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MORAL EXPERIENCE

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THE PRINCIPLES OF UNDERSTANDING. Cambridge University Press, 1915.

SOCIALISM AND CHARACTER. Allen & Unwin, 1922.

HUMAN VALUE ; an Ethical Essay. Cambridge University Press, 1923.

MORAL EXPERIENCE

AN OUTLINE OF ETHICS FOR CLASS-TEACHING

BY

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PREFACE

THE present volume is the outcome of much experience in university teaching at St. Andrew's, Aberdeen, Bangor, and Belfast, and is meant to be used in connexion with the moral philosophy classes which are held at most British universities. The plan of the book has been governed by the conviction that the moral system which is currently accepted in a country ought to be one which is suited to its political and social organization; the writer therefore offers no apology for making plain that he has definite views about those matters. One omission in the book may be noticed: very little has been said about the connexion of religion with moral experience. Much might be said on this topic, but it would hardly be in place in a book intended for class-teaching at the present time.

What the writer holds to be the essential element of moral experience has been treated by him in a previously published essay, entitled *Human Value*, which he hopes may be used in conjunction with the present Outline.

Oxford, January, 1928.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

(1) The study of moral experience, though motived by scientific curiosity, should also look to the promotion of welfare. (2) Moral experience is mainly communal. (3) Its most important element is the currently accepted moral system by which men regulate their conduct as members of a community; and this is the chief object of ethical study. (4) The point in which the currently accepted moral system most needs improvement is that there should be more appreciation of the spirit of public service, which is needed for the working of democratic institutions. (5) And yet these institutions also require a great development of individual personality.

§ 1. THE study of moral experience, with which this book is concerned, is primarily an intellectual affair, motived by scientific curiosity. Nevertheless, the subject-matter is of such a kind that good theoretical results are not likely to be achieved unless the moralist has a practical as well as an intellectual purpose in view. This can be nothing else than the promotion of human welfare.

There are great difficulties against a completely detached or purely theoretical treatment of ethics, such as is possible in provinces like mathematics which make no appeal to our affections and passions. The purely theoretical moralist lacks guidance in regard to selection and arrangement of material. There are an immense number of things which can be said about our moral experience, and it is neither possible nor desirable that one treatise should say them all. Every moralist has therefore to decide what ideas to select for presentation, and in what order to arrange them. How wide his discretion is in these matters may be understood by comparing any two current ethical treatises: it will be seen that they are more divergent than two similar works of natural science.

These difficulties do not exist for a moralist who has a

strong practical interest. He is sure to think that, at the time of writing, there are certain virtues which are specially important for welfare and certain vices which are specially dangerous. This indicates a plan for his work, suggesting what ideas to select, and how to arrange and express them. An ethical book written with mathematical detachment is likely to be unsatisfying intellectually; because, even if the ideas are true, they are not such as we want to hear, nor are they arranged in the order of their relative importance.

The theoretic utility of practical interest (if one may so express the matter) is often overlooked by English students of ethics, because most of us have begun our studies by reading the masterpieces of Greek thought. It is quite true that Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Ethics* do make the best introduction to philosophy; but, being written under the conditions of antiquity, they treat of problems which are different from those which engage us to-day. They therefore make upon the junior student an impression of unpracticality (which wider knowledge will remove), and encourage the delusion that an attitude of detachment is appropriate to the philosopher. But when we have come to understand the conditions which prevailed in the ancient world, we must recognize that upon the whole Greek philosophy was too much, rather than too little, influenced by practical purposes. The best results are got, I think, when there is a due balance between practice and theory. In no thinker is the proportion so perfect as in Plato. His great aspiration to rehabilitate the city state was never wholly absent from his mind; and yet he pursues theoretical inquiries with the proper scientific enthusiasm. Aristotle's *Ethics*, though it serves as a preface to his severely practical lectures on statesmanship, is hardly less satisfactory as a piece of theorizing. But the Stoics were definitely lacking on the theoretical side, and were much more successful as preachers and spiritual directors than as men of ideas.

§ 2. We cannot undertake the study of moral experience without assumptions. But that which I wish to make at the

outset is not one which is likely to be challenged at the present time; it is that moral experience is something which men have because of the fact that they live together in communities. There certainly are kinds of moral experience which are not directly communal; for example, that which is spoken of later in this volume as 'self-respect'; but they are possible only for communal beings. Genuinely solitary creatures can have no morality at all. The simplest justification which can be given for the assumption is to refer to articulate expressions of moral experience; such as moral codes, books, and current precepts. All these deal mainly with a man's relations to his fellows. The most familiar articulation of moral experience, the Ten Commandments, is a good example for my purpose. Apart from the religious element in them, the Commandments could have no application to a solitary being.

It is the more important part of community-life with which moral experience is concerned. There are certain sentiments which men must entertain towards each other, and certain acts which they must perform towards each other, if community-life is to be maintained; they must, for example, feel goodwill and do mutually helpful acts. And there are certain feelings which are unfavourable to living together, and acts which inevitably break up a community; from these they must abstain. The negative or prohibitional elements of morality, such as are conspicuous in the Ten Commandments, are those which attract attention first and are most easily expressed. But the positive elements of willing and doing are of deeper importance; though it is much harder to formulate them in definite precepts.

§ 3. The element of moral experience which a moralist judges to be the most important should take the first place in his exposition, and govern the arrangement of all that follows. In the past it has often been assumed that the cosmic element should be put first, and that treatment of ethical problems should be governed by a conception of man's general position in the universe. This cannot commend itself to any one in whom the practical interest is very strong. To him the

most important element must be the moral system by which men actually regulate their conduct, especially their conduct towards their fellow-men.

Let me explain this term 'moral system.' A synonym for it is 'system of virtues.' As an alternative I might have used 'moral ideal'; but this is rather a system of virtues regarded as an object of aspiration. What I am thinking of is a system of ideas which is currently regarded in a community as proper for the actual regulation of conduct. 'Moral system' or 'system of virtues' is, of course, quite different from 'ethical system,' which means a general theory of morals.

The accepted moral system of a community is expressed in various forms: in sacred books or scriptures, in ethical writings which are meant expressly to give precepts, in literary writings which manifest definite tendencies in regard to conduct, in traditions of moral exhortation and education. Treating of a very large and complex community such as our own, one does not find it easy to say exactly what the moral system is which it accepts. The moralist must make a mental survey of the mass of precepts and principles which are mentioned with respect, and decide which of them are truly observed and which are practically inoperative for the majority of lives.

The moralist performs no small service in stating and arranging the rules which his fellow-citizens currently observe. But in addition he cannot help exercising a critical function. Moral systems are in continual change; because of change in the conditions under which men live, especially change in economic conditions. At any given period, parts of the moral system which men profess to accept are really becoming obsolete, and a process of reform has begun. It is the business of the moralist to pick out and discard the obsolescent parts; and, at the same time, to welcome the influences which are acting upon progressive minds.

§ 4. The element of moral conduct in which our own accepted moral system seems most to need improvement is that of devotion to public service. There are a large and

increasing number of citizens whose standards of conduct in this respect are all that could be desired; but we cannot say so much of the majority. Increased devotion to public service is needed because of the advance of democracy.

When the government of a country becomes genuinely democratic, the functions of government are greatly increased, because the organization of the whole community is inspired by the purpose of promoting public welfare. There is a great growth in various kinds of institutions; not merely those of the central government, but also local and subordinate institutions, together with institutions, such as churches, which have a semi-private character. All these institutions, so numerous, so powerful, and so complex, cannot be worked successfully unless there are widely diffused among the people qualities which are appropriate to the task. One of the most necessary qualities is a high degree of communal virtue, especially that kind of it which manifests itself in devoted public service. The general average level of communal virtue hardly suffices at the present time for the successful working of a truly democratic system; and we cannot expect democracy to be fully successful till a higher level has been attained.

These considerations have had influence upon the selection of the ideas which are contained in the present book, and upon the manner in which the ideas are arranged and expressed. On purely theoretical grounds, I hold we ought to regard the communal virtues as more important than any other element of our moral experience. Yet I doubt if this would have occurred to me but for my interpretation of the practical needs of the time.

§ 5. Supremely important as communal virtue is, it is not all-sufficient for the character of the democratic citizen; there are needed also qualities of a more individualistic kind. A thoroughly civilized democracy, with all its manifold and elaborate institutions, cannot be worked by citizens who, considered as individuals, are of poor quality. They must have great natural gifts which have been developed by careful education. This is most evidently true in regard to the

leading citizens; they need personal force, high accomplishments prompted by wide and varied interests, and a capacity for self-determination. In a certain sense they must be individualists as well as collectivists.

It is well recognized at the present day that there is no philosophic justification for the old antithesis between the individual and the community. When Tennyson said, "the individual withers, and the world is more and more," he was describing what is an impossibility, in the moral sphere at least. The general view of human life and character, which was in the writer's mind when the present book was composed, is that men are at their best when they are working as members of a large and good system with which they are heartily in accord. It is this sort of life which encourages strength of character; it is intellectually satisfying, because it encourages the creative powers of the mind; and it is best for happiness. Above all, what specially concerns us here, it develops the various kinds of virtue, giving the individual opportunity to appreciate all the good elements of humanity, and to actualize the moral possibilities of his own nature.

Part I. A Moral System

CHAPTER II

POLITICS AND MORALS

(1) The moral system which is outlined in this Part is suitable only to a truly democratic community; (2) which has self-governing institutions, and in which the mass of the population has risen from the position of a proletariat to that of a demos. Such a community is politically mature. (3) A community cannot approach political maturity unless it enjoys national freedom, (4) and is exempt from internal disunion; (5) it ought also, if possible, to have opportunities for national pride.

(6) Under the political conditions of to-day we need a moral system which is neither proletarian, (7) nor pagan; (8) but one in which benevolence, though it is always recognized as the first of the virtues, is modified by regard for the general welfare.

§ 1. THE task which is undertaken in this the first Part of my Outline is to set forth a moral system which is suitable to a truly democratic community. The system which follows was not, of course, invented by the present writer; the elements of it have been collected from actual current practice. But the writer has exercised some freedom of selection and criticism.

It would be a great mistake to think, if any philosopher ever has thought, that a moral system can be proposed which would be suitable to all communities alike; the fact is, rather, that a rule of life which is advantageous in one place may be injurious in another. This sounds so commonplace that one is almost ashamed to say it; but it is said for the purpose of anticipating criticism. Some critics will doubtless question the expediency of proposals in the following chapters; but the proper answer to them may be that the community which is in their minds is not a truly democratic community. Any

community which does not deserve that name certainly needs a moral system different from that set forth below.

This makes it necessary to say what is meant by a 'democratic community.' Some who read the description which follows may object that no such community exists at the present time. Here is a serious difficulty, but not a fatal one. My answer to it is that communities do exist which approach democracy more or less; and that, so far as they are democratic, the moral system of the following chapters is suitable to them. Admittedly, it is not suitable to communities which are immature.

§ 2. Let me mention first the more obvious conditions of genuine democracy. There must, of course, be self-governing institutions; that is, institutions which give the non-official part of the population an opportunity of co-operating in the work of government. The main work of government must be done by professional governors; but a political system is not wholesome unless there is also popular co-operation.

This implies that the mass of the population should be so far advanced that it is qualified to co-operate with the government. The main qualification is a moral one. There must be diffused throughout the population sufficient patriotism to make them zealous for the welfare of the community. They must also have enough intelligence to understand the functions of government and the duties of the citizen. It is intelligence which makes the difference between tribal feeling and patriotism. The ignorant tribesman is ready to fight and die for his community without understanding it; but this is only the raw material of patriotism.

The population of a community cannot have high political capacities unless it has various qualities which are not political in the narrower sense. It must be a comparatively wealthy population, and the wealth must be produced under conditions which are favourable to the welfare of the workers. Whatever the outward form of constitution may be, there can be no good politics with an economically degraded population. Moreover, there must be a high standard of popular education. Democracy is indeed the one form of government which has

a direct and imperative interest in diffusing knowledge and in preparing men of natural ability for their proper sphere of action. Above all, a truly democratic community must have a high general standard of morals. The moral qualities which are requisite are positive rather than negative, consisting in strong public and private affections and in good purposes. But there must be negative qualities also, especially the power of self-control. This is perhaps the most conspicuous feature of a fully civilized population. It is specially important in all matters relating to reproduction. A community cannot reach political maturity unless there is a proper adjustment between population and wealth.

When the mass of the population has risen to this level, it has, politically speaking, come of age, and is worthy of the name of 'demos.' The term 'proletariat,' on the other hand, is appropriate to hand-workers who are so far wanting in wealth, morals, and intelligence that they are incapable of co-operating in the work of government. The term has been applied most often to low-grade urban populations; but proletariat conditions exist also in rural countries. The lowest class of people in London are proletarians; but so also are the moozheeks or peasants in Russia, unless they have become very different from what they were under the Tsars.

If a political community has reached this condition—that is, if it enjoys self-governing institutions and has a population which is fully qualified to take its share in the business of government, it has become politically mature. The term 'mature community' is meant as a shorter synonym for 'truly democratic community.' Such a term may be thought to have the disadvantage that it implies finality in democracy. It may be argued that democracy is only a stage towards some better form. That better form, however, is not in sight as yet. Such a word as 'mature' must always be understood relatively; it is used with the proviso, 'as far as we can see.'

§ 3. The foregoing are conditions of good politics, and therefore of good morality, which it behoves Englishmen to keep well in view for their own benefit. But there are other

conditions which ought to be considered, not because they affect our nation directly, but because of their influence upon other communities whose fortunes are linked to ours.

A community cannot have advanced institutions unless it enjoys national freedom, in the sense that it is not subject to alien domination. Every one, probably, would be ready to maintain this in regard to his own country; but not necessarily in regard to other countries. An average Russian, for example, would resent alien domination in Russia, but in pre-War days would have defended Russian domination over Finland and Poland. Viewing the matter impartially, however, no one can deny that alien domination inflicts grave moral disabilities upon those who are subjected to it, if only by preventing the development of the political side of morality. There are circumstances which may justify domination. It is by the pressure of conquering races that tribal separateness is broken down. Nations which are not qualified to exercise political rights are benefited by tutelage. But such a state of things must be regarded as provisional. It is a political crime to prolong an alien domination which is no longer conducive to welfare.

It must be put to the credit of British statesmen that the principle of national self-determination is now well recognized by them and is put into practice so far as circumstances allow. Our leaders of political thought do not desire that the peoples of India should remain indefinitely in their present tutelage. They know that a politically dominated population not only receives moral injury, but also provokes the formation of vices in the dominators.

§ 4. Another important condition of good politics is internal unity. A population cannot be truly self-governing unless it can act as a whole. One cause of disunion is difference of language. This is so in South Africa, where the survival of the 'taal,' together with cultural and religious differences, prevents English and Dutch from working heartily together as a united people. From this situation there can be only one issue, that the Dutch should discard their language and become anglicized. The Africaans dialect

has no literary or cultural value whatever; and, even if it had, that would not justify the political (and therefore the moral) disabilities which are involved in its retention. The actual policy to be adopted in regard to measures of anglicization must always be determined by opportunity; great harm may be done by wounding racial susceptibilities, which should be treated diplomatically. But it should be well recognized that to encourage minority populations in a separatist policy is not to consult their best interests. It is not truly patriotic to work for the preservation of the Breton language or of the Irish. The disappearance of old Cornish may be grievous to antiquaries, but it was a blessing for Cornwall.

The arguments which tell against bilingualism can also be used against other causes of separation, such as differences of religion. Morally and politically it must be matter of regret that Irishmen are set against each other by religious enmities, and that in Canada the French are taught to hold themselves apart from the Anglo-Saxon population. The issue which is desirable in Canada is that the two races should unite into a nation which is gifted with the best qualities of both. At present there seems but little tendency towards this, owing largely to clerical influence. The priests of Lower Canada who maintain the French-Canadian separateness are animated no doubt by respectable motives; but they are doing disservice to their country.

All this does not mean that national populations should be reduced to a featureless uniformity of speech, religion, or cultural character. Local individuality is precious, just as is personal individuality. I am only arguing that the differences should not be sharp enough to prevent social and political co-operation. No one wishes that Scotchmen should speak otherwise than with a Scottish accent, or that there should be complete religious uniformity all over England. These minor diversities help to make life interesting.

The desirability of union within a State has some bearing also upon another question of the day—that of alien immigration. 'Aliens,' in the full sense of the term, are persons of other races who come to settle among us, but do not share

fully in our culture. We cannot exclude foreigners completely, nor is it expedient that we should; but they ought, in a spiritual sense, to cease to be foreigners as soon as possible. If the alien is such a person that he cannot be assimilated to our population (by reason of colour or otherwise), he ought not to be admitted to permanent residence. This is not an important question in Great Britain; but it is in some of the British colonies. I think that the Australians and Canadians are right in excluding Orientals, whose importation has been encouraged by the employers who desire cheap labour.

§ 5. A community is also more likely to have an excellent political life if it has good cause for national pride. There are some virtues which cannot easily be cultivated in a small, poor, and isolated community, such as was Seriphus in the ancient world. A Seriphian is tempted either to despise and disown his country, or to find impossible excellences in it which excite strangers to ridicule. Seriphus ought to merge itself in some larger system.

For purposes of national self-respect it is desirable that a State should be of considerable fighting force; otherwise it does not suffice for its own protection. A very weak State suffers in self-respect, even if it is not in appreciable danger of being conquered by a powerful neighbour. For national pride it is desirable that a State should also have great historical and cultural traditions. Classical students know the admirable effect of such traditions upon the morality of the upper classes in Athens and Rome. A citizen belonging to a State of poor traditions must always have some sense of inferiority.

These considerations should influence our attitude towards some present-day questions of international politics. In particular, they tell against increasing the number of small States. I venture to think that there is much to regret in the 'balkanizing' process which resulted from the Great War, and that the movement for the formation of small new States was politically and morally mistaken. As for the separatist tendencies, such as those which appeared some time ago in the

Rhineland and are still influential in Bavaria and Catalonia, they cannot be too strongly condemned. Let us look at the matter in its effect upon European civilization. What does the world stand to gain from the establishment of all those little autonomous republics—Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia, Albania, and the rest—each clinging to its own uncouth national tongue and thereby cutting itself off from the main cultural systems of the world? There are seven or eight great languages in Europe, none of which could be extinguished without serious loss; but no good purpose is served by the preservation of a larger number. The proper destiny of a small nation is to federate itself with a great one; to share the glories and the pride of a wider system, and to provide for its ambitious men in every sort of activity opportunities for the display of their talents and for the formation of the virtues which are proper to commanding minds.

§ 6. The foregoing sections have attempted to give some indication of the kind of community which would be suited by the moral system outlined in the chapters which follow. By way of further preliminary to these chapters, I should like to speak of the general character of the system.

A moral system which would meet the needs of the best communities existing to-day cannot be of the proletarian type. A good example of a proletarian moral system may be found in Islam. Prof. D. S. Margoliouth, who speaks with the highest authority on all matters of Semitic learning, says (*Mohammedanism*, p. 146) that the morality which is enjoined by Islamic moralists may be summarized in the following list of virtues: "Humility, patience, gentleness, refinement of speech, giving good for evil, truthfulness, fidelity, sympathy, respect for poverty and misfortune, care for orphans, attention to the sick, condolence with the bereaved, the suppression of such passions as envy, malice, the desire to defame, and the desire to surpass." This list is remarkable as much for what it omits as for what it includes. There is nothing said about the patriotic virtues, although they are conspicuous in the better members of the near-

Eastern governing classes. On the other hand, those classes are in practice anything but remarkable for 'humility, patience, and gentleness.' The fact is that the moral teachers of Islam emphasized the virtues which alleviate the lot of the poor people living under a despotic government, and in which the governors themselves are lacking. It was the same in pre-revolution Russia. The moozheek professed his admiration for those virtues which are consistent with contentment in a poverty-stricken and obscure way of life. He had "an infinite pity for the poor, the unfortunate, the oppressed, the humbled, and all to whom fate has been unkind." (Paléologue, *An Ambassador's Memoirs*, i, 248.) His favourite devotional exclamation was "Gospodi, pomiloui"—O Lord, have mercy on me. It is true that many Russian noblemen also made profession of these moozheek virtues; but, it must be feared, they were prompted largely by a desire to keep their own moozheeks in a condition of meek subjection.

§ 7. These remarks are not meant to advocate a return to pagan morality. The pagan moral systems were formed in societies which were based on slavery, and in which women (largely because of slavery) were in a condition of strict subjection. They are totally unsuitable to modern conditions. A very well-known pagan system is set forth in Aristotle's *Ethics*. The virtues commended there are courage, temperance in respect of bodily pleasures, liberality in respect of dealing with property, magnificence or readiness to spend money upon a large scale, greatness of soul (which means a man's consciousness of worth and desire of honourable recognition when his worth is really great), moderation in anger, agreeableness and propriety in social intercourse, justice in giving each person his due share, the virtues which make a man a good friend, and zeal in the pursuit of knowledge. The last-named virtue, Aristotle lets us see very plainly, is more valuable than any other in his opinion. Long as Aristotle's list is, he misses out the most distinctive virtue of the ancient city-state—patriotism. It is implied everywhere both in him and in Plato, yet never expressly named. But, even if we add patriotism, Aristotle's system of virtues is

unsuitable to the modern world. It was meant for an Athenian gentleman, possessing leisure and high intelligence and raised far above all menial work, such as was Aristotle himself. Slaves, or persons engaged in work of a non-gentlemanly character, he regarded as quite excluded from the kind of life which he thought desirable. Women he does not mention at all.

It does not seem to be generally understood why the moral systems of pagan antiquity do not gain our approval, and what was the distinctive moral quality of paganism. The term 'pagan' suggests that the difference between modern and ancient systems of morality is due to religion. I think that religion may almost be left out of account here. In antiquity the most important fact for morals was the existence of slavery. In later antiquity the ill effects of slavery were aggravated by despotic political institutions. Throughout antiquity there existed more or less the principle of the subjection of women. These were the conditions which made ancient morality 'pagan.'

§ 8. The main characteristic of a proletarian moral system is that it recognizes benevolence as a virtue, but very little else. If, in any society, proletarian conditions prevail, the moral system which is generally accepted should be of that type; for, when there is sharp opposition between governing class and subject class, it is better that the accepted moral system should be one that commends itself to the subject class. This is because such a system is more favourable to moral reform. Moral reform consists mainly in changes leading to fuller recognition of the rights of the weaker members of the community. If the accepted system of virtues is one which embodies the ideas of the governing class, the outlook for reform is unfavourable. It is always difficult to get moral systems changed; and the difficulty is increased if the governing class has gained a well-established influence over teaching agencies and religious institutions. Aristotle's moral system was very dignified and admirable so far as it went, but it was of an unprogressive type. There would have been more hope of progress in his day if the accepted moral

system had been suitable to the needs of the poor people by whose labour he lived.

The moral system which we need to-day, I think, is one which would combine the best qualities of the Greek city-state with the benevolent virtues of Islam. Let it be well understood that benevolence is the primary virtue. Those who are wanting in sheer unreflecting goodwill towards their fellow-men lack the chief basis of moral goodness. But unreflecting virtues are not enough for a democratic society.

In a democracy there need be no opposition between governors and governed. When governments are free from popular control, they tend to be tyrannical, out of sympathy with the mass of the population, and non-benevolent; while the masses are indifferent to the public-spirited qualities which the ruling class possess, and exercise no restraint upon yielding to benevolent impulses. But a democracy is not like that; there the masses are in sympathy with the governing class, and will share its morality and its outlook, so far as opportunities allow.

At the present day no one advocates a moral system which is pagan, in the philosophic sense of the word. No one can read Plato and Aristotle without feeling that their systems are utterly impracticable for us. On the other hand, mere moozheek-morality is hardly less unsuited to a mature community. If carried out consistently, it must produce demoralization and ruin. Everywhere to-day benevolence needs to be informed and directed by patriotism.

CHAPTER III

COMMUNAL VIRTUES

(1) The communal virtues, of which benevolence and loyalty are the chief, are the most important elements of morality.

(2) Benevolence is the oldest and most important of all the virtues; in a mature community it should include an interest in the welfare of all classes.

(3) Loyalty, which implies many subordinate virtues, is indispensable to communal welfare; (4) as may be proved by a survey of occupations. (5) Loyalty has a controlling influence upon benevolence. (6) To strengthen loyalty is the chief moral problem of the age, (7) because of the progressive socializing of our institutions.

§ 1. THE qualities which I wish to designate by the term 'communal virtues' have no recognized collective name; but they are those which are specially important for community-life. By 'community-life' I mean the life and conversation which a person has outside his home. Thus the communal virtues are meant to be distinguished from the domestic virtues; and they are, of course, different from the self-regarding virtues. They are those qualities which cause a man to be regarded with affection by his neighbours in community-life, together with the qualities which make him a trustworthy comrade and efficient fellow-worker.

The communal virtues may be divided into two main groups—those of affection and those of action. The former group consists of kindly feeling towards our fellow-men, together with the subordinate qualities which are necessary to make the feeling effective. I propose to speak of this group by the general term 'benevolence.' Among the virtues of action the chief is loyalty. With loyalty should be associated other qualities which must be manifested by any servant who wishes to be really useful, differing according to the character of the service. A member of a fighting organization needs courage; an industrial worker needs

industry and honesty; every kind of subordinate needs fidelity.

The communal virtues seem to me to be the most important elements of morality; which is my chief reason for speaking of them first. There is a further reason, that they are older than the others. Aristotle thought that families and homes existed before men had learnt to live in wider forms of community. This cannot be maintained in view of modern research into human origins. Anthropologists are now convinced that primitive men lived in packs or groups long before they were in a position to acquire homes. In any case, I should be inclined to give priority to the communal virtues, because increase in one of them, loyalty, seems to me to be the chief moral need of our age.

The present book is merely an outline; the communal virtues alone would need a volume, if treated adequately. In what follows I will speak of little more than of benevolence and loyalty, paying but slight attention to the virtues which are subordinate to them. And what is said about benevolence and loyalty will be said specially with reference to the importance which those virtues have for a modern fully democratic community.

§ 2. Neither benevolence nor loyalty can be well understood unless we recognize that they have developed out of instincts which are much older than humanity itself. This is evidently true in regard to benevolence. All animals which live in herds have an instinct which makes them seek and take pleasure in the society of their fellows. It is natural, therefore, that they should have a kindly feeling towards each other; because such a feeling tends to keep the group together, whereas ill-feeling is disruptive. Elementary forms of it may be noticed in gregarious creatures such as horses and cattle, which have the habit of licking and caressing each other. In a domestic dog the affectionate sentiment which naturally is directed towards his pack-fellows is transferred to his human friends.

How does this instinctive benevolent feeling develop

into moral virtue? This is a speculative question which I hope to deal with later. At present I would only say that the change seems to come to pass when the agent recognizes intrinsic value in the objects towards which his benevolence is directed. We find this in human action so far as it can be called virtuous, but not below the human level.

Benevolence is the most important of all the virtues. This follows as soon as we recognize the communal or social character of morals; because benevolence is the most important condition of success in social co-operation. It is the quality which has most effect in promoting social welfare, and is most powerful in winning for a man the approval of his fellows. All this is so well recognized now that there is little need of expending argument upon it. It was not so in antiquity. The ancient moralists were weak in their recognition of benevolence. This is to be explained by the fact that the recognized system of virtues was formed by a governing class which was limited in its sympathies, owing to the prevalence of slavery. There was, of course, plenty of benevolence in antiquity, but philosophers did not do justice to it. Ample justice to it has been done since the establishment of Christianity, both by the currently accepted moral systems and by professional moralists.

For a mature community the benevolence which is most approved by currently accepted moral systems is hardly adequate; we need to-day something more than the unreflecting kindness that is enough for simple people. In particular, it is the citizens who occupy governing positions that have most need to systematize their benevolence; they must be careful to keep in view classes with which they have but little direct relation. Any individual, however wide his circle of acquaintance may be, comes into touch with only a limited number of his fellow-citizens. But he cannot fill his position adequately unless he enlarges his circle by an effort of imagination. The kindly feeling which desires the welfare of those immediately around him must be supplemented and modified by regard for multitudes who personally are utter strangers to him.

§ 3. Let us pass to the consideration of loyalty. It is secondary to benevolence; but I mean to speak of it more fully, in view of the special conditions of our time. The importance of loyalty has never been fully recognized by moralists in modern Europe. There are many reasons for this. The chief one is that it has been so much associated with war, and there has been in all Christian countries a tendency to exclude warlike virtues from the accepted moral system.

There are two main forms of loyalty—the personal and the corporate. The former comes first in the development of the individual. Young children show it in their appreciation of the elder persons who have charge of them. A good child 'looks up' to its father and mother; boys are loyal to their leaders. The quality is very conspicuous in the better sort of savages, who never fail to appreciate qualities of leadership in those who govern them.

Corporate loyalty is devotion to some institution of which the agent is a member. It appears in individuals later than the personal form; nevertheless personal loyalty and corporate loyalty are interdependent and grow together. Among subordinates the more intelligent always have a sense of corporate loyalty, as well as of loyalty to persons. Among elder men, who are well acquainted with the limitations of the individual, leaders are usually reverenced mainly as representing the institution which they direct.

Loyalty is, above all, a virtue of action. The acts by which it is manifested must change from age to age, according to what men have to do. In tribal days man's work was mostly hunting and fighting, and so the virtue was manifested mostly in situations of danger. When industry began to flourish, new opportunities arose for loyalty, directed both towards organizations and towards the chiefs of organizations. Loyal sentiments are absolutely indispensable for the success of every kind of institution; if they are wanting, no other motive, such as fear or cupidity, can replace them.

It is easy to see how in tribal life loyalty, in order to be effective, implies some other elementary virtues. Courage is

obviously needed for a loyal tribesman. So is veracity; at least, in the relations of tribesmen towards each other and towards their leaders. Fidelity, as opposed to fickleness, is evidently needed also; and so is staunchness, as opposed to readiness to be discouraged. And no subordinate is of much value unless he is conscientious; that is, unless he performs tasks to the best of his ability without close supervision, and is ashamed of slovenly execution. Zeal and industry are needed also; here we come to virtues which are specially important in societies where the works of peace are greater than those of war. There are various motives to industry in an employee; but not the least of them is loyalty to his employers and to the general body of workers associated with him.

§ 4. Let us quickly run over the occupations of upper-class Englishmen to show the indispensableness of loyalty and its associated virtues. A member of the fighting services needs them without question. The weakness of the position of our Army and Navy in this matter is that the units to which loyalty is mainly due, the nation and the Service, are very large and possess but little intrinsic unity. The mind has difficulty in grasping such great totalities, and the work of any one individual makes but little difference to the final result. Loyalty is more natural and more human when it is directed towards smaller objects, such as a ship or a battalion.

In the civil public services the need of these qualities is almost equally evident; though the courage required is the kind which is called 'moral' rather than 'physical.' If the public services continue to extend at their present rate, one of the problems which the statesmen of the future will encounter will be to constitute units of organization which will be well adapted to attract the devotion of those who work for them. The other chief liberal professions are education, the church, medicine, and law. Of these the first most plainly calls for social devotion, and is well adapted to the exercise of it. Where schools or colleges are of suitable size, are free from all taint of profiteering, are sincerely directed to good educational purposes, and pay fair wages to those who work for

them, conditions exist which demand and encourage all the qualities of loyal and efficient service. Churches encourage loyalty in very various degrees according to the methods by which they are organized. The medical profession has the weakness that it is too individualistic; each practitioner struggling along for himself, often in acute competition with a number of rivals. What keeps up the standard of the profession is the existence of a code of professional honour, which is enforced by central associations to which the individual feels allegiance. The legal profession is in the least favourable position. The bar is better organized than the lower branch, and has associations which are well suited for evoking loyalty; but the solicitor is almost entirely a struggle-for-lifer.

In commerce and industry our present system is still very individualistic, and there are not enough objects to which whole-hearted devotion can be given. It is, of course, quite possible to give loyal service to private firms and public companies; and indeed, unless men did serve in this way, any high commercial development would be impossible. But the position has moral difficulties both for employers and employees; because service is often inadequately rewarded, and the employer has to fear that an able employee will set up for himself and become a dangerous competitor. At the present day the air is full of proposals for reconstructing our economic system, which are commonly recommended by the increase in material welfare that is likely to ensue. That line of argument is certainly very sound and effective; but arguments of a moral character must also be allowed to have their due weight. The most numerous and most necessary institutions of a country are always those which are connected with the satisfaction of men's material wants. These institutions cannot have a good moral influence upon those who work in them unless they are well adapted to evoke sentiments of loyalty. And so long as reform in organization can be made to produce this result, efforts to improve these institutions will be a moral duty.

§ 5. As loyalty and benevolence both have their origin in

our communal manner of life, they cannot be generally opposed to each other. Nevertheless, they are related respectively to such different social requirements and to such different elements of personal psychology that they come into opposition upon occasion. Speaking generally, we may say that loyalty, supervening upon the older virtue and modifying it, exercises a controlling influence.

Any one can quote cases in which benevolent impulse must be restrained out of consideration for the common good. Policemen and soldiers are continually being required to do unpleasant things at the call of duty. It seems likely that in the future such exigencies will be recognized in the formation of our institutions more fully than they are at present. We have upon our hands grave problems connected with undesirables; a comprehensive class in which I mean to include criminals, defectives, persons diseased or predisposed to disease, and undesirable immigrants. Various policies have been adopted in the past: one (if it can be called a policy) was to do nothing until evils became intolerable; another, to act with savage repression, as when women were hung for shop-lifting; another, to act with indiscriminate benevolence. Science is hardly yet in a position to advise us confidently how to deal with the evils which everybody recognizes; when it is, a mature society is not likely to be deterred from acting for the common good by the protests of uninstructed humanitarians. Even now, great results might be achieved if measures were taken about which eugenical experts are well agreed; though, perhaps, our community is still hardly democratic enough for that. Democracy is the strongest of all governments, and can venture upon very drastic measures. But it must be a real democracy, not merely democratic in form.

§ 6. A time can never come when loyalty and the virtues which are subordinate to it will be obsolete. This is so even as regards the most primitive manifestation of loyalty, which is staunchness in the face of danger. For, though civilization may diminish certain kinds of dangers, yet there always will remain a number of dangerous tasks to be faced.

And in the future, perhaps, such tasks will not be pushed off on to some specialized class of men, such as professional soldiers, but will have to be faced by all classes of the community. As for the kind of loyalty which is manifested in the ordinary works of peace, it becomes more and more indispensable with the improvement of our political and social institutions.

If loyal feeling is not so strong in our society as it ought to be, this can be explained largely as a bad inheritance from the past. The sentiment should be directed towards all public institutions; upon the national state most of all, and then upon subordinate governing bodies, such as those of cities. Now, public institutions can attract devotion only if they themselves are highly moralized; that is, if they are set to subserve the moral good of the community. In the past this has not been so. On the contrary, they have subserved too much the selfish interests of rulers. A State such as that of France under Louis XV could evoke nothing but a feeble loyalty, because of its moral imperfections.

With ordinary people, the greatest part of their loyalty goes out towards the institutions through which they earn their living; for the most part, the institutions of industry. These also attract loyalty only so far as they are of a character to deserve it; and at present our industrial institutions leave much to be desired. Speaking broadly, we may say that the true function of merchants and manufacturers is to provide for the material needs of society. This is admirable work, and, if it is done in the right spirit and by the right methods, evokes an admirable form of loyalty. But it is not capable of doing so if the captains of industry are influenced too much by motives of private gain.

Every age has its own moral problems which are specially urgent at the time. Upon my interpretation, the chief moral problem of to-day is to increase loyalty. It is true that benevolence is no less indispensable. But that need is well recognized, and there are powerful agencies working to supply it. This is not so with loyalty.

§ 7. If we look towards the future, we must recognize an

ever-increasing need for loyalty directed towards the State. No one can deny that the functions of the State (or of subordinate bodies within the State) are increasing continually; not only for economic reasons, but for reasons of morality. We have quite got back to the Greek idea, that it is the business of the State to help us to live well by any means which may be in its power.

Concurrently we are witnessing a movement to socialize industry, or at least to regulate it elaborately in the public interest. By 'socialize' I do not mean necessarily that the State should in all cases take action, but that in various ways the element of private profit should be eliminated or greatly reduced. This process has already gone far, and is likely to go farther; though we cannot predict exactly how far. It needs for its success high qualities among those who work the system. The system will not prosper in the hands of grasping and narrow-minded men. The instinct of individual aggrandizement is very strong, especially in the vigorous races of the North, which are the chief hope of humanity. But it must somehow be brought under control.

Those who deplore the development of socialistic institutions are wont to predict that great evils may be expected to arise if we advance further along that path. Their predictions may come true, unless there is a moral improvement concurrent with the socializing process. The amount of public virtue at present in existence is hardly adequate to work such elaborate institutions. If a population is not on a high level morally and intellectually, relatively simple, individualistic institutions are best for it. Those who justify the existing socialistic tendency must hope for great moral progress in the future. There are good reasons for believing that the moral progress will be achieved; but it will not be achieved except through great and continuous efforts by those who have the public welfare at heart.

If it is desirable that moral progress should be made in any direction, the best hope lies in getting people to see the practical need of it; but much can be done by exhortation also. The traditions of our moral education are not wholly

favourable to including public spirit and loyalty among the virtues which are inculcated upon the young, and upon those who occupy subordinate positions in our social system. When war breaks out, there certainly is much exhortation producing excellent results. But what we need is a public spirit which is effective in the works of peace. We need that men should go about their daily work, in field, factory, shop, and counting-house, as well as in higher spheres, with the consciousness that they are public servants, and that right performance day by day of public duty is the most important moral element of their lives. From youth upward this should be explained and impressed upon them; and impressed not merely by the exhortation of words, but by the personal example of those who are the spiritual leaders of the community.

CHAPTER IV

DOMESTIC VIRTUES

(1) The domestic virtues depend much upon conditions of environment, (2) some of which are not realized everywhere even in Western Europe. (3) The domestic virtues of affection conduce directly to securing the welfare of the children; those of continence conduce to domestic tranquillity. (4) The affectionate domestic virtues are very important as elements of character. (5) Well-developed home-life is impossible except under a good political system, and therefore public duty should be put before domestic duty; (6) otherwise, moral evils arise. (7) On the other hand, a good political system is impossible without a high standard of domestic morality. (8) Because of the moral importance of the home, no class should be denied participation in good home-life.

§ 1. By the term 'domestic virtues' I mean, not exactly the virtues of 'home' in the strict sense, but those of the domesticated family. Home and family are not inseparable; it is due to the circumstances of life in our own country that we are inclined to identify them. Even in England there is a considerable percentage of families which have no home worthy of the name; while there are countless homes in which there is no element of family. But, since home and family are so closely connected in the English mind, it is permissible to apply the term 'domestic virtues' to qualities which are requisite for the successful conduct of a family living in a settled home. They are concerned mainly with the safeguarding of marriage and the rearing of children.

Those who deplore the development of socialistic institutions are wont to predict that great evils may be expected to arise if we advance further along that path. Their predictions may come true, unless there is a moral improvement concurrent with the socializing process. The amount of public virtue at present in existence

race, because the oldest men had no homes. The family itself is very ancient, having existed ever since the time when our remote ancestors began to have a protracted infancy, and therefore needed long parental care. Even early man had an infancy which was long compared with that of animals (though not so long as ours), because he needed much more intelligence to obtain his living. It is the nervous, not the muscular, system which needs many years for its growth. Even the most primitive marriages must have been more durable than pre-human unions. The most elementary condition of the domestic virtues, then, is that there should be children needing many years of parental care.

Another condition which also is elementary, but comes much later in the history of the race, is that the family should have a home. This is impossible for a wandering hunter, such as was primitive man. The Australian black-fellows of to-day are in this position, and therefore it is impossible for them to have home virtues. Nor are these virtues very easy for people who rely solely upon domesticated animals without recourse to agriculture, unless they have great facilities for transport to enable them to maintain a travelling home. Most of the homes of the world depend, directly or indirectly, upon agriculture, which affords a regular supply of food within easy reach of a fixed dwelling-place. The introduction of cultivated plants has had an immense influence upon morals, as upon other sides of human life.

For the full development of these virtues yet other conditions are needed. The climate must not be too favourable to the growth of food-plants, nor the temperature too genial; otherwise family affection loses much of its utility. This is so in some of the Pacific islands, where there is an easily-obtained abundance of simple food and the children run about naked. Though there is general friendliness among the islanders, the ties of affection between parents and children are much weaker than with us. For similar reasons there is in some countries a great slackening of the marriage relation, so that a person may be divorced and re-married twenty or thirty times without incurring social censure.

Climate also determines conditions of housing, which has much influence upon morals. In some mild climates, such as that of the Nicobar Islands, very little shelter is needed; the people have no separate homes in our sense, and no domestic privacy. And therefore, though they are very amiable, they are weak in respect of continence.

§ 2. The most favourable conditions for home-life prevail in such countries as those of Western Europe to-day; where the children are slow in growing up, because high intelligence is needed to obtain a good living; where an ample supply of food and wealth can be obtained, provided that people have the necessary abilities; and where the climate is severe, so that good clothing and housing are necessary for welfare. In such countries marriages must be durable, and great care must be expended on rearing children if they are to grow up well.

But even in Western Europe these conditions are often wanting. For various reasons, mostly economic, many families have no settled home, or are compelled to change their abode more frequently than is good for them. Many families have insufficient incomes, or get their income irregularly and precariously. Others are housed under such conditions that they have little privacy or pride in their dwelling-place. This lowers the general level of domestic virtue. We cannot expect children to be well trained for home-life who grow up in barges or are continually on the move like travelling tinkers; whose parents never know what their next week's earnings are going to be, and must grudge every penny spent for purposes of culture; or who live crowded into a single room under conditions which the upper-classes regard as horribly indecent.

Persons subjected to such conditions cannot be expected to profit greatly by moral exhortation. The pulpit-preacher has not much opportunity of usefulness so long as his hearers are suffering from a bad material environment.

§ 3. Let us concentrate attention upon the more important of the domestic virtues—those whose function is to secure the welfare of the children. They fall into two groups—the virtues

of affection and those of continence. As regards the former, it may be said, generally speaking, that affection towards children prevails in any country in proportion as the children need it. Dr. Pruen, speaking of the natives of East Africa, remarks (*Arab and African*, p. 156) that half of their children might die of epidemic disease without any one feeling deep concern. This is not evidence of natural depravity, but only of the easiness and simplicity of vital conditions in East Africa. In civilized communities affection is bestowed upon children in proportion as they need long and careful training for citizenship. Together with strong affection, parents who take their duties seriously need steady principles of conduct to carry them through their manifold labours and vexations. For, though children are in most aspects very charming, they are also very fatiguing to their elders.

The domestic virtues which consist in continence tend to the same result, but in an indirect way. They are necessary for the maintenance of affection between the spouses, which is essential for the proper performance of parental duties. The need of continence depends upon the fact of sexual jealousy, which, if aroused, is fatal to domestic peace; in common phrase, 'it breaks up the home.' Persons who have no home or a very poor one, no children or no need to give close attention to the children, are wanting in some of the strongest motives which induce men to maintain continence.

§ 4. The affections which exist between spouses and between parents and children are very important for character—a fact which is now well recognized by students of human nature. Their influence cannot be expressed adequately by any enumeration of definite qualities. It consists mainly in the fact that family relationships make persons more sympathetic and sensitive, and establish the habit of thinking about and understanding other minds. The humanizing influence of family affection is felt by both parents, and more especially by the mother, from whose mind the welfare of children and husband ought never to be wholly absent. As regards the children, experience of an affectionate home-life is the most important formative influence in their lives; and

nothing can give adequate compensation to those unfortunates who are deprived of it. It is utterly impossible to rear children satisfactorily in orphanages or other barrack-like institutions. This consideration has weight in the controversy of boarding-schools versus day-schools. The young Englishman, who has been educated on the plan which is customary in our upper-class families, may be very patriotic and self-respecting, but is often lacking in domestic qualities.

Another reason for the moralizing influence of home-life is that it increases the influence of women. It is characteristic of a good home that it should be both comfortable and beautiful. Both these elements depend mainly upon the wife, because the work of the husband naturally lies outside the home. Most civilized men have strong appreciation of a good home, and consequently of the type of woman who is able to make one. When men live without homes, as tribes of wandering hunters do, women are but slightly regarded. Their power increases greatly when homes are established, and therefore much more attention is paid to female claims and preferences. What this means for matters of morality may be learned by studying civilized men who live under non-domestic conditions, as in camps or ships of war.

The moral value of family life is so great that long-continued celibacy always brings grave moral danger. The chief danger which I now have in view is not that of slackness and incontinence, but rather that which consists in a hardening and drying up of character, which is even more deplorable. Men are considerably affected in this way, and women even more so, because marriage and parenthood mean more to them. In a hard-hearted and careless world celibate women as they grow old are objects of ridicule and dislike; but all serious minds recognize the pathos of their condition. In savage societies there is no celibacy, and so they are free of one great source of misery and danger; in civilized societies, mainly owing to economic causes, there is a great deal. This is one of the many evils incident to progress in civilization, which a further advance may eliminate in course of time.

§ 5. Very simple homes, such as the huts of African negroes, can exist without the need of any considerable political organization, though they are always liable to be broken up by invaders unless a strong State exists to protect them. But wealthy and comfortable homes, such as we have in England, are impossible without a highly developed social and political system. The State is evidently needed for protection against external and internal enemies; it is also needed for the mere production of wealth. A community cannot be very wealthy unless it has an elaborate currency system, efficient protection of life and property, and good means of transport and communication. All this cannot be enjoyed except by means of government.

For these various reasons the domestic virtues, very important though they are, are subordinate to the communal virtues. It is a great misfortune that a man should be wanting in domesticity, so that he is not a good husband and father and does not appreciate the amenities of home-life; but it is a still greater misfortune if he is destitute of public spirit, and if he is cowardly, untruthful, and untrustworthy in his dealings outside the home.

The true relation between communal and domestic morality is obscured when social institutions are not so good as they ought to be. When the State is very large and there are no adequate means for bringing it vividly to the consciousness of the people, or when it is perverted to selfish purposes, or when the systems of commerce and industry are pervaded with trickery and bitterness, men tend to withdraw into the home, where they can preserve a relatively pure, though narrow, virtue. The climate of Northern Europe also tends to drive men indoors, when they want to be comfortable. And for various reasons we in England are somewhat lacking in places where men can be comfortable and easy and can gather together to talk rationally about matters of common interest. The ancient Greeks spent much of their time lounging and gossiping in the market-place. This did not conduce to industry or energy, but did conduce to some excellent communal virtues.

§ 6. It is important therefore that we should have a proper adjustment between communal and domestic morality. To those who neglect the State for the home it must be pointed out that family life, though it encourages most important virtues, may also be an occasion of vice. According to a well-known proverb, a family-man is capable of anything. There is no meanness, no injustice, no cruelty to which anxiety for family welfare may not impel a man; and, in the present ill-organized condition of society, he is often hardly to be blamed. In the Great War, which found a large part of the nation without any proper conception of public duty, such men were food-hoarders, or took advantage to profiteer and grow rich upon the public distress.

An excessive development of acquisitiveness is the chief vice which springs up under the conditions of family life. This instinct can hardly appear in man before the establishment of homes. Its primary usefulness is to impel men to collect things which have value for the purposes of the home, subserve the material wants of its inmates, and make it comfortable and beautiful. But the acquisition of wealth is prompted also by other natural motives, such as love of power and vanity. Now, in its proper place, the instinct of acquisition is most salutary and indispensable; the communists who desire to abolish it are wanting in psychological knowledge. But it can be abused, like any other instinct; in fact, it is the widespread abuse of it in certain countries that explains the spread of communistic doctrines. In some natures of lower quality the acquisitive tendency, which in its due measure is praiseworthy, degenerates into the vice of avarice; in its higher forms it merges into the love of power, and those who give way to it continue to grasp and accumulate without knowing exactly why—certainly long after the point at which individual accumulation benefits the community.

Moreover, it is a condition of family welfare that the parents should 'make provision' for the children. Among simple people this means supplying their wants till they are in a position to shift for themselves; in fully civilized con-

ditions it means furnishing them with an endowment which may help them to qualify for high-class employment. The abuse of this tendency is in endowing the children so that they need to do no work at all; a position which produces moral evils both for those who have the wealth, and for the rest of the community who are stinted of their proper share.

§ 7. But on the other side it must be noted that, under such conditions as prevail in this country, it is impossible to have good community-life unless there is a high level of home-life. Nothing can take the place of the home as an institute of early education. As civilization advances, more intelligence is needed from the individual. This implies a prolongation of infancy, and therefore strengthens the influence of the home. All educators are now agreed upon the extreme importance of the years of infancy, even of those previous to the kindergarten age.

Owing to fault or misfortune, a considerable number of children are reared without a proper home life. The effects are specially injurious in the case of girls. This is shown very plainly by investigations into the cases of those who have suffered moral shipwreck, which seems to be due mainly to want of maternal care. Such is the conclusion of observers who have studied our female prison population. Now it needs no argument to show that a good community is impossible without virtuous women.

Upon grown men the effect of undertaking family responsibilities is to improve them as citizens upon the whole. They generally become more industrious and steadier. Young men have a natural tendency to roving which is very salutary at its proper season, but may be continued too long; marriage usually puts an end to it. Children instinctively dislike roving, and grow up best in a fixed habitation occupied continuously for many years. Domestic interest ought also to increase a man's interest in public affairs. A childless person, when he begins to age, tends to lose interest in the world, because he has no share in the new generation. It must be admitted that in poorly endowed characters domesticity has an opposite effect and makes them lose the little

public interest which they formerly possessed. But better-natured men will not feel the temptation of becoming too much absorbed in home-life, and, indeed, will find in the home new motives of zeal for public duty.

§ 8. The foregoing theoretical considerations have obvious application to the circumstances of the present time. It is necessary to the moral welfare of the community that all classes should have opportunity of family-life under such conditions as make possible the proper development of the family virtues. Some of the people who suffer deprivation in this respect are the salaried persons who occupy genteel positions, but are not sufficiently well paid to make marriage possible. Such are the assistant-masters in our smaller public schools, whose evil case is depicted so vividly in Mr. Hugh Walpole's novel, *Mr. Perrin and Mr. Traill*. There is much to be said for some lateness of marriage among upper-class young men; it gives them a most powerful incentive to exertion. But to put marriage hopelessly out of their reach is very injurious morally.

For such evils the directing classes have remedies which are not difficult to come by; the matter is different with the hand-working class. Many causes are in operation which impair home-life for them and deprive it of a great part of its moral value; among them are low wages, irregular wages, spells of unemployment, an unsettled or wandering way of life, and over-crowding. Poverty and bad housing are the great enemies of the home. Some of those evils are due to faults in the sufferers; but a greater part are due to causes over which they have no control, and can be removed only in the face of very strong opposition from vested interests. The conscience of the nation has now at last become fully awakened to these evils; considerable efforts have been made to relieve them, and will be made increasingly in the future.

Parallel to this change in our English accepted moral system there has been a change in political principles. Two generations ago politicians took their stand upon freedom of contract. They assumed that if a man chooses to accept very low wages, live and sleep with his family in a cellar, or

do anything else to degrade himself and his dependants, he should be allowed to do it; and could not be restrained from doing it without gross infringement of personal liberty. The view which now is coming to prevail is one which looks to the moral consequences of such actions. If wages in any industry are so low or so irregular that a proper home-life cannot be maintained upon them, some steps should be taken to correct the situation. It should not be lawful either to offer such wages or to accept them. To put the matter into other words, a full understanding of the moral value of the home is inconsistent with a *laissez-faire* attitude in political and social questions. If the mass of the population can acquire good homes without the contrivances of statesmanship, let them do so. If not, contrivance must be used. And no supposed principle or vested interest should be permitted to block the way—neither the alleged laws of political economy, nor maintenance of the principle of free trade, nor respect for the rights of property. The rights of property are always less important than the rights of man.

CHAPTER V

SELF-RESPECT

(1) The self-regarding virtues, which may all be regarded as forms of self-respect, are also necessary for a mature community. (2) They are different from prudence. (3) Self-respect, though not directly communal, can arise only in community life. (4) It conduces to moral consistency (5) and to self-cultivation. (6) Citizens who are injured in their self-respect cannot have loyal sentiments towards the community.

§ 1. THERE is yet a third main group of virtues which are necessary to the character of the democratic citizen, the self-regarding or self-respecting virtues. They are different from the two other groups considered in the two preceding chapters, in that they are not outward-looking or directed upon objects outside the agent, but are concerned rather with the agent's self. The self-respecting man is interested in himself as an intrinsically valuable being, knows his own value, and is resolved to maintain it. His attitude is a sort of higher egoism or pride.

There are various self-regarding virtues, corresponding to the ways in which a man may be interested in himself as intrinsically valuable or excellent. The simplest and commonest is physical interest; care of the person as a beautiful object, or as exhibiting strength and efficiency. Closely allied to this is care for and pride in the home, which is very common among women. Another sort of self-regarding virtue is intellectual; a man who is fond of learning is generally proud of his acquisitions. The most important from the present point of view is moral pride. This may easily degenerate into an odious self-complacency or pharisaism; but in its due degree it is quite indispensable for the full development of human character.

There is no adequate recognized name for this group of

virtues; but we shall not go far wrong if we speak of them collectively as 'self-respect,' a term which has not the unfavourable associations that attach to 'pride.' Beside the more important forms of self-respect in regard to morality, matters of intellect, and care of the body, we see the quality manifested also in speech, manners, bearing, and in all the external circumstances of life.

§ 2. The self-regarding attitude, so far as it is virtuous, seems to me to be quite different from prudence. I doubt, indeed, if prudence ought to be reckoned as a moral virtue; it is a desirable quality, but not a moral quality, Here I venture to differ from some eminent authorities. Butler, in treating of moral qualities, gave the first place to 'self-love,' Bentham to 'prudence,' Herbert Spencer to 'egoism.' Common sense, however, does not uphold them. We esteem a man as virtuous who takes care of the health and safety of others; but in ordinary cases a man claims no moral merit on the ground that he takes good care of himself. We are all impelled to prudential conduct by motives which are extraneous to morality, and are indeed common to the whole animal creation. The cases in which prudential conduct has a moral value are those in which a man is genuinely influenced by social or quasi-social motives; as when a man gives up some dangerous amusement, such as Alpine climbing, for the sake of his family.

A similar view should be taken of the higher or more social sort of egoisms, such as the love of praise and ambition generally. These are experiences which are felt in some degree by the higher animals. Dogs, for example, enjoy praise and marks of approbation. Perhaps they even feel a sort of ambition, in being eager to lead their pack when they have abilities which qualify them for leading. In gifted persons ambition is a good quality, but not a virtue; nor is the want of it a vice. On the whole, it is morally neutral. In opposition to a once widely prevalent opinion, I do not think that we can count it as virtuous in a man that he prefers an obscure and humble way of life. In a good society, we like to see able men aspiring to a high sphere of

usefulness; though the motives impelling them thereto will usually be powerful enough without the need of moral exhortation.

What should prevent us from reckoning prudence as a virtue is that there is no element of valuation in it. A man does not take care of his life because it is intrinsically valuable, any more than a dog does. Nor is there any valuation in elementary ambition and love of praise. But in all self-regarding virtue (as I understand the term) a man views himself and his qualities as having value, apart from the fact that they are his.

§ 3. Although the self-regarding virtues are not directly communal, they can arise and work only in close relation to community-life. Self-respect of any kind is hardly conceivable out of relation to society. It is wanting in very young children, and is developed only in a lower form among very simple people, especially those who, like savages, live in rudimentary social conditions. There are two factors which seem to be necessary to the growth of self-respect. The main one is that the agent should be conscious of himself as making a valuable contribution to the social system of which he forms part. But, moreover, it is necessary for an ordinary man that his neighbours also should view him as valuable in the same relation. Very rarely is a man who is despised by his fellows able to enjoy self-respect; and, when he can, he is usually sustained by religion.

The degree to which the virtue of self-respect pervades a community must depend mainly upon its social and political arrangements and organization. It is not easy for people to have high self-respect if they are very poor, or very ignorant, or have no share in the government by which they are ruled. A man is always self-respecting if he belongs to some fine organization where he has work which is responsible, well appreciated, and adequately paid, and where he has some share in the management of the organization.

§ 4. Advanced institutions cannot be worked by a community whose members are lacking in self-respect. The obvious utility of it is to be a steadying and regulating

influence, giving consistency to the individual's moral life. It works like a fly-wheel in a piece of machinery: our outward-looking appreciations and devotions furnish the impelling energy; self-respect carries on the working of the system in the intervals between the impulses.

Very simple people are greatly wanting in moral steadiness. A negro, for example, may show admirable traits of devotion and courage, but may yield to minor temptations in a way which to us is almost incredible. A striking example of this occurred in one of H. M. Stanley's African expeditions: the very best of his black subordinates, who had behaved splendidly for years, was convicted of petty theft towards the end of the expedition. A Spanish proverb current in the Philippines says, "Never trust an Indian." There are plenty of good Indians, but very few whose goodness is thoroughly consistent.

In an advanced society it is necessary that there should be a high level of consistency among the citizens. Our country to-day, and still more our country as one hopes it will be in the future, has need of citizens who will work faithfully without the need of constant supervision. In a social organization which is very complex, rigid supervision is impossible. The case is the same as in modern warfare, where mass-action has grown out of date, and much must be left to the individual soldier. In modern fighting the individual can always fight badly, if he will; so that armies are almost useless unless they are pervaded throughout by an excellent *moral*. There is need of consistency also for citizens who mean to co-operate in the work of government. Every one recognizes that for the officer-class in all services a high standard of honour is required. So far as the governed co-operate with the governors, they also assume governing functions and must have governing virtues.

§ 5. For a mature community it is necessary also that the citizens should be interested in self-cultivation. It is only under conditions of social immaturity that men are willing to stay contentedly in some small field of work beyond which they do not look. This spirit of limitation will not suffice for

a high type of citizenship. In order to perform adequately their civic functions, the members of a good State must know much more than suffices for bread-winning. They need the kind of knowledge which is tested by a general-knowledge paper such as is set in high-schools, and much else besides; since self-cultivation not only means knowing things, but ability to do them. For all this no definite prescriptions can be given. There must be diffused a desire to learn things intellectually and to do them practically. What accomplishments any individual will choose to acquire must depend upon his personal taste and opportunity.

It goes without argument that men will not do all this if they have no other motive but public duty. There must be a strong natural inclination prompting them to measures of self-improvement. Such is the personal pride which men feel in extending their powers and excellences. In youth this interest will probably be concerned to a large degree with physique, or with matters of an æsthetic character. As we advance in life we come to think more of qualities for which mature men are valued; for technical skill, organizing ability, or learning. The latter sort of interest is one on which the world looks very kindly, and which is inexhaustible. The man of learning never feels that he has learned enough. And, so long as his intellectual zeal is controlled by regard for public interest, his knowledge will make him a better citizen.

§ 6. Unless the masses of the population enjoy such a position that they can have self-respect, they are not likely to entertain loyal sentiments for the community to which they belong. The happiness of the individual requires that he should stand in satisfactory relations with his fellow-men; he must be assured that he is well thought of by those with whom he works; otherwise he feels himself in a position of inferiority, and it is hardly possible for him to be happy. If the prevalent social system is such as to make self-respect difficult for a man, he is not likely to feel kindly disposed towards it. During the Middle Ages there was in the south-west of France an unfortunate race or tribe called Cagots, distinguished from

the rest of the population by blue eyes and fair complexions. They were treated as pariahs and vile creatures, being forbidden even to walk barefoot on the highways, lest the touch of their skin should spread pollution. The Revolution, with its salutary doctrine of the rights of man, put an end to this cruelty, and the Cagots became merged in the rest of the population. It is difficult to suppose that, before they were thus admitted to full citizenship, they can have felt any affection for France.

The relationship between the community and the individuals or classes which compose it must be two-sided. If the community asks for loyal service, it must treat citizens, individually and as classes, with justice, and allow them due consideration. Those who suffer from injustice exaggerate the faults of the community and depreciate its virtues. But very rarely is a man unresponsive to the claims of public duty who feels assured that his fellow-citizens appreciate his personal worth.

CHAPTER VI

WIDER INTERESTS

(1) It is expedient that men should have interests which extend beyond their own community; namely, religious and international interests. (2) Such wider interests should enhance their appreciation of the community to which they belong.

§ 1. THOUGH men's chief interests naturally lie within the political community to which they belong, and are directed mainly towards State, family, and profession, it is expedient that they should have other interests which are wider even than the State. A civilized man should have some interest in the universe as a whole, and a citizen of a mature community should be interested in foreign nations. In fact, without such interests, members of the governing class, at least, can hardly perform their civic duties with full efficiency.

The widest of human interests, the cosmic interest, may take the form of philosophy; but usually it is religious. Our appreciation of the State does not depend upon religion, and can in fact be maintained without support from religion; but it ought to be strengthened by religion. Great and imposing as the State is, it shares the weakness of all human things. Modern astronomy and geology have brought home to our minds the littleness and transience of our works and institutions. If we can believe in a cosmic being who is favourable to a good political life, if we can believe in a cosmic purpose towards which our efforts make some contribution, then our mundane duties gain in dignity, and something should be added to the zeal with which we perform them.

In a mature community it is desirable also that an 'international' interest should be widely diffused, at least among the members of the directing class. By this I mean an interest in the qualities of other nations, and in their welfare as members of civilized humanity.

Interest in foreign ideas and institutions has always been an important factor in progress. Its influence can be observed very plainly at the present time, now that ideas pass readily from one country to another by means of books and newspapers. If in one civilized country a good institution is developed, such as the Boy Scout movement, it is quickly copied in other countries; in this way British parliamentary institutions have spread all over the world. But, much as foreigners have learned from us, we also have much to learn from them.

A great practical opportunity of expressing interest in international welfare is now afforded by the League of Nations. In its origin the League had the prudential purpose of securing peace; but in the future probably it will work to secure as many advantages of all kinds as are within the power of an international organization. Great benefits, both moral and material, may be expected from this source, especially in raising the standard of life among the hand-workers throughout the civilized world.

§ 2. Both towards the cosmic interests of philosophy and religion and towards international interests there is an attitude of mind which is appropriate to a mature community, but is difficult elsewhere.

In an immature community there is a tendency for philosophy and religion to cause men to withdraw themselves from the world. We find this universally in the East from the earliest times to the present day; we find it in antiquity, most noticeably in the latest period when the political outlook in the Roman Empire became really hopeless. It was very common in the Middle Ages also, in such careers as those of St. Bernard and St. Francis. The Middle Ages were full of barbarous violence and vice. Everywhere throughout medieval Europe there was opposition between the ideas of men of the world and the ideas of those who aspired to lead the highest kind of spiritual life. It was right for the latter to make their protest against the world, and even to make it without the reservations which would be desirable to-day. The anti-mundane ways of life chosen by St. Bernard and

St. Francis were, perhaps, the most helpful to good causes under the conditions of their times. But in a society whose institutions are good there ought to be no opposition between cosmic interest and interest in current affairs; neither the philosopher nor the man of religion needs to feel that he is imperilling his spiritual health by performing his civic duties. To Plato it would have seemed impossible that religion and patriotism could ever be in any relation other than one of close alliance. Thus it was also in ancient Israel. And so, we may hope, it will be in Europe in the not distant future, even if the time for it has not already come.

In a mature society there are some powerful causes inducing a friendly feeling towards neighbouring nations, and no causes to provoke hostility. The matter is otherwise under conditions of political immaturity. Despotisms and oligarchies are warlike; they are systems of government under which conquests are made, and tribes are consolidated into nations. So long as the national governments of Europe were organized thus, their normal relationship was sure to be one of hostility or suspicion. The only sort of despotic empire which is not continually thinking of war is one which, like the Roman Empire, has conquered all the desirable lands within its reach.

Democracy, on the other hand, is naturally pacific, whether in a small State or in a large one. Intelligent working-men are not usually prejudiced against foreigners, because they live by trades which thrive under a system of free international exchange; while a democratic upper-class is not war-like, because it stands to lose heavily by war and usually takes an intelligent interest in alien literatures and cultures. Under the conditions which prevail to-day, a war between two great European States must involve sacrifices in lives and in wealth which will affect every family from the highest to the lowest. This ensures the existence of a powerful public opinion against war. Under a truly democratic political system there is nothing to prevent this public opinion from having its full effect.

The result should be an attitude which has the advantages

without the disadvantages of cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitan has overcome insularity, but he has also lost interest in his own country. This means that he must be a poor creature both morally and intellectually. Acquaintance with other nations ought rather to be of such a kind as to enhance appreciation of one's own. "What do they know of England who only England know?" It is by observing other countries that we realize the value of the institutions under which we live. They help us also to see our faults, and to adopt the proper methods of eliminating them.

CHAPTER VII

LEADERSHIP

(1) A mature community needs a governing class which has the natural qualities of leadership in a well-moralized form. (2) A good governing class should also have both strong State-consciousness and a sympathetic understanding of other minds, (3) and should appreciate gifts of original intelligence.

§ 1. So far I have been speaking of qualities which are desirable for all members of the community; in the present chapter and in the next I wish to say something about qualities which are specially desirable for members of the governing class, though other citizens also should have a good share of them.

But the question may be raised, Do we really need a distinct governing class? I think that we do; at the present day, no less than in the past. Democracy is government for the people, but it is not government by the people. The people can no more govern than they can educate, or pursue scientific research; there must be special classes for these special pursuits. Nor will there ever cease to be need of government. The early Stoics thought otherwise; and so did Godwin and Shelley, and in our own time Tolstoy and Kropotkin. But anarchist views are out of date now, even in Russia. As men progress, their lives need to be ever more carefully arranged, and public welfare will depend increasingly upon the governing class.

Next for the qualities which are needed by an efficient governing class. Consider first leadership in action. This is always the chief kind of leadership, and is much older than leadership in ideas. The active leader must have certain natural gifts—wide-reaching and quick intelligence, firmness, courage, and insight into the minds of others. But these gifts must be moralized by the spirit of public devotion.

The leader must also desire to bring his gifts into action in a suitable position. Ambition in a crude form is not to be admired; but when it is moralized it deserves a place among the manly virtues.

An idea is current, for which literary men are largely responsible, that leadership qualities are at their best under despotisms and oligarchies. Carlyle and Mr. Kipling are specially chargeable with this delusion; for delusion I think it is. The reason, no doubt, is that under non-democratic conditions leadership is so much more spectacular. By circumstances of outward pomp, Louis XIV, for example, got the world to believe that he was an incomparable leader; and the ex-Emperor William was also a practitioner in the same line. The fact seems to be rather that mature political conditions are much more favourable to leadership, because then the moral encouragements connected with it are greater and the temptations less.

In immature societies men of the governing class are exposed to severe temptations, to which they usually have succumbed. Not being duly controlled by the classes which are governed, they have not been content with moderate and appropriate rewards: they have grasped excessively at wealth; they have exacted adulation from their subjects; they have made the office of governor hereditary in their own families, and so have exposed the community to the dangers of incompetent direction. All these are faults which impair the power of governing. There is much less temptation to them under a democratic system.

A perception of these moral dangers, and of the difficulty, one may even say the impossibility, of evading them, has made moralists in the past speak against ambition and denounce the ways of life which are prevalent among the governing class. But the influence of exhortation should be directed rather towards urging young people to take their proper share in leadership. This may not be inconsistent with maintaining the virtues of humility and obedience, so far as those qualities are really virtuous. Spinoza said, *humilitas non est virtus*; and we may agree with him if humility is to

be an attitude of mind which has reference to the agent's whole field of activity. But a leading citizen, who would not be called humble upon the whole, may be conscious that he has imperfections, and be willing to accept correction so far as it will increase his efficiency. As for obedience, it is learned best by serving apprenticeship for the position of leader.

Though leadership qualities are specially desirable in the governing class, they ought to be widely diffused throughout the population. Despotic institutions, however, have the contrary effect. It is one of their great faults that they lower the manly qualities of those who are subjected to them. This may be observed on a small scale in families where a tyrannical parent always has a depressing influence upon the character of the children. Frederick the Great said at the end of his life that he was tired of ruling over a nation of slaves; but with the Prussian system of government and his own style of behaviour to subordinates he could not expect his subjects to hold themselves as free men.

§ 2. It is worth while to say something also about one or two other qualities which are necessary for a good governing class. The most important of them is a strong consciousness of the State. A State-blind governing class is both absurd and horrible. It might not be easy to find an example of one in Europe to-day, but there have been plenty in the past; for instance, the Polish nobility, which insisted on the privilege of *liberum veto*, and so destroyed the political existence of the nation. There was also much State-blindness among the nobility of France before the Revolution, and in that of Russia before the Great War.

Now this fault is never found in an intelligent democracy. Proletariats have it, as we know from the example of Russia, no less than short-sighted aristocracies. But when the mass of a nation is politically well educated its national consciousness usually errs, if at all, on the side of excess. In England our governors at present cannot justly be reproached with indifference to the State. The fault is to be found, rather, among the commercial classes. Business men need frequently

to be reminded that sectional profits must be subordinated to national welfare.

It is also requisite for governors that they should have the faculty of understanding and appreciating the minds of various sorts of men; not only those who are similar to themselves, but also men who are engaged in widely different spheres of life. A great help to this is education, which widens our sympathies and quickens our powers of understanding. It is high education that explains the success in the arts of governing which has been achieved by the highest grade of our Civil Services, both at home and abroad. Ill-educated people are inclined to be tactless and harsh towards those who are under their power.

Even more helpful to governors is freedom from class-prejudice. This can come only to those who recognize that the State has need of many various services, and that every sort of work which is done for the common good is respectable and gives the worker a claim to sympathetic consideration.

§ 3. With the division of labour, which is necessary in highly civilized communities, there has come into being a new sort of leadership—leadership in ideas. This is not to be found in primitive societies, nor even in societies at the level of Homer. Primitively, thought is most intimately conjoined with action; there is no appreciation of intellectual work except in direct preparation for action. The Homeric heroes appreciated Nestor, but they would have had no use for Socrates. Things are different in a complex society. Men arise who have plans and ideas for improvements in the community, though they may not be able to carry them into effect personally. This sort of leadership has been very important in modern Europe. On all matters of public interest, such as politics, social organization, religion, and education, ingenious men have invented ideas and have cast them forth in the hope that they may influence men of action. Bentham spent his whole life thus. Such men were rare in his day, but there have been many since; Carlyle, Ruskin, and William Morris among the number. These were intellectual leaders of gigantic stature; but lesser men are always

attempting the same kind of service, according to their powers.

It cannot be said that the qualities of intellectual leadership have been fully appreciated in the past, either by the powers of the spirit or by the powers of the world. Accepted moral systems have made no mention of such qualities; nor have preachers held up such careers for imitation. The governing classes everywhere have been definitely hostile; in England Bentham, Carlyle, Ruskin, and William Morris were very unpopular with the high society of their day, and had a hard struggle to secure a hearing. This shows that high society had much to fear from thinking men; it had a well-grounded apprehension that when the masses came under the influence of new ideas their submissiveness would be diminished.

In a mature community the governors have nothing to fear from any proposals which conduce to public welfare. Perhaps in the future there will be some public organization, similar to the Inventions Board during the War, with the duty of examining and reporting upon proposals of reform. The difficulty then will be, not to convert our governors, but to educate public opinion to the point where reforms may safely be introduced. The masses are naturally conservative, and, so long as they are reasonably prosperous, walk contentedly along the old paths. The governing class will then no longer act the part of wet-blanket or exterminator of heresy, but rather that of public educator. If that time ever does arrive, the men of ideas will come fully into their own at last.

CHAPTER VIII

CRITICISM

(1) Civilized communities have need of criticism for purposes of reform; (2) and therefore the critical attitude of mind should be encouraged.

§ 1. DEMOCRACY is a system which is eminent for adaptability. A truly democratic governing class is one which regards institutions and principles of conduct as being made for the commonwealth, and not *vice versa*. Without being in the least fickle and fond of mere novelty, it is ready to adopt reforms when the balance of argument is in their favour, and to give up ideas which have gone out of date. The case is otherwise in less mature communities. An oligarchic governing class is usually wanting in imagination, and that alone obstructs reform. Moreover, in all immature communities there are great numbers of people who have vested interests in the established order, and treat a reformer as a villain who is attacking their livelihood. The resistance of vested interests is bitterest when pecuniary motives are strengthened by religion. It was the shrine-makers of Ephesus who stirred up the pagan multitude against St. Paul.

But, it may be asked, why do we need so much change? Why discard the old institutions and ideas? The answer is that there is continual change in the conditions under which we live. The most important of these are connected with the supply of food. There have been countries where the food supply could not be made plentiful. Such a country was primitive Australia: having by nature no cultivable plants nor domesticable animals, the Australian blacks were compelled to remain stationary on a very low level of savagery. Primitive England could not have risen far in the cultural

scale if wheat, cattle, and horses had not been introduced from eastward lands. In our own time, as food becomes more plentiful and easier to get, as the supply of useful articles is enlarged, as inventions multiply, and as the wealth-producing abilities of the population increase, changes must occur both in the production and in the distribution of wealth. This makes a deep alteration in every part of our social life, and therefore changes are called for in all our ideas and institutions.

Most of the changes which are needed come about by a process of unnoticed adjustment which is almost like organic growth; others are made by deliberate purpose and contrivance. In primitive societies there is very little deliberate contrivance; but much is needed in modern complicated States. No one can doubt this who considers some of the modern efforts of constructive statesmanship; such as the constitutions of the British self-governing colonies and of the present German *Reich*, and the recently-established institutions in British India. There is endless opportunity for contrivance in the reform of our social institutions in England. Now, wherever there is need of change there is need of criticism, and most of all when the changes are made by contrivance.

Much of the criticism which society requires has a destructive function. There are not a few institutions which should be abolished altogether. There are others which have to be adapted and transformed. For many needs of recent origin we want institutions which are altogether new. Criticism is specially important for the establishment of new institutions. When anything new is established it must be preceded by many projects and discussions. A great part of the business of the higher sort of critic is to contribute to such constructive anticipations.

§ 2. Useful as criticism is, the habit of criticizing would not be prevalent unless there were an innate tendency towards it. All persons in an inferior position are naturally critical of those above them; workmen of their employers, private soldiers of their officers, schoolboys of their teachers. But

the most effective sort of criticism is connected with the natural antagonism between the young and the old. Youth is the critical age above all others; and young men are more boldly critical than young women. There seem to be causes for this which lie deep in the foundations of human nature. In every gregarious company of higher animals the lead is taken by the strongest males, who maintain their supremacy till they are displaced by the juniors. So long as the juniors are weak, the seniors keep them sternly in subordination. In any flock of sheep one may observe how jealousy governs the relations between the older and the younger rams. Things are not far different among companies of primitive men. The young bucks impatiently await the day when their subordination will cease; and sneers and grumbling precede the serious contest for mastery. The 'Oedipus-complex' of modern psycho-analysis (hostility of son to father) has really descended to us from pre-human ancestors. Almost all high-spirited young men have this tendency in some degree: those who have it in its less offensive forms, or who dissemble it, are termed 'modest'—a virtue of the young which is greatly appreciated by their seniors.

It is expedient that this, like other instinctive tendencies, should be utilized for social welfare and individual happiness. The young should not be blamed and discouraged from offering criticism; they should rather be trained to do it well. The young people of the directing class, on whom the duty of improving institutions specially rests, receive this instruction chiefly at universities. The training of critical minds ('critical' in this sense implying 'constructive' in some degree) is a function which is fairly well recognized in English universities, at least in practice. By a process of trial and error our academic teachers have discovered what subjects are most effective as intellectual stimulants. They are the subjects of predominantly human interest, which give large opportunities for the discussion of principles, especially the principles of politics, morality, religion, and education.

In no department of life is the influence of politics more penetrating than in education. The accredited teachers of a

non-progressive society discourage their pupils from discussing principles; they keep them to the memorizing of classics, as in by-gone China. Literature containing subversive ideas is put upon an *Index* and forbidden. In a mature society such precautions are held to be superfluous. The classics are certainly taught, and the pupil is encouraged to admire them; but, even more, he is encouraged to criticize them. Nor are the basic ideas of the existing order regarded as exempt from discussion, the assumption being that they have nothing to fear from it. There will not be any *Index librorum prohibitorum*. On the contrary, young minds, which are naturally inclined to range and seek out novelties, will be encouraged to read the newest books and to bring forward their ideas to be talked over.

It is hardly necessary to regard the critical attitude as a virtue in the young; there are non-moral motives which are adequate to encourage it in them as much as is desirable. But it should be recognized as salutary, at least for minds of high intelligence; and its opposite, the contented acquiescence in established ideas, should not be praised as virtuous. In elder men, however, we should reckon it as a virtue if they encourage the young to criticize, and if they exert themselves to invent projects and new ideas to serve as material for discussion.

CHAPTER IX

WOMANLY VIRTUES

(1) The system of virtues which is suitable to women must always differ somewhat from that of men.
(2) In the less advanced civilizations women are subjected to restrictions which are unfavourable to width of interest and force of character. (3) But in a mature community the work of the women of the governing class demands those qualities, (4) and therefore they should have high education and economic freedom.

§ 1. THE moral system which is suitable to women cannot at any stage of social development be just the same as that of men. In regard to the main elements of our life the morality of the two sexes must coincide; and yet at all times the differences are considerable. They are least in the earliest stages, because life is simplest then, and there is least division of labour. They become great at an intermediate stage among the upper classes, for reasons which I will explain. But in mature societies the differences diminish, and there is no longer so definite a contrast in morals between men and women.

The moral differences between the sexes are due mainly to the position which women occupy in relation to the family and the home. Being so much more concerned with these matters than men are, they have more need of the qualities which conduce to the successful rearing of children and the management of the home. Though a man also should have domestic virtues, they cannot be of just the same kind as those of women.

Women need self-respect no less than men; but it must be manifested differently. Men base their self-respect mainly upon their powers of action. Women, though they are proud of what they can do, show their self-respect largely by an attitude of reserve. A forward or 'pushing' manner in a woman is not consistent with self-respect.

The sexes are not upon quite the same footing in regard to the communal virtues. Women of course should be benevolent and loyal no less than men, but in a rather different manner. Their chief life-functions are more connected with cherishing and protecting, and therefore their benevolence is more intimate and tender. Many men, who have admirable goodwill, show the fault of lack of warmth. On the other hand, men are more discriminating; it is a frequent fault in good women that their benevolence is not restrained by prudence. We see this in family life, when wives and mothers 'spoil' the objects of their affections. In public affairs it would be a great evil if things were regulated under the influence of indiscriminately charitable women.

A somewhat similar difference distinguishes the loyalty of women from that of men. It is less connected with fighting and more with working; it is conservative and pitying. The fault of women is that they cling too long to lost causes, and support old institutions and customs long after their usefulness is past. This is very noticeable in regard to institutions of religion.

As they have a moral system of their own, women need a moral education which is not quite the same as that of men. But their morality, though different, is not inferior; nor should their education be inferior upon the whole, nor less carefully planned.

§ 2. As a community rises in the scale of morality, there is sure to be at any given time some one quality which its women-folk have special need to acquire. The quality in which savage women are greatly lacking is reserve; which also is the quality that their husbands desiderate most. As societies become more civilized, a modest behaviour in women is more and more valued. In middle-grade civilizations, the men-folk reinforce female reserve with restrictions upon freedom. Restriction reaches its maximum in the purdah-system, such as prevails in India and Persia. A further advance in civilization allows restrictions to be relaxed, because women have gained in self-control and dignity.

Under a purdah-system the virtues of the women of the governing class are narrower than those of the women of mature communities. A purdah-lady never sees a man of her own class other than her near relatives; she has attended no place of higher education; she does not read; she has no acquaintance with public affairs, no public duties. Her thoughts are limited to the elementary interests of life, and to the maintenance of her social position. Such close restrictions make it impossible for purdah-women to have wide interests, and are unfavourable to force of character. There are, of course, many Eastern women so well endowed by nature that no limitation of opportunity can make them commonplace. But their fine endowments cannot conduce to their happiness; and, for want of a proper field of exercise, their abilities are often misdirected into the paths of futile ambition or of religious superstition.

§ 3. The virtues which are within the reach of purdah-women are not to be despised; they are indeed the elementary female virtues: but they are not enough for the conditions of modern society. We need width of interest and force of character in our women; at least, in the women of the governing class. The institutions of a mature community cannot be worked successfully without the full co-operation of the women citizens. In England women have now a well-recognized place in public life. During the controversy (at last happily settled) about granting the parliamentary franchise to women, the change was usually recommended as an act of justice to persons who were suffering an unmerited exclusion. But female enfranchisement was expedient also upon grounds of public welfare.

The public questions on which women are most competent to speak are those which have reference to domestic morality. Being so deeply interested in maintaining the welfare of their own families, sensible women must desire that there should be welfare in the homes around them. They do not think that they can preserve little domestic heavens of their own while anti-domestic conditions exist in neighbouring families. So they must take interest in such

matters as wages, regularity of employment, and housing; and also in the elimination of certain vices, such as drunkenness, which gravely impair domestic life.

Apart from their public duties in the ordinary sense, civilized women have other duties of great importance for the community. To fit children for full citizenship needs a long period of careful training; and the most important years are those which are spent in the nursery, before systematic schooling begins. The education which a mother can give her children is both intellectual and moral; but the latter is more important, consisting mainly in development of the affections. And in the process of giving education the mother herself gains greatly in respect of morality.

The foregoing are duties of the present time. In the future one question which is likely to engage the thoughts of social reformers is the regulation of population. At present we have done little more than lament existing evils; very little has been done towards definite schemes of remedy. But before very long proposals may be made for controlling the most intimate human relationships. If so, the business of carrying them into effect must rest mainly in the hands of women.

§ 4. If women are to be entrusted with these high functions, they must be carefully prepared for them. There is a close connexion between democratic institutions and female education. In all civilized countries female education is increasing, mainly perhaps for economic reasons; but the movement could also be justified on political and moral grounds. It must not be supposed that female education has no opponents to-day. There are still in our country, and even in America, certain upper-class circles which are averse from giving to their women the education that is necessary to make them fully effective citizens; the reason which they allege is that education diminishes a girl's chance of making an advantageous marriage. Because of lack of education, many of our rich women have but little notion of public duty; they are inclined to view society as an organization contrived to maintain them and their relatives in idleness.

And, in order that women may have full self-respect and opportunity to use their powers effectively, they ought to have economic freedom. This means not only that they should have professions before marriage, but that they should receive wages later as wives and mothers. This can be justified by the principle that all citizens who serve the community should be paid in proportion to the value of their service.

The economic independence which young women now enjoy in growing measure throughout English-speaking lands makes them freer in respect of marriage. In the past they have been greatly restricted for reasons of property. Husbands have been chosen for them whom they would never have chosen for their own sake; or they have been denied marriage altogether, because of difficulties in regard to dowry. The dowry-system was universal in England 150 years ago among the upper classes, and it is still prevalent in France to-day. Its tendency is to weaken female self-respect. There is no matter about which young people feel more deeply than the choosing of their mates. We choose mates for our domestic animals only because they have not sense enough to choose for themselves. Marriages of convenience, however, are likely to continue so long as conditions of property are such as they are in France, where families are compelled in self-defence to cling most tenaciously to their patrimony.

As women become better educated, freer, and more competent, there is every reason to expect that they will gain in virtue. Education by itself does not make people virtuous, but it does enlarge their moral opportunities. Thackeray seems to have thought otherwise, if we can judge from his best-known heroines. These early-Victorian ladies who were brought up by half-educated governesses in secluded schoolrooms may have been very sweet examples of domestic virtue, but they were usually saturated with social prejudice and superstition.

CHAPTER X

HAPPINESS

(1) As happiness is indispensable for welfare, (2) the communit should be organized to make its members happy, and the individua citizen should work for the same purpose. (3) The individual i entitled to claim from the community the opportunity to be happy it is also a moral duty for him to try to secure his own happiness.

§ 1. THE matter of happiness cannot be treated fully withou much psychological analysis, especially in order to determin how happiness is produced and what is the relation betwee happiness and pleasure. In the present chapter I wish tc consider only what the duties of the citizen are in regard tc happiness, both that of the community and of himself.

It is necessary to anticipate the results of the psychological analysis of a later chapter so far as to say that happiness consists of more than pleasure. If we consider what is in our minds when we say that we are happy, we shall find that the experience involves much that is not hedonic at all; namely, an experience of activity, a survey of past, present, and future, and an attitude of valuation. These non-hedonic elements raise happiness to a level much higher than pleasure. In confirmation of this we may point to the fact that not every creature which is capable of pleasure is also capable of happiness. We do not attribute happiness to worms and insects, nor even to the higher animals, nor to infants. Happiness, as Aristotle held, is an experience which only a fully rational being can achieve.

Whatever views may be taken of the debated questions concerning happiness, it will be agreed that a community cannot be said to enjoy welfare unless it is happy. If unhappiness is greatly prevalent, the causes may be physical or moral; but it is evidence of some grave maladjustment that ought to be remedied. An unhappy community cannot be

ully virtuous, because its members cannot devote themselves o the interests which are necessary for virtue. Nor can an unhappy individual be fully virtuous, for the same reason. A very unhappy person does not indeed survive for long, as a rule. Families which suffer from long-continued and severe unhappiness soon proceed to extinction.

§ 2. At the present day no political thinker would question the doctrine that it is the duty of a government so to organize institutions as to promote the general happiness of the community. The formulas of the English utilitarians may be questionable philosophically, but their practical soundness is universally admitted. And no theoretical limit can be set to the activity of government in promoting happiness; though experience may show that in certain directions non-political agency is more likely to be beneficial: for example, it is not expedient for government to interfere much in matters of religion.

Though all kinds of governments—despotic, aristocratic, and democratic—profess at the present day the Benthamite principle of consulting the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the two former kinds can give but imperfect assurance that such a policy will be maintained consistently. The most benevolent of despots is apt to become corrupted by long tenure of power; and even a despot of superhuman incorruptibility cannot ensure benevolence in his successors. Marcus Aurelius was the father of Commodus, and had not the strength of mind to disinherit him. A democracy, on the other hand, is provided with the material checks that human frailty will always require. A democratic statesman must make at least his own supporters believe that he is working for the public happiness; and, as the people become more intelligent, it is less and less easy to impose upon them.

Now let us consider the attitude of the individual citizen towards the promotion of general happiness. Philosophically speaking, we must say that the virtuousness of conduct designed to promote the happiness of a community depends upon the value of the community. If the community is a good one, everybody ought to work for its happiness; if,

however, it is wanting in moral value, there is no merit in trying to make it happy. A pig-keeper who devoted himself to increasing the pleasures of his pigs would be regarded as merely foolish. In certain exceptional cases men's duties are concerned with institutions the inmates of which are morally defective, such as prisons and lunatic asylums. Governors of such places are not expected to devote themselves to the happiness of those in their charge; though we condemn cruelty.

Practically no citizen can have any doubts about the moral value of his community as a whole. We do not expect such scepticism even in reference to communities which manifestly are capable of much improvement. It is specially characteristic of the democratic citizen that he regards all classes of the community as having value, and therefore as deserving to enjoy opportunities of happiness. No one can make persons happy; one can only remove hindrances and extend opportunities. For the sake of giving this indirect moral assistance to his fellow-citizens, a man should be desirous to increase their material prosperity, and even to increase their pleasures, so far as they are free from blame; since man is so constituted that a certain amount of pleasure is necessary to enable him to live with zest.

§ 3. The relationship of duty as between the individual and his community is two-sided: he has duties towards it, but the community also has duties towards him. Plato spoke as though the relationship were one-sided only, and so did Hegel; but those were roundabout ways of protesting against individual selfishness. When a virtuous individual member of a good society claims that it should give him opportunities of happiness, he is only asking for common justice. Carlyle was wont to treat this as an act of monstrous presumption. Somewhere he exclaims: "Wretch! What right hast thou to be happy? What right hadst thou, a few years back, even to be?" Very true. And yet the individual may answer that he never asked to be brought into the world; but that, having been brought here, he may reasonably claim that the world should treat him fairly. The humane man does no less for the animals which he breeds.

Now for another question. Ought the individual to strive to secure his own happiness? My answer is, Certainly yes. No doubt he will do so merely as a matter of prudence; but this should be regarded also as a moral duty. In a subsequent chapter I am going to argue that we want to be happy mainly for reasons which are independent of morals, because unhappiness is a detestable condition which all men shun. But there are motives for wanting to be happy which are definitely moral; though this is a duty which is never more than derivative and subordinate.

Happiness, as I shall argue in detail in a later place, results normally from living a virtuous life. If that is so, the opportunity for happiness is the same as the opportunity for a virtuous life. And this it must be right to desire. Moreover, it has to be considered that, as happiness is necessary to existence and efficiency, it is a duty to be happy so long as one's existence and efficiency contribute to social welfare. If it is right that A should seek the happiness of B, C, and D, it must be right that B, C, and D should in some measure seek their own happiness. If they do not, they are failing to support the laudable efforts of A. We take this point of view sometimes when, in trying to benefit some one, we find ourselves thwarted by his own perverseness. We must also remember that an unhappy man depresses those around him by the effect of sympathy. Continued proximity to unhappiness is a saddening influence which no one can resist without great callousness. Conversely, nothing is more comforting and strengthening than close association with persons of happy character.

This is quite a different position from Utilitarianism. We cannot, as the Utilitarians did, put the search for happiness into the first place. Happiness depends upon good morality; not good morality upon happiness. We must recognize that there are many claims which ought to prevail over the desire to be happy. Duty may call upon us to give up life itself. No one is properly moral who does not recognize the subordinate position of his own existence and welfare.

Part II. Circumstances and Morality

CHAPTER XI

OUR MORAL RELATION TO CIRCUMSTANCES

(1) The statement of a moral system is incomplete if not supplemented by the statement of our moral relation to circumstances.
(2) Towards the chief circumstances of our lives we have certain instinctive reactions which become moralized by community-life.
(3) The proper attitude to circumstances is to use them as means to a good life and to enjoy them.

§ 1. THE term 'circumstances' is used in this Part for the concrete objects which environ our life, and for the situations in which men are commonly placed in relation to them. In this sense, dangerous things, such as fierce beasts and enemies, are environing objects, and war is a situation. The chief circumstances of which I wish to speak are the physical body, neighbours or fellow-men, enemies, sex-mates, and the objects of use and enjoyment which we call wealth or property, together with situations in which we find ourselves in regard to these various matters. An outline of a system of virtues must be very incomplete unless it is supplemented by a statement how circumstances influence the formation of our moral system, and how we ought to behave in relation to them.

The moral relation of mankind to circumstances is twofold. On the one hand, the existence of environing objects has determined the formation of moral qualities. For example, there exist currently among Englishmen certain virtues and vices in regard to property, which have been formed in the course of time by dealing with property. If the general condition of England had been such that the inhabitants could have had very little property (or property very different from what we actually have), we should not have those

particular virtues and vices. So it is plain that we can understand our existing moral system only with the help of a historical survey. On the other hand, our moral qualities can be displayed only by dealing with circumstances; and therefore we must review the chief circumstances which environ us, in order to understand the practical outcome of a moral system.

§ 2. Before attempting to determine what is the right attitude to circumstances, we must recognize the naturalness and instinctiveness of our reactions to all the most important objects around us. In reference to such matters as property and sex we have innate desires which are among the chief motives of our lives, and which it is neither possible nor expedient to change fundamentally. What happens to them, rather, is that they become modified and moralized by community-life. Our primitive instincts bring us into relations with our fellow-men, so that we form communities; and, as communities develop, our instincts become increasingly moralized.

There ought to be no thought of eradicating these elementary motives. Consider, for example, our proprietary instincts: all normal human beings have them, and are influenced by them powerfully in regard to much of their conduct. They can be modified and moralized; but cannot be eradicated from any large proportion of the population, because that would involve the break-up of community-life. So far as these instincts are eradicated from any individual, the result can only be a mutilation or weakening of character.

On the other hand, it is necessary to a good moral life that our instincts should be brought under control, regulated, modified, and accommodated to each other. If any one of them is allowed to increase excessively, so as to interfere with the agent's neighbours and to disturb the balance of his own character, he may be said to be enslaved to it.

§ 3. In the light of these considerations we can say in general terms what our attitude to circumstances ought to be: we ought to use them aright and to enjoy them; we ought

not to renounce them or to be enslaved by them. To use circumstances aright is to treat them as affording opportunities for a good moral life. And, so far as objects are enjoyable, there is no reason why we should not enjoy them; provided, of course, that no higher interest is made to suffer. Enjoyment draws men together almost as much as work, makes them like each other, and so increases their opportunities for good moral experience.

The matter may be illustrated once more by the example of property and of wealth generally. Property is acquired by work; and in working we can display many virtuous qualities, especially if the work is done in co-operation with others. When once acquired, property confers power which can be used for good purposes. Moreover, we get enjoyment from property. While it is easy to indulge the proprietary instinct too much, there is a moderate enjoyment which is harmless. There is no reason why we should not permit ourselves that enjoyment; and it is positively virtuous to give facilities for it to others. In regard to the instinct of property, just as in regard to our other chief instincts, there ought to be no thought of eradication. We ought not to renounce property; we ought not to wish to be poor or to see others poor. On the other hand, it is not right that we should desire property immoderately, so as to interfere with our neighbours or to diminish our interest in other objects which ought to occupy a suitable share of our thoughts.

While a right understanding of these matters is evidently desirable for regulating the inner life of the individual, it is still more important for the arrangement of institutions. Institutions should be so arranged that the citizens of the community are in right relations with the chief circumstances around them. The most important point is that they should be in right relations with their fellow-men; not hating them, nor tyrannizing over them, nor basely subservient to them, but co-operating with them for the common welfare. In regard to property, institutions are well arranged when every normal citizen has an opportunity of gratifying his instinctive proprietary desires, but is restrained from indulging them

excessively so as to injure the community and himself. This is only a general prescription, which must be carried out in different ways at different stages of society. The actual institutions to be set up in a society, in order to regulate such matters as national defence, bodily welfare, sex, and property, must be relative to the average share of intelligence and virtue among the population. If the average share of intelligence and virtue is low, institutions must be simple and of low efficiency. They can be raised to a higher level only in concurrence with the improvement of individual character.

CHAPTER XII

FELLOW-MEN

(1) It is requisite for good morality that a man should stand in right adjustment to his fellow-men. (2) Citizens are best able to adjust themselves to each other when not hampered by privilege, nor by poverty, nor by defective education. (3) The community should be organized for the purpose of facilitating good adjustment. (4) Moral advance in the future must depend mainly upon reforms in communal organization.

§ 1. OUR fellow-men are by far the most important of the circumstances which environ us; because morality, as we have seen, is a communal function. But in the present place it is not necessary to treat the matter with the corresponding fullness, in view of the preceding chapters upon the community and the home. There are some points to be mentioned, however, on which hitherto we have had no occasion to touch.

If it is true that moral experience is communal, it follows that our moral welfare requires that we should live in close relations with a community; we cannot be shut off from community-life without suffering moral injury. This applies to the partial self-exclusion which takes place when persons refuse to work, and live on the community without undertaking any share in its activities. It is necessary also for welfare that the relations of workers with their fellow-citizens should be of a satisfactory kind. They may participate actively in a community, but in a position which is not fully satisfactory, though it may be preferable to complete exclusion. Such was the position of the slave-population in antiquity; and such, unfortunately, is the position of a great part of our population even to-day.

In judging whether an individual's relations towards his fellow-men are satisfactory, there are three main spheres of activity to be considered, which the Germans term *Beruf*,

Gesellschaft, and *Liebe*; in other words, the relations of profession or calling, society, and sex. In regard to all of them, normal men have certain claims which, upon the whole, are not unreasonable. Men expect employment in the community which is suitable to their tastes and abilities, to receive appropriate social consideration, and to stand in good relations with the opposite sex. If these claims are denied they are not happy, and their moral opportunities are impaired.

Dr. Freud has emphasized, perhaps to excess, the ill-effects resulting from maladjustment in matters of sex. Dr. Alfred Adler, on the other hand, has spoken more about the other two departments of activity. In his *Individual Psychology* he has shown from the records of his immense clinical experience how the neurotic diathesis, with all its train of suffering and moral evil, is connected with maladjustments between the individual and his social environment. A man who is not appreciated, or thinks that he is not appreciated, as he ought to be by his fellows is in a dangerous condition of internal strain. He is likely to adopt an anti-social or even criminal attitude; he may suffer from physical pains and disabilities which, though purely psychic in their origin, are quite beyond the unassisted power of the sufferer to overcome.

It is difficult to imagine a state of society in which there will be perfect adjustment of every individual in respect of calling, society, and sex, because so many maladjustments are due to causes which we have not learnt to control. But it is easy to imagine a state of things in which the adjustment will be better than it is to-day. The present organization of the community is imperfect, both in respect of what it does and in respect of what it fails to do. It does not allow enough freedom of choice, putting people into unsuitable positions; and it fails to correct evils which arise without premeditation, but could be corrected if suitable measures were taken.

§ 2. There are certain conditions which are helpful to us in adjusting ourselves to each other.

One condition is that citizens should be allowed great

liberty in choosing their careers. The power which men have of making choice for themselves may be observed at the universities. Well-educated young men, who are not fettered in any way, do not often choose an unsuitable career. On the other hand, maladjustments are frequent when young men are pressed to adopt careers by their parents. A man who takes Holy Orders because his family has a 'living' in its gift, or enters a counting-house because his father is a partner of the firm, is often condemning himself to a life of imperfect usefulness and moral danger. Such influences in prescribing careers may be classed together under the term 'privilege,' which means any social and political arrangement that assigns employment or social position to persons independently of their qualifications and past services.

It is commonly supposed that persons who enjoy privilege are benefited thereby; and, certainly, they are exempted from some material wants and anxieties. And yet on the whole it is not an advantage, and certainly not a moral advantage. The happiness of the English upper-class would probably be increased, if entrances to employment were as free from the influence of privilege as if they were made under the management of the Civil Service Commissioners.

But the most obvious gainers by the abolition of privilege would be those who are victimized by the present system, and see less qualified candidates for employment preferred before them. Persons who suffer thus are set in opposition to the established order, and this is not conducive to moral welfare. Any one who has come much into contact with intelligent working-men knows how widespread is this feeling of injustice and discontent.

There is coming to be a consensus of opinion as to the expediency of removing obstacles which prevent men from finding the positions in life for which they are best suited. But this is not enough. More constructive measures are needed, both economic and educational, for which public opinion is not yet fully prepared, though there are reasons for believing that men's thoughts are moving in that direction.

There cannot be real freedom of adjustment till poverty is

abolished, since poor men must take the first work that is offered to them. To abolish poverty we need a better distribution of wealth. It is the parental instinct which is the main cause of the present inequitable distribution. There is no more beneficent element of human character, and yet in this manifestation it needs restraining. In combination with some other motives, of which the chief is social vanity, it induces men to endow their relatives, providing them permanently with shares of wealth out of all proportion to their social services.

The elementary conditions of a satisfactory economic system are that there should be a large production and a fair distribution of wealth. But much more than this will be needed in the future if communities are to be free from economic danger. It will be necessary to combat systematically some obstinate failings of human nature which conduce to poverty. There are many people who are, so to speak, born to be poor, in the sense that they are utterly lazy, or wasteful, or so incontinent that they multiply beyond the means of subsistence. It will need much contrivance to devise effective measures for dealing with such people, in order to keep them from dragging down and demoralizing the better elements of the community.

A community of well-adjusted citizens must also have a high level of education. The commercial value of education is already well recognized; just now I wish to emphasize its liberating power. An ignorant man must remain fixed to the occupation in which he was placed in boyhood. Though he may have abilities for a higher career, he has no power to make the change. He is as unfree as the victim of coercive privilege.

There is yet another kind of education which seems to me to be indispensable to good social adjustment. Because of the division of labour in a civilized community and of the very unequal distribution of wealth, one half of the citizens does not know how the other half lives. This needs correction. It may be difficult to make the hand-working class understand the life of those over them; the lower always

has difficulty in understanding the higher. But there is no reason why the higher should not be taught to understand the lower. What I have in view is a system something like that which has been adopted in certain armies, where officers are expected to be thoroughly acquainted with the life of the rank-and-file. No member of the directing class can adjust himself quite satisfactorily to the hand-workers under him unless he has spent some time as a hand-worker, and knows both the good and the bad sides of the hand-worker's life. To carry out this principle thoroughly would need a complete reorganization of society, which has not been attempted anywhere outside Russia, and perhaps not there. Even a partial application of it would remedy some of our social evils.

§ 3. In order that citizens may work in the positions for which they are best suited, it is not enough that they should enjoy the foregoing advantages; it is necessary also that they should be helped in their choice of profession and dissuaded from choosing wrongly. We need, in fact, a great extension of the system of vocational direction which has recently been established in some large cities. Young people, when they have passed out of school and college and are thinking of employment, should be judged and graded, as students are by means of university examinations, and then advised as to their employable capacities. Such vocational examinations should have reference not only to intellect, but to all the other qualities, physical and moral, which are requisite for good employees.

Closely connected with this there should be systematic arrangements for correcting faults. It is possible that in the future every community may employ professional correctors performing functions which are at present claimed in part by the clergy and in part by the educational services. They would be something like the "Straighteners" in Samuel Butler's *Erewhon*; only that those functionaries were concerned wholly with moral correction, whereas the Straighteners of the future would deal with every point of character which counts in contributing to social efficiency and harmony.

All these arrangements would, of course, be official in character, and be made through the agency of public institutions. But where, it may be asked, should we find officers with knowledge and technical skill adequate to such elaborate tasks? A very pertinent question; it points to an immense extension of psychological studies, and to a much more earnest application of psychological knowledge to social service. We need for society in general something like the existing Institute of Industrial Psychology. When psychologists have carried further their researches into human nature, and when their lessons have pervaded our educational system, perhaps the community will employ them to organize society; to reform institutions, to make the best use of the available human material, and generally to adjust the citizens to each other so that they may be both efficient and happy.

§ 4. We may distinguish two main periods in the history of communal organization: one in which men are hindered from adjusting themselves by restrictions placed upon them by superior power, and one in which superior power helps the citizens to make adjustments which they cannot make for themselves. I think that we have entered upon the second period, but have not advanced very far in it.

It is characteristic of the earlier period that certain indispensable institutions, those which form the elementary political State, seem inseparable from other institutions or customs which are injurious to moral welfare. A philosopher of the Court of Louis XIV would have said that the royal system was necessary to France, and that both the evils of the Court and the unfavourable condition of the humbler classes were necessary results of royalty. Under such conditions the best hope of national progress is in having another institution, such as a Church, animated by principles which are very different from those of secular society, and aiming at the mitigation of secular evils. But there comes a stage in political development when secular institutions no longer bring these evils with them; in other words, when governors are no longer tyrannical, grasping, callous, and vain. Then the antagonism between Church and State

becomes obsolete, and it is possible to organize all the good-will of the community into one harmonious system.

In the future it seems likely that the moral progress of the community will depend mainly upon institutional reform; in other words, upon the establishment of deliberate contrivances for improving the conditions of human life. This is not so difficult when new institutions are being established; for example, when a new coal-field is opened, regulations can be made to obviate such bad conditions as exist in the old coal-fields which were developed under the system of *laissez-faire*. It is much harder to reform old institutions, because of the opposition of vested interests. Nevertheless, the moral welfare of the community requires that it should be undertaken. There are many complaints about the tendency of industrial and commercial institutions at the present time; it is said that they are arranged in such a way as to encourage some undesirable elements of character, such as greed, suspicion, cunning, an unfriendly attitude towards fellow-workers, and indifference to the public welfare. If the allegations were established, it would have to be considered whether these were necessary evils or whether they could be corrected by reform. And, if some promising line of reform presented itself, the moral interest of the community would require that it should be undertaken.

Were such things to happen, new opportunities of usefulness would be offered to Churches and clergy. They would be able to adopt a role directly opposite to that which is actually adopted, say, by the clericals in France. In general, French clericals are extremely conservative, and, indeed, reactionary in the sense that they wish to restore institutions which the mass of the nation has renounced; they are also closely connected with the propertied classes. But a better function of the Church would be to take the lead in social reform, and to act as an agency of social education. Its special interest would be to see that reforms in national organization do not consult material advancement only, but that they are proposed with due regard to the paramount claims of moral welfare.

CHAPTER XIII

PHYSICAL EXISTENCE

(1) In regard to their physical existence men have two main instincts—those of self-preservation and physical pride. (2) It is a moral duty to preserve the existence of one's fellow-citizens. (3) Physical pride, when moralized, becomes an element in self-respect; (4) so does pride in regard to food, housing, (5) and clothing.

§ 1. ONE'S physical or bodily existence is not a 'circumstance' in ordinary language, but I wish to treat it as such for the purposes of moral theory. As the strongest instinct connected with the body—self-preservation—is even more elementary than our community-instincts, it might seem that the moral aspect of our interest in the body should have been treated before our relations to our fellow-men. But there is this reason for adopting the other order—that the community-motives become moralized before those connected with the body. The latter should take second place in an order of exposition which is settled in relation to moral experience.

Concerning the body we have two main instincts, or perhaps we may say groups of instincts; they are self-preservation and physical pride. Both of them must be considered by the moralist. To preserve one's own existence, to avoid violent danger and disease, is not a moral virtue, except subordinately and indirectly; but it is a moral virtue to guard others from such evils. Physical pride also is not in the first instance a moral quality, but it readily becomes moralized as contributing to the virtue of self-respect. To consult the legitimate physical pride of others is, of course, virtuous from the first.

§ 2. The care which the good citizen has for the physical safety of himself and his neighbours ought to take effect in institutions which afford protection against violent dangers and against disease. Those protecting us against violence,

or, to use a well-known term, the 'fighting services,' will be mentioned in a subsequent chapter. But a few words may be said here about services which protect health. So far as the individual interests himself in such services to protect his own health, his interest is hardly moral; it is moral when he is prompted by interest in his fellow-men. The institutions of a civilized country should embody this interest. If they fail to do so, the moral experience of the whole community suffers injury.

Owing to the contagiousness of disease and to the general dependence of each man's physical welfare upon that of his neighbours, the care of health must be largely a matter of public concern; unassisted private efforts are utterly inadequate. Now, in England we are much hampered by traditions of individualism; our institutions and our ideas about health-protection come down to us from a time when government took no responsibility for such things; when sick people might die in the streets if no charitable person would take them in. Hence our hospitals are 'supported by voluntary contributions'; hence the fact that certain most necessary health-services are regarded as matters of private concern. Every civilized government but our own makes proper provision for such needs. We think it a cause of pride that our government evades the plainest moral obligations, and lets large departments of the public health-service be pauperized and starved.

Housing is closely connected with health; a badly-housed population cannot be a healthy one. This is now coming to be recognized as a matter of public concern, but here also we are greatly hampered by traditions from a stage of lower morality. We have not got much further at present than some measure of public inspection and control. The fact is that under simple conditions of life men cannot expect much help from government either to combat disease or to secure good housing. But under civilized conditions, especially in thickly populated areas, health cannot be preserved without measures which the community alone can undertake. If it does not undertake them, if it allows conditions to exist which

are injurious to health, it is inflicting moral injury upon the community; partly the direct moral injury which arises from bad conditions, partly the indirect moral injury caused by defect of public institutions which ought to attract the devotion of the citizens.

§ 3. Let us now turn to the other kind of interest in one's physical existence—physical pride. An elementary or pre-moral form of this interest may be observed in animals. Creatures such as birds, which have adornments calculated to attract the opposite sex, behave as if they are proud of their display. Among the higher animals, cats keep themselves clean to a degree beyond what seems to be needed for mere self-preservation. In man the care of the body beyond what is needed in relation to health and violent danger is prompted by two powerful motives—those of sex and of social vanity. Both can be observed in young children at a stage before they have any direct moral significance.

Physical pride—that is, satisfaction in the efficiency and beauty of one's body—assumes a moral form when it becomes an element in self-respect. Good physique is, of course, a great element in a man's qualifications for holding a good social position. As soon as men enter upon a co-operative way of life, it is necessary that they should value the esteem of their fellow-workers, and that the individual should value himself as possessing social importance. Thus arises the sentiment of pride. One valuable sort of pride is that which a man feels in relation to his body and its powers. For this reason it is grossly ill-mannered even to allude to any physical defect which a person may have; and such a defect is always a source of humiliation which one needs much fortitude to endure.

The progress of civilization can almost be measured by the pride which men feel in bodily perfection and in care for bodily fitness. This has never been higher than in ancient Greece. Greek statuary alone and the records which we have of Greek athletics would prove the high level of their civilization. In modern times there have been some curious conflicts between the dress-instinct and pride in the body;

because there have prevailed in Europe fashions of dress which denoted high social position and so flattered one kind of pride, while they disfigured the bodily shape and so were against another kind of pride. In our generation we have seen men growing less careful of the ceremonial side of dress and more careful of physical fitness. And the same may be said of women. Against such disfiguring things as crinolines modern women feel a repulsion in which a moral element is plainly to be discerned.

It is the peculiar merit of English educators that they have come to understand clearly the moral value of physical culture. Some one who had the management of boys in a reformatory school remarked it as a good sign when a boy began to feel his biceps; it showed that he was becoming trustworthy. The poor boy's act was, of course, a mark of pride, which is an indispensable condition for occupying a position of trust. What is needed at the present time is that this interest in physical fitness should extend downwards and penetrate every part of the population. It can be brought about only by training the young people in athletics; and then, when they are grown up, giving them the same opportunities of exercise as are enjoyed by upper-class Englishmen. Therefore men and women need some leisure and opportunities of physical exercise organized on the basis of public utility, not of private amusement.

§ 4. Some other primitive instincts and desires connected with food and shelter may also be mentioned in this connection. In both cases we may observe that what was in the first instance purely self-regarding in a narrow sense comes to have moral value by being connected with social position and by contributing to pride.

Take the case of food. Here savages show an indifference which to us seems shocking. In one of Stanley's African travel-books there is an interesting scene of some natives who had found the half-decayed head of a wild pig and set it upon a fire to roast, tapping it with a stick from time to time to expedite the exit of the maggots by which it was infested. It is an unfailing mark of growing culture when men become

more particular as to what they eat and how they eat it. Even low-class people of civilized nations will not touch food which is dirty or has been partly eaten by another person, and they eat at regular times and with as much formality as circumstances allow. And all this they count as a virtue, despising those who are devoid of scruple.

The change evidently takes place through the influence of public opinion. To eat like Stanley's negroes becomes the mark of abject poverty; such persons are objects of general contempt, and cannot maintain their self-respect. It is part of civilization that we should attend to circumstances of eating which savages never think about. To live on other people's leavings may be satisfactory as a mere matter of nutrition, but it would be very unsatisfactory for moral reasons. A negro servant in South Africa will see no hardship in such a diet, and he will be content with mealie-porridge interminably for every meal. This would break the spirit of a white man.

So it is with housing. An Australian native hunter must be content with the rudest shelter; an African negro is happy in a beehive-hut woven from grass. If he is in service with a farmer on the veld, he sleeps in any kind of shed which happens to be available with a rush mat or sack or coloured blanket for covering. In Europe a man might not be injured physically by such housing, in the summer-time at least, but he would be gravely injured morally unless it were well known that his action was quite voluntary. Every year thousands of young English people 'camp out' and live for a spell under barbarous conditions of housing. This is excellent for health and moral welfare. But if it became a permanent way of life, as it is with our 'caravan' or gypsy population, it must lead to degradation.

For long generations Europeans have lived in houses, and this has caused the growth of house-instincts; that is, desires to have a fixed and comfortable home, and to beautify it. It is taken for granted in civilized countries that every one has such desires, and if he does not or cannot satisfy them he is despised as a coarse, unworthy creature, or

pitied as an unfortunate. In either case his self-respect is diminished, and so are his usefulness and happiness.

§ 5. The foregoing instincts—those connected with safety, food, and shelter—men share in large measure with the animals; those connected with clothing are purely human. Low savages have little, if any, clothing-instinct, and the primitive inhabitants of Britain, with their woad and skin-clothing, cannot have had much more. The present inhabitants of Britain certainly have a great deal, which shows how instincts grow up in conjunction with circumstances. Coarse and dirty clothes may not be injurious to health, and in rough trades they are cheerfully accepted as necessary incidents of labour. But to wear such clothes under inappropriate circumstances is painful and demoralizing. This is especially true of women, in whom the clothing-instinct is more strongly developed than in men, because ornament means much more to them. This seems a sufficient reason for prohibiting the employment of women in certain trades—coal-mining, for example. In mines there is always an element of danger, and even if there were none the dirtiness of the work would be enough to cause it to be closed to women. We should be revolted by seeing English women follow the trade of chimney-sweep.

The bearing of the foregoing remarks upon social reform is obvious, so obvious that not much needs to be said about it. There ought to be no classes in the population in which these self-regarding instincts are denied. If there is dirty work which must be done for the general good, it should not be put off on to one separate class, but should be spread out as evenly as possible over the male population. That principle is now recognized in regard to warfare; the true democratic system is that the young fellows of all classes should be called upon for service impartially. A certain amount of danger and dirt has a good moral effect upon men; a large amount is bad for them. And in regard to food and shelter there should not be classes who are so badly provided in those respects that they cannot maintain a decent level of self-respect.

Matters of housing, food, and clothing have much importance in regard to moral education. It is important that children should be brought up in a home the physical aspect of which they can regard with respect and affection. And they should be encouraged to take interest in their food and clothing. A child who will eat anything anyhow gives evidence of a low nature, or has been grossly neglected. It is natural for boys below the age of puberty to be dirty and untidy in their persons; above that age it is a bad sign, and steps should be taken to correct it. To stint a boy of clothing or to make him wear unsuitable clothing (as corduroys when other boys wear cloth) is to inflict mental suffering upon him, and to impair his self-respect and therefore his morality. For this reason some well-organized schools insist that their scholars shall wear clothes of uniform material and pattern, so that no one may be depressed and no one indulge the taste for clothing to excess.

CHAPTER XIV

DANGER, WAR, AND COMPETITION

(1) Men have always had to face danger, which has tended to make them courageous. (2) The virtue of courage should be part of our accepted moral system.

(3) Throughout history men have been at war, and owe much of their progress to it. (4) War has encouraged some manly qualities which we still need—in particular the chivalric virtues.

(5) Competition also encourages manliness. (6) The competitive instinct should be moralized, not extirpated.

§ 1. DANGER is a circumstance of human life which has had great influence upon morals in the past, and will continue to have influence even under the highest civilization. All savages 'live dangerously'; nearly all of them fight with each other, and those who do not, such as the Eskimo, incur danger in procuring their food. Our remote ancestors in Northern Europe, who hunted large and fierce animals with imperfect weapons, must have had to face danger continually. Painful as all this may seem to us, we must recognize that it has been indispensable to progress. Danger is the one thing above all others which draws men together, and induces them to form associations and to trust each other. It was the change from the harmless fruit-eating life of apes to the dangerous life of big-game hunters which caused the development of primitive man.

By conversance with danger men have acquired the quality of native courage. I use the term 'native courage' to distinguish this instinctive quality from courage as a moral virtue. Native courage is displayed most characteristically in the presence of moderate danger, which, though considerable, offers good opportunities of escape. Very few people can resist extreme danger; insensibility to it is regarded as almost superhuman, and is certainly disadvantageous to the

individual. But moderate danger provokes a very different reaction from different natures. Non-courageous persons it routs or paralyses; upon the courageous its effects are stimulative and exhilarating. In battles, where the danger though serious is not extreme, some soldiers are excited and gay. They may be men who in peace-time are quiet and unassuming, because they lack the instinct of display, but in action become enterprising and conspicuous. Such men are greatly appreciated by commanders of troops. Not only do they perform valuable service individually, but they also raise the courage of all around them. The stimulating and pleasing effect of moderate danger explains the popularity of certain sports among the British: such as yachting, mountaineering, and the hunting of big game. The risk makes them distasteful to the non-courageous; but courageous men make distant and expensive journeys to enjoy them.

It would be a mistake to think that civilization has meant the elimination of danger from our lives; it has for some of us, but not for all, nor for the best. Warfare has become more dangerous than ever before, and in civil life there are now more dangerous trades than there were a hundred years ago. There is danger in all rapid locomotion, in all handling of great forces such as steam and electricity, in all seafaring and mining—not to mention disease. It has been common for moralists in the past to neglect the fact of danger, or to allude to it as something exceptional and shocking. We must recognize, rather, that it will always be with us, and that our moral principles must be adapted to it.

§ 2. Native courage is the basis of courage as a moral virtue. Courage becomes moralized when the agent faces danger in a spirit of social service or self-respect. With courage there must be associated other qualities in order that it may be effective: such as fidelity, staunchness, and conscientious performance of obligations. They ought all to be included in our accepted moral system.

The courageous virtues should not be neglected in forming plans of moral education; in other words, boys should be taught to be brave. In some cases this is not possible.

To enjoy danger is a gift of nature, which cannot be made good if a man is born wanting it. And yet much can be done to train and fortify characters which are not very well endowed with courage. They may never feel happy under dangerous conditions; but they can be taught to inhibit in some degree the natural symptoms of fear, so that they do not demoralize their comrades. It is the special merit of the English school system that it makes due provision for education in the manly virtues, especially in courage. This is done by means of rough and slightly dangerous games, in which boys are trained from early years. There is no finer sight than to watch young boys being taught to play football or hockey by teachers who are fully conscious of the moral value of the instruction. These games, of course, teach much more than courage; no individual player, however brilliant, is useful in a team unless he is also unselfish, obedient to orders, and steadfast under adverse circumstances.

Though the main business of training young people to face danger must be done by men, much also rests with women. Unfortunately, many English women are not fully awake to this aspect of their duty. Women have great need for courage in men, to get protection for themselves, their homes, and their children. Savage women understand this well; they taunt cowards unmercifully, so that all the fighting men stand in fear of their reproaches. Civilized women admire brave men, of course; but somehow the wives and mothers of our upper class do not always understand that their own sons should be taught to be brave. They are too fond of inculcating self-preservation, and think that some one else's sons can be hired to do the fighting.

§ 3. Danger we shall always have with us; but it is a question whether we shall always have war. However, having regard to the present conditions of mankind, we must recognize that we shall need to reckon with the possibility of war for a long time to come. Wars arise primarily from faults in human nature and maladjustments in society; and till these are eliminated the peace of the world will never be secure.

In the past men have been fighting with each other almost continuously since the beginning of history; and this has had a great influence upon progress generally, and especially upon moral progress. Because of our recent dreadful experiences the mischief of war is very vividly realized by all minds, and it is generally agreed that conflicts between civilized nations must be limited greatly, if not abolished altogether. But the philosophic student of history and sociology must recognize that men would not be where they are now had there been perpetual peace. War has eliminated much that is bad and encouraged much that is good in institutions and in personal qualities.

Most of the utility of war lies in the past, especially in the remote past. Progress has been effected very largely through the destruction of inferior by superior breeds of men. Consider the case of Africa. Probably the whole continent was once inhabited by a race similar to the Pygmies of the centre or the Bushmen of the south. These races are aboriginal hunters, and have been displaced by the bigger and steadier races who live by agriculture. We are sorry that there should have been these exterminations, just as we are for those which the inhabitants of Roman Britain suffered at the hands of the Anglo-Saxons, and these latter at the hands of the Norsemen subsequently in the northern part of the island. But no one wishes these acts undone, assuming that the incoming people were really higher than those whom they displaced.

In modern Europe war has had great influence in destroying obsolete systems of government, or in giving an impetus towards their removal. Low-grade institutions which are never exposed to the trials of war may persist indefinitely. It was war which brought about the abandonment of the feudal system; it was the wars of the French Revolution which discredited the eighteenth-century monarchies of Europe; it was the Great War that destroyed the political systems of the Central Powers, of Turkey and of Russia.

We naturally think of war mainly in its destructive aspect; but it has created much, and its creations have endured, while its ravages are forgotten. Without wars of conquest primi-

tive men would have gone on living in tribal isolation, hating and harrying each other at every opportunity. All kingdoms and empires from the beginning of history have been formed by war; though, in order to endure, they needed the consolidating work which is done by the men of peace. War is almost the only pursuit in which uncultured men co-operate upon a large scale, and therefore all early institutions have reference to it. This is true, for example, of medieval England; our monarchy, land-system, parliament, and taxing-system were all formed to meet the needs of war.

§ 4. It is a fact which is undeniable, though it may provoke melancholy thoughts, that a great part of the excellent qualities both of men and animals have been developed for the purposes of aggression and conflict. Among animals there can be no question about the intellectual superiority of the carnivora, as compared with the peaceful creatures upon which they feed. So it is among men. A fighting nation needs high qualities of energy, intellect, and emotion. There is nothing like war for sharpening men's wits, and for binding them together in hearty co-operation.

What chiefly concerns us here is the moral influence of war. For this we have plenty of evidence in the records of anthropology and history. Herbert Spencer, whose mind was subjugated by the pacifist ideas of the Manchester school, thought that war was the parent of vice, and that every virtue was encouraged by unbroken peace. This is not at all confirmed by observations upon existing savages. In Borneo, for example, where some of the tribes are peaceful and others warlike, the warlike are superior in every point. They are, of course, merciless in actual fighting; but in time of peace they are more humane, braver, and more trustworthy, stricter in their domestic morality, cleaner, and more self-respecting.

Turning to a higher level of culture, we may get instruction by comparing the moral systems of China and Japan. China, which has for ages been a peaceful and commercial country, has developed some valuable commercial and domestic quali-

ties, but is weak in the virtues appropriate to war and public affairs. Japan, which is warlike, is strong where China is weak. In commerce the Japanese are not so trustworthy as the Chinese, but they are better soldiers and better public officials. And, from the standpoint of general welfare, the advantage rests with the Japanese.

What Englishmen admire especially in the Japanese are certain manly virtues which may be called virtues of chivalry. We ourselves owe the development of these virtues to the warlike conditions of the Middle Ages. The knightly character is classically depicted for us in Chaucer and in Spenser's *Faerie Queene*. The "very perfect, gentle knight" had two sets of good qualities; one of which made him a first-class fighting man and loyal servant to his king, while the other commended him to the favour of women. There is an obvious connection between these two sets of qualities, because courage is closely connected with virility. Now, we may have outgrown the Middle Ages in the arts both of war and of peace, but we cannot dispense with the medieval virtues. It would be a sign of national decadence if the chivalric character fell into disrepute, and were counted inferior to those qualities which contribute to worldly prosperity—in China or in Manchester.

The foregoing remarks are not meant to have a militarist tendency. To say that war has influenced morality for good, and that the warlike virtues are admirable, is not to advocate the continuance of war to-day. There is danger enough in ordinary civil life to preserve our moral health without the need of war. But, both for the life of peace and in view of the ever-present possibility of war, we shall continue to need the warlike virtues. Many of them can be taught without real fighting. The Officers' Training Corps, which are now well established as part of our school and university system, are valuable, no doubt, for purposes of national defence; but the educationist and moralist must favour them chiefly for their encouragement of manliness. War itself is terrible; preparation for war is almost entirely good. There are weighty reasons for thinking that the adoption by our country

of some form of national military service, such as that of Switzerland, would have a beneficial moral effect upon our population.

§ 5. Closely allied to the qualities which enable men to behave well in danger are those which are advantageous in competition. Manliness is displayed in competitions of the right kind, and is encouraged by them.

If we wish to understand the competitive instinct, we should observe it in the higher animals. It is very conspicuous in horses and dogs, so that they can be made to race against each other. The interest which men take in horse-racing is due primarily to the sympathy which they feel for the efforts of the competing animals, and is evidence for the strength of the competitive instinct in themselves. Gregarious creatures have developed the instinct, partly from the motive of sex, partly from desire to lead. It is an instinct which is specially strong in males.

In men the primitive motives of competition have been reinforced by others; we are influenced by desire for social position and for material advantages, such as food, clothes, and housing. Above all, we desire the good opinion of our fellows. Milton speaks of fame as the last infirmity of noble minds; in general, however, desire of social approval is no infirmity, but an indispensable element of character. If the competitive spirit is markedly wanting in a community, the men must be lacking in vigour, and the community as a whole must lack cohesion. Professor McDougall observed a defect of competitiveness in some of the tribes of the hot and damp parts of Borneo. But in a vigorous and active society men always desire to excel, to display their powers, and to have their merits recognized.

The chief social utility of competition is to discover the men who are qualified for leadership. In actual fighting young warriors will contend in deeds of daring in order that they may be selected later for positions of command; and their competitions in warlike exercises have the same purpose. But competition not only discovers leaders; it helps to form

them. All the qualities which leaders in action need, such as physical ability, courage, firmness, and quick-wittedness, are developed by active competition. It has a similar influence in the intellectual sphere. Think of the wonderful results which were evoked by the dramatic contests in Athens —hundreds of masterpieces, a few of which are still preserved and read with admiration.

§ 6. In civilized communities the competitive instinct can be utilized for purposes of improvement, provided that it is moralized. It is specially valuable in education; young people can be stimulated to exertion by means of it. And yet the instinct must not be aroused too strongly, otherwise rivalry becomes tinged with hatred. It is most beneficial when the competitors do not view each other as enemies to be exterminated, but as members of a wider system who are striving for a high place in the system. When competition becomes savage it ceases to have any moral value. All is as it should be when those who are concerned with a competition as competitors, judges, or spectators recognize how the display benefits the community.

It is one of the chief merits of the English educational system that it trains and encourages the competitive spirit in a way which appeals strongly to children, and especially to boys—the way of athletic games. The best in their moral influence are team-games which are played between large teams, such as football. In these games there are two distinct kinds of competition—competition for a place in the team and competition of the teams with each other. Such competitions under good management should bring out good qualities in all concerned and suppress bad ones. The rewards of success in this field are not corrupting. There is no question of destroying or injuring rivals. When one college, for example, plays against another it is necessary to the enjoyment of the game that the teams should be well matched in force, and therefore there can be no desire that rivals should permanently decline. Those who interest themselves in such competitions without taking part in them cannot do otherwise than desire that the qualities which

conduce to success in the competitions should be diffused continuously throughout the social system.

In recent times there has been a reaction against competition; some educational theorists have argued that the instinct should be suppressed as far as possible. This seems to be psychologically mistaken. I think that the enemies of competition must be influenced by a moral reaction against current commercial practice. Commercial competition is very different from that which has been spoken of above. The struggle against commercial rivals makes no appeal to the natural desire of display; it demands and encourages many qualities which are morally undesirable; the riches which reward it tend to the corruption of our nature; it aims at the extermination or, at least, the swallowing-up of rivals; and it is not regulated by any regard for the common welfare. One cannot deny that commercial competition has some utility; it is a check upon extortionate charges, it stimulates contrivance and invention, and encourages some of the qualities of an efficient commercial manager. But, if these advantages could be secured in other ways, there would be little justification for its continuance.

CHAPTER XV

WEALTH

(1) The moral system of a community must be determined largely by economic conditions; which have great influence, both upon the individual citizen (2) and upon the general form of the community. (3) A community should have a large production and an equitable distribution of wealth, in order to give opportunity for developing the communal, (4) the domestic, (5) and the self-respecting virtues. (6) The proprietary instinct should therefore be duly encouraged, but at the same time regulated. (7) Regulation is much needed under existing social conditions, which tend to over-stimulate the instinct and to promote undue concentration of wealth.

§ 1. We cannot understand the moral system of any community unless we consider its economic position; nor can proposals for improving the morality of a community have much prospect of success unless they are conjoined with improvement in its economic position. The term 'wealth' means objects of human use and ornament, including food and food-resources, together with houses and other immovable property. There ought also to come into consideration man's opportunities and powers of obtaining wealth. Two men may at a given moment be exactly similar in respect of the wealth which they possess, and yet one may have better prospects than the other, and therefore enjoy a superior economic position.

It would need far too long a discussion to show fully how wealth influences morality; let me mention a few points relating to food. Food, together with the conditions of obtaining food, is by far the most important of all the economic conditions which environ us, because that is the foundation upon which all our life is built. In order to understand the morality of any individual person it is always necessary to survey his position in regard to food and similar necessary things; and the same survey must be made if we

wish to understand the moral system which is accepted in any community.

Consider first the individual. No one, however civilized his community may be, can have a high type of moral life unless his own food conditions are satisfactory; he must not only have enough food, but must also be free from great anxiety in respect of food. Bad conditions in this respect have a directly unfavourable effect upon morals by weakening a man's energies, concentrating them upon humble objects, and tending to make him unfriendly towards neighbours who are competitors in the procuring of food. They also have an indirect effect by depressing his social position. A hungry or indigent man is an object of pity and contempt, and this injures him morally in all that has reference to self-respect.

These considerations are so obvious that it would not be worth while to mention them if they were not neglected practically even in the most advanced societies to-day. Men whose food conditions are unsatisfactory are exhorted and expected to practise a high morality. The thing is impossible. If we cannot reorganize society so that every one has enough food and is free from anxiety about food, we must renounce the hope of a high level of morality throughout the population.

§ 2. Now for a few words about the manner in which conditions of food-supply influence the general form of a community, and therefore the moral system which is possible for its members.

There are three main sources of food-supply—hunting, domesticated animals, and agriculture. The first, which is the most primitive, gives nearly always a comparatively scanty supply of food, which is also laborious to collect. The level of culture to which hunters can attain depends upon the quality of the game which they pursue. The Australian natives, for example, who live upon small game in a country with a naturally poor fauna, can never be anything but indigent and thinly scattered. They must therefore be lacking in all the qualities which depend upon the

possession of wealth, settled homes, and extensive political organization. The Red Indians of Catlin's day, who lived mainly on the herds of buffalo which roamed over the Western prairies, were much more prosperous. Their food was good, abundant, and obtained without great difficulty. They had horses and dogs, could store food (in the form of pemmican), and derived objects of use, such as clothing, from the animals which they killed. They suffered from the great disadvantage of the hunting-life, the necessity of following the migrations of the game. But Catlin's Indians had as much political and social organization as hunting tribesmen can reach, and even something like home-life in their tents or 'lodges.' Their morality, in every department, was far above that of the Australian blacks.

The possession of domestic animals without agriculture gives opportunity for forming a society such as is depicted in Genesis, and such as exists among the pastoral Arabs of to-day. Pastoralists are better off for food and property than any hunters can be; but no considerable accumulation of wealth is possible without settled habitation, and this depends upon agriculture.

Agriculture, combined with the use of domestic animals, furnishes the best supply of food; and, by enabling men to settle in homes, gives opportunity for accumulation of property. Our civilization and civilized morality are based on agriculture.

Further economic development depends upon other factors than food. All food is perishable, and there can be no great store of wealth till metals become plentiful and manufactures are invented. Then, and not till then, do men begin to form cities, which are primarily gatherings of craftsmen; and they begin to engage in foreign trade. As an example of a country which had got these elements of civilization but no more, may be instanced England at the period of the Norman Conquest.

When a society has arrived at an economic level at which cities are possible, the time has come for the establishment of extensive political systems. Kingdoms are made possible by

wealth. The business of a primitive king is to settle disputes and to organize national defence. For this he needs to possess wealth, so that he can attach helpers to his service as officers of justice, warriors, and counsellors. This is hardly possible till cities come into being. The formation of kingdoms encourages the production of wealth. Cities need the protection of a strong government; nor can trade expand till an efficient police has assured the security of transport and travel.

These considerations are enough to prove the close relation between economic conditions and moral systems. The moral rules which are conducive to the welfare of a community must be relative to its social and political arrangements; and these must depend upon the amount and distribution of the wealth which it enjoys.

§ 3. It is necessary, then, for the moral welfare of a community that the economic part of its life should be satisfactory. There is an ancient notion that communities are virtuous in proportion as they are poor, and that the possession of wealth involves moral corruption. But communities are really corrupted, not by wealth, but by a faulty distribution of wealth. A very poor community cannot have a high type of morality, because it cannot have the virtues which are possible under an extensive political system; while it is certain to have undesirable qualities which are inevitable when men live under tribal conditions. Unless a man is a citizen of a civilized State he can have no patriotism. He will have, no doubt, tribal feeling, which is the primitive sentiment out of which the civic virtues have developed; but that is narrow in its object, and implies a hostile attitude to all who are outside the tribe. In civilized States clannishness interferes with patriotism.

There is needed, then, a large production of wealth as an elementary condition for the development of a high type of communal virtue; but the wealth must be well distributed if benevolence and loyalty are to be diffused throughout the population. Men cannot have State-virtues without a strong and definite State-consciousness; and this they cannot have if they are very poor. A man suffering from great poverty

can no more have strong political interest than can a man suffering from painful disease. In such a country as Russia was under the Tsars there could be no State-consciousness outside the *intelligentsia*. The poverty-stricken and ignorant 90 per cent. of the Russian population had no public sentiment, except some sort of barbarous devotion towards the 'Little Father' and the national religion. Recent events have shown how poor a substitute that was for civilized patriotism. But patriotism cannot be strong in a proletariat anywhere.

§ 4. Considerable wealth is necessary also for a high development of the domestic virtues. Man's family life is quite transformed by the material prosperity which comes with civilization. The ordinary home has three main elements—wife, children, and a settled place of abode. In respect of all of them a higher level of moral experience is made possible by the acquirement of wealth.

The lowest savages are of course not wanting in parental affection, otherwise the children would not survive; but this side of character is greatly developed by material prosperity. The children cease to be causes of painful labour and anxiety; the parents can take pride in their beauty and pleasing qualities, and can devote themselves to training them as citizens.

As to women, their position is quite transformed by the establishment of the home. We are so accustomed to home comforts and luxuries that we do not realize how much we owe to them, and what an influence they have even upon the physical appearance of the race. Why are civilized people more pleasing in appearance than savages? Why are the lowest savage women indifferent to ornament and hideously ugly? The explanation lies in the establishment of the home. The women of wandering hunters have no opportunity to beautify themselves, nor have they homes to which adornment can be given. They have therefore no æsthetic value. But among people possessing settled homes there comes into activity a principle of sexual selection which is impossible among low savages. A civilized man chooses his wife with

some reference to good looks and to her power of making a nice home. Operating through ages, this principle has been able to modify the appearance of the race.

The establishment of the home, then, adds enormously to the importance and appreciation of women, and therefore influences all matters of morality in which women are concerned. The rules of domestic morality are, so far as they have to be observed by women, rules which are necessary to feminine dignity and usefulness; while they are, so far as men are concerned, rules which are necessary for respecting the rights and susceptibilities of domesticated women. The Australian savages have definite rules of sex-morality; they are very severe against incest, for example: but their ideas of decency are so different from ours that it is impossible for Europeans to live in association with them. The Eskimo, who have homes, have rules which differ from those of the Australians; but they also differ greatly from ours, because their homes are very different. In an Eskimo dwelling all privacy and reserve is impossible, and this affects their notions of decency; they treat as indifferent much that we think immoral. Close association with them by a European family would be almost as impossible as with a group of Australian natives.

So much for the domestic virtues which have relation to persons. There are also virtues which have relation to the home in its local character. They may be seen at their best in domesticated women; but men also have no small share of them. A civilized man is not satisfactory unless he has some home-sentiment—unless he has some attachment to his dwelling-place, takes an interest in its convenience and beauty, and is ready to work for it or to defend it against enemies.

§ 5. With things as they are now in our country it is not necessary to spend time in proving that economic conditions have a great influence upon all the qualities that are connected with self-respect. Among us the mere acquirement of wealth raises a person's self-respect. I think it ought always to do so; but at present self-respect is influenced by property to an excessive degree.

The other factors contributing to self-respect are social position and personal accomplishments, both of which are influenced by economic conditions. In our community social position is connected too closely with possession of riches; and yet in all communities throughout history those who have acted as leaders in politics or in war have been, relatively to their neighbours, rich men. Since the establishment of a truly national civil service in our country there has been much change in this respect. We have among us men possessing great power, and enjoying high consideration, who are not wealthy. No doubt in the future social position will be less and less dependent upon wealth. But there always will be some connexion; the most democratic of States will never allow its leaders to be really poor. By 'personal accomplishments' I mean all sorts of knowledge and skill. They depend upon a man's own efforts, but the indirect influence of economic conditions is also very great. A poor community must be an ignorant community, if only because intellectual accomplishments are not greatly in demand. And, however wealthy a community may be as a whole, an individual citizen who is very poor has little leisure or opportunity for learning.

Apart from the self-respect which is purely individual there is also family pride, which counts for much in morals. Families which possess inherited property acquire belief in themselves, and establish a tradition of good behaviour. Family pride is apt to take on some odious or ridiculous forms; as when members of distinguished families rely entirely upon their past, and neither perform useful services nor acquire valuable accomplishments. But upon the whole it is an influence for good, conducing to self-restraint, scrupulousness, and delicacy of feeling. It is much encouraged by the possession of a fixed and well-appointed home, which testifies to the care and good taste of its occupants.

§ 6. If wealth is upon the whole conducive to virtue, the proprietary instinct must be good; it should be encouraged in those in whom it is lacking, and trained and directed in all. Educationists are well aware how important the instinct is for

the development of character. Children have a natural pride and self-assertiveness which should be encouraged in due proportion. One method of encouragement is to give them things of their own, in accordance with their special tastes—to one child a fishing-rod, to another a doll's-house. Sad is the lot of children who have no loving elders to give them gifts.

One may take for granted that the proprietary instinct must be encouraged in all classes of the population, not merely in the favoured few. It is a cause of misery and public danger that there should be large sections of the population possessing no property; no piece of land to cultivate, no secure settled home to beautify and tend, no store of useful and ornamental things in which to take pride. Children who grow up under such unfavourable conditions cannot be expected to become good citizens; they have no fair chance to develop either the public or the private virtues.

The evil results of possessing too little property are, and always have been, much greater than those of possessing too much; but the latter are, so to speak, more spectacular, and have attracted the attention of moralists. And so in the history of morals there have been periods of reaction against all property. But what is needed rather is regulation of the instinct; it must be directed towards proper objects, and not allowed to grow to excess. The objects of property which have the best moral influence are those which are made by the owner, or manifest in some special way good elements of his character. As regards little girls, for example, two dolls may be intrinsically the same; but if one has been made at home, the possession of it will have a better influence than that of the other which has been bought at a shop. The hypertrophy of the instinct usually is caused by its becoming connected with two others—the love of display and the love of power. These do not have much influence upon children as regards the acquisition of property; but they do influence older people. The remedy lies in the thorough socialization of the individual in a moral sense. In the course of moral education citizens should be taught that their desires for

display and power must be kept to their proper sphere, and made subservient to good purposes; and that it is inexpedient to gratify them by an immoderate accumulation of material goods, or by establishing excessive claims upon the produce of the labour of the community.

§ 7. To regulate the proprietary instinct by means of education so that men may not even desire to be very rich, even if they have the opportunity, is very necessary at the present time, when individual fortunes are larger than they have ever been in history. In countries where industry can be organized on a vast scale, and there is not a high level of mental and moral qualities among the population, opportunities are given to individuals for acquiring excessive quantities of wealth. The enormous fortunes which can be made by industry and speculation are disquieting facts. Probably they are due to causes which are transitory. So long as they operate, however, they are evidence that there exist some undesirable qualities, both in the masses of the population who are exploited and in the capitalists who take such excessive advantage of their opportunities.

There is no matter about which moralists are more perfectly agreed than the evils of great concentration of wealth. The evils are most obvious in regard to the poverty which it causes. Modern wealth does not consist so much in actual accumulation of material goods as in claims upon the productive energies of the community; and so far as these are expended for the benefit of a few, so far must the majority be stinted. The logical situation of a wealthy mansion is that it should be surrounded by slums.

It is more timely, perhaps, to emphasize the moral injury which great wealth inflicts upon its possessors. It may be less difficult for a rich man to be virtuous than for a camel to pass through a needle's eye, but he certainly has a hard task before him. Some of the demoralizations of wealth have been lashed by the satirist ever since the beginning of literature, especially excessive indulgence in physical pleasures; what Aristotle called the tastes of Sardanapalus. Other sorts of vices are those which are encouraged by the possession of

excessive power. Wealth is power, and it is not good for character to possess excessive power of any kind. Napoleon was wont to say that ordinary moral rules had no validity for such a man as he; and many other powerful men act upon the same conviction, though they may not declare it so openly.

There is an ancient tradition, which is hardly true at the present day, associating great wealth with patriotic service. There were good reasons why this was so in the ancient city-State. Defeat of the State meant ruin for its inhabitants, and certain impoverishment for wealthy families. There was also a time-honoured custom that wealthy men should volunteer for expensive public services. Conditions have been changed greatly by the establishment of large nation-States. At the present day there are no 'leitourgiai' (i.e., voluntary public services), or none which cannot easily be evaded. It is common now for rich men to increase their wealth in times of public distress by taking advantage of the necessities of the community.

Speaking generally, we may say that great wealth encourages a spirit of egoism which is antagonistic to public devotion and to zeal for social reform. To many minds it seems shocking that the heir of a great estate should expose his life in battle like a common soldier; his riches make his life seem precious, like the life of a Kaiser's son. "Let wealth and commerce, laws and learning die, but leave us still our old nobility." This famous couplet of the seventh Duke of Rutland expresses perfectly the logical attitude of the hereditary rich. As a class they have a direct interest in the perpetuation of poverty and ignorance among the majority who are subject to their domination.

CHAPTER XVI

SEX

(1) Sex has contributed much to progress, both previously to the evolution of man and subsequently. (2) The sex-instincts are necessary to the full moral development of the individual. (3) Their best satisfaction is in monogamous marriage. (4) The well-recognized rules of sex-morality are restrictive rules, tending generally to the success of marriage. (5) The observance of restrictive rules is much affected by economic conditions.

§ 1. THE sex-side of morality is one which moralists are rather shy of discussing. Not only is it difficult to form right judgments about it, but anything that one does say is so liable to be misunderstood. However, it cannot be omitted from this survey of 'circumstances,' in view of its powerful influence upon the formation of moral systems and its importance for public and private happiness.

Sex is an element in human experience which is much older than property; it has influenced the development of biological forms far below the level of man. But it is discussed in this Part subsequent to property because our conduct in these matters is so greatly influenced by economic conditions.

The lowest forms of life have no special reproductive organs, propagating by fission. Reproductive organs become necessary when creatures acquire the power of movement, because creatures with specialized organs of locomotion and perception can no longer divide themselves in order to propagate. It is not necessary that the sex-characters should be dicecious; each individual may be bi-sexual.

In the subsequent course of biological evolution sex has had much influence in developing both physical and mental qualities. In low-grade creatures, if the individuals are unisexual, the males are usually smaller and shorter-lived than

the females, and their functions are more special and less important. The primary biological use of sex is to cross the strains of a race, and so to effect the mixture of qualities which conduces to vigour and gives opportunity for variation; and the male animal at first seems to be little more than a device for crossing. Among relatively higher creatures, however, we find that the males are usually larger, stronger, more active, and more ornamented than the females. How has this change come about? We must answer, Mainly by sexual selection. There comes a point in the evolutionary process when the males compete for the favour of the females. They do this in two ways—by displaying attractions and by fighting against each other. We see this very plainly in birds. Among domestic fowls, why is the rooster so much handsomer than the hens? Why does he show them attentions, calling them up to share a piece of food? Why is he so large and strong and courageous and armed with spurs?

We cannot doubt that the same cause has contributed greatly to human progress. Among the groups in which our very primitive ancestors lived there must have been rivalry between the males such as we see in farm-yard life. Sex-competition has had a powerful influence in raising the level of physical and mental qualities among men. It is still active in advanced society; in fact, it grows stronger with every advance in the intelligence and self-respect of women. This is what Lester Ward called gyneclexis, meaning the selection of men by women. To this influence of sex we owe the development of the distinctively manly virtues.

Concurrently there operates another cause which Ward called andreclexis, or the selection of women by men. This begins when the work of the sexes has become clearly differentiated. Among very early men there was probably much less difference between the sexes than there is now, because less difference in their work. Feminine work is specialized when home-life begins, and women begin to have their own crafts, accomplishments, and attractions. Then begins a process of selection of women by men, which has

contributed greatly to the development of all the higher feminine qualities.

§ 2. There are two main sex-instincts—those of mating and of parentage. Though closely allied, they are not identical, because many persons who have much of the former are destitute of the latter. I think it may be said that both of them are necessary to the full moral development of the individual.

This is most evidently true of the parental instinct. A man who has no desire for children and takes no interest in them is not a fully satisfactory citizen. In women the ill effects of celibacy and childlessness are very marked; it is only the best natures that escape serious deterioration. When children show the instinct definitely, as little girls do when they take assiduous care of their dolls, one may make a favourable prediction for their moral future.

The mating instinct is much older than the parental, is more widely diffused, and has subtler reactions upon the rest of our life. Its aberrations cause grave mischief, and so it has been unduly decried. But the moralist has to show how great its influence is upon the development of morality and culture.

The masculine virtues which are most plainly connected with the mating instinct are those of manliness in all its forms. Even among boys, long before maturity, it is desirable that there should be some sex-interest. In schools there is often much trouble with premature and misdirected manifestations of the instinct, but experienced educators do not approve of boys in whom it is definitely wanting. These are erratic or feeble characters; their influence in the school is not good, and they are not to be encouraged. At a later age maturity of the sex-elements of the body is accompanied with a notable increase in size, strength, enterprise, and courage. This fact must be explained biologically by the conflicts of the males for the favour of the females, such as may be seen in any herd of cattle.

It is not only the fighting qualities of men which are influenced by sex; its influence is hardly less upon their

intellect. General intellectual ability has great value as an element of sex-attractiveness, so that young men who are susceptible to female influence always try to display their wit and mental accomplishments almost as much as their physical powers. The general superiority of men to women in respect of intellectual enterprise, inventiveness, and accuracy is a secondary sex-character.

In order that a man may be virtuous as a citizen, it is necessary that he should feel benevolently disposed towards the whole mass of his fellow-citizens. Now, in addition to the main instinct which makes women attractive to men, there is a curious by-instinct of sex-antagonism. It may be observed very plainly in bachelors and old maids, and has had no small influence upon our social arrangements and legislation, and even upon academic institutions. In sex-deficient men there is nothing to counteract it, and they tend to become misogynists.

If a man has fine manly qualities, fine intellectual qualities, and is well disposed towards one-half of the human race, he is favourably situated for leading a good life. On the other hand, sexless men suffer from grave disadvantages. In tribal societies unmanly individuals are greatly despised. Advanced societies can find good use for them, if they will consent to be used. But generally they suffer from inferiority-complexes, and cannot in any case expect to reach leading positions. Such public virtue as they may possess must be of a humble, unassuming kind.

It may be thought that men who are excluded from sex-experience are likely to find compensation in literature and art; but this is not so. Most of the arts in their origin are closely connected with sex, and those which have other origins are connected with war and manly achievement, and therefore are influenced by sexual motives. Nearly everything that is artistically beautiful has some suggestion of sex in it. This may be said of all the arts which can be used for adornment, and also of music. Much even of the music of religion is coloured with sex-emotion.

It is through understanding of the value of sex that

modern people find the idea of castration so loathsome. Where no moral issues are involved, as with domestic animals, we view it with indifference. It was common in the ancient Roman world, in the East until recent days, and in modern Italy till the latter part of the eighteenth century. It seems to us now to indicate the prevalence of a low standard of morality.

What has been said about the value of sex in men applies with even greater force to women, because this element is even more directly important in their life.

§ 3. The predominant conviction at present is that the sex-instincts find their best satisfaction in durable monogamous marriage. Many forms of marriage have prevailed at various times and places, and the earlier researches of anthropologists threw doubt upon the old belief that monogamy was the original form. Later researches have tended to bring us back to the old belief. The Eskimo, for example, who are a very primitive people, have monogamy with occasional seasons of licence. But, however it may be with early human history, men are at the present time growing stronger rather than weaker in their adherence to the monogamous system; the more advanced Mohammedan countries, such as Turkey, where polygamy is allowed by law and ancient custom, have become predominantly monogamous. There are many reasons in favour of monogamy, one of the weightiest being that it is the best system for educating children. Anything of the nature of polygamy certainly weakens the tie between spouses, whereas the business of education demands the closest union between them. Everything which increases the need of education increases the reasons in favour of monogamy.

The sex-relationship is intrinsically a very difficult one; and no system exists, or can even be imagined, which does not involve some maladjustment and suffering. A strictly monogamous system brings with it the consequence that a considerable fraction of the population is denied sex-experience altogether. The disproportion in the number of the sexes alone makes this inevitable, and there are economic

causes contributing to the same result. All that can be aimed at is that as many as possible of those who wish to marry should have opportunities of doing so; and that marriages should be entered into under circumstances which are as favourable as possible for the main work of marriage, which is the rearing of the new generation. However favourable the conditions may be, there is much hard and trying work connected with young children. And the work is made more difficult and its success endangered by evil conditions such as poverty and bad housing.

§ 4. It is evident from the foregoing considerations that sex-virtue, in the full sense of the term, includes many positive elements, and that these are more important than any others. But for obvious reasons attention hitherto has been drawn more to negative or restrictive elements. One or two of these I will now speak of, by way of indicating how I think the whole matter ought to be treated.

Granting the desirability of marriage, we must desire also certain conditions under which alone marriage can be successful in modern life. Let us speak now of continence. The demands which are made for conjugal continence are based upon powerful instincts, which must be satisfied if the spouses are to be happy. The first and most important condition for a successful marriage is female reserve, which is demanded by the husband from the wife. The instinct which is here in question is marital jealousy, a very ancient instinct much older than humanity. It can be observed among many of the higher animals, and among birds such as domestic fowls. Its general effects are salutary, though in some characters it is carried to excess. There have been modern societies in which it has been weakened; in eighteenth-century Italy for example, as might be illustrated from certain passages in the life of Lord Byron. But it is not weak anywhere in Europe at the present day.

The observance of female reserve is mainly a response by woman to the reasonable claims of man; it is also supported by personal pride. This has an instinctive basis in the natural coyness of female animals, but it needs to be

reinforced by the various motives which women have to maintain a self-respecting attitude. Savage women have much reserve after marriage, when they have gained an assured position; though in many societies they are wanting in reserve before marriage. But in civilization the observance by women of pre-nuptial reserve has an obvious bearing upon the subsequent attitude of their husbands, and therefore upon the success of the marriage. This is especially important where, as in upper-class society, the wife has great responsibilities, and both spouses must devote themselves earnestly to the training of the children.

Next for the restraints upon men. In marriage the chief restraining influence is wifely jealousy. This is now instinctive in the European races; but it does not appear among animals, and is only weakly developed, if at all, among many non-Europeans. Mohammedan law allows four lawful wives; among African negroes it is usual for the husband to take a second wife when the first is growing old. But, as civilization has advanced and the position of women improved, wifely jealousy has come to have more influence upon conduct. And the change in practice has been recognized in England by recent reforms in the law of divorce.

Continence on the side of men answers to reserve in women, and, like it, is in part a response to a reasonable demand from the other sex. But it is also prompted by recognition of the fact that for the sake of the home and the children men must submit to much restriction. Most highly civilized men have also a general admiration for the character of good women, and a repulsion from those of irregular and incontinent life. This may be observed especially in very young men. It is instinctive, and illustrates once more the fact that there may be in a single individual reactions to an object attracting and repelling him at the same time, so that there may be uncertainty which of them will prevail. The attitude of Joseph to Potiphar's wife may have been due to a good education; but he is equally likely to have acted quite naturally, as many another young man has done.

Speaking generally about sex-restraint, we may say that

there are two contrary errors to be avoided. One is to look on sex as a necessary though somewhat degrading weakness, or as a cumbrous and ill-contrived method of repeopling the earth, in regard to which a man can show virtue only by turning resolutely away; the other is to ignore the need of moderation and inhibition. The fact is that we need the instinct for virtue, but must limit it, and under some circumstances (as those of ill-health) deny it satisfaction altogether.

§ 5. A person's ability to observe restrictive rules which he recognizes as salutary must depend partly upon the force of the impulses which are to be restrained, partly upon his restrictive power. It can be shown that in both these respects the economic conditions of a society have much influence. Those who hope to effect reform in sex-morality must give attention to maladjustments in the distribution of wealth.

Poverty acts in the direction of strengthening the sexual impulse, for the following reason. In any race of creatures which is much exposed to the attacks of enemies, the reproductive instinct must be powerful in order to counteract the wastage caused by the enemies. Hence the extreme productivity of rabbits. In man poverty takes the place of destructive enemies in the field of animal life. Working-class families have a hard time when the children are young and burdensome; they would not face it if instinct were not imperious. Those who have foresight and are sensitive to hardship limit their offspring most rigorously, and so the population is increased by persons with less self-restraint.

Now let us turn to the influence of economic conditions upon restrictive power. It is weakened by extremes both of wealth and of poverty. In rude conditions of society very little self-restraint is exercised by powerful men—a fact well known to students of savage life. The same may be said of many royal persons in civilized societies, like those of England and France during the eighteenth century. As Sir Walter Scott remarked, "Full easy is the wooing of a king." Now rich men in modern communities are in a position of great power, which is always likely to be abused if they are

brought into relation with people so poor as to be unable to resist pecuniary temptation.

The power of self-restraint is weakened in both sexes by poverty; or perhaps one ought to say that it is only under good economic conditions that self-restraint is acquired. Poverty means ignorance, ignorance means want of foresight, and foresight is indispensable to self-restraint. Poverty is also injurious to self-respect. It may seem an invidious thing to say, but it is a fact that female reserve in Europe is largely a matter of social position. Women of good position are seldom wanting in this quality. It is true that there have been notorious exceptions in the highest places; but those were women who were wealth-demoralized, or thought themselves justified in despising conventions, like Catharine of Russia. The best way of strengthening female reserve among the masses is to improve the economic conditions generally, and the position of the women in particular. If every working-woman were free from material anxieties, if her work were honoured and adequately remunerated, if she were free from all trammels of servitude in her relations towards husband and relatives, employers and fellow-citizens, her dignity would be increased. And with increase of dignity there is always increase of reserve.

Part III. Moral Psychology

CHAPTER XVII

THE SELF

(1) The primary fact of moral psychology is the self. (2) The human self is spiritual, unitary, extensive, and dependent for its distinctively human qualities upon community-life. (3) Good qualities are encouraged in the self by association with a mature community; (4) while mature institutions are practicable only if citizens have good personal qualities. (5) The individual self, though dependent upon the community, should have some separateness from it.

§ 1. LIKE other parts of our spiritual life, morality may be studied psychologically; that is, as one of the functions of the self, standing in relation to other functions which are non-moral. The study is indispensable for moralists—at least, if they wish to form theories which will be useful for moral education and statesmanship. Educators and statesmen are concerned with much the same matters, in spite of their difference of position. The educator works to improve character, but always must have regard to existing institutions; the statesman works to improve institutions in order to improve character. But, utility apart, psychology altogether is worth studying for itself, if anything is. The human self is the most valuable object within our range of direct experience—indeed, the only one to which we can attribute intrinsic value—and we cannot know too much about it.

The primary fact which the moral psychologist has to recognize is the existence of the self, or ego, or personality. If the conscious self is to be treated as unreal, the moralist has no object of study; for mere outward behaviour does not concern him. The behaviourist does not solve the problems

of ethics; he abolishes them. The self must be recognized no less for working out all the details of a psychology of morals. The feature of moral conduct which has continually to be kept in view is that it shows internal regulation. Internal regulation implies an internal regulator, for which 'self' is the most convenient term.

§ 2. In chapters which follow I will speak of qualities of the self which can be viewed separately, such as energy, intelligence, and power of regulation; in the present chapter I wish to speak of qualities which are general and belong to it as a whole. The following are the most worthy of mention: the self is spiritual, has unity and continuity, and has extent or quantity; it is also dependent, so far as regards its distinctively human character, upon community-life.

To say that the self is spiritual is no more than to say that it is psychic, or has a mode of existence and activity such as we ascribe to the soul, and different from that which we ascribe to material things. For present purposes it is not necessary to offer a definition or description of matter; every one has already a sufficient notion of how material things exist, and what they can do. What material things cannot do is to show purpose; that is, to have desires, to foresee what is going to happen, and to adjust behaviour so as to satisfy desire. This is a quality which we find in everything to which psychic life can confidently be ascribed. The human self has much more than this, but it has at least this; otherwise there can be no such thing as moral experience.

The self is unitary, both in the sense that it feels, thinks, and acts as one at any given point of time, and in the sense that it has continuity through successive periods of time. Both kinds of unitariness may be impaired by disease. A self may be split or dissociated, so that its spiritual elements, whatever they may be, do not function harmoniously at any one time; or there may be breaches of continuity, so that the agent does not know what he did on a preceding occasion, or is even definitely in opposition to his previous line of conduct. It is by consistency of purpose that the unity of the self is

usually displayed. When a person manifests at one hour a purpose which is inconsistent with his purpose of the previous hour, we suspect him of suffering in some measure from dissociation.

The self has extent or quantity; it is not like the Euclidean point, which is currently defined as having neither parts nor magnitude. I do not think that this will be questioned so long as it is made plain that extent and quantity are not to be understood spatially. The terms are apt to be misleading, because it is so difficult to disconnect them from space; but here we ought to understand them spiritually or non-spatially. The work of modern psychiatrists has brought home to our minds the great extent and complexity of the self.

The foregoing are psychic qualities which we share with animals, and are indispensable pre-conditions of moral experience. The self has also other qualities which are distinctively human, and are manifested in morality. They are qualities of will, of intelligence, of affection, and of valuation. These we have because we are social creatures. The qualities of will and intelligence, such as they appear in man, are needed for community-life; they do not, and could not, appear in creatures living solitary lives. The qualities of affection and valuation are even more evidently social; for they are directed mainly upon our fellow-men. But these points need not be argued further in view of the assumption—which is basic to the present work—that morality, like all the rest of our higher experience, is essentially communal.

§ 3. Human characters are improved in their unitariness or consistency and in their extent or richness by association with a good community. Some persons are wanting in mental stability, and cannot lead consistent lives under any circumstances. But much depends upon the community to which they belong. A man has good opportunities of moral consistency when he can adopt a scheme of life according to which he can work steadily without being drawn in different directions by opposing interests. This is possible when there exists a community such as to evoke his loyalty, and when he can find work in it to which he can devote himself without

reservation. But this cannot be if the community is badly organized; for example, if the arrangements are such as tend to the aggrandisement of some limited section of the citizens, while disregarding the welfare of the majority. A despotism or a close oligarchy is not a form of government which is well suited to attract devotion; nor is it one under which a man can feel sure that faithful service will be suitably rewarded.

Richness of character also depends largely upon native gifts. Some selves are born poor; they suffer from what the French call *misère psychologique*, and remain spiritual paupers under conditions where better natures would grow rich. Low savages cannot be otherwise than poor; a wandering hunter leads a life which is limited to a simple round of interests. We may say the same of many workers in civilized countries whose occupations are narrow and monotonous. A man is favourably placed for self-expansion when he belongs to a society in which there are many various occupations, and when he can vary his occupation; or, at least, take an intelligent interest in the occupations of his fellow workers. He loses greatly when he is limited rigidly for long periods to a single line of work. A community would find it worth while to make arrangements for varying the occupations of its citizens, merely for reasons of spiritual welfare.

The work of the moral educator is to help his pupils in respect both of consistency and of richness of character. He may regard himself as successful when he has brought the pupil into such a condition that he can associate himself in the work of a good community, if there is one existent at hand. But if the community itself is unsatisfactory, his efforts can have but moderate success. He may do much during the pupil's years of pupilage to unify his scheme of conduct, and to extend his interests; but the pupil's later experience, when once he enters upon worldly life, will tend towards inward conflict and spiritual poverty.

§ 4. Now let us move to the standpoint of the statesman. The most difficult part of his work is concerned with introducing reforms. For this he needs to be a practical, if not a

scientific, psychologist. He must form judgments as to whether the level of character in the community is high enough to allow a proposed reform to be introduced, and as to what the psychological effect of the reform is likely to be. Advanced institutions cannot work well if the majority of the community is backward. If premature advances are made, the result may be retrogression. This should make us cautious in criticizing what is being done, for example, in Russia and in India.

It is a condition of the success of advanced institutions that the citizens should be on the average men who live consistently, and upon whom firm reliance can be placed. They must be men who do not need constant supervision. They must be intelligent enough to understand the general plan of their work, and sufficiently devoted to the public welfare to dispense with a close and fettering adherence to rules.

And the citizen of an advanced community should have wide and varied interests, otherwise he will not understand the lives of those who are above him, nor of those who are below him. In a State where the main power is put into the hands of the masses, the various classes cannot afford to be strangers to each other's way of life.

In practice all this means that the spread of democratic institutions must be conditioned by public education. It is impossible for a genuinely democratic system of government to exist in an illiterate country. Whatever the form of government may be, actual power will be in the hands of a few, because there can be no genuine public opinion.

§ 5. Association with a good community, then, is the chief condition of spiritual welfare. But it must be observed that there cannot be any advanced development of selfhood unless the individual can separate himself in some degree from his community. A civilized person is not fully developed unless he has powers of criticism and self-determination; he must be able to pass judgment upon persons and institutions around him, and must be able to settle his own course.

The lower we go down the scale of development, the less

independence we find among gregarious creatures. The individual ant or bee has little more than physical separateness from its hive-fellows; savages are much more hive-like than civilized men. The civilized man's need of separateness shows itself both in the institutions and in the wants and habits of civilization. Less advanced communities are rigid and intolerant in their uniformity. The conditions of the life of savages are such that they cannot allow to individuals much independence of thought and action. In advanced communities there is more freedom, both political and social. 'Freedom,' as it is used most commonly in reference to politics, means self-government; but in another sense it means that the individual has some rights as against the coercive power of the community. An advanced community is hardly possible without much individual freedom.

Thus there is a sense in which it is desirable that each man should live his own life. This explains why civilized men feel an instinctive need of privacy and, in some degree, of solitude. Without in the least becoming anti-social, the highly civilized man tends to dislike crowds, and to crave for some quiet place where for a few hours daily he can be quite alone. Total solitude, such as men endure in prisons to-day, is a dreadful thing; but almost as dreadful would be the prospect of being continually with others, especially if they were of unsympathetic character. Such was the fate of inmates of debtors' prisons a hundred years ago, as we may learn from *Pickwick*.

The close observer of social life will notice many manifestations of the desire to be private. The more civilized people are, the more they dislike noise and the intrusion of other people into their thoughts. Their manners in public are restrained and self-effacing. Not that they are humble, but they wish to preserve themselves from unnecessary interference, and not to inflict themselves on others. They like separate homes for their families; if possible, a completely self-contained dwelling-place. Even in family-life it is only the young children who like continual society; those who are older want to have some time alone. Continual society

has a stunting and coarsening influence upon character. Each person should have one room at least to which he can retire. The economic and domestic arrangements of a community are not fully civilized unless they give opportunity to satisfy the need of privacy which is felt by civilized men.

CHAPTER XVIII

INNATE QUALITIES

(1) Under the term 'innate qualities' are comprised faculties and instincts. (2) Instincts are the chief motive forces of our life. (3) Most of them should receive satisfaction, though they need to be controlled and harmonized. (4) Our instinctive nature is plastic; it can be changed for the better by improvement in the conditions of life

§ 1. THE qualities which belong to any particular self are either innate or acquired. Important as the qualities are which come from education and training, the innate qualities are more important still. To use Galton's well-known terms, 'nature' counts for more than 'nurture.' This fact should be recognized by those who are concerned with the ordering of social and political institutions, and by those who have to assign position and employment to the citizens.

It is possible that a time may come when governments will accord more recognition to psychology, and when systematic arrangements will be made for ascertaining the natural endowments of citizens in the interests of the public service. If that is done, the work must be entrusted to educators, who will then have to undertake new and grave responsibilities. It will be their duty, not only to train their pupils, but also to study and report upon their characters with a view to their subsequent employments. Such reports would be not unlike those which are made as a matter of routine in the British Army. Qualities of character are all-important for military service, and they receive due mention in Confidential Reports by commanding officers. The system evidently is capable of being adopted widely in civil life. But that would require that educators should be in the position of public servants.

For present purposes innate qualities may be classified into faculties and instincts; the former are more general, while the latter are directed towards specific objects. As

examples of 'faculties' may be mentioned intellectual gifts such as quickness of apprehension, retentiveness, accuracy, imagination, and generalizing power; artistic gifts; and qualities which are generally called 'moral' (though they are really neutral in that sense), such as natural courage, tenacity of purpose, dislike of change, enterprise, and emotional excitability. Often it may not be easy to distinguish them from instincts; the difference lies in degree of generality.

Innate faculties are very important for morality, but the importance is indirect. We do not praise or blame men morally in respect of them. But for moral reasons it is most desirable that persons should be placed in positions for which their faculties suit them, and should be excluded from positions for which they are unfitted. For example, a man who is weak in imagination should not occupy a political or educational post in which imaginative power is necessary for efficiency. Round men in square holes are not only a social nuisance, but are in a situation of moral danger both to themselves and to others.

Instincts may be described as inherited directions of our faculties. For the most part they have come down to us from a remote antiquity. Psychologists have now learnt to make a full application of Darwinian principles to this part of their study. Man must have inherited from his pre-human ancestors mental no less than physical qualities. The behaviour of animals is evidently determined in the main by instinctive motives. And so it is likely to be with man.

Professor McDougall's definition of instinct has won general acceptance. He says it is "an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class; to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object; and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action." He offers an enumeration of the chief human instincts, which seems to me to have the defect that it is drawn too much from introspection. I venture to

think that we get a better enumeration if we consider what are the chief environing circumstances of human life. Corresponding to everything which welfare requires us to pursue or to avoid, we have groups of instincts. For example, food is necessary to our life; we have, therefore, a group of food-instincts, which have reference to the procuring and consuming of food. So with the other main circumstances which interest us, such as comrades, enemies, family, home, and property; towards each of these we have the reactions that have been found to be salutary in the history of the race. To each there correspond, not one instinct merely, but a number of instincts, tending to keep the agent in a right relation towards the object. Towards property, for example, there is the primary instinct of acquisition: there are also various subordinate ones; men instinctively take pride in their property, make provision for storing and preserving it, and defend it against aggression.

§ 2. "Instincts," says Professor McDougall, "are the prime movers of human activity." This statement seems to me almost self-evidently true as soon as we understand what instincts really are. The individual is, and has been for ages, surrounded by certain kinds or classes of objects which are necessary to his welfare, his political community, his friends, family, property, and so on. Towards each he naturally feels a favourable interest; the opposite to that which he feels towards enemies. I am going to argue in a later chapter that our higher life is composed of interests which occupy us in turn in the course of our normal existence. These interests are impossible without the appropriate instinctive basis. If a man is wanting in the mating, parental, and domestic instincts, he is not fitted to undertake family life, and that great interest must therefore be closed to him.

§ 3. We are not denying human free-will nor taking a low view of morals if we argue that man's main instincts ought to receive satisfaction, and that no personal scheme of life or system of public institutions is good in which important instincts must be suppressed. We need not be slaves to our instincts, but they supply the materials out of which our

careers must be constituted, and if we extirpate these natural motives we have no others to fill their place.

These remarks apply to our main instincts, but not to all the rest. As the circumstances of human life change, some instincts, which were formerly salutary or at least inevitable, come to be obsolete, and have to be greatly modified or suppressed altogether. One of these is racial or tribal enmity, which still exists strongly, but is at present mainly injurious. Such usefulness as it still has seems to consist in stimulating communities to rivalry in contests which have good results, such as those of international or inter-university athletics. Another bad instinct is cruelty; that is, pleasure in causing or witnessing suffering. Every one who knows children well must recognize this as a primitive instinct, which is probably connected with the desire for power. Its manifestation upon a large scale and as a recognized element in the social system may be studied in Blasco Ibañez's novel about Spanish bull-fighting, *Blood and Sand*. What its utility may have been among our ancestors is a matter of conjecture, but we have no use for it to-day.

There remain the instincts which are admittedly useful. So far from being in servitude to them, it is our duty to regulate and harmonize them. Few men are born with a duly proportioned instinctive inheritance. As a rule, a man who indulges some instinct excessively interferes with his neighbours. We see conspicuous examples of this in the proprietary instinct, where the overgrown accumulations of one man mean deprivation for others. Nor does this excessive indulgence make men happy. Hypertrophy of the proprietary instinct, such as we observe among misers, is notoriously unfavourable to happiness. Even the best of our instincts need careful regulation. The parental instinct, for example, may reach such strength that it becomes a hindrance to virtue. We see cases of this in mothers who let themselves get so absorbed in their own children that they are unmindful of all public duty, and even of the just claims of those immediately around them; a course of action not really conducive to their own happiness, nor to the

welfare of the children. What we have to aim at is such a scheme of life that our various main instinctive tendencies shall be, all of them, well developed each in its due proportion, according to the agent's sphere of social usefulness and to the special mental conformation with which he was born.

§ 4. In Professor McDougall's otherwise admirable treatment of instinct there seems to me to be some over-emphasis upon its permanence and rigidity. Our instincts certainly are very ancient and enduring; but that is mainly because the objects to which they are directed do not change. There is great possibility of change in living creatures, even in regard to their bodily structure; we know this from experiments upon a certain species of toads which can be modified by being transferred from a terrestrial to an aquatic environment. As human life changes our instincts change also. It may be objected that all this is excluded by Weismann's doctrine of the non-transmissibility of acquired characters. But if Weismann was right, it is difficult to see how a race can acquire anything. Some civilized persons have certain instinctive tastes which are impossible for savages, such as collecting objects of art. And there are many other examples which are less striking.

It is important for moralists to recognize that instincts are plastic, because the moral improvement of a population is accomplished largely by the establishment of new instinctive reactions. Certain vices, for example, which were commonly practised in the ancient world have become almost extinct, because, without any need for exhortation, they have come to be regarded as loathsome. And so of some virtues which we may hope to see established in the future, especially in regard to public duty. They will never become firmly established until there is a natural feeling of disgust towards the personal characters in whom they are lacking.

The agency which is to effect these desirable changes in instinct must in great part be education. But it is necessary to point out that considerable changes in instinct are not possible, nor indeed desirable, unless there is a corresponding change in the conditions under which men live. Take, for

example, the instinct of cruelty, which no one defends to-day, though probably it had some function in the past. One may conjecture that it had utility in two ways—in dealing with enemies and in eliminating useless members of the tribe. Savages are continually fighting, tribe against tribe. Naturally, therefore, they take pleasure in killing their enemies. At the same time they live so close to the margin of subsistence that they cannot afford to feed useless mouths. Naturally, therefore, they take pleasure in suppressing them. To such people it is useless to speak of the detestability of cruelty; there must be a change in their environment. Tribal war must be brought to an end, which can be done only by the establishment of large political systems; and the production of wealth must be increased, so that the community can afford to support some non-producers.

Similar arguments apply to other instincts which are very frequently developed to excess, such as that of property. When there is a possibility of acquiring property, but when it can be acquired only by much effort and there are too many competitors for it, it is almost inevitable that men should be grasping. This is generally so among the agricultural population of Western Europe; as Alphonse Daudet says somewhere, *C'est si rapace, ces paysans.* The main remedy must be to increase the *per capita* production of wealth—that is, to have more goods produced, though not increasing proportionately the number of consumers; while at the same time making arrangements to restrain individuals in whom the proprietary instinct persists with atavistic violence. Then, probably, a sentiment will grow up which will make moral exhortation in that matter superfluous. Average decent Englishmen will loathe the grasping characters which are now so common in our commercial life as they loathe the Spanish cruelties depicted in *Blood and Sand.*

CHAPTER XIX

INTERESTS

(1) Human life, so far as it is purposive, is made up of interests which are based on instincts. (2) Our lower interests are directed towards objects which subserve merely individual satisfactions; our higher interests involve unselfish appreciation of objects. (3) Unselfish interests, which are indispensable to a good life, are facilitated when men are well placed socially and have a good political and social environment.

§ 1. ALL our purposive doing may be regarded as made up of interests, which we satisfy with more or less regularity. It is our interests that give continuity to our lives. Each one forms a system which is both volitional and cognitive, and usually endures for many years. Most of our interests have reference to the basic facts of life, such as bread-winning, family, and so forth, and these are the most lasting. But every man who is successful in the management of his life has some less vital interests in which he takes pleasure and pride. There are gradations of value among our interests, both the greater and the lesser; some have much intrinsic value, others none. However, before considering on what grounds we value interests, let us proceed a little further with psychological analysis.

Our main interests are based on instincts; it is in this manner that instincts come to have so great an importance for moral experience. In themselves they are not moral. There is no morality in the conduct of the ox which keeps close to the herd and is unhappy when out of its company. Nor is there any value in the mere gregariousness of men. But an anti-gregarious man is unfitted to take a full share in the world's work, because he cannot take part in ordinary social interests.

Interests must be directed upon objects; whereas instincts,

or at least instinctive tendencies, exist before the agent has come into contact with the appropriate class of objects. The maternal instinct in girls, for example, shows itself at such an early age that it must have been there in a latent form from birth, ready to spring to life on the first occasion. But we cannot say that a female has a maternal interest unless she has children or similar objects upon which the interest can be directed.

It is through interest that we ought to explain 'motive.' There has been some controversy about the relation between 'motive' and 'intention.' Intention seems to refer to the proximate, motive to the remoter, purpose of the agent; as when my intention is to call upon a friend, and my motive is to discuss the purchase of a dog. This motive must stand in relation to an interest which I take in dogs—probably an interest of long standing. When we know what a person's main interests are we can predict with confidence the motives which are likely to influence him on any given occasion. And it is in relation to interests that we estimate the value of motives. When conflicting motives A and B impel us in different directions, we say that motive A is worthier than motive B because it belongs to a better interest.

§ 2. Now for the ground upon which we judge interests to be high or low. The lower interests are those directed towards objects which subserve our merely individual existence and satisfy our physical needs, such as food. These are interests which we share with the animals. There are also interests which are indirectly selfish, as when a man bends his mind towards some trade from no other motive than that of maintaining his individual existence. Every one would admit that such interests are lower than an interest in politics, even though he might not be able to say exactly wherein the difference lies.

The valuableness which characterizes our higher interests depends both on the quality of the object of the interest and on the agent's attitude towards the object. The interest is a high one, or has intrinsic value, if the object is intrinsically valuable, and is regarded by the agent as having intrinsic

value apart from its ministering to his merely individual satisfactions. The value of the object and the agent's attitude towards it may be definitely moral; such objects are the great institutions and organizations within which we live, and such should be our attitude towards them. But, in addition, there are interests which, though they do not deserve the name of moral, are not low, because the agent takes them up in an unselfish way. Consider, for example, some amusement, such as whist. There are elements of value in a man's interest in whist if he plays it with much regard for the fine points of the game, or views it as a means of coming into kindly social relations with his neighbours. On the other hand, the player's interest in whist would not be a high one if he played merely to win money which he meant to spend upon himself.

§ 3. It will not be questioned that it is indispensable for a good life that a man should have good interests. This is self-evident as regards our more important duties. If a man cares nothing for country, family, or social institutions, he can be good only in some very restricted sense. But it is also desirable that men should have interests which may be called higher, even though they do not deserve to be called moral. A man is raised in his self-respect and gains respect from his neighbours if he is interested in intellectual matters, or in some form of art, or even in some physical pursuit or sport such as fox-hunting, in which admirable qualities of mind and body can be displayed.

The objects towards which men's interests are directed are mainly, though not entirely, personal. In the early life of man, interests could hardly have been directed towards other than personal objects, unless perhaps men had sentiments towards the caves or shelters in which they lived. A civilized man takes interest in persons regarded individually, such as his relatives, neighbours, and employers; and also in persons regarded collectively or as members of organizations, such as nations, cities, political parties, churches, and economic bodies such as trading firms. Moreover, he takes interest in lifeless things, in animals, and in places such as

houses and the local district in which he lives. There are few men who do not also take interest in classes of things such as pictures, music, fine scenery, and so on; or in pursuits, such as fox-hunting.

This being the meaning of interest, it is easy to see what conditions are favourable to a rich development of interests; they are an environment in which there are plenty of objects in which interest can be felt, together with good opportunities for the agent to take up interests.

An agent is favourably placed in regard to interests if he has an adequate supply of wealth, but not an excessive supply. Another favourable condition is some fixity of residence and of employment. Great fixity, as when a family is planted in exactly the same place for more than one generation, is unfavourable, because the element of variety is wanting. But too much change is still more injurious. A man who is always a 'rolling stone' can acquire none of the habits of loyalty and devotion which grow up with long service. If he changes his abode frequently, he can form no home-sentiment nor pride in his locality. The moral advantages of a steady and comfortable abode are seen especially in the case of children. For reasons of moral education it is very important that there should be fixity in the objects among which they are reared—in their homes, neighbours, and places of education.

Important as are these private conditions, it is political and social institutions which have the most decisive influence upon the development of interests. It was the merit of the old city-States, such as Athens, that they provided their citizens with plenty of objects for which devotion could be felt. Under modern conditions, with our huge national States, it is not so easy to make life interesting. And yet life must be made interesting if a high moral level is to be reached.

It is a fatal fault in any form of government or society that it is dull. Every reform of political organization which induces men to think about the State and its institutions, every step towards the democratization of industry, every

extension of art, science, and literature in which wide circles can share, every extension of pleasing pursuits grave or gay, makes it easier for men to form interests and to add to the vividness and usefulness of their lives.

CHAPTER XX

THE DYNAMIC ELEMENT OF MORAL EXPERIENCE

(1) Moral experience is dynamic, (2) manifesting conation, (3) and volition. (4) To attain moral excellence requires great dynamic qualities; while great power of action is seldom possible without high morality.

§ 1. THE next three chapters will deal with the analysis of moral experience, in the sense of considering what psychic elements are included there. It must be borne in mind that we cannot expect to see as much separateness between the elements of the psyche as there is between the chemical elements of substances. The moralist, however, often finds himself compelled to use language which suggests more separateness than really exists.

Moral experience includes an element of energy. The life of man is dynamic throughout; and morality is eminently dynamic, just because it is the most important part of our life. The self has dynamic qualities both of higher and of lower order, the latter of which we have in common with animals, the former belonging to man alone: all of them are requisite for moral experience. The higher kinds of moral experience, especially, require great energy; the agent must live strenuously, have great control over himself, and much power of influencing others.

In what sense, it may be asked, can we use the term 'energy' as applied to psychic activity? Does it imply that the soul has energy which is co-ordinate with the energies of the material world, and can be measured by the methods of natural science? Surely not. Psychic energy manifests itself in forms which are quite different from physical energies, and cannot be subjected to physical measurement. It may, however, appropriately be termed 'energy,' because it interacts with the physical energies of the body. The soul directs the

movements of the body and regulates the bodily energies, restraining or releasing them according to its purposes. Therefore it must itself be 'energetic.'

§ 2. For the lower dynamic faculty of the self I shall use the term 'conation'; the higher faculty is 'volition.' Though volition is to be distinguished from conation, the two have much in common. When a man is exercising volition, he is striving or conative, but is also manifesting a further faculty. While volition belongs to man alone, animals have conation no less than ourselves. Conation is a quality which we do not attribute to other than animate creatures; we do not use the term for plants, still less for lifeless things. Lifeless things may display energy, but not conation. The body as a mere physical structure has energy of the merely physical kind. Conation occurs when an animal directs its bodily energy for the accomplishment of its desires in accordance with purpose.

Many scientists in the past, and not a few even at the present time, refuse to recognize anything in the life of animals beyond physical energy. The insuperable difficulty which meets them is the fact of purpose. Animals are purposive in the same sense that men are, and they direct their energies in accordance with their purposes. Purpose involves foresight; the purposive agent must arrange his action in anticipation of coming events. Now, anticipation is not a faculty which we are justified in attributing to lifeless things; indeed, it does not seem to be possessed by creatures other than those which can move spontaneously.

This enables us to give a definite psychological meaning to the statement that moral experience is conative. When we consider moral experience as a process going on in minds, we see that it involves what are called 'principles,' which are settled schemes of thinking and acting for the regulation of conduct. We speak of a man as having good or bad principles in regard to some pursuit in which he is interested, such as the management of a commercial business. Now, principles imply purpose and foresight. An agent who acts according to principles must manifest also the higher striving

element which we call 'volition'; of this I will speak presently. But he must at least manifest the lower element in virtue of which he looks ahead, and arranges his movements accordingly.

§ 3. Now for will or volition in moral experience. Unlike conation, this does not seem to be found in animals. What makes the difference between conation and volition is not fully agreed by psychologists. It is agreed, however, that volition is something which is peculiar to man. I put forward the theory that the faculty of will is one which comes into being as a result of community-life. It is, primarily, a quality of human leaders. All leaders, even leading wolves, have to form plans of action which they carry out with the assistance of subordinates. Dogs evidently understand the plans of their masters, and co-operate in them—a faculty which they must derive from their primitive mode of life. The characteristic difference of the human leader is that he has to form plans which are much more extensive than those of animals, and therefore he has to influence subordinates to co-operate long before the time arrives for carrying out the plan. I think that volition may be said to exist when a person in pursuance of a plan deliberately puts pressure upon others to carry it out. This is the outward-directed exercise of will; and it is probably the earlier form. But in all well-developed characters there is also an action of the agent upon himself. In his dealings with subordinates he always meets with opposition; he has to beat down the obstinate and refractory, and to urge forward the slack and timorous. So also he must contend with himself. He will have fits of irritation which he must suppress; and of nervousness and depression against which he must fortify himself. There is not very much of this inward effort among simple people; but it increases as conscience is formed, and as men acquire the faculty of introspection.

It will be universally admitted that moral experience involves volition in this inward-directed sense. Almost too much stress has been put upon "self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control" as elements of moral virtue. But, if volition is

part of moral experience at all, it must be directed outwards as well as inwards. It must include the habit of putting pressure upon other selves, to induce them to take certain lines of action.

Moral principles, then, consist in part of a certain habitual direction of the will. It is the same with moral experience as with other kinds which are remote from morality. For example, the fisherman's experience is partly cognitive; he must have the requisite skill, and generally 'understand' fishing, but he must also have a regular will to fish. Ancient thinkers, especially Plato and Aristotle, were weak in their recognition of this side of moral experience; but it has got justice from most modern moralists.

§ 4. A character which is dynamically weak can never attain to high moral excellence; those who would excel need active powers of every kind. Life is a strenuous affair when it is lived worthily; we need a large supply of crude physical energy, we need the quick decision and unfaltering execution which bold and clever animals display, we need strong desires which are carried out by means of enduring purposes, and we need volition.

It will not be questioned that we need volitional force so far as the inward-directed part of morality is concerned; a weakly self-indulgent attitude is not consistent with virtue. But it may be questioned whether a good man needs to have great volitional influence upon others. I think that he should, provided that the influence is of the right kind; if it is of the wrong kind, we must judge very differently. It is because men in high position have so often misused their strength that moralists have overlooked the value of this particular kind of gift. Misused strength has an injurious effect upon the characters of those upon whom it is exercised, demoralizing and weakening them. Napoleon, for example, was strong in the sense that he could get his own way all the years that his good fortune lasted; but he did not educate his subordinates. The case is very different with men who are serving well as members of a good system. It is a condition of their usefulness that they should act upon their subordinates favourably,

encouraging, directing, and correcting them. Thus they exercise a strengthening influence, training the younger generation through precept and still more through example.

With certain reservations, we can maintain the converse of the foregoing argument, and say that a great dynamic career is hardly possible without high morality. Napoleon may be quoted in opposition ; but he really owed most of his power to a cunning utilization of energies which had their source in revolutionary enthusiasm. This is certainly true of all the constructive and beneficent part of his life-work. Most of the bad men who are powerful are powerful in one direction only —for evil.

The power which any person in public office enjoys depends upon his ability to influence subordinates. A man of imperfect moral character is always so far selfish ; and, so far as he is selfish, his mind is narrow and his plans contemptible. Therefore he is not served with devotion, and cannot have much power of action. If he is the unworthy head of a fine institution, he must in great measure thwart the purposes of the institution. This might be said of Napoleon in the later years of his rule.

Every organization of persons is in one aspect an organization of will-power. When the purposes of the organization are not good, the power which is developed is low, relatively to the energies of the members of the organization taken as individuals. When the purposes of the organization are good, and it is well led, great power is developed, because the members throw themselves into their work with undivided minds, and give their best to it. All the members of the organization gain greatly in their dynamic qualities as individuals ; the leaders most of all. Even a man who does not seem naturally strong can exercise a surprising influence when placed in a leading position, if he gains the moral confidence of his subordinates.

CHAPTER XXI

UNDERSTANDING IN MORAL EXPERIENCE

(1) Moral experience contains a cognitive element. (2) It implies understanding of separate objects, including minds; (3) of collective objects or totalities; (4) and of rules. (5) Moral progress is impossible without intellectual invention.

§ 1. No moralist of any school will deny that there must be a cognitive or 'understanding' element in moral experience. The mistake in the past has been to make too much of it, and to neglect the non-cognitive elements which are equally or even more indispensable. Plato, Kant, and Hegel all speak as if morality can be reckoned as a kind of thinking. If, however, it is necessary to prove that moral experience must have an element of understanding, I should do it by pointing out that morality, as being communal, must be concerned with objects; and, in order to deal with objects in any moral relation, they must be known or understood.

The objects which we have to understand in moral experience may be classified thus—as separate things and persons, as totalities or collective objects, and as rules. Of the three classes the first and last need no explanation. A person who has the mental power to grasp any system of moral principles (such, for example, as the Ten Commandments) must be able to understand the persons and things about which they speak. It is equally plain that moral experience is concerned with general rules. Totalities or collective objects alone need some explaining. They are not mentioned directly in the Ten Commandments, but they are implied there. The Jewish Law implied a certain social system which it was the duty of the individual not to injure by selfish or inconsiderate action. The more highly developed a society is, the more important are the objects of this class. We have to-day not only our civil State or community, but all kinds of subordinate public

institutions, to which our service is due. A person is not a fully moral agent unless he has mental power enough to grasp such totalities. The moral education of schoolboys consists largely in training them to this kind of understanding. When they enter a school they have very little comprehension of the school as a whole. As they grow older they learn to understand it and to work on behalf of it.

§ 2. It is so evident that morality implies understanding of separate objects that no more needs to be said about the matter in general. But there is one particular class of objects to which special attention may be called—namely, the minds of persons. Understanding of minds is implied in the Ten Commandments. The commandment against false witness, for example, has meaning only for an agent who understands what effect veracity or unveracity has upon the minds of those with whom he has to deal.

Of all the cognitive elements in morality, the understanding of minds is the most important. There are persons whose grasp of rules and totalities is very weak, and yet they may understand the minds of those around them and be morally good. Conversely, there are persons who are well able to grasp rules and to direct their conduct by them, and yet are morally unsatisfactory because their understanding of minds is imperfect. Some of these persons pride themselves upon their consistency, and stand by their favourite rules without reference to the minds of their neighbours; but usually the moral value of their action is small.

This kind of moral experience is based on instinct; that is, the instinctive sympathy or understanding which gregarious creatures have of each other. Morality is something which supervenes upon gregarious mutual understanding. Under very simple social conditions, where people live together in a small group without much contact with wider surroundings, the individual is usually very sensitive to the minds of those about him, and therefore considerate of their welfare.

Under the conditions of civilization, where division of labour is carried so far, men lose the instinctive contact of minds and tend to drift widely apart unless care is taken to

bring them together. Education is the chief agency for this; a great part of the moralizing effect of education consists in its improvement of our power of understanding other minds, especially those which are remote from us in space and time. But even education can have little influence if general social conditions are unfavourable. Conditions under which the mass of the population is exposed to suffering are unfavourable to sympathy. Suffering men can have very little sympathy to spare for others. On the other hand, it is difficult to raise the level of sensibility in the upper class if they are surrounded by miserable people. This may be illustrated by a trivial example. In the large towns of Scotland slum children may be seen walking barefoot in the depth of winter. At first the south-country stranger is shocked by their misery, but soon grows callous. In civilized communities the conditions which are most favourable to sympathy are a good level of welfare throughout society; an absence of specially sheltered or privileged classes, so that every one is liable (though not actually subjected) to common human misfortunes; good institutions, so that there are not many who suffer by the fault of others; and a high level of morality, so that there are not many who suffer by fault of their own.

§ 3. For the higher kinds of morality it is necessary that persons should understand collective objects or totalities which are much wider than the narrow circle with which they are directly in contact. Even when the agent knows all the persons who form a totality, as a child knows his family, some mental grasp is necessary to apprehend it as a whole; there must be understanding of its work or function; but with institutions of any considerable size a further effort is needed. This may be so even in a barbarian clan, which often comprises more persons than the ordinary clansman can know personally. In civilization, where there is a political State with institutions of many kinds included within it, the individual citizen can know personally but a small fraction of those who are comprised within the objects of his loyalty; the rest must be supplied by imagination. Furthermore, most of the institutions which interest us are viewed in

practice as including persons still unborn. Founders of colleges, for example, must be persons whose imaginative power far transcends the limits of the here and now.

The need for the mental power of understanding totalities and of completing totalities imaginatively increases with civilization. Under primitive social conditions men have an instinctive loyalty to their community which impels them to act on its behalf, especially in the way of fighting. But this is not enough for civilized life. It is not enough now even for war; still less for the works of peace which grow more important continually. In order to perform their share of public duty, modern men must have wide understanding and strong though disciplined imagination, and this is impossible without education.

§ 4. We come now to that kind of understanding which is connected with rules. The Ten Commandments are rules in this sense, and it is plainly necessary for a moral agent that he should be able to understand them. But certain questions of detail relating to this kind of understanding are matters of discussion.

In regard to rules of action generally (not moral rules only) we hardly realize what an immense mass of cognitive matter they compose, because in ordinary life they are so seldom put into language. Rules of skill and craftsmanship are almost entirely unsuited to articulate formulation. Rules of morality, or general moral resolutions adopted by the individual, are mostly inarticulate; their expression in language is not often useful, and may sometimes be dangerous. They may not even be present with full consciousness to the agent's mind. Nevertheless they are forms of cognition.

Indispensable though they are, rules have only a secondary importance in morals. What is of primary importance is that the agent should have certain interests directed towards certain objects. The origin, value, and meaning of moral rules are entirely dependent upon such interests. This is so, in particular, as regards the cognitive aspect of moral rules. We must have an intellectual grasp of human character and

institutions if rules of moral action are to have any real meaning for us.

The function of moral rules is to give consistency and definiteness to our moral life. Persons who are wanting in rules may have some admirable moral qualities, but they will be too much like children of nature. There are persons who speak the truth habitually to one person because they like him, but are untruthful to another whom they do not like. In such a case the agent has no understanding of the general effects of unveracity, nor any corresponding rule of conduct. We need rules especially for dealing with matters where our affections are not engaged, especially for dealing with strangers, as we are continually called upon to do in all wider spheres of action.

The place of general principles or rules in moral experience may be understood well by considering the relation of law to morals. The laws of England, for example, consist of a body of precisely formulated rules on matters which fall within the moral sphere, though not more than a small part of our duties on these matters can be expressed in legal form. Laws are, or ought to be, an expression of the moral consciousness of a nation. And they are very useful, though not indispensable, for the guidance of conduct, especially when a man is dealing with persons and situations which are strange to him.

§ 5. It is possible to take the term 'understanding' in a sense still wider than that which has been kept in view so far in this chapter, as including intellectual invention. This would not be in conformity with current usage, and might be regarded as extending the term too far; but some recognition is needed in ethics of the creative side of our intellectual life, and some term is needed which will cover invention as well as knowledge in the ordinary sense. Intellectual invention has its place in moral experience. The most familiar forms of invention—the activities of the mechanical inventor, the scientific theorist, the artist, and the literary man—are separate from morality. But there must be invention of a certain kind when moral advances are made. The matter

might be illustrated from any one who makes any sort of advance upon the morality in which he has been educated; but most strikingly, perhaps, from those who put forward new proposals as professed moralists. Take, for example, Plato in the *Republic*, or Zeno. Both these thinkers advocated schemes of life which were widely different from the practice around them. And their schemes were efforts of intellectual construction which needed great powers of mind.

There are vast numbers of undistinguished persons who make, or at least desire, improvements in the moral systems in which they find themselves. It is by this means indeed—by the unnoticed efforts of great numbers of people—that moral progress is made, more than by the proposals of epoch-making reformers. But, however this may be, invention will always be needed if there is not to be moral stagnation or decay. And so we may be sure that the conditions which depress invention and creation generally will depress it in morals. If a nation is very poor and ignorant, if it is subject to alien conquerors, if its internal system of government is unfree, if its intelligence is dominated by some organization which is committed irrevocably to a fixed system of ideas, then invention in matters of morality is checked. In such a condition it can hardly be hoped that the existing moral level will be maintained. There are in modern society forces which make for regression as well as forces which make for progress; and when the latter are weakened, the former are likely to prevail.

CHAPTER XXII

AFFECTION AND VALUATION

(1) In moral experience there are elements of affection, (2) and of valuation.

§ 1. In addition to the dynamic and cognitive elements of moral experience there are others which must be recognized—those of affection and of valuation. But to recognize them we must go somewhat beyond accepted psychological views. Most psychologists have adopted a three-fold classification of psychic elements—namely, conation, cognition, and feeling. But neither affection nor valuation is suited to be classified under 'feeling,' if that is meant to include also sensation and pleasure-pain. Nor can affection and valuation be put under conation or cognition, though they imply both striving and knowing.

We cannot imagine a moral agent without affections. For the most part they are directed upon objects external to the agent; mainly upon his fellow-men, either as individuals or as organized into communities: and these are the affections which are most plainly indispensable to moral experience. But there seems to be an affectionate element even in self-regarding virtue. A man who has self-respect thinks about himself with a favourable interest. The term 'self-love,' however, which was used so commonly by the eighteenth-century moralists, is not well suited to express this attitude of the agent towards himself; because love, I think, is always outward-looking: perhaps a better term is 'self-regard.'

When we speak of 'affections' in moral experience we are naturally understood to mean positive or favourable affections; and these are much the more important. But there exist also negative affections, or dislikes and hatreds, which are implied in moral experience. A man who admires and likes one type

of character must necessarily dislike the opposite type. Even if he does not actually meet such unpleasing characters, he must dislike them in imagination.

Professor McDougall, in treating this part of psychology, speaks of 'sentiments' rather than of 'affections.' His term has the advantage that it evidently includes the negative as much as the positive; for we speak of a 'sentiment of dislike' no less than of a 'sentiment of liking.' But I think it is better to keep the term 'sentiment' for well-established or relatively permanent affection. We meet a man once and like him, and then after several meetings we have a sentiment towards him. Only we must note that repetition is not really necessary to establish a sentiment; it may be of instantaneous growth, like that of Romeo for Juliet, or that of a mother for her new-born babe.

§ 2. In moral experience there is, I hold, also an element of valuation. Valuation is affection plus something further. Animals have affections, but we cannot credit them with valuations. In valuation the agent recognizes in the object something which is intrinsically valuable, and not something which is merely attractive by instinct or conducive to his own interest or pleasure. In a later chapter (on the Judgment of Intrinsic Value) I will try to explain this experience more fully. At present I only wish to maintain that it must be recognized as an element of morality.

In recognizing the element of valuation we get still further away from current psychological doctrine. To justify fully the position which I have taken up would need too long a digression. Valuation I regard as a distinctively human experience; in fact, as the thing which above all distinguishes man from the creatures beneath him. Therefore we ought not to regard it as merely some kind of animal experience superficially changed; nor should we make difficulty if we cannot find a place for it among the kinds or classes into which we divide animal experience. A distinctively human kind of experience may require a new classificatory division of its own.

As a rule, the objects which we regard with affection we

also regard as having intrinsic value. The members of a man's own family, for example, he loves upon instinct; but usually he also believes that they are valuable in themselves. But this is not always so. There is a story of Verga about a woman who lavished affection for many years upon a tortoise. And cases are common of persons who devote themselves to such objects as lap-dogs and imbecile children; though, usually, they profess to find imaginary good qualities in creatures which are apparently worthless.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND MORAL JUDGMENT

(1) The moral consciousness is the self's faculty of moral experience.
(2) Moral judgment is the active expression of the moral consciousness.

§ 1. 'MORAL consciousness' is the term which I propose to use for the faculty of moral experience, or for the self as exercising that faculty.

To speak of a faculty of moral experience does not commit us to the mistakes of the faculty-psychology, which has over-emphasized the separateness of our faculties. There certainly is a difference between the faculties of the self, such as those of morality, cognition, and artistic experience; but there is not a definitely marked separation. The chief source of error is to think of these differences too much in spatial terms. We go wrong if we picture to ourselves the various human faculties as separate, like the drawers in a cabinet or the departments in a government office. Everywhere in the mental and moral sciences we have to guard against spatial thinking.

From the faculty-psychology there has been some reaction to the other extreme—that of questioning all distinctions. Hegelianism has contributed to this with its principle of finding a synthesis to reconcile all antitheses. But we can make no progress with psychology unless we recognize the distinctions which experience really forces on us. A sound theory of the moral consciousness should recognize that we find in it an element which occurs nowhere in the lower levels of human life, and still less in infra-human creatures.

§ 2. Now let us consider the moral consciousness in action. The self in its moral activity, as in its other faculties, is never entirely at rest. We can see proof of this in hypnotic practice. Hypnotized patients cannot usually be

made to do things contrary to their moral principles; and during ordinary sleep one may observe in his own experience a certain morality. This may be said also of our cognitive powers. But, just as in cognition there are times when consciousness is active in a more special sense so that we say that the agent is judging, so also in morality, when the agent is morally active beyond his continuous, unremitting activity, we may say that he is exercising moral judgment.

(Moral judgments) considered as distinct acts, (are the units of moral experience,) just as cognitive judgments are the units of cognitive experience. Here again we must not be misled by spatial associations. Most of the units of our common experience are spatial units, which have local separateness from each other. So also it is with the ultimate units of matter which we call atoms. But there are no such definite units of consciousness. What we have are rather distinguishable "pulses" of experience without clearly-marked boundaries. They give us a sense of change when they occur; we feel a new impulse of energy or a change of direction; but in morality, for example, they are units mainly in the sense that we cannot distinguish any smaller elements of which they could be composed.

In speaking of (moral judgment) we must be careful to recognize that it (is an active or dynamic experience even more than one of intellect. It is not to be regarded as being typically a judgment or criticism which an agent makes upon a situation that is set before him, such as a judge pronounces in a legal trial.) (The typical moral judgment is rather one which is pronounced by the agent about himself in reference to future action;) a situation arises and the agent determines to do something about it. St. Peter formed a typical moral judgment (an unfortunate one) when he decided to deny his Master. (Socrates formed a moral judgment when he decided not to withdraw himself from justice after sentence had been passed upon him.) It is only an imperfect or partial moral judgment which is not combined with action.

Unless the faculty of (moral judgment) were (used primarily for self-direction) it would have no utility, and therefore we

could not explain its origin. But having come into existence thus, it can be used otherwise. Hardly less useful than self-judgments are those which we pass upon the persons immediately around us in the way of approval or of disapproval. By a further extension we gain the power of judging acts and characters which are remote from us and in regard to which we have no opportunity of direct action. Because of the intellectualist associations of the term 'judgment' we are tempted to the fallacious view that such unpractical judgments are the typical expressions of the moral consciousness.

CHAPTER XXIV

NORMS AND IDEALS

(1) The conduct of all active creatures is regulated from within by the self. (2) On the pre-moral plane creatures exercise inhibition. (3) In man the faculty of inhibition comes to be used for moral purposes. (4) Moral agents regulate their conduct by a norm; (5) it is the possession of a moral norm which distinguishes moral agents from those who are incapable of moral experience. (6) There are also social norms which regulate the conduct of bodies of men. (7) Regulative moral systems which are objects of aspiration are termed ideals. (8) Ideals have utility even if unpractical, especially in less mature communities. (9) The process of moral education, viewed psychologically, consists mainly in the formation of norms and ideals.

§ 1. We come now to the question how conduct is regulated. In the first Part of this Outline there is an account of the system of virtues, or moral system, which seems to me to be suitable to a mature community. How, as a matter of individual psychology, does a moral system regulate an agent's conduct? How are our moral judgments, as we form them from minute to minute, brought into conformity with a moral system existing externally to us? My answer is, By means of norms and ideals, which exist primarily within the minds of personal agents.

We cannot doubt the general fact that the behaviour of living creatures is regulated from within.

In recent years physiologists and biologists have come to admit how difficult it is to explain the facts of their sciences without recognizing some agency other than the forces of physics and chemistry. Both the vital processes of animals and their behaviour are unintelligible unless we assume that there is in them a regulative power which we do not find in lifeless things. This is so even in bodily processes, such as digestion, circulation, and respiration, which proceed normally

without any interference from ordinary consciousness. For this reason biologists have invented the theory of Vitalism, which assumes that the elementary processes of our bodies are regulated by a vital power. Vitalism is said to be different from Animism, which assumes the existence of a soul, though it is not easy to state exactly the difference between the theories.

At a higher level, when we are considering action that requires full consciousness, it seems utterly impossible to avoid recognizing a regulative power. Any one who has watched, for example, a hunting cat must see that its action shows regulation throughout. It forms judgments about the character, distance, direction, and movement of its prey, and corresponding judgments about its own movements; in accordance with these judgments it controls its energies, releasing them, inhibiting them, and regulating them in respect of quantity, direction, and time. Vitalism may or may not be adequate to explain the lower vital processes, but it seems quite inadequate to explain the processes of purposive movement. Here we need to assume the existence of a self; that is, a central entity which can understand and act, and has power to manage the whole organism.

§ 2. Morality is one form of self-management, which has both a positive and a negative side; that is, it involves both doing and abstaining. Let us consider the latter first. The basis of our power of moral abstention is infra-human; it is the faculty of inhibition which we see below the level of man. Some of the higher animals, such as cats and dogs, have great inhibitive power; when thoroughly domesticated they refrain from stealing and from other conduct which is objectionable to their masters. In this respect they seem to get very near to a sort of morality, though the most scientific observers of animal behaviour do not credit them with knowledge of right and wrong. One part of the inhibitive power which cats possess seems due to the fact that in their native state they have homes or lairs, which for reasons of comfort and hunting-efficiency must be kept clean. Another part is probably due to the fact that they mate in pairs which continue

together in enduring association, and so must exercise self-restraint towards each other in the matter of food. The self-restraint of dogs seems to be due to their gregarious co-operative way of life and their habit of deferring to leaders. Creatures such as horses, cattle, and swine, which have none of these motives, show little evidence of self-restraint.

As being creatures who live in domesticated families and also work in co-operation, men experience in combination those motives of inhibition which we find separately in cats and dogs. Little children have to be trained to inhibition in the nursery, long before they can be reckoned as moral agents. A certain percentage of children are born so defective that they can never acquire this pre-condition of moral life, and so are unfit to become members of society.

§ 3. Children, who in early years are taught to inhibit from non-moral motives, come later to exercise their inhibitive powers in the service of morality. If inhibitive power is weak, the agent, whatever good qualities he may possess, cannot lead a satisfactory moral life. This is brought home very strongly to any one who has to deal with the members of our prison population. Some of these unfortunates have very amiable qualities, but cannot resist ordinary temptations. Their inhibition is weak, as it is in young children and also in savages, who never can be trusted fully. With normal children inhibition becomes stronger with their growth, and this is one reason why their early lapses should not be remembered against them.

It is by reference to inhibition that we ought to explain what Aristotle called 'enkrateia,' or continence. The chief matters about which men show lack of self-control are property, sex, alcohol, and anger; we have certain natural tendencies to action in these matters, and when we fail to regulate them we are incontinent. Of incontinence Aristotle gives a characteristically intellectualist explanation, which seems to be as follows, though his statement of it is confused. When men and animals act, he says, they have before their minds two premisses—one general ('Such-and-such things are to be done') and one particular ('This is such a thing').

Action follows from the union of these premisses, as an intellectual conclusion follows in an ordinary syllogism. But with an incontinent man passionate desire causes him to disregard or temporarily forget one of the premisses, so that he yields to his desire. This is what Aristotelian scholars call the 'practical syllogism.' It shows that Aristotle regarded action based upon syllogistic principles as being the primitive type, and impulsive action as diverging from type. At the present day no psychologist would accept such a theory. Impulsive action, which under certain conditions is incontinent, is the primitive type, and the inhibitive power is a later acquisition. All human beings, except the lowest idiots, have acquired some inhibitive power; most men have enough for ordinary social purposes; no one has more than a limited amount. For example, no one ever committed suicide by ceasing to breathe, however much he may have desired to die. And when inhibitive power is acquired, it need not depend upon apprehension of a general principle or major premiss; unless we hold the opinion, which seems to follow from Aristotle's doctrine, that animals have so much intelligence as this implies.

Indispensable as inhibition is, too much praise may be given to it: to use an American phrase, it cuts no ice; it only prevents us from cutting ice, when that is not desirable. In the *Hippolytus* of Euripides the hero more than once draws attention to the fact that he is the most continent of men. Setting aside the appearance of egoism in Hippolytus's declarations, we feel that he is putting the emphasis in the wrong place. Early moral exhortation always makes too much of the inhibitive or negative elements of morality; more important are the positive interests which move us to action.

§ 4. The regulation of conduct which we see in normal human agents is something far beyond animal inhibition. It implies positive doing as well as abstaining; it has will, intelligence, and valuation, which are distinctively human. But what I wish to speak of now is the systematic aspect of moral regulation. A moral agent must have in his mind a system

(composed of volitional, cognitive, and valuational elements) according to which he regulates his conduct, and which has a certain conformity to the system of objects in relation to which he acts. The conduct of an animal is, of course, systematic; but that of a moral agent is much more so: his system is bigger, has more elements, and is more powerful. To such a regulating system within the agent's mind I propose to give the term 'norm.'

We can illustrate the meaning of 'norm' from spheres of action other than morals. Grammar is a systematic arrangement of speech which is needful for the communication of meaning. To speak grammatically implies at least two things: that there should be a recognized grammatical system which the speaker has learned to comprehend, and a system in the speaker's mind. The latter internal system need not conform exactly to the external; but there must be a great measure of conformity, otherwise the speaker will not make himself understood. So also in quasi-moral matters, such as politeness; there must be a current recognized system of manners, and the agent must have his own internal system according to which he behaves. There is a close analogy between a norm of politeness and a moral norm. Every civilized man—indeed, every savage—has a standard of conduct towards his neighbours in matters where the minor morality which we call politeness is displayed. If he acts against it, he has the same compunctious feeling as when he acts against his moral norm.

It is the moral norm which is meant by the term 'conscience,' as commonly used. The mistake to avoid about conscience is that of regarding it as a heaven-sent faculty or infallible monitor, and as something quite special to moral experience. The fact is that we have norms or consciences for every part of our conduct which needs regulation—a grammatical conscience, an artistic conscience, a sporting conscience, and consciences which are displayed in craftsmanship and workmanship. They are so different that a person who is conscientious in one department may be lax in another, like François Villon.

Another current term is 'moral sense.' The objection to this is that it suggests that we possess a special sense for morals, like the senses which belong to seeing and hearing. The moral norm is rather a system of elements—intellectual, conative, and the rest—which belong to the central part of the self, and have no corresponding sense-organ. It is no more appropriate to speak of a moral sense than of a sense of politeness or of good workmanship.

§ 5. The possession of a moral norm is one character which distinguishes a moral agent from persons who have no moral capacity and are not responsible in the eyes of the law. Such are infants and persons of gravely defective endowments, imbeciles, and the like, who are said to have no moral sense. In regard to ordinary moral agents, we may be sure that they have norms, even though they cannot talk about them or even think about them clearly. It is not necessary at all that a man's regulative moral system should be formulated by him in definite terms. Men use standards of all kinds, moral and otherwise, long before they become able to formulate them. Many elements of morality cannot be formulated at all; and yet an agent may know just what to do in respect of them.

The moral norm is not to be regarded as a luxury, nor as an object of aspiration; it is an absolute necessity for men who live and work together in society. Co-operation is impossible unless the conduct of the co-operators is under regulation. In a matter so complex as our social life, the regulation cannot merely be imposed upon the agents from without, but must come from within. This is true of every stage of society. There are moral norms among savages, no less than among civilized men—though, of course, they are very different from ours, because of the difference in the circumstances under which they live. The same is true even of criminals, who are often spoken of as if they had no morality at all. This is an utter misunderstanding. Criminals in part are people who have ordinary moral standards, but are incontinent; in part they have standards which differ from the ordinary, though they serve the purpose of regulation. Michael Davitt

(a political prisoner) says in his book on prison life that average thieves and pickpockets express detestation of certain crimes—of some forms of blackmailing, for example. 'Honour among thieves' is not a mere phrase. Some sort of morality is necessary for any form of human co-operation, honest or dishonest.

How strong a spiritual force there is behind the norm of conduct is shown by its effects upon our hedonic experience. When a man acts up to his norm he has an immediate sense of satisfaction. When he acts in sharp opposition to it he experiences a mental conflict which shows itself in shame and remorse. This, in common language, is the pain of a bad conscience. For happiness, as opposed to hedonic feeling, which is more or less transitory and occasional, conscience has still greater importance. When an agent fails repeatedly to conform to his norm, the stress becomes so great that the norm is modified—or, in common phrase, his conscience is blunted. If his conscience is not blunted and he still disobeys it, he cannot be happy.

§ 6. So far I have spoken of moral norms existing in the minds of individuals. We may speak appropriately also of 'social norms' in the sense of moral systems which regulate the conduct of the community regarded as a whole. There are so many different kinds of men and so many classes in an extensive community such as ours that it would be hard to state in definite terms what the moral system is which the whole community observes. Nevertheless, there is a great measure of agreement as to what is morally desirable in our relations towards each other; and a system is not the less real and powerful because it is indefinite.

We come to something which is rather more definite when we consider the norms which belong to various subordinate bodies within our community, such as professions and trades. These differ not a little from each other and from the general standard of society. For example, there exist among solicitors and physicians certain standards of professional practice which are to some extent formulated as codes of etiquette or professional honour, but in the main are tacitly recognized and

handed on by tradition. These traditions are most important for the welfare of professions, and no professional man, however callous or froward he may be, is wholly unaffected by them.

§ 7. Now let us consider the regulative systems of moral ideas which are called ideals. The difference of ideal from norm is that it is more a matter of aspiration. The norm is strictly necessary; an ideal is something of a luxury. Pick-pockets and savages regulate their lives by norms; but there is no reason to think that they cherish ideals. Norms can do their work with little talking: ideals too often are matters of display; preachers preach about them under the term of 'counsels of perfection.' Those who cherish ideals think of themselves as they would wish to be and to act without the limitations, imperfections, and compromises which circumstances or their natures force upon them. The distinction between norm and ideal is usually not clearly marked; most civilized men hardly know whether the standard by which they profess to guide themselves is really effective, or whether it is an aspiration for Sabbath days only.

Besides the personal ideals of which I have just been speaking, there are also ideals which may be called social or communal. They are composed mainly of ideas which have been put forward by religious teachers, philosophers, or literary men, and are viewed with approval by a great part of the population, if not universally. Social ideals are very interesting features of civilized life; they are, indeed, one of the things which distinguish civilization from savagery. At a certain stage in culture it seems as if men feel themselves impelled to construct schemes and visions of a state of society which is much better than that in which they live. We find such ideals all over the world among the higher races—in Western Europe, in the Nearer East, and in India and China. For the most part they have arisen independently, and therefore must answer to a deeply-seated human need. Some of them have been formulated by famous teachers, and developed by the schools of philosophy or religion which they founded. Such were the ideals of Stoicism and Epicureanism in the

ancient world, of Confucianism in China, and of Mahommedanism. In each of the countries concerned the prevalent social ideal, the scheme of conduct which is most generally admired, has drawn its chief elements from one of these systems of doctrine.

§ 8. What is the use of ideals if they do not actually regulate conduct? Well, though they may not regulate, they influence the development of conduct, and express certain tendencies which ought to be expressed. They are least practical in the earlier conditions of society. The Islamic system of virtues, quoted in an earlier chapter, is of an ideal character. It represents a reaction against the actual practice of society. Now, when it becomes possible for moral practice to change, the prevalence of the ideal helps the change to go in the right direction. In any case, if a society is suffering from grave evils, it is right that protests should be made against them. The moral system of Stoicism is another example of a protestant moral system. The Stoics taught that man has worth and dignity merely as man, and that slavery is contrary to nature. It was right that this should be said, even long before the abolition of slavery was possible; and it contributed to the abolition of slavery at a later time.

The minds which are influenced most deeply by ideals are the minds of the young; in them they are a manifestation of the enthusiasm and spirit of criticism which ought to animate those who are just entering upon the business of life. There are two powerful motives which make young men take up with ideals. They are convinced, like Diomede, that they are much better men than their fathers; and they are eager to display their powers of invention and reform. This is why a university ought to be a home of ideals; it does not fulfil its function if it is always looking back towards the past.

As society improves, the ideals which are current in it tend to be less protestant, less uncompromising and romantic, and more practical. We are still a long way from such a condition of morals that protestant ideals will be superfluous. But we are justified in hoping for a time when no radical improvements in principle will remain to be made, and what

will be most needed will be a faithful carrying out of principles which have been generally recognized as sound. Then the ideals which will be most useful will be those that look forward to changes of detail, which are desirable but have not yet become practicable. There will be no attack upon the foundations of things.

§ 9. The process of moral education may be viewed as one in which the young are helped in forming their norms and ideals. The norm is formed by the influence of example and by contact with social organizations. It is all-important for the young that they should grow up under the influence of persons who have high standards of duty, and also that they should become socialized by means of the miniature community of the school. Every place of education is regulated by principles which are set, partly by its governors for the time being, partly by its permanent constitution; and these principles penetrate into the pupils' minds. The socializing process is begun at a tender age in the kindergarten, is carried on through preparatory school and public school, and should be completed at the university. It cannot be replaced by any system of home-education, even granted that an equal amount of knowledge can be acquired privately.

The formation of ideals is greatly helped by literature. It is one of the main services of literature that it formulates and publishes abroad systems of ideal morality. There is no first-rate literature which is not deeply moral; indeed no first-rate literature can arise except in a society which embodies good moral principles. This is one of the reasons why literature is so indispensable as a means of education, as opposed to natural science and mathematics which are useful in a more utilitarian sense. And this is why the practice of reading is so helpful for a virtuous life. It is only a short-sighted, low-toned sort of virtue that is possible for illiterate men.

CHAPTER XXV

HEDONIC EXPERIENCE

(1) The psychology of hedonic experience is important for morals. (2) Pleasure is due mainly to successful activity. (3) It is generally valuable as an incitement to conduct which is conducive to welfare; though men are often led astray by it. (4) It has great influence in the forming of mental associations and of mental and moral habits. (5) There is no moral value in rejecting pleasure; and yet pleasure-seeking is not natural.

(6) Happiness is different from pleasure, though allied to it. (7) It arises normally from a survey of our higher activities, and is useful as a guide to conduct. (8) It is right to desire happiness, but impossible to aim at it apart from a system of life which produces it. (9) Virtue results in happiness only if the environment is favourable.

§ 1. ALREADY in a previous chapter I have had to say something about happiness. The most important of the conclusions reached in that place were that the individual has a right to expect that the community should make him happy, and that it is a duty for him to seek his own happiness. These views, I venture to think, are in accordance with common sense and with the actual practice of good men. But they cannot be justified without a psychological study of hedonic experience—a term which is meant to include both happiness and pleasure and also their opposites, unhappiness and unpleasure.

There are many weighty reasons why we should try to understand hedonic experience. Happiness, though not the same as welfare, is indispensable to welfare; we ought therefore to consider carefully what happiness is, and how it is to be attained. And happiness is impossible without pleasure, and without freedom from pain. Moreover, men are greatly influenced in their conduct by happiness and pleasure; we need therefore to study this part of psychology in order to manage men and to arrange our own lives.

There has been great disagreement among moralists about hedonic experience, especially about pleasure. Up till what may be called the later modern period, pleasure on the whole has been condemned. Some of the great moralists of antiquity spent much effort in maintaining the doctrines, which seem to us paradoxical, that pleasure is unreal or bad, and that pain is a matter of indifference. In the earlier modern period the commonly accepted doctrines, though less sharply opposed to common sense than those which were characteristic of Stoicism, tended towards condemning pleasure. We find a great change when we come down to Bentham: aversion from pleasure he identified with asceticism, which was his *bête noire*; he was very eloquent about the duty of leading an enjoyable life. Questions of this kind cannot be settled without the help of psychology. There is some excellent psychological analysis in Plato and Aristotle; but not much in the works of modern moralists, till a very recent date.

§ 2. Pleasure should be discussed first, because it is more primitive than happiness.

Now what *is* pleasure? An answer can be given only by way of description; for this is a case where definition is unsuitable. Pleasure is a feeling which is agreeable to us, so that we desire to repeat it; and it arises mainly from successful performance of functions and activities. The most primitive pleasure arises from the satisfying of hunger; another very primitive kind is that which we get from muscular activity. But it is also attached to certain kinds of sensation, no one can say exactly why. Sugar, for example, is very pleasing in moderate quantities to European children. It has no doubt much nutritive value, but this does not explain why it is so much more pleasing than plain bread.

The psychology of pleasure is admittedly obscure. The attempts to explain it either as a special kind of sensation or as a resultant of the total condition of the agent have hardly been successful. Without going into the various explanations and the difficulties which beset them, I will venture to put forward my own view. The difficulties seem to me to be least

if we suppose that creatures have a special neural tract, which when stimulated in one way gives a sense of pleasure, and when stimulated otherwise gives a sense of pain. The agreeable stimulation may be caused in many various ways: by special sensations, such as those of sweetness, or those caused by certain colours; by discharges of nervous energy in the performance of organic functions; by the excitement of various emotions; by intellectual activity. In most of these cases the agent is doing something which contributes to his success and general welfare; though there are some experiences, especially some sensations of taste, colour, and smell, which are pleasant apparently without any solid reason. Experiences in which we fail, are injured, or are likely to suffer harm, are unpleasant mostly. They may be supposed to stimulate the special neural tract in the way which produces a disagreeable feeling.

§ 3. Pleasure is inviting; unpleasure is deterrent. This is familiar to every one in regard to completed acts; when an animal has obtained food by a particular method it is incited to try the method again on a subsequent occasion. But pleasure has also an important function in regard to the beginnings of acts. When a hungry dog approaches its accustomed food it obtains pleasure from the smell and is incited to eat. If the food, though really nutritious, has not the proper smell, the dog will not eat. No infant will eat ill-tasting food, though he may be hungry and though the taste may not affect the nutritive value of the food. What seems to happen, psychologically, is that instinctive desire prompts an animal to approach food, and then the pleasure which arises from preliminary contact with the food encourages the animal to eat. If the possibly edible object does not show these attractions, it is likely to be injurious in some way. Or if the animal, having recently fed, gets no pleasure from the view or smell of the food, it will not eat.

It is evident how indispensable these feelings of pleasure and unpleasure are to animals. They incite them to acts which are for their good and deter them from those which are harmful. Animals do not live for pleasure; they are

impelled along certain lines of conduct by their instincts; the feelings of pleasure and pain have the function of helping and guiding them in those natural paths. Nor can we say that pleasure and pain are the lords and masters of animal life, still less of the life of man. We cannot suppose that a wounded buffalo which charges the hunter, or a cat which attacks a large dog in defence of her kittens, acts under the mastery or the guidance of hedonic feeling. It is true that sometimes pleasure leads animals astray, as when horses eat poisonous plants such as the yew. But if these misdirections were frequent the species could not survive.

Animals are seldom misguided by pleasure; men often. This is because animals act under the influence of a comparatively small number of interests and live in ways which require little foresight. Men, on the other hand, have many interests which have to be adjusted and balanced, and they need continually to be thinking about the future. To drink a pint of beer at dinner may be pleasant; but it may interfere with some duty which needs to be done after dinner, or with the future consumption of beer if the available stock is limited. And there is yet another reason why pleasure is an untrustworthy guide for men. We have a long process of evolution behind us, and so pleasure has become attached to acts which were once salutary but now are harmful.

§ 4. In order that pleasure and pain may be efficacious in guiding us, they must have influence in the forming of associations. This is how creatures learn by experience; it is not mere repetition which teaches them, but the repetition of trains of acts resulting in pleasure or pain. Animals are taught to perform tricks thus, by contriving that the stages of the trick shall lead up to some pleasant result; while they are deterred from acts which interfere with success. Primitive human creatures, such as savages and children, are greatly under the influence of associations established by pleasure and pain. But even the most intelligent and self-controlled of men are not exempt. A place where we have been very happy is thereby endeared to us; another place (no worse in itself) is rendered hateful by some painful experience. It is

impossible to counteract such feelings by reasoning; we have them because of an inherited organization which is much older than man.

These considerations were not present to the minds of the Stoics when they advocated the doctrine that pleasure and pain are indifferent; they meant it merely as an assertion of personal dignity and independence. But it would cause terrible mischief if applied in education or in the working of public institutions. The educator cannot be too careful in regard to the formation of hedonic associations by the pupil. If any subject is presented to a pupil under unpleasing conditions, as by an ill-tempered teacher, or under depressing and uncomfortable surroundings, or in a dull mechanical style, he will be inclined to dislike, to forget, and to avoid it in the future. How many men have been 'put off' the classics by their memories of school! This is now perfectly well recognized by educationists. It ought to be recognized also by moralists and statesmen. It is very easy to make morality repulsive by laying too much stress upon the less attractive sides of it. And it is easy to discourage patriotism by associating government with nothing but the payment of taxes, police, the maintenance of workhouses and lunatic asylums, and the prevention of nuisances.

§ 5. If the foregoing contention is true, that the primary function of pleasure is to be a guide or inducement to certain courses of action, this must influence our judgment about some long-debated moral questions—for example, that of asceticism. No one will approve of asceticism who understands the biological function of pleasure. The typical ascetic is one who refuses sugar merely because it is nice, and prefers some other substance which has no more nutritive value but is without pleasure in the eating. Such persons are not merely self-tormentors, but are acting unnaturally, and are likely to go far astray from the true path of welfare. To avoid or despise pleasure is to reject one of the helps which Nature has granted us for leading a good life.

This attitude of utilizing pleasure (so to speak) is quite different from pleasure-seeking, which hedonists have thought

to be both universally prevalent and the foundation of morality, but which seems to me to be neither. In a later chapter (on Bentham) I shall discuss the moral value of human pleasure-seeking. At present I wish to point out that, though it is not uncommon, it is not very natural. Natural men are like animals in that they are impelled instinctively towards certain courses of action and are confirmed in them by pleasure. They do not, as a general rule of life, adopt courses of action merely for pleasure's sake. Pleasure-seeking or luxury, to give it its ordinary name, begins to become prevalent when men become sophisticated; in other words, when men's lives become too much specialized in some particular direction. In relatively simple societies luxury appears first in the ruling class; in later stages we find it in those whose wealth exempts them in some degree from daily labour. In fact, it is one of the many results of imperfect culture which a further cultural advance will eliminate, or at least greatly diminish.

§ 6. And now let us speak about happiness; first about the relation between happiness and pleasure. The Utilitarians assumed as self-evident that happiness is nothing but a form of pleasure, and their whole moral system rested upon that assumption. But this is shallow psychology. There are elements in happiness which are not to be found in pleasure. This might be anticipated from the fact that some creatures (such as animals and infants) which are capable of pleasure are not reckoned to be capable of happiness. It is true that animals are sometimes spoken of as 'happy.' I once heard a professor of physiology say that some decerebrated frogs in a tub in the laboratory were "perfectly happy." But this was a misuse of language, even granted that decerebrated creatures can experience pleasure and pain, which does not seem to be true. It is necessary for happiness, as Professor McDougall has pointed out, that the agent should have reflection.

Can we say, then, that happiness is just pleasure with the addition of reflection? I doubt it, mainly on introspective evidence. The two experiences are so very different as

directly felt. There seems to be some higher element in happiness which is not to be found in pleasure. Let us imagine some cases in illustration. Suppose that Sardanapalus (the typical pleasure-lover of antiquity) looked back over a long series of pleasant experiences unmixed with pain. Would he thereby enjoy the characteristic experience of happiness? There seems no reason to think so; he might just as well experience remorse, if we can suppose that he had any conscience left. On the other hand, Socrates, looking back over a past not unchequered with suffering, might say that he was, and had been, happy. Nevertheless, there is kinship between pleasure and happiness; they are in some degree alike in the feeling which we have of them. Moreover, happiness depends largely upon pleasure and pain; a great lack of pleasure is fatal to happiness, and so is a great deal of pain.

Just as for pleasure, there must be physiological conditions for happiness. One may venture upon the assumption that the experience of happiness-unhappiness, like that of pleasure-pain, is dependent upon stimulation of a definite neural tract, which is closely contiguous to the pleasure-pain tract, and is affected by what passes there. The assumption of a special tract would be consistent with some curious pathological facts, such as the unhappiness of melancholia and the happiness of mania and of phthisis. These seem to depend upon neural excitements due to ill-understood conditions of disease.

§ 7. Now let us try to settle what it is that distinguishes happiness from pleasure. The most important of the higher elements in happiness is, I think, intrinsic valuation. There must be reflection; but mere reflection is not enough, for remorse is a kind of reflection. Activity is not enough, though that is necessary also. The agent must have reflection and activity of a certain kind. His activity must be prompted by higher interests, among which morality predominates; and his reflection must assure him that he is duly appreciating those interests. Normally, when a man surveys his higher activities and is satisfied, he is happy; but when dissatisfied, unhappy. It is a precedent condition of happiness

that the functions of his physical existence should be prosperous on the whole. But mere physical prosperity does not suffice for happiness.

Here it is desirable to obviate a possible mistake. The reflective or higher element in happiness need not be fully conscious. It very often happens that a man is unhappy without knowing why. He may be very desirous of analysing out the disturbing element in his mind, and yet be unable to do so; he may even think it worth while to have recourse to a psychiatrist to make the analysis for him. But happiness is reflective in the sense that it depends on some power of survey and of apprehending the general character of one's life, though we may not be able to say just why we are happy or unhappy. We have a similar experience in other spheres, as when we pronounce a landscape beautiful or a face interesting without being able to state the grounds of our judgment.

In regard to our life generally, happiness has much the same function as pleasure has for separate acts; it is a guide to what we ought to do and an encouragement to continue doing it. Because of its wider range of influence, the effects of what may be called 'happiness-tone' are much more powerful than those of pleasure-tone, especially when the tone is unfavourable. Great and continued unhappiness leads inevitably to extinction both for individuals and for races. In a less acute form it reduces one's powers of action. Unhappy men are very seldom efficient in their work. The unhappiness of melancholia urges the sufferer almost irresistibly to suicide.

§ 8. If, as I have argued in preceding pages, happiness results from following a good course of life and has the effect of confirming us in following it, then men ought to desire it. Nevertheless, it cannot be regarded as a very high moral duty to desire to be happy. Happiness is an experience which lies within the circle of the agent's individual existence. Our moral experiences, on the other hand, are mainly appreciations directed outwards upon objects which are external to the agent. It is not even necessary to virtue that a man should regard it as a duty to pursue his own happiness. Ordinary

people want to be happy for reasons which are independent of morality. The feeling of happiness is one which we need to make life enjoyable. The effects of unhappiness are devastating; if a man from some pathological cause experiences this feeling, no amount of outward prosperity will make him contented. And so men shun unhappiness, as they shun physical pain, without the need of exhortation.

The doctrine that happiness-seeking is the sole or supreme moral duty has a natural affinity to individualism. Some of the Utilitarians, writing in an individualistic age, spoke as though happiness could be isolated as an object of desire, and the individual could seek to obtain it upon a plan entirely his own. This is not possible. Happiness cannot be made into a separate object of effort, because it is an experience which is adjectival to other experiences that have their own definite character. A man may be happy in a great many careers—as a soldier, or a thinker, or a man of commerce—and each sort of happiness can be viewed only in relation to the career which has produced it. If a man wants to be happy, he must interest himself in some satisfactory career, and take the happiness as resultant from the career. And at the present day, at least, a satisfactory career is possible only if a man ceases to be an individualist, and associates himself closely with his community.

§ 9. Finally, it is desirable to say a few words upon a matter which has engaged the attention of moralists for ages—the connexion between virtue and happiness. The generally approved doctrine tells us, 'Be virtuous and you will be happy'; and this is true enough as a rule, but some important reservations must be made.

What I think ought to be guarded against is the idea that one can wrap oneself up in one's virtue and be happy without reference to social and political environment. If virtue and happiness both depend upon forming a good scheme of life and acting thereupon, the conditions must be such as to make a good scheme possible. But take such conditions as are disclosed to us in the *Arabian Nights*, with an unchecked despotism in the State, and with slavery as a cardinal institu-

tion of society. We must recognize that the most virtuous citizen of old Bagdad could hardly frame a scheme of life which we should think admirable; and, if he had done so, there was not much chance that he could carry it out so as to be thoroughly happy. Our existing West-European civilization affords better opportunities than that of Harun-el-Raschid, but it is far from perfect. Great numbers of our population have no possibility of adopting a thoroughly good moral system; for, if they did, they would be prevented from participating fully in society.

There are a few men who insist on adopting a moral system which is too good for their environment. They may be persons who have changed their place of residence, or their native environment may be to blame. If an Englishman is compelled to live in Haiti, for example, he will find that the moral system of an average Englishman is not well suited to the country, and can be maintained only at a somewhat heavy cost. A similar experience must have been very common in the period of the decline of the Roman Empire; the better men found their moral principles too good for the society of that day. How much unmerited misery this must have caused we may learn from the pages of Tacitus. Even in England now this kind of suffering is not unknown.

Part IV. Speculative Ethics

CHAPTER XXVI

THE PROBLEMS OF SPECULATIVE ETHICS

The problems of speculative ethics are concerned with the ultimate nature and widest relations of the moral judgment.

IN ethics, as in other branches of study, the principles about which we feel the strongest confidence are what may be called middle principles, dealing with things which fall directly under our powers of observation and in regard to which we have to make practical decisions. But no man of speculative interests is content to remain limited to this region; he cannot help reflecting about problems concerning the ultimate nature of moral experience, and its relation to the general scheme of things. These problems we must not expect to solve unquestionably; but even conjectural answers are better than none, and it certainly makes much difference to practice what answers we adopt.

The speculative problems that are discussed in this Part may all be regarded as having reference to the moral judgment, which is the term that is given to moral experience in its most active form. Various questions have been raised about the moral judgment—what it is, how it is made, what is its object, and so on; but no one has ever doubted that it is the business of a moral agent to form moral judgments, and that a person who is incapable of moral judgment is incapable of moral experience.

The following seem to me to be the chief speculative questions in relation to the moral judgment about which we naturally feel curiosity. We want to know what it is, and how it is related to other kindred sorts of judgment, what the

object of it is, how it arose as a human faculty, and upon what the individual relies in forming it. And more than all else we want to know how moral experience is related to the general system of the world, what help moral experience gives us in our attempts to understand the world-system, and what influence our metaphysical conclusions should have upon our attitude to doubtful questions about the moral conduct of life.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE JUDGMENT OF INTRINSIC VALUE

(1) The moral judgment is a kind of judgment of intrinsic value. (2) Intrinsic value or goodness, which is to be distinguished from the merely desirable, is a quality of consciousness. (3) It is recognized by the agent both in himself and in others. (4) It is indefinable, though men agree sufficiently respecting it to enable them to co-operate in higher activities. (5) It can be described, however, by saying that in it the agent has a sense of elevation, directs his attention upon human objects, and gains in personality. (6) The fact upon which intrinsically valuable or good experience is based is the valuableness of man. (7) To deny that 'good' has any definite meaning results in misinterpretation of moral experience and in practical impotence. (8) The kinds of intrinsically valuable experience are generically related, though their specific differences are irreducible. (9) We are impelled to believe that our intrinsically valuable experience has some cosmic function, though we cannot say exactly what it is.

§ 1. We are helped in understanding the moral judgment if we consider it in relation to other judgments of kindred character, such as we make in the fields of artistic and intellectual experience. It is one sort of judgment of intrinsic value. By this I mean that when we pronounce something (some character or act) to be morally good, we are pronouncing it to be intrinsically valuable—that is, good in itself, not good as a means to something else. This will be disputed mainly by those who advocate hedonism, saying that things are good so far as they conduce to pleasure. I will deal with hedonism in a later chapter; the main point of my criticism will be that it ignores intrinsic valuation, one form of which I take to be the essential element of moral experience. In regard to other fields, it can hardly be doubted that we do make intrinsic-value judgments. We may say this confidently of artistic judgments, in which we recognize beautiful objects as good in themselves, not merely as means. But it may surely be

said also of many intellectual judgments, especially of those which exemplify the best intellectual experience. We often call pieces of reasoning or contrivance 'beautiful,' meaning a 'beauty' which is intellectual rather than æsthetic. The term implies that we admire them for themselves, not for any results which may be achieved by means of them.

In the phrase, 'judgment of intrinsic value,' the word 'judgment' may mislead unless we remember that this kind of experience is much more than merely intellectual. In morality the judgment of an agent is manifested most characteristically in doing something, not in recognizing the quality of an act done by another person. Most people would admit that this is so in the sphere of art. It will be admitted also in the sphere of intellect when it is recognized that the higher exercise of intellect is creative. Besides conation there is an element in value-judgments which is commonly called 'emotional,' though I doubt the propriety of the term. It means that in them our affections are engaged; the creative artist is not cool, nor is the inventor of theories and intellectual schemes, nor is the agent in weighty moral action.

§ 2. Now let us consider the object upon which the judgment of intrinsic value is directed. It is, we may assume, the intrinsically valuable or good. As used in ordinary speech, 'good' is a mere word of approval, without any implication as to the grounds upon which the approval is given. There are some things which are called 'good' because they conduce to the preservation of our physical existence or have pleasure-value. These I would call 'merely desirable.' But there are also things which are admirable in themselves without reference to mere desirability; these I would call 'intrinsically good or valuable.' Things which are merely desirable have no intrinsic value or goodness. They satisfy the needs of the lower element of our composite nature, which has an animal basis upon which higher elements have supervened.

I would earnestly deprecate the idea that in distinguishing intrinsically valuable goods from those which are merely desirable I am putting forward a distinction which is nothing more than verbal or a matter of detail. If the distinction is

not recognized, we ignore the best elements of our life, and cannot give a probable account of any of our higher activities. Indeed, one may go further than this, and say that to ignore what is intrinsically valuable is to ignore that element in man which makes him distinctively human.

Now, what sort of things are they to which the quality of intrinsic goodness can be ascribed? They are, surely, either personal characters, or things which have been produced by them or seem as if they had been produced by them. This is self-evident in regard to objects of moral value. I believe it to be true also of objects which have other kinds of value. When we admire a natural object for the beauty or the ingenuity of its design, we are looking upon it as we should look upon a product of human intelligence. In any case, objects which have intrinsic value must have it in relation to conscious experience. What is artistic merit which no eye can perceive, or intellectual merit which no mind can appreciate?

§ 3. I will take for granted, then, that everything which can be called intrinsically good is conscious or is viewed in relation to conscious experience. Next we must ask: In whose consciousness is it recognized by those who do recognize it? The answer is: It is recognized by the agent in himself, and also in others with whom he has to deal; and the two kinds of recognition are indispensable to each other. A man cannot recognize what is intrinsically valuable in himself without recognizing what is intrinsically valuable outside himself, and *vice versâ*.

This statement is less evidently true of intellectual than of moral experience; though, even in the former case, I believe that it needs only a little careful thinking to command assent. The finest exercise of intellect is that of invention or constructive thinking. When an agent is thus engaged he has a peculiar experience which sometimes reaches great intensity. If he did not know what it means to invent or construct, would he be able to understand and appreciate invention in others? And if he had never appreciated a book or a piece of mechanism showing inventive qualities, would he have

been able to exercise that faculty himself? In every sort of intellectual and also of artistic activity, capacity to do the activity oneself and capacity to appreciate the activity in others are indispensable to each other.

Let us now consider the matter in relation to moral experience. In order to be as definite as possible, let us think of some particular virtue, such as generosity. When a man is doing a generous act it is a necessary part of the act as a moral experience that he should, in doing it, have a feeling that he is doing well—a feeling which is quite different from that which he has when he is doing a mean act. He must feel thus if he is going to experience appreciation of generosity in others. And, on the other side, unless he appreciates generous acts and characters when he comes into contact with them, it is impossible that he should have the characteristic feeling of satisfaction or self-approval when he acts so himself.

§ 4. We now approach what seems to me the central question of speculative ethics. Can we define intrinsically good or valuable experience? Can we regard it as part of a genus with a differentia separating it from other species in the genus, so that we could form an adequate idea of it even though we had no knowledge of it by direct acquaintance? We cannot. It must be reckoned as an ultimate element of experience. The same might be said of many other conscious elements, such as sensation and all the chief classes of sensation. Redness, for example, is an ultimate kind of experience. We cannot define it; nor can we form any idea of it if the physical conditions of the experience are wanting.

At first sight it may seem that such a view is highly individualistic, and strips the term 'goodness' of all objective meaning. The answer is that objectivity in the meaning of goodness is assured by the actual agreement between men as to their personal experience of what they term good. The case is the same as with our colour-sensations. Each man's experience of red is individual, and there is *a priori* no assurance that it coincides with the experience of other men. What gives a man assurance that it does coincide is the fact

that he can co-operate with others socially. No one can be sure that the coincidence is exact, but it must exist in large measure. So with moral experience. It is conceivable that a Judas might feel his act of betrayal as innocent or even meritorious; but if such divergencies from ordinary experience were frequent there could exist no social system of co-operation in moral affairs. Among races of living men there is much limitation upon the possibility of moral co-operation; Englishmen, for example, cannot co-operate socially with native Australian blacks. So far as men find themselves unable to join in co-operation it indicates a difference of personal moral experience. So far as men co-operate in any field, moral, intellectual, or artistic, where intrinsic value exists, we may assume that their experiences of what is intrinsically valuable are approximately the same.

§ 5. Though we cannot define the kind of experience which is intrinsically valuable, we can describe some features of it sufficiently for purpose of identification.

The central experience of goodness can hardly be touched by description any more than redness can. This only we can say, that, when we are going through an experience which seems to us intrinsically valuable, we have a feeling of elevation or highness which can be indicated only by contrasting it with its opposite. Almost any man, if in a moment of temptation he sold his master for a handful of silver, would have a feeling that he was degrading himself. On the other hand, a heroine like St. Joan would have a feeling of upliftedness in assuming her mission.

It is easier to describe a less central element of our higher experiences. They are experiences in which the agent concerns himself with objects that are external to himself. We can verify this by passing our higher activities in review. In our lower activities—that is, in the satisfaction of physical wants—we are thinking of objects only incidentally, if at all. But in matters of morality, intellect, and art our attitude is necessarily objective. This is most evidently true, perhaps, of the whole of artistic experience. Every one would agree that it is true also of the largest part of moral experience;

a man is moral mainly by reason of interest in his fellow men. But our intellectual interests, also, are outward-looking. When we study we are always interested in something which is objective to ourselves. Even self-study, as that of a psychologist, has an objective reference, because that which is studied is regarded as typical of selves other than the agent. Aristotle thought that the intellectual activity of God must eternally be turned inward upon himself; but this speculation is not supported by anything which we know of man.

The objects upon which our higher interests are directed are human, or are closely connected with humanity. I think that this is true in regard to knowledge and art, though it would take too long to set forth the proofs in this place but it is undoubtedly true of morals. We must admit that there exist non-human objects, such as animals and houses, towards which we feel some moral duties; but these are not without a share of humanity.

There is yet another feature which must be mentioned in a description of higher experience. Normally, it gives us a sense of expanded personality. This is easy to understand if it is directed upon objects outside ourselves. Evil experiences, on the other hand, are narrowing; they limit our sympathies, and cut us off from our fellows. They are also weakening. Good moral experience, on the other hand, has a tonic influence; it makes the personality more forcible as well as more extended.

§ 6. We need a central position from which to understand the general nature of all our higher or intrinsically good experiences: this we find, I think, when we recognize that they are all forms of human valuation; that is, they are various modes in which we recognize the intrinsic worth of human nature. Within our range of experience there is one general object, and one only, which is good in itself or in its own right; namely, man. The valuableness of man is the fact upon which our intrinsically valuable experience is based. In this way we can unify our view of morality, higher intellectual activity, and art. Each of these branches of activity

has its own independent character, so that no one can be reduced to or expressed in terms of another. And yet each one is a form of human valuation.

But then there arises a question about this valuation or appreciation of man. Is it an appreciation of all men, high and low, good and bad? Or only of the higher and better? Is it appreciation of every part of man; of all the bad and selfish parts, or only of the better part? Assuredly it is appreciation only of good men and of the better part of human nature. And now the objection will be made that my argument is circular—intrinsic goodness consists in appreciation of the intrinsically good. But one commits this kind of circle in dealing with any ultimate, unanalysable kind of experience; in other words, one assumes a knowledge of the very thing that has to be explained. It cannot be stated too clearly that intrinsic goodness is ultimate, as much as activity, or intelligence, or sensation. We can explain other things by it; but it itself we cannot explain. If a man came forward and protested that he had no such experience, and did not know what was meant by the term, it would be impossible to confute him.

§ 7. The position which I have been trying to maintain, then, is that goodness has a very definite meaning, because we have good experiences which have a definite character; but that, in the case of intrinsic goodness for morals at least, no one can explain what it is. On the other hand, there are moralists, both of the past and of the present day, who have denied that goodness has any definite meaning. They say that 'good' is simply equal to 'desirable,' and that human desires are indefinitely various and have no common quality. In other words, they are sceptics in this matter. Hume thought that the sceptical attitude was amiable and salutary; and, certainly, it is better than bigotry, which was the enemy he had in view. But some of its results are evil.

As regards theory, I do not think that, with a sceptical view as to the meaning of good, it is possible to reach a satisfactory explanation of any part of our higher experience, even of that part which seems to be merely intellectual. It

certainly is impossible to explain morality. The sceptic about goodness is always a hedonist; for no one with those opinions goes so far as to deny the desirability of pleasure. Now hedonism is the poorest and dullest of ethical theories, which alone should make us suspect it. It is also the most paradoxical, because it is inconsistent with common moral judgments and with well-established institutions.

As regards practice, a Humian scepticism paralyses moral philosophy for any useful purpose. Moral education is a process of training which helps men to appreciate the good; social reform consists in giving men wider opportunities for leading a good life. If 'good' really has no determinate meaning, the moralist can do nothing in either of these spheres. He will probably adopt the pose of despising enthusiasm. He can tell us nothing better than that we ought to follow custom, or conform to the will of the stronger, or realize a sum of pleasures, or some other precept equally abhorrent to the moral consciousness of earnest men.

§ 8. The kinds of higher experience which I have had in view in this chapter are three—morality, knowledge, and art. They seem to be generically related, but to have such specific differences that no one of them can be reduced to or expressed in terms of the other. They are all of them intrinsically valuable. They are of course useful also; but their value does not depend upon their utility. In all of them the agent feels that he is lifted up to a plane of life which is higher than that of purely individual cares. If this is questioned at all, the question will be raised about intellectual experience. But here we must remember that the best intellectual experience is creative, not receptive. A man may accumulate information without having the sense that his experience is of a high character; but he has that sense in acts of intellectual invention. The other two characteristics of higher experience—that it is concerned with objects and gives a sense of expansion—could be questioned only with reference to morals, and then only because of mistaken ethical views. I hold it a mistake to regard the essence of moral experience as consisting in observance of rules; since rules, really, are valuable

only because of the objects whose welfare the rules subserve. It is Kant who is the chief exponent of ethical legalism, which has an influence both unsympathetic and narrowing to the personality. A different kind of opposition to the views which I have been advocating would come from the ascetic. Asceticism means an inward direction of moral effort and a restriction of personality. This, even more than its wrong attitude towards pleasure, accounts perhaps for its disfavour at the present time.

Notwithstanding the generic resemblance, the specific differences between our kinds of higher experience are irreducible. It is a facile and fallacious generalization to say that goodness, truth, and beauty are the same. They may be related in the same manner as our primary colour-sensations; but they differ as definitely as red differs from blue and yellow. In confirmation of my opinion I can only appeal to common sense. The act of the good Samaritan was not valued because of its intellectual or artistic quality; Newton's thinking about gravitation was not moral; and Benvenuto Cellini, though an excellent artist, was not virtuous. To identify these things which are naturally distinct seems to me to be bad psychology, and practical mischief might arise if any one really acted upon the belief that good art is equivalent to, or a substitute for, good morality.

§ 9. Now comes a question which we cannot help asking, though it cannot be answered. There is often much utility in asking unanswerable questions; it brings home to us the limitations of our knowledge, which should always be remembered in matters of speculation. The question is this: These intrinsically valuable experiences, what are they valuable for? No definite answer can be given. It can only be said that morality, knowledge, and art are felt by the agent to be valuable in themselves, even if nothing further results from them. The motive which prompts the question is, however, a good one. It is felt to be strange if these excellent things have no purpose which is wider than the consciousness of the personal agent; for a man soon dies, and then "all his thoughts perish."

The same question, of course, might be asked of human life as a whole. What is the use or function of it in regard to the general scheme of things? This evidently weighed on Plato's mind; he often says that it is intolerable to think that man, the noblest of created things, has no function.

In such a matter one can do no more than offer conjectures. Plato, if he had dealt with the question explicitly, would have invented a myth. The conjecture which seems to be indicated is that there is a cosmic purpose to which man, and especially the higher part of man, makes contribution. But we cannot say what the purpose is, nor how human action can contribute to it. In this case, as in many others, our moral experience prompts us to make claims which are greater than our metaphysical knowledge can justify.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE MORAL QUALE

(1) The specific quality of moral experience is reverence. (2) Moral experience is also more human, more social, and more important than the other parts of our higher life, and it is more dynamic. (3) The objects of reverence are personal or quasi-personal. (4) Characters are faulty in which the distinctive moral appreciations are lacking or are not in due proportion.

§ 1. I WILL now try to describe the quale or special quality of the moral judgment in distinction from the other judgments of intrinsic value—namely, the artistic and the intellectual. It is common to all the parts of our higher life that they are forms of favourable interest in man, or in objects of quasi-human character; in all of them the agent appreciates certain objects as intrinsically valuable, and feels that his own experience in doing so has intrinsic value. But between them there are specific differences which make them almost as separate as our experiences of the primary colours.

We cannot explain the differences between art, intellectual interest, and morality by means of anything which is more elementary or better known. Here we are dealing with ultimate mental facts which we can identify only by affixing familiar terms to them. The special quality of artistic interest is a sense of beauty; we value the object because it appears beautiful to us. What 'beauty' and the 'sense of beauty' mean is sufficiently well understood for the purpose of this exposition. It is only needful to add that in its best form the experience is creative; it involves making something, not merely admiring. The special quality of intellectual interest I take to be curiosity. Here, again, we must remember that the best intellectual experiences are creative. What is the special quality of moral experience? I hold that it is reverence. In moral experience we find ourselves dealing

with objects which call forth in good minds the special indefinable attitude that we call reverential. And here, again, the dynamic, creative aspect of the experience must not be forgotten. The best reverential attitude is one in which the agent not only reveres the object in relation to which he is acting, but also contributes to form the object by his action. Such is the normal relation of the good citizen to his community.

§ 2. There are yet other features than reverence which are distinctive of moral experience. There is more humanity in moral experience than in the other parts of our higher life. It excels intellectual experience in this respect, and intellectual experience excels artistic experience. I think it could be shown that in our non-moral higher interests the human element is the most important, and that the non-human element is closely akin to humanity. All this, however, may be said more truly of moral experience. There is one consideration which is, I think, decisive in this respect. The objects which we revere are mainly persons, and institutions which subserve personal existence. The persons are revered entirely for qualities which are seen nowhere else than in man; while institutions to gain our reverence must embody good moral principles, which are essentially human things. On the other hand, artists and men of science interest themselves in objects which can be said to have human quality only in an indirect sense.

Closely allied to the humanness of moral experience is its sociality. All our higher life is social, but morality is more social than the other parts. There is no virtue out of society; and it is absolutely necessary for a person who is to be a satisfactory member of society that he should have a considerable measure of virtue. It is not necessary that he should have an equal measure of artistic quality. High intelligence is very desirable for the citizens of an advanced community; but even with limited intelligence a man can live a fairly good civic life.

For these reasons moral experience is the most important part of our higher life. And the qualities which claim our

reverence are manifested in affairs which are felt to be of deep importance—such affairs as personal health and safety, civic relationships, family, and property. This is where morality is chiefly manifested; the man who takes a devoted interest in his fellows in respect of these affairs is the kind of man whom we admire morally and revere. The man who shows goodwill in things which have reference to the less important interests of our life is liked as observing the 'minor moralities'; but our sentiment towards him does not amount to reverence.

Moral experience in its specific quality is more dynamic than the other parts of our higher life; it must of necessity be manifested in action. Although the best kind of artistic and intellectual interests are, no less than moral interest, manifested in doing or making, yet there are highly artistic and intellectual men whose creative powers are very weak, and who use their gifts almost entirely in appreciating the work of others. This cannot be so in moral experience; a genuine moral valuation must be actively expressed. In treating of this feature of morality we suffer some disservice from the inappropriateness of language. 'Reverence' is not a term which in ordinary usage implies doing; it suggests, rather, an attitude of passive contemplation. But in using the word to denote the specific quality of moral experience we must give it an active meaning. The explanation of all this seems to be that man is essentially a dynamic or active creature. His life must be active; and the higher he rises in the scale of being, the more active he becomes. Now, moral experience is, so to speak, the most central experience which we have, so far as regards the higher part of our life. In it, therefore, we manifest our nature in its essential character.

§ 3. The objects which we judge to be worthy of reverence are, as I have said already, either personal or quasi-personal. The personal objects are plain enough; they are human characters, or acts manifesting character. To very young people, or to people of limited mental powers, persons are the first objects of reverence. Later they appreciate acts. At first, of course, they feel reverence for certain characters

without knowing why; it is only when they know why and can generalize that acts make appeal to them.

Quasi-personal objects are such objects as families, human associations of all kind, and above all the inclusive organization which we call the community or the State. The regard which people have for the community is shown by their sensitiveness to public approbation and censure. This is very noticeable in simple people. Consciousness of the State comes later in the order of development; but when it does come it gives opportunity for a purer and more enduring sentiment than the earlier reverences. When a man grows mature in intellect and in knowledge of the world, his respect for individual persons is always qualified by understanding of their shortcomings; but it is rare to find a good man who does not revere the political community to which he belongs.

It is not uncommon among highly intellectual men to find a sentiment of reverence directed towards the sum of things or the laws of the world, without reference to any dogma of religion. It seems hardly possible to give a fully satisfactory explanation of this. One can only say that such men are assuming an attitude which religious dogma is needed to justify. They must, without being fully conscious of it, view the world as manifesting the sort of character which we reverence when we meet it in men—that is, as displaying æsthetic or intellectual excellence, or as manifesting good moral purpose in its scheme of construction. It is, indeed, not possible to revere a world which the agent judges to be morally bad, or even morally neutral.

§ 4. A theory of virtue should also be a theory of vice; just as a theory of knowledge should also be a theory of ignorance and error. Moral pathology is a wide subject, which as yet has hardly received its due share of attention. Without going into details of it, one may say that when men are bad it is either because they are lacking in the appreciative power which I have called 'reverence,' or because the appreciations which they have are not in due proportion.

The former cause of vice is the more important. Moral capacity in this respect is like artistic capacity. In matters

of art most bad taste is lack of taste; the agent is not appreciative of some elements of beauty which are apparent to men of average capacity. We notice this most plainly, perhaps, in the case of music, where good taste depends so much upon definite natural gifts. In morals the analogous defect is the dullness and ignorance which make some men insensitive to the finer elements of the human objects around them: they do not understand the social system in which they work; they are ignorant of its traditions; they do not need the motives which actuate their neighbours so far as they are good, or they misunderstand them in a bad sense.

It is not often that men feel moral appreciation of any object which is totally unworthy; of unsociable, cowardly, or treacherous characters, for example. But it is very common to find persons whose appreciations are not in due proportion, so that they lay excessive stress upon some particular element of experience. The matter could hardly be otherwise, since man has had so long a history, and his circumstances have changed so greatly. The commonest cases are those of persons who have disproportionate regard for power or money or social position. But any disproportion is unfavourable to the moral life, even excessive devotion to the interests (or the supposed interests) of a family. We can hardly look forward to a time when such disproportions will cease to trouble us; because what is proportionate at one epoch, and under one set of circumstances, becomes disproportionate at another. Our inherited constitution does not change quickly enough to suit the changing conditions of human life.

CHAPTER XXIX

ORIGIN AND VALIDITY

(1) The validity of moral judgment is not affected, though we suppose moral experience to have developed out of a lower form (2) The human soul has the capacity of developing new forms of experience, which grow out of the old but yet are unlike them.

§ 1. It was a current notion some years ago that to accept the doctrine of evolution meant denying the value and validity of moral experience. Darwin had taught the world that there was a time when our remote ancestors were non-moral beings; morality must have come into being at some point in human development, and its appearance must have been occasioned by the pressure of non-moral needs. Therefore, some thinkers argued, moral experience can be nothing more than non-moral experience in a form which is only outwardly different.

It is possible to feel much sympathy with some of the motives of this argument, and yet not to agree with it. The pre-evolution moralists did not pay sufficient regard to man's humble relations; they separated him too much from the rest of creation, and put him on a platform by himself. Darwin corrected all that. But, now that we have adjusted our minds to the evolutionary doctrine, we can see that validity is not determined by origin. Whatever theories we may hold as to the manner of morality's coming into existence, that does not decide what morality is now that it is in existence. It may still have all the intrinsic worth that it seems to have, and its precepts may still command respect. We can illustrate from another field of experience. Our faculty of sight has developed out of the skin-sensibility which we experience in touching. But visual sensations are quite different from skin sensations. And the character of visual experience in respect of its intellectual and æsthetic value is not affected by

the discovery of the primitive relationship between skin sensibility and sight. It remains just what it was before that discovery was made.

§ 2. These are plain considerations; what has stood in the way of their recognition has been a reluctance to see that the human soul has the capacity for genuinely new experiences. These new experiences certainly have the disadvantage that they defy our powers of explanation. The theoretical man is pleased when he can show that the apparently new is really nothing more than a superficially different case of the old. And so he has a temptation to offer explanations of much that is really beyond his range.

But this reluctance and this temptation are less now than they used to be; Bergson has familiarized us with the idea of creative evolution. The manner of creative evolution is incomprehensible. But in every department of biology we have to recognize that novelties emerge, and must be accepted as mysterious. So it is with the psychic life of man also. And surely this is more in accordance with human dignity. We must think of soul-life as manifesting a development upwards from very humble forms. From time to time new elements emerge, sensational or otherwise, springing out of the hidden resources of the soul. Of these moral experience is one. It is the business of the moralist to analyse that experience, and tell us what elements of it are new as compared with experience in which there is no morality. We shall be grateful also for theories which help us to understand what the material pressures were which favoured the appearance of morality; that is, in what way it helped creatures in their struggle for physical existence. Of such things we cannot know too much. But this knowledge must not obscure for us the novelty of what is really new.

Neglect of these considerations impairs the value of such an evolutionary system as that of Herbert Spencer, who was always trying to state the higher in terms of the lower. He did not do this very systematically in regard to morality; but he attempted it in regard to knowledge, which he explained in sensational terms, on the ground that sensation is the

primitive form of consciousness. It is very doubtful if he was right in this view of sensation ; but even if he were, that would not have established his theory. Cognitive experience, even if it had developed out of sensation, might yet be non-sensuous in its essential character.

CHAPTER XXX

MORAL AUTHORITY

(1) The community is the chief source of moral authority (2) and imposer of sanctions. (3) The individual, however, has some independence of moral judgment, both in judging persons and in judging principles. (4) But when the individual condemns the principles which are accepted by his community, it is impossible to say definitely upon what he is relying, nor can we determine exactly what shares of authority belong to the community and the individual respectively.

§ 1. THE present chapter and that which follows are concerned with the source of moral authority, or basis of moral judgment. The present chapter will attempt to show what the real source or basis is, so far as that can definitely be ascertained; the next chapter will discuss some alleged bases of moral judgment which seem to me illusory.

The following are typical cases of moral judgment: an agent judges that for moral reasons he will refrain from some contemplated act; he judges that some one with whom he has dealt has acted unfairly; he decides about his future conduct generally, that he will organize his life in a certain way—for example, that he will give up a bad habit; he observes with approval or disapproval a general principle of conduct which is prevalent in the society around him. In all such cases the agent must have some authority or basis of judgment on which he relies. What is it? The answer which I wish to maintain is that in moral experience the agent relies, and ought to rely, mainly upon the judgment of the community to which he belongs; but that advanced morality is impossible unless individuals have also a considerable power of judging for themselves without direct reference to the community. It is difficult, however, or even impossible, to say precisely what proportion of authority belongs to the community, and what to the individual.

I think we are most likely to understand the general relation between the community and the individual in forming moral judgments if we observe the close analogy between morality and the other kinds of higher experience, in which also there are the communal and the individual factors. The analogy brings home to us the primacy of the community. The individual does not become capable of the higher, or distinctively human, life till he has assimilated the communal tradition; in Professor Graham Wallas's phrase, he must enter on his "social heritage": and he can continue to lead that higher life, only if he is on the whole in harmony with the communal tradition. In art he must attain to the current standard of taste and skill before he can make any advance of his own. And at a later stage in his career, however advanced he may be or may think himself to be, his work cannot be excellent unless it agrees much more than it disagrees with traditional artistic judgments. The case is the same in science, and also in morality.

The source of moral authority is most easily to be discerned in primitive communities. All primitive men are ruled very strictly by custom, which is an expression of the communal consciousness. As to criticism of principles, there is no possibility of such a thing except under fully civilized conditions; simple people are not capable of stating moral principles, still less of criticizing them.

Superficially, the matter is very different in an advanced society, where men argue freely about detailed questions of conduct and about moral principles. But really the difference is not so great as it seems. Consider some definite division of conduct, say the obedience which the citizen owes to the civil power. In the overwhelming majority of cases the civilized citizen accepts the judgment of the community as to the obedience which is required of him from day to day; he may use his own judgment continually, but deliberation mostly leaves him in accordance with the communal judgment. The general principle of civil obedience has been questioned by some persons, as by anarchists of various shades, but not by any large proportion of persons. This subordination of

the individual to the community is obscured in advanced societies, not only by the freedom of criticism which prevails in them, but also by the mildness with which the dictates of the communal will are enforced.

The most striking cases of opposition to the communal will are those where reformers challenge some generally accepted principle. Now, on what were anarchists like Godwin relying when they protested against the principle of civil obedience? Partly, no doubt, upon individual judgment, but not altogether. To some extent they were relying upon the judgment of other men. They believed that there was an inconsistency between the principle of civil obedience and that of individual development. This latter principle they did not invent for themselves; it was beginning to be accepted by enlightened men all over Europe. What Godwin and his friends did was to draw attention to an alleged inconsistency between two principles, both of which they discovered by analysis of current practice. In other words, they were setting one element of the communal moral consciousness over against another.

§ 2. As being the chief source of authority, the community is also the chief imposer of sanctions by which authority is supported. A sanction is an unpleasant consequence which falls upon those who disobey a law. Now, the chief sanction in morals is estrangement from the community; even sanctions which seem to be material act upon the offender mainly in this way. Our most usual punishment, imprisonment, is feared mainly because of the social stigma which it inflicts. It is no disproof of this view that men suffer from remorse. Remorse or the torment of an uneasy conscience is largely an effect of public disapproval. Men usually do not worry much about those of their past misdeeds which are not blamed by the persons immediately around them.

This helps us to form a theory of crime. Crime is essentially an act committed in defiance of public opinion. Certain acts which are strongly reprobated in England may not be crimes elsewhere; for example, the suppression of twin infants among South African negroes. It is mainly the attitude of

public opinion which determines the general level or percentage of criminality in a country. The former prevalence of brigandage in Corsica seems to have been due largely to public sympathy with brigands, and to the admiration felt by the peasantry for the outlaw's way of life. When crimes become unpopular in a country, they become rare.

It helps us, too, in forming theories of punishment. Punishments in the main are expressions of public disapproval. If the disapproval is qualified—that is, if the offence is such that the offender may possibly be reinstated in his social position—the punishment should be of such a kind as to conduce to reformation. The usual civilized punishment—imprisonment in a cell combined with low-grade, monotonous toil—has not much reformatory influence. If the offender's act has been such as to make it impossible for him to resume a self-respecting social position, it is better that he should pass out of existence altogether.

The question has often been asked in the past, though it is not asked so often now, what right the State has to inflict punishment. In regard to the citizens who can be reformed, the answer is that the State punishes them in the same spirit that a parent punishes a child. In regard to incorrigibles, the State takes action by the same right that it protects itself against foreign enemies. A citizen who has no sensitiveness to public opinion nor to the promptings of conscience is in the position of a public enemy.

§ 3. Now let us turn to the individual: he also has his share of moral authority; and, unless he has due recognition, there can be no sound theory of morals.

We can see how absurd it is to neglect the individual if we ask how the community comes by its power of moral judgment; it can only be because individuals have that power. The case is the same with moral as with artistic judgments. There could be no standard of artistic taste in a community unless there were taste in its members individually. Two generations ago it would have been necessary to put in a warning against the individualist fallacy that the judgment of the community is the mere sum of the judgments of its

members, but that is not so to-day. It is well recognized that the combining of persons in a community gives them, both collectively and individually, powers which they could not have had without the combination. I shall not be misunderstood when I maintain that there is a true sense in which the individual may be said to be prior to the community. All our conscious experience comes to us directly in an individual form.

The foregoing consideration is purely theoretical; let us look at the matter more in relation to practice.

In the life-history of the individual some independence of judgment must be shown from the very first. No moral agent is so immature as not to make some reaction upon the examples and teachings that are presented to him, and to show some degree of selection. Long before children are able to think about principles they learn to value one person more than another; to take one for imitation and to dislike another.

In primitive societies, though there is no criticism of principles, there is incessant criticism of persons. This implies that principles of conduct are somehow apprehended and are used, though they are not formulated. Personal criticism is one of the ways in which public opinion manifests itself; without it there can be no sound condition of public morals.

Principles of morality begin to be formulated when societies draw towards maturity. Criticism of principles begins to be prevalent when men betake themselves to literature; then tradition ceases to be entirely oral, and rules are written down and so can be subjected to thorough discussion. Such was the course of moral development in ancient Greece. We may observe something of a similar kind in the history of law. At the stage of mere custom there is very little discussion of the expediency of legal rules; men begin to discuss when the laws have been written down and records are kept of the decisions of the courts. Legal history also makes plain to us the method in which the work of criticism is performed. The reforms which are made from

time to time in our English legal system are made by considering what are the main principles of the system, and asking whether some subordinate rule is in accordance with them. The British legislators who, not long ago, changed the law about married women's property must have argued in this way; recognizing that every person should enjoy the fruits of his labour, they asked, Why should not this principle be made applicable to married women?

Criticism of subordinate principles is going on continually in mature communities, and is necessary to keep the morality of a community from stagnation and decay. But at certain periods criticism has gone much further, so as to attack some of the main principles currently recognized. In the history of European morals the first great protest against tradition was made by the Cynics and Stoics. The elements of moral practice against which they protested were those connected with slavery, with social and political privilege, and with the separate existence of city-States. Another great protest was made when Christianity was diffused over the Roman Empire, another at the Reformation, another at the French Revolution. But in every case, when the early fervour had died down, the successors of the first reformers greatly modified their doctrine in the direction of conformity to tradition.

And all these protests, even the strongest, were no more than partial. In *Gulliver's Travels* Swift seems to be 'up against' all mankind. But he does not really reject the whole body of moral tradition; no one could possibly do that. He merely invests an imaginary race of horses with all the good qualities of men, and with none of their vices.

§ 4. There are some perplexing questions in regard to moral conflicts between the community and the individual which ought to be considered, even though definite answers cannot be given to them.

One such question has regard to the confidence which the individual has in his own judgment when it is in opposition to that of his community. When the Cynics made their protest against most of the institutions of the ancient city-State, and when the enthusiasts of the French Revolution

attacked the abuses of the Old Régime, what were they relying upon? It does not seem a convincing answer to say, Upon reason. The essential fact in such protests is that a way of life which the agents see in imagination appears to them of higher value than the system which they see in actuality; and in this judgment there is an element which is not merely intellectual or reasonable. The protesting Cynic pitted his judgment of value against that of the average Greek citizen. What was his ground of confidence? Sometimes the agent does not state the ground of his confidence. The Cynics seem to have offered no reasoned justification of their 'protestantism.' The Stoics, however, who carried on the Cynic tradition, and made it available for ordinary moral guidance, declared that their judgments were in harmony with the World-Soul, and gained firmness and calmness from that belief. If they had been asked what evidence they had to show for this harmony, they could have offered nothing objective; and, indeed, men of to-day are far from accepting all the Stoic rule of life. But I doubt if we can get better assurance than the Stoics for our final peace of mind.

Nor is it possible to give a clear-cut answer to the question, What shares of authority in moral matters belong respectively to the individual and the community? All that can be said is that in the overwhelming majority of cases the community is likely to be right, but that sometimes the individual is right. In undeveloped communities the individual has but little authority, and ought to have but little, because the motives which induce men of that stage to differ from the community are generally selfish. In an advanced community the judgment of the individual is more worthy of respect; but then the authority of the community is stronger also. The chance that the individual may be right as against accepted principles is greatest when the institutions of the community are much out of date, but there are within the community many persons who are well qualified to form moral judgments of their own. Such were the conditions in the French Revolution and in the recent revolution in Russia.

This uncertain conclusion may seem to be lame as a matter of theory; and yet I think it is important that we should recognize the limitations of our knowledge. This was what was in Hume's mind when he praised the advantages of scepticism. From a properly diffident attitude there follow some practical consequences which have not always been appreciated. When an individual puts forward a moral judgment at variance with accepted standards he certainly runs a considerable risk of error; but no one can say exactly how great the risk is, nor is there any criterion which would enable us to decide with certainty when a moral enterprise of this kind is indefensible. When Athanasius takes up a certain position *contra mundum* no one can be sure off-hand which party is in the right. It is a mistake to threaten the Athanasiuses of this world with eternal damnation.

This, of course, is an argument for toleration, but not for unlimited toleration. Moral experiments have been proposed in the past, such as those of the Anabaptists of Muenster, the Mormons, and the Russian sect of Mutilators, which the majority of citizens have judged to be definitely noxious and have persecuted. The community will continue to make similar judgments, and to act firmly upon them. But neither the community nor the individual can claim to reach certainty in disputed moral questions by processes of rigorous proof.

CHAPTER XXXI

ALLEGED MORAL CRITERIA

(1) There exists no criterion which can give us certainty in moral judgments.

(2) We have no such criterion in Reason, (3) morality being much more than rational. (4) Virtue, however, can be called 'rational' in the sense that it is in accordance with the general expansion of human nature and with the cosmic scheme of things.

(5) The doctrine of the Summum Bonum is another attempt to establish a criterion; but it gives no practical help in the formation of moral judgments, and tends to individualism.

(6) Intuitionism is the theory that men have unquestionably valid moral intuitions or principles in accordance with which they form their moral judgments. (7) The fatal objection to it is that no one can draw up a satisfactory list of moral intuitions. (8) Points in its favour are that we really do form moral judgments without deliberation, and that the basis of our moral experience is a principle which we cannot explain.

(9) Self-realization cannot be used as a criterion, whether we understand it in the ordinary or in the Hegelian sense.

(10) Nor can Self-sacrifice, though that also is a necessary element of good morality.

§ 1. THE present chapter will criticize various theories about the basis of moral judgment which differ from the theory put forward in the preceding chapter. There it was argued that we form such judgments mainly by relying upon the community, but in part also by relying, each of us, upon our own power of judging. Against such a theory the objection may be made that it does not give us certainty. Sometimes the community is in the wrong, even when it feels surest that it is right; and still more often the individual. Now there has always been a demand for certainty in morals; wherefore many thinkers have maintained that mankind possesses some sort of certain moral criterion. Such a criterion, if it existed, ought to have much the same utility as the standard units of length and weight which are established in every civilized

country by official authority and enable us to form correct judgments of measurement. With the aid of the criterion the individual would be able to choose the best course of action for himself on all occasions, to judge the human characters whom he meets, and to test the validity of moral principles. Various criteria have been proposed, but I do not think that any of them can be established from the speculative standpoint. Their invalidity might be suspected from their practical ill-success. The moralists who profess to have criteria produce schemes of life which differ greatly from each other and generally conflict with common sense. No criterion which has been proposed has won universal acceptance; and no criterion has much efficacy for eliminating doubts and difficulties in practice. Nevertheless, all the chief criteria which have been proposed do recognize, each of them, some important feature of moral experience.

§ 2. In the ancient world the claim to have reached certainty in morals came from professional philosophic teachers. For such men it was natural to propose a purely intellectual criterion. They were not, as so many modern moralists have been, connected with religious organizations. The regular attitude of the ancient philosopher was one of distaste for popular religion, because it was full of low superstition. He usually relied upon Reason. If men would listen to reason, he said, they would be able to resist the solicitations of passion and get infallible guidance in moral affairs. This theory or attitude of mind is commonly termed Rationalism.

Let us try to be clear about the meaning of rationalism. It amounts to this: that human reason is of such a quality that it will tell us infallibly what we ought to do in morals. Every man, so far as he is truly human, is supposed to have a higher or rational element in him which is his real self. If we follow its dictates, we are sure to act aright and walk with certainty along the path of virtue.

This is the position of the consistent rationalist; but Plato is the only thinker who fully deserves the term. All the ancient moralists were rationalists in the sense that they

preached the supremacy of reason and exhorted men to lead their lives under its guidance. But none of them really believed in reason with Plato's fervour; and the same may be said of the modern philosophers to whom the term 'rationalist' has been applied.

Can reason be used as a moral criterion or infallible guide of conduct? We must answer emphatically that it cannot. If it could, Plato would not have proposed so many absurd, mischievous, and, indeed, anti-moral institutions for his two Ideal States. The other moralists who appeal to reason differ as regards their practical proposals very widely from each other and from Plato. Reason, as such, prescribes no definite line of action, neither in morals nor anywhere else.*

§ 3. The fact is that the moral faculty or the essential element in moral experience is not merely rational, if by that term is meant a merely intellectual faculty; it is something of a still higher order. Moral experience, certainly, is impossible without reason; but we cannot say that moral agents are virtuous in proportion as they are rational. If that were so, we should have to revolutionize our standards of praise and blame and our methods of moral education. The latter change would be specially disastrous. Having decided what is the best sharpener of young wits, we should then rely upon it for the formation of character. The same line of argument might be followed in relation to artistic experience. A poet must be rational, and yet his merit does not depend upon his rationality; though it is said that an eminent Scotch professor did find the special excellence of Horace to consist in his common sense.

But the supporters of the view which I am attacking may turn round with a question: If the moral faculty is not reason, then what is it? Is it a kind of will or feeling? The question could not be answered without a long psychological digression. We certainly are not moral beings in so far as we are conative or possess will; since moral goodness depends more upon the direction of striving than upon the

* Such is the writer's view, but he is informed that most Rationalists nowadays would challenge the statement.

force of it. Nor are we moral in so far as we experience feeling (whatever feeling may be exactly), since this we share with the animals. I think that these difficulties suggest an imperfection in the current psychological analysis and classification. Our experience of intrinsic valuation, of which moral experience is one species, does not fit in well with the ordinary tripartite psychological division of conation, cognition, and feeling. As possessing moral faculty, man is both conative and cognitive; but he seems also to possess another psychological element for which 'feeling' is not a suitable term. There can be no doubt that the general acceptance of the tripartite division, and the manifest impossibility of viewing moral experience solely as a kind of conation or feeling, has contributed to influence moralists to view it as a matter of intellect.

§ 4. But I think that there are other and deeper causes which have induced philosophers to take reason as a moral criterion. What, indeed, do we mean by 'rational' and 'reason'? The terms must be explained in relation to purpose. A rational act, in a narrower sense, is one which contributes effectively to some purpose which the agent has in view. A rational purpose, in a wider sense, is one which contributes effectively towards the agent's general scheme of life. Now good morality does, for most men, give help towards their scheme of life, and is in harmony with the general development of human nature. By this I mean that the better a man is in morals, the more likely is he to find himself in accord with his fellow-men, and the more likely is he to contribute towards general human progress. And so it comes natural to say that good morality is rational, or is what right reason dictates; this is what a well-disposed citizen is inclined to believe who recognizes purpose in his community as a whole, and shares appreciatively in its life.

The congruity of good morality with public welfare is, perhaps, the main reason why it is spoken of as rational; but there is the further reason that it seems to agree with the total scheme of things. We do not know what is the purpose of the world; and yet we may entertain a faith that it has

one. If so, we may be sure that it is according to the world-purpose that the good things in the world should be heartily appreciated. We feel this very strongly in regard to things of beauty and of intellectual value. Perhaps we can hardly say that the beautiful objects of nature are there to be admired; because it is only a very small part of them that fall under human observation. But it is right and fitting that they should be admired; just as it is right and fitting that the complicated schemes of things, such as chemistry discloses to us, should awaken in us an eagerness to explore them. If there is a world-purpose, we may feel sure that morality contributes towards it, and therefore appreciation of what is morally valuable, which is the essential element in moral experience, must be rational from the cosmic point of view.

§ 5. Another attempt to establish a moral criterion is contained in the doctrine of the Summum Bonum. We owe the doctrine to Aristotle, who states it with characteristic precision in those opening chapters of the *Ethics* which seem so irrefutable on a first reading. Among the various ends which men pursue, he says, we may observe a relation of subordination. We can safely assume that this subordination does not go on *ad infinitum*. There must be "some end of things which we desire for its own sake, and the rest for the sake of it." This, then, is the chief good, which we call 'eudaimonia.'

The Summum Bonum doctrine is a fine effort of speculation. Its main purpose was to teach men to systematize their lives in accordance with a master-principle. It also had the same sort of high speculative advantage as rationalism; it enabled the philosopher to regard the world in general as governed by a good purpose in which human individuals could share. But it cannot be called practically successful. If it were, it ought to enable men to form right moral judgments, and so to lead the best kind of life. But in practice it is useless for this purpose, because the chief good is not in any way objectively determined. It can be used to justify

any sort of life which has consistency. Observe the variety of the interpretations which have been put upon it. Aristotle said that the Summum Bonum was 'eudaimonia'; which is commonly translated as 'happiness,' but really means no more than such a quality in a man's life that an observer can justly pronounce him to be blest with a good genius or guardian angel. The Stoics said that it was 'apathy,' or freedom from the tyranny of passion; the Epicureans said that it was 'ataraxy,' or undisturbed peace of mind. Taken literally, these latter formulas are unsatisfactory, because they are negative. But what the Stoics really were aiming at was spiritual firmness and calmness of a self-reliant kind; while the ideal of the Epicureans was quiet enjoyment of a simple, though intellectual, community-life. At the present time no one would be content to accept such methods of life as embodying the chief good. Nor would any large proportion of men favour the doctrine of Plotinus, who put perfect happiness in mystic union with the One-and-All.

The Summum Bonum is not often mentioned by the moralists of the modern world, to which, indeed, it is not well suited. But it is prominent in Spinoza; it is adopted in some well-known passages of Kant, apparently without his recognizing how inconsistent it is with his main ethical system; and it occurs in T. H. Green, who was greatly under the influence of Aristotle. No two of these thinkers agree as to the meaning which should be given to it. For Spinoza the chief good means pleasure-happiness; for Kant it means virtue plus happiness; for Green it is virtue only.

The Summum Bonum doctrine, though not avowedly individualist, has an individualist tendency. It would never have been proposed by Plato, who would have felt its inconsistency with his principle of the subordination of the individual to the community. Aristotle, it is true, was like Plato a believer in the city-State, but not fervently enough to make him trust to the community for a rule of life; the speculative activity, in which he thought that happiness was mainly to be found, was something quite remote from the ideas of the ordinary citizen. The Stoics and Epicureans

did not trust to the community at all; their 'apathy' and 'ataraxy' were in sharp contrast to common desires and hopes. Among the modern moralists who profess the doctrine, Spinoza lived and thought in the complete isolation which was enforced upon an excommunicated Jew; Kant had no attachment to the institutions of his country; while Green's politics were those of a mid-Victorian Liberal. It would not be unjust to speak of the Summum Bonum as a camouflaged individualism, so far as ethical theory is concerned. Its advocates would have recognized the presumption of declaring that they were competent to decide on their own judgment what is the best way of life. They professed to appeal to an objective criterion; but it was one which had no real objectivity.

§ 6. Now we pass to modern attempts to formulate a criterion.

Take, first, Intuitionism. So far as I know, it has not been stated in an exact form by any of the great classical moralists; but its purport seems to be as follows. We are supposed to have absolutely certain, self-evident principles in our minds which will guide us infallibly in morals. How we come by such principles it is not necessary to inquire for the moment; but in the type of theory which I have in view they are not regarded as supernatural. There may be one master principle from which subordinate rules can be deduced; or there may be an indefinite number with no manifest bond of connexion. The theory is called 'intuitionism,' because the self-evident moral principles are 'intuitions.'

The term 'intuitionism' has, however, been used in a wider sense, and more in accordance with its etymology. Etymologically, it means no more than that we form our judgments upon moral situations immediately on inspection without any process of deliberation. Usually, says Rashdall, intuitionism is understood as "the theory that actions are pronounced right or wrong *a priori* without reference to their consequences." This definition seems to me to be too vague; it would apply to the conscience-theory of Butler and to the

moral-sense theory of Hutcheson, no less than to intuitionism in the narrower sense stated above. Moreover, it has the defect that it is negative; it tells us what moral judgments are not (that they do not look to consequences): it does not explain how we are able to make infallible moral judgments on immediate inspection of acts. In what follows I shall keep to the narrower sense of intuitionism.

We can hardly understand this theory of the moral criterion without considering the motive behind it. Its purpose was to support authority; that is, to increase the stringency of moral rules. This need has been felt more strongly in the modern world than in the ancient. All through the modern period, down to comparatively recent times, there has been want of confidence in the moral quality of the State, and reaction against the moral principles actually observed by the governing class. On the other hand, the Christian Church has always claimed great moral authority. That authority would be much strengthened if the rules which it prescribes could be regarded as having unquestionable, self-evident validity. Most of the advocates of intuitionism have been ministers of religion, and, more or less directly, it is the support of religion that they have had in view. They have not said explicitly that the Ten Commandments, or any other ecclesiastical set of rules, are self-evident; but they have maintained the self-evidence of moral rules, and assumed that there can be no rules worth mentioning which are different from those of Christian morality.

§ 7. As will be seen later, in a chapter on the British Moralists, the chief theoretical argument which was used to support intuitionism was an analogy between moral and mathematical principles. In that chapter I shall argue that the analogy is fallacious. But, leaving pure theory aside for the present, let us consider whether any system of moral intuitions which has actually been proposed will serve practically as a moral criterion.

What seems to me a fatal objection to intuitionism is that no satisfactory list of moral intuitions ever has been (or ever will be) drawn up. The late Professor Henry Calderwood

may be taken as an average or typical intuitionist. He enumerates eleven "first principles"—those of self-development, industry, temperance, purity, reverence, love, obedience, justice with honesty, benevolence, truthfulness, fidelity; and he adds that "under these will come a series of subordinate laws of life belonging to a sphere of inferential ethics." Now, these eleven principles, with the "subordinate laws," may or may not comprise the whole duty of man; they seem indeed to omit some most important provinces of conduct, and they are very different from a list of twenty-three *noemata moralia* drawn up long before by the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More. But in any case they are not intuitions in the sense in which mathematical first principles may claim that name. They are not universally admitted to be true—millions of people have no care for self-development, nor for industry, nor for temperance; often they cannot be applied without deliberation to concrete cases, and they often conflict with each other (e.g., self-development with benevolence) as mathematical principles never do. In fact they are not intuitions at all, but mere generalizations made by Calderwood from his observation of decent members of mid-Victorian Edinburgh society. Rashdall has a short list of intuitions—those of Prudence, Rational Benevolence, and Equity. These are still further from the precision of mathematics; they are no more than vague indications of the lines of conduct which it is generally desirable to follow. Sidgwick has only one intuition—the promotion of universal happiness, which is vaguer still.

It is easy to explain why a satisfactory list of moral intuitions cannot be drawn up. The concrete matters of morality are complicated and incapable of being observed with precision; if the attempt is made to regulate them exactly, endless qualifications and exceptions must be made to suit different times, places, and personal characters; if a few simple principles are drawn up, they can be no more than general indications of what ought to be done. In neither case can the rules or principles serve as criteria.

§ 8. There is, of course, no little truth in intuitionism,

otherwise it would not have been so widely accepted. It cannot be doubted that we usually do form moral judgments immediately on inspection of the facts without deliberation or computation of profit and loss. But this is a kind of immediacy which is different from that of mathematics. When we judge offhand concerning a triangle which is before us that any two of its sides taken together are longer than the third, we are applying an exact formula to an object which is exactly suited by it. But when we judge, equally offhand, that the conduct of Socrates after his condemnation was admirable, we are judging a complex situation, which we should have difficulty in analysing, according to principles which we should have difficulty in formulating. In cases where moral judgments are really made by the deliberate application of formal rule to a situation, the process of judging is usually slow and difficult. The quickest and best judgments upon situations are made by men who are intimately familiar with a certain field of experience, but have not formulated definite rules about it. This is a well-known fact in the case of judgments about social usage or manners.

Intuitionism also has the advantage, for such I think it, that it views morality as something which is in the end inexplicable. That we have a moral faculty is a fact of human nature which just has to be accepted : it is not to be explained by something else which is better known ; it is rather a basis for explaining other things.

Although the term does not seem to me very appropriate, it might be said that our appreciation of humanity, which I take to be the central fact of moral experience, is an 'intuition.' If such a view can be called a sort of intuitionism, it is, of course, widely different from the sort which maintains the existence of a large number of definite self-evident rules. It is different also from Rashdall's form of the doctrine with its three principles of Prudence, Rational Benevolence, and Equity, which seems to me to have the weakness of a compromise. It is nearest to the doctrine of Sidgwick, whose single principle was the promotion of universal happiness.

In a succeeding chapter I shall argue that 'welfare' is a

better ethical term than 'happiness.' If 'welfare' be substituted for 'happiness,' I think that Sidgwick's formula is brought still nearer to the truth. But even so I would argue that the real object of our moral interest is, not so much the welfare of human beings, as the human beings themselves in all the fullness of their qualities. We must appreciate a person as valuable in himself before we can take a moral interest in his welfare.

§ 9. In recent British thought the moral criterion which has been most favoured is that of Self-realization. The term is one which needs some explanation, and to which more than one meaning has been given. In its ordinary and natural sense it means a building-up of character. This sort of higher egoism certainly has its due place in a good system of virtues. It is specially strong in artistic natures. Goethe said that he desired to raise the pyramid of his existence as high as possible, and we do not blame him, though the means which he adopted are open to criticism. But no such principle will serve as a moral criterion. In the first place, moral experience is outward-looking in the main, not inward-looking or directed towards the personality of the agent. Then, human perfection is an idea which cannot be determined out of relation to society; by itself it is nothing definite, and therefore lends itself to caprice. Self-realization understood in the natural sense is individualistic, and is open to the criticisms which are valid against all forms of ethical individualism.

But there is another meaning of Self-realization which belongs to the Hegelian school of moralists. In this sense the principle is anything but individualistic; its fault, rather, is that of ignoring the individual. Hegel, as I shall argue later, gave no proper recognition to the individual. He himself was not conscious of this as a fault; he was content to say that the individual realizes himself in the community, and can do so nowhere else. But the British thinkers who have adapted Hegelian ideas to our national requirements speak rather differently, knowing that one of those requirements is that the individual should be recognized. However,

their recognition seems to me to be mainly verbal. They say that the criterion of moral action is Self-realization, though not exactly in the ordinary sense. They distinguish the narrower or merely personal self from the wider self, which includes both the personal self and the community to which the agent belongs. It is the wider self which it is our moral duty to realize. Practically, this seems to be nothing more than a way of calling attention to the importance of public duty. It was a lesson which was opportune in England at that time, but it still leaves the individual without adequate recognition.

§ 10. Finally, there is the principle of Self-sacrifice, though we need not spend much time in discussing the claim of this as a moral criterion. There certainly was a time when moralists advocated as a practical rule of life, 'Find out what you like, and then do the opposite.' But there has been a reaction against all that since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Bentham, for example, spoke strongly against the views which were currently accepted in his day. "Sacrifice," he said, "sacrifice is the demand of the every-day moralist. Sacrifice, taken by itself, is mischievous, and mischievous is the influence that connects morality with suffering." On the whole, the world since Bentham's day has sympathized with his conclusions, though it has rejected most of the arguments with which he supported them.

Even if we agree with Bentham in rejecting asceticism, we ought, I think, to admit that there must be an element of self-sacrifice in good morality. The Anglo-Hegelians were wont to dispose of the question by denying the antithesis between self-sacrifice and self-realization. Taking a wider view, they said, we realize the self by what is apparently a sacrifice. But when we think of cases of self-sacrifice such as are common in warfare, we must recognize that this part of Hegelian ethics is not much more than empty phrase-making, tending to produce exasperation rather than comfort in those who suffer. Although the way of virtue is the way of self-realization in the main, yet there are, and apparently always will be, occasions on which self must be denied at the

call of duty. Without any computation of advantage, we have to give up things which are not merely desirable, but valuable in themselves.

We must admit the reality of self-sacrifice, even if we cannot justify it as profitable to the individual. There is a strong and ancient desire that it should so be justified, as we may see from the eschatologies of nations in widely-separated parts of the world: Plato's eschatology in the *Republic* is largely a justification of self-sacrifice. But there are many men who do not believe in Plato's eschatology nor in any other, and cannot give any reasoned account of self-sacrifice, but nevertheless do self-sacrificing acts. They may be said to have a kind of faith that the scheme of things will compensate them, though their faith may not be definite and articulate. About this matter moral philosophy can give us no certain assurance, and yet most men would be glad if they could be assured that their sacrifices have not been in vain in respect of their personal welfare.

CHAPTER XXXII

FREEDOM

(1) Moral experience implies personal freedom, which means capacity to act according to one's judgment of intrinsic value. (2) Freedom is necessary for all our higher activities, not for morality only. (3) While recognized by common sense, it has been denied by thinkers who apply to human conduct the concepts of natural science, (4) and by those who are under the influence of philosophic absolutism. (5) Freedom does not mean independence of society, nor does it mean unpredictability. The will of a free agent may be influenced both by circumstances and by his own past. (6) The libertarian doctrine implies that spirit can interact with the non-spiritual, and that an agent can increase his own spiritual energy by willing; neither of which things is easy to understand.

§ 1. THE purpose of this chapter is to vindicate the reality of moral freedom. The problem of freedom is often spoken of depreciatingly, as an argument about words or a labyrinth from which there is no issue. I venture to think otherwise. If we are in earnest in maintaining that moral experience must be personal, then moral acts must really issue from the agent's personality. This cannot be said of acts done under compulsion, or without free agency. Unless we are free, all the better part of our life is delusion. And unless a person is both free and believes himself to be free, he cannot have a proper sense of dignity. We know this from common experience. A life of subjection is satisfactory to no one, except to a low kind of moral agent, even though he enjoys all the material conditions of happiness.

The problem of freedom, then, is a real one—as real as any in speculative philosophy. But, before attempting it, let us consider what freedom means. Too often it has been understood in a merely negative sense. Hobbes, for example said "liberty or freedom signifieth properly the absence o

opposition"; "a free man is he who is not hindered to do what he has a will to do." In these expressions Hobbes showed his usual blindness to all the higher side of our experience. Ordinary people never use 'freedom' as a mere negation when speaking of what concerns our higher life; they use it, rather, for the doing of acts which proceed from a personal will and express personal appreciations.

We are helped in understanding moral freedom by considering a non-moral example. Suppose a master of the violin to be holding his instrument and to be asked to improvise upon it. He complies, and plays with all his skill. We should say that he is the free author of the music which he produces. In this freedom we can distinguish the following elements. The musician must at least be free in Hobbes's sense; his hands must not be tied or paralysed. Then he must have the musical gifts, interests, and training which are necessary for violin-playing. Then he must will to play. Finally (and this is the most important point for our present purpose), the music which he improvises must be the outcome of his own musical taste; he must see musical value in it, and must play it for that reason.

Let us draw out the parallel in moral action. An act which is free in the sense which is meant by the moralist must, of course, be done without physical compulsion. It must also be an act dealing with some object which comes within the range of the agent's moral appreciations. An Australian black-fellow is not free to practise the domestic virtues, because he has no idea of any such thing as a home. Then the agent must will the act by free choice, as a man chooses his wine from a wine-list at dinner. Finally, the act must be one which expresses the agent's judgment of intrinsic value; it must be an act such as he admires in others, and such as makes him feel better when he does it himself.

§ 2. It is not moral experience alone for which freedom is indispensable; all our higher activities require that we should act freely, and that we should believe in the reality of our freedom. In the sphere of art this is a commonplace of criticism. A picture, for example, must express the artist's

conscious personal preference, if it is to have high artistic merit. So with musical composition. There is an impassable difference between work which is spontaneously personal and work which is imitative or the result of some affectation. It is the business of the critic to recognize and call attention to work which has genuine personal quality. We may say the same of that lower kind of artistic work which consists in interpretation, such as that of the executant musician. Very few executants have the gifts to enable them to compose; but even to interpret well they must have personal appreciations which resemble those of the creative artist.

These considerations have no less weight in the sphere of understanding; and this would be recognized at once if it were remembered that the highest exercise of understanding is creative. There is no need to labour the argument in regard to fine literature. But consider the invention of theories about such subjects as historical research or political economy; even there the inventor is always expressing an attitude of personal appreciation towards certain objects, and without that appreciation his work would be of inferior value. There is much knowledge in which we should not discern any freedom in this sense; for example, a shop-assistant may know the price of every article in his shop without caring deeply about the business. But this is knowledge of a lower kind.

§ 3. This seems to me to be what is meant by the freedom of personal agency. The possibility of it has been disputed for various reasons which I shall proceed to examine. But first it must be noticed that personal freedom is in accordance with common sense. By this I mean, not so much that the majority of people believe in it, but that a great deal of serious practice implies it. This is the only form in which the appeal to common sense has much weight. So great is the prevalence of delusion and self-delusion that we cannot be greatly impressed by what men believe or say they believe. We must, however, pay careful heed to what they act upon. Men do really act, and act successfully, upon the supposition that persons have at least some measure of free agency. If that is not so, all our system of rewards and punishments,

legal and non-legal, is based on delusion. When common sense supports a theory in this way, we are entitled to hold to it till we are driven from it by arguments of the strongest cogency.

None of the arguments against free-will seem to me to have such force. They come from different quarters, and are prompted by very unlike motives; but they, each of them, neglect some unquestionable fact of our experience. Those who deny free-will I will call 'determinists'; those who affirm it 'libertarians.'

Let us first consider those determinists whose minds are under the influence of the concepts of natural science. These are what William James called "hard" determinists.

The most uncompromising of the hard determinists are those who profess materialism. They maintain that no causality can be recognized except that of inanimate matter governed by fixed laws and therefore calculable; in other words, they apply material categories to animate behaviour. This doctrine, however, is now less widely held than formerly. It is an example of the warping influence which is exercised by exclusive devotion to certain departments of natural science. It breaks down evidently when it is confronted with the facts of life, even the life of the lower creatures. It is certainly not held by the majority of biologists. No one can make any approach to calculating the behaviour of the humblest organism, in the way that the behaviour of a dead particle can be calculated. We can predict what animals will do in the general features of their behaviour. If hungry and healthy dogs are shut up in a room with food, we may be sure that they will eat. But we cannot say exactly how they will set about it. Consciousness always defeats exact prediction.

Those who approach these matters under the dominance of biological ideas take a different position; they are prepared to recognize the weight of the anti-materialistic argument, and yet they would deny the reality of personal agency in the sense in which I wish to maintain it. They hold (rightly) that animals, though not rigidly determined, cannot be counted

as free, and (wrongly) that men in matters of morality are on the same plane as animals. The defect of this view is that it ignores the effectiveness of the value-judgment. Animals do not form such judgments, so far as we know. But men have the capacity of valuing one kind of conduct as higher than another, and of acting accordingly. And so we could not be sure that hungry men shut up in a room would be certain to eat a particular piece of food; there might be moral reasons against eating it. The Romans, besieged in their Capitol by the Gauls, abstained from the sacred geese of Juno, though suffering severely from famine.

§ 4. Let us now pass to those whom William James called "soft determinists"; they are the Hegelians who use the language of freedom and recognize some of its aspects, but not enough to satisfy the moral consciousness. A thinker such as F. H. Bradley would repudiate the fallacies of the materialist and the merely biological interpretations of human conduct; he would in some sense maintain that men value certain objects more highly than others. But this recognition cannot be effective, because of his attitude to personality. Bradley, like all absolutists, is anti-personal. He insists that the individual, or indeed any separate element or part of the world, is unreal, and that nothing is fully real or admirable except the Absolute. He, therefore, has no proper recognition of volition, which we experience primarily in a personal form. Now, without volition valuation can do nothing; or, perhaps one ought to say, in all actual human valuation a volitional element is involved.

Hegel's absolutism is somewhat different from Bradley's; but it is not more favourable to freedom. In a certain sense Hegel does recognize volition, but reduces it to thought. Willing, he says explicitly, is a kind of thinking; Bradley, on the other hand, never states plainly his view of the relation between thought and will. To ordinary minds, however, moral experience is more than thinking; certainly moral freedom is more than thinking freely, or thinking oneself free.

Another point of weakness in the absolutist is that he cannot say upon what our appreciations are directed. The

origin of absolutism, which in religious experience takes the form of pantheism, I take to be an excessively strong consciousness of the world-whole. It is right to have some considerable share of this consciousness, but not so much as to divert attention from those human associations which are the natural objects of our devotion. No one can be devoted to the Absolute in any intelligible sense. A good citizen is devoted to his community when he understands and appreciates the purposes which are manifested in its institutions. But we do not know the purposes of the Absolute; in fact, the concept of the Absolute as such excludes purpose altogether.

The freedom, then, of the absolutist or Hegelian type is not satisfactory for ethics. Though it claims to be positive, it amounts to no more than a denial of merely natural necessity. Its practical outcome varies in different thinkers. With Hegel it really meant complete submission to the political State; with Bradley, a somewhat sentimental or mystic identification of the individual with the sum of things. No form of the doctrine allows any possibility of true freedom.

§ 5. Having defended free-will against its chief opponents, I wish now to try to correct some common misunderstandings.

The free-will doctrine has suffered most, perhaps, from its connexion with the traditional English individualism; as though the assertion that a man is free meant that he is, or could be, independent of his community. In the latter half of the nineteenth century there was in England a strong and well-deserved reaction against neglect of the communal element of our life, and therefore many thinkers failed to see that the assertion of freedom is fully consistent with the recognition of community. Freedom must have a communal element just because it is an expression of valuation. Valuation implies valuable objects, and these are impossible without community-life; they are, indeed, for the most part persons with whom we stand in social relations, or they are institutions to which we belong. So far as a man lives a separate, solitary life, so far is it impossible for him to enjoy moral

freedom; because he will lack the objects through which alone self-expression is possible.

Nor does the libertarian maintain that free human action is unpredictable. Bradley in his anti-libertarian essay on the "Vulgar Notion of Responsibility" is caricaturing his opponents when he says that they take a view of human nature which makes it utterly irregular, and therefore unaccountable and idiotic. Any mode of conduct is regular, and therefore in some measure predictable, when it proceeds upon a system which men can comprehend. This is plainly so in æsthetic judgments. We can often predict with great confidence the æsthetic judgments of our friends—certain pictures, for example, we may feel sure, will not please them; while certain other pictures, we may feel almost sure, will please them. And yet their judgments will none the less be free.

Taken in large numbers, value-judgments may even be capable of mathematical treatment, like other statistical facts. There is regularity in the number of crimes which are committed year by year, and in the amounts of money which are bequeathed for charitable purposes. But this does not make us regard any particular crime or charitable bequest as necessitated. The statistical regularity shows that certain causes are permanently at work; it does not decide as to the character of the causes, whether free or unfree.

Nor is moral freedom inconsistent with the fact that the agent is influenced by his environment, both material and spiritual. The material environment acts largely through pleasure and pain; and of pain, at least, our endurance is limited. Hardly less potent are the spiritual pressures of the agent's community and friends. The libertarian only maintains that the value-judgment and volition of the individual have some power and make some considerable contribution to the totality of his conduct.

Nor is a free moral agent uninfluenced by his own past. Psychology is not yet sufficiently advanced to enable us to give definite meaning to the phrase 'structure of the mind.' Nevertheless, the best psychologists of the present day are convinced that the mind has a structure; and that it has been

formed gradually, in part by the agent's own action. Now, everything which has a structure is influenced in its behaviour by the fact of the structure; the more so in proportion as the structure is of slow growth, and can be changed but slowly by the efforts of the agent.

§ 6. I would not for a moment be thought to maintain that there are no real difficulties in the theory of free-will, nor that the difficulties to which thinkers have drawn attention are mere misunderstandings. The difficulties are real, but they are due to inevitable limitations of our knowledge; nor are they greater in moral experience than in other parts of our higher life.

A libertarian must assume that the soul of man can act upon material things, in particular upon the neural elements of the agent's own body; otherwise the value-judgments which we form can have no practical effect. This necessitates the assumption that there is community of nature between the spiritual and the non-spiritual; for things which interact must always have something in common. This is denied only by those thinkers who adhere unreservedly to pluralism. We cannot understand how there can be community of nature between things which apparently are so diverse; but to suppose that they have no community leads to even greater difficulties. And it is not in morals only that we must assume an action of spirit upon matter; it is needed no less in art and cognition.

The libertarian must assume also that a human being has, not only the capacity of self-direction, but the capacity of increasing his spiritual energy by an exertion of will. When a man resolves that, for a moral reason, he will devote himself to some task more earnestly than before, he is in the position of creating something out of nothing by his personal fiat. We have no parallel to this in the sphere of natural science; and, so long as we think of forces as being all of the kind which can be scientifically measured, such an assumption is inexplicable. But, in regard to the world as a whole, we feel a very strong demand that new things should come into being; in Bergson's phrase, that evolution should be creative. And, if we believe in this, we have less difficulty in believing

in the creation of energy by the individual. Everywhere in the spiritual life in which value-judgments are found there is individual creation of energy, in art and cognition no less than in morals. And, though this may seem strange because of prejudices that have their origin in natural science, it is really no more strange than the creation of ordinary ideas which goes on every minute of our waking life.

CHAPTER XXXIII

ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS

(1) The influence of ethics upon metaphysics is greater than that of metaphysics upon ethics. (2) It is to moral experience, largely, that we owe the impulse to metaphysical speculation; it also prescribes limits to metaphysical inquiry. (3) Non-moral experience suggests to us some elementary metaphysical principles, but moral experience gives them new meaning. (4) Through moral experience we become convinced that the world upon the whole is favourable to man, and that the individual is important and has power of action; convictions which have a decisive influence in metaphysical controversies. (5) Moral experience is also the basis of natural theology. (6) On the other hand, a right metaphysical doctrine gives support to our moral experience.

§ 1. In discussing the relation between ethics and metaphysics the chief difficulty lies in keeping clear of religious controversy. The main practical use of metaphysics is to help in the reform of religion. Primitive religions are blind and grovelling, because such is the condition of primitive man. There never has been a time since philosophy began when thinkers could not have exerted a reforming influence upon the established religion. However, in what follows I will try to treat the subject as uncontroversially as possible.

The metaphysician owes much more to the moralist than the moralist owes to the metaphysician. We might almost reverse a phrase which was once generally accepted by the British adherents of German idealism—"the metaphysical basis of ethics." To me this phrase seems almost as preposterous as to speak of the metaphysical basis of chemistry or of political economy. Except for some elementary facts which do not help us very far, the chief data of metaphysics are derived from moral experience. And, whatever the basis of fact that we adopt for metaphysics, no metaphysical theory can be held with the firm assurance that we have in the main principles of morality.

It is not hard to justify this view of the relation between ethics and metaphysics if we form a right idea of the task of the metaphysician. An ideally complete system of metaphysics would be a statement of the plan and purpose of the world. This would involve forming a general idea of the world as a whole, together with a general account of the three main elements of it—the human spirit, physical matter and force, and Deity. Such a programme is, of course, far beyond human powers, because only an extremely small part of the world comes under our observation. We must be content with some imperfect, conjectural answers to certain inquiries; and we naturally direct attention mainly to those inquiries which have some reference to human welfare. The metaphysical questions which seem to me most interesting are those about the general character of the world, whether it is favourable or unfavourable to man; about the importance and the powers of the personal individual; and about the existence and character of God. On all these points the conclusions which we form must be influenced by moral experience more than by anything else. This is one side of the account. The other side, however—the influence of metaphysics on ethics—is not to be neglected. Having formed our metaphysical system mainly, though not entirely, on ethical data, we can then view moral experience in a new light. A right metaphysical doctrine gives valuable support to good moral practice, and therefore to sound moral theory.

§ 2. In considering the relation between ethics and metaphysics it is not always recognized how largely morality contributes to the motives which induce us to enter upon metaphysical speculation. No doubt the primary purpose of these speculations is to satisfy curiosity. There is, for example, not much moral element in the earliest Greek metaphysics, so far as our scanty fragments enable us to judge. But philosophy begins to show a moral interest from the time of Heraclitus. In the great age of Greek thought and onwards the moral element is predominant. Though they yielded themselves freely to curiosity, the leading thinkers of antiquity always held it their duty to improve current practice;

most of the tenets of each thinker can be shown to have a moral bearing. In our own country during the greater part of the past century there was a strong prejudice against metaphysics as being a kind of futile dreaming. That, I think, was because so few metaphysicians interested themselves in the most practical part of their profession—the reform of religion. There can be no doubt about the moral benefit of a good religion, or about the moral mischief of a bad one. Any one who is interested in reforming religion can fully justify a devotion to metaphysical study.

Nor has moral experience less influence in delimiting the field of inquiry. About the subject-matter of metaphysics an almost infinite number of questions may be raised, and a treatise which professed to discuss them all with equal fullness could have no limits nor any unity of interest. The obvious method is to deal with those questions which have the strongest moral interest at the time. This is one reason why the metaphysics of one age seem old-fashioned to the next. Not only do the sciences advance which furnish the metaphysician with so much of his material, but the moral needs of the age change. We get only a moderate amount of ethical instruction from the ancient and from the medieval thinkers. One may say the same even of the foreign moralists of our own day. No country in the world is in the same social and political position as England, and therefore none needs just the same moral philosophy or is interested in just the same metaphysical problems.

§ 3. Without moral interest, then, we should hardly philosophize at all; but when, prompted by this interest, we come to study our experience thoughtfully, we must recognize at the outset certain elements of it which are independent of morality. The various elements of our experience differ greatly in certainty. There are things about which we have more certainty than we have even about primary moral experience; some are perceptual, others conceptual.

The most fundamentally important element of our experience is hunger. As the German poet said, the world is controlled by love and hunger, and, of the two, hunger is the

stronger. Many men have been sceptical about love or have refused it. But the stoutest sceptic believes in hunger, like a little child. Another basic experience is that of resistance, as when our bodies strike against a wall. Another is kinæsthetic experience, as when we move the body or some member of it. Then there are conceptual experiences which are hardly less certain. The individual must understand the need of making efforts to secure his own existence, and must make them upon a definite plan; he must recognize that he has some separateness both from his material environment and from other living individuals; and he must recognize that new situations are continually forming themselves, and that he must think new thoughts for encountering them. All these facts are made unquestionable to us by pain, which afflicts us when we disregard or misinterpret them.

The foregoing elementary experiences compel us, I think, to accept some elementary propositions about the world. The chief of them is that the world is dynamic. The world as a whole is a manifestation of force or power, some of which is favourable and some unfavourable to man; and human spirits also must have force or power to contend with it. This implies that we live in a world of change, since all the power of which we have any experience changes in manifesting itself, and is the cause of change in that upon which it acts. Secondly, the world must form some sort of regular system. It is necessary to our physical existence that we should think so. Hunger recurs regularly and, in man, is satisfied by anticipating the course of things in the trust that the future will resemble the past. None of the higher animals could live in a chaotic world. Thirdly, the world must, though unified, also give room for the individual. To have unity is much the same as to possess system. An example of perfect unity would be a machine which was perfectly adapted to some function, and was perfectly under the control of a perfectly competent operator for the performance of the function. The opposite of unity is chaos. The world as we know it is not chaotic, and yet is not perfectly unified. Much is left to the individual, who can manifest his energies and

develop himself within the limits which his environment prescribes. Fourthly, the world must be creative in the sense that new things are always coming into existence—new forces and events in the non-human world of nature and new capacities and acts in the mind of man. It may be said that, from the standpoint of physics and chemistry, all that seems new is really a re-arrangement of what is old. But, if only the re-arrangement is new, that is genuine novelty. In any case, the faculties, experiences, and acts of conscious beings are new. Moreover, if there is no novelty in the world, there is no meaning in evolution.

The foregoing principles are not derived from moral experience, but to each of them moral experience gives confirmation and extension of meaning. Moral experience is essentially a striving in which we try to change our environment and ourselves. It implies that we live in a world which is systematic; for there alone are human activity and society possible. It implies agency on the part of the individual, since morally good action must be done by each individual for himself. And it implies that new values are created by moral agents. A good moral act which is done to-day cannot have existed in previous time; nor can elements of character which develop in the course of moral progress. Progress, whether it be manifested by individuals or by communities, must mean emergence of novelty.

§ 4. So far we may say that our metaphysical data are independent of morals; but the independence ceases when we come to any metaphysical question which is deeply interesting. The most interesting of all metaphysical questions is whether the world in general is favourable or unfavourable to man; and here we must rely mainly upon moral experience. Moral experience is the most important part of our higher life; if the general arrangement of the world is such that it favours good moral experience, we are justified in saying that the world is favourable to us. Such a judgment is formed about the world very much as it is formed about an individual or a society. We regard a society as favourable to us when its arrangements are such that the

good elements in our character are encouraged, especially the moral elements. Upon the whole, this may be said of the world in general, though in many respects the arrangements are not so favourable as we could easily imagine them to be.

Our convictions in this direction are, of course, strengthened by every advance in personal character and by every step of progress in the community. Advance in personal character implies a keener appreciation of the good elements of the world, and progress in the community implies that the communal arrangements are such as to attract admiration with increasing force. When pessimism prevails in a community the cause may lie either in the community or in the individual. The individual may be personally unfortunate or unworthy, or the community may be at fault. A striking example of the influence of social and political conditions was to be found in Russia before the revolution, when the national literature upon the whole was unhappy and gloomy. Men of imagination and original vigour were depressed by the despotism of the Tsars and gave way to pessimism.

It is in regard to all metaphysical questions relating to the personal individual that moral experience is most decisive. From it we get an overpowering impression of the importance of persons. The conscience of the modern world is not satisfied unless each person is regarded as an end in himself; and to treat a person as an end in himself means to provide him with opportunities for virtue. No social organization is satisfactory which tends to contravene this principle; and no one can be regarded as leading a satisfactory life who does not recognize the importance of personal morality, not only for himself, but for all those around him.

It is impossible to draw out fully here the metaphysical implications of this attitude to persons and to personal morality. It seems to me to govern one's decisions in regard to most of the metaphysical controversies of the present time. On this ground alone there is hardly a single doctrine in Bradley's anti-personal book, *Appearance and Reality*, to which I could give assent; and much the same might be said of Professor A. E. Taylor's more systematic work on meta-

physics. The bearing of all this upon questions where religion is involved is touched on in the next section. Questions concerning the metaphysics of the ancient thinkers will be mentioned in later chapters. Of modern controversies one may mention in particular that about the general nature of matter, and that about the world-views called 'monism' and 'pluralism.' If the individual is really important, he must have powers of action; he must be able to exert influence upon his body and upon the material things around him. This implies that matter is of common nature with spirit; for between things which are completely alien no interaction is conceivable. Turn now to monism and pluralism. The monist believes in what William James called a block-universe. This may be understood in one of two very different senses, according as the 'block' is material or spiritual; but in neither sense is monism ethically satisfactory. The materialistic monist must deny the agency of the human spirit, just as all materialists do, and must therefore deny the reality of moral experience. The spiritual monist also does less than justice to the individual, though he speaks in milder tones; his fault is the same as that which we find in pantheism. At the same time, pluralism without any comprehending unity is no less in conflict with the moral consciousness; because the individual can live a good life only in a system, and there can be no system in the world if it consists of disconnected beings.

§ 5. Moral experience is the chief basis of natural theology. In the past natural theology has been least successful when it has adopted a basis remote from morality; when God has been regarded as a primal originator of motion, or as a First Cause, or as a being whose existence is demonstrated by a purely logical proof like that of St. Anselm. If moral experience is the most important part of our higher life, it is proper that the element which, absolutely, is the most important in the world should be revealed to us by it.

The moral argument for theism seems to me to run as follows. In recognizing the prevalence of good in the world we are led towards recognition of a source of good, or of a

cosmic power which is favourable to what is best in us. This source of good or power for good is what we mean by God; that is what religion has become transformed into among civilized men. Among savages God is a dispenser of material favours; at a higher level of culture he is a guarantee of the prevalence and permanence of goodness.

To base natural theology on morals is, in effect, the doctrine of Kant. Though Kant denied the possibility of natural theology in the ordinary sense, he admitted it in some other sense. His arguments for God and immortality are based upon our experience of moral freedom.

When once we have satisfied ourselves that we have adequate grounds for believing in the existence of God, we can draw further conclusions of wide range, which make a metaphysical system based on moral experience very different from the systems which are connected with pantheism or atheism. The difference is that the pantheist or atheist must view the world as being unconcerned about human claims; whereas the theist must view it as favourable to them. If, therefore, we make claims upon the world which are requisite for the development of our better nature, it is reasonable to suppose that the arrangements of the world are such that the claims are likely to be satisfied. For it is not in accordance with theistic belief that man should be subjected to influences which cause him to put forward claims for increase of welfare, and then that the claims should be rejected. The task of the metaphysician is to find out what are man's reasonable claims, to arrange them in what may be called an order of importance, and to adjust them to each other. I think it is not too much to say that in metaphysics we are warranted in accepting any doctrine which is salutary or conducive to human welfare; the difficulty lies in finding out what is truly salutary, and what some persons think to be salutary without good reason.

§ 6. Now let us consider the points in which the moralist is indebted to the metaphysician. We certainly can live a good moral life in practice without thinking about metaphysics; and it is equally possible for a non-metaphysical

mind to have a fairly sound theory of morals. Nevertheless, there is some advantage both for practical and for theoretical morals in holding a metaphysical doctrine of the right kind. Man is a small, weak, and transient creature, and becomes increasingly conscious of this as his knowledge widens. In his moral activities he is, perhaps, more independent and self-sufficing than in any others; but even there it is a comfort for him to believe that he has the chief power of the world upon his side. In this way we can explain our need of religion, which does not cease as civilization advances, though it grows more refined. Metaphysics is a supplement to, or a substitute for, religion with a certain type of mind.

The following are the points at which I think that morality gains support from doctrines resulting from a general survey of our experience.

A right natural theology will lend support to our appreciation of human value. To well-matured men mankind is irresistibly attractive, both to work with and to study; and this is enough for ordinary practice. But then, it may be asked, What is man valuable for? What, from the cosmic standpoint, is the justification for our high valuation of him, as compared with the animals of which we think so little? We cannot meet this question fully, but we can give a conjectural answer which is better than nothing. The world altogether is so full of purpose and design that we are induced to think that there is some master-design pervading the whole, the author of which may be the Deity who is assured to us primarily by moral experience. If so, it is natural to suppose that mankind came into existence as part of that world-purpose, and that what each man does in the way of good achievement contributes to universal welfare. Such a thought is comforting; because, otherwise, there must be a continual waste of what is valuable, as men pass away and their achievements do not persist in any form which we can apprehend. The weakness of this doctrine is that we cannot even conjecture what the cosmic purpose is, nor how human achievements can be preserved so as to contribute to it.

A religious argument can be used also to support our

regard for the human community, which is the chief objective factor in our moral experience. There is much that is communal in the higher non-moral parts of our life; science and art are no less impossible than morality for a solitary being. The general arrangement of the world seems to favour these higher experiences so much as to suggest that there is some sort of cosmic community of which the human community is part. In former days natural science would have been against such an idea; to-day, with the prevalence of dynamic and relativistic theories, it is less incredible.

The element of our moral life which most needs metaphysical support is, perhaps, the personal moral judgment, especially that in which an individual sets himself against or criticizes established authorities. We find very little of this spirit in primitive societies; but in advanced societies it is frequent, and is indispensable to their welfare. The individual does not pronounce his criticisms with sufficient confidence and sense of responsibility unless he is convinced that somehow or other the universe is backing him. This implies that the power behind the visible system of things is moral, and that the individual is in such a relation to it that his judgments express a power of moral judgment that is infinitely greater and better than anything which is merely human.

We have a conviction something like this in regard even to parts of our non-moral experience. The varieties and vagaries of æsthetic judgments are notorious; but we are not satisfied to think that beauty is merely subjective or conventional. There must be a Mind which would uphold our preference of a chaffinch to a toad in respect of beauty. It is intolerable also that there should be no absolute difference of intellectual value, and that the things which we regard as intellectually admirable (such as works of Plato and Shakespeare) might with equal justice be condemned by another mind as detestably foolish. We need not suppose that there are accessible standards of beauty and truth; and yet we may well reject the sceptical arguments that our judgments on these matters are the outcome of mere subjective taste.

Part V. Chapters from the History of Ethics

CHAPTER XXXIV

A SURVEY OF THE HISTORY OF ETHICS

(1) History shows how both moral practice and moral theory have been influenced by social and political conditions.

(2) The moral theories of antiquity were formed for men of the governing class. (3) Their best feature was their emphasis upon the State. (4) But pagan morality was unprogressive, because of its unfavourable attitude to hand-workers and to women.

(5) In the earlier modern period the chief moral institution was the Church. It advocated an ideal not congenial to the governing class, but favourable to hand-workers and to women, and therefore conducive to progress. (6) The chief question of theory which was debated by moralists in this period was the authority of moral rules. (7) In the later modern period moral systems were put forward, especially by Bentham and Hegel, recognizing the moral value of the community and the State.

§ 1. It is not possible to write a satisfactory book on moral experience without some survey of the history of theory. A historical survey ought to be helpful in two ways. It will assure us what the questions are which men expect moral philosophy to answer; and it will show that the answers which are given from time to time are, and ought to be, relative to the existing conditions of society and political constitution.

The moral theories of one generation cannot be the same as those of the preceding, unless the generations have stood stock still. As practice changes, as institutions are reformed, and as new practical problems appear, theories must change also. A conscientious moralist will endeavour strenuously after truth; but his choice of theoretical problems for discussion, and his relative emphasis upon problems, must be determined by what he thinks to be the needs of his time.

And these needs also are certain to exercise, consciously or unconsciously, a great influence upon the solutions which commend themselves to him.

In the remaining Part of this book some famous pieces of ethical writing will be reviewed, and attempts will be made to explain the relation of the opinions which they advocate to the conditions which environed the writers. This 'relativity of ethics,' if one may call it so, forbids us to borrow from the past without careful consideration. Great as our veneration may be for the illustrious moralists of old, we are justified in criticizing them with perfect freedom; we can adopt their ideas only so far as the conditions of the present resemble the conditions under which they wrote.

All this may seem to be so obvious as hardly to be worth mention; and yet the influence of environing conditions upon ethical theories has not been adequately recognized by historians of philosophy. This can be said of James Martineau, for example; his *Types of Ethical Theory* is much less helpful than it might be because of his neglect of environment. There exist many expositions of Plato and Aristotle which hardly mention that those thinkers were citizens of city-States and members of slave societies; and yet those conditions influenced every part of their ethical systems. Comparisons have been drawn between an ancient moralist such as Aristotle and a modern such as Kant, without considering all the difference in politics, social organization, and religion that separated a Prussian of the eighteenth century from a citizen of ancient Stagira.

§ 2. Before proceeding to the individual reviews contained in the chapters which follow, it may be useful to attempt a bird's-eye survey of the whole development of ethics, both ancient and modern.

The moral practice of pagan antiquity from beginning to end was dominated by two main facts—one the existence of slavery and general depression of the hand-working class, the other the subjection of women. This condition of practice had its inevitable influence upon the men of theory. The

ancient moralists thought it was their function to put forward ideals or schemes of life for their fellow-citizens; and, various as their teachings were, they had this in common—that they were meant for the men of the governing class only, not for hand-workers or for women. The hand-workers, if not slaves, were approximate to the servile condition; the qualities which they had were held in slight regard, and they were supposed to lack the qualities which fit men for full personal and political rights. Women were in the depressed condition which was a natural result of the slave system, and were not expected to be seen or heard in public. In Athens, which was the intellectual centre of Greece and therefore had a decisive influence upon ideas, upper-class women were kept in almost oriental seclusion; so that they had far less than their proper share of influence upon morality.

The moral systems of Plato and Aristotle are manifestly upper-class systems. Plato's *Republic* ignores the hand-workers, and Aristotle gives explicit reasons for keeping them in subjection. Neither thinker gives any attention to the special moral position of women. Both of them wrote for class-conscious gentlemen who were deeply interested in the welfare of the State and believed in its main institutions, and they were full of intellectual zeal.

Stoicism, which became dominant in Greece shortly after Aristotle had passed away, was, in its earlier form at least, definitely opposed to the ideas of the governing class. It presents a feature which was new in the Western world—that of a reaction against existing moral practice and teaching. Zeno rejected the institution of the city-State together with the other institutions which then were necessary to a gentlemanly career. But the founder of Stoicism never put forward any workable proposals to take the place of what he condemned; in other words, he did nothing on behalf of hand-workers and of women. In its later period Stoicism accommodated itself largely to the prevailing order; it never came fully into harmony with the ideas of the governing class, but was no longer so reactive against them as Zeno was. It developed a sort of cosmopolitan patriotism, and it preached

the virtues of endurance and self-control which were appropriate to superior men enduring unhappy social and political conditions with dignity and resignation.

In the last period of pagan thought all the older systems went out of fashion, and their place was taken by the Neoplatonism of Plotinus. Plotinus's system was no genuine revival of Platonism, but a new development of mystical thought. His attitude to the world is negative; he withdraws, so far as possible, into the inner life of worship and contemplation. But in spite of his unworldliness Plotinus never addressed himself to any but the rich; he spoke to a cultured audience in Rome, and seems to have thought of no other.

§ 3. The part of ancient ethics that has most moral instruction for us is that which has reference to the State, the chief moral institution of antiquity. There were three main political periods—that of the old city-State, the Macedonian period, and the Roman Empire. Of these the first was by far the best. In the Macedonian period the city-States which survived throughout the chief area of civilization had lost much of their ancient freedom; and the new forms of polity which came into being were not so favourable to morals. The Roman Empire was still less favourable, and went down continually till it reached extinction.

The political element is manifest everywhere in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Both of them were devoted to the city-State, though they did not agree as to the best form of it. Plato advocated many striking changes in order to purify it from abuses and to perfect its better qualities; Aristotle was content with it almost as it existed in some favoured parts of Hellas. The good part of their moral teaching which is not political is concerned with the virtues of self-respect; what they say about them is admirable, especially as regards intellectual pursuits.

Early Stoicism is political in what may be called a negative sense; which means that Zeno was interested in protesting against existing institutions, rather than in trying to improve them. The later Stoics did give some attention to

practical political morality. But the best of their teaching had reference to self-respect, in a form which was less intellectual and more definitely moral than that of Plato and Aristotle.

Neoplatonism arose in the last and saddest period of the Roman Empire, when the ship of State was evidently sinking, and men had lost confidence in the institutions of the present, together with their hopes for the future. Plotinus shows no political interest; but then he shows no interest in any of the things of the world.

§ 4. One of the features of ancient society which astonishes us is its unprogressiveness. In general this may have been due mainly to economic and political causes; but in morals it seems to be explained in some measure by the prevailing attitude towards hand-workers and women. To raise the moral level above that of the best period of the ancient city-State, it was necessary to improve the position of those classes and to introduce corresponding ideas into the accepted moral system. But this was never done. The institution of slavery persisted; there were no causes, economic, political, or moral, to abolish it. And women had no champions, nor had their ideas any influence upon current moral systems. What the ancient world needed was more benevolence and more domestic virtue. Probably it would have been impossible to effect the needed moral changes without deep reforms in social and political organization. But the leading moralists of antiquity did nothing to supply the need.

The matter may be expressed in another way by saying that in pagan antiquity there was no centre of opposition to the ideas of the governing class. Men of a governing class are, taken by themselves, usually wanting in the softer and kindlier virtues and in those of the domestic family. There was no pagan institution to recommend those virtues. In Christian Europe it is the Church which has represented the ideas of the hand-workers and of women. Pagan religions altogether had but slight moral influence. As institutions they were under the control of men of the governing class. They had no stock of ideas which could have contributed to moral progress.

If there was stagnation in the moral practice of antiquity, we may be sure that there would be little progressiveness in its moral theory. The doctrine of Plato strikes us as vigorous and fresh in spite of his conservatism; that of Aristotle is less so, though it is still very impressive. Stoicism, except so far as it is reactive, is dreary; ages passed and no useful new ideas were invented by Stoic teachers. Neoplatonism was new and beautiful, but unearthly.

§ 5. Let us turn to the modern world. The history of modern ethical theory may be divided into two main periods, with the French Revolution as the point of division. There is a great difference of tone between pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary moralists.

In the earlier modern period the chief moral institution is not the State, as it was in antiquity, but the Christian Church. We cannot say exactly that the Church provided the European nations with a working norm of conduct; it rather advocated an ideal. Now, Christianity from the first was a poor man's religion. It has never been sympathetic to any of the ideas which are characteristic of a governing class. The virtues which it has preached are poor men's virtues; the vices which it has attacked most strongly are those of the rich and powerful. And it has been a consistent supporter of certain important claims of women. It is true that a few centuries after the foundation of the religion it entered into alliance with the secular power of the Roman Empire, and that everywhere in the modern nation-States of Europe similar alliances were formed. Nevertheless, there is no real solidarity between Christianity and the principles which animate a governing class.

Throughout modern history, therefore, there has been a clash of ideas; the ideals of the Church against the working moral systems of the world—that deceitful world which, not without some reason, the Anglican Litany mentions in conjunction with the flesh and the devil. Both good and evil have resulted from the strife; but one great good has been that it has prevented the European conscience from settling down

complacently. No longer were the ideas of the governing class incontestably predominant. Certain sins have always been denounced by the Christian Church which were tolerated throughout pagan antiquity. No doubt the increased production of wealth and the free political institutions of the Germanic peoples have had most to do with the moral advance of the modern world upon antiquity. But Christian ideas have made no small contribution.

§ 6. So great was the moral authority of the Church that its ideas held the field without overt opposition. Kings, statesmen, and warriors acted in quite a different spirit, but always pretended to be submissive to the Church. It was very rare that any one was bold enough, as Machiavelli was, to advocate in theory the maxims which princes currently practised. Down to the later years of the eighteenth century the excellence of the Christian ideal was taken for granted, and moralists debated questions of another kind.

The main question which is debated in the earlier modern period is that of authority. The moral rules and precepts of Christianity are put forward by the Church with a demand that they should be accepted with absolute obedience. But why should men obey them? Does their authority rest upon the will of God? Or does it rest upon some superior principle within our own breasts, such as conscience? Or is there no absolute authority in moral rules at all? Is any particular commandment to be obeyed only so far as it conduces to make men happy? Throughout the long period of British moral philosophy which extends from Hobbes to Price the question of authority is always the chief matter of debate. It was a truly interesting question for men of that age, because the moral ideal of the Church did not commend itself self-evidently; it was, in fact, distasteful to worldly men. The pagan world had never concerned itself with the question, because no rule of life put forward by any of the great schools of philosophy had a practical influence comparable to that of Christianity, or was so definitely opposed to the sentiments of those who led the community, or claimed an authority greater than that of merely human reason.

§ 7. We may reckon that a new period in ethics begins with the movement towards freedom which culminated with the Revolution in France and produced no less important, though less spectacular, results all over Europe. With the breaking down of privilege and the extension of self-government the State begins to gain in moral value, and to claim the service of earnest minds. Even if the political institutions which actually existed were very imperfect, imagination easily outdistanced the progress of reform, and fashioned the pattern of a better political order to which devotion could be given. We see the beginning of the new ethical spirit in Rousseau, though he was much more a political philosopher than a moralist. In England it was put into a systematic form first by Bentham; later it found classic expression in the *Utilitarianism* of J. S. Mill. Historians of philosophy have hardly recognized what innovators the Utilitarians were. Bentham and his friends ceased to regard the Christian Church as the paramount moral institution. They did not definitely renounce its moral system; but they held themselves free to accept or to reject its tenets according as they thought them conducive to public welfare. Their interest and loyalty were transferred to the community. By practice, even more than by precept, they undertook the task of constructing a moral system the most important element of which should be devotion to the common good.

Hegel is generally regarded as a moralist of a totally different type from Bentham; but we ought to view his ethics as manifesting the same communal spirit as that of the Utilitarians. The differences are largely due to his political environment, which was quite unlike that of our own country. Recently, owing to the Great War, we have seen a sharp reaction against Hegel's *étatisme*; certainly his principles can be used for bad purposes, and were used by the philosopher himself to fight against reform. But in pre-war days Hegel was generally recognized in England as a valuable exponent of collectivist ideas; and his principles were borrowed and adopted, not always judiciously, by British thinkers to whom our traditional individualism had become distasteful.

It is the communal or political spirit which ought, I think, to animate the moralists of to-day. We need for present use a moral system which is in accordance with the ideas of a good governing class. When the institutions of a State have a low moral value, and governors are wanting in devotion to the community as a whole, it is not desirable that the accepted moral system should embody their ideas. The case is altered when State and governing class have risen to a higher level and public policy is directed towards general welfare. Our present institutions are very far from being as good as they might be; nevertheless, substantial advances have been made—quite enough to justify an attitude of hope. It would strengthen the friends of reform if we could have an accepted moral system which justifies an enlightened management of public affairs without abandoning the moral gains which have been made since the days of paganism.

CHAPTER XXXV

PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*

(1) The ethical system of the *Republic* was influenced by contemporary political and social conditions, of which the chief was the city-State. (2) It was biassed by Plato's intellectualism, (3) and by his dislike of democracy, (4) which appears in his account of justice. (5) Plato gives due weight to the virtues of public life, though his interest is too much limited to the governing class. (6) He undervalues the family and home life. (7) He emphasizes duly self-respect and self-culture, though he ignores the element of invention, (8) and he is hostile to freedom. (9) His moral psychology manifests his intellectualism and anti-democratic bias, and depreciates unduly the passionate element of human nature. (10) His metaphysical doctrine, so far as it is religious, is not unsatisfactory to the moral consciousness. (11) But the Theory of Ideas, which was mathematical in its origin, and in which we can observe the influence of his political bias, (12) can give no help in forming correct moral judgments; and illustrates his neglect of the dynamic elements of human nature and his antipathy to change. (13) If ever Plato's proposals in regard to politics and morals had been carried into practice, the defects in his theory would have become manifest.

§ 1. In making a review of certain 'chapters' of the history of ethics it seems better to deal as far as possible with selected masterpieces rather than to attempt to judge any thinker as a whole, or to sum up the work of a school of philosophy. It is difficult to criticize briefly and with justice even a single thinker's life-work; especially where, as with Plato, his activity extended over a long period of time.

Some one has said of Plato that he is the grandest of all philosophers, and would be the most beloved but for his insufferable superiority to the common passions and affections of men. He certainly was the most gifted mind that ever devoted itself to philosophic writing. Not only is he unrivalled in speculative analysis and synthesis, but he had also wonderful gifts of imagination, dramatic power, humour, and literary style. His *Republic*, therefore, makes the best

introduction to philosophy. The only possible alternative to him is Kant. And the Greek thinker was not only personally superior to the Prussian, but had a much better country behind him. Prussia, when Kant worked in its service, was a poor place intellectually and morally compared with Athens in the fourth century B.C.

The ethical system of the *Republic* was influenced as a whole and in every detail by the general conditions which prevailed at the time.

The strongest influence upon Plato was that of the city-State; and this is also the highest morally, though the Hellenic cities had seen their best days before the *Republic* was written. Down to the end of his long life Plato believed passionately in the small, self-contained, civic community. In the *Laws* he fixes the exact number of citizens at 5,040. There he thought that perfect virtue was possible, so far as the refractory qualities of human nature permit. Even if such a State cannot be realized on earth, the pattern of it is certainly laid up somewhere in heaven.

On the other hand, unfavourable influence was exerted by two other enveloping conditions—slavery and the subjection of women. Speaking generally, we may say that the masters of Greek literature are not lovable. They are grand, profound, imaginative, witty, intensely vivid and stimulating; but few of them are kindly. And Plato was one of the majority. This seems to be due largely to the fact that he lived in a slave-civilization; slavery has always had a hardening influence wherever it has prevailed. Nor was there any female influence to make men more sympathetic. Throughout the *Republic* we perceive the author's contempt and indifference for the hand-working class, together with a deplorable ignorance of female human nature. His ideal State is chimerical, if only on the ground of its proposals regarding the female citizens.

§ 2. A very fine side of Plato's character is his intellectual enthusiasm. It manifests itself in a continual effort of exploration and construction, together with an intense love of truth. There never was a more truthful writer than Plato,

not only in his determination to ascertain the facts and to state them plainly, but in his complete freedom from vanity and corrupt partiality. No doubt the zeal for knowledge was abroad in Hellas at that time, for we find it equally strong in Aristotle. Science was then in its bright early morning, and no one could set limits to what it might do for mankind.

But we cannot fail to notice that Plato's intellectual zeal was not balanced by adequate interests in other directions. More will be said of this when we come to speak of his treatment of the family. Plato was an intellectualist—by which term I mean a person who over-estimates the part which intelligence or cognition plays in our life. Professor Burnet has denied, almost passionately, that this can justly be said of Plato, and is inclined to question the existence of intellectualism altogether. But in reality the fault is quite common among academic men—even those of to-day. In morals such a person is inclined to over-estimate intellectual powers and accomplishments as factors of virtue and to ignore or depreciate everything else. Sometimes this tendency in Plato expresses itself in violent paradox. Ignorance, he declares repeatedly, is worse than wilful falsehood. The latter is quite permissible if used for good purposes, and is indeed recommended in the *Republic* as a measure of State; but ignorance is the "lie in the soul," always deadly and detestable. There are dialogues, such as the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, where he shows ample appreciation of some non-intellectual elements of human nature; but the want of balance is very apparent in the *Republic*.

In Plato's own case the intellectualism which diminishes the theoretical value of his work must be connected with a certain defect of character or limitation of experience; but it is a fault which is found more or less all through the history of ancient philosophy. It appears first in the Socratic dictum that "virtue is knowledge." It pervades Platonism and Aristotelianism. Even the later pagan philosophies, such as Stoicism and Neoplatonism, adhered formally to the Socratic dictum, though they are not intellectualist in the full sense of the earlier thinkers.

The root-cause of intellectualism is, I think, a partial or one-sided appreciation of human nature. This was inevitable under the conditions of ancient society. Plato, like his great successors, is on the right path insomuch as he recognizes the fact of valuation, or the intrinsic worth of man. But throughout the pagan ages it was hardly possible to appreciate the whole nature of man; there was too great a separation of classes and too much contempt felt for the lower by the higher. It was only some part of man that was appreciated—something which was possessed only by a select few. To Plato and Aristotle the something which was supremely admirable was intellect.

§ 3. Plato was a fully-privileged citizen of Athens—indeed, a member of one of its leading families—and he was a patriot in the best sense. Moreover, it is evident that as a thinker and a literary artist he owed everything to that wonderful civic community, by far the most brilliant and interesting that has ever existed. Nevertheless, Athens as he knew it, with its large democratic population, its empire, and its commerce, did not please him. He gave all his admiration to rigidly organized military States, such as Sparta and the cities of Crete, or to communities with immemorial, unchanging institutions, such as Egypt. As an aristocrat by nature and breeding and as an intellectualist, he reacted strongly against the Athenian political system. All the outward features of democracy were shocking and disgusting to persons of his quality; they hated the noise, the vulgar jostling of the ecclesia, the bawling of the demagogues. We may be sure that Plato felt bitterly against its moral defects also—the exploitation of the subject cities, the unscrupulous schemes of conquest, the savage fits of suspicion and cruelty. With the fate of his master Socrates before him, he knew that there was risk in attacking democracy too violently; and yet he says more than enough to show what he thought about it as a mode of government, and how he despised its ignorance and want of method. Worst of all seemed to him its choice of governors. Here were experts in morals and politics, such as Plato himself, able and ready

to govern and to offer advice on all matters of statesmanship; but the demos passed them over with contempt, and trusted men like Cleon and the accusers of Socrates.

Everywhere in Plato, in every part of his thinking, we see the anti-democratic bias. And yet he was quite free from what may be called the vulgar prejudices of the aristocrat; he was no respecter of what is termed 'good blood,' or of ancient hereditary dignity. Still less was he a plutocrat. He thought but meanly of the rich, and disapproved of all private accumulation; he hated all forms of money-making, especially the activities of the merchant and the trader overseas. He did not wish that his ideal city should be enriched with the tribute of subject cities, as Athens was; nor suffer from the corruptions of a great emporium, such as Corinth.

§ 4. We must keep Plato's political views in mind when we interpret what he says about justice. To discover the meaning of justice is the ostensible purpose of the *Republic* as a whole, and the results which he reaches are the most significant part of his moral theory. His definition of the virtue is given in terms which at first seem colourless and even commonplace. Justice in the State consists in each part of the State attending to its own business; in the individual, likewise, it consists in each part of the soul attending to its own business. 'Attending to one's own business' was a laudatory phrase in common use at Athens, and its opposite, 'interference in other men's business,' was a term of reproach. But Plato's definition of justice is neither colourless nor commonplace when we consider what it really means. In its political reference it is a profession of faith in an intellectual aristocracy. The class that ought to rule (though, unhappily, they do not) are the men of excellent natural gifts perfected by careful education, free from all the vulgar taints of handicraft or commerce. The function of the young warriors is to serve the rulers bravely, faithfully, and blindly. The function of the plebeian masses is to obey and to perform the tasks allotted to them by superior wisdom; they have no other political function. Such is the meaning of justice in the macrocosm. In the microcosm of the individual it means

the absolute supremacy of reason—of that part of man which alone has intrinsic worth and alone has claim to rule our lives. The passions, which all belong to the low corporeal nature of man, have no claims which the just man is bound to respect. They have no function but absolute submission to reason. A personality in which they are not in absolute submission is wicked, diseased, and unhappy.

§ 5. Although we may not be able to agree with Platonism as a system, we must recognize the excellence of that part of its moral teaching which has most significance for us to-day. Plato is perfectly convincing when he speaks about the dependence of the individual upon the community. He believed most fully in the political State; in its indispensableness, its power for good, and its dignity. The moral value of the *Republic* in this respect quite outweighs its many faults; it is the best corrective to individualism. Plato is the inheritor of the spirit of Pericles, as it is displayed in the Funeral Speech recorded by Thucydides; he composed, indeed, a somewhat similar speech which is contained in the *Menexenus*.

In Plato's day, however, the spirit of Pericles was no longer fully in place. During his life-time the city-State continuously declined, and Macedonia began to extend its power over the communities which were once so proud and tenacious of their freedom. But the philosopher did not understand the changes which were going on around him; he kept his faith in a political system which belonged to the past. He dreamed that the city-State could be restored to more than its ancient glory, and that a polity could be founded which would preserve the ancient virtues and exclude modern vices without excluding modern culture.

Plato's appreciation of the State is manifested, not in magniloquent phrases, such as we find in Hegel, but rather in his general ethical scheme, which views moral excellence as dependent upon good political conditions, and in the spirit of his proposals for the life and education of the governing class. The chief devotion of the ruling citizens, he thought, should be directed towards knowledge, for that brings them out of the cave of shadows and unrealities into the bright

daylight of reality. But next to that comes public duty. To make himself an efficient citizen and warrior, the virtuous youth will cheerfully undergo a long and laborious course of physical and moral discipline; while in maturity he will tear himself away from study, and spend toilsome and harassed years in political management. At the call of country the guardians are to renounce home, its comforts and affections; they are to renounce wealth which confers luxury and power; they are even to make some sacrifice of intellectual virtue in order to preserve the true balance of the commonwealth. Plato's Ideal State, with its combination of military and monastic rigour, would not have fulfilled the purpose for which it was designed; but that should not make us withhold our admiration for the devotion by which it is inspired.

The point in which his patriotism is most open to criticism is the limitation of his interest to the governing class of guardians. On what I hold to be a right view of ethics, the main interest of the statesman should be in the mass of ordinary people; the social director is in the position of a ship's officer. But, to Plato's mind, the whole ship exists for the sake of the officers, because they alone are capable of philosophy.

§ 6. The part of the *Republic* which provokes the most emphatic dissent from a modern mind is the treatment of family and home. The Ideal State had elaborate arrangements which were meant to make both these institutions impossible. The male and female guardians were to live together in public barracks, sharing the same work and exercises. At stated times they were to be brought together nuptially by the civic authorities; but there was to be no permanent marriage, and children were not to be brought up by, or even to recognize, their parents. The establishment of a home was precluded by the prohibition of private wealth, in order to preserve the unity of the State.

All these proposals show failure to appreciate the ordinary springs of personal happiness, and the conditions under which children can be reared successfully in respect of their health and morals. So far as we know, Plato was not himself a

family man; and nowhere in his writings does he show any appreciation of home life. Probably he lived for learning and teaching, and got the human sympathy which he needed from fellow-students and pupils. Women he shows no sign whatever of understanding. By way of palliating these mistakes we must remember that the Greek family in its general tone was decidedly inferior to its modern counterpart. Where the women were carefully secluded, as at Athens, they grew up impaired in intelligence and physique. At Sparta there was great freedom in the relations of the sexes, especially between the youths and maidens. This had unfortunate effects upon female reserve; and yet the vigorous and handsome Spartan women, with their bold free manners, were much admired in Greece. Plato seems to have thought that he could secure female perfection by carrying Spartan principles to what seemed to be their logical issue.

The arrangements in respect of sex and family which Plato proposes are detestable, and if adopted would be ruinous. But there is nothing offensive in his manner of proposing them. If he had been pressed in argument about them, he might probably have admitted that they are somewhat paradoxical; but they are for that reason all the more stimulating. And that is indeed their chief value. They are put forward with perfect candour and purity of purpose, and give an excellent opportunity for discussing the matters with which they deal.

With Plato's want of appreciation of women and of all the tender side of human nature must be connected his attitude towards art and poetry. He says very little about plastic art, beyond a passing remark that his guardians will grow up among objects of beauty which will improve their characters. He does not tell us what these beautiful objects are, what artists are to produce them, or how they are to be remunerated. His general attitude towards art is that of a monk or a philistine. All poets, dramatists, and actors are to be excluded from the Ideal State on the ground that their profession is undignified and unworthy of a free citizen, that they represent low passions and weaknesses of humanity, and so introduce

corruption into the State. The fact is that art of all sorts is closely connected with appreciation of women and of home as a place to be loved and beautified. Plato supports his moral arguments against art by a metaphysical argument to the effect that poets and artists produce copies of material things which are themselves at one remove from true reality; and that therefore they are producers of objects which are doubly unreal and false. But he would not have thought either of the moral or the metaphysical argument if he had not been biased against those interests which are the natural motives of artistic production.

§ 7. Plato is much better when he deals with the self-regarding elements of morality. He has a high ideal of self-respect; his fault is that he limits it too closely to the governors. A State is not really in a good condition unless each class has its proper pride, and not least the hand-workers. Plato did not understand that a "little bald-headed blacksmith" might be proud of producing excellent ironwork, and that his pride would be an important element of virtue. Nor did he recognize mercantile pride, that which makes a Chinese merchant so trustworthy. He saw in commerce nothing but base greed of gain.

So far as it goes, his ideal of self-culture and education is very high; but it does not go very far. Because of the limitation of his sympathies, his educational plan is very narrow. His moral education contains little more than civic devotion and intellectual enthusiasm; which are very fine, but not enough. The intellectual side is limited to music (of a stern and monotonous form), mathematics, and philosophy in the form of dialectic inquiries leading up to a knowledge of Ideas. It is no blame to Plato that he did not include in his plan elements which have been discovered only in modern days; but it is evident that he did not avail himself fully of the resources which existed even at that time. Poetry and fine literature generally he of course excluded: there is no training in any sort of plastic art: there is no natural science, not even geography, in which some progress had been made; astronomy he speaks of with contempt: there

is no history; Plato never mentions Herodotus and Thucydides: there is no study of the arts and sciences (such as medicine) which increase the comforts and lessen the dangers of life; Plato specially deprecates the careful study of disease: there is not even any study of the history of thought; Plato had no high opinion of his precursors in philosophy.

But, apart from special points in which his scheme of culture is lacking, he shows a marked hostility to all originality and invention. This is to be connected with his general antipathy to change. There had been thinkers in Greece, such as Anaximander, who believed in development; and, if the course of Greek history had been different, their views perhaps might have prevailed. But Plato threw all his weight against them; he was an anti-developmentalist. He said that what things truly are, they are immutably; if they change at all, it must be to decline and perish. The pride of invention, the joy of expression, are surely the finest things in self-culture; and Plato himself must have enjoyed these experiences supremely. But they are not consistent with his system. All that wonderful development of Greek thinking, which culminated in him and went on for ages after him, would have been proscribed by the rigorous government of the *Republic*, and still more by the later commonwealth which is set forth in the *Laws*.

§ 8. With such views we cannot expect to find in Plato any real appreciation of the principle of freedom. If the principle had been put before him in an abstract form, to the effect that moral action should proceed from the very self of the agent, he might have assented to it. But he could not have allowed it any practical exercise.

The whole arrangement of the Ideal State excludes the possibility of criticism. Plato did not allow criticism even in such an apparently non-moral matter as music. A change in the established music would be like a little breach in the dam, which presently would widen and let in a flood that would overwhelm the State. As for any other sort of æsthetic criticism, that was impossible in regard to literature, for the State was to contain no literary men; and no provision was

made for plastic art. In politics and morals criticism was utterly inadmissible. The general effect of the Platonic education was to train the young to abstain from criticizing; their whole duty was in ready obedience and reverent submission. To incite them to ply their elders with questions and to formulate doubts, as our modern universities do, would be to debauch and demoralize them.

Equally alien to Plato is the notion that the individual citizen has any function in the development or improvement of institutions and ideas. All the institutions of the Ideal State—political, social, religious, educational, and æsthetic—come perfect from the hand of the legislator, and can be changed only for the worse. There can be no change in the Ideas; for they exist in immaterial yet objective forms which are as immutable as the figures of geometry. The individual's duty is to obey the laws which are established and keep his mind fixed upon the eternal types of the virtues. All this no doubt was constitutional with Plato; but his natural bias was aggravated by his devotion to mathematics. It is indeed not very easy for a mind which has surrendered itself utterly to mathematics to understand the full significance of the principle of development. The study which is most helpful in this respect is biology; but this was one of the natural sciences, which Plato despised.

The novelties which the Ideal State displays are many and striking, and yet they are mostly superficial. From time to time in his dialogues Plato mentions Egypt, and always with admiration. Egypt for the Greeks was the type of all that was steadfast and continuous in politics and social tradition; and that was what Plato aspired to in his imaginative construction. His own mind was inventive and original beyond that of any other thinker; but in theory he could find no use for such gifts. If he had been born a citizen of his own Ideal State, it would have stoned him to death or ostracized him.

As is usual with those who dread development, all this indicates a defect of affection and of faith. There was a strain of pessimism in Plato. Like Kant, he did not think very

highly of human nature; he disliked and distrusted common men and common motives of action. He did not expect the new generations to be better than the old; he thought it would almost be a miracle if they did not decline. If anything good were established, it would be done by the superhuman wisdom of a lawgiver who for a time must have despotic power. He had no belief in the self-adjusting and self-reforming capacity of human communities.

§ 9. Plato's intellectualism and his anti-democratic prejudice show themselves strongly in his psychology; about which something must be said so far as it bears upon his ethical views. He regarded the divisions of the soul as closely parallel to the divisions of the State. In the State there are governors, warriors, and hand-working people; in man there are reason, spiritedness, and the appetites. Plato makes the most absolute separation between the three parts of human nature. Man, he says, is a being with three different creatures enclosed in one skin. One of these creatures is a man (this is reason); another is like a lion (this is spiritedness); the third is an insatiate, base, many-headed creature destitute of all higher qualities. It is the function of the truly human or rational element in man to rule; that of spiritedness to be the loyal executive agent of reason; while the appetites have no function but to be kept in subjection. In the *Timæus* Plato even makes the separation local; reason dwells in the head, spiritedness in the thorax, the appetites in the belly. The political influence upon Plato's thought is shown specially by the position of spiritedness; he would not have made it into a separate element if he had not needed a division of the soul to correspond to the class of warriors in the State. Nor, perhaps, would he have spoken so bitterly against the appetites if he had felt more appreciation of working people. But that is very difficult in a slave-society.

Such psychological views as those of the *Republic* are absolutely inconsistent with a true understanding of human nature, with good political ideals, and with a sound theory of moral good and evil. Unless we appreciate duly the

passionate e men we cannot understand how they behave as they do, what they desire, nor what will satisfy them. Nor can we construct a proper State; failure is certain if we appoint as governors men who are all brain without passion, like the Platonic guardians. Nor can we theorize rightly or lay down good practical principles for the moral life. The passions are the main dynamic elements of our nature, as Aristotle saw; they are not in themselves moral, but they impel us forward into situations in which morality arises. They must be regulated, but should not be crushed or stunted as Plato would have them.

From the other dialogues we know that there was one side of Plato's gifted nature which was fully responsive to the call of passion. But at present we are dealing with the *Republic*, and there his scheme of thought is hard, dry, and bloodless. He is quite consistent logically when he denounces poetry, limits music, neglects plastic art, and confines the intellectual side of education to mathematics and philosophy. I have spoken about his treatment of art already in relation to his proposals for abolishing the family. His negative attitude both to the family and to art must be connected with his want of appreciation of passion.

§ 10. The grandeur of Platonism is due to its cosmic interest. Plato is no pedestrian moralist or limited empiric. He speculates with sublime boldness about the highest things in heaven and earth. He was deeply interested in religion; more and more so as he advanced in life. There is a large religious element in the *Republic*, and still more in the *Timæus* and *Laws*, which are later works. And yet no Platonic dialogue deals expressly with religion; we are compelled to piece together scattered passages.

No combination of passages, however, can give an adequate idea of what religion meant to Plato. Everywhere we feel in him the seriousness of a mind which is conscious continually of the divine government of the world. Philosophic thinking itself—in his view the highest pursuit of which man is capable—he regarded as part of the service which the good man owes to Deity. The form of religion

which he professes in the *Republic* may be described as an enlightened and temperate monotheism. He treats the Olympian religion with respect, though he saw how much it needed reform; but 'God,' rather than 'the gods,' is the term he uses when he is speaking most seriously. The most important quality of God is his perfect goodness. Many Platonic interpreters have supposed that the Idea of the Good, which stands highest in the hierarchy of Ideas, is only another name for God. With the divine goodness is conjoined perfect wisdom. Plato thought that these two attributes of God compel us also to hold that he is unchangeable. To these dogmas he adds another which is not really quite consistent with it: that God has created all things. In the *Timæus*, which was written as a continuation or supplement to the *Republic*, the process of creation is elaborately described; and the motive is said to be a desire that all things should be excellent, like their creator. Everywhere it is implied that God interests himself in the affairs of our mundane existence. He also ordains rewards and punishments for mankind in a future state.

It is a question not easy to answer how these doctrines are to be harmonized with the Theory of Ideas; but, taken by themselves, they are not unsatisfactory to the moral consciousness. The man who is in earnest about morality desires a religion which will support moral effort and add dignity to the moral life. It may be that a synthesis is possible which would do this more effectually than Plato's; but evidently he had a true view of the general relation between religion and morality. And here he compares favourably with Aristotle, whose theology is ethically unsatisfying.

§ 11. The central element of the explicitly formulated metaphysics of the *Republic* is the Theory of Ideas, which is a theory at once of reality, of knowledge, and of moral experience. In order to criticize it justly, it is necessary to consider a little how it arose in the mind of its author. Platonic scholars agree that the theory is mathematical in its origin. But I venture on the opinion that, to understand

why Plato adopted it, we must also consider his attitude towards Athenian politics. Most of the faults of the democracy he attributed to want of instruction. What is needed for good government, he often says, is that power should be in the hands of those who really know. Contemporary statesmen are bunglers who guess and grope; the ideal statesman is one who can speak with certainty. Now, where is certainty to be found? Admittedly we attain it in mathematics; but why not in politics and morals also, if only we view them in the right way? Here comes in the Theory of Ideas. The doctrine of the *Republic* is that there exist definite, perfect, eternal, unchanging, and intelligible Ideas or Forms of the virtues, such as justice, and of political institutions, such as the State, similar to the forms of circles and triangles in geometry, and of unity, duality, and other numbers in arithmetic. The man who has real knowledge in moral affairs is he who fixes his contemplation upon these Ideas and can recognize them infallibly whenever he meets them embodied in concrete conditions.

The Theory of Ideas professes to be primarily an explanation of reality. In concrete objects which are circular that which truly exists is the Idea or Form of circularity; the particular and accidental embodiment, in which it appears on any occasion, has existence only in some lower sense. Men who really know, then, are in touch with perfect reality, while uninstructed men are perplexed among shows and shadows.

Plato puts this difference of kinds of being first, and then proceeds to infer from it a difference in kinds of knowing. To Ideas there corresponds science, or certain knowledge; to the transitory existence of ordinary concrete things there corresponds opinion, which is essentially uncertain. In Plato's exposition the passage is from kinds of being to kinds of knowing. There is good reason, however, for thinking that the passage actually made by Plato's mind was in the other direction. He felt convinced that he had certain knowledge about mathematics (for purely intellectual reasons), and convinced no less about matters of moral and political contro-

versy, for reasons which were not purely intellectual, though he may have thought that they were. It was to justify these latter convictions that he invented the ontological differences between the Ideas and concrete things. He may not have done all this wittingly, but such was the motive that really influenced him.

§ 12. The Theory of Ideas is a grand theory, a supreme effort of speculative power; but it is not successful in the sense that it meets the ethical difficulty which Plato specially had in view, and it illustrates the defects from which he suffered most as a moralist and a politician.

Plato's chief problem was that of the basis of moral judgments. He needed a theory which would justify the wise man's claim that he could settle all moral difficulties, both in his own life and that of others, and would enable him to confute his opponents with unquestionable arguments. But no one can seriously claim that the Theory of Ideas does this. Consider the case of justice. Suppose that Socrates had claimed to know the Idea of Justice. What advantage would that have given him over his accusers in proving that his own conduct as a teacher of youth was just, while their conduct was unjust in bringing their accusation? He would have encountered the obvious difficulty that he could not produce the Idea of Justice, set it out for common inspection as one can set a circle or a triangle, and compare it with his own conduct and that of his accusers. Leaving this point aside, however, see what a contrast there is between the ideas of justice and of circle as they exist in human minds. Really there is very little similarity between them; they are different in themselves, are formed differently, and are used in a different manner. Our idea of circle, as of other geometrical figures, is very distinct, being formed from observation of objects which come under our more exact perceptive faculties; our idea of justice is not distinct, though it is very powerful. Our idea of circle is all the clearer because we can make a circle whenever we wish; we know its plan exactly, and with a pair of compasses can describe a circle of any given size. But we do not know the plan of our idea of justice; it has

grown up in our minds somehow, and the average man can give no clear account of it. By means of our idea of justice we certainly do form judgments about what is just and unjust in practice; but we do not know how we form them, and not even a trained moralist can, when there is dispute about the justice of some act, support his opinion with arguments that constrain the assent of his hearers. Altogether the Ideal Theory has very little plausibility in relation to morals; it has some plausibility in relation to mathematics. We can easily imagine that geometrical figures and numbers, which exist so definitely as schemes of human thought, may have an independent existence outside of human thought; but this cannot be said of moral ideas.

Another point may be mentioned. Plato is weak altogether in his treatment of human motives; he does not go far in explaining why we engage in action in morals, or politics, or elsewhere. The Theory of Ideas illustrates this weakness; it gives no help in understanding the motives of the moral life. Plato evidently thought it did. He speaks of Ideas as majestic things; he assumes that their eternity and immutability give them an irresistible claim upon us. But is that so? Consider the circle. It is a most useful figure; the arts and sciences could not do without it; and yet we do not regard it with reverence. This is certainly true of the mundane circle. But if we came to believe in an Ideal Circle, would that make any difference? I think not. The fact that a Circle has existed in some "heavenly place" immutable from all eternity does not confer moral worth upon it; and it is to moral worth that our reverence is due. So it is with justice. We revere the just man solely because he is just. It would not make any difference in our attitude to him if we believed also in an eternal and immutable Idea of Justice which somehow is embodied in him. The argument is the same in regard to political institutions. Imagine a man who is weak in political devotion—who performs no political service and takes no interest in the State in which he lives. Will his zeal be quickened by thinking that there is a perfect Ideal State laid up in heaven? Will not the

effect of this belief rather be to distract his mind from actual mundane institutions?

For the practical and wholesome motive of interest in what is actual the Theory of Ideas tends to substitute the unpractical and unwholesome motive of contemplating imaginary existences. The tendency of Platonism is to induce us to try to become virtuous by turning away from the world (which is a Cave of Illusion) and absorbing ourselves in contemplation. This is what actually happened in Neoplatonism.

Another defect in Plato which is exemplified in the Ideal Theory is his fear and hatred of change; the Theory is the speculative expression of an extreme conservatism. The Ideas of the virtues and of institutions were meant by him to be as untouched by time and circumstance as geometrical figures. How unlike the better side of Plato, with his rich poetic imagination and joy in living! There could hardly be a greater contrast to Plato than Kant, the reserved and intensely regular Prussian State professor. And yet, logically, Plato's moral Ideas are as rigid and unprogressive as Kant's categorical imperative.

§ 13. If Plato's moral system is as faulty theoretically as I hold it to be, the faults must have appeared in practice, if ever it had been put to trial. We are told that there was once really a chance that this might happen. Hundreds of years later, in the reign of Gallienus, Plotinus wished to found a Platonic community, and fixed his choice upon a ruined city in Campania which he begged the emperor to make over to him. His disciple Porphyry relates that he was thwarted by the jealousy of the emperor's ministers. In the interests of ethical research it is a great pity that Plotinus was not encouraged to go forward with his project, in spite of the sufferings which the participants would probably have endured. One interesting part of the experiment would have been to observe the results of a Platonic education. Plato had some experience of that himself when he went to Syracuse and tried to train the young tyrant Dionysius into a virtuous ruler by lecturing to him on mathematics. It is

doubtful if Plotinus's young people would have proved more docile than Dionysius. They would have chafed against the simplicity and monotony of the music, and have felt irresistibly attracted by the pleasantly emotional tunes of the outside world. They would have wearied of the mathematics, a study which upon the whole follows a path divergent from the main interests of life. One period of the Platonic education was to be devoted exclusively to gymnastics for the space of two years. How brutalizing for the men, and still more for the women! What young people enjoy is a judicious mixture; study alternating with games, grave with gay. Nor would any education have succeeded which did not allow for criticism and discussion; but Plato's system demanded absolute submission.

After finishing their education the Platonic governors (male and female) were to enter upon the active business of warfare and service under the elder statesmen. What virtues would their education have given them? The Spartan system of communal barrack-life without industry or home influence had an unfavourable influence upon the young men, making them rough and contemptuous of all culture, and therefore prone to many crude vices, such as rapacity, which, according to Aristotle, eventually ruined their State. And what of the women? We know that the Spartan women had a bad reputation. What would have happened in Plato's super-Sparta? As for the children, who were to be reared in public institutions, they would, for the most part, have died, and those who lived would have suffered greatly from want of maternal care. Absence of maternal care has a very evil effect upon the moral development of children, especially upon girls.

Plato would have claimed that his ruling class would have been pre-eminent in the patriotic virtues of the soldier. But can we admit this? The parallel with Sparta is not to be relied on. War was a necessity for the Spartans, because they were in the position of a dominant race plundering and tyrannizing over the surrounding peoples. But Plato does not propose anything like this. His State would have no

motive for fighting. Then the Spartan, after his arduous period of youthful service was over, might look forward to a peaceful middle age amid the amenities of home. Not so the Platonic governor; there was never to be any period of comfort for him. A man is patriotic when his country gives him full opportunity to be happy; he does not love it when it makes him miserable through no fault of his own. If a Platonic city had ever been founded, I think that the citizens would have dispersed after a short trial of the experiment with feelings of detestation towards the institution and a total loss of faith in the philosophy of its founder.

BOOKS RECOMMENDED:—

Republic of Plato. Translated by A. D. Lindsay. (Dent.)
Plato. By A. E. Taylor. (Constable.)
Plato: The Man and His Work. By A. E. Taylor. (Methuen.)

CHAPTER XXXVI

ARISTOTLE'S *ETHICS*

(1) Aristotle's moral system was formed in relation to a small city-State such as was Stagira. (2) It is good in regard to public spirit, and deals adequately with the virtues which are needed by the fully-qualified citizens in their public intercourse; (3) it scarcely notices the domestic virtues; (4) it is good in regard to self-culture and self-respect. (5) Aristotle's moral psychology is in advance of Plato's, though he does not adequately recognize the dynamic elements in man. (6) His doctrine of the Mean, which embodies the Greek tradition of moderation, is not valid as a speculative principle. (7) The chief fault of Aristotle's doctrine as a whole is its cool and self-regarding tone. (8) His moral limitations are illustrated by his theology.

§ 1. PLATO's *Republic* is a heroic book, admirable above all in the force of its moral enthusiasm. It presents to us an ideal as high as was possible, perhaps, in the pagan city-State. Aristotle also constructed an ideal community and put forward a moral system which was to be practised in it. But both his city-State and his morality are on a lower plane than Plato's; in fact, much nearer to what actually was to be found in Hellas at that time.

The *Ethics* of Aristotle should be read in close connection with his *Politics*. The latter work was composed for the instruction of practical statesmen; it contains the substance of a long course of lectures on what we should now call Political Science. The *Ethics* was meant to be introductory to it, putting forward considerations on human nature which ought to be present to the statesman's mind, and describing what Aristotle thought would be the ideal kind of life within a well-ordered political system. Behind the moral teaching of the *Ethics*, therefore, stand Aristotle's views as to what is the best kind of political community. We may sum him up by saying that what he admired most was a small, self-contained

State governed by its upper-middle class; such as was, no doubt, his own native town of Stagira in Chalkidike. "Aristotle's political ideal," says Professor A. E. Taylor, "is that of a small but leisured and highly cultivated aristocracy, without large fortunes or any remarkable differences in material wealth, free from the spirit of adventure and enterprise, pursuing the arts and sciences quietly, while its material needs are supplied by the labour of a class excluded from citizenship, kindly treated but without prospects. Weimar, in the days when Thackeray knew it as a lad, would apparently reproduce the ideal State better than any other modern State we can think of." It is to such a community that Aristotle's moral system is suitable.

It was not inevitable that Aristotle's political preferences should have taken this direction. For one period in his career he was a court-tutor in the Macedonian royal family. But, as Professor Taylor observes, "though Aristotle's political theories must have been worked out during the very years in which Alexander was revolutionizing Hellenism by the foundation of his world-empire, they contain no allusion to so momentous a change in the social order. For all that Aristotle tells us, Alexander might never have existed, and the small city-State might have been the last word of Hellenic political development."

Nor was Aristotle's system deeply influenced, except in one particular, by Athens, which had held, and still retained in some measure, an imperial position. During his long residence in Athens, Aristotle was nothing more than a resident alien. The great city never supplanted Stagira in his affections. It influenced him, however, upon the intellectual side. His own life, especially when he was head of an academic institution at Athens, was one of intense intellectual activity. This was well in place at Athens, though it would hardly have been possible in Stagira.

§ 2. There is a good patriotic spirit pervading the *Ethics* and *Politics*, though it is less elevated than Plato's. Even Stagira, decently-oligarchic and commonplace though it might be, made pretty high demands upon its leading citizens. In

the Greek city-State it was absolutely necessary that each citizen should be ready to do personal service, to undertake duties of a civil and military character, and to put his life and fortune at the disposal of the city magistrates. There was no possibility of vicarious patriotism, of hiring mercenaries to fight and watch; it was not permitted, as it is in modern States, that men should talk loudly about public duty and yet do nothing themselves.

As with Plato, the characters and qualities of the fully qualified citizens occupy Aristotle's thought to the exclusion of other classes of the community. This is evident when we examine the list of virtues in the third, fourth, and fifth books of the *Ethics*. Courage, for example, which is first on the list, is considered mainly with reference to war. "The term 'courageous,'" says Aristotle, "in the strict sense will be applied to him who fearlessly faces an honourable death and all sudden emergencies which involve death, and such emergencies mostly occur in war." This excludes all such courage as is shown by women; and all kinds which are manifested in following trades and professions—that, for example, of a steeplejack or of a physician.

So of other virtues. 'Magnificence' is a virtue which has special reference to expenditure upon public objects, such as wealthy men were often called upon to make in the city-State. 'High-mindedness' is the dignified attitude of one who both claims much and deserves much in the matter of public honours. Certain minor virtues—gentleness, agreeableness, truthfulness, and wittiness—have narrower meanings than what their names suggest to us: they are mainly desirable qualities which are displayed in social intercourse; as when men get angry in a reasonable manner; when they observe the proper mean between obsequiousness and brusqueness; when they are neither boastful nor self-depreciating; and when they are ready to take their share in amusing conversation. In what he says about these virtues Aristotle seems to be thinking mainly of the intercourse of citizens outside the home; such as modern gentlemen have when they meet in clubs, and ancient Greeks in the agora or the palaestra.

The moral virtue to which Aristotle devotes most space is justice; and very naturally, because it is of supreme importance in public affairs. In what he says he has two things especially in view: the conduct of the directing statesman who has to assign to citizens such share of desirable things as is conformable to their merits, and the principles which should guide judges in redressing wrongs. Those of Aristotle's remarks which do not apply to these matters are concerned mainly with commercial exchange.

Perhaps the most pleasing part of the *Ethics* is the discussion of friendship in the eighth and ninth books. Aristotle treats it mainly as a matter of private virtue, the relationship between kinsmen and comrades; but in part he is thinking of the association of citizens in public affairs which draws them together, and therefore gives occasion for a certain kind of friendship. He has nothing to say about the friendship of persons of opposite sex; neither that of married life, nor those social friendships where a sex-element is present, though in a refined form.

Aristotle's account of the moral virtues is not very systematic; we are always conscious that we are reading lecture-notes, not a finished treatise: but it is not inadequate from the Greek point of view. What strikes the modern reader as a great omission is that he says nothing about benevolence or self-sacrifice. But this could not be expected in a pagan moralist. Benevolence is implied to some extent in what Aristotle says of friendship, and self-sacrifice in what he says of courage. But all the affectionate and self-denying side of morals was recognized much more fully after the introduction of Christianity.

§ 3. Plato evidently disliked home-life; in the *Republic* it is either ignored or only glanced at as a hot-bed of selfishness and anti-social interests. We do not find this twist in Aristotle. We know that he was a family man, and that he was fortunate in his domestic relations. Nevertheless, there is comparatively little in Aristotle about the family. This was due to its secludedness; normally there was very little social intercourse in Greece between men and ladies. There is

consequently nothing in the *Ethics* about the special duties of women or their influence; nor anything about the relationship between parents and children.

Some treatment of the morality of private life is given in the chapters which deal with continence and incontinence. But what mainly interested Aristotle is evidently the purely theoretical problem how a man can know what is right and yet do what is wrong. The books on friendship are more instructive for Aristotle's views about the private virtues. Much of what he says could be made applicable to the home. But certain passages show that he has in view mainly the friendship of men for each other; as where he says: "Whatever that be which a man holds to constitute existence, or for the sake of which he chooses to live, in that he wishes to pass his time together with his friends; and thus some drink together, others gamble, others practise gymnastics, or hunt, or study philosophy."

§ 4. In what Aristotle says or implies about self-culture and self-respect he is generally admirable; though sometimes we have to criticize him for want of consistency or want of humour.

The most impressive thing about Aristotle is his intellectual enthusiasm—a virtue in which he was nowise inferior to his great master. To this side of our life his doctrine of the Mean has no application. It is impossible to have too much of wisdom and the other intellectual virtues, nor can one's range of knowledge ever be too wide. Moreover, Aristotle's performance is even more instructive than his theory. He was indeed a great encyclopedist, perhaps the greatest in history—"the master of those who know."

And yet all this intellectual ardour was not in harmony with his systematic convictions on matters of politics and morality. His character and career were well suited to Athens, a large, wealthy, intelligent, and enterprising centre to which eager students thronged from all parts of Hellas, and where a masterly teacher could be sure of a respectful and sympathetic hearing. If he had not come to Athens and set up his Lyceum, the world would never have heard about

him. In Stagira he would have been merely a local celebrity. And yet his political system, his scheme of virtues, and his doctrine of the Mean are all dominated by his affection for his native town.

The Greeks had no definite term for the quality of self-respect, and it is not expressly dealt with by Aristotle. But in the *Ethics* and *Politics* a very high level of self-respect is always implied. In one famous chapter, that concerning "high-mindedness," his emphasis upon the quality seems excessive. The high-minded man takes himself so seriously, and is so solemn in his self-importance, that the description of him reads almost like a caricature. It has been conjectured that in this passage Aristotle may be 'guying' some of the court-grandees whom he had known in Macedonia. But I think it is more likely that he wrote seriously, and that the high-minded man represents the type of citizen who took a leading part in the affairs of the small city-State. It is well known that in small communities the leaders assume airs of importance inversely proportional to the size of the community. Aristotle was probably thinking of some of the notables of Stagira; men whom he had admired, and whose position he would have liked to occupy. It is recorded that he himself was always most careful of his personal appearance. But, on the whole, the environment of Athens was not favourable to megalopsuchia, and his description of that quality may have amused his pupils as much as it amuses us.

§ 5. As a moral psychologist Aristotle is in advance of Plato. He has much more recognition of the systematic unity of human nature. He sees that sensation and desire cannot be accidental or harmful elements in relation to our moral life; he sees that they must have some functions, though he does not explain clearly what the functions are. Purpose, he says, may be described as "thoughtful desire" or as "desireful mind." And so he would have agreed that moral purposes presuppose desires. This, at least, is better than Plato's treatment of the desires as a base crowd which must be governed inflexibly by reason. In regard to the relation between reason and desire Aristotle expresses himself

doubtfully. Sometimes he speaks of reason as the governing element in man; and then his position approximates to Plato. At other times he admits that "mere thinking never set anything going"; and then he implies that moral action is prompted by elements which are not merely intellectual.

Nevertheless, Aristotle does not give adequate recognition to the dynamic elements of human nature. He ignores the affections, whether directed upon individuals or upon combinations of men and institutions. If his attention had been directed to them, he would doubtless have included them among the passions, which are part of our lower nature. Moral virtue, according to him, is a mean or moderate state of the passions. There is nothing to show that he recognized the affections as having any intrinsic value. Nor is there in Aristotle any recognition of the will as a human faculty distinct from reason and desire. The ancient thinkers altogether were weak in their recognition of will; and this alone makes their moral philosophy very different from ours. It is a matter of discussion why the ancients differed so widely from the moderns in this respect. The recognition of will is closely connected with the concept of personality. It is generally recognized that the world has been strengthened in its apprehension of personality by Roman law and by the Christian religion, which emphasizes the personal relation between man and God. It must also be considered that personality depends largely upon the exercise of individual force and decision. Now, early society is not favourable to individual development; the primitive individual is merged in his community. Even the Greeks, wonderfully civilized though they were, had not reached the conditions which allow individuals to develop with the freedom which is permitted in modern societies.

§ 6. The most famous ethical doctrine of Aristotle is that of the Mean. It appears in his definition of virtue in general: "Virtue is a habit or trained faculty of choice, the characteristic of which lies in observing the mean"; later, it is the basis of his treatment of the several virtues. At the outset it gives a show of precision to his ethics which is not maintained later. Courage, for example, is said to be virtuous because

it is equidistant from the extremes of cowardice and foolhardiness. But we soon find that Aristotle has to qualify the arithmetical idea so much that it becomes no more than a vague metaphor. Men ought to be affected by the various passions of human nature "at the right times, and on the right occasions, and towards the right persons, and with the right object, and in the right fashion."

The doctrine of the Mean had this to recommend it to the Greeks, that it embodied a venerable tradition of practical wisdom. The precept, "Nothing too much," came down to Aristotle from the Seven Sages. He was in harmony with the accepted moral system of Hellas in commending moderation, self-restraint, and reliance upon the judgment of approved sensible men. But such a spirit is very different from that which we find later in Western Europe among societies which were influenced by the ideals of Christian chivalry. It seems to be specially connected with the Greek habit of city life. Those whose example was most powerful in Hellas were townsmen, living under such conditions that men must be considerate and self-restrained, if they are not to be unbearable to their neighbours: it was thought, for example, ill-mannered to walk fast in the street, Greek streets being narrow. What the world needs most is, not moderation, but enthusiasm.

The *Ethics* is a strictly practical treatise; the author repeatedly disclaims mere speculation, and says that his purpose is to help his readers to live well. From this standpoint the doctrine of the Mean is useful; it points to the line of conduct which sensible men actually follow. But as a speculative principle it is evidently worthless. It does not help us to discriminate conduct which has moral value from conduct which is blameable or morally indifferent. A man may exercise moderation in eating; but taken by itself this moderation is quite indeterminate morally. We cannot judge till we know the agent's motive. And we do not pronounce judgment upon motives according to their moderation, but according as they show that the agent aims at promoting human welfare.

§ 7. The feature which the modern reader finds least attractive in Aristotle is the cool and self-regarding tone of his teaching. The general form of the *Ethics* is a discussion of the meaning of happiness and of the way in which it can best be attained; the happiness which the writer has in view is always that of the individual. His apparent selfishness is mitigated practically by his recognition of the dependence of the individual upon the State, and by his recognition of the individual's need of friends. But Aristotle never gives any theoretical justification for these altruistic interests. It is hardly consistent with his explicit theory that a man should devote himself to the State or to the welfare of his friends. When he is treating of intellectual interests he gives no speculative justification of them. Sometimes, when he seems to be speaking somewhat incautiously, he tends to the view that we do all these things for the sake of the pleasure which they yield.

Speculatively, the same objection might be brought against Plato. He also gives no theoretical justification of altruism. But we do not notice any defect in Plato thereby; his devotion to the State is so strong, and he is so full of zeal for the higher life. But we do notice it in Aristotle because of his cooler nature. Plato would never have thought that the formula of moderation was adequate to enable us to discriminate a good act from a bad one.

§ 8. The defects of Aristotle as a moralist are well illustrated by his theology, which, though not explicitly stated in the *Ethics*, must be kept in mind, if we would understand the book both in what it says and in what it passes over. Aristotle was not irreligious, but what he had was a sort of biologist's religion. He was impressed by the manifestation of design everywhere in living nature, in the growth of creatures to realize their predestined forms, and in the perfection of natural adjustments. He never explains at length his view of the relation between Nature as a formative power and Deity; but, evidently, to him Nature is somehow divine. He often speaks of the divine element in natural things.

Aristotle nowhere deals very fully with religion. In the

brief passages of the *Metaphysics* which deal expressly with these matters he views God as being primarily the source of the motion in the world. God is not immanent in the world, but acts upon it from outside. How the divine influence operates Aristotle can explain only by metaphor. Just as a beloved object attracts the lover, so God by his perfection moves the world. The motion thus produced is, first, that of the heavenly bodies; and, subsequently, that of terrestrial things. This is the source of the formative power of Nature, so that living things pass from lower to higher shapes.

All this is very far from any form of religion which would be satisfactory to the moral consciousness. Apart from his general action upon the world, Aristotle's God has no influence upon human life: he is not a providence; he does not love the world or care for it in any way. In fact, God, Aristotle argued, could not even think about the world without declining from his perfection, since all thinking derives its value from the object of thought. God thinks of nothing but himself; he is *noesis noeseōs*—thought of thought. Thought is the best thing in the universe. God is therefore pure thought; there is no admixture of passion in him. As activity is better than passivity, God is intensely active; and yet his activity has no result, since he lacks nothing for his perfection.

The Aristotelian theology has the merit that it is not anti-developmental; it does recognize a growing and self-adjusting power in living things. But that is the best that can be said for it. It is the theology of a man who had little sympathy with the passionate element of human life, and who felt little or no enthusiasm for anything but matters of intelect. It suits well with his praise of moderation and his preference for a small, unenterprising, oligarchic community.

BOOKS RECOMMENDED:—

Aristotle; the Nicomachean Ethics. With translation by H. Rackham. (Loeb Library.)
Aristotle. By A. E. Taylor. (Dent.)
Aristotle. By W. D. Ross. (Methuen.)

CHAPTER XXXVII

ZENO AND EPICTETUS

(1) The Cynics, who were Zeno's teachers, took up an attitude of protest against existing institutions. (2) Zeno shows the Cynic influence very plainly in his earlier period, (3) but his system was more satisfying than Cynicism to religious minds. (4) The most distinctive feature of Zeno's ethics, the life according to nature, is to be connected with his religious convictions. (5) In his later period he modified his teaching for purposes of moral instruction.

(6) The teaching of Epictetus is relative to a state of society which was declining and oppressed by despotism. (7) It is religious, though too submissive. (8) It is weak in patriotism and in domestic morality. (9) The best element in Stoicism is its emphasis on personal character, especially upon firmness, courage, and dignity. (10) Stoicism was, properly, a product of the old Greek city-State.

§ 1. STOICISM, though inferior intellectually to the systems of Plato and Aristotle, had much more influence upon the practice of the world. It served as a religion and a moral ideal to the most earnest minds of paganism, and, by supplying ideas to the Roman jurists, came to have a great influence upon European institutions. But what is most interesting about it is that in the early Stoics and in the Cynics who preceded them we see the first example in Europe of a reactive moral tendency; that is, a spirit of protest against the basic ideas of the established social and political order. Later a still stronger reactive tendency appeared in Christianity; but that was of a different character.

Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was under Cynic influence when he began his career as a writer and teacher. Antisthenes, the first of the Cynics, flourished more than half a century before Zeno's time. He was a pupil of Socrates, who, taking up philosophy rather late in life, devoted himself specially to the teaching of morals, and strove to exemplify his precepts by his own way of life. His great principle was that virtue is self-sufficing for happiness. By this he justified

his attitude of renouncing the commonly coveted objects of desire, and of protesting against the chief institutions which environed him.

The things which men commonly desire are wealth, comfortable surroundings, exemption from toil, and fame. These, and the pleasures which result from them, Antisthenes declared to be valueless, because they are either morally neutral or are hindrances to virtue. On the other hand, poverty, hard work, and a frugal way of life are conducive to virtue, and therefore to be desired. Antisthenes seems to have rejected the main institution of Hellenic life, the city-State; his disciple, Diogenes, certainly did so, calling himself a "citizen of the world." Together with the city-State, Antisthenes renounced the polytheism which was inseparably bound up with the independent existence of the numberless little Hellenic commonwealths. He said that there was by nature one God only, who could not be represented in visible form. It is also recorded of Diogenes, though not of Antisthenes, that he rejected the institution of marriage, advocating what we should now call free love. This indeed was perfectly logical in any one who renounced property, since marriage without property is impossible for a dweller in a civilized country. Diogenes altogether was a more thoroughgoing exponent of this strange way of life than his master. Antisthenes accepted invitations to banquets, and must have made a presentable figure in society. Diogenes lived like an Indian fakir, without any sort of domestic comfort or convenience, rejecting all observances and conventions, religious and secular, and even disregarding ordinary decency. Nevertheless, he was greatly liked and respected by the wealthy and pleasure-loving Corinthians, close to whose city he lived, for the intellectual vigour of his conversation and for the strictness with which he observed his own moral system.

What was the motive of this violently protestant or reactive attitude of Cynicism? The fakir finds his reward in the reverence of his devout fellow-countrymen; this was wanting to the Cynics, who scorned the popular religion and were frequently attacked with reproaches and physical

maltreatment. Our authorities do not enable us to answer the question confidently; we are reduced to conjecture.

The Cynics may have been moved by indignation against the evils resulting from the existing institutions of property. These were greater in the ancient world even than in the modern, because of slavery. The most eminent Cynics seem to have been born in good social positions, but divested themselves of everything on adopting their profession. Or their protest may have been directed against the separate city-State, which was responsible for so many of the evils which troubled Hellas—wars, rivalries, and invidious prejudices against men of alien birth. But on the whole it seems likely that what chiefly moved them was a desire to vindicate the independence of the individual against the excessive demands of the community (as exemplified in Plato's Ideal State), and against the tyranny of conventions based on differences of wealth, rank, and personal status. A really satisfactory community is impossible unless there is a fair adjustment between the individual and the community; and up till then no effort to make this adjustment had been tried in Greek thought or practice. The Cynics preached that nothing was more desirable than freedom, nothing more beautiful than plain speaking. Being the first to advocate the claims of the individual, they naturally overdid their advocacy.

§ 2. Antisthenes flourished about 400 B.C.; Crates, the immediate teacher of Zeno, came about fifty years later. We see the Cynic influence very strong in the fragments of what seems to have been Zeno's earliest work, his *Politeia*. This was written on the model of a similar work by Diogenes, and was definitely meant to oppose Plato. Plato, as I have argued, was not an innovator in the most important elements of polity; Zeno's proposals, like those of his Cynic masters, attacked the foundations of the established order. He wished to abolish the city-State utterly. Men were to live no longer in separate communities, but all in one great community, like a herd feeding upon a common pasture. Over this world-State, which was to include both Greeks and barbarians, Love

was to be king. In other words, Zeno was a sentimental anarchist, something after the fashion of Godwin and Shelley.

Together with the city-State Zeno wished to sweep away all the ordinary civic institutions. He would have no temples nor statues of the gods, for these are vulgar things and not worthy of the deity. A city should not be adorned with religious statues, but with the virtues of its inhabitants. Just men had no need for law-courts, for there would be no quarrels to be decided and no coveted objects to quarrel about; no gymnasia, for there would be no occasion to train the body for war—indeed, the body was of no account as compared with the welfare of the soul; no need for schools, since elaborate education is useless for practical virtue; no need for coinage, since there would be no trade. Moreover, in Zeno's commonwealth there was to be no marriage; love was to be entirely free; no difference of clothing as between the sexes; no reticence of speech in speaking of an act or object usually accounted indecent. Zeno saw nothing offensive in incestuous unions such as that between Œdipus and Jocasta; still less in paiderastia, supporting his views practically by his personal example. Even cannibalism was a matter of indifference. Why not dispose of deceased relatives thus, as well as by the ordinary methods? What does it matter whether the dead are burnt, buried, or eaten, or who eats them?

The institution of slavery, so basic in Greek life, is not mentioned in our Fragments; but we may be sure that Zeno meant to abolish it. As there was to be no money in his ideal State, slaves could neither be bought nor maintained. The later Stoics definitely repudiated the distinction between freeman and slave.

Zeno's *Politeia* must have been one of the most interesting books of antiquity. It is true that Cicero depreciates his originality, saying that all his ideas are to be found in earlier writers such as Polemo; but there must have been some element in him which made the deepest impression upon his contemporaries. This is proved by the predominant position which was held by Stoicism till the time of Plotinus.

§ 3. We may say of Zeno that he systematized the ideas of the Cynics on morals and on social and political organization, and combined them with purely intellectual teaching on metaphysics, theory of knowledge, physical science, and literature. After the establishment of Zeno's Stoa a young man could attend lectures there as at a university and profit by its non-moral instruction, even though he doubted the practicability of its way of life. Part of the success of Stoicism was due no doubt to the organizing genius of Zeno and of those who followed him as presidents of the school.

Stoicism was successful also because a protestant or reactive attitude was at that time the one best suited to earnest minds. Plato had felt acutely many of the evils by which he was surrounded; but there was still the city-State to which he could give his faith and hope. This was not possible for Zeno. The city-State had then become a manifestly inadequate form of polity, and the new political systems had caused new political evils without completely curing the old; meanwhile the social evils connected with property and slavery tended to increase.

And with the establishment of the new kingdoms it was more and more necessary that a claim should be made for individuality and freedom. The man who had merged himself in the old city-State, as Plato's guardians were exhorted to do, might feel that his spiritual gain outweighed his loss; but this could not be felt by those who suffered under the soulless despotisms of the successors of Alexander.

We may be sure, however, that Stoicism would never have gained its success but for its religious element. The old Cynics were wanting on this side; they were monotheists who scoffed at the superstitions and impostures of polytheism, but had no religious enthusiasm of their own. Stoicism from the first was profoundly religious; Cicero's book, *De Natura Deorum*, tells us that it was the only one of the four rival schools which satisfied the religious needs of the ancient world. Zeno followed the Cynics in affirming the unity of God; but he had, moreover, the liveliest conviction

of his all-pervasiveness. God is a rational power which penetrates matter everywhere, like honey in a honeycomb; he fashions, orders, and unites everything, like a creative fire. We may call him fate, or providence, or nature. The chief element of Zeno's spiritual life seems to have been a strong pantheistic experience, not dissimilar from that which we shall meet with later in Plotinus, but without Plotinus's ecstasy.

§ 4. The most distinctive features of Zeno's ethics are to be explained with reference to his religious convictions. His main principle was "to live in accordance with nature." Now, for Zeno, nature was the same as God. The world was alive and rational. A man lives reasonably when, to use a modern phrase, he is 'in tune with the infinite'—when he shares in the cosmic reason and recognizes the perfect goodness and inevitableness of its ways. This implies that he surrenders all merely human conventions and prejudices, and leads a perfectly natural and sincere life. By so doing he attains at once to absolute and self-sufficing virtue. Virtue is one and indivisible. A man either attains to it or lacks it entirely. All sins are equally heinous; for any sin, however trivial in appearance, evinces a bad spiritual condition. Virtue gives perfect calm; for when a man has surrendered himself to the cosmic influence his life flows on equably. Therefore he is perfectly happy. He has all the peace of mind which is commonly supposed to be given by great riches and by excellence of physical gifts. He may indeed, by a figure of speech, be said to possess all these things, since he possesses all the inward blessings for which alone they are prized. The passions, on the other hand, are unnatural, morbid disturbances of the soul. This is true not only of the manifestly base passions, but also of such passions as love and pity, which are so often wrongly praised. Pleasure also is a sort of passion; so far as it disturbs the soul it is bad. The best we can say of it is that it is of neutral value; for it does not contribute to bring us into union with nature.

§ 5. Zeno's *Politeia*, the most consistent and striking of his books, seems to have belonged to his earlier period. After

he had founded his school at Athens in rivalry with the Academy and the Lyceum, he attained a commanding position as a moral teacher, and must have been consulted continually for practical advice and matters of moral training. Hence it was inevitable that he should soften the rigour of his doctrine. He had to show some toleration for the existing state of things, so that his pupils could make the best of the world in which they found themselves. At one time in his life—probably in the latter part of it—he is said to have recommended participation in public affairs and the undertaking of family responsibilities. He also modified the absolute opposition between virtue and vice, which must have been too discouraging for those who were trying to profit by moral instruction. The Stoics had to admit that few men, if any, could be termed truly good. 'Good' might be applied to certain heroes of the past, such as Herakles, Odysseus, Socrates, and Diogenes; but that a man of the day should claim the term was felt to be intolerably presumptuous. On the other hand, those who were doing their best to improve, though not 'good' in the proper sense, were at least in a state of progress, and could be said to be approaching the unattainable ideal. So also objects of desire, such as wealth and health, were not 'good' exactly and ought not to be coveted or admired; and yet they are preferable to their opposites, such as poverty and disease, because they are helpful in leading a natural life. Critics of Stoicism laughed at these preferable things; they said they were like sour wine, which the wine merchant could sell neither as wine nor as vinegar. The process of accommodation was carried much further by the Hellenistic teachers, Panaetius and Posidonius, whose ideas are known to us from the adaptations of their treatises composed by Cicero.

§ 6. For the study of the early Stoics we have nothing but scattered fragments, the order and context of which are uncertain, and which have to be supplemented by conjecture. For the later Stoics we have many first-rate documents; the best of them, perhaps, the *Discourses* and *Manual* of

Epictetus, put together by his pupil Arrian. These furnish ample material for understanding the meaning of Stoicism in its strong and its weak points, and for placing it in relation to other systems.

Epictetus was born about 60 A.D., and taught for some time in Rome, but for most of his life at Nicopolis in Epirus. In spite of his comparatively late date, he represents a somewhat early type of Stoic teaching, and much of what he says is evidently derived from the first leaders of the School; though the harshest paradoxes have now been softened, and the whole doctrine brought into a form which could be used for practical guidance and moral education.

The moralizing of Epictetus (like that of Marcus Aurelius) has very little value for our world of to-day, and gives one an impression of hopelessness and dreary unreality. It is all relative to a state of society in which culture and civilization were declining, attacked with continually increasing success by the fierce barbarians without and demoralized by the servile semi-barbarians within. The only hope of the Roman State was that it might have invented institutions which would have given men freedom of thought and political action. But this was never done. Epictetus's moral system was, perhaps, the best that was possible to a pagan under the Flavian emperors.

§ 7. The most striking feature of his writings is their deeply religious tone. More important than any specially characteristic doctrine of the Stoics is their continual reference to the divine pervasiveness and providence. The Enchiridion closes with the words of Cleanthes's hymn: "Lead me, O Zeus, and lead me, Destiny, whither ordained is by your decree." Here was the main strength of Stoicism, which enabled it to overcome the rival schools. Aristotelianism and Epicureanism were non-religious in different ways; Platonism was religious, but in a way which did not attract devout minds. And yet the religion of Epictetus, though it impresses by its sincerity, is not agreeable to a modern mind, because its tone is that of a broken-spirited slave. His doctrine is that the proper attitude of the good man is always one of absolute,

unresisting, uncomplaining submission to the divine will. Such submission is not exactly virtue; because the good man has his virtue entirely within himself, and no power in heaven or earth can take it from him. But God is our master, and submission is the only proper and dignified course even when he makes us suffer atrociously.

Epictetus's attitude towards human masters is like his attitude towards God. He himself was a slave; a slave of one of Nero's freedmen, who had risen by the arts of an imperial freedman to the summit of wealth and power. There is of course in him no reverence, no adulation, for the despot; but there is no thought of resistance. He praises Lateranus, who stretched out his neck to Nero's executioner, "and when the blow dealt him was too weak, shrank up a little and then stretched it out again."

§ 8. There is no patriotism in Epictetus; under such wretched political conditions there could not possibly be any. There was some weak effort towards a cosmopolitan public spirit. "We say, Dear city of Cecrops; and shall we not say, Dear city of Zeus?" But it does not really amount to more than the fellow-feeling of slaves crushed under a common tyranny. No Greek Stoic teacher ever took the smallest active part in public affairs. If he had done so, it could only have been at the cost of glaring inconsistency. For all public business is concerned with defence against enemies, with worldly possessions, the maintenance of domestic relationships and public religion. Such things were vanity to the Stoic. The consistent Stoic preached indeed a doctrine of absolute non-resistance; not only towards tyrants, but towards thieves, who take from us what is really of no worth, and towards external enemies. When women are carried off, and children are made captive, and men themselves are slaughtered—these things seem evil, but are really indifferent. Closely connected with all this is a strain of what can only be called 'illusionism' in Stoic doctrine. Epictetus says that all the experience which comes to us from without consists of impressions (*phantasiai*); and the Greek word suggests that external experience consists of unreal

shows. Impressions are nothing; all depends upon our attitude towards them.

There is no element of domestic or family morality in Stoicism. Zeno advocated free love, and shared a house with a brother-philosopher, Persæus, whose morals were of the laxest kind. The most consistent Cynics, who always remained the ideal to which the Stoic teacher aspired, rejected home life altogether and lived without ordinary shelter. There is a remarkable chapter of Epictetus (iii, 22) in which he speaks of the calling of the Cynic as one of the highest and holiest on earth: the Cynic is a messenger from God to men; his duty is to preach and warn; he will rejoice in hardship, and be happier thus than the Great King. In the present constitution of the world, "which is that of the battle-field," he will not entangle himself in domestic or matrimonial duties; to do so would be to renounce his kingdom. In carrying out his sacred mission "the Cynic must have infinite patience"; "reviling or blows or insults are nothing to him." One who practises absolute non-resistance is evidently incapacitated from family life; for every house-father must defend his family against aggressors.

§ 9. The strength and dignity of Stoicism lay in its emphasis upon personal character. Excellence of character, it said, lies entirely in the will. Stoics assented in form to the Platonic dictum, "Virtue is knowledge," but they gave it quite a different meaning. Without being averse to education, as the Cynics had been, they put intellectual knowledge into a secondary place; they set little value upon Plato's favourite mental exercise, dialectic, and still less upon rhetorical display. The knowledge which they valued was shown almost entirely in practice.

With endless iteration Epictetus preaches the all-importance of a right will; or, as he expresses it, of reason which has the power of approving and disapproving, deals rightly with impressions, and is master and guide of our whole life. This is the part of us which is divine, which cannot be taken from us, gives us perfect contentment and patience, gives us dignity and distinction, makes us infinitely strong and

courageous, makes us free, and brings us into harmony and kinship with God. It is the will, or reason in the sense of will, which we must train continually; all education is subsidiary to volitional training.

These exhortations have a noble sound, but mean little till we can picture to ourselves the kind of conduct in which they actually issued. The aim of the wise and good man, the Stoics said, is to reach 'apathy,' a condition of mind in which the passions have no effect whatever upon us. Even the passion of pity is bad. When a friend is in sore trouble we ought to help him; but not to feel any pity, for that would be weak and silly. Such are the phrases of Stoicism when it is most paradoxical. But, if we read Epictetus sympathetically, it is plain that the passion against which he is really trying to strengthen men's hearts is that of fear. From the beginning to the end of the *Discourses* the tyrant is always with us. A tyrant may order our execution, but we must not flinch; we must be like the athlete who chose to die rather than sacrifice his virility, we must imitate the calmness of Socrates when he took the cup of hemlock. If we find the pressure of tyranny intolerable, we can always escape by suicide, like Seneca and his friends who perished under Nero.

The fear of death can be met only by the conviction that it is not an evil. The tyrant's threats cannot touch a good man's will; Socrates was killed, indeed, but his will was victorious. King's courts are terrible places to thoughtless men; but not to those who know that exile, fetters, death, and loss of civil rights are matters of indifference. All this seems overstrained to us, but it had real meaning to Epictetus's hearers. The evil against which he strove to fortify his hearers was all-pervasive in the Roman Empire; for there was not merely the tyranny of rulers and officials, but that of the slave-master over his slaves. Against tyranny the individual was absolutely helpless, except by way of violent and desperate revolt, such as recruited the gangs of brigands that infested every outlying part of the Roman world. No moral teacher could recommend revolt: he could do no more than try to

persuade men that the tyrant had no hold over them; that not merely life and property were nothing, but that the most intimate affections, for wife, child, and home, were paltry weaknesses, and that the tyrant could not touch our fortitude and self-respect by trying to work upon them.

The true Stoic character, therefore, involved a kind of pride; but it was not a pride of action. Throughout his *Discourses* Epictetus never exhorts men to do anything; his lessons are always of endurance and self-control. What positive exhortations could he give? Rome, with the fearful risks of the imperial court, its prizes of wealth and power only to be purchased by base compliance, its corruptions so luridly described to us by Juvenal, was a place to be avoided by all who valued purity and peace of mind. If a man retired from Rome and lived quietly in some provincial town like Nicopolis, he could not be too frugal, peaceful, and obscure. By desiring or accumulating property, by marrying and rearing children, a man entangled himself with the world and all its wretched weaknesses and corruptions, and so impaired his freedom and capacity for meeting tyranny unafraid. The Stoic attitude was barren and impracticable. But it was the only one which gave due opportunity for pride and consistency.

§ 10. Stoicism, as a genuine system of thought and conduct, is altogether a product of the Hellenic world; or, at any rate, it is not Roman. The writings of two Roman Stoics, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, are perhaps better known than Epictetus, but they are wanting in sincerity. Roman Stoicism, altogether, is a curious phenomenon in the history of thought, such as appears sometimes when ideas which have come into existence under one set of conditions are transplanted into foreign ground. The great Roman Stoics—men like Cato, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and the imperial jurists—certainly drew comfort and strength from Stoicism, and yet their lives and characters were in strong opposition to the main bulk of Stoic doctrine. Those Roman philosophers in high positions did not wear the threadbare Stoic cloak, nor preach and teach austerely. They were men

of affairs and pillars of society, noblemen and capitalists, great pleaders and jurists, prime ministers, emperors. The passive-resistance principles to which they professed to adhere were absurdly at variance with their practice. They had some great virtues which were not Stoic, and defects for which the Stoic teaching cannot be blamed. Of Marcus Aurelius, for example, we know to his credit that he filled with public approval the difficult post of emperor, administering as well as he could a bad system of government in a society which was manifestly sinking; and that he carried on with some success an arduous war against the barbarian hordes that were threatening the frontiers. On the other side we are told that he persecuted the Christians, causing or allowing them to be butchered and devoured by savage beasts for the amusement of the rabble; that in some cases he yielded to the practice of degrading superstition; that he was the indulgent husband of a most incontinent wife; and that he was the reputed father of the brutal Commodus, whom he did not disinherit. There is nothing distinctively Stoical either in the credit or the debit side of this account.

The authentic Stoic character and doctrine, such as we discern in Zeno's Fragments and are plainly displayed in Epictetus, were formed originally under the influences of the self-governing city-State. They include elements of free thinking, free speech, and personal pride which could never have arisen under despotism. Men of that temper naturally wish to devote themselves to public service and public reform; and so doubtless would Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus have done had the circumstances permitted. As it was, circumstances drove the earlier Stoics into an attitude of protest; while the later Stoics withdrew more and more into an inward life.

As the pressure of despotism increased, as barbarism kept gaining upon civilization, as political institutions continually decayed, the pride of the Stoic became harder, his submission to destiny more absolute, the range of his mundane affections and activities more circumscribed; while his thoughts were fixed increasingly upon religion. It was a mode of life

which was neither warm nor fruitful, though it was dignified and pure.

BOOKS RECOMMENDED :—

Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes. By A. C. Pearson. (Clay.)
Stoics and Sceptics. By E. R. Bevan. (Clarendon Press.)
Greek Thinkers. By T. Gomperz. Vol. I. (Murray.)
Epictetus. Translated by P. E. Matheson. (Clarendon Press.)

CHAPTER XXXVIII

PLOTINUS

(1) Plotinus's system exemplifies the effect of an excessively strong religious interest upon philosophic minds. (2) Happiness for him consisted in mystic union with Deity, and he makes this experience the basis of his whole system. (3) He says that virtue consists in becoming like God, and ignores ordinary human interests. (4) Practically, Neoplatonic virtue consists in ascetic quietism. (5) The Neoplatonic system is inconsistent with appreciation of human value. (6) It prevailed under the later Roman Empire because it was suited to a declining civilization.

§ 1. PLOTINUS is well worth study, because he is the best example of those thinkers whose minds are dominated by religion. Very strong religious feeling naturally, though not inevitably, takes on a mystical form. Of all mystical thinkers Plotinus was, not only the first, but also the best. He did not combine his mysticism with radically incompatible doctrines such as materialism and hedonism, like Spinoza; he is not pessimistic, like Schopenhauer; he is not an ineffective dreamer, like Amiel. His system gives us a great impression of nobility and power; next to Plato and Aristotle he is the greatest speculative mind of antiquity. Greek philosophy, as A. W. Benn remarked, presents in its history a sort of double curve; from the materialism of the Pre-Socratics up to the spiritualism of Plato and Aristotle, then downward to the materialism of the Stoics and Epicureans, and finally upward to the spiritualism of the Neoplatonists. Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism, formulated in a definite and well-reasoned shape the arguments which prove the difference between mind and matter. After Plotinus there was no lapse back to materialism in ancient thought.

And yet the results of Plotinus's thinking are, in regard to ethics, by no means commensurate with his speculative gifts. All extremely strong religious interest is prejudicial

to philosophy—mysticism most of all. Put shortly, the reason is that very strong religious interest tends to make a man turn away from the world. Now, this is very different from the attitude which is appropriate to the moralist. The moralist should be deeply interested in the world; primarily in explaining it, and secondarily in improving it. He cannot know too much about the world or be too closely in touch with it, at least so far as is consistent with the leisure and quiet which speculation requires. "Neither with Plotinus nor with any of his successors," says Mr. Whittaker, "is there the least doubt that the contemplative life is in itself superior to the life of action." Here, in form at least, the founder of Neoplatonism agrees with Plato and Aristotle, and indeed with the Greek thinkers of all periods. But no previous thinker was ever so 'inward' as Plotinus. Neither Plato nor Aristotle ever meant that the philosopher should ignore mundane affairs so completely as the Neoplatonists were wont to do. In Plotinus's opinion, worldly business and worldly virtues, if they have any value at all, have it only as preparing for the life of devout contemplation.

§ 2. The essential feature of mystical experience is that the subject of it feels himself united directly with Deity. There are mental conditions, says Professor Rufus Jones, in which the consciousness of the agent "is not focalized or clearly differentiated into a subject-object state. The subject and object are fused into an individual One. Religious mystical experience is an intense variety of this fused, undifferentiated consciousness. The individual soul feels invaded, vitalized with new energy, merged with an enfolding presence, liberated and exalted with a sense of having found what it has always sought, and flooded with joy."

Plotinus speaks of such an experience as this in words of passionate earnestness which show that everything else, compared with it, was unreal and unimportant to him. He held that supreme happiness consists in mystic union with the One; the One which is the central reality and source of all excellence, from which all being emanates, and towards which the soul of man naturally yearns. The One cannot be

described; it is ineffable: it can be spoken of only in terms which are negative, though Plotinus wishes his accumulated negatives to carry a superlative implication. The One is not existent, for such a predicate would imply that it is this rather than that; it is not active, for it needs nothing to which action could be directed; it does not think, for there is no object outside of itself to think about; it has no desires; it is not beautiful rather than ugly; not moral rather than immoral, for all our morality consists in facing the difficulties and dangers of mundane existence. By these negatives Plotinus means that the One is above all conceivable predicates, because it is more excellent than anything which can be conceived. But no logical justification can be given of his investment of a negation with excellence. When Plotinus attributes all this wealth of meaning to the ineffable One, he is thinking of his personal experience. In the mystic ecstasy he felt that he was everything, knew everything, and enjoyed everything. The One with which he felt united must therefore be similarly perfect.

Mysticism is not confined to any race or period, though it is much commoner in the East than in the West. We find traces of it even among savages, and there are many evidences of it in Greek literature before Plotinus. But Plotinus was the first philosopher to make it the basis of a system. And he is much the most consistent of mystic moralists. The Neoplatonist Proclus, who followed him after a long interval, tried to accommodate his doctrine to the needs of ordinary life, and gave some recognition to ordinary duties. But with Plotinus virtue means just what it should mean to a man whose main happiness consisted in ecstatic devotion.

§ 3. The doctrine of Plotinus is much less copious on ethics than on metaphysics; most of his teaching is about the general nature of things and the relation of man to reality. On ethics he has comparatively little to say; and what he leaves out is more remarkable than what he puts in. His summary account of human perfection is that it consists in being like God. In consistency this would imply the

abolition of ordinary goodness; because the One (or God the Father) is neither good nor bad in an ordinary sense. But Plotinus, very inconsistently, attributes every sort of positive perfection to the One. The function of moral virtue is to prepare us for the mystic union, and in the union we acquire the qualities of divinity.

Plotinus does not treat the virtues in detail. His *Enneads* are made up of unsystematic essays or lecture-notes dealing with topics which interested him personally, or were pressed upon his notice by members of his circle. Very few of our ordinary virtues did interest him, since most of them are concerned with matters which the mystic either ignores completely or is ashamed of. Domestic or family virtue is never spoken of; the body he treats as altogether evil. It is true that Plotinus does mention civic virtue as having some value by way of preparation for higher experiences. But this is not the spirit in which civic duties should be undertaken. The statesman deals with matters of worldly welfare—with wealth and things of war, for example. He must view men as active, desiring, and passionate beings. He must, indeed, be such a being himself; life must be intensely real for him, and he must set great value upon worldly success and failure.

Worldly success in any line of life, in statesmanship or anything else, is utterly alien from the Neoplatonic inwardness and ecstasy. If Plotinus himself had turned to public affairs, he must have done so in a spirit of indifference or contempt; contempt for his work and all its objects and aims, and contempt with himself for caring for such things. Wealth, he expressly says, is a matter of indifference. War is indifferent; "murder and every kind of death, the fall of cities and their despoiling, we must view as things done upon a theatre-stage where all is but a shifting of scene and costume, dirge and outcry enacted in counterfeit" (*Enn.* III, ii, 15).

§ 4. In its practical outcome the teaching of Plotinus is an ascetic quietism. The body with all its desires must be reduced to the weakest and humblest state in order that soul may be left as free as possible, and all occasions of activity must be shunned in order to preserve inward peace. All that

is evil in the world is connected with matter and with separation from the One; therefore the main vices are indulgence in pleasure and self-will.

In the order of his exposition he sets forth a scheme of metaphysics and justifies his practical precepts by the scheme. But in the order of Plotinus's thought it is more likely that he had first before his mind the mystic experience and its accordant way of life, and invented the metaphysical scheme subsequently. In any case, the two are well suited to each other. The following are the chief points of the metaphysical scheme, which I mention merely to make quite plain the outcome of the Neoplatonic theory of virtue.

From the One all things spring by a process of emanation; the One was bound to create the world because it could not remain self-enfolded and grudge to show its power. The first created thing was Mind; then Soul, or the general principle of life. These three form the Neoplatonic Trinity. From the One, through the two lower Persons of the Trinity, the universe of ordinary experience is produced, the primal energy continually decreasing as it spreads outwards from the central reality. At its furthest distance from the centre, spirit appears weakened in two ways; it is mixed with matter, a mysterious substrate which can be defined only as the negation of spirit, and it is divided up into individual souls. Such is the world process, which in reality is no process at all; for time and change are illusory. Rest alone is real.

§ 5. Except to persons of special character, such as was Plotinus himself, the moral system of Neoplatonism is not helpful; it is inconsistent with a due appreciation of human value, and incompatible with mature social and political institutions. No moral system can commend itself to the democratic spirit which regards all statesmanship as futile and family life as vicious so far as it is enjoyable. What, perhaps, a modern person feels most inclined to protest against in Plotinus is his treatment of individuality. It must be premised that, according to strict logical Neoplatonic doctrine, individuality is an illusion; for all thoughts are part of the cosmic Mind (the Second Person in the Trinity),

and all souls are part of the cosmic Soul (the Third Person). But yet, in some sense and somehow, Plotinus does recognize individuality, as we may see from the following account of the Fall of Souls: "What can it be that has made the souls to forget God their father, and, members of the World Beyond though they are and altogether his, cease to know both themselves and him? The beginning of their trouble was audacity and coming to be born, and primal differentiation and desire for independence. They began to revel in free-will; they indulged in much movement, according to their own fancies; they were froward; they went far astray; and so they forgot that they also were of the World Beyond. Like children taken early from their fathers and nurtured for a long time in a distant place, they know not who they are or who their fathers are" (*Enn.* V, i, 1).

Every kind of self-assertion, then, every sort of pride, is bad. As to freedom, Plotinus oscillates: sometimes he says, as in the above-quoted passage, that it is bad; sometimes that it is impossible. "To bad men, who act in accordance with carnal imaginations, we can allow no independence nor free-will" (*Enn.* VI, viii, 3). There is no place in his system for intellectual culture, since nothing in the world is worth study; nor is there really any place for artistic interest. Plotinus talks much about beauty; but it all comes to this—that "to make one's soul beautiful is to make oneself like to God." Indeed, Plotinus himself may be cited as an illustration of the uselessness of his own æsthetic opinions. There is no philosopher, not even Kant, whose writing shows less appreciation of literary form.

§ 6. Plotinus taught in Rome, and his doctrine won speedy and general acceptance there and in all the other centres of culture. After his death Neoplatonism became the predominant mode of thought, and maintained its ground for centuries, till the light of philosophy faded away into the gloom of the Dark Ages. Evidently it was well suited to its times. The reason seems to be that mysticism is able to give comfort and consolation to a down-going and desponding age. The reign of the emperor Gallienus, when Plotinus taught in

Rome, was a period of fearful disasters. The emperor, on whom everything hinged, was frivolous and dissolute; the empire was racked and scourged with pestilence, barbarian invasion, and civil war. Man's only refuge seemed to consist in withdrawal into an inner life. We hear of some philosopher of this period resident in Greece who suffered from the incursion of the Gothic barbarians; his home was destroyed, his family massacred or ravished, and he himself driven out naked in his old age. Yet nothing could shake his invincible calm; he enjoyed an inward happiness which no external misfortunes could touch. Such was the temper which the age admired; and the attainment of it is the sum and substance of the moral teaching of Neoplatonism.

Plotinus is by far the least read of the great ancient philosophers. In English there is as yet no complete translation of him, and the literature about him is very small compared with that of other thinkers. This means that his teaching does not answer to the needs of the modern world. A mystic philosophy is appropriate only to an age which has good grounds for pessimism. Mysticism need not be pessimistic (Plotinus and Spinoza made profession of optimism); but it easily becomes so, as we see from the examples of the Gnostics, Schopenhauer and Hartmann. It is worth noticing that the most Plotinian of contemporary thinkers, the Dean of St. Paul's, is very eloquent in his denunciation of the evils of his age, and is gloomily despondent about the future of popular institutions.

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CHAPTER XXXIX

SOME BRITISH MORALISTS

(1) The most eminent of the British moralists devoted themselves to vindicating the genuineness and authority of moral rules against such attacks as those of Hobbes.

(2) The dianoetic moralists supported moral authority by an analogy between morals and mathematics; (3) but the analogy is not really close enough to justify their position. (4) They recognized the creative power of the mind, and thus tended towards a recognition of man's moral freedom.

(5) Butler based moral authority upon conscience.

(6) One school of clerical moralists based moral authority upon the will of God.

(7) The best theory was that of the moral-sense school.

§ 1. THE contributions to ethics which were made in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by a long series of British moralists are most honourable to our country. They not only show great speculative power, but are evidence of high moral qualities diffused throughout the nation. It is not very easy to explain why philosophic Englishmen should have taken more interest in ethics than did their Continental colleagues; perhaps the reason lies in the character of our ecclesiastical institutions. Most of the British moralists, though not all of them, were clerics; and it seems likely that their chief motive was a desire to vindicate the authority of the moral rules which they advocated from their pulpits. The whole discussion about moral experience, continued from generation to generation, arose out of attacks made by Hobbes upon the foundations of Christian ethics. The Church parties in England could not repel such attacks with persecution, nor with a dogmatic assertion of infallibility. They had to use argument and throw themselves upon the judgment of their fellow countrymen.

Throughout Hobbes's ethical writing we see the same

combination of speculative power with a spirit of wilful paradox and desire to exasperate opponents that pervades the political part of the *Leviathan*. The following is a typical Hobbism: "There can be no greater argument to a man of his own power than to find himself able, not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs; and this is charity." Hobbes's general explanation of the Christian virtues is that they are merely selfish impulses disguised under pretentious names. This is much on the same level as the paradox of Mandeville, a coarse and amusing writer of about half a century later, that the so-called cardinal virtues are qualities which have been produced in vain men by the flattering arts of politicians. The more systematic part of Hobbes's doctrine may be summed up in two propositions: that men are actuated universally by personal selfishness in a low sense, and that moral rules have no validity except so far as the power of government is able to enforce them. All this, really, was part of Hobbes's anti-clericalism, of his dislike for all Churches impartially—Catholic, Anglican, and Nonconformist. His mind was preoccupied with the need of establishing a strong government in England. He regarded the Churches as the natural enemies of government, and struck at them by attacking the foundations of their morality. As might be expected from one who was both a cynic and a recluse, Hobbes offered no helpful constructive proposals of his own. But he performed the considerable service of forcing orthodox moralists to consider how the authority of Christian ethics could best be supported.

§ 2. The most elaborate and ambitious solution of the problem of moral authority is that which was given by the moralists whom Martineau calls 'dianoetic'; they have also been called 'intuitionists,' because they think we have intuitive knowledge of unquestionable moral truths; or 'rationalists,' because they base morality entirely upon reason. The chief of these writers are Cudworth, Clarke, and Price. 'Dianoetic' may be accepted as a convenient label for them. Their chief common doctrine is that they

support moral authority by means of an analogy between mathematics and morals.

Cudworth's system borrows largely from those of Plato and Plotinus. He says that there are essences of things, such as justice or triangularity, which exist as archetypal ideas in the mind of God, and are thence communicated as ectypes to man. We do not derive them from sense-experience, which merely awakens them to activity within us. We cannot, he says, have derived our geometrical ideas from sensation, "because there never was any material or sensible straight line, triangle, circle, that we saw in all our lives that was mathematically exact." Nor are these ideas produced by an arbitrary exercise of will, either of the divine will or of any other. God himself could not change the nature of the square nor the nature of justice. Mathematical and moral principles are alike eternal and immutable.

Samuel Clarke uses the mathematical analogy rather differently. His main argument in support of moral authority is that there are eternal and necessary differences of things; and that these differences consist in different "relations, respects, or proportions," whence "there necessarily arises an agreement or disagreement of some things with others, or a fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another." And all this is as plain and undeniable as "proportion or disproportion in geometry and arithmetic." Thus it is as absurd and blameworthy to disregard either by theory or practice the true proportions of things in morality as to maintain that twice two is not equal to four, or that the whole is not equal to the sum of its parts.

Richard Price, writing long after Cudworth, restates Cudworth's doctrine, but without his reference to Plato. The idea of triangle is in the mind, self-generated by the mind's own powers, and is excited to go out to meet the triangle when we encounter it in nature. So with right and wrong. This vindicates moral authority. "Morality," says Price, "is eternal and immutable. Right and wrong denote what actions are. Now, whatever a thing is, that it is, not

by will or decree or power, but by nature and necessity. Whatever a triangle or circle is, that it is unchangeably and eternally. It depends upon no will or power whether the three angles of a triangle and two right ones shall be equal, or whether the periphery of a circle and its diameter shall be incommensurable." In short, "morality is a branch of necessary truth, and has the same foundation with it."

In spite of their differences of expression, it is evident that the dianoetic writers are all founding themselves upon the same analogy. Cudworth speaks of immutable ideas and essences, Clarke of eternal fitnesses of things, Price of the immutable natures of actions; but throughout they have mathematics in view.

§ 3. What are we to think of the analogy between mathematics and morals? It seems to be no more than partial. In one important respect there is no analogy at all. We have no reverence for mathematical principles as we have for moral principles. But there is some little analogy in other respects. It may appear, at least at the first glance, as though a moral principle such as 'Thou shalt not steal' is like a mathematical principle such as 'Any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third' in respect of its clearness, universal acceptance, and usefulness. But on further consideration we shall find that the likeness is not close enough to help much in the establishment of moral authority.

Let us compare mathematical with moral principles in respect of their clearness. Even the clearest moral principle, such as 'Thou shalt not steal' or 'Thou shalt do no murder,' is nothing like so clear as our concept of a triangle or a circle. We can define the geometrical object exactly without relation to the circumstances in which it may happen to stand; but we can hardly do so with theft or murder, because a difference of circumstances may alter the moral quality of the act. Nor do moral principles form a class clearly distinguishable from other classes of principles; that is why no moralist has ever been able to enumerate them. Cudworth's friend, Henry More, drew up a list of twenty-three *noemata moralia*, but it is quite different from the self-

evident principles which are set forth in mathematical works; it is a list which any other intuitionist would probably add to, or abridge, or modify.

Nor are there any moral principles which are so universally accepted as mathematical principles are. There is, it is true, much agreement about moral principles, otherwise men could not live together in societies; but much less than about mathematical principles. Consider the disagreement between ourselves and the ancient Greeks in respect of morals as compared with our agreement in respect of geometry.

Nor is the utility of conforming to principles of morality the same as that of conforming to the principles of mathematics. A principle such as the relation between the sides of a triangle is a fact of nature, no less than the force of gravitation or the dynamic properties of steam, to which we must adapt ourselves in order to live. But moral principles have not this solid objectivity. They are plainly dependent upon social conditions, which the individual can do something to change. Individuals can act contrary to them without suffering so inevitably as those who act against the chief laws of nature. There are too many prosperous rogues in the world to justify the opinions of Cudworth, Clarke, and Price.

We may conclude, then, that, though there is some analogy between morals and mathematics, it is not enough to serve for the main use to which it has been put—namely, the support of moral authority. The fact is that the main principles of mathematics are relative to features of experience which are more elementary and fundamental even than morality, are more clearly cognizable, and compel us more stringently to conform to them.

§ 4. The greatest merit of the dianoetic moralists is that they recognize the creative power of the mind. Cudworth says this with emphasis: the mind makes its own contribution to the totality of its experience; it is not merely passive; it has ideas which are not imprinted upon it from sensuous objects without, but "arise from the innate vigour and activity of the mind itself." This is true especially of what

Cudworth calls "scheses," or "relations of cause and effect, whole and parts and the like." Such scheses arise from the mind, though they are not "mere notions or figments of the mind, without any fundamental reality in the things themselves without us." If they are, then "art and wisdom themselves must needs be figments and fancies"—"nay, virtue, justice, honesty, must of necessity be figments also, because moral good and evil are schetical and relative things." All this is not really consistent with Cudworth's Platonism or Neoplatonism, according to which moral and other "schetical" ideas are archetypes in the mind of God and ectypes in the mind of man. Nevertheless, Cudworth, first among modern thinkers, had set his foot upon the path which leads to the recognition of our free creative activity. We find nothing of the kind in Clarke, who indeed was a thinker of lower speculative power; but it reappears in Price. Price is very emphatic in controverting Locke's assertion that sensation and reflection are the sources of all our ideas; the understanding itself, he says, is "a spring of new ideas," and knowledge implies an "active and vital energy of the mind." Among such ideas are power and causation, mathematical ideas, and also right and wrong.

In all this we are reminded of Kant. Price, in his *Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*, approaches Kant at many points. Of both thinkers it may be said that their main interest is to support authority, but that in the analyses which they undertook for this purpose they were forced to recognize the mind's creative power. Kant's famous phrases about 'autonomy' and 'heteronomy' point this way; though when he comes to give a definite meaning to them we find that he makes no effective recognition of moral freewill. Kant has got all the credit for opening up this line of thought, and certainly he seems to have done it independently of the English thinkers. He was the first to attempt to give a systematic account of the mind's own contribution to the sum of its experience. But Cudworth and Price had advanced so far that a few steps further would have brought them to see that moral ideas and moral rules

are not imposed on us from without as mathematical principles are supposed to be, but proceed from the mind itself in the exercise of its free creative activity. Such a discovery would have been specially in accordance with Price's general mental attitude, which tended to the recognition of freedom, in politics no less than in speculative thinking.

§ 5. A different way of vindicating moral authority was taken by Bishop Butler, who professed to found himself upon a direct study of human nature. He says: "There are two ways in which the subject of morals may be treated: one begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things [here he is glancing at the dianoetic moralists], the other from a matter of fact—namely, what the particular nature of man is." The latter way justifies us, he thinks, in asserting the natural supremacy of reflection or conscience. It is his insistence on conscience that forms Butler's main contribution to morals; he has much to say also about benevolence and self-love, but these are doctrines which are common to many other writers. 'Conscience' had been for generations a familiar term in theology and practical religion. We meet it in Milton, who makes Jehovah say of his Elect: "and I will place within them as a guide my umpire, Conscience." But Butler was the first to use it in ethical writing. It is of course a highly authoritative principle. It is a principle of action which, "compared with the rest as they all stand together in the nature of man, plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction of them all." And in what he says further about conscience similar phrases recur—"superiority," "absolute authority," "strictest moral obligation." "The very constitution of our nature requires that we bring our whole conduct before this superior faculty, wait its determination, enforce upon ourselves its authority, and make it the business of our lives, as it is absolutely the whole business of a moral agent, to conform ourselves to it." Failure to take into consideration the authority of conscience, he adds, "seems a material deficiency or omission in Lord Shaftesbury's *Inquiry Concerning Virtue*."

There is nowhere in philosophy to-day any support for this conscience-theory of morals. In advocating it Butler shows how limited his outlook was by the boundaries of clerical life. He adopts uncritically from current religious teaching a concept which Hobbes and Locke had long ago shown to be unserviceable for moral philosophy. His conscience is just the conscience of devout English Churchmen. He ignores the fact that there are countless varieties of conscience; that there are savages with various sorts of morality prescribing conduct very different from ours; and that even in Christian countries conscience has prompted men to commit the strangest and more abhorrent deeds.

Butler's contemporaries knew, just as well as we do, that the dictates of conscience in Roman Catholics and Nonconformists were different from those in Anglicans; and they knew enough of anthropology to be able to cite cases (like those of the Caribbees and Tououpinambos in Locke) which present insuperable difficulties to a conscience-theory of morals. But they had not the advantage, which we now possess, of viewing these things from the standpoint of evolution. Butler never says whence conscience is derived; but there is no doubt that he thought of it as a God-implanted mentor or umpire. It is, in fact, a piece of special creationism. But Darwin annihilated creationism. Our moral faculty did not come into existence at a single stroke, any more than our reasoning or artistic faculties; they have all grown up gradually, and in their growth have passed through many changes. And so there is an end of 'eternal and immutable morality,' as it was understood either by the dianoetic moralists or by Butler. If the decisions of a tribunal change, they cannot be regarded as axiomatically true. They can claim no more than a relative authority, which is far short of what authoritarian moralists desire.

§ 6. Butler's preference for conscience is perhaps to be explained by his Nonconformist upbringing. Freedom of conscience in matters of religion has always been the best principle of British Nonconformity. A more typical Anglican

attitude is represented by the school of moralists who based the authority of moral principles on the will of God—a doctrine which may have seemed to them less dangerously subjective than Butler's. Their position is very like that of Euthyphro in Plato's dialogue. Euthyphro said: "What is dear to the gods is holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy." The clerical moralists of the school of Paley said something equivalent to this, but made an addition which is not to be found in the *Euthyphro*. They saw that they must meet the question, Why should man conform to the will of God?, and they thought that the only sensible answer was: We must conform to God's will, otherwise he will punish us. Paley is the best-known representative of this line of thought; his *Moral Philosophy* had great popularity in the clerical circles of his day. "Virtue," he said, "is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." Paley's famous (or infamous) definition of virtue was written towards the close of this period of ethical thought, when the French Revolution was close at hand and very different ideas were within his reach, if only he had chosen to notice them. An earlier and very vigorous exponent of the same doctrine was Rev. John Brown, from whom we may make the following quotation: "Having sufficiently evinced the flimsy, though curious, contexture of these cobweb speculations [those of Shaftesbury], let us consider what are the real motives by which mankind may be swayed to the uniform practice of virtue. Nothing can work this great effect but what can produce an entire and universal coincidence between private and public happiness, and nothing can effectually convince mankind that their own happiness universally depends on procuring, or at least not violating, the happiness of others, save only the lively and active belief of an all-seeing and all-powerful God, who will hereafter make them happy or miserable, according as they designedly promote or violate the happiness of their fellow creatures. And this is the essence of religion."

John Brown and William Paley were good reasoners of a hard-headed and very British type. They were right in

thinking that the view of moral authority which they held does logically issue in hedonism. But, if that is so, it is an indication that their view of moral authority was false, and that they had misunderstood the whole character of moral experience.

§ 7. The Moral-Sense School of moralists, of whom the chief were Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, may be regarded as influenced by reaction both against Hobbes and against the clerical hedonists. Shaftesbury thought it was degrading to human nature to argue that men do right only for the sake of pleasure or personal advantage either in this world or in the next. He held that man possesses a faculty which he called Conscience (in a different sense from Butler), and which Hutcheson later called Moral Sense; this makes us approve of virtuous acts and characters, and disapprove of their contraries apart from any considerations of self-love or of religion.

Such a doctrine seems to me to be much nearer the truth than either religious hedonism or the theories which rely upon the analogy between morals and mathematics. Some of the criticisms which have been made upon it appear to be unjust. One, which is due to Richard Price, is that the moral-sense theory degrades our moral faculty to the level of a mere sensuous relish "similar to the relishes and aversions created by any of our other senses"; so that "virtue is an affair of taste." But what Shaftesbury really does is to draw a parallel between our apprehension of the æsthetic beauty or deformity of objects and that of the moral beauty or deformity of actions. The purpose of drawing the parallel, which is used also by Hutcheson, is to show that moral approbation is disinterested, and that it manifests itself immediately upon view of the object without ratiocination.

Another criticism is contained in the term 'sentimental,' which is often applied to these writers. The only justification for it seems to be that they lay great stress upon the sentiment of benevolence—that is, upon the kindly feeling of men

towards each other, and upon zeal for the general good of the community. But in this, surely, they were not mistaken. Instead of 'sentimentalists' it would be more appropriate to term Shaftesbury and Hutcheson 'humanists'—a term which might be applied also to Adam Smith and to Hume. They are interested in exploring the nature of man without reference to the attack or defence of any institution; they hold that moral experience is explainable by the study of man alone, and that it owes nothing to any outside branch of study such as theology; and they hold that ordinary moral experience should be accepted as being genuinely what it professes to be; for example, that charity is charity and not some merely animal motive in disguise, nor a selfish satisfaction arising from the exercise of power. To an impartial explorer of human nature one of the first perceived and most undeniable of facts is that men have a power of moral judgment—call it 'moral sense' or what you will—which seems to be both immediate and unselfish. Whether it can be analysed, and what its relations are to other parts of our nature, are further questions to which various answers have been given. In explaining moral experience Shaftesbury lays the main stress upon our social affections, Hutcheson upon benevolence, Hume and Adam Smith upon sympathy. Many of their speculations are interesting and valuable; some, and especially those of Adam Smith, are most ingenious and suggestive. All these thinkers were investigating the matter by the right method; and of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson one may say that their results were mostly right as far as they went. They could not have got much farther without more psychological analysis and more study of the history of human society.

At the present day psychologists have still an almost boundless field of discovery before them; but we are at any rate well aware how vast the field is, and what great results may be expected from exploring it. This was not so in the eighteenth century. Men had no idea what a big thing the human soul is, what a number of parts it has, and how complicated are their relationships. Progress in ethics is always conditioned by progress in psychology.

And even if the eighteenth-century thinkers had known more psychological facts than they did, they lacked the principles of arrangement which we draw from the concept of evolution. Consider some physiological structure such as the human brain. How greatly we are helped in understanding its arrangement and functions by comparing it with less developed structures, and so reconstructing its history! So it is with the mind in general and with the moral consciousness in particular. We must survey a wide expanse of less developed or imperfect forms—animals, savages, children, insane persons, defectives, and criminals. Comparative psychology is indispensable for helping us to grasp the facts and laws of moral growth, and to place aright the various elements of normal moral experience.

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CHAPTER XL

KANT'S *FOUNDATION OF THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS*

(1) In the main Kant is an authoritarian moralist, though he opened his mind to the new ideas of freedom. (2) His main doctrine is that moral experience and authority are based upon reverence for law as law; (3) but this basis is illusory, and deprives us of the means of distinguishing good laws from bad. (4) He expressed views favourable to freedom, but precludes himself from a true recognition of it, not only by his authoritarianism, (5) but also by his concessions to determinism and hedonism. (6) Though he is right in maintaining that morality springs essentially from human nature, his idea of human nature is too narrow, limiting itself to reason. He does not do justice to the affections, nor to the striving element of our nature, though he speaks much about will. (7) He is right in arguing that moral experience gives us assurance about ultimate realities, but chooses a wrong basis for his proofs of God and immortality. (8) Kant made a close to the authoritarian line of thought in ethics; and yet he was also one of the first to emphasize the free creative activity of the human spirit.

§ 1. There are few philosophers, perhaps none except Plato and Aristotle, who can offer a larger stock of ideas than Kant. His life extended from 1724 to 1804, a period of great social and political change. He retained many of the ideas in which he had been brought up, adopted many new ones which came into currency through the general European movement of reform, and invented many of his own. But in point of consistency he is much inferior to the great Greek thinkers. His mind passed through various phases of change; and, when he moved to a new point of view, he carried with him many of the ideas of his earlier period. The mass of his material was always too much for him, though his systematizing power was great and his industry unwearied. And so there is no moralist less easy than Kant to sum up and criticize. The difficulty which arises from the number and diversity of his ideas is enhanced by his perverse,

pedantic, and clumsy arrangement, and by the endless hesitations, qualifications, and half-retractions with which the ideas are expressed. About some of the most important questions which Kant raises there is still much doubt as to what he really did mean. However, the difficulties in regard to Kant's ethics are less than in regard to his metaphysics and theory of knowledge; and so there is less danger of doing injustice in criticism.

The critic must always be careful to distinguish the ideas which form the main framework of Kant's ethical system (which was authoritarian) from the very different ideas which came to him from contemporary liberalism. The latter are the best part of his teaching. His *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten* was published in 1785, only four years before the beginning of the French Revolution. Revolutionary ideas, which had received great encouragement from the issue of the American War of Independence, were familiar to enlightened men all over Europe. Kant adopted them, and attached them as well as he could to his main system. It is they which give to his ethical work most of its educational value.

In respect of his main system Kant is an authoritarian moralist; the great purpose which he had in view was to vindicate the absoluteness and unconditionality of moral rules. In this he was acting in accordance with his native character and personal history. He was a Prussian by birth, and the basis of his character was Prussian. He was eminently a man of authority; inflexible with himself and with others, not very amiable, and not very ready to enter into other people's minds. And yet he was quite remote from the spirit of the Prussian junker. The authority which he admired was the authority of law, not that of a privileged class. His parents were small working tradesfolk, deeply imbued with the evangelical religion of the *Pietisten*, the Methodists of Germany. He was bred up in a rigid form of Christianity among people who had a severe struggle to live, and whose virtue consisted in fulfilling faithfully the duties of a dull and narrow sphere, in which desires for enjoyment

and a wider life must continually be repressed. In all his outlook upon life Kant was essentially lower middle-class. He had an unwavering attachment to the morality which he had learnt in his parents' house; a desire to vindicate the absolute authority of its rules is the strongest motive of his thinking.

Hardly less potent upon Kant's mind was the influence of religion. Christian dogma he had apparently given up, though he always mentions it with respect; the Christian priesthood he reacted against strongly, and incurred severe censure from the Government for some hostile expressions regarding it. But he held most firmly to his belief in God and to his expectation of a future life. He was always a thoroughly devout man; his interest in finding a philosophical justification for the chief tenets of religion came second only to his interest in justifying the strictness of moral obligation.

§ 2. Kant's first concern, then, was to establish moral authority. But what basis was he to choose? He was so far under the influence of new ideas that he could not adopt the basis which was most in favour with the supporters of the established order; he could not view moral rules as resting upon the will of God. He had not only ceased to believe in revealed religion; he thought that sceptics like Hume had succeeded in proving that we can have no intellectual knowledge of God at all. At an earlier period of his development he was inclined to accept the principle of moral sense; later he rejected it on the ground that "feelings which naturally differ infinitely in degree cannot furnish a uniform standard of good and evil." The analogy between morals and mathematics he never used; indeed, it was hardly open to him to use it, because he held that mathematical truths have application only to that which appears to us, and not to that which is truly real. Finally he chose a basis for moral authority which is altogether his own; no one ever anticipated him in it, and very few have imitated him.

Before setting forth Kant's explanation of our obedience to moral rules, let us first see his explanation of our faculty

of apprehending them. We have this faculty, he says, because we are essentially rational beings. Kant is as uncompromising as any thinker in asserting this primary principle of intellectualism. Our higher or distinctively human life belongs entirely to the rational part of us. The fact that the human consciousness actually includes other elements in addition to reason has no influence upon morality. Now, reason, according to Kant, is the faculty of apprehending laws. Therefore moral reason is the faculty of apprehending moral laws.

The way is now clear for Kant to explain why we should obey moral laws. It is utterly impossible, he says, that our duty to obey should rest upon self-interest or upon any other empirical consideration. For then it would not rest upon the nature of reason itself. It can therefore rest upon nothing but upon the character of law as law. Mere law, in virtue of its form alone, imposes respect upon us; and we act morally when we act from the motive of reverence towards it. The root of evil in human nature is the propensity to take some other motive to determine action. To maxims which express reverence for law as law, Kant gives the imposing term 'categorical imperative.' Here we have the main principle of his ethical system, which he thought could be established by *a priori* reasoning without reference to experience. In morals, he said, experience is the mother of illusion.

§ 3. The value of Kant's ethical system lies more in its subordinate parts than in its main principles, few of which are sound. We must deny the doctrine, on which everything else rests, that man is essentially a creature of reason. Man is a composite being, and the non-rational part of him is as truly human as the rational. Moral experience is not an affair of reason only. Moreover, reason is not exclusively concerned with laws and rules; reason is primarily constructive, and its constructions are not exclusively, nor even predominantly, constructions of laws. Then there is no such thing as reverence for law as law. No law is venerable in respect of its form, but solely in respect of the content which it enjoins; a good law is revered, a bad law is not. There

is no possibility of discovering anything about moral laws, or about any other matter of morals, except by experience. Experience is not the mother of illusion, but of wisdom, in morals as everywhere else.

The absurdity of Kant's categorical imperative is shown up most clearly if we ask the question, How are we to distinguish good laws from bad? Kant said that this could be done by applying the principle of non-contradiction: any moral maxim which can be stated universally without self-contradiction is a genuine law, and commands reverence from us; while a maxim which cannot be so stated has no moral worth. For example, to tell the truth under all circumstances is a maxim of universal application, and therefore moral. But to make a promise under pressure of circumstances, with no intention of keeping it, is immoral; for then no promises would be made, because no one would believe them. A moral law thus disclosed is categorical; it is of unquestionable authority, eternal and immutable.

I doubt whether any intelligent person has ever been convinced by this reasoning of Kant's. Kant was a pedant, more enslaved to formulas than any man of genius before or since. He was preoccupied with the elaboration of his system according to a rigid scheme, and never heeded objections which occur at once to any one of humble common sense. Consider his famous phrase, "In all cases I must act in such a way that I can at the same time will that my maxim should become a universal law." Does this enable us to recognize a morally good maxim, and to discriminate it from maxims which are immoral or neutral? Surely it does not. Here are three maxims: "All twin infants should be put to death"; "Trousers should always be worn tight across the hips"; "Marriages should be indissoluble." The first is immoral, though observed by some races; the second is neutral, because frivolous; the third is doubtful. And yet all three can be stated universally without self-contradiction.

§ 4. The best elements of Kant's ethics are those which show the influence of the general European movement towards freedom. Many of the phrases which he coined are

admirable and express the best aspirations of his age. It is strange that we should have to look to Koenigsberg for an ethical book embodying the spirit of Rousseau; but so it is—since Rousseau composed no such book himself. One famous phrase runs thus: "In all cases I must act in such a way that I can at the same time will that my maxim should become a universal law." This is Kant's formulation of the republican principle of equality before the law. Another runs thus: "Man, and indeed every rational being as such, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be made use of by this or that will." This may be understood as a protest against the current official view of the proper relation between rulers and their subjects. Another phrase is the "kingdom of ends," which means a commonwealth of persons each of whom is to be regarded as having intrinsic value. This is the basic principle of democracy; and Paulsen, criticizing Kant's ethics, says very justly that it would have made a better foundation for his system than the categorical imperative.

The foregoing are phrases which refer, or ought to refer, to public freedom; there are others in Kant which have reference more to the freedom of the individual. He speaks often of "laws which man imposes upon himself"; of "autonomy"; and of the "self-legislation of will" as being necessary to moral experience.

In his use of all these phrases Kant was expressing something which he felt most sincerely, and he did great service merely by putting them into currency. Nevertheless, there is really no place for any kind of freedom in his system. A free community is one which makes its own laws in accordance with what its leaders hold to be the public welfare; and for Kant this is impossible. The Kantian moral law is fixed, inflexible, and eternal. Though he was out of sympathy with the institutions of his country, his general tone is not favourable to the liberal parties in Western Europe. Nor was he favourable to personal freedom. A man who is really free has freedom to criticize and to act; Kant can allow neither. That man, individually or collectively, should set up to be a

judge of moral rules would have seemed to him downright immoral—almost blasphemous; and, moreover, as futile as debating about the validity of Euclid's axioms or the formal laws of syllogism. Nor is man free in action in any sense in which freedom is practically desirable.

§ 5. An influence which acted very powerfully upon Kant was that of the Enlightenment, or *Aufklaerung*: not only the enlightenment represented by Voltaire and Hume, but even more that of natural science. Kant himself was well informed on various branches of the subject, and in his earlier years made some excellent scientific researches. Thus he came to adopt the determinism to which scientists are always inclined. He was also a psychological hedonist, in the sense that he believed that men in their actual behaviour are moved by no motives save those of pleasure and pain. This also is a current doctrine in times of scepticism like that of the *Aufklaerung*.

If hedonism and determinism are true, then it would seem that free action is impossible. Kant evaded this consequence by his great distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal spheres, which it was the main purpose of his *Kritik of Pure Reason* to establish. As part of the world of appearance to which all our empirical experience belongs, we are non-morally determined; but as part of the noumenal or trans-phenomenal world we can act autonomously (i.e., from reverence for law as law) and are free.

Upon an ordinary reader Kant's long argumentation about freedom usually brings a feeling of perplexity. Such a one may possibly, in the hope of ending the matter, ask a plain question: "What I want to know is this: Does the individual John Smith, in his everyday dealings with his neighbour William Jones, act freely or without freedom?" To this question the inquirer will get no plain answer. He will get nothing clearer than this: "How a categorical imperative is possible can be answered so far that we can specify the only hypothesis on which it is possible—that is, the idea of freedom; and we can also discern the necessity of this hypothesis, which suffices for the practical exercise of

reason—that is, for the conviction of the *validity of this imperative*, and hence of the moral law; but how this hypothesis itself is possible can never be discerned by any human reason." We cannot comprehend the unconditional necessity of the moral imperative; but in the light of the distinction between phenomena and noumena "we can comprehend its incomprehensibility." This is a typical Kantian dictum.

§ 6. One of the best things in Kant is his emphasis upon the truth that moral experience is essentially implied in human nature. Moral rules, therefore, are not imposed upon us from without, but spring from within us. So far, what Kant says is admirably true; but, though in form he is right, in substance his doctrine is inadequate, because his view of human nature is much too narrow. The human nature from which morality actually springs has elements of affection and of striving as well as of reason. But for Kant morality is exclusively a matter of reason. He expressly denies moral value to the affections, and he does not really recognize striving.

What Kant says about the affections is much opposed to the spirit of the present age. He treats them as mere inclinations or modifications of our sensibility. That a man should take pleasure in spreading joy around him and should delight in the happiness of others is, he says, of no true moral worth. A brother has a duty to help his brethren; but he must not do it out of love. This, indeed, seems to have been Kant's own practice in his family relationships.

His treatment of conation is not unlike his treatment of freedom: he uses some admirable phrases about it, but has no real place for it in his system. Every one knows the fine sentence with which his *Grundlegung* begins: "Nothing in the whole world, or even outside of the world, can possibly be regarded as good without limitation except a good will." Equally admirable is a phrase immediately following: "A man's will is good, not because the consequences which flow from it are good; it is good in itself." But if we inquire further what Kant means by will, we find that he recognizes no element of striving in it; it is merely the acceptance by a

rational agent of a rule. A moral will is one which accepts rules solely because they are rules; the same futile something-out-of-nothing doctrine that I have already criticized. Of course, Kant knew quite well that moral experience implies striving—striving with others, with things and physical conditions, and with the refractory elements in one's own character; but he does not get all this into his system.

§ 7. Kant's ethical writing has the inspiring quality which belongs to a thinker who always has in mind the great possibilities which lie behind our everyday experience. From the first it was his intention to vindicate by philosophy the belief in God and in a future state which he learnt from his parents. This he thought that he could do through moral experience; but he does it in a queer fashion. His attitude towards God and immortality is a combination of scepticism and belief. He thought that Hume had shown the impossibility of getting any intellectual knowledge of trans-phenomenal realities, and that rational theology therefore was impossible. Nevertheless, he believed that we could learn something about these matters from moral experience. What sort of knowledge that would be which would not be intellectual neither Kant nor any one else can explain. As usual, he expresses himself about it in contradictory terms: we know and yet we don't know; God and immortality are "intelligible," and yet no one can understand them. Kant's term for this ambiguous experience is "faith."

The metaphysical passages of the *Grundlegung* deal only with freedom, which Kant says is assured to us by our moral experience as members of the noumenal or trans-phenomenal world. God and immortality are vindicated in a later work, the *Kritik of Practical Reason*. His argument for the existence of God is a sad declension from the best level of his thinking, and shows glaring inconsistency with certain tenets on which he had insisted elsewhere very strongly. We must, he says, believe that God exists, because otherwise good men will not be made happy. This is a kind of argument which we might have expected from William Paley or John Brown. Previously throughout the *Grundlegung* he had maintained

that the desire for happiness is merely hedonistic and is morally indifferent. He had protested earnestly against those ethical systems which are based on the idea of happiness; but now he makes it the chief justification of religious belief. And so he lays himself open to the gibe of Schopenhauer, that his virtue, which at first bore itself so bravely towards happiness, ends by holding out its hand to receive a *trinkgeld*.

His argument for immortality is better; it is that we need a future state in which human wills may be brought into perfect harmony with the divine. But even this is not so good an argument as might be drawn from moral experience. If we are going to base metaphysics upon ethics, we should consider man's moral achievement rather than his needs.

Kant's general view of the relation between ethics and metaphysics is that we draw from moral experience, not from merely intellectual experience, our assurance about the highest realities. This is implied in his phrase "the primacy of the practical reason." It is a fine phrase and a true one; but he himself was far from exploiting fully the possibilities of his own idea. He could not have done so without much more recognition than he had of human value. Whatever the cause may have been, whether it was from his Puritan upbringing or from natural coldness of heart, he had no faith in humanity. There was a deep tinge of pessimism in Kant: man, he thought, was naturally bad; he doubted whether any one had ever really done a disinterested act, or whether there had ever existed a really true friend. Such an attitude makes a satisfactory vindication of God and immortality impossible.

§ 8. Kant is a moralist whom it is very easy to criticize and even to ridicule, but whom it is very important to understand. His obscurities, tergiversations, and changes of view are irritating; his Prussian authoritativeness challenges opposition; his pedantry is absurd: none the less, he is the great central figure of philosophy in the later eighteenth century. Certain lines of thought end in him, while others begin from him: he faces in two directions, like Janus; he points backwards to the past and forwards to the future. As

a child of the *Aufklaerung*, as the spiritual heir of Voltaire and Hume, he finished the work of scepticism and destroyed the established systems. This does not affect his ethics directly, because in that branch of philosophy he was a believer; but he freed ethics from dependence upon dogmatic theology and metaphysics. He also closed the succession of authoritarian moralists; no one of note since Kant has insisted upon the absolute rigidity of moral rules. At the same time he did a much greater service by opening up that line of thought which leads to the recognition of the creative activity of the human spirit, to the recognition of freedom, and to that of the primary importance of moral experience.

It is a commonplace of the history of philosophy to say that modern thinkers are more subjective than the ancient. Since Kant philosophy has been egocentric. His 'critical method' really means 'psychological method'; we must base ourselves upon our knowledge of the human soul, the only direct and certain knowledge which we enjoy. When, following in his footsteps, we study the soul carefully and impartially we come, I think, to hold three main opinions about it: that it is spiritual (not material), creative, and free. All these opinions may be found in some degree in Kant, though apprehended imperfectly and with imperfect understanding of their implications. We can discern them most plainly in his ethics, which was, as he knew well, the central province of his whole system. When we notice what he failed to do, we must remember the lamentable conditions in eighteenth-century Prussia, and how remote Kant was in Koenigsberg from the centres of freedom—such freedom as existed at that day. In moral philosophy we must regard him as a prophet who never entered the Promised Land; he pointed forward along a path which he himself was forbidden to explore.

BOOKS RECOMMENDED:—

The Philosophy of Kant, as Contained in Extracts from His Own Writings. By John Watson. (Maclehose.)

Introduction to Kant's Philosophy. By Norman Clark. (Methuen.)

CHAPTER XLI

BENTHAM

(1) Bentham's ethical system is based theoretically on hedonism, which is unsound as an explanation of moral experience either in its egoistic or its universalistic form. (2) Creatures below the human level are not actuated mainly by desire for self-pleasure; (3) nor are men in the better part of their conduct. (4) In virtuous action men are not actuated considerably by desire to increase the pleasures of the community, but are rather under the influence of moral valuation. (5) Bentham's utilitarianism was part of the general European movement towards freedom. (6) He adopted the greatest-happiness principle mainly because of its convenience as a criterion of reform. (7) The purpose of his ethical writings was to put forward a moral system which should be suitable to a free community. (8) His chief theoretical defect is that he fails to justify benevolence, and the defect is not made good by J. S. Mill. (9) One solution of the difficulty proposed by Mill is to distinguish qualitative differences between pleasures; the pleasure of benevolence being the highest. This is not consistent with Benthamism. (10) Sidgwick's solution is that benevolence is justified by intuition. (11) Practically, Bentham's doctrine is defective in its neglect of the moral value of institutions.

§ 1. THE utilitarian moralists, of whom Bentham is the chief, suffer even more than other thinkers by being studied too abstractly. Their doctrine should not be treated merely as a variety of hedonism, without reference to the conditions under which they wrote or the aims which they desired to achieve. Martineau, in his *Types of Ethical Theory*, is guilty of this fault. It certainly is right to criticize hedonism abstractly, but we ought not to stop there. I am going to argue that hedonism is mistaken as an explanation of moral experience. Nevertheless, the utilitarians were mostly right in the practical and more important part of their doctrine.

Hedonism is an ancient theory, but before Bentham's time it had never been used for any worthy purpose. In antiquity it was little better than a maxim of self-indulgent slave-masters, which explains Plato's horror of it; for Helvétius,

the French capitalist-philosopher of whom Bentham thought so highly, it was the generalization of a member of the idle-rich class from what he observed of the court-society of Louis XV; for Anglican hedonists like Paley and John Brown it was a justification of other-worldliness. It assumed a new meaning and dignity in utilitarianism. In Bentham's hands it was used as a theoretical basis for proposals of reform. We are most likely to do justice to Bentham if we first criticize hedonism purely as a theory, and then consider it subsequently in its historical setting.

The characteristic doctrine of hedonism is that an act is morally good in proportion to the amount of pleasure which results from it. This sounds simple; but the question at once arises, Whose pleasure? The egoistic hedonist answers, The agent's own pleasure. And there have been psychologists to support him by maintaining (very falsely) that no agent can ever aim at anything else. The universalistic hedonist, on the other hand, argues that the agent ought not to value his self-pleasure more highly than the pleasure of others, and that virtue in general means to aim at increasing the pleasures of the community.

Both egoistic and universalistic hedonism I hold to be mistaken; but evidently they are very different theories. No satisfactory reconciliation of them has ever been proposed. Bentham professed to show that they are compatible, but offered no proof worthy of serious attention. They ought to be criticized separately, for their bases of fact are not the same, nor are the purposes which their advocates have kept in view.

§ 2. In criticizing egoistic hedonism we ought to adopt a developmental standpoint, which was not available to the utilitarian thinkers. Bentham was quite ignorant of biology; nor is there any recognition of development in J. S. Mill and Sidgwick: though they were contemporaries of Darwin, they came too late to be influenced by his ideas. But no present-day moralist can afford to neglect development. Only by studying creatures of a lower level can we hope to understand human nature.

Now, is it true that animals are in the main actuated by desire for pleasure and aversion from pain? There are not many biologists at present who would answer, Yes. Most of the activities of animals are connected either with self-preservation or race-preservation. The self-preserving activities connected with food and some of the race-preserving activities result in pleasure when they are successful. But they are not entered upon for the sake of pleasure; because, antecedently to experience, the animal does not know that pleasure will result from them. They are entered upon instinctively. The pleasure which the animal enjoys encourages it to proceed along its instinctive path and to repeat the act; but it does not cause the animal to enter upon the path. Similarly, we may say that life-destroying experiences are usually painful, but not always. And, whether painful or not, the animal shuns them instinctively; otherwise it would have little chance of survival.

There are two important departments of animal activity where the hedonist explanation of behaviour seems plainly inadequate—those of parenthood and of conflict. Animals certainly do get pleasure in tending their offspring, as we may see by watching a mother-cat with its kittens; but it would be a very bad mother which was actuated merely by hedonic motives. Conflict plays a considerable part in the lives of some animals; for example, in that of dogs. Dogs fight with each other for reasons of food and of sex, and at the prompting of the pack-instinct. It seems absurd to argue that they fight in order to secure pleasure or to avoid pain. An animal can be said to act from hedonic motives only so far as it acts from anticipation. When a creature has once gone through a train of acts and got pleasure from it, anticipation influences it to repeat the train. And animals, especially the higher domesticated animals, do many things to which they are prompted neither by instinct nor necessity; and such things they may be said to do for the sake of pleasure. But the range of an animal's anticipation is narrow, and not sufficient to direct it in the more important parts of its conduct.

§ 3. Now let us turn to man. Primitive men are like animals in being largely under the dominance of instinct. At all stages of human culture instinct is very powerful; but in the more developed stages it becomes modified by other influences. Like animals, primitive men also are under the influence of pleasure and pain; and even more so than animals are, because their range of anticipation is wider. But so far as they act from hedonic motives men are not acting in a distinctively human way, and cannot progress in morality. The life which is distinctively human is a kind of community life, the maintenance of which depends upon the two main communal virtues—benevolence and loyalty. And I would argue that benevolence and loyalty cannot be regarded as forms of desire for self-pleasure.

Take benevolence first. When a man acts benevolently towards his fellow citizens, or a mother towards her children, is the act done for the sake of the pleasure experienced by the agent? It is admitted that the doing of benevolent acts is often or usually accompanied with self-pleasure. But are they done for the sake of the pleasure? I think that common sense would answer, Certainly not. If we look at the matter psychologically, the main argument against the hedonist is that in benevolent action the interest of the agent is manifestly directed towards the persons for the benefit of whom the action is done. And when an agent's interest is directed towards an object in relation to which he is acting, we say that he is acting for the sake of it.

As regards the other main communal virtue, loyalty, there is very little ground for arguing that it is practised for the sake of self-pleasure. The self-pleasure of loyalty, though considerable, is much less than that of benevolence, simply because the main object of it, the community, is not emotionally responsive. It would be specially absurd to explain the loyalty of savages as desire for self-pleasure. Among rough people that virtue is mainly of the military type, such as is displayed in war. And the natural fighting-man never regards hard and dangerous service as enjoyable.

§ 4. Now let us discuss universalistic hedonism. The

basis of the theory is the fact that, when men are acting in a way to command our moral admiration, they usually are acting in a way to increase the common welfare. But is this the same as increasing the common pleasure? Surely it is very different. It certainly is true that good men are desirous of adding to the pleasures of the community, when no higher interest suffers thereby. They are still more desirous of diminishing the pains of the community; for when people are in pain they are debarred from most of the higher forms of experience. But upon the whole such hedonic considerations take a subordinate place in a virtuous mind. The good man reverences his community because of its moral worth. When he devotes himself to its welfare, he aims at increasing its worth or its opportunities of attaining worth. Pleasure and pain, as such, do not come directly into question. To aim at increasing the mere pleasure of persons is either frivolous, or implies a low estimate of those persons. That is how injudicious parents spoil their children, by trying to increase their pleasures without reference to character.

Hedonism is the easiest and shallowest of ethical theories; it recognizes some obvious and simple features of conduct, but neglects the characteristic element of our higher experience. Every one knows what pleasure is—that it is a common motive of action, and that many acts (such as those which aim at mere amusement) are deemed successful in proportion as they produce pleasure. Now, pleasure is certainly concerned in moral acts; when a moral act achieves the purpose which the agent set before himself in doing it, he is pleased. Therefore, says the hedonist, the act was done for the sake of the pleasure, and is to be esteemed in proportion to the pleasure arising from it; either the pleasure of the agent, or that of a wider circle. But what the hedonist neglects is the fact of valuation—i.e., the fact that in moral experience, as in all the higher parts of our life, we have the sense of being in relation with objects which are valuable in themselves, and of enjoying experience which itself is intrinsically valuable. Valuation is the essential element of our moral experience. If it has not been universally recognized

in the past, that is due, I think, to imperfect psychological analysis.

The fault of neglecting valuation is specially chargeable against Bentham. He insisted that no distinction can be made between pleasures in respect of quality, but only in respect of characters which are forms of quantity. If poetry is preferable to push-pin, that is only because the quantity of pleasure afforded is greater. All this was in accordance with his personal character, which was a strange compound of diverse qualities—philanthropy and cynicism, serious industry and childish levity, acuteness in criticizing facts, and want of insight into human minds.

§ 5. The piece of utilitarian writing which is most generally read is J. S. Mill's *Utilitarianism*, one of the best of all short books of philosophy. But the student who confines himself to it will not be favourably placed for understanding why the theory was invented; nor does Mill give a consistent presentation of it. For that we must go to the first of the utilitarians, Bentham; though, unluckily, Bentham never put his ideas into a compact form.

When we look at Bentham's writing as a whole, especially if we read it in the light of the admirable social and political survey of England in Leslie Stephen's *English Utilitarians*, we see that it should be regarded as belonging to the great European reform-movement which, coming to a critical point towards the end of the eighteenth century, manifested itself in the French Revolution, and, nearly fifty years later, in our own Reform Act. The basic fact underlying these conspicuous historical events was a general improvement in the wealth and culture of Western Europe, so that the population became desirous of full citizenship and capable of using properly a considerable measure of political power. When the decisive power in the State is in the hands of the mass of the population, there is democracy. Neither the French Revolution nor the British Reform Act established full democracy on either side of the Channel; but they set the two nations well upon the democratic path, and from thenceforward democratic ideas prevailed in the minds of thinking

men. In the sphere of ethics that spirit expressed itself in the doctrine of the Rights of Man, and in Utilitarianism.

§ 6. The consistent and comprehensive purpose of Bentham's life, then, was the promotion of reform. With his characteristic intellectual thoroughness, he thought he must have a speculative principle upon which everything else could be based, and chose the principle of utility. Utility he interpreted uncompromisingly in terms of pleasure and pain. He need not have done so, because the term 'utility' can be used not inappropriately of the higher objects of human desire. The reasons why he did so were, as I have said already, partly temperamental; but we must also recognize that the principle of hedonic utility was really one which was convenient for the purposes of the reformer. Let it be assumed that the aim of laws and institutions is to make as many persons happy as possible, and then we have a ready criterion for judging what exists, and for estimating the effects of proposed changes. If a system of government makes the mass of the people miserable, as the Old Régime did in France, that is a very weighty reason for changing it. It is true that happiness contains elements other than pleasure; but it is also true that men cannot be happy unless they enjoy a certain amount of pleasure.

Other principles, based on some sort of intuition, had been advocated by other thinkers; but Bentham rejected them scornfully, because they were not objective and definite, and might be used to obstruct reform. He is unsparing in his attacks upon those whom he called dogmatists, or ipse-dixitists, or dictators of morals. "The various systems that have been formed concerning the standard of right and wrong (other than the utilitarian).....consist all of them in so many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external standard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author's sentiment or opinion as a reason for itself. The phrases different, but the principle the same." "One man [Hutcheson] says he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong, and that it is called a moral sense; and then he goes to work at his ease and says,

Such a thing is right, and such a thing is wrong—Why? Because my moral sense tells me it is.....Another man says that there is an eternal and immutable rule of right; that that rule of right dictates so and so: and then he begins giving you his sentiments upon anything that comes uppermost; and these sentiments (you are to take for granted) are so many branches of the eternal rule of right.....Another man [Dr. Clarke] says that there are certain practices conformable and others repugnant to the fitness of things, and then he tells you, at his leisure, what practices are conformable and what repugnant, just as he happens to like a practice or dislike it. A great multitude of people [in France] are continually talking of the Law of Nature; and then they go on giving you their sentiments about what is right and what is wrong: and these sentiments, you are to understand, are so many chapters and sections of the law of nature.....The fairest and openest of them all is that sort of man who speaks out and says, 'I am of the number of the elect. Now, God himself takes care to inform the elect what is right; and that with so good effect that, let them strive ever so, they cannot help, not only knowing it, but practising it. If therefore a man wants to know what is right and what is wrong, he has nothing to do but to come to me.'" (*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, p. 17.)

Bentham distinguished three stages in the moral history of mankind. "First epoch, that of Force. No other code, no other standard, no other source of morality. Violence the law, and violent the law-giver.....Then comes the second reign, the reign of Fraud. Force belongs to a time of ignorance, Fraud to semi-civilization. Its influence, like that of Force, is usurpation; but it comes with fallacies, instead of open violence, to help it. It fosters credulity, it leagues itself with superstition. It takes hold of the terrors of the mind, and makes them subservient to its real, but often concealed, despotism. The usurping priest [such as those of the Established Churches], the aristocratical lawyer [such as Blackstone], flourish under its dynasty. Last of all comes the reign of Justice, the reign of utility. Under its

auspices the work of the legislator will be lightened, and the moralist will assume many of the legislator's functions..... The lines which separate right and wrong will be more clearly and broadly defined as the predominance of the great social interest breaks down those barriers which have been raised for sinister purposes, or left by the ignorant traditions of ancient days. Delightful it is to contemplate the progress of virtue and happiness; to see them subduing.....more and more of the domain where false maxims of private and public morality had so long held undisputed sway. Yet more delightful it is to anticipate a period when the moral code, grounded on the greatest-happiness principle, will be the code of nations, teaching them in their vast political concerns to create no useless misery, and to make their patriotism subservient to the demands of benevolence." (*Deontology*, ii, 48.) In the realm of Fraud various agencies were at work oppressing and plundering the mass of men; in particular, aristocrats, lawyers, and priests. Most of the false moral theories which were current in Bentham's day were, he thought, nothing but blinds or masks to help those licensed brigands in their nefarious enterprises.

§ 7. The only book of Bentham's which deals expressly and entirely with ethics is the *Deontology*, which was left by him unfinished, and was worked up after his death from his manuscripts by his confidential secretary, Bowring. Though the authenticity of the book has been questioned, there is nothing in it which is inconsistent with his known opinions. Its general purpose may be described as putting forward a moral system which would be suitable to a free community; incidentally this leads him to criticize the accepted moral system.

Bentham reduces all human goodness to two main virtues —Prudence and Effective Benevolence. Prudence is merely the familiar self-love of the eighteenth-century moralists. But Bentham's Benevolence differs somewhat from that of his predecessors in being more businesslike and comprehensive. It consists not merely in kindly feeling towards one's neighbours, but in deliberate purpose to promote the welfare of all sentient beings, so far as the agent's influence extends.

The most interesting part of the *Deontology* is that in which the moral system of his age is criticized; Bentham reacted violently against the teachers of his youth. His bitterest remarks are directed against asceticism, which seemed to him to be the sheer antithesis of good morals. "The ascetic principle must be wrong; wrong whenever it is in action. It exclaims as Satan did—'Evil, be thou my good!'—and turns upside down all virtues in endeavouring to shift them from their true foundation—happiness." (*Deontology*, ii, 17.) He has some good observations on self-sacrifice. "Sacrifice, sacrifice is the demand of the everyday moralist. Sacrifice, taken by itself, is mischievous; and mischievous is the influence that connects morality with suffering. Little does he seem to be aware how far morality may be effective without anything painful. Its associations are cheerfulness and joy, not gloom and misery. Certain it is the less the sacrifice made of happiness the more there must be of happiness remaining. Let it be obtained gratis where it can; where it cannot be had without sacrifice, let the sacrifice be as small as possible; where the sacrifice must be great, let it be ascertained that the happiness will be greater." (*Deontology*, i, 34.) Another object of his attacks is 'sentimentalism,' by which he means excessive emphasis upon benevolence as opposed to prudence and indulgence in benevolent sentiments out of due season.

§ 8. The theoretical defect in Bentham, about which all critics are agreed, is that there is no logical connexion between his two virtues of Prudence and Benevolence; in other words, there is no road from 'each for himself' to 'each for all.' The *Deontology*, on its title-page, claims to be a treatise "in which the harmony and coincidence of duty and self-interest, virtue and felicity, prudence and benevolence, are explained and exemplified." But any one can see that Bentham has not proved the "harmony and coincidence" of the two chief elements of virtue. He says the "process by which benevolence is generated.....and virtue associated with felicity" (*Deontology*, ii, 38) is performed by education and the bestowal of praise and blame in childhood. This is not

enough. We want to know why the prudent man should not, when he reaches years of discretion, divest himself of the influences of his education, so far as they interfere with his prudential care for himself. J. S. Mill, Bentham's chief successor, made no advance in settling this question, the chief one which utilitarians have to face. He says: "No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good; that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 53.) This is an example of the elementary Fallacy of Composition; it is like saying that, as each man ought to wash his hands, therefore all men ought to wash the hands of all. In a later passage he tries to effect the reconciliation of duty with self-interest by means of the association of ideas. Virtue, he says, must be originally indifferent to us as an object of desire; but by association with pleasurable and desirable things it comes eventually to be desired for its own sake. It is like money, which originally was valued only as a means for what it would buy. "Yet the love of money is not only one of the strongest moving forces of human life; but money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 55.) Here is another very weak argument. It is characteristic of enlightened people that they try to free themselves from irrational tendencies such as love of money for its own sake (if such a tendency really exists). In the eighteenth century 'divesting oneself of prejudices' was a common phrase of libertines; and they would be justified in using it if Mill's association-theory were true.

§ 9. It was probably from a feeling of the weakness of these arguments that Mill adopted the doctrine of the difference in quality between pleasures. He says: "It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasures are more desirable and more

valuable than others. It would be absurd that, while in estimating all other things quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 12.) This is an admission which Bentham would never have made. His keenly logical mind would have seen that to admit differences of quality in pleasure would mean abandonment of the greatest-happiness principle. In the quaint mnemonic verses by which Bentham helps us to remember how to measure the value of "a lot of pleasure or pain," he says: "Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure—such marks in pleasures and in pains endure." Nothing is said about quality. If quality were admitted, his political opponents might have argued that, though certain existing institutions (primogeniture, for example) might cause unhappiness to the majority of Englishmen, the surplus of pain was more than compensated by the superior quality of the pleasure which it produces for the minority. Mill's modification, then, makes the utilitarian principle worthless as a political criterion. Formally, it could still be used as a principle of private conduct. On merely hedonic grounds a man might say: 'I prefer this single glass of exquisite wine to a gallon of beer, because of the difference of quality; though the gallon may afford a greater quantity of pleasure.' But this is not Mill's meaning. He goes on to say: "It is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures;

no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he, for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him.....We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride.....to the love of liberty and personal independence.....to the love of power or to the love of excitement.....but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 12.) This reference to "dignity" shows that Mill has left utilitarian ground. He is recognizing that some ways of life have a higher intrinsic value than others: and intrinsic value cannot belong to a kind of pleasure merely as such; it must refer to human character in a wider sense.

§ 10. All these difficulties were perfectly well appreciated by the last exponent of utilitarian views, Henry Sidgwick. In the preface of the sixth (and posthumous) edition of his *Methods of Ethics* there is printed a most interesting account of his own mental development. "My first adhesion to a definite ethical system was to.....Utilitarianism.....The elements of Mill's view which I am accustomed to distinguish as Psychological Hedonism (that each man does seek his own happiness) and Ethical Hedonism (that each man ought to seek the general happiness) both attracted me, and I did not at first perceive their incoherence." So Sidgwick set himself to study the problem why self-interest should be subordinated to duty. The result was that he concluded "that no complete solution of the conflict between my happiness and the general happiness was possible on the basis of mundane experience." He therefore had recourse to intuition under the guidance of Kant, Butler, and Aristotle. He became convinced that the precept to promote universal happiness was a primary and intuitively recognized moral principle, and that the opposition between utilitarianism

and intuitionism, of which Bentham had made so much, was due to a misunderstanding.

§ 11. This flaw in Bentham, his failure to reconcile egoistic and universalistic hedonism, may be counted theoretical. One which is more practical and seriously impairs the moral value of his doctrine is his attitude towards public institutions; he never speaks of them as being more than devices for increasing pleasure and decreasing pain. He himself worked with life-long devotion for the improvement of English institutions; but he gives no reasons for doing so, except such as are patently selfish and mean. Although he was, in all the best part of his life, a collectivist, he never emancipated his mind from the prevalent individualism. No doubt this must be explained largely by the poor quality of public institutions in his day. National institutions were dominated by the sinister interests of an oligarchy; while local institutions, in the towns at least, were hot-beds of base corruption. If he had put a high value on institutions, they must have been the institutions which he hoped to see in the future rather than those existing at the time. But even so his views were needlessly low and cynical. Therefore he is less read and appreciated than J. S. Mill, whose mind was inferior in vivacity and logical power but more awake to the spiritual element in things, and more inclined to make the passage from individualism to collectivism.

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CHAPTER XLII

HEGEL'S *PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT*

(1) Hegel's ethical doctrine is dominated by the idea of the State. (2) His *étatisme* is logically part of his system of absolute idealism, (3) by which he undertakes to explain the world. (4) His *Philosophy of Right* issues in a justification of the existing order in Prussia. (5) It practically ignores the individual. (6) The best points in Hegel are that he brings ethics into relation with metaphysics, and that he gives recognition to the moral value of institutions, to growth, and to the primacy of action over reflective thinking.

§ 1. HEGEL is out of favour in our country to-day. Certain features in him have always repelled us: his dry, pedantic, wearisome method of exposition; his monstrously arrogant pose of omniscience; the paradoxical character both of his assumptions and his conclusions. But the present feeling is largely political. Hegel took it upon himself to stand forward as vindicator of the Prussian State, as it was established in the period immediately following the downfall of Napoleon. The outstanding features of Prussia at that time were militarism, bureaucracy, and *Junkertum*. This was the Government which partitioned Poland, tried consistently to crush the rising forces of democracy in Europe, and persecuted thinkers (Kant among the number) who were known to hold liberal opinions in theology or politics; it was the ancestor of the Government that made the Great War. And yet it was Prussia which Hegel had in mind when he wrote that the State is "the embodiment of reason," "the march of God in the world," "the realization of concrete freedom in which the rights of personal individuality receive adequate recognition."

It is difficult for even the most charitable historian of philosophy to condone Hegel's political standpoint; but it is easy to see how he reached it. Some of his earliest writings (date about 1800) deal with the constitution of the State of Wirtemberg, of which he was a native. Here he manifests

his deep dissatisfaction with the existing institutions of Germany, and indicates the changes which he thinks that the times require. These are all in the direction of unity, by limiting the excessive local freedom which was traditional in the country and by consolidating the very numerous small Governments in the hands of a strong central authority. As a logician and a patriot, Hegel was deeply impressed by the absurdity of the existing political confusion, by the humiliations and losses which the German nation had suffered from its disunion, and by the danger of dismemberment and servitude such as had been suffered by Poland and Italy. In the last decade of his life, after his entry into the Prussian service, he became convinced that his newly-adopted country was destined for the salvation of the German people. "What is rational is real," he said, "and what is real is rational." This, when interpreted, meant that Prussian institutions were all that they should be, and that the liberal thinkers who criticized them were charlatans and enemies of society. Thus Hegel became *the* official philosopher; and Altenstein, the Prussian minister of education, took care that none but his disciples received academic preferment. In the time of his youth, which was contemporary with the French Revolution, Hegel had been fired with the ideals of freedom; he ended as an instrument of the reactionary system of the Holy Alliance.

Now that the bitterness of the Great War is passing away, it is time to cease to be angry with Hegel and to estimate what we owe to him. Our debt is not small, in all the branches of philosophy; in ethics it is his emphasis upon community-life (his *étatisme*, as it has been called) which has contributed most to make him interesting and useful to Englishmen. English moralists were in a condition of State-blindness almost up to the middle of the nineteenth century. Bentham always wrote as an individualist. Even in so recent a writer as Henry Sidgwick, who represented Mid-Victorian liberalism, there is very little recognition of the moral value of institutions. We find a better tone in T. H. Green, who was the first important British moralist to learn from Hegel. Hegel's ideas have always been turned to liberal purposes in

England, though their inventor used them conservatively. The virtue of public devotion, which Hegel certainly possessed, was directed by him towards an existing order; whereas the same spirit in the British Hegelians has been directed more towards a state of the future.

§ 2. Logically, Hegel's *étatisme* is an integral part of his system, in which he undertook a comprehensive explanation of the world. I must, therefore, try to say very briefly indeed what is the purport of the system. There is only one good way of approaching it—the historical. Hegel stands so far from us in his assumptions, his method, and his conclusions that we cannot understand him without a survey of his antecedents in thought and of the circumstances under which he wrote.

The doctrines which Hegel adopted and developed were those of the German idealism of which Kant was the founder. Kant effected what he called a "Copernican revolution" in philosophy; which meant that for the future the world was to be explained in terms of humanity, whereas previously it had been viewed as existing independently of man. His doctrine of space and time and the categories comes to this—that the world in its most general aspect, as it appears to us, must be interpreted with reference to the human mind. Outside the world as we know it, he said, there is the sphere of things-in-themselves; but to this our intelligence can never penetrate.

Fichte, who came next in the philosophic succession, accepted the new idealism enthusiastically, but thought it was incomplete; he condemned the notion of a world of things-in-themselves, inaccessible to our intelligence. Moreover, he thought that Kant ought to have given a more systematic account of the organic principles of the human mind. He argued that everything should be deduced from one original principle, so that the character and position of the subordinate principles could be logically demonstrated. We should then understand, what Kant had left obscure, why just these principles exist and not others. And we should have no need for a world of things-in-themselves, as opposed

to things-which-appear-to-us. The one primary principle would be all-explaining, and there would be nothing left outside it. Taking a suggestion from Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception," Fichte fixed upon the consciousness of the ego as his primary principle. The contents of this consciousness he expresses in three positions, whose mutual relations of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis are repeated in all the divisions of his system. The thesis is, the ego originally posits absolutely its own being; the antithesis is, the ego posits in distinction from itself a non-ego; the synthesis, the ego posits itself as limited or determined by the non-ego while it posits the non-ego as determined by the ego. From the primary thesis, antithesis, and synthesis Fichte, by a method of reasoning, which is very abstract and seems to us very unreal, attempted to deduce the whole of philosophic doctrine, both speculative and practical. To this method he gave the name of 'dialectic.' Both these leading features of Fichte's doctrine, deduction from a single principle and dialectic, were taken over by Hegel.

One of the first questions which naturally arise in regard to Fichte's system is, What ego is it from which, not merely the whole of experience, but also the whole of reality, can be unfolded? The question is not definitely faced in Fichte's earlier writings; but apparently in those writings he is thinking of the individual or personal ego, and his system is therefore one of subjective idealism. So was he commonly understood by his contemporaries. On reading some of Fichte's earlier work, Kant remarked that it made a ghostly or phantasmal effect upon him. Later Fichte saw how intolerable subjective idealism was morally, if for no other reason; and explained that his ego was a universal or cosmic ego, in which personal selves are necessary elements.

When this change was made his system took on a totally different character; it became an attempt to explain the universe viewed as an objective whole. This evidently is a very bold and, one may even say, an impossible attempt. But Fichte was a man of boundless self-confidence, and, indeed, of considerable egoism. He thought that the inmost

nature of reality could be discovered, that he had discovered it, and that he could demonstrate it with strict, irrefutable logic.

Thus opened a strange chapter in the history of human thought. Fichte began it, and it was continued by a somewhat younger writer, Schelling. From the first Schelling definitely and consciously engaged himself in the task of reconstructing the cosmos. But whereas Fichte's main interest was in Mind, Schelling's was in Nature. Most of his work is *Natur-philosophie*, wildly imaginative stuff which did not a little to bring the whole line of thought into discredit after its authors had passed away. The main idea in it is that matter is extinct or petrified mind, and that we can interpret the forces of matter and the stages of material development by regarding them as parallel to the stages of self-consciousness.

Schelling's strong feeling for Nature, which was not the less genuine because misdirected, did not allow him to accede to Fichte's doctrine that the primary existence is an ego, and that the whole material world is merely a plane-of-impact or screen upon which mind throws its pictures. Schelling thought that justice could be done to Nature only if we regard the primary existence as something which is not more ego than non-ego, something which is an identity of subject and object. This is the famous Identity-Philosophy, which Schelling put forward but did not work out systematically, passing over in his later years into a kind of mysticism or theosophy. To reduce the Identity-Philosophy to logical form, or (perhaps one should say) to a show of logical form, was the work of Hegel, who had all Fichte's self-confidence and egoism together with an unequalled capacity for laborious system-making.

§ 3. I will now show what place Hegel gives to moral experience in his system.

Philosophy as a whole, said Hegel, is the science of the Absolute Idea; which, like Schelling's Primary Identity, is above the distinction between subject and object, but has a power of self-development in accordance with the abstract laws of thought. Hegel's Absolute is essentially thought;

whereas Schelling maintained that the Absolute must be regarded as will. Hegel spoke with contempt of Schelling's Absolute as the "night in which all cows are black"; but Schelling retorted that Hegel's thought-world was dead and negative, and could have no power of self-motion.

Hegel divided his science of the Absolute Idea into three parts: first, logic, which is the "science of the pure idea," thought by and for itself, without intermixture of "otherness"; secondly, the philosophy of nature, thought in its state of self-alienation into otherness; and, thirdly, the philosophy of spirit, thought returning from otherness into itself and manifesting itself in the various spiritual functions of man. One of these is moral experience, which manifests itself in some measure as individual morality (or *Moralitaet*), but more fully as *Sittlichkeit*, which means moral experience objectified in institutions—namely, in family, civil society, and State. But morality as a whole, which is part of Objective Spirit, is a lower kind of function than Absolute Spirit, which consists of Art, Revealed Religion, and Philosophy.

Let us consider what claims this whole enterprise of Hegel's implies. It implies that he knows the law or plan according to which the world-process moves and has always moved; that he is able to explain why every feature of the world is what it is and what it ought to be; so that, if he thought it worth while, he could prescribe the proper regulations for passports and the best method of rearing silkworms; that he can explain the events and tendencies of history, and say why, when, where, and how Cæsar crossed the Rubicon, why Greece failed and Rome succeeded, and why the German polity and national spirit are superior to all others.

At the present day there is very little support for the Hegelian system as a whole, and very little inclination to admit the validity of its enormous claims. As to the three main divisions of it, the prevalent view is that the Logic, though very ingenious, is empty and barren, and that the Philosophy of Nature is fantastic and absurd. The Philosophy of Spirit is the most interesting part of the work; it

is an attempt to evaluate the various elements of human experience (including morality), supported with great knowledge of facts and metaphysical enthusiasm. The ethical division, however, is very unsatisfactory, if only because of its treatment of the personal individual.

§ 4. Hegel's only book which deals exclusively with morals is his *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, which was published in 1821, two years after he had been summoned by the Prussian Minister of Education from Heidelberg to Berlin to occupy the most important philosophical professorship in Germany. It is so much taken up with institutions and says so little about the personal moral consciousness that the English reader may find some difficulty in recognizing it as a work on ethics at all; but Hegel thought that it covered adequately the field of inquiry. The book shows how far Hegelian ideas give us help in understanding moral experience.

The plan of the book is to arrange facts of moral experience such as right, morality, family-life, and polity into an order which the author thought to be conformable to his system of absolute idealism, and to show how one form of moral experience leads on dialectically to the next immediately above it. The result is to justify every feature of contemporary Prussia (hereditary monarchy and bureaucracy included) as the necessary and sacred result of the unfolding of the absolute idea. What is not conformable to this he dismisses as accidental or transitory. This ultra-conservatism provoked, as might be expected, angry protests from those of his colleagues who held liberal opinions and had sufficient independence to declare them. Hegel's theory of the State, said Professor Fries, has grown, "not in the gardens of science, but on the dunghill of servility."

To support the established order is the most obvious use for Hegelian ideas. However, they can be applied otherwise —in the interests of reform; we have only to say that the defective institutions of the present are accidental and transitory, and that the reforms which we advocate are the true expression of the absolute idea. The supporters of Kaiserism

in recent years might have justified themselves on Hegelian principles, if they had thought it worth while; and so no less might the revolutionary party which abolished monarchy throughout the German realm.

§ 5. While we are attracted by Hegel's emphasis upon loyalty and the public-spirited side of morals, we are repelled by his treatment of the individual.

It is essential to Hegel's system and to his claim of omniscience that the world should be regarded as consisting of thought and of thought only. This makes it impossible to give any valid explanation of personal experience. Hegel is forced to misrepresent every element of our life in which our physical existence is directly concerned. In his account of marriage, for example, he hardly mentions the facts of reproduction; his interest is all in fitting marriage into its place as a stage in the development of the Thought-Absolute. He omits pleasure and pain. He omits the element of personal striving. He could not recognize freewill, for that would have been inconsistent with his claim to understand everything.

But the fault in Hegel which makes the most practical difference is that he refuses any proper recognition of personal freedom in relation to the State. "In considering freedom," he says, "we must not start from individuality—i.e., from the individual self-consciousness—but rather from the essence of self-consciousness. For, whether we recognize it or not, this essence realizes itself as an independent power, in which individuals are mere phases." (*Philosophy of Right*, § 258.) On this view the individual can have no rights as against the State, and no good can come of his criticizing or trying to improve it. It seems natural, Hegel continues, to put the question, "Who ought to make the constitution? The question seems intelligible; but on closer consideration turns out to be senseless.....It is strictly essential that the constitution, though part of the order of time-events, should not be regarded as something which is made. It is something absolutely existent; something which should be viewed as divine and perpetual, something which is above the sphere

of things which are made." "To think of giving to a people a constitution *a priori* is a whim.....Every nation has the constitution which suits it and belongs to it." (§ 274.) "Concerning the constitution [i.e., concerning constitutional reforms], there has been in modern times an endless babble, which in Germany has been emptier than anywhere else." (§ 272.)

With these views it was natural that Hegel in his last work, an essay upon the English Reform Bill, published in 1831, the year of his death, wrote in support of Toryism, and predicted evil if Lord Grey should overcome the resistance of the Peers. The revolution in France in 1830 filled him with dismay, and he reprobated strongly the agitation of German Liberals for a parliamentary constitution. He had the liveliest appreciation of monarchy; the monarch is the "summit and essential factor of the constitution." (§ 281.) "Public freedom and hereditary succession are mutual guarantees and absolutely connected." (§ 288.) But for parliaments Hegel had no use, no more than the Bolsheviks of Russia to-day, or the Fascists of Italy, or the supporters of dictatorship in Spain.

§ 6. The influence of Hegel upon British thought has been beneficial on the whole, now that the first unreasoning fervour of discipleship is past. No one ever mentions the fantastic speculations of his nature-philosophy; none of his English disciples has followed him in his hostility to popular causes. The following seem to be the main points in which British moral philosophy has gained from him.

Hegel has helped us to bring ethics into relation with metaphysics. In ethics, as in other departments of thinking, his mind was always directed towards the cosmic totality which environs and conditions human experience. In this he was not original, but inherited the traditions of the continental metaphysicians since Descartes. British philosophy was always weak in metaphysics till the Continent began to influence us through Kant and Hegel. It is now fully agreed among us that the moralist ought to treat his subject in relation to the widest facts of the world.

The most important service rendered to us by Hegel I have mentioned already; it is that of drawing attention to the moral value of institutions, and generally of emphasizing the community-element of moral experience.

Hegelianism has lent support to the developmental way of viewing the world. In this respect our debt is greatest to biologists like Darwin; without Hegel, however, developmental ideas would have advanced more slowly in the sphere of philosophy. To recognize development in moral ideas and institutions is no small gain for practice as well as for theory; it helps us to be tolerant for imperfection and to be hopeful for the future. The danger is that phrases such as 'immanent growth' may become an excuse for inaction, so that we leave to others those personal efforts by which alone reforms can be brought to pass.

The last point in favour of Hegelianism is one which is not often mentioned, for the good reason that it is not fully in accordance with the system; it is his recognition of the primacy of action over reflective thinking. For the purpose of teaching the world what it ought to be, philosophy, says Hegel, always comes too late. In other words, moral advances are made by men of action rather than by philosophers. This is the truth in Hegel's phrases about philosophy painting its grey on grey, and about the twilight light of Minerva's owl. Here again we must beware of exaggerating a truth. Most moral institutions certainly do come into being by a process rather like organic growth; that is, they are developed gradually by men who do not realize fully the import of what they are doing. And yet fully conscious contrivance also has a share in progress; and sometimes philosophers are the contrivers. But not Hegelian philosophers. A consistent Hegelian will never invent anything—certainly nothing in politics or morality.

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