as that would tend to increase the friction of the soil; it had to be removed lightly and swiftly from the furrow, and so forth. Depending on these economic and technical conditions in the various regions, a number of variations in the basic type of the two-share adjustable "Russian" *sokha* developed—the "Vladimir," the "Vyatka," the "Kostroma heavy plow," and many others.

Among the other implements mentioned are harrows, scythes, sickles, and plows of wood or of iron. The relatively advanced level of the agriculture of that period is indicated by the fact that in the central nonblack-soil provinces, for example, they were already familiar with manure fertilization. One of the usual obligations listed in the peasant contracts was "the carrying of manure to the land."[7] The usual draft power were oxen and horses, which on the large boyar and monastery estates amounted to several hundred animals. Outside of the work cattle used in their field chores, comparatively little use was made of any other types of domestic animals (lambs, sheep, hogs, and poultry), except on the larger estates of the princes and the boyars. The fertility of soil in Moscow Rus, particularly in its southern parts was, according to the testimony of foreign travelers (Oleari and Gerberstein), unusually high. They reported rye and wheat as yielding a harvest of twentyfold or thirtyfold. These accounts of fabulous harvests, however, must be treated with great caution indeed.

Our most recent investigation and studies of the concrete harvest records of the state, seignioral, and monastery estates indicate that even in the seventeenth century harvests for the most part ran twofold, threefold, and only on rare occasions reached five to one.[8]

PRODUCTION SYSTEM OF THE PRIVATE ESTATE. USE OF *KHOLOPS* Aside from the question of technique, an important factor in the organization of agricultural production within the private estate was the question of its labor power organization. As was stated above, the arable land of the manor during the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries was relatively small, being limited to the consumption needs of the master's rather large household, its occupants, and servants. Moreover, in cultivating the seignioral lands, the partial utilization of the work of *kholops* still prevailed. At the peak of feudal economy of the Moscow period, that is, in the fifteenth century the

seignioral fields grew considerably, and the supply of *kholop* labor became inadequate.

In the opinion of some historians, by the sixteenth century the number of agricultural slaves in Moscow Rus was already rather negligible (Belyayev). True, other authors (Klyuchevsky) maintain an opinion to the contrary, and, according to more recent studies (Rozhkov), it appears that in the central counties of Moscow Rus the number of *kholop* households working on the seignioral plowland amounted to from 8.8 to 10 per cent. In the steppes and in the Kama region, *kholop* labor in the manorial fields was somewhat more prevalent.

The severe shortage of labor power for the feudal economy is emphasized by the circumstance that during the sixteenth century there appeared for the first time in Moscow Rus a special variety of the *kholop,* the indentured *kholop.* This was a form of the *kholop* status which emerged on the purely economic basis of indebtedness (*kabala*—the receipt for a loan). For all the controversy in our historical literature affecting some of the problems connected with the origin, legal position, and other features of the *kabala kholop,*[9] the important facts here seem to be, on the one hand, the purely economic origin of the indentured *kholop,* and, on the other, the fact that, during the sixteenth century, rather than being bound by a temporary loan, the indentured *kholop* was gradually transformed into permanent and lifelong slavery, including his loss of the right to return the *kabala* money. From here it is but a short step to the registration of "free people" into the *kholop* class, that is, to a form of voluntary *kholop* status even without the receipt of a loan but through some other economic cause. Thus, by the end of the sixteenth century (the decrees of 1586 and 1597), a new source of labor power for the boyar household was secured. It served to confirm an intensification of the economic causes behind the enslavement of the population during that time. A similar situation existed on the monastery estates, where the fields were cultivated by the monastery's "servants" and "young ones."[10]

The drive to expand the seignioral plowland, which was gathering momentum during the sixteenth century because of a shortage of *kholop* labor, could not succeed unless it availed itself of the sole alternatives at the disposal of the landowner: to transform the obligations of the peasants living on his land into compulsory serf labor, and to expand the *barshchina* as the system for exploiting the labor of the peasant. The private estate owners and the monasteries were almost simultaneously confronted by the necessity of utilizing peasant labor for their own fields. With the next short step came the conversion of this economically independent peasant tiller into the serf. Henceforth the problem of the productive organization of the privately owned rural economy became the peasant problem, the problem of serfdom.

RENT IN KIND AND IN LABOR We have already seen above how during the feudal *votchina* era the manorial lands and waste spaces were usually settled with various types of farmers—"people," "orphans," *zakups*, "smerds," and plain "Christians" (*krestyane*), who received for their use land that belonged to the owner, sometimes a loan for setting up their household, and who, in return, performed certain obligations in the form of labor and *obrok* in kind or in money for the benefit of the landowner.

With the development of a money economy (especially from the sixteenth century), the production relationships between the tillers of the soil and the landowners became more complicated. The estate-owner strove to increase his income, and to that end so organize his production as to obtain a maximum yield.

Within the framework of the serf economy, the landowner of the sixteenth century had at his disposal the various forms of exploitation of the direct producer and the extraction of a surplus product from him; namely, the three types of precapitalist rent: rent in labor (*barshchina*), in kind or in produce (*obrok*), and in money. The latter would come closest to fulfilling the landowners' purpose of increasing their money incomes, but it was predicated on the existence of money relationships within the peasant economy itself, and, therefore, was unable during the sixteenth century to make a vital contribution. The *barshchina* offered greater opportunities for a more intensified exploitation than did *obrok*, and for an increase in the quantity of surplus products. But the *barshchina* required a direct participation on the part of the *pomeshchik* (landowner) in the conduct of the economy, and a more complex form of organization than the *obrok* required. Throughout this period, from the end of the fifteenth century to the end of the sixteenth, the two forms of serf exploitation became intertwined in a most varied manner, depending on local conditions, the size of the economy, the position of the *pomeshchik*, and so forth. At any rate, by the end of the sixteenth century, victory on the whole was achieved by rent in the form of labor, or the *barshchina* system of exploitation, as expressed by its formal exaltation to the position of a serf "law," that is, in the transformation of the former actual relationships of serfdom into relationships sanctioned by law and protected by it. This process is clearly traceable through the so-called peasant "contracts."

PEASANT CONTRACTS Economic relations between the peasant and the *pomestye* or *votchina* owner had already grown quite complex by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Hence, whereas up to the sixteenth century relations between them were for the most part regulated by verbal agreement, usually by means of a "God's truth," during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries these conditions were more frequently set down in

writing, in the form of "contracts." Many such contracts of that period have come down to us, revealing the working relations between the landowners and the agriculturists.[11]

A fixed section of land, a village, a plot, an estate, or piece of wasteland, was usually "contracted out" in general or "contracted out to the peasants" for a fixed period: for three to five years or, more rarely, for ten to twenty years. After occupying his plot, the peasant contractor ordinarily received an "assistance" and a loan—"five rubles in money," "ten hampers of oat seed," "four quarters of rye," and so forth. The most important points, of course, were the enumerated terms and forms of labor obligations to which the contractor was subject. They were fixed by a listing of his *barshchina* labors: "to plow and sow the land, to mow the hay," "to keep up the fallow land," "to carry manure," "to plot gardens in the fields and in the meadows," "to prevent the land from going to waste," "to make new clearings," "all appendages . . . to be maintained," "to catch fish," and so forth. Since the peasant occasionally obtained wasteland for his use, the most detailed catalogue of obligations usually applied to the farm buildings to be erected by the peasant, indicating the exact size in length, width, and height of the peasant huts and the storage bins, his duties in this connection, the materials of construction, and their repair. Obviously, all these buildings at the end of the term of contract became the property of the landlord, and the contracts specifically stated: "The yard, the house, and gardens near the arable lands shall be surrendered to the steward in full" and: "The house in the yard shall not be laid waste."

Duties and obligations toward the owner mentioned in the contract were for the most part cited in terms of money: "to give *prazoa* five *altyn* of money," "to give us *obrok* . . . of four grivny." But there were also additional payments in kind: the fifth sheaf of every grain, fish from the fish ponds, finally, some minor revenue in the form of eggs, flax, wool, butter, honey, lambs, and even mushrooms. Furthermore, "to make all wares" was another in the usual lists of *barshchina* duties in remuneration for the land obtained.

The obligations and "work" of the peasants were fixed in precisely the same words and usually by the same standards in the monastery contracts, while money taxes were evidently collected by the monasteries from their peasants to a lesser degree. On the other hand, they exacted their *obrok* in kind very vigorously, and, above all, every kind of peasant "work," that is, *barshchina* labor for the monastery.

In the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a tendency on the part of the *pomeshchiks* to transfer their peasants from *obrok* in kind to money obligations became quite evident. Many cadastres of the early sixteenth century contain an enumeration of the norms on the basis of which *obrok* in kind should be transferred into money payments ("for a *korobya* [Novgorod grain

measure] of rye, ten *dengas;* for a *korobya* of oats, five *dengas;* for a goose, two *dengas;* for a hen, one"). In the cadastres of the late sixteenth century, *obrok* was often determined directly in the form of money ("from a plot at the rate of five *altyn*"), although there are at the same time a great many references to *korobyas* of rye, to geese, linen, and other articles.[12] In any event the evolution of money *obrok* from the former obligations in kind, a process in which the former was dislodging the latter, was revealed clearly enough. In the seventeenth century money *obrok* already occupied a prominent place.

Aside from *obrok* a considerable practice of sharecropping existed in some areas; that is, the cultivation of land in return for a share in the harvest. The share to be delivered to the landowner was not everywhere uniform: in Pskov (according to the *Pskov Judiciary Charter*), a quarter of the crop; in other places, one-fifth, one-third, and, more rarely, one-half. Sharing the crop was apparently a more advantageous way of making payment from the peasant's standpoint. But during the sixteenth century that payment too was constantly rising, and, furthermore, sharing in general was on the decline, being superseded by either *obrok* or *barshchina.*

BARSHCHINA Rent in the form of labor, that is, labor on the seignioral land, was becoming increasingly important. As the leading and most typical form of the serf economy, the *barshchina* fully retained the "method of production" inherent in this economy—the performance of work on the seignioral lands by the labor of the serf and by his means of production. In the course of its development, however, *barshchina* led to a cleavage between the seignioral economy and the economy of the peasantry proper, to a notable expansion in the whole pattern of the economic tasks on the seignioral economy, and to a great increase in the forms in which peasant labor was utilized. As a result, seignioral economy both in its tendencies (its system of husbandry, the state of its livestock), its cultivation of various crops and in the products processed, was able to achieve a level of production higher than that of the peasant economy. Hence the *barshchina* obligations were frequently not confined to work on the manorial fields only, but were extended to, say, fishing obligations, to boat construction, to work in the flour mills, in the weaving mills, in the distilleries, to lumbering work, and other activities. Under the impact of a developing money economy and a market, the seignioral economy became vitally concerned in the peasant's "carting" obligation, that is, his duty to carry the master's grain to the market either at Moscow or at other cities. Thus the peasant household not only supplied the *pomeshchik's* economy with produce but also furnished free transportation for his contact with the market. On its own part, the peasant household was merely regarded as a source of necessary labor and tools, entitled to its allot-

ment of land and its own economic organization as a necessary step in the reproduction of the labor power required for the economy of the *pomeshchik*.[13]

Being more complex, requiring a more developed organization and a comparatively heavy investment of resources, the *barshchina* system was accessible only to the more substantial estates. It therefore prevailed on the monastery estates, for example, and in the larger manors of the boyar aristocracy. In the monasteries the system of "work," or *barshchina*, had existed in practice as early as the fourteenth century; in later years it was further reinforced and emerged in a number of variations. On the privately owned estates the decline of agriculture during the sixteenth century was reflected in a reduction of the seignioral fields, but the latter subsequently, particularly by the seventeenth century, nevertheless began to expand somewhat. While still retaining a welter of obligations—in kind, in money, and in labor—the last became more and more preponderant. By the end of the sixteenth century, we observe in a number of cases the complete replacement of all other obligations by the *barshchina*, that is, the complete transition of privately owned estates to a system of receiving their surplus product through rent in labor. During this period too, and for the first time, the geographic localization of the *barshchina* type of estate became evident: the *barshchina* was beginning to entrench itself more strongly in the southern agricultural counties of the Moscow state, the new center of serfdom.[14]

What, then, was the extent of the peasant's exploitation under the *barshchina* system of that time? What was the share of the surplus product taken from the peasant by the *pomeshchik* and, consequently, the burden of the *barshchina*? Our available sources offer little evidence for ascertaining exactly what the burden of this *barshchina* meant to the peasant economy and to what extent it was increasing. Data from monastery estates reveal the following figures, illustrating the burden of the *barshchina* in the early sixteenth century. In Dmitrov County, for example, on the estate of the Troitsky monastery, a peasant who obtained five *dessyatins* of land cultivated one and one-half to two *dessyatins*, sometimes paying some *obrok* in addition.[15] In other words the *barshchina* deprived the peasant of about one-fourth to one-third of his time; the rest of the time the peasant worked for himself. If this was the situation in the central parts of the Moscow state, it may be assumed that the burden of the *barshchina* in other localities was no greater.

Beginning with the end of the sixteenth century, however, the proportion of the *barshchina* began to increase conspicuously: in 1590, on the same Troitsky monastery, the peasant, in transferring from *obrok* to *barshchina*, had to plow five *dessyatins* in return for his plot, that is, one *dessyatin* for one.[16] What was still more significant was the fact that the *barshchina* obli-

gation had not only increased in proportion to the amount of seignioral land to be cultivated, but also became materially complicated by new duties, such as, for example, the above-named carting obligation. Obviously, under these circumstances the drive to increase the "surplus labor" part of the necessary labor, that is, the drive to increase the exploitation of the peasantry, could not fail to result in the ruin of the village economy during the second half of the sixteenth century.

THE BLACK LANDS The confiscation of the patrimonial feudal lands of the boyar aristocracy in the Moscow state placed at the disposal of the central authority a huge fund of lands which it could grant as remuneration to persons in its service. However, the further expropriation of the land of the small farmer, the owner of the former black lands of the peasant, and the absorption of that land into the privately owned estates of the princes, boyars, and monasteries proceeded simultaneously. In the course of the sixteenth century, the land relations in the Moscow state were marked by the completion of that process of reducing the black lands and increasing the privately owned lands in their stead. In the opinion of some students, the black lands, as the peasant's communal volost lands, had already completely disappeared in the central Moscow counties by the sixteenth century, but were left somewhat intact in the northwest, and continued to exist in substantial proportions only in the far north borderland.[17] In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as we have seen, the black lands had already begun to be rapidly drawn into the sphere of boyar property. With the ascendancy of the Moscow princely authority, the black lands entirely lost their importance as volost lands and were absorbed by the princes and the sovereign. At first this was merely a change in title and designation, but the process very soon assumed great economic significance in the development of land relationships. In the hands of the prince and sovereign, the black lands became part of that state fund of lands from which it began to "grant" and reward its service people, and specifically those serving the central authority. In the event that the royal treasury found itself in need of money, the sale of land began to serve as another source for replenishing its finances.[18]

THE PALACE LANDS In addition to the black lands which were distributed to service people, lands confiscated from the old hereditary owners usually served the same purpose. Whereas the black lands in the course of their appropriation by the prince still retained the character of a state land fund (later these gave rise to the state lands inhabited by state peasants), the lands confiscated from the *votchina* owners were considered the property of the prince—palace lands. The conquests and the political struggle between

Moscow and the other principalities, particularly Novgorod, provided considerable spoils in land for this fund of palace lands: in Novgorod Province, Ivan III and Ivan Grozny confiscated almost all land belonging to the boyars, monasteries, and sovereigns and turned them into palace lands. However they did not usually remain long in the hands of the Moscow tsars proper since the latter needed this land for distribution among service people. Moreover it was sometimes necessary to grant to the service people not only land that was either conquered and confiscated, that is, the state lands properly speaking, but also some of the princes' own personal *votchina* lands. The sharpening of the political struggle for power during the early seventeenth century required an especially great outlay of palace and princely lands for use in distribution.[19]

In this manner the palace lands were a revolving, temporary, rapidly increasing, and at times rapidly disappearing fund by which the central power propagated its serving and dependent *pomestye* class, whose help it needed both for the extermination of the old *votchina* type of landownership and for consolidating its own power.

CHURCH LANDOWNERSHIP Another important type of landownership during the sixteenth century, alongside the *votchina* and *pomestye* types, were the Church and monastery lands. By the end of the sixteenth century this type of ownership had become widespread in the Moscow state, its importance being due not so much to the amount of total land thus held as to the amount of land brought under cultivation. Thus, in thirteen *stans* of Moscow county at the end of the sixteenth century, about 60 per cent of the total cultivated land belonged to monasteries,[20] so that in the center of the state, where the land often lay waste, the type of landownership that flourished was not the boyar type but that of the monasteries, and the latter still continued to "lay up land."

A situation of this type already began to appear somewhat menacing to the *pomestye* state of the time. The danger of exhausting the land fund, and of losing both the *votchina* and *pomestye* lands "in perpetuity" to the Church, raised the problem of landownership by the Church. As a result of the rise in the land properties of the Church, the service class "was near to impoverishment." The state had to replenish its land fund from some new sources in order to be in a position to make grants to its service people and thus repay for the "salvation of the souls" of its boyars. Therefore, by the sixteenth century, measures began to be taken to restrict either gratuitous or paid transfers of *votchinas* to the Church and to the monasteries without permission from the central authority (the Sobor decree of 1551). The provision for making money contributions for "the salvation of the soul" instead of land and *votchina* grants (Sobor decree of 1562) was rather unsuccessful, since neither

the *votchina* owners themselves nor the state possessed sufficient funds for replacing land grants with money contributions. The Sobor decree of 1580 prohibited the acquisition of *votchinas* by monasteries by any means whatsoever.[21]

The net effect of all these limitations, however, was insignificant, and the landed property of the Church remained as before a tremendous land fund, although, to be sure, increasing only slowly since the seventeenth century. Only in the course of extraordinary events, such as the struggle between Moscow and Novgorod, was all property, privately owned *votchinas* as well as that belonging to the Church, the metropolitans, and the monastery destroyed. By the end of the sixteenth century, the latter type of landownership was sharply curtailed in Novgorod.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE *VOTCHINA* AND THE *POMESTYE* Thus, with the decline of the feudal order in the Moscow state, from the second half of the fifteenth century two types of private ownership existed. On the one hand there was the hereditary, rather large and privileged *votchina* as a remnant of the former feudal boyar and princely landownership, and on the other, the *pomestye*, which had become more prevalent during the sixteenth century, a temporary and often less privileged, small and medium-size property of the nobles and the service people. The policy of Ivan III in Novgorod in particular served greatly to undermine the proportion of large boyar *votchina* ownership there, replacing it with the smaller *pomestye* type. The *oprichina* * of Ivan Grozny personified the final triumph of *pomestye* landownership and the complete destruction of the feudal privileges of the boyar *votchina*. At the end of the Moscow era the overwhelming form of land relationships was the *pomestye* system.

The social composition of the new *pomestye* class was quite heterogeneous. Historically its basic nucleus consisted of the serving people of the prince who rendered personal and military service, receiving in reward for that service, and for the duration of that service only, an allotment of the prince's land for temporary use in the nature of a "living," a *pomestye*. This circumstance makes our *pomestye* closely related to the western European benefice (grant), an institution that is also encountered quite early in our own history, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Pavlov-Sylvansky). But the more rapid increase and formation of the new *pomestye* class began to occur during the sixteenth century, when Moscow, having ended with the fiefs and boyar *votchinas*, attracting into its service not only former princes and boyars but also townspeople, merchants, farmers, palace servants, and even *kholops*, regardless of the diversity of their social position, personal and political influ-

* *Oprichina*: Ivan the Terrible's personal and select military force.—ED.

ence, equalized them all in one stroke—the grant of land for temporary use as a remuneration for service to the state.

As a result, more than one-half of the Novgorod lands confiscated by Moscow in the Shelonskaya *pyatina* * were distributed to Moscow service people as *pomestye* early in the sixteenth century. In other parts of Novgorod Province, at about the same time, more than one-half and as much as two-thirds of the land was held by their owners on the *pomestye* basis. The *pomestye* was becoming still more important in the south where, for the sake of defending the frontier against attack by southern nomads, land was awarded almost exclusively to military service people, and where almost all landed property existed by the right of *pomestye* (in the Ryazan, Yepiphany, Tula, Kashira, and Oryol counties between 50 and 99 per cent of all land belonged to *pomestye* owners). The *votchina* variety of ownership remained in effect somewhat longer and to a greater degree in the older northern and central parts of the Moscow state (in the Zvenigorod and Kolomna counties), but here, too, the *pomestye* was gradually dislodging the *votchina*. Only in the extreme north did the *pomestye* fail to predominate as a result of the continued existence of considerable tracts of black lands. In all other localities the feudal *votchina* was yielding to the new, dominant type of landownership, the *pomestye*.

This latter circumstance—the temporary nature of the *pomestye* type of landholding—led some students (Rozhkov) to emphasize the conditional nature, the impermanence of this type of ownership and its transient character as the main features of the legal system of *pomestye* property, a circumstance that was fraught with important economic consequences, and explained the character of the economic decline which was apparent in the Moscow state during the second half of the sixteenth century.

In reality the "temporariness" of the *pomestye* landownership could not exert so profound and decisive an economic influence. As to the perpetuity or "temporariness" of its ownership, in practice the *pomestye* differed little from the *votchina*, and in time, through the right of inheritance, it became indistinguishable from the *votchina*. But the large *votchina* of the princes and the boyars was a synonym of feudal disintegration, of the independence of the individual lands and principalities, and of the supremacy of local and territorial ties. Closed within itself, the isolated economy of the feudal *votchina* stood in distinct contrast to the incipient social division of labor and the development of commodity exchange, which, as the progressive economic phenomena of that era, were apparent even by the sixteenth century. To the extent of the increase in exchange and commodity movement, and of the

* *Pyatina:* a fifth part. The ancient province of Novgorod was divided into *pyatinas*, into five sections.—ED.

fusion of the various provinces, lands, and principalities into one whole, the feudal *votchina* as an economic form of organization was forced to yield to the self-operated *pomestye* allied to the central power and dependent upon it. But in its method of production and in its social relationships, the *pomestye* retained the feudal character of the old *votchina.*

THE DECLINE OF RURAL ECONOMY IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY The transition from the old form of the large, feudal, self-contained economy to the new form of serf-operated *pomestye,* rooted in the drive for a maximum exploitation of labor, could not fail to produce a rather protracted general decline in the whole national economy of the Moscow state of the sixteenth century. The rapid rate at which Moscow Rus was settled prior to the fifteenth century inevitably led to a considerable expansion and a high level of rural economy. By this time arable land had largely succeeded in crowding out the forest; plowed or living fields predominated, with a permanent three-field system. Of the total area of arable land, this type of plowing was being applied to more than 95 per cent by the middle of the sixteenth century, whereas the "visited" kind of plowland and *perelozhnaya* type occupied only 4 to 5 per cent.

But, beginning with the second half of the sixteenth century, a sharp decline in rural economy became evident. By the 1580's the plowed arable fields in the central province declined to 31.6 per cent, and in the Novgorod province to a mere 6.9 per cent, whereas the "visited" type of arable land and the *perelozhnaya* increased proportionally.[22] This process was accompanied by the outright depopulation of the village. In the estimates of Oganovsky, deduced from data submitted by Rozhkov, the number of "wastelands," that is, abandoned villages, in the central provinces amounted only to 5.2 per cent during the first half of the sixteenth century, but by the end of the century it grew to 49.2 per cent. For the same periods in Novgorod the figures were 3.2 and 82.2 per cent. These bulk figures embrace about 108,000 settled localities and present a picture of the far-reaching depopulation of the village during the second half of the sixteenth century.

At the same time the landholdings and agricultural productivity of the peasant household were sharply curtailed. A majority of students of this period (Rozhkov and Gotye),[23] assert that the arable land of the peasant attached to one household dropped during the sixteenth century in the central parts of the Moscow state between two and two and one-half times. And this reduction of the peasant's arable land, especially on a per capita basis, continued throughout the seventeenth century, despite the increase in the size of the family within the household which occurred during the period.

What, then, was the cause of this decline in rural economy that came in

the wake of so great and so progressive a revolution as was the fall of the feudal *votchina* and the emergence of the *pomestye*?

The main reason for the decline caused by the transition from large-scale *votchina* economy to *pomestye* should be sought, it seems to us, in that struggle for labor power that was inevitably intensified with the fall of the feudal *votchina*. In its social basis and in the methods of its production, the feudal *pomestye* differed in no way from the *votchina*. At its basis lay the same exploitation of the bonded direct producer who was furnished with the lands and a variety of obligations. Aside from his land, the *pomeshchik* needed labor power as the primary requisite, and the possibility of providing that labor power with the means of production. In this respect, however, the *pomeshchik* had fewer resources at his disposal than did the large-scale feudal *votchina* owner.

We have seen how even the large *votchinas* of the princes and the boyars during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries encountered the problem of labor power. The number of *kholops* and servants, who during the eleventh and twelfth centuries constituted the main elements in the labor force throughout the "hamlets" of the princes and boyars, began to decline by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and were no longer capable of satisfying the needs of production of a large-scale economy with its newly added branches. The *votchina* based its economic system on the exploitation of the labor of the smerds, *zakups, izorniks,* and other types of economically dependent population, and on their obligations in kind or in labor. Through their immunities the *votchinas* had so many privileges for attaching the peasants to their land that they could easily gather to themselves large labor forces and bring about the gradual enslavement of the peasants.

When the development of money circulation, the market and commodity turnover ended the isolation of the economy, the need for a change in the position of its labor power became paramount. The average *pomestye* economy could not be operated by *kholop* labor, little of which was owned, to say nothing of its poor quality, particularly under conditions of a money economy. But neither was it able to base its production entirely on economically dependent peasant labor, since the economic strength of the *pomestye* economy was often not very great.

The necessary organization of labor of the *pomestye* could be achieved only by extraeconomic compulsion, "binding" the labor power to the *pomestye* by enslaving the toilers not only through indebtedness, loans, duration, and so forth, but also through the recognition of the *pomeshchik's* "right" to the compulsory labor of the peasant. What the feudal *votchina* owner was able to accomplish proved to be beyond the powers of the small *pomestye* owner without the legal sanction of the state. Naturally the small owner strove to

exert the full measure of his economic strength in order to attach the labor of the peasants living on his lands by the same methods of economic pressure in use among the larger *votchina* owners: by loans, assistance, economic obligations, and other ways. But the landowners were frequently endowed with *pomestyes* that were wastelands, either abandoned or uncultivated, devoid of any settled peasantry. To organize their economy they needed not only manpower but also the means of household equipment. Therefore new *pomeshchiks* frequently obtained from the government either tax privileges or outright grants for "building a mansion." [24]

The means for economic subjugation of the peasantry at the disposal of the *pomestye* could not compare with those of the old feudal *votchina.* Moreover, general conditions of economic and political life in the sixteenth century—the *oprichina,* the growth of taxes, and the development of a money economy—ruined the peasant economy because it was a natural form that had continued to be basic to the whole economy. The ruin of the peasantry and the increase of economic pressure on the part of the *pomeshchik* forced the peasants to reduce their arable land and to seek salvation in running away from the enslaved to the "free" lands. As a result, a decline not only of the *pomestye* itself, but also of the peasant economy connected with it, became evident during the sixteenth century.

In the course of the second half of the sixteenth century, the average arable land of the peasant household was reduced by half, and even more.[25] The peasant yards on both the state lands and the *pomestye* were becoming depopulated. Increasing economic pressure from the *pomeshchik* evoked attempts on the part of the peasantry to seek an escape; hence the growth of various peasant "withdrawals" and the flight of indebted peasants from their homesteads. There began at the same time, however, a stronger tendency on the part of the *pomeshchik* toward a "regularization" in his own favor of that right of repudiation by permitting it only once a year (on Yuryev day) and, finally, by the complete binding of the peasants and the restoration of the full personal power of the *pomeshchik* over the peasant as it existed under the *votchina.*

WAYS OF BINDING THE PEASANTS Naturally, in its historical development the bondage of the peasantry had traveled the long road of the persistent drives of the owners toward the real enslavement of the peasantry on the one hand, and, on the other, the obstinate struggle of the latter against total serfdom. We saw this road of bondage and the struggle against it during the feudal period of the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries this struggle became greatly intensified. Rooted in the struggle against enslavement were not only all the peasant movements of

the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, but also less conspicuously the prolonged and daily struggle that took the form of the peasants' "flight" from serfdom. For the peasants the right of withdrawal and removal from a *pomeshchik* was one of special significance, although in fact, in event of indebtedness and economic dependency, it was difficult to assert this right.

For this reason the *pomeshchiks* were striving with particular vigor to abolish this right of removal. As long as the peasantry had the opportunity to withdraw from its obligation and escape from the land of the owners, it was not yet entirely bound to the land of the *pomeshchik*. Since the fifteenth century, as a matter of practice, however, among the peasants who usually moved freely between one owner and another, there began to emerge a group of "old-resident" peasants, "aged peasants," who occupied the same land over a period of several decades and in practice made no use of their right of transfer.[26] Indeed, as compared with the fixed economic ties established between the *votchina* and the old residents, the departure of the latter was quite dangerous to the *pomeshchik*. Therefore the prohibition of the transfer of old residents on the basis of mere duration was encountered quite early. By the second half of the sixteenth century, the old residents were beginning to lose the right to leave.[27]

Thereafter the restriction of the right to leave began to be extended to the "newly contracted," that is, no longer on the basis of duration but in view of economic considerations and on the basis of the indebtedness of these newly contracted peasants to the landowner.

Naturally the restriction of the freedom of transfer, especially in view of intensified exploitation, began to arouse the opposition of the peasants. The flight of peasants became more frequent, this time both among the old residents, the peasants "from time immemorial," as well as among those newly contracted, in most cases for reasons of their unpaid debts to the landowner. Indebtedness to the landowner and the monastery was the formal basis that evoked the restriction of transfer. Assistance or a loan "in silver" and in seed, "in grain and money," predominated in the relations between the peasants and the owners in the sixteenth and even in the seventeenth centuries. Without these loans a majority of peasants were evidently unable to establish the "peasant enterprise" and to acquire "the various rural implements," that is, to set up a household with the necessary inventory. But apparently even in the case of the more self-supporting peasants who could manage without a loan, the owners endeavored to apply the extension of a loan as a method of enslavement. In the course of his attempt to withdraw, the peasant was compelled to prove that he "had no assistance from him [the *pomeshchik*] whatsoever." How prevalent, in fact, were loans in seeds, that is, the most indispensable economic material, is indicated by the record of

the *votchina* book of the Cyril-Beloozero monastery, according to which it appears that of all the peasants who rented land from the monastery about 70 per cent did not have their own seeds for planting and made use of seeds granted as a loan by the monastery.[28]

The above-described forms of the serf *pomestye* of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries represent in their economic respect a later historical stage in the development of the economic system of feudalism of the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, but under circumstances characterized by the collapse of the political independence and economic isolation of the self-contained economy of the feudal *votchina.* Fundamentally the serf *pomestye* used the same method of production as the feudal *votchina,* but under conditions of a more advanced phase in the productive forces of agriculture, marked by the development of exchange and of the market, the necessity to raise the productivity of labor, and the transition to more stable and technically intensive forms of economy (the three-field system), superseding the erstwhile extensive forms of tillage (the migratory system). This evolution of the productive forces finally undermined the economic isolation and static nature of the feudal manor, and resulted in the emergence of the *pomestye* economy based on the same method of production but more progressive in character.

LEGISLATION In the course of the sixteenth century, as we have seen, the economic life of the nation witnessed the gradual emergence of conditions tending to strengthen the bonds between the peasant and the *pomestye* economy. Even before legislation had recorded these evolving relationships, they had already come into existence and found widespread application.

The legal restrictions made on the freedom of transfer during the sixteenth century reflected the embittered class struggle that raged around that issue. These restrictions were therefore introduced and extended gradually, and were frequently of a temporary nature, by way of compromise. Thus the *Pskov Judiciary Charter* had already fixed one legal date for withdrawal, "Philips's Feast Day" (Nov. 14) for the fifteenth century. This date was further legalized by various subsequent charters. Furthermore the Codes of 1497 and 1550 dwelt in great detail on the problem of the peasantry. They once more confirmed the right of withdrawal, but at the same time imposed a limitation upon this departure by setting a single period during the year: "And the peasants shall withdraw from the volost from hamlet to hamlet one term in the year"—during the week before and after Yuryev Day.*

In general, free transfer and removal were still quite common almost until the end of the sixteenth century. From material found in the Volokolamsk monastery it appears that the withdrawal of the peasants at Yuryev Day with

* April 23.—ED.

a payment of *pozhiloy* (rent) and the extinction of their debts was a mass phenomenon. Regarding the *kholops,* the law of 1555 also established the right of departure for the *kholop* upon the payment of his debt. But gradually this freedom of departure of the debtor, the *kholop,* and peasant became still further restricted by legislation. In 1580 a decree on "the forbidden days" was issued, establishing the right of legal search for "runaway" peasants. But the "code of Fyodor Ivanovich," which has come down to us, evidently "abolished altogether the class of free servants" in the Moscow state (Karamzin). Furthermore, the law of 1597 on the kabals (bonds) of servitude ordained (concerning those who had served more than a half year): "Upon those free *kholops, kabals* of servitude shall be imposed and their petitions shall not be heeded."

The legal act that established the formal binding of the peasants has not come down to us, but we do have the law of 1597 on the five-year prescriptive right of search for runaway peasants, ordering all *pomeshchiks* and *votchinniks* to return all those runaway peasants who had settled on their land after having abandoned other estates in course of the last five years preceding the decree, that is, not before 1592; the peasants, even the runaways, who had settled earlier, were not returned to their former landowners. On this basis some old historians (Tatishchev, Karamzin, and Kostomarov) assumed that 1592 was the date of that decree which had formally abolished Yuryev Day and effected the final binding of the peasant.

At present we may consider as proven and generally accepted the opinion that in fact no legislative act which established the binding of the peasants and the abolition of the rules of the Codes referring to the right of departure on Yuryev Day ever existed. This right of removal on Yuryev Day had died of its own accord by the end of the sixteenth century. The decree of 1597 thus merely established the five-year prescriptive right of search by owners for runaway peasants who had left their owners by illegal "flight" without arranging for their withdrawal.

Did, however, the instability in the position and organization of labor on the owners' estate, a problem the attempted solution of which led to the binding of the peasant, come to an end? Evidently, over a period of nearly a century, no appreciable stability was ever achieved in this respect. As the matter stood, not only were the peasants themselves occasionally interested in the freedom of relocation of labor power. If the peasants on their own initiative frequently abandoned some owners and transferred to others, the owners of necessity took an active part in such a transfer. This participation ordinarily took the form of the "export" of peasants, that is, the luring of peasants by some owners away from the lands of other owners, sometimes legally, "with a withdrawal," sometimes "without refusal and without tax,"

and even by outright violence—by abduction. According to the "Cadastre of Tver County," as calculated by Lappo, out of 333 instances of peasant transfers, 188 cases were of the type in which they were "exported," that is, lured away or forcibly resettled by landowners who wanted to settle their lands.[29] Naturally the removal of peasants by "force" and in violation of the decrees about legal dates could be performed only by the larger and more powerful feudal lords, who were in this way depriving their less powerful colleagues of their labor power. A great seignior like the boyar Romanov used purely piratic methods of removing peasants from other landowners in the seventeenth century. Complaints on the part of peasants that have been preserved in our historical monuments testify:

> They come . . . his men and peasants numbering about forty or fifty or more, into our settlements by day and by night, beat and plunder us, your *kholops*, they dishonor our wives and daughters and ask for money, clothes, and for us, your *kholops*, and carry off by force the peasants and the serfs of the monasteries.[30]

Another factor delaying the possibility of effective attachment of the peasants to the land of their owners were those unfavorable economic and political conditions characteristic of the sixteenth century, which frequently forced not only the peasants but the owners themselves to abandon their estates. The Time of Troubles burned and ruined a mass of villages, hamlets, and estates, and scattered the peasants through new lands, which in turn offered an opportunity to other owners and monasteries to attach new peasants to their land. In time of famine peasants frequently quit the land of the poorer landowners who were unable to come to their help, and went to the more powerful nobles from whom it was difficult to retrieve them. And although the receiver and seizer of outside peasants was liable to legal punishment, the economic interest in solving the most pressing problem of the seignioral economy, the problem of labor power, was so great that achievement of this goal was worth risking a drawn-out legal action that always ended, not in favor of the just, but in favor of the wealthy.

Therefore, even after the laws of 1597, the question of bondage and of the freedom of departure for the peasants as well as the *kholops* arose repeatedly. In 1601–1603, in connection with the terrible three-year famine, Boris Godunov restricted the rules of the "forbidden years" and granted release to *kholops* who had left their masters because of the famine regardless of the will of their lords, while the still uncanceled transfers of the peasants were temporarily solved in practice: "That peasant shall live with him who fed him during the hungry years." In 1607–1608 the rules limiting the *kabal* registration into the *kholop* status were confirmed, and only in 1609 was the law of 1597 reinstated.

THE CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE REVOLT OF THE PEASANTS IN THE FIFTEENTH TO SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

The intensified enslavement of the peasantry during the second half of the seventeenth century, the impoverishment of the populace and the peasant household by war, especially the prolonged and unsuccessful Livonian War of Ivan IV, the terrible famines of the early seventeenth century and, finally, the bitter struggle for power among the various groups of boyars and nobles, culminating in foreign invasions by the Swedes and Poles—all this intensified and sharpened the class struggle of the peasantry against the serf holders. Beginning with the crop failures of 1601–1603, when entire villages died of starvation and of eating grass and birch bark, the *pomeshchik* refused to feed their domestics and *kholops,* driving them from their estates. The starving population flocked to the cities, moved toward the Don and the Ukraine, began to gather into detachments and attack the granaries of the *pomeshchiks* and merchants. In 1603 one of such detachments under the leadership of Kosolap almost reached the gates of Moscow and a large detachment of regular troops was required to overpower it, after which the participants of the revolt suffered brutal repression.

The thrust of the Poles into the Moscow state, which began in 1604, their capture of Moscow, and the subsequent struggle against the Polish invasion during 1607–1612 impoverished the peasantry still further. The population, in the words of the chronicler, "threw itself from fear and horror into the woods and swamps." In Moscow itself disturbances among the minor urban people and the new immigrant population began. While the most tense struggle for power among the various groups of the large boyar and noble class during the reign of Vasily Shuysky (1606–1610) was raging, a revolt broke out and swept through a considerable part of the Moscow state. In the southern counties near the Ukraine, in 1606, the *kholops* who had found refuge there, the peasants, and a part of the Cossacks and the petty service people rose in rebellion; in the Nizhny-Novgorod region the Mordvinians, who were joined by the Russian peasants, staged an uprising; revolt spread through several districts of the Tver, Pskov, and Novgorod regions. A rebellion of unusual scale and force broke out in the southern near-Ukrainian counties, where Bolotnikov assumed leadership of the revolt. In his "excellent charters" Bolotnikov called upon the peasants and *kholops* to rise against the *pomeshchik,* promising to bestow upon the peasant the land of their lords. Therefore, when Bolotnikov and his detachment reached Moscow, after capturing a number of towns and fortresses, masses of the peasantry and *kholops* from private estates came out to join him. The uprising thus assumed the social character of a peasant war against the feudal lords and the *pomeshchiks.* Bolotnikov was, however, subsequently

joined by several military companies of nobles who were discontented with the boyar aristocracy and its representative, the Tsar Shuysky. This weakened the homogeneous peasant character of the movement. Although Bolotnikov did succeed in reaching Moscow proper, his movement, elemental and unorganized in character, ended in the rout of the rebels. For a time the echoes of this revolt could still be heard through the borderlands of the state in the continuing uprisings among the Mordvinians and the Cheremis (Mari) (1608).

A new invasion by the Poles during 1607–1612 and the capture of Moscow drew the mass of the population into the war against the invaders. The popular victory over the Poles resulted in the liberation of Moscow. Even afterward, however, power remained in the hands of the *pomestye* class. The intensification of serf oppression during the second half of the seventeenth century provoked a new outbreak of peasant movements against the serf holders. The flight of peasants from their *pomeshchiks* once again increased. It was particularly severe during the seventeenth century along the Don River, where some free lands had still remained, unappropriated by the boyars, the nobles, or the Church. About that time, however, an intensified seizure of land was begun in these parts by the *pomeshchiks* and boyars, chiefly in the more populated and grain-producing areas of the upper Don. The Cossack "have nots" and the recently arrived runaway peasants again faced the threat of enslavement to the *pomeshchiks*.

Against this background the Don region became the center of a new peasant movement, led by Stepan Razin. After the first raids staged by Razin's Cossack detachments along the Volga, the Don, the Urals, and the Caspian Sea (1667–1668), and after some unsuccessful attempts to escape the persecutions of Moscow by flight to Persia, Razin's movement after 1670 assumed the character of a peasant war against the boyar class and the *pomeshchiks*. The troops of Razin were joined by masses of the peasantry from the estates, and also by Bashkirs, Kalmyks, Chuvashes, Mordvinians, and Tatars. The uprising swept through the whole Volga region, the area beyond the river from Astrakhan to Simbirsk, and up to the Oka. But like Bolotnikov's movement during the early seventeenth century, Razin's uprising, after a struggle of nearly three years, was crushed by troops of the Tsar. As the largest movement of peasants against serfdom in the Moscow state during the seventeenth century, at times assuming the character of a peasant war and "a revolution of the bonded peasants," the uprising led by Razin revealed a number of features common to movements of this type, such as the absence of class consciousness and organization, and the dissipation of its forces, as a result of which it was suppressed by government troops. The uprising could not have succeeded since the peasantry was at that time

without a leader—there was as yet no working class under whose leadership alone is the victory of the people against their oppressors possible.

DEVELOPMENT OF SERFDOM IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY During the latter sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the various forms of compulsory peasant serf labor, against which the centuries-old bitter struggle of the peasantry with the landowners manifested itself, were finally and legally entrenched in "the law of serfdom." This centuries-long struggle of the peasantry against its enslavement, the peasant revolts, and the systematic flights from serfdom ended during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in a final victory for the serf-owning *pomeshchik,* who took to himself the "legal right" to the labor and person of the peasant.

Obviously we must not attach any exclusive or decisive significance to the legal aspect of this "formulation" of the *pomeshchik's* feudal "right" to the labor of the peasant, and regard it as the beginning of serfdom, as frequently happened in our old Russian historiography. In the development of our serf economy and in the actual advance of serf relationships over a period of centuries, this was merely a minor "episode." We saw that the institution of serfdom began to take shape back in Kiev Rus during the period of the *Russkaya Pravda,* when the *pomeshchiks* began to "enslave the peasants" (Lenin). It developed and spread in the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Yet, the formal legalization of the serf system and the abolition of the right to leave the landlord, which took place at the end of the sixteenth century, was an event of great significance. The "extraeconomic" element of compulsion was thus no longer a "custom" or a "fact," but also an irrevocable "law" and the "right" of the landowner.

The social-economic revolution in the second half of the sixteenth century, which was expressed in the abolition of the feudal *votchina* and in the ascendancy of the nobleman's bonded *pomestye,* could not fail to manifest itself in an economic and political crisis that encompassed the entire life of the Moscow state over a long period of time, in the form of the "great disorder" of the Time of Troubles. It was a stormy era fraught with profound social economic crises, an era that witnessed the completion of the preceding, centuries-old history of the "expropriation" of the agricultural producer, no longer in the form of preemption by the princes and the boyars, but through the seizure of the peasant lands by the landowning *pomeshchik,* and the ruin and enslavement of the small agricultural producer by the *pomestye* nobility.

Only by the middle of the seventeenth century, in the decree of the Sobor Code of 1649 on the abolition of "fixed years" in the search for runaway peasants, was the unlimited right of the serf owners to the runaway peasants

enacted. Although the right to return runaway and kidnaped serf peasants even after the enactment of this decree often remained merely a paper right, nevertheless the fact that this new confirmation of the rights of serfdom coincided with new prosperity on the serf estate was highly significant. Up to the second and third decades of the seventeenth century, the results of the great disorder were still everywhere in evidence, in the central regions particularly. Thus, for example, on the estates of the Troitsky monastery the arable land, which at the end of the sixteenth century constituted 37.3 per cent, fell to 1.8 per cent by 1614–1616, and in 1621–1640 rose again, but only to 22.7 per cent; in general, throughout the outlying counties, the used plowland constituted 22 to 49 per cent of all arable land. But by the 1640's the decline engendered by the struggle and unrest may be considered as fully overcome. In the 1640's the plowed portion of the arable land in fourteen counties had already increased to 42.8 per cent, and in the 1670's and 1680's, to 62.2 per cent.

The decisive political triumph which the *pomestye* nobility scored in the election of the Romanovs brought to the forefront new ruling groups, not a titled or feudal-princely aristocracy but a less distinguished *pomestye* gentry—the Romanovs themselves, the Morozovs, Saltykovs, and others. Under the new conditions within the *pomestye* estate, only the labor power attached to it could be used in the performance of its economic task—the greatest possible enhancement of the seignioral demesne and the seignioral arable lands. The fulfillment of this task was the function of the *barshchina,* the labor of the serf on the *pomeshchik's* land, which did indeed begin to develop with great intensity by the middle of the seventeenth century throughout the main districts of the Moscow state.

Toward the middle of the seventeenth century, the seignioral arable land usually began to occupy about one-half, and in some places as much as 90 per cent of all arable land. But since, even earlier, the most acute problem facing the *pomestye* estate was that of manpower, the expanded manorial plowland characteristic of the seventeenth century made this problem more acute. Hence, along with the intensified bondage of the peasants and the expansion of *barshchina,* the further loss of land by the populace continued, as did also the growth of such categories of the population as *bobyli* (backyard) people and *delovyie* (business) people, whose numbers swelled during the seventeenth century, filling the ranks of the labor force required by the serf-operated estate.

Geographically the *barshchina* system of serfdom during this period embraced chiefly the central provinces of the state. On the other hand the more northerly "coastal" regions (the Perm northeast and Siberia), as well as the

steppes of the south, had not yet felt the heavy hand of the serf owner, still retained their black lands, and served as an area for free colonization.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, the unifying influence of the market, no longer local but nationwide, began to be felt. It drew all regions of the land into the circulation of commodities. The *pomestye* estate received a new stimulus for increasing its production, raising its income, and intensifying exploitation. The chief means therefore was the *barshchina* system, which became intensified not only in the realm of agricultural labor but also overflowed into the field of industry.

The metal-processing, salt-mining, potash, and other industries belonging to Morozov, the Tsar Aleksis Mikhailovich, Odoyevsky, the monasteries, and so forth, indicate that serf industry had by the middle of the seventeenth century achieved considerable successes. Although this development of serf industry naturally belongs to the later period of eighteenth century serfdom (and will be examined by us in its respective chapters), it may nevertheless be noted that the origin of "serf manufactures" had its roots in the Moscow period of the seventeenth century—a fact long forgotten or not recognized by some historians.

Notes

1. Gerbershtein, *Zapiski o moskovitskikh dyelakh* (1526) (Notes on Muscovite Affairs [1526]—Russian translation 1866), pp. 98-99.
2. Some historians believe that the *perelog* (fallow land) of the cadastres should not be confused with the fallow system of cultivation: that *perelog* referred to land that had once been plowed but was not under cultivation at the time of registration. If we consider that even where the system of fallow cultivation is followed, as at the present time, a tract of land may be abandoned for a period of 15 to 25 years, it would seem that even the fact that a tract of fallow land remained unused for a period of 25 years before being entered on the records of the cadastres does not disprove the existence of a fallow system of cultivation, as far as one may conceive of any kind of "system" for that period. Cf. Blagoveshchenskii, *Chetvertnoye pravo* (The Right to Quarter Holdings) (1899), p. 2; Stashevskii, *Moskovskii uyezd* (The Moscow County) (1907), p. 28; Kulisher, *Istoriya narodnogo khozyaistva* (History of the National Economy (1925), Vol. II, p. 31.
3. On the same subject see Rozhkov, *Selskoye khozyaistvo Moskovskoi Rusi XVI v.* (Rural Economy of Moscow Rus in the Sixteenth Century) (1899), pp. 59-128; Miklashevskii, *K istorii khozyaistvennogo byta Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (On the History of the Economic Life of the Moscow State) (1894), pp. 20-47; Gotye, *Zamoskovnyi krai v XVII v.* (The Trans-Moscow Region in the Seventeenth Century) (1906).
4. Rozhkov, *Selskoye khozyaistvo Moskovskoi Rusi XVI v.* (Rural Economy of Moscow Rus in the Sixteenth Century), p. 61.
5. Fletcher, *O gosudarstve russkom* (On the Russian State) (1905 ed.), pp. 6-9.
6. Zelenin, *Russkaya sokha, yeyo istoriya i vidy* (The Russian Sokha, Its History and Its Varieties) (1908), pp. 119-126.

7. *Svodnyi tekst krestyanskikh poryadnykh XVI v.* (Collected Texts of Peasant Regulations of the Sixteenth Century) (1910), p. 15.
8. See, for example, the *Knigi posevnye, uzhinnye i umolotnye* (Seeding, Harvesting, and Threshing Books) of the B. I. Morozov estates, publ. by Zabelin, in *Vremennik moskovskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh* (Record of the Moscow Society of Russian History and Antiquities) (1850), Bk. VII: the yield of rye on these model estates during 1657–1670 fluctuated between 2.5 to 1 and 4.5 to 1, wheat, 2 to 3 and between 3 and 4 times the amount seeded.
9. Dyakonov, *Ocherki obshchestvennogo i gosudarstvennogo stroya drevnyei Rusi* (Essays on the Social and Political Order of Ancient Rus), 3rd ed. (1910), p. 381.
10. Dyakonov, *Ocherki iz istorii selskogo naseleniya v Moskovskom gosudarstve* (Essays on the History of the Rural Population in the Moscow State—Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries) (1898), p. 306.
11. See *Svodnyi tekst krestyanskikh poryadnykh XVI v.* (1910).
12. *Novgorodskiye pistsovyye knigi* (Novgorod Cadastres), Vols. III-V; *Pistsovyye knigi Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Cadastres of the Moscow State), Vol. I; *Moskovskii, Kostromskii, and Dmitrovskii uyezdy* (Moscow, Kostroma, and Dmitrov Counties), Vol. II, *Tverskoy uyezd* (Tver County), and others.
13. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, p. 140.
14. Gotye, *Zamoskovnyi krai v XVII v.* (The Trans-Moscow Region in the Seventeenth Century) (1906), p. 515.
15. *Pistsovyye knigi Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Cadastres of the Moscow State), *Dmitrovskii uyezdy* (Dmitrov County), pp. 756-770.
16. Sokolovskii, *Ekonomicheskii byt zemlyedelcheskogo naseleniya i kolonizatsiya yugo-vostochnykh stepei* (The Economic Life of the Agrarian Population and the Colonization of the Southeastern Steppes) (1878), p. 40.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 5 ff.
18. By an ukase issued in 1628 Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich announced the sale of "empty lands" to boyars, to ministry employees, to service as well as nonservice personnel, and to "powerful merchants" "at three *cheti* per ruble" (or 1.5 *dessyatin* as to the ruble), in order that they might turn "from waste into life." *Ukaznaya kniga pomestnogo prikaza* (Legislation Book of the Department for Estates) (Storozhev), p. 82. The interesting part of this ukase is the principle of near "classlessness" governing the sale of these lands.
19. The ukase of Feb. 26, 1627 prohibited the alienation of palace lands, but the ukase was violated, and 2,795 homesteads were distributed anew during the reign of Fyodor. Under Sophia and in the early years of Peter I, enormous grants were handed out to favorites and courtiers—to the Saltykovs, Apraksins, Naryshkins, and others. The eighteenth century fell heir to this policy.
20. Kulisher, *Istoriya narodnogo khozyaistvo* (History of the National Economy), Vol. II, p. 54.
21. Rozhdestvenskii, *Sluzhiloye zemlyevladeniye v moskovskom gosudarstve XVI v.* (Military Service Landownership in the Moscow State During the Sixteenth Century) (1898), pp. 111-120.
22. Oganovskii, *Zakonomernost' agrarnoi evolyutsii* (The Pattern of Agrarian Evolution), Vol. II, p. 116.
23. Rozhkov, *Selskoye khozyaistvo Moskovskoi Rusi XVI v.* (The Rural Economy of Moscow Rus in the Sixteenth Century), p. 146.
24. Rozhdestvenskii, *Sluzhiloye zemlyevladeniye v moskovskom gosudarstve XVI v.*, p. 284.
25. Rozhkov, *Selskoye khozyaistvo Moskovskoi Rusi XVI v.*, pp. 146-149.
26. Dyakonov, *Ocherki obshchestvennogo i gosudarstvennogo stroya drevnyei Rusi*, p. 19.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
28. Klyuchevskii, *Opyty i issledovaniya* (Experiments and Research), p. 264.
29. Lappo, "Tverskoi uyezd v XVI v. Yego naseleniye i vidy zemelnogo vladeniya" (The Tversk Uyezd in the Sixteenth Century. Its Population and Types of Land Tenure), in *Chteniya obshchestva istorii i drevnostei* (Readings of the Society of History and Antiquities) (1894), Vol. IV, pp. 44-48.
30. Stashevskii, *K istorii kolonizatsii yuga* (On the History of the Colonization of the South) (1913), p. 4.

(XI)

Town and Industry in the Moscow State of the Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries

THE MOSCOW TOWN AS AN INDUSTRIAL CENTER We have said previously that in Russia's national economy the town did not attain the developed and specifically industrial form it attained in western Europe. In our country the towns did not assume the function of local industrial centers with a strong guild organization among the tradesmen and with a developed local trade turnover within a small area of gravitation between the industrial town and the village, as was the case in western Europe.

Nevertheless, in the era of the Moscow state of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, particularly with the unification of the previously scattered feudal principalities into one national entity, and with the expansion in social division of labor and exchange within national frontiers, the significance and role of the town increased as a result of the character of the military-political and economic development of the Moscow state during the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. The Moscow towns were predominantly, in importance and in number, either industrial and commercial centers (throughout the center and north of the country) or military strongpoints (in the south and southeast). Of leading economic significance were, of course, the towns of the first group, since they were economically based on a growing social division of labor on a wide, often national, scale. But even the new towns of the "military lines" guarding the southern frontier, as the frontier shifted further to the south, gradually lost their exclusively military character (connected partly with agriculture) and changed into local commercial and industrial centers. Naturally, under the still prevailing "self-sufficient" natural economy of the rural population of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, we should not overestimate the extent of the probable division of labor between the town and the village of that time. Without mentioning the large, privately owned or monastery estates, the small peasant household satisfied almost all its requirements in clothing, shelter, and household utensils by its own domestic production. Therefore the industrial branches of the town population were limited to a small output necessary for the town population itself, for its productive as well as unproductive groups.

The urban nonindustrial population, according to the record of the cadastres, consisted of various groups of heterogeneous social positions and professions: first of all were the military and service people, and then such persons as coachmen, clowns, apothecaries, bloodletters, midwives, and so forth. A student of the towns of Moscow Rus of the sixteenth century, on the basis of the cadastres, counted as many as 210 urban "artisan" professions, although some of them, as the few just mentioned, did not, of course, belong to the category of industrial crafts.[1] The chief artisan group comprised producers of foodstuffs: bakers, fish men, cake bakers, brewers, distillers, and so forth. In individual towns this group of artisans constituted between one-fifth and one-half of the total number of artisans (in Pskov, 30 per cent; in Tula, 32.4 per cent; in Kazan, 41 per cent; in Sviyazhsk, 43 per cent).

Another large group of urban artisans were the producers of clothing: fullers, linen drapers, tanners, bootmakers, tailors, *sarafan* makers, furriers, coatmakers, hatters, hosiery makers, and so forth. In most towns this group constituted between one-fourth and one-third of all artisans. But here, too, the crafts apparently did not yet include the processing of the primary material (flax and wool) since spinning and weaving were still, as ever, chiefly activities of the rural economy rather than that of the urban crafts, which concerned themselves only with the fashioning of articles from these materials.

Following these, in the classification of Chichulin, is a group of artisans engaged in the production of household articles of prime necessity, and another group employed in the preparation of various articles less widely consumed. Prominent in this group were the artisans concerned with the processing of metal, involving on the one hand military supplies (saddlers, swordmakers, armor makers, axmakers, arrow makers), and on the other household articles (panmakers, locksmiths, tinsmiths, and needle makers), and, finally, articles of luxury. The second group was the most closely connected with rural economy, inasmuch as metal articles and household utensils were rarely produced in the village itself, being largely procured through the town.

The significance of crafts in the economic life of the town in the Moscow state of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries is revealed by the numerical strength of the artisan population: Moscow had 2,367 artisans in 1638, Kolomna, 159 (22 per cent of the urban population); Mozhaisk, 224 (40 per cent); Serpukhov, 331; Kazan, 318, and Novgorod, about 2,000.

Hence urban industry showed considerable progress during the sixteenth century, but in the whole national economy the village generally depended less on the industry of the town than the town depended on the village. Agriculture was not only the foundation of all national economic life, but even

among the urban residents and the artisans was often an occupation of no lesser importance than their own trade. The towns were still frequently agricultural in character, and the town industrial population had not yet become identifiable as a distinct social class, but belonged to the general taxable urban class. Yet the Moscow town of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries had none the less already lost that feudal-manorial appearance it bore during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, and was becoming more and more a center of trade and industry.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE TOWN POPULATION The main nucleus of the commercial and industrial urban population was the "tradespeople," the petty burghers who were most completely identified with town industry and commerce. They, too, however, often had their own agriculture, leased land and meadows, had their own fish ponds, and so forth. On the other hand the service and military people, the second most prominent stratum of urban population, almost always engaged in trade and handicraft while maintaining their own agriculture. In addition, in some towns, especially in the south where the population comprised a strong military element and few elements of typically urban settlers, the military people owned the bulk of commercial enterprises and craft establishments. But in other towns as well they not only engaged in trade and practiced some craft but, judging by the size of the tax and excise collected from them, owned larger enterprises than the tradespeople proper. Furthermore the peasants were not merely customers, consumers of the products sold in the town market. The more well-to-do groups among them engaged in handicraft and in trade alongside the other groups of the urban industrial population.

The town in Moscow Rus, unlike the medieval town of western Europe, did not become the organizational center of the future urban industrial class. In this respect the town of the Moscow period differed little from the town of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, although its relative economic importance had become immeasurably greater. The urban industrial population long remained of a mixed social character.

The formal individualization of the urban populace began to be revealed through its tax dealings with the state as the lower taxpaying class, including within its ranks the less substantial artisans, traders, peasants, working people, and minor service people, without any sharp class cleavage among them.

In general the urban population bore more traces of social grouping than of productive grouping in accordance with their position in a trade. As named in the cadastres and other records of that time, there were pawnshop keepers, janitors, *zakhrebetniki* (porters), *podsosedniki*, and others, whose

position was determined chiefly by their relation to the *tyaglo* (land assessment), whether they were within or without the urban taxable class. At the same time the commercial and industrial settlements were acquiring stores and enterprises not belonging to the taxpaying tradespeople but to service people, soldiers, and even to the Church. And, conversely, the taxpaying townspeople, the traders and artisans, were "mortgaging" themselves to the boyars, the landowners, and monasteries, and under their protection and privileges pursued the same trades, but without bearing the burden of taxation.

TOWN HANDICRAFTS True, some attempts were made as early as the seventeenth century (the Sobor Code of 1648) to segregate the urban industrial population into a taxsharing and nonrural group, that is, inhabitants of the cities who engage in trades and perform their respective obligations. The instructions were "to return to the household" all urban settlements belonging to private owners and to forbid personal mortgaging. Nevertheless, the economic organization of the seignioral economy, with its own large body of manorial artisans, was so strong that the sphere of influence of urban industry remained rather limited for a long time.

Therefore, during the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries we can still detect no signs of the economic organization of the urban tradespeople as an industrial class. During these centuries when craft guild organizations flourished in western Europe, they made no progress whatsoever in Moscow. The western European patterns into which the entire artisan class was organized (syndics, masters, journeymen, and apprentices), as well as the regulation of craft production (the strict rules governing the character and quality of the artisan goods produced, and others), were in the Moscow state either absent altogether or existed in the nature of customary practices rather than organized forms of industrial production (apprenticeship). No strict segregation of the various craft occupations, like the compulsory guild membership of western Europe, existed. The same person could be a shoemaker, a woodworker, and a farmer. The division and differentiation of labor within the trade were also considerably less defined, although they occasionally existed in connection with the manufacture of an article requiring comparatively high skill (icon painting). The artisan not only made his wares to order from the materials of his customer, but also produced a portion of them for the market and for direct sale, this being why the majority of craftsmen owned stores in town. These unique features of the position and development of handicrafts in the Moscow state; namely, the freedom to engage in any trade and the absence of guild regulation and exclusiveness, were

characteristic not only of this period but remained in effect during the later development of industry, and continued to be of great significance.

In their economic position and social influence the urban craftsmen of Moscow during the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries were far from being a typical influential town bourgeoisie such as the western European guild crafts. They were the lower urban class, the city poor, living, according to the report of foreign observers, in chimney-less huts on the edge of town. Their earnings were so meager that, even in a comparatively skilled trade like the silversmith's, the finished articles were sold almost at the cost of the metal. The tailors, bootmakers, coachmen, and sawyers were the least self-supporting of the artisans, paying a duty of less than one ruble a year; somewhat less poor were the furriers, curriers, and silversmiths, whose property in some rare instances was valued at several thousand rubles.[2] There also were frequent examples of artisans who lacked their "own livelihood" and sought "for alms."

We have very little data for ascertaining the level of technique and the implements of production used in the urban handicrafts of this period. But the very character of the above-listed crafts—the bakers, confectioners, brewers, tailors, bootmakers, and others—suggests a primitive technique and the use of simple types of working tools. According to the evidence of Krizhanich, there were no saws used in the carpenter's trade in Rus since boards were hewed out of logs by ax.[3] Primitive looms were set in motion by human power. In the more complex metal-processing trade and in the foundries, small hand bellows were used.[4] Metal was prepared in the state, monastery, and manorial enterprises in small hand-operated smelting furnaces, in "bloomery furnaces" by the raw-air-blowing method; here, too, simple tools were in use: hand hammers, tongs, and bellows.[5]

Some aspects of the urban crafts, although their level was primitive on the whole, were distinctly on a much higher plane. This was primarily true of the manufacture of luxury articles and precious metal goods, crafts that were frequently practiced by foreign masters especially invited from abroad. In Moscow in the middle of the seventeenth century, there were so many of these foreign masters that they formed a separate suburban settlement; among them were master silversmiths and goldsmiths, watchmakers, painters, saddlers, lacemakers, apothecaries, tailors, and others. These were of a type more closely related to the guild crafts of western Europe.

VILLAGE HANDICRAFTS The town crafts alone did not exhaust the variety of industrial activity that came to be typical of the national economy of that age. More important than the urban trades were the numer-

ous handicrafts practiced in the village. We have already indicated that the large estate or monastery, with its complex economic order, had to attain a rather high degree of specialization in a number of technical phases of their requirements. The daily needs of both the manor and the monastery required carpenters, smiths, stonemasons, bootmakers, weavers, tailors, and bakers, and, for the monasteries and the churches in particular, icon painters, engravers, goldbeaters, and many others. Part of the work was performed by the same peasant serfs who resided on the manor or monastery lands, in contribution of their share of the required labor. But a substantial portion was performed for special money wages and by special persons as their "free handicraft." The monasteries in particular were evidently compelled to resort frequently to this type of "free" hired artisan. Accounting books in existence today from a number of monasteries present a picture of the great variety of craft specialties of the hired artisans employed on a monastery economy.[6] Of course the artisan hired by the monastery worked on order of the latter, using the materials and frequently the tools of the monastery.

Still more important were the rural handicrafts serving the needs of the small peasant household. The absence of close industrial and exchange circulation between the town and the village stimulated a substantial development of peasant crafts. The slow development of urban trades, on the other hand, was afterward responsible for a new trend in village handicraft—for turning it into petty commodity or *kustar* production, working not only for the satisfaction of the relatively narrow consumption needs of the village market but also for the broader urban market.

In this manner, within the confines of the serf economy, the basic forms of industrial processing of materials arose not so much for the purpose of satisfying their own needs but of working for the market. The peasant economy began to dispose on the market a portion of the products of its own "household production" which formerly served exclusively the needs of personal consumption. In order to satisfy their need for money, the peasants attempted to develop all manner of occupations in the processing of local raw material for sale through jobbers in the market. In this way the peasant *kustar* industry and village handicrafts arose. The market also received through the landowner a number of products of peasant output delivered to the seignioral household in the form of *obrok* in kind (linen, wool cloth, flax tow, and wool). Furthermore the manor itself, possessing its own reserves of agricultural raw material and the unpaid serf labor of demesne peasants and domestics, began to engage in the processing of agricultural materials for its own consumption, while surpluses that might accumulate were disposed of on the market.

THE EMERGENCE OF LARGE-SCALE INDUSTRY Town and village handicrafts together did not exhaust all the industrial requirements of all branches of economy of that period. Some trades that required the use of mass labor both for reasons of technique and economy, and worked for the market, did not fit within the framework of artisan production or the economy of the manor. The most important of these branches were the salt-boiling, mining, potash, metallurgical, and several other industries. These activities came to be organized into relatively large enterprises of a special character (that is, not connected with the manorial economy), frequently involving the use of "free" labor, especially foreign skilled labor.

The iron-ore and salt trade, as we have seen above, were the oldest branches—which during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had already achieved a status of large industries—working for the market. These trades were organized on privately owned estates or on monastery grounds. Some monasteries, along with their fisheries, encouraged the development of salt boiling not only for their own needs but also for sale. During the sixteenth century this branch of industry had already produced distinct salt industrialists who were operating large salt enterprises.

The most prominent salt industrialists, forebears of the future big commercial-industrial bourgeoisie, were the well known Stroganovs, the owners of numerous large salt factories on the Ustyug, along the Kama, in Perm, and in the Urals, and who rose from among the Solvychegodsk peasants. The organizational form of the Stroganov enterprises was again the family estate:

> villages bought by their grandfathers, fathers, and themselves in inhabited as well as depopulated volosts . . . and in those villages the hayfields near the big stoves and islands by the sown fields . . . and various privileges in accordance with the royal charters by legal right, by purchase, given in mortgage and by all rights of serfdom.

The main field of production of the Stroganov enterprises was the salt industry. Its development involved the acquisition of vast estates, special factories, and villages with peasants, while a great many types of persons were employed on terms of *kabal, obrok,* or hire.[7] In addition to extracting salt, the Stroganovs engaged in the production of potash, in buying up bristles, and in the bristles trade. About ten thousand free workers and some five thousand serfs were employed on the enterprises of the Stroganovs.

The Stroganovs were the most typical representatives of the merchants and industrialists of that time, who emerged from the rich peasants. The same type of large-scale enterprising industrial activity could also be found among the upper manorial boyar class. A no less colorful figure and typical

representative of the manorial industry was the "great boyar" Morozov, with his vast estates and renowned *budnye maidany* (potash business). Morozov's potash was exported abroad where it enjoyed great fame. Seventeen such potash enterprises, producing about one hundred barrels of potash each, represented for that time a very large industrial output, intended partly for export. Industrial relations within this industry were founded on the manorial system, that is, the forced labor of the peasants who lived on the Morozov lands. The merciless exploitation of the peasants, coupled with a great many governmental privileges in the sale and export of potash, enabled the boyar Morozov to obtain a large profit from his business. The income of Morozov from the sale of potash attained, according to the most modest calculations, a profit of 24,000 rubles (400,000 prewar rubles) each year. Aside from his potash plants, Morozov operated iron foundries in the village of Pavlovsk, leather factories, and trade in Russia leather, large-scale linen production, distilleries, brick yards, flour mills, fisheries, stores, and many other enterprises. In addition Morozov conducted a domestic and export trade in grain on a large scale, with a turnover of about 200,000 prewar rubles. If we add to this the 80,000 rubles (approximately 1,400,000 prewar rubles) invested in *kabal* debts, and the fact that Morozov owned estates in seventeen counties numbering a total of three hundred hamlets and villages with tens of thousands of serfs and bonded persons who brought in large amounts of *obrok* in money, taxes in kind, service obligations, and unpaid labor, the personality of this super-great new type of estate owner—the boyar, farmer, merchant, industrialist, and money lender—appears extremely striking.[8]

Industrial enterprises were also operated by other representatives of the manorial nobility—by the Miloslavskys, Trubetskoys, Odoyevskys, and the Tsar Aleksis Mikhailovich himself.[9] We may thus see in them the first phase of those large serf-operated manufacturing industries which during the later manufacturing period of our industrial development attained great prominence.

Finally, still in the course of the sixteenth century, but to a greater degree during the seventeenth century, we come upon another form of industry—the state "factories" connected predominantly with mining, military, construction, money-minting, and other types of production. Necessitating substantially larger means and a skilled type of labor, these branches arose largely in the form of "royal" (state) enterprises, and involved the importation of foreign master workmen. The mining of iron ore near Tula, as well as iron and copper ore in the Urals, resulted between 1632 and 1677 in the construction of iron and copper plants in those areas under the direction of foreign masters for the manufacture of arms and various other articles, for the casting of cannon, and so forth. Here, for the first time, in 1632 the

Dutch merchant André Vinius organized the industrial processing of iron ore and built the first ironworks, no longer connected in any way with the serf-operated estate, in the form of a rather large *melnishna* (water-driven) manufacturing unit. In 1639 the company of Vinius was joined by the foreign merchants P. Marcelis and F. Akem who built a number of additional ironworks. In 1634 the Swede Koet built a glass factory near Moscow. In all these manufacturing enterprises the labor supply appeared through the special assignment of peasants, who were obliged to serve the plant in the mining of ore, in the delivery of fuel, as well as in working directly at the plants. But apparently here, as in the other large-scale industrial enterprises, a considerable amount of freely hired labor of various "volunteer persons" was employed.

THE FORMATION OF LARGE FORTUNES What relative weight and what social significance did this "big industry"[10] have in its above-described feudal manorial phase?

Undoubtedly within the general economic structure of Moscow Rus during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the large-scale manorial industry was not significant either in quantity or in proportion to total industry. The overwhelming part of the country's needs was satisfied by the household method of processing materials within the manor itself and for its own needs, or by peasant household industry and peasant handicraft. Only a few branches of industry, such as iron ore, armament, and some others, by the very nature of the conditions under which their production took place, were conducted on a larger scale in state enterprises or within the manors of great wealthy boyars.

But state and boyar industry were historically very significant as a source which, even during that early period, began to yield large money incomes and fortunes for the wealthy, feudal estate owners.

The enormous landed properties with their many thousands of dependent and bonded peasants living thereon, the *obroks* in money and in kind paid them, the obligatory labors performed for them—all these precapitalist forms of rent were, as we may now consider confirmed by documentary evidence,[11] one of the basic sources of large money fortunes during the period of serfdom. It is sufficient to indicate that Tsar Ivan IV was considered, in the opinion of foreigners, one of the richest feudal lords in Europe. Nor was the wealth of Boris Godunov any smaller. The estates of Tsar Aleksis Mikhailovich brought him an annual income of 200,000 rubles. The incomes of Morozov attained at least several millions in current money. No less, if not larger, were the incomes derived by the Stroganovs and many other noblemen from their estates. The very profitable royal-trade monopolies applied to

foreign trade relied exclusively on the manorial economy of the Tsar himself and his entourage, and had their material base in the agricultural production of these manors. These large commercial profits were distributed, of course, among a very small handful of great feudal lords and wealthy "guests."

How great was the concentration of feudal fortunes in the hands of certain groups among the larger manorial lords is suggested by the following figures for the potash trade alone. Of all the potash delivered to the treasury during 1662–1663 (it was a state monopoly at that time), amounting to 213,000 poods valued at 698,000 rubles, ten boyars and noblemen delivered 145,000 poods valued at 522,000 rubles, that is, almost 75 per cent by value. Among these one enterprise of the Morozovs delivered 359,000 rubles' worth of potash, or more than 50 per cent of total deliveries, whereas all other twenty-seven nontitled contractors together accounted for 175,000 rubles. To be sure, the potash trade, as a large-scale factory production, was unusually concentrated. The delivery of other monopolized goods, Russia leather, for example, which was produced largely by *kustar* methods, does not reveal the same extreme concentration.[12]

In any event what we have said leaves no doubt that, first, by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries large fortunes had already accumulated among the feudal manorial aristocracy and the upper strata of the wealthy merchants, concentrated in the hands of a tiny number of families, and, secondly, that the original source of these riches was, during the period of serfdom, income from estates and from precapitalist land rents.[13]

RESULTS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT We may now summarize the results of the development of industry in the period just examined as ensuing from the process of the social division of labor, the development of a money economy, and the formation of the market.

In the Moscow state of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, in the realm of industry, we note already the first faint traces of all those industrial forms into which in the course of its later development industry would be ultimately cast. The largest share of the national economy belonged to the industrial processing of foodstuffs within the household itself, whether on the estate, in the monastery, or within the peasant home, not for sale but rather for personal consumption and without breaking away from agricultural occupations. But gradually the peasant household engaging in the processing of agricultural products began to produce not only for the satisfaction of the needs of the household itself but for the market as well. In this manner emerged the *kustar* industry and the village handicrafts. Alongside, too, emerged the small industrial processing of materials in town for sale on the market; namely, the town handicrafts. Last of all emerged the "large-scale"

manorial industry operated by the labor of both the *barshchina* and *obrok* peasants at the seignioral factories and enterprises. This type also included the "royal" (state) factories, similarly employing obligatory peasant labor and, on rare occasions, the freely hired labor of various persons.

On the whole, industry in Moscow Rus of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries developed to a point where it becomes possible to observe its geographic distribution.[14] The mining and metallurgical industries were concentrated in two districts: near the Tula iron-ore deposits, where the Demidovsky, Protvinsky, Istinsky, Ugodsky, and other factories were erected, and around Moscow, where a number of iron and armament plants were built by Marcelius, Izbranyat, Soroksansky, Obushkovsky, and others. Somewhat more scattered in comparison was another important branch of industry—the salt industry. Its largest center was the Kama area, where large factories existed in Cherdyn, Solikamsk, Novoye Usolye, Chusovaya, and elsewhere. There were also large salt plants in the north, in Solvychegodsk, Yarensk, Soligalich; along the upper Volga, at Rostov-Yaroslavsk, Kinechma, Velikaya Sol (near Kostroma), and Balakhna; in the Novgorod region, at Staraya Russa and Soltsy; and in the Moscow area, at Kirzhach and Pereyaslavl. The center of potash production was in the Nizhny Novgorod counties and in the hamlets of Arzamas, Sergach, Lyskovo, and Murashkino, as well as in Smolensk, and along the banks of the Kama. The most important centers for leather manufacture were Great Novgorod, Pskov, Nizhny Novgorod, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Suzdal, and Murom. Rope manufacturing was located in Vologda, linen making, in Tver, Moscow, Yaroslavl, and Vologda; glass, near Moscow; soapmaking, in Vologda, Nizhny Novgorod, and Moscow. These chief industrial centers well nigh exhaust the geography of Moscow's "large-scale" industry during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Notes

1. Chechulin, *Goroda Moskovskogo gosudarstva v XVI v.* (The Cities of the Moscow State in the Sixteenth Century) (1889), p. 339.
2. Dovnar-Zapolskii, *Torgovlya i promyshlennost' Moskvy XVI i XVII vv.* (Trade and Industry in Moscow in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries) (1910), p. 84.
3. Krizhanich, *Russkoye gosudarstvo v polovine XVII v.* (The Russian State in the Middle of the Seventeenth Century) (1859 ed.), pp. 52-53.
4. Kielburger, *Kratkoye izvestiye o russkoi torgovlye* (Short Report on Russian Trade —1674) (1915), pp. 163-169.
5. Kashin, "Krestyanskaya zhelezodelatelnaya promyshlennost' " (The Peasant Iron Working Industry) in *Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh formatsii* (Problems in the History of Precapitalist Structures) (1934), No. 4, p. 34.

6. Kulisher, *Istoriya narodnogo khozyaistva* (History of the National Economy), Vol. II, pp. 211-223.
7. The founder of the Stroganov line is considered to be the peasant Spiridon Stroganov of Solvychegodsk (died in 1395). It was not until the fifth or sixth generation that some of the descendants of Spiridon received the title of "guests"; during the seventh generation they received the title of "worthy people"; and during the tenth generation (in the eighteenth century), the title of barons, intermarrying among the princes Volkonskii, the Naryshkins, Baryatinskiis, Streshnevs, and other nobility. At the same time the descendants of another branch of the Stroganov family lived as ordinary peasants in Solvychegodsk County. Vvedenskii, *Torgovyi dom XVI-XVII vv.* (The Commercial House of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries) (1924).
8. *Khozyaistvo krupnogo feodala-krepostnika XVII v.* (The Estate of the Large Serf Owner of the Seventeenth Century), Pt. I; "Khozyaistvo boyarina Morozova" (The Estate of the Nobleman Morozov), Akademiya nauk (1933); also Zabelin, "Bolshoi boyarin v svoyom votchinnom khozyaistve" (The Great Nobleman on His Patrimonial Estate) in *Vestnik Yevropy* (European Herald) (1871), Bks. I-II.
9. Zaozerskii, *Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich v svoyom khozyaistve* (Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich on His Estate) (Moscow, 1917).
10. It should be noted that the phrase "large-scale patrimonial industry," as applied above as well as hereafter, is used in its conventional historical sense of that period as opposed to small-scale handicrafts and petty peasant household industry.
11. See the above-mentioned publication of the Academy of Sciences, *Khozyaistvo krupnogo feodala-krepostnika XVII v.*
12. *Ibid.*, Tables 9-10.
13. Lyashchenko, *Ocherki agrarnoi evolyutsii Rossii* (Essays in the Agrarian Evolution of Russia) (1908), Chap. 2.
14. See Map 5, facing p. 214.

(XII)

Commerce and Market in the Moscow State

THE GROWTH OF COMMODITY CIRCULATION We have previously indicated that Lenin, in analyzing the economic causes of the merger of the formerly separate feudal principalities and lands in the Moscow state by the seventeenth century, emphasizes that this merger

> was brought about by the increasing exchange between the provinces, the gradual growth in circulation of goods, and the concentration of the small local markets into one all-Russian market. Inasmuch as the leaders and the masters of this process were capitalist merchants, the creation of these national ties was tantamount to the creation of bourgeois ties.[1]

But, of course, the process of merging the former separate provinces into the Moscow state, as well as the formation of the "all-Russian market," proceeded at a slow pace and required more than one century for its consummation. It is sufficient to say that the founder of the Moscow princely dynasty, Daniel, left to his son Ivan Kalita (1328–1340) altogether a territory of about 1,240 square kilometers (that is, less than the later Moscow province). Ivan III (1462–1505) inherited a principality covering an area of 37,500 square kilometers. His grandson Ivan IV (1533–1584), fell heir to about 110,000 square kilometers, and by the end of his reign held 195,000, covering nearly all of the Russian lands that were wholly included within the boundaries of the Moscow state during the seventeenth century. By 1613 the territory of the Moscow state covered 402,000 square kilometers, and at the beginning of the reign of Peter I, 686,000 square kilometers.

This rapid tempo of merging the various provinces of the country and forming a single "all-Russian market" was engendered by the rapid growth of the production forces of the country, the social division of labor, the circulation of goods, and the cash exchange of goods.

The transfer of peasant obligations from payment in kind to payment in money, which was already under way during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, tended to stimulate the cash exchange of goods. In order to pay his obligations in money, the peasant himself had to sell his product in the market. Thus, as we have seen, during the early sixteenth century the "surplus product" rendered by the peasant in the form of obligatory labor to the

landowner constituted no less than one-fourth of his entire product; in the course of the century it rose to one-third and more. Upon the transfer to cash obligations, this part should have been in any event not less than between one-third and one-fourth of the entire peasant output. To be sure, his obligations in money were only a part of the peasant's total obligations, but on the other hand many household needs of the peasant also had to be satisfied through outside purchase, and that indeed required money, that is, the diversion of some of his own products even where they were insufficient for his own consumption.[2]

This portion of the peasant's output diverted to the market comprised a varied selection of products, depending on the conditions of local production and sale. They were chiefly, for example, flax in the Pskov and Novgorod provinces; grain, livestock and its products—leather, lard, and butter—in the more fertile southern localities; vegetables and other foodstuffs in the vicinity of towns and in the relatively large settlements.[3] Even an article of prime necessity and a leading product of agriculture such as grain, the peasants produced not only for their own needs but also for sale in distant markets.

With the precarious position and the low standard of living characteristic of the peasant household, such sales were at times involuntary and achieved at the expense of its own consumption. For this reason the peasants' sales of their own products on the market were comparatively quite large. In any event our foreign observers plainly indicate that the peasants of Moscow Rus in the sixteenth century lived in extreme poverty and subsisted on rye bread alone, while the more valuable products of their household were carried to the market (Daniel Printz). But indeed, despite that fact, the peasant's demand, especially for a number of articles of prime necessity (salt and metals), was in turn among the most significant for the market.

Selling by the peasant household was not always confined to the local market. Well-to-do peasants and peasant jobbers began to sell their produce, along with supplies bought up from fellow villagers, in comparatively remote markets. The limited capacity of near-by urban centers and the rise of large urban and commercial centers outside the fertile agricultural region led to the development of commercial sales of peasant produce through jobbers and wholesalers in far-off markets. Thus peasant grain was bought in Ryazan and carried by cart trains to Moscow, while the extreme southern counties shipped grain to Yaroslavl and Vologda. Jobbers' rafts laden with peasant grain were floated as far as the Ustyug and Kholmogor.

The large, serf-cultivated, privately owned estate or monastery sold its produce to the market on a still larger scale. According to the testimony of Gerberstein,[4] Moscow during the wintertime received daily about 700 to 800 cartloads of grain, fish, and other foodstuffs, and this grain was, fur-

thermore, brought from remote areas, as distant as 1,000 miles, partly for the food supply of the landowners residing in town and partly for sale. Estates like those of the boyar Morozov or Tsar Aleksis Mikhailovich sold a great variety of products on the market: grain, vegetables, livestock and its products (leather and lard), flax, hemp, and particularly potash products.

Moreover the monasteries were also substantial producers and suppliers of the market. They not only sold on the market the products of the peasant deliveries in kind but also specialized in some branches of activity devoted chiefly to producing for the market; namely, salt enterprises, fisheries, and the manufacture of crude linen, leather, footwear, and so forth. The monastery itself was also a large consumer of a great many commodities of both common consumption (fish, roe, salt, honey, clothing), and other and more costly articles of religious use (incense, wine, and wax).[5]

LOCAL TRADE The organization and economy of trade depended upon a great many conditions existing in each district and on the trend in the sale of its goods. "Small markets," that is, centers of local trade predominantly for agricultural produce and articles of prime necessity, existed not only in the towns but also in the hamlets, around monasteries, and near churches.

Here, too, the monasteries primarily organized and built these trading centers for the sale of their own output and the products of the peasant households. Some of the village and monastery "small markets" were in no way inferior to town markets in number of stores or volume of trade. At such centers the purchase of agricultural raw material was the major commercial turnover. Here came commercial people and artisans from the towns who sold the products of town handicrafts at the market and bought village produce for the town.

In this way emerged the peddler trade of the small professional tradesmen and artisans who "traveled away" through the villages and fairs with goods of all sorts. Fairs were usually timed with Church holidays, when both sellers and buyers came together from remote regions to do their shopping and obtain their supply of goods. The fairs usually offered for sale all major salable articles, produced in a given district by the peasant, landowner, and monastery households, or those required by them.

Precisely this type of small local trade serves as a particularly important gauge of the extent and depth of the evolution of commodity circulation and of a money economy. A mere list of goods offered for sale at such small markets, and recorded in the customs charters, bears evidence of the notable progress made by money economy not only in the large town but in the hamlets and villages as well. Here were sold and bought: salt, meat, cows,

lambs, geese, ducks, suckling pigs, grouse, eggs, fish, roe, onions, garlic, apples, poppy seeds, wheat, barley, salt, buckwheat, peas, oatmeal, hops, honey, flax, hemp, furs, sheepskins, footwear, coal, kindling wood, boards, battens, baskets, sleds, wheels, troughs, spades, millstones, bast, bark, matting, iron, and so forth.[6]

TRADE ROUTES AND CENTERS The leading center of trade, domestic as well as foreign, was Moscow. Here were brought together the products of agriculture from the south, of hunting, fishing, and animal trapping from the Siberian colonies and from the north, iron products from the Urals and Tula, and every possible variety of luxury articles and household utensils from abroad. Moscow stood in the center of the new trade routes that came to replace the old roads of Kiev and Novgorod Rus. The old route to the West and into Europe ran from Moscow by way of Tver, Torzhok, Novgorod, Narva. The contemporary western route, however, passed through Smolensk, Vitebsk, Riga. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the new and more popular route to the north ran by way of Vologda through Sukhona, Ustyug, Dvina to Archangel, a route opened by the English and serving as a strong stimulant to the development of Anglo-Russian trade. The river system through the Moskva and the Oka joined Moscow with the main water highway, the Volga, as far as Astrakhan, and through the Kama, by using small "overland hauls," with Siberia. The routes south led to Kiev and Chernigov which, to be sure, were no longer very important. Then followed a number of roads of "local" significance to Tula, Ryazan, Kaluga, Kostroma, and Vladimir.

Along these main routes were also situated the new trading centers of the Moscow state which served Moscow as collecting stations and as industrial and export commodity centers. Thus the important commercial and salt-works centers along the northern route were Ustyug Veliky, Solvychegodsk, and Totma. Vologda was a reloading point between the Dvina and the overland route, as well as a large distribution center throughout the north for goods traveling from the Dvina and from the Volga. Equally important along the Oka was Kolomna, the anteroom of Moscow, and along the Volga itself, Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Nizhny Novgorod, and Kazan. Astrakhan was the most distant point for commercial rendezvous between the Moscow merchant groups and those from Bokhara, Persia, Nogay, and other parts of the East, as well as a center of export for valuable oriental goods. Toward the Volga, along the Siberian water route, were scattered a number of large salt and iron-ore industrial centers: Solvychegodsk, Yarensk, Cherdyn, Perm, and, farther, Irbit and Yeniseysk—important centers of periodic fair-trade with the Siberian nationalities and with the Far East, including China. Along the

northwestern routes were located the old prominent commercial centers: Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, and Tver, and some minor centers: Staraya Russa, Torzhok, and Vyshny Volochek, rich in goods of their own, particularly flax, fur, and salt, and serving as points of transit and reloading centers for the movement of commerce along the western Dvina into Lithuania and the Baltic coast. These centers indeed no longer enjoyed their erstwhile importance and were not, in any event, expanding as vigorously as Moscow. Less important as trading points during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were the new military towns of the south, but even here cities like Tula, Ryazan, Kaluga, Serpukhov, and, afterward, Voronezh were gradually gaining more and more prominence.

On the whole, judging by the volume of the "fifth" tax collected from commerce, the first in volume of commercial turnover was Moscow, with about 450,000 rubles or almost one-third of the total turnover for the country; second place was held by Kazan with 140,000 rubles, or about 10 per cent, followed by Nizhny Novgorod, 50,000 rubles; Yaroslavl, 35,000 rubles; Pskov, and others.[7] There is little doubt, however, that the actual volume of trade was considerably larger than is indicated by the turnover from which the "fifth" tax was collected.

The character and organization of trade emerged more prominently in large commercial towns like Moscow, Pskov, Novgorod, Ryazan, Kolomna, Kholmogory, Archangel, and others. From foreigners' visits to these towns, Moscow in particular, we have a number of descriptions that make it possible to reproduce the setting and circumstances of large-scale urban trade in Moscow Rus. Outwardly all foreigners were amazed by the abundance of shops in Moscow and the other towns, and by the extensive development achieved in trade. According to the observations of Kielburger (1674), the number of shops in Moscow exceeded those of Amsterdam, but the shops were mostly small booths in which the merchant turned around with difficulty. An entire store usually covered an area of 4 to 5 *sazhen*,* but most of them consisted of "half stores," and "quarter stores." Some traders had as many as one and a half, two, or more stores in one or in several of the store rows.[8] Another traveler (Reitenfels, 1671–1673), in describing commerce in Moscow around the Kremlin and Kitay-gorod, emphasized the diversity of goods sold there, each commodity in a separate row: silk, fabrics, linen, silver, foreign wines, furs, bells, axes, leather, rugs, lard, harnesses, icons, grain, and others. In 1626 the commercial section of Moscow (Kitay-gorod) numbered 827 commercial enterprises of the permanent store type and 680 mobile commercial structures: tents, benches, and others.[9] Trade in the same commodity was usually concentrated in special "rows": wool, silk, sable, and iron

* One square sazhen equals 49 square feet.—ED.

rows; rows of this sort were counted by the dozens by foreign travelers. Between these rows operated a number of pack peddlers hawking fish, bread, and a variety of trinkets alongside local residents and visiting peasants who sold linen, clothing, and so forth. Trade in the other commercial centers was of the same general character.

Throughout these centers, not counting the large number of minor towns, small market places, hamlets, monasteries, and fairs, trade was conducted by Russian tradesmen of all grades as well as by foreign merchants who took up residence in all trading points of any importance. Commercial turnover during the seventeenth century encompassed not only the entire area of the country but also served to connect it with foreign lands. Naturally we must not overestimate the size or the vigor of this trade turnover, or the level of its organization. For lack of good overland communications and because of the freezing of rivers, trade moved very slowly; merchant capital often turned over but once a year, sometimes even less. Roads were not good thoroughfares because of swamps and woods, and were not safe against robbers. Weighing heavily on trade were the various commercial taxes, customs duties, transit dues, *tamga,* bridge taxes, *myt* and others. These duties were paid by both Russian and foreign merchants, becoming more burdensome for trade because, aside from the legal duties, customs officials and governors exacted bribes or else goods were plundered outright.

TOWN TRADE In the smaller towns trade consisted chiefly of local commodity transactions. The participants were tradespeople, artisans, small merchants, visiting peasants, and individual local residents. Not merely in volume but also in economic function, this trade was predominantly of the "handicraft" type. The smaller stores, the booths, and benches belonged to artisans and peasants who sold their own along with purchased wares and products. The town tailor, smith, potter, and carpenter had their own stores where they also traded in all types of goods entirely unrelated to their specialty. Thus the town gardener sold onions and garlic from his own garden, but in addition traded in salt, fish, and bread. At the stores maintained by the serfs of the boyars, monasteries, and the patriarchate, the peasants sold hay, grain, *lapti,* and here, too, trade in woodenware and in iron was conducted.[10] Purely "handicraft" trade here came to merge imperceptibly with small middleman trade and with the resale of goods bought from fellow villagers, but without growing into the professional trade of the merchant capitalist.

This prevailing character of trade in the Moscow state had repeatedly attracted the attention of foreign observers. Kielburger and Rhodes indicated the "petty" level of the trade in Russian towns, and the fact that trade was the

concern of all, peasants, service people, army men, clergy, and boyars alike. They were all engaged in trade, each with his respective "surplus." The peasant traders sometimes conducted extensive wholesale trade in purchased goods. This, for example, is the meaning of the above-mentioned reference of Chancellor to the shipment of rafts full of grain by peasant merchants from Ustyug to Vologda. It was at Ustyug, also, where mention was made of peasants who "traded in big goods," that is, conducted wholesale trade, and with "other people's means" at that, with borrowed capital, while they maintained their usual peasant establishment and paid tax (*tyaglo*) not as merchants but "on their plowed fields the same as the peasants." For reasons of its own revenue collection, the government persecuted this variety of untaxed trade by peasants. In the documents of the early seventeenth century, aside from the cultivating or agricultural, peasant, frequent mention is made of trading peasants, "who, besides their plowland, engage in trade." Such "trading peasants" were frequently encountered among monastery and patriarchate peasants, and on large private estates. These erstwhile field hands quite frequently became the later commercial townspeople, the merchants, and trading capitalists.

Side by side with the professional merchants and trading peasants, some military and service people, gunners, sharpshooters, clergymen—priests, deacons, sextons, and others—also maintained their own stores containing a variety of goods, ranging from icons to furs, fish, and meat. The less prevalent was professional merchant trade, the more successful was the others' trade in these commodities. Hence the southern frontier towns were the area where military people traded with particular success; in Tula, for example, they owned 30 per cent of all stores, while only 20 per cent of the stores belonged to urban tradespeople. A similar lack of advanced professional trade, and, in its stead, the trade of sharpshooters, gunners, and cossacks, was typical of all frontier towns—Kozelsk, Odoyevo, Likhvin, and Novosila. In the more remote and old commercial centers, like Pskov, Novgorod, and Kazan, trade was chiefly in the hands of professional merchants, but even here service people, clergy, and peasants engaged in various phases of trade.

THE RISE OF LARGE-SCALE TRADE More and more frequently during the sixteenth century, particularly in the larger towns, the stores of large merchants, who engaged not only in retail but also in wholesale trade, were encountered among the stores owned by peasants, artisans, and service people also dealing in furs, leather, and salt. In addition to their large overseas, Siberian, and northern trade transactions, the big merchants did not disdain to engage in petty trade in their own store rows, selling their miscellaneous goods.

A majority of the provincial merchant class belonged to the medium-scale merchants according to their capital outlay, and engaged chiefly in domestic trade. But even within the ranks of this ordinary merchant class, a conspicuous differentiation as to size of capital and turnover was proceeding apace. Among these urban merchant elements the cadastres and other documents of the time usually identified "better," "middling," and "poorer" types, depending on size of capital and volume of trade. Such representatives of the mercantile class as Frolka Rebrov, Yakim Patokin, and Fyodor Kozlov owned dozens of stores in a number of towns and in Moscow, had their own estates, traded in salt, furs, and grain, owned flour mills, distilleries, and salt works, operated leases and possessed a capital of several tens of thousands (hundreds of thousands in our money) of rubles. In the opinion of society, as reflected in the official terminology, these were the "better" people, the representatives of big mercantile capital.

Still higher, above this middle group of professional traders, ranked the upper wealthy merchant class, the "guests." The title of "guest" was a privileged designation granted in return for special services and to a very few people at that; in Moscow there were about thirty such persons. It was not, indeed, merely a matter of honorary title; fundamentally it reflected the volume of their commercial capital. The "guests" were representatives of big capital.

In former times in Kiev and Novgorod Rus, the "guest," as we know, was generally a professional merchant, for the most part a large entrepreneur. Gradually this upper stratum of wealthy Moscow merchants became grouped into three special corporations: the "guests," "guest hundred," and the "cloth hundred." The first category, in the description of Kielburger, comprised "royal commercial counselors and factors" of the tsar, a "covetous and pernicious fraternity" that "controlled trade throughout the state with unbridled power."[11] Primarily they handled the tsar's internal and foreign trade in monopolized goods and operated leases, but also engaged in trade independently. Among the merchants of the "guest" and "cloth" hundreds, independent commercial operations were the rule. They were, however, all representatives of big mercantile capital.

How great was the concentration of commercial capital may be illustrated by the following examples. The most outstanding "guest" was Nikitnikov, who traded a variety of goods, including wool cloth, salt, and fish, owned a fleet of ships that sailed as far as Astrakhan, was a competitor of the Stroganovs, and contemplated the purchase of their estate for 90,000 rubles (more than 1,000,000 in our money); his capital constituted one-fourth of the total capital of all other thirty "guests." Another "guest" from the "guest hundred," YA. Gruditsyn, owned more than forty villages, fisheries, salt works,

numerous stores, and so forth; he was the most substantial merchant of the entire "guest hundred" (158 men), and his capital constituted about one twenty-third of all capital held by the "guest hundred." On the whole, of the 158 merchants composing the "guest hundred," seven persons owned one-fourth of its total capital. Further, one of the largest "guests" was Voronin, a Moscow merchant who owned thirty stores selling wool cloth and various other goods, and simultaneously the owner of a large ironworks employing hired labor, a grain industrialist, shipowner, a lease operator, and an army contractor. In general, some "guests" owned a capital of between 20,000 and 100,000; that is, between 200,000 and 1,000,000 rubles in present-day money, and, in the words of Fletcher, some owned capital up to 300,000, that is, 3,000,000 rubles.[12]

And if such were the representatives of the merchant aristocracy of the capital city, close to the royal throne and the recipients of many benefits and privileges therefrom, a still more imposing picture of large-scale mercantile capital was indeed presented by the already-mentioned "distinguished people," the Stroganovs, the largest representatives of provincial merchantdom, who at first remained outside of the privileged organizations of the "guests." The commercial transactions of the Stroganovs were very large for that time. They traded not only throughout the Moscow state, from Perm and Archangel to Moscow, Nizhny, and Ryazan, but also in Siberia and abroad, whither they dispatched goods along with their own salesmen. Their transactions included the greatest variety of goods: salt and iron from their own works, grain shipped to the north, fish from their own fisheries, furs, sables, and arctic foxes procured from the Siberian people to whom they sold "German trinkets and bells," also wax, leather, and furs, which they sold abroad, and silk, wool cloth, and luxury articles, which they received from abroad. They also collected the *yasak* * for the tsar, operated leases, and fulfilled government procurement orders and contracts.[13]

It may be seen from the above that the trade of the guests was not confined to commercial operations exclusively. Their activity was considerably broader. Little wonder, then, that Kielburger calls them "royal commercial counselors," and "a covetous and pernicious fraternity" that controlled trade throughout the state.

Finally, the tsar himself also engaged in trade. A number of branches of domestic as well as foreign trade were monopolized for the benefit of the tsar and the royal treasury. According to the reports of Rhodes and Fletcher, the royal monopoly in the middle of the sixteenth century included the following lines of trade: grain, hemp, rhubarb, raw silk, potash, tar, and caviar. Occasionally the monopoly was extended to include other goods as well.

* Tribute paid in furs.—ED.

In addition to these "forbidden" goods, foreign goods in general coming into Moscow were brought before the royal "guests" or the tsar himself soon after their customs inspection and appraisal, the latter selected what they pleased, and only the remainder was released for sale. The special attention of the tsar and the "guests" was directed to precious stones and metals, diamonds, valuable "damasked" materials, and others. Taking these goods, in the words of Fletcher, from the foreign merchants at a cheap price or without paying, the tsar and the "guests" later sold them at higher prices. Even goods in which anyone was permitted to trade—fur skins, honey, wax, lard, and others—were frequently bought for royal commerce by special persons at arbitrarily fixed and low prices, and afterward resold at higher prices in the internal market and abroad. Furthermore the populace was sometimes prohibited from selling their goods even for the purpose of tax payment until the stocks of these goods held at the royal warehouses were sold.

The guides and executors of these operations were again the large merchants, the privileged "guests." Benefiting by and abusing their broad authority, they oppressed both the public and the ordinary merchants, provoking so much hatred that, in the expression of Kielburger, the people were ever ready to "break their neck."

To this should be added the fact that the merchants and some boyars frequently engaged in financial and moneylending operations. We have already mentioned that Morozov, a prominent estate owner, industrialist, and merchant, advanced large sums of his capital for *kabala* debts, for commercial operations, and so forth. In our documents we find reference to a number of instances of credit and moneylending operations concluded by the big merchants. Engaged in such activities, for example, was the moneylender and clothier Wepr, the large-scale creditor of Prince Ivan Borisovich, and the grain merchant and shipowner Leonty Dmitriyev, who bequeathed to his children notes for 15,000 to 17,000 rubles in our money.[14]

FOREIGN TRADE In its organizational aspect the foreign trade and commercial relations with foreigners of Moscow Rus during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had not reached the definitive forms evolved, as we have seen, by Novgorod. True, the foreigners—Dutchmen, Germans, Swedes, and Englishmen—did have their own courtyards and organizations in nearly every major commercial town. In Moscow they lived in the German suburb. Still, even at Moscow their position was not strictly or meticulously regulated. Competition between the Russian and foreign merchant elements frequently evoked a complaint on the part of the Russian merchant to the effect that the foreigners were "denuding the Russian land," coupled with petitions to forbid them to trade, and so forth. Such complaints

often achieved their aim, and the trade of the foreigners was encumbered with duties, persecuted, or altogether forbidden.

By means of a basic rule, which was afterward affirmed by the Novotorgovy Code of 1667, foreigners were forbidden to engage in direct retail trade with the population: "Any foreigners shall not sell any goods in retail . . . and they shall not visit the fairs or travel with their goods and money into any town or send any salesmen." Thus foreigners were not permitted to sell at retail or to trade outside the towns, at fairs, and in the villages in direct contact with the producer. All such intercourse could only be maintained through the Russian merchant. On the whole this measure was double-edged and disadvantageous from the standpoint of the volume of trade, but profitable for the Russian merchants. Likewise, the monopoly of royal commerce in many goods of both domestic and foreign trade movement, which enriched the royal treasury only, was unprofitable for the national economy, raising the price of imported goods and depressing the price of marketed goods.

Nevertheless foreign trade was gaining quite rapidly, primarily with the Germans, Swedes, and English. Rhodes and Kielburger carry interesting lists of goods imported and exported by Muscovy. During 1650–1655 were exported: 10,000 *lasty* (about 1,000,000 pood) of grain, furs valued at 98,000 rubles, leather valued at 371,000 rubles, about 500,000 arshin * of canvas and linen; and further, lard at 126,000 rubles, caviar, wax, and other products.[15] In the list of goods imported through Archangel during 1671 are included: diamonds, gold and silver articles, 28,000 reams of paper, 10,000 German hats, 837,000 pins and needles, gold coins, wine, ginger, pepper, herring, arms, muscatel, apothecary goods, wool cloth, and other goods.[16]

The economics of Muscovy's importation and exportation were founded to a considerable extent on the fabulously low prices of the marketed raw-material goods and the high prices at which they sold abroad, and, conversely, on the comparatively low original prices of the imported goods from abroad and the high prices fetched by them in Moscow. Thus great opportunities were offered for profit for the benefit of both the foreign and the Russian merchant at the expense of the producer and consumer.

Notes

1. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. I, p. 73.
2. This is told (in the sixteenth century) by Daniel Printz; see "Nachalo i vozvysheniye Moskovii" (The Beginning and the Rise of Muscovy) in *Chteniya obshchestva istorii i drevnostei* (Readings of Society of History and Antiquities) (1876).

* One arshin equals 2⅓ feet.—ED.

3. Thus, in one description of the sixteenth century, it is reported that the peasants near Pereyaslavl "carried to town for sale the fruits of their labors on the land and other exchange goods as well as of their livestock." Rozhkov, *Selskoye khozyaistvo Moskovskoi Rusi XVI v.* (The Rural Economy of Moscow Rus in the Sixteenth Century), p. 283; Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii v tsarstvovaniye Alekseya Mikhailovicha* (On Russia During the Reign of Aleksis Mikhailovich) (1906), p. 99.
4. Gerbershtein, *Zapiski o Moskovii* (Notes on Muscovy—1556) (Russian trans., 1866); cf. Seredonin, "Izvestiya anglichan o Rossii" (Reports on Russia by Englishmen) in *Chteniya obshchestva istorii i drevnostei* (Readings of the Society of History and Historiography) (1884), Vol. IV.
5. *A.A.E.*, Vol. I, Nos. 97, 258, 271, 322.
6. *Tamozhennyye gramoty* (Customs Documents), Belozerskaya, Vesyegonskaya, Suzdalskaya, and others, *A.A.E.*, Vol. I, Nos. 230, 263; Vol. II, No. 65, and others.
7. Stashevskii, "Pyatina 142 Goda" (The Fifth Tax During 142 Years) in *Zhurnal ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniya* (Journal of the Ministry of Public Education) (1912), Vols. IV-V, pp. 99 ff.
8. Kielburger, *Kratokoye izvestiye o russkoi torgovlye* (Short Report on Russian Trade), p. 88.
9. Dovnar-Zapolskii, *Torgovlya i promyshlennost' Moskvy XVI i XVII vv.* (Trade and Industry in Moscow of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries) (1910), p. 55.
10. See the numerous income and expense books of the monasteries, such as, for example, the large Kirillo-Belozerskii monastery, *A.A.E.*, Vol. II, No. 204.
11. Kielburger, *Kratokoye izvestiye o russkoi torgovlye*, p. 164.
12. Fletcher, *O gosudarstve russkom* (On the Russian State), p. 55.
13. Vvedenskii, *Torgovyi dom XVI-XVII vv.* (The Commercial House of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries), pp. 160-163.
14. Grekov, *Ocherki po istorii feodalizma v Rossii* (Essays in the History of Feudalism in Russia), p. 96.
15. B. Kurtz, *Sostoyaniye Rossii v 1650–1655 podoneseniyam Rodesa* (The Condition of Russia in 1650–1655 According to the Reports of Rodes) (Moscow Society of Russian History and Antiquities, 1914), pp. 166 ff.
16. Kielburger, *Kratokoye izvestiye o russkoi torgovlye*, pp. 123-133.

(XIII)

The Formation of the Multinational State and the Economic Absorption of the National Borderlands

UNTIL NOW we have described the internal economic order of the Moscow state alone during the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. However, to understand the economic development and the social-economic relationships of the Moscow state itself and, above all, the later economic and political development of the Russian state of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such an examination would be inadequate. By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, after having liquidated its feudal disunity, Moscow already extended considerably beyond its "national" frontiers of Great Russia proper and had become transformed into a "multinational" state. From that time onward the new forms of territorial annexations began to be more in the nature of an empire of colonial and national subjugation, and of the exploitation of conquered peoples. The Moscow state, having overcome its own feudal dissipation, became at the same time "a prison of peoples."

During that era two circumstances may be considered as decisive for the progress, nature, and direction of these territorial annexations and conquests of entire nationalities. First, the Moscow state inherited from the feudal period the most important event of its political and economic history—the Tatar yoke, which, as we have shown above, over a period of two and one half centuries (1236–1480) held in great strain and enslaved the entire political and economic life of the country.

Having overthrown this foreign rule in 1480, the Moscow state in turn, following the collapse of the Golden Horde, conquered the remnants of the former Mongol state, the Kazan and Astrakhan kingdoms and, later, the Kuchum kingdom in Siberia, incorporating them with its own possessions. With the collapse of the Golden Horde (1502), a great area was thrown open to comparatively easy conquest. In the southeast the frontiers of Moscow by the end of the sixteenth century reached the Terek River, that is, as far as Daghestan and the Caucasian foothills; in the east, beyond the Volga as far as the Yaik; in Siberia, to the Tobol and the Irtysh (1582); and only in the south, during the Moscow state period, there still existed states independent of Moscow and a constant source of disturbance on its frontiers—the

Crimean khanate and the Nogay Horde (the Azov coast area and the Kuban) —the last stronghold of the former Mongol empire. They prevented Moscow from carrying out the agricultural colonization of the southern steppes, held the central provinces in permanent fear of attack, and blocked their outlet to the Black and Azov seas. Regardless of the significance of the economic stakes involved, Moscow was unable to achieve any success in this direction until the seventeenth century.

Another important circumstance was Moscow's loss to Lithuania and Poland of her former western regions, not only the Ukrainian west Dnepr bank and White Russia but also parts of the old Russian lands (the Smolensk province and part of the east bank). The Moscow state exerted much effort to restore its old frontiers in the west, but without success. The unsuccessful Livonian war of Ivan IV (1558–1582), and the later unsuccessful Polish wars of the first Romanovs (the Polish war of 1632–1634, the second war of 1658–1667, and the Andrusovo peace of 1667) left all White Russia and the Ukrainian west bank under the rule of Poland down to the eighteenth century.

Hence, although Moscow did not at this point include within its political frontiers the former Ukrainian and White Russian lands or the tribes of the old Kiev state, with the expansion of its territory, in some of its parts at least, it already represented a multinational state.

THE NATIONALITIES OF THE OKA-VOLGA INTERRIVER AREA AND THE NORTHEAST Moscow's territorial acquisitions and the seizure of areas inhabited by other nationalities began directly after the unification of the formerly scattered Russian feudal principalities into the single Moscow state was accomplished.[1]

We have already seen that the original settlement of the upper Volga and the Oka-Volga interriver area by the Slavs (the Vyatichi) occurred by conquest and assimilation of the former aborigines of these provinces—the Muroms, Meshchery, Vesi, and, later (in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries), the Mordvinian and Cheremis tribes. With the conquest of the Ryazan principality and the Nizhny Novgorod lands, the Moscow state included within its frontiers a number of new national areas which were rapidly being encircled by Russian landowner and peasant colonization, and largely absorbed.

Existing in several different stages of development, economically and socially, these nationalities assimilated quite rapidly with the Russians. Thus the Cheremis (Mari), who lived along the Vyatka and the Volga prior to their subjugation by Moscow, clung to a seminomadic clan existence of hunters and trappers; hence, for example, their original payment of tribute

to Moscow in the products of their hunting. By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries they began, however, to adopt a settled mode of life and agriculture. The neighbors of the Cheremis to the south, the Chuvash (of controversial ethnological origin), were depicted in early Arab literature as a people engaged in animal trapping and agriculture; they retained agriculture as their major occupation after being annexed to Moscow during the sixteenth century. The Mordvinian tribes, living along the Sura and the Moksha, began somewhat earlier, within the twelfth century, to fall under the conquering and colonizing drive of the Russians. This drive culminated in the conquest of Mordva during the thirteenth century, at a time when the Mordvinians were already a fully settled agricultural people. In 1329 the land of the Mordvinians was conquered by the Tatars, thereupon became a part of the Kazan kingdom, and subsequently, after the conquest of Kazan (1552), became once more part of the Moscow state. Because of the early settlement of the region and the agricultural mode of life of the population, the region was among the first to witness early Russification, the introduction of Russian feudal institutions, and the formation of "royal Mordvinian estates." As a result Mordva began a struggle against Moscow at an early date, rising in revolt (1580), and taking part in the wars engendered by the Time of Troubles as well as in the later Pugachyov uprising.

The ethnic composition of the Moscow state was considerably enriched as a result of the conquest and destruction of Great Novgorod, followed by Moscow's inheritance of its vast possessions in the north, along the seacoast, across the Voloch, in the Urals, and beyond the mountains. Since the eleventh century Novgorod had annexed vast territories in the valley of the northern Dvina, beyond the Voloch, in the Pechora basin, beyond the Urals, along the Ob, and in Yugra, famous not only for their wealth in furs, "in sables, in ermine, in black martens, and the arctic fox," but well known even at that time for their rich mineral resources.

These districts of the Novgorod lands were inhabited by many small tribes: in the northeast, the Yem and Karelians; in the Voloch area, the Chuds; in the north, the Lapari (Saami); further to the northeast and beyond the Urals, the Komi-Permyaki and the Komi-Zyryane, the Voguly (Mansi), the Ostyaki (Khanty), and the Samoyeds (Nentsy). All these nationalities of that time lived for the most part in clans, following the seminomadic mode of life of hunters and trappers.

Novgorod since an early date had collected tribute from these nationalities in furs and in other products. Coming in quest of these riches from Novgorod were industrialists, boyars, merchants, river pirates, and common robbers, who bought (but more often plundered) valuable furs from the native people, established their own enterprises, built fortified towns, appropriated

land, and laid the foundations of a new colony. The Urals, renowned at that time as mountains of inaccessible height, "even unto heaven," were circumvented by these seacoast industrialists along the northern "Frigid" (Studeny) Sea up to the mouth of the Ob, or "overland" through the tributaries of the Pechora (the Izhma and Usa) and the tributaries of the Ob (the Sob and Sychva). They were enticed to Yugra by fabulous riches in furs, where *veveritsy* (squirrels) "fell from the sky" along with the rain and snow. In the course of the thirteenth century, the Novgorod people had come to consider Yugra and Obodrino as practically their own volosts.

In the wake of these Novgorod river pirates and "prospectors," if not together with them, also came the Moscow traders and industrialists. Their journey, however, was somewhat more arduous and long; it lay along the northern Dvina, the Ustyug-Vychegda, and the Perm region, and thence "overland" to the trans-Ural rivers. Another simpler and easier route (by way of the Kama, the Chusovaya, and the Vichera, and thence to the trans-Ural tributaries of the Ob, the rivers Tura, Tavda, and the Irtysh) was blocked by the Tatar kingdom of Kazan up to the middle of the sixteenth century.

A more intensified territorial expansion by Moscow to the east, to the Urals and beyond, began during the sixteenth century when, in consequence of its unification into a large Russian state, Moscow began to pursue an aggressive policy over the entire eastern front along the Volga River valley. The almost simultaneous fall of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556) gave Moscow the entire length of the extremely important commercial route along the Volga, and opened up new vistas of further military penetration toward the trans-Volga area and Bashkiria, as well as of economic and commercial penetration of the south and of Central Asia through Astrakhan, and of the north, the trans-Ural region and Siberia, through Kazan and the Kama.

THE SETTLEMENT OF THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST

The southern trend of the territorial expansion of the Moscow state differed from the eastern and northern drive in that it engulfed territories nearly uninhabited. On the other hand the southern steppes always lived under the shadow of attack by the southern nomad Mongols of the south. Remnants of the former steppe nomads, such as the Polovtsy, after being conquered by the Tatars in the thirteenth century, scattered and vanished completely. But the Tatars, after the collapse of the Golden Horde, entrenched themselves in the Crimea; another of these groups, the Nogaitsy, settled along the Azov shore and throughout the steppes of the North Caucasus. From that vantage point they dominated and menaced the whole southern steppe-land frontier

of Moscow. Hence settlement of the southern steppes proceeded at a slower pace, predominantly in the form of a military campaign. The free and unsettled lands of the south, aside from military necessity, held little allure both for the Moscow industrialists and the government itself, who were seeking not so much free and uninhabited land as industrial and commercial riches, as well as a population from which to exact tribute, or *yasak*.

The desire to secure its southern frontiers convinced the Moscow government that only the permanent settlement of the steppes with people "self-supporting and with families" might result in ultimate success. Hence the systematic settlement of the "wild field" during the time of Ivan III, and particularly under Ivan IV, became one of the most important economic endeavors of the state.[2] The hired military detachments of "Sevryuks," who were guarding the then southern frontier at Putivl, proved to be unsuitable for defense and still less for developing a system of agriculture. In lieu of them the government began systematically to send as permanent residents children of the boyars, cossacks, officials, and military people, who were simultaneously entrusted with the tasks of military defense and agricultural exploitation of the region. The government endowed them with *pomestye* in lieu of salaries. In this manner emerged a new *pomestye* system of agriculture in the south, while the military settlement was reinforced with a developed agriculture. The latter, naturally, required military protection, which led to the erection of new "lines," that is, a chain of fortifications, strongpoints, and towns for frontier guard service. Under Ivan IV there already existed a long chain of about fifteen towns from Alatyr and Temnikov as far as Rylsk and Putivl.[3] Subsequently the line of towns moved further south, and new fortress towns were erected: Voronezh (1586), Kursk (an ancient town converted into a fortress in 1586), Kromy, and afterward, in the reign of Fyodor Ivanovich, Belgorod (1593), Oskol (1593), Valuyki (1600), and a number of others. The latter, the Belgorod line, was one of the most important lines securing the settlement of the steppes carried out by the Moscow state during the seventeenth century.[4]

The agricultural character of Moscow's settlement of the southern steppes facilitated the complete and early economic assimilation of these new districts within Moscow Rus.

During the seventeenth century southern agriculture had already begun to supply Moscow from such relatively distant borderlands as Voronezh, Kursk, and Oskol. These towns began more and more to change from fortified military centers into local trading centers, and Moscow proceeded to furnish these borderlands with the products of its industry. Their economic bonds to the center became more reinforced. By the eighteenth century

these districts were almost thoroughly assimilated by the national economic life of the Russian state as a whole.

A similar sequence of penetration and adaptation of the land occurred in the direction of the southeast, in the lower Volga and Don areas. The settlement of the Volga west bank took place somewhat later, but here, too, by the middle of the sixteenth century, a number of major outposts like Saratov (1584–1589), Samara (1586), and several others were established, securing the routes of Moscow's commercial penetration along the entire Volga to the Caspian Sea and further, to the Caucasus.

Along with its penetration of the southern steppes, Moscow began to increase its military pressure toward the southeast as well—along the roads to the Don, toward the Azov Sea. The Venetian ambassador Contarini, while describing the Don region as thoroughly devastated (1477), reported vast riches of fish in that river, which enticed the Muscovites.[5] Still more alluring were the Don steppes and the crowds of runaway peasants and freemen who took refuge there from the oppression of serfdom and the boyars. However, it appears from journeys along the Don by Metropolitan Pimen (1388) and by the Moscow envoys Golokhvastov (1499) and Alekseyev (1514), that the Don province during the sixteenth century was still a wasteland, still completely untamed either economically or politically. The lower reaches of the Don, with its Turkish fortress of Azov, remained the obstacle which prevented Moscow from moving farther toward the southern sea. But the commercial capital of Moscow, as indicated by Gerberstein, did succeed, as early as the sixteenth century, in moving its goods along the Don to the Azov, and even into the Black Sea and the Crimea.[6]

THE TATARS OF THE GOLDEN HORDE After the disintegration of the empire of Genghis Khan into a number of individual "kingdoms," the most western of these states included the entire Russian plain under the name of the Kipchak khanate, the "Ulus Dzhuchi," or, according to the Russian chronicles, the "Golden Horde." By the middle of the thirteenth century it engulfed within its frontiers, on terms of vassalage, the south Siberian steppes up to the Syr-Darya, all of the trans-Volga (Bashkiria) and Volga areas, the Bulgar province, the North Caucasus, Derbent, Crimea, the southern steppes as far as the Dnestr, and all of feudal Rus up to Kiev and Galicia. Its capital was first Stary Sarai (on the site of ruined Itil of the Khazars), and afterward Novy Sarai (not far from Stalingrad). In western Siberia, along the upper reaches of the Ob up to the Yenisey, they organized the Siberian kingdom (khanate).[7]

So enormous an eastern empire, encompassing a variety of nations, could not have been expected to be particularly stable or enduring. Its transitory

stability was primarily due to the fact that its unified armies were opposed only by the petty feudal armies of the Russian principalities.

At the time of the formation of the Genghis Khan empire, the Mongols were experiencing the dissolution of their patriarchal mode of life and passing through a stage of transition to a feudal order of a special eastern and nomadic variety. The mobile economy of the old clan type was founded around nomadic camps by patriarchal communes called *kurenya.* Upon the collapse of clan relationships during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the camps came to be dominated by *ails,* that is, families. This transition was occasioned by the collapse of the clan, the segregation of a ruling aristocracy within it, and the seizure by the latter of the former clan pastures. The roaming individual families of the common people (*kharashu*) retained their rights of ownership over the chief economic factor, the herd, but could not utilize the pasture except in return for obligations to the feudal lord who had appropriated these pastures. The main leaders (*noiony*) were surrounded by a military retinue (*temniki*) with a similar system of feudal relationships toward the smaller herdsmen dependent upon them. In this manner the peculiar forms of feudalism among the eastern nomads were taking shape.

Having arrived in the new provinces of eastern Europe with the aim of conquest at a time when these provinces were already settled by an agricultural population, the Tatar-Mongols fell under the influence of agricultural civilizations, although still retaining their own military-feudal and occasionally nomadic system. Nowhere did the Mongols constitute a majority of the population, and in the southeast they were assimilated by the Polovtsy Turks inhabiting that area. In the interest of the trade routes passing through the southeast, the khans followed a policy of protecting commerce, guaranteeing it various privileges by special charters. As a result urban life and trade began to flourish. In the agriculture of the settled districts a system of feudal relationships evolved and the peasants became attached to the land.

Modeled on this feudal basis of vassalage were also the external relations of the Horde khans with the conquered peoples, especially the Russian provinces and their population. The tributes and dues of the Tatars were themselves very heavy, not to mention the frequent raids, devastations, and punitive expeditions. The internal order of the conquered lands remained in effect untouched. Catalogues of feudal dues and privileges have been preserved in the *tarkhan yarlyks* or charters still extant today.

Toward the second half of the thirteenth century, after conquering Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, and adopting the Islam faith, the Golden Horde reached the pinnacle of its power and economic prosperity in towns,

commerce, and agriculture. Beginning with the second half of the fourteenth century, however, internal feudal dissolution and decline began, especially after the conquest and destruction of the Golden Horde by Tamerlane (1395). At this time Moscow Rus had become strong and unified under a single leadership, confronting the Tatars no longer as many scattered feudal armies but as a unified and trained army. By the early fifteenth century the independent Crimean khanate broke away from the Horde. Later the Kazan kingdom achieved its independence. Soon the subject nationalities paying tribute to the Horde, such as the Bashkirs, also began to fall away. What was formerly the central region of the Horde became the Astrakhan kingdom in 1480. As such, it no longer constituted a serious military threat to aggrandized Moscow. In 1480 Ivan III repudiated the Tatar yoke completely and stopped all payment of tribute to the Tatars. Subsequently the various Tatar khanates (Kazan and Astrakhan) fell under the military blows of Moscow and were converted into Muscovite provinces.

With the collapse of the Golden Horde and the Tatar yoke, vast and easily absorbable provinces were thrown open to territorial annexation by Moscow in the east, beyond the Volga, in Siberia, even in the Caucasian foothills, and along the Caspian shore.

BASHKIRIA Our earliest information about the Bashkirs comes from Arab travelers of the tenth century (ibn-Dast and ibn-Fadlan), who depicted them as wild nomads. Later, Rubrukvis (1253) speaks of the Bashkirs as a nomadic people of herdsmen without towns. In the thirteenth century the Bashkirs, who were then living in a stage of dissolving clan customs, were conquered by the Mongols, who introduced no changes whatever into their social order. Afterward the Bashkirs were absorbed into the empire of the Golden Horde, and, following the collapse of the latter, became subject to the authority of the Kazan kingdom.

Moscow began its own penetration into Bashkiria during the fifteenth century (the campaign of 1468), but its more permanent conquest was not completed before the end of the sixteenth century when, after the fall of Kazan, the Bashkirs in 1557 began to pay *yasak* to the Moscow tsar. In 1586 the town of Ufa was erected as a military stronghold of Moscow rule. Military mastery over Bashkiria did not prove to be a brief or easy task for Moscow, inasmuch as the plunder of the Bashkir lands, which began immediately after the penetration of Bashkiria by the Moscow authorities, and the appropriation of land by the Moscow governors provoked a series of revolts by the Bashkir people (the uprising of 1662, 1707, and others). However, the abuses did not cease; indeed, through bribery, gifts, and drunken debauchery of the local Bashkir princelings and tribal chiefs, vast territories

of tribal land were seized, and the Bashkirs were despoiled of the pasture land so vital to the nomad and his herds.[8] For fear of resultant complications, the Moscow government at first attempted to prohibit the purchase of Bashkir lands (the Sobor Code of 1649, Chapter XVI, page 43). This prohibition naturally proved to be without effect. For Moscow proper, however, Bashkiria at that time, apart from its territorial reserves, held no great interest. Therefore the final economic exploitation of Bashkiria did not begin until much later, during the eighteenth century, when interest in the Bashkirian lands was coupled with industrial interest in the mineral riches of the Bashkir Urals. This, however, we shall discuss elsewhere.

THE NATIONALITIES AND THE ECONOMIC ABSORPTION OF SIBERIA Most important for the Moscow state, both with respect to size and economic significance, were the conquest and economic mastery of Siberia, its rich raw-material resources, its very highly priced contemporary commodities (furs), and its tremendous reserves of land.[9]

The nationalities of Siberia were individually weak in number and existed at a low stage of development, which made their conquest an easy matter. It is sufficient to say that, according to the calculations of 1662, the Siberian population totaled 288,000 persons.

The most important nationalities of western Siberia were the Tatars who, after the dissolution of the Golden Horde, settled along the Ob, the Irtysh, and the Ingul. The Siberian Tatars of that time were partly settled and partly nomadic. They engaged in animal trapping, in hunting, deer raising, and partly in agriculture. By the sixteenth century some remnants of tribal life and a territorial-volost organization still survived among them, with strong influence on the part of the clan and tribal aristocracy. In 1563 they were united by Kuchum into the Siberian kingdom, with its capital at Isker (on the Tobol), which the Russians called Siberia. The kingdom of Kuchum could not muster any great military strength inasmuch as the Tatars had not yet learned the use of firearms.

Of the other nationalities the most numerous were the Tungusy (Evenki), who inhabited the banks of the Yenisey and its tributaries, lived under clan customs without any groupings or associations, and engaged in hunting and trapping. The Yakuts, with whom the Russians had come in contact as early as the sixteenth century, lived at that time not only along the Lena and the Yenisey, but also along the Amur and in Chungaria. Chiefly herdsmen, hunters, and trappers by occupation, they led a nomadic existence. The Buryats, who then inhabited the shores of the Lake Baikal and Amur River region, were among the indigenous tribes of eastern Siberia known to have lived here during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (the historian of Persia,

Rashid al-Din). In the thirteenth century they had already merged into a large tribal union, abandoning their erstwhile purely patriarchal order. Their social organization was at the same time distinguished by considerable differentiation, and the existence of upper tribal groups who held the mass of the population in economic and personal bondage.

A number of other nationalities of Siberia—the Ostyaki (Khanty), the Samoyeds (Nentsy), the Voguli (Mansy), Chukchi, and others—all lived by clan customs, completely isolated from other clans, and only occasionally uniting (as among the Voguli, for example) under a general leader or a chieftain of several clans.

Under these circumstances Moscow could not in its conquests have encountered any organized or effective challenge, the exception being the more serious opposition of the Siberian kingdom of Kuchum.

For such reasons the military and colonial-commercial penetration of Siberia by Moscow proceeded very rapidly. It proceeded first from the north, along the Irtysh, the Tobol, Ob, and Yenisey rivers. In 1574 the major Ural industrialists, the Stroganovs, outfitted a number of expeditions for "exploring" the routes into these districts and for laying claim to new "sable areas." By the 1570's the Russian industrialists had reached Mangazeya (on the river Taz), and by the end of the century seized the area as a whole and reached the Yenisey River.

At the same time, after the fall of the Kazan kingdom, came the penetration of the southern parts of the Ob, Tobol, and Irtysh valleys. Across the path of Moscow's attack, the Tatar state of Kuchum lay as a barrier. The Moscow government itself preferred to follow a cautious and slow policy with regard to the penetration of Siberia and the subjugation of its nationalities, developing individual conditions of vassalage for them, promising "to spare and guard them against all sides, to hold within its hand," demanding in turn "tribute of one sable from every man," and threatening with "the sharp sword" in case of failure to comply. The military-commercial campaign into Siberia during the sixteenth century was headed by the outstanding local industrialists, the Stroganovs. In 1580 they equipped a large expedition under the leadership of Yermak, which culminated in his conquest of Siberia, specifically the possessions of Kuchum, which were thereupon annexed to Moscow. After the conquest of this part of Siberia, Moscow began to send troops and governors, and to build a number of towns and strongpoints (Tobolsk in 1587, near former Isker; Tyumen in 1586, Berezov in 1593, Narym in 1596, and others).

Following the conquest and consolidation of this part of Siberia, a freer route for movement into southern Siberia, to the Baraba steppes, as well as farther to the northeast, became available to Moscow. After relatively stub-

born opposition from the various local princelings and khanates (the Pelym principality, for example), after rather frequent and scattered local revolts by the various local tribes (Ostyaks, Voguli, and others), from the early seventeenth century the conquests of Moscow proceeded with great speed. Even the political crisis of the Time of Troubles did not hamper the drive to the east. During 1598–1613 all of the upper reaches of the Ob (the city of Tomsk was founded in 1604) and the entire lower Yenisey area were occupied. By the time the first Romanov came to the throne, the entire valley of the Yenisey was annexed and a number of fortified towns established (Yeniseisk in 1618, Krasnoyarsk in 1628). At rapid tempo henceforth, in the course of thirty to fifty years, nearly all eastern Siberia and the entire Lena valley were conquered, and the conquest was consolidated by the erection of a number of "prisons," strongpoints, and towns (Ilimsk in 1630, Verkholensk in 1642, and Kirensky Pogost in 1630, all along the upper Lena; Irkutsk in 1653, and Barguzin in 1648, on Lake Baikal; Yakutsk in 1632 and Olekminsk on the Lena; Nerchinsk in 1654, and Chita in 1653, on the Shilka, as well as others). Finally the entire extreme northeastern part of the Asiatic continent was occupied beyond the Kamchatka peninsula and the Sea of Okhotsk (Nizhnekolymsk in 1644, the Anadir fortress on Chukotka in 1649, and Verkhnekamchatsk on Kamchatka in 1697). By the end of the seventeenth century the Moscow state reached the Pacific Ocean. It subsequently began to dream of new lands that "may be seen in the sea only beyond the gulfs" of the "Apon State," and of the "vast land" where "unknown people" lived—North America and Alaska.

However, the conquest policy of Moscow on these remote eastern frontiers began to encounter greater resistance. Thus the above-cited movement toward the south of western Siberia, to the Baraba steppes, met with resistance from Mongols, warlike and better recognized in comparison with the North Siberian nationalities—the Khakass, Kirghiz, and other tribes; hence the more permanent occupation of the South Siberian steppes was delayed until the eighteenth century (Semipalatinsk in 1718).

The drive to the northeast proceeded more easily and rapidly, but even in Kamchatka and on the Chukotsk peninsula the Moscow conquest encountered strong resistance from the populous and warlike Chukotsk tribes, who were not thoroughly "pacified" until after their uprising of 1731. Still stronger and better organized resistance against the Russian conquest was later encountered in Dauria, on the Chinese border in the lower reaches of the Amur, where the local tribes (the Duchery and Daury) lived under conditions of vassalage to China. The military expeditions of Poyarkov (1643) and Khabarov (1647) took the following routes: the former along the river Olekma to the Amur and Dauria, the latter along the Aldan and Zeya rivers

and thence along the Amur as far as its mouth on the Sea of Okhotsk. However, the Moscow state concluded an agreement with China at Nerchinsk (1689), according to which the Amur remained for the time being a part of China. Finally, the expedition of Dezhnev and Alekseyev of 1648, consisting of seven small boats, sailed out of Kolymsk on the Arctic Ocean and reached the Pacific Ocean, thus becoming the first to open the sea route between Asia and North America, the existence of which was finally confirmed by the scientific expedition of Bering one hundred years later. In course of the expedition six boats were lost and only one of Dezhnev's ships, with twenty-five Cossacks among its survivors, reached Anadyr, where Dezhnev assumed control over the Chukotsk region in the name of Moscow.

In this manner the Moscow state during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries engulfed tremendous territories throughout Siberia, not only nearly reaching its then "natural" oceanic frontiers but overflowing them.

The policy of Moscow in connection with the economic absorption and political administration of these vast territories was at that time, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, quite primitive. It corresponded to the feudal institutions prevailing in the social order of the Moscow state during that period. In itself the conquest of Siberia cost Moscow no great effort. Suffice to say that the above-mentioned legendary "conquest of Siberia" was accomplished by Yermak with an "army" of 540 Cossacks, to which the Stroganovs contributed an additional several hundred persons. Similar conquests and annexations of Siberian territory were frequently performed by military expeditions composed of several dozen, or a maximum of one hundred, Cossacks. For example, the military expedition of Dezhnev to eastern Siberia, as far as the Okhotsk coast, ended with twenty-five Cossack survivors. The conquest of the Amur littoral by Khabarov was likewise accomplished by a completely negligible military force (four hundred men and three cannons). This is easily understandable since the vast expanse of eastern Siberia was very sparsely inhabited, its scattered population existed in a primitive stage of economy and customs, and its arms were also utterly primitive—the bow and arrow. The firearms of the Russians were the conquering force.

The conquerors frequently were not so much a properly organized military force as a band of adventurers who came in quest of plunder from the local population, and indirectly for the purpose of earning a "pardon" from the Moscow tsar should they perchance be charged with some political or other misdemeanors. Behind them followed the real military might of the Moscow state. After the first stages of conquest of new land had passed

(Yermak, Khabarov, and Dezhnev), the Moscow government sent its own troops and officials who began to "build towns" or "prisons," and established "customs" for the collection of the *yasak*, that is, tribute, from the local population. In this manner Moscow created the complete political and military consolidation of the occupied territory.

From the newly erected towns and forts (Krasnoyarsk, Yeniseisk, Irkutsk, Chita, and others) as centers of large military concentrations, new military groups were recruited for the purpose of exploring the "new small lands." New military parties were dispatched into the interior of the territory to complete conquest. Tribal princelings and influential personages among the local population were suborned by various gifts, by promises of all types of privileges, and by simple debauchery with vodka, this being a fundamental method in annexations of this kind. Whole vast territories with their populations were declared transferred to the Moscow state as its new "subjects." The population was levied with the *yasak*, a tribute for the benefit of the Moscow state, and the conquest was completed.

The seized territory was afterward visited by the Moscow industrialists and traders who bought up furs, walrus oil, hides, and a great many other valuable goods from the population. Occasionally the Moscow industrialists seized and expanded the gold and silver mining enterprises which they found in operation among the peoples of eastern Siberia (Altay). The state began to appropriate vast spaces of land appendages, proclaiming their transfer from ownership by the local nationalities to the property of the Moscow state, and built a number of state enterprises on these lands. In this manner, for example, were launched the first Altay mining enterprises.

Simultaneously the Moscow government also adopted measures for the development of the agricultural economy of the new districts. The needs of the Siberian service and military people, as well as the industrialists, required systematic "releases of grain," which were often difficult to ship from the European area. Therefore the government began to organize the "plowing business" in Siberia by settling the area with agriculturists, by the organization of "royal fields," and by sending "willing people" to these fields. In the charter granted by Fyodor Ivanovich to the town of Solvychegodsk (1590), the latter was enjoined:

> To choose for life in Siberia thirty persons of field peasants and their wives and children and all those living with them, and each man shall have three good geldings, three cows, three goats, three hogs, five sheep, two geese, five hens, two ducks, grain for a year, a plow with oxen for field work, a cart, a sled, and all types of household utensils, and as assistance it is ordained that to each person shall be given 25 rubles.[10]

In the later decrees of 1605–1609, repeated reference was made to the order for attracting to the Siberian fields "willing idle" people, those "who shall be willing to go, but not from among the taxpayers" (*tyaglo*), and "settle on the land that they may choose," including the appendages, "depending on the available free land."[11] All these peasant "resettlers" were designated as "field" people and obliged, in addition to working their own land, to cultivate the "royal acre."

One cannot, indeed, believe that the economic incorporation of the vast spaces and wealth of Siberia by "willing people" would be fully successful, especially as they moved into the Far East, toward the Lena, and into Yakutia. With respect to numbers, the decrees in question usually listed conscription quotas of "willing people" and "field peasants" amounting to fifty or one hundred men. Moreover, in response to the plans and requests from Moscow for the development of local agriculture, the governors frequently indicated the unsuitability of the land, as, for example, that "in Yakutsk grain cultivation cannot be done; the land here, sire, will not even thaw in the summertime."[12] In any event the scope of activity by the Moscow government in connection with the agricultural exploitation of the land was quite impressive for that time. It concerned itself with the organization of large "royal" economies or a strong peasant economy in that area. Thus, besides its insistent measures for the "introduction of planting by willing people" with vast common lands, the government with equal energy organized "royal" fields and "suburbs," setting up large-scale farming there. In 1607 plows, irons, scythes, sickles, axes, and other implements were issued to the "field peasants" for their husbandry.[13]

Finally the government, under Aleksis Mikhailovich, granted permission for the establishment of "suburbs" and arable fields by private persons as well.[14]

The quantitative results of the colonization of Siberia by resettlers from the central parts of the Moscow state were negligible, particularly in view of Siberia's infinite expanse. According to data for 1662, Siberia, with an approximate population of 288,000 persons, contained a total of 70,000 Russians: among them were 34,500 peasants, including 3,000 "field" hands of the crown acreage; 6,000 industrial and tradespeople, 7,400 exiles, 13,000 military and retired people, and about 6,000 officials, clergy, drivers, and others.[15]

Thus proceeded the conquest and economic pioneering in Siberia, channeled within the typical forms of a primitive military-feudal and commercial-agricultural economy and policy. The relationship between the mother country and Siberia long remained on this level, up to the era of industrial capitalism.

THE FIRST ATTEMPTS AT THE PENETRATION OF TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL ASIA While the Moscow state of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries was successfully liquidating its feudal vestiges and evolving into a multinational state, the nationalities of Transcaucasia, under the impact of endless military invasions and struggles among the Mongols, Persians, and Turks, continued to experience a period of extreme political and economic decline and feudal dismemberment. This was equally true of Armenia, which had lost its national territory completely, and of Azerbaijan, which had become fully "Mongolized," Islamized, and partitioned into Mongolian khanates. The same occurred in Georgia, which did, however, succeed in preserving its nationality, although it fell into complete feudal decline during the sixteenth century.

After the annexation of Astrakhan and the consolidation of Moscow's hold on the Caspian Sea, Moscow came into possession of a direct route for the immediate penetration of both Central Asia and the Caucasus, including Transcaucasia. The North Caucasian steppes, however, were at that time still inhabited by the nomad tribes of the Nogay Horde, a vassal of the Turks. The Nogay tribes mustered a powerful force of resistance against Moscow. A similar attitude of hostility toward Moscow was displayed by a number of small tribes and khanates along the Caspian and Kuma who considered themselves under the protection of Turkey. Among these North Caucasian mountain people Moscow succeeded in establishing strong bonds of great usefulness with the Kabardins. Kabarda saw in Moscow a source of protection in its struggle against the Nogay and the Caspian khanates, while Moscow sought support from the Kabardin princes for its deeper penetration into Transcaucasia and Georgia. Ivan IV accepted Kabarda as a "subject of the Moscow state and married a Kabardin princess. The absorption of Kabarda by Moscow facilitated the latter's penetration into Georgia, Kakhetia, and Imeretia.

GEORGIA During the sixteenth century Gruzia finally broke into separate feudal parts:

Kartalinia, Kakhetia, Imeretia, and Samtskhe-Saatabago (with Dzhavakhetia, Tao-Klardzhetia, and Shavshetia). Meanwhile, the internal feudal struggle and feudal wars continued, resulting in the separation of the Mingrel and the Gury principalities. At the same time, new conquests by the Turks led to the complete loss of Samtskhe-Saatabago, Dzhavakhetia, and Artan, these becoming incorporated within the Turkish Akhaltsikhsk *pashalyk.** Eastern Georgia was again conquered by Persia in 1614, its capital Tiflis sacked, a number of its towns destroyed, and part of its population carried off into slavery; while its entire rural

* Turkish province.—ED.

economy (silk raising in particular) and trade were utterly destroyed, and the remaining population subjected to unbearable taxation. Raids against Georgia by the mountainous tribes were also becoming more frequent. This was a period of the most extreme economic and political decline of feudal Georgia.

The Georgians of the pre-Reform period . . . dissolved into a number of disjointed principalities, could not pursue a common economic existence, continued for centuries to engage in warfare among themselves, and ruined each other, setting the Persians and the Turks against each other. The ephemeral and casual unifications of the principalities which were at times successfully carried out by some lucky king, at best merely encompassed the upper administrative sphere, and were easily shattered by the whims of the princes and the apathy of the peasants. In view of the economic dismemberment of Georgia, it could not have been otherwise.[16]

No less profound in its influence on the economic decline of Georgia, compared with the Mongol conquest and feudal wars, was the sharp change in the world-trade routes and world trade as a whole that occurred in the fifteenth century. The opening of a sea route to India (Vasco da Gama, 1498) at once deprived the old overland caravan routes to the East by way of Syria, Georgia, Armenia, and Central Asia of their former significance. Almost simultaneously the fall of Byzantium (Istanbul) and the capture of Constantinople by the Turks (1453) also blocked the local trade routes between the West and the East that passed through Georgia. With the discovery of America (1492), world trade on the whole shifted chiefly to the West. Georgia was left without its former routes and connections with the centers of world trade, and became an outlying and inaccessible borderland to the advanced western countries and world centers, encircled by the militant Islamism of Turkey and Persia, and consumed by its own internecine feudal quarrels.

Under these conditions the military and political ascendancy of the Russian state served as an auspicious circumstance for Georgia in its unequal struggle against its powerful neighbor-conquerors. Although by that time Russia no longer had any direct route for contact with Georgia, being separated from the latter by many warlike peoples, Moscow more and more energetically undertook to prepare the way for its incursion into the Caspian area and Transcaucasia. In the Caucasian states (Georgia, Kakhetia, and Imeretia), Tsarism saw one of the avenues for extending its political and commercial influence into the East.

In turn the Kakhetian kings sought the aid of the Moscow tsars in their struggle for national independence. In 1586 a "cross-kissing inscription" or agreement was signed between the Moscow government and the Kakhetian king Alexander II, according to which the Kakhetian king declared himself

a vassal of the Moscow tsar Fyodor Ivanovich, while the latter promised to "protect him against all enemies." This alliance was subsequently renewed under the later tsars, although it had no material significance for either side.

In 1614 Kakhetia once more suffered invasion and unprecedented destruction at the hands of Persia. More than 150,000 captives were moved to Persia, while the vacated lands were settled by Azerbaijan Turks. The Kakhetian king Teimuraz again turned to Moscow for help and an alliance. In 1621 the Imeretian king, George III, pressed and ruined by the Turks, also appealed for help to the Moscow tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich, but on this occasion Moscow was in no position to offer any material help. The failure of support from Moscow and renewed invasions by the Turks and Persians brought the national survival of the Transcaucasian people into great peril. Ceaseless military attacks brought the country to the brink of ruin, devastated its towns and destroyed its population. The Georgian and Armenian feudal aristocracy, in order to preserve their rights and possessions, adopted Mohammedanism and became "Iranianized" or "Turkified," losing altogether their national identity. Most destructive of all were the results of these events to the conditions of the peasantry, which lost its land and fell into slavery through captivity and purchase ("bought serfs"). With the aid of foreign feudal lords and foreign power, the local feudal lords were turning their peasants into serfs. In the seventeenth century the peasants were completely deprived of the "right of departure" and attached to their owners. Only in a few mountainous districts (in Svanetia and Khevsuria) were some havens of freedom preserved from the yoke of the feudal lord and the foreign conqueror. Clearly, then, for Gruzia and the other Transcaucasian states, a union with Russia was indeed the "lesser evil" as compared with Turkey and Persia. This union with Russia and the simultaneous liquidation of feudal dismemberment of the Georgian national state occurred considerably later, not before the early nineteenth century.

CENTRAL ASIA The Moscow state had likewise failed during the seventeenth century to bring to successful conclusion its attempts at military penetration of the South Siberian steppes and Central Asia, where it encountered national state organizations of substantial strength. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, after the dissolution of the empire of Tamerlane and the decline of the power of his successors, Central Asia witnessed the formation of two large khanates—Khiva and Bukhara. Their population consisted of a national mixture of Turkomans, Tadzhiks, Uzbeks, and, later, Kara-Kalpaks, as well as other nationalities. They lived in various stages of economic and social development. A majority of them, the Turkomans, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Kara-Kalpaks, were nomad herdsmen.

The Tadzhiks, on the other hand, engaged in agriculture, particularly in the irrigated districts, and developed a form of handicrafts and trade in their towns.

From the end of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, political power in Central Asia, especially in the Bukhara and Khiva khanates, passed to the Uzbeks (so called after the name of one of the heirs of Genghis Khan, Dzhushi-Uzbek), a nation of Turko-Mongolian origin. The Uzbeks had formerly roamed through Dashti-Kipchak (the western part of the present-day Dazakh steppe). Their appearance on the historical scene was marked by frequent raids against Cherasmia, culminating in the sixteenth century in the establishment of Uzbek power in Turkestan. Uzbek rule for a period of nearly two centuries contributed very little to the economic revival of the country or the development of trade, handicrafts, agriculture, and building. The Uzbeks, in effect, completed the partitioning of Central Asia into small independent principalities ruled by protégés of the khans in a position of vassalage to the latter. Authority was vested in the tribal aristocracy (*beks*), who appropriated large holdings in land and changed from viceroys of the khans into independent feudal owners. Various dynasties of the Uzbek khans assumed control over the khanates of Bukhara, Kokand, and Khiva.

Simultaneously with the formation of these Uzbek khanates occurred the emergence of the Kazakhs and Turkomans. A number of tribes, having broken away from the Uzbeks as early as the fourteenth century, wandered toward Dzhetys, where they became known as the Kazakhs. Together with other kindred nationalities, the Kirghiz (Kara-Kirghizy and Buruty), the Kazakhs waged a stubborn struggle against the Kalmyks throughout that area. The latter raided Turkestan for a time, but subsequently returned once more to roam the lower Volga steppes.

Tsarism's efforts at military penetration of the Central Asian steppes ended unsuccessfully. They were confined during the sixteenth century to the foundation of a small military advance post on the Ural River—the Yaitsky Gorodok (township), and the organization of the Yaitsky Cossacks. More successful, however, were the commercial relations developing between Moscow and Central Asia. After achieving the conquest of Astrakhan and mastery over the Caspian Sea, the whole length of the commercial route into the Central Asiatic khanates was thrown open to Moscow. It began to export to them, through Astrakhan, furs, leather, metal articles, and hollow ware, receiving from Central Asia cotton and silk fabrics, arms, jewelry, and Oriental spices.

Notes

1. See Map 4, facing p. 166, Map 5, facing p. 214.
2. Bagalei, *Ocherki po istorii kolonizatsii stepnoi okrainy Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Essays on the History of the Colonization of the Steppe Borderland of the Moscow State) (1877); by same author, *Materialy dlya istorii kolonizatsii i byta stepnoi okrainy Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Materials for the History of the Colonization and Life of the Steppe Borderland of the Moscow State) (1886).
3. Belyayev, *O storozhevoi, stanichnoi, i polevoi sluzhbe na polskoi Ukrainye Moskovskogo gosudarstva do Alekseya Mikhailovicha* (On Guard, Cossack, and Military Service Along the Polish Ukraine of the Moscow State Before Aleksis Mikhailovich) (Moscow, 1896).
4. See Map 5, facing p. 214.
5. "Puteshchestviye Kontarini" (The Travels of Contarini) in *Biblioteka inostrannykh pisatelei o Rossii XV-XVII vv.* (Library of Foreign Writers on Russia During the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Centuries) (St. Petersburg, Semyonov, 1863), pp. 102-104.
6. Gerbershtein, *Zapiski o moskovitskikh delakh* (Notes on Muscovite Affairs), pp. 157-159.
7. See Map 3, facing p. 130.
8. Firsov, *Polozheniye inorodcheskogo naseleniya severo-vostochnoi Rosii v Moskovskom gosudarstve* (The Condition of the Foreign Population of Northeastern Russia in the Moscow State) (1866).
9. See Map 4, facing p. 166.
10. *A.A.E.*, Vol. I, No. 349.
11. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 133; *A.I., Vol. II, Nos.* 52, 251; Vol. III, Nos. 172, 179.
12. Supplement to *A.I.*, Vol. II, No. 90.
13. *A.I.*, Vol. II, No. 81.
14. Supplement to *A.I.*, Vol. III, No. 46; Vol. IV, Nos. 92, 138; *A.I.*, Vol. IV, Nos. 3, 36, and others.
15. Solovtsov, *Istoricheskoye obozreniye Sibiri* (Historical Survey of Siberia), 2nd ed. (1886).
16. Stalin, *Marksizm i natsionalno-kolonialnyi vopros* (Marxism and the National-Colonial Problem) (1937), pp. 5-6.

(XIV)

White Russia and the Ukraine Under the Polish Yoke of Serfdom During the Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries

IN EXAMINING above (see Chapter V) the consequences of the political and economic decline of Kiev Rus following its feudal dismemberment (after 1054) and the Tatar devastations (1240), we indicated that the political and economic centers of feudal Rus had subsequently shifted toward the northeast, to the Rostov-Suzdal and the Vladimir-Moscow grand principalities. As for the northwestern White Russian and southern and southwestern Russian lands, which had formerly comprised part of the Kiev state, they were absorbed at the beginning of the fourteenth century, after the fall of Kiev Rus, by two large and politically independent centers: the grand principality of Lithuania and the Galicia-Volhynia principality. Both of these, the former in particular, suffered less at the hands of the Tatars and, therefore, were able for quite some time to preserve and afterward strengthen their independent existence. But by the fourteenth century Lithuania had annexed not only the White Russian lands but also the southwestern Ukrainian principalities of Chernigov, Volhynia, and Kiev. Since the end of the sixteenth century Lithuania had entered into a union with Poland, by that time having completely engulfed all the southwestern Ukrainian and White Russian lands, and even a portion of the western lands of the Moscow state proper (the principality of Smolensk).

In this manner the political and economic development of White Russia and the southwestern Russian (Ukrainian) lands were severed for a period of nearly four centuries from the political and economic life of the Russian nation and the Russian state. At a time when the process of liquidating the feudal dispersion of the Russian lands began to develop around the Moscow state, White Russia and the Ukraine fell into the channel of the political, economic, and cultural development of Lithuania at first, and then a united Poland and Lithuania, the Rzeczpospolita. Hence a detailed inquiry into the economic development of White Russia and the Ukraine between the fourteenth century and the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is impos-

sible without an examination of the entire national economy of Lithuania and Poland, particularly since the former, and still more the latter, were tending ever more closely to integrate their economies with the European West, adopting the standards of western European industrial and urban law in the field of industry, trade, town, and handicraft system, and developing trade with the western European countries.

However, this task of studying the national economy of Lithuania and Poland is beyond the scope of a study of the economic development of the peoples of the USSR. Therefore we shall confine our aim in this chapter to a mere examination of, on the one hand, the general economic conditions and the yoke of serfdom under which the White Russian and Ukrainian populace lived in the course of these centuries, first within the Lithuanian state and afterward within Poland; and on the other hand, to the struggle for freedom which the peasant serfs conducted against the Lithuanian-Polish lords until the time of unification between the Ukrainian and White Russian lands and the simultaneously strengthened Russian state during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

LITHUANIA AND WHITE RUSSIA Until the middle of the eighth century Lithuania, embracing an area between the Dvina and the Niemen, was not united politically, being divided into a number of tribes (the Prussy, Yatvyagi, Zhmuds, Golyad, and others) governed by their particular tribal princelings. Their forms of clan organization were undergoing dissolution, and private ownership in land had already become known. The country was sparsely inhabited, the population engaging chiefly in hunting and grazing, and occasionally in primitive agriculture (especially the Yatvyagi and Prussy). Handicrafts such as pottery, weaving, leatherworking and tar distilling were widely practiced. In the twelfth century the Lithuanian tribes were frequently subject to attack by their neighbors, the Volyn and Polotsk Russian principalities, and plundered them in turn. But beginning with the thirteenth century the Lithuanian lands fell under the brutal conquest of the Knights of the Teutonic Order who, along with their propagation of Christianity, proceeded to plunder the country, decimate the Lithuanian-Russian population, impose slavery upon them, and seize the land for themselves. Another German order, the Order of Livonia, conquered the province of the Zhmuds. The Lithuanians stubbornly resisted the despoilers and in 1236, in a battle near Chavli, inflicted defeat upon them. At that time, too, the Russian prince Alexander Nevsky routed the Livonian knights on the ice of Lake Peipus in 1242. These events tended to ease the situation of the Lithuanian tribes slightly, but the knights of the Teutonic and

Livonian orders, on the other hand, formed a union (1237) and continued to menace Lithuania.

In the east the Lithuanians came in contact with the White Russian tribes (the Polochane, Krivichi, and Drevlyane) who also engaged in agriculture and cattle raising, but enjoyed a somewhat higher level of civilization than the Lithuanians. Hence, even prior to the conquest of Russia's western lands by Lithuania, the Russian cultural and economic-political influence on Lithuania was considerable. It gained strength particularly after the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries when, for the first time, under the impact of aggression by the Teutonic knights, a number of Lithuanian feudal principalities and tribal provinces united into a Lithuanian state (under Mindovg, 1230–1263), absorbing Zhmud as well as parts of the Polotsk and Turov Russian principalities. Afterward (under Olgerd, 1345–1377) occurred the annexation of the Russian principalities of Bryansk (1355), Chernigov, Seversk, Podolya, and Kiev (1362), Volhynia (1377), and Smolensk. Thus, by the second half of the fourteenth century, the Lithuanian principality extended over a vast area between the western Dvina and the Dnepr and Volhynia, representing a feudal union of the several Lithuanian and Russian regions under the reign of the Lithuanian Gedymin princes. In territory, in tribal composition, in culture and language, in the prevalence of legal standards, and so forth, the northwest of the Lithuanian principality was dominated by the White Russian nationality, and the south and southwest by the South Russian Ukrainians.

Both the Lithuanians proper and the population of the annexed Russian provinces engaged in agriculture as the main branch of national economy, and partly in stock raising and hunting during the thirteenth century. Unregulated and freely appropriated land utilization, such as prevailed while some remnants of tribal and clan customs were still present, had disappeared by that time. As a survival of the former communal land system in eastern White Russia (down to the sixteenth century), a special form of communal peasant land tenure, which was known in those parts under the name of *syabrinny* tenure, had still been preserved, distinguished by inequality in the holdings of the individual participants and a gradual attachment of these holdings to the various families for perpetual use.

Still more important proved to be the fact that in lieu of the former communal ownership of land, in western White Russia especially, private property of individual persons in land began to emerge along with the concentration of holdings, particularly among the privileged classes, the princes, boyars, and others. This prepared the ground for the evolution of feudal social relationships throughout the country. In the fourteenth century the Lithuanian principality was a typical feudal state with large holdings in the

hands of the princes and boyars, maintained by the labor of their independent peasant labor and in part by the slave labor of their domestics.

As a result of the partitioning of the state (among the numerous sons of Gedymin after his death in 1341), the feudal wars among the princes and frequent succession of rulers, coupled with an increase in large patrimonial landownership by the boyars and princes, feudal institutions began to penetrate all aspects of social life. This, along with the pressure exerted by the conquerors—the "hound-knights" (Marx) of the Teutonic order—threatened the political independence and integrity of the Lithuanian principality. The threat of German conquest and the increased economic association between Lithuania and Poland compelled Lithuania to enter into a union with Poland (the union of 1385–1386). And although the German "crusaders" were beaten (near Grunewald in 1410), the union between Lithuania and Poland was again confirmed by the *sejm* * in Gorodel (the Gorodel Act of 1413), but with preservation of the political identity of Lithuania as well as the right of independent election of its own grand prince (who was customarily chosen as the Polish king, thus constituting a personal union).

Feudal dispersion in Lithuania had thus not progressed as far as in northeastern feudal Rus. On the contrary the central power of the grand prince, after an extended period of civil wars and struggles, succeeded in subjugating the provincial princes, although this necessitated a personal union with Poland. In the social-economic sphere this not only failed to prevent the progress of incipient feudal-serf relationships, but instead contributed to the development of a system of landownership and serfdom which prior to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was little known in Lithuania.

For the administration of their various provinces, the princes appointed viceroys who collected their remuneration in kind from the population in the form of various produce or a share of the grain harvest. It was an institution similar to that of the "pensioners" in existence in the Moscow state and dependent upon the central power. Therefore, despite their subordination to these viceroys, the villagers never came to be personally dependent upon them in a feudal sense as "holders" of the land. Here, however, was fertile soil for the growth of conditional landownership in return for service to the prince. In general the grand prince and sovereign was the supreme owner of the lands. Under his authority land was formally held by feudal right by the large boyar class, the princes and the aristocracy who, in effect, owned these lands without any restriction. On the basis of privileges granted by Yagailo (1387 and 1413), these owners obtained full patrimonial right of ownership over their lands. This type of ownership was followed by the "perpetual" ownership of the land, likewise guaranteed by the above-men-

* Legislature of Poland-Lithuania.—ED.

tioned privileges, but conditional upon military service to the sovereign. At a lower level was the form of landownership conditional "on the will and favor of the sovereign," characteristic of the ordinary nobility, with arbitrary terms of ownership. Below these groups were the unprivileged types of landownership. The above-named forms of privileged landownership became the basis for a feudal system of relationships and a bonded peasantry. On the seignioral estates individual sections of land (*voloki*) were granted to the peasants for use in return for *obrok* (*chinsh*)—honey, wax, furs, and, less frequently, money. Although the feudal economy was of a natural type, these products were offered for sale as well as export, accumulating wealth for the big owners.

In the White Russian provinces of Lithuania, although sparsely populated and often characterized by the prevalence of freely appropriated homesteads and a *zalezhnaya* (migratory) system of farming, agriculture had already become the major branch of the national economy by the fifteenth century. In the various official state acts frequent references are made to "arable lands," "meadows," "wheat land," and others as objects of disposition, bequest, and taxation. Livestock raising was practiced as an occupation subsidiary to agriculture. With the development of towns, crafts, and trade, a money economy began to develop; the payment of obligations to the king and *obrok* to the owner began to be made in money.

The towns of Lithuania and of the old White Russian and Russian provinces were of two types. The large ancient towns along the Dnepr, the western Dvina, the Neman (Vilno, Grudno, Kovno, Berestye, and others) conducted a rather widespread trade with the West, particularly by way of the western Dvina, had a substantial industrial and craft population, and for the most part obtained urban self-government in accordance with the so-called "Magdeburg Law" introduced there from Germany and Poland.[1] Other types of towns (*mesta*) were the small townships frequently found on the lands of the feudal lords and paying dues to the latter. The population there engaged in trade and industry along with agriculture.

During the fifteenth century the land system of the eastern portion of White Russia, despite the development of private ownership and serfdom, still contained remnants of the former *dolevoy* (shareholding) and *syabrinny* (fraternal) peasant landownership (in its various forms and designations: *syabry, uchastniki, dolniki, priimaki,* and so forth), closely related to the so-called "shareholding commune" based on the collective and communal appropriation of land. These vestiges of the *syabrinny* landownership were, however, rapidly disappearing, especially in western White Russia and in Podolya, and superseded by private large-scale landownership with feudal relationships. Besides large patrimonial estates of the princes, mili-

tary men, boyars, *pany,** and other gentry, a lesser type of conditional landownership, on the usual terms of remuneration for service, began to grow. On all these lands, on the princely estates in particular, in lieu of the former *obroks, barshchina* and seignioral fields began to develop, chiefly in the form of the three-field grain-raising agricultural system (sometimes with the use of fertilization).

Land cultivation and rural economy were maintained in part by the still existing *kholop* slaves, "the bonded domestics." The domestics lived in the courtyard of the owner, owned no property, and received only their "feed" or a plot of land for their own use in return for performing their obligatory labor. A second, more numerous group consisted of the *tyaglo* (taxpaying) peasants, *dyakolnyie* (clerical), and *prigonnye* (driven) people. All taxable peasants were divided into "unremovable," attached to the land (old dwellers), and "freely removable," unattached to the land. The peasants living on the manorial lands were obliged to perform demesne labor in the owner's field, to furnish *statsy* (carts), and to pay *obrok* in various forms: *dyaklo,* in rye, oats, and hay; *mezlev,* in livestock, honey, salt, coal, fur, and so forth. These relationships of dependence and dues were gradually transformed into serfdom during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The evolution of this process of bondage was related to similar manifestations in the Moscow state. The basic cause of the rise of serfdom was the indebtedness of the peasants, who frequently lacked the means for setting up a household. The landowners, on the other hand, in order to expand their demesne economy, strove to retain the peasants on their land by all available means. The endeavors of the landowners to attach to their lands all types of "settled people," *zasyadly* (settlers), and others, increased strongly during the fifteenth century. The "settled" peasant was a tenant of the owner's land who was bound by his indebtedness, and lost his right to leave the land after the ten-year term of rent had elapsed. At first all these peasants were free to leave on condition that they supply another person in their place. In 1457 it became illegal to accept into other owners' estates peasants who were "taxed, long-dwelling and rural" (*danny, izvechny* and *selyanity*), which was a formal way of introducing bondage. Thus, in Lithuania where during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries serfdom existed on a very small scale, the serf-manned type of estate became widely prevalent during the fifteenth century.

At the same time the remnants of the old communal, fraternal (*syabrinny*) peasant landownership were obliterated during the sixteenth century through the introduction on the seignioral estates, especially in western Lithuania, of the so-called *volochnaya* system. Under this system the best land was allocated for the establishment of the landowner's farmstead—the *folvarka,*

* Polish gentlemen.—ED.

while the peasant allotments around the *folvarka* were divided into *voloki;* that is, equal plots of about nineteen or twenty hectares, in which each allotment was divided into three fields. The middle field of each *volok* contained the peasant courtyard and was inhabited occasionally by one, but more often by several peasant families. The peasants were expected to cultivate the *folvark* lands under the *barshchina* system, and in addition to pay *obrok* (*chinsh*) in money. By this reform (under Sigismund II) the courtyard-allotment type of peasant landownership was finally made secure and, simultaneously, the required labor force was created and attached to the owners' estates.

Of decided significance for the future political and economic destiny of Lithuania and its White Russian population were the increased Polish influences and ties, which (beginning in 1386, under Yagaillo) became particularly noticeable in the Lithuanian state and among the ruling Lithuanian nobility toward the end of the fifteenth century. The drive toward a merger with Poland was not only contrary to the political interests of the Russian serving circles but also to the interests of the mass of the Lithuanian and White Russian population, for whom the Polish influence and system meant the intensification of serfdom. Nevertheless the failure in the Livonian war compelled Lithuania to seek a union with Poland. The Lublin union of 1569 served to bring to a conclusion this prolonged historical process of unification between Lithuania and Poland, with all the advantages on the side of the latter. Poland gained from Lithuania Podolya, Volhynia, Kiev, and Podlyasye. Lithuania itself, White Russia, and the Ukraine became the colonies of feudal (*panskaya*) Poland.

Henceforth the political destiny and economic development of Lithuania and its White Russian provinces, until the end of the eighteenth century, moved and developed within the channels of the new political form of the Polish-Lithuanian state, the Rzeczpospolita. The White Russian peasantry was subjected to the oppression of serfdom more brutally. In Lithuania and in all the White Russian provinces, the Polish system of central and local administration, of types of landownership, and so forth, came to predominate. The Lithuanian and Russian landowners were equal to the Polish nobility in their patrimonial property rights over their estates. The Lithuanian and Russian aristocracy, having attained equality with the Polish nobility in their political rights, became with the latter the ruling aristocratic, landowning, feudal upper class.

The peasantry, on the other hand, suffered rather heavy losses of its rights and its economic position. The landowners of the Lithuanian and White Russian provinces succeeded in securing not only their economic rights to the labor of the peasant, but also their personal rights over the peasantry in

the harshest medieval forms. With the rapid development of a money economy and market selling, the Lithuanian-Russian *pomestye* nobility, in order to increase their income, imitated the feudal methods of the Polish lords and knights in their exploitation of the peasantry. The Polish nobility had long mastered full, unbridled, and unpunished disposition over the life and death of their peasants: in the words of contemporary Polish writers, for a Polish noble to kill his *kholop* was nothing more serious than killing a dog. With the introduction of Polish administration into the Lithuanian and White Russian provinces, and under its protection, an intensified colonization by Polish landowners began, accompanied by the acquisition of inhabited estates by the Polish nobility, who introduced the Polish methods of serfdom to this area. The population, seeking refuge from the oppression of serfdom, ran from the interior provinces into the steppe borderlands of the Polish state, beyond the Dnepr to the southern Ukrainian steppes, in quest of personal freedom and land free from the nobility.

SOUTHERN AND SOUTHWESTERN RUS OF THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES We have already indicated that the west-Dnepr bank of the Ukraine, and especially the Galicia-Volhynia principality, suffered less from the Tatar invasions than the east-bank Chernigov and Kiev provinces. The many wastelands that arose in these lands following the flight of the population from the villages and towns as a result of the Tatar devastations, became the scene of colonization by farmers and landowners after the fifteenth century. But even then the invasion by the Crimean khan Mengli-Girei (1482) long retarded and destroyed the incipient colonization of these districts.

Hence the Galician principality became the political and economic center of western Rus, where the population of the Dnepr region began to resettle after the fall of Kiev. In the early fourteenth century Galicia still retained its independent existence, including within its frontiers Podolya, Volhynia, Chervonnaya Rus, and Polesye. Here populous settlements began to grow rapidly, towns came into existence, and new colonization strengthened the movement toward the south, toward the steppes and down to the shores of the Black Sea. Under the favorable climatic conditions and fertile soil found there, agriculture not only became the main branch of national economy but also succeeded in improving its technique at a comparatively rapid pace. In this respect there was a notable difference between the Ukrainian east-bank and Dnepr littoral provinces (which up to the beginning of the fourteenth century were part of the grand principality of Suzdal) and the more westerly parts, the Galician principality, Podolya, and Volhynia. As recorded in the revenue records and charters of the mid-fifteen century, it seems clear that in

the Kiev province, among the appendages on the owners' lands, it was not "plowed" lands that were most frequently encountered but, instead, various types of "beehives," "beaver preserves," "animal traps," meadows, apiaries, and so forth. The products of this land—honey, wax, as well as the products of hunting, fishing, and so forth—were articles for use in the payment of *obrok*. In Podolyia and Volhynia during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, agriculture became the leading occupation, arable lands came to predominate in the various official records, and the payment of *obrok* to the owners took the form of grain, wheat, livestock, and other produce. Located near the major trade routes and the western consumer markets, these provinces developed a brisk trade in agricultural produce. With the growth of trade came the development of towns, and in the towns—handicrafts. The chief center of trade and industry was Lwow, which during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries conducted vigorous commercial relations with Danzig, Thorn, Nuremberg, and Constantinople.

With the growth of commerce, a money economy, and urban industry, the position of the peasant was also changing along with the forms of landownership and use. In the old Russian districts such as Kiev, for example, because of a sparse population and an abundance of free land, the various forms of communal, unregulated, "free" land use were preserved the longest. According to evidence contained in the Cherkass and Kiev revenue records of 1552, "the Cherkass people plow their fields, anyone wherever he wishes."[2] In districts where agriculture was pursued somewhat more steadily and in settled fashion, but where an abundance of land existed, and where its economic exploitation was effected not by one person but by an entire collective, a commune or a family, the *syabrinny* (fraternal) system of landownership and land use came into practice and persisted, with allotments of varying sizes held by each participant. But here, too, the wealthier members of the commune frequently seized the lands of the impoverished villagers who thus became *podsusedki* (underneighbors) working for the wealthy householders. Furthermore, in the more settled and advanced districts such as western Galicia and Volyn, the remnants of the *syabrinny* type of landownership disappeared, and peasant landed property usually took the form of small courtyard-allotment landownership with a rapidly developing economic differentiation among the agricultural populace.

In the meantime, since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in particular, the large patrimonial estates of the princes and the boyars, together with the large Church and monastery holdings, continued to grow and strengthen. They grew as a result of the outright seizure of free or even long-occupied peasant lands, the purchase of these lands, and, above all, remuneration for services to the state. The latter gave rise to the *pomestye* type of

landownership as a conditional and temporary type in return for service, although, as elsewhere, it was legally merged with the *votchina* type afterward.

The expansion and consolidation of private, large-scale privileged landownership under conditions of increasing commodity circulation and market, of necessity led to the enlargement of the demesne plowland by the landowners and to the emergence of serfdom. In this area the process of land seizure and expansion of the landowners' arable fields during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries proceeded slowly, partly owing to the insufficiently rapid colonization by the peasants. The usual conditions of the peasant household which made the process of enserfment inevitable—low resources, the inability to set up their own household without a loan or assistance, the shortage of good broken earth, the compulsory measures of the great privileged landowners—all these tended more and more to enslave the peasantry of Galicia, Volhynia, and Podolia economically and, later, also personally. The burden of the *barshchina,* due to the above-described conditions—the shortage of manpower, inadequate allotments, the power of the feudal landowning aristocracy, and the growth of the market system—was extremely heavy. In the sixteenth century demesne labor (*panshchina*) in this area consumed three, four, and as much as five days of the week.

Besides the peasantry the taxable lower classes of South Russian society of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries also included the urban artisans and the small-town tradesmen whose economic position was equally unfavorable. Among them were great numbers of poor Jews. The introduction of the "Magdeburg Law," adopted from Poland and Germany, into several large towns and townships of the Galician principality during the fourteenth century contributed notably to the growth of a number of towns and the development of guild crafts and large-scale trade within those towns. The inhabitants of the towns, the artisans and tradesmen, had a right to engage in trade and in handicrafts on the basis of corporative guild organization with self-administration in urban and corporative affairs, with their own urban class jurisdiction, and so forth. All this stimulated the commercial and industrial development of the towns, the organization of handicrafts in guilds after the manner of western Europe, preparing the formation of a class of urban bourgeoisie. In the western parts of Galicia in particular, the growth of commercial towns and small towns was conspicuous during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, tending to draw the entire life of the country into the money economy and the market. Local fairs were abundantly scattered throughout the country. In the small towns trade and fairs were chiefly of a local character, and the handicrafts were practiced by the urban poor, chiefly Jews and Poles.

The difficult economic position of the toiling urban classes was especially intensified by the double system of their economic exploitation. The supreme political power exacted large revenues from numerous forms of taxation on urban handicrafts and trade, erecting customs stations (*komory*) for levying upon trade and trade turnover a tax called *myt* that reached sizable proportions. Meanwhile, since many towns and small towns sometimes arose on the latifundia of the feudal aristocracy, they were under such circumstances deprived of the right of self-government, while the artisan and commercial population of such towns contributed heavily in taxes and duties for the benefit of the owners.

In the hands of the large feudal owners, Russo-Galician as well as Polish-Lithuanian—the Ostrozhskys, Chartoriiskys, Vishnevetskys, Potatskys, Zamoiskys, and others—were concentrated vast landed properties of the size of entire provinces, with a great many villages and towns located thereon. This is illustrated, for example, by the landed wealth of the former feudal Prince Ostrozhsky, whose patrimonial estates extended over a large part of Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev, where he owned thirty-five towns and over seven hundred villages from which he derived an income of about 10,000,000 gold rubles. Another Polish magnate, Vishnevetsky, owned the entire Poltava district. The feudal aristocracy during the fourteenth century enjoyed the position of a ruling upper class whose decisions dictated the supreme administration of the state. In local administration—in economic life, jurisdiction, and so forth—the feudal nobility, with its retinue of *tysyatskys, voyevodas* (governors), and others, enjoyed the absolute independence of feudal seigniors, exploiting and despoiling the population living on their lands.

Grouped around them, finally, was the lesser local nobility. These were chiefly service people of the privileged class, who received land from the "lord" on the basis of a feudal, conditional right of grant, under an obligation of rendering military service, but enjoying the right to transmit these lands to their heirs. These forms of feudal relationships and landownership conditional on service began to develop in the South Russian (as well as in the Lithuanian-Russian) provinces during the fifteenth century. Afterward, however, in the sixteenth century, this service-conditional landed property of the nobility was gradually endowed with all rights and privileges of patrimonial ownership. This process achieved its final consummation, commensurate with the growth of Polish influence, when the South Russian as well as the Lithuanian and Russian nobility obtained the social rights and pattern of the Polish nobility.

THE FALL OF SOUTHWESTERN RUS The political ascendancy of southwestern Galician Rus occurred immediately following the decline of

Kiev Rus during the thirteenth century. Daniel Galitsky (1201–1264) not only succeeded in unifying the Galician lands but also attempted to expand his possessions. He was forced, however, to submit to the Tatar yoke, losing the middle and South Dnepr provinces. In his campaigns of conquest toward the northwest, he met resistance on the part of the Lithuanians, who were, as we have seen, entrenched in nearly all of southern Rus and Podolia, Volhynia, the Kiev land, and a part of the western Russian land including the Smolensk principality. Afterward Galician Rus began rapidly to decline. Only Chervonnaya Rus remained unoccupied by Lithuania; in 1340 it was subjugated by Poland, in 1386 Poland seized the remaining parts as well, and from that time Galicia became one of the Polish provinces.

THE UKRAINIAN SERF PEASANTRY IN POLAND The Lithuanian union of 1569 thus achieved the formal unification of Lithuania and Poland, which resulted in the ascendancy of Polish influence over the northwestern White Russian and southern Ukrainian and Russian lands, all alike being engulfed by the Polish state. The Polish-Lithuanian Rzeczpospolita, a Polish-Lithuanian elected monarchy of the nobility in form, was in reality a feudal state, distinguished by a clearly expressed hegemony of the great feudal landed aristocracy, around which was grouped the numerous petty Polish, Lithuanian, and Russian nobility. The economic base of both groups was the bonded Polish, White Russian, and Ukrainian peasantry.

By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the eastern—that is, White Russian and Ukrainian—parts of Poland were already quite densely populated by a mixed Lithuanian, Polish, and Ukrainian population, who comprised the overwhelming part of the rural population. In the White Russian provinces (the so-called "Podlyashye," Chernaya Rus, and White Russia proper) inventories (economic censuses) taken during the sixteenth century no longer referred to the former "wastelands" but, on the contrary, recorded a great quantity of villages, hamlets, small towns, and towns. The situation was worse in the Dnepr area, in the Chernigov-Seversk and Kiev lands: here, in the latter particularly, traces of earlier "desolation" remained in evidence for a long time. Only after the second half of the sixteenth century did a rapid and popular colonization movement by the Russian masses from the central Polish provinces begin in this area, a movement by the serf peasants, the *pospolity,* who were running away from Polish serfdom in search of land and freedom. Simultaneously these provinces became the scene of landowning colonization by the Polish nobility, overtaking the peasants in their flight from serfdom. The lords and nobility were armed with grants from the Polish government covering entire counties, *starostvos,* including Ukrainian towns with their free inhabitants, who thus fell into feudal sub-

servience to the Polish lords. In the endless, immeasurable Ukrainian steppes the Polish nobles openly seized for their own benefit vast land areas at will. Not far behind the common nobility was the upper landed aristocracy, the same Ostrozhskys, Vishnevetskys, and Potatskys, who appropriated enormous tracts of land, entire provinces, and established themselves as the great feudal overlords of entire districts. The despoliation of these lands—formally, indeed, unoccupied by anyone—was on a colossal scale. It is little wonder that some historians compare it, in the quantities of lands appropriated, with the despoliations of the Bashkir lands during the nineteenth century.[3] These new possessions were settled by the colonization of the toiling peasantry moving in that direction. The peasants were enticed by the landowners with all types of privileges, and were subsequently turned into serfs.

The owners, the large holders in particular, having occupied a given district, built their "castles" or fortresses, around which the agricultural and small-town artisan population was settled. The result was extraordinary wealth for the new owners. With the development of a money economy and market, the practice of *barshchina* increased, arable land expanded, trade routes were established, fairs, trade, and handicrafts were introduced. Inventories and various official acts of that period have presented indisputable evidence of the rapid development of these phenomena and, simultaneously, the increase of demesne-labor exploitation. The technique of agriculture on the landowners' estates in the interior provinces of the Ukraine revealed considerable progress. In the wooded districts the *lyadinnaya* (wood-burning) system was disappearing; everywhere a transition to the three-field system, often including fertilization, became noticeable. In the colonizing area of the southern steppe the unregulated forms of the *zalezhnaya* (lying fallow) system prevailed. Thus, in the development of rural economy in this region during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the outstanding factors were the expansion of the "seignioral" economy and the intensification of the *panshchina,* that is, obligatory labor on the demesne lands. Ordinarily the *folvark* land, or *pashnya dvorna* (manorial plowland), occupied no less than one-half of the entire estate, and occasionally much more. Demesne labor here was performed through all types of agricultural tasks: plowing, grain planting, harvesting, hay mowing, care of livestock, and so forth. As we have indicated, during the fifteenth century obligatory demesne labor had often begun to absorb more than one-half of the entire working time of the peasant. Moreover, aside from their demesne labors, the peasants were frequently liable to all sorts of *obroks* in kind (honey, eggs, and other products) or in money.

Extremely important in the formal establishment of serfdom was the third Lithuanian statute of 1588, which revoked the "right of transfer" and in-

cluded within the category of "unremovable persons" all peasants who had lived with any one owner for ten years. This bondage was occasioned by the development of a money economy and the increase in the exploitation of the peasantry. The peasant had fallen under the absolute power and will of the landowner. With respect to personal rights he had become subject to the "seignioral justice" of the owner and his agencies. All possessions of the peasant became the property of the owner, not excluding the person of the peasant, whom the owner could resettle, sell without land, and so forth.

Simultaneously with the binding of the peasantry came the expansion and formalization of the rights of the Polish manorial nobility (*shlyakhty*). The rights of personal independence were confirmed for those nobles who even on the basis of the old feudal and vassalage relationships held their estates "under the princes." Besides these and other personal rights (self-administration, and others), the most important economic gain of the nobility (*shlyakhty*) consisted in their acquisition of full "seignioral" rights over their peasants, on an equal footing with the upper feudal aristocracy: the right of jurisdiction, right of absolute disposition over the person and possessions of the peasant, and so forth. By this reform the separation of society into two completely distinct and sharply defined classes—the manorial nobility and the serf peasantry—was performed with unmistakable clarity. Over the Polish, White Russian, and Ukrainian peasantry the noose of serfdom was drawn even more tightly.

The increase in the oppression of the serfs provoked an elemental movement among the peasantry, a systematic flight into the steppe and beyond the Dnepr, where the peasantry sought escape from seignioral slavery. From the same roots of their struggle against serfdom and the Polish nobility grew that distinct national movement which afterward acquired tremendous significance in the destiny of the whole Ukraine and its laboring population, assuming definite shape in the organization of the Ukrainian Cossack elements.

THE COSSACK POPULATION Cossack elements in the Dnepr area in general came into existence on the same economic basis as in the other provinces of Moscow Rus (along the Don, for instance). During the sixteenth century the name of "Cossacks" was given to persons without a fixed occupation or a permanent place of residence, men who temporarily worked as farm labor in the peasant courtyards. They were later designated as "free" or "idling persons," terms that also found their way into our official documents.

In the south, in the semisteppes and steppes, the emergence of such groups among the population was impelled by a number of circumstances. Large

masses of the populace had come there in flight from serfdom, attracted by the wealth of the steppe activities. But the trade routes across the steppes were in constant danger of attack by the Tatars and other nomads, and therefore needed military protection. Against this background grew up a special group of the population that came to be designated as Cossacks. During the fifteenth century these elements had already come into the steppes to "act as Cossacks," that is, engage in fishing, hunting, animal trapping, bee raising, and also occasionally in capturing Tatars. In the wintertime the Cossacks returned to the commercial towns on the Dnepr (Cherkassy and others), where they sold their loot and hired themselves out as day laborers. In the course of their summer pursuits in the steppes, the Cossacks were forced by the threat of attack to move in armed groups, and retained this organization afterward. Frequently the Cossacks themselves fell in armed groups upon the Tatar and Turkish populations along the shores of the Black Sea, and thus became a direct armed menace to the Turks.

In its struggle against Turkey, Poland began to make use of these armed units of the Cossack classes. In the sixteenth century Poland attempted to introduce a form of organization among the Cossacks through the designation of so-called "listed" or registered Cossacks. At first these lists, which legalized the position of the Cossacks, included between three hundred and five hundred persons, this number being afterward increased until it reached six thousand in 1625. All other Cossacks were treated as "worthless" (*zashtatny*) and illegal. By this time, however, the matter became complicated by the fact that the Cossacks arose not only as a weapon of external struggle against the Turks but also as an internal threat to Polish serfdom. Masses of runaway serfs flocked to the Cossacks in the steppes, seeking freedom from the serfdom in their midst. The Polish nobility, while using the Cossacks for military purposes, always strove to keep their numbers restricted, returning all "illegal" Cossacks back to *pospolstvo,* to the status of the serf. This provoked extreme protests and embitterment from the population which had joined the Cossacks. The population grew especially indignant after the Cossacks obtained a permanent organization and territory as the Zaporozhye Cossacks, or Zaporozhye Sech, on the island of Khortitsa in the Dnepr.

The Zaporozhye Sech was a military, free, and mobile organization with its own independent military self-government. The greater part of its population existed on military loot, while another part engaged in hunting and fishing, and only a negligible portion of married Cossacks (*sidni*) undertook grain cultivation in their winter quarters. The Cossacks staged raids with fine impartiality against the Turkish, Russian, and Polish districts, although they themselves nominally formed a part of the Polish state. The tenseness of social relations engendered by the development of serfdom in Poland

(from which source the Cossack ranks were constantly replenished with new recruits of discontented people) was further aggravated by the religious issue, which turned into an issue of national struggle on the part of the Orthodox Ukrainian peasantry against the Catholic Polish landlords. The result was that the struggle and wars against seignioral, serf-ridden, and Catholic Poland became the major task of the Zaporozhye Cossacks. "The Cossack people took up a banner, the face of which called for war on behalf of the faith and the Russian nation, and the obverse side, for the extermination or expulsion of the Polish landlords and nobility from the Ukraine," and Zaporozhye itself became an "insurrectionary haven for the enslaved Russian population."[4]

The Cossack class threatened Poland not by its original relatively small numbers but because it had inexhaustible reserves in the Ukrainian, South Russian, and White Russian serf peasantry. The registered Cossack population, which had reached six thousand by 1625, tended more and more to become merely the upper class of Cossack society. These groups of Cossacks began to settle in the border districts from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, occupying free homesteads in the steppes and establishing their own agriculture while retaining their military regimental organizations and divisions. Apart from this small stratum, the mass of the Cossack population became more and more filled with landless people, runaway peasantry, and others, who likewise joined the ranks of the Cossacks to take part in their military campaigns with the support of the Polish government. After the end of such military campaigns, however, the government "mustered out" of the Cossack ranks all the unregistered recruits, demanding that they return to their original *pospolstvo;* that is, into the serfdom of the peasantry. This caused serious disturbances among the Cossacks and gained the support of the entire Ukrainian peasantry. And although the number of registered Cossacks increased rapidly, rising to forty thousand in 1649 and about sixty thousand in 1654, the problem of the existence and organization of the Cossack groups was not solved.

POLAND AND MOSCOW For the next stage the history of the Dnepr Cossacks is filled with the highly complex record of both internal struggle among the several groups of Cossacks, between the Cossack "have nots" and the Cossack elders and hetmans, between the Cossacks and the serfs, and so forth, and a complex external struggle among the forces grouped behind the Cossack elements—Poland, Moscow, Turkey, as well as the other states which used the Cossacks in the struggle against their particular enemies. For our purposes we need not attempt to recite this intricate history of the Cossack population, or the struggle between the Moscow state and Poland. The culminating points in this struggle were the violent uprisings

of the Cossacks against Poland during 1625–1638, and the wars of Khmelnitsky during 1646–1649 and 1651, when the question of a union between the Cossacks and Moscow became paramount. At the same time the wars between Moscow and Poland began. The war of 1632–1634 ended in a victory for the Poles (Smolensk and Chernigov surrendered by Russia). But in 1654, under Khmelnitsky, the east-Dnepr bank Ukraine joined Moscow. The war between Moscow and Poland, which arose as a consequence (1654–1656), ended in a victory for Moscow. Another war during 1658–1667, which was at first distinguished by Moscow victories (the conquest of nearly all White Russia), ended (after defeat in White Russia and in Volyn) in the loss of all of Lithuania, White Russia, and the west-bank Ukraine, with only Smolensk and Chernigov provinces and Kiev proper retained by Moscow (the Andrusovo Peace). Hence the east-bank of the Ukraine, along with Kiev, remained with Moscow, the west-bank, with Poland, and the south, under the rule of the Turks.

Thus the Moscow state had not succeeded in the course of the seventeenth century in achieving the complete liberation of White Russia and the Ukraine from Polish oppression.

Notes

1. "Magdeburg Law": a collection of German decrees of the late thirteenth century whereby the towns and the urban classes were granted the right of administration and self-government, courts, and class-based guild organizations free from seignioral dues or the jurisdiction of the feudal lords. During the fourteenth century it spread from Germany and Silesia into Poland, and from there into several towns of Lithuania, Galicia, and the Ukraine, stimulating urban colonization and the organization of the urban populace on the basis of classes and guilds.
2. Lyubavskii, "Nachalnaya istoriya malorusskogo kazachestva" (Early History of the Cossacks of Little Russia), in *Zhurnal ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniya* (Journal of the Ministry of Public Education) (1895), Vol. VII, p. 234.
3. Klyuchevskii, *Kurs russkoi istorii* (Course in Russian History), Vol. III, p. 131.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 139, 145.

THE FEUDAL ECONOMY OF RUSSIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND FIRST HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURIES

(XV)

General Conditions of Development of the Serf Economy During the Eighteenth Century

We now pass to an examination of the last phase of the feudal economic system, which in Russia encompasses the period between the early eighteenth century and the middle of the nineteenth century, after which the serf economic system gave way to industrial capitalism. We shall first present a brief general sketch of the social and political conditions of economic progress during the eighteenth century.

THE GENERAL LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRODUCTION FORCES We have seen that at the end of the seventeenth century the economy of the Moscow state, although completely dominated by the privileged landownership regime, began to reveal material improvement in the form of a growing social division of labor, the formation of a national market, and the development of commodity circulation and a money economy. The economy of serfdom began to adapt itself to the expanding market. With the development of urban life, with the increase in the cultural requirements of the ruling *boyar* and noble landowning classes, the rural lords began to feel a greater need of money and, in order to satisfy this need, endeavored to raise their income by increasing the exploitation of the *barshchina* and *obrok* peasants. Among the peasantry itself, the development of the market brought about greater differentiation. Trading peasants appeared, who bought produce in the villages for sale in distant markets, while other peasants established temporary contacts with the towns where they engaged in industry and trade.

Nevertheless, the production forces of the nation remained on an extremely low level. Neither urban handicrafts nor peasant household industry, nor even the more sizable estate industries could satisfy the needs of the expanding internal demand, the necessities of the growing foreign trade,

and, above all, the military needs of the state. All fairly important and advanced products of household need of the upper classes, or of the court (valuable wools, silks, wine), as well as those of military equipment (metals, arms), were imported from abroad. All foreign trade was in the hands of foreigners (Englishmen and Dutchmen), since Moscow had no maritime fleet of its own and had even lost its old outlets to the Baltic Sea during the seventeenth century. The war machine was in a poor condition and bore traces of the outmoded class organization of the feudal nobility. In time of war the manorial nobility was expected to render service "with horse, men, and arms," that is, in full equipment, with their "company people." Almost no regular army existed, aside from "musketeer" regiments and some unsuccessful attempts at organizing "foreign" regiments, and even these began to be introduced only by the end of the seventeenth century. No navy existed at all. The arming of the troops and detachments of the nobles was handled irregularly: at times they were equipped with "firearms," on other occasions with "arrow weapons," that is, the bow and arrow. The domestic industry of the country was completely unequipped for the manufacture of good firearms, particularly cannons. It was mainly for this purpose that the first ironworks of the foreign masters, Vinius, Akem, and Marcelis, were organized.

In other branches of national economy, methods of production and labor productivity were also quite backward. The yoke of serfdom in both rural economy and urban handicrafts in the industry of the time killed all initiative and every opportunity for raising the productivity of labor. The ruling element in the administration of the state was the arbitrary will of the governors and clerks, who pauperized the population through heavy taxes. Finances were in a state of disorder, despite enormous duties. The population was almost wholly illiterate, and even among the privileged classes literate persons were rare.

The wars of the seventeenth century against Poland and Sweden revealed the glaring general backwardness of the Moscow state in its cultural, social, economic, industrial, and military aspects. Many progressive people of that period (such as Prince B. Golitsyn and others) clearly saw in this backwardness a great danger to the very existence of the state and to the interests of the ruling classes—the landowners and big merchants. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the interests of the growing state of the "all-Russian market," of the serf-holding landlord class, and of the emerging mercantile class raised acutely the problem of the need for overcoming this backwardness. All attempts to overcome this general backwardness in the economic development of Russia found expression in the era of Peter I and his reforms.

THE REFORMS OF PETER "When Peter the Great," says Comrade Stalin, "was confronted with the more advanced countries of the West, and feverishly went about building factories and mills to supply his army and improve the defense of the country, it was a peculiar attempt to jump out of the framework of backwardness." [1] In this respect "Peter accomplished a great deal toward the creation and strengthening of the national state of the landowners and merchants. It should also be stated," Comrade Stalin says further, "that the exaltation of the landlord class, the cooperation with the incipient merchant class, and the strengthening of the national status of these classes was carried out at the expense of the serf peasantry, which was being fleeced threefold." [2]

The Moscow state of the end of the seventeenth century (at the beginning of Peter's reign, 1682) already embraced nearly all Russian territories, including Smolensk, Chernigov, and the east-bank Ukraine, and was rapidly pushing its frontiers toward the east, into Siberia. It was, in the expression of Marx, "a system of local annexations, appropriate for continental areas; for a general offensive the use of the sea was necessary." [3] The wars of Peter I during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries pursued precisely this new aim—to obtain outlets to the seas (the drives toward the Azov and Black Sea, and the conquest of the Caspian shores), and to the western seas in particular, which would make possible "the opening of a direct passage to Europe" (Marx). The transfer of the nation's capital to the shores of the Baltic Sea (in 1713) was the culmination of this drive toward the western seas.[4]

By his sharp break with the old political and social order, Peter created the political, military, and material foundations for the "Europeanization of Muscovy," and its transformation into a European empire. But at the basis of this "Europeanization," Peter was unable to provide anything beyond the old system of serfdom, the same social serf institutions. The influence of Europe inevitably, indeed, awakened among the progressive elements of Peter's associates the idea of the advisability, in the interest of the state, of abolishing the practical slavery of a vast portion of his subjects. From the foreign reports we now have on the last years of Peter's reign, it appears that Peter was repeatedly advised to abolish serfdom and to introduce even a "limited freedom" for his submerged subjects.[5]

The influence of the bourgeois ideas of mercantilism on the urgency of promoting industry and commerce, and the importance of the personal freedom of the peasantry from that point of view were reflected in the well known views of the first publicist of the Petrine era, Pososhkov. "The landowners," he said, "are not the permanent owners of the peasants. . . . Their direct owner is the all-Russian autocrat, while they own only temporarily." [6]

Peter was, however, incapable of changing the existing social conditions. Therefore, while he was fully capable of seeing the negative features of serfdom, he was powerless before his own serf-holding nobility. He could find no other sources of revenue for his reforms besides the serf economy, and no other sources of personnel for his army or for his industrial construction aside from the same serf population. Having once become upset, for example, by the sight of the retail sale of serfs, where men were sold like chattel, "a thing unheard of in the whole world," Peter issued a decree to the Senate in 1721 in which he limited himself merely to the wish that "this type of sale cease, or should that be impossible," then, at least, they should be sold in whole families.

His decrees sounded, however, a great deal more authoritative on occasions when they made the raising of revenue their objective, and when their full burden fell on the taxpaying population in general, and the serfs in particular. A vital part in this connection was played by the capitation census of the whole taxpaying population taken by Peter (the first revision, or census of 1718) for the purpose of ascertaining and increasing the number of the taxpayers and of introducing, on the basis of this census, a direct "per capita" tax for everybody, "excepting no one, from the aged to the very last babe" (Senate decree of 1718). His fiscal aims—an increased tax—were achieved, but from the standpoint of the national economy and the taxpaying public the effect was negative. First, the quotas of persons reported by the census and subject to the per capita levy were raised through the inclusion of not only all various "idling" and "free" persons, but also of categories of the population which had previously not been subject to the per capita tax—palace peasants, state peasants, one-yard men (*odnodvortsy*), taxpaying tradespeople, common-land (*chernososhnye*) peasants, Siberian agricultural service people, and others. Secondly, among the serf population itself, the census and the per capita tax introduced a change whereby the decree of 1723 "placed" the *kholops* within the per capita impost equal to the serf peasants. In this manner occurred the apparent elimination of the *kholop* class. It was not accomplished, however, by way of abolition, but by joining the *kholops* to the peasants in the general "census affidavit" and in the general per capita levy. The inclusion of the *kholop* in the census affidavit meant his complete bondage, whereas formerly the "service kabal" and "residence record" (*zhilaya zapis*) afforded him some opportunity for earning his freedom.

Thus, henceforth, their mere official entry into the census record fixed the taxpaying position of two main groups of the taxable population: the "royal" tax-liable persons and the serfs of the landlords. The fiscal aims of these reforms of Peter were such that among the taxable population "no one . . . shall belong to the idle," and that each "shall be attached to some

service or in someone's domestic service, and not roam without serving," and that "none shall remain without being included in the tax."

We shall not dwell here on the other phases of Peter's reforms, on his measures for the promotion of industry related both to his reform and military problems, or on his "Europeanization" in the spirit of the mercantilist ideas of his age. These shall be discussed separately at a later point. Here, to raise the general problem, we shall merely indicate that, in any event, the enormous successes of Peter in this respect required new methods and means for developing industry—the attraction of "new people," new initiative, new technique, capital, and a new organization of industry. And here, too, as we shall see subsequently in greater detail, Peter was still incapable of functioning outside the general conditions of serfdom within which he was compelled to propagate industry.

Clearly, on the basis of what we have just said, the reforms and wars of Peter, despite their advantageous significance, were of necessity a heavy burden on the national economy of the mass of the people, who were being "fleeced threefold." Diverted from their work to endless wars, to build towns and a navy, for hard labor on industrial enterprises, and to all types of general "royal service," the population was impoverished, forced to curtail or completely abandon its economy. Even an apologist and theoretician of the reforms of Peter like Pososhkov refers to the "soul-killing per capita head levies" (the per capita tax), and also to the fact that the peasantry, due to the burdensome levies, "quit their homes and ran, some into the lowlands, some toward the borderlands, and others beyond the frontier, and thus settled foreign lands while leaving their own wasteland." [7] It must be noted, however, that the per capita duty had one advantageous aspect: the peasant who paid one poll tax of 70 kopecks per person, regardless of the amount of land he cultivated, could by hard work increase his acreage. This did, in fact, occur: the arable land of the country increased in the course of the first half of the eighteenth century, regardless of other circumstances.

His huge military expenditures compelled Peter to initiate, in addition to the per capita tax, a variety of other duties, leaving nothing untaxed which could be used as a source of revenue: the sale of salt, the wearing of beards, the sale of oak coffins or cucumbers, the keeping of bees, the grinding of knives and axes. The total amount of tax collected over several years of Peter's reign increased five times. In addition to money duties, the populace was extremely overburdened by heavy obligations in kind—by the requisitioning of horses and carts for the military supply, by chopping wood for shipbuilding, by work on the construction of fortresses and towns, by work in factories, and so forth. For the fortification and construction of Petersburg alone, tens of thousands of peasants were driven together from all parts of

Russia to perish in that swampy region from exhausting labor. Moreover, the dragnet of military recruiting caught annually tens of thousands of the peasant youth.

PEASANT UPRISINGS UNDER PETER I So unbearable an existence for the mass of the population provoked many spontaneous revolts. Minor disturbances on the part of the peasants and the urban propertyless poor were a common occurrence. The largest uprisings broke out at Astrakhan in 1705, provoked by heavy taxation. A more serious rebellion spread among the Cossacks of the Don in 1707, when the latter were being mobilized for the performance of various labors and obligations on the same basis as the rest of the taxable population. The Cossack hetman Bulavin became the head of the rebellion, after which it began to spread rapidly. The Cossacks were soon joined by "runaway" peasants who had come to the Don as a place of refuge from serfdom. From the Don the revolt burst into Voronezh County, where it gained support among the people employed in the construction of a canal between the Volga and the Don. From there the uprising swept through a number of near-by districts where the bonded peasantry joined with the Cossacks in razing the mansions of the landlords. The uprising of Bulavin engulfed a huge area between the lower Don and Volga and the middle Volga region, finding an echo in many outbreaks of peasant revolts in a number of localities, as well as among the Bashkir, Tatar, Cheremis, and other non-Russian nationalities. Like many another elemental and unorganized peasant revolt, the Bulavin uprising was crushed by the regular troops.

CONDITIONS OF DEVELOPMENT DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY The radical departure from the old political, social, and economic order under Peter I was significant in that, although it left untouched the rule of the landowning class, it changed the conditions of existence and also social roles to a considerable extent. In many respects it made a return to the old Moscow order impossible. Therefore, despite the palpable strength of reaction during the second half of the eighteenth century, particularly during the so-called "dictatorship of the nobility" in the reign of Catherine II, dedicated to an even stronger entrenchment of the rights of serfdom and the personal and official privileges of the nobility, the future trend in the economic development of the country remained unchanged.

By the end of the eighteenth century, as a result of new conquests and new annexations, the frontiers of the empire came to include new vast possessions: the Baltic area (Estonia, Livonia, and a part of Finland under

Elizabeth); the entire southland, including the Crimea, the Azov shore, and the northern Caucasus (under Catherine II); and from Poland (in 1772–1795) all of the west-bank Ukraine, Polesye, White Russia, and Courland.[8] This circumstance alone was of great potential significance. "The all-Russian market" during the eighteenth century expanded in area to about 913,000 square kilometers, compared with 687,000 square kilometers at the beginning of Peter's reign, and in size of population, to more than double that of the early eighteenth century: it now served 29,000,000 people, compared to 13,000,000 people in the reign of Peter.

GROWTH OF THE SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET The rapid gains in territory and population during the eighteenth century of necessity quickened the process of social division of labor, the expansion of the market, and the circulation of goods. Underlying this process was the development of industry and, despite the prevailing system of serfdom, the "flight from the village" induced by industry, which was attracting more and more part-time, factory-employed peasants who paid *obrok* and who were turning from their ancient pursuit of agriculture to industrial and commercial occupations. The nonblack-soil belt was the first to be drawn into this movement. Throughout the nonblack-soil provinces, between one-fifth and one-third of the adult male population had already changed to nonagricultural means of livelihood, severing their ties with rural life by the end of the eighteenth century. At the same time geographic specialization within the country's economy began to increase. Agriculture was constantly gaining in the southern districts, and becoming their specialty, while the nonblack-soil north, which paid *obrok*, based its economic existence upon the development of industry. In the peasant rural economy special groups of households became distinguishable by their acquisition of a money character and by working for the market.

The greatest upheaval in this respect occurred in fact during the first half of the eighteenth century. One of the foreign observers of the seventeenth century emphasized this fact which amazed him; namely, that "in Muscovy . . . in the provinces far from the rivers, the inhabitants cultivate only sufficient land for their own subsistence." And in further depicting the general conditions of economy and life, he observes: "It is impossible to conceive of anything poorer than the garments of the Moscow peasants: underwear of thick coarse canvas and bast slippers, which they fashion with extraordinary skill. There is almost no Muscovite who did not know or did not practice this handicraft."[9]

By the middle of the eighteenth century, this exclusive maintenance of a

natural economy and the existence of the processing industry, in conjunction with agriculture, began to recede into the realm of tradition, and remained only in the memory of contemporaries. The writers of the second half of the eighteenth century were unanimous in emphasizing the far-reaching changes since the beginning of the century in connection with the separation of industry from agriculture. One well known author of the mid-eighteenth century, Boltin, describes this upheaval in the following words:

> From the agricultural class a substantial number passed into the class of factory and handicraft industrial workers. A number of towns were erected, and many buildings were added, the construction of which required a great many master workmen. . . . The most fertile provinces suffered poor grain harvests for many years, in the course of which all reserves of grain were exhausted and the price consequently doubled.[10]

And writers of the same age, Shcherbatov, Yelagin, and others, in emphasizing "the shift of diligence in work from agriculture to industry," ascribed to that fact the reduction in agricultural acreage, the exhaustion of "reserve granaries," the rise in the cost of living, and so forth. Shcherbatov says:

> This is the root of evil in Russia, that in many of its provinces a great number of peasants have abandoned agriculture and taken up other occupations. Formerly the peasants devoted themselves to grain raising, and were well fed but poor. Now the same peasants, taking leave of agriculture, have proceeded to engage in other work, and have actually become richer in money, although agriculture declined.[11]

Furthermore, the scholarly statistician and economist of the early nineteenth century, Arsenyev, in recalling the bygone period, declared that

> in former times our native land knew very little about urban industry, and therefore the inhabitants themselves were compelled to satisfy their own basic needs, and to be some type of artisans and manufacturers, at least for articles vital for their shelter, clothing, and subsistence. This still continues today, and, hence, many villages have acquired the aspect of towns inhabited by handicraft peasants.[12]

GROWTH OF URBAN POPULATION Population statistics for the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries (the so-called "revisions") offer insufficient data for a calculation of the urban and industrial population. Combining all available figures in this field and making all the necessary corrections, we may express the general growth of the population during the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, including urban, rural, and serf population, in the whole empire (including Poland, the Baltic, and Finland) in the following table. (Figures of the first census of 1897 are shown for purposes of comparison.)[13]

TOTAL POPULATION
(BOTH SEXES IN MILLIONS)

DATES OF THE REVISIONS		IN THE ORIGINAL TERRITORY	IN THE ANNEXED TERRITORY	TOTAL	URBAN		RURAL		SERFS	
					Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1st Revision	1722	13		13	0.3	2.3	12.7	97.7		
3rd Revision	1762	19*		19*			14.5†		7.6†	52.4†
5th Revision	1796	29	7	36	1.3	3.6	34.7	96.4	20.0	55.5
7th Revision	1815	30.5	14.5	45	1.7	3.8	43.3	96.2	20.8	46.2
9th Revision	1851	39	28	67	3.4	5.0	63.6	95.0	21.7	31.5
10th Revision	1859	45	29	74	4.2	5.7	69.8	94.3	22.7	30.7
1st Census	1897	65	64	129	16.3	12.6	112.7	87.4		

* For the whole empire.
† Persons of both sexes for Great Russia and Siberia only. The percentage of the serf population for 1762 is computed in relation to the rural population only.

From the above table it is evident that the absolute growth of the population, with regard to both the natural increment of the population and its increase in the annexed territory, proceeded very rapidly. The urban population meanwhile increased substantially in absolute gains, but, as previously, it constituted a small proportion of the total population. We have no data for accurate calculation of the industrial population proper, that is, those same seignioral, state, "possessional," registered, and other peasants, who, in small groups of "free people," together with parts of the urban population, were engaged in industrial production. In any event, it may be stated with confidence that during the eighteenth century the serf-operated agricultural economy occupied a preponderant position in the economy and social relationships of the country. Beginning with the early nineteenth century, however, one striking fact may be observed: the nearly static number of the serf population, but its relative decline in proportion to the total population of the country.


SUMMARY OF THE GROWTH OF THE SERF POPULATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY According to the statistical evidence for the eighteenth century (not entirely accurate, to be sure), the serf population during the eighteenth century noticeably grew in numbers, constituting the majority of the entire population by the middle of the eighteenth century. Thus, the second revision in Great Russia and Siberia (without Petersburg Province) reported 3.4 million serfs of the male sex out of a total number of 6.4 million male peasants, that is, 53.7 per cent of serfs. According to the third revision of 1762–1766, of the total number of 7.1 million males among the rural population of Great Russia and Siberia (about 14.5 million of both sexes), serfs amounted to 3.8 million males (about 7.6 million of both sexes, or 52.4 per cent of the total village population). Estimating the entire population of Great Russia and Siberia at some 17 million persons

of both sexes in 1762,[14] the proportion of serfs to the whole population in those parts of the former empire was 45.5 per cent at the beginning of the reign of Catherine II. In later years the absolute number of peasant serfs increased sharply, particularly as a result of granting state peasants and state lands to the nobility: during the thirty-five years of Catherine's reign, a total of 800,000 peasants were "granted," that is, turned into serfs, in this manner, and in the four years of Paul's reign, 600,000 persons. In the meantime Catherine's decrees of 1763 and 1783, and Paul's decree of 1796 extended serfdom to the rural population of the annexed Ukrainian provinces and throughout the remaining provinces of the south: the Yekaterinoslav, Caucasian, Tauride, and Don areas. As a result, the fifth revision (1794–1796) recorded a serf population of 9.9 million males, the sixth revision of 1811, 10.4 million, the eighth revision (after the emancipation of 416,000 serfs in the Baltic provinces), 10.9 million. The size of the serf population remained at this figure almost without change until the end of the period of serfdom: according to the tenth revision of 1859, there were 10.7 million male serfs.

Thus the rapid growth of the serf population becomes evident in the early nineteenth century, when it rose in number from 3.8 million (third revision) to 10.9 million male persons, that is, nearly three times (eighth revision), after which the absolute number of the serf population began to decrease slightly. The relative size of the serf population to the total population was, however, declining throughout the entire period, decreasing from 45 per cent, in the sixth revision, to 30.7 per cent for the whole empire, and to 37.5 per cent for European Russia, by the tenth revision.[15]

However, these summary figures tracing the growth of the serf population are subject to correction in view of the disproportion in its geographic distribution.[16] The percentage relationship of the number of serfs to the total number of peasants in the fourth revision was, for example, in the Kaluga Province 83 per cent; in the Smolensk and Tula, 80 per cent; in Yaroslavl, Kostroma, and Pskov, 72 to 76 per cent; in Nizhny Novgorod, Oryol, Vladimir, Moscow, and Tver, 64 to 69 per cent; in Pensa, Saratov, Novgorod, and Simbirsk, 56 to 51 per cent; and lowest in Olonets at 6 per cent; and in Vyatka at 2 per cent.[17] On the basis of the tenth revision figures of 1859, the percentage of serfs to the total population for the various provinces was over 50 per cent in 17 provinces, chiefly the nonblack-soil regions adjacent to Moscow (Smolensk, 69.07 per cent; Tula, 68.94; Kaluga, 61.80; Vladimir, 57.91; Kostroma, 57.41; Tver, 50.63), and also in several of the northwestern provinces. A percentage of between 25 and 50 was recorded in 19 provinces, chiefly in the central black-soil area (Oryol, 46.26 per cent; Pensa, 46.25; Kursk, 39.99; Tambov, 39.87), in the Ukraine (Poltava, 34.47 per cent), the southern (Yekaterinoslav, 31.51 per cent), and in sev-

No. 8


PERCENTAGE OF SERF POPULATION AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OBROK* AND BARSHCHINA† ACCORDING TO THE IV REVISION 1781 - 1783
0 125 250 375 500
Kilometers
Archangel
Petrozavodsk
Helsingfors
Revel
St. Petersburg
Novgorod
Vologda
Pskov
Riga
Mitau
Kostroma
Yaroslavl
Tver
N. Novgorod
Vyatka
Perm
Kovno
Vilno
Vitebsk
Moscow
Vladimir
Kazan
Grodno
Minsk
Smolensk
Kaluga
Ryazan
Simbirsk
Mogilev
Tula
Warsaw
Penza
Samara
Orenburg
Tambov
Orel
Chernigov
Kursk
Voronezh
Saratov
Uralsk
Kiev
Poltava
Kharkov
Yekaterinoslav
Cherkassk
Astrakhan
Percentage of serfs
up to 20
21-40
41-60
61-79
Over 80
Percentage of serfs on Barshchina
up to 35
35-65
over 65
No data
State frontier
*Payment in kind or in cash in commutation of compulsory labor.
†Compulsory labor on land, in handicrafts or in factories (corvée).

eral northwestern provinces. Between 10 and 25 per cent prevailed in six provinces (Petersburg, Vologda, Tiflis, Samara, Kazan, and Orenburg), while six other provinces (Tauride, Olonets, Vyatka, Astrakhan, Stavropol, and Bessarabia) had a serf population of less than 10 per cent.[18] Moreover, the percentage of the serf population declined in individual provinces. If we compare the above-cited calculations based on the fourth and tenth revisions, it seems obvious, despite the incomplete comparability between the data, that by 1858 the relative size of the serf population had decreased most sharply in those particular provinces where the urban and industrial population were increasing at the highest rate.

Hence, the center of serfdom was to be found in the old provinces of the Moscow state, in the provinces nearest to the capital, as well as in the Polish west, where the institution of serfdom was quite prevalent even prior to its annexation. In the borderlands, southern as well as northern, and in Siberia, the proportion of the serf population was considerably smaller, and in some areas negligible.

OTHER CATEGORIES OF THE PEASANT POPULATION Besides the serf peasants on the estates, the intricate social composition of the peasant population of the eighteenth century included numerous other groups of the peasantry, who were generally fewer in number than the manorial peasants. Thus, according to our figures of the fourth and fifth revisions (1783 and 1796), the peasants of some of the larger groups numbered in male persons: state peasants, 7.2 million; common-land peasants (*chernososhnye*), 627,000; palace and royal peasants, 597,000; those assigned to mining enterprises, 264,000; and "possessional," 80,000. Altogether, according to data of the fourth revision, the number of manorial serfs constituted 52 per cent, and state peasants, 42.4 per cent. The latter incidentally served as a reserve from which various "grants" were made, that is, state peasants were turned into serfs.

These were the quantitative totals of the main groups of the peasantry, the manorial serfs and the various types of "state" peasants. As we have seen, these groups made up the preponderant portion of the population. Urban and industrial inhabitants were still negligible in number, although they constituted the particular sector showing the highest rate of increase.

SERF ECONOMY AND INDUSTRY DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY From the above data it seems that the quantitative results of development in the social division of labor and in the market, as revealed by their basic statistical indexes, that is, the growth of the urban

population and the rise of industry, could not be very great under an economy of serfdom. To be sure, aside from its quantitative growth, the significance of the market became more profound as the result of the growth of industry. In absolute size the growth of the industrial population was not yet impressive. And Russia remained an agrarian and peasant land. But it should nevertheless be noted here, as we shall indicate in greater detail later, that Russia in the second half of the eighteenth century was not a backward country in its industrial aspect by comparison with other European countries, especially continental states (France, Germany), the latter likewise not yet having entered the stage of "free" capitalist development. A significant number of industrial enterprises (increasing nearly eighteen times by the end of Catherine II's reign compared with the age of Peter), their large scale, and the high quality of such basic industrial products as ferrous metals indicate the achievements of the industrial development in Russia which had begun under Peter I, the growth of social division in labor, and the separation of industry from rural economy. Continued possibilities and successes in the direction of the development of industrial and capitalist relationships in Russia, similar to those of the West during that time, were hampered by the prevalence of serfdom. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, due to the "aristocratic reaction," the predominance of the serf system became more entrenched. The extension of serfdom into new territory, the lavish distribution of state-owned "inhabited lands" (lands and peasant serfs, through grants to the nobility, the favorites, and others), the extension of the practice of "assigning" peasants to the "possessional" factories (submerging them in a position close to serfdom, the increase in the application of peasant serf labor not only to rural economy but to industry as well)—all these tended to expand serfdom, to intensify it, and to lend it the character of a system encompassing the entire national economy and all regions of the land.

The end of the eighteenth century was the height of the development of the serf economic system. It corresponded fully to the existing level of development of the nation's material productive forces, and was conditioned by them. Under a system of primitive and exclusively manual methods of production, which required no skilled labor, a fairly large-scale production could be achieved merely on the basis of the simple cooperation of a poorly skilled mass labor force. A large labor force was required not only in the productive process proper but in its subsidiary and contributory operations such as the preparation of wood and coal, the delivery of water, and so forth, as well as in the supply of provisions and foodstuffs for the workers. The serf organization of labor in its simplest form fulfilled these requirements.

Here, for example, was fashioned a form of organization of serf labor on industrial enterprises known as "brother for brother," that is, whereby one-half of the serfs worked in industry, and the other half in agriculture to obtain the food supply. Even in a major branch of industry such as ferrous metallurgy in the Urals, a primitive manual technique prevailed (aided by the application of water power and horse power). The raw materials and fuel needed for production were prepared by the labor of peasants working for the "per-capita tax" at low wages. The same was true of other branches of industry.

During the nineteenth century European capitalist technique steadily outstripped the backward serf-production methods of Russia. The latter was falling more and more behind the capitalist industry of western Europe, due to the continued predominance of serfdom in Russia. Moreover, since the early nineteenth century, especially the first quarter, serfdom entered a period of integration and decline, as a result of which industry began to witness the birth of capitalist technique along with the development of the use of free labor. The effect on agriculture was equally decisive. In the non-black-soil belt, as a result of industrial development, the agricultural population was declining and changing to industrial occupations. Agriculture in the black-soil belt, however, consequently found an expanding market in the other areas.

True, the problem of the formation of an extensive national single market could not be fully solved, primarily because of the natural economy of serfdom. Another obstacle was raised by the distance of the consuming centers from the producing zone, and the lack of an improved transportation system. Thus, for example, the fluctuation of prices for agricultural produce was extremely great during various years and in various areas. Moreover, the fiscal policy of the government, along with the internal customs duties, long retarded the formation of a single market. Founded upon mercantilist ideas, the legislation of Peter I, which concerned the regulation of the domestic supply of grain and its export abroad, rigidly delimited the areas in which the ports could make their purchases for export, while export proper was also regulated. Internal trade, besides a number of long-existing monopolies, was paralyzed by internal tariffs and other restraints. After 1753, however, internal customs duties were abolished, and subsequently, in 1762, free trade in agricultural produce, and in grain particularly, was ultimately permitted. To this, however, should be added the measures of special protection for the landowner's rural agriculture; for example, the provisioning rules of 1758 concerning the purchase of grain from producers, the confirmation of the nobility's right of monopoly in distilling, and so forth.

UPRISINGS AMONG THE PEASANTS AND WORKERS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY The growing burden of serfdom, and the extension of serf bondage during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries resulted in the most severe aggravation of the peasantry's struggle against serfdom. The direct oppression of the serf manorial economy always created an atmosphere favorable to uprisings among the mass of the serf peasantry. The social protest of the peasantry against the system of serfdom was reflected in their systematic flight from the manor, and in their unauthorized resettlement on new land in the south and east where the oppression by serfdom was not as harsh. Individual instances of active resistance to landlord oppression manifested themselves in the murder of landlords and the burning of mansions, which were consistently becoming more frequent. When the system of serfdom, from the second half of the eighteenth century and during the reign of Catherine II in particular, began to assume more brutal forms along with its widespread extension into new regions, and not only into agricultural areas but industrial regions as well, peasant uprisings began to encompass a vast continuous territory. In some areas (the East, for example) the discontent engendered by the general oppression of serfdom was supplemented by national discontent, with the result that entire nationalities (Bashkirs, Kalmyks, and Mordvins) rose with the Russian peasants against Tsarism and the landowners.

Disturbances and revolts among the bonded peasants, the serfs, and "possessional" workers became more frequent from the end of the eighteenth century. Thus, during 1750–1760 numerous rather large outbreaks occurred in the most varied localities—in the Tver and Yaroslavl provinces, in the Urals, in the Voronezh, Simbirsk, and other provinces. The strength and significance of these outbreaks are revealed by the fact that the pacification of the peasants required troops employing artillery, and that, as a result of the clashes, dozens of persons were killed. During the subsequent decade, 1762–1772, some forty major peasant disturbances were reported in various localities (Novgorod, Smolensk, Kazan, Vyatka, Tver, and others), similarly involving the use of military force for their pacification.

Disturbances among the workers were particularly frequent and sizable in the "possessional" factories. During the second half of the eighteenth century they were reported at numerous factories in both the central provinces and the Ural mountains (especially frequent and serious, for example, in the Demidov plants). The main causes of the disturbances were usually the general harsh conditions and low wages for "possessional" and serf labor. For instance, at the Repnin plants in Lipetsk the disturbances were occasioned by the reduction of wages from 4 and 5 kopecks a day to 2 and 3 kopecks. The seriousness of the clashes may be gauged by the fact that at the Demidov

plant, for example, in 1752, a clash with a military detachment of five hundred people ended in losses of over one hundred persons dead and wounded among the workers and peasants.[19]

The uprising of Pugachyov (1772–1774) was the culminating point of the elemental mass struggle of the peasantry and workers against the regime of serfdom. Engulfing a vast area from the Urals to Penza, and from Kazan to the lower Volga, the uprising found fertile soil in the harsh conditions of serfdom throughout the Ural factories, in the national discontent and impoverishment of the Bashkir people, and in the oppressive conditions of the demesne peasants in the Saratov, Simbirsk, and other provinces. This extremely serious uprising of serfs against the nobility was crushed only with the aid of large forces of regular troops.

After the suppression of the Pugachyov revolt, peasant uprisings quieted somewhat, and after 1774 the historian counts a total of twenty outbreaks.[20] Later, however, at the very end of the century, uprisings began to occur once more. During the three years of the reign of Paul I, 278 disturbances were recorded in thirty-two provinces.[21]

THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SERFDOM IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY The question of the nature and peculiarities of the development of serfdom during the eighteenth century becomes especially important and complex, since by the end of that century serfdom as an economic system reached its greatest development and expansion both quantitatively and qualitatively. Beginning with the early nineteenth century, however, it entered a period of decline, and by the middle of the nineteenth century suffered its final collapse. Hence, the period of the economic history of serfdom and its dissolution during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is most replete with internal contradiction.

The reforms and wars of Peter, his "Europeanization" of Russia, and the outlet to the sea stimulated the development of towns, industry, and trade. But all the Petrine reforms, as a "peculiar attempt to leap out of the bounds of backwardness," were carried out within the framework of the feudal system, and aimed not at its abolition but merely at adapting it to new conditions and thereby give it added strength. Serfdom, in its most brutal and backward forms, not only remained the basis of rural economy in the old provinces, but was extended into new regions not previously accustomed to the economy of serfdom. Since the time of Peter I, large-scale industry (by the standards of that period) gained a scope and organization that called for the employment of capital, free labor, and commodity production. But after numerous attempts at such an organization, which would have been

outside the framework of serfdom, industry, as represented by a major branch such as metallurgy, resorted to the most difficult manorial and serf forms of organization. The "democratic" and bourgeois mercantilist ideas (Pososhkov) and policy of Peter I, exemplified by his promotion of "new people," entrepreneurs, factory builders, and seekers for free manpower for these factories, invariably encountered conditions of serfdom which shackled industrial freedom and enterprise. Flourishing under Peter I in part, but especially under his successors, were such manifestations of the feudal regime as the distribution of hundreds of thousands of *dessyatins* of land with millions of bonded peasants to the palace aristocracy and favorites, and the existence of various privileges for the official nobility, as well as the expansion of their proprietory rights over their serfs. The subsequent expansion of the market and the increase of commodity circulation conflicted, as previously, with the natural agriculture of serfdom and its poorly developed production of commodities, its low productivity, and primitive technique. In social-political life a handful of privileged "Europeanized," sometimes "liberal," aristocrats, despite their European education in liberalism, were fiercely devoted to serfdom. Millions of the submerged, illiterate, impoverished, and semistarved peasantry struggled for freedom and a better existence through persistent uprisings, and represented, despite their lack of organization, a serious threat to the ruling class.

These were the contradictions of the age which, by the end of the eighteenth century and particularly in the nineteenth century, reached their highest tension and led to the absolute collapse of the system of feudal serfdom by the middle of the nineteenth century.

Notes

1. Speech before the plenum of Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), Nov. 19, 1928.
2. Stalin, *Beseda s nyemetskim pisatelem Emilem Lyudvgom* (Interview with the German Author Emil Ludwig) (1938), p. 3.
3. Marx, *Secret Diplomatic History*, p. 87.
4. See Map 6, facing p. 268.
5. Klyuchevskii, *Kurs russkoi istorii* (Course in Russian History), Vol. IV, pp. 135-136.
6. Pososhkov, *Kniga o skudosti i bogatstve* (Book on Poverty and Wealth) (Sotsekgiz, 1937), p. 254.
7. *Ibid.*
8. See Map 7, facing p. 269.
9. Olearii, *Opisaniye puteshestviya v Moskoviyu* (1637–1639 gg) (Description of a Journey to Muscovy [1637–1639]—1906 ed), pp. 279 ff.

10. *Primechaniya na istoriyu drevniya i nynechniya rossii g. Leclerca, sochinyonnye general-mayorom Iv. Boltinym* (Comments of Mr. Leclerc on the Ancient and Contemporary History of Russia, Composed by Major-General Iv. Boltyn) (1778).
11. Shcherbatov, "Statistika v rassuzhdenii Rossii" (Statistics in an Analysis of Russia) in *Sochineniya* (Collected Works) (1896), Vol. I.
12. Arsenyev, *Nachertaniya statistiki rossiiskogo gosudarstva* (Outline of Statistics on the Russian State) (1818), Vol. I, p. 135.
13. The table is compiled on the basis of the following data: from the first to the tenth *revision*, according to the calculations made by "Statisticheskoye issledovaniye otnositelno Rossiiskoi imperii" (Statistical Investigation Concerning the Russian Empire), Pt. 1, O *narodonaselenii* (On Population) (St. Petersburg, 1819); Keppen, *Devyataya reviziya* (The Ninth Revision) (1857); Troinitskii, *Krepostnoye naseleniye Rossii po desyatoi narodnoi perepisi* (Serf Population of Russia According to the Tenth National Census) (1861); as well as on data drawn from Ignatovich, *Pomeshchichye krestyane nakanune osvobozhdeniya* (Manorial Peasants on the Eve of Liberation) (1925), Chap. III.
14. K. German, *Statisticheskiye issledovaniya* (Statistical Investigation) (1819), Vol. I, p. 33.
15. Troinitskii, *Krepostnoye naseleniye Rossii po desyatoi narodnoi perepisi* (1861), p. 83.
16. See Map 8, p. 275.
17. Semevskii, *Krestyane v tsarstvovaniye Yekaterini II* (The Peasants During the Reign of Catherine II) (1903), Vol. I, pp. 31 ff.
18. Troinitskii, *Krepostnoye naseleniye Rossii po desyatoi narodnoi perepisi* (1861), p. 85.
19. Semevskii, *Krestyane v tsarstvovaniye Yekaterini II*, Vol. I, pp. 418-441; Vol. II, pp. 414-503.
20. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 456.
21. Trefilyev, *Ocherki po istorii krepostnogo prava v Rossii* (Essays in the History of Serf Law in Russia) (1904), pp. 18-282.

(XVI)

The Serf Manufacturing Industry of the Eighteenth Century

GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MANUFACTURING PERIOD In the economic history of Russia, the beginning of the eighteenth century and the reforms of Peter were of great importance for the development of industry. In this particular period began the "manufacturing" stage in the history of Russian industry, which continued within the framework of serf industry until the middle of the nineteenth century, when feudal manufacture changed into capitalist manufacture, and afterward into the capitalist factory. In the industrial development of Russia the prehistory of this period of serf manufacturing of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries may be found on the one hand in the development of the serf manorial industry in the Moscow state of the seventeenth century, and on the other hand in small handicraft and *kustar* industry.

While the early eighteenth century may be considered the first line of demarcation of the "manufacturing" period in the industrial development of Russia, this should not be understood in the sense that Russian manufacturing and its budding large-scale industry emerged *only* in the early eighteenth century, created *only* by Peter and, furthermore, "artificially" propagated by him without any preliminary economic preparation (as originally believed by one of the historians of Russian industry, Korsak, and later by many writers of Populist tendencies).[1] On the contrary, from our preceding presentation we have seen that, as early as the second half of the seventeenth century, "large" (for that age) industry[2] began to come into existence in the Moscow state alongside the prevailing small urban handicraft production. Its first infant steps were taken on the large manorial economies by a variety of industrial enterprises working for a wide market (the enterprises of Morozov and others), or in the enterprises of foreigners, created chiefly for the military and other needs of the state.

Still, these early steps and peculiar forms of "large" industry were not sufficient in the seventeenth century to lay the foundation of the manufacturing period in Russian industry. This foundation can be traced specifically to the reforms of Peter, inasmuch as the distinct elements that had come into existence earlier and functioned as the prerequisite premises for manufacturing were by the age of Peter I molded into a developed system.

The bases for the creation of capitalist manufacturing in the West were: the expropriation of the agricultural population and the emergence of a class of hired workers; the accumulation of capital and the rise of the industrial capitalist; the existence of a market for mass production and wide exchange on the basis of social division of labor; and the well known advanced level of manufacturing technique founded upon the division of labor within the workshop.

In the circumstances leading to the rise of serf manufacturing industry in Russia, these preliminary conditions assumed a very different character in consequence of the very existence of the social-economic relationships of serfdom, within which serf manufacturing in Russia originated during the eighteenth century.

The existence of large fortunes and the accumulation of capital in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries arose, as we have seen, on the basis of the substantial accumulation of money by the landowning class, as well as by merchants and industrialists. Large commercial capital became the chief source for the emergence of our first manufacturing during the age of Peter. Among these "manufacturers" of Peter may be found many names of the former Moscow "guests" and merchants. To them we should, indeed, add a number of large landowners, a few foreigners, and other persons. A majority of these persons, to be sure, owing to a lack of personal capital, obtained assistance from the treasury in the course of establishing their industrial enterprises. But the amount and number of these contributions were not especially impressive: according to the calculations of Tugan-Baranovsky, no more than fifteen to twenty private enterprises per hundred established during the age of Peter obtained loans for their enterprise amounting to 15,000 to 30,000 rubles.

Clearly, the "large" manufacturing industry emerging in Russia during the eighteenth century was, by its very nature, most intimately connected with the state, with the latter's military and economic problems, and, hence, with such financial assistance as the state might render an infant industry. Likewise, in western Europe, even in the case of an advanced industrial state like France, the participation of the state with its investments and the erection of fiscal industrial enterprise were known to have occurred and exercised a strong influence on the development of private capitalist industry. There, too, private enterprise found support in the government by means of various industrial privileges, tariff protection, and so forth.

In this same respect we should examine the question of the formation of the large-scale exchange and wide market required by a system of manufacturing. The serf economy with its natural and consumption character, as well as its poorly developed social division of labor, could not function as

an extensive consumer market for our nascent manufactures. Nevertheless, manufacturing under Peter to a large extent did cater to a wide market, preparing wool cloth, linen, nails, dishes, and so forth. This aspect of feudal manufacture developed even further in Russia than in western Europe, owing to the backwardness of handicrafts and the earlier emergence of extensive market connections and a wide market. Obviously in Russia, as in western Europe, the state and its military-industrial orders served, especially during the earlier phases, as the largest consumer of the products of manufacturing industry. The artisan could not satisfy this type of demand either as to the nature of such products or as to their volume. Therefore the large government contractors, in western Europe and in Russia alike, faced with an increased demand on the part of the state, arrived at the natural conclusion that for such large deliveries they must depend only on unified manufacturing production rather than on the small handicrafts. Nor should we, despite all this, exaggerate the connections between manufacture and government orders and consumption during the age of Peter.

Finally, another preliminary condition for the development of manufacturing was the evolution of the class of the industrial proletariat. In this respect we observe a most significant distinction in the industrial development of Russia compared with western Europe. The economic conditions of serfdom and the bondage of a considerable part of the agricultural population offered little opportunity for the substantial and rapid formation of the class of free manufacturing workers required by the rapid rate of development in industry proper. Therefore, in conformity with the whole economic system of serfdom, the question of manpower for Russia's manufactures during the eighteenth century became largely a problem of serf labor. The ranks of free and hired laborers could be filled from the urban handicrafts, but the latter were poorly developed; hence, this source was small and could not yield the skilled workers required by manufacturing. Another source were the enterprises employing seasonal peasant labor (*otkhozhye*) of the serfs who paid *obrok* and were released by the landlord. At times these seasonal enterprises outside the villages provided the manufactures with the relatively skilled labor of the *kustars,* who, after engaging in industrial processing in their own homes, brought their technical skills to manufacturing. Finally, the most skilled among the free laborers were the foreign master workmen. All this limited the availability of a technically trained worker force equipped for manufacturing production.

However, even under Peter, industry had already found the number of these free workers inadequate for its purpose. At times a newly established factory would obtain, along with assistance from the state, experienced masters and workmen from old state plants. Additional forces of hired work-

ers needed by the entrepreneurs were recruited with great difficulty from various elements: fugitives, retired soldiers, children of the soldiers, the poor, the vagabonds, and others. Although in western Europe persons of this type likewise filled in part the ranks of manufacturing workers, the bulk of such labor was recruited among the mass of proletarianized free rural population, while the more skilled labor elements came from the former artisans. In Russia, under conditions of a poorly developed system of handicrafts, industry had no access to such sources. For this reason the problem of labor organization became particularly acute for the manufactures of Peter. The solution of this problem was marked by lack of absolute clarity or consistency. The well known Petrine decree of 1721 [3] permitted "mercantile people" to buy fully inhabited villages for their factories and works "upon the condition that those villages remain forever inseparable from those factories." But even the use of another method—the "assignment" of peasants to the "merchants' factories"—still left unsolved the problem of hired or serf labor in industry. Although the "assigned" factory workers were not formally serfs, the practice did, in fact, encroach upon the nobility's monopolistic class rights to the compulsory labor of the serf. The struggle for industrial manpower between the nobility and the merchants became, therefore, a matter of supreme importance during the eighteenth century.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE WORKERS Our latest sources enable us to assume that even for the eighteenth century one must not exaggerate the prevalence and significance of serf labor in our industries. Despite the earlier opinion of Tugan-Baranovsky concerning the expansion and profitability of serf labor from the standpoint of the factory owners of the period (for which reason they sought the right to acquire serfs), recent historical publications (still fragmentary to date) assign much less significance to serf labor in many branches of industry than had been previously assumed. Thus, according to the surveys (*enquette*) of 1737–1740, for the manufacturing enterprises of the Moscow, Yaroslavl, and Kazan provinces (a small number of thirty-four enterprises and 6,992 workers, to be sure), the social composition of the labor force in the various branches of production is characterized by the figures (in percentages) in the table on page 287.[4]

As suggested by this table, "peasant children" proper often constituted no more than between one-third and two-fifths of the total number of workers. Such "declassed" proletarianized groups as the children of soldiers and tradespeople together constituted about one-half or more of the labor force. Furthermore, during these years, the "hereditary proletariat" proper, as represented by the "mill hands' children," held a position rather prominent for

that era, comprising about one-tenth of the total number of workers in the said branches of production.

On the whole, then, serf labor played a prominent role in the industry of the eighteenth century. In contrast with western Europe, therefore, the first growth of Russian manufacturing industry came within the milieu of serfdom. This circumstance was fraught with important consequences. Once a solution for the basic manpower problem in the organization of production was found, "industrial development" and the establishment of serf-operated manufactures began to be undertaken not only by merchant capital but also by the manorial nobility with their abundant supply of serf manpower. As the result of the nobility's struggle to preserve its monopoly over manpower, the decrees of 1762 forbade nonaristocratic enterprises to buy peasants for their manufacturing mills. And although permission to buy peasants for industrial enterprises was restored in 1798, the latter measure was of

Social Groups of Workers	Wool Cloth	Linen and Cotton	Silk	Other †
Peasant children	23.5%	41.2%	36.1%	46.9%
Tradespeoples' children *	23.2	22.3	33.4	20.9
Soldiers' children	27.8	11.1	11.6	6.0
Mill hands' children	11.0	13.3	5.6	9.0
Total ‡	85.5	87.9	86.7	82.8

* Included in the group of tradespeople (*posadskiye*) were the tradespeople proper, "tax-paying peasants of the various settlements," artisans, clerks (*podyachiye*), and others.
† Included in the group of "other" manufactures are sailmaking, button-making, the manufacture of red lead, glass, pipe, and other products.
‡ No breakdown is available for the others.

little significance by that time, inasmuch as the merchant industries began to change to hired labor from the turn of the century. But the industries of the nobility continued for a time to operate with serf labor. In view of their privileges, the branches of manorial industry connected with raw material produced on the estates proper, in the production of wool cloth, for example, or in linen and paper production, began more and more to crowd out the mercantile industries. By the end of the eighteenth century, for example, of the forty wool-cloth industries nineteen belonged to the nobility (Tugan-Baranovsky). The situation was reversed in cotton, silk, and leather production.

MANUFACTURING UNDER PETER I In this way three main types of manufactures[5] appeared since the time of Peter: the fiscal, "possessional" (belonging chiefly to the merchants), and manorial (owned by the

nobles). What, then, were those industries during the age of Peter in technical and economic aspects? Were they in actuality comparatively large and technically centralized industrial enterprises, or, on the other hand, were they merely a simple aggregation of primitive attic rooms (*svetelka*) of the *kustar* character, unified by capital through the so-called "distribution system"?

This question has not been answered unanimously by our economic literature. The first historian of the Russian capitalist factory, M. Tugan-Baranovsky, and a recent historian of the Ukrainian factory, A. P. Ogloblin, as well as P. G. Lyubomirov, have answered the question to the effect that the Petrine and post-Petrine industries were centralized enterprises on a rather large scale. These authors found support in the fact that many manufactures under Peter I employed a thousand and more workers. Other students (Tarle and Kulisher) adhere to a contrary opinion, maintaining that only small numbers of workers were employed on the manufacturing premises while the rest worked at home, and that a considerable number of the latter engaged in supplementary labor as well. The paucity of facts at the disposal of these authors prevents them from arriving at a conclusive and well documented solution of this problem. Only a few very recent publications make it possible, on the basis of concrete detailed material, to reconstruct the scene in which the old manorial industrial enterprises, employing the labor of taxpayers (*tyagletsy*) or bonded peasants in their own homes, at times gradually became centralized manufactures, operating partly with serf and partly with hired labor.

On the basis of these data, it may be recognized that serf manufacturing during the eighteenth century was conducted in enterprises employing manual labor exclusively and operating on primitive technical equipment, but these enterprises were none the less quite sizable at times. In some branches the technical equipment of the manufacturing process (weaving, for example) was such that it easily fitted into the ordinary peasant hut, and, hence, such "manufacture" amounted to a type of domestic work by the peasant on his own loom and in small separate "attics." For example, the Crown manufacturing of sails in Moscow employed 1,162 workers, the wool-cloth manufacture of Sachegolin, 730; the state wool-cloth manufacture of Miklyayev, 742 workers, and so forth. Despite this impressive number of workers, however, the technical concentration of production in such manufactures was evidently quite undeveloped. A number of available descriptions of the latter indicate, for instance, that the weaving manufactures were frequently not a single enterprise with hundreds of workers in a single building, but rather a coordinated system of separate units, including even part-time work at home by a number of *kustars*. For instance, one of the

large sail manufactures of Menshikov, at Pochep, consisted of twenty-three attic rooms for "working persons," eight barns for work, and a number of additional wooden structures. Still another sail manufacture, that of the Stroganovs (in 1732), consisted of thirteen attic rooms of seven to eight windows each. Thus the "manufactures" were sometimes settlements of *kustar* huts while real "factory" buildings, stone-built and large in size, were, in light industry at least, not of common occurrence.[6]

In some instances (in the ironworks, for example) the technique of production called for performance of operations in general shops, and involved the application of mechanical motive power, chiefly water power, the use of refining furnaces and bellows, brick furnaces, and so forth. Although in such instances the division of labor within the shop was limited, and each worker was equipped with primitive tools and implements, such as a hammer, tongs, and others, it none the less made possible a simple accumulation of labor and its division, that is, an increase of productivity. In addition, in some of the more important state enterprises, only a few operations, which were impossible to perform in the homes of the master workmen, were performed in the factory buildings, while the remaining operations were performed in the attics of the *kustars* or in the homes of the master workers. For example, the Tula armament plant, a major industrial unit, possessed very little technical centralization of production. If this was true of the state arsenals, the process of production at the other, smaller, private manufacturing establishments must have been, indeed, still less centralized and still closer in organization to the attic of the *kustar*. In a number of branches of production, such as wool cloth, linen, silk weaving, and others, the entire process was often divided between a centralized type of manufacturing (weaving) and a *kustar* hut type (the woof, spinning, and coarse work [surovya]), a fact acknowledged by the protagonists of the theory of a "centralized" type of manufacturing.[7]

We must naturally not underestimate the significance of technical centralization of production achieved by the eighteenth century. The proper answer to the question of the nature of manufacturing during the early eighteenth century must evidently not be sought within a framework of conditions applying to all types of industry, but rather in specific relation to the concrete technical and economic conditions of the emergence and operations of these branches and individual enterprises. Whether a branch of production or enterprise had its origin in an environment of manorial production for the consumption needs of the owner, originally employing serf labor exclusively, or in the small peasant "household" industry, or, finally, whether they evolved as special manufactures for the market or for

government contracts, determined the form of organization of a particular serf manufacturing industry.

An interesting comparative picture for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is presented in this respect between, on the one hand, the manorial linen production of the "royal estates" and the "common (*khamovnye*) suburbs" near Moscow (Kadashevo and Khamovniki) or near Yaroslavl (Breytovo and Cherkasovo) and, on the other hand, the Tula and Kashira ironworks.

The common (*khamovnye*) royal suburbs came into existence as early as the sixteenth century when, as it seemed, the former free artisans' settlements there were subjugated to the manorial regime. By the seventeenth century they were typical feudal manors of the industrial type: the taxpaying industrial inhabitants in return for their allotment and for the "royal wage" rendered obligations in the form of their "trade," that is, preparing linen. In the early seventeenth century all "taxpayers" worked at their own benches in their own homes. No "free" workers of any kind, except a few foreign masters, existed. The typical features of the feudal manor were quite apparent. The greater part of production was for the personal use of the estate owner—the Tsar and his court, and only surpluses were destined for the market. But by the end of the seventeenth century, work which was previously performed at home and at the benches belonging to the peasants came to be superseded by work in "chambers" at a common court, that is, in the form of centralized manufacturing; the obligatory labors had become a form of industrial factory labor.[8] By the end of the seventeenth century, linen production in these villages began to die down, but in the early eighteenth century Khamovniky became the scene of the first linen-manufacturing company of the capitalist type, belonging to a group of Russian merchants and headed by the foreigner Tames.

The origin of large-scale manufacturing in such branches as iron production at the Tula and Kashira factories was of a quite different character. In the Tula district production of metal in small handicraft foundries, as we have seen previously, had existed for a long time. The history of large-scale production dates back to 1632, when the foreigner Vinius obtained from Tsar Mikhail Fyodorovich a charter of grant for the construction of an iron-making plant (15 versts from Tula). The Dedilov mines were assigned as a raw-material base for the plant, and the factory was also assigned an entire volost of 347 peasants. This complete industrial production unit had the general name of the "Gorodishchensk factories."[9]

Vinius, at first in the company of two other foreigners, Akem and Marcelis, and afterward all three independently, established a number of factories on the Vaga (near Vologda)—the Kashira, the Protvin, Ugoda, and other mills.

Omitting the lengthy history of the transfer of these factories from hand to hand and from one management to another, as well as the occasionally sad fate of the factory owners themselves, we may still see in these factories, as regards their organization, composition of the labor force, and technique, some of the first centralized manufactures of the capitalist type in Russia. A majority of the labor force at the Tula and Kashira plants, in the main branches of production as well as in the extraction of raw material, was hired labor. Only the preparation of lumber and transport remained organized along the line of obligatory *obrok* dues. In a technical sense the process of production in a majority of these factories was centralized, even if incompletely. The technical division of labor within the plant and the breakdown of the process of production were conducted quite adequately at such factories, although not thoroughly. Primitive mechanical engines and machines were used. According to the designation of production, a portion thereof, especially at the factories of Akem (bar and roofing iron, iron shutters, pans, anchors, and so forth), went to the open market. From the cannon and armament factories, chiefly the factories of Marcelis, production—cannons, mortars, and grenades (of a rather poor quality it may be noted)—went to the state, but even these factories produced a considerable quantity of goods for wide consumption through the free market.[10]

Some elements of the commodity-capitalist character of these manufactures and their technically centralized organization may be clearly observed. Generally speaking, the technique and centralization of production were not too far advanced, to be sure. These problems remained uppermost in the organization of industry for some time to come. It became necessary to adopt measures, not always successfully, for improving production technique through the centralization and mechanization of production. Thus in 1712, with a view to "better discretion and speed" in the armament business, Peter I ordered the construction at the Tula factory of an "armament yard, in order that arms shall be produced by all masters at the same armament yard without stoppage, whereas in the home, where some of them might live, no guns shall henceforth be made." Consequently, guns were manufactured until that time by masters in their own workshops, and only several operations (the boring of the muzzle) were performed in the factory shops and at the factory benches. The armament yard was completed in 1718, but evidently centralized production somehow failed to occur, since working at home was permitted even afterward, and in 1733 a substantial part of the buildings within the armament yard were carried away for scrap.[11]

Thus it may be noted that manufacturing under Peter produced no revolution in technique, and developed largely on the base of the old technique of handicraft and *kustar* production. This does not, indeed, diminish the

importance of the Petrine era as a period that brought into view the trend and organizational forms of later industrial development in all its characteristics and peculiarities.

STATE MANUFACTURES The first and simplest form of big-industry organization to which Peter I turned his attention was the construction of state industrial enterprises. The military needs, the creation of a navy, the reorganization of the army, and the construction of cities demanded swift measures for the increase of industrial production. In this manner emerged the armament and metallurgical plants: the Petrozavodsk, Sestroretsk, Okhta, and Tula. The Urals and Perm witnessed the creation of state mining units, the largest of which were at Uktuss and Kamensk. Other large state enterprises were the sail plant at Moscow, the saltpeter plants in Kazan and in the south, a number of glass factories (including the largest and well known Petersburg plant still in existence today), cotton cloth, wool cloth, tobacco, silk, and other plants. The size of these state enterprises may be judged by the following figures: 9 mining establishments in Perm had 25,000 peasants assigned to them, the Sestroretsk plant employed 683 workers, the Tula factory had 508 peasant households assigned to it, while 1,162 persons worked at the sail factory in Moscow. Built at government expense, these factories operated with the aid of foreign masters and Russian workers, along with peasants assigned to the factories as their "royal service."

MERCHANT MANUFACTURES It became necessary, however, at an early date to abandon this type of government industry, evidently because of its wastefulness. Gradually a large part of such enterprises, especially in the field of light industry, were transferred to the use of private persons on fixed terms. Along with a small number of previously existing enterprises, thus emerged, on the one hand, a special group of private merchant manufactures employing hired labor, and, on the other, the so-called "possessional manufactures."

A general order was issued in 1723 to the effect that the "state factories" should be transferred to "particular persons," individually or in companies. The main elements among such companies and individual entrepreneurs were merchants, tradespeople, foreigners, and, occasionally, noblemen. Thus the state wool-cloth manufacture at Kazan was transferred to the merchant Miklyayev, another to the merchant Shchegolin, a paper manufacture at Petersburg to Maslov and Solodovnikov, the Moscow linen factories to the merchant company of Andrey Turk, Tsimbalshchikov, and others. Of the industrial companies maintained by the nobility, the largest silk industry was organized by Count Apraksin, Shafirov, and Tolstoy. The largest entre-

preneur among the foreigners was Tames, the owner of several industries and the head of a company of large Russian merchants.

In general the "undistinguished" names of the merchantry, almost exclusively Russian at that, predominate in the lists of entrepreneurs during the age of Peter. This was true with respect both to private enterprises erected independently, and those leased from the state.

A part of the factories was built entirely by "personal expense," another part with some assistance from the treasury. Thus, in the above-named large company of Shafirov, the founders invested a capital of 81,300 rubles, while the assistance from the treasury amounted to 36,700 rubles. In the Tames company the founders invested 46,000 rubles (including 12,000 rubles by the largest shareholder, Miklyayev), while 5,000 rubles came in assistance from the state. The capital of the Tomilin needle factory company consisted of 3,000 rubles, and that of the linen factory of Goncharov of 142,000 rubles.

Thus, bearing in mind the high value of money during that period, it may be considered that the organization of industrial enterprises involved the investment of large capital, about a million or more rubles in terms of present-day money. "Primitive accumulation" had evidently attained a substantial volume for that time. The development of the manufacturing industry occurred, however, under conditions of the economic system of serfdom. The basic problem remained the shortage of the free and skilled industrial worker. Merchant manufacturing, employing freely hired labor, had therefore not shown any significant development, prior to the early nineteenth century at least.

"POSSESSIONAL" MANUFACTURE Serf manufacturing first emerged on the basis of the decree of 1721, which granted permission "in the interest of increasing the number of factories. Both the nobility and commercial persons shall be entitled to buy villages for those factories upon the permission of the Mining and Manufacturing Collegium only on this condition: that these villages shall remain inseparable from these factories." [12] Thus came into existence a special type of manufacturing, afterward known as the "possessional." [13] The name "possessional" was applied to factories of private merchants or former Crown enterprises which had been transferred to the use of private persons, together with their buildings and land, and sometimes including a loan as well as the right to buy peasants on the above-named conditions. The "possessional" owners obtained exemptions from obligatory government service and taxes, special customs privileges, and so forth.

The peculiar features of the organization and position of the "possessional"

workers were as follows. The peasants were "bound" not to the owner but rather to the enterprise; they could not be sold apart from it, and constituted one indivisible entity together therewith. All production in the "possessional" factories was under the control of the government. The volume, articles, and quality of output, including the regulation of the width and quality of wool cloth, for example; the terms of sale of the product, the level of wages, and conditions of work were all subject to control and regulated by the government.

Clearly, the "possessional" enterprises were under these circumstances a rather unprogressive and wholly noncapitalist apparatus. The owner was tied down by the terms of the production of goods, their pricing, delivery, and so forth. He was tied down by the availability of a fixed number of workers assigned to the enterprise. The conditions of the "possessional" and assigned workers were quite difficult, and disturbances and uprisings were very frequent among them. Wages were negligible: men received between 4 rubles 50 kopecks and 8 rubles 50 kopecks a month, women, 2 to 3 rubles a month. Some factory owners maintained their workers at full room and board and paid their taxes, as did the landowner for his serfs, while the workers were obliged to labor for him at a fixed rate of pay. The money earned was subject to the deduction of taxes, and only a few kopecks fell into the hands of the workmen. Each "possessional" worker spent about 260 days of the year in factory work, and some were released to do field work for one or two months. The length of the workday usually was 11, 13, and even 15 hours a day, or more.[14] A system of "tasks" was adopted, as a result of which it was necessary for an annual quota to be performed, and by the minors and the aged as well. Child labor was employed rather widely. At the same time the factory owners had no right to discharge their workers or curtail production. Nor was there any permanent force of professional and qualified workers.

Under the economic conditions of serfdom, many "possessional" factory owners were evidently interested not so much in industrial production itself as in a chance to acquire serf labor which they frequently used for purposes other than industrial production. The Factory Investigation of 1740 discovered a number of "false factories," that is, factories provided with serfs, but not actually functioning and, hence, subject to closure. Nevertheless, the "possessional" enterprises, in some branches of industry particularly such as the Ural mining industry, for example, existed throughout the entire era of serfdom and were liquidated only by a general order in 1861.

MANORIAL MANUFACTURING Finally, the last type of serf industry was the "manorial" manufactures of the landowners, operated exclu-

sively by serf labor of the seignioral peasants. The manufactures of the nobility were almost nonexistent during the reign of Peter, began to develop only with the second half of the eighteenth century, during a period of intensified protectionist policy on behalf of the nobility, and continued until 1840–1850, when they finally began to pass out of existence.

The elements of manorial manufacturing began to take root in the natural economy of the manor, partly as a result of several advantages in the latter's possession. First, of course, the manor was well supplied in manpower which the landowner was able to allocate with perfect freedom. In its mass this serf manpower was entirely unsuitable for skilled industrial labor. Yet some technical experience was gradually being accumulated, inasmuch as the manorial economy itself was always concerned quite extensively with the technical processing of materials for its own consumption needs. Many individuals from the large force of domestics were engaged in weaving linen, in preparing wool cloth, in knitting lace, and in producing a number of other articles. These trades were also practiced in the peasant household itself, again partly for its own consumption, partly to be delivered as dues in kind to the landowner, or, finally, for sale.

An important factor contributing to the development of serf manorial manufacturing was the ready supply of large quantities of raw materials—flax, hemp, wool, hides, and grain—which proved to be more profitable when sold in processed form. A market was readily assured, inasmuch as free transport supplied by the serfs in this respect provided another advantage to the manufacturing activities of the landlords. Under such circumstances only a minimum of expenditure in resources and capital was needed to organize a serf-operated manufacturing enterprise. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries these manorial manufactures appealed to all relatively prosperous landowners.

The organization of serf manufacturing proper was closely connected to the organization of the manor as a whole. The bonded peasants were engaged in agricultural labor, and only a portion of them worked in industry. At times, manufacturing was performed during the winter only, leaving all summer for agricultural work. No wages of any kind were paid, since these peasants were performing their tasks as *barshchina* obligations. Exploitation of serf labor was extremely severe, and it is little wonder that the peasants, in the words of Turgenyev, spoke of the "serf factory" with the same horror as "of the plague." Hence, the natural opposition of the serfs was reflected in the extremely low productivity of labor, in flight, disturbances, and so forth. Yet, down to 1861, all manorial manufactures continued to retain their main advantages: the abundance of unpaid manpower, access to raw material, and a low level of technique in production. They consequently persisted in those

branches of industry for which the raw material was produced within the economy itself, and in which production technique was low (wool and linen cloth). Conversely, they did not venture into production utilizing imported raw materials or requiring an advanced system of production (cotton industry).

MANUFACTURES OF THE PEASANT SERFS In addition to the manufactures of landowners proper, mention should be made of one other form of manufacturing closely connected with the system of serfdom, although employing hired labor for the most part. We refer to the enterprises of the peasant serfs. Inasmuch as the landowners, in the provinces paying *obrok* especially, were interested in promoting industrial activity on the part of their serfs, they readily permitted the serfs to set up industrial undertakings, at first rather small and of the *kustar* variety, which, if successful, grew into rather sizable manufactures and, eventually, into real factories. Occasionally these serf-entrepreneurs employed in their enterprises serfs officially assigned to the landowners, but for the most part they employed the hired labor of outside workers or of their own fellow villagers. Personally, together with all their possessions, they were still considered the property of the landlord. Their *obroks,* under such circumstances, were very high. It was even more difficult to buy their freedom; they were at times forced to pay tens of thousands of rubles for their release. Such, for example, was the history of the later well known prominent factory owner Morozov, who bought his freedom from his landowner for 17,000 rubles, or the Maltsevs, who by 1875 had already acquired a title of nobility; or a number of cotton-factory owners of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk district, formerly the serfs of Count Sheremetev, and many others. In general, however, most of these serfs quite rapidly became fairly well-to-do entrepreneurs (although some remained serfs up to the time of the reform of 1861), and their enterprises evolved as full-fledged capitalist factories as early as 1840–1850.

THE QUANTITATIVE RESULTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING UNDER PETER I[15] The above were the main types and trends of industry evolved since the time of the Petrine manufactures. They did, as we have seen, appreciably expand industrial production in existence at that time both in number and in new branches of production. The bulk of manufacturing under Peter I consisted of mining and iron works, arsenals, sailmaking, linen, wool cloth, cotton, glass, leather, silk, mirrors, wallpaper, chinaware, and other industries. Many of these branches had existed prior to the reign of Peter I, but were strongly stimulated in their development during the Petrine era. Regrettably, there are no

exact data as to the number of manufactures launched during the reign of Peter I. The frequently cited figures of Kirillov[16] list 233 industries at the end of Peter's reign, but these figures are obviously quite low for some branches, while they include, on the other hand, some enterprises of a non-manufacturing type. According to other data,[17] among 195 of the largest industries were included 10 wool-cloth, 19 linen, 7 silk, 5 leather, 4 cotton, and 3 armament-making enterprises.

Still more important was the fact that large-scale manufacturing, regardless of its rather low level, contributed to a rise in the general level of production forces. This was especially true, for example, of an industry like metallurgy. In volume of production of pig iron, Russia at that time, if we accept the figures of the same Golikov,[18] held a foremost position among the countries of the world, producing under Peter 6,500,000 poods of pig iron; this figure, however, appears to be considerably inflated.

THE POSITION OF HANDICRAFTS AND THE ATTEMPTS AT THE INTRODUCTION OF GUILDS It should be noted, however, that alongside these sizable enterprises of the manufacturing type, the small-scale production of the artisan and the *kustar* continued to develop under Peter. The increase in the number of urban centers, particularly such large and new centers as Petersburg, accelerated the growth of many types of urban handicraft. The city of Petersburg contained several thousand artisans. In addition to the customary and old crafts—the bootmakers, tailors, tanners, carpenters, and others, there were also new types: carriage builders, bookbinders, watchmakers, barbers, dressmakers, and others.

An attempt was made by Peter I to organize all urban handicraft along western European models, as part of his policy of introducing new urban institutions, by his Regulations of the Chief Magistrate in 1721[19] and by the special decree of April 27, 1722.[20] According to these statutes of Peter I, all "regular" urban residents were divided into two guilds: to the first guild belonged the big merchants, doctors, apothecaries, goldsmiths, and painters; to the second, the petty traders and small artisans. The latter were divided, according to their specialty, into *tsunfty* (guilds) headed by aldermen (elders), who kept special guild books containing a record of all artisans and were responsible for seeing that each artisan "practiced his handiwork with good workmanship." Each guild consisted of masters who practiced their trade independently. The masters were authorized to employ journeymen and apprentices, who joined the guild but without full membership rights. The guilds could admit persons of all classes, that is, the guilds were not to become class organizations. The guild-handicraft system envisaged by this legislation of Peter I was too much a replica of the western European models

to correspond to real conditions and the position of crafts within Russia. Therefore the system introduced by Peter I remained paper decrees without any application, as is confirmed by the repetition of a number of decrees containing demands that a guild organization of the urban handicrafts be introduced. As a matter of form, guilds indeed existed in many towns and settlements, but they included a negligible number of urban artisans; for example, in the second revision (population survey—1742), the Petersburg guilds reported a total of 709 artisans, Moscow, 117.

THE *KUSTAR* INDUSTRY Far greater in importance than handicrafts, at the time of the formation of serf manufacturing in Russia, was quite another form of small industry, namely the petty household, or *kustar,* industry. In examining the problem of the formation of manufactures in the West, Marx and Engels pointed out that "the immediate effect of the division of labor among the various towns was the emergence of manufactures, branches of production that had grown from the framework of the guild system."[21] In Russia the emergence of serf manufactures was related less to guild handicrafts than to the household *kustar* industry, which was widely distributed. Academician Shtorkh has already observed that the Russian artisans worked very little on order from the consumer, but instead sold their products in the market through jobbers. In fact, from the brisk trade in linen conducted through the Moscow stalls, and from the sizable export of this commodity abroad, we may conclude that this type of cloth was mainly produced by *kustars* and bought from the small towns and villages by merchants, since there were no linen weavers listed among the Moscow artisans. The same was true of many other branches. The wool cloth required by the state, nearly all of it of a coarse military variety, was likewise prepared by the peasants. It is, indeed, easy to see the reason why the nobility represented in the royal commission of Catherine II requested permission for the peasants to sell their wool cloth: this would be certain to increase their *obrok.* Mills for the production of paper also existed in the form of small enterprises. Furthermore, the manufacture of some articles consumed by the upper classes of the population, such as silk fabrics, gold and silver articles, was also performed by the *kustar* industry.

The villages of Moscow County alone, during the second half of the eighteenth century, had more than three hundred looms for the weaving of silk and cotton cloth and several hundred looms for weaving ribbons. In other areas the peasants manufactured light silk taffeta and silk shawls. In the Kostroma province dozens of goldsmiths, gilders, silversmiths, and embossers lived and worked in the villages. The forest provinces produced a variety of occupations associated with the processing of wood and other forest

materials, plaiting mats, sieves, bolters, and *lapti*, and making wheels, yokes, and sleighs; tanning and leatherworking were also rather popular peasant occupations. The same may be said of other branches: small-scale iron production, soapmaking, and so forth. It was under such circumstances that *kustar* production of linen arose during the eighteenth century at Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Shuy, the later centers of large-scale manufacturing. At that time, too, *kustar* production of metal articles came into existence at Pavlov in Nizhny Novgorod Province.

INDUSTRIAL POLICY AFTER PETER I The general character of industrial development discernible during the era of Peter I, the early eighteenth century, remained unchanged throughout the eighteenth century and half of the nineteenth century. The mercantilist policy of promoting industry on a basis of state regulation, and of supporting the industrial activity of private capital loomed large in the policy of Peter I and his successors. The state patronized the development of big industry by establishing manufactures and by extending loans and assistance through the treasury. It promoted the erection of large industrial and commercial monopolies in a number of lines of production. For the protection of native industry, high tariff duties were instituted, and occasionally outright prohibition against the importation of foreign goods.

The problem of supplying the enterprises with manpower was solved, as before, either by compulsory labor on the part of various "vagabonds," beggars, "persons of low grade or without subsistence," and others, or by the additional regulation of the rights of merchant manufactures to the employment of serf and "possessional" peasant labor. In view of the prevailing abuses in the use of "possessional" peasants, a decree issued in 1752[22] specifically fixed the number of "possessional" peasants that could be bought "for the mill" (between 12 and 42, depending on the rate of production). The labor problem of the merchant manufactures still remained unsolved. They were compelled more and more to resort to hired labor. A decree issued in 1762[23] stated: "It shall be unlawful henceforth to buy villages with land or without land for the factories and mills, which shall be content with free and hired persons according to their passports and for an agreed wage." The decree came as new confirmation of the privileges of the nobility and its monopolistic right to the labor of the serf. On the other hand, however, it reflected the cumulative need of the era—the need for a change to hired labor in industry.

It should be noted that, in view of the conditions of the age, under the successors of Peter I in particular, the policy of the "promotion of industry" through the extension of loans and the introduction of monopolies was

tantamount to a policy of encouraging the nobility, or even individual persons and "favorites." Owing to the prevalence of colossal bribery, loans and monopolistic rights were very often granted not to the actual entrepreneurs and not for purposes of production involving large capital investment, but to various favorites by bribes. The reigns of Elizabeth and Anna were periods of such unbridled favoritism and subornation that the extension of industrial loans and monopoly were changed from a means of encouraging industry into open raids on the treasury. Participating in enterprises of this type were not only the powerful figures of the day and their favorites, but also senators and the empress as well. Thus, under Anna and her powerful favorite Biron, in the direct violation of the law of 1714 which prohibited the leasing of mining enterprises to private persons, the favorite Biron Shemberg (who was himself also the "General Director of Mining," that is, manager of all mining enterprises) organized a private company for the lease and exploitation of Russian mines. Shemberg's company was granted enormous privileges and large subsidies along with commercial monopoly rights in mining products and tax exemptions. Both Biron and Anna shared in the income of the company. The affair ended with the change of reign, at which time Shemberg escaped abroad, leaving behind an unpaid debt to the treasury of about 370,000 rubles.

Another example of similar plunder under the guise of the protection of industry was the business activity of the most influential magnate of the Elizabethan period, Count P. I. Shuvalov. Being in control of the very rich White Sea, Astrakhan, and Caspian fisheries as well as the walrus and other animal and oil industries along the shores of the Arctic Ocean, he undertook to arrange for his acquisition of the new and very rich Goroblagodatsk (Mount Blagodat) mines in the Urals. The Senate decided to transfer these properties to him, explaining its action by the fact that Shuvalov had brought his fisheries "to a degree of expansion they had never known before." The result, however, was that the Goroblagodatsk mines, leased to Shuvalov for the negligible sum of 90,000 rubles, had to be taken over by the treasury after several years against a debt of 750,000 rubles owed by the count to the state. This happened despite the fact that a pood of copper which cost the "possessional" factory owner, at the highest price, no more than 2 rubles, 25 kopecks (the usual price was 1 ruble, 70 kopecks), was delivered by Shuvalov to the treasury at 5 rubles, 50 kopecks.[24]

THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF CATHERINE II Since the 1760's, in the reign of Catherine II, a change in governmental industrial policy became discernible, a policy under the guise of proclaiming the "freedom" of trade and industry aimed at the expansion of the rights of the land-

owning nobility in this field. The nobility was interested mainly in the abolition of industrial and commercial monopolies which, as we have seen, benefited only the upper clique of aristocracy and favorites. Commerce in the produce of the estates of the nobility had already assumed such proportions that it felt oppressed by internal customs duties. The interests of the commercial class in this connection also required the abolition of industrial and trade monopolies and restrictions. All this was reflected in the addresses made by many deputies of the famous commissions of Catherine II: "Freedom is the chief method for the promotion of commerce."

A number of industrial and commercial restrictions were, therefore, abolished in the second half of the eighteenth century. Several industrial monopolies were abrogated (in silk and calico).[25] A major barrier against the development of internal trade and industry was removed with the abolition of the internal customs duties in 1753. In the course of abolishing the monopolies, Catherine expressed herself in favor of the freedom of trade and industry. "No affairs," read the decree of 1767, "pertaining to commerce and factories can be conducted through compulsion, and a low cost of living is achieved as a result of a large number of sellers and an unimpeded increase of goods." A similar exhortation "to avoid monopoly in all cases" was repeated in the *Nakaz* [Instructions] of Catherine II.

Finally, with the Manifesto of 1775, Catherine proclaimed the freedom of industry and trade, permitting "everybody and anybody to start any type of mill and to produce in these mills any type of handiwork." This was not, of course, a proclamation of the principle of bourgeois freedom, but instead primarily a move to encourage the nobility and to adapt its manorial agriculture to new conditions. The nobility demanded protection and safeguards for its rights and economic privileges in its type of feudal industry and trade in the products of its estates. These measures did not, therefore, create real freedom in industry, but instead continued in effect the policy of protection for the benefit of the nobility and its enterprises. It was implemented, as previously, by high protective tariffs against foreign goods, by a number of prohibitions against imports and exports, and by attracting foreign industrialists for the purpose of developing new branches of industry. While forbidding industrial monopolies, Catherine introduced an important class monopoly of her own by confirming (in the Decree of Distilling issued in 1765) the exclusive rights of the nobility in the field of distillation. The reinforcement of the regime of serfdom and the expansion in the use of serf labor resulted in an increase in the manorial factories of the nobility, with the latter tending to surpass the factories of the merchants.

The late eighteenth century, a period of general substantial growth in several branches of industry represents the height of the manorial factories

of the nobility: in 1773 there were 66 enterprises of the nobility as compared with 328 merchant manufactures, that is, about 16.5 per cent of the total number. Fifty years later, by 1820, this proportion remained almost unchanged (15 per cent), but by the 1840's it declined to 5 per cent.

In this manner Catherine's policy favoring the nobility, in contrast to her proclaimed ideas on "industrial freedom," strengthened the role of the nobility's industrial enterprises and serf-operated manufactures. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, their importance began to decline rapidly.

In the field of small-scale industry and in the organization of handicrafts, a further step in the direction of the guild-artisan system of Peter was taken by Catherine II with the publication in 1785 of the Artisan Regulations, as a part of the Charters of Rights and Privileges of the Towns in the Russian Empire. Being a further development of the bases of Peter's legislation, the Artisan Regulations of 1785 retain the classless character of the guilds, but introduce a ban against "practice of a handicraft by he who is not enrolled in the administration in towns where an administration [guild] has been established for certain handicrafts." Retaining the institution of journeymen (with a term of training not less than three and not more than five years), the Regulations of 1785 anticipate the existence of not only a general "artisan administration," but also that of a "journeymen administration." However, the Regulations of 1785 introduced neither broad self-government among artisans nor, even less, any strict regulation of the working methods of the artisan, as was true of the western European guilds.

The final guild organization of handicrafts in Russia was introduced under Paul I, through his Code of Guilds issued in 1799. According to this code, the guild organization embraced all types of manual labor, all guilds being divided into three groups: (1) artisan, (2) service (domestics, laundresses, and seamstresses), and (3) laboring (for common laborers). The two latter guilds never were actually established, being eventually abolished in 1802, and the handicraft guilds proper also remained largely paper institutions.

QUANTITATIVE RESULTS OF THE MANUFACTURING PERIOD AT THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY[26]

What were the quantitative results of the development of Russian industry by the end of the eighteenth century? If we consider the number of contemporary industrial enterprises alone, any expansion along that line will appear quite negligible. The industrial statistics of that period are wholly inaccurate. According to the calculations of some students of the period,[27] compared with the 233 factories in existence by the end of Peter's reign, there were 984 at the time Catherine II ascended the throne (1762), while at the time of her

death (1796), their number rose to 3,161 (not counting the mines in which production was valued at 3,584,000 rubles). According to other calculations, there were 201 factories in 1761, and 478 in 1776.[28] Academician I. Hermann, in a report he published for 1780, gives a list of 302 large manufactures (without mines or government arsenals).[29] The differences may be explained not only by the unavoidable inaccuracy of such calculations, but also by the lack of any clear indication as to exactly what was designated as a "factory" during the period in question, and by the incomplete records of manorial industrial enterprises in particular, which were frequently counted among the enterprises of the small *kustar* type. Thus, in the same report of I. Hermann, about 1780, we find some enterprises with a capital of 150,000 to 300,000 rubles along with others capitalized at 1,000 rubles or less; as to the number of workers employed, we find in the list enterprises with 3,479 workers (the manufacture of the Goncharovs in Moscow), 2,679 workers (that of Yakovlev in Yaroslavl), and other enterprises employing only 15 to 20 workers.

In any event, by the end of the eighteenth century industry had achieved substantial quantitative successes. Thus, for example, if we consider leading branches of industry such as metallurgy and metal processing, we discover in the course of the eighteenth century both an impressive increase in the number of factories and a shift of the main centers of the industry from the old Tula region to a richer location in the Urals, which from then on became the chief center of the metallurgical and metal-processing industries. By the middle of the eighteenth century these branches had made enormous progress as compared with the early eighteenth century, when the chief center of these industries was still at Tula and in the old Oka and Ryazan districts. The first two ironworks in the Urals, the Nevyansk and the Kamensk plants, began operating in 1701; by 1716–1723 three more factories were added, and between 1724 and 1736 fifteen additional new factories were operating in the Urals. In 1766–1767, according to the official figures of the Board of Mines, the total number of blast furnaces and iron-producing plants in Russia was 120, of which 76 were located in the Urals.[30] According to data submitted by one of the most recent students concerning the location of the metallurgical and the metal-processing works, it would seem that the Ural metal industry (blast furnaces, forges, copper works, and metal-processing plants) consisted of 84 factories by the middle of the eighteenth century, an overwhelming number of which were founded during the second and third quarters of the century. In copper smelting the Urals accounted for 90 per cent—and in iron and steel, over 65 per cent—of total Russian production. The middle and south Ural regions were "a grandiose industrial district by contemporary, and not merely Russian, world standards."[31]

Compared with the expansion of Russian industry in volume and in number of enterprises, the problem of raising production technique and productivity of labor was still far from solved. In this respect even a major branch of industry like the ferrous metallurgy of the Urals had shown no noticeable improvement in the course of the entire eighteenth century. The daily volume of pig-iron smelting at the Ural plants had increased by the end of the eighteenth century, as compared with the Tula plants of the seventeenth century, more than three times (about 372 poods as against 100 to 120 poods). By comparison with the Tula plants of the seventeenth century, or with natural draught smelting, the Ural blast furnaces of the eighteenth century consumed considerably less coal and ore in connection with pig-iron smelting. But each blast furnace yielded only 4,900 to 20,700 poods of pig iron per year in the small plants, and in the largest, about 126,700 poods per year.[32] In general, blast furnace and metal-yielding production was primitively organized. The sources of power were limited to water power, and all factories employed water-operated hammers. The smelting of pig iron was done with charcoal exclusively. In the forging of iron, manual labor was the general practice. During 1723–1737 the first rolling mills for processing hoop iron appeared, and subsequently for the manufacture of sheet iron as well.

The rate of progress, as well as the total progress, achieved by feudal manufacturing of the eighteenth century in the field of technology were quite small, especially in comparison with the capitalist techniques that had already begun to develop in western Europe. Serfdom had fully revealed its negative influence in the realm of industry by the end of the eighteenth century.

Notes

1. Korsak, *O formakh promyshlennosti* (On the Forms of Industry) (1861), pp. 127-128 ff.
2. On the character of this "big" industry, see footnote No. 5 below.
3. *Polnoye sobraniye zakonov* (Complete Collection of Laws), Vol. VI, No. 3,711.
4. *Krepostnaya manufaktura v Rossii* (Feudal Manufacture in Russia), Pt. IV, Sotsialnyi sostav rabochikh pervoi poloviny XVIII v. (Social Composition of the Workers of the First Half of the Eighteenth Century), Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) (1934), p. xiii.
5. In the terminology of the period, the manufactures of the age of Peter I and immediately thereafter were called "factories," a term that does not correspond to the present-day meaning of the word. The so-called "factories" of the age of Peter I, and even those of the following period, were, as we shall see later, typical manufactures. They were, in addition, often decentralized, although quite large in size. Hence, we shall continue to call them "manufactures" except in such cases where it becomes necessary in context to retain the old name, which on such occasions we shall carry within quotation marks.

6. Ogloblin, *Ocherki po istorii ukrainskoi fabriki. Manufaktura v getmanshchine* (Essays in the History of the Ukrainian Factory: Manufacture in the Hetman Era) (1925), pp. 49, 66.
7. P. G. Lyubomirov, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi promyshlennosti v XVIII i nachle XIX v.* (Essays in the History of Russian Industry in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries) (1930), pp. 39, 94, 120, 173.
8. Yakobson, *Tkatskie slovody i sela v XVII v.* (Weavers' Settlements and Villages in the Seventeenth Century), GAIMK (1934), No. 113; also, *Krepostnaya manufaktura v Rossii* (Feudal Manufacture in Russia), Pt. III, *Dvortsovaya polotnyanaya manufaktura XVIII v.* (Palace Manufacture of Linen in the Eighteenth Century), Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) (1932).
9. See Map 5, facing p. 214, and Map 6, facing p. 268.
10. Baklanov, Mavrotin, and Smirnov, *Tulskiye i kashirskiye zavody v XVII v.* (The Mills of Tula and Kashir in the Seventeenth Century), GAIMK (1934), No. 98; also, *Krepostnaya manufaktura v Rossii* (Feudal Manufacture in Russia), Pt. 1, *Tulskiye i kashirskiye zheleznyye zavody* (The Ironworks of Tula and Kashir), Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) (1930).
11. *Arkhiv istorii truda v Rossii* (Archives of the History of Labor in Russia), Vol. I, pp. 18-19.
12. P. S. Z., Vol. VI, No. 3,711.
13. *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIV, Nos. 18087, 18211.
14. Semevskii, *Krestyane v tsarstvovanie Yekatereni II* (Peasants in the Reign of Catherine II) (1903), Vol. I, pp. 569-579.
15. See Map 6, facing p. 268.
16. Kirilov, *Tsvetushcheye sostoyaniye vserossiiskogo gosudarstva* (1727) (The Prosperous Condition of the All-Russian State [1727]) (1831 ed.), Vol. II, p. 133.
17. Golikov, *Deyaniya Pyotra Velikogo* (The Deeds of Peter the Great) (1789), Pt. VII. Cf. also German, *Istoricheskoye nachertaniye gornogo proizvodstva v Rossiiskoi imperii* (Historical Outline of the Mining Industry in the Russian Empire) (1810), Pt. 1.
18. This figure has been questioned by most recent students who regard it as either a simple typographical error or a figure representing the "administrative"; i.e., the projected factory output, rather than actual output, inasmuch as the production of pig iron in 1767 amounted to 4,985,000 poods only. See Strumilin, *Chyornaya metallurgiya* (Ferrous Metallurgy) (1935), pp. 174-180.
19. P. S. Z., Vol. VI, No. 3,708.
20. *Ibid.*, No. 3,980.
21. Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. IV, p. 45.
22. P. S. Z., Vol. XIII, No. 9,954.
23. *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, No. 11,490.
24. On the enterprising activities of Shemberg, Shuvalov, Shafirov, Yevreinov, and other "business men" of that age of favoritism, promotorism, and plunder, see Firsov, *Russkiye torgovopromyshlennyye kompanii v pervoi polovine XVIII v.* (Russian Commercial-Industrial Companies in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century), 2nd ed. (1922), p. 80 ff., also Lappo-Danilevskii, *Russkiye promyshlennyye i torgovyye kompanii v pervoi polovine XVIII v.* (Russian Industrial and Commercial Companies in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century) (1899).
25. P. S. Z., Vol. XVI, No. 11,630.
26. See Map 7, facing p. 269.
27. Burnashev, *Ocherk istorii manufaktur v Rossii* (Essay on the History of Manufactures in Russia) (1833), pp. 16-26.
28. Semyonov, *Izucheniye rossiiskoi vneshnei torg. i promyshl.* (Study of Russian Foreign Trade and Industry) (1859), Vol. III, App. 4.

29. B. F. Iohann Hermann, *Statistische Schilderung von Russland* (1790), S. 359-423.
30. Chulkov, *Istoricheskoye opisaniye rossiiskoi kommertsii* (Historical Description of Russian Commerce) (1786), Vol. VI, Bk. 2; Strumilin, *Chyornaya metallurgiya*, p. 174.
31. Lyubomirov, *Ocherki po istorii metallurgicheskoi i metalloobrabatyvayushchei promyshlennosti Rossii* (Essays in the History of the Metallurgical and Metal-Processing Industry of Russia) (1937), pp. 109 ff.
32. Strumilin, *Chyornaya metallurgiya* (1935), p. 175.

(XVII)

The Economic Structure of Serf Agriculture During the Nineteenth Century

THE ORGANIZATION OF SERF AGRICULTURE In its method of production, in its organization, and in its relation to the farming of the direct producer, the serf peasant, serf agriculture of the early nineteenth century differed little in essence from agriculture during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although all relationships within it had naturally become more complex.

All land on the serf estate was divided into two parts—the seignioral acreage and the land of the peasants. The sizes of each type of holding and the proportion between the two were determined exclusively by the economic considerations of the landlord, varying with his method of operating his economy. Under a standard obligation of three days of compulsory demesne labor, the distribution of the main arable acreage had to be approximately equal for both parts—the seignioral and peasant plowland. By the nineteenth century, however, this sort of proportion had already become rare, and, on the whole, the peasants tilled much more of the owner's land than of their own. As revealed in contemporary literature, there were occasions when each household (*tyaglo*) under *barshchina* obligations cultivated, say, 21 dessyatin, of which 14 belonged to the landlord and 7 to the peasant.[1] At times, indeed, the proportion was exactly in the reverse.[2] The owner's land was of a better quality and more conveniently located. In addition, even the arable land of the noblemen and the peasant land were not located separately, but for the most part lay scattered in separate pieces in cross-strips. As a result, both the manorial and peasant fields were frequently in need of so-called "compulsory crop rotation," that is, the planting of similar grains requiring simultaneous planting and simultaneous harvesting. With the development of more intensive forms of manorial farming during the nineteenth century (the introduction of beet planting, plowing under, and so forth), the manorial land tended to become more and more segregated from the peasant land, to be better cultivated and fertilized, although the strip system was frequently retained. The use of other types of land, pasture, for example, was mostly common for the manorial and peasant livestock alike. The

meadows were at times maintained similarly for common use, but the better "spring" meadows were to be found chiefly within the manorial farm area. The forests were almost always controlled by the landlord, and peasants were granted access to the forest only in case of need, for construction, and so forth.

Inasmuch as the farm of the peasant serf was almost the sole source of manpower and means of production for the estate, the owner, as a rule, in his own interest assured the proper maintenance of the manpower of the peasant household, its resources for production, its livestock, inventory, and supply of land. The organizational unit in the system of peasant obligations under serfdom was the *tyaglo,* that is, the peasant family, consisting of two adult workers, the man and the woman. In the *tyaglo* were usually registered peasant men between the ages of seventeen and fifty-five years, and peasant women from the time of marriage up to fifty years of age; minors were registered for light work. Frequently, however, the landlords registered in the *tyaglo* minors, bachelors, and elderly men up to seventy years of age. Each *tyaglo* was charged with a number of obligations: compulsory labor, *obrok,* and cash. The *tyaglo,* as a rule, was the standard for measuring the economic capacity of the estate as a whole and its income. Naturally, the fulfillment of obligations by the *tyaglo* depended upon its access to a definite amount of land, livestock, and inventory. Generally speaking, therefore, peasant farming under serfdom was arranged on a basis of "equalizing," that is, through the organization of comparatively uniform peasant households in respect to production capacity. When the need arose, the landowner performed an appropriate reshuffling between his weaker and stronger *tyaglos.* The interest of the landowner demanded a system of households more or less equal in their economic productivity.

The peasants themselves were interested in achieving the same goal. Weighed down by burdensome obligations, in labor as well as in kind, which had to be fulfilled on the basis of mutual responsibility, the peasants bore their obligations as one whole *mir* (community), while at the same time utilizing their allotted land as a community. As a result, the development of serfdom in the nineteenth century was accompanied by a revival of the "reallotment" function of the peasant land commune. All peasant land was subject to joint use and was divided in equal shares among all households according to the number of *tyaglo* members in each. Depending upon the shifts in the total number of the commune population as well as upon the change in the *tyaglo* standing of each family, periodic adjustments were carried out either in the form of a general reallotment of all land or a partial "lightening" or "loading" of "souls," that is, with land and the obligations connected with it. Frequently the landlord himself participated in this reallot-

ment and imposition, on some occasions forbidding the separation of families and the formation of independent households. On the whole, however, the *mir* and the commune largely served as the intermediary between the peasant and the owner, shielding the peasant, however faintly, against the arbitrary will of the landowner. Thus, parallel with the intensification of serfdom in the nineteenth century, came an increased need for the existence and utilization of the reallotment and equalizing functions of the peasant commune.

THE CORRELATION BETWEEN *BARSHCHINA* AND *OBROK*

Regarding the form of exploiting labor of the serf, each region, depending upon prevailing economic conditions—primarily on the extent of the development of trades and the industrial population on the one hand, and on the lucrativeness of the landowner's farming on the other—arrived at a different form of exploitation of labor and, consequently, a different organization of manorial farming. The peasant's "own" farming was merely "under the conditions of the seignioral economy, for the purpose not of 'securing' the peasant with means of subsistence, but the landlord with manpower." [3]

Therefore, depending upon a number of conditions and upon the requirements of the manor, the methods of operating both the manor and peasant farming underwent change. At times the landowners found it more convenient to develop their own agricultural production, and on such occasions they restricted the peasants' use of land to the absolute minimum, to a point just sufficient to retain a certain amount of economic capacity on the part of the peasant economy. On other occasions the landowners could liquidate altogether the independent farming of the peasant, granting him, in lieu of an allotment, merely his "keep" as a slave, and utilizing all peasant manpower exclusively for the landlords' own farming. In other instances a landowner might, on the other hand, find it inconvenient to maintain his own independent agriculture, in which case the bulk of the land was distributed among the peasant households while the estate derived its income from the numerous obligations in kind and in money incumbent upon the peasant household.

Thus we have two basic forms for the organization of farming under serfdom—the *barshchina* and *obrok* systems. Almost nowhere did an absolutely pure and clear form exist, being, instead, complicated by another, secondary form of labor exploitation of the serf. In their more distinct aspects these two forms of agricultural serfdom found expression in the two main geographical regions of the country—the nonblack-soil north and the black-soil south.


Let us first submit the quantitative data indicating the distribution of these two forms in the regions mentioned. The proportion of *barshchina* and *obrok* peasants for all estates during the first half of the nineteenth century was as follows (in percentages): [4]

PROVINCES	SERF POPULATION	BARSHCHINA	OBROK
Russian:			
Nonblack-soil	28.5%	41.1%	58.9%
Black-soil	22.5	71.2	28.8
Volga area	6.0	73.3	26.7
Eastern steppe lands	1.7	83.0	17.0
White Russian	9.7	92.4	7.6
Ukrainian:			
West bank	10.0	97.4	2.6
East bank	7.8	99.3	0.7
Steppe lands (New Russia area)	3.2	99.9	0.1
Total for 40 provinces	37.5	71.7	28.3

Thus we may note three regions distinguishable by the form of organization of their farming under serfdom.[5] In the first region of the nonblack-soil industrial provinces, *obrok* predominated (three-fifths of all estates), not without a sizable proportion of *barshchina* (two-fifths of the estates). In the second region, the black-soil provinces, the Volga area, and the black-soil southeast, *barshchina* predominated (about three-fourths or more of all estates), while *obrok* also existed (one-fourth to one-fifth). In the White Russian, Ukrainian, and southern steppe provinces *barshchina* predominated heavily (more than nine-tenths of all estates, almost a full 100 per cent). Outside of the main Russian (black- and nonblack-soil) provinces, the other provinces, especially those of the steppe lands of the south and east, the serf population was on the whole rather insignificant, as shown by the table.

From a comparison of the above figures we may see that, in the main, the boundaries between the regions in which either the *barshchina* or the *obrok* system predominated coincided with the boundaries between the black-soil and nonblack-soil belts, varying only with the difference in the economic conditions within these regions. In the black-soil belt, and in the central agricultural provinces in particular, because of the high-fertility abundance of the soil, because of the proximity of either the internal or external consumer market and the rather high prices for farm products, and because of a lack of other sources of livelihood and pursuits for the peasants, in such areas it was most profitable to exploit the labor of the peasant on the manorial farm in the landlord's fields.

No. 9



† Payment in kind or in cash in commutation of compulsory labor.

* Compulsory labor on land, in handicrafts or in factories (corvée).

BARSHCHINA The *barshchina* organization of farming in its typical form, particularly, say, in the central agricultural regions, was a system of farming in which the cultivation of the owner's field was performed not only by peasant labor but also with the aid of the livestock and implements of the peasant. As a result, the agriculture of the manor as a whole, in its trend as well as in its technical level, differed little from that of peasant farming.

To the landowner the peasant's own farming represented primarily a source of manpower. In his own field work the lord could have employed his own implements, or selected the trend of his production independently of the trend of peasant farming, utilizing peasant labor not only in agricultural but in industrial production as well. But for this manner of organization for his farming, a landlord would have required a rather sizable amount of capital, something which most landowners did not possess. The usual agricultural activity of the nobility was, therefore, technically and integrally connected with the farming of the peasant, the latter serving as the basis of manorial farming. The expansion of the one usually resulted in the contraction of the other.

Therefore, in those provinces where *barshchina* cultivation predominated and advanced, the allotments and plowing of the peasant were curtailed. Thus, in the typical *barshchina* provinces of the central agricultural zone, where the proportion of manorial land was not less than 50 per cent of all arable land, the average peasant allotment per person ("per each 'revision' soul") seldom exceeded 2.5 to 3 *dessyatins*. In the nonblack-soil provinces, on the other hand, where manorial farming was less profitable and where *obrok* consequently predominated, the landowners retained for their own use 20 to 25 per cent of all land, and on rare occasions one-third, releasing the remainder to the peasants, with the result that the peasant allotment per person in these regions attained as many as 4 to 5 *dessyatins* or more.

The *barshchina* method of farming, therefore, usually predominated on estates of medium size, inasmuch as this method required not only the presence of the owner but also his active participation in the farming of his land. The very large or very small landowners, on the contrary, preferred not to maintain their own agriculture: the first, because they lived in the cities, held high office in the government, and even a small *obrok* from many thousands of serfs yielded a tremendous income; the second, because the amount of land they owned was so small that there was barely enough for peasant farming.

How heavy then, on the whole, was *barshchina* exploitation from the standpoint of the peasant household? We have already said that within agriculture proper the increase of *barshchina* had reached a point in the seventeenth century, where in return for the use of 3 to 4 *dessyatins* for his own

farming, the peasant cultivated one *dessyatin* of the owner's land. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the peasant cultivated, as a norm, one *dessyatin* of the owner's land for each *dessyatin* of his own. In 1797 a general standard for *barshchina* work was fixed by law at three days per week, with a rest day on Sunday. But even earlier, mostly, however, by the nineteenth century, the landowners were evidently no longer content with this three-day *barshchina* limit. Thus many deputies and members of the nobility indicated to the commissions of Catherine II that the three-day *barshchina* was "considered quite moderate" and that, in fact, *barshchina* often was greater and attained as many as a full six days and even seven days, with the result that "agriculture has begun to decline." [6]

In a similar manner during the nineteenth century, according to the reports of a number of contemporaries (N. Turgenyev, Tuchkov, and others), many landowners in the Tula, Ryazan, and other agricultural provinces increased *barshchina* requirements for the summer not only to four but to five and even six days, leaving only Sunday for the peasant's own affairs. And some landowners of the Tula province, reported by the same Tuchkov, enforced compulsory labor duties on Sunday as well, and since it would be "a sin for a Christian to work for himself on a holiday," the peasant had no choice but to harvest his own grain . . . at night. At times the fulfillment of *barshchina* requirements according to the number of days was substituted by "quotas" in the form of a fixed amount of work per *tyaglo;* in other words the daily system was replaced by piecework, but the quotas were so large that a tremendous strain of labor was required to fulfill them.

Such was the labor situation on the manorial plowland during the summer. The landowner was not, however, merely interested in the gratuitous labor of his serf peasants from the point of view of his own agricultural production. Many industrial enterprises of the landlords were similarly founded on traditional serf labor. During the nineteenth century, with the expanding scope of industrial enterprises on the manor, this aspect of exploitation of compulsory labor became steadily more important. The profit to the landlord was greater because the exploitation of the peasant labor was maintained not only during the summer, as was true of agriculture, but throughout the year. The establishment of large industrial enterprises, however, required large capital, which made this method of utilizing *barshchina* labor accessible only to a comparative few.

Furthermore, besides field work the *barshchina* obligations of the peasant on nearly all estates applied to various types of construction work, to the production and transportation of bricks, to digging, and others. During the winter months the women assumed the burden of *barshchina* by weaving linen, wool, and so forth, all on the basis of very heavy quotas.

Finally, another very prevalent and important way of utilizing the unpaid obligatory labor of the serf was the so-called "carting obligation," that is, the duty of the peasant household to supply carts and manpower for carrying the produce of the landlord's farm into town and to the market. Under the system of transportation prevailing at that time, the manorial farm needed a dependable source of transportation to carry produce to the town house and to the market for sale. The estate owner thus found the means for organizing his transportation in the *barshchina* labor of his serfs: the delivery of grain and other produce was usually among the major obligatory tasks of the peasant. And since such products during this period were shipped not only to the nearest market or pier, but to certain distant central markets, say Moscow or even Petersburg, sometimes for distances of 400 or 500 versts and more, in order to obtain more advantageous prices, the carting obligation consumed a great amount of time. According to figures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Moscow during the 1840's received no less than 9,000,000 poods of various grains, which required no less than 450,000 carts. The total shipments of manorial produce engaged about 800,000 persons during the summer, and as many as 3,000,000 during the winter. Consequently, we may consider that the carting obligation consumed approximately up to 30 per cent of the working time of the serf peasant during the wintertime, and up to 8 per cent during the summer, while its value expressed in money amounted to 54,000,000 rubles.[7]

Nor does this exhaust the list of obligations imposed upon the *barshchina* peasant. He was, in addition, obligated to various minor contributions in kind: linen, wool, hemp, eggs, geese, and others, and often to money payments in addition. Consequently, *barshchina* frequently went hand in hand with *obrok*.

It thus becomes rather difficult to ascertain exactly the burden of the *barshchina*. We may merely indicate that it consumed the preponderant part of the working time of the serf, leaving him an insignificant portion of time in which to provide his own subsistence. According to the calculations of Semevsky, the cost of *barshchina* obligations during the 1760's amounted to approximately 7 or 8 rubles per person, while thirty years later it rose to 14 or 16 rubles for each person.[8]

From increasing *barshchina* to 5 or 6 days per week there was only a short step to the discontinuance of the independent farming of the peasants altogether, compelling them to work full time for the manorial farm. In this manner *barshchina* evolved into the so-called *mesyachina*, by which the serf peasant was turned into a common serf worker, a slave without his own farming, receiving a *mesyachina* from the landowner, that is, a monthly wage in kind, including subsistence produce, clothing, and so forth. The

attempt to transfer their peasants to the *mesyachina,* this highly oppressive form of serfdom, was often made by many "enlightened" landowners of the age, who strove to intensify the exploitation of serf labor under the pretext of abandoning serfdom and changing to hired labor. But all these experiments and quests for new methods of raising the productivity of the peasant's obligatory labor fell short of their goal, inasmuch as the economic structure of the manor was completely dependent upon the peasant farm, on its primitive methods of production, and on the low productivity of serf labor.

THE *OBROK* SYSTEM The other basic method for the exploitation of labor and organization of manorial farming under serfdom was the *obrok* system. In its pure form the *obrok* system in agriculture involved the liquidation of a considerable part of the landlord's own production and the distribution of the bulk of the land for farming by the peasants. This arrangement, according to the evidence of contemporaries, was actually attained in some areas during the late eighteenth century.[9] For the most part, however, the *obrok* system was not applied in its pure form, and the landowners continued to retain a portion of the land for themselves, operating it either by *barshchina* or by a mixed system. In any event, under the *obrok* system the peasant was obligated to the landowner in return for the use of the land, either in the produce of his farm in kind (particularly in various minor dues) or in money.

The economic purpose of the *obrok* system, however, went further: the *obrok* system was not strictly limited to the exploitation of peasant labor in agriculture only. The beggarly agriculture of the peasant could not yield heavy *obroks* to the estate. *Obrok* was therefore not usually adjusted to the earning capacity of the land and the rural economy, but was exacted from the total of all earnings by peasant labor. Under the circumstances described, only a portion of the peasants continued to till the soil, performing a type of agricultural labor which did not pay for itself, and maintaining what often amounted to purely subsistence farming. The bulk of peasant labor, on the other hand, found an outlet in outside (*otkhozhie*) labor in the towns, at factories, in trade, or, on rare occasions, in *kustar* handicraft at home. It was this type of labor that made possible, and served as a source for, the extraction of heavy *obrok* by the landowner.

Available information on the main portion of *obrok* in its monetary form enables us to ascertain its volume and periodic changes more accurately than for *barshchina.* At the end of the eighteenth century, average *obrok* fluctuated between 1 ruble and 5 rubles per person, depending on the locality and the earning power of the peasant household. In the opinion of Semevsky, the usual *obrok* during the 1760's amounted to 1 or 2 rubles, in the 1770's, 2 or 3 rubles; in the 1780's, 4 rubles; and in the 1790's, as many as 5 rubles per

person. Each household, therefore, yielded 10 to 12.5 rubles by the end of the eighteenth century.[10]

The rate of growth of *obrok* remained undiminished during the nineteenth century. In the first decade of that century *obrok* was about 25 to 35 rubles per household (*tyaglo*), that is, 10 to 14 rubles for each soul, while during the second half of the reign of Alexander I, a "normal" *obrok* for the provinces of Great Russia, in the opinion of some students, was 70 rubles per *tyaglo*, that is, about 30 rubles per person.[11] As a rule, however, *obrok* usages were extremely varied and irregular. Cases were common where by taking advantage of the prosperity and steady income of his peasantry, the landowners collected from them several hundreds of rubles in *obrok*.

No such large *obrok* could, indeed, have been exacted from the agricultural activity of the peasant. The volume of *obrok* varied, therefore, between the black- and nonblack-soil belt. In the black-soil belt a landlord who preferred the *obrok* system, apart from being in a minority, would have to be content with a relatively modest income. Hence a majority of owners resorted to the *barshchina* system as a means of raising their incomes by intensifying the exploitation of the peasants, by expanding their own agricultural economy at the expense of the peasant acreage. But the low productivity of serf labor provided a narrow margin for increasing the farm's incomes through the use of *barshchina* labor. The landowners thus fell into the impasse of being unable to develop the production forces of their economy. It was likewise impossible to increase the owner's income through the outside earnings of the peasantry in the black-soil belt as under the *obrok* system prevailing in the nonblack-soil belt.

THE PROBLEM OF PRODUCTIVITY ON THE MANORIAL FARMS In this manner the landowner's agriculture by the early nineteenth century was confronted with the acute problem of ways whereby he might raise the productivity of serf labor and develop the production forces of his own farming. For the landowner the expansion of his production forces amounted to the increase of his income from agriculture. Naturally any increase in the production forces of agriculture would have to express itself in greater productivity of peasant farming. Without the latter no prosperity in manorial farming was possible. The basic drawback, however, was the system of serfdom itself. Many landowners, in fact, realized this perfectly well, but were nevertheless compelled to seek a solution to their problem within the framework of serfdom.[12]

Since the early nineteenth century the problem had become rather clear. The problem of the developing of the production forces of agriculture within the framework of serfdom became the central problem of the rural economic

structure of the time for a period of a half century. The well known Slavophile and squire, YU. Samarin, wrote during the 1850's:

> The owners of large estates concerned themselves very little with agriculture and for the most part remained content with a modest *obrok*, in addition collecting various supplies in kind for their own household needs. This state of affairs gradually changed as a result of the combined effect of many causes. . . . The noblemen felt the need to supervise their affairs more steadily, to raise their income, to secure their true mission for the future, and for the attainment of these aims they naturally chose the most convenient and cheap method: the introduction of *barshchina*.[18]

Among the "numerous" causes mentioned by Samarin, the external impulse which caused many landlords to drift from the towns to the village and led them to engage in agriculture resulted, as Haxthausen correctly observed, from the events of 1812, which ruined the bulk of the landlords and impelled them to farm against their own will. Of major significance, however, were the changes in the general economy of the nation, which in the early nineteenth century found reflection in the growth of the urban industrial population, the flourishing of industry, the rise of grain prices, and the rise of exports. The result was a stimulation of enterprise, offering new opportunities for increased money earnings, and urgently demanding the improvement of farming technique and labor productivity.

We are familiar with the great interest in agriculture and in its progressive forms and systems aroused among Russian landowner circles and reflected in the literature of the era between 1825 and 1840. This period of enthusiasm over agriculture "as the basis of all wealth," engendered in part by the then popular physiocratic doctrine, also passed as rapidly as it had arisen, leaving in its wake a fairly rich literary heritage, so that even till now that period remains one of the more thoroughly explored ages in the history of Russian agriculture.[14]

In its economic essence, however, this venture was significant by being the first test of Russian agricultural entrepreneurship on the basis of serfdom, which, for that very reason, was doomed in advance to failure.

From the point of view of technique, the models according to which the "progressive" landowners attempted to operate their farms were furnished by the height of West European agronomy of the time. They attained a rationally arranged agricultural production on the basis of "crop rotation," that is, the substitution of the hitherto prevailing extensive grain farming by a system of crop rotation. The centers of the progressive movements in agriculture—the Free Economic Society of Petersburg and the Moscow Society for Agriculture with its *Agricultural Journal*—were devoted exclusively to the promotion of the system of crop rotation. In the central nonblack-

soil area the new system mainly took the form of planting grass and of a change towards the livestock phase of agriculture not only on the estates of the landowners but on the peasant farm as well. In the southwest the new technical rationalization of manorial farming took the form of more extensive beet planting and the erection of beet-sugar factories.

THE BEGINNING OF CAPITALIST TECHNIQUE IN AGRICULTURE Despite the artificial nature of these "enthusiams" over the West European capitalist pattern in agriculture, we may observe several concrete results, emphasizing the fact that in some parts of serf agriculture conditions for the rise of new relationships had already matured.

The elements of capitalist technique and organization of agriculture began to evolve at first, and in greater measure, in the south, where serfdom was generally less entrenched and where the proximity of the international market and the widely prevalent commercial production for export began to require the application of hired labor and capitalist methods of production at an earlier date. This was supported by the government policy of colonization in the New Russia provinces, utilizing foreign colonists (German, Bulgarian, and Greek), who introduced large-scale capitalist or farmer-peasant commercial farming and incorporated a higher technique of agricultural production.

The origin of capitalist technique in the steppe provinces of the south resulted in a widespread application of improved agricultural implements, chiefly harvesting machines (mowers, threshers, and others). The requirements of southern capitalist agriculture were responsible for the permission granted in 1806 to import foreign agricultural machines duty-free, as well as for the first attempts to build modern agricultural machinery factories in Russia (Kremenchug, Romney, Odessa, the earlier factories of the Englishman Wilson at Moscow in 1802, and of the Butenop Brothers in 1831). At about this time there also evolved the first independent, as well as imitative, Russian designs of agricultural machines such as the iron "little plow" (*pluzhok*) of Pavlov, the threshing machines of Shcherbatov, the winnowing machines of Kulman, the plow of Gusyatnikov, and others.

In general the South Russian "farmer" agriculture of the colonists was one of the earliest forms of widespread small capitalist farming, chiefly of the grain and livestock variety, highly commercial in character, and operating by means of hired labor and machine methods of production. Side by side with this farmer-peasant agriculture there emerged by 1820–1830 a new type of large-scale capitalist farming, at first assuming the form of extensive livestock cultivation (Merino sheep), and changing subsequently to the exclusively commercial production of grain destined for export. These latifundia of the

new entrepreneurs (frequently belonging to foreign colonists, such as the well known enterprises of Valtz-Fein) worked exclusively on capitalist principles, with hired labor and with the extensive use of machinery. Agriculture here retained the same character even during the period of the later settlement of the territory by Russian settlers, large planters, landowners, and lessees of large feudal latifundia.

In the southwest intensive capitalist agriculture appeared chiefly in the form of newly organized, large, capitalist beet-sugar factories. The somewhat more complex technique required not only fairly large capital investments but also compelled a preference for hired labor. After the first beet-sugar factory was established (owned by Blankenagel in the Tula province), sugar plants became one of the "fashionable" enthusiasms of the "advanced" landowners in connection with their efforts to raise profits in agriculture: in 1825 there were seven beet-sugar factories in Russia, in 1836, 57, and in 1844, as many as 206.

Naturally, the process of origin and development of capitalist relationships in agriculture was not limited to the leading agricultural districts of the country. In the north, for example, a similar process appeared and expressed itself in the development of intensive dairy farming among the landowners, and, moreover, in the development of small commercial dairy farming by the peasants.

It should be pointed out, however, that these were unique manifestations submerged in the general mass of primitive peasant farming, in backward landlord farming, in the oppressive burdens of serfdom, and in feudal primitive technique. By the 1840's, as a consequence of the generally unfavorable market conditions and the failure of all efforts to Europeanize Russian feudal agriculture, a reaction began against the infatuation with "Western notions" and in favor of a return to the "indigenous" forms of feudal farming.

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF SERFDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY In practice a vast majority of landowners, in the black-soil region especially, saw clearly that the rational Western technique was unadaptable to Russian feudal conditions and could not provide a solution to their difficult situation. Grain farming remained the chief trend in production, corresponding more thoroughly to the low level of technique, to the lack of resources for the reorganization of farming, and to the traditional habits of the countryside, and was capable of providing a direct gain in income by the simple device of expanding the arable land of the landlords. Therefore the interest of the landlords in "rotation of crops" and in intensive farming declined by 1840, since the attainment of a rational technology under the conditions of serfdom proved

impossible, particularly in the more typically feudal and backward area of the central agricultural region. Thus when the southwest, where capitalist influences were gaining rapidly, began to develop sugar-beet production, and the steppe region in the south, while retaining large-scale extensive sheep-raising, undertook more and more extensive wheat planting in the steppes, the districts which suffered most from serf backwardness, the central agricultural provinces of Russia, witnessed a marked return to preoccupation with grain farming in its most detrimental forms: by means of an excessive planted acreage, by the curtailment of meadowland and forage areas, and, hence, also by cattle raising.

Capitalist technology shattered hopelessly against the economic structure of serfdom and the feudal organization of agriculture. For the introduction of an intensive rotation of crops, for livestock raising, and for the cultivation of industrial plants, two main premises of production were required: a supply of basic and circulating capital and the existence of a free, skilled, and highly productive labor force. Neither of the two was available to the feudal Russian landlord. "In Russian agriculture," says one contemporary writer on this subject, "capital in the form of cash seldom plays any part, and the main necessary, or rather, indispensable capital is the bonded peasants." [15] "That remarkable novelty in Russian agriculture, capital," says another contemporary author, "has not even been heard." [16] Russian agriculture did not have, and could not have, a progressive and productive form of capital investment except by investing capital in the unproductive labor of the serf, in what our feudal bookkeeping called "implement capital."

With this type of "implement capital" as the sole and inevitable source, the transition to an improved and rationalized organizational form of agricultural organization was, of course, impossible. West European rural economy, in its organization, furnished the models of the capitalist economic order. They were either the English variety of farming, where the farmer invested capital in agriculture while the landowner liquidated his property, or the German type, where *"Der Ritter wird Landwirt,"* that is, in which the landowner himself retained the conduct of his farm in his own hands, investing the capital necessary for its intensification and industrialization.

The progressive landlords, who only recently had been infatuated with Western technique and paid heavily for their enthusiasm about the "English farmer" and the "industrialization" of agriculture, began to behave rather negatively toward "English" farming. "The English farmer has become as necessary to many Russian noblemen as the French emigrant, their own Italian windows at home, and race horses in harness," the famous author of the pamphlet, *Plug i Sokha* [Plow and Simple Plow] wrote, not without sarcasm. Actually, how could the farmer type of agricultural enter-

prise be successful, when the farmer himself did not exist and when that "farmer" himself was only so much "implement capital" on the landlord's farm? All propaganda in favor of the so-called "unification of industry and agriculture" also fought hopelessly against this obstacle. And this course could only be upheld by special privileges, such, for example, as the legislation of Catherine II for the promotion of distilling by the nobility, by special protective measures in behalf of the beet-sugar factories, and so forth.

In this manner, once the period of enthusiasm and quest for progressive forms of agriculture during the 1820's and 1830's had passed, Russia's landlord farming during the decade of the 1840's returned once more to the routine feudal methods of operating farms, selecting among them methods that proved most suitable under the new conditions of money and commercial farming. The need for increasing their income impelled the landlords toward the use of *barshchina,* but it seemed obvious that the low productivity of serf labor precluded any possibility of economic progress. "The *barshchina,*" says the *Penza Landowner,* famous in the literature of serfdom, "which deprives the poor of a chance to escape from poverty, the well-to-do of a chance to gain riches, the gifted person of a chance to develop his talent . . . affects all peasants like a slow poison, killing the body and soul." [17]

The *obrok* system, which determines in advance the share of surplus labor to be withheld by the landlord, and in addition affords some measure of freedom for the economic activity of the peasant, might have secured a more productive source of labor. "The labor of the *obrok* peasant, subject to his own free will, could not be utilized in a fashion contrary to the mental capacities and physical powers of the worker. . . . Under free labor each succeeds according to his performance, and diligence . . . will lead through the shortest road to perfection," says another experienced and rather advanced practical farmer of the age, a champion of the *obrok* system. *Obrok,* in his opinion, "removes apathy and laziness, and offers an opportunity to develop the powers of an individual." [18]

The fact that even the *obrok* system failed to satisfy many landlords may be seen in the case of the same author, a protagonist of the *obrok* system, who found it necessary to introduce on his farm "an entirely new type" of labor organization and system of dues. The method was hardly as new as it seemed to its inventor, being, in fact, a type of compulsory lease of the owner's land to be paid in kind: all domestics and peasants in the category of "*obrok* workers" were transferred from *barshchina* to *obrok* and obliged to earn that *obrok* by working on the owner's land at fixed rates and pay their *obrok* dues in grain in kind. With this method the author endeavored to remove what were, in his words, the major shortcomings of *obrok:* the failure of the peasants to fulfill their *obrok* dues and the accumulation of arrears.

Thus the extremely low productivity of farm labor under serfdom remained unchanged whether the *obrok* or the *barshchina* organization of labor prevailed. Thus one of the opponents of the *obrok* system ironically describes the situation into which an estate fell under the *obrok* system of farming, as a result of its extreme poverty and low productivity:

> The manager reports most respectfully that everything on the estate is proceeding favorably, except that in consequence of a poor harvest or the low price of grain, the peasants will be unable to fulfill all of their *obrok* dues, but he will try most assiduously to make sure that the arrears are kept as low as possible. . . . A year passes, the arrears had grown larger than we had hoped, trusting to the diligence of the manager; in the meantime, still rejoicing eagerly, it becomes necessary to rely upon well wishing people—to borrow money. . . . During the following year the manager reports most respectfully that everything on the estate is proceeding in good order, only that the cattle of some peasants were ailing of an infection; other peasants, now that he had become better acquainted with the estate, seem to him to have a tendency toward drunkenness, shiftlessness, laziness, and indifference; still others, although prosperous, refused to pay *obrok* and persuaded the poorer men to do likewise in the hope that the landlord, upon seeing their general impoverishment, might reduce the *obrok* and forgive the arrears. In general, circumstances nowadays are so difficult and farm products so cheap, adds the manager, that I wonder how your peasants remain solvent and pay their *obrok*.[19]

It was no surprise, indeed, to find such consequences of the *obrok* system, since the landlord had always endeavored to appropriate through the *obrok* not only as large a part as possible of the surplus product under any given circumstances but even to deprive the peasant farm of any part of the "indispensable" product above the starvation subsistence minimum of the peasant. The burden of the *obrok* was for the peasant no less oppressive than the fulfillment of his *barshchina* labors.[20] Under *barshchina* and *obrok* alike the income of the landowners was squeezed from the extremely overworked peasant and the overstrained productive capacity of his household. A *barshchina* duty of three to four days of labor for the manor left the peasant little opportunity to raise materially the productivity of his own farming. For the landowners, on the other hand, apart from the low productivity of *barshchina* labor, the maintenance of an independent farm on the seignioral land was complicated by his own lack of capital and other resources necessary for the organization of an independent economy. The tools of production, the livestock, and frequently the farm buildings as well, for the most part belonged to the peasant. The lack of such equipment by the owners often proved to be the chief cause for their failure to maintain a rationally organized *barshchina* farm property.[21]

The economic literature of agriculture during the 1840's and 1850's is rich in controversy concerning the relative profitability and preference of *barshchina* and *obrok* and the quest for new methods of more profitable organization of peasant farming. It should be observed that the ingenuity of the serf-holding landlord in this respect was quite varied, but the results were negative. According to their own reaction, on the whole, the productivity of their type of feudal farming was very low and showed no sign of progress. Therefore, under the general impact of economic life, with the development of cash farming and the growth of commodity circulation, the landlord's agriculture was confronted by only one possibility: to increase its income through the quantitative expansion of its acreage and extensive grain raising by means of intensifying the exploitation of peasant labor, that is, by overburdening the peasant household still further.

THE QUANTITATIVE RESULTS OF FEUDAL AGRICULTURE BY THE MIDDLE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The absence of any statistical data on agricultural production during the period precludes the possibility of submitting any comprehensive or precise data on the quantitative results of the development of agriculture at the beginning of the nineteenth century on its basic trends, the degree of its productivity, or the relation of its volume of production to the national requirements and the market.

The more competent statisticians of the prereform period (Protopopov for 1830, Tengoborsky for the 1840's, Semyonov and Wilson for the 1850's)[22] arrived at a figure for the grain harvest in the neighborhood of 250 million quarters (*chetvert*) or about 2.0 to 2.2 billion poods. Computing internal consumption of all types (the food supply of the population, animal feed, distilling, and so forth), as well as export, these authors came to the conclusion that the national economy was left with an unsold grain residue of about 10 to 12 million quarters and over, that is, about 90 to 100 million poods. For a somewhat later period, the middle 1860's, Wilson suggests a figure of 266 million quarters for the total crop and an unsold remainder of grain, in the form of reserves, of about 25 million quarters or some 200 to 225 million poods.[23]

These calculations are, of course, exceedingly inaccurate and far from explaining the situation, inasmuch as, despite such "surpluses" of grain, the majority of the peasant population, the direct producers of grain, were inadequately fed or actually starved. All calculated "reserves" and "surpluses" remained either in the hands of the landlords, the chief suppliers of grain, or in the hands of grain dealers. These "surpluses" emphasized the narrow capacity of the commercial market under serfdom and the impossibility of

developing the productive forces of agriculture under such circumstances.

In any event, by the middle of the nineteenth century the trend of feudal agriculture inevitably was in the direction of excessive grain raising, with a large arable acreage and with an overwhelming proportion of the sown area under cereal grains. In view of the absence of direct data for that period, we may note, taking the above-mentioned sources as our point of departure, that for the somewhat later period of the middle 1860's (by which time the situation could not have altered radically) we have the following indications: first, a high percentage of land under cultivation, particularly in certain districts (the black-soil, nonsteppe belt, 50.6 per cent, the western provinces, 54.3, the industrial provinces, 46.4, White Russia, 59.4), and secondly, a preponderant proportion of grain planting: about 96 per cent of the total plowed area generally, with 4 per cent for all nongrain crops including industrial crops.[24]

As for the level of productivity of feudal agriculture, in the absence of statistical data on yields that could serve as a major index of the level of production in agriculture during the nineteenth century, we shall submit here our calculations of the yield according to the data contained in the gubernatorial reports for fifty provinces of European Russia: [25]

YEARS	YIELD
1801–1810	3.5 fold
1811–1820	3.5 "
1821–1830	3.4 "
1831–1840	3.4 "
1841–1850	3.6 "
1851–1860	3.6 "
1861–1870	3.7 "

In other words, for a period of sixty years during the nineteenth century, our agriculture under serfdom was distinguished by an almost stationary yield. Feudal agriculture on the whole (with the exception of some regions; namely, the south and southwest) in the development of its productive forces, as much as these could be measured by the summary index of the yield, made no gains throughout the entire nineteenth century and remained entirely at a low level of yield between 3.5 fold and 3.6 fold. Assuming a planting of one-quarter of winter grain and 1.5 quarters of spring grain per *dessyatin*, an average yield of about 30 to 35 poods per *dessyatin* was produced.

In addition severe general crop failures recurred extremely often, during 1820–1821, 1832–1834, 1839, 1843–1845, and 1850–1851, when famine spread through dozens of provinces. Poor crops were a result of the primitive methods of peasant and landowner agriculture alike, the excessive adherence to the three-field system and grain raising, the strong plowing of the land,

the reduction in livestock breeding, and the absence of fertilization, while the above, in turn, were the inevitable result of the system of serfdom in agriculture.

Notes

1. Zablotskii-Desyatovskii, "Graf Kiselev i yego vremya" (Count Kiselev and His Times), Vol. IV, *Zapiski o krepostnom sostoyanii* (Report on Feudal Conditions) (1882), p. 277.
2. Nikolskii, *Khozyaistvennoye opisaniye Balashovskogo uyezda* (Economic Description of Balashov County) (1855), p. 59.
3. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, p. 140.
4. Ignatovich, *Pomeshchichyi krestyane* (Manorial Peasants), pp. 70-76.
5. See Map 9, p. 311.
6. Semevskii, *Krestyane v tsarstvovaniye Yekaterini II* (Peasants in the Reign of Catherine II), Vol. I, pp. 63-67.
7. Zablotskii, "Prichiny kolebaniya tsen na khleb v Rossii" (Causes of Price Fluctuation on Grain in Russia) in *Otechestvennyye zapiski* (Homeland Notes) (1847), Vol. 52, p. 43; also Lyashchenko, *Ocherki agrarnoi evolutsii* (Essays in Agrarian Evolution), 4th ed. (1925), p. 127.
8. Semevskii, *Krestyane v tsarstvovaniye Yekaterini II*, Vol. I, pp. 51-54.
9. *Zapiski kn. Trubetskogo* (Memoirs of Prince Trubetskoy) (1863), p. 102.
10. Semevskii, *Krestyane v tsarstvovaniye Yekaterini II*, Vol. I, pp. 53 ff.
11. Seredonin, *Istoricheskii obzor deyatelnosti komiteta ministrov* (Historical Survey of the Activity of the Committee of Ministers) (1902), Vol. I.
12. See, for example, the letters of the Penza landowner which were popular in the literature of the feudal period, *Zhurnal zemlevladeltsev* (Landowners' Journal) (1858); also Zhukov, *Rukovodstvo otchetlivo, uspeshno i vygodno zanimatsya russkim selskim khozyaistvom* (Instruction on the Careful, Successful, and Profitable Pursuit of Russian Rural Economy) (1848); Vilkins, *Mysli i nablyudeniya o polozhenii zemledelcheskoi promyshlennosti* (Thoughts and Observations on the Condition of the Agricultural Industry) (1843); Shvitkov, "O dvukh glavnykh sposobakh k luchshemu derevnyami upravleniyu" (On the Two Principal Methods for the Better Management of the Villages), *Trudy volnogo ekonomicheskogo obshchestva* (Studies of the Free Economic Society), Vol. 62, and others.
13. Samarin, "O krepostnom sostoyanii i o perekhode iz nego k grazhdanskoi svobode" (On Feudal Conditions and on the Transition Therefrom to Civil Freedom) in his *Sochineniya*, Moscow (1878), Vol. II.
14. Associated with this period is the activity of such well known practical scholars in the history of Russian agronomy as I. I. Samarin, D. N. Shelekhov, S. I. Gagarin, A. T. Bolotov, Poltoratskii, N. N. Muravyov, and many others.
15. *Nachalnyye osnovaniya russkogo selskogo khozyaistva* (Early Foundations of Russian Rural Economy) (Moscow), 1837.
16. *Russkii zemledelets* (Russian Agriculturist) (Pavlov, 1838), Vol. I.
17. *Zhurnal zemlevladeltsev* (1858), Vol. I, "Pisma Penzenskogo Pomeshchika" (Letters of a Penza Landowner).
18. Povdyunin, *Ob obrochnykh rabotnikakh ili severshenno novom obraze vzimaniya pomeshchichyikh povinnostei* (About Workers on Obrok or a Completely New Method of Collecting the Landowners' Dues) (Moscow, 1845), p. 5.

19. Zhukov, *Rukovodstvo otchetlivo, uspeshno i vygodno zanimatsya russkim selskim khozyaistvom* (1848), p. 139.
20. Among numerous examples of burdensome *obrok*, we may cite the case of the industrialized estate of the Sheremetevs (Nizhny Novgorod Province) where some peasants paid as high as 1,500 rubles of *obrok* a year. On the other estates of the same province, the usual *obrok* was 80 rubles. In some villages 36 persons were reckoned as 28 *tyaglo*, or less than two persons per *tyaglo*. *Deystviya Nizhegorodskoi uchyonoi arkhivnoi komissii* (Acts of the Nizhny Novgorod Scientific Archivist Commission) (Nizhny Novgorod, 1898), Vol. III, article by Snezhnevskii, "Krepostnoyye Krestyane Nizhegorodskoi gubernii nakanune reformy 19 fevralya" (Bonded Peasants of the Nizhny Novgorod Province on the Eve of the Reform of February 19). See also Semevskii, *Krestyane v tsarstvovaniye Yekaterini II*, Vol. I, pp. 51-58.
21. Shishkov, "Obrok i barshchina," in *Zapiski Lebedyanskogo obshchestva selskogo khozyaistva* (Records of the Lebedyanskii Society of Rural Economy) (1857), Pt. I, p. 246. Another author, remonstrating against the excessive expansion of arable land by landowners with the resultant overproduction and fall of prices, says: "The only place where it may be profitable to keep the peasants on output [on *barshchina*], is where the area of plowed land is maintained at a level nine or more times that of the sown area. But one will hardly find such estates where all peasants could be put on *barshchina* to work a plowland of this type . . . because such a quantity of *barshchina* workers would require a lot of draft animals, and there would usually not be enough hay or, indeed, even enough straw." *Zemledcheskii zhurnal* (Agricultural Journal) (1843), Vol. III.
22. See Tengoborskii, *O proizvoditelnykh silakh Rossii* (On the Productive Forces of Russia) (1854), Vol. I, p. 197; Protopopov, "O khlebnoy torgovle v Rossii" (On the Grain Trade in Russia), in *Zhurnal ministerstva gosudarstvennykh imushchestv* (Journal of the Ministry of State Properties) (1842), Vol. V; Semyonov, *Izucheniye istoricheskikh svedenii o rossiiskoi vneshnei torgovlye* (The Study of the Historical Data on Russian Foreign Trade) (1859), Vol. III, p. 300; Wilson, *Obyasneniya k khozyaistvenno-statisticheskomu atlasu* (Explanations to the Economic-Statistical Atlas) 1st ed. (1851); see also Lyashchenko, *Ocherki* (Essays), Chap. V.
23. Wilson, *Obyasneniya* (Explanations), 4th ed. (1869), pp. 112-113.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-46 and 112-121, also Yanson, *Sravnitelnaya statistika* (Comparative Statistics) (1880), p. 273 ff.
25. These calculations were made by the author on the basis of data available at the Leningrad Division of the Central Historical Archives (LOTSIA), with the aid of funds from the Department of General Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior, in connection with the author's study *Istoriya urozhainosti* (The History of Agricultural Yields) for the Institute of Economics.

(XVIII)

Feudal Manufacturing During the Nineteenth Century and the Origin of the Capitalist Factory

IN SPITE of the brief interval of time that separated the end of the eighteenth century, the "Age of Catherine," as it was called by its contemporaries, from the first quarter of the nineteenth century, we find many vital changes during that period in economic conditions in general, and in the field of industry in particular. The pinnacle of feudal economic development attained in the late eighteenth century began to be superseded, in industry especially, by new manifestations marking the beginning of a decline in feudal relationships within industry and the development of new conditions and connections of the bourgeois variety.

GENERAL CONDITIONS The military and political events of the first fifteen years of the nineteenth century were also of necessity reflected in the general situation of industry. The incessant wars against Napoleon produced a heightened demand for military production in the metallurgical and metal-processing industries, as well as in the wool, linen, and other branches of industry. The Napoleonic invasion of 1812 either ruined or forced evacuation upon many industrial enterprises in the Moscow industrial districts (wool, silk, wool cloth, calico, and others). The continental blockade in effect during the period of alliance with Napoleon, which closed the Russian market against the importation of English goods, stimulated the development of some branches of industry but gravely affected the interests of the agricultural class by decreasing the sale of agricultural products. Furthermore, the continued rapid expansion of national territory (the annexation of Georgia under Paul I, Finland and Bessarabia under Alexander I, the beginning of a campaign of conquest in the Caucasus and Central Asia under Nicholas I, and the later penetration of the Far East and the Amur region) constantly expanded the "all-Russian market," stimulated the circulation of goods, and accelerated the social division of labor. The above events inevitably exerted a conspicuous influence on the development of industry.

CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY Of vital influence on the development of industry were the lasting and profound upheavals in the fields of

industrial technique and economic structure, which during the nineteenth century began to rise in European industry and, in turn, to be reflected in Russian industry. During the eighteenth century European industry, in its technological aspect, for the most part also consisted of a type of manufacturing similar to that of Russia, operated largely by similar manual methods except for its use of free rather than bonded labor. Naturally, even this was sufficient to give it a great advantage. Since the nineteenth century, however, European industry, in England particularly, changed completely to machine methods of production, with the aid of power engines and coal. For feudal Russia all this was hardly feasible, and, hence, the nation soon began to lose its position among the Western countries, particularly, for example, in iron and steel. Yet the influence of the advanced European technology could not fail to filter into Russian feudal industry, rapidly dissolving the bases of serfdom and contributing to its reconstruction on a new technical and economic basis.

This became abundantly clear when England, the leading capitalist country, after abandoning the old mercantilist dogma of the advisability of prohibiting the exportation of machinery, began intensively to supply the other countries with the products of its own advanced capitalist machine-building industry (the removal of the ban against the export of cotton machinery in 1842, and so forth). Russian industry began actively to import the improved tools, implements, and machines. Between 1815 and 1816 imports of tools for handicrafts and factories, implements of production, and machinery were of a total value of 97,000 rubles in bank notes, in 1825, 828,000 rubles in bank notes; in 1840, 1,010,000 credit rubles (about 3,500,000 rubles in bank notes); in 1850, 2,685,000 credit rubles (about 8,397,000 rubles in bank notes).[1] Feudal manufacturing changed to some extent in the direction of factory production, employing machinery and at the same time inevitably replacing serf labor with "hired" labor.

In 1763 the self-educated inventor Polzunov, followed in 1790 by the foreigner Goskoin, were the first to construct in Russia a steam engine of the Watt type. In 1805 the first steam engine came to be applied in the cotton industry of Petersburg, thus introducing mechanical production into Russia. In 1809 English linen-spinning machines were installed at the Alexandrovsk linen-manufacturing plant.[2]

The first rolling mills for the processing of iron were introduced during 1826 in iron casting and iron production (at the Alexandrovsk fiscal factory); in 1836 the first experiments in hot-draft blasting were conducted (at the Vyksunsky factory in Nizhny Novgorod Province) and the first experiments in the puddling method instead of the old refining method of production (in

the Urals). In 1857 initial tests were made of the Bessemer process of blowing pig iron (at the Vsevolodovilvensk factory).

Machine equipment began to penetrate the citadel of manual feudal labor, Russia's countryside, although in the primitive form of a simple thresher, constructed for the first time in 1802 at the Wilson farm-machinery plant. In 1820 Poltoratsky was the first to organize factory production of plows and other agricultural implements. In the field of transportation, the first river steamboat in Russia was built at the Berd factory, and in 1817 the factory was granted a license to operate a river steamship line.[3] The first Russian railroad was laid in 1836 (Tsarskoye Selo) and opened for operations in 1838. Between 1835 and 1836 the first telegraph lines for general use were completed. Progressive people of the age, such as N. S. Mordvinov, vigorously promoted the ideas of the development of industry, the exploitation of resources, the construction of railroads, steamship lines, and machine production.

Naturally, this was still far from the industrial revolution that had embraced Europe since the end of the eighteenth century. Serf labor and serf institutions continued to hamper the progressive methods of production and to prevent their adoption. Hence, the application of improved technical methods often stalled in the experimental stage, without being incorporated into mass production.

In both the consumption and production of major industrial commodities, Russia was thus already far behind the western European countries. For example, in the calculations of some of the contemporary statisticians, the per capita production of pig iron during 1840–1850 was: in Russia, 8.7 Russian pounds; in England, 23.1; and in France, 37.5; the consumption of cotton fabrics in Russia was 0.87 Russian pounds, in England, 8; in Germany, 3.1; and in France, 3.07.[4]

Regardless of the negative influence of serfdom, however, an ever greater number of industrial branches and enterprises abandoned the old institutions and changed to the capitalist forms of production.

For a characterization of this process, let us examine the development of the various branches of production during the nineteenth century.

FERROUS METALLURGY In the early nineteenth century Russia possessed 170 large iron-smelting plants of a capacity of 10.2 million poods of pig iron, although actual smelting evidently never exceeded 75 per cent of productive capacity. By this time the Urals had become the foremost district of the iron and steel and metal-processing industries. This district was at the same time one of the most flagrant examples of the retarding influence of serfdom on the development of industry. During that time, as Lenin indicates,

serfdom served as the basis for the utmost prosperity of the Urals . . . and the same serfdom, which helped the Urals to achieve such heights during the era of developing European capitalism, was also the cause of the decline of the Urals during the peak era of capitalism. . . . The main cause of the stagnation of the Urals was serfdom; the iron and steel industrialists were either landlords or factory owners, and based their rule not on capital and competition but on monopoly and on their proprietary right.[5]

According to the description of the Ural mining and metal industry by Academician I. German,[6] it contained 87 blast-furnace works in 1800, while the total amount of pig iron smelted in 75 blast furnaces at 49 of the listed factories was computed at 7.4 million poods. This gave an average of 151,000 poods for each factory, with a majority of the plants producing 50,000 to 100,000 poods or 100,000 to 150,000 poods; output per blast furnace was 98,800 poods, and the daily output per worker was 15.9 poods. The largest works were the old Nizhny Tagil factories of the Demidovs. The most conspicuous improvement in the Ural factories during the nineteenth century was the introduction of cylindrical English air-blasting machines, which, according to German, were used at 27 plants (of the 49 factories listed by him). In metal-refinery production the Ural plants yielded an annual output of 4,495,000 poods of iron. Improvement in the technique of blast-furnace and refinery work came with the introduction of the hot draft in the blast-furnace process, with the change from the refinery method of iron production to the puddling process (for the first time in 1836), with the first experiments in smelting with the aid of coke, as well as with the introduction of rolling mills in lieu of the former method of forging by hammers, with rolling and cutting mills for sheet iron and for forging iron and steel products.

Glancing at the production of iron and steel outside the Urals, we find the same extremely slow rate of growth and for the same reason; namely, the all-pervasive influence of serfdom. During 1822–1827 total production of ferrous metals attained 8.9 to 9.0 million poods of pig iron and 6.1 million poods of iron. For the period of 1831–1839 it attained 10.5 to 10.9 million poods of pig iron and 6.7 million poods of iron. During the 1840's the figures were 11.1 to 11.8 million poods of pig iron, during the first half of the 1850's, 13.9 to 15.9 million poods, and only by 1858–1860 did the output reach 17.6 million poods of pig iron and 12.2 million poods of iron, with the Urals in 1860 accounting for 14.5 million poods or 82 per cent of pig-iron production.[7]

Between the beginning of the nineteenth century and 1861, production of pig iron had thus barely doubled, an average annual increase of less than 1 per cent. How insignificant this increase was may be seen from the following comparison: pig-iron smelting in Great Britain in 1800 was 10 million poods, whereas in 1860 it reached 240 million poods, an increase of 24 times.

Such was the effect of the new capitalist technique, the use of coal, the employment of skilled labor and hired workers, in short, all the conditions lacking in Russia.

NONFERROUS METALS In the field of nonferrous metallurgy, the Urals and part of Siberia were the main centers for the production of copper, which during 1850–1854 attained an output of 375,000 poods, and platinum, of which 227 poods were produced during the decade between 1850 and 1860. Moreover, the total production of gold (in eastern and western Siberia and in the Nerchinsk district) by 1860 amounted to 1,569 poods, and silver, to 1,034 poods per year. These negligible figures serve as evidence that here too the system of serfdom paralyzed the development of production.

OTHER BRANCHES OF HEAVY INDUSTRY There is almost nothing to be said in connection with the other branches of heavy industry during the first half of the nineteenth century. Almost no fuel, petroleum, or coal industry existed. Although coal was discovered in the south in 1790, and the petroleum riches of the Baku area had long been known, no real industrial exploitation of either coal or petroleum resources was yet attempted. In 1821 a system of leases was introduced to release the Baku oil fields for production, which yielded no concrete results in the development of the industry. Some basic chemical production (sulphuric acid and soda) existed on a very limited scale. In existence since the time of Peter I and totaling 25 factories by the end of the eighteenth century, the sulphuric-acid industry had 30 factories by 1850 producing a total of 300,000 to 350,000 poods, fair evidence of the petty, half *kustar* nature of the output and of the slow, inadequate rate of development for so important a branch of industry. Similar was the scale of production maintained by the other chemical products manufactured in small factories for paints, paste, turpentine, and alum (products used in the cotton industry, in calico printing and others), chiefly in the Kostroma, Vladimir, Moscow, and other provinces.

THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY In the field of light industry the textile industry deserves most attention, existing either in the form of the old linen and wool production, or in the form of both silk and cotton-fabric production.

The production of linen, as we have seen, was one of the most ancient pursuits in the field of weaving; during the seventeenth century it was already occasionally organized into large manorial enterprises, gradually expanding into production for the market. Simultaneously, small-scale commercial manual production of linen became widely prevalent in the peasant household, particularly in the Tver, Yaroslavl, Moscow, Kostroma, and Vladimir provinces. Here, too, were inaugurated the first large linen-manufacturing

enterprises of the merchants. These amounted to 285 by 1804, but by 1825 their number had declined to 196, and in 1845 they decreased still further to 156. The decline of the linen industry was due to the intricate circumstances of production and the market both inside and outside Russia. The widespread use of cotton fabrics during this period rapidly began to crowd out the more expensive linen articles both at home and abroad. With the development of ocean steam transportation, the demand for sailcloth by the outside world also began to recede rapidly, and Russia was a large world supplier of sailcloth. The Russian linen industry, working largely for export (especially in the higher grades of linen and in sailcloth), lost the foreign market and began to curtail exports. Production abroad, with its mechanical methods, tended to depress prices to a level at which Russian production, with its manual methods, was incapable of competing. In the main centers of linen production, one after another of the linen-manufacturing establishments was closed during 1830–1840. The attempt to change to machine production met with little success since Russian technology was still too far behind the foreign level to be able to compete in the export of high-grade fine linen, while the domestic market was largely served by the more inexpensive, coarse product of peasant household production. As a result, the very considerable surplus of Russian raw flax at about the time of the reduction in the exports of linen manufactures stimulated the increase of linen fiber exports. This may be seen from the following table on the exports of the two products: [8]

YEARS	LINEN PRODUCTS		LINEN, RAW
	Thousand Pieces	Thousands of Rubles *	Thousand Poods
1812–1814	217	6,767	1,367
1836–1840	223	10,766	2,740
1856–1860	137	1,254	4,049
1866–1870	46.7	1,588	6,687

* In "assignat" rubles for 1812–1840, in credit rubles for 1856–1870.

Another old branch of the textile industry, the production of wool cloth, had long been, as we know, a stronghold of feudal conditions of production, the most prevalent commodity yielded by feudal landlord manufacturing. But that, too, has witnessed substantial changes since the nineteenth century. In 1804 the total number of wool-cloth manufacturing enterprises was 155, employing serf labor at 90 per cent of their labor force. Working on contract for the government, producing cheap military wool cloth with the support of government subsidies, the manufactures of the landlords "flourished" within an atmosphere of serfdom, and under a guaranteed government market were

not affected even by the free-trade tariffs of 1816–1819. The results of such circumstances were extreme technical backwardness, the predominance of manual labor, the low productivity of labor, and complete stagnation within this feudal industry. Nevertheless, emerging alongside the feudal variety of wool manufacture were the peasant manufactures of the merchants, producing a more valuable grade of goods and working largely for the open market. There were 324 wool manufactures in 1825, employing 18 per cent hired labor, while in 1850 the total number was 492 manufactures, of which only 4 per cent were "nobility" enterprises employing serf labor.

The production of silk attained its peak at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, when a total of 328 enterprises existed in the industry (in 1804). The continental blockade and, subsequently, the War of 1812 seriously disrupted this branch of industry. By 1809 only 194 silk manufactures remained, and by 1825, 184. Working on imported raw material, requiring skilled labor, and developing on the basis of an internal market, the silk industry was among the early fields of production to adopt hired labor (83 per cent free labor in 1825), increasing its production successfully (it attained 6.5 million rubles in 1850), particularly after the introduction of the protective tariff of 1822.

THE COTTON INDUSTRY Finally, the most typical branch of industry, not connected in any way with either serf labor or governmental privileges and contracts, and developing on the basis of free labor and capitalist technology, was the cotton industry.

Cotton production was a comparatively new branch of the Russian textile industry (particularly by comparison with an old occupation like linen making).

The last stage in cotton production, calico printing, was the first to develop, after working on ready-made foreign unbleached cloth. The first calico-printing factory for printing imported coarse cloth with fast dyes was established in the middle of the eighteenth century in the village of Ivanovo in Vladimir Province (now Ivanovo-Voznesensk).[9] In this manner the calico and coarse-cotton industry in general began. Its center became Ivanovo and adjoining districts in the Vladimir and Moscow provinces, and all factories arising in this area originally worked on finished imported yarn.

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries cotton spinning of imported raw cotton made its appearance. The first spinning machine with 104 spindles was erected in 1793 at the Liman cotton-printing factory at Schlüsselburg. The year 1808 saw the establishment of the first privately owned cotton-spinning mill, which obtained its spinning machinery from the government model spinning and weaving plant at Alexandrovsk, estab-

lished in 1799. By 1812 Moscow alone had 11 cotton-spinning mills, including 780 spinning machines. In the cotton industry as a whole, however, and in the preparation of the finished product, imported yarn still predominated up to 1830–1840. This may be seen from the following table on the imports of yarn and cotton (in thousand poods):[10]

YEARS	COTTON YARN	COTTON, RAW
1812–1820	165	55
1821–1830	339	87
1831–1840	574	235
1841–1850	471	841
1851–1860	167	1,877
1861–1870	143	1,847

Thus, only beginning with 1850–1860 did raw-cotton imports begin to predominate heavily in connection with the development of the whole cycle of cotton production in Russia (cotton, yarn, fabrics, calico-printing production).

Cotton-weaving manufactures made their appearance during the middle of the eighteenth century. In 1753 a monopoly in cotton weaving was granted to the English industrialists Chamberlain and Cozzens. They obtained, besides the monopoly, a number of other privileges: the right to import equipment and material duty-free, and also, afterward, a loan of 30,000 rubles, assignment of three hundred peasants, and an increase in the tariff duties as a protection against the importation of English cloth. No similar privileges (prior to the time of the protectionist tariff of 1822) were granted to any other industrialists. The Russian cotton industry achieved tremendous gains during the second quarter of the nineteenth century. The cause of its rapid progress was primarily the reduction of costs in English cotton-yarn production, on which the Russian cotton-weaving industry worked until 1840–1850. This made cotton fabrics the cheapest material for clothing, creating a wide market for them and competing successfully with the consumption of the more expensive linen fabrics. In the course of 1850–1860 the Russian cotton industry began to work predominantly on yarn of its own preparation, still, indeed, on the basis of imported raw cotton.

Technologically, Russian cotton production, in its printing as well as weaving, was also a manufacture, that is, an industry operated exclusively by manual labor. Because of the relative simplicity of its operations, once the former monopolies were rescinded in 1722, cotton printing and weaving began to spread among the peasants as another variety of *kustar* production, especially in the Vladimir province and elsewhere. At times some *kustar* weavers became the owners of workshops and evolved into substantial, quite large "manufacturers." On the other hand these rural industries provided the

first cadres of technically trained workers not connected with serfdom, who were gradually changing into professional industrial workers.

Lenin has described the formative process of *kustar* weaving industries and their capitalist nature in considerable detail. The position of dominance in these industries was held by the large capitalist workshops with their hundreds of workers. Their owners bought their raw materials wholesale (cotton or yarn) and in part processed them in their shops, while distributing another part as "home work." Fundamentally, production was maintained by manual labor, but a fair amount of specialization had already arisen in a number of operations (dyeing, reeling or "warping" the yarn, weaving, winding the woof, and others). Economically, such "workshops" and huts where the weavers worked were merely the "outside branches of the manufactures." [11] Thus was laid the basis for the development of the future capitalist factory: the accumulation of capital, the preparation of a class of professional workers, and the elaboration of factory and machine technique.

Still more important to the subsequent development of the Russian cotton industry proved to be the abolition of the then existing ban against the export of cotton machinery from England by the Act of 1842. From that period the Russian industry began to utilize not only the low-cost English yarns but also the most modern English machines, and passed from the manufacturing stage into real factory production. The change to machine printing and weaving began as early as the fourth decade of the nineteenth century. After 1842, however, the importation of machinery gained in tempo, including not only printing and weaving but spinning machines as well.

The successful incorporation of English technology into the Russian cotton industry during 1840–1850 was personified in the activities of the famous English entrepreneur and broker Knopp, who equipped and built the majority of Russia's large cotton factories that continued to exist until the Revolution of 1917 (ranging from the Morozov, Danilov, and Voznesensk manufactures to the large Kreenholm plant). The immediate result was to render the Russian industries independent of imported English yarn and to inaugurate the importation of raw cotton for their own cotton spinning. During 1821–1830 total cotton imports into the country amounted to only 87,000 poods; during 1851–1860 they rose to 1,877,000 poods, while the quantity of imported yarn fell meanwhile from 339,000 poods to 167,000 poods.

Naturally, the new cotton factories operating with machinery could not use the unskilled and unproductive labor of the serf. The cotton industry thus changed completely to the employment of hired labor by 1840. None the less, the negative influence of serfdom still affected the cotton industry. For the free flow of free labor required by the industry there was no adequate

reserve army of workers. There was yet another way in which serfdom exercised a retarding influence on the industry: being oriented to a broad popular market, the industry had to contend with an extremely low purchasing power among the main body of consumers—the peasant, and with an inadequate rate of expansion of the internal market, and it was compelled to seek a market for itself in the "borderlands." [12]

In this manner the cotton industry, compared with other branches of industry, outgrew serfdom at an early date, both technologically and economically attaining the form of the large capitalist factory while still functioning within the confines of serfdom.

THE BEET-SUGAR INDUSTRY Let us now glance at another branch of industry which likewise originated during the nineteenth century and which, although first connected with feudal agriculture, soon evolved into a capitalist industry as an expression of commercial farming. Such was the beet-sugar industry.

The first mills for the refining of sugar were erected at Petersburg in 1718 and at Moscow in 1723. Inasmuch as sugar-beet cultivation was still unknown in Russia, they operated on imported raw sugar cane. The first beet-sugar factory was opened in 1802 at Tula, and from there such factories spread rapidly, particularly through the east-bank and west-bank Ukraine: in 1844 there were 206 plants producing 484,000 poods, and in 1848–1850, over 300 with a production of more than 900,000 poods of granulated sugar. Despite this rapid quantitative growth, methods of production continued to be fairly primitive, and the yield of sugar was considerably below that of western European standards. This industry was chiefly maintained by, and flourished with, the aid of serf labor, cheap raw-material resources, and high, nearly prohibitive duties on imported sugar. Nevertheless, by 1850 this agricultural industry became one of the main predilections of the large-scale capitalist landlords of the southwest. Having achieved a position of monopoly in the internal market, the sugar-mill owners then began to demand of the government a number of privileges, organizing their own "sugar-mill committees"—the first privileged, class-monopoly organizations of the sugar industry in Russia, which afterward flourished widely in the form of real capitalist monopolies.

RESULTS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT TOWARD THE MIDDLE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY We shall not stop for a detailed analysis of each of the other branches of industry as they developed by the middle of the nineteenth century. The basic problem in each case, like the industries considered above, was the question of their reorgan-

ization from a feudal to a capitalist basis, their adjustment to free, hired, and skilled labor, their change to a modern capitalist technology, and their production for a wide market on a general foundation of capitalist competition rather than on the basis of feudal monopoly and "proprietary rights."

The system of serfdom, as long as it was not utterly destroyed, acted as a powerful brake against all new trends of development. Within the realm of serfdom proper, however, a number of industrial branches, at an irregular rate of speed and with varying degrees of success, were beginning to throw off the shackles of feudal economy.

For the purpose of illustrating this problem, we shall here submit such figures as are available for the early nineteenth century.

The total number of workers, excluding the mining, distilling, brewing, and flour-mill industries, was: [13]

YEARS	NUMBER OF FACTORIES	NUMBER OF WORKERS (IN THOUSANDS)	HIRED WORKERS
1770	260	55.3	32%
1804	2,402	95.2	47
1812	2,322	119.0	50
1820	4,578	179.6	58
1825	5,261	210.6	54
1860	14,388	565.1	87

Within the several branches of production, the percentage relationship of the number of hired workers fluctuated rather sharply: [14]

	NUMBER OF FACTORIES		HIRED WORKERS	
INDUSTRIES	1804	1825	1804	1825
Wool cloth	157	324	10%	18.4%
Linen	285	196	60	70.8
Cotton	196	484	83	94.7
Silk	328	184	73	83.0
Paper	64	87	22	24.0
Iron and steel	28	170	28	22.0
Leather	843	1,784	97	93.0
Rope	58	98	85	92.0

Thus, by 1825 the remaining stronghold of serf labor was confined to the wool-cloth manufactures of the nobility and the metallurgical industry (iron, pig iron, and steel production, chiefly in the Urals), the "possessional" factories, as well as the paper factories of the landowners. In the others, free labor began to prevail to an overwhelming degree. For some thirty-five years prior to the serf reform, many branches of industry had outgrown their basis of serfdom and were changing to the "free" factory system.

In spite of the dominance of serfdom, industry made considerable progress. In the opinion of foreign observers, Russian industry in the late eighteenth century was not a hothouse or extensive growth, but in some respects it did place Russia in one of the outstanding positions as compared with other countries. Particularly impressive was the scale attained by, say, ferrous metallurgy, in which Russia held first place during the early nineteenth century: in 1800 the production of pig iron in Russia attained 10,300,000 poods, while English production was only 10,000,000 poods, with the quality of Russian (Ural) pig iron rating very highly. But by 1850 Russia was lagging far behind England, where production had soared to 140,100,000 poods compared to Russia's total production of 13 to 16 million poods; France and the United States had also outstripped Russia by that time, and by 1860 Russia held eighth place in the production of pig iron, its output amounting to 17.6 million poods, below that of Austria (19 million poods) and Prussia (27 million poods).

In the Ural iron industry the influence of serfdom proved extremely injurious, causing a decline, during 1850–1860, in what was formerly a highly developed industry. The technical progress which so fully engrossed the iron and steel industries of other countries during this period left the feudal metallurgy of the Urals almost untouched. It continued to be maintained exclusively by serf labor, basing its supremacy "not on capital and competition, but on monopoly and on its proprietary rights." [15]

This monopoly was secured by a high tariff duty which, as in the case of the customs tariff of 1822, amounted to 250 per cent of the cost of iron and 600 per cent of the cost of pig iron. Duties of this type protected the Russian market against the influx of lower priced English products, but they also perpetuated the technical backwardness of the Ural mining industry. Being a mainstay of serfdom, the Urals, even long before the decline of its iron and steel industry, revealed all the disastrous consequences of serfdom and the official policy on behalf of serfdom and the nobility.

The Ural feudal metal industry in its period of dissolution and decline merely reflected more sharply the elements of crisis prevalent among all branches of industry under the stagnant conditions of serfdom. For example, another sphere of serf-labor predominance and of manorial manufacturing, the wool-cloth industry, had proceeded, as we have seen, along the same path of class privilege, contract patronage from the state, tariff protection against foreign competition, and the preponderance of serf labor, ending, as a result, in complete technical stagnation and decline.

On the other hand the cotton industry, which was among the first fully to adjust itself to capitalist machinery, to the new technology, and to free labor, had completely outgrown the pattern of feudal relationships by the

middle of the nineteenth century. At the same time this branch of industry did experience, however, all the contradictions engendered between serfdom and the incipient capitalist system within the country.

Notes

1. Computed on the basis of data from *Sbornik svedenii po istorii i statistike vneshnei torgovli Rossii* (Collection of Data on the History and Statistics of the Foreign Trade of Russia) (1890), pp. 264-269 and tables on p. 66.
2. *Sbornik svedenii po istorii i statistike vneshnei torgovli Rossii* (1890), p. 286.
3. Kornilov, *Kurs russkoi istorii* (A Course in Russian History), Vol. I, p. 218.
4. Tengoborskii, *O proizvoditelnykh silakh Rossii* (On the Productive Forces of Russia) (1854–1858), Pt. 2, pp. 337-516.
5. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, pp. 376-377.
6. I. German, *Opisaniye zavodov, pod vedomstvom Yekaterinburgskogo gornogo nachalstva sostoyashchikh* (Description of the Factories Under the Administration of the Yekaterinburg Mineral Authority) (1808).
7. Strumilin, *Chyornaya metallurgiya* (Ferrous Metallurgy), pp. 200-201.
8. Compiled on the basis of the *Sbornik svedenii po istorii i statistike vneshnei torgovli Rossii*, edit. by V. Pokrovskii, (1902), pp. 281-283 and 135-136.
9. *Istoriko-statisticheskii obzor promyshlennosti Rossii* (Historical-Statistical Survey of Russian Industry) (1883), Vol. II, p. 78.
10. Compiled on the basis of the *Sbornik svedenii po istorii i statistike vneshnei torgovli Rossii*, pp. 272-279.
11. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, p. 300.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 462-463.
13. Compiled on the basis of data from the Boards of Manufactures and the Department of Manufactures for the respective years, LOTSIA, *Arkhiv narodnovo khozyaistva* (Archives of the National Economy) and *Vedomosti o manufakturakh v Rossii* (Gazette on Manufactures in Russia) for the respective years. See also Semyonov, *Izucheniye istoricheskikh svedenii o rossiiskoi vneshnyei torgovlye i promyshlennosti s poloviny XVII v do 1858* (The Study of Historical Data on Russian Foreign Trade and Industry from the Middle of the Seventeenth Century to 1858) (1859), Vol. III, Appendix. Among the general surveys of the situation in manufacturing during that period see the well known survey by Academician Karl German; see C. Hermann, *Coup d'oeil sur l'état des manufactures en Russie, Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences* (1822), VIII, p. 448. Cf. also Tugan-Baranovskii, *Russkaya fabrika v proshlom i nastoyashchem* (The Russian Factory in the Past and Present) (1898), Vol. I, pp. 76, 85-86, 89.
14. Compiled from the same data of the Department of Manufactures. See also Zyablovskii, *Statisticheskoye opisaniye Rossiiskoi imperii* (Statistical Description of the Russian Empire) (1808), pp. 9-73.
15. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. III, p. 377.

(XIX)

The Colonial Policy of the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries

We have already said (Chapter XV) that the eighteenth century and the first quarter of the nineteenth century were periods of vigorous expansion of the empire's frontiers, reaching for the first time, in the west, beyond the boundaries of the Russian land proper (Finland, the Baltic, and Poland). Likewise, the dynamic expansion of the nation's frontiers proceeded to the south, into the ancient Russian territories, to the Ukraine, as well as into the New Russia steppes, to the Crimea, toward the European southeast (North Caucasus), into Transcaucasia (Georgia, Mingrelia, Daghestan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia), and, finally, toward the Asiatic East (the Central Asian steppes and Kamchatka) as far as the American continent (Alaska). These conquests of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were already of a purely colonial expansionist character. We shall now examine the colonial policy and the military expansion of the empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the west, south, and east.

The struggle against Poland over the Ukraine and White Russia, that terminated unsuccessfully for Moscow at the end of the seventeenth century, was vigorously resumed during the eighteenth century. It ended during the late eighteenth century not only with the reunion of the Ukraine and White Russia with Russia but also with the collapse of Poland.

In 1772, as a result of the first partition of Poland, Russia acquired a substantial part of White Russia; the second partition of 1793 yielded the remainder of White Russia, the Ukraine, Podolya, and the eastern portions of Polesye and Volhynia; and finally, by the third partition of 1795, Russia acquired Lithuania, together with Vilno and Grodno, and the remainder of Polesye and Volhynia.[1]

WHITE RUSSIA AND LITHUANIA DURING THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES After their incorporation within Russia during the late eighteenth century, White Russia and Lithuania composed the six northwestern provinces of Russia (Wilno, Grodno, Kowno, Minsk, Mogilev, and Vitebsk).

However, the economic reunion of this area with the empire was not achieved immediately. The Lithuanian and Polish nobility strove to preserve their independence, and during the Napoleonic invasion of 1812 joined forces with the conqueror. The war and the merciless requisitions of livestock and food by the French brought utter ruin to the farm population of the country. Moreover, a series of crop failures ravaged this area between 1820 and 1822. The White Russian peasantry began to leave their farms en masse, resettling or departing in search of temporary work in the interior provinces of Russia. The Polish uprising of 1830 succeeded in spreading partly through Lithuania and White Russia, although it failed to reach any serious proportions there since the peasantry gave no support to the rebellious Polish nobility. In the meantime the tsarist government had promised the peasantry freedom from serfdom; after the suppression of the uprising, however, the promise was not kept. Instead the government confiscated all the lands of the nobles who had taken part in the uprising and began to colonize Lithuania and White Russia with Russian landowners. The feudal agriculture of the landlords in the Lithuanian and White Russian provinces, after a period of decline during 1820–1830, began a more intensive exploitation of its peasant serfs in connection with the development of commercial farming and the increasing sales of their products abroad. The general level of peasant agriculture was uncommonly low. Under the three-field system the manuring of peasant fields was highly inadequate in view of the neglect of livestock raising among the peasants. The estate system of farming among the landlords was maintained with the aid of the highly burdensome obligatory labor of the small tenants, but many landlords in the interest of a more intensified agriculture began to organize their own farming, working with the free hired labor of the landless villagers. These farms operated directly by the landowners achieved considerable success, developed commercial production, supplying the market with flax, lard, hides, bristles, and grain. These farms began to abandon the three-field system in favor of a more improved form of crop rotation, specializing in the cultivation of potatoes and distilling. These innovations, however, brought no improvement to the peasant level of farming, which remained extremely backward. Crop failures and famines were "customary" (*bytovyie*) phenomena among the White Russian peasantry. The primitive state of local industry offered no opportunity for other than agricultural pursuits. Among the *kustar* industries were the most primitive trades in the processing of wood and in the production of wood articles. The mass of the urban population was no better situated. It consisted largely of poor Jews, small artisans, and tradesmen. The upper Jewish bourgeoisie conducted the more extensive wholesale trade in agri-

cultural products and leased the estates of the wealthy Lithuanian and Polish landowners.

Thus the newly annexed parts of Lithuania and White Russia constituted one of the backward economic areas in the feudal economic structure of Russia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, characterized by a relatively low level of farming, by a peasant agriculture submerged in servility and land scarcity, and by a primitive state of processing industries. Yet annexation to Russia did open to the White Russian and Lithuanian peasantry more opportunities for development than under the yoke of landlord-ridden Poland. Hence, as capitalism progressed during the nineteenth century, the region experienced a degree of prosperity commensurate with its position as a component part of the Russian capitalist economic structure.

URBAN UKRAINE As for the Ukraine, after its unification with Russia, the settlement and economic incorporation of its various parts proceeded irregularly and with varying degrees of success.

The first to be settled was the so-called "Slobodskaya" Ukraine (the former Kharkov Province). Although nominally under the control of Moscow since the early seventeenth century, it was still "wild country" at that time, that is, an uninhabited steppe through which the Tatars roamed freely and where a few guard posts of the Moscow military people were scattered. Here, in the middle of the seventeenth century, appeared the first agricultural settlers, the "Circassians," who had come from the Polish part of the west-bank Ukraine and from Lithuania, and who were "slaves" (*khlopy*) escaping from Lithuanian-Polish feudal slavery. They formed their first settlement of the urban type, the city of Kharkov, during 1654–1655. The Moscow government encouraged the settlement of the region by the Circassians by granting them rights of serf government, free homesteads, the use of fisheries, freedom of distilling, and the right of free trade "subject to neither tribute nor duty." In return the Circassians, who brought with them their own institutions of a military Cossack system and mode of life, were under obligation to defend the frontiers of the state and to participate in its military campaigns (in the Azov campaigns of Peter I, in the northern war, and in the Crimean campaign). In the course of the eighteenth century the Circassians gradually came to lose their independent existence as a military caste. Their rights of the free appropriation of land began to be restricted, and the population was made subject to all general taxes in effect throughout the rest of Russia.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, the "Slobodskaya" Ukraine lost its position as that of a militarized borderland, since it was already surrounded on the east and south by new settlements of Russians, Ukrainians, Serbs, and

other elements. Its settlement proceeded apace: in 1773 it contained some 677 centers and 666,000 inhabitants. Agriculture became the main economic pursuit of the population in the area. Distilling was fairly prevalent in the Kharkov territory (976 distilleries by 1780), as was the production of tar, and both alcohol and tar were exported not only within the empire but also abroad.[2] Some *kustar* industries were of considerable importance (leather, and others). Trade relations with the Moscow area were meanwhile strengthened and expanded: the fairs of "Slobodskaya" Ukraine attracted a flow of goods from many remote districts of Russia and from foreign lands as well.

Under the impact of economic progress within the region, land tenure among the population also witnessed a sharp change. In the Kharkov area the free appropriation of homesteads disappeared by the middle of the eighteenth century. The local Cossack chieftains and the rich Russian landowners were appropriating or buying the Cossack homesteads and lands and settling the land with their bonded peasants. By the end of the eighteenth century, vast feudal latifundia already existed in the region, as, for example, the estate of the Golitsyn princes with 4,500 serfs, the Kondratyev estate with 5,958 serfs, and the Tevyachev estate with 4,250 serfs, besides a great many owners of between 1,000 and 1,500 serfs.

THE EAST-BANK UKRAINE The Ukraine's left-bank territory (officially designated as "Little Russia" and including the Chernigov and Poltava provinces), following the depopulation of the fifteenth century, began to be heavily populated during the seventeenth century by fugitive serfs who escaped from their Polish landowners in the Ukraine and White Russia. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this region included, apart from such old towns as Chernigov, Pereyaslavl, and Starodub, new flourishing towns like Nezhin, Cherkassy, Baturin, Konotop, Glukhov, Krolevets, and others. Originally the "regimental" towns of the Cossacks, these towns gradually became transformed into sizable local trading and fair centers.

Upon annexation to Russia, and since the eighteenth century in particular, the east-bank Ukraine witnessed the introduction of a Russian administration through the appointment of hetmans who were adherents of Moscow in lieu of the former elective system of hetmans. Subsequently, "The Board for Little Russia" was established as the chief organ of administration. Under Catherine II the hetman institution was entirely abolished and a completely Russian administration was introduced in its stead (1782). Customs barriers between this area and Russia were abolished, and

the general laws of the land, including the per capita tax, were extended to the region.

In the course of the eighteenth century, and particularly during its second half, the east-bank Ukraine experienced far-reaching changes in its system of land tenure. Instead of the former preponderance of the Cossack population and its system of "free" allotment farming, the peasant population came to predominate, a considerable proportion of which consisted of persons with small holdings and households without land. Simultaneously the Cossack chieftains, the Ukrainian nobility, and the Great Russian nobility appropriated the land of the Cossacks and the peasants, imposing a state of bondage on the peasants in occupation of these lands. Since 1739 the military administration forbade the voluntary transfer of peasants from one landlord to another. The ban was later abolished by Elizabeth in 1742, at which time the Great Russian landlords were forbidden to "bind" the Ukrainian peasants to the land. The policy of compulsory bondage continued, however. During the reign of the hetman Razumovsky (1751–1764), the bulk of the settlements were changed to "the perpetual hereditary ownership" of the Cossack chieftains and the landowners. The peasant's right to transfer was restricted and all property was retained by the landowner in the event of such transfers. Under Catherine II the right to transfer was entirely abolished in 1783, and in this manner the Russian institution of serfdom was extended to the Ukraine.[3]

By this time the population became engaged almost exclusively in agriculture and livestock raising. Their produce—grain, hemp, hides, and bristles—was sold by the landowners as well as by the peasants at the numerous fairs, whence they were carried to the ports and beyond the frontier. *Kustar* industries were fairly well developed. The best developed of the industrial enterprises were the distilling mills; there was a sailmaking factory at Pochep, founded by Peter I, and a number of small workshops (for glass, leather, and so forth).

THE WEST-BANK UKRAINE The Ukraine west-bank region (embracing the Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia provinces), in Russia's possession since 1793–1795, was severely ravaged by the Poles during the second half of the seventeenth century in connection with Khmelnitsky's uprising and his wars as an ally of Turkey against Poland (1646–1649 and 1651–1653). The Cossack and Ukrainian serf population sought refuge beyond the Dnepr inside the Moscow state. Agriculture fell into ruin. Not before the beginning of the eighteenth century, under the Polish king Jan Sobiesky, did a new vigorous Polish colonization by wealthy landowners begin in this area. The big Polish magnates, and after them the smaller gentry, again

seized or otherwise obtained large landed property. In the organization of their large-scale agriculture, they lacked manpower, and hence the landlords undertook to settle their land by attracting peasants from other locations. In this manner was created the formation of special settlements called "Slobody" (free centers). The peasants who settled in the Slobody were not regarded as serfs, but took up their residence on the basis of long-term agreements which provided for a number of personal and economic privileges such as, for example, exemption from taxes for a number of years, cash assistance, and so forth, as well as a precise enumeration of duties and service obligations toward the landowner (so-called "inventories"). As a result the Dnepr's west-bank became quite densely populated with peasants by the middle of the eighteenth century. When the peasantry had become solidly settled upon the land, however, and the original terms of the agreements expired, the landowners began to avoid the conclusion of new agreements. They deprived the peasants of their former privileges and bound them to the land on the basis of the generally prevailing conditions of serfdom throughout Poland. In the midst of this intensified feudal oppression, during the period between 1730 and 1768, the peasant, so-called *haydamak* movement again broke out against the lords and gentry of Poland. The most serious uprising of the *haydamaks* (the "Kolivshchina") occurred in 1768. When the west-bank Ukraine was annexed to Russia, it was a province typified by large holdings in the hands of the Polish landlords, by extremely minute peasant land holdings, and by difficult conditions of serfdom. For example, of a total population of 533,000 persons in Kiev Province, according to the census of 1797, peasant serfs amounted to 444,000;[4] that is, serfs constituted about 84 per cent of the population.

In its technical level the agriculture of the west-bank Ukraine rapidly advanced to rank with the foremost regions of the country. Since about 1840 the farms of the landowners undertook the regular cultivation of beets, and began to build sugar mills. Consequently, its entire agricultural system of farming registered a series of notable changes, and the three-field system disappeared, being replaced by crop rotation. The methods of soil cultivation improved, and the use of manure was introduced.

THE UKRAINE OF THE STEPPES The colonization of the steppe provinces of the Ukraine came somewhat later. Only after the southern part of the west-bank, between the Dnepr and the Bug, was wrested from Turkey (the Kuchuk-Kainardzhy Treaty of 1774), after the obliteration of the Zaporzhye Cossack seat of power (1775), after the annexation of the Crimea (1783), as well as after the annexation of Bessarabia (the Bucharest Treaty of 1812), was the systematic colonization of the steppe provinces of the Black

Sea and Azov coast made possible. In 1803 the population of Yekaterinoslav Province numbered 660,000 persons, Kherson, 370,000.[5] In 1844 the total population in four of the so-called "New Russia" provinces rose to 3,127,000 persons of both sexes, of which Yekaterinoslav accounted for 776,000 and Kherson for 850,000. The settlers of these provinces had originally been enrolled in special Hussar and Cossack regiments, like the military agricultural settlements. Besides the main mass of resettlers from the Ukraine, as well as some from parts of Great Russia (Voronezh Province), the settlement of foreign elements played an important role in populating and taming the territory. In 1752 the first military-agricultural settlement of Austrian Serbs (the "New Serbia" in Kherson Province) took place: in 1774 came the Greek settlements, followed by Bulgarian, German, and others. Besides peasant colonists, the rapid development of agricultural colonization was begun by the nobility when the government distributed to the gentry vast latifundia covering tens of thousands of *dessyatins* each. In total, Catherine II released to the nobility 4.5 million *dessyatins* of land throughout that area during the first twelve years following the incorporation of the Ukraine steppe lands.

The distribution of land proceeded at a more accelerated speed during the early nineteenth century, with the aim of expanding fine-wool-sheep breeding. For this purpose wealthy noblemen and foreigners (the princes Vorontsov, Kochubey, the counts Stroganov, Kankrin, Pototsky, the Duke of Anhalt-Keten, the foreigners Fein, Kornis, Filibert, Vassal, and others) became the recipients of vast latifundia of tens and hundreds of thousands of *dessyatins* of land, under obligation to raise the merino sheep. The government bought merino sheep abroad and distributed them to the large landowners. By 1840 the steppe regions of the Ukraine supported about seven million head of sheep, half of which were merino. The largest sheep herders, such as the foreign colonists Fein and Filibert, owned over a hundred thousand heads of sheep each.

The cultivation of grain became prominent somewhat later, when, stimulated by the proximity of several seaports, it very soon developed on a large commercial scale. As early as the 1780's the grain crop harvested in this area attained between 230,000 and 240,000 quarters, and during 1846–1847, between 8.8 and 8.0 million quarters.[6] Although wheat had not yet succeeded in crowding out sheep grazing and virgin steppe land during the 1840's, its cultivation was increasing rapidly. The chief producers of grain were the large-scale planters, both peasant and landlord. The export of grain from the steppe provinces to the Black Sea ports, and thence abroad, had attained an annual level of 1.5 million quarters (50 million poods) by 1840.[7]

The development of commercial grain farming and of large wheat planting in comparison with a negligible population in general, and a small number of serfs in particular (of the 3,127,000 total population bonded peasants constituted 658,000 persons), stimulated the use of machinery and hired labor, as well as technological improvement in general. It was in the steppes of the Ukraine, therefore, that the foundations of capitalist agriculture were laid earlier than in any of the other regions.

As for industry, its presence was still little felt during the first half of the nineteenth century. Although coal was discovered in the Donets basin in 1790, and the first iron-smelting plant was established at Lugansk in 1795, the vast riches of the Donbass and Krivoi Rog still remained to be opened up and exploited. The main branches of production were still the industries based on agricultural raw material, the sugar mills, and the distilleries. Peasant household crafts were fairly well developed in connection with the processing of leather, hemp, tobacco, and similar rural raw materials.

Thus, during the pre-Reform * era, prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, the Ukraine steppe land (as well as Northern Caucasus, the Trans-Volga region, and others) was still a colony with large tracts of available free land and with production devoted exclusively to agricultural products to be sold to the metropolitan area in return for industrial products. Some of the economic relationships between a colony and the mother country remained partly in effect during the period of capitalism.[8] In the main, however, the development of capitalism profoundly altered the previous relationships. The formation in the Ukraine of such large industrial centers of empire-wide significance as the Krivoi Rog metallurgical district, the Donbass, the southwestern sugar-beet district, the erection of excellent ports (Odessa, Nikolayev, Kherson, and others), the construction of a unified dense network of railway lines, the rapid expansion of the sown area, and exports of grain to the internal as well as the external markets, not to mention the general economic policy, currency circulation, and taxation policy, integrated the economy of the Ukraine indissolubly and organically with the general economy of Russian capitalism. In turn the latter in its development inevitably absorbed the industry, the agriculture, the proletariat, and peasantry of the Ukraine as an indissoluble and organic part of itself. Hence, our further study of the capitalist epoch, its various elements and historical phases, should be a comprehensive study of the whole system of Russian capitalism, including the Ukraine as an integral and organic part of the whole, repeating the general pattern and peculiarities of development of Russian capitalism.[9]

* The Reform by abolition of serfdom in 1861.—ED.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE CRIMEA Following its occupation of the southern steppes, Russia achieved the separation of the Crimea from Turkey by the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardzhy, and, subsequently, in 1783 annexed the peninsula outright.

The Crimea was held by the Tatars since 1239, when Batu-Khan invaded the Russian steppes. Having settled mainly in the steppe belt of the Crimea, the Tatar nomads engaged in livestock raising, retaining their usual forms of feudal grouping in tribes and clans in a position of vassalage to the upper feudal families. At first the Crimean Tatars constituted a special *ulus* (settlement) of the Golden Horde, but upon the collapse of the latter maintained their independent existence as a khanate. After the fall of Byzantium at the hands of the Turks (1453), who occupied the shores of the Black Sea, the Crimean khanate recognized the suzerainty of Turkey. From that time, the Crimean khanate became a military tool of Turkey in her numerous wars against Russia. Meanwhile, the Russian government had striven greatly since the end of the seventeenth century to conquer the Crimea, a goal that was finally attained with complete success under Catherine II.

The Crimea, together with the South Russian steppes, soon became one of the richest colonies of tsarist Russia. Russia's rule and a colonial regime were introduced into the Crimea after the conquest. As an initial measure the population was deprived of much valuable land that was promptly transferred to the Russian magnates and gentry. According to official data, about 288,000 *dessyatins* of land were taken from the Tatar peasants by Catherine and distributed among the nobility over a period of twelve years. Apart from fertile, black steppe-land soil, valuable coastal lands were taken and the population driven to the infertile foothills. In 1796 the institution of serfdom was introduced into the Crimea. The Tatar aristocracy, the "Murzy," were granted a status of nobility and, with it, part of the land and the right to own serfs. The land plunder, the colonial regime, and serfdom caused the wholesale migration of the Tatars from the Crimea to Turkey. Rich and thriving Crimea was thus depopulated. To repopulate the area, the government organized systematic resettlement of the peninsula by Russian peasants, as well as by foreign colonists, with large land areas set aside for sheep herding and for the cultivation of wheat. During the Crimean War the mass eviction of the Tatars from the Crimean shores became even more intensified, and the despoliation of the land continued. In this manner the destiny of this rich colonial prize of Russia differed very little from that of Bashkiria and other "internal colonies." After the second half of the nineteenth century, the Crimean steppes became the site of vigorous agricultural colonization as well as a rich granary, supplying Russian export with its best grades of wheat.

THE CAUCASUS AND TRANSCAUCASIA Russia's final conquest of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought to a conclusion the lengthy historical process of Russian penetration which, as we have seen, began back in the tenth to fourteenth centuries. That process, particularly as the Russian state expanded eastward, was motivated by the urge to reach the old commercial "silk" route from the West to India, and the "fabulous" riches of that land. Therefore, after control over the entire Volga route and access to the Caspian were achieved, the military spearhead of tsarism at first followed the shore of the Caspian and the Terek River toward Derbent, into Dagestan, and in the direction of Persia. The drive to establish commercial relations with the East through this route called for the military protection and colonization of these regions. The lower reaches of the Terek had for some time been settled by descendants of the Don Cossacks. During 1534–1584 a special Cossack army of the Terek was organized in connection with a newly built line of fortifications. This military-colonization pressure gained additional strength during the eighteenth century. The Derbent and Persian campaigns of Peter I (1722) ended in the occupation of Derbent and Baku, which was, however, subsequently abandoned by the Russians. The presence of petroleum was beginning to attract the Russians to Baku.

The conquest of the western part of the North Caucasus, the valley of the Kuban River, was undertaken somewhat later. The Slavic Tmutorokan principality that existed on the Taman peninsula during the tenth century was conquered by the Mongols in the thirteenth century. By the fifteenth century the region fell under the control of the Turks. By the late seventeenth century, however, Russian settlers began to appear in the Taman peninsula and were subsequently organized into special Black Sea, Cossack troops. Russia annexed Taman and the land along the Kuban River in 1783. All along the new frontier, fortification lines of the so-called "line" Cossacks were established, who in 1860, together with the Black Sea Cossacks, were merged into the Kuban Cossack army. Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century, during 1763–1792, the Russian frontier, reinforced by military Cossack colonization, followed the rivers Kuban and Terek from the Black to the Caspian Sea.

From there, following the tributaries of these rivers in the mountains, the armies of the tsar undertook the conquest of the Caucasus from the north during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: during 1791–1825, the Greater Kabarda; during 1806–1821, Dagestan; in 1806, the khanate of Kuba and Baku (from Persia); in 1828, Karachai; in 1858, Chechen; and in 1862–1863, Cherkess (Adyge) from Turkey. Almost a century was thus consumed by the conquest of these mountainous tribes. Follow-

ing the conquest of the northern Caucasus, its fertile land, wrested from the local inhabitants, who were dislodged into the mountains, became the scene of colonization by Cossacks, peasants, and noblemen. After 1782 began the distribution of large estates to high-ranking aristocrats (the counts Vorontsov, Chernyshev, Besborodko, and others): the lands thus distributed during the first twelve years amounted to more than 600,000 *dessyatins.*

Parallel with the military-colonization pressure from the north against the Caucasus, proceeded the annexation and conquest of Transcaucasia from the south. Here conquest was facilitated by the fact that feudal disunion and the internal struggle among the numerous feudal rulers (of Georgia, Mingrelia, Imeretia, Guria, and others), coupled with the menace from Turkey and Persia, in a number of cases suggested need of a *rapprochement* with Russia. Therefore, when war broke out between Russia and Turkey in 1768, Georgia, faced with the choice between submission to Turkey and union with Russia, chose the latter as the "lesser evil." Georgia was occupied by Russian troops in the course of the war, and afterward, according to the Russian-Georgian treaty of 1783, Georgia recognized Russian suzerainty in international relations while retaining its independence in internal affairs. This was presumed to achieve a voluntary "unification" with Russia on the basis of military defense against Turkey and Persia. As a matter of fact, however (contrary to the terms of the treaty of 1783), not unification but annexation of Georgia to Russia as another province resulted in 1801, followed by the annexation and subjugation of its various sections: Mingrelia (1803), Imeretia, and Guria (1804). In the meantime Russia wrested from Persia the khanates of Azerbaijan: Gandzha (1804), Karabakh (1805), Shirvan Shukha (1805), and others. Following another war against Persia in alliance with Turkey, the Gulistan treaty of 1813 secured these conquests for Russia, granting her in addition shipping rights through the Caspian Sea, and permitting her to retain Abkhazia lost by Turkey (1810) during the wars. A new war with Persia during 1826–1828 ended in the treaty of Turmanchay (1828), which left Russia in possession of part of Armenia (the khanates of Erivan and Nakhichevan), while another war with Turkey, in 1829, and the treaty of Andriantinople that followed, gained for Russia Akhaltsykh and Akhalkalaky. Finally, the war of 1877–1878 gave Russia control over the vast Kara province, including Ardagan and Batum.

Along with the conquest of the Caucasus, however, grew the resistance of many of its various nationalities, particularly in the mountainous areas, and requiring new military expeditions by the tsars. Expeditions of this type were frequently accompanied by the utter destruction of *auls* (Caucasian villages) and their inhabitants. The occupation of the Black Sea coast was accompanied by the annihilation, or wholesale flight to Turkey, of the entire

Cherkess population. Prolonged and heroic resistance against conquest was also manifested by the mountain people of the East Caucasus, but here, likewise, the disproportion of power resulted in the ultimate fall, during 1859–1860, of the last strongholds of the struggle (the village of Shamilya Gunib in August, 1859). The years between 1860 and 1864 are regarded as the years of the ultimate conquest of the West and East Caucasus, although its pacification still required numerous military expeditions.

These were the main stages in the military-political conquest of the Caucasus by Russia. Its economic conquest, however, came much later and was not, in fact, completed before 1890–1900, as indicated by Lenin in his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.*[10] We shall deal with this question later in its appropriate section; here we shall merely touch upon the first steps in the colonial-economic incorporation of the Caucasus during the first half of the nineteenth century.

The colonial policy of the Russian autocracy, as well as the colonial penetration of this region, followed the usual lines with the usual methods: troops were dispatched. (Inasmuch as it was a frontier zone, the military occupation was particularly heavy.) Behind the troops came the army of the bureaucracy, whose chief task was Russification: schools were established, and the Russian language was introduced into the administration and in public education. The Church participated actively in the process of Russification. In other words this "borderland" received the full measure of a colonial policy of subjugation and Russification, although the culture and historic past of some of its parts, Georgia, for example, was on a higher level than that of the mother country.

Due to its special frontier position, the economic subjugation of Transcaucasia at first followed a more or less cautious course. For that reason the imperial and customs policy (which had acquired a protectionist trend in the mother country since the early nineteenth century) was not at once extended into Transcaucasia and Georgia, and both areas continued for some time to enjoy a privileged position with regard to foreign imports. But by the 1830's these privileges were rescinded and Transcaucasia was incorporated within the regular customs system of the Russian Empire. Meanwhile, regular transportation and commercial connections linking Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus with the empire were established by building surfaced highways through the mountains, by permanent sea routes by way of the Black and Caspian seas and along the Volga, by developing special steamship lines, and so forth. (Commercial steam shipping on the Black Sea began in 1856.) Through these channels the industrial goods produced by the mother country began to gain markets in Transcaucasia.

In the process of the political and military subjugation of Transcaucasia,

Russian tsarism found support for its policy in the social structure of Georgia and of the other national states and khanates of the Transcaucasus. Georgia was then undergoing the stage of feudal decline and internal struggle among the feudal lords. Power was concentrated in the hands of the feudal aristocracy, the large landowning classes (the *tavaly* and the princes). Apart from them were the minor gentry (the *aznaury*). In their own interests they all gladly cooperated with Russian tsarism, especially in the sphere of feudal policy toward the peasantry and the land. Here feudal relationships, therefore, survived for a longer time. In Transcaucasia (in Georgia and especially in the khanates of Dagestan and Azerbaijan) serfdom and even common slavery were left untouched by tsarism and persisted, in fact, down to 1912; that is, to a time when even the most backward districts of Russia had long abolished the institution.

The alliance between the local nobility and Russian tsarism bore fruit in the sense that, after the liberation of the Russian peasants in 1861, and primarily under the influence of political security considerations about the position of the Caucasian frontier territory, the problem was raised of adapting the Peasant Reform to Transcaucasia and allotting land to the peasants in keeping with the general rules of the Reform of 1861. Below (Chapter XXI), we shall dwell in greater detail upon the execution of the Peasant Reform in the various districts of Transcaucasia during 1863–1870. This Reform "after the Russian pattern," indeed, corresponded even less to local conditions than it had within the mother country. Moreover, guided by considerations of protection for the local ruling classes, the Reform was conducted in an even more restricted fashion than in the Russian provinces in connection with the regulation of 1861, as the result of which serfdom, and in some parts even slavery, continued in practice even after the Reform.

Feudal oppression and the persistent survival of vestiges of serfdom provoked systematic, violent mass outbreaks among the peasantry. From the early nineteenth century such uprisings recurred in some localities almost every decade; namely, in 1804, 1811, 1812, 1820, 1830, 1837, 1841, 1857, 1866, 1875, 1876, and other years. From the second half of the nineteenth century the peasant movement assumed a particularly stubborn character in the form of uprisings against feudal oppression and the harsh conditions under which the peasantry continued to live after the Reform.

CENTRAL ASIA Russian penetration of Central Asia began considerably later than that of Siberia. Whereas by the end of the eighteenth century the Russian state had conquered nearly all of Siberia as far as the Pacific Ocean, penetration into the southern steppes of West Siberia and into Central Asia proceeded at a slower pace. These steppes, as we have indicated,

were peopled by heterogeneous nomad tribes of Mongol origin, who, even after the fall of the Golden Horde, the liquidation of the Kazan and Astrakhan kingdoms, and the conquest of the Siberian kingdom, did not consider themselves vanquished by tsarism and periodically continued their attacks against the southeastern frontiers of Russia. The Cossack colonization of the Don and the Ural (the Yaik, or Ural, Cossack settlements) were the first military outposts in the conquest and settlement of this territory. The Russian conquests encountered the outbreak of uprisings among the Bashkirs and the Kalmyks, who had inhabited the steppes of the lower Volga, the Yaik (Ural), and the Don since 1630.

The systematic offensive by the Russians against the South Siberian and Central Asian steppes began during the eighteenth century under Peter I. Piqued by rumors of the region's great wealth in gold, and persisting in his attempts to find a direct route to India, he equipped several military expeditions for that purpose. Two expeditions (that of Buchholz in 1714–1716, and that of Likhachev in 1719) were dispatched across the Irtysh and along the Erketi-Yarkend in Central Asia. These expeditions erected the fortresses of Omsk, Semipalatinsk, and Ust-Kamenogorsk as outposts for further penetration, but no great purpose was thereby achieved. Another expedition, led by Prince Cherkassky-Bekovich and sent in 1716 by way of the Caspian Sea and the Amu-Darya River into Central Asia, reached the territory of the Khiva khanate, but met with disaster when all members of the expedition were brutally executed by the khan.

The instructions issued by Peter for the last expedition are highly interesting. In his orders of 1714, Peter wrote:

> To set out for Khiva with salutations for the khan, and to Bukhara, finding some commercial objective, a real objective. . . . The road to be taken shall follow that river [Amu-Darya], while the course of the river, as well as the water depth if possible, shall be carefully studied, and the river shall be returned to its old bed while all other mouths of the river are blocked. [The khan of Khiva] shall be asked to send his men (with whom two of our people shall also go) upstream by water along the Syr-Darya River to the town of Irket to search for gold. He shall also be asked for ships in which to sail a company along the Amu-Darya River into India. Lieutenant Kozhin shall be ordered to investigate about spices and other goods.[11]

Such was the broad scope of the economic questions raised by Peter concerning trade, waterways into India, colonial products, Yarkend gold, and so forth.

The failure of the Circassian expedition (as well as the expedition of Muravyev in 1819) impelled the tsarist government to try another tactical approach. On the one hand, it adopted a series of measures for the "peaceful" subjugation of the nomads and the penetration of their territory. During the

first quarter of the eighteenth century, the Kalmyks gained control over Turkestan and began to crowd the Kazakhs toward the west until the latter reached the Russian frontier. At that time the Kazakhs were divided into three hordes, the Great, the Medium, and the Small Hordes. Fully exploiting the quarrels among the khans of the various hordes, the tsarist government succeeded through bribery and gifts in having one of the khans of the Small Horde agree "to become a Russian subject" (during the reign of Anna Ioannovna). Although the decision was taken without the consent of the Small Horde as a whole, the Russian government not only succeeded in subjugating the Horde in question but also, soon afterward, in winning over the khanates of both the Great and Medium Hordes in a similar manner. Thus occurred the "peaceful" annexation, during the 1730's and 1740's, of the provinces of Ural, Turgay, a part of Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk, and thus of a vast *place d'armes* for future military and economic offensives.

The aggressive policy was initially launched with the building of the so-called "Siberia-Orenburg" fortification line in the guise of a "defense" against the nomads. From a position of "defense," the tsarist government easily went over to the offensive. For fear of unduly alarming Europe, and England particularly, this offensive was disguised and organized in the form of scientific expeditions. In 1824 a "scientific" expedition under Berg was equipped "to conduct a barometric study between the Caspian and Aral seas" supported by half a battalion of infantry, 1,200 Ural and 400 Orenburg Cossacks, 6 cannons, and 872 two-horse-drawn carts! At the Gulf of Kaidak, in 1834, the fortress of Novo-Alexandrovsk was erected for the purpose, apart from military aims, of "improving our trade with Khiva." Then followed the Khiva expedition of General Perovsky in 1839 (with 5,325 soldiers, 22 cannon, and 10,000 camels), which was equally unsuccessful and injurious to Russian influence in Central Asia. Characteristically, the official motive behind these military expeditions, as under Peter I, was purportedly the need "to protect our goods and our merchants" against attacks by the people of Khiva.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, that is, in the period preceding the Russian conquest of Central Asia, the volume of trade turnover between Russia and that area attained sizable proportions by the standards of that time. During 1827–1837 Russia imported from Central Asia a quantity of goods valued at 6,951,000 rubles and exported 4,575,000 rubles' worth of goods; during 1837–1847 the respective figures were 8,944,000 and 5,027,000. Among the imported articles a very prominent place was held by raw cotton, cotton yarn, and cotton fabrics, jointly valued at 6,782,000, or about two-thirds of all imports; among exports, apart from gold, by fabrics, sugar, tableware, and other commodities.[12] In subsequent years both the

total volume of trade and the predominance of raw cotton among imports continued to increase, as did fabrics and other goods among exports. As an example, during 1840–1850 Russia imported a total of 100,000 poods of cotton, and during 1850–1855, 270,000 poods. The total value of imports into Russia from Central Asia reached 9 to 12 million rubles, and of exports, 5 to 10 million rubles.

On the eve of the capitalist epoch in Russia, the Central Asian cotton and livestock regions were thus already beginning to contribute their raw materials to the expanding industry of the mother country. With the development of capitalist industry, economic control over these colonies became a historic necessity for Russian capitalism, inasmuch as they were almost its only source of cotton. This phase of the economic development of the Central Asian republics properly belongs to a later period, where we shall have occasion to examine it.

THE FAR EAST We have already shown how the frontiers of the Russian state, by the end of the seventeenth century, extended as far as the shores of the Pacific Ocean. In the Far East, Kamchatka, which was occupied under Peter I, still remained a zone in need of further colonial penetration. The Pacific Ocean coast area, the Amur region, and Sakhalin were still entirely unexplored wastelands. After the first Cossack expeditions of Khabarov and Poyarkov in the seventeenth century, an expedition under Admiral Nevelsky once more sailed along the entire course of the Amur during 1848–1849, explored the mouth of that river, and established for the first time the fact that Sakhalin was an island. In 1853 Russia occupied Sakhalin, and in 1854 a steamship service was opened along the Amur. The vast Amur territory was occupied by Russia in accordance with the terms of the Peking agreement signed with China in 1860, and after the founding of Vladivostok (1860), the region rapidly began to develop and gain in population.

The Russian state did not bring its colonial expansion to a halt at the shores of the Pacific Ocean, but began to extend its occupation over a number of islands in the ocean. The Russian drive beyond the Pacific coast toward the islands and into North America continued throughout the eighteenth century. The expedition of the Kamchatka Cossacks during 1711–1715 toward the "Great Land," that is, America, and the commercial expeditions of the merchants Serebryannikov, Trapeznikov, and others between 1730 and 1740, ended in the occupation of the Aleutian and, afterward, the Kurile Islands. In 1733 the famous scientific expedition of Bering was organized, one of the first truly scientific Arctic expeditions, which bequeathed to posterity the famous names of Bering, Chelyuskin, Laptev, and others. Fur-

ther expansion toward the shores of the "unknown lands" and "unknown people" continued until it reached North America.

Following the Bering expedition and the occupation of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands, the Russian merchant and explorer Shelekhov equipped a large, private trade expedition consisting of three ships which proceeded to occupy a number of islands and the coast of Alaska. The expedition established a number of settlements, commercial and colonial agencies. In 1797 the "United American" company, afterward known as the Russo-American Trading Company, was organized on the European model for the purpose of exploiting this new colony. In its colonial ventures the company nominally extended its ownership over all Alaska, as far as the boundary of the English settlements. In 1812 the company founded several Russian colonies in California.

The first Russian round-the-world expedition for the promotion of Russian-American commercial relations was led by Kruzenstern during 1803–1806, passing through the Atlantic Ocean and around Cape Horn into the Pacific Ocean as far as Kamchatka and Sakhalin, and yielding much valuable scientific material (translated into several European languages).

Neither Russian capital, however, nor Russian tsarism succeeded in maintaining themselves securely in the vast and rich American colony. It was a task beyond the power of the backward feudal state. Alaska, with its great wealth of gold, was sold to the United States in 1867 for a nominal price (seven million dollars), while the Kurile Islands were bartered to Japan for the southern half of Sakhalin (a region that was again returned to Japan by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1904).

Notes

1. See Map 7, facing p. 269.
2. Bagalyei, *Russkaya istoriya* (Russian History), Vol. II, pp. 69, 107, 132, and others.
3. The chief primary source for the study of the economy of the Ukraine of the east bank during the eighteenth century is the so-called *Rumyantsevskaya opis'* (Rumyantsev Census) of the population, towns, and estates carried out in 1765. See *Zapiski Chernigovskogo statisticheskogo komiteta* (Records of the Chernigov Statistical Committee) (1866), Vol. I; Bagalyei, "Generalnaya opis' Malorossii" (General Census of Little Russia) in *Kiyevskaya starina* (Kiev Antiquity) (1883); Lazarevskii, *Opisaniye staroi Malorossii* (Description of Old Little Russia) (1888).
4. Funduklei, *Statisticheskoye opisaniye Kiyevskoi gubernii* (Statistical Description of the Kiev Province) (1852), Vol. I, pp. 177-179.
5. Bagalyei, *Kolonizatsiya Novorossiiskogo kraya* (Colonization of the New Russia Territory), p. 76.

6. Skalkovskii, *Opyt statisticheskogo opisaniya Novorossiiskogo kraya* (Experiment in the Statistical Description of the New Russia Territory) (1853), Vol. II, pp. 92-94.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
8. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, p. 462.
9. See Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, Chaps. II-VII for an analysis of the decline of the peasantry as shown by data from the New Russia, Chernigov, and Poltava provinces, the development of commercial farming through the southwestern Ukrainian provinces, industry in the Donbass, the south, etc.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 463.
11. *Na istoricheskom rubezhe* (On the Historical Frontier) (Tashkent, 1924), p. 56.
12. Khrulev, *Proyekt ustava tovarishchestva dlya razvitiya torgovli v Srednyei Azii* (Project of a Charter for a Company for the Development of Trade in Central Asia) (1863).

(XX)

The General Crisis in Serf Agriculture by the Mid-Nineteenth Century

IN COMPARING the backward system of serfdom with capitalism, Lenin noted that the former was founded "not on capital and competition but on monopoly and proprietary right." [1]

In our historical study of serf agriculture and the conditions leading to its general crisis and disintegration, we shall now proceed to examine how this feudal "monopoly" and "proprietary right" of the dominant landlord class collapsed, and what economic causes predetermined and evoked the general crisis in our system of serfdom. In addition it should be observed at this point that the causes of the crisis and collapse of serfdom should not be sought in any of its unique phases, as has been done by several authors, either in the external (*Pokrovsky*) or internal (*Rozhkov*) market conditions, but in the social-economic and political system of serfdom as a whole. To be sure, the system as a whole evolved and declined disproportionately and differently in its various sectors (such as industry and agriculture) and within various regions. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the conditions and causes of the crisis and collapse of serfdom sectionally, by each of the chief components of its economic system. We shall begin with that basic sector of serf economy, its own form of agriculture.

THE NATURAL ECONOMY AND ITS DISINTEGRATION In evaluating the feudal agricultural economy of the landowners and the conditions fundamental to its predominance, Lenin identifies the first condition as:

> the reign of a natural economy. The feudal estate had to be a self-sufficient closed entity, connected by the merest thread with the outside world. The landowners' production of grain for sale, which increased conspicuously during the final phase of serfdom already served as a harbinger of collapse for the old regime.[2]

To be sure, the dissipation of the natural character of serf agricultural economy, its self-contained existence and its lack of national economic relations did not occur quickly. A growing exchange of goods, as we have seen,

during the eighteenth century had already attracted the landlords' *barshchina* agriculture to the market, although agricultural production itself was still far from being commercialized, that is, working specifically for the market. During this period it was not so much grain that went to the market as the other more "commercial" products of agriculture; namely, flax, wool, lard, linen, and others. Furthermore, toward the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the *barshchina* farm of the landowner actively began to erect and promote wool, linen, and distilling industries. In these factories the feudal farms of the estates produced millions of gallons of spirits for the dealers, and millions of yards of wool for the army and of linen for export, that is, it began to change from a natural economy to production for the market, being more and more involved in commodity circulation. Moreover, in addition to the *barshchina* estate, nearly half of the bonded peasantry throughout the nonblack-soil belt existed chiefly on the basis of *obrok* during the nineteenth century, and many of them engaged in nonrural occupations. The landowner capitalized directly upon his serf monopoly and his proprietary right in the form of money dues from his peasants paying *obrok* and employed in industry and trade in the towns, appropriating his share of the peasants' earnings.

Thus, in its several branches and in various regions of the country, the economy of the serf-owning landowner was changing at varying tempi from a natural economy and a payment of dues in kind to a money-commodity economy. The nonblack-soil *obrok* economy led all the others in this respect, while the *barshchina* agricultural central area remained the most backward. The bulk of the medium-sized agricultural enterprises of the landowner, in the central agricultural belt particularly, continued longest to maintain a closed economic existence with but very tenuous threads linking them to the national economy as a whole and to the market. The larger farms were among the first to begin production for the market and to make their debut in the capacity of both seller and buyer. Whereas in the early nineteenth century many large landowners, even in Moscow Province, for example, had their own "factories for domestic consumption," by 1820 the crude products of this household production, common household linen and coarse wools, began to be displaced by purchased goods in the consumption of the wealthier landowners.[3] And even in a district like Ryazan Province, where a "thoroughly natural" economy still reigned, the landowners, according to the evidence of contemporaries, were buying tea, sugar, caviar, wine and whisky, coffee, fish, fabrics, leather and metal products, carriages, and so forth.[4] All this required money and, consequently, the sale of their own products. By such steps the economy of the landowner was drawn into commodity exchange and the market.

The farms operated by the estates were the main producers and suppliers of agricultural products to the market. At a somewhat later stage they began to sell grain as a bulk and cheap product. According to the calculations of several pre-Reform statisticians it is possible to ascertain approximately that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, in the grain market, for example, as much as 90 per cent of the total commercial grain came from the estates and only 10 per cent was supplied by the peasantry.[5] Even if in other products (flax, hemp, and so forth) the share of peasant production was more substantial, the commodity market as a whole was none the less dominated by the landowner.

Naturally, the influence of market selling and the money income derived therefrom, including income from the sale of grain, reflected most strongly on the large farms which possessed large planted areas. We may cite as an example the interesting data on the Rakityan estate owned by Yusupov (in Kursk Province). Of the estate's total area of 42,000 *dessyatins,* the manor farm during 1815–1830 planted about 3,500 *dessyatins* of various food crops and grains. Between 25,000 and 35,000 quarters of the six chief grains were harvested. Altogether the estate had the following production balance (in thousands of quarters): [6]

	1815	1823
Total crop consumed	33.8	25.1
As seed	3.7	3.7
As food and forage	4.2	7.9
In industrial processing	3.6	5.4
Sold (from harvest and reserves)	18.0	13.8

The sale of grain was the leading item in the balance, constituting more than 50 per cent of total grain production.

The total money income of the farm amounted to 144,785 rubles in 1815, to which the sale of grain contributed 97,243 rubles; furthermore, a substantial part of the money income was derived from livestock and from the herds of sheep which furnished the wool used in the manor woolen mill for the processing and selling of cloth. In any event, from the figures just cited, it may be seen that grain alone yielded a large money income, and its marketability expressed in terms of money accounted for 65 per cent of all income.

Behind the landowners' farm came the peasant farm, following the same trend, on a smaller scale, to be sure, and with other products of demand; namely, salt, tar, iron products, and others. With a greater tendency toward money *obroks,* in the nonblack-soil belt particularly, and with the development of nonrural occupations in that region, market exchange also began to assume greater significance for the peasant household.

In the domestic market two quite clearly delimited regions were beginning to emerge: the agricultural black-soil center and south and the industrial nonblack-soil north. The latter received grain, cattle, and other products of rural economy, in the supply of which not only the landowners but also the peasants participated. How substantial local and distant commodity exchange was may best be seen from the turnover at local and district fairs. There were more than 270 fairs, large, medium, and small, in the Slobodskaya Ukraine during the early nineteenth century, and their turnover attained ten million rubles during the Epiphany fairs, and eight million rubles during the Easter fairs. The Kursk district fair had a total trade turnover of about seven million rubles, and the Berdichev about four million rubles. The central Nizhny Novgorod fair yielded a turnover of 46,800,000 rubles in 1825, and total annual turnover of domestic trade during the period has been estimated by the statisticians at 900,000,000 rubles.[7]

Thus the "all-Russian market" had by the mid-nineteenth century already attained considerable proportions in both the volume of its commercial turnover and the territory encompassed. It was drawing the feudal economy more and more in the direction of commercial exchange and into production for the market.

But commercial production found itself in a position of irreconcilable antagonism toward serf economy. To the latter, production for sale became the "harbinger of collapse for the old regime."

From that time the problems of the market, of commercial production and its significance to the economy, of prices and their fluctuation, of commodity "crisis" and so forth, became ever more acute in the minds of the economists and publicists of the age of serfdom. Accustomed to the "natural" economic structure of serfdom, even the best of them frequently failed to understand that all these phenomena were only a natural consequence of the process of social division of labor and the separation of industry from agriculture, a process in irreconcilable contradiction to serfdom and, therefore, impelling serfdom to its inevitable collapse.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE MARKET AND THE PROBLEM OF PRODUCTIVITY Since 1803 the upward movement of agricultural prices (in part evidently a result of inflation) was so considerable and obvious that it aroused the apprehensions of contemporary economists. In 1803 the Free Economic Society, the center of progressive economic thought, announced an essay contest on the problem of "The Causes of the High Cost of Foodstuffs," endeavoring in this manner to "discover the most fitting method whereby prices on such foodstuffs may be lowered." The prize-winning essay written by Shvitkov, in agreement with so many of the other

essays in the contest, identified the cause of rising agricultural prices in the spirit of the old dissertations of Shcherbatov, Boltin, and others. Shvitkov indicated that the main cause for higher prices was the fact that the "commercial and industrial people were increasing in number" at a rate "not in harmony with the needs of society as a whole," that "the peasant . . . engaging in industry on the side, imposes a double burden upon society: (1) by not performing his natural duty of grain raising, and (2) by incidentally eating grain needed by the farmer." The unpublished essays similarly indicated the "multiplying of distilleries to a point of obvious superfluity," and the growth of mines and ironworks, as a result of which "agriculture . . . has been reduced by half, while the consumers of grain have multiplied in number." [8] Within these circumstances the remedy for overcoming the high cost of living was self-evident; Shvitkov says it becomes necessary "to diminish the number of the tradespeople in town." Although a prize-winning answer, its economic meaning was profoundly reactionary.

In effect, these apologists of feudal agriculture objected not to the rising trend in prices, which was indeed to their own advantage, but rather to the disintegration of the feudal economy set in motion by the development of towns and industry. They failed to notice that the development of market demand was relentlessly driving the landowner to overexpand his planted areas, thus leading to overproduction and the fall of prices. Thus a representative of the wealthy agrarians like Count Rumyantsev postulated another theory: "Russia," in his words, "will be rich when a quarter of grain rises in price to 25 rubles." And it was evident, in fact, that the landowners were universally striving to utilize the favorable market situation to increase their acreage by intensifying and expanding their forced-labor farms.

The growth of towns and domestic demand, and the high prices prevailing almost continuously during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, strengthened the tendency of the serf owners to expand their agricultural production. This gave rise to a general endeavor among the landowners to improve technically and intensify their farming in imitation of the western European pattern. By 1840, however, confronted with a sharp downward trend in prices, this enthusiasm waned. Lack of capital, low productivity of serf labor, and the economic structure of feudalism as a whole blocked the technical improvement and capitalist organization of farming. The feudal estate farms, being ever more drawn into market commodity exchange, could not by their very nature adjust themselves to the market and turn into commercially producing units, as a result of which they suffered severely from fluctuating prices.

In fact, market conditions changed quite abruptly by 1820–1825, and, as a result of the western European crisis, a period of continued low commodity

prices began. After the essay contest of the Free Economic Society was held in 1803 to consider the causes of rising prices and the methods of combating them, another scientific organization, the Academy of Sciences, in 1826 raised precisely the opposite question: to throw light on the problem of falling agricultural prices that was then becoming evident. The prize-winning author, A. Fomin, provided an explanation for the causes of falling prices, and methods of combating them in striking contrast to the Shvitkov essay. Moreover, he no longer limited himself to stating the fact of falling prices, the beginning of which he traces to 1820, but advances a complete economic program opposite to that agrarian program of Shvitkov and Shcherbatov "to diminish the number of tradespeople."

Among the economic causes of the falling prices, the author especially stresses the following two: the contraction and narrow capacity of the foreign market, and the insufficiently developed domestic market, that is, the urban industrial demand for the products of agriculture. The economic program of Fomin was not one of perfect clarity, but it was quite definite in many respects: the growth of towns and industry, "the transfer of a large number of persons from a status of agriculturists to a status of artisans and tradesmen, the multiplication of the middle group" as well as "the spread of manufacturing industry." In other words, the growth of the social division of labor would be capable of "providing a market for agricultural products." Citing "the science of political economy" and the authority of Storch, the author observes that only "under a free state of industry" will the productive forces always be utilized to the utmost advantage. Under an economy of serfdom, however, the peasants "are not free to find themselves employment in industry." Serf labor is utilized improperly as long as the landlord receives his profit. The result, therefore, is "interference with the natural course and distribution of national wealth," weakness of "capital accumulation," the slow rate of "middle-class" expansion, the inadequate development of the internal market as well as the insecurity of the external market. He then comes to the correct pessimistic conclusion that the agricultural crisis will last as long "as the present state of affairs and operational causes, external as well as internal, shall continue." [9]

Fomin's essay may be considered as almost the first fairly well founded statement of the priority of industry in the development of national economy and of the vital role of the principles of freedom in the "natural course" of both the distribution of national wealth and the development of the production forces; in other words, a statement expressing the contrast between the first phase of bourgeois development and the system of serf economy. This would, indeed, indicate that the contradictions in the economy of serfdom came to be admitted by bourgeois ideologists, such as Fomin was

essentially. In what manner, then, and with what success did the production under serfdom adapt itself to the new conditions?

As we have seen above (Chapter XVII, page 307), according to calculations made by pre-Reform statisticians as well as official investigations, total production on the estates, after deducting exports, urban consumption, and some processing, yielded between 10 and 10.5 million quarters of grain during 1840–1850 as residue after sale. That no real surpluses actually existed within the country is evident from the fact that the peasantry suffered famine in entire provinces from year to year, and ate pigweed and substitutes. Prices, therefore, often rose to inordinate heights even in the producing areas. For example, under the impact of severe crop failures alone, the price of grain rose steeply during the famine years of 1833, 1839, 1840, and 1841. Hence, according to the calculations of the pre-Reform economists, the price of grain during 1825–1840 was not low at all.

On the basis of his investigation of average five-year prices for grain, Veselovsky[10] arrives at the conclusion that prices both in the domestic and foreign markets not only did not fall, but instead increased. For example, average selling prices for one quarter were (in silver money): during 1824–1828, 3 rubles, 27 kopecks; in 1829–1833, 4 rubles, 40 kopecks; in 1839–1843, 5 rubles, 5 kopecks. And if the landlords still complained of low prices, it was not, in the opinion of Veselovsky, because of a drop in prices, but because of their extreme fluctuation, as a result of which a landowner, "having sold his grain at 15 to 20 rubles for three years in succession considers a price of 5 to 6 rubles unprofitable." Another cause seems to Veselovsky to lie in the "disproportion between the selling price of agricultural products and their cost to the producer," that is, in the very conditions of feudal farming. Another outstanding prerevolutionary economist, Zablotsky, even more clearly identifies the problem of the market and the price structure as essentially the effect of agriculture under serfdom.[11] He asks, in effect: What is the meaning of costs of production under conditions of serf farming? And could the landowner "know" them under the conditions of feudal production? He maintains that the serf-owning landlord "does not know" how much his agricultural production costs him. Under conditions of feudal farming the landlord was bound by an "obligatory" rent, that is (in the terminology of the period concealing the ban against discussing the problem of serfdom), the "obligation," or by the economic inevitability of the whole system of feudal economy. He cannot discontinue production while grain prices on the market become unprofitable; he sells grain "come what may," particularly in view of the feudal organization of market supply. In general, under the existence of this "obligation," he could not even exploit a favorable market situation. Making allowances for the "Aesop" language of the time, imposed

by the prohibition of all discussions of serfdom, we may see that Zablotsky states the problem with perfect clarity: the crux of the situation was not even the fluctuating prices but the very system of serfdom proper, which offered no opportunity to establish an agricultural enterprise "rationally," that is, in a capitalist manner, under the new economic conditions, with accurate cost accounts of production, and with adjustment to the market. The fact that Zablotsky's argument was also understood in that sense by his contemporaries is revealed by the polemic between him and another important economist of the age, Tengoborsky. Tengoborsky, while agreeing with the author that "the present system of our agriculture (meaning serfdom) precludes the possibility of establishing the cost of production with any accuracy," and that it "removes thereby one of the determining factors of market prices and constitutes one of the main causes of the serious fluctuation of prices," finds nothing stronger as a counterargument than to indicate "many other moral and physical causes," and also "the gradual improvement of our public economy," which, in his opinion, may help to save the agriculture of the nobility from the impasse of contradictions between itself and market conditions.[12]

Hence, the somewhat more observant and wise contemporaries of serfdom during 1840–1850 began to see clearly and were able to furnish accurate proof of the fact that the crisis of serfdom was caused not by any particular changing market condition, but by the very essence of the system of serfdom as a whole. Even the improved market situation of 1840–1850 could not solve the problem or improve the position of the feudal agriculture of the landowner, precisely because he was connected with the market but at the same time unable to reconcile his "obligatory" character with the capitalist conditions of price formation.

Within the circumstances of feudal farming and production for the market, the landlord had at his disposal only one device for increasing his money income—to tighten the screws of feudal exploitation as much as possible and expand production. The labor of the serf, which provided the landlord with a great volume of surplus product, also furnished free transportation for the delivery of landowner's products even to the remotest market. And inasmuch as the winter months on the estate were not a time for the creation of "surplus product" by the peasant, zealous landlords endeavored to employ their serfs during the winter season either in a trade or in transportation. The landlords, "not knowing the price" of grain produced by their "gratuitous" labor, also "did not know" the cost of the "gratuitous" labor to deliver their product to the market, and were ready to grant all types of reductions in price in order to realize something from the grain they brought to the market. Consequently, in the areas where the estate

farms produced the bulk of commercial grain, the regions of the producing belt, grain prices were both in time and space extremely unstable. According to the calculations of Protopopov, during the second half of the 1830's high prices in the producing areas often exceeded the lower prices five, six, and even ten times. Fluctuating grain prices, according to the reaction among rural producers, were the most serious obstacle to progress and to a rational organization of production on the whole.

THE POSITION OF THE SERF ECONOMY IN THE VARIOUS REGIONS The general crisis in the serf economy during the last years of its existence, appearing externally as a crisis in commercial production, did not develop in a similar manner within the various regions. In the nonblack-soil provinces agricultural production by bonded serf labor had already passed out of existence. The attitude of the landlord in the nonblack-soil belt toward the *barshchina* was thoroughly unfavorable: he saw in it "the root of all evil," and considered it more profitable to transfer to the peasants as much as two-thirds of the land and to maintain, with the *obrok* he thus received, a rational type of farming operated by hired labor on his remaining land.[13]

Therefore, prior to 1861 the percentage of peasants working on terms of *barshchina* was constantly declining in the nonblack-soil belt. The total number of *barshchina* serfs constituted 30 per cent in Vladimir Province, 13 per cent in Yaroslavl, 16 in Vologda, 12 in Kostroma, 32 in Moscow, and so forth. The trend of production of the farms in the nonblack-soil area had long begun to change from extensive grain cultivation to the more intensive crops, flax, potatoes, and hemp, and to livestock breeding. These intensive crops were, however, far from successful on the nobles' estates operated by compulsory labor, but, on the contrary, met with considerable success on the farms of the peasantry.

In regard to these products—flax, hemp, and potatoes—peasant production by the middle of the nineteenth century began to displace the production by the large estates both in the foreign and the domestic markets. The increase of Russian exports in, for example, flax, hemp, and oakum—the chief export products of the nonblack-soil belt—came to a marked degree from the peasant farm, to be sure, from the upper strata of commercial producers among the peasantry. For example, during 1821–1851 the exports of flax amounted to 1.7 million poods, and in 1846–1850 to 3.5 million poods. This new trend in peasant farming increased the landowners' income and the *obrok*. Still more conspicuous was the economic advantage of *obrok* gained by the serf owners in instances where the *obrok* was derived from the industrial pursuits of the peasants. Here there was in essence no longer any "feudal economy" of the landlord, and all that remained, in its naked form, was his feudal monopoly

and "proprietary right" to collect the surplus product of all of the peasant's labor on the basis of extra-economic compulsion. To the landlord the problem merely resolved itself to the price for which he might surrender that right. This helps to explain the "liberalism" of the landowners in the nonblack-soil belt with respect to the abolition of serfdom, provided that the compensation was extremely large.

The other agricultural regions, the interests and development of which had outlived the economic structure of feudal farming, were the southern, New Russian, and southeastern provinces. In all of these alike, and particularly in the first, the serf population was, as we have seen, rather negligible. The settlement of the virgin steppes, and the development, first, of extensive livestock (sheep) raising, and, afterward, of wheat cultivation on the fabulously fertile local soils, proceeded in large measure not on the basis of feudal but of capitalist colonization. The percentage of the serf population here was a minute fraction of the total: in Tauride Province, for example, 5.9; in Bessarabia, 1.1. Since the 1840's large agricultural peasant enterprises of the farmer type existed in this territory. Here, too, large estates of the nobility rapidly began to plant their vast acreages to wheat designed for export, employing hired labor, attracting unattached farm workers from other provinces, and making extensive use of farm machinery. By 1816 the southern landowners were already debating the question of the advantages of machine power, and the Ministry for Internal Affairs issued a propaganda brochure entitled "On the Scotch Threshers." Wheat, the acreage of which had been expanded vigorously, became the pivot point of the economy, bringing liberal returns, even with the high cost of wages, and gradually superseding the formerly dominant interest in merino-sheep raising.

The selling market for southern wheat was no longer the prescribed and fluctuating domestic market but the foreign market, whither the bulk of wheat traveled by oxen, along the rivers, and through the southern ports. The average annual exports of wheat increased from 10.7 million poods during 1831–1835 to 38.1 million poods during 1856–1860, with exports through the southern ports accounting for 90 per cent of total Russian wheat exports. Russia's southern agriculture was thus closely connected not only with the domestic but the world market as well. The prevailing world demand and world price as expressed in the Odessa grain exchange determined the profitability and the volume of grain exports for the whole region. And whereas the world demand was relatively low during the 1840's and prices showed no trend to rise, the situation changed after the middle of the decade. The abolition of the English corn laws in 1846, as well as the growth of the industrial and urban population, created a steadily increasing demand and rising prices. Working for the foreign market, however, the landowner and

grain planter of the south felt a need for the free influx of labor, for railroads and an improved transportation system, for capital and credit—in a word, for a "free" capitalist economy.

A similar situation existed in the southeast, east, and in the Trans-Volga region. Serf labor here was somewhat more prevalent: the serf population of Orenburg Province amounted to 11.8 per cent, and in Samara, to 15.3 per cent, of the total. The great distances separating this region from open ports and the world market tended to link the agriculture of the area more effectively with the internal market of the nonblack-soil industrial belt, although a part of the local grain still went into exports through the Volga and the Baltic ports. And again, because of the extreme remoteness of this region from its market, the lack of an improved system of transportation was felt even more acutely. Here, too, agriculture was based not so much on serf labor as on the settlement of the vast land area with free farmers and on the development of large-scale planting of the farmer variety by the peasantry.

We come, at last, to the central black-soil agricultural area. This was the center and the core of serfdom, the core of the *barshchina* and feudal agriculture. The *barshchina* peasants on the eve of the Reform, for example, constituted 78 per cent of the total peasant population in Tambov Province, 72 per cent in Oryol, and 75 per cent in Tula, Penza, and Kursk provinces. In terms of production this was the stronghold of the old three-field system, of extreme expansion of the arable land, of the exclusive predominance of grain cultivation, including the "gray grains," rye, and oats, and of the almost complete absence of outside peasant earnings as well as "outside" income for the landowner, apart from the agricultural *barshchina* economy. Excluded from the external markets by lack of transportation and by the prevalence of rye in its grain production, this region became exclusively dependent upon the domestic market. But even in this market the landowner failed to find adequate scope for increasing his production, and instead began more and more to encounter the competition of the southern districts. No wonder that by 1840 some landlords began to speak of the need for setting up domestic customs duties for the protection of the black-soil center against competition from the south.[14]

The only way in which serf agriculture could maintain itself in this impasse was by strengthening the *barshchina* regime and its backward form of grain raising, along with its carting obligations which gave the landowner a primitive form of transport and enabled him to compete in the market. Serf agriculture was interested not in making the transition to the capitalist form of production, nor in improving transportation, nor in expanding relations with the world market, but in the *barshchina* which made its income secure, even at the cost of the utter exhaustion of the peasant household. Only

by such circumstances, rather than on the basis of the economic benefits inherent in the *barshchina,* can we explain the reign of the feudal *barshchina* economy in the central agricultural region up to the very moment of the Reform. It was this circumstance that also determined the position assumed by the landlords of the black-soil provinces in carrying out the Reform, and during the whole subsequent history of the "impoverished" center with its semifeudal labor system and other vestiges of serfdom.

THE STATE OF INDUSTRY We need not here deal in detail with the situation in industry during the period of disintegration of serfdom, inasmuch as our earlier surveys of industrial development during the first half of the nineteenth century revealed the sharpness of the contradictions between the various branches of industry and the feudal economy. The more a particular branch of industry was connected with serfdom, the more that industry was doomed to a low level of technique, low productivity, general backwardness in comparison with the progressive industrial West, and an inability to compete with the latter in spite of prohibitive tariffs. Feudal Russia was being increasingly surpassed even by the secondary industrial capitalist countries. Quality of production was low, while prices were inordinately high. For all that, industry was unable to find a steady or extensive outlet even in the domestic market as a result of the low purchasing power of the population and of the prevalence of a natural economy and small household production. The institutions of serfdom blocked all avenues for the emergence of a class of industrial workers. True, in some branches industry was able to overcome all obstacles raised by feudal economy. Still, whenever they hired peasant serfs who were under *obrok* liability to some landowner, the industrialists paid a sizable "tax" to the landowners through the *obrok* collected by the landlord from the earnings of their peasants employed in industry.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, feudal Russia had become even more backward in comparison with western Europe.


THE GENERAL POLITICAL CRISIS Economic backwardness eventually resulted in a general political crisis of the serf-ridden state. The vigorous expansion of the state frontiers and the victorious wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (under Catherine II and Alexander I) were replaced under Nicholas I by several unsuccessful and costly wars against Turkey, culminating in Russia's defeat at Sevastopol by a coalition of France, England, and Turkey (1854–1855). Russian troops proved to be poorly armed (they had almost no modern rifles), owing to the outmoded technique and low productivity of the nation's industry and metal-

lurgy. The wool, linen, and leather industries maintained by serf labor furnished a poor and insufficient supply of uniforms. No special munitions industry existed. The complete absence of roads crippled the army supply system, which had to depend upon the common peasant. Even food for army rations was scarce. Embezzlement flourished in the army and in the commissary department. The cumbersome feudal military system was incapable of effecting a swift mobilization or concentration of its military manpower. Serfdom stifled every manifestation of initiative on the part of the Russian soldier. In the course of his twenty-five-year term of military service, he was subjected to brutal military drilling for parades in the notorious manner of Nicholas I, but remained untrained in active military operations. Regardless of his heroism in battle, the Russian soldier was unequal to the well trained and well armed foreign troops.

The Russian tsarist regime, which had so eagerly waged war against revolution in Europe and assumed the role of "gendarme of Europe" (by the suppression of the Polish uprising, the intervention against revolution in Hungary, and attempted interference in the French Revolution), revealed its utter bankruptcy in a clash with the European, bourgeois, well equipped and well trained armies. The Sevastopol defeat and the oppressive peace terms that followed were a clear symptom of the collapse of the entire political and economic system of the old feudal order in Russia. "The Crimean War revealed the decadence and impotence of feudal Russia." [15]

THE CLASS STRUGGLE AND UPRISINGS OF THE PEASANTRY [16] We have indicated above that intensification of feudal oppression and extension of serfdom during the late eighteenth century resulted in grave aggravation of the struggle against serfdom by the peasants and workers. In the Pugachyov rebellion the movement of peasants and workers proceeded beyond the stage of separate, individual, and poorly organized disturbances, reached a point where the revolt engulfed a vast section of the country, and was a threat to the autocratic feudal state as a whole.

During the nineteenth century peasant unrest, uprisings, and disturbances were steadily gaining in intensity. Between 1826 and 1861, 1,186 peasant uprisings were reported officially. The revolts rapidly grew in number with every five-year period leading up to the Reform. Specifically, 148 outbreaks were officially recorded during 1826–1834, during 1835–1844, 216; during 1845–1854, 348; while during 1855–1861 there were as many as 474 uprisings. Unrest was most serious in the central districts and in the Urals, those bulwarks of serfdom and of the extremely harsh regime of forced labor. This trend was milder in the south, but there too it was rising. For example, there was one disturbance in the east-bank Ukraine during 1826–1829 as compared



1. Single outbreaks by peasants against landowners (crop damage, illegal timber cutting, etc.)
2. Frequent outbreaks of crop damage, plowing of manor land, illegal timber cutting, non-fulfillment of obligations
3. Mass occurence of crop damage, plowing of manor land, illegal timber cutting, burning and robbing of estates.
4. Mass outbreaks of peasants involving the murder of landowners sometimes with armed resistance against local guards, police and troops; accompanied by shooting of peasants by troops and police.


with twelve disturbances reported during 1830–1840. In the Ukraine steppes peasant disturbances began only about 1830, in response to the extension of serfdom to that region, and increased in number after 1840. During 1828–1829 there were peasant rebellions in Georgia, in 1835, in Bashkiria; and in 1836, in Osetia.

According to official investigations, the causes were ascertained for outbreaks on 423 estates. At 210 estates the disturbances were provoked by premature rumors of the "freedom" that the peasants had expected and by the attempt of the serfs to liberate themselves from feudal servitude. Among the causes of such uprisings were also cited: harsh conditions of *barshchina* labor on 95 estates, heavy *obroks* on 26, the exaction of arrears on 9, famine on 30, resettlement of serfs on 17, and reduction of land holdings on 13 estates.

Peasant disturbances in the nineteenth century frequently assumed the character of mass revolts. For the duration of the disturbances and bitterness of the struggle conducted by the peasants, we have the following figures as evidence. On 68 estates disturbances recurred between 2 and 5 times, on 14 estates they continued 10 to 30 years, on 29 estates, 3 to 9 years, and on 24 estates they lasted more than 2 years. These disturbances, breaking out at one point, rapidly spread to another and promptly engulfed an entire region. In 1826 rebellions swept through 26 regions, and in 1832 they engulfed the entire black-soil center of the nation.

The government meted out harsh punishment to the rebels. Military force, sometimes entire regiments, was used for the protection of the nobility, for the suppression of the outbreaks, and for reprisals against the peasantry. At the end of the reprisals, investigation of the causes behind the uprising began, but very rarely was the position of the serfs eased, and only the most vicious landlords (like the famous Saltychikha, who killed seventy-five persons) were punished and their estates put under a trusteeship. During the entire reign of Catherine II only twenty landowners were subjected to penalties (which included "church penance") for such heavy crimes as the murder and torture of peasants. Nevertheless the fear of a general uprising and a revolution by the feudal serfs, at the time of the Pugachyov rebellion in particular, haunted both the nobility and the government. The classic expression of this mood on the part of the government may be found in the famous words of Alexander II spoken on the eve of the promulgation of the Reform; namely, that "it is better to liberate the peasants from above" than to wait until this freedom is achieved "from below."

No less revealing of the characteristic official fear of revolution was the mood of alarm prevailing within upper "spheres" and the precautionary measures adopted by the government in connection with the proclamation



1. Single outbreaks by peasants against landowners (crop damage, illegal timbercutting, etc.)
2. Frequent outbreaks of crop damage, plowing of manor land, illegal timber cutting, non-fulfillment of obligations.
3. Mass occurence of crop damage, plowing of manor land, illegal timber cutting, burning and robbing of estates.
4. Mass outbreaks of peasants involving the murder of landowners sometimeswith armed resistance against local guards, police and troops; accompanied by shooting of peasants by troops and police.

of "freedom." The manifesto, signed on February 19, was deliberately withheld from the public until March 15. In connection with his project for establishing special temporary general-governorships throughout Russia, Alexander II asked in alarm: "What will happen" when "the people's expectations concerning freedom are not realized?" It was expected that if no "freedom" were announced on February 19, "the mob will appear at the Winter Palace to demand emancipation." On the eve of the proclamation of the March 15 manifesto, front-line cartridges were issued to the guard regiments in the event of "street disturbances." "Protective measures" were also adopted on behalf of the Petropavlovsk Fortress in Petersburg. In a word, everything was ready for crushing the expected revolution.

Such was the mood of the ruling circles at the moment when they had found their solution for the problem of liquidating serfdom. The government and the serf owners were gripped by an extreme fear of revolution during the period of the proclamation of "freedom." In the words of one contemporary, "the people, incapable of understanding a single word in the manifesto, somehow had very little faith in this freedom." Afterward, in the words of Herzen, they saw "that freedom was a fraud" and that "the old serfdom was replaced by a new one." Therefore, when the time arrived to carry this "freedom" into effect locally, general disturbances broke out anew among the peasantry. According to the official reports of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1,100 peasant incidents occurred in 39 provinces during the first two years (1861–1863), while on the basis of more accurate calculations, the number of outbreaks was nearer 2,000, that is, almost as many as during the thirty-five-year period before emancipation. These revolts, scattered and unorganized, were crushed with the aid of military and police force, by shooting the peasants, as was the case, for example, in the serious outbreaks that spread through three counties in Kazan Province, where shooting into a crowd of peasants in the village of Vezdna ended in the killing of 70 persons and the wounding of 350.

Thus the bitter struggle of the peasantry for a "real," a "genuine" freedom did not come to a successful conclusion in 1861. The peasants obtained the type of "freedom" that the landlords and the tsarist government were ready to grant in their own interests. The reason for this, in the words of Stalin, was the fact that "peasant uprisings will lead to success only when they occur in combination with uprisings among the workers, and when the workers lead the peasants in their revolts."[17] Actual historical conditions in Russia during the 1860's offered no such opportunity for the complete success of the peasant uprisings. Nevertheless the peasant revolts, which at times reached the scale and significance of veritable class battles for emancipation, played a major role in the downfall of serfdom.

Notes

1. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, p. 377.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
3. Rozhkov, *Russkaya istoriya* (Russian History) (1924), Vol. X, p. 14; Bagalyei, *Ocherki* (Essays) (1913), p. 69.
4. Volkonskii, "Usloviya pomeshchichyego khozyaistva pri krepostnom prave" (Conditions of Manorial Economy under Feudal Law), *Trudy Ryazanskoi arkhivnoi komissii* (Studies of the Ryazan Archivist Commission) (1897), XII.
5. Saburov, "Vliyaniye zemledeliya na gosudarstvennoye bogatstvo s russkoi tochki zreniya" (The Influence of Agriculture on State Wealth from the Russian Point of View), *Zhurnal zemlevladeltsev* (Landowners' Journal) (1858). See Lyashchenko, *Ocherki* (Essays), 4th ed. (1924), Chap. V.
6. Figures taken from a graduate study by I. Nikishin, *Agrotekhnika i organizatsia krepostnovo khozyaistva v chernozemnoy polose na primere izuchenia Rakityanskoi votchiny Yusupova* (Agrarian Technique and Organization of a Feudal Farm in the Black Belt as Exemplified by a Study of the Rakityansk Patrimony of Yusupov), based on original archive data and the bookkeeping accounts of this estate for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
7. Arsenyev, *Nachertaniye statistiki Rossiiskogo gosudarstva* (Outline of Statistics of the Russian State) (1818), Vol. I, pp. 170-174.
8. *Arkhiv narodnogo khozyaistva* (Archives of the National Economy), Central Historical Archives, Group VII, Fund I, Records of the Free Economic Society, Nos. 440, 454, and 456.
9. Fomin, *O ponizhenii tsen na zemledelcheskie proizvedenia v Rossii* (On the Decline of Prices on Agricultural Products in Russia) (1829); see Lyashchenko, *Ocherki* (Essays), Chap. V.
10. Veselovskii, "O tsenakh na khleb v Rossii" (On Grain Prices in Russia), *Zhurnal ministerstva gosudarstvennykh imushchestv* (Journal of Ministry of Government Properties) (1845), Vol. XV, p. 75.
11. Zablotskii, "Prichiny kolebania tsen na khleb v Rossii" (Causes of Fluctuation of Grain Prices in Russia), *Otechestvennye zapiski* (Homeland Notes) (1847), p. 52.
12. Tengoborskii, *O proizvoditelnykh silakh Rossii* (On the Productive Forces of Russia) (1854–1858), Vol. II, pp. 64-67.
13. See the numerous expressions along this line of thought in the literature of the period, such as, for example, Chaplin, *Zemledeliye i zemledelets v Rossii* (Agriculture and the Agriculturist in Russia) (1839); also articles by Shelekhov in the *Biblioteka dlya chteniya* (Library for Reading) (1838), *O volnonayomnom trudye* (On Free Hired Labor), Vol. VII; *O polze i sredstvakh uluchsheniya v russkom selskom khozyaistvom* (On the Benefits and Means of Improvement in Russian Rural Economy), Vol. VI, and others.
14. Saburov, "Zapiski penzenskogo zemledeltsa o teorii i praktike selskogo khozyaistva" (Notes of a Penza Agriculturist on the Theory and Practice of Rural Economy), *Otechestvennye zapiski* (1842–1843), Nos. 20-26.
15. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. XV, p. 143.
16. See Map 10, p. 371, and Map 11, p. 373.
17. Stalin, *Beseda s nyemetskim pisatelem Emilem Lyudvgom* (Interview with the German Author Emil Ludwig) (1938), p. 9.

(XXI)

The Peasant Reform of 1861–1866

RAISING THE QUESTION OF THE REFORM Looking through the controversial literature dealing with economic and agricultural questions during the last three pre-Reform years, that is, at a time when the problem of liquidating serfdom was largely decided and officially promulgated, we find it full of lively discussion of the Reform. The landowner, the sole arbiter of the fate of 20 million serf peasants, well understood that it was a matter of life and death for the serf economy as a whole. The other interested party, the serf peasant, was not represented in any of the various official commissions of the government and the nobility, and gave expression to its demand for emancipation by even more frequent outbreaks. In literature alone the struggle of the peasantry against serfdom was effectively mirrored in the articles of Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov, and others.

There was, indeed, still a third party, the emerging bourgeoisie, likewise concerned with the abolition of serfdom. During the period of the literary phase of the Reform discussion, the bourgeoisie expressed itself in favor of liquidating serfdom from the standpoint of its own interests (the well known addresses of the broker Kokorev). But the proportional size of the bourgeoisie was small, its interest found no official recognition in the implementation of the Reform, and its voice went almost unheeded. In part the latter circumstance may be explained by the censorship applied against any comprehensive discussion of the Reform even at a time when the question of abolishing serfdom had already been officially raised. Therefore, in carrying out the Reform the problem was considered exclusively from the standpoint of the nobility's interests, and resulted in a type of liquidation that was most advantageous to the landowner.

In view of the steady development of a money economy throughout the country and the peasant household's constantly growing need for money, it became necessary to create such conditions for land allotment under which the peasant would still feel the same "economic compulsion" to surrender some of his surplus labor to the landowner as before, although in a somewhat different manner. The Reform, as we shall see later, did not accomplish the final "purging" of the nobility's land or the conditions of serfdom. Bourgeois

relationships continued to develop, despite the fact that the Reform itself contained a number of elements retarding this development.

Within the landowner class the most avowed representatives of bourgeois tendencies in the capitalist development of agriculture were the landlords of the nonblack-soil provinces. In the words of Unkovsky (a deputy from Tver Province), who demanded the immediate emancipation of the peasants along with their redemption of the land and their persons, the landowners declared that "a grant of capital was vital to the support of their farms and the latters' adaptation to maintenance by hired labor." These protagonists of future capitalist development, however, in many cases had to yield to the interests of another group of serf-owning landowners, the so-called "planters," who endeavored to preserve as much as possible of the former relationships of serfdom. In the eventual execution of the Reform, the latter interests emerged predominant.

The first officially announced governmental act in connection with the Reform (after numerous "secret" committees, the last of which met in 1856),[1] and the beginning of the historical era of the "Emancipation Reform," is considered to be the rescript of November 20, 1857, to the governor-general of Wilno, Nazimov, setting forth the basis of the Peasant Reform contemplated for the western territory. The rescript was followed by a number of additional government proclamations about the necessity of undertaking the Reform in the Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Moscow, and other provinces, "in accordance with the wishes of the nobility." By July, 1858, the nobility throughout the provinces "expressed a desire" to commence working out the bases of the Peasant Reform. Everywhere, so-called "provincial committees" consisting of representatives of the nobility began to form for discussion of the basic principles of the Reform. The former "secret" committee was converted into the "main" committee, retaining its previous bureaucratic composition. Projects developed by the provincial committees were submitted to the main committee, to which, since March, 1859, were attached "editorial commissions" including "experts" from among the nobility in addition to officials, while for the purpose of general discussion of these plans, additional "deputies" (also noblemen) were invited from the provinces. The editorial commissions were at first presided over by Ya. Rostovtsev, who was considered "a liberal," and, after his death, by the open archprotagonist of serfdom, Count Panin. After examining the various Reform plans during three periodic sessions, the editorial commissions were disbanded and the plans once more submitted to the main committee; from there it went in January, 1861, to the state council where examination was completed on February 7, and on February 19 the tsar signed the manifesto which was proclaimed on March 5, 1861.

Such were the external events in the history of the progress of the Reform. In the course of this lengthy procedure of drafting the bases of the Reform, the serf owners adopted every possible measure to achieve a type of abolition of serfdom most advantageous to themselves, and one that would guarantee them a continued income from the land and from the labor of their ex-serfs. The hopes of the "liberal" elements of Russian society about the "Great Reform" were thoroughly dispelled. For example, the first official proclamation of the Reform and the rescript of November 20, 1857, evoked an enthusiastic response among contemporaries, including Herzen, who, in his expatriate journal *The Bell,* wrote an article entitled "Thou Hast Conquered, Galilean." [2] But when the Regulation of February 19 was promulgated and "emancipation" became a reality, Herzen completely changed his opinion on the subject and came to the conclusion that "the old serfdom was replaced by a new form. Serfdom was not abolished at all, and the nation has been deceived." [3]

The attitude toward the reform assumed by N. G. Chernyshevsky was much more profound. Beginning with an article in the February, 1858, issue of the journal *Contemporary,* "On the New Conditions of Village Life," [4] he undertook a detailed analysis of both the general problem of the tremendous significance of emancipation and the concrete plans of the government. Chernyshevsky related his understanding of the process of emancipation to his ideas on the peasant commune as a "possible foundation for the socialist arrangement of society." He understood that the process of emancipation was under control of the autocratic government and the landlords, and that from this emancipation "nothing but abomination will result." He also perceived the fundamentally bourgeois character of the Reform, and in view of the actual conditions of its execution, he upheld the right of the peasants to retain all of the land in their use prior to the Reform, the immediate redemption of the land through government assistance without saddling the peasantry with burdensome payments, the preservation of communal land tenure, and so forth.[5] The more the Reform was conducted by the government in the spirit of the feudal interests of the nobility, the more Chernyshevsky's position became negative and revolutionary, a fact that could not, of course, be reflected in the pages of the *Contemporary.* The promulgation of the Regulation of February 19 was met by the *Contemporary* with silence. Chernyshevsky attempted a series of critical essays on the Reform under the heading of "Letters Without an Address." The essays were forbidden by the censor,[6] and Chernyshevsky himself was arrested. It was in this period as well that Chernyshevsky wrote the appeal "To the Bonded Peasants," in which the author calls upon the peasants to unite and take revolutionary action (to the "ax") in a struggle for "real freedom," for "land and freedom."

Such was the evaluation of the Reform by the best representative of social thinking in the Russia of that period.

THE GENERAL BASES OF THE REFORM The bases of the Reform, as they were finally formulated in the aforesaid stages, were as follows: [7]

First, all land, whether in use by the landowner or the peasant, was recognized in principle as belonging to the landowners. In recognizing the land, including the peasant serfs settled on it, as the "full and inalienable" property of the landowner, all views and tendencies among the leaders of the Reform were decisively in complete agreement.

The acceptance of this principle, however, necessarily raised the problem of whether to emancipate the peasants with or without land. The government, motivated by fear of revolution in the event the bulk of the peasantry were deprived of the land, considered it necessary to effect the liberation of the peasants with a grant of land to be obtained by detaching a portion of the "landowners'" land. But this provoked extreme indignation among a section of the nobility, who hurled charges of "spoliation" (plunder), and of a violation of the "inalienable, inviolate, and legitimate" rights of the nobility. In fact, however, the interests of the landowners of the different regions were at considerable variance on the question of emancipating the serfs with or without land.

In the central black-soil provinces where, as we have seen, the serf type of agriculture was largely concentrated, the oversupply of the estates with unproductive and unprofitable serf labor had begun to attract attention by 1850. Here, according to the testimony of the broker Kokorev, the landowner Samarin, and others, in some instances during the 1850's land without serfs sold at a better price than land with serfs. With his possession of the land, the landowner appeared here, in the expression of Cherkassky, as "a monopolist over the most valuable commodity"—the black soil. Therefore the interests of the landowners of the central black-soil provinces dictated the type of "emancipation" under which they could retain all of the soil, that is, emancipation without land. But inasmuch as the landowner would have needed capital and labor for the maintenance of his new farm, as a compromise a form of liberation was devised with an allotment sufficiently minute to attach the peasants to the land, thus securing for the landowner a cheap source of labor power or enabling him to derive his income from land leases granted on usurious terms to the small landholding peasants. In the same category were the proprietary interests of the northwestern provinces, where the nobility was prepared to carry through the Peasant Reform without land or with a minimum allotment of land, including the right of the peasant to his house and lot.

In the southwestern and Ukrainian provinces, where by this time purely capitalist production employing free labor had already begun to develop rapidly, particularly in the sugar-beet fields, the landowners were interested in retaining control over the largest possible area of land and in holding the bulk of the peasant population, that is, in releasing to the peasantry, whenever possible, merely the homestead plot alone to secure the landowners' farms with peasant labor.

Finally, in the New Russian and Trans-Volga provinces, where the serf population was small, the landowners were universally in favor of emancipation without land, inasmuch as the land there, although cheap, held a promise of great profits and a future increase in price, hence, the interest in retaining complete control over the land.

The interests of the landowners in the nonblack-soil provinces were quite different. The source of income for the nobility in that area was not the land itself but the peasants paying *obrok* settled on the land. Here, a high value was set not so much on the land, which was poor in fertility and low in price, as on the "serf souls." Hence, settled estates in this area brought a price even higher than in the black-soil provinces. The landowners, therefore, demanded a form of emancipation that would compensate them for the loss of their feudal rights to the peasant personally. Hence, they demanded originally the outright redemption of the peasant's person, and when personal redemption proved to be impossible in open form, a solution was found in excessive land valuations which included personal redemption in a hidden form.

Under such a variety of methods employed in order to accommodate the interests of the landowners in the various regions, the general development of the Reform followed the line of a compromise solution as advantageous as possible to all landowners. Emancipation without any land whatsoever was rejected on the bases of the above-cited economic interests of a section of the nobility and because of considerations of a political character; namely, from fear of peasant disturbances and the "dangerous" formation of a proletariat. Similarly, the idea of endowing the peasant with his house plot alone, without a land allotment, was rejected, since under such circumstances neither the nobility's commercial farming nor the rather poorly developed industry of the nation was capable of rapidly absorbing great masses of surplus peasant labor. The general principle of liberating the peasants with land was therefore adopted, but of such limits and under such conditions as would fully secure a supply of peasant labor for the agriculture of the nobility, and would, in addition, help the landowners acquire through the Reform the capital required by them under the new circumstances. The government formulated the underlying principles of the Reform in the following manner: "The peasant should immediately feel that his life has been improved; the

landowner should at once be satisfied that his interests are protected, and stable political order should not be disturbed for one moment in any locality." [8] The landowners knew well that an adequate supply of land for the peasantry would prove unprofitable from the standpoint of the landowners. The landowners journal, *Rural Welfare*, wrote:

> We cannot provide the peasants with land to an extent where their life be made completely secure. The peasant . . . must remember that his personal labor is his chief source of livelihood, and therefore . . . a too generous grant of land will instead prove morally injurious to him, [!] relieving him of the necessity to value his labor.[9]

THE SIZE OF ALLOTMENT [10] Although in the preparation of the bases for the Reform a fixed principle was formulated, according to which the peasant allotment must be sufficient "to assure their livelihood and their fulfillment of all obligations to the government and the landowner," [11] this "sufficiency" nevertheless failed to materialize. First, there were no exact data available for ascertaining this "sufficiency." The provincial committees, particularly in the central black-soil provinces, strove by every possible means to reduce all allotments even below the level of existing landholdings.

The editorial commissions decided to use as a basis of land allotment no abstract "standards" of any kind but, instead, "the existing fact or the order of affairs achieved under the impact of centuries of experience," that is, to adopt the existing allotment as the standard. On this basis the editorial commissions stipulated: "The peasant class, in return for definite obligations, should be allowed as far as possible to retain the use of the same allotment whereby his existence was hitherto secured, that is, on the level at which it existed in 1859." [12] In other words, conditions prevailing under serfdom were hereby enacted into law for the future.

This, however, was not all. Under pressure from the advocates of retaining all land for the landowners, in repudiation of all existing allotments, a system of "high" and "low" allotments was adopted, providing at the same time that, in the event the existing allotments exceeded the "high" allotment for a given locality, the landowner could reduce their size to correspond to the high norm. In the event existing allotments fell below the minimum standard, the reverse "additional allotment" was not always given, and the landowner was able in any event to keep no less than one-third of the entire land for himself.

After the proposed allotments were subjected to the scrutiny of local "deputies," a further reduction of the norm followed, although the editorial commissions had stipulated that these allotments "shall in no event be subjected to any further reduction." Furthermore, in the course of their final

examination, the main committee and the state council also lowered the standards of allotment.

As a result, a special set of regulations was formulated for the Great Russian, southwestern (Little Russian), and western provinces, while the Great Russian provinces were further divided into three belts: the black-soil belt with five high norms of allotment between 3 and 4.5 *dessyatins*, a nonblack-soil belt with seven high allotments of 3.5 to 8 *dessyatins*, and a steppe belt with four high allotments of 6.5 to 12 *dessyatins*. In these regulations a reduction in the size of allotments compared to those proposed by the commissions was made in 50 of the 142 counties of the black-soil belt, that is, in 35 per cent of the cases, and, furthermore, in 8 counties reductions were as great as 1 to 3.5 *dessyatins;* in the nonblack-soil provinces the reductions affected 107 of the 232 counties, or 46 per cent.

Thus, in a majority of cases, the peasant allotments under the Emancipation Act suffered considerable reduction. If we take the figures submitted by Skrebitsky on "customary allotments" as they existed before the Reform and compare them to the figures of the actual average land allotments distributed in connection with the Peasant Reform, we obtain the following results for the black-soil provinces with their predominant *barshchina* system of production (in *dessyatins*): [13]

PROVINCES	PRE-REFORM ALLOTMENTS PER PERSON	POST-REFORM ALLOTMENTS PER PERSON
Kursk	2.3	2.2
Oryol	2.6	2.6
Ryazan	2.6	2.3
Tula	2.6	2.8
Tambov	3.1	2.4
Voronezh	2.6	2.7
Penza	2.8	2.2
Kharkov	2.5	2.6
Yekaterinoslav	2.8	2.0
Kiev	6.6	2.1
Podol	5.5	2.2
Saratov	3.8	2.4
Simbirsk	2.9	2.4
Kazan	3.0	2.3
Vyatka	3.2	3.0
Perm	5.5	4.0

As far as it is possible to ascertain from these inaccurate and rather approximate figures, peasant allotments were substantially reduced in most of the black-soil provinces during the apportionment of land. The difference between the pre-Reform and post-Reform allotments is still greater when we

consider that, in ascertaining the size of the "customary allotments," the provincial committees did not for the most part include either the house plot or the forest privileges which were, however, included in the allotments under the Emancipation Act.

As a rule we obtain an entirely different picture in connection with the nonblack-soil industrial provinces, where the *obrok* system predominated prior to emancipation. Here the allotments were as follows (in *dessyatins*):

PROVINCES	PRE-REFORM ALLOTMENTS PER PERSON	POST-REFORM ALLOTMENTS PER PERSON
Yaroslavl	5.2	3.8
Kostroma	6.8	4.9
Vladimir	3.1	3.9
Moscow	2.6	2.9
Kaluga	2.5	3.8
Petersburg	3.3	4.8
Novgorod	2.7	5.7
Smolensk	3.6	4.8

With small exceptions (the first two provinces), peasant landholdings in most nonblack-soil provinces increased rather than decreased as a result of the Reform. The gain was largely to the advantage of the landowner class. With an unprofitable type of soil and agriculture, here was another method of liquidating serfdom, different from the method used in the black-soil provinces but none the less profitable: transferring the land to the peasant on a basis of excessive valuations.

This was the manner in which the question of the size of land allotments was settled. Moreover, within the limits of the established norms the manner of apportionment was determined by a "voluntary agreement" between the landlord and the peasant. The landowner was thus, in fact, given an opportunity to choose the method he considered most profitable for liquidating his rights under serfdom. For example, within the limits of such "voluntary agreements" the landowner was permitted to release to the peasant, without payment, as much as one quarter of the higher land allotment adopted for the area, while retaining the remainder of the land for himself. These "unpaid," or "quarter" allotments, introduced in the state council during the last phase in the execution of the Reform at the suggestion of Prince Gagarin, made it possible to liberate the peasants almost without any land. The method was applied with particular success in the east and southeast (Samara and Saratov), where the peasants had hoped to rent the land instead of having to pay for it, since rent charges in these provinces were at that time lower than the redemption payments. Hence, in Saratov Province, for example,

about 107,000 peasants (33 per cent) accepted the free allotments, in Samara, 39,000 (35 per cent); in Yekaterinoslav, 40,000 (25 per cent); in Simbirsk, 40,000 (19 per cent); in Voronezh, 45,000 (17 per cent); and in Penza, 36,000 (14 per cent).

Comparing the pre-Reform peasant landholdings with all reductions from the pre-Reform allotments, we obtain the following table (in thousand *dessyatins*): [14]

	LAND USED BY PEASANTS BEFORE 1861	REDUCTIONS	%
15 nonblack-soil provinces	14,550	1,437	9.9
21 black-soil provinces	14,619	3,825	26.2
Total for 36 provinces	29,169	5,262	18.1

In this manner the peasants of the black-soil provinces were deprived by the Reform of over one-fourth of the land in their use before the Reform. In a number of provinces this percentage was especially high. Thus, in Samara Province reductions amounted to 44 per cent of the total land in use by the peasants before the Reform; in Saratov Province, 41; in Poltava and Yekaterinoslav, 40; in Kazan, 32; in Kharkov and Simbirsk, 31, and so forth.

TERMS OF ALLOTMENT AND GRADATION OF DUES [15] We have thus far discussed the quantitative results of the land apportionment. No less important than the size of allotment were the conditions under which the peasants were provided with the "landowners'" land. The land was granted to the peasants not in outright ownership but merely for "indefinite use" in return for fixed obligations, the extent of these obligations being subject to change after a certain number of years. Such obligations might consist either of a fixed number of workdays on the owner's land (on the *barshchina* estates), or of a fixed monetary *obrok* (on the *obrok* estates). The peasants who received the land and obligated themselves to fulfill certain obligations in return for its use were designated as "temporarily-obligated" persons. In reality, therefore, the former economic feudal relations were retained, in a somewhat regulated form, although without the institution of serfdom itself.

On the *barshchina* estates, in return for a higher allotment, the customary annual labor obligation of the *tyaglo* amounted to forty days for the male and thirty for the female, the work being performed according to a set of rules about "quotas" and under the supervision of the landlord. In other words it was feudal economy in its pure, although regulated, form. On the *obrok*

estates of the various areas, there were also higher scales of *obrok* in return for larger size allotments, amounting to 12 rubles, 10 rubles, 9 rubles, and 8 rubles. Furthermore, in the case of the smaller rather than the larger allotments, a so-called "gradation" system of *obrok,* devised by the Tver committee, was adopted. According to this system, if an allotment of four *dessyatins* in the nonblack-soil belt carried a fixed *obrok* of 12 rubles, the *obrok* for any smaller size allotments was computed as follows: for the first *dessyatin,* one-half the above payment or 6 rubles, and for the second *dessyatin,* one-quarter, that is, two *dessyatins* brought 9 rubles, the remaining quarter payment applying to the last two *dessyatins.* In this way the landowners in the nonblack-soil provinces could, if it were to their advantage, provide their peasants with a larger allotment, and if not, grant a reduced allotment and receive a higher value for it. These up-graded valuations also contained, in a hidden form, the redemption payment for the peasant's person.

In this manner the whole system of calculating the peasants' obligations for the land was a repetition of serf conditions, and, moreover, frequently on a scale even more burdensome and disadvantageous to the peasant. From the standpoint of the landlords, too, a regulated serf economy of this type was fraught with great danger. Hence, they too strove to change from *barshchina* dues to *obrok* and, whenever possible, to hasten the termination of "compulsory relationships." Furthermore, as Unkovsky said, the landowners needed "capital" and were, therefore, doubly concerned in having all outstanding peasant obligations converted into capital.

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD[16] Although the legislative acts for the emancipation of the peasants were signed on February 19 and proclaimed on March 15, 1861, a two-year "transitional period" was established before actual emancipation was put into practice, a period during which the position of the erstwhile serfs actually remained little changed. Beginning with the day of promulgation of the new laws, the peasants were promptly liberated only from some of the more crude feudal restrictions against their rights. The serf owners lost the right to sell the peasants, to resettle them forcibly, to place them in workhouses, and so forth. Meanwhile, however, the landowners retained their right of feudal jurisdiction over the peasant, including the imposition of fine and punishment, up to the time of the establishment of special volost courts. The peasants also immediately obtained the right to marry without permission of the landowner, to engage in trade, to practice a craft, and so forth. But the peasants were expected to pay *obrok* and *barshchina* due the landlord as before. All arrangements directly connected with the land—the specification of the size of the land allotment, its actual assign-

ment, the designation of the "reduction," the calculation of dues incurred by the assigned land, the agreement on the redemption of the soil, and others —were made by "peaceful intermediaries" from the nobility in special "charters of rules," which had to be drafted and put into action in the course of a two-year period. In this manner the peasant did not actually obtain his new land and social status before 1863, and even afterward he remained in a position of "temporary obligation" to the landlord. Only the extremely tense political situation in the village and the fear of peasant uprisings compelled the nobility to hasten the introduction of the "charters of rules," as well as the termination of the peasants' provisional status, by bringing them to the redemption stage.

THE REDEMPTION OPERATION [17] It was the redemption operation that served the purpose of hastening the termination of the peasants' temporary, obligatory position. According to the "voluntary" agreement with their landlord, the peasants had a right to redeem their "land," that is, their obligations, and thereupon pass from a position of temporary obligation into that of "peasant-proprietors." Inasmuch as the peasants' liabilities to the owners were determined without regard to the income capacity proper of the estate's agricultural economy, and also included the landowners' income from the nonagricultural pursuits of the peasantry, the redemption of the land exceeded the cost of the land itself to a considerable degree, although the formal assumption was that only the land was being redeemed.

The act of redemption was performed on the following bases: The annual *obrok* fixed in behalf of the landowner was capitalized at 6 per cent, that is, it was equated to an income obtainable from a capital yielding 6 per cent. In the case of an *obrok* of 6 rubles, for example, its capitalization amounted to 100 rubles. This capitalized sum was called the "redemption value" of the allotment. The government undertook to serve as intermediary between the landowner and the peasant in the repayment of this sum in such manner that, when the redemption settlement was effected, the government paid the landowner 80 per cent of this sum in interest-bearing notes (redemption certificates) yielding a 6 per cent income. The remaining 20 per cent of the redemption sum, in the event that a voluntary agreement on the settlement was concluded, the peasants themselves had to pay to the landowner. In the event the settlement was made at the request of the landowner, he merely obtained the 80 per cent. The money paid to the landowner by the government was listed as the redemption debt owed by the peasant to the government, and divided into periodic payments over a period of 49 years from the date of issue, with payments of 6.5 per cent of interest and amortization.

TRANSITION TO OBLIGATORY REDEMPTION The commencement of redemption was not obligatory and, in fact, the landowner could at will either keep the peasants in a position of temporary obligation or transfer them to redemption even against the will of the peasants, losing in the latter event only the right to the additional 20 per cent (the so-called "bonus"). But a delay in terminating the temporary obligation phase generally involved a loss to the landlord. Moreover, his obligations in connection with the land were also quite considerable. The change to redemption was therefore rather prompt, although as late as 1881, when the undertaking of redemption became compulsory, 15 per cent of the peasantry were still in a position of temporary obligation.

If we compare the total payments for land made by the peasants through redemption to the selling prices of the land not only before emancipation but even soon thereafter, it becomes clear that the redemption figure was greatly in excess of selling prices. Specifically, a parallel comparison yields the following figures (in millions of rubles): [18]

PROVINCES	VALUE OF AN ALLOTMENT AT SELLING PRICES		VALUE OF AN ALLOTMENT THROUGH REDEMPTION	ACTUAL INCREMENT FOR PERSONAL REDEMPTION
	1854–1858	1863–1872		
Black-soil	219	284	342	123
Nonblack-soil	155	180	342	187
Western	170	184	183	13

If we compute the entire premium collected by the landowners for the portion of land detached from them, it seems evident that they sold land at a price well above average prices prevailing at the time: in the black-soil belt, at 12.5 rubles per *dessyatin*, and in the nonblack-soil zone at 15.2 rubles per *dessyatin*. This was indeed a payment to the landowner in redemption of the peasant's person, a payment for the "serf souls" formally charged against the land. If we relate this cost specifically to that which it actually represented; namely, payment for the "serf souls," it would seem that the landowners, having received in the redemption operation the entire value of the land, obtained additionally, as a result of the inflated redemption values, about 36.1 rubles per "serf soul" in the black-soil belt, and as much as 62.3 rubles per person in the nonblack-soil belt.

Altogether, by the time all redemption operations were completed in 1906, the former nobles' peasants alone, in accordance with the Act of February 19, paid a capital debt of 1,574 million rubles for the land they received, including interest and other charges, while together with other

groups of ex-serfs they paid more than two billion rubles for the land obtained under the Act.

THE SETTLEMENT AMONG OTHER PEASANT GROUPS—THE PEASANTS OF THE IMPERIAL FAMILY AND THE STATE[19] It should be noted that the Act of February 19, 1861, was broader in its meaning and affected not only the landowners' peasants. It was generally used as a basis for a land settlement made in behalf of other numerous categories of the peasants, with some modifications in accordance with specific conditions.

We shall present a general summary of the main groups of the peasantry that were effected by the Act of February 19, 1861 and by the subsequent laws of 1863 concerning the imperial family's peasants and that of 1866 for the state peasants.

Among the various legal class groupings of the peasantry that existed from ancient times till the period of the Reform, the most important group numerically was that of the state (Crown) peasants. They, in turn, were divided into a number of special groups (the former common [*chernososhnye*] peasants, the economic peasants [those belonging to the secularized church estates], the peasants assigned to the state factories, the one-yard men [*odnodvortsy*], the postriders, and many others). The legal and land position of these peasants varied considerably, and they were merely all combined for administrative purposes, all being subject to the authority of the Ministry of State Properties. Some of these groups, which originally possessed "hereditary" rights of ownership to their lands, had lost those rights almost completely by the nineteenth century and were considered as living on state or crown land. In practice not all of them enjoyed personal freedom (as, for example, the peasants assigned to the Crown factories), but they all paid the poll tax, discharged their rural and recruiting obligations in kind, and paid an *obrok* tax for the land.[20]

Most closely related to the landowners' serf peasants was the group of former state peasants who had been assigned to the royal and palace estates, segregated through a decree issued by Paul I in 1797 as a special group of *udelnye* peasants, that is, peasants of the estates of the imperial family. They were serfs of the imperial family or of its various members, and their position differed from the regular estate peasants only in that they were not sold as were the other serfs, and in that they were nearly all transferred from *barshchina* to *obrok* as early as the eighteenth century.[21]

The number of these and other basic groups of the peasant population by the middle of the nineteenth century may be shown by the following figures (in thousands):

TYPES OF PEASANTRY	NUMBER OF SOULS ACCORDING TO THE REVISION OF 1858	
	Males	Both Sexes
Palace, royal, and imperial family	955	2,019
Crown (state), of various designations	7,965	16,535
Crown, of the western provinces	852	1,773
Crown, of the mining enterprises	185	386
Landowners' peasants	9,803	20,173
Peasants assigned to private factories	241	518
Artisans of the crown mines	114	230
Retired soldiers	487	1,093

On the whole, all groups of the peasant population totaled 51,516,000 persons of both sexes, among them 25,027,000 males.

Especially important was the land settlement made in behalf of the peasants belonging to the imperial family and the state. By an act issued in 1863, all land in use by the imperial family's peasants was transferred to them, not in permanent use but in ownership, making redemption compulsory and at the same time converting their former land payments into redemption payments. The total number of such peasants was 850,000, and they received about 3.6 million *dessyatins*, or 4.2 *dessyatins* per person, an allotment somewhat larger than that of the serfs on the private estates.

Another fairly large group of the peasant population, numbering 16.5 million persons of both sexes, were the state peasants. The Act of 1866 secured for them all the lands they actually held, not in ownership, however, but for indefinite use in return for fixed payments, that is, an *obrok* tax which was to be modified after twenty years. In 1887 this *obrok* tax was converted into redemption payments. On the whole 5.7 million state peasants were awarded land on this basis in twenty-seven provinces during the first two redemption periods, receiving an average allotment of 5.7 *dessyatins* per person. Thus, in land apportionment, the state peasants were in a somewhat better situation compared with not only the landowners' peasants, but also the former serfs of the imperial family.

THE PEASANT REFORM IN THE NATIONAL REGIONS

The general Act of February 19, 1861, together with the special local regulations for the provinces of Great Russia, the southwest (Ukraine), and the northwest (White Russia), was thus extended to the entire European part of the empire, except for such variations as we have noted with respect to the size of allotment, the valuation, extent of obligations, and so forth.

In some regions, however, political circumstances compelled the government to retreat somewhat from its avowed plan to proceed with the execution

of the Reform. The Polish uprising of 1863 inevitably reflected also on the position of the peasantry in the Polish, White Russian, and Ukrainian provinces. In Lithuania, White Russia, and the Ukraine the landowners were chiefly Poles, who in the course of the Reform made larger reductions in the peasant landholdings. Following the uprising, and for the purpose of winning over the White Russian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian peasants, the government conducted a supplementary Land Reform in 1863. Wherever the apportionment of land had not yet been completed, the reductions were curtailed, immediate compulsory redemption at lower valuations was introduced, all temporary obligations to the landowners were canceled, and the peasants came into possession of their allotments. Therefore in Lithuania, for example, and in the northern part of White Russia the peasant allotments were increased as compared with their original size, in some instances by 50 to 70 per cent, and in the west-bank Ukraine redemption payments were reduced nearly by half.

In Poland, where the peasants had formally obtained their personal freedom during the early nineteenth century, but where conditions of serfdom remained in effect on the land, the uprising of the Poles likewise accelerated the Land Reform. By the law of February 19, 1864, all land in use by the peasants in Poland was recognized as their property, and all obligations to the landowners completely abolished. Landless peasants were awarded land as well. In this manner, because of political considerations, the tsarist government progressed much further in conducting the Land and Peasant Reform in Poland than in the Russian provinces, with the result that fewer vestiges of old feudal relationships persisted in this region and the development of capitalist procedures advanced more rapidly. Nevertheless, the great Polish magnates retained their enormous latifundia, and the Polish and White Russian peasantry, burdened by heavy taxes and losing their land, changed into rural farm laborers and "workers with allotments," and descended to a position of oppressive semiserf dependency upon the Polish nobles.

The Peasant and Land Reform came to the agricultural regions of Transcaucasia somewhat belatedly and in a greatly curtailed form.[22] Here the tsarist government was concerned on the one hand over the outbreak of peasant uprisings that had grown more frequent in the various parts of Georgia during the 1850's. On the other hand, however, it did not intend to antagonize the local feudal serf owners, who supported its policy in Transcaucasia, by a radical application of the Reform. The abolition of serfdom, therefore, and the Land Reform here were conducted in an extremely limited form, with most oppressive terms for the peasant and with special prerogatives

for the owners. The Reform was formally inaugurated in eastern Georgia during 1863, in western Georgia, during 1865–1867; in Imeretia, in 1867; and in Abkhazia, in 1870. The apportionment of land to the peasant, the terms for redeeming their obligations, and so forth, were performed in a manner comparable to the general regulations of the Reform of 1861, but with substantial modifications, none of them in favor of the peasantry. Thus, while awarding the land according to the "norms," the reductions in the land actually held in use by the peasants, which in Russia attained 18 to 20 per cent, were made on a much greater scale in Transcaucasia; for example, 40 per cent in Tiflis Province. The small landowners were entirely exempted from a compulsory grant of land to the peasants. The redemption of the allotments was not made compulsory for the landowner, as a result of which temporary obligations remained in effect for a long time (down to 1912). As a protection for the nobility, a special form of "personal redemption" of former serfs was introduced. For example, for a "hearth" (*podymny*) allotment, costing approximately 790 rubles in Georgia, the peasant was obliged to pay 440 rubles of his own besides the government's redemption loan. Furthermore, the government granted substantial subsidies to the nobility "in view of the losses sustained through the abolition of the right to serf labor." In Tiflis Province alone some 2.8 million rubles were appropriated for that purpose.[23] By the apportionment of land the peasants were left without forests and without meadows, and in the arid districts they were unable to obtain water from the springs on the noblemen's property except with the latter's permission and for pay. The Reform as a whole left untouched a very numerous stratum of the peasant population of Georgia, the so-called "Khizany," who did not receive their land endowment until 1912. Extremely small allotments and high redemption payments were also designated in Abkhazia.

By 1867, with the spread of uprisings among the mountain people of Caucasia, the abolition of serfdom and the Land Reform were extended to the mountainous provinces. The peasants here received only their extremely small house plots, without any allotment of land, and were subject to a personal redemption payment of 250 rubles. The greatest hardship for the livestock breeding economy of the mountainous districts was the loss of their mountain pastures, which reverted to the local princes and lords and thereby became a medium of unrestrained exploitation of the populace. Until redemption was completely paid, the former slaves and serfs remained in a position of temporary obligation and discharged their *barshchina* duties to the landlord. As a result, slavery and serfdom in this area prevailed for a much longer period of time, down to 1912.

TWO PATHS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN AGRICULTURE Such were the land, financial, and payment settlements and the general results of the Reform of 1861, and of the subsequent acts of 1863–1866 implementing the main regulation and extending its effect over other categories of the peasantry and into other regions. The land settlement instituted for the landowners' peasants was, of course, of greatest importance to the new economic structure of the nation. By the Reform the landowners with great success expropriated a substantial part of the peasant lands, retaining large latifundia for themselves, appropriating a part of the peasant lands through various reductions, imposing, moreover, payments amounting to billions of rubles for the abolition of the peasants' feudal liabilities, and eventually retaining a form of semifeudal economic dependency through the peasants' "obligatory" services, labor dues, and so forth.

The collapse of serfdom and the bourgeois Land Reform, as prerequisites of the growing need for bourgeois development, assumed a special character by virtue of special historical conditions and the interplay of social forces, which for some time predetermined the entire future course of the development of capitalism.

In examining the general conditions of agrarian development in Russia after the Reform, Lenin notes that the very application of the Reform had objectively raised the question of those "two paths" of possible capitalist development in the village, which he calls the "Prussian" and "American." The struggle between the two was in process in 1861, served as the basis for the entire subsequent development of agrarian conditions, and eventually appeared very clearly in the Revolution of 1905. The Reform itself contained the objective causes of the circumstance that, in the post-Reform economic structure of the village as a whole, "the point of the struggle" of the peasantry was the serf estates "as the most conspicuous incarnation and the most solid supporter of the vestiges of serfdom in Russia." The development of commercial farming and capitalism once and for all put an end to these vestiges. In this respect only one course of bourgeois development lay open for Russia.

The forms of this development could, however, be twofold. The vestigial remains of feudalism could disappear either by the reorganization of the landowners' farms or by destruction of the large latifundia, that is, "by reform or by revolution."[24] The first, or Prussian type, in which

> the landowners' feudal economy is slowly transformed into the bourgeois *Junker* variety of farming, condemned the peasantry to decades of agonizing expropriation and indebtedness, while a small minority of *grossbauers* (*wealthy peasants*) make their appearance. In the second instance, no landowner agriculture exists or it is destroyed by a revolution which confiscates and distributes the feudal estates.[25]

Of the two paths of development, "which in 1861 were barely outlined," and "in the Revolution of 1905 . . . developed, grew, and found expression in the movement of the *masses*,"[26] the Reform of 1861 had projected a development along the "Prussian" way of transforming landowner and peasant farming into bourgeois capitalist agriculture. The revolutionary "American" way of development, breaking up and destroying the owners' latifundia and developing a free capitalist and farmer-peasant economy, did not materialize in 1861. Therefore, irrespective of the rapid process of differentiation and commercialization in agriculture during the first decades following the Reform, survivals of semiserf conditions and "agonizing expropriation and indebtedness" of the peasantry continued long afterward, while the farms of the owners themselves "slowly grew into bourgeois *Junker* farms."

THE LANDOWNERS' FARMS As is obvious, the above circumstances of the Reform of 1861 actually provided the basis for the "Prussian path" of development of landlord farming. The owners, numbering 30,000 noblemen, retained ownership over some 95 million *dessyatins* of the better land immediately after the Reform, compared with 116 million *dessyatins* of suitable land left to the 20 million "emancipated" peasants. The capitalist organization of farming on the estates required large resources. As a rule, however, the feudal agriculture of the nobility, as we have seen, did not possess any such resources, and the basic need for capital with which to operate a farm under new conditions was satisfied to a small degree only. The bulk of the huge redemption payments could not be utilized productively in agriculture, inasmuch as they were used for payment of the owners' existing debts. About 62 per cent of the serfs were mortgaged to the banks by 1860, and the settled estates of the nobility had incurred a debt of 398 million rubles, that is, over 53 per cent of their value; the total indebtedness on land ownership, however, amounted to 425 million rubles. Consequently, the vast sums that should have been acquired by the landowners through the redemption payments were largely consumed by the repayment of bank loans. Thus, during the first decade, by 1871, about 248 million rubles of the total sum of 543 million rubles paid by the peasantry in redemption of the land went into the repayment of bank loans obtained by the landowners, while a large part of the remaining sum was either consumed unproductively by the nobility or diverted into various branches of industry, thus being taken out of agriculture.

Hence, by 1870 the landowners were beginning to reduce the size of their arable land. As noted by the Valuyev Government Commission organized to investigate the agricultural situation during the 1870's, after emancipation the landowners, apart from the capitalist farms of the south and southwest,

rapidly began to curtail their planted acreage because of insufficient resources for equipment and the absence of incentive to operate their farms on a capitalist basis. This applies chiefly to the nonblack-soil provinces and to the former *barshchina* agriculture of the central region. In these areas the farms of the landowners did not attempt to develop their own production resources but continued to utilize for their own estates the labor and production resources of the peasant. It was in this manner that the post-Reform work-duty system came about in the economy of landed estates. The conditions under which the peasant farms of these regions functioned after the Reform aided the development of semifeudal servile relationships.

To be sure, some of the estate farms, particularly in the southern, southwestern, and western districts, found it possible to effect a transition to a capitalist organization of their economy. The Reform with its nearly landless "emancipation" presented the landowners of these districts with a free source of labor in the village laborers or the migrant agricultural workers. The estate farms of these regions entered a capitalist path of development within a comparatively short time.

THE POSITION OF PEASANT FARMING The Reform, apart from reducing the size of the peasant's allotment, imposed upon the peasant household a greater demand for money by stimulating the development of a money economy throughout the country.

First of all, the various payments and obligations to the state as well as to the former owners substantially increased. In addition the majority of the peasant's liabilities were now converted into money. In place of the former poll tax and other government collections, the rural population after the Reform was expected to pay numerous other heavy duties: payments in redemption for the land exacted from the former landowners' and imperial family's peasants, and *obrok* tax for the land paid by the former state peasants, a government rural tax, local rural taxes, the poll tax, the communal tax, recruiting taxes, and a tax for the maintenance of the national food supply. All these payments increased heavily in comparison with the pre-Reform period, particularly the money dues. The money dues of these payments alone amounted to 4 rubles, 40 kopecks, or 5 rubles per person, or 1 ruble per *dessyatin* of land. They constituted so heavy a burden on the agricultural economy of the peasants that, according to the conclusions of an official commission,

> the total sum of all taxes and payments to which the peasants are liable can in few localities be covered by the income derived from the land allotments without the aid of supplementary earnings, and in some localities, even within the black-soil belt, the amount of these payments is five times higher than peasant income.[27]

The same conclusion as to the lack of proportion between the required payments and the income of the peasant allotment was reached by still another government tax commission, according to whose calculation the payments to be made by the former landowners' peasants, in the case of a full allotment in the nonblack-soil provinces, constituted between 200 and 276 per cent of the income capacity of the land, and in the nonblack-soil belt, up to 124 per cent on an average, and about 200 per cent for the smaller allotments. Professor Yanson says in this connection:

> Hence, the black-soil peasant showed the same interest in supplementary earnings displayed by the nonblack-soil peasant, not because of a desire to increase his standard of living, but because of the sheer necessity to feed and clothe his family and pay his taxes.[28]

We have very little data for ascertaining the importance of purely monetary expenses on the peasant farm and in his household budget prior to emancipation and immediately thereafter. Our feudal statistics contain few very detailed budgetary records of the expenditures of the peasant family for food, for the operation of the farm, and so forth. From these it appears that the proportion of money in the peasant household accounts was rather negligible. Thus one of the landowners in the nonblack-soil belt, a certain Wilkins, who compiled a very detailed and rather accurate budgetary record for the peasant households in his villages, computed the money expenditures of a peasant middle-income group family of five persons at 72 rubles, 50 kopecks, or 12 rubles, 50 kopecks in currency per person a year.[29] In another budget for the 1840's the money expenditures of a family of three persons has been calculated at 47 rubles in currency, or 15 rubles, 7 kopecks per person for the year.[30]

Other writers[31] have generally submitted figures quite similar to these. For an average peasant family of five persons, the money portion of the annual budget expenditure consisted of about 70 rubles in currency, or 19 rubles in silver. Thus the size of the money portion of the annual peasant budget under serfdom, and under a system of obligations in kind or in labor, was on the whole very small. Moreover, in the aforesaid budgets, in so far as they apply to the nonblack-soil belt, the role played by money expenditures must have been comparatively large, whereas money expenditures were of less importance in the *barshchina* agricultural provinces. After the Reform they must have increased very sharply. Thus, if we consider merely the obligations listed above, for which the peasant household was not liable exclusively in the form of money, and which constituted the majority of the peasant's money expenditures, they may be said to have at least doubled after the Reform.

GENERAL RESULTS OF THE REFORM Thus, along with being emancipated from personal bondage to the landowner, the peasantry was also "emancipated" from a considerable and invariably better part of the land it held. For the portion of the land retained, the peasantry had to pay billions of rubles in redemption payments. Furthermore, in lieu of his former obligations in kind, the peasant now had to eke from his farming enough cash with which to pay his steeply rising money dues and taxes of all kinds. The general development of a commodity and money economy and the replacement of the former household trades by factory industry increased still further the peasant's need for money and resulted in a decline in the living standard of the erstwhile pastoral natural economy of the peasant. Yet, "the more such a peasant is impoverished, the more he is compelled to resort to the sale of his labor power, and the greater is the proportion of his (to be sure very meager) means of subsistence which he must seek to acquire in the market."[32] The Reform thus furnished a strong impetus toward the accelerated development of a money economy, the expansion of the domestic market, and differentiation among the peasantry; that is, a development of capitalist conditions in agriculture.

In this new epoch, however, the beginning of a commercial economy and capitalist relationships among the peasantry coincided with the prevalence of poorly developed production forces within the economy, as well as the prevalence of extremely small landholdings. Hence arose the struggle for land by the peasantry so characteristic of the entire post-Reform period, the struggle against the feudal latifundia, and the search for land to produce an extra pood of grain. His own land was insufficient, and once again, as of old and exactly as under serfdom, partly for payment in money but largely for payment in kind on the basis of labor duties or sharecropping, the owners' fields began to be cultivated by the peasant with the peasant's implements and livestock. This was particularly true of the old serf regions in the central agricultural region, in the Volga area, and elsewhere.

In other regions the passing of the vestiges of serfdom, the differentiation among the peasantry, and the development of capitalist relationships proceeded more rapidly. In the southern and eastern steppe regions both the landowners and the wealthy peasants were successfully adapting capitalist methods of production, working with the aid of hired labor and machinery, and developing their commercial production intensively. Moreover, in the nonblack-soil belt peasant labor was steadily diverted from agriculture into the sphere of industry. All this increased the differentiation of the regions to a high degree, created a wide domestic market, an advance in commercial agriculture, and social stratification inside the village, and strengthened the industrial character of the nonblack-soil belt along with its demand for the

products of southern agriculture, as well as the sale of its industrial products to the agricultural regions. If we add the fact that simultaneously with the Reform came the beginning of large-scale railroad construction, which likewise accelerated and invigorated the progress of commodity exchange, it becomes clear that the collapse of serfdom released the forces necessary for leading the national economy into new capitalist conditions at a rapid pace.

Finally, the bourgeois Land Reform of 1861 necessitated a reorganization of other parts of the state apparatus and social life along bourgeois lines: a rural reform (1864), a court reform (1864), a reform of the urban system of self-government (1870), and even a military reform (the introduction of universal military service in 1874).

However, the conditions under which the Peasant Reform was conducted were responsible for the fact that the vestiges of feudal economic relationships persisted in the Russian countryside for a long time. The income level of the landowners from the financial and agricultural exploitation of the peasant household was so high that, by comparison, there was at times little profit in maintaining the estate farm on a capitalist basis. Hence, in a considerable number of regions and localities—including primarily the old serf region of the central agricultural region—the landowners' farms were organized, even after the Reform, chiefly with a view to exploiting the peasant household as much as possible in connection with its land famine and by land usury. The "Prussian type" of agrarian development was solidly and permanently implanted in the very Reform of 1861, "condemned the peasantry to decades of agonizing expropriation and indebtedness, while a small minority of *grossbauers* (wealthy peasants) make their appearance."[33]

The ruling agricultural class, whose voice in the Reform was decisive, was able to conduct it in such a manner as to leave the peasant in a position in which he could be exploited most harshly through economic compulsion, even without the device of the "right" of serfdom. Lenin says in this connection:

> The peasants of Russia were "emancipated" by the landowners themselves, and by the landowners' government of the autocratic tsar and his officials. And these "emancipators" so managed the affair that the peasants emerged "at liberty" as tattered beggars from slavery to the landowners and into financial bondage to the same landowners and their agents.[34]

These conditions, inherent in the Reform itself, left their peculiar imprint on the entire post-Reform economic development for some time, and became one of the major causes of those peculiarities in the development of Russian industrial capitalism in Russia which we are about to examine in the next phase of our presentation.

Notes

1. Lyashchenko, *Poslednii sekretnyi komitet po krestyanskomu dyelu* (The Last Secret Committee on Peasant Affairs) (1911).
2. *Kolokol* (The Bell) (1858) No. 9.
3. *Ibid.*, (1861), No. 101.
4. Chernyshevskii, *Polnoye sobraniye sochinyenii* (Complete Collection of Works) (1905), Vol. IV, pp. 50-54.
5. See numerous articles in the *Sovremennik* (Contemporary) for 1858–1859 on the problems concerning the Reform: "Materialy dlya resheniya krestyanskogo voprosa" (Material for the Solution of the Peasant Problem), "Truden li vykup" (Is Redemption Difficult), "O pozemelnoi sobstvennosti" (On Landed Property), "Kritika filosofskikh predubezhdenii protiv obshchinnogo zemlyevladeniya" (Criticism of Philosophical Prejudices Against Communal Landownership), and others; N. G. Chernyshevskii, *Polnoye sobraniye sochinyenii* (1905), Vol. IV.
6. Included in *Polnoye sobraniye sochinyenii* (1905), Vol. X.
7. The chief official sources and material on the progress of the execution of the Reform, as well as its foundations, will be found in the Bibliographical Index. The references and factual data found in the text are cited in accordance with the very detailed survey, of Skrebitskii, *Krestyanskoye dyelo v tsarstvovaniye imperatora Aleksandra II* (Peasant Affairs in the Reign of the Emperor Alexander II) (Bonn-on-the-Rhine, 1863), Vols. I-IV.
8. Skrebitskii, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, LVI.
9. *Selskoye blagoustriostvo* (Rural Welfare) (1858), Bk. X.
10. On the size of allotment and allotment rates in the various provinces see Skrebitskii, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Pts. 1-2.
11. The rescripts to Nazimov and Ignatiyev, Skrebitskii, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. II.
12. Skrebitskii, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Pt. 1, p. 33.
13. Table compiled on the basis of figures provided by Skrebitskii, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Pt. 2, VI, and Vol. III. See also *Doklad vysochaishe utverzhdyonnoi komissii dlya issledovaniya nyneshnego polozheniya selskogo khozyaistva i selskoi proizvoditelnosti Rossii* (Report of Royal Commission for the Investigation of the Present Condition of Rural Economy and the Rural Productivity of Russia) (St. Petersburg, 1873), A, Vol. I, and *Statistika pozemelnoi sobstvennosti 1877–1878* (Statistics of Landed Property in 1877–1878).
14. Lositskii, *Vykupnaya operatsiya* (The Redemption Operation) (1906).
15. On the subject of obligations and conditions of allotment, see Skrebitskii, *op. cit.*, Vol. III.
16. On the enforcement of the Feb. 19 regulations and on the "period of transition," see Skrebitskii, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 526-549.
17. On the organization of redemption see Skrebitskii, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, Chap. II.
18. Lositskii, *Vykupnaya operatsiya* (1906), Appendix, Table I, p. 16.
19. On the settlement with the other groups of the peasantry, see Lyashchenko, *Krestyanskoye dyelo i poreformennaya zemleustroitelnaya politika* (Peasant Affairs and the Post-Reform Land Settlement Policy) (1913).
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 299-398.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 186-198.
22. On the Peasant Reform in Transcaucasia see Lyashchenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 472-569, 606-622.
23. Lyashchenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 483-489.
24. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XI, p. 348.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 348-349.
26. *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 145.

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28. Yanson, *Opyt statisticheskogo issledovaniya o krestyanskikh nadelakh i platezhakh* (Experiment in a Statistical Study of Peasant Allotments and Payments) (1881), pp. 33, 81.
29. Wilkins, *Chto nuzhno pomeshchichyemu izdelnomu krestyaninu dlya bezbednogo soderzhaniya sebya v nechernozemnykh guberniyakh* (What Does the Manorial Peasant Artisan Need to Support Himself in Abundance in the Nonblack Soil Provinces?) (Moscow, 1832).
30. Vilkins, *Mysli i nablyudeniya o polozhenii zemledelcheskoi promyshlennosti* (Thoughts and Observations on the State of the Agricultural Industry) (Moscow, 1843).
31. See the very detailed budget schedule in Gruzinov, "Byt krestyanina Tambovskoi gubernii" (Life of the Peasant in the Tambov Province), *Zhurnal zemlevladeltsev* (Landowners' Journal) (1858), Vol. II; also Saburov, "Zapiski penzenskogo pomeshchika" (Notes of a Penza Landowner), *Otechestvennyye zapiski* (Homeland Notes) (1842-1843); Solovyov, *Selsko-khozyaistvennaya statistika Smolenskoi gubernii* (Agricultural Statistics of the Smolensk Provinces) (Moscow, 1855), p. 230; Afrosimov, "Opyt otsenki rabot v dvoryanskikh pomestyakh" (Experiment in the Valuation of Labor on the Estates of the Nobility), *Zemledelcheskii zhurnal* (Agricultural Journal) (1834), p. 20, and others.
32. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. III, p. 19.
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34. *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 109.

PART II

CAPITALISM

(XXII)

Premises and General Character of the Development of Industrial Capitalism

GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE FORMATION OF CAPITALISM The official downfall of the system of serfdom in 1861 may be considered as merely a conventional line of demarcation separating two eras of economic development: the era of serfdom and the era of bourgeois industrial capitalism. Lenin says in this connection:

> The transition to a system so totally different could not, indeed, have occurred at once. . . . The conditions necessary for capitalist production were still nonexistent. . . . Capitalist economy could not have emerged at once, nor could the serf system of economy have disappeared at once.[1]

This nature of the transition to a new system was revealed both in the process of decay among the remnants of the economic forms and social relationships of serfdom and in the process of emergence and development of the new forms of industrial capitalism, gradually lending a bourgeois façade to the entire post-Reform economy. Hence, transformed vestiges of feudal forms and relationships may be encountered many years after 1861, while the germs of bourgeois relationships existed in a number of economic fields much earlier than 1861.

Nevertheless we believe that this year does separate two distinct economic eras in history, because this period specifically witnessed the final removal of the basic obstacles which blocked the development of industrial capitalism. With the Reform of 1861, the way was cleared for a final consolidation of the conditions necessary for industrial capitalist development, and the legal superstructure of serfdom, which had completely outlived the development of its economic base, was removed. The whole feudal-serfdom foundation of the absolutist political order of tsarism, together with the rule of the landed nobility, still remained intact after the Reform. As a result, various parts of the old economy proved themselves so tenacious, and their social power so considerable, that the new economy inherited from serfdom a heavy economic and social legacy which left its imprint on the character and tempo of development of industrial capitalism.

Industrial capitalism, as is well known, presupposes as its primary bases *the development of a commodity economy* ensuing from the collapse of primitive economy, and the development of the social division of labor, which is "the basis of the whole process of development of commodity economy and capitalism."[2] An ever widening gulf appears between industry and agriculture along with an increase in the industrial population at the expense of the agricultural, "a separation of the direct producer from the means of production . . . takes place,"[3] and an internal market for capitalism comes into existence, not simply a small and local market but one of broad "national" scale. Before such a market can be created, particularly in a large country, one technical condition becomes essential—the perfection of transportation, of steam railroads, and water routes, which under capitalism begin to develop with particular vigor.

Furthermore, industrial capitalism requires the preliminary formation and the *accumulation* of comparatively large money fortunes and capital. The accumulation is merely another phase of the same process of the development of a commodity economy and "the separation of the producer from the means of production," which latter in this process "are transformed into capital in the hands of their new owner." Marx, speaking of "the so-called 'primary accumulation,'" indicates that "capitalistic accumulation was preceded by 'primary accumulation' . . . an accumulation which was not a result of the capitalist method of production but its point of departure."[4] In reality "the so-called 'primary accumulation' is only the historical process of the separation of the producer from the means of production. It is represented as 'primary' because it forms the prehistory of capital and its corresponding method of production."[5]

In this process of "separation of the producer from the means of production," and "of the transformation of the latter into capital in the hands of the capitalists"—in this process of capitalistic accumulation, the class of the industrial bourgeoisie comes into being. Capital itself becomes transformed into the material substratum of capitalist enterprise, into its means of production, machines, buildings, and the whole complex capitalist technique.

Finally, during the same process of expropriation of the direct producer occurs the formation of another basic premise of capitalist production—the creation of a class of hired workers, a proletariat without any means of production, whose means of existence becomes "transformed into a material element of variable capital"[6] of the capitalists, that is, into workers' wages.

As is known, the development of industrial capitalism assumed its most typical form in England whose order of economic development Marx studied for the pattern of development of capitalist society.

To what extent do we find in the Russian economic development during

the capitalist era manifestations analogous to, or identical with, this classic course, and on the other hand what special characteristics do we discover therein? In this section we will examine the general character of the process of formation of industrial capitalism and its historical peculiarities in Russia.

PRIMARY ACCUMULATION AND ITS PECULIARITIES IN RUSSIA The problem of the "so-called 'primary accumulation,'" as stated by Marx, was studied by him chiefly through experience in England. Pointing out that "the economic structure . . . of capitalist society ensued from the economic structure of feudal society," since "the disintegration of the latter released the elements of the former," [7] Marx emphasizes that in England "the first beginnings of capitalist development occurred as long ago as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries . . . despite the fact that the beginning of the capitalist era proper belongs rather to the sixteenth century." In addition Marx indicates that the process of primary accumulation "bears a different color in different countries, and passes through different phases in a different order and during different historical epochs." [8] In England, where this process of primary accumulation assumed "the classic form," it occurred after the destruction of feudal vassalage and serfdom as long ago as the fourteenth century. Hence, this process engulfed the free and independent small producers, who rapidly became transformed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries into proletarians, and were deprived of their land and the means of production in the course of the stormy and coercive process of the plundering of state, Church, and public lands, the "enclosure" and "clearing" of estates, the transformation of meadows into pasture, and so forth. Simultaneously, at the other extreme, the process of accumulation occurred, the capitalist farmer appeared in agriculture and the capitalist enterpreneur in industry as the reverse aspect of the same process of formation of capitalism.

In the historical development of Russia's national economy, this process of primary accumulation followed a course different from the "classic form" which, according to Marx, it assumed in England. In Russia it proceeded more slowly, at a later period, and with much smaller quantitative results as a result of the more prolonged preservation of feudal relationships. Therefore, even in the Russian state of the seventeenth century and particularly the eighteenth century, there began within the feudal economy the formation of quite considerable groups of the population without their own land and means of production (various types of "fugitives," who broke away from the status of serfdom, "idlers," "vagabonds," city poor folk working for wages at enterprises, and others). There even were hired factory workmen employed in industry from one generation to another: as we have seen in the

several enterprises in Moscow during the seventeenth century they amounted to 10 per cent of the workers. But the majority of these groups were still in one way or another bound by feudal ties. They were still not the direct progenitors of the proletariat and did not yet signalize the birth of capitalist relationships. Serfdom remained the foundation, economic as well as social: there was still no change in the forms of enslavement and no transformation of "feudal exploitation into capitalist." [9]

Only in the nineteenth century, as we have seen above, within some branches of industry in particular, the cadres of permanent, freely hired workmen began to grow and even to predominate, revealing the existence of the process of expropriation of the small producer despite its occurrence in the midst of a serfdom economy. At the same time the form of exploiting this hired worker also began to change, assuming the character of capitalist exploitation. At the head of industry emerges the capitalist-entrepreneur. The separation of industry from agriculture proceeds more distinctly as a basic premise of commodity production. And although in the course of the first half of the nineteenth century these elements of primary accumulation and premises of capitalism appeared superficially in considerable prominence, serfdom for some time continued to impose its imprint and to retard the process of the development of capitalist relationships, not only up to 1861 but even thereafter. That stormy process of primary accumulation and of the formation of the proletariat (which occurred in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the aspect of wholesale coercive plunder of common and state lands and the expulsion from these lands of the once independent small producers), in Russia developed at a slower pace and on a basis of serfdom, that is, assuming the form of various "grants" of state land and the transformation of the peasants living thereon into serfs. And although "to expropriate the land workers it is not necessary to drive them from their lands," [10] even in this case in Russia the feudal base of expropriation and land plunder did not result, as in England, directly in conditions leading to the emergence of capitalist relationships. In the Reform of 1861 this process was completed by the general "cleansing of the lands" in the form of the "separation" of liberated peasants from a considerable part of their lands, segmentations, decreases in allotments, wholesale dispossessions, and so forth, with subsequent, now purely capitalist, forms of expropriation of the "free" agricultural producer. The Reform of 1861 amounted to the first "landowners' 'cleansing of the lands' for capitalism." [11]

Therefore, as compared with the classic form of primary accumulation and the initial stages of the emergence of capitalist relationships in England, Russia possessed numerous peculiarities resulting in a more extended reign of feudal relationships, in a consequently slower change of the forms of

feudal-serf exploitation into capitalist forms of exploitation, and in a less clearly defined process of "liberation" of capitalist elements of society from "the disintegration of feudal society."

This, of course, does not mean that in Russia by 1861 "conditions had not yet ripened" for the development of capitalism, as the Populists have maintained. On the contrary, as we have seen, these conditions had already come into being by the middle of the nineteenth century, bringing final disruption to the system of serfdom. Hence, "after the abolition of serfdom, the development of industrial capitalism in Russia proceeded quite rapidly, regardless of the remnants of serfdom still retarding its development."[12] The negative influence of serfdom manifested itself by not permitting the full development of capitalist relationships such as the accumulation of capital, the formation of a proletariat, the creation of a market, and others. The collapse of the system of serfdom occurred in Russia during the middle of the nineteenth century, whereas for England Marx traces the beginning of the capitalist era to the sixteenth century, while serfdom there had already been abolished in the fourteenth century. This belatedness also explains the whole backwardness of the development of Russian capitalism and the prolonged survival of vestiges of serfdom well into the capitalist era.

SOURCES OF PRIMARY ACCUMULATION IN RUSSIA: *a*) COLONIAL POLICY Among the "idyllic methods" of primary accumulation, which occurred in western Europe at a vigorous tempo, Marx places foremost the colonial policy with its accompanying plunder of colonial countries. The colonial policy of Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as we have seen, was accompanied by the same plunder of the colonial "borderlands" of the country, if not of the world, during the epoch of the Moscow state at least, on a relatively local but nevertheless large scale. Therefore, it would be incorrect to assume that the colonial sources during the "primary" as well as the later capitalist accumulation were not present in our country. The outright plunder and debauchery of the indigenous Siberian population, the collection of tribute (in furs), the barter trade in the form of exchange of valuable furs for glass beads and trinkets—such were, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the "idyllic" methods of the accumulation by the Moscow upper strata of nobility and commercial capitalists. They did not yield in this respect to the American and African types of "idyllic" primary accumulation, and thus laid the basis for the wealth of the Romanovs, Stroganovs, and many other nobles and industrialists. Later, the same manifestations of colonial policy, with the same aims and results, occurred during the advance of Peter I and his successors in Central Asia, the wars of Nicholas, and, finally, the conquering, colonial

despoliations in Transcaucasia and in Central Asia during the nineteenth century. All these colonial enterprises proved an inexhaustible source of wealth. To such colonial sources of direct primary accumulation should also be added, for example, the activity of the Russian-American Trading Company, which, according to its records, "acquired islands and lands for the fatherland" and "earned" for itself enormous profits of tens of millions of rubles annually. A no lesser source of enrichment proved to be the policy of plundering the so-called "internal colonies" like Bashkiria, the lands robbed from the Bashkirs, and, later, the same plundering in the Crimea, the Caucasus, and elsewhere.

b) WARS AND STATE PROCUREMENTS An equally great source of capital accumulation were the *wars,* so frequent in the eighteenth century, and the *state military-supply system.* No wonder one of the titled military contractors and bankers of Catherine II, Baron Friedrichs, at one of his official receptions put an inscription in his dining room to the effect: "War feeds, peace exhausts." Wars were accompanied by plundering the property of the population, and the lion's share of the loot fell into the hands of the high command. Menshikov in Poland, Field Marshal Sheremetev by his destruction of Finland, and Apraksin in Sweden amassed fortunes of millions. The huge industrialist-mercantile fortunes of the eighteenth century of the bourgeois families of Faleyev, Yakovlev, Shemyakin, and numerous others frequently had as their original and basic source wars, military contracts, and plunder.

c) FAVORITISM Another prevalent source for the acquisition of some of the largest fortunes in Russia was *favoritism,* connected with the frequent palace revolutions of the period, which brought counselors and favorites to the foreground, especially under the empresses Elizabeth and Catherine II. Although this source brought enrichment chiefly to a limited circle of persons, nevertheless it must be accorded a place of prominence as a source for some of the largest fortunes. In its economic form the basis for this source in the eighteenth century was for the most part purely feudal through grants of settled estates including thousands of serfs, sometimes with the addition of large sums of gold, and so forth. Beginning with the first favorite of Peter I, Menshikov, considered one of the richest persons in Europe (a fortune of several millions and over 100,000 serfs), there followed a long list of favorites of Anne, Elizabeth, and Catherine II, who sometimes within several days became millionaires, acquiring tens of thousands of *dessyatins* of land and serfs. This source had not merely a "noneconomic" origin but also profound economic significance and results, as may be seen from the fact that many of these contemporaries and favorites, like Menshikov, Demidov, Vorontsov, Potemkin, Chernishev, Rumyantsev, Dmitriyev-

Mamonov, and others, were listed among the largest owners of factories, plants, and mines, and had become state procurement agents and tax farmers. Later, in the capitalist period, their descendants became the privileged concessionaires, industrialists, promoters, and owners of industrial and banking stocks.

d) FOREIGN TRADE Connected with the colonial system, foreign trade in western Europe served as one of the more important sources of accumulation of wealth as long ago as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and during the period of the incipient development of capitalism in particular. In the Moscow state it assumes a somewhat significant development beginning with the sixteenth century. Founded on the exportation of agricultural raw materials and the importation of luxury articles and other goods for the upper classes, but remaining connected with monopolies, it could not by its very nature contribute to the development of the nation's productive forces. A raw-material agricultural export of this kind and an exclusively consumer type of imports also continued throughout the time of Peter and in the post-Petrine era. In addition foreign trade provided a very insignificant favorable balance: in the years 1710–1718, at the only port of the period, Archangel, the favorable balance was 1 to 1.7 million rubles, around which figure it fluctuated up to the end of the eighteenth century. During the eighteenth century, exports as well as the favorable balance increased, but still the favorable balance during 1791–1795 amounted only to 1.9 million rubles per year, in 1836–1840, to 3.4 million rubles per year, and, finally, in the 1856–1860 period, to 3.9 million rubles per year.

The volume of foreign trade and its favorable balance may serve as only an indirect index of its significance as a source of accumulation. For the latter purpose it would be necessary to calculate the rate of commercial profits, which cannot be done on the basis of the available data. In any event, as we have seen above, in the foreign trade of the seventeenth century, and even in the eighteenth, monopolies (royal and state) predominated, and the volume of the foreign trade of Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in comparison with such countries as England, Holland, and France, was so negligible that foreign trade for that period served as a comparatively small source of accumulation.

e) DOMESTIC TRADE One of the sources for accumulation of capital was domestic trade. Under conditions of serfdom it had a greater and more widespread significance than foreign trade. But, of course, owing to the prevalence of a primitive feudal economy, it could not expand in volume very rapidly. No exact data on its volume are available. According to several estimated calculations, the volume of domestic trade in the course of the first quarter of the nineteenth century alone increased almost four times, comprising as much

as 90 or 100 million rubles per year. Contemporaries and foreign observers alike during the 1840's often list among the merchants of the time large traders, who were formerly serfs, as owning 4 to 5 million rubles in capital and acting as monopolists in control of entire branches of trade in grain, textiles, and other large fields.[13]

f) GOVERNMENT CREDIT SYSTEM In the accumulation of large monetary fortunes in Russia, even under the serfdom system, a prominent part was played by such "vestiges of the hand-manufacturing period," in the expression of Marx, as government debts, taxes, protection, and, finally, leases. Government loans on the eve of the Reform of 1861 already amounted to 807 million rubles, and although they were applied in the main to unproductive and chiefly military uses, still, in the form of internal loans they created and helped to concentrate capital within the country.

To the same category of sources of accumulation belong the private banking operations, which began to develop in Russia at the end of the eighteenth century and laid the foundation of many large fortunes. Such was one of the first (in the eighteenth century) Russian foreign bankers, Solovyov (at Amsterdam), and later the large industrial-financial families of Stieglitz, Lazarev, Friedrichs, and others.

g) LEASE AND MONOPOLY Among the largest internal sources of primary accumulation of capital may be included the system of leases and monopolies, chiefly the wine leases.

Commercial and, in part, manufacturing monopolies, an old heritage of the Moscow state, enjoyed vigorous expansion under Peter I and during the time of his immediate successors, embracing almost all leading articles of internal trade as well as foreign trade staples such as Russia leather, tar, ham, rhubarb, caviar, flaxseed, hemp oil, potash, and others. And although these were Crown monopolies, courtiers like Count Vorontsov, Prince Kurakin, the Glebovs, and others accumulated enormous fortunes for themselves. Still more important were such very large monopolistic commercial-industrial companies as the White Sea fisheries of Menshikov, Shafirov, and others, the Astrakhan and Kamchatka fisheries, the monopolist companies of the iron and pig-iron plants of Shuvalov, and, finally, the class-right monopolies of manorial distilleries. These monopolies were responsible for the formation of the fabulous fortunes of the eighteenth century such as those of Menshikov, Shuvalov, the Yevreinovs, Vorontsovs, Chernishevs, and others.

Yet all these sources of profit and enrichment pale in comparison with the system of leases, particularly liquor leases. As a system of governmental finance and taxation, the system of leases enjoyed its most widespread prevalence during the eighteenth century, embracing a variety of branches

from customs collection to projects for farming out taxes on beards and on "disallowed dress" (1749).

The granting of leases for spirits, introduced by Peter I in 1712, continued to 1863, serving, indeed, as one of the largest Russian sources of capital accumulation. Based on the unrestrained debauchery of the nation's millions, the liquor leases proved a significant means of primary accumulation. The lease price—that is, the treasury's income from the lease of intoxicants—amounted to 10 million rubles in 1781, to 53 millions during 1811–1815, and to 128 millions during 1859–1863, constituting about 40 per cent of total government revenue. The incomes of the lessees themselves were truly gigantic: according to the calculations of some authors, the legal income alone of the lessees in the middle of the nineteenth century attained 600 to 780 million rubles annually.[14] Such leases were the origin of the later fortunes of the large industrial bourgeois families of the Yakovlevs, Zlobins, Saposhnikovs, and Kokorevs. Out of the liquor leases also were amassed the fortunes of such representatives of the titled families as the princes Dolgoruki, Gagarin, Potemkin, Kurakin, Count Shuvalov, and others who did not disdain such far from "noble" sources as tavern leases.

h) RANSOM OPERATIONS While economic conditions of the post-Reform period destroyed some of the sources of accumulation listed above, particularly the system of leases, it opened up one new source of accumulation as a consequence of the very act of expropriation of the village population. These were the payments of manumission fees received by the landowners for setting their peasants free.

Despite the fact that this source of accumulation in point of time belongs well within the capitalist period, we may characterize it as primary accumulation, since its underlying basis was not so much capitalist exploitation as the capitalization of precapitalist feudal rents. The volume of collection of manumission payments to the landowners was (in millions of rubles):

1863–1872	607.2
1873–1882	158.2
1883–1892	100.0
1893–1897	6.2

On the whole, the landed nobility received through the government in the form of manumission loans, in accordance with the decree of February 19, as much as 870 million rubles over a period of thirty years. If we add to this the so-called "premiums" (20 per cent of the manumission value) which were paid by the peasants themselves, we obtain a figure of more than 1 billion rubles in payments to the landowners for "liberation" in the form of the capitalization of their feudal rents. A portion of these funds went for the landowners' living expenditures and was consumed unproductively, but a

considerable part found its way into the national funds of accumulation, which by that time began to be deposited in the banks or invested in railroads, industrial enterprises, and stock capital.

Such were the sources and methods of primary capital accumulation in Russia at the beginning of the capitalist era. The above, of course, does not exhaust all avenues of the less visible widespread accumulation of capital such as usury, speculation, and others. It should be well noted that underlying these sources of primary accumulation were "extraeconomic" and purely feudal ways and means of legalized plunder of the population by encouraging drinking, by leases, "grants" of land and serfs, or by commercial monopolies in the hands of court celebrities and rich merchants, and by billions in ransom payments to the landowners for releasing their peasants. Thus, although primary accumulation in Russia in its course and momentum differed substantially from that of the advanced countries of western Europe, and particularly England, even here one finds "anything but an idyll," and a great part being played by "conquest, enslavement, robbery—in a word, violence." [15]

INADEQUACY OF INTERNAL ACCUMULATION AND FOREIGN CAPITAL The state of statistical materials does not permit us to arrive at any total for the quantities of primary capital accumulation at the beginning of the capitalist era, or to determine the subsequent rate of transformation of this capital into productive capital by its investment in factories and mills for the production of surplus value. Below we shall consider in greater detail the various indexes of capitalist accumulation during the capitalist era. Here we shall cite a few of these by explaining the relative rate, if not the size, of accumulation in the precapitalist and capitalist periods.

For the latter the sources of accumulation are no longer the above-listed sources of primary accumulation, but the prime and basic source—the production and accumulation of surplus value in capitalist enterprises. Our factory statistics for the first three decades after the Reform are so inaccurate that it is impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy even the number of enterprises, let alone any other data. Lenin, after submitting our factory statistical sources for the period 1860–1890 to a critical analysis, arrives at the general conclusion that in Russia in 1866 there was a maximum of 2,500 to 3,000 more or less sizable factory enterprises in the processing industry (including enterprises subject to the excise, but not mines), that in 1879 there were about 4,500; in 1890, about 6,000; in 1894–1899, about 6,400; and in 1903, about 9,000. Consequently, says Lenin in conclusion, "the number of factories in Russia in the post-Reform period increases, and increases quite rapidly at that." [16]

However, the absolute number of capitalist factories and their volume of production were in the 1860's still very small. It is sufficient to say that such leading branches of production of heavy capitalist industry as ferrous metallurgy, coal and petroleum remained still in the formative stages: in 1860 only 1.8 million poods of petroleum were produced, iron ore in the Krivoi Rog district yielded 1.3 million poods, and coal in the Donbass, only 6 million poods. All this denoted merely the beginning of heavy capitalist production. In the processing industries capitalist manufacturing still prevailed. The concentration of capital was still small: if we take as the basic index of concentration of industrial capital the industrial stock company, we find that in 1861 these numbered 78 with a capital of 72 million rubles, that is, less than 1 million rubles per company. The level of social division of labor and the size of the commodity-capitalist circulation may be deduced from the fact that in 1861 Russia had only 1,488 versts of railroad lines. The entire commercial credit of the pre-Reform credit system barely attained 50 million rubles, and total accumulation (all savings and deposits) in that credit system amounted to only 1,350 million rubles.

These facts indicate that Russian industrial capitalism at the beginning of the capitalist period possessed still insufficient internal accumulation, an inadequate productive apparatus, and a backward system of capitalist methods of production. All this, especially during the first decades of the capitalist period, raised the problem of foreign capital, that is, direct transfer of foreign production technique into Russian industry. Hence, speaking of the accumulation of "national" capital as a basic premise for the development of Russian capitalism, it is impossible to leave unmentioned this most important problem of Russian capitalist development—the role and significance of foreign capital.

Having entered upon the road of capitalist development considerably later than the advanced western European countries, and particularly under the influence of the prolonged survival of feudal remnants retarding the development of capitalism, Russia at that moment was economically and technically a backward country. For foreign capital Russia represented a field of investment broad in extent and attractive from the standpoint of profits. Therefore, ever since the beginning of the development of Russian capitalism, foreign capital began to participate actively therein. The first fairly substantial quantities of foreign capital began to flow into Russian national economy during the decade of 1860–1870. The basic channels through which foreign capital flowed during this period were mainly the construction of railroads, banks, credits, and insurance; to a lesser extent during this period it found its way into actual industrial production. In absolute size the import of foreign capital during these years was comparatively small. But by the 1890's

circumstances, as will be seen later, changed quite radically so that the influx of foreign capital increased to a high degree, and at the same time it was concentrated not on capitalist means of circulation but on industrial production and on the creation of great industrial enterprises. At this time native industrial capital by its volume still could not achieve any very rapid rate of development of capitalist industry and create its own capitalist production technique. Therefore the influx of foreign capital in the 1890's played a positive role in developing the production forces of the national economy and in raising its technical level. True, the country paid for this dearly. Foreign capital removed from the country surplus value of tremendous volume, and huge dividends. Nevertheless, the import of foreign capital and the incorporation of developed foreign production technique played an important part in the development of Russian industrial capitalism in the course of these years, particularly in heavy industry (mining, fuel, and metallurgy).

FORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL BOURGEOIS CLASS

The rapidly multiplying and expanding avenues and sources of capital accumulation at the beginning of the capitalist era indicated the formation of a new social force in national economy: the formation of the Russian industrial bourgeoisie as a new social class.

We have already met as long ago as in the Moscow state of the seventeenth century and the Petrine era of the eighteenth century great millionaires, merchants, and industrialists negotiating large trade transactions and owning extensive industrial enterprises. All these industrialists, however, the Morozovs, Stroganovs, Odoyevskis, Trubetskoys, and others, were in their social origin primarily feudal fief holders. Other, more "democratic," purely merchant strata of Russia's feudal society controlling tremendous fortunes were also merchants rather than industrialists.

The Petrine era was the first to produce a sizable stratum of representatives of industrial capital not connected by origin with the feudal fief holders. Such were, for example, the first factory owners of Peter's time, the Shchegolins, Miklyaevs, Maslovs, Solodovnikovs, Tsimbalshchikovs, the foreigners Tames, Akem, and others. But even in this period, and especially in the subsequent era of the end of the eighteenth century, many much larger industrial enterprises belonged either to the privileged representatives of the landowning class, the counts Shuvalov, Apraksin, Tolstoy, and others, or to the *nouveaux-riche* upstarts from the lowest strata of society, like Menshikov and Chernyshev (orderlies of Peter I), Shafirov, and others. Growing rich fast, but just as speedily and as frequently disappearing from the scene, these families were not of great importance in the formation of the future class of the industrial bourgeoisie. Hence the "democratic" families of the

commercial-industrial bourgeoisie of Peter's time, such as many of those listed above, for the most part either disappear in the subsequent years from the industrial chronicles of that period, or change into barons and counts, becoming landowning gentry and privileged members of serf-owning society. Such was the destiny not only of old industrial families like the Stroganovs, but also of certain newer families like Demidov, Maltsev, Goncharov, and many others who assumed the status of nobles, counts, and so forth.

In the history of the West European bourgeoisie, it has also been observed how eagerly the representatives of the upper bourgeoisie have merged with the top strata of feudal society and the titled nobility. In Russia this process had its special economic appeal in the "serf-holding monopoly" over labor which constituted the exclusive "property right" of the privileged class, the nobility. The capitalist-industrialist in need of manpower could in the main obtain it only through the existing feudal relationships. To obtain this right to serf labor he quite readily exchanged his "democratic" bourgeois status for that of nobility, for the title of count or baron. In western Europe, as indicated by Marx,

> industrial capitalists, these new ruling personages, had on their part to dislodge not only the guild masters but also the feudal lords, who were in control of the sources of wealth. . . . The point of departure in the development which created the wage earner as well as the capitalist was the worker's enslavement. This development resulted in a change in the form of this slavery, a transformation of feudal exploitation into capitalist.[17]

In Russia, owing to the extended survival of feudal conditions, this process of the formation of the class of the bourgeoisie and its dislodging of the "feudal lords" moved at a slower pace. Only toward the middle of the nineteenth century does the process of formation of a distinct class of industrial bourgeoisie become more apparent. Hence, at the beginning of the capitalist period the Russian bourgeoisie could not yet muster any great social influence. The portion of it owning larger capital resources consisted of representatives of great commercial capital, the "Russian mercantile class"—lessees, wholesale grain traders, Volga boat owners, and others—the types which later found brilliant literary reflection in the works of Ostrovsky, and who, in their social and cultural influence, were not ready to achieve any importance. They were associated with lower groups of the commercial classes smaller in capital resources, the local agents of large capital engaged as middlemen in the marketing of agricultural products and articles of small handicraft and artisan industries. In fact the influential industrial upper bourgeoisie by the 1860's represented a comparatively small upper stratum of large capitalists in the major industrial districts of the predominantly light industry.

Since the Reform of 1861, against the background of the rapidly proceeding differentiation of the peasantry and its stratification as a class, the bourgeoisie began intensively to fill its ranks from below, from such "social dregs" as the liberated peasants, the village kulak, cattle dealer, handicraft jobber, land speculator, and village moneylender. Of course only a few of these succeeded in "elbowing their way" into the circles of the rather influential bourgeoisie, while the majority of them remained so-called "unwashed" landlords, often barely literate rich men. This was to remain the prevailing type among the representatives of the new Russian bourgeoisie during the first two decades after the Reform. In their new circumstances they rapidly accumulated and concentrated capital, sometimes became transformed into "millionaires." The numerical strength of this group of capitalists grew still more rapidly. Understandably enough, this class could not conceive of playing a great social role. Its task was the most furious accumulation of capital, unrestrained in any way. The source of this accumulation and the object of its exploitation in the average postserfdom village were the enslaved peasant, the partly ruined landowner, and sometimes the small city artisan. From the soil of the differentiating and stratifying village sprouted new varieties of Russian petty bourgeoisie, the village moneylender, the land speculator, the kulak, the small jobber and cattle dealer—those "unwashed," colorful types depicted by the pens of Uspensky and Gorky, and from which later emerged the builders of our factories and mills (*Brothers Artamonov,* and others).

However, by the 1870's the typical social traits of this bourgeois group began to show important changes. Even if its provincial mass still consisted of the "unwashed," the Kolupayevs and Razuvayevs, the upper stratum living in the central region during the second and third generations began to make the transition from its erstwhile trading in cattle, from buying the peasant's produce, and from its recent status as the village kulaks to the building of factories, to participating in the construction of railroads, to industrial promotion, and, later, also to banking activity, and at the same time to absorb the benefits of European culture and education. Their fourth generation in the decade 1900–1910 came to be represented by such European-educated Maecenases as the Morozovs, Krestovnikovs, and Guchkovs, some of the leading executives of industrial and banking capital.

The first industrial expansion of the 1870's proved not only a good source of capital accumulation and concentration but also a school of bourgeois "culture" for the Russian middle classes. In this respect great influence was exerted by the very forms and new courses of industrial construction such as the development of banks, railroads, and stock companies, as well as by the direct participation of European capital in these activities. Russian capital began to become "Europeanized," to follow new lines in its class consolidation

and the defense of its class interests. For the first time bourgeois class organization begin to appear in the aspect of several representative organs of the class. True, the first attempts at the creation of such organs (as long ago as the pre-Reform period) could not be recognized as successful in any way, inasmuch as those were purely bureaucratic appendages to the government administration. Such were the Manufacturing Council, the Commercial Council, and others. Not before 1870 do representative and social organizations of an industrial-capitalist character, bearing considerable importance and displaying great activity, begin to emerge.

Thus in the decade 1860–1870, several societies were formed to express the aspirations and ideology of the then progressive portions of the Russian industrial bourgeoisie: the Society for Advancing the Development of Industry and Trade, which showed great energy in the study of conditions of Russian industrial economy; later, the Russian Technical Society (established in 1866) with its numerous divisions, and others. Here too belong the all-Russian conventions of factory and millowners (the first in 1870), the all-Russian trade and industry conventions (in 1896 in Nizhny Novgorod), and numerous others. Of still greater importance was the emergence, almost simultaneously, of such representative organs of the various branches of industry as the periodic conventions of the mineowners of southern Russia (the first in 1874) which developed, in conjunction with their permanent organizations, tremendous activity in defense of the interests of the mineowners in tariff policy, railroad rates, railroad construction, credit, and so forth. Here also belongs the activity of the Permanent Board of Ironmongers (since 1887), conventions and bureaus of the oil industrialists, the organizations of the textile industry, and others, as first steps toward the future monopolistic associations.[18]

THE FORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL PROLETARIAT As stated above, the process of the formation of the industrial proletariat which occurred in England quite early (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) and quite tempestuously, took place in Russia much slower as a result of the more lasting persistence of feudal conditions. It would be incorrect to think that the serf system definitively precluded the possibility of the formation of cadres of industrial workers. On the contrary, in the quitrent system and the liberation of serfs for industrial labor it found a profitable means of increasing its income. Still, the feudal system retarded and restricted economically the formation of a class of full-time industrial workers. Therefore, neither quantitatively nor qualitatively could the cadres of industrial workers formed during serfdom satisfy the needs of the developing capitalist industry. The serf system was reflected alike in the social relationships which overlapped between

the peasant and worker on the one hand and the landowner and factory owner on the other. The peasant was changed into a factory worker, falling into economic dependence, subjugation, and exploitation from the factory owner, while remaining a serf at the same time.

In a similar way the relations between the industrial capitalists and the serf-owning landlords also began to overlap indirectly: the former, through the wages paid to the serf factory worker, the bonded peasant, was paying the landowner his rent or quitrent. The landowner, by economic pressure to receive this rent, could at any time (prior to the law of 1835) recall his worker-peasant from the factory. Of course, the industrial factory owner found such conditions intolerable.

Serf labor was paid less than freely hired labor because of the peasant's low standard of living, his lack of skill, the seasonal and temporary nature of his work, and other reasons. But the low productivity of serf labor under these circumstances did not bring the factory owner any real profit and rendered the progressive development of his production extremely difficult.

Therefore the Reform of 1861 should have not only removed all these obstacles but also provided a strong impetus for the quantitative formation of cadres of a genuine "free" proletariat. Thus the Reform itself was not only a "Peasant" Reform, but, having freed 10 million serfs from personal bondage and from a substantial part of the land belonging to them, thereby also resolved the major problem of capitalism—its demand for "free" manpower.

The formation of a landless peasantry was openly conducted by the Reform of 1861 for the following groups of former serfs: first, the landowners' domestics and monthly workers, who before the Reform numbered 1,461,000 persons of both sexes; to these should be added 12,000 serfs belonging to estate-less noblemen, and part of the serfs on petty estates, numbering 137,000 persons who did not receive any land allotments. These were groups of the already completely proletarianized population. In the second group of this type were the former serfs of the manorial factories; they numbered at the time of liberation about 59,000 persons. Then followed the peasants of the state factories and mills, amounting to 386,000 persons of both sexes, and, in addition, 230,000 employees of state mines; these were already bona fide proletarians and skilled workmen. Finally, there were those serfs who were assigned to private mills with the right of ownership, 519,000 persons of both sexes. Altogether in these groups the number of persons who did not receive land allotments in 1861, or who received negligible allotments, was 2,800,000 of both sexes, and together with several other groups liberated without land, there were about 3,000,000 persons of both sexes,[19] not counting such categories as retired soldiers, hereditary warriors, and others. According to a calculation by Lokhtin, the number of the population

rendered landless by the reform was approximately 2,600,000 males, or 11 per cent of the peasantry.[20]

The above does not exhaust all the cadres of the landless proletariat created in 1861. A no less extensive group of the fully proletarianized population were those peasant households with extremely small allotments of land, which represented merely "workers with land allotments." If we count among these all peasants who received allotments less than one *dessyatin* in size, they amount to 5.5 per cent of the male population recorded by the census, or about one million persons of both sexes.

Thus the cadres of the landless peasantry created by the reform may be fixed at approximately four million persons of both sexes. This mass also constituted that "invisible overpopulation" which began to feed the growing towns and industries. In the subsequent years the more the latter grew, the more complete became the proletarianization of this mass which was "peasantry" merely by name and by passport. This could be seen from the increase in the number of so-called "long-term passports" issued to peasants leaving for extended labor in industry: the number of such passports amounted to 59,200 per year during 1861–1870, and increased to 1,845,000 during 1891–1900. Nevertheless, despite this migration of landless and small allotment persons from the village, their number in the countryside did not decrease: studies made during 1893–1897 calculated the number of landless rural population at 7 per cent, that is about 4.3 million persons, while in several provinces their number attained 11 to 17 per cent (in Poltava, 11.4 per cent; in Nizhny Novgorod 11.6 per cent; and in Kiev, 16.7 per cent).

However, the actual dispossession of the population from the land was considerably greater than these figures on landless people indicate, since a considerable share of the "landed" households had no land of their own. In describing the economic circumstances of various groups of these actual landless persons, the rural censuses of 1880–1890 used the descriptions of "household-less," "houseless," or "nonplanting" households. For the 140 *uyezds** of European Russia, according to the censuses of the 1890's, the number of these "household-less" was computed at 10 per cent, of "houseless" at 4.7 per cent,[21] and by Lokhtin's calculation, the total amount of dispossessed peasants of all types (counting also those with allotments under one *dessyatin*) in 1905 constituted 19.4 per cent of the then total peasant population of European Russia.

Indeed, this mass did not in its entirety constitute a proletarianized population, since it included some of the peasants who left agriculture to go into trade, or who owned enterprises, and others. From these figures, however, it may be seen that within the economy of industrial capitalism during the

* Administrative district corresponding roughly to the American county.—ED.

1880's there were fully formed large reserves of that invisible overpopulation which filled the ranks of the industrial proletariat. If we consider that the number of industrial workers employed in large industry toward the end of the nineteenth century amounted to approximately three million persons (and with their families amounted to more than seven millions), it is obvious that the reserve army of capitalism assured a supply of labor approximately three times the size of the employed army.

From this reserve army was formed, first, the industrial proletariat indispensable for capitalism, as well as the cadres of agricultural workers, especially for the capitalist farm areas of the south. The proletarianization of the village served as a source of supply for the rapid growth of urban population and facilitated the rapid growth of a market for capitalism. As a result, the urban population after the Reform grew twice as fast as the total number of the population: whereas in 1863, of a population of 61.4 millions in European Russia, 6.1 million (9.9 per cent) lived in the city, in 1897, of 94 million, 12 million (12.8 per cent) lived in the city; in other words the rural population increased by 48.5 per cent, the urban by 97 per cent.[22]

Besides the cities and industry, the proletarianized population of the village was absorbed in great numbers in capitalist agriculture, especially in the steppe districts of the south. According to the calculations of S. Korolenko for the end of the 1880's, in 15 provinces of the largely overpopulated agricultural center, the surplus of hired hands over the local demand amounted to 6,360,000 persons, who thus represented a huge army moving northward to the industrial centers and especially southward, where the shortage of labor for agriculture was estimated by him at 2,173,000 persons.[23] In other calculations based on data from rural statistics, in 148 *uyezds* of European Russia, of the 5.1 million male workers there were approximately 2.8 millions of "industrials," that is, employed for wages in industry, and 2.3 million employed in "agricultural occupations," that is, hired for agricultural work, which constituted up to 25 per cent of all male workers in the black-soil belt and 10 per cent in the nonblack-soil areas. If we extend this percentage to all European Russia, we obtain a minimum of 3.5 million of agricultural workers.[24] Thus capitalism in agriculture already possessed a considerable army of agricultural proletarians.

However, the rural overpopulation due to the insufficiently rapid development of capitalism assumed an acute form in many localities. Therefore, beginning with 1880 the surplus manpower of the "overpopulated" village began to be forced into Siberia and the east. The main mass of the migrants was composed, if not entirely, of horseless and landless folk or at least of those who owned allotments no larger than one *dessyatin*. During 1882, when resettlement was still officially forbidden (in order not to deprive the

landowners of cheap local manpower), the number of "voluntary" resettlers amounted to 10,000; in 1889 the number reached 37,700; in 1891, 82,100; in 1895, 108,300; in 1896, 202,300; and in 1899, 223,900.

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND INDUSTRIAL CAPITALIST TECHNOLOGY In western Europe the capitalist machine technology changed the hitherto prevailing "manufacturing" technique by the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This industrial transformation came to Russia only after great delay.

The capitalist machine technique, which since the eighteenth century had rapid development in the West, could not find application within the feudal economy of Russia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although, as we have seen above (Chapter XVIII), many foreign machines and inventions did appear quite promptly in Russia, they were not utilized there extensively or soundly. The influence of serfdom on the development of independent scientific-technical thought in Russia proved to be still more detrimental. Tsarism and serfdom suppressed all manifestations of personal initiative and invention, did not prepare and did not create the technical culture necessary for capitalism. But despite the suppression of all initiative by tsarism and serfdom, and despite the low level of education among the masses of the population, the Russian people during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries produced a number of talented and even brilliant representatives of science and technology, inventors, and so forth. However, only very few of them, like Lomonosov (1712*–1765), by tremendous will power succeeded in clearing a path for themselves toward science; but even the work of Lomonosov in the realm of chemistry, physics, and electricity, though well in advance of contemporary European science, found no application in Russian life.

Thus a capitalist machine-factory technology could not be created in its full form within the framework of the feudal economy. Inasmuch as in the late eighteenth century in industrial technique generally, Western as well as Russian, handwork still predominated, in several branches, such as heavy industry, for example, Russia progressed, as we have seen, ahead of the most advanced industrial country, England. But beginning with the nineteenth century, as a result of the adoption of a new method for obtaining iron from pig iron (puddling), the industrial development of England rapidly surpassed that of Russia, and by the beginning of the century Russia remained among the backward industrial countries. The serf-manned iron industry of the Urals, unfamiliar with the steam engine even up to the middle of the

* According to the Russian *Literaturnaya entsiklopediya*, Lomonosov's birth is variously given as 1711 and 1712.—ED.

nineteenth century, working in primitive refineries and displaying complete technical backwardness, presents the best evidence of the impossibility of any industrial revolution within the framework of the serf system.

Yet the technical foundation of industrial capitalism began to appear even within the bounds of the serf system. The cotton industry before any other, as long ago as the 1840's, began its transition to capitalist machine technology. Naturally, these textile machines were not yet produced by native capitalist industry. They were imported from England during the 1850's, for example, at the rate of 7.5 million rubles annually. But the very fact of a substantial demand for imported machinery by the cotton industry emphasized the fact that even during the serf period it was capable of mastering the capitalist machine technique and of rendering itself independent in this aspect of the more developed system of English capitalism.

Although the development of capitalist machine technique in several branches of industry begins sometime prior to 1861 (in some branches during 1860–1870, and in still others much later), in general, however, the final victory of capitalist technology in all branches of industry may be acknowledged only during the 1890 decade.

Hence, although the cotton industry was the first to adopt improved machinery during the 1840's, in the bulk of the industry mechanical weaving did not begin to replace handwork before the early seventies. In 1866 in all of Russia there were only 42 mechanized cotton mills; in 1879 there were 92. In addition, compared to the 94,600 employees working in factories in 1866, there were 66,200 working at home; in 1879 the ratio was 162,700 in factories to 50,200 at home, and in 1894–1895, 242,100 in factories and only 20,500 at home. By 1897 Russia already had 722 mills for cotton processing, including 465 weaving and 67 spinning mills employing a force of 325,000 workers, that is, an average of 45 persons for each enterprise. The total value of equipment in these capitalist mills was valued at 246,800,000 rubles, of which 181 million rubles' worth, or about 73 per cent of the total equipment, were machines of foreign origin. In other words the cotton mills were being established predominantly on the basis of imported foreign machinery and with the direct participation of foreign production managers and foreign capital (Knopp). Consequently, the degree of concentration of production in the Russian cotton industry was even higher than in England. For example, the average number of spindles in Russia's spinning mills was 56,000, while in England it was 40,000. Nevertheless, the system of "distributing offices" and home work as a supplement to capitalist manufacturing still persisted in Russia for a long time.[25]

In other branches of the textile industry, control by large capital occurred much more slowly. For example, in the Moscow mills of the late seventies,

75.7 per cent of the production of cloth was performed in mechanized mills, wool and semiwool cloth, 33.3 per cent; and silk cloth, 1.5 per cent.

In other branches of our industry, the extension of capitalist technology came still later, as in mining and metallurgy, although, on the other hand, here too it was making great strides. For example, in mining alone since the end of the 1870's hand chipping in Russia was replaced by a perforator (mechanized drill), but as late as 1890 the perforator was still powered by hand, and only toward the 1900's did mechanical and electric power begin to be applied and the steel drill to be replaced by a diamond drill. In Europe, however, this technique began to be adopted during the 1870's.

In Russian metallurgy the continued prevalence of backward technique is quite typical. One of the important features of capitalist technology is the operation on mineral fuel rather than wood. In Russia even as late as the 1890's up to two-thirds of our pig iron was obtained by means of wood fuel, and only in the 1900's mineral fuel came to be used in 57 per cent of the smelting. Similarly, even during 1870–1880 so backward a technical method in blast-furnace production as operation by cold blast was widely practiced in Russia. In western European industry the hot blast (the use of the hot gases obtained in the smelting process as the result of which a great saving in fuel is effected) was introduced during the 1830's and rapidly replaced all cold-blast work. But fifty years later in Russia it was still far from being adopted everywhere. Thus in Russia, of the 195 blast furnaces in 1885 there were still 88 operating on cold blast, and only in 1900 did the number decrease to 32 of a total of 302: but even by 1910 there still remained 11 of the total of 165. Another sign of capitalist progress was the replacing of the old refinery method by puddling: in 1870 we had 425 puddling furnaces compared to 924 refineries, and only in 1893 did the number of refineries (404) fall below the number of puddling furnaces (640). At the same slow rate of speed occurred the replacement of Bessemer furnaces by open hearths. In 1876 Russia did not have a single open-hearth furnace, compared to 8 Bessemer furnaces, but in 1893 the number of open-hearth furnaces rose to 105, compared with 15 Bessemers. Of the total production of 11.8 million poods of steel in 1885, 4.6 million came from open-hearth production; in 1900, of 135 million poods, 92.7 million; and in 1910, of 202 million poods, open-hearth production accounted for 167.5 million poods. In other words our very backward technology began to be completely replaced by improved machinery not before 1890–1900.

One branch of industry that was the first to adopt an advanced technology was the oil industry. Here too, however, in instances almost up to the twentieth century the very primitive "well" method of obtaining petroleum (out of a well by hand with buckets) or by "baling" (by a bailer from pits)

were retained. Gushers in 1891 yielded only 39 million of the total of 274 million poods, that is, about 15 per cent, and even in 1910, about 24 million of a production of 484 million poods. Improved methods of drilling wells in Baku were first adopted in 1871 in the form of percussion-rod drilling which prevailed here until 1910, whereas in the United States by that time it was replaced by rotary and turbine methods. The latter technique was introduced in Baku for the first time on an experimental scale in 1911. The more perfected methods of extraction, such as compression and pumping, remained unknown here up to the October Revolution.

Besides improved mechanical technique for production proper, of great importance to the development of industrial capitalism was a perfected method of transportation such as the steam-powered railroad and water transport. As we have seen, the adoption of the technique of steam transport began in Russia even during the period of serfdom, but found no widespread application. Permission to operate steamers freely over all rivers of Russia dates back to 1843; commercial seagoing steam shipping was organized on the Black Sea in 1856. However, not until after the 1860's did steamships on the Volga, for example, begin to replace the backward serf methods of shipping, such as the *burlak* * system, barge rafting, and so forth. Railroad construction, although it also began as early as 1840–1850, produced insignificant results up until 1861—a total of 1,500 versts of rail lines. The first capitalist boom in railroad construction during the 1870's occurred almost exclusively by the direct transplanting of foreign technique and by the importation of locomotives, cars, and rails from abroad. Only with the growth of domestic ferrous metallurgy and machine-building in the 1890's did Russia's industrial capitalism begin to master the technique and to organize its plants for locomotive, car, and steamship-building, and to accelerate its own construction of railways.

Thus the perfection of the technique of industrial capitalism experienced a greatly retarded development in Russia. Russian industrial capitalism could not create its own excellent industrial technique. As occurred during the period of serfdom, general conditions within the country did not create circumstances favorable to the independent development of a Russian industrial technique. Russian industrialists preferred to incorporate foreign methods and machines into their own production rather than expend their resources on new Russian inventions. Foreign capital brought into Russia not only its methods and machinery but its technicians and engineers as well. Regardless, therefore, of the number of contributions made by gifted Russian scientists in the field of natural science, physics, chemistry, and technology, particularly

* Pulling boats upstream by hand. The pullers, or *burlaks*, walked along the bank, hauling the boat by a rope.—ED.

between 1860 and 1890, their discoveries and inventions, as in earlier years, often found no application inside Russia. The total number of patents, according to data pertaining to 1917, issued to Russian inventors on the eve of the Revolution was 24,992, that is, one-tenth that of Germany (248,006) and less than one-fortieth of that in the United States (1,034,227). Russian inventions, despite world-wide fame, were frequently not applied in Russia, and their inventors died in poverty.

The brilliant mathematician Lobachevsky (1793–1856) brought about a revolutionary change in mathematical science with his *New Principles of Geometry* (1840), but was not recognized in Russia and was merely subjected to persecution.

Brilliant self-educated mechanics and inventors of the eighteenth century like I. Kulibin (1735–1818) wasted their talents on building ornamental clocks at the court of Catherine II, and the work of Kulibin, remarkable for that time, in the field of mechanics and construction (the automatic bicycle, the mechanical self-propelling boat, semaphoric telegraph, a projected arched bridge) was not utilized. In 1763, several years prior to the invention of the steam engine by Watt, the skilled miner I. Polzunov, son of a soldier in a Ural mountain company, invented and designed a steam "fire" engine of the same type as Watt's machine. Although Polzunov's engine was tested in production and proved its usefulness, it was nevertheless dropped and the inventor died in poverty. A similar fate also met many other Russian scientists and inventors during the period of serfdom, whose discoveries much later, frequently under other authorship and in other countries, produced revolutionary changes in production methods.

Thus in 1802 the self-educated V. Petrov, later professor of physics at Petersburg, was first to obtain an electric light arc, later called the "voltage arc," which found wide application as the invention of the Englishman Davy.

In 1832 the Russian scientist P. Schilling was first to invent an electromagnetic telegraph such as was later given wide distribution in the form of the apparatus of Wheatstone and Cooke, who borrowed from Schilling.

In 1833 at Novy-Tagil, Cherepanov built the first Russian locomotive after an original design, but nevertheless, during the subsequent development of railroad construction in Russia, locomotives were for a long time exclusively imported from abroad.

In 1842 the chemist Zimin of Kazan was first to discover aniline, a basic material for the production of aniline dyes which several years later was again "discovered" and patented by the German chemist Hofmann.

In 1837 the Russian scientist and electric technician Jacoby was first to discover galvanoplasty, and on its basis, in 1847, the electric method for

refining copper was first applied, a method that was only in 1865 adopted in America. The same Jacoby was first to design an electric boat, which navigated the Neva in 1838, and almost fifty years later it appeared on the river Thames in London to arouse the amazement of all spectators.

In the field of ferrous metallurgy, after Bessemer's first publication of his new method for iron production, Russian ironmongers as early as 1857 began to attempt to adopt it (at the Vsvolodovilvensky plant in the Urals), but these experiments were unsuccessful, as were the later tests during 1863–1864 at the Votkin factory. During the same period, the Obukhov plant in Petersburg tested an original installation of converters of the Bessemer type, designed by the remarkable Russian engineer D. Chernyshev. Although the experiment was successful, his method, the "Russian Bessemer Process," was dropped without adoption.

The famous Russian inventor in the field of electric lighting, P. Yablochokov, was first to introduce into many Russian cities as well as abroad (in France and in England) electric light by means of his remarkable "Yablochokov candle." In France in 1876 the inventor obtained a patent for his method of lighting, which Parisians and Londoners came to know as the "Russian sun." In Russia a company for the exploitation of the invention, the "Association of Yablochokov-Inventor and Company" was formed, but it soon disappeared and the inventor died a poor man. The "Yablochokov candle" was soon overshadowed by another invention, the incandescent lamp of the American, Edison. But during these years another Russian electrical technician, Lodygin, invented his own incandescent lamp before Edison. The company established in 1874 for the exploitation of this invention soon disintegrated, the inventor himself left for America to serve with the American firm Westinghouse. Attempting to return to Russia in 1906, the inventor was barely able to receive a position in his native land—that of supervisor of a street-car substation, and after returning to America, died there in poverty. In 1895 the Russian physicist Popov for the first time in the world made one of the most remarkable discoveries of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: he invented the wireless telegraph which, however, was adopted into world technique in the name of the Italian, Marconi (1896). The scientist and inventor Tsiolkovski, in 1895, ten years earlier than the famous Zeppelin, designed an all-metal dirigible, but his work was not recognized in Russia until the October Revolution.

Thus, conditions of life in tsarist Russia strangled scientific and inventive thought. The brilliant discoveries of Mendeleyev in the field of chemistry, the work of Lebedev in physics, of Timiryazev in plant feeding, of Michurin in genetics and fruit culture, of Mechnikov, Butlerov, and many others found greater recognition abroad than in Russia. Under the conditions of Rus-

sian autocracy, advanced Russian science could not successfully develop, nor could Russian capitalism create the excellent and independent technical culture indispensable for a developed and progressive capitalism. Under the protection of customs tariffs, affording security against foreign competition, capitalism could survive even without advanced technology, since even with its primitive methods profits and accumulation were very large. This circumstance imposed upon Russian capitalism its backward character. And only after foreign capital began to flow into Russia did it bring the better improved foreign technique and put into effect the concentration of production. Hence, by the early twentieth century Russian capitalism did master a relatively advanced, although far from excellent, capitalist technique. At the same time the development of the heavy concentration of production also began.

THE QUESTION OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT DURING 1870–1890 Such was the basic pattern of development followed by Russian industrial capitalism. Many of the conditions and premises, as we saw above, existed or were in preparation for some time, even during the last decades of serfdom. However, the forces of serfdom capable of retarding industrial development were still so imposing that the tempo and results of industrial progress during the first decade after the Reform were inconsiderable.

After 1870, however, the development of capitalist relationships began to proceed at a rapid, and at times tempestuous, speed. The "novelty" of economic conditions, as they first developed, seemed so striking to observers of that period, compared with the recent past, as to obscure the fact that the basic elements of these conditions had already been implanted long ago. The rapid rise of capitalism over the ruins of noncapitalist institutions led many to regard these capitalist methods of production as having been introduced from the outside, transplanted "forcibly" onto the soil of indigenous noncapitalist conditions of "national production."

In this way emerged the reactionary idea of the "artificiality" of Russian capitalism, of the possibility of avoiding capitalism in the development of Russia's national economy, and of the possibility of "turning the wheel of history" backward. Thus were engendered in social thought and in the literature of Russia during 1870–1880 ideological tendencies which denied the expediency, the possibility, or even the fact of capitalist development in Russia.

These trends in social thought on the question of the essence and direction of capitalism in Russia were not, of course, purely literary trends, but reflected the class interests which by that time had already become clearly outlined against the social-economic background of Russia. And it was no

mere coincidence that the controversy about the direction of Russia's social-economic development and its essence raged with particular vigor during 1880–1890.

Despite the bourgeois character of the Reform of 1861, the interests of the semifeudal landowner class were safeguarded by the preservation of "patriarchal" social relationships, and by the preservation of a "natural" economic order among the mass of peasant farms which were still operating under medieval conditions of communal agriculture, with a semifeudal system of labor obligation to the manorial estate. These economic interests of the landowning class, as well as the kulak elements clinging to it, including a part of the middle peasantry, found their ideological reflection in the theory of the "uniqueness" of economic development along the line of noncapitalist "national production," in assigning to the land commune the role of savior from capitalism, in a denial of the significance of social division in labor and the development of capitalism, in eulogizing the "natural-consumption" character of the peasant farm, "the union between agriculture and household industry," and so forth. In its economic aspect this trend was profoundly reactionary, since in spite of all discussion concerning the "national spirit," "universal equality," and so forth, it was in effect going backward in the direction of serfdom. This tendency in social thinking attained its highest form in the so-called "Legal Populism" of 1880–1890, which became the direct expression of the interests of the kulak elements.

The question of the "uniqueness" of Russia's social-economic development was raised for the first time by the Slavophiles (Aksakov, Khomyakov, Samarin, and others) as early as 1830–1840. Proceeding from their idealistic views of social development as a manifestation of the "national spirit," they considered the Russian land commune as a form of social organization that might enable Russia to avoid the capitalist path of development. Similarly, Herzen, after raising the same question: "Should Russia pass through all phases of European development or will its life evolve according to other laws?" stated his answer in the sense of accepting the "uniqueness" of Russian social development and the possibility, by virtue of the communal spirit of the people, "of recreating the crumbling social order" in the spirit of socialism.[26]

The idea that socialism in Russia would be achieved not by the dictatorship of the proletariat but through the commune and the peasantry formed the basis of the views and programs of the revolutionary Populism of the 1860's. Assuming that the main revolutionary force was not the working class but the peasantry, and that the peasant land commune contained the germ of socialism, revolutionary Populism of the sixties attempted to arouse the peasantry to a struggle against tsarism, and later, following the failure

of these attempts, resorted to individual terror. After the dispersion of the "Narodnaya Volya" (People's Will) Party by the tsarist government, a majority of the Populists abandoned their revolutionary struggle against tsarism and adopted a conciliatory position.

The Populists of the eighties, imitators of the revolutionary Populism of the sixties, changed the old revolutionary, but mistaken and utopian, economic program of revolutionary Populism into an opportunist reactionary program, which became an expression of the interests of the kulak elements in the village and the petty bourgeois class of the city. The economic ideas of so-called "Legal Populism" on the question of the essence and direction of economic development in Russia during the eighties and nineties were most ably presented in the work of V. V. (V. Vorontsov), *The Fate of Capitalism in Russia,* and in many of his other writings.[27] The point of departure for V. V. is his acceptance of the "uniqueness" of Russian social-economic development. In the opinion of V. V., the main productive force in Russian national economy are the peasants. The railroads, capitalist industry, and the banks all exist and prosper at the expense of the peasantry and the peasant farm. But the peasants have no need of railroads, banks, or capitalist industry itself, since the peasants "maintain their economy not in accordance with the laws of European political economy," but for the satisfaction of their own needs. Agriculture and the other activities of the farm provide everything necessary for rural consumption. Only the scarcity of land serves, in the opinion of V. V., as the primary cause for the development of money and market relationships within the rural economy. If it were possible to provide a full and adequate supply of land, all movement from the village to the factory, and the formation of a landless proletariat, would cease at once. The ideas of V. V. were thus a simple idealization of the natural economy of the peasantry. V. V. denies the existence of the social division of labor as the premise for the development of commercial farming and capitalism. Russian capitalism, in the opinion of V. V., has been "implanted artificially," and is therefore "a guest brought in against his will."

But happily, says V. V., capitalism in Russia is maintained so artificially that it does not, and cannot, develop. The reason, according to him, lies in the need of a foreign market for the development of capitalism. Russia cannot expect to conquer foreign markets as long as it remains the most backward of the European states technologically. Upon examining the factual data on the total amount of workers in Russia's factory industry, V. V. comes to the conclusion that their numbers are declining.

Similar ideas were expressed by other Populist writers. "Nikolay-on" * (Danielson) in his *Outline of Post-Reform Agriculture* (1893) develops in

* Danielson's nom de plume.—ED.

greater detail V. V.'s idea that Russian capitalism is merely a "capitalism of circulation," that it has not affected the foundation of noncapitalist peasant production and was therefore "stillborn."

"Legal Populism" attained its greatest influence during the eighties and nineties, that is, precisely during the period of industrial stagnation, decline, and social reaction. The leaders of Populism, V. V., "Nikolay-on," Kablukov, Yuzhakov, Mikhailovsky, as well as their successors, Peshekhonov, Chernenkov, Kocharovsky, and others—gathered round their organ *Russia's Wealth* during the nineties—along with the general propaganda of their views on the "uniqueness" of Russian economic development, were most energetic in their opposition to revolutionary Marxism.

Unique among Russian economists of 1860–1870 writing about the development of capitalism in Russia and the significance of the Russian land commune was N. G. Chernyshevsky, who was, in the words of Lenin, "a remarkably profound critic of capitalism despite his utopian socialism," [28] dreaming "of a transition to socialism through the old, semifeudal, peasant commune." [29] For all that, however, Chernyshevsky was far from both the Populist general attitude toward the problem of capitalism and the Populist idealization of the peasant commune. He believed that the commune could safeguard Russia against the "plague of proletarianism," but indicated that this could not occur except under certain definite conditions of political and social economic development in Russia. He says:

> What may appear as utopian in one country exists as a fact in another country. . . . The pattern, toward which the West is now striving by so tortuous and long a road is still in existance among us in the mighty national habits of our rural life. . . . We see what grievous consequences were bred by the loss of communal landownership in the West, and how difficult it is to restore that loss to the Western people. The example of the West must not be ignored here.[30]

Chernyshevsky emphasized particularly the conditional nature of his defense of communal ownership, which "acquires meaning only when other . . . guarantees of welfare have been secured." These guarantees he saw in the abolition of private landownership, in collective production, and in a highly advanced agriculture. And yet, the "utopianism" of Chernyshevsky prevented him from fully resolving the contradiction in his views on the role of the commune in the development of capitalism and in the transition to socialism.

When the rising industrial capitalism began to improve its economic position during 1870–1890 and clear the way for its "free" development, it proceeded to proclaim its demands as to the need of liberating Russian economic life from the survivals of semifeudal institutions that retarded its develop-

ment. Here the champions of bourgeois development in Russia had occasion to clash primarily with the Populists, who were denying both the fact and the "desirability," from their standpoint, of capitalist development in Russia. The protagonists of capitalist development had, therefore, to take issue with the Populists, to demonstrate not merely the fact of capitalist progress and capitalist institutions in Russia (the growing numbers of factories, the increase in industrial workers, the decline of peasant household industry, and so forth) but also the historical inevitability and progressiveness of such manifestations in that period (the social division of labor, the growth of the market, the development of capitalist technology, and so forth), compared with the backwardness and routine of semifeudal "national" production. In the course of their struggle against Populism, the representatives of this trend of thought acquired the literary name of "Legal Marxists." In reality they were the purest ideologists and champions of the interests of the bourgeoisie and of capitalist development in Russia. Asserting that they were merely investigating this problem "objectively," they denied any class bias in its solution but actually sided with the interests of the bourgeoisie, urging the latter, in the words of Struve, "to take their lessons from capitalism." Struggling in this manner against the reactionary ideas of Populism, they

> attempted to use . . . the banner of Marxism to gain control over the workers' movement and adapt it to the interests of bourgeois society and to the interests of the bourgeoisie. From the teachings of Marx they discarded the most important element—the concept of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.[31]

But, still, this literary and social trend of thought of the liberal bourgeoisie during the nineties was very important as one of the channels through which a literary struggle against reactionary Populism was possible under existing conditions of censorship. Of the representatives of this trend, Lenin said that they were "bourgeois democrats, to whom the break with Populism signalized a transition not from petty-bourgeois (or peasant) socialism to our proletarian socialism, but to bourgeois liberalism."[32] For this reason, revolutionary Marxism takes its stand, on the one hand, against the Populists and, on the other, against "Legal Marxism."

One of the most important Russian economists of the time was Ziber, who was also among the first to popularize Marx in Russia in his book *D. Ricardo and K. Marx and Their Social-Economic Studies* (1885). Taking the position that it was inevitable for Russia to follow the course of capitalist development, he maintained that "our peasant will have to stew in the factory boiler." A great contribution to the study of the economic position of Russia and the development of capitalism was made by a number of studies of factual and

historical content, such as Tugan-Baranovsky's work *The Russian Factory in the Past and Present* (1898), which was a first and highly valuable attempt (despite a number of erroneous theses) to clarify the problem of the origin of capitalist industry in Russia, and to refute the opinion of the Populists as to the "artificiality" and "lifelessness" of Russian industrial capitalism. Among the first attempts at Marxist interpretation of conditions in the Russian village during the nineties may be mentioned the book of Gurvich, entitled *The Economic Position of the Russian Village* (1896). Finally, a noteworthy contribution to the polemic against the Populists was Struve's *Critical Remarks on the Problem of the Economic Development of Russia* (1894), in which the author, evaluating the economic situation of Russia and the causes of her backwardness from the standpoint of the ideas of bourgeois-capitalist development, ends with the appeal: "Let us recognize our backwardness in culture and let us take our lessons from capitalism." As a literary trend, "Legal Marxism" enjoyed considerable popularity during the nineties in the circles of the liberal bourgeoisie, the publicists, and professors grouped around the periodical *Contemporary World,* and also around the Free Economic Society, where lively discussions of the current problems of Russian economic life were held during the nineties (the position of the peasant economy, the development of capitalism in Russia, the construction of railways, monetary reforms, the price of grain, and so forth).

Thus the "Legal Marxists" were merely the "temporary fellow travelers" of that great social movement which during the nineties began to spread vigorously throughout Russia: the movement of revolutionary Marxism integrated with the mass revolutionary labor movement and with the awakening of the working class to a revolutionary struggle against tsarism and against the whole capitalist system. The theoretical and ideological basis of revolutionary Marxism were the teachings of Marx, but not in the distorted interpretation given by the Populists or the "Legal Marxists," but in recognizing the leading revolutionary role of the proletariat, who, by means of the proletarian revolution, through the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, can conquer the capitalist world and create a new, classless society.

Revolutionary Marxism first launched its struggle against Populism through the publications of Plekhanov and through the first Russian Marxist group abroad, the "Labor Liberation" group which he organized (in 1883). In his writings against the Populists, Plekhanov asserted "that the views of the Populists have nothing in common with scientific socialism."[33] Such studies of Plekhanov as *Socialism and the Political Struggle, Our Disagreements, About the Problem of the Development of a Monistic View of History,* cleared the way for the victory of Marxism in Russia.[34]

In his work *Our Disagreements,* Plekhanov, utilizing the Marxist theory

and method "of applying a given scientific theory to the analysis of rather complex and inter-related social relationships," and with the aid of factual statistical material (very limited at that time), demonstrated the incorrectness of the very manner in which the Populists stated the problem of Russia's ability to avoid capitalism, since "Russia has *already entered* upon the road of capitalist development."[35] He also attacked the other mistaken view of Populism; namely, the possibility of attaining socialism without the proletariat, through the peasantry guided by the intelligentsia, and through the peasant commune, that harbinger of socialism. He proved, on the contrary, that the formation of a revolutionary workers' party is the sole method for solving the economic and political contradictions of contemporary Russia and for achieving socialism through the proletarian revolution. Furthermore, he also shattered the generally erroneous views of the Populists concerning the whole course of human history.

Very effective in the popularization and the philosophical and sociological foundation of Marxism, as well as in dislodging the "philosophy" of Populism, was another work of Plekhanov (Beltov), *On the Problem of the Development of the Monistic View of History* (1895), a work "on which," in the words of Lenin, "a whole generation of Russian Marxists was nurtured."[36] Another study dedicated to a detailed criticism of the economic theories of V. V., Plekhanov's (Volgin's) *The Basis of Populism in the Works of V. V.* (1896), exercised widespread influence.

The writings of Lenin struck a vital blow at the Populists, primarily his first work on this subject, "What Are These 'Friends of the People' and How Do They Fight the Social Democrats?" (1894). Printed by hectograph in a limited number of copies, this essay, although it could not enjoy a wide circulation for a long time, was the most noteworthy Marxist study of that period, containing not only an analysis of Russian economic reality but also for the first time a formulation of the tasks confronting proletarian socialism and the Communist revolution.[37] Lenin's criticism, exceptional in its force and logic, completed the ideological rout of Populism.

Another remarkable contemporary work (1893) of Lenin's (which remained in manuscript and was undiscovered for a long time) was his article "On the So-Called 'Problem of Markets.'"[38] Here he presented with crystal clarity and with his inherent mastery the Marxist theory of the market and production—a question which also played a vital part in exposing the mistaken concepts of the Populists.

Having thoroughly defeated Populism in the field of ideas, Lenin at the same time launched a sharp attack against the bourgeois content of "Legal Marxism." Lenin made it his task not only to offer a correct interpretation of Marx (of the type that could not exist among the "Legal Marxists," to say

nothing of the outright distortions of the Populists) but also to assign a position and a vital meaning to the revolutionary struggle of the working class, to liberate the latter from the influences of petty-bourgeois illusions spread by the Populist "leaders," and to reveal the existence of revolutionary forces not only in the working class but also in the impoverished peasantry. Lenin then was already pointing the way to the proletarian revolution, which, thirty years later, materialized under his leadership.

This revolutionary class point of view is followed by Lenin in his critique of Struve's book, in which he singles out, aside from the author's various errors, the basic characteristic of his views as being

> narrow objectivism limited to proving the inevitability and necessity of the process, and not attempting to identify at each concrete stage of the process the inherent form of its class antagonism—an objectivism which deals with the process as a whole, but not specifically with the antagonistic classes from whose struggle the process is composed.[39]

Another major work by Lenin, which was published legally at that time and, therefore, proved to be of profound importance in the dissemination of Marxist ideas on the essence of economic development in Russia, represented a new and mighty blow against the theories of Populism. It was his *Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899).

Following the publication of this book, the controversy over the general character of economic development of Russia may be considered as definitely settled. In our concrete historical survey of the development of capitalism in Russia, we shall have more than one occasion to return later to this remarkable study of Lenin's for an interpretation of all such problems as may arise.

In connection with the many discussions in Russian literature during 1870–1890 concerning the character of Russian economic development, the rise of capitalism, the significance of the peasant land commune in this process, and so forth, one must refer to the opinions of Marx and Engels, who interpreted these problems with extraordinary insight and submitted a remarkable prognosis of future economic development of Russia.

As we have indicated, Marx studied Russian history and economics very closely and frequently expressed his views on their basic problems: on feudalism, on the significance of Peter's reforms, on the peasant land commune, and others. The progress of capitalism in Russia attracted his attention in particular, and he studied it through primary sources. The problem of the importance of Russia's peasant commune in the development of capitalism, which had been raised by Chernyshevsky and, thereafter by revolutionary Populism, greatly aroused the interest of Marx as well. The Populists turned to Marx on a number of occasions in quest of a solution to some of their

problems. In this way arose the correspondence between Marx and V. Zasulich on the question of the commune,[40] as well as the correspondence between Marx and Engels and the first Russian translator of *Capital*, N. Danielson (Nikolay-on).

In his well known letter to the editors of *Native Notes*, the organ of the Populists during that period, in connection with an article by Mikhailovsky, Marx as early as 1877 called attention to the erroneous interpretation of his theories by Mikhailovsky. Concerning himself specifically with the problems of Russian economics, and studying it through primary sources, Marx came to the conclusion:

> Should Russia continue to follow the road it has taken after 1861, it will miss the best opportunity that history ever offered to any single nation, and will experience all the fatal misadventures of the capitalist order.

However, Marx indicates further:

> If Russia is striving to become a capitalist nation on the pattern of the Western European nations—and during recent . . . years it has labored more than a little in that direction—it will not attain its goal without first converting a considerable portion of its peasantry into proletarians; and afterward, having found itself in the grip of the capitalist system, it will be subjected to capitalism's inexorable laws together with all the other unhallowed nations.[41]

Engels discusses the problems of Russian economic development in still greater detail in a number of letters to Nikolay-on about the subject of some concepts contained in his book on the development of Russian capitalism. Upon entering a new industrial era after 1861, Russia has to develop its capitalist production, which cannot assume any other form except that of large-scale capitalist production. And this, in turn, implies the decline of peasant household industry, the loss of land by the peasantry, the formation of a large reserve army of workers, the irregularity in the growth of capitalism, with its contradictions and crises, and so forth. Indicating in another letter the utopianism of the Populist views of the Russian land commune as the "germ" of a new social order which might "spare Russia the necessity of passing through the agony of the capitalist regime," Engels refers to the well known passage in the Communist Manifesto to the effect that the conditions prerequisite for that purpose could be found only "in the transformation of the economic system of the European West and in the abolition of the capitalist system." And since these conditions "are only just now beginning to develop," for Russia too, therefore, the only road remaining open was the road of capitalist development. Indicating further that "the process of replacing about 500,000 landowners and about eighty million peasants with a new class of landowners of the bourgeois type could not develop without frightful

suffering and upheavals," Engels in another letter presents a remarkable prognosis of the future prospects of Russian capitalism:

> Capitalist production is constantly working toward its own ruin, and you may rest assured that it will proceed to do the same in Russia. It may carry out—and if it lasts long enough undoubtedly will—a radical agrarian revolution; I mean a revolution in agricultural conditions that will ruin both the landowner and the peasant and substitute for them a new class of large landlords. . . . In any event, I am convinced that the honorable conservatives who are planting capitalism in Russia will some fine day be terribly astonished at the unexpected results of their own actions.[42]

Such was the remarkable prognosis made by the founders of Marxism as to the course of capitalist development in Russia and the future collapse of capitalism.

Economic development in Russia since the last years of the nineteenth century, and especially during the first years of the current century, clearly demonstrates that Russia had permanently entered the road of bourgeois capitalist development with all its attendant consequences. There was no longer any question of the "peculiarities" of our development but only of the form and tempo to be followed by capitalist industrial development here and, at the same time, of the position and role of each particular social group and class in this process of capitalist development. The grouping of social forces and classes in Russia followed along another road, as Lenin already indicated at that time (1894)—the road of the class struggle, the formation of a revolutionary proletariat, the emancipation of its ideology from petty-bourgeois influences, and the creation of a revolutionary workers' party under whose leadership, as anticipated by Lenin forty years earlier,

> the Russian *worker,* rising at the head of all democratic elements, will upset absolutism and lead the *Russian proletariat* (besides the proletariat of *all lands*) along the direct road of open political struggle *to a victorious communist revolution.*[43]

Notes

1. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, p. 141
2. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
4. Marx, *Kapital* (1935), Vol. I, pp. 571-572
5. *Ibid.*, p. 573.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 598.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 573.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 574.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 574.

10. Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XXVII, p. 685.
11. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XI, p. 378.
12. *Istoriya VKP (b)* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks], A Short Course), p. 6
13. Haxthausen, *Issledovaniya vnutrennikh otnoshenii narodnoi zhizni i v osobennosti selskikh uchrezhdenii Rossii* (Studies of Internal Relations of the National Life and in Particular the Rural Institutions of Russia—Russian translation, 1870), pp. 35, 92, 288.
14. Zakrevskii, *O vozmozhnosti zamenit vsye nalogi vygodami ot prodazhi vina gorodskimi i selskimi obshchestvami* (On the Possibility of Replacing all Taxes by Profits from the Sale of Wine by Urban and Rural Societies) (1866). See also Pryzhov, *Istoriya kabakov v Rossii* (The History of Taverns in Russia) (1868).
15. Marx, *Kapital* (1935), Vol. I, pp. 573, 572.
16. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, p. 364.
17. Marx, *Kapital,* Vol. I, p. 574.
18. The history of the Russian bourgeoisie as a class still remains completely untouched by scientific study. Almost the only comprehensive work in the field is that of Berlin, *Russkaya burzhuaziya v staroye i novoye vremya* (The Russian Bourgeoisie in the Old and New Times) (Moscow, 1922). See also Ioksimovich, *Manufakturnaya promyshlennost' v proshlom i nastoyashchem* (Manufacturing Industry in the Past and Present) (1915).
19. Lyashchenko, *Krestyanskoye dyelo* (Peasant Affairs), pp. 8, 9.
20. Lokhtin, *Bezzemelnyi proletariat v Rossii* (The Landless Proletariat in Russia) (1905), p. 30.
21. Blagoveshchenskii, *Svodnyi statisticheskii sbornik khozyaistvennykh svedenii po zemskim podvornym perepisyam* (A Summary Statistical Handbook of Economic Data Based on Rural Household Censuses) (Moscow, 1893).
22. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, p. 47.
23. *Selskokhozyaistvennye i statisticheskie svedenia po materialam, poluchennym ot khozyayev* (Agricultural and Statistical Data Based on Materials Obtained from Owners), Issue V; S. Korolenko, *Volnonayomnyi trud v khozyaistvakh vladelcheskikh i peredvizheniye rabochikh* (Free Hired Labor on Privately Owned Estates and the Migration of Workers) (1892).
24. Rudnyev, "Promysly krestyan Yevropeyskoi Rossii" (Handicrafts of the Peasants of European Russia), *Sbornik Saratovskogo zemstva* (Symposium of the Saratov Zemstvo) (1891). Lenin considers this figure of Rudnyev to be the "minimum"; see his *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, p. 179.
25. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, p. 366.
26. Herzen, *Sochineniya* (1878), Vol. V, pp. 249-278.
27. V. V., *Sudby kapitalizma v Rossii* (The Destinies of Capitalism in Russia) (1882); *Progressivnyye techeniya v krestyanskom khozyaistve* (Progressive Trends in the Peasant Economy) (1892); *Krestyanskaya obshchina* (The Peasant Commune) (1892). Cf. A. Volgin (Plekhanov), *Obosnovaniya narodnichestva v trudakh V. V.* (The Foundations of Populism in the Studies of V. V.) (1896).
28. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XVII, p. 342.
29. *Ibid.,* Vol. XV, p. 144.
30. Chernyshevskii, *Sochineniya,* Vol. IV, pp. 306-322 and Vol. V, p. 19. See also the utterances of Marx on the views of Chernyshevskii, on the Russian commune, and on the development of capitalism in Russia as expressed in his letter to the editors of the journal *Otechestvennyye zapiski* (Homeland Notes) (1877), *Sochineniya,* Vol. XV, pp. 375-378, as well as an article by Engels, "Poslesloviye k statye 'Sotsialnyye otnosheniya v Rossii' " (A Postscript to the Article Social Relations in Russia), in his *Sochineniya,* Vol. XVI, Pt. 2, pp. 388-401.

31. *Istoriya VKP (b)*, p. 22.
32. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. XII, p. 57.
33. Plekhanov, *Sochineniya*, Vol. II, p. 349.
34. *Istoriya VKP (b)*, p. 14.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
36. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. XIV, p. 347 (note).
37. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 191-194.
38. Published for the first time in the periodical *Bolshevik* (1937), No. 21.
39. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. I, p. 356. This article was first included in the already mentioned *Materialy k kharakteristike nashego khozyaistvennogo razvitiya* (Materials for the Characterization of our Economic Development) (1895), which was destroyed by the tsarist censorship.
40. Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 117 ff.
41. *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, pp. 376, 377.
42. See *Pisma Marksa i Engelsa* (Letters of Marx and Engels) (1932), p. 324.
43. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. I, p. 194. On the development of capitalism in Russia, see also the numerous expressions of opinions in Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya*, Vols. IX, XVI, Pt. 2; Vols. XXVI-XXVIII.

(XXIII)

Agriculture After the Reform

GENERAL CONDITIONS OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

The Reform of 1861 and the abolition of serfdom "undermined the main foundations of that system: the process of natural farming, the self-contained and self-sufficient character of the manorial estate, the close ties existing among its several component elements, and the power of the landowner over the peasants." They were merely "undermined," however, and "not altogether destroyed." Indicating further that "a transition to a system so totally different could indeed not have occurred at once,[1] Lenin points out that the cause of the slow progress of the transition may be traced primarily to the fact that within agriculture

> such conditions as are necessary for capitalist production were still nonexistent. What was required was a class of people accustomed to working for wages, and the substitution of peasant inventory by tools belonging to the landowner; what was needed, too, was the organization of agriculture like any other commercial-industrial enterprise, and not as a seignioral affair.[2]

Secondly, the old *barshchina* system was only "undermined" and "not completely destroyed." Peasant agriculture after the Reform was still not entirely separated from that of the manor, inasmuch as the landowners retained for their own use a rather sizable portion of the peasant allotments: the "withheld land," the forests, the meadows, horse ponds, and pastures. Without the use of these lands, the peasants were unable to maintain their farms independently, and the landowners were in a position to continue "the old system of farming with the aid of labor dues." There remained, moreover, the possibility of extraeconomic compulsion (the status of temporary obligation, corporal punishment, and so forth). "Capitalist economy could not emerge at once, and the forced labor economy could not at once disappear."[3]

In this manner the bourgeois Reform of 1861 by the serf owners foreordained the "Prussian" character of post-Reform agricultural development, that is, the slow metamorphosis of feudal manorial agriculture into farming of the bourgeois and *Junker* variety, condemning the peasant household "to decades of the most agonizing expropriation and indebtedness, while a small minority of *grossbauers* (wealthy peasants) arose."[4]

Our study of the history of agriculture after the Reform must, therefore, resolve itself into an inquiry into, on the one hand, the change of the feudal agriculture of the landowners into bourgeois and *Junker* agriculture, and, on the other hand, the process of that "agonizing expropriation and indebtedness" of the peasantry during the post-Reform era.

The disappearance of the last remnants of semifeudal conditions, and the emergence of capitalist institutions proceeded at varying rates of speed in the different regions of the country, since some regions, as we have seen above (the south and southwest, for example, the Ukraine, and a large part of the nonblack-soil zone), had made a start in the direction of capitalist organization in agriculture even under serfdom, with the employment of hired labor and machinery, with the investment of capital, and so forth. In other regions, by contrast, semifeudal conditions continued to exist much longer (the central agricultural region). On the whole we may regard the "transitional era" just mentioned, with its various peculiar forms of combining the feudal labor-dues system with the system of capitalism, and with the gradual ascendancy of the latter, as covering the period between the sixties and the end of the eighties. In this connection Lenin cites a table, compiled by Annensky, on the relative distribution of each of these particular systems during the late eighties: [5]

	Number of Provinces		
	Black-soil	Nonblack-soil	Total
Provinces where the capitalist system predominated	9	10	19
Provinces with a mixed system	3	4	7
Provinces where a labor-dues system prevailed	12	5	17
Total	24	19	43

"If in the purely Russian provinces," says Lenin in this connection, "the labor-dues system prevails, in European Russia as a whole the capitalist system of manorial farming may be recognized as dominant at the present time." [6]

The combination of the labor-dues and capitalist systems, particularly in such districts where the labor-dues system continued to prevail for some time, made a slow, painful, and less progressive development of peasant agriculture inevitable. After the Reform, while capitalist influences were penetrating agriculture generally, the farms of the landowners were also undergoing a process of selection favoring the farms that were economically more vigorous, farms that were developing commercial capitalist production, specializing in

some branch of commercial agriculture, and utilizing machinery and hired labor in their operation. Another part of the manorial farms, however, and a substantial part at that, continued in the status of enormous feudal latifundia, where production was maintained not on capitalist principles but on the discharge of labor dues, on a sharecropping rental system, and so forth. Therefore, the struggle of the peasantry against these feudal latifundia and their semiserf methods of exploitation also constituted one of the characteristic traits, a "peg" of the post-Reform economic structure. And although the development of capitalism in agriculture, which turned land into a commodity, dislodged the system of the nobility's class landownership, replacing it with a variety of capitalist, merchant, and kulak-peasant landholding, the struggle against the feudal latifundia continued unabated throughout the entire capitalist epoch, culminating in the great October Socialist Revolution.

THE GROWTH OF COMMERCIAL FARMING The development of commercial farming is incompatible with either the remnants of a natural economy or the remnants of the obligatory labor system. The erstwhile natural and self-sufficient economy of the small agricultural producers began to yield to a commercial economy and, drawn into the orbit of the capitalist market, began to specialize in the production of commercial marketable products.

As Lenin has shown,

> because of the very nature of agriculture, its transformation into commodity production proceeds in a special way, unlike a corresponding process in industry. . . . Agricultural industry does not split into a number of entirely distinct branches, but merely begins to specialize in the production of sometimes one and sometimes another market product.[7]

This specialization in agriculture is accompanied by a change in production methods, by the application of machinery, and by the rise of industrial enterprises for the processing of the raw material. All this requires investment of capitalism, occasionally on a large scale. In this manner have arisen and vigorously developed such specialized pursuits as sugar-beet production, agricultural distilling, potato grating, starch and molasses production, oil pressing, cheese making, flax scutching, and others. These trends in agricultural production, calling for rather substantial investments of capital, were often inaccessible not only to the peasant farmer but even to many landowners. Therefore they were frequently associated with either the economically more resourceful manorial farms or, in some cases (as, for example, in oil pressing, in flax processing, and in potato-starch production) with the wealthier peasants or peasant cooperatives. This expansion of commercial production and its specialized branches led to an increase in the use of hired labor, prepared

the ground for the development of capitalist conditions in the village, intensified the stratification of the peasantry, and changed a part of the village population into hired hands of these specialized commercial, capitalist, landowner, or kulak-peasant farms.

In this manner the basic process of development in rural peasant economy during the post-Reform era amounted to an expansion of commercial farming with all its inherent contradictions "that are characteristic of all commercial economy and of all capitalism," [8] involving a struggle among the individual farms for their economic independence, a concentration of the means of production in the hands of a minority, and the proletarianization of the majority. This process of disintegration of the peasantry (*raskrestyanivaniya*), taking place at the expense of the "middle peasantry," created the rural bourgeoisie at one extreme of the village population and the village proletariat at the other. During 1880–1890 the former had already become, in the words of Lenin, "the master of the present-day village." [9] The disintegration of farming created an internal market for the nascent capitalism in both industry and agriculture. In agriculture the development of the domestic market found expression in a general growth of agricultural production, in an expansion of the planted acreage and, above all, in the growth of specialized branches, in the development of special regions of commercial agriculture, in a growing demand for machinery, and in the increased employment of hired labor.

However, two circumstances tended to retard perceptibly this process of differentiation among the peasantry and the development of capitalist institutions in the village after the Reform. First, as Lenin has indicated, considerable influence in the village was exerted by commercial and moneylending capital, which retarded the stratification of the peasantry.[10] Another important factor retarding social differentiation among the peasantry were the remnants of *barshchina* farming and labor obligations which

> were based on the payment of labor in kind—hence, on a relatively low stage of commercial farming. Labor dues specifically presume and call for the middle peasant, whose affairs would not be entirely in a state of solvency . . . nor, however, would he be a proletarian.[11]

As the result of the frequent recurrence of such phenomena, according to Lenin, "the true masters of the present-day village are often, in fact, not the representatives of the peasant bourgeoisie but the rural moneylenders and neighboring landowners." [12]

THE LAND COMMUNE AFTER THE REFORM Of vital importance in the operation of peasant economy after the Reform were also the

conditions governing landownership in the village, which found expression in the development and strengthening of the reallotting commune.

We have noted that even under serfdom, and particularly since the introduction of the poll tax and the aggravation of land scarcity in the village, the reallotment of land and the reallotting commune came into considerable prominence as an instrument of equalizing land use and the obligations connected with it. Since land and agriculture were the chief, and often the sole, source of fulfillment of the peasant's obligations toward the government (the poll tax) and toward the landowner (the *barshchina* and *obrok*), the peasants were naturally interested in providing every worker and every payer of taxes and obligations a proportionate amount of land. Under serfdom, changes in the allocation of taxes were usually adjusted by the so-called "revisions," which enumerated the serfs attached to each landowner. Usually, therefore, after each revision the peasants redistributed their land allotments in accordance with the new number of "revisional souls" recorded by the revision, equalizing land among them at the same time in accordance with a uniform "per capita assessment" for each revisional soul. In this manner serfdom lent its support to the land-reallotting and equalizing commune in existence among the peasantry.

The Reform of 1861 confirmed the existence and the land reallotting and equalizing function of the peasant commune by issuing its land allotments not to the peasants individually but to the commune as a whole. At the same time the commune could from time to time redistribute the land among its individual members, who thus received their allotments of the communal land for temporary use only. Furthermore, all obligations were fulfilled on terms of mutual responsibility on the part of the entire commune.

The result of all this was a growing interest on the part of the peasantry in periodic reallotments during the years following the Reform, especially from 1880–1890, when "land crowding" in the village became extreme. Inasmuch as revisions were no longer being made, and the existing population was fast increasing, the communes undertook to redistribute the land as often as the changes in the family status of its individual families entailed a visible disparity in the distribution of land. In the meantime the allotment of land was no longer based on revisional souls but on "existing" persons, reckoned either by the labor resources of a family (number of workers), or "by mouths," that is, by the total family membership, including minors and nonworkers. In practice, "general" reallotments were organized at times within a period of five, ten, or twelve years. Besides these general reallotments, however, "private" redistributions of land allotments and appendages were conducted, and at times almost an annual "subtraction" and "addition" of village souls, that is, a redistribution of land and the corresponding

taxes in accordance with the changing labor status of a family. The purpose of the land reallotments was not only the quantitative equalization of land use but also a qualitative equalization. Portions of allotted land of various quality or at varying distances from the settlement were, therefore, usually each divided in accordance with the available number of persons. Because of the three-field system, each portion was then further divided into three fields, every member of the community receiving at least one strip in each field.

Such circumstances in land use within the reallotting-equalizing commune were fraught with extremely unfavorable consequences for peasant agriculture. The allotments of each household were scattered across strips through several dozens of sections. (In some communes of the Moscow province, for example, an allotment consisted of thirty-three segments.) The partitioning of strips reached a point where a strip was two arshins wide. The result of this cross-strip system was the so-called "compulsory rotation of crops," that is, the need for all tillers to maintain the same three-field system of farming. Frequent reallotments and the temporary nature of land use resulted in poor cultivation, in the neglect of natural fertilization, and so forth.

Despite all these negative agrotechnical results, the reallotting commune could not even attain the equalization of land use since, due to the rapidly developing differentiation and proletarianization of the peasantry, the allotted lands of the village poor, who were away working in town and at the factories, were rented by the kulaks and the rural rich. By 1890 the reallotting commune had entered the stage of full economic decline. This situation, notwithstanding all assertions of the Populists to the contrary, was brilliantly revealed by Lenin in his epoch-making work, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899).

Such were the basic factors in the development of the economic structure of both peasant and landowner agriculture after 1861. In addition to these basic internal processes of stratification and capitalization, the effects on the concrete conditions of progress of Russian agriculture after the Reform by such factors as the economic policy of the government (the tax policy in particular) toward the peasant economy, and the general protectionist policy of the state toward the landowners, were obviously far-reaching. Moreover, external influences, such as the international agricultural crisis that engulfed the agriculture of the world during 1875–1894, were also strongly reflected in Russia's agriculture precisely at a time when it had just begun to work for the foreign market.

Later on we shall touch upon these problems of agricultural and agrarian development in greater detail.

THE POSITION OF THE PEASANT FARM AFTER THE REFORM The Reform of 1861 found Russian agriculture at an extremely low level of technical and agronomical development. Both in the nonblack-soil zone and in the more densely settled parts of the black-soil belt, the three-field system continued to predominate. In the southern regions a form of migratory (fallow-lying) farming still prevailed, along with the extensive herding of livestock in general and sheep in particular, especially throughout the south and southeast. In the northern nonblack-soil provinces grass-seeding and special crops began to appear in a very few areas only. Because of the absence of official agricultural statistics prior to the eighties, it will be necessary to utilize the estimates of various investigators in this connection. According to the data of Professor Yanson, the general distribution of the agricultural area in 1875 was as follows: arable land covered 98.3 million *dessyatins* (21.5 per cent); meadowland, 54.6 million (11.9 per cent); woodland, 138.6 million (30.2 per cent); while the remaining 167.4 million *dessyatins* (36.4 per cent) are placed in the category of unsuitable land. Naturally, the above distribution was not identical in the various regions of the country. Thus, for example, in the central agricultural region and in the west the arable land covered approximately 60 per cent of the total.[13]

At any rate, outside the central agricultural region the prevalence of the three-field system had not yet reached the point of making further existence impossible, and had not yet reached a stage of crisis. Of the total area of arable land, fallow land occupied about 32 million *dessyatins*—that is, about 33 per cent; of the remaining area about 63.5 million *dessyatins* were under cereal grains (including 51 million *dessyatins* of bread crops, of which 23.9 million *dessyatins* were sown to rye). The remaining noncereal and industrial crops covered a negligible area: potatoes, about 1.5 million *dessyatins;* flax, 800,000; hemp, 500,000; beets, 212,000; tobacco, 41,000; and so forth.

The number of livestock in 1872 included 16.4 million horses, 24.6 million head of cattle, 49.5 million sheep, and 10.5 million hogs. The total number of cattle in European Russia in 1851 was 49.2 million head, in 1861, 47.9; and in 1871, 49.8. This was obviously insufficient for manuring and maintaining the fertility of the soil under the three-field system.

In agriculture an overwhelming proportion (up to 97 per cent) of the planted area was taken by the cereal grains, and only 3 per cent of the land was left to serve the needs of all noncereal, commercial, and special industrial cultures. Of the cereal grains as much as 36 per cent of the acreage was occupied by rye, about 17 per cent by wheat, 18 per cent by oats, and 7 per cent by barley; the rest of the plowland was under buckwheat, millet, and other cereal foods. During later years still greater emphasis was placed on both the quantity of arable land and the preponderance of grain raising. As a

result of the prevailing primitive methods of production, peasant agriculture, overladen with all types of exactions by the government and the landowner, began to experience a sharp decline during the first decade following the Reform.

By 1870 the critical situation on the peasant farm as a result of the general unfavorable conditions caused by the Reform of 1861, particularly by land scarcity and the pressure of payments, had become evident even to the government. To the latter the main symptom of rural "distress" was the accumulation of arrears, which had begun to mount rapidly. In this connection the government created during 1872–1878 local commissions in some of the provinces where arrears were greatest, and officials were dispatched into the areas to investigate the position of peasant economy. In spite of the specific nature of these commissions, which consisted of landowners and officials, the picture they revealed was truly appalling.

In Chernigov Province, according to the report of the official sent there, bread among the peasants was frequently "used not for food but as a safeguard against starvation; grain was mixed with weeds or oil cake, sometimes up to two-thirds; from the use of bark, and such items, as food, they were beginning to suffer from swelling of the whole body." In Simbirsk Province "the peasant land, due to its poor quality, fails to raise a crop" and is being abandoned. Similar conditions were reported to exist in Pskov, Tver, Petersburg, and other provinces. The government's Valuyev Commission, organized "in the manner of the royal commissions in England" in 1872, through the testimony of "experts" (also, of course, landowners, marshals of the nobility, and officials) presented a no less depressing picture of the peasant situation. The Livny (Oryol Province) marshal of the nobility describes the agriculture of his district to the effect that "anyone who looks at it from the outside might well think that the district had been ravaged by the enemy, so pitiful has it become." The governor of Kursk writes that agriculture "has remained in the same wild state as before, both among the landlords and the peasants." Aside from the usual reasons of drunkenness and laziness on the part of the peasantry offered by the marshals of the nobility in explanation of conditions prevailing in peasant farming, a majority of the relatively sober observers of the countryside recognized that the heavy burden of payments borne by the peasant constituted one of the main causes of his inability to maintain his farming. In comparison with the nobles' land, the peasant's holding was taxed ten, twenty, and even forty times more. Whereas on the landlord farms taxes constituted between 2 and 10 per cent of revenue, on the peasant farm they exceeded 50 per cent everywhere. In general, of the 208 million rubles of taxes levied on agriculture as a whole, the peasants paid 195 million rubles and the landowners, 13 million rubles.[14]

In some provinces, particularly for households with small allotments, taxes often exceeded the earning capacity of the farm. Thus, the taxes on low allotment farms in the seventies, in percentage relation to the revenue of the peasant lands, constituted: in Samara Province, 129; in Simbirsk, 189 to 240; in Bryansk County, 400 to 456; and in Kharkov Province, 139 to 226, and so forth, that is, they exceeded by two to four times the earning power of the farms.[15]

Such were the direct results of the Reform of 1861 with its inadequate land allotments and the resultant land scarcity among a large portion of peasant farmers, who were unable to maintain a properly organized and profitable agricultural production on their allotments.

How disproportionate the tax burden was to the paying capacity of the peasant farm, and how steadily it increased, may be seen from the following table showing the percentage relationship of peasant arrears to the annual assessment of taxes for a number of years in various provinces (according to official data): [16]

PROVINCES	1871–1875	1876–1880	1881–1885	1886–1890	1891–1895	1896	1898
Simbirsk	5%	6%	34%	42%	204%	223%	277%
Tula	3	5	16	35	134	151	244
Kazan	4	31	101	170	370	334	418
Orenburg	43	54	46	135	448	334	277
Samara	48	59	152	210	433	315	363
Ufa	25	40	77	208	336	360	397

For thirty years after the "emancipating" Reform, the village revealed a complete inability to meet its obligations, confronted by the constantly rising scale of government, redemption, and other payments. In the land-scarce and more heavily taxed provinces of the central agricultural area and the Volga region, the peasantry underwent the process of differentiation, and the majority were ruined, moved to the city in search of work, resettled, or abandoned their allotment and became proletarianized.


If during the years of relatively favorable market conditions (1860–1870) the peasant farm was unable to pay for itself, the decline in agricultural prices during 1880–1890 could not but bring utter ruin. By this time the peasant farm, even in the central agricultural region, for example, where the system of payment for labor in kind and labor dues remained in force the longest, was receiving almost half its income in the form of money. In Voronezh Province, according to the calculations of Lenin, as much as 41 to 46 per cent of the accounts of the middle groups, and about 57 to 60 per cent of the extreme groups (upper and lower) were money receipts from

the market and the commercial sale of their goods. In the export-minded provinces of the south and southwest as well as in the provinces of the non-black-soil area, where a more marketable variety of goods was produced, this percentage was even higher. Hence, the fall of prices during 1880–1890 led partly to an absolute reduction in the arable land of the peasantry; in the central agricultural region, for example, the sown area on the peasant land allotments was reduced from 12.6 million *dessyatins* during 1861–1870 to between 10 and 7 million *dessyatins* in 1881–1890.

The total amount of livestock, the basic index of economic prosperity among the peasantry, also declined, and among the lower groups complete "cattlelessness" and "horselessness" became common. According to data contained in the military census of horses during 1888–1891, peasant households without horses constituted 27.3 per cent of the total number in 48 provinces, while in 1896–1900 a similar census showed 29.2 per cent. The absolute number of horseless and one-horse farms, that is, the village poor, rose during this period from 5.6 million to 6.6 million households. Even the number of farms with many horses decreased from 2.2 million households to 2 million households, or from 22 to 18.5 per cent. "The growth of poverty and expropriation of the peasantry," says Lenin about these figures, "is beyond any doubt." [17]

However, as we shall see later, the problem of post-Reform village economics is not exhausted by the mere impoverishment and ruin of the peasant farm. The essence of the process amounted to the "decomposition" of the peasantry, the development of capitalist relationships, and the formation of a capitalist market.

GRAIN FARMING AND THE CRISIS OF THE THREE-FIELD SYSTEM The backwardness of peasant farming, the low level of its methods of operation, and the reign of medieval forms of communal landownership despite the peasantry's need for cash resources led inevitably to the expansion of the arable land within the very backward and irrational three-field system. Hence, peasant farming after 1861 was characterized by a forced expansion of the acreage under grain. But this expansion was not an indication of economic improvement of the village economy. The forced rise in grain sowing was caused by the peasant's need to increase his commodity and money receipts, especially in the central agricultural black-soil provinces. Agricultural statistics for that period offer no exhaustive data on the sown acreage for a continuous period of time, and we must, therefore, be content with a fragmentary juxtaposition of various individual sources (not always comparable).


AGRICULTURAL LAND-USE:
TILLABLE AND
NON-TILLED FODDER* LAND
IN THE 1890'S
0 125 250 375 500
Kilometers
Archangel
Petrozavodsk
Helsingfors
Reval
St Petersburg
Novgorod
Vologda
Vyatka
Perm
Mitau
Riga
Pskov
Kostroma
Yaroslavl
Iver
Vladimir
N. Novgorod
Kazan
Ufa
Kovno
Moscow
Vilno
Vitebsk
Grodno
Minsk
Smolensk
Kaluga
Ryazan
Simbirsk
Mogilev
Tula
Warsaw
Orel
Penza
Samara
Orenburg
Tambov
Chernigov
Kursk
Voronezh
Saratov
Uralsk
Zhitomir
Kiev
Kamenets Podolsk
Poltava
Kharkov
Yekaterinoslav
Kishinev
Novocherkassk
Kherson
Astrakhan
Simferopol
Stavropol
Yekaterinodar
Vladikavkaz
Tiflis
PERCENTAGE OF TILLABLE TO TOTAL AGRICULTURAL LAND
Up to 15%
16 – 30%
31 – 45%
46 – 60%
61 – 75%
No data
Provinces containing less than 35 hectares of fodder* area per 100 hectares of tillable land.
*Hay land and pasture


Thus in forty-five provinces of European Russia the total amount of arable land during the sixties and, by comparison, in 1880 and in 1887 (in thousand *dessyatins*) was as follows: [18]

	In the Early 1860's	In 1881	In 1887
Black-soil belt	49,034	65,492	73,164
Nonblack-soil belt	33,499	28,782	30,629
Total for 45 provinces	82,533	94,274	103,793

Thus, by the middle eighties as compared with the sixties, we may note, on the one hand, a very rapid rise in the arable acreage throughout the provinces of the black-soil zone, amounting to 24 million *dessyatins*, and on the other, a retarded growth and even a decline of sown area throughout the nonblack-soil provinces. Taking the plowed acreage of the sixties as 100, the changes by 1881 and 1887 may be expressed in the following relative figures (in percentages): [19]

	1881	1887
Black-soil belt	133.6%	149.2%
Nonblack-soil belt	85.9	91.4
Total for 45 provinces	114.2	125.8

Thus, while the plowland in the nonblack-soil provinces decreased by almost 10 per cent, it increased in the black-soil provinces by nearly 50 per cent. What occurred, therefore, was a sharp differentiation among the various regions according to their importance in agricultural production, with a decline on the part of the northern industrial provinces and a growth in the contribution of the black-soil agricultural provinces. And since the expansion of arable land in the black-soil provinces proceeded at a considerably faster rate than its decline in the nonblack-soil provinces, total agricultural production, and that of cereal grains in particular, increased. In the borderlands the increase in arable land was achieved by plowing virgin soil, by the reduction of the fallow period, and by the development of large-scale capitalist or farmer type of agriculture. In the central regions the expansion of arable land proceeded at the expense of the meadows and pastures, and brought with it further aggravation of the dominance of the three-field system in this region. In the south and east expansion of the arable land resulted in an increase of the wheat and barley crops, and in the center, of rye. Consequently, the size of the acreage under cereal grains increased. In


CHANGES IN THE SOWN AREAS OF BASIC CROPS IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA: 1860 - 1913
0 125 250 375 500
Kilometers
Archangel
Petrozavodsk
Helsingfors
Reval
St. Petersburg
Novgorod
Vologda
Vyatka
Perm
Pskov
Riga
Mitau
Kostroma
Yaroslavl
Vladimir
N. Novgorod
Kazan
Ufa
Kovno
Vilno
Moscow
Vitebsk
Grodno
Minsk
Smolensk
Kaluga
Ryazan
Simbirsk
Mogilev
Tula
Warsaw
Orel
Penza
Tambov
Samara
Orenburg
Kholm
Chernigov
Kursk
Voronezh
Saratov
Uralsk
Zhitomir
Kiev
Kamenets Podolsk
Poltava
Kharkov
Yekaterinoslav
Kishinev
Novocherkassk
Kherson
Astrakhan
Simferopol
Yekaterinodar
Stavropol
Vladikavkaz
Tiflis
Provinces with a decrease in sown area
Provinces with an increase in sown area
Up to 25%
25 - 50%
50 - 100%
Over 100%
No data

1881 the sown area constituted 60.6 per cent of the total arable land, and cereal grain constituted 91.3 per cent of the total acreage. In other words the emphasis on grain seemed to be completely predominant. This was the form assumed by commodity farming and commercial agriculture in the grain regions.

But whereas southern wheat had a near-by and extensive export market, the forcing of production of the peasant's own gray-bread crops in the central agricultural region, which was confronted by a relatively small domestic market, placed the agriculture of this region in a particularly unfavorable position. By the nineties the rate of growth of the sown area under grain had begun to decline perceptibly in most provinces, especially in the central agricultural region, while in some areas it began a downward trend.

Thus, if we compare the sown area under cereal grains during the eighties with that of the early nineties, we note the following decreases in the sown area: in the agricultural center, between 3 and 10 per cent (Ryazan, 10 per cent; Tula, 10 per cent; Oryol, 5 per cent; Kursk, 5 per cent; and Voronezh, 3 per cent), and in the nonblack-soil provinces, 9 to 19 per cent (Tver, 9 per cent; Nizhny Novgorod, 10 per cent; and Moscow, 19 per cent). In contrast the sown acreage of the south, southeast, and west was growing steadily during the same period (Bessarabia, 41 per cent; Yekaterinoslav, 59 per cent; Samara, 57 per cent; Tauride, 46 per cent; Podolia and Volhynia, 18 per cent; Mogilev, 30 per cent; Vitebsk, 25 per cent; and so forth). In the nonblack-soil provinces the decline of acreage under cereal grains indicated a transition to more intensive forms of cattle raising and forage crops, as well as to special cultures. In the central agricultural region, however, this tendency of decline in the sown area signalized an outright crisis in the three-field system of grain raising in practice there. The amount of plowed land in this area reached 70 to 75 per cent by 1880. The fall of prices caused by the world crisis hastened the decline of the sown area: during the period between the sixties and the end of the nineties, the acreage under cereal grains on the peasant farms in this region fell from 12.6 million to 10.4 million *dessyatins*.

Thus, in the nonblack-soil belt the cessation of the expansion of the plowed acreage, and of the cereal grain harvests in particular, became evident as early as 1860–1870. In the central agricultural region the increase of the plowland and the acreage under grain began to slacken during 1880–1890. Yet, the expansion of grain raising in the south, east, and southeast was so great and rapid that the total harvest and grain production in general were constantly increasing since 1860, and by 1900 added between 2.5 and 3 billion poods to the country's harvest of cereal grains.

SUMMARY OF GRAIN PRODUCTION AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY The general volume of increased agricultural production is well illustrated in the following table cited by Lenin: [20]

YEARS	POPULATION (IN MILLIONS)	NET HARVEST OF ALL GRAINS AND POTATOES (IN MILLION QUARTERS)	CEREAL GRAINS *	POTATOES *
1864–1866	61.4	152.8	2.21	0.27
1883–1887	81.7	255.2	2.68	0.44
1900–1905	107.6	396.5	2.81	0.87

* In quarters of net harvest per person of total population.

As shown in the above table, over a period of forty years the population increased by 75.2 per cent, the grain harvest, by 159 per cent, and the potato harvest in particular, by 452.3 per cent; that is, the population grew half as much as the total harvest of all grains, and, hence, the amount of grain harvested per capita increased by 48.4 per cent. In the various regions of the country, the net harvest per person increased from 1864–1866 to 1883–1887, in the south steppe region, for example, from 2.09 to 3.42 poods, and in the lower Volga region, from 2.12 to 3.35 poods.[21]

Consequently, for the country as a whole both the productivity of agriculture and the total volume of agricultural output increased. In the case of cereal grains in particular, during the later years for which we have more accurate statistical data, we may cite the following figures on the sown area and grain harvest in fifty provinces of European Russia: [22]

YEARS	SOWN AREA (IN MILLION DESSYATINS)				
	All Cereal Grains	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats
1881	59.0	10.7	23.2	4.2	12.9
1883–1887	59.9	10.7	23.9	4.6	12.9
1893–1895	60.4	12.0	22.8	5.8	12.3
1896–1900	64.1	13.7	23.2	6.4	14.4

YEARS	GRAIN HARVEST (IN MILLION POODS)				
	All Cereal Grains	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats
1886–1890	2,243.9	351.8	970.5	183.0	519.4
1894–1895	2,487.9	452.2	995.7	267.7	531.9
1896–1900	2,734.9	500.8	1,090.0	274.7	595.4

Over a period of fifteen years (1886–1900), the harvesting of all grains in the fifty provinces increased by 1.5 million poods, of which wheat increased 150 million and barley, 90 million. If we add to these fifty provinces the remaining areas of European and Asiatic Russia, the general rate of increase in acreage and gross harvest would show a still higher figure. During the last five-year period of 1895–1900 the total agricultural acreage under grain was recorded at 75.2 million *dessyatins*, with a harvest of about four billion poods. Thus, during the thirty years following the Reform, Russia increased its harvest of cereal grains from two billion to four billion poods, a rate of increase quite impressive for that period. Let us now see what progress was made by the specialized, commercial branches of agriculture, which were quite undeveloped before the Reform.

THE INCREASE OF SPECIAL CROPS In the northern nonblack-soil provinces the change from cereals to special crops and to livestock breeding had partly begun even during the period of serfdom. In the nonblack-soil provinces in general, for example, and particularly in the provinces near the capital in the west and north, multiple-field rotation of crops and livestock branches of agriculture existed even prior to 1861. Parallel with the development of urban life, the dairy industry of this area began to increase the supply of its products to the city. The commercial production of dairy products in 1879 for ten northern provinces was valued at 3,370,000 rubles, and in the industrial provinces at 1,088,000, or jointly at about 4.5 million rubles. Dairy production there became a commodity industry, reorganizing not only the routine technique of both the manors and the peasant farms but also changing their social forms, introducing the use of machinery, hired labor, and investment of capital, and dispelling the former "consumption" nature of peasant dairy-cattle breeding.

A similar trend was likewise in evidence in the other region of special crops and flax cultivation—in Pskov, Smolensk, and Tver provinces. Having become more and more the major large-scale center of flax production, this region began to expand flax growing so rapidly that largely because of this area the country's total production of flax rose from 12 million poods in 1860 to 20 million poods in 1880, and to 26 million poods annually during 1893–1897.[23] The exportation of flax grew simultaneously, increasing during 1894–1897 from 4.6 million to 13.3 million poods per year. Here, too, the emphasis on flax growing displaced the bread crops in local agricultural production, producing a demand for imported grain, expanded the commercial sale of flax for domestic industry as well as for export and, furthermore, changed the whole economic structure and technology of farming, calling for a change

to improved systems, to the perfection of techniques, to production for the market, and so forth.

The most revolutionizing influence on the agriculture of the various regions came from this change to industrial crops and to the factory processing of their products. Among these, for example, was the cultivation of potatoes in the northern and western provinces, which not only changed the entire system of agriculture and crop rotation but also increased the processing of this raw material at the potato-grating and distilling mills. The production of potatoes during the sixties gained perceptibly both through the direct increase in their consumption and because of the growing demand for their industrial use. The demand for potatoes for distilling grew from 6.9 million poods in 1867 to 102 million poods during 1896 and 1897.[24] Production of potato starch increased in value during the period of 1860–1890 from 270,000 to 1,760,000 rubles.[25]

Finally, one of the most important industrial crops, which began to attract the attention of the farmers during the sixties, was sugar beets. The area sown under sugar beets, computed at 100,000 *dessyatins* in 1860 and about 160,000 in 1870, was expanded by 1896–1898 to 369,000 *dessyatins*. The amount of beets processed during the same period increased from 4.1 million to 35 million *berkovets*.* [26] Beet planting and sugar production, involving a considerable investment of capital and the employment of large numbers of hired workers, was the typical outlet for the large-scale capitalist farmers among the landowners in the southwestern and part of the western and southern provinces.

Besides these special crops which had become associated with some of the larger regions as the latters' main industrial trends in commercial agriculture, under the influence of urban demand and a growing industry in the remaining agricultural regions a number of other, somewhat smaller, commercial lines of agriculture were beginning to gain in prominence. Among these were commercial truck gardening, particularly, say, in the Yaroslavl province, the orchards and tobacco fields of the southern provinces, the production of vegetable oil, and others.[27]

DIFFERENTIATION OF THE PEASANTRY DURING 1880–1890 The steady advance of commercial agriculture stimulated the rapid stratification of the peasantry, aiding, on the one hand, in the emergence of a village bourgeoisie, a kulak group, from among their ranks and, on the other, in the "washing away" of the middle peasant and in the proletarianization of the weaker elements. The agricultural crisis of 1880–1890 accelerated and intensified the process of separation into these opposite economic groups.

* Measure of weight. One *berkovet* equals 400 Russian pounds.—ED.

The years 1880–1890 were, therefore, years in which the process of stratification of the peasantry and the capitalist expropriation of the mass of small producers developed at violent speed.

As was shown earlier, the question of differentiation or stratification of the peasantry was at that time, during 1880–1890, one of the disputed issues of our economic literature and the press during the controversy then raging between the Marxists and the Populists concerning the "destiny of capitalism in Russia." The Populist economists, because of a decline in peasant farming during that period, failed to note the other, more important phenomenon; namely, the stratification of peasant agriculture, the emergence from its midst of small capitalist groups engaged in promoting their own capitalist variety of farming.

In one of his earliest works (1893) dealing with the formation of a market under conditions of capitalist development, Lenin indicated that in this process

> the first place belongs particularly to the differentiation among our small producers. If we take the peasant farmers, it can be seen that, on the one hand, peasants were abandoning the land en masse, losing their economic independence, turning into proletarians, while, on the other hand, other peasants were constantly expanding their acreage and introducing improved methods of cultivation. On the one hand, peasants were losing their agricultural inventory (animal as well as mechanical), while, on the other hand, some peasants were acquiring modernized inventory and mastering the use of machinery. On the one hand, peasants were abandoning the land, selling or renting their allotments, while, on the other hand, many peasants were renting additional plots and eagerly buying up privately owned land. . . . Capitalism and the impoverishment of the masses not only do not exclude but, on the contrary, mutually condition one another.[28]

The most complete and brilliant classic analysis of this historical phenomenon was presented by Lenin in his later work, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899). Here, on the basis of a tremendous mass of facts, Lenin demonstrated that what was taking place in the Russian village of 1890–1900, as well as in Russian economy as a whole, was a process of capitalist development and the formation of the capitalist market, accompanied by the disappearance of the small independent producers in agriculture as well as in industry.

Here we shall merely recall some of the main conclusions on the subject of the differentiation of the peasantry reached by Lenin on the basis of his study of the extensive material collected by the rural censuses in nearly all the agrarian provinces.[29]

The upper groups, as a general rule, had larger families. Consequently, the 20 per cent of all peasant households belonging to the upper economic

groups included between 26 and 36 per cent of the rural population. A large family is of vital necessity to these farms precisely because the size of their farms exceeded their own consumption needs and fell within the category of commercial enterprises. But even a large family did not always, as we shall see below, meet the labor requirements of such farms. Irrespective of the existence of communal, equalizing land tenure, the upper groups controlled a more significant portion of the allotted lands than would have fallen to their share on the basis of the number of persons in their families entitled to land.

The amount of land held under allotment was far from being an adequate gauge of the disproportionate use of land. First, the land subject to sale was concentrated overwhelmingly in the hands of the upper elements, such groups (20 per cent of all households) holding 60, 70, and even as much as 99 per cent of purchased land, while 50 per cent of the households (the lower groups) throughout the various provinces held between 0.4 and 12.8 per cent, or, at the most, 15 per cent of all land acquired by purchase.

This disproportion in the use of land revealed itself even more clearly in the land-renting system: the upper group of 20 per cent of the peasantry absorbed between 49 and 83 per cent of the total rented land, while the small landholding groups made use of rented land to a much smaller extent: about one-half of all households held a total of between 5 and 16 per cent of the rental lands. On the contrary, the process of renting land presented a reverse picture: the main lessors of land were the lower groups, which, although constituting only 50 per cent of the rural population, accounted for 63 to 98 per cent of all land let out for rent. Thus, despite the contention of the Populists regarding the "food supply" or "labor" character of land renting and leasing, the latter was decidedly of a capitalist nature.

As a result of this internal redistribution of land tenure, actual land use presented the following picture: the 20 per cent of upper household groups used between 35 and 50 per cent of all land, while the 50 per cent of lower household groups utilized 20 to 30 per cent of all lands. Moreover, this disproportion became even more marked in the distribution of planting than it did in land tenure, since the lower groups did not, as a rule, fully utilize their land for planting: their planted acreage altogether amounted to between 16 and 31 per cent of the total land they held, whereas the 20 per cent of upper groups planted 34 to 56 per cent of their land.

Grouping of the peasantry by the amount of livestock, and draft animals in particular, revealed a similar pattern of distribution parallel to the development of agriculture.

The most revealing factor in the development of capitalist tendencies among the peasantry was the prevalence of commercial and industrial estab-

lishments among the various groups. The class character of this statistical index was frequently confused in the rural investigations. Under the general designation of "industries," the commercial-industrial establishments of the entrepreneur type was placed in the same category with the "industrial" earnings of the proletarian strata of the peasantry who sold their own labor in the market. In analyzing these phenomena, Lenin indicated that one-fifth of all households (the well-to-do group) controlled about one-half of all commercial-industrial establishments, while one-half of the households, the poor, held about one-fifth. Conversely, industrial earnings of the proletarian variety were centered among the poorer elements; 50 per cent of these households accounted for 60 to 90 per cent of such "industries."

We thus see that, on the one hand, "the well-to-do peasants, therefore, invested capital in agriculture (in the purchase of land, in rent, in the hiring of workers, and in the improvement of their implements) as well as in industrial shops, in commerce, and in moneylending." On the other hand, among the lower, destitute groups "industries" also prevailed, but "of the type that signalized the transformation of the peasant into a proletarian." [30]

Another important sign indicating the dissolution of the peasantry into two opposing camps, into farm laborers on the one hand, and farmer-capitalists on the other, was the extent to which the various farm groups employed day laborers. Households employing day laborers could be found chiefly among the well-to-do peasantry: between 48 and 78 per cent of all households using hired laborers were in the category of the well-to-do group embracing 20 per cent of all households.

Finally, the upper and lower groups occupied opposite positions in the income and expenditure level of each farm, in the composition of such incomes and expenditures, and in the proportion of purchased produce in their food supply. On the basis of budgetary data for the Voronezh province during 1889, Lenin, grouping the peasant farms by the index of their livestock numbers, computed that the lower farm groups (lacking draft animals) had a gross income of 118 rubles, 10 kopecks per farm, including a cash income of 64 rubles, 57 kopecks; the upper groups (with five or more head of draft animals) had a total income of 1,766 rubles, 79 kopecks, of which 1,047 rubles, 26 kopecks comprised the cash portion of the income. On the expenditure side, the lower groups had a total outlay of 109 rubles, 8 kopecks per farm, including a cash expenditure of 62 rubles, 29 kopecks, while for the upper groups the respective figures were 1,593 rubles, 77 kopecks, and 959 rubles, 20 kopecks. For food in particular the families spent 1 ruble, 43 kopecks per person a year on purchased goods in the lower group, and 6 rubles, 41 kopecks in the upper group. Furthermore, of the total amount of cash expenditures per farm, the lower groups spent 62.9 per cent on personal

consumption, 12.3 per cent on the operation of the farm, and 24.8 per cent in taxes, while the upper groups spent only 19.6 per cent of their money outlay for personal consumption, 71.6 per cent on their farm, and 8.8 per cent on taxes. "The transformation of the peasantry into a rural proletariat," concludes Lenin, "will create a market mostly for articles of consumption, while its transformation into a rural bourgeoisie will create a market largely for implements of production." [31]

Thus Lenin succeeded, despite the defects of rural statistics, in revealing the process of stratification among the peasantry that culminated in the formation of a village bourgeoisie on the one hand, and a rural proletariat on the other. The well-to-do agricultural peasantry, the owners of commercial-industrial enterprises, the owners of moneylending capital, according to Lenin's estimate, comprised only about one-fifth of all households and about three-tenths of the total population. In terms of economic power this group was doubtless the "master of the present-day village." The rural proletariat on the other hand, the class of hired laborers with a plot of their own, the landless and small landholding peasantry, the day laborers and the peasant households subsisting primarily through the sale of their labor, comprised approximately one-half of all households and about four-tenths of the entire population. The intermediate groups of medium peasant households, approximately 30 per cent of the total households and population, constituted a transitional stratum which upon distintegration produced capitalist elements on the one hand, and proletarians on the other.[32]

DIFFERENTIATION OF THE PEASANTRY DURING THE FIRST DECADE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY Did this process of peasant differentiation continue further, and at what rate of speed? On this subject the rural statistical surveys of 1880–1890 contain no exact evidence.[33] Yet the general data do indicate that this process was intensified between 1870 and 1900. The economic structure of the village during the thirty-year period following the "emancipation" was an altogether different entity compared with the economic structure of the village under serfdom. And if, even under serfdom with its feudal system of equalization, the economic differentiation of the peasantry still was apparent, the "emancipating" Reform, indeed, really released and strengthened these tendencies. The general industrial and agricultural prosperity of the late nineties gave rise to conditions still more conducive to differentiation within peasant agriculture.

Therefore the recurrent rural statistical surveys of the peasantry during the 1900's, like the general statistical data, indicate that the previously noted capitalist conditions were developing in peasant agriculture during the sub-

sequent years: the increase of the land area under cultivation by the economically stronger groups who bought and rented additional lands, their accumulation of livestock, the improvement of cultivation by the use of machinery and manuring, the increasing marketability of their produce, and the growing employment of hired labor.

It is sufficient to say, for example, that private landownership was steadily increasing among the peasants, and increased to about 21 million *dessyatins* by the end of the nineties compared to 5.6 million *dessyatins* after the Reform. Such purchases were primarily made by the more resourceful kulak groups, as may be seen from the fact that the purchase of land through the peasant bank by rural societies, that is, by the general mass of the peasants, constituted no more than about one-quarter of all purchases, while the wealthier groups, buying as individuals or in companies, bought three-quarters of the total land. This is further confirmed by the fact that the larger purchases of over 100 *dessyatins* took about 60 per cent.

Of continued significance in the expansion of agriculture was the part played by the leasing of privately owned land. Instead of the once prevalent semifeudal sharecropping, or labor-service terms of rent, in the first decades of the twentieth century, rent in cash, chiefly by the more well-to-do groups, came into practice. An official commentator, surveying the activities of the "local committees" during a Special Conference on the Needs of Rural Industry held in 1902, asserted that "nearly one-half of the peasant households fail to take advantage of land available for rent because of lack of the necessary resources, and the rental lands are used only by the households enjoying a certain solvency. . . . The less prosperous peasants are being dislodged from the land by the well-to-do." [34] This fact was also confirmed by the recurrent rural surveys in a number of provinces. We shall cite in this connection some evidence on the central agricultural region. In Tula Province (1899), for example, within the small-farm group of under one *dessyatin* and less, the number of households renting land amounted to only 3.6 per cent, while among the larger farms of over 10 *dessyatins*, 95 per cent rented additional land, with the first group renting 0.5 *dessyatins* per household, and the latter renting 8.9 *dessyatins*. In Voronezh Province (1900) the same relationship was reflected in the following figures: in the lower group of below one *dessyatin*, the number of renting households was 7.9 per cent with a rental of 0.87 *dessyatins* per household; in the upper groups with an average acreage of between 20 and 40 *dessyatins*, 87.4 per cent of the households rented land on an average of 12.7 *dessyatins* each; and among the holders of more than 40 *dessyatins*, the percentage of renting households was 69.7, with an average rent of 112.9 *dessyatins* each. In Poltava Province among the peasants holding two *dessyatins* or less, 27.2 per cent of the house-

holds rented land to the average extent of 0.9 *dessyatins* for each household; among the group of peasants farming 15 to 50 *dessyatins*, 42.8 per cent of the households rented an average of 12.8 *dessyatins* each.

Thus the kulak farmers, or village bourgeoisie, secured for themselves quantities of rented land ten times more intensively than the poor and middle farmers. This required production resources, of course. For example, among the lower farm groups of the same Poltava Province (1900), of those with an acreage of one to two *dessyatins*, the number of livestock owned per farm averaged 1.3 heads; in the upper group, those planting 50 *dessyatins* or more, the average was 28.2 heads. Among the nonplanting groups of Voronezh Province, 92.7 per cent of the households were without livestock, and 92.5 per cent without implements. The group planting up to one *dessyatin* included 83.5 per cent of the households without livestock, and 84.2 per cent of those without implements, whereas among the group exploiting over 40 *dessyatins* of agricultural acreage, 79.2 per cent of households owned four horses each, while the number of households without implements among them totaled 0.2 per cent. In Yekaterinoslav County (1899), among the landless households, 44.5 per cent were without horses, while among the farms using over 25 *dessyatins* of acreage, 94 per cent of the households owned an average of four horses each. At the same time, the heavily planted farms had 5.73 machines per farm, and the small acreage farms, 3.45 machines. Finally, 32 per cent of the larger farms hired outside labor at an average of 3.5 workers per farm. In Tula Province (1910) the average number of plows used on 100 farms in the groups using up to 5 *dessyatins* amounted to 0.0, and the same for threshers; among the group planting more than 25 *dessyatins* the average was 87 plows and 183 threshers. Obviously, the large-scale kulak farm also yielded better results in production. In Poltava Province the yield of wheat by the lower groups was 86 poods, while the higher groups harvested 110 poods per *dessyatin*. Some 4.2 per cent of the larger farms held more than one-third of all grain surpluses, while 12.8 per cent of the prosperous farms accounted for two-thirds of all grain surpluses.[35]

THE FARMS OF THE LANDOWNERS AFTER THE REFORM

Let us now see what the economic situation was in the agriculture of the landowners after the Reform. We shall first of all stop for an explanation of the basic element in the social power of this agriculture—the ownership of land.

The distribution of land after the Reform of 1861 is reported by the first land census of 1877 in the following terms: [36] Of the total quantity of 391 million *dessyatins* of land recorded in forty-nine provinces, the category of "peasant-allotment" lands included 131.4 million *dessyatins* (33.6 per cent),

of which 116.8 million *dessyatins* (29.9 per cent) was good land; private owners were credited with 93.4 million *dessyatins* (23.8 per cent), while 150.4 million *dessyatins* (38.5 per cent) belonged to the state. To be sure, immediately after the Reform the landowning nobility were the main proprietors of the 93 million *dessyatins* of privately held land; during the sixties this figure for the gentry decreased to 79.1 million *dessyatins*. In the course of the seventies they still held 73.1 million *dessyatins*, but by the census of 1887,[37] the landowning nobility accounted for only 65.3 million *dessyatins* of land, and in 1905 for 53.2 million *dessyatins*.[38] In other words the sale of land by the nobility over a period of forty-five years amounted to 26 million *dessyatins* of land. According to official statistics (recording the distribution of privately owned land by legal classes, and not by social groups) we have the following figures on the changes in landownership by the various legal class groups (in percentages):

LEGAL CLASS GROUPS	1877	1887	1905
Nobility	77.8%	68.3%	52.5%
Peasants	7.0	13.1	23.9
Merchants and burghers	14.2	16.3	20.2


Landownership by the nobility was being displaced by merchant and private kulak-peasant property, that is, privileged class landownership was being replaced by the capitalist variety. "Capitalism . . . departed from the class nature of landownership, changing land into a commodity."[39]

But this was not the only phase of the social upheaval affecting the landowning class after the Reform. One of the most significant indications in this direction was the distribution of the land by the amount of land owned. From the same statistics of 1877 we obtain the following figures:

GROUP	NUMBER OF OWNERS	TOTAL LAND	ARABLE LAND IN EACH GROUP
Up to 10 *dessyatins*	50.8%	1.0%	46.2%
From 10 to 50 *dessyatins*	26.8	3.6	44.4
From 50 to 200 *dessyatins*	11.5	6.2	41.6
From 200 to 500 *dessyatins*	5.0	8.7	39.3
From 500 to 1,000 *dessyatins*	2.7	10.1	35.8
Over 1,000 *dessyatins*	3.2	70.4	19.8

From the table it seems clear that up to three-fourths of all land was concentrated in the hands of a small number (about 15,000) of landowners. Among them 924 owners controlled nearly one-third (29.7 per cent) of all land. By contrast, over 80 per cent of all owners held less than 5 per cent

No.14


AVERAGE SIZE
OF LAND HOLDINGS
OF THE NOBILITY
1905
0 125 250 375 500
Kilometers
Archangel
Petrozavodsk
Helsingfors
Reval
St. Petersburg
Novgorod
Pskov
Mitau
Riga
Vologda
Vyatka
Perm
Kostroma
Yaroslavl
Ver
N. Novgorod
Vladimir
Kazan
Ufa
Moscow
Kovno
Vilno
Vitebsk
Smolensk
Kaluga
Ryazan
Simbirsk
Grodno
Minsk
Mogilev
Tula
Penza
Samara
Orenburg
Warsaw
Orel
Tambov
Saratov
Uralsk
Chernigov
Kursk
Voronezh
Zhitomir
Kiev
Kamenets
Podolsk
Poltava
Kharkov
Yekaterinoslav
Novocherkassk
Kishinev
Kherson
Astrakhan
Simferopol
Stavropol
Yekaterinodar
Vladikavkaz
Tiflis
Area in hectares
Up to 200
201 - 400
401 - 600
601 - 800
Over 800
No data

of the land. In other words the land was concentrated in the hands of a small group, the owners of the huge latifundia.[40]

In this connection Lenin cites the following highly significant and revealing table on the distribution of landownership for 1905 by social groups of owners (in round figures): [41]

	NUMBER OF HOLDINGS (IN MILLIONS)	NUMBER OF *Dessyatins* OF LAND (IN MILLIONS)	AVERAGE NUMBER OF *Dessyatins* PER HOLDING
The impoverished peasantry submerged by feudal exploitation	10.5	75.0	7.0
The middle peasantry	1.0	15.0	15.0
The peasant bourgeoisie and capitalist landownership	1.5	70.0	46.7
The feudal latifundia	0.03	70.0	2,333.0
Total	13.03	230.0	17.6
Not distributed by holdings	..	50	..
Total	13.03	280.0	21.4

"Large-scale landownership by the nobility," Lenin summarizes in another connection—"30,000 owners for 70 million *dessyatins* of land. . . . Small peasant landownership: 10.5 million owners for 75 million *dessyatins* of land." [42] Such were the consequences of the Reform of 1861—the concentration of a huge portion of the land in the hands of the nobility, and land hunger among the peasants. Indeed, this type of distribution of the land was responsible for retarding capitalist development in the realm of land property.

Only caricature Marxists, such as Populists were attempting to describe during their struggle against Marxism, could have regarded the Reform, which left the peasantry landless in 1861, as a guaranty of capitalist development. On the contrary, it was closer to being a guaranty, and in fact proved to be a guaranty, of extortion, that is, the semifeudal rents, and of a variety of service dues, that is, *barshchina* farming, which largely contributed to retarding the development of capitalism and the release of the production forces of Russian agriculture.[43]

It would be incorrect to assume that all large-scale manorial farming by the nobility was liquidated after the Reform. While selling its land rather intensively, the landed nobility was also buying land at the same time. Of the total "mobilized fund" of land, amounting to 80.7 million *dessyatins*, the nobility bought 33 million *dessyatins*, or about 40 per cent of all land sold in the course of the thirty-year period following the Reform. In addition

the average land transaction during a sale by members of the nobility amounted to 224.9 *dessyatins,* and the average block of land in purchases involving the nobility was 346 *dessyatins.*[44]

In other words, among the landowning nobility the post-Reform process of "land mobilization" singled out the more vital economic groups, which were not only not losing land but were instead accumulating ever larger holdings and organizing their agriculture along capitalist lines. Upon changing over to hired labor after 1861, these estate farms were steadily expanding the use of machinery and artificial fertilizers, and adopting intensive methods of livestock raising and productive systems of farming. The use of agricultural machinery, which was gaining rapidly toward the end of the seventies, came chiefly on the privately owned farms. Thus domestic production of farm machinery, which in 1862 was performed in 52 factories, was distributed throughout 340 factories in 1879, with its output valued at 3,980,000 rubles. Imports of farm machinery from abroad rose from 788,000 rubles' worth during 1869–1872 to 3,519,000 rubles during 1877–1880. The employment of steam power machinery and locomobiles was also expanding both to the branches of industry connected with agriculture, as well as directly to the farm.[45]

In technical and organizational forms large-scale capitalist agriculture was being drawn into the orbit of the sugar-beet, distilling, and potato mills that were beginning to arise among the large landowners of the southwest, west, and parts of the south. These products (beets and potatoes) were also being delivered in considerable quantities to the purely industrial enterprises of this type. Thus sugar-beet processing at the factories of the southwest rose from 5.5 million *berkovets* in 1860 to 22.9 million during 1882–1883. Simultaneously the distilling mills increased their processing of potatoes into alcohol from 5.5 million poods to 43 million. In the southern regions, in place of the disintegrating vast feudal latifundia (80,000 to 200,000 *dessyatins* of land) with their extensive system of sheep herding, new commercial grain farms of between five and ten thousand *dessyatins* of land each came into existence, working with machinery and substituting the export of wheat for that of merino sheep. Finally, in the nonblack-soil provinces, due to the proximity of urban and industrial centers, capitalist dairy and livestock farms began to form. Obviously the change to a purely capitalist footing, with the use of hired labor and machinery, was hardly accessible to all farms and, under actual conditions, not always profitable. The affair was least satisfactory in the central former agricultural region. The extreme scarcity of land among the peasants, together with the lack of capital on the part of the landowners, made it most profitable here to lease the lands to the peasants for cultivation with their own inventory. Hence this area became

the scene of the most backward type of private farming, rudimentary agrarian methods, the predominance of three-field grain raising, labor dues to the owners, and semifeudal conditions in general. The direct participation of landowners in farming declined in favor of leasing the land on a sharecropping basis for labor performed, for produce, and, on rare occasions, for money. For the peasants this rent payable in labor exceeded ordinary cash rent; in other words, the labor of the peasant was valued very low.

The situation became extremely aggravated during the 1880's, when the price of grain began to fall. Even the landowners who had been operating their own farms began to resort to renting their land and to sharecropping.

The official source previously cited indicates clearly that this situation, most acute in the black-soil belt (but quite common everywhere), "is due to the depletion of the circulating capital of the owners, and the unprofitability of money expenditures on agriculture, whereas farming on a sharecropping basis protects the owner at least against an outright loss." [46]

How great was the increase of the old labor-dues and sharecropping types of farming since the eighties is shown by the following figures for 1886–1900.

Of the number of estates mortgaged at the Noblemen's Bank (in percentages):

YEARS	OPERATED THEIR OWN FARM	LEASED ON SHARECROPPING BASIS	MIXED FORMS
1886–1890	40%	39%	21%
1891–1895	38	42	20
1896–1900	29	51	20

The sharecropping system of farming did safeguard the landowners against an outright loss, but not the peasants. The actual "commodity-producing" peasant paid the landowner his rent in a share of the crop, and "paid himself" out of the remainder—according to the official statistician—a wage . . . of eleven kopecks a day at his own board.[47]

The rising trend of the lease of the nonallotted land of the nobility, whether on a cash or a sharecropping basis, reached its highest level toward 1880–1890, amounting to 49.8 million *dessyatins* in fifty provinces, that is, over 42 per cent of the allotted land, with rental payments amounting to more than 315 million rubles, or an average of 25 rubles per household.[48]

THE INDEBTEDNESS OF THE NOBILITY'S LANDED PROPERTY Indebtedness among the landowning nobility increased sharply after the Reform. In 1878 the mortgage debt of private landowners had risen to 1,328 million rubles (or to 1,544 million rubles, including the western

provinces) embracing about 42 million *dessyatins* of land. Of this amount the share of the landowning gentry amounted to 448 million rubles of indebtedness and 12.5 million *dessyatins* of mortgaged land. Forced sales of land by the banks for unpaid debts increased: during 1886–1887 between 21 and 160 mortgaged estates were put on auction each year, and by 1893 the number of such estates reached 2,237.[49]

In 1885 the Noblemen's Land Bank was founded for the purpose of providing direct support to the property interests of the nobility. During the first two years of the bank's existence, 3.9 million *dessyatins* of land were mortgaged, and loans amounting to 140 million rubles were issued. Altogether, during 1886–1912 24.7 million *dessyatins* of land were mortgaged for loans of 1,146 million rubles. The first peasant land bank was established in 1883 and at once became a most profitable outlet for the sale of land to the kulak groups of the peasantry: through this bank 15.8 million *dessyatins* of land, chiefly former property of the nobility, were sold to the peasants in the course of thirty years.

The prices at which this land sold were constantly rising and were quite favorable to the nobility. Land prices rose extremely fast. According to the records of the Central Statistical Commission, average land prices on the eve of emancipation throughout forty-five provinces were 12 rubles, 69 kopecks per *dessyatin,* but by the end of the sixties they were 20 rubles, 44 kopecks, and by the end of the nineties, 66 rubles, 92 kopecks. Moreover, throughout the various regions they were rising at the following rates: in the south steppe area they grew from 11 rubles, 34 kopecks on the eve of emancipation to 123 rubles, 97 kopecks during the late nineties; in the Ukraine region the price of one *dessyatin* of land rose from 17 rubles, 76 kopecks to 119 rubles, 80 kopecks, and in the east from 5 rubles, 82 kopecks to 32 rubles, 50 kopecks.[50]

Thus, while the value of all privately owned land amounted to 2.6 billion rubles at prices prevailing in 1860, in 1900, at prices of that year, this value had risen to 6.8 billion rubles. The landed property of the nobility at the time of the Reform was computed at 73.2 million *dessyatins* valued at 2.6 billion rubles; by 1900 its volume had decreased to 54 million *dessyatins,* still valued, however, at 3.9 billion rubles. Thus, in selling its land the gentry was capitalizing its rent in the most profitable manner possible. Such was the enormous tribute imposed upon agriculture by the landowning class.

THE FOREIGN MARKET AND THE WORLD AGRICULTURAL CRISIS By the turn of the century, commercial farming by the village bourgeoisie and the landowners expanded substantially. During those

years the rural bourgeoisie, together with the farming gentry, produced large commercial surpluses of grain and other agricultural products, the bulk of which they delivered to the domestic and foreign market. Later we shall examine in greater detail the various aspects of both the internal and foreign agricultural market. Here we shall merely consider the effects of the international agrarian crisis of 1875–1895 [51] on agriculture after the Reform.

Until the late seventies European capitalism enjoyed general prosperity and an upward trend of the market. Consequently, grain exported from Russia, or even from overseas, although constantly increasing was easily absorbed by the European demand. World prices of cereal grains during the early seventies either followed an upward trend or, in any event, remained rather stable. Beginning with the second half of the seventies, however, and the early eighties, partly as a result of increasing grain exports from Russia and overseas, and partly because of the extended depression which by that time struck European industrial capital, the world price of grain began to fall, and a serious international agrarian crisis developed.

The largest decline in grain prices came in 1894, when in the portion of the western European market that was not protected by tariffs, such as England, they equaled only about half the prices prevailing during the seventies: average English prices on wheat during 1891–1895 were 97 kopecks per pood compared to 1 ruble, 87 kopecks during 1871–1875.[52]

Naturally, the fall of world prices was reflected in the downward trend of Russian export prices. This may be seen from the following table for the average export prices of Russian grain exports (in kopecks per pood): [53]

YEARS	WHEAT	RYE	BARLEY
1871–1875	90.1	65.7	60.6
1876–1880	85.1	63.1	56.1
1881–1885	76.7	63.4	52.0
1886–1890	64.6	42.5	37.6
1891–1895	55.6	46.6	35.9

The full extent of the price decline is somewhat obscured in these five-year averages because of the crop failures of 1883–1884 and 1888–1891; in some particular years, 1894, for instance, the price level was: for wheat, 46.7 kopecks per pood; for rye, 35.2 kopecks; and for barley, 29.1 kopecks, or half the level of the 1870's.

The European agricultural crisis, which by 1880 had expanded into an extended world crisis, made serious inroads into Russian grain farming proper during these years. After the middle eighties domestic prices on grain likewise began to fall. By 1894 prices on all grains, including wheat, had reached

their lowest point. This may be seen from the following comparison of the so-called "local" prices (the selling price of the producer) according to a summary by the Ministry of Agriculture (in kopecks per pood):

YEARS	WINTER WHEAT	RYE	OATS	AVERAGE FOR ALL GRAINS
1881	—	98	62	80
1883	109	82	57	78
1885	81	63	60	67
1887	85	49	38	53
1894	51	41	35	42

In a number of individual localities, prices fell even more sharply, reaching about one-fifth of the price level of the early eighties. Thus, in the middle and western sections of the black-soil belt the price of rye throughout many localities declined from one ruble to 20 kopecks per pood, and a price of less than 30 kopecks prevailed for months. In 1885 an official observer of agriculture reporting on the "difficult position of the agrarian industry," asserted:

> The crisis was growing both in depth and in breadth, not only in the realm of agriculture but in other branches of industry and trade as well. Because of the difficulty in marketing agricultural produce, and as a result of the low prices prevailing, the purchasing power of a large part of the population has been curtailed, and the demand for all types of manufactures and factory products has consequently been reduced.[54]

Another, no less "competent" author, Minister of Internal Affairs Tolstoy, declared:

> The uncontrollable decline of prices of all cereal products in effect since 1881 has brought the population to the point where most of the products of the soil cannot yield their owners any profit in reward for their labors, and only yields a net loss.[55]

From the commercial records of that period, we learn that in some parts of the northern black-soil provinces the price of one pood of rye fell to 18 and even 12 kopecks.

> A price level of this type was unknown to, or has been forgotten by, the present generation of Russian farmers; such prices have not existed since the Peasant Reform, and even the most farsighted farmers had made their calculations on the assumption that they were unlikely to exist.[56]

The same official source, in calculating the cost of production of the various grains and their profitability under prevailing market prices (1887), reports that nearly all regions producing rye, and oats to a considerable extent,

incurred a loss (including rent), with a more favorable situation in the case of wheat. Thus only in the southern provinces, and not in all of those, did rye yield a profit of 4 to 6 rubles per *dessyatin;* in the middle black-soil provinces rye netted an average loss of 2 to 8 rubles, in the northern black-soil provinces 1 to 9 rubles, and in the eastern provinces, between 3 and 7 rubles. Similar data were submitted for oats, which resulted in an average loss, for example, in the middle black-soil provinces of 5 to 7 rubles per *dessyatin,* while in the northern black-soil provinces losses occurred of between 2 to 3 and 7 to 9 rubles. Only wheat yielded a net profit in all regions: 14 to 38 rubles per *dessyatin* for winter wheat, and somewhat less, 8 to 27 rubles per *dessyatin* for spring wheat in the southern provinces. The profit from wheat in the central and northern black-soil provinces was somewhat lower, 5 to 25 rubles per *dessyatin.*[57]

The agrarian crisis of 1875–1895 profoundly affected the development of agriculture in Russia after the Reform. Lenin says:

> An agrarian crisis, like every other crisis, brings ruin to the mass of owners, produces a major change in the prevailing property relations, leads to technological retrogression and to a revival of medieval relationships and forms of economy *in some areas,* but on the whole *accelerates* social evolution and forces patriarchal stagnation out of its last refuges.[58]

The same may be said for the influence of the agrarian crisis of 1875–1895 on the development of Russian agriculture.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SUMMARY We can now summarize the agrarian and agricultural development of Russia during the four decades following the Reform (1861–1900).

Its basic feature was the fact that the evolution of agrarian conditions in Russia proceeded

> along capitalist lines *both* on the farms of the gentry, *and* on the peasant farms, *both* within *and* outside the "commune." . . . This development already predetermined *irrevocably* that *no* road of development other than the capitalist, and that *no* grouping of classes other than the capitalist grouping, shall be followed.[59]

The economic basis of the new relationships, compared with pre-Reform capitalism, was the growth of the social division of labor and the development of a commodity economy, of commercial agriculture, and the latter's specialization. In the village the penetration of the capitalist influence expressed itself in the stratification of the peasantry, its proletarianization on the one hand, and the segregation of a peasant bourgeoisie, this "master of the present-day village," on the other. A similar process of stratification and capitalist development also infiltrated the agriculture of the landowners.

But, as we have shown repeatedly, inherent within the Reform itself were a number of conditions arresting and slowing the process of capitalist development. The Reform executed by serf owners was not only "an act of robbery against the peasants performed with the utmost want of conscience," leaving the peasant "destitute, submerged, ignorant, and at the mercy of the landowners in the law, in administration, in the schools, and in the zemstvos," [60] but also leaving in the hands of the landed aristocracy the source of its social power—the enormous feudal latifundia. Hence the "crux" of agrarian relations forty years after the Reform, as in 1861, continued to be the struggle of the peasantry against the large feudal estates.

During 1880–1890, in an atmosphere of general political reaction and a fear of revolutionary activity by the peasantry, the privileged nobility undertook new pressure with a view to strengthening its social-political hegemony and, above all, its enslaving financial power over the peasantry. In the late eighties there began a long period of a policy of increased official protection of the nobility and its "trusteeship" over the peasantry. The establishment of "firm rule" by the rural officials, the raising of legal class barriers against the peasantry, the limitations upon family subdivisions (the law of 1888), the restriction of communal redistribution of land (the law of June 8, 1893), the transformation of the peasants allotted property into an "inalienable class fund" by prohibiting the alienation or mortgaging of peasant allotments (the law of December 14, 1893), the prohibition and limitation of resettlement by the peasants in the interest of retaining locally a labor supply for the landowners (the laws of 1881 and 1889)—these were the chief measures adopted during this dark era of aristocratic reaction.

In 1893 the tsarist government, reflecting the will of the landed gentry, decided to conduct a general review of its entire body of legislation affecting the peasantry and their agrarian status, and to abolish the last remnants of freedom in the self-government and class organization of the peasantry still left intact from the legislation of 1861. In order to "strengthen the power" of the landowners over the peasantry and protect the "economic security" of the peasantry as a distinct closed legal class holding its own inalienable allotted land under the hegemony of the local nobility, new "Editorial Commissions for the Review of Legislation Affecting the Peasantry" were organized in 1901. By 1903 these commissions had compiled a new reactionary legal code in seven volumes dealing with the peasantry.[61]

By this time, however, the entire political and social scene in Russia had changed radically. The working class had not only entered upon its own organized revolutionary struggle against tsarism, but was exerting an ever more effective influence over the progress of the peasantry's revolu-

tionary struggle. Peasant uprisings had demonstrated that the peasantry was continuing its struggle against the economic and political supremacy of the serf-owning nobility, and for a "free" "American" trend in the village.[62]

Toward the beginning of the twentieth century, the revolutionary activity of the workers and peasants indicated that a revolution in Russia was maturing and approaching, a revolution in which among the most significant issues would inevitably be the problem of the nationalization of the land and the final destruction of the remnants of serfdom in the village. These subjects belong to a later period in our social economic development, where we shall examine them in the proper order.

Notes

1. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, p. 141.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*, Vol. XI, pp. 348-349.
5. *Vliyaniye urozhayev i nizkikh khlebnykh tsen na nekotoryye storony russkogo narodnogo khozyaistva* (The Influence of Harvests and Low Grain Prices on Some Aspects of the Russian National Economy), ed. by Chuprov and Posnikov (1897), Vol. I, article by Annenskii, "Stoimost' proizvodstva khleba v chastnovladelcheskikh khozyaistvakh" (Cost of Producing Grain on Privately Owned Estates), p. 170.
6. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. III, p. 144.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 237-238.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
13. Yanson, *Sravnitelnaya statistika Rossii* (Comparative Statistics of Russia) (1880), Vol. II, Sec. 1, pp. 273, 277.
14. *Doklad valuevskoi komissii* (Report of the Valuyev Commission), p. 35.
15. Lyashchenko, *Krestyanskoye dyelo* (Peasant Affairs), p. 639.
16. *Issledovaniye ekonomicheskogo polozheniya tsentralno-chernozemnykh gubernii: Trudy osobogo soveshchaniya 1899–1901* (Study of Economic Conditions in the Central Black-Soil Provinces: Proceedings of the Special Conference of 1899–1901), collected by A. Polenov (1901), p. 8.
17. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. III, p. 104.
18. *Svod statisticheskikh svedenii po selskomu khozyaistvu Rossii k kontsu XIX v.* (Collection of Statistical Data on the Rural Economy of Russia Toward the End of the Nineteenth Century) (Ministry of Agriculture and State Properties, St. Petersburg, 1902), III, Table IV, p. 44.
19. See Map 12, p. 449; Map 13, p. 451.
20. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. III, p. 189.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
22. Compiled on the basis of statistical data contained in the publication *Urozhai*

khlebov (The Grain Harvest), issued by the Central Statistical Committee, for the respective years.

23. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, p. 214.
24. *Ibid.,* p. 219.
25. *Ibid.,* Vol. III, pp. 223-224.
26. *Ibid.,* Vol. III, p. 221.
27. For more detailed data on the growth of commercial farming and its specialization, see Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, pp. 188-253.
28. Lenin, "Po povodu tak nazyvayemogo voprosa o rynkakh" (Apropos the So-Called Problem of the Markets), in *Bolshevik* (1937), No. 21, pp. 139-140.
29. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, Chap. II, pp. 43-136.
30. *Ibid.,* p. 97.
31. *Ibid.,* p. 120.
32. *Ibid.,* pp. 87-99.
33. Lenin refers to this in his *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, p. 132.
34. *Svod trudov mestnykh komitetov. Arenda* (Collection of Studies by Local Committees. Tenancy) (St. Petersburg, 1902).
35. On the differentiation of the peasantry during 1900–1910 as revealed by the data of the periodic rural censuses, see Z. N. Svavitskii, *Zemskiye podvornyye perepisi 1880–1913* g.g. (Rural Household Censuses of 1880–1913) (1926). See also Lyashchenko, "Mobilizatsiya zemlevladeniya v Rossii i yego statistika" (The Mobilization of Landownership in Russia and Its Statistics) in *Russkaya mysl'* (Russian Thought) (1905), Bk. II.
36. *Statistika pozemel'noi sobstvennosti i naselyennykh mest Yevropeiskoi Rossii* (Statistics of Landed Property and Settled Places of European Russia) (1880–1885), Issue 8; Yershov, "Pozemelnaya sobstvennost Yevropeiskoi Rossii 1877–1878" (Landed Property in European Russia 1877–1878), in *Statisticheskii vremennik rossiiskoi imperii* (Statistical Periodical of the Russian Empire) (1886), Series III, Issue X.
37. *Glavneishiye dannyye pozemel'noi statistiki po obsledovaniyu 1887* (Principal Data on Land Statistics Based on the Survey of 1887) (1892–1897), Issues I-LX.
38. *Statistika zemlevladeniya 1905 g.* (Statistics of Land Tenure in 1905), (Central Statistical Committee), 50 issues, and *Svod po 50 guberniyam* (Summary for 50 Provinces) (St. Petersburg, 1907). It should be noted that as a result of differences in calculation, the various sources on land tenure statistics yield different figures on the movement in land tenure.
39. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, p. 239.
40. For the geographical distribution of large-scale landholdings of the nobility, see Map 14, p. 463.
41. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol .XI, p. 339.
42. *Ibid.,* Vol. XV, p. 471. In the group of "feudal latifundia," Lenin includes 61,990,000 *dessyatins* of large scale (over 500 *dessyatins*), landholdings belonging to 28,000 "gentry and commoner landlords," 5,100,000 *dessyatins* of royal lands, and 3,600,000 *dessyatins* of the big commercial industrial companies; Vol. XI, p. 339, note.
43. *Ibid.,* Vol. XI, pp. 349-350.
44. Lyashchenko, *Mobilizatsiya zemlevladeniya* (Mobilization of Land Tenure), p. 15.
45. *Ibid.,* Vol. III, pp. 166-187.
46. *Materialy vysochaishe utverzhdyonnoi komissii 16 noyabrya 1901 g. po obsledovaniyu blagosostoyaniya sel'skogo naseleniya* (Materials of the Royal Commission of November 16, 1901, on the Survey of the Well-Being of the Rural Population) (St. Petersburg, 1903).

47. S. Korolenko, *Obzor ekonomicheskogo polozheniya Rossii* (A Review of the Economic Position of Russia) (1895), a report delivered before the Petersburg Conference of Rural Owners.
48. Karyshev, *Krestyanskiye vnyenadelnyye arendy* (Peasant Allotment Land Tenancy) (1892), pp. vii-viii.
49. *Materialy po statistike zemlevladeniya v Rossii* (Materials on the Statistics of Land Tenure in Russia) (1897–1910), Issues I-XVII; also the *Otchyoty* (Accounts) of the Noblemen's Bank for the same years.
50. *Svedeniya o prodazhnykh tsenakh na zemli* (Data on Land-Selling Prices) (Ministry for Internal Affairs, 1859); "Tseny na zemlyu v Yevropeyskoi Rossii po prodazham, sdelannym v 1882 and 1887 gg." (Land Prices in European Russia Based on Sales Made in 1882 and 1887), in *Vremennik Tsentralnogo statisticheskogo komiteta* (Periodical of the Central Statistical Committee) (1889), No. 11; and *Selskokhozyaistvennyye i statisticheskiye svedeniya po materialam, poluchennym ot khozyayev* (Agricultural and Statistical Data Based on Material Obtained from Owners) (Ministry for Agriculture, 1891), Issue IV.
51. For more details on the international agrarian crisis of 1875–1895, see Lyashchenko, *Russkoye zernovoye khozyaistvo v sisteme mirovogo khozyaistva* (Russian Grain Farming in the System of International Economics) (1927), and by the same author, *Sotsialnaya ekonomiya selskogo khozyaistva* (Social Economy of Agriculture), Vol. II, pp. 350 ff.
52. Lyashchenko, *Zernovoye khozyaistvo i khlebotorgovyye otnosheniya Rossii i Germanii v svyazi s tamozhennym oblozheniyem* (Grain Farming and Grain-Trading Relations Between Russia and Germany in Connection with the Customs Tariff) (1915), p. 133.
53. V. Pokrovskii, *Sbornik svedenii po istorii i statistike vneshnei torgovli* (Collection of Data on the History and Statistics of Foreign Trade), pp. 12-35.
54. *1885 god v selskokhozyaistvennom otnoshenii* (The Year 1885 in Agricultural Relations).
55. *Doklad predsedatelya vysochaishe uchrezhdennoi v 1888 g. komissii po povodu padeniya tsen na selskokhozyaistvennyye proizvedeniya* (Report of the Chairman of the Royal Commission Established in 1888 for the Study of the Fall in Prices on Agricultural Products), p. 10.
56. *Selskokhozyaistvennyye i statisticheskiye svedeniya po materialam, poluchennym ot khozyayev* (1890), Issue III, p. xii.
57. *Ibid.*, summary table, pp. xxv ff.
58. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. II, p. 471.
59. *Ibid.*, Vol. XIV, p. 213.
60. *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 142.
61. *Trudy redaktsionnoi komissii po peresmotru zakonopolozhenii o krestyanakh* (Studies of the Editorial Commission for the Review of Legislation About the Peasants) (1903–1906), Vols. I-VII.
62. On the subject of peasant revolts during 1861–1900, see Map 11, p. 373.

(XXIV)

The Capitalist Factory After the Reform and Industrial Promotion During the 1870's

THE DOWNFALL of the system of serfdom released the creative energies of the nation, however incompletely, and guided them in the direction of a commercial economy and capitalist industry, which by the mid-nineteenth century had been foreshadowed even under the feudal system, but were unable to attain full development.

The "emancipation," through which the "landowners cleared the land for capitalism," threw into the market the labor supply necessary for the progress of capitalism. The final disintegration of the natural economy created a selling market for capitalist industry. The accumulation of capital made it possible to undertake the organization of large-scale industry on a capitalist pattern.

But this process of economic reconstruction naturally required considerable time, and therefore the first two or three decades following the Reform proved to be, as regards the development of industry, a period of dissolution of the old economic relationships, their reorganization along new lines, and the formation of new forces, resources, and techniques.

THE THREE STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY In studying the subject of capitalist development in Russian industry, and applying the interpretations of Marx to the forms and stages of development of capitalist industry, Lenin demonstrated [1] that Russian industry during the post-Reform period similarly passed through the following three stages: (1) the disintegration of domestic (peasant) industry and its transformation into petty commodity production working for the market and dominated by commercial capital; (2) the formation of capitalist manufacturing as a stage directly connecting it with the preceding era in respect to manual technique, but expanding further the division of labor with a partial or complete transition from working at home to working in capitalist enterprises; (3) the capitalist factory, the highest stage of capitalism in industry, an enterprise with large-scale power machinery, with a "ma-

chine system," with a numerous force of permanent skilled workers, and with substantial investments of capital.

In the study of the concrete forms of capitalist industrial development in Russia during the post-Reform era, the three historical stages in the development of industrial patterns formulated by Lenin assume a special meaning. They expose the distortions interposed in the problem by the Populists. We have already mentioned that V. V. and "Nikolai-on," among others, considered the peasant household industry as a form of "national production" and the "antithesis" of capitalism and production of goods for the market, while the jobber disposal of the *kustar* products they recognized as a phenomenon "inherently superfluous and made necessary only by the disorganization in the sale of such products."[2] In Populist writings, and afterward in general literature, the name "*kustar* industry" acquired a diffuse meaning as an alternative to capitalism. Therefore the economic analysis of this *kustar* industry by Lenin was extremely important for proper understanding of the historical development of capitalist industry during the period following the Reform. Lenin proved that the *kustar* industry represented economically either small household commodity production for a jobber, or a form of capitalist manufacturing, as the two stages in the evolution of capitalist industry prior to attaining its highest form—the capitalist factory.

Let us now pass to a concrete examination of industrial development during 1860–1880.

THE SITUATION IN INDUSTRY DURING 1860–1870 In a technological sense the transition from serfdom to "free labor" and capitalism found Russian industry, as we have learned, in the handicraft stage of its development. With the exception of a few branches of industry (cotton spinning, calico printing, and some others), manual labor and technical backwardness prevailed in the majority of industries, particularly in heavy industry, in the production of woolens, and in many others. Hence, industry as a whole during the first decade of the Reform was exemplified by small, decentralized, capitalist handicraft units, or small-scale production at home under the control of the distributing offices.

Large-scale capitalist industry emerged primarily through the victory of the essentially capitalist "merchant" factory over the backward, feudal, manorial handicraft establishments of the nobility. Simultaneously, the process of expanding small-scale production of goods for the market and the *kustar* industry continued unabated. Two tendencies, therefore, may be observed in the development of Russian industry during the first decade after the Reform: on the one hand the former manorial industries of the

nobility were being liquidated, yielding to the mechanized capitalist factories; on the other hand the decentralized capitalist handicraft enterprises, distinguished by production methods and work in the home, and serving as a supplement to the other, gained considerably in size although its capitalist organization of production was still insufficiently great (the first and second stages according to Lenin). In this manner precapitalist industry generally evolved into capitalist production. The capitalist manufacturing organizations were frequently quite backward both technically and economically. And on this backwardness Populism proceeded to erect its theory of national production and the "artificiality of capitalism."

Most backward technically and economically were the manorial, previously feudal, industries, as well as the "proprietary" factories. These were the first to be replaced, once they lost under the new conditions the basis of their existence—serf labor. For example, in Simbirsk Province alone after the Reform, of thirty existing woolen manufactures three such manorial enterprises were closed altogether, ten passed into the hands of merchants, and only eight continued to be operated by the landowners. (Two were merchant enterprises prior to 1861.) In the entire woolen industry, chiefly a manorial industry, the number of workers declined from 99,000 to 71,800 between 1859 and 1863, and the number of factories declined from 419 to 365.

The Reform exerted less direct influence on the labor situation in the industries not closely connected with serfdom (the silk and especially the cotton industries had meanwhile fallen into a crisis during 1860–1865 as a result of the Civil War in America). To a certain extent, however, in many branches of large industry during the first flush of excitement following the Reform, a part of the workers began to leave the cities and the factories, returning to the village to claim their "allotments." No doubt, this circumstance was short-lived, inasmuch as the "landowners' clearing of the lands for capitalism," which was effected in 1861, soon began to exert a reverse influence, resulting in an exodus from the village and a substantial flow of manpower toward the factories and mills, together with the development of industrial activity in the village. From 1865 to 1890 the number of workers employed by the large factories, mills, and railroads alone, as computed by Lenin, increased from 706,000 to 1,433,000.[3]

The transition to capitalist methods after 1861 soon resulted in a process of differentiation among the factories, favoring the more powerful and those better equipped by capitalist standards. Thus, for example, the former manorial woolen industry in the course of three or four years after the Reform witnessed a drastic decline in the number of its factories and employed workers, while during the same years its remaining capitalist factories boosted their production from 24 million to 26.1 million rubles. In absolute

production figures, however, most basic industries made small gains during the first decade following the Reform, while some industries actually declined. For example, the total output of pig iron, which in 1860 amounted to 20.5 million poods fell to 18.2 million poods in 1865, and to 17 million poods in 1867; only by 1877 did total pig-iron production reach 24.6 million poods. Furthermore, during these years the Urals still accounted for 65 per cent of all pig iron smelted (11.1 million poods in 1867 and 16.1 million in 1877), while the south yielded only 1.6 million poods in 1877, or 6.5 per cent of the total output.[4] The mining of coal after 1860 rose from 18 million poods to only 22.3 million in 1865, and to 26.7 million in 1867. The amount of processed cotton fluctuated during the decade following 1860 between 1.5 and 2.8 million poods, and fell even lower in some years. Altogether large-scale enterprises of the factory type in 71 lines of production employing 100 or more workers, as listed in the factory statistics of 1866, amounted to 644 (of which only 307 used steam engines), employing a labor force of 232,000 with an output valued at 201 million rubles.[5]

SMALL COMMODITY PRODUCTION AND *KUSTAR* INDUSTRY DURING 1860–1880 The growing social division of labor, the rise of a commodity and money economy in the village, together with a growing need for money among the peasantry, tended to stimulate the "household industries" of the peasants as small commodity production destined for a wide market. This was the source of the Populist legend about the "national" character of production in the *kustar* industry and its independence from capitalism. In fact, as was made very clear by Lenin, this process was only one of the aspects of the general process of development of capitalist relationships in the village. "The disintegration of the agricultural peasantry had to be compensated by the growth of small peasant enterprises. To the extent that natural economy declined, one type of raw material processing after another changed into special industries."[6] The development and expansion of small peasant industries could not proceed except by "setting up a minority of small capitalists on the one hand, and a mass of hired workers on the other, or such 'independent *kustars*' whose lot was even more difficult and meager than that of the hired worker."[7]

We shall now consider in greater detail the origin of *kustar* handicrafts and their development after the Reform.

THE ORIGIN OF *KUSTAR* HANDICRAFTS It is easy to see that very many (if not the majority) of the *kustar* handicrafts do not, and could not, have anything in common with "national production." Such industries as the manufacture of silk fabrics, brocades, gloves, and enamel products

could not have arisen on the basis of peasant demand. But even articles of more popular consumption such as cotton fabrics and metal products, requiring for the most part imported or bought raw materials, could not have sprung directly from a natural economy. Hence the origin of *kustar* crafts could be ascribed directly to peasant household production in only a very small number of industries.

Naturally some few *kustar* handicrafts did grow from household production by separating some of its marketable portion from the articles of personal consumption and increasing the portion gradually until the entire enterprise was adapted to working primarily for the market (the first stage according to Lenin). This type of origin could usually be traced in industries producing mostly articles of daily necessity among the peasantry, in which the technique of production was quite primitive and the raw materials readily available within the peasant economy. This was true, for example, in connection with the plaiting of bast shoes, the weaving of coarse linen, the fulling of felt products, the cart and cooperage trades, and others. These and similar crafts, being among the oldest and regarded by the peasants as "immemorial," were the most ancient varieties of village crafts and peasant-household industry.

Many *kustar* trades of this type arose not directly through "household production," but separated from it at an early stage to become independent village crafts. Whenever its technique was somewhat complex, the handicraft usually became the specialty of a full-time village artisan, who at first supplied the local market independently and only later changed into a *kustar*, that is, an artisan working for a wide market through a jobber. Frequently a village artisan of this type, in seeking a wider market for his skill, first passed through a stage of being a "migrant artisan," roving with his pack of goods from consumer to consumer, until a change in the conditions of transport and the market made it more profitable for the artisan not to travel but to deliver his goods to the consumer through a jobber. This development of a *kustar* institution from a village trade was typical, among others, of the boot-making, the wool-fulling, wool-carding, and sheepskin trades. The famous Kimry bootmaking crafts, existing as a part-time peasant trade since the seventeenth century, became a *kustar* industry only in the course of the nineteenth century.

Somewhat different was the evolution of a *kustar* handicraft from a trade where the trade itself arose in the village not as a part of the peasant natural economy but independently, through some specialist artisan, who, having founded his trade in the village for one reason or another, expanded his output and began to produce for the market. Such was the historically proved origin of the *kustar* enamel-painting crafts in Rostov (Yaroslavl Province),

the furniture industries of Vyatka Province, and very frequently the forging and nail-making industries.

The rise of many *kustar* industries is connected directly with the rural economy under serfdom. The latter exerted its influence on the origin and development of *kustar* crafts in various ways. Specifically, in order to meet the needs of the manor for various articles of personal and economic consumption, a number of artisans from the manorial domestics were put to work as shoemakers, tailors, carpenters, lacemakers, weavers, and so forth. The nobility often strove to improve the skill of their domestics by hiring master workmen, by special training, and so forth. Another manner in which similar feudal *kustar* crafts emerged was through the manorial manufacturing enterprises of the gentry. The peasants employed there acquired industrial experience, and since the production technique of these establishments was simple and largely manual, they could, if necessary, transmit it to their own work. At times these artisans, even under serfdom, succeeded in taking their trade beyond the bounds of the manor and the feudal factory, and organized their own establishments. Since this type of independent peasant production had its advantages for the landowner, enabling him to derive a higher *obrok*, he frequently encouraged an interest in such industrial enterprises among his peasants.

In this manner the feudal economy gave rise to many *kustar* industries. The typical and widespread lacemaking craft for the most part arose from the manor's "handmaidens' rooms" and "attic rooms," being subsequently moved to the peasant huts where they began to produce for the market. Connected with the feudal factories were a number of woolen, leather, and metal trades. Furthermore, under the direct influence of the feudal *obrok* system and the desire of the nobility to increase the amount of dues collected, such large centers of *kustar* industry as the metal industries of the village Pavlovo, on the former estate of Count Sheremetev, and many others came into existence.

Such was the origin of a number of *kustar* crafts under conditions of precapitalist economy. Capitalism utilized the existing *kustar* crafts and soon began to dominate them, at first in the sales field, and afterward in the field of production as well. Quite apart from that, however, industrial capitalism during its first stages of development occasionally aided the emergence of a *kustar* handicraft. And this manner of origin of a *kustar* occupation, that is, essentially by working at home for a capitalist manufacturing unit or a factory, appeared to be quite common in some cases. For example, according to the calculations of Tugan-Baranovsky, of the 141,000 *kustars* in Moscow Province no more than 25 per cent of the total number were engaged in the ancient crafts of "national" origin (the plaiting of bast shoes, the cooperage

trade, and others), whereas about 59 per cent were employed in the crafts created directly by the factory (cotton, silk, haberdashery, glovemaking, and others). In other words this was a stage in the transition to real capitalist manufacturing. The latter, under the prevailing low level of technology, made use of the work of *kustars* at home through the so-called "distributing system," whereby production is carried on wholly by decentralized methods. Frequently the organizing force in such production was capital in its commercial phase, in the person of the capitalist merchant who distributed purchased yarn to be woven by the various small *kustars*. In accordance with the prevailing level of technique, it was sometimes more profitable to perform some operations in a centralized unit, while others were left in a decentralized form. Thus, for example, the *kustar* weaving trades emerged not in connection with the distributing office of the merchant-middleman, but in connection with the spinning manufactures where the yarn was spun directly and then passed to the *kustars* for weaving; the final process of calico printing was again performed by machinery in the factory.

The factory also frequently influenced the rise and development of "independent" *kustar* trades. As long as methods of production were simple, workers who returned from the factory could establish a small "mill" in their own homes. If successful, they developed small enterprises, "attic rooms" of their own, induced their fellow villagers to work for them, and thus became engaged in capitalist manufacturing. A small enterprise of this type could sometimes begin to "flourish" and to yield a large profit for its organizer on the basis of increased exploitation and low wages paid for the labor of the working *kustars*. This, in fact, was a way in which a real manufacturing enterprise came into being, frequently surrounded by a whole chain of "attic rooms" and single *kustars*, until competition from power machinery and the factory finally killed both this variety of manufacturing and *kustar* production (the second stage according to Lenin).

It is thus impossible to speak of the *kustar* industry as having had a specifically "national" manner of origin and significance. Its historical origin and development is quite another matter, whether by disintegration of natural household production, by the disintegration of primitive crafts, or, finally, as the first step in capitalist manufacturing through the distribution system and home work.[8]

THE CAPITALIST FACTORY DURING 1870–1880 In Russia's industrial development the years 1870–1880 represent a period of the final struggle and, by 1890, the victory of the capitalist factory and machine industry over the historical remnants of household production and over the primitive types of manufacturing.

We have already mentioned that the adoption of machine methods of production in some branches of Russian industry, particularly in the cotton industry, antedates the Reform of 1861. This was a serious blow to the unmechanized cotton weaving of the manual, *kustar,* and handicraft varieties. Although during 1860–1870 the proportion of the latter was still great, being nearly equal to factory production in the number of persons engaged, the higher productivity of labor in the mechanized factory made its victory over manual production a foregone conclusion.

During subsequent years the elimination by the capitalist factory of handicrafts, and of the *kustar* activities connected therewith, was gaining momentum. Usually, when a mechanized factory emerged in the midst of some old *kustar* area, often built by one of the larger and more successful former *kustars,* jobbers, or attic-room owners, it brought a radical change in all productive, economic and technical conditions and relationships. Mass production by machines lowered the price of the product drastically; the former "independent" *kustar,* unable to compete against the price of the factory output, abandoned his enterprise and became a hired worker of the factory itself.

This direct method of the *kustar's* absorption by the factory was in actuality naturally complicated by a number of concomitant factors, which sometimes hastened and sometimes retarded the general trend of the process. If the technique of the machinery was such that the power element (as in the case of electric power) could be dispersed and adapted in small units to small work benches, this technique was often mastered even by a relatively small *kustar,* and production in such a field for some time maintained the character of the "distribution" system of manufacturing. This type of evolution of the mechanized factory and large-scale manufacturing from the small *kustar* workshop was common, for example, in the metal industry of the Pavlovo region. Here, because of the possibility of mechanizing small-scale production and of making it accessible to the small *kustar* entrepreneur, although beyond the reach of the ordinary *kustar* worker, a number of small mechanized enterprises employing hired workers arose and prospered. The number of such establishments in 1879 was 12, becoming 24 in 1890 and 31 in 1894, while the number of steam engines rose from 2 to 11, and later to 19. From such *kustar* workshops and small manufacturing units arose the later well known factories of the Zavyalovs, Kondrashevs, Ananyevs, and others. Using at first a simple system of production, these small manufacturers for a time conducted some of their operations, along with the preparation of the semifinished product, in the homes of the individual *kustars.* And only the mass production of cheap locks, knives, and nails in the large mechanized

factories finally swept from the scene not only the "individual *kustar*," but often the larger handicraft enterprises as well.

A similar rivalry evolved between the factories and the handicraft enterprises in the samovar *kustar* industry of the Tula province. The making of samovars, once a manual operation exclusively, after 1870 began to change into comparatively large-scale, mechanized manufacturing, under which part of the basic operations were performed at the main plant, while the remainder remained decentralized among the *kustar* huts of individual artisans. In 1894 the number of these establishments, some of them equipped with steam engines, was 25, with a labor force of 1,202 employed at the manufacturing plants and 670 additional workers employed at home. And since only special parts of samovar production was mechanized, while it chiefly remained manual labor, the industry continued to function largely on the basis of purely handicraft and *kustar* methods.

But if the samovar and knife *kustar* industries, due to technological conditions, on the one hand escaped for a time complete absorption by the large-scale mechanized factory, and on the other succeeded in assimilating some of the advantages of mechanized production, the fate of other metal industries was quite different. This applies, for example, to the popular lock industry of the same Pavlovo region. Despite the fact that no competitive mechanized enterprises in lock production arose in Pavlovo itself, the local lock industry fell into decline by the nineties. This happened because in the western provinces a number of large-scale lock factories made their appearance and, with their locks selling at half the price, drove the Pavlovo lock made by *kustars* from the all-Russian market. The same fate overtook another metal industry, the production of nails, which prior to 1870 was widespread throughout Tver, Yaroslavl, and Nizhny Novgorod provinces. The first competition to this crude and rather expensive hand-made nail came from the English factory-made nail, which proved to be better made and cheaper than the *kustar* product, and began to compete successfully after 1870. During the eighties Russian mechanical factories making a so-called "wire" nail appeared, and dealt the final blow to the nails produced by the *kustars*. Here again the first to be displaced were the *kustar-entrepreneurs*, the owners of "attic rooms," and small handicraft units employing hired workers, after which production passed to the forges of the individual *kustars*, where it lingered a while as a result of the low pay received for *kustar* labor. Soon afterward the factory-made wire nail and its low price killed this type of production as well, leaving to the *kustars* only the field of large and specialized nails, ship nails, and beam nails, along with several other products which had not yet been taken into machine production.

As an example of how manual production was dislodged by mechanized

factories, it is interesting to follow the fate of the bootmaking industry at its center at Kimry, Tver Province. Exclusively a manual craft at first, it was in the hands of a small *kustar* artisan who worked by himself for a jobber engaged in marketing Kimry boots all over Russia. Beginning in the seventies, a bootmaking machine was introduced in this industry; the machine was within the reach of the small workshop, although still inaccessible to the ordinary individual *kustar*. Small manufacturing plants began to multiply, with the result that the number of hired workers increased. During the nineties large mechanized footwear factories appeared with a type of equipment beyond the reach of the small manufacturing plant. The latter's boots, too, were unable to compete with machine-made footwear. Since the mechanized shoe factories were, however, producing a commodity of a higher quality, and chiefly for the urban population, a *kustar* variety of shoecraft continued in the more common and coarse line of village footwear.

Occasionally large-scale machine methods in general failed to invade a given branch of production because of the lack of incentive to mechanize it (the toy and matting trade, the making of felt, of bags, and other items). In these and similar industries the introduction of factory mechanized methods proceeded slower, as long as no major technical revolution occurred (the mechanized production of jute bags in place of hand-sewn canvas bags, for example).

Most typical was the onslaught and conquest by mechanized factory production on the handicraft and *kustar* systems in the cotton industry. The first appearance of the cylindrical printing machines during the thirties undermined the "household" nature of *kustar* cloth printing done for the handicraft plants, while the calico-printing "pyrotype" machines (with which two men produced as much as fifty men did previously) completely ruined manual household calico printing ten years following their appearance. Beginning with 1840–1850, cotton spinning began to be mechanized. (The first factories of Maltsev, Morozov, and Garelin arose during 1846–1848.) The mechanization of weaving began about the same time. Up to 1840–1850, weaving was organized on the typical basis of the handicraft system, with the capitalist merchant or manufacturer buying his English yarn abroad and distributing it among the *kustar* weavers. In 1846 the first mechanical cotton-weaving factory was organized in the town of Shuy. In 1866 there were 42 such factories employing 94,600 workers, and only 66,000 *kustars* remained; in 1879 there were 92 factories, 162,700 workers, and only 50,000 *kustars*. By 1894 there were 20,500 *kustar* weavers in the industry, and these were no longer workers in *kustar* "attic rooms," but individual *kustars* "dispersed" by the mechanized factory and eking out a miserable existence.

This process was repeated in the flax-spinning and linen-weaving indus-

tries that were largely scattered through the Yaroslavl, Vladimir, and Kostroma provinces. Here again the appearance of the flax-spinning machine during the fifties quickly ended flax-spinning by hand. The mechanized linen-weaving factories did not make their appearance until the seventies, at which time they began swiftly to dislodge the previously existing "attic rooms" of the *kustar* entrepreneurs and the small manufacturing establishments with their two or three looms; the linen-weaving handicrafts remained a while in the hands of the individual *kustars,* until the consolidation of mechanized factory weaving during the seventies eliminated them almost completely.

Till now we have been examining the type of handicraft and *kustar* activities into which the development of factory production came, so to speak, "organically," merging into the rise and fall of the *kustar* crafts, and at times extending the process of their decline over another decade or two. In a number of cases, however, the coming of capitalist industry immediately and catastrophically destroyed a whole group of small crafts. This happened, for example, whenever some new branch of capitalist production began to make a completely new and more valuable product, undermining demand for the old product. Typical in this connection was the fate of the tar-distilling and charcoal-producing *kustar* crafts under the impact of the rising petroleum and coal industries. The tar-distilling trade was a highly popular occupation throughout many wooded areas during 1860–1870, especially in Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Vladimir, Tambov, and Perm. Connected with tar-making was also a sizable output of charcoal for consumption by the local foundries and ironworks. The development of the petroleum industry and the production of lubricating oils from petroleum residue quickly put an end to the hand distillation of tar, while the new variety of coal extracted from mines, a cheaper and more valuable industrial fuel, made the burning of charcoal obsolete. In Ryazan and Tambov provinces these trades disappeared completely by the eighties; in the more northerly provinces, such as Nizhny Novgorod and Perm, they lingered until the nineties, but lost their previous importance.

Finally, the development of the railroads during the seventies undermined overland transportation, and thereby reduced rather sharply a number of *kustar* occupations: the building of carts and sleds, wheelmaking, saddlery, and others, which in the forest areas and along the main ancient highways were at one time well developed and important.

SUMMARY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF FACTORY INDUSTRY DURING 1860–1880 Factory statistics for 1860–1880 are so unsatisfactory and inaccurate that they provide no details with which to amplify

or explain the results of the emergence of large-scale factory industry during these years.[9] This applies both to the confusion with regard to the number of enterprises (as a result of conflicting methods of classifying "large" and small enterprises), the number of workers employed, the value of production, and so forth. With this reservation it is possible, for the sake of some comparison, to cite the following figures on the growth of industrial production during the fifteen-year period following the Reform by the individual industries whose scale of production lends itself to a more accurate statistical treatment.[10]

	1860	1876
Cotton spinning (in million rubles)	28.7	44.2
Cotton manufactures (in million rubles)	42.9	96.3
Woolen yarn (in million rubles)	0.45	2.5
Woolen manufactures (in million rubles)	34.9	52.7
Machines (in million rubles)	14.0	43.4
Petroleum (in million poods)	0.6	10.9
Coal (in million poods)	7.3	111.3
Pig iron (in million poods)	18.2	25.5
Iron (in million poods)	11.7	17.1
Steel (in million poods)	0.1	1.1

Thus the first fifteen years that followed the Reform were for many Russian industries years of some success, years in which even such old industries as cotton and wool more than doubled some phases of their production. In terms of the absolute volume of production, however, these successes were not very conspicuous. New industries, such as coal, petroleum, and steel smelting, during these years witnessed the founding of their first large capitalist enterprises, creating new large industrial areas with vast prospects in production. Among these, for example, were the first factory of the Englishman Hughes (built by an English joint-stock company with a capital of three million rubles), which laid the foundation of our southern iron and steel industry in the Krivoy Rog basin, the first large coal-mining enterprises in the Donets basin, the great petroleum companies of the Nobel brothers in Baku, and others. But these industries, too, were still in the early stages of production during 1870–1880.

After having analyzed meticulously and critically the factory statistics of the period by individual industries, Lenin prepared the following summary table of the leading factories in European Russia during 1866–1879, and also in comparison with 1890, in seventy-one lines of production for which information was available for all the years involved (cited here in somewhat contracted form): [11]

FACTORY GROUPS BY NUMBER OF WORKERS	1866			1879			1890		
	Number of factories	Number of workers (in thousands)	Value of output (in million rubles)	Number of factories	Number of workers (in thousands)	Value of output (in million rubles)	Number of factories	Number of workers (in thousands)	Value of output (in million rubles)
Between 100 and 499 workers	512	109.0	99.8	641	141.7	201.6	712	156.7	186.3
From 500 to 999	90	59.9	48.3	130	91.9	117.8	140	94.3	148.5
1000 and over	42	62.8	52.9	81	156.8	170.5	99	213.3	253.1
Total	644	231.7	201.0	852	390.4	489.9	951	464.3	587.9

By the same calculation of Lenin's, the number of workers in all large-scale capitalist enterprises, including the metal industry and the railroads, was (in thousands): [12]

YEARS	IN FACTORY INDUSTRIES	IN METAL INDUSTRY	ON RAILROADS	TOTAL
1865	509	165	32	706
1890	840	340	253	1,433

Thus, all indexes for the period under examination indicate a rather impressive increase, with the most significant expansion falling to the lot of the largest enterprises, particularly from the standpoint of the value of their output and the number of workers employed. Capitalist industry was scoring remarkable gains not only by forcing out small-scale commodity production and manufacturing but also through the elimination of the more marginal capitalist factories.

THE POSITION OF THE WORKERS DURING 1870–1880 During 1860–1870 the workers were subject to very harsh forms of exploitation. Neither the length of the working day, nor the labor of women and children, nor even the sanitary working conditions at the factories were regulated by law, and were left entirely to the discretion of the factory owner. The working day usually consisted of not less than 12 or 14 hours a day, and more frequently amounted to 16 or 18 hours, not only for adult males but also for women and children. Although in 1882 children under 12 were excluded from employment by law, which also limited the work of adolescents between

12 and 15 years to 8 hours a day, the law was regularly evaded. In fact, 25 per cent of the labor force of some industries was composed of children, with as high a proportion of adolescents. Exploitation was particularly harsh and the work day particularly long in the various branches of light industry, cotton in particular. Many establishments in these industries were frequently nothing more than small and poorly organized manufacturing units, existing chiefly by the exploitation of the unskilled labor of workers newly arrived from the villages: women, youths, and children. In these enterprises the working day was especially long, wages particularly low, and sanitary conditions of labor most deplorable. But even in such huge capitalist textile enterprises as the Kreenholm textile mill at Narva, the working day for adults as well as for adolescents and women was 16 hours long. Sanitary conditions, even according to official surveys, were appalling; no attempt was made to dispose of the harmful dust in the cotton mills or the poisonous vapors in the leather, dyeing, and chemical factories. Crippling injuries due to exhaustion were very common among the workers, and many were maimed because the machines were not only devoid of any safety devices but because they had to be cleaned by the workers while in motion.

Wages were low: the average wage of an adult worker in all industrial regions was 14 rubles per month; a woman received an average of 10, and children were paid 7. A frequent practice (especially in the seasonal enterprises, or those in which no skilled labor was required, such as the brickyards) was the signing of a contract between an artel and a contractor who paid adult workers between 9 and 10 rubles a month. In a region like the Urals, for example, wages were extremely low. But even in the Petersburg area, at such big factories as the Sestroretsk state munitions plant, the wages of skilled workers fluctuated between 25 and 100 rubles a month for master workmen, and 10 to 15 rubles for children. At the other large Petersburg factories, the later well known plants of Vargunin, Pal, and Maxwell, average earnings of master workmen amounted to 25 to 35 rubles per month. This wage was systematically reduced by fines collected for the benefit of the factory owner. Moreover, particularly in enterprises located outside the city, the workers did not, in fact, draw their full wages, since they were obliged to buy all their provisions in the factory stores at prices two and three times higher than the market prices. A store of this type often yielded the factory owner an income equal to that derived from the factory itself. The workers, when they did not live in the village homes of their own, were usually housed in factory barracks under the most insanitary conditions, in huge common rooms, without distinction as to sex and age. In conclusion it may be noted that the income of a factory owner during this period was very great. For instance, the famous million-ruble factory of Khludov, which according to

the investigation of the Zemstvo Sanitary Commission in 1880 was "a nest of all sorts of infection . . . and at the same time a model of merciless exploitation," returned a net earning of 45 per cent on capital invested. But when the workers of the factory went on strike in 1880, military force was used against them, and the "ringleaders" were arrested.[13]

The growth of the political consciousness of the Russian workers and the rise of their struggle against capitalism and tsarism began during 1870–1880, finding expression in the organization of the South Russian Workers' Union at Odessa in 1875, and the Northern Union of Russian Workers in 1878 at Petersburg. A number of political labor demonstrations occurred during these years (in Petersburg), as well as the first big strikes (the strikes of the textile workers at Petersburg in 1878, at Ivanovo-Voznesensk in 1885, and at Shuy in 1888). But the labor movement of 1870–1880, like the earlier movement during the sixties, was of an elemental character. It was, however, of great significance inasmuch as this "elemental feature" was "in reality no other than the *nascent form* of consciousness." [14]

INDUSTRIAL PROMOTIVENESS DURING THE 1870's From what we have said, it is evident that, despite the relatively high rate of development distinctive of capitalist industry during the seventies, we must not overrate either its scale of operations or its general technical and economic position. Compared with the technically advanced contemporary industry of Europe, it was backward and weak. The factors for a higher rate of industrial development; namely, large capital resources, improved technical methods, skilled labor, a capitalist organization of distribution in the form of a developed network of railroads, commercial banks, credit, and organizational experience in the construction of such new industries as petroleum and coal, were still largely nonexistent in Russia at that time.

Hence another characteristic of the seventies, apart from the above-described general conditions and tendencies in capitalist industrial development, was the general atmosphere of industrial expansion, the first of its kind in our history, signified by outbreaks of so-called "promotiveness," a fever of company building, the founding of corporations, the attraction of foreign capital to native companies, numerous concessions for railway construction, and the formation of banks.

Economic activity of this type manifested itself in our national economy on a very low level during the period of serfdom. Thus, before the Reform of 1861 the number of joint-stock companies in Russia was 78, with a capital of 72 million rubles. In the course of 1861–1873, 357 stock companies possessing a capital of 1,116,000 rubles were newly founded. True, the implementation of the Reform itself required a great financial effort. The

redemption operations and the government's issue of 607 million rubles' worth of redemption certificates during 1863–1872 diverted a great amount of liquid capital from stock capital channels, as a result of which investment in new corporation capital fell to 2 million rubles in 1862, and to 850,000 rubles in 1863, from a level of 6.2 million rubles attained in 1860. By 1866, however, capital investment again reached 7.5 million rubles, rising in 1870 to 23.5 million rubles and continuing at a level of several tens of millions of rubles annually during subsequent years.

A number of corporations then coming into existence were founded with the aid of foreign capital, but the proportion of foreign capital in Russia's joint-stock companies was not very large during 1860–1870. Specifically, the flow of foreign capital into Russian industry prior to 1850 amounted to 2.7 million rubles, and in 1860, to 9.7 million. During the seventies this flow increased perceptibly, and by the end of that decade attained a total of 97.7 million rubles. Compared with the investment of Russian capital, the foreign contribution was still decidedly of a minor nature, and in the general process of company organization the major share continued to come from Russian capital. We know, for example, that during the decade of 1863–1872 the landed nobility alone collected about 772 million rubles in redemption payments and through the sale of land, a substantial portion of which went into the newly established joint-stock companies.

We shall now attempt to see into what branches of the nation's economy this capital was directed during the period under consideration—1860–1870.

The above-cited 357 corporations founded during 1861–1873, were divided into the following categories: 73 banks with a total value of 226.9 million rubles in stock capital, 53 railroad companies with a capital value of 698.5 million rubles, 15 steamship companies aggregating 7.3 million rubles in investment, 14 commercial enterprises totaling 6 million rubles in capital, and 163 various types of strictly industrial companies with a capital of 128.9 million rubles. Hence, industry absorbed nearly 11.4 per cent of the total stock capital, while the banks, railroads, and capitalist commercial enterprise, that is, the capitalist organization of distribution, had as much as 83 per cent.

An important part in the further development of capitalist industry was played by the newly organized large commercial banks. All the old credit institutions had already been liquidated by 1861 (the Bank of Issue, the Loan Bank, and the personal loan institutions), and the old Commercial Bank was reorganized into the State Bank (1860). By 1870 there existed a fairly developed network of credit institutions headed by the State Bank and its 41 branches, including 29 joint-stock banks, 15 mutual credit companies, 163 municipal banks, and 16 savings and loan associations.

How effective the banking system was as a channel for the concentration and redistribution of capital may be seen from the following figures. In 1873 current accounts of the State Bank amounted to 1,041 million rubles, and those of the joint-stock banks to 1,479 million. Deposits amounted to 42 million rubles at the State Bank, and 191 million rubles at the joint-stock banks. Thus the total amount was 2,753 million rubles, whereas prior to 1861 deposits in the Loan Bank amounted to only about 350 million rubles, with about 1 billion rubles in the entire system of the old credit institutions (the Land and Commercial banks, the Charitable Board, the safe-deposit vaults, and the personal loan institutions). Moreover, these were largely deposits made on behalf of state institutions, while private commercial deposits proper were insignificant.[15]

The trend followed by the capital of the new banks during 1860–1870, and the manner of its distribution may be ascertained from the fact that the total amount of promissory notes throughout the entire credit network in 1873 amounted to 431 million rubles, while loans against goods and commercial paper reached 225 million rubles, that is, total commercial credit had attained a value of 656 million rubles as against 15 million rubles of commercial credit proper prior to 1861.

One important branch of capitalist economy, which attracted both private and state capital, was the construction of railroads. Heavy investment in this field began as early as 1857, the year in which the privately owned shareholding Main Company of Russian Railroads was founded, chiefly with the aid of French capital, and granted a concession to build 4,000 versts of railway. On the whole, the hope of attracting foreign capital to railroad construction failed to materialize, since soon after obtaining their shares at a cheap nominal price, the foreign investors promptly sold them at a higher price to Russian capitalists. Nevertheless, beginning with this period, a feverish campaign of promotion of railroad construction became one of the main channels of capitalist investment. As a result, in comparison with a total of 1,000 versts of railways in 1857, Russia's total trackage in 1865 had grown to 3.5 thousand versts, in 1871, to 10.2 thousand versts, and in 1881, to 21.1 thousand versts. Joint-stock capital invested in railway building in 1860 amounted to 178 million rubles, and during the decade of 1861–1870, 698 million rubles of private capital were newly invested in rail construction, while government railroad loans had reached 1,833 million rubles by 1877.

As a consequence, the abundant flow of capital due to the establishment of new banks and expansion of bank credit, along with the intensified construction of new railway lines, resulted in a general industrial prosperity and in a rapid growth of all branches of capitalist industry, particularly ferrous metallurgy and machine building. However, Russia's ferrous metallurgy and

machine-building capacity of that period were not equipped to keep pace with the vigorous growth of railroad construction. Domestic production of rails was almost nonexistent, locomotives were built at only one plant, general railroad equipment at some seven plants, and domestic pig-iron smelting was on the whole insufficient. Consequently, almost all equipment, rails, locomotives, and railroad car accessories had to be ordered from abroad. For example, the importation of pig iron and iron rose from 198,000 poods in 1851–1856 to 19.5 million poods during 1867–1871, and to 29.4 million poods for 1877–1881, while machine imports of all types increased from 7.5 million rubles in 1856–1860 to 29.5 million rubles in 1871–1875, and to 51 million rubles in 1876–1880. Even for the equipment of the railroads in the Urals, the center of Russia's iron industry, not only locomotives and rails but all types of small iron products, screws, bolts, and other items were imported from abroad.[16] The total cost of goods imported from abroad for the construction and equipment of railway lines during the seventies amounted to one billion rubles. The attempt of Russian metallurgy to compete against foreign output in the face of the free-trade tariff of 1857 was foredoomed to failure in view of the higher quality and lower price of the foreign products.

Therefore the industrial uplift based on bank credit, stock-company building, and the influx of foreign capital was fraught with serious dangers. The economic foundation of the new industrial investment during the 1870's was still quite insecure.

For heavy industry railroad construction was the chief market, which it was unable to supply fully, as we have seen, because of an insufficient quantity of domestically produced pig iron and rails, and which absorbed the entire output of coal and petroleum. Railroad construction grew steadily up to the middle of the seventies, extending Russia's rail network during the five-year period of 1871–1875 by 7,400 versts, and increasing it by 1876 to 17,600 versts. During the next period the pace of railway construction slowed considerably, and only about 3,500 versts of new trackage were added during the five-year period of 1876–1880. At the same time the market for heavy industrial production also contracted sharply. For light industry, and cotton in particular, the chief support came from the mass market, mainly the peasantry. But this market, confronted with the low purchasing power of the population and the frequent crop failures during the seventies, was extremely unstable.

THE INDUSTRIAL CRISIS OF 1873–1875 AND 1881–1882 Following the financial and industrial boom of the early seventies, the first signs of an impending capitalist crisis began to appear in 1873, when under the impact of the general European crisis Russian banking and industrial enter-

prises were inundated by a wave of financial difficulties from the West, which later turned into a crisis of overproduction of goods, falling prices, and bank and industrial failures. Investments in new companies, which had been increasing at a rapid rate up to 1873, began to decline. The total amount of capital invested in newly organized corporations reached 30.8 million rubles in 1871, 61.9 million rubles in 1872, and 86.9 million rubles in 1873, but in 1874 new capital invested was only 51.1 million rubles, and in 1875 it declined further to 37 million rubles. As a consequence only 272 new corporations, with a capital of 305.6 million rubles, were organized during 1874–1881, compared to an average annual investment of 1,116 million rubles during 1861–1873. Most remarkable in this connection was the fact that the decline in newly founded companies was most notable in banking (only 2.5 million rubles of new shareholding capital compared to 227 million rubles during the preceding period) and railroads (41.3 million as compared with 698 million). In contrast, capital investments in new industrial corporations had absolute increases (up to 177.4 million rubles of capital as compared with 128.9 million rubles for the preceding period), as well as relative (from 11.4 per cent to 58 per cent of the total shareholding capital).

Contemporary observers of the crisis of 1873–1875 quite correctly considered the major cause of the crisis to be the decline of railway construction, which in turn entailed difficulties of a financial character. The crisis of 1873–1875 was, therefore, primarily a crisis of heavy industry, chiefly iron, steel, and fuel. From these industries, however, it proceeded to spread to light industry as well. During the seventies the mass market for the latter became quite constricted. The chief potential mass consumer of the products of light industry, the peasant, at that time still continued to a large extent to satisfy his own needs by his own output of household linen, wool cloth, and other products, while factory goods were still largely out of his reach. The village could not even think of using roofing iron in place of straw roofs. The economic position of the peasantry during the first period following the Reform held its purchasing power very low. The first half of the seventies (except 1874) was marked by poor crops, while 1871 and 1872 and 1875 and 1876 were years of famine.

As a result of the crisis, new business investment slackened toward the middle seventies, and 1873 to 1877 were years of a prolonged industrial lull. In 1877, under the impact of the Russo-Turkish War, industry was stimulated into greater activity by sizable military orders. A revival in industrial promotion came during 1879–1881, and production and trade reached their highest levels for the decade under examination. The good harvests of 1877–1879 reacted favorably on the results of the Nizhny Novgorod fair of 1879–1880, bringing about a revival of industry, especially cotton, a rise in prices

of industrial goods, an increase in dividends, and an incentive to invest in new enterprises. According to the records of some cotton-goods enterprises, dividends for 1879–1880 amounted to 40 or 50, and even 70 per cent of invested capital. The value of total output in the cotton industry rose from 96.3 million rubles in 1876 to 200 million rubles in 1880. Coal production in 1880 increased again to 201 million poods, the petroleum output to 20 million, and the iron industry to 26.1 million poods.

This industrial prosperity did not last long, however. Beginning with 1881–1882, partly as a result of short crops, but also as a reaction to the further decline in railroad construction and, finally, under the direct influence of the western European crisis of 1880, industry was once more seriously disrupted, entering into a period of extended depression that continued until the early nineties. To be sure, the general accretion of industry and railroad construction continued. But the extent to which the rate of development had slackened may be seen from the following figures: the formation of new shareholding capital, which in 1873 reached the maximum figure of 86.9 million rubles, fell to 51.2 million in 1880, and continued to fall in the years that followed, reaching 20 to 24 million rubles per year during 1886–1887. Railway construction, after adding 7,400 versts of new railway during 1871–1875, decreased to only 3,100 versts during 1881–1885, and to 2,800 versts during 1886–1890. Reduced business activity, wholesale closing of factories, mass unemployment, and, finally, the first mass appearance of the labor movement and strikes marked the end of this period in the history of Russian capitalist industry.

Notes

1. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, Chaps. V-VII, particularly pp. 423-431.
2. V. V., *Ocherki kustarnoi promyshlennosti* (Essays on the Handicraft Industries) (1886), p. 150.
3. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, p. 388; see also *Istoriya VKP(b)* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks], A Short Course), p. 7.
4. Lenin, *Ibid.,* Vol. III, p. 380.
5. *Ibid.,* p. 397.
6. *Ibid.,* p. 264.
7. *Ibid.,* p. 274.
8. *Ibid.,* Chap. V, "Pervyye stadii kapitalizma v promyshlennosti" (First Stages of Capitalism in Industry), especially paragraphs III and V.
9. In connection with the factory statistics of that period, see the critical remarks in Lenin's well known work, *Razvitiye kapitalizma v Rossii* (Development of Capitalism in Russia), Chap. VII, Sec. 2, pp. 354-364.

10. V. Pokrovskii, *K voprosu ob ustoichivosti aktivnogo balansa* (On the Problem of the Stability of the Favorable Balance) (1898), pp. xxix-xxxi.
11. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. III, p. 397.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 388.
13. Pazhitnov, *Polozheniye rabochego klassa v Rossii* (Condition of the Working Class in Russia) (1906), pp. 21-27. On the position of the workers during the period of the 1880's, see the very important reports of the factory inspectors, particularly, for example, Yanzhul, *Fabrichnyi byt Moskovskoi gubernii, otchyot za 1882–1883* (Factory Life in the Moscow Province, a Report for 1882–1883) (St. Petersburg, 1884); Svyatlovskii, *Otchyot po kharkovskomu okrugu za 1885*; (Report on the Kharkov District for 1885); Davidov, *Otchyot po Peterburgskomu okrugu* (Report on the Petersburg District) (1885); Peskov, *Fabrichnyi byt Vladimirskoi gubernii* (Factory Life in the Vladimir Province) (1884).
14. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. IV, p. 384.
15. Kaufman, *Statistika russkikh bankov* (Russian Bank Statistics) (1875), Pt. II, p. xxxviii.
16. Brandt, *Inostrannyye kapitaly* (Foreign Capital) (1899), Vol. II, p. 20.

(XXV)

The Formation of a Domestic Market for Industrial Capitalism

One of the most important problems that must be solved in order to understand the post-Reform, or capitalist, economic structure of Russia during the last decades of the nineteenth century is the problem of the formation of a domestic market for industrial capitalism. For this reason Lenin in his investigation of the origin of capitalism in Russia assigns a central position to the problem of the formation of the internal market. He says:

> The basic process in the creation of the domestic market [the development of the production of goods and capitalism] is the social division of labor. It is a process in which one after another of the various activities in processing raw materials become separated from agriculture . . . and evolve into independent branches of industry, exchanging their products (which have by now become *goods*) for the products of agriculture.[1]

The basic elements in the formation of the domestic market for capital, according to Lenin, are: the expanded circulation of goods, the rise of cities and an increased commercial-industrial population, internal colonization, the differentiation of the peasantry, the increased employment of hired labor, and the formation of an internal labor market.[2]

We have seen in the preceding chapters, from our inquiry into the conditions of development prevailing in agriculture and industry during 1860–1880, that the elements in the formation of an internal market for capitalism achieved great success in comparison with the pre-Reform, feudal economy and its rather poorly developed market economy. From the same inquiry we have also learned that during the first two or three decades of the capitalist period many of the above-cited elements active in the creation of the domestic market for industrial capitalism had not yet attained their complete fruition. The village continued to cling to many survivals of semifeudal conditions and natural farming. The process of separation between industry and agriculture was far from complete and, hence, the purchasing power of the village with regard to the products of capitalist industry, although growing steadily, was still at a low level. At the same time, capitalist industry had not yet freed itself from primitive forms of small-scale manufacturing production, the "distribution system," and "home work." The backwardness of industry during the seventies was particularly striking in connection with its leading

branches of production, namely the ferrous metallurgy, metal-smelting, and fuel industries, in which the future great capitalist centers such as the Donbass and Baku regions were then only entering the first stages of their production. Heavy industry, therefore, especially rail production, machine and locomotive building, and the fuel industry, were still unable fully to meet the demand for their products, so that even during the first expansion in railway construction this demand had to be covered by imports from abroad.

Hence the process of formation of the internal market for capitalist industry, along with the development of industry itself during the seventies and especially during the depression period of the eighties, could not have gained any great momentum. A more vigorous drive in that direction came with the economic upsurge of the nineties, which in turn was made possible by the economic advance made during the preceding decade. Indeed, irrespective of the economic lull of the eighties, the growth of the social division of labor continued and the development of a market economy was intensified, dissolving the remnants of precapitalist relationships, accelerating the separation between industry and agriculture, and creating an internal market for the benefit of capitalism. The capitalist form of exploitation stimulated the accumulation of capital, creating conditions favorable for the expansion of investment in producers' goods. The banks and corporations continued to serve as the great storage centers for the concentration of capital, preparing the way for further industrial gains and a wave of prosperity.

Due to the disproportionate development inherent in capitalism, the movement of expansion proceeded at an uneven rate both in individual industries and in the various regions of the country. In Lenin's description, the process of formation of a market for capitalism presented two aspects: "the development of capitalism in depth, that is, the further entrenchment of capitalist agriculture and capitalist industry over a given, fixed, and closed territory, and the development of capitalism in breadth, that is, the extension of the scope of capitalist rule over new territory." [3] When, for example, in the textile industry the progress of capitalism "in depth"—the expansion of the home market within the old territory—was retarded as a result of prevailing backward social-economic conditions in those regions, then "the factory owners would indeed not wait until the other branches of the nation's economy had overtaken the stage in capitalist development attained by the textile industry. The factory owners were in need of a market immediately. . . . They had to begin their search for a market in another area," [4] that is, attempt to promote capitalism in breadth. "This feature of capitalism," says Lenin, "is manifested with great force, and continues to be manifested, in post-Reform Russia." [5]

The more the backward agrarian character of the economy and social con-

ditions in Russia restricted and retarded the development of industrial capitalism "in depth," the more necessary it became to seek a path of expansion "in breadth." This was soon reflected in the assimilation of the remote border areas of Russia, in the linking of these areas by railroad to the industrial centers, and in the development of markets in those areas both for the sale of industrial goods and for the purchase of their own raw material. The vigorous construction of railroads and the expansion of the railway network created a livelier demand for the products of the iron and steel industry, of machine and locomotive building, as well as for coal and petroleum, and placed these major industries among the foremost economic factors contributing to the general industrial boom.

This nature of the development of Russian capitalism "in breadth" was a natural and logical consequence of the disproportionate development of capitalism. But it was precisely the inadequacy, the narrow scope, and the slow development of the internal market for the extension of capitalism "in depth" that was responsible for creating its vast connection, especially in the leading branches of heavy industry (metallurgy and fuel), with government policy in railway construction and with government orders.[6] All this largely determined both the character and cause of industrial prosperity during the nineties, as well as the course and the nature of this process of formation of an internal market for industrial capitalism that was instrumental to the prosperity.

THE CHARACTER OF THE PRE-REFORM DOMESTIC MARKET "The circulation of goods," says Lenin, "precedes the production of goods and constitutes one of the conditions (but not the sole condition) for the emergence of production for the market."[7] Therefore, as we have seen earlier, a gain in the circulation of goods in Russian national economy had occurred long before the emergence of capitalism, within the scope of our serf economy. But the content, organization, and technique of that type of goods circulation bore the imprint of the feudal era (fairs, overland hauls, the absence of credit, and so forth). Only the capitalist era introduced into all phases of the circulation of goods a type of organization appropriate to capitalism; namely, railroads, banks, and so forth, simultaneously extending the scale of the commodity market to the utmost extent.

Under conditions of feudal economy, the process of creating a single national market was retarded by causes inherent in the economic structure of serfdom as well as in its system of distribution and transportation of goods. True, the first steps in the development of a perfected system of capitalist transportation, the railroad system, were taken in Russia sometime prior to the abolition of serfdom, and almost concurrently with the beginning of rail-

way building among the capitalist nations of the West. Yet this capitalist medium of distribution was in such contradiction to the entire feudal system of the time that it could not expand with any vigor; prior to the Reform the entire railway network of Russia consisted of 1,000 versts of line. Although they undermined the natural character of the economy under serfdom, the first railways were at the outset still unable to overcome the self-contained character and limited scale of the market under serfdom.

These conditions continued to prevail to a certain extent during the early period after the Reform, before the greatly expanded railroad network succeeded in introducing a radical change into all market conditions. With the prevalence of small local industry throughout the country, its market was for the most part limited to the narrow scope of local turnover imposed by the natural character of economy still obtaining in the village. Only the larger cities, like Moscow, Petersburg, Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Nizhny Novgorod, and Kazan, had already begun to function as rather large producing, consuming, and trading centers with a permanent demand and circulation of goods. The sale of agricultural products was preponderantly from the manorial farms, which had at their disposal not only a large volume of salable produce but also the available labor of the serfs, who under the existing "carting" obligation had to deliver the products of the manor to the market.

In the absence of improved roads, together with the small volume of circulating goods and the low purchasing power of the population, the commerce of that period developed primitive forms of commodity turnover. The leading commodities in trade were the agricultural raw materials collected through small buyers in small lots from the landowners as well as the peasants, concentrated into the hands of the larger merchants, and then directed into the domestic consuming areas or abroad. Trade circulated rather slowly, but the profits earned were enormous. In organization and merchants' resources local trade was dominated by small jobbers, although the range of middlemen between the small jobbers and the large-scale merchant-wholesalers was often immense. The reverse flow of goods from town to village was relatively small because of the natural character of the peasant economy, the widespread existence of household crafts, and the limited selection of industrial goods. The sale in the village of industrial products not produced locally was conducted by numerous small tradesmen and peddlers, who sold a variety of products of urban industry at the numerous village fairs, and simultaneously acted as buyers, procuring agricultural raw materials from the peasants and the smaller landowners. The large landowners delivered their agricultural produce directly to the merchant-wholesaler at the far-off markets and ports.

The main organized outlet for the circulation of goods was the agricultural fair, which served as the primary source in the process of concentration of goods in a rather extensive, slow-moving trade. The total number of fairs for the whole country were about 6,500 during the middle sixties. Of these, there were over 33 large fairs with a turnover exceeding one million rubles each (including Nizhny Novgorod with 115 to 130 million rubles, Irbit with 41 million rubles, and others), 27 fairs yielding over 500,000 rubles, and 182 fairs with more than 100,000 rubles; the remaining 6,250 fairs were small county and village affairs. The chief function of this mass of fairs was to collect agricultural raw materials; they also served as channels for the distribution of industrial goods between the producing regions and the village, through the large fairs of Nizhny Novgorod, Irbit, and the Ukraine. The goods of the Moscow industrial center went through Nizhny Novgorod to the Volga and beyond, through Irbit into Siberia, and through the Ukrainian fairs to the south. Every economic region of importance in the country had its own leading commercial center, a fair, around which were grouped the local merchant capitalists directing the supply and sale of goods throughout the entire region, and guiding all purchases and sales through the mass of small middlemen or through their own salesmen.

The development of capitalist relationships after the Reform of 1861 and the rapid movement of railway construction played a vital part in the expansion of the internal market, introducing radical changes into its economic structure as well as its technique. The natural basis of the peasant economy changed rapidly under the impact of money relations, the burden of money payments increased, and the household crafts were undermined at the same time. All this, naturally, drove the peasant toward the market both as a seller of his own agricultural products and as a buyer of industrial goods. The market began to gain conspicuously. The turnover in the volume of goods attracted to the fairs grew from 360 millions in 1860 to 460 million rubles in 1863. The railroads brought a powerful impetus to the distribution of goods and the market, drawing into the orbit of the market for the first time regions never previously touched, increasing the dimensions of the market, and changing radically not only the technical methods but the entire economic structure of the market.

RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION The first efforts in railroad construction in Russia date from the pre-Reform period: the Tsarskoye Selo road opened in 1838, the Warsaw-Vienna line opened in 1851, the Petersburg-Warsaw line opened in 1859, and the Nikolayevskaya railroad line opened in 1851. These roads, however (except for the Nikolayevskaya between Petersburg and Moscow), were of no great economic importance. The first

economically significant roads began to be built during the sixties, when the fall of serfdom impelled agriculture to search for an ever wider market for its products.

In the projected plan of railroad construction, first priority went to the connection of Moscow with Petersburg, and the Baltic ports with the central grain-raising areas. Another line that received early consideration was the southern line, a line planned to connect Moscow with the central region, and the central area and the south with the southern seaports, which would thus open "a means of transportation of great advantage in distributing our products through the south to the foreign market, and through the west and northwest to the interior provinces." [8]

The program of the Chief Company of Russian Railroads (a railway-building corporation founded in 1857) already foreshadowed the principal motivations behind the proposed railroad network. The latter was intended to consist of a main line

> from St. Petersburg to Warsaw and the Prussian frontier, from Moscow by way of Kursk and the lower Dnepr to Feodosiya, and from Kursk and Oryol through Kinaburg to Libau; in this manner an unbroken railroad line running through twenty-six provinces will link: three capitals, our main inland waterways, the centers of our grain surpluses, and two ports in the Black and Baltic seas open nearly all the year; exports abroad are thus facilitated, imports are secured, and the problems of internal food supply solved.[9]

The first aim of the government's railroad policy was, therefore, specifically to draw into commercial circulation and into the market the agricultural districts. The roads considered as being of the utmost importance were those connecting the grain-raising regions with the internal markets. This was the *raison d'être* of the first major road between Petersburg and Moscow. Only later, after the internal market was provided for, were the railroads expected to connect the producing regions with the ports and thereby open the foreign market to their produce.

Less than twenty years after launching a correct and methodical system of railroad construction; namely, by the end of 1868, an entire network of roads began to operate between Moscow and the producing regions: the Moscow-Kursk line drew freight from the central area to Moscow; the Moscow-Kozlov-Voronezh collected grain throughout the southeast; and the Moscow-Nizhny Novgorod line did the same for the entire Volga and Kama district. The Petersburg-Moscow line served partly as a means of drawing freight from the northwest, and partly as a medium for supplying Petersburg with grain from the south. Once these lines were completed, new roads began to be built for the purpose of connecting the grain-trading centers with the ports, and thus aiding the delivery of grain for export. Among these was

the main line of Riga-Tsaritsyn, on which construction in separate sections was begun much earlier but not completed before 1871; running from the lower Volga and the southeastern steppes through the central black-soil area, it served as a broad channel for taking grain from this area to the frontier. After these were completed, a number of additional roads began to be laid, but in no way changed the general plan of the network. By the end of 1875, the central area had acquired the new Moscow-Yaroslavl line, along with the Syzran-Vyazma and Kozlov-Saratov lines, thus extending Moscow's hinterland area further eastward. In addition to these two lines which were partly engaged in serving the export trade, the main export lines were Kursk-Kharkov-Odessa, Kharkov-Rostov, Voronezh-Rostov, and Kharkov-Sevastopol, carrying grain from the central area to the southern ports, and the line Libau-Romny, which, with the Riga-Tsaritsyn line, was drawing freight to the Baltic ports not only from the central but the southern provinces as well.

By 1875 the railroad network outlined in the decree on the organization of the Chief Company of Railroads was in the main completed.

The subsequent development of Russia's rail network in Europe is shown in the following table by five-year periods: [10]

YEARS	RAILROADS OPENED DURING THE PERIOD (VERSTS)	TOTAL LENGTH OF RAILROADS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD (VERSTS)
1861–1865	2,055	1,488
1866–1870	6,659	3,543
1871–1875	7,424	10,202
1876–1880	3,529	17,626
1881–1885	3,074	21,155
1886–1890	2,864	24,229
1891–1895	6,643	27,093
1896–1900	7,978	33,736
1901–1905	6,532	41,714

If we include the construction of the grandiose Siberian railroad that began during the nineties, as well as that of the Central Asiatic rail lines, the increase in the whole network in European and Asiatic Russia for the later years would appear as follows:

YEARS	RAILROADS OPENED DURING THE PERIOD (VERSTS)	TOTAL LENGTH OF RAILROADS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PERIOD (VERSTS)
1896–1900	15,139	48,875
1901–1905	7,255	56,130
1906–1910	5,162	61,292

By 1915 the length of the entire railroad network amounted to 70,300 versts.

The railroads were an important new factor in the development of capitalism and in the formation of the capitalist market. They exerted the strongest single influence on the expansion and intensification of the sales of agricultural products. In the realm of industry the railroads provided a powerful stimulus to many existing industries, while serving as the source of origin for some of them. In the general economy of the country, the railroads affected profoundly the redistribution of productive forces under capitalism by bringing nearer to the centers of capitalist industry the raw material sources, the areas of surplus labor, and the selling markets.

THE GROWTH OF CITIES AND THEIR COMMERCIAL-INDUSTRIAL POPULATION One of the simplest but rather accurate statistical indexes of the process of the social division of labor and market formation is the growth of cities and the increase of the urban commercial-industrial population. Prerevolutionary statistics, including the only general population census taken in 1897, provided no comprehensive statistical answer to such questions. Hence, we must make use of such summary and fragmentary data as are available.

Compared with the last population census taken during the serf period (the "revision" of 1858), the census of 1897 presents the following population figures for the whole country: the total population, including Finland and the Central Asiatic possessions, was 129 millions compared to 74 millions in 1858; in this total the urban population was recorded at 16.3 millions (12.6 per cent) compared with 4.2 millions (5.7 per cent) in 1858. The figures for these two censuses are not altogether comparable in that the increased population for the whole country by 1897 was partly due to new territorial acquisitions. Hence the increased population figures just cited reflect the extent to which the market for capitalism had grown not only "in depth," but also "in breadth," that is, over new territories. This growth is expressed, as may be seen from the above figures, in a 74.3 per cent increase for the whole population, and a 293 per cent increase for the urban portion of the population.

In order to isolate the population increase in the cities as a basic index of the growth of social division of labor and the extension of capitalism "in depth," we may cite below the appropriate figures for the fifty provinces of European Russia computed by Lenin on the basis of data derived from the same census of 1897 and compared with 1863.[11]

"Thus," says Lenin in this connection, "the percentage of the urban population is constantly growing; that is, a movement of the population away

from agriculture toward commercial-industrial occupations may be clearly noted."[12] Most characteristic in this respect was an increase in the number of large cities by more than three times, with the result that in 1897 about 53 per cent of the total urban population lived in large cities as compared with only some 27 per cent in 1863. At this point it should be noted that the figure for the urban settlements given by the census of 1897 was wholly incorrect: the total number of towns listed was 865, whereas in reality Russia's urban industrial settlements were considerably more numerous at that time. According to information gathered in 1896, they numbered 945, although even this figure did not include such industrial urban settlements as, for example, the Sergiyevsky suburb (now Zagorsk), Pavlova, or Kolpino with its 8,000 to 10,000 inhabitants.[13]

Years	Total Population (Millions)	Urban		Number of towns with a population of:			
		Millions	%	More than 200,000	Between 100,000-200,000	Between 50,000-100,000	Total Large Cities
1863	61.4	6.1	9.94	2	1	10	13
1897	94.2	12.1	12.76	5	9	30	44

No less important in judging the process of the social division of labor, which is fundamental in the growth of production for the market and capitalism, are statistics on the distribution of the population by occupations and classes. The census of 1897 provides no useful answer to these questions, especially to the last-named. On the basis of special treatment of the figures of the census of 1897, Lenin presents the following approximate table on professional and class divisions within the Russian population, excluding Finland (round figures in millions).[14]

Division by Occupation		Division by Class	
Agricultural population of Russia	97.0	Upper bourgeoisie, landowners, high officials, and others	3.0
Commercial-industrial population of Russia	21.7	Well-to-do small owners	23.1
Nonproducing population of Russia	6.9	Poor small owners	35.8
		Proletarians and semiproletarians	63.7
Total	125.6	Total (approximate)	125.6

A picture of the professional and class division of the Russian population by the end of the nineties shows the great depth of capitalist contradictions, and at the same time the considerable success achieved in the social division of labor, in the formation of an internal market for industrial capital-

ism, and in the creation of a widespread labor market. In concentrating upon the last-named problem, and summarizing his calculations of the size of the labor market for capitalism, Lenin separates labor into the following approximate figures: (1) agricultural hired workers (in European Russia), 3.5 million; (2) factory, mine, and railroad workers, 1.5 million; (3) construction workers, about one million; (4) workers engaged in forestry, in earthwork, and in the construction of railways, about two million; (5) workers at home employed by the capitalists, and so forth, about two million. Altogether some ten million workers, of whom about 7.5 million were male adults, or nearly one-half of the total adult male population of Russia, participated in production.[15]

Such were the results of capitalist development "in depth" by the late nineties, denoting the extent of formation of the internal market for industrial capitalism.

Another aspect of the process of creating a market for industrial capitalism was the formation of a market for goods, and primarily a market for the major branches of heavy industry, namely iron and steel, rail production, locomotive and machine building, and the fuel industry. In other words the process of formation of the capitalist market for producers' goods served as a significant index of the level of development of industrial capitalism.

THE INDUSTRIAL MARKET We have observed earlier that the intensified railroad construction during the seventies, and later again during the nineties, inevitably stimulated the demand for the products of heavy industry: metallurgy, machine building, fuel, and ceramics. During the seventies we noted an apparent lag in the productive capacity of these industries compared with the demand arising from railroad construction. By 1890 the situation had changed. Industrial capitalism, especially after the rise of the new major areas of heavy industry and fuel production, the Donets, Krivoy Rog, and Baku regions, attempted to gain full control of this internal market in the basic means of industrial production. Consequently the character and dimension of the market for a number of industries, particularly for metals and fuel, presented a changed appearance.

Clearly the increased scale of railroad construction mentioned above, along with the expansion and new construction of heavy industry itself, called for enormous quantities of heavy industrial goods: the products of machine building, rails, beams, machines, locomotives, railroad cars, pipes, bricks, and cement. Let us attempt to calculate the volume of that demand created by the railroads and by other large consumers of iron and steel products.

In accordance with the approximate technical standards of that period, one verst of railroad building consumed about 4,900 to 5,000 poods of rails

and ties, and, in addition, about 150 to 200 poods of pipes, beams, and switches. Expressed in terms of pig iron and computed for the entire length of the railroad lines newly built during 1895–1900, this results in an average of over 15 million poods annually, and considerably more for some years (about 18 million poods in 1898, as much as 32 million in 1899, and 20 million poods in 1900). Furthermore, the construction of new lines also created a demand for new locomotives, new freight and passenger cars. Assuming that each locomotive required as much as 6,000 poods of pig iron, each freight car 365 poods, and each passenger car 1,515 poods, and bearing in mind the volume of new railroad construction, we may estimate that the rolling stock itself consumed an average of 15 to 20 million poods of pig iron each year. Moreover, apart from new construction, a considerable demand for metal came from the operational requirements of the railroads and from the shops engaged in the repair of the tracks and rolling stock. Altogether, according to information from the Ministry of Finance, the entire locomotive and railroad-car inventory of the roads was more than doubled in the ten-year period between 1890 and 1900. (Locomotives increased by 93 per cent, passenger cars by 113 per cent, and freight cars by 118 per cent.) The consumption of metal for maintenance and repair of the railroads amounted approximately to 400 poods per verst. Applying this rate of consumption to the size of the railroads' rolling stock and the volume of new construction, it may be approximately determined that railway operations consumed between 13 and 15 million poods during the period under discussion. On the whole, according to the figures of the representative organs of the iron and steel industry, the railroads during those years absorbed annually between 800 and 1,000 locomotives, 20,000 to 25,000 freight cars, 1,000 to 1,300 passenger cars, and between 20 and 22 million poods of rails.[16] In terms of pig iron, all the above calculations constitute a total of 440 million poods, or an average of 40 million poods of pig iron per year during 1890–1900, with the more active years consuming between 40 and 65 million poods of metal (for example, 36 million in 1897, 45 million in 1898, and 65 million in 1899). If we recall that the entire iron and steel industry smelted a total of 55 million poods of pig iron in 1890, 68.8 million in 1895, and only by 1900 succeeded in raising its production to 176.8 million poods, it becomes clear how significant and decisive was the railroads' demand for metal in Russia's metallurgy, absorbing in some years nearly the entire domestic output of pig iron.

In addition to consuming the basic products of heavy industry, railroad construction created a demand for equally large quantities of brick, cement, and lumber. This was promptly reflected in a sharply increased demand and growing production within these industries, which in their rate of development were among the outstanding industries of those years. Moreover, the

increased railway movement created a significant demand for fuel, with the result that the coal and petroleum industries were also stimulated by the railways to a greatly increased level of production.

To be sure, the direct influence of railway building was not the only factor in the improved market condition. The connection established by the railroads between an entire mass of new towns and the rural areas resulted in an expansion in urban construction and an increased demand for the same products of heavy industry and building materials. However, compared with the railroads the urban construction market was rather small for heavy industry. For a general evaluation of the size of this urban construction market, it will be sufficient to cite a few figures on conditions in the Russian towns and town improvement during the early twentieth century.[17] Of the total number of 949 listed towns, "big" cities (over 100,000 population) constituted 2.1 per cent, average cities (20,000 to 100,000) amounted to 18.6 per cent, while small towns and "city-settlements" comprised 79.3 per cent of the total. Only 44 per cent of these cities were within the orbit of the railroad network. As for the material used in construction, 56 per cent of all listed urban structures were wooden and only 24 per cent of stone; 26 per cent of all urban structures were covered with wood, and only 23 per cent with iron. Electric lighting was found in only 7 per cent of the towns, water piping in 18 per cent, and sewage systems in 3.5 per cent. Obviously, with such conditions (except, of course, for the largest and best run cities) urban construction during the nineties could not have been an important factor in the market for the products of the metal, building, and fuel industries: steel beams, pipes, cement, or roofing iron.

A larger capitalist market for the products of the metallurgical, construction, and fuel industries was new construction in capitalist industry itself, and, more specifically, heavy industry and ferrous metallurgy, which were steadily expanding their production capacity during these years under the impact of the ever growing demand of the railroads. Seventeen very large metal plants and seven giant metal-processing and machine-building plants (by the standards of the period, of course), besides many small plants, were erected during the nineties.[18] It is impossible to compute statistically the demand for metal created by this type of construction, but it was obviously significant. It is sufficient to indicate that capital investment in construction for the iron and steel industry of the south totaled 833 million rubles during the five-year period of 1895–1899. Spokesmen for the mining industry of southern Russia have also emphasized that "a period of construction of large plants itself creates a vast market for the existing metallurgical plants, because the equipment of the plants in construction consumed large quantities of all types of iron shapes, accessories, machines, and water and gas mains."[19]

It thus may be safely estimated that during the decade of 1890–1900 the railroads, along with the metallurgical and metal-processing industries proper, according to our reckoning jointly absorbed up to 70 or 75 per cent of the total production of ferrous metals. The remaining 25 to 30 per cent went into the mass market, converted into roofing iron, nails, household articles, and agricultural implements. Among the latter should be mentioned the building of agricultural machinery, which during the nineties consumed between 7 and 8 per cent of the total iron and steel output, still far from filling the domestic demand for such machines, half of which had to be met by imports from abroad. But if during the industrial surge of the seventies the growing internal demand for the products of heavy industry had to be met to a considerable degree by the importation of foreign goods, the increased consumption of ferrous metals during the nineties was substantially satisfied by domestic production. Thus, during 1870–1879, with the demand for iron and steel amounting to 59.2 million poods, domestic production of this product amounted to 24.4 million poods, or 41 per cent of the demand, whereas during 1890–1899, when consumption had reached 127.5 million poods, domestic production of metal was 92.3 million poods, or 73 per cent of total consumed. Average per capita consumption of pig iron during the nineties was 1.05 poods, or almost double the rate of 0.58 poods prevailing during 1880–1889, a rate that was nevertheless very low by comparison with other countries for the same years (356 pounds in England and 254 pounds in Germany).

However, these summary figures on metal consumption do not reveal in detail the nature of the market for the metallurgical industry. If we select from the general volume of its production an item in railroad construction such as rails, and another product consumed by the mass market such as roofing iron, we obtain the following striking comparison (in million poods):

	1890	1900
Rails	10.1	30.3
Roofing iron	8.4	29.6

In other words capitalist industry produced more rails than a product as vital in mass consumption as roofing iron, which was particularly needed in "straw-thatched" Russia. In addition the basic region of capitalist heavy industry, the southern metallurgical district, served overwhelmingly (with 68.8 per cent of its production) the needs of the railroads, while some large plants, like the Druzhkovsky, and the Novorossiisky, were engaged in the production of rails, rims, and other railway parts to the extent of 87 or 100 per cent of its total output. True, as we have seen, even this production did

not cover the entire domestic demand inasmuch as 27 per cent, or about 35.1 million poods of all products of the metal industry, expressed in terms of pig-iron, was filled by imports.

Similarly the coal and oil industries found their markets chiefly in large-scale industrial production. For example, the Donets coal industry during the second half of the nineties sold 36 per cent of its output to the transportation industry, 29 per cent to the metal plants, and only 25 per cent to private consumers. (Ten per cent was self-consumed.) Of course the market for the oil industry was mainly (except for kerosene) a large industry market. Thus, domestic consumption of kerosene in 1893 was 37.9 million poods, while in 1900 it rose to 54.6 million; mazut (petroleum residue) sales comprised 114.5 million and 286.4 million poods respectively, and all other oil products, 182.4 million and 381 million. In other words internal consumption of kerosene increased by 44 per cent, mazut by 150 per cent, and all oil products by 190 per cent. The Russian oil industry was becoming ever increasingly a "mazut" or railroad industry, and in part a lubricant industry, but not a "kerosene" or peasant consumption industry. In 1892 the cost of the total amount of kerosene produced exceeded the cost of mazut three and one-half times, while in 1900 it was two-thirds as high. Inasmuch as so large a quantity of petroleum could not be absorbed by domestic industry, it was channeled into exports on a large scale, increasing from 4.7 million poods (of which kerosene comprised 2.6 million) during 1881–1885 to 57.9 million poods (including 47.1 million poods of kerosene) in 1891–1895, and to 90.9 million poods (75.3 million poods of kerosene) in 1900.

The nature of the market in which the light industry, and its most typical branch, the cotton industry, sold their products was somewhat different. This market was largely based on mass domestic consumption, which was expanding rapidly during the nineties when the cotton factory had finally displaced home-woven linen goods in peasant consumption. In 1890 per capita consumption of cotton fabrics in Russia amounted to 23 arshin, or a total of 2.7 billion arshin for a population of 115.5 million, while in 1899, with a population of 129.7 million, per capita production amounted to 36 arshin on the basis of a total production of 4.7 billion. In other words, over a ten-year period per capita consumption rose by 56.5 per cent and total consumption by 75 per cent. Meanwhile, cotton production itself increased during this period by 107 per cent in terms of the value of its production, and by 100 per cent in terms of the amount of cotton processed. Therefore, although this level of production was not very high in absolute volume (even in 1904 per capita consumption of cotton in Russia amounted to only 5.3 pounds compared to England's 39 pounds, or to the 20.4 pounds in the United States), nevertheless the expansion of domestic consumption and the mass market fur-

nished the basis for the further growth of the cotton industry. This was one of the most important reasons why the cotton industry was least affected by the subsequent crisis.

At this point we should call attention, however, to another palpable feature in the development of the cotton industry. With domestic consumption of the industry's products at a low level, due to the limited purchasing power of the population, the rapidly expanding cotton industry began to seek an outlet for the export of its goods, chiefly in the markets of the Near East and the Far East. In 1890 total exports of cotton fabrics were still somewhat below 100,000 poods, but in 1900 attained 324,200 poods, with 44 per cent going to Persia and 30 per cent to China.

Another industry, evolving under conditions of an internal market which was "regulated" in the manner of a monopoly and restricted to obtain monopoly prices, was the sugar industry. But whereas the highly modernized cotton industry went into the foreign market on the strength of its own technical and economic progress, although aided by some protective measures, the policy behind the sugar industry was based entirely on the monopolization of the domestic market by the sugar-mill men in the interest of raising domestic prices and lowering export prices for the foreign market. In 1887 the sugar manufacturers, on the basis of a private agreement, organized a syndicate (joined by 206 factories of the existing 226) with a production quota for each mill, and on condition that all sugar produced above quota must be exported abroad. In 1895 the government assumed the regulation of the total production quota, the release of sugar to the internal market, and the production quotas of each plant, all of which made the decisions of the sugar-mill syndicate mandatory. Restricting domestic consumption in this manner by stringent quotas (to 25 million poods, for example, during 1895–1896) and by imposing a high excise tax upon sugar released to the domestic market (1 ruble, 75 kopecks per pood compared to a cost of production of 3 rubles, 25 kopecks), the government also introduced the system of rebates on this excise in the event that the surplus sugar produced above the quota was exported abroad. These measures implemented the policy of greater profits for the aristocratic millowners by raising the domestic prices and exporting at low prices abroad. At a time, therefore, when the Russian consumer (in 1900) paid 6 rubles, 15 kopecks a pood for lump sugar, Russian sugar in London sold for 2 rubles, 38 kopecks a pood. Under such conditions the domestic market for sugar products improved only in the slightest degree during the ten-year period under examination; the rate of consumption remained nearly unchanged, while all excess production went into the foreign market. Thus, during 1890 and 1891 the domestic market absorbed 24.4 million poods, and 37.4 million poods in 1899 and 1900, that is, the capacity

of the market increased by 54 per cent, but almost exclusively through a rise in population, since per capita consumption was still only 10.5 pounds as compared with, say, 92 pounds in England. Exports abroad during the same period rose, however, from 3.3 million poods to 12.5, a fourfold increase.

THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE CIRCULATION OF GOODS We have thus seen the general quantitative results of the formation of a market for the major branches of capitalist industry during the last decade of the nineteenth century. Let us now turn to an examination of the general dynamic aspect of the circulation of goods as it began to develop during the capitalist period under the influence of the whole complex of elements examined by us as part of the formation of a domestic market for capitalism.

The early phase of the capitalist era during the sixties, and more particularly the period of intensive railroad building during the seventies, were years of far-reaching changes in Russia's industrial, agricultural, and commercial geography. The decline of the old industrial and commercial centers, the emergence and development of new vital areas, the expansion of some regions at the expense of others, and the shift to new trade routes altered completely the conditions under which production was conducted in the localities now traversed by the railroads. Along with the stimulation of industry in general, and with the increased tempo of both domestic and foreign commerce, came a sharp turn in industrial and commercial relations between the various regions of Russia. Under the direct impact of the railroads, the first two or three decades of the capitalist era thoroughly changed the industrial geography of the land and the commercial significance of individual centers.[20]

The very fact that railroad construction was first launched in the black-soil producing regions indicated exactly what was intended to be used as goods for the development of commercial activity of the railroads. The prime function of the railroads became the transportation of grain shipments. For the first time it was established as a fact that the farther the railroads cut into the interior of the country the more intensive the railway traffic became, and the greater were the share of grain shipments. The mass of grain that swamped the railroads rapidly began to increase both absolutely and relatively, outstripping the shipments of all other types of freight. During the first years of the network's existence, railway shipments may be classified as shown on page 512 (in million poods).[21]

While gaining steadily in the total volume of freight on all railroads, the shipment of grain on some lines was almost the sole freight item and consequently almost the only source of income. On the Tambov-Kozlov railroad

grain shipments constituted as much as 73.1 per cent of total freight, on the Rybinsk-Bologoye, 57.6; on the Oryol-Gryazy, 83.6; on the Byazhsk-Morshansk, 88.9.

Not only did the railroads draw into commodity circulation ever larger masses of agricultural and grain products, but they also changed drastically the existing routes used to supply the market. They ruined the old beaten overland highways, diverted freight from some wharves while expanding the hinterland of others, and eliminated the commercial role of some of the former overland reloading, redistributing, and transit centers, rendering them unnecessary by "dispersing" commercial turnover throughout many small railway stations.

YEARS	TOTAL FREIGHT	ALL GRAINS	% OF GRAIN IN TOTAL MOVEMENT
1870	492	135	27.5
1873	1,152	444	38.5
1874	1,356	557	41.1
1875	1,374	577	42.1

The method of supplying such large centers as Moscow changed completely after the coming of the railroads, on the one hand as a result of the sudden decline in overland deliveries (from 15,000,000 to 500,000 or 800,000 poods) and the disruption of the former hinterlands of the ports under the impact of the railways (for example, the Riga-Oryol line), and, on the other hand, as a result of the enormous expansion of the hinterland of Moscow along the other railway lines.

Equally important was the influence exerted by the railroads in changing the composition of the commercial class. Along with the dispersion of the once immense agricultural trade concentrated at a few centers of collection, transit, and marketing, the role of large-scale commercial capital also changed. In place of the great Moscow or Kolomna merchant, the Nizhny Novgorod miller, the Moscow flax or hemp-factory owner, the large export wholesaler, and the old "flour dealers," the railroad stations now swarmed with a mass of small traders, exporters, and commission merchants, all buying grain, hemp, hides, lard, sheepskin, down, and bristles—in a word, everything bound for either the domestic or the foreign market. Operating with relatively little capital, aided by credit, with a small mark-up in price but with a rapid turnover of capital, these petty commercial middlemen penetrated deep into the village, constantly drawing the rural area into the orbit of cash turnover, increasing the role of the market in the economy of the village, and augmenting the volume of goods available both for domestic and foreign commerce.[22]

THE POLICY OF RAILROAD RATES The influence of the railroads in drawing new remote regions and the products of their agriculture into commercial circulation began to be felt in full strength after the government took control of railroad rates during the late eighties and introduced a system of differential rates. The differential system established lower freight rates for long distances as compared with short hauls, and thus, by reducing the price of shipment, expanded the hinterland for the selling market and succeeded in drawing into market turnover the most remote regions in the southeast, the Trans-Volga, and Siberia, which formerly had no sales outlet because of high carrying costs of shipment. Now, with the cost of shipment lowered, local prices began to be determined by the price prevailing at the central market, causing prices to rise faster in the most distant markets. Thus, if we follow the rise of prices during the period of railroad development both in the consuming area markets and in the borderland areas as well, we find, for example, that the price of a quarter of rye during the seventies rose, as compared with pre-Reform prices, by 30 per cent at the Petersburg market, 50 per cent at Rybinsk, 66 per cent at Oryol, 85 per cent at Kharkov, and 100 per cent at Saratov. Hence the amount of the price increase grew in proportion to the distance from the center as a direct result of railway transportation.

The new horizons opening before the agriculture of the borderland areas effected revolutionary changes in the farming of those regions. Throughout the once abandoned steppes, where only extensive sheepherding was performed heretofore, the virgin soil began to be rapidly turned over and intensively planted with cereal grains for sale abroad and in the domestic markets. This competition from the new and rich regions of the south, as well as Siberia, against the former "granary" of the domestic and foreign market—the central black-soil area, spelled the ruin of the central region's agriculture where the cost of arable land was high, and where primitive agrarian methods and high rental charges prevailed.

For the benefit of the landowners and grain producers of the central black-soil zone, and for their protection against the cheap Siberian grain, the railroads introduced the so-called "Chelyabinsk break" in the grain-rate schedule. Under this "break" the differential rate for Siberian grain bound for the European ports applied as far as Chelyabinsk, while between the latter station and the ports a new effective rate was enforced.

The government tax policy, the ruthlessness with which taxes were exacted, and their own mortgaged lands compelled the peasants to sell an ever larger share of their products in the market. In some regions this was accompanied by very grave consequences. The peasant farms of the agricultural center were forced to carry their produce to the market at very low prices, and only by reducing their own consumption.

The agricultural market witnessed its most significant expansion after 1870. Moreover, since the domestic market could not absorb the profusion of grain and other products streaming toward it, the foreign market began to account for an ever larger share in the turnover of agricultural goods. At the same time the products of the agricultural borderlands began to participate more prominently in the volume of market trade.

We shall cite a few statistical illustrations tracing the developments in the circulation of goods during those years.

THE CHARACTER OF THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS Let us first of all juxtapose the basic elements in the progress of railroad movement: [23]

YEARS	LENGTH OF NETWORK (VERSTS)	VOLUME OF FREIGHT (MILLION POODS)	HAULAGE OF FREIGHT (BILLION POOD-VERSTS)	FREIGHT PER ONE VERST (POOD)
1865–1869	4,682	377	72.9	81
1870–1874	12,441	978	203.7	78
1875–1879	18,513	1,698	383.4	93
1880–1884	21,611	2,707	649.6	125
1885–1889	24,882	3,628	747.9	146
1890–1894	27,940	4,648	989.2	166
1895–1898	34,161	6,470	1,504.5	189

Thus, the volume of freight in general grew faster (17 times) than the railroad mileage (7.5 times), while the haulage of freight, reflecting railroad shipments from the more distant regions, increased still faster (21 times).

The major branches of Russia's economy were variously represented in railroad traffic and in its expansion. Specifically, the railroads carried on an average during 1895–1897: [24]

	MILLION POODS	% OF TOTAL MOVEMENT
Products of Agriculture	1,023.9	36.8
Agriculture	599.9	21.2
Forestry	364.5	13.5
Livestock, fishing, and poultry	60.4	2.1
Products of Industry	1,692.8	60.0
Textile fibers	53.7	1.9
Foodstuffs	285.1	10.1
Ceramic and glass production	130.2	4.6
Mining industry	947.3	33.7
Metal processing and machine building	68.0	2.4
Colonial Goods	17.7	0.6

As to the bulk of shipments, about two-thirds comprised the products of industry, half of which consisted of mine products. The village provided more than a third of all freight, with agricultural products in the lead.

Let us now see what changes occurred in the character and composition of railroad freight movement during the last three decades of the nineteenth century under examination.

The average annual volume of railroad shipments in the major commodity groups was as follows: [25]

COMMODITY GROUPS	QUANTITY (MILLION POODS)			GROWTH DURING 1876–1902	
	1876–1878	1895–1897	1898–1902	Million Poods	%
Petroleum products	6.4	200.7	236.9	230.5	3,602
Coal	90.3	446.6	639.1	548.8	608
Iron and steel, including rails	23.8	99.5	122.4	98.6	414
Lumber	67.8	201.7	263.5	195.7	289
Sugar	21.6	51.1	63.9	42.3	196
Cotton	7.2	16.9	21.8	14.6	203
Wool	4.2	8.4	8.5	4.3	102
Eight cereal grains	311.9	572.0	620.5	308.6	99
All goods of low-speed freight	978.0	2,808.3	3,649.0	2,671.0	273

During the early days of the railway network, the shipment of grain constituted the largest share in total freight movement. During 1876–1878 the eight cereal grains accounted for 30 per cent of all railroad freight, or 312 million poods out of 978 million, while on a number of roads they comprised as much as 50 to 75 per cent of total freight. In addition a vast portion of this traffic was in the form of the "gray" peasant grains as agriculture's leading product in domestic sale and export. By 1878–1885, however, the proportion of grain in total railroad freight declined to 26 per cent, falling further to 23 per cent during 1886–1890. Because of a more rapid rate of development in industry, and because of the backwardness of agriculture, the capitalist market and the railroads became more an outlet for the products of capitalist industry and less for the products of agricultural production. During 1876–1902 total railroad freight increased more than 3.5 times, in which the greatest rate of increase was made by fuel shipments (petroleum increased 36 times and coal 6 times), iron and steel products (5 times), and the products of light industry (3 times). By contrast, the leading item in the railroad freight of the seventies, cereal grains, only doubled.

Another characteristic feature in the progress of railroad traffic and an index of the expansion of capitalist turnover of goods was the ever greater territorial embrace of the national economy by rail-freight movement. This

may be seen from the increase in the average haul of various goods. Comparing the figures for 1876–1880 with those of 1896–1898, the average railroad haul of petroleum during that interval rose from 145 versts to 490 versts; coal increased its average travel from 288 versts to 359, lumber from 162 to 308, and the six grains from 478 to 646 versts. In other words the area of sale more than doubled for some of the major commodities of that period with the increase in the density of the railroad network.

Apart from the influence of the railroads, the circulation of goods benefited to a significant extent from the improved inland waterways and steamboat transportation. In 1863 there were only 646 steamboats totaling 447,000 horsepower in Russia; by 1890 that number had increased to 1,824 steamers and 103,000 horsepower, while the Russian inland waterways fleet in 1895 consisted of 2,539 steamers of 130,000 horsepower. Hence water transportation, and steamer and steamer-barge shipments in particular, grew very rapidly, although not as fast as railroad transportation. The total volume of freight transportation was, therefore, as follows: [26]

YEARS	WATER TRANSPORT		RAILROAD TRANSPORT	
	In Million Poods	% of Growth	In Million Poods	% of Growth
1876–1880	852	100	1,053	100
1881–1885	852	100	1,418	135
1886–1890	1,015	119	1,801	171
1891–1895	1,228	144	2,270	215
1896–1898	1,684	198	3,049	290

In the course of twenty years the commercial traffic of all freight doubled in size on the inland waterways, and tripled on the railroads.

Besides the total increase in contact with the market by the various products of industry, an important index for some products is the extent of their "marketability," that is, the proportion of the total product that reaches the market. This is of prime importance in connection with the products of agriculture, since even in a developed commodity economy only a portion of farm commodities finds its way to the market. The size of this portion serves as an important index of the development of commercial farming. Unfortunately we have no statistical data that might give a picture of the development of the commercial aspect of our economy with respect to all agricultural products. Therefore we shall confine ourselves to its basic and most characteristic products; namely, the cereal grains.

CHANGE IN THE MARKETABILITY OF GRAIN The growth of the urban population and industry, which greatly increased first during the

seventies and again during the nineties, was inevitably reflected in an increased commercial output of agricultural goods in general, and of the cereal grains in particular. Beginning with the eighties the "marketability" of grain was growing considerably faster than grain production itself. Thus, if we take the freight shipments of grain in their correlation to the harvests as a measure of the volume and as an indication of marketability, then we obtain the following comparisons for the major cereal grains over a number of five-year periods: [27]

YEARS	HARVEST		SHIPMENTS		SHIPMENTS IN % OF HARVEST
	Million Poods	% of Growth	Million Poods	% of Growth	
1886–1890	2,457	100.0	421.8	100.0	17.2
1891–1895	2,709	110.3	476.3	112.7	17.6
1896–1900	2,993	121.8	615.0	145.8	20.5
1901–1905	3,485	141.8	744.7	176.6	21.4
1906–1910	3,300	134.3	897.5	212.8	27.2
1911–1913	4,557	185.5	842.1	199.6	18.5

For certain individual grains we find an appreciable difference in the relation between shipments and harvests, as may be seen from the following juxtaposition:

YEARS	PROPORTION OF RAILROAD SHIPMENTS TO THE HARVEST			
	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats
1896–1900	21.8%	5.8%	10.3%	13.0%
1901–1905	21.9	6.6	14.3	16.3
1906–1910	26.4	6.4	18.8	14.1
1911–1913	22.9	5.1	20.2	14.2

From the above it may be seen that at the beginning of the twentieth century railroad freight received about one-fourth of all the wheat produced, one-fifth of the barley, one-seventh of the oats, and only one-fifteenth of the rye. But this, of course, does not answer the questions arising in connection with the "marketability" of our grain products. If we add to the railroad shipments all cargoes carried by water and overland shipment, as well as the intraregional sale of grain, then the general marketability of grain may be estimated at 50 per cent during the early twentieth century, chiefly for the major commercial grains, wheat, and barley.

Another rather important aspect of the marketability of grains is its trend toward either the internal or the foreign market. There was much variation in this respect in the individual regions. Thus the central agricultural region shipped 57.9 per cent of all of its grains into internal circulation, the Volga

region, 53 per cent, and the left-bank Ukraine, 53.5 per cent, while the right-bank Ukraine sent only 27.2 per cent, and the New Russia region, 24.6 per cent. The two latter regions were specializing in exports to a large extent.

The growing role of the internal market in the absorption of grain products becomes more apparent when we inquire into the share of the total grain output going into exports. The answer is provided by the following table: [28]

YEARS	PERCENTAGE RELATION OF EXPORTS TO THE HARVEST				
	Number of Provinces	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats
1886–1890	50	46.3	8.5	33.6	10.6
1891–1895	50	37.9	5.7	34.6	10.7
1896–1900	53	28.7	6.8	26.9	8.1
1901–1905	53	26.6	6.3	31.1	11.3
1906–1910	53	25.6	3.9	37.4	8.0
1911		34.2	5.4	52.5	13.4
1912		16.2	2.2	29.8	6.6
1913		15.0	2.9	34.2	4.0

In the course of the eighties, nearly one-half of the wheat harvest went into exports, during 1901–1905 the share of exports declined to almost one-quarter, while during 1912 and 1913 only 15 to 16 per cent of the wheat found its way into exports. The export percentage of barley, on the whole, changed little, whereas that of rye and oats, which was quite small from the start, also declined perceptibly. All this clearly indicated the increased significance of the internal market and domestic demand for agricultural products, owing to the development of capitalist industry and the growth of cities.

THE EXPORT MARKET AND FOREIGN TRADE The export market in general, and the export of agricultural products in particular, formed an integral part of the economy of capitalism and the capitalist market. Let us first submit some general figures on the total volume of foreign trade, both exports and imports, over a number of years (in millions of rubles): [29]

YEARS	EXPORT	IMPORT	BALANCE (+ OR −)
1861–1865	225.8	206.7	+ 19.1
1866–1870	317.3	317.8	− 0.5
1871–1875	470.6	565.8	− 95.2
1876–1880	527.3	517.8	+ 9.5
1881–1885	549.9	494.3	+ 55.6
1886–1890	630.9	392.3	+238.6
1891–1895	621.4	463.5	+157.9
1896–1900	698.2	607.3	+ 90.9

Our exports began to rise rapidly after the sixties, showing a threefold increase during a period of forty years. Imports rose steeply during the seventies, the period of our first industrial upsurge, then decreased during the quiescent period of the eighties, and increased once more during the prosperity years of the late nineties. These changes were appropriately reflected in the total balance of our foreign trade.

The significance of foreign trade in the development of industrial capitalism may be judged by such an indication as the volume of machinery imported for the purpose of developing industry.

Russian average annual imports of machines and tools of all types by five-year periods across the European frontier were as follows:

YEARS	MILLION RUBLES	YEARS	MILLION RUBLES
1861–1865	7.4	1881–1885	22.4
1866–1870	18.1	1886–1890	18.5
1871–1875	29.4	1891–1895	33.7
1876–1880	49.9	1896	59.8

In this manner foreign trade gave Russian industry during 1876–1880 machinery and production equipment at the rate of 50 million rubles per year. Especially illuminating in this connection was the rapid increase of machinery imports during 1861–1880, and the abrupt decline during 1881–1891, owing to the stagnant conditions in industry during those years, followed by a new vigorous increase during 1891–1895 parallel with the new industrial upsurge of the nineties.

The leading position in our export trade during 1880–1890 was held by agricultural products. In our export trade of 1891–1895, all products of rural economy composed 75 to 80 per cent of the total value, and the cereal grains alone accounted for one-half of that high percentage. If we compare, for example, the value of exports during 1861–1865 with the exports of 1891–1895 for the various groups of agricultural products, we obtain the following table: [30]

	1861–1865		1891–1895	
	Million Rubles	%	Million Rubles	%
Total exports	181.6	100.0	628.0	100.0
Cereal grains	56.3	31.0	296.7	47.2
Sugar	0.5	0.3	18.3	2.9
Eggs	0.01		14.7	2.3
Butter	0.7	0.4	3.4	0.5
Poultry and domestic animals	0.02		4.6	0.7
Tallow	10.8	5.9	0.7	0.1
Flax	17.8	9.7	54.2	8.6
Hemp	9.1	5.0	14.8	2.4

With its own four-billion-pood annual harvest, Russia was thus Europe's richest granary during the nineties. To a considerably lesser degree it also exported the products of intensive livestock raising plus a number of special crops. We shall now submit a table on the exports of the major cereal grains for a greater number of years. Average annual grain exports by five-year periods were as follows: [31]

YEARS	WHEAT (THOUSAND POODS)	RYE (THOUSAND POODS)	OATS (THOUSAND POODS)	BARLEY (THOUSAND POODS)	ALL GRAINS (THOUSAND POODS)	MILLION RUBLES
1861–1865	50,135	13,774	5,967	5,023	79,886	56.3
1866–1870	76,768	20,494	15,179	7,556	130,056	95.1
1871–1875	92,149	53,274	23,937	12,050	194,113	172.4
1876–1880	110,490	83,219	42,676	20,665	287,005	281.7
1881–1885	124,267	61,268	51,244	32,358	301,735	300.1
1886–1890	162,285	82,507	61,199	61,577	413,746	332.1
1891–1895	171,211	56,863	56,885	92,533	441,139	296.7
1896–1900	166,884	74,711	48,981	81,118	444,166	298.8

Or, if we may express the growth of export volume and its value in relative numbers, taking the export level of 1861–1865 as 100, we obtain an index figure of 556 for the increased volume of exports and 531 for their increase in value for the period 1896–1900. Toward 1900 all exports of agricultural products yielded the country 450 to 500 million rubles annually, including 300 to 350 million rubles for cereal grains alone. But as significant as these figures appear, they were small by comparison with the total turnover in domestic trade.

TOTAL VOLUME OF THE INTERNAL MARKET With the statistical material at our disposal, we can only present a summary sketch of the domestic market and the volume of its turnover by individual branches of production. For this purpose we shall cite the far from accurate figures on the volume of turnover by all commercial enterprises as computed on the basis of the collection of the so-called "assessment" taxes. The figures derived from this statistical source are greatly minimized. Moreover, the calculations about to be cited do not include any of the small commercial enterprises, or any business establishments located in fifteen provinces of the former empire where the assessment tax was not collected.

For 1898, turnover by commercial enterprises was recorded in official statistics by the following groups as shown on page 521.

In addition, banking operations were recorded at 4,017 million rubles, the commercial middleman's trade at 1,001 millions, transportation offices, 174 million, and taverns, 269 million, a general total of 9,903 million rubles.

Furthermore, the turnover of the so-called "enterprises subject to public inspection" (commercial corporations, banks, and others), was reported at 10.4 billion rubles, making, therefore, a grand total of 20.3 billion rubles. For the reasons cited above, these figures are considerably below the actual volume of total trade, which may be estimated at 25 billion rubles.[32]

How perceptible was the growth of domestic commercial turnover during the nineties is further revealed by the following significant figures. During the decade of 1890–1900 alone, the basic capital of all commercial stock-holding companies rose from 25.3 million rubles to 76.6 million rubles. The value of postal shipments, as an index of goods and money turnover, mounted from 348 million to 849 million for the same period.

	MILLION RUBLES	%
Commerce in goods	4,442	100.0
Dry goods and haberdashery	923	20.8
Grain and flour	880	19.8
Colonial and grocery goods	612	13.8
Timber, lumber, coal, and building materials	188	4.2
Wine, whisky, and beer	186	4.2
Cattle, meat, eggs, and vegetables	180	4.1
Nonprecious metals	175	3.9

For an evaluation of the domestic and foreign market and its significance in the development of capitalism, we shall now consider the final problem of the volume of the commercial profit derived from domestic and foreign trade as one of the important sources of the internal accumulation of capital.

Naturally, no absolute figures for commercial turnover and profits are available in any form approaching statistical accuracy. Nevertheless, the momentum of commercial accumulation after the Reform may be realized from the following approximate figures taken from the official records of commercial turnover in domestic trade for purposes of taxation.[33] In 1873 the total value of commercial turnover for these enterprises (exclusive of petty trade) was reported at 2,400 million rubles; in 1885, 5,440 million; in 1890, 7,755 million; in 1895, 9,690 million; and in 1898, 9,903 million rubles. If we consider that capital turned over an average of approximately three times annually for trade as a whole, we find that the total amount of circulating capital invested in trade for the period in question had risen from 800 million rubles to 3,300 (or, if we take the accelerated turnover of capital of four times a year, as in 1898, about 2,500 million rubles). At the same time we should note the circumstance that commercial profits were becoming less and less dependent upon the turnover of agricultural products: in 1885, of the total of 5,440 million rubles of turnover, 2,905 million fell to the

share of the banks, personal loan companies, and transport organizations; while of the remaining 2,535 million rubles, trade in agricultural products amounted to 526 million rubles, or to about 9.6 per cent of all transactions. In 1898, despite the general increase in commercial-capitalist circulation to nearly double the former volume, the percentage share of agricultural goods in the turnover declined to 8.7. On the other hand, an ever larger share of capital was withdrawn from commercial circulation in the form of banking and industrial capital: during the same period, for example, the deposits and current accounts of the commercial banks rose from 78 million rubles in 1870 to 230 million rubles in 1890, while the turnover of the industrial enterprises subject to the assessment tax increased from 529 million rubles in 1885 to 879 million in 1896. Commercial accumulation was thus rapidly becoming concentrated in the banks, whence it reemerged as industrial capital.

It is even more difficult and complex to arrive at an accurate calculation of commercial earnings in foreign trade. Hence we shall merely submit an approximate summary of the commercial profits derived from the grain export trade.

During the pre-Reform decade of 1851–1860, the total amount of exported grain was valued at 85.7 million rubles, a figure that increased during 1861–1870 to 165.1 million rubles. During the period of 1870–1900, Russia exported altogether 10.4 billion poods of grain at a customs valuation of 8.3 billion rubles. If we take into account the fact that the middlemen's commissions during the various stages of the shipment of grain from the producers to the port could scarcely have amounted to less than 15 to 20 per cent, the total volume of profit for commercial capital engaged in the grain export trade during the period of 1870–1900 amounted approximately to between 1 and 1.5 billion rubles for the thirty years, or about 50 million rubles annually, whereas during 1850–1860 the value of commercial profits from the grain export trade amounted to no more than 8 million rubles per annum, and during 1861–1870 to no more than 50 million rubles per annum.

From the preceding discussion we can see the great changes which had occurred in the process of formation of an internal market for industrial capitalism in the course of two or three decades after the Reform of 1861. The general nature of the changes occurring may be summarized as a rapid growth of the social division of labor and commercial farming, a faster tempo in the circulation of goods, and a rise in the domestic demand for production goods for an expanding capitalism, as well as in a demand for articles of personal consumption for the growing cities and their commercial-industrial population. In this process of building up the domestic market, the railroads played a vital part both as the major consumer of the products of heavy industry and

as an efficient connecting link in the commercial exchange between the various regions of the country. The railroads made possible the rapid expansion of the market, and of its volume, territory, and turnover as described above.

All these changes were an expression of the all-embracing and rapid development of capitalist relationships within our national economy during 1870–1890. They also laid the foundation for the industrial upsurge characteristic of our capitalist economy during the last decade of the nineteenth century.

Notes

1. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, p. 40.
2. *Ibid.*, Chap. VIII, pp. 432, 469.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 464.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 462.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 464.
6. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed., p. 37.
7. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, p. 432.
8. Kulomvin, *Nasha zheleznodorozhnaya politika* (Our Railroad Policy) (1902), Vol. I, p. 38.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
10. Compiled on the basis of the *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii ministerstva putei soobshcheniya* (Collection of Statistical Data of the Ministry of Transport) for the respective years.
11. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, p. 436.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 453-454.
13. *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii po Rossii za 1896 g.* (Collection of Statistical Data on Russia for the Year 1896) (Central Statistical Commission, 1897).
14. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, pp. 391, 393.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 453-454.
16. Glivits, *Zhelezodelatelnaya promyshlennost'* (The Iron Industry), p. 80.
17. *Goroda Rossii v 1904 g.* (The Cities of Russia in 1904) (Central Statistical Commission, 1906).
18. The Yuzovka, Dnepr, Alexandrovsk, Petrovsky, Donetz-Yuryev, Druzhkov and Taganrog plants, which employed 67 per cent of the total number of workers in the metallurgical and metal-processing plants. (The first two plants alone employed about 30 per cent of all workers.)
19. A report read before the convention of Metallurgical Industrialists of South Russia, entitled "O sovremyonnom polozhenii zheleznoi promyshlennosti" (On the Current Position of the Iron Industry) (1901–1902).
20. For further details see Lyashchenko, *Ocherki agrarnoi evolutsii* (Essays in Agrarian Evolution), Chap. VII.
21. *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii po ministerstvu putei soobshcheniya* (St. Petersburg, 1879), Issue III, p. 15, and Chuprov, *Zheleznodorozhnoye khozyaistvo* (The Railroad Economy) (Moscow, 1878), Vol. II, p. 242.
22. On railroad construction and the resultant "dispersion" of trade, see Lyashchenko, *Ocherki,* Chaps. V-VIII; also an article by Mukoseyev in the collection *Obshchestvennoye dvizheniye v Rossii* (Social Movement in Russia), Vol. I.

23. Bilimovich, *Tovarnoye dvizheniye na russkikh zheleznykh dorogakh* (Freight Traffic on the Railroads of Russia) (1902), Chap. I, pp. 2-3.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.
25. Compiled on the basis of the *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii po ministerstvu putei soobshcheniya.* Cf. Bilimovich, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.
26. *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii po ministerstvu putei soobshcheniya* for the respective years.
27. Lyashchenko, *Zernovoye khozyaistvo i khlebotorgovyye otnosheniya Rossii i Germanii* (Grain Farming and Grain-Trading Relations Between Russia and Germany) (1915), Chap. II; also *Russkoye zernovoye khozyaistvo v sisteme mirovogo khozyaistva* (Russian Grain Farming in the System of International Economics) (1927).
28. Lyashchenko, *Russkoye zernovoye khozyaistvo,* p. 314.
29. *Sbornik svedenii po istorii i statistike vneshnei torgovli Rossii* (Collection of Data on the History and Statistics of the Foreign Trade of Russia), ed. by V. Pokrovskii (1902), p. xxxiv.
30. Compiled on the basis of *Obzory vneshnei torgovli Rossii po Yevropeiskoi i Aziatskoi granitsam* (Surveys of the Foreign Trade of Russia Along the European and Asiatic Frontiers), and *Vneshnyaya torgovlya po Yevropeiskoi granitse* (Foreign Trade Along the European Frontier) for the respective years.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Statisticheskiye rezultaty protsentnogo i raskladochnogo sborov* (Statistical Results of the Percentage and Distribution Taxes). Material for commercial and industrial statistics published by the Department of Commerce and Manufactures (St. Petersburg, 1888–1900).
33. *Svod dannykh o torgovykh sborakh v Rossii* (Collection of Data on Commercial Taxes in Russia) (1885–1900), and *Statisticheskiye rezultaty protsentnogo i raskladochnogo sborov* (Statistical Results of the Percentage and Distribution Taxes) (Department of Commerce and Manufactures, 1885–1900).

(XXVI)

The Industrial Expansion of the 1890's

THE INDUSTRIAL CRISES of 1873–1875 and 1881–1882 turned attention to the fact that the national economy of Russia, having been launched on the path of capitalist development, came completely under the operation of the general laws of behavior of capitalism, its disproportionate pattern of development, its periods of prosperity and depression, its crises of overproduction, and its interludes of quiescence and revival. These two periods of crisis, like all other capitalist crises, favored within the Russian capitalist economy the enterprises that were economically stronger and technically better equipped, while it ruined and swept away the less efficient enterprises. These crises contributed to the further entrenchment of capitalist relationships by eliminating the remnants of precapitalist types of industry, and to the further proletarianization of the population, and intensified the concentration of capital, thus preparing industry for a transition to a higher technical and economic level. At the same time the working class began to stir into action during 1870–1880 for the purpose of waging its struggle against the capitalists through the organization of mass strikes and the first labor unions.

From what has been said in the previous chapters, it should be clear that within Russian capitalism of 1860–1880 the features of an advanced industrial capitalist economy were closely intermingled with the old elements of Russia's backward agrarian economy, primitive forms of small-scale commodity production and manufacturing, a backward industrial and agricultural technology, and a distinct lag in the industry producing equipment and means of production such as machines, locomotives, and rails, as well as in the industries supplying such raw materials as the coal and petroleum required for modern industrial production. In social aspects the rapidly spreading bourgeois capitalist relationships both in the village and in the town were intermingled with survivals of the Middle Ages, backward forms of semifeudal relations, and the political and economic hegemony of the landed nobility, the owners of feudal latifundia who were holding the mass of the rural population in financial subjugation and retarding the development of capitalist relationships.

Under these circumstances the development of capitalist forms in industry and agriculture was inevitably retarded with respect to both its general tempo and the depth of its penetration into the national economy. Therefore, whereas the more vigorous and advanced capitalism of western Europe usually rid itself in two or three years of the effect of the crises that descended upon them during 1870–1880, returning once more to a period of lively activity, in Russia the crisis of the early eighties was turned into a prolonged depression continuing for ten to fifteen years, an industrial and agricultural stagnation, and an economic disruption to the village, ending in the catastrophic famine of 1891. All of this resulted in a strong social reaction on the part of the landed gentry.

Not before the early nineties do we note in the capitalist economy in Russia any sign of a new turn toward the industrial revival which in the course of a few years produced results that dwarfed the achievements of capitalist industry during 1870–1880. This industrial upsurge of the nineties was one of the important stages in the history of the capitalist industry and national economy of Russia as a whole. It was during this period that Russia's system of "national capitalism" took shape with all its economic, social, and political peculiarities, including its unique class relationships.

THE MARCH OF INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS DURING THE 1890's The general results of the growth of capitalist industry during these years are presented according to the official *Summary of Data on Factory Industry of Russia* in the following figures:

YEARS	NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES	NUMBER OF WORKERS (IN THOUSANDS)	TOTAL VALUE OF PRODUCTION (IN MILLION RUBLES)
1887	30,888	1,318.0	1,334.5
1890	32,254	1,434.7	1,502.6
1897	39,029	2,098.2	2,839.1

During the ten-year period the number of enterprises increased by 26.3 per cent, the number of workers by 59.2 per cent, and the value of production, by 112.8 per cent. In other words not merely an absolute expansion of industry occurred, but also a concentration and increase in the productivity of industry.

How strong was the impetus in this direction during the nineties may be seen from the rate of increment in the total value of production, which, according to the Ministry of Finance, amounted to 26.1 million rubles a year of added industrial production during 1878–1887, 41.6 million during

1888–1892, and 161.2 million rubles during 1893–1897. And inasmuch as the greatest proportion of this growth came from large corporation capital, the degree of concentration of Russian industry during the nineties actually became greater than in German industry. Thus, if we divide total industrial production into three groups according to the number of workers employed, we find that in 1895 only 15.9 per cent of Russia's workers were employed in small enterprises (employing 10 to 15 workers), while Germany had 31.5 per cent in that category; in the larger plants (over 500 workers) Russian industry employed 42 per cent and Germany only 15.3 per cent.[1]

We shall now cite certain figures to illustrate the progress made in a number of individual branches of industry, grouped into the following classes: [2]

	1887	1897	% OF GROWTH
I. Textile materials			
Number of enterprises	2,847.0	4,449.0	56.3
Value of production (million rubles)	463.0	946.3	104.4
Number of workers (thousands)	399.2	642.5	60.9
of which			
In cotton processing			
Number of enterprises	501.0	947.0	89.0
Value of production (million rubles)	281.7	430.2	52.7
Number of workers (thousands)	207.7	316.1	52.2
II. Mining and Metal producing			
Number of enterprises	2,656.0	3,412.0	28.5
Value of production (million rubles)	156.0	393.7	152.4
Number of workers (thousands)	390.0	545.3	39.2
III. Metal manufacturing			
Number of enterprises	1,377.0	2,412.0	75.2
Value of production (million rubles)	112.6	310.6	175.8
Number of workers (thousands)	103.3	214.3	107.5
IV. Chemical production			
Number of enterprises	588.0	769.0	30.8
Value of production (million rubles)	21.5	59.6	177.2
Number of workers (thousands)	21.1	35.3	67.3
V. Ceramic industry			
Number of enterprises	2,380.0	3,413.0	43.4
Value of production (million rubles)	28.9	82.6	185.8
Number of workers (thousands)	57.3	143.3	112.9
VI. All groups			
Number of enterprises	30,888.0	39,029.0	26.0
Value of production (million rubles)	1,334.0	2,839.0	113.0
Number of workers (thousands)	1,318.0	2,098.0	59.0

Adding to the number of workers employed at the enterprises of the factory and mining industries listed above the employees of the railroads, we find that the total number of workers throughout Russia during the late nineties was 2,792,000.

The above table indicates that, although in absolute volume of production the textile industry was foremost, heavy industry (mining and metallurgical) was rapidly overtaking light industry. During the period under examination the annual increase in total value of production by individual industries was: for mining industry, 11.2 per cent; chemical, 10.7; lumber industry, 9.3; metallurgical, 8.4; ceramic, 8; textile, 7.8; and food industry, 1.7. At the basis of the industrial upsurge, therefore, lay the expansion of heavy industry engaged in the production of capital goods.

THE POSITION OF THE MAJOR INDUSTRIES We shall now cite certain figures to depict the gain in production achieved by several of our major industries. The fuel industry, coal and petroleum, made its first rapid advance during 1880–1890. The extraction of coal increased at the following rate:

YEARS	TOTAL MINED (MILLION POODS)	OF WHICH THE DONETS BASIN PRODUCED:	
		Million Poods	% of Food Mined
1860	18.3	6.0	32.8
1870	42.4	15.6	36.8
1880	200.6	86.3	43.0
1890	367.2	183.3	49.9
1895	555.5	298.3	53.7
1900	995.2	691.5	69.5

First coming into existence during the 1860's, coal production attained remarkable successes during its four decades of development, and during the last decade alone increased its production nearly three times, while the Donets basin, which forty years earlier had been a "wild field," became a vast productive center, increasing its output two and one-half times during the last decade alone, and accounting for more than two-thirds of the total amount of coal extracted.

No less impressive was the rate of growth displayed by the petroleum industry, including its major region of Baku:

YEARS	TOTAL PETROLEUM PRODUCED (MILLION POODS)	OF WHICH BAKU PRODUCED:	
		% of Total Output	Million Poods
1870	1.8	1.7	94.4
1880	34.0	25.0	73.5
1890	241.0	226.0	93.8
1895	386.0	385.0	99.7
1900	632.0	601.0	95.1

A production increase of twenty times during 1880–1890 was the result of the development of this capitalist branch of industry, and the preponderant part of the total output came from the major Baku oil region.

Extraction of iron ore, and the portion of the output represented by the mines of the south, may be set forth in the following figures:

YEARS	TOTAL (MILLION POODS)	OF WHICH OUTPUT IN THE SOUTH WAS:	
		Million Poods	% of Total Output
1870	45.9	1.3	2.8
1880	60.2	2.7	4.5
1890	106.3	23.0	21.6
1895	168.0	59.1	35.2
1900	367.2	210.1	57.1

Here, too, in the course of the last five-year period the south had completely outstripped the other regions prominent in the extraction of iron ore.

The growth of ferrous metallurgy proceeded parallel to the development of the coal- and ore-mining industries. The smelting of pig iron and the production of iron and steel are summarized in the following figures:

YEARS	PIG IRON SMELTED			PRODUCTION OF IRON AND STEEL		
	Total (Million Poods)	Including the South		Total (Million Poods)	Including the South	
		Million Poods	%		Million Poods	%
1860	19.6			12.4		
1870	20.7	0.3	1.4	14.5		
1880	26.1	1.3	5.0	35.3	1.6	4.5
1890	55.2	13.4	24.3	48.4	8.6	17.8
1895	86.8	33.6	38.7	62.3	18.2	29.2
1900	176.8	91.6	51.8	134.4	59.2	44.0

The development of the iron and steel industry during the five-year period of 1895–1900 resulted in a general doubling of production in the country as a whole, and an increase of between three and four times for the metallurgy of the south, as a result of which the south finally forced out of existence the old iron industry of the Urals. The percentage share of the Urals in ferrous metal production declined from 67 per cent during the 1870's to 28 per cent in 1900, while the share of the south rose from 0.1 to 51 per cent during the same period.

As for cotton production, the statistical data concerning that industry are unusually incompatible over any extended period of time because of the large numbers of small enterprises during the earlier period, a fact that some-

times tends to obscure the nature of the statistics compared with the later years when only the larger factories were reported. For the three major branches of cotton production we have the following figures: [3]

YEARS	COTTON SPINNING		COTTON WEAVING		COTTON PRINTING	
	Number of Enterprises	Value of Product (Million Rubles)	Number of Enterprises	Value of Product (Million Rubles)	Number of Enterprises	Value of Product (Million Rubles)
1870	44	48.4	744	48.0	130	30.7
1880	69	74.2	678	99.7	774	66.6
1890	66	106.6	349	136.3	413	91.9
1897	67	134.9	465	237.5	190	105.5

A more accurate and detailed picture of the steadily increasing production in the large plants during the last decade (1890–1900) may be obtained from the following comparisons based on the official statistics of cotton spinning and weaving.[4]

	1890	1900	% OF INCREASE
Number of spinning mills	66	109	65
Number of weaving mills	83	118	42
Number of spindles (thousands)	3,457	6,646	92
Number of looms (thousands)	87	151	74
Consumption of cotton (thousand poods)	8,328	16,007	92
Production of unbleached cloth (thousand poods)	6,671	11,702	75
Value of cotton (million rubles)	81.6	192.1	135
Value of yarn (million rubles)	119.6	233.7	95
Value of unbleached cloth (million rubles)	146.8	259.8	77

Production thus nearly doubled during the ten-year period while the number of enterprises was considerably reduced, indicating an over-all expansion of industry accompanied by a high degree of concentration. Such was the state of the cotton industry at the end of the nineties.

THE PROCESS OF CONCENTRATION In the course of the 1890's, therefore, Russian industry was rapidly adopting modern capitalist technological methods and large-scale production. We can now begin to observe the results of not only a general growth in production but also of a concentration of production and a rise in the level of productivity. The degree of concentration in industry on the whole may be depicted by the following comparative figures derived from data prepared by V. I. Lenin for 1879–1900 (excluding the production of rails),[5] supplemented with

more recent information collected by Pogozhev[6] for 1902 (for all industry) in percentage relations to the general total.

GROUPS OF FACTORIES NUMBER OF WORKERS	1879		1890		1902	
	% of Factories	% of Workers Employed in Them	% of Factories	% of Workers Employed in Them	% of Factories	% of Workers Employed in Them
From 100 to 499	79.7	44.2	79.6	42.1	73.8	30.7
From 500 to 999	13.3	23.0	12.8	20.2	15.2	19.5
1,000 and over	7.0	32.8	7.6	37.7	11.0	49.8

By the early twentieth century large-scale enterprises had already concentrated one-half of all workers, whereas twenty years earlier they had accounted for only one-third. If for the sake of a more graphic presentation we cite by groups the percentage of increase in the number of factories and employed workers according to the same data, we obtain the following figures on the gains made during 1879–1902:

GROUPS OF FACTORIES	INCREASE IN NUMBER OF FACTORIES	INCREASE IN NUMBER OF WORKERS
From 100 to 499	53.6	60.7
From 500 to 999	66.9	71.3
Over 1,000	123.0	141.4

In certain individual industries this process of concentration produced even more striking results. Thus, in the mining industry during the ten-year period 1890–1900, the number of enterprises increased by 112.6 per cent in the class of large factories employing over 1,000 workers, while the total number of workers employed rose by 159.4 per cent. In the cotton industry during 1879–1894, the group of large plants increased by 65.8 per cent in number of enterprises and 88 per cent in number of workers, while the group of smaller plants correspondingly increased only by 9.2 per cent in number of enterprises and by 4.4 per cent in number of workers.

Still more significant was the growth of concentration in the process of production itself within the larger enterprises, since the trend in that direction was stimulated not only by a concentration of large numbers of workers in such plants but also by the increase in productivity per worker as a result of better equipment. Thus in the petroleum industry, for example, 9.5 per cent of all firms produced as much as 69 per cent of all petroleum products. In the coal industry 4 per cent of the mines in 1898 accounted for 43 per cent of the total coal output. In the metallurgical industry the

same process of concentration and increased productivity is revealed by the following figures: [7]

	1890	1900
Pig iron smelted per plant (thousand poods)	253	716
Number of workers per plant	899	1,325
Number of horsepower per plant	255	1,286
Number of horsepower per worker	0.28	0.97
Pig iron smelted per blast furnace (in thousand poods)	286	629
Pig iron smelted per worker (poods)	282	541
Production of open-hearth steel per furnace (thousand poods)	199	439
Production of Bessemer steel per converter (thousand poods)	722	1,143

The table helps to illustrate the rapid technical improvement of production and its concentration. The intensity of this process may be best seen when production in the progressive south is compared with that of the backward Urals: [8]

	URALS		SOUTH	
	1890	1900	1890	1900
Pig iron smelted per plant (thousand poods)	250	436	1,491	3,192
Horsepower per plant	135	244	1,530	6,159
Number of workers per plant	1,281	1,496	1,505	1,841
Smelted per blast furnace (thousand poods)	259	342	958	2,035
Smelted per worker (poods)	194	297	990	1,714
Ore extracted per worker (thousand poods)	2.4	3.3	10.7	19.3

The low state of Ural production was not due to the poor natural qualities of the Ural ores. On the contrary, the Urals contained some of the richest ore deposits, known for their high metal content and good quality. Production in the Urals, however, had been overwhelmed by the new capitalist technology of the south, by a highly efficient system of production, and by the whole new economy that capitalism had introduced in lieu of the old semifeudal routine still persisting in the Urals.

RAILROAD PRODUCTION AS A FACTOR IN THE INDUSTRIAL UPSURGE OF THE NINETIES We stated earlier that the upsurge of the 1890's was due primarily to the expansion of railway building. Railroad construction was responsible for the fact that the production base of the industrial rise of the nineties included the various branches of heavy industry such as ferrous metallurgy, machine building, rail production, coal and petroleum, and, to a lesser degree, the brick, cement, and other industries vital to railway construction.

These industries, as we have seen above, were still in their early stages of development during the 1870's. A rapid expansion of these industries required the investment of large capital, which had become available during the nineties in the form of large-scale foreign corporation capital. To the extent to which the construction movement of the railways involved first the metallurgical and fuel industries, then the other branches of heavy industry, followed also by the light industries, railroad construction became the ultimate base of industrial upsurge as a whole, and of the expansion of the internal market for industrial capitalism.

After the railroad fever of 1870–1875, which augmented the Russian railway network by 7,500 versts, had subsided, new construction on the railways proceeded at a more moderate tempo during 1876–1890. By 1891–1895, however, a new surge of activity produced an additional 6,257 versts of new railway lines, while the subsequent five-year period (1896–1900) added 15,139 more versts, following which the total network increased to 56,130 versts in 1901. In other words 37 per cent of the entire network, or one-half as much as built during the preceding fifty years, was constructed in the course of the single decade of 1890. After this, capitalist Russia did not experience another surge in railway construction on a scale similar to that of 1895–1900.

It should be pointed out, of course, that even despite this feverish period of railway construction Russia was still rather backward in the density of its railway network by the standards of the advanced capitalist nations: for each thousand of square kilometers of territory there were only 1.5 kilometers of railroad in Russia in 1895, of which the European half had 9.7 kilometers and the Asiatic half, 0.6 kilometers, whereas England had 106 kilometers, and Germany, 80.

The system of railway construction itself had also witnessed a number of important changes since 1870. Although the government did not forbid private construction and even encouraged private initiative, nevertheless, as a result of the unsuccessful experience of the Chief Company, the major share of new construction was borne by the government. According to the calculations by Schwanebach, during the second half of the nineties (the period of greatest activity in railroad construction), investment was almost evenly divided between private and government capital. But the financial participation of the government in railroad affairs was considerably greater, since in addition to the direct government railroad loans a system of "government-guaranteed" private loans came into practice during the nineties. For the latter loans the government guaranteed the profit on each loan, thereby making them essentially similar to ordinary government loans. Besides, the government authorized the treasury to buy from private railway companies

either the more important or the heavily indebted roads. Consequently, the role of the government in the nation's railway construction, as well as in ownership, increased conspicuously during 1890–1900.

By 1890 the cumulative value of all railroad loans attained 1,363 million rubles; during the following ten-year period (under Minister Witte) a total of about one billion rubles of guaranteed loans (exclusive of the Chinese Eastern Railway) were contracted. Moreover, the direct expenses of the state for the construction of new lines and for the improvement of the network and the rolling stock amounted to about 1,350 million rubles (not including the 275-million-ruble loan to the Chinese Eastern Railway). The total value of nonguaranteed loans floated by private companies amounted to 205 million rubles. Hence we may reckon the total value of the government share in the nation's railway business at 3.5 to 3.6 billion rubles during 1890–1900. At the turn of the century the entire capital of the railroads in the country amounted to 4.7 billion rubles, of which approximately 3.5 billion rubles belonged to the government. To provide this amount the state treasury during the last decade of the nineteenth century paid out 1,691 million rubles in direct capital expenditures (including the Chinese Eastern Railway), or about one-half of total government capital invested in the railways during the entire period of construction.

What were the sources of this immense volume of capital invested by the government in railway construction? Of the total amount mentioned above, foreign investment covered about 341 million rubles, while the bulk of the capital was raised within the country, chiefly through the general budgetary government resources. Thus, during the period of heavy railroad and industrial construction the state, by using its pressure, its direct and indirect taxes, the vodka monopoly, and customs taxes, extorted from the population an average of 120 million rubles a year, which was spent in building railways, and thus in subsidizing and supporting heavy industry by costly orders of rails, locomotives, and other equipment. How large a part in the business of railroad construction was played by the small savings of the population, drained from them through the system of the government's credit institutions, may be judged from the fact that the deposits in the state savings banks were utilized largely in support of railroad loans: as of January 1, 1901, 637 million rubles of the general balance of deposits in the state savings banks amounting to 752 million rubles, consisted of government interest-bearing notes, and 248 million rubles of this, or as much as 37 per cent, were in railroad loans.

THE INFLUX OF FOREIGN CAPITAL The flow of capital into industry that made possible its steady expansion during 1890–1900, may be measured by the following figures on foreign and Russian joint-stock com-

panies founded during these same years. In 1889 Russia had 504 joint-stock companies with an aggregate capital of 911.8 million rubles, and in 1899 the number of incorporated companies had risen to 1,181 with a total capital of 1,736.8 million rubles. In other words capital investment in industry increased during the ten-year period by 825 million rubles, to which may be added the fact that annual investments of corporation capital reached a figure of 230 to 250 million rubles during 1896–1898, and 431.9 million rubles in 1899. Furthermore, the total value of all joint-stock capital (basic, reserve, amortized, and others), according to the reports of the Finance Ministry, had increased to 2.3 billion rubles in 1899.

A rather large and ever growing role in the process of joint-stock-company formation was beginning to be played by foreign investment capital. During the years 1893–1900 a total of 191 new foreign stock companies with an aggregate capital of 634 million francs were founded in Russia. Furthermore, although Russian capital on the whole played a predominant role in company building, the influence of foreign capital was nevertheless increasing. The total value of foreign capital in joint-stock enterprises doing business in Russia in 1870 amounted altogether to 26.5 million rubles (all capital), 97.7 million in 1880, 214.7 in 1890, and 911 million rubles in 1900 according to Ol. As computed by other students, the figure for foreign investments in 1900 is somewhat lower: 765 million rubles according to Schwanebach and 778 million rubles according to Voronov.[9] In any event, from a comparison of the above figures it seems clear that foreign capital comprised somewhat more than one-third of all corporation capital during 1890, rising to nearly one-half in 1900.

The distribution of the new corporations and their capital throughout the various branches of our national economy is rather characteristic. Among the companies organized prior to 1889, the banks, insurance, and transportation companies represented about 34.4 per cent of the invested capital (313 million rubles), while among the companies founded after 1889–1899 they accounted for only 8.3 per cent (59 million rubles). During the former period 56.1 per cent (578 million rubles) were invested in industrial enterprises, while during the latter period the industrial proportion was 74.3 per cent (715 million rubles). It would appear, therefore, from the above that the shift of investment capital toward the field of industry, mentioned in connection with the 1870's, continued and gained additional momentum during the nineties.

The increase in the purely industrial phase of new incorporations during the nineties is further reflected in the distribution of corporation capital by industries. Comparing the figures on the basic capital of the corporations in

the major industries in 1890 and 1900, we obtain the following results according to the statistics of the Ministry of Finance (in million rubles):


BRANCH OF INDUSTRY	BASIC CAPITAL		% INCREASE
	1890	1900	
Mining	85.7	392.2	358
Metal	27.8	257.3	826
Chemical	15.6	93.8	501
Ceramic	6.7	59.0	781
Textile	197.5	373.7	89
Food	87.6	153.1	75
All industries	580.1	1,742.3	200

Thus the most intense activity in new incorporations developed in the field of heavy industry (mining, metal, and chemical), as well as in the building industry, while in the old textile and food branches of light industry the influx of new investment capital was at a much slower rate.

The distribution of investment capital was no different for the foreign corporations. The basic capital of the foreign firms in the same groups of industry was distributed as follows (in million rubles):

BRANCH OF INDUSTRY	1890	1900	% INCREASE
Mining	70.1	437.9	525
Metal	14.0	145.3	938
Chemical	6.4	29.3	358
Ceramic	0.2	26.6	13,200
Textile	26.0	71.4	175
Food	7.6	11.4	50
All industries	186.2	911.0	389

The above figures confirm the nature of the capitalist upsurge of the nineties as an increase of heavy industry, due primarily to an accelerated tempo in railroad building and to heavier investments by foreign capital. The impact of foreign capital becomes especially marked during the last few years of the period under examination (especially after the adoption of the gold standard in 1897), and manifests itself in varying degrees in the various branches of industry. In the mining industry, for example, foreign capital investments overtook Russian investments and constituted 58 per cent of total capital in 1890, rising to 70 per cent in 1900; in the metal industry the proportion of foreign capital increased only from 32 to 42 per cent, while in the textile, food, and similar industries Russian investment capital covered 90 to 98 per cent of the field.


RUSSIA:
BASIC ECONOMY
1909–1913
0 125 250 375 500
Kilometers
AGRICULTURE
Grain deficiency area (importing grains)
Surplus grain area (exporting grains)
Area of heaviest grain export (over 2 centn. per capita)
Flax
Sugar beet
Cotton
Extensive livestock breeding
M Dairy farms
F Fishing
BESTICULTURE
Commercial hunting
Deer breeding
INDUSTRY
Iron ore mining
Coal
Petroleum
Manganese ore mining
Copper ore mining
Gold mining
Smelting of iron and copper
Factory metal manufacturing and machine building
T Textile
Flour milling
Beet sugar
Archangel
Petrozavodsk
Helsingfors
Reval
Petersburg
Novgorod
Riga
Mitau
Kovno
Wilna
Grodno
Warsaw
Minsk
Vitebsk
Smolensk
Moscow
Mogilev
Kaluga
Tula
Ryazan
Vladimir
Yaroslavl
Kostroma
Vologda
Nizhni Novgorod
Kazan
Ufa
Perm
Vyatka
Simbirsk
Penza
Tambov
Samara
Orenburg
Uralsk
Orel
Kursk
Voronezh
Saratov
Chernigov
Zhitomir
Kiev
Kamenets Podolsk
Kharkov
Poltava
Ekaterinoslav
Kishinev
Kherson
Nowocherkassk
Odessa
Simferopol
Sevastopol
Ekaterinodar
Stavropol
Astrakhan
Vladikavkar
Tiflis
Baku
Kholm
Uralsk
Baku
Turgai
Tobolsk
Akmolinsk
Tomsk
Krasnoyarsk
Irkutsk
Chita
Yakutsk
Blagoveshchensk
Khabarovsk
Vladivostok
Semipalatinsk
Kilometers

At this point we may cite the calculations made by the same author with respect to the distribution of foreign capital investments by country of origin during 1890–1900 (in million rubles): [10]

CAPITAL	1890	1900
French	66.6	226.1
Belgian	24.6	296.5
English	35.3	136.8
German	79.0	219.3
American	2.3	8.0

Thus, by 1900 the first position among foreign investment capital in Russia was held by Franco-Belgian capital and the capital of the future "entente" in general, while German capital moved from its original first place to third during the decade under examination.

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF CAPITALIST INDUSTRY From our analysis of conditions in the leading branches of industry (coal, metal, and oil), we noted the emergence of certain predominant regions in which these industries began to concentrate with the advent of capitalism. On the whole, in its total economic plant, according to a survey made in 1896, Russian industrial capitalism possessed the following basic industrial regions: [11]

1. The Moscow industrial region, with a total volume of production valued at 755.1 million rubles for the six provinces of the region (of which the Moscow province alone accounted for 403 million). This region was preponderantly one of textile industries in all their phases such as cotton, linen, silk, and wool, and in part of metal-processing and chemical industries.

2. The Petersburg region, consisting of the Petersburg province alone, with a total output valued at 316.7 million rubles. This region concentrated on the metal-processing, machine-building, and textile industries.

3. The Polish region, where total annual production in the three leading industrial provinces amounted to 335.5 million rubles, of which the Petrokov province accounted for 215.9 million (including that major center of the cotton industry, the city of Lodz, with its 481 factories and a total product valued at 78 million rubles), and the Warsaw province for 98.1 million rubles. It was a region of textile, coal, iron, metal-processing, and chemical industries.

4. The South Russian Ukrainian region (Krivoy Rog and Donets) was one of coal, iron ore, and basic chemical industries, with the total production in the four main provinces of the region attaining 246.1 million rubles (of which Yekaterinoslav yielded 97.5 million rubles, Kherson, 69.4, and Kharkov, 51.0 million).

5. The Ural mining-metallurgical region (iron, nonferrous metals, and minerals) with an average production of 85.3 million rubles annually.

6. The Baku petroleum region (Azerbaijan) with an output valued at 82 million rubles.

7. The Southwestern region, chiefly a beet-sugar producer, with a total output value for the two main provinces of 135.1 million rubles (77.4 million for Kiev and 57.7 million for Podol).

8. The Transcaucasian manganese-coal region (Chiaturi-Tkvibuli), where 19 million poods of manganese and 2.5 million poods of coal were produced annually.

These regions and provinces comprised the chief concentration centers of large capitalist industry. In the other regions large-scale capitalist industry was represented to a considerably lesser degree. The extent of this concentration may be judged by the fact that 58 per cent of the total number of factory workers employed in the 63 provinces of European Russia were concentrated in 8 of the above-mentioned more highly developed industrial provinces.

In this manner the geographic location of capitalist industry during the 1890's was at least partly due to natural conditions of production (Donets, Urals, and Baku region), although extremely irrational in character on the whole. In this respect capitalist industry inherited the historically evolved conditions of industrial location in effect since the feudal era of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries (the Moscow and Petersburg regions). But even during the capitalist period a rational distribution of industry and the development of the new industrial regions were blocked by the policy of monopoly capital (petroleum among others), by the tsarist national policy of discriminating against the development of the non-Russian areas, and by the lack of knowledge concerning the natural wealth of the various regions, which to a certain extent was also part of a deliberate policy in the interests of monopoly capital. For this reason a number of regions extremely rich in natural resources (the Kuznetsk region and the far north) remained entirely unexploited, or were utilized on a consciously restricted level for monopolistic reasons, in order not to encourage the development of production in capitalist enterprises outside the old regions (Ural petroleum, and so forth). In general, with respect to the productive-technological equipment of their enterprises, the various major regions were on quite a variety of levels. This was due to the existing contradictions among the capitalist industries of the various regions with respect to sources of raw materials, price of manufacturing, conditions of marketing, and the official economic, customs, and tariff policies. Among such contradictions, for example, may be cited the case of the textile

industry in the advanced Petersburg and Polish regions (working with imported raw material) on the one hand, and the more primitive Moscow textile industry on the other (in need of protective measures), or the progressive metallurgy of the south and the backward iron industry of the Urals.

The above was a concrete manifestation of the general law of disproportion in the development of capitalism as it evolved in Russia under conditions of feudal survivals in the village, an inadequate accumulation of domestic capital, the nature and direction of the influx of foreign capital, and the national policy of tsarism. These, in turn, predetermined the inadequate and backward nature of Russian capitalism despite the rapid expansion of a number of individual industries. The disproportionate economic development manifested itself most clearly, for example, in the lag between heavy industry and its raw-material metallurgical and fuel base, as well as between light industry and its agricultural raw-material base.

The main fuel sources for Russian industrial capitalism during the 1890's were the coal deposits of Donets and Dombrovsky (Poland) and the oil region of Baku. Of minor importance were the Moscow and Ural coal deposits, and the rather negligible, barely discovered regions of Siberia, Central Asia, and the southeast (Grozny). How preponderant was the role of the first two regions may be judged by the fact that of the total extraction of 684 million poods of coal in 1897, the two deposits accounted for 91 per cent of total production (59 per cent for Donets and 32 per cent for Dombrovsky). Among the other coal basins the Moscow and Ural deposits were of substantial local importance. The operation of such enormous coal deposits as the Kuznetsk basin yielded a bare million poods, or 0.15 per cent of the total amount extracted. How inadequate the existing fuel base was for the requirements of industrial capitalism during the 1890's may be seen from the fact that, despite possessing vast exploited coal deposits of its own, Russia was compelled to import an average of 155 million poods of coal in the course of these years. Moreover, the scale of domestic consumption of coal was exceedingly low, amounting to only 7 poods per inhabitant as compared with 237 poods in Great Britain, 147 poods in the United States, and 131 poods in Germany. In total volume of coal production, Russia was among the most backward nations, accounting for only about 1 per cent of total world output.

The situation was somewhat different in connection with the other major fuel source; namely, petroleum. When total world production during the nineties was 1 billion poods, Russia accounted for 478 million poods, or about 48 per cent of the total. Exports amounted to 64 million poods, or 13.3 per cent of total output. This export was, however, a result of extreme domestic underconsumption, particularly on the part of the mass of people; for exam-

ple, in 1897 the country consumed only 11.8 pounds per inhabitant as against 41.8 pounds in Germany.

Likewise, the metallurgical base of capitalist industry was far below requirements. The extraction of raw material for the iron and steel industry, and the smelting of pig iron were concentrated in three main regions—in the south, in the Urals, and in Poland, and only in part around Moscow, and still less in Siberia and in the north; in addition, a comparatively small quantity of local significance was produced in Finland. How preponderant was the share of the south, the Urals, and Poland in this field of production is suggested by the fact that of the total extraction of iron ore in 1900 these regions produced: the south, 57.2 per cent; the Urals, 27.6; and Poland, 7 per cent. Approximately the same correlation existed among these areas with respect to the quantity of pig iron smelted: the south, 51.8 per cent; the Urals, 28 per cent; and Poland, 10 per cent. In general, however, the inadequate supply of ferrous metals and their raw materials is apparent from the fact that, despite her vast inexhaustible natural resources, Russia was among the least developed nations with respect to the production and consumption of pig iron, that yardstick of industrial capacity, producing in 1897 only 112 million poods, or about 5.5 per cent of total world production, and importing about 51.8 million poods of iron and steel. At the same time domestic consumption of pig iron amounted to only 52 pounds per capita, compared to 356 pounds in Great Britain, 336 in the United States, and 254 in Germany.

Russia was in a rather special position with regard to the production of manganese ore, a raw material extremely important in the manufacture of high-quality steel. In 1897 the extraction of manganese in Russia was on the level of 22.6 million poods per year, which was about 50 per cent of world output. Production was concentrated in the Kutaisi province of Transcaucasia (85 per cent), in the Ukraine (about 12 per cent), and to a lesser extent in the Urals. The export of manganese ore from Russia, which amounted to 11.4 million poods, comprised about 50 per cent of total world export. Nevertheless, while exporting this valuable raw material, Russian capitalism imported about 1.2 million poods of ferro-manganese, a processed semifinished product.

Domestic supply of nonferrous metals was even less satisfactory. Here again, regardless of the existence of adequate natural resources, the production of these metals in Russia was insignificant. As long ago as the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the smelting of copper had attained such proportions that an export trade of 292,000 poods annually developed. Russian (Ural) copper was the basis of the French bronze industry. By the nineties, however, exports of copper had declined to about 1,800 poods compared to

an import of 831,000 poods, and total domestic output amounted to merely 2.3 per cent of world copper production. As for the white metals, domestic production amounted to less than 1 per cent of world output (0.017 per cent for zinc, and 0.05 per cent for tin), and all requirements of Russian industry were covered by foreign imports exclusively despite the vast riches of unexploited deposits at home.

In light industry, for which the supply of raw materials came from agriculture, there was likewise a considerable lag between the raw-material base and the industrial requirements for some materials regardless of the immense agricultural resources of the country. In other materials, however, capitalist industry was incapable of absorbing the entire agricultural raw material output; the latter was therefore exported abroad, and frequently reentered the country in the form of imported manufactured goods. For example, as the main producer and exporter of flax fiber, Russia produced 18 million poods throughout her main regions of commercial flax raising, of which 2 million poods were processed locally by *kustar* methods, 3 million poods were absorbed by domestic factories, while 12 to 14 million poods went into export channels. As for wool, Russia gathered about 10 million poods, or 14 per cent of world production, exported no more than between 1 and 1.1 million poods, and imported about as much raw wool (of the higher grades) and an additional 5.9 million rubles' worth of finished woolen goods. During the 1880's the Russian cotton industry acquired its own domestic raw-material base in Central Asia. At the turn of the century production of raw cotton in Russia had increased to between 6 and 6.7 million poods, which constituted 5.1 per cent of world output. Since total domestic requirements in cotton amounted to 14.5 million poods (including small-scale production), an additional 9 million poods of raw cotton, 127,000 poods of yarn, and 1.5 to 1.7 million rubles' worth of finished goods were supplied by imports.

From the above-cited examples we note how incompletely Russian capitalism assimilated the immense resources and natural wealth of the country, especially as regards the individual regions of the country. The effect of the general law of the disproportionate development of capitalism was felt even more strongly in the outlying areas because of the technological, economic, and social-political backwardness of the country. In a region like the Urals, this onetime center of feudal metallurgy, the influence of certain lingering elements of serfdom and the general social backwardness were reflected in low labor productivity and primitive methods of production.

NUMBER AND COMPOSITION OF THE WORKING CLASS DURING THE 1890's The steady advance of industrial capitalism and the high degree of its concentration stimulated the numerical growth of the

working class and its concentration in large-scale enterprises. Specifically, during the nineties, in the wake of a wave of industrial prosperity and a rapid process of proletarianization in the village, the ranks of the industrial proletariat perceptibly increased. Thus, as computed by Lenin, the number of workers employed in the larger capitalist enterprises of Russia, including the Caucasus and Poland, during the twenty-five years following the Reform may be expressed in the following figures (thousands): [12]

YEARS	IN FACTORY INDUSTRY	IN MINING INDUSTRY	ON RAILROADS	TOTAL
1865	509	165	32	706
1890	840	340	253	1,433

The number of workers thus more than doubled during the twenty-five-year period, and increased not only much faster than the population as a whole but also faster than the urban population. At the beginning of the twentieth century (1900–1903), in fifty provinces of European Russia the number of workers in the factories and mills, according to Lenin's figures, amounted to 1,262,000, in addition to the 477,000 mineworkers and 469,000 railroad workers, making a general total of 2,208,000. In other words the rate of growth during the decade 1890–1900 reached a new height above that attained during the preceding twenty-five years.

As for the various branches of the economy, the highest number of workers and the most rapid rate of increase could be found among the railroads (712,000 men in 1904, or an increase of about 22 times during the thirty-year period after the Reform). Among the industrial branches proper the number of mineworkers increased to 599,000 during the early twentieth century; and the total number of factory workers amounted to 1,663,000, of which the textile industry employed 621,000 and the metal-processing industry 236,000. The tremendous process of concentration of industry and the consequent growth of large-scale capitalist enterprises also led to the concentration of the labor force. According to the records of factory inspectors, of all 15,821 enterprises with a total number of 1,640,000 workers in 1903 in 64 provinces in European Russia, the largest enterprises, numbering over 500 persons each, accounted for 797,900 workers; that is, 4 per cent of the enterprises employed 48.7 per cent of the total number of workers.

In connection with the growth and concentration of large-scale capitalist industry, attention should also be called to the changes in the nature of the labor force itself, the complete divorce of the factory workers from the soil and the village as their erstwhile basic source of existence, and their transformation into a factory proletariat.

This influence of modern capitalist industry on the formation of an industrial proletariat and on hastening its divorce from the village is well illustrated in the following table prepared by Lenin on the basis of Dementyev's study: [18]

FACTORIES AND MILLS	WORKERS LEAVING FOR FIELD WORK	
Cotton weaving and dyeing, manual	72.5%	Manual Production
Silk weaving	63.1	
China and porcelain	31.0	
Manual cotton-printing and cloth-distributing offices	30.7	
Wool (all phases)	20.4	
Cotton spinning and automatic weaving	13.8	Mechanized Production
Automatic weaving, including cotton printing and finishing	6.2	
Machine-building plants	2.7	
Cotton printing and finishing, mechanical	2.3	

In this manner large-scale capitalist industry, with its mechanized production requiring a skilled labor force, exerted its influence in the direction of almost completely separating the worker from his land, his village, and agriculture. Historically this process evolved in the course of the period between the eighties and the nineties, and, as regards the major industries, was nearly complete by the early twentieth century.

This course of development of the Russian industrial proletariat and its erstwhile "peasant" origin may be illustrated more clearly by the following table, which combines the data of several students in the field: [14]

YEARS	ORIGIN OF EACH 100 WORKERS	
	Of the Peasantry	Other
1884–1885	91.5	8.5
1899	94.2	5.8
1902	87.3	12.7

But this "peasant" genealogy of the Russian industrial working class, based on passport classification, ignores the actual fact of its "factory" antecedents, if we consider their continuous employment at the factories: [15]

YEARS	WORKERS WHOSE FATHERS HAD	
	Worked at Factories	Not Worked at Factories
1884–1885	55.0%	45.0%
1897	38.0	62.0
1899	44.4	55.6

Thus, by the end of the 1890's one-half of the Russian industrial workers had already become "hereditary proletarians," whose fathers before them were also employed at the factories. In individual industries and regions the percentage of permanent workers (who did not return to the village) had increased to 97 (metal processing) and 89 (the Petersburg region as a whole).

THE POSITION OF THE WORKERS Despite the steady progress made by industrial capitalism and the upsurge of the nineties, the material position of the workers employed in factory industries—their wages, length of working day, employment, conditions at the plants, as well as the social and sanitary conditions of their existence—had not improved. Whatever had been achieved in that respect was earned in battle by the workers, as we shall see later, through their stubborn struggle for the betterment of their economic conditions and social life.

Throughout the various regions and in the individual industries, labor conditions and the life of the workers differed somewhat, depending on the character and the historical background of capitalism and its technology in the region or the industry. The most palpable difference in this respect could be found between the plants of light industry, the textile industry in particular, and the plants of the heavy, metallurgical, coal, and petroleum industries.

Let us first cite some general figures to illustrate the level of wages in several industries during the late nineties and the early years of the twentieth century, averaged per worker irrespective of sex or age (in rubles per year): [16]

Cotton manufacturing	180
Wool manufacturing	172
Flax manufacturing	140
Woodwork, mechanized	189
Manufacture of foodstuffs	187
Manufacture of mineral products	206
Chemical production	260
Metal processing, machine production, and so forth	342

These figures show a marked distinction between the level of wages among metal workers and workers in heavy industry in general, on the one hand, and the workers in light industry and the textile industry in particular, on the other. These same groups of workers also differed from one another rather sharply in all other conditions of labor and existence; namely, with respect to the proportion of woman and child labor employed, sanitary and living conditions, and the length of the workday. In part this serves to explain, as we shall see later, the nature of participation by these groups in the revolutionary movement.

Textile production in the central-industrial region, widely prevalent since the period of serfdom, began to develop rapidly after 1870 in the form of

capitalist manufacturing plants. Beginning as ordinary small enterprises, they arose in those localities where an adequate supply of skilled workers was available among the former *kustars* and individual household craftsmen. Inasmuch as this type of textile production did not require any great physical strength or particularly high skill on the part of the worker, the new capitalist enterprises utilized exclusively the labor of local workers from the peasantry and the former *kustars*, a large proportion of whom were women and children (in some places nearly one-half). The conditions of employment and existence in general of these workers were characterized by harsh forms of exploitation. The workday usually was 14 to 15 hours, while conditions in such a "factory" were extremely insanitary. Wages were exceedingly low, adult workers receiving between 70 kopecks and 1 ruble a day, and women and children between 30 and 50 kopecks. The abuse of the penalty system by the factory owners reduced the wages still lower, at times by as much as 30 to 50 kopecks from the day's earnings. Many workers continued to live in the village, arriving to work every day with their own supply of food. The factory had no provisions for housing the workers, and if the employees were compelled to stay at the plant overnight, they simply slept in the shop on the floor or on the table at which they happened to work. According to the descriptions of the factory inspectors of that period, wages, working conditions, and the life of the workers employed in these enterprises were of the lowest possible level. In the central region, besides the textile industry (cotton and silk) this category included the enterprises of the food industry, leather manufacturing, woodworking, chemical, and other production. The appearance of large-scale capitalist mechanized factories in this region tended to improve labor conditions slightly, at least at the plant itself, especially after the institution of regular factory inspection which afforded some supervision over the sanitary conditions of the plant building. The general conditions of labor, however, and the social environment of the workers changed little. Although the law of June 2, 1897, limited the workday to 11½ hours, and to 10 hours on the eve of holidays, even these long hours were, in fact, exceeded by permitting overtime and all types of other ruses. The concentration of a large number of textile workers at huge plants during 1880–1890, working under extremely unfavorable conditions, helps to explain the fact that the textile workers were among the first to undertake an organized struggle against capitalist exploitation.

Technical labor conditions in the heavy industrial plants (metallurgical, metal-processing, machine-building, and fuel) required most of the workers employed in such production to possess a considerable amount of physical strength and a relative degree of skill. In such industries, therefore, the labor of women and children was naturally less prevalent (no more than 3 to 5

per cent). Heavy exhausting work here went hand in hand with an extremely long workday. During 1870–1880 the workday in these industries, especially as a result of a system of compulsory overtime, amounted to 15 or 16 hours a day. During the nineties, even at the best ironworks and machine-building plants in Petersburg, the "normal" workday was 11 to 12 hours, increasing to 15 to 16 hours with overtime. Nominal wages among metalworkers, as we have seen, were higher than for the textile workers, but an increase of 10 to 15 per cent that came during the 1890's was, in fact, largely nullified by rising prices of food and rent. With respect to living conditions, the metalworkers were somewhat better situated, since they lived mostly in private apartments in the cities or suburbs where the factories were located.

During the nineties, as was stated earlier, the Donets basin became one of the largest and most important industrial regions of capitalism. Here, too, the ranks of the mining proletariat were increasing steadily. By the end of the 1890's some 65 per cent of the labor force in the Donets mines consisted of permanent workers. Extremely difficult and insanitary conditions of work in the mines were accompanied by similar social conditions of existence among the miners and their families, who lived in hovels near the pits. According to a survey on living conditions among the miners during the nineties, the mine-worker aged very rapidly, usually turning into a helpless invalid at the age of 35 or 40. Wages were low, especially as a result of the commonly practiced contract system of distributing work, whereby the contractor farmed out the work to the artel by piecework, utilizing his opportunity of exploiting the workers in the most merciless manner possible. Wages received from the contractors were usually half of the usual wage paid by the industry directly. By working directly for the mines, the miner drew a wage of 37 to 40 rubles a month, while the contractor paid only 17 to 20 rubles a month with the men supplying their own board. A system of penalties was also commonly in practice. Under a system of piecework, the length of the workday was not regulated and usually amounted to 12 hours whenever shifts were used, and 13½ hours without shifts. Efficiency of the underground work was extremely poor, and accidents were frequent: according to the official, notoriously inaccurate mining industry statistics, the number of recorded accidents in the mining industry increased substantially during the nineties, totaling 29,000 cases in 1900. Even in the case of heavy injuries, a worker received a negligible compensation of a few rubles and was released from employment.

One of the most cruel systems of labor exploitation existed in the oil fields. The workers of the Baku oil fields during the 1890's were of extremely varied national composition, including Russians, Armenians, Persians, Tatars, and Lezghians. They were on the whole not a highly skilled group of workers, except for a small number of specialists connected with the mechanized

phase of petroleum extraction and refining. The workday in the oil fields was 16 to 17 hours, with the men working under conditions highly detrimental to their health. Harsh labor conditions and a cruel system of exploitation were responsible for the fact that the oil workers of Baku, including the most backward groups among them, appeared by the early twentieth century to be fully prepared for a conscious economic and political struggle against capitalist exploitation and tsarist political rule.

In this manner the industrial boom of the nineties, the intense concentration of industry and of the working class as well, together with a cruel system of capitalist exploitation, impelled the working class to resort to active struggle against capitalist exploitation and the entire tsarist regime that supported it. By 1890 the working class in both number and composition had become

> a contemporary industrial proletariat, entirely unlike the earlier workers of the semifeudal factories or the small-scale kustars and other manual producers, and united in respect to its concentration in large capitalist enterprises and its militant revolutionary qualities.[17]

LABOR LEGISLATION DURING 1880–1890 For all the appalling conditions under which the workers lived and the inhuman forms of exploitation practiced against them, the tsarist government passed almost no labor legislation during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The first decree issued, that of July 1, 1882, a decree restricting the work of minors, was a direct outgrowth of the incipient labor disturbances of that time. Simultaneously the government established a system of factory inspection. The second decree (July 8, 1885) outlawed nightwork for women and children in a number of unhealthy occupations.

Under the pressure of new labor unrest, the tsarist government on June 3, 1886, promulgated a law regulating the conditions of hiring workers. This measure was a direct response to a wave of strikes among the workers of the Morozov factories. These regulations prescribed the terms and procedures under which the entrepreneur could hire labor, specifying the periods during which wages had to be paid in cash, and outlawing all payments in kind. Fines, which the factory owners collected for their own benefit prior to this law, henceforth had to be paid into a special fund intended for the "welfare" of the workers. All the above laws, however, were for the most part not applied in practice.

Following the strike of 30,000 Petersburg textile workers during the summer of 1896, on June 2, 1897, the tsarist government was compelled to enact another law, this time limiting the workday to 11½ hours and making Sundays and holidays obligatory days of rest for all workers. All these laws and regulations, besides offering very faint protection to the workers' interests,

had the additional defect of applying only to the factories, mills, and enterprises employing 20 workers or more. All establishments employing less than 20 workers were exempt from supervision by the factory inspection system, and consequently from observing the labor rules. Many other enterprises, such as handicraft workshops and transportation agencies, were not subject to the law at all. Children under 15 years of age were classed as minors, and their workday was limited to 9 hours; adolescents between 15 and 17 years worked 10 hours a day. These rules were for the most part ignored, however. The ineffectual factory-inspection service could not enforce their execution, and moreover a number of reservations in the regulations concerning overtime offered the factory owners an opportunity to extend the length of the workday.

In the same manner very little was accomplished by the right of the factory inspection service in its function as a "council on factory affairs" to issue "mandatory rules" on good maintenance, sanitation, and safety in the plant buildings. Hence factory buildings and lofts were often extremely insanitary and poorly maintained in general.

This was the net result achieved by the tsarist government in its "labor" legislation of the 1890's.

THE LABOR MOVEMENT DURING 1880–1890 The historic 1885 strike of the workers of the Morozov factory at Orekhovo-Zuyev played an important role in awakening the class consciousness of the workers. While it began as an ordinary dispute involving a demand for a rise in wages and the improvement of conditions (against fines, and so forth), the strike eventually became a major political event that revealed the full extent of the political implications of the labor problem in Russia. The workers were ordered to appear in court. Here the whole amazing story of labor exploitation at the Morozov factory was told in full. Labor conditions at this factory, which employed about 8,000 workers, were deteriorating daily: wages were systematically being reduced, and the workers were persecuted by fines which reduced every ruble of wages by 30 to 50 kopecks. Eventually, the strike was stopped by military force, over 600 workers were arrested, and several dozens of workers were put on open trial.

The horrible tale of exploitation told in the courtroom was such that the court was compelled to acquit the defendants, who were thereupon immediately arrested and sent into exile by administrative order. Nevertheless, after the Morozov strike the government was forced to undertake some "regulation" of the labor problem, enacting at this time its decree on fines, which, according to the new law, instead of being paid to the owner, had to be collected in a special fund for the welfare of the workers.

Altogether, about 80,000 workers took part in 48 strikes during the five-year period of 1881–1886. The mass character of these strikes began to change the elemental opposition to capital into a class-conscious political struggle. The workers were beginning to understand that they could not win except through organized struggle. In the course of the nineties, leadership of the strike activities of the workers passed to the party of the working class. The tasks arising in that struggle were clearly formulated by Lenin, who soon became the head of the party's leadership of the workers' movement, uniting all Marxist labor circles in 1895 into the League of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class, thus preparing the creation of a revolutionary Marxist labor party. During this period of recurrent strikes, previously discussed and formulated demands were presented, and the time and place of each strike were determined in advance. These "systematic strikes already indicated a beginning of the class struggle, but only a beginning,"[18] wrote Lenin in his book *What Is to Be Done?*

In an article entitled "New Tasks and New Forces" (1905), Lenin formulated the following sequence of stages in the advance of the labor movement in Russia:

> The development of the mass labor movement in Russia parallel with the development of our social democratic activity is characterized by three notable transitions. The first transition was from narrow propagandistic circles to broad economic agitation among the masses; the second phase took us to political agitation on a large scale and to open street demonstrations; the third led to actual civil war and to insurrection. Every one of these stages was duly prepared, on the one hand, by the direction of socialist thought toward one main objective, and on the other hand, by profound changes in the living conditions and in the psychological mood of the working class, and by awakening more and more strata of the laboring population to a more conscious and active struggle.[19]

In time, the first of the three stages cited by Lenin coincided largely with the 1890's. The height of the economic struggle of the workers came after the famine of 1891–1892, when the acutely critical conditions in the village evoked a new exodus into the cities and industry. At the same time, with a mature labor movement, the industrial prosperity of the middle nineties intensified the struggle of the workers, which had now acquired more of a class-conscious political character.

After 1894–1895 a wave of strikes spread throughout the country, beginning at the same time to fall under the express influence of the social-democratic workers and under the direction of the League of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class. In 1894 occurred the clashes at the Semyannikov factory; in 1895 occurred the strike in the Petersburg harbor, at the

Thornton factory (November, 1895), at the Laferme factory, at the mechanical shoe factory, at the Koenig cotton-spinning mill, at the Lebedev weaving mill, at the Putilov plant, at the factory of the brothers Karzinkin at Yaroslavl, and elsewhere. In January, 1896, a strike broke out at the Voronin spinning mill in Petersburg; in May, 1896, came the general strike of the Petersburg weavers and spinners. The strike spread from Petersburg to Moscow, to Ivanovo-Voznesensk, to the Vladimir region, again to the Morozov factory at Orekhovo-Zuyev, to the Tver plants, and to the mines and mills of the Urals.

The Petersburg strikes of 1896–1897 were of particular significance, encouraging the working class in all parts of the country to present its economic demands for a shorter workday, for higher wages, and for changing the methods of wage payment. Next came a series of purely political demands, which after 1898 were beginning to predominate in all labor demands. Through the League of Struggle Lenin began to achieve the *merging of socialism with the labor movement* and to link the struggle of the workers for economic goals with political struggle against tsarism, passing from propagandization of Marxism to political agitation among the broad masses of the working class. Thus, on May 1, 1898, occurred the first political strikes in celebration of May Day at Petersburg. In the same year, during a strike at the Maxwell and Pall factory, the workers not only presented purely political demands, such as freedom of assembly and the right to strike, but also offered organized resistance to the troops sent against the strikers by the tsarist government. A strike movement on an even larger scale and of a general character also spread during these years to Poland and the Baltics, where the workers similarly moved from economic to political demands.

The activities of Lenin and the League of Struggle which he created furnished a powerful impetus for the organization and unification of Marxist and labor groups in the other areas of Russia. During the middle nineties Marxist organizations arose in Transcaucasia, and in 1894 came the establishment of the Union of Workers at Moscow. During the same years similar Marxist social-democratic organizations came into existence in all major industrial centers of Russia and Siberia: at Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Orekhovo-Zuyev, Yekaterinoslav, and Rostov-on-the-Don. Finally, organizations of this type also extended to the non-Russian borderlands and to Poland and Lithuania. At the first Social-Democratic Congress held in 1898 (by this time Lenin had been sentenced to exile, and was therefore absent from the congress) an attempt was made to unify all Marxist social-democratic organizations. The congress officially announced the formation of the RSDRP (Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party—ED.). In reality, however, the Marxist-Social Democratic Party did not begin to function as such. Owing to

a number of causes, ideological dissension began to increase within the local organizations, resulting in the encouragement of an opportunist tendency toward "economism," which denied the necessity for creating an independent political party of the working class. From his place of exile, Lenin waged a bitter struggle against the champions of "economism." For the purpose of unifying the scattered Marxist organizations into one party, Lenin proposed and carried out his plan of launching the first all-Russian publication of the revolutionary Marxists, the well known *Iskra.** The first few issues were published abroad (1900–1901), and "served as a transition to a new period, a period of the actual organization of a single Russian Social-Democratic Party from the scattered groups and circles." [20]

THE CONDITION OF URBAN ARTISANS With the development of large-scale capitalist industry during 1890–1900, the small urban handicrafts were being steadily driven out of all major branches of production. They continued to exist either exclusively in the form of small auxiliary crafts in fields that had not yet been adapted to large-scale production (in repair shops, for example), or had been turned into a form of "home work" in the service of large commercial firms (so-called "confectionary production," or the preparation of ready-made garments for the big stores). The guild organizations of the artisans gained neither strength nor independent status. In accordance with the industrial code of 1893, artisan guild boards were introduced into three cities only, where the number of artisans warranted such action. In these cities the registration in the guilds was made obligatory for all artisans. In reality, however, guilds and the artisan boards existed in 140 to 150 cities at the turn of the century. Registration in the guild could be either of a temporary nature, in which event the legal class status of the registered person remained unchanged, or of a permanent nature, which involved the person's commitment to a special "guild status" for all time. A guild master had the right to maintain his own establishment and to employ journeymen and apprentices, who before attaining the status of master were given special training under the supervision of the artisan boards. The right to participate in the self-governing boards of the artisans was held only by the "old-craft" masters, who elected the guild elders, the head master artisan (the president of the artisan board), and other officials. The "temporary" artisans (in reality the majority of the urban artisan population everywhere) were deprived of the right to take part in the self-government of the guilds. The occupational interests of the working artisans received little consideration. The existing rules on apprenticeship, which regulated the obligations of the masters and limited the length of the workday to 10

* Spark; i.e., the spark to kindle a revolution.—ED.

hours, were not strictly observed, since the handicraft workshops were not subject to the supervision of the factory inspection service. Most pitiful was the fate of the minor apprentices who were the true "white slaves" of the artisan workshops. In such shops they learned very little of their trade, but were exploited rather cruelly. There are no statistics available on handicraft production, but according to the various surveys made in the larger cities and industrial centers, under-age and adolescent apprentices comprised about 31.6 per cent of the total number of working artisans in the handicrafts (1899). Special trade schools for the apprentices or for the minor children of the guild artisans were almost nonexistent. In 1900, owing to the thoroughly unsatisfactory conditions and the public organization of the handicrafts, the guild establishments of most cities were abolished, and the regulation of handicrafts, wherever it existed, was merged with the general urban administration. However, under conditions of extreme bureaucratic officiousness, which limited the rights of urban self-government and interfered with local administration, the position of the urban artisan did not improve but instead deteriorated. The urban crafts were also left untouched by the cooperative movement, which succeeded in the form of producers' cooperatives among the *kustar* industries, but not within the handicrafts.

GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISES AND ECONOMIC POLICY DURING THE NINETIES Our study of Russia's economic structure during the nineties would be incomplete without touching upon one of the very important problems of the period; namely, government enterprise and economic policy during the 1890's.

The impact of government enterprise and economic policy upon the economy of the nation had never before achieved such importance as during the period under discussion. Government enterprise in all its phases, state railroads and plants, large government orders, the complex system of government credit, its tariff, industrial, and taxation policy, and its conduct of the monetary reform—all combined in the course of the nineties to promote industrial capitalist development within the economy of the nation.

This policy of vigorously promoting industrial capitalism was best personified in the activities of Russia's Minister of Finance, S. Witte, the most prominent figure among the "government officials" and tsarist ministers during the last half century of the empire's existence.[21]

This tendency in our economic policy and state business activity was not, indeed, altogether new; the way had been thoroughly prepared by the preceding economic phase of development and by the policy of Witte's predecessors since 1870, men like Bunge and Vyshnegradsky. However, the

economic policy of the Russian government during the nineties bore more conspicuously the imprint of our industrial and capitalist interests.

State enterprise in Russia, largely a legacy of the feudal state of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was always distinguished by its considerable size, by its complexity, and by its close interconnection with the national economy as a whole. These characteristics in Russia's state economy always attracted the attention of foreign observers. In contrast with the Western capitalist countries of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the state in Russia widely extended its economic activity in the fields of industry, railway construction, telegraph, and credit institutions (the State Bank, the Peasant Bank, the Noblemen's Bank). The state owned vast tracts of land and 60 per cent of all the forests in the country. It possessed valuable mines in the Altai, the Urals, and Siberia, and processed their valuable ores at state-owned plants; it engaged in the direct sale of alcoholic beverages to the population, either buying them on monopolistic terms or producing all the required alcohol at state-owned mills.

THE STATE BUDGET AND GOVERNMENT CREDIT The first prerequisite for the proper maintenance and development of the state economy was a rather sizable and balanced government budget. Before Vyshnegradsky took office, the state budget of Russia and even its section of ordinary expenditures had chronic deficits, not to speak of the extraordinary expenditures. The attainment of a balanced budget, which had been undertaken during the ministry of Vyshnegradsky, became under Witte a major objective of governmental policy. For this goal, motivated ostensibly by the need of achieving "independence" from foreign credits, all means were considered justifiable. Henceforth the slogan, "an excess of revenue over expenditures," and the accumulation of free liquid capital became the guiding principle in the policy of Vyshnegradsky, Witte, and all their successors.

Witte's success in this direction was most conspicuous. The last years during which Russia had a deficit in its regular budget were 1887 and 1888, after which the fulfillment of the budget was usually managed not only without a deficit but with an "excess of revenue over expenditures." This financial soundness was even more remarkable in view of the fact that during these years economic conditions in the country generally, and in the village economy in particular, were manifestly critical. The urgency behind this ostensible "financial soundness" did not indeed rise from a natural desire for "independence" from foreign credit, but instead from a hope of obtaining more extensive foreign credits by meeting all payments promptly. Thus, by 1892 the actual excess in receipts over expenditures, as reported by the state comptroller, was 45.2 million rubles; in 1895 it reached 138.5 million, in

1898, 237.9 million, yielding during the subsequent years a surplus of 122 to 228 million rubles. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Ministry of Finance itself in its budget schedule estimated the proposed revenues so "cautiously"—that is, understated them deliberately—that the actual balance, according to the comptroller's final figures, was always much above that proposed in the schedule. Thus in 1898, according to the budget, the deliberately underestimated balance was shown as 14.4 million rubles, while according to the comptroller, it was actually 237.9 million; in 1899 it was shown as 6.5 million, and actually was 217.7 million rubles. Altogether during the ministry of Witte this "excess" of revenue over expenditure yielded 1.8 billion rubles.

Of course, not nearly as favorable, even superficially, was the so-called "extraordinary" budget. In order to impart as impressive an appearance as possible to the "favorable" balance of the budget, many quite ordinary expenditures were listed under the extraordinary budget. Nevertheless, these "extraordinary" expenditures were financed not by ordinary revenue but by means of increased credit operations and an increased state debt. The expenditures in this extraordinary budget, aside from covering the debt itself, were allocated chiefly for the building of new railroads, for the retirement of obligations contracted under the old loans, and for purchasing railways.

During the same period the deficit of the extraordinary budget rose beyond 2.5 billion rubles, a sum partly covered by the above-mentioned "excess" in the regular budget and partly by various credit operations.

As a result of this situation, both the state budget and the government debt rose steadily during the 1890's. The regular government budget, which was below 900 million rubles in 1890, rose to 1.5 billion rubles by 1900, going over the 2 billion mark in 1906, and reaching 3.4 billion rubles in 1913. The rate at which the state debt grew was even greater. In 1876 it amounted to only about 3.9 billion rubles, while in 1892 it rose to 4.9 billion, in 1903 to 6.7 billion, and in 1913 to 8.8 billion rubles. Of this total about 305 million rubles were spent during the nineties for the conversion of old loans and for increasing the gold reserve, while the major portion, consisting of 892 million rubles, was consumed in railroad construction. In addition to the latter sum, and with the same goal in view, the extent of government-guaranteed railroad loans was as follows: in 1876, 767 million rubles; in 1892, 968 million; and in 1903, 1,141 million rubles. Thus the extent of government participation in the railway business had risen to 2,033 million rubles by 1903.

Adding to this amount several other loans, it may be safely estimated that in the course of the nineties, during Witte's term of office, the extent of government indebtedness in financing railway construction, promotion of

industry, accumulation of a gold reserve, and other financial operations, increased by more than 3.5 billion rubles, of which nearly 2.5 billion rubles were raised through the domestic money market and 1 billion rubles by borrowing abroad.

These colossal sums were the foundation of the financial "soundness" and economic "prosperity" injected into the national economy through railway construction, huge government orders, industrial, mortgage, and agricultural credits to develop industrial capitalism.

We shall now consider the sources of this "financial soundness," and at whose expense these loans were contracted, the interest paid, the railroads built, the credit created, and the industrial protectionism promoted.

BUDGET AND TAXATION POLICY We have seen that behind the brilliant financial façade of the 1890's was the surplus of revenue over expenditure. In reality this surplus was achieved not by economizing in the expenditure of the nation's resources and not through the actual financial soundness of the country, but by a peculiar system of taxation that entailed extraordinary hardships for the mass of the population.

First of all, the government budget since the time of Witte was increasingly based on indirect taxes, a form of taxation for which Witte immediately expressed a special preference. Apart from these indirect taxes, the revenue from the sale of vodka began to occupy a very important position. Indirect taxes accounted for 45 to 50 per cent of all revenue during this period. In 1880, for example, of the gross budget of 690 million rubles direct taxes amounted to 172 million rubles and indirect taxes to 393 million. Of the total budget of 1892, consisting of 964 million rubles, direct taxes contributed 168 million rubles and indirect taxes 533 million. Finally, in 1909, of a total budget of 1,704 million rubles, direct taxes accounted for 228 million rubles and indirect taxes, 777 million. Government sales of "drinks" alone yielded a clear profit of 300 to 365 million rubles after paying all costs of operation (1902).

Kerosene, matches, sugar, and tobacco all exacted a heavy toll of indirect taxes from the mass of the population.

There is no need to elaborate on the meaning of such a taxation and budget policy for the economic interests and welfare of the population. We may add, however, that direct taxes not only played a minor part but were also extremely inequitable and levied unfavorably for the interests of the working masses. No income tax of any type existed. The land tax, which affected the interests of the mass of the agricultural population, was so inequitable that the peasant lands were taxed several times more than the property of the gentry. The redemption payments, which by the nineties had become a

complete anachronism, were still being collected from the peasant lands, and constituted a substantial item in the budget. This overburdening of the peasant economy with land taxes, redemption payments, and other collections was responsible, as we have indicated above (see Chapter XXIII), for the heavy arrears among the peasantry during the nineties, which in some provinces accumulated to 300 or 400 per cent of the annual tax assessment.

There can be little doubt, therefore, that the "financial soundness" of the empire at the end of the century had been built upon a system of burdensome taxes on the mass of the people, which tended to undermine the nation's productive forces, and among the peasantry in particular. All this was indispensable, however, for the rapid development of industrial capitalism, for the creation of large factories, for joint-stock capital, and for the attraction of foreign capital. To facilitate the influx of foreign investments, it became necessary to adopt the gold standard and to improve the credit position of the country. Therefore, simultaneously with the apparent balancing of the budget and the increase of taxes, a firm course was also adopted in connection with the tariff policy, money circulation, and the credit system of the nation, all from the standpoint of protection for capitalist industry.

TARIFF POLICY As we have learned earlier, the first upsurge in Russian industry during the seventies took place under conditions of a free-trade tariff policy. The tariff of 1868 was quite "liberal" and afforded the infant industries of the country little protection against foreign competition.

The shift from a free-trade policy to higher tariff duties occurred in 1877, when, for fiscal reasons and because of the decline of the ruble's exchange value, the customs duties prescribed by the tariff of 1868 began to be collected on the basis of their gold equivalent; customs taxation was thereby increased by approximately 40 to 50 per cent. At the same time, a higher tariff duty was imposed on articles of heavy industry as well as a number of other goods. In 1877 the duty-free importation of locomotives and railroad rolling stock was abolished, and such commodities were now taxed at the rate of 1 ruble, 25 kopecks per pood. Afterward high duties were introduced and gradually raised on pig iron, metal manufactures, cotton, and coal, and on a number of occasions a flat increase of 20 per cent duty for all goods was added as well. Thus, although higher tariff duties were originally introduced chiefly for fiscal purposes, by 1890 the customs tariff had, in effect, become an unmistakable protectionist device. Hence, as the problem of developing and strengthening "native" industry arose in the seventies, the answer naturally followed the line of protection against foreign competition through the tariff.

Beginning with the late seventies and early eighties, a number of indus-

trial organizations approached the government with a proposal for raising tariff duties on pig iron, metal products, machines, and others. Once the duties on iron and raw material for the iron industry were raised, it became necessary next to boost the duties on metal manufactures as well, that is, in the final analysis to protect the entire industry at the expense, of course, of the domestic consumer. One of the interesting factors in Russia's tariff policy was the problem of duties on agricultural machinery, an item in which the interests of the influential circles of rural property owners opposed the interests of the industrialists. The latter asked for a duty of 90 kopecks per pood. After considerable argument a compromise was first adopted in the form of a 50-kopeck duty, which was afterward increased.

The protectionist policy of the government was most fully expressed in the tariff of 1891, which was a model of a purely protectionist, and in part nearly prohibitive, tariff.

The duties imposed on the principal import commodities by the tariff of 1891, compared with the tariff of 1868, may be seen from the following tables (in gold kopecks per pood):

	1868	1891
Coal	duty free	2 to 3
Iron ore	duty free	10.5
Pig iron, raw	5	45 to 52.5
Pig-iron products	50 to 250	112.5 to 255
Iron	20 to 50	90 to 150
Forge and boiler products	100	255
Rails	20	90
Machines, industrial, other than copper	30	250
Locomotives	75	300
Locomobiles	30	170
Machines, agricultural	duty free	70 to 140
Cotton, raw	duty free	120 to 135
Cotton yarn, bleached	325	420 to 540
Cotton manufactures	28 to 110	35 to 135

The above demonstrates that the tariff of 1891 raised duties on some goods three or four times by comparison with 1868, thus making them almost prohibitive. Yet it failed to protect the country altogether against the importation of foreign goods, since in view of the generally high duties on raw materials and the relatively lower (by value) duties on manufactured articles imported from abroad, the emphasis in imports fell on the latter. The industries most affected by the increased tariff were metallurgy, machine-building, and partly the cotton industry of the central district (to the detriment of Lodz, which worked on imported raw material). In any event, although it did not curtail the supply of foreign goods and did not prevent

them from competing against native industry, the tariff of 1891 succeeded in raising domestic prices and providing large dividends for the industrialists. The added costs, as usual, were eventually paid by the consumer, since as a result of tariff protection the Russian consumer was forced to pay for poorly made goods of domestic origin two to four times as much as similar products of a higher quality cost in western Europe.

What effect in the final analysis did the government policy have on the development of capitalist industry?

If we view this policy as a temporary but necessary measure of protection against a stronger foreign system of production, its favorable contribution to the development of Russian capitalist industry cannot be denied. It should be noted, however, that it was not always possible to collect the high rates provided in the general tariff, since the prohibitive duties of the Russian tariff provoked a sharp reaction abroad in the form of increased duties against Russian imported goods, whereupon it became necessary to lower rates by a mutual tariff agreement. It was under such circumstances that a tariff war with Germany occurred during 1892–1894. Russia asked Germany for a reduction in the high duties of the latter's general tariff on agricultural products, which strongly affected the interests of the Russian landowners and Russia's grain export trade. After failing to obtain from Germany an agreement reducing such rates, Russia applied the maximum duties of its own general tariff against industrial products imported from Germany. The latter, in turn, retaliated by raising the duties on Russian goods imported into Germany. The tariff war ended with the agreement of 1894, which introduced lower agreement rates on many goods with mutual reductions by both sides.[22]

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS The protectionist industrial policy of this period included, in addition to tariff rates proper, another manifestation of this protection; namely, government contracts. As early as the 1870's an attempt was made to meet the government's requirements for the equipment of railroads and ports through the resources of domestic industry. At that time, however, the Russian iron and steel industry was basically incapable of satisfying the rapidly expanding needs of the railways, whereupon it became necessary to give some contracts to foreign manufacturers. When the problem of industrial protection was raised in 1890, the proposal to prohibit the granting of government orders to foreign firms, especially for railroad equipment, once more was advanced. The result was an increase in large orders to a number of domestic plants at monopolistic prices, that is, a form of outright subsidies in support of heavy industry at the expense of the treasury.

Prices for such orders, as reported by a number of factories, were approved by government commissions and were usually well above the cost of production of the articles in question.

Thus, in 1897–1898 the price for rails was fixed at 1 ruble, 10 kopecks to 1 ruble, 25 kopecks, whereas the cost of production at the best South Russian plants was 77 to 89 kopecks; on the "free" (nongovernment) market these rails sold at 85 to 89 kopecks, and foreign rails were available at 60 to 65 kopecks. For the construction of the Siberian railway, for example, English manufacturers agreed to deliver rails at 75 kopecks, but the order was given to Russian plants at a price of 2 rubles. The treasury's systematic overpayment for railroad equipment (in effect a subsidy) amounted, according to the most modest estimates, to 15 million rubles a year, and, moreover, these subsidies were distributed among a dozen "favorite" plants owned for the most part by persons close to the upper "circles."

Under these conditions it is clear that the big manufacturers who had access to the costly "government" market showed little interest in the cheaper domestic mass market. In this manner the iron and steel industry by its own choice proceeded to restrict and reduce the base of its own operations, making itself utterly dependent upon government protection so that its own development assumed an artificial, unhealthy character. For there could be no sound development of heavy industry when the per capita consumption of pig iron in Russia, in 1897, for example, amounted to 52 pounds, as compared with 356 in England, 254 in Germany, and 336 pounds in the United States.

THE MONETARY REFORM The age of capitalism in Russia, as in other countries, inherited from the preceding era—an era of a dissolving natural economy—a disrupted system of currency circulation and an unstable paper currency. For the development of capitalism, and moreover for the attraction of foreign capital into Russian industry, it was essential to establish a sound metallic currency in place of the constantly fluctuating paper currency. A fluctuating currency, which had been common in Russia since the late eighteenth century as the usual accompaniment of a disintegrating natural economy and of the transition to a monetary economy, was wholly incompatible with a sound capitalist economy.

When capital is invested for many years, as, for example, in heavy industry, and particularly when a sizable proportion of this capital is invested by foreign interests, a firm, sound, and international standard of value, such as gold, becomes necessary. Therefore, since the basis of capitalist development during the nineties consisted of heavy industry and the attraction of foreign capital to that industry, the shift from paper currency to gold became

an economic necessity of first importance. Here, again, it is worth noting that the establishment of the gold currency was entirely to the advantage of industrial capitalism rather than of the wealthy landowners. It is easily appreciated that an unstable and declining paper currency stimulates exports, providing the exporter with a type of premium in the difference between the two rates of exchange of the paper currency, the higher rate inside the country and the lower rate prevailing abroad. Therefore large-scale agriculture, producing for the export market, was interested in retaining the paper currency and acted in every possible way against the adoption of the gold reform. But just as during the agricultural crisis of 1890–1894 Russian grain held its place in a low-price export market largely with the aid of its own low, paper currency, during the later period of expansion in the international market, around 1900, Russia's grain exports were able to advance their position even despite a stable currency. Last but not least to be mentioned on behalf of the monetary reform is the fact that the circulation of goods within the country had also become increasingly difficult as a result of the chaotic state of the monetary system.

Thus the interests of the national economy as a whole, and the interests of its continued progress along capitalist lines, required a change to a sound gold currency, regardless of the systematic and rather stubborn opposition of the landowning class. Of course, the question at whose expense this gold reform was executed is quite another matter. The reform required an accumulation of enormous quantities of gold, which had to be obtained through a favorable balance of trade and payments, through the reduction of imports and expansion of exports, through loans, and by increasing the general tax burden. The policy of tariff protectionism since the late eighties caused substantial reductions in the importation of foreign goods. Exports of agricultural goods, and of grains in particular, at the same time were forced irrespective of hunger conditions inside the country. The well known formula of Russia's trade policy, as formulated by Minister of Finance Vyshnegradsky—"We may not eat enough, but we will export"—cynically and succinctly summarized the chief source of this gold accumulation. This formula fails to emphasize one fact, however; namely, that Russia exported its grain at a price lower than the lowest prevailing costs of production, not justifying all the labor of the peasant and offering no opportunity for the progressive development of agriculture. In any event this policy did result in a favorable foreign trade balance for Russia. The excess of exports over imports, which on an average amounted to 55.6 million rubles during 1881–1885, began to yield an average of 238.6 million rubles annually during 1886–1895.

Another source for increasing the gold reserve was the accumulation of

greater budget resources, chiefly through the "balanced" budget and the development of debt conversions and other financial and credit operations on the basis of the balanced budget.

The underlying factors in this financial "soundness" and balanced budget of 1890–1900 were, as we have already seen, the higher indirect taxes and the revenue from the beverage monopoly, that is, heavy taxation of the mass of the people and its debauchery by drink. In pursuing the finance and budget policy of Ministers Vyshnegradsky and Witte, the Government Bank accumulated large reserves of gold in the form of a fund for the support of the future gold reform. In 1890 the gold reserve consisted of 475 million rubles compared to a total of 928 million rubles of credit notes in circulation. In 1897 the gold reserve reached 1,095 million rubles compared with a total of 1,067 million rubles of credit notes in circulation. Under such circumstances it became feasible to conduct a reform in currency circulation, that is, to make the credit notes exchangeable for gold.

For our purposes it is unnecessary to make a detailed analysis of the progress of this reform. We shall merely refer to the basic factors in its execution. Although formally Russia's basic currency unit prior to the monetary reform was the silver ruble, that is, a system of silver monometallism, the government nevertheless decided, for the considerations cited above, to change to a system of gold monometallism despite the fact that this was the most costly monetary system.

In making a correlation between the gold ruble and the paper-credit ruble, the government proceeded on the basis of the fact that by this time, as a result of some regulating measures in the interest of stabilization, the rate of exchange of the ruble on the market had settled at a point where the credit ruble was equal to 66 kopecks of gold, that is, the former gold imperial of 10 rubles was now equal to 15 rubles in the new gold currency. In other words the reform actually resolved into a devaluation, a downward adjustment of the value of the ruble to the rate of exchange it commanded in the market. As a preliminary step, the Ministry of Finance in 1895 permitted transactions in gold at the current rate of exchange; furthermore, the treasury was authorized to accept gold in all due payments. In 1897 the law effecting the gold reform was finally approved, the minting of new gold five-ruble coins worth one-third of the former (ten-ruble) imperial was begun, and rules for guaranteeing the credit notes in circulation were established. Specifically, while the State Bank was transformed into a bank of issue, its "right of issue" was limited by the rule that all credit notes in circulation of less than 600 million rubles were backed by gold up to one-half of their value, and over 600 million rubles, at full value. In other words the State Bank could issue unbacked credit notes up to a value of 300 million

rubles more than the gold reserve. These regulations concerning the issue of currency (rather rigid on the whole compared with the systems of other countries) were applied even above the quota during the first years, inasmuch as the gold reserve frequently exceeded the total value of credit notes in circulation. (In 1899 there were 1,007 million rubles of gold and 661 million rubles of credit notes in circulation, or 646 million rubles below the limit of emission.)

The golden glitter of Russia's colossal gold reserve lighted the way to still other major economic and credit-finance measures by the government, which were designed to aid the development of heavy industry. With the support of this gold reserve, Russia made new gains in advancing its credit policy, state loans, railroad financing, and industry.

RESULTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL BOOM OF THE NINETIES

During the last decade of the nineteenth century, industrial capital, displacing small-scale production, routine technology, and backward social relationships, was rapidly advancing Russian industry. To be sure, by volume of production in specific industries Russian industry still lagged far behind the advanced nations of the period. In the course of one decade, however, it had none the less progressed substantially, reaching a degree of industrial concentration much higher than the most advanced capitalist countries. With respect to its tempo of development during these years, Russian industry outstripped nearly all countries. The smelting of pig iron during this ten-year period, for example, increased in England by 18 per cent, in Germany by 72, in the United States by 50, and in Russia by 190, as a result of which Russia became the seventh ranking power in 1880, sixth in 1890, fifth in 1895, and fourth in 1900. The production of iron during this period increased in England by 8 per cent, in Germany by 78, in the United States by 63, and in Russia by 116. The coal industry of Great Britain expanded by 22 per cent, that of Germany by 52, of the United States by 61, and that of Russia by 131. Finally, in number of spindles operating in the cotton industry, England made a gain of 3.8 per cent in the course of the same decade, the United States, 25.6, the European continent, 33, and Russia, 76. By virtue of this number of spindles, Russia in 1890 owned 4 per cent of the world's total number of spindles and 14 per cent of the total spindles in use on the European continent, while by 1899 it accounted for 6 per cent of the world total and 18 per cent of the European total number of spindles.

Naturally, these relative figures present a somewhat inaccurate picture of actual conditions in that the high percentage of increase just cited was due entirely to the low initial level of production.

Hence, if we compare the scale and tempo of capitalist development dur-

ing the nineties with the precapitalist era in Russia, we must admit that they are rather considerable. If, however, we compare this

rapid development with what could have been achieved with the aid of contemporary technology and civilization, then actual progress of capitalism in Russia must indeed be recognized as having been slow. And it could not have been anything but slow, since no other capitalist country retained altogether such an abundance of ancient institutions incompatible with capitalism, retarding industrial development, and hopelessly depressing the condition of the producers, who "suffer both from capitalism and from the inadequate development of capitalism." [23]

Yet the 1890's definitely brought the national economy of Russia into the world system of capitalist economy as a major national-capitalist entity with vast natural possibilities for development and with capitalist institutions penetrating deeply into the nation's economy. And whereas at the beginning of this period there were voices at home which considered it possible "to turn the wheel of history" away from capitalism, by the end of the century it was apparent even to the most convinced champions of precapitalist Russia that a retreat from capitalism with all its historically positive and negative elements was impossible. Russia had been decisively transformed into a capitalist country with its own peculiar "national system" of capitalism. The peculiarities of this system were such that, despite the rapid growth of capitalism during the nineties and the high degree of concentration of Russian industry, the nation suffered from technological and social-economic backwardness, a confusion of clearly expressed bourgeois-capitalist relationships with many survivals of medievalism, the supremacy of the serf-owning landed aristocracy, and a backward village where the most flagrant forms of exploitation continued to exist. This was enough to retard a progressive development of capitalism, and placed Russia in a position of semicolonial dependency upon western European capitalism, which only sought in Russia a supply of the raw materials it required, a market for the sale of its industrial goods, and an outlet for the profitable investment of its capital.

In Russia of the 1890's the capitalist seed was still growing within its old "autocratic" and semifeudal shell, which retarded capitalist development in every way possible. In the interest of the industrial bourgeoisie, it was necessary as quickly and as completely as possible to discard these feudal brakes on industrial development in the aspect of serfdom latifundia and the vestiges of semiserf relationships in the village which slowed rural differentiation, rapid increase in production for sale, and expansion in the capacity of the village market. But the interests of the dominant feudal-minded section of the landowning class consisted in preserving the social isolation of the peasantry, its land hunger, and proximity to the land, and the semifeudal methods

of exploitation in the village. The latter tendencies, despite the considerable entrenchment of capitalism by this time, still proved predominant during the 1890's, succeeding not only in placing their characteristic imprint upon this era of Russian industrial capitalism but continuing also during the subsequent period of imperialism.

Notes

1. Zak, *Promyshlennyi kapitalizm v Rossii* (Industrial Capitalism in Russia) (1908), p. 9. The figures of the Russian and German censuses are not entirely comparable and are used, therefore, for purposes of illustration only.
2. Prepared on the basis of *Svod dannykh o fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti Rossii* (Summary of Data on the Factory Industry of Russia) (1889–1900), as well as *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii po gornozavodskoi promyshlennosti* (Collection of Statistical Data on the Mining Industry) (1900).
3. Information for 1870 based on *Istoriko-statisticheskii obzor promyshlennosti Rossii* (Historical and Statistical Survey of Russian Industry), Vol. II, p. 91; and for 1880–1897 on *Svod dannykh o fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti Rossii* (1897). See also Pokrovskii, *Sbornik svedenii po istorii i statistike vneshnei torgovli Rossii* (Collection of Data on the History and Statistics of Russian Foreign Trade) (1902), p. 276. Included in the figures for the cotton-weaving and cotton-printing enterprises for 1870 and 1880–1897 were a large number of small enterprises.
4. *Materialy dlya statistiki khlopchatobumazhnogo proizvodstva v Rossii* (Material for the Statistics of Cotton Fabric Production in Russia) (1901).
5. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, pp. 397-399.
6. Pogozhev, *Uchyot chislennosti i sostava rabochikh Rossii* (Calculation of the Number and Composition of the Workers in Russia), St. Petersburg (1906), p. 42.
7. Glivits, *Zhelezodelatelnaya promyshlennost' Rossii* (The Iron Processing Industry of Russia) (1911), p. 111.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
9. The difference in the computations is due for the most part to the varying methods of converting the foreign units of currency into Russian. Cf. Ol, *Inostrannyye kapitaly v khozyaistve dovoyennoi Rossii* (Foreign Capital in the Economy of Prewar Russia) (1925); Voronov, *Inostrannyye kapitaly v Rossii* (Foreign Capital in Russia) (1901); Schvanebakh (Schwanebach), *Denezhnoye preobrazovaniye i narodnoye khozyaistvo* (Monetary Reform and the National Economy) (1901), and also Pushkin, *Statistika aktsionernogo dyela v Rossii* (Corporation Statistics of Russia) (1897–1898).
10. Ol, *Inostrannyye kapitaly v khozyaistve dovoyennoi Rossii* (1925).
11. See also Map 15, p. 537.
12. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. III, p. 388.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 420; Dementyev, *Fabrika, chto ona dayot naseleniyu* (The Factory and What It Contributes to the Population), 2nd ed. (1897), p. 36.
14. Data for 1884–1885 based on Dementyev, *Fabrika, chto ona dayot naseleniyu* (The Factory and What It Contributes to the Population); for 1899, on Shestakov, *Rabochiye manufaktury Tsindelya* (The Workers of the Tsindel Manufacturing Company); for 1902, on Bernshtein-Kogan, *Chislennost', sostav i polozheniye Peterburskikh rabochikh* (Number, Composition, and Conditions of the Petersburg Workers)—see "1905 god" (the year 1905) (1926), Vol. I—and on Pankra-

tov, *Rabochii klass i rabocheye dvizheniye* (The Working Class and the Labor Movement), p. 418. Needless to say, the data of the several authors are not fully comparable.

15. Data for 1884–1885 and 1899 based on the authors cited in the preceding reference, for 1897, on Pogozhev, *Uchyot chislennosti i sostava rabochikh* (Calculation of the Number and Composition of the Workers) (1906).
16. *Statisticheskie svedeniya o fabrikakh i zavodakh po proizvodstvam, ne oblozhennym aktsizom, za 1900 g.* (Statistical Data on Factories and Mills in Industries not Subject to Excise Tax, for the Year 1900) (Ministry of Finance, 1903).
17. *Istoriya VKP (b)* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks], A Short Course), p. 7.
18. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. IV, p. 384.
19. *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, p. 142.
20. *Istoriya VKP (b)*, p. 26.
21. See his interesting *Vospominaniya* (Memoirs) (1923–1924 ed.), Vols. I-II.
22. Lyashchenko, *Zernovoye khozyaistvo i khlebotorgovyye otnosheniya Rossii i Germanii v svyazi s tamozhennym oblozheniyem* (Grain Farming and Grain-Trading Relations Between Russia and Germany in Connection with the Customs Tariff) (1915), pp. 80-103, and also Sobolev, *Istoriya russko-germanskogo torgovogo dogovora* (History of the Russo-German Trade Agreement) (1915).
23. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. III, p. 469.

THE ECONOMY OF THE "NATIONAL MINORITY BORDERLANDS" AND THE COLONIAL POLICY OF TSARISM DURING THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

(XXVII)

The National Economy of Bashkiria and Kazakhstan in the Era of Capitalism

GENERAL CHARACTER OF RUSSIA'S NATIONAL-COLONIAL POLICY In our earlier discussion of the problem of capitalist development and the formation of the capitalist market in the last decade of the nineteenth century, we have called attention to the significant contribution to this process made by "the development of capitalism in breadth, that is, the extension of the sphere of influence of capitalism into new territory. . . . This characteristic of capitalism," according to Lenin, "manifests itself in great strength and continues to manifest itself in Russia during the post-Reform period." [1]

The development of capitalism "in breadth" hastened the colonial assimilation of the "national borderlands" by the industrial capitalism of metropolitan Russia. But in the general system of the Russian state the question of the national borderlands had still another highly significant political aspect; namely, a manifestation of the "military-feudal imperialism" of tsarist Russia and its expansionist ambitions. The peculiar nature of the historic development of the Russian state predetermined the multinational character of the state, imposing thereby a peculiar and significant imprint upon its entire economic structure and its trend of development.

In his report on the tasks confronting the Party in connection with the nationality problem delivered before the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) on March 10, 1921, Comrade Stalin, speaking of the emergence of nations, and of the origin and trend of national oppression throughout history, pointed out that in the case of such western nations as England, France, Italy, and to a certain extent Germany,

> by and large, the period of the liquidation of feudalism and the grouping of people into nations coincided in point of time with the emergence of centralized states, as

a result of which these nations were appropriately molded into national states. . . . In eastern Europe, on the contrary, the process of national formation and the liquidation of feudal provincialism did not coincide in time with the process of formation of centralized states.

In Hungary, Austria, and Russia,

the capitalist mode of production had not yet been established, or it perhaps was just being born, whereas the interests of defense against the invading Turks, Mongols, and other Eastern peoples called for the immediate formation of centralized states capable of stemming the tide of the invasion. [Consequently,] multinational states arose in the East which included one more highly developed nation in a position of dominance, while the others were minor national groupings in political, and afterward also economical, subordination to the dominant nation.[2]

As we have seen from our analysis of the concrete historical evolution of the Russian state, as early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Russia had been forged into a centralized state with a number of subordinate nations within its territorial framework. At the time of the rise of industrial capitalism, with the expansion of the state frontiers from the Vistula to the Pacific Ocean and from the Arctic Ocean to the Pamir mountains, the Russian state began to include a vast number of nationalities. According to the population census of 1897, Russia contained among its indigenous and immigrant population more than 100 more or less sizable nationalities and many other smaller national groups, differing distinctly in language, customs, and degree of economic development. The largest number of nationalities was found in Siberia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Besides the more populous national units, the Great Russians, Ukrainians, and White Russians, the other nations varied in number from several millions (4,082,000 Kirghiz) to a few thousands, and even to several hundreds (the Chukchi, 11,700; the Kamchadaly, 2,800; the Ostyaki, 988 persons; and the Aleuts, 574 persons). As for their stage of social-economic development, these nationalities and national groupings could be found at various levels of evolution, from the most primitive forms of tribal life and hunter-herdsman colonies to the most highly advanced capitalist societies. Of the total 140 million population, besides the 75 million Great Russians and the 35 million inhabitants of the Ukraine, White Russia, Armenia, and parts of Azerbaijan, some 30 million persons, most of them of Turkic origin living in the Caucasas, Central Asia, and Siberia, had not yet entered the capitalist phase of development, did not have their own proletariat, and remained for the most part herdsmen people living in an atmosphere of patriarchal-tribal customs, or just emerging from a semipatriarchal and semifeudal form of social existence.[3]

In an economic sense the national borderlands of Russia served the capital-

ism of the home provinces in the capacity of colonies or semicolonies whose function was to supply various types of raw material required by the industry of the central regions. This position was in part responsible for their economic and cultural backwardness, and retarded the emergence and development of local industry and an indigenous industrial proletariat. Not all the national borderlands, of course, were in the same stage of economic development. The latter varied with the degree of development of capitalist forms, or, on the other hand, with the extent of the survival of backward forms of customs and economic life. Through its economic subordination of the national borderlands, capitalism moderated their distinctive local characteristics, sometimes changing a particular national borderland into an economically organic part of the general system of capitalism and assimilating it completely, as with the Ukraine, which during 1870–1890 became one of the basic and more advanced regions of Russian capitalism (as exemplified by the Donbass, the Krivoy Rog iron district, and the sugar mills). In other national borderlands where primitive economic institutions and national customs persisted longer, the old forms of local national-feudal exploitation were joined by new forms of capitalist exploitation imposed from the center (the Moscow factory owners in Central Asia), by local national capitalist groups (Armenia and Georgia), or by foreign capital (Azerbaijan). Depending upon the nature of the economic and capitalist development, each national borderland followed an individual course to attain different results with regard to the development of industry and the formation of a national proletariat.

In the history of the colonial conquests of tsarism, as well as in its political, social, and economic relations with the subjugated nationalities of the empire, there were a great many characteristic elements of social-economic and historical development that had made autocratic Russia a "prison of nations." The feudal military imperialism of tsarist Russia erected an enormous empire founded on the oppression of the vast masses of the native non-Russian groups and on the economic colonial exploitation of their people and resources.

In spite of the harsh forms of colonial exploitation and the national oppression suffered at the hands of tsarism, however, the economic absorption of the multinational borderlands into Russia and into the national economy of Russia exerted a great and positive historical influence. It laid the foundation for sound economic intercourse between the national borderlands and the general economy of Russia and served, in the words of Engels, as a "civilizing" force in the life of many nationalities of these border areas.[4]

The policy of national-colonial oppression pursued by the tsarist regime in the national borderlands to a large extent contributed to the speed and ease with which the proletarian revolution upset not only the old autocracy

and capitalism of Russia but also the local national-bourgeois governments formed after the February Revolution.

> The October Revolution broke the chains of national-colonial oppression and without exception liberated all oppressed nations contained in the vast empire. . . . It achieved these national-colonial revolutions in the USSR not under the banner of national animosity and international strife but under that of mutual trust and fraternal friendship of the workers and the peasants of the nationalities of the USSR, and not in the name of *nationalism* but in the name of *internationalism.*[5]

For this reason the problem of colonial conquest and the national-colonial policy of Russia's autocracy and capitalism must be considered as fundamental to understanding the entire course of social-economic and national-economic development in Russia.

1. BASHKIRIA As mentioned earlier, the conquest of Bashkiria as a colony dates back to the Moscow state of the seventeenth century. Its economic assimilation at that time was, however, limited to the usual collection of fur tribute and to the incipient plunder of land from the natives. The latter basic characteristic in the economic relations between Russia and its Bashkirian colony continued to predominate throughout the entire later period, since the predatory policy of the mother country in this area found its main outlet in systematic plunder of the rich Bashkir lands for the purpose of colonizing the zone with the surplus peasant population from the interior provinces.

The rise of the mining industry in the Urals during the feudal period introduced several new factors into the relations with Bashkiria. Beginning with the eighteenth century the colonial assimilation of Bashkiria entered a new phase. By that time the Urals, which fell within the frontiers of Bashkiria, had become the main base of the iron and steel industry in Russia. The interests of Ural metallurgy required that vast land tracts belonging to the Bashkirs in southern, central, and in some of the northern sections of the Urals should be set aside for the building of factories. The arbitrary seizure of Bashkirian land therefore began on a larger scale.

At this stage the Bashkir people had already been thoroughly "pacified" with the aid of numerous military strongpoints scattered throughout the area, and the resistance of the mass of the Bashkir population was broken. During the reign of Peter I, new seizures of Bashkirian land for the purpose of developing them into mining and metal-producing properties were undertaken even more aggressively. Inasmuch as the metal plants consumed large quantities of timber, the Bashkir forest resources were depleted at an enor-

mous rate. In 1724 all forest areas located within Bashkiria were declared government territory, that is, expropriated from age-old use by the Bashkirs and changed into state property. These forest lands were then released on terms of "possessional" ownership or rented to various manufacturers for the use of their mills. In most cases the distribution of these forests amounted almost to an outright gift, while the Bashkir people received negligible compensation for their lands and forests. Specifically, some iron and steel plants rented a section of forest land embracing 180,000 *dessyatins* at a price of 20 rubles, or bought 150,000 *dessyatins* for 150 rubles in paper currency, that is, at a price of 1 kopeck for 10 *dessyatins*.[6]

In 1735 the government founded Orenburg, a new military and administrative outpost in the heart of the more recalcitrant Bashkirian regions.

Increasing exploitation of the populace, together with the widespread plunder of the lands and forests, provoked a number of new uprisings which were followed by harsh repressions, indiscriminate shooting of the rebels, punitive losses of land, and the utter ruin of the population. At the same time the Bashkirian regions were subjected to a relentless process of Russification. In the eighteenth century a number of vigorous measures were undertaken for the purpose of converting the Bashkirs to Christianity. The Orenburg territory was flooded with Russian priests and officials, thus provoking another wave of uprisings.

At this time, too, the special system of taxes in fur tribute collected from the Bashkirs and the other nationalities of the colonies was abolished, and the general Russian taxation system was introduced. The result was a great increase in tax collections. Among the more oppressive taxes thus introduced was the salt tax, involving the compulsory sale of salt at a government fixed price.

Altogether, the plunder of the land, the impoverishment of the mass of the Bashkir population, their expulsion from their native land, and the increased tax burden regularly provoked new uprisings among the Bashkirs. In the middle of the eighteenth century, a whole series of general Bashkir revolts broke out, besides a number of local disturbances. Among these may be mentioned the uprising of 1755 under the leadership of Aleyev, and the later participation in the revolt of Pugachyov which engulfed all Bashkiria as well as the whole Ural province and all its factories.

AGRARIAN CONDITIONS In 1832 the government began to adopt measures for the regulation of the agrarian problem in Bashkiria. After an interval of open land seizure and plunder, the government launched a policy of colonizing the Bashkir lands with Russian peasants. In 1832 the government began to redivide the landholdings and to institute a new agrarian order among the Bashkirs. In the course of establishing this "agrarian order," vast tracts of

land were again taken away from their former users, and the native Bashkir populace was allotted relatively negligible holdings, which frequently were inadequate to meet the needs of a nomad stock-raising economy. The privileged group of Bashkirs, the former possessors of patrimonies, received about 40 to 50 *dessyatins* per person. Another privileged group, the so-called "licensed" soldiers, that is, the new settlers from among the other nationalities (the Tepteri and Meshcheryaki) who sided with the Russian government during the "pacification" of Bashkiria, were rewarded with land allotments up to 30 *dessyatins* per person. The remainder of the Bashkirs received 15 *dessyatins* each. These plots were obviously inadequate as long as the dominant occupation was nomad stock raising in its extensive form. The land that remained after the Bashkirs were awarded their paltry allotments became government property, a fund to be used for the resettlement of Russian settlers or peasants, or for founding large estates of the gentry. Even prior to the Reform the landowners began to resettle here, bringing with them their bonded peasants, and appropriating for their own estates enormous areas of land amounting to several thousands of *dessyatins* which once belonged to the Bashkirs. Hence, even before the coming of capitalism, all of the eastern Bashkir steppes, with their constantly rebelling nomad population of Bashkirs, Kalmyks, Kirghiz, and Kazakhs, were eventually encircled not only by a ring of military fortifications and Cossack settlements—the Ural, Orenburg, Siberian, and Semirechye troops—but also by a solid mass of resettled Russian peasants.

The mass colonization of Bashkiria by the peasantry, partly compulsory and partly spontaneous, provided a basis there for the eventual development of a wide market for the industrial goods of the home provinces and a source of industrial raw material. The colonists played a vital part in the progress of Bashkir economy, which had been chiefly the breeding of livestock, and changed the habits of the native population from those of wandering herdsmen to ones of settled agriculturists. After the Reform of 1861, Bashkiria was deluged by a powerful stream of peasant immigrants from the central provinces, who settled in the Bashkir steppeland pastures and fields. Here, too, came large numbers of settlers in search of "easy money," and all types of persons who utilized every possible illegal device for acquiring large holdings of land that still remained unpre-empted in Bashkiria.

SPOLIATION OF THE LAND The confused situation in the matter of land property and the absence of fixed property lines all created an atmosphere highly favorable to wholesale and unjustified land appropriation by the local officialdom as well as outside adventurers. The native Bashkirs, who at that time were still largely engaged in stock herding, on occasion rented their surplus land. In accordance with the law of 1878, all such rent

transactions had to be made by public auction, in order to arrive at a more or less "normal" price. In practice, however, these auctions were conducted through fictitious persons; and with the aid of all types of abuses, bribery, and subornation (so-called "dark money"), the land was rented at a cost of 1 to 2 kopecks per *dessyatin.*

The land fund of Bashkiria was being very rapidly exhausted. During the early nineteenth century the total land area owned by Bashkirs amounted to approximately 11.5 million *dessyatins.* The government census of 1882 conducted by Senator Kovalevsky disclosed large-scale spoliation and abuses in the handling of public land in Bashkiria and wholesale illegal acquisitions by private persons. Altogether, in the figures of the same census, some 850,000 *dessyatins* of Bashkirian land were stolen, besides the vast land "reserves" in the former Orenburg and Ufa provinces that were thoroughly plundered. Many high officials took part in these land seizures: marshals of the nobility, city mayors, and local officials. They were formally engaged in legitimate land purchases which they obtained, however, at a price of 15 to 20, or even 8 kopecks per *dessyatin.* Moreover, since no fixed boundaries existed and the land was usually sold by entire "plots," they actually bought several *dessyatins* for a price of 8 kopecks. During the period of 1869–1878, a total of one million *dessyatins* of land were "bought," or, more accurately, stolen, from the Bashkirs.

Another way of depriving the Bashkir population of its land was through wholesale colonization by peasants newly arriving from the central provinces of Russia. Vast sections of land were also bought for a nominal price by various peasant societies and farmers who resettled here on their own initiative. Thus, for example, one society (numbering 120 households) acquired about 20,000 *dessyatins* of land for 1,500 to 2,000 rubles, that is, at the rate of 7 to 10 kopecks per *dessyatin.*[7]

All that remained from the large land reserves of Bashkiria by 1890 was about 1.5 million *dessyatins,* which yielded the natives a paltry income, renting for 2 kopecks a *dessyatin.*

TRANSITION TO SETTLED AGRICULTURE The cynical mass plunder of land in Bashkiria forced the masses of the Bashkir population to undertake settled habitation and agriculture, although they were unprepared for the new economic conditions and for rational methods of agriculture, and were uprooted from their former seminomadic life of herdsmen. Although this transition to sedentary agriculture represented a step in the direction of a somewhat higher type of economic activity and life compared with their life of wandering herdsmen, under the circumstances just described it often entailed great economic hardships for the native population. By the end of the nineteenth century the Bashkirs were all leading a settled life, residing in villages on

fixed land allotments, and engaging in grain raising and in small household crafts for their own needs. The influence of their previous nomadic pastoral life was retained in various surviving customs such as the traditional spring encampment in *koshi,* or felt tents (while the poor used *alasyki,* or bast tents), scattered throughout the steppes; this encampment had lost, however, its former economic significance. Another trait of earlier national life survived in the widespread use of kumiss, or fermented mare's milk. The amount of livestock in use among the Bashkirians greatly declined; this was especially evident in the case of horses belonging to the poorer households. As a result, the Ufa province reported that 22.9 per cent of its households were without horses in the first years of the twentieth century, and 20.4 per cent in 1912. The number of landless and small-allotment households (holdings of less than 3 *dessyatins*) amounted to 13 per cent of the total. The type of agriculture practiced by the Bashkirs was indeed very primitive: until the end of the nineteenth century, the most common plowing implement was a variety of the wooden plow, and only the well-to-do farmers in contact with the Russian methods of farming began in some rare instances to adopt the iron plow after 1900. The method of allowing the land to lie fallow for a long period of time was still common; field work was entirely unsystematic and unregulated, so that even the three-field system was not generally known.

Industry played a very small part in the life of the Bashkir population, and was, in fact, almost unknown. The most common household crafts were wool weaving and leatherwork performed only for the needs of personal consumption. In the forest regions there existed some primitive *kustar* trades such as bast weaving, wheel making, and tar boiling. Large-scale industry had arisen in the Urals which were once a part of Bashkiria, but had long been taken by the Russian industrial colony and lost by Bashkiria. In the Bashkir steppe regions proper capitalist industry was represented by some flour mills and a few distilleries owned by Russian entrepreneurs. There was a handful of small-scale enterprises for the processing of leather and other agricultural raw materials. In 1899 the entire factory industry of the Ufa province (the main region of Bashkiria) yielded an output valued at 2 million rubles only, and employed 2,500 factory workers. The latter participated to some extent in the labor movement of 1905.

Such were the limited and frequently rather burdensome results of capitalist penetration into colonial Bashkiria. By the late nineteenth century the region had been Russified to a considerable degree, at least as regards the main Bashkir regions and provinces (Ufa and Orenburg): the Russian population comprised 36 per cent of the total in 1865, and 45 per cent in 1899. During 1890–1900 the Russian type of large-scale agriculture practiced by resettled peasants and commercial entrepreneurs had spread throughout the

former steppes of Bashkiria. It was a highly commercial type of farming supplying agricultural and livestock raw material to the industrial capitalist market, and in turn serving as a large consumer for the products of industry. The economic activities of the Bashkir people proper, however, were much less affected by this development than was the economy of the Russian settlers. The general character of this "internal colony" remained unchanged until the great October revolution.

2. KALMYKIA Economic development in Kalmykia, another colonial borderland, was very similar to that of neighboring Bashkiria. During the nineteenth century the land owned by the natives of Kalmykia was similarly plundered, Russian peasants from the central zone were methodically resettled in the Kalmyk steppeland, and the native inhabitants were rapidly deprived of their land, as the result of which a substantial portion of the indigenous population died out. True, the process of land-grabbing from the Kalmyks never reached the same scale as in Bashkiria, since the Kalmyk land was less suitable for agricultural colonization. Peasant colonists were, therefore, less attracted to this region than to the more fertile soil of Bashkiria.

In this manner Bashkiria, and to a certain extent Kalmykia, along with some other adjacent regions, constituted particular types of "internal colonies" and objects of the tsarist regime's colonial policy. The colonial seizures made during the precapitalist period, and, even more, those of the capitalist period, were intended chiefly for mass resettlement of the population of the home provinces and were accompanied by open and large-scale land plunder and land speculation. In the process the mass of the native population of these national borderlands was deprived of its land, was impoverished, and died out.

3. KAZAKHSTAN As noted in an earlier section of this study, the trade routes between the Moscow state and Asia passed partly through the western Siberian, Kazakh, and Kirghiz steppes as early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. At that time, however, Russia began to exert military pressure in that direction, rising in intensity during the reign of Peter I and his successors. By the end of the eighteenth century, following the occupation of the Ural, Turgai, and Akmolinsk provinces (1730–1740), Kazakhstan proper[8] was quite effectively surrounded by a ring of Siberian, Orenburg, and Ural Cossack settlements and fortified "lines." Throughout the occupied territory Russian agricultural, urban-commercial and industrial colonization was expanding and entrenching at a steady pace. The Kazakhs and Kirghizians roaming through these provinces, who during this period were in the final declining stages of clan customs and their primitive nomadic-herdsman

economy, were incapable of offering systematic resistance to the military and colonization pressure of tsarist Russia. The next Russian drive beyond the Orenburg-Ural fortified line, and the final annexation of the Kazakh and Kirghiz steppes proper up to the rivers Alma Ata and Syr-Darya, and to the borders of China was made during the middle of the nineteenth century (in the reign of Nicholas I), when tsarist troops occupied the vast expanse of southern Kazakhstan, a part of Semirechye, and the Kirghizia of that time as far as the frontiers of China and the then independent Central Asiatic territories of Fergana, Samarkand, Khiva, and Bukhara.

SOCIAL ORDER Besides outright military conquest, the rapid movement of tsarist Russia into Kazakhstan and Kirghizia was abetted by the feudal-tribal and commercial dominant elements of the Kazakh and Kirghiz clans, who eagerly proclaimed themselves the "subjects" of Russia (1732–1735) in order thereby to consolidate their feudal rights over the mass of the population and improve their commercial position vis-à-vis the empire. During the early nineteenth century the whole of Kazakhstan became an internal province of the empire. Of course, for the bulk of the population absorption into Russia meant not only the perpetuation of the yoke imposed upon them by their own native feudal aristocracy, who had strengthened their position, but also an additional burden of taxation and national oppression on the part of the central government. This prepared the way for the later participation of the Kazakh workers in the Pugachyov rebellion and in the national uprisings of the Kazakhs and Kirghizians during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which were brutally crushed by tsarist forces.

The Kazakhs, together with the related people of Kirghizia, constituted the largest numerical group (4.5 million) among the Central Asiatic nationalities. Prior to the Russian conquest, the Kazakhs who belonged to the Turkic-Tatar branch of the Mongolian race were divided into three primitive political formations: the Great, the Middle, and the Small Hordes, ruled by khans and subdivided into various clans headed by their own clan leaders, the sultans, and princes. They were surrounded by the large native nobility, the "white bone" (*tore, aksuek*), from whose midst the khans and the sultans were elected. The upper groups also included the *aksakaly,* or tribal chieftains, the upper clergy, as well as the *bai,* the wealthy cattlemen. The remaining mass consisted of the common people, the "black bone" (*karasuek*), including the lowest group consisting of the serfs (*tolenguty*) and the slaves (*kuly*). This form of social division, owing to many survivals of the clan customs, persisted long after the latter had, on the whole, disintegrated. Only with the penetration of new capitalist relationships were clan divisions replaced by property and class distinctions.

A closely related type of social order continued to prevail among the

Kirghiz as well during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The system of clan life had also broken down and was superseded by many new relationships of a feudal character. At the head of the various clan communities stood the chieftains, the *aksakaly*. Within the clans the process of economic differentiation had begun, and was based on the appropriation of the main land areas and the richer pastures by the stronger clans and their *aksakaly*. The administration of each territory and union of clans was headed by a khan, called a *manap*, who was the supreme feudal owner of the entire region, and who, in turn, controlled a number of vassals, *ortomanaps*, who had their own dependents among the lesser owners. The upper groups included the khanate administrators, the judges, and the owners of large herds of sheep, horses, and camels, herds that often consisted of several tens of thousands of heads of livestock. Having seized for themselves the richer pastures, they held the mass of the Kirghiz worker population in economic as well as financial enslavement.

To complete the subjugation of the Kazakh people and to destroy the power of the still somewhat independent Kazakh khanates and sultans, the Russian government reformed the administrative system hitherto used in Kazakhstan, subordinated them in the general provincial organization to Russian organs both centrally and locally, and preserved a mere semblance of self-administration on the lowest level of the social order among Kazakhs (the villages). In this way it strengthened the power of the native local elders, the clan authorities, and the upper strata of the property owners, the wealthy cattlemen. The campaign to resettle the Russian peasants from the interior provinces was meanwhile pursued more vigorously, with the result that the economic position of the Kazakh population deteriorated still further.

AGRARIAN CONDITIONS AND NOMAD ECONOMIC LIFE The vast expanse of the steppe region between the river Ural and the Central Asiatic provinces, where the Kazakhs and Kirghiz roamed and pitched their tents, covered an area of about 2.5 million square kilometers, or a space equal to nearly one-half of western Europe.

During the early twentieth century the inhabitants of the steppe region lived on various levels of social customs and economic institutions. In a considerable section of the territory they still adhered to their system of clan life and a nomadic form of stock raising, while in other localities they changed to a settled agricultural habitation. The old clan customs and nomadic pursuits exerted their individual influence over the type of agrarian relations which eventually evolved in this region.

At the basis of the local system of land utilization lay the right of the tribe to appropriate land, that is, to occupy certain portions of the territory over which this tribe habitually roamed. After the dissolution of the clans, roam-

ing by entire clans gave way to roaming by smaller groups of the original clans. With the growth of the population, the natives began to experience an acute shortage of pasture land, especially winter pasture, the so-called *kstau*, where the livestock could pass the season on some poor source of green fodder. The pastures began to be seized by private persons, the common use of land was still further restricted, and as a result of land scarcity various forms of economic dependency and exploitation began to arise. The summer pastures (*dzhailyau*) continued to be available for common use for a long time, but they, too, were being removed from circulation by being combined with the winter pastures, of which there was a natural scarcity.

Thus the economic mode of life followed by the majority of the Kazakh laboring population during the nineteenth century, and even in the early years of the twentieth, was that of wandering herdsmen. Their nomadic activities were conducted in the typical form of moving from one place of habitation to another, from winter pastures to summer pastures. The winter habitation consisted for the most part of primitive dugouts which were later abandoned when the time came to change to summer pasture; in the summertime the natives lived in their portable felt tents. The wealthier Kazakhs built themselves permanent wooden huts for the winter camping grounds, occasionally with metal roofs, but they, too, continued to wander from pasture to pasture and to live in tents during the summer season.

In the nomadic districts of Kazakhstan, migrations began in the spring when the cattle were first driven to the early spring pastures (*koktau*). After the grass there dried up, the herds were driven to the summer pastures, which were usually located in the upper foothills (*dzhailyau*). During the fall the animals were taken down the mountainsides and then driven into their winter shelter areas scattered throughout the steppe.

These migrations usually took place by whole communities and clans, and each clan was assigned its own fixed route and roaming area. During the earlier abundance of free steppe space, the natives sometimes wandered with their herds from the winter pastures to their summer locations over a distance of 1,000 to 1,500 versts. Once the steppes began to be colonized and its rich grasslands were broken by the plow, the territory left for stock herding contracted steadily, which forced a large proportion of the natives to change from nomadic stock raising to sedentary agriculture.

At the winter pastures the nomads usually established their villages, where they first began to introduce hay mowing, followed later by the planting of grain as the first step in the direction of a settled agricultural mode of life. As a result, the length of time and the area over which the herds were driven to pasture were steadily decreasing, eventually being confined to a small area around the winter camps. Most of the herds were changed from green fodder

to hay, which necessitated systematic hay mowing, a new type of activity for the nomads. Finally, the inhabitants of the winter camps began to engage in agriculture, thereby virtually completing their transition to a sedentary habitation. Although every winter camp was originally inhabited by one clan group or family, after the transition to a settled existence and because of the increase in the population, these winter quarters changed from family settlements into complex communal settlements functioning as "territorial communes." The commune began to regulate and guide the economic activity of its membership, establishing conditions and plans for the use of the land, for hay mowing, pastures, and the construction of water ponds. This commune did not, however, practice a system of periodically equalizing the use of land, such as prevailed in the Russian commune. On the contrary, within each commune some powerful and influential groups owned pasture land extending over several hundred *dessyatins* for each family, while the poorer households scarcely owned several dozen *dessyatins*. Thus according to a survey made during the 1890's, the amount of land held by one wagon household in Aktyubinsk County varied from 53 to 1,356 *dessyatins*, in the northern part of Kustanay County, from 31 to 2,187, and in the southern part, from 26 to 3,857, while an occasional large household could be found with as many as 15,882 *dessyatins* at its disposal. The commune, furthermore, had the right to rent land to outsiders, which still further increased the inequality in landholdings. The result, naturally, was extreme economic differentiation, the existence of a special class of large owners ("elders" or "graybeards," and *aksakaly*), who seized control over the internal life, the administration, and economic activity of the commune.[9]

Among the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz, particularly among their nomadic groups, the main source of wealth and the predominant economic activity were their herds, especially the breeding of horses. The horse served not only as a means of transportation but also as a source of food, supplying milk for the preparation of fermented mare's milk and meat for their daily diet. Hence in the more remote, purely nomadic localities horses comprised almost 100 per cent of the herd, but after the transition to a sedentary existence this percentage dropped from 30 to 40, while cattle increased to 40 to 50 per cent of the total herd.

In connection with stock raising in general, and the breeding of horses in particular, the chief economic problem was the supply of pasture land. The roaming Kazakhs and Kirghiz had previously not been accustomed to preparing a supply of fodder for their livestock, being accustomed to driving them from summer pastures to winter encampments, and to special spring and fall locations where the animals fed on green fodder all year by following the grass with the change of the season. This method made the maintenance

of economic activity extremely undependable during unfavorable years, often resulting in the ruin of entire large nomad groups. With the beginning of Russian colonization, and in close proximity to Russian settlements, the erstwhile Kazakh and Kirghiz nomads began to adopt settled habits of life and to abandon their more primitive methods of gaining a livelihood. In the settled agricultural regions they began to raise sizable harvests of wheat (for sale), millet, and other grains. The primitive wooden plow, the *omach,* began to be displaced by the iron plow and other tools for soil cultivation.

PEASANT IMMIGRATION As a result of the administrative reform of 1869, all lands suitable for agriculture, but not used for that purpose and instead exploited in a nomadic fashion, were declared to be the property of the government, which merely granted the land to the natives for "indefinite use." In the remainder of the land held as government property, large-scale spontaneous colonization by Russian peasants proceeded rapidly, becoming at that time an important factor in the economy and agrarian order of the region. The first wave of resettlement reached this region during the 1880's, spreading in more or less irregular and impetuous fashion, chiefly in the form officially termed as "unwarranted" resettlement, with the result that the native population suffered great losses of land. Shortly thereafter a special government commission was appointed to study locally the problem of agrarian conditions among the Kirghizians and the Russian resettlers. After surveying twelve counties in which large-scale colonization had taken place, the commission merely confirmed the fact that the vast expanse of the once endless and free steppe accessible to the herds of the natives had been intersected by broad belts of grain fields planted by the resettlers and partly by the recently settled Kirghiz themselves. The survey of the available supply of land resulted in a decision that, on the basis of the accepted quotas for nomad economic activity, the 106,000 Kirghiz wagon households in the surveyed counties should be granted 17 million *dessyatins* of land. The remaining 18 million *dessyatins* heretofore left open to the herds were declared "surplus" land and taken away from the Kirghiz. During the next few years 3,800,000 *dessyatins* of this land were assigned to peasant resettlers.

After the construction of the main line of the Siberian railroad, the government resettlement policy, which had hitherto forbidden "unwarranted resettlement" (by the laws of 1889 and 1893) in the interests of the landowners in the home provinces, changed to encouragement of the rapid colonization of Siberia and the steppe territory in order to create a source of raw material and a market for the industrial goods of the capitalist factories. By a new law promulgated in 1904, the tsarist government undertook to promote colonization of this area by taking away most of the best Kazakh land and opening it to new settlers. This measure delivered the death blow to the nomad eco-

nomic order of the steppe region. The new official "quotas" of land remaining for the use of the Kazakhs were obviously insufficient, to say nothing of the many abuses to which they gave rise. The plunder of the Kazakh lands, although not on a scale equal to the same process in Bashkiria, still resulted in a great loss of land and in the open plunder of the local population on a vast scale. In 1914 the total size of the "resettlement fund" formed from the expropriated land in the steppe territory (chiefly in the Petropavlovsk, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk counties) reached 41 million *dessyatins*. In the Semirechye province alone the Kazakhs were "relieved" of 2.4 million *dessyatins*, while the Kirghiz lost about 4 million *dessyatins*. According to the government census conducted by Senator Palen in 1908, the Kirghiz and the Kazakh natives lost to the resettlement zone inhabited areas frequently amounting to areas of ten thousand *dessyatins*, and containing ready pastures and irrigation structures; winter quarters and mosques were demolished.[10]

This predatory colonization policy of the tsarist regime ruined the economic life of the Kirghiz and Kazakh population. During 1903–1913 the Kirghiz population of the colonizing regions declined by 7 to 10 per cent; livestock was reduced on an average by 27 per cent. Most affected in this respect was the herdsman economy of the Kazakhs, which required great stretches of space and a methodical and skillful use of the pasture land. The herds fell into utter ruin: according to the same official figures based on local surveys during 1903–1908, 65 to 70 per cent of all local households in the main colonization area (the Akmolinsk and Petropavlovsk counties) were in the category of small livestock-owning and declining households. Side by side with the impoverishment of the Kirghiz and Kazakh population, as well as a portion of the Russian colonists, there began to emerge among the Russian resettlers a class of village kulaks who availed themselves of the cheap labor of the natives and the latters' land to expand their own large-scale commercial farming.

The economic basis of Kazakh and Kirghiz economic life during the twentieth century, as during the preceding century, was extensive stock raising, partly for home consumption and partly intended for the market. Simultaneously a process of settled habitation and a change from nomad herdsman life to agriculture became noticeable among the Kazakh and Kirghiz population. The economic survey of 1905 disclosed that 88 per cent of the Kirghiz households in the Ural province, for example, were engaged in tilling the soil, with an average of 7.6 *dessyatins* of sown area per farm. In the Kustinai county during the same year, 94.4 per cent of the families were engaged in agriculture with an average of 8 *dessyatins* each. Under the new agrarian regime, as the Kirghiz inhabitants were changing to a sedentary and semisedentary form of existence, the size of their allotments declined from

the previous 150 to 550 *dessyatins* per family to between 55 and 350 *dessyatins,* while the Russian colonists who engaged in sedentary agriculture occupied an average of 30 to 45 *dessyatins* per farm.

In any event, both the nomad herdsman economy and the sedentary agriculture of the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs were seriously undermined by the colonization policy of the tsarist government. At the same time, however, this policy was an added impetus for strengthening economic relations between the native economy and that of the home provinces along capitalist lines. With the introduction of railroads into the heart of the Kazakh steppes, the products of their economy began systematically to be drawn into the general circulation of goods. At the local fairs great quantities of agricultural and livestock products of the Kirghiz and Kazakh countryside were offered for sale: hides, wool, lard, horsehair, livestock, and others. From the industrial regions of the home provinces came a supply of Moscow cloth and ready-made garments (which displaced the native home-woven cloth and cloaks) as well as tableware, iron manufactures, and so forth.

The tsarist colonizing policy operated against the development of a local processing industry. Despite the abundance of local raw materials no large-scale industries came into existence. Existing industrial production was confined to the preparation of either animal products (leather and lard-making factories) or foodstuffs entering into local consumption (flour mills and oil-pressing plants). The rich local mineral deposits, the existence of which had been known for centuries, remained almost untouched, and only a few, such as the Uspensk copper mines, the Spassk copper-smelting plants, the Karaganda coal pits, and the Ridder enterprises, were exploited by foreign capital.

Under these conditions there was little opportunity for the creation of a large skilled labor force among the native population. In the early twentieth century the total number of factory workers in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia amounted to 8,200 persons. Besides the Russian immigrant workers, the local industrial proletariat were drawn from the ranks of the Kirghiz and Kazakh population that had been dispossessed of their land. Many Kirghiz day laborers took seasonal jobs in near-by industries, such as the salt mines near the Caspian Sea. Conditions under which the workers lived were very harsh, particularly in the mines and in the salt-producing industries, owing to the extremely low remuneration of labor peculiar to the area. Hence the workers of Kazakhstan, the men of the Uspensk mines, for example, even during the first revolution of 1905 joined the Russian workers in their common struggle against capitalist exploitation. Under the circumstances just described, however, the labor movement could not develop on a large scale.

Such were the conditions prevailing in one of the most backward colonies of the Russian tsarist regime.

Notes

1. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, p. 464.
2. Stalin, *Marksizm i natsionalno-kolonialnyi vopros* (Marxism and the National-Colonial Problem) (1937), pp. 73-74.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 77, 208.
4. On this subject see the interesting comments of Engels in his letter to Marx dated May 23, 1851, in Marx and Engels, *Pisma* (Letters) (Social-Economic State Press, 1932), p. 52.
5. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed., p. 205.
6. L. Sabaneyev, *Ocherki Zauralya i stepnoye khozyaistvo na bashkirskikh zemlyakh* (Essays on the Trans-Ural Area and Steppe Economy of the Bashkirian Lands) (Moscow, 1873), p. 5.
7. Lyashchenko, *Krestyanskoye dyelo i poreformennaya zemleustroitelnaya politika* (Peasant Affairs and the Post-Reform Land Settlement Policy) (1914), Chap. III, pp. 155-182.
8. Before the revolution a considerable portion of the Kazakh SSR was grouped into the "stepnoye general-gubernatorstvo" (The Government-General of the Steppe) and included four provinces of Ural, Turgai, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk. A portion of Kazakhstan (beyond Lake Balkhash and the river Chu), together with the present-day Kirghiz SSR, was included with the Semirechye province of the Turkestan Government-General. Hereafter, in our treatment of the capitalist era, and in conformity with the available prerevolutionary statistical material, we shall employ these old administrative units.
9. *Materialy po kirgizskomu zemlepolzovaniyu, sobrannyye i razrabotannyye expeditsiyei po issledovaniyu stepnykh oblastei* (Materials on Land Utilization in Kirghizia Collected and Analyzed by the Expedition for the Study of the Steppe Provinces) (1898–1903), Release No. 12.
10. *Otchyot po revizii Turkestanskogo kraya, proizvedyonnoi senatorom Palenom* (Report Based on the Census of the Turkestan Region, Conducted by Senator Palen) (1909–1910).

(XXVIII)

The Economy of Siberia and the Siberian Nationalities in the Era of Capitalism

SIBERIA, as we have learned in a previous section of our study, was one of the earliest and largest colonies of the former Moscow state. From our survey of the official colonization policy in effect during the seventeenth century, we saw that the Moscow state policy was primarily based on the military-feudal and commercial exploitation of the native groups, who were subject to heavy fur-tribute taxes and to the still greater avarice of the collectors, governors, and various local officials. On the other hand the government was intent on promoting with all the resources at its command a policy of agricultural colonization by free persons or by state peasants throughout the "royal acreage," which drew great land resources into more economically sound agricultural exploitation. The third type of colonization in order of importance was colonization of a purely industrial character. Another important factor in settling this vast continent was the system of compulsory settlement of offenders against the state.

All these trends in the colonization policy continued to operate during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, although in somewhat altered relative proportions. In view of the necessity to strengthen the South Siberian border, the government transferred large military forces into Siberia, erected lines of fortifications, and founded Cossack settlements. The bulk of agricultural colonization continued to be furnished by peasant settlers from the central provinces who were escaping from the hardships of serfdom. With the eighteenth century a new element of the population appeared on the scene and began to gain in numbers; namely, the peasants assigned to the state iron-works of Siberia. During the same century colonization by convicts began to gain in importance, and included all types of criminal elements, vagabonds, persons rejected for military service, deported serfs, and, afterward, political exiles as well. Many of these elements were either directly sentenced "to forced settlement," or were placed in the category of "compulsory settlers" after having served a term at hard labor, whereupon they were absorbed by the basic agricultural or industrial population of the region.

As a result of the high death rate among some of the native tribes, Siberia,

and particularly its western portion, was rapidly becoming a "Russian" colony in population. During the nineteenth century agricultural colonists from the home provinces settled large contiguous land areas in the most fertile zones of the more southerly counties of the Tobolsk, Tomsk, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk provinces, and on a somewhat lesser scale in the Yenisey province, extending in narrow strips, following the rivers of eastern Siberia along the tributaries of the Yenisey and the Lena as far as Yakutsk and the Amur territory. The remainder of the vast expanse of Siberia attracted few colonists even by the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, according to Solovtsov, Siberia in 1709 contained 153,000 male inhabitants, or about 300,000 persons of both sexes; in 1763 the local native population amounted to 132,000, and in 1783 Siberia numbered 1,059,800 Russian inhabitants. In 1897 the first Russian census recorded the total population of Siberia (excluding the Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk provinces) at 5,760,000 persons, including 4,651,000 Russians and 870,000 persons of other nationalities. Finally, according to data for 1911, the total population increased to 9,366,000 persons, including 7,995,000 Russians.

Thus the rate of population growth was rather considerable, but in proportion to the territory, in some individual sections in particular, the net results of colonization were still minor even by the first decade of the twentieth century: only the Tomsk province attained a population density of 4.8 persons per square verst in 1911 compared with 2.5 in 1897; in the Tobolsk province the density was 1.7 (compared to 1.2 in 1897), while in the Yenisey province average density remained at 0.42 (compared to 0.25 in 1897), in Yakutsk, 0.082 (compared to 0.081); and in the Amur territory, 0.8 (compared to 0.3). Thus the results of three hundred years of agricultural colonization were far from satisfactory.

THE RAILROADS The relative importance of Siberia as a colony within the system of Russian capitalism began to rise toward the end of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries as a result of building a continuous railway line. The Siberian main line, which began with the construction in 1891–1892 of a number of separate sections together with various branch lines (the Trans-Baikal and Ussuri lines), was completed in 1899–1900 with a length of 6,500 versts at a cost of 489 million rubles (without the Chinese Eastern, which was built in 1897–1904 across Manchurian territory at a cost of 375 million rubles). Besides these basic lines the program called for the construction of additional lines, some of which were built and some not: the Amur, the Tashkent-Barnaul, and the Verny-Semipalatinsk lines (the latter two were not completed).

The railroad lines thus built contributed decisively to the rapid economic penetration of Siberia by capitalism. After the completion of the main line, all restrictions against settlement in Siberia had to be removed, which was in fact accomplished by the law of 1904. Thereafter resettlement and colonization, especially along the railroad line in western Siberia, proceeded very rapidly. Simultaneously this increased the agricultural acreage, livestock breeding, butter making, sheep breeding and hog raising; the resettled peasants also engaged in large-scale commercial farming. We shall cite a few figures illustrating these trends in 1900 (at the beginning of operations on the Siberian railway) and in 1909. The following changes occurred in the regions along the Siberian railroad.[1]

	1900	1909
Population (in thousands)	5,846	8,683
Freight turnover (in thousand poods)	44,672	199,188
	1900–1905	1906–1909
Annual exports of wheat (in thousand poods)	16,925.0	45,692.0
Average number of resettlers installed annually (in thousands)	66.8	320.0

No less significant was the construction of the Amur railroad, which opened a vast agricultural area to colonization and huge forest resources for industrial exploitation and export.

After the construction of the railways, the most important factor in the economic development of Siberia was the resettlement movement of the peasantry.

RESETTLEMENT OF THE PEASANTS During the early stages of capitalist development that followed the Reform of 1861, peasant resettlement in Siberia, as shown above, even when not completely prohibited, certainly did not enjoy the support and protection of the government. In spite of the extremely persistent nature of the popular impetus to settle Siberia and incorporate it into the capitalist economy, the government in its anxiety for the class interests of the landowners did everything possible to restrain free resettlement in order to avoid a loss of labor in older areas that might embarrass the large estates of the landowners. Therefore, by the laws of 1881–1889 and 1893–1896, the resettlement movement was subjected to strict control, resettlement was allowed only upon special permission, and every other type of resettlement was treated as "unwarranted" and proscribed under threat of forcible return to the original place of residence. Only after the Siberian railway was laid was the vital need for a systematic peasant

colonization of the areas adjoining the railroads fully recognized. The law of 1904 made resettlement free, and special organs were created for its regulation as well as for rendering financial assistance to the resettlers in providing them with land. Although even at the time when resettlement was forbidden the "unwarranted" movement eastward did not subside, the movement assumed a more steady character during the early twentieth century. The following figures on the movement of new settlers and *khodoki* (pioneers) in Asiatic Russia summarize the period of 1905–1913 (in thousands of both sexes):

YEARS	SETTLERS	YEARS	SETTLERS
1905	44.0	1910	353.0
1906	216.7	1911	326.1
1907	577.0	1912	259.6
1908	758.8	1913	327.9
1909	707.5		

Altogether, the officially recorded resettlement alone brought into Siberia during the period of 1896–1913 some 4,795,000 new inhabitants. Since 1910 the migration eastward began to decline somewhat, as the supply of land allocated for resettlement in the more fertile zones of western Siberia and the steppe zone was largely exhausted, and eastern Siberia did not attract many new settlers. The decrease of the eastward movement during 1911–1912 was partly due to the Stolypin land reform.

The geographic distribution of resettlement was extremely uneven, the natural tendency being to concentrate heavily in western Siberia and in the steppeland. Thus, of the total number of farmers newly settled in the east during 1893–1913, the Tomsk province gained 554,600 persons, Akmolinsk, 320,400; Turgay and Ural, 232,800; Yenisey, 186,300; Tobolsk, 159,300; the remainder of Siberia, less than 100,000, and the entire Trans-Baikal territory, only 3,200.

As for their place of origin, the majority of resettlers came from the Ukrainian and central agricultural provinces, that is, from the most congested and land-starved areas. During the period under discussion the following number of persons were resettled from place of origin (thousand persons of both sexes):

From Poltava province	399.5
From Chernigov province	312.8
From Kursk province	263.4
From Mogilev province	254.2
From Voronezh province	230.1
From Kiev province	220.7
From Kharkov province	219.3
From Yekaterinoslav province	204.4

The economy of Siberia was greatly stimulated not only by the influx of new inhabitants but also by the additional increment resulting from their activities. As a result of the increased stream of settlers during 1907–1909, in western Siberia particularly, new land began to be brought under cultivation, the area under crops began to increase, and the livestock population expanded considerably. During the five-year period of 1906–1910 alone, some 30 million *dessyatins* of virgin soil were put into cultivation, the highest rate of increase in agricultural acreage for the whole empire. In the course of several years after the liberalization of resettlement, especially after the construction of the railroad and the development of a selling market, both the "old-resident" and the "new-settler" farms of Siberia became, for the most part, typical small-scale commercial kulak enterprises. According to an official survey of farming among the resettlers made during 1911–1912, the average size of cultivated acreage among Siberian resettlers who had been farming for over ten years was 17.25 *dessyatins* per farm. The acreage of wheat on these farms increased during the ten-year period by 1 million *dessyatins,* and the commercial surplus of grain rose from 10.5 million poods to 50 million poods. As we shall see later, the Siberian peasant farms (in their upper kulak groups, to be sure) became a large consumer of agricultural machinery, buying on an average several times more of such implements than the "middle" peasant farm in European Russia. The same Siberian kulak farm groups became the chief participants in the butter-producing cooperatives, which contributed heavily to the development of commercial dairy farming and butter production in Siberia. In their supply of cows and horses, the Siberian farms also ranked well above the level of the peasant household in European Russia. Thus, according to the data of the army horse census, all Siberian provinces contained the lowest proportion of households without horses; for example, in 1912, 7.2 per cent of the households in the Tomsk province were without horses, in the Trans-Baikal, 9.4; in Tobolsk, 9.7; in Yenisey, 10.4; while in the central agricultural provinces horseless farms constituted 33 to 40 per cent, in the southwestern provinces, 60 to 65 per cent, and in Transcaucasia 67 to 83 per cent of the total farm families.

These average figures characterizing the generally higher economic level of peasant life in Siberia naturally provide no clue to the differentiation in existence among the peasant population as a whole. Unfortunately the nature of the statistical data made available by the various surveys conducted on the Siberian resettlement movement does not enable us to treat this subject exhaustively, and we must limit ourselves to a few illustrations. The difference in economic conditions was primarily between the farms of the old residents and the new settlers. In a survey of peasantry made in the Tomsk

province, the farms of the old residents and new settlers presented the following contrast: [2]

AVERAGE PER HOUSEHOLD	RESETTLERS BEFORE 1886	RESETTLERS IN 1893
Acreage in *dessyatins*	6.6	1.7
Dairy cows	2.4	0.8
Draft horses	3.1	1.3
Percentage of horseless and one-horse households	18.5	60.1
Percentage of households supplying day laborers	9.8	17.6

In citing evidence on the old-resident and new-settler peasant economy as furnished by a survey of the Irkutsk and Yenisey provinces, and in grouping them by their class distinctions, Lenin notes that, while 39.4 per cent of the lower category of households (without horses or with 1 or 2 horses) constituted 24 per cent of the population, they controlled 6.2 per cent of the total agricultural acreage and 7.1 per cent of total livestock, whereas 36.4 per cent of the households which owned five horses and more contained 51.2 per cent of the population and controlled 73 per cent of the planted acreage and 74.5 per cent of the livestock. The former group supplied farm workers (20 or 35 to 59 per cent of the farms), while the latter upper group resorted to hired labor on a large scale (30 to 70 per cent of the farms employed hired hands).[3]

Thus, a sizable group of nonplanting or small-planting, horseless and almost cowless farms, which supplied farm labor to the wealthier group, existed alongside the prosperous old-resident farms which were operated as large-scale commercial kulak farms.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE Agricultural development in Siberia was thus closely connected with the growth of resettlement and with the rising trend toward large-scale commercial farming among the peasants, particularly after the building of the Siberian railroad. The most significant advances in planted acreage become apparent during the early twentieth century. According to the figures of the Central Statistical Commission, Asiatic Russia in 1905 planted less than 7 million *dessyatins,* while in 1911 the sown acreage increased to 11 million or, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Agriculture, to 12,239,000 *dessyatins.* Within the administrative divisions of that time, the size of the planted area varied greatly, as may be seen from the following figures on the sown acreage in 1911 (in thousand *dessyatins*). Figures for Central Asia are also presented for purposes of comparison:

	TOTAL	OF WHICH THE LOCAL NATIVE POPULATION PLANTED
Two provinces of western Siberia	4,413.0	43.7
Three provinces of eastern Siberia	1,140.5	139.3
Four provinces of the Far East	973.3	59.5
Four provinces of the steppe territory	2,392.3	729.0
Five provinces of Turkestan	3,319.7	1,435.5

Thus the bulk of the agricultural acreage in Siberia belonged to the Russian farm groups, old resident as well as resettled, while the local native population controlled a small section of the plowland and maintained a primitive type of agricultural production. Only in Turkestan, with its preponderance of cotton, did the local native population control a major portion, nearly one-half of the sown area. In the development of Siberian agriculture, the resettled peasant farm groups from the interior of Russia played the part of dominant and privileged colonists for whose benefit the tsarist regime for political reasons set aside enormous reserves of land wrested from the local population. On this basis western Siberia evolved during the early twentieth century into an agricultural colony capable of producing a grain surplus for export.

On the whole, Siberia supplied about 440 million poods of grain during 1906–1910, 350 million of which belonged to the category of edible cereal grains. After meeting its food requirements, the region yielded a balance of 70 to 80 million poods available for export to European Russia and abroad, as well as to the East. Eastern Siberia was a deficit area in cereal grains and depended upon western Siberia for its supply. In western Siberia, which began to provide the main flow of grain into Europe, wheat had meanwhile begun to constitute 49 per cent of the total grain acreage, and, therefore, also predominated in exports.

As for its farming methods, Siberian agriculture knew almost nothing about correct rotation of crops and still less of fertilization. The dominant method was that of unregulated fallow farming in which plantings of grain were followed by more grain, with the fallow periods lasting ten to twelve years. In the livestock areas the planting of fodder crops was developed to some extent. Average harvests were relatively high (by the standards of the time) because of the new vigor of the soil in the nonarid agricultural regions, amounted to 60 or 70 poods, and in good years as many as 150 poods. In the arid steppe zone the harvests were erratic and considerably lower. Yields were low, of course, in the northern taiga areas. In general, no farming was attempted further north than 56 to 58 degrees of latitude.

One of the most important indications of the character of Siberian agriculture was the steady growth in the use of farm machinery. The vast expanse of Siberia's fields and meadows, the large-scale farms, and the shortage of manpower all combined to create an increased demand for the widespread use of machinery. The average Siberian farm employed 2.25 agricultural implements compared with 1.8 per peasant household in European Russia, that is, the Siberian peasant farms utilized 1.25 times as much. According to a classification of that period every one hundred agricultural implements used in Siberia included 76.6 "perfected" implements, whereas in European Russia the proportion was 57.1; moreover, the preponderance was decidedly in harvesting and soil-cultivating machinery as an indication of the extensive nature of Siberian farming. Altogether, Siberia consumed 20 million rubles worth of agricultural machines and implements per year during 1910–1911.

LIVESTOCK The importance of livestock in the national economy of Siberia may be seen from the following figures. In 1910 the number of domestic animals per one hundred persons of the population was as follows:

	EUROPEAN RUSSIA	ASIATIC RUSSIA
Horses	15	54
Cattle	24	60
Sheep	33	153
Goats	1	19
Hogs	9	8

In other words the per capita amount of livestock in Asiatic Russia exceeded by many times the figure for European Russia. The relative share of horseless farms was also lowest in the Siberian provinces (7.2 per cent to 10.4 per cent).

BUTTER PRODUCTION IN SIBERIA The high level of stockbreeding and the vast stretches of fodder acreage and meadow land available in western Siberia from the beginning contributed significantly to the steady rise of dairy farming. The absence of transportation facilities, however, limited the outlet of this industry to the local market. With the building of the railroad came new opportunities for the development of commercial butter making intended for export. It may be sufficient to indicate that in 1894 the two provinces of western Siberia exported 400 poods of butter valued at 4,000 rubles, in 1900, 1,050,000 poods valued at 11,886,000 rubles; in 1907, 3,413,000 poods valued at 44,513,000 rubles; and in 1912, 4,459,000 poods selling at 68,000,000 rubles.[4]

In addition to the part played by the railroads, the successful development of Siberian butter making was substantially aided by the rapid spread of dairy and credit cooperatives. The cooperative movement in the dairy indus-

try originated in Tobolsk Province (Kurgan County) in 1896, and thence spread rapidly, competing successfully with the privately owned butter-making plants that had hitherto dominated the market. By 1911 there existed in western Siberia a total of 3,102 plants, including 1,318 cooperative and 1,784 private plants; and, moreover, in the older districts of cooperative butter production (the Kansk and Yalutorovsk counties), the number of cooperatives constituted 90 to 94.5 per cent of the total number of factories.

The dominant element in Siberia's cooperative butter industry, to a degree greater than in agriculture as a whole, was the large kulak farm with its considerable herd of cows. According to figures available for 1895–1905, the average number of cows for every member of a cooperative association in the Tobolsk province was between 4.5 and 5, the yield being 30 to 33 poods of milk per cow, and the proceeds 47 or 48 kopecks per pood (1904–1905). But the membership of this cooperative movement came almost exclusively from the kulak farms owning a number of cows. According to a survey of the butter-making cooperatives in the Tobolsk province made by the Ministry for Agriculture in 1903, the number of cows owned by all farms, whether participating in cooperatives or not, was as follows: [5] members of cooperatives, 7.3 cows per farm; nonmembers, 2.0

The author of the reports, an official of the Ministry for Agriculture, noted that "influential and well-to-do-persons comprise the chief element, and always the initiators, of the cooperative movement." On the other hand, as reported by another observer of the Siberian butter-producing associations,

> tramps and paupers cannot be made rich by any cooperatives, which are not intended for them anyway; nor can the artels save the poorer milk suppliers who own a cow or two, because for lack of capital they cannot raise their farm facilities to the level at present . . . urgently dictated by the world market.[6]

Thus the Siberian butter-making cooperative movement turned into an association of large-herd kulak commercial farms operating for the export market. The Siberian cooperatives and their export trade were greatly assisted in this connection by foreign, chiefly English, capital. Special English butter-exporting firms supplied the cooperatives with credit, with separators, and with packing supplies, and organized their refrigerating and warehouse facilities.

Among the other branches of agriculture prominently developed during this period was the production of eggs: Siberia's egg exports attained 360,000 to 370,000 poods a year.

THE FORESTS OF SIBERIA By their immense size alone, the forest riches of Siberia were destined to play a vital role in the general economy

of the region. According to reports for 1912, which were far from complete or accurate, the total area of Siberia's forest land was estimated at 316,700,000 *dessyatins* (compared with 296.5 for Canada and 224.5 for the United States). Of this number 238,700,000 *dessyatins* were held by the government, 20 million *dessyatins* were considered as "cabinet" land (the personal property of the emperor), while 10 million *dessyatins* belonged to the Cossack population. The exploitable portion amounted to only 39 per cent of the total forest area, compared to 80 per cent of usable forest land in European Russia. The conditions of forest work and the level of the forest economy as a whole were such that the exploitable proportion of the forest resources was negligible, and income per unit of forest land was extremely small. For example, total revenue from all Asiatic forests during 1910–1912 amounted to between 4 and 4.3 million rubles, thus yielding an income in the Tomsk and Tobolsk provinces, for example, of 5 or 6 kopecks per *dessyatin* of forest, and an average of 1.3 kopecks per *dessyatin* throughout Siberia.

FISHING AND HUNTING In the regional economy of Siberia fishing played quite a prominent role, yielding, according to information gathered for 1909–1910, an output of about 9.73 million poods valued at 25.84 million rubles for export, of which the Far East accounted for 7 million poods worth 18 million rubles (excluding the Japanese fishery concessions). Despite the abundance and high quality of the available fish, however, the technical level of the fishing industry, as well as its storage, salting, processing, and shipping facilities, were still very primitive.

Hunting was another major activity in the regional economy of Siberia. The interminable forests of Siberia still contained many valuable wild animals which during an earlier era, in the tenth to fifteenth centuries, had been the object of the hunter's trade in European Russia: sables, ermine, silver fox, fitch, otter, bear, squirrel, and others. In addition to the Russian hunters, trapping and hunting were widely practiced by the many nationalities of Siberia, while among some of the seminomadic tribes, the Tungusi, Pani, Chukchi, and others, the hunting and trapping of animals were almost the sole source of livelihood.

In the absence of any exact information, it is difficult to measure the size of this industry statistically. According to estimates of the world fur business in 1910 made by the international press, in the general world fur turnover amounting to 130 million rubles, Russia's share was 50 to 55 million rubles, while Siberia alone supplied about 15 million squirrels, 70,000 sables, 700,000 ermine, 150,000 fitch, and so forth.


Despite this great importance of hunting and trapping in the economic life of the region, the organization of fur procurement in the twentieth cen-

tury was still very primitive, almost as antiquated, in fact, as during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. All buying was done by middlemen, beginning with the small jobber or agent who collected fur skins from the hunters in payment for previous debts, or exchanged valuable furs for gunpowder, lead, vodka, sugar, tobacco, or piece goods. The goods involved in this barter trade were of extremely poor quality but were sold at high values, with the result that the hunter found himself not only poorly rewarded for his labors but also in perpetual debt to the jobber, at times even transmitting a heavy debt to his progeny from one generation to the other. The next step in the fur trade brought the furs into the hands of the larger buyers until they reached the regional fairs, such as Yakutsk or Irbitsk, and then Nizhny Novgorod, from which they went into the domestic market or to foreign firms for export.

DEER RAISING Among the inhabitants of the tundra zone, the Tungusi, Voguly, Chukchi, Yakuti, Nentsy, and Ostroki, and occasionally among the Russians, deer raising was still another activity of major local significance. In 1906–1910, according to approximate official figures, there were about 1,100,000 head of domesticated deer throughout Siberia. The deer was employed chiefly as an invaluable draft animal, and also used as a source of milk and meat for food, and hide and horns for sale. The conditions of deer raising involved roaming from one pasture to another. The poorer herdsmen usually possessed about 10 to 20 head of deer, while the somewhat wealthier owners owned herds of 2,000 head and more. Herds of the latter size became highly commercial enterprises, offering many products for sale to the urban traders and agents.

INDUSTRY[7] As for the factory processing industry in Asiatic Russia, its negligible proportions may be judged from the following figures gathered by the census for 1908:[8] the total number of industrial establishments in Siberia was 1,049, employing a total number of 37,230 workers with a total product valued at 161 million rubles, which constituted 3.5 per cent of industrial production within the empire. Annual output by region was as follows (Central Asia is included for comparison):

REGIONS	VALUE OF PRODUCTION (MILLION RUBLES)	OUTPUT PER ENTERPRISE (THOUSAND RUBLES)	NUMBER OF WORKERS (THOUSANDS)	OUTPUT PER WORKER (RUBLES)
Central Asia	75.5	202.8	12.0	6,536
Western Siberia	65.8	150.8	19.3	3,400
Far East	16.6	153.7	5.9	2,817


POLAND
0 75 150 225
Kilometers
Suwalki
Plock
Lomza
Kalisz
Warsaw
Piotrkow
Siedlce
Radom
Kielce
Lublin
Krakow
RUSSIA: INDUSTRY
Based on the Census of 1908
0 125 250 375 500
Kilometers
Archangel
Petrozavodsk
Helsingfors
Reval
St. Petersburg
Novgorod
Vologda
Vyatka
Perm
Mitau
Riga
Pskov
Kostroma
Yaroslavl
Vladimir
Nizhni Novgorod
Kazan
Ufa
Kovno
Vilno
Vitebsk
Grodno
Minsk
Mogilev
Smolensk
Tula
Kaluga
Ryazan
Simbirsk
Penza
Samara
Orenburg
Orel
Tambov
Saratov
Uralsk
Chernigov
Kursk
Voronezh
Zhitomir
Kiev
Kamenets Podolsk
Kharkov
Poltava
Yekaterinoslav
Kishinev
Odessa
Novocherkassk
Astrakhan
Simferopol
Yekaterinodar
Stavropol
Vladikavkaz
Tiflis
Baku
VALUE OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION BY PROVINCES
up to 10 mil. rubles
10 - 20
20 - 50
50 - 100
100 - 200
over 200
TYPES OF INDUSTRY
Iron ore mining
Coal
Petroleum
Manganese ore mining
Copper ore mining
Gold mining
Smelting of iron and copper
Factory metal manufacturing and machine building
Textile
Flour milling
Beet sugar
Kholm
Uralsk
Tobolsk
Turgai
Akmolinsk
Tomsk
Krasnoyarsk
Yakutsk
Baku
Khiva
Semipalatinsk
Irkutsk
Chita
Blagoveshchensk
Khabarovsk
Bukhara
Samarkand
Tashkent
Kuldja
Verny
Vladivostok
500 0 500 1000 1500
Kilometers

The immense mineral wealth of Siberia remained largely unexplored by the capitalist economy of the period. The production of gold was maintained on a primitive, "prospector" basis, and only in a few districts around the Lena, Vitim, Zeya, and Bureya rivers was large-scale capitalist mining undertaken by foreign companies. In 1910 a total of 1,769 poods of gold was mined throughout Siberia, to which the Vitim district contributed 821 poods, Zeya, 199; and Bureya, 193. It was further estimated that an additional 1,000 poods were obtained by "illegal" mining. Other metal deposits (silver, lead, copper, zinc, and tin) were known to exist in significant quantities throughout the Nerchinsk territory (silver), in Kirghizia (lead and copper), and in the Altay, but their extraction and use were negligible (for example, 30 poods of silver a year in the Nerchinsk district, or a total output of 300,000 poods of copper). Iron, graphite, salt, and many other useful minerals remained almost untouched.

Historically, the mining industry of Siberia was several centuries old. The extraction of metal by the native population of Siberia antedated the Russian conquest of the region. In the eighteenth century the Russian government erected a number of large plants at Kolyvan and Nerchinsk, the Zmeinogorsk, the Salair, and Zyryanka silver mines. By the nineteenth century the more important of these undertakings passed under the control of the "cabinet," that is, became the property of the emperor. The procurement of labor for these establishments in the eighteenth century was based largely (besides convicts) on the "assignment" of state peasants, who in practice were thus turned into a type of factory serfs. After the Reform of 1861–1866, these serfs began to fill the ranks of the professional metalworker class on a wage basis.

State ownership and operation of the mineral resources, the low level of the technical processes used, and the absence of initiative were among the major causes responsible for the meager showing made by Russia's capitalist mining industry in spite of the inexhaustible mineral wealth found in Siberia. Because of their indifference to either the local industrial raw materials or to the fuel required for the development of local industry, the capitalists of the home provinces proved themselves incapable of developing such excellent mining districts as Altay, Kuznetsk, and others. Despite the widespread rich deposits of copper, output of this metal in the rich Altay mines during the first decade of the twentieth century amounted to only 1,000 or 1,500 poods. The fabulous coal reserves of the Kuznetsk basin were left almost unexploited. A meager output of coal was mined there during the early twentieth century, chiefly in the Anzherskaya (government owned) and Sudzhenka (private) pits, yielding a total of 30 million poods annually. Scarcely any other minerals were extracted on a regular basis in this region. Small-scale

processing of iron and steel was maintained locally at small *kustar* workshops. Following the construction of the railroads, the largest privately owned ironworks in this area (located near Yakutsk) became a joint-stock company in order to expand production, but collapsed financially shortly afterward.

Russian industrial capitalism not only failed to create within its rich Siberian colony a second metallurgical and fuel base (in addition to the Donets basin and Krivoy Rog) to stimulate its own development, but proved generally incapable of incorporating this colony into its industrial structure. Even during the twentieth century Siberia remained to Russian tsarism a place of exile for its convicts and partly a source of income from the "cabinet" factories, while in the plans of Russian capitalism it represented as before a source of agricultural raw materials and a market for industrial products, chiefly consumer goods.

TRADE Prior to the erection of the railroad, Siberia's internal trade, except for the inland waterways, was conducted by a system of fairs connected by overland routes. In the face of the vast distances involved the trade was severely handicapped, the market remained narrow, and the price of distributed articles inordinately high. The main centers of the trade turnover and the distribution of goods were the Nizhny Novgorod and Irbitsk fairs. The situation changed radically after the construction of the railroad, the flow of goods began to follow the railroad line, and, as a consequence, some of the railroad stations along the line (Novonikolayevsk, now Novosibirsk) became important distributing points with truly "American" speed. At the same time goods began to reach the most remote and distant points through all types of traveling salesmen and agents, who were also instrumental in bringing raw material from the most obscure localities.

However, even after the construction of the railroad, economic assimilation of Siberia by Russian capitalism progressed rather slowly. In the Far Eastern provinces competition by foreign firms and goods played an important role (especially during the existence of free port facilities in Vladivostok). Only in the markets of western Siberia did metropolitan capitalist industry remain unchallenged. This may be seen from the table below

Roads Along Which Goods Arrived	Agricultural Machines and Implements	Machines Other Than Agricultural	Metal Manufactures
Ussuri railroad	6.7	8.8	10.9
Chinese Eastern railroad	2.2	36.7	41.5
Trans-Baikal railroad	63.6	81.5	64.2
Western Siberian railroad	80.4	82.3	83.8

summarizing the importation of the principal commodities from European Russia in percentage of the total amount of goods imported by way of the various railroads of Asiatic Russia.

Thus, before the closing of Vladivostok's free port facilities, the marketing of goods produced by Russian capitalist industry yielded greatly to foreign imports after 1900 not only in Manchuria but also in the Russian maritime province: for example, in the Ussuri territory 93.3 per cent of all agricultural machines and 89.1 per cent of all metal manufactures came not from European Russia but from abroad.

From Siberia the railroads carried: grain from the West Siberian provinces (not further than Krasnoyarsk); from the steppe provinces, livestock and other animal products except butter, which came from the Tomsk and Tobolsk provinces; and fish from the Far East, from the Ob and Yenisey rivers.

In foreign trade, despite the great continuous length of the eastern frontier (running eastward from the Caspian Sea to the shores of the Pacific Ocean), Siberia played a minor role compared with the rest of the nation, accounting for only 53.7 million rubles in exports during 1909–1911, or 3.8 of the empire's total turnover, and for 130.8 million rubles, or 14.2 per cent of imports.

THE ECONOMY AND CUSTOMS OF SIBERIA'S NATIONALITIES Thus far we have examined chiefly the conditions under which Siberian economy evolved in relation to the colonization and resettlement movement. As indicated earlier, however, of Asiatic Russia's total population of 19,693,000 persons of both sexes there were only 9,945,000 persons belonging to the Russian, Ukrainian, and White Russian group in 1911. In Siberia proper (exclusive of Central Asia and the steppe territory), with its total population of 9,366,000, the Russians, Ukrainians, and White Russians numbered 8,393,000 persons, while the remaining 973,000 were scattered among a whole series of nationalities, the indigenous inhabitants of the region. These included (to cite their old names along with their present-day names) the Chukchi (Luoravetlany), 12,900; Koryaki (Nymylany), 7,900; Kamchadaly (Itelmeny), 2,200; Gilyaki (Nivkhy), 4,300, and others; the Ural-Altay ethnic groups: Ostyaki (Khanty), 17,200, and the Voguli (Mansy), 7,500; the Samoyed tribes (Nentsy) numbering 7,800; the Tungusy (Evenky) and their numerous tribal subdivisions totaling 75,200 persons; the Turkic-Tatar group, including its largest nationalities, the Yakuts, who numbered 245,000, and the Tobolsk-Tomsk Tatars totaling 208,100; and, finally, the Mongol group, including the most numerous nationality in Siberia, the Buryats, who numbered 332,500 persons.

The mere listing of these numerous nationalities—the aborigines of the

country—and their geographic location, chiefly in the northernmost tundra and coastal zone of the country, indicate a prolonged historical process in the course of which these nationalities were displaced from their original habitat by the incursion of Mongol and Turkic-Tatar nationalities from the foothills of the Altay mountains and the Mongolian steppes. Subsequently a portion of these nationalities moved, as we noted earlier, further to the west, to the southeastern steppes of Europe (the Mongols), while another portion remained in Siberia in the form of small remnants of the former Mongolian dominion (the Tobolsk Tatars, the Buryats, and others). At a considerably later period they were all engulfed by the tide of Russian colonization.

Surviving into the era of capitalism, many of these nationalities, particularly the smaller ones and those who inhabited the distant inaccessible areas, continued to adhere to their patriarchal mode of clan life, their peculiar economy of nomad hunting, fishing, and deer raising, their language, religion (paganism, Buddhism, shamanism), and their own backward but original culture. Until the end of the capitalist era, about 90 to 95 per cent of the population among many of these nationalities knew nothing of the Russian language, which was understood only by the clan elders and the intermediaries who represented the natives in their trade with the Russians. All relations with the latter were, in fact, confined to trade, which was often merely a type of barter in which the native producer was defrauded both by his own intermediary and the representative of Russian commercial capital. Even the decision of the Russian authorities to appoint local administrative bodies consisting of clan chieftains and settlement elders could not be effectively implemented among some of the more backward groups. Only the larger, more civilized, sedentary or partly sedentary nationalities, such as the Buryats, Mongols, and Tatars, adapted themselves to agriculture and animal husbandry without abandoning their patriarchal customs altogether.

Hence the majority of Siberia's peoples remained unaffected by the capitalist system of production. This was a fact of utmost significance in their subsequent economic and cultural evolution after the great October Socialist Revolution, when they began to merge directly with our Soviet socialist culture and economy.

Because we could not present within the scope of this study a detailed account of the economic and cultural conditions of these numerous nationalities, we shall merely touch briefly upon the basic and more typical features of their economy and customs during the capitalist period.

The Buryats inhabiting the territory around Lake Baikal, Irkutsk, and the Trans-Baikal district, who had become "Russified" to a considerable degree (especially at Irkutsk) and adopted Russian economic civilization,

began as early as the arrival of Russian resettlers (during the eighteenth century) to abandon their traditional life of hunters and shepherds of the seminomadic variety in favor of sedentary agriculture. In the agricultural districts farms ranging in size from 5 to 10 *dessyatins* predominated, including the planting of wheat, which was raised in surplus and sold by the larger farms. The primitive stock raising of the natives lost its nomadic character and changed into animal husbandry of the domestic type, subsisting mainly on hay mowing. Some survivals of the primitive seminomadic economy did persist, however: the Buryats lived in their tent villages of 10 to 20 tents, all belonging to the same clan. Such clan communes (*buluk*) and nomad camps, with their unmistakable "winter" and "summer" tents, survived among many Buryats until recent times. Agrarian conditions among the Buryats varied considerably throughout the different districts, depending upon whether nomad customs had survived more fully, as, for example, in the Trans-Baikal district, or whether the transition to sedentary agriculture had been completed, as in the Irkutsk province. The nomad district retained perceptible vestiges of the clan mode of life, but marked by the disintegration of the clan into more integrated, smaller subdivisions and separate economic units. These economic units and groups began to assume possession over the pastures in their use, which varied in size between the well-to-do and poor families. Usually a Buryat nomad who owned a small herd of stock had two pastures, one for the summer and one for the winter; the well-to-do herdsmen owned four pastures, changing to a new pasture with each season of the year; and, finally, the wealthier among them possessed very many pastures and alternated them still more often. In the summer pastures they pitched their tents to form a settlement called a*khorton;* several neighboring *khortons* constituted a commune, or a *buluk,* which was an administrative, taxpaying, and agrarian unit. In view of prevailing economic conditions, common use of the meadowland by such nomad communes required that the hay-mowing area be enclosed, and therefore everybody in the commune who contributed his labor to building the enclosure could share in the meadowland, and the size of his allotment was determined in accordance with his labor contribution. The use of meadowland sections was hereditary. The family's hereditary ownership was even more secure for its allotment of arable land, especially in instances where they had been originally cleared or drained by the head of the household and, therefore, were considered his personal property. On these bases there began to appear among the mass of the Buryat population privileged groups of wealthy Buryats, landowners, and rich herdsmen who exploited the land-hungry poor.

The economy of the Buryats retained its subsistence character but sold many of its products on the market, especially in the agricultural and live-

stock districts. The articles sold, besides grain from the agricultural districts, were animal products, wild game, and household products such as, for example, leather-covered boxes for the transportation of tea from Kyakhta. A class of commercial middlemen arose in connection with the marketing of such household handicrafts to the extreme disadvantage of the producer. Another element in exploiting and exacting heavy payments from the population was local Lamaism with its monks, monasteries, medicine men, healing ceremonies, and so forth.

Another rather numerous Siberian nationality were the Yakuts, who inhabited the area between the Lena and Aldan rivers. They likewise retained their herdsman type of economy, especially horse breeding, along with substantial herds of cattle. Agriculture was practiced on a smaller scale, primarily throughout the more fertile southern zone. In the north the chief occupations were trapping and hunting. Although the Yakuts had for the most part changed to a sedentary mode of existence, many survivals of nomadic life long remained organically interwoven with their communal heritage, such as group migrations from permanent "winter camps" to "summer camps" where they found green fodder for their animals and a source of hay for the winter. Their land relationships also revealed some survivals of communal clan life, although individualized to a great extent. After clearing a piece of plowland from the forest, a family retained that land as its own property and transmitted it in inheritance. When a tract of land was cultivated jointly by the commune membership as a whole, it was considered common land and distributed accordingly by the commune elders; this gave rise to land inequality, indebtedness, and usury. Despite a subsistence economy, a considerable amount of trade developed (a certain amount of barter, but chiefly for cash) in the surplus furs and fish. Trade was organized through buyers, who in the course of procuring furs and other valuable goods plied the natives with drink and resorted to many frauds. In the larger settlements and in the towns, the existence of trade created a class of petty native merchants and a class of artisans. In social customs the Yakuts as late as the twentieth century manifested traditional traits of the old clan order, as a result of which the leading clan elements, the clan officials called *toyony*, wielded great power. First of all, they collected the fur tribute from the Yakuts on behalf of the Russian government and grew rich in the process. With the development of agriculture, however, they began to seize and otherwise acquire control over the land, thus becoming not only the aristocratic upper class but also the dominant agricultural group. The tsarist government found support for its colonial policy among the clan officials, granting them a status of nobility and entrusting them with the administration of the Yakut natives. The result was increased exploitation, semifeudal as well as commercial and

capitalist, for the Yakut workers in the twentieth century, leading to the extreme impoverishment of the native masses.

The Tungusi (Evenky) group, and the smaller nationalities related to them (the Eveny, the Nanai, and others), originally inhabited the entire broad expanse of eastern Siberia from the Yenisey river to the Pacific and Arctic oceans, from which they had been gradually dislodged by other peoples (the Yakuts and the Russians), chiefly in the direction of the Yenisey tributaries. Living in scattered groups within the deep forest, they continued for a very long time their original nomad customs and economic activities, including hunting, trapping, and deer raising. In their quarters and camps the Tungusi retained the usual forms of nomad life, and their summer and winter portable quarters, the tents. Hunting for bear and other animals, along with fishing, were their main sources of subsistence. The products of their hunting were exchanged by barter for sugar, alcohol, tobacco, lead, and powder. Heavy vodka drinking, shamanism, and commercial exploitation were the chief causes of the low cultural and social level at which the Tungusi lived up to the twentieth century.

Among the numerous groups of so-called "Paleo-Asiatic" nationalities inhabiting the far northern and eastern ocean shores of Siberia and retaining the most primitive forms of life, the Chukchi and Koryaki were chiefly engaged in deer raising, the Kamchadaly were hunters and fishermen, the Eskimos and Aleuts were seamen and fishermen. Even during the nineteenth century these nationalities retained their original patriarchal clan order, and a nomad, vagabond mode of existence, which excluded agriculture completely because of climatic conditions. This was thoroughly reflected in their living conditions, their food and shelter. Trade, mostly of a barter nature, brought them their supply of sugar, alcohol, vodka, tobacco, and guns for which they traded valuable furs, deer hide, sealskins, and whalebone. The primitive level of their culture may be judged from the fact that some of these nationalities (the Chukchi, for example) as late as the second half of the nineteenth century were still using stone implements, and frequently obtained fire by twisting a stick in a board.

SUMMARY What were the ultimate results of the economic incorporation of the Siberian colony and its peoples into the Russian capitalist system?

From the foregoing we have seen how inadequately capitalism utilized Siberia's enormous natural and national wealth. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries their exploitation was of a predatory and almost exclusively commercial character. Siberia contributed very little to the capital wealth of Russia. Large capital did not undertake any long-range develop-

ment of the region's productive resources. The low level of capitalist accumulation in Siberia may be seen, incidentally, from the fact that of a total of 420 million rubles of government interest-bearing paper offered for sale internally, the share of Siberia and the Far East amounted to only 85 million rubles.

Local accumulation, on the other hand, proceeded more successfully: the savings banks of Siberia during 1907–1909 showed a deposit balance of 79.8 million rubles in an empire-wide total of 253.7 million rubles, or 31 per cent, with an average of 204 rubles per depositor compared with a 41-ruble average for the empire as a whole. This was largely the result of the successful kulak type of farming among the resettled peasants and the appearance of a petty commercial bourgeoisie. In this respect the development of commercial capital in Siberia attained considerable proportions, a high degree of concentration, and an effective banking organization (the participation of the wealthy Siberian commercial capitalists, Vtorov and others, in the central imperial banks, the large local municipal associations, the commercial joint-stock companies, and so forth).

Thus, until the end of its existence as a colony in the system of Russian industrial capitalism, Siberia retained the typical aspect of an agricultural colony. It disposed of its agricultural products to the mother country and, owing to an undeveloped local industry, imported its industrial goods from central European Russia. With industrial capital faintly represented in the region, the large as well as the petty commercial bourgeoisie wielded considerable economic power. In rural economy the small commercial kulak farms were the dominant economic element. The life and customs of the indigenous Siberian peoples were on an extremely low cultural and economic level, subject to some of the harshest forms of colonial exploitation. At the same time, however, the close association between Russia, on the one hand and Siberia, its economy, and its peoples, on the other, played a great and constructive role in the development of the region, laying the basis for the closest relations between these nationalities and the Russian people.

These were the results of the colonial policy of tsarism in its largest colony.

Notes

1. *Aziatskaya Rossiya* (Asiatic Russia) (Ministry of Agriculture, 1914), Vol. II, p. 531.
2. Kaufman, *Pereseleniye i kolonizatsiya* (Resettlement and Colonization).
3. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, p. 85.
4. See Map 15, p. 537.
5. Balashkin, *Otchyot za 1903 g.* (Report for the Year 1903), p. 27.

6. Prokopovich, *Kooperativnoye dvizheniye v Rossii* (The Cooperative Movement in Russia) (1913), p. 137.
7. See Map 15, p. 537; Map 16, p. 595.
8. *Statisticheskiye svedeniya po obrabatyvayushchei fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti za 1908 g.* (Statistical Data on the Fabricating Factory Industry for 1908), ed. by Varzar (St. Petersburg, 1912).

(XXIX)

The National Economy of Turkestan During the Capitalist Period[1]

As we have indicated earlier, the advance of Russian tsarism into the Central Asiatic provinces as a colonial region came after the annexation of the southeastern regions of Europe (the Ural and Orenburg provinces) and the Kazakh steppes. The military offensive against Central Asia began as early as the reign of Peter I and his unsuccessful campaigns and expeditions into Khiva and the Caspian coast, culminating in the "peaceful" annexation of Kazakhstan during the reign of his successors (1730–1735).

The final conquest of Central Asia belongs to the capitalist period, that is, the early, and especially the middle portion of the nineteenth century. The main centers of Central Asia, Fergana, Tashkent, Samarkand, and Ashkabad, were not conquered until the reign of Alexander II, during the period of 1867–1881; during this period, too, Khiva and Bokhara fell under Russian rule, Merv was annexed in 1885–1887, and, last of all, the Pamirs in 1895. These were, therefore, purely capitalist colonial conquests. And for this reason even the economic assimilation of this colony differed in its process from that of the older colonies such as Siberia and Bashkiria, and displayed from the beginning a more decisive capitalist character.

Here, too, the first steps in economic penetration and colonial policy were taken in the usual order: after the conquest and the deployment of the troops came the influx of goods from the industrial provinces of central European Russia, chiefly products of the Moscow light industries. Both in view of the natural-historical circumstances and the basic agricultural nature of this region; namely, the predominance of cotton cultivation, this territory was not particularly suitable for the wholesale resettlement of peasants from the interior regions of Russia. Hence the industrial and agricultural evolution of this colony proceeded without the degree of participation by Russia's peasant colonists noted in the case of Bashkiria or even Kazakhstan. The characteristic of the agricultural, and afterward also the industrial, capitalist development of this colony was the joint exploitation of the native inhabitants by local tradesmen and usurers as well as by Russian industrial capital.

AGRARIAN CONDITIONS The most important factor in the assimilation of the national economy of Turkestan, with its overwhelmingly agricultural economy, by Russian capitalism, was the system of agrarian relationships which the tsarist conquest found in existence among the local population, and which with the development of capitalist relationships was reorganized on a bourgeois basis.

At the basis of agrarian conditions in Turkestan, as in the other eastern regions living by the rules of the Sheriyat, lay the formal absence of private property in land and the recognition of all land as subject to the sovereign ownership of the state. But actual conditions and the right of custom (*adat*) modified this principle considerably and introduced many complications and much confusion in agrarian relationships. All available land fell into three groups: (1) land belonging to the state (*amlyak*), (2) privately owned land (*myulk*), and (3) land of the religious organizations (*vakuf*). The first group included the bulk of the uncultivated areas and the land used by the nomadic tribes as well as the cultivated land found in the use and in the possession of the inhabitants in return for fixed obligations. In reality the disposition of the land made the latter approximate the right of ownership. The privately owned lands were grants made by the government to individual persons as a reward for service and merit; on these lands, whenever they were leased to the population at large, emerged a native variety of dependency approximating the feudal system of obligations.

The first act of the tsarist government after its conquest of the territory was to extend in practice the rights of the government (by making use of the rules of Mohammedan canon law) to the uncultivated land of the native nomad population and to bar the local native population from access to such land.

After introducing an "agrarian order" into the nomadic regions in accordance with the customary norms of landholding, all remaining land was listed as "surplus," wrested from popular use, and proclaimed government property. This land was then set aside as a reserve for future Russian colonization. These lands were also distributed as allotments to the Cossacks, as well as to peasant settlers. The Semirechye Cossacks, who had resettled here from Siberia in 1848 as a military outpost of tsarist Russia, dispossessed the nomadic population of more than 556,000 *dessyatins* of land. Under the terms of the new land settlement, the immigrant peasants received 10 *dessyatins* of land per person, while the Cossacks were allowed between 40 and 50 *dessyatins*. The total Cossack and resettler population, according to the census of 1897, amounted to 175,000. The native sedentary population received 10 *dessyatins* per person by the terms of the new agrarian laws. At the same time all land occupied by buildings and plantations both in the nomadic

and in the settled districts, and especially in the irrigated zones, were recognized as "hereditary," that is, as in fact the private property of the owners, with the right to bequeath, sell, or otherwise dispose of it.

Similar changes were introduced into the landholding system of the state, private, and Church types, with considerable inroads into the private, and particularly the Church landholdings, as well as additional restrictions against the legal class privileges of their owners. By these measures new bourgeois agrarian conditions were virtually transplanted to this region. According to the calculations of some prerevolutionary students, about 90 per cent of all irrigated land had by 1913 become the property of private owners.[2] In this manner the land belonging to the native population was plundered in the interest of subsidizing Russian colonization and of transplanting private property in land to these regions. In addition the agrarian order in Turkestan began to manifest typical bourgeois-capitalist characteristics: the rapid increase of the salable fund of land, the rise in land prices, the concentration of the land in the hands of wealthy landlords, and the loss of land and diminution of allotments among the lower groups of the population.

IRRIGATION IN CENTRAL ASIA The second most important condition in the agricultural economy of the settled regions in Central Asia and Turkestan was the irrigation system. Under the naturally arid climatic conditions of Central Asia, the question of artificial irrigation, especially in connection with crops like cotton or rice, was a matter of prime economic urgency. Irrigation in Central Asia was known and practiced since ancient times. The Chinese traveler Chen Kyan, who traveled through this territory in 126 B.C., reports that "in the land of Davan," that is, in the foothills zone of Turkestan, he found some seventy towns whose residents planted wheat, rice, and alfalfa, and cultivated vineyards on artificially irrigated land. Many elaborate ruins of such ancient irrigation structures have remained intact until our own times. The elaborate Sharikhan-Say canal, 101 versts long, with a water flow of 7 cubic *sazhen* per second, the Andizhan-Say, and the Bos-Su (the equal of which may be found only in Egypt and in India), are among the best of the ancient watering installations.

In terms of ancient customs (the right of custom, or *adat* and according to Mohammedan canon law), the regulation of water rights and irrigation facilities were matters of utmost significance. This helps explain the development of ambitious irrigation projects throughout the East. Whereas all unirrigated and uncultivated land was considered subject to the supreme authority of the government, any irrigated and cultivated section of land belonged to whoever had made the improvements. According to custom, water could be neither bought nor sold, but had to be distributed equitably.

This created, however, special forms of economic and personal dependency on the part of the bulk of the population. The irrigation system did not function with equal success in all localities. Before irrigation could be effective, the fields had to be perfectly level and absorb the water evenly without stopping its flow. This required a tremendous expenditure of labor and was not conducted successfully everywhere. Furthermore, the canals proper and the disposition of the water often fell into the hands of some powerful individual, some tribal, village, or *aryk* elders (*aryk-aksala*). Mohammedan canon law and custom notwithstanding, the *aryk* elders did in reality trade in water and, yielding to bribes, distributed the water unequally, diverting it to the lands of the wealthy and defrauding the poor, requiring of the latter payment in money or labor for the use of the water.

After it had conquered the region, the tsarist government left the question of water rights to be settled on the basis of "customary rights," whereby all the shortcomings and abuses cited above were left in force, with the Russian government reserving for itself the right to general supervision and to all new installations. By 1910 the total area of irrigated land in Central Asia (including the vassal possessions of Khiva and Bokhara) amounted to 4,758,000 *dessyatins,* of which the five provinces of Turkestan contained 2,808,000 *dessyatins,* and Bokhara, 1,600,000. Considering the total area and population of these provinces, we find that the irrigated acreage comprised only 2.6 per cent of the total area, and that the per capita amount of irrigated acreage amounted to 0.5 *dessyatins.* This was the net result of the tsarist achievements in measures so highly important for this territory. Although the expansion of the irrigation system was vitally connected with the cotton crop, the problem remained largely unsolved. The question was complicated not only by the enormous outlays of money required to produce any visible results, but also by the social structure of the transplanted system of agriculture and landownership.

The Central Asiatic provinces were a region of small landholdings and small-scale cultivation. Among the local peasant population the average holding rarely exceeded 5 to 7 *dessyatins;* in many regions an average farm covered no more than 1.5 to 2 *dessyatins* of land, and frequently as little as 0.5 and 0.25 *dessyatins.* Labor productivity on such tiny plots, due to primitive methods employed, was notoriously low. The larger farms, even of the peasant class, such as existed among many of the Russian colonists with their 40 to 50 *dessyatins* per household, not to speak of the occasional capitalist farms of 150 to 200 *dessyatins,* suffered from chronic shortages of labor as a result of the great amount of labor required for cotton planting. Hence only agrarian collectivization and the organization of large socialist farms

after the great October Socialist Revolution were capable of coping with the problem of irrigation and of raising the productivity of agriculture.

COTTON GROWING The cultivation of cotton existed in the territory of Central Asia since ancient times, having been introduced there from India. It was mentioned by Herodotus as early as the fifth century B.C. as a crop of the local population. For many centuries the cultivation of cotton in this region was no more than another local industry, since neither the cotton itself nor its products could find a wide outside market in the face of poor transportation facilities, especially because the varieties raised there were mostly common local types intended for the manufacture of wadding, and the finished home-woven articles were poor quality goods.

After 1900 cotton was grown in all provinces of Turkestan, whence came about 80 per cent of Russia's entire cotton crop; the most important plantations were located in Fergana (75 per cent), as well as in the Samarkand, Syr-Darya, and Trans-Caspian provinces. As a rule the cultivation of cotton was not attempted beyond the 43rd parallel, which was at that time considered to be the natural boundary for this semitropical crop.

On the basis of the climatic conditions prevailing in the region, it was assumed that the American varieties of the cotton plant would prove most suitable for local cultivation. Introduced during the 1880's, the American varieties became fully acclimated even on the small peasant farms. The Egyptian and other finer varieties were, on the other hand, not cultivated successfully. As compared with the American types, the cotton obtained from local seeds (*guza*) was notably poor in the quality of its fiber.

Cotton farming became the common occupation of the small rural peasant throughout this cotton region. Cotton plantations comprised about 30 to 40 per cent of the cultivated acreage in most regions, and as much as 70 to 85 per cent in some regions (Andizhan County).

The small cotton grower raised his crop either on his own modest plot of 2 to 4 *dessyatins* or, on a sharecrop basis, on an allotment leased to him by a wealthy landowner, in which case this sharecropper (*chairiker*) performed all the labor connected with the cultivation, care, and harvesting of the cotton, receiving between one-half and one-third of the total cotton crop harvested. According to some budgetary studies made by the resettlement administration during the 1900's, the total cost of farm equipment (buildings, livestock, inventory, and so forth) in the case of a "typical" peasant cotton farm amounted to 328 rubles. Such a farm usually had one horse; cattle were not to be found everywhere. The total gross income of the farm was only 450 rubles, about one-half of which came from cotton.

The cotton plant was cultivated with great care on the average peasant

farm, but the methods employed were generally primitive and manual. The plowing implement most commonly used, the *omach,* was a primitive wooden plow which was merely an ordinary heavy wooden branch that furrowed the soil. The plowing operation was usually repeated three times, since otherwise the wooden plow would have loosened the soil insufficiently. As the next step, ridges were built by the use of hand hoes. After the seedlings sprouted, they were thinned, watered several times, and cultivated. The harvesting of the ripe cotton bolls was also done by hand in several stages as the crop ripened. The cost of raising the cotton crop, according to the above-mentioned budgetary studies and expressed in terms of money, amounted to 208 rubles per *dessyatin,* which for a gross income of 300 rubles yielded a net income of about 100 rubles per *dessyatin.* With the use of machinery, costs were reduced by more than 40 to 50 per cent, or to about 101 rubles per *dessyatin.*[3]

The cultivation of cotton was far less common among the Russian resettlers, who because of unfamiliar economic conditions were less attracted to this region than, for example, to Bashkiria. Even when they did settle in Central Asia, they consistently chose to engage in raising their familiar wheat rather than cotton and rice.

Even prior to the Russian conquest, during the 1860's the cotton industry of Turkestan received a strong impetus when the entire world, including Russia, experienced a cotton crisis as a result of the American Civil War. In 1861 Turkestan cotton was sold at the Nizhny Novgorod and Moscow markets for 4 to 5 rubles per pood, while in 1864 its price rose to between 20 and 23 rubles. Cotton cultivation throughout Turkestan was greatly stimulated due to the steeply rising prices. With the aid of Turkestan cotton, the Russian processing industry passed through the critical years with comparative ease.

The planting of cotton in Turkestan expanded still further after the region's annexation by tsarist Russia. During the 1870's the government began to adopt certain measures for the purpose of easing credit and improving the agronomical situation in the cotton-growing industry. The turning point in the development of cotton cultivation was the introduction of the American varieties of the cotton plant during the eighties. The American plant was quick in displacing the local *guza* variety, since the latter was extremely poor in quality and suitable for the preparation of the coarsest fabrics only. In 1884 a representative of the Russian commercial firm of Kudrin for the first time dispatched to Moscow ten kip (about 100 pounds) of American cotton fiber. This was the first shipment of American cotton of Turkestan origin, and was ginned at American mills and returned to Russia. Henceforth these shipments of cotton multiplied rapidly: in 1888 they totaled 873,000 poods,

in 1889, 1,470,000; and in 1890, 2,673,000. During the period of 1890–1896 they fluctuated between 2.6 and 3.5 million poods, during 1896–1900 they approximated 4.3 to 4.9 million, and, finally, by 1907, reached 10.7 million poods. Turkestan became the cotton colony of Russian capitalism. In the absence of accurate cotton statistics for the earlier years, we can merely cite some approximate figures on the spread of cotton cultivation through the various regions of Turkestan. The steady increase of the acreage under cotton is revealed by the following figures (in thousand *dessyatins*): [4]

YEARS	FERGANA	SYR-DARYA PROVINCE	SAMARKAND PROVINCE	TRANS-CASPIAN PROVINCE	KHIVA AND BOKHARA	TOTAL FOR CENTRAL ASIA †
1885	34.6	1.0	5.8	..	..	41.4
1890	51.1	19.8	15.4	..	..	86.3
1895	109.7	12.2	16.4	..	..	138.3
1900	188.4	15.5	17.0	10.7	125.2 *	356.8
1905	166.1	13.2	18.8	13.3	80.0	291.4
1910	299.4	29.3	22.1	28.3	110.0	489.2
1915	250.9	69.9	29.3	45.7	146.0	541.9

* Local

† For the years 1885–1895, exclusive of Khiva and Bokhara, partly native and partly American; beginning with 1900–1905, American.

As these figures show, Fergana (the Margelan, Andizhan, Namangan, and Kokand districts) led the other provinces in size of cotton acreage, accounting for about two-thirds of the total cotton acreage. During the 1890's the cotton plantations of Fergana yielded between 1 and 1.8 million poods of ginned fiber, and between 3.6 and 3.8 million poods during the 1900's. In the Syr-Darya and Samarkand provinces the leading cotton districts were near Tashkent, Chimkent, Samarkand, and Kata-Kurgan. Among the other provinces of the region (besides Khiva and Bokhara) ranking high in cotton production was the Trans-Caspian province (the Merv district).

The total volume of the raw cotton crop raised in Turkestan, along with the cotton lint obtained therefrom, may be summarized by the following figures of the Central Statistical Commission (in thousand poods): [5]

YEARS	RAW COTTON	COTTON LINT
1906	13,520	4,345
1907	15,301	4,850
1908	13,359	4,350
1909	14,755	5,000
1910	25,488	8,450
1911	26,677	8,550
1912	18,097	5,800
1913	23,685	8,250
1914	26,002	8,500
1915	33,918	10,750

THE ORGANIZATION OF COTTON MARKETING Besides the prevailing conditions of production, an important element in the cotton economy of the native peasants was the organization of cotton selling. By being dependent upon the metropolitan provinces for the sale of this basic local commodity, the native producer soon found himself completely at the mercy of Russian commercial capital, the local commission merchants and moneylenders. The usual cotton transaction was in the form of a purchase by a Moscow firm, or more specifically by a local native commercial capitalist upon instructions of such a firm, or occasionally directly through the local agents of the Moscow firm who allowed the native farmer a small advance. During the 1890's, when cotton shipments to the Moscow and Lodz factories were increased, the buying of cotton was for the most part done directly by the agents of Moscow and Lodz firms. Beginning with the twentieth century, however, during the period 1900–1913, the picture changed considerably. Cotton purchases now began to be made by local commercial capital in its role as an agent not of Moscow industrial capital but of metropolitan banking capital. Inasmuch as local commercial capital did not possess adequate resources whereby it might acquire on its own account this vast supply of cotton, the banks began to play an increasingly important part in the purchasing, financing, and marketing of cotton. During the 1900's the Moscow banks gained control over 80 to 90 per cent of cotton buying and selling. By commanding enormous resources, concentrated bank capital descended upon the cotton market with the force of a monopoly. The small producer gained nothing from the change in the marketing forces, since he remained, as before, heavily indebted to commercial capital, the local agent, the moneylender, or the landowner, and henceforth upon monopolistic bank capital as well.

THE ORCHARDS AND THE SILK INDUSTRY OF TURKESTAN Among the more common native occupations of Turkestan were the vineyards, the orchards, and the silk farms, all of which existed long before the modern era. In 1912 the five Central Asiatic provinces, according to the best available estimates, included about 30,000 *dessyatins* under fruit orchards and 30,000 *dessyatins* under vineyards. Despite favorable climatic conditions the quality of locally raised fruit was poor, and its variety was limited to the demands of the local market. Only since 1900, following the construction of the Orenburg-Tashkent rail line, did a number of imported varieties of fruit begin to be cultivated here with a view to shipping them to the central markets for sale.

Silk culture was another very important regional industry, and in one form or another it could be found as a regular occupation on almost every

native farm. With the coming of the Russians, it became a commodity of great export value. Along with the Caucasus, Turkestan became a major source of the raw-silk supply for the metropolitan area. As practiced in the peasant household, the technical level of silk industry—that is, the production of the eggs, the incubation, the raising of the silkworm, and the unreeling of the cocoon—was thoroughly primitive (such as carrying a bag of eggs in one's bosom in order to hatch the eggs by the heat of the body). The unreeling of the silk was performed by hand on simple wooden wheels. The total volume of silk production in 1910, according to approximate figures, amounted to 340,000 poods of cocoons (with an additional 32,000 poods coming from Khiva and Bokhara), which yielded over 50,000 poods of raw silk valued between 90 and 250 rubles per pood, depending upon the quality. The unreeled silk was partly exported, but the majority was processed in local mills or by small *kustars* where it was made into cloth for local consumption as well as export. During 1909–1910 Turkestan had about 1,750 silk-weaving workshops, most of them on the *kustar* level, employing 2 to 3 workers apiece and producing 1,300 to 1,500 rubles' worth of silk cloth each.

RUG MAKING In addition to the silk-weaving industry, Turkestan possessed a number of other widely practiced *kustar* occupations: among the foremost of these was the production of rugs, followed by footwear, the minting of metal articles, wood carving, and others. These were all largely of a local consumer character, with the exception of the making of rugs which enjoyed world renown for high quality (Tekin, Turkoman, Bokhara, and others). According to the information of local agencies, in 1908 in the Trans-Caspian province alone the value of rug production amounted to 200,000 rubles. In general, however, the rug-making industry began to decline steadily after 1900, largely because of the poor quality of the new imported fabric dyes as compared with the old local dyes, and partly as a result of poor marketing organization which gave the direct producer an income too small for any reasonable incentive. Other local industries, such as hand weaving, metal minting, gun making, and boot making, lost their place in the market with the development of capitalism, being helpless in competition with the industrial products of the metropolitan provinces, which were rapidly displacing and destroying the local industries.

CREDIT FACILITIES FOR THE SMALL PRODUCER The scourge of the small cotton farm or orchard of the peasant was indebtedness forced upon him by his lack of resources for the proper organization and maintenance of his farm and the burdensome usurious terms on which he obtained credit from the jobbers. During the 1890's the small farmers began to obtain

advances from the commercial firms, usually at the rate of 1 to 1.5 rubles per pood of cotton. Inasmuch as such advances scarcely covered the expenditures involved in raising a crop of cotton, while the farmer himself possessed little circulating capital of his own, he was forced to resort to the local money-lenders and to pay a rate as high as 60 per cent for a loan. Of course this high cost of credit consumed the entire income of the small producer.

Some relief in this connection could have been afforded by local cooperative credit organizations, but these were still in their first stages of development. In 1914 there were only 210 credit societies and 146 cooperative savings associations throughout Central Asia, with a membership of 80,500 and a balance of 1,264,000 rubles. Taking part in these credit societies were considerable sections of the local agricultural population, primarily the more substantial groups. The poor peasant class on the whole, therefore, derived very little assistance from the cooperative organization of credit, and was entirely dependent upon private credit on usurious terms. In the cooperative credit establishments the average loan in 1912 was only 62 to 86 rubles, and 41 per cent of all loans were in connection with the purchase of livestock, 33 per cent for seeds, and 8 per cent for the payment of wages.

RAILROAD DEVELOPMENT The ascendancy of Russian capitalism over the regional economy of Central Asia, cotton in particular, came after 1880, when the demand for cotton by metropolitan industry had risen significantly and the newly constructed railroads made possible the development of cotton farming on a commercial scale.

Construction of railroads in Central Asia began during 1881–1886 with a line running east from the shores of the Caspian to Kizylarvat (217 versts), which was afterward extended to Chardzhou (for a total of 755 versts), chiefly for military purposes. Then followed a number of lines from Merv to Kushka by way of Samarkand, Fergana, Tashkent, and Andizhan, as a result of which the total trackage in Turkestan rose to 2,368 versts during the early part of the twentieth century. Traversing rich cotton, rice, fruit, and vineyard territory, these lines aided materially in stimulating market production within these fields, particularly in cotton, and in supplying a flow of industrial goods to these regions from the metropolitan provinces. The freight load of the railroads increased over a ten-year period (in the case of low-speed freight) from 23 million poods, including 5.2 millions of cotton, to 69.8 million poods, of which cotton accounted for 11.8 million poods. The most important of this group was the Tashkent-Orenburg line, which connected the Central Asian markets with the railroad network of central European Russia, thus serving as a direct channel for cotton going to the Moscow industrial region and for supplying the cotton producers with wheat from

European Russia. While the total export of cotton from Central Asia was only 873,000 poods in 1888, it grew to 4,960,000 in 1900, and to 13,697,000 in 1913.

THE PROCESSING INDUSTRIES How vital cotton was to the national economy of Turkestan may be judged by the fact that the volume of total agricultural production in Turkestan during the early twentieth century was valued at 350 million rubles, more than half of which, according to the Ministry of Agriculture, was contributed by cotton.[6]

As for local industries based on this basic raw material, progress was notably slow. After the turn of the century some industrial production based on cotton was beginning to increase, chiefly cottonseed-oil preparation and some phases in the initial processing of cotton. These industries comprised about 85 per cent of total industrial production in Turkestan; in other words, virtually no other industries existed.

The proportions of the various branches of the processing industries, as reported by several local surveys, may be seen from the following table:[7]

BRANCH OF INDUSTRY	NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES	TOTAL PRODUCTION (THOUSAND RUBLES)	NUMBER OF WORKERS	MECHANICAL PRIME MOVERS (HORSEPOWER)
Cotton ginning	201	98,412	7,769	10,231
Cottonseed-oil production	19	12,381	1,720	4,566
Flour mills	46	3,982	472	1,869
Cocoon drying	28	3,136	2,198	12
Leather factories	72	1,324	422	170
Others	340	16,966	8,487	5,172
Total	706	136,201	21,068	22,020

The foremost industry of the region, whose output overshadowed all the rest, was the cotton-ginning industry. According to the more complete official figures of the industrial survey of 1908, Turkestan had 204 cotton-ginning mills (out of 220 for all Russia) and 5 cotton-wadding mills. Production during the same year included 6,865,000 poods of cotton lint, 9,900 poods of linters, and 12,153,000 poods of scrap and waste.

The technological level of production was relatively low in the old factories but quite advanced in the newer plants. Whereas in the earlier period, for example, manual labor was used almost exclusively in cleaning and preparing the cotton, by the beginning of the twentieth century mechanical labor was the rule rather than the exception. The motive power, which previously was almost exclusively water power, was now being replaced by steam and internal combustion engines (145 factories of the above total). It is

interesting to note the structure of production costs in the cotton-ginning industry in Turkestan in comparison with the cotton-processing industry of the empire as a whole. According to the survey of 1908, the various elements of production cost were in the following percentage relationship to the total cost of production:

	COTTON GIN PRODUCTION IN TURKESTAN	COTTON CLOTH INDUSTRY OF THE EMPIRE
Raw material	85.20%	68.66%
Fuel	0.34	3.36
Wages	1.04	11.37
Buildings and motive power	0.06	11.10

The cotton-ginning mills were thus vitally interested in the price of raw cotton, taking, in fact, a direct part in cotton buying so as to profit as much as possible by the differences between the price of ginned and unginned cotton. Technically the cotton-ginning factories of Turkestan were rather badly equipped: for example, the proportion of mechanical power per worker was 0.80 horsepower compared to 9.75 horsepower for the cotton industry as a whole; the number of workers per factory was 34 compared with 520 workers for the whole industry. The great profits earned by these enterprises, apart from their share in cotton purchasing, were due to the low wages and the unrestrained exploitation of the workers.

In conclusion we may touch upon the degree to which native and Russian capital participated in this basic local capitalist industry. According to data for 1911, of the entire 157 listed factories 109 were owned by local and 48 by Russian firms; moreover, the number of gins (the basic equipment of the cotton-ginning factories) per factory was 7 for the Russian enterprises and 3.4 for the local, that is, the former were twice as large as the latter.

Besides the important fact that Russian capital investments were on a larger scale than local and native investments, we may also note a tendency toward the concentration of capital. During 1910–1914 a few monopolistic syndicates extended their influence over the cotton-ginning and cottonseed-oil enterprises, working primarily with capital belonging to Moscow cotton firms. According to data for 1914, of the total number of 201 cotton-ginning plants, 9 of the associated firms owned 88 factories (44 per cent); 58 of these belonged to 2 firms, and all belonged to a secret syndicate. The same associations also controlled 15 plants, or 40 per cent of the total number of 38 plants engaged in cottonseed-oil production.

There were scarcely any other branches of industry in Turkestan approaching in size the few discussed above. A poor grade of coal was mined at 14 pits in 1908 at the annual rate of 1.5 million poods, rising to 3.5 million in

1911 in the Khodzhent district. The petroleum industry (in Fergana and on Cheleken Island) yielded 3.7 million poods in 1908 and 17 million poods in 1911. It was owned partly by the Nobel (German) group of oil companies and partly by French firms; neither group was especially interested in expanding petroleum production in this region. The bulk of the mineral wealth of the region, the rich deposits of gold, copper, nephrite, lapis lazuli, and other rare minerals were left virtually undeveloped.

THE POSITION OF THE WORKING CLASS With industry in its earliest phase of development in Turkestan, the size of the proletariat was rather small. Altogether, according to a local survey, Turkestan in 1914 had 20,925 factory workers; about 77.2 per cent of this number were indigenous native elements, including 60.7 per cent Uzbeks, while the Russians accounted for only 22.8 per cent. The latter were for the most part (70 to 79 per cent) skilled workers employed at the power plants and engines for mechanical repairs, and in similar work requiring some degree of industrial skill. On the other hand, the ordinary industrial workers and the common laborers belonged largely (50 to 60 per cent) to the local native groups. Woman and child labor was quite common; for example, in the cocoon-drying enterprises women comprised 56.5 per cent and children 3.9 of the total number of workers, and at the egg-collecting sheds, women 88.3 per cent and children 5.2 per cent. In most enterprises the length of the workday was 10 to 12 hours, and at times 16 hours or more. Wages were low, average annual pay being about 180 rubles compared with an average of 288 rubles for Russia. The difficult living conditions of the workers, the low wages, and the extreme degree of exploitation accounted for the relative cultural backwardness of the local workers.

Thus, although the economic penetration of Turkestan by Russian industrial capitalism after 1880 provided a substantial impetus to the development of its productive forces, the region nevertheless continued to function as another agrarian-colonial appendage of the mother country. The exploitation of this rich "national borderland," one of the empire's most valuable sources of colonial raw materials, was maintained at the sacrifice of the health and wealth of the direct producer. The combined effect of the newly introduced capitalist forms of exploitation, the remnants of the native semipatriarchal and semifeudal customs, and local usurious practices and financial-agrarian exploitation weighed heavily upon the conditions of the laboring masses of the Turkestan nationalities. Through its policy of forcing upon Turkestan the role of a supplier of cheap raw material for the home provinces, the tsarist regime added to the system of colonial exploitation a large measure of nationality oppression, for which purpose it preserved intact the Asiatic,

feudal, and cruel rule of the local khans. By these means it perpetuated the extreme social and economic backwardness of the submerged nationalities of this colony.

Notes

1. Prior to the revolution all provinces and districts of Central Asia were grouped together in the Turkestan Government-General, the latter consisting of five provinces: Trans-Caspian, Syr-Darya, Samarkand, Fergana, and Semirechye; in addition there were two "vassal" khanates: Khiva and Bokhara. In their present form these districts constitute the Turkmen, Uzbek, Tadzhik, and Kirgiz SSR. Hereafter, in conformity with the available prerevolutionary statistical material for the capitalist era, we shall be compelled to employ the old administrative subdivisions and designations.
2. Masalskii, *Turkestanskii krai* (The Turkestan Region) (1913).
3. *Aziatskaya Rossiya* (Asiatic Russia) (1914), Vol. II, pp. 289-291.
4. The figures for 1885–1900 are compiled on the basis of the approximate data of the Petersburg Cotton Committee; see Malakhovskii, *Proizvoditelnyye sily Turkestana* (Productive Forces of Turkestan) (1909), Release No. 1, pp. 64-79; for the years 1900–1915 the table is based on data of the Ministry of Agriculture; namely, the various issues of the *Sbornik statistiko-ekonomicheskikh svedenii po selskomu khozyaistvu* (Collection of Statistical and Economic Data on Rural Economy).
5. *Sbornik statistiko-ekonomicheskikh svedenii po selskomu khozyaistvu Rossii i inostrannykh gosudarstv* (Collection of Statistical and Economic Data on the Rural Economy in Russia and in Foreign Countries) (1917), pp. 134-135. The harvests of ginned cotton are calculated.
6. *Aziatskaya Rossiya* (1914), Vol. II, p. 294.
7. Zaorskaya and Alexander, *Promyshlennyye zavedeniya Turkestanskogo kraya* (Industrial Enterprises of the Turkestan Region) (1915).

(XXX)

The National Economy of the Caucasian Peoples During the Capitalistic Era

WE HAVE already indicated that the economic assimilation of the Caucasus was accomplished considerably later than its military conquest, and at so slow a pace that, in Lenin's opinion, it was still incomplete by 1890–1900.[1] In fact it could hardly have occurred before the entrenchment of industrial capital, when the latter adopted the Caucasus as its own colony, drawing its required industrial raw materials from the Caucasus and supplying this colony with manufactured goods from the Moscow, Yaroslavl, and Petersburg factories.

Besides the geographic remoteness of the Caucasus and the difficulties involved in absorbing it into the economy of the empire as a whole before effecting a railroad connection between the two (which was not accomplished before the period of 1880–1890), an important factor in the slow progress of extending capitalist control over the Caucasus was the persistence within the social-economic fabric of the Caucasian people of numerous feudal survivals hindering the development of capitalism.

As one of the larger national-political structures of Transcaucasia, Gruzia in the nineteenth century lived in a state of frigid and immobile reactionary feudalism.

During the middle and second half of the nineteenth century, the upper rural classes of Gruzia represented an economically reactionary and parasitic growth on the masses of the serf and semiserf, almost wholly illiterate, and impoverished peasantry. As regards Gruzia, this submerged state of the peasantry represented, in the words Lenin applied to feudalism in Russia, only "stagnation . . . and the sway of Asiaticism."[2]

In the southeastern Turkic sections of Transcaucasia, with its remnants of patriarchal and tribal customs, its nomadic herdsman economy, and a declining, although once prosperous, agricultural civilization, the situation was even less favorable for the development of capitalist relationships. Finally, the mountainous and inaccessible districts of the Caucasus were characterized by even more pronounced survivals of patriarchal life, subsistence farming, primitive animal husbandry, and a generally low level of culture.

A somewhat different situation prevailed in Armenia. Among the Armenians, particularly throughout the scattered Armenian colonies abroad (Constantinople, Cilicia, and elsewhere), there had already arisen a commercial-industrial bourgeoisie, in cooperation with which Armenian capital in the nineteenth century played a considerable role in Transcaucasia proper (especially in Georgia, at Tiflis), becoming the active agent and intermediary for the penetration of Russian capital into the region. But the mass of the native population within Armenia proper lived under a most backward agricultural and stock-raising subsistence economy, distinguished by primitive methods of production and virtually without industry.

The tsarist government not only consciously upheld the backwardness of the social-economic order in the Transcaucasian national borderlands but also kindled the flames of national rivalry throughout the territory (especially in a district like Baku and in Azerbaijan generally, between Armenians, Tatars, and other nationalities). Nationality persecution by Russian officialdom led to voluntary as well as compulsory mass emigration into Turkey by entire national groups, such as the numerous Circassian mountain tribes (the Adygey, Kizilbekhi, Abanzintsy, and Shapsugi), as well as sections of the Abkhazians and the Chechens. Finally, to this should be added the colonizing policy of Russification, which brought into Transcaucasia, in charge of governmental, court, and economic measures, the worst elements among the "homeland" administrators, who (as was later confirmed by senatorial investigations) accepted bribes, openly violated the law of the land, and plundered the native population.

These were the conditions and methods of the colonial annexation of Transcaucasia by the Russian tsarist regime at the beginning of the capitalist period. We shall now consider in greater detail the various branches of the regional economy of Transcaucasia during the capitalist era.

AGRICULTURE As a rural area with marked vestiges of a feudal subsistence farming and with a predominantly peasant population, Transcaucasia's economy was dominated by agriculture. It was the principal occupation of 80 per cent of its inhabitants. The distribution of the population was not very dense: average density throughout Transcaucasia was 33.8 persons per square verst in 1911, although higher in a number of industrial districts, as, for example, 406 persons per square verst around Baku; in the agricultural districts, however, it seldom rose above 23 to 28 persons per square verst. The volume of arable land, in some localities particularly, was extremely limited, owing to the high proportion of unsuitable territory (41.8 per cent in Armenia, 26.1 in Gruzia as a whole, and 25.2 per cent in Azer-

baijan). This circumstance, coupled with the extremely inequitable distribution of landholdings, produced a state of land scarcity at times so extreme that stretches of plowland had to be created artificially in some mountainous districts by transporting quantities of land into narrow spaces between the mountains.

The distribution of the agricultural area proper by type of land use was extremely disproportionate and unfavorable for the development of a successful rural economy. In the absence of figures on the distribution of land by types for the prerevolutionary period, we shall cite a few comparative figures applying to the larger republic units during the period 1922–1923, by which date the proportion between the land types could not have altered greatly (data prepared by local statistical agencies): [3]

REPUBLICS	% OF ARABLE LAND	OF THE TOTAL QUANTITY OF ARABLE LAND:		
		% of Meadows and Pastures	% of Crop and Homestead Land	% of Forest Area
Gruzia	73.9	31.5	20.0	48.5
Armenia	58.2	49.8	25.9	24.3
Azerbaijan	74.8	54.2	28.4	17.4
All Transcaucasia	71.1	44.9	24.9	30.2

The fodder area (meadow and pasture land) was proportionately highest in Armenia and Azerbaijan, especially in the upland districts where most of the herds were maintained. In the economic utilization of the agricultural acreage in the arid sections of the region, the question of irrigation was of paramount importance. As mentioned previously, the ancient irrigation system of Azerbaijan had long lain in ruins, and only a minor portion was restored by the tsarist government. The greater part of the canals and of their lesser branches was restored and repaired by the population itself, and was, therefore, in a rather primitive state. Nevertheless, according to later data, the irrigated area in Transcaucasia amounted to 950,000 *dessyatins,* or about one-third of the total cultivated acreage, comprising 43 per cent of the total in Azerbaijan and 32.9 in Armenia. In relation to the area of land potentially suitable for agriculture, however, it constituted no more than a minor portion.

BRANCHES OF RURAL ECONOMY Among the several branches of Transcaucasia's rural economy the most important were: grain raising in the agricultural districts and the care of livestock in the nomadic steppe regions. Of the total cultivated acreage, plowland amounted to: 97.7 per cent in Armenia, 95.5 per cent in Azerbaijan, and 94.8 per cent in Georgia. In 1909 the total area under all agricultural crops amounted to 1,891,000

dessyatins, of which 1,867,000 were planted with cereal grains, yielding a harvest of 84 million poods.

The technique of grain cultivation, like the grain harvests, was low. No correct system of crop rotation was practiced. As a result of the increasing land scarcity, the once prevalent three-field system had been virtually displaced by the multicrop field system with the irregular planting of various grains, usually grain followed by grain. The main cultivated crops were corn (covering 466,000 *dessyatins* of the above-mentioned total sown acreage) for personal consumption, and wheat (889,000 *dessyatins*) partly intended for shipment to the cities; there were also smaller plantings of millet, barley, and rye. The peasants performed their field work with the aid of a primitive Armenian wooden plow, called *aror,* or by an antediluvian Gruzian wooden plow, to which they harnessed 6 to 8 pairs of oxen, an operation that usually necessitated several households to pool their resources and work as a *supryaga* (primitive artel). Threshing was performed with the aid of a board embedded with stones and drawn by a horse.[4] Average harvests were in the neighborhood of 40 poods per *dessyatin,* according to official figures.

Besides grain raising, the native agricultural population of Transcaucasia devoted a substantial share of their land and labor to vineyards, orchards, and to cotton and tobacco plantations. As reported by the Ministry of Agriculture,[5] during 1908–1909 the area under vineyards in the eight Transcaucasian provinces amounted to between 90,000 and 95,000 *dessyatins,* of which Kutaisy contained 31,000, Yerivan, 500; Yelizavetpol, 10,600; and Tiflis, 23,000 *dessyatins,* yielding a combined harvest of 12 to 15 million pails of wine, most of which was consumed locally. Except for a few advanced localities, the technical level of viticulture and wine making on the native farms was still very primitive. Some of the capitalist farms, however, produced a high grade of wine enjoying world renown. In Armenia the production of cognac was organized on a capitalist basis.

Transcaucasia was the second most important region, after Turkestan, in the production of cotton and rice. According to the same data of the Ministry of Agriculture, in 1910 the area under cotton was 60,500 *dessyatins* in all of Transcaucasia (compared to 489,200 in Turkestan). Rice covered an area of 26,800 *dessyatins* and produced a harvest of 2,062,000 poods (compared with 183,900 *dessyatins* and a 14,632,000 pood crop in Turkestan). Both crops were raised by very primitive methods and yielded low harvests, chiefly owing to the poor state of the irrigating system. Despite the excellent possibilities for cotton cultivation on the steppes of Azerbaijan with the aid of irrigation, it failed to expand its acreage and to become a second cotton base for Russian capitalism.

Among the other important branches of agriculture was the cultivation of

citrus fruit, oranges and lemons, and tea in the subtropical sections of Abkhazia. In most cases, however, such plantations were operated as "amateur" enterprises, and did not extend to the average peasant farm, while only a few scattered attempts were made to place them on a capitalist basis (the tea plantations of the Popov firm). Of a total area of 50,000 *dessyatins* suitable for cultivation of tea, only 900 *dessyatins* were actually devoted to this culture.

The foremost area in the herdsman economy of Transcaucasia was the steppeland of Azerbaijan, where the herds of the Turkic inhabitants were tended on a nomadic and seminomadic basis. The migrant camps usual in this type of stock raising moved, according to the conditions of a locality, from spring and fall steppe pasturage (in the Mugan, Milskaya, and Karabakh steppes), which also served as winter camps (*kishlaki*), to summer and fall pastures (*yailigi*) in the mountains. In the summertime, when the grass on the steppeland dried up, the herds were driven toward the lush and moist mountain meadowland of Karabakh. This type of stock raising made the question of land very acute, especially as cultivated crops were being expanded at the expense of the available pasture land. The change to the intensive variety of animal husbandry was proceeding slowly. Yet, because of favorable climatic conditions and excellent mountain meadows found in Transcaucasia, this region produced a considerable amount of livestock for food and for further processing (cheese making). In view of the inaccuracy of the available absolute figures on this subject, we shall cite some comparative figures on the various types of livestock available for every 100 residents in Transcaucasia in comparison with the empire as a whole and with Central Asia. The following data were reported by the Ministry for Agriculture for 1908: [6]

HEAD OF LIVESTOCK PER 100 RESIDENTS	TRANSCAUCASIA	CENTRAL ASIA	ENTIRE EMPIRE
Horses	16.8	47.7	20.8
Cattle	57.4	51.9	31.2
Sheep	101.3	240.4	52.1

Another ancient occupation of great significance closely related to agriculture in Transcaucasia was silk culture: before the Russian conquest the tax levied upon silk furnished the khans of the Eastern Caucasus with about 20 per cent of their revenue. After the second half of the nineteenth century, silk culture declined heavily, and was afterward restored on a greatly reduced scale. According to the figures for 1909, about 270,000 egg boxes were produced that year, while the total quantity of cocoons collected was 320,000

poods; at a price of 45 to 55 rubles a pood of dry cocoons, this yielded the population an income of about 4 million rubles annually.

The timber industry was very little developed in the Caucasus despite the presence of vast forest containing valuable species of trees (yew, box, black maple, walnut, and others), and the local woods were largely denuded and wasted instead of being systematically exploited. Only negligible quantities of lumber went into exports.

AGRARIAN CONDITIONS As we have stated earlier, agrarian conditions in the Caucasus were extremely complex and varied greatly from one district to another in accordance with the historical and national characteristics of each district. In the nomadic and mountain pasture districts vestiges of the patriarchal clan customs and primitive slavery were still dominant among the population; in the agricultural districts feudal relations were still in force; still otherwise in the irrigated districts of intensive farming and so forth. After the conquest of Caucasia, Russia's tsarist regime launched a relentless colonization policy as a result of which the native toiling population, in the nomad districts particularly, lost its so-called "surplus" lands, which were at once converted into state property for the purpose of further colonization by Russian peasant elements. The size and terms of the landholdings left to the local population were even more rigid here than, for example, in Central Asia. The lands abandoned by owners in the course of the wholesale emigration that followed the Russian conquest were disposed of on the same inequitable basis, particularly in the Moslem districts (land belonging to the *beks*, and others). In this instance, too, the land was confiscated for the state, but became, in effect, the immediate object of wholesale plunder in every way as gigantic and unbridled as the notorious epic plunder of the Bashkirian lands.[7]

Russian resettlement did not play the same important role in Transcaucasia as in western Siberia. Of a total population of 7.3 million in 1911, the Russians in the Transcaucasus (including urban population) numbered only 598,000; moreover, apart from the urban and Cossack population, the Russian village population proper consisted partly of various religious sects (Dukhobors and others), who were resettled here, forcibly for the most part, during the 1890's. The well kept farms of these resettlers exerted considerable agricultural influence upon local rural economy until the time persecution by the Russian government forced the sects to migrate en masse to Canada. The few remaining households soon afterward became typical kulak farms.

LOCAL SERFDOM AND ITS LIQUIDATION While pursuing a relentless policy of colonization and depriving the native Caucasian toiling

population of its lands, the tsarist government at the same time left inviolate not only the land of the privileged landowning classes but also their feudal rights over the peasants living on their lands. From our analysis of the conditions under which the "emancipation" reforms of 1863–1870 were conducted in Transcaucasia, we may recall that these reforms brought much more hardship to the peasantry and more extensive privileges for the landlords than did the Act of 1861 in Russia. As a result of making redemption optional and continuing the status of "temporary obligation," that is, actual conditions of serfdom, or outright slavery in some localities, the personal and economic bondage of the peasantry residing on the "landlord" holdings continued unabated during the twentieth century.

Besides the serf peasants who lived under conditions of "customary" serfdom in the various parts of Georgia, virtual feudal conditions also prevailed among such groups of the peasantry as the *khizany* of Georgia, for example (or the *mandobili* of Mingrelia);[8] the peasants living on the *myulk* (granted) lands of the *beks* in the Moslem sections; the peasants on the *tiul* lands (formerly those of the Persian shahs and *beks*) in the Armenian localities around Yerivan; and the peasants occupying the lands of the *agalari*, the privileged classes of the nomad peoples in the former Turkish provinces. Some groups of the population frequently lived under conditions resembling slavery rather than serfdom, as did the *unauty* among the Circassian and Kabarda inhabitants, the *kuly* in the Kumyki district, the *kusaki* in Osetia, and the servants and slaves of various designations among the Chechens and Ingushi in Dagestan and Abkhazia. This category also included persons living under semislave or semiservile conditions such as the *pshitli*, *chagary*, or *akhue* in the Kuban district, in Kabarda, and Abkhazia. Altogether, in the mountain provinces of Caucasia during the period of 1860–1870, more than 52,000 persons lived in a state of slavery or serfdom, 10,000 of whom were complete slaves.

The attempt to solve such highly complex social relationships by applying the all-Russian General Act on the Peasantry of 1861 to this area failed to achieve its objective as a result of encountering a set of local conditions totally different from those prevailing in Russia. The expedient of the semifeudal status of "temporary obligation" was, therefore, left to prevail throughout the main districts of Transcaucasia until 1912, the "constitutional" period of the third state Duma, at which time, considerably later, to be sure, than in the other regions of Russia, the remnants of serfdom were formally abolished by law. In reality, however, semifeudal economic bondage remained the lot of the local peasantry even after 1912.

This lag in the liquidation of semifeudal institutions proved to be a most

serious obstacle and a powerful brake against the development of economic activity in Transcaucasia. This could not, indeed, prevent the actual proletarianization of the popular masses nor the development of capitalist relationships, but it did retard these tendencies as long as many of these national areas retained survivals of primitive clan customs. Hence, even after the rich mineral resources and agricultural raw material of the Caucasus began to attract foreign and Russian capital after 1890, and the Caucasus produced such major centers of capitalist industry as Baku, the general economy of this national borderland remained on a primitive level. Thus:

> Baku did not emerge from the bowels of Azerbaijan but was superimposed from above, as a result of the efforts of Nobel, Rothschild, Vichau, and others. As for Azerbaijan itself, it remained a land of most primitive patriarchal and feudal relationships.[9]

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY AND RAILROADS The "economic conquest" of the Caucasus as a colony began, therefore, only after 1870, long after its political conquest, as indicated by Lenin.[10]

In view of the geographic isolation of the Caucasus, the creation of an improved transport system became an important prerequisite for the penetration of goods and capital from the metropolitan area. For this reason, following the annexation of the various parts of the Caucasus steamship lines were opened on the Black and Caspian seas. These, however, proved to be inadequate both for internal communication and as a link with the home provinces. From the 1880's this region began to witness great activity in connection with the building of railways to connect Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus with Moscow and the central regions of Russia. These railroads became the channels for the agricultural and industrial exploitation of the territory. The basic Transcaucasian trunk line, Baku-Tiflis-Poti-Batum, was completed in 1883, and this line was gradually augmented by auxiliary networks and spur lines: the Yerivan and Dzhulf line, the Kakhetin line, and the Chiaturi and Tkvibuli lines leading to the centers of the coal and manganese industries. In this manner was built up the skeleton of the regional railroad network, still inadequate but affording some outlet to the more important agricultural and industrial areas. Finally, the line built between Baku and Rostov joined the railway system of Transcaucasia with the general network of the empire and completed the chain of railroads to be used in the direct exchange of goods between Transcaucasia and the home provinces.

In the meantime Transcaucasia was being gradually overrun by the products of Moscow's cotton industry, by Russian sugar, metal manufactures, household goods, and others. These were steadily displacing local cloth made

by *kustars,* felt cloaks, guns, national costumes, and so forth.[11] At about this time, too—constituting a distinctive feature of this colony—the Caucasus began to attract foreign capital, which soon assumed a dominant position in the leading industries of the region.

THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY Between 1860 and 1870 the foundation of Russia's large-scale petroleum industry was laid in the Baku area. First of all, the Russian government was utterly incapable of coping with the problem of exploiting this black "pearl of the Caucasus" on an economic basis. Although Baku had been a Russian possession since 1806 (not to mention earlier unsuccessful attempts by Peter I), and its petroleum resources had been adequately explored by the Academicians Pallas, Gmelin, and others during the late eighteenth century, the Russian government long considered it unnecessary to organize the systematic extraction of petroleum. Instead it transplanted into this area its customary "lease" system for operating the wells and extracting crude oil, and its method of "assigning" peasants for that purpose, which yielded a highly unsatisfactory output (200,000 to 250,000 poods per annum during 1818–1840). Only after the lease system was abolished in 1872 was the exploration of oil-bearing strata, the submission of bids, exploitation, and extraction made "free." The Baku oil-bearing region was thus opened as a wide field for the investment of large-scale capital. Domestic capital was, however, unequal to the task, and capitalism in the Baku oil fields was "superimposed from above" by the efforts of foreign capital. Baku rapidly became an important center for the concentration of an industrial proletariat (chiefly Persians, Russians, Armenians, Tatars, and, to a lesser extent, Lezghians).

MANGANESE, COPPER, AND COAL In the meantime new important industrial centers began to arise in other sections of Transcaucasia, in the Chiaturi manganese district, around the Tkvibuli and Tkvarcheli coal deposits, and near the Allaverdi and Zangezur copper mines. For the most part these areas became important centers of local capitalist mining production, but in some cases, such as Chiaturi manganese, they became an important factor in world supply. Before the war Chiaturi accounted for 35 to 40 per cent of total world manganese output. Apart from the great depth of its mining strata and its extensive reserves of ore (about 90,000,000 tons), Chiaturi ore is both richer in pure metal content and higher in quality than the ore obtained in India or Brazil. Despite all this, the entire system of operating these deposits (begun in 1779) was very poorly organized. The tsarist government and Russian capitalism discouraged the development of

local production in order to prevent competition by the Chiaturi deposits against Donets manganese. Manganese production was thus performed by handicraft methods, organized by a number of small firms (as many as 260 in 1913), and yielded a total output valued at 1.4 million rubles. All efforts to introduce large-scale foreign capital ended in failure. Chiaturi manganese became an export product exclusively, shipping 966,000 tons in 1913, chiefly to England, Belgium, and the United States.

Following the construction of the railroad, the Tkvibuli coal deposits, discovered in 1845 but not exploited until 1887, were of considerable, although purely local, importance among the other branches of Caucasia's mining industry. Possessing a medium grade of coal and modest reserves, and being also a small-scale project (only three pits), this deposit before the war maintained a volume of output of between 2 and 2.4 million poods. The extraction and smelting of copper were carried on before the war chiefly at the Allaverdi and Zangezur mines, where a few sizable copper-smelting plants were built, and to a lesser extent in connection with the Shamblug, Kapkan, and Eilar deposits. Some deposits of copper (occurring together with zinc, sulphur pyrites, silver, plus an admixture of gold) were available in many other localities but were not exploited for industrial purposes. There were altogether about 66 copper-producing enterprises employing 4,600 workers (of which the Yelizavetpol province accounted for 25 enterprises and 2,400 workers). The total output of ore and metal in Transcaucasia amounted to 14 per cent of the country's total copper production during 1890–1900, contributing during the years mentioned 1 to 1.3 million poods of ore and 350,000 to 400,000 poods of copper valued at 3,867 rubles. The Sadon and Alagir (North Osetia) silver and lead mines produced about 175 poods of silver and nearly 45,000 poods of zinc.

LIGHT INDUSTRY In the field of light industry, the production of tobacco based on local raw material, such as the Sukhimi and other high grade tobaccos, developed on a considerable scale. In Armenia a cognac industry arose on the basis of local raw material. The ginning of cotton, extraction of cottonseed-oil, and some local cotton weaving also achieved some industrial importance, chiefly in eastern Transcaucasia and in Azerbaijan. Although not on a scale comparable to the cotton districts of Turkestan, these industries included a number of large capitalist enterprises employing over a thousand workers and yielded a total product valued at 3 million rubles. Finally, we may mention in this connection the local silk-weaving industry with its small-scale enterprises numbering altogether (before the war) 124 silk-reeling and silk-weaving establishments employing 4,156 workers and yield-

ing a total product (exclusive of handicraft work) valued at 2.7 million rubles.

HANDICRAFT INDUSTRIES AND THEIR DECLINE Special mention should be made of the Caucasian handicraft industries, which were highly developed before the coming of capitalism, whose gradual disappearance under the impact of capitalist production has been indicated by Lenin. Of foremost importance among the handicraft industries was the making of firearms, metal articles (silver tableware, ornaments), and rugs. In the production of light arms (daggers and rifles) Transcaucasia once enjoyed world-wide renown, and some historians believe that in deep pre-historical antiquity it was the cradle of all metal-processing arms making. This highly developed handicraft production of metal articles and arms, especially in Azerbaijan, in Daghestan (Gandzha), in Georgia (Dushet, Kutaisy), in Armenia (Leninakan, Yerivan), and other localities and cities, suffered heavily from the impact of capitalist competition.

The cloak, rug, and wool-fulling industries, which also at one time sent their goods to a wide market, were preserved for a somewhat longer time, but by the end of this period also fell into decline as a result of capitalist competition and the general decline of sheep breeding in this area. It nevertheless succeeded in maintaining itself on a considerable scale in some localities before the war, engaging 15 to 22 per cent of the entire population in a number of districts (Kuba, Shushin, and Mugan), and as much as 30 per cent in the Karabakh district.[12]

These numerous types of household industry and small-scale handicraft production were being rapidly displaced in the consumer market by competitive goods from the capitalist industries of the home provinces. Cotton goods from Moscow displaced the home-woven cloth formerly produced by handicraft methods at home and consumed largely by those small peasant households spared from utter ruin by the conditions of capitalism. Similarly, handmade arms (blades and cold arms), which were traditionally articles of wide consumption in the Caucasus, yielded to factory-made arms produced in the Tula workshops. The making of felt cloaks, a "national" product of local output (best made in Daghestan and in the Tersk province), as well as hats, disappeared altogether and was superseded by factory goods thrown into the market by Russian capitalism. Other important handicraft industries, including rug making, also declined greatly.

THE GENERAL SCALE OF LARGE INDUSTRY We shall now submit some summary figures on the development of capitalist industry in Transcaucasia. According to an empire-wide survey of factory industry made

in 1908, supplemented by figures on the mining industry, the development of industry in the various prerevolutionary provinces and regions may be illustrated by the following figures.

1908 industrial census.[13]

	Number of Factories and Mills	Value of Production (Thousand Rubles)	Number of Workers
Total for Transcaucasia	497	238,470	64,113
Tiflis Province	128	9,660	6,567
Kutaisi Province	4	103	74
Yelizavetpol Province	127	6,579	6,851
Baku and Baku Province	178	218,520	48,699
Yerivan Province	9	1,150	502
Batum Province	15	2,225	1,223

Adding to these figures on factory industry the output of the mining industries (coal, manganese, and copper ores), we obtain the following summary figures for the major branches of Transcaucasian industries included in the census:[14]

	Number of Enterprises	Value of Production (Thousand Rubles)	Number of Workers
Petroleum industry	39	188,832	39,766
Food industry	98	19,427	2,925
Metal processing	121	14,281	11,335
Cotton processing	19	3,007	1,366
Silk processing	91	2,676	4,156
Animal products processing	14	2,147	708
Extraction of copper	66	4,600	3,867
Extraction of manganese	114	1,426	674
Extraction of coal	4	300	386
All factory and mining industries	689	244,497	69,066

Thus, for the value of its total output in 1908, large-scale capitalist industry (covered by the census) presents an impressive figure of about 250 million rubles, some 210 million rubles of which came from heavy industry, with petroleum contributing an overwhelming share of the total. Inasmuch as the total product of these industry groups (including petroleum but not the mining industry) within the empire as a whole was valued at 4,565 million rubles, Transcaucasia consequently accounted for 5.2 per cent of the total value of the country's industrial production, while the number of workers employed by these branches of industry in Transcaucasia comprised about 3 per cent of the total number of factory workers in Russia. In addition the railroad workers (estimating 11 persons per verst of railway line) would give an additional 20,000 persons.

It is clear, therefore, that without the vast Baku oil industry and a few other units of capitalist industry, the bulk of Caucasian industry must be classified as belonging within the small and medium categories, and sometimes in the semihandicraft class (which was not included in the tables just cited). Large bodies of industrial, railway, and port workers were concentrated chiefly in Baku and in the other larger industrial centers and ports (Tiflis, Batum, and elsewhere).

This situation was rooted deeply in the peculiar features of Transcaucasia's economy, in the manner in which Russian and foreign capital penetrated this region, and in the interrelation between the latter and native capital. With the advent of capitalism, local native capital, Georgian and particularly Armenian, began to take an active part in the creation of a local capitalist industry. In Tiflis, as the main cultural and industrial capitalist center of the region, a number of more or less sizable stock companies in the manganese, coal, and other industries arose during 1890–1900, involving the participation of Russian and foreign capital, a substantial share of which came, however, from native capital. Fourteen stock companies with a circulating capital of more than 9 million rubles were formed in 1900.

By these indications Transcaucasia as a colonial "borderland" of Russian capitalism differed markedly from the other borderlands, Siberia, and Central Asia. Largely on the basis of foreign capital, but—what is more important—with the cooperation of local national capital, this colony was endowed with a capitalist industry more powerful than was ever known in the other national borderlands both in terms of the scale of production and the size of the proletariat involved.

FORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL PROLETARIAT Along with the emergence and growth of a capitalist factory industry in Transcaucasia, came the formation of a large body of industrial workers. In the major center of local capitalist industry, the Baku oil district, the working class during the late nineties was of a highly mixed racial composition: Russians (employed chiefly on jobs requiring greater skill) comprising 18 to 20 per cent of the total, Armenians, 25 to 29; Iranians (chiefly common laborers), 19 to 21; Tatars, 12 to 13 per cent, and others. Labor conditions in the oil fields were extremely harsh: the workday was between 16 and 18 hours; grime, soot, and deadly vapors injured the men's health. Wages were pitifully low, most of all for the unskilled workers of the local nationalities—the oil drawers, the common laborers engaged in drilling, and others. Working conditions in other branches of industry were no better.

Nurtured on the difficult living conditions of the workers in Transcaucasia, a local labor movement arose in this area after 1880 and expanded rapidly

both in size and in organizational effectiveness. The workers soon passed from social and economic demands to demands of a broader and purely political character. This was the nature of the great Batum strikes in 1882, the Tiflis railroad strikes in 1898, the strikes at the tobacco factories, and later the railroad shop strikes in 1900.

Marxist ideas had been gaining a wide following among the revolutionary-minded intelligentsia of Transcaucasia since the middle nineties. In 1893 came the organization of the first Marxist group ("Mesame-dasi"). In 1898 this circle was joined by Comrade Stalin, who infused a new revolutionary spirit into the life of the group. With Comrade Stalin at the head, a significant revolutionary minority of this group, destined to become the seed of revolutionary social democracy in Georgia, began to arise and take shape. During 1898–1900 came the formation of the guiding central social-democratic group, the Tiflis organization, which Comrade Stalin entered as a member. Henceforth the labor movement came under the influence of the political slogans of revolutionary Marxism (the 1901 May Day demonstration at Tiflis). Workers' organizations following the Lenin-Iskra tendency began to be created. The Tiflis committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, with Comrade Stalin at the head, was founded in 1901. At the end of the same year Stalin helped to create the Batum Social-Democratic organization, and in 1902 he led the first big strike at the Mantashev factory of Batum. The first general strike was organized at Batum in 1903. In 1904 Comrade Stalin created the Bolshevik organization, and in 1905 at Tiflis a Bolshevik bureau was organized—the guiding center of Bolshevist activity in Transcaucasia. In December, 1904, under the leadership of the Baku Bolshevik committee, a great strike of the Baku workers was held, ending in the signing of the first collective agreement in Russia between the workers and the oil industrialists and serving as a signal for increased labor activity throughout Russia on the eve of the first revolution. Following the strike of the Baku proletariat, a general strike broke out at Tiflis in January, 1905, and spread from there to all industrial centers of Transcaucasia, to Chiaturi, Kutaisi, Samtredi, and Batum. The intensity of the strike movement spreading through this region may be judged by the fact that during 1905 the number of strikes per worker was 4.56 in Baku and 4.49 in Tiflis. In the meantime serious peasant uprisings occurred in many parts of Georgia, in Guria, and elsewhere.

After the first revolution was suppressed by the tsarist government, the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants slackened as a result of the treacherous conciliatory tactics of the Mensheviks. During the period of reaction from 1907 to 1912, the Baku Bolshevik party organization under the leadership of Comrade Stalin matured, strengthened, and hardened in the

struggle against the Mensheviks, winning over the overwhelming majority of the Social-Democratic workers. Meanwhile the Bolshevik labor organizations were gaining in strength. By this time all working class districts of Baku—Balakhani, Surakhani, Bibi-Eibat, and Black Town—came under the influence of the Bolsheviks. The large Baku strikes of 1908, organized by Comrade Stalin, were conducted under Bolshevik slogans and raised general political demands. In his struggle with the Mensheviks, Comrade Stalin conducted propaganda on behalf of Lenin's theory on revolution and the Bolshevik idea of transforming the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

Notes

1. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, p. 463.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
3. *Statisticheskii spravochnik Ts.S.U.* (Statistical Handbook of the Central Statistical Administration) (1924); Khudadov, *Zakavkazye* (Transcaucasia) (1926).
4. Haxthausen, *Zakavkazskii krai* (The Transcaucasian Region (1857), pp. 57, 71, 144, and others.
5. *Sbornik statistiko-ekonomicheskikh svedenii po selskomy khozyaistvu* (Collection of Statistical and Economic Data on Rural Economy) (1910), p. 108.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 196-197.
7. On this subject see Lyashchenko, *Krestyanskoye dyelo i poreformennaya zemleustroitelnaya politika* (Peasant Affairs and the Post-Reform Land Settlement Policy) (1913), Chaps. IX-X, pp. 472-569, 606-622.
8. *Khizany*, meaning "refugees," were a class of poor, land-deficient and landless agriculturists who settled on the land of the gentry from whom they received either a homestead allotment or open-field land, paying for such land by means of a *gala*, which was a form of feudal dues payable either by a portion of the harvest of all products or by a fixed number of "plowing days"; i.e., a *barshchina*. Although personally free, in an economic sense the *khizany* were hardly distinguishable from feudal serfs.
9. Stalin, *Marxism i natsionalno-kolonialnyi vopros* (Marxism and the National-Colonial Problem) (1937), p. 80.
10. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. III, p. 463.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 463-464.
12. See in the collection *Zakavkazye*, an article by Piralov, "Kustarnaya promyshlennost' zakavkazya" (Handicraft Industry of Transcaucasia), as well as his *Kratkii ocherk kustarnykh promyslov Kavkaza* (Short Essay on the Handicraft Trades of the Caucasus) (1913).
13. *Statisticheskiye svedeniya po obrabatyvayushchei fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti za 1908 g.* (Statistical Data on the Fabricating Factory Industry for 1908), ed. by Varzar (St. Petersburg, 1912).
14. Data for the mining industry taken from *Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii po gornozavodskoi promyshlennosti Ross za 1908 g.* (Collection of Statistical Data on the Mining Industry of Russia) (1910, 1917), Pts. 1, 2. Inasmuch as production for the mining industry is reported in the above source in physical units, in order to arrive at a total production figure the units were correspondingly recomputed in terms of value.

poods; at a price of 45 to 55 rubles a pood of dry cocoons, this yielded the population an income of about 4 million rubles annually.

The timber industry was very little developed in the Caucasus despite the presence of vast forest containing valuable species of trees (yew, box, black maple, walnut, and others), and the local woods were largely denuded and wasted instead of being systematically exploited. Only negligible quantities of lumber went into exports.

AGRARIAN CONDITIONS As we have stated earlier, agrarian conditions in the Caucasus were extremely complex and varied greatly from one district to another in accordance with the historical and national characteristics of each district. In the nomadic and mountain pasture districts vestiges of the patriarchal clan customs and primitive slavery were still dominant among the population; in the agricultural districts feudal relations were still in force; still otherwise in the irrigated districts of intensive farming and so forth. After the conquest of Caucasia, Russia's tsarist regime launched a relentless colonization policy as a result of which the native toiling population, in the nomad districts particularly, lost its so-called "surplus" lands, which were at once converted into state property for the purpose of further colonization by Russian peasant elements. The size and terms of the landholdings left to the local population were even more rigid here than, for example, in Central Asia. The lands abandoned by owners in the course of the wholesale emigration that followed the Russian conquest were disposed of on the same inequitable basis, particularly in the Moslem districts (land belonging to the *beks*, and others). In this instance, too, the land was confiscated for the state, but became, in effect, the immediate object of wholesale plunder in every way as gigantic and unbridled as the notorious epic plunder of the Bashkirian lands.[7]

Russian resettlement did not play the same important role in Transcaucasia as in western Siberia. Of a total population of 7.3 million in 1911, the Russians in the Transcaucasus (including urban population) numbered only 598,000; moreover, apart from the urban and Cossack population, the Russian village population proper consisted partly of various religious sects (Dukhobors and others), who were resettled here, forcibly for the most part, during the 1890's. The well kept farms of these resettlers exerted considerable agricultural influence upon local rural economy until the time persecution by the Russian government forced the sects to migrate en masse to Canada. The few remaining households soon afterward became typical kulak farms.

LOCAL SERFDOM AND ITS LIQUIDATION While pursuing a relentless policy of colonization and depriving the native Caucasian toiling

The second contradiction is "between the various financial groups and imperialist powers in their struggle for the sources of raw material and for foreign territory. . . . This mad struggle between the various groups of capitalists" leads inevitably to imperialist wars and simultaneously "to the mutual weakening of the imperialists, to the debilitation of capitalism in general, and to the acceleration of the proletarian revolution."

Finally, the third contradiction is "between the handful of dominant 'civilized' nations and the hundreds of millions of the world's colonial and dependent peoples." While intensifying capitalist exploitation and capitalist contradictions in this sphere, imperialism inevitably changes "the colonies and the dependent countries from a source of reserves for capitalism into reserves for the proletarian revolution.

"Such . . . are the major contradictions of imperialism which transformed the old 'flourishing' capitalism into a dying capitalism." [3]

"Imperialism is the eve of the socialist revolution." [4]

The Lenin-Stalin theory of imperialism, in addition to its depiction of the historical position of imperialism as the final phase in the development of capitalism and as a "dying" capitalism, and its analysis of all the attendant social and political contradictions and the ripening of the proletarian revolution, also presents an exhaustive characterization of the economic aspect of imperialism. Lenin shows that "economically, the basic element in this process is the change from capitalist free competition to capitalist monopolies." But "the monopolies that arise from free competition do not engulf the latter but exist simultaneously, producing a series of extremely acute and violent contradictions, frictions, and conflicts." Therefore, "if it were necessary," says Lenin, "to supply the briefest possible characterization for imperialism, it may be said that imperialism is the monopoly phase of capitalism." [5] In a more elaborate description, Lenin has summarized the economic content of the concept of imperialism under the following five headings:

> (1) the concentration of production and capital, leading to a degree of development so extreme that it creates monopolies which exercise a decisive influence over economic life; (2) the fusion of banking capital with industrial capital and the resultant emergence of "financial capital" or financial oligarchy; (3) the exportation of capital, as distinct from exports of goods, becomes of major importance; (4) the organization of international monopolistic associations of capitalists, who divide the world; and (5) the completion of the territorial division of the earth among the major capitalist countries.[6]

As a result of the generally uneven development of capitalism, far from all imperialist countries reveal these symptoms to the same degree. Therefore, for the purpose of our study of the economy of imperialism in Russia

we must consider in greater detail the various manifestations of capitalism indicated by Lenin and the distinctive forms which they assumed in Russia.

MONOPOLIES Monopoly, according to Lenin, is "the primary economic basis of imperialism[7] . . . the last word in 'the newest phase of capitalist development,'"[8] and "the transition from capitalism to a higher order."[9] The monopolies emerge from the concentration of production on its highest level in the form of cartels, syndicates, and trusts. They aim at the seizure of the basic sources of raw material, particularly in the key industries of coal and metals, whereby the power of large capital may be consolidated. The monopolies do not, however, destroy competition. On the contrary, they intensify competition between the various groups of monopolists and widen the breach between cartelized and noncartelized industry.

A small number of capitalists, the industrial financial oligarchy, concentrate in their hands a preponderant portion of all means of social production. Monopolistic control over production makes it possible to fix monopoly prices and make excess profits for the benefit of the monopolist companies, as a result of which "the incentive to technological advancement, and hence any other type of progress, tends largely to disappear. . . . It becomes . . . *economically* possible to retard technological progress by artificial devices."[10] The rule of the financial oligarchy has been characterized by Lenin as entailing "venality, bribery on a gigantic scale, and mass swindles of all types,"[11] as well as a "change from democracy to political reaction." The existence of monopolies and financial oligarchies creates an atmosphere favorable to the growth of "*rentier* states" and "*usurer* states," whose parasitic bourgeoisie lives by the export of capital and by "clipping coupons." "Progressive" capitalism has been superseded by "decadent" capitalism.

FINANCE CAPITAL The final result of the concentration of production and monopoly is the concentration of banks and banking capital, as well as a change in the function of the banks, who instead of confining themselves to the role of financial intermediaries become the direct rulers of industry. A process of fusion, a "coalescence" brings together banking and industrial capital, resulting in the formation "of finance capital." Industrial capital is no longer the outright property of the industrialists, who exercise their power over capital only by the grace of the banks, while the latter, in turn, begin to invest directly in industry an ever greater portion of the public funds accumulated by them. "The concentration of production, the monopolies that follow in its wake, and the merger or coalescence of banking and industry," said Lenin, "represent both the history of the rise of financial capital and the content of that concept."[12]

THE EXPORT OF CAPITAL Just as the exportation of goods was a typical feature of the "old capital, the newest type of capitalism, governed by the monopolies, specializes typically in the exportation of *capital.*" [13] The need for exporting capital under an imperialist economy is due to the fact that the general disproportion in the development of capitalism has created in the more advanced countries "an accumulation of capital on a gigantic scale. Most advanced countries were confronted with a huge 'surplus of capital.'" In those countries capitalism had "'grown overripe,' and capital (because of an undeveloped agriculture and the poverty of the masses) found itself without an outlet for 'profitable' investment." [14] On the other hand, "profits are usually high in the . . . backward countries because capital is scarce, the price of land is comparatively cheap, wages are low, and raw materials are cheap." [15] The monopolistic character of capital export not only guarantees the latter enormous excess profits but also leads to economic and, consequently, political subjugation of the nation importing capital (the trade agreements and government loans between France and Russia, the exports of English capital to India, and so forth).

Within the countries importing capital the foreign capital partly aids the development of a native capitalism, but at the same time succeeds in enslaving the native economy by all types of concessions, by obtaining various customs privileges, by taking out excess profits, and even by securing political privileges in its own interest, frequently leaving intact within such a country the rule of precapitalist relationships, as in the case of Russia, China, and India.

DIVISION OF THE WORLD BETWEEN ASSOCIATIONS OF CAPITALISTS To the extent of the formation of monopolistic mergers of capitalists (cartels, syndicates, and trusts) in the large capitalist countries, monopoly capitalism "naturally" tends toward international agreements among the monopolists, toward the formation of international cartels, and toward "world concentration of capital and production" [16] on a scale exceeding anything previously attempted. Most typical in this connection are the electrical, petroleum, and steel industries of the world. The major world trusts in these fields resort to international agreements for the "division of the world" among themselves. The American General Electric Company (G.E.) is allotted the United States and Canada, and the European General Electrical Company (A.E.G.) operates in Germany, Austria, Russia, and Holland; in reality both companies are bound by a single agreement. A similar struggle for the division of the world developed among America's Rockefeller oil trust (Standard Oil Company), the Dutch-English Shell group, and the

German oil interests which included, besides Rumania, a part of the Russian petroleum concerns of Nobel and Rothschild.

THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD AMONG THE GREAT POWERS The partition of the world among the imperialist powers during the early twentieth century has been illustrated by Lenin in the well known tables he had prepared with the aid of data supplied by the statisticians Morris, Supan, and Guebner, supplemented by figures on several other countries.[17]

According to the figures presented in these tables, England reached the height of colonial annexations during 1860–1880 and went even further during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, when she was joined by France and Germany in a race for colonial conquests. As a result, the major colonial powers in 1876 controlled 40.4 million square kilometers, of which England held 22.5, Russia, 17 million, and France, 0.9 million. By 1914 the size of colonial holdings rose to 65 million square kilometers, including 33.5 million for England, 17.4 for Russia, and 10.6 for France. Germany ruled over a colonial empire covering 2.9 square kilometers, the United States, 0.3 million, and Japan, 0.3 million. If we add the colonial empires of the other countries (Belgium and Holland), as well as all the semi-colonial countries (Persia, China, and Turkey), we find that the partition of the world by the imperialist powers was fairly complete at the turn of the century. According to Supan's data, too, by 1900 as much as 90 to 100 per cent of the territory in Australia, Africa, and Polynesia belonged to the Western capitalist powers. And inasmuch as neither Asia (where the colonial powers controlled 56.6 per cent of the territory) nor America has, as a rule, any land unoccupied by or not belonging to some state, Lenin concludes that by the beginning of the twentieth century "the colonial policy of the capitalist powers *completed* the seizure of all unoccupied land. . . . For the first time the world was so well apportioned that in the future *only* redivision of territory was possible," [18] that is, the forcible seizure of colonies by one power from another.

> Only the possession of colonies can fully guarantee the success of a monopoly in the event of a struggle against its rival. . . . The higher the development of capitalism, the greater a country's awareness of a lack of raw material, the sharper the rivalry and the drive for sources of raw material throughout the world, the more desperate becomes the struggle for the acquisition of colonies.[19]

In addition to supplying raw materials, the colonies serve the interests of imperialist capitalism as a monopolized market for the sale of goods from the mother country, as a source of monopolist excess profits, and a reserve

of cheap labor. "The colonies and dependent countries, oppressed and exploited by financial capital, constitute a highly important reserve and a most conspicuous source of power for imperialism." [20]

THE LAW OF THE DISPROPORTIONATE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM The process of partitioning the world among the imperialist powers showed abundant evidence of the law of the disproportionate development of capitalism. In consequence of the unparalleled development of technology and the concentration of capital, the development of most capitalist countries during the period of imperialism proceeded by "surges," whereby some of the more advanced capitalist countries rapidly and decisively outstripped the others in economic progress, and developed a need for new markets and new sources of raw material. The more backward capitalist countries, on the other hand, became dependent economically and financially upon the advanced capitalist nations, and were compelled to subordinate their economies to the needs of the imperialist countries as semicolonial provinces of the latter, supplying them with raw material, buying their goods, and granting various concessions and privileges to their monopoly capital. Finally, a number of the more backward countries, which had not yet reached the capitalist phase of development, begin to fall victim to the intensified aggression of the imperialist powers and become their colonies and suppliers of cheap raw materials and low-paid labor power.

The uneven development of capitalism manifests itself not only in the unequal levels of economic development within the various countries but also in the disproportionate development of the various regions and industries within capitalist society. Consequently the monopolized organizations of a few leading industries (the petroleum, metallurgical, and electrical industries) adopt a more distinctly aggressive policy in the imperialist struggle for markets, sources of raw material, and territory. With the division of the world complete, this impels the imperialist countries into desperate contradictions, armed conflict, and imperialist wars for a new partitioning of the world.

Within the colonies proper, the advanced forms of their imperialist exploitation by capitalism is supplemented and mingled with feudal oppression by the ruling social groups of the old feudal order and commercial-usurious exploitation by their native bourgeoisie. In this manner, "the specific colonial forms of capitalist exploitation . . . in the final analysis *brake* the development of production forces of the respective colonies." [21] In such colonies the position of the toiling masses becomes most intolerable, and the colonies themselves become a major factor in the collapse of capitalism.

THE UNIQUE FEATURES OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM In our study of the period of industrial capitalism in Russia we have indicated that, despite a relatively rapid tempo of development, particularly during the late nineties, and rather impressive quantitative successes, Russian capitalism on the whole represented a backward social-economic system in comparison with the western European countries. This backwardness was reflected alike in the low technological level of Russian industry compared with western Europe, and in the backward social-economic relationships in which elements of an advanced capitalist economy and bourgeois organization were intermingled with primitive medieval, semifeudal institutions by which the landowning class ruled supreme. In this connection Lenin observed that economically Russia was the most backward of all the imperialist countries, a land "in which a modern capitalist imperialism is entwined, so to speak, in a thick network of precapitalist relationships."[22] The result, as regards Russian capitalism and the entire Russian economy, was technological and economic subjugation to foreign capitalism.

Although Russian capitalism launched upon its imperialist phase of development in the first decade of the twentieth century, achieving notable successes in raising the technological level of its industry, in the concentration of production, and in productivity, its technological and social-economic backwardness, like its colonial dependence upon the advanced imperialist powers, did not end. By borrowing, or frequently by directly transferring a high industrial technique from the other advanced countries, and by adopting organizational forms already tested in those advanced countries of finance-monopoly capitalism, Russian capitalism only succeeded in further extending its subservience to foreign capital. In the meantime the general economy of Russia continued to harbor survivals of medieval despotism, the domination of a feudal landowning class, and a primitive agrarian economy. These, in turn, still further aggravated and intensified the contradictions of capitalism.

This is why Lenin, in his analysis of the events of 1905, traced the concrete conditions of Russia's economic structure and social relationships of that time to the fact that Russia possessed "the most backward system of landownership, the most primitive village, and a very advanced industrial and financial capital." At a later time, while characterizing the relations between classes in Russia during 1904–1916, Lenin again emphasized the fact that during the above years "a handful of serf-owning landlords, headed by Nicholas II, held the reins of power in close alliance with the magnates of financial capital."[23]

These basic peculiarities of the social-economic structure and political conditions of tsarist Russia apply likewise to the economic aspects of Russian

capitalism during its imperialist period. With the aid of foreign capital, Russian capitalism during the first decade of the twentieth century attained substantial success in the technological reconstruction and concentration of its industry, particularly with regard to its major branches.

The concentration of industry reached a point where, for example, 54 per cent of all workers in Russia worked in enterprises employing over 500 workers, compared with only 33 per cent in the United States.[24] Nevertheless, the technological level of Russian industry as a whole was far behind the advanced Western countries: having subordinated Russian industry to itself and secured its own high excess profits, foreign capital, which controlled all the leading branches of industry and exacted its monopoly profits, had no impelling reason for endowing Russia with an advanced industrial technology.

The development of monopolies and monopolistic associations in industry, in transport, and in the banks also proceeded to a considerable extent under the direct influence, and with the active participation, of foreign capital. In a number of industries the monopolies extended to nearly 100 per cent of all production. A characteristic trait of monopoly organization in Russia was the fact that, on the one hand, it did not attain an advanced organizational form such as trusts, remaining rather in combinations of the syndicate type. On the other hand, these Russian syndicates were often, in fact, merely branches of foreign monopolistic associations, their "daughter" organizations. This, again, revealed the backwardness and the subserviency of Russian monopoly capital.

In the organization of large monopolistic bank combinations and in the penetration of bank capital into the field of industry, foreign finance capital likewise played a major role. It was not, indeed, as dominant here as in the colonies of western Europe's finance capital, in countries like Turkey or Persia. The Russian State Bank, although it did not compare in financial resources to the foremost world banks (English, French, or German), none the less represented considerable financial strength, and could to a certain extent maintain its own financial and industrial policy, holding in check the influence of foreign finance capital in Russian industry. In general, however, western European finance and banking capital had a substantial share in Russian industry.

With regard to another economic characteristic of imperialism—the export of capital—the inferior and dependent role of Russian imperialism becomes even more apparent. Russia was not so much an exporter as an importer of capital. Only with some of the more backward neighboring countries, which in agreement with the Western powers were her own "spheres of influence" (Persia, partly Turkey, and Manchuria), did Russian capital play the active,

if small, role of an exporter. Because of its subordinate position, Russian finance capital even in such cases did not, in fact, act independently but rather as an "agent" or partner of foreign capital in the division of Turkey, Persia, and China. In any event, Russia was far from having become a "*rentier*-state" as were France and England, to whom, on the contrary, she also paid millions of rubles in interest on industrial investments and state loans.

Another characteristic of Russia in the period of imperialism and under the dominance of foreign financial capital was, in the words of Lenin, the fact that Russia was ruled not by a capitalist imperialism of the latest variety but by a "military and feudal imperialism." The West European imperialistic powers, while exploiting Russia as a semicolony for the procurement of cheap raw materials and for the investment of surplus capital, regarded her at the same time as a reserve of military power ready to serve their cause in the event of an imperialistic conflict. In either case tsarist Russia was a valuable "ally" of the imperialist powers not as a developed industrial nation but as a "non-capitalist medium," furnishing not only cheap raw materials but also the millions of soldiers required in time of war to defend the interests of *Entente* capital. Therefore Western imperialist finance capital, in addition to promoting energetically its own industrial investments in Russia, also extended to the tsarist regime huge loans for the suppression of revolution, for the equipment of her army and for the rehabilitation of her fleet, as in 1906–1909, when France advanced the autocratic regime 4 billion francs to help to suppress the revolution and to heal the wounds of an unsuccessful war. The tsarist regime rested upon the social economic power of the landowning class, and the latter, in turn, on its vast feudal estates, on the medieval economic and cultural backwardness of the village, and on retaining its supremacy by economic and extraeconomic compulsion. The growth and concentration of industry during the imperialist era and the rising revolutionary mood of the working class and peasantry destroyed this social-economic foundation of the power of landlordism and tsarism. In tsarist Russia the contradictions of an advanced imperialism were mingled with vestiges of serfdom and with military and feudal imperialism.

Hence even the "decay" of imperialist capitalism assumed a peculiar form in Russia. This decadence was reflected in the artificial obstruction of technological progress by monopolist capital, in the predatory exploitation of natural resources, and in the deliberate disregard of new sources and methods. In Russia the process of decay was hastened as a result of the extreme degree of monopolization and the semicolonial subordination to foreign capital characteristic of Russian industry. Foreign monopoly capital extracted enor-

mous superprofits from Russia. Once foreign capital had captured for its own benefit the more accessible and easily exploitable areas, it proceeded deliberately to thwart the development of all other regions. This was true, for example, in the case of the petroleum industry, where the rich Baku oil fields were exploited wastefully while several other oil-bearing areas already known by that time were utterly disregarded. This was equally true of the coal, iron ore, and metallurgical industries. To the largest extent, however, this process of decay created by the period of imperialism was revealed in the extreme backwardness of Russia's rural economy and in the persistence of medieval semifeudal institutions and antiquated methods of cultivation, as a result of which the gulf between agriculture and industry widened and the village was frozen in its semicolonial role of supplier of cheap raw materials to the foreign powers. Finally, in consequence of the general social-economic backwardness and the "military-feudal" version of imperialism in Russia, the process of decay thoroughly infected the entire state apparatus turning it into a weak, rotten link in the chain of the imperialist powers.

Under these circumstances, Russian imperialist capitalism was incapable of playing a major, active, or independent role in the international monopolist associations of capitalists engaged in the division of the world. Its role, with a few exceptions, was rather that of an agent and partner of the more powerful imperialist combinations than an equal and independent member in the apportionment of "spheres of influence" with other imperialistic powers. In a few powerful international monopolist associations, such as the petroleum, tobacco, and manganese cartels, Russian industry had a certain importance, but remained confined to a subordinate position. Finally, we may see from the foregoing that Russia's importance as an ally of the *Entente* group of imperialist powers in the world struggle for markets and colonies lay largely in her role as a military reserve for these powers, for which purpose Russia was employed by the powers exclusively in their own interests. Hence the imperialist struggle brought her none of those singular advantages in the realm of world imperialist rivalry which accrue from the possession of free access to the ocean and control over open seas. Russia had free access only to two seas, and in both cases the final outlet was in the hands of another power (the Baltic and Black seas). Every effort to reach a direct outlet, even to the almost land-locked Mediterranean Sea, was openly opposed by the "Allied" imperialist powers (England). The country's existing outlet on the Pacific Ocean (the main arena of imperialist struggle during the twentieth century) was exposed to the direct blows of two major imperialist powers (Japan and England). From the military standpoint, therefore, without an effective defense industry and with poorly armed troops, Russia as a

partner of the great imperialist powers in the redistribution of the world did not command the independent military might at the disposal of the industrial imperialist countries—England, France, and Germany.

However, while occupying the subordinate position of a semicolony to the Western imperialist powers, tsarist Russia, as we have seen, possessed an enormous colonial fund in the form of her "interior colonies"—the national borderlands. This colonial fund had been accumulated by Russia largely as a result of tsarist conquests during the precapitalist period of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century, and partly during the capitalist period of 1860–1890. In the subsequent years tsarist Russia—the "prison of peoples"—added to the feudal and national oppression prevailing in the borderlands new varieties of capitalist exploitation and imperialist subjugation of the native populace of these colonies. The imperialism of tsarist Russia was predominantly a variety of "military and feudal imperialism," in which imperialist and feudal contradictions and oppressions were thoroughly intermingled.

Emphasizing the special character of Russian imperialism and its contradictions, Comrade Stalin reminds us that Russia "was not and could not be an imperialist country of the classic type," but that at the same time "Russia was a combination of all the contradictions of imperialism." She "was a hearth of all types of oppression, capitalist, colonial, or military, all assuming the most inhuman and barbarous forms." She "was the greatest reserve of Western imperialism not only in that she allowed freedom of access to foreign invested capital which controlled such strategic branches of the national economy in Russia as fuel and metallurgy, but also in that she could place her multimillion army at the disposal of the Western imperialists." Tsarism was "the agent of Western imperialism in the operation of grinding from the population hundreds of millions of rubles in interest on loans." It "was the true ally of Western imperialism in the division of Turkey, Persia, China, and other countries."[25] At the same time, however, by virtue of possessing "the most revolutionary proletariat in the world," working in harmony with the revolutionary peasantry and led by the Bolshevik Party armed with the revolutionary theory of Leninism as "the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution," Russia alone possessed the actual power capable of resolving the contradictions of imperialism through revolution, and of ending them as the final historical phase of bourgeois society as a whole.

CHRONOLOGICAL DATES OF THE IMPERIALIST ERA In the case of Western capitalism, Lenin outlined the following historical stages in the development of monopolies:

(1) The period between 1860 and 1880 represented the greatest extent of the development of free competition. The monopolies were only in the embryo stage. (2) After the crisis of 1873 cartels began to develop extensively, but were still the exception. They were not yet firmly rooted and, rather, were a transitional feature. (3) During the prosperity of the late nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900–1903, the cartels became one of the foundations of all economic life. Capitalism had turned into imperialism.[26]

This outline of Lenin's offers no direct guidance for tracing the main phases in the development of Russian imperialism. We may mention, however, that the first two phases occurred rather belatedly in Russia, and that the extensive development of cartels did not become noticeable before the beginning of the twentieth century. After the crisis of 1900–1903, monopolies as a feature of imperialism were growing apace in Russia. The beginning of imperialism in Russia came during the early twentieth century. As a new era in the development of capitalism, however, the imperialist phase of capitalism did not, of course, arise at once in the course of any single year, but (as shown by Lenin in the case of western Europe) evolved gradually on the economic foundation of industrial capitalism with all the peculiar historical variations of the latter in Russia.

The various elements operating toward the transformation of capitalism into "imperialist capitalism" were active in Russia since the late nineteenth century. Not to mention the inordinately high customs tariffs, the most important elements in the preparation of imperialist capitalism were: extreme concentration of industry, greater than in any other country, the close connection between industry and the banks, and the widespread existence of syndicate associations. A vital part in the final transition to imperialism was played by the crisis of 1900–1903. By selecting for survival the stronger capitalist enterprises and by bringing ruin upon the weak and technologically inefficient economic units, this crisis, like any other crisis, forced capitalist industry to reorganize on a new and improved technological, economic, and organizational level, intensifying the tendency toward concentration and monopoly. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904 was, therefore, already a purely imperialist war for the redistribution of colonies. With the prosperous period of 1909–1913, the role of the monopolies, banks, and financial capital, as well as Russian participation in international monopoly cartels, assumed progressively greater importance in the economic life of the empire. On the eve of the World War, Russian imperialism entered into close relations with the other imperialist systems, joining in alliance with them in a world struggle for the redivision of the earth, but pursuing at the same time its own particular aims.

Notes

1. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XIX, p. 301.
2. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 466.
3. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed., pp. 3-4.
4. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XIX, p. 71.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 133-135.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
20. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma,* 10th ed., p. 36.
21. *VI Kongress Kominterna* (The Sixth Congress of the Comintern), stenographic report, Issue 6, pp. 128-129.
22. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XIX, p. 136.
23. *Ibid.*, Vol. XX, p. 570.
24. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma,* 10th ed., p. 36.
25. Stalin, *Ibid.*, p. 45.
26. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XIX, p. 86.

(XXXII)

The Crisis of 1900–1903 and the Depression of 1904–1908

THE INFLUENCE OF THE WORLD CRISIS By the late nineties the development of capitalist industry, the disintegration of precapitalist forms of economy, and the closer integration with the world economy had progressed so far, partly under the impact of specific measures of economic policy, that Russia's national economy found itself closely interrelated with Western and world capitalism not only in its periods of prosperity but in its crises as well.

We have already mentioned that Lenin, in tracing the main stages in the history of monopolies and imperialism for western Europe, distinguishes the prosperity of the late nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900–1903 as the crucial moment when "cartels became one of the foundations of all economic life. Capitalism had turned into imperialism."[1] And further, Lenin points out, on the basis of the investigations of Eidels, that the crisis of 1900 found alongside the gigantic "combined" enterprises (especially in metal production and in the electrical industry) a number of "pure," uncombined enterprises distinguished by a more primitive technology. The crisis conducted a process of "selection" among these enterprises, preparing for further concentration and for the monopolization of industry.[2]

The importance of the crisis of 1900 in the development of Russian imperialism and in the concentration and monopolization of Russian industry was approximately the same as in western Europe, ending the capitalist prosperity of the late nineties in Russia. Therefore the history of imperialist capitalism in Russia likewise begins with the crisis of 1900.

The interdependence between the progress of Russian capitalism and western Europe's stock exchanges and banks, especially as the financial situation became aggravated, very soon became apparent, even, in fact, when the prosperity of the nineties was still progressing. In 1899 western European capitalism, after a long period of prosperity, began to feel the effects of a monetary crisis. One of the major signs of the developing financial crisis was in the level of the discount rate. For the leading European centers the changes in the rate were as follows:

	1898	1899	1900
Paris	2.20	3.06	3.23
London	3.26	3.75	3.96
Berlin	4.28	4.98	5.33

In other words western Europe in 1899 entered a period of contraction in the money market, involving a rise in the discount rate. By the end of 1899 and in 1900 the money scarcity turned into a monetary crisis and, subsequently, into an industrial crisis, which by 1900 swept over nearly all of western European capitalist industry.

Changes of this type in the world economy could hardly fail to affect economic conditions in Russia. Large-scale capitalist industry, which had grown so rapidly in Russia during the nineties under the stimulus of the incoming foreign capital, could not long remain outside the general capitalist crisis. And at the same time, as noted above, a number of distinctly internal characteristics, which tended to vitiate still further the position of Russian industry, made the crisis for the latter more difficult and prolonged than for western Europe.

PECULIARITIES OF THE RUSSIAN CRISIS The capitalist character of the crisis that struck Russia in the autumn of 1899, at the highest peak of its industrial prosperity, was, of course, perfectly apparent. For example, long before the crisis in 1897, Lenin wrote:

> At the present time we are obviously passing through a period in the capitalist cycle, when industry "flourishes," trade moves briskly, factories are working at full capacity and, like mushrooms after a rain, new plants, new enterprises, corporations, railway projects, and so forth arise in countless numbers. One need not be a prophet to foresee the inevitability of a crash (more or less precipitate) that must follow this "flourishing" of industry.[3]

And in August, 1901, Lenin wrote:

> The crisis has arrived, a crisis as severe as ever known in Russia. . . . The commercial-industrial crisis has been continuing now for nearly two years. And, evidently, it is still growing, engulfing new industries, spreading over new regions, and becoming aggravated by new bank failures.[4]

The general, purely capitalist, causes of the crisis were also perfectly evident. But apart from the general causes, the crisis of 1900 in Russia had a national characteristic rooted in the very nature of her industrial development. As we have seen from our survey of industrial development, particularly during the preceding prosperous period of the nineties, the major industries—ferrous metallurgy and fuel—depended heavily on state orders and railroad construction. At the same time the large proportion of foreign capital invested in these

industries made them highly sensitive to changes in the foreign stock exchanges and banks. Russia's general economic backwardness retarded the rate of development of Russian capitalism "in depth." All this made the "flourishing" of industry, as Lenin had pointed out, especially unstable and primarily expansionist in character. As a result the crisis lasted much longer here than in the outside world, and its depredations were immeasurably more severe than in other countries.

COMPANY PROMOTION DURING 1890–1900 In Russia the late nineties were marked by intensive activity in stock exchange brokerage and industrial promotion. At the same time the surplus of liquid capital available for investment in the western European countries was so great that the rate of discount in Paris and London sometimes was below 2 per cent. As was inevitable, Western capital was eagerly exported into Russia where entrepreneurship held the promise of dividends ranging between 15 and 30 per cent.

On this basis there appeared during the 1890's a wave of speculative industrial company promotion. Capital was frequently invested in risky ventures and in nonoperating plants and mines whose stocks soared upwards, however, as a result of stock-exchange speculation, enriching the promoters but draining the enterprises proper of fixed or circulating capital. Through bribery, bureaucracy, and patronage the "founders" of such industrial enterprises diverted into their own pockets, as commission and service charges for establishing the particular corporation or concession, a heavy share of the stock capital, leaving only 20 to 30 per cent of the accumulated capital for the equipment of the enterprise itself.

There were cases, for example, all confirmed by official inquiries, when of a stock capital amounting to 8.5 million francs only 1.5 million francs were available to be put into the enterprise, with the remainder withheld by the promoters who were granted, in addition, 1 million rubles in cash and 2 million francs in obligations. A government organ (*Vestnik finansov* *) was forced to admit that

> a vast amount of capital collected through the sale of shares, in passing through the founding, financing, and various other intermediary stages, had been known to disappear with amazing speed. Enterprises endowed with millions in basic capital were frequently without any circulating resources, and had to go into debt at the very moment of the company's emergence.

Apart from foreign capital which proved to be an abundant source for establishing new industrial corporations, a similar purpose was served by

* Financial Herald.—ED.

the rain of government orders and bank credits. During the 1890's, for example, when the market price for pig iron was 40 to 45 kopecks and for rails 80 to 85 kopecks, the state paid 1 ruble, 25 kopecks for a pood of rails. Under such circumstances high dividends were, of course, well assured in advance, regardless of the low financial and technological state of the plants. Frequently the receipt of one large government order (likewise requiring bribery and influential contacts) constituted the sole aim of the organization of a new stock company. The achievement of this aim, although it did not contribute to the advancement of production in general, did, however, guarantee a favorable return on the capital raised by the founders of a fraudulent enterprise.

The banking system stimulated company promotion still further. The State Bank, by its example of leadership for the private banks, in direct violation of its own charter encouraged industrial promotion by so-called "noncharter" industrial loans (that is, forbidden by the State Bank charter) and the expansion of "on call" operations and personal promissory notes.[5] Private commercial banks took a direct lead in industrial promotion, lending thereby a certain "solidity" to industrial entrepreneurship, attracting new resources for this purpose and contributing to the profits of stock-exchange brokers. Usually, upon the founding of a new corporation, the bank guaranteed a certain portion of the loan in shares, as a result of which almost no stock capital was necessary. Once operations were begun, such a company could, by discounting its promissory notes at the same bank, acquire for itself a circulating capital as well. Inasmuch as every large corporation was usually associated with an entire chain of other enterprises (such as mining with metallurgical, rail-rolling, and machine-building enterprises), by financing one undertaking a bank soon began to support a number of others simultaneously. In this manner each bank was ultimately surrounded by its own system of enterprises, and the collapse of one unit in its financing system frequently led to the failure of the whole system.

Indeed this can in no way be described as an exclusive trait of Russian capitalism. Similar characteristics were displayed by other countries, especially during the company-building phase of prosperity, as normal features of capitalism. We have already cited Lenin's characterization of the rule of monopoly and financial oligarchy as "venality and bribery on a gigantic scale, a world-wide scandal under various guises."[6] In Russia such practices found a most favorable atmosphere in the autocratic political order and the economic immaturity of industrial and finance capital. Here, therefore, they flourished with great success, and their effects pervaded the economy of the country in a profound and disastrous manner.

THE MONETARY CRISIS OF 1899 The first signs of an impending crisis began to appear in August, 1899, in the form of a sudden money scarcity caused by the monetary crisis sweeping throughout western Europe. Following the example of the European banks, the Russian State Bank raised the discount rate to 5.5 per cent, and by December, 1899, raised it further to 7. The private commercial banks also began to restrict credit and the discounting of notes.

The scarcity and high cost of credit were immediately reflected in the position of the incorporated industrial enterprises, especially those of the more speculative variety. The reaction of the stock exchange was quite sensitive, and the value of all industrial shares declined. By August, 1899, the trend of the stock exchange had become so alarmingly downward that the Ministry of Finance considered it necessary to issue an official pacifying statement, denying "the possibility of an occurrence of anything in the nature of a general commercial-industrial crisis." There followed, nevertheless, the collapse of very many enterprises, among others those of Von Derviz and Mamontov, two of the largest and most intricate banking-industrial combinations. By September of the same year the mood of the stock exchange had become utterly terrified: credit continued to be restricted, and the rate of discount rose still higher. By the end of 1899, it was fully apparent that Russia was struck by an industrial crisis even before it had broken out in western Europe.

THE FALL OF PRICES AND THE INDUSTRIAL CRISIS The industrial enterprises, even those economically most sound, as long as they were working at full speed were always in need of circulating capital and of credit to maintain the uninterrupted turnover and sale of their goods. A situation of credit scarcity immediately reflected itself in making the expansion of production impossible and the marketing of goods more difficult. Enterprises which did not themselves operate on credit restricted their own credit in connection with the release of goods for distribution, which aggravated the market situation still further. The surplus of goods began to loom ominously over the market. The fall of prices became more rapid. For example, the price for iron beams in Moscow declined from 2 rubles, 30 kopecks during the middle of 1899 to 1 ruble, 45 kopecks by the end of 1900, then to 1 ruble, 25 kopecks by the end of 1901, and to 1 ruble, 10 kopecks by the end of 1902. The price for structural iron fell from 1 ruble, 68 kopecks in 1900 to 1 ruble, 40 kopecks in 1901. From a price of 70 to 80 kopecks in the middle of 1900, the price of pig iron declined to 45 to 48 kopecks by the end of the same year. The price of regular coal dropped from 9 or 10 kopecks at the beginning of 1900 to 6 or 7 kopecks by the end of 1902. The price of

Donets anthracite went from 12 to 14 kopecks in early 1900 to 7.5 kopecks at the end of 1902. The price of crude oil dropped from 17 or 18 kopecks in 1900 to 4 to 6 kopecks at the beginning of 1902.

The fall of prices, which began in the first half of 1900, continued nearly throughout 1902, when the crisis reached its lowest point. For a great majority of enterprises, including many quite sound organizations, it was no longer a matter of temporary financial and credit difficulties but an industrial calamity, a collapse of values for the enterprise proper. This was clearly reflected in a decline of prices on both banking and industrial shares.

Thus, if we compare the high rates of stocks during January, 1899, with rates prevailing in the subsequent years, we obtain the following comparison. The high share rates were (in rubles):

YEARS	PETERSBURG DISCOUNT & LOAN BANK	INTERNATIONAL BANK OF PETERSBURG	RUSSIAN BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE	BRYANSK FACTORY	DONETS YURYEV COMPANY	BAKU OIL COMPANY
1899	809	597	450.0	511.5	680	950
1900	665	430	343.0	475.0	530	830
1901	472	323	267.5	240.0	210	695

The stock-exchange index of the value of industrial enterprises, as well as the capital of the banks connected with them, declined between two and three times in the course of two years. The crisis erased one-half of the "nominal" earnings of two years. A natural result was not only a decline in the nominal valuation of such enterprises but also actual decrease of their production. To be sure, the crisis did not affect all industries simultaneously or uniformly. It may be well to cite a few characteristic figures in this connection.

Pig-iron smelting began to decline in 1901 throughout all regions, except Poland where the recession did not begin until 1902, as may be seen from the following table (in million poods):

YEARS	SOUTHERN RUSSIA	URALS	POLAND	CENTER	ALL REGIONS
1899	82.2	45.2	18.8	14.8	163.7
1900	91.6	50.2	18.2	14.0	177.5
1901	91.7	49.0	19.8	10.6	172.8
1902	84.1	44.6	17.2	9.9	156.5
1903	83.4	39.6	18.6	8.5	149.1

In this manner the total volume of pig-iron smelting declined after 1901 by nearly 5 million poods in comparison with 1900. In 1902 it declined by 16 million compared with 1901. The production of metal semimanufactures decreased in all regions during 1902, the decline amounting to 50 million poods compared with 1901. The output of finished goods began to drop after

1901, falling from 134.3 million poods in 1901 to 122.3 million poods in 1902.

For the metal industry of the south the crisis acted as a process of selection of the better equipped enterprises, reducing the number of operating furnaces and concentrating production in larger units.

SOUTHERN REGION	1899	1900	1901	1902
Number of all blast furnaces	48	55	56	56
Number of operating furnaces	35	29	31	23
Number of workers (thousands)	45.4	41.4	38.6	35.8
Pig iron smelted (million poods)	82.2	91.5	91.7	84.4

The above table emphasizes a few characteristic features of the crisis, primarily a reduction in the number of operating furnaces and in the number of workers employed (beginning in 1900), and to a lesser extent subsequently a drop in production, which during 1900–1901 was still maintained by state orders (particularly the "favorites" among the plants), although on a somewhat reduced scale.

For the output of iron ore in the Krivoi Rog district the basic indices of production during these years were as follows:

YEARS	NUMBER OF OPERATING MINES	PRODUCTION OF ORE	NUMBER OF WORKERS	BALANCE OF GOODS
1900	64	156.2	5,879	20.3
1901	48	111.3	4,226	35.6
1902	41	111.8	5,177	30.8
1903	40	149.5	7,004	24.2

During 1901–1902 the number of active mines declined, output declined heavily, ore was overproduced and "overstocked." The more efficient enterprises maintained their position, and in some cases even succeeded in advancing their position to a considerable extent with the aid of treasury orders, while the weaker metal enterprises had to be liquidated. Between 1901 and 1904, of the 70 metallurgical corporations, 18 enterprises with a total capital of 55 million rubles were eliminated, and one new corporation with an invested capital of 1.8 million rubles was founded. Concentration became more evident by an increase in total output and in the number of workers after 1903 despite continued decline in the number of operating mines.

The effects of the crisis spread to the Donets basin coal industry, an industry closely connected with foreign capital on the one hand and iron and steel production on the other. The Ural and Dombrovsky districts, however, being connected with the more limited local market, suffered less from the ravages

of the crisis. The decline in output of Donets basin coal during 1902 may be traced in the following table:

YEARS	NUMBER OF MINES	OUTPUT (MILLION POODS)
1900	290	691.4
1901	246	694.4
1902	240	642.1
1903	209	728.0

By 1903 an increase in output became noticeable with the number of mines reduced by concentration. In the petroleum industry the following official figures cover the period 1900–1903:

YEARS	TOTAL NUMBER OF FIRMS	NUMBER OF FIRMS INACTIVE	NUMBER OF INACTIVE WELLS	PETROLEUM PRODUCTION	PETROLEUM EXPORTS
1900	160	2	21	600	443.1
1901	167	8	34	672	488.2
1902	171	12	36	636	513.4
1903	167	17	37	596	494.0

Here again the process of selection left its mark in the form of a greater number of inactive firms and wells, with a comparatively smaller decline (after 1902) in output and a more or less unchanged level of petroleum exports.

The same phenomenon of a more or less serious decline in production, also made its appearance somewhat belatedly in all other branches of heavy industry.

The crisis eventually spread to light industry as well, although here the ravages were not so profound as in heavy industry. The reason was, of course, that light industry, and cotton processing in particular, depended to a greater extent on the internal mass market (chiefly the peasantry), which as a result of a series of relatively good harvests during 1900–1903 increased its purchasing power. Hence, production proper declined only slightly in the cotton industry, the latter experiencing only a minor slackening in 1900, after which it resumed its rather rapid growth in the later years. This may be illustrated by the following figures:

YEARS	NUMBER OF SPINDLES (THOUSANDS)	NUMBER OF AUTOMATIC LOOMS (THOUSANDS)	AMOUNT OF COTTON PROCESSED (THOUSAND POODS)	PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF COTTON FABRICS (POUNDS)
1899	6,091	145.8	16,126	3.55
1900	6,645	151.3	16,006	3.51
1901	6,864	157.9	16,123	3.55
1902	6,996	164.7	17,427	3.70
1903	7,146	171.2	18,000	3.60

By comparing the above table with some of the tables submitted earlier in connection with the changes wrought by the crisis in heavy industry, it is easy to appreciate the difference in the effects of the crisis on the two fields of production. Heavy industry—metallurgy and fuel—being connected with government orders and with railway building, sustained the greatest losses. The preservation, and afterward the renewed growth, of the domestic mass market enabled the cotton industry to survive the crisis with less difficulty.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE INDUSTRIAL CRISIS We may now attempt to see what effect the crisis had on Russia's industry as a whole. The most immediate result inevitably was a decline in the flow of new capital toward industry. This may be demonstrated by the following table on new companies incorporated during the years of the crisis:

YEARS	TOTAL NUMBER OF STOCK COMPANIES FOUNDED	FOREIGN COMPANIES FOUNDED	BASIC CAPITAL OF ALL COMPANIES (MILLION RUBLES)
1899	325	69	363.2
1900	202	40	250.7
1901	135	23	107.6
1902	78	13	73.1
1903	76	15	68.1

During 1900–1903 the influx of new capital into industry declined rather sharply. The extent of the decline naturally varied in the different industries. The metallurgical industry, machine building, and chemical production were among the heaviest losers.

Another result of the crisis was the widespread closing of enterprises, both on account of bankruptcy and of a curtailment of production made necessary by a decline in orders. The number of insolvent enterprises, whether privately owned or incorporated, large or small, ran into the hundreds during 1900–1902, and these insolvent companies included such great million-ruble concerns as the Alchevsky, Derwis, and Mamontov firms. The number of enterprises in which production was suspended during the years of the crisis also amounted to several hundred each year; in 1902, for example, according to some rather inaccurate statistics, 840 enterprises were shut down, exclusive of mines. On the whole, as many as 3,000 enterprises, large and small, were forced to close during the critical years of 1900–1903.

Closely related with the above, the crisis had a third important consequence—the concentration of production. The large enterprises were, of course, more resourceful in resisting the effects of the crisis. By ruining and

closing the smaller enterprises, the crisis helped again to advance large capital in its process of concentration and in the transition to monopolies.

THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS In the course of curtailing production, the industrialists also reduced the number of their employed workers. Large lockouts occurred during 1900–1902, bringing great unemployment in their wake. Because of closed plants, 34,800 workers were discharged in 1901 (exclusive of the mining industry), and 33,300 in 1902. In the coal industry of the Donets basin, employment dropped from 67,500 in 1901 to 58,500 in 1902; in the blast furnace and metal-processing industries of the south, the decline was from 54,000 to 43,200. Here the crisis became so acute that the government was compelled to establish special railway rates in order to help send the discharged workers to their homes: in the summer of 1901, 10,000 workers were thus sent out of Yekaterinoslav (now Dnepropetrovsk) alone.

Widespread unemployment, loss of earnings, and mass discharges led to a marked deterioration in labor conditions. At the same time the struggle of the workers began to assume a more revolutionary character. During 1900–1903 political agitation became more intense, finding a willing ear and a ready susceptibility among the mass of workers. The direct participation of workers in purely political demonstrations and in the political activities of the student groups was clearly increasing. Strikes became more frequent, assuming a militant political character and spreading into all branches of economy. The strike movement spread most intensively among the railroad shopworkers (at Saratov, Tambov, Tiflis, and other cities in 1901). In 1900 the miners struck throughout the Donets basin, and in 1901 at the Yaroslavl factory and in the Lena and Bodaibo mines. During the summer of 1901 strikes broke out in Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Nizhny-Novgorod, Odessa, Tiflis, Saratov, Astrakhan, and in the Urals. According to an incomplete statistical report for this period, some 120 separate strikes, involving several thousands of workers each, occurred in 1901. In many cases the demands raised were of a purely political character. These ultimately reached a point of active armed resistance on the part of labor against the armed force employed by the government to suppress strikes.

In general the crisis and the depression produced a wave of strikes that was universal as well as extremely acute. As suggested by the list of cities given above, the strikes engulfed not only the major industrial centers; namely, Petersburg, Moscow, and Poland as previously, but the entire country, reaching into the most remote borderlands where strikes were hitherto unknown. Leading the strike movement was the vanguard of the working class—the

metalworkers, who were the best organized and politically most mature. The forms and methods of the struggle were themselves becoming more complex. The working class was plainly confronted by purely revolutionary tasks. Outstanding in this respect was the May Day strike of 1901 at the Obukhov plant in Petersburg. The discharge of twenty-six workers by the administration of the plant for taking part in a May Day strike produced a state of ferment among the workers, followed by a new strike on May 14 with a demand for an eight-hour day, the recognition of May 1 as a holiday, and so forth. A detachment of gendarmes and troops was mustered against the strikers and ordered to open fire against the workers. The latter barricaded themselves in the factory building and defied the troops. The strike soon turned into a bloody encounter between the unarmed workers and the soldiers (three workers were killed and twenty wounded), and became known historically as "the Obukhov defense." Although the workers' resistance was finally broken by military force, the heroic Obukhov defense made a profound impression on labor, arousing a wave of sympathy among the workingmen of all Russia.

During these years great political significance was acquired by the strikes organized by Comrade Stalin at Batum in 1902, the Rostov strike of 1902, the first general strike in the south in 1903, and the strikes of the same year in Baku, Tiflis, and Batum. They were a direct prologue to the revolution of 1905. These strikes and demonstrations played their historic role in the all-Russian political movement, opening the way to the famous July strikes in the south. The political struggle of the workers was nearly everywhere beginning to be directed by Social-Democratic committees.

No less important historically were the events of 1902 at Rostov-on-the-Don. They began in November of that year with an economic strike by the workers of the main railroad shops at Vladikavkaz who demanded a ten-hour workday, an increase in wages and work rates, the abolition of fines, and so forth. The strike was led by the Don committee of the Social-Democratic Party, which in connection with the strike organized huge mass meetings attended by as many as 30,000 workers. These meetings ended in armed attacks by the Cossacks against the assembled workers and townspeople. From here the strike movement spread throughout the entire length of the Vladikavkaz railroad, and everywhere the government retaliated with savage military repression.

The mood of the workers soon spread to the peasantry. During 1902 widespread peasant disturbances occurred in the Ukraine, the central agricultural regions, and the Volga region, marked by the burning of estates, land seizure, and the murder of landowners, rural officials, and police. As in the case of the

labor movement, these peasant uprisings were brutally suppressed by military force.

In 1902 a peasant revolutionary movement of unusual strength spread through Guria (Ozurget County of Kutaisi Province). Having begun as a protest against agrarian exploitation and impoverishment, this movement lasted several years and finally turned into a direct uprising against the tsarist government. After 1904 leadership of this movement came under the control of the revolutionary Social-Democrats. The government sent a large military force into Guria and declared a state of siege. It was not before 1906, however, that this movement was crushed by cruel repression, reprisals, and the destruction of entire settlements.

The revolutionary activity of the workers and the peasants stimulated the opposition movement among Russia's student elements. In response to government repressions (the closing of universities, arrests, mustering into the army, and so forth), the students staged a general strike during 1901 and 1902, with 30,000 students participating.

The revolutionary movement in town and village, and especially the activities of the student groups, also aroused the liberal bourgeoisie, which began to express timid "protests" against the "excesses" of the tsarist regime.

Wholly apart from military repression of the striking workers, the government after 1900 attempted to disrupt the strike movement by a special police approach afterward known as the "Zubatov method" or "police socialism." When the strike wave began to assume a mass political character during these years, it became evident that even the most cruel repression directed against the progressive workers at the head of the movement could yield no results. The government, therefore, attempted to win over the less sophisticated labor masses, distracting their attention from general and political demands toward minor and purely economic demands within a "permissible" framework suggested by the government, along the lines of mutual aid, and so forth, while at the same time increasing police surveillance over the revolutionary workers. In 1902, under the leadership of Zubatov, chief of the Moscow security department, "Labor Mutual Aid Societies" with the abovementioned aims began to be created in Moscow, Minsk, and Odessa, and in 1904 the priest Gapon organized a similar "Association of Russian Factory Workers" at Petersburg. The attempt on the part of the tsarist *Okhranka* (security department) to win over the workers' movement ended, however, in complete failure.

Beginning with the first vastly important Rostov strikes, Russia was on the verge of "a new epoch—mass demonstrations." In evaluating the significance of the Rostov strike, Lenin in an article published in the *Iskra* in December, 1902, pointed out:

Although this ostensibly simple strike movement in a distant provincial city appeared anything but a "real" uprising at the beginning, its continuation and completion compelled one to accept it fully as an uprising. The humble nature of the strike's cause and the minor scope of the demands raised by the workers tend to show the mighty power of solidarity among the proletariat, who recognized at once that the struggle of the railroad workers was a matter of its own general concern, its susceptibility to political ideas and to political propaganda, and its readiness to face danger in open battle against the troops in defense of its right for a free life and a free development, which had by this time become a general and elementary characteristic of all thinking workers.[7]

At a later date, in February, 1906, while discussing the contemporary situation in Russia and the tactics of the Workers' Party in connection with the repressions and the crushing of the December uprising, Lenin raised the question of the uprising once more, pointing out that in some of the outlying regions, where Bolshevik leadership showed the most firmness and initiative, the preparation of the working class for revolution displayed more thoroughness than did the revolutionary movement of the center. He says:

We have been outdistanced in this respect by the Caucasus, by Poland, and by the Baltics, that is, precisely by those areas where the movement abandoned most completely the former terrorism, where the uprising was prepared best, and where the mass character of the proletarian struggle was vigorous and more clearly expressed.[8]

In this manner, regardless of the government's strong repressive policy, the idea of an uprising and of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolutionary struggle, and the idea of a union between the proletariat and the peasantry—ideas persistently advanced by Lenin and Stalin—were winning over the laboring masses with ever greater success. After the Rostov events of 1902 and the broadening of the revolutionary movement in Transcaucasia, the revolutionary-strike movement in Russia entered a third period, which, in Lenin's characterization, was a transition to "real Civil War and to an uprising," that is, directly to the preparation of the revolutionary struggle of 1905.

The prologue to this struggle was the strike and the political movement in the south during the summer of 1903. Beginning early in 1903 a wave of strikes swept throughout the former empire. In March, 1903, a strike began in Zlatoust which ended in the shooting of workers; in May a series of strikes broke out in Kostroma, and by June they engulfed the entire industrial south of Russia, thus becoming the first general political strike. In July, 1903, the movement assumed a new form with an economic strike in Baku, whence it extended to Tiflis, Batum, Poti, Chiaturi, then to Odessa, Nikolayev, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, and to all industrial areas of the south. The new ele-

ment clearly observable in this movement was, first, the general character of the strikes, encompassing all districts, all enterprises, and all industries, and, second, the political nature of the agitation and the demands, the speed, and the organization which denoted the expansion of the strike movement.

The reason here may be traced to the fact that by this time the first elements of a single revolutionary party of the working class were already in existence. In his article "Where to Begin?" and in his book *What Is to Be Done?* (1902), Lenin elaborated a plan and theoretical framework for the structure of the party, and simultaneously delivered a staggering ideological blow against "economism" and the ideology of opportunism. He presented a brilliant analysis of the ideological bases for a Marxist party, advancing the proposition that a Marxist party represents a fusion of the labor movement with socialism, thus increasing the importance of the party as a revolutionizing and guiding force for the elemental labor movement. At the second convention of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party in July, 1903, the Lenin program formulated in the *Iskra* was adopted as proposed, and the central organs of the party were established. At the same convention a major disagreement, at first in organizational problems, arose between Lenin's followers grouped around *Iskra* on the one hand and the opportunist-minded disciples of Martov and the "economists" on the other. The latter began to pursue a policy leading to a party schism, to an intentional dispersion of forces, and to a spirit of club politics. Against this Lenin struck in his well known work *One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward* (1904), in which he formulated for the first time the concept of the party as a directing organization of the proletariat, and demolished the Menshevist opportunist position on organizational problems. On the eve of the first Russian revolution, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks emerged upon the scene as two clearly defined political groups.

INDUSTRY DURING 1904–1908 The crisis in Russia reached its lowest point in 1902. Beginning with 1903–1904, a few industries gradually began to enjoy some measure of stability, and some even showed signs of improvement. With the passing of the crisis in western Europe and the strengthening of the money market, the rate of discount began to drop. Prices were once more rising: pig iron, which in 1902 sold for 42 to 55 and even 38 kopecks, cost 65.9 kopecks a pood in 1903 and 71.6 kopecks in 1904. The price for structural iron rose from 1 ruble, 35 kopecks to between 1 ruble, 45 kopecks and 1 ruble, 50 kopecks. Kerosene, after selling for 8.2 kopecks in 1902, commanded a price of 12.6 kopecks in 1903 and 20.8 kopecks in 1904. The price of industrial shares was also rising; by the end of 1903 the most marked rises occurred for shares of industrial enterprises which only

recently had been rapidly declining. The famous "Maltsev" shares, for example, rose from 335 rubles in December, 1901, to 530 rubles in November, 1903; "Putilov" shares, from 57 to 100 rubles, and so forth. Capital began to be attracted to industry once more, and new stock companies began to arise at an increased rate. The following figures demonstrate the rate of new incorporations:

YEARS	TOTAL NUMBER OF COMPANIES	TOTAL VALUE OF BASIC CAPITAL (MILLION RUBLES)	RUSSIAN COMPANIES		FOREIGN COMPANIES	
			Number of Companies	Value of Basic Capital (Million Rubles)	Number of Companies	Value of Basic Capital (Million Rubles)
1904	94	119.2	81	92.5	13	26.7
1905	75	72.3	65	64.3	10	8.0
1906	115	105.1	105	84.9	10	20.2
1907	131	156.9	119	125.9	12	31.0
1908	120	112.5	108	103.4	12	9.1

Although the founding of new corporations did not equal the level of the prosperous period immediately preceding the crisis (325 companies with a capital of 363 million rubles in 1899), the trend in that direction was none the less quite decisive. In reality, however, not all of the above-cited new corporations established during 1905–1907 became active organizations. Specifically, of the ten foreign companies founded in 1905 whose charters were confirmed, only four began operations, and in 1906 eight of the ten began to operate, while in 1907 four out of twelve became active enterprises.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1905 Since the late nineteenth century the imperialist powers were engaged in a bitter struggle for the control of the Pacific Ocean and for the division of China. Russia, as may have been expected, took an active part in this struggle. In 1900 Russia's troops, together with those of the other imperialist states, suppressed with great brutality a nationalist uprising against the imperialist powers in China. During the immediately preceding years the tsarist government forced China to agree to a number of territorial concessions. Tsarist Russia acquired the Liaotung peninsula, including the fortress of Port Arthur, and obtained the right to build a railroad line across Chinese territory. Northern Manchuria was occupied by Russian troops. But in the course of its continued annexations in the Far East, Russian imperialism conflicted with another predatory power—the imperialist power Japan. The result was an armed conflict between Russia and Japan which ended in the defeat of the tsarist army, the utter annihilation of the fleet, and the conclusion of a humiliating peace. The war revealed the decadence of the autocracy

and the general economic backwardness of Russia. This military adventure of the tsarist regime cost the Russian people 120,000 human lives and a vast fund of material resources estimated at 2,617 million rubles.

The recklessness of the autocracy, its unmitigated military rout, the heavy sacrifices of the people, and the ever increasing burden of capitalist and landowner exploitation could not but hasten the approach of revolutionary events. The intensification of the strike movement in 1903 was the immediate prologue to the revolution of 1905. The day on which the tsarist troops fired upon the marching workers, "Bloody Sunday" of January 9 (22), 1905, became the opening act of the revolution.

Lenin, in reviewing the events of the 1905 revolution, asserted:

> The unique character of the Russian revolution was the fact that it was *bourgeois-democratic* in its social content but *proletarian* in the methods of its struggle. It was bourgeois-democratic since its immediate objectives, the goals it was capable of attaining directly by its own forces, were a democratic republic, the eight-hour day, and the confiscation of the vast landholdings of the upper nobility —all measures almost fully achieved by the bourgeois revolution of 1792 and 1793 in France.
>
> The Russian revolution was at the same time a proletarian revolt, not only in that the proletariat was the leading force, the vanguard of the movement, but also in that the distinctly proletarian method of struggle; namely, the strike, was the foremost method of swaying the masses and the most characteristic phenomenon in the undulating growth of decisive events.[9]

In the revolution of 1905, "the mass political strike played an unusually vital part." [10] How great was the importance of the mass strike may be seen from the examples cited by Lenin. The average annual number of strikers during the ten years prior to the Russian revolution was 43,000, or a total of 430,000 strikers for a period of ten years. In January, 1905, the number of strikers rose to 440,000, exceeding the figure for the whole preceding decade. The total number of striking workers reached 2,800,000 in 1905. At the head of the movement, as in all previous strikes, stood the metalworkers: according to Lenin's reckoning in this connection, there were 160 strikers in 1905 for every 100 factory workers, whereas among the metalworkers the figure was 310 for every 100 workers.

In the strike movement of the years immediately preceding 1905, the local economic demands of the workers, usually the direct cause of a strike and among the less advanced workers particularly, became more often and more closely intermingled with political demands. In the revolutionary mass movements of 1905, this intermingling of economic and political demands became especially close, thus assuring the success of the general mass movement. The economic phase of the struggle drew into the revolution the more back-

ward and less enlightened section of the workers, such as, for example, the bulk of the textile workers. Once drawn into the general struggle for such reasons, however, even these unenlightened strata were rapidly molded into an army of political fighters for the general interests of the working class.

The mass political character of the movement of 1905 also exerted a profound influence on the political awakening of the peasantry. Beginning with the spring of 1905, the peasant movement began to reach mass proportions under the direct influence of the revolutionary movement in the cities and industrial areas. The movement opened in February, 1905, in the Kursk province, spreading from there to Oryol and Chernigov, and emerging simultaneously in the Baltics, in the Caucasus, and in Transcaucasia. During the summer of 1905 the agrarian movement embraced some 90 counties, and by the fall of the year, 240 counties, notably the areas where landlord oppression was heaviest, and where the number of horseless, landless, and otherwise pauperized peasant households was highest.

The movement expressed itself chiefly through the seizure of estates, land, crops, and livestock of the landowners, and in the destruction of forest land.[11]

The simultaneous surge of labor strikes and peasant outbreaks could not fail to produce a revolutionary mood within the ranks of the army. A wave of mutinies broke out among the men of the fleet (on the battleship *Potemkin*, at Krondstadt, and so forth) as well as in the army (Tiflis, Vladivostok, Tashkent, Kiev, Warsaw, and other cities), affecting at first the more advanced service groups, the sappers, for example, and spreading from them to other parts of the army.

In an attempt to divide the revolutionary movement, the government undertook some "concessions" to the popular demands in the form of the Manifesto of August 6 (old calendar) establishing a consultative assembly, the so-called "Bulygin" Duma. In contrast to the diffuse attitude of the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks declared an active boycott against the Duma in order to expose the deceitful tsarist game against the people with this caricature of popular representation. Lenin and the Bolsheviks guided the revolutionary movement of the popular masses both ideologically and organizationally. With his remarkable work *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (1905), Lenin demolished the tactical position of the Mensheviks on the role of the bourgeoisie as the "leader" of the revolution, armed the working class with the ideas needed for a drive against tsarism and for the advancement of the bourgeois democratic revolution, and opened a clear vista for transforming it into a socialist revolution.

The October political strike became general and nation-wide. The Bolshevik slogan of a mass political strike brought immediate results. By October, 1905, the number of striking workers rose to nearly a half million. The


movement engulfed the mass of railroad workers, postal-telegraph employees, the student and petty-bourgeois masses. The working class led the movement, raising, along with its economic slogans for the eight-hour day, slogans of general political freedom. The popular organizations of the first soviets of workers' deputies began to "play the role of a provisional revolutionary government, they became the organs and leaders of the uprising."[12] At the same time, a movement of liberation broke out among the national minorities. By these steps the development in 1905 of a mass movement among the workers reached the stage of a "transition to real civil war and to uprisings."

The December uprisings of 1905 were the height of the revolutionary movement. In December tsarism gained its victory over the uprisings and the revolution, after which the latter began to recede gradually. After a few outbreaks during the summer of 1906 (affecting 240 counties), the peasant movement also lost considerable strength by the fall of 1906 (with only 72 counties reporting outbreaks), and, after the savage military force brought against them, subsided altogether by the fall of 1907 (3 counties). The labor movement, after reaching a maximum height in October (475,000 strikers) and December (425,000), lost its impetus during February and March of 1906 (less than 50,000 strikers) despite the attempts "on the part of the militant elements of the working class to halt the retreat of the revolution and prepare a new offensive."[13]

In this manner the first Russian revolution was crushed by the military power of the tsarist regime.

The bourgeoisie, in its fear of the proletarian revolution, "lost all semblance of any revolutionary mood . . . and joined with the tsar and the landowners against the revolution and in opposition to the workers and the peasants."[14]

THE STOLYPIN REACTION After the suppression of the 1905–1907 revolution, a prolonged period of reaction, lasting from 1907 to 1912, settled upon the social and political life of Russia. This period is remembered as the "Stolypin reaction," so named after its leading protagonist, the tsarist prime minister Stolypin. Alarmed by the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants, the tsarist government, while suppressing the revolution by force, became convinced of the need for a new agrarian policy toward the peasantry. The aim of this policy was to extirpate by force the medieval legacy of peasant communal landownership in the village, and to strengthen stable individual kulak peasant agriculture. In a trend of this type, tsarism saw a guarantee against the recurrence of peasant uprisings and further attempts at the destruction of the nobility's estates by the revolutionary action


SIZE OF PEASANT ALLOTMENTS 1905
0 125 250 375 500
Kilometers
Archangel
Petrozavodsk
Helsingfors
Reval
St. Petersburg
Novgorod
Vologda
Vyatka
Perm
Pskov
Mitau
Riga
Kostroma
Yaroslavl
Tver
Nizhnyi Novgorod
Kazan
Ufa
Kovno
Vilna
Vitebsk
Moscow
Vladimir
Grodno
Smolensk
Kaluga
Ryazan
Tula
Simbirsk
Minsk
Mogilev
Penza
Samara
Orenburg
Warsaw
Orel
Tambov
Saratov
Uralsk
Chernigov
Kursk
Voronezh
Zhitomir
Kiev
Poltava
Kharkov
Kamenets Podolsk
Yekaterinoslav
Novocherkassk
Kishinev
Kherson
Astrakhan
Simferopol
Stavropol
Yekaterinodar
Vladikavkaz
Tiflis
Area of Allotment per peasant household in hectares
Up to 6.0
6.1 - 8.5
8.6 - 11.0
11.1 - 20.0
Over 20.1
No data

of the peasants. Besides the continued general political repressions, particularly brutal against the workers, the central feature in the program of this aggressively reactionary period was the execution of the Stolypin land reform. In the complex interplay of an advanced type of imperialism and the outmoded medieval institution of gentry rule, this reform represented the final attempt on the part of tsarism to bolster the support of its own class power. In a later chapter we shall discuss this question in greater detail.

A SUMMARY OF THE CRISIS AND THE PROGRESS OF INDUSTRY DURING 1905–1908 After the suppression of the 1905 revolution (to a considerable degree with the financial support of foreign capital in the form of two foreign loans from France for a total of 3.9 billion francs), Russian and foreign capital began once more to "show confidence" in the returning "calm." Deposits began to stream into the banks again, and small savings into the savings banks. The balance of deposits and capital in the leading institutions engaged in concentrating capital (the joint-stock banks, the municipal banks, the mutual credit societies, as well as the state savings banks) was as follows (as of January 1st): 1906, 2.8 billion rubles; 1907, 3.1 billion; 1908, 3.3 billion; 1909, 3.4 billion; and 1910, 3.8 billion rubles. As a result, both Russian and foreign industrial corporations, as mentioned earlier, although still on a rather restrained scale and at a notably slow rate during 1907–1908, developed and increased their investments in industry.

However, large capitalist industry made very unimpressive gains in growth during 1905–1908, and may be described as being almost at a standstill. We shall cite a few figures illustrating the position of the main industries during 1904–1908 in comparison with 1900 (in million poods):

Years	Total Pig-Iron Smelting	Production of Semimanufactures	Production of Coal	Production of Petroleum in Baku
1900	177.5	160.8	1,003	600
1904	180.6	178.3	1,196	614
1905	165.8	162.0	1,010	410
1906	164.0	158.8	1,216	448
1907	172.1	173.4	1,507	476
1908	171.1	174.8	1,509	467

As evidenced by the above, all major branches of Russia's industry entered a period of stagnation. The somewhat greater output of coal noticeable during 1906–1908 is caused by a sharp decline in the output of petroleum, a rise in oil prices, and the displacement of liquid fuel by coal in general, as well as by the increase in Russia's coal exports. The drop in the production of

petroleum, however, and the increased price were due, in turn, to the general policy of the oil men, a reduction in refining, and a lower rate of drilling, in addition to the fires and social violence that swept the oil districts in 1905.

The war of 1904–1905, by reducing the level of mass demands, created an unfavorable situation in the production of light-industry goods and products of mass consumption. Production of some goods required for the army (in the leather and flax industries) showed considerable improvement, but in the output of other goods of wide consumption and the mass internal market there was marked stagnation during the years 1904–1905. The war proved to be especially difficult for the cotton industry. The quantity of processed cotton declined from 22.1 million poods in 1903 to 20.1 million poods in 1904; imports of foreign textile machinery fell to 193,000 poods valued at 1.7 million rubles, compared to 254,000 poods of a total value of 2.3 million rubles. The Nizhny Novgorod fair of 1904 ended in an excess of dry goods and in a fall in prices. The critical state of the industry was most apparent in the Lodz district, but in the central region, too, production was curtailed, factories closed, and the level of employment declined.

From the above discussion we may see that between the crisis of 1900 and the end of 1908 Russian industry was passing through a period of stagnation from which it began to extricate itself by 1909.

Considering the causes responsible for the length, depth, and characteristics of this industrial depression, we must seek our answer, apart from the general causes of capitalist crises, in the general character of industrial conditions in Russia, particularly in the major industries, as described in our treatment of this subject for the 1890 period. We have seen that the prosperity of the nineties arose on the basis of heavy industry and the rapid gains made largely under the stimulus of government orders and railroad construction. In other words this prosperity led inescapably to a considerable expansion of basic capital, to overproduction in capital goods, and to the concurrent relative restriction of the amount of capital devoted to the production of articles of mass consumption. The latter could develop only within the limited scope of the existing internal mass market, whereas the production of heavy industrial goods, used for the capital equipment of the country with railroads and plants, flourished under the protection of a prohibitive tariff system and was supported by the system of government orders and railway construction. Inasmuch as these sources of industrial prosperity were exhausted by the war and the revolution, the crisis of 1900–1903 turned into a prolonged depression and economic stagnancy lasting from 1904 through 1908. Only after 1909 did Russian industrial capitalism succeed in overcoming its economic difficulties and in launching upon a new period of prosperity.

Notes

1. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XIX, p. 86.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
3. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 186.
4. *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 164.
5. "On call" operations in general are loans issued by a bank subject to call ("on call" means "upon demand" in Russian) and secured by some sort of collateral (such as securities, for example) or a promissory note. During periods of great stock exchange activity, "on call" loans are most popular as a means of obtaining money from the bank and are used as such by stock-exchange speculators, promoters, as well as the "general public" engaged in playing the stock exchange, inasmuch as the banks will grant loans up to 75 per cent of the value of the securities, protecting themselves only against the possibility of a decline in the exchange value of the paper. "Solo" promissory-note operations (i.e., operations in promissory notes carrying only the individual signature of the borrower as opposed to commercial notes carrying two signatures) were introduced by the State Bank during the nineties chiefly with a view toward granting short-term loans to landowners as a sort of circulating capital with their real estate as collateral; in reality these loans became a form of illegal long-term loans (contrary to the charter of the State Bank) to individual influential landowners.
6. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XIX, p. 302.
7. *Ibid.*, Vol. V, pp. 208-209.
8. *Ibid.*, Vol. IX, p. 27.
9. *Ibid.*, Vol. XIX, p. 345.
10. *Ibid.*, Vol. XIX, p. 345.
11. See Map 21, p. 743.
12. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XIX, p. 353.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 356.
14. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed., p. 36.

(XXXIII)

Concentration of Industry and Monopoly. The Prosperity of 1909–1913

As stated earlier, the crisis of 1900 in western Europe was "the turning point in the history of the newest monopolies" (Lenin). Having found alongside of the gigantic "combined" enterprises a great many smaller "uncombined" enterprises with a relatively archaic technology, the crisis acted as a selecting force with respect to these enterprises, ruining the weaker ones and culminating in industrial concentration and monopolistic control by the stronger enterprises capable of safely surviving the crisis. Russian capitalism followed a similar course when, after the crisis of 1900–1903, it entered into a period of industrial concentration and monopolies.

THE PROCESS OF CONCENTRATION Even during the period of industrial capitalism, the process of industrial concentration in Russia attained considerable proportions. The reason here was the large proportion of foreign capital in Russian industry, which was attracted chiefly in the form of big corporate capital introducing a highly advanced production technique. The connection between the leading branches of heavy industry on the one hand, and government orders and railroad construction on the other, contributed still further to the concentration of industry. The process of "natural selection" and concentration of industry was responsible for still greater success. Taking the total number of enterprises and classifying them by size according to the number of workers, we obtain the following comparative relationship between the beginning and the end of the crisis (in percentage to the total number): [1]

Classes of Enterprises	% of Establishments in the Group		% of the Number of Workers	
	1901	1910	1901	1910
Small, up to 50 workers	70.5	65.7	14.3	11.6
From 50 to 500 workers	26.0	29.3	39.0	34.9
Over 500 workers	3.5	5.0	46.7	53.5

The huge, giant enterprises increased alike in number and in the amount of workers employed, while the remaining groups showed a decline in labor employment. Moreover, it may be pointed out for purposes of comparison that in the United States the total number of workers employed by small and medium enterprises (less than 500 workers) amounted to 67 per cent of the total, and by large plants (over 500 workers), 33 per cent. In other words, the process of concentration in the number of workers was greater in Russia than in the United States.

From another, more detailed source—the official factory statistics[2]—we obtain the following characteristic figures on the basic trends in the development of industry during 1887–1908:

YEARS	NUMBER OF FACTORIES	VALUE OF PRODUCTION (MILLION RUBLES)	NUMBER OF WORKERS (THOUSANDS)
1887	30,888	1,334.5	1,318.0
1897	39,029	2,839.1	2,098.2
1908	39,866	4,908.7	2,679.7

The relative rate of growth during the periods 1887–1897 and 1897–1908 may be seen in the following figures (in percentages):

	BETWEEN 1887 AND 1897	BETWEEN 1897 AND 1908
Number of enterprises increased by	28.3%	2.1%
Total value of production increased by	53.0	72.9
Number of workers increased by	59.9	27.7

Although the figures are somewhat inaccurate and the statistical method not comparable for the two periods, we may still appreciate the intensity of the process of concentration in the early twentieth century (an increase of production by three-fourths with the number of enterprises remaining almost unchanged) compared with the late nineteenth century (an increase of production by 50 per cent while the number of enterprises increased by more than one-fourth). Especially impressive were the economic concentration and technological improvement that followed the crisis. During the period between 1900 and 1908, the increase in the total number of prime movers was 20.8 per cent, and that of steam engine capacity 43.2 per cent, that is, while the increase in the number of enterprises was only slight, their productivity and capacity of motive power rose by nearly 50 per cent during the eight-year period.

This process of concentration is even larger when considered not so much with regard to the total figures as in connection with particular branches of

production. For example, in the metallurgical industry Russia in 1895 had only one plant capable of producing 10 million poods of pig iron, the latter constituting 12 per cent of the country's total production. In 1900 there were two such plants producing 30 million poods and accounting for 17.2 per cent of total production; in 1908, 5 plants with 70 million poods (41.5 per cent of production); and in 1913, 9 plants producing 150 million poods (53.1 per cent of production). In this manner, during the first decade of the twentieth century 9 metallurgical giants had taken over more than one-half of the total production of pig iron. In the petroleum industry the process of concentration went still further: in 1912 the petroleum distillation plants producing less than 1 million poods contributed only 1.1 per cent of the total Baku output, while 6 large enterprises producing over 5 million poods each accounted for 65 per cent of the total output, and two of these plants, yielding over 10 million poods, made up 29.6 per cent of the total. In the coal industry the contribution of large enterprises producing over 5 million poods amounted to 47.8 per cent of the Donets-basin total in 1891, and 84.5 per cent in 1912. In rail output, of the 13 existing plants 7 large producers accounted for 90 per cent of the total amount of rails produced in the country.

TECHNIQUE AND INCREASE OF PRODUCTIVITY Along with the concentration of industry and the process of selection among enterprises, the general index of productivity of the industrial enterprises also increased. On an earlier occasion we presented a table illustrating the growth of productivity in the iron and steel industry during 1890–1900. We shall now submit for comparison the respective figures for 1909: [3]

	1900	1909
Pig iron smelted per plant (thousand poods)	716	1,025
Number of workers per plant	1,325	1,545
Number of h.p. per plant	1,286	1,805
Number of h.p. per worker	0.97	1.17
Pig iron smelted per blast furnace (thousand poods)	629	1,138

As compared with 1900, the smelting per plant increased by nearly 50 per cent in 1909, and by four times in comparison with 1890. Furthermore, the more progressive industry of the south had completely outdistanced the backward Ural sector of iron production. Poland remained in the middle. This may be seen from the table on page 672.

The figures cited in the above table disclose a sharp contrast between the progressive south and the more primitive Urals. The south began not only to equal but to surpass European methods of production. Thus, in 1912 the

amount of pig iron smelted per furnace rose to 3,152,000 poods for the south, and to an average of 1,525,000 poods for Russia as a whole. By comparison, it is sufficient to show that in the same year pig-iron smelting per furnace in other countries was as follows: England, 2 million poods, and Germany, 2.6 million; in the United States the figure was 5 million poods per furnace and 2,560 poods per worker. Hence, southern Russia's iron and steel industry, with respect to technical equipment, technological processes, and productivity, had surpassed average western European standards, although it was below North American standards. The productivity of Russian ferrous metallurgy as a whole, however, was one-third to one-half that of all the above countries.

	South		Poland		Urals	
	1900	1909	1900	1909	1900	1909
Pig iron smelted per plant (thousand poods)	3,192	5,375	455	878	436	367
Number of workers per plant	1,841	2,541	437	1,025	1,496	1,540
Number of h.p. per plant	6,159	9,986*	714	2,222	244	478
Number of h.p. per worker	3.34	3.93*	1.60	2.43	0.16	0.33
Pig iron smelted per blast furnace (thousand poods)	2,035	2,670	570	1,317	342	453

* In the column "South" for 1909, the number of h.p. per plant and per worker include, in addition to steam h.p. (8003 h.p. per plant and 3.23 h.p. per worker), a considerable amount of electric installations which were then beginning to be introduced in the south; these motors have been converted into steam h.p. (a total of 27,400 kw., or 37,300 steam h.p.).

Another sign of the technical success attained by Russian industry during 1908–1909 was the increase in the capacity of its motive power and the substitution of improved internal combustion and electric motors for steam engines. The total capacity of mechanical prime movers in industry (exclusive of mining, transportation, and military plants) increased from 853,000 h.p. in 1900 to 1,206,000 h.p. in 1908, an increase of almost 50 per cent. True, in terms of the absolute total of mechanical power Russian industry was still far behind western European and American industry. In Germany, according to the census of 1907, industry had 7.9 million h.p., and in the United States the census of 1910 recorded 18.7 million h.p. Computed in terms of every 100 persons of the population, this gives the United States a figure of 25 h.p., Germany, 13; England, 24; and Russia, 1.6. These very low absolute figures evidence the extremely weak position of Russia's capitalist industry as a whole within the national economy of the country: total power resources, computed on a per capita basis, showed Russia to be at one-fifteenth of the level prevailing in the United States and at one-eighth

of Germany. Taking large-scale industry only, however, and computing the mechanized power applied in industry per worker, we receive quite another picture. Specifically, the amount of mechanical power for every 100 industrial workers in Russia in 1908 (exclusive of mining) reached 91.9 h.p., in the United States according to the 1910 census, 282 (for similar fields); in England in 1907, 152.7; in Germany, 72.9; and in France, 84.9 h.p.[4] In this manner, in terms of the power equipment of the industrial worker, which is a basic index in large-scale industry, Russian industry, despite its poor showing compared with American and English industry, ranked higher than continental European industry by virtue of its higher degree of concentration.

Among the many technical successes achieved by Russian industry after the crisis of 1900–1903, mention should be made of the significant displacement of wood fuel by mineral fuel in the iron and steel industry. As late as 1900 only 57 per cent of the country's pig iron was produced with the aid of mineral fuel, while by 1907 the percentage had reached 72.3. Equally rapid was the replacement of wrought iron by ingot iron: in 1890 ingot iron produced in Russia amounted to 44 per cent of the total, rising to 84 in 1900, and to 96 in 1909, with the remaining 4 per cent entirely produced by the outdated Ural industry, since the south had changed to ingot iron exclusively. In the field of steel production, the Bessemer process was steadily yielding to the open-hearth method: the latter produced 68 per cent of all metal in 1890, 74 per cent in 1900, and 81 per cent in 1909. The capacity of motive power in southern metallurgy was distributed as follows: the power capacity of steam engines declined from 220,000 h.p. in 1904 to 192,000 in 1910, and electric motor power rose from 19,000 kw-hr to 84 kw-hr. Finally, in the textile industry technical progress was signified by the replacement of mule spindles with ring spindles: the number of ring spindles in relation to mule spindles was 77 per cent in 1900 and 122 per cent in 1910.

ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS OF INDUSTRY For all the comparative success in technology and the high degree of concentration attained by Russian industry, its general economic backwardness remained an undisputed fact. A whole series of major industries were either completely or almost completely nonexistent in Russia. For example, the level of machine building was very rudimentary. The overwhelming portion of machinery for the equipment of domestic plants, especially the more complex types such as electrical equipment, turbines, modern machine tools, and others, had to be procured abroad. There was no automobile industry anywhere in the country. Basic chemical production was very poorly developed, and some phases of chemical production were never undertaken. The very rich and long-known potash deposits of the northeast (Solikamsk) were left almost

entirely unexploited (as a result of the restrictive policy of the international potash trust), as were the phosphate deposits so sorely needed by agriculture. The final decision in each case was made by foreign-monopoly capital, which was frequently interested in assuring that one phase or another of Russia's natural wealth remained undeveloped. This explains the deliberate delay in exploiting any new petroleum deposits and many other important mineral resources.

How far Russia lagged behind the advanced Western countries in the industrial-economic field may be judged from the following figures. In 1913 the total volume of industrial production in France was 2.5 times as much, England 4.6 times, Germany 6 times, and the United States 14.3 times as much as Russia. In some industries, and even in a few major industries, this backwardness was most conspicuous. For example, in the coal industry Russia in 1913 produced 36 million tons, Germany, 190.1 million tons; and the United States, 517.1 million tons. Iron ore was produced at the rate of 9.5 million tons in Russia, while France produced 43 million tons, and the United States, 63 million tons; pig-iron production in Russia amounted to 4.6 million tons, in the United States, 31.5 million tons; and in Germany, 16.8 million tons; copper in Russia, 31,100 tons, and in the United States, 557,200 tons. This feeble state of industrial production became still more apparent in per capita calculations. Thus, in 1913 the production of electric power was 14 kw-hr per capita in Russia as compared with 175.6 kw-hr in the United States; the smelting of pig iron was 30.3 kg. per capita compared to 326.5 kg. in the United States, 206 kg. in England, and 250 kg. in Germany; the extraction of coal gave Russia a per capita figure of 209 kg., while the United States showed 5,358 kg. and Germany, 2,822 kg. Per capita consumption of cotton in Russia amounted to 3.1 kg., in the United States, 14 kg.; and in England, 19 kg.[5] A noteworthy example in this connection was the fact that Russia not only failed to overtake the more advanced capitalist countries, but instead continued to fall behind still further. Thus, per capita production in tsarist Russia was one-eighth of the United States figure in 1900 and one-eleventh in 1913, and in comparison with Germany it was one-sixth in 1900 and one-eighth in 1913.[6] A similar situation existed in the majority of industries.

FORMATION OF INDUSTRIAL MONOPOLIES From the foregoing it is clear that the process of concentration in industry, which existed since the late nineties and had become further intensified during the first decade of the twentieth century, impelled Russian capitalist industry along the road of monopoly. From the early twentieth century Russia's "old" capitalism turned into the "new" capitalism of monopolies, syndicates, and financial capital.

In the history of Russian capitalism, syndicate agreements among enterprises made their first appearance during the seventies and eighties, when the leading insurance companies concluded a monopolist convention for the establishment of a single insurance rate system. In 1886 a syndicate was organized by the nail and wire factories, and in 1887 the sugar-mill owners joined in a syndicate, which with the aid of the government became a very important instrument in the regulation of the sugar industry. Later a syndicate agreement was concluded among the major oil firms in 1892, and attempts were made to unify the coal and metallurgical industries.

It was not only the economic development of the late nineteenth century and the crisis of 1900–1903 that prepared the ground for a move toward syndicates and trusts within Russian industry. The general conditions tending toward monopolist industrial combinations were basically inherent in the high degree of concentration prevailing in industry and an outgrowth of the preponderance of big-corporation capital, particularly foreign capital. On the other hand the demand for the products of the major branches of heavy industry also represented a combining influence to a considerable extent, because of the predominance of huge government and railroad orders.

Among the leading circles of Russia's industrial bourgeoisie, it was considered necessary to conduct the following measures in order to liquidate the effects of the crisis of 1900–1903: first, the "rationalization" and reorganization of industry to segregate the weaker and poorly equipped establishments, and the reconstruction of basic capital and reenforcement of the remaining enterprises; secondly, reduction in the middleman's cost and commercial expenses by monopolistically regulated sales by the industry itself; and, finally, a change in the very character of production and the market by refusing to serve the needs of government orders exclusively, and by expanding the production of consumer goods industries.

During the first years of the twentieth century, these problems became the subject of lively discussion in the Russian capitalist press, particularly in the specialized industrial-capitalist publications and in the organs of the representative organizations of the industrialists such as *Industry and Trade,* the *Council of the Conference of Industry and Trade,* the organs of the southern fuel and metallurgical industries, and the *Proceedings of the Congress of Mine Operators in South Russia.* The way out and the solution of the problems thus raised could, in the opinion of these leading elements of the bourgeoisie, be found in those models of organization which by that time were coming into existence among the advanced western European and American industries. The reorganization of industry and the regulation of production as a means of greater concentration and elimination of weaker competitors, the achievement of monopoly in production, the regulation of

sale with the aid of syndicate combinations, the increase of profit through a reduction in intermediary commercial costs and the establishment of monopoly prices—these in the opinion of this section of the bourgeoisie were the new tasks and goals for the reconstitution of industry.

However not all paths and methods were equally acceptable to the leaders of the industrial bourgeoisie, and not all of them appeared to be easily attainable. Russian industry, even its major branches, was not a homogeneous industry (as evidenced by the iron and steel industry of the south and the Urals), and a general combination of these, particularly in the form of trusts, involved considerable difficulties and a conflict of interests among the various leading groups. For this reason even the monopolist combinations in Russian industry never advanced beyond the syndicate phase. Moreover the dominant metal and fuel industries were reasonably assured of their high profits by lucrative government orders. Hence these protected industries and "favorite" enterprises had no impelling motives for seeking any new markets or any unfamiliar selling practices.

Therefore, for the natural leaders among large-scale privileged industry the internal mass market still represented something quite restricted and difficult of attainment, and it seemed more profitable and expedient to follow the old path of government orders. "The idea of building up our metallurgical industry on the basis of the horseshoes, axles, forged wheels, plows, and iron roofs needed by the Russian peasant will not appeal to practical people." This is the way the central representative organ of industry, the Council of Conferences, formulated its attitude toward the problem of the internal market in its report of 1908.[7] Of course, before industry could in reality be "built up" on this basis, it would have been necessary to release the production forces of the village and to liberate the latter from its economic and social morass. Such a program was indeed not in the interests of the upper strata of the landowner class. Therefore the industrial bourgeoisie too, the important metallurgical industrials especially, preferred to return to the old system of a government market, state orders, subsidies, and protectionism.

Another problem confronting industrial capital in its merger activities was the problem of commercial costs. Commercial distribution was always very costly in Russia. In contrast with the Western countries, commercial profits in Russia were higher than production profits. For example, while the dividends paid the machine-building and mechanical enterprises amounted to between 2 and 2.7 per cent according to official figures for 1906–1908, the dividends of the commercial houses engaged in selling the same products came to between 6 and 7.9 per cent. To be sure, the real value of the dividends paid by industrial as well as commercial joint-stock enterprises greatly exceeded the unimpressive profit figures that went into the official reports.

In any event, however, the syndicate combinations offered an opportunity for industry to rid itself of high commercial costs and to gain direct monopoly control over the market.

THE EMERGENCE OF SYNDICATE COMBINATIONS As soon as the more acute stage of the crisis had passed, during the years 1901–1903 the idea of syndicates in industry became a subject of serious discussion within the leading industrial circles. In this idea the bourgeoisie saw a means of fighting out of the crisis and avoiding subsequent difficulties. The idea, like a red thread, could be seen running through all speeches at the conventions of industrialists, the special press, and the written reports submitted to the government. The government officially declared that it "would interpose no obstacles" in the event that industry "find it useful to combine its efforts in order to seek egress from existing difficulties."

In 1901, at the congress of mine operators in South Russia, a decision was adopted to proceed with the organization of a syndicate.

SYNDICATES IN IRON AND STEEL A number of huge syndicate combinations were formed in 1902. The most important of these was the First Corporation for the Sale of Products of Russian Metallurgical Plants (Prodamet), which was entrusted with the sale of sheet and universal metal produced at these plants (up to 70 or 72 per cent of all sales) on monopoly terms, and in 1902 with the sale of beams and bars (up to 76 per cent of total sales). Later, it gradually took over the sale of rims and railway car axles, cast-iron pipes, structural iron and shapes, mine rails, and other products Thus, by 1908 Prodamet combined twelve to fifteen of the largest plants and all major branches of metallurgical production, and represented between two-thirds and three-fourths of total sales. On the formal side, Prodamet as a "Corporation for the Sale of Products" was an intricate combination acting in accordance with five separate agreements for each individual type of production and with several different sets of terms for the enterprises embraced by Prodamet. But the general character of the activity of regulating production and sales united all these enterprises in a single syndicate policy. It resulted in the very first few days in the organization of a syndicate for the establishment of general prices, the regulation of credit terms, and the distribution of marketing territory.

The results of this policy may be ascertained from the fact that within one month of the syndicate's existence, prices for structural iron rose throughout the south from 1 ruble, 40 kopecks to 1 ruble, 70 kopecks. Although afterward prices declined somewhat due to the competition of enterprises outside of the syndicate, they were still 20 per cent above prices in

effect prior to the formation of the syndicate. The competitors of the syndicate were some southern plants (Yuzovsky) and especially the Polish plants. Nevertheless, Prodamet gradually absorbed new plants and whole districts, extended its control, as we have said, over three-fourths of the entire market of iron and steel products, and became thereby the dominant factor in the monopoly control over this major industry.

The success of combinations in the metallurgical industry, as evidenced by this first and influential Russian syndicate, may be explained by the fact that this combination was well prepared in advance by extensive economic concentration within the metallurgical industry and by its complete dependence upon trust-minded foreign capital. Nearly all enterprises served by Prodamet were dependent upon foreign capital. For example, the enterprises chiefly connected with Franco-Belgian capital were: the South Russian Dnepr plant, the Novorossysk Company, Makeyevka, and others; they accounted for 51.7 per cent of structural iron in Prodamet's turnover. Enterprises connected with German capital, the Kramatorsk and Laura plants, contributed about 17.2 per cent of the structural iron in the turnover of Prodamet; the mixed enterprises, those of Franco-Belgian and Russian capital, such as the Company of Bryansk Factories, the Donets-Yuryev plants, and others, accounted for 22.8 per cent; and the enterprises operated by Russian capital, the Sulinsky, Phoenix, and other plants, accounted for only 8.2 per cent. The management of Prodamet was actually in the hands of four banking groups: a French group headed by "Credit Lyonnais," a German group headed by the German Bank of Industry and Trade, a Belgian group headed by the Belgian General Company, and, finally, a Russian group consisting of the Azov-Don, International, and Russian Foreign Trade Bank, which in turn were themselves dependent upon foreign capital.[8] From this example we may easily see both the extreme dependence of Russian monopolies upon foreign capital and the process of coalescence between industry and bank capital.

In 1902 there was organized another large syndicate for the sale of iron pipes (Truboprodazha), controlling the sale of pipes for water, gas, petroleum, and factories, and uniting ten Russian and foreign plants operating in Russia. The "originality" of this syndicate was its secret character and the fact that it represented in reality a combination of foreign plants with branch factories in Russia (the Laura Hütte, Guta Bankova, and other factories). Hence control over the syndicate was maintained in Berlin, while Russia had . . . the modest "Commercial House of Truboprodazha," in reality merely the Moscow agent of the German syndicate. The syndicate exercised control over nearly 100 per cent of the marketing of pipes in Russia, pursuing the usual monopolist policy of a syndicate.

During the same year a third large syndicate was founded for the sale of special pig iron (ferromanganese and others), combining six southern plants and nearly 90 per cent of the production of special pig iron.

Following these three pioneers, the syndicate movement began to spread gradually to all other branches. After some unsuccessful attempts at unifying the mining industry in 1905, a syndicate of southern mine operators for the sale of ore (Prodarud) was formed in 1908, which included at once six major southern ore enterprises producing jointly as much as 80 per cent of the country's ore.

In this manner, over a period of 6 to 8 years the overwhelming part of Russia's mining and metallurgical industry, particularly in the south, became syndicated. Remaining outside of syndicate movements by 1906 was the pig-iron industry, a fact that may be explained by the dissimilar conditions of production in existence at the various pig-iron smelting plants, some working directly with ore and coal while others operated with purchased materials.

To the metallurgical industry of the Urals, the question of regulating production and the market was no less acute than it was to the industry of the south, especially in view of the strong competition it received from the latter. The question of a syndicate for Ural metallurgy was raised at the convention of the Ural mine and mill operators in 1902, but "home capital," represented by a number of small and feeble enterprises, could not agree upon a combination as easily as the larger units in either southern Russia or western Europe. After disposing of many problems on production quotas, distribution, and prices, in 1904 an agreement was reached in the form of a convention and the creation of the unified Committee of Ural Ore and Metal Plants, consisting of twelve of the largest Ural plants with a combined production of about 80 per cent of roofing iron. The convention regulated both the total output of iron and its distribution among the plants to curtail the release of metal to the market and thus maintain prices, along with the terms of sale, credit, grading, and so forth. After holding together until 1906, the convention collapsed, but was replaced in 1907 by a more durable syndicate, the Krovlya, combining about 75 per cent of roofing-iron output at first, and a number of other products afterward. On the model of the Krovlya, syndicates were organized for other products as well—structural iron and tin plate (eighteen firms with a joint production of 1,375,000 poods, or almost the entire Russian output).

Later, in 1907, a syndicate of farm-machinery factories came into existence, represented by the Congress of Farm Machines and Implements Manufacturers, which by 1913 united eighteen large firms and concentrated some 73 per cent of the production of seeders and 72 per cent of other agricultural implements. The formation of this syndicate aroused great alarm, among

others, in agricultural circles, where a rise in prices was feared. Indeed, the first action of the syndicate involved a general rise in prices, curtailment of credit to the zemstvos and cooperatives, and restrictions in selling terms.

In 1904 came the organization of a syndicate of railway-car-building plants, Prodvagon (Company for the Sale of Russian Car Factory Products), consisting of thirteen plants and almost wholly monopolizing the production and sale of cars. In 1905, for example, Prodvagon sold 97.5 per cent, in 1906, 97 per cent; and in 1907, 95 per cent of the total Russian output. A similar syndicate among locomotive building plants combined seven or eight Russian factories, similarly accounting for 90 to 100 per cent of production. In 1909 a syndicate of rail-making plants was formed as a part of a vast international combination led by the American firms. Finally, these syndicates were followed by the Med syndicate, combining nearly all large plants engaged in production of copper and exercising control over 94 per cent of the total output by 1913. This was followed by the Platina * syndicate and others.

A natural result of so rapid a process of monopolization in the metallurgical industry was an expected transition from syndicates to metal production trusts, that is, a transition to a higher form of combination and regulation of production. Conversations leading to the formation of a trust began as early as 1900–1902, at a time, however, when the way seemed to have been insufficiently prepared, and the matter ended in the above described syndicate combinations. In 1908, however, nine sizable southern metallurgical enterprises, at the initiative of the important South Russian Company, signed a preliminary agreement on a merger into one Corporation of Metallurgical Plants, Mines, and Pits. A capital of 171 million rubles was agreed upon, and the output of plants entering into the trust was expected to cover about 82 to 84 per cent of the production of pig iron and ingots in the south (42 to 52 per cent of Russia's total production), 88 or 89 per cent of rails and girders produced in the south (73 or 74 per cent for Russia as a whole), 78 per cent of structural iron (36 per cent of the total Russian output).

This single metallurgical trust failed to materialize, however. It remains an extremely important fact, nevertheless, that beginning with syndicate combinations, the metal industry of the south rapidly reached a point where it was ready for the formation of the more perfect, single, metallurgical producers' combination—the trust. The Ural industry remained aside, but this represented less danger to the southern trust, which on the whole dominated about 45 per cent of Russia's metal industry, than to the Ural group itself, which was thus confronted by a technologically superior, economically stronger, and unified competitor.

* Platinum.—ED.

UNIFICATION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY A monopoly situation was achieved in the coal industry with the formation of three syndicates for the major coal areas. The Donets syndicate, reorganized in 1906 into the huge Produgol unit (Russian Company for Trade in Mineral Fuels of the Donets Basin), combined eighteen large Donets basin coal enterprises producing 75 per cent of the total coal output of the south. Control of this powerful combination of coal producers, most of them Franco-Belgian enterprises, was exercised from Paris. During 1907–1908 two Siberian coal syndicates were organized—the Cheremkhovo and Trans-Baikal. In this manner all main regions of coal production became syndicated, and the monopolized agencies headed by Produgol controlled over 75 per cent of all domestic production.

It was rather remarkable that this syndicate, which neither in organization nor in policy differed from any other syndicate, aroused the opposition of both the nonsyndicated and even the syndicated iron and steel industry, the reason being that its policy resulted in a fuel crisis and in great hardship for plants working on purchased fuel. But Produgol, which consisted almost entirely of foreign enterprises, enjoyed special patronage and protection from foreign capital. Therefore, when the government in 1914 raised the question of intervening legally into the affairs of Produgol in view of the disclosed abuses, diplomatic pressure was exerted by France, and the suit was dropped.

COMBINES IN THE MINING AND METALLURGICAL INDUSTRIES As a result of the organization of monopolies in the coal industry and the ensuing difficulties in industrial fuel, the large syndicated metal plants endeavored to acquire their own coal mines in order to secure their coal production. In this manner, as a result of a conflict among these monopolist organizations, Russian industry witnessed for the first time the emergence of highly complex "vertical" combines. This movement did not spread to any extent within Russian industry as a whole, but in the mining and iron and steel industries of the south this "last word" in monopoly capitalism attained considerable proportions. In 1913, for example, of a total coal output of 1,560 million poods, 453 million poods, or 34 per cent, came from combined enterprises; in the case of coke, 162 million poods of the total 270 million (60 per cent) was produced by the combines; in ore production, 302 million poods of a total of 420 million poods (72 per cent); and in pig iron, 160 million poods of the total 189.7 million pods (84 per cent).

PETROLEUM The formation of monopoly mergers in the petroleum industry dates back to the nineties, when a capital export syndicate of Baku

kerosene producers was organized with the cooperation of the government in 1892 to compete more successfully in the foreign kerosense market against the American trust, the Standard Oil Company. Inasmuch as concentration had reached a high level in the Russian petroleum industry, the process of its monopolization was a comparatively easy matter. For example, in 1900 sixteen firms, each producing over 10 million poods of petroleum annually, controlled about 65 per cent of the country's petroleum output and 55 per cent of its oil wells. In the kerosene trade, two firms, the Nobel Brothers Company and the Mazut Company, disposed of 70 per cent of all sales of kerosene and oil residues. A characteristic of the petroleum industry in Russia was that in reality a large portion of the stock of the Russian petroleum companies was either in the portfolios or under the control of the large international petroleum corporations. Consequently all oil production in Russia by 1912–1913 was either directly or indirectly dominated by four huge competing companies: the Russian-American General Petroleum Companies (General Oil Company), the English company Shell (the Lianozov group), the Dutch Royal General Company (Russian Petroleum Company), and finally the Nobel Brothers Company, the largest of the groups, which in addition had a special agreement with the oil-transport organization and controlled the entire petroleum and kerosene market by monopoly methods.

LIGHT INDUSTRY The process of syndication in other branches of Russian industry, chiefly the light industries, proceeded slower and less conspicuously, but during the period of depression it gained considerable prominence. In the textile industry the pressure toward syndication began in the Polish sector of the industry, where in 1908 the Lodz cotton manufacturers started a syndicate with a capital of 30 million rubles. This served as a stimulus to syndication in the textile region of Central Russia.

The erstwhile Conference of Dry Goods Industrialists of the Moscow Region was reorganized into the Cotton Manufacturers Association, which combined forty-seven enterprises owning 3.7 million spindles (of a total of 8.8 million) and 61,000 looms. In 1912 came the formation of a syndicate in the linen industry—The Russian Linen Corporation.

The formation of syndicates in the textile industry before long produced results similar to those experienced by other industries. While in 1904 Moscow-made cotton cloth cost 11 kopecks, in 1907, after the formation of the syndicate, this price rose to 14.5 kopecks, and was maintained at that level by the syndicated enterprises during 1908, although "independent" millowners reduced their prices by 10 to 20 per cent.

Although the cotton-textile industry was somewhat behind heavy industry in the organization of monopoly mergers (because of a high proportion of

smaller and "independent" enterprises and the conflicting interests of the Lodz, Moscow, and Petersburg owners), the monopoly combinations within the cotton industry disclosed unique characteristics. The entire cotton industry of the central region represented "Russian" capital almost exclusively, as personified by the Siberian merchant Vtorov, the financier Ryabushinsky, the old Moscow firms of Stakheyev, Konshin, Prokhorov, and others. Foreign capital, such as the Knop, Gubner, and other interests, played a decidedly minor role. The various groups of textile industrialists were identified by "their" banks—the Moscow Mercantile Bank (Krestovnikov), the Siberian (Vtorov), the Moscow (Ryabushinsky), and other banks. At first, these groupings did not represent any sizable financial capital combinations. But when after 1910 these banks began to be taken over by foreign capital and joined large banking concerns (such as the United, the Azov-Don, and the Russo-Asiatic banks), even the textile industry began to witness the rise of large concerns (on the eve of the war and even more during the war years 1914–1916): Vtorov, Stakheyev, Ryabushinsky, and others. The unified textile industry forced its export trade vigorously: during 1907 some 20.5 million rubles' worth of cotton fabrics were exported (chiefly to the Near East), but by 1913 the value of such exports had risen to 43.9 million rubles.

Without dwelling on the subject at length, we shall merely mention some of the more important of the other syndicates. Among these, for example, is a merger of the cement producers (Russian Cement Trading Company, controlling up to 90 per cent of the total output), the rubber plants (Treugolnik, which in 1907 controlled about 100 per cent of production), and the large (chiefly French) combinations among the salt enterprises headed by the Ocean Company and organized along the pattern of a selling agency. Further, there were the tobacco syndicate, formed in 1912–1913 under the influence and direction of the international (American) tobacco syndicate (75 per cent of production), the syndicates of match factories, asphalt plants, glass and mirror factories (all existing mills), a cork syndicate, an electric syndicate, and many others.

TRANSPORT SYNDICATES Besides the field of production, monopolist combinations began to gain great impetus within the sphere of transportation. Private combinations were precluded in the railroad business in view of the government's ownership and operation of most of Russia's railroad lines. But even here the monopoly trend found expression in car- and locomotive-building syndicates as previously mentioned. In river transport, however, a field in which a great many companies competed before, syndicates, or, more properly speaking, trusts, began to develop at a feverish rate. During 1906–1909 the existing companies began to merge into syndicates

and trusts including all the major river arteries—the Volga, Oka, Dnepr, and the Siberian rivers (the mixed combines Samolet, Caucasus and Mercury, Dneprovskoye, and others). At about the same time a syndicate movement began to succeed among the maritime shipping companies, with Ropit (Russian Shipping and Trading Corporation) absorbing a number of other concerns. The trust movement in the field of river and maritime transport soon resulted in the establishment of higher rates, which frequently aroused protests from many interested organizations, but such protests were nearly always without effect.

By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, therefore, there was not a single small industry or transportation service of any size in Russia which some monopolies or syndicates did not influence. Because of the backwardness of legislation, however, this occurred frequently not in the form of open syndicates but instead disguised as "associations" and "sales agencies," or even simply in the form of "conferences" (for example, the Conference of Millers), or by secret agreements altogether. Hence it is sometimes difficult to ascertain the exact degree and extent of monopolist combination in industry, although in most cases it is obvious from the facts just cited that these monopolies had reached an advanced stage, at least in the major branches of heavy industry, and metallurgy in particular.

A SUMMARY OF SYNDICATE ACTIVITIES We have thus seen that the syndicates largely succeeded in attaining the most important of their goals; namely, the monopolist seizure of the market and an increase in prices. Of course the bitter struggle for markets and competition not only between the combined and "independent" enterprises but also among the various monopolist combinations themselves had by no means come to an end. We have seen examples of this struggle in the relations between the iron and steel industry of the south and the Urals, among the several groups of Ural ironmongers, between the combined coal industry of the Donets basin and the interests in control of the Dombrovsky (Polish) region, and finally the wrangling among the various groups of the cotton industry—the millowners of Moscow, Petersburg, and Lodz. At times bitter rivalry arose over the control of small combinations and "independent" enterprises, and ended in the creation of larger and more powerful monopolist mergers. In case of a stalemate between the competing forces, the contest ended in a temporary agreement on the division of "spheres of influence" and markets and in the establishment of uniform monopoly prices. In addition to seeking monopolistic control over the domestic market for the purpose of raising prices, the syndicates reached for a share of the foreign market. They succeeded in obtaining a foothold by dumping goods abroad at low prices while prices at

home were held unnaturally high. On this basis Russian manufacturers developed an export trade in sugar, cotton cloth, and a number of other products to markets both in the East and the West. It was on this basis, too, that Russia's iron and steel industry found a considerable outlet in the foreign market. In 1906 exports of pig iron abroad, almost nonexistent previously, increased precipitately to 1.3 million poods in response to a "dumping-exports" policy, and reached 4.5 million poods in 1907, as compared with 59,000 poods in 1905; exports of iron and steel amounted to 1.9 million poods in 1906 and to 15 million poods in 1907, as compared to 867,000 poods in 1905. However, this initial success of Russia's metal industry on the foreign market was soon erased by the European crisis. Pig-iron exports once more dropped to 548,000 poods in 1908 and to 58,000 in 1909. The hope of "conquering" the foreign market by a policy of dumping fell far short of realization.

There remained the domestic market. But in regard to the latter, the leading representatives of the metal industry, as we have seen earlier, were inclined to be pessimistic. Control of the domestic mass market was in their opinion both a difficult and a worthless business. They had far greater faith, despite the recent lessons of the crisis, in large railroad orders, in a new wave of company promotion, and in a demand for capital goods by industry itself. The boom of 1909–1913 was, therefore, to a considerable degree the result of new expansion of railway building. Urban construction as well as the capitalization of the village, both rapidly gaining during this period, also made a more noteworthy contribution to this prosperity (increased consumption of roofing iron, farm machinery, and so forth) than, say, toward the prosperity of the late nineteenth century.

As we have already pointed out, Russian industrial monopolies did not advance as far as the highest form of monopolist unification of enterprises in which the latter are thoroughly merged into one production unit, a trust, managing directly all production in the unified enterprises. The syndicates were formally a type of combined "sales agencies" and exercised direct regulation over the market only, dividing the territory among its participants, fixing prices, normalizing sales, but dealing with production itself only on rare occasions. In this manner they did, indeed, exert an unmistakable influence on production, strengthening the position of the more powerful syndicated group, and undermining still further the position of the nonsyndicated, less vigorous, and more poorly equipped enterprises. The management and direction of production within the various enterprises and combined groups remained, however, independent, and the syndicates did not turn into trusts or complete monopolistic production mergers under a unified management.

The only attempt at a combination of the trust variety, made in the metal

industry of the south, failed to materialize, as we have seen. The activities of the syndicates proper did, on occasion, involve management and regulation of production. This, for example, occurred in connection with the syndicate Krovlya organized by the Ural plants, which decided in favor of two methods for processing iron instead of four. The Prodamet, too, discontinued the production of several grades of iron at the Sulinsky factory. The same Prodamet shut down the Strakhovitsky plant (in Poland) because of the high cost of operation, paying the shareholders of the closed plant their respective dividends from the profits of the other plants. The mirror syndicate, embracing four plants, shut down production in two of these plants, but continued to pay the shareholders their respective share of profits.

In the establishment of agreements among industrial enterprises and the elimination of competition incident to the formation of a syndicate, it was necessary to select enterprises that were relatively similar in technology and economic structure, and to limit the combines by agreement as to individual, precisely defined products. Hence the formation of monopoly mergers of the more general, industry-wide type was rather encumbered from the beginning, as we have seen, and instead it was necessary to formulate individual agreements. The Russian syndicates could not at the outset muster sufficient strength to undertake the widespread closing of "independent" or poorly equipped and competing enterprises. They could not, therefore, attain monopoly conditions and a complete concentration of production at once. The crisis of 1900–1903 cleared the way for the expansion of monopoly most effectively by its "natural selection" of the stronger enterprises from the weaker. Thus, the period of 1901–1904 witnessed the liquidation of sixteen machine-building and engineering corporations of a total value of 7,254,000 rubles, or 450,000 per enterprise on an average. Here we may say, therefore, that it was the comparatively small and poorly equipped plants that were being liquidated. But during 1905–1909 the ten enterprises that closed in the same field had a joint capital of 12,455,000 rubles, or an average of 1,240,000 rubles per enterprise.

By the first decade of the twentieth century, monopolist combines in Russia had accumulated such great financial strength that they could, in the course of pursuing their own aims, crowd out and liquidate huge million-ruble enterprises.

RUSSIAN MONOPOLIES AND FOREIGN CAPITAL For Russia the question of turning "national" monopolies into international monopolist combines and of participating in the division of the world among the unions of capitalists amounted in reality to the role of foreign capital in the creation of Russian monopolist organizations.

As we have pointed out earlier, the enormous concentration of production and the monopolies that arose on that basis in the advanced imperialist countries resulted in a situation where vast monopolistic organizations burst across the frontiers of their own "national" economy and assumed international stature (the steel mergers of Morgan, the oil trusts of Rockefeller, the Anglo-Dutch petroleum companies, the munitions enterprises of Schneider-Creusot, Vickers-Armstrong, the German chemical and electrical industries, and others). These colossal world unions of capitalists endeavored to unite within their framework the monopolized organizations of other countries by financial, economic, or even outright political pressure. In the process of securing their access to raw materials, they become a decisive and active force in the seizure and distribution of colonies.

From the above survey of monopoly trends in Russian industry, we may conclude that despite their wide prevalence, great proportions, and high degree of concentration, the Russian monopolies were still incapable of achieving any great international importance comparable to the combines cited above as an example of world monopolies originating in the other imperialist countries. In consequence of their general economic weakness and semicolonial subordination to foreign finance capital, the Russian industrial monopolies did not play an independent, active role in the world-wide struggle for territory among the capitalist trusts. They were, in fact, themselves frequently the object of precisely such a struggle among the foreign imperialist systems for the exploitation of Russia. All more or less important Russian syndicate combines were either merely members of international monopolistic mergers, or, in effect, "daughter" organizations and branches of foreign monopoly units, or even merely their "agencies" on Russian soil. Such syndicates as cement, tobacco, ferromanganese, and farm machinery, Truboprodazha, Prodvagon, Treugolink of the rubber industry, Ocean in the salt industry, the match syndicate, and others, functioned more or less under the direction of, and at times completely subordinate to, the respective international monopolist organizations. Even the petroleum industry of Russia, which had considerable influence in the world market, was in fact completely dominated by foreign monopoly combines, except for the difference that the industry included a number of competing international groups.

All this revealed the ancillary and subordinate character of Russian capitalism during the imperialist era.

INDUSTRY DURING THE PROSPERITY OF 1909–1913 We may now summarize the results of the development of Russian industry during the period of monopoly capitalism, that is, after the crisis of 1900–1903 and during the new industrial prosperity of 1909–1913.

In an earlier connection we have characterized monopoly capitalism in the words of Lenin as a "capitalism in decay" and "in the throes of death." However, Lenin says:

> It would be erroneous to assume that this tendency toward decay precludes a rapid growth of capitalism; no, various branches of industry, various strata of the bourgeoisie, and various countries display during the era of imperialism, more or less forcefully, sometimes one and sometimes the other of these tendencies. On the whole, capitalism rosé immeasurably faster than before, but this growth . . . tends to become, as a rule, more irregular.[9]

In the industrial development of Russia during the imperialist period, especially after the industrial boom of 1909–1913, we may observe a substantial, although rather irregular growth of production in many individual industries.

The volume and growth of production in the major industries during the period 1909–1913 are given in the following table (in million poods):[10]

Years	Pig Iron	Iron and Steel	Roofing Iron	Rails	Copper	Coal	Petroleum	Coke	Cotton Consumption
1900	177	163	14.0	30.2	0.5	1,003	632	137	16.1
1903	150	135	14.4	19.4	0.6	1,094	630	112	16.6
1909	175	163	20.7	29.1	1.3	1,591	563	161	21.3
1910	186	184	22.9	29.5	1.4	1,522	588	168	22.1
1911	219	203	20.7	31.0	1.6	1,739	558	202	21.4
1912	256	227	22.4	38.2	2.1	1,904	569	236	25.7
1913	283	246	25.3	35.9	2.0	2,214	561	271	25.9

As shown by the table, in 1909 the major industries had almost completely recovered from the effects of the crisis of 1900–1903, and in several instances the level of output was already above the precrisis level. During the prosperous years that followed (up to the beginning of the World War) this level was exceeded in all fields of production (except oil), doubling in some cases the peak reached before the crisis (coal).

Since from the territorial standpoint the greatest advances in the mining and iron industries took place in the south, the prosperity period of 1909–1913 witnessed a still greater increase in the disproportional development of the various producing regions—the progressive south, the backward Urals, and the other less important regions. This growth in the proportions of the south, which had become noteworthy, as we have seen, as early as the 1890's, continued during the first decade of the twentieth century at the following rate:

	1900	1913
Smelting of pig iron, total (million poods)	177.0	283.0
Southern region (million poods)	91.5	189.7
Southern region (percentage)	51.7	67.0
Urals (million poods)	50.5	55.8
Urals (percentage)	28.5	19.7
Iron and steel production, total (million poods)	163.0	246.0
Southern region (million poods)	75.8	141.0
Southern region (percentage)	46.5	57.3
Urals (million poods)	33.8	40.8
Urals (percentage)	20.7	16.6
Coal production, total (million poods)	1,003	2,214
Southern region (million poods)	671.6	1,560.9
Southern region (percentage)	67.0	70.5
Urals (million poods)	22.7	73.4
Urals (percentage)	2.3	3.3

In this manner iron and steel from the south continued in 1913 to overshadow the metal industry of the Urals. In 1900 the latter still contributed an output about half of that achieved by southern metallurgy, but by 1913 it functioned between one-third and one-fourth of the level maintained in the south. In coal the total contribution of the Urals was negligible.

A somewhat different shift in production took place in the petroleum industry. Although the Baku oil fields were far from exhausted, the effect of the monopolist policy of the oil companies was a curtailment of oil production. The drop in Baku's petroleum output can also be traced to the ravages of the "Black Hundred" during 1905–1906. Furthermore, new oil-bearing regions began to appear during this period. As a consequence, petroleum production showed the following distribution between 1900 and 1913 (in million poods):

	1900	1910	1913
Total	632	588	561
Baku region	600.4	501.8	466.2
Grozny region	30.7	74.6	73.0

After attaining its peak of production in 1905, the petroleum industry of Baku as a result of the above-cited causes, as well as because of a deteriorating world market, failed to regain its previous level in the output of petroleum. Instead, new oil areas began to gain prominence (Grozny, Maikop, and Emba). Technical methods of extraction were also improving, as evidenced by the increase in the number of perfected processes and the increase in the amount of improved motive power (internal combustion and electricity).

Among other leading industries, machine building in 1912 reached a level of production valued at 136.6 million rubles, compared with 101.9 million rubles in 1910. In particular, farm-machinery output in 1912 reached a value of 52.3 million rubles, compared to 38.3 in 1908, 13.3 in 1900, and 9.2 million rubles in 1897. Although total Russian production of machinery was still far from impressive, it attained considerable growth, and the production of agricultural machinery specifically increased 15 times over a period of 15 years in response to the capitalist reconstitution of the Russian village after 1900.

In the field of light industry we shall cite a few figures on cotton production:


	1900	1909	1913
Number of spindles (thousands)	6,646	8,064	9,200
Amount of cotton processed (thousand poods)	16,007	21,274	25,900
Number of spinning machines (thousands)	151	200	230
Yarn produced (million poods)	14.6	20.2	22.7
Fabrics produced (million poods)	11.7	17.0	19.6

Developments in the linen industry may be summarized by the following figures:

	1900	1909	1913
Number of spindles (thousands)	337	412	394
Number of looms (thousands)	11.0	14.1	15.9
Including mechanized (thousands)	9.6	13.4	15.3
Raw materials processed (thousand poods)	3,132	4,484	4,719
Yarn produced (thousand poods)	2,042	3,088	3,039

Despite the somewhat slower growth of the linen industry in comparison with cotton, it was marked by a considerable increase in mechanization and by a growth of output, while the number of spindles declined by 1913 as a result of concentration and monopolist mergers conducted within the linen industry.

Progress in the sugar industry during the period under consideration may be measured by the following figures: total sugar output increased from 49 million poods in 1900 to 92.6 million poods in 1909 and 108.4 million poods in 1913; of this, lump-sugar production rose from 24.4 million poods in 1900 to 42.8 million poods in 1909 and 57.8 million poods in 1913. But, as we have indicated above, this conspicuous growth in the volume of production made by the sugar industry was largely due to government patronage measures (compulsory syndication, normalization of the industry, and exports).


STRIKE MOVEMENT
1912–1914
0 125 250 375 500
Kilometers
Up to 5,000 strikers
5,000–25,000
25,000–50,000
50,000–100,000
Over 100,000
Major strike centers
Centers with bolshevik organizations
1. Bogorodsk
2. Verkhne-Isetsky Works
3. Lysvensky Works
4. Kynovsky Works
5. Vladimir
6. Voskresensk
7. Gus-Khrustalny
8. Yegoryevsk
9. Ivanovo-Voznesensk
10. Konstantinovka
11. Lyubertsy
12. Makeyevka
13. Nerekhta
14. Orekhovo-Zuyevo
15. Pavlov-Posad
16. Petrokov
17. Sereda
18. Sosnovitsy

THE LABOR MOVEMENT DURING THE PROSPEROUS YEARS The industrial prosperity that spread throughout the country after 1909 created conditions favorable to a rise of activity in the labor movement. Neither the Stolypin reaction and reprisals nor the political regime of the so-called "Monarch of June 3" succeeded in undermining the force of the movement and its political character. The working class, led by the Bolsheviks, intensified its political struggle against tsarism irrespective of reaction, persecution, and massacres.

During the last five-year period prior to the war, the number of strikes, both economic and political, increased at a substantial rate. According to official data, the number of strikes, showing the number of workers involved, was as follows:

YEARS	TOTAL NUMBER OF STRIKES	TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF POLITICAL STRIKES	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN POLITICAL STRIKES
1910	222	46,623	8	3,777
1911	466	105,110	24	8,380
1912	2,032	725,491	1,300	549,813
1913	2,404	887,096	1,034	502,442
1914*	3,534	1,337,458	2,565	1,059,111

* Exclusive of the Warsaw district. In addition, during the five months of the war of 1914 (Aug.-Dec.) there were a total of 68 strikes; in other words 3,466 occurred during the first seven months of 1914.

In reality, according to more complete data, the number of strikes and participants was much greater (namely, 1,272,000 strikers in 1913, and 1,425,000 during the first half year of 1914).[11]

The tremendous increase in the strike movement on the whole during the five-year period, and most of all the feverish rise of the political strikes, thus become clearly apparent. The purely revolutionary political character of the movement manifested itself not only in the systematic and mass participation of the workers in the traditional May Day political strikes (in defiance of a government ban against the celebration of that day), but also in strikes commemorating recent revolutionary events, such as January 9, the Lena massacres, and others.

A rising wave of revolutionary activity began during April and May, 1912, when mass political strikes broke out throughout Russia in protest over the Lena massacres. The Lena gold mines (in Siberia), owned by English interests, yielded an annual profit of 7 million rubles to their investors. The workers of these mines were exploited cruelly, poorly paid, and supplied with unfit food. When these conditions provoked a strike among the 6,000 workers,

the unarmed crowd was fired upon on April 4 by order of a gendarme officer, in the course of which 500 persons were either killed or wounded. "The Lena days, like a hurricane, burst through the atmosphere of 'pacification' created by the Stolypin regime." [12]

The nucleus of the labor movement during this period, in numbers as well as in political consciousness and organization, were the metalworkers, who since 1912 participated overwhelmingly (83.8 per cent) in political strikes. Even in the more backward industries, in cotton, for example, whose workers as late as 1910–1911 participated in economic strikes only, as many as 69.1 per cent of the strikers took part in political demonstrations by 1912. A powerful weapon in the hands of a Bolshevik party, in its task of awakening the labor masses politically and in extending its influence among them, were the Bolshevik newspapers, at first the *Zvezda,** and afterward, after 1912, the *Pravda,*† which aroused the working-class masses for struggle against tsarism and helped to organize working-class activities. By 1914, 80 per cent of the active workers in Russia followed the tactics urged by *Pravda.*

Of the various industrial centers and regions, six basic industrial areas [13] (containing one-third of all industrial establishments and about one-half of all workers) contributed during 1910–1914 about 75 per cent of all strikers. Among these industrial regions a leading role was played by the Petrograd region, which itself in 1914 accounted for 72 per cent of the total number of strikers in the six industrial regions referred to above.

Outside the Petrograd region, the labor movement of Transcaucasia, Baku particularly, acquired enormous nation-wide political importance during this period. Here during 1907–1908, under the leadership of Stalin, all working-class areas were wholly under the influence of the Bolsheviks. Baku became a center of Bolshevik revolutionary organizations. In 1908 Stalin led a number of important strikes in Baku, in the course of which minor economic demands evolved into broad political and general proletarian demands.

It is worth noting that the bourgeoisie itself had clearly recognized the acuteness and the decisive political character of the workers' struggle against tsarism, anticipating during 1913–1914 (in the words of its leader Guchkov) "the inevitability of a catastrophe" and expressing (through the cadet Makalakov) a loss of faith "in the possibility of a peaceful settlement." And although the bourgeoisie has long become disillusioned about the success and expediency of the autocracy's "firm policy," the more the workers intensified their political struggle after the revolution of 1905, the more the bourgeoisie in cooperation with the government intensified its active opposition to the workers. Thus in March, 1914, the organized factory owners of Petersburg declared a huge lockout affecting about 70,000 workers (including

* *Star.*—ED. † *Truth.*—ED.

17,000 at the Putilov plant). In July several enterprises were again closed and their workers discharged. All this heightened the excitement among the Petersburg workers and resulted in stormy political demonstrations.

Following the leadership of Petersburg, a wave of labor activity spread through the provinces: Moscow, Kharkov, Nizhny Novgorod, Yekaterinoslav, Kiev, and Bryansk. Outstanding in this connection was the Baku general strike of May, 1914, which was led by the Bolsheviks and met a broad revolutionary response in other cities, especially in Petersburg, where at a meeting in the Putilov plant in July, 1914, 200,000 workers declared a strike. The tsarist government countered with monstrous repression against the striking workers.

The labor movement of the prewar years was riding the crest of a high wave. Disturbances among the peasantry became more frequent, numbering more than 13,000 during 1910–1914. Revolutionary activities broke out among the troops and in the fleet. Spreading steadily not only through the chief industrial centers but to the vast periphery of the country as well, the revolutionary movement under the guidance of the Bolshevik party assumed nation-wide proportions preliminary to a general uprising against tsarism. "The country was on the verge of a new revolution."[14]

Notes

1. *Statisticheskii yezhegodnik Soveta syezdov predstavitelei promyshlennosti i torgovli* (Statistical Annual of the Council of the Conferences of Representatives of Industry and Commerce), ed. by Shary (1912).
2. *Statisticheskiye svedeniya po obrabatyvayushchei fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti* (Statistical Data on the Fabricating Factory Industry), ed. by Varzar (1908).
3. Glivits, *Zhelezodelatelnaya promyshlennost' Rossii* (The Iron-Processing Industry of Russia) (1911), pp. 111-114.
4. Figures for the United States are computed on the basis of data of the 1910 census, for Germany, on the basis of the economic census of 1907; for other countries, according to the official statistics for the respective years; for Russia, on the basis of the industrial census of 1908 (edited by Varzar). See *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.A.*, and the *Statistisches Jahrbuch fiir das Deutsche Reich* for the respective years.
5. Figures are computed according to the publication *Mirovoye khozyaistvo za 1913–1927* (World Economy for 1913–1927) (Central Statistical Administration, 1928).
6. Molotov, *Tretii pyatiletnii plan razvitia narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR* (Third Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR) (1939). A report delivered before the 18th convention of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), pp. 16-17.

7. *Zapiska Soveta syezdov predstavitelei promyshlennosti i torgovli o merakh k podyomu otechestvennoi zheleznoi promyshlennosti i mashinostroyeniya* (A Statement of the Council of the Conferences of Representatives of Industry and Commerce on Measures for the Expansion of the Domestic Iron Industry and Machine Building) (1908).
8. Tsyperovich, *Sindikaty i tresty v Rossii* (Syndicates and Trusts in Russia) (1919), pp. 97-98.
9. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XIX, p. 172.
10. *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Rossii* (National Economy of Russia) (1913).
11. See Map 18, p. 691.
12. *Istoriya VKP (b)* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks], A Short Course), p. 141.
13. The Petrograd, Moscow, Baku, Kharkov, Kostroma, and Vladimir regions.
14. *Istoriya VKP (b)*, p. 143.

(XXXIV)

Finance Capital and Russian Industry

We shall now pass to an examination of the problem of finance capital and the new role of the banks, when, along with the concentration of production and the growth of industrial monopoly, by fusing with industry "they exchange their humble role of intermediaries for that of all-powerful monopolists," [1] disposing of nearly all money capital whether it belonged to capitalists or to small owners. The concentration of banking capital, which merged with the concentrated industrial capital of the monopolistic producing organizations, culminates in the dominance of a handful of monopolists, the financial oligarchy. "The concentration of production, the monopolies that arise therefrom, the fusion or coalescence of banking and industry—therein lies the history of the rise of finance capital and the meaning of that concept." [2]

As Lenin has suggested: "Capitalism in general is unique in having separated the ownership of capital from the application of capital to production," that is, "in having separated money capital from industrial or production capital." [3] Under the system of imperialism and the supremacy of finance capital, this separation reaches an extreme point. It occurs through the concentration of the entirety of national savings, the money resources of the *rentiers* and the capital of the entrepreneurs, and their collection into the complex network of credit and banking institutions ranging from the savings banks for small accounts to the great banks for million-ruble current accounts and the deposits of the capitalists. The concentration of money capital also takes place through the issuance of various securities, debentures, and shares, which become another method for the profitable investment of money resources by the population and the *rentiers*. The resources concentrated in the banks and in industrial issues become the basis for the development of banking capital and its coalescence with industry.

Hence we must first devote our attention to the sources and ways for the formation and accumulation of money capital and its concentration in the banks, and to the forms of fusion between banking capital and industry, that is, the formation of finance capital under the actual circumstances through which this process developed in Russia.

THE SOURCES OF INTERNAL ACCUMULATION Internal accumulation of capital, its concentration in the banks and in industrial issues, and its fusion with industry trace their origin to the accumulation of resources and income from the various fields of national economic activity—to agriculture, industry, trade, and, particularly, exports. The concentration of such income in Russia occurred by small savings in savings banks or through the lodging of great money resources in the banks in the form of current accounts and deposits and, finally, through the issue of various securities, stocks, industrial shares, and so forth. In our old Russian statistics we find no direct or exact evidence as to the nature and size of income derived from the various branches of national economy and the size of the so-called "national income," that is, the total volume of income from all economic activities. These statistics throw even less light on the subject of the class composition of the national income. It will be necessary, therefore, to limit ourselves to approximate and summary figures on this subject.

According to the computations of the State Planning Commission of the USSR, in 1913 the national income for the whole former empire, distributed by branches of national economy, was as follows: [4]

	MILLION RUBLES	%
Agriculture	8,792	51.4
Industry	4,793	28.0
Construction	699	4.1
Transportation	1,356	7.9
Trade and communications	1,468	8.6
Total	17,108	100

As shown by these State Planning Commission figures, the national income per capita amounted to 102.2 rubles. The small size of the national income may be judged from the following comparative figures for other countries during the same year: England, 463; Germany, 292; France, 355; and the United States, 695 rubles.

The above figures still tell us very little as to the class composition of the national income. In this connection, Lenin, utilizing the data taken in the industrial census of 1908, submits the following figures on the earnings of the factory workers and the profits of capitalists as an index of the distribution of the national income. There were altogether, according to the census, about 20,000 (19,983) enterprises employing 253,000 workers. The total amount of wages was 555,700,000 rubles, an annual average of 246 rubles per worker, or 20 rubles, 50 kopecks a month. The profits of the 20,000 capitalists, however, with the total value of production amounting to 4,651

million rubles, after the deduction of all costs, amounted to 568.7 million rubles, or to an average of 297,000 rubles for each factory. In other words, 20,000 capitalists received as much as 2¼ million workers.[5]

Despite their approximate character, the State Planning Commission figures still indicate: (1) that the size of the Russian national income per capita in 1913 was far below that of other countries; (2) that the concentration of income in the hands of a small group of propertied classes was rather considerable; and (3) that the overwhelming proportion of this total national income had its origin in agriculture. This structure of the national income, as we shall see below, proved to be extremely significant in the process of capital accumulation.

In explanation of the dynamics of our national income, we have little except the calculations of Prokopovich,[6] who computed the national income for the fifty provinces of European Russia as follows, in prices of the respective years: for 1900, 6,579,600,000 rubles, and for 1913, 11,805,500,000 rubles. The increase for the thirteen years, therefore, amounted to 79.4 per cent, with agriculture increasing by 88.5 per cent (from 2,985,000,000 to 5,630,000,000 rubles), and industry by 83 per cent (from 1,402,000,000 to 2,566,000,000 rubles). In its rate of expansion this increase was rather impressive for that time.

In the above calculations the increase of the "national income" during the period 1900–1913 was due alike to an increase in production proper and to a rise of prices. In reality, prices of agricultural products increased by 40.9 per cent during the period under examination, while prices of industrial goods rose by a mere 12.5 per cent. But if we calculate production in all branches of the economy in terms of the uniform prices of 1900, in order to exclude the effects of the price rise and to determine the actual increase in production itself, we find that industrial production increased by 62.2 per cent (from 1,402,000,000 to 2,282,000,000 rubles), whereas agriculture rose by only 33.8 per cent (from 2,985,000,000 to 3,995,000,000 rubles). By these calculations, therefore, industrial production ranked first in the quantitative growth of the various branches of national economy, while in terms of value, on the other hand, the increase of agricultural production surpassed that of industrial output. In other words the rapid expansion of industry occurred, in part, with the aid of income and capital from other branches of the national economy, which, by virtue of a more favorable value relationship, made a relatively higher contribution to industrial development through the medium of the banking system. Of course it is rather difficult on the basis of available statistical data to ascertain the exact size of income derived, for example, from agriculture and capitalized into industry. The reality of this process itself is, however, beyond any doubt. Statistically, it expresses itself

in a lodging of national savings in the various institutions of the nation's credit and banking system, and their redistribution to a considerable extent through industrial channels. Later we shall examine the main trends of this concentration and redistribution.

SAVINGS BANKS The crisis of 1900–1903 and the subsequent war with Japan could not fail to have their repercussion in a declining rate of internal accumulation. If we take the savings banks as an index of small-scale internal accumulation, we find that the widespread withdrawals of deposits by the petty bourgeoisie, frightened by the revolution of 1905, caused an absolute decline of 79 million rubles in deposits. After 1907, however, and especially during the subsequent industrial boom of 1909–1913, deposits began once more to show a substantial increase in volume. The balance of money deposits held by the savings banks was as follows (in million rubles):

As of January 1, 1900	679.9
As of January 1, 1903	920.1
As of January 1, 1906	831.2
As of January 1, 1909	1,207.6
As of January 1, 1913	1,594.9
As of July 1, 1914	1,704.2

Together with the interest-bearing notes of the depositors, the total amount of deposits reached 2,073 million rubles by July 1, 1914. It is clear, therefore, that whereas prior to 1903 the annual accretion of deposits amounted to 80 or 85 million rubles, during the period 1903–1907 (not counting the mass withdrawals in 1905—79 million rubles—and the redeposits in 1906—204 million rubles) the annual rate of accretion reached about 102 to 114 million rubles, declining to between 60 and 67 million rubles during 1910–1911, and, still further, to between 43 and 38 million rubles in 1913. In this manner the volume of accumulation in the savings banks rose during these fourteen years by more than one billion rubles, although the growth of deposits subsided somewhat during the later years. This sum of one billion rubles may be taken as an index of the accumulation of money capital by the petty bourgeoisie, since the preponderant majority of the savings-bank depositors consisted of the rural and urban lower middle classes. The average deposit per book was 204 rubles in 1913, and of the total number of depositors, 31.1 per cent belonged to the rural bourgeoisie, the kulak peasantry; 21.4 per cent to the city lower middle class, the artisans and tradesmen; 22.2 per cent to the white-collar worker group, and only 4.6 per cent to the working class.

The decline in the rate of accumulation through the savings banks observable during 1912–1913 is partly explained by the fact that new savings methods had come into practice among the petty bourgeoisie during these years; namely, the small credit institutions. Thus, for example, the volume

of circulating capital (original capital, deposits, and loans) of all institutions of small credit (cooperative and class) amounted to only 258 million rubles as of January 1, 1909, rising to 459 million rubles in 1912, to 779 million rubles in 1914, and to 954 million rubles as of July 1, 1914, 773 million rubles of which belonged to the cooperative establishments alone. Another cause was the fact that during 1909–1914 the leading depositor of the savings banks, the hoarding upper kulak stratum of the village, began to channel its income and savings, as we shall see below, into direct economic application by acquiring inventory, livestock, and farm buildings.

In evaluating the importance of the role played by the savings banks in the accumulation and concentration of capital compared with other types of banks, it is of great interest to present a comparison of data collected by an American commission on the deposits held by the regular banks and savings banks in England, France, and Germany as prepared by Lenin, with the data for Russia calculated by us: [7]

	REGULAR BANKS	SAVINGS BANKS
England, 1908; billion marks	23.2	4.2
France, 1908; billion marks	3.7	4.2
Germany, 1908; billion marks	7.1	13.9
Russia, 1909; billion marks	7.0	5.4
Russia, 1914; billion marks	16.1	7.7

As revealed by this table, the regular banks in Russia (as in England) were more significant centers of capital accumulation than the savings banks, in contrast with France and Germany, where small savings exceeded regular bank deposits. This alone is abundant evidence of the highly pronounced concentration of banking capital in Russia and the comparative paucity of the mass savings of the petty bourgeoisie.

THE ISSUE OF SECURITIES The volume and growth of the investment of capital in industry (directly in the form of industrial stock capital, or indirectly through state loans and bank shares) is further evidenced by the volume of securities issued in Russia during the prosperity period (in million rubles): [8]

YEARS	TOTAL	ISSUED DOMESTICALLY	ISSUED ABROAD
1908	899.6	645.2	254.4
1909	795.3	449.8	345.5
1910	918.9	713.8	205.1
1911	1,236.3	980.3	256.0
1912	1,350.0	898.0	452.0
Total for five years	5,200.1	3,687.1	1,513.0

In 1913 the domestic market again absorbed 570 million rubles in securities, thus making the total issue of securities during 1908–1913 nearly 6 billion rubles. Furthermore, the above total figure of issue for 1908–1912 included: 2,292 million rubles of fixed-interest (mortgage) securities, 1,128 million rubles of industrial shares and debentures, 413 million rubles of bank shares, 744 million rubles of railroad stock, 375 million rubles of state loans, and 248 million rubles of municipal loans. As to their specific purpose, the securities issued during the period under discussion were distributed as follows: about 12 per cent for state and municipal loans, 44 per cent for mortgage credit, and 44 per cent for commercial-industrial, banking, and railroad issues. As these figures indicate, the issuance of securities was a significant source for the formation of bank and finance capital. Moreover, domestic issues were 2 to 3 times greater than foreign. An enormous share of these capital resources went, however, into agriculture, or more accurately into financing the liquidation of the gentry's land through the Noblemen's Bank, the Peasant Bank, and the various incorporated agrarian banks, that is, into the capitalization of the land rents of the nobility.

THE BANKING SYSTEM From the standpoint of organization, the Russian banking system differed materially from the banking system of the Western capitalist countries. At the head of the system stood the State Bank (founded in 1860), which, although the only institution authorized to issue bank notes (paper currency), most of its active operations were concerned not with the issue of bank notes or with deposits by private persons (as in the case of the central banks of issue in other countries), but with the so-called "free resources of the treasury." The issuance of currency (credit notes), on the other hand, was almost completely covered by the gold reserve. Thus, in the balance of the State Bank as of January, 1914, the amount of credit notes issued by the State Bank totaled 1,664 million rubles, with a gold coverage of 1,695 million rubles. The active discount and loan operations of the bank, amounting to 1,072 million rubles, were supported, however, chiefly by the "free resources of the treasury" in the amount of 951 million rubles. Of the above total volume of discount and loan operations of 1,072 million rubles, 487.7 million rubles, or about one-half, were on loan to other credit establishments.[9]

Thus the State Bank was the central bank of the entire Russian credit system, and was capable of exerting a considerable influence on that system by pursuing a definite credit, discount and loan, foreign exchange, and economic policy, by supporting a favorable commercial and clearing balance, and by financing grain exports. Nevertheless the State Bank was not a true central bank of issue in an imperialist capitalist credit system, as were the central

banks of issue of other imperialist countries (England, France, Germany, and the United States). It was based not upon operation with deposits by private persons and the capitalization of enterprises, but upon the "resources of the treasury" and a huge gold reserve. Both were the result not so much of the development and execution of a policy of imperialist capitalism as of the financial and economic policy of the military-feudal imperialism of tsarist autocracy—its merciless taxation policy toward the toiling masses of the population, its colonial exploitation of the national borderlands, its foreign indebtedness, its policy of dumping exports, and, in the final account, its semicolonial subservience to the Western imperialist countries. The State Bank, and the banking system headed by it, were thus not only an expression of imperialist capitalism in Russia, but equally a creature of the military-feudal imperialist system of tsarist Russia and an expression of its semicolonial subordination to the Western imperialist powers.

Besides the State Bank as a bank of issue and central bank of commercial credit, the Russian credit system included two state banks for agrarian credit: the Noblemen's Bank (established in 1885) and the Peasant Bank (established in 1882). As institutions of mortgage credit they were somewhat outside the sphere of industrial financing. But as we have noted from the figures on issue cited above, they occupied a prominent position, together with the ten private mortgage banks, in the total issue of securities (about 45 per cent), diverting large resources for the maintenance of the landed property of the nobility.

Another mighty link in the Russian banking system were the private incorporated banks for commercial credit. On January 1, 1909, there were 31 such banks, including 10 in Petersburg, 4 in Moscow, and 17 in the provincial cities. By January 1, 1914, there were 47 such banks with 743 branches in the provinces. Their total balance, as of January 1, 1910, was 2,611,600,000 million rubles, in which the share of the 10 Petersburg banks amounted to 1,845 million rubles (including, among the largest, the Petersburg International Bank with 332.8 million rubles, the Russian Bank for Foreign Trade with 330 million, the Volga-Kama Bank with 265.5 million, and the Azov-Don Bank with 235 million rubles), that of the 4 Moscow banks to 378.8 million rubles, while the remaining 17 provincial banks had a balance of 387.3 million rubles. By 1910 there was, therefore, considerable concentration in the incorporated banks.[10] Below we shall discuss the extent to which they were all dependent upon foreign capital. The remaining parts of the Russian banking system were: 467 societies for mutual credit with a balance of 485.2 million rubles as of January 1, and 276 municipal banks with a balance of 181.5 million rubles. The latter type of credit institutions served the needs of local small industry and trade.

In this manner the Russian bank network, as the main agency for accumulating the money resources of the population and concentrating them in the major collecting stations of the banking and credit system, was quite well developed.

THE VOLUME OF BANKING CAPITAL The concentration of these resources within the banking system was, therefore, proceeding with great success during 1909–1914. The process of accumulation by the banks and other credit institutions is illustrated by the following figures on the expansion of the banks' own capital and the outside resources attracted by them (as of January 1, of the respective years, in million rubles): [11]

	THE BANKS' OWN CAPITAL		DEPOSITS		TOTAL	
	1909	1914	1909	1914	1909	1914
State Bank	55	55	210	263	265	318
Incorporated banks	312	836	977	2,539	1,289	3,375
Municipal banks	50	58	103	171	153	229
Mutual credit societies	62	151	270	595	332	746
Total	479	1,100	1,560	3,568	2,039	4,668

The capital resources at the disposal of the banking network (aside from the mortgage banks) for the financing of industry and trade had, therefore, more than doubled over fifteen years, increasing by 2.6 billion rubles.

Most characteristic in this connection is the absolute as well as the relative growth of resources at the disposal of the incorporated commercial banks. The growth in number and capital of the incorporated banks, over a more extended period of years, shows the following results:

AS OF JANUARY 1	NUMBER OF BANKS	NUMBER OF BRANCHES	OWN CAPITAL (IN MILLION RUBLES)	DEPOSITS AND CURRENT ACCOUNTS
1870	6	15	15.7	96.3
1895	34	160	175.5	309.7
1900	39	242	280.0	552.0
1910	31	492	332.0	1,262.0
1914	47*	760	836.0	2,539.0

* In addition, three banks operating on "special bases": two at Riga and one at Libau.

During the final four years alone (1910–1914) the incorporated banks increased their capital by 504 million rubles, compared with a total capital of only 332 million rubles during all the preceding years (up to 1910). The

deposits attracted by the banks during the same years, 1910–1914, amounted to 2.5 billion rubles, whereas during the preceding period, 1870–1900, it was altogether 550 million rubles.

THE CONCENTRATION OF BANKS At the same time it was a rather characteristic fact that during 1900–1914 the banking business was affected by a great process of concentration. Very many independent small banks merged into a smaller number of giant banks during this period. Thus, for example, one of the largest Russian banks came into existence during 1901–1904—the Azov-Don Bank, composed of the former Petersburg-Azov, the Minsk, and Kiev Commercial banks. In 1908 the United Bank arose from the combined resources of the Moscow International, the Oryol, and the South Russian banks. In 1910 the Northern Bank merged with the Russo-Chinese into the Russo-Asiatic Bank. It is sufficient to indicate that the proportion of the thirteen largest Petersburg banks of that period in the total capital owned by all incorporated banks increased from 49 per cent in 1900 to 66.5 per cent in 1913, and to 65.2 per cent in 1914. On the average each Petersburg bank owned 42 million rubles of its own capital, while each Moscow bank owned 19 million, and each provincial bank, 5 million rubles. The distribution of deposits was still further concentrated: as of January 1, 1914, the Petersburg banks held 72.2 per cent of all deposits, compared with 54 per cent in 1900.

Dividing all banks into four groups, according to size of basic capital, we obtain the following picture of the shift that occurred during 1900–1914:

GROUPS OF BANKS WITH A CAPITAL OF	NUMBER OF BANKS		THEIR CAPITAL IN % TO TOTAL CAPITAL OF ALL BANKS	
	1900	1914	1900	1914
Up to 9.9 million rubles	30	24	43.7	10.8
From 10 to 19.9 million rubles	6	11	32.9	22.5
From 20 to 29.9 million rubles	2	4	23.4	14.6
From 30 million rubles up	—	7	—	52.1

During the thirteen years the small banks declined in proportion of total capital from almost one-half to one-tenth, whereas the seven large banks, which did not exist in 1900, owned more than one-half of all capital by 1914.

THE FINANCIAL OLIGARCHY The concentration of banking capital resulted in the emergence of a conspicuous "financial oligarchy": the seven Petersburg banks disposed of more than one-half of all capital resources for the financing of all Russian industry. Even here, however, as in all other

cases, Russian finance capital displayed two clear characteristics: first, the financial oligarchy frequently became a financial oligarchy of foreign capital, owing to the dependence of the leading Russian banks upon foreign finance, and, second, it frequently merged with the oligarchy of Russia's military-feudal imperialism and its financial bureaucratic apparatus to become the executor of the will of the same foreign imperialist capitalism.

The leadership of the Russian banks, corporations, and industrial enterprises consisted of a comparatively small circle of persons who were the captains of industry and finance, while at the same time the board chairmen of several banks, directors and board members of numerous syndicates and corporations associated with these banks, and large shareholders in these companies. Such, for example, was Putilov, the chairman of the board of the huge Russo-Asiatic Bank (connected with French capital), as well as a leader of the Russo-Chinese Bank, director of Prodamet (likewise under the influence of French capital), and the chief shareholder in many metallurgical enterprises associated in Prodamet—the Putilov, Sormovo, Bryansk, the Neva shipbuilding, Kolomna, and other plants. Despite their "French orientation" and connection with French heavy and munition industries (Schneider-Creusot), the Putilov enterprises were at the same time connected with the German Krupp plants, the Levi armament firm, and the German banks. The head of the Russian coal industry and its various monopolist combinations, Avdakov; the oil-men Nobel, Mantashev, Lianozov; and the leader of the mining industry, Guzhon, all alike were connected not only with a number of varied industrial enterprises but also with the leading Russian and foreign banks active in these fields (oil, with the International and Russo-Asiatic banks; coal, with the Azov-Don, International and other banks), as well as with the foreign trusts.

Attached to these financial-industrial groups were businessmen-financiers and "stock-exchange men" who were themselves prominently connected with the financing of industry and with the stock exchanges, the outstanding financial organizers and directors of credit institutions: Utin and Plotnikov, the directors of the Discount and Loan Bank (German capital), Kaminka, director of the Azov-Don banks (French capital), and others, who controlled the destinies of millions of industrial enterprises. Among them, too, were some lesser financiers and bankers, proprietors of banking houses, such as Ryabushinsky, Dzhamgarov, Wawelberg, and others, who were afterward made directors of the large banking combines. The great sugar-mill owners, Bobrinsky, Brodsky, Kharitonenko, and Tereshchenko, also joined the circle of the financial-industrial oligarchy and were associated primarily with the Russian Foreign Trade, Commercial-Industrial, and International banks. The textile industry had for some time held somewhat aloof from

banking capital, since it was represented by such old Russian firms as Stakheyev, Konovalov, Konchin, Vtorov, Morozov, Prokhorov, and many others. But here, too, a financial group connected with banking capital made its appearance after 1900, and a few of this group became prominent leaders in the field of financing and organizing a united cotton industry (Ryabushinsky, Vtorov, Stakheyev, and others). The connection between Russian finance capital and industrial monopoly and foreign banking capital was often maintained in a personal way by the appointment (formally through an "election" by the stockholders) of their own representatives as members of the board for the banks and corporations. Thus the "interests" of the German stockholders in the management of the International Bank were represented by Weber, Pfieffer, and, unofficially, by Landshof. In the Azov-Don Bank the interests of the German shareholders were represented by Raupert and the interests of French finance capital (Société Général) by A. Werth.

The leading representatives of Russia's financial-industrial bourgeoisie also welcomed into their ranks members of the upper bureaucracy, particularly from the ministries for finance, industry, and trade. Men like Putilov, Utin, Kaminka, Ryabushinsky, Avdakov, and others were "at home" in these ministries. They knew how to exert their influence by resorting to bribery, a "lucky" play at the stock exchange on behalf of the officials of the ministries, stock subscriptions on privileged terms, and by attracting the upper officialdom to highly paid positions in the management of banks and corporations. Thus, one of the highest officials of the tsarist government, the director of the Credit Department, who controlled the entire financial apparatus of the country, A. Davydov, exchanged his high bureaucratic post for the well paid position of director in a Petersburg private bank, and became one of the dominant figures in banking capital. The former deputy-minister for trade, Bark, also readily exchanged his ministerial chair for the chair of a director of a bank and several corporations. Such representatives of the upper bureaucracy as Palchinsky, Vyshnegradsky, Bezobrazov, Protopopov, the prime minister of the prerevolutionary years; Trepov, the minister of transportation, and others were in one way or another, legally or illegally, very closely connected with banking and finance capital. The trend of "coalescence" with banking capital was not confined to the higher bureaucracy alone but also engulfed the upper strata of the hereditary aristocracy, the grand dukes, and other personages of the reigning family. Frequently these persons were the main stockholders in highly profitable, government-connected enterprises. Among the chief shareholders, for example, in one of the most profitable railroad lines (the Vladikavkaz railway) were many grand dukes. Through Chamberlain Bezobrazov, as well as through Rasputin and Prime

Minister Protopopov, the most disreputable businessmen and the most fraudulent enterprises found approval at the court of Nicholas II and obtained subsidies of millions of rubles from the Ministry of Finance.

Finally, finance capital was also responsible for a "coalescence" not only between Russian industry and foreign financial interests but also between the state apparatus, its foreign policy, and foreign capital. The allies and creditors of the tsarist government and the holders of groups of Russian industrial enterprises, that is, the French banks, at times transmitted demands to the Russian government and the Finance Ministry in the form of ultimatums outside the framework of business and economic relations. Thus in 1908 the French government transmitted to the Russian government through diplomatic channels a demand to reconsider its order for warships granted to the German firm of Blom and Voss, and to transfer that order to French firms. The propositions of the latter were stated in such terms that even the Russian envoy at Paris characterized them as "blackmail," and Minister of Finance Kokovtsov considered them "incompatible with the political dignity of Russia." Yet the same Kokovtsov, when he became president of the Council of Ministers, found it necessary to furnish Netslin, the representative of French finance capital, with preliminary estimates of the state budget in advance of its publication.[12]

Under these circumstances foreign finance capital in tsarist Russia indulged in many outright abuses and predatory activities. In 1905, in response to a telegram order from its French directorate in Paris, Produgol raised the price on coal at government auctions by 10 kopecks. Some directors of the Ministry for Transportation undertook to challenge the demands of Produgol and were about to place the order at cheaper prices. The order remained, however, with Produgol because the minister of transportation was among the officials "close" to Produgol, and the affair was hushed up. Such incidents were common in the activity of Prodamet, the Nobel oil companies, the salt syndicate, and others.

In the Russian environment the financial oligarchy, its venality, its colossal bribery, and its hoaxes of all types found a favorable soil, as epitomized by Lenin.[13]

FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE RUSSIAN BANKS The years after the revolution of 1905, especially the last years preceding the World War, were a period in which foreign capital, especially French and German, launched its offensive against the banking system of Russia. The prewar history of the leading Russian banks—the Northern, Petersburg-Azov, Discount and Loan, and Russo-Chinese—was not only the history of financial concentration but also a record of the fusion of Russian banking with the

capital of German and French banks. Except for the unsuccessful struggle for "independence" waged by the Bank of Siberia, most of the incorporated banks were heavily under the "influence" of foreign capital. Specifically, of a total basic stock capital in the eighteen major corporate banks of 435.5 million rubles in 1914, 185.5 million rubles, or 42.6 per cent, belonged to foreign capital. Of this figure the German share amounted to 77.2 million rubles, or 17.7 per cent; the French, 95.25 million rubles, or 21.9 per cent; and English, 13 million rubles, or 3 per cent. In other words, some preponderance in controlling the banking capital of Russia's major banks was in Entente, Anglo-French capital: 108.25 million rubles compared to 77.2 million rubles for German capital.

Some banks were predominantly "foreign": the Russo-Asiatic (72 per cent of foreign capital, including 60 per cent French), Bank of Siberia (60 per cent, including 40 per cent French), the Riga Commercial (50 per cent, all German), and the Moscow private (56 per cent, all French).

It should be noted in this connection that the above-cited percentages of "participation" by foreign capital in Russian banking capital "controlled" the activities of the Russian banks. As in the case of any corporation, in order to exercise such "control" it is usually quite sufficient to own no more than 30 to 40 per cent of the shares. Hence, even if we do not consider the above measure of participation by foreign capital in Russian finance as sufficient to dominate the entire Russian banking system, the role of foreign banking capital was none the less considerable.

THE FUSION OF BANKING CAPITAL WITH INDUSTRY How did the coalescence between banking capital and industry take place? That is, how did financial capital arise within the Russian imperialist system?

Although the Russian banks were prohibited by their charters to exceed their purely intermediary and credit functions and engage in the financing of industry, this injunction had long become a dead letter. The banks were not only the creditors of many industrial enterprises but also their founders, cashiers, directors of their current accounts, the managers and owners of their shares and their basic capital, in short, the complete master of their destinies. And if the use of the industrial capital of the banks for its own current credit did not completely deprive industrial capital of its independence, the new form of financing placed an industrial enterprise in a position of absolute dependency upon banking capital.

The dependence of industrial enterprises upon banking capital began to gain prominence in Russia during the late nineties, reflecting a rise in the influence of the banks and a greater need for credit on the part of industry.

It may be of interest to cite some examples of how the banks became "interested" in various industrial enterprises.[14]

In 1895 the Russian Commercial-Industrial Bank was involved in the financing of the Eastern Warehouse Corporations, the Ista Factories, the Volga Steel Plant, the Nikopol-Mariupol Company, the Russian Gold Production Company, the Association of Tula Copper Rolling and Cartridge Factories, the Moscow Glass-Making Company, and others. Their indebtedness to the bank exceeded 14 million rubles. In addition to supplying credit, the bank owned 13,735 shares of the Nikopol-Mariupol Company and 11,836 shares of the Hartman Company; in 1898 the bank had in its vaults 519 shares of the Volga Steel Plant, 97 shares of the Petersburg Car-Building Plant, 87 shares of the Sergino-Ufaley Plant, and others. In number of shares held, the Nikopol-Mariupol Company and the Hartman Plant deserve special mention: the bank was the complete master of these two corporations, owning a majority of their stock and debentures.

The vaults of the Discount and Loan Bank contained in 1898 1,307 shares of the Baku Petroleum Company, 430 shares of the Donets-Yuryev Metallurgical Corporation, 600 shares of the Lessner Machine-Building Plant, and 400 shares of the Likfeld Glass-Making Corporation.

The Russian Foreign Trade Bank held 370 shares of the Bromley Brothers Company, a number of debentures of the Nikopol-Mariupol Company, the Sormovo Company, and others. The International Bank owned 4,000 shares of the Hartman Machine-Building Plant, 1,492 shares of the Moscow Glass-Making Corporation, 4,003 shares of the Gold Production Company, and 2,031 shares of the Nikopol-Mariupol Corporation.

The Private Commercial Bank owned stock in the Volga Steel Plant, the Northern Glass Company, the Kolomna Machine-Building Plant, the Putilov Plant, the Hartman Plant, and others.

In general the share of industrial securities in the holdings of the banks had already risen to considerable proportions by this time. Thus the percentage relationship between industrial securities and total cash assets held by the banks was as follows:

YEARS	INTERNATIONAL BANK	DISCOUNT AND LOAN BANK	COMMERCIAL-INDUSTRIAL BANK	PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BANK
1896	23.4	17.9	31.4	70.4
1897	23.8	17.4	49.0	59.3
1898	25.5	23.4	53.3	62.2

Consequently, industrial securities by 1896–1898 had already begun to comprise a considerable proportion of the banks' assets, with a tendency toward continued increase. For this reason, when the industrial crisis came

in 1900, it immediately affected a number of banks, varying with the extent to which the vaults of these banks were loaded with industrial securities. For example, the International Bank lost about 4.5 million rubles in the course of the crisis, the Petersburg Discount and Loan Bank suffered heavily, as did the Petersburg-Azov, the Riga Commercial, the Kharkov Bank of Commerce, and a number of other banks.

Comparing, however, the basic and the debenture capital of the corporations themselves, we will find that the proportion of shares and debentures owned by the banks was still relatively small during the 1890's. At this date it is still premature to speak of finance capital, that is, the fusion of banking capital with industry (except for individual cases, such as the above-mentioned Hartman and Nikopol-Mariupol corporations).

The crisis of 1900–1903 seriously undermined the independence of industrial capital. In the face of the crisis and the losses suffered by the corporate industrial enterprises indebted to the banks, the banks were forced to resort to so-called "financial reorganizations" in order to avoid complete collapse and liquidation of these enterprises. As a rule, the total amount of losses involved were "written off" the basic capital of the company, that is, the basic capital of the enterprise was greatly reduced. After such a "cleansing" the bank undertook to issue new stock to secure an influx of new capital, serving no longer as merely the intermediary in an issue of new stock in return for a certain commission in the form of a fixed proportion of shares, at times as high as 10 to 20 per cent, but frequently simply taking all the new stock into its own holdings to become in reality the owner of a substantial part of the company's stock capital. In order to obtain a dominant influence in the affairs of a corporation, it was sufficient for a bank or group of banks to own considerably less than half the stock.

During the crisis of 1900–1903 there was hardly a major industrial enterprise that escaped this type of "cleansing" and financial reorganization of corporation (or the reorganization of single-ownership enterprises along similar lines and their conversion into stock companies). The result was to place industry in a position of direct subservience to banking capital. But the Russian banking system and bank capital, despite their remarkable advance during 1909–1913, were still unequal to the task of satisfying the demand for capital involved in such a "reorganization" of industry. Consequently Russian banking capital, after effecting its fusion with industry, was compelled to turn to foreign banking circles in order to secure a financial base for its own support. Russian finance capital thereby became a decidedly dependent system, and Russian industry "merged" not only with Russian banking capital but, through the latter, with foreign capital as well.

Banking capital was not content to assume a position of leadership in Rus-

sian industry; it began to extend its monopolistic influence over the other, still less organized segment of the Russian economy—the export of agricultural products. As we shall see in greater detail in our inquiry as to the position of rural economy during the imperialist era, the major Petersburg banks; namely, the Russian Foreign Trade, the Azov-Don, and the Petersburg International banks, drew into their monopolist sphere many branches of foreign and domestic trade: the export of grain, eggs, butter, and meat products, the organization of refrigerated transport, the purchase and sale of cotton, the export of sugar, and others.

THE STOCK EXCHANGES The fusion of banking capital with industry and the transfer of a considerable portion of industrial capital through the acquisition of stock by the banks provided the stock exchange with a highly significant role in the national economy. During the era of imperialism the stock exchanges became a market for securities, that is, for the type of "fictitious capital" which in the form of stocks and debentures can change hands at the market without affecting the real capital invested in the enterprise. Although the banks retained in their holdings a considerable proportion of all types of shares and debentures, they distributed the rest among capitalists and speculators. Wide elements of the well-to-do "public" began to take part in the sale and purchase of stock-exchange securities, and the stock exchange became a center of lively speculation in such assets, reflecting in its rates for such paper all fluctuations in the industrial situation and political events. The participation of broad circles of the "public" in stock-exchange trading was conducted through the banks by so-called "on-call" accounts,[15] which, in the final analysis, served to enrich the banks and ruin the general public at every serious fluctuation in values. In general the high rate and stability of securities (government loans, industrial shares and debentures) become an index of the soundness and stability of an enterprise or a loan. Therefore the official stock exchanges, especially the more prominent among them, accept securities for circulation and quotation only in accordance with a special list. According to a special international statistical calculation, a total of 850 billion francs' worth of securities were in circulation through the various countries of the world in 1912. Of this total England accounted for 150 billion francs, the United States for 140 billions, France for 115, Germany for 110, and Russia for 35 billion francs, or about 4 per cent of the world total.

Stock exchanges in Russia existed only in the form of securities' divisions of the general exchanges (in the Petersburg as well as in the Moscow, Warsaw, Kharkov, and a number of other exchanges). Of the total volume of

securities issued in Russia as of January 1, 1912 (state loans and government-guaranteed loans of private corporations, chiefly railroads), amounting to 5,782 million rubles, a heavy proportion (about 85 per cent) was either acquired by the banks on their own account or went into so-called "safe hands" (*rentiers*, and others), thus remaining outside stock-exchange circulation. Making up the bulk of the latter were the stocks of private companies whose value fluctuated more markedly. These shares were the object of stock-exchange playing through on-call accounts with the banks. During 1901–1905 the total amount of on-call accounts in all of Russia's commercial banks (balances as of January 1) was valued at about 206 million rubles. By January 1, 1910, they increased to 326 million rubles and by January 1, 1913, this figure rose to 849 million rubles, attesting to a substantial increase in the volume of securities' turnover at the stock exchanges. The leading Russian stock exchange at Petersburg quoted 618 different stocks in 1912, of which 323 were state loans, state-guaranteed loans, and fixed-interest securities, and 295 were corporation shares. The total amount of capital invested in all the securities quoted represented 17 billion rubles. In addition to the Petersburg and other Russian exchanges (Moscow, Warsaw, Kharkov, Riga, and Odessa), Russian securities were quoted at foreign stock exchanges, these being chiefly loans and shares in which the banks of a given country were interested. Thus, the Paris Bourse, in addition to state securities, had a substantial turnover in the stocks of Russian metallurgical and metal-processing enterprises—Prodamet, Med, Produgol, Prodvagon, and other syndicates, and, finally, in shares of the commercial banks. At the Berlin exchange, equally influential, most attention was enjoyed by the shares of some Russian banks, the Nobel Oil Corporation, the Siemens and Halske Electrical Company, the United Cable Plants, and the General Electrical Company, all organizations under the "influence" of German banks. The Belgian Bourse quoted stocks of the coal, gas, electrical, streetcar, and similar Belgian enterprises in Russia. The London stock exchange was interested primarily in oil and mineral stock.

In this manner foreign as well as Russian finance capital found in the stock exchange a powerful and mobile device for gathering into their hands the industrial capital of Russia's corporate enterprises.

FOREIGN CAPITAL IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY One way in which foreign banking capital gained control over industry was by the disposition of its stock through Russian banks, and sometimes directly through foreign banks. A bank organized the subscriptions for the stock of the industrial enterprises, held them in its own vaults, and accepted them as security for

on-call accounts. Hence the rise of finance capital was accompanied by the development of great corporations.

After the sharp decline in the incorporation of new companies during the crisis and business lull between 1900 and 1908, new incorporations, including foreign companies, began to increase rapidly in number during 1910–1911. In the next table we can ascertain the number of corporations newly licensed during 1909–1913 in comparison with the number of companies licensed in 1900:

YEARS	TOTAL NUMBER OF CORPORATIONS		RUSSIAN COMPANIES		FOREIGN COMPANIES	
	Number	Basic Capital (Million Rubles)	Number	Basic Capital (Million Rubles)	Number	Basic Capital (Million Rubles)
1899	325	363.7	256	256.2	69	107.5
1900	202	250.7	162	201.2	40	49.5
1904	94	119.2	81	92.5	13	26.7
1909	131	108.8	116	95.9	15	12.9
1910	198	224.3	181	190.5	17	33.8
1911	262	320.9	222	240.9	40	80.0
1912	342	401.5	322	371.2	20	30.3
1913	372	545.2	343	501.1	29	44.1

We see, therefore, from the above that by 1911 the flow of new capital into industry had nearly reached the maximum figures of the preceding prosperity, and that by 1912–1913 it exceeded the level of all earlier years by a wide margin.

It is worth noting in this connection that the rise of new incorporations was only partly due to the organization of new industrial enterprises, and largely to the reorganization of erstwhile single-ownership enterprises into corporations. In fact as much as 65 to 75 per cent of the total amount of capital attracted by newly established corporations during these years went into enterprises reorganized from single ownership into corporations. Apparently the demands which monopolized industry placed upon capital were such that individually owned capital was no longer in a position to satisfy them, and only the corporate form of concentrating large quantities of capital provided adequate sources for the supply of industry with capital.

The above figures do not, however, fully cover the problem of the role of foreign capital in Russian industry at the beginning of the twentieth century. In official prerevolutionary statistics the distinction between "foreign" and "Russian" capitalist enterprises was made on the basis of the conventional indication as to whether the company operated on a "Russian" or a "foreign" charter. In reality the degree of participation of foreign capital in Russian industrial corporations was substantially greater. Because of the impossibility

of arriving at a satisfactory and accurate calculation, however, most students of this subject emerge with somewhat differing sets of figures.

According to the calculations of Voronov,[16] a total of 1,595 corporations (Russian and foreign) operated in Russia in 1900, having at their disposal a basic capital of 2,396 million rubles; these included 269 foreign companies with an aggregate capital of 691 million rubles, which amounted to 28.18 per cent of the total value of the basic capital of all corporate enterprises.

During the period 1900–1914 the number of incorporated business establishments continued its steady rise, reaching a total of 2,163 companies. As calculated by Kritsman,[17] the 2,163 enterprises classified as corporations existing in Russia before the war with a total basic capital of nearly 4 billion rubles, included 327 enterprises in which foreign capital was invested in a total of 1,340 million rubles, that is, one-seventh of all incorporated enterprises attracted foreign investments in volume equal to one-third of the total basic capital of all corporations.

This estimate of the total foreign capital corresponds rather closely to the data submitted by Ziv, who arrived at an overall figure of 1,532 million for 1914, a figure which included the banks, whose share of the foreign capital, according to his reckoning, amounted to 250 million rubles. Subtracting the latter amount, we obtain 1,282 million rubles for the incorporated industrial enterprises proper.[18]

Still another study, that of P. Ol,[19] computes the total amount of foreign capital in Russia for 1916–1917 at 2,242 million rubles. This figure includes 256 million rubles in debenture capital and 237 million rubles in credit institutions, so that Russia's industrial enterprises specifically held a total of 1,749 million rubles of foreign capital on the eve of the revolution. Since the total amount of stock capital was reckoned at about 4 billion rubles, and since the war years witnessed the addition of 997.2 million rubles in stock capital, the total amount of this capital by 1917 amounted to nearly 5 billion rubles, in which the share of foreign capital was approximately 1.7 billion rubles or about 34 per cent.

Two foreign authors, Pasvolsky and Moulton,[20] spokesmen for American capital, in an effort to compute tsarist Russia's foreign indebtedness arrive at a figure of 13,823 million rubles (after subtracting the Polish and Finnish shares of the debt). This figure includes prewar government debts amounting to 3,850 million rubles, war loans at 6,681 million rubles, government-guaranteed loans of 870 million rubles, municipal loans of 422 million rubles, and 2 billion rubles in foreign industrial investments. Divided by country, the prewar debts were contracted chiefly in France (80 per cent) and in England (14 per cent); the war debt was divided between England (70 per

cent), France (19 per cent), and the United States of America (7 per cent). Industrial investments came from France (32 per cent), England (25 per cent), Germany (16 per cent), Belgium (15 per cent), and the United States of America (6 per cent). Thus, the Entente nations (England, France, and Belgium) supplied as much as 72 per cent of all industrial investments. France, moreover, was the leading prewar creditor of the tsarist government, while England was its major source of credit during the war.

By industry, according to P. Ol, foreign corporate and debenture capital directly invested in industry in 1916–1917 was distributed as follows:

BRANCHES OF PRODUCTION	THOUSAND RUBLES
Mining industry	834,320
Metal-processing	392,710
Municipal real estate and construction	259,431
Credit institutions	237,200
Textile industry	192,494
Chemical industry	83,593
Commercial enterprises	80,715
Food-processing	37,330
Paper and printing	31,405
Transport, roads, and rolling stock	26,650
Saw-mills and wood-processing	25,737
Processing of minerals	18,239
Processing of animal products	14,450
Insurance companies	8,700
Total	2,242,974

Enterprises of the mining, metal, and metal-processing industries absorbed 1,227 million rubles, or 54.7 per cent of the total value of foreign capital. Here we may observe the greatest degree of coalescence between foreign banking capital and Russian industry.

Within the mining and metal-producing industries foreign capital was distributed in the following manner: metallurgical enterprises and blast furnaces, 268,747,000 rubles; petroleum industry, 253,520,000; coal, 159,951,000; copper industry, 60,914,000; and the gold industry, 41,792,000.

Foreign capital invested in the metallurgical and machine-building industries were distributed as follows: machine-building enterprises, 81,845,000 rubles; agricultural-machinery production, 81,128,000; metal-processing industry, 45,152,000; electro-technical, 45,353,000 rubles; and so forth.

As for foreign capital invested in municipal enterprises, the bulk of such capital went into electric-light corporations, 99,627,000 rubles; and into streetcar companies, 50,553,500.

Taking Ol's figures on the distribution of all direct foreign capital invest-

ments in the various industries as the basis for calculating the share of foreign capital in each particular industry for 1916–1917 (without considering the indirect role of foreign banking capital), we obtain the following comparison:

INDUSTRIES	TOTAL CAPITAL, STOCK AND DEBENTURE (IN MILLION RUBLES)	INCLUDING FOREIGN (IN MILLION RUBLES)	PERCENTAGE
Mining	917.8	834.3	90%
Metal-smelting and processing	937.8	392.7	42
Textile	685.4	190.5	28
Chemical	166.9	83.6	50
Wood-processing	68.8	25.7	37

The distribution of foreign capital corporation investments by nationality may be illustrated in the following manner:

CAPITAL	THOUSAND RUBLES	PERCENTAGE
French	731,746.6	32.6%
English	507,479.8	22.6
German	441,593.2	19.7
Belgian	321,602.5	14.3
American	117,750.0	5.2
Dutch	36,456.7	1.6
Swiss	33,479.1	1.5
Swedish	23,772.3	1.1
Danish	14,737.7	0.7
Austrian	7,550.0	0.4
Italian	2,506.2	0.1
Norwegian	2,300.0	0.1
Finnish	2,000.0	0.1
Total	2,242,974.1	100.0

As thus indicated, by 1917 Entente (Anglo-French-Belgian) capital accounted for 69.5 per cent of total foreign capital engaged in the industrialization of Russia, whereas German capital investments merely attained 20 per cent of this total. This fact alone helped to predetermine the side on which Russia eventually participated in the World War.

The above data may also help us answer the question of the "nationalization" or "denationalization" of Russian capital during the twentieth century. Between 1900 and 1914 corporation capital increased by 47 per cent. The share of foreign capital in the total corporate capital, however (not counting the stock held in the vaults of the banks), increased from 28 per cent in 1900 to 32 or 33 per cent in 1914. In rate of growth, foreign capital increased faster than did internal accumulation. Thus foreign capital during 1900–1913 increased by 85.5 per cent, and Russian capital by 59.3 per cent.

To be sure, these calculations are rather inaccurate and approximate. They do indicate, however, beyond any doubt that (1) in rate of growth, foreign capital investment was gaining over Russian capital investment, and (2) in absolute volume Russian capital continued to predominate.

Although in terms of absolute size Russian capital was far more important than foreign capital in the capitalist system of Russia, the system as a whole was nevertheless falling more and more under the influence of foreign capital, the latter infiltrating into the capitalist system of Russia at a rate faster than the rate of internal accumulation.

RUSSIA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS In connection with the general subject of foreign capital imports and their effect on the development of national economy, an element of considerable importance is the comparative relation between the assets imported into the country, or created within the country by means of foreign capital, and the assets exported by the country to cover profits, dividends, and the amortization of foreign capital investments. In summarization this interrelationship is usually expressed in the balance of payments of a particular country, that is, in a balance between its indebtedness to foreign capital and its own financial and commercial resources with the aid of which it can cover that indebtedness and assure foreign capital of profits and dividends.

The general balance of interrelationship between the national economy of Russia and the foreign capitalist system is composed of the following factors. Of first importance on the credit side was the importation of foreign capital in the form of investments in industry, in railway construction, in the banks and the credit economy as a whole, and in municipal and rural organizations. Another item was the investments of foreign capital in state loans, whether these were foreign loans negotiated directly by the government or Russian state loans purchased by foreign capitalists and distributed through foreign stock exchanges. Among the lesser items in the influx of foreign capital into the country may be included income from foreign tourists, expenditures of foreign ships in Russia, interest received from abroad, and others. Finally, the chief source of foreign payments and capital was the income received from abroad in payment for the exports of Russian merchandise. Conversely, on the debit side the major items were: payment of dividends and profits to foreign capital on investments in industry and in other enterprises, payment of interest on government and private loans, payment for the redemption of industrial, banking, and railroad securities when purchased by the state or private capital, as well as the many lesser items of expenditure corresponding to similar items on the credit side of the balance. Finally, the main

item in the outflow of capital from the country were the payments for imports of foreign goods.

Computation of the balance of payments is a rather complicated problem, both from the standpoint of methodology and because of the difficulty of determining the quantities that enter into its composition. From among the several known attempts to reconstruct Russia's prewar balance of payments the following data may be cited: [21]

The balance of payments for Russia during 1881–1897 and 1898–1913 were (in thousand rubles):

CREDIT	1881–1897	1898–1913
Receipts from exports	10,775	17,435
Investment of foreign capital:		
a) In industrial enterprises	200	1,500
b) In private railroad contruction	550	—
c) In credit institutions	—	350
d) In municipal economy	—	375
Government loans	1,050	2,000
Other receipts	125	240
Balance	12,700	21,900

DEBIT	1881–1897	1898–1913
Payments for imports	8,140	13,313
Interests and dividends paid abroad	2,900	5,000
Redemption of securities:		
a) Banking	100	—
b) Railway	—	400
Expenditures by Russians abroad	1,000	2,000
Other expenditures	287	415
Increase of gold reserve	273	772
Balance	12,700	21,900

As may be seen from these approximate calculations, Russia's balance of payments, during 1898–1913 particularly, were maintained primarily, on the one hand, by an increase in foreign indebtedness (capital investments and government loans up to 4,225 million rubles), and by a favorable balance of trade (4,122 million rubles) based on forced exports, on the other. The enormous payments on debts, amounting to 5,400 million rubles, which erased the favorable balance of trade, made it necessary to continue foreign borrowing. At the same time the increasing intensity of exports yielded a considerable balance of gold that went in the form of gold cash into the State Bank. This invested capital and gold formed the foundation of the "financial

prosperity" required for the development of industrial capitalism. But, as may be seen from the above figures, this foundation was built up either by exports (chiefly agricultural products) or by an ever increasing industrial or state indebtedness to foreign capital.

This indicates not only the financial backwardness of Russia but also the danger of perpetuating its dependence upon foreign capital and its semi-colonial character.

A SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT By these stages Russia's system of finance capital reached a rather striking degree of development by 1909–1914. Its banking capital had built up a vast network of credit and banking agencies for the concentration of the country's monetary resources in several dominant centers—the financial oligarchy. The monopolization of industry and the banks created a high degree of fusion between banking capital and industry, aiding in the formation of a powerful finance capital. But Russia's system of capitalism still was far from being an entirely independent national system. The general social-economic backwardness of tsarist Russia contributed to keeping the nation in the position of a minor appendage of the Western imperialist powers. Imperialism in Russia was patently a "military-feudal imperialism" with its tsarist political system, its social domination by the feudal landowner class, its caricature of national representation, and its policy of colonial oppression of the nationalities of the borderlands. The political weakness of the bourgeoisie, frightened by the revolutionary movement of the working class and dependent upon government orders, reduced it to a position of subservience to tsarism and into an alliance with it. At the same time both the tsarist regime and Russian capitalism were inextricably dependent upon foreign capital. Despite an impressive rate of capital accumulation within Russia, foreign capital began during 1900–1914 to consolidate its position of dominance in Russian banking and industry. Through the system of state credit and state loans to the industrial and banking monopolies, foreign finance capital expanded its power and influence in the Russian economy. It strove to gain for itself a free hand in the exploitation of the national economy of Russia as a semicolony for the purpose of draining her cheap raw materials, as an outlet for the profitable investment of capital, and even more as an ally with a huge army ready to be used in the imperialist partition of the world.

Tsarist military-feudal, imperialist Russia of the twentieth century joined the system of imperialist powers as a large and powerful, but rather backward participant, and ultimately proved to be the weakest link in that imperialist system during the clash of interests for the partition of the world.

Notes

1. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XIX, p. 93.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
4. *Perspektivnaya orientirovka na 1927–1928–1931–1932 gg.* (Perspective Orientation for 1927-1928–1931-1932) (State Planning Commission of the USSR, Moscow, 1928), p. 12, and also *Kontrolnyve tsifry narodnogo khozyaistva na 1926–1927 g.* (Control Figures of the National Economy for 1926–1927), p. 214.
5. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XVI, pp. 94-95.
6. Prokopovich, *Opyt ischisleniya narodnogo dokhoda po 50 guberniyam Yevropeiskoi Rossii v 1900–1913* (Experiment in the Calculation of the National Income for 50 Provinces of European Russia in 1900–1913) (1918), pp. 67 ff.
7. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XIX, p. 99. Data for Russia have been taken from the official reports of the savings banks and other banks cited in the text and converted into marks at the prewar rate of exchange of Russian currency.
8. Prepared on the basis of the *Yezhegodnik ministerstva finansov* (Annual of the Ministry of Finance) for the respective years.
9. Report of the State Bank for 1913.
10. These and subsequent figures have been taken from the summary balances of the banks as well as from the *Yezhegodnik ministerstva finansov* (1910).
11. Compiled on the basis of the balances as of Jan. 1, 1909 and 1913; for the Municipal Banks as of Jan. 1, 1909 and 1913; *Yezhegodnik ministerstva finansov* for the respective years.
12. *Krasnyi arkhiv* (Red Archive), Vol. IV, Letter from Kokovtsov to Netslin written Sept. 21, 1909.
13. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XIX, p. 302.
14. Brandt, *Torgovo-promyshlennyi krizis v Zapadnoi Yevrope i v Rossii* (The Commercial-Industrial Crisis in Western Europe and in Russia) (1902), Pt. 2, p. 53, and Levin, *Aktsionernyye kommercheskiye banki* (Joint-Stock Commercial Banks) (1917), p. 267.
15. See Note 5, Chap. XXXII.
16. Voronov, *Inostrannyye kapitaly v Rossii* (Foreign Capital in Russia) (1901), p. 22.
17. Kritsman, "Russkaya promyshlennost' pered revolutsiei" (Russian Industry Before the Revolution), in *Yezhegod. Komin.* (Annual of the Comintern) (1923), p. 334.
18. Ziv, *Inostrannyye kapitaly v russkoi gornoi promyshlennosti* (Foreign Capital in the Russian Mining Industry), p. 123.
19. Ol, *Inostrannyye kapitaly v Rossii* (1922).
20. L. Pasvolsky and H. Moulton, *Russian Debts and Russian Reconstruction* (1925), pp. 26-27.
21. Engeyev, "O platezhnom balanse dovoyennoi Rossii" (On the Prewar Balance of Payments of Russia), in *Vestnik finansov* (Finance Herald) (1928), No. 5, p. 82.

(XXXV)

The International Acquisitions and Colonial Policy of Tsarism in the Era of Imperialism

WE SHALL now turn to the final problem connected with the nature of imperialism in Russia as depicted by Lenin; namely, the participation of imperialist Russia in the international politics of imperialist powers and the imperialist struggle for a redivision of the world and the acquisition of colonies. This problem is of utmost importance not only in an evaluation of imperialist economy but also in understanding this economy as the last stage in the "decay" of capitalism, when the colonies and the dependent countries turn "from reserves of imperialism" into reserves of the proletarian revolution.

The colonial problem in Russia, as we have seen earlier, was unique in resulting, during the early preindustrial phase of capitalism, in the formation of a multinational state and a system of "internal colonies" and "national borderlands" within the boundaries of the Russian state. During the imperialist era the colonial problem in Russia appeared as one of the manifestations of the general economy of imperialism and monopoly capitalism.

In his report to the tenth party congress on current problems facing the party in connection with the problem of nationality, Stalin traced the various phases of development in the national-colonial problem during the era of imperialism, and indicated that the growth of capitalism in Europe and the search for new markets, new sources of raw material and fuel, and new outlets for the exportation of capital

> intensified among the ruling nations of the old multinational states a tendency not only to retain the old national frontiers but also to expand their state boundaries, and to the subjugation of new (weak) nationalities among its neighboring states. As a consequence, the problem of nationality broadened considerably, and in the end was merged by the march of events with the general problem of colonies, and the oppression of nationalities changed from an intrastate problem into an international problem, into a problem of conflict (and war) among the "great" imperialist powers for the subjugation of the weak, nonsovereign nationalities.[1]

In fact, we have noted earlier that during the phase of industrial capitalism tsarist Russia possessed a vast reserve of "internal colonies," which were exploited by capitalism as a ready source of raw material for the industries

of the home provinces and a market for the products of these industries. This was invariably accompanied by colonial oppression that doomed the national borderlands to a backward colonial existence, causing not only the stifling of their national culture and economy, but also a serious lag in their national capitalist development.

With the entry of Russian capitalism into the imperialist phase of development, Russia began, along with the other groups of imperialist powers, to take part in the world struggle for new colonial conquests and a new partition of the world.

In spite of the fact that after building up a tremendous "international" colonial reserve, Russian capitalism was incapable of assimilating it fully either as a source of raw material for its industry or as a market for its finished goods, its colonial ambition continued to impel it beyond the state frontiers. The economic ambitions of Russian capitalism extended to a number of semicolonial countries bounding the empire on the south and the east —Turkey, Perisa, Afghanistan, and China. As stated earlier, tsarist Russia's policy of conquest toward her "internal colonies," her territorial expansion to the borderlands, or the economic conquest of the latter by Russian capitalism encountered no serious obstacle from the outside and produced no impression of extraordinary ambition (a fact that had attracted the attention of Marx in his articles on Anglo-Russian relations). In its external colonial drive, however, Russian tsarism was confronted with vigorous opposition on the part of its rivals, the other imperialist aggressors, as early as the second half of the nineteenth century. In this respect the position of Russian imperialism was marked by a certain amount of contradiction and duplicity. On the one hand the imperialist regime of Russia was "a most loyal ally" of Western imperialism in the partitioning of Turkey, Persia, and China, taking its place beside the Entente imperialists in a war against Germany for the division of these countries. Here Russia entertained and pursued her selfish imperialistic aims, with the latter enjoying the support of her allies. But the predatory imperialist plans of the tsarist regime were opposed by the imperialist powers not only in the West (in the Balkans, for example) but frequently even in the East, in Turkey, Persia, and China, where even the allies of tsarism limited the imperialist conquests of tsarist Russia. Even in the twentieth century the Russian drive for territorial expansion encountered a number of powerful opponents, who raised insuperable obstacles against further colonial acquisitions by tsarism. In the struggle for the "division of the world," Russian capitalism and imperialism were opposed originally by England, then by Germany, and finally by Japan. Hence the results of Russia's territorial expansion during the twentieth century were far less impressive than her sweeping colonial conquests of the eighteenth and nine-

teenth centuries. Russian capitalism did, nevertheless, achieve notable success in extending its economic domination over several colonial and semicolonial nations.

Even before Russian capitalism had finally launched upon its imperialist career and committed itself to an essentially imperialist colonial policy (as early as the eighteenth century), the various directions of its colonial and conquest-seeking ambitions had become rather clearly outlined.

In one direction it aimed at the possession of the Dardanelles, which promised to provide Russian imperialism with an outlet to the broad lanes of the semilandlocked Mediterranean Sea. This was one of the oldest nationalist-chauvinist ambitions of Russian tsarism. It was motivated economically by the need for a free outlet for the wheat, petroleum, coal, and pig iron of South Russia, and the manufactured goods of the Moscow area. Along this path of expansion, Russian tsarism and capitalism had always, not only in periods of hostility and rivalry, but even in times of "cordial agreement," met with implacable opposition from England and even Germany.

In another direction Russia's territorial expansion led through Persia and through the northern provinces, which had long been under Russian influence, toward the South Persian coastline, the Persian Gulf, and from there to the open sea. Along this path, especially in her movement toward the south, Russia was likewise confronted by England, which had entrenched herself firmly in control of South Persian petroleum and the Persian shores as a base for its fleet, and only on these terms did she allow Russian tsarism a free hand in North Persia.

A third direction of Russian territorial ambitions was a continued drive into the Middle East through Afghanistan and the Pamirs, along the most direct route to India. This ambition, which, as we have seen earlier, dates historically from the time of Peter I, was considered by England as fraught with the greatest danger to her interests. Consequently Russia's military movement in this direction was halted during the nineties by an agreement with England calling for the mutual recognition of "neutral" zones and nonintervention by Russia in Afghan and Tibetan affairs.

Finally, the final and newest direction in the expansion of Russian capitalism was the Far East—Manchuria, Mongolia, and Korea. This direction was considered by many Russian imperialists as being the most painless (and by others, like Witte, as the most unnecessary). It was here, in fact, that Russian tsarism suffered its first and greatest military defeat in the course of the Russo-Japanese War.

We shall now take up in somewhat greater detail the various imperialist conquests made by Russia in various alliances with the other imperialist powers in the course of the twentieth century.

TURKEY One of the nearest semicolonial countries susceptible to the economic pressure of Russian capitalism was Turkey. A semicolony of European capital since the period of industrial capitalism, and more particularly during the late phase of imperialist rivalry, Turkey soon also became the object of colonial aggression on the part of Russian capitalism. The economic penetration by Russian capitalism was expressed primarily in the sale of consumer-industry products, in which Russian capitalism had gained a favorable market for itself by virtue of the short distances and convenient communications between the two countries, the cheap price (and poor quality) of its products, and several other factors in the sale of such goods (such as the dumping of sugar and flour). Consequently Russian capital enjoyed a somewhat more favorable position in Turkey than, say, English capital.

In any event, in the adjacent Turkish regions, primarily in Constantinople, along the Black Sea coast of Asia Minor, and partly along the Mediterranean Sea, Russian goods were sold in significant quantities and frequently even dominated local markets. For example, in Constantinople it was easy to note the preponderance, almost to the complete exclusion of all other competitors, of Russian textiles, tableware, sugar, and other items. The latter products fully dominated the market at Constantinople and throughout the regions adjacent to Russia.

But even here, especially since the middle nineties, Russian capitalism began to yield to the competition of the remarkably expanded German industries. The more efficient capitalism of Germany came into the area not only with the products of its light industries but also with its finance capital. It rapidly began to acquire a position of leadership in the industrial and banking circles of Turkey, and to force out Russian competitive goods. Only merchandise not in competition with German industry, such as flour and sugar, held their position in Constantinople. German capital likewise attained a dominant position in the country's banking and finance.

From the standpoint of Russian imperialist capitalism, the penetration of Russian goods into Turkey was insufficient. Its economic impulse, as well as the chauvinist and nationalist ambitions of tsarism, called for Constantinople and the Straits. Although England remained steadfast in its refusal to permit Russia access to Constantinople, this idea finds its first acceptance diplomatically during the Franco-Russian alliance of 1891. By this time France's relations with England had become strained because of the rapid rate of French colonial expansion (the Fashoda incident of 1898, and so forth), while the troops of tsarist Russia in Middle Asia were conveniently stationed almost at the frontier of India. The alliance of Russia and France was, therefore, at that time directed not so much against Germany as against England.

But France was also against the dismemberment of Turkey, and only considerably later, in 1912, was she ready to recognize diplomatically "the need, in the interest of both allies, of facilitating the Russian problem concerning the control of the Black Sea." [2]

But the issue of the actual control over Constantinople was decided by Germany. Preparations for German economic aggression against Turkey had been in process a long time. As early as the thirties of the nineteenth century, F. List called attention to the vital significance for Germany to gain control over Turkish territory. During the alliance with Austria, German goods traveled over a direct land route from Berlin to the interior of Turkey, as far as Bagdad, without running the risk of an encounter with the English on the sea. This was the basis of the "Turkophile" policy of Wilhelm II. In 1899 this policy came to fruition in a project for a German-built direct railroad line between Berlin and Bagdad by way of Constantinople. This road implied complete economic dominance by Germany not only in Turkey but also, in part, in Persia, Syria, and Mesopotamia. The Berlin-Bagdad railway aggravated relations between Germany and England, and the latter henceforth began to veer more closely toward the Paris-Petersburg "axis." The crucial move taken to secure imperialist Germany's hegemony over Turkey came almost on the eve of the war, in 1913, when Germany obtained the right to reorganize and train the entire Turkish Army, thereby assuring herself an ally in the impending imperialist clash. Although this event evoked considerable alarm in Russia, Germany succeeded in accomplishing her domination and leadership over Turkey's finances as well as her army. Russian imperialism, on the other hand, had to restrain its designs upon Constantinople up to the World War. Only in the course of the war, and after considerable argument, did tsarism obtain the consent of its imperialist allies to eventual Russian acquisition of Constantinople and the Straits.

PERSIA The penetration of Russian capitalism into Persia was comparatively more successful. Here Russian capitalism was less bothered by German competition, while English goods and English capital constituted a real challenge. However, by virtue of convenient communications, proximity of frontiers, and a number of other advantages, the efforts of Russian capital met with considerable economic success in Persia, while the tsarist regime made serious political inroads. After a prolonged struggle with England, which at times approached the stage of military conflict, the affair finally ended in 1907 in an agreement on the division of Persia into spheres of influence, a division by no means favorable to England. England at that time was passing through a difficult stage not only with regard to its intense economic struggle against Germany but also in connection with a number

of internal difficulties, and, above all, lived in a continued state of alarm over the route to India as long as Russian troops were deployed in the Middle East. In return for Russian nonintervention in Afghan and Tibetan affairs and a pledge to stabilize Russia's frontiers in this region, England agreed to the demarcation of "spheres of influence" in Persia. By the agreement of 1907, all Persia was divided into two zones and predominant "spheres of influence." England, whose interests in Persia were chiefly concerned with the country's petroleum riches and the naval ports in the south, kept within her sphere of influence the southern portion of Persia, south of a line running from the Afghan frontier to Bender-Abbas. All of northern Persia, better developed and more useful as a market, along with its leading political centers, came within the sphere of Russian economic and political influence. Although a middle zone was left neutral, Russia's favorable geographic position led most observers to believe that this zone, too, would soon fall under Russian influence, and would eventually become another Russian "province" as a direct extension of Russia's Transcaucasian possessions. The tsarist government actually began without delay to "master the situation" in its own manner, sending a Cossack brigade in 1906 in support of the Shah during his conflict with the Medzhlis (Persian parliament), and supplying the followers of the Shah with arms. In the civil war that broke out in 1908, Russia sent money and troops to help the Shah crush the revolution. Although the agreement between Russia and England on the allocation of spheres of influence within Persia was considered in some quarters (in Germany, for example) as tantamount to a diplomatic defeat for England, the agreement of 1907 had the added significance of undermining German plans in Turkey and Persia. In this manner the alignment of the two imperialist groups of powers, the Entente and the German group, was once more confirmed in preparation of the future World War.

The importance of the economic advantages gained by Russian capitalism in Persia may be judged by the fact that during the second half of the nineties all capitalist nations of western Europe together sold to Persia less than half the amount of goods involved in the commercial turnover with Russia alone.

The sale of Russian industrial goods in Persia followed a pattern typical for the economy of so backward a country with a poorly developed industry, Russia sending chiefly textiles, tableware, small metal products, some tools, and so forth. In the sale of such goods Russian capitalism achieved considerable success.

Russian capitalism did not confine itself, however, to the sale of goods in Persia. At quite an early stage it began to reveal its financial-imperialist ambi-

tion. During the nineties Russia founded the Persian Loan Bank, thus drawing Persia into the orbit of Russian finance capital. Later, Russian capital obtained concessions to build railways, to mine coal, and to extract petroleum. During 1900–1902 Russia advanced two loans to Persia totaling 32.5 million rubles. In other words Russian capital proceeded to behave here as "finance capital," performing the function of an "exporter of capital" along with its exportation of goods—a circumstance rather rare in the policy and the achievements of Russian capitalism. However, aside from the construction of railways, most enterprises of Russian finance capital in Persia did not develop greatly.[3]

AFGHANISTAN As stated above, tsarist Russia's drive to penetrate India through Central Asia dates back to the eighteenth century. Historically, it was a constant source of fear for England. During the Russian occupation of Merv in 1885, and her march to the borders of Afghanistan, especially after the occupation of the rich Afghan oasis of Pendzhe, the danger became quite acute, and England halted Russia's movements. After Russia's occupation of the Pamirs, and her attempt to penetrate by "scientific expeditions" into Tibet, an area considered as in England's sphere of influence, the fears of the British were once more aroused. By the above-mentioned agreement of 1907, England made a number of concessions in Persia in order to achieve a final halt in Russia's military march toward India and Afghanistan. Inasmuch as Russian imperialism was more interested in a "free hand" in the Near East, it readily agreed to these terms. Consequently no economic causes ever arose to motivate further penetration into Afghanistan beyond the existing frontiers in Central Asia.

THE FAR EAST One of the more important phases in the imperialist venture of Russian capitalism into colonial conquest was its drive to the Far East, beyond its own political frontiers, into China, Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea.

The penetration of Russian commercial capital into these regions, as shown above, had its historical origin in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Immediately after the conquest of Siberia, Russian tradesmen began to penetrate into China and Mongolia through Kyakhta, and to establish permanent commercial relations with those areas. Of interest to us now, however, is not this previously examined period but the period of industrial and imperialist capitalism.

After the construction of the Siberian railroad, the commercial ties between these semicolonies and Russian capitalism were rooted primarily in the fact that Mongolia constituted a major source of animal raw material.

The Russian textile, wool, leather, and related industries always suffered from a shortage in their own supply of wool, hides, and skins. Mongolia became one of the important centers for the supply of such raw materials. In addition, it was capable of becoming a rather important market for the sale of Russian industrial goods, although potentially not as strong in purchasing power as the markets in Persia or Turkey.

As for China, besides so vital a food product as tea, which this country exported to Russia, commercial relations consisted largely of the supply of a considerable volume of goods from Moscow's light-industry factories to this semicolony.

The drive toward Manchuria and Korea, however, was somewhat different in character, and belonged more properly to the more recent imperialist phase. In Korea and Manchuria Russian imperialist capitalism sought not only a market for the disposition of its finished goods and the procurement of raw materials but also an outlet for its own capital. The construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria (at a cost of 375 million rubles) and the organization of timber and other concessions were forms of "capital export" quite new (and rather "adventurous" in character) for Russian capitalism. In this direction the ambitions of Russian capitalism encountered the stubborn resistance of imperialist Japan, and the latter inflicted a profound and irreparable breach in the position of Russian imperialism in the Far East. This brought a sudden end to the tsarist regime's attempt at penetration of the Far East, and to its struggle for the partition of that area with rival imperialist powers.

The last attempt of Russian autocracy and imperialism to join in the struggle for a redivision of the world in alliance with one of the two major imperialistic groups, in support of its claims to the Turkish "straits" and to the territory of its erstwhile semicolony Turkey, brought Russia into the World War of 1914–1917. Participation in this war proved to be crucial in the destiny of Russian autocracy and capitalism, and we shall, therefore, examine the economy of this period of world imperialist struggle in a separate chapter.

Notes

1. Stalin, *Marxism i natsionalno-kolonialnyi vopros* (Marxism and the National-Colonial Problem) (1937), pp. 204-205.
2. Tarle, *Yevropa v epokhu imperializma* (Europe in the Age of Imperialism) (1928), p. 214.
3. On the subject of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia, see Parker T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (1928), pp. 173-187.

(XXXVI)

Agriculture During the Era of Imperialism and the New Agrarian Policy

THE INDUSTRIAL prosperity of the late nineties and the end of the world agrarian crisis were marked by a new wave of prosperity in the realm of agriculture. During the first decade of the twentieth century, and especially under the impact of the new industrial prosperity of 1909–1913, agriculture's own prosperity attained considerable proportions. The indexes of agricultural development (the size of planted acreage, the expansion of industrial crops and livestock economy, the growth of commercial farming, exports, farm income, and so forth) showed an upward trend throughout this period.

However, the chronic dependence of Russian capitalism on foreign capital and the general social-economic backwardness of Russia affected the position and the development of rural economy most unfavorably. Foreign capital continued to utilize Russia as a vast source of cheap agricultural raw material, extending its control by monopolistic commercial and transport combines over the routes and markets along which Russia's agricultural products were sold. The vestiges of semifeudal conditions and the still existing feudal latifundia retarded the rate at which capitalist institutions developed in the village even during the period of imperialism. Consequently, even at the end of the nineteenth century, in the words of Lenin, the "crux" of the agrarian problem, and with it the success of capitalist development in Russia, remained, as before, the feudal latifundia and the need for "breaking up the medieval system of landownership."

During the late nineteenth century, and particularly in the first decade of the twentieth century, industrial capitalism scored remarkable successes on the Russian economic scene. It had "undermined irrevocably the whole basis of the old agrarian order in Russia." It could not "expand further without breaking up that order. . . . The old class commune, the attachment of the peasants to the land, and the routine of the semifeudal village came into sharp contradiction with the new economic conditions." [1]

This gave rise to the economic necessity for "a new agrarian policy," the necessity for the ruling serf-owning class to renounce its erstwhile policy "of *preserving* the old communal system of peasant land tenure," [2] and for a

change in the direction of "relying on the strong peasant," that is, on individual landownership of the kulak type.


As was the case in 1861, however, the peasant unrest of 1902 and the subsequent uprising of 1905–1906 made it apparent that the peasantry was intent upon a "peasant purge of the land," upon the "American" road of development, and upon the destruction of the feudal latifundia.

With the suppression of the 1905 revolution, the attempt of the peasantry to carry out its own "peasant purge of the land" against the feudal latifundia ended in defeat. The autocratic-landowner government, having crushed the revolution of 1905, decided to launch its own "new agrarian policy" and effect "a second landowner purge of the land" and a "landowner dissolution" of the medieval agrarian order. Stolypin's agrarian reform of 1906–1910 implemented this new agrarian policy, relying on the "strong peasant" in his "free" individual land tenure, and at the same time on the "forcible destruction of the commune and the accelerated impoverishment and extermination of the mass of pauperized small owners for the benefit of a handful of kulaks."[3]

Hence, in examining the nature of rural economic development and agrarian conditions in Russia during the twentieth century, we must consider four basic factors: (1) technical conditions of production prevailing in agriculture; (2) ever increasing dependence upon foreign capital and semicolonial conditions in the export of agricultural raw materials; (3) increased revolutionary activities of the peasantry during 1905–1906 on behalf of the "American way" of development and abolition of the feudal latifundia; and (4) the "new agrarian policy" of the autocratic-landowner government that followed the victory of reaction during 1907–1912.

THE POSITION OF AGRICULTURE The two periods of recent industrial prosperity, the late nineties and 1909–1913, made their imprint upon agriculture in the form of a sharp increase in general output and, particularly, in the form of a greater intensification of production. The total planted area in the seventy-one provinces of European and Asiatic Russia increased from 88.3 million *dessyatins* in 1901–1905 to 97.6 million *dessyatins* in 1911–1913, with the acreage of the nonblack-soil zone remaining almost at the old level (21.3 million and 21.8 million *dessyatins*), while the planted area in the black-soil belt increased by 14.1 per cent (from 49.7 million to 56.7 million *dessyatins*), and Asiatic Russia almost doubled its sown area (from 5.1 million to 9.5 million *dessyatins*).

The process of intensification in agriculture was manifested during these years by a slow but quite evident increase in acreage under industrial crops,


GRAIN YIELDS ON
PEASANT ALLOTMENTS
1909 – 1913
0 125 250 375 500
Kilometers
Archangel
Petrozavodsk
Helsingfors
Reval
St. Petersburg
Novgorod
Pskov
Mitau
Riga
Kovno
Vilno
Grodno
Minsk
Warsaw
Kholm
Vitebsk
Smolensk
Mogilev
Moscow
Kaluga
Tula
Orel
Chernigov
Kursk
Zhitomir
Kiev
Poltava
Kharkov
Kamenets Podolsk
Yekaterinoslav
Kishinev
Novocherkassk
Kherson
Simferopol
Yekaterinodar
Stavropol
Vladikavkaz
Tiflis
Baku
Astrakhan
Yaroslavl
Kostroma
Volugda
Vyatka
Perm
Vladimir
Nizhni Novgorod
Kazan
Ufa
Ryazan
Simbirsk
Tambov
Penza
Samara
Orenburg
Saratov
Voronezh
Uralsk
YIELD PER HECTARE (IN CENTNERS)
Up to 6.00
6.01–7.00
7.01–8.00
8.01–9.00
Over 9.00
No data
Boundary of crop predominance: rye to the north, wheat to the south

root crops, fodder grasses, and so forth—crops requiring a much greater investment of capital than required for cereal grains. Thus, during the three five-year periods preceding the war, the planted area of the seventy-one provinces of the former empire increased in the following manner (in thousand *dessyatins*): [4]

YEARS	TOTAL ACREAGE	INCLUDING CEREAL GRAINS AND LEGUMINOUS PLANTS	INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER CROPS
1901–1905	88,289	81,843	6,446
1906–1910	92,057	85,605	6,452
1911–1913	97,630	90,645	6,985

The cereal grains continued, of course, in a position of overwhelming importance in the nation's agricultural economy during the twentieth century. The acreage under industrial and special crops (potato, sunflower, tobacco, sugar-beet, and cotton) increased conspicuously in proportion, although in absolute volume it was rather unimpressive. During the period under examination the greatest rise in sown area occurred in cotton (111.6 per cent), sunflowers (61 per cent), sugar beets (39.5 per cent), tobacco (18.5 per cent), and potatoes (15.8 per cent). Fodder crops rose by 79.3 per cent, while the acreage under the old textile fibers, flax and hemp, declined by 11.1 per cent. The cereal grains made a gain of 10.8 per cent in their acreage. Specifically, the increase in grain cultivation occurred almost entirely in the southern and borderland provinces. Thus, during this period the acreage under grain through the entire nonblack-soil belt increased from 15.39 to 15.61 million *dessyatins,* that is, by a mere 1.4 per cent, and the acreage under potato, flax, and hemp from 1,650 to 1,820 *dessyatins,* that is, by 10.3 per cent, while in the northern Caucasus the total sown area was expanded from 4.68 to 6.88 million *dessyatins,* or 47 per cent; and in the steppe region, from 2.87 to 4.67 million *dessyatins,* or 62.7 per cent; generally by expanding the acreage under cereal grains.[5]

In European Russia every 100 *dessyatins* of planted area averaged the following:

	GRAINS		ROOT CROPS		FODDER GRASSES	
	1901–1905	1913	1901–1905	1913	1901–1905	1913
Nonblack soil	86.3	84.4	5.1	5.8	1.6	3.0
Black soil	92.5	91.4	3.6	4.0	0.5	0.7
Total	91.0	89.7	3.9	4.4	0.8	1.4

the impossibility of effecting "a peasant dissolution" of feudal medieval relationships and destruction of the feudal latifundia without overthrowing the power of tsarism. Consequently, despite the defeat of the revolution among both the working class and the peasantry, the situation was ripe for a new revolutionary upheaval.

A NEW AGRARIAN POLICY LAUNCHED BY TSARIST GOVERNMENT The agrarian unrest of 1902 and the subsequent agrarian revolutionary movement of 1905–1906 impelled the government to reexamine the basis of the agrarian policy which it had firmly pursued since the reactionary period of 1880–1890. The government now began to regard the continued social isolation of the peasantry, the reallotting commune, mutual responsibility, and other features inherent in its earlier policy as a vicious survival of the old system which perpetuated among the peasantry the belief in "the right of all to the land," the idea of the public character of land, as opposed to the bourgeois principle of personal and inviolate private property. In order to maintain and propagate these new ideas of private property, it was necessary to seek support among the new bourgeois strata of the "strong" peasantry and to help remove them from the equalizing influence of the peasant commune. On the other hand, in order to gain the confidence of the middle peasantry, the government decided to bestow certain favors upon them by reducing the burden of agrarian redemption payments and by some expansion of land-credit facilities for the middle and kulak groups. By this policy the government sought to create under the new conditions a stable political and economic base in the form of a numerous village bourgeois class—the kulaks and a portion of the middle-peasant elements.


Since the very beginning of the twentieth century, the problem of rural conditions and the danger of "a revolution from below," due to the extremely difficult and inferior status of the peasantry, became a very important problem of economic policy and the concern of numerous government commissions. The crop failure of 1901 was responsible for bringing into existence a commission for inquiring into the causes of impoverishment in the central region,[18] and after the peasant disturbances of 1902 the Ministry for Internal Affairs organized special "editorial commissions" for the review of all legislation affecting the peasantry, including many important issues of economic policy: landownership, the commune, mutual responsibility, and others.[19] Finally, in 1902 a special Conference on the Needs of the Agricultural Industry under the chairmanship of Witte was convened with great publicity. Besides the central agency consisting of officials and representatives of the "public," such as landowners and rural councillors, 618 local

committees were organized, including 536 county committees with a membership of up to 12,000 persons, all recruited from the landowners, officials, and representatives of the rural administration (with only 2 per cent from the peasantry).

The voluminous reports of these local commissions on the needs of agricultural industry originated the ideas that were later incorporated into the main provisions of the Stolypin Reform of 1906. The local commissions traced the cause of peasant distress to technological backwardness. Consequently a majority of the commissions urged the abolition of the old three-field system in favor of the multifield system, recommending specifically the planting of grass and root crops. But inasmuch as the way to technological improvement in the village was blocked by the commune, most of the commissions concluded that it was necessary to help transform the village communes into individual farmstead ownership, granting the individual peasant the right to separate his allotment from the communal landholdings irrespective of the wishes of the commune. They also stressed the need of removing the disabilities imposed upon the peasantry in the realm of civil and personal rights.[20]

The revolutionary movement and agrarian disturbances of 1905 created a panic among the nobility. At about the same time Professor Magulin and N. Kutler made public their proposals for the partial alienation of privately owned land, proposals championed by the Cadet party.[21] But with the suppression of the revolution and the new reign of reaction, these projects were abandoned upon the demand of the Congress of the United Nobility. Even Witte's Special Conference was considered too radical and was disbanded. The nobility expressed itself in favor of the "new agrarian program" proposed by Stolypin.[22] In order to "pacify" the peasantry, a number of "reforms" were promulgated, such as the law of November 3, 1905, on redemption payments (which, it may be pointed out, had already been paid in full, and, according to the reckoning of some authors, even in excess, by the peasants).[23] New regulations were introduced for the expansion of the facilities of the Peasant Bank, for the transfer of some crown lands to the bank to be distributed among the peasants (August 12, 1905), along with some fiscal lands for the same purpose (August 27, 1905), followed by new regulations on land tenure (March 4, 1906), and other measures.

STOLYPIN'S REFORM With these measures the tsarist government readied its new agrarian policy, which was intended to prevent the recurrence of agrarian violence and to remove the menace of "land redistribution by mobs" and the violation of inalienable private property rights.


PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS WITHOUT HORSES
Based on Cavalry Census of 1912
0 125 250 375 500
Kilometers
PERCENTAGE BY PROVINCES
Less than 20
20–30
30–40
40–50
Over 50
No data
Archangel
Petrozavodsk
Helsingfors
Reval
St Petersburg
Novgorod
Vologda
Vyatka
Perm
Pskov
Riga
Mitau
Kostroma
Yaroslavl
Tver
N Novgorod
Kovno
Vilno
Vladimir
Kazan
Ufa
Moscow
Vitebsk
Smolensk
Ryazan
Grodno
Minsk
Kaluga
Mogilev
Tula
Simbirsk
Warsaw
Penza
Samara
Orenburg
Orel
Tambov
Ivangorod
Kholm
Chernigov
Saratov
Kursk
Zhitomir
Kiev
Voronezh
Uralsk
Kamenets Podolsk
Poltava
Kharkov
Yekaterinoslav
Kishinev
Novocherkassk
Kherson
Astrakhan
Simferopol
Yekaterinodar
Stavropol
Vladikavkaz
Tiflis
Odessa
Uralsk
Tobolsk
Yakutsk
Baku
Turgai
Tomsk
Krasnoyarsk
Akmolinsk
Kokand
Semipalatinsk
Irkutsk
Chita
Blagoveshchensk
Khabarovsk
Bukhara
Tashkent
Samarkand
Verny
Jarkend
Vladivostok
700 0 700 1400
Kilometers

1901–1905, may be expressed in the following relative figures (1901–1905 = 100): [10]

	GROWTH OF SHIPMENTS	GROWTH OF EXPORTS
Cereal grains	122	107
Sugar beets	246	98
Potatoes	161	365
Sugar	159	207
Spirits	160	409
Starch	167	1,527
Flax and hemp	131	131
Tobacco	136	192
Meat	1,119	227
Eggs	141	127
Dairy products, total	212	204
Butter	159	200
Poultry, slaughtered	150	180

As may be seen above, the selling trend in industrial crops and their products, as well as in animal products, increased during 1901–1913 to a much greater extent than in the products of extensive farming, chiefly cereal grains. At the same time, too, the "export trend" in industrial crops increased still further, along with that of several animal products (butter and slaughtered poultry). In contrast, the increase in exports of cereal grains, sugar beets, and potatoes did not keep pace with the general growth of the commercial trend in agriculture.

In this manner the role of the domestic market for agricultural goods increased substantially during the first ten to fifteen years of the twentieth century under the impact of an expanding industrial capitalism. Export of farm products, however, comprised an unusually large, and sometimes an overwhelming, proportion of total sales. Thus, if we look at the percentage of export shipments to general railroad movements, we find that during 1901–1905 and 1911–1913 the proportion of export shipments was as follows:

	1901–1905	1911–1913
Cereal grains	57.9	45.8
Flax	75.3	75.6
Hemp	52.5	48.2
Bran	77.0	73.8
Potatoes	11.3	26.4
Sugar	12.6	16.4

Hence nearly half the grain carried by the railroads went into exports, and for flax and bran the proportion was as high as three-fourths. Products of intensified farming, such as potatoes and sugar, while going to the foreign markets in considerably smaller proportions, still increased their exports

significantly during the ten-year period. The old formula: "We shall eat a little less but we shall export," enunciated in the eighties by Minister Vyshnegradsky, still remained in force after 1900. The increasing supplies of colonial raw material sent to the foreign market from Russia were made possible by the hunger and poverty of the mass of the population.

Foreign capital exploited Russia largely as a semicolony and as a source of cheap grain and a number of industrial raw materials. The results were sometimes disastrous both for the particular branch of agriculture as well as for the industry processing this raw material. More than one-half of Russia's flax production went abroad: of the 24 million poods of flax fiber harvested throughout twenty-seven flax-raising provinces during 1900–1912, the foreign market received 14.7 million poods while domestic factories processed a total of 3.4 million poods. This left about 6 million poods for processing by the handicraft industries and for consumption within the peasant household. Quite apart from the uneconomical aspect of this situation, it resulted in a decline of flax prices, thereby undermining a highly profitable branch of rural economy.

In general, however, the increased demand on the part of the domestic market, along with the upward trend of prices in the foreign market, made commercial farming more profitable during the 1900's. The greatest increase in profitability took place in such commercialized phases as livestock raising (hogs, sheep, and so forth), and within agriculture proper in the commercial-industrial crops.

AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AND FOREIGN CAPITAL The rise in the export value of the country's leading agricultural products was as follows (in million rubles):

	1901–1905	1911–1913	INCREASE (IN PERCENTAGES)
Cereal products, flour, and bran	447	596	133%
Products of intensified farming	139	253	182
Animal products	115	277	241
Total	701	1,126	161

The value of agricultural exports increased by 50 per cent in the course of a ten-year period. First position continued to be held by grain exports, which alone yielded annually more than one-half billion rubles. The growth in value of grain exports during 1909–1913, when compared with early years, shows an increase of 16.6 times compared to 1861–1865 (655.5 million compared to 56.3 million rubles), and more than double the 1891–1895 figure (296.7 million rubles).[11]

These grain exports, as indicated above, were among the chief sources of internal "national" accumulation of capital, increasing with particular vigor during the twentieth century. But at the same time the exportation of cereal grains and other agricultural produce manifested the semicolonial dependence of Russia upon foreign capital.

Beginning with the nineties, and especially after the turn of the century, Russia's export trade in general, and the export of grain, eggs, and butter in particular, fell under the influence of foreign banking capital. During the twentieth century foreign finance capital controlled not only Russian industrial enterprises but extended its hold to the nation's trade, especially the trade in agricultural products. Export operations in Siberian butter, Voronezh eggs and poultry, Tambov bacon, Pskov flax, and in grain in general were beginning to be increasingly financed by foreign capital. Foreign interests found their way into the export business and soon assumed leadership in this trade, forming their own export agencies in Russia (as, for example, the French grain-trading firm of Dreyfus, the German, Greek, and Italian grain companies, the Danish butter and egg firms, the English butter and meat companies, and others) and creating special export companies (the Export Trade Company). Most important from the economic standpoint was the participation of foreign capital in the export trade through the chain of banks controlled by foreign capital (the Russian Foreign Trade, the Azov-Don, the Petersburg International, and other banks). In an important line of exports such as grain, the banks of the southern ports took over a considerable proportion, no less than one-half, of the export business, advancing substantial loans to the planters against "unreaped" grain, buying through small tradesmen and through their own agents large holdings of grain, and granting loans in duplicate for the building of elevators, and so forth. Besides the private banks, the financing of grain exports also attracted the State Bank. Thus in 1910 it advanced 16 million rubles in loans against grain exports to the planters (landowners and kulak peasants) in Kherson Province, and about 6 million rubles in Tauride Province.[12] In such large ports as Nikolayev, the grain export business of the banks constituted 35 per cent of total exports in 1909, and, moreover, three large banks controlled all financing of private commercial firms.[13]

The influence of foreign capital was felt also in the development of special types of cooperative processing and selling of agricultural products. This was true especially, for example, in the cooperative exporting of Siberian butter, in the sale of eggs, and in the mass of sales by kulak peasant farms producing for the foreign market. Large English capitalist firms supplied the Siberian cooperative movement with credit, with separators, machines, and containers for their exports, and in general controlled the basic routes of butter exports.

Still more conspicuous was the influence of foreign capital in fields of exports where great outlays for capital equipment were needed, as in the case of bacon and other perishable goods which depended upon costly refrigeration and refrigerated transport. Refrigeration and transport companies, like the Union or the Petersburg Warehouse Company (owner of the largest refrigerator in Europe) were founded largely, and sometimes entirely, by foreign capital and operated through foreign banks.

The main banks taking an active part in the trade in agricultural products, and in grain export operations particularly, were the Azov-Don, the International, the Petersburg Private Commercial, the Northern, the Russo-Asiatic (operating chiefly with French capital), the Russian Foreign Trade, and the Petersburg Discount Bank (working chiefly with German capital). Among the remaining large banks heavily involved in the grain trade but still retaining their "national" independence, the one outstanding example was the Volga-Kama Bank—a stronghold of the old "national" commercial capital in the Volga-Kama area since the days of the grain barges and manual hauling. As mentioned previously, the proportion of foreign capital in the basic capital of the above banks was about 30 to 50 per cent, a figure that may also be used to express the degree to which Russia's export trade in agricultural products was dependent upon foreign banking capital. Russian capitalism failed to muster the necessary facilities with which to dispose of its own agricultural resources independently on the world market, and the nation's leading export trade was steadily passing into the hands of foreign capital.

INCREASING DIFFERENTIATION IN THE VILLAGE The industrial prosperity of 1909–1913, the growth in commercial exchange, and the establishment of wide connections with the international market could not fail to contribute to strengthening capitalist relationships in the village. By the beginning of the twentieth century, during the first decade in particular, we may observe a marked increase in economic differentiation within the village. We shall cite a few illustrations from the agrarian censuses and budget studies of that period.

According to the agrarian census of 1905,[14] the distribution of peasant households by amount of allotment land held by the various groups in percentage to the total area was as follows:

GROUPS	HOUSEHOLDS	LAND HELD
From 1 to 4 *dessyatins*	15.8%	3.6%
From 4 to 8 *dessyatins*	33.7	19.0
From 8 to 20 *dessyatins*	40.0	41.8
Over 20 *dessyatins*	10.5	35.6

The data of the 1905 census, which refer only to the size of the landholdings, cannot, of course, adequately depict the social grouping within the peasantry. The latter two groups of landholders include both the large-planting commercialized kulak farms (over 15 to 20 *dessyatins*) and the medium farm holdings (8 to 15 *dessyatins*). But even these agrarian statistics disclose that, by and large, one-half of the households (50.5 per cent) throughout the fifteen provinces of European Russia held 77.4 per cent of the allotment land, while one-sixth of the nation's farmers (15.8 per cent) owned only one-thirtieth (3.6 per cent) of the allotted land.

Economic differentiation within the village manifested itself still more conspicuously in the ownership of farm inventory, especially the more complex and costly implements, in the employment of hired labor, and in the possession of salable surplus—all basic indications of a commercial-capitalist economy. For purposes of illustration, we shall cite a few figures on this subject drawn from the recurrent rural censuses of that period, although these demonstrate the process of differentiation in summary only.

Throughout the Samara Province, in localities where the average planting per farm was 7.1 *dessyatins*, every 100 farms owned only 2.6 harvesting machines, while in localities of this province having an average acreage of 10.3 *dessyatins* or more, the figure was 12.1 machines for every 100 farms. The same correlation with respect to screening machines was 11.2 and 32, and for seeders, 1 and 4.2. In other words, in the large acreage areas, where strong households of the farmer type predominated, mechanical equipment was used at a rate 3 to 4 times as high as in areas where smaller holdings were common.

Again in the Samara Province the proportion of permanent farm hands to every 100 working members of families was, on farms planted up to 3 *dessyatins* only 0.2 workers, on those farms planted up to 3 to 9 *dessyatins* 0.9 persons, while on farms planted over 30 *dessyatins* 42.2 persons.

Farms employing full-time help in the first two groups amounted to between 0.6 and 1 per cent, while in the upper group the proportion was 61.5 per cent. Here, again, the segregation of kulak farms exploiting hired labor was clearly evident.

The commercial interests of these groups are further revealed, for example, by the following figures on the sale of grain by farm groups (according to data of the Kharkov Agricultural Society): the group having an acreage up to 2 *dessyatins* sold 3.4 rubles' worth of grain, the group with 2 to 4 *dessyatins*, 27 rubles; the group with 8 to 10 *dessyatins*, 100 rubles, 60 kopecks; and the group planting over 30 *dessyatins*, 876 rubles, 70 kopecks. According to similar data from the Poltava Province, farms planting under 1 *dessyatin* had 4 poods of grain, farms with 1 to 2 *dessyatins*, 16 poods; those with 9 to 15

dessyatins, 111 poods; and farms planting 25 to 50 *dessyatins,* 381 poods. In other words the impoverished farms did not even have sufficient grain of their own to carry them over until spring, while the kulak farms had considerable surpluses of grain for sale.

Thus all our data seem to indicate that during the 1900's, even more than during the nineties, the process of differentiation within the village was accelerating, giving rise to a kulak, peasant-bourgeois, upper social stratum. This stratum was steadily modernizing its farming, increasing production by the purchase and renting of land, expanding its output in the more profitable technical and intensified farming crops, increasing the use of machinery, fertilizer, and hired labor, and raising the income capacity of its agriculture. Even before the Stolypin rural reform, in the early 1900's, the social power of the "grimy lords," "the new gentry" or large planters from the "strong" peasants, began to grow, with these elements, to an extent greater than in the nineties, becoming "masters of the contemporary village." Simultaneously the number and strength of the rural proletariat, the landless and land-deficient peasantry, increased perceptibly. This double process intensified the internal contradictions of the village, prepared the way for a struggle not only between the peasantry as a whole and the landowners but also between the peasantry and the kulaks, the so-called "new gentry."


THE INFLUENCE OF THE AGRARIAN MOVEMENT We have noted previously that under the impact of the mass labor movement of the 1900's and the revolutionary mood among the industrial workers, the Russian village of this period also witnessed the rise of a revolutionary spirit which found expression in a growing mass movement among the peasantry. The expansion of capitalism, which in the village reflected itself in an increasing economic differentiation among the peasantry and in the creation of a constantly growing village proletariat and widespread rural distress, intensified the class struggle in the village. The peasant mass movement of the early twentieth century was essentially spontaneous in character and largely devoid of any class consciousness and organization. It nevertheless constituted an important phase in the development of a revolutionary mood among the proletarian and pauperized elements of the village in a period of transition toward later revolutionary uprisings among the peasantry under the leadership of the working class.

The peasant movements of the early twentieth century[15] reached their greatest intensity in those rural regions where landlord oppression was greatest, where the number of landless and land-deficient peasants was highest, and where rural farm labor was most prevalent and worst exploited. In 1902

peasant unrest broke out in the Kursk, Kharkov, and Poltava provinces in the wake of a crop failure, and was aggravated by the land hunger of the peasants and the extreme exploitation of village labor by landlords and sugar-mill owners. In 1905, with the rise of the revolutionary movement in the city, rural unrest became more prevalent, spreading at first through the land-scarce and predominantly feudal counties of the Kursk, Oryol, and Chernigov provinces, and from there to the capitalist and labor-hiring farming localities in the Baltic area and elsewhere. Under the immediate influence of the 1905 revolution, the peasant movement turned away from attacking the feudal mansions to the seizure and distribution of the estate lands. By the spring of 1906 the movement reached its maximum strength, engulfing with varying degrees of force 240 counties of European Russia, chiefly in the central-agricultural, southern, southwestern, and western areas. It was much less prevalent in the nonblack-soil zone, in the north, and in Siberia.

The demolition of estates as a form of peasant violence was most widespread in districts where, as in the central black-soil belt, the land hunger and enslavement of the peasants to the land they rented from the gentry were most pronounced, and where perpetual indebtedness to the landowners had aroused the elemental hatred of the entire village population, including the middle and even the more prosperous groups. This elemental protest broke into the open in the form of wholesale burning of mansions, destruction of crops, forest fires, and seizures of grain, livestock, and hay. The distribution and seeding of estate land by the aroused peasantry, while, to be sure, of an unplanned character, were none the less important as experience for the future revolutionary reapportionment of land in 1917. The proletarian forms of struggle, such as strikes among the agricultural workers, occurred for the most part in the regions of capitalist agriculture—in the south, southwest, and west. Finally, peasant activities of a purely political nature, such as changes in the village administrative agencies, occurred only rarely. In many provinces the Social-Democrats began to hold meetings and organize committees among the peasantry.[16]

After reaching its peak in the winter of 1905 and the summer of 1906, the peasant movement, crushed by the military force of the punitive expeditions, began to subside, and during 1907–1908 only relatively few outbreaks were recorded in the rural areas. Due to the defeat of the revolution, "the peasantry did not get the serf-owners' land, the workers did not obtain the eight-hour day, and the popularly despised tsarist autocracy was not overthrown. . . . The basic problems raised by the revolution were not solved."[17] The most positive result of the peasant revolutionary movement of 1902–1906 was the fact that it had become convinced, by its own experience, of



1. Sporadic outbreak by peasants against landowners (crop damage, illegal timber cutting, etc.).
2. Movement embracing up to 50% of all Uyezds, including land seizure, illegal timber cutting, crop damage, etc.
3. Movement embracing between 50% and 75% of all Uyezds, involving demolition of estates, division of land, livestock, and property, and occasionally accompanied by resistance against the guards and police.
4. Movement embracing entire provinces and in some places assuming the character of armed uprisings as well as the complete destruction of estates, including the seizure of land and property belonging to the landowners, and accompanied with the shooting of peasants by troop and police.

the impossibility of effecting "a peasant dissolution" of feudal medieval relationships and destruction of the feudal latifundia without overthrowing the power of tsarism. Consequently, despite the defeat of the revolution among both the working class and the peasantry, the situation was ripe for a new revolutionary upheaval.

A NEW AGRARIAN POLICY LAUNCHED BY TSARIST GOVERNMENT The agrarian unrest of 1902 and the subsequent agrarian revolutionary movement of 1905–1906 impelled the government to reexamine the basis of the agrarian policy which it had firmly pursued since the reactionary period of 1880–1890. The government now began to regard the continued social isolation of the peasantry, the reallotting commune, mutual responsibility, and other features inherent in its earlier policy as a vicious survival of the old system which perpetuated among the peasantry the belief in "the right of all to the land," the idea of the public character of land, as opposed to the bourgeois principle of personal and inviolate private property. In order to maintain and propagate these new ideas of private property, it was necessary to seek support among the new bourgeois strata of the "strong" peasantry and to help remove them from the equalizing influence of the peasant commune. On the other hand, in order to gain the confidence of the middle peasantry, the government decided to bestow certain favors upon them by reducing the burden of agrarian redemption payments and by some expansion of land-credit facilities for the middle and kulak groups. By this policy the government sought to create under the new conditions a stable political and economic base in the form of a numerous village bourgeois class—the kulaks and a portion of the middle-peasant elements.

Since the very beginning of the twentieth century, the problem of rural conditions and the danger of "a revolution from below," due to the extremely difficult and inferior status of the peasantry, became a very important problem of economic policy and the concern of numerous government commissions. The crop failure of 1901 was responsible for bringing into existence a commission for inquiring into the causes of impoverishment in the central region,[18] and after the peasant disturbances of 1902 the Ministry for Internal Affairs organized special "editorial commissions" for the review of all legislation affecting the peasantry, including many important issues of economic policy: landownership, the commune, mutual responsibility, and others.[19] Finally, in 1902 a special Conference on the Needs of the Agricultural Industry under the chairmanship of Witte was convened with great publicity. Besides the central agency consisting of officials and representatives of the "public," such as landowners and rural councillors, 618 local

committees were organized, including 536 county committees with a membership of up to 12,000 persons, all recruited from the landowners, officials, and representatives of the rural administration (with only 2 per cent from the peasantry).

The voluminous reports of these local commissions on the needs of agricultural industry originated the ideas that were later incorporated into the main provisions of the Stolypin Reform of 1906. The local commissions traced the cause of peasant distress to technological backwardness. Consequently a majority of the commissions urged the abolition of the old three-field system in favor of the multifield system, recommending specifically the planting of grass and root crops. But inasmuch as the way to technological improvement in the village was blocked by the commune, most of the commissions concluded that it was necessary to help transform the village communes into individual farmstead ownership, granting the individual peasant the right to separate his allotment from the communal landholdings irrespective of the wishes of the commune. They also stressed the need of removing the disabilities imposed upon the peasantry in the realm of civil and personal rights.[20]

The revolutionary movement and agrarian disturbances of 1905 created a panic among the nobility. At about the same time Professor Magulin and N. Kutler made public their proposals for the partial alienation of privately owned land, proposals championed by the Cadet party.[21] But with the suppression of the revolution and the new reign of reaction, these projects were abandoned upon the demand of the Congress of the United Nobility. Even Witte's Special Conference was considered too radical and was disbanded. The nobility expressed itself in favor of the "new agrarian program" proposed by Stolypin.[22] In order to "pacify" the peasantry, a number of "reforms" were promulgated, such as the law of November 3, 1905, on redemption payments (which, it may be pointed out, had already been paid in full, and, according to the reckoning of some authors, even in excess, by the peasants).[23] New regulations were introduced for the expansion of the facilities of the Peasant Bank, for the transfer of some crown lands to the bank to be distributed among the peasants (August 12, 1905), along with some fiscal lands for the same purpose (August 27, 1905), followed by new regulations on land tenure (March 4, 1906), and other measures.

STOLYPIN'S REFORM With these measures the tsarist government readied its new agrarian policy, which was intended to prevent the recurrence of agrarian violence and to remove the menace of "land redistribution by mobs" and the violation of inalienable private property rights.

With this in view, it was necessary to abandon communal land tenure and peasant-family ownership, to introduce into the peasant milieu the bourgeois principles of inalienable private property in land, and to encourage among the peasantry the emergence of the strong economic elements which might serve as the harbinger and champion of these new ideas.

The period of confusion and fear was quickly superseded by a regime of the "firm hand" personified by Stolypin. Stolypin, a landowner and a marshal of the nobility, and later a provincial governor who "distinguished" himself in the eyes of the tsar and the Black Hundred camarilla by his savage reprisals against the peasantry in 1906, became minister of that epoch in which, in Lenin's words,

> the serf-owning landlords pursued with all their might and at the fastest possible tempo, a *bourgeois* policy with respect to peasant agrarian customs, dispelled all romantic illusions and hopes connected with the "patriarchal character" of the humble peasants, and *sought* new allies among the new bourgeois elements in Russia generally and in rural Russia particularly. Stolypin attempted to pour new wine into old bottles, and to remold the old autocracy into a bourgeois monarchy.[24]

He implemented these ideas in the famous ukaze of November 9, 1906, which, after approval by the Third State Duma, became known as the law of June 14, 1910.

The essence of Stolypin's agrarian reform consists of the following: All peasant land communes were divided into two groups: communes that did not engage in land redistribution from the time of the land apportionment, and communes that redistributed the land periodically. The first, so-called "nonredistributing," type of communes was declared as having shifted to a basis of household-allotment land tenure, and all landholdings of the individual peasants were secured to them in personal ownership. In communes where redistribution was practiced, every householder could at any time request that all land to which he is entitled by redistribution be granted to him in personal ownership. If in practice the number of allotment units within the family, and, consequently, the amount of land due the peasant seeking individual ownership after redistribution, had meanwhile diminished, then the surplus land can become the property of the owner upon payment of the original (1861) redemption cost of such land to the commune. In the case of cross-strip fields, the householder had the right to request that the commune, as far as possible, grant him a sector of land in a single location, and, moreover, if the request for separation is made at the time of a general redistribution, separation with all land in one location was, in fact, mandatory upon the commune. Likewise, separation into contiguous

land plots was obligatory upon the commune when requested by not less than one-fifth of the total number of householders.

In addition to individual separation from the agrarian commune, the law provided for the transfer of entire communes to private ownership of individual holdings by the decision of a simple majority of householders in settlements having a household-allotment system, and by a two-thirds vote in settlements with communal land tenure. In all cases cited above, the separated peasants retained their rights to the common lands, the meadows, forests, and so forth.[25]

These were the main provisions of the law of June 14, 1910. We may see from the above the far-reaching changes wrought by this reform of the peasant agrarian system. By granting the right of leaving the commune to everybody, the law clearly favored those who at the moment of separation had gathered into their possession more land than the average share of commune members. Furthermore, such surpluses were acquired by them at low cost, in fact, at the redemption rates of 1861, a rate that was between one-half and one-third of the 1906–1910 prices. At the same time the reform made it possible for households owning little land, and drawing their sustenance not from agriculture but from industrial labor, to sell their holdings. Land sold by such impoverished peasants was bought by the kulaks. And although the law placed a definite limit upon the accumulation and purchase of allotment land (not to exceed six personal allotments), in practice the opportunities for the acquisition of considerable landholdings were obvious. The new agrarian relationships in the village were thus founded upon the interests of the kulak peasant, the individual owner who had abandoned the redistributing communal system and dedicated himself to defending the "inviolability" of his personal holding or farmstead property.

Turning to the quantitative results of the reform for the first nine years after its introduction (since 1907), we may cite the following data:

By January 1, 1916, requests for acquisition of land in personal ownership were submitted by 2,755,000 householders in European Russia. Among these, some 2,008,000 householders with a total acreage of 14,123,000 *dessyatins* separated from the communes. In addition, 470,000 householders with an aggregate acreage of 2,796,000 *dessyatins* obtained "certified deeds" attesting to their acquisition of personal holdings in communes not practicing any redistribution. Altogether, 2,478,000 householders owning an area of 16,919,000 *dessyatins* left the communes and secured their land in personal ownership. This constituted about 24 per cent of the total number of households in forty provinces of European Russia.

By individual years the process of the exodus from communes took place as follows:

YEARS	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDERS REQUESTING THE ACQUISITION OF LAND IN OWNERSHIP	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDERS FINALLY SEPARATED FROM THE COMMUNE
1907	211,922	48,27*
1908	840,059	508,344
1909	649,921	579,409
1910	341,884	342,245
1911	242,328	145,567
1912	152,397	122,314
1913	160,304	134,554
1914	120,321	97,877
1915	36,497	29,851
Total	2,755,633	2,008,432

Thus the greatest number of departures from the commune occurred during 1908–1909. This is explained by the fact that the persons most eager to leave the commune; namely, the more prosperous peasants or those who endeavored to liquidate their land and their agricultural bonds as soon as possible, left at this time. During the subsequent years, therefore, the acquisition of land and separations proceeded at a slower pace.

Throughout the various regions the acquisition of land as personal property showed marked variations. Between the promulgation of the ukazes of November 9, 1906, and May 1, 1915, data prepared by the agrarian division of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, present the following picture by regions:

REGIONS	PROPORTION OF NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDERS ACQUIRING LAND		AREA OF LAND FINALLY SEPARATED (IN DESSYATINS)	PROPORTION OF SEPARATED LAND TO TOTAL AREA OF ALLOTMENT LAND TENURE
	To Number of Householders Requesting Separation	To Number of Landholders on Communal Basis		
West-bank Ukrainian	98.4%	48.6%	77,987	50.7%
New Russian	85.1	42.7	2,495,757	34.2
White Russian	82.8	33.8	1,138,784	30.4
Central black-soil	75.1	27.6	2,057,303	17.5
Lower Volga	58.6	21.7	2,843,142	12.2
Middle Volga	64.2	19.1	1,829,325	11.8
Central Industrial	73.2	16.7	1,378,464	12.9
East-bank Ukrainian	75.4	16.5	651,462	13.8
Lake	69.2	12.7	773,245	10.4
Northern	50.8	6.6	137,458	3.7
Total	70.8	21.8	13,382,927	16.4

As may be seen from the above table, the west-bank Ukraine, the most developed capitalist agricultural area, led all the other regions in percentage

of privately secured land. It was followed by the New Russian, White Russian, and, to a lesser degree, by the more backward farming areas of the Volga, central area, and the north.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE PEASANT BANK During the Stolypin Reform the Peasant Bank performed an important function as an agency in the process of this vast change in landed property. Having been granted the right to purchase independently privately-owned (chiefly landowner) estates, the bank changed from a credit agency into an instrument of the new agrarian policy and into a source of assistance to the landowners whose estates it liquidated at advantageous prices. The importance of the activity of the Peasant Bank in this respect may be judged from the following figures. During the period between 1895 and 1905, the bank sold 504 estates with a total area of 961,000 *dessyatins* valued at 68 million rubles, while in 1906 alone it sold 700 estates of 1,144,000 *dessyatins* valued at 124 million rubles; in 1907, 1,191,000 estates of 1,520,000 *dessyatins* at a value of 159 million rubles, and throughout the decade 1906–1915, 3,257,000 estates of 4,326,000 *dessyatins* valued at 465 million rubles. In addition, the land fund of the bank was augmented by 1,258,000 *dessyatins* of land from the crown estates valued at 71 million rubles. The total land fund of the bank for the period under examination amounted to 6.4 million *dessyatins* valued at 578 million rubles.

The government operated this huge land fund, on the one hand, to support abnormally high land prices for the benefit of the landowners and, on the other, to build up a strong peasantry. The extent to which the prices paid by the Peasant Bank actually favored the landowners may be judged from the fact that the Peasant Bank's average purchase price of a *dessyatin* of land in 1895–1905 was 71 rubles, but in 1906–1915 rose to 131 rubles, and, moreover, even during the years of extreme "panic" among the landed gentry, in 1906–1907, the price was 122 to 129 rubles per *dessyatin,* rising again in 1910 to 140 rubles.

As for the distribution of this land reserve among the various categories of buyers according to their land needs, this is well shown by the following figures: in 18 provinces having the highest number of land-deficient peasants (over 30 per cent), the bank had at its disposal a land supply of only 588,000 *dessyatins* for 1,447,000 small households, or an average of 1.4 *dessyatins* per farm. In contrast, in 18 provinces with a total of 145,000 small holders (about 10 per cent of all households), the bank's available land fund was 1,987,000 *dessyatins,* or an average of 13.7 *dessyatins* per farm. Clearly the land fund of the bank was not intended for the satisfaction of the land needs of the small owners. The bank in its activity followed

the same policy that was the basis of the Stolypin Reform; namely, a policy of creating an individualistic, kulak peasant-farming system. This is plainly evident from the fact that the land sales of the Peasant Bank during 1907–1916 showed the following results by category of purchasers. The land fund was sold: to those separating from the commune, 54.6 per cent; to small homesteaders, 23.4; to rural societies, 17; and to others, 5 per cent. The bank promoted farmstead and small private landownership. Moreover, although the statistics of the Peasant Bank show that a considerable portion of the land was bought by "landless" persons, upon closer scrutiny it appears that a sizable proportion of these "landless" persons were representatives of the rural bourgeoisie, landless storekeepers, tradesmen, suburban townspeople, and in general such prosperous elements as could afford the expense involved in the purchase of land through the bank at a high price. Altogether the peasants individually and in societies (the more prosperous groups) acquired during the period of 1905–1911 a total of 4,868,400 *dessyatins*. Furthermore (in the classification of the statistics of that period), merchants, distinguished citizens, and similar elements of the bourgeoisie acquired 1,043,400 *dessyatins*.

The Stolypin Reform and the activities of the Peasant Land Bank did not aid the formation and strengthening of the capitalist kulak upper stratum alone in the village. As a consequence of the reform the village witnessed, at its opposite social extremity, the rise of landlessness and the formation of a landless proletariat which availed itself of the opportunity to sell its traditional allotment land. Both the Stolypin Reform and the permission to sell and mortgage the peasant's allotted land through the bank increased the sale of allotments. During the period of 1908–1915, about 1.2 million peasant households sold a total of 3.9 million *dessyatins* of allotment land valued at 445 million rubles. The categories of sellers and the causes for sale varied: besides resettlement, accidental causes, and others, the bulk of households sold their land because of their complete proletarianization, their break with agriculture, and their departure to the towns and industry; another part, however, sold their allotments in one place in order to buy land and establish farms in another area. According to a special government inquiry into this problem conducted throughout twelve counties, the number of households selling their allotted land because of proletarianization comprised between one-fourth and one-half of all cases, while those endeavoring to establish better and more independent farms in a new area (resettlement in Siberia or other provinces) constituted between one-third and one-half of all cases.[26] In this manner the Stolypin Reform achieved the unmistakable result of hastening the proletarianization process in the village on the one hand, and

of consolidating the position of the strong kulak economic elements on the other.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REFORM These were the basic features and results of the new agrarian policy of the tsarist government and the new turn in agrarian affairs of the twentieth century. The combined result of the government's reliance on the "strong farmer" or kulak, of the elimination of archaic survivals in the commune, and of the legal class isolation of the peasantry was to strengthen the position of capitalism in the village. By these steps it was proposed to remove forever the menace of an agrarian revolution and to direct the agrarian development of Russia along bourgeois channels with the aid of a mass of strong peasant kulak farms.

For the above reasons Lenin characterized the Stolypin legislation as being

> thoroughly permeated with a purely bourgeois spirit. It follows, beyond any doubt, along the lines of capitalist evolution, facilitating and impelling this evolution, hastening the expropriation of the peasantry, the collapse of the commune, and the creation of a peasant bourgeoisie.[27]

The reform effected "a radical dissolution of the old medieval land system," [28] and was the "second cleansing of the land by landowners." This cleansing by the landowners perpetuated within the agrarian order the "Prussian" type of bourgeois development, compared to the "American" type involving a "peasant cleansing of the land" and the complete elimination of feudal latifundia. But at the same time the Stolypin Reform brought into the village the type of antagonism that tended to revolutionize the village still further, creating a deep chasm between the small upper stratum of the rural bourgeoisie and the mass of the village landless and land-deficient poor. It contributed to "the opening of still another and *final* valve"; it could not "eliminate either the debts and work duties of the mass of peasants or their starvation." [29]

Despite the "final valve" to prevent a revolutionary explosion in the village by boldly encouraging its development along bourgeois-capitalist lines, the Stolypin Reform vitiated the position of the land-hungry peasants and the village poor and simultaneously helped to spread a revolutionary spirit among them. It not only failed to alleviate peasant unrest but sharpened the clash between peasant commune members and both the wealthy landowners and the new "Stolypin landowners," the kulak farmers.

In many instances the village poor and the middle masses of the toiling peasants displayed furious hostility to the land surveyors who came to segregate from the communal land the property of the separating peasants. Such instances were reported in Ufa Province and elsewhere.

Stolypin's Reform, therefore, helped to drive the peasantry to new revolutionary activity against the landowners as well as against the general policy of tsarism. "The collapse of the Stolypin policy," which became evident during the first few years of its existence alike to the landowners themselves and to the bourgeoisie, also signified the "collapse of tsarism on this *last conceivable* road for the tsarist regime." [80]

The revolutionary masses of workers and peasants raised a demand for the nationalization of the land and for the confiscation of all the land held by the landowners.

Under these Bolshevik slogans, along with the slogans for a democratic republic and the eight-hour day, the nation witnessed a new upsurge of the revolutionary movement during 1912–1914.

Notes

1. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XII, p. 135.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
4. Prepared on the basis of the harvest statistics of the Central Statistical Committee, Lyashchenko, *Russkoye zernovoye khozyaistvo v sisteme mirovogo khozyaistva* (Russian Grain Farming Within the System of International Economy) (1927).
5. See Map 13, p. 451.
6. See Map 20, p. 733.
7. *Selskokhozyaistvennyye mashiny i orudiya v Yevropeiskoi Aziatskoi Rossii v 1910 g.* (Agricultural Machines and Implements in European and Asiatic Russia in 1910); *Statistika Rossiiskoi imperii* (Statistics of the Russian Empire) (Central Statistical Committee, 1913), Vol. LXXIX.
8. *Annuaire International de Statistique Agricole* (1913). Rashkovich, *Udobritelnaya promyshlennost' Rossii* (The Fertilizer Industry of Russia) (1920).
9. *Selskoye khozyaistvo na putyakh vosstanovleniya* (Agriculture on the Road of Restoration) (1925), pp. 458-463, 484, 645-665; a publication of the Commission of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the Study of the Present-Day Village.
10. *Selskoye khozyaistvo Rossii v XX v.* (Russian Rural Economy in the Twentieth Century) (1925), a collection of statistical and economic data.
11. Lyashchenko, *Russkoye zernovoye khozyaistvo v sisteme mirovogo khozyaistva* (1927), Chap. XV.
12. Lyashchenko, *Khlebnaya torgovlya na vnutrennikh rynkakh Yevropeiskoi Rossii* (The Grain Trade on the Domestic Markets of European Russia) (1912), pp. 105, 129.
13. Tsyperovich, *Sindikaty i tresty v Rossii* (Syndicates and Trusts in Russia), 2nd ed. (1919), p. 95.
14. *Statistika zemlevladeniya 1905 g.* (Statistics of Land Tenure in 1905) (Central Statistical Committee, St. Petersburg, 1907), summary issue for 50 provinces.
15. See Map 21, p. 743.

16. *Agrarnoye dvizheniye v Rossii 1905–1906 gg.* (Agrarian Movement in Russia during 1905–1906) (1908), based on a questionnaire of the Free Economic Society.
17. *Istoriya VKP (b)* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks], A Short Course), p. 128.
18. "Materialy vysochaishe uchrezhdyonnoi 16 noyabrya 1901 g. komissii po issledovaniyu voprosa o dvizhenii s 1861 g. po 1900 g. blagosostoyaniya selskogo naseleniya sredne-zemledelcheskikh gubernii sravnitelno s drugimi mestnostyami Yevropeiskoi Rossii" (Materials of the Royal Commission Established November 16, 1901, for the Study of the Problem of the Change in the Welfare of the Rural Population of the Central Agricultural Provinces Between 1861 and 1900 as Compared with Other Areas in European Russia) (1903), Vols. I-III; and also Polenov, *Issledovaniye ekonomicheskogo polozheniya tsentralno-chernozyomnykh gubernii* (A Study of Economic Conditions in the Central Black Soil Provinces) (St. Petersburg, 1901), proceedings of a special conference, 1899–1901.
19. *Trudy redaktsionnoi komissii po peresmotru zakonodatelstva o krestyanakh* (Proceedings of the Editorial Commission on the Review of Legislation on the Peasants) (St. Petersburg, 1903–1906), Vols. I-VI.
20. "Materialy, postupivshiye v Osoboye soveshchaniye o nuzhdakh selskokhozhaistvennoi promyshlennosti" (Materials submitted to the Special Conference on the Needs of the Agricultural Industry) (1904–1905). A summary of these may be found in the publication *Nuzhdy derevni* (The Needs of the Village) (1904), 2 vols.
21. On this subject see Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XVI, pp. 111-118, and Vol. XI, particularly Chaps. I-II.
22. See "Trudy I syezda upolnomochennykh dvoryanskikh obshchestv 29 gubernii" (Proceedings of the First Congress of the Authorized Societies of the Nobility for 29 Provinces) (1910). Cf. Witte, *Zapiska po krestyanskomu dyelu* (A Note on Peasant Affairs) (1906).
23. Lositskii, *Vykupnaya operatsiya* (The Redemption Operation) (1910).
24. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XV, pp. 224-225.
25. "Zakon ob izmenenii i dopolnenii nekotorykh postanovlenii o krestyanskom zemlevladenii" (Decree of the Changes and Supplements of Certain Statutes on Peasant Land Tenure) (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1910), official edition.
26. "Obsledovaniye zemleystroistva khozyaistv, proizvedennoye v 12 uyezdakh Yevropeiskoi Rossii (Investigation of Farm Land Tenure Conducted in 12 Counties of European Russia) (1915).
27. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XI, pp. 351-352.
28. *Ibid.,* Vol. XVI, p. 87.
29. *Ibid.,* pp. 89 and 90.
30. *Ibid.,* Vol. XV, p. 225.

(XXXVII)

The Imperialist War.

The Collapse of Tsarism and Capitalism (1914–1917)

We must now pass to an examination of the final period in the development of capitalist economy in tsarist Russia; namely, its position and crisis during the imperialist war and its subsequent revolutionary collapse. We separate this three-year period into a special chapter not because the wartime development of Russian capitalism represents something unique in nature, or something "abnormal" as distinct from a "normal" process of capitalist development in peacetime. On the contrary, the imperialist war was merely the natural consequence of conditions created by imperialism and the international organizations of finance-monopoly capitalism of which Russian capitalism was an active and interested member. But events in military-capitalist development, in Russian economic history particularly, should be examined separately inasmuch as they are not only the summation and final phase of the capitalist economy in Russia but also a symptom of its social-political crisis, its agony, and revolutionary collapse.

The World War confronted the national economy of the country with the need for a great exertion of its production forces, primarily the enormous diversion of the most healthy and youthful portion of its population, a total of 14 million persons, from productive activity to military service. It required a thorough adaptation of all branches of industry to the needs of the war, along with a vast effort on the part of agriculture. Transportation and the railways had to be adapted overwhelmingly to the needs of war. The war required a great financial effort on the part of the government budget and the entire national economy. The national economy as a whole became militarized, with the result that the production forces of the nation were rapidly undermined and the economic base for the conduct of the war soon fell into ruin.

The war, as the sharpest expression of struggle among the imperialist powers for the redivision of the world in the interest of finance monopoly capital, simultaneously caused an open merger between the economic control exercised by finance monopoly capital and the "state" regulation of economic, industrial, agricultural, and financial life of the nation, while the financial oligarchy itself merged with the state apparatus. In all countries

this process was painted with the bright hues of national chauvinism and disguised with loud epithets of "a struggle for national survival," "social" welfare, and so forth. In its economic essence all this represented nothing less than the complete control gained by the finance-monopoly oligarchy over the government, and primarily over the military apparatus for the protection of its imperialist interests in the struggle for the further partitioning of the world.

The World War, along with vast squandering of production resources, intensified still further the monopolist tendencies within capitalism in general and among its strongest groups in particular. The state power, in reality the financial oligarchy in control of the state apparatus, attempted in all countries to regulate the production as well as the supply and distribution of goods. Industry was militarized in all countries, and invariably militarization was most complete wherever industry was most concentrated and monopolized before the war. Even in England, the citadel of "industrial freedom," the Defense of the Realm Act gave the government of the combined large bourgeoisie the power to direct all production. The same occurred in France, in Germany, and in the United States.

The fusion of political power with industrial and finance capital resulted everywhere in the establishment of a number of monopolies, in the partial "nationalization" of some industries, in government control over production, and in the formation of mixed companies in which the government was a partner and a shareholder equal to large finance capital. Even small-scale agriculture fell under the influence of government regulation through the establishment of market monopolies (the monopoly of the grain trade, for example), the establishment of fixed prices, and so forth.

Following the pattern of military economy established by its stronger allies, upon whom she had become increasingly more dependent, imperialist Russia also attempted to emulate their economic and financial organizational forms of adapting industry to military tasks. But the results of state regulation of industry, trade, agriculture, supply, and food, as well as the fusion of the finance monopoly oligarchy with the government apparatus for this purpose in Russia, were notably less impressive, since the entire Russian political apparatus presented a picture of utter collapse during the World War.

THE WAR AND FINANCE CAPITAL The imperialist war inevitably entailed the further concentration of industry, the intensification of monopolist tendencies, and increased influence by the magnates of industrial and banking capital. The war effort in which industry was engaged required first of all either the curtailment or the military adaptation of "peacetime" industries, both small and large, especially heavy industry, metallurgy, and

machine building, and their conversion to the production of armaments, weapons, and other military supplies.

The expansion of war production required the establishment of new enterprises and new corporations, the retooling of old enterprises, and new capitalist investments. Hence, in 1916 alone, for example, 244 new corporations were founded in Russia with an aggregate basic capital of 373 million rubles. The old corporations increased their capital assets. The syndicates and the trusts, particularly in heavy industry, such as fuel and metal production, joined closely with the war effort and displayed great vigor in advancing their monopolist tendencies. The syndicates of the oil, coal, metallurgical, metal-processing, and even tobacco industries secured huge government orders in connection with war procurement and became absolute monopolists, paying their shareholders enormous war profits.

Glancing at the general results of the new activity in corporation establishment and new capital investments in the existing enterprises within the field of industry and trade in Russia, we find that, after a brief delay during the first year of the war, total capital investments reached the unprecedented figure of 923.5 million rubles by 1916, compared with 526 million rubles invested during the last prewar year of 1913. Of this wartime investment, the mining and metallurgical industry alone absorbed 369 million rubles. In part this reflected an incipient decline in the value of currency. In any event, the mobilization of capital was very considerable.

In connection with the demand for vast new capital investments and with the continued concentration and monopolization of large industry, the role of the banks and banking capital expanded significantly. The number of large banks increased to 44 by 1917 compared with 40 in 1914, while their total balance rose to 13,051 million rubles compared to 5,779 million rubles in 1914. Bank deposits increased to 6,747 million rubles in 1917 compared with 2,410 million rubles in 1914 (due in part to a declining currency value). In the course of the war, the banks proceeded to establish their control over industry more vigorously and more thoroughly than ever before, a fact admitted by the industrialists themselves.[1]

At this point it may be worth noting that the role of foreign capital in total Russian industrial and banking investments apparently declined somewhat during the war years. According to the calculations of Ol and Granovsky,[2] the share of foreign capital in the founding of new corporations declined during the first two years of the war to approximately 35.9 per cent of the total, compared with 40.5 per cent before the war. This was due on the one hand to an interruption in the financial relations between Russian industry and foreign capital, which during the war years was absorbed by its own "national" industry, and on the other hand to an increased accumulation of

war profits and the greater flow of internally accumulated capital into the banks.

This does not, however, suggest the conclusion that in the course of the war "national" finance capital had become more successful in handling its own problems independently. On the contrary, Russia's total indebtedness and the country's dependence upon foreign capital increased substantially during the war. In the war years, until the middle of 1917, tsarist Russia obtained from West European capital as much as 8.5 billion rubles in loans, a sum used only in a small degree to develop Russian industry and for the most part remaining abroad where it was consumed in payment for military equipment. This obviously tended to increase even further the dependence of Russia's industry, along with the country's entire financial system, upon foreign capital.

The stimulus behind the greater mobilization of capital and its attraction to industry were the huge wartime excess profits.

WAR PROFITS OF THE INDUSTRIALISTS Even during the prewar years the extension of monopoly practices in industry had resulted in a greatly increased rate of payments to shareholders. Wartime dividends, especially in the industries working on war orders, began to attain tremendous proportions. The official reports of the corporations (subject to a so-called "public accounting") fail to tell the full story of war profits, since the latter were carefully disguised by various bookkeeping devices, "deductions," and so forth. Nevertheless, even the published reports disclose an enormous increase in profits during the first years of the war. According to the records of the Council of Industrialists, 791 joint-stock enterprises (comprising about two-thirds of all active corporations) increased their 1913 stock capital of 2,087 million rubles to 2,281 million rubles in 1915. Gross profits rose during these years from 351.7 to 692.2 million rubles, while paid dividends increased from 155.3 to 216.3 million rubles. According to the same source, the capital and profits of eight very important metallurgical and seven metal-processing enterprises filling war orders presented the following picture in 1916 compared with 1913: [3]

	1913	1916
METALLURGICAL ENTERPRISES		
Total stock capital (million rubles)	89.9	97.1
Total gross profits (million rubles)	23.2	48.6
Profits on stock capital	25.8%	50.0%
METAL-PROCESSING ENTERPRISES		
Total stock capital (million rubles)	19.0	25.8
Total gross profits (million rubles)	2.6	20.9
Profits on stock capital	13.5%	81.1%

In the case of some individual enterprises, wartime profits attained Homeric proportions. Thus the Tula copper-rolling plant, which before the war paid between 1.8 and 2.8 million rubles in profits on its stock capital of 6 million rubles, paid during the first year of the war (1915) 8,390,000 rubles in net profits, and 15.5 million rubles, or 250 per cent on stock capital, in 1916. The Kolchugin plants, with a capital of 3 million rubles, yielded a profit of 2,230,000 rubles before the war, but in 1915 paid out 4,220,000 rubles, or 140 per cent on its stock capital. The United Cable plants, with a capital of 6 million rubles, paid 1,399,000 rubles before the war and 3,520,000 rubles in 1915. The South Russian Dnepr Metallurgical Company, with a capital of 15 million rubles, paid out 9.6 million rubles during 1913–1914, and 12.1 million rubles of net profits, or 80 per cent on its stock capital, in 1915–1916; and the Nikolsk Cotton Mills of Savva Morozov, with a capital of 15 million rubles, yielded a net profit of 12 million rubles, or 80 per cent, in 1915–1916. Enterprises of the linen industry paid a net profit of 127 per cent on basic capital, and so forth.[4]

Equally remarkable profits were earned by the incorporated commercial banks, especially in connection with the system of "guarantees" granted by the banks to enterprises working on military orders, a practice which increased the price of the orders by 100 to 200 per cent. Because of the close connection between banking and industrial capital, all such profits went into the pockets of the same shareholders. During 1915 and 1916 alone, fifty-three incorporated banks earned a net profit of 132.4 million rubles. We are not speaking here, of course, of such outright abuses as, for example, the case of War Minister Sukhomlinov, who was not only a foreign spy but also the main shareholder of the Promet Company, and who placed government orders at high prices with his own plants and in the course of two years erected three new plants with the income from these orders. In part the increased profits were due to a decline in the value of money, but none the less the growth of profits was tremendous. The industrialists themselves confirmed through their official organ the existence of "considerable profiteering in some branches of industry in wartime."[5]

THE WAR AND THE MILITARIZATION OF RUSSIAN INDUSTRY The war disrupted both industry and agriculture by altering all normal conditions of production, demand, export, manpower, and other factors. Owing to the heavy mobilization of workers, the output of industries working for the free market began to decline seriously by early 1915.

The position of industry was affected quite radically by the militarization of industry and by the conversion of plants to war requirements, which was at first performed through the private initiative of the entrepreneurs inter-

ested in obtaining profitable government orders, and afterward by official compulsion. By the autumn of 1914, military orders had absorbed all facilities of the larger metal-processing and metal-construction plants: the Sormovo, the Bryansk, the Kolomna, and others. As a result, production of locomotives at the Sormovo Plant, for example, dropped from 117 in 1913 to 64 in 1916 and to 55 in 1917. From 1915 all more or less suitable metal-processing plants began to be converted for war production, with little quantitative or qualitative results, however, owing to the inflexibility and poor technical equipment of these plants. The same was attempted, with even less success, in the chemical industry, which was converted to the production of explosives and similar military supplies.

These were followed by the leather and shoe industry, and the cotton and wool industries, which were adapted to the production of supplies ordered by the military commissaries.

The results of the first year of war production were quite depressing. By the spring of 1915 it had become obvious that Russian industry was incapable of coping with the tremendous military problems imposed by the world imperialist war. Inasmuch as the government apparatus proved to be completely helpless, in order to accomplish anything in improving the situation, the Russian industrial bourgeoisie attempted to create special organizations, in the pattern of the Western countries, to take over the supply of the military requirements of the government with the aid of a broad program for military mobilization of industry.

At the beginning of the war the bourgeoisie offered its unconditional support to the autocracy, which was performing the function of executor of bourgeois imperialist ambitions. But by the summer of 1915, the defeat of the Russian Army destroyed the "unity" of the tsar and the imperialist-minded upper stratum; the latter began to manifest an oppositionist temper. The bourgeoisie demanded greater rights for itself and freedom of action in the sphere of organizing defense activities. As early as the summer of 1914, the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos and the All-Russian Union of Cities came into existence, uniting afterward into a single organization known as Zemgor. They aided the mobilization and conversion of the small handicraft industries to military needs, conducted a considerable proportion of the work connected with army supply, and, like the imperialist bourgeoisie, lent their support and assistance to "their own" government in its imperialist struggle.

Since May, 1915, the large industrial bourgeoisie and the capitalist groups of the agricultural class began to create new public organizations, war-industry committees which assumed the duties of mobilization and the allocation of war orders among the large industrial establishments.

In order also to attract the workers to "defense activities" and to draw them

away from the revolution, it was decided upon the suggestion of Guchkov to organize "labor groups" within the war-industry committees. The Mensheviks supported this idea of Guchkov's, while the Bolsheviks utilized the elections of worker delegates to the war-industry committees to expose the imperialistic aims of the war and to unmask the bourgeoisie and the Mensheviks. During these elections a bitter struggle was waged between the "defeatists" (Bolsheviks) and "defenders" (Mensheviks), whose leader in the Petrograd elections was the worker Gvozdev. As a result of the Bolshevik campaign, the elections were disrupted, and only 36 of the 239 provincial and local war-industry committees managed to set up labor groups.

GENERAL DEGRADATION OF INDUSTRY Under the conditions prevailing in tsarist Russia, these public organizations created by capital in support of the crumbling government apparatus proved to be a hopelessly inadequate effort. The low technical equipment of the country's industry, especially in the production of machines and weapons, precluded the possibility of effecting the necessary retooling of its plants for new types of production once imports of machinery from abroad ceased. On the eve of the war, of a total annual consumption of 720 million rubles in technical equipment of capitalist industry, up to 37 per cent was satisfied by imports from abroad, and in the case of industrial machinery, as much as 58 per cent. In addition the acute shortage of qualified workers, the congestion of transport, the critical condition of the fuel supply, and the general disruption that was steadily spreading throughout all economic and public life completed the hopelessness of the situation. As a result many enterprises were forced to liquidate, and although war conditions gave rise to new industrial undertakings, the number of liquidated companies exceeded the number of those newly established.

Thus 350 enterprises closed as early as 1914 compared to 215 new establishments. In 1915 these figures were 573 closed and 187 newly opened, in 1916, 298 closed and 276 opened, and in 1917, 541 closed compared with 264 opened. The militarization of industry and "survival of the fittest" among enterprises naturally resulted in further concentration of industry. Hence some quantitative successes were achieved in the increase of production. The "war" industries succeeded in increasing their production somewhat by 1916. According to the industrialists' own figures, in one of the main regions engaged in "defense work," the fifteen provinces of the central-industrial region, the number of workers increased by 19 per cent in 1916 compared with the prewar period, and in the metal-processing industry of that region specifically, the increase amounted to 190 per cent, chiefly as a result of

attracting unskilled manpower. The situation was similar in the metal-processing industries of the Petrograd and the Ural regions. Conditions were much worse, however, in the branches of industry not working on war orders. For example, in the cotton industry of the central region the number of workers declined from 391,000 in 1913 to 322,000 in 1917. In general, regardless of the mobilization of industry, the total number of industrial enterprises declined. Thus, according to the figures of the factory inspection service, the total number of enterprises subject to its inspection (that is, the larger units), exclusive of the Warsaw and Courland areas that were occupied by the Germans, was as follows:

YEARS	NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS	TOTAL GROSS OUTPUT (MILLION RUBLES)	NUMBER OF WORKERS (THOUSANDS)
1913	13,485	5,621	1,927
1914	13,858	5,690	1,926
1915	12,649	6,390	1,899
1916	12,492	6,831	2,094

The decline in the number of enterprises accompanied by some expansion in production is clear evidence of the concentration of industry, but in general the increase of production was only 21 per cent by 1916 compared with the prewar level, an increase manifestly inadequate for military purposes. On the other hand the decline in the number of workers occurring in 1915, although their number increased somewhat after the mobilization of industry in 1916, attested to the strained manpower situation in industry. In addition the above increase in the number of workers is largely explained by the recruitment of female, child, and unskilled labor in general. At the same time many industries were beginning to suffer from unemployment.

How great was the displacement of skilled male labor by woman and child labor may be seen from the following figures. The percentage of employed male workers to the total number of workers was:

	1913	JANUARY, 1917
In industry as a whole	68.8%	59.0%
Metal-processing	94.9	80.2
Cotton-processing	43.5	30.0
Food industry	82.6	65.0

This change in the composition of the labor force (along with the deterioration of production standards, such as worn out machinery, and so forth) could not but be reflected in a lower productivity per worker. For industry as a whole we have the following data to cite: [6]

	1913	1915	1916
Gross output (million rubles)	5,621	6,390	6,831
Number of workers (thousands)	2,598	2,641	2,926
Output per worker (rubles)	2,163	2,419	2,335

Thus productivity per worker in 1916 had declined, compared with 1915, by 4 per cent, and in some industries by more. Furthermore, although the calculation has been made in prewar rubles, we must take into account in connection with 1913 the decline in the purchasing power of the gold ruble.

THE CRISIS IN METALLURGY The productive resources of industry, because of general backwardness and industry's failure to meet the requirements of the World War, continued to decline even in those branches most immediately connected with the war effort. A few figures illustrating the situation in the metallurgical industry (without Poland) may be cited here.

The number of plants and blast furnaces in operation during the war years, compared with the prewar period, was as follows:

YEARS	NUMBER OF PLANTS		NUMBER OF OPERATING BLAST FURNACES
	Total	Including Operating Blast Furnaces	
1913	255	165	151
1914	253	148	128
1915	223	139	120
1916	219	145	115

The quantity of metallurgical products manufactured at all plants (without Poland) was as follows (in million poods):

YEARS	PIG IRON	SEMIMANUFACTURES	MANUFACTURES
1913	257.4	263.9	219.5
1914	249.3	272.4	222.7
1915	225.3	251.3	199.4
1916	231.9	260.9	205.9
First half of 1917	98.9	102.8	79.2

As the table indicates, the greatest decline occurred in 1915. Whereas some increase in the volume of production was achieved in 1916 following the mobilization of industry, the improvement was so insignificant that the volume of production never attained the prewar level, and from the first half of 1917 began to decline steeply.

The most catastrophic influence upon the national economy and in under-

mining the country's basic production forces was not so much the decline in output but complete absorption in war production. The militarized industry siphoned from the economic life of the country everything available: metal, fuel, financial resources, and manpower. According to the figures of the War Industries Committee, the country's ferrous metal requirements (which before the war amounted to 305 million poods) in 1915 had to be satisfied with an allocation of 48 million poods for the private market and 15.8 million poods for industrial consumption of the total 241.3 million poods of iron produced. Among the various metal products of mass consumption, structural iron, for example, declined in output from 41 million poods to 15.7 million poods. The amount of orders received by the leading distribution syndicate, Prodamet, declined to 79 million poods of iron products of all types in 1916, and to about 48 million in 1917, compared with 148 million poods in 1913.

THE FUEL CRISIS Similar results may be observed in the distribution of fuel. With respect to coal, even the expanded production of the Donets-basin region in 1916 could not cover all requirements because of the elimination of the Polish coal region and of the considerable foreign imports of the prewar period.

Fuel production during the war years was as follows (in million poods):

YEARS	COAL		PETROLEUM
	In the Whole Empire	Including the Donets Basin	
1913	2,199	1,560	561
1914	2,181	1,684	550
1915	1,919	1,627	568
1916	2,096	1,751	602

The increased Donets-basin output was not sufficient to compensate for the loss of the entire output of the Dombrovsky coal basin. In 1913 the latter yielded almost 426 million poods of the total coal output of 2,199 million poods, and in 1916 total production could not be raised above 2,096 million poods. Moreover, although a maximum labor supply was thrown into the Donets coal industry (291,000 persons by January, 1917, compared to 168,000 in 1913), production per worker declined by January, 1917, to 534 poods a month compared to 764 poods a month in 1913.

The situation with regard to petroleum was somewhat better, but here, too, production was far from adequate. The country's oil resources were exploited wastefully. With the increase of oil production in 1916, drilling work declined. By 1917 the number of active oil wells in the Baku region dropped from 3,600 to 1,500, drilling work having declined to about one-tenth of the

usual volume. A similar tendency was apparent in the Grozny and Emba regions.[7]

As a consequence of the war and of the mobilization of industry, the consumption of fuel increased to a great extent, especially because some of the country's major industrial regions formerly operating on imported coal were now drawing upon the domestic coal supply. The greatest detriment to industry was not so much the coal deficit as the policy of fuel distribution. The creation of a Special Council for Fuel, and its policy of fuel allocation based on the establishment of categories of privileged (entirely war-connected) and nonprivileged (all other) consumers, brought the country into a state of critical fuel scarcity.

THE COTTON INDUSTRY The cotton industry was outside the class of patronized "military" industries to which, for example, metallurgy belonged. Here dislocation was especially acute. The primary cause for this industry's sad plight was its dependence upon foreign cotton, the importation of which had nearly ceased during the war. The decline in the purchasing power of the population also affected the industry adversely, as during the early years of the war the cotton industry was orientated upon the internal mass market to a considerable extent (about 75 per cent). Finally, the scarcity of manpower affected cotton production more unfavorably than any other industry.

Because of a lack of imported raw material, the enterprises of the Petersburg region working on foreign cotton began to close as early as 1914. In 1916 the percentage of nonoperating looms in all enterprises reached 18.9, in the Moscow region, 21, and in the lesser regions, 41.9. Furthermore, in a predominant number of cases the production curtailment was due to a shortage of labor.

With the price of cloth increasing by almost 200 per cent, consumer demand inevitably showed a marked decline. Also, with the continuation of the war an increasingly greater share of the cotton industry's output was absorbed by military requirements: in 1916 some 80 per cent of fabric production went into military use, and the share allocated to the civilian population was no more than 15 to 20 per cent of the industry's reduced output.

THE CRISIS AND DECLINE IN AGRICULTURE Most direct and most depressing was the effect of the war and the heavy manpower mobilization upon agriculture. Compared with the prewar army of 1,370,000 persons, Russia mobilized during the war, up to the middle of 1917, a total of 14 million persons. Moreover the first years of the war withdrew from the national economy about 7.4 million persons, most of them

adult workers of the agricultural population. According to the census of 1917, no less than a third, and in some cases as much as one-half, of the total number of peasant households were left without workers in a majority of provinces. The forced labor of the war prisoners and refugees brought little relief both because of its limited supply and because of the casual manner in which this type of manpower was distributed. In all, not more than 10 per cent of the losses in labor was replenished from the above source.

Aside from devouring great masses of human labor power, the war seriously undermined all resources of production in agriculture. As a result of the metal scarcity and the policy of distribution of fuel and metal, the production of agricultural machines and implements was thoroughly disrupted. By the end of 1914 some of the largest farm-machinery plants had reduced their output of machinery to one-third of the prewar level, while in 1916, production in 173 of the largest plants amounted to only 25 per cent of the prewar output of farm machines. A majority of these plants was converted to war production, while the remaining plants were allowed only 1.3 million poods of metal in lieu of the 15 million poods previously consumed. With a situation of this type prevailing in the large plants, the position of the small repair and maintenance workshops, the village forges, was obviously desperate: because of a lack of metal and fuel and because of the mobilization of manpower into the army, repair work on farm inventory was completely abandoned. Finally, to this should be added the almost complete halt in agricultural machinery imports, which before the war amounted to 9.7 million poods annually and covered about 50 per cent of the country's requirements; in 1915 only some 196,000 poods were imported, and 391,000 poods in 1916. Thus, with domestic production reduced to 20 or 25 per cent and imports to 4 per cent of the prewar level, only 8 to 9 per cent of the requirements for agricultural machinery was satisfied. Together with the loss of manpower in rural economy, this decline in farm machinery supply lowered output very seriously. A change in wartime economic policy during 1915–1917 (in 1917 some 1,726,000 poods of farm machines valued at 21.8 million rubles were imported from abroad) was too late to be effective. In any event it could not actually have saved the situation.

Another rather important factor, likewise affected by the reduction of domestic output as well as imports, was mineral fertilizer requirements. Of a total quantity of 42 million poods consumed before the war, only about 11 million poods were produced within the country, while 31 million poods were imported from abroad, chiefly from Germany. While imports dropped to almost zero, domestic production also declined as a result of the conversion of the chemical industry to war, with the result that in 1916 the market could satisfy no more than a similar 8 to 9 per cent of consumption needs.

A similar situation existed in the supply of improved seeds, which were hitherto imported from abroad.

Finally, the war dealt a most serious blow to another basic element in agricultural production; namely, livestock. The mass mobilization of horses from the peasant economy, without regard for its minimum needs of draft power, left a number of households either without horses or with too few. Altogether, in the second half of 1917 some 2.1 million head of horses were mobilized, and the total number of work horses in the fifty provinces of European Russia declined from 17.9 million in 1914 to 12.8 million in 1917. No less disastrous was the decline in draft cattle generally, and in oxen particularly, caused by increased requisitioning and slaughtering for the army food supply, which consumed about 18 million head. On the whole, taking into account the cattle lost in the provinces occupied by the German Army, the total losses in cattle during the first nineteen months of the war amounted to 26 million head. The effect upon the peasant economy was particularly ruinous, since it was incapable of replenishing its losses in livestock, of replacing its worn out inventory, or of alleviating the shortage of manpower on the farm.

The result of this situation was a steep decline in farm output of all types, especially in the more important market commodities as well as in grain. By 1917 the acreage of the major grains declined to 78 million *dessyatins* compared to 88.6 million in 1914, or by nearly 10 million *dessyatins*. The edible grains dropped from an acreage of 51.2 million to 45.1 million *dessyatins*. The sharpest decline occurred in the major commercial and producing areas (the North Caucasus and the southern steppe provinces) and in the more valuable commercial grains, wheat and barley. With an inevitable decline in yield, the gross harvest of grain dropped even below the level of the reduced acreage. The total harvest of all grains and potatoes was 7 billion poods during 1909–1913 and 6.9 billion in 1914, declining in 1916 to 5.1 billion, and in 1917 to 5 billion poods; of this, the food grains dropped from a total of 2.8 billion poods during the last peacetime five-year period to 2.2 billion poods for 1916–1917, while the fodder grains (barley and oats) declined from 2.1 billion poods for the prewar period to 1.1 billion poods in 1916.

The exportation of agricultural products was almost completely discontinued. The extent of the reduction in foreign trade may be seen from the following export figures comparing 1913 with 1916:

	1913	1916
Cereal grains (million poods)	648.0	2.7
Flax (million poods)	18.6	7.4
Hemp (million poods)	3.3	1.2
Butter (million poods)	4.7	0.6
Eggs (billion pieces)	3.5	0.1
Bristles (thousand pieces)	138.0	0.4

THE FOOD CRISIS Bearing in mind that before the war grain exports alone withdrew from the national food supply between 600 and 750 million poods, with the complete cessation of exports the above-cited decline in harvest should not have resulted in a food crisis. However, by 1916 the country began to experience a critical food shortage. The causes lay not only in the above-mentioned decline in agricultural production but also in the entire combination of a disrupted economic life and the government's food and supply policy. By directing all industrial production into war channels, the government policy deprived the village of its supply of goods, of both the producer and consumer type. The village lost interest not only in planting but also in selling its grain, especially when the value of the currency began to decline in the face of an increased output of paper money. Beginning with 1915 a food scarcity was clearly in evidence not only in the cities but in army provisioning as well.

In the fields of civilian food supply and of the regulation of agriculture and the agricultural market, an attempt was made, in view of the impossibility of coping with the difficulties by ordinary measures, to establish the same type of regulating agencies that existed in industry and in transport. In August, 1915, a Special Council on Food was established, formally endowed with consultative functions only but in reality invested with very broad, almost dictatorial authority in the person of the president and his local "delegates," the governors.

From this time the food procurement for the population (aside from army procurement, which remained under the control of the military authorities) passed into the hands of the government and partly to the local municipal and rural self-administrative agencies. The centralized government apparatus procured 305 million poods during 1914–1915, 502 million in 1915–1916, and 540 million poods in 1916–1917. In other words the government procurement took away nearly the entire volume of commercial grain, destroying the free grain market. A situation of this type was, however, far from a successful solution of the food crisis. Government procurement was based on a system of fixed farm prices, which, with the depreciation of the currency and the wide divergence between farm prices and the price of industrial goods, was very unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the agricultural producers. After partial requisitioning had also failed to alleviate the situation, it was decided in December, 1916, to undertake the compulsory allocation of grain, beginning with a pool of 772 million poods of grain. But this measure was not put into force before the coming of the February revolution. Upon the testimony of Shingarev, the first Minister for Food of the Provisional Government, the government had no grain reserves of any kind at its disposal by 1917, and in early March of 1917 "there were moments when the flour

supply was sufficient for only a few days in Petrograd and Moscow, while there were sectors of the front with hundreds of thousands of soldiers where the bread supply was sufficient to last no more than half a day." [8]

THE TRANSPORTATION CRISIS Utter dislocation had also spread through the nation's transportation system. As indicated earlier, the complete conversion of the more important machine-building, locomotive, and metallurgical plants, such as the Sormovo, Putilov, Bryansk, and Kolomna, to war work halted all production of locomotives, railway cars, and rails. At the same time not only purely military traffic but the evacuation of refugees, the movement of imported equipment and ammunition and food shipments to the cities and to the army placed an increasingly heavy burden on the country's transportation facilities. Railway-car loading on the entire network in 1916 increased to 91,500 cars a day compared with 58,000 cars in 1913, and traffic rose to 3 billion car-versts in 1916 compared to 1.9 billion car-versts in 1913.

The railroads were incapable of coping with the unbearable burden imposed by the increased demands for military, food, and other shipments. The creation of the bureaucratic Special Council on Traffic, as in the other fields of government regulation, did not improve but instead complicated matters by the creation of all types of privileged "priority" shipments that were frequently used not for the purpose intended but for speculative aims. The disruption of transportation was at a height. By the beginning of 1916 the freight backlog of the railroad attained 150,000 cars, including 50,000 priority cars, while 575 stations were completely closed for loading. Not only civilian provisioning but the movement of military supplies was seriously threatened. Therefore, when the hopeless dislocation of the traffic system became fully known, the inevitability of a general military catastrophe was apparent. It is not surprising that during early 1916 the military censorship prohibited all newspaper dispatches referring to incidents of disorganization on the railroads.

FINANCIAL CRISIS As for the financial position of the government, the colossal expenditures incurred by the war could not, of course, be covered by the usual budget resources, which had begun to show an ever increasing deficit. Thus, during the four years of war the expenditures caused by the war and the budget deficit were as shown in the table on p. 769 (in million rubles).

In this manner, according to official reports, the four war years brought the direct expenditures of the state to a total of 47 billion rubles and the budget deficit, despite increased taxes, to over 46 billion rubles. In order to cover the military expenditures and the deficit of the war years, the govern-

ment had borrowed 42.5 billion rubles by the second half of 1917, including 8.5 billion in foreign loans, 11.6 billion rubles in internal long-term loans, and 21.5 billion rubles in internal short-term loans.

YEARS	MILITARY EXPENDITURES	BUDGET DEFICIT
1914	1,234	1,898
1915	8,620	8,561
1916	14,573	13,756
1917	22,561	22,568

The foreign loans incurred by the Russian government increased the country's dependence upon its allies, who furnished money, on extortionate terms, with which Russia bought military equipment from them in order to conduct an exhausting war. After the February revolution the Allies, in fact, raised this point with cynical candor, asserting that they would provide Russia with a loan if the Russian troops continued to fight.

Another device used by the government for covering its military expenditures was to increase the printing of paper currency while making the latter no longer exchangeable for gold. The issue of paper currency in the course of the war and the parallel decline in the value of money due to rising prices were as follows:

	CREDIT NOTES IN CIRCULATION (MILLION RUBLES)	PRICE INDEX
On July 1, 1914	1,630	100
On January 1, 1915	2,946	115
On January 1, 1916	5,617	238
On January 1, 1917	9,103	702
On October 1, 1917	17,175	1,171

With this rapid increase of credit notes in circulation, the gold reserve of the State Bank, which on July 1, 1914, amounted to 1,744 million rubles and provided 98.2 per cent coverage for all paper currency issued, declined by January 1, 1917, to 1,474 million rubles, and by October 1, 1917, to 1,295 million rubles, thus providing only 6.8 coverage for notes in circulation. Having been forced off its gold basis by a deficit budget and by a curtailment of industrial activity and credit, the paper currency began to depreciate in value rapidly, while the price of goods rose steadily, aggravating the general catastrophic nature of conditions still further.

AN INCREASING UNFAVORABLE TRADE BALANCE The harmful effect of a disrupted currency system and of a depreciating currency

was still further aggravated by the fact that Russian exports had almost completely stopped, and her trade balance (and even more her balance of payments) had become unfavorable. Russia's foreign trade balance during the war period was as follows (for all frontiers, in million rubles):

	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	BALANCE (+ OR −)
1913–1914 (to July 1)	1,470	1,697	+227
July–December, 1914	297	228	−69
1915	1,131	397	−734
1916	2,675	579	−2,096

During two and one-half years of the war the unfavorable balance totalled 2.8 billion rubles; that is, the excess of imports, as compared with a favorable prewar balance, reached a rate exceeding 1 billion rubles per year. This lowered the status of the ruble on the foreign money markets still further, and added to the burden of Russia's unfavorable balance of payments already under increasing foreign indebtedness.

DISRUPTION OF CREDIT The dislocation of Russia's financial economy reflected unfavorably on the nation's credit system, which also began to contract considerably. Thus one of the more important types of short-term commercial credit, the discounting of notes, was curtailed by the State Bank at the following rate: on October 1, 1914, the balance on all note discount operations was 709 million rubles, on January 1, 1915, 619 million; on January 1, 1916, 382 million; on January 1, 1917, 251 million; and on April 1, 1917, 211 million rubles. By thus restricting credit to industry, the State Bank attempted to increase the credit supply of its chief "debtor"—the treasury: the so-called "short-term obligations of the State Treasury" (the government's promissory "notes") began to be discounted by the bank in tremendous quantities. On January 1, 1917, the discounting of these obligations gave a balance of 6,866 million rubles, and on October 1, 1917, 14,098 million rubles. In this manner all active operations of the bank were absorbed in supplying credit for the treasury and for its military expenditures.

At the same time both the State Bank and the private banks disclosed a marked increase in deposits and current accounts. Thus the balance of deposits and current accounts in the entire credit system (the State Bank, the private commercial banks, the mutual credit societies, and the municipal and public banks, but exclusive of the savings banks) was as follows (in million rubles):

	STATE BANK	PRIVATE BANKS AND OTHER CREDIT INSTITUTIONS
On January 1, 1914	235	3,218
On January 1, 1915	482	3,535
On January 1, 1916	960	4,346
On January 1, 1917	1,652	7,566

Deposits and savings in the savings banks (including interest-bearing securities) increased during this period from 2 billion rubles on January 1, 1914, to 3.1 billion rubles by January 1, 1916, to 5.2 billion rubles by January 1, 1917, and to 6.9 billion rubles by October 1, 1917.

The above figures indicate a considerable increase in the attraction of private resources and savings into the credit system, especially into the State Bank, where deposits and current accounts by 1917 had increased to seven times those of the prewar level. But if we take into account the actual decline in the purchasing value of the money, it becomes apparent that this accumulation was really fictitious. Even more significant was the fact that after siphoning considerable money resources from the national economy, the State Bank utilized them in ever greater quantities, not for the purpose of furnishing credit to industry, agriculture, or trade, but for financing military expenditures. In this manner the war period witnessed an extremely rapid increase in "fictitious" monetary capital, which was utilized increasingly for nonproductive purposes.

THE RISING COST OF LIVING The decline in agricultural production, the disruption of supply, the reduction in consumer-goods output, and the rapid depreciation of the ruble could not fail to cause a rapid rise in the cost of living affecting all articles of consumption, especially foodstuffs. The burden of the high cost of living was made more real by the fact that the nominal increase in money wages, especially during the first years of the war, lagged far behind the rise of prices. The facts most responsible for this situation were the increased amount of currency in circulation and the depreciation of the paper money.

During the first few months of the war, as early as December, 1914, food prices increased by 25 per cent compared with the prewar level, while other prices rose by 11 per cent. Toward the spring of 1917, grain prices increased by 59 per cent and industrial goods by 35 per cent. During the second year of the war the price of grain rose by 122 per cent and that of industrial goods by 145 per cent. Finally, by 1917 prices on all goods increased in the course of one year from 40 to 200 per cent. Thus, if we take food prices in Moscow

for 1916 as 100, the price index for January, 1917, would be: bread, 141; meat, 249; vegetables, 328; milk, 191; dairy products, 238; and so forth. The sharpest increase in food prices occurred in the major industrial and urban centers such as Petrograd, Moscow, and others. In Petrograd, prices in late 1916 increased in comparison with 1914: milk, 150 per cent; white bread, 500; butter, 830; shoes and clothing, 400 to 600 per cent.

DECLINE OF NATIONAL INCOME AND RESOURCES The above-described position of the national and state economy under the heavy burden of military expenditure could not fail to lead to a most disastrous exhaustion and reduction of both national prosperity and national income. According to the calculations of Prokopovich, Russia's "national income," which he computed at 16.4 billion rubles on the eve of the war, declined during the war years at the following rate, leaving less and less for national consumption and devoting more to military expenditures (in billion gold rubles):

YEARS	NATIONAL INCOME	CIVILIAN CONSUMPTION	MILITARY EXPENDITURES
1914–1915	15.8	11.5	4.3
1915–1916	13.9	8.7	5.7
1916–1917	12.2	7.3	7.1

Although the above figures are merely estimates, they clearly emphasize not only the increasing absorption of the national income by military expenditures but also the absolute deficit that had arisen by 1916–1917 (approximately 2 billion rubles), that is, the newly arisen need for covering the balance not from "national income" but from "national resources," the capital reserves of the country. The war consumed altogether 27 per cent of the entire national income during the first year and 49.3 per cent, or nearly one-half of total income, during the third year of military operations. This could not have been achieved except by the most intense application of the power of taxation, and especially by the increased printing of a depreciating paper currency—the most cruel, ruinous, and inequitable tax burden. But apparently, on the basis of the above-cited estimate, it must be assumed that by the third year of the war military expenditures had not only consumed about one-half of the national income but had also begun to use the capital reserves of the country and the nation's accumulated savings. By the same estimates, Russia's war expenditures up to August 1, 1917, amounted to about 19.6 per cent of her "national resources," 52 per cent of her national income, and 313 per cent of her savings.

THE CONDITION OF THE WORKERS During the war of 1914–1917 the condition of the workers deteriorated substantially as a result of the gap between the wage level and the rising cost of living, poorer conditions of work, and wartime repression of labor, especially in the militarized enterprises. The workday was nearly everywhere lengthened, as a rule, by the compulsory overtime work necessary for the fulfillment of war orders. The number of rest days was reduced, and sanitary conditions at the plants grew worse as a result of overloading the factories and twenty-four-hour production, which increased sickness as well as accidents among the workers. With a great number of male workers recruited into the army, the manufacturers began to utilize a larger proportion of female and child labor, which, although less trained, was less costly. By 1916, despite the fact that industry had not been able to cope successfully with the huge orders placed by the army, unemployment began to increase not only in the textile industry, for example, but in metallurgical production as well. In 1915 the government organized labor exchanges in Petrograd and several other major centers. But during the nine months of their operation only 237,900 workers of the 313,900 workers offering their services obtained work. The industrialists preferred to hire, outside the labor-exchange channels, the cheaper, though less trained, labor of women and children, while the labor exchanges were accumulating masses of unemployed trained workers.

Wages, nominally increased during wartime, were in reality lagging behind the rise of prices. Average annual wages in the Moscow industrial region were as follows (in rubles): [9]

YEARS	AVERAGE FOR ALL INDUSTRIES	METAL-WORKERS	TEXTILE WORKERS
1913	218	384	210
1914	221	324	202
1915	248	445	221
1916	406	761	320

The nominal wage of all workers in the Moscow region increased by 86 per cent, that of the metal workers, by 98, and textile workers, by 65.6 per cent, but the price of goods had risen by the end of 1916 by 200 to 300 per cent as compared with 1914, and prices on articles of prime necessity in the worker's consumption rose to five or six times the prewar level. The budgetary costs of the worker as of January 1, 1917, had increased by 294 per cent on an average for all Russia, and by 306 per cent for Moscow, in comparison with 1913.[10] Hence, despite a nominal increase in wages, the workers were on the verge of starvation in 1916. The attempt to place labor in the war industries on a system of payment in kind by the military authorities, along with other

measures of the tsarist regime and the bourgeoisie for "combating the high cost of living," ended in failure. The workers soon began to realize that the solution of their "food problem" was to be found in a revolutionary struggle against tsarism and the imperialistic bourgeoisie.

THE LABOR MOVEMENT DURING THE WAR PERIOD The military crisis and the disruption of the capitalist economy, which was turning more and more into a general economic, social, and political crisis, could not avoid intensifying and hastening the process of revolutionizing the toiling masses in general and, of course, the progressive ranks of the workers in particular. The war was, in Lenin's expression, "a mighty accelerator" of the process of revolutionization, despite the great quantitative and qualitative changes that occurred in the composition of the working class during the war.

The mobilization of 14 million peasants and workers for service at the front at once withdrew from production a considerable proportion of workers, frequently those best trained, and occasionally replaced them with politically less advanced elements. But this circumstance, which at times affected production unfavorably, was of tremendous political significance: it intensified the propagandistic work of the mobilized progressive workers at the front. At some plants the very first phases of mobilization withdrew about 40 per cent of the skilled labor. Although the government and the bourgeoisie had regarded mobilization of the workers as a device to discourage their revolutionary activity, economic necessity required that some skilled workers be left behind, especially in enterprises engaged in war production, which became systematic after the inauguration of a system of industrial mobilization.

Of particular political significance was the fact that, with the expansion and new construction of large plants, the concentration of industry continued to increase still further during the war. Thus, of a total of 2.5 million industrial workers on January 1, 1915, small enterprises employing up to 100 persons (78.4 per cent of all enterprises) accounted for only 17.8 per cent of the labor force, while the larger enterprises, employing over 500 workers and constituting only 5.6 per cent of the country's enterprises, employed 56.5 per cent of all workers. These huge enterprises, chiefly in the metal-processing industry, became the labor headquarters for the preparation of the revolution.

During the first years following the declaration of war, mobilization provoked serious strikes and labor demonstrations at Petersburg. Because of the wartime regime, however, the labor movement and its leadership had to prepare a new set of tactics. Consequently, during the very first days of the war a type of propagandist-agitational work came into being, of which Lenin said, "It *alone* will bring the fruits of socialism and the fruits of the revolution." [11]

The Social-Democratic Party and the Second International had betrayed

the working class. At the very outset of the war it called the working class to support its "own" government, to "defend the fatherland." Only the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, conducted a consistent international revolutionary propaganda. Lenin continued tirelessly to expose the treachery of the leaders of the Second International and to organize the revolutionary elements for a struggle against imperialism and the war. In opposition to the appeals of the social-chauvinists of the Second International for defense of the bourgeois fatherland, Lenin raised the slogan of defeat of their government in the imperialist war as the battle slogan for every Social-Democratic Party in any imperialist country. Lenin considered the military defeat of tsarist Russia as the lesser evil from the standpoint of the people, since that would facilitate the victory over tsarism and the struggle of the working class. In opposition to the treacherous appeals for internal peace, Lenin raised the slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war.

The rising cost of living and the food crisis could not but serve as revolutionary factors among the masses. The explanation of the political significance of the food problem to the worker became one of the most pertinent and easily understood issues, even for the less progressive masses. Gradually the minor issues of food, the price of bread, and the lack of goods turned into general political discussions concerning the entire system of the social order. In this atmosphere political movements and political demands grew feverishly and matured quickly, although they were still limited in form to economic strikes.

The "food riots" that broke out in Petrograd and Moscow in April, 1915, slowly spread to various other centers and acquired a political character, laying the foundation for the future civil war. At that time Lenin already considered it necessary to utilize the food difficulties for spreading revolutionary ideas among the masses, so as to "explain to the masses . . . that we are in the presence of an historical impellent of the greatest force which generates disaster, famine, and countless miseries. This impellent is war." [12]

The above statements with respect to the condition of the working class and of all toilers in general during the first years of the war, also explain the character of the labor movement during these years. Figures on the strike movement (at enterprises subject to factory inspection) during the war years are presented in the following table:

YEARS	NUMBER OF STRIKES	NUMBER OF STRIKING WORKERS (THOUSANDS)
1914 (August to December)	68	34.7
1915	928	539.5
1916	1,284	951.7
1917 (January and February)	1,330	676.3

The movement in the form of economic strikes was begun by the textile workers, while the final phase of the political strike movement was undertaken by the metalworkers. Petrograd became the center of the labor movement and of its more clearly expressed political demands. Here, beginning with the second half of 1915, the strikes had become more tempestuous in character, involving the introduction of political demands and active armed opposition to the police and the troops. By September, 1916, the commander of the Petrograd military district announced that workers who failed to appear at their jobs would be sent to courts-martial (that is, actually to the firing squad). But even this military repression failed to halt the movement.

Beginning with October, 1916, the labor movement of Petersburg and Moscow entered a period of widespread increase in political and revolutionary demands made under the direct leadership of the "Leninist underground" and by Bolshevik slogans and propaganda. During the first months of 1917, the proletariat of Petrograd emerged fully prepared to deliver the crushing blow to the tsarist regime, and, further, to the whole system of Russian capitalism.

On February 18, 1917, a strike broke out at Petrograd among the workers of the Putilov plants, and by February 22 the workers at most enterprises in the city were on strike. During February 23 and 24 the city witnessed a number of large political demonstrations, and about 200,000 workers were on strike. By February 25 and 26 the revolutionary movement had spread to all proletarian sections of Petrograd, and the demonstrations began to turn into attempts at an uprising.

In the other industrial centers, including Moscow, the movement was at first limited in scope, with purely economic demands foremost, but here, too, strikes provoked by the high cost of living and marked by purely economic demands evolved into significant political events as a result of the political leadership of the Bolsheviks and the resentment of the workers against military repression by the government. Among such events were the strikes at Kostroma and Ivanovo-Voznesensk in the summer of 1915, at the Tver mills, at the Tula and Bryansk plants in 1916, and at the Nizhny Novgorod factories, all of which ended only after troops fired upon the workers. In the south the labor movement had been developing with equal intensity since 1915–1916, changing rapidly even there, and for the same reasons, from economic forms of struggle to political demands and to active resistance against the police. Such were the strikes at the metallurgical enterprises of Taganrog, at the mines and pits of Mariupol and the Don districts, at the shipbuilding yards of Nikolayev, and at the mines and enterprises of the Bakhmut, Gorlovka, and Baku regions, which ended in bloody clashes. All these strikes, while originating for economic reasons and not always success-

ful from the standpoint of the worker, were vastly significant because they prepared the working masses of the periphery for delivering, in conjunction with the Petrograd workers, the crushing blow against the tsarist regime.

The revolutionary struggle of the worker found sympathy and support among the soldier-peasants in uniform. Thus soldiers called to suppress a strike at the automobile plant of Louis Renault in Petrograd in October, 1916, fired not at the workers but at the police.[13]

In the course of the February revolution, during the first days of the uprising (February 26) the Petrograd garrison joined the side of the revolutionary masses against the autocracy. On the morning of February 27 some 10,000 soldiers were in open rebellion, by the evening of the same day, over 60,000, and by the morning of March 1, 144,700. In the course of that day, as they became better acquainted with the situation, the military detachments of the capital became fully activated and changed to the side of the revolution. By the evening of March 1, 170,000 soldiers had risen against the government.[14]

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION AND THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT The autocratic government of Russia was overthrown on February 27, 1917. The victory of the revolutionary people over tsarism occurred almost without bloodshed.

The revolution was won so easily because, wrote Lenin, there were joined in it "completely distinct currents, completely dissimilar class interests, and completely contradictory political and social trends."[15] Tsarism was opposed by the main force of the revolution, the working class, the protagonist of the revolution. The tsarist regime was opposed by the millions of peasant masses in their soldier uniforms, under the guidance of the working class. The bourgeoisie, too, dissatisfied with the tsar's weakness and hastening to forestall the proletarian revolution, was against Nicholas II and his government in the February revolt. The allies had also been pressing the Russian bourgeoisie to take this step because they feared a victory of the working-class revolution and the loss of Russia as an ally in the war. In the course of several days, under the impact of these "currents," "came the collapse of a monarchy which had held together for centuries and through three years of the very great, nation-wide class battles of 1905–1907, holding on at all costs."[16] And although the Soviet of Workers' Delegates began its activities at Petrograd on February 27, a secret agreement between the Social-Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders settled the issue of political power by instituting a government of the imperialist bourgeoisie in alliance with the bourgeois-minded landowners; namely, the provisional government of Prince Lvov and Kerensky. By its very nature this bourgeois provisional government could not solve any of the basic and urgent problems in the political and economic life of the

country. It could not terminate the imperialist war, inasmuch as it was itself the agent and executor of the will of the Western imperialist powers. It could not (and did not wish to) halt the disorganization of the national economy, because it was precisely the difficult wartime position of the economy that brought surplus profits to the capitalists. It could not settle the agrarian problem, since that would have jeopardized the interests of the landowners or even of the bourgeoisie which had provided itself with land, and it was not prepared to permit the abolition of this type of property.

Therefore both the general and the economic policy of the provisional government represented in essence a continuation of the pre-February policy, despite the fact that after February conditions began to deteriorate at a catastrophic rate. Thus, in the metallurgical industry the production of pig iron during the first half of 1917 declined to 98.9 million poods compared to 257.4 million poods in 1913. Coal production likewise declined, dropping from a monthly output of 175 million poods in 1916 to only 115 million poods in August, 1917, and to 110 million poods in September. In the realm of war finance the Provisional Government accelerated the issue of paper currency so that by October 1, 1917, 17 billion rubles were in circulation. As a result of currency depreciation and high living costs, real wages in 1917 declined to nearly one-half (57.4 per cent) of the 1913 level. In the meantime the manufacturers, largely as a measure of repression and "restraint" of the workers, began to conduct large-scale lockouts: according to the reports of *Industry and Trade,* the organ of manufacturers, some 231 enterprises were closed and 61,000 workers released during August and September of 1917. Production in both the Urals (with 50 per cent of its plants closed) and the Donets basin was completely disrupted. At the same time the food crisis had turned into real famine not only among the workers but throughout the urban population as a whole. There was a consciously pursued policy of stifling the revolution by the "bony hand of hunger." The conduct of government grain procurement ended in collapse, and the October plan of buying grain for 1917 was fulfilled only by 19 per cent. The agrarian policy of the Provisional Government, with its refusal to find an immediate solution for the land problem while threatening the peasants against the seizure of the landowners' fields and crops, resulted in a sharp increase in peasant unrest: according to official reports, the number of estates demolished or seized in June, 1917, rose to 112, to 387 in July, 440 in August, and 958 in September.

The labor movement became even stronger. In response to the Kornilov uprising, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party called the workers and soldiers of Russia to active armed resistance against the counterrevolution. The workers armed feverishly for the defense of Petrograd. The Kornilov conspiracy was shattered. The struggle against Kornilov revived the

moribund soviets and brought them to the side of the Bolshevik Party. A process of Bolshevization rapidly swept through the soviets (after August 31 in Petrograd, and after September 5 in Moscow), the trade unions, and the factory committees. By October, 1917, the movement of the proletariat was completely won over to Bolshevik slogans, calling for the seizure of power by the soviets.

THE ECONOMIC PLATFORM OF THE BOLSHEVIKS The Bolshevik economic program, which was born in the course of a struggle for the socialist revolution and against the imperialist provisional government, stemmed from the theoretical propositions of Leninism concerning imperialism as "the eve of the socialist revolution," the transformation of the bourgeois democratic revolution into a proletarian revolution, and the possibility of building socialism in one country.

The concrete demands of the Bolsheviks were formulated by Lenin in his historically momentous "April Theses," and later expanded at the April Party Conference. These theses furnished the Party and the proletariat with a clear revolutionary line of transition from the bourgeois to the socialist revolution. In the economic field they resolved into the following: [17]

The Party's agrarian program called for the immediate revolutionary confiscation of the land held by the landlords, the nationalization of all land, and the immediate disposition of the land by local soviets of farm-labor and peasant deputies. In the general economic field it advocated the nationalization of all banks and their fusion into a single national bank under the control of the soviets. Similar control was proposed over all social production and distribution of goods, over the insurance companies and over the large syndicates like Prodamet, Produgol, the sugar syndicates, and the others. Furthermore, one of the major theses in the economic platform of the Bolsheviks was a demand for worker control with the gradual transformation of the latter "into full regulation of production." [18]

The Sixth Party Convention (July 26 to August 3, 1917), which committed the Party to armed resistance and to the socialist revolution, approved the economic platform of the Bolsheviks; namely, the confiscation of the landowners' properties and the nationalization of all of the nation's land, the nationalization of the banks and large industry, and working class control over production and distribution.

Within one half year after the February revolution, when the disorganization in all walks of life approached a catastrophe, Lenin wrote his pamphlet *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It,* in which he criticized savagely the activities of the Provisional Government, and indicated in detail the need for the revolutionary materialization of the main measures of the

pre-October economic platform of the Bolsheviks: the nationalization of the banks and syndicates, the abolition of commercial secrecy, the compulsory syndication of entrepreneurs, the organization of the populace into consumer societies, and the regulation of consumption. These measures, together with the abandonment of the imperialist war, which were indispensable for the fight against disorder and catastrophe, were in reality steps in the direction of socialism:

> One cannot stand still in history generally, and in time of war particularly. One must either go forward or backward. In twentieth century Russia, which has achieved a republic and democracy by a revolution, it is *impossible* to go forward without *going* toward socialism, and without taking *steps* in that direction.
>
> The imperialist war is the eve of the socialist revolution. . . . State-monopoly capitalism provides the fullest *material* basis for socialism, the *threshold* of socialism.[19]

In this manner the Bolsheviks struggled to transform the bourgeois democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

THE COLLAPSE OF CAPITALISM It now remains to explain the last and conclusive question in the history of Russian capitalism. Why in the military-imperialist encounter among the world-imperialist powers battling for the division of the world did the political and economic system of capitalism in Russia prove to be the weakest member, and, having suffered defeat before the others, why did it completely disintegrate?

The answer to this question is provided by all that has been said in our study of the history of capitalism in Russia, and of its economic and social peculiarities compared with the Western imperialist countries.

In explaining the peculiar nature of the Russian bourgeois revolution and the causes of its transformation, within a comparatively short period, into a proletarian revolution, Stalin points out that because it had developed in an atmosphere of a more advanced class struggle, "the bourgeois revolution in Russia projected into the foreground not the liberal bourgeoisie but the revolutionary proletariat with the many millions of the peasantry rallied around it."[20] The political impotence of the Russian bourgeoisie was conditioned by the development of Russian capitalism during its late imperialist phase. In view of these conditions and peculiarities in the history of Russian capitalism, Stalin calls attention to the following circumstances responsible for the unique character of the Russian bourgeois revolution and its conversion into a proletarian revolution:

> *a*) The unparalleled concentration of Russian industry on the eve of the revolution . . . It is hardly necessary to prove that this circumstance alone, in the presence of so revolutionary an organization as the Bolshevik Party, turned the

working class of Russia into a mighty force in the political life of the country.

b) The outrageous exploitation in industry and the unbearable police regime of the tsarist mercenaries were other factors that turned every serious labor strike into a tremendous political act and hardened the working class as a revolutionary force to the very end.

c) The political weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie, which after the revolution of 1905 turned into an attitude of servility to tsarism and into open counter-revolution, an attitude that may be explained not only by the revolutionary spirit of the Russian proletariat, tending to throw the Russian bourgeoisie into the arms of tsarism, but also by the utter dependence of that bourgeoisie upon government orders.

d) The persistence of most hideous and most intolerable vestiges of feudalism in the village, aggravated by the tyranny of the landowner—a fact which thrust the peasantry into the arms of the revolution.

e) Tsarism, smothering everything alive and aggravating with its own arbitrary will oppression by the capitalist and the landowner—a fact that united the struggle of the workers and the peasants into a single revolutionary current.

f) The imperialist war which merged all these contradictions in the political life of Russia into a profound revolutionary crisis and gave the revolution an unbelievable power of attack.[21]

The war of 1914–1918

occurred as a result of the irregular development of the capitalist countries, as a result of the disruption of the equilibrium among the major powers, and as a result of the imperialists' need for a new partitioning of the world through war and through the creation of a new balance of power.[22]

In this chain of imperialist powers, Russia, because of her social, political, economic, and technological backwardness, proved to be the weakest link. The colossal economic dislocation provoked by the war influenced the national economy of Russia most ruinously.

By 1916–1917 the war drove Russia's national economy into a critical stage of disorganization and decline in productive capacity. The social-political impotence and flabbiness of the Russian bourgeoisie, and the weakness of its industrial, technological, and financial-economic position could not raise the resources necessary either for an effective military showing or for enduring an internal economic and political crisis. The dependence of Russian capitalism upon the finance capital of the West European powers turned, during the military crisis, into absolute financial, technological, and military subjugation for the benefit of alien interests, and into needless sacrifice of millions of lives and the complete disruption of the country in the interests of the Western powers.

Aside from economic causes, Russia proved to be the most vulnerable link in the chain of imperialist powers because she possessed, besides the thor-

oughly rotten autocracy and its ally, the impotent and flabby bourgeoisie, "the most revolutionary proletariat in the world," hardened in the revolutionary battles of 1905–1907 in alliance with the peasantry, and led by the revolutionary party of Lenin and Stalin.

The above predestined the rapid and complete collapse of not only the political but also the entire social-economic system of Russian capitalism, a speedy transformation of the bourgeois revolution into a proletarian revolution, and the victory of socialism in Russia.

After the February revolution and the overthrow of tsarism,

> the major problem of the revolution became the problem of liquidating the war. . . .
>
> But in order to withdraw from the war, it was necessary to overthrow the provisional government, to set aside the power of the bourgeoisie, and to overthrow the power of the Social-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks because they, and they alone, were intent on prolonging the war to a "victorious conclusion." . . .
>
> This was a new revolution, a proletarian revolution.[23]

In evaluating the historical position of imperialism, Lenin describes it as "a dying capitalism," and "the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat." In the era of imperialism, capitalist oppression becomes intensified, elements of a revolutionary explosion grow within a capitalist country as well as indignation against imperialism in the colonial and dependent countries. Disproportionate development becomes more pronounced under conditions of imperialism. The struggle for colonies, markets, and raw-material sources leads inescapably to imperialist wars for the redistribution of the world's resources. When capitalism emerges into an international system of colonial oppression and financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the world's population by a handful of "advanced" countries, and when these imperialist countries are drawn into a world conflict for the division of the spoils, the growth of contradictions among them makes the international imperialist front especially vulnerable to revolution.

A break-through on this front becomes probable in a number of countries, particularly in those where the line of the imperialist front is weakest and where the revolution is most ripe on the basis of domestic economic and political oppression. From this premise Lenin draws the general conclusion as to the impossibility of the simultaneous victory of socialism in several countries and the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, even if that country is least developed in a capitalist sense. "Uneven economic and political development," says Lenin, "is an unconditional law of capitalism. It follows, therefore, that at first a victory of socialism is possible in a few nations and even in one individual capitalist country."[24]

The October Revolution confirmed completely the correctness of the Lenin theory on the proletarian revolution. From October, 1917, to January and February, 1918, the revolution continued to spread throughout the country at such a rapid tempo that Lenin called the progress of the revolution the "triumphal march" of soviet power.

Among the many causes responsible for the comparatively easy victory won by the socialist revolution in Russia, the following are the most outstanding:

First, in the Russian bourgeoisie the revolution faced a relatively weak, poorly organized, and politically inexperienced enemy. Economically dependent before the revolution upon government orders, the Russian bourgeoisie tried to come to agreement with the tsar, who was overthrown by the February revolution, and, after having risen to power, continued in effect all the basic policies of tsarism. It favored "war unto a victorious conclusion" and landowner property. In its attitude toward the working class, the bourgeoisie displayed even greater hatred than the tsar, and strove to strengthen oppression by the industrialists and to make it intolerable by application of mass lockouts.

Secondly, the revolution was led by the revolutionary working class, which had been tempered in the battles of the previous revolution and had earned among the people the authority of a leader to peace, freedom, and socialism. The working class had as its ally in the socialist revolution the village poor, who in the course of eight months of revolution had become convinced that only in union with the working class could the peasantry crush the landowners and end the struggle for peace, freedom, and land. The union between the working class and the peasant poor determined the behavior of the middle peasantry, with the latter joining the peasant poor in the course of the revolution.

Finally, the working class was led by the Party of the Bolsheviks, tested in political battles, and uniting into a common revolutionary current several distinct revolutionary movements: the socialist movement of the proletariat for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship, the peasant movement for the seizure of the landowners' land, the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples, and the democratic movement for peace.

Moreover, at the moment of the outbreak of the October Socialist Revolution the bourgeois governments were still engaged in war and could not take an active part against the October Revolution.

"Undoubtedly the union of these separate revolutionary movements into one common mighty revolutionary current decided the fate of capitalism in Russia." [25]

Notes

1. See articles in the organ of the United Industrialists, such as *Promyshlennost' i torgovlya* (Industry and Commerce) and others. "The banks obtained control of the stock of nearly all industrial enterprises, and, along with it, of the enterprises proper. . . . The banks undertook to syndicate industry and began themselves to unite into syndicates. . . . The banks naturally became the masters of our industry," wrote Prof. Migulin in his journal *Novyi ekonomist* (The New Economist) in 1916.
2. Granovskii, *Monopolisticheskii kapitalizm v Rossii* (Monopolistic Capitalism in Russia), pp. 131-133.
3. *Vestnik finansov* (Finance Herald) (1917), Nos. 31-32, pp. 126-191.
4. See "Svodnyye balansy aktsionernykh obshchestv" (Summary Balances of Corporations) in *Yezhegodnik ministerstva finansov* (Annual of the Ministry of Finance) (1916), and also the journal *Letopis'* (Chronicle) (1917), No. 1, article by Arskii, "Voyennye pribyli" (War Profits), pp. 278-283, and *Vestnik finansov* (1917), No. 21.
5. *Promyshlennost' i torgovlya* (1917), Nos. 14-15.
6. Vorobyov, "Izmeneniya v russkoi promyshlennosti vo vremya voiny i revolutsii" (Changes in Russian Industry During the War and Revolution), *Vestnik statistiki* (Statistical Herald) (1923), XIV.
7. See the collection *Na novykh putyakh* (On New Roads), "Promyshlennost' " (Industry) (1923), Issue 3, p. 64.
8. *Izvestiya po prodovolstvennomu dyelu* (News on Food Affairs) (1917), No. 1.
9. *Statistika truda* (Labor Statistics) (1919), Nos. 5-7.
10. *Nayomnyi trud v Rossii* (Hired Labor in Russia), ed., by Strumilin, Issue I, p. 52.
11. *Leninskii sbornik* (A Lenin Collection), II, p. 204.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 354.
13. Paleologue, *Tsarskaya Rossiya nakanunye revolutsii* (Tsarist Russia on the Eve of Revolution), p. 230.
14. *Bolshevizatsiya Petrogradskogo garnizona v 1917 g.* (The Bolshevization of the Petrograd Garrison in 1917), *Sbornik materialov i dokumentov* (A Collection of Material and Documents) (Lengiz, 1932), p. iv.
15. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XX, p. 16.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 87-90.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 347, as well as *Protokoly VI syezda RSDRP (b)* (Protocols of the Sixth Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party) (1934), pp. 108, 241-243.
19. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XXI, p. 187.
20. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed., p. 36.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.
22. *Istoriya VKP (b)* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks], A Short Course), p. 173.
23. Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma,* p. 38.
24. Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XVIII, p. 232.
25. *Istoriya VKP (b)*, p. 204.

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* The appended bibliographic index does not attempt to draw up an exhaustive list of the literature on the economic history of Russia but is merely intended to perform an auxiliary service by facilitating the task of the elementary readers and students, as well as instructors in the higher educational institutions and all other persons engaged in the more profound study of economic history, in pursuing a well rounded study of the various problems. The general bibliography, as well as that on special problems, is arranged as follows: the first to be cited are the leading works of the Marxist-Leninist classics, followed by general and factual history, along with official material, historical, statistical, and other sources required for a more intensive investigation. The general and factual literature, predominantly prerevolutionary in origin, as well as the official and other related material, should be utilized critically. [Au.]

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* Social-Economic State Press, hereinafter referred to as Sotsekgiz. Ed.

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PART I

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FOR THE VARIOUS NATIONALITIES: *a*) GRUZIA (in the Gruzian language), Brosse, *Istoriya Gruzii* (History of Gruzia) (1923); M. Dzhanashvili, *Istoriya Gruzii* (History of Gruzia) (1906), I; I. Dzhavakhishvili, *Istoriya gruzinskogo naroda* (History of the Gruzian People) (1913); by the same author, *Ekonomicheskaya istoriya Gruzii* (Economic History of Gruzia) (1907); in the Russian language, see Baratov, *Istoriya Gruzii* (History of Gruzia) (1865–1871); Khakhanov, *Drevneyshiye predely rasseleniya po Maloi Azii* (Ancient Settlement Frontiers in Asia Minor) (1890). *b*) ARMENIA: Abaza, *Istoriya Armenii* (History of Armenia) (1888); Khalatyants, *Ocherki istorii Armenii* (Essays on the History of Armenia) (1910); Manandyan, *Materialy po istorii ekonomicheskoi zhizni drevnyei Armenii* (Material on the History of the Economic Life of Ancient Armenia) (1928); by the same author, *O torvolye v gorodakh Armenii v svyazi s mirovoi torgovlyei drevnikh vremyon* (On Trade in the Cities of Armenia in Connection with World Trade of Ancient Times) (1930), fifth century B.C. to fifteenth century after Christ; by the same author, *Istoriya Armenii v epokhu tyurko-tatarskikh nashestvii* (History of Armenia in the Era of the Turko-Tatar Invasions) (1922), in the Armenian language; Bryusov, *Letopis' istoricheskikh sudyeb armyanskogo naroda* (Chronicle of the Historic Destinies of the Armenian People) (1918). Among the ancient Armenian authors, see Moisei Khorenskii (seventh century), *Geografiya* (trans. into Russian by Patkanov as *Armyanskaya geografiya VII v.*) (Armenian Geography of the Seventh Century) (1877), and by same author, *Istoriya Armenii* (History of Armenia)—(Russian trans. by Emin, 2nd ed., 1893). *c*) AZERBAIJAN: Pakhomov, *Kratkii kurs istorii Azerbaidzhana* (Short Course on the History of Azerbaijan) (1923); Sysoyev, *Kratkii ocherk istorii Azerbaidzhana* (A Brief Outline of the History of Azerbaijan) (1925). *d*) For the other nationalities, see Martirosian, *Istoriya Ingushii* (History of Ingushia) (1933); Samurskii, *Dagestan* (1925); Shora-Beklurzin, *Istoriya adygeyskogo naroda* (History of the Adyger People) (1861); Kokiev, *Ocherki po istorii Osetii* (Essays on the History of Osetia) (1926); Fadeyev, *Kratkii ocherk istorii Abkhazii* (A Brief Outline of History of Abkhazia) (1934); Basaria, *Abkhaziya v geograficheskom, etnograficheskom i ekonomicheskom otnoshenii* (Abkhazia in its Geographic, Ethnographic, and Economic Position) (1923); Ashkhatsava, *Puti razvitiya abkhazskoi istorii* (Lines of Development of Akbhazian History) (1925). (For a critical appraisal of the last two authors, see the preface to the

above-named book by Fadeyev.) See also Kudryavtsev, *Sbornik materialov po istorii Abkhazii* (Collection of Material on the History of Abkhazia) (1926).

IN THE GENERAL HISTORICAL LITERATURE ON MIDDLE AND CENTRAL ASIA, see the following major works dealing with the problem of economic development: Bartold, *Turkestan v epokhu mongolskogo nashestviya* (Turkestan in the Era of the Mongolian Invasion) (1899–1900), 2 vols.; by the same author, *K istorii orosheniya Turkestana* (On the History of Irrigation in Turkestan) (1914); by the same author, *Istoriya Turkestana* (History of Turkestan) (1922); by the same author, *Mesto prikaspiiskikh oblastei v istorii musulmanskogo mira* (The Place of the Caspian Provinces in the History of the Moslem World) (1925); Tanyshnayev, *Materialy k istorii kirgiz-kazakhskogo naroda* (Materials on the History of the Kirghiz-Kazakh Peoples) (1925); Chuloshnikov, *Ocherki po istorii kazakh-kirgizskogo naroda* (Essays on the History of the Kazakh-Kirghiz People) (1924); Shteinberg, *Ocherki istorii Turkmenii* (Essays in the History of Turkmenia) (1934). Notes of *foreign travelers* in Asia: Giovanni de Piano Carpini (Yazykov edition, 1825), Wilhelm Rubruguis (*Puteshestviye v vostochnyye strany*) (Travels in Eastern Lands) (1911); Marco Polo (trans. by Bartold, 1902), Gonzales (*Dnevnik puteshestviya ko dvoru Timura*) (Diary of a Journey to the Palace of Tamerlane) (Academy of Sciences, 1881), and others.

ON THE PRIMITIVE ECONOMY OF THE SLAVS, most of the detailed information is available in the textbooks of Dovnar-Zapolskii (archaeological material, literary references) and Kulisher, Vol. I (literature). On the prehistory and clan society of the Slavs, see Belyayev, *Russkaya zemlya pered pribytiyem Ryurika* (The Russian Land Before the Advent of Rurik), Vremennik Moskovskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostyei (Periodical of the Moscow Society of History and Antiquity) (1850); Hrushevsky, *Istoriya Ukrainy* (History of the Ukraine) (1891); by the same author, *Kievskaya Rus'* (Kiev Rus) (1911); A. Presnyakov, *Obrazovaniye velikorusskogo gosudarstva* (Formation of the Great-Russian State) (1918).

ON THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY of ancient Rus, see: Barsov, *Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii* (Russian Historical Geography), *Geografiya nachalnoi letopisi* (Geography of the Early Chronicles) (1873); Maykov, *Zametki po geografii drevnyei Rusi* (Notes on the Geography of Ancient Rus) (1874). On Ancient Geography and Cartography, see *Kniga glagolemaya bolshoi chertyosh* (Book Depicting the Great Chart), a description of a geographic map prepared in the sixteenth century (Spassky, Moscow, 1846).

WRITTEN RECORDS of early Slavic society, chiefly the chronicles, in the following transcriptions: the Laurentian (Archaeographic Commission, 1872) and the Ipatiyev (1871); the Novgorod chronicles in the Synod transcription (Archaeographic Commission, 1889); *Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles* (1841–1917), I-XXIII.

PART II

FEUDAL ECONOMY OF THE NINTH TO FOURTEENTH CENTURIES

For the classics of Marxism-Leninism on the genesis, reality, and disintegration of *feudalism,* see: Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. IV, p. 64; Marx, *Kapital,* Vol. I, Chaps. 8 and 24, Vol. III, Chaps. 20, 36, and 67; Engels, *Proiskhozhdeniye semyi, chastnoi sobstvennosti i gosudarstva* (Origin of the Family, Private Property, and State) (1937); *Anti-Dühring* (1933), especially sections II and III; on the disintegration of feudalism and the development of the bourgeoisie during the late Middle Ages, see Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XVI, Pt. 1; Marx, an article, Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XV; Lenin, *O gosudarstve* (On the State), a lecture in his *Sochineniya,* Vol. XXIV; Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed.; *Istoriya VKP(b)* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks], A Short Course), pp. 119-120.

On the genesis and general problems of *feudalism in Russia* and its peculiarities, see: Karl Marx, *Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1899); a number of articles in Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya,* Vols. IX, X, XI, Pt. 1, XV; Lenin: *Razvitiye kapitalizma v Rossii* (Development of Capitalism in Russia), in his *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, especially Chap. III; "Chto takoye 'druzya naroda' i kak oni voyuyut protiv sotsial-demokratov?" (What Are These Friends of the People and How Do They Fight the Social-Democrats?) in his *Sochineniya,* Vol. I, pp. 72, 73; "Agrarnyi vopros v Rossii k kontsu XIX v." (The Agrarian Problem in Russia Toward the End of the Nineteenth Century), in his *Sochineniya,* Vol. XII.

ON THE ECONOMIC ORDER OF ANCIENT, PREFEUDAL RUS OF THE NINTH AND TENTH CENTURIES and on economic relationships during the early feudal period, see in addition to the above-cited general textbooks in history and general textbooks in the history of the national economy: Grekov, *Feodalnyye otnosheniya v Kievskom gosudarstve* (Feudal Relations in the Kiev State) (1936); by the same author, *Rabstvo i feodalizm v drevnyei Rusi* (Slavery and Feudalism in Ancient Rus) (GAIMK), Issue 86; by the same author, *Ocherki po istorii feodalizma v Rossii* (Essays on the History of Feudalism in Russia) (1934); Voznesenskii, "K voprosu o feodalizme v Rossii" (On the Problem of Feudalism in Russia), in *Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh formatsii* (Problems in the History of Precapitalist Structures) (1934), Nos. 7-8; Deselovskii, *K voprosu o proiskhozhdenii votchinnogo rezhima* (On the Problem of the Origin of the Patrimonial Regime) (1926); Tikhomirov, "Feodalnyi poryadok na Rusi" (The Feudal Order in Rus), in *Istoriya razvitiya obshchestvennykh formatsii* (History of the Development of Social Structures) (1930); Yushkov, "Feodalnyye otnosheniya v Kievskoi Rusi" (Feudal Relations in Kiev Rus), *Uchenyye zapiski Saratovskogo universiteta* (Scientific Notes of the University of Saratov) (1924), Issue 4; Argunov, "Krestyanin i zemlevladelets v epokhu Pskovskoi sudnoi

Gramoty" (Peasant and Landowner in the Era of the Pskov Court Charter), *Uchenyye zapiski Saratovskogo universiteta* (Scientific Notes of the University of Saratov) (1925); Tsvibak, "Osnovnyye problemy genezisa i razvitiya feodalnogo obshchestva" (Basic Problems of the Genesis and Development of Feudal Society), *Izvestiya* (News) of GAIMK (1934), Issue 103. From prerevolutionary historiography: Pavlov-Silvanskii, *Feodalizm v drevnyei Rusi* (Feudalism in Ancient Rus) (1907); see also the *Istoricheskiye sborniki* (Historical Collections) (1934), of the Academy of Sciences, such as collection *Iz istorii dokapitalisticheskikh formatsii* (From the History of Precapitalist Structures) (1933); Mavrodin, *Obrazovaniye russkogo natsionalnogo gosudarstva* (Formation of the Russian National State) (Sotsekgiz, 1939).

SOURCE MATERIAL: in addition to the chronicles, there are the *Russkaya pravda* (Russian Law) in the following transcriptions: the Academic, the Troitsky, and the Karamzin (Moscow, 1847); *Akty, sobrannyye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Rossiiskoi imperii Arkheograficheskoi ekspeditsiei Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk* (Deeds Collected in the Library and Archives of the Russian Empire by the Archaeographic Expedition of the Imperial Academy of Sciences) (abbreviated as A.A.E.) (1294–1700), Vols. I-IV; *Akty istoricheskiye, sobrannyye i izdannyye Arkheograficheskoi komissiei* (Historical Deeds Collected and Published by the Archaeographic Commission) (abbreviated as A.I.) (1334–1700), Vols. I-IV; *Dopolneniya k aktam istoricheskim* (Supplements to the Historical Deeds) (abbreviated as D.A.I.) (1846), Vol. I; *Sobraniye gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov* (Collection of State Charters and Treaties) (1813–1828), Pts. I-IV. Laws and material dealing with economic institutions: *Sbornik Mukhanova* (The Mukhanov Collection) (1866); *Novgorodskaya sudnaya gramota* (Novgorod Court Charter) and *Pskovskaya sudnaya gramota* (Pskov Court Charter) (Archaeographic Commission, 1888); *Pamyatniki istorii Kievskogo gosudarstva IX-XII vv.* (Monuments in the History of the Kiev State of the Ninth to Twelfth Centuries) (1936), a collection of documents.

ON FEUDAL RELATIONS AMONG THE NATIONALITIES OF THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA, in addition to the historical literature cited, see: Khudadov, *Zakavkaziye, istoriko-ekonomicheskii ocherk* (Transcaucasia: A Historical and Economic Essay) (1926); Purtseladze, *O krepostnom sostoyanii v Gruzii* (On Feudal Conditions in Gruzia) (1882); Shopen, *Istoricheskii pamyatnik sostoyaniya armyanskoi oblasti v epokhu prisoedineniya yeyo k Rossii* (Historic Record of Conditions in the Armenian Province at the Time of Its Annexation to Russia) (1852); Dzhanaisha, *Gruziya na puti rannego feodalizma* (Gruzia on the Path of Early Feudalism) (1937); Yakubovskii, *Feodalnoye obshchestvo v Srednyei Azii* (Feudal Society in Central Asia) (1935).

ON THE FEUDAL RELATIONS and rural economy of northeastern feudal Rus of the eleventh to fourteenth centuries, see: Blumenfeld, *O formakh zemlevladeniya v drevnyei Rossii* (On the Forms of Land Tenure in Ancient Russia)

(1884); Klyuchevskii, *Opyty i issledovaniya* (Experiments and Studies); Gnevushev, *Ocherki ekonomicheskoi i sotsialnoi zhizni selskogo naseleniya Novgorodskoi oblasti* (Essays on the Economic and Social Life of the Rural Population of the Novgorod Provinces), Vol. I; *Selskoye naseleniye Novgorodskoi oblasti* (Rural Population of the Novgorod Province) (1915); I. Belyayev, *Krestyane na Rusi* (The Peasants in Rus) (1879); P. I. Belyayev, "Kholopstvo i dolgovye otnosheniya po drevnyerusskomu pravu" (Slavery and Indebtedness According to Ancient Russian Law), in *Yuridicheskii vestnik* (Herald of Jurisprudence) (1915); Pavlov-Silvanskii, "Zakladnichestvo—patronat" (Mortgages and Patronage), in *Zapiski Moskovskogo arkeologicheskogo obshchestva* (Records of the Moscow Archaeological Society) (1937), IX; Nikitskii, *Istoriya ekonomicheskogo byta velikogo Novgoroda* (History of Economic Life in Great Novgorod) (1893); Polezhayev, *Moskovskoye knyazhestvo v polovinye XIV v.* (The Moscow Principality in the Middle of the Fourteenth Century) (1878).

ON THE CITIES, INDUSTRY, AND TRADE OF THE FEUDAL PERIOD, see, in addition to the above-cited general literature, on the cities: Samokvasov, *Drevniye goroda Rossii* (Ancient Cities of Russia) (1873); Kostomarov, *Severnorusskiye narodopravstva* (North Russian Popular Rights) (1863); Leshkov, *Russkii narod i gosudarstvo* (The Russian Nation and State) (1858); Zabelin, *Istoriya goroda Moskvy* (History of the City of Moscow) (1905); Aristov, *Promyshlennost' drevnyei Rusi* (Industry of Ancient Rus) (1868).

ON TRADE, see: Vasilevskii, "Drevnyaya torgovlya Kieva s Regensburgom" (Ancient Commerce between Kiev and Regensburg), in *Journal of the Ministry of Public Education* (1888), VII; Berezhkov, *O torgovle Rusi s Ganzoy do kontsa XV v.* (On the Commerce between Rus and Hansa Up to the End of the Fifteenth Century) (1879); Svyatlovskii, *Primitivnotorgovoye gosudarstvo* (The Primitive Commercial State) (1914); Kaufman, *Serebryanyi rubl v Rossii* (The Silver Ruble in Russia) (1910); Zabelin, "O metallicheskom proizvodstve v Rossii do XVIII v." (On the Production of Metal in Russia to the End of the Eighteenth Century), in *Zapiski Moskovskogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva* (Records of the Moscow Archaeological Society), Vol. V.

PART III

THE FEUDAL ECONOMY OF THE MOSCOW STATE OF THE FIFTEENTH TO SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

For the basic setting for the emergence of the Moscow state, see: Lenin, "Chto takoye 'druzya naroda' i kak oni voyuyut protiv sotsial-demokratov?" (What Are These Friends of the People and How Do They Fight the Social-Democrats?), in his *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. I, p. 73; Stalin: *Marksizm i natsionalno-kolonialnyi vopros* (Marxism and the National-Colonial Problem) (1937), and *Ob ocherednykh zadachakh partii v natsionalnom voprose* (On the Imminent Tasks of the Party in the Nationality Problem), pp. 72-74.

ON THE GENERAL HISTORY OF THE ECONOMY and life of the Moscow state during the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, see in addition to the appropriate chapters of the general textbooks: I. Miklashevskii, *K istorii khozyaistvennogo byta Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (On the History of the Economic Life of the Moscow State) (1894); Kostomarov, *Ocherk domashnei zhizni i nravov velikorusskogo naroda v XVI i XVII st.* (Outline of the Domestic Life and Customs of the Great Russian People in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries), *Monografii* (Monographs), Vol. XIX. Among the works of foreigners on Muscovy, see: Matvei Mekhovskii, *Traktat o dvukh Sarmatiakh* (Tract on the Two Sarmatias) (dates from 1517) (Academy of Sciences, 1936); Gerbershtein, *Zapiski o Moskovii* (Notes on Muscovy) (1549—Russian trans., 1866). About the author, see Zamyslovskii, *Gerbershtein i yego istoriko-geograficheskiye izvestiya o Rossii* (Gerbershtein and His Historical-Geographic Reports on Russia) (1884). See also, Fletcher, *O gosudarstve russkom* (On the Russian State) (1591—Russian trans., 1905). About the author, see Seredonin, *Sochineniye D. Fletchera, kak istoricheskii istochnik* (The Collected Works of D. Fletcher as a Historical Source) (1891). See also, Olearii, *Podrobnoye opisaniye puteshestviya Golshtinskogo posolstva v Moskoviyu i Persiyu* (Detailed Description of a Journey by the Holstein Mission to Muscovy and Persia) (1633–1639—Russian trans., 1870); Kielburger, *Kratkoye izvestiye o russkoi torgovle* (Short Report on Russian Trade) (1674—Russian trans., 1820). About the author, see B. Kurts, *Sochineniya Kilburgera o russkoi torgovlye v tsarstvovaniye Alekseya Mikhailovicha* (The Collected Works of Kielburger on Russian Trade During the Reign of Alexis Mikhailovich) (Moscow, 1915). See also, De Rhodes, *Razmyshleniya o russkoi torgovlye v 1653 g.* (Reflections on Russian Trade in 1653), *Magazin zemlevedeniya i puteshestvii* (Magazine of Geography and Travel), Vol. V. About the author, see B. Kurts, *Sostoyaniye Rossii v 1615–1655 gg. po doneseniyam Rodesa* (Condition of Russia in 1615–1655 According to the Reports of Rhodes) (Moscow, 1914). See also: Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii v tsarstvovaniye Alekseya Mikhailovicha* (On Russia in the Reign of Alexis Mikhailovich) (1906); Krizhanich, *Russkoye gosudarstvo v polovine XVII v.* (The Russian State in the Middle of the Seventeenth Century) (1859); Klyuchevskii, *Skazaniya inostrantsev o Moskovskom gosudarstve* (Reports of Foreigners on the Moscow State) (1866 and 1916); Seredonin, *Izvestiya anglichan o Rossii* (Reports on Russia by Englishmen) (1884); *Biblioteka inostrannykh pisatelyei o Rossii* (Library of Foreign Writers on Russia) (1836–1847).

SOURCES AND MATERIAL other than those cited. The most important sources for the economic history of the Moscow Era are the cadastres of the period: *Pistsovyye knigi Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Cadastres of the Moscow State), ed. by Kalachev (1872–1877); *Novgorodskiye pistsovyye knigi* (Novgorod Cadastres) (1859–1910), Vols. I-VI; *Pistsovyye knigi Ryazanskogo kraya* (Cadastres of the Ryazan Region), ed. by Storozhev (1893); Materialy po istorii goroda XVII-XVIII st. st. (Materials on the History of the City of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth

Centuries) (1883). On the history of the peasantry specifically, see Dyakonov, *Akty otnosyashchiesya k istorii tyaglogo naseleniya v Moskovskom gosudarstve* (Laws Pertaining to the History of the Taxable Population in the Moscow State) (1895–1897), Vols. I-II; Samokvasov, *Krepostnoye pravo v drevnyei Rossii* (Feudal Law in Ancient Russia) (1909), archive material; *Svodnyi tekst krestyanskikh poryadnykh* (Summary Text of Peasant Regulations) (1910); *Prikhodoraskhodnaya kniga Volokolamskogo monastyrya 1593–1594* (Account Book of the Volokolamsk Monastery for 1593–1594), in the studies of the Historical Archaeographic Institute of the Academy of Sciences.

SPECIFICALLY ON THE PROBLEMS OF RURAL ECONOMY, see in addition to the above-cited general monographs: Rozhkov, *Selskoye khozyaistvo Moskovskoi Rusi XVI v.* (Rural Economy of Moscow Rus in the Sixteenth Century) (1899); Gotye, *Zamoskovnyi krai v XVII v.* (The Moscow Region in the Seventeenth Century) (1906, new ed., 1937); Zaozerskii, *Tsarskaya votchina XVII v.* (The Tsarist Patrimony of the Seventeenth Century), 2nd ed. (1937); Zabelin, "Bolshoi boyarin v svoyom votchinnom khozyaistve" (The Great Nobleman on His Patrimonial Estate), in *Vestnik Yevropy* (The European Herald) (1871), Vols. I-II; Blagoveshchenskii, *Chetvertnoye pravo* (The Law of Right to Quarter Holdings) (1899); Belyayev, *O storozhevoi, stanichnoi i polevoi sluzhbe na polskoi ukraine Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (On the Guard, Cossack, and Military Service Along the Polish Borderland of the Moscow State (1846); Klyuchevskii, *Khozyaistvennaya deyatelnost' Solovetskogo monastyrya: Opyty i issledovaniya* (Economic Activity of the Solovetskii Monastery: Experiments and Studies); A. Novoselskii, *Votchinnik i yego khozyaistvo v XVII v.* (The Patrimonial Owner and His Estate in the Seventeenth Century) (1929); *Khozyaistvo krupnogo feodala-krepostnik XVII v.* (The Manorial Economy of the Large Serf Owner of the Seventeenth Century) (1933), studies of the Historical-Archaeographic Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; Bakhrushin, *Knyazheskoye khozyaistvo XV v. i pervoi poloviny XVI v.* (The Princely Estate of the Fifteenth and First Half of the Sixteenth Centuries) (1909).

ON AGRICULTURE AND AGRARIAN RELATIONSHIPS; see: Dyakonov, *Ocherki iz istorii selskogo naseleniya v Moskovskom gosudarstve* (Essays in the History of the Rural Population in the Moscow State) (1848); Rozhdestvenskii, *Sluzhiloye zemlevladniye v Moskovskom gosudarstve XVI v.* (Military Land Tenure in the Moscow State of the Sixteenth Century) (1897); Stashevskii, *Opyt izucheniya pistsovykh knig Moskovskovo gosudarstva* (Experiment in the Study of the Cadastres of the Moscow State) (1907), Vol. I; M. Shimanskii, *Ryazanskii uyezd v kontse XVI v. i v nachale XVII v. po pistsovym knigam* (The Ryazan County at the End of the Sixteenth and Beginning of the Seventeenth Centuries According to the Cadastres) (1911), Studies of the Ryazan Scientific Archive Commission; Belotserkovskii, *Tula i tulskii uyezd v XVI i XVII vv.* (Tula and Tula County in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries)

(1914); Lappo, *Tverskoi uyezd v XVI v.* (Tver County in the Sixteenth Century) (1894), P. Smirnov, *Orlovskii uyezd v kontse XVI v.* (Oryol County at the End of the Sixteenth Century) *Universitetskiye izvestiya* (University News) (Kiev, 1909–1910); Belyayev, *O pozemelnom vladenii v Moskovskom gosudarstve* (On Land Tenure in the Moscow State) (1851); Gorchakov, *O zemelnykh vladeniyakh vserossiiskikh mitropolitov, patriarkhov i svyateishego sinoda* (On the Landholdings of the All-Russian Metropolitans, Patriarchs, and the Holy Synod) (1871); Sedashev, *Ocherki i materialy po istorii zemlevladeniya moskovskoi Rusi XVII v.* (Essays and Materials on the History of Land Tenure in Moscow Rus of the Seventeenth Century) (1912).

On the problem of THE RUSSIAN LAND COMMUNE AND ITS HISTORY specifically, see the guiding articles and letters in Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vols. IX, XV, XVI, Pt. II, Vols. XXVI-XXVIII; Lenin, in his critical articles directed against the Populists: "Chto takoye 'druzya naroda' i kak oni voyuyut protiv sotsial-demokratov? (What Are These Friends of the People and How Do They Fight the Social-Democrats?), in his *Sochineniya,* Vol. I; "Ekonomicheskoye soderzhaniye narodnichestva i kritika yego v knige g. Struve" (Economic Content of Populism and Its Criticism in the Book of Mr. Struve), *Sochineniya,* Vol. I; "Ot kakogo naslyedstva my otkazyvayemsya?" (What Is the Heritage We Are Renouncing?), *Sochineniya,* Vol. I; *Razvitiye kapitalizma v Rossii* (Development of Capitalism in Russia), especially Chaps. I-IV, in his *Sochineniya,* Vol. III; "Agrarnaya programma sotsial-demokratii v pervoi russkoi revolutsii 1905–1907 gg." (The Agrarian Program of the Social-Democrats in the First Russian Revolution of 1905–1907), *Sochineniya,* Vol. XI; "Agrarnyi vopros v Rossii k kontsu XIX v." (Agrarian Problem in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century), *Sochineniya,* Vol. XII; see also his articles on agriculture, the agrarian problem, and the Stolypin Reform mentioned below. In the old Russian historiography on the origin and development of the commune, see: Chicherin, *Obzor istorii razvitiya selskoi obshchiny. Opyty* (Survey of the History of the Development of the Rural Commune. Experiments) (1858); Sokolovskii, *Ocherk istorii selskoi obshchiny na severe Rossii* (Outline of History of the Rural Commune in North Russia) (1877); Yefimenko, *Krestyanskoye zemlevladenie na severe* (Peasant Land Tenure in the North) (1884); Kaufman, *Russkaya obshchina v protsesse yeyo zarozhdeniya i rosta* (The Russian Commune in the Process of Birth and Growth) (1908); Panayev, *Obshchinnoye zemlevladeniye i krestyanskii vopros* (Communal Land Tenure and the Peasant Problem) (1881).

ON RURAL POPULATION AND THE BINDING OF THE PEASANTS, see: Klyuchevskii, *Proiskhozhdeniye krepostnogo prava, Podushnaya podat i otmena kholopstva v Rossii: Opyty i issledovaniya* (Origin of Feudal Law, Per Capita Tax and the Abolition of Slavery in Russia: Experiments and Studies) (1919); Lappo-Danilevskii, "Ocherk istorii obrazovaniya glavneyshikh razryadov

krestyanskogo naseleniya" (Outline of the History of the Formation of the Principal Categories of the Rural Population), included in the collection *Krestyanskii stroi* (Peasant Order) (1905), Vol. I; by the same author, *Organizatsiya pryamogo oblozheniya v Moskovskom gosudarstva* (Organization of Direct Taxation in the Moscow State) (1890); Dyakonov, "K istorii krestyanskogo prikrepleniya" (On the History of the Binding of the Peasants), in the *Journal of the Ministry of Public Education* (seventeenth century) (1935), a collection of documents.

THE CITY IN THE MOSCOW STATE OF THE FIFTEENTH TO SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES. In addition to the above-cited general literature, see the following on the history of the city specifically: Chechulin, *Goroda Moskovskogo gosudarstva v XVI v.* (Cities of the Moscow State in the Sixteenth Century) (1889); Samokvasov, *Drevniye goroda Rossii* (Ancient Cities of Russia) (1873); Prigara, *Opyt istorii sostoyaniya gorodskikh obyvatelei v vostochnoi Rossii* (Experiment in the History of the Conditions of Urban Inhabitants in Eastern Russia) (1868); Smirnov, *Goroda Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Cities of the Moscow State) (1917–1919); Zabelin, *Istoriya goroda Moskvy* (History of the City of Moscow) (1905); Nikitskii, *Ocherk vnutrennyei istorii Pskova* (Outline of the Internal History of Pskov) (1873); by the same author, *Istoriya ekonomicheskogo byta Velikogo Novgoroda* (History of the Economic Life of Great Novgorod) (1893); Bogoyavlenskii, *Nekotoryye statisticheskiye dannyye po istorii russkogo goroda XVII v.* (Some Statistical Data on the History of the Russian City of the Seventeenth Century), studies of the Archaeographic Commission of the Moscow Archaeological Society, Vol. I; *Gorodskiye vosstaniya v moskovskom gosudarstve XVII v.* (Urban Uprisings in the Moscow State of the Seventeenth Century) (1936). On the situation in urban industry, see Dovnar-Zapolskii, *Torgovlya i promyshlennost' Moskvy v XVI i XVII vv.* (Commerce and Industry of Moscow in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries) (1910); by the same author, "Organizatsiya moskovskikh remeslennikov v XVII v." (Organization of the Artisans of Moscow in the Seventeenth Century) in the *Journal of the Ministry of Public Education* (1910).

ON COMMERCE IN THE MOSCOW STATE OF THE FIFTEENTH TO SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES, see: Kostomarov, *Ocherk torgovli Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Outline of Commerce in the Moscow State), *Monografii* (Monographs) (1899), Vol. XX; Ustryalov, *Imenitye lyudi stroganovy* (The Notable Stroganovs) (1842); Stashevskii, "Pyatina 142 goda" (The Fifth Tax During 142 years), in the *Journal of the Ministry of Public Education* (1912), IV-V; Lyubimenko, *Istoriya torgovykh snoshenii Rossii s Angliyei* (History of Commercial Relations Between Russia and England) (1912); Chulkov, *Istoricheskoye opisaniye Rossiiskoi kommertsii* (Historical Description of Russian Commerce) (1781–1788). On the circulation of currency see: Klyuchevskii, *Russkii rubl XVI-XVII vv.* (The Russian Ruble of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries); Kaufman, *Serebryanyi rubl* (The Silver Ruble) (1910).

ON THE COLONIAL POLICY OF THE MOSCOW STATE, see: Bagaley, *Ocherki po istorii kolonizatsii stepnoi okrainy Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Essays on the History of the Colonization of the Steppe Borderland of the Moscow State) (1887); by the same author, *Materialy dlya istorii kolonizatsii i byta stepnoi okrainy Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (Materials for the History of the Colonization and Social Life of the Steppe Borderland of the Moscow State) (1886); Peretyatkovich, *Povolzhye v XV i XVII vv.* (The Volga Region in the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Centuries) (1877); by the same author, *Povolzhye v XVII i nachalye XVIII v.* (The Volga Region in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries) (1882); Stashevskii, *K istorii kolonizatsii yuga* (On the History of the Colonization of the South) (1913); I. Miklashevskii, *K istorii khozyaistvennogo byta Moskovskogo gosudarstva* (On the History of the Economic Life of the Moscow State), Pt. 1; *Zaseleniye i selskoye khozyaistvo yuzhnoi okrainy XVII v.* (Settlement and Rural Economy of the Southern Borderland of the Seventeenth Century) (1894); Sokolovskii, *Ekonomicheskii byt zemledelcheskogo naseleniya i kolonizatsiya yugo-vostochnikh stepei* (Economic Life of the Agricultural Population and the Colonization of the Southeastern Steppes) (1878); Miller, *Opisaniye Sibirskogo tsarstva i vsyekh proisshedshikh v nyom del ot nachala, a osoblivo ot pokoreniya yego Rossiiskoi derzhave, po sii veremena* (Description of the Siberian Kingdom and All Events That Occurred There Since the Beginning, Especially Since Its Conquest by the Russian State Until the Present) (1750); Solovtsov, *Istoricheskoye obozreniye Sibiri* (Historical Survey of Siberia) (1838–1844); Butsinskii, *Zaseleniye Sibiri i byt yeyo pervykh poselnikov* (The Settlement of Siberia and the Life of Its First Settlers) (1889); Titov, *Sibir v XVII v.* (Siberia in the Seventeenth Century) (Moscow, 1890), a collection of materials; Bakhrushin, *Ocherki po istorii kolonizatsii Sibiri v XVI i XVII vv.* (Essays on the History of the Colonization of Siberia in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries) (1928); *Kolonialnaya politika Moskovskogo gosudarstva v Yakutii XVII v.* (Colonial Policy of the Moscow State in Yakutia in the Seventeenth Century) (1936), collection of archive documents; Kozmin, *K voprosu o turetsko-mongolskom feodalizme* (On the Problem of Turko-Mongolian Feudalism) (1934), feudalism in Buryatiya; Kolonialnaya politika tsarizma na Kamchatke i Chukotke v XVIII v. (Colonial Policy of Tsarism in Kamchatka and Chukotka in the Eighteenth Century) (1936), a collection of archive material; Asfendiarov, *Istoriya Kazakhstana s drevnyeyshikh vremyon* (History of Kazakhstan Since Ancient Times) (1935), Vol. I; Tukhvatullin, *Materialy po istorii Bashkirii* (Materials on the History of Bashkiria) (1928); Nikolskii, *Bashkiry* (The Bashkirs) (1899); *Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR* (Materials on the History of the Bashkirian ASSR) (Academy of Sciences, 1936) Pt. 1; Grekov and Yakubovskii, *Zolotaya Orda* (The Golden Horde) (1937); Geraklitov, *Arzamasskaya mordva po pistsovym i perepisnym knigam XVII-XVIII vv.* (Arzamas Mordvinia According to the Cadastres and Census Records of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries) (1930); P. S. Rykov, *Ocherki po istorii mordvy* (Essays on the History of Mordvinia) (1933).

Of the extensive literature ON THE HISTORY OF WHITE RUSSIA, LITHUANIA, AND SOUTHWESTERN RUS OF THE THIRTEENTH TO SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES, the following may be cited as the principal studies of the national-economic problems discussed in the text: Antonovich, *Monografii po istorii zapadnoi i yugo-zapadnoi Rossii* (Monographs on the History of Western and Southwestern Russia) (1885), Vol. I; Dovnar-Zapolskii, *Gosudarstvennoye khozyaistvo velikogo knyazhestva Litovskogo pri Yagellonakh* (The State Economy of the Grand Principality of Lithuania Under the Jagellons) (1901), Vol. I; by the same author, *Ocherki po organizatsii zapadnorusskogo krestyanstva v XVI v.* (Essays on the Organization of Western Russian Peasantry in the XVI Century) (Kiev, 1905); Vladimirskii-Budanov, *Naseleniye yugo-zapadnoi Rusi ot poloviny XIII do poloviny XV v.* (The Population of Southwestern Rus from the Middle of the Thirteenth to the Middle of the Fifteenth Centuries), *Arkhiv yugo-zapadnoi Rossii* (Archives of Southwestern Russia), Pt. 7; by the same author, *Naseleniye yugo-zapadnoi Rusi ot poloviny XV v do Lyublinskoi unii* (The Population of Southwestern Rus from the Middle of the Fifteenth Century to the Union of Lublin), *Arkhiv yugo-zapadnoi Rossii* (Archives of Southwestern Russia), Vol. II, Pt. 12; Hrushevskii, *Ocherki istorii Kievskoi zemli* (Outline of the History of the Kiev Land) (1891); Lyubavskii, "Nachalnaya istoriya malorusskogo kazachestva" (Early History of the Little Russian Cossack Group), in the *Journal of the Ministry of Public Education*, (1895); Linnichenko, *Cherty iz istorii soslovii v yugo-zapadnoi Galitskoi Rusi* (Outline of the History of Classes in Southwestern-Galician Rus) (Moscow, 1894); Kulish, *Istoriya vossoedineniya Rusi* (The History of the Unification of Rus) (1874–1877), Vols. I-III; Vladimirskii-Budanov, *Pomestye v Litovsko-Russkom gosudarstve* (The Manor in the Lithuanian-Russian State) (1899); Leontovich, *Ocherk istorii litovsko-russkogo prava* (Outline of the History of Lithuanian-Russian Law) (1894); Picheta, *Istoriya Belarusi* (History of White Russia) (1924); by the same author, "Litovsko-Russkoye gosudarstvo" (The Lithuanian-Russian State) in the collection *Russkaya istoriya v ocherkakh i statyakh* (Russian History in Essays and Articles), ed. by Dovnar-Zapolskii, Vol. II.

SOURCE MATERIAL: *Akty, otnosyashchiesya k istorii Zapadnoi Rossii* (Deeds Pertaining to the History of Western Russia) (1846–1853), Vols. I-V; Leontovich, *Akty litovskoi metriki* (Deeds of the Lithuanian Parish Register) (1896), Issues I-II; *Arkhiv yugo-zapadnoi Rossii* (Archives of Southwestern Russia) (1859–1893), Vol. I, Pts. 3-8; *Akty Vilenskoi arkheograficheskoi komissii* (Deeds of the Vilno Archaeographic Commission) (1867–1912); Dovnar-Zapolskii, *Akty Litovsko-Russkogo gosudarstva* (Deeds of the Lithuanian Russian State) (1899), Vol. I.

PART IV

THE FEUDAL ECONOMY OF RUSSIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND FIRST HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

ON THE GENERAL PROBLEMS of feudal economy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, its disintegration and causes of its decline, see the Marxist-Leninist literature cited in connection with the Introduction and Chaps. XXII-XXXVII. In addition, particularly for the period of the liquidation of feudal dispersion and the emergence of the feudal-absolutist state, see: Engels, "O razlozhenii feodalizma" (On the Disintegration of Feudalism), in Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XVI, Pt. 1, as well as Vol. XXVII, p. 117; Lenin, "Chto takoye 'druzya naroda' i kak oni voyuyut protiv sotsial-demokratov?" (What Are These Friends of the People and How Do They Fight the Social-Democrats?), in his *Sochineniya,* Vol. I, pp. 72, 73; *Razvitiye kapitalizma v Rossii* (Development of Capitalism in Russia), *Sochineniya,* Vol. III, pp. 139-141; "Vozrastayushcheye nesootvetstviye" (The Growing Disproportions), *Sochineniya,* Vol. XVI; "O levom reyachestve i o melkoburzhuaznosti" (On Leftist Infantilism and Petty-Bourgeois Attitudes), *Sochineniya,* Vol. XXII; Stalin, *Marksizm i natsionalno-kolonialnyi vopros* (Marxism and the National-Colonial Problem) (1937); *Ob ocherednykh zadachakh partii po natsionalnomu voprosu* (On the Imminent Tasks of the Party on the Nationality Problem), pp. 65-79; *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed.; *Rech na Pervom syezde kolkhoznikov-udarnikov* (Speech Before the First Convention of Collective-Farm Shock Workers), p. 527.

Among the GENERAL PUBLICATIONS on the factual *history of the feudal economy* of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see: Lyashchenko, *Ocherki agrarnoi evolyutsii Rossii* (Outline of the Agrarian Evolution of Russia), especially Chaps. IV-VI; Volkonskii, *Usloviya pomeshchichyego khozyaistva pri krepostnom prave* (Conditions of Manorial Farming Under Feudal Law) (1897), studies of the Ryazan Scientific Archive Commission, 1897; Povalishin, *Ryazanskiye pomeshchiki i ikh krepostnyye* (Landowners of Ryazan and Their Serfs) (1903); Struve, *Krepostnoye khozyaistvo* (Feudal Economy) (1913); Ignatovich, *Pomeshchichyi krestyane nakanune osvobozhdeniya* (Manorial Peasants on the Eve of Liberation), 3rd ed. (1925); Khovanskii, "Pomeshchiki i krestyane Saratovskoi gubernii" (Landowners and Peasants of Saratov Province), in *Materialy po krepostnomu pravu* (Materials on Feudal Law) (Saratov, 1911); Snezhnevskii, *Krepostnyye krestyane nizhegorodskoi gubernii* (Peasant Serfs of the Nizhny Novgorod Province) (Nizhny Novgorod Scientific Archive Commission) (1898), Vol. III; Engelman, *Istoriya krepostnogo prava* (History of Feudal Law) (1900); *Krestyanskii stroy* (The Peasant Order) (1905), a collection; *Velikaya reforma* (The Great Reform) (1911), 6 vols.

AMONG THE GENERAL ECONOMIC AND STATISTICAL works on the feudal economy of the nineteenth century by contemporary authors and

investigators, the most important are: Pososhkov, *Kniga o skudosti i bogatstve* (A Book on Poverty and Wealth) (1937); Radishchev, *Puteshestviye iz Peterburga v Moskvu* (Journey from Petersburg to Moscow), 1st ed. (1790); Shcherbatov, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works) (1896), particularly Vol. I; Arsenyev, *Obozreniye fizicheskogo sostoyaniya Rossii* (A Survey of Physical Conditions of Russia) (1818); by the same author, *Nachertaniya statistiki Rossiiskogo gosudarstva* (Outline of Statistics of the Russian State) (1818–1819); Zyablovskii, *Statisticheskoye opisaniye Rossiiskoi imperii* (Statistical Description of the Russian Empire) (1808); by the same author, *Rossiiskaya statistika* (Russian Statistics) (1832); Keppen, *Devyataya reviziya* (The Ninth Census) (1857); Troinitskii, *Krepostnoye naseleniye Rossii po 10 narodnoi perepisi* (The Serf Population of Russia According to the Tenth National Census) (1861); Androsov, *Khozyaistvennaya statistika Rossii* (Economic Statistics of Russia) (1827); Tengoborskii, *O proizvoditelnykh silakh Rossii* (On the Productive Forces of Russia) (1854–1858), Vols. I-III; Pelchinskii, *O sostoyanii promyshlennykh sil Rossii* (On the Condition of the Industrial Forces of Russia) (1822–1832) (St. Petersburg, 1833); Semyonov, *Izucheniye istoricheskikh svedenii o rossiiskoi vneshnei torgovlye i promyshlennosti s poloviny XVII v. do 1858 g.* (A Study of Historical Data on Russian Foreign Trade and Industry from the Middle of the Seventeenth Century Until 1858) (1859), Pts. 1-3; *Obyasneniya k khozyaistvenno-statisticheskomu atlasu Yevropeiskoi Rossii* (Explanations to the Economic-Statistical Atlas of European Russia), prepared by Vilson, 1st ed. (1851); Turchinovich, *Istoriya selskogo khozyaistva Rossii* (History of the Rural Economy of Russia) (1854). For an index of the general literature on the feudal economy, see the Appendix in Lyashchenko, *Ocherki* (Essays).

Of considerable importance IN THE HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND ECONOMY of the feudal era are also the publications of the various archives of the feudal period, such as *Arkhiv kn. Kurakina* (Archives of Prince Kurakin) (1890–1902), 10 vols., as well as the archives of the brothers Turgenev, Count Mordvinov, Count Vorontsov, Prince Vyazemskii, and others.

FROM THE PERIODIC PRESS of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (still largely untouched by research), a great deal of material may be obtained through: *Trudy volnogo ekonomicheskogo obshchestva* (Studies of the Free Economic Society), *Zemledelcheskii zhurnal* (Agricultural Journal), *Zhurnal zemlevladeltsev* (Landowners' Journal), *Russkii zemledelets* (Russian Agriculturist), and later the *Biblioteka dlya chteniya* (Library for Reading), *Otechestvennyye zapiski* (Homeland Notes), as well as the official *Zhurnal manufaktur i torgovli* (Journal of Manufactures and Trade), *Manufakturnyye i gornozavodskiye izvestiya* (Manufacturing and Mining News), and *Ekonomicheskii ukazatel* (Economic Guide).

ON THE AGE OF PETER I and the significance of his reforms, see: Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. IX, p. 401; Vol. XI, Pt. 1, p. 77;

Vol. XXII, pp. 112-113; Vol. XXIII, p. 147; Lenin, *Sochineniya,* Vol. XVI, p. 314; Vol. XXII, p. 517; Stalin, *Beseda s nemetskim pisatelem Lyudvigom* (Interview with the German Author Ludwig), in separate edition, or in the collection, *Lenin i Stalin* (Lenin and Stalin), a literary collection for the study of the history of the Party, Vol. III; Stalin, *Ob industrializatsii strany i o pravom uklone v VKP(b)* (On the Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation in the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks]), in the same collection.

General historical works are: Solovyov, *Istoriya* (History), Vols. XIII-XVIII; Pavlov-Silvanskii, *Proekty reform v zapiskakh sovremyonnikov Pyotra Velikogo* (Projected Reforms in the Writing of the Contemporaries of Peter the Great) (1897); Milyukov, *Gosudarstvennoye khozyaistvo Rossii v pervoi chetverti XVIII v i reforma Pyotra Velikogo* (State Economy of Russia During the First Quarter of the Eighteenth Century and the Reform of Peter the Great) (1892); Lebedev, *Reformy Pyotra* (The Reforms of Peter) (Moscow, 1937), a collection of documents.

DESCRIPTIONS BY CONTEMPORARIES: Golikov, *Deyaniya Pyotra Velikogo, mudrogo preobrazovatelya Rossii, sobrannyye iz dostovernykh istochnikov i raspolozhennyye po godam* (The Activities of Peter the Great, the Wise Reformer of Russia, Collected from Authentic Sources and Arranged by Years) (Moscow, 1788–1789), 12 parts; I. Kirilov, *Tsvetushcheye sostoyaniye Vserossiiskogo gosudarstva, v kakovoye nachal privyol i ostavil neizrechennymi trudami Pyotr velikii, otets otechestva* (The Prosperous Condition of the All-Russian State, Which Was Initiated, Directed, and Bequeathed by the Incomparable Labors of Peter the Great, Father of His Country) (1727) (Pogodin, Moscow, 1831).

ON INDUSTRY during the age of Peter I and under his successors in the eighteenth century, see: Korsak, *O formakh promyshlennosti* (On the Forms of Industry) (1861); Tugan-Baranovskii, *Russkaya fabrika v proshlom i nastoyashchem* (The Russian Factory in the Past and Present), 2nd ed. (1838); Nisilovich, *Istoriya fabrichno-zavodskogo zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoi imperii* (History of Factory Legislation in the Russian Empire) (1883–1884); M. Chulkov, *Istoricheskoye opisaniye Rossiiskoi kommertsii* (Historical Description of Russian Commerce) (1781–1788); German, *Istoricheskoye nachertaniye gornogo proizvodstva v Rossiiskoi imperii* (Historical Outline of the Mining Industry in the Russian Empire) (1810); Gennin, *Opisaniye uralskikh i sibirskikh zavodov* (A Description of the Factories of the Urals and Siberia) (1735) (Moscow, 1937); Semyonov, *Izucheniye istoricheskikh svedenii o rossiiskoi vneshnei torgovlye i promyshlennosti s poloviny XVII st. po 1858 g.* (A Study of Historical Data on Russian Foreign Trade and Industry from the Middle of the Seventeenth Century Until 1858) (1859), Pts. 1-3; Burnashev, *Ocherk istorii manufaktur v Rossii* (Outline of the History of Manufactures in Russia) (1833); Belov, *Istoricheskii ocherk uralskikh gornykh zavodov* (Historical Outline of the Ural Mining Enterprises) (1896); Udintsov, *Possessionnoye pravo* (System of Possessional Peasants)

(1896); Rozhkov, *Materialy po istorii gornogo promysla v tsarstvovaniye imperatritsy Yelizavety Petrovny* (Materials on the History of the Mining Trade in the Reign of the Empress Elizabeth Petrovna) (St. Petersburg, 1855); Lappo-Danilevskii, *Russkiye torgovo-promyshlennyye kompanii v pervoi polovine XVIII v.* (Russian Commercial-Industrial Companies in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century) (1899); Firsov, *Russkiye torgovo-promyshlennyye kompanii v pervoi polovine XVIII st.* (Russian Commercial-Industrial Companies in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century), 2nd ed. (Kazan, 1922); Shipov, *Khlopchato-bumazhnaya promyshlennost' v Rossii* (The Cotton-Fabrics Industry in Russia) (1857); Boblyi, *Ocherki po istorii polskoi fabrichnoi promyshlennosti* (Essays on the History of the Polish Factory Industry) (1909), Vol. I (1764–1830); *Obzor razlichnykh otraslei manufakturnoi promyshlennosti Rossii* (Survey of the Various Branches of the Manufacturing Industry of Russia) (1862–1865), Vols. I-II.

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mentioned volumes of *Krepostnaya manufaktura* (Feudal Manufacture), Vol. IV, "Sotsialny sostav rabochikh pervoi poloviny XVIII v." (Social Composition of the Workers of the First Half of the Eighteenth Century) and Vol. V, "Moskovskii sukonnyi dvor" (The Moscow Wool-Cloth Mart).

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PART V

INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM

ON THE GENERAL PROBLEMS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM in Russia, see articles and letters in Marx and Engels, *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XXVII (letter to V. Zasulich); Vol. XV (postscript by Engels to the book *Sotsialnyye otnosheniya v Rossii* [Social Relations in Russia]); Lenin, *Razvitiye kapitalizma v Rossii* (The Development of Capitalism in Russia), in *Sochineniya,* Vol. III; "Chto takoye 'druzya naroda' i kak oni voyuyut protiv sotsial-demokratov?" (What Are These Friends of the People and How Do They Fight the Social Democrats?), *Sochineniya,* Vol. I; Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed., particularly pp. 4-5 and 35-38; *Istoriya VKP(b)* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks], A Short Course), Chaps. I-II; Beltov (Plekhanov), *K voprosu o razvitii monisticheskogo vzglyada na istoriyu* (On the Problem of the Development of the Monistic View of History) (1895); Plekhanov, *Nashi raznoglasiya* (Our Disagreements), 1st ed. (1885); Volgin (Plekhanov), *Obosnovaniya narodnichestva v trudakh V. V.* (The Foundations of Populism in the Works of V. V.) (1896).

For prerevolutionary studies and general surveys of the period of industrial capitalism according to the interpretation of bourgeois authors, see Bezobrazov, *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Rossii* (National Economy of Russia) (1882–1889); 2 vols.; Timiryazev, *Razvitiye glavneishikh otraslei fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti s 1850 po 1879 gg.* (Development of the Principal Branches of Factory Industry from 1850 to 1879) (1881); Dementyev, *Fabrika, chto ona dayot naseleniyu i chto ona u nyego beryot* (The Factory, What It Contributes to the Population and What It Takes from It), 2nd ed. (1897); Shultse-Gevernits, *Ocherki obshchestvennogo khozyaistva Rossii* (Outlines of the Social Economy of Russia) (1901); Tugan-Baranovskii, *Russkaya fabrika v proshlom i nastoyashchem* (The Russian Factory in the Past and Present) (several editions); Zak, *Promyshlennyi kapitalizm* (Industrial Capitalism) (1908); Dovnar-Zapolskii, *Belorussiya 1861–1914 gg.* (Belo-Russia During the Years 1861–1914) (1926); Litvinov-Falinskii, *Nashe ekonomicheskoye polozheniye* (Our Economic Conditions) (1908); *Obshchestvennoye dvizheniye v Rossii v nachale XX v.* (Social Movement in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century), ed. by L. Martov, P. Maslov, and A. Potresov (1909–1914), Vols. I-IV, particularly Vols. I and II. For a general summary of basic indexes of the development of capitalism during this period (1870–1913), see the tables in the study by S. Pereushin, *Khozyaistvennaya konyunktura* (Economic Conjuncture) (1925). Among postrevolutionary studies, see data for the prewar years in Strumilin, *Problema promyshlennogo kapitala SSSR* (Problem of Industrial Capital of the USSR) (1925).

ON THE HISTORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY, see: Strumilin, *Chyornaya metallurgiya v Rossii i v SSSR* (Ferrous Metallurgy in Russia and in the USSR) (1935); Glivits, *Zheleznaya promyshlennost' Rossii* (The Iron Industry of Russia) (1911); Skalkovskii, *Gorno-zavodskaya*

promyshlennost' Rossii (The Mining Industry of Russia) (1879); Fomin, *Gornaya i gornozavodskaya promyshlennost' yuga Rossii* (Mining and Metal-Smelting Industries of South Russia) (Kharkov, 1915), Vol. I; Poletika, *O zheleznoi promyshlennosti v Rossii* (About the Iron Industry in Russia) (1864); Belov, *Istoricheskii ocherk uralskikh gornykh zavodov* (Historical Sketch of the Ural Mining Enterprises) (1896), Vol. II; P. Tunner, *Gornozavodskaya promyshlennost' Rossii* (The Metal-Smelting Industry of Russia) (St. Petersburg, 1872); Iossa, *O vlianii postroiki russkikh zheleznykh dorog na razvitiye otechestvennogo zheleznogo proizvodstva* (On the Influence of Railway Construction in Russia on the Development of Domestic Iron Production) (1878); Den, *Kamennougolnaya i zhelezodelatelnaya promyshlennost'* (The Coal and Iron Industries) (1907); Ragozin, *Zhelezo i ugol na yuge Rossii* (Iron and Coal in South Russia) (1895); Matveyev, *Uralskiye metally* (Ural Metals) (1898–1901); by the same author, *Zheleznoye dyelo v Rossii* (The Iron Business in Russia) (1899); Fomin, *Ocherk istorii gvozdarnoi promyshlennosti v Rossii* (Outline of the History of the Nail Industry in Russia), Zapiski Kharkovskogo universiteta (Notes of the Kharkov University) (1897); Kafenhaus, *Razvitiye russkogo selskokhozyaistvennogo mashinostroeniya* (Development of Russian Farm Machinery Production) (1910); Levin, *Nasha sakharnaya promyshlennost'* (Our Sugar Industry) (1908); Maslennikov, *K voprosu o razvitii fabrichnoi promyshlennosti v Rossii, rost khlopchatobumazhnogo proizvodstva v period s 1866–1879 gg.* (On the Problem of the Development of Factory Industry in Russia, the Growth of Cotton Textile Output During the Period 1866–1879), Zapiski geograficheskogo obshchestva (Notes of the Geographic Society), Vol. VI; Luxemburg, *Promyshlennoe razvitiye Polshi* (Industrial Development of Poland) (1899); Yanzhul, *Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiya fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti* (Historical Outline of the Development of Factory Industry) (1900); Ioksimovich, *Manufakturnaya promyshlennost' v proshlom i nastoyashchem* (Manufacturing Industries in the Past and Present) (1915).

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Industries of European Russia in 1868), in *Statisticheskii vremennik Rossiiskoi imperii* (Statistical Periodical of the Russian Empire) (1872); *Materialy po statistike parovykh dvigatelei* (Materials on the Statistics of Steam Engines) (Central Statistical Committee, 1882); "Materialy, sobrannye imperatorskogo russkogo tekhnicheskogo obshchestva komissiei dlya issledovaniya polozheniya v Rossii mashino-stroyeniya" (Materials Collected by the Commission of the Imperial Russian Technical Society for the Study of Conditions in Russian Machinery Production) (St. Petersburg, 1875); "Trudy vysochaishe uchrezhdyonnogo syezda glavnykh po mashinostroitelnoi promyshlennosti deyatelyei" (Proceedings of the Supremely Authorized Congress of Leading Figures in the Machinery Industry) (1875); Orlov, *Ukazatel fabrik i zavodov Yevropeiskoi Rossii* (Guide to Factories and Mills of European Russia) (St. Petersburg, 1881; 2nd ed., 1887; 3rd ed., 1894). Among the publications of the agencies and congresses of the industrialists during the period: "Trudy vysochaishe uchrezhdyonnogo vserossiiskogo torgovo-promyshlennogo syezda v Nizhnem Novgorode" (Proceedings of the Supremely Authorized All-Russian Commercial-Industrial Congress in Nizhny Novgorod) (1896–1897), Vols. 1-13; "Trudy obshchestva dlya sodeistviya russkoi promyshlennosti i torgovle" (Studies of the Society for Assistance to Russian Industry and Commerce) (St. Petersburg, 1873–1893), 22 vols.; *Yezhegodniki ministerstva finansov* (Annuals of the Ministry of Finance); *Statistika proizvodstv, oblagaemykh aktsizom* (Statistics of Industries Subject to the Excise Tax), and *Svod otchyotov fabrichnoi inspektsii* (Summary of Accounts of the Factory Inspection Service) for the various years.

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PART VI

THE ECONOMICS OF THE "NATIONAL MINORITY BORDERLANDS" AND THE COLONIAL POLICY OF TSARISM DURING THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NATIONAL-COLONIAL PROBLEM IN THE CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA, see: Lenin, *Razvitiye kapitalizma v Rossii* (Development of Capitalism in Russia), in his *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, Chap. VIII, Sec. V; *K natsionalnomu voprosu* (On the Nationality Problem), Leninskii sbornik (The Lenin Collection), III; *Imperializm, kak vysshaya stadiya kapitalizma* (Imperialism As a Higher Phase of Capitalism), *Sochineniya,* Vol. XIX; "Sotsialisticheskaya revolutsiya i pravo natsii na samoopredelyoniye" (The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination), *Sochineniya,* Vol. XIX; "Itogi diskussii o sa-

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ON THE COLONIZATION AND ECONOMY OF SIBERIA DURING THE CAPITALIST PERIOD, see: Yadrintsev, *Sibir' kak koloniya* (Siberia as a Colony), 2nd ed. (1892); *Aziatskaya Rossiya* (Asiatic Russia) (1914), 2 vols.; *Sibir' i velikaya Sibirskaya zheleznaya doroga* (Siberia and the Great Siberian Railroad), 2nd ed. (1896); Kramer, *Sibir' i znacheniye velikogo Sibirskogo puti* (Siberia and the Significance of the Great Siberian Road) (1900); Okun, *Ocherki po istorii kolonialnoi politiki tsarizma v Kamchatskom kraye* (Essays on the History of the Tsarist Colonial Policy in the Kamchatka Region) (1935). For prerevolutionary official material and sources, see: "Materialy dlya izucheniya ekonomicheskogo byta gosudarstvennykh krestyan i inorodtsev Zapadnoi Sibiri" (Materials for the Study of the Economic Life of the State Peasants and the Non-Russians of Western Siberia) (1888–1898), 22 issues; "Materialy po issledovaniyu zemlepolzovaniya i khozyaistvennogo byta selskogo naseleniya Irkutskoi i Yeniseiskoi gubernii" (Materials for the Study of Land Tenure and Economic Life of the Village Population of the Irkutsk and Yeniseisk Provinces) (1889–1894), 4 vols.; Razumov, *Zabaikalye, Svod materialov komissii dlya issledovaniya*

mestnogo zemlevladeniya i zemlepolzovaniya (Trans-Baikal, Collection of Material by the Commission for the Study of Local Land Tenure and Land Use), ed. by Kulomzin (1899); *Pamyatnyye knizhki* (Memory Books), for the various provinces and years, and the *Statisticheskiye obzory* (Statistical Surveys) of the local provincial statistical committees.

ON TURKESTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA during the capitalist era, see: Kostyenko, *Srednyaya Azia i vodvoreniye v nyei russkoi grazhdanstvennosti* (Central Asia and the Introduction of Russian Civil Institutions in the Area) (1870); Subbotin, *Rossiya i Angliya na sredneaziatskom rynke* (Russia and England on the Middle-Asia Market) (1885); Fyodorov, *Khlopkovodstvo v Srednyei Azii* (Cotton Growing in Central Asia) (1898); Palen, *Orosheniye v Turkestane* (Irrigation in Turkestan) (1910); Yuferov, *Khozyaistvo sartov v Ferganskoi oblasti* (The Economy of the Sarts in the Fergana Province) (Tashkent, 1911); Knopka, *Turkestanskii krai* (The Turkestan Region) (1912); Ponyatovskii, *Opyt izucheniya khlopkovodstva v Turkestane i Zakaspiiskoi oblasti* (Experiment in the Study of Cotton Growing in Turkestan and the Trans-Caspian Province) (1913); Massalskii, "Turkestanskii krai" (The Turkestan Region), in the publication, *Rossiya, polnoye geograficheskoye opisaniye nashego otechestva* (Russia, a Complete Geographic Description of Our Country) (1913), Vol. XIX; Ogloblin, *Promyshlennost' i torgovlya Turkestana* (Industry and Commerce of Turkestan) (1914); Demidov, *Ekonomicheskiye ocherki khlopkovodstva, khlopkovoi torgovli i promyshlennosti Turkestana* (Economic Outlines of Cotton Growing, the Cotton Trade and Industry of Turkestan), 2nd ed. (1926); Kusheva, *Sredneaziatskii vopros i russkaya burzhuaziya* (The Problem of Central Asia and the Russian Bourgeoisie in the 1840's) (1935); Lavrentyev, *Kapitalizm v Turkestanye* (Capitalism in Turkestan) (1930). Source material: "Material k kharakteristike narodnogo khozyaistva v Turkestane" (Material for the Evaluation of the National Economy in Turkestan), Pts. 1-2; *Reviziya senatora Palena* (The Census of Senator Palen) (1911); "Otchyot A. Polovtseva, komandirovannogo v 1896–1897 gg. dlya sobiraniya svedenii o polozhenii pereselencheskogo dyela v Turkestanskom kraye" (Report by Polovtsev, Who Was Commandeered in 1896–1897 to Collect Data on the Situation in Resettlement Affairs in the Turkestan Region) (1898); "Materialy dlya statisticheskogo opisaniya Ferganskoi oblasti" (Materials for the Statistical Description of the Fergana Province) (1897–1899), Issues I-II; "Pereselencheskoye dyelo v Turkestanskom kraye" (Resettlement Affairs in the Turkestan Region) (1911), a report by N. Gavrilov; "Materialy po izucheniyu khozyaistva osedlogo tuzemnogo naseleniya v Turkestanskom kraye" (Materials for the Study of the Economy of the Settled Native Population in the Turkestan Region) (Tashkent, 1912); "Materialy po obsledovaniyu kochevogo i osedlogo tuzemnogo khozyaistva i zemlepolzovaniya v Amu-Daryinskon otdyelye Syr-Daryinskoi oblasti" (Materials for the Study of the Nomad and Settled Native Economy and Land Use in the Amu-Darya Section of the Syr-Darya Province) (Tashkent, 1915).

ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY OF THE CAUCASUS IN THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM, see: Lenin, *Razvitiye kapitalizma v Rossii* (Development of Capitalism in Russia), *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, Chap. VIII, p. 463; Stalin, *Marksizm i natsionalno-kolonialnyi vopros* (Marxism and the National-Colonial Problem) (1937), p. 80; Beriya, *K istorii bolshevistskikh organizatsii v Zakavkazye* (On the History of the Bolshevik Organization in Transcaucasia) (1935); Makharadze, *Gruzia v XIX st.* (Gruzia in the Nineteenth Century) (1933); Olonetskii, *Ocherki po razvitiyu kapitalisticheskikh otnoshenii v Abkhazii* (Essays on the Development of Capitalist Relations in Abkhazia) (1934); Khudadov, *Zakavkazye, Istorichesky ocherk* (Transcaucasia, A Historical Sketch) (1926); Makharadze and Khachapuridze, *Ocherki po istorii rabochego i krestyanskogo dvizheniya v Gruzii* (Essays in the History of the Labor and Peasant Movement in Gruzia) (1922); Massalskii, "Kavkaz" (Caucasus), in the collection *Okrainy Rossii* (The Borderlands of Russia), ed. by Semyonov (1900); Samurskii, *Dagestan* (1925); Gulishambarov, *Proizvoditelnyye sily Zakavkazya* (Productive Resources of Transcaucasia) (1895); Piralov, *Kratkii ocherk kustarnoi promyshlennosti Kavkaza* (Brief Outline on the Handicraft Industry of the Caucasus) (1913); Lyashchenko, *Krestyanskoye dyelo* (Peasant Affairs), Chaps. IX-X, on the Peasant Reform in Transcaucasia; Semin, *Velikaya godovshchina: Agrarnyi vopros i krestyanskaya (krepostnaya) reforma v Zakavkazye* (The Great Anniversary: The Agrarian Problem and the Peasant [Feudal] Reform in Transcaucasia) (1911). Source material and surveys: "Sbornik statisticheskikh dannykh o zemlevladenii i sposobakh khozyaistva v 5 guberniyakh Zakavkazskogo kraya" (Collection of Statistical Data on Land Tenure and Economic Methods in the Five Provinces of the Transcaucasian Region) (1899); "Materialy po izucheniyu byta gosudarstvennykh krestyan Zakavkazskogo kraya" (Materials for the Study of the Life of the State Peasants of the Transcaucasian Region) (1885–1887), I-VII; "Materialy dlya ustroistva letnikh i zimnikh pastbishch i dlya izucheniya skotovodstva na Kavkaze" (Materials on the Management of Summer and Winter Pastures and for the Study of Stock Breeding in the Caucasus); "Sbornik svedenii o Kavkaze" (Collection of Data on the Caucasus) (1870–1885), I-IX; the "Kavkazsky," "Tersky," "Kubansky," and "Dagestan" collections for a series of years.

PART VII

THE ERA OF IMPERIALISM IN RUSSIA (TWENTIETH CENTURY)

ON THE NATURE OF IMPERIALISM AND ITS PECULIARITIES IN RUSSIA, see: Lenin, *Imperializm, kak vysshaya stadiya kapitalizma* (Imperialism As a Higher Phase of Capitalism), *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XIX; "Sotsializm i voina" (Socialism and War), *Sochineniya,* Vol. XVIII; "Krakh II Internatsionala" (Collapse of the Second International), *Sochineniya,* Vol. XVIII; "O karikature na marksizm i ob 'imperialisticheskom ekonomizme'" (On the Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism), *Sochineniya,* Vol. XIX; "Imperializm i raskol sotsializma" (Imperialism and the Socialist Schism),

Sochineniya, Vol. XIX; "K peresmotru partiinoi programmy" (For a Review of the Party Program), *Sochineniya,* Vol. XXI; see also his articles on the colonial and nationality problem cited in connection with Chaps. XXVII-XXX. See also Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed., particularly "Ob osnovakh leninizma" (On the Foundations of Leninism), pp. 3-7, 33-43; *Marksizm i natsionalno-kolonialnyi vopros* (Marxism and the National-Colonial Problem) (1935); "O sotsial-demokraticheskom uklone v nashei partii" (On the Social Democratic Deviation in Our Party), a report and concluding address before the Fifteenth All-Union Conference of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks); "Yeshchyo raz o s.-d. uklone v nashei partii" (Again About the Social-Democratic Deviation in Our Party), before the Twelfth expanded plenary session of IKKI *; "Revolyutsiya v Kitaye i zadachi Kominterna" (The Revolution in China and the Tasks of the Comintern), in the collection *Ob oppozitsii* (About the Opposition) (1928); *Istoriya VKP(b)* (The History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks]. A Short Course), especially Chaps. III, IV, V.

ON THE CRISIS OF 1900–1903, THE REVOLUTION OF 1905, AND THE ECONOMIC-POLITICAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA DURING 1904–1908, see: Lenin, "Uroki krizisa" (The Lessons of the Crisis), *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. IV; "Novyye sobytiya i staryye voprosy" (New Events and Old Problems), Vol. V; "Sovremyonnoye polozheniye Rossii i taktika rabochei partii" (The Current Situation in Russia and the Tactics of the Workers' Party), *Sochineniya,* Vol. IX; "Doklad o revolutsii 1905 g." (Report on the 1905 Revolution), *Sochineniya,* Vol. XIX; Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed.; *Na putyakh k Oktyabryu* (On the Roads to October) (1925); *Istoriya VKP(b)* (The History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks]. A Short Course), Chap. III.

For bourgeois authors on the industrial crisis of 1900–1903 and the subsequent depression, see: Brandt, *Torgovo-promyshlennyi krizis v Zapadnoi Yevrope i Rossii* (The Commercial-Industrial Crisis in Western Europe and in Russia) (1902–1904), Vols. I-II; Afanasyev, *Denezhnyi krizis* (Monetary Crisis) (1900); Migulin, "Promyshlennyi krizis v Rossii" (Industrial Crisis in Russia), article in *Narodnoye khozyaistvo* (National Economy) (1902–1903); Tugan-Baranovskii, "Sovremyonnyi promyshlennyi krizis" (The Current Industrial Crisis), article in the journal *Mir Bozhii* (God's World) (1900), XI; Meyerson, "Promyshlennaya depressiya v Rossii 1906–1909 gg." (The Industrial Depression of 1906–1909 in Russia), *Vestnik Kommunisticheskoi akademii* (Herald of the Communist Academy) (1924); Shteinfeld, "K voprosu o prichinakh krizisa" (On the Problem of the Causes of the Crisis), an article in *Narodnoye khozyaistvo* (National Economy) (1902), IV; by the same author, "Politika kazyonnykh zakazov" (The Policy of Government Orders), *Narodnoye khozyaistvo* (National Economy) (1902), VIII; Balabanov, "Promyshlennost' Rossii v nachale XX v." (Industry in Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century), in the collection *Obshchestvennoye dvizheniye Rossii* (Social Movement in Russia), Vol. I.

* IKKI—Executive Committee of the Communist International.—ED.

ON THE CONCENTRATION OF INDUSTRY AND THE MONOPOLIES during the period of imperialism, see: Lenin, *Imperializm, kak vysshaya stadiya kapitalizma* (Imperialism As a Higher Phase of Capitalism), *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XIX, particularly Sec. I. In the prerevolutionary bourgeois literature on the problem of monopolies in Russian industry during the 1900's, see: Tsyperovich, *Sindikaty i tresty v Rossii* (Syndicates and Trust in Russia), 2nd ed. (1919); Goldshtein, *Sindikaty i tresty* (Syndicates and Trusts) (1912); Kafengauz, *Sindikaty v russkoi zheleznoi promyshlennosti* (Syndicates in the Russian Iron Industry) (1910); Yanzhul, *Promyslovyye sindikaty* (Industrial Syndicates) (1895); Guryev, *Promyshlennyye sindikaty* (Industrial Syndicates) (1898–1899); Rafalovich, *Promyshlennyye sindikaty za granitsei i v Rossii* (Industrial Syndicates Abroad and in Russia) (1904); Farmakovskii, *Sindikatskiye etyudy* (Syndicate Studies) (1908); A. Gushka, *Predstavitelnyye organizatsii torgovo-promyshlennogo klassa v Rossii* (Representative Organization of the Commercial-Industrial Class in Russia) (1912).

ON THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT DURING THE BOOM PERIOD, see: *Istoriya VKP(b)* (The History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks]. A Short Course), Chap. V; Beriya, *K istorii bolshevistskikh organizatsii v Zakavkazye* (On the History of Bolshevist Organizations in Transcaucasia) (1938); Popov, *K istorii zabastovochnogo dvizheniya v Rossii nakanune imperialisticheskoi voiny* (On the History of the Strike Movement in Russia on the Eve of the Imperialist War) (1926); *Lenskiye sobytiya* (Events on the Lena River) (1925), documents and source material collected by Vladimirova; Shestakov, *Vseobshchaya stachka v oktyabre 1905 g.* (The General Strike of October, 1905) (1926); Ainzaft, *Zubatovshchina i gaponovshchina* (The Zubatov and Gapon Movements) (1924); *Tsarizm v borbe s revolutsiyei 1905–1907 gg.* (Tsarism in the Struggle with the Revolution of 1905–1907) (1936), documents and source material; Varzar, *Statistika stachek rabochikh na fabrikakh i zavodakh za 1906–1908 gg.* (Statistics of Labor Strikes in the Factories and Mills during 1906–1908) (1910).

FOR STATISTICAL SOURCE MATERIAL ON CONDITIONS IN INDUSTRY DURING 1900–1914, see: "Svod dannykh o fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti v Rossii" (Summary of Data on Factory Industry in Russia) (1900); "Statisticheskiye svedeniya o fabrikakh i zavodakh po proizvodstvam, ne oblozhennym aktsizom" (Statistical Data on Factories and Mills of the Industries Not Subject to the Excise Tax), for 1900, ed. by Varzar (St. Petersburg, 1903); "Statisticheskiye svedeniya po obrabatyvayushchei fabrichno-zavodskoi promyshlennosti za 1908 g." (Statistical Data on the Processing Factory Industries for 1908), ed. by Varzar (St. Petersburg, 1912); "Fabrichno-zavodskaya promyshlennost' Yevropeiskoi Rossii v 1910–1912 gg." (Factory Industry of European Russia in 1910–1912) (1914), 12 issues; "Statistika proizvodstv, oblagayemykh aktsizom" (Statistics of Industries Subject to the Excise Tax), published annually; "Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii po gornozavodskoi promyshlennosti Rossii" (Collection

of Statistical Data on the Mining and Smelting Industries of Russia). A summary of the main statistics may be found in the *Yezhegodnik ministerstva finansov* (Annual of the Ministry of Finance). Valuable summaries and surveys for the period 1907–1915 are contained in: "Obzory glavneishikh otraslei promyshlennosti i torgovli" (Surveys of the Principal Branches of Industry and Commerce), for 1907–1912; *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Rossii* (National Economy of Russia), 1913–1915, a collection published by the Ministry of Finance. Another very important source is the "Obyasnitelnyye zapiski" (Explanatory Notes) attached to the state budgets of the Ministry of Finance. General economic and statistical publications issued by the industrialists are: *Promyshlennost' i torgovlya* (Industry and Commerce), a journal of the Council of the Industrial Congresses; *Zheleznaya promyshlennost' yuzhnoi Rossii* (Iron Industry of Southern Russia) for 1901–1907; *Zhelezorudnaya promyshlennost' yuga Rossii* (Iron Ore Industry of South Russia) (1907); *Obzory bakinskoi neftyanoi promyshlennosti* (Surveys of the Baku Oil Industry); *Statistika pryadilnogo i tkatskogo proizvodstva za 1909–1910 gg.* (Statistics of Spinning and Weaving Production During 1909–1910) (Society for Cooperation with the Textile Industry); *Trudy syezdov gornopromyshlennosti yuga Rossii* (The Iron-Processing Industry of South Russia); Fomin, *Kratkii ocherk istorii syezdov gornopromyshlennikov yuga Rossii* (Brief Outline of the History of Mining Industry Congresses of South Russia). Summaries of these statistical data are included in the *Statisticheskii yezhegodnik* (Statistical Annual) of the Council of Congresses of the Representatives of Industry and Commerce, ed. by Sharyi.

ON FINANCE CAPITAL IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY DURING THE IMPERIALIST ERA, see: Lenin, *Imperializm, kak vysshaya stadiya kapitalizma* (Imperialism As a Higher Phase of Capitalism), *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XIX, particularly Secs. II and III; Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed.

On postrevolutionary factual studies on finance capital and banking in Russia, see: Granovskii, *Monopolisticheskii kapitalizm v Rossii* (Monopoly Capitalism in Russia) (1929); Gindin, *Banki i promyshlennost' v Rossii* (Banks and Industry in Russia) (1927); Ronin, *Inostranyi kapital i russkiye banki* (Foreign Capital and the Russian Banks) (Moscow, 1926).

ON FOREIGN CAPITAL in Russian industry, see: Brandt, *Inostrannyye kapitaly russkoi promyshlennosti* (The Foreign Capital of Russian Industry) (1898–1899), Vols. I-II; Zak, *Nyemtsy i nyemetskiye kapitaly v russkoi promyshlennosti* (Germans and German Capital in Russian Industry) (1914); Levin, *Germanskiye kapitaly v Rossii* (German Capital in Russia) (1914); Voronov, *Inostrannyye kapitaly v Rossii* (Foreign Capital in Russia) (1901); P. Ol, *Inostrannyye kapitaly v Rossii* (Foreign Capital in Russia) (1922); by the same author, *Inostrannyye kapitaly v khozyaistve dovoyennoi Rossii* (Foreign Capital in the Economy of Prewar Russia) (1925); Eventov, *Inostrannyye kapitaly v neftyanoi promyshlennosti* (Foreign Capital in the Petroleum Industry) (1925);

Ziv, *Inostrannyye kapitaly v russkoi gornozavodskoi promyshlennosti* (Foreign Capital in the Russian Mining Industry) (1917); Pershke, *Russkaya neftyanaya promyshlennost'* (The Russian Petroleum Industry) (1913); Migulin, "Inostrannyye kapitaly Rossii, doklad obshchemu sobraniu Russko-angliiskoi torgovoi palaty" (Foreign Capital of Russia, a Report to the General Assembly of the Russian-English Chamber of Commerce) in *Vestnik Russko-angliiskoi palaty* (Gazette of the Russian-English Chamber) (1913), No. 3; Pasvolsky and Moulton, Russian Debts and Russian Reconstruction (1925); "Russkiye finansy i inostrannaya birzha" (Russian Finance and the Foreign Stock Exchange), a collection of source material; *Tsentroarkhiv* (Central Archives) (Moscow Worker, 1926); Strumilin, *Problema promyshlennogo kapitala SSSR* (The Problem of Industrial Capital in the USSR) (1925); Engeyev, "O platezhnom balanse dovoyennoi Rossii" (On the Balance of Payments of Prewar Russia); *Vestnik finansov* (Finance Herald) (1928), No. 5.

ON THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM DURING THE 1900's AND THE STOLYPIN REFORM, see articles by Lenin on the agrarian and peasant problems, on the agrarian program of the RSDRP, etc.: "Agrarnyi vopros v Rossii k kontsu XIX v." (The Agrarian Problem in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century), *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XII; *Agrarnaya programma sotsial-demokratii v pervoi russkoi revolutsii 1905–1907 gg.* (The Agrarian Program of the Social-Democrats in the First Russian Revolution of 1905–1907), Vol. XI; *Novaya agrarnaya politika* (New Agrarian Policy), Vol. XII; *Dve taktiki* (Two Tactics), Vol. VII; *Poslednyi klapan* (The Last Valve), Vol. XVI; *Krestyanskaya reforma i proletarskaya-krestyanskaya revolutsiya* (The Peasant Reform and the Proletarian-Peasant Revolution), Vol. XV; *Stolypin i revolutsiya* (Stolypin and the Revolution), Vol. XV; *Dva tipa burzhuaznoi agrarnoi evolutsii* (Two Types of the Bourgeois Agrarian Evolution), Vol. XI; *Zemlyevladeniye v Yevropeiskoi Rossii* (Land Tenure in European Russia), Vol. XV. For a comparison of the Stolypin and the Populist (Narodniki) agrarian program, see Vol. XVI. For the official edition of the text of the decree of 1910 as well as some commentaries, see: "Zakon ob izmenenii i dopolnenii nekotorykh postanovlenii o krestyanskom zemlyevladenii" (A Law Amending and Supplementing Certain Decrees on Peasant Land Tenure) (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1910).

ON LAND PROPERTY in Russia and its mobilization during the 1900's, see: Svyatlovskii, *Mobilizatsiya zemelnoi sobstvennosti v Rossii* (Mobilization of Land Property in Russia) (1911), a guide to the literature; Lyashchenko, *Mobilizatsiya zemlevladeniya i yeyo statistika* (Mobilization of Landownership and Its Statistics) (1905); Kosinskii, *Osnovnyye tendentsii v mobilizatsii zemelnoi sobstvennosti* (The Main Trends in the Mobilization of Land Property) (1917); by the same author, *K agrarnomu voprosu* (On the Agrarian Problem) (1906); *Materialy po statistike dvizheniya zemlyevladeniya* (Materials for Statistics on the Movement in Landownership) (1896–1917); *Statistika zemlyevladeniya 1905 g.* (Statistics on Landownership in 1905) (Central Statistical Committee,

1905). See also *Ararnoye dvizheniye v Rossii 1905–1906 gg.* (The Agrarian Movement in Russia During 1905–1906), based on the questionnaire of the Free Economic Society.

ON THE PEASANT BANK and the agrarian policy, see: Zak, *Krestyanskii pozemelnyii bank v 1883–1910 gg.* (The Peasant Land Bank During 1883–1910) (1911), detailed guide to the literature; Krasik, *Krestyanskii bank i yego deyatelnost' 1883–1905 gg.* (The Peasant Bank and Its Activity During 1883–1905) (1910); Baturinskii, *Agrarnaya politika tsarskogo pravitelstva i Krestyanskii pozemelnyi bank* (Agrarian Policy of the Tsarist Government and Peasant Land Bank) (1925), detailed bibliographical guide.

ON THE POSITION OF THE COMMUNE AND THE AGRARIAN ORDER, see: Lositskii, *Raspadeniye obshchiny* (The Dissolution of the Commune) (1912); Chuprov, *Po povodu ukaza 9 noyabrya 1906 g.* (Apropos the Decree of November 9, 1906) (1908); I. Chernyshev, *Krestyane ob obshchine nakanune 9 noyabrya 1906 g.* (The Peasants on the Subject of the Commune on the Eve of November 9, 1906) (1911); by the same author, *Obshchina poslye 9 noyabrya 1906 g.* (The Commune after November 9, 1906) (1917); Koffod, *Krestyanskiye khutora na nadyelnoi zemlye* (Peasant Farmsteads on Allotment Land) (1905), Vols. I-II; by the same author, *Russkoye zemleustroistvo* (The Russian Agrarian Order) (1914); Bilimovich, *Zemleustroitelnyye zadachi i zemleustroitelnoye zakonodatelstvo* (Agrarian Problems and Agrarian Legislation) (1917). The two last-named authors, and Koffod in particular, are extreme advocates of the Stolypin Reform. See also Pershin, *Uchastkovoye zemlepolzovaniye v Rossii: Khutora i otruba, ikh rasprostraneniye za desyatiletiye 1907–1916 gg. i subda yego vo vremya revolutsii* (Sectional Land Usage in Russia: Farmsteads and Holdings, Their Distribution During the Decade of 1907–1916 and Its Fate at the Time of the Revolution) (1917–1920 gg.) (1922); Karpov, *Agrarnaya politika Stolypina* (The Agrarian Policy of Stolypin) (1925); A. Tyumenev, *Ot revolutsii k revolutsii* (From Revolution to Revolution) (1925). Among the official source material, see *Agrarnyi vopros y sovete ministrov* (The Agrarian Problem in the Council of Ministers) (Tsentroarkhiv, 1924).

FOR LOCAL STUDIES ON THE STOLYPIN REFORM, see: Mozhukhin, *Zemlyeustroistvo v Bogoroditskom uyezde, Tulskoi gubernii* (Agrarian Order in the Bogoroditskii County of the Tula Province) (1917); "Khutorskoye rasseleniye na nadelnoi zemlye Pskovskoi gubernii" (Farm Resettlement on the Allotment Land of the Pskov Province) (1909); "Obsledovaniye zemleustroennykh khozyaistv, proizvedennoye v 12 uyezdakh Yevropeiskoi Rossii" (Inspection of Newly Settled Farms Carried Out in Twelve Counties of European Russia) (Central Administration of Agriculture, 1915); "Podvornoye i khutorskoye khozyaistvo Samarskoi gubernii" (Homestead and Farmstead Economy of Samara Province) (1909), 3 vols.; "Otchyot po obsledovaniyu khutorskogo khozyaistva v Verkhnednyeprovskom uyezde" (Report on the Inspection of Farmstead Economy

in the Upper Dnepr County) (1908); "Ukrepleniye nadyelov v lichnuyu sobstvennost v Kazanskoi gubernii" (The Absorption of Allotted Land into Personal Ownership in the Kazan Province) (1911); "Lichnoye krestyanskoye zemlyevladeniye v Moskovskoi gubernii" (Personal Landownership by Peasants in the Moscow Province) (1913); "Khutorskoye khozyaistvo Kievskoi gubernii" (Farmstead Economy of the Kiev Province) (1911). See also the periodic press, particularly *Russkoye bogatstvo* (Russian Fortune), *Sovremyonnyi mir* (Contemporary World), *Vestnik Yevropy* (Herald of Europe), *Russkaya mysl'* (Russian Thought) for the years 1907–1912.

FOR OFFICIAL SOURCE MATERIAL ON THE PEASANT PROBLEM DURING THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY, see: "Materialy vysochaishe uchrezhdyonnoi komissii 16 noyabrya 1901 g. po issledovaniyu voprosa o dvizhenii blagosostoyaniya selskogo naseleniya srednezemledelcheskikh gubernii sravnitelno s drugimi mestnostyami Yevropeiskoi Rossii" (Materials of the Royal Commission of November 16, 1901, for the Investigation of the Problem of Change in the Welfare of the Village Population of the Central Agricultural Provinces as Compared with Other Localities of European Russia) (1904), 3 vols.; "Issledovaniye ekonomicheskogo polozheniya tsentralno-chernozemnykh gubernii: Trudy osobogo soveshchaniya 1899–1901 gg." (Inquiry into the Economic Situation in the Central Black-Soil Provinces: Proceedings of the Special Conference of 1899–1901), compiled by Polenov (1901). A vast but not easily accessible body of material is collected in the "Osoboye soveshchanye o nuzhdakh selskokhozyaistvennoi promyshlennosti" (Special Conference on the Needs of the Agricultural Industry); "Materialy, postupivshiye v osoboye soveshchaniye o nuzhdakh selskokhozyaistvennoi promyshlennosti" (Materials Submitted to the Special Conference on the Needs of the Agricultural Industry), for all provinces; "Svody trudov mestnykh komitetov" (Summary of Proceedings of the Local Committees) dealing with specific problems (rent, taxation, small credit, land use, etc.). An abbreviated summary is available in the two-volume collection *Nuzhdy derevni* (The Needs of the Village) (1904). See also "Trudy I syezda upolnomochennykh dvoryanskikh obshchestv 29 gubernii" (Proceedings of the First Congress of the Authorized Noblemen's Societies of Twenty-nine Provinces) (1910); Witte, *Zapiska po krestyanskomu dyelu* (Memorandum on the Peasant Problem) (St. Petersburg, 1905).

ON FOREIGN COLONIAL POLICY DURING THE PERIOD OF IMPERIALISM, see: Lenin, *Imperializm, kak vysshaya stadiya kapitalizma* (Imperialism As a Higher Phase of Capitalism), *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XIX, especially Secs. V and VI; Stalin, *Marksizm i natsionalno-kolonialnyi vopros* (Marxism and the National-Colonial Problem) (1937).

Among the factual surveys by individual countries are: Babynin, *Persia, yeyo ekonomicheskoye polozheniye i vneshnyaya torgovlya* (Persia, Its Economic Position and Foreign Trade) (1923); Grulev, *Sopernichestvo Rossii i Anglii v Srednyei Azii* (Rivalry of Russia and England in Middle Asia) (1909); I. A.

Zinovyev, *Rossiya, Angliya i Persiya* (Russia, England and Persia) (1912); Lakosta, *Rossiya i Angliya v Tsentralnoi Azii* (Russia and England in Central Asia) (1908); Krotkov, *Russkaya manufaktura na kitaiskom rynke* (Russian Manufactures on the Chinese Market) (1914); Lisenko, *Blizhnii Vostok, kak rynok sbyta russkikh tovarov* (The Near East As a Market for Russian Goods) (1913); Ruir, *Anglo-russkoye sopernichestvo v Azii v XIX v.* (Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Asia in the Nineteenth Century) (1924); Shebunin, *Rossiya na blizhnem Vostoke* (Russia in the Near East) (1926); Lavisse and Rambeau, *Istoriya XIX v.* (History of the Nineteenth Century) (Russian trans., 1939), particularly Vol. VIII. For source material on the economic position of Russia and Russian capitalism in foreign markets, see the *Sbornik konsulskikh donesenii* (Collection of Consular Reports) for a number of years, particularly during 1906–1914.

ON THE WAR ECONOMY during the years 1914–1917, see: Lenin, *Imperializm, kak vysshaya stadiya kapitalizma* (Imperialism As a Higher Phase of Capitalism), *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. XIX, particularly Secs. VIII-X, and his articles and addresses during 1914–1917, *Sochineniya,* Vols. XIII-XV; Stalin, *Voprosy leninizma* (Problems in Leninism), 10th ed., and *Na putyakh k Oktyabryu* (On the Roads to October) (1925); *Istoriya VKP(b)* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [of Bolsheviks]. A Short Course), Chaps. VI and VII.

FOR SURVEYS of the entire economy during the war years of 1914–1917, see: Prokopovich, *Voina i narodnoye khozyaistvo* (War and the National Economy), 2nd ed. (1918); Klaus, *Voina i narodnoye khozyaistvo Rossii* (War and the National Economy of Russia) (1914–1917) (Moscow, 1926); Sharov, *Vliyaniye ekonomiki na iskhod mirovoi voiny* (The Influence of Economics on the Outcome of the World War) (1928); Danilov, *Vliyaniye velikoi mirovoi voiny na ekonomicheskoye polozheniye Rossii* (The Influence of the Great World War on the Economic Position of Russia) (1922); Ya. Rudoi, *Gosudarstvennyi kapitalizm v Rossii* (State Capitalism in Russia) (1925); Ioffe, *Blokada i narodnoye khozyaistvo v mirovuyu voinu* (The Blockade and the National Economy During the World War) (1929); Shigalin, *Podgotovka promyshlennosti i voina* (Industrial Preparedness and the War) (1928). For a general summary of statistical data on the national economy during the war and postwar period, see *Rossiya v mirovoi voine* (Russia in the World War) (1925), a statistical compilation of the Central Statistical Administration, 1925.

ON THE POSITION OF AGRICULTURE AND THE FOOD SUPPLY DURING THE WAR YEARS, see: Gordeyev, *Selskoye khozyaistvo v voine i revolutsii* (Agriculture During the War and Revolution) (1925); A. Khryashcheva, "Krestyanstvo v voine i revolutsii (The Peasantry During the War and Revolution), *Vestnik statistiki* (Statistical Herald) (1920), Nos. 9-12; Liskun, *Myasnoi vopros v sovremyonnoi obstanovke* (The Meat Problem in the Present Situation) (1917); "Trudy soveshchaniya po organizatsii posevnoi ploshchadi" (Proceedings of the Conference on the Organization of the Sown Acreage)

(1917); *Trudovoye posrednichestvo* (Labor Mediation) (All-Russian Bureau of Labor, 1917). In the periodic press, see: *Izvestiya po prodovolstvennomu dyelu* (Information on the Food Problem), the journal *Prodovolstviye i snabsheniye* (Food and Supplies), published by the Ministry of Agriculture, and others.

ON THE SITUATION IN INDUSTRY DURING THE WAR YEARS, see: "Fabrichnozavodskaya promyshlennost' v period 1913–1918 gg." (Factory Industry During the Period 1913–1918) (Central Statistical Administration, Moscow, 1926); "Statisticheskii sbornik za 1913–1917 gg." (Statistical Compilation for 1913–1917) (Central Statistical Administration, Moscow, 1921), Issue I; "Narodnoye khozyaistvo v 1916–1917 gg." (The National Economy During 1916–1917), by the Institute of Economic Studies of the NKF (People's Commissariat of Finance) (1921–1922); *Na novykh putyakh* (Along New Paths), Issue III, "Promyshlennost" (Industry) (Moscow, 1923); A. Sidorov, "Vlianiye imperialisticheskoi voiny na ekonomiku Rossii" (The Influence of the Imperialist War on Russian Economics), article in the collection *Ocherki po istorii Oktyabrskoi revolutsii* (Essays on the History of the October Revolution) (1927), Vol. I; K. Sidorov, "Rabocheye dvizheniye v Rossii v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny" (The Labor Movement in Russia in the Years of the Imperialist War), *ibid.*; Vorobyov, "Izmeneniya v russkoi promyshlennosti vo vremya voiny i revolutsii" (Changes in Russian Industry in the Course of the War and Revolution), *Vestnik statistiki* (Statistical Herald) (1923), Vol. XIV.

ON GOVERNMENT ECONOMY, FINANCES, CURRENCY CIRCULATION, see: Bogolepov, *Voina, finansy i narodnoye khozyaistvo* (The War, Finance, and the National Economy) (1914); Mikhailov, *Voina i nashe denezhnoye obrashcheniye* (The War and Our Currency Circulation) (1916); by the same author, *Gosudarstvennyye dokhody i raskhody vo vremya voiny* (Government Income and Expenditures During the War) (1917); Shingarev, *Finansovoye polozheniye Rossii* (Financial Position of Russia) (1917); Shmelev, "Finansy Rossii" (Russian Finance) in *Vestnik finansov* (Finance Herald) (1924), No. 8; Pasvolsky and Moulton, *Russian Debts and Russian Reconstruction* (1925); "Denezhnoye obrashcheniye i kredit" (Currency Circulation and Credit) (1922), a collection. In the periodic press, see: *Vestnik finansov* (Finance Herald), *Novyi ekonomist* (New Economist), *Promyshlennost' i torgovlya* (Industry and Trade).

FOR SOURCE MATERIAL, OFFICIAL SURVEYS, AND THE CONTEMPORARY PRESS, see: "Vliyaniye voiny na nekotoryye storony ekonomicheskoi zhizni Rossii" (The Influence of the War on Some Aspects of the Economic Life of Russia) (1916); "Trudy komissii po izucheniyu sovremyonnoi dorogovizny" (Proceedings of the Commission for the Study of Present High Cost of Living) (Society Named After Chuprov, 1915–1916); "Anketa o dorogovizne" (Questionnaire on the High Cost of Living) (All-Russian Union of Cities, 1915). A vast amount of material may be found in the *Izvestiya* (Information) of the Cen-

tral War-Industry Committee, in the *Izvestiya* (Information) of the Rural and Urban Associations, as well as in the journals *Promyshlennost' i torgovlya* (Industry and Commerce), *Vestnik finansov* (Finance Herald), in the annual *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Rossii* (National Economy of Russia) for 1916, and in the periodic press: *Narodnoye khozyaistvo* (National Economy), *Sovremyonnyi mir* (Contemporary World), *Novyi ekonomist* (New Economist), and others.

CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX OF THE PRINCIPAL ECONOMIC EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR

(Taken from 1947–1948 editions of this Lyashchenko volume)

Precapitalist Structures

I ANCIENT TIMES (TO THE TENTH CENTURY)

Fourteenth to seventh centuries B.C. Formation of political communities on the territory of Armenia (Urartu, Nairi).

Eleventh to seventh centuries B.C. Resettlement of the Kartveli tribes from Mesopotamia to the Transcaucasus.

Eighth century B.C. Expulsion of the Cimmerians from the Azov shore by the Scythians.

Seventh and sixth centuries B.C. Emergence of Greek colonies along the Black Sea coast.

Eighth to third centuries B.C. Scythians in the steppes along the Black Sea (according to Herodotus).

Sixth century (circa 521) First historic reference to Armenia (the Bagitan inscription of Darius).

Sixth century B.C. Earliest data about Kolkhida.

329–328 B.C. Conquest of Central Asia by Alexander of Macedonia.

323–190 B.C. Formation of the Armenian state with the subdivision of Greater and Lesser Armenia.

150–140 B.C. Subjugation of Bactria, Armenia, and Atropatena by the Parthians.

110 B.C. Conquest of the Bosporus kingdom by the Persians.

First century B.C. First penetrations by Rome into Parthia and Armenia.

95–56 B.C. Tigran II (the Great) and the unification of Armenia.

90 B.C. Conquest of the Greco-Bactrian state by the Scythians.

69–63 B.C. Roman wars against Mithridates of Pontus and Tigran II of Armenia.

First century B.C. to second century after Christ Sarmatians inhabiting the East European plain (according to Strabo, Tacitus, and others).

First and second centuries after Christ Formation of a state by the Alans (the "Yasy" of the Russian chronicles) in northern Caucasia.

Second century First historical references to the Slavs in Dicia (the Venedy).

113 War over Armenia between Rome (Trajan) and Parthia (Khosroi).

Second and third centuries Migration of the Gothic tribes southward to the Black Sea and the Danube.

226 Fall of the Parthian state and the transfer of Armenia to Persia.

350–375 Unification of the Gothic tribes (by Ermanaric) on the East European plain.

375 Conquest of the Goths by the Huns and formation of the Hun empire.
451 Defeat of Attila in the battle of the Catalaunian fields.
453 Death of Attila and dissolution of the Hun empire.
The middle of the sixth century Invasion of Turkestan by the Oguz Turks from Altay and emergence of the Turkic khanate.
Seventh century The Khozar state.
642 Conquest of Armenia by the Arabs.
643–645 Conquest of eastern Gruzia by the Arabs.
860 Attack by Rus against Constantinople.
862 References by the Chronicle to the beginning of the East Slav state.
882 Transfer of the capital to Kiev.
907 Agreement between Oleg and the Greeks.
911 Second agreement between Oleg and the Greeks.
913 Igor's campaign to the Caspian coast of Transcaucasia.
945 Igor's campaign against Constantinople and the treaty with the Greeks.
965 Conquest of the Taman peninsula by Svyatoslav and the formation of the Tmutorakan principality.
966 Campaign of Svyatoslav against the Khozar kingdom and destruction of the Khozars.
967 Svyatoslav's campaign along the Danube.
968 The Pechenegs in the South Russian steppes and the attack against Kiev.
972 Agreement between Svyatoslav and the Greeks.
978–1015 Reign of Prince Vladimir, son of Svyatoslav, in Kiev.
985 Union between Abkhazia and Gruzia.
996 Formation of the state of the Khorezm shahs.
1019–1054 Yaroslav the Wise.
1024 First mention of Suzdal in the chronicles.
1025 Traditional date of the founding of Yaroslavl.
1034 Siege of Kiev by the Pechenegs and their rout by Yaroslavl.
1035–1046 Conquest of Central Asia by the Seljuk Turks.
1045 Conquest of the Anian kingdom of the Bagratides by Byzantium.

II THE PERIOD OF FEUDAL DISINTEGRATION (ELEVENTH TO FIFTEENTH CENTURIES)

1054 Beginning of feudal disintegration of the Kiev state.
1054–1073 (approximately) "Law of the Sons of Yaroslavl."
1068 Invasion of the Kiev state by the Polovtsy.
1089–1125 David the Builder and the consolidation of the monarchy in eastern Gruzia.
1108 Traditional date of the chronicles of the founding of Vladimir.
1123 Conquest of Ani, capital of Armenia, by the Gruzians.
1147 First reference to Moscow.
1155–1157 Yuri Dolgoruky. Beginning of the dynasty of the Grand Princes of Suzdal.

1169 Annexation of Kiev by Andrey Bogolyubsky and the transfer of the capital to Suzdal.
1184–1213 Queen Tamara and the flowering of the Gruzian state.
1185 Campaign of Igor, son of Svyatoslav, against the Polovtsy (*Tale of Igor's Expedition*).
1200 Beginning of the ascension of Khorezm.
1206 Founding of the old Mongolian khanate by Genghis Khan.
1209 First reference to Tver.
1221–1222 Invasion of Transcaucasia by the Mongols.
1221 Founding of Nizhny-Novgorod.
1223 Invasion of Rus by the Mongols and the battle on the Kalka River.
1236 Conquest of the Volga Bulgars by Batu-Khan.
1236–1237 Conquest of Gruzia and Azerbaidjan by the Mongols.
1237 Invasion of Rus by Batu-Khan and the beginning of the Tatar yoke (1237–1480).
1237 Capture of Ryazan by the Tatars.
1238 Capture of Moscow, Vladimir, and Suzdal by the Tatars.
1238–1264 Grand Prince Daniel of Galicia.
1240 Tatars capture Kiev.
1240 Victory of Prince Alexander over the Swedes on the Neva River.
1242 Final conquest of all Armenia by the Mongols.
1242 "Battle on the Ice" and the defeat of the Germans by the Russians.
1243 Formation of the Golden Horde.
1246 First census of the population by the Tatars in the Kiev and Chernigov lands.
1246 Travels of Piano Carpini through the Kiev lands.
1248 Census of population taken by Tatars in Gruzia.
1252 Moscow as an independent feudal hereditary principality.
1255–1256 Population census by the Tatars in the Suzdal territory.
1257–1258 Population census by Tatars in the Novgorod lands (repeated in 1273).
1302 Annexation of Pereyaslavl to Moscow.
1307 Annexation of the Polotsk land by Lithuania.
1320 Annexation of the Vitebsk principality by Lithuania.
1328–1341 Ivan Kalita I, the first Grand Prince of Moscow.
1340 Seizure of Ruthenia by Poland.
1341 Beginning of feudal disintegration in Lithuania.
1349 Poland seizes the principality of Galicia.
1362 Fall of Kiev and the seizure of the Kiev and Podol lands by Lithuania.
1379 Conquest of Khorezm by the Mongols.
1380 Battle of Kulikovo between the Russians and Tatars.
1382 Moscow taken by Tokhtamysh, the Tatar khan.
1382–1394 Invasion of Central Asia and Transcaucasia by the Mongols of Tamerlane.
1387 "Privileges" of Jagello to the Lithuanian nobility.

1395 Invasion of southern Russia by Tamerlane and the defeat of the Golden Horde.
1406–1408 War between the Moscow principality and Lithuania.
1413 Union of Gorodelsk between Lithuania and Poland.
1437 Formation of the Tatar khanate Khazan.
1453 Conquest of Constantinople by the Turks.
1457 Binding of the peasants in Lithuania.

III LIQUIDATION OF FEUDAL DISINTEGRATION AND THE CREATION OF THE MULTINATIONAL MOSCOW STATE (FIFTEENTH TO SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES)

1462–1505 Ivan III and the proclamation of "autocracy" (1492).
1463 Annexation of the Yaroslavl principality to Moscow.
1463 Conquest of the Marii lands by Moscow.
1468 Moscow campaigns against Bashkiria.
1468 Dissolution of Gruzia into three kingdoms (Kartali, Kakhetia, Imeretia) and five principalities (Guria, Mingrelia, Abkhazia, Svanetia, and Samtskhe-Saatabago).
1472 Annexation of Perm lands to Moscow.
1472 Greater Armenia as a Persian province.
1478 Annexation of Novgorod and its lands to Moscow.
1480 Overthrow of Tatar yoke by Moscow government.
1482 Invasion of Kiev by the Crimean khan Mengli-Girea.
1485 Annexation of Tver to Moscow.
1487 Conquest of Kazan by armies of Moscow.
1492 Code of Ivan III.
1499 Conquest of Samarkand by Uzbeks.
1510 Annexation of Pskov to Moscow.
1514 Conquest of Smolensk by Moscow troops.
1520 Annexation of Ryazan to Moscow.
1523 Annexation of the principality of Seversk to Moscow.
1533–1584 Ivan IV and his assumption of the title "Tsar" (1547).
1550 Code of Ivan IV.
1550 Organization of the *Streltsi* troops.
1552 Conquest of Kazan by Ivan IV.
1553 Opening of the northern sea route to Russia by the English (Richard Chancellor).
1553 Beginning of book printing in Russia (Fyodorov I in Moscow).
1555 Formation of the "Muscovy Company" in England and the extension of privileges to them for trade in the Moscow state.
1555 Abolition of the "support" system for service in the Moscow state.
1555 "Statute on services due from patrimonial and service estates."
1556 Subjugation of Astrakhan.
1557 "Statute on Acreages" in the Lithuanian state.

1558 Beginning of trade with England.
1558–1583 The Livonian War of Ivan IV.
1564 Publication of first printed book in Moscow.
1565 Formation of the *Oprichnina* body of troops.
1567 Privileges of the "Muscovy Company" expanded.
1567 Construction of the town of Tersk on the Terek River.
1569 Union of Lublin between Lithuania and Poland.
1569 English subjects undertake to build an ironworks in the Solvychegodsk district.
1570 Campaign of Ivan IV in Novgorod.
1570–1574 Penetration of western Siberia by Russians.
1571–1572 Raids against Moscow by the Crimean khan Devlet Girei.
1577 Beginning of trade between Holland and Moscow by way of the White Sea.
1580 Decision of the Church Council limiting the landholdings of the monasteries.
1581 First known year of "prohibition" (against transfer of peasants).
1582 Conquest of the Siberian kingdom of Kuchum by Yermak.
1584 Founding of Archangel.
1584 Statute of Church Council abolishing *tarkhans* (tax exemption) of church lands.
1586 Decree on service indentures.
1586 Founding of Ufa, Samara, Tyumen, and Veronezh.
1587 "Cross-kissing agreement" on mutual assistance between Alexander, King of Kakhetia, and the Moscow Tsar, Fyodor Ivanovich.
1587 Founding of Tobolsk.
1588 Lithuanian statutes and the binding of the peasants.
1589 Code of Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich.
1593 Founding of Belgorod, Oskol, and Beryozov.
1596 Founding of Narym.
1597 Law on service indentures and indentured *kholops*.
1598 End of the Rurik dynasty.
1600 Founding of Valuiki.
1601–1602 Temporary and partial restoration of the right of the peasants to transfer.
1601–1603 Years of famine and the reign of Boris Godunov.
1604 Founding of Tomsk.
1604 Arrival of first trading vessels from Hamburg to Archangel.
1605–1609 Decrees on the colonization of Siberia by "plowing" and "hunting" people.
1606 Statute of the Boyar Assembly on the indentured *kholop* system.
1606–1607 Peasant uprising under the leadership of Bolotnikov.
1607 Decrees on the establishment of a fifteen-year limitation on the search for runaway peasants (March 9) and on "voluntary" *kholops* (March 7).
1607–1608 Earliest records of a metal-working industry in the village of Pavlovo.

1608 Migration of the nomad Kalmyks from Dzhugaria to the Yaik River.
1609 Decree by Shuisky on indentured and nonindentured *kholops*.
1609 Statute of the Boyar Assembly abolishing the decree of March 7, 1607, dealing with *kholops*.
1612 Liberation of Moscow from Polish occupation.
1613–1645 Reign of Mikhail Romanov.
1619 Founding of Yeniseisk.
1619 Decree on the conduct of the first land census in the Moscow state.
1621 First invitation to master "ore experts" from abroad.
1621 Emissaries of the kings of Imeretia and Guria to the Moscow Tsar Mikhail
1625–1638 Cossack uprisings against Poland.
1627 Decree prohibiting the distribution and alienation of palace lands.
1628 Founding of Krasnoyarsk.
1630 Establishment of the first ironworks beyond the Urals (near Irbit).
1632 Founding of Yakutsk.
1632 Establishment of the Tula iron mill by Vinius.
1633 Opening of copper ores along the upper reaches of the Kama River and establishment of the first copper-smelting factory.
1634 First embassy of Oleari to Moscow (second in 1638).
1634 Permission granted to the foreigner Coates for the establishment of a glass factory.
1637 Conquest of Azov by the Cossacks.
1637 First mission from Moscow to China.
1638 Beginning of colonization in the Slobodskaya Ukraine.
1642 Founding of Verkholensk.
1643 Poyarkov expedition to the Aldan and Amur regions.
1644 Permission granted to Marcelius and Akema for the establishment of ironworks along the Vaga, Sheksna, and Kostroma rivers.
1645–1676 Reign of Alexis Mikhailovich.
1646 Population census of the Moscow state (by "district of residence").
1646 Tax on salt and the "salt" riot of 1648 in Moscow.
1648 Expedition by Dezhnev and Alexeev to the Anadyr and the Sea of Okhotsk.
1649–1652 Amur expedition of Khabarov.
1649 Abrogation of duty-free trade privileges with the Moscow state enjoyed by the English.
1649 Church statute of Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich.
1649 Abolition of "prescribed years" and final binding of the peasants.
1650 Oath of allegiance to Moscow taken by Alexander, king of Imeretia.
1651 Establishment of ironworks by Morozov along the Istra River near Moscow.
1652 Establishment of a settlement in Moscow for foreign master craftsmen.
1652 Founding of Irkutsk.
1653 Founding of Chita.
1654 Emission of copper coins (for 4,000,000 rubles).
1654 Promulgation of "charter of rules" for commerce.

1654 Ukraine swears allegiance to Moscow (January 8).
1654 Founding of Kharkov in the Slobodskaya Ukraine.
1655–1656 Establishment of the Protvin ironworks by Miloslavsky.
1655 Establishment of paper "mill" on the Pakhra River.
1660–1667 Copper-money crisis caused by the minting of debased copper coins.
1662 Uprising in Moscow, so-called "copper riots" (July 25).
1666 Establishment of postal service in Russia.
1666 Prospecting for copper ore organized in the Olonetsk district.
1667 Trade treaty with Persia.
1667 End of copper coin minting and the appearance of silver coin.
1667 Peace of Andrusovo between Moscow and Poland.
1667 New commercial charter.
1667 Establishment of ironworks on the Neiva River by Tumashev.
1668 Erection of the Vepreisky iron mill (Tula region).
1670–1671 Peasant war under the leadership of Stepan Razan.
1678–1679 Population census in the Moscow state (household and tax unit).
1678–1679 Construction of two ironworks beyond the lake Onega (by Butenant and the son of Marcelius).
1680 First government budget of the Moscow state.
1681 Establishment of velvet and silk mill in Moscow by the foreign master craftsman Paulson.
1682 Abolition of hereditary right to office.
1686 Beginning of a regular army in Russia.
1687–1689 Crimean campaigns.
1689–1725 Reign of Peter I (sole ruler since 1696).
1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk with China.
1691 Invasion of Imeretia by the Turks and the capture of Kutaisi.
1694 Establishment of ironworks at the Bely Kolodets River by the merchant Aristov.
1695 Beginning of Russian navy.
1695–1696 Azov campaigns of Peter I and the capture of the town of Azov.
1697 Conquest of Kamchatka and the founding of Verkhne-Kamchatsk.
1697–1698 First travels of Peter I abroad.
1698 Beginning of the reforms of Peter I.
1698 Invitation to foreign master craftsmen for metallurgical works.
1699 Establishment of "state houses" in the cities for the administration of duties levied "upon commercial and handicraft people."
1699 Peasants forbidden to engage in trade and industry except as members of urban settlements.
1699 Introduction of stamp tax.
1699 Establishment of first blast-furnace type of ironworks on the Neiva River in the Urals by Vinius.
1700 Beginning of new chronological system (as of January 1).
1700 The second factory in the Urals established at Kamensk.

IV FEUDAL ECONOMY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

1700–1721 Northern war between Russia and Sweden.
1700 Beginning of operations in the Nerchinsk silver and lead mines.
1702–1704 Establishment of the third Ural ironworks at Uktussk.
1702 Decree on the attraction of foreign master craftsmen.
1703 Decree prohibiting timber felling along rafting rivers.
1703 Establishment of the Alapaevsk ironworks in the Urals.
1703 Founding of Petersburg.
1703 Beginning of the construction of the Vyshnevolotsk canal (opened in 1709).
1703 First Russian bourse (merchant center) in Petersburg.
1703 First newspaper in Russia (*News of Military and Other Affairs Worthy of Knowledge and Memory*).
1705 Beginning of printing in civil (non-Slavonic) typography.
1705 Treasury monopoly of the sale of salt.
1705 Treasury monopoly of the sale of tobacco.
1707–1708 Bulavin uprising.
1708 Establishment of provincial subdivisions (gubernii) by Peter I.
1708 Publication of first book printed in Russian in civil type (*Geometry*).
1709 Battle of Poltava.
1710 Population census (household and tax).
1711 First civil press in Petersburg.
1711 Monetary reform of Peter I (minting of gold, silver, and copper coins).
1711 Decree on the transfer of state-owned textile factories in Moscow to the companies of Turkin, Tsimbalshchikov, and others.
1711–1765 Life of M. V. Lomonosov.
1712 Decree on the organization of commercial-industrial companies.
1712 Establishment of a collegium for commerce in Moscow.
1712 Decree introducing the lease system in the sale of spirits.
1712 Decree of Peter I establishing an arsenal at Tula.
1712 Establishment of the mint at Petersburg.
1713 Transfer of capital from Moscow to Petersburg.
1714 Decree establishing the single-heir system.
1714 Establishment of the Sestroretsk arsenal.
1715 Establishment of naval academy.
1715 Establishment of Russian consulates abroad.
1715–1717 Expedition to Central Asia.
1716 Founding of Omsk.
1716 Establishment of ironworks on the Tagil River by Demidov.
1717 Establishment of silk textile mill by Apraksin & Co.
1717 Establishment of tobacco factory in the Ukraine by Menshikov.
1717 Expedition to Khiva.
1718 Founding of Semipalatinsk.

1718 Establishment of the collegium (or board) system of central administration.
1718 License granted to the merchant P. Vestov for the erection of sugar mills in Moscow.
1718 Establishment of state-owned Dudorovsk paper "mill" at Petersburg.
1718 Decree on the first Russian census (conducted during 1719–1722).
1719 Beginning of construction of the Ladoga canal (completed in 1731).
1719 Establishment of Board of Manufactures.
1719 Separate establishment of Board of Mining and its functions (the so-called "mining licenses").
1719 Promulgation of instructions for the Board of Commerce.
1719 Curtailment of (state-owned) commercial monopoly of the treasury.
1719 Licenses for the establishment of turpentine, rosin, and gum factories.
1719 Establishment of sugar mill at Petersburg.
1720 Establishment of the office of chief magistrate.
1720 Decree on equalization of rights of foreigners and Russians in mining industry.
1720 Decree prohibiting factory owners to retain workers "without documents."
1720 Establishment of wool textile mill by Shchegolin & Co. and Dokuchaev.
1720 Publication of the book *On Poverty and Wealth* by Pososhkov.
1721 Peace of Nystadt between Russia and Sweden (annexation of the Baltic region).
1721 Peter I assumes the title of emperor.
1721 Decree permitting merchants to buy peasants for factories on equal terms with nobility.
1721 Charter of the chief magistrate.
1721 Decree releasing factory owners from "urban services."
1721 Organization of state postal service.
1722 Establishment of guilds and crafts.
1722 Promulgation of table of ranks.
1722 Prohibition of returning to their owners runaway peasants employed on industrial enterprises.
1722–1727 First collegium in Little Russia.
1723 Establishment of cane-sugar mill in Moscow.
1723 Charter of the Board of Manufactures.
1723 Invasion of Kazakstan by Oirot-Kalmyks.
1723 Regulations on forest "preserves" and forest cultivation in Russia.
1723–1725 Establishment of state-owned copper-smelting mills in the Urals.
1723 Appearance of laminating mills in the ironworks of Russia.
1724 Introduction of poll tax.
1724 Introduction of money taxes for state peasants.
1724 Customs tariff with protectionist duty rates.
1724 Establishment of a company for trade with Spain.
1724 Proclamation of all forests of Bashkiria in the Urals as state property.
1725 Establishment of the Nizhny-Tagil ironworks by Demidov.

1725 Establishment of the first Altay copper factory by Demidov at Kolyvansko-Voskresensk.
1725–1727 Reign of Catherine I.
1725 Opening of the Academy of Sciences.
1725–1729 Arctic expedition of Bering (second during 1732–1741).
1726 Abrogation of the rights of serfs to depart into industry freely.
1727 Establishment of Offices of Manufactures.
1729 Promulgation of statute on commercial notes.
1729 Abrogation of the regulations of Peter I on forest preserves.
1730 Abrogation of Peter I's decree on the single-heir system.
1730 Beginning of peasant movement in western Ukraine (the "Haidamaki" movement).
1730–1736 Beginning of the production of iron and copper along the Yenisei River.
1730–1740 Annexation of the Ural, Turgai, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk provinces.
1731 Abrogation of the right to sign leases and contracts by bonded peasant serfs.
1731 Merger of Board of Manufactures with Board of Mining.
1731 New "preferential" customs tariff.
1731 Promulgation of "maritime code."
1731 Abolition of the office of chief magistrate.
1731 Conclusion of Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Russia and England (renewed in 1766).
1732–1743 Expedition to Siberia by Academician Gmelim, sponsored by the Academy of Sciences.
1734 Peasants prohibited to establish wool mills.
1735–1738 Erection of ironworks near Blagodat mountains.
1735 Founding of Orenburg and the Bashkir uprisings.
1736 Decree on the "permanent attachment" of master craftsmen in manufacturing.
1736 Decree compelling the transfer of beggars, vagabonds, and others to work in factories.
1736 Decree prohibiting factory owners to acquire villages with land.
1736 Establishment of the General Mining Directorate.
1738 Publication of the first manual on agricultural economics in Russia.
1739 Founding of Barnaul.
1739 Decree transferring state-owned ironworks to private owners.
1740 Founding of Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka.
1741–1761 Reign of Elizabeth, daughter of Peter.
1741 "Labor regulations" (legal rules for labor in manufacturing industries).
1742 Decree restoring freedom of transfer to non-Cossack peasants in the Ukraine.
1742 Reinstitution of the Boards of Manufactures and Boards of Mining.
1742 Decree on the second census (conducted during 1744–1747).
1742 Decree on making factory peasants subject to the poll tax.

1744 Founding of the third ironworks in Altay at Shulbinsk.
1745–1750 Founding of the first iron and copper works in southern Urals and Bashkiria (Voskresensky in 1745, Preobrazhensky in 1750, Kaslinsky, Kyshtymsky, and others).
1746 Ban on purchase of serfs by non-nobles.
1747 Conversion of the Altay copper-smelting mills of Demidov to the smelting of silver.
1747 Permission granted to manufacturers to purchase villages for their factories.
1747 Monopoly granted to Chernikov and Safyanov for the production of beaver hats in the Moscow province.
1748 Major monopoly granted to Count P. I. Shuvalov for fisheries in the White Sea and for ironworks in the Blagodat mountains.
1750–1754 Beginning of prospecting for gold and early mining in the Yekaterinburg district (Beryozovsky plant).
1752 Establishment of quotas for the acquisition of peasants and laborers by factories and mills on the basis of the number of benches.
1753 Decree abolishing internal customs (effective April 1, 1754).
1753 Licenses granted to the English entrepreneurs, Couzens and Chamberlain, for the first cotton-dyeing factory (operation begun in 1755).
1754 Decree establishing the first Commercial ("Merchant") Bank in Russia.
1754 Decree in the prohibition of "unauthorized" production by manufacturers.
1754 Establishment of government (owned) Loan Banks for the Nobility.
1755 New customs code.
1755 "Copper" currency reform of Shuvalov.
1755 Organization of Russian commercial company for trade with Persia.
1755 Licenses granted to the foreigner Butler for the manufacture of tapestry.
1755 Establishment of Moscow University.
1757 Introduction of the new customs tariff.
1757 Establishment of first Russian joint stock company, the "Russian Trading Company in Constantinople."
1757 Establishment of banking offices in Russian cities for transfer of promissory notes.
1758 Establishment of the second joint stock company, the "Company for Persian Trade."
1758 Establishment of a "copper" bank in Russia for operations in copper coins.
1758 "Commissary Regulations" (rules) for the purchase of grain by the army.
1758 Monopoly in distilled beverages granted to the nobility.
1760 Hetman Razumovsky issues a "Universal," limiting transfer of peasants in the Ukraine.
1760 Decree granted landowners the right to exile their serfs to Siberia.
1760 Unification of Gruzia and Kakhetia by Irakli II.
1761 Serfs deprived of the right to sign promissory notes.
1762 Manifesto of Peter III on the "Rights of the Nobility in Russia" signed on February 18.
1762 Decree on the secularization of Church estates.

1762 Purchase of peasants for factories by non-nobles prohibited.
1762 First decrees on the freedom of trade to all subjects.
1762–1796 Reign of Catherine II.
1762 First drafts of a government budget of revenues.
1762 Decree on the third census (1763–1765).
1762–1763 Withdrawal of privileges granted to "authorized manufacturers."
1763 Foreigners permitted to buy serfs for factories.
1763 Manifesto on the setting aside of lands to foreigners for grain cultivation.
1763 Confirmation by serfs of the limitation of the right to transfer in accordance with the Hetman's "Universal" of 1760.
1763 Establishment of a cotton-dyeing factory in Shlisselburg by Liman (the second in Russia).
1763 Erection of a "fire machine" by Polzunov.
1764 Destruction of the Hetman system and the first collegium for Little Russia.
1764 Increase in the salt tax to cover the budget deficit.
1764 Secularization of the Church estates and the loss of the right to own serfs ("economic" peasants) by the Church.
1765 Establishment of the Free Economic Society in Russia.
1765 Manifesto ordering a general land survey.
1765 Charter on distilled beverages and the introduction of a monopoly in distillation for the nobility.
1765 Decree on the right of the landowners to exile serfs to hard labor.
1766 Annexation of the Aleutian Islands.
1767 New customs tariffs.
1767 Catherine establishes commission for drafting a new code.
1767 First senate decrees granting permission to all subjects to establish weaving looms and to engage in industry.
1767 Peasants are prohibited to submit complaints against their landowners.
1767 Introduction of the lease system in the sale of spirits (except Siberia).
1768 Uprising of the Haidamaks (the Koliiv movement).
1768–1773 Expedition of Pallas, member of the Academy.
1768–1774 Russo-Turkish War.
1769 Establishment of two exchange banks.
1769 Beginning of the emission of assignats in Russia.
1769 Russia's first foreign loan floated in Amsterdam.
1770 Russia's second foreign loan floated in Genoa.
1771 Ban against the sale of serfs at public auction for debts of their landowners.
1771 Black Plague epidemic in Moscow.
1772 First partition of Poland and annexation of parts of Belorussia by Russia.
1772 Opening of loan and savings banks for short-term credit.
1773–1775 Peasant war under the leadership of Pugachyov.
1773 Establishment of the Slavyansk gingham and calico factory by E. Sheidemanova.
1773 Establishment of the Alexandrovsk artillery factory at Petrozavodsk (1774).

1774 The peace of Kuchuk Kainardji between Russia and Turkey.
1774 Opening of the first school of mining in Petersburg.
1774 Destruction of the Zaporozhe Cossack host.
1775 Organization of bureaus for the administration of the provinces.
1775 Establishment of a general guild duty on the merchant class.
1775 Opening of branch offices of public inspection (Lombards) in the provincial cities.
1775 Preferential customs tariff for Black Sea ports.
1775 Abolition of industrial and commercial monopolies.
1775 Construction of a copper-smelting plant at Miass.
1777 Founding of Yekaterinoslav.
1779 Abolition of the Boards of Manufactures.
1781 Establishment of a postal department and introduction of uniform postal rates.
1781 Manifesto on the fourth census (1781–1783).
1782 Closing of the Commercial (Merchant) Bank opened in 1754.
1782 Manifesto of June 28 on the abolition of the mining royalties system and the recognition of the rights of owners of land to their mineral deposits.
1782 New customs tariff and ban against imports of a number of products.
1783 Final consolidation of serfdom in the Ukraine.
1783 Annexation of Crimea to Russia.
1783 Acceptance of Russian suzerainty by Gruzia.
1784 Conquest of Samarkand by the Khan of Bukhara.
1784 Establishment of Russian settlements in Alaska.
1785 Catherine II grants "Property Charter" to nobility.
1785 Municipal statutes.
1785 Regulation of crafts.
1786 Closing of Loan Banks for the Nobility established in 1754.
1786 Merger of exchange banks established in 1769 into the Bank of Assignats.
1786 Establishment of State Loan Banks for granting loans against real-estate security.
1786 Secularization of Church and monastery estates in the Ukraine.
1787 Commercial agreement with France.
1787–1792 Publication of the first economic encyclopaedia in Russia, the *Commercial Dictionary* of Levshin.
1790 First steam engine of the Watt type built in Russia by the foreigner Goscoigne.
1790 Discovery of coal in the south.
1791 Beginning of the conquest of the Kabarda region.
1792 Reinstitution of the sale of serfs at public auction (abolished in 1771).
1793 Second partition of Poland.
1794 Decree on the fifth census (1794–1796).
1794 Founding of Odessa.
1795 Third partition of Poland.
1795 Invasion of Gruzia by the Persians and the pillage of Tibilisi.

1796–1801 Reign of Paul I.
1796 Formation of the province of Little Russia and extension of serfdom to that area.
1797 High protective customs tariff.
1797 Establishment of "Three-day *barshchina*" (Manifesto of April 5).
1797 Formation of a distinct group of "crown" peasants.
1797 Commercial agreement with England.
1797 Peasant disturbances in a number of provinces.
1798 Labor disturbances at the Kazan wool mill.
1798 Establishment of Department of Waterways.
1798 Permission granted to purchase peasants for industrial enterprises.
1799 Establishment of the first Russian Corporation for colonial trade, the Russo-American Trading Company.
1799 "Charter on Crafts."
1800 Increase in the customs rates of the tariff of 1797.

V FEUDAL ECONOMY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

1801 Annexation of Gruzia to Russia.
1801–1825 Reign of Alexander I.
1801 Sale of serfs without land prohibited.
1801 Manifesto on the encouragement of inventions and the granting of patents.
1801 Merchants and burghers granted the right to buy unsettled lands.
1802 Permission granted to establish private printing shops.
1802 First experiments in the production of farm machines in Moscow by Wilson.
1802 Formation of ministries.
1802 Opening of a beet-sugar mill in Tula by Blankenagel.
1803 Establishment of Forestry Institute in Petersburg.
1803 (June 30) Regulations on factory labor and on the rights of owners of serf-labor factories.
1803 Decree on free agriculturists.
1803 Annexation of Mingrelia to Russia.
1804 Decree limiting the punishment of peasants by landowners.
1804 Conquest of the Gandzha khanate.
1805 Conquest of the Karabakh, Shirvan, and Shukha khanates.
1805 First steam engine and machines used in the production of cotton cloth.
1806 Conquest of Daghestan and Baku by Russia.
1807 Russia adheres to the "Continental system" of Napoleon.
1807 Abolition of serfdom in the former Duchy of Warsaw.
1808 First private cotton-spinning factory.
1809 Annexation of Finland.
1809 Establishment of first English spinning machine at the Alexandrovsk textile mill.

1810 Adoption of a prohibitive customs tariff.
1810 Conquest of Abkhazia by Russia. Annexation of Imeretia.
1811 Manifesto on the sixth census (1811–1812).
1812 Invasion of Russia by Napoleon.
1812 Uprising in Kakhetia.
1812 Prospecting for gold in the Urals opened to private persons.
1813 First steamship built in Russia at the Berda factory in Petersburg.
1814 Establishment of the Guryev silver-smelting plant (near Barnaul).
1814 Sharp decline in the value of the paper ruble (20 kopecks in silver).
1815 Labor unrest in the textile mills of the Tambov and Yaroslav provinces.
1815 Peasant disturbances in the Poltava, Kursk, and Orenburg provinces.
1815 Annexation of the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia.
1815 Manifesto on the seventh census (1815–1817).
1816 Establishment of military settlements by Arakcheev.
1816 Abolition of serfdom in the Estonian provinces.
1816 New, partly prohibitive customs tariff.
1817 Establishment of the Government Commercial Bank.
1817 Beginning of the construction of paved highways (Moscow to Petersburg).
1817 Measures taken to reduce the number of banknotes by means of loans.
1817 Transfer of the Makaryev fair to Nizhny-Novgorod.
1817 Patents granted to the Berda factory for the construction of steamships.
1817 Return from the lease system to the state monopoly over spirits.
1818 Abolition of serfdom in the Courland province.
1819 New (free trade) customs tariff.
1819 Abolition of serfdom in the Livonian province.
1820 First plants for the production of farm machines built by Poltoratsky.
1820 Loan to Russia floated in England and Holland for 40 million rubles.
1821 Introduction of lease system in the state-owned petroleum fields.
1822 Abolition of customs duty on imported cotton.
1822 Loan to Russia floated (with Rothschild) for 43 million rubles.
1822 New customs tariff with return to a prohibitive system.
1823 First kerosene factory in the world established at Mozdok.
1823 Final closing of the Board of Commerce.
1824 Owners of the serf-labor factories granted the right to set peasants free.
1825 Landowners forbidden to lease peasants out to factories owned by "commoners."
1825–1855 Reign of Nicholas I.
1825 Uprising of the Decembrists (December 14).
1825 Farm-machinery factory established by Wilson in Moscow.
1825 Final conquest of Kabarda and Balkaria.
1826 Appearance of rolling mills in processing of iron (at the Alexandrovsk plant).
1826–1828 War between Russia and Persia.

1826 Establishment of courts-martial for dealing with cases arising out of peasant uprisings (148 uprisings recorded for 1826–1834).
1826 Peasant disturbances recorded in sixteen provinces.
1827 First Russian joint-stock fire insurance company.
1827 Return to the system of leases for spiritous drinks.
1828 Conquest of Karachai.
1828 Peace of Turkmanchai with Persia and the annexation of the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates to Russia.
1828 Establishment of the Petersburg Technological Institute.
1828–1829 War between Russia and Turkey.
1829 Peace of Adrianople and the annexation of Akhaltsykh and Akhalkalaka.
1829 First all-Russian exposition of manufactures.
1829 Establishment of the Agricultural Society of South Russia.
1830 Disturbances and uprisings in a number of cities and provinces.
1830 Uprising in Poland.
1830–1835 First weaving and spinning mechanical factories (Volkov and others).
1831 Establishment of a farm-machine factory by the brothers Butenapov.
1831 Abolition of preferential tariff for Transcaucasia.
1832 Law on "Agrarian Order" for Bashkirs.
1832 Peasant disturbances in the Voronezh, Ryazan, Saratov, and Penza provinces.
1832 Commercial treaty with the United States.
1833 Manifesto on the eighth census (1833–1834).
1833 Prohibition of the sale of serfs at public auction.
1833 Building of the first steam locomotive in Russia by Cherepanov.
1834 Disturbance among workmen of the Kupavin factory in the Bogorodski county.
1835–1844 Peasant uprisings recorded (216).
1835 Ordinance on a uniform system of weights and measures.
1835 First telegraph lines of the Shilling system in Petersburg.
1835 Establishment of the second Russian joint-stock fire insurance company.
1835 Establishment of Russian Company for the Insurance of Capital and Income.
1835 Factory legislation for serfs: "Code" on relations between factory owners and workmen.
1836 Contract let out to private stock company for the construction of the Tsarskoye Selo railroad (opened in 1838).
1836 First experiments in the application of the hot blast (at the Vyksun factory in the Nizhny Novgorod province).
1836 First experiments in the transition from the furnace method to the puddling method (in the Urals).
1837 Disturbances among workers in the enterprises of the Tula province.
1839 Manifesto on the restoration of silver currency.

1839 First establishment of the automatic telegraph system of Yakobi (Russian inventor) in Petersburg.
1840 (June 18) Rules on the liberation of serf factory workmen and on serf-labor factories.
1841 Emission of credit notes.
1841 Ban against the sale of peasants individually.
1841 Armed uprising in Guria.
1842 Decree on indebted peasants.
1842 Discovery of aniline by Zinin.
1843 Withdrawal of assignats from circulation.
1843 Closing of the Assignat Bank.
1843 First telegraph line in Russia (Petersburg to Tsarskoye Selo).
1843 Steam shipping permitted on all rivers of Russia.
1843 Landless nobility forbidden to purchase peasants.
1843–1848 Construction of the Warsaw-Vienna railroad.
1844 Establishment of an incorporated Russian company for maritime, river, highway insurance, and transport of cargoes and warehouses.
1844 Unrest among workers at the Voznesensky factory in Moscow.
1844 Unrest among peasants in various provinces.
1844 Landowners permitted to grant freedom to domestics without land.
1844–1845 Introduction of "inventories" on the landed estates of Belorussia.
1845 Coal deposits discovered in Tkvibuli.
1845–1854 Peasant uprisings recorded (348).
1846 Mechanical cotton-weaving factory in the town of Shui.
1846 Abolition of the "Corn Laws" in England and the increase of Russian grain exports.
1846 Convention on trade and navigation with Austria.
1847 Peasants granted right to purchase freedom with land in cases of the sale of estates for owners' debts.
1847 Discovery by Yakobi of electrolytic method for refining copper.
1847 Rules on introduction of "inventories" in the Kiev Government-General.
1847–1851 Construction of railroad between Petersburg and Moscow (opened in 1851).
1848 Peasants granted the right to acquire real estate.
1848 Peasant disturbances in a number of provinces.
1848 Imposition of excise tax on matches (abolished in 1858).
1848 Imposition of tax on sugar.
1850 Adoption of a moderately protective customs tariff.
1850 Manifesto on the ninth census (1850–1851).
1850 Peasant disturbances in a number of provinces.
1851–1858 Construction of railroad between Petersburg and Warsaw (open in 1859).
1851 Peasant disturbances in a number of provinces.
1852 Extension of the rules on inventory to Lithuania and Belorussia.
1853 First underwater telegraph cable in Russia (Petersburg to Kronstadt).

1854–1856 Crimean War.
1855–1881 Reign of Alexander II.
1855–1861 Peasant uprisings recorded (474).
1856 Treaty of Paris (Russia deprived of right to maintain navy in Black Sea).
1856 Founding of Blagoveshchensk on the Amur River.
1856 Beginning of commercial steam shipping on the Black Sea.
1857 (January 3) First session of the special Secret Committee on the immediate preparation of a plan for the gradual liberation of the peasants.
1857 Exchange of credit notes for metallic coins discontinued.
1857 Peasant uprisings in Mingrelia and in the provinces of Kutaisi, Vladimir, Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov, and others.
1857 The rescript of November 20 to the governor-general of Vilno, Nazimov (official beginning of the Peasant Reform).
1857 Concession granted to the incorporated Principal Company of Russian Railroads.
1857 First experiment in the Bessemer method for blowing pig iron (at the Vsevolodvilvensk factory).
1857 Moderately liberal customs tariff.
1857 Commercial treaty with France.
1858–1859 Tenth census.
1858 (January 8) Establishment of the Principal Committee on Peasant Affairs.
1858 Treaty of Aigun (annexation of the Amur territory).
1858 Founding of Khabarovsk on the Amur River.
1858 Commercial treaties with England (in effect until 1914) and Belgium.
1858 Establishment of uniform postal rates.
1858 Conquest of Chechia.
1858 Peasant disturbances in the Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Podolsk, Samarav, Saratov, Kaluga, Ryazan, and Tula provinces and others.
1859 (February 17) Organization of the editing commissions for the preparation of a plan for a charter on peasants released from feudal servitude.
1859 Establishment of a commission for the review of taxation and excise system.
1859 First experiments in the smelting of pig iron by means of coke (at the Bakhmut state plant).
1859 Peasant disturbances in a number of provinces.
1860 Treaty of Peking and the annexation of the Ussuri territory to Russia.
1860 Establishment of the State Bank.
1860 Founding of Vladivostok.
1860 First butter-producing artels in the Tver and Yaroslavl provinces.
1860 (October 10) Completion of work by the editing commissions for the preparation of a charter on peasants released from serfdom and the submission of the plan to the Principal Committee on Peasant Affairs.
1861 (January 28) Beginning of the study of the plan for a peasant charter in the State Council.

1861 (February 19) The signing of the peasant charter by Alexander II.
1861 (March 5) Publication of the manifesto on the Peasant Reform.

INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM (1861–1900)

1861 Abolition of the lease system.
1861 Establishment of the Petrovsk Agricultural Academy in Moscow.
1861 Establishment of the first Russian Municipal Credit Company in Petersburg.
1861 Opening of the Riga-Dinaburg railroad.
1861 Widespread peasant disturbances (1,176 instances recorded, including 337 outbreaks suppressed by troops). Uprising in the Bezdna village in the Kazan province.
1862 Statute on municipal and public banks.
1862 First credit cooperatives among artisans (in Odessa, Riga, and so forth).
1862 Statute on the settlement of Cossacks on the lands of exiled Caucasian mountaineers.
1862 Permission granted to private persons to prospect for gold in the Altay region.
1862 Beginning of the publication of the government budgets.
1862 Peasant unrest in a number of provinces.
1863 Introduction of the excise system on spirits.
1863 Statute on the agrarian settlement for crown peasants.
1863 Decrees on the ending of "temporary-indebtedness" relationship and on the preparation for redemption in the northwestern and southwestern provinces.
1863 Introduction of a household tax on urban real estate.
1863 Peasant unrest in various provinces.
1864 Statute on rural institutions in Russia.
1864 Court reform.
1864 Establishment of first Russian Mutual Credit Company in Petersburg.
1864 Establishment of the first private incorporated commercial bank in Russia at Petersburg.
1864 Establishment of the first Land Bank for Mutual Credit (at Kherson).
1864 First savings and loan cooperative association (in the Kostroma province).
1864 (October 13) Peasant reform in the Tiflis province.
1864 Peasant disturbances in various provinces.
1865 Capture of Tashkent.
1865 First merchant convention in Moscow.
1865 Resettlement of peasants in the Altay district permitted.
1865 Peasant reform in the Kutaisi province.
1865 Peasant unrest in various provinces.
1866 Statute on the agrarian order for state peasants.
1866 Organization of the Russian Technical Society.
1866 Establishment of the Merchant Joint Stock Bank of Moscow.

1866 First concession granted to the Voronezh zemstvo for the construction of a railroad (Kozlov-Voronezh).
1866 Peasant reform in Mingrelia (published February 19, 1867).
1866 Peasant unrest in various provinces.
1867 Sale of Alaska to the United States by Russia.
1867 Railroad between Riga and Mitau opened.
1868 Moderately protectionist customs tariff.
1868 Capture of Samarkand.
1868 Capture of Bukhara.
1868 Peasant unrest in various provinces.
1869 Erection of the first open-hearth furnace at the Sormovo factory.
1869 Introduction of an all-Russian administration among the Kirghizians.
1869 Peasant unrest in various provinces.
1870 New municipal statute.
1870 Regulations on guarantees and government subsidies for private railroad construction.
1870 First issue of consolidated bonds of the Russian railroads (second in 1871, third in 1872, fourth in 1873, fifth in 1875, for a total of 427 million rubles).
1870–1871 Establishment and beginning of operations at the Yuzovka plant in the Donbass.
1870 Beginning of pig-iron smelting by means of coke in the southern mills.
1870 First all-Russian convention of factory and mineowners.
1870 Unrest and strikes at Kronstadt, on the Voronezh railroad, at the Neva cotton-spinning mill in Petersburg, and at the sugar mill in Moscow.
1870 Circular of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on intensifying the campaign against the labor movement.
1870 Law on the agrarian settlement for the peasants of Abkhazia, Erivan, and Shemakhan provinces.
1871 Restoration to Russia of the right to maintain a navy in the Black Sea.
1871 Establishment of the first private joint-stock agrarian bank (at Kharkov).
1871 Introduction of the percussion method of drilling oil wells at Baku.
1871 Organization of the Committee on Savings and Loan Banks and Craft Associations.
1871 Capture of Kuldzha.
1872 First polytechnical exhibit in Moscow.
1872 Publication of the Russian translation of the first volume of Karl Marx's *Capital*.
1872 Abolition of the lease system in the Baku petroleum industry.
1872 Labor strikes at Tiflis, Petersburg, Vyshny-Volochk, and so forth.
1873 Capture of Khiva.
1873 Strikes at the Bogorodsk factory of Morozov in Moscow, at Serpukhova, in the Nerchinsk district, and so forth.
1873–1875 Industrial crisis in Russia.
1874 Introduction of universal military service.

1874 First convention of the mineowners of South Russia.
1874 Concession granted for the building and exploitation of the Indo-European telegraph across Russian territory.
1874 Strike of railroad workers of the Nikolaev railway in Moscow, workers at the weaving mill in Bogorodsk, at the Semyannikov factory in Petersburg, and so forth.
1874 Invention of the incandescent electric lamp by Lodygin.
1875 Treaty with Japan on the exchange of the Kurile Islands for the southern half of Sakhalin.
1875 Bessemer method adopted to production at the Nizhny Tagil plant.
1875 Introduction of government land tax.
1875 Organization of the "South Russian Union of Workers" (in Odessa).
1875 Strikes and labor unrest at the factories of Petersburg, Vladimir province, and so forth.
1875 Invention of "Yablochkov's candle."
1876 Conquest of the Kokand khanate (Fergana).
1876 Labor unrest in Petersburg factories and the first labor demonstration (December 6).
1876 Peasant unrest in Mingrelia and Svanetia.
1876 Patent issued for the invention of "Yablochkov's candle."
1877 Collection of customs duties in gold ordered (tariff increased by 40 per cent).
1877 First statistical census of land property in Russia.
1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War.
1878 Treaty of San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin.
1878 Annexation of Kara province, Batum, and Ardagan to Russia.
1878 Formation of the "Northern Union of Russian Workers" (in Petersburg).
1878 Strike of Petersburg textile workers.
1878 Rules on the lease system for Bashkir lands.
1878 Peasant uprising in Kakhetia.
1879 Strikes and labor unrest at the cotton-spinning plants of Petersburg, the Perm artillery plants in Motovilikha, at the Petersburg metal plant, and so forth.
1880 Abolition of salt tax.
1880 First telephones in Russia.
1880 Labor strikes in Moscow, Kiev, and so forth.
1880 Peasant unrest in the Chernigov, Pskov, and Tula provinces.
1881 Construction of the first electric station in Russia (one year earlier than in North America).
1881 Regulations on private gold industry.
1881 New excise system for the taxation of sugar.
1881 Law on the compulsory transfer of peasants to redemption status.
1881 Labor strikes in the Nizhny Novgorod province, in Rybinsk, and so forth.
1881 Disturbances among peasants in the Saratov, Samara, Kherson, Tambov, and Voronezh provinces.

1881–1882 Peasant uprisings in Guria.
1881–1882 Industrial crisis in Russia.
1882 Establishment of tax on properties transferred free of costs.
1882 Statutes on tobacco (introduction of excise system).
1882 Opening of first state-owned railroad, the Baskunchak line.
1882 Beginning of factory laws in Russia, the law of July 1st, limiting night work of minors.
1882 Establishment of factory inspection system.
1882 Labor strikes in Petersburg at the cotton-spinning factory, the nail factory, at the Sormovo plant, and so forth.
1882 Major strikes in Batum.
1882 Organization of the peasant land bank (opened in 1883).
1882 Abolition (as of 1883) of poll tax on burghers and some categories of peasants.
1882 Reduction of redemption payments (by 12 million rubles).
1882 All-Russian exposition in Moscow.
1883 Opening of Transcaucasian railroad (Baku to Batum).
1883 Plekhanov organizes first Russian Marxist group, the "Liberation of Labor," at Geneva.
1883 Labor strikes at the Voznesensk, Yaroslavl, Krenholm factories, and so forth.
1883 Peasant disturbances at the Ufa province.
1884 Establishment of central administration of posts and telegraphs.
1884 Opening of state-owned Catherine railroad.
1884 Strikes and unrest among labor in Petersburg at the Smolensk weaving mill, the cotton-spinning factory of Shtiglits, and so forth.
1884 Reactionary regulations for universities.
1885 Law of May 25 abolishing poll tax as of January 1, 1886, for peasants, and as of January 1, 1887, for all categories of the population throughout the empire (except Siberia).
1885 Introduction of new taxes on industry and trade.
1885 Introduction of tax on liquid capital.
1885 Opening of state-owned railway between Yekaterinburg and Tyumen.
1885 Establishment of the Land Bank for the Nobility.
1885 Law for the regulation of night work of adolescents and women.
1885 Strike at the Morozov factories in Orekhovo-Zuyevo and Ivanovo-Voznesensk.
1885 Peasant unrest in the Kiev, Chernigov, Kherson, Podol, Yekaterinoslav, Tavrid, Kursk, and Voronezh provinces, in the Don region, and so forth.
1886 Opening of the Transcaucasian railroad.
1886 First syndicate of nail and wire factories.
1886 Law on supervision of factory establishments.
1886 Labor strikes at Demidov's plant in Verkhne-Serginsk, and so forth.
1886 Decree prohibiting family partitions among peasants.

1886 Decree transferring state peasants to redemption status (as of January 1, 1887).
1887 Agreement with England on Afghanistan.
1887 Organization of syndicate of sugar-mill owners.
1887 Introduction of excise system for petroleum illuminating oils.
1887 Second statistical survey of landed property.
1887 Rules on private mining industry.
1887 Beginning of coal extraction at Tkvibuli.
1887 Organization of a silk-cultivating station at Tiflis.
1887 Opening of Permanent Office of Iron-Mill Owners.
1887 Labor strikes in factories in the Tambov province, Tver, in the Tiflis railroad shops, and so forth.
1888 Increase of customs tariff by 20 per cent.
1888 Introduction of excise system for spirituous drinks.
1888 Construction of railroad to Samarkand.
1888 Opening of state-owned railroad between Samara and Ufa.
1888 Statute of April 4 on forest conservation.
1888 Labor strikes in Tver, Shui, and Petrokov.
1889 Statute on railway rates and on bureaus for dealing with the problem of rates.
1889 Statute on rural district supervisors.
1889 New regulations on resettlement of peasants.
1889 Labor strikes in Moscow, Shui, Tiflis, and so forth.
1890 New (reactionary) statute on Zemstvos.
1890 Curtailment of laws of 1882–1885 outlawing night work for minors and women.
1890 First industrial electric station at the Perm artillery plant.
1890 Establishment of the Society for Aiding in the Improvement and Development of Manufacturing Industry.
1890 Organization of the Pavlov artel of handicraftsmen.
1890 Labor strikes at Yaroslavl, in the Yekaterinoslav and Olonetsk provinces, in Warsaw, and so forth.
1890–1891 Increase in sugar tax.
1891 Beginning of construction of the Siberian railroad main line.
1891 New (protective) customs tariff.
1891 First May Day demonstration in Petersburg.
1891 Labor strikes at the New Admiralty in Petersburg, the Girard factory in Warsaw, and so forth.
1891–1892 Famine covering twenty-one provinces of European Russia.
1892 New (reactionary) municipal statute.
1892 Increase in taxes on matches (100 per cent), beer (50 per cent), kerosene (50 per cent), patented tobacco (50 per cent), real estate, commercial, and industrial levies.
1892 Organization of an Export Syndicate of Baku Kerosene Manufacturers.
1892 Opening of state-owned railroad between Samara and Zlatoust.

1892 Labor strikes in Yuzovka, Makeyevka, Kamenka, Tver, and so forth.
1893 "Regulations on industry."
1893 Establishment of tax on lodgings (as of January 1, 1894).
1893 Law establishing inalienable right of peasants to their allotment of lands.
1893 Abolition of Article 165 of the Statute of February 19 dealing with premature redemption.
1893 Decree limiting general redistribution of peasant communal land.
1893 Establishment of the incorporated Eastern Company of Warehouses, Insurance, and Transportation of Goods.
1893 Introduction of a general railroad rate system.
1893 Tariff war with Germany.
1893 Beginning of industrial exploitation of petroleum at Grozny.
1893 Formation of the first Marxist group (Mesame-dasi) in Transcaucasia. Joined by Stalin in 1898.
1893 Labor strikes at the Nizhny Tagil plant, at the Izhevsk arsenal, at the Khludovsk paper factory, and so forth.
1893–1894 Commercial treaties on the basis of conventions with France (1893), Germany (1894), and so forth.
1894 New charter for the State Bank.
1894 General review of legislation dealing with peasantry.
1894 Decree on sale of vodka ("drinks") by the state.
1894 State acquires railroads of the former Central Company of Russian Railways.
1894 Labor strikes at Rostov-on-the-Don, in the Petrokov province, on the Siberian railroad.
1894 Acquisition of southwestern railroads by the state.
1894 Opening of West Siberian railroad.
1894 Publication (in hectograph form) of Lenin's study "What Are These 'Friends of the People' and How Do They Fight the Social Democrats?"
1895 Lenin unites labor Marxist circles in Petersburg into the "Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class."
1895 Strike in the Petersburg port.
1895 Strike at the Thornton plant, at the Morozov factory, at the Putilov plant, the mechanical shoe factory, the Prokhorov factory, the Karzinkin mill in Yaroslavl, and so forth.
1895 Invention of wireless telegraphy by Popov.
1895 Construction of an all-metal dirigible by Tsiolkovsky.
1895 (May 8) Transactions in gold currency made legal.
1895 (August 8) Rate of ruble fixed at 1 ruble and 50 kopecks of credit note for one gold ruble.
1896 All-Russian industrial exposition in Nizhny Novgorod and the first all-Russian commercial and industrial congress.
1896 First butter-producing artel in Siberia (Kurgan county).
1896 First Union of Credit and Savings and Loan Associations (in Berdyansk).
1896 Acquisition of the Moscow-Brest railroad by the state.

1896 Establishment of the concessionaire (incorporated) Chinese Eastern Railroad Company (opened in 1903).
1896 Opening of the state-owned Ural railroad.
1896 Strike at the Voronin factory in Petersburg, general strike of weavers and spinners (30,000 men).
1896 Strikes in Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Orekhovo-Zuyevo, Tver, and in the Urals.
1896–1899 Construction of the Ussuri railroad.
1897 First general census of population in Russia.
1897 Abolition of the passport tax.
1897 Decree on the length and distribution of working hours in factory establishments (11 hours and 30 minutes).
1897–1898 Occupation of Port Arthur and treaty with China concerning the Kwantung peninsula.
1897 (January 3) Beginning of the minting of imperials—fifteen-ruble gold coins.
1897 (August 29) State Bank granted right to issue currency.
1897 (November 14) Minting of five-ruble gold coins.
1898 (March 27) Final adoption of a gold currency.
1898 (June 8) New law for taxation of industry and commerce (effective January 1, 1899).
1898 Abolition of poll tax in Siberia.
1898 Construction of railroad to Tashkent.
1898 First congress of the RSDRP (Russian Social Democratic Labor party).
1898 Labor strikes in Petersburg and Ivanovo-Voznesensk, and among the railway workers in Tiflis.
1899 Peasant unrest in the Tavrid, Oryol, and Minsk provinces.
1899 Publication of Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.*
1899 Promulgation of statute on the Main Office for Factory and Mill Affairs.
1899 New monetary regulations.
1899 New statute on weights and measures.
1899 Establishment of a commission "On the Impoverishment of the Center."
1899 Establishment of polytechnical schools in Kiev and Warsaw.
1899 Opening of Central Siberian railroad.
1899 Opening of the Perm state-owned railroad.
1899 Labor strikes at the Sormovo plant.
1899 Peasant disturbances in Gruzia, in the Samara, Saratov, and Kiev provinces.

IMPERIALISM AND THE EVE OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION (1900–1917)

1900–1903 Industrial crisis in Russia.
1900 Strike of workers in the railway shops of Tiflis under the leadership of Stalin.

1900 Beginning of widespread application of the open-hearth method of steel production.
1900–1902 Russian loans to Persia valued at 32.5 million rubles.
1900–1905 Beginning of industrial exploitation of manganese deposits at Chiaturi (opened in 1779).
1901 Mass lockouts of industrial workers.
1901 Mass strikes of railroad workers in Saratov, Tiflis, and so forth; of workers at the Yaroslavl mill, the Bodaiba works, in Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, Saratov, in the Urals, and so forth (total of 120 strikes).
May Day strike at the Obukhovo arsenal (clash with troops); May Day demonstration in Tiflis.
1900–1902 Peasant unrest in Gruzia, in Nizhny Novgorod and Tver provinces.
1902 Publication of Lenin's *What Is to Be Done?*
1902 Zubatov movement.
1902 Strike among workers of Rostov-on-the-Don.
1902 Stalin directs first strike at the Mantashyov factory in Batum.
1902 Organization of syndicate for the sale of ferromanganese.
1902 Formation of the "Truboprodazha" syndicate (for the sale of steel pipes).
1902 Organization of the syndicate "Prodamet" (First Stock Company for the Sale of Products of Russian Metallurgical Mills).
1902 Witte establishes Special Conference on the Needs of the Agricultural Industry.
1902 Agrarian unrest among peasants of the Kharkov and Poltava provinces.
1903 (July 17) Second congress of the RSDRP.
1903 New decrees: (1) For the compensation of workers in the case of accidents; (2) on the establishment of labor overseers.
1903 First general strike in Tiflis and mass political strikes in Baku, Chiaturi, Batum, Odessa, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Zlatoust, Kostroma, and so forth.
1903 Establishment of a Russian timber concession on the Yalu River in Korea.
1904 (January 27) Beginning of Russo-Japanese War.
1904 Publication of Lenin's *One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward.*
1904 Second general strike in Tiflis (beginning of an all-Russian strike movement).
1904 General strike in Baku.
1904 Gapon organizes the Congress of Russian Factory Workers of Petersburg.
1904 Formation of the convention "Committee of Ural Mines and Mills."
1904 Organization of the syndicate "Prodvagon."
1904 Formation of the syndicate "Produgol."
1904 Statute on small-credit establishment.
1904 New law dealing with resettlement of peasants in Siberia.
1905 (January 3) Strike at the Putilov plant at Petersburg (beginning of the general strike and general revolutionary movement).
1905 (January 9) Demonstration of workers at the Winter Palace dispersed by gunfire. Beginning of first revolution.
1905 (April) Third congress of RSDRP in London.

1905 (May) May Day strikes of workers throughout the empire.
1905 (June) Armed uprising of workers and barricades in Lodz.
1905 Extended strike (2½ months) of workers at Ivanovo-Voznesensk; armed clashes with troops.
1905 (June) Uprising on the battleship *Potemkin*.
1905 Lenin publishes *Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*.
1905 (August 7) Manifesto on the "Bulygin" (consultative) Duma.
1905 (August 23) Conclusion of the Portsmouth peace treaty with Japan.
1905 (September) Beginning of the political strike (the printers of Moscow).
1905 (October) General strike throughout Russia.
1905 (October 17) Manifesto on the convocation of a "legislative" State Duma and on "constitutional freedoms."
1905 (October 13) First council (soviet) of workers' deputies held in Petersburg.
1905 (October-November) Spread of revolutionary struggle and uprisings throughout the empire.
1905 December uprising in Moscow and in a number of other cities.
1905 (November 3) Manifesto on the abolition of redemption payments for peasant land effective January 1, 1907.
1905 General strike in Tiflis, Chiaturi, Kutaisi, Batum, and so forth.
1905 Agrarian movements (in 240 counties).
1905 Third statistical census of landownership in Russia.
1906 (April) Fourth congress of RSDRP in Stockholm.
1906 (June) Dispersion of the first State Duma and punitive expeditions into the districts swept by revolts.
1906 Treaty with France granting Russia a loan of 2¼ billion francs.
1906 (November 9) Decree on quitting the village commune—the "Stolypin Reform."
1906 (November 15) Peasant Bank permitted to grant loans against allotment land as collateral.
1906 Peasant Bank granted crown lands and parts of state-owned land for sale to peasants.
1906 Opening of oil pipe line between Baku and Batum.
1906 Opening of railroad between Orenburg and Tashkent.
1906 Organization of the syndicate "Krovlya" by the Ural iron mills.
1907 (February-June) Second State Duma and its dissolution.
1907 (May) Fifth congress of the RSDRP in London.
1907 (June 3) New election law for the third State Duma.
1907 Formation of the syndicate "Congress of Farm Machinery and Implement Manufacturers."
1907 Organization of the syndicate "Treugolnik" by rubber producers.
1907 Organization of the syndicate "Russian Association for the Cement Trade."
1907 Organization of the "Med" (copper) syndicate.
1907 Organization of the "Prodarud" syndicate (for the sale of ores).

1907 Agreement between Russia and England on the division of "spheres of influence" in Iran.
1908 Attempt to organize the trust Corporation of Metallurgical Mills, Mines, and Pits.
1908 Organization of a syndicate of Lodz cotton manufacturers.
1908 Organization of major strikes in Baku by Stalin.
1909 Publication of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.*
1909 Organization of a syndicate of maritime transport companies under the name of "Ropit."
1909 Organization of the syndicate "Platina" (platinum).
1909 First experiments in smelting electric furnace steel (at the Obukhovo factory in Petersburg).
1909 Beginning of industrial operations in the Maikop oil fields.
1909 Appearance of cooperative associations for the processing of potatoes (in the Kostroma and Yaroslavl provinces).
1910 (June 14) State Duma confirmed the provisions of the decree of November 9, 1906, on abandoning the commune.
1910–1916 Construction of the Amur railroad.
1911 (May 29) Decree on the agrarian status of peasant allotment lands.
1911 Experiments in the turbine methods of drilling oil wells in Baku.
1912 (January) Conference of the RSDRP in Prague.
1912 (April 4) Shootings in the Lena gold fields. New rise of strike and revolutionary movement.
1912 Uprising in Kabarda.
1912 Decree abolishing temporary indebted relations and slavery in Transcaucasia.
1912 Armed outbreak among the troops in Turkestan.
1912 Organization of the syndicate "Russian Flax Industrial Corporation."
1912–1913 Formation of monopolistic combinations in the petroleum industry.
1914 Construction of the oil pipe line between Grozny and Petrovsk.
1914 Large-scale lockout at the factories of Petersburg.
1914 Increase in the strike movement (1,425,000 strikers during half-year period).
1914 (May) Strike in Baku.
1914 (July) Strike at the Putilov plant in Petersburg and in other cities.
1914 (July 19) Beginning of First World War.
1914 Exchange of paper currency for gold discontinued.
1914 (November) Arrest of the Bolshevik faction of the fourth State Duma and exile of its members to Siberia.
1915 (April) Food "riots" in Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities.
1915 (June-July) Formation of war-industry committees and all-Russian urban and rural unions.
1915 (August 17) Establishment of a Special Conference on Defense, Food, Fuel, and Transportation.
1915 Introduction of government procurement of foodstuffs for the population.

1915–1917 Growth of strike movement (in Petersburg, Moscow, Kostroma, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Tver, at the Tula and Bryansk factories, in Baku, the Donbass, and so forth).
1916 Uprising against tsarist government in Kazakhstan.
1916 Lenin completes his *Imperialism as an Advanced Phase of Capitalism.*
1917 Lockouts in Petersburg, in the Donbass, the Urals, and so forth.
1917 (January 9) Strikes and political demonstrations in Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities.
1917 Formation of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
1917 (February 18) Strike of workers of the Putilov plant.
1917 (February 25) General strike and political demonstrations in Petrograd.
1917 (February 26) Troops engage in actions on the side of the people.
1917 (February 27) Triumph of the bourgeois February revolution. Formation of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Organization of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma.
1917 (March 2) Fall of the monarchy and formation of the provisional government.
1917 (March 9) Ordinances on court action against "agrarian disorders."
1917 (March 10) Agreement between the Petrograd Soviet and the Association of Factory Owners on the introduction of the eight-hour workday.
1917 (March 11) Decision of the Soviet on the eight-hour workday and its "clarification" by the provisional government as a "temporary concession."
1917 (March 12-16) Cabinet and crown lands ordered sequestered.
1917 (April 3) Lenin returns to Russia.
1917 (April 4) Lenin's "April Theses."
1917 (April 20-21) Demonstration against the war and for power to the Soviets.
1917 (April 24) All-Russian April Conference of the Bolsheviks.
1917 (May 5) Formation of the coalition government.
1917 (May 17) Order of the provisional government forbidding any transactions in land.
1917 (June 3) First all-Russian Congress of Soviets.
1917 (June 18) Demonstration under Bolshevik slogans.
1917 (June 21) Establishment of the Economic Council and the Principal Economic Committee under the Provisional Government.
1917 (June 26) Appeal by Minister of Labor Skobelev to the workers, ruling out "unauthorized acts."
1917 (July 3) Demonstrations of workers and soldiers.
1917 (July 26-August 3) Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party. Stalin issues slogan on preparation to armed uprising as condition for the triumph of the socialist revolution.
1917 (August 12) State conference in Moscow.
1917 (August 25) Counterrevolutionary revolt by Kornilov.
1917 (September 12) All-Russian democratic conference resulting in the selection of a pre-parliament.

1917 (September 23) Announcement of an all-Russian railroad strike.
1917 (October 7) Lenin returns from the underground to Petrograd.
1917 (October 10) Meeting of the Central Committee of the Party. Decision adopted to launch an armed uprising within the immediate future.
1917 (October 13) Creation of the Military Revolutionary Committee.
1917 (October 16) Election of a Party directorate for the conduct of the uprising headed by Stalin.
1917 (October 19) Resolution of factory committees on the transfer of power to the soviets.
1917 (October 23) Decree No. 1 of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies "On the Hiring and Dismissal of Workers with the Approval of Factory Committees."
1917 (October 24) Arrival of Lenin in Smolny for the direction of the uprising.
1917 (October 25 [November 7, Gregorian calendar]) Overthrow of the provisional government and the triumph of the great October Socialist Revolution.

RUSSIAN TRANSLITERATION TABLE

(Based on the new Russian orthography)

This scheme is designed for the convenience of readers who do not know Russian. It is intended primarily for the rendering of personal and place names—mostly nouns in the nominative case.

The aim is to produce words as "normal" in appearance as possible, without the use of diacritical marks, superscripts or apostrophes, but at the same time to approximate the sounds of the Russian words, so that if spoken by an educated American they would easily be identified by a Russian.

Names which are a part of English cultural tradition, such as Moscow, Archangel, Tolstoy, Tchaikovsky, are given in their customary English spelling.

Extended phrases or entire sentences involving verb forms and case endings, which occur in footnotes for the convenience of students who know Russian, are given in a somewhat more complex transliteration which is reversible.

Russian			*English*	
А	а		*a*	
Б	б		*b*	
В	в		*v*	
Г	г		*g*	except in genitive singular where it is *v*, as in Tolstovo.
Д	д		*d*	
Е	е	(1)	*ye*	when initial, and after ь, ъ, and all vowels, except ы, и: Yekaterina, Izdanie, Nikolayev.
		(2)	*e*	elsewhere, as in Lenin, Vera, Pero.
Ё	ё		*yo*	but after ж and ш = *o*.
Ж	ж		*zh*	
З	з		*z*	
И	и		*i*	but after ь = *yi*, as in Ilyich.
Й	й		*y*	in terminal diphthongs, but *i* medially, as in May, Kochubey, Kiy, Tolstoy, but Khoz*yai*stvo.
К	к		*k*	
Л	л		*l*	
М	м		*m*	
Н	н		*n*	
О	о		*o*	
П	п		*p*	
Р	р		*r*	
С	с		*s*	
Т	т		*t*	

Russian		*English*	
У	у	*u*	
Ф	ф	*f*	
Х	х	*kh*	as in Kharkov.
Ц	ц	*ts*	Tsargrad.
Ч	ч	*ch*	Chapayev, Vaigach.
Ш	ш	*sh*	Shakhta.
Щ	щ	*shch*	Shchedrin.
Ъ	ъ	Omit	
Ы	ы	*y*	Mys, Tsaritsyn.
Ь	ь	Omit	
Э	э	*e*	Ermitazh.
Ю	ю	*yu*	
Я	я	*ya*	

Adjectival Endings

Singular	ЫЙ, ИЙ	ый, ий	{	both simply *y*, as in Dostoyevsky, Grozny.
Plural	ЫЕ, ИЕ	ые, ие		both simply *ie*.

The English letter *y* serves both as vowel and as consonant (as it does in English): (1) as a vowel *within* words, as in Mys, Tsaritsyn, and also (2) as an adjectival terminal vowel, as in Khoroshy, Razumovsky, May, Kochubey, Tolstoy, and (3) with consonantal force to soften vowels, as in Istoriya, Bratya, Yug.

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