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A Preface to Our Day

POST-WAR REVISED EDITION

EDITED BY
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THE DRYDEN PRESS . NEW YORK

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Designed by Burnshaw and Manufactured in the United States of America. Published by The Dryden Press, Inc., 386 Fourth Avenue, New York 16, New York

Checked 1965

Checked 1969

NOTE

Simultaneously available with this post-war edition is a volume entitled *A Preface to Our Day: Supplement.* It consists of a section of ten familiar essays ("Man Himself") and fifteen interpretations of the creative arts ("Man in the Arts").

THIRD PRINTING, REVISED EDITION: AUGUST 1947

To our classes
at Queens College —
our teachers, as we are theirs

TO THE STUDENT

THE SELECTIONS in the following pages are preceded by biographical introductions (set in smaller type). Where an author appears more than once, the biographical matter accompanies the first essay.

Selections are followed by study introductions which include exploratory questions.

The source of each essay is indicated by a credit line set at the foot of the page on which the title occurs.

FOREWORD TO THE POST-WAR EDITION

THE EDITORS have sometimes been tempted to borrow G. Lowes Dickinson's title *A Modern Symposium* as the best expression of their purpose. *A Preface to Our Day* is a collection neither of the "best prose" (though some of the best is in it) nor of all essay types; it is rather a literary forum in which are heard voices of past and present, often conflicting, as they speak on the great scientific, social, and cultural issues of our post-war world.

It may be relevant to suggest the direction of the thinking that led to the book. We want the student to learn to think for himself and we want him to learn to read and write good prose of exposition: these ends seem best served by offering the challenge of the best expression of ideas most alive in our own world. The student knows he lives in days of decision. Show him what ideas men live by, what motives drive the wheels of thought and action all about him. He will respond and be impelled to clarify his own ideas and (an inseparable process) to put them as effectively as possible into words. But since no book can be a complete preface to our day, a symposium on *all* vital issues, let the alternatives represented strike at the roots of the matter. The great classics of the past live on because their relevance increases with time: let past and present stand side by side, then, and be heard together. The present will thus be recognized as the child of the past. And let conflicting views on controversial matters stand side by side also, so that students may be challenged to think and choose.

As a collection of essay types and of varyingly effective solutions of problems of writing, the book should gain much by juxtaposition of past and present and of pro and con, which provides rich contrasts of method, strategy of organization, and personal style, from the level of good journalism to that of permanent literature. The intelligent student should learn how to distinguish the indispensable great artist and thinker, addressing the ages, from the worthy, competent journeyman speaking to his own day.

At the publishers' suggestion we have added study introductions and exploratory questions to show the student why each selection is important and how it may be read critically. In the biographical introductions and in footnotes we wished to give only information necessary to understanding or appreciation. The amount of apparatus pro-

vided for different selections is, of course, no indication of relative literary value or relative importance.

What issues have demanded inclusion? The book explores these questions: What is the meaning of the evolutionary view of life? What new meanings lie in recent scientific advance? What is the true meaning of "liberty"? Should we choose freedom or authority? Should we return to economic freedom or move toward socialism? Are economic planning and democratic freedom compatible? Why has America fought in two world wars? How can we build lastingly "the work of peace"? For what final ends of human culture do we desire such means as freedom, security, and peace? How can liberal education and the arts help us toward these ends?

We hope that others may find in these pages the enjoyment and stimulus we ourselves have found.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge our debt for valuable suggestions from colleagues of the English Department at Queens College, Professors Robert H. Ball, William Dighton, Emory Holloway, and George B. Parks, and for aid in phases of the scientific material from Dr. Mervin Oakes and Professor Donald E. Lancefield of the Biology Department and from Professors Hugo N. Swenson and J. Edmund Woods of the Physics Department. Professor Israel Baroway of the English Department, a collaborator on the first edition of *A Preface to Our Day,* was most generous in permitting us to adapt to the new edition certain pages of his original editorial material. Dr. Esther Sheldon of the English Department and Mrs. Dwight Durling gave generous and timely assistance in preparing the manuscript. The constructive suggestions of Mr. Stanley Burnshaw and Mr. Donald Ambler of The Dryden Press have affected both general plan and details of treatment. Our debts to authors and publishers for copyrighted material are acknowledged in pages that follow. To some holders of copyright we are much more than commonly indebted for the generous spirit of their cooperation.

Queens College D. L. D.
Flushing, New York E. M. S.
November, 1945 H. G. V.

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A Preface to Our Day

POST-WAR REVISED EDITION

I

PERSPECTIVES OF SCIENCE

Increasingly for nearly two centuries, natural science has been a chief formative power in our world. Its researches have revolutionized our thinking about man and the universe; the application of its discoveries has revolutionized our social environment; the changed world it has brought has revolutionized our politics and economics in both practice and theory. It follows that any "preface to our day" will almost inevitably begin with science. First, the Victorian giants, Darwin and Huxley, present the evolutionary view of life, crucial to modern thought both scientific and philosophical, and a contemporary scientist applies it with ruthless logic to man's future. More recent developments are represented by the emerging science of human personality, with its hope for healing and adjustment; by promulgation of the quantum theory, with its breath-taking implications; and by the ultimatum of released atomic energy—which has made all isolated nationalism forever obsolete.

The Struggle for Existence

CHARLES DARWIN

In many crucial ways, the 19th century determined what is happening in our day—most obviously, perhaps, in its development of an industrial civilization which raised tormenting social and economic issues. But equally important, it was a period of advancement in scientific knowledge which transformed man's understanding of his world, raising spiritual problems that still harass those who would preserve, unmodified, the religious faith of their forefathers. While physicists, chemists, and astronomers pressed forward, new sciences were being evolved: geology, for example, paleontology, embryology, bacteriology, anthropology. And the new scientific knowledge, especially in geology and paleontology (the study of fossils), seemed to demonstrate that our earth and all plant and animal life have developed during unimaginable eons. To people trained to believe the Biblical story of creation literally true, these conclusions were painfully disturbing. Not since the 16th century, it has been said, when Copernicus maintained that our earth is not the center of the universe but merely a planet revolving about its sun, has there been any scientific development which more completely revolutionized man's vision of his world and of himself than did the theory of evolution as finally disseminated during the Victorian Age.

Though the evolutionary concept is rooted in many sciences, basically in geology, no name has been associated with it more closely than that of the biologist Charles Darwin (1809–82), who, in 1859, published *The Origin of Species* to explain why he believed that there has been a gradual evolution of the myriad species of life and that a chief agent of this evolution has been "natural selection." The research which led to these conclusions had begun in the early 1830s when, a graduate of Cambridge University, Darwin had spent three years in South America. While there, Darwin was struck, at first, by the resemblances between the living creatures and the fossil remains in recent geologic strata; then, traveling, he constantly noted that specimens in neighboring regions showed close resemblances, but, at the same time, differences sufficient to mark them as separate species. Darwin wondered how these different though interrelated species could have arisen. Though by his day many scientists had endorsed the evolutionary theory, so far the conventional explanation for separate species was that each originated through a separate act of Divine Creation.

Five years later, in England, Darwin was struck by another fact: through careful selection, breeders were able to create new varieties of domestic animals. He concluded that probably the forms of species were variable. Was there in nature some selective agent which helped to breed new species?

Chapter III, *The Origin of Species*, 1859.

At this point he read the *Essay on the Principle of Population,* in which Robert Thomas Malthus maintained that the population of our earth tends to increase more rapidly than the food supply, that there is consequently a struggle for existence, and that, on the whole, the weak perish and the strong survive. If species were variable, then in the "struggle for existence" Darwin had found the selective agency which would explain the formation of new species by natural means. It soon seemed obvious that as plants and animals struggled against shortage of food and natural enemies, the individuals best adapted to environment would survive and transmit their characteristics. He concluded that out of the "struggle for existence" would come "survival of the fittest" through "natural selection." The same species would undergo different modifications in different environments until, in time, related but increasingly disparate species would be evolved. Accordingly, Darwin believed it would be possible to trace the forms of life from unicellular organisms.

In Darwin's day the science of genetics (dealing with heredity and variation) was undeveloped, and Darwin consequently knew little about heredity and nothing about the mechanism of transmitting hereditary traits, although he had based his theory on the existence of variations and their inheritability. Today, with more accurate and detailed knowledge, geneticists agree with Darwin's premise that species arise because of variations which have a hereditary basis. But they disagree with Darwin's explanation of how the characteristics are inherited. Darwin had reluctantly accepted Lamarck's theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics to explain variations due to use and disuse and other environmental factors; today, almost without exception, biologists feel that the Lamarckian theory must be rejected because of insufficient evidence. Thus they deny a detail of Darwin's hypothesis. In its place, however, chiefly as a result of actual breeding experiments and of their work on chromosomes, they have substituted another, more elaborate explanation of the origin of hereditary variations. Unlike Darwin, they also distinguish between variations with a hereditary basis and those due to environmental characteristics and not hereditary. Thus they have elaborated on a detail of the Darwinian hypothesis. Other details have been questioned, modified, or elaborated. But Darwin's major premises, his conclusions, and the general course of reasoning which led to those conclusions remain essentially unchanged. Before long, his hypothesis will probably be accepted with as little comment as is aroused by the Copernican astronomy today.

BEFORE ENTERING ON THE SUBJECT of this chapter, I must make a few preliminary remarks, to show how the struggle for existence bears on Natural Selection. It has been seen in the last chapter that amongst

organic beings in a state of nature there is some individual variability: indeed I am not aware that this has ever been disputed. It is immaterial for us whether a multitude of doubtful forms be called species or sub-species or varieties; what rank, for instance, the two or three hundred doubtful forms of British plants are entitled to hold, if the existence of any well-marked varieties be admitted. But the mere existence of individual variability and of some few well-marked varieties, though necessary as the foundation for the work, helps us but little in understanding how species arise in nature. How have all those exquisite adaptations of one part of the organisation to another part, and to the conditions of life, and of one organic being to another being, been perfected? We see these beautiful co-adaptations most plainly in the woodpecker and the mistletoe; and only a little less plainly in the humblest parasite which clings to the hairs of a quadruped or feathers of a bird; in the structure of the beetle which dives through the water; in the plumed seed which is wafted by the gentlest breeze; in short, we see beautiful adaptations everywhere and in every part of the organic world.

Again, it may be asked, how is it that varieties, which I have called incipient species, become ultimately converted into good and distinct species, which in most cases obviously differ from each other far more than do the varieties of the same species? How do those groups of species, which constitute what are called distinct genera, and which differ from each other more than do the species of the same genus, arise? All these results, as we shall more fully see in the next chapter, follow from the struggle for life. Owing to this struggle, variations, however slight, and from whatever cause proceeding, if they be in any degree profitable to the individuals of a species, in their infinitely complex relations to other organic beings and to their physical conditions of life, will tend to the preservation of such individuals, and will generally be inherited by the offspring. The offspring, also, will thus have a better chance of surviving, for, of the many individuals of any species which are periodically born, but a small number can survive. I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term Natural Selection, in order to mark its relation to man's power of selection. But the expression often used by Mr. Herbert Spencer[1] of the Survival of the Fittest is more accurate, and

[1] English philosopher, psychologist, and sociologist (1820–1903). Seven years before Darwin finished *The Origin of Species*, Spencer had published a forceful essay, "The Development Hypothesis." Spencer based his thesis on his study of Lamarck and of the geologist Lyell. Subsequently, Spencer built a vast system of philosophy on his acceptance of the theory of evolution.

is sometimes equally convenient. We have seen that man by selection can certainly produce great results, and can adapt organic beings to his own uses, through the accumulation of slight but useful variations, given to him by the hand of Nature. But Natural Selection, as we shall hereafter see, is a power incessantly ready for action, and is as immeasurably superior to man's feeble efforts, as the works of Nature are to those of Art.

We will now discuss in a little more detail the struggle for existence. In my future work this subject will be treated, as it well deserves, at greater length. The elder De Candolle and Lyell[2] have largely and philosophically shown that all organic beings are exposed to severe competition. In regard to plants, no one has treated this subject with more spirit and ability than W. Herbert,[3] Dean of Manchester, evidently the result of his great horticultural knowledge. Nothing is easier than to admit in words the truth of the universal struggle for life, or more difficult—at least I have found it so—than constantly to bear this conclusion in mind. Yet unless it be thoroughly engrained in the mind, the whole economy of nature, with every fact on distribution, rarity, abundance, extinction, and variation, will be dimly seen or quite misunderstood. We behold the face of nature bright with gladness, we often see superabundance of food; we do not see, or we forget, that the birds which are idly singing round us mostly live on insects or seeds, and are thus constantly destroying life; or we forget how largely these songsters, or their eggs, or their nestlings, are destroyed by birds and beasts of prey; we do not always bear in mind that, though food may be now superabundant, it is not so at all seasons of each recurring year.

The Term, Struggle for Existence, Used in a Large Sense

I should premise that I use this term in a large and metaphorical sense including dependence of one being on another, and including (which is more important) not only the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny. Two canine animals, in a time of dearth, may be truly said to struggle with each other which shall get food and live. But a plant on the edge of a desert is said to struggle for life against the drought, though more properly it should be said to be dependent on the moisture. A plant which annually produces a thousand seeds,

[2] Augustin P. *De Candolle* (1778–1841), Swiss botanist; Sir Charles *Lyell* (1797–1875), British geologist who began to publish his epoch-making *Principles of Geology* in 1831.

[3] William *Herbert* (1778–1847), English naturalist.

of which only one on an average comes to maturity, may be more truly said to struggle with the plants of the same and other kinds which already clothe the ground. The mistletoe is dependent on the apple and a few other trees, but can only in a far-fetched sense be said to struggle with these trees, for, if too many of these parasites grow on the same tree, it languishes and dies. But several seedling mistletoes, growing close together on the same branch, may more truly be said to struggle with each other. As the mistletoe is disseminated by birds, its existence depends on them; and it may metaphorically be said to struggle with other fruit-bearing plants, in tempting the birds to devour and thus disseminate its seeds. In these several senses, which pass into each other, I use for convenience' sake the general term of Struggle for Existence.

Geometrical Ratio of Increase

A struggle for existence inevitably follows from the high rate at which all organic beings tend to increase. Every being, which during its natural lifetime produces several eggs or seeds, must suffer destruction during some period of its life, and during some season or occasional year, otherwise, on the principle of geometrical increase, its numbers would quickly become so inordinately great that no country could support the product. Hence, as more individuals are produced than can possibly survive, there must in every case be a struggle for existence, either one individual with another of the same species, or with the individuals of distinct species, or with the physical conditions of life. It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms; for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food, and no prudential restraint from marriage. Although some species may be now increasing, more or less rapidly, in numbers, all cannot do so, for the world would not hold them.

There is no exception to the rule that every organic being naturally increases at so high a rate that, if not destroyed, the earth would soon be covered by the progeny of a single pair. Even slow-breeding man has doubled in twenty-five years, and at this rate, in less than a thousand years there would literally not be standing-room for his progeny. Linnæus[4] has calculated that if an annual plant produced only two seeds—and there is no plant so unproductive as this—and their seedlings next year produced two, and so on, then in twenty years there would be a million plants. The elephant is reckoned the slowest breeder of all known animals, and I have taken some pains to estimate

[4] Carolus *Linnæus* (1707–78), Swedish botanist.

its probable minimum rate of natural increase; it will be safest to assume that it begins breeding when thirty years old, and goes on breeding till ninety years old, bringing forth six young in the interval, and surviving till one hundred years old; if this be so, after a period of from 740 to 750 years there would be nearly nineteen million elephants alive descended from the first pair.

But we have better evidence on this subject than mere theoretical calculations, namely, the numerous recorded cases of the astonishingly rapid increase of various animals in a state of nature, when circumstances have been favourable to them during two or three following seasons. Still more striking is the evidence from our domestic animals of many kinds which have run wild in several parts of the world; if the statements of the rate of increase of slow-breeding cattle and horses in South America, and latterly in Australia, had not been well authenticated, they would have been incredible. So it is with plants; cases could be given of introduced plants which have become common throughout whole islands in a period of less than ten years. Several of the plants, such as the cardoon and a tall thistle, which are now the commonest over the wide plains of La Plata, clothing square leagues of surface almost to the exclusion of every other plant, have been introduced from Europe; and there are plants which now range in India, as I hear from Dr. Falconer, from Cape Comorin[5] to the Himalaya, which have been imported from America since its discovery. In such cases, and endless others could be given, no one supposes that the fertility of the animals or plants has been suddenly and temporarily increased in any sensible degree. The obvious explanation is that the conditions of life have been highly favourable, and that there has consequently been less destruction of the old and young, and that nearly all the young have been enabled to breed. Their geometrical ratio of increase, the result of which never fails to be surprising, simply explains their extraordinarily rapid increase and wide diffusion in their new homes.

In a state of nature almost every full-grown plant annually produces seed, and amongst animals there are very few which do not annually pair. Hence we may confidently assert that all plants and animals are tending to increase at a geometrical ratio,—that all would rapidly stock every station in which they could anyhow exist,—and that this geometrical tendency to increase must be checked by destruction at some period of life. Our familiarity with the larger domestic animals tends, I think, to mislead us: we see no great destruction falling on them,

[5] The southern extremity of India; Dr. Hugh *Falconer* (1808–65), Scotch paleontologist.

but we do not keep in mind that thousands are annually slaughtered for food, and that in a state of nature an equal number would have somehow to be disposed of.

The only difference between organisms which annually produce eggs or seeds by the thousand, and those which produce extremely few, is, that the slow-breeders would require a few more years to people, under favourable conditions, a whole district, let it be ever so large. The condor lays a couple of eggs and the ostrich a score, and yet in the same country the condor may be the more numerous of the two; the Fulmar petrel lays but one egg, yet it is believed to be the most numerous bird in the world. One fly deposits hundreds of eggs, and another, like the *hippobosca,* a single one; but this difference does not determine how many individuals of the two species can be supported in a district. A large number of eggs is of some importance to those species which depend on a fluctuating amount of food, for it allows them rapidly to increase in number. But the real importance of a large number of eggs or seeds is to make up for much destruction at some period of life; and this period in the great majority of cases is an early one. If an animal can in any way protect its own eggs or young, a small number may be produced, and yet the average stock be fully kept up; but if many eggs or young are destroyed, many must be produced or the species will become extinct. It would suffice to keep up the full number of a tree, which lived on an average for a thousand years, if a single seed were produced once in a thousand years, supposing that this seed were never destroyed, and could be ensured to germinate in a fitting place. So that, in all cases, the average number of any animal or plant depends only indirectly on the number of its eggs or seeds.

In looking at Nature, it is most necessary to keep the foregoing considerations always in mind—never to forget that every single organic being may be said to be striving to the utmost to increase in numbers; that each lives by a struggle at some period of its life; that heavy destruction inevitably falls either on the young or old, during each generation or at recurrent intervals. Lighten any check, mitigate the destruction ever so little, and the number of the species will almost instantaneously increase to any amount.

Nature of the Checks to Increase

The causes which check the natural tendency of each species to increase are most obscure. Look at the most vigorous species; by as

much as it swarms in numbers, by so much will it tend to increase still further. We know not exactly what the checks are even in a single instance. Nor will this surprise anyone who reflects how ignorant we are on this head, even in regard to mankind, although so incomparably better known than any other animal. This subject of the checks to increase has been ably treated by several authors, and I hope in a future work to discuss it at considerable length, more especially in regard to the feral animals of South America. Here I will make only a few remarks, just to recall to the reader's mind some of the chief points. Eggs or very young animals seem generally to suffer most, but this is not invariably the case. With plants there is a vast destruction of seeds, but, from some observations which I have made, it appears that the seedlings suffer most from germinating in ground already thickly stocked with other plants. Seedlings, also, are destroyed in vast numbers by various enemies; for instance, on a piece of ground three feet long and two wide, dug and cleared, and where there could be no choking from other plants, I marked all the seedlings of our native weeds as they came up, and out of 357 no less than 295 were destroyed, chiefly by slugs and insects. If turf which has long been mown, and the case would be the same with turf closely browsed by quadrupeds, be let to grow, the more vigorous plants gradually kill the less vigorous, though fully grown plants; thus out of twenty species grown on a little plot of mown turf (three feet by four) nine species perished, from the other species being allowed to grow up freely.

The amount of food for each species of course gives the extreme limit to which each can increase; but very frequently it is not the obtaining food, but the serving as prey to other animals, which determines the average number of a species. Thus there seems to be little doubt that the stock of partridges, grouse, and hares on any large estate depends chiefly on the destruction of vermin. If not one head of game were shot during the next twenty years in England, and, at the same time, if no vermin were destroyed, there would, in all probability, be less game than at present, although hundreds of thousands of game animals are now annually shot. On the other hand, in some cases, as with the elephant, none are destroyed by beasts of prey; for even the tiger in India most rarely dares to attack a young elephant protected by its dam.

Climate plays an important part in determining the average numbers of a species, and periodical seasons of extreme cold or drought seem to be the most effective of all checks. I estimated (chiefly from the greatly reduced numbers of nests in the spring) that the winter of

1854-5 destroyed four-fifths of the birds in my own grounds; and this is a tremendous destruction, when we remember that ten per cent is an extraordinarily severe mortality from epidemics with man. The action of climate seems at first sight to be quite independent of the struggle for existence; but in so far as climate chiefly acts in reducing food, it brings on the most severe struggle between the individuals, whether of the same or of distinct species, which subsist on the same kind of food. Even when climate, for instance extreme cold, acts directly, it will be the least vigorous individuals, or those which have got least food through the advancing winter, which will suffer most. When we travel from south to north, or from a damp region to a dry, we invariably see some species gradually getting rarer and rarer, and finally disappearing; and the change of climate being conspicuous, we are tempted to attribute the whole effect to its direct action. But this is a false view; we forget that each species, even where it most abounds, is constantly suffering enormous destruction at some period of its life, from enemies or from competitors for the same place and food; and if these enemies or competitors be in the least degree favoured by any slight change of climate, they will increase in numbers; and as each area is already fully stocked with inhabitants, the other species must decrease. When we travel southward and see a species decreasing in numbers, we may feel sure that the cause lies quite as much in other species being favoured, as in this one being hurt. So it is when we travel northward, but in a somewhat lesser degree, for the number of species of all kinds, and therefore of competitors, decreases northwards; hence in going northwards, or in ascending a mountain, we far oftener meet with stunted forms, due to the *directly* injurious action of climate, than we do in proceeding southward or in descending a mountain. When we reach the Arctic regions, or snow-capped summits, or absolute deserts, the struggle for life is almost exclusively with the elements.

That climate acts in main part indirectly by favouring other species, we clearly see in the prodigious number of plants which in our gardens can perfectly well endure our climate, but which never become naturalised, for they cannot compete with our native plants nor resist destruction by our native animals.

When a species, owing to highly favourable circumstances, increases inordinately in numbers in a small tract, epidemics—at least, this seems generally to occur with our game animals—often ensue; and here we have a limiting check independent of the struggle for life. But even some of these so-called epidemics appear to be due to parasitic worms, which have from some cause, possibly in part through facility of diffu-

sion amongst the crowded animals, been disproportionally favoured: and here comes in a sort of struggle between the parasite and its prey.

On the other hand, in many cases, a large stock of individuals of the same species, relatively to the numbers of its enemies, is absolutely necessary for its preservation. Thus we can easily raise plenty of corn and rape-seed, etc., in our fields, because the seeds are in great excess compared with the number of birds which feed on them; nor can the birds, though having a superabundance of food at this one season, increase in number proportionately to the supply of seed, as their numbers are checked during the winter; but anyone who has tried, knows how troublesome it is to get seed from a few wheat or other such plants in a garden: I have in this case lost every single seed. This view of the necessity of a large stock of the same species for its preservation, explains, I believe, some singular facts in nature, such as that of very rare plants being sometimes extremely abundant, in the few spots where they do exist; and that of some social plants being social, that is abounding in individuals, even on the extreme verge of their range. For in such cases, we may believe that a plant could exist only where the conditions of its life were so favourable that many could exist together, and thus save the species from utter destruction. I should add that the good effects of intercrossing, and the ill effects of close interbreeding, no doubt come into play in many of these cases; but I will not here enlarge on this subject.

Complex Relations of All Animals and Plants to Each Other in the Struggle for Existence

Many cases are on record showing how complex and unexpected are the checks and relations between organic beings, which have to struggle together in the same country. I will give only a single instance, which, though a simple one, interested me. In Staffordshire, on the estate of a relation, where I had ample means of investigation, there was a large and extremely barren heath, which had never been touched by the hand of man; but several hundred acres of exactly the same nature had been enclosed twenty-five years previously and planted with Scotch fir. The change in the native vegetation of the planted part of the heath was most remarkable, more than is generally seen in passing from one quite different soil to another; not only the proportional numbers of the heath-plants were wholly changed, but twelve species of plants (not counting grasses and carices[6]) flourished in the

[6] Plural of *carex*, a grass-like plant of the sedge family.

plantations which could not be found on the heath. The effect on the insects must have been still greater, for six insectivorous birds were very common in the plantations which were not to be seen on the heath; and the heath was frequented by two or three distinct insectivorous birds. Here we see how potent has been the effect of the introduction of a single tree, nothing whatever else having been done, with the exception of the land having been enclosed, so that cattle could not enter. But how important an element enclosure is, I plainly saw near Farnham, in Surrey. Here there are extensive heaths, with a few clumps of old Scotch firs on the distant hill-tops: within the last ten years large spaces have been enclosed, and self-sown firs are now springing up in multitudes, so close together that all cannot live. When I ascertained that these young trees had not been sown or planted, I was so much surprised at their numbers that I went to several points of view whence I could examine hundreds of acres of the unenclosed heath, and literally I could not see a single Scotch fir, except the old planted clumps. But on looking closely between the stems of the heath, I found a multitude of seedlings and little trees which had been perpetually browsed down by the cattle. In one square yard, at a point some hundred yards distant from one of the old clumps, I counted thirty-two little trees; and one of them, with twenty-six rings of growth, had, during many years, tried to raise its head above the stems of the heath, and had failed. No wonder that, as soon as the land was enclosed, it became thickly clothed with vigorously growing young firs. Yet the heath was so extremely barren and so extensive that no one would ever have imagined that cattle would have so closely and effectually searched it for food.

Here we see that cattle absolutely determine the existence of the Scotch fir; but in several parts of the world insects determine the existence of cattle. Perhaps Paraguay offers the most curious instance of this; for here neither cattle nor horses nor dogs have ever run wild, though they swarm southward and northward in a feral state; and Azara and Rengger[7] have shown that this is caused by the greater number in Paraguay of a certain fly, which lays its eggs in the navels of these animals when first born. The increase of these flies, numerous as they are, must be habitually checked by some means, probably by other parasitic insects. Hence, if certain insectivorous birds were to decrease in Paraguay, the parasitic insects would probably increase; and this would lessen the number of the navel-frequenting flies—then

[7] Felix de *Azara* (1746–1811), Spanish naturalist; Johann R. *Rengger* (1795–1832), author of *Journey to Paraguay in the Years 1818–26.*

cattle and horses would become feral, and this would certainly greatly alter (as indeed I have observed in parts of South America) the vegetation: this again would largely affect the insects; and this, as we have just seen in Staffordshire, the insectivorous birds, and so onward in ever-increasing circles of complexity. Not that under nature the relations will ever be as simple as this. Battle within battle must be continually recurring with varying success; and yet in the long-run the forces are so nicely balanced that the face of nature remains for long periods of time uniform, though assuredly the merest trifle would give the victory to one organic being over another. Nevertheless, so profound is our ignorance, and so high our presumption, that we marvel when we hear of the extinction of an organic being; and as we do not see the cause, we invoke cataclysms to desolate the world, or invent laws on the duration of the forms of life!

I am tempted to give one more instance showing how plants and animals, remote in the scale of nature, are bound together by a web of complex relations. I shall hereafter have occasion to show that the exotic *Lobelia fulgens* is never visited in my garden by insects, and consequently, from its peculiar structure, never sets a seed. Nearly all our orchidaceous plants absolutely require the visits of insects to remove their pollen-masses and thus to fertilise them. I find from experiments that humble-bees are almost indispensable to the fertilisation of the heartsease (*Viola tricolor*), for other bees do not visit this flower. I have also found that the visits of bees are necessary for the fertilisation of some kinds of clover; for instance 20 heads of Dutch clover (*Trifolium repens*) yielded 2290 seeds, but 20 other heads protected from bees produced not one. Again, 100 heads of red clover (*T. pratense*) produced 2700 seeds, but the same number of protected heads produced not a single seed. Humble-bees alone visit red clover, as other bees cannot reach the nectar. It has been suggested that moths may fertilise the clovers; but I doubt whether they could do so in the case of the red clover, from their weight not being sufficient to depress the wing-petals. Hence we may infer as highly probable that, if the whole genus of humble-bees became extinct or very rare in England, the heartsease and red clover would become very rare, or wholly disappear. The number of humble-bees in any district depends in a great measure on the number of field-mice, which destroy their combs and nests; and Col. Newman,[8] who has long attended to the habits of humble-bees, believes that "more than two-thirds of them are thus

[8] Edward *Newman* (1801–76), English naturalist.

destroyed all over England." Now the number of mice is largely dependent, as every one knows, on the number of cats; and Col. Newman says, "Near villages and small towns I have found the nests of humblebees more numerous than elsewhere, which I attribute to the number of cats that destroy the mice." Hence it is quite credible that the presence of a feline animal in large numbers in a district might determine, through the intervention first of mice and then of bees, the frequency of certain flowers in that district!

In the case of every species, many different checks, acting at different periods of life, and during different seasons or years, probably come into play; some one check or some few being generally the most potent; but all will concur in determining the average number or even the existence of the species. In some cases it can be shown that widely different checks act on the same species in different districts. When we look at the plants and bushes clothing an entangled bank, we are tempted to attribute their proportional numbers and kinds to what we call chance. But how false a view is this! Everyone has heard that when an American forest is cut down, a very different vegetation springs up; but it has been observed that ancient Indian ruins in the Southern United States, which must formerly have been cleared of trees, now display the same beautiful diversity and proportion of kinds as in the surrounding virgin forest. What a struggle must have gone on during long centuries between the several kinds of trees, each annually scattering its seeds by the thousand; what war between insect and insect—between insects, snails, and other animals with birds and beasts of prey—all striving to increase, all feeding on each other, or on the trees, their seeds and seedlings, or on the other plants which first clothed the ground and thus checked the growth of the trees! Throw up a handful of feathers, and all fall to the ground according to definite laws; but how simple is the problem where each shall fall compared to that of the action and reaction of the innumerable plants and animals which have determined, in the course of centuries, the proportional numbers and kinds of trees now growing on the old Indian ruins!

The dependency of one organic being on another, as of a parasite on its prey, lies generally between beings remote in the scale of nature. This is likewise sometimes the case with those which may be strictly said to struggle with each other for existence, as in the case of locusts and grass-feeding quadrupeds. But the struggle will almost invariably be most severe between the individuals of the same species, for they frequent the same districts, require the same food, and are exposed

to the same dangers. In the case of varieties of the same species, the struggle will generally be almost equally severe, and we sometimes see the contest soon decided: for instance, if several varieties of wheat be sown together, and the mixed seed be resown, some of the varieties which best suit the soil or climate, or are naturally the most fertile, will beat the others and so yield more seed, and will consequently in a few years supplant the other varieties. To keep up a mixed stock of even such extremely close varieties as the variously coloured sweet-peas, they must be each year harvested separately, and the seed then mixed in due proportion, otherwise the weaker kinds will steadily decrease in number and disappear. So again with the varieties of sheep: it has been asserted that certain mountain varieties will starve out other mountain varieties, so that they cannot be kept together. The same result has followed from keeping together different varieties of the medicinal leech. It may even be doubted whether the varieties of any of our domestic plants or animals have so exactly the same strength, habits, and constitution, that the original proportions of a mixed stock (crossing being prevented) could be kept up for half a dozen generations, if they were allowed to struggle together in the same manner as beings in a state of nature, and if the seed or young were not annually preserved in due proportion.

Struggle for Life Most Severe Between Individuals and Varieties of the Same Species

As the species of the same genus usually have, though by no means invariably, much similarity in habits and constitution, and always in structure, the struggle will generally be more severe between them, if they come into competition with each other, than between the species of distinct genera. We see this in the recent extension over parts of the United States of one species of swallow having caused the decrease of another species. The recent increase of the missel-thrush in parts of Scotland has caused the decrease of the song-thrush. How frequently we hear of one species of rat taking the place of another species under the most different climates! In Russia the small Asiatic cockroach has everywhere driven before it its greater congener. In Australia the imported hive-bee is rapidly exterminating the small, stingless native bee. One species of charlock has been known to supplant another species; and so in other cases. We can dimly see why the competition should be most severe between allied forms, which fill nearly the same place in the economy of nature; but probably

in no one case could we precisely say why one species has been victorious over another in the great battle of life.

A corollary of the highest importance may be deduced from the foregoing remarks, namely, that the structure of every organic being is related, in the most essential yet often hidden manner, to that of all the other organic beings, with which it comes into competition for food or residence, or from which it has to escape, or on which it preys. This is obvious in the structure of the teeth and talons of the tiger; and in that of the legs and claws of the parasite which clings to the hair on the tiger's body. But in the beautifully plumed seed of the dandelion, and in the flattened and fringed legs of the water-beetle, the relation seems at first confined to the elements of air and water. Yet the advantage of plumed seeds no doubt stands in the closest relation to the land being already thickly clothed with other plants; so that the seeds may be widely distributed and fall on unoccupied ground. In the water-beetle, the structure of its legs, so well adapted for diving, allows it to compete with other aquatic insects, to hunt for its own prey, and to escape serving as prey to other animals.

The store of nutriment laid up within the seeds of many plants seems at first sight to have no sort of relation to other plants. But from the strong growth of young plants produced from such seeds, as peas and beans, when sown in the midst of long grass, it may be suspected that the chief use of the nutriment in the seed is to favour the growth of the seedlings, while struggling with other plants growing vigorously all around.

Look at a plant in the midst of its range; why does it not double or quadruple its numbers? We know that it can perfectly well withstand a little more heat or cold, dampness or dryness, for elsewhere it ranges into slightly hotter or colder, damper or drier districts. In this case we can clearly see that if we wish in imagination to give the plant the power of increasing in number, we should have to give it some advantage over its competitors, or over the animals which prey on it. On the confines of its geographical range, a change of constitution with respect to climate would clearly be an advantage to our plant; but we have reason to believe that only a few plants or animals range so far that they are destroyed exclusively by the rigour of the climate. Not until we reach the extreme confines of life, in the Arctic regions or on the borders of an utter desert, will competition cease. The land may be extremely cold or dry, yet there will be competition between some few species, or between the individuals of the same species, for the warmest or dampest spots.

Hence we can see that when a plant or animal is placed in a new country amongst new competitors, the conditions of its life will generally be changed in an essential manner, although the climate may be exactly the same as in its former home. If its average numbers are to increase in its new home, we should have to modify it in a different way to what we should have had to do in its native country; for we should have to give it some advantage over a different set of competitors or enemies.

It is good thus to try in imagination to give any one species an advantage over another. Probably in no single instance should we know what to do. This ought to convince us of our ignorance on the mutual relations of all organic beings; a conviction as necessary as it is difficult to acquire. All that we can do, is to keep steadily in mind that each organic being is striving to increase in a geometrical ratio; that each at some period of its life, during some season of the year, during each generation or at intervals, has to struggle for life and to suffer great destruction. When we reflect on this struggle, we may console ourselves with the full belief, that the war of nature is not incessant, that no fear is felt, that death is generally prompt, and that the vigorous, the healthy, and the happy survive and multiply.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Who has not heard of Darwin's *Origin of Species?* For decades it was a storm center of discussion, and even today there remain those to whom the very name of Darwin is signal for alarm. There seems to be but one point about which men always have agreed: this work was an event of inescapable significance in human thought.

Why? Not because Darwin originated the theory of evolution. For almost thirty years before *The Origin of Species,* educated men and women had been much troubled by the mounting evidence that life had gradually developed from simple forms. Evolution had been a theme recurrent in the poetry of Tennyson and Browning since the early 1830s. And it was long ago that man had first conceived the general concept: it is mentioned in Babylonian inscriptions; it is often found in Greek, Roman, and medieval thought; and in more modern times it had been frequently discussed before Darwin.

Darwin was not original even in proposing that natural selection through the struggle for existence might explain the evolutionary process. He himself, in the introduction to his famous volume, calls attention to scientists who already had suggested this idea. And one of the dramatic stories of

science recounts how Darwin, while shaping results of his research, received from Alfred Russell Wallace, working in the South Pacific, a request that he present a paper advancing the very argument Darwin was elaborating as his own. In the end Wallace's paper and Darwin's thesis were presented conjointly, though for a while each had insisted, with stubborn generosity, that his name should be withdrawn.

The fame of Darwin's book resulted from the significance, not the novelty, of what he had said, and even more, perhaps, from the effectiveness of his presentation. Unlike Wallace (who was the first to stress the difference) Darwin had been patiently conducting his investigations for almost thirty years, and now he could present a vast array of concrete evidence. Indeed, the evidence seemed so logical and so transparently honest that for the first time multitudes of dispassionate observers were convinced. Hence we hear the whole theory of evolution referred to often, though loosely, as the "Darwinian hypothesis."

In our time, Darwin's thesis has been accepted as a basic scientific concept. And far beyond the range of the pure sciences, the influence of his work has colored modern thought. In literature, philosophy, and the social sciences we find writers habitually assuming a slow development of forms of life and social institutions, and the average person thinks in terms of "progress" and development. Nor would anyone deny that the question Darwin raised is interfused, inextricably, with most of the pressing problems of our time.

1. In *The Origin of Species* Darwin did not mention the development of man. From what forms of life did he draw his illustrations and conclusions (this chapter is typical of the whole book)? Why would his research naturally have been confined to these forms? Why was it psychologically to his advantage to avoid, in this book, even references to the "human species"?

2. Having copied the headings that subdivide this chapter, show in simple outline form, under each heading, the main points Darwin makes. How is it important to the whole argument that not all individuals in a species are exactly alike? Give three examples other than those Darwin mentions to show various ways in which living things "struggle for existence." List the "checks to increase" noted by Darwin and explain which you think would be most important in our climate. How is it possible for the presence of certain birds to alter the vegetation of a countryside? of neighborhood cats to determine the amount of clover? Why is there always a "struggle for existence"? Why is this struggle most intense among members of the same species? How, according to Darwin, does the intensity of this struggle lead to the development of new species? Why is it possible for modern geneticists to reject the theory that acquired characteristics are inherited and nevertheless to agree with Darwin's conclusions (see biographical introduction)? Summarize the main points of Darwin's argument.

What adjectives, in your opinion, would best describe the organization of the chapter as a whole?

3. How many paragraphs of the last four main sections of this chapter lack concrete illustrations? Why would Darwin have been less (or more) effective if he had omitted some of his examples?

4. Though in its style this chapter is objective rather than subjective, it nevertheless reflects certain qualities of Darwin's personality. What evidence indicates whether he was accurate or inaccurate? arrogant or modest? candid or otherwise? logical or illogical? imaginative or unimaginative? interested primarily in fact or in theory? Account for people's saying that Darwin makes you "think and see and feel as he does."

5. In Darwin's discussion, *physical* "fitness" leads to survival and transmission of *physical characteristics*. In modern economic competition, what factors, in your opinion, contribute most to success or possibly even "survival"? As a result of the economic struggle, what gains do those who prove most "fit" transmit to their offspring? What, then, are the most essential differences between the struggle Darwin describes and the one we witness in modern society? Why is it a mistake to transfer to modern economic life Darwin's thesis of the "survival of the fittest"?

6. What characteristics of mankind, in your opinion, most need to be developed to produce better human beings? Toward this end, may the survival and development of the underprivileged child be as important as those of the child of more fortunate parents? Why or why not? Why would you consider it correct or mistaken to say that the "fittest" will survive if we permit or encourage unrestricted competition (the ideal of laissez-faire) in the economic order?

On a Piece of Chalk

THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY

After *The Origin of Species* was published, the theory of evolution found a champion in Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–95), an eminent young British biologist who, two years after Darwin's work appeared, startled his contemporaries by applying the evolutionary hypothesis to man. The illustrative material in Darwin's book had been drawn from plants and animals, the forms of life on which Darwin could experiment; as to the possible development of humanity, he had merely observed that his theory would probably throw light "on the origin of man and his history." Soon his friend Huxley, a specialist in vertebrate anatomy, began to compare the skeletons and skulls of man and the apes, and within two years was announcing that there was "less difference between man and the higher apes than between the higher apes and inferior animals." From these observations Huxley concluded that both man and the higher apes could be classified in the Order of Primates and that they probably had a common ancestor. Ten years later this conclusion was endorsed by Darwin, who used Huxley's data as part of the evidence drawn from many sources to demonstrate that the higher apes and human beings belong to closely related species. In the meantime Huxley had further outraged his contemporaries by his lecture "On the Physical Basis of Life" (1868), in which he popularized the recent discovery that all life has a common characteristic, the living substance "protoplasm." Expressed in the language of modern scientists, the concept is merely that all life has a bio-chemical basis. Huxley's contemporaries charged indignantly that, not content with making them kin to apes, Huxley now linked them with molecules.

Though he was thus a distinguished scientist who did some important research, Huxley is remembered primarily for his service as the apostle of 19th-century science, particularly of evolution. As a young man, he had followed with intense interest the amazing achievements of his contemporaries: his age, he once remarked, would be remembered as "a second Renaissance." He realized that the new knowledge was creating a new "scientific vision" which was meeting opposition because it seemed to contradict some of the teachings of Christian theology. The new geology, for example, had been anathematized by theologians. In 1859 the Darwinian hypothesis naturally became the special target of attack. At this point Huxley was aroused. He was convinced that of all theories about the development of life, Darwin's was the most tenable. And, perhaps more important, he was also convinced that the average man cannot live intelli-

Lecture delivered in 1868. By permission of D. Appleton-Century Company.

gently unless he accepts whatever information science can offer him as guidance in comprehending his world. He began by conducting classes for London workingmen; and thereafter, for forty years, he continued to write and to lecture as "Darwin's bull-dog" and "prophet of science," his belief in education and his passion for truth leading him constantly to challenge those whose opposition to new scientific facts and theories seemed to him rooted in fear, prejudice, and ignorance. Out of the "gigantic movement" represented by the science of his day there would come, he sometimes hoped, a reorganization of society. "But this reorganization," he said, "will be the work of generations of men, and those who further it most will be those who teach man to rest in no lie, and to rest in no verbal delusions. I may be able to help a little in these directions; perhaps I have helped already."

IF A WELL WERE SUNK at our feet in the midst of the city of Norwich, the diggers would very soon find themselves at work in that white substance almost too soft to be called rock, with which we are all familiar as "chalk."

Not only here, but over the whole county of Norfolk, the well-sinker might carry his shaft down many hundred feet without coming to the end of the chalk; and, on the sea-coast, where the waves have pared away the face of the land which breasts them, the scarped faces of the high cliffs are often wholly formed of the same material. Northward, the chalk may be followed as far as Yorkshire; on the south coast it appears abruptly in the picturesque western bays of Dorset, and breaks into the Needles of the Isle of Wight; while on the shores of Kent it supplies that long line of white cliffs to which England owes her name of Albion.

Were the thin soil which covers it all washed away, a curved band of white chalk, here broader and there narrower, might be followed diagonally across England from Lulworth in Dorset, to Flamborough Head in Yorkshire—a distance of over 280 miles as the crow flies. From this band to the North Sea, on the east, and the Channel, on the south, the chalk is largely hidden by other deposits; but, except in the Weald of Kent and Sussex, it enters into the very foundation of all the south-eastern counties.

Attaining, as it does in some places, a thickness of more than a thousand feet, the English chalk must be admitted to be a mass of considerable magnitude. Nevertheless, it covers but an insignificant

portion of the whole area occupied by the chalk formation of the globe, much of which has the same general characters as ours, and is found in detached patches, some less, and others more extensive, than the English.

Chalk occurs in north-west Ireland; it stretches over a large part of France—the chalk which underlies Paris being, in fact, a continuation of that of the London basin; it runs through Denmark and Central Europe, and extends southward to North Africa; while eastward, it appears in the Crimea and in Syria, and may be traced as far as the shores of the Sea of Aral, in Central Asia.

If all the points at which true chalk occurs were circumscribed, they would lie within an irregular oval about 3,000 miles in long diameter—the area of which would be as great as that of Europe, and would many times exceed that of the largest existing inland sea—the Mediterranean.

Thus the chalk is no unimportant element in the masonry of the earth's crust, and it impresses a peculiar stamp, varying with the conditions to which it is exposed, on the scenery of the districts in which it occurs. The undulating downs and rounded coombs, covered with sweet-grassed turf, of our inland chalk country, have a peacefully domestic and mutton-suggesting prettiness, but can hardly be called either grand or beautiful. But on our southern coasts, the wall-sided cliffs, many hundred feet high, with vast needles and pinnacles standing out in the sea, sharp and solitary enough to serve as perches for the wary cormorant, confer a wonderful beauty and grandeur upon the chalk headlands. And, in the East, chalk has its share in the formation of some of the most venerable of mountain ranges, such as the Lebanon.

What is this wide-spread component of the surface of the earth? and whence did it come?

You may think this no very hopeful inquiry. You may not unnaturally suppose that the attempt to solve such problems as these can lead to no result, save that of entangling the inquirer in vague speculations, incapable of refutation and of verification. If such were really the case, I should have selected some other subject than a "piece of chalk" for my discourse. But, in truth, after much deliberation, I have been unable to think of any topic which would so well enable me to lead you to see how solid is the foundation upon which some of the most startling conclusions of physical science rest.

A great chapter of the history of the world is written in the chalk. Few passages in the history of man can be supported by such an

overwhelming mass of direct and indirect evidence as that which testifies to the truth of the fragment of the history of the globe, which I hope to enable you to read, with your own eyes, to-night.

Let me add, that few chapters of human history have a more profound significance for ourselves. I weigh my words well when I assert, that the man who should know the true history of the bit of chalk which every carpenter carries about in his breeches-pocket, though ignorant of all other history, is likely, if he will think his knowledge out to its ultimate results, to have a truer, and therefore a better, conception of this wonderful universe, and of man's relation to it, than the most learned student who is deep-read in the records of humanity and ignorant of those of nature.

The language of the chalk is not hard to learn, not nearly so hard as Latin, if you only want to get at the broad features of the story it has to tell; and I propose that we now set to work to spell that story out together.

We all know that if we "burn" chalk the result is quicklime. Chalk, in fact, is a compound of carbonic acid gas and lime, and when you make it very hot the carbonic acid flies away and the lime is left.

By this method of procedure we see the lime, but we do not see the carbonic acid. If, on the other hand, you were to powder a little chalk and drop it into a good deal of strong vinegar, there would be a great bubbling and fizzing, and, finally, a clear liquid, in which no sign of chalk would appear. Here you see the carbonic acid in the bubbles; the lime, dissolved in the vinegar, vanishes from sight. There are a great many other ways of showing that chalk is essentially nothing but carbonic acid and quicklime. Chemists enunciate the result of all the experiments which prove this, by stating that chalk is almost wholly composed of "carbonate of lime."

It is desirable for us to start from the knowledge of this fact, though it may not seem to help us very far towards what we seek. For carbonate of lime is a widely-spread substance, and is met with under very various conditions. All sorts of limestones are composed of more or less pure carbonate of lime. The crust which is often deposited by waters which have drained through limestone rocks, in the form of what are called stalagmites and stalactites, is carbonate of lime. Or, to take a more familiar example, the fur on the inside of a tea-kettle is carbonate of lime; and, for anything chemistry tells us to the contrary, the chalk might be a kind of gigantic fur upon the bottom of the earth-kettle, which is kept pretty hot below.

Let us try another method of making the chalk tell us its own

history. To the unassisted eye chalk looks simply like a very loose and open kind of stone. But it is possible to grind a slice of chalk down so thin that you can see through it—until it is thin enough, in fact, to be examined with any magnifying power that may be thought desirable. A thin slice of the fur of a kettle might be made in the same way. If it were examined microscopically, it would show itself to be a more or less distinctly laminated[1] mineral substance, and nothing more.

But the slice of chalk presents a totally different appearance when placed under the microscope. The general mass of it is made up of very minute granules; but, imbedded in this matrix, are innumerable bodies, some smaller and some larger, but, on a rough average, not more than a hundredth of an inch in diameter, having a well-defined shape and structure. A cubic inch of some specimens of chalk may contain hundreds of thousands of these bodies, compacted together with incalculable millions of the granules.

The examination of a transparent slice gives a good notion of the manner in which the components of the chalk are arranged, and of their relative proportions. But, by rubbing up some chalk with a brush in water and then pouring off the milky fluid, so as to obtain sediments of different degrees of fineness, the granules and the minute rounded bodies may be pretty well separated from one another, and submitted to microscopic examination, either as opaque or as transparent objects. By combining the views obtained in these various methods, each of the rounded bodies may be proved to be a beautifully-constructed calcareous[2] fabric, made up of a number of chambers, communicating freely with one another. The chambered bodies are of various forms. One of the commonest is something like a badly-grown raspberry, being formed of a number of nearly globular chambers of different sizes congregated together. It is called *Globigerina,* and some specimens of chalk consist of little else than *Globigerinæ.*

Let us fix our attention upon the *Globigerina.* It is the spoor of the game we are tracking. If we can learn what it is and what are the conditions of its existence we shall see our way to the origin and past history of the chalk.

A suggestion which may naturally enough present itself is, that these curious bodies are the result of some process of aggregation which has taken place in the carbonate of lime; that, just as in winter, the rime on our windows simulates the most delicate and elegantly arborescent foliage—proving that the mere mineral, water, may, under certain con-

[1] In thin, flaky layers.
[2] Consisting of carbonate of lime.

ditions, assume the outward form of organic bodies—so this mineral substance, carbonate of lime, hidden away in the bowels of the earth, has taken the shape of these chambered bodies. I am not raising a merely fanciful and unreal objection. Very learned men, in former days, have even entertained the notion that all the formed things found in rocks are of this nature; and if no such conception is at present held to be admissible, it is because long and varied experience has now shown that mineral matter never does assume the form and structure we find in fossils. If any one were to try to persuade you that an oyster-shell (which is also chiefly composed of carbonate of lime) had crystallised out of sea-water, I suppose you would laugh at the absurdity. Your laughter would be justified by the fact that all experience tends to show that oyster-shells are formed by the agency of oysters, and in no other way. And if there were no better reasons, we should be justified, on like grounds, in believing that *Globigerina* is not the product of anything but vital activity.

Happily, however, better evidence in proof of the organic nature of the *Globigerinæ* than that of analogy is forthcoming. It so happens that calcareous skeletons, exactly similar to the *Globigerinæ* of the chalk, are being formed, at the present moment, by minute living creatures, which flourish in multitudes, literally more numerous than the sands of the sea-shore, over a large extent of that part of the earth's surface which is covered by the ocean.

The history of the discovery of these living *Globigerinæ,* and of the part which they play in rock building, is singular enough. It is a discovery which, like others of no less scientific importance, has arisen, incidentally, out of work devoted to very different and exceedingly practical interests.

When men first took to the sea, they speedily learned to look out for shoals and rocks; and the more the burthen of their ships increased, the more imperatively necessary it became for sailors to ascertain with precision the depth of the waters they traversed. Out of this necessity grew the use of the lead and sounding line; and, ultimately, marine-surveying, which is the recording of the form of coasts and of the depth of the sea, as ascertained by the sounding-lead, upon charts.

At the same time, it became desirable to ascertain and to indicate the nature of the sea-bottom, since this circumstance greatly affects its goodness as holding ground for anchors. Some ingenious tar, whose name deserves a better fate than the oblivion into which it has fallen, attained this object by "arming" the bottom of the lead with a lump

of grease, to which more or less of the sand or mud, or broken shells, as the case might be, adhered, and was brought to the surface. But, however well adapted such an apparatus might be for rough nautical purposes, scientific accuracy could not be expected from the armed lead, and to remedy its defects (especially when applied to sounding in great depths) Lieut. Brooke, of the American Navy, some years ago invented a most ingenious machine, by which a considerable portion of the superficial layer of the sea-bottom can be scooped out and brought up from any depth to which the lead descends.

In 1853, Lieut. Brooke obtained mud from the bottom of the North Atlantic, between Newfoundland and the Azores, at a depth of more than 10,000 feet, or two miles, by the help of this sounding apparatus. The specimens were sent for examination to Ehrenberg of Berlin, and to Bailey of West Point, and those able microscopists found that this deep-sea mud was almost entirely composed of the skeletons of living organisms—the greater proportion of these being just like the *Globigerinæ* already known to occur in the chalk.

Thus far, the work had been carried on simply in the interests of science, but Lieut. Brooke's method of sounding acquired a high commercial value, when the enterprise of laying down the telegraph-cable between this country and the United States was undertaken. For it became a matter of immense importance to know, not only the depth of the sea over the whole line along which the cable was to be laid, but the exact nature of the bottom, so as to guard against chances of cutting or fraying the strands of that costly rope. The Admiralty consequently ordered Captain Dayman, an old friend and shipmate of mine, to ascertain the depth over the whole line of the cable, and to bring back specimens of the bottom. In former days, such a command as this might have sounded very much like one of the impossible things which the young prince in the Fairy Tales is ordered to do before he can obtain the hand of the princess. However, in the months of June and July, 1857, my friend performed the task assigned to him with great expedition and precision, without, so far as I know, having met with any reward of that kind. The specimens of Atlantic mud which he procured were sent to me to be examined and reported upon.

The result of all these operations is, that we know the contours and the nature of the surface-soil covered by the North Atlantic for a distance of 1,700 miles from east to west, as well as we know that of any part of the dry land.

It is a prodigious plain—one of the widest and most even plains

in the world. If the sea were drained off, you might drive a waggon all the way from Valentia, on the west coast of Ireland, to Trinity Bay, in Newfoundland. And, except upon one sharp incline about 200 miles from Valentia, I am not quite sure that it would even be necessary to put the skid on, so gentle are the ascents and descents upon that long route. From Valentia the road would lie down-hill for about 200 miles to the point at which the bottom is now covered by 1,700 fathoms of sea-water. Then would come the central plain, more than a thousand miles wide, the inequalities of the surface of which would be hardly perceptible, though the depth of water upon it now varies from 10,000 to 15,000 feet; and there are places in which Mont Blanc might be sunk without showing its peak above water. Beyond this, the ascent on the American side commences, and gradually leads, for about 300 miles, to the Newfoundland shore.

Almost the whole of the bottom of this central plain (which extends for many hundred miles in a north and south direction) is covered by a fine mud, which, when brought to the surface, dries into a greyish-white friable[3] substance. You can write with this on a blackboard, if you are so inclined; and, to the eye, it is quite like very soft, greyish chalk. Examined chemically, it proves to be composed almost wholly of carbonate of lime; and if you make a section of it, in the same way as that of the piece of chalk was made, and view it with the microscope, it presents innumerable *Globigerinæ* imbedded in a granular matrix.

Thus this deep-sea mud is substantially chalk. I say substantially, because there are a good many minor differences; but as these have no bearing on the question immediately before us,—which is the nature of the *Globigerinæ* of the chalk,—it is unnecessary to speak of them.

Globigerinæ of every size, from the smallest to the largest, are associated together in the Atlantic mud, and the chambers of many are filled by a soft animal matter. This soft substance is, in fact, the remains of the creature to which the *Globigerina* shell, or rather skeleton, owes its existence—and which is an animal of the simplest imaginable description. It is, in fact, a mere particle of living jelly, without defined parts of any kind—without a mouth, nerves, muscles, or distinct organs, and only manifesting its vitality to ordinary observation by thrusting out and retracting from all parts of its surface, long filamentous processes, which serve for arms and legs. Yet this amorphous particle, devoid of everything which in the higher animals

[3] Easily crumbled or pulverized.

we call organs, is capable of feeding, growing, and multiplying; of separating from the ocean the small proportion of carbonate of lime which is dissolved in sea-water; and of building up that substance into a skeleton for itself, according to a pattern which can be imitated by no other known agency.

The notion that animals can live and flourish in the sea, at the vast depths from which apparently living *Globigerinæ* have been brought up, does not agree very well with our usual conceptions respecting the conditions of animal life; and it is not so absolutely impossible as it might at first sight appear to be, that the *Globigerinæ* of the Atlantic sea-bottom do not live and die where they are found.

As I have mentioned, the soundings from the great Atlantic plain are almost entirely made up of *Globigerinæ,* with the granules which have been mentioned and some few other calcareous shells; but a small percentage of the chalky mud—perhaps at most some five per cent of it—is of a different nature, and consists of shells and skeletons composed of silex, or pure flint. These silicious bodies belong partly to the lowly vegetable organisms which are called *Diatomaceæ,* and partly to the minute, and extremely simple, animals, termed *Radiolariæ*. It is quite certain that these creatures do not live at the bottom of the ocean, but at its surface—where they may be obtained in prodigious numbers by the use of a properly constructed net. Hence it follows that these silicious organisms, though they are not heavier than the lightest dust, must have fallen, in some cases, through fifteen thousand feet of water, before they reached their final resting-place on the ocean floor. And, considering how large a surface these bodies expose in proportion to their weight, it is probable that they occupy a great length of time in making their burial journey from the surface of the Atlantic to the bottom.

But if the *Radiolariæ* and Diatoms are thus rained upon the bottom of the sea, from the superficial layer of its waters in which they pass their lives, it is obviously possible that the *Globigerinæ* may be similarly derived; and if they were so, it would be much more easy to understand how they obtain their supply of food than it is at present. Nevertheless, the positive and negative evidence all points the other way. The skeletons of the full-grown, deep-sea *Globigerinæ* are so remarkably solid and heavy in proportion to their surface as to seem little fitted for floating; and, as a matter of fact, they are not to be found along with the Diatoms and *Radiolariæ* in the uppermost stratum of the open ocean.

It has been observed, again, that the abundance of *Globigerinæ,*

in proportion to other organisms, of like kind, increases with the depth of the sea; and that deep-water *Globigerinæ* are larger than those which live in shallower parts of the sea; and such facts negative the supposition that these organisms have been swept by currents from the shallows into the deeps of the Atlantic.

It therefore seems to be hardly doubtful that these wonderful creatures live and die at the depths in which they are found.*

However, the important points for us are, that the living *Globigerinæ* are exclusively marine animals, the skeletons of which abound at the bottom of deep seas; and that there is not a shadow of reason for believing that the habits of the *Globigerinæ* of the chalk differed from those of the existing species. But if this be true, there is no escaping the conclusion that the chalk itself is the dried mud of an ancient deep sea.

In working over the soundings collected by Captain Dayman, I was surprised to find that many of what I have called the "granules" of that mud, were not, as one might have been tempted to think at first, the mere powder and waste of *Globigerinæ,* but that they had a definite form and size. I termed these bodies *"coccoliths,"* and doubted their organic nature. Dr. Wallich[4] verified my observation, and added the interesting discovery that, not unfrequently, bodies similar to these "coccoliths" were aggregated together into spheroids, which he termed *"coccospheres."* So far as we knew, these bodies, the nature of which is extremely puzzling and problematical, were peculiar to the Atlantic soundings.

But, a few years ago, Mr. Sorby,[5] in making a careful examination of the chalk by means of thin sections and otherwise, observed, as Ehrenberg had done before him, that much of its granular basis possesses a definite form. Comparing these formed particles with those in the Atlantic soundings, he found the two to be identical; and thus proved that the chalk, like the soundings, contains these mysterious

* During the cruise of H.M.S. *Bull-dog,* commanded by Sir Leopold M'Clintock, in 1860, living star-fish were brought up, clinging to the lowest part of the sounding-line, from a depth of 1,260 fathoms, midway between Cape Farewell, in Greenland, and the Rockall banks. Dr. Wallich ascertained that the sea-bottom at this point consisted of the ordinary *Globigerina* ooze, and that the stomachs of the star-fishes were full of *Globigerinæ.* This discovery removes all objections to the existence of living *Globigerinæ* at great depths, which are based upon the supposed difficulty of maintaining animal life under such conditions; and it throws the burden of proof upon those who object to the supposition that the *Globigerinæ* live and die where they are found.

[4] George C. *Wallich* (1815–99), English scientist of whose work during the cruise of H.M.S. *Bull-dog* Huxley speaks.

[5] Henry C. *Sorby* (1826–1908), English geologist and petrographer who "opened a new and vast field for petrography by means of the microscope."

coccoliths and coccospheres. Here was a further and most interesting confirmation, from internal evidence, of the essential identity of the chalk with modern deep-sea mud. *Globigerinæ,* coccoliths, and coccospheres are found as the chief constituents of both, and testify to the general similarity of the conditions under which both have been formed.*

The evidence furnished by the hewing, facing, and superposition of the stones of the Pyramids, that these structures were built by men, has no greater weight than the evidence that the chalk was built by *Globigerinæ;* and the belief that those ancient pyramid-builders were terrestrial and air-breathing creatures like ourselves, is not better based than the conviction that the chalk-makers lived in the sea.

But as our belief in the building of the Pyramids by men is not only grounded on the internal evidence afforded by these structures, but gathers strength from multitudinous collateral proofs, and is clinched by the total absence of any reason for a contrary belief; so the evidence drawn from the *Globigerinæ* that the chalk is an ancient sea-bottom, is fortified by innumerable independent lines of evidence; and our belief in the truth of the conclusion to which all positive testimony tends, receives the like negative justification from the fact that no other hypothesis has a shadow of foundation.

It may be worth while briefly to consider a few of these collateral proofs that the chalk was deposited at the bottom of the sea.

The great mass of the chalk is composed, as we have seen, of the skeletons of *Globigerinæ,* and other simple organisms, imbedded in granular matter. Here and there, however, this hardened mud of the ancient sea reveals the remains of higher animals which have lived and died, and left their hard parts in the mud, just as the oysters die and leave their shells behind them, in the mud of the present seas.

There are, at the present day, certain groups of animals which are never found in fresh waters, being unable to live anywhere but in the sea. Such are the corals; those corallines which are called *Polyzoa;* those creatures which fabricate the lamp-shells, and are called *Brachiopoda;* the pearly *Nautilus,* and all animals allied to it; and all the forms of sea-urchins and starfishes.

Not only are all these creatures confined to salt water at the present day; but, so far as our records of the past go, the conditions of their existence have been the same: hence, their occurrence in any deposit

*I have recently traced out the development of the "coccoliths" from a diameter of 1/7000th of an inch up to their largest size (which is about 1/1600th), and no longer doubt that they are produced by independent organisms, which, like the *Globigerinæ,* live and die at the bottom of the sea.

is as strong evidence as can be obtained, that that deposit was formed in the sea. Now the remains of animals of all the kinds which have been enumerated, occur in the chalk, in greater or less abundance; while not one of those forms of shell-fish which are characteristic of fresh water has yet been observed in it.

When we consider that the remains of more than three thousand distinct species of aquatic animals have been discovered among the fossils of the chalk, that the great majority of them are of such forms as are now met with only in the sea, and that there is no reason to believe that any one of them inhabited fresh water—the collateral evidence that the chalk represents an ancient sea-bottom acquires as great force as the proof derived from the nature of the chalk itself. I think you will now allow that I did not overstate my case when I asserted that we have as strong grounds for believing that all the vast area of dry land, at present occupied by the chalk, was once at the bottom of the sea, as we have for any matter of history whatever; while there is no justification for any other belief.

No less certain it is that the time during which the countries we now call south-east England, France, Germany, Poland, Russia, Egypt, Arabia, Syria were more or less completely covered by a deep sea, was of considerable duration.

We have already seen that the chalk is, in places, more than a thousand feet thick. I think you will agree with me, that it must have taken some time for the skeletons of animalculæ of a hundredth of an inch in diameter to heap up such a mass as that. I have said that throughout the thickness of the chalk the remains of other animals are scattered. These remains are often in the most exquisite state of preservation. The valves of the shell-fishes are commonly adherent; the long spines of some of the sea-urchins, which would be detached by the smallest jar, often remain in their places. In a word, it is certain that these animals have lived and died when the place which they now occupy was the surface of as much of the chalk as had then been deposited; and that each has been covered up by the layer of *Globigerina* mud, upon which the creatures imbedded a little higher up have, in like manner, lived and died. But some of these remains prove the existence of reptiles of vast size in the chalk sea. These lived their time, and had their ancestors and descendants, which assuredly implies time, reptiles being of slow growth.

There is more curious evidence, again, that the process of covering up, or, in other words, the deposit of *Globigerina* skeletons, did not

go very fast. It is demonstrable that an animal of the cretaceous[6] sea might die, that its skeleton might lie uncovered upon the sea-bottom long enough to lose all its outward coverings and appendages by putrefaction; and that, after this had happened, another animal might attach itself to the dead and naked skeleton, might grow to maturity, and might itself die before the calcareous mud had buried the whole.

Cases of this kind are admirably described by Sir Charles Lyell. He speaks of the frequency with which geologists find in the chalk a fossilised sea-urchin, to which is attached the lower valve of a *Crania*. This is a kind of shell-fish, with a shell composed of two pieces, of which, as in the oyster, one is fixed and the other free.

> The upper valve is almost invariably wanting, though occasionally found in a perfect state of preservation in the white chalk at some distance. In this case, we see clearly that the sea-urchin first lived from youth to age, then died and lost its spines, which were carried away. Then the young *Crania* adhered to the bared shell, grew and perished in its turn; after which, the upper valve was separated from the lower, before the Echinus became enveloped in chalky mud.

A specimen in the Museum of Practical Geology in London, still further prolongs the period which must have elapsed between the death of the sea-urchin, and its burial by the *Globigerinæ*. For the outward face of the valve of a *Crania,* which is attached to a sea-urchin (*Micraster*), is itself overrun by an incrusting coralline, which spreads thence over more or less of the surface of the sea-urchin. It follows that, after the upper valve of the *Crania* fell off, the surface of the attached valve must have remained exposed long enough to allow of the growth of the whole coralline, since corallines do not live imbedded in mud.

The progress of knowledge may one day enable us to deduce from such facts as these the maximum rate at which the chalk can have accumulated, and thus to arrive at the minimum duration of the chalk period. Suppose that the valve of the *Crania* upon which a coralline has fixed itself in the way just described, is so attached to the sea-urchin that no part of it is more than an inch above the face upon which the sea-urchin rests. Then, as the coralline could not have fixed itself, if the *Crania* had been covered up with chalk mud, and could not have lived had itself been so covered, it follows, that an inch of chalk mud could not have accumulated within the time be-

[6] Having the qualities of, or abounding in, chalk.

tween the death and decay of the soft parts of the sea-urchin and the growth of the coralline to the full size which it has attained. If the decay of the soft parts of the sea-urchin; the attachment, growth to maturity, and decay of the *Crania;* and the subsequent attachment and growth of the coralline, took a year (which is a low estimate enough), the accumulation of the inch of chalk must have taken more than a year: and the deposit of a thousand feet of chalk must, consequently, have taken more than twelve thousand years.

The foundation of all this calculation is, of course, a knowledge of the length of time the *Crania* and the coralline needed to attain their full size; and, on this head, precise knowledge is at present wanting. But there are circumstances which tend to show that nothing like an inch of chalk has accumulated during the life of a *Crania;* and, on any probable estimate of the length of that life, the chalk period must have had a much longer duration than that thus roughly assigned to it.

Thus, not only is it certain that the chalk is the mud of an ancient sea-bottom; but it is no less certain, that the chalk sea existed during an extremely long period, though we may not be prepared to give a precise estimate of the length of that period in years. The relative duration is clear, though the absolute duration may not be definable. The attempt to affix any precise date to the period at which the chalk sea began, or ended, its existence, is baffled by difficulties of the same kind. But the relative age of the cretaceous epoch may be determined with as great ease and certainty as the long duration of that epoch.

You will have heard of the interesting discoveries recently made, in various parts of Western Europe, of flint implements, obviously worked into shape by human hands, under circumstances which show conclusively that man is a very ancient denizen of these regions.

It has been proved that the whole populations of Europe, whose existence has been revealed to us in this way, consisted of savages, such as the Esquimaux are now; that, in the country which is now France, they hunted the reindeer, and were familiar with the ways of the mammoth and the bison. The physical geography of France was in those days different from what it is now—the river Somme, for instance, having cut its bed a hundred feet deeper between that time and this; and, it is probable, that the climate was more like that of Canada or Siberia, than that of Western Europe.

The existence of these people is forgotten even in the traditions of the oldest historical nations. The name and fame of them had utterly vanished until a few years back; and the amount of physical change

which has been effected since their day renders it more than probable that, venerable as are some of the historical nations, the workers of the chipped flints of Hoxne or of Amiens[7] are to them, as they are to us, in point of antiquity.

'But, if we assign to these hoar relics of long-vanished generations of men the greatest age that can possibly be claimed for them, they are not older than the drift, or boulder clay, which, in comparison with the chalk, is but a very juvenile deposit. You need go no further than your own sea-board for evidence of this fact. At one of the most charming spots on the coast of Norfolk, Cromer, you will see the boulder clay forming a vast mass, which lies upon the chalk, and must consequently have come into existence after it. Huge boulders of chalk are, in fact, included in the clay, and have evidently been brought to the position they now occupy by the same agency as that which has planted blocks of syenite from Norway side by side with them.

The chalk, then, is certainly older than the boulder clay. If you ask how much, I will again take you no further than the same spot upon your own coasts for evidence. I have spoken of the boulder clay and drift as resting upon the chalk. That is not strictly true. Interposed between the chalk and the drift is a comparatively insignificant layer, containing vegetable matter. But that layer tells a wonderful history. It is full of stumps of trees standing as they grew. Fir-trees are there with their cones, and hazel-bushes with their nuts; there stand the stools of oak and yew trees, beeches and alders. Hence this stratum is appropriately called the "forest-bed."

It is obvious that the chalk must have been upheaved and converted into dry land, before the timber trees could grow upon it. As the boles of some of these trees are from two to three feet in diameter, it is no less clear that the dry land thus formed remained in the same condition for long ages. And not only do the remains of stately oaks and well-grown firs testify to the duration of this condition of things, but additional evidence to the same effect is afforded by the abundant remains of elephants, rhinoceroses, hippopotamuses, and other great wild beasts, which it has yielded to the zealous search of such men as the Rev. Mr. Gunn.[8]

When you look at such a collection as he has formed, and bethink you that these elephantine bones did veritably carry their owners

[7] Deposits of the chipped flint weapons of prehistoric (paleolithic) man were discovered at *Hoxne*, in Suffolk, England, and at *Amiens*, in northern France.

[8] Robert K. *Gunn* (1808–81), Australian naturalist.

about, and these great grinders crunch, in the dark woods of which the forest-bed is now the only trace, it is impossible not to feel that they are as good evidence of the lapse of time as the annual rings of the tree stumps.

Thus there is a writing upon the wall of cliffs at Cromer, and whoso runs may read it. It tells us, with an authority which cannot be impeached, that the ancient sea-bed of the chalk sea was raised up, and remained dry land, until it was covered with forest, stocked with the great game the spoils of which have rejoiced your geologists. How long it remained in that condition cannot be said; but "the whirligig of time brought its revenges" in those days as in these. That dry land, with the bones and teeth of generations of long-lived elephants, hidden away among the gnarled roots and dry leaves of its ancient trees, sank gradually to the bottom of the icy sea, which covered it with huge masses of drift and boulder clay. Sea-beasts, such as the walrus, now restricted to the extreme north, paddled about where birds had twittered among the topmost twigs of the fir-trees. How long this state of things endured we know not, but at length it came to an end. The upheaved glacial mud hardened into the soil of modern Norfolk. Forests grew once more, the wolf and the beaver replaced the reindeer and the elephant; and at length what we call the history of England dawned.

Thus you have, within the limits of your own county, proof that the chalk can justly claim a very much greater antiquity than even the oldest physical traces of mankind. But we may go further and demonstrate, by evidence of the same authority as that which testifies to the existence of the father of men, that the chalk is vastly older than Adam himself.

The Book of Genesis informs us that Adam, immediately upon his creation, and before the appearance of Eve, was placed in the Garden of Eden. The problem of the geographical position of Eden has greatly vexed the spirits of the learned in such matters, but there is one point respecting which, so far as I know, no commentator has ever raised a doubt. This is, that of the four rivers which are said to run out of it, Euphrates and Hiddekel are identical with the rivers now known by the names of Euphrates and Tigris.

But the whole country in which these mighty rivers take their origin, and through which they run, is composed of rocks which are either of the same age as the chalk, or of later date. So that the chalk must not only have been formed, but, after its formation, the time required for the deposit of these later rocks, and for their upheaval into dry

land, must have elapsed, before the smallest brook which feeds the swift stream of "the great river, the river of Babylon," began to flow.

Thus evidence which cannot be rebutted, and which need not be strengthened, though if time permitted I might indefinitely increase its quantity, compels you to believe that the earth, from the time of the chalk to the present day, has been the theatre of a series of changes as vast in their amount, as they were slow in their progress. The area on which we stand has been first sea and then land, for at least four alternations; and has remained in each of these conditions for a period of great length.

Nor have these wonderful metamorphoses of sea into land, and of land into sea, been confined to one corner of England. During the chalk period, or "cretaceous epoch," not one of the present great physical features of the globe was in existence. Our great mountain ranges, Pyrenees, Alps, Himalayas, Andes, have all been upheaved since the chalk was deposited and the cretaceous sea flowed over the sites of Sinai and Ararat.

All this is certain, because rocks of cretaceous or still later date have shared in the elevatory movements which gave rise to these mountain chains, and may be found perched up, in some cases, many thousand feet high upon their flanks. And evidence of equal cogency demonstrates that, though, in Norfolk, the forest-bed rests directly upon the chalk, yet it does so, not because the period at which the forest grew immediately followed that at which the chalk was formed, but because an immense lapse of time, represented elsewhere by thousands of feet of rock, is not indicated at Cromer.

I must ask you to believe that there is no less conclusive proof that a still more prolonged succession of similar changes occurred, before the chalk was deposited. Nor have we any reason to think that the first term in the series of these changes is known. The oldest sea-beds preserved to us are sands, and mud, and pebbles, the wear and tear of rocks which were formed in still older oceans.

But, great as is the magnitude of these physical changes of the world, they have been accompanied by a no less striking series of modifications in its living inhabitants.

All the great classes of animals, beasts of the field, fowls of the air, creeping things, and things which dwell in the waters, flourished upon the globe long ages before the chalk was deposited. Very few, however, if any, of these ancient forms of animal life were identical with those which now live. Certainly, not one of the higher animals

was of the same species as any of those now in existence. The beasts of the field, in the days before the chalk, were not our beasts of the field, nor the fowls of the air such as those which the eye of man has seen flying, unless his antiquity dates infinitely further back than we at present surmise. If we could be carried back into those times, we should be as one suddenly set down in Australia before it was colonised. We should see mammals, birds, reptiles, fishes, insects, snails, and the like, clearly recognisable as such and yet not one of them would be just the same as those with which we are familiar, and many would be extremely different.

From that time to the present, the population of the world has undergone slow and gradual, but incessant, changes. There has been no grand catastrophe—no destroyer has swept away the forms of life of one period, and replaced them by a totally new creation: but one species has vanished and another has taken its place; creatures of one type of structure have diminished, those of another have increased, as time has passed on. And thus, while the differences between the living creatures of the time before the chalk and those of the present day appear startling, if placed side by side, we are led from one to the other by the most gradual progress, if we follow the course of Nature through the whole series of those relics of her operations which she has left behind.

And it is by the population of the chalk sea that the ancient and the modern inhabitants of the world are most completely connected. The groups which are dying out flourish, side by side, with the groups which are now the dominant forms of life.

Thus the chalk contains remains of those strange flying and swimming reptiles, the pterodactyl, the ichthyosaurus, and the plesiosaurus, which are found in no later deposits, but abounded in preceding ages. The chambered shells called ammonites and belemnites, which are so characteristic of the period preceding the cretaceous, in like manner die with it.

But amongst these fading remainders of a previous state of things, are some very modern forms of life, looking like Yankee pedlars among a tribe of Red Indians. Crocodiles of modern type appear; bony fishes, many of them very similar to existing species, almost supplant the forms of fish which predominate in more ancient seas; and many kinds of living shell-fish first become known to us in the chalk. The vegetation acquires a modern aspect. A few living animals are not even distinguishable as species, from those which existed at that remote epoch. The *Globigerina* of the present day, for example, is not

different specifically from that of the chalk; and the same may be said of many other *Foraminiferæ*.[9] I think it probable that critical and unprejudiced examination will show that more than one species of much higher animals have had a similar longevity; but the only example which I can at present give confidently is the snake's-head lamp-shell (*Terebratulina caput serpentis*), which lives in our English seas and abounded (as *Terebratulina striata* of authors) in the chalk.

The longest line of human ancestry must hide its diminished head before the pedigree of this insignificant shell-fish. We Englishmen are proud to have an ancestor who was present at the Battle of Hastings. The ancestors of *Terebratulina caput serpentis* may have been present at a battle of *Ichthyosauriæ* in that part of the sea which, when the chalk was forming, flowed over the site of Hastings. While all around has changed, this *Terebratulina* has peacefully propagated its species from generation to generation, and stands to this day, as a living testimony to the continuity of the present with the past history of the globe.

Up to this moment I have stated, so far as I know, nothing but well-authenticated facts, and the immediate conclusions which they force upon the mind.

But the mind is so constituted that it does not willingly rest in facts and immediate causes, but seeks always after a knowledge of the remoter links in the chain of causation.

Taking the many changes of any given spot of the earth's surface, from sea to land and from land to sea, as an established fact, we cannot refrain from asking ourselves how these changes have occurred. And when we have explained them—as they must be explained—by the alternate slow movements of elevation and depression which have affected the crust of the earth, we go still further back, and ask, Why these movements?

I am not certain that any one can give you a satisfactory answer to that question. Assuredly I cannot. All that can be said, for certain, is, that such movements are part of the ordinary course of nature, inasmuch as they are going on at the present time. Direct proof may be given, that some parts of the land of the northern hemisphere are at this moment insensibly rising and others insensibly sinking; and there is indirect, but perfectly satisfactory proof, that an enormous area now covered by the Pacific has been deepened thousands of feet since the present inhabitants of that sea came into existence.

Thus there is not a shadow of a reason for believing that the physi-

[9] Minute animals that form chalk.

cal changes of the globe, in past times, have been effected by other than natural causes.

Is there any more reason for believing that the concomitant modifications in the form of the living inhabitants of the globe have been brought about in other ways?

Before attempting to answer this question, let us try to form a distinct mental picture of what has happened in some special case.

The crocodiles are animals which, as a group, have a very vast antiquity. They abounded ages before the chalk was deposited; they throng the rivers in warm climates, at the present day. There is a difference in the form of the joints of the back-bone, and in some minor particulars, between the crocodiles of the present epoch and those which lived before the chalk; but, in the cretaceous epoch, as I have already mentioned, the crocodiles had assumed the modern type of structure. Notwithstanding this, the crocodiles of the chalk are not identically the same as those which lived in the times called "older tertiary," which succeeded the cretaceous epoch;[10] and the crocodiles of the older tertiaries are not identical with those of the newer tertiaries, nor are these identical with existing forms. (I leave open the question whether particular species may have lived on from epoch to epoch.) But each epoch has had its peculiar crocodiles; though all, since the chalk, have belonged to the modern type, and differ simply in their proportions, and in such structural particulars as are discernible only to trained eyes.

How is the existence of this long succession of different species of crocodiles to be accounted for?

Only two suppositions seem to be open to us—Either each species of crocodile has been specially created, or it has arisen out of some pre-existing form by the operation of natural causes.

Choose your hypothesis; I have chosen mine. I can find no warranty for believing in the distinct creation of a score of successive species of crocodiles in the course of countless ages of time. Science gives no countenance to such a wild fancy; nor can even the perverse ingenuity of a commentator pretend to discover this sense, in the simple words in which the writer of *Genesis* records the proceedings of the fifth and sixth days of the Creation.

On the other hand, I see no good reason for doubting the necessary alternative, that all these varied species have been evolved from pre-

[10] The *Cretaceous* Period (older scientists like Huxley used the words *period, epoch,* and *era* interchangeably) is the third, or last, great period of the Mesozoic Era, the Age of Reptiles. The *"older tertiary"* is the first period of the modern Cenozoic Era, the Age of Mammals.

existing crocodilian forms, by the operation of causes as completely a part of the common order of nature as those which have effected the changes of the inorganic world.

Few will venture to affirm that the reasoning which applies to crocodiles loses its force among other animals, or among plants. If one series of species has come into existence by the operation of natural causes, it seems folly to deny that all may have arisen in the same way.

A small beginning has led us to a great ending. If I were to put the bit of chalk with which we started into the hot but obscure flame of burning hydrogen, it would presently shine like the sun. It seems to me that this physical metamorphosis is no false image of what has been the result of our subjecting it to a jet of fervent, though nowise brilliant thought to-night. It has become luminous, and its clear rays, penetrating the abyss of the remote past, have brought within our ken some stages of the evolution of the earth. And in the shifting "without haste, but without rest" of the land and sea, as in the endless variation of the forms assumed by living beings, we have observed nothing but the natural product of the forces originally possessed by the substance of the universe.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Huxley's "On a Piece of Chalk" is one of the greatest scientific essays in English. It was presented as a lecture in 1868 at the Workingman's College as Huxley served the cause of spreading scientific truths through public education. His basic purpose, on this occasion, was merely to explain to average folk why geologists believed our earth unimaginably old. And though now the upshot of what he had to say is known to almost every schoolboy, it is interesting to note how recent is the knowledge we so casually accept, particularly since it has an important bearing on our ideas about the past and future of mankind (see also Haldane, "Man's Destiny").

Huxley was aware that his audience might be reluctant to accept his argument and evidence. Like preceding generations, they had been trained to believe that the earth had been created not more than ten thousand years ago; that from the beginning its plant and animal life and its topography had closely resembled those of today; and that such changes as had occurred had been caused by a series of major catastrophes, of which the greatest had been the Biblical Flood. This theory, called *Catastrophism,* had prevailed among geologists until almost the middle of the 19th century. But in 1830 the British geologist Charles Lyell had begun to publish his epoch-making *Principles of Geology,* in which he advanced

the theory known as *Uniformitarianism:* the surface of the earth, he said, has been sculptured into its present shapes primarily by the very agents at work today—for example, by erosion, glacial action, heat and cold. Many scientists soon adopted this hypothesis of "uniform" causation, whereupon geology became the *enfant terrible* of the 19th century. One difficulty was that the configuration of our earth by the slow action of natural agents would have required a length of time immensely longer than a mere few thousand years. And, men asked, if our earth really is so ancient, and even more, if the gradual development of life apparently recorded by the fossils in the rocks has actually taken place on it, what happens to the story of creation in *Genesis?* In Huxley's day the new geology, with paleontology as its adjunct, seemed the spearhead of a dangerous attack on religious faith.

Huxley undertook to demonstrate that any honest, thoughtful individual can understand why our earth *must* be eons old. He began, prosaically enough, by merely offering an analysis of a specimen of chalk—an analysis which showed that all chalk must once have been part of an ocean bed where, particle by particle, it had been deposited until it reached a depth that must have taken centuries to form. He went on to show why scientists believed these ocean depths had arisen to remain, for centuries more, part of the land which had supported prehistoric life—and had sunk again, eventually to arise once more and become part of the land composing vast areas of continental Europe.

As you follow this analysis, you will find Huxley unveiling the mysteries of the past, showing you the scientific mind at work, and telling you how great stretches of this earth were formed; how rocks record the gradual development of our flora and fauna, of man himself, and of prehistoric civilization. Here, through the knowledge and sweeping imagination of a great scientist, and the vivid lucidity of a great writer and teacher, we find the poetry which often characterizes scientific vision. Said Tennyson:

> There rolls the deep where grew the tree.
> O earth, what changes hast thou seen!
> There where the long street roars hath been
> The stillness of the central sea.
> (from *In Memoriam*)

1. Sketch, roughly, a map which shows the boundaries of the area of chalk from England to the east. (Huxley's opening reference to the chalk area in England would naturally have been as clear to his audiences as a reference to an area east of a diagonal line drawn, for example, between New Orleans and New York would be to us. Note, incidentally, how casually he first mentions the depth of the chalk.)

2. Through what three tests does Huxley answer "What is chalk?" How does he answer "Whence the chalk?" In the passage which answers this question, how does he answer opposing arguments? (This is called

"argument by rebuttal.") Show how he also argues from direct evidence; from collateral evidence. How long has the chalk been forming, and through what evidence does Huxley illustrate this point? (Modern scientists consider his estimate too conservative.) How do we know that the "chalk sea" became dry land and sank again? How do the rocks and chalk show that plant and animal life has gradually changed? Why does Huxley believe that these changes have been brought about by natural causes? Show, through a topical outline, the main divisions into which the essay falls. How does the organization help to make the essay as a whole easy or difficult to follow?

3. What is the effect of Huxley's use of the first person and of direct address? Illustrate his use of colloquial diction; of homely figures of speech (like "fur on the inside of a tea-kettle"). What gives the essay a literary tone despite such informality? Select three passages especially memorable for their vivid eloquence: what words especially reflect the power of Huxley's imagination? Read aloud several sentences which also show this imaginative power through their varied but sweeping rhythms. In what part of the sentence are the cadences likely to become most sweeping? Why there? What is meant by the statement, "In Huxley's essays, we find a perfect fusion of style and content"?

4. What impressions do you receive of Huxley's personality? Remembering that his audience was composed of workingmen, do you think they would have liked him? Why or why not? Through what qualities of the essay, beyond its wealth of factual content, would they have become aware of Huxley's complete mastery of his subject? Generalizing from this essay, explain why Huxley succeeded in gaining wide acceptance of new scientific knowledge in spite of people's reluctance to believe. Give examples drawn from life today (not necessarily from science) which show that people continue to be unwilling to accept new knowledge and fresh points of view.

5. As the result of the analysis of this essay made through the preceding groups of questions, explain what you would consider the characteristics of a *great* scientific essay. What might a merely *good* scientific essay lack which this essay has? What characteristics would be most likely to make a scientific essay *inferior?*

6. How does the development of Huxley's thesis affect one's understanding of the span of time covered by recorded history? How did the new knowledge about the age of the earth prepare for widespread acceptance of the evolutionary view of life by 19th-century laymen? (Darwin said that the geologist Lyell was his intellectual "father.") How does the evolutionary view of life contribute to our understanding of the "fighting instinct" as a cause of war? How does it emphasize the importance of the social sciences? Why do most people no longer feel that it threatens religious faith? How does the belief that there has been and can be an upward development of life affect one's ideas about what constitutes "moral" conduct?

Man's Destiny

J. B. S. HALDANE

No age escapes the need of men equipped to interpret the knowledge acquired by specialists; and among the writers of our day, none has been more effective than John Burdon Sanderson Haldane (b. 1892) in helping laymen to assimilate scientific concepts. Mr. Haldane, himself a specialist in genetics, has done much original work on human chemical physiology, genetics, and natural selection, and has held appointments at the Royal Institution, Cambridge University, and the University of London, where he is at present teaching. But he also has a gift for writing which has made him influential as a teacher outside academic circles. Among his books of popular science a few suggestive titles are *Animal Biology* (written with Julian S. Huxley as co-author), *Science and Ethics, Causes of Evolution, New Paths in Genetics.* "Man's Destiny" is an essay written with Mr. Haldane's forceful clarity, and it is arresting as a comment of a specialist on the probable future of the human species. Mankind, Mr. Haldane argues, does not have *a* predictable destiny; instead, we stand at a crossroads and, whichever fork we take, the stakes will be immense. In fact, as he sees it, the use we make of our intelligence will spell the fate of our intelligence itself.

IF, AS I AM INCLINED TO SUSPECT, the human will is to some small extent free, there is no such thing as a destiny of the human race. There is a choice of destinies. Even if our actions are irrevocably predetermined we do not know our destiny. In either case, however, we can point to a limited number of probable fates for our species.

First let us consider the stage for our drama. The earth has existed for over a thousand million years. During most of this period its surface temperature has not been very different from that now prevailing. The sun has not cooled down appreciably during that time, and it will probably be only a little cooler a million million years hence, though somewhere about that time it is quite likely that the earth's surface will be destroyed owing to the disruption of the moon by tidal forces. Six hundred million years ago our ancestors were worms, ten thousand years ago they were savages. Both these periods

Possible Worlds by J. B. S. Haldane, copyright, 1927, by Harper & Brothers.

are negligible compared with our possible future. Provided, therefore, that man has a future lasting for more than a few million years we can at once say that our descendants may, for anything we can see to the contrary, excel us a great deal more than we excel worms or jellyfish.

There are, however, several alternatives to this prospect. A catastrophe of an astronomical order, such as a collision with a stray heavenly body, is unlikely. The earth has lasted a long time without any such disasters. The sun may possibly swell up temporarily, as similar stars occasionally do. In this case the human race will be very rapidly roasted. A disease may arise which will wipe out all, or almost all, mankind. But there is nothing in science to make such up-to-date versions of the apocalypse very probable.

Even if man does not perish in this dramatic manner, there is no reason why civilisation should not do so. All civilisation goes back to a common source less than 10,000 years ago, very probably in Egypt. It is a highly complicated invention which has probably been made only once. If it perished it might never be made again. When in the past its light was extinguished in one area—for example, when the Angles and Saxons wrecked Roman Britain—it could be lit again from elsewhere, as our savage ancestors were civilised from Italy and Ireland. A modern war followed by revolutions might destroy it all over the planet. If weapons are as much improved in the next century as in the last, this will probably happen.

But unless atomic energy can be tapped, which is wildly unlikely, we know that it will never be possible to box up very much more rapidly available energy in a given place, than we can already box up in a high explosive shell, nor has any vapour much more poisonous than "mustard gas" been discovered in the forty-one years that have elapsed since that substance was first produced. I think therefore that the odds are slightly against such a catastrophic end of civilisation.

But civilisation as we know it is a poor thing. And if it is to be improved there is no hope save in science. A hundred and forty years ago men, women and children were being hanged in England for stealing any property valued at over a shilling, miners were hereditary slaves in Scotland, criminals were publicly and legally tortured to death in France. Europe was definitely rather worse off, whether in health, wealth or morals, than the Roman Empire under Antoninus Pius in A.D. 150. Since then we have improved very greatly in all these respects. We are far from perfect, but we live about twice as long, and

we do not hang starving children for stealing food, raid the coast of Africa for slaves, or imprison debtors for life. These advances are the direct and indirect consequences of science. Physics and chemistry have made us rich, biology healthy, and the application of scientific thought to ethics by such men as Bentham[1] has done more than any dozen saints to make us good. The process can only continue if science continues.

And pure science is a delicate plant. It has never flowered in Spain, and to-day it is almost dead in Italy. Everywhere there are strong forces working against it. Even where research is rewarded, the usual reward is a professorship with a full-time programme of teaching and administration. The bacteriologist can most easily earn a title and a fortune if he deserts research for medical practice. The potential physicist or chemist can often quadruple his income by taking up engineering or manufacture. In biology and psychology many lines of research are forbidden by law or public opinion. If science is to improve man as it has improved his environment, the experimental method must be applied to him. It is quite likely that the attempt to do so will rouse such fierce opposition that science will again be persecuted as it has been in the past. Such a persecution may quite well be successful, especially if it is supported by religion. A world-wide religious revival, whether Christian or not, would probably succeed in suppressing experimental inquiry into the human mind, which offers the only serious hope of improving it. Again, if scientific psychology and eugenics are used as weapons by one side in a political struggle, their opponents, if successful, will stamp them out. I think that it is quite as likely as not that scientific research may ultimately be strangled in some such way as this before mankind has learnt to control its own evolution.

If so, evolution will take its course. And that course has generally been downwards. The majority of species have degenerated and become extinct, or, what is perhaps worse, gradually lost many of their functions. The ancestors of oysters and barnacles had heads. Snakes have lost their limbs and ostriches and penguins their power of flight. Man may just as easily lose his intelligence.

It is only a very few species that have developed into something higher. It is unlikely that man will do so unless he desires to and is prepared to pay the cost. If, as appears to be the case at present in most parts of Europe and North America, the less intelligent of our species continue to breed more rapidly than the able, we shall probably go the

[1] Jeremy *Bentham* (1748–1832), English utilitarian philosopher, maintained that "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" is the "test and measure of virtue."

way of the dodo and the kiwi.[2] We do not as yet know enough to avert this fate. If research continues for another two centuries, it is probable that we shall. But if, as is likely enough, the welfare of our descendants in the remote future can only be realized at a very considerable sacrifice of present happiness and liberty, it does not follow that such a sacrifice will be made.

It is quite likely that, after a golden age of happiness and peace, during which all the immediately available benefits of science will be realized, mankind will very gradually deteriorate. Genius will become ever rarer, our bodies a little weaker in each generation; culture will slowly decline, and in a few thousand or a few hundred thousand years—it does not much matter which—mankind will return to barbarism, and finally become extinct. If this happens I venture to hope that we shall not have destroyed the rat, an animal of considerable enterprise which stands as good a chance as any other of evolving towards intelligence.

In the rather improbable event of man taking his own evolution in hand—in other words, of improving human nature, as opposed to environment—I can see no bounds at all to his progress. Less than a million years hence the average man or woman will realize all the possibilities that human life has so far shown. He or she will never know a minute's illness. He will be able to think like Newton, to write like Racine, to paint like Fra Angelico, to compose like Bach. He will be as incapable of hatred as St. Francis, and when death comes at the end of a life probably measured in thousands of years he will meet it with as little fear as Captain Oates or Arnold Von Winkelried.[3] And, every minute of his life will be lived with all the passion of a lover or a discoverer. We can form no idea whatever of the exceptional men of such a future.

Man will certainly attempt to leave the earth. The first voyagers into interstellar space will die, as did Lilienthal and Pilcher, Mallory and Irvine.[4] There is no reason why their successors should not succeed in colonising some, at least, of the other planets of our system, and ulti-

[2] The *dodo* was a species of large pigeon that became extinct toward the end of the seventeenth century; the *kiwi* is a bird with undeveloped wings.

[3] Titus *Oates* (1649–1705), famous English conspirator sentenced to prison and to repeated floggings, which he survived. *Arnold von Winkelried,* legendary Swiss hero who, alone, made a charge against the Austrian army Though he was killed, his courage enabled his countrymen to penetrate the Austrian ranks.

[4] Otto *Lilienthal* (1848–90), German inventor and aeronaut who made an aeroplane for gliding flight. After making more than 2000 flights, he was killed when a gust of wind upset his plane. Percy S. *Pilcher* (1866–99), an engineer, carried on Lilienthal's pioneer work in gliding and was killed in a trial flight. George L. *Mallory* (1866–1924) and Andrew C. *Irvine* (d. 1924) died while attempting to scale Mount Everest.

mately the planets, if such exist, revolving round other stars than our sun. There is no theoretical limit to man's material progress but the subjection to complete conscious control of every atom and every quantum of radiation in the universe. There is, perhaps, no limit at all to his intellectual and spiritual progress.

But, whether any of these possibilities will be realized depends, as far as we can see, very largely on the events of the next few centuries. If scientific research is regarded as a useful adjunct to the army, the factory, or the hospital, and not as the thing of all things most supremely worth doing, both for its own sake and that of its results, it

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us that it is perfectly consistent with indefinite persistence in one state or with gradual retrogression." And there are many contemporary biologists who foresee possible deterioration of our species because of man's artificial control over his environment, which thwarts the evolutionary process and may therefore actually reverse what heretofore has been an upward trend. With Mr. Haldane, they remind us that, in the past, many species have developed only to perish.

Young people of today do not seem especially sanguine about the destiny of man. At least in certain circles, it is distinctly fashionable to scoff at progress, despite rich tokens of social advancement ever since our century began. But disciples of "the gloomy Dean" may pause as they envisage the abyss which causes Mr. Haldane to admonish us not to forget the responsibilities imposed by intelligence. In contrast, the most sanguine can scarcely imagine the possibilities should we pursue the path of upward evolution. Already the "wildly unlikely" tapping of atomic energy has been achieved, and to the danger of slow racial degeneration has been added a specific and imminent threat to civilization itself. The crucial question is, perhaps, whether we have yet evolved sufficient social consciousness to be able to think beyond ourselves and our immediate groups, sufficient intelligence to avoid obliteration and to realize our opportunity for accelerated progress.

1. In what sentence does the author state the central purpose of this essay? Why does he believe that probably our species will have time to develop further? Why does he think it likely or unlikely that our species will improve?

2. Note in simple outline form the main divisions of the argument. How does the author emphasize his own opinion about "man's destiny" (a) through the amount of space given to developing each alternative and (b) through stress achieved by position? How does his final paragraph clinch the impression created by the sharply contrasting pictures of degeneration and further evolution?

3. Choose three inconsecutive paragraphs (almost any in the essay would do), and then show how vivid concrete details are used to illustrate abstract ideas. How is the essay made clear and forceful through other means, such as organization of the whole, paragraph technique, sentence structure, and diction? Compare "Man's Destiny" with some other scientific essay you have studied in class: are the two essays equally effective? Explain why or why not.

4. What would probably be the author's answer to pessimists who say that so far man has not surpassed the cultural and intellectual achievements of the Greeks? What characteristics of the human species does he seem to consider our most promising potentialities? Why do you agree or disagree? What characteristics might be added to the list, and why? What characteristics of mankind, in your opinion, are most threatening to the

human species? Can these characteristics be explained by the evolutionary view of life, and if so, how? If not, what explanation would you suggest? Is it desirable and, if so, is it possible to develop in the average person a greater sense of responsibility about the destiny of man? Explain your opinion. Why do you agree or disagree with Haldane's belief that the chief, if not the only hope of the human species rests in the pure sciences? Explain why you believe that we are or are not justified in hoping that mankind will, henceforth, develop upward.

Psycho-Analysis: What Freud and His Followers Have Done for Psychology

EVERETT DEAN MARTIN

In 1900 the Austrian physician Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) published his *Interpretation of Dreams,* the first of a series of books that have given us a new view of human behavior and personality, modifying modern thought as dynamically as did the work of Darwin and Marx—names with which Freud's is inevitably linked. These men conducted investigations that touched the quick of human life, and each illuminated realms far beyond the province of his own immediate interests.

Working with patience and genius in the laboratory which was his office, Freud discovered psychoanalysis as a technique to relieve the type of suffering expressed so poignantly in Macbeth's cry—

> Canst thou not minister to a mind diseas'd
> Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow,
> Raze out the written troubles of the brain . . .
> Cleanse the stuff'd bosom of that perilous stuff
> Which weighs upon the heart?

But beyond the therapy which Freud devised to help the individual patient, he achieved insight into human nature enabling us to understand more fully forces which help to shape our civilization: his theories emphasize again that events can be only partially explained in terms of economic forces. In contrast to the Marxian theory that impersonal economic causes dominantly determine what occurs, Freud's theories suggest that human behavior is determined, in part, by unrecognized emotions as intense as they are primitive and by motives intelligence would repudiate if they were understood. Naturally it follows that society, often reflecting the leadership of strong individuals, may also reflect in mass behavior the working of powerful though unrecognized compulsions. Today, in other words, most Freudians would agree that not only as individuals but also as members of society, men are far too prone to place on outside agencies the blame for many ills rooted in their own nature.

Part IV, *Psychology,* by Everett Dean Martin, published by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1924. The first section is omitted.

When the Nazis seized Austria, Freud was living in Vienna, carrying on his work as a physician and finishing his last book, *Moses and Monotheism,* a study of Jewish religion and psychology and, incidentally, of anti-Semitism. Freud was himself a Jew. And so, despite the significance attached to his accomplishments even by his adverse critics, this man, in his seventies, fell into the hands of petty Nazi officials. His private fortune was confiscated. Inevitably, his books fed that pyre which symbolized the suppression of intellectual life in Europe. Finally he was rescued by a Greek princess, who paid 250,000 Austrian shillings as his ransom. He was very ill, having long been a victim of cancer. But he escaped to London. There, at midnight of September 23, 1939, he died among men who, in fear of air-raids, were groping through a darkened city, caught in the maelstrom of a darkened world.

We are indebted to Everett Dean Martin (1880–1941) for an essay designed to clarify for the layman Freudian concepts peculiarly difficult to explain without distortion. Devoting his career to public education, Martin taught in the Graduate School of Claremont Colleges, California, the New School for Social Research, the Brookwood Workers' College, and Brown University, and wrote many books on sociology and on philosophic subjects—for example, *The Behavior of Crowds, The Mystery of Religion, The Conflict of the Individual and the Mass, Farewell to Revolution.* The discussion of Freud and psychoanalysis here reprinted from his *Psychology* (1924) was originally delivered at the Cooper Union during a lecture series of the People's Institute, of which he was long the director. It is significant that what he said more than twenty years ago remains valid as an introduction to the basic ideas of Freud.

WE HAVE NO TIME in this brief lecture to give anything like a historical account of psycho-analysis. But the main outline will be of some interest, I think. Freud, as I said, approached psychology from the practice of medicine. Before 1890 psychology had already taken into account the effects of abnormal mental life. Hypnotism was known and cases were reported giving certain valuable facts about hysteria and other forms of neurosis. In James' *Principles of Psychology* there is a fairly good résumé of the achievements of psychology in this direction at the time. One interesting explanation of certain abnormalities was that of "multiple personality." It was discovered that certain patients could be put into such conditions that they acted and seemed to regard themselves as really different persons at different times. Often, between these various "personalities" which existed in

the same individual there were memory gaps of such a nature that when the patient thought of himself as one of these personalities he could not remember anything that had to do with the other. Sometimes there was, however, a consciousness of the other personality, but no real connection between these various levels of consciousness. Psychopathologists gather from such facts the conviction that much nervous disease was the result of a splitting of consciousness, as if a certain portion of the mind might be broken off from the main body of the association of memories, and in the detached condition seem to form a little association of its own. Many forms of automatic behavior and of compulsive or obsessive ideas[1] were explained in this way. Certain physicians whose task it was to treat such cases resorted to hypnotism in the attempt to reintegrate the broken-up personality. When the patient was hypnotized the physician made certain suggestions designed to re-associate the split-off elements of the mind with the main consciousness of the patient.

It was in this way that Freud at Vienna began his work with such patients in the early nineties. He found that when patients were hypnotized they often remembered things which they could not remember in their normal waking consciousness. When these forgotten facts, most of which were very painful to the patient, were later brought to his consciousness he commonly showed strong emotion; in fact, he reacted to them with very much the same emotional response that one would show in actually experiencing them. This was an interesting psychological discovery, for the patient might have been for many years unable to recall these unpleasant memories. More interesting still is the fact that very often when such things were brought to his mind the emotion that he expressed seemed to clear things up for him so that he got well. From this fact it was concluded that his nervous trouble was due to his inadequate emotional response at the time of certain unhappy experiences.

The bringing about of such a belated response in the effort to cure the patient was called the "cathartic method" and the emotional re-

[1] *Automatic behavior* is that in which a response is made without delay or deliberation, as in sleep-walking. *Compulsive ideas* are those which irresistibly lead to action that is not based on, and is often opposed to, the dictates of one's reason and judgment: for example, when a person is impelled to keep returning to see whether he has locked the door. *Obsessive ideas* are thoughts which persistently recur although one's reason may demonstrate them to be false and, on a rational plane, inconsequential or even repellent: for example, when a person feels that his hands are always dirty and would like to keep on washing them constantly, even though he knows that they are clean.

sponse which was produced by this method was given the rather awkward name of "abreaction."

Freud began his practice with these facts in mind, but he says in his early papers on hysteria that he had some difficulty in applying hypnotism. Often the patient refused to be hypnotized. At any rate, Freud said there were many persons he was unable to treat in this way. So he had to find another method of getting at these forgotten memories which were troubling the patients. He began by pressing his hands on the patient's head and suggesting that he or she would remember. In this way, after exhaustive effort, he found that he was able to bring out the forgotten psychic *material* into consciousness, just as had been done with patients who were hypnotized. Later he discovered that sometimes patients would recall their forgotten experiences when they were allowed just to talk freely and at random. Freud also discovered that when his patients told him their dreams, the dream commonly had some relation to the facts which they were trying to recall. In this way Freud learned the technique of interpreting dreams. It was in a sense similar to the technique which he had employed in interpreting to his nervous patients the significance of forgotten things which in themselves had often proved to be insignificant to the patient even when recalled.

Freud's work on dreams is the classic study of the subject and is one of the most important books in the whole science of modern psychology. After accumulating thousands of studies of dreams he was able to show the psychological meaning of dreams for the first time in history. He learned that the dream is a symbolic expression of some hidden wish; that it contains elements which go back to infancy; that the wish is generally one which we don't admit that we entertain; that the dream is invariably egoistic; in other words, that we are in some way actually, or under certain disguises, always the hero of our dreams. Perhaps a simple case reported by one author will make clear the way in which he made use of dream analysis to learn what was in his patient's unconscious mind. One of Freud's patients, a young woman, unmarried, relates to him that she dreamed her nephew (her sister's only son), a young boy whom she loves very much, is dead. Freud, by getting her to remember all the facts associated with this dream, succeeded in interpreting it about as follows: Several years ago, this young woman lived in her sister's house. At that time she was engaged to a certain young man whom her married sister disliked and, owing to the sister's opposition, the engagement was broken off. The patient, at least consciously, accepted the inevitable and believed that she had

come to agree with her sister's judgment. The young man went away and she did not see him for several years. At this time the married sister had two boys. The elder one died and at the funeral service the patient noticed that her former fiancé had returned. She saw him as she stood beside the casket containing the body of her nephew. In the dream she now recalls that he is again standing in the same position beside the casket containing the body of the second boy who she dreams is dead. Centering her attention upon this fact brings to her the consciousness that the dream merely means, not that she wished her nephew to die but that in fancy she is duplicating the scene in which her lost fiancé returned. Hence the dream is an expression of the wish that some accidental situation might bring this man back to her.

Freud learned that there were many typical dreams; such as falling, flying, being undressed in the presence of a group of people, being submerged by a tidal wave, and so on. All these are typical symbols of certain wishes which we have but do not recognize. Thus Freud was led to the theory of the unconscious. The unconscious consists of those forgotten facts and wishes which we cannot recall at will. The reason why we cannot recall them is that they have been "repressed"; that is, they have not been reacted to adequately for the reason that such a reaction would be painful. While, therefore, we do not attend these wishes and memories, they exist in us just the same and they produce in us certain effects. Sometimes the unconscious impulses are expressed in bodily symptoms as in hysteria. It has long been known that there are a great many persons who apparently suffer certain ailments while physically there is really nothing the matter with them. Freud has shown that the symptoms in such cases are really symbols of something in the unconscious. In other words, it is as if in some respect the dream thought or wish were haunting the individual during his waking hours. The same is true with the various actions and ideas of the insane. Curiously enough Freud has demonstrated that errors in speech, forgetting in general, and in fact, a very large part of our daily life, are all expressions of things which exist in the unconscious. In the *Psychopathology of Every Day Life* Freud discusses these things, giving many illustrations in proof of his contention that even the tiniest and most insignificant things are really governed by the laws of cause and effect. The discovery of the specific causes of acts which otherwise we should regard as purely accidental in ourselves has led to a new view of human nature.

We are not the beings we consciously think that we are. There exists in us each and all something of the animal, the savage, and a large

element of childish egoism. The conscious habits which we build up through the course of our lives hold these more primitive impulses in check. We get the habit of diverting our attention from them. We come to picture ourselves as persons in whom primitive trends do not exist; but they do exist, and, in many disguised forms, they assert themselves. So, while primarily, psycho-analysis has to do with curing persons who are mentally abnormal, it shows us our normal behavior in a new perspective.

The Unconscious

Perhaps I can make clear this matter of the unconscious by a simple analogy. Let us say that a man leaves his home to attend a lecture at Cooper Union. He gets in the subway several miles from the hall in which the lecture is to be given. He may probably during that time read a paper or a book or talk to someone. He may not once during the entire journey consciously think of the lecture or his purpose of attending it. It is as if he had made a connection between the purpose of attending the lecture and the Astor Place station in the subway and then, having made such a connection, he drops the matter out of his mind until the subway guard calls "Astor Place." Then he suddenly gets up almost automatically and steps out on the platform. I have often seen people step out on the platform in a rather dazed condition as if for a moment they could not consciously recall how they happened to be there. Now, during the time that our traveler is on his way to the lecture, he is not thinking about the lecture or Astor Place station. Nevertheless, unconsciously, he has for the time so organized himself that the calling of the station automatically discharges him into activity. That is, the purpose to attend the lecture becomes an impulse to act when the fact in the environment with which it is associated is present.

Now there are formed in the lives of all of us many such associations. Purposes that we have long forgotten, tendencies in ourselves which we have "subdued and mastered," unhappy experiences and desires which are inconsistent with our disciplined and mastered characters, may operate in us in a way similar to the operation of the purpose to leave a subway station at Astor Place. We may not even know just what these associations are. Nevertheless, the forgotten purpose may be incited to some incipient degree by thousands of things which we never think of as being associated with it. Thus whole elaborate systems of unconscious association may be built about certain of

our suppressed desires and we may, quite unknown to ourselves, be experiencing tendencies to act upon these repressed impulses. Usually these tendencies of the unconscious do not throw normal people out of harmony with their environment. We may be reminded of some vague forgotten experience by smelling a flower or hearing a song; we may have certain likes and dislikes of people which we cannot understand; sometimes we may have a curious feeling, on seeing certain objects, of having been in certain places before, when we know that this is impossible. Sometimes we find ourselves inaudibly repeating lines of poetry or silly jingles for whole days without being able to stop and we wonder why that thing keeps running through our heads.

If this were all that the unconscious did in our lives it would not be a very serious matter; but it might be interesting psychologically. But we shall see as we go on in this course of lectures that many of our religious beliefs, our moral ideals, our social philosophies as well as many of the customs and traditions of organized society have the function primarily of expressing in symbolic form certain of our repressed wishes. Our lives consist of fictions and whims to a degree that is quite unsuspected by us and oftentimes, when we act upon such fictions, we are surprised to see that we thought we were doing one thing when we were really doing something quite different.

The abnormal mind becomes the victim of these symptoms of association which are built about its repressed wishes. So much so, indeed, that one may lose his sense of reality altogether, and be unable to distinguish between fancy and fact. In many cases it is as if one were dreaming throughout the greater part of his life a dream from which he could not be awakened. In a sense, we are all "the stuff that dreams are made of." The unconscious with its dream thoughts exists underneath our conscious life like a stream flowing under a foot-bridge. Our acts of conscious attention are like planks thrown over this stream, resting upon rocks which here and there rise above the surface. We throw out these efforts of attention in order that some conscious purpose may cross over to an achievement, but the purpose seldom gets across with dry feet; often we upset the planks and tumble in altogether.

As Dr. Stanley Hall has pointed out, we are greatly indebted to Freud for our knowledge of the processes by which one reaches his mental maturity. The *psyche,* or mental nature of the maturer person, is not so much a growth as it is an achievement. During childhood and adolescence each one of us has passed through various critical periods, periods in which there had to be achieved a definite integra-

tion of the forces of our nature, and in which it was necessary to detach our interest from various objects that held our love and loyalty, and to find new interests and new ways of reacting adequately to an ever widening environment. "The child," says Freud, "is naturally polymorphous perverse." By preverse he means that the psycho-sexual life of the child differs from that of the normal adult in that it is not attached to the same love objects as it is with normal persons. There is a period when a child is egocentric; a period when he attaches his love to one or both parents; a period also which is called *narcissism,* in which the growing youth himself becomes the object of his love. In the process of psycho-sexual development there are many places where the emotional life may go astray. Wrong environmental influences, hereditary defects or a bad start may cause the individual to become the victim of various "fixations," that is, if at any point of his development he has failed to solve the problems of a certain critical period, he is likely to remain fixed in the emotional attitudes of an earlier stage of his development. This fixation is frequently accompanied by a certain *complex* of ideas. Sometimes this complex may be an unconscious wish, often it is a conflict which is going on unconsciously, in both cases the wish or the conflict is associated with a system of ideas. The individual will, then, in all likelihood, be unable to meet certain situations in his later life.

The perverse tendencies which Freud says exist in children are, as he puts it, *polymorphous*—that is, they are many-form. Physiologically the little child has various *erogenous zones,* or areas in the body which respond with sex feeling to stimulus. During the process of growth in many of these zones there must be a repression of the erogenous type of response to stimulus, and the *libido,* or capacity for love excitement, must be directed toward the organs which in later life serve for reproduction. Along with this reintegration there must be such a building up of functional capacities as will enable the individual to behave normally in the situations of his mature life.

There are individuals who, unfortunately, retain various of these perverse tendencies. Some are consciously or unconsciously *sadistic;* that is, their sex interest instead of being associated with affection is associated with the love of cruelty. Others are *masochistic*—that is, they retain consciously or unconsciously in later life a curious sex-excitation in experiencing self-torture. Others may remain *autoerotic*—that is, they are never able to free the sex interest from their own persons so that they can give themselves whole-heartedly to anyone whom they love. And finally, there are, of course, certain individuals who re-

main in mature life, either consciously or unconsciously, *homo-sexual*—which means that they more easily love a person of their own sex than one of the opposite sex. When these maladjustments occur in mature people we speak of them as perversions. If I understand Freud correctly, he wishes to imply that tendencies to all these perversions exist in small children and are not, with them, really abnormal. Normality, therefore, is achieved by habit formations and the habits are not easily acquired, and none of our habits of normality are so thoroughly achieved as to destroy completely the infantile elements in our psychic life. We trail behind us not necessarily "clouds of glory," as Wordsworth said, but our unconscious carries in a more or less repressed manner all that we have been or lived through, or have failed to become.

Fortunate indeed is he who "out of the booming, crashing, confusion" of his early years, and through the "storm and stress" of adolescence comes to maturity with such mental habits as enable him to meet the demands which life will henceforth make upon him. Such, of course, is the normal man, and it is possible that if parents and educators knew more of the Freudian psychology many more individuals would reach their maturity mentally equipped for the tasks of life than have done so in the past.

So far we have spoken about the *repressed elements,* which exist in the unconscious of the individual, normal and abnormal. Much more should be said on the subject. I would suggest that the student read such books as *Mechanisms of Character Formation,* by Dr. William White; *A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis,* by Freud; *The Neurotic Constitution,* by Dr. Alfred Adler; *Psycho-analysis,* by Dr. A. A. Brill. Repression in itself is not an evil. It is positively necessary if there is to be any order or effectiveness in our lives. All thinking and all habit formation depend upon it. One of the misrepresentations of psycho-analysis has to do with this point.

During recent years there has developed a school of scamp psychologists who have told their followers that repression is an evil which may result disastrously for them. They compare the repressed "energy" in the psyche to steam which is enclosed in a boiler without any possibility of escape and they picture the neurosis as a form of explosion, thus telling young people that if they allow themselves to be "repressed" by moral conventions or by our present social system, they are running the danger of a frightful neurotic explosion. And they point to the doing away with inhibition as the path of happiness and effective living. Candidly, this is sheer nonsense. Doubtless there is

more restraint in modern civilization than would be necessary if men were intelligent enough to govern their behavior by ideals which are relevant to the situations in which they act, but that is another matter. It has to do with what I hope may some day be a common-sense attitude toward morals. We are not, however, discussing morals now, but psychopathology. Every repression involves in some way a conflict. But if the repression is *successful,* the conflict is solved to the satisfaction of the individual. What psychology is concerned with is *unsuccessful* repression, and such repressions demand not that the people "go on the loose"; they demand *re-education.* If people tried to live without any inhibitions, they would very soon find themselves in much more serious conflicts than they were in before. For us, as students of psychology, the important fact is just the difference between a successful and unsuccessful type of repression. Sometimes a successful type of repression is called "sublimation," which means that there has been set up in the individual, through the creation of what in an early lecture we called a "conditioned reflex," habits which direct his repressed psychic energies toward socially acceptable ends.

The interesting point about material which is unsuccessfully repressed is that it gets out of us in some sort of *disguised form* and leads us to actions and thoughts which are often not what we think they are. Thus, there was reported in a recent psychological journal the case of a man who was subject to what was apparently epileptic attacks. It seems that his father had fainting spells due to heart trouble. The simplest explanation of the case would probably be to say that this man had inherited the disease. Close examination, however, revealed the fact that the patient's attacks were not due to epilepsy or heart trouble but were of a hysterical nature. That is, they were a symbolic expression of some wish or conflict. Analysis revealed the fact that back in this man's childhood there was a morbid fear of his father, and a stronger than normal attachment to his mother. The fact was also revealed that the patient was employed in the office of an elderly man who was very strict morally, and whom the patient unconsciously identified with his father. An attachment grew up between the patient and one of the female employees with whom he worked. Fear of the employer's disapproval was related as the cause of the neurotic symptom of fainting. When the picture of this patient's psychic life was sketched out it was found that his fear of his father was associated with an unconscious love of his mother, and also was often associated with an unconscious identification of himself with his father. The pseudo-epileptic attacks of fainting were the symbol of this self-identification

since the father had suffered from heart attacks. They were, therefore, a neurotic and ineffective form of protest against the authority of the employer to whom the patient had to defer. It will be seen that most neurotic symptoms, like most dreams (Freud would say all of them), have the function of expressing in symbolic form some such repressed wish or conflict.

There are three or four types of expression which the unconscious may assume, all of which have interest for our study. First, there are what we might call *mechanisms of defense.* Such mechanisms are fabricated by the unconscious to protect one's feelings about himself against the recognition of tendencies in his own nature which are unacceptable to his conscious. Thus, the individual to whose case we have just referred, suffered his attacks of fainting because they were in a way a defense of his ego. So Freud reports a case in which a young man suffering from compulsion neurosis behaved similarly. Compulsion neurosis is a neurotic disease in which individuals find themselves compelled even against their will to say and do things which are often silly or injurious. The case reported by Freud is that of a young man who was impelled to stay in his room for fear that he might do somebody an injury, and who spends his time writing alibis so that no one may accuse him of having committed murder. Analysis in this case showed that the patient unconsciously had in mind the thought of killing his father, who, as a matter of fact, had been dead for a number of years. Here was, as you see, a fixation of the nature referred to above. In this case, as in the case of the man who suffered with fainting spells, the unconscious cause of the difficulty was an infantile attachment to the mother image, and a consequent fear or hatred of his father. This situation is rather common. It is known as the "Oedipus Complex." You will remember that in the Oedipus myth of the ancient Greeks, Oedipus is led by cruel destiny to kill his father and marry his own mother, Jocasta. It is interesting to note how great a part this myth plays, not only in the dream literature of the world, but also in the great religions. It may be argued, therefore, that there is an element of the Oedipus Complex in most people, and that much thinking serves the purpose of a defense against it. If not the Oedipus Complex itself, then any form of the feeling of inferiority may lead people to fabricate defense mechanisms. Until one has his attention called to this fact, he probably never realizes how much conscious behavior of normal people is motivated by the wish to defend the ego against the feeling of inferiority. Much ambition, the

wish to be important, moral reform, social unrest, even race riots, should be regarded as defense mechanism.

The second type of mechanism fabricated by the unconscious might be called the *mechanism of compensation*. Whenever there is a psychic loss of any kind, the unconscious seeks imaginary or fictitious goods to put in the place of those lost. Thus, one who has a serious defect in his character may "over compensate" for it by going to the other extreme. Illustrations of these mechanisms may often be seen in the prudishness of certain people whose excessive delicacy on analysis reveals the existence of the very opposite—that is, the prudishness is over compensation for the morbid and infantile obsession with the obscene. Religion may also be used for compensation in this way, as well as many "virtues of extenuation and self justification." Thus, men who live dissolute lives are usually very sentimental about their mothers and the corrupt politician is frequently over conscientious about domestic morality.

Third, there is a type of behavior which has been called the *mechanism of escape*. Thus when for any reason people find themselves unable to react adequately to the realities about them or to derive satisfaction from the world of facts, they have a tendency to substitute for the true meaning of things fictions of their own fabrication. In imagination they strive to "shatter this world to pieces and mold it nearer to their hearts' desire"; thus, "stone walls do not a prison make nor iron bars a cage." Love is not sex; death is not death, but entrance into life eternal; and the wretched struggle for existence in civilization is not the inevitable lot of man on earth, but is merely contingent upon the existing social system and could be changed in the twinkling of an eye by the ballot or mass action. Most heavens and most utopias are escape mechanisms of this sort. Such mechanisms exist in their completest form in the delusions of the insane, where reality is completely repudiated and the tortured spirit takes refuge in a substitute world of wish-fancies. Often associated with these mechanisms is a phenomenon which Freud calls *regression*, which means that many persons who are fixed, as we have said, in earlier emotional forms of response tend when they are in difficulty to return in thought to the parent images—usually the image of the mother—and to behave as if they were taking refuge in the protection of the family circle.

Turn backward, turn backward,
Oh, time, in your flight;
And make me a child again,
Just for tonight.

This is a very common wish and it motivates more of our behavior than we think.

Finally, there is what should be called the fact of *rationalization. Rationalization is not rationality.* It is the fabrication by the intellect of systems of ideas which render plausible and give specious explanation or justification to impulses and actions which are fully determined by the unconscious. Thus a subject who is hypnotized may be given a "post hypnotic suggestion." He may be told, for instance, that after he has awakened, say at three o'clock in the afternoon, he will go and knock on the door of a fellow-student's room. At three o'clock he is very likely to do this. But he does not remember in his waking consciousness the suggestion which was given him while under hypnotic influence. Now if the subject is asked why he knocks at this particular door at three o'clock, you will find that he is fairly sure to have a plausible explanation for his conduct. He may say that he wanted to borrow a book or that he remembered that he and the student had an engagement which he wished to talk over. These explanations are "rationalizations" and any behavior which is motivated by an unconscious wish is very likely to give rise to rationalization of one sort or another. The delusions of the paranoic are rationalizations, and so, also, I regret to say, is the great portion of public opinion and of crowd thinking and propaganda.

Freud's Place in Psychology

In closing, perhaps we should note some of the criticisms of Freud's discoveries and beliefs. Most of these criticisms are motivated by considerations that have nothing to do with the case. There is, for instance, as Freud himself has pointed out, strong objection to him because of the resistances which men have to the candid discussion of sexual matters. There is often a feeling, therefore, that Freud places too much emphasis on sex. Whether he has done so or not is a matter to be decided by further study. Certainly on an empirical ground and on the basis of the many hundreds of cases with which he worked he is justified in giving the explanation which he has given of the symptoms of these particular cases. I think much of the difficulty concerning this point arises from Freud's peculiar use of the word "sexuality." He makes it mean almost the entire instinctive and emotional life. And perhaps such terminology does blur distinctions which should be kept clear. Thus the distinction between sex and ego is not quite clear in

Freud's work. Dr. John T. McCurdy pointed out this fact. But Dr. McCurdy's criticisms are quite technical and, moreover, McCurdy retains much of the old instinct psychology which is to-day under severe criticism.

Again Freud has been obliged to use figurative language to express some of his concepts. For instance, he speaks of the existence of a psychic "censor" between the unconscious wish and consciousness. I think he should not be taken too literally here. For he is dealing with new ideas and should be allowed a great measure of freedom in expression. The same, I think, is true of the use of the word libido, by which he means sexual energy. And I suspect he is often led to use the term "unconscious" as if the unconscious were a sort of psychic storehouse rather than a term by which are expressed behavior trends and processes which are not accompanied by full awareness. Freud himself has modified his earlier theory that abnormal mental life is due to a shock, or "trauma," and that the symptoms may all be removed by "catharsis." A discussion of this point would lead us to the medical side of the Freudian psychology and this is not the object of our present interest.

Freud has given us on the whole a new view of human personality. He shows that the self of each of us is wider and richer than we had thought before, and that we retain vestiges of primitive life even in our highest and most civilized thought and behavior. He has shown us the role that fictions and wish-fancies play in fixing the destinies of man. He has given us a new kind of determinism, not the old mechanism of the brain physiology. He has pointed out in a very helpful way the causal connection that exists among ideas themselves and in the sequence of events in which men play an active part. His influence on the whole is on the side of wholesome self-criticism, which is a true educational aim, and it also makes for a more decent candor in society. In social philosophy he has provided us with a criterion by which we may know when people are seeking to solve problems and are really working for a better order of things and when their behavior is merely motivated by a wish to solve their inner conflicts, save their faces, and substitute for the realities in life a system of fancies and fictions. Freud has given a most significant discovery in a realm where new knowledge is most needed, and is most important. The world is looking to psychology to-day as never before for the answer to some of the deepest questions of our lives. Freud, it seems to me, has gone further to provide us with a method of answering these questions than has any one else in our times.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Now that another war has left its human wreckage, we find more pressing a problem which is always with us—the problem of those emotionally in conflict with their surroundings and hence unable to function at maximum productivity with a minimum of stress. These are the psychological casualties of civilization—merely more numerous and more pronounced after periods of acute anxiety. Distinctly, they are not insane. They are simply maladjusted people, characteristically able to find specious reasons—convincing to themselves—to account for their recurrent difficulties, disappointments, and general unhappiness. They are what we call *neurotic,* a term which could be used to describe a startlingly large percentage of our population, everywhere. "Normal," "neurotic," "insane"—these rough categories merge; the differentiation is often just a question of degree. It is usually the "more" neurotic whom the psychoanalysts help through the general technique first used by Sigmund Freud.

Probably no contribution to the welfare of mankind has ever aroused more controversy than Freud's insight into human nature and the therapy he worked out, to be improved, naturally, by his successors. For many years, all but unanimously, the orthodox psychologists rejected his ideas, while more and more insistently (and dogmatically) the Freudians urged their views. The medical profession, too, remained skeptical: not until our day has the average doctor even begun to think that physical illness may have a psychosomatic basis; in other words, that emotional disturbances may cause—some go so far as to say *all* organic ailments. Nevertheless, Freud's theories were swiftly popularized: by the 1920s his ideas, almost always oversimplified and therefore garbled (especially in reference to sex), had become a staple of "sophisticated" table-talk. Fortunately, by now, the layman's interest in Freud is more intelligent. Increasingly, the widespread influence of his ideas grows manifest: note, for example, your neighbor's next reference to his pet *complex* (probably his "inferiority complex") or to his *inhibitions* or *repressed desires;* or observe, perhaps, a painter's *symbolic* representation of the *unconscious,* a novelist's study of *neurotic behavior,* a dramatist's revelation of an *Oedipus complex,* a biographer's account of a *father-fixation,* or a sociologist's essay on the rehabilitation of the criminal, who is no longer merely a "bad" man deserving punishment but a *sick personality* needing an *analyst's* care. Or remember the concern expressed because, as we prepared for war, so many inductees proved *psychologically unfit* and because there was (and still is) such a serious shortage of doctors prepared to offer *psychiatric* help. Today the very atmosphere in which informed, intelligent people live has been tempered by a view of personality which stems from Freud: the modern mother is influenced by his concepts, even though she may never have

heard his name; similarly the modern teacher treats "behavior problems," and before long a trained psychiatrist will almost certainly be considered an essential member of the personnel of every modern school. Thus, slowly and indirectly, it is being recognized that of late there was among us a man whose quiet and unpretentious life was of incalculable significance to his fellow-creatures. It is well to read an essay which will at least introduce you to the patterns of his thought.

1. What was the most important fact that Freud discovered through his work with hypnotized patients, and how was it related to his theory of the unconscious? How was his work on dreams related to this theory? Why, today, is the person who indiscriminately recounts his dreams usually considered naive? Recount some incident which shows how children (unconsciously through their play, and directly through other acts and speech) express their emotions in ways amusing in frankness and intensity. Why, then, in our dreams do we often "wish" for things which, superficially, are "shocking" on the adult level? Though all dreams represent "wish-fulfillment" according to the Freudians, why is the wish seldom (if ever) precisely what it seems in the dream? From first-hand observation, show how slips of speech, "accidents," acts of forgetfulness, etc. can reveal the "unconscious" at work.

2. From literature or direct observation, show how some people seem to take pleasure in giving or receiving pain. How does knowledge of the psychic development of the human personality affect one's understanding of "perverted" behavior? Why should Freud's interpretation of our development through infancy and childhood prevent a parent's saying, "Oh, he's too young to remember or to understand"? How would it modify the usual interpretation of the statement that childhood is "the age of innocence"? How does Freud's picture of the development of human personality seem to contradict or help to substantiate the evolutionist's theory of human development? How would Freud interpret Wordsworth's statement, "The child is father of the man"? Why would he consider emotional environment during infancy and childhood more fundamentally important than the surroundings and economic circumstances of adult life? Why is it a travesty of Freud to assert he advocates "uninhibited" behavior?

3. How do "unsuccessful repressions" lead to "neurotic" behavior? From first-hand observation, give examples of people who seem always impelled to do things hurtful to themselves—always, of course, with "good" excuses (the student, for example, who is always late; the acquaintance who is constantly tactless, fault-finding, unpleasantly self-assertive or self-righteous). How could such behavior be explained by "defense of ego," "overcompensation," "mechanism of escape"? How is each of these people likely to "rationalize" his conduct if he is aware of it? (Usually, of course, the victim of such traits is not aware of what he does; one chief function of a

psychoanalyst is to enable him to recognize such behavior patterns and their fundamental causes.)

4. The determinist believes that man does not have "free will" but that what he is and does has been "determined" by environment and heredity. Explain what is meant by the "determinism" of Freud. How would Freud's interpretation of human nature affect one's understanding of the chief figure in the latest social scandal or murder case? the "problem child"? the querulous "school-marm"? the over-anxious mother? the over-conscientious daughter? the insight into human nature revealed through one or more characters in some literary work most of you have read—for example, in *Macbeth?* Of the many other applications of Freud's ideas to our daily life and intellectual interests, mention the two or three which you consider most illuminating. Giving an off-hand judgment, decide about what percent of your acquaintances are neurotic, more or less.

The New Vision of Science

P. W. BRIDGMAN

Scientist and philosopher, Perry William Bridgman (b. 1882) began to teach at Harvard in 1910 and has served as Hollis Professor of Mathematics and Philosophy for almost twenty years. From his more restricted scientific work have resulted books like *The Physics of High Pressure* and *The Nature of Thermodynamics* and from his wider interests volumes such as *The Logic of Modern Physics* and *The Intelligent Individual and Society.* But Professor Bridgman might deny that anything could be *wider* than the interests of the modern physicist engaged in pure research. For modern physics, he explains, has questioned assumptions heretofore part and parcel of rational thought.

The first impact of the discoveries which began with Planck was made on specialists. Theoretical chemistry entered a new era. By the 1920s outstanding philosophers like Russell and Whitehead considered developments in physical theory indispensable to their speculations. Mathematical physicists like Jeans and Eddington, contemplating the new theories, in effect became philosophers. In the early '30s new developments aroused theologians. And before long, talk about the "quantum theory" and its "revolutionary implications" began to spread among the "intellectuals." But the layman was untouched—until our airmen dropped the first atomic bomb. Then in the terror of exploding atoms we began to feel, if not to grasp, the meaning of the knowledge put together, link by link, through fifty years. Professor Bridgman says that language as yet cannot express precisely what this knowledge spells: language verbalizes thought, and it is thought itself which in another several generations may have been transformed. Intimations of what such knowledge is and signifies are given through this essay on the quantum theory, written by a scientist notable for his services in interpreting the significance of pure research.

THE ATTITUDE which the man in the street unconsciously adopts toward science is capricious and varied. At one moment he scorns the scientist for a highbrow, at another anathematizes him for blasphemously undermining his religion; but at the mention of a name like Edison he falls into a coma of veneration. When he stops to think, he does recognize, however, that the whole atmosphere of the world in

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which he lives is tinged by science, as is shown most immediately and strikingly by our modern conveniences and material resources. A little deeper thinking shows him that the influence of science goes much farther and colors the entire mental outlook of modern civilized man on the world about him. Perhaps one of the most telling evidences of this is his growing freedom from superstition. Freedom from superstition is the result of the conviction that the world is not governed by caprice, but that it is a world of order and can be understood by man if he will only try hard enough and be clever enough. This conviction that the world is understandable is, doubtless, the most important single gift of science to civilization. The widespread acceptance of this view can be dated to the discovery by Newton of the universal sway of the law of gravitation; and for this reason Newton may be justly regarded as the most important single contributor to modern life.

The point of view for which Newton is responsible is well exemplified by the remark often made that every particle of matter in the universe attracts to some extent every other particle, even though the attraction is almost inconceivably minute. There is thus presented to the mind a sublime picture of the interrelatedness of all things; all things are subject to law, and the universe is in this respect a unit. As a corollary to this conviction about the structure of the universe, an equally important conviction as to man's place in the universe has been growing up; man feels more and more that he is in a congenial universe, that he is part and parcel of everything around him, that the same laws that make things outside him go also make him go, and that, therefore, he can, by taking sufficient pains, understand these laws. These two theses so closely related—that the world is a world of order and that man can find the guiding motif of this order—have come to be the tacit cardinal articles of faith of the man of science, and from him have diffused through the entire social structure, so that now some such conviction essentially colors the thinking of every educated person. It is to be emphasized that the justification for this conviction is entirely in experience; it is true that, as man has grown older and acquired more extensive acquaintance with nature and pondered more deeply, he has been increasingly successful in reducing the world about him to order and understandability. It has been most natural to generalize this experience into the conviction that this sort of thing will always be possible, and to believe that as we delve constantly deeper we shall always be able to give a rational account of

what we find, although very probably the difficulties will become continually greater.

The thesis of this article is that the age of Newton is now coming to a close, and that recent scientific discoveries have in store an even greater revolution in our entire outlook than the revolution effected by the discovery of universal gravitation by Newton. The revolution that now confronts us arises from the recent discovery of new facts, the only interpretation of which is that our conviction that nature is understandable and subject to law arose from the narrowness of our horizons, and that if we sufficiently extend our range we shall find that nature is intrinsically and in its elements neither understandable nor subject to law.

The task of the rest of this article is twofold. In the first place I shall try to give some suggestion of the nature of the physical evidence and of the reasoning that has forced the physicist to the conclusion that nature is constituted in this way. This task is by no means easy; for not only is it impossible to indicate more than very partially the physical evidence, but it is often necessary to compress into a few sentences steps in the reasoning that can be completely justified only by long and difficult mathematical or logical analysis. The second part of the task is to envisage a few of the far-reaching consequences on the whole outlook of mankind of the acceptance of the view that this is actually the structure of nature. This aspect of the situation can be appreciated without a detailed grasp of the preliminary analysis.

II

The new experimental facts are in the realm of quantum phenomena. Comparatively little has been written for popular consumption about this new realm which has opened in the last fifteen years. The man in the street has been much more interested in relativity, which to him has seemed extremely interesting and revolutionary. Occasionally, however, there has filtered down to him the news that nearly all the theoretical physicists are occupied with a new order of phenomena which they find very much more exciting and revolutionary than any in the realm of relativity. For after all is said and done, the practical effects of relativity, measured in dollars and cents or in centimeters and grams, are exceedingly small, and require specially designed experiments executed by men of the highest skill to show their existence at all. The phenomena with which quantum theory deals, on the other hand, are of the greatest practical importance and involve the

simplest aspects of everyday life. For example, before the advent of quantum theory no one could explain why a tea kettle of water boiling on the stove should not give out enough light in virtue of its temperature to be visible in the dark; the accepted theories of optics demanded that it should be visible, but every burned child knew that it was not.

One reason that the man in the street has not sensed this new domain is that it is much more difficult to explain than relativity; this is partly due to the nature of the subject, and partly also to the fact that the physicist himself does not understand the subject as well. I shall not in this article rush in where the angels have not ventured, but it is, nevertheless, necessary to try to give a glimmering of an idea of what it is all about.

Although all the phenomena of ordinary life are really quantum phenomena, they do not begin to stand out unequivocally in their quantum aspect and admit of no other interpretation until we have penetrated very far down into the realm of small things and have arrived at the atoms and electrons themselves. It must not be pretended that the nature of the quantum phenomena met in this realm of small things is by any means completely understood; but a suggestive characterization of the general situation is that atomicity or discontinuity is an even more pervading characteristic of the structure of the universe than had been previously supposed. In fact the name, "quantum," was suggested by the atomicity.

We were a long time in convincing ourselves of the atomic structure of ordinary matter; although this was guessed by the poets as early as the beginning of the Christian era, it was not generally accepted as proved, even by physicists, until the beginning of this century. The next step was the discovery of the atomic structure of electricity; there are indivisible units of positive and negative electricity, and the atoms of matter are constructed of atoms of electricity. This situation was not even guessed until about 1890; the proof and acceptance of the doctrine have taken place within the memory of the majority of the readers of this article. Finally comes the discovery that, not only is matter doubly atomic in its structure, but that there is an atomicity in the way in which one piece of matter acts on another. This is perhaps best understood in the case of optical phenomena. It used to be thought that light was infinitely subdivisible—that I could, for example, receive at pleasure on the film of my camera either the full intensity of the sun's radiation, or, by interposing a sufficiently small stop, that I could cut the intensity of the light down to anything this

side of nothing at all. This is now known not to be true; but the light which we receive from the sun is atomic in structure, like an almost inconceivably fine rain composed of indivisible individual drops, rather than like the continuous flood of infinitely subdivisible radiation that we had supposed. If I close the stop of my camera too much I may receive nothing at all on the film, or I may receive a single one of the drops in the rain of radiation, but there is no step between one drop and nothing. The recognition that radiation has this property means that in some respects we have come back very close to Newton's ideas about light.

The proof that this is the structure of light can be given in many ways. Perhaps the most illuminating for our purpose is that discovered by Arthur Compton, for which he received the Nobel prize. Compton's discovery consisted in finding that the drops of radiation behave in certain ways like the material drops of ordinary rain; they have energy and mass and momentum, which means that when they collide with matter they behave in some respects very much as ordinary bodies do. The laws which govern the interaction or collision of ordinary bodies are known to any graduate of a high-school course in physics; he could calculate what would happen after two billiard balls had collided provided we would tell him exactly how each of the balls was moving before the collision, and what were the elastic properties of the materials of which the balls are composed. In making the calculation he would use, among other things, the two fundamental principles of the conservation of energy and the conservation of momentum. Now Compton showed that what happens when a drop, or better a bullet, of radiation collides with an electron is also governed by the same two fundamental principles. The proof consisted in showing that the way in which the electron rebounds is connected with the way in which the bullet rebounds by equations deduced from these principles; this is one of the features which makes Compton's discovery of such a fundamental importance.

But Compton's experiment contains another feature, and it is this which seems destined to revolutionize the thinking of civilization. Go back to the billiard-ball analogy: an expert billiard player can, by proper manipulation of the cue ball, make the two balls rebound from the collision as he wishes; this involves the ability to predict how the balls will move after collision from their behavior before collision. We should expect by analogy to be able to do the same thing for a collision between a bullet of radiation and an electron; but the fact is that it never has been done and, if our present theories are correct,

in the nature of things never can be done. It is true that, if someone will tell me how the electron bounces away, I can tell, on the basis of the equations given by Compton's theory, how the bullet of radiation bounces away, or conversely; but no one has ever been able to tell how both will bounce away. Billiards, played with balls like this, even by a player of infinite skill, would degenerate into a game of pure chance.

This unpredictable feature has been seized and incorporated as one of the corner stones in the new theory of quantum mechanics, which has so stirred the world of physicists in the last three years. It has received implicit formulation in the "Principle of Uncertainty" of Heisenberg, a principle which I believe is fraught with the possibility of greater change in mental outlook than was ever packed into an equal number of words. The exact formulation of the principle, which is very brief, is framed in too technical language to reproduce here, but I shall try to give the spirit of the principle. The essence of it is that there are certain inherent limitations to the accuracy with which a physical situation can be described. Of course we have always recognized that all our physical measurements are necessarily subject to error; but it has always been thought that, if we took pains enough and were sufficiently clever, no bounds could be set to the accuracy which we might some day achieve. Heisenberg's principle states, on the other hand, that the ultimately possible accuracy of our measurements is limited in a curious and unsuspected way. There is no limit to the accuracy with which we can describe (or measure) any one quality in a physical situation, but if we elect to measure one thing accurately we pay a price in our inability to measure some other thing accurately. Specifically, in Compton's experiment, the principle states that we can measure the position of the electron as accurately as we choose, but in so doing we must sacrifice by a compensating amount the possibility of accurately measuring its velocity. In particular, if we measure with perfect accuracy the position of the electron, we have thereby denied ourselves the possibility of making any measurement at all of its velocity.

The meaning of the fact that it is impossible to measure exactly both the position and velocity of the electron may be paradoxically stated to be that an electron cannot have both position and velocity. The justification of this is to be found in the logical analysis of the meaning of our physical concepts which has been stimulated by the relativity theory of Einstein. On careful examination the physicist finds that in the sense in which he uses language no meaning at all can

be attached to a physical concept which cannot ultimately be described in terms of some sort of measurement. A body has position only in so far as its position can be measured; if its position cannot in principle be measured, the concept of position applied to the body is meaningless, or in other words, a position of the body does not exist. Hence if both the position and velocity of the electron cannot in principle be measured, the electron cannot have both position and velocity; position and velocity as expressions of properties which an electron can simultaneously have are meaningless. To carry the paradox one step farther, by choosing whether I shall measure the position or velocity of the electron I thereby determine whether the electron has position or velocity. The physical properties of the electron are not absolutely inherent in it, but involve also the choice of the observer.

Return to the analogy of the billiard ball. If we ask our high-school physicist what he must be told before he can predict how the billiard balls will rebound after collision, he will say that, unless he is told both how fast the balls are traveling when they collide, and also what their relative positions are at the moment of collision he can do very little. But this is exactly the sort of thing that the Heisenberg principle says no one can ever tell; so that our high-school computer would never be able to predict how a bullet of radiation and an electron behave after collision, and no more could we. This means that in general when we get down to fine-scale phenomena the detailed results of interaction between the individual elements of which our physical world are composed are essentially unpredictable.

This principle has been built into a theory, and the theory has been checked in many ways against experiment, and always with complete success. One of the consequences of which the man in the street has heard a good deal is that an electron has some of the properties of waves, as shown so strikingly in the experiments of Davisson and Germer. Of course no one can say that some day a fact may not be discovered contrary to the principle, but up to the present there is no evidence of it; and it is certain that something very much like this principle, if not this principle exactly, covers an enormously wide range of phenomena. In fact the principle probably governs every known type of action between different parts of our physical universe. One reason that this principle has not been formulated before is that the error which it tells us is inherent in all measurement is so small that only recently have methods become accurate enough to detect it. The error is unimportant, and indeed immeasurably small when we are dealing with the things of ordinary life. The extreme minuteness

of the effect can be illustrated again with the billiard balls. Suppose that at the instant of collision the position of the balls is known with an uncertainty no greater than the diameter of a single atom, a precision very much higher than has ever been attained. Then the principle says that it is impossible to measure the velocity of the balls without a related uncertainty; but on figuring it out we find that this uncertainty is so small that after the lapse of one hundred thousand years, assuming a billiard table large enough for the balls to continue rolling for one hundred thousand years, the additional uncertainty in the position of the balls arising from the uncertainty in the velocity would again be only the diameter of a single atom. The error becomes important only when we are concerned with the ultimately small constituents of things, such as the action between one atom and another or between an atom of radiation and an electron.

III

It is easy to see why the discovery that nature is constituted in this way, and in particular is essentially unpredictable, has been so enormously upsetting. For the ability to predict a happening is tied up with our ideas of cause and effect. When we say that the future is causally determined by the present we mean that if we are given a complete description of the present the future is completely determined, or in other words, the future is the effect of the present, which is the cause. This causal relation is a bilateral relation; given the cause, the effect is determined, or given the effect, the cause may be deduced. But this means, in the particular case that we have been considering of collision between a bullet of radiation and an electron, that the causal connection does not exist, for if it did the way in which the electron rebounds after the collision would be determined, that is, it could be predicted, in terms of what happens before the collision. Conversely, it is of course impossible to reconstruct from the way in which the electron and radiation rebound the way in which they were moving before collision. Hence the rebound of the electron is not causally connected with what goes before.

The same situation confronts the physicist everywhere; whenever he penetrates to the atomic or electronic level in his analysis, he finds things acting in a way for which he can assign no cause, for which he never can assign a cause, and for which the concept of cause has no meaning, if Heisenberg's principle is right. This means nothing more nor less than that the law of cause and effect must be given up.

The precise reason that the law of cause and effect fails can be paradoxically stated; it is not that the future is not determined in terms of a complete description of the present, but that in the nature of things the present cannot be completely described.

The failure of the law of cause and effect has been exploited by a number of German physicists, who have emphasized the conclusion that we are thus driven to recognize that the universe is governed by pure chance; this conclusion does not, I believe, mean quite what appears on the surface, but in any event we need not trouble ourselves with the further implications of this statement, in spite of their evident interest.

One may be sure that a principle as revolutionary in its implications as this, which demands the sacrifice of what had become the cardinal article of faith of the physicist, has not been accepted easily, but there has been a great deal of pondering and searching of fundamentals.

The result of all this pondering has been to discover in the principle an inevitableness, which when once understood, is so convincing that we have already almost ceased to kick against the pricks. This inevitableness is rooted in the structure of knowledge. It is a commonplace that we can never know anything about anything without getting into some sort of connection with it, either direct or indirect. We, or someone else, must smell the object, or taste it, or touch it, or hear it, or see it, or it must affect some other object which can affect our senses either directly or indirectly, before we can know anything about it, even its existence. This means that no knowledge of any physical property or of even mere existence is possible without interaction; in fact these terms have no meaning apart from interaction. Formerly, if this aspect of the situation was thought of at all, it would have been dismissed as merely of academic interest, of no pertinence at all, and the justification of this would have been found in the supposed possibility of making the inevitable interaction as small as we pleased. The defender of the old point of view might have flippantly remarked that a cat may look at a king, by which he would have meant that the act of observation has no effect on the object. But even in the old days a captious critic might have objected to this easy self-satisfaction by pointing out that light exerts a pressure, so that light cannot pass from the king to the cat without the exercise of a certain amount of mechanical repulsion between them. This remark of the captious critic now ceases to be merely academic because of the discovery that light itself is atomic in structure, so that at least

one bullet of radiation must pass if any light at all passes, and the king cannot be observed at all without the exertion of that minimum amount of mechanical repulsion which corresponds to a single bullet.

This evidently alters the entire situation. The mere act of giving meaning through observation to any physical property of a thing involves a certain minimum amount of interaction. Now if there are definite characteristics associated with the minimum interaction, it is conceivable that no observation of anything whatever can be made without entraining certain universal consequences, and this turns out to be the case. Let us return again to the useful billiard-ball analogy. What must our high-school calculator know in order completely to calculate the behavior of the balls after collision? Evidently, if he is to give a complete description of the motion, that is, give in addition to direction and velocity of motion the exact time at which the balls are in any particular location, he must know how long the collision lasts. This means that the act of collision itself must be analyzed. This analysis is actually possible, and in fact, rapid-moving pictures have been taken, showing in detail how the balls are deformed during their contact together.

Returning now to the collision between a bullet of radiation and an electron, in order to determine completely the behavior after collision we must similarly analyze the details of the process of collision. In particular, if we want to predict where the electron is after collision we must analyze the collision sufficiently to be able to say how fast the electron is moving at each instant of the collision. But how shall this analysis be made? If the analysis means anything, it must involve the possibility of observation; and observation involves interaction; and interaction cannot be reduced below a minimum. But the collision, or interaction, between the electron and radiation that we are analyzing is itself the minimum interaction. It is obvious that we cannot discover fine details with an instrument as coarse as the thing that we are trying to analyze, so that the necessary analysis of the minimum interaction can never be made, and hence has no meaning, because of our fundamental dictum that things which cannot in principle be measured have no meaning. Therefore, the act of collision cannot be analyzed, the electron and radiation during collision have no measurable properties, and the ordinary concepts, which depend on these properties, do not apply during collision, and have no meaning. In particular, the ordinary concept of velocity does not apply to the act of collision, and we are prepared to expect something curious as the result of the collision. In fact, the detailed working out of the theory

shows that the meaninglessness of velocity during the act of collision carries with it the consequence that the electron emerges from the collision with a certain nebulosity or indefiniteness in properties such as position, which according to the old point of view depend on the velocity, and it is precisely this nebulosity which is described in Heisenberg's principle.

The infinitesimal world thus takes on a completely new aspect, and it will doubtless be a long while before the average human mind finds a way of dealing satisfactorily with a situation so foreign to ordinary experience. Almost the first necessity is a renunciation of our present verbal habits and of their implications. It is extraordinarily difficult to deal with this new situation with our present forms of expression, and the exposition of this paper is no exception. The temptation is almost irresistible to say and to think that the election *really* has *both* position and velocity, only the trouble is that our methods of measurement are subject to some limitation which prevents us from measuring both simultaneously. An attitude like this is justified by all the experience of the past, because we have always been able hitherto to continue to refine our methods of measurement after we had apparently reached the end. But here we are confronted by a situation which in principle contains something entirely novel, and the old expectations are no longer valid. The new situation cannot be adequately dealt with until long-continued familiarity with the new facts produces in our subconsciousness as instinctive a grasp as that which we now have of the familiar relations of everyday experience.

IV

The implications of this discovery are evidently most far-reaching. Let us first consider the scientific implications and, in particular, the implications for physics. The physicist is here brought to the end of his domain. The record of physics up to the present has been one of continued expansion, ever penetrating deeper and deeper, and always finding structure on a finer and finer scale beyond previous achievement. Several times in the past even eminent physicists have permitted themselves the complacent announcement that we were in sight of the end, and that the explanation of all things was in our hands. But such predictions have always been set at naught by the discovery of finer details, until the average physicist feels an instinctive horror of the folly of prediction. But here is a situation new and unthought of. We have reached the point where knowledge must stop because

of the nature of knowledge itself: beyond this point meaning ceases.

It may seem that we are getting back pretty close to the good Bishop Berkeley, but I think that actually nothing could be wider of the mark. We are not saying that nothing exists where there is no consciousness to perceive it; we are saying that existence has meaning only when there is interaction with other existence, but direct contact with consciousness need not come until the end of a long chain. The logician will have no trouble in showing that this description of the situation is internally self-contradictory and does not make sense; but I believe that, nevertheless, the sympathetic reader will be able to see what the situation is, and will perhaps subscribe to the opinion that to describe it the development of a new language is necessary.

The physicist thus finds himself in a world from which the bottom has dropped clean out; as he penetrates deeper and deeper it eludes him and fades away by the highly unsportsmanlike device of just becoming meaningless. No refinement of measurement will avail to carry him beyond the portals of this shadowy domain which he cannot even mention without logical inconsistency. A bound is thus forever set to the curiosity of the physicist. What is more, the mere existence of this bound means that he must give up his most cherished convictions and faith. The world is not a world of reason, understandable by the intellect of man, but as we penetrate ever deeper, the very law of cause and effect, which we had thought to be a formula to which we could force God Himself to subscribe, ceases to have meaning. The world is not intrinsically reasonable or understandable; it acquires these properties in ever-increasing degree as we ascend from the realm of the very little to the realm of everyday things; here we may eventually hope for an understanding sufficiently good for all practical purposes, but no more.

The thesis that this is the structure of the world was not reached by armchair meditation, but it is the interpretation of direct experiment. Now all experiment is subject to error, and no one can say that some day new experimental facts may not be found incompatible with our present interpretation; all we can say is that at present we have no glimmering of such a situation. But whether or not the present interpretation will survive, a vision has come to the physicist in this experience which he will never forget; the possibility that the world may fade away, elude him, and become meaningless because of the nature of knowledge itself, has never been envisaged before,

at least by the physicist, and this possibility must forever keep him humble.

When this view of the structure of nature has once been accepted by physicists after a sufficiently searching experimental probe, it is evident that there will be a complete revolution in the aspect of all the other physical sciences. The mental outlook will change; the mere feeling that boundaries are set to man's inquiry will produce a subtle change of attitude no less comprehensive in its effects than the feeling, engendered by Newton's conquest of celestial mechanics, that the universe was a universe of order accessible to the mind of man. The immediate effect on scientific inquiry will be to divert effort away from the more obviously physical fields back to the fields of greater complication, which have been passed over by the physicist in his progress toward the ultimately little, especially the field of biology.

Another important result of the realization of the structure of the world is that the scientist will see that his program is finite. The scientist is perhaps only a passing phase in the evolution of man; after unguessable years it is not impossible that his work will be done, and the problems of mankind will become for each individual the problem of best ordering his own life. Or it may be that the program of the scientist, although finite, will turn out to need more time than the life of the world itself.

But doubtless by far the most important effect of this revolution will not be on the scientist, but on the man in the street. The immediate effect will be to let loose a veritable intellectual spree of licentious and debauched thinking. This will come from the refusal to take at its true value the statement that it is meaningless to penetrate much deeper than the electron, and will have the thesis that there *is really* a domain beyond, only that man with his present limitations is not fitted to enter this domain. The temptation to deal with the situation in this way is one that not many who have not been trained in careful methods of thinking will be able to resist—one reason is in the structure of language. Thought has a predisposition to certain tendencies merely because of the necessity of expressing itself in words. This has already been brought out sufficiently by the discussion above; we have seen how difficult it is to express in words the fact that the universe fades away from us by becoming meaningless without the implication that there really is something beyond the verge of meaning.

The man in the street will, therefore, twist the statement that the scientist has come to the end of meaning into the statement that the scientist has penetrated as far as he can with the tools at his command.

and that there is something beyond the ken of the scientist. This imagined beyond, which the scientist has proved he cannot penetrate, will become the playground of the imagination of every mystic and dreamer. The existence of such a domain will be made the basis of an orgy of rationalizing. It will be made the substance of the soul; the spirits of the dead will populate it; God will lurk in its shadows; the principle of vital processes will have its seat here; and it will be the medium of telepathic communication. One group will find in the failure of the physical law of cause and effect the solution of the age-long problem of the freedom of the will; and on the other hand the atheist will find the justification of his contention that chance rules the universe.

Doubtless generations will be needed to adjust our thinking so that it will spontaneously and freely conform to our knowledge of the actual structure of the world. It is probable that new methods of education will have to be painfully developed and applied to very young children in order to inculcate the instinctive and successful use of habits of thought so contrary to those which have been naturally acquired in meeting the limited situations of everyday life. This does not mean at all that the new methods of thought will be less well adapted than those we now have to meet the situations of everyday life, but on the contrary, since thought will conform to reality, understanding and conquest of the world about us will proceed at an accelerated pace. I venture to think that there will also eventually be a favorable effect on man's character; the mean man will react with pessimism, but a certain courageous nobility is needed to look a situation like this in the face. And in the end, when man has fully partaken of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, there will be this difference between the first Eden and the last, that man will not become as a god, but will remain forever humble.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

We have been born into a world made confident by belief in man's capacity for rational thought. Even a child comes to assume that every effect must have a cause and that that cause must have been the effect of another cause. And so we can go back and back—to the First Cause, which, many reason, must be God. Though if we only knew enough, is it conceivable that we could explain even that? Or let us say, in the beginning there *was* God, and He made and ordered the universe so that it

would forever work by universal laws. If so, given time, we will discover what those laws are and will then fully understand the nature of our world—all except the first Great Mystery.

This complete confidence in reason, in man's ultimate power to understand, has not always prevailed. Professor Bridgman dates it from the late 17th century. In the *Principia* (1687) Newton had explained gravitation; and as mind foretold even the courses of the stars, the age of faith in intellect arrived. By the 18th century the Age of Reason was full-blown. The conception of a mechanistic universe dominated thought: God was like a clock-maker who had started a great machine which worked with eternal regularity from earth through sun to star. The English deists easily found in laws of nature revelations of Divinity, although in England as in Voltaire's France, skepticism also gained ground.

In the 19th century (Huxley's "second Renaissance") faith in reason as the handmaid of science was finally driven home even to the layman. More and more completely the human intellect was dissipating mystery and establishing the reign of "natural law," which then seemed terrible in its bleak magnificence. Some voices still protested there were mysteries which could not be plumbed by test-tubes. But science was master, and scientists' passionate faith in rational thought was inescapably impressive. In his religious attitude the strict rationalist was agnostic: he could not deny but he could not accept the existence of a God he could not prove. Then, as in our century, many felt with dogmatic assurance that reason could eventually "explain" even the First Cause.

Conceive the irony should scientists themselves discover cause and effect, and law—the very premises of rational thought—to be meaningless. Would not a post-Newtonian era inevitably begin? The quantum theory may prove more destructive in its philosophic implications than its offspring, the atomic bomb, has been (as yet) in material effects.

Momentarily at least, man's dream of fully comprehending the nature of all matter has ended in frustration. Probing into the infinitesimal, physicists discovered that their modes of observation seem to have limitations unsurmountable by refinement in technique. Because of these limitations, intrinsic in the very means of measurement, it is impossible to "prove" cause-effect relationship. This does not mean that causal relationship does not *exist*. But obviously, something that can't be proved can no longer be sacred law. And because causation is one of its indispensable tools, reason cannot explain a material world in which causation is unprovable. Ours therefore is no longer the *intrinsically* reasonable world we heretofore have thought it.

Today, paradoxically, the physicist must be agnostic in his scientific attitude: he can only assume causation; perhaps he can nevermore be *sure*. And now, dogmatically, some theologians assert that if something can't be proved, it must be non-existent. It may help us to think of what happens after an astronomer announces that there may be life on Mars:

picking up the Sunday Supplement, we find the picture of a Martian. Just as there may or may not be Martians, so the Law of Cause and Effect may or may not be operative. Still, that *may* expresses the doubt that has destroyed old certainties.

1. Write a carefully constructed paragraph précis of Section I. Contrast the author's reasons for considering Newton important with those behind the average layman's respect for Edison. What is an essential difference between a savage's "superstitious" and a doctor's "rational" reaction to a plague? What cardinal assumption of "every educated person" does Bridgman propose to question? What general reason does he advance for believing "the age of Newton is now coming to an end"?

2. Where and how does Bridgman (1) prepare us for difficult reading? (2) whet our desire to comprehend? By the end of Sec. I, ¶3, what evidence have you received of his (1) awareness or lack of awareness of your point of view? (2) clarity or lack of clarity in developing paragraphs? larger units of thought? (3) relative complexity or simplicity of sentence structure? (4) abstruseness or relative simplicity and clarity of diction? (5) erudition or homeliness of illustration?

3. Before 1890, what was known about the structure of matter? Did information about the working of the atomic bomb help you comprehend the last half of Sec. II, ¶4? If so, how? How did Compton's discovery (Sec. II, ¶5) help to prove that light is composed of individual atomic "drops"? What do you understand by Heisenberg's "Principle of Uncertainty"? Explain as clearly as you can why Einstein's theory of relativity implies that position and velocity are not absolute properties of matter but are bestowed on matter by us—that is, are subjective rather than objective characteristics. Why does the author conclude no one can predict how the most minute particles of matter will interact? Precisely what is meant by *predictability?* Why did 19th-century scientists fail to question the predictability of the behavior of matter? How conclusively, according to Bridgman, has unpredictability been proved?

4. After studying Sec. II, why would no intelligent layman (perhaps especially your instructor) assume he had begun fully to comprehend the quantum theory? Beyond the elementary level, why is all *reading* that deserves the name a creative process? Why, as creative reading skill develops, do we grow more modest about how fully we comprehend challenging content? What penalty would we pay if we limited our reading, in any field, to what we fully comprehend? In what way, so far, has this essay rewarded your attempt to read?

5. Show how the law of cause and effect is basic to the reasoning in some essay you have studied (Huxley's, for example). Why is this law a basic premise of rational thought? Why is ability to know the present essential to thinking in terms of cause and effect? Now explain as fully as you can why physicists have concluded that in the nature of things the

present is unknowable. Explain why the nature of language makes it "extraordinarily difficult" to explain these concepts clearly.

6. From the essay as a whole gather evidence to explain why you think that when Bridgman says the law of cause and effect ceases to have meaning he implies either (1) that it does not operate in nature, or (2) that we can't *check* its operation. (Most physicists would disagree if he should mean the first; unlike Jeans and Eddington, they do not believe that each particle is a world unto itself and that ours is therefore inherently a "disordered" universe.) Do you feel that Bridgman has failed to make what he believes about this issue completely clear? How much light is thrown on his position by Sec. III, ¶3?

7. Why do discoveries leading to the quantum theory make the physicist doubt whether it will ever be possible fully to comprehend the nature of the universe? What different conclusions might be drawn from these discoveries by rationalists and by religious and philosophical "mystics"? How does the conclusion of the essay round out the opening statement about the Age of Newton? Even if the scientific difficulties explained by Bridgman are eventually resolved, is the quantum theory likely to have a general effect on 20th-century thought? Why or why not?

8. Evaluate the excellence of this essay as scientific-philosophic exposition, giving reasons for your estimate. Why, in your opinion, did the editors include this essay? Why were they right or wrong in doing so?

We Enter the Atomic Age

HARRY M. DAVIS

The release of atomic energy in the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, was the dramatic culmination of prolonged research in England, France, Germany, Italy, Scandinavia, and America harnessed to military uses by a cosmopolitan band of workers contributing to the United States War Department's secret "Manhattan Project." The force that killed 100,000 Japanese at a stroke, leveled almost five square miles of a city, and immeasurably hastened the end of the war affects the very destiny of mankind and is the concern of all thinking men. Atomic energy may ultimately either destroy civilization or open a future unbelievably bright.

Since August 6, 1945, a startled world has been asking itself many new questions. Will unprecedented new sources of energy eventually make coal and water power as outmoded as the flintlock or hand loom and revolutionize economics, politics, and thought? Will they make rocket transit and speeds of thousands of miles an hour sober realities? Will they release mankind partially or wholly from grinding manual toil, or will they impose new bondage and serfdom? Will they be seized by the few, intensifying the grasp of monopoly, or will they be turned to the benefit of all? Will atomic energy equalize small and large nations in military strength? Does it even now make peacetime compulsory military training irrelevant? Knowing that millions of their citizens and perhaps all their industries could be wiped out overnight in one atomic attack, will the nations move toward that "one world" which can keep the peace?—or will the genii of impersonal force, unbottled from the atom, destroy us and all our works in sudden blasts unimaginably blinding and intense? Unless the fund of wisdom, good will, and morality, which lie outside the sphere of science, is increased in the world, we may not have long to survive.

In a world whose very existence thus hinges on atomic energy, even the unscientific will wish to understand the basic facts of nuclear fission, source of atomic power. These basic facts are clearly set forth in the article here reprinted.

At the time of writing this article, Harry M. Davis (b. 1910) was a captain in the Signal Corps, on military leave from the *New York Times*. He holds the degrees of B.S. in Engineering and of Electrical Engineer from Columbia University. Entering journalism, he worked for the Associated Press 1932–34, then in 1935 went to the *Times*. In 1940–41, on leave from the *Times*, he held a Nieman Fellowship in Journalism at

The New York Times Magazine, Aug. 12, 1945. By permission of publisher and author.

Harvard. His work for the *Times* has been largely for the Sunday edition, in particular "News of the Week in Review" and articles on science such as that reprinted here. Since entering the Army he has published *What You Should Know about the Signal Corps.*

THE POWER of the atom has been unleashed. For better or for worse we have entered upon a new era in the history of mankind. The dreams and speculations that have been with us since the Curies discovered the amazing radioactive powers of the atom have become stern reality in the proving grounds of New Mexico and the streets of Japan.

The development is of Promethean significance. Generations millenniums hence may look back upon these years when atomic energy was first put to work in the same spirit in which we now think of the less well documented occasion when man first learned the use of fire.

Fire is a terrible destroyer, and so, today, is atomic energy. But fire is also the basis of the industrial civilization we now know—fire controlled in the boilers of our power plants, in the furnaces of our steel mills and smelters, in our automobile engines and in our jet-propelled and propeller-driven aircraft. The energy within the atom may well be the basis of an entirely new kind of civilization.

What has been done with atomic bombs, and the future prospect of useful atomic power, depend upon the knowledge of the atom's interior that has been gained in the last half century. The government-sponsored "Manhattan project" may have cast new light on the very nature of the atom; however, even with the 1940 model atom as it was publicly known before atomic physics became a military secret, we can form a pretty workable idea of what atoms are, what constitutes them and where their tremendous energy comes from.

In the first place, atoms are not rare animals. They are everywhere, since every substance in existence is simply an aggregation of atoms, in extraordinary quantities.

Individual atoms are very small. An ounce of uranium, made of one of the heaviest kinds of atom, contains approximately 100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 of them. Hydrogen, with the lightest atom, runs about 20,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 to the ounce. To avoid wasting paper with so many zeros, physicists, some years ago, decided to designate the atomic weight of hydrogen as 1 (strictly speaking, this was later modified to 1.008, but that is a rather technical matter). On this scale

helium has an atomic weight of 4, oxygen 16, lead about 207 and a particular variety of uranium of current interest has an atomic weight of 235 and is therefore popularly known as U-235.

Small as the atom may be, it is composed of particles which are very much smaller. The simplest of all atoms, hydrogen, consists mostly of empty space sparsely tenanted by only two particles. One of them is the electron, the smallest unit of negative electricity. The other is the proton, with an equal charge of positive electricity. Almost all the mass of the atom resides in the proton, which weighs about 1,800 times as much as the electron. A heavy object is generally less mobile than a light one and the simplified picture of the hydrogen atom is one with the proton constituting a more or less stationary nucleus while the electron circles around it somewhat as the earth circles around the sun. In fact, scientists at one time took the analogy to astronomy so seriously that they borrowed the word "orbit" and we speak of the orbit of the electron in the atomic system.

The minute we leave the simple hydrogen atom, we find that the nucleus gets more complicated. The next step is heavy hydrogen, which has a nucleus consisting of two particles. One is the same proton we found in ordinary hydrogen. The other is a particle called the neutron, which seems to be identical with the proton except that, as its name was meant to indicate, it is electrically neutral.

Heavier atoms, going up the scale through magnesium, oxygen, iron, lead and uranium, have more and more protons and neutrons in the nucleus, but in every case the positive electrical charge of the nucleus due to its protons is normally balanced by the negative charge of an equal number of electrons circling around it. When in the course of atomic events the number of electrons fails to match the positive charge of the nucleus, the atom is said to be positively, or negatively, electrified.

In a superficial way, men have been tinkering with atoms for thousands of years. For instance, when a piece of glass was rubbed with a silk cloth both the glass and the silk demonstrated properties of attraction and repulsion which were called electrical. What happened, we now know, was that electrons were added to the atoms of one substance and subtracted from the atoms of the other. In modern times it has been found that electrons can be removed from the outside of the atom fairly easily by the action of light, heat and electrical forces, and it is with electrons thus removed from their natural habitat that the entire art of electronics is concerned. Our ability thus to liberate and control the movements of electrons lifted from the outer shells

of atoms is employed in the vacuum and gaseous tubes that are at the heart of radio, radar and many industrial processes. But all this merely scratched the surface of the atom.

In the laboratories a deeper search was carried into the very interior of the atom—the nucleus. The secret of the nucleus became known to man because nature betrayed it in the phenomenon of radioactivity. The first betrayal took place nearly fifty years ago with the very element that assumed such significance last week—uranium. In 1896, Henri Becquerel, at the Sorbonne in France, happened to place a uranium preparation in the same desk drawer with some photographic plates. When he came to use those plates he found that, although they had been carefully wrapped in thick black paper, they were fogged as if they had been exposed to light. Instead of merely worrying about the spoiling of some photographs, he proceeded deliberately to ruin some more plates by placing them again close to the uranium, but this time with an iron key in between. The result, on development, was a silhouette of the key. Here was a new kind of ray which would penetrate through paper but not through iron.

Two other French scientists, Pierre and Marie Curie, found that in the pitchblende ore of uranium there were other substances which also gave off strange new kinds of radiation. The tremendous power of the radium finally isolated by Madame Curie was shown by the prices which tiny quantities of it later commanded for both hospital and industrial use.

In the ensuing years, many other types of radioactive elements were discovered. These elements—such as uranium and radium—consist of heavy atoms which seem to be naturally unstable. They disintegrate at various rates. In a quantity of a given radioactive element, a certain fixed proportion of the atoms simply explodes over a certain period of time. The nucleus shoots out a particle or a bit of energy known as a gamma ray. There remains a smaller nucleus—that of an atom of lower atomic weight. In most cases, the new atom is itself unstable and therefore radioactive, giving off other particles. These explosions occur in a series which terminates in the form of lead.

The rays thus given out are powerful. They have power, as Becquerel originally found, to penetrate through solid substances and to blacken a photographic plate. They have power to destroy human flesh, but fortunately the effect is stronger on cancerous than on normal tissue—a phenomenon which made radium so precious as an instrument of medicine. The rays have still another power—to smash into the nucleus of stable atoms and turn them into unstable and therefore

radioactive substances. In other words, with certain combinations, radioactivity becomes contagious. The discovery of this contagion was the beginning of atom-smashing.

As early as 1905, Einstein wrote a classically simple little equation which really explained a good deal of what was going on. It was part of the theory of relativity, and it indicated two things—that light, which is a form of energy, has mass just as does a particle of matter and that, conversely, any particle of matter can be considered as a bundle of energy. The startling thing about his equation was the factor by which one had to multiply mass to figure out its equivalent in energy. This factor was the square of the velocity of light, that is, 300,000,000 meters per second multiplied by itself. The conclusion, which at first seemed to be only of philosophical interest, was that if only a tiny bit of matter should somehow be destroyed, it would be reincarnated as energy in an enormous quantity.

As physicists began to get better concentrations of radioactive materials they found that an actual disappearance of mass was occurring in the disintegration of unstable atoms. By very careful measurements of the particles into which the atoms split, it was found that the sum of the parts was not equal to the original whole. The difference had gone off into energy, represented in the speed of the particles shot out, in their ability to penetrate through sheets of solid matter, to kill cancers, to darken photographic plates and to smash other atoms.

These discoveries were supplemented by artificial instruments, such as the cyclotron, in which sub-atomic particles were whirled around under very high electrical voltage and speeded up to the point where their atom-smashing abilities were considerably increased. It was found that atoms bombarded by these high-speed particles were transformed into other atoms. Thus the combination of natural radioactivity and artificial accelerating machinery was actually doing what the alchemists of old had never succeeded in accomplishing with their magic words.

But all these man-controlled processes affecting the nucleus of the atom were on a very tiny scale. The energies of the particles were measured by turning a microscope on the tracks made by them in special photographic plates or by their effect in causing tiny droplets to condense out of foggy vapor. The quantities of gold, radioactive salt and similar products of the newer alchemy were microscopic. And, although atomic energy was definitely released it usually appeared only in a relatively small number of atoms. While an indi-

vidual atom might show a profit in energy, the over-all power input until a few years ago was always far greater than the output.

The laboratory knowledge did bring the gradual realization that in the world around us, atomic energy was really at work on a tremendous scale. For one thing, radioactive atoms of heavy elements distributed in the rocks of the earth are now believed by geologists to be playing a very important part in keeping the earth from cooling off and, over millions of years, to be creating by their subterranean heat the irresistible forces which push up new mountain ranges and change the shapes of continents.

Astronomers applied the findings of the atom-smashers to the solution of one of the greatest problems about the sun and the stars—the problem of what makes them shine. They knew that our sun could not be "burning" in the usual sense for two reasons—first, because it would have burned away its substance long ago; and second, because at the temperatures of the sun, the atoms of "fuel" elements and the atoms of oxygen were moving too fast to join together in the chemical union that constitutes burning. The new method of calculating the conversion of mass to energy indicated that through the collision and disruption of the sun's atoms, followed by the recombination of the fragments into other kinds of atoms, the sun's tremendous quota of radiation could be accounted for with a reasonably slow reduction in its mass. By 1940, it was quite generally accepted by astronomers that the sun shines by atomic energy.

In an article describing what was known to science about the sun's functioning in the *New York Times Magazine* of April 7, 1940, the writer described this solar power system and stated: "In earthly laboratories men have not yet been able to set the process going on a practical scale."

Even as those words were written, however, men in the laboratories were beginning to find that with a certain type and concentration of radioactive uranium the release of energy could approach truly explosive dimensions.

Strangely enough, it turned out that for this purpose the most effective atom-smashing weapons were not the fast-moving electrically charged fragments such as the helium nucleus (known as alpha rays), the heavy hydrogen nucleus (known as deuterons) nor the fast electrons (known as beta rays). Instead, the most potent weapon turned out to be one of the last atomic particles to be discovered—the neutron—the slow-moving neutron at that.

Being electrically neutral, the free neutron is neither attracted nor

repelled by the positive and negative components of the atom, but instead proceeds serenely along through any atoms in its way and occasionally enters the nucleus of one of them. In joining this new and closely knit family of protons and neutrons, the foreign neutron creates a new kind of atom which is unstable. And the instability thus induced was found to be of a hitherto unknown kind.

This new kind of modified uranium atom was not merely radioactive; it did not merely shoot off one or two neutrons, protons and electrons. It was so unbalanced that it virtually split in half into atoms far down in the list of atomic weights. This was far beyond radioactivity, and it got a new name—nuclear fission. And the energies released, owing to the loss of mass in the split, were fantastically greater than those of merely radioactive atoms. Here at last—just as the world was going to war—was a real possibility of releasing from the massed stores of the atom a concentration of energy that would be truly terrific.

How this discovery suddenly faded from publicity into secrecy in Germany, Britain, Canada and the United States, and how the work went on on a billion-dollar basis under the direction of the Allied Governments, and with what military results—all this has made . . . probably the story of the century.

President Truman uttered the literal facts of physics when he taunted the worshipers of the rising sun with the statement that "the force from which the sun draws its powers has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East."

The magnitude of the powers thus put in the hands of mortal man has startled all who pause to think. The immediate applications are overshadowed by the problems of good and evil that this instrumentality poses for the future.

Perhaps for the sake of perspective we should look into the history of another kind of explosive force—not nearly so powerful, yet perhaps similarly terrifying in its early days. This is the explosive recombination of atoms into new kinds of molecules which constitutes rapid burning. The first internal combustion engine was the ignition of powder that propelled a bullet through a gun barrel. Today the explosive burning of gasoline and other fuels within the cylinders of our engines represents a superbly controlled release of chemical energy. Perhaps the coming decades will witness a similar harnessing of atomic energy. All energy can in some way be made to take the form of heat, and heat can be made to generate power in useful form.

Tremendous labors—probably greater than those involved in creat-

ing the atomic bomb—lie before mankind in harnessing this new and awe-inspiring power. It is impossible to foresee and predict how, and in fact whether, this will be done. Consider the millenniums from the first use of fire to the gasoline engine. Yet certain speculations seem plausible. The first step might likely be to capture atomic energy as heat, perhaps using a tiny pellet of the stuff to flash a tremendous amount of water into superheated steam—which could then drive the turbines now in our power plants. In this application uranium would replace both coal and falling water to provide a vastly increased flow of electric power over the high-tension lines of the nation.

If this were to happen it would probably mean far-reaching changes in the distribution and use of electric power besides reducing coal to a raw material for synthetic compounds, and limiting dam-building projects to the functions of flood control and irrigation.

Then again, and this seems a thing of the more distant future, some more direct way of utilizing atomic energies may be found. Perhaps, for example, a way of channeling the explosive force at once into a jet-thrust providing super-speed propulsion for winged and wingless conveyances. If this can be done, then gravitation might easily be overcome and the day of actual travel beyond our planet would be at hand.

It must be remembered too that atomic science is still in its infancy. The fission of uranium may be only the first of many ways of releasing the known energies within the atom—just as the rubbing of two sticks was only one primitive way of starting the contagious molecular explosions known as fire.

The tasks are such as to mobilize the best brains of humanity for generations to come. Atomic physics with its intricate apparatus, its dangerous radiations of still obscure biological effect on the human system, its baffling equations of quantum mechanics and its basic impact on the problems of the very nature of the universe—this science, far more than the much discussed field of electronics, is likely to challenge an increasing proportion of young man entering our universities.

Actually the ultimate source of all the power we use today on earth is from the heat radiated to us from the sun—where its generation is atomic. Thus we work on an indirect transformation of energy from a distant atomic furnace. The problem for our scientists and statesmen is to utilize the energy of our own earthly atoms directly without turning the earth itself into an incandescent and uninhabitable ball of fire.

If atomic explosions can be properly tamed, as molecular explosions already have been, the world may well enter a new era in which everything up to the middle of the twentieth century will seem only a short step from the caveman's shadowed home into the sun.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

The awful power of atomic energy frightened even the scientists who had released it. Of all the great secrets they have wrung from nature, this is the first they dared not trust to society without warnings and exhortations that it must be used wisely on peril of disaster. Coming out of their laboratories, they spoke up in the press, testified before Congressional committees, staged what has been called "the revolt of the scientists." For on what society does about atomic energy hinges not only the scientists' own freedom of research but the quality and even the existence of the society of which they and we are part.

What does the release of atomic energy mean for research? The wrong kind of government control, by requiring secrecy or giving power to private interests, could stifle scientific research. On the other hand, wise control, and further application of the technique of public support which so spectacularly hastened development of the atomic bomb, could advance research immeasurably. What could not such international cooperation, vast expenditure of public funds, and concentrated effort accomplish if applied to cancer and polio research, venereal disease, unemployment, illiteracy, intolerance, and other scourges of mankind! Can men fully cooperate only for destruction of their fellows, never for liberation and enlightenment? If so, we are doomed.

What does the new discovery mean for education? Beyond the need to train many more research scientists than we have had in the past there is the necessity of educating for internationalism and the overmastering requisite that we raise the general level of intelligence if we are to use the new force well. Liberal education must teach mankind to be wiser, more sensitive in conscience, more aware of human kinship, more courageous morally and intellectually, if atomic energy is to be our servant, not our destroyer. Science has put the new force into our hands; it cannot make us wise and moral men and women.

What does the new discovery mean for statesmanship? The scientists themselves have been very clear on that point. It means, they tell us—as do many others—that we must stop another war before it starts, for another war could be lost over night in one unannounced atomic attack. We can no longer afford leaders whose interests and knowledge are less than

world-wide or who conceive of their duties provincially. "One world or none": we must organize the world for peace—or perish.

1. Which sentence in the first three paragraphs expresses the gist of the introductory passage? Just what does that sentence mean?

2. Why are there more atoms in an ounce of hydrogen than of uranium? Labeling the details, draw diagrams of an atom (1) of ordinary hydrogen and (2) of heavy hydrogen. Through another diagram, represent an atom which is "positively electrified." What part of the atom can most easily be taken from the atom's outer shell? What is left?

3. What is (1) an essential characteristic of a radioactive atom? (2) an essential difference between an atom of some radioactive element and an atom of lead? How, then, can we explain (1) the spoilage of the plates Becquerel left next to uranium? (2) the helpfulness of radium in the treatment of cancer?

4. According to Einstein's theory, why would a particle of matter yield enormous energy if it could be destroyed? How did physicists begin to realize that, in radioactivity, matter was actually being transformed into enormous energy? How did they themselves begin to transform, by mechanical contrivance, one element into another? Why does the author call them modern "alchemists"? How did the new knowledge affect the theories of geologists? of astronomers?

5. Why did the free neutron turn out to be the particle of the atom most effective in penetrating the nucleus of another atom? What effect did it have on the atom it penetrated? Why did scientists now know that they might be able to release "a concentration of energy . . . truly terrific"? And what happened next?

6. What were the results of man's ability to release molecular energy? Why could the results of ability to release atomic energy be even more revolutionary? And now reread the introductory paragraphs. Which sentence states the chief purpose of the essay as a whole? What qualities of the author's style (his diction and sentence structure, for example, or perhaps his paragraphing and organization of the essay as a whole) were especially helpful in enabling him to make clear, even to the layman, the nature and significance of atomic energy?

7. How do you explain the fact that man's scientific knowledge so far surpasses his social and political wisdom? How does this discrepancy explain the public's shocked reaction to the news that we can now use atomic energy? Why was it absurd to hope that our nation could keep the new knowledge its own "secret"? What moral, in your opinion, does this tremendous story carry for mankind?

II

CONFLICTS IN SOCIAL THOUGHT

All the essays in this section bear on the nature and function of liberty in modern society. The section opens with essays probing the meaning of freedom: selections from John Milton and John Stuart Mill which are classics of the democratic tradition, and applications to our day by two contemporary writers. Then, since the tradition of freedom has been peremptorily challenged in our times by an authoritarian counter-revolution, the second essay-group presents Carlyle's denunciation of want-amid-plenty (one root of the counter-revolution), with his pre-fascist solution, followed by an analysis of Nazi-Japanese ideology and a warning from the War Department against the fascist forces still at work in a lopsided world where organs of control over the mass mind grow ever stronger. But the problem of want-amid-plenty has been tackled more directly and effectively by non-fascist thought. Thus in group 3, an early statement of socialist theory by William Morris is followed by examples of contemporary gradualist and Marxist argument, with their sharply differing attitudes toward freedom, and by the reaction of a contemporary liberal to the Marxist view. The section closes with Ruskin's early argument for a planned capitalist society and presentations of conservative and liberal conceptions of the relationship between planning and democratic freedom. The issues represented in this section will work like yeast among the masses of men until their insistence brings adequate solutions.

Areopagitica

JOHN MILTON

The great poems of John Milton (1608–1674), *Paradise Lost* and *Samson Agonistes,* and shorter poems like "Lycidas," "L'Allegro," "Il Penseroso," and the sonnets are better known than his prose. Every schoolboy knows something of the life of the sublime poet. The conventional division of his career into four periods summons up familiar images of the fair-cheeked, auburn-haired "lady of Christ's College," Cambridge; the sensitive, retired youth at Horton writing "L'Allegro," "Il Penseroso," "Comus," and "Lycidas," and the scholarly traveler in Italy; the vigorous Puritan polemicist and Latin Secretary to the Cromwellian Council of State; and at last the blind poet "fallen on evil days" dictating his greatest verse to his daughters in the licentious days of the Restoration. All English readers, whether or not they still read those last great poems, know them by reputation and know the connotations of the term "Miltonic," its suggestions of lofty dignity, imaginative richness, and concern with great issues of time and eternity.

Milton's poetry has almost crowded his prose out of public consciousness, on the whole quite justly. Much of the prose, in both English and Latin, has lost direct relevance and is marred by a spirit of bitter controversy, as was most of the polemical writing of the time. But his greatest prose work, *Areopagitica,* the most forceful of all pleas for freedom of the press, "the charter of the fourth estate," has had an unabating vitality and influence. It is filled with the great passion for rational freedom and the relentless hatred of tyranny that were the informing spirit of all his prose and of much of his poetry. Without the rancor that is so difficult to extenuate or accept in some of his prose, *Areopagitica* is animated by broad philosophical grasp of great issues and by noble reasonableness, common sense, and imagination. It combines the moral fervor of the Reformation with the intellectual and imaginative enthusiasm of the Renaissance. It displays the range and depth of Milton's mind and the sweep of his prose style with extraordinary magnificence.

The pamphlet was occasioned by an act of Parliament of June 14, 1643, requiring, among other matters, that no book be printed or sold "unless the same be first approved and licensed by such person or persons as both or either of the . . . [Houses of Parliament] shall appoint . . ." The Presbyterian party, then in control of Parliament, was much exercised about the

First published in 1644. A number of passages, including the opening paragraphs, have been omitted here. Much the best edition of *Areopagitica* is that of John W. Hales, Oxford Press, originally published in 1875. Students will find in this edition a wealth of commentary on the text.

dangers of "sects and schisms" and wished to impose religious uniformity and to suppress political opposition. Milton saw in the measure a revival of the old tyranny which the Commonwealth had sought to overcome, and he tried to persuade Parliament to repeal the edict. Though he failed in this objective, his words have ever since furnished weapons against new tyrannies. The work is in the form of a classical oration; but it was not, of course, publicly delivered, nor was it meant to be. The title comes from the Areopagitic Oration of Isocrates addressed in the 5th century B.C. to the Areopagus or Great Council of Athens urging them to reconsider some of their measures. Like Milton, Isocrates wrote his oration to be read rather than publicly delivered. The scholarly Milton was deeply versed in the ancient orations of Demosthenes and Cicero and in the principles of oratory set forth by writers like Quintilian, as not only *Areopagitica* but the eloquence of the fallen angels in *Paradise Lost* (Book II) reveal. The form of this "oration" is a masterly revivification of classical learning applied to an issue of the 17th century in a way still valid in the 20th.

I DENY NOT, but that it is of greatest concernment in the Church and Commonwealth, to have a vigilant eye how books demean themselves as well as men; and thereafter to confine, imprison, and do sharpest justice on them as malefactors. For books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a potency of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are; nay, they do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them. I know they are as lively, and as vigorously productive, as those fabulous dragon's teeth;[1] and being sown up and down, may chance to spring up armed men. And yet, on the other hand, unless wariness be used, as good almost kill a man as kill a good book. Who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image; but he who destroys a good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were in the eye.[2] Many a man lives a burden to the earth; but a good book is the precious life-blood of a master spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life. 'Tis true, no age can restore a life, whereof perhaps there is no great loss; and revolutions of ages do not oft recover the loss of a rejected truth, for the want of which whole nations fare the worse.

We should be wary therefore what persecution we raise against the

[1] The Greek hero Jason sowed the teeth of the Colchian dragon, and armed warriors sprang up. See Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, Book VIII.

[2] Stabs reason itself, the "eye" of man, who is the image of God.

living labours of public men, how we spill that seasoned life of man, preserved and stored up in books; since we see a kind of homicide may be thus committed, sometimes a martyrdom, and if it extend to the whole impression, a kind of massacre; whereof the execution ends not in the slaying of an elemental life, but strikes at that ethereal and fifth essence,[3] the breath of reason itself, slays an immortality rather than a life.

. . . . . .

How great a virtue is temperance, how much of moment through the whole life of man! Yet God commits the managing so great a trust, without particular law or prescription, wholly to the demeanour of every grown man. And therefore, when He Himself tabled the Jews from heaven, that omer,[4] which was every man's daily portion of manna, is computed to have been more than might have well sufficed the heartiest feeder thrice as many meals. For those actions which enter into a man, rather than issue out of him, and therefore defile not, God uses not to captivate under a perpetual childhood of prescription, but trusts him with the gift of reason to be his own chooser; there were but little work left for preaching, if law and compulsion should grow so fast upon those things which heretofore were governed only by exhortation. Solomon informs us, that much reading is a weariness to the flesh; but neither he nor other inspired author tells us that such or such reading is unlawful: yet certainly had God thought good to limit us herein, it had been much more expedient to have told us what was unlawful than what was wearisome. . . .

Good and evil we know in the field of this world grow up together almost inseparably; and the knowledge of good is so involved and interwoven with the knowledge of evil, and in so many cunning resemblances hardly to be discerned, that those confused seeds which were imposed upon Psyche as an incessant labour to cull out, and sort asunder,[5] were not more intermixed. It was from out the rind of one apple tasted, that the knowledge of good and evil, as two twins cleaving together, leaped forth into the world. And perhaps this is that doom which Adam fell into of knowing good and evil, that is to say of knowing good by evil. As therefore the state of man now is; what wisdom can there be to choose, what continence to forbear without the knowledge of evil? He that can apprehend and consider vice

[3] An *elemental* life is one composed of the four material elements; the *fifth essence* is immaterial, spiritual. Cf. Aristotle and other ancient philosophers.

[4] A unit of measurement. See *Exodus* 16: 16–36.

[5] In the famous tale of Cupid and Psyche. See *The Golden Ass* of Apuleius, Books IV–VI.

with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true wayfaring Christian.

I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much rather; that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary. That virtue therefore which is but a youngling in the contemplation of evil, and knows not the utmost that vice promises to her followers, and rejects it, is but a blank virtue, not a pure; her whiteness is but an excremental whiteness. Which was the reason why our sage and serious poet Spenser, whom I dare be known to think a better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas,[6] describing true temperance under the person of Guion, brings him in with his palmer through the cave of Mammon, and the bower of earthly bliss, that he might see and know, and yet abstain.[7] Since therefore the knowledge and survey of vice is in this world so necessary to the constituting of human virtue, and the scanning of error to the confirmation of truth, how can we more safely, and with less danger, scout into the regions of sin and falsity than by reading all manner of tractates and hearing all manner of reason? And this is the benefit which may be had of books promiscuously read.

But of the harm that may result hence three kinds are usually reckoned. First, is feared the infection that may spread; but then all human learning and controversy in religious points must remove out of the world, yea the Bible itself; for that ofttimes relates blasphemy not nicely,[8] it describes the carnal sense of wicked men not unelegantly, it brings in holiest men passionately murmuring against Providence through all the arguments of Epicurus:[9] in other great disputes it answers dubiously and darkly to the common reader. And ask a Talmudist what ails the modesty of his marginal Keri, that Moses and all the prophets cannot persuade him to pronounce the textual Chetiv.[10] For these causes we all know the Bible itself put by the

[6] Duns *Scotus* (1265–1308), the great medieval English theologian. Thomas *Aquinas* (1225?–1274), the supreme philosopher among the Schoolmen.

[7] *Faerie Queene,* Book II.

[8] In an outright way, without sparing.

[9] *Epicurus* (c. 42–270 B.C.), Greek philosopher, founder of Epicureanism, who wished to destroy religion.

[10] The original Talmud is the *Chetiv* ("written"); the marginal notes are the *Keri* ("read"). It is provided that "words which in the law are written obscenely must be changed to more civil words."

Papist into the first rank of prohibited books. The ancientest fathers must be next removed, as Clement of Alexandria,[11] and that Eusebian book of Evangelic preparation, transmitting our ears through a hoard of heathenish obscenities to receive the Gospel.[12] Who finds not that Irenæus, Epiphanius, Jerome,[13] and others discover more heresies than they well confute, and that oft for heresy which is the truer opinion?

. . . . . .

Seeing, therefore, that those books, and those in great abundance, which are likeliest to taint both life and doctrine, cannot be suppressed without the fall of learning and of all ability in disputation, and that these books of either sort are most and soonest catching to the learned, from whom to the common people whatever is heretical or dissolute may quickly be conveyed, and that evil manners are as perfectly learnt without books a thousand other ways which cannot be stopped, and evil doctrine not with books can propagate, except a teacher guide, which he might also do without writing, and so beyond prohibiting, I am not able to unfold, how this cautelous[14] enterprise of licensing can be exempted from the number of vain and impossible attempts. And he who were pleasantly disposed could not well avoid to liken it to the exploit of that gallant man who thought to pound up the crows by shutting his park gate.

Besides another inconvenience, if learned men be the first receivers out of books and dispreaders both of vice and error, how shall the licensers themselves be confided in, unless we can confer upon them, or they assume to themselves above all others in the land, the grace of infallibility and uncorruptedness? And again, if it be true that a wise man, like a good refiner, can gather gold out of the drossiest volume, and that a fool will be a fool with the best book, yea or without book; there is no reason that we should deprive a wise man of any advantage to his wisdom, while we seek to restrain from a fool, that which being restrained will be no hindrance to his folly. For if there should be so much exactness always used to keep that from him which is unfit for his reading, we should in the judgment of Aristotle not only, but of Solomon and of our Saviour,[15] not vouchsafe him good precepts, and by consequence not willingly admit him to good

[11] *Clement of Alexandria* (2d century) attacked polytheistic religion.
[12] *Eusebius* (c. 264–c. 340), a Palestinian, author of the *Evangelical Preparation.*
[13] *Irenaeus,* made Bishop of Lyons in 177. *Epiphanius,* made Bishop of Salamis in 367. Saint *Jerome* (c. 340–420), one of the most learned of the Latin Church Fathers.
[14] Crafty, over-cautious.
[15] See Aristotle's *Ethics,* I, 3; *Proverbs* 26:5; *Matthew* 7:6.

books; as being certain that a wise man will make better use of an idle pamphlet, than a fool will do of sacred Scripture.

'Tis next alleged we must not expose ourselves to temptations without necessity, and next to that, not employ our time in vain things. To both these objections one answer will serve, out of the grounds already laid, that to all men such books are not temptations, nor vanities, but useful drugs and materials wherewith to temper and compose effective and strong medicines, which man's life cannot want. The rest, as children and childish men, who have not the art to qualify and prepare these working minerals, well may be exhorted to forbear, but hindered forcibly they cannot be by all the licensing that Sainted Inquisition[16] could ever yet contrive. Which is what I promised to deliver next, That this order of licensing conduces nothing to the end for which it was framed; and hath almost prevented me by being clear already while thus much hath been explaining. See the ingenuity of Truth, who, when she gets a free and willing hand, opens herself faster than the pace of method and discourse can overtake her.

. . . . . .

Plato, a man of high authority, indeed, but least of all for his commonwealth,[17] in the book of his Laws, which no city ever yet received, fed his fancy by making many edicts to his airy burgomasters, which they who otherwise admire him wish had been rather buried and excused in the genial cups of an Academic night sitting. By which laws he seems to tolerate no kind of learning but by unalterable decree, consisting most of practical traditions, to the attainment whereof a library of smaller bulk than his own Dialogues would be abundant. And there also enacts, that no poet should so much as read to any private man what he had written, until the judges and law-keepers had seen it, and allowed it. But that Plato meant this law peculiarly to that commonwealth which he had imagined, and to no other, is evident. Why was he not else a lawgiver to himself, but a transgressor, and to be expelled by his own magistrates; both for the wanton epigrams and dialogues which he made, and his perpetual

[16] "The Holy Inquisition," as it was called, set up by Pope Innocent III in the 13th century, for the purpose of stamping out heresy, was introduced into France, Italy, and Spain. It was revived in Spain in the 15th century under the Grand Inquisitor Torquemada, practicing inhuman tortures and burning many heretics at the stake. It was under the Inquisition, says Milton, that the practice of licensing books was first begun. The office of the Inquisition lasted until its abolition by Napoleon in 1808. Revived in 1814, it was permanently abolished in 1820.

[17] Plato describes in the *Republic* what he considers an ideal commonwealth, but he suggests that it is impossible actually to realize the conditions necessary for such a state.

reading of Sophron Mimus and Aristophanes,[18] books of grossest infamy, and also for commending the latter of them, though he were the malicious libeller of his chief friends, to be read by the tyrant Dionysius,[19] who had little need of such trash to spend his time on? But that he knew this licensing of poems had reference and dependence to many other provisos there set down in his fancied republic, which in this world could have no place: and so neither he himself, nor any magistrate, or city ever imitated that course, which, taken apart from those other collateral injunctions, must needs be vain and fruitless. For if they fell upon one kind of strictness, unless their care were equal to regulate all other things of like aptness to corrupt the mind, that single endeavour they knew would be but a fond labour; to shut and fortify one gate against corruption, and be necessitated to leave others round about wide open.

If we think to regulate printing, thereby to rectify manners, we must regulate all recreations and pastimes, all that is delightful to man. No music must be heard, no song be set or sung, but what is grave and Doric.[20] There must be licensing dancers, that no gesture, motion, or deportment be taught our youth but what by their allowance shall be thought honest; for such Plato was provided of; it will ask more than the work of twenty licensers to examine all the lutes, the violins, and the guitars in every house; they must not be suffered to prattle as they do, but must be licensed what they may say. And who shall silence all the airs and madrigals that whisper softness in chambers? The windows also, and the balconies must be thought on; there are shrewd books, with dangerous frontispieces, set to sale; who shall prohibit them, shall twenty licensers? The villages also must have their visitors to inquire what lectures the bagpipe and the rebeck reads, even to the ballatry and the gamut of every municipal fiddler, for these are the countryman's Arcadias, and his Monte Mayors.[21]

Next, what more national corruption, for which England hears ill abroad, than household gluttony: who shall be the rectors of our daily rioting? And what shall be done to inhibit the multitudes that frequent those houses where drunkenness is sold and harboured? Our garments also should be referred to the licensing of some more sober workmasters to see them cut into a less wanton garb. Who shall regu-

[18] *Sophron Mimus* (5th century B.C.), author of coarse "mimes." *Aristophanes,* Plato's contemporary, the great satirical comic dramatist, whose lines are often obscene.

[19] *Dionysius* the Elder (430–367 B.C.), Tyrant of Syracuse.

[20] Martial music, distinguished from the voluptuous Lydian and wild Phrygian modes.

[21] Sidney's *Arcadia* and Montemayor's *Diana Enamorada* were prose pastoral romances popular in courtly and educated circles.

late all the mixed conversation of our youth, male and female together, as is the fashion of this country? Who shall still appoint what shall be discoursed, what presumed, and no further? Lastly, who shall forbid and separate all idle resort, all evil company? These things will be, and must be; but how they shall be least hurtful, how least enticing, herein consists the grave and governing wisdom of a state.

To sequester out of the world into Atlantic and Utopian[22] polities which never can be drawn into use, will not mend our condition; but to ordain wisely as in this world of evil, in the midst whereof God hath placed us unavoidably. Nor is it Plato's licensing of books will do this, which necessarily pulls along with it so many other kinds of licensing, as will make us all both ridiculous and weary, and yet frustrate; but those unwritten, or at least unconstraining, laws of virtuous education, religious and civil nurture, which Plato there mentions as the bonds and ligaments of the commonwealth, the pillars and the sustainers of every written statute; these they be which will bear chief sway in such matters as these, when all licensing will be easily eluded. Impunity and remissness, for certain, are the bane of a commonwealth; but here the great art lies, to discern in what the law is to bid restraint and punishment, and in what things persuasion only is to work.

If every action, which is good or evil in man at ripe years, were to be under pittance and prescription and compulsion, what were virtue but a name, what praise could be then due to well-doing, what gramercy to be sober, just, or continent? Many there be that complain of Divine Providence for suffering Adam to transgress; foolish tongues! When God gave him reason, He gave him freedom to choose, for reason is but choosing; he had been else a mere artificial Adam, such an Adam as he is in the motions.[23] We ourselves esteem not of that obedience, or love, or gift, which is of force: God therefore left him free, set before him a provoking object, ever almost in his eyes; herein consisted his merit, herein the right of his reward, the praise of his abstinence. Wherefore did He create passions within us, pleasures round about us, but that these rightly tempered are the very ingredients of virtue?

They are not skilful considerers of human things, who imagine to remove sin by removing the matter of sin; for, besides that it is a huge heap increasing under the very act of diminishing, though some part

[22] The reference is to Plato's imaginary island of Atlantis (see *Timaeus* and *Critias*) and to Sir Thomas Moore's Utopia.

[23] Puppet shows.

of it may for a time be withdrawn from some persons, it cannot from all, in such a universal thing as books are; and when this is done, yet the sin remains entire. Though ye take from a covetous man all his treasure, he has yet one jewel left, ye cannot bereave him of his covetousness. Banish all objects of lust, shut up all youth into the severest discipline that can be exercised in any hermitage, ye cannot make them chaste, that came not thither so: such great care and wisdom is required to the right managing of this point. Suppose we could expel sin by this means; look how much we thus expel of sin, so much we expel of virtue: for the matter of them both is the same; remove that, and ye remove them both alike.

This justifies the high providence of God, who, though He commands us temperance, justice, continence, yet pours out before us, even to a profuseness, all desirable things, and gives us minds that can wander beyond all limit and satiety. Why should we then affect a rigour contrary to the manner of God and of nature, by abridging or scanting those means, which books freely permitted are, both to the trial of virtue and the exercise of truth? It would be better done, to learn that the law must needs be frivolous, which goes to restrain things, uncertainly and yet equally working to good and to evil. And were I the chooser, a dram of well-doing should be preferred before many times as much the forcible hindrance of evil-doing. For God sure esteems the growth and completing of one virtuous person more than the restraint of ten vicious.

And albeit whatever thing we hear or see, sitting, walking, travelling, or conversing, may be fitly called our book, and is of the same effect that writings are, yet grant the thing to be prohibited were only books, it appears that this Order hitherto is far insufficient to the end which it intends. Do we not see, not once or oftener, but weekly, that continued court-libel against the Parliament and City,[24] printed, as the wet sheets can witness, and dispersed among us, for all that licensing can do? Yet this is the prime service, a man would think, wherein this Order should give proof of itself. If it were executed, you'll say. But certain, if execution be remiss or blindfold now, and in this particular, what will it be hereafter and in other books? If then the Order shall not be vain and frustrate, behold a new labour, Lords and Commons, ye must repeal and proscribe all scandalous and unlicensed books already printed and divulged; after ye have drawn them up into a list, that all may know which are condemned, and which not; and ordain that no foreign books be delivered out of the custody, till they

[24] Apparently the bitter Royalist sheet *Mercurius Aulicus* or *Court Mercury*.

have been read over. This office will require the whole time of not a few overseers, and those no vulgar men. There be also books which are partly useful and excellent, partly culpable and pernicious; this work will ask as many more officials, to make expurgations and expunctions, that the Commonwealth of Learning be not damnified. In fine, when the multitude of books increase upon their hands, ye must be fain to catalogue all those printers who are found frequently offending, and forbid the importation of their whole suspected typography. In a word, that this your Order may be exact and not deficient, ye must reform it perfectly according to the model of Trent and Seville,[25] which I know ye abhor to do.

Yet though ye should condescend to this, which God forbid, the Order still would be but fruitless and defective to that end whereto ye meant it. If to prevent sects and schisms, who is so unread or so uncatechised in story, that hath not heard of many sects refusing books as a hindrance, and preserving their doctrine unmixed for many ages, only by unwritten traditions? The Christian faith, for that was once a schism, is not unknown to have spread all over Asia, ere any Gospel or Epistle was seen in writing. If the amendment of manners be aimed at, look into Italy and Spain, whether those places be one scruple the better, the honester, the wiser, the chaster, since all the inquisitional rigour that hath been executed upon books.

Another reason, whereby to make it plain that this Order will miss the end it seeks, consider by the quality which ought to be in every licenser. It cannot be denied but that he who is made judge to sit upon the birth or death of books, whether they may be wafted into this world or not, had need to be a man above the common measure, both studious, learned, and judicious; there may be else no mean mistakes in the censure of what is passable or not; which is also no mean injury. If he be of such worth as behoves him, there cannot be a more tedious and unpleasing journey-work,[26] a greater loss of time levied upon his head, than to be made the perpetual reader of unchosen books and pamphlets, ofttimes huge volumes. There is no book that is acceptable unless at certain seasons; but to be enjoined the reading of that at all times, and in a hand scarce legible, whereof three pages would not down at any time in the fairest print, is an imposition which I cannot believe how he that values time and his own studies, or is but of a sensible nostril, should be able to endure. In this one thing I crave leave of the present licensers to be pardoned

[25] That is, according to the model of the Spanish Inquisition under Torquemada.
[26] Hack-work.

for so thinking; who doubtless took this office up, looking on it through their obedience to the Parliament, whose command perhaps made all things seem easy and unlaborious to them; but that this short trial hath wearied them out already, their own expressions and excuses to them who make so many journeys to solicit their license are testimony enough. Seeing therefore those who now possess the employment by all evident signs wish themselves well rid of it; and that no man of worth, none that is not a plain unthrift of his own hours is ever likely to succeed them, except he mean to put himself to the salary of a press corrector; we may easily foresee what kind of licensers we are to expect hereafter, either ignorant, imperious, and remiss, or basely pecuniary. This is what I had to show, wherein this Order cannot conduce to that end whereof it bears the intention.

I lastly proceed from the no good it can do, to the manifest hurt it causes, in being first the greatest discouragement and affront that can be offered to learning, and to learned men.

It was the complaint and lamentation of prelates, upon every least breath of a motion to remove pluralities,[27] and distribute more equally Church revenues, that then all learning would be for ever dashed and discouraged. But as for that opinion, I never found cause to think that the tenth part of learning stood or fell with the clergy: nor could I ever but hold it for a sordid and unworthy speech of any churchman who had a competency left him. If therefore ye be loth to dishearten heartily and discontent, not the mercenary crew of false pretenders to learning, but the free and ingenuous sort of such as evidently were born to study, and love learning for itself, not for lucre or any other end but the service of God and of truth, and perhaps that lasting fame and perpetuity of praise which God and good men have consented shall be the reward of those whose published labours advance the good of mankind, then know that, so far to distrust the judgment and the honesty of one who hath but a common repute in learning, and never yet offended, as not to count him fit to print his mind without a tutor and examiner, lest he should drop a schism, or something of corruption, is the greatest displeasure and indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put upon him.

What advantage is it to be a man over it is to be a boy at school, if we have only escaped the ferula[28] to come under the fescue of an

[27] "Pluralism" was the appointment of a clergyman to more than one benefice or "living."
[28] A rod or cane.
[29] The *fescue* was the teacher's "pointer." *Imprimatur* (Let it be printed) was the form printed with the official licenser's name in books approved by the Catholic authorities under the Inquisition.

Imprimatur,[29] if serious and elaborate writings, as if they were no more than the theme of a grammar-lad under his pedagogue, must not be uttered without the cursory eyes of a temporising and extemporising licenser? He who is not trusted with his own actions, his drift not being known to be evil, and standing to the hazard of law and penalty, has no great argument to think himself reputed in the Commonwealth, wherein he was born, for other than a fool or a foreigner. When a man writes to the world, he summons up all his reason and deliberation to assist him; he searches, meditates, is industrious, and likely consults and confers with his judicious friends; after all which done he takes himself to be informed in what he writes, as well as any that writ before him. If, in this the most consummate act of his fidelity and ripeness, no years, no industry, no former proof of his abilities can bring him to that state of maturity, as not to be still mistrusted and suspected, unless he carry all his considerate diligence, all his midnight watchings and expense of Palladian[30] oil, to the hasty view of an unleisured licenser, perhaps much his younger, perhaps far his inferior in judgment, perhaps one who never knew the labour of bookwriting, and if he be not repulsed or slighted, must appear in print like a puny[31] with his guardian, and his censor's hand on the back of his title to be his bail and surety that he is no idiot or seducer, it cannot be but a dishonour and derogation to the author, to the book, to the privilege and dignity of Learning.

And what if the author shall be one so copious of fancy, as to have many things well worth the adding come into his mind after licensing, while the book is yet under the press, which not seldom happens to the best and diligentest writers; and that perhaps a dozen times in one book? The printer dares not go beyond his licensed copy; so often then must the author trudge to his leave-giver, that those his new insertions may be viewed; and many a jaunt will be made, ere that licenser, for it must be the same man, can either be found, or found at leisure; meanwhile either the press must stand still, which is no small damage, or the author lose his accuratest thoughts, and send the book forth worse than he had made it, which to a diligent writer is the greatest melancholy and vexation that can befall.

And how can a man teach with authority, which is the life of teaching, how can he be a doctor[32] in his book as he ought to be, or else

[30] Learned. Milton thinks of the "midnight oil" as a gift of Pallas Athena.
[31] A minor. Cf. French *puis-né*.
[32] Cf. Latin *doctor* (from *docere*), a teacher.

had better be silent, whenas all he teaches, all he delivers, is but under the tuition, under the correction of his patriarchal licenser to blot or alter what precisely accords not with the hidebound humour which he calls his judgment? When every acute reader, upon the first sight of a pedantic license, will be ready with these like words to ding the book a quoit's distance from him: I hate a pupil teacher, I endure not an instructor that comes to me under the wardship of an overseeing fist. I know nothing of the licenser, but that I have his own hand here for his arrogance; who shall warrant me his judgment? The State, sir, replies the stationer, but has a quick return: The State shall be my governors, but not my critics; they may be mistaken in the choice of a licenser, as easily as this licenser may be mistaken in an author; this is some common stuff; and he might add from Sir Francis Bacon, that such authorised books are but the language of the times.[33] For though a licenser should happen to be judicious more than ordinary, which will be a great jeopardy of the next succession, yet his very office and his commission enjoins him to let pass nothing but what is vulgarly received already.

Nay, which is more lamentable, if the work of any deceased author, though never so famous in his lifetime and even to this day, come to their hands for license to be printed, or reprinted, if there be found in his book one sentence of a venturous edge, uttered in the height of zeal, and who knows whether it might not be the dictate of a divine spirit, yet not suiting with every low decrepit humour of their own, though it were Knox himself,[34] the Reformer of a Kingdom, that spake it, they will not pardon him their dash:[35] the sense of that great man shall to all posterity be lost, for the fearfulness or the presumptuous rashness of a perfunctory licenser. And to what an author this violence hath been lately done, and in what book of greatest consequence to be faithfully published,[36] I could now instance, but shall forbear till a more convenient season.

Yet if these things be not resented seriously and timely by them who have the remedy in their power, but that such ironmoulds[37] as these shall have authority to gnaw out the choicest periods of exquisitest books, and to commit such a treacherous fraud against the orphan remainders of worthiest men after death, the more sorrow will belong to that hapless race of men, whose misfortune it is to have under-

[33] From Bacon's *Advertisement Touching the Controversies in the Church of England.*
[34] John *Knox* (1513?–1572), the famous Scottish religious reformer.
[35] A sign indicating erasure or deletion.
[36] Milton's allusion here has not been identified.
[37] Rusts.

standing. Henceforth let no man care to learn, or care to be more than worldly-wise; for certainly in higher matters to be ignorant and slothful, to be a common steadfast dunce, will be the only pleasant life, and only in request.

And as it is a particular disesteem of every knowing person alive, and most injurious to the written labours and monuments of the dead, so to me it seems an undervaluing and vilifying of the whole Nation. I cannot set so light by all the invention, the art, the wit, the grave and solid judgment which is in England, as that it can be comprehended in any twenty capacities how good soever, much less that it should not pass except their superintendence be over it, except it be sifted and strained with their strainers, that it should be uncurrent without their manual stamp. Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolised and traded in by tickets and statutes and standards. We must not think to make a staple commodity of all the knowledge in the land, to mark and license it like our broadcloth and our woolpacks. What is it but a servitude like that imposed by the Philistines,[38] not to be allowed the sharpening of our own axes and coulters, but we must repair from all quarters to twenty licensing forges? . . .

Nor is it to the common people less than a reproach; for if we be so jealous over them, as that we dare not trust them with an English pamphlet, what do we but censure them for a giddy, vicious, and ungrounded people; in such a sick and weak state of faith and discretion, as to be able to take nothing down but through the pipe[39] of a licenser? That this is care or love of them, we cannot pretend, whenas, in those popish places where the laity are most hated and despised, the same strictness is used over them. Wisdom we cannot call it, because it stops but one breach of license, nor that neither; whenas those corruptions, which it seeks to prevent, break in faster at other doors which cannot be shut.

. . . . . .

This is not, ye Covenants and Protestations[40] that we have made! this is not to put down Prelaty; this is but to chop[41] an Episcopacy;

[38] Cf. *I Samuel 13.*

[39] Tube used for feeding those too weak for normal feeding.

[40] The Scotch *Covenant* of 1638 and the English of 1643 were documents in the history of the Reformation and the Commonwealth. In 1641 the Commons, peers, and bishops issued a *Protestation* affirming intent to defend Protestantism and the liberties of Parliament and the people.

[41] Exchange.

this is but to translate the Palace Metropolitan[42] from one kind of dominion into another; this is but an old canonical sleight[43] of commuting our penance. To startle thus betimes at a mere unlicensed pamphlet will after a while be afraid of every conventicle,[44] and a while after will make a conventicle of every Christian meeting. But I am certain that a State governed by the rules of justice and fortitude, or a Church built and founded upon the rock of faith and true knowledge, cannot be so pusillanimous. While things are yet not constituted in Religion, that freedom of writing should be restrained by a discipline imitated from the Prelates and learnt by them from the Inquisition, to shut us up all again into the breast of a licenser, must needs give cause of doubt and discouragement to all learned and religious men.

. . . "The punishing of wits enhances their authority," said the Viscount of St. Albans;[45] "and a forbidden writing is thought to be a certain spark of truth that flies up in the faces of them who seek to tread it out." This Order, therefore, may prove a nursing-mother to sects, but I shall easily show how it will be a step-dame to Truth: and first by disenabling us to the maintenance of what is known already.

Well knows he who uses to consider, that our faith and knowledge thrives by exercise, as well as our limbs and complexion.[46] Truth is compared in Scripture to a streaming fountain; if her waters flow not in a perpetual progression, they sicken into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition. A man may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe things only because his Pastor says so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds becomes his heresy.

There is not any burden that some would gladlier post off to another than the charge and care of their Religion. There be—who knows not that there be?—of Protestants and professors who live and die in as arrant an implicit faith as any lay Papist of Loretto.[47] A wealthy man, addicted to his pleasure and to his profits, finds Religion to be a traffic so entangled, and of so many piddling accounts, that of all mysteries[48] he cannot skill to keep a stock going upon that trade. What should he do? fain he would have the name to be re-

[42] Lambeth Palace, London center of Church authority.
[43] A familiar trick allowed by canon law.
[44] Non-conformist meeting and chapel.
[45] Sir Francis Bacon in his *Advertisement* mentioned above (cf. note 33).
[46] Physical constitution.
[47] Any devout lay-believer at such a shrine of superstition as Loretto.
[48] Trades, businesses.

ligious, fain he would bear up with his neighbours in that. What does he therefore, but resolve to give over toiling, and to find himself out some factor,[49] to whose care and credit he may commit the whole managing of his religious affairs? some Divine of note and estimation that must be. To him he adheres, resigns the whole warehouse of his religion, with all the locks and keys, into his custody; and indeed makes the very person of that man his religion; esteems his associating with him a sufficient evidence and commendatory of his own piety. So that a man may say his religion is now no more within himself, but is become a dividual movable,[50] and goes and comes near him, according as that good man frequents the house. He entertains him, gives him gifts, feasts him, lodges him; his religion comes home at night, prays, is liberally supped, and sumptuously laid to sleep, rises, is saluted, and after the malmsey, or some well-spiced brewage, and better breakfasted than he whose morning appetite would have gladly fed on green figs between Bethany and Jerusalem, his Religion walks abroad at eight, and leaves his kind entertainer in the shop trading all day without his Religion.

Another sort there be who, when they hear that all things shall be ordered, all things regulated and settled, nothing written but what passes through the custom-house of certain Publicans[51] that have the tonnaging and poundaging[52] of all free-spoken truth, will straight give themselves up into your hands, make 'em and cut 'em out what religion ye please: there be delights, there be recreations and jolly pastimes that will fetch the day about from sun to sun, and rock the tedious year as in a delightful dream. What need they torture their heads with that which others have taken so strictly and so unalterably into their own purveying? These are the fruits which a dull ease and cessation of our knowledge will bring forth among the people. How goodly and how to be wished were such an obedient unanimity as this, what a fine conformity would it starch us all into! Doubtless a staunch and solid piece of framework, as any January could freeze together.

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There is yet behind of what I purposed to lay open, the incredible loss and detriment that this plot of licensing puts us to; more than if

[49] Agent.
[50] A thing separable from its owner and movable.
[51] Tax-collectors.
[52] The king's levying of *"tunnage and poundage"* customs duties on his own authority was one of the grievances against Charles I.

some enemy at sea should stop up all our havens and ports and creeks, it hinders and retards the importation of our richest Merchandise, Truth; nay, it was first established and put in practice by Antichristian malice and mystery on set purpose to extinguish, if it were possible, the light of Reformation, and to settle falsehood; little differing from that policy wherewith the Turk upholds his Alcoran, by the prohibition of Printing.[53] 'Tis not denied, but gladly confessed, we are to send our thanks and vows to Heaven louder than most of nations, for that great measure of truth which we enjoy, especially in those main points between us and the Pope, with his appurtenances the Prelates: but he who thinks we are to pitch our tent here, and have attained the utmost prospect of reformation that the mortal glass wherein we contemplate can show us, till we come to beatific vision, that man by this very opinion declares that he is yet far short of Truth.

Truth indeed came once into the world with her Divine Master, and was a perfect shape most glorious to look on: but when He ascended, and His Apostles after Him were laid asleep, then straight arose a wicked race of deceivers, who, as that story goes of the Egyptian Typhon with his conspirators, how they dealt with the good Osiris,[54] took the virgin Truth, hewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to the four winds. From that time ever since, the sad friends of Truth, such as durst appear, imitating the careful search that Isis made for the mangled body of Osiris, went up and down gathering up limb by limb, still as they could find them. We have not yet found them all, Lords and Commons, nor ever shall do, till her Master's second coming; He shall bring together every joint and member, and shall mould them into an immortal feature of loveliness and perfection. Suffer not these licensing prohibitions to stand at every place of opportunity, forbidding and disturbing them that continue seeking, that continue to do our obsequies to the torn body of our martyred saint.

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Behold now this vast City: a city of refuge, the mansion house of liberty, encompassed and surrounded with his protection; the shop of war hath not there more anvils and hammers waking, to fashion out the plates and instruments of armed Justice in defence of be-

[53] The Turks prohibited printing until well into the 18th century. The *Alcoran*, or Koran, is the holy book of the Mohammedans.

[54] *Typhon*, brother of *Osiris* and usurper of his throne, cut the body of Osiris to bits and threw them in the Nile. Isis, wife of Osiris, and their son Horus slowly recovered the body and later overthrew Typhon. See Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, V, 318–331.

leaguered Truth, than there be pens and heads there, sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and ideas wherewith to present, as with their homage and their fealty, the approaching Reformation: others as fast reading, trying all things, assenting to the force of reason and convincement. What could a man require more from a Nation so pliant and so prone to seek after knowledge? What wants there to such a towardly and pregnant soil, but wise and faithful labourers, to make a knowing people, a Nation of Prophets, of Sages, and of Worthies? We reckon more than five months yet to harvest; there need not be five weeks; had we but eyes to lift up, the fields are white already.

Where there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making. Under these fantastic terrors of sect and schism, we wrong the earnest and zealous thirst after knowledge and understanding which God hath stirred up in this city. What some lament of, we rather should rejoice at, should rather praise this pious forwardness among men, to reassume the ill-reputed care of their Religion into their own hands again. A little generous prudence, a little forbearance of one another, and some grain of charity might win all these diligences to join, and unite in one general and brotherly search after Truth; could we but forego this prelatical tradition of crowding free consciences and Christian liberties into canons and precepts of men. I doubt not, if some great and worthy stranger should come among us, wise to discern the mould and temper of a people, and how to govern it, observing the high hopes and aims, the diligent alacrity of our extended thoughts and reasonings in the pursuance of truth and freedom, but that he would cry out as Pyrrhus did, admiring the Roman docility and courage: If such were my Epirots,[55] I would not despair the greatest design that could be attempted, to make a Church or Kingdom happy.

Yet these are the men cried out against for schismatics and sectaries; as if, while the temple of the Lord was building, some cutting, some squaring the marble, others hewing the cedars, there should be a sort of irrational men who could not consider there must be many schisms and many dissections made in the quarry and in the timber, ere the house of God can be built. And when every stone is laid artfully together, it cannot be united into a continuity, it can but be contiguous

[55] *Pyrrhus,* King of Epirus, overthrew the Romans at Heraclea in 280 B.C. Words attributed to him by Florus are paraphrased here. His *Epirots* were, of course, men of Epirus.

in this world; neither can every piece of the building be of one form; nay rather the perfection consists in this, that, out of many moderate varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes that are not vastly disproportional, arises the goodly and the graceful symmetry that commends the whole pile and structure.

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. . . Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks. Methinks I see her as an eagle mewing[56] her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam; purging and unscaling her long-abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly radiance; while the whole noise of timorous and flocking birds, with those also that love the twilight, flutter about, amazed at what she means, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of sects and schisms.

What would ye do then? should ye suppress all this flowery crop of knowledge and new light sprung up and yet springing daily in this city? should ye set an oligarchy of twenty engrossers[57] over it, to bring a famine upon our minds again, when we shall know nothing but what is measured to us by their bushel? Believe it, Lords and Commons, they who counsel ye to such a suppressing do as good as bid ye suppress yourselves; and I will soon show how. If it be desired to know the immediate cause of all this free writing and free speaking, there cannot be assigned a truer than your own mild and free and humane government. It is the liberty, Lords and Commons, which your own valorous and happy counsels have purchased us, liberty which is the nurse of all great wits; this is that which hath rarefied and enlightened our spirits like the influence of heaven; this is that which hath enfranchised, enlarged and lifted up our apprehensions degrees above themselves.

Ye cannot make us now less capable, less knowing, less eagerly pursuing of the truth, unless ye first make yourselves, that made us so, less the lovers, less the founders of our true liberty. We can grow ignorant again, brutish, formal and slavish, as ye found us; but you then must first become that which ye cannot be, oppressive, arbitrary, and tyrannous, as they were from whom ye have freed us. That our hearts are now more capacious, our thoughts more erected to the search and expectation of greatest and exactest things, is the issue of

[56] Renewing by moulting.
[57] Monopolists.

your own virtue propagated in us; ye cannot suppress that, unless ye reinforce an abrogated and merciless law, that fathers may dispatch at will their own children. And who shall then stick closest to ye, and excite others? not he who takes up arms for coat and conduct, and his four nobles of Danegelt.[58] Although I dispraise not the defence of just immunities, yet love my peace better, if that were all.[59] Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties.

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And now the time in special is, by privilege to write and speak what may help to the further discussing of matters in agitation. The temple of Janus[60] with his two controversial faces might now not unsignificantly be set open. And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter? Her confuting is the best and surest suppressing. He who hears what praying there is for light and clearer knowledge to be sent down among us, would think of other matters to be constituted beyond the discipline of Geneva,[61] framed and fabricked already to our hands. Yet when the new light which we beg for shines in upon us, there be who envy and oppose, if it come not first in at their casements. What a collusion is this, whenas we are exhorted by the wise man to use diligence, to seek for wisdom as for hidden treasures early and late, that another order shall enjoin us to know nothing but by statute! When a man hath been labouring the hardest labour in the deep mines of knowledge; hath furnished out his findings in all their equipage; drawn forth his reasons as it were a battle ranged; scattered and defeated all objections in his way; calls out his adversary into the plain, offers him the advantage of wind and sun, if he please, only that he may try the matter by dint of argument: for his opponents then to skulk, to lay ambushments, to keep a narrow bridge of licensing where the challenger should pass,

[58] Perhaps an allusion to John Hampden's famous defiance of the demand for ship-money. *Danegelt,* an old tax levied for protection against the Danes in early days, was cited by Charles I as precedent for his demand of ship-money. The *noble* was 6s 8d.

[59] If it were simply a matter of immunity from a tax.

[60] Livy tells us how the *temple of Janus* was opened in war-time and closed in peace. Milton suggests that his time is one of warfare between Truth and Error, which stand opposed like two-headed Janus.

[61] Hales interprets this as "beyond what seems to the Presbyterians so adequate and perfect."

though it be valour enough in soldiership, is but weakness and cowardice in the wars of Truth.

For who knows not that Truth is strong, next to the Almighty? She needs no policies, nor stratagems, nor licensing to make her victorious; those are the shifts and the defences that error uses against her power. Give her but room, and do not bind her when she sleeps, for then she speaks not true, as the old Proteus[62] did, who spake oracles only when he was caught and bound, but then rather she turns herself into all shapes, except her own, and perhaps tunes her voice according to the time, as Micaiah did before Ahab,[63] until she be adjured into her own likeness. . . .

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Milton's *Areopagitica,* first published in 1644 in protest against an order of Parliament requiring the licensing of printed books, is an occasional pamphlet now more than three centuries old. Why study it today? Is it of more than historical interest? Writers no longer pen pamphlets modeled, like this one, on the form of the classical oration, borrowing titles from Isocrates. Many of them would not know who Isocrates was. They would not draw for their citations of authority upon the Greeks, the Romans, the Bible, and the Church fathers; nor would they be likely to base their argument in part on the moral and religious sanctions of the Reformation which broke the universal sway of the Roman Catholic Church. Their readers would not, like Milton's, be deeply concerned about religious "sects and schisms." Our writers would not, like Milton, put a high value upon works of religious and theological disputation as an important branch of learning. Nor would they write in an orotund, copious style consciously raised high above the normal level of daily discourse. Is not the present essay, then, a museum piece only? No, for it has the timeless relevance of the true classic.

The other day the news-reels presented two of the most prominent American journalists in a discussion of the present status and prospects of freedom of the press. The speakers were able; but in so far as they touched at all the deeper issues at stake, they said only what Milton had said far better three centuries ago, and they were not philosophers enough to see the subject with his comprehensiveness and elevation. They would have been better spokesmen for contemporary writers and readers if they had known and fully understood Milton. Not very long ago the Ger-

[62] The sea-god with whom Menelaus (*Odyssey*) wrestled as he assumed many strange new forms to escape the hero's grasp but who was forced to prophesy truly at last.

[63] Cf. *I Kings* 22: 1-28. *Micaiah* spoke untruly before King *Ahab* but a little later, recovering himself, spoke the unwelcome truth.

mans, in one of the most absurd spectacles of national folly in all history, made bonfires and burned books like children or savages who imagine that their borders are the borders of the world and that ideas may be quarantined, forgetting that the very air that fed the flames had become a medium for dissemination of thought, bearing the very seed they imagined they destroyed, and that truth seeps in at every chink and on every wind. Had they read Milton, they might have been spared such folly; but had they understood the spirit of his writing, they could never have been Nazis at all. But it is not Nazis alone who wish to be spared the ardors of choice and thought, who are always seeking a *Führer,* and who, when they find one, want to subject others to him.

America, though proud of the partial degree of freedom it has earned, has never really understood a thing Milton pointed out plainly, that virtue is unattainable by constraint or edict. It has sometimes gallantly defended freedom, but it has been the home of Prohibition, of Anthony Comstock, of blue laws and Watch and Ward Societies. The label "banned in Boston" has made the fortune of many an insignificant book. Unenlightened Americans have even organized vigilantes and Klans to impose their astigmatic versions of "true Americanism." We need to understand the noble reason and common sense of *Areopagitica.* Americans need to breathe freedom's amplest air and to make its greatest prophets their familiars. As for Milton's prose style, though men will never write in just that way again, it can never be outmoded: the noblest themes will always deserve the noblest expression.

1. The part of *Areopagitica* we have reprinted falls into four main divisions: a fine introduction on the importance of the theme, a defense of the free use of books, an attack on censorship as futile and ineffective, and an account of the harm it does. As you read, fill out these main headings by writing out the subheads under each.

2. Reasoning by analogy is often criticised. Is Milton's use of analogy in the first paragraph valid? effective? Why?

3. Though Milton wants no licensing before publication, do you think he would approve of punishment afterwards for proved libel or blasphemy? Why or why not? What is your own opinion about such punishment?

4. In defending the free use of books, how does Milton use argument by analogy? appeal to authority? appeal to experience? Are these paragraphs valid today? Why are you convinced or unconvinced of the truth of the plea that good and evil, truth and falsehood are so bound up with each other in the world that good and truth can be known only by contrast and conflict with their opposites? How do the conflicts of good and evil and of truth and error enable us to define, for example, moral principles? political beliefs? laws? ideals of social justice? Do you agree that true virtue must grow from inner discipline, not from ignorance and

constraint? How would this belief affect a parent's attitude towards his child, a church's control over its members, or a state's view of "prohibition" or of censorship of books, stage, and screen? There are always many who fear that infection may spread from "tainted" books or who say we should not needlessly expose ourselves to temptation or "employ our time in vain things." How does Milton answer these people? Are his answers still valid? Are they final?

5. Why does Milton give a good deal of space to Plato's views on censorship? Does he successfully refute them? What use is made of irony in Milton's argument that, if we regulate printing, we must with equal logic regulate all other sources of evil and error, including dancing and diet? Are his argument and method here fair or unfair? valid or invalid? Why? Notice how he returns again here to the key idea that freedom and unhampered choice are necessary to "the trial of virtue" and "the exercise of truth." What value has the ironic argument that censorship will be defective unless it scans all books of the past, all books partly good and partly bad, and all foreign books? Why is it true or untrue that no man really fit to be a censor would consent to be one? What are the deficiencies of self-appointed censors (Anthony Comstock, for instance, or Cato the Censor)? Has Milton, in your opinion, successfully shown that licensing must be futile and ineffective? If not, why not?

6. Why is literary censorship an attack on "the privilege and dignity of learning" both past and present? To what kinds of book would this objection apply today? In what sense is censorship a "vilifying" of the whole nation? Why is the point important? How does censorship give notoriety and authority to what it bans? Mention, if you can, books that prove this point. Show how censorship would retard Truth if knowledge thrives by exercise and if new truth is attained only by search and discussion (cf. Mill). What was the strategic value of Milton's plea that the high level of mental activity in England was due to the freedom introduced by the government of the Commonwealth, and that Parliament, in destroying it, would be destroying itself? How do the implications of this plea apply today? Do you agree that Truth is never defeated "in a free and open encounter"? How far would the history of human slavery or of the rise of Christianity support Milton's belief? Does Milton's argument for freedom from censorship apply not only to books but to stage plays, moving pictures, and radio broadcasts? Why or why not?

7. Milton's prose, like his greatest poetry, is usually deliberately raised above common speech by its learning, elaborate construction, and richly varied vocabulary. What use is made of allusion to legend, history, ancient and modern literature, the Bible, travel, science? Beyond illustration, what value has Milton's wealth of allusion? His style is uneven: what examples, for instance, do you find of anticlimactic after-thoughts ending sentences or paragraphs; broken and incomplete syntax; overburdening with too much coordination of phrases or clauses? These result from Milton's char-

acteristic impetuousness of expression. But if the pages are read aloud, the faults will seem to you unimportant; and the style will move with vigor and sweep, sometimes rising to the most rich and passionate utterance. Try to account for the effect of opulence and stateliness, noticing what is contributed by the frequency of periodic structure; by the ample co-ordinations of phrases and clauses; by variations of normal English word order; by sonorous balance and parallelism; by emphasis through repetition or elaboration; by bold metaphors and similes and striking, memorable phrases; by the use of many words of Latin derivation. Milton sometimes uses plain, homely phrases of idiomatic English (give examples); but he moves effortlessly from the level of common diction to a very uncommon profusion of connotation and rich rhythm. Why did Wordsworth write, in a sonnet to Milton, "Thou had'st a voice whose sound was like the sea"?

Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion

JOHN STUART MILL

John Stuart Mill (1806–73), the Victorian logician, ethical theorist, economist, and philosopher of liberty guided by reason, Gladstone's "saint of rationalism," described his main purpose in politics as "the elevation of the mind of man." Educated according to a rigorous system devised by his father, James Mill, the Utilitarian philosopher, he escaped becoming the "reasoning machine" his training might have produced (see his fascinating *Autobiography*). Though a prodigy of learning and a master of logical method, he was too human, too flexible and open-minded, to be a rigid system-maker like Jeremy Bentham or James Mill. Though a rationalist he was aware of claims of imagination and intuition. And though cloistered enough to produce a large body of closely reasoned theory, he was not remote from active affairs. In the intervals of thirty-four busy years as an India House official, he wrote for the more radical journals of his day; for six years he edited the militant *London and Westminster Review*; he served briefly but usefully in Parliament from 1865 to 1868.

Setting out early in his career to elaborate individualism into a system of thought, he applied it in the intellectual, political, and economic spheres, defending unfettered reason and free inquiry; the free development of the individual as far as compatible with a like freedom to others; extension of the franchise, political democracy, and local self-government; the economic doctrines of laissez-faire and free trade. But both temperament and experience later persuaded him to veer from strict individualism in economic theory. A growing sympathy with socialism is evident in later editions of his *Principles of Political Economy* and in his *Chapters on Socialism*. He revised his defense of property and allowed much more scope to government than did predecessors like Ricardo and Bentham, though he did not renounce his belief that the burden of proof must rest on those urging limitation of individual freedom. If he did not solve the economic paradox of liberty and state authority, he brilliantly succeeded in writing a philosophical charter of intellectual liberty, freedom of thought and discussion, and representative democratic government. His most finished effort was his great essay *On Liberty* (see below), like Milton's *Areopagitica* or Socrates' self-defense in Plato's *Apology* a classic of the literature of freedom. Here one is conscious of a tension between

Chapter II, *On Liberty*, 1859. Approximately the last third of the essay, and brief passages earlier, are omitted.

the intense urgency of his theme and the characteristic restraint of his temperament, a tension that often makes his prose as incandescent in its way as Carlyle's is in his. *Considerations on Representative Government,* part of which is also reprinted below, is an eloquent justification of democratic institutions as a school of public spirit and a discipline of capacities for thought and action.

Incidentally it is worth noting that Mill urged removal of property qualifications for the franchise and proposed a "weighted ballot" giving extra votes to the better educated and more intelligent who could qualify for them by formal examination. His *On the Subjection of Women,* far ahead of its time, argued for equal rights and opportunities of all kinds for the sex then legally dominated by the other. Mill maintained that half the innate capacity of mankind would be sacrificed while women remained in subjection. In another context his place as an ethical philosopher would demand more attention. When but sixteen he had found in Bentham's "greatest happiness of the greatest number" an ideal which seemed "in one of the best senses of the word, a religion." As both an ethical and a political thinker he always served this end, and he always remained confident that democracy can best achieve it. He defended his theories with the supple intellectuality of a brilliant logician, in beautifully articulated structures of thought.

The influence of Mill is still vigorously alive. The traditional liberal ideals of "fraternity and equality" seemed to him in the passing years (as they do to most liberals today) more and more incompatible with economic "liberty," which becomes the freedom of the strong to exploit the weak. Many now feel that the great problem is how to preserve democratic government and liberty of thought and discussion while so restricting economic liberty as to insure a higher level of life for all. Contemporary liberals recognize Mill as the ablest prophet of the intellectual and political liberty that seems to them an indispensable element of the good life.

THE TIME, it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any defence would be necessary of the "liberty of the press" as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear. This aspect of the question, besides, has been so often and so triumphantly enforced by preceding writers, that it need not be specially insisted on in this place. Though the law of England, on the subject of the press, is as servile to this day as it was in the time

of the Tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force against political discussion, except during some temporary panic, when fear of insurrection drives ministers and judges from their propriety; and, speaking generally, it is not, in constitutional countries, to be apprehended, that the government, whether completely responsible to the people or not, will often attempt to control the expression of opinion, except when in doing so it makes itself the organ of the general intolerance of the public. Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation, those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.

It is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it. We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.

First: the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that *their* certainty is the same thing as *absolute* certainty. All silencing of discussion is an as-

sumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common.

Unfortunately for the good sense of mankind, the fact of their fallibility is far from carrying the weight in their practical judgment which is always allowed to it in theory; for while everyone well knows himself to be fallible, few think it necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any opinion, of which they feel very certain, may be one of the examples of the error to which they acknowledge themselves to be liable. Absolute princes, or others who are accustomed to unlimited deference, usually feel this complete confidence in their own opinions on nearly all subjects. People more happily situated, who sometimes hear their opinions disputed, and are not wholly unused to be set right when they are wrong, place the same unbounded reliance only on such of their opinions as are shared by all who surround them, or to whom they habitually defer; for in proportion to a man's want of confidence in his own solitary judgment, does he usually repose, with implicit trust, on the infallibility of "the world" in general. And the world, to each individual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact; his party, his sect, his church, his class of society; the man may be called, by comparison, almost liberal and large-minded to whom it means anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age. Nor is his faith in this collective authority at all shaken by his being aware that other ages, countries, sects, churches, classes, and parties have thought, and even now think, the exact reverse. He devolves upon his own world the responsibility of being in the right against the dissentient worlds of other people; and it never troubles him that mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance and that the same causes which make him a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Pekin. Yet it is as evident in itself, as any amount of argument can make it, that ages are no more infallible than individuals; every age having held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that many opinions now general will be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.

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When we consider either the history of opinion, or the ordinary conduct of human life, to what is it to be ascribed that the one and the other are no worse than they are? Not certainly to the inherent

force of the human understanding; for, on any matter not self-evident, there are ninety-nine persons totally incapable of judging of it for one who is capable; and the capacity of the hundredth person is only comparative; for the majority of the eminent men of every past generation held many opinions now known to be erroneous, and did or approved numerous things which no one will now justify. Why is it, then, that there is on the whole a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and rational conduct? If there really is this preponderance—which there must be unless human affairs are, and have always been, in an almost desperate state—it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of everything respectable in man either as an intellectual or as a moral being, namely, that his errors are corrigible. He is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument; but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it. Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring out their meaning. The whole strength and value, then, of human judgment, depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand. In the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him; to profit by as much of it as was just, and expound to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious. Because he has felt, that the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner. The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it: for, being cognisant of all that can, at least obviously, be said against him, and having taken up his position against all gainsayers—knowing that he has sought for objections and difficulties, instead of avoiding them, and has shut out no light which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter—

he has a right to think his judgment better than that of any person, or any multitude, who have not gone through a similar process.

It is not too much to require that what the wisest of mankind, those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment, find necessary to warrant their relying on it, should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals, called the public. The most intolerant of churches, the Roman Catholic Church, even at the canonisation of a saint, admits, and listens patiently to, a "devil's advocate." The holiest of men, it appears, cannot be admitted to posthumous honours, until all that the devil could say against him is known and weighed. If even the Newtonian philosophy were not permitted to be questioned, mankind could not feel as complete assurance of its truth as they now do. The beliefs which we have most warrant for have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded. If the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty still; but we have done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of; we have neglected nothing that could give the truth a chance of reaching us: if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving it; and in the meantime we may rely on having attained such approach to truth as is possible in our own day. This is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being, and this the sole way of attaining it.

Strange it is, that men should admit the validity of the arguments for free discussion, but object to their being "pushed to an extreme"; not seeing that unless the reasons are good for an extreme case, they are not good for any case. Strange that they should imagine that they are not assuming infallibility, when they acknowledge that there should be free discussion on all subjects which can possibly be *doubtful,* but think that some particular principle or doctrine should be forbidden to be questioned because it is so *certain,* that is, because *they are certain* that it is certain. To call any proposition certain, while there is any one who would deny its certainty if permitted, but who is not permitted, is to assume that we ourselves, and those who agree with us, are the judges of certainty, and judges without hearing the other side.

In the present age—which has been described as "destitute of faith, but terrified at scepticism"—in which people feel sure, not so much that their opinions are true, as that they should not know what to do without them—the claims of an opinion to be protected from public

attack are rested not so much on its truth, as on its importance to society. There are, it is alleged, certain beliefs so useful, not to say indispensable, to well-being that it is as much the duty of governments to uphold those beliefs, as to protect any other of the interests of society. In a case of such necessity, and so directly in the line of their duty, sometimes less than infallibility may, it is maintained, warrant, and even bind, governments to act on their own opinion, confirmed by the general opinion of mankind. It is also often argued, and still oftener thought, that none but bad men would desire to weaken these salutary beliefs; and there can be nothing wrong, it is thought, in restraining bad men, and prohibiting what only such men would wish to practise. This mode of thinking makes the justification of restraints on discussion not a question of the truth of doctrines, but of their usefulness; and flatters itself by that means to escape the responsibility of claiming to be an infallible judge of opinions. But those who thus satisfy themselves, do not perceive that the assumption of infallibility is merely shifted from one point to another. The usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion: as disputable, as open to discussion, and requiring discussion as much as the opinion itself. There is the same need of an infallible judge of opinions to decide an opinion to be noxious, as to decide it to be false, unless the opinion condemned has full opportunity of defending itself. And it will not do to say that the heretic may be allowed to maintain the utility or harmlessness of his opinion, though forbidden to maintain its truth. The truth of an opinion is part of its utility. If we would know whether or not it is desirable that a proposition should be believed, is it possible to exclude the consideration of whether or not it is true? In the opinion, not of bad men, but of the best men, no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful: and can you prevent such men from urging that plea, when they are charged with culpability for denying some doctrine which they are told is useful, but which they believe to be false? Those who are on the side of received opinions never fail to take all possible advantage of this plea; you do not find *them* handling the question of utility as if it could be completely abstracted from that of truth: on the contrary, it is, above all, because their doctrine is "the truth," that the knowledge or the belief of it is held to be so indispensable. There can be no fair discussion of the question of usefulness when an argument so vital may be employed on one side, but not on the other. And in point of fact, when law or public feeling do not permit the truth of an opinion to be disputed, they are just as little tolerant of a denial of its usefulness. The utmost they allow is

an extenuation of its absolute necessity, or of the positive guilt of rejecting it.

In order more fully to illustrate the mischief of denying a hearing to opinions because we, in our own judgment, have condemned them, it will be desirable to fix down the discussion to a concrete case; and I choose, by preference, the cases which are least favourable to me—in which the argument against freedom of opinion, both on the score of truth and on that of utility, is considered the strongest. Let the opinions impugned be the belief in a God and in a future state, or any of the commonly received doctrines of morality. To fight the battle on such ground gives a great advantage to an unfair antagonist; since he will be sure to say (and many who have no desire to be unfair will say it internally), Are these the doctrines which you do not deem sufficiently certain to be taken under the protection of law? Is the belief in a God one of the opinions to feel sure of which you hold to be assuming infallibility? But I must be permitted to observe, that it is not the feeling sure of a doctrine (be it what it may) which I call an assumption of infallibility. It is the undertaking to decide that question *for others,* without allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side. And I denounce and reprobate this pretension not the less, if put forth on the side of my most solemn convictions. However positive any one's persuasion may be, not only of the falsity but of the pernicious consequences—not only of the pernicious consequences, but (to adopt expressions which I altogether condemn) the immorality and impiety of an opinion; yet if, in pursuance of that private judgment, though backed by the public judgment of his country or his contemporaries, he prevents the opinion from being heard in its defence, he assumes infallibility. And so far from the assumption being less objectionable or less dangerous because the opinion is called immoral or impious, this is the case of all others in which it is most fatal. These are exactly the occasions on which the men of one generation commit those dreadful mistakes which excite the astonishment and horror of posterity. It is among such that we find the instances memorable in history, when the arm of the law has been employed to root out the best men and the noblest doctrines; with deplorable success as to the men, though some of the doctrines have survived to be (as if in mockery) invoked in defence of similar conduct towards those who dissent from *them,* or from their received interpretation.

Mankind can hardly be too often reminded, that there was once a man named Socrates, between whom and the legal authorities and

public opinion of his time there took place a memorable collision. Born in an age and country abounding in individual greatness, this man has been handed down to us by those who best knew both him and the age, as the most virtuous man in it; while *we* know him as the head and prototype of all subsequent teachers of virtue, the source equally of the lofty inspiration of Plato and the judicious utilitarianism of Aristotle, *"i maëstri di color che sanno,"*[1] the two headsprings of ethical as of all philosophy. This acknowledged master of all the eminent thinkers who have since lived—whose fame, still growing after more than two thousand years, all but outweighs the whole remainder of the names which make his native city illustrious—was put to death by his countrymen, after a judicial conviction, for impiety and immorality. Impiety, in denying the gods recognised by the State; indeed his accuser asserted (see the *Apologia*)[2] that he believed in no gods at all. Immorality, in being, by his doctrines and instructions, a "corruptor of youth." Of these charges the tribunal, there is every ground for believing, honestly found him guilty, and condemned the man who probably of all then born had deserved best of mankind to be put to death as a criminal.

To pass from this to the only other instance of judicial iniquity, the mention of which, after the condemnation of Socrates, would not be an anti-climax: the event which took place on Calvary rather more than eighteen hundred years ago. The man who left on the memory of those who witnessed his life and conversation such an impression of his moral grandeur that eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage to him as the Almighty in person, was ignominiously put to death, as what? As a blasphemer. Men did not merely mistake their benefactor; they mistook him for the exact contrary of what he was, and treated him as that prodigy of impiety which they themselves are now held to be for their treatment of him. The feelings with which mankind now regard these lamentable transactions, especially the later of the two, render them extremely unjust in their judgment of the unhappy actors. These were, to all appearance, not bad men—not worse than men commonly are, but rather the contrary; men who possessed in a full, or somewhat more than a full measure, the religious, moral, and patriotic feelings of their time and people: the very kind of men who, in all times, our own included, have every chance of passing through life blameless and respected. The high-priest who rent his garments when the words were pronounced, which, according

[1] The masters of those who know.
[2] Plato's *Apology* purports to give Socrates' self-defense before his accusers and judges.

to all the ideas of his country, constituted the blackest guilt, was in all probability quite as sincere in his horror and indignation as the generality of respectable and pious men now are in the religious and moral sentiments they profess; and most of those who now shudder at his conduct, if they had lived in his time, and been born Jews, would have acted precisely as he did. Orthodox Christians who are tempted to think that those who stoned to death the first martyrs must have been worse men than they themselves are, ought to remember that one of those persecutors was Saint Paul.[3]

Let us add one more example, the most striking of all, if the impressiveness of an error is measured by the wisdom and virtue of him who falls into it. If ever any one, possessed of power, had grounds for thinking himself the best and most enlightened among his contemporaries, it was the Emperor Marcus Aurelius.[4] Absolute monarch of the whole civilised world, he preserved through life not only the most unblemished justice, but what was less to be expected from his Stoical breeding, the tenderest heart. The few failings which are attributed to him were all on the side of indulgence: while his writings, the highest ethical product of the ancient mind, differ scarcely perceptibly, if they differ at all, from the most characteristic teachings of Christ. This man, a better Christian in all but the dogmatic sense of the word than almost any of the ostensibly Christian sovereigns who have since reigned, persecuted Christianity. Placed at the summit of all the previous attainments of humanity, with an open, unfettered intellect, and a character which led him of himself to embody in his moral writings the Christian ideal, he yet failed to see that Christianity was to be a good and not an evil to the world, with his duties to which he was so deeply penetrated. Existing society he knew to be in a deplorable state. But such as it was, he saw, or thought he saw, that it was held together, and prevented from being worse, by belief and reverence of the received divinities. As a ruler of mankind, he deemed it his duty not to suffer society to fall in pieces; and saw not how, if its existing ties were removed, any others could be formed which could again knit it together. The new religion openly aimed at dissolving these ties: unless, therefore, it was his duty to adopt that religion, it seemed to be his duty to put it down. Inasmuch then as the theology of Christianity did not appear to him true or of divine origin; inasmuch as this strange history of a crucified God was not

[3] Before his conversion, under his earlier name of Saul, *St. Paul* was a strict member of the Jewish sect of Pharisees and a persecutor of followers of Christ.

[4] *Marcus Aurelius* Antoninus, Stoic philosopher, was emperor 161–180 A.D. His *Meditations* is a classic of literature.

credible to him, and a system which purported to rest entirely upon a foundation to him so wholly unbelievable, could not be foreseen by him to be that renovating agency which, after all abatements, it has in fact proved to be; the gentlest and most amiable of philosophers and rulers, under a solemn sense of duty authorised the persecution of Christianity. To my mind this is one of the most tragical facts in all history. It is a bitter thought, how different a thing the Christianity of the world might have been, if the Christian faith had been adopted as the religion of the empire under the auspices of Marcus Aurelius instead of those of Constantine. But it would be equally unjust to him and false to truth to deny, that no one plea which can be urged for punishing anti-Christian teaching was wanting to Marcus Aurelius for punishing, as he did, the propagation of Christianity. No Christian more firmly believes that Atheism is false, and tends to the dissolution of society, than Marcus Aurelius believed the same things of Christianity; he who, of all men then living, might have been thought the most capable of appreciating it. Unless any one who approves of punishment for the promulgation of opinions, flatters himself that he is a wiser and better man than Marcus Aurelius—more deeply versed in the wisdom of his time, more elevated in his intellect above it—more earnest in his search for truth, or more single-minded in his devotion to it when found; let him abstain from that assumption of the joint infallibility of himself and the multitude, which the great Antoninus made with so unfortunate a result.

Aware of the impossibility of defending the use of punishment for restraining irreligious opinions by any argument which will not justify Marcus Antoninus, the enemies of religious freedom, when hard pressed, occasionally accept this consequence, and say, with Dr. Johnson, that the persecutors of Christianity were in the right; that persecution is an ordeal through which truth ought to pass, and always passes successfully, legal penalties being, in the end, powerless against truth, though sometimes beneficially effective against mischievous errors. This is a form of the argument for religious intolerance sufficiently remarkable not to be passed without notice.

A theory which maintains that truth may justifiably be persecuted because persecution cannot possibly do it any harm, cannot be charged with being intentionally hostile to the reception of new truths; but we cannot commend the generosity of its dealing with the persons to whom mankind are indebted for them. To discover to the world something which deeply concerns it, and of which it was previously ignorant; to prove to it that it had been mistaken on some vital point of

temporal or spiritual interest, is as important a service as a human being can render to his fellow-creatures, and in certain cases, as in those of the early Christians and of the Reformers,[5] those who think with Dr. Johnson believe it to have been the most precious gift which could be bestowed on mankind. That the authors of such splendid benefits should be requited by martyrdom; that their reward should be to be dealt with as the vilest of criminals, is not, upon this theory, a deplorable error and misfortune, for which humanity should mourn in sackcloth and ashes, but the normal and justifiable state of things. The propounder of a new truth, according to this doctrine, should stand, as stood, in the legislation of the Locrians, the proposer of a new law, with a halter round his neck, to be instantly tightened if the public assembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his proposition. People who defend this mode of treating benefactors cannot be supposed to set much value on the benefit; and I believe this view of the subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have been desirable once, but that we have had enough of them now.

But, indeed, the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience refutes. History teems with instances of truth put down by persecution. If not suppressed for ever, it may be thrown back for centuries. To speak only of religious opinions: the Reformation broke out at least twenty times before Luther, and was put down.[6] Arnold of Brescia was put down. Fra Dolcino was put down. Savonarola was put down. The Albigeois were put down. The Vaudois were put down. The Lollards were put down. The Hussites were put down. Even after the era of Luther, wherever persecution was persisted in, it was successful. In Spain, Italy, Flanders, the Austrian empire, Prot-

[5] Leaders of the Protestant Reformation of the 15th and 16th centuries.

[6] *"Twenty times . . . put down . . .* **Arnold of Brescia** (d. 1155?), who preached that the Church should not possess property and that it had become tainted through temporal power, was tried and executed by the Roman Curia. **Fra Dolcino** (d. 1307), whose denunciations of the Church brought him into conflict with the Inquisition, was at last burned at the stake. **Savonarola** (1452–98) preached against the corruptions of society and of the Church; he was executed in 1498. The ***Albigeois***, an ascetic and unorthodox sect in southern France in the 11th century, spread rapidly. The Inquisition had suppressed it by 1400. The ***Vaudois*** in southern France in the 12th century were persecuted for heresy, and Innocent VII proclaimed a crusade of extermination against them in 1487. The ***Lollards***, led by John Wycliffe in 14th-century Britain, tried to effect reforms of doctrine and practice; they were suppressed. The ***Hussites***, Bohemian reformers, were pledged to carry on the work of John Huss after he was burned at the stake in 1415. Their military strength was broken by the defeat of Frederic, the Winter King, in 1620.

estantism was rooted out; and, most likely, would have been so in England, had Queen Mary lived, or Queen Elizabeth died. Persecution has always succeeded, save where the heretics were too strong a party to be effectually persecuted. No reasonable person can doubt that Christianity might have been extirpated in the Roman Empire. It spread, and became predominant, because the persecutions were only occasional, lasting but a short time, and separated by long intervals of almost undisturbed propagandism. It is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake. Men are not more zealous for truth than they often are for error, and a sufficient application of legal or even of social penalties will generally succeed in stopping the propagation of either. The real advantage which truth has consists in this, that when an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it.

It will be said, that we do not now put to death the introducers of new opinions: we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets, we even build sepulchres to them. It is true we no longer put heretics to death; and the amount of penal infliction which modern feeling would probably tolerate, even against the most obnoxious opinions, is not sufficient to extirpate them. But let us not flatter ourselves that we are yet free from the stain even of legal persecution. Penalties for opinion, or at least for its expression, still exist by law; and their enforcement is not, even in these times, so unexampled as to make it at all incredible that they may some day be revived in full force. In the year 1857, at the summer assizes of the county of Cornwall, an unfortunate man, said to be of unexceptionable conduct in all relations of life, was sentenced to twenty-one months' imprisonment, for uttering, and writing on a gate, some offensive words concerning Christianity. Within a month of the same time, at the Old Bailey, two persons, on two separate occasions, were rejected as jurymen, and one of them grossly insulted by the judge and by one of the counsel, because they honestly declared that they had no theological belief; and a third, a foreigner, for the same reason, was denied justice against a thief. This refusal of redress took place in virtue of the legal doctrine, that no person can be allowed to give evidence in a court of justice who does not profess belief in a God (any god is sufficient)

and in a future state; which is equivalent to declaring such persons to be outlaws, excluded from the protection of the tribunals; who may not only be robbed or assaulted with impunity, if no one but themselves, or persons of similar opinions, be present, but any one else may be robbed or assaulted with impunity, if the proof of the fact depends on their evidence. The assumption on which this is grounded is that the oath is worthless of a person who does not believe in a future state; a proposition which betokens much ignorance of history in those who assent to it (since it is historically true that a large proportion of infidels in all ages have been persons of distinguished integrity and honour); and would be maintained by no one who had the smallest conception how many of the persons in greatest repute with the world, both for virtues and attainments, are well known, at least to their intimates, to be unbelievers. The rule, besides, is suicidal, and cuts away its own foundation. Under pretence that atheists must be liars, it admits the testimony of all atheists who are willing to lie, and rejects only those who brave the obloquy of publicly confessing a detested creed rather than affirm a falsehood. A rule thus self-convicted of absurdity so far as regards its professed purpose, can be kept in force only as a badge of hatred, a relic of persecution; a persecution, too, having the peculiarity that the qualification for undergoing it is the being clearly proved not to deserve it. The rule, and the theory it implies, are hardly less insulting to believers than to infidels. For if he who does not believe in a future state necessarily lies, it follows that they who do believe are only prevented from lying, if prevented they are, by the fear of hell. We will not do the authors and abettors of the rule the injury of supposing that the conception which they have formed of Christian virtue is drawn from their own consciousness.

These, indeed, are but rags and remnants of persecution, and may be thought to be not so much an indication of the wish to persecute, as an example of that very frequent infirmity of English minds, which makes them take a preposterous pleasure in the assertion of a bad principle, when they are no longer bad enough to desire to carry it really into practice. But unhappily there is no security in the state of the public mind that the suspension of worse forms of legal persecution, which has lasted for about the space of a generation, will continue. In this age the quiet surface of routine is as often ruffled by attempts to resuscitate past evils, as to introduce new benefits. What is boasted of at the present time as the revival of religion, is always, in narrow and uncultivated minds, at least as much the revival of bigotry; and where there is the strong permanent leaven of intolerance

in the feelings of a people, which at all times abides in the middle classes of this country, it needs but little to provoke them into actively persecuting those whom they have never ceased to think proper objects of persecution.* For it is this—it is the opinions men entertain, and the feelings they cherish, respecting those who disown the beliefs they deem important, which makes this country not a place of mental freedom. For a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal penalties is that they strengthen the social stigma. It is that stigma which is really effective, and so effective is it, that the profession of opinions which are under the ban of society is much less common in England than is, in many other countries, the avowal of those which incur risk of judicial punishment. In respect to all persons but those whose pecuniary circumstances make them independent of the good will of other people, opinion, on this subject, is as efficacious as law; men might as well be imprisoned, as excluded from the means of earning their bread. Those whose bread is already secured, and who desire no favours from men in power, or from bodies of men, or from the public, have nothing to fear from the open avowal of any opinions, but to be ill-thought of and ill-spoken of, and this it ought not to require a very heroic mould to enable them to bear. There is no room for any appeal *ad misericordiam* in behalf of such persons. But though we do not now inflict so much evil on those who think differently from us as it was formerly our custom to do, it may be that we do ourselves as much evil as ever by our treatment of them. Socrates was put to death, but the Socratic philosophy rose like the sun in heaven, and spread its illumination over the whole intellectual firmament.

* Ample warning may be drawn from the large infusion of the passions of a persecutor, which mingled with the general display of the worst parts of our national character on the occasion of the Sepoy insurrection. The ravings of fanatics or charlatans from the pulpit may be unworthy of notice; but the heads of the Evangelical party have announced as their principle for the government of Hindoos and Mahomedans, that no schools be supported by public money in which the Bible is not taught, and by necessary consequence that no public employment be given to any but real or pretended Christians. An Under-Secretary of State, in a speech delivered to his constituents on the 12th of November, 1857, is reported to have said: "Toleration of their faith" (the faith of a hundred millions of British subjects), "the superstition which they called religion, by the British Government, had had the effect of retarding the ascendancy of the British name, and preventing the salutary growth of Christianity. . . . Toleration was the great corner-stone of the religious liberties of this country; but do not let them abuse that precious word toleration. As he understood it, it meant the complete liberty to all, freedom of worship, *among Christians, who worshipped upon the same foundation.* It meant toleration of all sects and denominations of *Christians who believed in the one mediation.*" I desire to call attention to the fact, that a man who has been deemed fit to fill a high office in the government of this country under a liberal ministry, maintains the doctrine that all who do not believe in the divinity of Christ are beyond the pale of toleration. Who, after this imbecile display, can indulge the illusion that religious persecution has passed away, never to return?

Christians were cast to the lions, but the Christian church grew up a stately and spreading tree, overtopping the older and less vigorous growths, and stifling them by its shade. Our merely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to disguise them, or to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion. With us, heretical opinions do not perceptibly gain, or even lose, ground in each decade or generation; they never blaze out far and wide, but continue to smoulder in the narrow circles of thinking and studious persons among whom they originate, without ever lighting up the general affairs of mankind with either a true or a deceptive light. And thus is kept up a state of things very satisfactory to some minds, because, without the unpleasant process of fining or imprisoning anybody, it maintains all prevailing opinions outwardly undisturbed, while it does not absolutely interdict the exercise of reason by dissentients afflicted with the malady of thought. A convenient plan for having peace in the intellectual world, and keeping all things going on therein very much as they do already. But the price paid for this sort of intellectual pacification is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the human mind. A state of things in which a large portion of the most active and inquiring intellects find it advisable to keep the general principles and grounds of their convictions within their own breasts, and attempt, in what they address to the public, to fit as much as they can of their own conclusions to premises which they have internally renounced, cannot send forth the open, fearless characters, and logical, consistent intellects who once adorned the thinking world. The sort of men who can be looked for under it, are either mere conformers to common-place, or time-servers for truth, whose arguments on all great subjects are meant for their hearers, and are not those which have convinced themselves. Those who avoid this alternative, do so by narrowing their thoughts and interest to things which can be spoken of without venturing within the region of principles, that is, to small practical matters, which would come right of themselves, if but the minds of mankind were strenghtened and enlarged, and which will never be made effectually right until then: while that which would strengthen and enlarge men's minds, free and daring speculation on the highest subjects, is abandoned.

Those in whose eyes this reticence on the part of heretics is no evil should consider, in the first place, that in consequence of it there is never any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions; and that such of them as could not stand such a discussion, though they may be prevented from spreading, do not disappear. But it is not the minds

of heretics that are deteriorated most by the ban placed on all inquiry which does not end in the orthodox conclusions. The greatest harm done is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is cramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy. Who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them in something which would admit of being considered irreligious or immoral? Among them we may occasionally see some man of deep conscientiousness, and subtle and refined understanding, who spends a life in sophisticating with an intellect which he cannot silence, and exhausts the resources of ingenuity in attempting to reconcile the promptings of his conscience and reason with orthodoxy, which yet he does not, perhaps, to the end succeed in doing. No one can be a great thinker who does not recognise, that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusion it may lead. Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think. Not that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great thinkers, that freedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as much and even more indispensable to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of. There have been, and may again be, great individual thinkers in a general atmosphere of mental slavery. But there never has been, nor ever will be, in that atmosphere an intellectually active people. Where any people has made a temporary approach to such a character, it has been because the dread of heterodox speculation was for a time suspended. Where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be disputed; where the discussion of the greatest questions which can occupy humanity is considered to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high scale of mental activity which has made some periods of history so remarkable. Never when controversy avoided the subjects which are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm, was the mind of a people stirred up from its foundations, and the impulse given which raised even persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity of thinking beings. Of such we have had an example in the condition of Europe during the times immediately following the Reformation; another, though limited to the Continent and to a more cultivated class, in the speculative movement of the latter half of the eighteenth century; and a third, of still briefer duration, in the intellectual fermentation of

Germany during the Goethian and Fichtean period. These periods differed widely in the particular opinions which they developed; but were alike in this, that during all three the yoke of authority was broken. In each, an old mental despotism had been thrown off, and no new one had yet taken its place. The impulse given at these three periods has made Europe what it now is. Every single improvement which has taken place either in the human mind or in institutions, may be traced distinctly to one or other of them. Appearances have for some time indicated that all three impulses are well nigh spent; and we can expect no fresh start until we again assert our mental freedom.

Let us now pass to the second division of the argument, and dismissing the supposition that any of the received opinions may be false, let us assume them to be true, and examine into the worth of the manner in which they are likely to be held, when their truth is not freely and openly canvassed. However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that, however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.

There is a class of persons (happily not quite so numerous as formerly) who think it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to what they think true, though he has no knowledge whatever of the grounds of the opinion, and could not make a tenable defence of it against the most superficial objections. Such persons, if they can once get their creed taught from authority, naturally think that no good, and some harm, comes of its being allowed to be questioned. Where their influence prevails, they make it nearly impossible for the received opinion to be rejected wisely and considerately, though it may still be rejected rashly and ignorantly; for to shut out discussion entirely is seldom possible, and when it once gets in, beliefs not grounded on conviction are apt to give way before the slightest semblance of an argument. Waiving, however, this possibility—assuming that the true opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument—this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.

. . . The greatest orator, save one, of antiquity, has left it on record that he always studied his adversary's case with as great, if not still greater, intensity than even his own. What Cicero practised as the means of forensic success requires to be imitated by all who study any

subject in order to arrive at the truth. He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion.

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If, however, the mischievous operation of the absence of free discussion, when the received opinions are true, were confined to leaving men ignorant of the grounds of those opinions, it might be thought that this, if an intellectual, is no moral evil, and does not affect the worth of the opinions, regarded in their influence on the character. The fact, however, is, that not only the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often the meaning of the opinion itself. The words which convey it cease to suggest ideas, or suggest only a small portion of those they were originally employed to communicate Instead of a vivid conception and a living belief, there remain only a few phrases retained by rote; or, if any part, the shell and husk only of the meaning is retained, the finer essence being lost. The great chapter in human history which this fact occupies and fills, cannot be too earnestly studied and meditated on.

It is illustrated in the experience of almost all ethical doctrines and religious creeds. They are all full of meaning and vitality to those who originate them, and to the direct disciples of the originators. Their meaning continues to be felt in undiminished strength, and is perhaps brought out into even fuller consciousness, so long as the struggle lasts to give the doctrine or creed an ascendancy over other creeds. At last it either prevails, and becomes the general opinion, or its progress stops; it keeps possession of the ground it has gained, but ceases to spread further. When either of these results has become apparent, controversy on the subject flags, and gradually dies away. The doctrine has taken its place, if not as a received opinion, as one of the admitted sects or divisions of opinion: those who hold it have generally inherited, not adopted it; and conversion from one of these doctrines to another, being now an exceptional fact, occupies little place in the thoughts of their professors. Instead of being, as at first, constantly on the alert either to defend themselves against the world, or to bring the world over to them, they have subsided into acquiescence, and neither listen, when they can help it, to arguments against their creed, nor trouble dissentients (if there be such) with arguments in its favour. From this time may usually be dated the decline in the living power

of the doctrine. We often hear the teachers of all creeds lamenting the difficulty of keeping up in the minds of believers a lively apprehension of the truth which they nominally recognise, so that it may penetrate the feelings, and acquire a real mastery over the conduct. No such difficulty is complained of while the creed is still fighting for its existence: even the weaker combatants then know and feel what they are fighting for, and the difference between it and other doctrines; and in that period of every creed's existence, not a few persons may be found, who have realised its fundamental principles in all the forms of thought, have weighed and considered them in all their important bearings, and have experienced the full effect on the character which belief in that creed ought to produce in a mind thoroughly imbued with it. But when it has come to be an hereditary creed, and to be received passively, not actively—when the mind is no longer compelled, in the same degree as at first, to exercise its vital powers on the questions which its belief presents to it, there is a progressive tendency to forget all of the belief except the formularies, or to give it a dull and torpid assent, as if accepting it on trust dispensed with the necessity of realising it in consciousness, or testing it by personal experience, until it almost ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human being. Then are seen the cases, so frequent in this age of the world as almost to form the majority, in which the creed remains as it were outside the mind, incrusting and petrifying it against all other influences addressed to the higher parts of our nature; manifesting its power by not suffering any fresh and living conviction to get in, but itself doing nothing for the mind or heart, except standing sentinel over them to keep them vacant.

To what an extent doctrines intrinsically fitted to make the deepest impression upon the mind may remain in it as dead beliefs, without being ever realised in the imagination, the feelings, or the understanding, is exemplified by the manner in which the majority of believers hold the doctrines of Christianity. By Christianity I here mean what is accounted such by all churches and sects—the maxims and precepts contained in the New Testament. These are considered sacred, and accepted as laws, by all professing Christians. Yet it is scarcely too much to say that not one Christian in a thousand guides or tests his individual conduct by reference to those laws. The standard to which he does refer it, is the custom of his nation, his class, or his religious profession. He has thus, on the one hand, a collection of ethical maxims, which he believes to have been vouchsafed to him by infallible wisdom as rules for his government; and on the other a set of every-day judg-

ments and practices, which go a certain length with some of those maxims, not so great a length with others, stand in direct opposition to some, and are, on the whole, a compromise between the Christian creed and the interests and suggestions of worldly life. To the first of these standards he gives his homage; to the other his real allegiance. All Christians believe that the blessed are the poor and humble, and those who are ill-used by the world; that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven; that they should judge not, lest they be judged; that they should swear not at all; that they should love their neighbour as themselves; that if one take their cloak, they should give him their coat also; that they should take no thought for the morrow; that if they would be perfect they should sell all that they have and give it to the poor. They are not insincere when they say that they believe these things. They do believe them, as people believe what they have always heard lauded and never discussed. But in the sense of that living belief which regulates conduct, they believe these doctrines just up to the point to which it is usual to act upon them. The doctrines in their integrity are serviceable to pelt adversaries with; and it is understood that they are to be put forward (when possible) as the reasons for whatever people do that they think laudable. But any one who reminded them that the maxims require an infinity of things which they never even think of doing, would gain nothing but to be classed among those very unpopular characters who affect to be better than other people. The doctrines have no hold on ordinary believers—are not a power in their minds. They have an habitual respect for the sound of them, but no feeling which spreads from the words to the things signified, and forces the mind to take *them* in, and make them conform to the formula. Whenever conduct is concerned, they look round for Mr. A and B to direct them how far to go in obeying Christ.

Now we may be well assured that the case was not thus, but far otherwise, with the early Christians. Had it been thus, Christianity never would have expanded from an obscure sect of the despised Hebrews into the religion of the Roman Empire. When their enemies said, "See how these Christians love one another" (a remark not likely to be made by anybody now), they assuredly had a much livelier feeling of the meaning of their creed than they have ever had since. And to this cause, probably, it is chiefly owing that Christianity now makes so little progress in extending its domain, and after eighteen centuries is still nearly confined to Europeans and the descendants of Europeans. Even with the strictly religious, who are much in earnest about their

doctrines, and attach a greater amount of meaning to many of them than people in general, it commonly happens that the part which is thus comparatively active in their minds is that which was made by Calvin, or Knox, or some such person much nearer in character to themselves. The sayings of Christ coexist passively in their minds, producing hardly any effect beyond what is caused by mere listening to words so amiable and bland. There are many reasons, doubtless, why doctrines which are the badge of a sect retain more of their vitality than those common to all recognised sects, and why more pains are taken by teachers to keep their meaning alive; but one reason certainly is, that the peculiar doctrines are more questioned, and have to be oftener defended against open gainsayers. Both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there is no enemy in the field.

The same thing holds true, generally speaking, of all traditional doctrines—those of prudence and knowledge of life, as well as of morals or religion. All languages and literatures are full of general observations on life, both as to what it is, and how to conduct oneself in it; observations which everybody knows, which everybody repeats, or hears with acquiescence, which are received as truisms, yet of which most people first truly learn the meaning when experience, generally of a painful kind, has made it a reality to them. How often, when smarting under some unforeseen misfortune or disappointment, does a person call to mind some proverb or common saying, familiar to him all his life, the meaning of which, if he had ever before felt it as he does now, would have saved him from the calamity. There are indeed reasons for this, other than the absence of discussion; there are many truths of which the full meaning *cannot* be realised until personal experience has brought it home. But much more of the meaning even of these would have been understood, and what was understood would have been far more deeply impressed on the mind, if the man had been accustomed to hear it argued *pro* and *con* by people who did understand it. The fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their errors. A contemporary author has well spoken of "the deep slumber of a decided opinion."

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STUDY INTRODUCTION

Many who use this book will have given a period of their lives and here and there one an arm or eye in defense of what is vaguely called "the American way of life." All who turn these pages will have been deeply

affected in one way or another by the second world war; some will have lost more than arm or eye. Why were we willing to sacrifice so much? The answer to such a question is complex; but it goes back ultimately, as all important questions do, to ideas and beliefs—for they determine our most essential choices. What did we believe when we chose war? Again, as in all wars, there were soldiers who found no clear answer when they asked themselves, "What are we fighting for?"—tragic figures because unless to die oneself by violence or to kill an enemy has clear meaning, serves a great end, as it did for Brutus, it is bestiality. "The American way of life," rightly understood, *is* a great end, though many cannot define it and others heatedly distort it to mean whatever their advantage dictates. Of this much we may be sure: we fought again to keep the right to work out according to traditions of liberty, bought with blood, a better life for all men, though we grant that plans for that better life are far from final and that we have vociferous differences of opinion about its pattern.

"According to traditions of liberty, bought with blood"! But what is the true meaning of this talismanic term *liberty?* Why is liberty a good worth so much sacrifice through so many generations? Can we be free without encroaching on others' freedom? What justifies that freedom of thought and discussion that we have defended without always understanding or even always granting to each other? Why are democratic institutions so precious that, rather than renounce them, we choose to kill their enemies if we must? John Stuart Mill is the classic philosopher of liberty who, more clearly and systematically than any other thinker, posed essential problems like these. We cannot afford not to know him. If we mean to build on his foundations, or Jefferson's or Lincoln's, we must know just where they lie and which ones are deep and secure enough to withstand corrosive time. The chapters printed here represent Mill the philosopher of civil liberties and political democracy.

Mill believed that civil liberties offer the surest pathway to truth and social progress, insure the highest level of leadership and of attainment among the people, and prevent the degradation of truth into "dead dogma." He believed representative forms most favorable to present good government, most conducive to improvement of the people in energies of thought and action, and most wholesome as a school of public spirit. Each of these phrases is full of the kind of meaning which can motivate essential choices. "Defense of liberty," a phrase so large with meaning that to the unthinking it is meaningless, is a duty of peace as well as of war. *Liberty, democracy* are large words, not "mere words." They represent ideal values very inadequately attained at bitter cost, constantly threatened (often by those who continually mouth the words), easily lost unless continually rewon, but always holding forth fair promises of ideal rewards.

1. What is Mill's main purpose, stated in the first paragraph? Into what two parts does the author divide his argument? Outline the essay, showing the chief reasons Mill gives to support his two main points. Could the order of his development be changed without any loss of effect? Why or why not?

2. What life-long beliefs that a student brings to college are most likely to be questioned by other students and his instructors? How might his beliefs have differed if he had come from a different family? from a different part of this country? from England, the Soviet Union, Japan, Nazi Germany? Why then does Mill think it absurd for him or any man to assume the infallibility of the opinions of the world he happens to come from? Why do you agree or disagree? Defend or attack the view that escape from such assumptions is the first important step in real mental growth.

3. Test Mill's belief that we move towards truth through the efforts of those who challenge accepted opinions: show how the belief is or is not supported by the progress of democracy in America, the abolition of slavery, women's efforts for "equal rights," the growth of internationalism, or any issue you wish to discuss. Why are free discussion and conflict of ideas necessary to progress?

4. Why does Mill believe that, even if we are right in our belief in democracy or tolerance, we must allow it to be challenged? What other beliefs might some consider too useful to society or too sacred to be challenged? Do you and all your classmates agree on what beliefs are indispensable and sacred? Do all thoughtful men? Is "indispensability" a matter of opinion? Why is it especially dangerous to close debate on the opinions considered sacred and indispensable? Why does Mill develop this part of his argument at such length?

5. Name some leader of political, religious, or scientific thought not mentioned by Mill who has been persecuted for beliefs now accepted as true. How does Mill answer the men who think truth ought to pass through the test of persecution? Why do you agree or disagree with him? Though we no longer burn men at the stake, how do we persecute those who hold unpopular opinions? Can persecution really stamp out true opinions? Why or why not?

6. Intolerance of conflicting opinions prevailed in Germany under Hitler and in Italy under Mussolini. On certain issues it prevails in parts of this country and among groups in our society. Perhaps it does on your own campus—if so, on what issues? What effect does such intolerance have, whenever it occurs, on the general level of mentality? on the character of leaders? Give examples from your own observation and experience and from your knowledge of history.

7. If a man "believes in" the golden rule but holds his faith as a "dead dogma," how does he show that the belief is really passive and lifeless?

Is Christianity, as Mill uses it, a fair example of truths that have degenerated into "dead dogma"? Why or why not? Do you think that some Americans' faith in freedom of speech and religion has become lifeless and merely passive? If so, what actions betray such a condition of belief? Did the fascist threat and the war reenergize our belief in democracy? If so, how? If not, why not? Why do you or do you not think it right to assume that a man believes not what he merely professes but what he is willing to act on?

8. Mill's style has a high order of beauty and distinction. It has been compared to a steel suspension bridge: it has the beauty of clear and ordered outline and of strong and delicate articulation of many interrelated parts, each of them alone and all of them together having the distinction of functional economy and absence of mere surface adornment. Show how Mill's intellectual intensity and passion for truth appear in his precise definitions, in his sentences (sometimes periodic) that include continual qualifications for the sake of exact meaning, in his use of balance and parallelism to focus interrelations of thought, in his rich resourcefulness of reasoning, and in his amplitude and aptness of illustration. How do his use of rhetorical questions and repetition of key words and phrases lend clarity or emphasis? Why is his diction primarily abstract? How, nevertheless, does he make his ideas vivid to you? Does his style seem to you to be leveled at a popular or restricted audience? Why? Why is it fitting for both his subject and his intended readers?

That the Ideally Best Form of Government Is Representative Government

JOHN STUART MILL

IT HAS LONG (perhaps throughout the entire duration of British freedom) been a common saying, that if a good despot could be ensured, despotic monarchy would be the best form of government. I look upon this as a radical and most pernicious misconception of what good government is; which, until it can be got rid of, will fatally vitiate all our speculations on government.

The supposition is, that absolute power, in the hands of an eminent individual, would ensure a virtuous and intelligent performance of all the duties of government. Good laws would be established and enforced, bad laws would be reformed; the best men would be placed in all situations of trust; justice would be as well administered, the public burthens would be as light and as judiciously imposed, every branch of administration would be as purely and as intelligently conducted, as the circumstances of the country and its degree of intellectual and moral cultivation would admit. I am willing, for the sake of the argument, to concede all this; but I must point out how great the concession is; how much more is needed to produce even an approximation to these results than is conveyed in the simple expression, a good despot. Their realisation would in fact imply, not merely a good monarch, but an all-seeing one. He must be at all times informed correctly, in considerable detail, of the conduct and working of every branch of administration, in every district of the country, and must be able, in the twenty-four hours per day which are all that is granted to a king as to the humblest labourer, to give an effective share of attention and superintendence to all parts of this vast field; or he must at least be capable of discerning and choosing out, from among the mass of his subjects, not only a large abundance of honest and able men, fit to conduct every branch of public administration under supervision and control, but also the small number of men of eminent vir-

Chapter III, *Considerations on Representative Government*, 1861; slightly abridged.

tues and talents who can be trusted not only to do without that supervision, but to exercise it themselves over others. So extraordinary are the faculties and energies required for performing this task in any supportable manner, that the good despot whom we are supposing can hardly be imagined as consenting to undertake it, unless as a refuge from intolerable evils, and a transitional preparation for something beyond. But the argument can do without even this immense item in the account. Suppose the difficulty vanquished. What should we then have? One man of superhuman mental activity managing the entire affairs of a mentally passive people. Their passivity is implied in the very idea of absolute power. The nation as a whole, and every individual composing it, are without any potential voice in their own destiny. They exercise no will in respect to their collective interests. All is decided for them by a will not their own, which it is legally a crime for them to disobey. What sort of human beings can be formed under such a regimen? What development can either their thinking or their active faculties attain under it? On matters of pure theory they might perhaps be allowed to speculate, so long as their speculations either did not approach politics, or had not the remotest connection with its practice. On practical affairs they could at most be only suffered to suggest; and even under the most moderate of despots, none but persons of already admitted or reputed superiority could hope that their suggestions would be known to, much less regarded by, those who had the management of affairs. A person must have a very unusual taste for intellectual exercise in and for itself, who will put himself to the trouble of thought when it is to have no outward effect, or qualify himself for functions which he has no chance of being allowed to exercise. The only sufficient incitement to mental exertion, in any but a few minds in a generation, is the prospect of some practical use to be made of its results. It does not follow that the nation will be wholly destitute of intellectual power. The common business of life, which must necessarily be performed by each individual or family for themselves, will call forth some amount of intelligence and practical ability, within a certain narrow range of ideas. There may be a select class of *savants,* who cultivate science with a view to its physical uses, or for the pleasure of the pursuit. There will be a bureaucracy, and persons in training for the bureaucracy, who will be taught at least some empirical maxims of government and public administration. There may be, and often has been, a systematic organisation of the best mental power in the country in some special direction (commonly military) to promote the grandeur of the despot. But the public at large

remain without information and without interest on all the greater matters of practice; or, if they have any knowledge of them, it is but a *dilettante* knowledge, like that which people have of the mechanical arts who have never handled a tool. Nor is it only in their intelligence that they suffer. Their moral capacities are equally stunted. Wherever the sphere of action of human beings is artifically circumscribed, their sentiments are narrowed and dwarfed in the same proportion. The food of feeling is action: even domestic affection lives upon voluntary good offices. Let a person have nothing to do for his country, and he will not care for it. It has been said of old, that in a despotism there is at most but one patriot, the despot himself; and the saying rests on a just appreciation of the effects of absolute subjection, even to a good and wise master. Religion remains: and here at least, it may be thought, is an agency that may be relied on for lifting men's eyes and minds above the dust at their feet. But religion, even supposing it to escape perversion for the purposes of despotism, ceases in these circumstances to be a social concern, and narrows into a personal affair between an individual and his Maker, in which the issue at stake is but his private salvation. Religion in this shape is quite consistent with the most selfish and contracted egoism, and identifies the votary as little in feeling with the rest of his kind as sensuality itself.

A good despotism means a government in which, so far as depends on the despot, there is no positive oppression by officers of state, but in which all the collective interests of the people are managed for them, all the thinking that has relation to collective interests done for them, and in which their minds are formed by, and consenting to, this abdication of their own energies. Leaving things to the Government, like leaving them to Providence, is synonymous with caring nothing about them, and accepting their results, when disagreeable, as visitations of Nature. With the exception, therefore, of a few studious men who take an intellectual interest in speculation for its own sake, the intelligence and sentiments of the whole people are given up to the material interests, and, when these are provided for, to the amusement and ornamentation, of private life. But to say this is to say, if the whole testimony of history is worth anything, that the era of national decline has arrived: that is, if the nation had ever attained anything to decline from. If it has never risen above the condition of an Oriental people, in that condition it continues to stagnate. But if, like Greece or Rome, it had realised anything higher, through the energy, patriotism, and enlargement of mind, which as national qualities are the fruits solely of freedom, it relapses in a few generations into the Oriental state.

And that state does not mean stupid tranquillity, with security against change for the worse; it often means being overrun, conquered, and reduced to domestic slavery, either by a stronger despot, or by the nearest barbarous people who retain along with their savage rudeness the energies of freedom.

Such are not merely the natural tendencies, but the inherent necessities of despotic government; from which there is no outlet, unless in so far as the despotism consents not to be despotism; in so far as the supposed good despot abstains from exercising his power, and, though holding it in reserve, allows the general business of government to go on as if the people really governed themselves. However little probable it may be, we may imagine a despot observing many of the rules and restraints of constitutional government. He might allow such freedom of the press and of discussion as would enable a public opinion to form and express itself on national affairs. He might suffer local interests to be managed, without the interference of authority, by the people themselves. He might even surround himself with a council or councils of government, freely chosen by the whole or some portion of the nation; retaining in his own hands the power of taxation, and the supreme legislative as well as executive authority. Were he to act thus, and so far abdicate as a despot, he would do away with a considerable part of the evils characteristic of despotism. Political activity and capacity for public affairs would no longer be prevented from growing up in the body of the nation; and a public opinion would form itself not the mere echo of the government. But such improvement would be the beginning of new difficulties. This public opinion, independent of the monarch's dictation, must be either with him or against him; if not the one, it will be the other. All governments must displease many persons, and these having now regular organs, and being able to express their sentiments, opinions adverse to the measures of government would often be expressed. What is the monarch to do when these unfavourable opinions happen to be in the majority? Is he to alter his course? Is he to defer to the nation? If so, he is no longer a despot, but a constitutional king; an organ or first minister of the people, distinguished only by being irremovable. If not, he must either put down opposition by his despotic power, or there will arise a permanent antagonism between the people and one man, which can have but one possible ending. Not even a religious principle of passive obedience and "right divine" would long ward off the natural consequences of such a position. The monarch would have to succumb, and conform to the conditions of constitutional royalty, or give place

to some one who would. The despotism, being thus chiefly nominal, would possess few of the advantages supposed to belong to absolute monarchy; while it would realise in a very imperfect degree those of a free government; since however great an amount of liberty the citizens might practically enjoy, they could never forget that they held it on sufferance, and by a concession which under the existing constitution of the state might at any moment be resumed; that they were legally slaves, though of a prudent, or indulgent, master.

It is not much to be wondered at if impatient or disappointed reformers, groaning under the impediments opposed to the most salutary public improvements by the ignorance, the indifference, the intractableness, the perverse obstinacy of a people, and the corrupt combinations of selfish private interests armed with the powerful weapons afforded by free institutions, should at times sigh for a strong hand to bear down all these obstacles, and compel a recalcitrant people to be better governed. But (setting aside the fact, that for one despot who now and then reforms an abuse, there are ninety-nine who do nothing but create them) those who look in any such direction for the realisation of their hopes leave out of the idea of good government its principal element, the improvement of the people themselves. One of the benefits of freedom is that under it the ruler cannot pass by the people's minds, and amend their affairs for them without amending them. If it were possible for the people to be well governed in spite of themselves, their good government would last no longer than the freedom of a people usually lasts who have been liberated by foreign arms without their own co-operation. It is true, a despot may educate the people; and to do so really, would be the best apology for his despotism. But any education which aims at making human beings other than machines, in the long run makes them claim to have the control of their own actions. The leaders of French philosophy in the eighteenth century had been educated by the Jesuits. Even Jesuit education, it seems, was sufficiently real to call forth the appetite for freedom. Whatever invigorates the faculties, in however small a measure, creates an increased desire for their more unimpeded exercise; and a popular education is a failure, if it educates the people for any state but that which it will certainly induce them to desire, and most probably to demand.

I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme exigency, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship. Free nations have, in times of old, conferred such power by their own choice, as a necessary medicine for diseases of the body politic which could not be got rid of by less violent means. But its acceptance, even

for a time strictly limited, can only be excused, if, like Solon or Pittacus,[1] the dictator employs the whole power he assumes in removing the obstacles which debar the nation from the enjoyment of freedom. A good despotism is an altogether false ideal, which practically (except as a means to some temporary purpose) becomes the most senseless and dangerous of chimeras. Evil for evil, a good despotism, in a country at all advanced in civilisation, is more noxious than a bad one; for it is far more relaxing and enervating to the thoughts, feelings, and energies of the people. The despotism of Augustus prepared the Romans for Tiberius. If the whole tone of their character had not first been prostrated by nearly two generations of that mild slavery, they would probably have had spirit enough left to rebel against the more odious one.

There is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community; every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the government, by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general.

To test this proposition, it has to be examined in reference to the two branches into which, as pointed out in the last chapter, the inquiry into the goodness of a government conveniently divides itself, namely, how far it promotes the good management of the affairs of society by means of the existing faculties, moral, intellectual, and active, of its various members, and what is its effect in improving or deteriorating those faculties.

The ideally best form of government, it is scarcely necessary to say, does not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of civilisation, but the one which, in the circumstances in which it is practicable and eligible, is attended with the greatest amount of beneficial consequences, immediate and prospective. A completely popular government is the only polity which can make out any claim to this character. It is pre-eminent in both the departments between which the excellence of a political constitution is divided. It is both more

[1] The dictatorship of *Solon*, Athenian lawgiver (639–559 B.C.), was a wise and benevolent one in which he restored order to distracted Attica, remodeled its constitution, and laid the basis for Athenian political liberty; he voluntarily abandoned his office after exacting from the people an oath that they would continue to obey his laws. *Pittacus*, Lesbian statesman (c. 652-569 B.C.), also voluntarily resigned his office as dictator, having prepared Mytilene for the safe enjoyment of republican government.

favourable to present good government, and promotes a better and higher form of national character, than any other polity whatsoever.

Its superiority in reference to present well-being rests upon two principles, of as universal truth and applicability as any general propositions which can be laid down respecting human affairs. The first is, that the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded when the person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for them. The second is, that the general prosperity attains a greater height, and is more widely diffused, in proportion to the amount and variety of the personal energies enlisted in promoting it.

Putting these two propositions into a shape more special to their present application; human beings are only secure from evil at the hands of others in proportion as they have the power of being, and are, self-*protecting;* and they only achieve a high degree of success in their struggle with Nature in proportion as they are self-*dependent,* relying on what they themselves can do, either separately or in concert, rather than on what others do for them.

The former proposition—that each is the only safe guardian of his own rights and interests—is one of those elementary maxims of prudence, which every person, capable of conducting his own affairs, implicitly acts upon, wherever he himself is interested. Many, indeed, have a great dislike to it as a political doctrine and are fond of holding it up to obloquy, as a doctrine of universal selfishness. To which we may answer, that whenever it ceases to be true that mankind, as a rule, prefer themselves to others, and those nearest to them to those more remote, from that moment Communism[2] is not only practicable, but the only defensible form of society; and will, when that time arrives, be assuredly carried into effect. For my own part, not believing in universal selfishness, I have no difficulty in admitting that Communism would even now be practicable among the *élite* of mankind, and may become so among the rest. But as this opinion is anything but popular with those defenders of existing institutions who find fault with the doctrine of the general predominance of self-interest, I am inclined to think they do in reality believe that most men consider themselves before other people. It is not, however, necessary to affirm even thus much in order to support the claim of all to participate in the sovereign power. We need not suppose that when power resides in an exclusive class, that class will knowingly and deliberately sacri-

[2] Like Morris (see his "True and False Society"), Mill used the term *Communism* to mean the communization of wealth and the elimination of economic inequality.

fice the other classes to themselves: it suffices that, in the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked; and, when looked at, is seen with very different eyes from those of the persons whom it directly concerns. . . .

It is an adherent condition of human affairs that no intention, however sincere, of protecting the interests of others can make it safe or salutary to tie up their own hands. Still more obviously true it is that by their own hands only can any positive and durable improvement of their circumstances in life be worked out. Through the joint influence of these two principles, all free communities have both been more exempt from social injustice and crime, and have attained more brilliant prosperity, than any others, or than they themselves after they lost their freedom. Contrast the free states of the world, while their freedom lasted, with the contemporary subjects of monarchical or oligarchical despotism: the Greek cities with the Persian satrapies; the Italian republics and the free towns of Flanders and Germany, with the feudal monarchies of Europe; Switzerland, Holland, and England, with Austria or ante-revolutionary France. Their superior prosperity was too obvious ever to have been gainsaid: while their superiority in good government and social relations is proved by the prosperity, and is manifest besides in every page of history. If we compare, not one age with another, but the different governments which co-existed in the same age, no amount of disorder which exaggeration itself can pretend to have existed amidst the publicity of the free states can be compared for a moment with the contemptuous trampling upon the mass of the people which pervaded the whole life of monarchical countries, or the disgusting individual tyranny which was of more than daily occurrence under the systems of plunder which they called fiscal arrangements, and in the secrecy of their frightful courts of justice.

. . . . . .

Thus stands the case as regards present well-being; the good management of the affairs of the existing generation. If we now pass to the influence of the form of government upon character, we shall find the superiority of popular government over every other to be, if possible, still more decided and indisputable.

This question really depends upon a still more fundamental one, viz., which of two common types of character, for the general good of humanity, it is most desirable should predominate—the active, or the passive type; that which struggles against evils, or that which endures

them; that which bends to circumstances, or that which endeavours to make circumstances bend to itself.

The commonplaces of moralists, and the general sympathies of mankind, are in favour of the passive type. Energetic characters may be admired, but the acquiescent and submissive are those which most men personally prefer. The passiveness of our neighbours increases our sense of security, and plays into the hands of our wilfulness. Passive characters, if we do not happen to need their activity, seem an obstruction the less in our own path. A contented character is not a dangerous rival. Yet nothing is more certain than that improvement in human affairs is wholly the work of the uncontented characters; and, moreover, that it is much easier for an active mind to acquire the virtues of patience than for a passive one to assume those of energy.

Of the three varieties of mental excellence, intellectual, practical, and moral, there never could be any doubt in regard to the first two which side had the advantage. All intellectual superiority is the fruit of active effort. Enterprise, the desire to keep moving, to be trying and accomplishing new things for our own benefit or that of others, is the parent even of speculative, and much more of practical, talent. The intellectual culture compatible with the other type is of that feeble and vague description which belongs to a mind that stops at amusement, or at simple contemplation. The test of real and vigorous thinking, the thinking which ascertains truths instead of dreaming dreams, is successful application to practice. Where that purpose does not exist, to give definiteness, precision, and an intelligible meaning to thought, it generates nothing better than the mystical metaphysics of the Pythagoreans or the Vedas.[3] With respect to practical improvement, the case is still more evident. The character which improves human life is that which struggles with natural powers and tendencies, not that which gives way to them. The self-benefiting qualities are all on the side of the active and energetic character: and the habits and conduct which promote the advantage of each individual member of the community must be at least a part of those which conduce most in the end to the advancement of the community as a whole.

But on the point of moral preferability, there seems at first sight to be room for doubt. I am not referring to the religious feeling which has so generally existed in favour of the inactive character, as being

[3] The followers of *Pythagoras* (6th century B.C.) accepted doctrines such as the origin of all things in number, the transmigration of souls, and the value of music in controlling the passions. *The Vedas* are the sacred literature of the Hindus, transcendental and pantheistic.

more in harmony with the submission due to the divine will. Christianity as well as other religions has fostered this sentiment; but it is the prerogative of Christianity, as regards this and many other perversions, that it is able to throw them off. Abstractedly from religious considerations, a passive character, which yields to obstacles instead of striving to overcome them, may not indeed be very useful to others, no more than to itself, but it might be expected to be at least inoffensive. Contentment is always counted among the moral virtues. But it is a complete error to suppose that contentment is necessarily or naturally attendant on passivity of character; and unless it is, the moral consequences are mischievous. Where there exists a desire for advantages not possessed, the mind which does not potentially possess them by means of its own energies is apt to look with hatred and malice on those who do. The person bestirring himself with hopeful prospects to improve his circumstances is the one who feels good-will towards others engaged in, or who have succeeded in, the same pursuit. And where the majority are so engaged, those who do not attain the object have had the tone given to their feelings by the general habit of the country, and ascribe their failure to want of effort or opportunity, or to their personal ill luck. But those who, while desiring what others possess, put no energy into striving for it, are either incessantly grumbling that fortune does not do for them what they do not attempt to do for themselves, or overflowing with envy and ill-will towards those who possess what they would like to hav.

. . . . . .

The striving, go-ahead character of England and the United States is only a fit subject of disapproving criticism on account of the very secondary objects on which it commonly expends its strength. In itself it is the foundation of the best hopes for the general improvement of mankind. It has been acutely remarked that whenever anything goes amiss the habitual impulse of French people is to say, *"Il faut de la patience"*;[4] and of English people, "What a shame." The people who think it a shame when anything goes wrong—who rush to the conclusion that the evil could and ought to have been prevented, are those who, in the long run, do most to make the world better. . . .

Now there can be no kind of doubt that the passive type of character is favoured by the government of one or a few, and the active self-helping type by that of the Many. Irresponsible rulers need the

[4] "We must be patient."

quiescence of the ruled more than they need any activity but that which they can compel. Submissiveness to the prescriptions of men as necessities of nature is the lesson inculcated by all governments upon those who are wholly without participation in them. The will of superiors, and the law as the will of superiors, must be passively yielded to. But no men are mere instruments or materials in the hands of their rulers who have will or spirit or a spring of internal activity in the rest of their proceedings: and any manifestation of these qualities, instead of receiving encouragement from despots, has to get itself forgiven by them. Even when irresponsible rulers are not sufficiently conscious of danger from the mental activity of their subjects to be desirous of repressing it, the position itself is a repression. Endeavour is even more effectually restrained by the certainty of its impotence than by any positive discouragement. Between subjection to the will of others, and the virtues of self-help and self-government, there is a natural incompatibility. This is more or less complete, according as the bondage is strained or relaxed. Rulers differ very much in the length to which they carry the control of the free agency of their subjects, or the supersession of it by managing their business for them. But the difference is in degree, not in principle; and the best despots often go the greatest lengths in chaining up the free agency of their subjects. A bad despot, when his own personal indulgences have been provided for, may sometimes be willing to let the people alone; but a good despot insists on doing them good, by making them do their own business in a better way than they themselves know of. The regulations which restricted to fixed processes all the leading branches of French manufactures were the work of the great Colbert.

. . . It is not sufficiently considered how little there is in most men's ordinary life to give any largeness either to their conceptions or to their sentiments. Their work is a routine; not a labour of love, but of self-interest in the most elementary form, the satisfaction of daily wants; neither the thing done, nor the process of doing it, introduces the mind to thoughts or feelings extending beyond individuals; if instructive books are within their reach, there is no stimulus to read them; and in most cases the individual has no access to any person of cultivation much superior to his own. Giving him something to do for the public, supplies, in a measure, all the deficiencies. If circumstances allow the amount of public duty assigned him to be considerable, it makes him an educated man. Notwithstanding the defects of the social system and moral ideas of antiquity, the practice of the di-

castery and the ecclesia[5] raised the intellectual standard of an average Athenian citizen far beyond anything of which there is yet an example in any other mass of men, ancient or modern. The proofs of this are apparent in every page of our great historian of Greece;[6] but we need scarcely look further than to the high quality of the addresses which their great orators deemed best calculated to act with effect on their understanding and will. A benefit of the same kind, though far less in degree, is produced on Englishmen of the lower middle class by their liability to be placed on juries and to serve parish offices; which, though it does not occur to so many, nor is so continuous, nor introduces them to so great a variety of elevated considerations, as to admit of comparison with the public education which every citizen of Athens obtained from her democratic institutions, must make them nevertheless very different beings, in range of ideas and development of faculties, from those who have done nothing in their lives but drive a quill, or sell goods over a counter. Still more salutary is the moral part of the instruction afforded by the participation of the private citizen, if even rarely, in public functions. He is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good: and he usually finds associated with him in the same work minds more familiarised than his own with these ideas and operations, whose study it will be to supply reasons to his understanding, and stimulation to his feeling for the general interest. He is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit. Where this school of public spirit does not exist, scarcely any sense is entertained that private persons, in no eminent social situation, owe any duties to society, except to obey the laws and submit to the government. There is no unselfish sentiment of identification with the public. Every thought or feeling, either of interest or of duty, is absorbed in the individual and in the family. The man never thinks of any collective interest, of any objects to be pursued jointly with others, but only in competition with them, and in some measure at their expense. A neighbour, not being an ally or an associate, since he is never engaged in any common undertaking for joint

[5] The *dicastery* was the highest court of the Athenian democracy, performing the functions of a modern judge and jury. The *ecclesia* was the regularly convoked assembly of Athenian citizens, consisting of all who were freemen of Athens. Through the democratic functions of the dicastery and the ecclesia the Athenian citizen participated directly in the government of Attica.

[6] George Grote (1794–1871), whose *History of Greece* (1846–56) is still a classic.

benefit, is therefore only a rival. Thus even private morality suffers, while public is actually extinct. Were this the universal and only possible state of things, the utmost aspirations of the lawgiver or the moralist could only stretch to make the bulk of the community a flock of sheep innocently nibbling the grass side by side.

From these accumulated considerations it is evident that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state is one in which the whole people participate; that any participation, even in the smallest public function, is useful; that the participation should everywhere be as great as the general degree of improvement of the community will allow; and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable than the admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the state. But since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of perfect government must be representative.

STUDY QUESTIONS

(For Study Introduction see "On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion")

1. Why does Mill believe that even a benevolent despot would be harmful, not beneficial? Thomas Carlyle (see selections in this book), at one time a friend of Mill, wanted rule by a few "Heroes" or leaders; for he believed that some men have extraordinary intuitive insight into reality and hence can rule us more wisely than we can rule ourselves. What might Mill, with his belief in reason rather than intuition, have replied to Carlyle—especially when, in later life, Carlyle condemned the common people as ignorant, irresponsible, obstinate, and corrupt?

2. Mill says democracy is necessary to the improvement of the people. Others have said that the cure for ills of democracy is more democracy. Are these two arguments really the same? How, in your opinion, do democratic institutions like free elections, free speech, free press, schools, and jury duty help the people to overcome the faults Carlyle mentions? Name other democratic practices and show their value, great or small, in improving the people. How do influences such as boss rule, political machines, and controled newspapers tend to short-circuit the educational values of democracy? Do your own thinking and observation lead you to believe that average men and women, under democracy, can correct the faults that persuade some men to deny their capacity for self-rule? Why or why not?

3. Mill says representative government is more favorable to present

good government than other forms because it permits the rights and interests of all to be represented by those disposed to stand up for them. How does our Congress represent such interests as those of farmers, laborers, big business, small business? How do such interests benefit as they would not under dictatorship? Why is the representative system capable of reflecting changes in alignment of interests? Why does it sometimes fail to provide for all interests, those of Negroes, for example? How, if at all, may this failure be counterbalanced or overcome? Why do you agree or disagree with Mill's belief that communism (equality and common ownership) would even now be possible among "the elite of mankind"?

4. How does representative government promote initiative and energy in the people? Show how the Americans or English exemplify these traits politically or otherwise. If you know something about the German or Japanese common people, show whether or not they can rightly be described as "passive." How does dictatorship promote "passivity"?

5. Most of the time most people think first of their private advantage; why is it important for themselves and for the community that they be trained to think of the common good also? How do democratic political practices, if participated in, serve as a school of public spirit? In what ways, besides voting, can private citizens who are not elected representatives take part effectively in democratic political life?

6. Sketch a brief topical outline of this essay and account for the position of each important link in the chain. Could any of the links be placed elsewhere equally well? Why or why not?

7. In his introductory paragraph how does Mill awaken interest and open his subject effectively? Compare the first paragraph of the previous essay in these respects. Which paragraph is the more effective? Why is the last paragraph of the present essay a strong or weak conclusion? Why does the present essay compare favorably or unfavorably with the preceding one in style (see the questions on style following the "Liberty" selection)?

The Limits of Tolerance

RALPH BARTON PERRY

Ralph Barton Perry (b. 1876), Professor of Philosophy at Harvard, is another distinguished American academic "elder statesman" who, like Carl Becker at Cornell, has felt the challenge of recent events and brought forcefully to bear on the present the learning and grasp of principles earned in life-long study and thought. A native of Vermont, educated at Princeton and Harvard, he has taught at Williams and Smith and, since 1903, at Harvard except for several excursions as visiting professor to French universities. During World War I he was secretary to the War Department's special committee on training and education. In his younger years one of William James's favorite students at Harvard, he is the chief authority on his teacher's life and work. His biography, *The Thought and Character of William James,* won a Pulitzer Prize in 1935; he has edited James's collected essays and reviews; and his own philosophy of "neo-realism" is a further development of Jamesian pragmatism. Such books as *The New Realism* and *General Theory of Value* established him in the front rank of American philosophers. When the threat of fascism appeared and America began to move unwillingly toward war, Professor Perry emerged as one of the most ardent enemies of the dictators and then as an advocate of the most unsparing prosecution of the attack. His fresh defense of democracy in books like . . . *Shall Not Perish from the Earth* (1940) and *Our Side Is Right* (1942) has supple intellectuality and great fervor.

Professor Perry is quite unlike the typical sophomore conception of a professor of philosophy. He is tall and erect, usually garbed in casual tweeds, younger in appearance than his years seem to warrant. He writes with notable vigor of style and lucidity of thought and is not wedded to the ungainly professional jargon that afflicts and encumbers so many professorial philosophers.

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The Meaning of Liberty

WHATEVER may be thought of the sincerity of the Wilsonian slogan, or of the success of the effort which it inspired in 1917–1919, one thing is clear, namely, that the world is *not* "safe for democracy." Its enemies abound and prosper. Some of these enemies are in our midst, and their presence raises in an acute form the problem of reconciling the tenets of democracy with its own preservation. Is it not a principle of democracy that it should not only live but *let live?* And how can it obey this principle without allowing its internal enemies to live until they have waxed strong and destroyed forever the very refuge which harbored them?

Every measure of constructive reform encounters the same problem. The remedy for evil, whether poverty, sickness, ignorance, oppression, or frustration, often lies in some general social change, which if it is to be effective must be enforced and implemented by government. But this is impossible without overcoming the resistance of individuals or groups whose advantage is identified with the status quo. They resist in the name of democracy and charge the innovator with interference. How, then, can a society which is pledged to the formula of live and let live ever improve or perfect itself, since to do so implies that some men shall be forbidden to do what is endeared to them by custom and by interest?

The question turns on that ingredient of democracy which is called "liberty," and upon its converse aspect which is called "tolerance." Liberty is a right to be tolerated, and that which is rightly tolerated is liberty. If democracy means that liberty and tolerance are unlimited, then democracy is indeed defenseless and impotent; doomed to acquiesce in its own stagnation or death. If not, then the principles by which liberty and tolerance are justified must at the same time define their limits.

In October, 1938, the American Bar Association's "Special Committee on the Bill of Rights" presented a brief to the Circuit Court of Appeals sitting in Philadelphia on the case of Mayor Hague[1] *vs.* the American Civil Liberties Union. Some months later (as reported in the *New York Times* of February 5, 1939), the Judge Advocate

[1] Frank *Hague* (b. 1876), Democratic Mayor of Jersey City, N. J., since 1917.

of a Jersey City Post of the American Legion made a speech in which he said:

> We hope the Supreme Court will not create an intolerable situation in Jersey City by placing a cloak of respectability about the shoulders of those dastardly communistic leaders and give them the rights and privileges which should only be accorded to real, honest, patriotic American citizens. If the Supreme Court made such a mistake and if this be declared criminal then, we, the war veterans of Jersey City, would be proud to be classed as criminals in defending our city against those paid agents of Soviet Russia in our fight for what we know and love as the principles of democracy. . . . The recent opinion of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals indicates that privileges and rights have been granted to a group who, it has been established, are known as enemies of our form of government, the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights, . . . which we fought to preserve in 1917 and 1918.*

The Bar Association protested against the violation of liberty, the American Legion protested against the abuse of liberty. Both parties were the friends of liberty, but each party was the other's enemy. When its friends are thus divided, and the public mind bewildered, it is worth the price of patience to set down the meaning of liberty, in order that professing libertarians may realize precisely what it is that they advocate, and anti-libertarians, if any then remain, precisely what it is that they oppose.

Liberty is both negative and positive. One does not speak of liberty at all unless there is a disposition to perform an act. Given such a disposition, negative liberty implies an external obstacle, as when the child is held in the grasp of an adult, or when some barrier, such as iron bars, is interposed between the prisoner and the place where he would prefer to be. With such an obstacle in mind, negative liberty means merely its absence or removal.

Negative liberty is relative to the specific character of a felt interest, and to its intensity. In an age of religious zeal, negative liberty will mean liberty from an oppressive church; when men aspire to the management of their own affairs, they will covet liberty from a tyrannical state; when they are ambitious to rise in the economic scale, negative liberty will mean escape from the limitations imposed by the existing industrial hierarchy. To writers, liberty means relief from censorship; to drinkers, repeal of prohibition; to pacifists, the absence of compulsory military service; to agitators and minorities, unrestricted speech and assembly. Negative liberty plays a small rôle in the lives of apa-

* *New York Times*, February 5, 1939, Section I, p. 15.

thetic men, and will take a high place in the code of men whose desires and ambitions are strong and who feel the impact of the obstacle with a proportional intensity.

Positive liberty, on the other hand, means that an externally unimpeded interest is capable of proceeding toward its realization. A man is not positively at liberty to walk unless he has sound limbs, or to travel unless he has the fare—even though nothing stands in his way and nobody forbids him. Liberty from prison bars is not positively enjoyed except by an individual who is capable of moving his body; the absence of censorship, persecution, or tyranny implies no positive liberty except to those who possess the resources for artistic creation, for worship, or for self-government. The force of socialism lies in its contention that no man is free whose tools of trade are controlled by some other man.

Liberty, positive and negative, is effective personal choice. No one can be said to be an advocate of full liberty, nor can any state or policy be said to promote it, unless liberty is thus doubly conceived, as both unhampered by obstacles and possessed of the requisite facilities.

When liberty is *claimed,* there arises a distinction between primitive and moral liberty. Primitive liberty is the sheer insistence of any interest whatsoever on the positive and negative conditions of its own realization. This liberty manifests itself on every plane, from the most elemental or selfish appetite to the most spiritual or humane aspiration. It possesses no moral quality in itself, but creates an obligation on the part of other interests. There is a presumption in favor of a man's obtaining what he desires and enjoying what he likes. The burden of proof is on any individual or institution that would inflict unhappiness on any sentient creature or deprive him of happiness.

But there is no moral right to do as one pleases, and no moral requirement that such liberty should be tolerated. Liberty possesses a moral justification only when it is limited by a regard for the like liberty of others: in short, only when it is reciprocal. The moral reason both for liberty and for tolerance lies in their serving the end of harmonious happiness.

The vigilant insistence on one's own liberty is a needful corrective of oppression, but no man can be said to be a genuine lover of liberty unless he is the friend of libertarian institutions by which liberty is diffused throughout the community at large. Patrick Henry's "Give me liberty or give me death" is ambiguous. If he meant that he preferred death to the loss of his own liberty, he did not rise above the

level of primitive liberty. But if he meant that he preferred death to the destruction of a social system under which all persons enjoyed their just rights, his sentiment was morally admirable; but it would then have found a fitter expression in the words, "Give *us* liberty, or give *me* death."

Legal Liberty

The liberties on which attention is focussed at the present time are those whose meaning is related to government. There are three such liberties: liberty *under* government, liberty *against* government, and liberty *for* government. The first of these is legal liberty.

The widely diffused idea that liberty is created by the state is both false and confusing. It is entirely conceivable that an isolated individual, or an individual living in an unorganized group of individuals whose interests were naturally compatible with his own, should possess and enjoy primitive liberty, both negative and positive. It is entirely possible, and does, in fact, frequently occur, that moral liberty should exist in a group of individuals who of their own free volition respected one another's spheres of interest. This reservation having been made, it is then in order to acknowledge that no high degree of liberty is normally possible without the protection of the state.

The most serious external threat to a man's interest is the rival interest of his neighbor. Interests, if left to themselves, are conflicting and unpredictable. It is the purpose of law to define the limits implied by moral liberty. It creates spheres of interest within which individuals or groups may pursue their interests without mutual interference. The state employs the collective force to guarantee moral liberty, so that those who remain within bounds can enjoy security. Through legal liberty a man knows what he can count upon, so that he can withdraw his fears from the frontier and concern himself with his domestic concerns. It so regularizes the behavior of men that they can not only trust one another, but engage in co-operative enterprise, each with the assurance that the other will play his part. It enables a man to form stable and well-founded expectations regarding the behavior of others. If others, despite the warning of the law, exceed their boundaries, he has a legitimate ground of complaint and a power to redress his grievances.

It is clear that legal liberty is both a privilege and an obligation. It is legitimately enjoyed only in so far as it is legally restrained. This duality reflects the meaning of the moral liberty which legal liberty

defines and enforces. Just as legal liberty loses its legitimacy when it exceeds certain limits, and is then nullified by the state, so it loses its moral justification, and deserves to be condemned rather than to be tolerated by the conscience of the community. Liberty is tolerable within limits, and intolerable beyond limits, the limits being prescribed by the general social end of harmonious happiness.

If it be the function of government to promote the orderly and compatible liberties of men, this function must be extended to embrace positive and not merely negative liberties. The most ancient, persistent, and oppressive enemies of liberty are not external hindrances, whether physical or human, but poverty and ignorance. It is the chief fault of prosperous and of enlightened men that they forget this fact. What government does in the way of education, public information, health, housing, increased wages, reduced hours of labor, or the redistribution of wealth may be as much a service of liberty as is its protection of men against interference. It is misleading to suppose that there is any clear line of demarcation between liberty and welfare.

Civil Liberty

Civil liberty is the most confused, and, next after war, the most acute of contemporary issues. The phrase has several distinct meanings which are, unhappily, not distinguished. It is sometimes used to mean liberty under government, that is, legal liberty, in the sense already discussed above. It is sometimes used to mean liberty for government, that is, political liberty, in the sense to be discussed below. It is sometimes used, without definition, to refer to an indeterminate list of specific liberties: the liberties of speech, press, assembly, and religion, as interpreted in judicial decisions; the so-called "inalienable" rights of life, liberty, and property or happiness; the rights of petition, habeas corpus, due process of law, trial by jury, and the inviolability of the home or person, together with other rights embraced under such broad formulas as "common law rights," or "the rights of Englishmen." It is sometimes used, again without definition, to refer to a narrower group of the liberties listed above, those liberties, namely, which have to do most directly with opinion and its effective public utterance. Finally, civil liberty is sometimes taken to mean such liberties as the above, when conceived as limiting the powers of government, and as resting on some more fundamental sanction, such as reason, conscience, or nature. It is the last of these meanings which is in question here.

Civil liberty, taken to mean liberty against government, defines a line between the use and the abuse of government. It has meaning only in a political philosophy, such as democracy, in which it is affirmed that government possesses obligations beyond itself. It signifies what, to use Jefferson's expression, "the people are entitled to against every government on earth";* and it implies a tendency of government to defeat its proper end. There are three ways in which government may thus defeat its end and become the enemy of liberty: by disloyalty, by excess, and by inefficiency.

By disloyalty of government is here meant any deviation from its public function due to the private self-interest of the ruler. It signifies the chronic evil, and the chronic suspicion, associated with the name of tyranny. The popularity of government does not suffice to save it from tyranny, but may create new forms of tyranny. Thus popular government lends itself to the tyranny of the majority or of the masses; and to the tyranny of the demagogue, who conceals his self-interest by flattering the people, and appeals to their baser instincts against their reflective judgment. The corrective of tyranny lies in a scrupulous regard for the liberty of minorities or dissenting individuals, and in a system of popular education that shall emancipate the critical faculties and develop a resistance to irrational appeal. But no individual has a just claim to tolerance on this ground unless he is himself loyal to that social purpose which is the ground of his indictment of government.

Liberty may be conceived as a just claim not only against disloyal government, or tyranny, but also against excessive government, or paternalism. This issue derives its present meaning to most Americans from the application to "business."

The beginning of sound thinking on this matter is to understand that the traditional American system known as "laissez-faire" capitalism is not an effect of "the silence of the law." It is defined and protected by government. Men who are merely let alone to do as they please do not compete with one another; they plunder one another. "Free competition" depends no more on letting men do as they please than on preventing them from doing as they please and forcing them to do as they do not please. When the government steps in between man and man, those whom the intervention is *for* call it "protection," while those whom the intervention is *against* call it "interference." The only question regarding government's interference with business is whether it shall interfere more or less, and in old ways or new. The only principle applicable to this question is the principle that

* Letter of December 20, 1787, to James Madison.

the restraints imposed by government shall be justified by their fruitfulness to the individuals living under government.

This same principle defines the limits of tolerance. No individual has a right to demand liberty from government on the ground that government is excessive, unless he is prepared to show by argument and by works that government is superfluous; unless, in other words, he can show that the social good for which the public agency is invoked is equally attainable by private agencies.

Civil rights protect man, in the third place, from the inefficiency of government, that is, from the malfunctioning of its mechanisms and agencies. Considering the instruments at its command, government will sometimes most effectively serve liberty by leaving the regulation of private interests to private institutions, such as church, school, or other charitable organization, or to the power of the social conscience.

Thus, for example, the public agencies which would effectively regulate opinion, sentiment, science, and art may be coarse instruments, unsuited to so delicate an operation. Every instrument may be dulled or broken by over-use. A state which is asked to do too much may do nothing well. Its functions may increase more rapidly than its competence. It is prudent, therefore, to limit the functions of the state out of regard for the human limitations of its mechanisms.

The inefficiency of government may consist not in the imperfection of its own instruments, but in its failure to profit by other instruments. It is self-evident that the state should derive the utmost public benefit from the motive of private self-interest. There is an area within which public and private interest coincide, and here the motive of private interest may be stronger and more reliable than the disinterestedness of government, and its use more economical.

While the charge of inefficiency may be invoked against government, no man is entitled to immunity from public control *on that ground,* unless he *takes* that ground, and accepts its full implications. He must be prepared to demonstrate not the superior efficiency of private enterprise in general, but its capacity to realize precisely that form of justice or beneficence which government is endeavoring, however inefficiently, to supply.

Political Liberty

Civil liberty sets limits to the government in power, and its rationale lies in the fact that the government in power tends, unless so re-

strained, to tyranny, paternalism, and inefficiency. There are, however, certain liberties which are justified not as a protection of the individual against government, but as indispensable to the functioning of government. Any civil liberty when so justified becomes a "political" liberty.

It is not easy to circumscribe the liberties which should be here included. There is no doubt, however, regarding those liberties which enable the individual to form judgments for himself and communicate them to his fellow men. Among these liberties are the liberties of speech, of press, of assembly, and of religion, when these are conceived as essential to the processes of political democracy. So-called "academic freedom," embracing the liberties of research and of teaching, may be considered as an application of the same principle; as may liberties of radio or cinema, or any other form of communication which advancing technology may devise. It is in this area that the question of tolerance is at present most confused and most acrimoniously debated.

The meaning of political liberty depends on the assumption that a distinction can be made between judgment and practice. The liberty to judge that property should be held in common does not imply a liberty to practise communism; the liberty to defend the theory of free trade does not imply the liberty to bring goods across the frontier without paying the duty. A similar distinction holds also between persuasion and incitement. The line is often difficult to draw, but in principle it is clear that the liberty to advocate a judgment which *if* acted upon *would be* lawless does not imply the liberty to perform or induce a lawless act.

A democratic polity is pledged to the principles of *enlightenment* and *consent,* and the political liberties are corollaries of these principles. In a state otherwise conceived, as founded on dogma or power, political liberties have no place.

First, then, democracy puts its trust in enlightenment, or in the achievement and dissemination of knowledge. But knowledge can be achieved only by minds which are freed from coercion, in order that they may be faithful to evidence. Knowledge is a potential achievement of every inquiring mind. The maximum advance of true knowledge depends on giving to every mind a commission to explore the facts and exercise its reasoning capacities. The essential liberty is thus liberty of thought, but the liberties of speech, press, assembly, and teaching are also conducive to enlightenment, through criticism, confirmation, and discussion.

Every liberty is limited by its justifying principle. Those who claim toleration of judgment and communication for the sake of enlightenment implicitly submit themselves to the standard of enlightenment. The liberty of dogmatic affirmation, or of impassioned utterance, or of artfully propagating error, or of silencing opponents, or of personal polemics cannot be justified as conducive to the achievement and spread of knowledge. Such liberties may be claimed, and perhaps rightly granted, on other grounds; but every thinker, speaker, writer, or teacher who claims to be tolerated *in order that he may promote enlightenment* is thereby pledged to intellectual sobriety, disinterestedness, and good faith.

It is a grave error to suppose that enlightenment is promoted by simply letting everybody speak his mind and plead his cause. It is a peculiar thing that the very people who consider laissez-faire to be a discredited superstition in economics often have a touching faith in its efficacy in the field of opinion. Justice Holmes gave his sanction to this error when he said: "The best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."* He here neglects the fact that what survives and gains acceptance in competitive struggle is a function not only of the freedom of the competition, but also of the conditions of the competition. If discussion takes the form of simultaneous affirmations in a large auditorium, the victory will go to the idea that is supported by the greatest lung power. If the competition of ideas takes place on a low level of mentality, or in an atmosphere of emotional instability, the most primitive or exciting idea will prevail. The evils of propaganda are not removed by multiplying the propagandists and giving them all a hearing, but only by raising the level of intellectual honesty and increasing the receptivity to evidence.

There is a right to be tolerated on the ground of enlightenment, but only those are entitled to it who are by works as well as by profession the friends of enlightenment. This does not mean that they shall be the exponents of a specific doctrine which is considered true, but that they shall be genuine lovers of truth, pledged to appeal their case to evidence and to accept its verdict.

There is the same restrictive implication in the principle of consent. The fundamental principle of political democracy is government by consent. If tolerance is to be claimed on the ground of consent, then its enjoyment must conduce to consent, in the sense of agreement of

* *The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes*, edited by Alfred Lief, 1929, p. 50.

government with a popular choice free and independently formed. This argues that the government must refrain from dictating the decision from which it derives its mandate. It must not only avoid interference, but it must positively assist the people to choose for themselves. But consent also implies a thoughtful decision, that is, an act of deliberate choice from among the relevant alternatives. He who demands toleration of opinion, assembly, or communication on the ground of consent cannot claim a right to use this privilege merely for purposes of intimidation, emotional excitation, or hypnotic suggestion.

The Partisan Use of Political Liberty

Political liberty may be exercised either in relation to the government in power, or in relation to the fundamental constitution, taken as embracing the principle of political liberty itself. The first of these uses of political liberty is its partisan use, and the second its revolutionary use.

The recognized device by which government by consent is obtained is known as the party system. It is an essential feature of this system that the election should be preceded by a free discussion of issues and candidates, and that the government elected should conform its policies to the judgment which has prevailed. Consent is periodically renewed or withdrawn by the same processes as those by which it is originally given. Thus the party in power, at the same time that it frames laws and performs administrative acts in accordance with the popular mandate from which it derived its authority, must also respect the political liberties of its opponents, despite the fact that such liberties will be used for its own defeat. Every party will have two loyalties, to itself and to the broad purpose of the system at large. Every "good" Republican or "good" Democrat will at the same time be a "good American," and will respect this quality in his opponent, despite the bitterness of partisan rivalry.

The crucial difference between a political democracy and all other forms of government is to be found here. A democratic government is pledged to maintain a general procedure which implies the possibility or even likelihood of its own overthrow, while an undemocratic government will use its power in whatever manner is conducive to its own perpetuation. There is no threat to political democracy in a shift of emphasis from private enterprise to public regulation, or from

state to federal control, or from the legislative to the executive branches of government. The diagnosticians who are watching these changes have applied their stethoscopes to the wrong spot. The enlightened guardian of democracy will scrutinize the government's attitude to its opponents and to public opinion. Does it use its power to intimidate and corrupt? Does it outlaw opposition and stifle criticism? Does it drug the public mind? Or does it rely for its possession of office on the merits of its policies as these are judged by a well-informed and free electorate? If not, then, and then only, is political democracy in jeopardy.

The purposes by which partisan liberty is justified define the limits of its toleration. If it is justified as a moral liberty, on the ground that a man naturally desires to exercise and voice his own mind, then it is limited by the principle of reciprocity. As there is no justifiable liberty of property or person which does not respect the property and persons of others, so there is no justifiable liberty of thought, speech, press, or assembly which does not respect the opinion of others and restrain itself within the bounds of temperate discussion. Whether control be exercised by public or by private agencies, the use of partisan privileges to injure the reputation or offend the honor of other individuals or groups is an intolerable abuse. Anti-Semitic propaganda, having reference to persons rather than to ideas, is a conspicuous instance of such an abuse. If it is not penalized under the laws of libel and slander, this is not because it is defensible, but only because it may be deemed inexpedient for the state to create the necessary agencies of enforcement. One thing is certain, namely, that open insult, like theft or homicide, is inconsistent with an all-embracing system of harmonious liberties.

Judged by the standard of enlightenment, it is evident that partisan opposition which assumes the form of personal invective, excitation of primitive emotion, appeal to acquired prejudice, suggestion, contagion, hypnosis, or intimidation is excluded and not justified. These are forces which make for darkness rather than light. The fertility of discussion is inversely proportional to the arousal of crude, combative instincts. Epithets used as weapons do not clarify issues or enrich understanding. With the radio, and to a considerable extent the press, persuasive communication is unilateral, and inflammatory utterance is not even neutralized by counterattack. A wide public is defenseless against the potent influence of rhetoric, which may be used with intent to obscure the facts and short-circuit the reasoning faculties.

If the principle of consent is to be invoked in behalf of partisan

liberties, then weight must be given to the negative as well as to the positive implications of this principle. If the exercise of partisan liberties is to be tolerated, it must be propitious to the emergence of acts of choice. It is proper that the people should be alive to their interests, and that to this end their feelings should be stirred. But the representation of their remoter interests is as important as the presentation of their immediate interests. In short, consent requires reflection and full awareness of what is at stake. "It is a stale contrivance, to get the people into a passion, in order to make them sacrifice their liberty."* A partisan uniformity produced by artfully manipulated psychological forces is not what is meant by "the consent of the governed," and such forces possess no title to toleration on the ground of this principle.

The Revolutionary Use of Political Liberty

Whatever the difficulties in practice, the partisan use of political liberty involves no fundamental difficulty of theory because it is clearly implied in the fundamental principles of the democratic political philosophy. But what if an anti-democratic faction arises within a democracy, claiming the partisan liberties, but pledged, in the event of securing power, to destroy the fundamental constitution which secures these liberties? While this issue has been forced to the front by the rise of communism and fascism, it has always been latent, and constitutes the central paradox of democracy, which seems bound to harbor and nourish its own enemies and thus connive at its own destruction.

Up to a certain point the question of the revolutionary use of political liberty is parallel to the question of its partisan use. There is the same distinction between theory and practice. The violation of the law guaranteeing political liberties would be intolerable, as would the advocacy of such violation; but this is to be distinguished from the advocacy of a revised system of law within which these liberties would no longer be legal. The difficulty of drawing a line between such theoretical advocacy of a new constitution, and a breach, by action, or incitement to action, of the existing constitution is great but not insuperable. It requires that careful examination of concrete cases and circumstances for which the courts exist.†

The fact that it is by faith and doctrine disposed to trust the inherent

* "Letters of Agrippa," *Essays on the Constitution of the United States*, edited by P. L. Ford, 1892, p. 114.

† Cf. Zechariah Chafee, *Freedom of Speech*, 1920.

beneficence of liberty, and to fear its suppression more than its abuse, exposes political democracy to the grave danger of condoning illegality. A state which permits the free discussion pro and con of its own constitution should be more, and not less, vigilant than other states in the suppression of unconstitutional action and incitement to violence. It has permitted the forging of a dangerous weapon and must protect itself against the misuse of that weapon. And it is a misuse of civil liberties if in their name men encourage and propagate a spirit of lawlessness. This holds without exception. One form of law-breaking is as lawless as another, whether the law-breaker be governed by the sordid passion of the thief or assassin or by the philosophical, political, religious creed of the revolutionary. The violent revolutionary may be nobler than the "criminal," but he is not less lawless; and it is his lawlessness rather than his nobility which determines the duty of the state.

Assuming political liberty to be guarded by the distinction between theory and practice, its revolutionary use is then justified by the same principles as are applicable to its partisan use, and is subject to the same limitations. If it is justified as a moral right, it is limited by the principle of reciprocity or inclusiveness, and is indefensible when its exercise by one individual or group is incompatible with its exercise by another. If it is justified as conducive to enlightenment, then, by the same token, it is unjustifiable when it conduces to darkness.

The most powerful argument for the revolutionary use of political liberties lies in the principle of consent. It is essential to a democratic polity that not only its specific policies, but its fundamental creed, its premises spoken and unspoken, should be freely accepted by those who live under it. It is impossible to appeal to reason for democracy, without admitting evidence against democracy. It is impossible that the mind should know without enjoying freedom to draw its own conclusions, and if it be given this freedom, its conclusions cannot be predicted in advance. The possibility of truth is conditioned by the hazard of error.

The principle of consent is, here again, restrictive in its implications. Revolutionary propaganda is dubiously tolerable when, however sincere the conviction of truth, it so mingles argument with emotion or with the coercive threat of group opinion and sentiment, as to diminish rather than increase the power of choice. It is then defensible, if defensible at all, only on other grounds. It may still be defended on the ground that it cannot effectively be prevented—because the attempt to prevent it will only give it the added strength of martyr-

dom. Or it may be defended on the ground that the agencies created to prevent it would do more evil than good.

Libertarianism as a Scruple and as an End

So far, the partisan and revolutionary uses of political liberty are similar. But there is a point at which they diverge. Partisan liberty is argued from the general end of democracy, and whether the partisan opposition to government succeeds or fails, the outcome is in agreement with that end. As regards revolutionary liberty, on the other hand, the situation is different. If such an opposition succeeds, liberty will have been used to destroy the very form of polity by which it was justified. The tolerant libertarian here appears to be presented with an insoluble dilemma. Either he must deny liberty for the sake of preserving it, or he must tolerate liberty with the full knowledge that in effect he will have denied it.

This apparent dilemma rests, however, upon a confusion between two kinds of libertarianism. There is a libertarianism of scruple, and a libertarianism of end; and the dilemma is escaped by the explicit and steadfast adoption of the one or the other.

By a libertarianism of scruple is meant the acceptance of tolerance as an absolute and inviolable maxim. Illuminating analogies are afforded by the cults of total abstinence and nonresistance. The devotee of total abstinence takes the position that the drinking of alcoholic beverages is wrong, absolutely. It would not be justified by the most beneficent consequences imaginable; even if it should be a means to the gradual elimination, in oneself, or in society at large, of the appetite for drink. Similarly, the nonresistant pacifist, if he is consistent, regards it as absolutely wrong to use violence. Scrupulous non-violence means "no violence, whatever the consequences"—even though one of the consequences should be the increase of violence in the future or in the world at large.

Following these analogies, a scrupulous libertarianism means that it is wrong to deny freedom of speech and assembly, regardless of consequences, even though a consequence of granting these liberties should be the permanent destruction of such liberties. As a scrupulous libertarian he is not concerned with the future of liberty, but only with his own fidelity to principle: liberty, though the heavens fall, and, in falling, bring liberty itself to ruin with them. As a scrupulous libertarian his way is clear.

He, on the other hand, who adopts libertarianism as an end is con-

cerned with creating and perpetuating a set of social institutions in which liberty is realized. If he gives this the first place in his social philosophy, then he is bound to employ the requisite means, even, if necessary, the momentary or partial suppression of liberty. Here also the way is clear, once the stand is taken: clear in principle, however difficult the application.

The constructive pacifist may take account of the disarming effect of magnanimity. It is no doubt true that in certain situations the enemy will drop his weapons if he is not resisted. It is equally true that in some situations the effect of nonresistance is only to invite or aggravate attack. For a constructive pacifist this is a question of technique based on an experimental knowledge of human nature. Only a constructive pacifist is entitled to take account of these considerations. A scrupulous pacifist would observe his taboo against violence regardless of consequences—even if he foresaw the multiplication and aggravation of violence.

So the constructive libertarian may use tolerance as a method for securing his end, believing that under certain circumstances men are less likely to abuse liberty if they are allowed to enjoy it. Only a constructive libertarian is entitled to employ this technique; but if he does so he is bound to fit the technique to the circumstances and withhold tolerance if such a procedure affords better promise of achieving the desired result. In other words, if a certain instrument is adopted because of its effects, then the same reasoning will require its rejection if the effects are the opposite.

In order to create and preserve an ideal state of affairs, it is often necessary to act in precisely that manner which the ideal state of affairs is designed to eliminate. The promotion of health or the saving of life may require a bodily injury called surgery. The purpose of a pleasant life on the whole may, and often does, require the inflicting of pain. The security of person and property sometimes requires the seizure of person or of property, under the name of punishment. Peace is a system of relations between man and man or between nation and nation in which the use of violence is reduced to a minimum; but the pursuit of peace may, and often does, require the use of violence. Similarly, liberty, as a durable form of human life in which individuals, groups, and societies may enjoy the maximum of spontaneity and autonomy consistent with public order, may require the abridgment of those very liberties which it is designed to secure. When this is the case, the abridgment of liberty is not only consistent but imperatively required.

In a perfectly pacifist and democratic world, violence and forcible repression would be unnecessary. The scrupulous pacifist or libertarian proposes to act at all times as though this ideal state of affairs were already realized. He assumes no responsibility for the attainment and protection of his ideal state of affairs, but assigns himself a privileged rôle, and leaves the more unpalatable task to others.

In deciding whether in any given situation the revolutionary use of political liberty will or will not result in the destruction of libertarian institutions, many considerations must be taken into account. Recent developments in the technique of propaganda and force have made it more difficult than ever before in the world's history to overthrow a dictatorship. The likelihood that democratic institutions once destroyed could be recreated is correspondingly small. A democracy which is in power should not lightly surrender its advantage.

On the other hand, it is difficult to deny political liberties to a revolutionary party, or in times of crisis, without weakening devotion to the ultimate end of libertarian institutions. The means tend to compromise the end, and to corrupt the purity of the will. The agencies required for the effective repression of political liberties in particular cases are likely to extend their application, and in the net result to do more evil than good. A government which is armed with the mechanisms required for the regulation of opinion and communication is peculiarly tempted to the characteristic abuses of government, namely, disloyalty, excess, and inefficiency. Once libertarianism is adopted as an end, it is appropriate to ask whether it may not sometimes be best to let the abuse of liberty discredit itself, rather than by suppression to give it the effect of martyrdom.

These and many other like considerations make the practical decision difficult. But the first step, and a long step, toward solving a difficult practical problem is the clear definition of the standard of judgment and the determination of what considerations are legitimate. The cause of a libertarian and tolerant democracy is seriously imperiled by the supposition that it is not an end at all, but a set of scruples or of absolute commandments like those revealed to Moses on Mt. Sinai. Granting that it is an end, then, if it is to survive in the world, it must like other ends be an object of steadfast devotion. Like any other end, it must be energized by will and sustained by morale. Like any other end, it must resolutely employ the means required to insure its fulfillment, even though these means be contrary to its genius.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

This essay does two important things: it supplies a very closely reasoned analysis of the meaning of rational liberty, especially in relation to government, and it tries to determine how far democracy is bound to permit discussion or action aimed at its own overthrow.

Why is the first important? Many claimants of "liberty" interpret the term to fit their own personal or group advantage. It is therefore essential to see where rational liberty for one man or group, consistent with a like liberty to others, begins and ends. Should an employer be at liberty to adjust wages and hours as he sees fit? Is competitive business justified in claiming "liberty" from governmental interference? Should a teacher be at liberty to advocate any doctrine he chooses? Has a political party a legitimate liberty to appeal to prejudice or to distort facts? Are the deliberate manipulations of evidence in much of what we call propaganda and advertising legitimate applications of liberty? Is pure laissez-faire or free competition a tenable principle in the realm of idea and opinion? Is liberty of action subject to qualifications which do not apply to liberty of thought and discussion? Such questions are among the agenda of democratic theory and practice.

One of the crucial questions is whether democracy must permit its enemies freely to use its constitutional liberties for the purpose of undermining it. Is democracy committed to so firm a faith in its ability to stand against all comers that it must issue a virtual invitation to them to organize and preach and win whatever converts they may? Before the war against fascism the American organizations of German Bundists, supporters of Hitler, met one night in Madison Square Garden, New York, thousands strong, while government, in the persons of police of New York, stood by ready to use force to guarantee their right to speak disloyally. In Hyde Park, London, imperturbable "Bobbies," the most courteous policemen in the world, stood by while soap-box orators advocated every conceivable heretical opinion in all shades of atheism, communism, fascism, and anarchism. Had a dissenter hurled anything more substantial than an epithet at a speaker, he would have found himself debating the blessings of democracy behind bars. Had any speaker, reaching for tracts in his briefcase, drawn out instead a bomb to hurl into the underground, or had he incited others to violent action, the "Bobby" standing by would instantly have forsaken imperturbability for efficient action. Is the implied distinction between theory and practice, discussion and action, tenable? Was our official tolerance of opinion an evidence, as Hitler believed, of democratic decadence? Was it a sign of self-confident health and vigor or merely of indolent indifference to ideas? Should we continue it in the future?

Professor Perry's penetrating analysis of the implications and limitations of liberty is likely to have long life and wide influence. It helps us to answer many questions like those above.

1. A preliminary outline will be particularly helpful in discussing Perry's essay. Make a topical outline that shows his main points; and, as you read the essay a second time, using the questions below, fill in the subheads, showing their relative importance and the ordered march of his thought.

2. Perry's first six paragraphs are introduction to the subject: what has he done in them to prepare us for what follows?

3. Why are the contrasts between "negative" and "positive" liberty and between "primitive" and "moral" liberty helpful at the outset? Where does the author fall back on these distinctions later? Give an example of each of these kinds of liberty. Perry thinks liberty and tolerance are good because they promote "harmonious happiness." Some critics of liberty would contradict him. How can we answer them?

4. Men who say they believe in liberty may mean very different things. One may mean that he believes in freedom from interference in his business; another may mean that he wants freedom to impose restrictions on business so that it will pay fair wages or earn no excessive profits. To avoid many confusions we need to know the difference between liberty *under* government (legal liberty), liberty *against* government (civil liberty), and liberty *for* government (political liberty). How does Perry define these? Give an example of each. How ought we to decide cases of conflict between these forms of liberty?

5. If you think government should promote education, health, housing, fair wages and hours, and "redistribution of wealth," how would "positive liberty" justify its doing so? What kind of "negative liberty" would be appealed to by opponents of such measures? Is their appeal justified? Why or why not?

6. Give examples, actual or theoretical, to show how governments may defeat their end (a) by "disloyalty" to the common good of the people, (b) by "excess" or "paternalism," (c) by "inefficiency" or "malfunctioning." The second possibility opens wide areas of difference in opinion. Business men, for example, may want the "paternalism" of high protective tariffs but object strenuously to other applications of the principle. What similar conflicts arise in other groups? Does Perry decide how far government can serve "positive liberty" (see question-group 5) without becoming too paternalistic? Should we decide this issue by weighing the social results, good or bad, of paternalistic measures? Why or why not? Can a government get "the utmost public benefit from the motive of private self-interest" and still serve "positive liberty" by promoting health, education, and general economic betterment? Why or why not?

7. In normal times, if a man is opposed to the democratic form of government he lives under, should he be equally free (a) to think and speak

against it and (b) to act against it? Show why the difference between "judgment and practice" is important. Should such a man be equally free (a) to try to persuade others to agree and (b) to incite others to rebellion? Why is the distinction between "persuasion and incitement" important? If rebels like Samuel Adams and Tom Paine deserve praise, are sincere, active rebels against our own government laudable too? Support your answer, negative or positive, with the best reasons you can summon. What are the meanings of Perry's principles of "enlightenment" and "consent" in a democracy? Why should these principles regulate freedom of discussion and use of propaganda? Show how they apply to teachers and to classroom practices of indoctrination rather than of instruction aiding the student to choose intelligently for himself. Apply them to treatment of opinion by political parties, the press, advertisers. Explain Perry's belief that in such cases "every liberty [is] limited by its justifying principle."

8. If party governments under democracy must preserve the possibility of their own defeat, never denying "consent" or enforcing "partisan uniformity," is democracy itself committed to a pledge to preserve the possibility of its own overthrow? Why or why not? If a man believes in "revolutionary use of political liberty," is he nevertheless bound by the principles of enlightenment and consent? If he does not consider himself so bound, is he morally an outlaw? How do the distinctions between "judgment and practice," "persuasion and incitement" apply to him?

9. Show what Perry means by "libertarianism of scruple" and "libertarianism of end." Is his distinction in any way logically contradictory to earlier argument? Under what conditions, according to Perry, may temporary or partial limitations of freedom be necessary in order to preserve the possibility of liberty as an end? Why do you agree or disagree? The question whether democracy, if overthrown, could be restored soon, or ever, is complicated by the development of what modern methods of propaganda and force?

10. All the textbooks on rhetoric recommend unity, coherence, proportion, and emphasis to you in your theme writing. Why is Perry's chapter a good example of these qualities? What one thesis does it elaborate? Show the continuity of its parts, and justify the proportions of each. How is "emphasis" illustrated in the progression of the steps? Why is or is not "beautiful" an appropriate descriptive term to apply to its logical structure and style? What other descriptive terms would you add or substitute?

"Certain Unalienable Rights"

MARY McLEOD BETHUNE

Mary McLeod Bethune (b. 1875) has qualified herself as a spokesman for the American Negro by a lifetime of determined and fruitful service. Born into a colored family in North Carolina, the seventeenth child of her parents, she knew the slave estate of her race through the testimony of father, mother, brothers, and sisters freed by the Emancipation Proclamation. As a child she worked in rice and cotton fields and walked ten miles daily to and from school, teaching her family in the evenings. Benefactors helped her to go on to Scotia Seminary and to the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago.

Her years of unremitting labor for Negro education have been heroic. After teaching in mission schools for a time, she courageously started her own school at Daytona Beach, Florida, with six students and virtually no capital at all. In two years she had 250 students, and her school, built with borrowed material and volunteer labor on a dumping ground called Hell's Hole, was well launched. "I rang doorbells . . . ," she says; "I wrote articles for whoever would print them, distributed leaflets, rode interminable miles of dusty roads on my bicycle; I invaded churches, clubs, lodges, chambers of commerce." In 1923 her school amalgamated with a men's college, Cookman Institute, and the Bethune-Cookman College resulted, a co-educational junior college for Negroes. In 1942 it had 600 students, a staff of 32, a 32-acre campus, and unencumbered buildings and property worth $800,000. Mrs. Bethune is its President.

The college is not her only achievement. In 1936 she became director of the Division of Negro Affairs of the National Youth Administration and went to Washington, supervising her college by "remote control." She has immersed herself in many other projects for racial improvement, as, for example, the Committee on International Cooperation of the National Urban League and the National Council of Negro Women, the latter founded by her. Her vitality and generosity of spirit have made her invaluable to our generation, and many honorary degrees and other honors are recognitions of her contribution. Her moving story is told in R. M. Bartlett's *They Did Something about It* (1939).

Democratic liberty in America wears a black stain as long as the work begun by the Emancipation Proclamation is unfinished. No unenlightened man can be really free, and Mrs. Bethune's long service to enlightenment qualifies her to speak for the Negro on the basic essentials of his freedom. Can white America be really free while he is still unemancipated?

From *What the Negro Wants* (Rayford W. Logan, ed.), University of North Carolina Press, 1944. By permission of author and publisher. Approximately the last third is omitted.

IT IS A QUIET NIGHT in December, 1773. A British merchant ship rides easily at anchor in Boston Harbor. Suddenly, some rowboats move out from the shore. Dark stealthy figures in the boats appear to be Indians in buckskin jackets and with feathers in their hair; but as they reach the ship, clamber aboard, climb down into the hold and carry out boxes of the cargo, the muffled voices speak English words. Their voices grow more excited and determined as they open the boxes and dump the King's tea into the ocean. The Boston Tea Party is in full swing. Resentment has reached flood tide. "Taxation without representation is tyranny!" The spark of the American Revolution has caught flame and the principle of the "consent of the governed" has been established by a gang disguised as Indians who take the law into their own hands. In this action a small and independent people struck out against restrictions and tyranny and oppression and gave initial expression to the ideal of a nation "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights."

It is a Sunday night in Harlem in the year of our Lord 1943. Along the quiet streets dimmed out against the possibility of Axis air attack, colored Americans move to and fro or sit and talk and laugh. Suddenly electric rumor travels from mouth to ear: "A black soldier has been shot by a white policeman and has died in the arms of his mother." No one stops to ask how or why or if it be true. Crowds begin to gather. There is a rumbling of anger and resentment impelled by all the anger and all the resentment of all colored Americans in all the black ghettos in all the cities in America—the resentment against the mistreatment of Negroes in uniform, against restriction and oppression and discrimination breaks loose. Crowds of young people in blind fury strike out against the only symbols of this oppression which are near at hand. Rocks hurtle, windows crash, stores are broken open. Merchants' goods are tumbled into the streets, destroyed or stolen. Police are openly challenged and attacked. There are killings and bodily injury. For hours a veritable reign of terror runs through the streets. All efforts at restraint are of no avail. Finally the blind rage blows itself out.

Some are saying that a band of hoodlums have challenged law and

order to burn and pillage and rob. Others look about them to remember riots in Detroit and Los Angeles and Beaumont. They will look further and recall cities laid in ruins by a global war in which the forces of tyranny and oppression and race supremacy attempt to subdue and restrain all the freedom of the world. They are thinking deeply to realize that there is a ferment aloose among the oppressed little people everywhere, a "groping of the long inert masses." They will see depressed and repressed masses all over the world swelling to the breaking point against the walls of ghettos, against economic, social and political restrictions; they will find them breaking open the King's boxes and throwing the tea into the ocean and storming the Bastilles stirred by the clarion call of the Four Freedoms. They are striking back against all that the Axis stands for! They are rising to achieve the ideals "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." With the crash of the guns and the whir of the planes in their ears, led by the fighting voices of a Churchill and a Franklin Roosevelt, a Chiang Kai-shek and a Stalin, they are realizing that "Governments are instituted among Men" to achieve these aims and that these governments derive "their just power from the consent of the governed." They are part of a peoples' war. The little people want "out." Just as the Colonists at the Boston Tea Party wanted "out" from under tyranny and oppression and taxation without representation, the Chinese want "out," the Indians want "out," and colored Americans want "out."

Throughout America today many people are alarmed and bewildered by the manifestation of this world ferment among the Negro masses. We say we are living in a period of "racial tension." They seem surprised that the Negro should be a party to this world movement. Really, all true Americans should not be surprised by this logical climax of American education. For several generations colored Americans have been brought up on the Boston Tea Party and the Declaration of Independence; on the principle of equality of opportunity, the possession of inalienable rights, the integrity and sanctity of the human personality. Along with other good Americans the Negro has been prepared to take his part in the fight against an enemy that threatens all these basic American principles. He is fighting now on land and sea and in the air to beat back these forces of oppression and tyranny and discrimination. Why, then, should we be surprised when at home as well as abroad he fights back against these same forces?

One who would really understand this racial tension which has broken out into actual conflict in riots as in Harlem, Detroit, and Los Angeles, must look to the roots and not be confused by the branches and the leaves. The tension rises out of the growing internal pressure of Negro masses to break through the wall of restriction which restrains them from full American citizenship. This mounting power is met by the unwillingness of white America to allow any appreciable breach in this wall.

The hard core of internal pressure among the Negro masses in the United States today is undoubtedly their resentment over the mistreatment of colored men in the armed forces. The Negro faces restrictions in entering certain branches of the service, resistance to being assigned posts according to his ability; and above all there is the failure of the Army and his government to protect him in the uniform of his country from actual assault by civilians.

Letters from the men in Army camps have streamed into the homes of their parents and friends everywhere, telling of this mistreatment by officers, military police and civilians, of their difficulties in getting accommodations on trains and buses, of numerous incidents of long, tiresome journeys without meals and other concrete evidence of the failure of their government to protect and provide for its men, even when they are preparing to fight in defense of the principles of that government.

They need no agitation by newspaper accounts or the stimulation of so-called leaders. These things are the intimate experiences of the masses themselves. They know them and feel them intensely and resent them bitterly.

You must add to these deep-seated feelings a whole series of repercussions of the frustrated efforts of Negroes to find a place in war production: the absolute denial of employment in many cases, or employment far below the level of their skills, numerous restrictions in their efforts to get training, resistance of labor unions to the improving and utilization of their skills on the job. Pile on to these their inability to get adequate housing even for those employed in war work, and often, where houses are available, restrictions to segregated units in temporary war housing. At the same time they see around them unlimited opportunities offered to other groups to serve their country in the armed forces, to be employed at well-paying jobs, to get good housing financed by private concerns and FHA funds.

Even those observers who have some understanding of the Negro's desire to break through all these restrictions will charge it to super-

ficial causes, such as the agitation of the Negro press and leaders; or they counsel the Negro to "go slow." It is as though they admit that the patient is sick with fever and diagnosis reveals that he needs twelve grains of quinine, but they decide that because he is a Negro they had better give him only six. They admit that he is hungry and needs to be fed, but because he is a Negro they suggest that a half meal will suffice. This approach, of course, is a historical hang-over. It is a product of the half-hearted and timorous manner in which we have traditionally faced the Negro problem in America.

In order to maintain slavery, it was necessary to isolate black men from every possible manifestation of our culture. It was necessary to teach that they were inferior beings who could not profit from that culture. After the slave was freed, every effort has persisted to maintain "white supremacy" and wall the Negro in from every opportunity to challenge this concocted "supremacy." Many Americans said the Negro could not learn and they "proved" it by restricting his educational opportunities. When he surmounted these obstacles and achieved a measure of training, they said he did not know how to use it and proved it by restricting his employment opportunities. When it was necessary to employ him, they saw to it that he was confined to laborious and poorly-paid jobs. After they had made every effort to guarantee that his economic, social and cultural levels were low, they attributed his status to his race. Therefore, as he moved North and West after Reconstruction and during the Industrial Revolution, they saw to it that he was confined to living in veritable ghettos with convenances that were as hard and resistant as the walls of the ghettos of Warsaw.

They met every effort on his part to break through these barriers with stern resistance that would brook no challenge to our concept of white supremacy. Although they guaranteed him full citizenship under the Constitution and its Amendments, they saw to it that he was largely disfranchised and had little part in our hard won ideal of "the consent of the governed." In the midst of this anachronism, they increasingly educated his children in the American way of life—in its ideals of equality of all men before the law, and opportunities for the fullest possible development of the individual.

As this concept took hold among the Negro masses, it has evidenced itself through the years in a slow, growing, relentless pressure against every restriction which denied them their full citizenship. This pressure, intensified by those of other races who really believed in democracy, began to make a break through the walls here and

there. It was given wide-spread impetus by the objectives of the New Deal with its emphasis on the rise of the forgotten man. With the coming of the Second World War, all the Negro's desires were given voice and support by the world leaders who fought back against Hitler and all he symbolizes. His efforts to break through have responded to Gandhi and Chiang Kai-shek, to Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt.

The radios and the press of the world have drummed into his ears the Four Freedoms, which would lead him to think that the world accepts as legitimate his claims as well as those of oppressed peoples all over the world. His drive for status has now swept past even most of his leaders, and has become imbedded in mass-consciousness which is pushing out of the way all the false prophets, be they white or black—or, be they at home or abroad.

The Negro wants to break out into the free realm of democratic citizenship. We can have only one of two responses. Either we must let him out wholly and completely in keeping with our ideals, or we must mimic Hitler and shove him back.

What then, does the Negro want? His answer is very simple. He wants only what all other Americans want. He wants opportunity to make real what the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and Bill of Rights say; what the Four Freedoms establish. While he knows these ideals are open to no man completely he wants only his equal chance to attain them. The Negro today wants specifically:

1. *Government leadership in building favorable public opinion.* Led by the President himself, the federal government should initiate a sound program carried out through appropriate federal agencies designed to indicate the importance of race in the war and post-war period. The cost of discrimination and segregation to a nation at war and the implications of American racial attitudes for our relationships with the other United Nations and their people should be delineated. Racial myths and superstitions should be exploded. The cooperation of the newspapers, the radio and the screen should be sought to replace caricature and slander with realistic interpretations of sound racial relationships.

2. *The victory of democracy over dictatorship.* Under democracy the Negro has the opportunity to work for an improvement in his status through the intelligent use of his vote, the creation of a more favorable public opinion, and the development of his native abilities. The ideals of democracy and Christianity work for equality.

These ideals the dictatorships disavow. Experience has taught only too well the implications for him and all Americans of a Nazi victory.

3. *Democracy in the armed forces.* He wants a chance to serve his country in all branches of the armed forces to his full capacity. He sees clearly the fallacy of fostering discrimination and segregation in the very forces that are fighting against discrimination and segregation all over the world. He believes that the government should fully protect the persons and the rights of all who wear the uniform of its armed forces.

4. *The protection of his civil rights and an end to lynching.* He wants full protection of the rights guaranteed all Americans by the Constitution; equality before the law, the right to jury trial and service, the eradication of lynching. Demanding these rights for himself, he will not be misled into any anti-foreign, Red-baiting, or anti-Semitic crusade to deny these rights to others. Appalled by the conditions prevailing in Washington, he joins in demanding the ballot for the District of Columbia and the protection of his rights now denied him within the shadow of the Capitol.

5. *The free ballot.* He wants the abolition of the poll tax and of the "white primary"; he wants universal adult suffrage. He means to use it to vote out all the advocates of racism and vote in those whose records show that they actually practise democracy.

6. *Equal access to employment opportunities.* He wants the chance to work and advance in any job for which he has the training and capacity. To this end he wants equal access to training opportunities. In all public programs, federal, state and local, he wants policy-making and administrative posts as well as rank and file jobs without racial discrimination. He wants a fair share of jobs under Civil Service.

7. *Extension of federal programs in public housing, health, social security, education and relief under federal control.* Low income and local prejudice often deprive him of these basic social services. Private enterprise or local government units cannot or will not provide them. For efficiency and equity in administration of these programs, the Negro looks to the federal government until such

time as he has gained the full and free use of the ballot in all states.

8. *Elimination of racial barriers in labor unions.* He demands the right of admission on equal terms to the unions having jurisdiction over the crafts and industries in which he is employed. He urges that job control on public works be denied to any union practising discrimination.

9. *Realistic interracial cooperation.* He realizes the complete interdependence of underprivileged white people and Negroes, North and South—laborers and sharecroppers alike. He knows that they stay in the gutter together or rise to security together; that the hope of democracy lies in their cooperative effort to make their government responsive to their needs; that national unity demands their sharing together more fully in the benefits of freedom—not "one as the hand and separate as the fingers," but one as the clasped hands of friendly cooperation.

Here, then, is a program for racial advancement and national unity. It adds up to the sum of the rights, privileges and responsibilities of full American citizenship. This is all that the Negro asks. He will not willingly accept less. As long as America offers less, she will be that much less a democracy. The whole way is the American way.

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STUDY INTRODUCTION

Our globe may have some spots where racial prejudice does not seriously blight relations among men: for example, the Soviet Union's educational program against consciousness of race is said to have yielded excellent results. Usually, however, the evil is so prevalent that people grow insensitive to its contaminating presence. Thus, during World War II we found the average American soldier repelled by English attitudes in India, although he himself, if he was white and stationed in the British Isles, shocked Englishmen no less by discriminating, almost automatically, against Negro comrades. The same type of prejudice was at the core of fascist creeds that convinced whole peoples, in Europe and the East, that they righteously exterminated or subdued the racially "inferior." But even as we sent our men to fight the spreading pestilence, anti-Semitism stained our people's acts and thoughts, while the man across the street showed himself grotesquely primitive by wishing to exterminate "those damned

yellow monkeys"—forgetting that he was irreparably indebted to allies yellow-skinned though culturally different from the Japanese, and that the forefathers of these same allies had an ancient civilization when many Europeans were wandering in nomadic tribes. This man (and he is legion) is at present helping to determine, through his vote, our chance to maintain peace among the white and black and yellow, in an age of atomic bombs that threaten all "races."

Nevertheless, most white Americans feel shame that our national culture has been so deeply stained by racial discrimination, especially against the Negro citizen. And this reaction at least marks an essential difference between the inadequate realization of the ideals of developing democracy and the vaunted intolerance of a fascist creed.

This essential difference makes us ask how we can hasten the achievement of equal opportunity for colored citizens. First, if we are white, it might help to realize more vividly how prevalent and glaring is the stain. Astonishingly enough, many Northerners tend to think that the problem exists only in the South. And yet, as Miss Bethune remarks, colored ghettos characterize the reaches of our nation (if you are white, do colored people live in *your* apartment house?). Everywhere the chance for employment commensurate with ability (ability seldom fully realized because of educational and environmental inequalities) is immeasurably lessened for the Negro. More subtly, too, prejudice manifests itself. On our Northern subways, true, colored people mingle with the white, but as the car fills up, notice that last empty seat—almost always by the Negro's side. And in your college, do the colored students mingle freely in your social life (invited to your dances, for example), or do you find them eating in your cafeteria as isolated individuals or groups? Would it help to meet our problem if the majority grew more aware of conditions and behavior they implicitly sanction by consent?

It is conventional to speak of *toleration* as a goal. But what a comment on our ways that the goal should be toleration! *Toleration* is a word with ugly connotations. At best we *tolerate* what we dislike—usually some necessary evil. And yet by all means let us learn at first to tolerate minorities, thus ridding ourselves of horrors such as lynching and Congressmen like—well, you supply the name. Let us, too, support all laws to protect minorities: though prejudice cannot be cured by statute, legislation *can* prohibit practices reflecting prejudices they help to perpetuate. We must eradicate "second-class citizenship" in a democracy. Then as we achieve our true goals, we may outgrow the need of "toleration," and be able to accept a man for what he is, no more conscious of the pigmentation of his skin than we are, today, of the color of his eyes or hair. And if we grant the possibility of such genuinely civilized behavior, we will agree that, as Miss Bethune states them here, the desires of Negro citizens are almost painfully modest.

1. How does the author link the restiveness of the Negro in America during the war years to the American tradition and to the contemporary world scene? Why do you consider the comparison just or invalid? adequate or inadequate as an explanation? How do you explain the fact that the manifestations of unrest have (or have not) continued in the post-war years?

2. What experiences have you or your friends had in the armed services to illustrate the treatment of the Negro soldier? Why would you agree or disagree with the assertion that the services themselves were primarily to blame for discriminatory practices? Are the difficulties of the Negro in civilian life increased or decreased in time of peace? Why, so far as you can judge, is the treatment of the Negro veteran in the post-war period likely to increase or to decrease bitterness?

3. Give examples to demonstrate how and to what degree, in your section of the country, conditions calculated to maintain "white supremacy" have prevailed. Explain why, in your opinion, these conditions do or do not result from the *conscious* effort of the majority of white people in your community. What should be done to overcome them?

4. How can the problem of the Negro in America affect the relations of the United States with other members of the United Nations? the effectiveness of our leadership in maintaining peace?

5. Illustrate specifically why you consider the author justified or unjustified in saying that at present newspapers, radio, and screen "caricature and slander" the Negro. Why have we failed to take effective steps to eradicate lynching? What can we do to see that such steps *are* taken?

6. If more people are enabled to vote by federal legislation against the poll tax, how will it help the Southern Negro to better his lot? Why would the passage of such legislation eventually affect all sections of our nation? Would the effect be beneficial or harmful, in your opinion, and why?

7. How is the problem of giving the Negro equal opportunities for employment related to the need of giving him equal opportunities for education? At present such opportunities might necessitate federal aid to the states for public education in Southern states. Apart from the special problem of the Negro, why do you consider federal help to public education desirable or undesirable?

Midas

THOMAS CARLYLE

By the middle of the 19th century a new civilization, born of the Industrial Revolution, had made England the richest of all nations—the land which had first developed modern methods of production and transportation and which, when Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) was in his prime, had no commercial rivals. The whole world was England's market—territory from which to draw food and raw materials, to which to ship manufactured products.

The new system had developed untrammeled by social legislation: old statutes had been repealed and a bewildered Parliament had been slow in formulating new laws, at best inadequate to meet the needs of the myriad workers sucked into the factory system which supported the mounting pyramid of national wealth. In *The Condition of the Working Class in England,* published in 1844 (the year after Carlyle's *Past and Present,* source of the first two excerpts here reprinted), Friedrich Engels told a tale of unexampled horror, and in the 1860s Karl Marx drew from shocking Parliamentary reports much of the illustrative material used in *Das Kapital.*

Reform was needed in that world of gargantuan accomplishments, of heady riches and hideous poverty. So far only a few men—and those unheeded by the public—had questioned the fundamental excellence of that "new order." The Classical Economists (Adam Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, James Mill) had described the workings of the economic system, and their analyses were accepted as "laws" of what must be . . . and ought to be. Carlyle was the first of a line of great literary figures to protest that the values and the functioning of 19th-century capitalism were monstrous, and that "a philosophy of Laissez-Faire, Competition, and Supply and Demand" must doom the nation by which it is practised. Well into the 1840s his chief function was to stir the conscience of Englishmen, arousing their awareness of cancerous social growths.

But Carlyle was not content to picture what was wrong. He tried to find the remedy. And with this aspect of his work he is today far too exclusively identified because we have become so highly sensitized to fascist ideology. Fascism was foreshadowed by Carlyle; some of its tenets were implicit in his earliest work, and in his later writings they were sometimes strenuously articulate. In the 20th century, formulators of fascist ideology found in him a useful source, though they drew more heavily from German authors such as Fichte, Wagner, Nietzsche. Carlyle himself

Book I, Chapter i, *Past and Present,* 1843.

opposed such cardinal characteristics of fascist thought as jingoistic nationalism and militarism.

Bad government, Carlyle taught, had been a basic cause of evil: for almost two centuries England had been ruled by "sham-kings" while her Parliament and nobility had become symbols emptied of meaning, inanimate forms like clothes without a body to fill them. (For Carlyle's "clothes-philosophy" see *Sartor Resartus.*) The well-being of a nation, he insisted, depends upon genuine leadership which only a few are capable of giving: some men are born to rule, just as others are born to lead by interpreting reality through priesthood, art, and literature. All such leaders he called "heroes," insisting that the duty of other men is to follow them loyally. How to find the genuine "hero as king"—the great political leader—Carlyle never explained clearly. But he reiterated, with passionate conviction, that a nation is doomed unless it discovers its true leaders, unless it is wisely governed. These leaders, he felt, can never be discovered through the ballot-box: for democracy Carlyle had the mordant contempt we have heard expressed by modern dictators.

Thus in Carlyle we find intertwined two strands of thought that in our day are conflicting. He is like the modern fascist in his faith in leadership and his scorn of the democratic process, and like the modern liberal in denouncing laissez-faire. Concentrated anger against the causes of suffering mingled with his pity for the underprivileged. "We have never had anything in literature so like earthquakes as the laughter of Carlyle," wrote Emerson. Doubtless, in the long run, he will be remembered as a prose-poet, a new Biblical prophet, whose words were lightning which illuminated surrounding chaos in which "brotherhood" and the dignity of work had been forgotten.

THE CONDITION OF ENGLAND, on which many pamphlets are now in the course of publication, and many thoughts unpublished are going on in every reflective head, is justly regarded as one of the most ominous, and withal one of the strangest, ever seen in this world. England is full of wealth, of multifarious produce, supply for human want in every kind; yet England is dying of inanition. With unabated bounty the land of England blooms and grows; waving with yellow harvests; thick-studded with workshops, industrial implements, with fifteen millions of workers, understood to be the strongest, the cunningest and the willingest our Earth ever had; these men are here; the work they have done, the fruit they have realised is here, abundant, exuberant on every hand of us: and behold, some baleful fiat as of Enchant-

ment has gone forth, saying: "Touch it not, ye workers, ye master-workers, ye master-idlers; none of you can touch it, no man of you shall be the better for it; this is enchanted fruit!" On the poor workers such fiat falls first, in its rudest shape; but on the rich master-workers too it falls; neither can the rich master-idlers, nor any richest or highest man escape, but all are like to be brought low with it, and made 'poor' enough, in the money sense or a far fataler one.

Of these successful skilful workers some two millions, it is now counted, sit in Workhouses,[1] Poor-law Prisons; or have 'out-door relief' flung over the wall to them—the workhouse Bastille being filled to bursting, and the strong Poor-law broken asunder by a stronger.* They sit there, these many months now; their hope of deliverance as yet small. In workhouses, pleasantly so named, because work cannot be done in them. Twelve-hundred-thousand workers in England alone; their cunning right-hand lamed, lying idle in their sorrowful bosom; their hopes, outlooks, share of this fair world, shut-in by narrow walls. They sit there, pent up, as in a kind of horrid enchantment; glad to be imprisoned and enchanted, that they may not perish starved. The picturesque Tourist, in a sunny autumn day, through this bounteous realm of England, descries the Union Workhouse[2] on his path. 'Passing by the Workhouse of St. Ives in Huntingdonshire, on a bright day last autumn,' says the picturesque Tourist, 'I saw sitting on wooden benches, in front of their Bastille and within their ring-wall and its railings, some half-hundred or more of these men. Tall robust figures, young mostly or of middle age; of honest countenance, many of them thoughtful and even intelligent-looking men. They sat there, near by one another; but in a kind of torpor, especially in a silence, which was very striking. In silence: for, alas, what word was to be said? An Earth all lying round, crying, Come and till me, come and reap me;—yet we here sit enchanted! In the eyes and brows of these men hung the gloomiest expression, not of anger, but of grief and shame and manifold inarticulate distress and weariness; they returned my glance with a glance that seemed to say, "Do not look at us. We sit enchanted here, we know not why. The Sun shines and the Earth calls; and, by the governing Powers and Impotences of this

[1] Places which, under the Poor Law of 1834, were the sole refuge of unemployed or unemployables refused "out-door relief" (i.e., home relief). Far into the century the conditions in these workhouses were unspeakably shocking compared with even the worst conditions today.

* The return of Paupers for England and Wales, at Ladyday, 1842, is, 'In-door 221,-687, Out-door 1,207,402, Total, 1,429,089'—*Official Report.*

[2] The workhouse caring for paupers from a specific group of parishes.

England, we are forbidden to obey. It is impossible, they tell us!" There was something that reminded me of Dante's Hell in the look of all this; and I rode swiftly away.'

So many hundred thousands sit in workhouses: and other hundred thousands have not yet got even workhouses; and in thrifty Scotland itself, in Glasgow or Edinburgh City, in their dark lanes, hidden from all but the eye of God, and of rare Benevolence the minister of God, there are scenes of woe and destitution and desolation, such as, one may hope, the Sun never saw before in the most barbarous regions where men dwelt. Competent witnesses, the brave and humane Dr. Alison,[3] who speaks what he knows, whose noble Healing Art in his charitable hands becomes once more a truly sacred one, report these things for us: these things are not of this year, or of last year, have no reference to our present state of commercial stagnation, but only to the common state. Not in sharp fever-fits, but in chronic gangrene of this kind is Scotland suffering. A Poor-law, any and every Poor-law, it may be observed, is but a temporary measure; an anodyne, not a remedy: Rich and Poor, when once the naked facts of their condition have come into collision, cannot long subsist together on a mere Poor-law. True enough:—and yet, human beings cannot be left to die! Scotland too, till something better come, must have a Poor-law, if Scotland is not to be a byword among the nations. O, what a waste is there; of noble and thrice-noble national virtues; peasant Stoicisms, Heroisms; valiant manful habits, soul of a Nation's worth,—which all the metal of Potosi[4] cannot purchase back; to which the metal of Potosi, and all you can buy with *it*, is dross and dust!

Why dwell on this aspect of the matter? It is too indisputable, not doubtful now to any one. Descend where you will into the lower class, in Town or Country, by what avenue you will, by Factory Inquiries, Agricultural Inquiries, by Revenue Returns, by Mining-Labourer Committees, by opening your own eyes and looking, the same sorrowful result discloses itself: you have to admit that the working body of this rich English Nation has sunk or is fast sinking into a state, to which, all sides of it considered, there was literally never any parallel. At Stockport Assizes,—and this too has no reference to the present state of trade, being of date prior to that,—a Mother and a Father are arraigned and found guilty of poisoning three of their children, to defraud a 'burial-society' of some £3 8*s*. due on the death of each child:

[3] Dr. William P. *Alison* (1790-1859), Edinburgh physician and humanitarian, who, after years of effort, caused the Scottish Poor Laws to be reformed.

[4] The silver in the rich mines of Potosi, a province of Bolivia.

they are arraigned, found guilty; and the official authorities, it is whispered, hint that perhaps the case is not solitary, that perhaps you had better not probe farther into that department of things. This is in the autumn of 1841; the crime itself is of the previous year or season. "Brutal savages, degraded Irish," mutters the idle reader of Newspapers; hardly lingering on this incident. Yet it is an incident worth lingering on; the depravity, savagery and degraded Irishism being never so well admitted. In the British land, a human Mother and Father, of white skin and professing the Christian religion, had done this thing; they, with their Irishism and necessity and savagery, had been driven to do it. Such instances are like the highest mountain apex emerged into view; under which lies a whole mountain region and land, not yet emerged. A human Mother and Father had said to themselves, What shall we do to escape starvation? We are deep sunk here, in our dark cellar; and help is far.—Yes, in the Ugolino[5] Hunger-tower stern things happen; best-loved little Gaddo fallen dead on his Father's knees!—The Stockport Mother and Father think and hint: Our poor little starveling Tom, who cries all day for victuals, who will see only evil and not good in this world: if he were out of misery at once; he well dead, and the rest of us perhaps kept alive? It is thought, and hinted; at last it is done. And now Tom being killed, and all spent and eaten, Is it poor little starveling Jack that must go, or poor little starveling Will?—What a committee of ways and means!

In starved sieged cities, in the uttermost doomed ruin of old Jerusalem fallen under the wrath of God, it was prophesied and said, 'The hands of the pitiful women have sodden their own children.'[6] The stern Hebrew imagination could conceive no blacker gulf of wretchedness; that was the ultimatum of degraded god-punished man. And we here, in modern England, exuberant with supply of all kinds, besieged by nothing if it be not by invisible Enchantments, are we reaching that?—How come these things? Wherefore are they, wherefore should they be?

Nor are they of the St. Ives Workhouses, of the Glasgow lanes, and Stockport cellars, the only unblessed among us. This successful industry of England, with its plethoric wealth, has as yet made nobody rich;

[5] A count of Pisa, imprisoned and starved in a tower with his two sons and two nephews (some say his three sons). The dying children, Gaddo among them, begged him to eat their flesh, and, according to some stories, he did this, after they had died from starvation. See Dante, *The Inferno,* Canto XXXIII, and Chaucer, "The Monke's Tale," ll. 3597–3652.

[6] *Lamentations,* 4:10. ***Sodden*** means *boiled.*

it is an enchanted wealth, and belongs yet to nobody. We might ask, Which of us has it enriched? We can spend thousands where we once spent hundreds; but can purchase nothing good with them. In Poor and Rich, instead of noble thrift and plenty, there is idle luxury alternating with mean scarcity and inability. We have sumptuous garnitures for our Life, but have forgotten to *live* in the middle of them. It is an enchanted wealth; no man of us can yet touch it. The class of men who feel that they are truly better off by means of it, let them give us their name!

Many men eat finer cookery, drink dearer liquors,—with what advantage they can report, and their Doctors can: but in the heart of them, if we go out of the dyspeptic stomach, what increase of blessedness is there? Are they better, beautifuler, stronger, braver? Are they even what they call 'happier'? Do they look with satisfaction on more things and human faces in this God's-Earth; do more things and human faces look with satisfaction on them? Not so. Human faces gloom discordantly, disloyally on one another. Things, if it be not mere cotton and iron things, are growing disobedient to man. The Master Worker is enchanted, for the present, like his Workhouse Workman; clamours, in vain hitherto, for a very simple sort of 'Liberty': the liberty 'to buy where he finds it cheapest, to sell where he finds it dearest.' With guineas jingling in every pocket, he was no whit richer; but now, the very guineas threatening to vanish, he feels that he is poor indeed. Poor Master Worker! And the Master Unworker,[7] is not he in a still fataler situation? Pausing amid his game-preserves, with awful eye,—as he well may! Coercing fifty-pound tenants;[8] coercing, bribing, cajoling; 'doing what he likes with his own.' His mouth full of loud futilities, and arguments to prove the excellence of his Corn-law;[9] and in his heart the blackest misgiving, a desperate half-consciousness that his excellent Corn-law is *in*defensible, that his loud arguments for it are of a kind to strike men too literally *dumb*.

To whom, then, is this wealth of England wealth? Who is it that it blesses; makes happier, wiser, beautifuler, in any way better? Who has got hold of it, to make it fetch and carry for him, like a true servant, not like a false mock-servant; to do him any real service whatsoever? As yet no one. We have more riches than any Nation ever had before; we have less good of them than any Nation ever had before. Our suc-

[7] The rich landowner.

[8] By the Reform Act of 1832 tenants who paid a rent of at least £50 a year had a vote.

[9] This law placed a high tax on imported wheat to protect the price of domestic grain. Naturally, it hurt the poor by raising the price of flour. It was finally repealed in 1849, as a result of popular agitation.

cessful industry is hitherto unsuccessful; a strange success, if we stop here! In the midst of plethoric plenty, the people perish; with gold walls, and full barns, no man feels himself safe or satisfied. Workers, Master Workers, Unworkers, all men, come to a pause; stand fixed, and cannot farther. Fatal paralysis spreading inwards, from the extremities, in St. Ives workhouses, in Stockport cellars, through all limbs, as if towards the heart itself. Have we actually got enchanted, then; accursed by some god?—

Midas longed for gold, and insulted the Olympians. He got gold, so that whatsoever he touched became gold,—and he, with his long ears, was little the better for it. Midas had misjudged the celestial music-tones; Midas had insulted Apollo and the gods: the gods gave him his wish, and a pair of long ears, which also were a good appendage to it. What a truth in these old Fables!

Democracy

THOMAS CARLYLE

IF THE SERENE HIGHNESSES AND MAJESTIES do not take note of that, then, as I perceive, *that* will take note of itself! The time for levity, insincerity, and idle babble and play-acting, in all kinds, is gone by; it is a serious, grave time. Old long-vexed questions, not yet solved in logical words or parliamentary laws, are fast solving themselves in facts, somewhat unblessed to behold! This largest of questions, this question of Work and Wages, which ought, had we heeded Heaven's voice, to have begun two generations ago or more, cannot be delayed longer without hearing Earth's voice. 'Labour' will verily need to be somewhat 'organised,' as they say—God knows with what difficulty. Man will actually need to have his debts and earnings a little better paid by man; which, let Parliaments speak of them or be silent of them, are eternally his due from man, and cannot, without penalty and at length not without death-penalty, be withheld. How much ought to cease among us straightway; how much ought to begin straightway, while the hours yet are!

Truly they are strange results to which this of leaving all to 'Cash'; of quietly shutting up the God's Temple, and gradually opening wide-open the Mammon's Temple, with 'Laissez-faire, and Every man for himself'—have led us in these days! We have Upper, speaking Classes, who indeed do 'speak' as never man spake before; the withered flimsiness, the godless baseness and barrenness of whose Speech might of itself indicate what kind of Doing and practical Government went on under it! For Speech is the gaseous element out of which most kinds of Practice and Performance, especially all kinds of moral Performance, condense themselves, and take shape; as the one is, so will the other be. Descending, accordingly, into the Dumb Class in its Stockport Cellars[1] and Poor-Law Bastilles, have we not to announce that they also are hitherto unexampled in the History of Adam's Posterity?

Book III, Chapter xiii, *Past and Present*, 1843. A passage five paragraphs in length has been omitted.

[1] Used to symbolize the frightful living conditions endured by industrial workers in manufacturing towns like Stockport, in northern England. Engels tells us that in Liverpool, typically, a full "fifth of the population, more than 45,000 human beings," were crowded under inhuman conditions in cellars.

Life was never a May-game for men: in all times the lot of the dumb millions born to toil was defaced with manifold sufferings, injustices, heavy burdens, avoidable and unavoidable; not play at all, but hard work that made the sinews sore and the heart sore. As bond-slaves, *villani, bordarii, sochemanni,*[2] nay indeed as dukes, earls and kings, men were oftentimes made weary of their life; and had to say, in the sweat of their brow and of their soul, Behold, it is not sport, it is grim earnest, and our back can bear no more! Who knows not what massacrings and harryings there have been; grinding, long-continuing, unbearable injustices,—till the heart had to rise in madness, and some *"Eu Sachsen, nimith euer sachses,* You Saxons, out with your gully-knives, then!" You Saxons, some 'arrestment,' partial 'arrestment of the Knaves and Dastards' has become indispensable!—The page of Dryasdust is heavy with such details.

And yet I will venture to believe that in no time, since the beginnings of Society, was the lot of those same dumb millions of toilers so entirely unbearable as it is even in the days now passing over us. It is not to die, or even to die of hunger, that makes a man wretched; many men have died; all men must die—the last exit of us all is in a Fire-Chariot of Pain. But it is to live miserable we know not why; to work sore and yet gain nothing; to be heart-worn, weary, yet isolated, unrelated, girt-in with a cold universal Laissez-faire: it is to die slowly all our life long, imprisoned in a deaf, dead, Infinite Injustice, as in the accursed iron belly of a Phalaris' Bull![3] This is and remains forever intolerable to all men whom God has made. Do we wonder at French Revolutions, Chartisms, Revolts of Three Days?[4] The times, if we will consider them, are really unexampled.

Never before did I hear of an Irish Widow reduced to 'prove her sisterhood, by dying of typhus-fever and infecting seventeen persons,'—saying in such undeniable way, "You *see* I was your sister!" Sisterhood, brotherhood, was often forgotten; but not till the rise of these ultimate Mammon and Shotbelt Gospels,[5] did I ever see it so expressly denied. If no pious Lord or *Law-ward* would remember it, always some pious Lady (*'Hlaf-dig,'* Benefactress, *'Loaf-giveress,'* they say she is,—blessings on her beautiful heart!) was there, with mild mother-voice and hand, to remember it; some pious thoughtful *Elder,* what we now call

[2] Words meaning *serf* in medieval Latin.

[3] A brazen bull in which the Sicilians burned a Greek tyrant, Phalaris, and his mother and friends.

[4] For *Chartisms,* see note 16. At the end of July, in 1830, Charles X of France attempted a *coup d'état;* after a three-day revolution he was deposed and Louis Philippe enthroned, on the theory that he would be a monarch with republican sympathies.

[5] The worship of riches and force.

'Prester,' *Presbyter* or 'Priest,' was there to put all men in mind of it, in the name of the God who had made all.

Not even in Black Dahomey[6] was it ever, I think, forgotten to the typhus-fever length. Mungo Park,[7] resourceless, had sunk down to die under the Negro Village-Tree, a horrible White object in the eyes of all. But in the poor Black Woman, and her daughter who stood aghast at him, whose earthly wealth and funded capital consisted of one small calabash of rice, there lived a heart richer than *Laissez-faire:* they, with a royal munificence, boiled their rice for him; they sang all night to him, spinning assiduous on their cotton distaffs, as he lay to sleep: "Let us pity the poor white man; no mother has he to fetch him milk, no sister to grind him corn!" Thou poor black Noble One—thou *Lady* too: did not a God make thee too; was there not in thee too something of a God!—

Gurth, born thrall of Cedric the Saxon,[8] has been greatly pitied by Dryasdust and others. Gurth, with the brass collar round his neck, tending Cedric's pigs in the glades of the wood, is not what I call an exemplar of human felicity: but Gurth, with the sky above him, with the free air and tinted boscage and umbrage round him, and in him at least the certainty of supper and social lodging when he came home; Gurth to me seems happy, in comparison with many a Lancashire and Buckinghamshire man of these days, not born thrall of anybody! Gurth's brass collar did not gall him: Cedric *deserved* to be his master. The pigs were Cedric's, but Gurth too would get his parings of them. Gurth had the inexpressible satisfaction of feeling himself related indissolubly, though in a rude brass-collar way, to his fellow-mortals in this Earth. He had superiors, inferiors, equals.—Gurth is now 'emancipated' long since; has what we call 'Liberty.' Liberty, I am told, is a divine thing. Liberty when it becomes the 'Liberty to die by starvation' is not so divine!

Liberty? The true liberty of a man, you would say, consisted in his finding out, or being forced to find out the right path, and to walk thereon. To learn, or to be taught, what work he actually was able for; and then by permission, persuasion, and even compulsion, to set about doing of the same! That is his true blessedness, honour, 'liberty' and maximum of wellbeing: if liberty be not that, I for one have small care about liberty. You do not allow a palpable madman to leap over preci-

[6] A country in Western Africa inhabited by Negro cannibals.

[7] African explorer (1771-1806) who, in his *Travels in the Interior of Africa,* recounts this story.

[8] In Scott's *Ivanhoe.*

pices; you violate his liberty, you that are wise; and keep him, were it in strait-waistcoats, away from the precipices! Every stupid, every cowardly and foolish man is but a less palpable madman: his true liberty were that a wiser man, that any and every wiser man, could, by brass collars, or in whatever milder or sharper way, lay hold of him when he was going wrong, and order and compel him to go a little righter. Or, if thou really art my *Senior,* Seigneur, my *Elder,* Presbyter or Priest,—if thou art in very deed my *Wiser,* may a beneficent instinct lead and impel thee to 'conquer' me, to command me! If thou do know better than I what is good and right, I conjure you in the name of God, force me to do it; were it by never such brass collars, whips and handcuffs, leave me not to walk over precipices! That I have been called, by all the Newspapers, a 'free man' will avail me little, if my pilgrimage have ended in death and wreck. O that the Newspapers had called me slave, coward, fool, or what it pleased their sweet voices to name me, and I had attained not death, but life!—Liberty requires new definitions.

A conscious abhorrence and intolerance of Folly, of Baseness, Stupidity, Poltroonery and all that brood of things, dwells deep in some men: still deeper in others an *un*conscious abhorrence and intolerance, clothed moreover by the beneficent Supreme Powers in what stout appetities, energies, egoisms so-called, are suitable to it;—these latter are your Conquerors, Romans, Normans, Russians, Indo-English; Founders of what we call Aristocracies. Which indeed have they not the most 'divine right' to found;—being themselves very truly Αριστοι, BRAVEST, BEST; and conquering generally a confused rabble of WORST, or at lowest, clearly enough, of WORSE? I think their divine right, tried, with affirmatory verdict, in the greatest Law-Court known to me, was good! A class of men who are dreadfully exclaimed against by Dryasdust; of whom nevertheless beneficent Nature has oftentimes had need; and may, alas, again have need.

When, across the hundredfold poor scepticisms, trivialisms and constitutional cobwebberies of Dryasdust, you catch any glimpse of a William the Conqueror, a Tancred of Hauteville[9] or suchlike,—do you not discern veritably some rude outline of a true God-made King; whom not the Champion of England cased in tin,[10] but all Nature and the Universe were calling to the throne? It is absolutely necessary that he get thither. Nature does not mean her poor Saxon children to

[9] A Norman hero (1078–1112) and a leader of the first Crusade.

[10] At the Coronation ceremony, according to an ancient custom, there still appears an armored Champion of England.

perish, of obesity, stupor or other malady, as yet: a stern Ruler and Line of Rulers therefore is called in,—a stern but most beneficent *perpetual House-Surgeon* is by Nature herself called in, and even the appropriate *fees* are provided for him! Dryasdust talks lamentably about Hereward and the Fen Counties; fate of Earl Waltheof;[11] Yorkshire and the North reduced to ashes: all which is undoubtedly lamentable. But even Dryasdust apprises me of one fact: 'A child, in this William's reign, might have carried a purse of gold from end to end of England.' My erudite friend, it is a fact which outweighs a thousand! Sweep away thy constitutional, sentimental and other cobwebberies; look eye to eye, if thou still have any eye, in the face of this big burly William Bastard: thou wilt see a fellow of most flashing discernment, of most strong lion-heart;—in whom, as it were, within a frame of oak and iron, the gods have planted the soul of 'a man of genius'! Dost thou call that nothing? I call it an immense thing!—Rage enough was in this Willelmus Conquæstor, rage enough for his occasions;—and yet the essential element of him, as of all such men, is not scorching *fire,* but shining illuminative *light.* Fire and light are strangely interchangeable; nay, at bottom, I have found them different forms of the same most godlike 'elementary substance' in our world: a thing worth stating in these days. The essential element of this Conquæstor is, first of all, the most sun-eyed perception of what *is* really what on this God's-Earth;—which, thou wilt find, does mean at bottom 'Justice,' and 'Virtues' not a few: *Conformity* to what the Maker has seen good to make; that, I suppose, will mean Justice and a Virtue or two?—

Dost thou think Willelmus Conquæstor would have tolerated ten years' jargon, one hour's jargon, on the propriety of killing Cotton-manufacturers by partridge Corn-Laws?[12] I fancy, this was not the man to knock out of his night's-rest with nothing but a noisy bedlamism in your mouth! "Assist us still better to bush[13] the partridges; strangle Plugson[14] who spins the shirts?"—*"par la Splendeur de Dieu!"*—Dost thou think Willelmus Conquæstor, in this new time, with Steamengine Captains of Industry on one hand of him, and Joe-Manton[15] Captains of Idleness on the other, would have doubted

[11] *Hereward,* Saxon hero who held out on an island in the *Fen Counties* even after William I had conquered England; *Waltheof,* Earl of Northumbria, beheaded by William for conspiring to seize the throne.

[12] Industrialists as well as the poor were hurt by the import duties which protected rich landlords, who had partridges on game preserves.

[13] To plant bushes which would keep poachers from using nets on game preserves.

[14] Carlyle's name for the typical industrialist.

[15] A famous maker of guns for the aristocracy.

which *was* really the BEST; which did deserve strangling, and which not?

I have a certain indestructible regard for Willelmus Conquæstor. A resident House-Surgeon, provided by Nature for her beloved English People, and even furnished with the requisite fees, as I said; for he by no means felt himself doing Nature's work, this Willelmus, but his own work exclusively! And his own work withal it was; informed *'par la Splendeur de Dieu.'*—I say, it is necessary to get the work out of such a man, however harsh that be! When a world, not yet doomed for death, is rushing down to ever-deeper Baseness and Confusion, it is a dire necessity of Nature's to bring in her ARISTOCRACIES, her BEST, even by forcible methods. When their descendants or representatives cease entirely to *be* the Best, Nature's poor world will very soon rush down again to Baseness; and it becomes a dire necessity of Nature's to cast them out. Hence French Revolutions, Five-point Charters,[16] Democracies, and a mournful list of *Etceteras,* in these our afflicted times.

. . . . . .

But truly, as I have to remark in the mean while, 'the liberty of not being oppressed by your fellow man' is an indispensable, yet one of the most insignificant fractional parts of Human Liberty. No man oppresses thee, can bid thee fetch or carry, come or go, without reason shown. True; from all men thou art emancipated: but from Thyself and from the Devil—? No man, wiser, unwiser, can make thee come or go: but thy own futilities, bewilderments, thy false appetites for Money, Windsor Georges[17] and suchlike? No man oppresses thee, O free and independent Franchiser: but does not this stupid Porter-pot oppress thee? No Son of Adam can bid thee come or go; but this absurd Pot of Heavy-wet,[18] this can and does! Thou art the thrall not of Cedric the Saxon, but of thy own brutal appetites, and this scoured dish of liquor. And thou pratest of thy 'liberty'? Thou entire blockhead!

Heavy-wet and gin: alas, these are not the only kinds of thraldom. Thou who walkest in a vain show, looking out with ornamental dilettante sniff and serene supremacy at all Life and all Death; and amblest

[16] At this time a movement for political reform, known as Chartism, was gaining momentum. The Chartists eventually had a six-point program, demanding annual Parliaments, universal suffrage, vote by secret ballot, abolition of property qualifications for members of Parliament, payment for Parliamentary representatives, and equal electoral districts.

[17] Decoration of the Order of the Garter, a badge picturing Saint George and granted by the king, one of whose palaces is at Windsor.

[18] Strong ale or porter.

jauntily; perking up thy poor talk into crotchets, thy poor conduct into fatuous somnambulisms;—and *art* as an 'enchanted Ape'[19] under God's sky, where thou mightest have been a man, had proper Schoolmasters and Conquerors, and Constables with cat-o'-nine tails, been vouchsafed thee; dost thou call that 'liberty'? Or your unreposing Mammon-worshipper again, driven, as if by Galvanisms, by Devils, and Fixed-Ideas, who rises early and sits late, chasing the impossible; straining every faculty to 'fill himself with the east wind,'—how merciful were it, could you, by mild persuasion, or by the severest tyranny so-called, check him in his mad path, and turn him into a wiser one! All painful tyranny, in that case again, were but mild 'surgery'; the pain of it cheap, as health and life, instead of galvanism and fixed-idea, are cheap at any price.

Sure enough, of all paths a man could strike into, there *is*, at any given moment, a *best path* for every man; a thing which, here and now, it were of all things *wisest* for him to do;—which could he be but led or driven to do, he were then doing 'like a man,' as we phrase it; all men and gods agreeing with him, the whole Universe virtually exclaiming Well-done to him! His success, in such case, were complete; his felicity a maximum. This path, to find this path and walk in it, is the one thing needful for him. Whatsoever forwards him in that, let it come to him even in the shape of blows and spurnings, is liberty: whatsoever hinders him, were it wardmotes,[20] open-vestries, pollbooths, tremendous cheers, rivers of heavy-wet, is slavery.

The notion that a man's liberty consists in giving his vote at election-hustings and saying, "Behold, now I too have my twenty-thousandth part of a Talker in our National Palaver;[21] will not all the gods be good to me?"—is one of the pleasantest! Nature nevertheless is kind at present; and puts it into the heads of many, almost of all. The liberty especially which has to purchase itself by social isolation, and each man standing separate from the other, having 'no business with him' but a cash-account: this is such a liberty as the Earth seldom saw;—as the Earth will not long put up with, recommend it how you may. This liberty turns out, before it have long continued in action, with all men flinging up their caps round it, to be, for the Working Millions a liberty to die by want of food; for the Idle Thousands and Units, alas, a still more fatal liberty to live in want of work; to have no earnest duty to do in this God's-World any more. What becomes of a man in such

[19] See note 23.
[20] Gatherings of voters in wards.
[21] Parliament, a "talking-place."

predicament? Earth's Laws are silent; and Heaven's speak in a voice which is not heard. No work, and the ineradicable need of work, give rise to new very wondrous life-philosophies, new very wondrous life-practices! Dilettantism, Pococurantism, Beau-Brummelism, with perhaps an occasional, half-mad, protesting burst of Byronism,[22] establish themselves: at the end of a certain period,—if you go back to 'the Dead Sea,' there is, say our Moslem friends, a very strange 'Sabbath-day' transacting itself there![23]—Brethren, we know but imperfectly yet, after ages of Constitutional Government, what Liberty and Slavery are.

Democracy, the chase of Liberty in that direction, shall go its full course; unrestrainable by him of Pferdefuss-Quacksalber,[24] or any of *his* household. The Toiling Millions of Mankind, in most vital need and passionate instinctive desire of Guidance, shall cast away False-Guidance; and hope, for an hour, that No-Guidance will suffice them: but it can be for an hour only. The smallest item of human Slavery is the oppression of man by his Mock-Superiors; the palpablest, but I say at bottom the smallest. Let him shake off such oppression, trample it indignantly under his feet; I blame him not, I pity and commend him. But oppression by your Mock-Superiors well shaken off, the grand problem yet remains to solve: That of finding government by your Real-Superiors! Alas, how shall we ever learn the solution of that, benighted, bewildered, sniffing, sneering godforgetting unfortunates as we are? It is a work for centuries; to be taught us by tribulations, confusions, insurrections, obstructions; who knows if not by conflagration and despair! It is a lesson inclusive of all other lessons; the hardest of all lessons to learn.

One thing I do know: Those Apes, chattering on the branches by the Dead Sea, never got it learned; but chatter there to this day. To them no Moses need come a second time; a thousand Moseses would be but so many painted Phantasms, interesting Fellow-Apes of new strange aspect,—whom they would 'invite to dinner,' be glad to meet with in lion-soirées. To them the voice of Prophecy, of heavenly moni-

[22] *Pococurantism* symbolizes indifference, "indifferentism," after Pococurante, a gifted and wealthy character in Voltaire's *Candide; Beau-Brummelism* is dandyism, after Beau Brummell, monarch of the mode in the early 19th century; *Byronism* is gloomy, romantic egoism, after the poet Byron.

[23] In Book III, ch. iii of *Past and Present* Carlyle adapts a Mohammedan legend, saying that certains Jews dwelling by the Dead Sea were so sinful that God sent them Moses as a prophet; mocking Moses, they were transformed into gibbering apes. According to the Moslem legend, Jews dwelling at Elath on the Red Sea in the time of David exercised "liberty" by disobeying the Lord and fishing on the Sabbath, whereupon, as punishment, they were turned into apes.

[24] "Horsefoot-Quackdoctor," described in the omitted portion of this chapter as "our distinguished Conservative Premier," namely Peel, the Prime Minister 1841–46.

tion, is quite ended. They chatter there, all Heaven shut to them, to the end of the world. The unfortunates! Oh, what is dying of hunger, with honest tools in your hand, with a manful purpose in your heart, and much real labour lying round you done, in comparison? You honestly quit your tools; quit a most muddy confused coil of sore work, short rations, of sorrows, dispiritments and contradictions, having now honestly done with it all;—and await, not entirely in a distracted manner, what the Supreme Powers, and the Silences and the Eternities may have to say to you.

A second thing I know: This lesson will have to be learned,—under penalties! England will either learn it, or England also will cease to exist among Nations. England will either learn to reverence its Heroes, and discriminate them from its Sham-Heroes and Valets and gaslighted Histrios,[25] and to prize them as the audible God's-voice, amid all inane jargons and temporary market-cries, and say to them with heart-loyalty, "Be ye King and Priest, and Gospel and Guidance for us": or else England will continue to worship new and ever-new forms of Quackhood,—and so, with what resiliences and reboundings matters little, go down to the Father of Quacks! Can I dread such things of England? Wretched, thick-eyed, gross-hearted mortals, why will ye worship lies, and 'Stuffed Clothes-suits, created by the ninth-parts of men!' It is not your purses that suffer; your farm-rents, your commerces, your mill-revenues, loud as ye lament over these; no, it is not these alone, but a far deeper than these: it is your souls that lie dead, crushed down under despicable Nightmares, Atheisms, Brain-fumes; and are not souls at all, but mere succedanea[26] for *salt* to keep your bodies and their appetites from putrefying! Your cotton-spinning and thrice-miraculous mechanism, what is this too, by itself, but a larger kind of Animalism? Spiders can spin, Beavers can build and show contrivance; the Ant lays up accumulation of capital, and has, for aught I know, a Bank of Antland. If there is no soul in man higher than all that, did it reach to sailing on the cloud-rack and spinning sea-sand; then I say, man is but an animal, a more cunning kind of brute: he has no soul, but only a succedaneum for salt. Whereupon, seeing himself to be truly of the beasts that perish, he ought to admit it, I think;—and also straightway universally to kill himself; and so, in a manlike manner at least *end,* and wave these brute-worlds *his* dignified farewell!—

[25] Actors, with contemptuous connotations.
[26] Substitutes.

The Hero as King

THOMAS CARLYLE

We come now to the last form of Heroism; that which we call Kingship. The Commander over Men; he to whose will our wills are to be subordinated, and loyally surrender themselves, and find their welfare in doing so, may be reckoned the most important of Great Men. He is practically the summary for us of *all* the various figures of Heroism; Priest, Teacher, whatsoever of earthly or of spiritual dignity we can fancy to reside in a man, embodies itself here, to *command* over us, to furnish us with constant practical teaching, to tell us for the day and hour what we are to *do*. He is called *Rex,* Regulator, *Roi:* our own name is still better; King, *Könning,* which means *Can*-ning, Able-man.

Numerous considerations, pointing towards deep, questionable, and indeed unfathomable regions, present themselves here: on the most of which we must resolutely for the present forbear to speak at all. As Burke said that perhaps fair *Trial by Jury* was the Soul of Government, and that all legislation, administration, parliamentary debating, and the rest of it, went on, in "order to bring twelve impartial men into a jurybox";—so, by much stronger reason, may I say here, that the finding of your *Ableman* and getting him invested with the *symbols of ability,* with dignity, worship (*worth*-ship), royalty, kinghood, or whatever we call it, so that *he* may actually have room to guide according to his faculty of doing it,—is the business, well or ill accomplished, of all social procedure whatsoever in this world! Hustings-speeches,[1] Parliamentary motions, Reform Bills, French Revolutions, all mean at heart this; or else nothing. Find in any country the Ablest Man that exists there; raise *him* to the supreme place, and loyally reverence him: you have a perfect government for that country; no ballot-box, parliamentary eloquence, voting, constitution-building, or other machinery whatsoever can improve it a whit. It is in the perfect state; an ideal country. The Ablest Man; he means also the truest-hearted, justest, the Noblest Man: what he *tells us to do* must be precisely the wisest, fittest, that we could anywhere or anyhow learn;—the thing which it will in all ways behoove us, with right loyal thankful-

Opening passage of Lecture VI, *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History,* 1840.

[1] Election speeches.

ness and nothing doubting, to do! Our *doing* and life were then, so far as government could regulate it, well regulated; that were the ideal of constitutions.

Alas, we know very well that Ideals can never be completely embodied in practice. Ideals must ever lie a very great way off; and we will right thankfully content ourselves with any not intolerable approximation thereto! Let no man, as Schiller says, too querulously "measure by a scale of perfection the meagre product of reality" in this poor world of ours. We will esteem him no wise man; we will esteem him a sickly, discontented, foolish man. And yet, on the other hand, it is never to be forgotten that Ideals do exist; that if they be not approximated to at all, the whole matter goes to wreck! Infallibly. No bricklayer builds a wall *perfectly* perpendicular, mathematically this is not possible; a certain degree of perpendicularity suffices him; and he, like a good bricklayer, who must have done with his job, leaves it so. And yet if he sway *too much* from the perpendicular; above all, if he throw plummet and level quite away from him, and pile brick on brick heedless, just as it comes to hand—! Such bricklayer, I think, is in a bad way. *He* has forgotten himself: but the Law of Gravitation does not forget to act on him; he and his wall rush-down into confused welter of ruin!—

This is the history of all rebellions, French Revolutions, social explosions in ancient or modern times. You have put the too *Un*able Man at the head of affairs! The too ignoble, unvaliant, fatuous man. You have forgotten that there is any rule, or natural necessity whatever, of putting the Able Man there. Brick must lie on brick as it may and can. Unable Simulacrum of Ability, *quack*, in a word, must adjust himself with quack, in all manner of administration of human things;—which accordingly lie unadministered, fermenting into unmeasured masses of failure, of indigent misery: in the outward, and in the inward or spiritual, miserable millions stretch-out the hand for their due supply, and it is not there. The "law of gravitation" acts; Nature's laws do none of them forget to act. The miserable millions burst-forth into Sansculottism,[2] or some other sort of madness; bricks and bricklayer lie as a fatal chaos!—

Much sorry stuff, written some hundred years ago or more, about the "Divine right of Kings," moulders unread now in the Public

[2] Democracy, from *sans-culottes*, meaning "without knee-breeches": in the days of the French Revolution the aristocracy wore knee-breeches, whereas the ill-clad volunteers in the revolutionary army wore long trousers.

Libraries of this country. Far be it from us to disturb the calm process by which it is disappearing harmlessly from the earth, in those repositories! At the same time, not to let the immense rubbish go without leaving us, as it ought, some soul of it behind—I will say that it did mean something; something true, which it is important for us and all men to keep in mind. To assert that in whatever man you chose to lay hold of (by this or the other plan of clutching at him); and clapt a round piece of metal on the head of, and called King,—there straightway came to reside a divine virtue, so that *he* became a kind of God, and a Divinity inspired him with faculty and right to rule over you to all lengths: this,—what can we do with this but leave it to rot silently in the Public Libraries? But I will say withal, and that is what these Divine-right men meant, That in Kings, and in all human Authorities, and relations that men god-created can form among each other, there is verily either a Divine Right or else a Diabolic Wrong; one or the other of these two! For it is false altogether, what the last Sceptical Century taught us, that this world is a steam engine.[3] There is a God in this world; and a God's-sanction, or else the violation of such, does lookout from all ruling and obedience, from all moral acts of men. There is no act more moral between men than that of rule and obedience. Woe to him that claims obedience when it is not due; woe to him that refuses it when it is! God's law is in that, I say, however the Parchment-laws may run: there is a Divine Right or else a Diabolic Wrong at the heart of every claim that one man makes upon another.

It can do none of us harm to reflect on this: in all the relations of life it will concern us; in Loyalty and Royalty, the highest of these. I esteem the modern error, That all goes by self-interest and the checking and balancing of greedy knaveries, and that, in short, there is nothing divine whatever in the association of men, a still more despicable error, natural as it is to an unbelieving century, than that of a "divine right" in people *called* Kings. I say, Find me the true *Könning,* King, or Ableman, and he *has* a divine right over me. That we knew in some tolerable measure how to find him, and that all men were ready to acknowledge his divine right when found: this is precisely the healing which a sick world is everywhere, in these ages, seeking after! The true King, as guide of the practical, has ever something of the Pontiff in him,—guide of the spiritual, from which all practice has its rise. This too is a true saying, That the *King* is head of the *Church.*— But we will leave the Polemic stuff of a dead century to lie quiet on its bookshelves.

[3] I.e., that the universe is mechanistic, runs like a machine.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Let us hope that when you read these comments, another and greater depression will not have made talk about the 1930s sound ironically outmoded. That was of course the period of the Great Depression—of unemployment and want acutely hideous amidst plenty so prolific that pigs were slaughtered, oranges destroyed, and potatoes left to rot as men tried to keep up prices and check financial failures. It was a time of deadly suffering—inconceivable to a generation reared during boom years of war. As we have managed it, peace can also have its wholesale casualties. We always have a great reservoir of unemployed; and for at least a century the "financial cycle" has recurred, growing only more pronounced, with periods of prosperity always followed, so far, by the deflationary spiral marked by anxieties as widespread and in some ways as hurtful as the more open wounds of war. About a hundred years ago, when Carlyle wrote *Past and Present,* he wanted to make men realize, emotionally, what unemployment, especially during a depression, means. It was Britain's "Hungry 'Forties" then. But reading what he said, you will also know our 1930s, when what men suffered in America was but a sample of what occurred throughout the world.

Such suffering, Carlyle said, is needless and intolerable; England must find its cause and remedy, he warned, or England will be no more. He voiced the cry we hear today from all except the most conservative, a cry which will once more grow million-throated if again depression spreads. No more than Carlyle will we today placidly accept the paradox of want-amidst-plenty, which has begun to seem the periodic complement of economic individualism and a result of passive governmental policies modeled on laissez-faire economy. Revolutions of the Right and of the Left have shown that he was right in saying men will not tolerate this paradox. You will find him eloquently up-to-date as he prophesies the hazards that still threaten every one of us.

More ominously, he recommends, as a recourse, leaders in some ways analogous to those followed in certain countries, through the early '40s, as pied-pipers to prosperity. Like Carlyle, millions were sure that democracy would never work. And now that we have won, through their defeat, another lease on time, can we show that, in the remedy he urged, Carlyle was wrong? For we have yet to demonstrate the soundness of our conviction that the economic paradox of the past century can be solved in democratic ways.

In their present thinking, many Americans stem from both Carlyle and his chief opponent, J. S. Mill (see Mill selections in this volume). Almost as vigorously as Carlyle, they are likely to reject economic laissez-faire,

while, quite as earnestly as Mill, they believe in political democracy as a chief key to human progress.

1. What is the meaning of the title "Midas"? What social paradox had been developed, according to Carlyle, by the economic system of his day? What was the Industrial Revolution and when, in England, had it gathered such force that it transformed the nation's means of livelihood? How did it usher in an era when for the first time there could be enough for all? What special conditions enabled England to reap enormous wealth? (See biographical introduction.) What is meant by the phrases "an economy of abundance" and "an economy of scarcity"? Why, in our day, do we live either more or less fully under an economy of abundance than men did in Carlyle's time? Explain why you do or do not believe that since Carlyle's day we have made progress toward eliminating the paradox of want amidst plenty.

2. In our day, what legislation protects workers and their families in normal times? in periods of depression? Today, how are believers in laissez-faire likely to react to such laws, and why? Though the average American is not expert in economic theory, how have his opinions been affected by the tradition of economic freedom that stems from a laissez-faire ideal? Why do you agree or disagree with Carlyle in blaming economic laissez-faire for much of the misery he described?

3. In Carlyle's day, genuine political democracy was being born in England. The Reform Bill of 1832 had given the franchise to a vast number of new voters, though property qualifications limited the vote to relatively prosperous middle-class citizens. Thereafter, through the Chartist Movement, labor leaders and other liberals worked for universal suffrage. Political democracy was therefore a hotly debated issue of the time. Why would the workers have placed their chief hope in suffrage unrestricted by property qualifications? What were Carlyle's objections to political democracy? How did he define "true liberty"? Why did he think the feudal serf happier than the modern worker? Why did he believe that England must solve its social and economic problems or perish? What was the remedy he urged? How in content and in spirit does his doctrine resemble and differ from that of leaders of 20th-century fascist nations?

4. Judging from information given in the biographical introduction and from what Carlyle himself says in these essays, describe what his comfortable middle-class audience must have felt about the desirability of economic freedom (laissez-faire) and political democracy. Were they deeply concerned over the suffering caused by unemployment? Why or why not? What was Carlyle's chief purpose as he addressed them? Cite concrete details and connotative diction electric with his various emotions (his prose has been called a "lava-flow" of emotion). What type of words and phrases is he likely to capitalize, and why? Illustrating by specific examples, describe the effects he achieves by his use of other typographical

devices; of superlatives, inverted sentence order, direct address, coined words and phrases (like *fataler, rich master-idler*), and other rhetorical devices. What effect is created by the prevailing present tense? Recast several sentences to show how omission of pronouns, copulative verbs, and other colorless parts of speech frequently accounts for sentence fragments and unorthodox use of semicolons. Which of the foregoing characteristics of style contribute most to Carlyle's nervous, ejaculatory, vehement sentence rhythms? Does Carlyle more closely resemble a minister exhorting his congregation, a professional evangelist, or an Old Testament prophet—for example, Jeremiah? Explain your opinion. Why would it be almost impossible to imitate Carlyle's style successfully?

Nazi Ideology

RALPH BARTON PERRY
(For biography see "The Limits of Tolerance.")

EVEN FIVE-SYLLABLE WORDS can get themselves into the newspapers and into daily speech. One of the words that has recently been added to the English language is the word "ideology." As often happens, although the word is new, the thing itself is old.

Before discussing nazi ideology I want to say something about ideology in general. People can go to war without an ideology. They can go to war for power, or territory, or plunder; or they can go to war, as individuals can, simply because they have quarrelled and come to hate one another. But since the beginning of time people have gone to war on account of their beliefs. The oldest and most common form of this is religious war. When Christians fought Mohammedans, and protestants fought catholics, and puritan protestants fought anglican protestants, each side was held together by a religious creed. When people ceased to fight about religion they still found other ideas to fight for. In our Civil War, people fought for and against slavery; in the wars following the French Revolution people fought for Liberty, Equality and Fraternity against absolute monarchy.

Modern nationalism has encouraged this tendency. For a nation is not a geographical area, or a pure race, or a society living under one government, but a people bound together by a common tradition and "way of life" to which they are profoundly attached.

So when we speak of the nazi ideology, and of the opposing democratic ideology, we are speaking of what is only the newest form of a kind of rivalry and opposition of ideas in which history abounds.

An ideology, then, is an idea, or set of ideas, for which people live, and are willing if need be to fight. If they are willing to fight for an idea they must feel it to be important; and they must share it, or hold it in common. This does not mean that all of the people are conscious of the idea all the time, or that it furnishes the only motive for which they fight. But it will be in the minds of the more thoughtful people in their more thoughtful moments, and it will be

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appealed to as the deeper justification of the more immediate motives. It is certain, for example, that the Mohammedans who fought the Christians were not all good Mohammedans, or that everything they did was done for Mohammedan reasons; but when they wished to put their action on the highest ground, and have the support of conscience and reason, and create among themselves the greatest collective unity and enthusiasm, then they invoked their Mohammedan faith. So it is with the nazis and their faith; and so it is with us and our faith.

One more point about ideology in general before turning to the nazi ideology in particular. An ideology cannot be invented overnight. It must be in the line of tradition, and associated with illustrious names in the nation's past. Our own democratic ideology is traditionally American. It received a memorable statement in the American Declaration of Independence, and has been known for generations to "every American school boy." It is associated with the great names of Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln. It is expressed in words, such as "freedom," "equality," "opportunity," "tolerance," and "government of the people," which will immediately excite applause in any not-too-sophisticated American audience to which they are addressed. Similarly the nazi ideology serves its purpose only because it is deeply rooted in the German past. It is possible to quote great Germans in its support, and it employs words such as *Volk, Geist,* and *Kultur,* which are peculiarly sweet to German ears.

While it is impossible that the nazi ideology should mean to Americans all that it means to Germans, there is nevertheless a simple way for Americans to understand this ideology—though it may still seem to them incredible that any one should believe it. For it happens that in essentials the nazi creed is almost the precise opposite of our own. Therefore we have only to think of our own, and then to think, point for point, of that which is most unlike it.

Our own ideology is composed of three main historic strands—the ancient Greco-Roman or Latin, the Hebraic-Christian, and the liberal. From the Greeks and Romans we have learned to think of culture as something universal or cosmopolitan, belonging to all mankind, expressing the highest human faculties, and dedicated to the paramount ideals of truth, beauty, goodness, and law. From Hebraism and Christianity we have learned to think that the highest of the virtues, the greatest of the commandments, is love—love of God and love of neighbor. From modern liberalism we have learned to think

of mankind in terms of individual men and women, each with a claim or right to happiness and self-development, and to the control of his own destinies within limits set by the similar rights of others. While these three strands have a certain degree of independence they are historically interwoven. The individualism of the Greeks and Romans was developed by Christianity into a respect for the sacredness of the human soul or personality. In the great civilization of the Middle Ages, Christianity was blended with the pagan idea of universal culture, and the Christian trinity of virtues—faith, hope and love—took their place beside the ancient virtues of temperance, justice, courage, and wisdom. Modern liberalism took over the humanitarian ideal of Christianity and the humanistic ideal of paganism, and taught us that they depend on freedom, tolerance, and equal opportunity of personal development. So there has grown up in Europe and America an ideology composed of these three elements, in which each is not merely added to the others but has enriched and to some extent transformed them. This is that moral ideology of which our Americanism is a special form—with a peculiar local coloring of its own, but shared in its essentials with a large part of the modern world.

The opposite ideology, then, would be anti-Latin, anti-Christian, and anti-liberal. And these are precisely what the nazi ideology is. These are not terms of abuse employed by its enemies, but what nazism means to be, and is proud of being. Germany has felt all of the three impulses which I have named and has contributed richly to their unfolding. The culture of Greco-Roman antiquity, Christianity both catholic and protestant, and modern liberalism, have entered deeply into the life of Germany and have found among Germans many of their greatest exponents. It would be false to history to deny this or even question it. Nevertheless it is true that in no other European country have Latin, Christian and liberal influences been so consistently escaped or resisted and their opposites so frequently and continuously affirmed.

Let us now ask ourselves just what in German terms this anti-Latin, anti-Christian, anti-liberal ideology means.

In the first place, it substitutes for a universal or cosmopolitan culture, a culture of the German race. For a universal religion it substitutes a Germanic religion, worshiping a tribal God, or deifying the soul of the tribe itself. In every branch of culture the same tribal standard is applied. The best art and music is the most German art and music. The artist or composer does not try to rise above his own

breed and locality and feel his kinship with the best art and music of all ages and peoples, but becomes as German as possible and then lets himself go. The best literature is that which deals with German themes in the German manner. The scientist conceives even of truth as German. He takes the fantastic view that the best physics or mathematics is a German physics or mathematics, in which the peculiar mentality of the tribe is substituted for that evidence of sense and reason which is the same for all men, and which unites the scientists of all nations in the creation of a common body of knowledge.

More serious still, because it leads more directly to action, is the tribal standard of good and right. Instead of a conscience of mankind, or a universal code of justice, veracity, happiness, and human perfection, this ideology adopts a Germanic code, recognizing only one moral obligation—the obligation, namely, to exalt the power of Germany. This code binds a man to his fellow Germans, but as between Germans and the rest of the world it recognizes no moral relations whatever.

In the second place, the nazi ideology rejects the Christian teaching of love. What does it substitute? What is the opposite of love? The answer is clear. Love pities and gives—its essence is sympathy. It enters into the feelings of others, seeks their happiness, and shrinks from inflicting pain. The enemies of Christianity have understood this and have attacked Christianity as a code of weakness, because it has taught man to be self-denying and compassionate. The opposite, then, of the Christian code of love is the code of physical strength, power, force, and the admiration of all those traits which make for force, such as self-assertion, animal vigor, hardness, ruthlessness and discipline.

Finally, what does anti-liberalism mean? If liberalism is essentially a belief in individual rights, anti-liberalism is the denial of these rights. And what is put in their place?

The opposite of the individual is not another individual, or a multitude of individuals, but another kind of thing altogether. It is a collective or social thing, such as a family, a corporation, a nation, or a state. The opposite of individualism, then, is to exalt this social thing at the expense of its individual members. Men and women are not beings in themselves, but are merely parts, like the cells of a physical organism; and the social thing is the end, of which the individual members are merely the means and instruments. Toward

this entity the members have duties; against this entity they have no rights.

To us, bred in another tradition, it is as though this social thing were a sort of Moloch appeased by human sacrifices, or one of those monsters that devour their own children. But we can understand the view more sympathetically when we think in terms of the motives of blind loyalty and obedience by which individuals willingly surrender themselves to the larger whole to which they belong and allow that whole to use them and speak for them. These motives are primitive and lasting, and can easily be aroused.

In practice, anti-individualism turns into the tyranny of one individual. The reason is that the social thing has no organs of its own —no hands and feet, no viscera, no heart, no mouth, no brain. If it is to think and act, *some* individual has to think and act for it. But what individual is *entitled* to think and act for it? This cannot be decided by a vote of the individual members of the group, each acting in the light of his own interest and intelligence; for according to the anti-individualistic theory the ruler is not supposed to represent any individual, or even a majority of individuals, but a very different thing, namely, the organic whole. Theoretically the ruler should be he who expresses the mind of that whole—the soul of Germany, for example. But since the whole has no way of telling who this privileged individual is, he has to designate himself, and *claim* to speak for the whole. There are always individuals who are willing to do this: the father to speak for the family, the director to speak for the corporation, or the dictator to speak for the nation or state. The theory thus serves to justify any ruler or any self-appointed Führer who pretends to be the inspired voice of the social entity—and can get away with it.

These opposite ideas, like the Greco-Roman idea of universal culture, the Christian idea of love, and the liberal idea of individualism, also form a consistent pattern. They compose the ideology which teaches that there is a higher social being, such as the German race, which substitutes its own private *Kultur* for the universal standards of beauty, truth, goodness, and legality; which dedicates itself to its own power regardless of the balance of mankind; and which imposes its will on its own members and on the balance of mankind under its inspired dictator.

This doctrine is plainly set forth in Hitler's *Mein Kampf,* in which it is clear that he takes himself to be the inspired dictator, whom he describes as that "one man" who must "step forward in order to form

. . . granite principles, and take up the fight for their sole correctness, until out of the playing waves of a free world of thought a brazen sort of uniform combination of will and form arises." Elsewhere he says, of his "folkish state," that it recognizes "the obligation in accordance with the Eternal Will that dominates this universe to promote the victory of the better and stronger, and to demand the submission of the worse and the weaker." Such a state, he continues, "cannot grant the right of existence to an ethical idea if this idea represents a danger for the racial life of the bearers of the higher ethics." And he concludes, finally, that "we all sense in the distant future problems . . . for the conquest of which only a highest race, as a master-nation, based upon the means and the possibilties of an entire globe, will be called upon.*

This ideology is directly, expressly, and dangerously opposed to the cause for which the United Nations fight today. It teaches war, and it teaches conquest. What "distant future" Hitler had in mind when he spoke of global domination by a master-race we do not know. But we do know that his master-nation is Germany. We know that Hitler claims the right to decide the time. And there is reason to believe that the time is now.

The ideas which compose this nazi ideology were not invented by Hitler, and did not arise as a result of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles. They find high sanction in the historic past of Germany. If Hitler himself did not originally know this, Rosenberg and others did, and taught him. By going over the German past, selecting what fits and rejecting the rest, it is possible to trace this ideology in an almost continuous thread from legendary Nibelungen days, through the Teutonic knights and the early history of Prussia, through the uprising against Napoleon, and through the building of the Hohenzollern Empire, to the humiliation of 1918 and the growth of the nazi power. It is possible, sometimes by omission and distortion, but sometimes by citing them truthfully and in full, to claim for this ideology the support of reformers, statesmen, historians, philosophers, and poets—Martin Luther, Frederick the Great, Fichte, Hegel, Trietschke, Mommsen, Wagner, Nietzsche, and a host of lesser men whose names are names to conjure with in Germany.

Germany has also her roll of honor—her great mediaeval emperors, her humanists, her Kant of the Age of the Enlightenment, her Goethe and Lessing of the early nineteenth century, her exemplars of Chris-

* *Mein Kampf*, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939, pp. 577–81.

tian piety, catholic and protestant, and the successive generations of liberals who have suffered exile and martyrdom in her repeated and unsuccessful struggles for political freedom. No critics of the German ideology have been more severe than those Germans who in anguish of soul and with a sense of helplessness have spoken out against their own fatal inheritance.

Friedrich William Foerster is one of those who have identified this evil creed with the spirit of Prussia:

> And so this powerful race of Prussian conquerors had of necessity to become a tragic curse to itself and to the world, just because every capacity for moral conquest, every spark of understanding of others' natures or endeavors was lost in its harsh, stern manner, in its certainty that it could not be surpassed. . . . In it was already the dreadful doom that it did not serve God, nor even a supreme ethical idea; but it served the state, and the logic of the state was raised on principle above the moral law. . . . A man in the civil administration of Belgium . . . defined for me the essence of all recent German activity . . . :"A highly developed organization in the service of moral anarchy!"*

The poet Fritz von Unruh, addressing himself to those who like himself had had their eyes opened at the time of the First World War, finds the root of the evil in the German's lack of individual self-reliance:

> To fall back into guilt, after the clatter of death in a brother's bones once went to our very marrow: that means being damned in the eyes of future ages. . . . There they go, those who are willing to bow their necks again to Mammon and the Kaiser; those who long for their true home as the slave longs for the lash, and would rather do anything than accept responsibility.
>
> But you, whose hearts beat high,—there you sit and wait, wait for a miracle to happen, and look outside and listen to the noise hoping to hear a *voice*—?
>
> And for eons you have not heard the cry of pain of the man who lies captive deep within your heart—the man who waits within you all—waits not for the *One*, the *Master*, but—*for you*.†

There is, then, another Germany which would, if it could, fight beside the United Nations in this struggle. Whether that other Germany shall triumph at home and enable the German people to take their place with the United Nations in a free world where all nations

* *Mein Kampf gegen das militaristische und nationalistische Deutschland*, 1920, tr. by Evan B. Davis, quoted by Will Schaber, in *Thinker vs. Junker*, 1941, pp. 223–226.

† *Vaterland und Freiheit*, 1923; quoted by Will Schaber, *op. cit.*, pp. 243–44.

shall enjoy security and fruitful intercourse hangs on the issue of present events. With the nazi ideology, and with the men whose deeds it is now used to justify, there can be no compromise.

By an extraordinary and most ominous coincidence, at the very time that this German ideology is bearing its practical fruits in nazism, a parallel ideology is springing into action on the opposite side of the globe. In its modern technology, industrial and military, Japan has been imitative, but its ideology is as original as its German counterpart, and of a purer type. Its statism is symbolized by the worship of the Emperor, its militarism is rooted in the cult of the Samurai, and its expanding nationalism in the belief that the race of Nippon are the chosen of the gods. As the arrogance of the Germans has been heightened and embittered by a sense of inferiority to the peoples of western and southern Europe, so the Japanese have suffered from a sense of their cultural dependence on the ancient empire of China. In Germany this ideology has been resisted and tempered by Christianity and liberalism, in Japan it has had a freer scope.*

Germany and Japan are partners in the spirit as well as allies in war. Both nations possess the same capacity to infuse the primitive instincts with a mystical faith and with artful mendacity; and to implement them with the most advanced techniques of science. Both nations, despite their distance and their independent origin, have been inoculated with the same creed: the subordination of the individual man to the state; the docile and disciplined acceptance of authority; the inhumane and unscrupulous cult of force; the destiny of a master race to conquer and enslave.

There is no hope for mankind in the prediction that these rival claimants for world domination will some day destroy one another, for before that day they intend to divide the world between them. Before that last war between the triumphant forces of evil they will have cleared the field. The time to meet them is now, when free nations pledged to the opposite faith can still subdue them both.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Although it had been gathering force for more than half a century, the conflict between democratic and fascist ways of life caught the anti-fascist

* Cf. Edwin O. Reischauer, "Wherein Are We Challenged: Japan," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 27, 1942.

nations almost unprepared. In America most men suddenly discovered, one Sunday noon, that they too must fight. But fundamentally, why? Some said F. D. R. had led us into war, though, in far greater numbers, others were content to blame the "sneak" attack on Pearl Harbor. Hirohito, Mussolini, Hitler—these too, as individuals, were held responsible. Or was some one event the cause—perhaps, as Hitler said, the Treaty of Versailles? All through the war many showed themselves confused. Until the very end some urged a compromise—first with Germany; then with Japan. Today, too, there are patriotic men and women who would be glad to have our occupation troops recalled; for after all, they say, I didn't raise my boy to stay abroad, in time of peace, in uniform. Many have been not only muddled but dangerously unaware if, as Professor Perry holds, *fascism* was (and remains) our inevitable enemy.

Fascism, Professor Perry states, is an ideology, a way of life, which in any of its forms must always be a deadly foe of its antithesis, democracy. And because fascism is a way of life, no leader could have *imposed* its ideology on any people: people must be ready to accept a way of life. According to this premise we were as naive, after World War I, to try to "give" the Germans a democratic government as we would be now to think that Hitler caused the war in Europe or to hope that, without re-education, the defeat of fascist peoples can prevent a repetition of the holocaust. We did not stumble into war with fascists. To see the nature of the fascist and the democratic ideology is to know that they never can live together.

With fascism disarmed, we would seem to have a choice: first, we can maintain, indefinitely, an armed guard over fascist nations; second, weary or indifferent, we can become careless, the price of carelessness being another war; third, we can follow our victory through with skill and patience, maintaining armed guard as long as may be necessary and also undertaking the prolonged responsibility of mass re-education. Peace has not outmoded the analysis of Nazi ideology here presented.

1. What was the author's main purpose in this essay? Indicating the content of the chief divisions and subdivisions, show in simple outline how he developed his central thesis.

2. Applying the author's definitions of *nation* and of *ideology,* show why it would seem possible to found (perhaps in Palestine) a Jewish "nation" living according to an "ideology," but impossible to form an Oriental "nation" with an Oriental "ideology" (perhaps in some large Pacific island). Why would the author think it dangerous to blame Hitler rather than the German people for plunging Europe into war? Why would he think that the average American was, relatively speaking, right or wrong in believing World War I was fought "to make the world safe for democracy"? Do you think he would consider mass re-education of the Japanese necessary, in the long run, to safeguard ourselves and other

democratic nations? Why or why not? In view of what he says, would he probably approve retaining an emperor for Japan? Why? Why does your knowledge of American and/or European history make you inclined to agree or disagree with the following assertions: no nation has ever gone to war (1) except for economic reasons; (2) without an ideology to fight for. Explain why you do or do not believe that a person could logically hold both of these opinions. Do you believe the author failed to stress economic causes because he did not consider them important or because they were relatively unimportant to his purpose in this essay? Give reasons for your judgment.

3. Show how the "three main historic strands" of democratic ideology supplement and overlap each other. Explain how each strand is illustrated by points of view developed in your college classrooms and in your church. Suppose you had been born in Nazi Germany: how and why might your present attitudes have differed about the nature and function of women; marriage; the education of children; eugenics; "mercy killings"; native minority groups; the foreign-born; military training; war; academic freedom; the function of science; the function of your church; the importance of the individual and of the state? It has been said that whatever ultimately furthers life, particularly in intellectual and spiritual development, is morally good and that whatever is ultimately destructive is morally evil. Judged by this concept, which is more moral, a democratic or a fascist ideology, and why? Aside from self-interest, would we be justified, in your opinion, in attempting to change the points of view of people reared in conquered fascist nations? Why or why not? Approximately how long might be required to work the transformation, and why do you select this length of time?

4. What are the chief characteristics of *Americanism* as the author uses the term? How does this meaning change when the word is used by groups like America First or the Ku Klux Klan? What characteristics of fascist ideology, as here described, lurk in American thought-habits of the past? Explain your answer. Show why you think it would be impossible, difficult, or relatively easy, according to the author's analysis, for a fascist ideology to become dominant in the United States.

5. How do the ideals of the United Nations Organization illustrate a democratic ideology? What characteristics of fascism would make fascists inevitably oppose such ideals?

Fascism!

FROM *ARMY TALK*

Though memory is short, have we forgotten the malignant skill with which the fascists demonstrated that ideas are weapons? No department was more essential to the Nazi war machine than the Ministry of Propaganda, and no agency performed its task with more effectiveness. *Propaganda* itself became a word connoting evil, as though deliberate spreading of ideas necessarily entailed serving falsehood. This impression our side tried to correct when it began to marshal its ideas for warfare, taking as its slogan, *"Our weapon is the truth,"* and scrupulously refusing deliberately to indoctrinate with ideas known to distort or contradict the facts. Facing the problem of how to arm our soldiers with ideological weapons, the War Department made orientation courses a part of basic training, and ordered that they be conducted by men trained to use the teacher's basic skills. Week by week these men received a pamphlet containing information and suggestions for discussion in the "classroom." From this series of directives, called *Army Talk*, the following selection is taken. Just as we needed to know the enemy in time of war, so we must recognize his continued presence in times of peace.

SOME AMERICANS would give an emphatic "No" to the question "Can fascism come to America after it has been defeated abroad?" They would say that Americans are too smart, that they are sold on the democratic way of life, that they wouldn't permit any group to put fascism over in America. Fascism, some might say, is something peculiar that you find only among people who like swastikas, who like to listen to speeches from balconies in Rome, or who like to think that their emperor is god. Their reaction might be that it is something "foreign" that Americans would recognize in a minute, like the goose-step. They might feel that we'd laugh it out of existence in a hurry.

In a good many European nations, the people felt the same way some of us do: that fascism was foreign to them and could never become a power in their land. They found, however, that fascist-

From Orientation Fact Sheet No. 64, *Army Talk*, March 24, 1945, issued by the United States War Department. The opening sections are omitted.

minded people *within* their borders, especially with aid from the outside, could seize power. The Germans, of course, made efficient use of fascist-minded traitors whom we have come to know generally as "the fifth column."

In France, which was considered a leading democracy of Europe, the betrayal was spearheaded by a powerful clique of native "100 percent French" fascists. Norway had its Quisling who was as "pure-blooded" a Norwegian as Laval was a "pure-blooded" Frenchman. The Netherlands' Musserts were "100 percent Dutch," Belgium's Degrelles "100 percent Belgian," and Britain's Mosleys "100 percent British." The United States also has its native fascists who say that they are "100 percent American." There were native fascists in the Philippines, in Thailand (Siam), in China, in Burma, in many other countries—all waiting to become the willing puppets of the Axis. Not one of these fascists is a "foreigner" who had to be imported from Germany, or Japan, or Italy.

Most of the people in America like to be good neighbors. But, at various times and places in our history, we have had sorry instances of mob sadism, lynchings, vigilantism, terror, and suppression of civil liberties. We have had our hooded gangs, Black Legions, Silver Shirts, and racial and religious bigots. All of them, in the name of Americanism, have used undemocratic methods and doctrines which experience has shown can be properly identified as "fascist."

Can we afford to brush them off as mere crackpots? We once laughed Hitler off as a harmless little clown with a funny mustache.

In January 1944, 30 Americans, many of them native born, were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on charges of conspiring with "the Nazi party to accomplish the objectives of said Nazi party in the United States." These objectives, according to the indictment, included undermining and impairing "the loyalty and morale of the military and naval forces of the United States." The case ended in a mistrial caused by the death of the presiding judge. . . .

Whenever free governments anywhere fail to solve their basic economic and social problems, there is always the danger that a native brand of fascism will arise to exploit the situation and the people.

An American fascist seeking power would not proclaim that he is a fascist. Fascism always camouflages its plans and purposes. Hitler made demagogic appeals to all groups and swore: "Neither I nor anybody in the National Socialist Party advocates proceeding by anything but Constitutional methods."

Any fascist attempt to gain power in America would not use the

exact Hitler pattern. It would work under the guise of "super-patriotism" and "super-Americanism." Fascist leaders are neither stupid nor naive. They know that they must hand out a line that "sells." Huey Long is said to have remarked that if fascism came to America, it would be on a program of "Americanism."

Fascists in America may differ slightly from fascists in other countries, but there are a number of attitudes and practices that they have in common. Following are three. Every person who has one of them is not necessarily a fascist. But he is in a mental state that lends itself to the acceptance of fascist aims.

1. Pitting of religious, racial, and economic groups against one another in order to break down national unity is a device of the "divide and conquer" technique used by Hitler to gain power in Germany and in other countries. With slight variations, to suit local conditions, fascists everywhere have used this Hitler method. In many countries, anti-Semitism (hatred of Jews) is a dominant device of fascism. In the United States, native fascists have often been anti-Catholic, anti-Jew, anti-Negro, anti-Labor, anti-foreign-born. In South America, the native fascists use the same scapegoats except that they substitute anti-Protestantism for anti-Catholicism.

Interwoven with the "master race" theory of fascism is a well-planned "hate campaign" against minority races, religions, and other groups. To suit their particular needs and aims, fascists will use any one or a combination of such groups as a convenient scapegoat.

2. Fascism cannot tolerate such religious and ethical concepts as the "brotherhood of man." Fascists deny the need for international cooperation. These ideas contradict the fascist theory of the "master race." The brotherhood of man implies that all people—regardless of color, race, creed, or nationality—have rights. International cooperation . . . runs counter to the fascist program of war and world domination.

In place of international cooperation, the fascists seek to substitute a perverted sort of ultra-nationalism which tells their people that they are the only people in the world who count. With this goes hatred and suspicion toward the people of all other nations. Right now our native fascists are spreading anti-British, anti-Soviet, anti-French, and anti-United Nations propaganda. They know that allied unity now foretells the certain defeat of fascism abroad. They know that post-war allied unity means world peace and security. They realize that fascism cannot thrive or grow under these conditions.

3. It is accurate to call a member of a communist party a "com-

munist." For short, he is often called a "Red." Indiscriminate pinning of the label "Red" on people and proposals which one opposes is a common political device. It is a favorite trick of native as well as foreign fascists.

Many fascists make the spurious claim that the world has but two choices—either fascism or communism, and they label as "communist" everyone who refuses to support them. By attacking our free-enterprise, capitalist democracy and by denying the effectiveness of our way of life they hope to trap many people.

Hitler insisted that only fascism could save Europe and the world from the "communist menace." There were many people inside and outside Germany and Italy who welcomed and supported Hitler and Mussolini because they believed fascism was the only safeguard against communism. The "Red bogey" was a convincing enough argument to help Hitler take and maintain power. The Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis, whose aggressions plunged the world into global war, was called the "Anti-Comintern Axis." It was proclaimed by Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito as a "bulwark against communism."

Learning to identify native fascists and to detect their techniques is not easy. They plan it that way. But it is vitally important to learn to spot them, even though they adopt names and slogans with popular appeal, drape themselves with the American flag, and attempt to carry out their program in the name of the democracy they are trying to destroy.

The only way to prevent fascism from getting a hold in America is by making our democracy work and by actively cooperating to preserve world peace and security.

Lots of things can happen inside of people when they are unemployed or hungry. They become frightened, angry, desperate, confused. Many, in their misery, seek to find somebody to blame. They look for a scapegoat as a way out. Fascism is always ready to provide one. In its bid for power, it is ready to drive wedges that will disunite the people and weaken the nation. It supplies the scapegoat—Catholics, Jews, Negroes, labor unions, big business—any group upon which the insecure and unemployed can be brought to pin the blame for their misfortune.

We all know that many serious problems will face us when the War is over. If there is a period of economic stress it will create tensions among our people, including us as returning veterans. The resentment may be directed against minorities—especially if undemo-

cratic organizations with power and money can direct our emotions and thinking along these lines.

The fascist doctrine of hate fulfills a triple mission. By creating disunity—it weakens democracy. By getting men to hate rather than to think—it prevents men from seeking the real cause and a democratic solution to the problem. By fake promises of jobs and security, fascism then tries to lure men to its program as the way out of insecurity. Only by democratically solving the economic problems of our day can there be any certainty that fascism won't happen here. That is our job as citizens.

Citizenship in a democracy is more than a ballot dropped in a box on Election Day. It's a 365-days-a-year job requiring the active participation and best judgment of every citizen in the affairs of his community, his nation, and his country's relations with the world.

Fascism thrives on indifference and ignorance. It makes headway when people are apathetic or cynical about their government—when they think of it as something far removed from them and beyond their personal concern. The erection of a traffic light on your block is important to your safety and the safety of your children. The erection of a world organization to safeguard peace and world security is just as important to our personal security. Both must be the concern of every citizen.

Freedom, like peace and security, cannot be maintained in isolation. It involves being alert and on guard against the infringement not only of our own freedom but the freedom of every American. If we permit discrimination, prejudice, or hate to rob *anyone* of his democratic rights, our own freedom and all democracy is threatened.

What is true of America is true of the world. The germ of fascism cannot be quarantined in a Munich Brown House or a balcony in Rome. If we want to make certain that fascism does not come to America, we must make certain that it does not thrive anywhere in the world.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Our armed conflict with fascism ended, will we fail to realize that we have not yet vanquished fascist attitudes that did not come with Hitler and have never been confined to Axis peoples? Typical fascist thinking exists, today, almost everywhere. In conquered nations, fascist ideology was not dissipated with fascist armies; and here in the United States, we

sometimes hear dangerously fascistic attitudes expressed in our very Congress. Nor is fascism, strictly speaking, a product of our age. Need we be reminded that, before Hitler, Nietzsche taught his doctrine of the superman "beyond good and evil," and even Wagner, glorifying intuition and emotion, exalted the themes of "blood, soil, and nature"; that German chancellors and kaisers chanted State and War to a *herrenvolk* so docile that, perhaps by way of over-compensation, they embraced the "Nordic" racial myth and the belief that, at least nationally "superior," they were born to rule? And in Japan, of course, many emperors before Hirohito served as symbols for the "sons of heaven" and as agents for a nationalistic military cult. Even in the democratic nations, fascistic attitudes have persistently cropped up. In England, for example, there was clearly a pre-fascist drift in Carlyle's thinking; and from Carlyle through Kipling, many authors made articulate the racial, nationalistic code behind the building of the British Empire. Our own history is marred by the blatant jingoism that gave us in South America a reputation we are still trying to live down, while racial hatreds, vigilante mobs, and (ironically enough) suspicions of the "foreign born" reach deep into our past. Just as certain democratic concepts have appeared in fascist nations, fascist attitudes have long existed in democratic countries. The difference lies in the dominant culture pattern.

In 1936 Lawrence Dennis, the theorist of the avowed American fascists, predicted their triumph in the United States in *The Coming American Fascism*—though, like Huey Long, he said that an American fascist party would "of course" be called "by another name." Today the elements of that party still exist: organizations with hidden, half-confessed, or openly avowed fascist doctrines; anti-Semitic, anti-labor, anti-Negro agitators; demagogic politicians with an eye to power, and religious leaders darkly bigoted and prejudiced; and, some would say, in effect though not in intent, certain militant industrialists, organized or unorganized. No more than we believe that fascism dates from Hitler should we assume it is so foreign to America that it could never happen here. During a depression, with people hungry and confused, disguised propaganda might easily play on prejudices and intolerance too long characteristic of our national life.

1. When people boast that they are "100% Americans," what is likely to be their attitude toward Jews? Negroes? Italian and other foreign-born Americans? Communists? almost anybody whose political opinions differ from their own? freedom of speech? the Constitution? liberal social legislation? labor unions? the British? the Soviet Union? the culture of almost any European or Oriental nation? whole-hearted American cooperation in world affairs? What justification is there for saying that if fascism comes to America, it will probably be disguised as "super-patriotism"?

2. From your general fund of information, contribute as much as you

can to class discussion of this group of questions: Did unsolved economic problems help fascist leaders to gain power in Italy? in France? in Spain? in Norway? in Japan? In which of these countries were the people apparently sympathetic to the fascist regime before and after fascist leaders were deposed? How do you account for the differences or similarities in popular reaction? What general conclusions can you draw about the role played by economic problems in the rise and popular support of fascist leadership?

3. After a period of serious inflation or of prolonged and wholesale unemployment, what groups in America might become the scapegoats? Explain your opinion. What do you consider the economic and social divisions in American life which native fascists might exploit if they wished to "divide and conquer"? Why do you believe that the conflicts between these divisions are, or are not, acute? If fascist leaders should once more promise "all things to all men," through what bait would they probably try to mislead each conflicting group? Why do you believe that, in time, there would or would not be a popular desire to overthrow fascists if they established themselves in power? Why would it be easy or difficult to do so?

4. Do any individuals, newspapers, organizations, social or economic groups in America reveal, in your opinion, what the War Department described as "fascist tendencies"? If so, which, specifically, and how? How do you explain the fact that fascists have customarily been so vociferously anti-Soviet Union?

5. How can cooperation for world peace help to prevent a rise of fascism in America? in other lands? What important legislation now being considered should we support or oppose if we are to remedy conditions that hearten fascist interests?

True and False Society

WILLIAM MORRIS

Few men have influenced modern life in more ways than has William Morris (1836-96). He was a distinguished narrative poet, remembered for ballads and tales of Arthurian legend and Scandinavian saga ("The Haystack in the Flood," "The Defense of Guinivere," *Sigurd the Volsung*), and a prose writer notable for limpid Anglo-Saxon simplicity of style (*A Dream of John Ball, News from Nowhere*). The hand-made furniture, textiles, glass, and pottery he designed and produced in his workshop had a strong and beneficial influence on British and American taste, and were main sources of the modern movements which keep alive various handicrafts in our machine age. The craft of beautiful printing also, fallen into neglect in an age of standardization, was revived at his famous Kelmscott Press.

In all these multiform activities Morris showed an acute awareness of the problems of the common man. His interest in craftsmanship arose not only from delight in the beauty of hand-made objects but also from a conviction that the creative instincts of the worker should be allowed to find expression; in this he was a disciple of Ruskin. *News from Nowhere* is one of the best of modern utopias. *A Dream of John Ball* is a moving narrative interpretation of the struggle of the masses to achieve security and beauty despite exploitation by the ruling class—for Morris here interprets history in terms of Marx's theories of class struggle and economic determinism. The whole drive of his prose, the direction of much of his poetry, was toward service of the disinherited. Indeed, the last twenty years of his life were dedicated almost wholly to the cause. Years before he read Marx, he had toured England speaking on street corners, in parks, and at political rallies to arouse the people against exploitation and imperialism. That crucial reading of *Das Kapital* in 1882 convinced him that the humanitarians' hope for cure of social woes by paternalistic capitalism was vain. He at once became an active member of the Social Democratic Federation (founded 1881), a Marxist group later absorbed into the British Labour Party. And for the rest of his life he was a crusading Marxist, the first among important English writers.

The selection here reprinted is from a series of lectures setting forth socialist theory in popular form. Its doctrine is still basic for both Socialism and Communism, principal contemporary branches of the socialist move-

Lecture delivered in 1887, published in *Lectures on Socialism, Collected Works*, Vol. XIII, 1915. By permission of Longmans, Green & Co.

ment, although the Communists adhere much more strictly to its Marxian interpretation of history.

I HAVE BEEN ASKED to give you the Socialist view of the Labour Question. Now in some ways that is a difficult matter to deal with—far beyond my individual capacities—and would also be a long business; yet in another way, as a matter of principle, it is not difficult to understand or long to tell of, and does not need previous study or acquaintance with the works of specialists or philosophers. Indeed, if it did, it would not be a political subject, and I hope to show you that it is pre-eminently political in the sense in which I should use the word; that is to say, it is a matter which concerns everyone, and has to do with the practical everyday relations of his life, and that not only as an individual, but as a member of a body corporate, nay, as a member of that great corporation—humanity. Thus considered, it would be hard indeed if it could not be understood readily by a person of ordinary intelligence who can bring his mind to bear upon it without prejudice. Such a person can learn the basis of the opinion in even an hour's talk, if the matter be clearly put before him. It is my task to attempt this; and whether I fail or succeed, I can at least promise you to use no technical phrases which would require explanation; nor will I, as far as I can help, go into any speculative matter, but will be as plain and practical as I can be.

Yet I must warn you that you may be disappointed when you find that I have no elaborate plan, no details of a new society to lay before you, that to my mind to attempt this would be putting before you a mere delusion. What I ask you to consider is in the main the clearing away of obstacles that stand in the way of the due and unwasteful use of labour—a task not light indeed, nor to be accomplished without the most strenuous effort in the teeth of violent resistance, but yet not impossible for humanity as we know it, and as I firmly believe not only necessary, but, as things now are, the one thing essential to be undertaken.

Now you all know that, taking mankind as a whole, it is necessary for man to labour in order to live. Certainly not all things that we enjoy are the works of man's labour; the beauty of the earth, and the action of nature on our sensations, are always here for us to enjoy, but we can only do so on the terms of our keeping ourselves alive and in

good case by means of labour, and no inventions can set aside that necessity. The merest savage has to pluck the berry from the tree, or dig up the root from the ground before he can enjoy his dog-like sleep in sun or shade; and there are no savages who have not got beyond that stage; while the progressive races of mankind have for many ages got a very long way beyond it, so that we have no record of any time when they had not formed some sort of society, whose aim was to make the struggle with Nature for subsistence less hard than it otherwise would have been, to win a more abundant livelihood from her.

We cannot deal at any length with the historical development of society; our object is simply to inquire into the constitution of that final development of society under which we live. But one may first ask a few questions:—1st, Since the community generally must labour in order that the individuals composing it may subsist, and labour harder in order that they may attain further advantages, ought not a really successful community so to arrange that labour that each capable person should do a fair share of it and no more? 2nd, Should not a really successful community—established surely for the benefit of all its members—arrange that everyone who did his due share of labour should have his due share of the wealth earned by that labour? 3rd, If any labour were wasted, such waste would throw an additional burden on those who produced what was necessary and pleasant to existence. Should not a successful community, therefore, so organize its labour that it should not be wasted? You must surely answer Yes to each of these three questions. I will assert, then, that a successful society—a society which fulfilled its true functions—would take care that each did his due share of labour, that each had his due share of wealth resulting from that labour, and that the labour of persons generally was not wasted. I ask you to remember those three essentials of a successful society throughout all that follows; and to let me apply them now as a test of success to the society in which we live, the latest development of so many ages of the struggle with Nature, our elaborate and highly-organized civilization.

In our society, does each capable person do his fair share of labour? Is his share of the wealth produced proportionate to his labour? Is the waste of labour avoided in our society?

You may perhaps hesitate in your answer to the third question; you cannot hesitate to say No to the two first. I think, however, I shall be able to show you that much labour is wasted, and that, therefore, our society fails in the three essentials necessary for a successful society. Our civilization, therefore, though elaborate and highly organized, is

a failure; that is, supposing it to be the final development of society, as some people, nay, most people, suppose it to be.

Now a few words as to the course of events which have brought us to the society of the present day. In periods almost before the dawn of continuous history the early progressive races from which we are descended were divided into clans or families, who held their wealth, such as it was, in common within the clan, while all outside the clan was hostile, and wealth not belonging to the clan was looked upon as prize of war. There was consequently continual fighting of clan with clan, and at first all enemies taken in war were slain. But after a while, as man progressed and got defter with his hands, and learned how to make more effective tools, it began to be found out that, so working, each man could do more than merely sustain himself; and then some of the prisoners of war, instead of being slain on the field, were made slaves of; they had become valuable for work, like horses. Out of the work they produced their masters or owners gave them sustenance enough to live on, and took the rest for themselves. Time passed, and the complexity of society grew; the early barbarism passed through many stages into the ancient civilizations of which Greece and Rome were the great representatives; but this civilization was still founded on slave-labour. Most of its wealth was created by men who could be sold in the market like cattle. But as the old civilizations began to decay, this slave-labour became unprofitable; the countries comprised in the Roman Empire were disturbed by constant war; the governments, both central and provincial, became mere tax-gathering machines, and grew so greedy that things became unbearable. Society became a mere pretext for tax-gathering, and fell to pieces, and chattel slavery fell with it, since under all these circumstances slaves were no longer valuable.

Then came another change. A new society was formed, partly out of the tribes of barbarians who had invaded the Roman Empire, and partly out of the fragments of that empire itself; the feudal system arose, bearing with it new ideas, which I have not time to deal with here and now. Suffice it to say that in its early days mere chattel slavery gave place to serfdom. Powerful men, privileged men, had not forgotten that men can produce more by a day's labour than will keep them alive for a day; so now they settled their labourers on certain portions of land, stocked their land with them, in fact, and on these lands they had leave to live as well as they might on the condition that they should work a certain part of their time on the land which belonged to their lords. The average condition of these serfs was better than that

of the chattel slaves. They could not be bought and sold personally, they were a part of the manor on which they lived, and they had as a class a tendency to become tenants by various processes. In one way or another these serfs got gradually emancipated, and during a transitional period, lasting through the two last centuries of the Middle Ages, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the labour classes were in a far better position than they had been before, and in some ways than they have been since; suffering more from spasmodic arbitrary violence than from chronic legal oppression. The transition from this period to our own days is one of the most interesting chapters of history; but it is impossible for me to touch on it here. All I can say is that the emancipated serfs formed one of the elements that went to make up our present middle class, and that a new class of workers grew up beneath them: men who were not owned by anyone, who were bound by no legal ties to such and such a manor, who might earn what livelihood they could for themselves under certain conditions, which I will presently try to lay before you, and which are most important to be considered; for this new class of so-called free labourers has become our modern working class.

Now it will be clear to you, surely, how much and how grievously both the classical period, with its chattel slavery, and the feudal system, with its serfdom, fell short of the society which we have set before us as reasonably successful. In each of them there was a class obviously freed from the necessity of labour by means of the degradation of another class which laboured excessively and reaped but a small reward for its excessive labour. Surely there was something radically wrong in these two societies. From the fact that labour is necessary for man's life on earth, and that Nature yields her abundance to labour only, one would be inclined to deduce the probability that he who worked most would be the best off. But in these slave and serf societies the reverse was the case: the man of leisureless toil lived miserably, the man who did nothing useful lived abundantly. Then, again, as to our third test, was there no waste of labour? Yes, indeed, there was waste most grievous. I have said that the slave-owner or the lord of the manor did nothing useful, and yet he did something; he was bound to do something, for he was often energetic, gifted, full of character; he made war ceaselessly, consuming thereby the wealth his slaves or his serfs created, and forcing them to work the more grievously. Here was waste enough, and lack of organization of labour.

Well, all this people find no great difficulty in seeing, and few would

like, publicly at least, to confess a regret for these conditions of labor, although in private some men, less hypocritical or more logical than the bulk of reactionists, admit that they consider the society of cultivated men and chattel slaves the very best possible for weak human nature. Yet though we can see what has been, we cannot so easily see what is; and I admit that it is especially hard for people in our civilization, with its general freedom from the ruder forms of violence, its orderly routine life, and, in short, all that tremendous organization whose very perfection of continuity prevents us from noticing it—I say it is hard for people under the quiet order and external stability of modern society to note that much the same thing is going on in the relations of employers to the employed as went on under the slave society of Athens or under the self-sustained baronage of the thirteenth century.

For I assert that with us, as with the older societies, those who work hardest fare the worst; those who produce the least get the most; while as to the waste of labour that goes on, the waste of times past is as nothing compared with what is wasted to-day.

I must now justify this view of mine, and, if possible, get you to agree with it by pointing out to you how society at the present day is constituted.

Now, as always, there are only two things essential to the production of wealth—labour, and raw material: everyone can labour who is not sick or in nonage, therefore everyone except those, if he can get at raw material, can produce wealth; but without that raw material he cannot produce anything—anything, that is, that man can live upon; and if he does not labour he must live at the cost of those that do; unless, therefore, everyone can get at the raw material and instruments of production, the community in general will be burdened by the expense of so many useless mouths, and the sum of its wealth will be less than it ought to be. But in our civilized society to-day the raw material and the instruments of production are monopolized by a comparatively small number of persons, who will not allow the general population to use them for production of wealth unless they pay them tribute for doing so; and since they are able to exact this tribute, they themselves are able to live without producing, and consequently are a burden on society. Nor are these monopolists content with exacting a bare livelihood from the producers, as mere vagabonds and petty thieves do; they are able to get from the producers in all cases an abundant livelihood, including most of the enjoyments and advantages of civilization, and in many cases a position of such power that they are practically

independent of the community and almost out of reach of its laws, although, indeed, the greater part of those laws were made for the purpose of upholding this monopoly; and wherever necessary they do now use the physical force which, by one means or another, they have under their control, for such upholding.

These monopolists, or capitalists, as one may call them broadly (for I will not at present distinguish the land capitalists from the money capitalists), are in much the same position as the slave-owners of ancient Greece and Rome, or the serf-masters of the thirteenth century; but they have this advantage over them, that though really they sustain their position by mere compulsion, just as the earlier masters did, that compulsion is not visible as the compulsion of the earlier times was; and it is very much their business to prevent it becoming visible, as may well be imagined. But as I am against monopoly and in favour of freedom, I must try to get you to see it, since seeing it is the first step towards feeling it, which, in its turn, is sure to lead to your refusing to bear it.

I have spoken of the tribute which the capitalists exact as the price of the use of those means of production which should be as free to all as the air we breathe is, since they are as necessary to our existence as it is: how do they exact the tribute? They are, to start with, in a good position, you see, because even without anyone's help they could use the labour-power in their own bodies on the raw material they have, and so earn their livelihood; but they are not contented with that, as I hinted above—they are not likely to be, because their position, legalized and supported by the whole physical force of the State, enables them "to do better for themselves," as the phrase goes; they can use the labour-power of the disinherited, and force them to keep them without working for production. Those disinherited, however, they must keep alive to labour, and they must allow them also opportunity for breeding—these are necessities that pressed equally on the ancient slave-owner or the mediæval lord of the manor, or, indeed, that press on the owner of draught cattle; they must at least do for the workers as much as for a machine—supply them with fuel to enable them to work. Nor need they do more if they are dealing with men who have no power of resistance. But these machines are human ones, instinct with desires and passions, and therefore, they cannot help trying to better themselves; and they cannot better themselves except at the expense of the masters, because whatever they produce more than the bare necessities of life the masters will at once take from them if they can; therefore they have always resisted the full exercise of the privilege of the mas-

ters, and have tried to raise their standards of livelihood above the mere subsistence limit. Their resistance has taken on various forms, from peaceful strikes to open war, but it has always been going on, and the masters, when not driven into a corner, have often yielded to it, although unwillingly enough; but it must be said that mostly the workers have claimed little more than mere slaves would, who might mutiny for a bigger ration. For, in fact, this wage paid by our modern master is nothing more than the ration of the slave in another form; and when the masters have paid it, they are free to use all the rest that the workers produce, just as the slave-owner takes all that the slave produces. Remember at this point, therefore, that everything more than bare subsistence which the workers gain to-day they gain by carrying on constant war with their masters. I must add that their success in this war is often more apparent than real; that too often it means little more than shifting the burden of extreme poverty from one group of workers to another; the unskilled labourers, of whom the supply is unlimited, do not gain by it, and their numbers have a tendency to increase, as the masters, driven to their shifts, use more elaborate machines in order to dispense with skilled labour, and also use the auxiliary labour of women and children, to whom they do *not* pay subsistence wages, thereby keeping down the wages of the head of the family, and depriving him and them of the mutual help and comfort in the household which would otherwise be gained from them.

Thus, then, the capitalists, by means of their monopoly of the means of production, compel the worker to work for less than his due share of the wealth which he produces—that is, for less than he produces. He must work, he will die else; and as they are in possession of the raw material, he must agree to the terms they enforce upon him. This is the "free contract" of which we hear so much, and which, to speak plainly, is a capitalistic lie. There is no way out of this "freedom" save rebellion of some kind or other: strike-rebellion, which impoverishes the workers for the time, whether they win the strike or lose it; or the rebellion of open revolt, which will be put down always until it is organized for a complete change in the basis of society.

Now to show you another link or two of the chain which binds the workers. There is one thing which hampers this constant struggle of the workers towards bettering their condition at the expense of their masters, and that is competition for livelihood amongst them. I have told you that unskilled labour is practically unlimited; and machines, the employment of women and children, long hours of work, and all that cheapening of production so much bepraised now, bring about

this state of things, that even in ordinary years there are more hands than there is work to give them. This is the great instrument of compulsion in our modern monopoly; people undersell one another in our modern slave-market, so that the employers have no need to use any visible instrument of compulsion in driving them towards work; and the invisibility of this whip, the fear of death by starvation, has so muddled people's brains that you can hear men, otherwise intelligent, *e.g.*, answering objections to the uselessness of some occupation by saying, "But you see it gives people employment," although they would see that if three of them had to dig a piece of ground, and one of them knocked off, and was "employed" in throwing chuckie stones into the water, the other two would have to do his share of the work as well as their own.

Another invisible link of the chain is this, that the workman does not really know his own master; the individual employer may be and often is on good terms with his men, and really unconscious of the war between them, although he cannot fail to know that if he pays more wages to his men than other employers in the same line of business as himself do, he will be beaten by them. But the workman's real master is not his immediate employer but his *class,* which will not allow even the best intentioned employer to treat his men otherwise than as profit-grinding machines. By his profit, made out of the unpaid labour of his men, the manufacturer must live, unless he gives up his position and learns to work like one of his own men, which indeed, as a rule, he could not do, as he has usually not been taught to do any useful work; therefore, as I have said, he must reduce his wages to the lowest point he can, since it is on the margin between his men's production and their wages that his profit depends; his class, therefore, compel his workmen to accept as little as possible. But further, the workman is a consumer as well as a producer, and in that character he has not only to pay rent to a landlord (and far heavier proportionately than rich people have to pay), and also a tribute to the middle-man who lives without producing, and without doing service to the community, by passing money from one pocket to another; but he also has to pay (as consumer) the profits of the other manufacturers who superintend the production of the goods he uses. Again, as a mere member of society, a should-be citizen, he has to pay taxes, and a great deal more than he thinks; he has to pay for wars, past, present, and future, that were and are never meant to benefit him, but to force markets for his masters, nay, to keep him from rebellion, from taking his own at some date; he has also to pay for the thousand and one idiocies of

parliamentary government, and ridiculous monarchical and official state; for the mountain of precedent, nonsense, and chicanery with *its* set of officials, whose business it is under the name of the law to prevent justice being done to any one. In short, in one way or another, when he has by dint of constant labour got his wages into his pocket, he has them taken away from him again by various occult methods, till it comes to this at last, that he really works an hour for one-third of an hour's pay, while the two-thirds go to those who have not produced the wealth which they consume.

Here, then, as to the first and second conditions of a reasonable society. 1st, That the labour should be duly apportioned. 2nd, That the wealth should be duly apportioned. Our society does not merely fail in them, but positively inverts them; with us those who consume most produce least; those who produce most consume least.

There yet remains something to be said on the third condition of a fair state of society, that it should look to it that labour be not wasted. How does civilization fare in that respect? I have told you that war was the occupation of the ancient slaveholders, set free by slave-labour from the necessity of producing; similarly, the mediæval baron, set free from the necessity of producing by the labour of the serfs, who tilled his lands for him, occupied himself with fighting for more serf-tilled land either for himself or his suzerain. In our own days we see that there is a class freed from the necessity of producing by the tribute paid by the wage-earner; what does *our* free class do, how does it occupy the life-long leisure which it forces toil to yield to it?

Well, it chiefly occupies itself in war like those earlier non-producing classes, and very busy it is over it. I know indeed that there is a certain portion of the dominant class that does not pretend to do anything at all, except perhaps a little amateur reactionary legislation; yet even of that group I have heard that some of them are very busy in their estate offices trying to make the most of their special privilege, the monopoly of the land; and taking them altogether they are not a very large class. Of the rest some are busy in taxing us and repressing our liberties directly as officers in the army and navy, magistrates, judges, barristers, and lawyers; they are the salaried officers on the part of the masters in the great class struggle. Other groups there are, as artists and literary men, doctors, schoolmasters, etc., who occupy a middle position between the producers and the non-producers; they are doing useful service, and ought to be doing it for the community at large, but practically they are only working for a class, and in their present position are little better than hangers-on of the non-producing class, from whom

they receive a share of their privilege, together with a kind of contemptuous recognition of their position as gentlemen—heaven save the mark! But the great mass of the non-producing classes are certainly not idle in the ordinary sense of the word; they could not be, for they include men of great energy and force of character, who would, as all reasonable men do, insist on some serious or exciting occupation; and I say once again their occupation is war, though it is "writ large," and called competition. They are, it is true, called organizers of labour; and sometimes they do organize it, but when they do they expect an extra reward for so doing outside their special privilege. A great many of them, though they are engaged in the war, sit at home at ease and let their generals—their salaried managers, to wit—wage it for them. I am meaning here shareholders or sleeping partners; but whenever they are active in business they are really engaged in organizing the war with their competitors, the capitalists in the same line of business as themselves; and if they are to be successful in that war, they must not be sparing of destruction, either of their own or other people's goods; nay, they not unseldom are prepared to further the war of sudden, as opposed to that of lingering death, and of late years they have involved pretty nearly the whole of Europe in attacks on barbarian or savage peoples, which are only distinguishable from sheer piracy by their being carried on by nations instead of individuals.[1] But all that is only by the way; it is the ordinary and necessary outcome of their operations that there should be periodical slackness of trade following on times of inflation, from the fact that everyone tries to get as much as he can of the market to himself at the expense of everyone else, so that sooner or later the market is sure to be overstocked, so that wares are sold sometimes at less than the cost of production, which means that so much labour has been wasted on them by misdirection. Nor is that all; for they are obliged to keep an army of clerks and such like people, who are not necessary either for the production of goods or their distribution, but are employed in safeguarding their masters' interests against their masters' competitors. The waste is further increased by the necessity of these organizers of the commercial war for playing on the ignorance and gullibility of the consumers by two processes, which in their perfection are specialties of the present century, and even, it may be said, of this latter half of it—to wit, adulteration and puffery. It would be hard to say how

[1] A reference to the "partition of Africa" among the colonial empires, a series of conquests and annexations which reached its climax in the later decades of the 19th century.

much ingenuity and painstaking have been wasted on these incidents in the war of commerce, and I am wholly unable to get any statistics of them: but we all know that an enormous amount of labor is spent on them, which is at the very best as much wasted as if those engaged on them were employed in digging a hole and filling it up again.

But further; there is yet another source of waste involved in our present society. The grossly unequal distribution of wealth forces the rich to get rid of their surplus money by means of various forms of folly and luxury, which means further waste of labour. Do not think I am advocating asceticism. I wish us all to make the utmost of what we can obtain from Nature to make us happier and more contented while we live; but apart from reasonable comfort and real refinement, there is, as I am sure no one can deny, a vast amount of sham wealth and sham service created by our miserable system of rich and poor, which makes no human being the happier, on the one hand, while on the other it withdraws vast numbers of workers from the production of real utilities, and so casts a heavy additional burden of labour on those who are producing them. I have been speaking hitherto of a producing and a non-producing class, but I have been quite conscious all the time that though the first class produces whatever wealth is created, a very great portion of it is prevented from producing wealth at all, and being set to nothing better than turning a wheel that grinds nothing—save the workers' lives. Nay, worse than nothing. I hold that this sham wealth is not merely a negative evil (I mean in itself), but a positive one. It seems to me that the refined society of to-day is distinguished from all others by a kind of gloomy cowardice—a stolid but timorous incapacity of enjoyment. He who runs may read the record of the unhappy rich not less than that of the unhappy poor in the futility of their amusements, and the degradation of their art and literature.

Well, then, the third condition of a reasonable society is violated by our present so called society; the tremendous activity, energy, and invention of modern times is to a great extent wasted; the monopolists force the workers to waste a great part of their labour-power, while they waste almost the whole of theirs. Our society, therefore, does not fulfill the true functions of society. Now, the constitution of all society requires that each individual member of it should yield up a part of his liberty in return for the advantages of mutual help and defence; yet at bottom that surrender should be part of the liberty itself; it should be voluntary in essence. But if society does not fulfill its duties towards the individual, it wrongs him, and no man voluntarily sub-

mits to wrong—nay, no man ought to. The society, therefore, that has violated the essential conditions of its existence must be sustained by *mere* brute force, and that is the case with our modern society no less than that of the ancient slave-holding and the mediæval serf-holding societies. As a practical deduction, I ask you to agree with me that such a society should be changed from its base up, if it be possible. And further, I must ask how, by what, and by whom, such a revolution can be accomplished? But before I set myself to deal with these questions, I will ask you to believe that though I have tried to argue the matter on first principles, I do not approach the subject from a pedantic point of view. If I could believe that, however wrong it may be in theory, our present system works well in practice, I should be silenced. If I thought that its wrongs and anomalies were so capable of palliation that people generally were not only contented, but were capable of developing their human faculties duly under it, and that we were on the road to progress without a great change, I for one would not ask anyone to meddle with it. But I do not believe that, nor do I know of any thoughtful person that does. In thoughtful persons I can see but two attitudes; on the one hand, the despair of pessimism, which I admit is common, and on the other a desire and hope of change. Indeed, in years like these few last, when one hears on all sides and from all classes of what people call depression of trade, which, as we too well know, means misery at least as great as that which a big war bears with it, and when on all sides there is ominous grumbling of the coming storm, the workers unable to bear the extra burden laid upon them by the "bad times,"—in such years there is, I do not say no hope, but at least no hope except in those changes, the tokens of which are all around us.

Therefore, again I ask how, or by what, or by whom, the necessary revolution can be brought about? What I have been saying hitherto has been intended to show you that there has always been a great class struggle going on which is still sustained by our class of monopoly and our class of disinheritance. It is true that in former times no sooner was one form of that class struggle over than another took its place; but in our days it has become much simplified, and has cleared itself by progress through its various stages of mere accidental circumstances. The struggle for political equality has come to an end, or nearly so; all men are (by a fiction it is true) declared to be equal before the law, and compulsion to labour for another's benefit has taken the simple form of the power of the possessor of money, who is all powerful; therefore, if, as we Socialists believe, it is certain that the class struggle

must one day come to an end, we are so much nearer to that end by the passing through of some of its necessary stages; history never returns on itself.

Now, you must not suppose, therefore, that the revolutionary struggle of to-day, though it may be accomplished (and necessarily) by violent insurrection, is paralleled by the insurrections of past times. A rising of the slaves of the ancient period, or of the serfs of the mediæval times, could not have been permanently successful, because the time was not ripe for such success, since the growth of the new order of things was not sufficiently developed. It is indeed a terrible thought that, although the burden of injustice and suffering was almost too heavy to be borne in such insurrectionary times, and although all popular uprisings have right on their side, they could not be successful at the time, because there was nothing to put in the place of the unjust system against which men were revolting. And yet it is true, and it explains the fact that the class antagonism is generally more felt when the oppressed class is bettering its condition than when it is at its worst. The consciousness of oppression then takes the form of hope, and leads to action, and is indeed the token of the gradual formation of a new order of things underneath the old decaying order.

I told you that I was not prepared to give you any details of the arrangement of a new state of society; but I am prepared to state the principles on which it would be founded, and the recognition of which would make it easy for serious men to deal with the details of arrangement. Socialism asserts that everyone should have free access to the means of production of wealth—the raw material and the stored-up force produced by labour; in other words, the land, plant, and stock of the community, which are now monopolized by certain privileged persons, who force others to pay for their use. This claim is founded on the principle which lies at the bottom of Socialism, that the right to the possession of wealth is conferred by the possessor having worked towards its production, and being able to use it for the satisfaction of his personal needs. The recognition of this right will be enough to guard against mere confusion and violence. The claim to property on any other grounds must lead to what is in plain terms robbery; which will be no less robbery because it is organized by a sham society, and must no less be supported by violence because it is carried on under the sanction of the law.

Let me put this with somewhat more of detail. No man has made the land of the country, nor can he use more than a small portion of it for his personal needs; no man has made more than a small portion of

its fertility, nor can use personally more than a small part of the results of the labour of countless persons, living and dead, which has gone to produce that fertility. No man can build a factory with his own hands, or make the machinery in it, nor can he use it, except in combination with others. He may call it his, but he cannot make any use of it as his alone, unless he is able to compel other people to use it for his benefit; this he does not do personally, but our sham society has so organized itself that by its means he can compel this unpaid service from others. The magistrate, the judge, the policeman, and the soldier are the sword and pistol of this modern highwayman, and I may add that he is also furnished with what he can use as a mask under the name of morals and religion.

Now if these means of production, the land, plant, and stock, were really used for their primary uses, and not as means for extracting unpaid labour from others, they would be used by men working in combination with each other, each of whom would receive his due share of the results of that combined labour; the only difficulty would then be what would be his due share, because it must be admitted on all hands that it is impossible to know how much each individual has contributed towards the production of a piece of co-operative labour. But the principle once granted that each man should have his due share of what he has created by his labour, the solution of the difficulty would be attempted, nay, is now hypothetically attempted, in various ways—in two ways mainly. One view is that the State—that is, society organized for the production and distribution of wealth—would hold all the means of the production and distribution of wealth in its hands, allowing the use of them to whomsoever it thought could use them, charging rent, perhaps, for their use, but which rent would be used again only for the benefit of the whole community, and therefore would return to the worker in another form. It would also take on itself the organization of labour in detail, arranging the how, when, and where for the benefit of the public; doing all this, one must hope, with as little centralization as possible; in short, the State, according to this view, would be the only employer of labour. No individual would be able to employ a workman to work for him at a profit, *i.e.*, to work for less than the value of his labour (roughly estimated), because the State would pay him the full value of it; nor could any man let land or machinery at a profit, because the State would let it without the profit. It is clear that, if this could be carried out, no one could live without working. When a man had spent the wealth he had earned personally, he would have to work for more, as there would be no

ribute coming to him from the labour of past generations. On those terms he could not accumulate wealth, nor would he desire to; for he could do nothing with it except satisfy his personal needs with it, whereas at present he can turn the superfluity of his wealth into capital, *i.e.*, wealth used for the extraction of profit. Thus society would be changed. Everyone would have to work for his livelihood, and everybody would be able to do so, whereas at present there are people who refuse to work for their livelihood and forbid others to do so. Labour would not be wasted, as there would be no competing employers gambling in the market and using the real producer and the consumer as their milch cows. The limit of price would be the cost of production, so that buying and selling would be simply the exchange of equivalent values, and there would be no loss on either side in the transaction. Thus there would be a society in which everyone would have an equal chance for well-doing, for, as a matter of course, arrangements would be made for the sustaining of people in their nonage, for keeping them in comfort if they were physically incapacitated from working, and also for educating everyone according to his capacities. This would at the least be a society which would try to perform those functions of seeing that everyone did his due share of work and no more, and had his due share of wealth and no less, and that no labour was wasted, which I have said were the real functions of a true society.

But there is another view of the solution of the difficulty as to what constitutes the due share of the wealth created by labour. Those who take it say, since it is not really possible to find out what proportion of combined labour each man contributes, why profess to try to do so? In a properly ordered community, all work that is done is necessary on the one hand, and on the other there would be plenty of wealth in such a community to satisfy all reasonable needs. The community holds all wealth in common, but has the same right to holding wealth that the individual has, namely, the fact that it has created it and uses it; but as a community it can only use wealth by satisfying with it the needs of every one of its members—it is not a true community if it does less than this—but their needs are not necessarily determined by the kind or amount of work which each man does, though of course, when they are, that must be taken into account. To say the least of it, men's needs are much more equal than their mental or bodily capacities are: their ordinary needs, granting similar conditions of climate and the like, are pretty much the same, and could, as above said, be easily satisfied. As for special needs for wealth of a more special kind, reasonable men

would be contented to sacrifice the thing which they needed less for that which they needed more; and for the rest the varieties of temperament would get over the difficulties of this sort. As to the incentives to work, it must be remembered that even in our sham society most men are not disinclined to work, so only that their work is not that which they are compelled to do; and the higher and more intellectual the work is, the more men are resolved to do it, even in spite of obstacles. In fact, the ideas on the subject of the reward of labour in the future are founded on its position in the present. Life is such a terrible struggle for the majority that we are all apt to think that a specially gifted person should be endowed with more of that which we are all compelled to struggle for—money, to wit—and to value his services simply by that standard. But in a state of society in which all were well-to-do, how could you reward extra services to the community? Give your good worker immunity from work? The question carries with it the condemnation of the idea, and, moreover, that will be the last thing he will thank you for. Provide for his children? The fact that they are human beings with a capacity for work is enough; they are provided for in being members of a community which will see that they neither lack work nor wealth. Give him more wealth? Nay, what for? What can he do with more than he can use? He cannot eat three dinners a day, or sleep in four beds. Give him dominion over other men? Nay, if he be more excellent than they are in any art, he must *influence* them for his own good and theirs if they are worth anything; but if you make him their arbitrary master, he will govern them, but he will not influence them; he and they will be enemies, and harm each other mutually. One reward you can give him, that is, opportunity for developing his special capacity; but that you will do for everybody, and not the excellent only. Indeed, I suppose he will not, if he be excellent, lack the admiration, or perhaps it is better to say the affection, of his fellow men, and he will be all the more likely to get that when the relations between him and them are no longer clouded by the fatal gift of mastership.

Moreover, those who see this view of the new society believe that decentralization in it would have to be complete. The political unit with them is not a Nation, but a Commune; the whole of reasonable society would be a great federation of such communes, federated for definite purposes of the organization of livelihood and exchange. For a mere nation is the historical deduction from the ancient tribal family in which there was peace between the individuals composing it and war with the rest of the world. A nation is a body of people kept

together for purposes of rivalry and war with other similar bodies, and when competition shall have given place to combination, the function of the nation will be gone.

I will recapitulate, then, the two views taken among Socialists as to the future of society. According to the first, the State—that is, the nation organized for unwasteful production and exchange of wealth—will be the sole possessor of the national plant and stock, the sole employer of labour, which she will so regulate in the general interest that no man will ever need to fear lack of employment and due earnings therefrom. Everybody will have an equal chance of livelihood, and, except as a rare disease, there would be no hoarding of money or other wealth. This view points to an attempt to give everybody the full worth of the productive work done by him, after having ensured the necessary preliminary that he shall always be free to work.

According to the other view, the centralized nation would give place to a federation of communities who would hold all wealth in common, and would use that wealth for satisfying the needs of each member, only exacting from each that he should do his best according to his capacity towards the production of the common wealth. Of course, it is to be understood that each member is absolutely free to use his share of wealth as he pleases, without interference from any, so long as he really uses it, that is, does not turn it into an instrument for the oppression of others. This view intends complete equality of condition for everyone, though life would be, as always, varied by the difference of capacity and disposition; and emulation in working for the common good would supply the place of competition as an incentive.

These two views of the future society are sometimes opposed to each other as Socialism and Communism, but to my mind the latter is simply the necessary development of the former, which implies a transition period, during which people would be getting rid of the habits of mind bred by the long ages of tyranny and commercial competition, and be learning that it is to the interest of each that all should thrive.

When men had lost the fear of each other engendered by our system of artificial famine, they would feel that the best way of avoiding the waste of labour would be to allow every man to take what he needed from the common store, since he would have no temptation or opportunity of doing anything with a greater portion than he really needed for his personal use. Thus would be minimized the danger of the community falling into bureaucracy, the multiplication of boards and offices, and all the paraphernalia of official authority, which is, after

all, a burden, even when it is exercised by the delegation of the whole people and in accordance with their wishes.

Thus have I laid before you, necessarily briefly, a Socialist's view of the present condition of labour and its hopes for the future. If the indictment against the present society seem to you to be of undue proportions compared with the view of that which is to come, I must again remind you that we Socialists never dream of building up by our own efforts in one generation a society altogether anew. All I have been attacking has been the exercise of arbitrary authority for the supposed benefit of a privileged class. When we have got rid of that authority and are free once more, we ourselves shall do whatever may be necessary in organizing the real society which even now exists under the authority which usurps that title. That true society of loved and lover, parent and child, friend and friend, the society of well-wishers, of reasonable people conscious of the aspirations of humanity and of the duties we owe to it through one another—this society, I say, is held together and exists by its own inherent right and reason, in spite of what is usually thought to be the cement of society, arbitrary authority to wit, that is to say, the expression of brute force under the influence of unreasoning habit. Unhappily though society exists, it is in an enslaved and miserable condition, because that same arbitrary authority says to us practically: "You may be happy if you can afford it, but, unless you have a certain amount of money you shall not be allowed the exercise of the social virtues: sentiment, affection, good manners, intelligence even, to you shall be mere words; you shall be less than men, because you are needed as machines to grind on in a system which has come upon us we scarce know how, and which compels us as well as you." This is the real, continuously-repeated proclamation of law and order to the most part of men who are under the burden of that hierarchy of compulsion which governs us under the usurped and false title of society, and which all true Socialists or supporters of real society are bound to do their best to get rid of, so as to leave us free to realize to the full that true society which means well-being and well-doing for one and all.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Too often people who talk of Socialists and Communists do not know what the terms mean: anyone they disagree with becomes automatically a Socialist or a Communist—or both!—and anything they disapprove of

is indiscriminately branded socialistic or communistic. But Socialists and Communists disagree so violently that a Socialist party like the British Labour Party, for example, may bar Communists from membership. Probably 99% of the people and things branded by reckless critics as socialistic or communistic are so only in small degree or not at all. And why should either epithet, however well deserved, be considered *ipso facto* condemnatory?

The whole matter is involved in ignorance and prejudice unworthy of free Americans. The question about a New Deal law such as that establishing the Federal Housing Administration is not so much whether it is socialistic (though we should know) as whether it is a good law. The question about an American Communist is not so much what his theories about government are (though we should know that too) as whether his actions benefit or injure our society. And to confuse friendship for the Soviet Union with belief in Communism is the height of folly: must we be monarchists to feel friendship for members of the British Commonwealth? Our ignorant prejudices could all too easily lead to disastrous quarrels with friendly nations and loss of opportunities to improve our own democracy.

If we go back of today's confusions to Morris' time, when the socialist movement was more nearly unified, we shall more easily discern the theoretical base of both Socialist and Communist parties. We shall perceive, too, the high aims and generous humanity of socialist-communist thinking, whether in England, in Russia, or in America. We may agree or disagree with the historical analysis, the proposed methods, even the envisaged goal. But, introduced by such an essay as "True and False Society" to the essentials of theoretical socialism, we will surely realize that the movement is to be examined and weighed rather than discarded in uninformed horror.

As for the differences between modern Socialists and Communists, they have little to do with Morris' definition of theoretical socialism (the transition stage: a classless society in which all means of production are publicly owned), and of communism (the end-product: a loose federation of communities or communes, within each of which all things are shared). The movement split at the time of the Russian Revolution, largely over the question of means: Socialists disapproved of Revolutionary violence and Soviet tendencies to dictatorship; Communists approved of both as necessary to establish first the traditional socialist stage, and ultimately the communist stage, which they agree the Soviet Union has not yet achieved. The gradualist Socialism of the British Labour Party and the Marxist philosophy characteristic of the Communists are represented in the essays by G. D. H. Cole and Harold J. Laski following Morris' essay.

1. In his opening paragraph, what does Morris promise to explain to his audience and in what style does he promise to explain it? Why is his

subject, the "labor question," fundamentally important to any discussion of how society should be organized?

2. What three tests does Morris propose to use in deciding whether a society is "true" or "false"? Note in outline form Morris' reasons for believing (1) that in the past society has failed to meet each of these tests, (2) that at present society still fails to meet them, and (3) that in the future society could be reorganized to meet them.

3. What are the three stages through which Morris traces the development of European society? How were the conditions of the first stage reenacted in the Nazis' treatment of prisoners of war and of civilians in World War II? How is the condition of the serfs in the second stage partially paralleled by the plight of Southern sharecroppers today? How did the society of the first two stages fail to meet Morris' triple test?

4. What two things, according to Morris, have always been "essential to the production of wealth"? What, in his opinion, enables a relatively small group of people to remain "masters" in modern capitalist society? What forces other people to work for them? Why must workers be paid at least "minimum wages"? What gives rise to a constant struggle ("class warfare")? How is the workers' cause hurt (1) by the need to compete for a living? (2) by the mistake of blaming the individual employer for conditions? Why does Morris believe that the individual employer is helpless? Why, in brief, does he believe that modern society fails to meet his first two tests?

5. List the ways (as many as six may be distinguished) in which Morris believes that modern capitalist society is wasteful of labor. What does he mean when he says that competition among capitalists is war "writ large"? How can such competition involve whole nations in actual war? Explain why you are inclined to reject or accept or why you would modify (1) the Marxian contention that war has economic causes; (2) the various charges of wastefulness that Morris makes against prevailing economic practices of his day. Why do you believe that in our day such practices are equally, more, or less characteristic of the social and economic order?

6. How does Morris define socialism? (If he were writing today, he would probably use lower case letters to denote the general theory and capitals to denote specific parties.) What would be the essential characteristics of the new society Morris desires? What characteristics would determine whether the new society was *socialist* or *communist* as he uses these terms? Why did he believe that it would be (1) necessary and (2) right to achieve this society through a revolution? How did he expect socialism to develop into communism?

7. Since men would no longer be producing for profit, why would they produce (i.e., what would be the end or goal of production in a socialist or communist society), and what would they produce? Why does Morris believe that, if the desire to make profits or the need to earn wages no

longer impelled people to work, they would nevertheless *want* to work? Why does he believe that such a society would be a "true" society?

8. In style, does Morris keep the promise he makes to his audience in the opening paragraph? What characteristics of his diction and sentence structure make his lecture easy to understand? How does his organization of material help to make his reasoning easy to follow? How through the tone of his address would he have persuaded or antagonized his audience? Where, if anywhere, does he make legitimate appeal to emotion or moral principle? illegitimate appeal to sentimentality or prejudice? What is your judgment on his intellectual honesty? on his ability to convince? Would his hearers have liked him? Do you? Why or why not?

Basic Socialism

G. D. H. COLE

George Douglas Howard Cole (b. 1889), now on the faculty of Oxford University, is one of the most distinguished of contemporary British economists. He has been writing books on labor economics and social theory since 1913: the 1944 *Who's Who* lists no fewer than forty-two volumes, not counting the detective yarns he writes in collaboration with his wife, who, incidentally, has also collaborated on several of the more serious books. The best known title on his impressive list is *The Intelligent Man's Guide Through World Chaos* (1932), an authoritative analysis of social, economic, and political theory and practice at the time of writing. Other representative books are *A Short History of the British Working-Class Movement, What Marx Really Meant, Socialism in Evolution,* and *Fabian Socialism.*

Mr. Cole's profound conviction that democratic socialism is the hope of the world seems, as he tells us in the chapter from *Fabian Socialism* (1943) here reprinted, to have come to him as naturally as his English citizenship; the observation and researches of a lifetime have merely clarified and strengthened his socialist philosophy. Belonging to the evolutionary wing of the movement represented by Morris in "True and False Society," he remained a Socialist after the formation of the more revolutionary Communist Party at the time of the Russian Revolution. The doctrine of this essay is only a little left of the philosophy of the British Labour Party, which came to power in 1945 in so sweeping a victory that some contemporary observers talked of a "revolution by consent."

I CALL MYSELF a "Socialist" and have so called myself ever since I was a boy. I became a Socialist, in those far-off days, because the world which I saw around me seemed, as soon as I began to look at it, to be full of injustice and very badly organised for the promotion of human happiness. I was one of the lucky ones, brought up in a well-to-do household, educated at a good school, and given every chance of thinking for myself by a father who believed in freedom, though he was a Conservative and could never be persuaded that Socialism did not mean "dividing everything up equally." I soon realised how excep-

Chapter II, *Fabian Socialism,* George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1943. By permission of the publishers.

tional my chances were, and began to wonder why I should be thus favoured. The only answer I could find was that there was no valid reason; and as soon as I had arrived at that answer I began wanting to reorganise society on a basis which would give everybody a decent chance.

That desire soon led me to Socialism, and has remained from that time the basis of my Socialist faith. For I could not, and cannot, see how everyone can be given a decent chance except in a society which is organised on the assumption of equal human rights. I do not mean by this that I suppose all men to be equal; for the phrase has no meaning. Equal in what? Certainly not in cleverness or bodily attainments, or moral qualities, or capacity for service—or in any combination of these qualities, if one could add up things so different. The doctrine of social equality stands for something quite other than this meaningless assertion that men are equal. It means that all men, and of course all women, ought to be given an equal chance of developing whatever good there is in them, of being reasonably happy in their lives, and of being pleasant to live with—for one man's well-being and happiness are bound up with others', and what makes the individual good and happy helps to make other men good and happy as well.

Of course, the equal chance is not by itself enough. Some men will miss their chances, and make a mess of their lives. They will be punished for this by their own sense of failure; and there is no need for society to set about punishing them into the bargain, merely because they have failed. In addition to the equal chance for all we need compassion for those who fail to take advantage of it, whether by their own fault or not.

This means to me, and has meant ever since I began to think about politics, that society ought to afford to all its members, irrespective of their virtues or vices, their strength or weakness, a tolerable basic standard of living, high enough to keep them in health and reasonable comfort and to enable them to bring up their children after a fashion that will allow them, in their turn, as far as possible, an equal chance of making the best of their lives. No social measures can give a really equal chance to a child that has the misfortune to be reared in a bad or unhappy home; but society can do its best not to punish the children for the parents' shortcomings. I am not under the illusion that the best forms of social organisation can make everybody healthy and happy; but to recognise the limits of what can be done is no reason for not doing all we can.

These two ideas, of the equal chance for all and of the basic stand-

ard of living assured to all, led me to Socialism. I think it was only a little later that I added to them a third—always implicit in my attitude, but not fully realised at first. This third idea was that of democracy, which was inseparably linked in my mind with that of freedom—so that I think of them instinctively as one idea, and not two. By democracy I mean not only that everybody who is not out of his mind ought to have an equal chance of playing his part in public affairs, but also that these affairs ought to be so arranged as to make it easy for as many people as possible to play an active part in them, and further that society ought to encourage the fullest possible open discussion of public affairs, and allow men the greatest practicable liberty to organize for public and private purposes.

Gradually this notion of democratic freedom broadened out in my mind. It came to mean to me that society ought to be so arranged as to encourage difference, and not merely to tolerate it. It takes many sorts of men and women to make a satisfactory human society; and within certain very wide limits the more men differ the better, not only in tastes and habits but also in opinions. For democratic progress comes of the clash of contending outlooks and opinions. In a growing free society, minorities of to-day become majorities of to-morrow, and it is disastrous to impose uniformity of either thought or conduct. This idea, like all true ideas, has its limits; for there must be a certain underlying community of manners and ways of thinking to hold a society together. But in a healthy society this basic community will establish itself almost without being sought: there is much more danger of overstressing it, so as to crush out individuality, than of insisting on it too little.

Socialism, then, came to stand in my mind for the predominance of these three—or, if you prefer, these four—ideas, the equal chance for all, the basic standard of living assured to all, and democratic freedom. You will observe that there is in all this no single word of what many people suppose to be the fundamental Socialist tenet—that the means of production, distribution and exchange ought to be owned in common by the whole people. There is no word of it, so far, because for me, and I think for nearly all Socialists, common ownership is not an end in itself, but a means of bringing these ends I have spoken of into existence. There is no *absolute* validity about the proposition that the entire community ought to own the means of production. Indeed, I can quite imagine societies for which it would not hold good, and I find it difficult to imagine any society in which *all* the means of production ought to be owned in this way. I can, however, imagine

no society which *ought* not to do its best to give to all its members an equal chance, an assured basic standard of living, and as much democratic freedom as possible. These things are *ends,* which all decent men *ought* at all times to desire and attempt to further. The communal ownership of the means of production is a *method* of bringing them about, appropriate in the main to the type of society in which you and I are living, but not in any sense morally imperative in all societies, irrespective of time and place.

Of course, even the ends of which I have spoken can be achieved in any society only in part. They are ends to aim at, and to achieve as far as lies within our power. Taking men as they are, we cannot hope to give everyone an equal chance, or to establish a perfect free democracy. We can hope to assure to all members of our own society, in our own time, a tolerable basic standard of life; but we cannot hope either to make that standard as high as we should wish it to be, or to extend a like standard to all the peoples of the world for a long time to come. We can hope for no more than the speedy banishment from among us of primary poverty in all its forms, and therewith a much nearer approximation to equality of opportunity for all our people, and a great growth among them of the democratic spirit. These, however, are ideals quite high enough to work for; and it will be enough for us if we can say on our death-beds that we have worked for them honestly, and have done our best to give a helping hand to other peoples who have been working for them.

This is a quiet way of stating a conviction which is felt with passion, if it is felt at all. If my reason tells me that this is what I ought to do, my emotions also tell me that this is what I want. I cannot be happy in a world full of unnecessary injustice and misery, unless I am doing what I can to help in putting things to rights. Or, at least, I cannot be happy unless I am doing *something* towards this, even if I do much less than I could. I have a conscience about my fellow-men; and this conscience wars with my private selfishness and laziness, which bid me attend to my own affairs, or let matters slide. I am no saint, to do all I should; but I should be acutely unhappy unless I could say to myself honestly that I am not living to myself alone, or to the narrow circle of those whom I love, but am also trying, though not with all my strength, to lessen the sum of human unhappiness and to promote the cause of democratic freedom.

This, surely, is the common experience. Our opportunities differ; and some of us find better chances of being useful to our fellow-men in a narrow, and others in a wider circle. But, in one way or another,

we feel a responsibility for the well-being of our fellows, and are not happy unless we are being of some use. Some people feel this more strongly than others; and some find their sphere of service in personal, and others mainly in public acts. But it is all an expression of the same spirit, resting on a sense of justice and a sympathy with others which are part of the way we are made.

Of course, these sentiments do not make all men Socialists. Socialism implies, among those who profess it by conviction and not by the accident of environment, a keener sense than the ordinary that the ends of social justice and human fraternity need to be promoted by collective action. It implies regarding the State as, potentially, not so much a policeman to keep us in order as a means of promoting the good life. It implies a belief that, even though men cannot be made good or happy by legislation, good laws can greatly improve their chances of being good and happy. It implies a belief that human societies ought to be organised for the benefit of all their members, and not of any limited class or group. It implies therewith the belief that collective action for the common good ought to extend to all things which are both essential to men's happiness and capable of being organised collectively without destroying their essential quality. In particular, it implies a conviction that the economic life of society ought not to be left to the play of private forces, but ought to be organised under some form of public control.

As against this view, it used to be argued that a beneficent Providence had so arranged economic affairs as to cause each man, in pursuing his own private interest, to pursue unwittingly and without conscious purpose the good of all. It used to be said that competition to make profits provided the surest guarantee that the consumers would be well and cheaply served, and that accordingly the State ought in all events to refrain from meddling in economic concerns. This notion was never in any place or time followed out to the full in practice; and hardly anyone continues to believe in it now. For it is obvious that, whatever may have been the situation a century ago, to-day the absence of State intervention does not lead to this supposedly beneficent competition. On the contrary, in nearly all the key industries and services, what happens in the absence of State intervention is not free competition, but some form of monopoly. Not all industries are monopolistic in structure; but there is hardly one left that is not monopolistic at some stage. Even where competition survives between the makers of finished goods, the producers of the materials out of which these goods are made may form a powerful

monopoly. Finance—the provision of credit to the producers—is almost everywhere a highly monopolistic affair; and even where monopoly is incomplete huge concerns in many places so dominate the market that it is a mockery to speak of free competition. Wages, too, are regulated more and more by large-scale collective bargains between Trade Unions and associations of employers, and the selling prices of goods are often fixed by the manufacturer, so that one retailer may not undercut another, even if he wishes to do so. The absence of State intervention no longer means competition as the dominant characteristic of the economic world: it means regulation by irresponsible monopolies instead of regulation in the common interest.

This would not suffice to condemn the system, if these monopolies did in fact serve the public well. But the natural tendency is for most monopolists, and most combines aiming at monopoly, to live in perpetual fear of glutting the market. The aim of those who control them is to make as much profit as possible; and this *must* be their aim, as matters stand, for unless they make it so they will speedily go to the wall. The highest profit is in most cases to be won, or seems likeliest to be won, not by producing as much as possible, but, on the contrary, by limiting production to what can be sold at a fairly high price. There are exceptions to this rule, in the case of goods the demand for which can be expanded considerably even by a small reduction in price; for in such a situation it may suit the monopolist to increase his output. It suited Ford to produce a very large number of motor cars, in order to secure the full economy of mass-production. But such instances are exceptional. Much oftener, what happens is that the business concerns turn out many fewer goods than they could, with the consequence that many workers are left unemployed and have to look to the State for support.

This is so much a commonplace that a great many people have become accustomed to it, and regard it as quite natural that millions of people should be out of work when they themselves, and millions of others, are going short of the things they could make. Yet such a state of affairs is, when you come to think of it, plainly immoral and absurd. If the means of making things exist, and the things are needed to give people a decent standard of life, it is manifestly wrong not to make them; and any economic system which leads to such results stands condemned at the bar of morality and commonsense. It is, no doubt, *possible* that men are so incompetent at managing their affairs as to be incapable of doing any better. But they ought to try; and

the method most widely advocated of curing this evil is that of Socialism.

At this point, it used always to be answered that Socialism was no doubt a very beautiful and lofty ideal, but could not be made to work in practice. "Human nature," we were told, made it impossible. That argument is now out of court. For Socialism *has* worked, over a period of more than two decades, in one of the largest countries of the world. The system which was set up in 1917 in the Soviet Union has many faults; but it has banished unemployment and set out to produce goods up to the very limits of its productive power. It used to be said that a Socialist State would inevitably break down because its citizens would insist on consuming all they could produce, instead of setting aside adequate provision for the accumulation of new productive power. That argument also is out of court; for the Soviet Union has put into capital accumulation probably a larger proportion of its natural income than has ever been put by any capitalistic State—and that despite the necessity it has been under of spending vast sums on armaments in self-defence.

It can no longer be argued that Socialism is unworkable. But it can, of course, still be held to be undesirable. There, the favourite contention is that Socialism is destructive of the freedom of the common man. That is harder to answer; for the situation in Russia in respect of freedom is much less obvious. I have listened to many inconclusive arguments about the relative extent of freedom in Russia and in Great Britain. One side will stress the suppression of doctrines supposed to make against the security of the Soviet State, the insistence on Marxian orthodoxy as the basis of all thinking, the prosecution of "comrades" who are held to have deviated from the true faith. The other side will argue that the Soviet workmen, conscious of owning the factories they work in and the State itself, emancipated from subservience to persons of a higher social class, much more able to live private lives after their chosen fashion than most people in a class-ridden society, enjoy a much larger real freedom than the workers in capitalist countries. In effect, each side puts the accent on certain particular aspects of freedom, and ignores other aspects. They are both right, and they are both wrong. However, the fact that the argument remains inconclusive does show that social control of the State and the means of production is not by itself enough to ensure freedom in all its desirable forms. The Soviet Union is not a free democracy, as we understand the term; but then—neither is Great Britain, as they understand it.

This suggests that there is a real danger, if we concentrate on securing the equal chance for all and the basic standard of living for all, to the exclusion of the type of democratic freedom which I have discussed earlier in this chapter, of our getting into conflict with a tradition of free speech and free organisation which hardly existed in Russia, but is very powerful here. Each country, in amending its social institutions, has to build upon its own past. Soviet Communism in Russia is what it is, in many respects, because Czardom was what it was; and British Socialism, when and if it comes to power, will have on it the stamp of the British tradition. That is why it is foolish for Communists to call upon us to do just as the Russians did. Our circumstances are so different that our revolution, when it comes, will necessarily take a different form and lead to a different set of institutions. The kinds of freedom we value and enjoy now we must carry over into the new society we mean to build; and we must add to them other kinds of freedom which are now denied to most of our people.

I have no wish to make light of the danger which threatens the kind of democratic freedom that I value. But I maintain that this danger arises, not from Socialism, but from the underlying conditions which make Socialism a necessity. I have tried to describe how capitalism, turning from competition to monopoly, refuses to use the growing powers of production for fear of losing profit. It forms vast aggregations of capital, and the controllers of these exercise immense coercive power over the lives of men. There is no way of curbing this anti-social power except by bringing these great monopolies under social control. But to do this is not, I agree, to remove the danger of their trampling the individual underfoot. For the danger arises out of their hugeness, however they are controlled; and this hugeness is an inescapable characteristic of the modern way of living. It is a direct outcome of the advance of science, of the growth of population, and of the development of urban forms which has accompanied these changes.

We shall not get rid of this danger by rejecting Socialism. Indeed, what will happen to us is that we shall get Fascism instead, as the only political instrument powerful enough to keep capitalism in being. For the monopolists, unless we take them over, will resort to Fascism as a means of holding us in subjection. It is a plain truth, as Marx pointed out long ago, that the development of productive technique presses on continuously towards a growing "socialisation," in the sense that all economic processes become increasingly interdependent. The culmination of this development is complete unification of control; but

it remains an open question whether this control is to be exercised by and on behalf of the whole people or by a gang which succeeds in imposing its rule on the entire society. Socialism is one form of this process of "socialisation": Fascism is the other. There is no third alternative consistent with the requirements of modern economic technique.

If we wish to repel Fascism, we must achieve Socialism. But we are free to give Socialism the shape that best suits our wills. Within the inevitable hugeness of the modern social structure, we are free to set up democratic institutions designed to counteract this hugeness, by providing ample means for the expression of diversity and for free association among groups of men. These opportunities must be provided within the framework of hugeness; for if we try to run counter to the tendencies of scientific advance we shall assuredly fail. The hugeness does offer us the means of ensuring to every person in our community a decent standard of national living; and this boon is out of our reach on any other terms. This is an overriding condition: our task is, having accepted it, to render it compatible with the claims of democratic freedom.

With this in mind, let us consider more closely, in terms of the economic structure of society, what it implies. The old Socialist slogan, we have seen, proclaimed the need for socialising "the means of production, distribution and exchange." We have to ask how far this is really necessary in order to establish communal control over the working of the economic system, to ensure the full use of the productive powers, or to establish justice in the distribution of the social product.

Why do we want to socialise any industry or service? For one or both of two reasons. Because it is working badly or inefficiently under private ownership, and is failing to give either the consumers generally or the producers whom it employs a square deal; or because it places too much power in the hands of its private owners, and enables them to use this power for anti-social ends. Let me take two obvious cases as a first, incomplete illustration of what I mean. The coal industry[1] manifestly ought to be socialised because under private control it has failed either to provide reasonably cheap coal for the consumers, or to keep the miners busy, or to pay those whom it has employed a decent wage. The economies that could be achieved by running the coal industry as a unified service are very great, and have been

[1] When Labour came to power in 1945, the Government immediately announced nationalization of the coal industry.

explained over and over again. Common pumping arrangements, the removal of barrier coal between separate pits, pooling of pits into larger units, common marketing and systematic development of new coal-bearing areas—all these offer large opportunities which could be taken if control were unified. But unification must be under social ownership, because in private hands it would mean a much too powerful monopoly.

For our other preliminary example, take the newspaper trade. Here the question is not mainly one of inefficiency, but of anti-social power. Of late years, a few great syndicates have swallowed up paper after paper. The independent local press has been totally extinguished in many areas; and new competition has been rendered nearly impossible by the vast capital which is necessary. Consequently, a very few men wield an immense power in spreading or suppressing or distorting news and in manipulating public opinion. Either they do this for their own political ends, or purely for profit, or from a mixture of these motives. In any event, the result is evil. It is plainly wrong and undesirable for these vast powers to be wielded irresponsibly by rich men, or for newspapers to be conducted solely on the basis of extracting the largest possible profit. Newspapers ought to be organs of opinions as well as of news. They ought to be so organised as to make possible the expression of a wide diversity of opinion, and not to repeat through a megaphone the views of a narrow group of very rich men.

This case, admittedly, is very much harder than that of the coal mines. Coal needs producing and marketing efficiently, with good conditions for the miners; and that is all. News and opinion cannot be satisfactorily marketed by the ton like coal. We do not want a "unified" newspaper industry with all the papers repeating the same thing, even if what they repeat is dictated by men who are responsible to the public and believe that they are speaking for the public advantage. Accordingly, I do not suggest that all newspapers ought to be run by the State. What is needed, is, rather, a common distributive machinery, common agencies for expensive news-gathering, and, I think, communally-owned presses which could be rented by groups desiring to produce a paper. The vital thing here is to reduce the minimum cost of starting a newspaper, so as to abolish the monopoly of the very rich.

I have taken this difficult case, rather than an easier one, because it so well illustrates the dilemma into which we are forced by the growth in the scale of production. To leave newspapers to "private

enterprise" does not mean that we have, or can have, a free democratic press. It means a press dominated by a few millionaires. On the other hand, socialisation would involve the risk of having only a Government press, with no opportunity for the expression of varying views or the publication of news unwelcome to the Government. We have therefore to find a mean—to eliminate millionaire control without substituting another form of unfreedom.

The case for socialisation, as I have stated it so far, is incomplete. Let us go back to our example of the coal mines. It is all very well to say that we must get the mines so controlled that they are able to employ all the miners and produce as much coal as possible. Mere socialisation of the mining industry cannot lead to that result, because it is useless to produce more coal than can find a market. The market for coal is only in part a consumers' market. If we give everyone a decent living income, more coal will be used both in household grates and in making gas and electricity for private consumption, and also in other ways. But a large part of the market for coal lies in the demand of other industries, such as steel-making. If we allow the steel industry to be controlled by a private monopoly, which proceeds to restrict the output of steel in order to keep prices and profits high, there will be unemployed miners, even if the mining industry is in the hands of a public body.

In effect, socialisation is not a matter of this or that industry, considered apart from others, but of the general driving force behind the economic system as a whole. That is where the more progressive Liberals are apt to make a great mistake. They profess themselves ready to consider, on the merits of the particular case, the socialisation of any industry which is being inefficiently run. But the unemployment and the underproduction which are the cause of our present economic system are not mainly a matter of inefficiency in any particular industry. They are also the result of a more general inefficiency, or anti-social quality, in the entire system. The root trouble is that industry, taken as a whole, produces not what is needed, or what it could produce, but only so much as will yield to its owners the largest possible profit. This is the disease which we have to cure; and we shall not cure it merely by transferring to public control a few industries which are exceptionally badly run.

The first principle of soundness in an economic system is that it should use all the available resources of man-power to work upon the gifts of nature up to the point at which men prefer having more leisure to having more material wealth. This principle cannot be made

operative where profit, and not need, is the determining factor in production. It can be brought into effect only by a radical change of system, which will either supersede the profit motive altogether, or relegate it to a secondary place. It is for society as a whole, and not for any profit-seeking capitalist, to settle how much it is worth while to produce; and it is monstrous that any man should be unable to find work as long as his labour could add something worth while, from the standpoint of human wants, to the sum-total of production.

How are we to make this principle operative? Clearly by planning—that is, by deciding, collectively and responsibly, how the available man-power and instruments of production are to be used. I shall have to discuss later how, in terms of social machinery, this can best be done. My point now is that it must *be* done, if we are to make an end of poverty and unemployment, and are not to waste the great opportunities which science is putting into our hands. It cannot be done, as long as private persons are free to turn their workers on to the streets as soon as it becomes more profitable to reduce production than to maintain it, or whenever some new invention makes it possible to reduce the number of workers employed.

I am not blaming the ordinary private employer. As matters stand, he has usually no choice; for he cannot be expected to go on producing at a loss. I am not even blaming gently those who direct the great capitalist monopolies; for they too are only acting in accordance with the system that makes profit the criterion of what is to be produced. What I am saying is that the system is radically and utterly wrong, and needs to be changed, not merely here and there, but as a whole.

What is necessary in order to change it? Before answering that question, let us look at what happens in the Soviet Union, where it has been radically changed. We can then see better, not how to imitate Russia, but how to apply the lessons of Russia to our own considerably different case.

In the Soviet Union, production proceeds according to a Five Years Plan. This plan is drawn up by a public body, which works upon lesser plans drawn up by the numerous bodies through which the plan as a whole will have to be carried into effect. The plan is, essentially, a plan for using all the available resources in order to produce as many as possible of the goods and services needed by the citizens of the Soviet Union. It is a plan for turning out these goods in the best possible proportions, both between different sorts of consumers' goods and between such goods on the one hand, and on the other machinery for the production of future goods. The first question asked in making

up the plan is not "Will it *pay* to produce these goods?" but "Are they needed?" or rather, "Where so many things are needed, what needs ought to come first?" On this basis there is never any question of saying that some of the available workers are not worth using; for plainly every able-bodied person is worth using where so many needs have to go unsatisfied. Unemployment, save as a quite minor incident of changing jobs, simply disappears. If the Soviet Union is still poor, that is because it started very poor, and not because it is not abolishing poverty as fast as it can.

Naturally, Soviet planning does not work with perfect efficiency. All manner of things go wrong and have to be put right. The plan is being continually modified throughout the period of its execution. It is not a rigid scheme, but something to aim at, and to amend wherever it is shown to have been wrongly drawn. Nor is it all rigidly centralised. There are planning authorities in each separate Republic of the Soviet Union and in each city. Each successive plan has shown a greater amount of decentralisation—a handing over of more responsibility to the smaller planning units. Only for a very few industries is the plan centrally administered: in most cases, all the centre does is to act as co-ordinator of local or sectional plans. The aim is to diffuse responsibility, not to concentrate it. The more people can be given responsibility for the plan and for its execution, the better will its democratic basis be assured.

Now, when this process of planning was started, most of the experts, including most economists, said flatly that it would never work. Some of them maintained that it would break down because of its top-heaviness, and because an organisation so gigantic was quite past the power of men to control. Others, especially among the professional economists, were so affrighted at the very notion of producing anything except under the stimulus of the profit motive that they simply announced that a system so different from that about which they had been teaching their pupils could not possibly exist, and awaited with daily impatience the news of Soviet collapse. But the Russian system did not collapse: it worked. The very mistakes which were made—and there were plenty of them—demonstrated its strength; for it was able to retrieve them, and to go on swiftly to fresh ventures. It was proved beyond a doubt that it was possible for a great country, not merely to discard the profit motive as the spur to production without disaster, but to advance without it in industrial efficiency very much faster than any other country had ever advanced before.

I am writing this book at a moment when even the critics who

have been maintaining for years past, in face of all the facts, that these victories of Soviet planning were unreal have been silenced by the magnificent resistance of the Soviet forces to the sudden and treacherous attack of the Nazi power. Whatever may be the outcome of this struggle, the Russians have already done amply enough to prove the virtues of Socialist planning. No bravery of their soldiers could have availed to check the Nazi advance if there had not been at its back an impressive industrial effort; and this effort, be it remembered, was achieved in less than a generation, in a backward country terribly short of technicians and skilled workers, practically without external aid. It was achieved by Socialist planning, which had released the pent-up energies of the people, instead of suffering them to be held back by fear of "spoiling the market."

The Soviet planning has rested throughout on the public ownership and control of all the large-scale industries, of the transport system, of power supply, of banking and finance, and of all foreign trade. It has rested, for some time past, on a collective system in agriculture more akin to Co-operation than to State Collectivism. In small-scale industry, it has rested on a form of Co-operation among the working craftsmen—the *artel*; and in distribution on a mixture of State, Co-operative and producers' enterprise. It is not a uniform structure, nor is it fixed. Changes are continually being made in it; and its completed form cannot yet be discerned. But there is no doubt about its essential character, which is that the key industries and services, on which the rest depend, are firmly controlled, and their output planned, in accordance with a collective conception of needs. From one Five Years Plan to another the emphasis changes. The heavy industries, agriculture, transport, the consumers' trades, each in turn come into the centre of the picture. This happens, not by accident or by the "higgling" of the market, but because it is thought to be right from the standpoint of the community as a whole.

The institution of Socialist planning in the Soviet Union followed upon a revolution, which was itself the sequel to a nearly complete collapse of the preceding social order. In the course of the war and the revolution, Russian industry had gone entirely to pieces: output was down to a few per cent. of what it had been in 1913. The Soviet planners had to start almost from nothing, building up a totally new economic system. That was in a sense an advantage in the long run, for it enabled them to start clean. But it meant terrible suffering while the new order was being created. It also meant much more centralisation of control than would have been necessary if the plan-

ners had been taking over a going concern. The planning had to begin from the centre, and decentralisation had to be introduced gradually as the regional organizations grew strong enough to take responsibility upon themselves. This process of diffusing responsibility is still going on. It is an essential part of what the planners have in mind.

Our circumstances in Great Britain are very different from those in Russia in 1917. We have, in comparison with the Soviet Union, an abundance of skilled workers, trained technicians, and competent administrators. Our economic system is working, even if it is not working well. The blows of war, so far from shattering it, have strengthened it, and have enforced the introduction of co-ordinating controls which were missing from it before. We have begun to plan—for planning is an imperative necessity in time of war; and war has banished unemployment for the time, and caused us to produce more nearly up to the limits of our capacity. It is true that we are not yet producing as much as we could produce—not by a long way. We have resorted to planning reluctantly and half-heartedly, and without getting rid of the vested interests, which are still everywhere hampering the work of organisation. We have, however, made big advances since our national peril became plain and compelled us to take reorganisation seriously in hand. We do now possess the rudiments of a system of planning which can, if we so decide, be applied to the uses of peace as well as war.

Moroever, a curious thing has happened. Although our planners have done their level best to leave the profit system undisturbed, by continuing to allow private firms to make contracts with the Government instead of taking over the factories and producing whatever is needed without any question of profit—in spite of this, the profit motive has partly ceased to work. It has been impossible not to limit profits—for the failure to do this would have caused too dangerous an outcry; but the consequence of taxing away the excess is that in all the trades which are busy on war work almost every employer is making much more profit than he is allowed to retain; so that it hardly matters at all to him whether his books show a larger or a smaller profit at the end of the year. The consequence is that a great many employers can hardly be said to-day to be working in any sense under the stimulus of the profit motive. Their conduct is guided, not by the hope of making larger profits, but by their will to help in the national effort for victory in the war. I have talked to many of them; and I know that they find this situation very strange. Having

been brought up to believe in profit as the sole spur to productive efficiency, they now find themselves spurred on by a quite different motive. They are bewildered; and in many instances the result is a strange confusion in their economic ideas and an opening of their minds to the possibility of an alternative economic system which they would have rejected as utterly impracticable only a year or two ago.

I do not suggest that this is true of all employers, or of the majority. But I think it is true of quite a number, and that it should be so is an exceedingly hopeful sign. For if we are to make the transition to a new industrial system without the chaos and the suffering which the Russians had to undergo, it is of vital importance that we should carry with us as many as possible of the men who know how to run industry, and should not have to find and train a totally fresh team.

I think this change of attitude is a great deal commoner among small and middle-sized employers than among those who are at the head of great monopolistic concerns. Naturally so; for the great monopolists have been so used to following anti-social policies and pitting their interests against those of the community that their capitalist sentiments are far more ingrained. They have also much more to lose, in power as well as riches. The ordinary employer may be as well or better placed as manager of a business run in the public interest and under public control as if he had to face the task of finding markets for himself when the war is over—to say nothing of the danger that one or another of the big combines may set to work to crush him out. On the other hand, the big monopolist does not want to work for the public. He loves power, for himself. Nine times out of ten he is by temperament a robber-baron, and not a technician or a business manager. He hates the thought of the State controlling him—unless it be such a State as he can himself control.

Side by side with the employers, great and small, are the salaried technicians and managers, who have been accustomed to working as the servants of capital, and trying to make as big profits as possible for their masters. These men, too, are going through a strange experience; for they also find themselves working now, not mainly for profit, but for the national cause. They are affected in much the same way as the smaller employers, having their eyes half-opened to the practicability of a different economic system, and rather bewildered by their experience. They, even more than many of the employers, are key men upon whom the efficiency of production directly depends; and in their case, unless they are very high up and in receipt of very

large salaries or shares in profits, they have no valid reason for supposing that they would be worse off, in a material sense, if industry were brought under public ownership and run in the public interest. Their opposite numbers in the Soviet Union get salaries which, allowing for differences in the wealth of the two countries, are comparable to theirs. Socialism has not meant, in practice, equality of incomes—far from it. As practised in the Soviet Union, it has meant the cancellation of unearned incomes, but not the reduction of all earners to a level.

Indeed, the technician and the manager can find much to attract them in industry run in accordance with the principles of Socialist planning. Which of them would not prefer to have his factory always running to capacity, with an assured market for all he could produce? This has been the position of his Russian equivalent ever since Soviet planning settled down after the initial disorder; and it is manifestly a state of things that gives the best of opportunities for doing a good job of work.

Nevertheless, many of the technicians and managers feel a great reluctance to accept Socialism. This is partly because they have been accustomed to regard themselves as belonging to the side of "Capital" rather than "Labour," and as members of a superior class; and also partly because they feel a mistrust of "Trade Union control." Nor is either of these feelings unnatural. In a society still ridden by the profit motive, and worshipping riches as a sign of achievement and prestige, anyone who is raised in income above the common level is under a temptation to ally himself in spirit with his "betters" against those who are worse off and may, therefore, envy him and wish to pull him down. Moreover, in such a society, the Trade Unions, excluded from any positive share in the conduct of industry, are compelled to defend their members' interests largely in negative and restrictive ways. From the standpoint of the technician or the manager, they are always obstructively objecting to things he reasonably wants to do; and he is apt to fear that under a Socialist system their power to obstruct will be greatly increased. I believe this view to be the very reverse of the truth, and to have been proved so in Russia. For under Socialism the Trade Union becomes the constructive ally of management both in improving the efficiency of production and in lightening the workers' tasks. No longer afraid of being exploited by the profit-seekers, the workers become interested in the efficiency of the factories in which they work, and eager to play their part in the common service. The

"team spirit," which many capitalist firms use all sorts of devices for vamping up, develops naturally; and managers and workers become partners instead of antagonists. Frictions no doubt still arise; but there is no longer the underlying class-hostility which magnifies small grievances into matters of principle and makes mountains out of molehills, to the torment of the manager who is trying to do his best.

The upshot of this discussion is that war conditions, by limiting the operation of the profit motive, have done an important work of psychological preparation for change among employers and managers alike. The other side of the medal is that they have also strengthened the position of the great combines as against the smaller firms, because these combines have largely been allowed to turn themselves into "Controls" acting on behalf of the State and wielding the State's authority. Where this has happened, the profit system has *not* ceased to operate. For the great capitalists, having larger incomes than they know what to do with, are in general more interested in future than in present profits. They want capital appreciation rather than income as a tribute to their power; and they cannot keep themselves from scheming now with a view to strengthening their post-war position. This often causes them to hamper the war effort, because they are dominated by a fear of "excess capacity" in the industries they control, and therefore unwilling to expand production during the war, even when expansion is needed to the utmost. Such men are hardly open to conversion to belief in an economic order which would knock away the foundations of their power. They remain "public enemies," even when they are quite unconscious that they are acting anti-socially.

To them it is of little use to appeal for a change of vision. But it is of use to appeal to the employer or to the salaried manager or technician whose heart is in doing his job well. Such men want to know—at least, many of them are reaching that point—how exactly industry would work under Socialism, and what exactly the Socialists do propose. . . .

STUDY INTRODUCTION

When a socialist joins a political party, what determines whether he will choose the Socialists or the Communists? When is a person who believes in planning a socialist and when is he a New Dealer? Is democracy the same as capitalism? Or can we have democracy and socialism too if

we choose? These are a few of the questions about the powerful and multiform collectivist movement of our day which an older essayist like Morris, for example, cannot answer for us. This essay by G. D. H. Cole on "Basic Socialism" outlines very well the ideas of contemporary Socialists with a capital S, and incidentally defines the Socialist, as distinct from the Communist, attitude toward the great socialist experiment in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet experiment was made possible, as Mr. Cole points out, by violent revolution, and it is based on a national tradition very different from Britain's or ours. What Socialists in the Western capitalistic democracies want, and believe we can attain, as this essay makes clear, is a gradual transition, by legal means, to a socialist society maintaining our cherished civil liberties and democratic rights. When the British Labour Party came to power in 1945, it had a mandate to begin just such a peaceful revolution—to institute a Socialist experiment alongside the Communist experiment of the USSR. So nothing could be more practical and important than the substance of this essay.

For American ideas about liberty and democracy are not much different from British, and America's post-war problems are much like Britain's. Whatever we can learn by what is said and done in Britain will help us to know what to do ourselves. We need more than ever to know the answers to such questions as these: is such-and-such a law socialistic—i.e., would its enactment be a step in the direction of the sort of society here advocated? And if it is socialistic, is that good or bad? We have to ask ourselves, too, whether it is true that we can get socialism (if we want it) without violence and without losing our "democratic freedom"; and whether, if we want to move in the direction of socialization, it is necessary for efficiency, as here suggested, to go all the way, or whether a "mixed economy"— partly socialized, partly in the hands of private enterprise—is the answer.

1. How did Cole come to be a Socialist? What does he mean by "an equal chance for all"? What are some of the ways in which Americans may be denied an equal chance? Illustrate from your own observation or general knowledge. What have we done toward guaranteeing a "basic standard of living"? What does Cole mean by saying that "democracy" and "freedom" are essentially one? Why do you think this belief right or wrong? Show from your own experience how "democratic freedom" encourages differences among men. As Cole remarks, the public ownership of the means of production was once considered a fundamental principle of Socialism (see, for instance, Morris' "True and False Society"). What part, in Cole's view, does it play in modern Socialist doctrine, and why? What are the three basic principles of Socialism as Cole defines it?

2. Older socialists (like Morris) held competition among individuals

responsible for much that they considered unjust and wasteful in society. Why do contemporary Socialists like Cole stress instead the evils and dangers of monopoly? Why, according to Cole, do private monopolies fail in service to the public? What old argument against socialism may now be answered, in Cole's view, by pointing to the USSR?

3. In what ways, according to Cole, do the citizens of the USSR enjoy freedom and in what ways are they denied it? How does the Soviet conception of freedom differ from ours? Why does Cole feel that neither side enjoys complete freedom? Why does he consider the Communists foolish "to call upon us to do just as the Russians did"? What does he mean when he says that the real danger to freedom is not in socialism but in the economic conditions necessitating it? Why do you agree or disagree with, or wish to qualify, this opinion?

4. What caused Cole to believe that the coal industry should be socialized? Could an equally convincing case be made for socialization of this industry in the United States? Why do his suggestions about how to socialize the newspaper industry without stifling freedom of the press seem to you practical or impractical? How might similar methods be used to socialize radio? Why does Cole believe that it would not be enough to socialize *part* of our economy? Why do you agree or disagree? What does he consider the first principle of a sound economy? Why does he consider planning essential if this principle is to be put into effect?

5. What does Cole believe we can learn from Soviet experience (1) in the operation of the Five Year Plan, and (2) in the resistance to the Nazi invasion? What differences in the history of Russia and of Great Britain make him believe that a socialist system in England would be different from that of the Soviet Union? Why would it therefore be different also in the United States?

6. What war-time developments (1) in British government and (2) in British psychology, according to Cole, improved the outlook for socialism? If, in your opinion, there were similar developments in the United States, what were they? Cole stood unsuccessfully for Parliament (from Oxford University) on the Labour ticket in the 1945 elections which swept Labour into power. If your information permits, explain how well satisfied you think he probably is with the achievement of that Labour Government.

7. What is gained and/or lost by the autobiographical, almost confessional tone of the opening pages of this chapter? Are the style and tone of the chapter as a whole personal or impersonal? sentimental, intellectual, warmly human? practical or visionary? Choose one or more representative passages and show whether the diction is simple or erudite, concrete or abstract. How does the sentence structure in these passages help to make the thought easy or difficult to follow? (Note, for example, whether the sentences are elaborately periodic, whether subordinate ideas are placed

in subordinate clauses, whether the punctuation between main clauses is resourceful, etc.)

8. Reviewing the essay, note in simple outline form the main divisions and subdivisions of the discussion. (The grouping of these questions should be helpful.) What does the outline reveal about the clarity and logic of Cole's organization of his material? If you wish to challenge any passage for illogical thinking, explain your objection.

Why I Am a Marxist

HAROLD J. LASKI

Harold J. Laski (b. 1893), "gadfly to Tories," "conscience of the British Labour Party," has never held public office, but through teaching, writing, and active participation in public affairs, he has materially influenced his generation. He has taught history and political science at McGill University in Canada, at Harvard and briefly at other universities in the United States, and in England at Cambridge and at the London School of Economics, where he has been Professor of Political Science since 1920. Representative of his many books on political theory are *Foundations of Sovereignty, Democracy in Crisis, Where Do We Go from Here?, Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time,* and *Faith, Reason and Civilisation.* Never a dweller in an ivory tower, he has been constantly active in the Fabian Society, the trade union movement, and the Labour Party. As chairman of the National Executive Council of the Labour Party (its policy-making body), he drew upon himself during the election campaign of 1945 such vitriolic attack from Tory leaders that he sued for libel.

Professor Laski is not a Communist; the Labour Party bars Communists from membership. He represents, however, the left wing of his party: he accepts the basic concepts of the Marxian interpretation of history (cf. this essay); in the 1930s he cried bitterly for action against Franco and Hitler when French and British socialism was either blind or timorous before the fascist menace; he has written, in the last two books mentioned above, perhaps the most eloquent tributes to the Soviet Union ever to come from a non-Communist. Yet his fear that Marx was right in prophesying that revolution must come through violent overturn has not prevented Professor Laski from urging his countrymen to seize any opportunity to prove Marx wrong. Thus in 1940 he wrote *Where Do We Go from Here?* to promulgate his idea of a "revolution by consent" (his own phrase) as prerequisite for winning the war; thus in 1945 he wrote of the Labour victory at the polls that it presented "a real chance" for proof "that there is a democratic solution for the issues of fundamental change" —proof which "would work an epoch in social thought as important in the imagination of men as the Reformation or the geographical discoveries of the 15th or 16th centuries."

First three sections of the author's contribution to *I Believe* (Clifton Fadiman, ed.), Simon and Schuster, 1939; first published, as a complete essay under the title used here, *The Nation,* Jan. 14, 1939. By permission of Simon and Schuster, Inc.

I HAVE, I suppose, been a socialist in some degree ever since the last years of my schooldays. When I try to think out the sources of a faith that has been the central conviction of my life, I find that the difficulties of sorting them out are immense. Something was due to the influence of a great schoolmaster who made us feel the sickness of an acquisitive society. Something, too, was the outcome of a Jewish upbringing, the sense it conferred of being treated differently from other people and for no obviously assignable cause. I learned a good deal from books, especially from those of Sidney and Beatrice Webb. They made me realize that a whole class of human beings was overlooked in the traditional liberalism of the family to which I belonged. And there stays in my mind a speech I heard in Manchester as a boy on the threshold of a university career from Keir Hardie, whose account of the effort of the Scottish miners to form a trade-union made me begin, at least dimly, to understand the price the workers have to pay for the social reform they achieve.[1]

I went up to Oxford with radical views, and my years there confirmed me in them. It was the first experience I had of the intensity of class division in England. It was the first experience I had, also, of the resistance atmosphere can impose upon the admission of new ideas, which are dismissed less because they have been examined than because their premises are outside the environment they seek to penetrate. My debt to Oxford is immeasurable. Contact there with the late Professor Dicey, with Mr. Herbert Fisher and Professor Ernest Barker, was, on the purely academic plane, a superb experience. But they were all, if I may so phrase it, aloof from life. Oxford generally, so far as its teachers were concerned, thought about social problems in a way which suggested interest in them but not responsibility for their solution. It told you, as it were, that correct analysis was important. It did not suggest that, when the analysis was made, any obligation emerged to act upon the principles it suggested.

I devoted a good deal of time at Oxford to the Fabian Society and to propaganda in behalf of woman suffrage. These brought me into contact with two of the greatest men I have ever known—George

[1] *Sidney* (b. 1859) and *Beatrice* (1858–1943) *Webb*, leaders in the Fabian Society and the British Labour Party, authors of many books on economics; *Keir Hardie* (1856–1915), Scottish labor leader.

Lansbury and H. W. Nevinson.[2] From the first I learned the meaning and importance of equality, and from the second the meaning and importance of liberty. George Lansbury, too, gave me my first job. He was then editing *The Daily Herald,* and when I left Oxford, in the summer of 1914, he asked me to write editorials for his paper. That was a significant experience for me. It brought me into contact with a good deal of what was most radical in the pre-war socialist movement, and it made me formulate to myself, in a coherent way, some of the lessons I learned at Oxford. Contact with Lansbury was a great education. He was absolutely straightforward, absolutely democratic, and entirely fearless. He always meant every word he said, and it never occurred to him to say less than he meant. Through him, I got my first chance of seeing the inside of the socialist movement at first hand, and that at a critical time. Within six weeks of my going to the *Herald* Great Britain was at war. I sought to enlist on the first day. I did not believe in the war. But I did believe that, on the whole, the victory of Germany would mean more evil than its defeat. I was rejected on physical grounds, mainly a weak heart. That rejection altered the whole course of my life. For I was asked, through the influence of Herbert Fisher, to take a lectureship in history at McGill University to replace an Oxford don who was anxious to serve. I did not believe that the war would last long. The life of a university teacher was my main ambition; and I was anxious for the leisure to write a book on sovereignty—an issue which seemed to me to lie at the root of the war. I accepted the invitation expecting to stay a year on the American continent. Instead, I remained there, first at McGill and then, for four years, at Harvard, until 1920.

There is, I think, a sense in which my years on the American continent were the most fundamental experience of my life. I learned there that it was my vocation to be a teacher, that, in whatever other fields I might wander, this was the activity, above all, to which I should devote my energies. I learned, secondly, that to teach political science, it was not enough to read books; one had to learn politics from actual experience of their working, and to seek to make of one's lectures an intimate marriage of theory and practice. I learned, thirdly, that the university scene in America was vitally related to the social

[2] *The Fabian Society,* a research and propaganda group of gradualist socialists within the British Labour Party; *George Lansbury* (1859–1940), churchman, lecturer, editor, British Labour Party leader; *H. W. Nevinson* (1856–1941), writer, war correspondent, for many years on the staff of the London *Nation.*

environment. One could speculate freely, but one must not question the basic assumptions of the system. When I was at McGill, I made a speech attacking the "bitter-endism" of Mr. Lloyd George,[3] that was immediately followed by urgent demands for my dismissal. When I was at Harvard, the famous Boston police strike occurred. President Lowell at once offered the services of the University to the city. It seemed to me that one ought to know why the police were striking before one accepted the view that the city was right. Accordingly, I took great pains to discover what had led to the strike, and found that it was the outcome of long-accumulated grievances met without sympathy or insight. I ventured to say so; and there broke about my head a storm of indignation in which I was described as almost everything from a villain who seduced youth to a Bolshevik who preached revolution. I was solemnly investigated by the Overseers of the university; and though it was decided that I was not to be dismissed, President Lowell explained to me with emphasis that a teacher limited his utility when he spoke on matters of current controversy. I was not, I inferred, to say my say on the living issues of the time if what I said was inconvenient to the rulers of Harvard. Mr. Lowell spoke with kindness, but his implication was clear. Thus though I loved Harvard, and found there friendships that have been of inestimable value to me, I was not sorry when, in the next year, the London School of Economics and Political Science invited me to join its faculty. There I have remained since 1920; and there I hope to remain during my life as a teacher.

But it was not only that I learned in America what I believe to be my vocation. I saw there, more nakedly than I had seen in Europe, the significance of the struggle between capital and labor. I learned how little meaning there can be in an abstract political liberty which is subdued to the control of an economic plutocracy. I saw, too, in strikes[4] like those of Ludlow and Lowell, how the vast machinery of the state is used to crush any movement that questions the authority of those who own economic power. I learned from the imprisonment

[3] Even before he became Prime Minister late in 1916, David *Lloyd George* (1863–1945), in succession as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Minister of Munitions, and War Minister, was the driving force of the British effort in World War I, ruthlessly organizing production by strict controls over labor, and forcing through an unprecedented military conscription act—to the dismay of those not so fully convinced that cherished freedoms must give way to the demands of war.

[4] The years Laski spent in America saw a series of great *strikes,* often marked by repressive violence, the most shocking incident occurring at *Ludlow,* Colo., in 1914, when militia set fire to a tent-colony of striking miners and two women and eleven children were burned to death.

of Debs and the attacks on La Follette[5] how immense are the pressures to conformity, how fragile the claims of tolerance, whenever the security of a social order is threatened. Not least, I began to perceive, in the difference in the average American attitude to the February and October revolutions[6] in Russia, how profound is the influence of the property relation in shaping opinion. I came back from America convinced that liberty has no meaning save in the context of equality, and I had begun to understand that equality, also, has no meaning unless the instruments of production are socially owned. But I was still academic enough in experience to believe that this could be proved on rational grounds, and that its proof would be sufficient to win acceptance for it as a principle of social organization. I had associated in America mostly with progressive or academic people who were accustomed to give argument its due weight; and even when, like Mr. Justice Holmes, they were fundamentally conservative in outlook, they were prepared to change their views in the light of discussion. Up to 1920, I think, as I look back, that my socialism was above all the outcome of a sense of the injustice of things as they were. It had not become an insight into the processes of history.

That, I believe, is the main burden of my experience in the eighteen years since I returned to England. They have been full years. From the outset I have been an active member of the Labour Party. I have served on government committees. I have "deviled" for ministers during the two periods when a Labour government was in power. I have done a good deal of industrial arbitration. I have helped the trade-unions in every important strike, especially the general strike of 1926. Teaching and the writing of books apart, most of my leisure has gone into work for socialism. I learned a great deal from five years as an alderman of a London borough. I have seen, too, a good deal of political journalism from within, not least in those four last brilliant years in which H. W. Massingham edited the London *Nation*. I have been closely concerned with the adult-education movement. Invitations to lecture abroad have given me first-hand acquaintance with the politics and the universities of France and Spain, pre-Hitler Germany,

[5] Eugene Victor *Debs* (1855–1926), Socialist leader, was imprisoned (1919–21) under the Espionage Act for a war-time speech assailing federal prosecution of persons opposing the war; Sen. Robert *La Follette* (1855–1925) was under heavy attack at this time for his opposition to America's entry into the war.

[6] The *February* (1917) Revolution brought to power a liberal capitalist group under Alexander Kerensky; the *October* Revolution of the same year brought Lenin and the Bolsheviki (Communists) to power.

and the Soviet Union; and I have returned constantly to America, latterly almost year by year, as a fairly close observer of its political powers.

Out of it all, the great lesson I have learned is the broad truth of the Marxian philosophy. What I have seen at first-hand, no less than what I have read, has left me no alternative. I came back to England in 1920 hopeful that I was going to watch the slow permeation of economic relationships by the democratic principle. I have been driven to the conclusion that no class voluntarily abdicates from the possession of power. I have come to learn that the private ownership of the means of production makes it impossible for the democratic idea to transcend the barriers of class without the capture of the state power by the working class. The experience of Russia, the advent of Fascism in Central and Southeastern Europe, the attitude of the owning class in Spain and France and the United States to all serious attempts at social reform, the general strike of 1926 and the betrayal of 1931 in England,[7] the new imperialisms of Japan and Italy, have all convinced me that, in large outline, there is no answer to the philosophy of Marx. Men, broadly, think in terms of an experience made and unmade by their class position. Their conceptions of right action are born of the inferences they draw from the experience of that class position. Individuals may transcend it. But taken generally, all our institutions and their working are conditioned by the property relations of any given society. The dominant ideas and principles of that society will be set by the way in which, in any moment, its property relations are working. If they are working well, there will be a period of concession to the multitude which can live only by the sale of its labor power. If they are working badly, the policy of concession will halt. A system which lives by profit must make profit. If its power to do so is challenged, the owners of the system will seek to destroy the men and the movements which challenge that power.

This is the reason for the decline of liberalism in the postwar epoch. Ours is that age, the coming of which was foreseen by Marx, in which the relations of production are in contradiction with the essential forces of production. Our time is comparable to that of the Reformation, when a similar contradiction appeared.[8] Then as now a new

[7] The *general strike of 1926*, called in support of the striking coal miners, failed to get public support and was abandoned in less than two weeks. The *betrayal of 1931* was the act of the Labour Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, in forming a coalition government to handle a financial crisis by orthodox capitalist methods.

[8] The *Reformation* was a time of widespread violence and religious wars, which, by shifting economic power from priestly hierarchy and feudal nobility to kings and bourgeoisie, contributed greatly to the rise of capitalism.

property relation was essential, and then as now those who lived by the privileges inherent in the old were ready to fight for them rather than find the terms of a new accommodation. For when such a contradiction reaches its maturity, the price of continuing concession means the erosion of the privileges associated with private ownership. It means a scale of taxation fatal to the making of profit in international competition. It compels that examination of social foundations which, because it disturbs traditional routines, destroys men's ability to be tolerant in matters of social constitution. For those who have been taught by long use to regard privilege as right are rarely able to adjust themselves to the admission that their right may be built upon what other men have come to experience as wrong.

It is, as I think, in this background that all the central problems of our time have to be set. That it makes the future of capitalist democracy dubious is clear. That the inference from it, in the international sphere, is the necessary relation between capitalism and war is clear also. For, given the present distribution of economic power, the owning class is driven into the search for markets abroad in order to win profit. Thence comes the need for armament. Thence comes also the politics of imperialism, concession hunting, spheres of influence—that whole gamut of power politics to which the world since 1919 has so grimly accustomed us. The failure of the League of Nations is built upon the fact that it demands from its members the surrender of the policy to which the whole inherent logic of their economic system impels them. We have either to find the way to a resumption of the economic expansion of the Victorian Age or enter upon—we have already entered—a period of war and revolution. But we cannot resume that expansion unless we adjust the relations of production in our society to the potential forces of production. Unless we do so, we are bound to have poverty in the midst of potential plenty, restrictionism, that economic nationalism which, all over the world, is lowering the standard of life. Since the state power is directed by men who live by the vested interests represented by these policies, it is at least difficult, and probably impossible, to transcend them within the limits of existing class relations.

I know no other way of explaining adequately the position in which our generation finds itself. The conclusion I draw from it is the necessity of a unified working-class party able either to win political power or, if it meets the challenge of Fascism, to emerge victorious from the conflict. The lesson of Germany and Italy is the clear one that division of the working class means its defeat. The lesson of France is the

equally clear one that the attainment of unity at the least enables the working class to give a good account of itself when the challenge comes.[9] And the evidence makes it plain that capitalism in its phase of contraction will respect no principle, however venerable, in its effort to retain the power of the state in its hands. That has been the experience of M. Blum in France; it has been, also, the experience of Mr. Roosevelt in the United States. Each had a great popular majority behind him. Each found that the power of his majority was largely nullified by the refusal of the propertied class to co-operate with his purposes. At the historical stage we have reached, the will of the people is unable to use the institutions of capitalist democracy for democratic purposes. For at this stage democracy needs to transform class relations in order to affirm itself; and it will not be allowed to do so by the owning class if it is able to prevent that achievement.

This attitude seems to me the explicit result of postwar experience, and it is, as I have said, the vindication of the analysis Marx made of social phenomena now nearly a century ago. Certain modes of behavior that I profoundly respect are, I think, ruled out of court by the inferences it involves. It is incompatible with the pacifist doctrine of nonresistance. It rules out, also, the Fabian method of gradualism. That principle was the natural method to recommend in an age of capitalist expansion. In the period of capitalism's decline, its result would, I think, be to give to the owning class a supreme opportunity to organize itself for counter-attack. The real lesson of postwar Germany is the futility of trying to reorganize the economic foundations of capitalism by half measures. That, again, is the inference I would draw from the experience of the two Labour governments in Great Britain.[10] Each was more anxious to prove its orthodox respectability to its opponents than it was to get on with the work of socialism to which it was committed by public profession. The result was to discourage its friends and to persuade its enemies that the price of social reform was greater than capitalism could afford. The time has come for a central attack on the structure of capitalism. Nothing less than wholesale socialization can remedy the position. The alternative in all Western civilization outside the Soviet Union is, I believe, a rapid drift to Fascism, in which the working class will be at a definite disadvantage by reason of the division of its forces. That division has already cost it Italy and Germany. It may one day cost it England

[9] I.e., under the Popular Front government (1936–38) of Leon Blum.

[10] The *two Labour governments* were 1923–24 and 1929–31; neither had a clear majority in Parliament.

and the United States as well. In that event, we shall see a new iron age descend upon mankind in which the very memory of civilized living may well become no more than a traditional legend.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Here, in broad outline, is the Marxian philosophy of history. History, Marxists believe, is made primarily by economics: a society lives, moves, and thinks according to its property and production relationships. If the basic property is land, you get feudalism; if it is privately-owned industrial equipment, you get capitalism. If, as in both feudalism and capitalism, property ownership and productive labor reside in different groups, you get class struggle. And since each class is driven by irresistible economic force, the privileged class (in capitalism the bourgeoisie) will not give up its dominant power through reasonable persuasion but only through forcible seizure of full power by the underprivileged (the proletariat), who will then, after a period of working-class dictatorship, form a classless society. This interpretation of history is accepted in full by Communists, the fullness of their acceptance constituting the core of their difference from the various Socialist parties. But Socialist thinking also owes much to Marx, and individuals within the non-Communist Left sometimes move fairly close to the Communist position. Thus Professor Laski, left-wing Labourite, here declares himself a Marxist.

Perhaps no modern theory, unless it be Darwin's or Freud's, has stirred as much discussion as Marx's. Is it true that economic motives are overwhelmingly dominant in the actions of individuals, groups, nations? Is it true that the times make the man, not the man the times? Is it true that men never give up special privilege voluntarily? that gradual reform by democratic process inevitably comes up at last against a blank wall of resistance from the ruling class? that power will inevitably be seized by the proletariat, and that the resulting society will eventually abolish the class struggle?

Much has happened since 1938, when this essay was written. Encouraged by the military defeat of fascism and the overwhelming victory of English believers in gradual socialization, Professor Laski now hopes that gradual transformation of society may be possible after all; but success of a peaceful revolution would not necessarily invalidate Marx's whole thesis. We are all, in our "one world," a long way farther into that "period of war and revolution" which Professor Laski here and elsewhere compares in complexity and significance to the time of the Reformation. Still the questions remain. Was Marx right? or partly right? or wholly wrong? "Why I Am a Marxist" gives the reasons for one man's answer.

1. What were the characteristics of university life as Laski knew it (1) during his undergraduate days at Oxford and (2) during his years of teaching in America? Why do you believe that what he says could or could not legitimately be used to characterize life in your own college or university? From what has been happening in your classrooms or on the campus, show why you believe that your college does or does not enjoy a high degree of "academic freedom" (i.e., faculty and student freedom of speech) when questions involving "the basic assumptions of the system" are discussed.

2. If the author were to rewrite ¶5 today, do you think he would or would not change or modify his opinion about what happens in America during a struggle between capital and labor? What concrete examples might he use to explain why his opinion had or had not changed? In your college, how do attitudes toward the Soviet Union resemble or differ from those he describes? If there has been a change, how do you account for it? When Laski says he had become convinced that "liberty has no meaning save in the context of equality," what does he mean by "equality"? by the whole statement?

3. From your own knowledge of how democracy works, show why, in theory, the socialist's goal of public ownership of the means of production could be achieved through the democratic process (freedom of discussion, the vote, etc.) if this should be the desire of the majority. Now let us follow the reasoning which made Laski conclude that in practice this development is impossible. What events made him decide (1) that ownership can meet demands of the working class only during periods of prosperity and (2) that protection of its own interests is the chief concern of private ownership? Later in the essay, how does he use this conviction to explain the bitter criticism and opposition encountered by Franklin D. Roosevelt? Why then did he conclude that public ownership of the means of production could never be achieved through the democratic process?

4. Why did Laski believe (1) that under capitalism war is inevitable? (2) that the interests of private property caused the failure of the League of Nations? (3) that we must produce and equitably distribute enough to maintain a high standard of living—i.e., achieve an economy of abundance—or face revolution? (4) that it is unlikely we will achieve such an economy under private ownership? Why, then, does he believe that the working class must unite if the will of a majority is to be made effective?

5. In the light of the foregoing analysis reread the summary of Marxian philosophy given in the study introduction and note each point to which Laski would subscribe. Add any other beliefs he holds as a Marxist. If you are not a Marxist, wherein do you agree, wherein disagree, with his reasoning and conclusions, and why?

6. The tradition of great political pamphleteering (which includes such classics as Milton's *Areopagitica* and Paine's *Common Sense*) is characterized by keen awareness of contemporary events, excoriation of the op-

position, and direct exhortation of the reader, and at its best by forceful argument and lofty vision. Judging the essay by these standards, would you say that it is an excellent, good, or poor example of its type? Be prepared to defend your opinion by specific references to the essay. What is gained, what lost, by the basically autobiographical structure?

The Marxian Philosophy of History

CARL L. BECKER

When he died in April, 1945, Carl Lotus Becker (1873-1945) was known as "the dean of American historians." He had long been an outstanding figure in American scholarship, a rare combination of historian and philosopher, chiefly interested in intellectual history, one of the ablest writers of his academic generation. In the 18th century, a period which especially interested him and which lent much to the incisiveness and wit of his style, he would have been called a "virtuoso" and a *"philosophe."* In the America of his time he was one of our great teachers and valiant disciples of social and political liberalism.

A native Middle Westerner, an Iowan, he was educated at Cornell College and Wisconsin. He taught at Pennsylvania State College, Dartmouth, Kansas, and Minnesota, and, from 1917 to 1945, at Cornell University, where his influence and reputation reached their zenith and where his campus seminar was even attended by other distinguished historians of his time. His most influential historical work is *The Declaration of Independence—a Study in the History of Political Ideas* (1922). But *The Eve of Revolution, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers,* and *Modern Democracy,* are also important and distinguished contributions, in Becker's individual style. Rather late in his career he began to bring his learning and wit to bear on the contemporary scene. He wrote a forceful series of essays for a general audience, many of which appeared in the *Yale Review. Everyman His Own Historian* (1935) and *How New Will the Better World Be?* (1944) are collections of such essays. In these his style has something less of the polish and epigrammatic point found in works like *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers:* he writes idiomatically, often borrowing from the pungent colloquialisms of American speech, but without discarding what he had learned from the masters of the English and French classical age.

Professor Becker taught European history mainly and wrote primarily American history, both with characteristic penetration and grace. But we may be grateful too that so lively a mind as his could not resist the temptation to comment, with wisdom and skeptical irony, on the thought and behavior of his own time. This essay is a good example of one phase of his brilliant and fruitful career.

From *Everyman His Own Historian,* F. S. Crofts and Co., 1935. By permission of the publishers and copyright holders.

I SOMETIMES find myself discussing communism with those who profess that faith; and not infrequently I note an implicit assumption on their part that I, as an intelligent person with some knowledge of history, ought either, (1) to refute the Marxian philosophy of history, or (2) in all honesty to support the communist cause. In such discussions I have maintained, (1) that an intelligent person may regard the Marxian philosophy of history as an illuminating interpretation of the past without subscribing to it as a law of history, and, (2) that even if convinced that the Marxian doctrine is a valid law of history, one might still with excellent reasons refuse to support the communist cause. Such discussions, developed more fully and presented more formally, may for convenience be put in the form of a discussion between a communist and a liberal.

COMMUNIST: Don't you think, Professor, that history proves that social progress, or change if you prefer, is the result of an inevitable class-conflict?

LIBERAL: Put in that precise way, no. I can't see that history proves anything except that what happened did happen, or that anything is inevitable except what happened; but what happened is precisely the question at issue. In using the words "prove" and "inevitable" you are, as the logicians say, begging the question.

COMMUNIST: I don't insist on those precise words.

LIBERAL: Very well, I agree then that history does support, or can easily be made to support, the Marxian doctrine in a general way. For example, in the middle ages the chief source of wealth was certainly land; and it is obvious that at that time the land-owning aristocracy was the ruling class. No great ingenuity is required to show that political, social, and religious customs and ideas of that time were suited to maintaining the political and economic ascendancy of the aristocracy. Likewise, it is obvious that during the last three centuries land has gradually been replaced by capital as the chief source of wealth; and the history of this time may easily be regarded as a conflict between the middle-class capitalist and the landowning aristocracy, as a result of which the former have replaced the latter as the ruling class and have substituted, in their interest, a new set of institutions and ideas (representative government, individual liberty, popular sovereignty, free competition) for the old. Yes, as an interpretation

of the last thousand years of European history, the Marxian theory is most illuminating.

COMMUNIST: Isn't it a bit more than merely illuminating? Can you deny that it is a more convincing and realistic interpretation than any other?

LIBERAL: I could very easily deny it, but I have no wish to do so. Let us admit that it is the most convincing interpretation. I will go farther. For purposes of argument I will admit that it is the only valid interpretation.

COMMUNIST: Very well then. If you admit that Marx has correctly interpreted the past, why not admit that he has correctly interpreted the future? Why not admit that just as the bourgeois-capitalist class displaced the land-owning aristocracy as the ruling class, so the proletariat will in its turn replace the bourgeois-capitalist class? And if they do so, isn't it reasonable to suppose that the characteristic ideas of the present society (representative government, freedom of speech, *laissez-faire*) will in turn give way to others suited to the interests of the proletariat?

LIBERAL: If I accept Marx's interpretation of the past it is because I know what it is, and can test it. If I hesitate to accept his interpretation of the future it is partly because I do not know precisely what it is, and partly because, even if I know what it is, I cannot test it. I willingly admit that the future will, in some way that can after the event be rationalized, resemble the past. Certainly change is the law of life, and it is obvious that the institutions and ideas of the nineteenth century, which were so well suited to the interests of the capitalist class, will not suffice without modification for the needs of the complex mechanized society of the twentieth. I willingly admit also that the ideas and institutions of today will be changed in such a way as to conform more closely with the economic interests of the workers, the mass of the people, the proletariat. But that is not to say that the change will come about in the way predicted by Marx, or that the result will be the sort of utopia predicted by him.

COMMUNIST: Utopia! I am not aware that Marx predicted any utopia.

LIBERAL: Well, let us say that he didn't. What then did he predict?

COMMUNIST: He predicted that the capitalist régime would by its own nature destroy itself. Its nature is to be ruthlessly competitive, so that in any industrial society the tendency is for wealth to be more highly concentrated in the hands of a few, while the mass of the people tend to fall to the condition of wage slaves. When this process

reaches a certain point, the system breaks down, as it is now breaking down because it has deprived the people of the means of buying the commodities which it is the sole aim of the capitalist class to make and sell for a profit. When the system ceases to work the people will necessarily take control, and, since it is their interest to do so, they will establish a classless society based upon the common ownership of instruments of production, and a more equitable distribution of the product. This is the social revolution that Marx predicted, and it has already begun—in Russia.

LIBERAL: In Russia, yes. In Russia, that is to say, not the most highly industrialized society but the least highly industrialized society. That is surely not according to Marx.

COMMUNIST: No, it is not. But you cannot maintain that because Marx's prediction is not verified in every detail it is not therefore valid in its general outline. The Great War created a special set of circumstances which were peculiarly favorable to the social revolution in Russia.

LIBERAL: Very true. The social revolution clearly occurred before its time in Russia. Providence, or Dialectic Materialism,[1] or whatever it is that regulates social changes, certainly did a very curious thing in bringing the social revolution to Russia before it brought it to more highly industrialized countries, such as England. For my part I don't think the Russian revolution does anything to verify the predictions of Marx; to me it indicates only that in a country in which the people were accustomed to being ruled by a dictatorship, a country moreover in which the prevailing form of dictatorship was especially corrupt and incompetent, it was very easy to establish a dictatorship of a different sort. But let that pass. My reluctance to accept the Marxian doctrine arises from something far more fundamental than the Russian accident. There are two difficulties which have always troubled me. Perhaps you can solve them. One is that it is extremely difficult to predict the future on the basis of past experience; or rather it is extremely easy to find in the past support for diverse predictions of the future. The other difficulty is to understand why a persistent economic class conflict in the past justifies us in predicting a classless society in the future.

As to the first difficulty. What little I know of history makes me chary of any prediction as to the form which social institutions will take in the future. Especially so when such predictions, based upon

[1] Marx's theory of history as determined primarily by the struggle of material (economic) forces.

a realistic view of the past, take an idealistic view of the future. During the last two thousand years all the saints and sages of the world, deploring greed and strife, poverty and injustice, have looked forward to the time when a more just society would be established. They have many times predicted the coming of a classless society in which everyone would have enough; but the course of events has never yet verified their hopes. This generalization is as solidly based on historical fact as any that Marx has made, and it is more widely based; and if I am to judge the future by the past, I see no reason for discarding this generalization for that which Marx offers me. The less so, since Marx's interpretation of the past, if projected into the future, seems to refute his own prediction.

COMMUNIST: I don't understand that.

LIBERAL: Perhaps it will become clear if I elaborate the second difficulty I just mentioned. Marx's interpretation of the past is explicit and realistic; his forecast of the future seems to me vague and idealistic. I have called it utopian, but you object to that word. I do not insist on it. I will even surrender the word "idealistic." But the point is this. Marx finds that in the past the effective force that has determined social change is the economic class conflict. He points out that this economic class conflict explains the rise of the present capitalistic society. He shows, or at least his disciples show, how this economic class conflict is working to undermine our capitalistic society. Very well. If then I project this explanation of social changes into the future, what does it tell me? It seems to tell me that there will be in the future what there has been in the past—an endless economic class conflict, an endless replacement of one dominant class by another, an endless transformation of institutions and ideas in accordance with the changes effected by the class conflict. But this is not what Marx predicts. What he predicts is the end of the economic class conflict, the establishment of a classless society. What you and he are asking me to accept is an explanation of history that will explain it only up to a certain point. Marx criticised Hegel for that very weakness. Hegel explained past history as a transformation effected by the Transcendent Idea realizing itself in the actual events of history; according to him the great objective of history was the complete realization of the Idea in the form of Freedom, and this great objective had already been in some sense attained in the Prussian state. Marx wanted to know what the Transcendent Idea would find to do in the future, now that it was entirely realized. That is a sound criticism. Now, my difficulty is to know how Marx has improved on Hegel. To be sure Marx does

not say that the great objective of history has already been attained. He says the economic class conflict will bring about another social revolution. But after the social revolution, what then? What becomes of the economic class conflict after the revolution has established a classless society? I can't find that it will have anything more to do than Hegel's Transcendent Idea. A law of history which, at some determinate moment, ceases to explain history, a law of history which is required, at the appropriate moment, to commit hari-kari on the doorstep of the ideal, surely leaves something to be desired.

COMMUNIST: Well, that's a point. But really, Professor, you know very well that this objection has been noted before, and that there is a good answer to it. Marx was not so blind as to overlook it. How could he have done so, since he pointed out that very weakness in Hegel's philosophy of history?

LIBERAL: I should be glad to learn how Marx avoids that difficulty.

COMMUNIST: I am not sure that Marx himself does altogether avoid it. But you must allow Marxian philosophy to be elaborated and interpreted by his followers in the light of later experience. You have no objection to that?

LIBERAL: None at all. We must by all means discuss Marxianism at its best, as it is now interpreted by the most expert exegesis available.

COMMUNIST: Very well. According to a recent interpreter of Marxianism, history is explainable in terms of a dialectic of transformation, in which conflicts appear only to be resolved in a higher synthesis. This conflict is not necessarily always an economic class conflict. After the classless society is established the conflict will continue, but on a different level. According to Professor Sidney Hook, a recent interpreter of Marx, the dialectic in a communist, classless society, will not be "historically conditioned in the same sense" as in earlier times. "It finds expression . . . on a more elevated plane. Although in advance no one can describe the detailed forms it will take, it is clear that its general locus is individual and personal." In other words, having solved the economic problem by establishing a classless society, men will be occupied with the higher, spiritual problems of human development.

LIBERAL: Well, I must confess that this greatly surprises me. A while back you would not allow me to apply the term "utopian" to the future society predicted by Marx, and yet this sounds to me very similar to all the utopian societies I ever heard of. Throughout the past men have engaged in brutal conflict for material gain; but this brutal conflict is somehow to bring about a classless society in which men

been unconsciously made over by the economically determined will of economic classes."

LIBERAL: I see; at least I think so, in spite of Professor Hook's somewhat obscure academic phraseology. But what it comes to, I suppose, is this. In the physical world a law operates forever in the same way because the physical object is not aware of, and is indifferent to, what happens. A billiard ball (to use the classic example) has no desire to make over its nature. But man is aware of, and is not indifferent to, what happens. His acts are indeed strictly conditioned, but as soon as he becomes aware of what it is that conditions them, his awareness enables him to react differently; his acts are then not less strictly conditioned than formerly, but his own awareness becomes a new element that changes and complicates the conditions. For a long time men may worship the sun; when they become aware of the influences that make them worship the sun, this awareness may become an influence that will make them cease to worship the sun. Freedom of the will, as Engels[3] said, is no more than man's knowledge that his acts are conditioned.

Very well, Marx then (or perhaps his disciples) applies this principle of freedom to the social changes or revolutions that occur in history. In the past, social revolutions have been conditioned by the economic class conflict. As long as men are not aware of this fact, social revolutions will continue to be conditioned by the economic class conflict. But when men become fully aware, through the great discovery of Marx, that social revolutions in the past have been conditioned by the class conflict, this knowledge will enable them to react differently—to react in such a way as to abolish the class conflict. This, I take it, is how you interpret Marx.

COMMUNIST: Yes, that is right.

LIBERAL: Well, I agree with this idea of free will. It seems to me obvious that as men acquire knowledge of the influences that determine their acts, this knowledge becomes a new influence that enables them to act differently. But if we accept this principle it seems odd to me that men shouldn't have acquired, before the time of Marx, some knowledge of the fact that their conduct was determined by the economic class conflict. I should have supposed that this element of awareness would have been steadily modifying the conditions that determine social changes from the time of the Neanderthal man down

[3] Friedrich *Engels* (1820–95), friend and associate of Marx, co-author of *The Communist Manifesto,* author of *The Condition of the Working Class in England,* a powerful indictment of capitalism.

to the present. How does it happen that this element has had no appreciable influence up to the time of Marx? Marx must have been a much greater man than I have always thought—a veritable Messiah, who at a single stroke has given mankind this epoch-making revelation that is to transform so radically the conditions that determine human history. I find it difficult to believe that. It seems more reasonable to believe that knowledge has been steadily modifying the economic influences that have determined social changes in the past, and that in the future further knowledge, knowledge unknown to Marx, will continue to modify those influences in ways not dreamed of by Marx.

But that is a minor point. Let us assume that up to the time of Marx men have been submitting blindly to the economic class conflict, and that now, thanks to Marx, they are in the way of becoming aware of the fact, and that being aware of it they are in a position to modify profoundly the conditions that will determine social changes. What then? Well, it seems to me that this great revelation made by Marx is precisely what makes it impossible for him to predict the character of the coming social revolution. If we did not know that social changes had been conditioned by the economic class conflict, the coming social revolution would presumably follow the course of previous ones, in which case no classless society would emerge from it. But since we do know that social revolutions in the past were conditioned by the class conflict, this very knowledge, according to Marx, will make the coming social revolution follow some different course, in which case we may hope, but cannot be sure, that a classless society will emerge from it. In short, in so far as Marx has made men aware of the influence of the economic class conflict in the past, he has destroyed the very conditions that would have enabled him to predict the nature of the social revolution in the future. If Marx wished to predict correctly the nature of the coming social revolution, he should not have told us what it is that makes social revolutions: since he has told us, the secret is out, and hence no one can predict it. The great secret is out, thanks to Marx, and this knowledge will enable us to make of the coming social revolution something different than it otherwise would have been. Marxian philosophy presents his disciples with a dilemma which they either do not see or refuse to meet. It is this. Either social changes are always determined by the same conditions, in which case we may be sure that the coming social revolution will be similar to those in the past—it will transform the present class conflict only to create the conditions that will issue in a new one. Or else knowledge of the

conditions that have determined social revolutions in the past introduces a novel influence in the conditions that will determine social revolutions in the future, in which case we cannot predict with any certainty the nature of those revolutions. The profound conviction of Communists that the proletariat is destined to establish a classless society on the ruins of the present capitalist régime is not justified by Marxian philosophy: if you interpret Marx in terms of mechanistic determinism, this profound communist conviction is a pure delusion; on the other hand, if you interpret Marx in terms of free will, this conviction is no more than a splendid hope. That is why I cannot accept the Marxian philosophy as a law of history.

COMMUNIST: Very well. Suppose, for purposes of argument, that the communist conviction is only a splendid hope. You yourself have said that the present capitalist régime must be changed in such a way as to harmonize better with the interests of the mass of the people, the proletariat. That is just what the Communists want. Since you sympathize with their object, and believe that it will in some measure be realized, why not join the Communists and help to realize this splendid hope?

LIBERAL: I refuse to join the Communists because, while I sympathize with their desire to make a better world for the mass of the people, I have no faith in the methods which they propose for obtaining this object. If I understand them, they claim that nothing really worth while can be done until conditions are ripe for the application of the revolutionary technique. When that time comes, they propose, following the example of the Bolsheviks in Russia, to seize control of the government, forcibly expropriate the bourgeois class, and ruthlessly suppress the expression of all opinion that a dictatorial government judges to be hostile to the welfare of the community of workers.

Now I have no faith in force and repression as the *primary* means of achieving the good life. I am not as yet a non-resistant pacifist. Any government is probably better than none, and all government rests at last on force. But I believe that the essential test of civilized society is the extent to which law and public authority rest on free discussion and voluntary consent. A resort to force as a means of obtaining consent may be sometimes necessary to prevent a society from falling into virtual anarchy; but the resort to force in place of persuasion is so far a confession of failure. I have no faith in the possibility of abolishing oppression by oppressing oppressors. I have no faith in the infallibility of any man, or of any group of men, or of the doctrines or dogmas of any man or group of men, except in so far as they can

stand the test of free criticism and analysis. I agree with Pascal that "thought makes the dignity of man"; and I believe therefore that all the great and permanently valuable achievements of civilization have been won by the free play of intelligence in opposition to, or in spite of, the pressure of mass emotion and the effort of organized authority to enforce conformity in conduct and opinion. I do not believe that there has been, or that there will be, a high civilization in any country in which the mind of man is limited to the expression of ideas authorized by public authority. Dictatorship is as old as European society; and whether it be the dictatorship of a Stalin, a Mussolini, or a Hitler, it does not become something new and admirable by being dressed up in a new and mystical ideology. I recognize it as a possibility that our modern, complex, machine civilization may so far fall into confusion that a dictatorship will in fact replace the present régime; but I refuse to recognize this outcome as inherently desirable, and I refuse to join in any effort to make it inevitable.

This is why I do not join the Communists. I believe that profound changes in our economic and industrial system are necessary; but I believe that they can and I hope that they will be made, in this country, without resorting to violent revolution, without resorting to dictatorship, without abandoning our traditional reliance on free discussion and criticism of public authority and of the measures it proposes for the solution of social ills. And there is nothing in the Marxian philosophy, as you expound it, that makes it illogical for me to take this position. According to you, now that Marx has made us aware of the influence of the economic class conflict in the past, this very awareness will enable us to master and modify the class conflict in the future. I agree. But why is it necessary to assume that this knowledge which Marx has revealed to us is the exclusive possession of the proletariat? After all, the bourgeoisie have a certain amount of intelligence. They can read Marx, or at least Sidney Hook. They can observe what has occurred in Russia, in Italy, in Germany. It is possible for them, too, to understand that the capitalist competitive system is in a fair way of destroying itself. Marxian doctrine tells me that capitalists, like proletarians, are motivated by their economic class interest; it does not tell me that they, any more than the proletarians, must forever be motivated by a blind illusion as to what that interest is. At the present moment it obviously is not to the interest of the capitalist class that the mass of the people should be without the means of buying the goods which the capitalist class produces in order to sell. It is still possible that the capitalist system in this country, subjected to the

pressure of economic necessity and the force of public discontent, may by reasonably peaceful procedure be sufficiently transformed into a coördinated and planned economic system to make it, not a utopia indeed, but at least a decently workable system. And a decently workable system which preserves our traditional liberty of discussion and criticism will, in my opinion, be superior in the long run to any system that can be established by the repressive measures now employed by the Communists of Russia, the Fascists of Italy, or the Nazis of Germany.

COMMUNIST: A decently workable system. That's certainly vague enough—as vague as Marx's idealistic society of the future which you derided. No doubt a decently workable system is one which you would prefer to something which you don't like, such as the Russian communist state.

LIBERAL: It is. But you must permit me to prefer a decently workable system which I like to a decently workable system which I don't like. You can hardly expect me to become a Communist until I am convinced that communism would be preferable to the system under which I live.

COMMUNIST: No. But you have already admitted that the "decently workable system" which you hope will be established may fail to be established—that the present system may end in a dictatorship. That I think is the more probable outcome. It is likely that in the long run the capitalist class, confronted by the rising power of the proletariat, will resort to force, as it has done in Italy and Germany. If then you are faced with the alternative of supporting a dictatorship of the proletariat or a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, what will you do? What then will become of freedom of speech and the appeal to persuasion? Since you sympathize with the objectives of the Communists, will you not then be forced to join them? Why wait till then? Why not join now the side which is bound to win in the long run because it is in harmony with the dominant trend of social forces?

LIBERAL: I do not admit that communism is necessarily in harmony with the dominant trend of social forces. I see that when it suits your argument you, like most Communists, fall back on the doctrine of a fatalistic determinism which makes the communist revolution inevitable whatever men do about it; but when your argument requires another doctrine you admit that the social revolution may be mastered and directed by the conscious purposes of men. You ought really to accept one doctrine or the other, and stick to it. But no matter. Accept one doctrine or both, as you like. In either case I see no good reason

for joining the Communists. If the communist revolution is inevitable, whatever men do about it, why do anything? Why join either side, if you know before hand that one side is bound to win anyway? But if the communist revolution is not inevitable, then the proletariat can indeed do something to hasten it, and by the same token the bourgeoisie can do something to retard it. And in that case why should I join the Communists? I am a professor; and the Communists are never weary of telling me that professors as a class support the capitalistic régime because it is their economic interest to do so. Very well, I will be a sufficiently good Marxian to accept the doctrine that men's actions are motivated by their economic class interest. If then my economic interests are bound up with the capitalist régime, and I can do something to retard the communist revolution, I should be, according to Marx himself, a poor humanitarian fool to desert my class and work for a revolution which, if successful, would ruthlessly suppress me. As a liberal humanitarian, or a Christian mystic, I might logically sacrifice myself and my class for the welfare of the masses; but as a Marxian that would be to adopt the very "utopian" attitude which Marx never ceased to ridicule. You really ask too much. The Marxian philosophy teaches me either that the communist revolution is inevitable, in which case I merely resign myself to it: or else it teaches me that the communist revolution can be hastened or retarded by the conscious efforts of men, in which case I stick to my class and do what I can to retard it. In either case I have the profound consolation of knowing that my conduct is based on the solid foundation of the Marxian philosophy of history.

These, you are to understand, are choices logically open to me on the assumption that I accept the Marxian philosophy of history. But life is less simple than logic. In logic you can present me with clear-cut alternatives. You can ask me whether I will "choose" to support the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, quite as if some day, the two contending parties being lined up in battle array on a *champs de mars,* I should be asked to step out and join one side or the other. In actual life it does not seem to me that I am ever confronted with choices as simple or as dramatically staged as that. When I voted for Mr. Roosevelt (if I *did* vote for him—I can't be sure now) I made a choice, without being certain (any more than Mr. Roosevelt himself was) what would come of it. I am now "supporting" (so far as I am supporting anything) the Roosevelt administration, and it is possible that in 1936 I shall vote for the re-election of Mr. Roosevelt. Does this mean that I am "choosing" to

support a fascist rather than a communistic régime? Thoroughgoing Communists appear to know that I am: the New Deal, they say, is obviously an American species of fascist technique. But I am sufficiently naïve not to be aware of having made any choice between communism and fascism. And very glad I am that it is so. I should dislike very much to be confronted with a clear-cut choice between a dictatorship of the proletariat and a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. I should be inclined to say, "A plague on both your houses!" I find Mussolini as offensive as Stalin, and Hitler more offensive than either.

COMMUNIST: That is all very well, but a real revolution is not impossible. There are plenty of Russians who could assure you that the alternative you so much dislike has been presented to them in a quite sufficiently clear-cut and dramatic manner. If it should be similarly presented in this country, it seems to me that you would, however much you might dislike it, have to choose one side or the other.

LIBERAL: Not necessarily. There would still be another possibility.

COMMUNIST: What would that be?

LIBERAL: I might still refuse to join either side. I might persist in the futility of expressing my faith in the superior virtues of persuasion.

COMMUNIST: That would have serious consequences for you. You would be suppressed.

LIBERAL: True enough. But I might accept the consequences. I might choose to be suppressed rather than to support what I object to. In short, I might, as a last refuge from imbecility, become a Christian and practise the precept that it is better to suffer evil than to do it.

COMMUNIST: That would be to fall back upon a far more mystical type of idealism than Marx ever contemplated, and I fail to see that it would get you anywhere.

LIBERAL: I dare say it wouldn't. But as I said before, I am a professor, and a professor, as the German proverb has it, is "a man who thinks otherwise": if he is not permitted to talk freely he cannot get anywhere anyway.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Not everyone takes naturally to "dialectics," or the art of disputation, but most of us are called on now and then to defend some cherished belief, more often than not a political or economic theory. If you happen to know a convinced Marxist (or are one yourself), you will surely have frequent occasion to explain and apply theory and to meet objections, for

Marx's philosophy has been (and is still being) analyzed, interpreted, modified, refuted, attacked, and defended as has happened to few non-religious systems of thought. Even if neither you nor your friends are Marxists, you need to know something about Marxism pro and con, since—by both acceptance and denial—it has influenced an amazingly wide area of modern thought. In this essay, probably an idealized composite of many actual dialogs with his students, an eminent historian, with ruthless logic and skillful irony, turns the arguments of the extreme Marxists (i.e., the Communists) against the Communists themselves, ending with a declaration of his devotion to democratic freedom. It is a beautiful performance, in the best Socratic tradition: Socrates used to crowd his victims into the same sort of logical corner. Whether or not you are convinced, you should learn a lot about both Marx and dialectics.

Certain things need to be kept in mind as one reads this dialog. As explained in the study introduction to "Why I am a Marxist," not all Marxists are Communists but Marxism as developed by Lenin and Stalin is the chief substance of Communist doctrine. Since Communism (in contrast to Socialism) has consequently identified itself with every aspect of the Russian experiment, it is inevitable that both disputants should refer continually to the USSR. The thing to remember here is that LIBERAL, viewing the world situation in the middle '30s, makes a near-identification of the Russian and German-Italian systems which he would probably not make today: not that he would approve of Russian dictatorship any more now than then, but that history has shown fascist dictatorship more oppressive at home and much more dangerous abroad than the Russian form has been. Even as it stands, the argument is leveled not at the Russian nation, but at its ideological Communism. LIBERAL's post-war counterpart feels impelled to make this distinction doubly clear.

1. What main divisions of the argument does the first paragraph lead you to expect? Note in outline form how each main division is developed. (The grouping of the following questions will help you to do this.)

2. Why does LIBERAL consider Marx's theory of class struggle a real contribution to an understanding of European history? What does he admit for the sake of the argument? Why does he make this concession? What *is* "the Marxian philosophy of history" as COMMUNIST explains it? How does COMMUNIST account for the fact that the Russian Revolution did not follow the Marxian pattern? Explain why LIBERAL's statement that in Russia "Providence, or Dialectical Materialism . . . certainly did a very curious thing" is ironic. (Irony is tongue-in-cheek talk—saying one thing and meaning another.)

3. What two difficulties make LIBERAL unwilling to apply Marx's theory to the future? What does the phrase "dialectic of transformation" mean, according to COMMUNIST, and why does he believe that it solves the second difficulty? How, according to LIBERAL, does this explanation actually serve

to illustrate the difficulty it is supposed to solve? What dilemma does COMMUNIST now have to face? Can you escape from it any more successfully than he does? What part of the argument outlined in ¶1 has now been concluded?

4. What is LIBERAL's chief reason for refusing to become a Communist? What is his attitude toward "force and repression"? If COMMUNIST had had a chance to reply at this point, what might he have said in defence of Communist methods (1) in the Soviet Union and (2) in the United States? (If you can't answer this question, never mind: some of your classmates will probably have something interesting to say.) How might LIBERAL have answered him?

5. Why does LIBERAL believe that the middle class may develop a "decently workable" system without dictatorship? Why does COMMUNIST think this so unlikely that LIBERAL might better join the Communists now? What inconsistency does LIBERAL point out in this argument, and what dilemma does he now proceed to develop? What examples of irony do you find in this subdivision of the argument? Why does LIBERAL deny that he must make the so-called "choice" posed by Marxists?

6. Throughout the argument the student (if COMMUNIST *is* a student) is obviously made to sound more "academic" than the professor. Show how the author's diction helps him to achieve this effect: give examples of colloquial expressions and decide whether they are used exclusively or chiefly by LIBERAL. In examples of irony you have noted, does the professor sound ill-humored? Precisely what *is* the effect? Illustrate LIBERAL's characteristic technique of apparently seeking light only to pounce on the explanation and demolish it. Does either or do both of the opponents have a sense of humor? How do they resemble or differ from each other in their earnestness? In what other ways does the author manage, incidentally, to characterize COMMUNIST? What advantages and/or disadvantages do you see in the use of dialog? Wherein, if at all, do you think the author has taken unfair advantage of his opponent? Where, if anywhere —and how—do you think you could have bettered COMMUNIST's presentation of his case? Do you think students breaking a dialectical lance with Professor Becker probably liked and/or admired him? Why or why not?

"A Joy Forever"

JOHN RUSKIN

In 1857 a Manchester audience gathered to hear the famous art critic, John Ruskin (1819–1900), discuss "the political economy of art." Still in his thirties, Ruskin had already published most of *Modern Painters.* Never in English prose had description been so elaborately but sincerely eloquent as Ruskin's record of God's handiwork in sunset, mountains, trees, and sea, and of such beauty as interpreted by various painters. He had written on architecture too—*The Seven Lamps of Architecture* and *The Stones of Venice,* showing his delight in Gothic as the most lovely of all styles and expressing his conviction that all art, but especially architecture, manifests the health and morality of the nation by which it is produced. By the 1850s he was one of the most influential writers of his century.

He himself, however, was intensely dissatisfied with his accomplishments. Though widely read, his books had not achieved his purpose: men remained essentially indifferent to art. They had been interested, he decided, merely in the "purple passages" for which he was most famous. He himself was questioning the soundness of his work, for he now found untenable the Evangelical creed on which his aesthetic theory had been based. Besides, the emphasis in his own interests was shifting. Supported by a wealthy father, he had lived, imaginatively, in the centuries which left our greatest heritage of art. Now, however, his attention became focused on the society of his day.

He was horrified by the civilization of which he grew increasingly aware. Here was a society made by men who professed to follow Christ. But, in actuality, his fellows seemed to him to be governed by desire for "profits" and to follow the gospel of the Classical Economists as they worshipped a strange new Deity, "the Goddess of Getting-on." In her service humanity had made the earth, he said, "a battlefield wet with blood"—the blood of millions of brutalized workers, ignorant, ill-housed, under-fed, under-paid, or unemployed. In such a world, he found it impossible to give himself whole-heartedly to art. And if, as he now believed, *all* art reflects the culture of a nation, then his attempt to foster art in contemporary England had been inevitably futile.

The Political Economy of Art (later published as *"A Joy Forever"*), from which this selection comes, marks the turning point in his career. Henceforth, as a disciple of Carlyle, he would attack the tenets of the Classical Economists and the practices of Christians content to let their

Opening passage of Lecture I, *"A Joy Forever,"* originally called *The Political Economy of Art,* 1857. Reprinted by permission of George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., publishers of the only authorized edition of Ruskin's works.

fellows suffer. Ill health and personal sorrow kept him from presenting his political economy as a coherent whole. But through twenty years of lecturing and essay-writing, he presented sometimes a carefully reasoned analysis of fallacies in the prevailing economic creed (see, for example, *Munera Pulveris*), sometimes with moving eloquence an appeal to conscience (see, for example, *The Crown of Wild Olive*), and often, with mounting feverishness as the years went on, indictments blistering in their scorn and anger (see *Fors Clavigera*). At first the public ignored his words, and the critics said it was "no pleasure to see genius mistaking its power and making itself ridiculous." But eventually he once more gained an audience, though he himself despaired because he thought his work so ineffectual while suffering and injustice were so great.

Now eighty-odd years have passed and we find, scattered through his essays on political economy, the slogans of contemporary liberals. That it should be the function of industry to provide for mankind and not to make profits, that national wealth must be ultimately measured in terms of consumption and of human happiness, that sound national economics and the whole destiny of labor depend on fair wages being paid regardless of supply and demand, that employment should be staggered, that consumers should feel responsibilities toward labor, that the government should bear responsibility for youth, for the unemployed, for the old and the sick and the destitute—these are convictions many hold today. Yet the list is culled from four magazine articles which Ruskin published in 1861 and later issued as *Unto This Last*. This liberal point of view and the dovetailing of his interest in art and political economy are clearly reflected in our selection.

AMONG THE VARIOUS CHARACTERISTICS of the age in which we live, as compared with other ages of this not yet *very* experienced world, one of the most notable appears to me to be the just and wholesome contempt in which we hold poverty. I repeat, the *just* and *wholesome* contempt; though I see that some of my hearers look surprised at the expression. I assure them, I use it in sincerity; and I should not have ventured to ask you to listen to me this evening, unless I had entertained a profound respect for wealth—true wealth, that is to say; for, of course, we ought to respect neither wealth nor anything else that is false of its kind: and the distinction between real and false wealth is one of the points on which I shall have a few words presently to say to you. But true wealth I hold, as I said, in great honour; and sympathize, for the most part, with that extraordinary feeling of the present age which publicly pays this honour to riches.

I cannot, however, help noticing how extraordinary it is, and how this epoch of ours differs from all bygone epochs in having no philosophical nor religious worshippers of the ragged godship of poverty. In the classical ages, not only there were people who voluntarily lived in tubs,[1] and who used gravely to maintain the superiority of tub-life to town-life, but the Greeks and Latins seem to have looked on these eccentric, and I do not scruple to say, absurd people, with as much respect as we do upon large capitalists and landed proprietors; so that really, in those days, no one could be described as purse proud, but only as empty-purse proud. And no less distinct than the honour which those curious Greek people pay to their conceited poor, is the disrespectful manner in which they speak of the rich; so that one cannot listen long either to them, or to the Roman writers who imitated them, without finding oneself entangled in all sorts of plausible absurdities; hard upon being convinced of the uselessness of collecting that heavy yellow substance which we call gold, and led generally to doubt all the most established maxims of political economy.

Nor are matters much better in the Middle Ages. For the Greeks and Romans contented themselves with mocking at rich people, and constructing merry dialogues between Charon and Diogenes or Menippus,[2] in which the ferryman and the cynic rejoiced together as they saw kings and rich men coming down to the shore of Acheron, in lamenting and lamentable crowds, casting their crowns into the dark waters, and searching, sometimes in vain, for the last coin out of all their treasures that could ever be of use to them.

But these Pagan views of the matter were indulgent, compared with those which were held in the Middle Ages, when wealth seems to have been looked upon by the best men not only as contemptible, but as criminal. The purse round the neck is,[3] then, one of the principal signs of condemnation in the pictured Inferno; and the Spirit of Poverty is reverenced with subjection of heart, and faithfulness of affection, like that of a loyal knight for his lady, or a loyal subject for his queen. And truly, it requires some boldness to quit ourselves of these feelings, and to confess their partiality or their error, which, nevertheless, we are certainly bound to do. For wealth is simply one of the greatest powers which can be entrusted to human hands: a power, not indeed to be envied, because it seldom makes us happy; but still less

[1] The Cynics, whose ideal was to get rid of every artificial want. Diogenes (412?–323? B.C.) lived in a tub and threw away his cup as a useless luxury.

[2] See Lucian's *Dialogues of the Dead*, "The Ferry-man" and "Menippus."

[3] Dante saw usurers in the *Inferno*, each with a pouch "pendent from his neck . . . on which it seem'd as if their eye did feed." (*Inferno*, XVII, 50–55.)

to be abdicated or despised; while, in these days, and in this country, it has become a power all the more notable, in that the possessions of a rich man are not represented, as they used to be, by wedges of gold or coffers of jewels, but by masses of men variously employed, over whose bodies and minds the wealth, according to its direction, exercises harmful or helpful influence, and becomes, in that alternative, Mammon either of Unrighteousness or of Righteousness.

Now, it seemed to me that since, in the name you have given to this great gathering of British pictures,[4] you recognize them as Treasures—that is, I suppose, as part and parcel of the real wealth of the country—you might not be uninterested in tracing certain commercial questions connected with this particular form of wealth. Most persons express themselves as surprised at its quantity; not having known before to what an extent good art had been accumulated in England: and it will, therefore, I should think, be held a worthy subject of consideration, what are the political interests involved in such accumulations; what kind of labour they represent, and how this labour may in general be applied and economized, so as to produce the richest results.

Now, you must have patience with me, if in approaching the specialty of this subject, I dwell a little on certain points of general political science already known or established: for though thus, as I believe, established, some which I shall have occasion to rest arguments on are not yet by any means universally accepted; and therefore, though I will not lose time in any detailed defence of them, it is necessary that I should distinctly tell you in what form I receive, and wish to argue from them; and this the more, because there may perhaps be a part of my audience who have not interested themselves in political economy, as it bears on ordinary fields of labour, but may yet wish to hear in what way its principles can be applied to Art. I shall, therefore, take leave to trespass on your patience with a few elementary statements in the outset, and with the expression of some general principles, here and there, in the course of our particular inquiry.

To begin, then, with one of these necessary truisms: all economy, whether of states, households, or individuals, may be defined to be the art of managing labour. The world is so regulated by the laws of Providence, that a man's labour, well applied, is always amply sufficient to provide him during his life with all things needful to him, and not only with those, but with many pleasant objects of luxury; and yet farther, to procure him large intervals of healthful rest and serviceable leisure. And a nation's labour, well applied, is, in like man-

[4] The Arts Treasures Exhibition in Manchester, which occasioned these lectures.

ner, amply sufficient to provide its whole population with good food and comfortable habitation; and not with those only, but with good education besides, and objects of luxury, art treasures, such as these you have around you now. But by those same laws of Nature and Providence, if the labour of the nation or of the individual be misapplied, and much more if it be insufficient—if the nation or man be indolent and unwise—suffering and want result, exactly in proportion to the indolence and improvidence—to the refusal of labour, or to the misapplication of it. Wherever you see want, or misery, or degradation, in this world about you, there, be sure, either industry has been wanting, or industry has been in error. It is not accident, it is not Heaven-commanded calamity, it is not the original and inevitable evil of man's nature, which fill your streets with lamentation, and your graves with prey. It is only that, when there should have been providence, there has been waste; when there should have been labour, there has been lasciviousness; and wilfulness, when there should have been subordination.*

Now, we have warped the word "economy" in our English language into a meaning which it has no business whatever to bear. In our use of it, it constantly signifies merely sparing or saving; economy of money means saving money—economy of time, sparing time, and so on. But that is a wholly barbarous use of the word—barbarous in a double sense, for it is not English, and it is bad Greek; barbarous in a treble sense, for it is not English, it is bad Greek, and it is worse sense. Economy no more means saving money than it means spending money. It means, the administration of a house; its stewardship; spending or saving, that is, whether money or time, or anything else, to the best possible advantage. In the simplest and clearest definition of it, economy, whether public or private, means the wise management of labour; and it means this mainly in three senses: namely, first, *applying* your labour rationally; secondly, *preserving* its produce carefully; lastly, *distributing* its produce seasonably.

I say first, applying your labour rationally; that is, so as to obtain the most precious things you can, and the most lasting things, by it: not growing oats in land where you can grow wheat, nor putting fine embroidery on a stuff that will not wear. Secondly, preserving its produce carefully; that is to say, laying up your wheat wisely in storehouses for the time of famine, and keeping your embroidery watchfully from the moth: and lastly, distributing its produce seasonably;

* *Proverbs* xiii:23, "Much food is in the tillage of the poor, but there is that is destroyed for want of judgment."

that is to say, being able to carry your corn at once to the place where the people are hungry, and your embroideries to the places where they are gay; so fulfilling in all ways the Wise Man's description, whether of the queenly housewife or queenly nation: "She riseth while it is yet night, and giveth meat to her household, and a portion to her maidens. She maketh herself coverings of tapestry, her clothing is silk and purple. Strength and honour are in her clothing, and she shall rejoice in time to come."

Now, you will observe that in this description of the perfect economist, or mistress of a household, there is a studied expression of the balanced division of her care between the two great objects of utility and splendour: in her right hand, food and flax, for life and clothing; in her left hand, the purple and the needlework, for honour and for beauty. All perfect housewifery or national economy is known by these two divisions; wherever either is wanting, the economy is imperfect. If the motive of pomp prevails, and the care of the national economist is directed only to the accumulation of gold, and of pictures, and of silk and marble, you know at once that the time must soon come when all these treasures shall be scattered and blasted in national ruin. If, on the contrary, the element of utility prevails, and the nation disdains to occupy itself in any wise with the arts of beauty or delight, not only a certain quantity of its energy calculated for exercise in those arts alone must be entirely wasted, which is bad economy, but also the passions connected with the utilities of property become morbidly strong, and a mean lust of accumulation merely for the sake of accumulation, or even of labour merely for the sake of labour, will banish at last the serenity and the morality of life, as completely, and perhaps more ignobly, than even the lavishness of pride, and the lightness of pleasure. And similarly, and much more visibly, in private and household economy, you may judge always of its perfectness by its fair balance between the use and the pleasure of its possessions. You will see the wise cottager's garden trimly divided between its well-set vegetables, and its fragrant flowers; you will see the good housewife taking pride in her pretty table-cloth, and her glittering shelves, no less than in her well-dressed dish, and her full storeroom; the care in her countenance will alternate with gaiety, and though you will reverence her in her seriousness, you will know her best by her smile.

Now, as you will have anticipated, I am going to address you, on this and our succeeding evening, chiefly on the subject of that economy which relates rather to the garden than the farm-yard. I shall ask you to consider with me the kind of laws by which we shall best distribute

the beds of our national garden, and raise in it the sweetest succession of trees pleasant to the sight, and (in no forbidden sense) to be desired to make us wise. But, before proceeding to open this specialty of our subject, let me pause for a few moments to plead with you for the acceptance of that principle of government or authority which must be at the root of all economy, whether for use or for pleasure. I said, a few minutes ago, that a nation's labour, well applied, was amply sufficient to provide its whole population with good food, comfortable clothing, and pleasant luxury. But the good, instant, and constant application is everything. We must not, when our strong hands are thrown out of work, look wildly about for want of something to do with them. If ever we feel that want, it is a sign that all our household is out of order. Fancy a farmer's wife, to whom one or two of her servants should come at twelve o'clock at noon, crying that they had got nothing to do; that they did not know what to do next: and fancy still farther, the said farmer's wife looking hopelessly about her rooms and yard, they being all the while considerably in disorder, not knowing where to set the spare handmaidens to work, and at last complaining bitterly that she had been obliged to give them their dinner for nothing. That's the type of the kind of political economy we practise too often in England. Would you not at once assert of such a mistress that she knew nothing of her duties? and would you not be certain, if the household were rightly managed, the mistress would be only too glad at any moment to have the help of any number of spare hands; that she would know in an instant what to set them to;—in an instant what part of to-morrow's work might be most serviceably forwarded, what part of next month's work most wisely provided for, or what new task of some profitable kind undertaken; and when the evening came, and she dismissed her servants to their recreation or their rest, or gathered them to the reading round the work-table, under the eaves in the sunset, would you not be sure to find that none of them had been overtasked by her, just because none had been left idle; that everything had been accomplished because all had been employed; that the kindness of the mistress had aided her presence of mind, and the slight labour had been entrusted to the weak, and the formidable to the strong; and that as none had been dishonoured by inactivity, so none had been broken by toil?

Now, the precise counterpart of such a household would be seen in a nation in which political economy was rightly understood. You complain of the difficulty of finding work for your men. Depend upon it, the real difficulty rather is to find men for your work. The serious

question for you is not how many you have to feed, but how much you have to do; it is our inactivity, not our hunger, that ruins us: let us never fear that our servants should have a good appetite—our wealth is in their strength, not in their starvation. Look around this island of yours, and see what you have to do in it. The sea roars against your harbourless cliffs—you have to build the breakwater, and dig the port of refuge; the unclean pestilence ravins in your streets—you have to bring the full stream from the hills, and to send the free winds through the thoroughfare; the famine blanches your lips and eats away your flesh—you have to dig the moor and dry the marsh, to bid the morass give forth instead of engulfing, and to wring the honey and oil out of the rock. These things, and thousands such, we have to do, and shall have to do constantly, on this great farm of ours; for do not suppose that it is anything else than that. Precisely the same laws of economy which apply to the cultivation of a farm or an estate, apply to the cultivation of a province or of an island. Whatever rebuke you would address to the improvident master of an ill-managed patrimony, precisely that rebuke we should address to ourselves, so far as we leave our population in idleness and our country in disorder. What would you say to the lord of an estate who complained to you of his poverty and disabilities, and when you pointed out to him that his land was half of it overrun with weeds, and that his fences were all in ruin, and that his cattle-sheds were roofless, and his labourers lying under the hedges faint for want of food, he answered to you that it would ruin him to weed his land or to roof his sheds—that those were too costly operations for him to undertake, and that he knew not how to feed his labourers nor pay them? Would you not instantly answer, that instead of ruining him to weed his fields, it would save him; that his inactivity was his destruction, and that to set his labourers to work was to feed them? Now, you may add acre to acre, and estate to estate, as far as you like, but you will never reach a compass of ground which shall escape from the authority of these simple laws. The principles which are right in the administration of a few fields, are right also in the administration of a great country from horizon to horizon: idleness does not cease to be ruinous because it is extensive, nor labour to be productive because it is universal.

Nay, but you reply, there is one vast difference between the nation's economy and the private man's: the farmer has full authority over his labourers; he can direct them to do what is needed to be done, whether they like it or not; and he can turn them away if they refuse to work, or impede others in their working, or are disobedient, or quarrelsome.

There *is* this great difference; it is precisely this difference on which I wish to fix your attention, for it is precisely this difference which you have to do away with. We know the necessity of authority in farm, or in fleet, or in army; but we commonly refuse to admit it in the body of the nation. Let us consider this point a little.

In the various awkward and unfortunate efforts which the French have made at the development of a social system, they have at least stated one true principle, that of fraternity or brotherhood. Do not be alarmed; they got all wrong in their experiments, because they quite forgot that this fact of fraternity implied another fact quite as important—that of paternity, or fatherhood. That is to say, if they were to regard the nation as one family, the condition of unity in that family consisted no less in their having a head, or a father, than in their being faithful and affectionate members, or brothers. But we must not forget this, for we have long confessed it with our lips, though we refuse to confess it in our lives. For half an hour every Sunday we expect a man in a black gown, supposed to be telling us truth, to address us as brethren, though we should be shocked at the notion of any brotherhood existing among us out of church. And we can hardly read a few sentences on any political subject without running a chance of crossing the phrase "paternal government," though we should be utterly horror-struck at the idea of governments claiming anything like a father's authority over us. Now, I believe those two formal phrases are in both instances perfectly binding and accurate, and that the image of the farm and its servants which I have hitherto used, as expressing a wholesome national organization, fails only of doing so, not because it is too domestic, but because it is not domestic enough; because the real type of a well-organized nation must be presented, not by a farm cultivated by servants who wrought for hire, and might be turned away if they refused to labour, but by a farm in which the master was a father, and in which all the servants were sons; which implied, therefore, in all its regulations, not merely the order of expediency, but the bonds of affection and responsibilities of relationship; and in which all acts and services were not only to be sweetened by brotherly concord, but to be enforced by fatherly authority.

Observe, I do not mean in the least that we ought to place such an authority in the hands of any one person, or of any class or body of persons. But I do mean to say that as an individual who conducts himself wisely must make laws for himself which at some time or other may appear irksome or injurious, but which, precisely at the time they appear most irksome, it is most necessary he should obey, so a nation

which means to conduct itself wisely, must establish authority over itself, vested either in kings, councils, or laws, which it must resolve to obey, even at times when the law or authority appears irksome to the body of the people, or injurious to certain masses of it. And this kind of national law has hitherto been only judicial; contented, that is, with an endeavour to prevent and punish violence and crime: but, as we advance in our social knowledge, we shall endeavour to make our government paternal as well as judicial; that is, to establish such laws and authorities as may at once direct us in our occupations, protect us against our follies, and visit us in our distresses: a government which shall repress dishonesty, as now it punishes theft; which shall show how the discipline of the masses may be brought to aid the toils of peace, as discipline of the masses has hitherto knit the sinews of battle; a government which shall have its soldiers of the ploughshare as well as its soldiers of the sword, and which shall distribute more proudly its golden crosses of industry—golden as the glow of the harvest, than now it grants its bronze crosses of honour—bronzed with the crimson of blood.

I have not, of course, time to insist on the nature or details of government of this kind; only I wish to plead for your several and future consideration of this one truth, that the notion of Discipline and Interference lies at the very root of all human progress or power; that the "Let-alone" principle is, in all things which man has to do with, the principle of death; that it is ruin to him, certain and total, if he lets his land alone—if he lets his fellow-men alone—if he lets his own soul alone. That his whole life, on the contrary, must, if it is healthy life, be continually one of ploughing and pruning, rebuking and helping, governing and punishing; and that therefore it is only in the concession of some great principle of restraint and interference in national action that he can ever hope to find the secret of protection against national degradation. I believe that the masses have a right to claim education from their government; but only so far as they acknowledge the duty of yielding obedience to their government. I believe they have a right to claim employment from their governors; but only so far as they yield to the governor the direction and discipline of their labour; and it is only so far as they grant to the men whom they may set over them the father's authority to check the childishnesses of national fancy, and direct the waywardnesses of national energy, that they have a right to ask that none of their distresses should be unrelieved, none of their weaknesses unwatched; and that no grief, nor

nakedness, nor peril should exist for them, against which the father's hand was not outstretched, or the father's shield uplifted.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Should a nation plan its economy? As early as the 1860s Ruskin answered "Yes," for reasons similar to those that guided the New Deal as it began its fight against the terrors of depression. Ruskin, however, called for planning during a period of prosperity: England's boom years from the early 1850s into the '70s have been called the "Golden Age" of capitalism. Nevertheless, then as now, even in good times many citizens were unemployed or lacked the wherewithal for decent homes and clothing or sufficient food, economic insecurity exacting its toll when labor and raw materials were plentiful, when factories could produce enough for all. Not least incongruous, while thousands of human beings were stunted by want, men bragged of what they called the national "wealth." Ruskin concluded that something was radically wrong with the political economy of his day.

What, he asked, *is* the genuine wealth of any nation? And when there can be enough for all, how can a nation resolve the paradox of want amidst plenty? Thus, in the address here reprinted, he posed two of the main issues we are facing as we renew the ways of peace. Trouble will continue, Ruskin maintained, until people accept cooperation instead of competition as the governing principle of their national economic life; the policy of laissez-faire is "the principle of death." Further, he protested that no nation's wealth consists of cash profits made by individuals; wealth must be measured, rather, by the health and happiness of *all* citizens. To achieve such wealth, he added, a nation must be wisely managed. If, on a farm, men are idle when there is work to be done, if there is want although the land is capable of yielding plenty, then something is wrong with management. So it is, he reasoned, with that vast farm, a nation. Calling for a planned economy (which he thought could be achieved through paternalistic capitalism), he warned that no civilization is static: "Change *must* come, but it is ours to determine whether change of growth or of death."

Ruskin's concepts flowed into the great stream of liberal thought and were gradually absorbed into the ideology of the British labor movement. This type of thinking bore fruit in England more quickly than in America, where vast reserves of undeveloped resources enabled us to postpone our reckoning with laissez-faire. But long before the 1930s many Americans had begun to protest that mere production for profit, based on a national creed of "every man for himself and the devil take the hind-most," does not guarantee national happiness, national strength. And after years of

New Deal leadership, a large majority were convinced that unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, better housing, projects like the TVA are legitimate undertakings of the state. But how much further should the federal government go in planning for the health and happiness of citizens? This is one question each must answer as he votes on the direction of future change.

1. What was the occasion of this lecture? What, then, can you infer about the class of people Ruskin addressed? about what they expected him to discuss? What denotation and connotation would the word *wealth* have had for them? What would have been their feelings as he surveyed attitudes toward wealth? Explain fully what the word *wealth* meant to Ruskin. Why, therefore, was his opening paragraph brilliantly ironic? (What, incidentally, is irony?) Where else was he ironic? What qualities helped him keep the audience sympathetic after they recognized the irony of these passages?

2. Contrast the popular definition of *economy* with Ruskin's. What does he mean by *political economy*? Why did he believe that men must plan and think in terms of an economy of abundance (i.e., ability to produce plenty for all)? What does he mean when he says we must produce for "use"? for "beauty"? Why do you believe him right or wrong in saying that wise production is fairly divided between use and beauty?

3. Why is it always dangerous to argue from analogy? Why do you consider Ruskin's analogy between a nation and a farm valid or invalid? Why does Ruskin believe that we can't afford *not* to give public work to the unemployed? Why do you think it does or does not remain true that we have more work needing to be done than men to do it? Why do you believe that we should or should not maintain full employment through federal financing of such work?

4. Why do you find the argument for "authority" convincing or unconvincing as Ruskin presents it? Would you consider him more conservative than radical (or *vice versa*) in his general tone and point of view? Why? Explain why, in your opinion, the government control he urges would be compatible or incompatible with democracy.

5. Select what you consider the half-dozen best figures of speech. Why are they effective, considering the nature of the audience and Ruskin's purpose? Is the diction dominantly simple or erudite? Explain how, in ¶1, he must have carefully selected the following words for their denotative meanings: *notable, just, wholesome, profound, false, distinction, extraordinary*. Illustrate the intellectual incisiveness ("purity") in use of words in other paragraphs. Select, in contrast, words rich in connotations, explaining why they are suggestive. Is the sentence structure characteristically simple or elaborate? Ruskin's sentence rhythms are one outstanding characteristic of his style; analyze ¶7 to discover how they are achieved. Indicate balance and parallelism between sentences 2 and 3. How do these

parallel constructions achieve an effect of rising climax through content, position, and rhythms? What is lost and/or gained through the falling cadence at the end of sentence 3? Illustrate final falling cadence (characteristic of Ruskin's style) from other paragraphs. List the triads (three-part parallelisms) in sentences 1, 5, 6, 7: how often and why is there syllabic increase (increasing length of each successive element in the parallelism)? How many sentences have initial periodicity? Read the paragraph aloud, stressing cadences. Where do the long sweeping cadences usually occur? Why not always there? What is their effect? Now read aloud ¶12 to see whether the same effects are analogously achieved. Why was this style appropriate or inappropriate to the occasion? How does it reveal Ruskin's qualities of intellect? of imagination? of emotion? Why is he considered one of the great stylists?

Planning and Democracy

FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK

Friedrich A. Hayek, born in 1899 in Austria, where he became Director of the Austrian Institute for Economic Research and Lecturer in Economics in the University of Vienna, has lived in England since 1931 and is now a British citizen and a professor at the University of London. He is the author of influential works, especially on monetary theory and the business cycle, in both German and English, such as *Preise und Produktion* and *The Pure Theory of Capital.* During the London blitz he wrote a short book, *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), because he could not concentrate on more ambitious writing plans and because he was alarmed by certain British and American economic and political trends. The book, really written for a few political leaders and fellow economists, surprised its author and publishers by becoming a sensational best-seller and a focus of excited controversy. As a professional economist, Professor Hayek found himself somewhat embarrassed by a notoriety due partly to imperfect understanding of a book of theory which necessarily lacked the scholarly array and weight of evidence commonly found in his work. Conservatives greeted the book joyfully; socialists, communists, and economic "planners" deprecated it as forcefully as possible. It is a very arresting assertion of the value of the free competitive market and of the dangers of centralized planning of the total economy.

Professor Hayek is not opposed to all government planning or to certain restrictions on private enterprise. He approves of public works, some degree of "social security," and currency control, to prevent the extreme fluctuations of the business cycle; and he wants free trade (or at least greatly lowered tariffs), relief of patent restrictions, and enforcement of laws against monopoly, as safeguards of free competition. But these very secondary elements in the book, since they get comparatively little stress, have often been overlooked or ignored in the preoccupation with the main point, the strongly argued warning that comprehensive centralized government planning of economic life is incompatible with survival of freedom as we understand the term—that it is, in fact, "the road to serfdom" under totalitarian dictatorship. Because of his fear of possible loss of freedom, the author is more concerned about the dangers of increased governmental power than about those of rapidly increasing private economic power. He feels that the freely functioning market, automatic regulator of the economy, protected against special privilege and excessive concentration in business and against state assumption of power to decide

Chapter V, *The Road to Serfdom,* University of Chicago Press, 1944. By permission of the publishers.

between the infinitely complex desires of different interests, must be the foundation of democracy and democratic liberties. He has tried to show that the tyranny of Hitler was but a final logical step in an evolution from socialistic theory to economic planning and then to dictatorship over all aspects of national life. He sees in the great democracies, England and America, tendencies suggesting that they may follow a similar road toward the destruction of freedom. Socialism and comprehensive planning, he believes, lead, in a word, to fascism.

The statesman who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted to no council and senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.—ADAM SMITH.

THE COMMON FEATURES of all collectivist systems may be described, in a phrase ever dear to socialists of all schools, as the deliberate organization of the labors of society for a definite social goal. That our present society lacks such "conscious" direction toward a single aim, that its activities are guided by the whims and fancies of irresponsible individuals, has always been one of the main complaints of its socialist critics.

In many ways this puts the basic issue very clearly. And it directs us at once to the point where the conflict arises between individual freedom and collectivism. The various kinds of collectivism, communism, fascism, etc., differ among themselves in the nature of the goal toward which they want to direct the efforts of society. But they all differ from liberalism and individualism in wanting to organize the whole of society and all its resources for this unitary end and in refusing to recognize autonomous spheres in which the ends of the individuals are supreme. In short, they are totalitarian in the true sense of this new word which we have adopted to describe the unexpected but nevertheless inseparable manifestations of what in theory we call collectivism.

The "social goal," or "common purpose," for which society is to be organized is usually vaguely described as the "common good," the

"general welfare," or the "general interest." It does not need much reflection to see that these terms have no sufficiently definite meaning to determine a particular course of action. The welfare and the happiness of millions cannot be measured on a single scale of less and more. The welfare of a people, like the happiness of a man, depends on a great many things that can be provided in an infinite variety of combinations. It cannot be adequately expressed as a single end, but only as a hierarchy of ends, a comprehensive scale of values in which every need of every person is given its place. To direct all our activities according to a single plan presupposes that every one of our needs is given its rank in an order of values which must be complete enough to make it possible to decide among all the different courses which the planner has to choose. It presupposes, in short, the existence of a complete ethical code in which all the different human values are allotted their due place.

The conception of a complete ethical code is unfamiliar, and it requires some effort of imagination to see what it involves. We are not in the habit of thinking of moral codes as more or less complete. The fact that we are constantly choosing between different values without a social code prescribing how we ought to choose does not surprise us and does not suggest to us that our moral code is incomplete. In our society there is neither occasion nor reason why people should develop common views about what should be done in such situations. But where all the means to be used are the property of society and are to be used in the name of society according to a unitary plan, a "social" view about what ought to be done must guide all decisions. In such a world we should soon find that our moral code is full of gaps.

We are not concerned here with the question whether it would be desirable to have such a complete ethical code. It may merely be pointed out that up to the present the growth of civilization has been accompanied by a steady diminution of the sphere in which individual actions are bound by fixed rules. The rules of which our common moral code consists have progressively become fewer and more general in character. From the primitive man, who was bound by an elaborate ritual in almost every one of his daily activities, who was limited by innumerable taboos, and who could scarcely conceive of doing things in a way different from his fellows, morals have more and more tended to become merely limits circumscribing the sphere within which the individual could behave as he liked. The adoption of a common ethical code comprehensive enough to determine a unitary economic plan would mean a complete reversal of this tendency.

The essential point for us is that no such complete ethical code exists. The attempt to direct all economic activity according to a single plan would raise innumerable questions to which the answer could be provided only by a moral rule, but to which existing morals have no answer and where there exists no agreed view on what ought to be done. People will have either no definite views or conflicting views on such questions, because in the free society in which we have lived there has been no occasion to think about them and still less to form common opinions about them.

Not only do we not possess such an all-inclusive scale of values: it would be impossible for any mind to comprehend the infinite variety of different needs of different people which compete for the available resources and to attach a definite weight to each. For our problem it is of minor importance whether the ends for which any person cares comprehend only his own individual needs, or whether they include the needs of his closer or even those of his more distant fellows—that is, whether he is egoistic or altruistic in the ordinary senses of these words. The point which is so important is the basic fact that it is impossible for any man to survey more than a limited field, to be aware of the urgency of more than a limited number of needs. Whether his interests center round his own physical needs, or whether he takes a warm interest in the welfare of every human being he knows, the ends about which he can be concerned will always be only an infinitesimal fraction of the needs of all men.

This is the fundamental fact on which the whole philosophy of individualism is based. It does not assume, as is often asserted, that man is egoistic or selfish or ought to be. It merely starts from the indisputable fact that the limits of our powers of imagination make it impossible to include in our scale of values more than a sector of the needs of the whole society, and that, since, strictly speaking, scales of value can exist only in individual minds, nothing but partial scales of values exist—scales which are inevitably different and often inconsistent with each other. From this the individualist concludes that the individuals should be allowed, within defined limits, to follow their own values and preferences rather than somebody else's; that within these spheres the individual's system of ends should be supreme and not subject to any dictation by others. It is this recognition of the individual as the ultimate judge of his ends, the belief that as far as possible his own views ought to govern his actions, that forms the essence of the individualist position.

This view does not, of course, exclude the recognition of social ends,

or rather of a coincidence of individual ends which makes it advisable for men to combine for their pursuit. But it limits such common action to the instances where individual views coincide; what are called "social ends" are for it merely identical ends of many individuals—or ends to the achievement of which individuals are willing to contribute in return for the assistance they receive in the satisfaction of their own desires. Common action is thus limited to the fields where people agree on common ends. Very frequently these common ends will not be ultimate ends to the individuals but means which different persons can use for different purposes. In fact, people are most likely to agree on common action where the common end is not an ultimate end to them but a means capable of serving a great variety of purposes.

When individuals combine in a joint effort to realize ends they have in common, the organizations, like the state, that they form for this purpose are given their own system of ends and their own means. But any organization thus formed remains one "person" among others, in the case of the state much more powerful than any of the others, it is true, yet still with its separate and limited sphere in which alone its ends are supreme. The limits of this sphere are determined by the extent to which the individuals agree on particular ends; and the probability that they will agree on a particular course of action necessarily decreases as the scope of such action extends. There are certain functions of the state on the exercise of which there will be practical unanimity among its citizens; there will be others on which there will be agreement of a substantial majority; and so on, until we come to fields where, although each individual might wish the state to act in some way, there will be almost as many views about what the government should do as there are different people.

We can rely on voluntary agreement to guide the action of the state only so long as it is confined to spheres where agreement exists. But not only when the state undertakes direct control in fields where there is no such agreement is it bound to suppress individual freedom. We can unfortunately not indefinitely extend the sphere of common action and still leave the individual free in his own sphere. Once the communal sector, in which the state controls all the means, exceeds a certain proportion of the whole, the effects of its actions dominate the whole system. Although the state controls directly the use of only a large part of the available resources, the effects of its decisions on the remaining part of the economic system become so great that indirectly it controls almost everything. Where, as was, for example, true in Germany as early as 1928, the central and local authorities directly

control the use of more than half the national income (according to an official German estimate then, 53 per cent), they control indirectly almost the whole economic life of the nation. There is, then, scarcely an individual end which is not dependent for its achievement on the action of the state, and the "social scale of values" which guides the state's action must embrace practically all individual ends.

It is not difficult to see what must be the consequences when democracy embarks upon a course of planning which in its execution requires more agreement than in fact exists. The people may have agreed on adopting a system of directed economy because they have been convinced that it will produce great prosperity. In the discussions leading to the decision, the goal of planning will have been described by some such terms as "common welfare," which only conceals the absence of real agreement on the ends of planning. Agreement will in fact exist only on the mechanism to be used. But it is a mechanism which can be used only for a common end; and the question of the precise goal toward which all activity is to be directed will arise as soon as the executive power has to translate the demand for a single plan into a particular plan. Then it will appear that the agreement on the desirability of planning is not supported by agreement on the ends the plan is to serve. The effect of the people's agreeing that there must be central planning, without agreeing on the ends, will be rather as if a group of people were to commit themselves to take a journey together without agreeing where they want to go: with the result that they may all have to make a journey which most of them do not want at all. That planning creates a situation in which it is necessary for us to agree on a much larger number of topics than we have been used to, and that in a planned system we cannot confine collective action to the tasks on which we can agree but are forced to produce agreement on everything in order that any action can be taken at all, is one of the features which contributes more than most to determining the character of a planned system.

It may be the unanimously expressed will of the people that its parliament should prepare a comprehensive economic plan, yet neither the people nor its representatives need therefore be able to agree on any particular plan. The inability of democratic assemblies to carry out what seems to be a clear mandate of the people will inevitably cause dissatisfaction with democratic institutions. Parliaments come to be regarded as ineffective "talking shops," unable or incompetent to carry out the tasks for which they have been chosen. The conviction

grows that if efficient planning is to be done, the direction must be "taken out of politics" and placed in the hands of experts—permanent officials or independent autonomous bodies.

The difficulty is well known to socialists. It will soon be half a century since the Webbs began to complain of "the increased incapacity of the House of Commons to cope with its work."* More recently, Professor Laski has elaborated the argument:

> It is common ground that the present parliamentary machine is quite unsuited to pass rapidly a great body of complicated legislation. The National Government, indeed, has in substance admitted this by implementing its economy and tariff measures not by detailed debate in the House of Commons but by a wholesale system of delegated legislation. A Labour Government would, I presume, build upon the amplitude of this precedent. It would confine the House of Commons to the two functions it can properly perform: the ventilation of grievances and the discussion of general principles of its measures. Its Bills would take the form of general formulae conferring wide powers on the appropriate government departments; and those powers would be exercised by Order in Council which could, if desired, be attacked in the House by means of a vote of no confidence. The necessity and value of delegated legislation has recently been strongly reaffirmed by the Donoughmore Committee; and its extension is inevitable if the process of socialisation is not to be wrecked by the normal methods of obstruction which existing parliamentary procedure sanctions.

And to make it quite clear that a socialist government must not allow itself to be too much fettered by democratic procedure, Professor Laski at the end of the same article raised the question "whether in a period of transition to Socialism, a Labour Government can risk the overthrow of its measures as a result of the next general election"—and left it significantly unanswered.†

It is important clearly to see the causes of this admitted ineffectiveness of parliaments when it comes to a detailed administration of the

* Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Industrial Democracy* (1897), p. 800 n.

† H. J. Laski, "Labour and the Constitution," *New Statesman and Nation*, No. 81 (new ser.), September 10, 1932, p. 277. In a book (*Democracy in Crisis* [1933], particularly p. 87) in which Professor Laski later elaborated these ideas, his determination that parliamentary democracy must not be allowed to form an obstacle to the realization of socialism is even more plainly expressed: not only would a socialist government "take vast powers and legislate under them by ordinance and decree" and "suspend the classic formulae of normal opposition" but the "continuance of parliamentary government would depend on its [i.e., the Labour government's] possession of guarantees from the Conservative Party that its work of transformation would not be disrupted by repeal in the event of its defeat at the polls"!

As Professor Laski invokes the authority of the Donoughmore Committee, it may be worth recalling that Professor Laski was a member of that committee and presumably one of the authors of its report.

economic affairs of a nation. The fault is neither with the individual representatives nor with parliamentary institutions as such but with the contradictions inherent in the task with which they are charged. They are not asked to act where they can agree, but to produce agreement on everything—the whole direction of the resources of the nation. For such a task the system of majority decision is, however, not suited. Majorities will be found where it is a choice between limited alternatives; but it is a superstition to believe that there must be a majority view on everything. There is no reason why there should be a majority in favor of any one of the different possible courses of positive action if their number is legion. Every member of the legislative assembly might prefer some particular plan for the direction of economic activity to no plan, yet no one plan may appear preferable to a majority to no plan at all.

Nor can a coherent plan be achieved by breaking it up into parts and voting on particular issues. A democratic assembly voting and amending a comprehensive economic plan clause by clause, as it deliberates on an ordinary bill, makes nonsense. An economic plan, to deserve the name, must have a unitary conception. Even if a parliament could, proceeding step by step, agree on some scheme, it would certainly in the end satisfy nobody. A complex whole in which all the parts must be most carefully adjusted to each other cannot be achieved through a compromise between conflicting views. To draw up an economic plan in this fashion is even less possible than, for example, successfully to plan a military campaign by democratic procedure. As in strategy it would become inevitable to delegate the task to the experts.

Yet the difference is that, while the general who is put in charge of a campaign is given a single end to which, for the duration of the campaign, all the means under his control have to be exclusively devoted, there can be no such single goal given to the economic planner, and no similar limitation of the means imposed upon him. The general has not got to balance different independent aims against each other; there is for him only one supreme goal. But the ends of an economic plan, or of any part of it, cannot be defined apart from the particular plan. It is the essence of the economic problem that the making of an economic plan involves the choice between conflicting or competing ends—different needs of different people. But which ends do so conflict, which will have to be sacrificed if we want to achieve certain others, in short, which are the alternatives between which we must choose, can only be known to those who know all the facts; and

only they, the experts, are in a position to decide which of the different ends are to be given preference. It is inevitable that they should impose their scale of preferences on the community for which they plan.

This is not always clearly recognized, and delegation is usually justified by the technical character of the task. But this does not mean that only the technical detail is delegated, or even that the inability of parliaments to understand the technical detail is the root of the difficulty.* Alterations in the structure of civil law are no less technical and no more difficult to appreciate in all their implications; yet nobody has yet seriously suggested that legislation there should be delegated to a body of experts. The fact is that in these fields legislation does not go beyond general rules on which true majority agreement can be achieved, while in the direction of economic activity the interests to be reconciled are so divergent that no true agreement is likely to be reached in a democratic assembly.

It should be recognized, however, that it is not the delegation of law-making power as such which is so objectionable. To oppose delegation as such is to oppose a symptom instead of the cause and, as it may be a necessary result of other causes, to weaken the case. So long as the power that is delegated is merely the power to make general rules, there may be very good reasons why such rules should be laid down by local rather than by the central authority. The objectionable feature is that delegation is so often resorted to because the matter in hand cannot be regulated by general rules but only by the exercise of discretion in the decision of particular cases. In these instances delega-

* It is instructive in this connection briefly to refer to the government document in which in recent years these problems have been discussed. As long as thirteen years ago, that is before England finally abandoned economic liberalism, the process of delegating legislative powers had already been carried to a point where it was felt necessary to appoint a committee to investigate "what safeguards are desirable or necessary to secure the sovereignty of Law." In its report the Donoughmore Committee (*Report of the* [*Lord Chancellor's*] *Committee on Minister's Powers,* Cmd. 4060 [1932]) showed that even at that date Parliament had resorted "to the practice of wholesale and indiscriminate delegation" but regarded this (it was before we had really glanced into the totalitarian abyss!) as an inevitably and relatively innocuous development. And it is probably true that delegation as such need not be a danger to freedom. The interesting point is why delegation had become necessary on such a scale. First place among the causes enumerated in the report is given to the fact that "Parliament nowadays passes so many laws every year" and that "much of the detail is so technical as to be unsuitable for Parliamentary discussion." But if this were all there would be no reason why the detail should not be worked out *before* rather than after Parliament passes a law. What is probably in many cases a much more important reason why, "if Parliament were not willing to delegate law-making power, Parliament would be unable to pass the kind and quantity of legislation which public opinion requires" is innocently revealed in the little sentence that "many of the laws affect people's lives so closely that elasticity is essential"! What does this mean if not conferment of arbitrary power—power limited by no fixed principles and which in the opinion of Parliament cannot be limited by definite and unambiguous rules?

tion means that some authority is given power to make with the force of law what to all intents and purposes are arbitrary decisions (usually described as "judging the case on its merits").

The delegation of particular technical tasks to separate bodies, while a regular feature, is yet only the first step in the process whereby a democracy which embarks on planning progressively relinquishes its powers. The expedient of delegation cannot really remove the causes which make all the advocates of comprehensive planning so impatient with the impotence of democracy. The delegation of particular powers to separate agencies creates a new obstacle to the achievement of a single co-ordinated plan. Even if, by this expedient, a democracy should succeed in planning every sector of economic activity, it would still have to face the problem of integrating these separate plans into a unitary whole. Many separate plans do not make a planned whole—in fact, as the planners ought to be the first to admit, they may be worse than no plan. But the democratic legislature will long hesitate to relinquish the decisions on really vital issues, and so long as it does so it makes it impossible for anyone else to provide the comprehensive plan. Yet agreement that planning is necessary, together with the inability of democratic assemblies to produce a plan, will evoke stronger and stronger demands that the government or some single individual should be given powers to act on their own responsibility. The belief is becoming more and more widespread that, if things are to get done, the responsible authorities must be freed from the fetters of democratic procedure.

The cry for an economic dictator is a characteristic stage in the movement toward planning. It is now several years since one of the most acute of foreign students of England, the late Élie Halévy, suggested that, "if you take a composite photograph of Lord Eustace Percy, Sir Oswald Mosley, and Sir Stafford Cripps,[1] I think you would find this common feature—you would find them all agreeing to say: 'We are living in economic chaos and we cannot get out of it except under some kind of dictatorial leadership.' "* The number of influential public men whose inclusion would not materially alter the features of the "composite photograph" has since grown considerably.

[1] *Lord Eustace Percy* (b. 1887), recently President of Board of Education and Minister without portfolio, writer on education and government. *Sir Oswald Mosley* (b. 1896), pre-war organizer of an abortive British fascistic movement. *Sir Stafford Cripps* (b. 1889), well known Labour Party figure, President of Board of Trade in the Attlee government.

* "Socialism and the Problems of Democratic Parliamentarism," *International Affairs*, XIII, 501.

In Germany, even before Hitler came into power, the movement had already progressed much further. It is important to remember that, for some time before 1933, Germany had reached a stage in which it had, in effect, had to be governed dictatorially. Nobody could then doubt that for the time being democracy had broken down and that sincere democrats like Brüning were no more able to govern democratically than Schleicher or von Papen.[2] Hitler did not have to destroy democracy; he merely took advantage of the decay of democracy and at the critical moment obtained the support of many to whom, though they detested Hitler, he yet seemed the only man strong enough to get things done.

The argument by which the planners usually try to reconcile us with this development is that, so long as democracy retains ultimate control, the essentials of democracy are not affected. Thus Karl Mannheim writes:

> The only [*sic*] way in which a planned society differs from that of the nineteenth century is that more and more spheres of social life, and ultimately each and all of them, are subjected to state control. But if a few controls can be held in check by parliamentary sovereignty, so can many. . . . . In a democratic state sovereignty can be boundlessly strengthened by plenary powers without renouncing democratic control.*

This belief overlooks a vital distinction. Parliament can, of course, control the execution of tasks where it can give definite directions, where it has first agreed on the aim and merely delegates the working-out of the detail. The situation is entirely different when the reason for the delegation is that there is no real agreement on the ends, when the body charged with the planning has to choose between ends of whose conflict parliament is not even aware, and when the most that can be done is to present to it a plan which has to be accepted or rejected as a whole. There may and probably will be criticism; but as no majority can agree on an alternative plan, and the parts objected to can almost always be represented as essential parts of the whole, it will remain quite ineffective. Parliamentary discussion may be retained as a useful safety valve and even more as a convenient medium

[2] Heinrich *Brüning* (b. 1885), Centrist leader of the Reichstag, German Chancellor 1930–1932. Kurt *von Schleicher* (1882–1934), Chancellor of the Reich for 57 days in 1932–33; resigned to be succeeded by Hitler. Franz *von Papen* (b. 1879), Chancellor following Bruning in 1932; Vice-Chancellor under Hitler; prisoner of the Allies following Hitler's collapse.

* *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (1940), p. 340.

through which the official answers to complaints are disseminated. It may even prevent some flagrant abuses and successfully insist on particular short-comings being remedied. But it cannot direct. It will at best be reduced to choosing the persons who are to have practically absolute power. The whole system will tend toward that plebiscitarian dictatorship in which the head of the government is from time to time confirmed in his position by popular vote, but where he has all the powers at his command to make certain that the vote will go in the direction he desires.

It is the price of democracy that the possibilities of conscious control are restricted to the fields where true agreement exists and that in some fields things must be left to chance. But in a society which for its functioning depends on central planning this control cannot be made dependent on a majority's being able to agree; it will often be necessary that the will of a small minority be imposed upon the people, because this minority will be the largest group able to agree among themselves on the question at issue. Democratic government has worked successfully where, and so long as, the functions of government were, by a widely accepted creed, restricted to fields where agreement among a majority could be achieved by free discussion; and it is the great merit of the liberal creed that it reduced the range of subjects on which agreement was necessary to one on which it was likely to exist in a society of free men. It is now often said that democracy will not tolerate "capitalism." If "capitalism" means here a competitive system based on free disposal over private property, it is far more important to realize that only within this system is democracy possible. When it becomes dominated by a collectivist creed, democracy will inevitably destroy itself.

We have no intention, however, of making a fetish of democracy. It may well be true that our generation talks and thinks too much of democracy and too little of the values which it serves. It cannot be said of democracy, as Lord Acton[3] truly said of liberty, that it "is not a means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest political end. It is not for the sake of a good public administration that it is required, but for the security in the pursuit of the highest objects of civil society, and of private life." Democracy is essentially a means, a utilitarian device for safeguarding internal peace and individual freedom. As such it is by no means infallible or certain. Nor must we forget that

[3] Sir John Emerich Edward Dalberg, 1st Baron *Acton* (1834–1902), Professor of Modern History at Cambridge, liberal historian and statesman.

there has often been much more cultural and spiritual freedom under an autocratic rule than under some democracies—and it is at least conceivable that under the government of a very homogeneous and doctrinaire majority democratic government might be as oppressive as the worst dictatorship. Our point, however, is not that dictatorship must inevitably extirpate freedom but rather that planning leads to dictatorship because dictatorship is the most effective instrument of coercion and the enforcement of ideals and, as such, essential if central planning on a large scale is to be possible. The clash between planning and democracy arises simply from the fact that the latter is an obstacle to the suppression of freedom which the direction of economic activity requires. But in so far as democracy ceases to be a guaranty of individual freedom, it may well persist in some form under a totalitarian regime. A true "dictatorship of the proletariat," even if democratic in form, if it undertook centrally to direct the economic system, would probably destroy personal freedom as completely as any autocracy has ever done.

The fashionable concentration on democracy as the main value threatened is not without danger. It is largely responsible for the misleading and unfounded belief that, so long as the ultimate source of power is the will of the majority, the power cannot be arbitrary. The false assurance which many people derive from this belief is an important cause of the general unawareness of the dangers which we face. There is no justification for the belief that, so long as power is conferred by democratic procedure, it cannot be arbitrary; the contrast suggested by this statement is altogether false: it is not the source but the limitation of power which prevents it from being arbitrary. Democratic control *may* prevent power from becoming arbitrary, but it does not do so by its mere existence. If democracy resolves on a task which necessarily involves the use of power which cannot be guided by fixed rules, it must become arbitrary power.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Henry Hazlitt, reviewing Professor Hayek's book in the New York *Times,* hailed the author as successor of Adam Smith, Macaulay, Mill, Morley, and other liberals of the English tradition, finding it ironic that so forceful a contemporary follower should be a naturalized Viennese. But terms like "liberalism" demand new definitions in different generations. Professor Hayek does go back to a basic principle of 19th-century

British economists in his conception of the free competitive market, though he is not arguing, as some seem to think, for return to unrestricted laissez-faire. His case is but a much more forcefully reasoned restatement of a contention often heard: that state economic control is inconsistent with democratic liberties in thought, discussion, and action. The issue involved is crucial. Exponents of planning have lacked his faith in the free market as the best arbiter of all men's fortunes. They have been more concerned than he with concentrations of private power over national life, having seen them limit freedom and opportunity and inflict misery; and they could hardly regard his proposed reforms and restrictions (see biographical introduction) as likely to achieve adequate results. They have believed that centralized planning, kept subject to democratic control, can be much extended without encroaching on essential liberties which do not infringe the liberties of others. But Professor Hayek's warning is motivated by deep concern for freedom and supported by keen reasoning. We must weigh the claims of both sides in so vital a debate. The essay above is Chapter V of his book; here he estimates probable effects of planning on democratic procedures.

1. If a government tried to plan all production and distribution, why would different interests (for example, farmers, small manufacturers, large manufacturers, merchants, miners, consumers) want different things? How might the interests of farmers and manufacturers, for example, clash? those of different manufacturers? those of manufacturers and consumers? Hayek thinks planning would require a complete ethical code—principles to show the relative value of what different interests contribute to public welfare (no such code exists, of course). Why is such a code not indispensably necessary to the functioning of our present economy? Why do you or do you not agree that it would be necessary under planning? Why do you agree or disagree with Hayek's belief that, as man has developed, his freedom of action has been less and less restricted?

2. Hayek says that present democratic government works because large numbers of persons can agree on the issues it raises. How do our national and state elections and the most important bills now before Congress illustrate his point? Why, under planning, if Hayek is right (is he?), would issues become so complex that it would be almost impossible to get a majority of Congressmen or of the people to agree? (Why would Congressmen from farming, mining, and manufacturing states, for example, find it difficult to agree on proportions of different articles to be manufactured?) Hayek says no mind can comprehend and justly decide between the many competing desires and needs of a whole nation. Why does this argument seem to you convincing or unconvincing?

3. What are the stages by which, according to the author, planning would lead to dictatorship? Why does he believe no parliament or congress could agree on a unified plan? To what "experts," in case of dis-

agreement, would the phases of such a plan probably be referred? Could these phases later be dove-tailed and unified by parliamentary means? Why or why not? Why would or would not "the cry for an economic dictator" be the inevitable result?

4. What is meant by "government with plenary powers"? Why does Hayek believe that such a government cannot remain really democratic? Why does the author's analogy of a military campaign seem to you exact or inexact? Under planning, why might government be tempted to try to control elections? Why do you believe that our democratic traditions and faith could or could not be relied on to preserve free elections? Remembering your answers to earlier questions, try to uphold or refute Hayek's conclusion that "when it becomes dominated by a collectivist creed, democracy will inevitably perish."

5. Give the author's reasons for believing that democratic machinery like our presidential office, houses of Congress, and courts might go on under planning though your freedom or mine might be destroyed by oppressive majority rule. Why is this consistent or inconsistent with his earlier view that majority agreements would become almost impossible? Would planning require suppression and thus become arbitrary even though it preserved our Congress and courts? Why or why not?

6. Hayek wrote for a limited audience of well-informed people and found himself widely advertised and read or at least discussed by a large audience. What qualities of the writing suggest the author's conception of his audience? Judging by the present chapter, suggest reasons why the book became a best-seller and why its message was often imperfectly understood. At what points would illustration and examples be useful? If the chapter were to be rewritten for a large audience, what changes, in general and in detail, would you suggest?

Progressive Government

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT

The name of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882–1945) will never need a footnote. He stands with the great, not only with those who served mankind but with those who had the magnetism and power to prevail. We of the era that will bear his name in our history cannot really estimate him, though we can recount the Titanic labors of a crippled body that somehow seemed an irrelevance linked to such debonair grace and luminance of spirit. But we can confidently rest his case with the future since we know what he did and wished to do and since we have seen that only great courage and magnanimity can command such love in the many and such hatred in the few. He was the despair of his enemies, who could never bait him into anger. The sincerest of his critics respected him because they could be neither for nor against him on cheap terms: he restored to politics the dignity of large issues. Millions will never escape the spell of that serene presence, will always see him too vividly to see him in perspective—the warmth and friendliness of his voice, his ease and confidence of command, his infectious zest and gaiety, the charm and frankness of his smile, his way of tossing his handsome head in laughter or challenge. His courage and faith will always feed in other men the reservoirs of courage and faith. As we read his words, we hear his voice. We need only remind ourselves of the outlines of the brave career out of which the words came.

Like Jefferson an aristocrat of democracy, though more adroit in all but books and words, he entered public life with mingled motives of "*noblesse oblige,* good sportsmanship, and solemn dedication." His first venture, when he won his seat in the State Senate overwhelmingly as a Democrat in a Republican district, was prophetic. His brilliant gifts for political organization were devoted in 1912 to the nomination and candidacy of Woodrow Wilson, whose influence on him was lifelong. His immediate political reward was an assistant secretaryship of the Navy, in which he was tireless and highly successful, doing much to break the back of German submarine warfare in World War I. But a period of political and of physical defeat followed. He had already lost a race for the United States Senate as early as 1914; in 1921 he campaigned vigorously but unsuccessfully for the vice-presidency as running mate of Governor Cox of Ohio. In the following year he fell victim to infantile paralysis. But by 1924, after a hard struggle, he was back in public life, on crutches, placing

Speech before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, September 23, 1932. Reprinted from Vol. I, *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1928–36)*, Random House, 1938. A brief introduction is omitted.

Al Smith in nomination for the presidential candidacy in his high-hearted "Happy Warrior" speech. By 1928, walking with the aid of steel braces and two canes, he left the law offices of Roosevelt and O'Connor to campaign for the governorship of New York. He never lost another election. As Governor, with a Republican legislature, he pressed with varying success for public development of hydro-electric power, enlightened labor laws, old-age pensions and unemployment insurance, prison reform, and other progressive measures.

In one of the black hours of history, amidst economic paralysis and inanition, the Democratic Convention of 1932 nominated him for the presidency. Nothing could have steadied the nation as did that buoyant and fearless nature and that vibrant voice that presently spoke from the White House: "We have nothing to fear but fear itself." Emergency was turned to opportunity. We remember that brave attack: the Civilian Conservation Corps; the Securities Act; monetary control; the Home Owners' Loan Corporation; the Tennessee Valley Authority; administrations for emergency relief, public works, agriculture, transportation, federal housing, commodity credit, and social security; the National Industrial Recovery Act—and many other measures to restore a functioning economy and to redress the balance of social justice and obviate future collapse. Not all these measures were successful, but the New Deal as a whole had revolutionary significance. It asserted governmental authority over the economy in the interest of the whole people and served notice on uncoordinated, oppressive power that irresponsible misrule was intolerable. Its vast projects involved mistakes and waste. The frequent reorganizations and pyramidings of offices revealed Roosevelt's chief weakness, a lack of firm administrative grasp, one of the great defects of his great qualities. He aroused both honest criticism and unreasoning antagonism. But no such concerted drive on maladjustment and injustice had ever been conceived before in our history. Reelected in 1936, 1940, and 1944, Roosevelt continued his program of social progress, against mounting opposition, until imminent war forced it into abeyance.

It became necessary to pause and fight an atavism of evil before men of reason and good will could build again. With flexible leadership Roosevelt moved to prepare a reluctant people wary of foreign commitments and slow to admit the meaning of what they saw. Few indeed realized so clearly as he the nature of the threat, the fact that Britain—and later Russia—must not fall, the ability of American industry and organization to overtake and overwhelm the longer-prepared enemy, and the necessity of an international community for future peace. We remember the stages of our advance: aid to Britain and China, "hemispheric solidarity," the National Defense Commission, the "two-ocean navy," the "destroyers for bases" agreement, aid to Russia, the Selective Service Act, the Atlantic Charter, the occupation of Iceland—Pearl Harbor. The war itself, the triumphs of industrial conversion, and the dramatic victories of our forces

with those of our allies are too vivid in memory to need rehearsing. Through the years of preparation and war, the follower of Wilson had become his more persuasive and powerful successor, known with gratitude and affection wherever liberty is known or desired.

And then, an hour before victory, the sudden death that stunned the world. So quiet a death to ring so loud! Never had so many millions, the humble and proud of the earth, felt a common desolation in the loss of one great friend. That mercurial spirit, "the great politician of good," whose example again vindicated our democracy before the world, was gone. No, not gone, for this time he had indeed come to stay.

THE ISSUE OF GOVERNMENT has always been whether individual men and women will have to serve some system of Government or economics, or whether a system of Government and economics exists to serve individual men and women. This question has persistently dominated the discussion of Government for many generations. On questions relating to these things men have differed, and for time immemorial it is probable that honest men will continue to differ.

The final word belongs to no man; yet we can still believe in change and in progress. Democracy, as a dear old friend of mine in Indiana, Meredith Nicholson, has called it, is a quest, a never ending seeking for better things, and in the seeking for these things and the striving for them, there are many roads to follow. But, if we map the course of these roads, we find that there are only two general directions.

When we look about us, we are likely to forget how hard people have worked to win the privilege of Government. The growth of the national Governments of Europe was the struggle for the development of a centralized force in the Nation, strong enough to impose peace upon ruling barons. In many instances the victory of the central Government, the creation of a strong central Government, was a haven of refuge to the individual. The people preferred the master far away to the exploitation and cruelty of the smaller master near at hand.

But the creators of national Government were perforce ruthless men. They were often cruel in their methods, but they did strive steadily toward something that society needed and very much wanted, a strong central State able to keep the peace, to stamp out civil war, to put the unruly nobleman in his place, and to permit the bulk of individuals to live safely. The man of ruthless force had his place in developing a pioneer country, just as he did in fixing the power of the central Gov-

ernment in the development of Nations. Society paid him well for his services and its development. When the development among the Nations of Europe, however, had been completed, ambition and ruthlessness, having served their term, tended to overstep their mark.

There came a growing feeling that Government was conducted for the benefit of a few who thrived unduly at the expense of all. The people sought a balancing—a limiting force. There came gradually, through town councils, trade guilds, national parliaments, by constitution and by popular participation and control, limitations on arbitrary power.

Another factor that tended to limit the power of those who ruled, was the rise of the ethical conception that a ruler bore a responsibility for the welfare of his subjects.

The American colonies were born in this struggle. The American Revolution was a turning point in it. After the Revolution the struggle continued and shaped itself in the public life of the country. There were those who because they had seen the confusion which attended the years of war for American independence surrendered to the belief that popular Government was essentially dangerous and essentially unworkable. They were honest people, my friends, and we cannot deny that their experience had warranted some measure of fear. The most brilliant, honest and able exponent of this point of view was Hamilton. He was too impatient of slow-moving methods. Fundamentally he believed that the safety of the republic lay in the autocratic strength of its Government, that the destiny of individuals was to serve that Government, and that fundamentally a great and strong group of central institutions, guided by a small group of able and public spirited citizens, could best direct all Government.

But Mr. Jefferson, in the summer of 1776, after drafting the Declaration of Independence turned his mind to the same problem and took a different view. He did not deceive himself with outward forms. Government to him was a means to an end, not an end in itself; it might be either a refuge and a help or a threat and a danger, depending on the circumstances. We find him carefully analyzing the society for which he was to organize a Government. "We have no paupers. The great mass of our population is of laborers, our rich who can live without labor, either manual or professional, being few and of moderate wealth. Most of the laboring class possess property, cultivate their own lands, have families and from the demand for their labor, are enabled to exact from the rich and the competent such prices as

enable them to feed abundantly, clothe above mere decency, to labor moderately and raise their families."

These people, he considered, had two sets of rights, those of "personal competency" and those involved in acquiring and possessing property. By "personal competency" he meant the right of free thinking, freedom of forming and expressing opinions, and freedom of personal living, each man according to his own lights. To insure the first set of rights, a Government must so order its functions as not to interfere with the individual. But even Jefferson realized that the exercise of the property rights might so interfere with the rights of the individual that the Government, without whose assistance the property rights could not exist, must intervene, not to destroy individualism, but to protect it.

You are familiar with the great political duel which followed; and how Hamilton, and his friends, building toward a dominant centralized power were at length defeated in the great election of 1800, by Mr. Jefferson's party. Out of that duel came the two parties, Republican and Democratic, as we know them today.

So began, in American political life, the new day, the day of the individual against the system, the day in which individualism was made the great watchword of American life. The happiest of economic conditions made that day long and splendid. On the Western frontier, land was substantially free. No one, who did not shirk the task of earning a living, was entirely without opportunity to do so. Depressions could, and did, come and go; but they could not alter the fundamental fact that most of the people lived partly by selling their labor and partly by extracting their livelihood from the soil, so that starvation and dislocation were practically impossible. At the very worst there was always the possibility of climbing into a covered wagon and moving west where the untilled prairies afforded a haven for men to whom the East did not provide a place. So great were our natural resources that we could offer this relief not only to our own people, but to the distressed of all the world; we could invite immigration from Europe, and welcome it with open arms. Traditionally, when a depression came a new section of land was opened in the West; and even our temporary misfortune served our manifest destiny.

It was in the middle of the nineteenth century that a new force was released and a new dream created. The force was what is called the industrial revolution, the advance of steam and machinery and the rise of the forerunners of the modern industrial plant. The dream was the dream of an economic machine, able to raise the standard of living for

everyone; to bring luxury within the reach of the humblest; to annihilate distance by steam power and later by electricity, and to release everyone from the drudgery of the heaviest manual toil. It was to be expected that this would necessarily affect Government. Heretofore, Government had merely been called upon to produce conditions within which people could live happily, labor peacefully, and rest secure. Now it was called upon to aid in the consummation of this new dream. There was, however, a shadow over the dream. To be made real, it required use of the talents of men of tremendous will and tremendous ambition, since by no other force could the problems of financing and engineering and new developments be brought to a consummation.

So manifest were the advantages of the machine age, however, that the United States fearlessly, cheerfully, and, I think, rightly, accepted the bitter with the sweet. It was thought that no price was too high to pay for the advantages which we could draw from a finished industrial system. The history of the last half century is accordingly in large measure a history of a group of financial Titans whose methods were not scrutinized with too much care, and who were honored in proportion as they produced the results, irrespective of the means they used. The financiers who pushed the railroads to the Pacific were always ruthless, often wasteful and frequently corrupt; but they did build railroads, and we have them today. It has been estimated that the American investor paid for the American railroad system more than three times over in the process; but despite this fact the net advantage was to the United States. As long as we had free land; as long as population was growing by leaps and bounds; as long as our industrial plants were insufficient to supply our own needs, society chose to give the ambitious man free play and unlimited reward provided only that he produced the economic plant so much desired.

During this period of expansion, there was equal opportunity for all, and the business of Government was not to interfere but to assist in the development of industry. This was done at the request of business men themselves. The tariff was originally imposed for the purpose of "fostering our infant industry," a phrase I think the older among you will remember as a political issue not so long ago. The railroads were subsidized, sometimes by grants of money, oftener by grants of land; some of the most valuable oil lands in the United States were granted to assist the financing of the railroad which pushed through the Southwest. A nascent merchant marine was assisted by grants of money, or by mail subsidies, so that our steam shipping might ply the seven seas. Some of my friends tell me that they do not

want the Government in business. With this I agree; but I wonder whether they realize the implications of the past. For while it has been American doctrine that the Government must not go into business in competition with private enterprises, still it has been traditional, particularly in Republican administrations, for business urgently to ask the Government to put at private disposal all kinds of Government assistance. The same man who tells you that he does not want to see the Government interfere in business—and he means it, and has plenty of good reasons for saying so—is the first to go to Washington and ask the Government for a prohibitory tariff on his product. When things get just bad enough, as they did two years ago, he will go with equal speed to the United States Government and ask for a loan; and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is the outcome of it. Each group has sought protection from the Government for its own special interests, without realizing that the function of Government must be to favor no small group at the expense of its duty to protect the rights of personal freedom and of private property of all its citizens.

In retrospect we can now see that the turn of the tide came with the turn of the century. We were reaching our last frontier; there was no more free land and our industrial combinations had become great uncontrolled and irresponsible units of power within the State. Clear-sighted men saw with fear the danger that opportunity would no longer be equal; that the growing corporation, like the feudal baron of old, might threaten the economic freedom of individuals to earn a living. In that hour, our anti-trust laws were born. The cry was raised against the great corporations. Theodore Roosevelt, the first great Republican Progressive, fought a Presidential campaign on the issue of "trust busting" and talked freely about malefactors of great wealth. If the Government had a policy it was rather to turn the clock back, to destroy the large combinations and to return to the time when every man owned his individual small business.

This was impossible; Theodore Roosevelt, abandoning the idea of "trust busting," was forced to work out a difference between "good" trusts and "bad" trusts. The Supreme Court set forth the famous "rule of reason" by which it seems to have meant that a concentration of industrial power was permissible if the method by which it got its power, and the use it made of that power, were reasonable.

Woodrow Wilson, elected in 1912, saw the situation more clearly. Where Jefferson had feared the encroachment of political power on the lives of individuals, Wilson knew that the new power was financial. He saw, in the highly centralized economic system, the despot of

the twentieth century, on whom great masses of individuals relied for their safety and their livelihood, and whose irresponsibility and greed (if they were not controlled) would reduce them to starvation and penury. The concentration of financial power had not proceeded so far in 1912 as it has today; but it had grown far enough for Mr. Wilson to realize fully its implications. It is interesting, now, to read his speeches. What is called "radical" today (and I have reason to know whereof I speak) is mild compared to the campaign of Mr. Wilson. "No man can deny," he said, "that the lines of endeavor have more and more narrowed and stiffened; no man who knows anything about the development of industry in this country can have failed to observe that the larger kinds of credit are more and more difficult to obtain unless you obtain them upon terms of uniting your efforts with those who already control the industry of the country, and nobody can fail to observe that every man who tries to set himself up in competition with any process of manufacture which has taken place under the control of large combinations of capital will presently find himself either squeezed out or obliged to sell and allow himself to be absorbed." Had there been no World War—had Mr. Wilson been able to devote eight years to domestic instead of international affairs—we might have had a wholly different situation at the present time. However, the then distant roar of European cannon, growing ever louder, forced him to abandon the study of this issue. The problem he saw so clearly is left with us as a legacy; and no one of us on either side of the political controversy can deny that it is a matter of grave concern to the Government.

A glance at the situation today only too clearly indicates that equality of opportunity as we have known it no longer exists. Our industrial plant is built; the problem just now is whether under existing conditions it is not overbuilt. Our last frontier has long since been reached, and there is practically no more free land. More than half of our people do not live on the farms or on lands and cannot derive a living by cultivating their own property. There is no safety valve in the form of a Western prairie to which those thrown out of work by Eastern economic machines can go for a new start. We are not able to invite the immigration from Europe to share our endless plenty. We are now providing a drab living for our own people.

Our system of constantly rising tariffs has at last reacted against us to the point of closing our Canadian frontier on the north, our European markets on the east, many of our Latin-American markets to the south, and a goodly proportion of our Pacific markets on the west,

through the retaliatory tariffs of those countries. It has forced many of our great industrial institutions which exported their surplus production to such countries, to establish plants in such countries, within the tariff walls. This has resulted in the reduction of the operation of their American plants, and opportunity for employment.

Just as freedom to farm has ceased, so also the opportunity in business has narrowed. It still is true that men can start small enterprises, trusting to native shrewdness and ability to keep abreast of competitors; but area after area has been preempted altogether by the great corporations, and even in the fields which still have no great concerns, the small man starts under a handicap. The unfeeling statistics of the past three decades show that the independent business man is running a losing race. Perhaps he is forced to the wall; perhaps he cannot command credit; perhaps he is "squeezed out," in Mr. Wilson's words, by highly organized corporate competitors, as your corner grocery man can tell you. Recently a careful study was made of the concentration of business in the United States. It showed that our economic life was dominated by some six hundred odd corporations who controlled two-thirds of American industry. Ten million small business men divided the other third. More striking still, it appeared that if the process of concentration goes on at the same rate, at the end of another century we shall have all American industry controlled by a dozen corporations, and run by perhaps a hundred men. Put plainly, we are steering a steady course toward economic oligarchy, if we are not there already.

Clearly, all this calls for a re-appraisal of values. A mere builder of more industrial plants, a creator of more railroad systems, an organizer of more corporations, is as likely to be a danger as a help. The day of the great promoter or the financial Titan, to whom we granted anything if only he would build, or develop, is over. Our task now is not discovery or exploitation of natural resources, or necessarily producing more goods. It is the soberer, less dramatic business of administering resources and plants already in hand, of seeking to reestablish foreign markets for our surplus production, of meeting the problem of underconsumption, of adjusting production to consumption, of distributing wealth and products more equitably, of adapting existing economic organizations to the service of the people. The day of enlightened administration has come.

Just as in older times the central Government was first a haven of refuge and then a threat, so now in a closer economic system the central and ambitious financial unit is no longer a servant of national desire, but a danger. I would draw the parallel one step farther. We

did not think because national Government had become a threat in the 18th century that therefore we should abandon the principle of national Government. Nor today should we abandon the principle of strong economic units called corporations, merely because their power is susceptible of easy abuse. In other times we dealt with the problem of an unduly ambitious central Government by modifying it gradually into a constitutional democratic Government. So today we are modifying and controlling our economic units.

As I see it, the task of Government in its relations to business is to assist the development of an economic declaration of rights, an economic constitutional order. This is the common task of statesman and business man. It is the minimum requirement of a more permanently safe order of things.

Happily, the times indicate that to create such an order not only is the proper policy of Government, but it is the only line of safety for our economic structures as well. We know, now, that these economic units cannot exist unless prosperity is uniform, that is, unless purchasing power is well distributed throughout every group in the Nation. That is why even the most selfish of corporations for its own interest would be glad to see wages restored and unemployment ended and to bring the Western farmer back to his accustomed level of prosperity and to assure a permanent safety to both groups. That is why some enlightened industries themselves endeavor to limit the freedom of action of each man and business group within the industry in the common interest of all; why business men everywhere are asking a form of organization which will bring the scheme of things into balance, even though it may in some measure qualify the freedom of action of individual units within the business.

The exposition need not further be elaborated. It is brief and incomplete, but you will be able to expand it in terms of your own business and occupation without difficulty. I think everyone who has actually entered the economic struggle—which means everyone who was not born to safe wealth—knows in his own experience and his own life that we have now to apply the earlier concepts of American Government to the conditions of today.

The Declaration of Independence discusses the problem of Government in terms of a contract. Government is a relation of give and take, a contract, perforce, if we would follow the thinking out of which it grew. Under such a contract rulers were accorded power, and the people assented to that power on consideration that they be accorded certain rights. The task of statesmanship has always been the re-defini-

tion of these rights in terms of a changing and growing social order. New conditions impose new requirements upon Government and those who conduct Government.

I held, for example, in proceedings before me as Governor, the purpose of which was the removal of the Sheriff of New York, that under modern conditions it was not enough for a public official merely to evade the legal terms of official wrongdoing. He owed a positive duty as well. I said in substance that if he had acquired large sums of money, he was when accused required to explain the sources of such wealth. To that extent this wealth was colored with a public interest. I said that in financial matters, public servants should, even beyond private citizens, be held to a stern and uncompromising rectitude.

I feel that we are coming to a view through the drift of our legislation and our public thinking in the past quarter century that private economic power is, to enlarge an old phrase, a public trust as well. I hold that continued enjoyment of that power by any individual or group must depend upon the fulfillment of that trust. The men who have reached the summit of American business life know this best; happily, many of these urge the binding quality of this greater social contract.

The terms of that contract are as old as the Republic, and as new as the new economic order.

Every man has a right to life; and this means that he has also a right to make a comfortable living. He may by sloth or crime decline to exercise that right; but it may not be denied him. We have no actual famine or dearth; our industrial and agricultural mechanism can produce enough and to spare. Our Government formal and informal, political and economic, owes to everyone an avenue to possess himself of a portion of that plenty sufficient for his needs, through his own work.

Every man has a right to his own property; which means a right to be assured, to the fullest extent attainable, in the safety of his savings. By no other means can men carry the burdens of those parts of life which, in the nature of things, afford no chance of labor: childhood, sickness, old age. In all thought of property, this right is paramount; all other property rights must yield to it. If, in accord with this principle, we must restrict the operations of the speculator, the manipulator, even the financier, I believe we must accept the restriction as needful, not to hamper individualism but to protect it.

These two requirements must be satisfied, in the main by the individuals who claim and hold control of the great industrial and

financial combinations which dominate so large a part of our industrial life. They have undertaken to be, not business men, but princes of property. I am not prepared to say that the system which produces them is wrong. I am very clear that they must fearlessly and competently assume the responsibility which goes with the power. So many enlightened business men know this that the statement would be little more than a platitude, were it not for an added implication.

This implication is, briefly, that the responsible heads of finance and industry instead of acting each for himself, must work together to achieve the common end. They must, where necessary, sacrifice this or that private advantage; and in reciprocal self-denial must seek a general advantage. It is here that formal Government—political Government, if you choose,—comes in. Whenever in the pursuit of this objective, the lone wolf, the unethical competitor, the reckless promoter, the Ishmael or Insull whose hand is against every man's, declines to join in achieving an end recognized as being for the public welfare, and threatens to drag the industry back to a state of anarchy, the Government may properly be asked to apply restraint. Likewise, should the group ever use its collective power contrary to the public welfare, the Government must be swift to enter and protect the public interest.

The Government should assume the function of economic regulation only as a last resort, to be tried only when private initiative, inspired by high responsibility, with such assistance and balance as Government can give, has finally failed. As yet there has been no final failure, because there has been no attempt; and I decline to assume that this Nation is unable to meet the situation.

The final term of the high contract was for liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We have learned a great deal of both in the past century. We know that individual liberty and individual happiness mean nothing unless both are ordered in the sense that one man's meat is not another man's poison. We know that the old "rights of personal competency," the right to read, to think, to speak, to choose and live a mode of life, must be respected at all hazards. We know that liberty to do anything which deprives others of those elemental rights is outside the protection of any compact; and that Government in this regard is the maintenance of a balance, within which every individual may have a place if he will take it; in which every individual may find safety if he wishes it; in which every individual may attain such power as his ability permits, consistent with his assuming the accompanying responsibility.

All this is a long, slow talk. Nothing is more striking than the simple innocence of the men who insist, whenever an objective is present, on the prompt production of a patent scheme guaranteed to produce a result. Human endeavor is not so simple as that. Government includes the art of formulating a policy, and using the political technique to attain so much of that policy as will receive general support; persuading, leading, sacrificing, teaching always, because the greatest duty of a statesman is to educate. But in the matters of which I have spoken, we are learning rapidly, in a severe school. The lessons so learned must not be forgotten, even in the mental lethargy of a speculative upturn. We must build toward the time when a major depression cannot occur again; and if this means sacrificing the easy profits of inflationist booms, then let them go; and good riddance.

Faith in America, faith in our tradition of personal responsibility, faith in our institutions, faith in ourselves demand that we recognize the new terms of the old social contract. We shall fulfill them, as we fulfilled the obligation of the apparent Utopia which Jefferson imagined for us in 1776, and which Jefferson, Roosevelt and Wilson sought to bring to realization. We must do so, lest a rising tide of misery, engendered by our common failure, engulf us all. But failure is not an American habit; and in the strength of great hope we must all shoulder our common load.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

What is the proper role of peacetime government in relation to the whole people and particularly in relation to economic activity? The two extreme schools of thought tell us (1) that that government is best which governs least, and (2), conversely, that the best government governs most, extending control widely over the essential activities of its people. Many who cry "laissez faire" are not, of course, disciples of free enterprise: many merely want to free their own hands in order to tie those of others. But some sincerely believe in limiting government as far as preservation of order permits. There was a time in our history, of course, when genuine free enterprise was essential to rapid opening of the land and utilization of its resources. But the spread of monopoly in one area after another, the fast dwindling possibilities of equal opportunity, and the social irresponsibility of competitive business have persuaded many Americans that government must assume a larger role in economic life. Some, the political Left, wish to push government functions beyond mere regulation and into ownership and operation. If private ownership and competitive economy

are to serve the future, it becomes increasingly clear, they must accept new moral responsibilities and new relations to the whole people through their elected representatives.

Twice in recent years American Presidents, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, have been diverted by war from their efforts to broaden the role of government as trustee for the whole people. In the post-war period, should government extend its scope yet further; or should it, as after the last war, retrench its activities and yield to the pressure of interested groups who want only to be let alone and who assure us that they now know how to avoid disasters like 1929, how to provide ample employment, and how to observe all the laws of decency? Have we been sufficiently instructed in the results of the second course by the history of years since 1919? Should we insist that post-war government take up again Roosevelt's and Wilson's uncompleted work? The nature of that work is the subject of the Commonwealth Club campaign address, of September 23, 1932. Roosevelt's Second Inaugural Address, of January 20, 1937, looks back over four years of effort in the direction announced in 1932, reaffirms a political philosophy, and defines the uncompleted task of progressive government. Many readers will wish to go beyond the pages of this book and compare with these speeches the statesmanlike Third Inaugural Address.

1. What are the "two general directions," as Roosevelt sees them, that democracy may take in its "quest for better things"? Is his point clearly made? Why or why not?

2. Why did Roosevelt include his sketch of the evolution of governmental power and responsibility? As far as your knowledge goes, does the history seem accurate? Show why you do or do not think it is digested into clear, lucid form for a popular audience and used skillfully for strategic effect in the argument. How does each of the following steps contribute to Roosevelt's argument on the new responsibilities of government: the account of the growth of limitations on arbitrary power, the thumbnail sketch of Hamilton and Jefferson, the outline of the effects of the Industrial Revolution, the account of the relations of government to American financial Titans of the last century? Why does Roosevelt deliberately avoid finer distinctions and more detailed facts in this whole passage?

3. What was the American economic situation in 1932, according to Roosevelt's summary? What did he see as the chief new economic tasks of that time? Why do you believe these are still our chief tasks or that we now have more pressing new ones to demand our attention?

4. When Roosevelt speaks of government as based on a "social contract" between rulers and ruled, he is using a time-honored theory of government, accepted by the framers of our Constitution, who reserved certain "rights" for the people and defined the powers of our government. Do

you believe that the "rights" defined in the Constitution have to be redefined as times change? Why or why not? Explain the statement "The task of Government in its relation to business is to assist the development of an economic declaration of rights, an economic constitutional order." What provisions does Roosevelt consider essential to a new "economic declaration of rights"? Why do you agree or disagree with him? If you would add other provisions, show why you think they are essential. What arguments would be advanced by those who believe government should not undertake to guarantee new economic rights and securities? Why do you agree or disagree with them?

5. Roosevelt believes economic power should entail moral responsibilities. Few would dispute this point. But what specific responsibilities? Should business accept responsibility for the well-being and security of its employees? for fair trade and labor agreements within industries and other businesses? for cooperation to prevent economic crises and depression? Is competitive business, in your opinion, capable of working voluntarily with government toward a more just and stable order? Give the grounds of your opinion on each of these questions.

6. What are some of the possible ways of "building towards a time when a major depression cannot occur again"? In answering this question, draw on Roosevelt's own words, the account of his career in the biographical introduction, your own knowledge and opinions, and, if you wish, the following address.

7. Explain the statement "The duty of a statesman is to educate." In what ways (see biographical introduction) did Roosevelt educate the people? Show how this address, though adapted to the audience and the crisis conditions of the time, skillfully uses those conditions to emphasize a long-range view of the function of government.

8. Like many other campaign speakers, Roosevelt is clearer about general principles aimed at than about specific reforms contemplated. Why? From the biographical introduction or your independent knowledge show specific ways in which the Roosevelt administrations tried to carry out principles outlined in this address.

Second Inaugural Address

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT

WHEN FOUR YEARS AGO we met to inaugurate a President, the Republic, single-minded in anxiety, stood in spirit here. We dedicated ourselves to the fulfillment of a vision—to speed the time when there would be for all the people that security and peace essential to the pursuit of happiness. We of the Republic pledged ourselves to drive from the temple of our ancient faith those who had profaned it; to end by action, tireless and unafraid, the stagnation and despair of that day. We did those first things first.

Our covenant with ourselves did not stop there. Instinctively we recognized a deeper need—the need to find through government the instrument of our united purpose to solve for the individual the ever-rising problems of a complex civilization. Repeated attempts at their solution without the aid of government had left us baffled and bewildered. For, without that aid, we had been unable to create those moral controls over the services of science which are necessary to make science a useful servant instead of a ruthless master of mankind. To do this we knew that we must find practical controls over blind economic forces and blindly selfish men.

We of the Republic sensed the truth that democratic government has innate capacity to protect its people against disasters once considered inevitable, to solve problems once considered unsolvable. We would not admit that we could not find a way to master economic epidemics just as, after centuries of fatalistic suffering, we had found a way to master epidemics of disease. We refused to leave the problems of our common welfare to be solved by the winds of chance and the hurricanes of disaster.

In this we Americans were discovering no wholly new truth; we were writing a new chapter in our book of self-government.

This year marks the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Constitutional Convention which made us a nation. At that Convention our forefathers found the way out of the chaos which followed the Revolutionary War; they created a strong government with powers of united action sufficient then and now to solve problems utterly beyond individual or local solution. A century and a half ago they

Delivered January 20, 1937.

established the Federal Government in order to promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to the American people.

Today we invoke those same powers of government to achieve the same objectives.

Four years of new experience have not belied our historic instinct. They hold out the clear hope that government within communities, government within the separate States, and government of the United States can do the things the times require, without yielding its democracy. Our tasks in the last four years did not force democracy to take a holiday.

Nearly all of us recognize that as intricacies of human relationships increase, so power to govern them also must increase—power to stop evil; power to do good. The essential democracy of our Nation and the safety of our people depend not upon the absence of power, but upon lodging it with those whom the people can change or continue at stated intervals through an honest and free system of elections. The Constitution of 1787 did not make our democracy impotent.

In fact, in these last four years, we have made the exercise of all power more democratic; for we have begun to bring private autocratic powers into their proper subordination to the public's government. The legend that they were invincible—above and beyond the processes of a democracy—has been shattered. They have been challenged and beaten.

Our progress out of the depression is obvious. But that is not all that you and I mean by the new order of things. Our pledge was not merely to do a patchwork job with second-hand materials. By using the new materials of social justice we have undertaken to erect on the old foundations a more enduring structure for the better use of future generations.

In that purpose we have been helped by achievements of mind and spirit. Old truths have been relearned; untruths have been unlearned. We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad morals; we know now that it is bad economics. Out of the collapse of a prosperity whose builders boasted their practicality has come the conviction that in the long run economic morality pays. We are beginning to wipe out the line that divides the practical from the ideal; and in so doing we are fashioning an instrument of unimagined power for the establishment of a morally better world.

This new understanding undermines the old admiration of worldly success as such. We are beginning to abandon our tolerance of the

abuse of power by those who betray for profit the elementary decencies of life.

In this process evil things formerly accepted will not be so easily condoned. Hard-headedness will not so easily excuse hard-heartedness. We are moving toward an era of good feeling. But we realize that there can be no era of good feeling save among men of good will.

For these reasons I am justified in believing that the greatest change we have witnessed has been the change in the moral climate of America.

Among men of good will, science and democracy together offer an ever-richer life and ever-larger satisfaction to the individual. With this change in our moral climate and our rediscovered ability to improve our economic order, we have set our feet upon the road of enduring progress.

Shall we pause now and turn our back upon the road that lies ahead? Shall we call this the promised land? Or, shall we continue on our way? For "each age is a dream that is dying, or one that is coming to birth."

Many voices are heard as we face a great decision. Comfort says, "Tarry a while." Opportunity says, "This is a good spot." Timidity asks, "How difficult is the road ahead?"

True, we have come far from the days of stagnation and despair. Vitality has been preserved. Courage and confidence have been restored. Mental and moral horizons have been extended.

But our present gains were won under the pressure of more than ordinary circumstance. Advance became imperative under the goad of fear and suffering. The times were on the side of progress.

To hold to progress today, however, is more difficult. Dulled conscience, irresponsibility, and ruthless self-interest already reappear. Such symptoms of prosperity may become portents of disaster! Prosperity already tests the persistence of our progressive purpose.

Let us ask again: Have we reached the goal of our vision of that fourth day of March, 1933? Have we found our happy valley?

I see a great Nation, upon a great continent, blessed with a great wealth of natural resources. Its hundred and thirty million people are at peace among themselves; they are making their country a good neighbor among the Nations. I see a United States which can demonstrate that, under democratic methods of government, national wealth can be translated into a spreading volume of human comforts hitherto

unknown, and the lowest standard of living can be raised far above the level of mere subsistence.

But here is the challenge to our democracy: In this Nation I see tens of millions of its citizens—a substantial part of its whole population—who at this very moment are denied the greater part of what the very lowest standards of today call the necessities of life.

I see millions of families trying to live on incomes so meager that the pall of family disaster hangs over them day by day.

I see millions whose daily lives in city and on farm continue under conditions labeled indecent by a so-called polite society half a century ago.

I see millions denied education, recreation, and the opportunity to better their lot and the lot of their children.

I see millions lacking the means to buy the products of farm and factory and by their poverty denying work and productiveness to many other millions.

I see one-third of a Nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished.

It is not in despair that I paint you that picture. I paint it for you in hope—because the Nation, seeing and understanding the injustice in it, proposes to paint it out. We are determined to make every American citizen the subject of this country's interest and concern; and we will never regard any faithful, law-abiding group within our borders as superfluous. The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little.

If I know aught of the spirit and purpose of our Nation, we will not listen to Comfort, Opportunism, and Timidity. We will carry on.

Overwhelmingly, we of the Republic are men and women of good will; men and women who have more than warm hearts of dedication; men and women who have cool heads and willing hands of practical purpose as well. They will insist that every agency of popular government use effective instruments to carry out their will.

Government is competent when all who compose it work as trustees for the whole people. It can make constant progress when it keeps abreast of all the facts. It can obtain justified support and legitimate criticism when the people receive true information of all that government does.

If I know aught of the will of our people, they will demand that these conditions of effective government shall be created and maintained. They will demand a Nation uncorrupted by cancers of injus-

tice and, therefore, strong among the Nations in its example of the will to peace.

Today we reconsecrate our country to long-cherished ideals in a suddenly changed civilization. In every land there are always at work forces that drive men apart and forces that draw men together. In our personal ambitions we are individualists. But in seeking for economic and political progress as a Nation, we all go up, or else we all go down, as one people.

To maintain a democracy of effort requires a vast amount of patience in dealing with differing methods, a vast amount of humility. But out of the confusion of many voices rises an understanding of dominant public need. Then political leadership can voice common ideals, and aid in their realization.

In taking again the oath of office as President of the United States, I assume the solemn obligation of leading the American people forward along the road over which they have chosen to advance.

While this duty rests upon me I shall do my utmost to speak their purpose and to do their will, seeking Divine guidance to help us each and every one to give light to them that sit in darkness and to guide our feet into the way of peace.

STUDY QUESTIONS

(For study introduction see "Progressive Government.")

1. More than four years had passed between the preceding address and this one. If you have read the earlier one, show that Roosevelt is here following the same line of reasoning about the function of government. What qualities of his personality and character appear in both speeches? Remembering the time of both addresses, explain why the second is more explicit about the direction Roosevelt intended to follow.

2. In his Inaugural a reelected President usually summarizes the accomplishments of his preceding term of office. Why is Roosevelt's summary effective or ineffective? "Practical controls," we are told, were attempted "over blind economic forces and blindly selfish men" and over "economic epidemic" (see the biographical introduction). Why did the attempt to set up such controls "without yielding democracy" have great historical importance? What factors in American tradition and practice limited its success?

3. Roosevelt says that "heedless self-interest" is not only "bad morals" but "bad economics." Why do you agree or disagree with him? How are those guilty of "heedless self-interest" instrumental in the recurrence of

depressions and unemployment? Why are avoidable depressions and unemployment "bad economics" and "bad morals"? What is meant by the statement that "we are beginning to wipe out the line that divides the practical from the ideal," altering "the moral climate" of America? If all business men, not merely some, accepted greater social responsibility, to labor, to government, to the public, how might the "moral climate" be altered? Was such alteration actually advanced under Roosevelt in your opinion? Why or why not? Show why you agree or disagree with the belief that "dulled conscience, irresponsibility, and ruthless self-interest" often appear as symptoms of returning prosperity (or returning peace).

4. In his Inaugural a President usually makes pledges of future effort and accomplishment, interpreting his mandate from the people. Why is the last half of Roosevelt's speech effective? How do the language, rhythm, and phrasing contribute to the effectiveness of the passage that begins "But here is the challenge to our democracy . . . one third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished" and ends with the ringing assertion that the nation, seeing such a picture, "proposes to paint it out"?

5. Why is social justice at home closely related to the power we can exert internationally as a force for peace? Why would American influence for peace be stronger, if we guaranteed justice, for example, to Negroes and the unemployed?

6. The address keeps to the middle level of idiomatic, commonly acceptable English equally suited to learned and unlearned listeners; yet it draws (with art that conceals art) on long-tested literary and oratorical methods. Show how emotional and imaginative color is achieved by concrete and connotative words, figures like simile and personification, balance and parallelism, antithesis, rhetorical question, quotation and adaptation of familiar imaginative phrases. Why does this address, in proportion to its length, have more of such coloring than the preceding one?

III

AMERICA IN WAR AND PEACE

It is a truism to say that, though we won the war, winning the peace is a continuing labor. But to understand why this is so, to see the goals toward which we would direct the labor of peace, and to steel our wills to persist in that labor—these things are not so easy as to repeat a truism. Yet, since America has emerged from the war a giant bestriding the globe, and since we as free citizens are America, it is overwhelmingly true of us that "we cannot escape history." This section is an attempt to take stock: in the first essay-group, of the war; in the second, of the prospect of peace. Group 1 begins with an analysis of the disastrous post-World War I mood of slackness and loss of faith which did so much to produce the ostrich policy of appeasement and to bring on World War II—an illumination of the past, a warning for the future; then two essays, alike only in their strong rekindled faith in America, present differing conceptions of war- and peace-aims, again turning the searchlight on the past and swinging it forward to the future. In that future (which has now begun), as the late President Roosevelt told us again just before he died, "the work is peace." Group 2, accordingly, presents a penetrating analysis of the moral foundation on which world order must be built, and Franklin Roosevelt's own challenge to Americans to press, "with strong and active faith," the work of peace.

What We Didn't Know Hurt Us a Lot

CARL L. BECKER

(For biography see "The Marxian Philosophy of History.")

IT IS A COMMONPLACE that history has to be rewritten from time to time. The reason is that, quite apart from any new information that may have been turned up in the meantime, each succeeding generation necessarily regards the past from the point of view of its own peculiar preoccupations and problems. In so far as these preoccupations and problems are different from those of the previous generation the events that led up to them inevitably acquire a significance that was not apparent before.

A notable example of this general truth is the effect of the last war on the estimate of the nineteenth century. In the light of the catastrophe of the First World War and the problems it bequeathed to the post-war generation, the facile optimism of the preceding century seemed obviously misplaced. Modern history could no longer be explained in terms of a simple faith in democracy, prosperity, and progress. The Victorian Age, therefore, came in for a bad beating. The Victorian was portrayed as a figure of fun—conventional, pompous, complacent, materialistic, inhibited, and hypocritical. The Victorians had blindly blundered into the most disastrous war of modern times and thereby left the world worse than they found it. Therefore, goodbye to all that, let us at least be honest, said all the cynical and disillusioned young men.

But now we are in the midst of another and even greater catastrophe in the light of which we are compelled to re-examine and re-assess the events that led up to it. As we look back over the twenty years between 1919 and 1939 what we see most clearly is the ineptitude of those intellectual attitudes and political policies that made the present war possible if not inevitable. The cult of prosperity and business efficiency, the complacent return to normalcy in national and international affairs, the brittle cynicism and theatrical despair of the sad

Yale Review, March, 1944. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, *The Yale Review*, copyrighted by Yale University Press.

young men, the disparagement of "ideals," the easy assumption that democracy was on the way out—all this now begins to look pretty thin and unrewarding. Already some kind things have been said about the despised Victorians; and the Hard-Boiled Age, sandwiched in between the Age of Progress and the German conquest of Europe, begins to appear in the light of a strange interlude of limited insight, confused purpose, and frustrated endeavor.

It is said that nothing reflects and portrays the essential spirit of an age better than what is called its literature—imaginative writing and criticism of it. Of American literature in this sense there was, during the period from the beginning of the First World War to the beginning of the second, a sufficient quantity. The number of stories and novels appearing in books and periodicals was unprecedented; the energy devoted to the propagation of literature, in the way of daily newspaper book reviews, book-of-the-month club activities, and high-powered advertising, was incredible. If criticism lacked much in quality and discrimination, it lacked nothing in quantity and good will. One day some reviewer hit upon the word "creative" to describe a writer whose book he happened to like. The word caught on; thereafter any writer, critic, artist, interior decorator, or cook not esteemed creative was damned indeed. And so every week the mass-production book reviewers and the authors of publishers' blurbs heralded the appearance of new creative writers whose work the world would not willingly let die. It is true that the world let most of it die within six months or a year. But the general impression left by all this frenzied literary propaganda was that American literature had at last come of age, that never before had there been so many writers of the first rank who saw life realistically and portrayed it as they saw it with fidelity and insight.

The fidelity and insight of the best American writers during the last twenty or thirty years are not to be doubted. I am not now concerned with that, but rather with the prevailing conviction that all this fidelity and insight served the laudable general purpose of emancipating American literature from two artificial limitations which, so it was thought, had hitherto prevented American writers from depicting American life as it was and as they knew it to be. One of these artificial limitations was the idea, surviving from colonial times, that great literature could flourish only in mature civilizations, and that American writers, living in a new and crude society, could attain excellence only by imitating the best English models and with this borrowed technique making what they could of the manners and customs

of a country which, from the point of view of "culture," was necessarily backward and provincial. The other artificial limitation was the moral squeamishness and "refinement" of the Victorian Age which had prevented writers, even English writers, from dealing frankly and fully, or even at all, with the question (fundamental for an adequate understanding of life) of sexual relations.

From these two artificial limitations American writers emancipated themselves with immense gusto and complete success. They accepted the fact that they were Americans, and that it was their business to observe life as it was lived in the United States and to describe it in the language that was native to them and to the people whom they described. American life, however crude, was what it was, and for an American writer excellence could be achieved only by accepting it in all its rich diversity and conveying the peculiar accent and flavor that made it essentially American. Like their English contemporaries, and perhaps with an even more deliberate bravado, American writers also emancipated themselves from the limitation of Victorian tabus—made no bones of describing fully and frankly all those matters which had formerly been thought too vulgar or too intimate to be mentioned in polite society, or to be referred to more than obliquely in books meant to be read aloud in the family circle, in the evening, under the shaded lamp on the living-room table.

Winning these two freedoms was all to the good. Even at the risk of much exaggeration and triviality, of much writing inspired by no more worthy purpose than to flout the mores and shock repressed spinsters and prim old gentlemen, it was eminently worth while for American writers to free themselves from subservience to foreign models and the tabus of the Victorian Age. But the consciousness of having been valiant in the battle for freedom too often engendered a certain intellectual arrogance—the feeling that if a writer knew how to observe accurately and portray with fidelity the details of the contemporary scene it didn't matter much what else he knew. The resulting impression is that American writers of the last quarter century, with some notable exceptions, have taken it for granted that since it isn't necessary to imitate foreign writers it isn't necessary to know much about them, and that since the work of the Victorians is defective in certain respects it isn't worth bothering about in any respect. The chief merit of American writers of the last quarter century is that they have observed closely and portrayed with fidelity the life of their own time and place; their chief defect is that they have mostly known too little about the life of other times and places to disclose the general

or universal significance of the life they knew and portrayed with so much realistic detail. The interesting result is that, aiming to emancipate themselves from provincialism, they have, by and large, exhibited a provincialism of their own—the provincialism of those who know little or nothing about what has been thought and said and done in the world before the year 1900 or beyond the confines of the United States of America.

Viewing the world in this short perspective, American writers have, accordingly, for the most part presented the various aspects of the contemporary scene with all the vividness but also with all the garish exaggeration of "close-ups." So presented, nothing could be more "realistic" or convincing than, for example, *Main Street*, or George Babbitt, or Studs Lonigan, or the Killers, or the inane lost soul in *An American Tragedy*, or the pathetic antics of William Jennings Bryan at the Scopes trial in Dayton, Tennessee, or the pathological behavior of the degenerates of *Tobacco Road*.[1] But as isolated phenomena, each for the moment filling the foreground and distorting the general picture, nothing could be more fragmentary, more marginal, and consequently less adequate for conveying the essential quality of American life as a whole. One feels that the authors are too close to the incidents they relate, too emotionally involved, to stand off and see them in proper relation to the life and history of the people of the United States, still less in proper relation to the life and history of mankind. Relating these incidents with much hardboiled objectivity, the authors appear, nevertheless, to judge them subjectively, in terms of their own resentment or contempt, or in comparison with some ideal of human behavior never realized outside of Utopia. They almost persuade us that only in the United States are there Main Streets or Babbitts or gangsters or boobs, and that in the United States there is very little else. With some notable exceptions, the most popular writers of the last quarter century seem to be saying: "We accept the U.S.A. but with a grimace; we are uncertain what it's all about, but it strikes us as pretty bad; we can at least show it up, though without knowing,

[1] Sinclair Lewis (b. 1885) is author of *Main Street* (1920). *George Babbitt* is the central figure of his *Babbitt* (1922) *Studs Lonigan* is the hero of *Young Lonigan* (1932) and *The Young Manhood of Studs Lonigan* (1934) by James Thomas Farrell (b. 1904). *The Killers* are in the story of that title by Ernest Hemingway (b. 1898) in *Men Without Women* (1927). Clyde Griffiths is the main character in *An American Tragedy* (1925) by Theodore Dreiser (1871–1945). In the "Bible-evolution" case, the State of Tennessee vs. John T. Scopes, a teacher of science, in 1925, Bryan indicted evolutionary scientists for "poisoning minds." *Tobacco Road* (1932) is the novel of Georgia tenant farmers by Erskine Caldwell (b. 1903), later dramatized (1934) by Jack Kirkland.

after all, what good it will do to show it up except that it eases our sense of frustration. Meanwhile some of us find satisfaction in becoming half-hearted fellow travellers on the Marxian line, or in going to Paris, although nothing is certain in Paris either, except that in Paris also the sun also rises."

It has been well said that anyone condemned to live with an optimist is bound to become a pessimist. This excuse is open to all disillusioned men—young or old. They were disillusioned not only because their view of human life was too much restricted to the immediate present but also because, imprisoned within the immediate present, they were condemned to live with the sentimental optimists who glorified material success as the new gospel of salvation. After the war of 1914-18 the mass of the people were fed up with noble ideals and eager to return to "normalcy,"[2] to business and pleasure as usual. No more parades, no more crusades! Put money in your purse and have a good time! For some years it seemed an easy thing for anyone to put money in his purse. One had only to buy and sell stocks on margin, or buy and sell land on a rising market. There seemed to be no end to it. The febrile prosperity of the late 1920's, founded on shenanigan and as unstable as water, was naïvely taken by hard-headed business men to be the beginning of a new era in human history, and was rationalized as the inevitable result of the business and technical efficiency and the superior moral qualities of the American people.

In this naïve glorification of business success and rationalization of frenzied finance, some trained economists were almost as gullible as the writers of superficial best-sellers or the editors of magazines designed to exploit the vanity of women. A famous Harvard professor declared that the United States was the land of prosperity chiefly because Americans were seeking "the kingdom of Heaven and righteousness." Bruce Barton's *The Man Nobody Knows* was a best-seller chiefly because it demonstrated that Jesus was, after all, a jolly fellow, the good-mixer prototype of the American business man. "There is only one first class civilization in the world today," exclaimed the editor of a popular woman's magazine. "It is right here in the United States." The editor of another popular magazine announced that the stories that "now pour in to us from all quarters of America are tales of ultimate success and happiness." "You business executives," so runs his inspired judgment, "sitting at your desks, thinking ever in terms of factories and output and financial setup, have been making a fairy tale come true."

[2] The word was a coinage of presidential candidate Harding.

This inspired judgment was uttered in 1930, after the stupendous stock market crash had already demonstrated to the discerning that the fairy tale was a fairy tale indeed. But for three years, the President of the United States and the outstanding political and business leaders of the country clung desperately to the fairy tale, and in the face of a wealth of evidence to the contrary assured the people that the depression was only temporary, that there would surely be a quick recovery, that prosperity was "just around the corner." Then all over the country the banks began to fold up. Normalcy and the temporary joy-ride were ended, and a New Deal, which was only a revival and expansion of Theodore Roosevelt's Square Deal and Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom, had to be improvised hastily to meet the three-year-old but still unforeseen crisis. The provincialism of the optimists was far worse than that of the pessimists, and what they didn't know hurt the country a lot more.

It is often characteristic of provincial minds to be overconfident—to think that we are the people and wisdom shall die with us. Much of the thinking of the Hard-Boiled Age, whether taking an optimistic or a pessimistic view of American life, was infected with this species of intellectual arrogance. Often enough, no doubt, the arrogance was no more than a mask concealing the failure of a quest for certainty, or the despair occasioned by fruitless journeys through the waste lands. But more frequently it was the arrogance of those who mistake sophistication for knowledge—in this case, those of little learning who picked up half-truths by reading books of popular exposition on psychiatry, the dialectic of history, the A B C of the atom, and the Einsteinian theory of relativity. To them it seemed that science had discovered the true nature of the universe and solved the mystery of human behavior. It seemed that the mind of man, by rational scientific procedure, had demonstrated that the universe was devoid of intelligence, and even of order, and that the mind of man was irrational; from all of which the astonishing conclusion was somehow reached that an age which regarded every belief as open to doubt had at last got the low-down on men and things.

The ideas of Marx and Freud had, of course, been known to scholars before 1914, but it was not until after the war that they entered the main current of popular thinking. Then it was that the lost generation, which studied psychology in college and read the works of Havelock Ellis, and the advanced intelligentsia in all the Greenwich Villages, and the pseudo-intellectuals of the fashionable world, who boned up for conversation at dinners given to popular lecturers from

abroad—then it was that all these people first learned about infantile fixations, complexes, frustrations, the factors of production, and the irrational behavior of the atom. How admirably these ideas were suited to the mood of the time! Who could any longer be fooled when it was known that the activities of the individual were largely determined by the subconscious without the individual being aware of it, and that the chief function of the conscious intelligence was to provide those "good reasons" which would lend moral credit to conduct inspired by egoistic motives? Who could any longer be taken in by the principles and ideals of democracy when it was known that the main course of history is a conditioned reflex induced by the factors of production, and that forms of government and theories of politics and morality set forth to justify them are scarcely more than by-products designed to buttress the economic interest of the ruling classes? The ideas of Marx and Freud have certainly added much to the knowledge and insight that in the long course of time men have acquired about themselves and their history; but as so often happens with new ideas, these were assimilated in popular thought without qualification and made too much of, serving the Hard-Boiled Age, as one may say, as compensation for its sense of frustration by demonstrating that the real motives of men are always sordid and the professed motives never sincere.

Equipped with these supposedly new truths which were at best only half-truths, many popular writers (historians, biographers, sociologists, novelists), with no adequate knowledge or understanding of either human history or human psychology, set about the agreeable task of debunking great men and the traditional ideals which they represented. Among the heroes thus debunked was the Father of his Country. A multitude of readers, whose knowledge of history was acquired from school or college textbooks and from what they could pick up in the newspapers and the news reels, now for the first time learned the devastating fact that George Washington was no stiff image of perfection but a passionate human fellow who sometimes indulged in profanity, liked hard liquor, and was by no means indifferent to attractive women. All this had, of course, long been known to those who took the trouble to learn something about the early history of the United States; but to the uninformed it came as a revelation, entertaining or shocking as the case might be.

Among the traditional ideals subjected to the debunking process were the liberties hitherto associated with, and supposed to be guaranteed by, democratic institutions. It appeared that democracy was not

all that it professed to be. Whatever was sordid and corrupt and hypocritical in private and public life (and there was plenty of it) was set forth without qualification and in distorted perspective. In the light of this unlovely picture, it was obvious that all men were in fact not equal, either in possessions or in opportunities or in their treatment by the police or in the courts of law, and that liberty was in fact the prerogative of the few but scarcely more than a sour joke for the many.

Liberty! Something in the Constitution—a word to be enclosed in quotes if one wished not to be thought naïve. Democracy as a going concern was exhibited, and judged, not in the light of the age-long struggle of men against ignorance and oppression, or in comparison with any practicable alternative, but in the light of those ideal aims which men have always cherished but which were now judged to be no more than disingenuous professions because not fully attained.

From this point of view, it seemed that what had been called liberal democracy could be properly understood only as "capitalist democracy." So far from being a permanent conquest of the human spirit, democracy, like all other political forms, was a temporary phenomenon which in the dialectic of history would be inevitably transcended, which indeed had already seen its best days and was now "at the cross roads," or "in retreat." Disillusioned by the results of the war, the odoriferous Harding era, and the great depression, many intellectuals saw in communism the most notable of the new forms which the dialectic of history was bringing to birth; and many former liberals—editors, college professors, writers of books—cast a hopeful eye at the great Russian "experiment," which, at a distance, seemed to hold out the promise of something better in the long run than capitalist democracy as they observed it at close quarters. A good word might even be said for Mussolini, who ran the trains on time and was by all accounts an engaging fellow personally.

All this—the disillusionment, the braggadocio, the advertised and cultivated emancipation from the ideas and conventions of the nineteenth century, the half-hearted hankering after strange foreign gods—was an indication that the spokesmen for the people of the United States were losing some of the old instinctive confidence in themselves, were no longer altogether sure of the high significance of the nation's history, of the superiority of its institutions, or of the essential rightness of what the nation had done, was doing, or would in the future be doing.

Of this uncertainty there was no clearer indication than the prevail-

ing attitude towards the last war. The Great War was, as one may say, like a black back-drop on the stage of history, shutting out the past and throwing an ominous shadow on things present and to come. With every effort to forget the war, it was ever present in the fringes of consciousness, disconcerting the thought and confusing the purposes of many people. The Great War, which had been sustained with so much emotional idealism, could now neither be idealized as a splendid victory nor accepted as a decisive defeat. It could be thought of only as a kind of enigma—an inexplicable mistake or misadventure, in which the country had become involved through its own blundering or through the clever manipulation of foreign governments in the promotion of their own interests.

One thing at least seemed certain. It was an illusion to have supposed that the war was different from other European wars, that it was a war to end wars or to make the world safe for democracy. So far from having made the world safe for democracy, it had only made it convenient for dictators. So far from having ended all wars, it had created the conditions that might easily lead to another war. Reliable historians, both European and American, exploring recently published documents from the archives of Germany, France, and Great Britain, reached the conclusion that Germany was not, after all, solely responsible for beginning the war—not more so than France, even less so than Austria or Russia. Thorough and admirable as many of these studies were, they were mostly too narrowly concerned with the immediate and superficial causes of the war—placed too much emphasis on the importance of specific decisions by high officials registered in communications sent, at one o'clock A. M., July 28, or whatever the precise hour may have been, from the Ballplatz, the Quai d'Orsay, or 10 Downing Street.[3] The explanation of a world conflagration was thus reduced to the level of a diplomatic intrigue, and the heavy responsibility for shaping the course of history was too easily attributed to the fallible judgment of particular governments or individuals. It almost seemed that the war might have been prevented if Bethmann-Hollweg had been more courageous, or Poincaré less ambitious, or poor Edward Grey[4] less befuddled or more familiar with the German language.

[3] Centers of German, French, and English government and foreign policy.

[4] Theobald von *Bethmann-Hollweg* (1856–1921), German Chancellor 1914–16, who called the Belgian treaty "a scrap of paper." Raymond *Poincaré* (b. 1860), French Premier and Foreign Minister 1912–13, 1922–24, 1926–29, and President of France in 1914. *Edward Grey*, first Viscount of Fallodon (1862–1933), British Secretary for Foreign Affairs 1905–16.

All this was, in its way, a debunking of history, the interpretation of great events in terms of what Charles Beard has called the "devil theory" of history, an attempt to find out what governments had deliberately "conspired," what individuals were to be pronounced "guilty." No historian seemed capable of presenting the war in its broad historical setting, as the result of impersonal forces generated by the complex industrial and technological society of modern times. No American historian, at all events, succeeded in making the entrance of the United States into the war an entirely credible event, the necessary result of extremely complex historical, political, economic, and psychological influences, the result less of the guilt of individuals or the conspiracy of governments than of the limited knowledge, the fallible judgments, and the instinctive emotional responses of leaders and people.

Professional historians were, for the most part, too antiquarian in their interests and too departmentalized in their knowledge to undertake such a task, and in any case too drily academic and unimaginative in their habit of writing to reach a wide public and so have much influence in molding public opinion. It was, therefore, left to popular writers, whose knowledge of history was neither extensive nor profound, to interpret the war to the reading public. So interpreted, the war appeared to be no more than a sinister conflict between European powers for territorial and commercial advantage; and this view was confirmed by the fact that the Allied powers, having with the aid of the United States won a complete victory, proceeded according to plans agreed upon in secret treaties to destroy the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, partition the Turkish empire, and take over the German colonies. Was it not, then, a mistake to have supposed that without the aid of the United States, France and Great Britain would have been decisively defeated? Would not the war in that case have ended as a stalemate, in a "negotiated" instead of a "dictated" peace, the "peace without victory" which Wilson had himself said was desirable? So it was made to appear, and so it was widely accepted. And this view of the war contributed much to the creation of a general feeling of resentment, a deep-seated suspicion that the people of the United States had been inveigled into a senseless European war without knowing what the pay-off was.

Oddly enough, no writers were more adept in presenting this view of the war than those who subscribed to the Marxian philosophy. Although, in general, believing that great historical events are determined by impersonal economic forces, they even more than others

managed to put their finger on the particular governments or individuals that were guilty of having conspired to bring this particular great event to pass. In the light of this provincial and unhistorical view of the war, it was widely believed that the entrance of the United States into the war had been a mistake, and a costly one. Some writers regarded it as a case of bad judgment, and let it go at that. Others looked for an alibi—blamed Woodrow Wilson for bamboozling us with his fantastic idea of a war to end war, or else said that we were maneuvered into the war by the sinister, under-cover activities of the international bankers and makers of munitions, or made out that we were a nation of starry-eyed idealists easily taken in by the skilful propaganda of the French and the British. And whether all of this was true, or only debatable, or merely preposterous, it was at once both the result and a contributory cause of the deep malaise of the Hard-Boiled Age—its disillusionment about the past, its uncertainty about the present, its apprehension about the future.

In this state of uncertainty and apprehension, the people of the United States watched the rise of Hitler and the approach of another European war. Having been fooled once, we were determined not to be fooled again. Hitler seemed to us just another Mussolini, only more theatrical and conceited. We might not like the Nazi philosophy or the Nazi form of government, but that was something for the Germans to take and like if they wanted to. Hitler was pretty hard on the Jews, but, well, the Jews—maybe after all! If Hitler wanted the Rhineland, well, why not? And if he wanted a strong army, that was no more than any country was entitled to; and if he wanted all Germans united under a German government, that was in accord with the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination. If Hitler wanted more than that, let Britain and France stop him. It was no affair of ours. We thanked whatever Gods there be that we did not belong to the League of Nations, and were determined that this time we would be wise guys, and put America first, and not again go on a crusade to set the world right.

This attitude on our part had some excuse perhaps, since it was not essentially different or more short-sighted than that of the people of France and Great Britain, who were nearer the seat of trouble. They, too, were obsessed with the idea of safety first, and their fear of becoming involved in another war blinded them, as it blinded us, to the real purposes of Hitler and the real nature of the Nazi philosophy. For years both Mussolini and Hitler had been explaining, clearly if blatantly, that fascism and Nazism were systematic organizations of

force and fraud, and for years both had exhibited the system in action. The ruthless suppression of all political, intellectual, and religious freedoms, the systematic liquidation of the Jews, the official glorification of hate and brutality—it was all there, explained in books and recorded in deeds, for the whole world to look at. A few people, even a few in high position, such as Ambassador Dodd and Winston Churchill, saw what they looked at and told what they saw. But most of the people and the responsible leaders of Great Britain, France, and the United States were unable or unwilling to see or believe anything that would disturb their half-hearted conviction that the way to play it safe was not to take any risks. Realists of the Hard-Boiled Age, we were then, who could believe, as late as 1937, that Hitler did not mean what he said in *Mein Kampf,* and yet with incredible mental agility could believe, as late as 1939, that he did mean what he said at Berchtesgaden and Munich!

And so the great democratic countries stood aside, as from something that did not concern them, while Hitler prepared for war. Fearful of becoming involved in a war in defense of institutions of the value of which they seemed none too sure, they looked the other way while Germany built the most powerful army in Europe, supported Mussolini in the brutal and senseless conquest of Ethiopia, aided Franco to destroy democratic institutions in Spain, and then proceeded to the conquest of Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As a result of this timid refusal to risk anything to prevent a war which by prompt, united, and decisive action could have been prevented, each country, one after the other, as circumstances dictated, became involved in the most desperate and disastrous war in all its history.

No country followed this futile policy more blindly than the United States. In September, 1939, President Roosevelt officially proclaimed a state of neutrality, and in a nation-wide broadcast told the people that he believed that we could keep out of the war, and that in any case he would do all that was possible to keep us out. It was the only thing he could then say which the overwhelming majority of the people would tolerate. If there was, in his solemn address, an overtone of doubt, that also expressed the general feeling. We were determined to keep out of the war, but we were less sure than we had been in 1914 that it would be possible to do so. Proclaiming neutrality was all very well, but proclaiming neutrality might not save us. Neutrality involves certain rights as well as certain obligations—the right of sailing on the high seas, of trading with neutral countries, and with belligerent countries in articles not contraband. If we exercised these

rights there might be "incidents," like the sinking of the *Lusitania* in the previous war; and if Hitler ignored our protests, as he would very likely do, then we might, in defense of our rights, become involved in the war in spite of all our good intentions.

This being the situation, we did a very strange thing. We refused to exercise our neutral rights for fear that we might have to defend them. To the belligerent powers we said in effect: "Define for us the danger zones, and we will keep our ships and our people out of them. It is true that we have certain neutral rights which, if exercised, would take our ships and our people into these zones, and hitherto we have always exercised and defended these neutral rights. But now we will abandon them because otherwise we might find ourselves in a position where it would be necessary to back down or fight." It was certainly the tamest surrender of neutral rights, even before they were violated, ever staged by a great country.

Meanwhile, Poland was quickly conquered and ruthlessly looted and oppressed, but for eight months there was virtually no fighting on the western front. We congratulated ourselves. It was, after all, a "phony war." And then suddenly Hitler struck. Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium were conquered, French resistance collapsed, and after Dunkirk it seemed that Great Britain would suffer the same fate. All this was a great shock to us. We discovered suddenly that the preservation of the British empire and the British fleet was a matter of vital importance to the United States. We, therefore, changed our policy. Instead of "cash and carry" the slogan became "all aid short of war." All aid short of war was better than cash and carry, but it revealed a state of mind scarcely less muddled. All aid short of war evidently meant, if it meant anything, that the preservation of British power and the defeat of Germany were of vital importance to us, but we were still unwilling to face the fact frankly. By shouting "all aid" we could convince ourselves that we were doing our utmost; but by whispering "short of war" we could convince ourselves that the boys would not have to be sent overseas. We could give all aid except the essential aid, and slip into the war without being in a "shooting war."

In this muddled state of mind we remained until Japan came to our aid by clarifying the issue. The attack on Pearl Harbor forced us at last to take note of the fact that something incredibly base and brutal was loose in the world, that the suppression of it was really our affair, and that nothing short of a shooting war would serve our purpose.

Edmund Burke said that he did not know how to draw an indictment against a whole nation. It would be equally vain and mistaken to draw an indictment against the achievements of an entire age or period in human history; and equally so to direct the indictment against any generation within that age or period. In the period between the two world wars, not all the sad and disillusioned men were young, nor were all the young men sad or disillusioned. The achievements of the time, as well as its failures, were many, and were shared in by old and young alike. That the achievements in science and technology and engineering, in medicine and the conquest of disease, and in cooperative humane enterprises were outstanding is not to be denied. Nor can it be denied that the achievements in educational experimentation, in specialized research in history and the social studies, in art and literature, and in psychology and philosophy were, if not outstanding, at least very considerable. I have no desire to disparage any of these achievements. But every age has its limitations and failures, and it is the limitations and failures of the Hard-Boiled Age, especially in the realm of social and political thought and policy, that need now to be noted because they contributed so much to bring about the desperate situation in which we are now involved.

The limitations and failures of any age, like its successes, are in no small part conditioned by what we have been taught to call its "climate of opinion"—those underlying assumptions or presuppositions, for the most part uncritically accepted, which so largely shape the thought and conduct of men. In this respect, we live in one of those periods in which men can neither accept without qualification nor reject without distress the traditional foundations of belief. In the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, all the traditional assumptions about the nature of the universe and what can and cannot happen in it, and about the nature of man and what is essential to the good life—assumptions which had sustained and given confidence to the nineteenth century—were brought out into the open, examined, and found more or less invalid. The general result was a pervasive sense of doubt and insecurity, a sense of having lost the way, of having been misdirected by the preceding generation, and of finding no reliable sign posts marking the road to the future. It is not without significance that the two most ambitious and notable historical works—those of Spengler and Arnold Toynbee[5]—were attempts to find a reliable plan

[5] *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (*Decline of the West*, 1920), by Oswald Spengler (b. 1880) and *A Study of History*, 6 volumes (1934–39), by Arnold Joseph Toynbee (b. 1889).

or pattern in the multifarious events of human history; or that the principal work of a distinguished American poet was entitled *The Waste Land;* or that the work of the most eminent American philosopher was in part summed up in a book, published in 1929, entitled *The Quest for Certainty.*[6]

Lack of certainty, lack of conviction—this may be taken as an essential, pervasive quality of the moral and political thinking of the Hard-Boiled Age, and the chief source of its confused purposes and frustrated endeavors. What is truth? Is justice the right of the stronger? Is morality no more than the custom of the time, and religion no more than the opiate of the people? These questions, endlessly argued by philosophers in all ages, now became real enigmas troubling the thought and influencing the conduct of many people unacquainted with philosophy. Lacking certainty and conviction, men sought compensation in diverse ways—in blind submission to the authority of church or state, or in disillusionment and indifference, or in a cheap sophistication, or in a conscious and cultivated cynicism nourished by the half-hearted conviction that since the world is meaningless and man corrupt one may as well get what one can while the getting is good.

The dominant tone or temper of an age, like the essential character of a nation, is more easily felt than defined. But in the speech and writing of any age, one can often detect a persistent overtone, a kind of impersonal collective voice, which conveys some prevailing attitude of that time. At least one of the voices which speaks for the Hard-Boiled Age seems to be saying: "Since the universe is devoid of purpose and the world a tough place and the life of man precarious and unpredictable, our best bet is to be hard and play the game close to our chests. We will endeavor at all events not to be taken in by anything 'unrealistic'—by the pretense that men or things are other or better than their observed behavior makes them out to be. We will not be taken in by the profession of 'principles' that are not applied in practice, or the profession of 'ideals' that are not lived up to. We will not be taken in by the ingenious, under-cover activities of the subconscious in persuading men that they are acting from purely unselfish motives even when they are obviously achieving something highly beneficial to themselves. We will not be taken in by emotionally sustained convictions as to the substance of things not seen—the notion that ordinary men may care more for liberty than for life, more for

[6] *The Waste Land* (1922), by Thomas Stearns Eliot (b. 1888). *The Quest for Certainty,* "a study of the relation of knowledge and action," by John Dewey (b. 1859).

equality than for the material possessions that enable them to keep up with the Joneses; or that some politicians would really rather be right than be president; or that business tycoons ever place service above self or prefer the public welfare to corporate profits. We will not be taken in by the notion that national honor and international justice are ever anything more than phrases in the mouths of statesmen uttered to conceal the fact that they are pursuing purely selfish national interests. Above all, we (we Americans) will not be taken in by the notion that it can be to our national interest to pull Europe out of a mess or go on another crusade to make the world safe for democracy."

No, we would not be taken in. But we were taken in, and on a grand scale. We were taken in by our fear of being taken in. We were taken in by our provincialism—our ignorance of the past history and present state of the world, and of our own history and our present position and interests in that world. We were taken in by the naïve belief that in a world that had been and was being rapidly and profoundly transformed by science and technology we could return to normalcy and live in isolation. We were taken in by our failure to appreciate the substantial merits, and our disposition to exaggerate the superficial defects, of our democratic institutions. We were taken in by our failure to understand that Nazism, in theory and practice, is a "revolution of nihilism"—a profound transvaluation of all the accepted values of Western civilization which, if successful, would destroy the institutions and freedoms that are essential not only to the democratic way of life but to any way of life that can rightly be called civilized. And the final ironic result of all this failure in understanding was that we were forced, against our will, at a late hour when we were still unprepared, to become involved in a second world war far more costly and desperate than the first—a war which we are now fighting, as every day with blithe complacence we assure the warring and conquered nations, for the sole purpose of ending all wars and making the world safe for democracy.

Whether the war will have that result I do not know. But I should think it unlikely unless we can learn, from the experience of the last thirty years, a good many things. We might learn, for example, that it's not smart to be provincial, that sophistication is not a substitute for knowledge, and that a hard-boiled realism which fails to penetrate to the essential realities is the worst species of romanticism any people can indulge in. We might learn that at a time when men can fly in bombing planes from New York to Hongkong in less time than it took Ben Franklin to travel from Philadelphia to New York

we cannot return to normalcy or live to any good purpose in economic and political isolation from other nations. We might learn that if we cherish our way of life and wish to have the world made safe for it, a refusal to run any risk in the hope that George will do it for us is not a realistic policy.

At the very least, the experience of the last five years should enable us to appreciate the truth of Somerset Maugham's saying in connection with the fall of France. "If a nation values anything more than freedom, it will lose its freedom; and the irony of it is that if it is comfort or money that it values more, it will lose that too."

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Many wars have been followed by a restless mood of disillusionment or even of despair. After the Napoleonic wars, for example, the intellectual life of Europe was "sicklied o'er" with a pale cast of melancholy that found in the theatrical Byronic hero its most expressive symbol. After World War I a similar mood prevailed, affecting all our thinking for a long period, reflected in the mordant, skeptical, disenchanted writers of what Professor Becker calls "the Hard-Boiled Age": the younger Eliot, Hemingway, Dos Passos, Lewis, Strachey, and many others. The high idealistic words which had echoed in our ears as we entered World War I seemed forgotten, betrayed, or even revealed as empty catchwords by the peace that followed, by the return to Harding's "normalcy," by the cynical exploitation of the boom years followed by dizzy descent into depression. Surely no defense can exonerate leaders implicated in the betrayal of ideals for which thousands of young men died. Old men returned to old hatreds and greeds and out of old habit and arrogance built up an old world full of the virus of wars. But the mood of the "Hard-Boiled Age" had two disastrous consequences: it forgot that no victorious war of liberation is really fought "in vain," that the world would have been in far worse straits had the war ended differently; and it played fatally into the hands of the fascists and dictators and thus led us straight into World War II.

Professor Becker very vividly describes the mood and its effect on our isolationism and drift into a second world war. Perhaps he blames the writers too much and others too little. But his picture, if incomplete, is true as far as it goes. What is its relevance for the future? World War II may also be followed by its wake of disillusion and discord. We shall not have gained all we fought for. Allies in war become competitors in peace. We have all lost so much that the most vulnerable of us will insist on special safeguards against attack. We have ideological differences, and we are zealous for proselytes who may be potential allies. There are

touchy problems of imperialism and race-relations to be met. Many will be avid to return to exploitation and "business as usual" on all fronts. And now the air-ways of the world offer new arenas for the old competitive instincts of man. But to succumb again to mere disillusionment, paralysis of purpose and will, would play into the hands of any adventurers bent on new political or economic enslavement. Generous ideals are natural to the young. This post-war generation must hold to them, must be undismayed by knowledge that they are realizable only gradually and imperfectly, must choose leaders in the light of them, must refuse to be alienated from them by detractors, and must advance them as far as devotion and determination can.

1. Why, according to Becker, must every age reinterpret the past for itself? Why is his account of the effect of World War I on the estimate of the 19th century a good introduction to his subject? What seems to you characteristic of the historian in his way of opening the subject?

2. What were the characteristics of "the Hard-Boiled Age," according to the author? Add still others if you have read any of the writers he mentions.

3. Becker names certain artificial limitations from which writers of the period emancipated themselves. Were all these developments really valuable "gains"? Why or why not? What serious limitations, according to Becker, are found in the writers of the period? Why does he develop his charges at such length? Why do you or do you not think he exaggerates the influence of the writers in creating the mood of the period? What other groups (including teachers?) must share the responsibility? Do you think "debunking" is a healthy literary function? What is to be said for and against it? Perhaps you will want to defend a particular writer (Lewis, Dos Passos, or Hemingway, for instance) against the author's criticisms.

4. Why does Becker blame the popular writers for their treatment of World War I? Why do you agree or disagree? Were the historians to blame if a superficial interpretation was allowed to prevail?

5. What factors unmentioned by Becker helped to produce the paralyzed "state of uncertainty and apprehension" in which America watched the rise of Hitler and the approach of war? Were the people themselves or their political leaders more responsible for the "timid refusal" of the democracies to risk anything to prevent a war that could have been prevented? Explain your answer.

6. What warnings for our own post-war period can you infer from Becker's picture of how people tried to escape from the bleak uncertainty and lack of conviction in the "climate of opinion" after the last war?

7. Explain "No, we would not be taken in. But we were taken in . . . by our fear of being taken in." Why do you or do you not agree that disillusionment and loss of faith made the war possible if not inevitable? What, if anything, would you add to Becker's summary of what we ought

to have learned from the last thirty years of history? Which of the lessons do you believe we have really learned?

8. What evidence, if any, do you see of the rise of another wave of disillusionment after World War II? In the light of the causes of such reactions, how, in your opinion, can they be opposed?

9. Make a topical outline of the essay. Account for the proportions and order of the development. What points, if any, would you wish the author to have developed further? Why? Are his beginning and conclusion effective? Why or why not?

10. Show that the author knew how to avoid the "drily academic and unimaginative" style of many historians. What elements of strength do you find in the style? What faults do you find? Is the liberal mixture of colloquialism and slang (give examples) a fault? Why or why not? Why is the style well or ill suited to the intended audience?

The American Century

HENRY R. LUCE

The story of Henry Robinson Luce (b. 1898) is the story of Time, Inc.; of the magazines *Time, Life,* and *Fortune;* and of the documentary films *The March of Time.* It is an American "success story" of a type more familiar in the last century than in this, but unusual in any time. Mr. Luce was born in Shantung Province, China, the son of missionaries. Educated at Hotchkiss School and Yale, he was the school and college friend of Briton Hadden, later his partner in publishing ventures that made history in their field. After an interval of newspaper work, the two friends launched *Time* in 1923. They started on the New York East Side with a minimum of equipment and a diminutive staff of five. *Time,* a new variety of weekly condensing the news in all important fields, soon developed a style of its own and became a substantial success. *Fortune,* a luxurious streamlined business magazine, was launched in 1930 after the untimely death of Hadden. *The March of Time,* editoralized documentary films, began in 1935. The most sensational of Mr. Luce's ventures, *Life,* using photography, usually with a minimum of text, for news and human-interest stories, began in 1936. In five years it rose to a circulation of four millions and made its editor one of the most widely influential of American journalists.

In February, 1941, some ten months before Pearl Harbor, Mr. Luce's much discussed article "The American Century" appeared in *Life.* The first part of the essay, here omitted, describes the confused, unhappy state of American thought and feeling on the conflict as we followed a policy of "all aid short of war" to the enemies of Germany—a state due to an ambiguous "neutrality" which was actually participation in all but the shooting; examines the contention that our aid to belligerents was necessary to national defense; and admits frankly that we were then actually *in* the war. Then follows the section, reprinted below, which raises the crucial problem of war-aims and peace-aims, of a national motive power for concerted effort. It is these later pages of the article that are relevant today as a statement of purposes affecting the future, purposes to which many Americans would undoubtedly subscribe.

Life, Feb. 17, 1941. By permission of the copyright holders, Time, Inc. About the first two-fifths and a short passage later are omitted with the author's approval.

HAVING NOW, with candor, examined our position, it is time to consider, to better purpose than would have been possible before, the larger issue which confronts us. Stated most simply, and in general terms, that issue is: What are we fighting for?

Each of us stands ready to give our life, our wealth, and all our hope of personal happiness, to make sure that America shall not lose any war she is engaged in. But we would like to know what war we are trying to win—and what we are supposed to win when we win it.

This questioning reflects our truest instincts as Americans. But more than that. Our urgent desire to give this war its proper name has a desperate practical importance. If we know what we are fighting for, then we can drive confidently toward a victorious conclusion and, what's more, have at least an even chance of establishing a workable Peace.

Furthermore—and this is an extraordinary and profoundly historical fact which deserves to be examined in detail—America and only America can effectively state the war aims of this war.

Almost every expert will agree that Britain cannot win complete victory—cannot even, in the common saying, "stop Hitler"—without American help. Therefore, even if Britain should from time to time announce war aims, the American people are continually in the position of effectively approving or not approving those aims. On the contrary, if America were to announce war aims, Great Britain would almost certainly accept them. And the entire world including Adolf Hitler would accept them as the gauge of this battle.

Americans have a feeling that in any collaboration with Great Britain we are somehow playing Britain's game and not our own. Whatever sense there may have been in this notion in the past, today it is an ignorant and foolish conception of the situation. In any sort of partnership with the British Empire, Great Britain is perfectly willing that the United States of America should assume the role of senior partner. This has been true for a long time. Among serious Englishmen, the chief complaint against America (and incidentally their best alibi for themselves) has really amounted to this—that America has refused to rise to the opportunities of leadership in the world.

Consider this recent statement of the London *Economist:*

If any permanent closer association of Britain and the United States is

achieved, an island people of less than 50 millions cannot expect to be the senior partner. . . . The center of gravity and the ultimate decision must increasingly lie in America. We cannot resent this historical development. We may rather feel proud that the cycle of dependence, enmity and independence is coming full circle into a new interdependence.

We Americans no longer have the *alibi* that we cannot have things the way we want them so far as Great Britain is concerned. With due regard for the varying problems of the members of the British Commonwealth, what we want will be okay with them.

This holds true even for that inspiring proposal called Union Now—a proposal, made by an American, that Britain and the United States should create a new and larger federal union of peoples. That may not be the right approach to our problem. But no thoughtful American has done his duty by the United States of America until he has read and pondered Clarence Streit's book[1] presenting that proposal.

The big, important point to be made here is simply that the complete opportunity of leadership is *ours*. Like most great creative opportunities, it is an opportunity enveloped in stupendous difficulties and dangers. If we don't want it, if we refuse to take it, the responsibility of refusal is also ours, and ours alone.

Admittedly, the future of the world cannot be settled all in one piece. It is stupid to try to blueprint the future as you blueprint an engine or as you draw up a constitution for a sorority. But if our trouble is that we don't know what we are fighting for, then it's up to us to figure it out. Don't expect some other country to tell us. Stop this Nazi propaganda about fighting somebody else's war. We fight no wars except our wars. "Arsenal of Democracy"? We may prove to be that. But today we must be the arsenal of America and of the friends and allies of America.

Friends and allies of America? Who are they, and for what? This is for us to tell them.

But how can we tell them? And how can we tell ourselves for what purposes we seek allies and for what purposes we fight? Are we going to fight for dear old Danzig or dear old Dong Dang? Are we going to decide the boundaries of Uritania?[2] Or, if we cannot state war aims in terms of vastly distant geography, shall we use some

[1] *Union Now* (1939), by *Clarence* Kirschman *Streit* (b. 1896), proposed federal union of North Atlantic democracies.

[2] "Ruritania," connoting cloak-and-sword romance and intrigue, is the fabulous kingdom in Anthony Hope's *Prisoner of Zenda* and *Rupert of Hentzau*.

big words like Democracy and Freedom and Justice? Yes, we can use the big words. The President has already used them. And perhaps we had better get used to using them again. Maybe they do mean something—about the future as well as the past.

Some amongst us are likely to be dying for them—on the fields and in the skies of battle. Either that, or the words themselves and what they mean die with us—in our beds.

But is there nothing between the absurd sound of distant cities and the brassy trumpeting of majestic words? And if so, whose Dong Dang and whose Democracy? Is there not something a little more practically satisfying that we can get our teeth into? Is there no sort of understandable program? A program which would be clearly good for America, which would make sense for America—and which at the same time might have the blessing of the Goddess of Democracy and even help somehow to fix up this bothersome matter of Dong Dang?

Is there none such? There is. And so we now come squarely and closely face to face with the issue which Americans hate most to face. It is that old, old issue with those old, old battered labels—the issue of Isolationism versus Internationalism.

We detest both words. We spit them at each other with the fury of hissing geese. We duck and dodge them.

Let us face that issue squarely now. If we face it squarely now—and if in facing it we take full and fearless account of the realities of our age—then we shall open the way, not necessarily to peace in our daily lives but to peace in our hearts.

Life is made up of joy and sorrow, of satisfactions and difficulties. In this time of trouble, we speak of troubles. There are many troubles. There are troubles in the field of philosophy, in faith and morals. There are troubles of home and family, of personal life. All are interrelated but we speak here especially of the troubles of national policy.

In the field of national policy, the fundamental trouble with America has been, and is, that whereas their nation became in the 20th Century the most powerful and the most vital nation in the world, nevertheless Americans were unable to accommodate themselves spiritually and practically to that fact. Hence they have failed to play their part as a world power—a failure which has had disastrous consequences for themselves and for all mankind. And the cure is this: to accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit.

"For such purposes as we see fit" leaves entirely open the question of what our purposes may be or how we may appropriately achieve them. Emphatically our only alternative to isolationism is not to undertake to police the whole world nor to impose democratic institutions on all mankind including the Dalai Lama[3] and the good shepherds of Tibet.

America cannot be responsible for the good behavior of the entire world. But America is responsible, to herself as well as to history, for the world-environment in which she lives. Nothing can so vitally affect America's environment as America's own influence upon it, and therefore if America's environment is unfavorable to the growth of American life, then America has nobody to blame so deeply as she must blame herself.

In its failure to grasp this relationship between America and America's environment lies the moral and practical bankruptcy of any and all forms of isolationism. It is most unfortunate that this virus of isolationist sterility has so deeply infected an influential section of the Republican Party. For until the Republican Party can develop a vital philosophy and program for America's initiative and activity as a world power, it will continue to cut itself off from any useful participation in this hour of history. And its participation is deeply needed for the shaping of the future of America and of the world.

But politically speaking, it is an equally serious fact that for seven years Franklin Roosevelt was, for all practical purposes, a complete isolationist. He was more of an isolationist than Herbert Hoover or Calvin Coolidge. The fact that Franklin Roosevelt has recently emerged as an emergency world leader should not obscure the fact that for seven years his policies ran absolutely counter to any possibility of effective American leadership in international co-operation. There is of course a justification which can be made for the President's first two terms. It can be said, with reason, that great social reforms were necessary in order to bring democracy up-to-date in the greatest of democracies. But the fact is that Franklin Roosevelt failed to make American democracy work successfully on a narrow, materialistic and nationalistic basis. And under Franklin Roosevelt we ourselves have failed to make democracy work successfully. Our only chance now to make it work is in terms of a vital international economy and in terms of an international moral order.

This objective is Franklin Roosevelt's great opportunity to justify his first two terms and to go down in history as the greatest rather

[3] The principal lama (religious head) of Tibet and Mongolia.

than the last of American Presidents. Our job is to help in every way we can, for our sakes and our children's sakes, to ensure that Franklin Roosevelt shall be justly hailed as America's greatest President.

Without our help he cannot be our greatest President. With our help he can and will be. Under him and with his leadership we can make isolationism as dead an issue as slavery, and we can make a truly *American* internationalism something as natural to us in our time as the airplane or the radio.

In 1919 we had a golden opportunity, an opportunity unprecedented in all history, to assume the leadership of the world—a golden opportunity handed to us on the proverbial silver platter. We did not understand that opportunity. Wilson mishandled it. We rejected it. The opportunity persisted. We bungled it in the 1920's and in the confusions of the 1930's we killed it.

To lead the world would never have been an easy task. To revive the hope of that lost opportunity makes the task now infinitely harder than it would have been before. Nevertheless, with the help of all of us, Roosevelt must succeed where Wilson failed.

Consider the 20th Century. It is ours not only in the sense that we happen to live in it but ours also because it is America's first century as a dominant power in the world. So far, this century of ours has been a profound and tragic disappointment. No other century has been so big with promise for human progress and happiness. And in no one century have so many men and women and children suffered such pain and anguish and bitter death.

It is a baffling and difficult and paradoxical century. No doubt all centuries were paradoxical to those who had to cope with them. But, like everything else, our paradoxes today are bigger and better than ever. Yes, better as well as bigger—inherently better. We have poverty and starvation—but only in the midst of plenty. We have the biggest wars in the midst of the most widespread, the deepest and the most articulate hatred of war in all history. We have tyrannies and dictatorships—but only when democratic idealism, once regarded as the dubious eccentricity of a colonial nation, is the faith of a huge majority of the people of the world.

And ours is also a revolutionary century. The paradoxes make it inevitably revolutionary. Revolutionary, of course, in science and in industry. And also revolutionary, as a corollary in politics and the structure of society. But to say that a revolution is in progress is not to say that the men with either the craziest ideas or the angriest ideas

or the most plausible ideas are going to come out on top. The Revolution of 1776 was won and established by men most of whom appear to have been both gentlemen and men of common sense.

Clearly a revolutionary epoch signifies great changes, great adjustments. And this is only one reason why it is really so foolish for people to worry about our "constitutional democracy" without worrying or, better, thinking hard about the world revolution. For only as we go out to meet and solve for our time the problems of the world revolution, can we know how to re-establish our constitutional democracy for another 50 or 100 years.

This 20th Century is baffling, difficult, paradoxical, revolutionary. But by now, at the cost of much pain and many hopes deferred, we know a good deal about it. And we ought to accommodate our outlook to this knowledge so dearly bought. For example, any true conception of our world of the 20th Century must surely include a vivid awareness of at least these four propositions.

First: our world of 2,000,000,000 human beings is for the first time in history one world, fundamentally indivisible. Second: modern man hates war and feels intuitively that, in its present scale and frequency, it may even be fatal to his species. Third: our world, again for the first time in human history, is capable of producing all the material needs of the entire human family. Fourth: the world of the 20th Century, if it is to come to life in any nobility of health and vigor, must be to a significant degree an American Century.

As to the first and second: in postulating the indivisibility of the contemporary world, one does not necessarily imagine that anything like a world state—a parliament of men—must be brought about in this century. Nor need we assume that war can be abolished. All that it is necessary to feel—and to feel deeply—is that terrific forces of magnetic attraction and repulsion will operate as between every large group of human beings on this planet. Large sections of the human family may be effectively organized into opposition to each other. Tyrannies may require a large amount of living space. But Freedom requires and will require far greater living space than Tyranny. Peace cannot endure unless it prevails over a very large part of the world. Justice will come near to losing all meaning in the minds of men unless Justice can have approximately the same fundamental meanings in many lands and among many peoples.

As to the third point—the promise of adequate production for all mankind, the "more abundant life"—be it noted that this is characteristically an American promise. It is a promise easily made, here and

elsewhere, by demagogues and proponents of all manner of slick schemes and "planned economies." What we must insist on is that the abundant life is predicated on Freedom—on the Freedom which has created its possibility—on a vision of Freedom under Law. Without Freedom, there will be no abundant life. With Freedom, there can be.

And finally there is the belief—shared let us remember by most men living—that the 20th Century must be to a significant degree an American Century. This knowledge calls us to action now.

What can we say and foresee about an American Century? It is meaningless merely to say that we reject isolationism and accept the logic of internationalism. What internationalism? Rome had a great internationalism. So had the Vatican and Genghis Khan and the Ottoman Turks and the Chinese Emperors and 19th Century England. After the first World War, Lenin had one in mind. Today Hitler seems to have one in mind—one which appeals strongly to some American isolationists whose opinion of Europe is so low that they would gladly hand it over to anyone who would guarantee to destroy it forever. But what internationalism have we Americans to offer?

Ours cannot come out of the vision of any one man. It must be the product of the imaginations of many men. It must be a sharing with all peoples of our Bill of Rights, our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, our magnificent industrial products, our technical skills. It must be an internationalism of the people, by the people and for the people.

In general, the issues which the American people champion revolve around their determination to make the society of men safe for the freedom, growth and increasing satisfaction of all individual men. Beside that resolve, the sneers, groans, catcalls, teeth-grinding, hisses and roars of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry are of small moment.

Once we cease to distract ourselves with lifeless arguments about isolationism we shall be amazed to discover that there is already an immense American internationalism. American jazz, Hollywood movies, American slang, American machines and patented products, are in fact the only things that every community in the world, from Zanzibar to Hamburg, recognizes in common. Blindly, unintentionally, accidentally and really in spite of ourselves, we are already a world power in all the trivial ways—in very human ways. But there is a great deal more than that. America is already the intellectual, scientific and artistic capital of the world. Americans—Midwestern Americans—are today the least provincial people in the world. They have traveled the

most and they know more about the world than the people of any other country. America's worldwide experience in commerce is also far greater than most of us realize.

Most important of all, we have that indefinable, unmistake sign of leadership: prestige. And unlike the prestige of Rome or Genghis Khan or 19th Century England, American prestige throughout the world is faith in the good intentions as well as in the ultimate intelligence and ultimate strength of the whole American people. We have lost some of that prestige in the last few years. But most of it is still there.

No narrow definition can be given to the American internationalism of the 20th Century. It will take shape, as all civilizations take shape, by the living of it, by work and effort, by trial and error, by enterprise and adventure and experience.

And by imagination!

As America enters dynamically upon the world scene, we need most of all to seek and to bring forth a vision of America as a world power which is authentically American and which can inspire us to live and work and fight with vigor and enthusiasm. And as we come now to the great test, it may yet turn out that in all our trials and tribulations of spirit during the first part of this century we as a people have been painfully apprehending the meaning of our time and now in this moment of testing there may come clear at last the vision which will guide us to the authentic creation of the 20th Century—our Century.

Consider four areas of life and thought in which we may seek to realize such a vision:

First, the economic. It is for America and for America alone to determine whether a system of free economic enterprise—an economic order compatible with freedom and progress—shall or shall not prevail in this century. We know perfectly well that there is not the slightest chance of anything faintly resembling a free economic system prevailing in this country if it prevails nowhere else. What then does America have to decide? Some few decisions are quite simple. For example: we have to decide whether or not we shall have for ourselves and our friends freedom of the seas—the right to go with our ships and our ocean-going airplanes where we wish, when we wish and as we wish. The vision of America as the principal guarantor of the freedom of the seas, the vision of America as the dynamic leader of world trade, has within it the possibilities of such enormous human progress as to stagger the imagination. Let us not be staggered by it. Let us rise to its tremendous possibilities. . . .

Closely akin to the purely economic area and yet quite different

from it, there is the picture of an America which will send out through the world its technical and artistic skills. Engineers, scientists, doctors, movie men, makers of entertainment, developers of airlines, builders of roads, teachers, educators. Throughout the world, these skills, this training, this leadership is needed and will be eagerly welcomed, if only we have the imagination to see it and the sincerity and good will to create the world of the 20th Century.

But now there is a third thing which our vision must immediately be concerned with. We must undertake now to be the Good Samaritan of the entire world. It is the manifest duty of this country to undertake to feed all the people of the world who as a result of this worldwide collapse of civilization are hungry and destitute—all of them, that is, whom we can from time to time reach consistently with a very tough attitude toward all hostile governments. For every dollar we spend on armaments, we should spend at least a dime in a gigantic effort to feed the world—and all the world should know that we have dedicated ourselves to this task. Every farmer in America should be encouraged to produce all the crops he can, and all that we cannot eat—and perhaps some of us could eat less—should forthwith be dispatched to the four quarters of the globe as a free gift, administered by a humanitarian army of Americans, to every man, woman and child on this earth who is really hungry.

But all this is not enough. All this will fail and none of it will happen unless our vision of America as a world power includes a passionate devotion to great American ideals. We have some things in this country which are infinitely precious and especially American—a love of freedom, a feeling for the equality of opportunity, a tradition of self-reliance and independence and also of co-operation. In addition to ideals and notions which are especially American, we are the inheritors of all the great principles of Western civilization—above all Justice, the love of Truth, the ideal of Charity. The other day Herbert Hoover said that America was fast becoming the sanctuary of the ideals of civilization. For the moment it may be enough to be the sanctuary of these ideals. But not for long. It now becomes our time to be the powerhouse from which the ideals spread throughout the world and do their mysterious work of lifting the life of mankind from the level of the beasts to what the Psalmist called a little lower than the angels.

America as the dynamic center of ever-widening spheres of enterprise, America as the training center of the skillful servants of mankind, America as the Good Samaritan, really believing again that it

is more blessed to give than to receive, and America as the powerhouse of the ideals of Freedom and Justice—out of these elements surely can be fashioned a vision of the 20th Century to which we can and will devote ourselves in joy and gladness and vigor and enthusiasm.

Other nations can survive simply because they have endured so long—sometimes with more and sometimes with less significance. But this nation, conceived in adventure and dedicated to the progress of man—this nation cannot truly endure unless there courses strongly through its veins from Maine to California the blood of purposes and enterprise and high resolve.

Throughout the 17th Century and the 18th Century and the 19th Century, this continent teemed with manifold projects and magnificent purposes. Above them all and weaving them all together into the most exciting flag of all the world and of all history was the triumphal purpose of freedom.

It is in this spirit that all of us are called, each to his own measure of capacity, and each in the widest horizon of his vision, to create the first great American Century.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

What were America's motives in entering World War II? What, legitimately, should she hope to gain, directly or indirectly, from her participation? What motives should guide her in post-war relations with the world? These questions are inseparable and insistent. Americans will not wholly agree as to the answers. The Atlantic Charter was one statement of aims, an official declaration. Archibald MacLeish's "The American Cause" was another. In the article here reprinted Henry R. Luce, before our actual declarations of war, stated what to him and very many others were the guiding purposes of the aid to China, Russia, and England which was the transitional stage to our actual armed participation. His words would apply equally well to our virtual (pre-Pearl Harbor) and our actual belligerency and are interesting as reflection not merely of what many thought in 1941 but also of what they think today about our aims in war and peace. Do you agree that he has stated "a program which would be clearly good for America, which would make sense for America—and which at the same time might have the blessing of the Goddess of Democracy . . ."? Is the implied mingling of idealism and self-interest in any way anomalous? Why or why not? Do you think his answers to our first three questions are in line with the probable direction of human affairs in coming years or do they suggest reasoning in terms of the past?

1. In the light of events since 1941, was Luce right in insisting that America needed to define clearly the war-aims she supported? What have been the later results of confused thinking about war-aims? How has it affected the peace we have made? Was Luce right in believing America had previously failed to play her part as a world power? What happened, for example, after World War I? Why *must* America be responsible for the world-environment she lives in? Why then can she not afford isolationism? Why do you agree or disagree with the writer's criticisms of Republican isolationism? of Roosevelt? of American failure after World War I?

2. Why does Luce call the 20th century "revolutionary" in science, industry, politics, and social structure? Illustrate. Has he, in your opinion, left out anything important in his account of revolutionary trends? If so, what? What four "propositions" does he consider necessary to any understanding of the 20th century? What others, if any, of similar importance, would you add? How is his argument affected by being limited to his four points? What does he mean by saying that "the abundant life is predicated on Freedom"? What kind of freedom in particular seems to be meant? Why do you agree or disagree with his point of view?

3. How, in the writer's opinion, do American jazz, movies, slang, machines, commercial products, scientific and artistic leadership, travel, and national prestige contribute to "internationalism"? Is this "American internationalism" which Luce believes already exists a true internationalism? Why or why not? Why would you or would you not agree that a true American internationalism would uphold a world "system of free economic enterprise" and assume leadership in world trade? What results might follow from such a policy? What recent events seem to you to indicate that we are or are not following it? Why do you or do you not agree that America should today share with the world her technical and artistic skills? that we should to the limit of our ability feed the hungry of the world? that we should try to foster abroad our own ideals of freedom and justice? Cite any evidence you can to show that we are or are not doing these things. How do Americans differ on the definitions of "freedom" and "justice"?

4. Condense into a brief statement your conception of the peace-time aims implied by the writer's discussion. Have our post-war policies toward Europe and Asia run parallel or counter to these aims? Should they further them? Why or why not?

5. The article is an example of popular pamphleteering. How does its purpose affect its logical organization, paragraphing, style, and diction? What seem to you to be its virtues and/or defects as popular presentation? If you find defects, suggest ways to remedy them. If you are familiar with what has come to be called the "*Time* style," show how the article fits or fails to fit into that pigeonhole.

The American Cause

ARCHIBALD MacLEISH

Archibald MacLeish (b. 1892) is a distinguished poet, an eloquent prose essayist, and an active participant in public affairs. He served overseas in World War I, lived for a time in the twenties among other expatriates in Paris, and returned to America, as many others did, at the beginning of the depression. By this time he had won considerable fame as a poet whose unconventional rhythms and sophisticated disillusion owed a good deal to T. S. Eliot; both the poetic excellence and the spiritual groping of this period are best seen, perhaps, in *The Hamlet of Archibald MacLeish* (1928).

But during the 1930s, under the double compulsion of depression at home and rising fascism abroad, Mr. MacLeish turned his attention from the human individual as mirrored in himself to the dignity of man as embodied in all of us. He gradually developed a fighting faith in democracy, and with it a theory of "public speech in poetry" which caused him more and more to turn his talent in verse to the task of interpreting the people to themselves and seeking to make articulate and hence to bring into being their hopes for the future. His finest verse of this period is probably to be found in *Conquistador* (1932 Pulitzer Prize) and *Public Speech* (1936). Reaching for a wider audience, he wrote also more experimental verse forms: radio plays such as the anti-fascist *Fall of the City,* a picture-book with "sound-track" on migratory workers (*Land of the Free*), *America Was Promises,* in which he makes direct appeal to the reader to "take" the promises of America.

Meanwhile he was turning more and more frequently to prose, and after the fall of France in 1940 he all but abandoned poetry, at least "for the duration." Between that time and Pearl Harbor, he played a notable part, through the increasing eloquence of his essays and addresses, in the gradual and painful national awakening to the value of our heritage of freedom and the terrible danger in which it stood. These and other essays and addresses were collected in the significantly entitled *A Time to Speak* and *A Time to Act.* He himself had begun to "act" as far back as 1939. President Roosevelt appointed him Librarian of Congress in that year, then in succession Director of the Office of Facts and Figures, Assistant Director of the Office of War Information, and finally Assistant Secretary of State. He left the State Department during the general reorganization early in President Truman's administration, but was soon appointed to the committee setting up the international education office of the United Nations

Address delivered in Boston, Nov. 20, 1940. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc.

Organization. That Mr. MacLeish should have thus devoted himself to the public service will surprise no one who remembers that his expressed ideal is the poet-statesman such as Chaucer or Milton.

THE ISSUE BEFORE the American people is not a political issue nor an issue to be decided by a public act. It is an issue between the American people and themselves: an issue which involves the vitality and the resources of the American soul.

These, I am well aware, are large and ornate words. They are words which a man would have used at the risk of his reputation for sincerity a dozen months ago. But they are words which none of us can help but use today. History, not rhetoric, has put them in our mouths. History has shown us at late last that the issue which divides our time is far more than an issue between armed forces. History has shown us that it is an issue between worlds: an issue which depends more surely on our souls than on our weapons: an issue which no nation can avoid. Specifically and precisely, history has made plain to us a fact we had refused before to see—the fact that the enemy which attacks us attacks us not with planes alone or tanks alone or arms, but with violence of belief. And the issue which the people of this country face, the issue which lies between this people and itself, is the issue whether or not those who believe in democracy—those specifically who believe in democracy in the United States—can bring against the violence and fanatical obsession of that invading faith a stronger faith, a more resisting ardor of their own.

Before the Battle of France—a battle which may prove to have been more decisive in our own history than in the history of Europe—fascism had seemed to us a force of weapons driven onward by the fear of force behind. But in the Battle of France we learned, in the words of a manifesto issued by a group of the most distinguished scholars in this country, that the enemy "were stronger in arms because they were stronger in heart. It was their fanatical faith that gave them wings and fire. It was the singleness of their purpose that quickened the spearhead of their march."* In France also we learned that the weakness of the democracies—the weakness at least of the democracy which there fell—was not, as we had wished to believe, a weakness only in arms, only in mechanical contrivances. We learned, in the

* *The City of Man, a Declaration on World Democracy* (The Viking Press, 1940).

words of the same manifesto, that the blindness of democratic diplomacy and the helplessness of democratic strategy "were the external symptoms of a decay of the men. . . . This they called appeasement. It implied that no conviction is worth fighting for and that the boundaries between good and evil had fallen. Military defeat was the embodiment of moral abdication."

It was the Battle of France which posed the issue we now face. Before that battle we had thought ourselves spectators of a war in Europe. After it, we knew the war was not in Europe but nearer—in the darker and more vulnerable countries of men's hearts. And after it we were not certain it was we who were spectators.

But the Battle of France did more than pose this issue. It weighted it—and weighted it against us. Before the Battle of France we had not understood—as a nation we had not understood—that the vitality of our democratic faith was put in issue. After the Battle of France we feared the issue was already lost. We saw then that the war was not, as we had wished to believe, a war between European powers which wanted conflicting things but a war between human beings who believed conflicting things. We saw that the differences of belief were differences as to the kind of society in which men should live. We saw that those who believed in the kind of society in which we also believe had been opposed not only by weapons, not only by machines, but by other men who believed, and believed fanatically, in the total destruction of that society. We saw that in the fighting which followed it had been those who believed fanatically in destruction who had been stronger and those who believed in the society in which we believe who had been less strong—less strong not only in their weapons but in their devotion to their cause. And we had wondered. We wondered whether the sickness of democracy in France would prove to be the sickness of democracy in every country. We wondered whether democracy, which had been unable to match conviction with conviction and certainty with certainty in France, would be able to match conviction with conviction elsewhere. We still are wondering. We are wondering whether democracy in the United States has other spiritual weapons than the doubts and misgivings which ten years of depression and twenty years of skepticism provided for the men of France to fight with.

It is of this fear I wish to speak. And to speak as candidly and earnestly as I am capable of speaking. It is a fear which exists—and which exists in the minds not of foolish or of frightened people, but of responsible men who love this country as well as any of its people

love it. It is also an understandable fear, for events which all of us have witnessed make it understandable. It is not a fear therefore which scornful men can put aside, or which demagogues can shout down, or which the patriotic societies can suppress with resolutions. It is a fear of which we must take account. But it is nevertheless—or so at least it seems to me—a fear both needless and mistaken. For it rests upon a total misconception of the democratic cause. It rests, to be precise, upon the misconception of democracy which those who most despise democracy have done their best to propagate and broadcast through the world. It is the fear of those who, being democrats themselves, accept the definition of democracy their enemies have written.

The enemies of liberty are not saboteurs in material things alone. They are saboteurs also in the things of the mind. And it is in the things of the mind that their sabotage is most dangerous. To destroy a machine or a manufacturing plant is one thing. The loss is great but the plant or the machine is replaceable. To destroy the integrity of words and to destroy the credibility of the users of words is another: neither can be replaced. The enemies of liberty, here as in other countries, practice the destruction of the integrity of words and the destruction of the credibility of the users of words. Indeed, it is this practice which principally characterizes the enemies of freedom in our time. They are the first men—the first men in the five hundred years since Johannes Gutenberg Zum Jungen, Knight of Mainz, invented the art of printing—the first men to use the printing press, deliberately and systematically, as an instrument of confusion and deceit. They are the first men in the five centuries of printing to turn the printing presses, like machine guns, on the people.

And nowhere have they used these *Kulturwaffen* to destroy a word more skillfully than with the word democracy—the word essential to our cause—the word which *is* our cause—the word we must defend whatever else we lose, or fail to fight for, or do not defend. What the enemies of liberty would have us take the word democracy to mean is not what Adams thought it meant, or Jefferson, or those who took it westward through the Shenandoah, or those who came to find it here by shipload after shipload through a hundred years. What the enemies of liberty would have us take the word to mean is something men and money and machines created in the nineteenth century and *called* democracy—a way of owning property, a scheme of doing business, an opportunity for comfort or for power or for certain forms of gain or entertainment.

It is this the enemies of liberty would have us take the word to mean. And it is with this meaning in our minds that they would have us make the choice before us—a choice, they say, between the new oncoming order of their fascist world and an old corrupted system full of fat and death—a choice between the new and iron cause for which a people can forget itself and sacrifice itself and go without and suffer and if need be die, and, on the other side, a world of goods and things and comforts and amusements with nothing to believe in but more goods, more things.

This was the choice which their confusions and their defamations and deceits presented to the citizens of France—and which the citizens of France, duped by confusions and deceits, accepted. It is the choice which many in this country, duped or themselves the dupers, would accept as well. The diplomat who tells us that democracy is dead in England, meaning by democracy a way of trading stocks, a chance to make ten millions in the market, accepts the choice the citizens of France accepted. The famous woman who assures us in a beautiful and cadenced prose that democracy is old in every country, and that the future like a wave will drown it down, accepts the same alternatives of terror and despair.[1]

But the fears and desperations and defeats which these and others like them breed and scatter are unreal fears. The democracy of which this writer and this statesman speak is not democracy but a distorted lie which both, but for their different reasons, take for true. Democracy itself has never been and is not now and never can become a way of trade, a world of goods, a heap of products, whether those products are of gold or steel or corn or silk or what-not: whether the trade is large or small or free or planned or neither. And only a very foolish man—only a man who had no understanding of the word democracy, or what it had been once, or what it can be—would take the issue in these terms and let his enemies compel him to defend, not the dream of freedom in the mind, not the way of freedom toward the future, but things already made, systems established, ways of trading, heaps of goods piled up.

If democracy is what the fascists say it is—if democracy is nothing but the world of innumerable automobiles and the best telephone system on earth and a new gadget just around the corner and the radios driveling on in the hotel lobbies eighteen hours out of twenty-four

[1] The *diplomat* was Joseph P. Kennedy, American Ambassador to Great Britain 1937–41; the *famous woman* was Anne Morrow Lindbergh, author of *The Wave of the Future* (1940).

and the simpering legs in the magazine advertisements and the simpering voices on the movie screen and the hundreds of thousands of miles of roadside billboards with the billboard faces and the ten millions of unemployed waiting for the next boom—if democracy is only this, then democracy cannot survive attack, for democracy is not a cause that men will fight for.

But the true issue is not this issue; democracy is not the world that men and money and machines built in the nineteenth century and called democracy. The real issue is an issue to be fought in the hard and stony passes of the human spirit—the strict Thermopylaes of time where even if a man is killed he cannot die. And democracy itself is neither things nor goods nor fatness and indifference and an empty heart, but winter on the Massachusetts Bay and cold at Trenton and the gunfire in Kentucky and the hungry ground. The real issue is an issue between the frenzy on the one side of a herded, whipped-up, crowd-begotten "cause," and on the other side the single man's belief in liberty of mind and spirit; his willingness to sacrifice his goods and comforts and his earnings for its sake.

The democratic faith which swept the world—the democratic faith which men believed in and men fought for, the faith which men believe in and will fight for still, is not a faith in things or goods or fortunes. John Milton knew the democratic faith that men will fight for. He spoke of it not once but often:

> And as for you, citizens, it is of no small concern, what manner of men ye are, whether to acquire, or to keep possession of your liberty. Unless your liberty be of that kind which can neither be gotten nor taken away by arms (and that alone is such which springing from piety, justice, temperance, in fine from real virtue, shall take deep and intimate root in your minds) you may be assured that there will not be wanting one, who, even without arms, will speedily deprive you of what it is your boast to have gained by force of arms. . . . For know (that you may not feel resentment, or be able to blame anybody but yourselves), that as to be free is precisely the same thing as to be pious, wise, just and temperate, careful of one's own, abstinent from what is another's, and thence in fine, magnanimous and brave—so to be the opposite of these, is the same thing as to be a slave; and by the wonted judgment and as it were by the just retribution of God, it comes to pass, that the nation, which has been incapable of governing and ordering itself, and has delivered itself up to the slavery of its own lusts, is itself delivered over against its will to other masters—and whether it will or no is compelled to serve.

John Milton's democracy was a democracy in which men believed.

It was a democracy for which a band of sober and unmilitary men fought as armies had not fought before them. It was a faith more powerful than any faith or cause which could be brought against it. It has been a faith more powerful than any other for three centuries of time and on two continents. It is still a faith more powerful than any other. All our history has made this plain. Whenever in the history of this nation we have given ourselves to the labor of creating upon this continent a life in which every man might have the freedom of his mind, we have been confident and certain of our future and assured and asked no questions either of ourselves or anyone. Whenever we have given ourselves to other labors, we have lost the meaning of our lives and lost our certainty and questioned everyone and most of all ourselves.

Three generations back in the thirties and the forties of the last century when the four-hundred-foot side-wheelers with the crystal chandeliers and the mahogany bars and the eight course dinners and the filigree funnels with their sparks like crazy stars went hooting and slapping up the Ohio and the Hudson and the Mississippi, the Americans had no questions about democracy. They had a job to do. They had the toughest job a people ever undertook—the job of clearing and settling and tying together with ships and roads and rails and words and names the largest area lived on as a single social unit by any nation, at any time. They had the job of creating on an undiscovered continent a country where a hundred million men could live in freedom from the rest and from each other. They had the actual and present job of clearing on this continent the quarter sections where a man could build his freedom out of logs and nails.

And while they had that job to do they asked no questions. They knew what democracy was. They knew what they were too. They were the smartest, toughest, luckiest, leanest, all-around knowingest nation on God's green earth. Their way of living was the handsomest way of living human beings had ever hit on. Their institutions were the institutions history had been waiting for. If you had told them anyone else had a harder hold on the earth than they had, or anyone else believed in himself more than they believed in themselves, they would have laughed in your face. And gone on with their working.

Who they were, what they were, never bothered the Americans. Virginia gentlemen and Boston philosophers and Long Island poets and visiting British lecturers might write and talk and wonder about American manners and American origins and American politics and

the American soul. Americans didn't wonder. They knew all about them. They knew about origins. They had all the origins of Europe in their veins before the century was over—all the races a man ever heard of and a lot more beside. Races didn't bother the Americans. They were something a lot better than any race. They were a People. They were the first self-constituted, self-declared, self-created People in the history of the world. And their manners were their own business. And so were their politics. And so, but ten times so, were their souls.

Who an American was and what democracy was, was nothing to talk about. You could see for yourself. An American was a man who had the luck to be born on this continent where the heat was hotter and the cold was colder and the sun was brighter and the nights were blacker and the distances were farther and the faces were nearer and the rain was more like rain and the mornings were more like mornings than anywhere else on earth—sooner and sweeter and lovelier over unused hills.

An American was a man who knew which way to take to reach tomorrow. An American was a man who could let himself in and let himself out and nobody asking him "please" not even the President. An American was a man who never asked anyone anything—who he was or where he came from or what he did—because it was answer enough to be a man. At least in America.

That was the way it used to be in this country. That was the way it was while the people of this country were clearing the quarter sections for a free man's field. That is the way it has been whenever we have remembered clearly and understood with reality what democracy is.

For democracy is never a thing done. Democracy is always something that a nation must be doing. The quarter sections which were freedom a hundred years ago are now not freedom. Freedom will be somewhere else. But the labor of creating freedom is the same. And the consequence.

What is necessary now is one thing and one thing only—that the issue of democracy be made precise and clear—that democracy become again democracy in action, not democracy accomplished and piled up in goods and gold.

Democracy in action is a cause for which the stones themselves will fight.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

It is a little startling to say that World War II was fought over the meaning of a word, but, as Mr. MacLeish makes clear in this address, there is enough truth in the idea to give us pause. The word, of course, is *democracy*. The Nazis, whose whole philosophy was based on calculated lying, sold too many people (as we say) a bill of goods, made them believe democracy was the sort of thing no man in his senses would die for. But in 1940, when France had fallen and Britain was fighting on alone, we Americans began to think more clearly about the words *democracy* and *liberty* and perceived that our words meant things without which life would not be worth living. So we went to war. We should look with new respect on words.

Mr. MacLeish's description of democracy is challenging too: "never a thing done" but "always something that a nation must be doing." He says elsewhere that an attempt to defend democracy by defending the status quo is bound to fail, for "the status quo *cannot be defended.*" And a few weeks before he delivered the address here reprinted he had written that the "true American cause is the defense of the American future." In this interpretation, therefore, the cause for which we went to war a year later was not alone the protection of our great heritage but also the chance to perfect it.

Mr. MacLeish's preview of our war-aims is very different from that of Henry Luce, whose "The American Century," written a few weeks later, precedes "The American Cause" in this book. As the similar yet contrasting titles suggest, whereas Mr. Luce envisages the beneficent power of America dominating the century by export of financial relief, ideas, and the materials of trade, Mr. MacLeish emphasizes the validity of our democratic tradition, its essential independence of the paraphernalia of a commercial society, its exciting adaptability and incompleteness, its challenge and promise to ordinary men and women everywhere. As "preview" became actual war-aims and war-aims merged into peace-aims, these two points of view have been continuously representative. As we make the peace we must still choose between them, or modify, combine, or substitute as we will. One part at least of Mr. MacLeish's thesis is surely beyond argument: "the labor of creating freedom" goes on . . . and on . . .

1. What must have been the state of mind of America between wars to explain MacLeish's saying in November, 1940 (a year before Pearl Harbor), that he would not have dared, twelve months earlier, to use such "large and ornate words" as those with which he opens his address? (The essay "What We Didn't Know Hurt Us a Lot" gives an interesting account of American attitudes between wars.) What do the "large and ornate words"

mean? How was the "issue" made clear to many Americans by the fall of France? Why did many then fear that the cause was "already lost"?

2. What had the Nazis tried to persuade us that the word *democracy* meant? How had such propaganda contributed to the fall of France? What does MacLeish mean when he says that this perversion of the meaning of *democracy* was part of the Nazi technique of destroying "the integrity of words"? In what sense is it true to say, as he does, that this word "*is* our cause"? Show how other idea-words (*liberty, fascism, socialism,* for example) are often made meaningless by careless, even though not always malicious, misuse. How does this process strike at the very roots of our culture? Why, in MacLeish's view, would an understanding of what the Nazis had been trying to do to words like *democracy* help Americans (in 1940) to overcome the fear that the cause was already lost?

3. What does MacLeish mean when he describes democracy as "the way of freedom toward the future"? as "the single man's belief in liberty of mind and spirit"? as "never a thing done" but "always something that a nation must be doing"? How can an acceptance of these definitions help us to avoid a repetition of the cynicism of the '20s and the near-despair of the '30s? What was the essential characteristic of the democracy of the pioneer period, as MacLeish describes it? If you agree that "democracy is never a thing done" but always a thing "to be doing," what do you consider the most important job or jobs before American democracy today?

4. When we did enter the war, it was to preserve our national existence, and—in the opinion of many, perhaps most, Americans—to preserve also our democratic "way of life" and our chance to perfect it: aims close to those MacLeish here sets forth. What further aims and hopes, especially concerning our relations with other nations, emerged during the war? To what extent have all these aims been achieved? to what extent, if at all, irreparably lost? Why is it hard to remember, after a war, the cause for which we fought? the disaster averted by dearly bought victory? Describe as fully as you can the sort of world we should probably be living in today if we and our allies had not won that victory. Should you say that, even if we should fail to reach our later goals, the "American cause" described by MacLeish was worth fighting for? Explain your answer.

5. Which of the following adjectives seem to you to apply to the style of this address?—prosaic, poetic, intellectual, exalted, figurative, simple, elaborate, concrete, abstract, passionate, sentimental, eloquent. What others can you add as appropriate? Point out passages made especially vivid by concrete symbolic details. The speech is full of striking phrases, such as "the hard and stony passes of the human spirit," or "which way to take to reach tomorrow." Find others, and evaluate their effectiveness. Name various ways in which this essay reveals that the author is a poet.

The Moral Basis of World Order

RALPH BARTON PERRY

(For biography see "The Limits of Tolerance.")

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS have spoken of two conditions of mankind, the "state of nature" in which the relations of men are regulated only by the free exercise of their natural faculties, and the state of civil society in which human relations are regulated by law and government—the second condition being regarded as the remedy for the evils or inconveniences of the first. Until recently, however, there has been a third condition of mankind—the condition, namely, of isolation. It has been possible to solve the problem of human relations, in whole or in part, by the absence of such relations. There was no European-American problem until in the fifteenth century Europe discovered America. The age of discovery was followed by the age of conquest—which was a problem both for the conquerors and for the conquered. For some time afterwards it was possible for Europeans to solve their problems by migrating to America; and even after intercourse between Europe and America was highly developed, remoteness continued to serve as a partial avoidance or solution of their inter-continental problems.

The basic fact governing human relations is that they tend to become harmful unless they are organized. When men come within range of one another, conflicts of interest arise, and these call into play a set of divisive and hostile instincts, such as covetousness, envy, jealousy, rivalry, and combativeness. Conflict can be mitigated or removed by the limitation and redirection of interests; and it can be converted into cooperation by exchange and division of labor. To make the relations of interests innocuous or positively beneficent, instead of destructive and degrading, is what is called morality. Certain forms of this harmonized life are called prudence, temperance, justice, benevolence, veracity, honesty; and these forms of life are happily made possible by reason and reinforced by certain instincts, such as sympathy, love, and consciousness of kind. But so long as ignorance

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and contrary instincts are not eradicated, some measure of compulsion must be exerted by the whole upon its members. The instruments by which this harmonious adjustment is effected embrace the social institutions, such as custom, education, economy, law, state, and church.*

The occasion for morality and its institutions arises, then, wherever men come into contact with one another. It makes not the slightest difference that one man happens to be on the one side and the other on the other side of that invisible line called a boundary. Morality does not stop at the frontier any more than space stops at the frontier. If one man murders, cheats or robs another it is no less wrong because they happen to be of different races or nations. It would still be "better" if they didn't; and better still if they exchanged goods or pooled their efforts for the good of both. Where there is intercourse there is friction; and where there is friction there is the need of lubrication, and the opportunity of collaboration.

Technological advances have now brought all men into contact with one another, and have thus brought the entire earth's surface into one moral domain and all its inhabitants under one moral jurisdiction. Distance has been annihilated by the development of new means of communication (especially by radio) and of transport (especially by air). Isolation is further impossible, because despite the industrialization of all parts of the world, each industry draws its materials from near and far; and because the increased volume of mass production requires a corresponding increase of purchasing power among all the peoples of the globe. These world-wide human relations require, as the only alternative to that "international jungle" which Mr. Lawrence Dennis[1] is apparently prepared to accept,† the extension to all mankind of those basic institutions by which conflicting interests are ordered and harmonized.

There are those who think that it will suffice if this is done in "sections"—a seductive idea because it sounds moderate and prudent. Let there be a European peace, and an Anglo-American peace, and a Far-Eastern peace, and a Russian peace, and then by adding these peaces together you will have a world peace! This idea is also attractive to those who would have America remain at home—if not within her strict national frontiers, then within the boundaries of language or

* I omit discussion of the "personal" side of morality, but here also the same principle of harmonious adjustment applies.

† Cf. his *Dynamics of War and Revolution*, 1940.

[1] Author of such frankly fascist books as *The Coming American Fascism* (1936); co-defendant in the indeterminate trial of thirty persons for sedition at Washington, April–December, 1944.

hemispherical geography. It is a new and more disarming disguise for isolationism.

But sectionalism merely shifts and aggravates the problem. The growth of nation-states and of alliances has not prevented war, but has only, by increasing the size of the warring units, made war more terrible and destructive. An inter-sectional war might well be the final cataclysm before the curtain goes down forever on the tragedy of civilization. There could be no deeper pessimism than the belief that before the world can be at peace it must pass through a phase in which human rivalries and conflicts are consolidated into four gigantic contestants. After such a phase the most probable peace would be a return of man to his prehistoric cave.

If the world were divided into sections, each of which was left to its own devices, what would prevent a conflict of interest among them? What would prevent a more gigantic race of armaments than the world has ever seen? What would prevent the devotion of science to the invention of more destructive instruments of war? What would prevent one section from acquiring illusions of grandeur and seeking to conquer the rest? Surely not a balance of power. For what is to hold such sectional powers in balance? Or what is to prevent three from combining to conquer the fourth? Of all the methods of preserving peace the balance of power should now be the most discredited. A balance of power is at best a temporary and precarious equilibrium of opposing forces, a truce among rivals who are merely biding their time, a momentary pause between the war that is past and the war that is being prepared. And when that war comes, its length and its destructiveness will have been increased, not prevented, by the near-equality of the opponents.

There is one and only one moral solution of this problem, which is to embrace all the nations of the world within one order, supported by a world-wide conscience, enlightened by a world-wide culture, implemented by a world-wide economy, stabilized by world-wide habits, and regulated by world-wide laws under whatever degree or kind of world-wide control may be necessary to create security among the members. This is our proposed solution—the solution for which we fight. And so long as our enemies oppose that solution, as under their present leadership they do, both in thought and in deed, they are wrong and we are right.

Morality must be as wide as social institutions. National institutions require a national morality, and world-institutions require a world

morality. A nation such as the United States is possible because its inhabitants, on the whole and in the long run, accept the same set of moral ideas. Coercion is undoubtedly necessary, but its role is to bring the abnormal into conformity with the normal. It would be impossible to impose the laws which protect life and property, or which guarantee civil liberties, or which correct injustice, or which prescribe the procedures of democratic government, upon a people that did not adhere by conviction, sentiment, and habit to a common underlying creed: who did not believe in honesty, in the sacredness of life, in the right to use and control the instruments of their happiness, in the right to worship, think, discuss, and persuade, in equality of opportunity, and in the authority of the people who live under the government to determine how and by whom they shall be governed.

It will be noted that this common morality is far from being the whole of life. It is confined to broad principles, and leaves room for the peculiarities of individuals and of minority groups. It is to be noted, furthermore, that this morality is not coextensive with the sphere of enforcement. The roots of morality, consisting of attitudes and habits, *cannot* be enforced, but must be inculcated by tradition and education; and there are certain practices, such as mendacity, that are so evidently self-defeating that they do not need to be prevented by any other penalties than their own effects. Nor is that public morality which is the condition of the national order coextensive with the *good* life. It provides only the framework within which the higher values of happiness, culture, self-development, piety, friendship, and love may be made possible to the maximum extent for the maximum number of persons.

What holds for the nation holds for the world society. World peace and world cooperation cannot be enforced unless there is built up in all nations a firm inner adherence to its underlying principles. This inner adherence cannot be enforced, but must be learned by experience, disseminated by world-wide education, and sustained by a world tradition. Enforcement must confine itself to the overt behavior of nations in their relations to one another. And beyond the limited area of world morality which immediately underlies this prescribed behavior will lie the untouched spheres of purely national life, and all the higher values attainable by persons and nations within the world-wide framework.

The morality which is characteristic of a democratic-Christian so-

ciety is not only universal in its application, but peculiarly capable of universal adoption.

A liberal or democratic society is that in which the utmost room is made for the private within the public. Liberty, equality, tolerance, self-government, human dignity, all mean, in one way or another, that public regulation shall respect personal choice to the maximum degree which is possible for everybody. Freedom is to be limited only by the requirement of universality—each freedom by its consistency with all freedoms.

This does not imply, as was supposed in the early phase of American democracy, that the functions of government shall be negative: for the development of the individual to the point at which he can choose for himself and do what he chooses, and his protection against the too-free freedoms of others, require the intervention and positive services of government. But the perfected democratic society would be that in which the largest possible sphere of each individual's life was left to the control of his own creative faculties, and in which he encountered both neighbors and the public authorities as allies rather than as obstacles.

A Christian society is a democratic society with added emphasis on the moral foundations of the state, the irreducible reality of the human soul, and the right of that soul to find its spiritual salvation through spiritual agencies independent of the state.

The principles of a democratic Christian society are thus peculiarly capable of universal extension because they place the minimum of restraint upon the genius and self-regulation of individual nations. The major difficulty of a world polity is its interference with the natural and justifiable desire of each nation to live its own life in its own way. A democratic Christian world polity would not only concede this desire, but assist it in all ways, subject to only one condition, the condition, namely, that it should so express itself in relation to other nations as to permit of their enjoying the same privilege. Such a world polity would ask only one thing of all nations, namely, that they should view the total human situation from the standpoint of all nations, and then act accordingly. That is asking much, it is true; and any given nation could refuse. But it could not refuse on moral grounds, least of all on the general ground of freedom.

The limitations which a democratic Christian *world* order places on nations are much less exacting than those which a democratic Christian national order places on the person or minority. International behavior is only a fraction of national behavior, and a still

smaller fraction of the behavior of individual persons. Similarly, while the world morality must intersect the lives of all nations and all persons, it would be but a thin section of their full concreteness.

How far, then, is it necessary for a world order to impose a common pattern of thought and sentiment upon all the world? How far does it prescribe the way in which the several nations shall conduct their own internal affairs? I am not here concerned with the question of coercion—undoubtedly a world order, like a national order, would require sanctions, and an abandonment of that "absolute" sovereignty which nations are supposed (questionably) now to possess. But the present question concerns only the extent to which there must be *agreement* in order that, when necessary, there can be coercion, and in order that the nations can dwell together in relations of peace and mutual help. It should now be possible to answer that question, if not definitively, then at least in spirit and in principle.

The answer begins by making it clear that a world-wide system of freedom is still a system, and that it is necessary under this as under any other system that the members shall be deeply attached to the system. Moral unity is as necessary for a world polity as for a national polity, and it is as necessary for a democratic Christian polity as for a less liberal polity.

Mr. Myron C. Taylor, who was the President's personal representative at the Vatican, is quoted as having made the following statement at a dinner of the Conference of Christians and Jews in Boston:

> In a broad sense this meeting is a public recognition in America that men of basic faith may dwell together in peace and harmony, to the uplifting of the human family and the glory of God. . . . I am not attracted by the one big family idea. Indeed I am suspicious of the man or woman who has no pride of religion or of race. I cannot convince myself that any world union is possible in these days if it involves as a prerequisite the acceptance of a single form of political economy and government or the acceptance of a single philosophy. Out of our differences we have forged our progress.*

This, I submit, is an unfortunate statement, in which the second part appears to contradict the first. "Out of our differences" we have also forged our wars. If a "basic faith" is required for peace and harmony at home it is likewise required for peace and harmony abroad. The "human family" to be uplifted is the family of all mankind, and

* *Boston Herald*, April 24, 1942.

the God to be glorified is the God of all men. Here is already the outline of a "single philosophy."

The principles essential to peace must be accepted and practiced by all who make peace and keep the peace. Within the broad framework of these principles there is room for all those differences which "forge our progress," and which provide us with many different prides over and above the common pride of belonging to the family of mankind. But this idea of peaceful and enriching differences is itself a basic faith and a single philosophy, which must prevail throughout the world if the world is to enjoy its fruits. Indeed it might be argued that, since the use of force is most difficult in a world polity and most inappropriate in a liberal polity, a liberal world polity must depend more than any other on its moral unity.

What are the elements of that world-wide morality on which all mankind (or most of mankind, most of the time; or the leading and articulate members of mankind) must be persuaded to agree, if a world order is to be possible? What are those habits of thought, feeling, and action which must be generally diffused throughout the peoples of the world if an all-inclusive and harmonious human society is to be stable and enduring?

First, there must be a recognition of duties and obligations to the whole on the part of each nation and its members. It is of the very essence of nationalism, in the sense in which it is an obstacle to world order, that individuals should recognize no obligation save to their own nation. This is the strength of nationalism—its strength for evil: for it gives to individuals a spirit of devotion to an end greater than themselves, but at the same time it moves them to betray an end still greater. It is a partial or pseudo-morality, which is the most dangerous of all enemies to entire and genuine morality.

Second, the obligations imposed by the world order must take precedence of those imposed by the national order, or by personal self-interest. As the personal life must accommodate itself to the limits imposed by the organized nation, so the national life must accommodate itself to the limits imposed by the world order, assuming these limits to be made as wide as possible.

Third, if there is to be a world conscience, in which world obligations are recognized and accepted as paramount, then the influences which create this conscience must be allowed to circulate freely among all men. All men must be allowed to become acquainted with one another's needs, and to profit by one another's experience. All men

must enjoy the liberty to think and to speak, and the corresponding liberty to hear and to learn.

Fourth, over and above the cultural expressions peculiar to each nation and of a rich diversity, there must be a cosmopolitan culture embracing the universal values of science, art, and morality.

Fifth, there must be a common love of freedom. By a love of freedom I mean that attitude of mind which finds it equally intolerable to live in subjection and to hold others in subjection. To arouse people from a passive acceptance of tyranny it is only necessary to break their habits, stir their combative emotions and their covetousness, create some symbol of collective action, such as nationalism or racism, and improve their standard of living, so as to give them the hope and the means of improving it further. Nothing is more remarkable than the extent to which this aspiration for freedom has spread to all parts of the world, despite long traditions of servitude. How to arouse people to revolt against tyranny is not the present problem. The difficulty is to prevent a people so aroused, and embittered by the memory of past wrongs, from creating a new tyranny with fresh wrongs to be righted in some future revolt. To stop this cycle of conquest and liberation it is necessary to spread in the world the second and more difficult half of the love of freedom, the half which desires to *give* freedom and not merely claim it.

Sixth, men and nations must feel a sense of joint participation. Liberals are so preoccupied with the escape from tyranny and exploitation that they forget that there is also a deep desire to "escape from freedom."* Men must feel that they are marching together to some common destination; that they are not working alone, but that, having done their utmost, they can count on forces greater than themselves to bring the issue to a successful conclusion. Men now find this sense of participation through war, at a fearful cost to themselves and to those other fellow-mortals whom unhappily they must treat as enemies.

Here is the paradox and the tragedy of human history in a nutshell: that men should find a refuge from their loneliness in the concerted action with which they meet catastrophes of their own creation; that they should have to descend to the level of violence against half of mankind in order to rise to the level of brotherhood with the other half. We must find a better solution of this problem—in a striving all together for the triumph of good over evil and of light over darkness; in the all-inclusive common enterprise of developing to the utmost the resources of physical nature and of the human soul, and

* Cf. Erich Frome, *Escape from Freedom*, 1941.

distributing the common gains among all the members. Then we may play our parts as free individuals and as free nations, and assume our respective burdens of responsibility, but at the same time feel a double security in the friendship of all other men, and in the irresistible might of the aggregate of men.

Finally, there can be no world order unless all human societies are pervaded by the sentiment of humanity. A world cannot live in peace which is half-humane and half-inhumane. For to the humane inhumanity is intolerable. We rightly hesitate to interfere with the domestic life of our neighbors, but it is impossible to live in proximity to a household in which the wife is beaten by the husband, or the children overworked and starved by the parents, or even in which domestic animals are abused by their owners. Nor can one nation live in proximity to another nation which practices brutality upon its slaves or its minorities. The only valid cause of the American-Spanish War was American sympathy with Cuban victims of Spanish misrule. Sympathy has its own rights over and above the rights of those with whom it sympathizes. And outraged sympathy is a force to be reckoned with. The nazi persecution of the Jews and of the Poles, and the nazi shooting of innocent hostages, have excited among remote American spectators emotions which have played a major part in their willingness to go to war.

There are, I know, those who say that what others do to others is no concern of ours. Why not close one's eyes and stop one's ears? Why not, like the priest and the Levite of the parable, pass by on the other side?

Because, in a world of press, photography, telegraph, and radio, every cruelty, no matter where it occurs, by whom it is done, and upon whom it is perpetrated, is in the full sight and hearing of every other man. Distance no longer provides a means of evasion, or an escape from pity.

Because one cannot cultivate indifference without becoming like those whose cruelty one condemns. The evidence of men's humanity is the resentment excited in them by inhumanity: the moment inhumanity ceases to excite them they will themselves have become inhumane. And if they feel compassion and resentment they must express them; and if they express them in words they must also act upon them, or they will stand condemned as hypocrites and sentimentalists.

The sentiment of humanity is the ultimate motive and spring of action for any order that would embrace all of humanity. Respect for

the dignity of human faculty, concern for the sufferings and joys of human sensibility, sense of kinship with human kind—these are the roots of morality. Their implanting, their cultivation, and their fruition among all peoples is the first condition of a moral order of the world.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

It would obviously be disastrous to tell ourselves that, having brought the United Nations Organization into being, we can now sit back and let peace and freedom rule the earth. For no government, national or international, can guarantee either peace or freedom, though we can be all too sure that without government there will be neither. To succeed, the United Nations, like the United States, must have the loyalty and labor of us all. It is therefore important to discuss the basis of a successful world order.

Furthermore, no one, least of all any delegate to the San Francisco Conference, ever maintained that the United Nations Charter is the last word. It is a good beginning. According to how we use it, it can mean much or little now; by tradition and amendment, it can come to mean more or less in the future. We need to know how to use it, how to change it, in the service of peace and freedom. Professor Perry, writing before the Charter was even conceived, makes no specific recommendations. But he offers a set of moral principles by which to test proposals and developments within the United Nations to see if they lead in the direction of freedom and peace.

Why *moral* principles? He answers that question by pointing out that morality is a method of making human relations beneficent rather than destructive, that no society can operate without essential agreement on how such adjustment can be made, and that all the world is now inescapably one society. Then he names seven principles which, as he believes, all peoples can accept without sacrificing the rich variety of their several cultures, and accepting which they can learn to live in freedom and peace. By these seven principles, then, we may test our personal attitudes, and our country's. Does a given proposal advance the development of a world moral order and thus make for peace? Do we want peace enough to put the world's good even above our country's? Do we want freedom enough to fly to the defense of the unfree "everywhere in the world"? In a world of radar and atomic energy, we should be rash indeed to evade the challenge of this analysis.

(Bracketed questions, which may, of course, be omitted, require some knowledge of the organization of the United Nations; the State Department will send copies of the Charter free on request.)

1. How does Perry define morality? Why does he believe that "moral isolation" has now become impossible? Why does he believe that sectionalism, which he identifies with balance of power, is "the most discredited of all solutions"? Why do you agree or disagree? [In what ways have sectionalism and balance of power affected the structure of the United Nations Charter? What safeguards are set up against the sectional wars Perry fears? Explain why these safeguards seem to you adequate or inadequate. What future amendment(s) to the Charter, if any, would you suggest as further safeguard?] Explain why you agree or disagree with this whole opening argument that the only way to peace is to develop a world-wide moral order.

2. What resemblances does Perry find between the functioning of a generally accepted morality in a nation and in the world community? When proposing a "democratic Christian" system of morality, how does he define a democratic society? a Christian society? If you find anything in either definition either inaccurate or unessential, explain your objection. If you believe any element would be unacceptable to individuals or peoples of other religions or of cultural traditions non-fascist but not democratic in the Anglo-American sense, explain why.

3. Before he discusses "how far . . . it is necessary for a world order to impose a common pattern of thought and sentiment," what warning does Perry sound? How does he defend his belief in a minimum basis of agreement against the charge that it would choke progress? Why do you agree or disagree?

4. The first two principles proposed as basic to a world morality are steps in a single process: (1) development of a sense of obligation to the world community, and (2) advancement of that obligation to take precedence over all others. Illustrate how devotion to country is a "partial" morality. Under what conditions, if at all, would you yourself be willing to put loyalty to the world community above loyalty to the USA? [To what extent does the United Nations Charter impose on us the larger loyalty? Argue for or against future amendment to increase the subordination of members to the whole—i.e., further voluntary surrender of sovereignty.]

5. Show how the third principle, world-wide freedom of speech and the press, would nurture a world conscience. Illustrate from recent history the efforts being made to advance that principle. [In what way, if at all, is it advanced by the United Nations Charter?] How would the fourth principle, development of a world culture, tend to develop a world conscience? [Suggest ways in which the United Nations, working presumably through subsidiaries of the Economic and Social Council, can aid the emergence of a world culture.]

6. In presenting his fifth principle, "a common love of freedom," how does Perry define "love of freedom"? Here he asserts that to cultivate a hatred of inflicting oppression is at present more essential than to stimu-

late readiness to resist oppression. Why would you accept or reject or wish to question this statement? How does the experience of Americans (perhaps your own) in World War II illustrate Perry's sixth principle, the importance of the feeling of participation? How can this moral value of war be transferred to peace? (Inasmuch as the search for what William James called "the moral equivalent of war" is one of the great quests of recent generations, you can scarcely be expected to do more than begin to discuss it.)

7. Why is Perry's seventh principle, development of a sentiment of humanity pervading all societies, set off from the other six in a new and concluding section? How does recent history seem to show that "a world cannot live in peace which is half humane and half inhumane"? What evidence, if any, leads you to question this belief?

8. Analyze the means Perry uses in this essay to present an abstract subject to a popular audience. You will find it helpful to begin by making a brief précis to test the clarity of organization and thought-movement. Show how transitions between paragraphs help to make the thought-movement easy to follow. Show whether or not the same care in transitions is practised within paragraphs. Find passages illuminated by specific examples or symbolic detail. If you feel that other passages need such development, point them out.

Jefferson Day Address

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT

(For biography see "Progressive Government.")

AMERICANS ARE GATHERED together this evening in communities all over the country to pay tribute to the living memory of Thomas Jefferson—one of the greatest of all democrats; and I want to make it clear that I am spelling that word "democrats" with a small "d."

I wish I had the power, just for this evening, to be present at all of these gatherings.

In this historic year, more than ever before, we do well to consider the character of Thomas Jefferson as an American citizen of the world.

As Minister to France, then as our first Secretary of State, and as our third President, Jefferson was instrumental in the establishment of the United States as a vital factor in international affairs.

It was he who first sent our Navy into far-distant waters to defend our rights. And the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine was the logical development of Jefferson's far-seeing foreign policy.

Today this nation which Jefferson helped so greatly to build is playing a tremendous part in the battle for the rights of man all over the world.

Today we are part of the vast Allied force—a force composed of flesh and blood and steel and spirit—which is today destroying the makers of war, the breeders of hate, in Europe and in Asia.

In Jefferson's time our Navy consisted of only a handful of frigates—but that tiny Navy taught nations across the Atlantic that piracy in the Mediterranean—acts of aggression against peaceful commerce and the enslavement of their crews—was one of those things which, among neighbors, simply was not done.

Today we have learned in the agony of war that great power involves great responsibility. Today we can no more escape the consequence of German and Japanese aggression than could we avoid the consequences of attacks by the Barbary Corsairs a century and a half before.

We, as Americans, do not choose to deny our responsibility.

Address written April 11, 1945, the day before his death, for delivery by radio to the 350 Jefferson Day dinners (later canceled) scheduled for April 13.

Nor do we intend to abandon our determination that, within the lives of our children and our children's children, there will not be a third world war.

We seek peace—enduring peace. More than an end to war, we want an end to the beginnings of all wars—yes, an end to this brutal, inhuman and thoroughly impractical method of settling the differences between governments.

The once powerful, malignant Nazi state is crumbling, the Japanese war lords are receiving, in their own homeland, the retribution for which they asked when they attacked Pearl Harbor.

But the mere conquest of our enemies is not enough.

We must go on to do all in our power to conquer the doubts and the fears, the ignorance and the greed, which made this horror possible.

Thomas Jefferson, himself a distinguished scientist, once spoke of the "brotherly spirit of science, which unites into one family all its votaries of whatever grade, and however widely dispersed throughout the different quarters of the globe."

Today, science has brought all the different quarters of the globe so close together that it is impossible to isolate them one from another.

Today we are faced with the pre-eminent fact that, if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships—the ability of all peoples, of all kinds, to live together and work together in the same world, at peace.

Let me assure you that my hand is the steadier for the work that is to be done, that I move more firmly into the task, knowing that you—millions and millions of you—are joined with me in the resolve to make this work endure.

The work, my friends, is peace, more than an end of this war—an end to the beginnings of all wars, yes, an end, forever, to this impractical, unrealistic settlement of the differences between governments by the mass killing of peoples.

Today as we move against the terrible scourge of war—as we go forward toward the greatest contribution that any generation of human beings can make in this world—the contribution of lasting peace, I ask you to keep up your faith. I measure the sound, solid achievement that can be made at this time by the straight-edge of your own confidence and your resolve. And to you, and to all Americans who dedicate themselves with us to the making of an abiding peace, I say:

The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. Let us move forward with strong and active faith.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Before this broadcast could be delivered came the incredulous voices of the radio announcers saying, "The President is dead." Men and women wept in the streets; people asked blankly, "What will become of us now?" Through all the Allied peoples ran a shudder of dismay. Then, as if the message of the undelivered broadcast had come to us silently through the whole spirit of the dead President's life, Americans, and their allies all over the world, looked up, closed ranks, got on with the job. You have seen in the news-reels how the camera in a bomber shakes at "Bombs away!" and then steadies again? It was like that. "Let us move forward" . . . "the work is peace" . . .

"The work is peace." He knew that victory was coming, though he could not know how mercifully soon. But more profoundly than most he knew also that "mere conquest of our enemies is not enough." That is why he had so spent his strength—had perhaps literally killed himself—laboring for unity among the great powers, for the beginning of international organization through the Charter drawn up a few weeks after his death at the San Francisco Conference—which he himself had called. Another thing he knew, for he was primarily responsible for it also: that at Oak Ridge and at Pasco, and in laboratories here and in Canada, work was going forward at tremendous speed on the smashing of the atom that it might smash our enemies. He knew that if and when the stupendous power of atomic energy was harnessed for destruction, the ultimatum of the machines, "Control us or die," would be trebly signed and sealed. Therefore: "if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships." For that, as he tells us, perhaps even more than for war, is needed "the straight-edge of your own confidence and your resolve."

1. What do you consider the key phrase in Roosevelt's characterization of Thomas Jefferson? How was this characterization relevant to the national needs and interests of the time? How, in general, was the content appropriate (1) to a brief address made to the whole nation by the President of the United States and (2) to world events of April, 1945 (by then, you will recall, we were sure that our European armies would soon be victorious)? How does the address reveal far-sighted leadership in shaping public opinion? In specific content and in tone, how may it reflect his knowledge that United Nations scientists were racing to complete the development of the atomic bomb? Why would you agree or disagree with him in believing that those who say that war *must* be prevented are practical and realistic? What did he mean by his concluding assurance, "The only limit of our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today"?

(Cf. the famous words uttered at the beginning of his presidency: "We have nothing to fear but fear itself.")

2. Why, preparing a radio address, did the President use staccato paragraphing? Which of his phrases seem to you most outstanding? How is his personality revealed through the address? What qualities of the address help to explain why millions of his countrymen would not willingly miss one of his radio addresses?

3. As soon as the atomic bomb had blasted Japan into surrender, voices rose to say that the United Nations Charter must be greatly strengthened, that the only protection now from constant terror of sudden annihilation was surrender of the terrible secret for exclusive use of the United Nations Organization, and that all nations (including our own) must allow United Nations policing to insure against the making of atomic weapons in secret. If Roosevelt could have heard those voices, what does this address suggest that he might have answered? Why would you agree or disagree?

IV

INTIMATIONS OF A BETTER WORLD

But suppose we were to attain our ends—the brave new world of science, security and liberty assured, a world-community at peace—what then? We should see that science and security, even liberty and peace, are not really ends but means to an end, machinery for enriching the lives of men and women. The writers in this section speak of that enriched and happier life, what its nature is, how we may take possession of it. What are the things men live by? Not "machinery," says Arnold, but the sweetness of beauty, the light of intelligence; James Truslow Adams in the '20s and Lewis Mumford in the '40s carry forward the thought to our day. How do we enter into this higher good? The writers of group 2 answer: by the spiritual liberation and enlargement, the preparation for wise and fruitful living, that we call liberal education. Emerson speaks of the discipline and function of the man of thought; Newman affirms the value of illumined intellect to the individual and society; Woodberry sees literature as the organ of the race-mind, disseminated by education and serving the unity of mankind; Archibald MacLeish bids us, possessors of a priceless heritage, believe in man "out of pride."

Sweetness and Light[1]

MATTHEW ARNOLD

Son of the famous educator Thomas Arnold of Rugby, Matthew Arnold (1822-88) was reared in the academic cloisters of Winchester, Rugby, and Oxford. He spent most of his official life as an inspector of English elementary schools—only in later life, as Professor of Poetry at Oxford, occupying a post really in keeping with his broad culture and personal distinction. In the intervals of official duties he contributed notably to the literature of his period as a poet, a literary, religious, political, and social critic, and an apostle of culture and humanistic education in an age of science and materialistic "progress."

His poetry, most of it written before his professorship at Oxford, expresses important tendencies of his period. Like many of his contemporaries, Arnold had lost faith in orthodox religious dogma. He questioned the divinity of Christ and the immortality of the soul; he thought of God as "a stream of tendency, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness." In "Dover Beach" he mourned this inevitable loss of faith and heard "the melancholy, long, withdrawing roar" of the great Sea of Faith at ebb tide retreating

> down the vast edges drear
> And naked shingles of the world.

The old dogmas were dead. Mankind confronted the future

> Wandering between two worlds, one dead,
> The other powerless to be born.

But some form of faith was essential to Arnold. The religious optimism of Browning and Tennyson, Macaulay's belief in material progress, Mill's faith in the liberal gospel of freedom, popular belief in the growing national wealth, increasing population, and religious organizations—all alike failed to satisfy him.

Arnold rested finally in a broad humanistic faith in culture, in the aspiration to achieve a balanced, harmonious perfection of the elements which make for human excellence—and in the social aim to make such harmonious perfection prevail among all classes of men. Such a faith finds its ultimate values in this life and, potentially, within man himself. It would make the most of this world instead of placing its hopes in a life

Chapter I, *Culture and Anarchy*, 1869.

[1] *Sweetness and Light*, an expression borrowed from Jonathan Swift's *Battle of the Books*, meaning here moral beauty and intelligence.

beyond. Religion has fallen short of the high ideal of rounded human perfection by insisting on a necessary but limited moral perfection and by falling into illiberality and bigotry. Hebraism, insisting on duty and self-control, the moral virtues, has been accepted at the expense of the largeness of understanding, the love of wisdom and harmonious development which Hellenism represents. The ideal of a culture of wise wholeness and balance, made available to all and operative among all classes, will furnish, Arnold believed, a faith to supply the place of an untenable supernaturalism and a force to resolve the evils of social maladjustment and class conflict. *Culture and Anarchy* (1869), from which our selection is taken, was Arnold's most eloquent plea for a religion of culture and human excellence.

THE DISPARAGERS OF CULTURE make its motive curiosity; sometimes, indeed, they make its motive mere exclusiveness and vanity. The culture which is supposed to plume itself on a smattering of Greek and Latin is a culture which is begotten by nothing so intellectual as curiosity; it is valued either out of sheer vanity and ignorance, or else as an engine of social and class distinction, separating its holder, like a badge or title, from other people who have not got it. No serious man would call this *culture,* or attach any value to it, as culture, at all. To find the real ground for the very different estimate which serious people will set upon culture, we must find some motive for culture in the terms of which may lie a real ambiguity; and such a motive the word *curiosity* gives us.

I have before now pointed out that we English do not, like the foreigners, use this word in a good sense as well as in a bad sense. With us the word is always used in a somewhat disapproving sense. A liberal and intelligent eagerness about the things of the mind may be meant by a foreigner when he speaks of curiosity, but with us the word always conveys a certain notion of frivolous and unedifying activity. In the *Quarterly Review,* some little time ago, was an estimate of the celebrated French critic, M. Sainte-Beuve, and a very inadequate estimate it in my judgment was. And its inadequacy consisted chiefly in this: that in our English way it left out of sight the double sense really involved in the word *curiosity,* thinking enough was said to stamp M. Sainte-Beuve with blame if it was said that he was impelled in his operations as a critic by curiosity, and omitting either to perceive that M. Sainte-Beuve himself, and many other people with him, would consider that this was praiseworthy and not blameworthy, or to point

out why it ought really to be accounted worthy of blame and not of praise. For as there is a curiosity about intellectual matters which is futile, and merely a disease, so there is certainly a curiosity,—a desire after the things of the mind simply for their own sakes and for the pleasure of seeing them as they are,—which is, in an intelligent being, natural and laudable. Nay, and the very desire to see things as they are implies a balance and regulation of mind which is not often attained without fruitful effort, and which is the very opposite of the blind and diseased impulse of mind which is what we mean to blame when we blame curiosity. Montesquieu[2] says: "The first motive which ought to impel us to study is the desire to augment the excellence of our nature, and to render an intelligent being yet more intelligent." This is the true ground to assign for the genuine scientific passion, however manifested, and for culture, viewed simply as a fruit of this passion; and it is a worthy ground, even though we let the term *curiosity* stand to describe it.

But there is of culture another view, in which not solely the scientific passion, the sheer desire to see things as they are, natural and proper in an intelligent being, appears as the ground of it. There is a view in which all the love of our neighbour, the impulses towards action, help, and beneficence, the desire for removing human error, clearing human confusion, and diminishing human misery, the noble aspiration to leave the world better and happier than we found it,—motives eminently such as are called social,—come in as part of the grounds of culture and the main and pre-eminent part. Culture is then properly described not as having its origin in curiosity, but as having its origin in the love of perfection; it is *a study of perfection.* It moves by the force, not merely or primarily of the scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also of the moral and social passion for doing good. As, in the first view of it, we took for its worthy motto Montesquieu's words: "To render an intelligent being yet more intelligent!" so, in the second view of it, there is no better motto which it can have than these words of Bishop Wilson:[3] "To make reason and the will of God prevail!"

Only, whereas the passion for doing good is apt to be overhasty in determining what reason and the will of God say, because its turn is for acting rather than thinking and it wants to be beginning to act;

[2] Charles de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de *Montesquieu* (1689–1755), French philosopher and jurist and author of *De l'esprit des lois* (1748).

[3] Thomas *Wilson* (1663–1755), Bishop of Sodor and Man, author of *Maxims* and other writings which appealed strongly to Arnold and which he often quotes.

and whereas it is apt to take its own conceptions, which proceed from its own state of development and share in all the imperfections and immaturities of this, for a basis of action; what distinguishes culture is, that it is possessed by the scientific passion as well as by the passion of doing good; that it demands worthy notions of reason and the will of God, and does not readily suffer its own crude conceptions to substitute themselves for them. And knowing that no action or institution can be salutary and stable which is not based on reason and the will of God, it is not so bent on acting and instituting, even with the great aim of diminishing human error and misery ever before its thoughts, but that it can remember that acting and instituting are of little use, unless we know how and what we ought to act and to institute.

This culture is more interesting and more far-reaching than that other, which is founded solely on the scientific passion for knowing. But it needs times of faith and ardour, times when the intellectual horizon is opening and widening all round us, to flourish in. And is not the close and bounded intellectual horizon within which we have long lived and moved now lifting up, and are not new lights finding free passage to shine in upon us? For a long time there was no passage for them to make their way in upon us, and then it was of no use to think of adapting the world's action to them. Where was the hope of making reason and the will of God prevail among people who had a routine which they had christened reason and the will of God, in which they were inextricably bound, and beyond which they had no power of looking? But now the iron force of adhesion to the old routine,—social, political, religious,—has wonderfully yielded; the iron force of exclusion of all which is new has wonderfully yielded. The danger now is, not that people should obstinately refuse to allow anything but their old routine to pass for reason and the will of God, but either that they should allow some novelty or other to pass for these too easily, or else that they should underrate the importance of them altogether, and think it enough to follow action for its own sake, without troubling themselves to make reason and the will of God prevail therein. Now, then, is the moment for culture to be of service, culture which believes in making reason and the will of God prevail, believes in perfection, is the study and pursuit of perfection, and is no longer debarred, by a rigid invincible exclusion of whatever is new, from getting acceptance for its ideas, simply because they are new.

The moment this view of culture is seized, the moment it is regarded not solely as the endeavour to see things as they are, to draw towards a knowledge of the universal order which seems to be in-

tended and aimed at in the world, and which it is a man's happiness to go along with or his misery to go counter to,—to learn, in short, the will of God,—the moment, I say, culture is considered not merely as the endeavour to *see* and *learn* this, but as the endeavour, also, to make it *prevail,* the moral, social, and beneficent character of culture becomes manifest. The mere endeavour to see and learn the truth for our own personal satisfaction is indeed a commencement for making it prevail, a preparing the way for this, which always serves this, and is wrongly, therefore, stamped with blame absolutely in itself and not only in its caricature and degeneration. But perhaps it has got stamped with blame, and disparaged with the dubious title of curiosity, because in comparison with this wider endeavour of such great and plain utility it looks selfish, petty, and unprofitable.

And religion, the greatest and most important of the efforts by which the human race has manifested its impulse to perfect itself,—religion, that voice of the deepest human experience,—does not only enjoin and sanction the aim which is the great aim of culture, the aim of setting ourselves to ascertain what perfection is and to make it prevail; but also, in determining generally in what human perfection consists, religion comes to a conclusion identical with that which culture,—culture seeking the determination of this question through *all* the voices of human experience which have been heard upon it, of art, science, poetry, philosophy, history, as well as of religion, in order to give a greater fulness and certainty to its solution,—likewise reaches. Religion says: *The kingdom of God is within you;* and culture, in like manner, places human perfection in an *internal* condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our animality. It places it in the ever-increasing efficacy and in the general harmonious expansion of those gifts of thought and feeling which make the peculiar dignity, wealth, and happiness of human nature. As I have said on a former occasion: "It is in making endless additions to itself, in the endless expansion of its powers, in endless growth in wisdom and beauty, that the spirit of the human race finds its ideal. To reach this ideal, culture is an indispensable aid, and that is the true value of culture." Not a having and a resting, but a growing and a becoming, is the character of perfection as culture conceives it; and here, too, it coincides with religion.

And because men are all members of one great whole, and the sympathy which is in human nature will not allow one member to be indifferent to the rest or to have a perfect welfare independent of the rest, the expansion of our humanity, to suit the idea of perfection

which culture forms, must be a *general* expansion. Perfection, as culture conceives it, is not possible while the individual remains isolated. The individual is required, under pain of being stunted and enfeebled in his own development if he disobeys, to carry others along with him in his march towards perfection, to be continually doing all he can to enlarge and increase the volume of the human stream sweeping thitherward. And here, once more, culture lays on us the same obligation as religion, which says, as Bishop Wilson has admirably put it, that "to promote the kingdom of God is to increase and hasten one's own happiness."

But, finally, perfection,—as culture from a thorough disinterested study of human nature and human experience learns to conceive it,—is a harmonious expansion of *all* the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature, and is not consistent with the overdevelopment of any one power at the expense of the rest. Here culture goes beyond religion, as religion is generally conceived by us.

If culture, then, is a study of perfection, and of harmonious perfection, general perfection, and perfection which consists in becoming something rather than in having something, in an inward condition of the mind and spirit, not in an outward set of circumstances,—it is clear that culture, instead of being the frivolous and useless thing which Mr. Bright,[4] and Mr. Frederic Harrison,[5] and many other Liberals are apt to call it, has a very important function to fulfil for mankind. And this function is particularly important in our modern world, of which the whole civilisation is, to a much greater degree than the civilisation of Greece and Rome, mechanical and external, and tends constantly to become more so. But above all in our own country has culture a weighty part to perform, because here that mechanical character, which civilisation tends to take everywhere, is shown in the most eminent degree. Indeed nearly all the characters of perfection, as culture teaches us to fix them, meet in this country with some powerful tendency which thwarts them and sets them at defiance. The idea of perfection as an *inward* condition of the mind and spirit

[4] John *Bright* (1811–89), a free-trade advocate, an English Liberal statesman and orator, with whose machinery of reform Arnold repeatedly takes issue.

[5] English essayist (1831–1923) and leader of Positivist philosophy (doctrine that man's knowledge is confined to phenomena and is merely relative). When Arnold's last Oxford lecture, "Culture and Its Enemies" (changed to "Sweetness and Light" when it became the first chapter of *Culture and Anarchy*), appeared in *The Cornhill Magazine* in 1867, it was Harrison, the Liberal, in favor of parliamentary reform, who made one of the principal replies, in *The Fortnightly Review*. This reply, among others, prompted Arnold in 1867 and 1868 to publish in *The Cornhill* the remaining chapters of what later became *Culture and Anarchy*.

is at variance with the mechanical and material civilisation in esteem with us, and nowhere, as I have said, so much in esteem as with us. The idea of perfection as a *general* expansion of the human family is at variance with our strong individualism, our hatred of all limits to the unrestrained swing of the individual's personality, our maxim of "every man for himself." Above all, the idea of perfection as a *harmonious* expansion of human nature is at variance with our want of flexibility, with our inaptitude for seeing more than one side of a thing, with our intense energetic absorption in the particular pursuit we happen to be following. So culture has a rough task to achieve in this country. Its preachers have, and are likely long to have, a hard time of it, and they will much oftener be regarded, for a great while to come, as elegant or spurious Jeremiahs than as friends and benefactors. That, however, will not prevent their doing in the end good service if they persevere. And, meanwhile, the mode of action they have to pursue, and the sort of habits they must fight against, ought to be made quite clear for every one to see, who may be willing to look at the matter attentively and dispassionately.

Faith in machinery is, I said, our besetting danger; often in machinery most absurdly disproportioned to the end which this machinery, if it is to do any good at all, is to serve; but always in machinery, as if it had a value in and for itself. What is freedom but machinery? what is population but machinery? what is coal but machinery? what are railroads but machinery? what is wealth but machinery? what are, even, religious organisations but machinery? Now almost every voice in England is accustomed to speak of these things as if they were precious ends in themselves, and therefore had some of the characters of perfection indisputably joined to them. I have before now noticed Mr. Roebuck's[6] stock argument for proving the greatness and happiness of England as she is, and for quite stopping the mouths of all gainsayers. Mr. Roebuck is never weary of reiterating this argument of his, so I do not know why I should be weary of noticing it. "May not every man in England say what he likes?"—Mr. Roebuck perpetually asks; and that, he thinks is quite sufficient, and when every man may say what he likes, our aspirations ought to be satisfied. But the aspirations of culture, which is the study of perfection, are not satisfied, unless what men say, when they may say what they like, is worth saying,—has good in it, and more good than bad. In the same way

[6] John Arthur *Roebuck* (1801–79), a radical and Utilitarian (adherent of the doctrine that virtue consists in acting for the greatest happiness of the greatest number). Roebuck during his parliamentary career was noted for his independence and vehemence. Arnold ridicules his position in "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time."

the *Times,* replying to some foreign strictures on the dress, looks, and behaviour of the English abroad, urges that the English ideal is that every one should be free to do and to look just as he likes. But culture indefatigably tries, not to make what each raw person may like the rule by which he fashions himself; but to draw ever nearer to a sense of what is indeed beautiful, graceful, and becoming, and to get the raw person to like that.

And in the same way with respect to railroads and coal. Every one must have observed the strange language current during the late discussions as to the possible failure of our supplies of coal. Our coal, thousands of people were saying, is the real basis of our national greatness; if our coal runs short, there is an end of the greatness of England. But what *is* greatness?—culture makes us ask. Greatness is a spiritual condition worthy to excite love, interest, and admiration; and the outward proof of possessing greatness is that we excite love, interest, and admiration. If England were swallowed up by the sea to-morrow, which of the two, a hundred years hence, would most excite the love, interest, and admiration of mankind,—would most, therefore, show the evidences of having possessed greatness,—the England of the last twenty years, or the England of Elizabeth, of a time of splendid spiritual effort, but when our coal, and our industrial operations depending on coal, were very little developed? Well, then, what an unsound habit of mind it must be which makes us talk of things like coal or iron as constituting the greatness of England, and how salutary a friend is culture, bent on seeing things as they are, and thus dissipating delusions of this kind and fixing standards of perfection that are real!

Wealth, again, that end to which our prodigious works for material advantage are directed,—the commonest of commonplaces tells us how men are always apt to regard wealth as a precious end in itself; and certainly they have never been so apt thus to regard it as they are in England at the present time. Never did people believe anything more firmly than nine Englishmen out of ten at the present day believe that our greatness and welfare are proved by our being so very rich. Now, the use of culture is that it helps us, by means of its spiritual standard of perfection, to regard wealth as but machinery, and not only to say as a matter of words that we regard wealth as but machinery, but really to perceive and feel that it is so. If it were not for this purging effect wrought upon our minds by culture, the whole world, the future as well as the present, would inevitably belong to the Philistines.[7] The people who believe most that our greatness and welfare are proved

[7] The hard, self-satisfied, narrow middle class, hostile to new ideas and to art.

by our being very rich, and who most give their lives and thoughts to becoming rich, are just the very people whom we call Philistines. Culture says: "Consider these people, then, their way of life, their habits, their manners, the very tones of their voice; look at them attentively; observe the literature they read, the things which give them pleasure, the words which come forth out of their mouths, the thoughts which make the furniture of their minds; would any amount of wealth be worth having with the condition that one was to become just like these people by having it?" And thus culture begets a dissatisfaction which is of the highest possible value in stemming the common tide of men's thoughts in a wealthy and industrial community, and which saves the future, as one may hope, from being vulgarised, even if it cannot save the present.

Population, again, and bodily health and vigour, are things which are nowhere treated in such an unintelligent, misleading, exaggerated way as in England. Both are really machinery; yet how many people all around us do we see rest in them and fail to look beyond them! Why, one has heard people, fresh from reading certain articles of the *Times* on the Registrar-General's return of marriages and births in this country, who would talk of our large English families in quite a solemn strain, as if they had something in itself beautiful, elevating, and meritorious in them; as if the British Philistine would have only to present himself before the Great Judge with his twelve children, in order to be received among the sheep as a matter of right!

But bodily health and vigour, it may be said, are not to be classed with wealth and population as mere machinery; they have a more real and essential value. True; but only as they are more intimately connected with a perfect spiritual condition than wealth or population are. The moment we disjoin them from the idea of a perfect spiritual condition, and pursue them, as we do pursue them, for their own sake and as ends in themselves, our worship of them becomes as mere worship of machinery, as our worship of wealth or population, and as unintelligent and vulgarising a worship as that is. Every one with anything like an adequate idea of human perfection has distinctly marked this subordination to higher and spiritual ends of the cultivation of bodily vigour and activity. "Bodily exercise profiteth little; but godliness is profitable unto all things," says the author of the *Epistle to Timothy*.[8] And the utilitarian Franklin says just as explicitly:—"Eat and drink such an exact quantity as suits the constitution of thy body, *in reference to the services of the mind.*" But the point of view of

[8] St. Paul, *First Epistle to Timothy*, 4:8.

culture, keeping the mark of human perfection simply and broadly in view, and not assigning to this perfection, as religion or utilitarianism assigns to it, a special and limited character, this point of view, I say, of culture is best given by these words of Epictetus:[9]—"It is a sign of ἀφυΐα,"[10] says he,—that is, of a nature not finely tempered,—"to give yourselves up to things which relate to the body—to make, for instance, a great fuss about exercise, a great fuss about eating, a great fuss about drinking, a great fuss about walking, a great fuss about riding. All these things ought to be done merely by the way: the formation of the spirit and character must be our real concern." This is admirable; and, indeed, the Greek word εὐφυΐα,[11] a finely tempered nature, gives exactly the notion of perfection as culture brings us to conceive it: a harmonious perfection, a perfection in which the characters of beauty and intelligence are both present, which unites "the two noblest of things,"—as Swift, who of one of the two, at any rate, had himself all too little, most happily calls them in his *Battle of the Books*,—"the two noblest of things, *sweetness and light*." The εὐφυής is the man who tends towards sweetness and light; the ἀφυής, on the other hand, is our Philistine. The immense spiritual significance of the Greeks is due to their having been inspired with this central and happy idea of the essential character of human perfection; and Mr. Bright's misconception of culture, as a smattering of Greek and Latin, comes itself, after all, from this wonderful significance of the Greeks having affected the very machinery of our education, and is in itself a kind of homage to it.

In thus making sweetness and light to be characters of perfection, culture is of like spirit with poetry, follows one law with poetry. Far more than on our freedom, our population, and our industrialism, many amongst us rely upon our religious organisations to save us. I have called religion a yet more important manifestation of human nature than poetry, because it has worked on a broader scale for perfection, and with greater masses of men. But the idea of beauty and of a human nature perfect on all its sides, which is the dominant idea of poetry, is a true and invaluable idea, though it has not yet had the success that the idea of conquering the obvious faults of our animality, and of a human nature perfect on the moral side,—which is the dominant idea of religion,—has been enabled to have; and it is destined,

[9] Roman Stoic philospher (c. 50–125 A.D.), author of many famous maxims of conduct; the quoted passage is from *Encheiridion*, Chap. XII.

[10] Lack of fitness or natural ability.

[11] Possessed of good natural endowments.

adding to itself the religious idea of a devout energy, to transform and govern the other.

The best art and poetry of the Greeks, in which religion and poetry are one, in which the idea of beauty and of a human nature perfect on all sides adds to itself a religious and devout energy, and works in the strength of that, is on this account of such surpassing interest and instructiveness for us, though it was,—as, having regard to the human race in general, and, indeed, having regard to the Greeks themselves we must own,—a premature attempt, an attempt which for success needed the moral and religious fibre in humanity to be more braced and developed than it had yet been. But Greece did not err in having the idea of beauty, harmony, and complete human perfection, so present and paramount. It is impossible to have this idea too present and paramount; only, the moral fibre must be braced too. And we, because we have braced the moral fibre, are not on that account in the right way, if at the same time the idea of beauty, harmony, and complete human perfection, is wanting or misapprehended amongst us; and evidently it *is* wanting or misapprehended at present. And when we rely as we do on our religious organisations, which in themselves do not and cannot give us this idea, and think we have done enough if we make them spread and prevail, then, I say, we fall into our common fault of over-valuing machinery.

Nothing is more common than for people to confound the inward peace and satisfaction which follows the subduing of the obvious faults of our animality with what I may call absolute inward peace and satisfaction,—the peace and satisfaction which are reached as we draw near to complete spiritual perfection, and not merely to moral perfection, or rather to relative moral perfection. No people in the world have done more and struggled more to attain this relative moral perfection than our English race has. For no people in the world has the command to *resist the devil,* to *overcome the wicked one,* in the nearest and most obvious sense of those words, had such a pressing force and reality. And we have had our reward, not only in the great worldly prosperity which our obedience to this command has brought us, but also, and far more, in great inward peace and satisfaction. But to me few things are more pathetic than to see people, on the strength of the inward peace and satisfaction which their rudimentary efforts towards perfection have brought them, employ, concerning their incomplete perfection and the religious organisations within which they have found it, language which properly applies only to complete perfection, and is a far-off echo of the human soul's prophecy of it. Re-

ligion itself, I need hardly say, supplies them in abundance with this grand language. And very freely do they use it; yet it is really the severest possible criticism of such an incomplete perfection as alone we have yet reached through our religious organisations.

The impulse of the English race towards moral development and self-conquest has nowhere so powerfully manifested itself as in Puritanism. Nowhere has Puritanism found so adequate an expression as in the religious organisation of the Independents.[12] The modern Independents have a newspaper, the *Nonconformist,* written with great sincerity and ability. The motto, the standard, the profession of faith which this organ of theirs carries aloft is: "The Dissidence of Dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion." There is sweetness and light, and an ideal of complete harmonious human perfection! One need not go to culture and poetry to find language to judge it. Religion, with its instinct for perfection, supplies language to judge it, language, too, which is in our mouths every day. "Finally, be of one mind, united in feeling," says St. Peter. There is an ideal which judges the Puritan ideal: "The Dissidence of Dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion!" And religious organisations like this are what people believe in, rest in, would give their lives for! Such, I say, is the wonderful virtue of even the beginnings of perfection, of having conquered even the plain faults of our animality, that the religious organisation which has helped us to do it can seem to us something precious, salutary, and to be propagated, even when it wears such a brand of imperfection on its forehead as this. And men have got such a habit of giving to the language of religion a special application, of making it a mere jargon, that for the condemnation which religion itself passes on the shortcomings of their religious organisations they have no ear; they are sure to cheat themselves and to explain this condemnation away. They can only be reached by the criticism which culture, like poetry, speaking a language not to be sophisticated, and resolutely testing these organisations by the ideal of a human perfection complete on all sides, applies to them.

But men of culture and poetry, it will be said, are again and again failing, and failing conspicuously, in the necessary first stage to a harmonious perfection, in the subduing of the great obvious faults of our animality, which it is the glory of these religious organisations to have helped us to subdue. True, they do often so fail. They have often been without the virtues as well as the faults of the Puritan; it has been one

[12] The Congregationalists, a moderately Calvinistic evangelical denomination.

of their dangers that they so felt the Puritan's faults that they too much neglected the practice of his virtues. I will not, however, exculpate them at the Puritan's expense. They have often failed in morality, and morality is indispensable. And they have been punished for their failure, as the Puritan has been rewarded for his performance. They have been punished wherein they erred; but their ideal of beauty, of sweetness and light, and a human nature complete on all its sides, remains the true ideal of perfection still; just as the Puritan's ideal of perfection remains narrow and inadequate, although for what he did well he has been richly rewarded. Notwithstanding the mighty results of the Pilgrim Fathers' voyage, they and their standard of perfection are rightly judged when we figure to ourselves Shakespeare or Virgil,—souls in whom sweetness and light, and all that in human nature is most humane, were eminent,—accompanying them on their voyage, and think what intolerable company Shakespeare and Virgil would have found them! In the same way let us judge the religious organisations which we see all around us. Do not let us deny the good and the happiness which they have accomplished; but do not let us fail to see clearly that their idea of human perfection is narrow and inadequate, and that the Dissidence of Dissent and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion will never bring humanity to its true goal. As I said with regard to wealth: Let us look at the life of those who live in and for it,—so I say with regard to the religious organisations. Look at the life imaged in such a newspaper as the *Nonconformist*,—a life of jealousy of the Establishment, disputes, tea-meetings, openings of chapels, sermons; and then think of it as an ideal of a human life completing itself on all sides, and aspiring with all its organs after sweetness, light, and perfection!

Another newspaper, representing, like the *Nonconformist*, one of the religious organisations of this country, was a short time ago giving an account of the crowd at Epsom on the Derby day, and of all the vice and hideousness which was to be seen in that crowd; and then the writer turned suddenly round upon Professor Huxley, and asked him how he proposed to cure all this vice and hideousness without religion. I confess I felt disposed to ask the asker this question: and how do you propose to cure it with such a religion as yours? How is the ideal of a life so unlovely, so unattractive, so incomplete, so narrow, so far removed from a true and satisfying ideal of human perfection, as is the life of your religious organisation as you yourself reflect it, to conquer and transform all this vice and hideousness? Indeed, the strongest plea

for the study of perfection as pursued by culture, the clearest proof of the actual inadequacy of the idea of perfection held by the religious organisations,—expressing, as I have said, the most widespread effort which the human race has yet made after perfection,—is to be found in the state of our life and society with these in possession of it, and having been in possession of it I know not how many hundred years. We are all of us included in some religious organisation or other; we all call ourselves, in the sublime and aspiring language of religion which I have before noticed, *children of God*. Children of God;—it is an immense pretension!—and how are we to justify it? By the works which we do, and the words which we speak. And the work which we collective children of God do, our grand centre of life, our *city* which we have builded for us to dwell in, is London! London, with its unutterable external hideousness, and with its internal canker of *publicè egestas, privatim opulentia,*[13]—to use the words which Sallust puts into Cato's mouth about Rome,—unequalled in the world! The word, again, which we children of God speak, the voice which most hits our collective thought, the newspaper with the largest circulation in England, nay, with the largest circulation in the whole world, is the *Daily Telegraph!* I say that when our religious organisations,—which I admit to express the most considerable effort after perfection that our race has yet made,—land us in no better result than this, it is high time to examine carefully their idea of perfection, to see whether it does not leave out of account sides and forces of human nature which we might turn to great use; whether it would not be more operative if it were more complete. And I say that the English reliance on our religious organisations and on their ideas of human perfection just as they stand, is like our reliance on freedom, on muscular Christianity, on population, on coal, on wealth,—mere belief in machinery, and unfruitful: and that it is wholesomely counteracted by culture, bent on seeing things as they are, and on drawing the human race onwards to a more complete, a harmonious perfection.

Culture, however, shows its single-minded love of perfection, its desire simply to make reason and the will of God prevail, its freedom from fanaticism, by its attitude towards all this machinery, even while it insists that it *is* machinery. Fanatics, seeing the mischief men do themselves by their blind belief in some machinery or other—whether it is wealth and industrialism, or whether it is the cultivation of bodily

[13] "Public want and private wealth," quoted from the *Catiline* of Sallust (86–35 B.C.), Roman historian.

strength and activity, or whether it is a political organisation,—or whether it is a religious organisation,—oppose with might and main the tendency to this or that political and religious organisation, or to games and athletic exercises, or to wealth and industrialism, and try violently to stop it. But the flexibility which sweetness and light give, and which is one of the rewards of culture pursued in good faith, enables a man to see that a tendency may be necessary, and even, as a preparation for something in the future, salutary, and yet that the generations or individuals who obey this tendency are sacrificed to it, that they fall short of the hope of perfection by following it; and that its mischiefs are to be criticised, lest it should take too firm a hold and last after it has served its purpose.

Mr. Gladstone well pointed out, in a speech at Paris,—and others have pointed out the same thing,—how necessary is the present great movement towards wealth and industrialism, in order to lay broad foundations of material well-being for the society of the future. The worst of these justifications is, that they are generally addressed to the very people engaged, body and soul, in the movement in question; at all events, that they are always seized with the greatest avidity by these people, and taken by them as quite justifying their life; and that thus they tend to harden them in their sins. Now, culture admits the necessity of the movement towards fortune-making and exaggerated industrialism, readily allows that the future may derive benefit from it; but insists, at the same time, that the passing generations of industrialists,—forming, for the most part, the stout main body of Philistinism,—are sacrificed to it. In the same way, the result of all the games and sports which occupy the passing generation of boys and young men may be the establishment of a better and sounder physical type for the future to work with. Culture does not set itself against the games and sports; it congratulates the future, and hopes it will make a good use of its improved physical basis; but it points out that our passing generation of boys and young men is, meantime, sacrificed. Puritanism was perhaps necessary to develop the moral fibre of the English race, Nonconformity to break the yoke of ecclesiastical domination over men's minds and to prepare the way for freedom of thought in the distant future; still, culture points out that the harmonious perfection of generations of Puritans and Nonconformists has been, in consequence, sacrificed. Freedom of speech may be necessary for the society of the future, but the young lions of the *Daily Telegraph* in the meanwhile are sacrificed. A voice for every man in his country's government may

be necessary for the society of the future, but meanwhile Mr. Beales[14] and Mr. Bradlaugh[15] are sacrificed.

. . . . . .

The pursuit of perfection, then, is the pursuit of sweetness and light. He who works for sweetness and light, works to make reason and the will of God prevail. He who works for machinery, he who works for hatred, works only for confusion. Culture looks beyond machinery, culture hates hatred; culture has one great passion, the passion for sweetness and light. It has one even yet greater!—the passion for making them *prevail.* It is not satisfied till we *all* come to a perfect man; it knows that the sweetness and light of the few must be imperfect until the raw and unkindled masses of humanity are touched with sweetness and light. If I have not shrunk from saying that we must work for sweetness and light, so neither have I shrunk from saying that we must have a broad basis, must have sweetness and light for as many as possible. Again and again I have insisted how those are the happy moments of humanity, how those are the marking epochs of a people's life, how those are the flowering times for literature and art and all the creative power of genius, when there is a *national* glow of life and thought, when the whole of society is in the fullest measure permeated by thought, sensible to beauty, intelligent and alive. Only it must be *real* thought and *real* beauty; *real* sweetness and *real* light. Plenty of people will try to give the masses, as they call them, an intellectual food prepared and adapted in the way they think proper for the actual condition of the masses. The ordinary popular literature is an example of this way of working on the masses. Plenty of people will try to indoctrinate the masses with the set of ideas and judgments constituting the creed of their own profession or party. Our religious and political organisations give an example of this way of working on the masses. I condemn neither way; but culture works differently. It does not try to teach down to the level of inferior classes; it does not try to win them for this or that sect of its own, with ready-made judgments and watchwords. It seeks to do away with classes; to make the best that has been thought and known in the world current everywhere; to make all men live in an atmosphere of sweetness and light, where they may use ideas, as it uses them itself, freely,—nourished, and not bound by them.

[14] Edmund *Beales,* M.P. (1803–81), a political agitator who became President of the Reform League and was involved in the Hyde Park riots in July, 1866.

[15] Charles *Bradlaugh* (1833–91), a prominent advocate of free thought and proprietor of *The National Reformer,* active in the agitation for the reform of Parliament in 1866–67.

This is the *social idea;* and the men of culture are the true apostles of equality. The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time; who have laboured to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive; to humanise it, to make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the *best* knowledge and thought of the time, and a true source, therefore, of sweetness and light. Such a man was Abelard[16] in the Middle Ages, in spite of all his imperfections; and thence the boundless emotion and enthusiasm which Abelard excited. Such were Lessing and Herder[17] in Germany, at the end of the last century; and their services to Germany were in this way inestimably precious. Generations will pass, and literary monuments will accumulate, and works far more perfect than the works of Lessing and Herder will be produced in Germany; and yet the names of these two men will fill a German with a reverence and enthusiasm such as the names of the most gifted masters will hardly awaken. And why? Because they *humanised* knowledge; because they broadened the basis of life and intelligence; because they worked powerfully to diffuse sweetness and light, to make reason and the will of God prevail. With Saint Augustine they said: "Let us not leave thee alone to make in the secret of thy knowledge, as thou didst before the creation of the firmament, the division of light from darkness; let the children of thy spirit, placed in their firmament, make their light shine upon the earth, mark the division of night and day, and announce the revolution of the times; for the old order is passed, and the new arises; the night is spent, the day is come forth; and thou shalt crown the year with thy blessing, when thou shalt send forth labourers into thy harvest sown by other hands than theirs; when thou shalt send forth new labourers to new seed-times, whereof the harvest shall be not yet."

STUDY INTRODUCTION

After sections of this book which have raised insistent political, economic, and other social problems, an inescapable question asserts itself. Liberty, political and economic reform, materialistic "progress," and even the great

[16] Pierre *Abelard* (1079–1142), brilliant teacher and philosopher.

[17] G. E. *Lessing* (1729–81), famous German dramatist and critic; J. G. von *Herder* (1744–1803), German poet and critic.

cause of international peace—the "four freedoms," freedom of discussion and religion, freedom from want and from fear—all these Matthew Arnold would have called "machinery," *means* rather than *ends* in themselves. Let us beware, he insisted, of confusing means with ends; and let us guard against the zealot who would persuade us that our problems are solved if only we achieve the partial aim which to him is everything—political or economic democracy, socialization, economic security, a higher morality, world organization for peace, or any other instrumentality. What then, above and beyond such means, is the great end? Arnold defines it in the one word *culture,* warning us at once against all limited conceptions of the scope of the term. He found a humanistic faith and purpose in aspiration to achieve a balanced, harmonious perfection of all the elements of human excellence—and in the social aim to make such perfection available and operative among all men.

Understood in such terms, "culture" can be the noblest, most catholic of aims. Political, economic, moral, or religious improvement may be even more urgent today than in Arnold's time; but it remains true that we desire improvement of whatever kind only in order that individual men may be themselves improved and ennobled, in order that the highest potentialities of humanity may be realized by as many as possible. Proponents of religion, insisting on a necessary but limited moral perfection, too often fall into illiberality and bigotry. Disciples of materialistic "progress" forget that multiplication of physical means and even realization of economic security may leave men quite undeveloped in the wisdom and fine humanity that render them worthy of freedom. Indeed, faith in mere materialistic advancement is degrading and ultimately destructive. Prophets of political and economic reform tend to forget that even freedom, security, and peace would provide only the conditions necessary to improvement of the human lot. They would insure a better world for the fostering of finer human values; but the better environmental soil is not yet the finer human flower that we desire. Arnold put his faith in the freedom and enlargement of the human spirit, in the cultivation of its elements of beauty and wisdom ("sweetness and light"), and in the social aim to make such harmonious development prevail among men, lifting them beyond the materialism, Puritanism, Philistinism, error, and bigotry springing from ignorance and the development of certain sides of human nature at the expense of others. Americans, prone to perennial faith in "machinery," sorely need to ponder the wisdom of Matthew Arnold.

1. What false meanings, according to Arnold, have been attached to the word *culture?* Have you yourself found the word used in ways that imply a snobbish exclusiveness? How, for example? By what sort of person? Why are such uses contrary to the whole spirit of culture as Arnold defines it?

2. For Arnold the word *culture* implies both the passion for true knowl-

edge (for "seeing things as they are") and "the study of perfection." Show what he means by each and why each is important. Which of your college studies are mainly concerned with "seeing things as they are"? What college subjects are concerned with "the study of perfection"? with both? Why is the first motive incomplete without the second? How may exact knowledge alone, in the hands of lopsidedly developed men, be harmful or dangerous? In what ways did state-controlled education in Nazi Germany fall short of Arnold's ideals? In what ways would education merely for a vocation fall short of them?

3. Arnold says that the "study of perfection," to be completely fruitful, must be a development of "harmonious perfection," "inner perfection," and "general perfection." What does he mean by "harmonious perfection"? What are the results of inharmonious development, concentrated, for example, on physical perfection? on moral growth? on intellectual accomplishment? on the social graces? on vocational skills? What does "inner perfection" mean? How are the aims of religion and culture alike in relation to "inner perfection"? How do they differ in cultivating inner faculties of mind, emotion, imagination, and will? What does "general perfection" mean? Why is the culture of the few incomplete and imperfect until shared with the many? Does this imply that a highly intelligent, cultivated man who shuts himself in an "ivory tower" is a man of imperfect culture? Why or why not? Why do you agree or disagree? Why does true culture wish to share its wealth?

4. Arnold wants harmonious development of all powers that make for human excellence. Can we perhaps develop his meaning here? What, for example, would full mental development mean in relation to knowledge, capacity for thought, tolerance, happiness? What would full, balanced emotional and moral development mean? full development of the life of the senses? You have your own idea of a well-rounded human being, of course: do you put more emphasis or less than Arnold does on mental development? Why? Do you think well-rounded cultivation of human excellence is possible for all men? Can it "prevail" as Arnold would have it? What social changes would help it prevail?

5. Arnold thought the aims of culture very difficult to accomplish in the England of his time because of men's faith in "machinery," mere means to important ends. Why does he consider the following to be "machinery": freedom, population, railroads, wealth, growth of religious organizations? In America today, what kinds of "machinery" are we most likely to have faith in and to think of as if they were ends in themselves? How do tendencies toward narrow specialization in education today run counter to the development of harmonious human excellence? How do these tendencies reflect narrow specialization in business, the professions, and most of our daily work? Apart from such specialization, what influences prevent a wide diffusion of culture among all classes? Why are we

wrong in struggling to *have* more and more rather than to *be* more and more (the aim of "inner perfection")?

6. What group of people does Arnold characterize as "Philistines," and why does he use this term? How does culture, as Arnold would have us understand it, reveal the inadequacy of such limited aims as more railroads, more machines and commercial products, more national wealth, more physical well-being, bigger and better churches, faith in abstract systems of social reform?

7. What does Arnold mean by saying that poetry has the same aim as culture? How is the study of great poetry a study of human excellence? Why does the author think knowledge of the Greeks is important for the modern world? Why do you agree or disagree?

8. Is Arnold's style discursive or strictly organized? conversational or literary? unselfconscious or mannered? Illustrate. If "style is the man," mind and temperament in the mirror of expression, what does Arnold's style reveal about him? What evidence do you find, for example, of wide scholarship, love of clear logical definition, moral earnestness, poetic feeling? Do you see Arnold as a good example of the balanced excellence he advocates? Why or why not?

9. Arnold knows how to use variety of sentence structure. Take, say, the first four paragraphs, and show how he uses variety of length, form, and pattern (loose, periodic, balanced). What form and pattern predominate and with what effect on the general tone of the style?

Sweetness and Light—Sixty Years After

JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS

In America most of the history is written by professors. James Truslow Adams (b. 1878) is that unusual kind of writer an historian without academic portfolio and without the customary Ph.D. guild-mark. Moreover he is a professional writer with a considerable background of experience in manufacturing and finance, a man who turned writer in mid-career and has done much valuable work. Though the leading authority on the famous New England Adamses, he is not related to them, was born in Brooklyn, and is of partly South American blood through his Venezuelan grandmother. Educated at Brooklyn Polytechnic, he went to Yale for graduate study in philosophy but soon abandoned his courses and entered a Wall Street firm. For years he was immersed in banking and various business enterprises but retired from these to become one of the most prolific of American journalists and historians.

His excellent trilogy, *The Founding of New England, Revolutionary New England,* and *New England in the Republic,* established his reputation solidly. In 1931 his *Epic of America,* described by Allan Nevins as "the best single volume of American history in existence," became a best-seller, an amazing feat for a work of its kind; it has since been translated into nine foreign languages. Sometimes since 1931 Mr. Adams has seemed to compromise temporarily with his own highest standards; but work like his studies of the Adams family, of Henry Adams, of the British empire, of Hamiltonian principles, and of such tendencies in American life as those he attacks in the essay below have maintained him in his high place as a gifted historian who makes both past and present his province.

Mr. Adams is a man of exceptionally wide experience, reading, and travel. Besides his writing of history and social commentary, begun when he was past forty, he has served his country in the Military Intelligence in World War I and on important special duty at the Versailles Peace Conference. He has received honorary doctorates from five universities. His object as a writer, he says, modestly enough, is "to make people think, and to relieve a certain pressure on my own mind. The latter is probably the real truth, as I have no confidence in my ability to accomplish the first." Despite this protestation, he has often been unusually successful in his first objective.

Atlantic Monthly, Nov., 1929. By permission of author and publishers.

I

THROUGHOUT LIFE WE ALWAYS, I think, maintain a peculiar interest in the men and books that deeply influenced our earliest and most formative years. No later work, however influential or revolutionary in our thought, ever attains to quite the same intensity of reality as those which helped to stir our minds in boyhood, when the whole world was opening before us, when thought was the great adventure, and when prophets commanded whole-souled homage. As it chanced, my own first decade was that which is generally accepted as the turning point between the old and the new worlds of thought. In America the Civil War was scarcely less recent, in Europe the pregnant Franco-Prussian War was more so, than is the Great War to-day. Carlyle died when I was three, Darwin when I was four, John Richard Green[1] and Karl Marx when I was five, Matthew Arnold and Sir Henry Maine[2] when I was ten, Browning when I was eleven, and Cardinal Newman and Tennyson a few years later. Dickens was but eight years gone when I was born, and Thomas Huxley and John Ruskin were writing when I was in college.

I have barely to-day touched my half-century, yet these names sound like a long-bygone age. In my boyhood, however, when I was keen on every new intellectual trail, their works were not classics or "required reading," but living voices to which I listened with the same sense of contemporaneity with which to-day we read Eddington or Harvey Robinson,[3] Einstein, O'Neill, or Aldous Huxley. The life, however, which has embraced both Darwin and Einstein, Thomas and Aldous Huxley, has straddled, as it were, two eras in thought and civilization. A straddle is generally considered to be neither a dignified nor a determined position, but if it entails certain discomforts it also offers certain advantages, certain piquancies of comparison. Just as a man who knows only one country cannot be considered to know even

[1] *John Richard Green* (1837–1883), great English historian, author of the *Short History of the English People* (1874).

[2] *Sir Henry Maine* (1822–1888), English author of works on philosophy of law, history, and government.

[3] Sir Arthur Stanley *Eddington* (b. 1882), English physicist, author of widely read books like *The Nature of the Physical World* (1928). James *Harvey Robinson* (b. 1863), American scholar in intellectual history, author of influential works like *The Mind in the Making* (1921).

that, so a man who knows only one era cannot savor its peculiarities with the same biting relish as one who has been a wider traveler in time.

Time, however, in a busy life is apt to pass imperceptibly, and I confess that it was with a good deal of a shock that I happened to note the other day, when engaged in the scholar's equivalent of big-game hunting, the glancing over of secondhand-book catalogues, that Matthew Arnold's most influential work, *Culture and Anarchy*, was published just sixty years ago. I had the sudden sense of being caught in the swift current of a river. I walked to my study window to look out and ponder.

In these present years of wanderings, my windows open on many scenes in many countries in the course of a twelvemonth, but at the moment my study overlooks Kensington Gardens, in which Arnold wrote one of his well-known poems:—

> I, on men's impious uproar hurl'd,
> Think often, as I hear them rave,
> That peace has left the upper world,
> And now keeps only in the grave.

If Arnold found "impious uproar" in 1869, the very mid-year of the Victorian reign, what would he find, I wondered, in 1929? What change, if any, would he feel called upon to make to-day in his philosophy, and how has the world moved with reference to it in those sixty years gone? Dickens, Darwin, Huxley, Green, Maine, and some of the others have conquered. The world has moved in the directions indicated by them. How about Arnold, who seemed to the cultured youth of the late-Victorian period perhaps the greatest prophet of them all?

One recalls his simple and singularly lucid prognosis and prescription for his own age, an age that to us now looking back seems itself singularly lucid and simple. One has to recall, however, a fact easily forgotten, that every age has its own "uproar." We have to be in it to hear it. Getting into an "age" is a good deal like getting into a railroad train. As we see it first approaching, far down the track, it seems very peaceful. There is no sound, no tremor, only the ease of swift motion. It is only when we are traveling in it ourselves that we feel the jolts and jars, hear the whistle shriek, the brakes grind, the roar of the wheels, and the babel of unedifying conversation in the club smoker.

Even, however, if we are justified in conceding to our self-esteem

that we have raised a good deal more of an uproar than was confusing the ears of Arnold, and that there may be more raving now than there was in 1869, it is to misconceive his philosophy to think of him as having given a simple solution for the problems of a simple age. His age was by no means as easy-gliding as the distant railroad train, by no means as stodgy and unstirred as the Georgian retrospect among the younger generation would make out. Arnold's doctrine, in spite of its emphasis on "sweetness and light," in spite of its being the mid-Victorian equivalent of "highbrow," was not intended for the scholar cloistered in an ivory tower, but for the man of action in the turmoil of a transition era.

That doctrine may easily be condensed to two chief points—the eternal contest between Hebraism and Hellenism, and the mediating function of culture, of "sweetness and light." The final aim of both Hebraism and Hellenism Arnold found to be the same, man's perfection or salvation, in spite of the fact that they approach the problem by utterly diverse routes. Hebraism lays the whole stress on doing, on the importance of the *act,* on religion, on strictness of conscience. On the other hand, Hellenism stresses knowing rather than doing, the whole rather than a part, spontaneity of consciousness. The "uppermost idea with Hellenism is to see things as they really are; the uppermost idea with Hebraism is conduct and obedience." Ideas of action and conduct fill the space of the Hebraist's mind. He is zealous to do battle for them and affirm them, for in affirming them he affirms himself, and that is what we all like." The Hellenist, on the other hand, tries to apprehend the whole of life, to let no part of it slip, to stress no part to the exclusion of the others. He insists upon a flexible activity of mind, and so attains to that clearness and radiancy of vision, that intelligence and tolerance, which Arnold called "sweetness and light." Nothing, he states, can do away with the ineffaceable difference between these two approaches to the problems of life.

Both of these disciplines, as we may call them, Arnold saw were necessary for the development of man. If the tendency of unimpeded Hellenism was toward rather a weakening of the moral fibre, that of Hebraism was no less inevitably toward an extreme hardening and narrowing of man's whole nature. Man's only salvation from swinging helplessly between these two poles was to be found in culture, which should not be a mere dilettante toying with art, but a disinterested aiming to see things as they really are, the effort to cultivate the best in all sides of man's nature. I do not think it has ever been noted that, whether Arnold was aware of it or not, his doctrine was exactly that

of Kant, who in his philosophy placed the æsthetic consciousness at the centre to mediate between reason and will. Feeling, however, that in his own time the whole tendency was to stress the Hebraic side, the side of unthinking action, Arnold stressed the other, the side of "sweetness and light," and throughout his life in one form and another preached his doctrine of the saving grace of a mediating and all-embracing culture.

II

Amid the complete confusion of our present-day social, intellectual, and spiritual life it is certainly not necessary to bring out in any great detail the evidence that Arnold, unlike some of the more fortunate Victorian leaders of thought, did not point in the direction in which the world was immediately to move. Thanks largely to America, where the forces of the modern world have had their freest sphere of influence, Hebraism has conquered Hellenism with an appalling completeness for the time being.

Arnold clearly saw and constantly preached the essential difference between the machinery of life and life itself. It was not that he merely questioned the utility of physical machinery, although it is easy enough to do so. We may well ask, for example, in what lies the great advantage of being able to travel thrice as fast as our grandparents if, arrived at our destination, we do not know how to occupy the time "saved" to as great advantage as they did? It was rather that Arnold saw all the institutional life of our time as machinery—our state constitutions, our churches, universities, libraries, and organizations of every sort. All these he found, of course, essential to life, but merely the tools of life, valuable only for their results, and not for themselves.

In this respect we have obviously gone directly counter to his teaching. We have come to worship our social machinery as an end in itself. Not only is every possible activity organized, which perhaps is to some extent unavoidable in our great modern masses of population, but, what surely is avoidable, we have come to lay more stress on the machinery than on the product, on the means than on the end.

Perhaps we may consider the five great educative influences for the life of the spirit to be one's daily toil, social intercourse, travel, education in its more technical sense, and religion. What of these to-day?

One's daily toil has always of course had for a main object the earning of a living, but it should have in addition an interest in itself. It is a mistake to think that such an interest can be aroused only by intellectual and not by manual work, but, in order that it should be, the

worker must feel that he is creating something which he can see grow and develop as a result of his toil. In this respect there was never before, perhaps, a period in which work had less spiritual value for most people than it has to-day. The worker himself has been lost in the complicated machinery of production, and in our worship of efficiency the machinery has come to be considered somehow such a desirable good in itself as to warrant any sacrifice in its name.

Social intercourse in the same way has succumbed to the machinery ostensibly provided for it. Clubs and organizations of all sorts for bringing people together are legion, but conversation has almost as completely disappeared as has letter writing between friends. We are so busy and wearied in rushing from one meeting to another that our minds themselves have almost entirely ceased to meet. It is not only in the hurry of great cities that there is no longer opportunity for friendly communion. For the inhabitants of innumerable Main Streets throughout the country, Monday night is for Grange, Tuesday the Red Men or Daughters of Pocahontas, Wednesday the Junior Mechanics or the Eastern Star, Thursday the Masons, Friday the Lions, Saturday the Rotary, to mention only a few of the provisions for social intercourse that have ended by destroying all real intercourse itself. There is no genuine depth or value to such gatherings—merely a sense of physical proximity to one's kind. For the life of the spirit they are utterly useless.

Travel, again, as its means have become multiplied and more accessible to all, has largely ceased to have the educational value it once had. Because one can make two hundred miles a day in a motor, people make it. Because one can cross to Europe and pass through half a dozen countries and back in a month, people do it. Let it not be thought that I am exaggerating. Ask any number of people what sort of motor trip they had, and all too frequently the answer will be, "Fine! We did a hundred and eighty miles the first day, two hundred the second, and so on. No trouble. We were gone only two weeks, and covered nearly twenty-five hundred miles!"

An excellent guidebook to London, lying before me on my desk as I write, tells how one may see the city in one day. In the morning one is to go to the National Gallery, the National Portrait Gallery, Houses of Parliament, Westminster Abbey, London Museum, St. James's Park, and four other places. One is to lunch near Piccadilly. In the afternoon one goes to the Royal Academy, Wallace Collection, British Museum, St. Paul's Cathedral, the Law Courts, and drives through two parks and three important thoroughfares. If the traveler intends to remain

overnight, the guide continues, he should visit the Embankment and attend a theatre.

This is not a joke. It is intended as a serious guide for 1929 travelers in search, presumably, of education and culture. Comment would be superfluous, but it is evident that the end of travel, the broadening of our minds, the development of our natures, has become lost to sight in the mere machinery of travel—that is, the physical transporting of our bodies from place to place.

Is not the same transfer of stress on, and interest in, the end to the mere means shown daily in our educational and religious systems? If one drops in to see a clergyman and inquire about his work, is not one, nine times out of ten, immediately shown over the "plant"—the new parish house, the gymnasium and the swimming pool, the men's clubroom—or offered statistics? If one goes to a college, one is shown with pride the new "J. Jefferson Jones" dormitory or the "Simeon Smith" laboratory, or the new stadium or business college building. If we turn to the teaching from desk or pulpit, we find the same immersion in the machinery of life rather than in life itself. The body, the "plant," is superb, but one too often looks in vain for the spirit of either Christ or culture.

Is not the reason for all this the fact that in taking the road that Arnold pointed out would surely lead to destruction, to anarchy, we have lost, with the loss of Hellenism, the power to see life steadily and see it whole? We see only parts, the physical part, the machinery part, and have failed to see the end of all these things, the full rounded life of the spirit for the growth of which alone these other things have any validity or value. Of what possible use is a machine, whether it be a dynamo or a university, unless it is to produce something of essential value for human life? Why waste that life on tending machines that produce nothing? Why travel sixty miles an hour if one sees nothing of the landscape, towns, or people on the way? Why go to five picture galleries, two museums, and two cathedrals in a day if one adds nothing to one's spiritual impressions—as one cannot—by doing so?

III

In seeking the reason of Arnold's failure more to influence his time and ours, I think we may trace it to the extraordinarily rapid increase in the influence of one force in the modern world to which he paid curiously scant attention—science, with its offshoot, modern business theory and practice. It is true that Arnold stood only at the threshold

of the changes that science was to bring. In *Culture and Anarchy,* at least, he, in striking contrast to Tennyson, seemed wholly oblivious of the dangers threatening from a new quarter.

Science, which from one standpoint may almost be considered a traitor in the Hellenistic camp, would seem to have deflected the world toward Hebraism in two ways. In the first place, through the products of applied science, and business, it has provided man with an infinity of things of all sorts. Whatever may be the ultimate result, the dream that control over the forces of nature would at once make life easier for man and increase his leisure for the things of the spirit has to a great extent been proved wrong. It is true that in very many cases the mere physical labor entailed in an occupation has been lightened by the new inventions. On the other hand, however, man has been over whelmed by the very multiplicity and variety of his new goods. These new goods differ in one marked respect from the old range. The old goods, such as enjoying the beauty of nature, reading, expressing one's self in one's work, "making things," playing music, conversing intelligently, looking at pictures or statues, studying, friendship, love, social intercourse, could all be had for little or no money, in civilized communities. The new goods, however, those provided by applied science and business, can only be had in exchange for money.

The consequence is that whoever turns from the old goods to the new at once increases enormously his need for money, and the financial pressure upon the individual becomes so great as in most cases to result in his complete absorption in providing the mere means for living, the accumulating of the things that belong to the machinery of life. So far from increasing the leisure for thought, feeling and emotion, not only has the time for leisure been greatly decreased, but with the abnormal condition of exhausting one's energies in preparation to live and enjoy, instead of actually living, comes an abnormal mental condition which finds relief only in an excitable activity instead of a normal savoring and enjoyment of existence.

Aside from the new inventions, such as motors, aeroplanes, and so on, of which the prime object is speed, the pressure of modern life due to science and business working hand in hand has greatly increased the whole tempo of life. We used to measure the hours. Now we live by the second hand. The spirit, however, cannot be hurried. We may get more quickly to the Grand Central and the 4:50 by the subway, but not to Heaven. Quiet and time are essential for the fruits of the spirit, whatever a Burbank may do with bulbs. I think it was Daniel Webster who once said that the most valuable thoughts he had

ever had came to him while jogging on his nag from place to place on his court circuit. No such deep reflections could come to a modern judge covering the same distance in a tenth of the time at sixty miles an hour in a high-powered car. It has recently been well said of our age that it is "restless, wide-ranging, enjoying pleasure and novelty, but moving in space rather than in time, dwelling on the surface rather than in the depth of things." These characteristics we can trace, I think, clearly enough to that applied science that disturbed Arnold so slightly.

In another and equally important way science has deflected us from the Hellenistic attitude which, in one of Arnold's definitions, is the effort to see things as they really are. To do this is precisely what, until almost the present day, science has claimed for itself, and what even to-day most people think it does. The now deeply ingrained belief that not only has science a peculiar validity, but it gives us the entire truth regarding all aspects of the universe, has acted as a corrosive upon a very large part of the content of culture and the things that have contributed to man's highest life—literature, art, and religion. Much of all this has come to seem mere moonshine fancies when contrasted with the "facts" of science, of which not only the validity, but the completeness, is not to be questioned whatever happens to any side of man's nature or whatever in that nature they leave unaccounted for.

A whole vast range of beliefs and values that were essentially human were wiped off the slate in the name of science. It is needless to catalogue them. The Hellenistic effort to see life steadily and see it whole on the human plane was replaced by an effort to follow a dance of atoms on the scientific plane. Human values became an irrelevant phantasmagoria. The universe was reduced to pure act. In place of the old dangerous error at the upper end of the Hellenistic scale of "art for art's sake," we reached the no less dangerous one at the lower end of the Hebraic, the "act for the act's sake." Hebraism, always more potent among the mass of men than Hellenism, has thus found itself since Arnold's day strengthened to a remarkable degree in both the practical and the theoretical spheres. Not only have the Hebraistic battalions been heavily reënforced, but in science, in the eyes of the public, they have apparently gained a recruit from the Hellenistic camp. The whole scene has shifted since Arnold. And yet was he not right? Is not culture, in its best and broadest sense, our only salvation? Can the present materialistic welter of confusion, if unchecked, lead eventually

to anything but that anarchy that formed the half of Arnold's title for his work? If so, what of the future?

IV

It seems to me that our civilization may take either of two courses. The first may be indicated by a suggestion made to Arnold by an American sixty years ago. This was that "we should for the future call industrialism culture, and the industrialists the men of culture"; and then of course, as Arnold ironically adds, "there can be no longer any misapprehension about their true character; and besides the pleasure of being wealthy and comfortable, they will have authentic recognition as vessels of sweetness and light." We must confess that to a great extent our leaders in religion and education have seemingly chosen to follow this suggestion in their teaching of the American people. The Christian spirit has got so mixed up with "drives" and gymnasiums, and culture with cost accounting and business English, that it takes a wise young man indeed to disentangle them in the face of the strenuous and muddle-headed efforts of his elders.

In many directions at present, however, we are getting suggestions which are not put forward by business men, clerics, or professional educators, and which for that reason, and because they are clothed in a semiscientific language, may claim more consideration from many. Thus a few weeks ago the noted French architect, Le Corbusier,[4] speaking of bridges, steamships, and other engineering works, said they once provoked æsthetically a "violent antagonistic feeling. They were deemed ugly. Yet these works to-day are acclaimed as admirable. A miracle has been accomplished, a spiritual revolution—'the spirit of the age becoming conscious of itself.'" Others suggest that art is an affair of the whole organism and that the art of any age is intricately bound up with the nervous organization of the people of the age. Others, again, hold that the essence of art is one thing and the form another, and that for the future the essence may be permanently passing from pictures, poems, and statues to engineering works.

There is no reason why an engineering work or any other utilitarian one should not be beautiful. They frequently have been in the past, from kitchen pots to bridges. But one cannot help the feeling, in reading such suggestions as that the age is becoming conscious of itself in the sense of admiring its own works, that their authors are unconsciously engaged less in finding new beauty than in condoning our lack

[4] Pseudonym of Charles Jeanneret (b. 1887), originally Swiss, leader in modern functional design.

of it, though the suggestions are worth pondering. A friend of mine claims not only that a finely made carpenter's tool has a beauty of form of its own, which is true, but that he can get as much pleasure out of studying it as he can out of a Rembrandt. Our race has behind it a long history and a far longer development. From the days of the Quaternary epoch in Europe we have been making both pictures and tools, but it has remained for our own epoch to claim that a tool, however beautifully made, has the same spiritual value as a picture. It is true that the populace of Athens enjoyed spending its leisure in listening intelligently to a play by Æschylus, Sophocles, or Euripides, whereas the populace to-day prefers the horseplay or sentimental slush of the movies, but I do not think the way out of the difficulty is to say that watching a slice of pie jump across the screen or kisses in a close-up is as culturally or æsthetically valuable as the unrolling of fate in Greek drama.

The fact would seem to be that for the time we have lost our scale of æsthetic values, because we have lost our scale of values for the whole of life itself. An age which cares only for the speed of its locomotion and nothing for its purpose or destination is not likely to distinguish between a gasoline station and the Parthenon. We obviously cannot have a scale of values unless we consider the whole of life, consider all the possibilities of man's nature, and reckon one against the other; unless we attain to that perfection which Arnold considered the end of culture—which is "an harmonious expansion of *all* the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature, and is not consistent with the over-development of any one power at the expense of the rest."

V

Of course, the anarchy suggested by Arnold as the final outcome of a democracy devoted to a philosophy of doing, not of being, of action rather than of thought, of developing only one side of man's nature at the expense of all the rest, is not impossible. It has overtaken mankind many times before, and in our busy lives immersed in intense activity we need not believe that what has been can never be again. We cannot rely too blindly upon a moderate distribution of baby bonds, savings deposits, and a share or two of stocks among the populace. It is conceivable, in a civilization based on tensions between its members, resulting from trying to secure each for himself the largest share of material goods possible, that as the gap between salary or wage earners and billionaire proprietors increases it may some day,

in an economic debacle, prove too wide to be bridged even by a baby bond.

On the whole, however, I do not think this is the direction in which we are going to travel, though I trust to neither the applied scientist nor the business man to divert us from it, useful as are the functions which each otherwise performs. It seems to me, however, that there are not a few signs in the social heavens that the times are changing and that Arnold's doctrine may come into its own at last.

For one thing, the constant stream of self-criticism that arises from the vocal and more thinking part of the American people at present, morbid as it may seem from one point of view, does indicate a deep dissatisfaction with life as it is now being lived by us. There is a widespread feeling that there is something radically wrong with that life, which feeling appears to centre in the demand that we should have more scope for the development of our own individuality, that we should somehow, vaguely as people may yet apprehend it, have a chance to *be* something rather than eternally to be *doing* something, whether for ourselves, posterity, or the Lions Club. In many households this is taking the form of refusing any longer to be dragooned by advertising and high-powered salesmanship into buying every new device that promises even the least contribution to amusement or efficiency. The very activity of the inventor and the business man may itself help in time to bring about our salvation.

For a while we lost our heads. The novel goods offered by the wonders of applied science have been like the glass beads and red cloth offered to savages. We have bestirred ourselves to unwonted exertions in order to get something to trade for them. But we are not savages. We have a long cultural history behind us. We have deep in us desires and cravings that cannot permanently be satisfied with beads and cloth; and there is a limit beyond which we cannot and will not work. If in the future applied science spawns out purchaseable goods which business offers us at a rapidly accelerating rate, we shall, instead of trying to have every new thing that comes along, begin to exercise choice. Once we have discovered that among such a multiplicity of objects choice is inevitable from all standpoints, such as capacity or willingness to work, room space, or even time to enjoy them, we shall become more individual, use our minds again, and once more take pleasure in expressing our own personalities. In trying to choose, in deciding what we really want, we shall discover that a great many things worth having are those that do not cost anything to speak of, such as reading, making our own music, conversation, and other old-

fashioned things of the mind. Once the strike is on against working to the limit in order to buy to the limit, we shall begin once more to try to see life steadily and see it whole. With the dawn of that day, the pendulum will begin to swing again toward Hellenism.

Intellectually, also, I believe the way will be made easier by a better understanding both among scientists and among the public of just what scientific truth is as an interpretation of the whole of the universe. That understanding, as I have recently said elsewhere, is making rapid headway among many leading scientists, although the public may be long in following their lead. Once, however, the way is open for the reinstatement, not only in a human world but in the universe, of the purely human *values,* the door toward Hellenism will be swung wide. We shall once more see life whole after a dark night of the spirit.

In that day Matthew, or some new Arnold with more contemporaneity of reference and style, will become our prophet, for as I turn from his works to glance at the books on my shelves on economics, sociology, psychology, and science, with their sprinkling of Freuds, Watsons,[5] and Heaven knows how many other "modern" voices, I cannot see that there is, after all, any saner doctrine being preached to-day for the salvation of society or the inner peace of the individual than that preached by the apostle of culture sixty years ago. That doctrine is simply that if democracy is to be saved from anarchy it must be permeated through with "sweetness and light," understood as intelligence and tolerance; that this can be attained only by culture, and not by ceaseless economic activity; and that, eventually, people will not consider that life worth living or that society worth saving which does not allow them to live normally and fully with all sides of their being.

Arnold believed his doctrine worth fighting for through a lifetime. It is assuredly worth fighting for to-day, with far better chances of success, as I see them, from the probable trend of thought and history in the next sixty years than in those which Arnold faced. But if our leaders—our clergy, our educators, our industrial captains, our statesmen, and our writers—continue to preach the contrary one, that our satisfaction and salvation are to be found in *busyness* and things and a unilateral warping of our nature, then Arnold will indeed have been a prophet, for the second half of his title and thesis will have come to pass.

[5] John Broadus Watson (b. 1878), the "behaviorist" psychologist (*Behaviorism,* 1925).

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Writing in 1929 and asking the question whether or not we had advanced along the way mapped sixty years before by Matthew Arnold in the preceding essay and the book of which it is part, James Truslow Adams narrows the range of the discussion appreciably. He narrows the scope of Arnold's terms "Hebraism" and "machinery" in applying them to the America of 1929. Though his summary of Arnold's ideas in *Culture and Anarchy* is generally admirable, he is primarily concerned with American absorption in the means rather than the ends of certain "educative processes" and with the gross materialism induced by the influence of science and industry. He believes us prone to delight in the mere commodities of industry, to sacrifice a well-rounded culture in febrile concern with the surface of life, and to surrender spiritual and human values in the whirl of our getting and spending. We need to hear and heed, but we should remember that Arnold's terms are capable of yet broader application and that his issues have even deeper significance than is given them here.

Mr. Adams' essay is somewhat colored by the time in which it was written. America was then approaching its worst economic debacle. Just before that memorable crash, America was dizzily spinning in the round of frenzied speculation, inflated values, promoters' and advertisers' superlatives, and enthusiastic spending that so bemused provincial prophets like Herbert Hoover and persuaded once sober men that a broker's and sales-manager's utopia had arrived. Carl Becker ironically described that economic era as "founded on shenanigan and as unstable as water." It exploded in the faces of its own manipulators as banks collapsed, Insulls went to jail, and war veterans marched in protest and laid siege to Washington. Many lessons were learned in the years of panic and prostration. But it is in the nature of our existing economy that peaks of prosperity should return—and with them the old temptations to spin the wheels and to find the true end of life in amassing more and more and gyrating faster and faster.

Since America has the most highly developed industrial machine in the world and the most skilled experts in puffery and advertising, its people are more prone than those of any other country to overvalue what the machine produces and the whole area of life to which it belongs. Their whole history having fostered in them a practical rather than a philosophical bent, they have an exaggerated regard for means and much confusion as to ends. And widespread popular education doubtless has fostered a general acquaintance with the surface of science without providing any antidote to its more materialistic tendencies. The author of this essay has a real case. Though he wrote at a particular moment of recent history, and

for that moment, it will be long before his words lose their sharp relevance to American life. We are far from achievement of Arnold's humane, well-rounded "culture"; but to understand its meaning is to take one essential step, at least, towards its realization.

1. Adams gets into his subject through a leisurely autobiographical introduction. What does he gain or lose by this approach? How might he have condensed this opening? What effects, if any, would be sacrificed by such condensation?

2. According to Adams' summary of Arnold's ideas, what are the characteristics of Hebraism and Hellenism? of culture? How can culture mediate between Hebraism and Hellenism? Why would Hebraism alone lead to a lopsided development of human nature? (If you have read "Sweetness and Light," show how Adams has narrowed the terms "culture" and "machinery." What "tools of life," important as means, not as ends, considered by Arnold, does Adams omit? How does his purpose account for his narrowing of terms?)

3. Through his analysis of America in the 1920s, how does Adams support the view that Hebraism had conquered Hellenism "with an appalling completeness"? What elements of his own definition of Hebraism in Part I does he apply here (Part II), and what element does he omit? In discussing American worship of "social machinery as an end in itself," does Adams paint a picture that applies today as well as in 1929? Take each of his "five great educative influences" and apply to them his own question "What of these today?"

4. In Part III business and science are said to be the basic causes of our materialism and regard for mere "things." In what ways does science serve Hellenism? Why, however, is it called "almost a traitor in the Hellenistic camp"? Why has applied science failed to increase leisure? How was the business man its partner in diverting us from old-fashioned satisfactions like "making things," playing music, expressing one's self in one's work? How have mass production and the assembly line affected the worker's self-expression? How have they accelerated the tempo of our lives by increasing demands for the "mere means of living," the trimmings and accessories of "modern design," and diverted us from deeper satisfactions? Why do you or do you not agree that the "old goods" were more rewarding than the new?

5. Adams thinks that science, when regarded as a body of knowledge giving the whole truth about the universe, acts "as a corrosive" on culture and spiritual values. What elements of the "whole truth" does science omit, elements found, for example, in literature and art? Explain the view that science cannot concern itself with "human values." Show that Adams is not here arraigning science itself but a mistaken view of the scope of scientific truth.

6. If men get as much pleasure from beautiful tools and engineering

works as from a Rembrandt, why does Adams feel they have lost their "scale of aesthetic values"? How might over-emphasis on scientific and materialistic values account for such a loss?

7. Why do you or do you not agree with Adams in concluding that only culture, as Arnold understands it, will make life really fruitful? Is such a conclusion as extreme, in one way, as absorption in "doing" is, in another? Why or why not? Why would over-emphasis on the values of business and science be ultimately disastrous? What groups in society will always oppose such surrender? What groups will further it? What validity do you find today in Adams' indications that Arnold's doctrine of culture may yet prevail in America? Add other evidence, pro or con, from your observation since Adams wrote.

8. Account for the ease with which we follow the developing thought of this essay: is its clarity primarily due to subject matter, organization, or style? Is the diction literary, common to good speech and writing, or colloquial? Which of the following kinds of words are most frequent: primarily denotative, connotative, abstract, concrete, general, specific? Why is the style well or ill suited to the theme?

The Task of Tomorrow

LEWIS MUMFORD

Lewis Mumford (b. 1895) is one of the most far-sighted and constructive critics of our national life. His work has reflected an integrated vision of our present as determining our future and growing from our past. He saw our sprawling, slum-infested cities and became an authority on city-planning, but he also wrote *The Brown Decades, American Taste, The South in Architecture* as studies of our cultural development. As a biographer, he fused his knowledge of literature and history and of modern psychology to interpret the complex personality of Herman Melville against social backgrounds. As a critic of public policies, he was among the first clearly to comprehend the fascist threat and to urge the ethical and practical necessity of meeting our national responsibility to civilization (*Men Must Act,* 1939; *Faith for the Living,* 1940). Sometimes he left his writing to serve the cause of education even more directly: from 1935 to 1937 he was a member of the Board of Higher Education of the City of New York, and he has taught at Harvard, Dartmouth, the New School for Social Research, and the School for International Studies at Geneva. In 1941, he was an Honorary Fellow at Stanford University, where, in June, he delivered to the graduating class the address here reprinted. His audience's "task of tomorrow" is our task of today.

In its historical point of view and the code of values it expresses, this essay is typical of Mr. Mumford's work and reveals his affinity with traditions not limited to any nation. He turns to us as Arnold turned to his contemporaries, reminding us that mechanical achievements never make a nation great and that material goods are mere "machinery" for a better life; that our goal is to develop, universally, what most distinguishes us as men. Those "humane" values, Mr. Mumford warns us, must be achieved today if we would win the peace.

THERE ARE TWO MAIN WAYS of looking at the present world war, and so there are two ways of interpreting its ultimate issues and its long-term possibilities. According to one view, the present crisis is the result of an accumulation of political and economic blunders that have been made during the last twenty-odd years. For those who think this way,

From *New World Theme,* published by James Ladd Delkin, Stanford University, 1943. By permission of the author.

the society we live in is still essentially sound and healthy, and the war is a painful but superficial misfortune, which has cut across the smooth and inevitable spread of the blessings of science and invention throughout the planet. My only quarrel with this view is that it seems to me limited in its historic perspective, naive in its interpretation of human possibilities, and erroneous in its counsels.

According to the other view, the present crisis has its seat in the nature of some of the institutions men sought to live by during the last four centuries: what most people look upon as the causes of the present catastrophe are only symptoms of a wider disintegration. Our society has ceased to provide men with the activities, values, and meanings by which people ultimately live. So in our time, the whole epoch which began in the fifteenth century is coming to an end: the age of one-sided mechanical conquest has now reached a natural terminus.

We no longer live in an expanding society; but we have still to create the habits and institutions and ideals that are appropriate to a more stable and humane order. The job that the statesman faces today is not like the reconstitution of order and law in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon: it is rather like the job that confronted Rome after the death of Marcus Aurelius;[1] and if we do not awaken to the problem more swiftly and more completely than the Romans did, if we do not sweep aside our obstructive prejudices and shortsighted vested interests more ruthlessly, we shall slide with greater swiftness into something that has never happened before—a worldwide Dark Age.

If the present crisis is essentially an accident, the world drama that we are now witnessing is, as Herbert Agar has well observed in his recent book, *A Time for Greatness,* little more than a farce: no more significant than the death of a healthy man who happens to slip on a banana peel and break his neck. If, however, the crisis has been brought upon us by our own failures and weaknesses, if the seeds of it lay buried in the very culture that we had counted upon so confidently to usher in a palpable heaven upon earth, then the war itself is not an empty farce, but a meaningful tragedy; and in the wholehearted acting out of this tragedy we may achieve a self-understanding and a moral strength that will enable us, perhaps, to lay the foundations for a new historical epoch.

[1] The death of Marcus Aurelius (121–180) was followed by a hundred years of increasing anarchy and degeneration within the empire, as a result of which the barbarian invasions became more and more successful. The emperor's paternalistic rule had left his people incapable of performing their duties as citizens, and the emperors of the next century lacked ability as leaders.

The war itself has meaning for the democratic peoples, not merely because their victory is essential to their bare physical survival, but because it provides the conditions necessary for their regeneration and their renewal. On this view of the present crisis, we must look upon the war, not as a meaningless accident that might have been avoided by a little clever finagling, but as the only means left for awakening us to the true nature of our condition and for giving us the courage and determination that will be necessary for embarking upon a new period of civilized effort. Business as usual, politics as usual, education as usual, if continued on the lines they were actually following all through this thirty-year crisis would have resulted inevitably in the steady dissolution of our civilization. The agony might have been prolonged, its pains might even have been less sharp and abrupt; but the final result, the death of this particular order, would have been no less inevitable.

The present war is a pre-condition, then, for our creating a culture which will be more responsive to human needs and human purposes than the machine-centered, power-driven lopsided system that Western Man had created during the last four hundred years. To preserve what was vital and good in this civilization, we must be ready to face profound changes in every part of our life, realizing that such changes cannot come about automatically, through the mere pressure of events, but that they must be understood and interpreted and utilized by thinking, willing men and women who have been profoundly transformed by the crisis itself and who have been at least partly purged of the petty values and trivial purposes that governed their lives.

Now what bearing has this interpretation upon the long range tasks that will issue out of the war? A very direct bearing; for since the war itself has grown out of conditions that are organic to our civilization, the decisive military victory of the United Nations, with the unconditional surrender of our enemies, is only the preliminary condition for a much larger and much more difficult task. The war did not begin quickly and it will not end quickly. There is no glib way of removing its penalties or ensuring that the end of physical fighting will bring about the permanent conditions needed for peaceful understanding, worldwide cooperation, and creative political action. If we fail once more to take the measure of the evils that confront us, if we fail to understand how deeply the world has already sunk into barbarism or how ready the fascists will be to seek cover and sham dead, until our vigilance has relaxed once more, if we minimize the fundamental changes that must take place in our own philosophy of life,

we shall not arrive at even a preliminary basis for worldwide rebuilding of the bombed and pillaged City of Man.

Let us remember this: the end of the war will not mean the end of war conditions. Tens of thousands of our best young men will have to be called to the colors each year to stand watch over those parts of the world that have been utterly demoralized and broken by barbarian rule, until the habits of self-government are restored to the peoples who have lost it under the Nazis, and until the poison of the fascist ideology, which has corrupted the life of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and their vassal states, has by the slow process of re-education been worked out of the body politic. This is one of the many grievous duties that will remain with us long after the preliminary steps toward peace have been made.

Similarly, if we are to do our part in creating the new world, we will have to continue to live in war economy many years after the fighting has ceased: we will have to tax ourselves heavily and forego many private comforts, in order to have enough money and energy and materials to build up the shattered economies of the less favored peoples and equalize advantages of life we can no longer claim for ourselves alone. We are not yet conscious of this duty, and we show no signs of abating our shameless boasts about our own prosperity in the face of the poverty of the rest of the world: indeed some of our American leaders, still cursed by the mirage of a dead past, are already seeking to whet our appetities with visions of the sleek motor cars and private planes and electrical refrigerators and expensive mechanical gadgets which will flow forth, they promise, as soon as war production ceases. Those are false promises; those are empty promises; they are in fact the proverbial returning of the sick dog to his vomit. Unless we have some bolder plan and some more humane intention for ourselves and the rest of the world, than is implied by these tall promises of material satisfaction, we might as well surrender to barbarism at once without any further effort. Mr. Waldo Frank has just returned from South America with the report that our representatives boast too much about our mechanical power, our technological progress and our science, and say too little about our achievement in political democracy and the arts. It is about time we remembered this fact in dealing with ourselves no less than with our Latin American neighbors. Unless our view of a good human society includes more than machines and material comforts we shall not even long enjoy our machines.

In other words, a long period of difficult adjustments and unremit-

ting efforts lies ahead of us once the active phase of fighting gives place to the even more difficult task of laying the foundations for an enduring peace. If our present sacrifices are not to become bitter mockeries, as the sacrifices of the first World War became mockeries, we must follow them up by more steadfast and effective efforts. The economic and political proposals that many people have been elaborating so hastily and offering so freely during the last few years will be nothing—they will be worse than nothing—unless the peoples of the United Nations undergo a profound moral and spiritual regeneration. Such regeneration must substitute for the energy and zeal and self-confidence of the fascist barbarian an even greater degree of energy and self-sacrifice on behalf of all our higher human values. We must not look forward impatiently to a quick, make-believe peace, followed by a deceptive orgy of economic expansion. We must rather gird ourselves stoutly for years of heroic, unremitting effort, poor in physical comforts, perhaps, but rich in political inventiveness, spiritual audacity, and human meaning, in order that our grandchildren and great-grandchildren may have the opportunity to mold for themselves a sounder and saner and larger life. Nothing that is worth doing in our time will come easily. The luxury liner, that symbol of our past civilization, has been sunk. Mankind has taken to the lifeboats. Only those who can live on hardtack and steer by the stars will reach land.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Character is a nation's fate, Mr. Mumford says—and he speaks urgently because our fate must be that of modern civilization. We need the reminder because the intellectual climate of today encourages us to put outside ourselves the blame for what goes wrong. The naturalists have taught that heredity and environment shape our fate. The weight of Marxian economic determinism has impressed itself on men's thought: have you not been trained to think that economic stress causes all war and that economic problems are basic to all our ills? To Mr. Mumford the need of a stable economic order seems too obvious to need stress. What he finds alarming is the superficiality of holding economic circumstances responsible for what is fundamentally caused by weaknesses within ourselves.

He analyzes the values by which man has lived for centuries. The Renaissance was a rebirth, but as the intellect became less trammeled and man rejoiced more deeply in the fruits of the earth, certain spiritual values were lost. Man began to find his satisfactions (as today his woes) *without* and not *within*. More and more his wealth became accumulation of goods,

his triumphs mechanistic gains. Through the years of the Industrial Revolution and the age of machines he followed the code of outer rather than inner enrichment that culminated in the tremendous material wealth and power now concentrated in America.

Today Mr. Mumford weighs the cost of war in human sacrifice and wonders whether we have learned to question the destructive faith that betrays our best potentialities. After World War II have old and treacherous values merely assumed new forms? Will America shut herself off in economic and spiritual isolation, hugging her gains, denying the needs of the wretched of the world, and following blindly a code that beckons forward to catastrophe? Or have we learned, through tragic suffering, what our real ills are and that they lie within? Have we experienced the regeneration of spirit without which we are lost?

1. The author says that the last four centuries have been an age "of mechanical conquest" (an expanding material culture). Illustrate this statement by mentioning specific achievements—those, for example, connected with the development of America, the Industrial Revolution, the successes of American industry, the revolution in transportation (since the days of the sailing ships) and in communication.

2. What does the word *humane,* as the author uses it, imply beyond mere kindliness? What values would we cherish if ours were a "humane order"? Why would these values be incompatible with those of a civilization dominantly materialistic?

3. Why does the author consider it essentially "farcical" for a healthy man to slip and break his neck? What contrasting characteristics, in his opinion, can transform suffering into tragedy? (If you know Aristotle's concepts of the "tragic hero" and "katharsis" show how they are implicit in ¶3.)

4. What comforts and other values do most Americans imply when they rejoice in having "the highest standard of living in the world"? Why would the author consider such goals as a-chicken-in-every-pot and a-car-in-every-garage "false" and "empty" promises? What values are implied by laughter at the idea of providing "milk for Hottentots" and of building "TVAs on the Danube"? by determination to protect "our vested interests" in South America, Europe, Asia? Why, according to Mumford, are such values "inhumane"? What reasoning could have led him to assert that they lead to an unstable order? What specific attitudes or policies or institutions, in your opinion, would lead to a more humane and stable order?

5. In your judgment, have Americans resumed in post-war years "business as usual"? "politics as usual"? "education as usual"? If not, what changes are you thinking of? If so, what changes should we try to effect? Explain why you believe (1) our civilians, (2) our veterans were or were not "profoundly transformed" by the war. Explain why you feel pride or shame in how we are meeting our responsibilities to nations which suf-

fered from World War II. Why does meeting such obligations demand values other than materialistic? In your opinion, might the author have greater cause today to believe that we are headed for a more highly civilized national and world culture, or that we are moving toward an increasingly barbarous one? Explain your answer.

6. Summarize the central purpose of this essay. Make an outline in which you indicate the central thought of each paragraph. Why do you consider the author skillful or unskillful in developing paragraphs? in using transitions within and between paragraphs? in organizing the essay as a whole? Show how the sentence structure reflects logic and clarity of thought: analyze several sentences illustrating (1) loose and periodic structure; (2) balance and parallelism within and between sentences; (3) particularly characteristic handling of punctuation. Select especially effective examples of concrete diction. How do you become aware of the author's learning? imagination or lack of imagination? scale of values? What are his most distinctive characteristics as an essayist?

7. If you have read Arnold's "Sweetness and Light," explain why Mumford's analysis of the causes of World War II and the "task of tomorrow" is a 20th-century application of Arnold's (1) doctrine of culture and (2) analysis of the shortcomings of modern civilization. If you have read the essays by J. T. Adams and/or Carl Becker ("What We Didn't Know Hurt Us a Lot"), show how the post-World War I values discussed in these essays exemplify Mumford's analysis of our civilization; how their recurrence would thwart us in our task today.

The American Scholar

RALPH WALDO EMERSON

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–88), "the enraptured Yankee," one of the "world-figures" of American literature, poet, essayist, and philosopher, was a transcendental thinker who could keep his feet on the ground even when his head was most in the clouds. He was a mystic—but not a mystic lost in contemplation of the unseen; he had a shrewd sense of practical issues and spoke out on American Mammon-worship, mediocrity and mob psychology, corrupt politics, and slavery. His practical sense and his idealistic bent are both typically American. "The American Scholar" is an address delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard on August 31, 1837. Oliver Wendell Holmes called it "our intellectual Declaration of Independence," the manifesto of American severance from the intellectual leading strings of the Old World. Emerson exalts the function of the scholar; mind, in his philosophy, is the dominant element of the universe, and the scholar is the mind of the race, "man thinking."

The essence of Emerson's transcendentalism, underlying this address, is in two words, *idealism* and *individualism. Idealism,* however, should be understood in its philosophical rather than its popular sense. Emerson did not, like Berkeley, deny the reality of material things apart from mind. The universe, he believed, is a dualism embodying two principles, mind (idea) and matter; physical nature, the world of flux and impermanence, is permeated by mind, by the divine Over-Soul, in the life of which every human soul shares as a spark of the divine fire. The human mind sees its own reflection, its own intellectual nature, "writ large," in the changeless laws which are the framework of the material world; and every process of nature has its counterpart in a fact of "moral" or human nature as in the great ebb and flow of physical "Undulation" and of moral "Compensation" (see his essay of that title). Everywhere the higher principle of mind *transcends,* molds, and animates matter, and the great Mind or Over-Soul speaks to the soul of man through instinct and intuition. Therefore one must rely on one's deepest intuitions of truth, one must be free of the tyranny of accepted opinions, one must seek new truth; this is Emerson's theory of transcendental *individualism,* of "self-reliance." This is the basis also for Emerson's belief in potential democracy and in the potential perfectibility of man. All minds share in the divine life of the Over-Soul; all must be made free and self-governing by intellectual illumination and may then achieve the potential divinity latent in every soul.

Phi Beta Kappa Address delivered at Harvard University in 1837. Reprinted by permission of and arrangement with Houghton Mifflin Company.

MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN,

I GREET YOU on the recommencement of our literary year. Our anniversary is one of hope, and, perhaps, not enough of labor. We do not meet for games of strength or skill, for the recitation of histories, tragedies, and odes, like the ancient Greeks; for parliaments of love and poesy, like the Troubadours;[1] nor for the advancement of science, like our contemporaries in the British and European capitals. Thus far, our holiday has been simply a friendly sign of the survival of the love of letters amongst a people too busy to give to letters any more. As such, it is precious as the sign of an indestructible instinct. Perhaps the time is already come, when it ought to be, and will be, something else; when the sluggard intellect of this continent will look from under its iron lids, and fill the postponed expectation of the world with something better than the exertions of mechanical skill. Our day of dependence, our long apprenticeship to the learning of other lands, draws to a close. The millions, that around us are rushing into life, cannot always be fed on the sere remains of foreign harvests. Events, actions arise, that must be sung, that will sing themselves. Who can doubt that poetry will revive and lead in a new age, as the star in the constellation Harp, which now flames in our zenith, astronomers announce, shall one day be the polestar for a thousand years?

In this hope, I accept the topic which not only usage, but the nature of our association, seem to prescribe to this day—the AMERICAN SCHOLAR. Year by year, we come up hither to read one more chapter of his biography. Let us inquire what light new days and events have thrown on his character, and his hopes.

It is one of those fables, which, out of an unknown antiquity, convey an unlooked-for wisdom, that the gods, in the beginning, divided Man into men, that he might be more helpful to himself; just as the hand was divided into fingers, the better to answer its end.

The old fable covers a doctrine ever new and sublime; that there is One Man—present to all particular men only partially, or through one faculty; and that you must take the whole society to find the whole

[1] Medieval poets, especially of Provence, who met in contests of music and poetry on themes of knighthood and love.

man. Man is not a farmer, or a professor, or an engineer, but he is all. Man is priest, and scholar, and statesman, and producer, and soldier. In the *divided* or social state, these functions are parceled out to individuals, each of whom aims to do his stint of the joint work, whilst each other performs his. The fable implies, that the individual, to possess himself, must sometimes return from his own labor to embrace all the other laborers. But unfortunately, this original unit, this fountain of power, has been so distributed to multitudes, has been so minutely subdivided and peddled out, that it is spilled into drops, and cannot be gathered. The state of society is one in which the members have suffered amputation from the trunk, and strut about so many walking monsters—a good finger, a neck, a stomach, an elbow, but never a man.

Man is thus metamorphosed into a thing, into many things. The planter, who is Man sent out into the field to gather food, is seldom cheered by any idea of the true dignity of his ministry. He sees his bushel and his cart, and nothing beyond, and sinks into the farmer, instead of Man on the farm. The tradesman scarcely ever gives an ideal worth to his work, but is ridden by the routine of his craft, and the soul is subject to dollars. The priest becomes a form; the attorney, a statute-book; the mechanic, a machine; the sailor, a rope of a ship.

In this distribution of functions, the scholar is the delegated intellect. In the right state, he is, *Man Thinking*. In the degenerate state, when the victim of society, he tends to become a mere thinker, or, still worse, the parrot of other men's thinking.

In this view of him, as Man Thinking, the theory of his office is contained. Him nature solicits with all her placid, all her monitory pictures; him the past instructs; him the future invites. Is not, indeed, every man a student, and do not all things exist for the student's behoof? And, finally, is not the true scholar the only true master? But the old oracle said, "All things have two handles: beware of the wrong one." In life, too often, the scholar errs with mankind and forfeits his privilege. Let us see him in his school, and consider him in reference to the main influences he receives.

I. The first in time and the first in importance of the influences upon the mind is that of nature. Every day, the sun; and, after sunset, night and her stars. Ever the winds blow; ever the grass grows. Every day, men and women, conversing, beholding and beholden. The scholar is he of all men whom this spectacle most engages. He must

settle its value in his mind. What is nature to him? There is never a beginning, there is never an end, to the inexplicable continuity of this web of God, but always circular power returning into itself. Therein it resembles his own spirit, whose beginning, whose ending, he never can find—so entire, so boundless. Far, too, as her splendors shine, system on system shooting like rays, upward, downward, without center, without circumference—in the mass and in the particle, nature hastens to render account of herself to the mind. Classification begins. To the young mind, everything is individual, stands by itself. By and by, it finds how to join two things, and see in them one nature; then three, then three thousand; and so, tyrannized over by its own unifying instinct, it goes on tying things together, diminishing anomalies, discovering roots running under ground, whereby contrary and remote things cohere, and flower out from one stem. It presently learns, that, since the dawn of history, there has been a constant accumulation and classifying of facts. But what is classification but the perceiving that these objects are not chaotic, and are not foreign, but have a law which is also a law of the human mind? The astronomer discovers that geometry, a pure abstraction of the human mind, is the measure of planetary motion. The chemist finds proportions and intelligible method throughout matter; and science is nothing but the finding of analogy, identity, in the most remote parts. The ambitious soul sits down before each refractory fact; one after another, reduces all strange constitutions, all new powers, to their class and their law, and goes on forever to animate the last fiber of organization, the outskirts of nature, by insight.

Thus to him, to this schoolboy under the bending dome of day, is suggested, that he and it proceed from one root; one is leaf and one is flower; relation, sympathy, stirring in every vein. And what is that root? Is not that the soul of his soul?—A thought too bold—a dream too wild. Yet when this spiritual light shall have revealed the law of more earthy natures—when he has learned to worship the soul, and to see that the natural philosophy that now is, is only the first gropings of its gigantic hand, he shall look forward to an ever expanding knowledge as to a becoming creator. He shall see, that nature is the opposite of the soul, answering to it part for part. One is seal, and one is print. Its beauty is the beauty of his own mind. Its laws are the laws of his own mind. Nature then becomes to him the measure of his attainments. So much of nature as he is ignorant of, so much of his own mind does he not yet possess. And, in fine, the ancient precept, "Know

thyself," and the modern precept, "Study nature," become at last one maxim.

II. The next great influence into the spirit of the scholar, is the mind of the Past—in whatever form, whether of literature, of art, of institutions, that mind is inscribed. Books are the best type of the influence of the past, and perhaps we shall get at the truth—learn the amount of this influence more conveniently—by considering their value alone.

The theory of books is noble. The scholar of the first age received into him the world around; brooded thereon; gave it the new arrangement of his own mind, and uttered it again. It came into him, life; it went out from him, truth. It came to him, short-lived actions; it went out from him, immortal thoughts. It came to him, business; it went from him, poetry. It was dead fact; now, it is quick thought. It can stand, and it can go. It now endures, it now flies, it now inspires. Precisely in proportion to the depth of mind from which it issued, so high does it soar, so long does it sing.

Or, I might say, it depends on how far the process had gone, of transmuting life into truth. In proportion to the completeness of the distillation, so will the purity and imperishableness of the product be. But none is quite perfect. As no air pump can by any means make a perfect vacuum, so neither can any artist entirely exclude the conventional, the local, the perishable from his book, or write a book of pure thought, that shall be as efficient, in all respects, to a remote posterity, as to contemporaries, or rather to the second age. Each age, it is found, must write its own books; or rather, each generation for the next succeeding. The books of an older period will not fit this.

Yet hence arises a grave mischief. The sacredness which attaches to the act of creation—the act of thought—is transferred to the record. The poet chanting, was felt to be a divine man: henceforth the chant is divine also. The writer was a just and wise spirit: henceforward it is settled, the book is perfect; as love of the hero corrupts into worship of his statue. Instantly, the book becomes noxious: the guide is a tyrant. The sluggish and perverted mind of the multitude, slow to open to the incursions of Reason, having once so opened, having once received this book, stands upon it, and makes an outcry, if it is disparaged. Colleges are built on it. Books are written on it by thinkers, not by Man Thinking; by men of talent, that is, who start wrong, who set out from accepted dogmas, not from their own sight of principles. Meek young men grow up in libraries, believing it their duty to accept the views,

which Cicero, which Locke, which Bacon, have given, forgetful that Cicero, Locke, and Bacon were only young men in libraries, when they wrote these books.

Hence, instead of Man Thinking, we have the bookworm. Hence, the book-learned class, who value books, as such; not as related to nature and the human constitution, but as making a sort of Third Estate with the world and the soul. Hence, the restorers of readings, the emendators, the bibliomaniacs of all degrees.

Books are the best of things, well used; abused, among the worst. What is the right use? What is the one end, which all means go to effect? They are for nothing but to inspire. I had better never see a book, than to be warped by its attraction clean out of my own orbit, and made a satellite instead of a system. The one thing in the world, of value, is the active soul. This every man is entitled to; this every man contains within him, although, in almost all men, obstructed, and as yet unborn. The soul active sees absolute truth; and utters truth, or creates. In this action, it is genius; not the privilege of here and there a favorite, but the sound estate of every man. In its essence, it is progressive. The book, the college, the school of art, the institution of any kind, stop with some past utterance of genius. This is good, say they—let us hold by this. They pin me down. They look backward and not forward. But genius looks forward: the eyes of man are set in his forehead, not in his hindhead: man hopes: genius creates. Whatever talents may be, if the man create not, the pure efflux of the Deity is not his;—cinders and smoke there may be, but not yet flame. There are creative manners, there are creative actions, and creative words; manners, actions, words, that is, indicative of no custom or authority, but springing spontaneous from the mind's own sense of good and fair.

On the other part, instead of being its own seer, let it receive from another mind its truth, though it were in torrents of light, without periods of solitude, inquest, and self-recovery, and a fatal disservice is done. Genius is always sufficiently the enemy of genius by over-influence. The literature of every nation bears me witness. The English dramatic poets have Shakespearized now for two hundred years.

Undoubtedly there is a right way of reading, so it be sternly subordinated. Man Thinking must not be subdued by his instruments. Books are for the scholar's idle times. When he can read God directly, the hour is too precious to be wasted in other men's transcripts of their readings. But when the intervals of darkness come, as come they must —when the sun is hid, and the stars withdraw their shining—we re-

pair to the lamps which were kindled by their ray, to guide our steps to the East again, where the dawn is. We hear, that we may speak. The Arabian proverb says, "A fig tree, looking on a fig tree, becometh fruitful."

It is remarkable, the character of the pleasure we derive from the best books. They impress us with the conviction, that one nature wrote and the same reads. We read the verses of one of the great English poets, of Chaucer, of Marvell, of Dryden, with the most modern joy—with a pleasure, I mean, which is in great part caused by the abstraction of all *time* from their verses. There is some awe mixed with the joy of our surprise, when this poet, who lived in some past world, two or three hundred years ago, says that which lies close to my own soul, that which I also had well-nigh thought and said. But for the evidence thence afforded to the philosophical doctrine of the identity of all minds, we should suppose some pre-established harmony, some foresight of souls that were to be, and some preparation of stores for their future wants, like the fact observed in insects, who lay up food before death for the young grub they shall never see.

I would not be hurried by any love of system, by any exaggeration of instincts, to underrate the Book. We all know, that, as the human body can be nourished on any food, though it were boiled grass and the broth of shoes, so the human mind can be fed by any knowledge. And great and heroic men have existed, who had almost no other information than by the printed page. I only would say, that it needs a strong head to bear that diet. One must be an inventor to read well. As the proverb says, "He that would bring home the wealth of the Indies, must carry out the wealth of the Indies." There is then creative reading as well as creative writing. When the mind is braced by labor and invention, the page of whatever book we read becomes luminous with manifold allusion. Every sentence is doubly significant, and the sense of our author is as broad as the world. We then see, what is always true, that, as the seer's hour of vision is short and rare among heavy days and months, so is its record, perchance, the least part of his volume. The discerning will read, in his Plato or Shakespeare, only that least part—only the authentic utterances of the oracle;—all the rest he rejects, were it never so many times Plato's and Shakespeare's.

Of course, there is a portion of reading quite indispensable to a wise man. History and exact science he must learn by laborious reading. Colleges, in like manner, have their indispensable office—to teach elements. But they can only highly serve us when they aim not to drill, but to create; when they gather from far every ray of various genius

to their hospitable halls, and, by the concentrated fires, set the hearts of their youth on flame. Thought and knowledge are natures in which apparatus and pretension avail nothing. Gowns, and pecuniary foundations,[2] though of towns of gold, can never countervail the least sentence or syllable of wit.[3] Forget this, and our American colleges will recede in their public importance, whilst they grow richer every year.

III. There goes in the world a notion, that the scholar should be a recluse, a valetudinarian—as unfit for any handiwork or public labor, as a penknife for an axe. The so-called "practical men" sneer at speculative men, as if, because they speculate or *see,* they could do nothing. I have heard it said that the clergy—who are always, more universally than any other class, the scholars of their day—are addressed as women; that the rough, spontaneous conversation of men they do not hear, but only a mincing and diluted speech. They are often virtually disfranchised; and, indeed, there are advocates for their celibacy. As far as this is true of the studious classes, it is not just and wise. Action is with the scholar subordinate, but it is essential. Without it, he is not yet man. Without it, thought can never ripen into truth. Whilst the world hangs before the eye as a cloud of beauty, we cannot even see its beauty. Inaction is cowardice, but there can be no scholar without the heroic mind. The preamble of thought, the transition through which it passes from the unconscious to the conscious, is action. Only so much do I know, as I have lived. Instantly we know whose words are loaded with life, and whose not.

The world—this shadow of the soul, or *other me*—lies wide around. Its attractions are the keys which unlock my thoughts and make me acquainted with myself. I run eagerly into this resounding tumult. I grasp the hands of those next me, and take my place in the ring to suffer and to work, taught by an instinct, that so shall the dumb abyss be vocal with speech. I pierce its order; I dissipate its fear; I dispose of it within the circuit of my expanding life. So much only of life as I know by experience, so much of the wilderness have I vanquished and planted, or so far have I extended my being, my dominion. I do not see how any man can afford, for the sake of his nerves and his nap, to spare any action in which he can partake. It is pearls and rubies to his discourse. Drudgery, calamity, exasperation, want, are instructors in eloquence and wisdom. The true scholar grudges every opportunity of action passed by, as a loss of power.

[2] Academic rank and wealthy subsidies for education.
[3] Real wisdom.

It is the raw material out of which the intellect moulds her splendid products. A strange process too, this, by which experience is converted into thought, as a mulberry leaf[4] is converted into satin. The manufacture goes forward at all hours.

The actions and events of our childhood and youth, are now matters of calmest observation. They lie like fair pictures in the air. Not so with our recent actions—with the business which we now have in hand. On this we are quite unable to speculate. Our affections as yet circulate through it. We no more feel or know it, than we feel the feet, or the hand, or the brain of our body. The new deed is yet a part of life—remains for a time immersed in our unconscious life. In some contemplative hour, it detaches itself from the life like a ripe fruit, to become a thought of the mind. Instantly, it is raised, transfigured; the corruptible has put on incorruption. Henceforth it is an object of beauty, however base its origin and neighborhood. Observe, too, the impossibility of antedating this act. In its grub state, it cannot fly, it cannot shine, it is a dull grub. But suddenly, without observation, the self-same thing unfurls beautiful wings, and is an angel of wisdom. So is there no fact, no event, in our private history, which shall not, sooner or later, lose its adhesive, inert form, and astonish us by soaring from our body into the empyrean. Cradle and infancy, school and playground, the fear of boys, and dogs, and ferules, the love of little maids and berries, and many another fact that once filled the whole sky, are gone already; friend and relative, profession and party, town and country, nation and world, must also soar and sing.

Of course, he who has put forth his total strength in fit actions, has the richest return of wisdom. I will not shut myself out of this globe of action, and transplant an oak into a flowerpot, there to hunger and pine; nor trust the revenue of some single faculty, and exhaust one vein of thought, much like those Savoyards, who, getting their livelihood by carving shepherds, shepherdesses, and smoking Dutchmen, for all Europe, went out one day to the mountain to find stock, and discovered that they had whittled up the last of their pine trees. Authors we have, in numbers, who have written out their vein, and who, moved by a commendable prudence, sail for Greece or Palestine, follow the trapper into the prairie, or ramble round Algiers, to replenish their merchantable stock.

If it were only for a vocabulary, the scholar would be covetous of action. Life is our dictionary. Years are well spent in country labors; in town—in the insight into trades and manufactures; in frank inter-

[4] The food of the silk-worm.

course with many men and women; in science; in art; to the one end of mastering in all their facts a language by which to illustrate and embody our perceptions. I learn immediately from any speaker how much he has already lived, through the poverty or the splendor of his speech. Life lies behind us as the quarry from whence we get tiles and copestones for the masonry of to-day. This is the way to learn grammar. Colleges and books only copy the language which the field and the work-yard made.

But the final value of action, like that of books, and better than books, is, that it is a resource. That great principle of Undulation in nature, that shows itself in the inspiring and expiring of the breath; in desire and satiety; in the ebb and flow of the sea; in day and night; in heat and cold; and, as yet more deeply ingrained in every atom and every fluid, is known to us under the name of Polarity—these "fits of easy transmission and reflection," as Newton called them, are the law of nature because they are the law of spirit.

The mind now thinks; now acts; and each fit reproduces the other. When the artist has exhausted his materials, when the fancy no longer paints, when thoughts are no longer apprehended, and books are a weariness—he has always the resource *to live*. Character is higher than intellect. Thinking is the function. Living is the functionary. The stream retreats to its source. A great soul will be strong to live, as well as strong to think. Does he lack organ or medium to impart his truths? He can still fall back on this elemental force of living them. This is a total act. Thinking is a partial act. Let the grandeur of justice shine in his affairs. Let the beauty of affection cheer his lowly roof. Those "far from fame," who dwell and act with him, will feel the force of his constitution in the doings and passages of the day better than it can be measured by any public and designed display. Time shall teach him, that the scholar loses no hour which the man lives. Herein he unfolds the sacred germ of his instinct, screened from influence. What is lost in seemliness is gained in strength. Not out of those, on whom systems of education have exhausted their culture, comes the helpful giant to destroy the old or to build the new, but out of unhandseled[5] savage nature, out of terrible Druids and Berserkirs[6] come at last Alfred and Shakespeare.

I hear therefore with joy whatever is beginning to be said of the dignity and necessity of labor to every citizen. There is virtue yet in the

[5] Ungifted, i.e., uncultivated.

[6] Celtic priests and Norse sea-rovers. Celts and Norsemen were ancestors of modern Britons.

hoe and the spade, for learned as well as for unlearned hands. And labor is everywhere welcome; always we are invited to work; only be this limitation observed, that a man shall not for the sake of wider activity sacrifice any opinion to the popular judgments and modes of action.

I have now spoken of the education of the scholar by nature, by books, and by action. It remains to say somewhat of his duties.

They are such as become Man Thinking. They may all be comprised in self-trust. The office of the scholar is to cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them facts amidst appearances. He plies the slow, unhonored, and unpaid task of observation. Flamsteed and Herschel,[7] in their glazed observatories, may catalogue the stars with the praise of all men, and, the results being splendid and useful, honor is sure. But he, in his private observatory, cataloguing obscure and nebulous stars of the human mind, which as yet no man has thought of as such —watching days and months, sometimes, for a few facts; correcting still his old records;—must relinquish display and immediate fame. In the long period of his preparation, he must betray often an ignorance and shiftlessness in popular arts, incurring the disdain of the able who shoulder him aside. Long he must stammer in his speech; often forego the living for the dead. Worse yet, he must accept—how often! poverty and solitude. For the ease and pleasure of treading the old road, accepting the fashions, the education, the religion of society, he takes the cross of making his own, and, of course, the self-accusation, the faint heart, the frequent uncertainty and loss of time, which are the nettles and tangling vines in the way of the self-relying and self-directed; and the state of virtual hostility in which he seems to stand to society, and especially to educated society. For all this loss and scorn, what offset? He is to find consolation in exercising the highest functions of human nature. He is one, who raises himself from private considerations, and breathes and lives on public and illustrious thoughts. He is the world's eye. He is the world's heart. He is to resist the vulgar prosperity that retrogrades ever to barbarism, by preserving and communicating heroic sentiments, noble biographies, melodious verse, and the conclusions of history. Whatsoever oracles the human heart, in all emergencies, in all solemn hours, has uttered as its commentary on the world of actions—these he shall receive and impart. And whatsoever new verdict Reason from her inviolable seat pronounces on the passing men and events of to-day—this he shall hear and promulgate.

[7] John *Flamsteed* (1646–1719) and Sir John Frederick *Herschel* (1792–1871), English astronomers.

These being his functions, it becomes him to feel all confidence in himself, and to defer never to the popular cry. He and he only knows the world. The world of any moment is the merest appearance. Some great decorum, some fetish of a government, some ephemeral trade, or war, or man, is cried up by half mankind and cried down by the other half, as if all depended on this particular up or down. The odds are that the whole question is not worth the poorest thought which the scholar has lost in listening to the controversy. Let him not quit his belief that a popgun is a popgun, though the ancient and honorable of the earth affirm it to be the crack of doom. In silence, in steadiness, in severe abstraction, let him hold by himself; add observation to observation, patient of neglect, patient of reproach; and bide his own time—happy enough, if he can satisfy himself alone, that this day he has seen something truly. Success treads on every right step. For the instinct is sure, that prompts him to tell his brother what he thinks. He then learns, that in going down into the secrets of his own mind, he has descended into the secrets of all minds. He learns that he who has mastered any law in his private thoughts, is master to that extent of all men whose language he speaks, and of all into whose language his own can be translated. The poet, in utter solitude remembering his spontaneous thoughts and recording them, is found to have recorded that, which men in crowded cities find true for them also. The orator distrusts at first the fitness of his frank confessions—his want of knowledge of the persons he addresses—until he finds that he is the complement of his hearers;—that they drink his words because he fulfills for them their own nature; the deeper he dives into his privatest, secretest presentiment, to his wonder he finds, this is the most acceptable, most public, and universally true. The people delight in it; the better part of every man feels, This is my music; this is myself.

In self-trust, all the virtues are comprehended. Free should the scholar be—free and brave. Free even to the definition of freedom, "without any hindrance that does not arise out of his own constitution." Brave; for fear is a thing which a scholar by his very function puts behind him. Fear always springs from ignorance. It is a shame to him if his tranquillity, amid dangerous times, arise from the presumption, that, like children and women, his is a protected class; or if he seek a temporary peace by the diversion of his thoughts from politics or vexed questions, hiding his head like an ostrich in the flowering bushes, peeping into microscopes, and turning rhymes, as a boy whistles to keep his courage up. So is the danger a danger still; so is

the fear worse. Manlike let him turn and face it. Let him look into its eye and search its nature, inspect its origin—see the whelping of this lion—which lies no great way back; he will then find in himself a perfect comprehension of its nature and extent; he will have made his hands meet on the other side, and can henceforth defy it, and pass on superior. The world is his, who can see through its pretension. What deafness, what stone-blind custom, what overgrown error you behold is there only by sufferance—by your sufferance. See it to be a lie, and you have already dealt it its mortal blow.

Yes, we are the cowed—we the trustless. It is a mischievous notion that we are come late into nature; that the world was finished a long time ago. As the world was plastic and fluid in the hands of God, so it is ever to so much of his attributes as we bring to it. To ignorance and sin, it is flint. They adapt themselves to it as they may; but in proportion as a man has anything in him divine, the firmament flows before him and takes his signet and form. Not he is great who can alter matter, but he who can alter my state of mind. They are the kings of the world who give the color of their present thought to all nature and all art, and persuade men by the cheerful serenity of their carrying the matter, that this thing which they do, is the apple which the ages have desired to pluck, now at last ripe, and inviting nations to the harvest. The great man makes the great thing. Wherever Macdonald sits, there is the head of the table. Linnæus makes botany the most alluring of studies, and wins it from the farmer and the herb-woman; Davy, chemistry; and Cuvier,[8] fossils. The day is always his, who works in it with serenity and great aims. The unstable estimates of men crowd to him whose mind is filled with a truth, as the heaped waves of the Atlantic follow the moon.

For this self-trust, the reason is deeper than can be fathomed—darker than can be enlightened. I might not carry with me the feeling of my audience in stating my own belief. But I have already shown the ground of my hope, in adverting to the doctrine that man is one. I believe man has been wronged; he has wronged himself. He has almost lost the light, that can lead him back to his prerogatives. Men are become of no account. Men in history, men in the world of to-day are bugs, are spawn, and are called "the mass" and "the herd." In a century, in a millennium, one or two men; that is to say—one or two

[8] Carolus (Charles) *Linnæus*, Swedish botanist (1707–78). Sir Humphrey *Davy*, English chemist (1778–1829). Georges Léopold Chrétien, Baron de *Cuvier*, French paleontologist (1769–1832).

approximations to the right state of every man. All the rest behold in the hero or the poet their own green and crude being—ripened; yes, and are content to be less, so *that* may attain to its full stature. What a testimony—full of grandeur, full of pity, is borne to the demands of his own nature, by the poor clansman, the poor partisan, who rejoices in the glory of his chief. The poor and the low find some amends to their immense moral capacity, for their acquiescence in a political and social inferiority. They are content to be brushed like flies from the path of a great person, so that justice shall be done by him to that common nature which it is the dearest desire of all to see enlarged and glorified. They sun themselves in the great man's light, and feel it to be their own element. They cast the dignity of man from their down-trod selves upon the shoulders of a hero, and will perish to add one drop of blood to make that great heart beat, those giant sinews combat and conquer. He lives for us, and we live in him.

Men such as they are, very naturally seek money or power; and power because it is as good as money—the "spoils," so called, "of office." And why not? for they aspire to the highest, and this, in their sleep-walking, they dream is highest. Wake them, and they shall quit the false good, and leap to the true, and leave governments to clerks and desks. This revolution is to be wrought by the gradual domestication of the idea of Culture. The main enterprise of the world for splendor, for extent, is the upbuilding of a man. Here are the materials strown along the ground. The private life of one man shall be a more illustrious monarchy—more formidable to its enemy, more sweet and serene in its influence to its friend, than any kingdom in history. For a man, rightly viewed, comprehendeth the particular natures of all men. Each philosopher, each bard, each actor, has only done for me, as by a delegate, what one day I can do for myself. The books which once we valued more than the apple of the eye, we have quite exhausted. What is that but saying, that we have come up with the point of view which the universal mind took through the eyes of one scribe; we have been that man, and have passed on. First, one; then another; we drain all cisterns, and, waxing greater by all these supplies, we crave a better and more abundant food. The man has never lived that can feed us ever. The human mind cannot be enshrined in a person, who shall set a barrier on any one side to this unbounded, unboundable empire. It is one central fire, which, flaming now out of the lips of Etna, lightens the capes of Sicily; and, now out of the throat of Vesuvius, illuminates the towers and vine-

yards of Naples. It is one light which beams out of a thousand stars. It is one soul which animates all men.

But I have dwelt perhaps tediously upon this abstraction of the Scholar. I ought not to delay longer to add what I have to say, of nearer reference to the time and to this country.

Historically, there is thought to be a difference in the ideas which predominate over successive epochs, and there are data for marking the genius of the Classic, of the Romantic, and now of the Reflective or Philosophical age. With the views I have intimated of the oneness or the identity of the mind through all individuals, I do not much dwell on these differences. In fact, I believe each individual passes through all three. The boy is a Greek; the youth, romantic; the adult, reflective. I deny not, however, that a revolution in the leading idea may be distinctly enough traced.

Our age is bewailed as the age of Introversion. Must that needs be evil? We, it seems, are critical; we are embarrassed with second thoughts; we cannot enjoy anything for hankering to know whereof the pleasure consists; we are lined with eyes; we see with our feet; the time is infected with Hamlet's unhappiness—

> Sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.

Is it so bad then? Sight is the last thing to be pitied. Would we be blind? Do we fear lest we should outsee nature and God, and drink truth dry? I look upon the discontent of the literary class, as a mere announcement of the fact, that they find themselves not in the state of mind of their fathers, and regret the coming state as untried; as a boy dreads the water before he has learned that he can swim. If there is any period one would desire to be born in—is it not the age of Revolution; when the old and the new stand side by side, and admit of being compared; when the energies of all men are searched by fear and by hope; when the historic glories of the old can be compensated by the rich possibilities of the new era? This time, like all times, is a very good one, if we but know what to do with it.

I read with some joy of the auspicious signs of the coming days, as they glimmer already through poetry and art, through philosophy and science, through church and state.

One of these signs is the fact, that the same movement which effected the elevation of what was called the lowest class in the state, assumed in literature a very marked and as benign an aspect. Instead of the

sublime and beautiful; the near, the low, the common, was explored and poetized. That, which had been negligently trodden under foot by those who were harnessing and provisioning themselves for long journeys into far countries, is suddenly found to be richer than all foreign parts. The literature of the poor, the feelings of the child, the philosophy of the street, the meaning of household life, are the topics of the time. It is a great stride. It is a sign—is it not? of new vigor, when the extremities are made active, when currents of warm life run into the hands and the feet. I ask not for the great, the remote, the romantic; what is doing in Italy or Arabia; what is Greek art, or Provençal minstrelsy; I embrace the common, I explore and sit at the feet of the familiar, the low. Give me insight into to-day, and you may have the antique and future worlds. What would we really know the meaning of? The meal in the firkin; the milk in the pan; the ballad in the street; the news of the boat; the glance of the eye; the form and the gait of the body;—show me the ultimate reason of these matters; show me the sublime presence of the highest spiritual cause lurking, as always it does lurk, in these suburbs and extremities of nature; let me see every trifle bristling with the polarity that ranges it instantly on an eternal law; and the shop, the plow, and the ledger, referred to the like cause by which light undulates and poets sing;—and the world lies no longer a dull miscellany and lumber-room, but has form and order; there is no trifle, there is no puzzle; but one design unites and animates the farthest pinnacle and the lowest trench.

This idea has inspired the genius of Goldsmith, Burns, Cowper, and, in a newer time, of Goethe, Wordsworth, and Carlyle. This idea they have differently followed and with various success. In contrast with their writing the style of Pope, of Johnson, of Gibbon, looks cold and pedantic. This writing is blood-warm. Man is surprised to find that things near are not less beautiful and wondrous than things remote. The near explains the far. The drop is a small ocean. A man is related to all nature. This perception of the worth of the vulgar is fruitful in discoveries. Goethe, in this very thing the most modern of the moderns, has shown us, as none ever did, the genius of the ancients.

There is one man of genius, who has done much for this philosophy of life, whose literary value has never yet been rightly estimated;—I mean Emanuel Swedenborg.[9] The most imaginative of men, yet writ-

[9] Swedish philosopher (1688–1722), founder of the New Jerusalem Church, who deeply influenced Emerson and who was included as a type of the mystic in Emerson's *Representative Men.*

ing with the precision of a mathematician, he endeavored to ingraft a purely philosophical Ethics on the popular Christianity of his time. Such an attempt, of course, must have difficulty, which no genius could surmount. But he saw and showed the connection between nature and the affections of the soul. He pierced the emblematic or spiritual character of the visible, audible, tangible world. Especially did his shade-loving muse hover over and interpret the lower parts of nature; he showed the mysterious bond that allies moral evil to the foul material forms, and has given in epical parables a theory of insanity, of beasts, of unclean and fearful things.

Another sign of our times, also marked by an analogous political movement, is the new importance given to the single person. Everything that tends to insulate the individual—to surround him with barriers of natural respect, so that each man shall feel the world is his, and man shall treat with man as a sovereign state with a sovereign state;—tends to true union as well as greatness. "I learned," said the melancholy Pestalozzi,[10] "that no man in God's wide earth is either willing or able to help any other man." Help must come from the bosom alone. The scholar is that man who must take up into himself all the ability of the time, all the contributions of the past, all the hopes of the future. He must be an university of knowledges. If there be one lesson more than another, which should pierce his ear, it is, The world is nothing, the man is all; in yourself is the law of all nature, and you know not yet how a globule of sap ascends; in yourself slumbers the whole of Reason; it is for you to know all, it is for you to dare all. Mr. President and Gentlemen, this confidence in the unsearched might of man belongs, by all motives, by all prophecy, by all preparation, to the American Scholar. We have listened too long to the courtly muses of Europe. The spirit of the American freeman is already suspected to be timid, imitative, tame. Public and private avarice make the air we breathe thick and fat. The scholar is decent, indolent, complaisant. See already the tragic consequence. The mind of this country, taught to aim at low objects, eats upon itself. There is no work for any but the decorous and the complaisant. Young men of the fairest promise, who begin life upon our shores, inflated by the mountain winds, shined upon by all the stars of God, find the earth below not in unison with these—but are hindered from action by the disgust which the principles on which business is managed inspire, and turn drudges, or die of disgust—some of them suicides. What is the

[10] Johann Heinrich *Pestalozzi*, Swiss educational theorist (1746–1827), whose "melancholy" was due to his failure to achieve immediate reforms in education.

remedy? They did not yet see, and thousands of young men as hopeful now crowding to the barriers for the career, do not yet see, that, if the single man plant himself indomitably on his instincts, and there abide, the huge world will come round to him. Patience—patience;—with the shades of all the good and great for company; and for solace, the perspective of your own infinite life; and for work, the study and the communication of principles, the making those instincts prevalent, the conversion of the world. Is it not the chief disgrace in the world, not to be an unit;—not to be reckoned one character;—not to yield that peculiar fruit which each man was created to bear, but to be reckoned in the gross, in the hundred, or the thousand, of the party, the section, to which we belong; and our opinion predicted geographically, as the north, or the south? Not so, brothers and friends—please God, ours shall not be so. We will walk on our own feet; we will work with our own hands; we will speak our own minds. The study of letters shall be no longer a name for pity, for doubt, and for sensual indulgence. The dread of man and the love of man shall be a wall of defense and a wreath of joy around all. A nation of men will for the first time exist, because each believes himself inspired by the Divine Soul which also inspires all men.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

When we call "The American Scholar" an address on *education,* we use the word in its very broadest sense; for, though Emerson spoke directly to a select university audience, he discussed the discipline and duties of thinking men everywhere. Like other classsics, his address gathers fresh meaning and relevance with passing time. His "man thinking," lately attacked with new violence, has had to "think for action" to preserve his right to think at all. Many forces, fearing thought and defending things as they are, would always have him abdicate his function: "He thinks too much. Such men are dangerous." The fascists burned books, sprayed bullets, and herded him in concentration camps; others would suppress him by less overt and violent compulsions.

In a healthy society "man thinking" is to be found in many departments of life—nowhere, perhaps, in quite such concentration as in the colleges and universities, where his task is speculation and experiment with no other end than attainment and propagation of truth as its own ample reward. But independent thought threatens all sorts of vested interests. Our colleges, it is murmured, are "hotbeds of radicalism." (When they no longer alarm conventional and timorous men, we may know they are no longer doing their proper job.) The New Deal's "brain trust" aroused

automatic fear and attack from stock-holders in Status Quo, Inc., whose scorn of "college professors" had strong overtones of the fear and reluctant respect in Caesar's remarks on Cassius. Not long ago Congress actually passed legislation which, in effect, forbade the government to employ any college teacher whose qualifications and training (often including pioneering knowledge in his field) warranted an annual salary as large as $5000. As a people we Americans are curiously contradictory in our respect for higher education and our distrust of independent thought, whether within or outside the college.

But Emerson preached the crusades of intellectual independence for Americans of his age and ours—he preached freedom from the dominance of older cultures, of custom and the past, of orthodoxies and majorities. He called on thinking men everywhere, especially Americans, to display the courage and self-reliance of pioneers in the quest of fresh insights into truth. Each age must "write its own books," he says with characteristic symbolism, though never is the function of the scholar so important as in periods of transition like ours: "If there is any period one would desire to be born in—is it not the age of Revolution; when the old and the new stand side by side, and admit of being compared; when the energies of all men are searched by fear and hope . . . ? This time, like all times, is a very good one, if we but know what to do with it."

1. The keynote of Emerson's famous "intellectual Declaration of Independence" is sounded in the first paragraph. Why now, even more than in 1837, is it important that America should lead, not merely follow, in cultural development and that we should refuse to be satisfied "with the exertions of mechanical skill," in which we have long excelled? Calling upon what you know of our own fine arts and literature, our thought and ideals, and our social institutions, suggest whether, in your opinion, we have made progress towards the worthy, really American culture that Emerson desired.

2. Does Emerson's word "scholar" mean the same as our term "the intellectual"? Why or why not? What qualities are found in the student, professor, or other man who is a genuine "scholar" in Emerson's sense? What does Emerson mean by saying that, although all men have specialized functions in society, "man is not a farmer, or a professor, or an engineer, but he is all," One Man? Why is realization of Man's essential "oneness" important for the scholar? for all men?

3. Emerson discusses the main influences on "man thinking": nature, the mind of the past (especially in books), and action. Some men feel that a wide knowledge of nature is not indispensable; why does Emerson believe the contrary, and say that knowledge of nature increases man's knowledge of himself? This section, like others, reflects Emerson's transcendental philosophy: see the biographical introduction. The hidden laws of nature unite apparently diverse things. These laws are, for Emerson,

like geometry ("the measure of planetary motion"), intellectual in their nature. Thus, for him, the framework that nature rests on is intellectual and therefore "mirrors the mind" of man. In the universal pervasiveness of principles and laws he sees evidence of an Over-Soul in all men and things.

4. Apart from books, where do we find the mind of the past preserved for us? Why does Emerson think books have always imperfectly and incompletely transmuted life into truth? Why does he believe great books should be esteemed but never blindly reverenced? Are the Koran and the written constitutions of modern nations fair examples of the documents on which, according to Emerson, men have wished to stand, to build institutions, resting on the past rather than advancing to new truth? Why or why not? What documents or books would you name as examples of Emerson's point? What does Emerson consider the right use of books? How does the bookworm differ from the scholar? For Emerson, what is the proper function of a college? Why do you agree or disagree? How does your college fulfil or fall short of its true function as Emerson sees it? as you see it?

5. Why, beyond thought and theoretical knowledge, is action necessary to the scholar? Why are thought and theory incomplete, imperfect until translated into action? How does action lead to new thought? Show how the life of some thinker-doer like Jefferson or Lincoln illustrates the relations of action to thought.

6. From your own experience in your college or community, show why "man thinking" needs self-reliance and courage. Why is the scholar likely to disagree with many current popular opinions? Illustrate, from what you know of Galileo, Paine, or Lincoln, the scholar's need of self-reliance. Why must the intellectual, in our time, protect his right to think freely by acting and defending it? What forces would want to limit or deny his right?

7. Emerson sees the genius and leader as the fulfilment of potentialities latent in all men. Show how his view contrasts with fascist doctrines of the Leader and is essentially democratic.

8. In discussing the place of the scholar in his age and nation, Emerson calls his time an "age of Introversion." Why is the term used, and why would it or would it not apply to our own age? Why does he approve of the exaltation of "the near, the low, the common" in his time? of the recognition of the importance of the individual? Elsewhere in the essay, what ideas support a democratic philosophy and way of life?

9. Do you believe the opportunity and responsibility of "man thinking" is less vital than heretofore or greater than ever in our own time? Explain your answer. In what sense is the scholar's task "the conversion of the world," not merely "the communication of principles"? The "conversion of the world" to what?

10. Emerson habitually entered his comments and insights on various

topics in notebooks under classified headings; he often composed from his collection of notes on particular topics, giving less attention than some writers to exact logical continuity and relationships of thought. His method in some essays has been called not "reasoned" but "intuitive." Why do you think "The American Scholar" was or was not composed in the way described? Emerson writes a kind of prose poetry, vibrant with grace and power. Give examples of his virtues of suggestiveness, of pregnant "gnomic" quality (saying much in little), of lively imagery drawn from daily life, of learning transmuted into poetry, of "sunny sublimity" when his thought, leavened by imagination, rises to his highest eloquence. Read several good paragraphs aloud and notice how the cadences of his prose grow out of the naturalness and directness of good vernacular speech.

Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Learning

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

During his long life, John Henry, Cardinal Newman (1801–1890) exercised influence such as comes to few spiritual leaders. In the 1830s, when he was preaching in St. Mary's, Oxford, at the height of the Oxford (or Tractarian) Movement within the Church of England, students pronounced a new creed: *"Credo in Newmanum."* In the early '40s, when his reading and thinking led him—wasted to a shadow by agony of spirit—to leave the Established Church for the Church of Rome, many followed him, the most famous convert of the Catholic Revival. The story of this time of spiritual and intellectual struggle is told in one of the world's great autobiographies, *Apologia pro Vita Sua* (1864). The luminous intellectual and spiritual integrity of this "apology," or defense, silenced the criticism of the convert which had inevitably been heard in both Church of England and Catholic communions, and the years that followed were full of honors, culminating in 1879, when he was created Cardinal.

A minor poet (author, for example, of the familiar hymn "Lead, Kindly Light"), Newman was a brilliant and prolific prose writer. Most of his many volumes, given over to ecclesiastical controversy, sermons, or religious doctrine, are little read except by specialists—though they too exhibit the chaste beauty of diction and balanced perfection of rhythm characteristic of Newman's style, and though some of the sermons, notably "The Second Spring," preached when the Catholic hierarchy in England was restored, rise to heights of passion and poetry. At least two volumes, however, combine masterly presentation with wide appeal: the *Apologia,* and *The Idea of a University.*

The discourses of *The Idea of a University,* delivered before the Irish bishops in 1852, outline the principles Newman hoped to see embodied in the Catholic university being established in Dublin. When he returned to Dublin in 1854 as rector of the university, he was already somewhat disheartened by the hostility of the bishops to his liberal attitude. By 1856 he was trying to resign, and in 1858 he left Dublin in deep discouragement. But the strength of Newman's idea is preserved for us by his artistic mastery. The nine discourses are welded into so eloquent and beautifully articulated a whole that Walter Pater called it "the perfect handling of a

Discourse VI, *The Idea of a University,* 1852 (V in the Everyman Edition, which is entitled *On the Scope and Nature of a University Education*). Approximately the last two-fifths is omitted.

theory." While only a Catholic could accept the theory of the book in its entirety, the passages here reprinted present a challenging analysis to Catholic and non-Catholic alike.

I

IT WERE WELL if the English, like the Greek language, possessed some definite word to express, simply and generally, intellectual proficiency or perfection, such as "health," as used with reference to the animal frame, and "virtue," with reference to our moral nature. I am not able to find such a term;—talent, ability, genius, belong distinctly to the raw material, which is the subject-matter, not to that excellence which is the result of exercise and training. When we turn, indeed, to the particular kinds of intellectual perfection, words are forthcoming for our purpose, as, for instance, judgment, taste, and skill; yet even these belong, for the most part, to powers or habits bearing upon practice or upon art, and not to any perfect condition of the intellect, considered in itself. Wisdom, again, is certainly a more comprehensive word than any other, but it has a direct relation to conduct, and to human life. Knowledge, indeed, and Science express purely intellectual ideas, but still not a state or quality of the intellect; for knowledge, in its ordinary sense, is but one of its circumstances, denoting a possession or a habit; and science has been appropriated to the subject-matter of the intellect, instead of belonging in English, as it ought to do, to the intellect itself. The consequence is that, on an occasion like this, many words are necessary, in order, first, to bring out and convey what surely is no difficult idea in itself,—that of the cultivation of the intellect as an end; next, in order to recommend what surely is no unreasonable object; and lastly, to describe and make the mind realize the particular perfection in which that object consists. Every one knows practically what are the constituents of health or of virtue; and every one recognizes health and virtue as ends to be pursued; it is otherwise with intellectual excellence, and this must be my excuse, if I seem to any one to be bestowing a good deal of labour on a preliminary matter.

In default of a recognized term, I have called the perfection or virtue of the intellect by the name of philosophy, philosophical knowledge, enlargement of mind, or illumination; terms which are not uncom-

monly given to it by writers of this day: but, whatever name we bestow on it, it is, I believe, as a matter of history, the business of a University to make this intellectual culture its direct scope, or to employ itself in the education of the intellect,—just as the work of a Hospital lies in healing the sick or wounded, or of a Riding or Fencing School, or of a Gymnasium, in exercising the limbs, of an Almshouse, in aiding and solacing the old, of an Orphanage, in protecting innocence, of a Penitentiary, in restoring the guilty. I say, a University, taken in its bare idea, and before we view it as an instrument of the Church, has this object and this mission; it contemplates neither moral impression nor mechanical production; it professes to exercise the mind neither in art nor in duty; its function is intellectual culture; here it may leave its scholars, and it has done its work when it has done as much as this. It educates the intellect to reason well in all matters, to reach out towards truth, and to grasp it.

2

This, I said in my foregoing Discourse,[1] was the object of a University, viewed in itself, and apart from the Catholic Church, or from the State, or from any other power which may use it; and I illustrated this in various ways. I said that the intellect must have an excellence of its own, for there was nothing which had not its specific good; that the word "educate" would not be used of intellectual culture, as it is used, had not the intellect had an end of its own; that, had it not such an end, there would be no meaning in calling certain intellectual exercises "liberal," in contrast with "useful," as is commonly done; that the very notion of a philosophical temper implied it, for it threw us back upon research and system as ends in themselves, distinct from effects and works of any kind; that a philosophical scheme of knowledge, or system of sciences, could not, from the nature of the case, issue in any one definite art or pursuit, as its end; and that, on the other hand, the discovery and contemplation of truth, to which research and systematizing led, were surely sufficient ends, though nothing beyond them were added, and that they had ever been accounted sufficient by mankind.

Here then I take up the subject; and, having determined that the cultivation of the intellect is an end distinct and sufficient in itself, and that, so far as words go it is an enlargement or illumination, I proceed

[1] "Knowledge Its Own End," first of four closely related discourses, including the two here reprinted and "Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Religious Duty," which follows them.

to inquire what this mental breadth, or power, or light, or philosophy consists in. A Hospital heals a broken limb or cures a fever: what does an Institution effect, which professes the health, not of the body, not of the soul, but of the intellect? What is this good, which in former times, as well as our own, has been found worth the notice, the appropriation, of the Catholic Church?

I have then to investigate, in the Discourses which follow, those qualities and characteristics of the intellect in which its cultivation issues or rather consists; and, with a view of assisting myself in this undertaking, I shall recur to certain questions which have already been touched upon. These questions are three: viz., the relation of intellectual culture, first to *mere* knowledge; secondly, to *professional* knowledge; and thirdly, to *religious* knowledge. In other words, are *acquirements* and *attainments* the scope of a University Education? or *expertness in particular arts and pursuits?* or *moral and religious proficiency?* or something besides these three? These questions I shall examine in succession, with the purpose I have mentioned; and I hope to be excused, if, in this anxious undertaking, I am led to repeat what, either in these Discourses or elsewhere, I have already put upon paper. And first, of *Mere Knowledge*, or Learning, and its connexion with intellectual illumination or Philosophy.

3

I suppose the *primâ-facie* view which the public at large would take of a University, considering it as a place of Education, is nothing more or less than a place for acquiring a great deal of knowledge on a great many subjects. Memory is one of the first developed of the mental faculties; a boy's business when he goes to school is to learn, that is, to store up things in his memory. For some years his intellect is little more than an instrument for taking in facts, or a receptacle for storing them; he welcomes them as fast as they come to him; he lives on what is without; he has his eyes ever about him; he has a lively susceptibility of impressions; he imbibes information of every kind; and little does he make his own in a true sense of the word, living rather upon his neighbours all around him. He has opinions, religious, political, and literary, and, for a boy, is very positive in them and sure about them; but he gets them from his schoolfellows, or his masters, or his parents, as the case may be. Such as he is in his other relations, such also is he in his school exercises; his mind is observant, sharp, ready, retentive; he is almost passive in the acquisition of knowledge. I say this in no disparagement of the idea of a clever boy. Geography,

chronology, history, language, natural history, he heaps up the matter of these studies as treasures for a future day. It is the seven years of plenty with him: he gathers in by handfuls, like the Egyptians, without counting;[2] and though, as time goes on, there is exercise for his argumentative powers in the Elements of Mathematics, and for his taste in the Poets and Orators, still, while at school, or at least, till quite the last years of his time, he acquires, and little more; and when he is leaving for the University, he is mainly the creature of foreign influences and circumstances, and made up of accidents, homogeneous or not, as the case may be. Moreover, the moral habits, which are a boy's praise, encourage and assist this result; that is, diligence, assiduity, regularity, despatch, preserving application; for these are the direct conditions of acquisition, and naturally lead to it. Acquirements, again, are emphatically producible, and at a moment; they are a something to show, both for master and scholar; an audience, even though ignorant themselves of the subjects of an examination, can comprehend when questions are answered and when they are not. Here again is a reason why mental culture is in the minds of men identified with the acquisition of knowledge.

The same notion possesses the public mind, when it passes on from the thought of a school to that of a University: and with the best of reasons so far as this, that there is no true culture without acquirements, and that philosophy presupposes knowledge. It requires a great deal of reading, or a wide range of information, to warrant us in putting forth our opinions on any serious subject; and without such learning the most original mind may be able indeed to dazzle, to amuse, to refute, to perplex, but not to come to any useful result or any trustworthy conclusion. There are indeed persons who profess a different view of the matter and even act upon it. Every now and then you will find a person of vigorous or fertile mind, who relies upon his own resources, despises all former authors, and gives the world, with the utmost fearlessness, his views upon religion, or history, or any other popular subject. And his works may sell for a while; he may get a name in his day; but this will be all. His readers are sure to find on the long run that his doctrines are mere theories and not the expression of facts, that they are chaff instead of bread, and then his popularity drops as suddenly as it rose.

Knowledge then is the indispensable condition of expansion of

[2] During the *seven years of plenty* in Egypt "the earth brought forth by handfuls," and Joseph, as ruler under Pharaoh, "left numbering" the corn, "for it was without number." See *Genesis* 41.

mind, and the instrument of attaining to it; this cannot be denied, it is ever to be insisted on; I begin with it as a first principle; however, the very truth of it carries men too far, and confirms to them the notion that it is the whole of the matter. A narrow mind is thought to be that which contains little knowledge; and an enlarged mind, that which holds a great deal; and what seems to put the matter beyond dispute is, the fact of the great number of studies which are pursued in a University, by its very profession. Lectures are given on every kind of subject; examinations are held; prizes awarded. There are moral, metaphysical, physical Professors; Professors of languages, of history, of mathematics, of experimental science. Lists of questions are published, wonderful for their range and depth, variety and difficulty, treatises are written, which carry upon their very face the evidence of extensive reading or multifarious information; what then is wanting for mental culture to a person of large reading and scientific attainments? what is grasp of mind but acquirement? where shall philosophical repose be found, but in the consciousness and enjoyment of large intellectual possessions?

And yet this notion is, I conceive, a mistake, and my present business is to show that it is one, and that the end of a Liberal Education is not mere knowledge, or knowledge considered in its *matter;* and I shall best attain my object, by actually setting down some cases, which will be generally granted to be instances of the process of enlightenment or enlargement of mind, and others which are not, and thus, by the comparison, you will be able to judge for yourselves, Gentlemen, whether Knowledge, that is, acquirement, is after all the real principle of the enlargement, or whether that principle is not rather something beyond it.

4

For instance, let a person, whose experience has hitherto been confined to the more calm and unpretending scenery of these islands, whether here or in England, go for the first time into parts where physical nature puts on her wilder and more awful forms, whether at home or abroad, as into mountainous districts; or let one, who has ever lived in a quiet village, go for the first time to a great metropolis,—then I suppose he will have a sensation which perhaps he never had before. He has a feeling not in addition or increase of former feelings, but of something different in its nature. He will perhaps be borne forward, and find for a time that he has lost his bearings. He has made a certain progress, and he has a consciousness of mental

enlargement; he does not stand where he did, he has a new centre, and a range of thoughts to which he was before a stranger.

Again, the view of the heavens which the telescope opens upon us, if allowed to fill and possess the mind, may almost whirl it round and make it dizzy. It brings in a flood of ideas, and is rightly called an intellectual enlargement, whatever is meant by the term.

And so again, the sight of beasts of prey and other foreign animals, their strangeness, the originality (if I may use the term) of their forms and gestures and habits and their variety and independence of each other, throw us out of ourselves into another creation, and as if under another Creator, if I may so express the temptation which may come on the mind. We seem to have new faculties, or a new exercise for our faculties, by this addition to our knowledge; like a prisoner, who, having been accustomed to wear manacles or fetters, suddenly finds his arms and legs free.

Hence Physical Science generally, in all its departments, as bringing before us the exuberant riches and resources, yet the orderly course, of the Universe, elevates and excites the student, and at first, I may say, almost takes away his breath, while in time it exercises a tranquilizing influence upon him.

Again, the study of history is said to enlarge and enlighten the mind, and why? because, as I conceive, it gives it a power of judging of passing events, and of all events, and a conscious superiority over them, which before it did not possess.

And in like manner, what is called seeing the world, entering into active life, going into society, travelling, gaining acquaintance with the various classes of the community, coming into contact with the principles and modes of thought of various parties, interests, and races, their views, aims, habits and manners, their religious creeds and forms of worship,—gaining experience how various yet how alike men are, how low-minded, how bad, how opposed, yet how confident in their opinions; all this exerts a perceptible influence upon the mind, which it is impossible to mistake, be it good or be it bad, and is popularly called its enlargement.

And then again, the first time the mind comes across the arguments and speculations of unbelievers, and feels what a novel light they cast upon what he has hitherto accounted sacred; and still more, if it gives in to them and embraces them, and throws off as so much prejudice what it has hitherto held, and, as if waking from a dream, begins to realize to its imagination that there is now no such thing as law and the transgression of law, that sin is a phantom, and punish-

ment a bugbear, that it is free to sin, free to enjoy the world and the flesh; and still further, when it does enjoy them, and reflects that it may think and hold just what it will, that "the world is all before it where to choose," and what system to build up as its own private persuasion; when this torrent of wilful thoughts rushes over and inundates it, who will deny that the fruit of the tree of knowledge, or what the mind takes for knowledge, has made it one of the gods, with a sense of expansion and elevation,—an intoxication in reality, still, so far as the subjective state of the mind goes, an illumination? Hence the fanaticism of individuals or nations, who suddenly cast off their Maker. Their eyes are opened; and, like the judgment-stricken king in the Tragedy,[3] they see two suns, and a magic universe, out of which they look back upon their former state of faith and innocence with a sort of contempt and indignation, as if they were then but fools, and the dupes of imposture.

On the other hand, Religion has its own enlargement, and an enlargement, not of tumult, but of peace. It is often remarked of uneducated persons, who have hitherto thought little of the unseen world, that, on their turning to God, looking into themselves, regulating their hearts, reforming their conduct, and meditating on death and judgment, heaven and hell, they seem to become, in point of intellect, different beings from what they were. Before, they took things as they came, and thought no more of one thing than another. But now every event has a meaning; they have their own estimate of whatever happens to them; they are mindful of times and seasons, and compare the present with the past; and the world, no longer dull, monotonous, unprofitable, and hopeless, is a various and complicated drama, with parts and an object, and an awful moral.

5

Now from these instances, to which many more might be added, it is plain, first, that the communication of knowledge certainly is either a condition or the means of that sense of enlargement or enlightenment, of which at this day we hear so much in certain quarters: this cannot be denied; but next, it is equally plain, that such communication is not the whole of the process. The enlargement consists, not merely in the passive reception into the mind of a number of ideas hitherto unknown to it, but in the mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas, which are rushing in upon it. It is the action of a formative power,

[3] Pentheus of Thebes, in Euripides' *Bacchae*.

reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements; it is making the objects of our knowledge subjectively our own, or, to use a familiar word, it is a digestion of what we receive, into the substance of our previous state of thought; and without this no enlargement is said to follow. There is no enlargement, unless there be a comparison of ideas one with another, as they come before the mind, and a systematizing of them. We feel our minds to be growing and expanding *then,* when we not only learn, but refer what we learn to what we know already. It is not the mere addition to our knowledge that is the illumination; but the locomotion, the movement onwards, of that mental centre, to which both what we know, and what we are learning, the accumulating mass of our acquirements, gravitates. And therefore a truly great intellect, and recognized to be such by the common opinion of mankind, such as the intellect of Aristotle, or of St. Thomas, or of Newton, or of Goethe (I purposely take instances within and without the Catholic pale, when I would speak of the intellect as such), is one which takes a connected view of old and new, past and present, far and near, and which has an insight into the influence of all these one on another; without which there is no whole, and no centre. It possesses the knowledge, not only of things, but also of their mutual and true relations; knowledge, not merely considered as acquirement, but as philosophy.

Accordingly, when this analytical, distributive, harmonizing process is away, the mind experiences no enlargement, and is not reckoned as enlightened or comprehensive, whatever it may add to its knowledge. For instance, a great memory, as I have already said, does not make a philosopher, any more than a dictionary can be called a grammar. There are men who embrace in their minds a vast multitude of ideas, but with little sensibility about their real relations towards each other. These may be antiquarians, annalists, naturalists; they may be learned in the law; they may be versed in statistics; they are most useful in their own place; I should shrink from speaking disrespectfully of them; still, there is nothing in such attainments to guarantee the absence of narrowness of mind. If they are nothing more than well-read men, or men of information, they have not what specially deserves the name of culture of mind, or fulfils the type of Liberal Education.

In like manner, we sometimes fall in with persons who have seen much of the world, and of the men who, in their day, have played a conspicuous part in it, but who generalize nothing, and have no observation, in the true sense of the word. They abound in informa-

tion in detail, curious and entertaining, about men and things; and, having lived under the influence of no very clear or settled principles, religious or political, they speak of every one and every thing, only as so many phenomena, which are complete in themselves, and lead to nothing, not discussing them, or teaching any truth, or instructing the hearer, but simply talking. No one would say that these persons, well informed as they are, had attained to any great culture of intellect or to philosophy.

The case is the same still more strikingly where the persons in question are beyond dispute men of inferior powers and deficient education. Perhaps they have been much in foreign countries, and they receive, in a passive, otiose, unfruitful way, the various facts which are forced upon them there. Seafaring men, for example, range from one end of the earth to the other; but the multiplicity of external objects, which they have encountered, forms no symmetrical and consistent picture upon their imagination; they see the tapestry of human life, as it were on the wrong side, and it tells no story. They sleep, and they rise up, and they find themselves, now in Europe, now in Asia; they see visions of great cities and wild regions; they are in the marts of commerce, or amid the islands of the South; they gaze on Pompey's Pillar,[4] or on the Andes; and nothing which meets them carries them forward or backward, to any idea beyond itself. Nothing has a drift or relation; nothing has a history or a promise. Every thing stands by itself, and comes and goes in its turn, like the shifting scenes of a show, which leave the spectator where he was. Perhaps you are near such a man on a particular occasion, and expect him to be shocked or perplexed at something which occurs; but one thing is much the same to him as another, or, if he is perplexed, it is as not knowing what to say, whether it is right to admire, or to ridicule, or to disapprove, while conscious that some expression of opinion is expected from him; for in fact he has no standard of judgment at all, and no landmarks to guide him to a conclusion. Such is mere acquisition, and, I repeat, no one would dream of calling it philosophy.

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Instances, such as these, confirm, by the contrast, the conclusion I have already drawn from those which preceded them. That only is true enlargement of mind which is the power of viewing many things at once as one whole, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values,

[4] A column near Alexandria, formerly thought to have been erected in honor of Pompey.

and determining their mutual dependence. Thus is that form of Universal Knowledge, of which I have on a former occasion spoken, set up in the individual intellect, and constitutes its perfection. Possessed of this real illumination, the mind never views any part of the extended subject-matter of Knowledge without recollecting that it is but a part, or without the associations which spring from this recollection. It makes every thing in some sort lead to every thing else; it would communicate the image of the whole to every separate portion, till that whole becomes in imagination like a spirit, every where pervading and penetrating its component parts, and giving them one definite meaning. Just as our bodily organs, when mentioned, recall their function in the body, as the word "creation" suggests the Creator, and "subjects" a sovereign, so, in the mind of the Philosopher, as we are abstractedly conceiving of him, the elements of the physical and moral world, sciences, arts, pursuits, ranks, offices, events, opinions, individualities, are all viewed as one, with correlative functions, and as gradually by successive combinations converging, one and all, to the true centre.

To have even a portion of this illuminative reason and true philosophy is the highest state to which nature can aspire, in the way of intellect; it puts the mind above the influences of chance and necessity, above anxiety, suspense, unsettlement, and superstition, which is the lot of the many. Men, whose minds are possessed with some one object, take exaggerated views of its importance, are feverish in the pursuit of it, make it the measure of things which are utterly foreign to it, and are startled and despond if it happens to fail them. They are ever in alarm or in transport. Those on the other hand who have no object or principle whatever to hold by, lose their way, every step they take. They are thrown out, and do not know what to think or say, at every fresh juncture; they have no view of persons, or occurrences, or facts, which come suddenly upon them, and they hang upon the opinion of others, for want of internal resources. But the intellect, which has been disciplined to the perfection of its powers, which knows, and thinks while it knows, which has learned to leaven the dense mass of facts and events with the elastic force of reason, such an intellect cannot be partial, cannot be exclusive, cannot be impetuous, cannot be at a loss, cannot but be patient, collected, and majestically calm, because it discerns the end in every beginning, the origin in every end, the law in every interruption, the limit in each delay; because it ever knows where it stands, and how its path lies

from one point to another. It is the τετράγωνος of the Peripatetic,[5] and has the "nil admirari"[6] of the Stoic,—

> Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
> Atque metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum
> Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.[7]

There are men who, when in difficulties, originate at the moment vast ideas or dazzling projects; who, under the influence of excitement, are able to cast a light, almost as if from inspiration, on a subject or course of action which comes before them; who have a sudden presence of mind equal to any emergency, rising with the occasion, and an undaunted magnanimous bearing, and an energy and keenness which is but made intense by opposition. This is genius, this is heroism; it is the exhibition of a natural gift, which no culture can teach, at which no Institution can aim; here, on the contrary, we are concerned, not with mere nature, but with training and teaching. That perfection of the Intellect, which is the result of Education, and its *beau ideal,* to be imparted to individuals in their respective measures, is the clear, calm, accurate vision and comprehension of all things, as far as the finite mind can embrace them, each in its place, and with its own characteristics upon it. It is almost prophetic from its knowledge of history; it is almost heart-searching from its knowledge of human nature; it has almost supernatural charity from its freedom from littleness and prejudice; it has almost the repose of faith, because nothing can startle it; it has almost the beauty and harmony of heavenly contemplation, so intimate is it with the eternal order of things and the music of the spheres.[8]

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[5] I.e., "the man four square" of Aristotle, called the Peripatetic, traditionally because of a habit of walking about while carrying on discussion.

[6] "To wonder at nothing": the Stoics cultivated a calm self-possession.

[7] "Happy is he who is able to understand the relationships of things, and has put beneath his feet all fear, and inexorable fate, and the roar of greedy Acheron."—Virgil, *Georgics,* II, 490–92.

[8] According to ancient legend, the celestial bodies made sweet music as they moved.

Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Professional Skill

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

I

I HAVE BEEN INSISTING, in my two preceding Discourses, first, on the cultivation of the intellect, as an end which may reasonably be pursued for its own sake; and next, on the nature of that cultivation, or what that cultivation consists in. Truth of whatever kind is the proper object of the intellect; its cultivation then lies in fitting it to apprehend and contemplate truth. Now the intellect in its present state, with exceptions which need not here be specified, does not discern truth intuitively, or as a whole. We know, not by a direct and simple vision, not at a glance, but, as it were, by piecemeal and accumulation, by a mental process, by going round an object, by the comparison, the combination, the mutual correction, the continual adaptation, of many partial notions, by the employment, concentration, and joint action of many faculties and exercises of mind. Such a union and concert of the intellectual powers, such an enlargement and development, such a comprehensiveness, is necessarily a matter of training. And again, such a training is a matter of rule; it is not mere application, however exemplary, which introduces the mind to truth, nor the reading many books, nor the getting up many subjects, nor the witnessing many experiments, nor the attending many lectures. All this is short of enough; a man may have done it all, yet be lingering in the vestibule of knowledge:—he may not realize what his mouth utters; he may not see with his mental eye what confronts him; he may have no grasp of things as they are; or at least he may have no power at all of advancing one step forward of himself, in consequence of what he has already acquired, no power of discriminating between truth and falsehood, of sifting out the grains of truth from the mass, of arranging things according to their real value, and, if I may use the phrase, of building up ideas. Such a power is the result of a

Discourse VII, *The Idea of a University* (1852). About three-fifths is omitted, but much of the omitted material is quoted from other authors.

scientific formation of mind; it is an acquired faculty of judgment, of clear-sightedness, of sagacity, of wisdom, of philosophical reach of mind, and of intellectual self-possession and repose,—qualities which do not come of mere acquirement. The bodily eye, the organ for apprehending material objects, is provided by nature; the eye of the mind, of which the object is truth, is the work of discipline and habit.

This process of training, by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacrificed to some particular or accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession, or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for the perception of its own proper object, and for its own highest culture, is called Liberal Education; and though there is no one in whom it is carried as far as is conceivable, or whose intellect would be a pattern of what intellects should be made, yet there is scarcely any one but may gain an idea of what real training is, and at least look towards it, and make its true scope and result, not something else, his standard of excellence; and numbers there are who may submit themselves to it, and secure it to themselves in good measure. And to set forth the right standard, and to train according to it, and to help forward all students towards it according to their various capacities, this I conceive to be the business of a University.

2

Now this is what some great men are very slow to allow; they insist that Education should be confined to some particular and narrow end, and should issue in some definite work, which can be weighed and measured. They argue as if every thing, as well as every person, had its price; and that where there has been a great outlay, they have a right to expect a return in kind. This they call making Education and Instruction "useful," and "Utility" becomes their watchword. With a fundamental principle of this nature, they very naturally go on to ask, what there is to show for the expense of a University; what is the real worth in the market of the article called "a Liberal Education," on the supposition that it does not teach us definitely how to advance our manufactures, or to improve our lands, or to better our civil economy; or again, if it does not at once make this man a lawyer, that an engineer, and that a surgeon; or at least if it does not lead to discoveries in chemistry, astronomy, geology, magnetism, and science of every kind.

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The author to whom I allude is no other than Locke. That celebrated philosopher has preceded the Edinburgh Reviewers[1] in condemning the ordinary subjects in which boys are instructed at school, on the ground that they are not needed by them in after life; and before quoting what his disciples have said in the present century, I will refer to a few passages of the master. " 'Tis matter of astonishment," he says in his work on Education, "that men of quality and parts should suffer themselves to be so far misled by custom and implicit faith. Reason, if consulted with, would advise, that their children's time should be spent in acquiring what might be *useful* to them, when they come to be men, rather than that their heads should be stuffed with a deal of trash, a great part whereof they usually never do ('tis certain they never need to) think on again as long as they live; and so much of it as does stick by them they are only the worse for."

And so again speaking of verse-making, he says, "I know not what reason a father can have to wish his son a poet, who does not desire him to *bid defiance to all other callings and business;* which is not yet the worst of the case; for, if he proves a successful rhymer, and gets once the reputation of a wit, I desire it to be considered, what company and places he is likely to spend his time in, nay, and estate too; for it is very seldom seen that any one discovers *mines of gold or silver in Parnassus.* 'Tis a pleasant air, but a barren soil."

In another passage he distinctly limits utility in education to its bearing on the future profession or trade of the pupil, that is, he scorns the idea of any education of the intellect, simply as such. "Can there be any thing more ridiculous," he asks, "than that a father should waste his own money, and his son's time, in setting him to *learn the Roman language,* when at the same time he *designs him for a trade,* wherein he, having no use of Latin, fails not to forget that little which he brought from school, and which 'tis ten to one he abhors for the ill-usage it procured him? Could it be believed, unless we have every where amongst us examples of it, that a child should be forced to learn the rudiments of a language, which *he is never to use in the course of life that he is designed to,* and neglect all the while the

[1] John *Locke* (1632–1704), founder of the Empirical School of philosophy; *Edinburgh Reviewers,* writers in *The Edinburgh Review,* influential Scottish periodical. The omitted passage concerns an attack made by the *Review* not long before on the concept of education at Oxford.

writing a good hand, and casting accounts, which are of great advantage in all conditions of life, and to most trades indispensably necessary?" Nothing of course can be more absurd than to neglect in education those matters which are necessary for a boy's future calling; but the tone of Locke's remarks evidently implies more than this, and is condemnatory of any teaching which tends to the general cultivation of the mind.

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Such then is the enunciation,[2] as far as words go, of the theory of Utility in Education; and both on its own account, and for the sake of the able men who have advocated it, it has a claim on the attention of those whose principles I am here representing. Certainly it is specious to contend that nothing is worth pursuing but what is useful; and that life is not long enough to expend upon interesting, or curious, or brilliant trifles. Nay, in one sense, I will grant it is more than specious, it is true; but, if so, how do I propose directly to meet the objection? Why, Gentlemen, I have really met it already, viz., in laying down, that intellectual culture is its own end; for what has its *end* in itself, has its *use* in itself also. I say, if a Liberal Education consists in the culture of the intellect, and if that culture be in itself a good, here, without going further, is an answer to Locke's question; for if a healthy body is a good in itself, why is not a healthy intellect? and if a College of Physicians is a useful institution, because it contemplates bodily health, why is not an Academical Body, though it were simply and solely engaged in imparting vigour and beauty and grasp to the intellectual portion of our nature? And the Reviewers I am quoting seem to allow this in their better moments, in a passage which, putting aside the question of its justice in fact, is sound and true in the principles to which it appeals:—

"The present state of classical education," they say, "cultivates the *imagination* a great deal too much, and other *habits of mind* a great deal too little, and trains up many young men in a style of elegant imbecility, utterly unworthy of the talents with which nature has endowed them . . . The matter of fact is, that a classical scholar of twenty-three or twenty-four is a man principally conversant with works of imagination. His feelings are quick, his fancy lively, and his taste good. Talents for *speculation* and *original inquiry* he has none, nor has he formed the invaluable *habit of pushing things up to their first*

[2] The omitted passage quotes the Reviewers to much the same effect as the passages from Locke.

principles, or of collecting dry and unamusing facts as the materials for reasoning. All the solid and masculine parts of his *understanding* are left wholly without *cultivation;* he hates the pain of thinking, and suspects every man whose boldness and originality call upon him to defend his opinions and prove his assertions."

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Now, I am not at present concerned with the specific question of classical education; else, I might reasonably question the justice of calling an intellectual discipline, which embraces the study of Aristotle, Thucydides, and Tacitus, which involves Scholarship and Antiquities, *imaginative;* still so far I readily grant, that the cultivation of the "understanding," of a "talent for speculation and original inquiry," and of "the habit of pushing things up to their first principles," is a principal portion of a *good* or *liberal* education. If then the Reviewers consider such cultivation the characteristic of a *useful* education, as they seem to do in the foregoing passage, it follows, that what they mean by "useful" is just what I mean by "good" or "liberal": and Locke's question becomes a verbal one. Whether youths are to be taught Latin or verse-making will depend on the *fact,* whether these studies tend to mental culture; but, however this is determined, so far is clear, that in that mental culture consists what I have called a liberal or non-professional, and what the Reviewers call a useful education.

This is the obvious answer which may be made to those who urge upon us the claims of Utility in our plans of Education; but I am not going to leave the subject here: I mean to take a wider view of it. Let us take "useful," as Locke takes it, in its proper and popular sense, and then we enter upon a large field of thought, to which I cannot do justice in one Discourse, though to-day's is all the space that I can give to it. I say, let us take "useful" to mean, not what is simply good, but what *tends* to good, or is the *instrument* of good; and in this sense also, Gentlemen, I will show you how a liberal education is truly and fully a useful, though it be not a professional, education. "Good" indeed means one thing, and "useful" means another; but I lay it down as a principle, which will save us a great deal of anxiety, that, though the useful is not always good, the good is always useful. Good is not only good, but reproductive of good; this is one of its attributes; nothing is excellent, beautiful, perfect, desirable for its own sake, but it overflows, and spreads the likeness of itself all around it. Good is prolific; it is not only good to the eye, but to the taste; it not only

attracts us, but it communicates itself; it excites first our admiration and love, then our desire and our gratitude, and that, in proportion to its intenseness and fulness in particular instances. A great good will impart great good. If then the intellect is so excellent a portion of us, and its cultivation so excellent, it is not only beautiful, perfect, admirable, and noble in itself, but in a true and high sense it must be useful to the possessor and to all around him; not useful in any low, mechanical, mercantile sense, but as diffusing good, or as a blessing, or a gift, or power, or a treasure, first to the owner, then through him to the world. I say then, if a liberal education be good, it must necessarily be useful too.

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You will see what I mean by the parallel of bodily health. Health is a good in itself, though nothing came of it, and is especially worth seeking and cherishing; yet, after all, the blessings which attend its presence are so great, while they are so close to it and so redound back upon it and encircle it, that we never think of it except as useful as well as good, and praise and prize it for what it does, as well as for what it is, though at the same time we cannot point out any definite and distinct work or production which it can be said to effect. And so as regards intellectual culture, I am far from denying utility in this large sense as the end of Education, when I lay it down, that the culture of the intellect is a good in itself and its own end; I do not exclude from the idea of intellectual culture that it cannot but be, from the very nature of things; I only deny that we must be able to point out, before we have any right to call it useful, some art, or business, or profession, or trade, or work, as resulting from it, and as its real and complete end. The parallel is exact:—As the body may be sacrificed to some manual or other toil, whether moderate or oppressive, so may the intellect be devoted to some specific profession; and I do not call *this* the culture of the intellect. Again, as some member or organ of the body may be inordinately used and developed, so may memory, or imagination, or the reasoning faculty; and *this* again is not intellectual culture. On the other hand, as the body may be tended, cherished, and exercised with a simple view to its general health, so may the intellect also be generally exercised in order to its perfect state; and this *is* its cultivation.

Again, as health ought to precede labour of the body, and as a man in health can do what an unhealthy man cannot do, and as of this health the properties are strength, energy, agility, graceful carriage and

action, manual dexterity, and endurance of fatigue, so in like manner general culture of mind is the best aid to professional and scientific study, and educated men can do what illiterate cannot; and the man who has learned to think and to reason and to compare and to discriminate and to analyze, who has refined his taste, and formed his judgment, and sharpened his mental vision, will not indeed at once be a lawyer, or a pleader, or an orator, or a statesman, or a physician, or a good landlord, or a man of business, or a soldier, or an engineer, or a chemist, or a geologist, or an antiquarian, but he will be placed in that state of intellect in which he can take up any one of the sciences or callings I have referred to, or any other for which he has a taste or special talent, with an ease, a grace, a versatility, and a success, to which another is a stranger. In this sense then, and as yet I have said but a very few words on a large subject, mental culture is emphatically *useful.*

If then I am arguing, and shall argue, against Professional or Scientific knowledge as the sufficient end of a University Education, let me not be supposed, Gentlemen, to be disrespectful towards particular studies, or arts, or vocations, and those who are engaged in them. In saying that Law or Medicine is not the end of a University course, I do not mean to imply that the University does not teach Law or Medicine. What indeed can it teach at all, if it does not teach something particular? It teaches *all* knowledge by teaching all *branches* of knowledge, and in no other way. I do but say that there will be this distinction as regards a Professor of Law, or of Medicine, or of Geology, or of Political Economy, in a University and out of it, that out of a University he is in danger of being absorbed and narrowed by his pursuit, and of giving Lectures which are the Lectures of nothing more than a lawyer, physician, geologist, or political economist; whereas in a University he will just know where he and his science stand, he has come to it, as it were, from a height, he has taken a survey of all knowledge, he is kept from extravagance by the very rivalry of other studies, he has gained from them a special illumination and largeness of mind and freedom and self-possession, and he treats his own in consequence with a philosophy and a resource, which belongs not to the study itself, but to his liberal education.

This then is how I should solve the fallacy, for so I must call it, by which Locke and his disciples would frighten us from cultivating the intellect, under the notion that no education is useful which does not teach us some temporal calling, or some mechanical art, or some physical secret. I say that a cultivated intellect, because it is a good in itself,

brings with it a power and a grace to every work and occupation which it undertakes, and enables us to be more useful, and to a greater number. There is a duty we owe to human society as such, to the state to which we belong, to the sphere in which we move, to the individuals towards whom we are variously related, and whom we successively encounter in life; and that philosophical or liberal education, as I have called it, which is the proper function of a University, if it refuses the foremost place to professional interests, does but postpone them to the formation of the citizen, and, while it subserves the larger interests of philanthropy, prepares also for the successful prosecution of those merely personal objects, which at first sight it seems to disparage.

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. . . If then a practical end must be assigned to a University course, I say it is that of training good members of society. Its art is the art of social life, and its end is fitness for the world. It neither confines its views to particular professions on the one hand, nor creates heroes or inspires genius on the other. Works indeed of genius fall under no art; heroic minds come under no rule; a University is not a birthplace of poets or of immortal authors, of founders of schools, leaders of colonies, or conquerors of nations. It does not promise a generation of Aristotles or Newtons, of Napoleons or Washingtons, of Raphaels or Shakespeares, though such miracles of nature it has before now contained within its precincts. Nor is it content on the other hand with forming the critic or the experimentalist, the economist or the engineer, though such too it includes within its scope. But a University training is the great ordinary means to a great but ordinary end; it aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the public mind, at purifying the national taste, at supplying true principles to popular enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspiration, at giving enlargement and sobriety to the ideas of the age, at facilitating the exercise of political power, and refining the intercourse of private life. It is the education which gives a man a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments, a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing them, and a force in urging them. It teaches him to see things as they are, to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irrelevant. It prepares him to fill any post with credit, and to master any subject with facility. It shows him how to accommodate himself

to others, how to throw himself into their state of mind, how to bring before them his own, how to influence them, how to come to an understanding with them, how to bear with them. He is at home in any society, he has common ground with every class; he knows when to speak and when to be silent; he is able to converse, he is able to listen; he can ask a question pertinently, and gain a lesson seasonably, when he has nothing to impart himself; he is ever ready, yet never in the way; he is a pleasant companion, and a comrade you can depend upon; he knows when to be serious and when to trifle, and he has a sure tact which enables him to trifle with gracefulness and to be serious with effect. He has the repose of a mind which lives in itself, while it lives in the world, and which has resources for its happiness at home when it cannot go abroad. He has a gift which serves him in public, and supports him in retirement, without which good fortune is but vulgar, and with which failure and disappointment have a charm. The art which tends to make a man all this, is in the object which it pursues as useful as the art of wealth or the art of health, though it is less susceptible of method, and less tangible, less certain, less complete in its result.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

Education, like art, is long—"and time is fleeting." There is so much to learn that no man now dares, like Bacon, "take all knowledge for his province." The need to earn a living is peremptory and insistent. The easiest way for a college to meet the problem is to make vague gestures toward the liberal arts, concentrate on technical and vocational subjects, then label the student A.B. or B.S. and send him forth "with a college education." He may or may not have learned to "do something." But has he learned to *be* something? Is his mind so trained that he will do his something well? If the answer to these questions is "No," it would seem that his college or university has not fulfilled its obligations either to him or to society. Or if the means of answering "Yes" have been offered but not accepted, the graduate has done both himself and his country a wrong.

Why this is so Newman makes clear in these discourses. He defines the aim of true education as a state of mental health, a trained and "illuminated" intellect, master and interpreter of its knowledge. Two conclusions would follow acceptance of this definition: that time spent in acquiring a body of liberal knowledge is well invested; but that one need not be discouraged at the impossibility of studying everything, for the essential thing is to train the intellect to comprehend and organize its knowledge,

that it may see things in the perspectives of history and human wisdom, each thing "in its place, . . . and with its own characteristics upon it." Such intellectual mastery, Newman says, comes only from creative study of liberal knowledge; and it is the distinguishing characteristic of the truly educated.

How does it repay us for time and labor invested? First, of course, in personal fulfillment, in being as well as doing. It brings inner resources for solitude, the satisfaction of clear thinking, entry to whole realms of enjoyment. It repays us too in more obvious ways, for an alert and disciplined mind is worth more than shallow vocational skills: many an employer signifies preference for a liberal arts graduate, saying that special training may be taken on the job. The educated person, furthermore, functions better as a citizen. William James wrote that the "social value of the college bred" lies in their ability to evaluate the personalities contending for leadership in our democracy. We might extend the saying to evaluation of legislation, ideas, movements. The vitality of a democracy is in proportion to the number of its citizens who develop in notable degree Newman's illuminated intelligence. "Art is long, and time is fleeting": the more reason to use the time we have for the most important things.

1. According to Newman, what does the average man consider to be the aim of education? Why do you believe that this popular conception has or has not changed? What does Newman mean by saying that the mental attitude of the average student is "passive"? Do you think that this word accurately describes the students in your classes? Why or why not? What is meant by the statement that "there is no true culture without acquirements"? If we accept this idea, how will it affect (1) our attitude toward the facts presented in some college course, and (2) our willingness to disagree with accepted interpretation of those facts? Show from your own experience the difference between an expression of dissent which is creative and the sort of irresponsible disagreement of which Newman disapproves.

2. Show how experiences of your own, in or out of school, have contributed to that "enlargement," that "movement onwards" of the "mental centre" which Newman calls true education. Show how, in one or more of these experiences, part of the enlargement came from discovery of new relationships—the fitting of new knowledge into the pattern of previous knowledge. Why does Newman object to the "walking encyclopedia" who is incapable of making a generalization of his own? Why were the wide travel and extraordinary experiences of the war profoundly educational to some members of the armed services and educationally useless to others? What analogy did Newman draw at the beginning of Discourse VI between a bodily state of health and the mental state of the truly educated person? In the light of his discussion and examples, which of the terms he

has proposed (*philosophy, philosophical knowledge, enlargement of mind, illumination, mental breadth, power, light*) seems to you most appropriate to describe this mental state? Why? Among the people you know, describe the one who comes closest to Newman's ideal of the person of illuminated intellect.

3. Why, according to Locke, is a liberal education useless? What similar arguments are used in America today? What others, if any, have you heard? How does Newman meet the objections of "practical" people by a reference to his original argument as to the value of knowledge? by his definition of the words *useful* and *liberal?* by the way he relates the *useful* to the *good?* Why do you find this part of the argument convincing or unconvincing?

4. Why does the analogy of bodily health lead Newman to conclude that "general culture of mind is the best aid to professional and scientific study"? To what extent, today, do (1) the liberal arts colleges, (2) professional schools, (3) trade schools, (4) public and private employers seem to act on the assumption that Newman's conclusion is correct? Explain why you believe that we place too much or too little stress on liberal education as an integral part of preparation for the various professions.

5. As Newman concludes Discourse VII (the last paragraph is a famous peroration), what benefits does he say the university confers on society? on the individual? Basing your description both on this paragraph and on other passages in both discourses, sketch the character of the truly educated person as Newman sees him. What changes, if any, would you make? Why, in a democracy, is it especially important that as many people as possible approach this ideal to the extent of their ability?

6. After a discourse proposing the subject and giving the point of view (that of a liberal Catholic), *The Idea of a University* as a whole falls into three main divisions: (1) Discourses II–IV, on theology as a branch of knowledge and the mutual relationship between it and other branches (2) Discourses V–VIII, on "liberal knowledge"; (3) and Discourse IX, which draws the whole together, on the Church's duties toward liberal knowledge. How do Discourses VI and VII, here reprinted, fit into the general scheme of the second main division? (You will recall that Newman himself explains in each discourse its function in the whole.) Show how the sense of logic dominant in the whole series is reflected in one or both of the discourses here reprinted (the logical organization of neither is seriously affected by the omissions): (1) enumerate the main steps in the argument; (2) state the central idea of each paragraph in one of the main sections; (3) indicate the means of coherence within one or more of the longer paragraphs. Try to summarize Discourse VI in one sentence, modeling your work on Newman's summary of Discourse V in ¶3 of Discourse VI.

7. Like Cicero's or Addison's, Newman's style is a model of classic lucidity, dignity, and perfection of form. How does the nature of the

audience (see biographical introduction) affect the general tone? what purposes are served by the heavy punctuation and the neat, compact sentence structure? by the "opulence of accumulation and parallelism"? Though almost any passage would do, you might choose for special analysis ¶¶2, 3, and 8 of Discourse VI, and the final paragraph of Discourse VII: estimate the prevalence of complete or partial periodicity; illustrate effective variety in sentence length and structure; point our different kinds of balance and parallelism (i.e., sentences, elements of various function and length within sentences), and discuss their effectiveness; read each passage aloud to test how its sound and rhythms serve the author's purpose. How would you add to or modify the description of Newman's style at the beginning of this question-group?

Man and the Race

GEORGE EDWARD WOODBERRY

Like Henry Adams and Barrett Wendell, George Edward Woodberry (1855–1930) represented New England's age of decline, what Santayana and Van Wyck Brooks call its "Indian summer." Though brilliantly gifted, he was spiritually out of touch with his era—a fact which gave to much of his work an autumnal, reminiscent, elegiac tone. He had studied at Harvard under Henry Adams and Charles Eliot Norton, had listened to the aging Emerson's valedictory lecture, and had been the protégé of Lowell and Norton. He had won early recognition as a writer and had been regarded by the last of the great Boston and Cambridge men as one of their successors, as the most promising poet of the rising generation. With one hand he touched the passing age of Emerson, Lowell, and Holmes; with the other he could never join hands with his own time.

After teaching in the new West, at Nebraska, he came to Columbia University in 1891 on the recommendation of Lowell and Norton. There he taught with extraordinary brilliance and effect until 1904 and built up a very able Department of English. He resigned to become an itinerant university lecturer at Amherst, Cornell, Wisconsin, and California. His writing continued through these years and through those of his last nostalgic wanderings in the Mediterranean world in search of a spiritual refuge he never found in America's "mastodon age of gold."

Woodberry was primarily a poet. The statement may seem a paradox since, despite fine things finely said, his verse owes more to *belles lettres* than to contemporary life, vibrates with rarified echoes of a dying epoch. But his literary criticism, excepting Lowell's the best America had yet produced, dwells with most eloquence and delight on poetic values and, like all his prose, is written with a poet's sensitivity. His former students testify that the poet in him fired his classes with his own noble enthusiasm for the beauty and wisdom of our finest inheritance from the race-mind. He is described as "shy, moody, wistful, with an apparent ache for affection"; but his students were so deeply influenced by him that they paid him the unique tribute of forming a Woodberry Society in 1911 and of publishing a special edition of his poems and essays.

Woodberry's alienation in New York from both the dying world of his Boston and Cambridge youth and the loud new world of industrialism and social conflict warped him as much as spiritual or physical exile warped Henry Adams, Henry James, or Barrett Wendell. But like them he must share with his age the blame for his alienation. When such men

From *The Torch*, 1905. By permission of the copyright holder, Mrs. Charles D. Woodberry. A critical passage on certain 19th-century poets is omitted.

draw apart or are driven apart from their time, the loss is great on both sides; each has deep need of the other. But a residue of Woodberry's work, veined with the fires at the core of his ardent nature, will surely survive, is too rare to be discarded.

IT BELONGS TO A HIGHLY DEVELOPED race to become, in a true sense, aristocratic—a treasury of its best in practical and spiritual types, and then to disappear in the surrounding tides of men. So Athens dissolved like a pearl in the cup of the Mediterranean, and Rome in the cup of Europe, and Judaea in the cup of the Universal Communion. Though death is the law of all life, man touches this earthen fact with the wand of the spirit, and transforms it into the law of sacrifice. Man has won no victory over his environment so sublime as this, finding in his mortal sentence the true choice of the soul and in the road out of Paradise the open highway of eternal life. Races die; but the ideal of sacrifice as the highest race-destiny has seldom occurred to men, though it has been suggested both by devout Jews and by devout Irishmen as the divinely appointed organic law of the Hebrew and the Celt. In the general view of men the extinction of a race partakes of the unreasoning finality of nature.

The vital flow of life has this in common with disease—that it is self-limited; the fever runs its course, and burns away. "All thoughts, all passions, all delights," have this history. In the large arcs of social being, movements of the human spirit, however embracing and profound, obey the same law of the limitation of specific energy. Revolutions, reforms, re-births exhaust their fuel, and go out. Races are only greater units of man; for a race, as for an individual, there is a time to die; and that time, as history discloses it, is the moment of perfection. This is the largest fact in the moral order of the world; it is the centre of providence in history. In the life of the human spirit the death of the best of its achieving elements, in the moment of their consummation, is as the fading of the flower of the field or the annual fall of the leaves of the forest in the natural world; and unless this be a sacrificial death, it were wantonness and waste like the deaths of nature; but man and his works are supernatural, and raised above nature by an imperishable relation which they contain. Race-history is a perpetual celebration of the Mass. The Cross initials every page with its broad gold, and he whose eye misses that letter has lost the clue to

the meaning. I do not refer to the self-devotion of individuals, the sacred lives of the race. I speak of the involuntary element in the life of nations, or what seems such on the vast scale of social life. Always some great culture is dying to enrich the soil of new harvests, some civilization is crumbling to rubbish to be the hill of a more beautiful city, some race is spending itself that a lower and barbarous world may inherit its stored treasure-house. Although no race may consciously devote itself to the higher ends of mankind, it is the prerogative of its men of genius so to devote it; nor is any nation truly great which is not so dedicated by its warriors and statesmen, its saints and heroes, its thinkers and dreamers. A nation's poets are its true owners; and by the stroke of the pen they convey the title-deeds of its real possessions to strangers and aliens.

This dedication of the energy of a race by its men of genius to the higher ends of mankind is the sap of all the world. The spiritual life of mankind spreads, the spiritual unity of mankind grows, by this age-long surrender of privilege and power into the hands of the world's new men, and the leavening of the mass by the best that has anywhere arisen in it, which is thus brought about. The absorption of aristocracies in democracies, the dissolution of the nobler product in inferior environments, the salutary death of cultures, civilizations, breeds of men, is the strict line on which history, drawing the sundered parts of the earth slowly together, moves to that great consummation when the best that has at any time been in the world shall be the portion of every man born into it. If the old English blood, which here on this soil gave birth to a nation, spread civilization through it, and cast the orbit of its starry course in time, is destined to be thus absorbed and lost in the nation which it has formed, we should be proud and happy in such a fate; for this is to wear the seal of God's election in history. Nay, if the aristocracy of the whole white race is so to melt in a world of the coloured races of the earth, I for one should only rejoice in such a divine triumph of the sacrificial idea in history; for it would mean the humanization of mankind.

Unless this principle is strongly grasped, unless there be an imperishable relation in man and his works which they contain, and which, though it has other phases, here appears in this eternal salvage stored up in a slowly perfecting race, history through its length and breadth is a spectacle to appall and terrify the reason. The perpetual flux of time—

> Sceptres, tiaras, swords, and chains, and tomes
> Of reasoned wrong, glozed on by ignorance—

is a mere catastrophe of blood and error unless its mighty subverting and dismaying changes are related to something which does not pass away with dethroned gods, abandoned empires and repealed codes of law and morals. But in the extinction of religions, in imperial revolutions, in the bloody conflict of ideas, there is one thing found stable; it is the mind itself, growing through ages. That which in its continuity we call the human spirit, abides. Men, tribes, states disappear, but the race-mind endures. A conception of the world and an emotional response thereto constitute the life of the race-mind, and fill its consciousness with ideas and feelings, but in these there is no element of chance, contingency or frailty; they are master-ideas, master-emotions, clothed with the power of a long reign over men, and imposing themselves upon each new generation, almost with the yoke of necessity. What I designate as the race-mind—the sole thing permanent in history—is this potentiality of thought and feeling, in any age, realizing itself in states of mind and habits of action long established in the race, deeply inherited, and slowly modified. The race-mind is the epitome of the past. It contains all human energy, knowledge, experience, that survives. It is the resultant of millions of lives whose earthly power it stores in one deathless force.

This race-mind is simply formed. Life presents certain permanent aspects in the environment, which generate ways of behaviour thereto, normal and general among men. The world is a multiplicity, a harvest-field, a battle-ground; and thence arise through human contact ways of numbering, or mathematics, ways of tillage, or agriculture, ways of fighting, or military tactics and strategy, and these are incorporated in individuals as habits of life. The craftsman has the mind of his craft. Life also presents certain other permanent internal aptitudes in the soul, whence arises the mind of the artist, the inventor, the poet. But this cast of mind of the mathematician or of the painter is rather a phase of individual life. In the larger unit of the race, environment and aptitude working together in the historic life of ages develop ideas, moods and energies characteristic of the race in which they occur. In the sphere of ideas, freedom is indissolubly linked with the English, righteousness with the Hebrew; in the temperamental sphere, a signal instance is the Celtic genius—mystery, twilight, supernatural fantasy, lamentation, tragic disaster—or the Greek genius, definiteness, proportioned beauty, ordered science, philosophic principle; and, in the sphere of energy, land and gold hunger, and that strange soul-hunger —hunger to possess the souls of men—which is at the root of all propagandism, have been motive powers in many races.

Thus, in one part or another of time and place, and from causes within and without, the race, coming to its best, flowers in some creative hope, ripens in some shaping thought, glows in some resistless enthusiasm. Each of these in its own time holds an age in its grasp. They seize on men and shape them in multitudes to their will, as the wind drives the locusts; make men hideous ascetics, send them on forlorn voyages, devote them to the block and the stake, make Argonauts, Crusaders, Lollards[1] of them, fill Europe in one age with a riot of revolution and in the next with the camps of tyrannic power. These ideas, moods, energies have mysterious potency; they seem to possess an independent being; though, like all the phenomena of life-energy they are self-limited, the period of their growth, culmination and decline extends through generations and centuries; they seem less the brood of man's mind than higher powers that feed on men. They are surrounded by a cloud of witnesses—fanatics, martyrs, dupes; they doom whole peoples to glory or shame; in the undying battle of the soul they are the choosers of the slain. Though they proceed from the human spirit, they rule it; and in life they are the spiritual presences which are most closely unveiled to the apprehension, devotion and love of men.

The race-mind building itself from immemorial time out of this mystery of thought and passion, as generation after generation kneels and fights and fades, takes unerringly the best that anywhere comes to be in the world, holds to it with the cling of fate, and lets all else fall to oblivion; out of this best it has made, and still fashions, that enduring world of idea and emotion into which we are born as truly as into the natural world. It has a marvellous economy.

> One accent of the Holy Ghost
> The heedless world has never lost.

Egypt, India, Greece and Rome, Italy, the English, France, America, the Turk, the Persian, the Russian, the Japanese, the Chinese, the Negro feed its pure tradition of what excellence is possible to the race-mind, and has grown habitual in its being; and, as in the old myth, it destroys its parent, abolishing all these differences of climate, epoch and skull. The race-mind unifies the race which it preserves; that is its irresistible line of advance. It wipes out the barriers of time, lan-

[1] *Argonauts*, the heroes who sailed to barbaric Colchis with the Greek hero Jason in quest of the Golden Fleece. *Lollards*, the 14th- and 15th-century British followers of John Wycliffe, the great reformer.

guage and country. It undoes the mischief of Babel, and restores to mankind one tongue in which all things can be understood by all men. It fuses the Bibles of all nations in one wisdom and one practice. It knocks off the tribal fetters of caste and creed; and, substituting thought for blood as the bond of the world, it slowly liberates that free soul, which is one in all men and common to all mankind. To free the soul in the individual life, and to accomplish the unity of mankind—that is its work.

To share in this work is the peculiar and characteristic office of literature. This fusion of the nations of the earth, this substitution of the thought-tie for the blood-tie, this enfranchisement of the soul, is its chief function; for literature is the organ of the race-mind. That is why literature is immortal. Though man's inheritance is bequeathed in many ways—the size and shape of the skull, the physical predisposition of the body, oral tradition, monumental and artistic works, institutions—civilization ever depends in an increasing degree upon literature both for expression and tradition; and whatever other forms the race-mind may mould itself into, literature is its most universal and comprehensive form. That is why literature is the great conservator of society. It shares in the life of the race-mind, partakes of its nature, as language does of thought, corresponds to it accurately, duplicates it, is its other-self. It is through literature mainly that we know the race-mind, and come to possess it; for though the term may seem abstract, the thing is real. Men of genius are great in proportion as they share in it, and national literatures are great in proportion as they embody and express it. Brunetière, the present critic of France, has recently announced a new literary formula. He declares that there is a European literature, not the combined group of national literatures, but a single literature common to European civilization, and that national literatures in their periods of culmination, are great in proportion as they coincide for the time being with this common literature, feed it, and, one after another taking the lead, create it. The declaration is a gleam of self-consciousness in the unity of Europe. How slowly the parts of a nation recognize the integrity of their territory and the community of their interests is one of the constant lessons of history; the Greek confederation, the work of Alfred or of Bismarck, our own experience in the Revolutionary period illustrate it; so the unity of Europe is still half-obscure and dark, though Catholicism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Revolution in turn flashed this unity forth, struggling to realize itself in the common civilization. The literature of Europe is the expression of this common genius—the best that man

has dreamed or thought or done, has found or been, in Europe—now more brilliant in one capital, now in another as the life ebbs from state to state, and is renewed; for, though it fail here or there, it never ceases. This is the burning of the race-mind, now bright along the Seine, the Rhine and the Thames, as once by the Ganges and the Tiber. The true unity of literature, however, does not lie in the literature of Europe or of India or of antiquity, or in any one manifestation, but in that world-literature which is the organ of the race-mind in its entire breadth and wholeness. The new French formula is a brilliant application, novel, striking and arresting, of the old and familiar idea that civilization in its evolution in history is a single process, continuous, advancing and integral, of which nations and ages are only the successive phases. The life of the spirit in mankind is one and universal, burns with the same fires, moves to the same issues, joins in a single history; it is the race-mind realizing itself cumulatively in time, and mainly through the inheriting power of great literature.

I have developed this conception of the race-mind at some length because it is a primary idea. The nature of literature, and the perspective and interaction of particular literatures, are best comprehended in its light. I emphasize it. The world-literature, national literatures, individual men of genius, are what they are by virtue of sharing in the race-mind, appropriating it and identifying themselves with it; and what is true of them, on the great scale and in a high degree, is true also of every man who is born into the world. A man is a man by participating in the race-mind. Education is merely the process by which he enters it, avails himself of it, absorbs it. In the things of material civilization this is plain. All the callings of men, arts, crafts, trades, sciences, professions, the entire round of practical life, have a body of knowledge and method of work which are like gospel and ritual to them; apprentice, journeyman and master are the stages of their career; and if anything be added, from life to life, it is on a basis of ascertained fact, of orthodox doctrine and fixed practice. I suppose technical education is most uniform, and by definiteness of aim and economy of method is most efficient; and in the professions as well as in the arts and crafts competition places so high a premium on knowledge and skill that the mastery of all the past can teach is compulsory in a high degree. Similarly, in society, the material unities such as those which commerce, manufacturing, banking establish and spread, are soonest evident and most readily accepted; so true is this that the peace of the world is rather a matter of finance than of Christianity. These practical activities and the interests that spring out of

them lie in the sphere of material civilization; but the race-mind, positive, enduring and beneficent as it is in that sphere, is there parcelled out and individualized, and gives a particular and almost private character to man and classes of men, and it seeks a material good. There is another and spiritual sphere in which the soul which is one and the same in all men comes to self-knowledge, has its training, and achieves its mastery of the world. Essential, universal manhood is found only here; for it is here that the race-mind, by participation in which a man is a man, enfranchizes the soul and gives to it the citizenship of the world. Education in the things of the spirit is often vague in aim and may seem wasteful in method, and it is not supported by the thrust and impetus of physical need and worldly hope; but it exists in all men in some measure, for no one born in our civilization is left so savage, no savage born in the wild is left so primitive but that he holds a mental attitude, however obscure, toward nature, man and God, and has some discipline, however initial, in beauty, love and religion. These things lie in the sphere of the soul. It is, nevertheless, true that the greatest inequalities of condition exist here, and not in that part of life where good is measured by the things of fortune. The difference between the outcast and the millionaire is as nothing to that between the saint and the criminal, the fool and the knower, the boor and the poet. It is a blessing in our civilization, and one worthy of the hand of Providence, that if in material things justice be a laggard and disparities of condition be hard to remedy, the roads to church and school are public highways, free to all. This charter of free education in the life of the soul, which is the supreme opportunity of an American life, is an open door to the treasury of man's spirit. There whosoever will shall open the book of all the world, and read and ponder, and shall enter the common mind of man which is there contained and avail of its wisdom and absorb its energies into his own and become one with it in insight, power and hope, and ere he is aware shall find himself mingling with the wisest, the holiest, the loveliest, as their comrade and peer. He shall have poet and sage to sup with him, and their meal shall be the bread of life.

What, then, is the position of the youth—of any man whose infinite life lies before him—at his entrance on this education, on this attempt to become one with the mind of the race? and, to neglect the material side of life, what is the process by which he begins to live in the spirit, and not as one new-born, but even in his youth sharing in the wisdom and disciplined power of a soul that has lived through all human ages—the soul of mankind? We forget the beginnings of life; we for-

get first sensation, first action, and the unknown magic by which, as the nautilus builds its shell, we built out of these early elements this world of the impalpable blue walls, the ocean and prairie floors, and star-sown space, each one of us for ourselves. There is a thought, which I suppose is a commonplace and may be half-trivial, but it is one that took hold of me in boyhood with great tenacity, and stirred the sense of strangeness and marvel in life; the idea that all I knew or should ever know was through something that had touched my body. The ether-wave envelopes us as the ocean, and in that small surface of contact is the sphere of sensibility—of light, sound, and the rest—out of which arises the world which each one of us perceives. It seems a fantastic conception, but it is a true one. For me the idea seemed to shrink the world to the dark envelope of my own body. It served, however, to initiate me in the broader conception that the soul is the centre, and that life—the world—radiates from it into the enclosing infinite. Wordsworth, you remember, in his famous image of our infancy presents the matter differently; for him the infant began with the infinite, and boy and man lived in an ever narrowing world, a contracting prison, like that fabled one of the Inquisition, and in the end life became a thing common and finite:

> Heaven lies about us in our infancy!
> Shades of the prison-house begin to close
> Upon the growing boy,
> But he beholds the light, and whence it flows,
> He sees it in his joy:
> . . . . . .
> At length the man perceives it die away,
> And fade into the light of common day.

This was never my own conception, nor do I think it is natural to many men. On the contrary, life is an expansion. The sense of the larger world comes first, perhaps, in those unremembered years when the sky ceases to be an inverted bowl, and lifts off from the earth. The experience is fixed for me by another half-childish memory, the familiar verses of Tom Hood in which he describes his early home. You will recall the almost nursery rhymes:

> I remember, I remember
> The fir-trees dark and high;
> I used to think their slender tops
> Were close against the sky;

It was a childish ignorance,
But now 'tis little joy
To know I'm farther off from Heaven
Than when I was a boy.

Sentiment in the place of philosophy, the thought is the same as Wordsworth's, but the image is natural and true. The noblest image, however, that sets forth the spread of the world, is in that famous sonnet by an obscure poet, Blanco White, describing the first time that the sun went down in Paradise:

Mysterious night! when our first parent knew
Thee from report divine, and heard thy name,
Did he not tremble for this lovely frame,
This glorious canopy of light and blue?
Yet, 'neath the curtain of translucent dew,
Bathed in the rays of the great setting flame,
Hesperus with the host of heaven came,
And lo! creation widened in man's view.

The theory of Copernicus and the voyage of Columbus are the great historical moments of such change in the thoughts of men. As travel thus discloses the amplitude of the planet and science fills the infinite of space for the learning mind, history in its turn peoples the "dark background and abysm of time." But more marvellous than the unveiling of time and space, is that last revelation which unlocks the inward world of idea and emotion, and gives solidity to life as by a third dimension. It is this world which is the realm of imaginative literature; scarcely by any other interpreter shall a man come into knowledge of it with any adequacy; and here the subject draws to a head, for it is by the operation of literature in this regard that the race-mind takes possession of the world.

We are plunged at birth *in medias res,* as the phrase is, into the midst of things—into a world already old, of old ideas, old feelings, old experience, that has drunk to the lees the wisdom of the preacher of Ecclesiastes, and renews in millions of lives the life that has been lived a million times; a world of custom and usage, of immemorial habits, of causes prejudged, of insoluble problems, of philosophies and orthodoxies and things established; and yet, too, a world of the undiscovered. The youth awakes in this world, intellectually, in literature; and since the literature of the last age is that on which the new generation is formed, he now first comes in contact with the large life

of mankind in the literature of the last century. It is an extraordinary miscellaneous literature, varied and copious in matter, full of conflicting ideas, cardinal truths, and hazardous guesses; and for the young mind the problem of orientation—that is of finding itself, of knowing the true East, is difficult. Literature, too, has an electric stimulation, and in the first onrush of the intellectual life brings that well-known storm and stress which is the true awakening; with eager and delighted surprise the soul feels fresh sensibilities and unsuspected energies rise in its being. It is a time of shocks, discoveries, experiences that change the face of the world. Reading the poets, the youth finds new dynamos in himself. A new truth unseals a new faculty in him; a new writer unlooses a new force in him; he becomes, like Briareus,[2] hundred-handed, like Shakspere, myriad-minded. So like a miracle is the discovery of the power of life.

. . . . . .

It is obvious that what I have advanced, brings the principle of authority into a cardinal place in life, and clothes tradition with great power. It might seem that the individual in becoming one with the race-mind has only to endue himself with the past as with a garment, to take its mould with the patience of clay, and to be in the issue a recast of the past, thinking old thoughts, feeling old emotions, doing old actions, in pre-established ways. But this is to misconceive the process by which the individual effects this union; he does not take the impress of the race-mind as the wax receives the imprint of the seal. This union is an act of life, a process of energy, joy and growth, of self-expression; here learning is living, and there is no other way to know the doctrine than to do its will; so the race-mind is not copied, but is perpetually re-born in men, and the world which each one of us thus builds for himself out of his preferred capacities, memories and desires—our farmer's, engineer's, painter's world, as I have said—is his own original and unique world. There is none like it, none. Originality consists in this re-birth of the world in the young soul. This world, nevertheless, the world of each of us, is not one of wilfulness, fantasy and caprice; if, on the one hand, it is such stuff as dreams are made of, on the other it is the stuff of necessity. It has a consistency, a law and fate, of its own, which supports, wields and sustains it. Authority is no more than the recognition of and obedience to this underlying principle of being, whose will is disclosed to us in man's life so

[2] Hundred-handed giant of Greek mythology.

far as that life in its wholeness falls within our view; in knowledge of this will all wisdom consists, of its action in us all experience is woven, and in union with it all private judgment is confirmed. Authority, truly interpreted, is only another phase of that identity of the soul in all men by virtue of which society exists, and especially that intellectual state arises, that state which used to be called the republic of letters and which is the institution of the race-mind to be the centre, the home and hope of civilization in all ages—that state where the unity of mankind is accomplished in the spiritual unities of science, art and love.

To sum up these suggestions which I have thought it desirable to offer in order that the point of view taken in these lectures might, perhaps, be plain, I conceive of history as a single process in which through century after century in race after race the soul of man proceeds in a progressive comprehension of the universe and evolution of its own humanity, and passes on to each new generation its accumulated knowledge and developed energies, in their totality and without loss, at the acme of achievement. I conceive of this inheriting and bequeathing power as having its life and action in the race-mind. I conceive of literature as an organ of the race-mind, and of education as the process by which the individual enters into the race-mind, becomes more and more man, and in the spiritual life mainly by means of literature. I conceive of the body of men who thus live and work in the soul as constituting the intellectual state, that republic of letters, in which the race-mind reaches, from age to age, its maximum of knowledge and power, in men of genius and those whose lives they illumine, move and direct; the unity of mankind is the ideal end of this state, and the freeing of the soul which takes place in it is its means. I conceive of the progressive life of this state, in civilization after civilization, as a perpetual death of the best, in culture after culture, for the good of the lower, a continuing sacrifice, in the history of humanity, of man for mankind. And from this mystery, though to some it may seem only the recourse of intellectual despair, I pluck a confident faith in that imperishable relation which man and his works contain, and which though known only in the continuity of the race-mind, I am compelled to believe, has eternal reality.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

The two great projects of the mind have been the attempts (1) to understand and apply to human needs the energies of the outer physical world, and (2) to understand, enrich, and cultivate toward higher good the energies of the inner world of man's spirit. We speak of these projects today as science, theoretical and applied, and the "humanities"—especially philosophy and the arts. They cannot be rigidly divided: science has its human values, and the spirit must reach self-awareness by interaction with its physical environment. Scientists and humanists are really allies; but their tasks lead them in opposite directions, and their absorption in their great enterprises can lead them to forget their kinship and to fall into dissidence. They often differ, for example, on the relative values of their disciplines in education. Both wish to enlist able youths of each generation to continue their uncompleted tasks.

So rapidly has physical science advanced since Descartes and Newton that the study of man has sometimes borrowed its methods and even assumed its impartiality in questions of value. Social sciences, as we call them for lack of a precise term, have arisen—efforts to understand the development and behavior of men in group and mass relations and to define laws of such relations. Borrowing certain interests and methods from both humanists and scientists, the analysts of social phenomena urge the claims of their highly specialized projects.

In time of war a special immediate usefulness attaches to science and its application. Scientific training becomes an exigent necessity. The humanities, which have the obligation of weighing values, judging worth to mankind, appealing to the whole man (reason, emotion, imagination, will) in the interest of creative ideals by which men guide their lives, may fall into temporary neglect. A nation seizes its weapons hotly and, like an angry man, has time for only martial virtues. And when war ends, science resumes its objective search without inquiring what results, good or bad, may arise from its discoveries; as science, it cannot inquire into values or judge them when they arise. Again, in time of peace, as it is called, when conflict finds other weapons than arms, the chaos of social strife seems to call peremptorily for study and action. Many feel they have no leisure to be wise and learned; they must be up and doing. With such men too the wisdom and beauty of the humanities fall into regretful or impatient neglect.

But even in the heat of military or social conflict we cannot afford to neglect such wisdom and beauty. We all need them even more at such times, not only because they are sources of infinite delight and enrichment but because, if we neglect them, we only sow new chaos. If men are to build "a better world," they must rise to the level of their best achievements;

they must raise their own level by cultivation in human excellence. They cannot be wise before they have learned to love wisdom and to sit at the feet of the wise. Our outer social disorder only reflects an inner disorder, and it is useless to try to impose abstract *a priori* systems of order on inward chaos. How shall minds become more free and wise? Woodberry had great faith in the discipline of the humanities and especially in literature. He saw human history as the evolution of the race-mind (the heritage of wisdom and beauty from many cultures), literature as its chief organ, education as its assimilation and fresh application, the unity and improvement of mankind as its great end, and the freeing and enlightening of the individual as its means to this end. Only free and enlightened individuals can ever create a free society where peace and justice will reflect inner wisdom and beauty.

1. Explain "the ideal of sacrifice as the highest race-destiny." How did ancient Rome, for example, in dying, pass on the best fruit of its culture? What did it pass on? With the help of Woodberry's suggestions, illustrate further the idea of dying civilizations enriching our human heritage.

2. Explain what the author means in saying "A nation's poets are its true owners; and by the stroke of the pen they convey the title-deeds of its real possessions to strangers and aliens." Besides the poets, what other men pass on such "real possessions"? What is meant by the implication that poets do so more truly than any others? How do men of genius dedicate the energies of their race to the higher ends of mankind? Illustrate by the example of an Englishman like Shakespeare or an American like Whitman.

3. Do you think we can attain the ideal Woodberry calls "that great consummation when the best that has at any time been in the world shall be the portion of every man born into it"? Why or why not? How can this ideal be furthered? If you have read "Sweetness and Light," show why Arnold would approve of the quoted words.

4. Show how navigation, farming, or some other "practical technique" illustrates the continuing tradition of "the race-mind." Woodberry thinks spiritual attainments in character, thought, and art are more imporant than the "practical techniques." Why do you agree or disagree? What do you understand Woodberry to mean by associating the "gift" of freedom with the English and that of "righteousness" with the Hebrews?

5. Families pass on inherited traits, heirlooms, property, knowledge, and traditions: how is mankind only a larger family in its dependence on heritage for unity and preservation? Explain the contention that, in crafts, trades, professions, the race-mind is "parceled out" and devoted to limited material ends whereas we find unity only in spiritual traditions.

6. How can initiation into the "race-mind" by education "liberate the individual soul"? From what and into what is it liberated?

7. Aside from literature, what important vehicles of man's inheritance

can you name? Why is or is not literature the most universal and comprehensive of them?

8. Woodberry says that men of genius are great or less great according to how fully they share in the race-mind and pass on the contributions of their time and people. Test the truth of his belief by applying it, for instance, to one of the Biblical writers, Whitman, Poe, or Shakespeare.

9. Explain "Originality consists in the rebirth of the world in the young soul." If you have read "The American Scholar," show why Emerson would agree.

10. Show evidences of rich imagery and use of poetic analogy in Woodberry's prose. Explain the figures of the first two paragraphs. Give other examples of the most common kinds of figure of speech found in the essay. From what kinds of experience and knowledge does the author draw most of his figures? Compare Emerson or Carlyle in this respect if you have read either.

11. Are Woodberry's sentences mainly loose or periodic? Does he use balance and parallelism frequently or infrequently? Give examples. Notice how short, pithy sentences are contrasted with the usual longer cadences. Single out several persuasively eloquent passages and show in them examples of highly connotative and imaginative language, arresting figures of speech, concrete expression of abstract ideas, and amplitude and surge of rhythm.

Humanism and the Belief in Man

ARCHIBALD MacLEISH

(For biography see "The American Cause.")

I

THE END OF THE WAR will present two great questions—a question of government for the governors and a question of education for the teachers. There will be other questions as well. There will be bankers' questions for the bankers, and food questions for the farmers, and traders' questions for the traders, and military questions for the generals and the admirals. But the two great questions will be the questions of government and of education.

How do you govern in the new world with its invisible frontiers? And how do you educate the new people with their new possibilities of creation and destruction?

These two questions are serious. We can perhaps get along if the bankers fail to find an answer to the question of money—or refuse to accept the answer someone else finds for them. We can probably get along somehow whether or not the farmers find an answer to the question of food, and whether or not the traders learn how to trade, and the generals and admirals how to police the isthmuses and the oceans and the islands. But unless the governors—which means those who are governed as well—and the teachers—which means also those who are taught—can find out how to govern the new world and how to educate men and women to live in it, we are quite literally lost. Lost not in rhetoric: lost in truth.

We used to say twenty-five years ago that the world couldn't survive another war. We thought we were making speeches. We know now that we were stating fact. The only parts of the world which will survive this war, except as ruins and fragments and remains, will be the parts of the world over which the war has not been fought. Next time, as the Nazis have obligingly shown us, there will be no margins. Planes which flew a few hundred miles with a few pounds of explo-

Atlantic Monthly, Nov., 1944; by permission of publisher and author. First presented to faculty, students, and townspeople at Madison, seat of the University of Wisconsin, where the author had been asked to conduct a three-day seminar.

sives in 1918 now fly thousands of miles with tons of explosives. Robot projectiles which now carry a ton of explosives a couple of hundred miles will increase both range and loads in much the same way.

The lesson we have learned over the last few years is the lesson that "there are no neutrals in this war." In the next war,—if there is a next war,—the lesson we shall learn will be the lesson that there is no part of the world which is not a battlefield. Which means, not as a figure of speech but as a statement of fact, that what we understand by "the world" will not survive that war. Which means, in turn, that if there is another war our world is lost. Which means, finally, that we have no future worth thinking about unless we can learn, and learn quickly, to govern the world in such a way, and to educate its people in such a way, that another war will not occur.

When anyone talks about the crisis of humanism at the war's end, he is talking, if he is serious, about the answer humanism has to give, or ought to have to give, or ought to be allowed to have to give, to these two inescapable and desperate questions of government and education. He is not talking, that is to say, about the sad plight of the classics in the modern college, or the overemphasis on science in the current curriculum, or the lamentable discovery, in universities which had previously terminated all literature with the last rock on Land's End, that an American literature also exists. He is not talking, that is to say, in terms of academic politics or academic prestige or his own future as a professor. Above all, he is not talking about the effect of the Army training program on the academic economic system.

He is talking about the most urgent and most critical decisions to be taken in his time. And he is saying that a certain approach to these problems, a certain tradition of thought, a certain discipline, has something of importance to offer to their solution. He is saying that the tendency of the practical men among his contemporaries to exclude that approach and that discipline is dangerous. He is saying that it is dangerous, not to him and his academic fellows only, but to the practical men themselves—and to the world they share with us.

The serious question in all this discussion of the humanities, in other words, is the question whether the humanists and their discipline have, in fact, anything to offer to the solution of the two great moral and intellectual and political problems we must solve or perish. If they have not, if the humanists can claim no more than a decorative function in the preparation of young men for dinners-in-hall, then their disputes with their academic rivals, however brilliantly managed and however learnedly expressed, are hardly worth the present atten-

tion of living men. For one thing, living men have other and more urgent business to attend to. For another, they have every reason to remark that a philosophy of the education and life of man which has nothing to say to mankind about its life and education at the most critical moment in its recorded history is not a philosophy of man at all but a dilettantism with a pretentious name.

Both problems clearly fall within the field of humanist concern. Certainly the question of the role of education in the crisis of our time is a question on which the humanists can be expected to speak and by which they should expect to be judged. Humanism is at bottom a theory of the education proper to man and cannot therefore avoid judgment upon its position in the most solemn examination of educational theory the modern world has been obliged to undertake. On the contrary, humanism might well protest, and bitterly protest, its exclusion from that great assize.

The same thing is true, or so it seems to me, of the problem of government. Humanists, I realize, have not claimed the right in recent years to speak with authority of the art of government. Some of them may even decline that right today. Some of them, thinking of humanism as though it were something in a university catalogue, may perhaps refuse to hold opinions on the art of government—on the ground that government is taught in the courses on political science and that the courses on political science are not usually given in the departments of humanities.

Others, taking a less curricular view, might conceivably renounce all right to be heard on the issue of government, and might decline to be judged by their contribution to its solution, on the ground that humanism is concerned with men solely as individuals and not with men in their relation to each other, or on the ground that humanism looks inward, not outward, or on the ground that humanism looks backward, not forward.

Philosophers of the ancient world would consider these to be strange limitations, I submit, upon the spiritual jurisdiction of a school which concerns itself with *humanitas*—with those things in man which are most manlike. Aulus Gellius defined *humanitas* by saying that earnest students of the liberal arts are most highly humanized because the knowledge they pursue is "granted to man alone of all the animals." Of the various forms of knowledge granted to man alone of all the animals, knowledge of the art of government is surely not the least.

Nor was it the least regarded in the past. It was not believed in Athens and Rome that the best education for man was an education

unrelated to his practice of the art of government. On the contrary, it was assumed that a philosophy which thought in terms of the whole man, of the man in whom the manlike qualities were most developed, must necessarily have views not only on the training of those qualities but upon their exercise as well, and above all upon their noblest exercise—which would have included, in that time and in those cities, their exercise in government.

2

But there are other reasons than reasons of logic and history for the extension of humanistic jurisdiction, and therefore of humanistic responsibility, to the art of government. There are reasons of a practical nature. The humanistic renunciation of the public world has been happy neither for the public world nor for humanism. Humanism has become pallid with the pallor of all things grown within ivory walls; and government, once considered a noble art, has become at best a kind of profession and at worst a business. The recent uproar about Henry Wallace[1] makes the point with an unintentional but appalling pertinence. Henry Wallace, said a characteristic article by one of the best-known of American journalists, is an exceptionally fine human being. He has a feeling for the tendency of things to come. But he is not at home and at ease in "the real world" and he is therefore, under the circumstances of the election, unacceptable for the Vice-presidency.

Whatever may be said of the opinion of Henry Wallace, the view of statesmanship there expressed is one a humanist might challenge and, in my opinion, should. Indeed both humanism and statesmanship would be healthier today if the humanists had challenged the businessman's view of the art of government before it produced the generations of leaders "at home in the real world" which conducted Western civilization through so much of the nineteenth century and the twentieth to the situation in which we find ourselves today. It would be difficult to prove that there would have been more Lincolns and Jeffersons if the humanists had not forsaken the public world, but it must be obvious that there would almost certainly have been fewer Coolidges and Tafts.

I propose to assume, therefore, and for the purposes of this discussion, that humanism can be expected to supply an answer to the two critical questions of how to govern and how to teach. It remains there-

[1] I.e., the sharp battle in the 1944 Democratic Convention which resulted in nomination of Harry S. Truman for the vice-presidency instead of renomination of Mr. Wallace.

fore to consider whether the answer humanism can be expected to offer is or is not entitled to a better hearing than it has had.

But that consideration turns, of course, upon the nature of the humanist answer. There are almost as many definitions of humanism and the humanities as there are men who have written them. If one assumes, for example, that the humanities are what Webster calls "the branches of polite learning," especially belles-lettres and the ancient classics, and that humanism is merely a scholarly devotion to these studies, there will be some difficulty in persuading a tortured world that humanism and the humanities have much to say to it.

Polite learning, it will be objected, is all very well for a polite age, and knowledge of the ancient classics and of beautiful letters is a charming embellishment in a serene and spacious time; but for us, bewildered and frightened in a chaotic and savage world in which all the landmarks are lost and all the assurances washed away, the book beneath the classic bough is a mockery and a delusion. We have First Things to learn again before we can learn Last Things. We must learn again how to survive—how to keep the peace; how to restrain the wild beasts and the violence. Keep your culture, the world might well say, until we can build a quiet room to house it in—until we can be certain that the house of culture will stand at least for a generation at a time; until the skies are quiet again and a place for stars, not for the most terrible and insensate death and the swiftest destruction.

And there will be much the same objection if you define your humanist as the perfect type of intellectual aristocrat, living a life of reflection and criticism above the battle and the common dust. You will be told that such a man, if he does not make himself a prig in the process, may well become an ornament in a world which has room for ornaments, but that we, who must buttress and rebuild our lives before chaos engulfs them, have no time to think of such luxuries as a natural aristocracy of learning and of taste.

So again if you adopt the definition of humanism which describes it as a form of intellectual discipline—the discipline of the intellect for its own sake rather than for the sake of proficiency in some art, or craft, or profession. Rude persons will tell you that to cultivate the mind for its own sake one must first have leisure, and that to have leisure one must be able to foretell the time, and that in our world a man cannot foretell the time since the time is already past and nothing is sure and each day is more dangerous than the last and a man can only prepare himself for disaster or survival.

It will be the same, too, even if you take the more generous defini-

tion in which humanism appears as that method of education and that practice of life of which the purpose is to free the faculties of men for their fullest exercise and their finest development. To free the faculties of men for their fullest exercise is a noble purpose. But its end, as someone will be unkind enough to point out, is not a free man,—a man committed to freedom as well as possessed of it,—but rather a *freed* man—a man freed of all commitments, including the commitment to freedom itself.

3

Such an end, however enchanting it may seem in a peaceful time when men can afford the after-dinner sport of questioning everything and giving themselves to nothing, has an irresponsible and even a frivolous look to a generation which has been compelled to think of freedom as something you were either prepared to die for or prepared to lose. To be free of every prejudice, including the prejudice of freedom, may make a man superior, but it can hardly endear him, for the moment at least, to those who have offered their lives precisely to defend the prejudice that freedom has a supreme and absolute worth. Moral eclecticism looks curiously out of place among the dead wreaths and the fading cotton flags of the soldiers' cemeteries. It is particularly out of place when the certainty of the soldier's grave that freedom was worth dying for is the only certainty men have to hold to. To offer to teach the men of such a generation how to avoid the pitfalls of prejudice and excessive belief is indeed to offer stones to those who starve for bread.

The fact is that the humanism of these various definitions is a humanism which finds its reason in the fifteenth century rather than our own—in the fifteenth century and in those later centuries in which, as in the fifteenth, the sickness of the soul was dogma and superstition. Humanism considered as an intellectual discipline-for-discipline's-sake, or as a regimen to free the mind of prejudice and infatuation, or as an aristocratic training of the taste, or as a cult of the classic past, or as the appreciation of fine arts and beautiful letters, is a prime specific for such ills as bigotry and puritanism and jesuitry and vulgarity and Victorianism and the complacency of the bourgeois mind. But humanism so conceived has little if anything to say to a time in which the spiritual sickness is not excess of belief but lack of belief. And ours, if we understand the ills we suffer from, is such a time.

We have valued liberty enough to fight for it, and we know very well what enemy we detest, but the affirmative cause, not only of the

war but of our lives, escapes us. When we debate, as we have debated endlessly, the question of what we are fighting for, we have sometimes thought it was what we are living for we needed most to know. The weakness is not in the time, we think, but in ourselves. We have seen whole peoples deliver their lives and purposes and wills to tyrants they themselves have invented out of a loud voice and a blathering mouth and a ridiculous uniform to satisfy the hunger of their fear. We have seen others who cried out for a great conversion of the world, a vast revival, a wind from beyond the planet and the stars, to fill us in spite of ourselves, and without our effort, by some miracle of faith, like the miracle they imagine to have happened when Christianity first took the world, or when the religion of the Prophet took it.

Everywhere in our time there are the signs and indications of a passion to believe, a passion to escape from the sense of human inadequacy which spreads and deepens as science and the mechanical arts disclose the enormous scale and the terrible potentialities of a universe vaster and more dangerous than men, before our generation, had imagined. The natural sciences open fissures in the skin of the earth and the cover of the sky which lead beyond human meaning. The specialists press their narrow drills of research outward and away from the human center of experience. The libraries overflow with a flood of printed pages, and knowledge has become too vast for men to know.

The world, we say to ourselves, is too large for us, too difficult to understand, too savage to restrain, too swift to master. It is no longer a world to be measured in distance by a man's foot, or in time by a man's sleeping and waking, or in danger by a man's strength or an animal's. It is a world beyond the capacity of men to control—a world that needs gods or men like gods. And so we long for the men like gods, or for the gods, to believe in.

Humanists may regret this hunger to believe, but they will be foolish, notwithstanding, if they ignore the longing of their generation; and worse than foolish if they do not see the significance of that longing to themselves and to their cause. For the meaning of our longing for belief is this: that we have lost our sense of the place of man in the universe.

It is to a generation which has lost this sense that the humanists now must offer what they have to teach. If they do not understand the significance of that fact to the philosophy they protest; if they persist in declaring that what they have to teach is a method only, a gymnastic, or at the best an antidote, a cleansing salt, an antiseptic;

if they are unwilling to turn their questions into answers for a time that needs their answers—then they have themselves to thank, and not the blunders of the Army and the Navy, or the blindness of their colleagues in the universities, for the indifference of which they now complain.

4

For there is a definition of humanism by which humanism becomes a belief in the one thing in which man has greatest need now to believe—himself, and the dignity and importance of the place he fills in the world he lives in. There is a definition of humanism by which humanism becomes precisely the belief of man in his own dignity, in his essential worth as a man, in what Ralph Barton Perry calls "his characteristic perfection": a belief not in the potentiality of man, but in the actuality of man; a belief not in the classic perfection of the beautiful letters men have written in the distant past, but in the human perfection of the men who wrote those letters and of others like them, whether writers or others than writers, and whether living in the past or in the present or not yet born; a belief not in the thing a man may become if he reads the right books and develops the right tastes and undergoes the right discipline, but a belief in the thing he is.

No one has put this better than Professor Perry in his superb *Definition of the Humanities.* "The reference to man in the context of the so-called 'humanities,' " he says, "is . . . not descriptive or apologetic, but eulogistic; not 'human—all too human,' or 'only human,' but human in the sense in which one deems it highest praise to be called 'a man.' " The answer humanism has it in its power to make to the two great questions, how to govern and how to teach, is the answer of belief in man, "in the sense in which one deems it highest praise to be called 'a man.' " If the world can be taught to believe in the worth of man, in the dignity of man, in the "characteristic perfection" of man, it can be taught not only to survive but to live. If the world can be governed in belief in the worth of man, in the dignity of man, it can be governed in peace.

These propositions need no proof. They speak for themselves. If government throughout the world were directed by a convinced belief in the dignity of man as man, in the worth of man as man, so that decisions of government were everywhere made in consonance with that belief and in furtherance of it, no one can doubt that the world would be well governed and that peace would be as nearly certain as peace can be in a variable universe. It is lack of faith in the

essential dignity and worth of man which corrupts and weakens democratic governments, substituting for a government by the people in the people's interest, which is peace, a government of rulers in the rulers' interest—which may be war. It is doubt of the dignity and worth of man which opens the road to the tyrannies and dictatorships which have no choice but war. It is cynical contempt for the worth and dignity of man which makes the wars of the dictators wars of slavery and subjugation.

If the fundamental proposition upon which the government of the world was based were the proposition that man, because he is man, and in his essential quality as man, has worth and value which governments exist to serve and to protect, regardless of race and regardless of color or religion, there would be little room for the play of international politics which, under color of realism or under color of necessity, puts power first or oil first or gold first, and men second or nowhere, preparing thus for the wars of power or of oil or gold. If the first business of government everywhere were man, the whole man of the humanists; if the first object of government everywhere were the good of man, man "in the sense in which one deems it highest praise to be called 'a man' "; if the first principle of government everywhere were the principle that government exists for man and not man for government, there would be no place for the governments of which the first business is business, or for the governments of which the first object is economic advantage, or for the governments of which the first principle is power.

But to govern in this way it is necessary first of all to believe, and not merely to declare that one believes, in the fundamental worth and value of man and to practice that belief and never to cease to practice it. It is necessary to believe in man, not only as the Christians believe in man, out of pity, or as the democrats believe in man, out of loyalty, but also as the Greeks believed in man, out of pride.

5

The same thing is true of the question how to teach. If education were informed with a belief in the dignity and worth of man; if the purpose of education were an understanding not only of the weaknesses of man and the sicknesses of man and the failures of man but of the essential nobility of man also, of his "characteristic perfection," men would be able again to occupy their lives and to live in the world as the Greeks lived in it, free of the bewilderment and frustration which has sent this generation, like the Gadarene swine, squealing and

stumbling and drunk with the longing for immolation, to hurl themselves into the abysses of the sea.

If science were taught, not as something external to man, something belittling of man, but as one of the greatest of the creations of the human spirit; if economics were taught not as a structure of deterministic laws superior to man and controlling his conduct, but as one of the many mirrors man has constructed to observe the things he does; if history and descriptive literature were taught not as peepholes through which the unworthy truth about mankind may be observed but as expressions of man's unique ability and willingness to see and judge himself; if belief in man and in his dignity and worth became the controlling principle of education, so that the people of the world were taught to respect the common principle of humanity in others and in themselves, and to believe that their lives would be shaped and their future determined not by some law of economics, or by some formula of science, or by some regimen of the subconscious, but by their own wills and on their own responsibility—if these things could be accomplished, who will doubt that the sense of irresponsibility and frustration which has driven so many millions of our contemporaries down the blind steep of slavery into war could be corrected?

The task education must accomplish, if free societies are to continue to exist, is the re-creation of the sense of individual responsibility—which means the re-establishment of the belief of men in man. Fascism is only another name for the sickness and desperation which overcome a society when it loses its sense of responsibility for its own life and surrenders its will to a tyrant it, and it alone, has invented. But the sense of responsibility in a nation is a sense of responsibility in the individuals who compose that nation, for the sense of responsibility is always a charge upon the individual conscience and vanishes when many share it. And to re-create the sense of individual responsibility it is necessary to restore the belief of men in man—the belief that man can direct his destiny if he will.

It is impossible to charge the consciences of men with responsibility for the world they live in without convincing them that they can act upon their world—that the power to decide and act is theirs. No one knew that better than Abraham Lincoln, who knew many things about the human soul. When it became necessary for him, in the terrible December of 1862, to drive home to the Congress a sense of its responsibility, he used these words: "Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this Administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance

can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. . . . We—even we here—hold the power and bear the responsibility."

What education in the free countries must drive home, if the free countries are to survive, is the conviction that we—even we here—hold the power and bear the responsibility. The task is in part a task beyond the power of the schools as such, for the sense of individual responsibility and power involves a sense of individual participation, and a sense of individual participation is only possible in a society in which individuals can make themselves felt directly and not through agglomerations of money or people. There must be social changes as well as educational changes. But the educational changes come first. Not until men believe that the responsibility can be theirs to bear, and therefore should be theirs to bear, will they make it theirs. To teach men to believe in themselves therefore is to teach them responsibility and so to assure their freedom.

6

These, as I understand humanism, are the answers the humanists have it in their power to give to their time and to the questions their time has asked of them. They are answers which seem to me to be true and to dispose, once and for all, of the question whether humanism has anything to say to the generation to which we belong. Any school, any philosophy, which can go as close to the root of the essential sickness of our time has a right to be heard, and may claim that right, and may denounce fairly and justly those who deprive it of that right, pretending that other points of view are more practical and therefore more important.

But these answers are not the answers, as I read the record, which the humanists—all the humanists at least—are willing to give. On the contrary, many humanists would reject them, and reject them for a reason which goes very deep. They would reject them because the dignity of man in which they believe is not the dignity implicit in these answers—is not, that is to say, a dignity which men possess because they are men, but only a dignity which men may earn by undergoing certain disciplines and acquiring certain characteristics.

Man, to these humanists, is not born with worth, but may acquire worth. Until he has earned it he has no right or reason to believe in himself, nor should a belief in man determine the attitude in which he is to be ruled. Humanism to these humanists, in other words, is not a democratic doctrine on which a practice of self-government can

be founded, but an aristocratic doctrine which, because its concern is inward, has little to say of government of any kind. It is, if anything, a doctrine opposed to democracy and to theories of the universal worth of man, because excellence, not equality, is its goal and purpose.

It would be a mistake to dismiss these humanists as dwellers in towers, or their definitions as definitions of refuge. The passion for excellence can be a sword as well as a sanctuary. Committed to the love of the arts and the great books and the monuments of unaging intellect, as Yeats so wonderfully called them, and the courtesies and graces and perceptions of a civilized and generous life, the worshipers of excellence have waged war, and noble war, against an increasing vulgarity which has won its greatest triumphs in our time, having found the mechanical means at last to intrude its coarseness into every hour, however private, and every chamber, however secret, of our lives.

Those to whom humanism is the worship of excellence do not admit, as they look around them in the streets and trains and hotel lobbies of our world, that all men have dignity and worth. They do not believe, as they look back across the centuries to the world they imagine to have existed in Athens and in Rome, that all men are able to govern themselves or should be allowed to. They do not agree, as they face the crisis of our time, that freedom is the answer to everything. They do not necessarily hold with public freedom. The freedom they seek is inward in the large and lofty world of enlightened intellect where learning paints the various landscape and a trained and delicate taste selects the road. That there must be peace and quiet outside the mind, if a man is to journey within it, they readily admit. But the peace without, they say, is not their business.

7

It is understandable enough that men should love what these men love, and hate what they hate. Their ideal of the truly civilized man is in every way admirable. Their contempt for a world in which taste is determined in advertising agencies, and intelligence is measured by the answers children give to questions on the air, is a contempt which later generations of Americans will not find strange. But what is not understandable is their choice of the word humanism to describe their inward and selective life. Humanism as a word cannot cut itself off from its root or forget its derivation. Humanism, to deserve the *humanitas* from which it comes, must incorporate some notion of things appropriate to every man as man—things worthy of man in every man.

It must incorporate, that is to say, some notion of a universal dignity which men possess as men and by virtue of their manhood. The dignity of man upon which a philosophy of man, a school devoted to man, is based cannot be a rare and sought-for attribute which only the school can teach man to acquire and only the philosophy aid man to deserve. You do not construct out of the airy goal at which you hope to arrive the solid ground from which you depart. You do not derive the dignity of man on which your philosophy is founded from the dignity which those few who practice your philosophy can claim to possess. The dignity of man is either here and now or it is never. It is either in mankind or it is nowhere.

One can no more make an aristocracy of human dignity than one can make an aristocracy of human love or human curiosity, or any other fundamental human characteristic. Some men will develop their manlike qualities farther than others. Some will be more learned, have surer taste, livelier imagination, greater gentility—will be, in brief, more civilized than others. But whatever the degree of their development, the qualities with which the true humanist is concerned are the manlike qualities—the qualities which men possess because they are men; the qualities, therefore, which all men possess to one degree or another. It is man whom the humanist values, and man is in all men—*is* all men.

To limit humanism, therefore,—to put a narrower construction upon it than this,—is quite literally to deprive it of its fundamental meaning. It is as though a select association of superior and cultivated people were to call themselves the association of mankind. The word mankind, in such a context, would have an ironic meaning or have none at all. So humanism, if its concern is not man, and therefore all men, has only an ironic meaning or has none. But founded on the universal human basis which its root implies, the name becomes a noble and intelligible word with meanings which our time needs more than any others.

This war is a war against those who, in contempt of man and in despair of man's power to direct his life, have surrendered their lives into the hands of tyrants they themselves have created. It is a war against the philosophy of contempt for man and despair of his future which those who have surrendered their lives have invented to justify themselves, or have accepted from their masters. It is a war therefore in which the issue is, in last analysis, the issue of man—of the concept of man which is to shape and control our time; of the idea of man which governments are to reflect and societies to mirror.

We, on our side, have found it easy to put our cause into negative words, into words of resistance. We are opposed to the philosophy of contempt for man and to those who accept that philosophy: we have seen what it does to those who practice it and to those upon whom it is practiced also. But we have not found it easy to put our cause into the affirmative words of our own purpose. And for this reason: that the affirmative statement of our cause is a declaration of belief in man, and we have not been altogether ready and willing to make that declaration, since we too have felt the winds of fear and doubt which turned our enemies to disbelievers. More than anything else, we need a rebirth of belief in ourselves as men. If humanism will make itself the instrument of that renaissance of man, its place, not only in the universities but in the world, is sure. For if it will make itself that instrument it will give our time its cause.

STUDY INTRODUCTION

"Yes," you may be saying, "I can see that studying the 'humanities,' literature and philosophy and history and all that, is likely to make me a finer, probably a happier, person. But in these days isn't it rather like climbing into an ivory tower? How is it going to help clean up the mess the war has made? Is it going to help keep the peace? Why not study things that will make me a more useful citizen?" If you have had thoughts like these, this essay is aimed at you.

For Mr. MacLeish picks up where Emerson, Newman, and Woodberry leave off, and carries the argument straight through to the future. He reminds us that the word *humanities* (i.e., the studies forming the core of a liberal education) comes from *homo* meaning *man,* that humanism therefore is in essence the study of man in all that lifts him above the nonhuman. And he argues that our bewildered world needs nothing so much as to believe in man, that only a deep understanding of man and a conviction of his worth can produce either the education or the government that will save us. If he is right, then nothing can be more important or less escapist than a liberal education.

For a liberal education is an introduction to the rich heritage of our race. How rich that heritage is we never dream if we focus exclusively on the present, or see in the past only its miseries, its ignorance, its wars. No other creature than man has so exalted living experience: carved it in stone, abstracted its essence in music and poetry, recorded it in history, interpreted it in science and philosophy; laughed at it in comedy, triumphed over it in tragedy; reached constantly through and beyond it, probing for beauty and truth. The record is there, the treasure is there.

We have only to appropriate the beauty and wisdom, making them ours and our world's; to study—and avoid—the failures. Will not the humanities thus nurture belief in ourselves as men and women, and with it a heightened sense of our individual responsibility to keep faith with ourselves and the world?

If they will, a liberal education will clearly make us not only finer and happier individuals, but also more useful citizens.

1. What, according to MacLeish, are the two overwhelmingly important questions that must be answered by our generation? What does he mean by saying that if we fail to answer them we are "quite literally lost"? Muster evidence to show why you agree or disagree with this assertion. What developments since this essay was written (in 1944) make the possibility of a third world war even more appalling? What, in MacLeish's view, is—or should be—meant by the phrase "the crisis of humanism"? What are some of the things he says it should *not* mean? Explain (a) why he believes that both education and government are in the field of the humanities, and (b) why you agree or disagree.

2. Describe the four types of humanist who cannot, if MacLeish is right, give us the answer to our two great questions. What value, if any, do you think each type has in itself (whether or not it can save our world)? Why is the extreme intellectual tolerance of the fourth type (described at the end of section 2 and the beginning of section 3) offensive to many people in these times? (This, incidentally, is the type of aloof and disillusioned intellectual reproached in Carl Becker's "What We Didn't Know Hurt Us a Lot.")

3. Why, in MacLeish's opinion, are the interpretations of humanism discussed in question-group 2 more suited to earlier generations than to ours? What developments in science and world events have tended to make us lose our "sense of the place of man in the universe"? From your own thinking and observation, argue for or against the proposition that this generation is seeking desperately to regain faith in the dignity of the human individual.

4. What is MacLeish's definition of humanism, designed to meet this contemporary need? If you have read one or more of the essays by Ralph Barton Perry in this book, relate the passage quoted by MacLeish to Perry's thought insofar as you know it. What is meant by man's "characteristic perfection"?

5. Why does MacLeish believe that if we were convinced of the dignity of man we could answer the question how to govern? how to teach? (Remember that, as he says at the beginning of the essay, the task of the teachers is also the task of the taught.) Show how such a conviction might affect branches of the college curriculum besides the social sciences: how, for example, might it increase the study of the arts? our appreciation of the accomplishment of the artist? our interest in the evil and the good

he portrays? Would you say that you yourself and your instructors are more inclined to be appreciative of or cynical about human achievement?

6. Even though, as MacLeish interprets *humanism,* the word signifies not so much content of studies as attitude toward whatever is studied, show why it is nevertheless difficult to foster a belief in man's dignity unless the "humanities" are given due weight in the curriculum.

7. How would an education permeated with belief in man foster the development of individual responsibility? How does Lincoln's "we cannot escape history" apply to us?

8. Show why humanism conceived as "the worship of excellence" is aristocratic; as the exaltation of humanity, democratic. How, if at all, can the two be combined? If you have read other essays in this section (by Emerson, Newman, Woodberry) show how, as humanists, their authors would seem aristocratic, or democratic, or both, from MacLeish's point of view. Why are you willing or unwilling to accept MacLeish's conclusion that humanism interpreted as a proud belief in man can give us (in war and in peace) our "cause"?

9. If you have read MacLeish's "The American Cause," test how well the questions in group 5 of the study material for that essay apply to this one. Show whether or not the two essays could be recognized as being by the same author.