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PSYCHOLOGY AND WORLD ORDER

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INTRODUCTION

THE full title of this book should be: "The Psychology of Law and Order in the World." In it "psychology" means the study of behaviour and motive; that is, what people do, and why they do it. And, while "behaviour" just means behaviour, "motive" includes two quite different things—what people think they want, and what they want but don't think much about, that is, "conscious" and "unconscious" motive. By "Order" I mean a harmonious community life, freed of the violence of anarchy and war. What I mean by "Law" I shall have to tell you as we go along. But it is in my view the only possible way to keep the order.

This book is an essay, an attempt to show that the study of political psychology is worth the consideration of a voter, and also of a statesman. It hopes to be authoritative enough in its application of psychological principles to politics for the reader to be able to believe it and refer to its statements as political occasions arise. It will be controversial in places. It will have made up its mind over one or two important psychological matters about which other people will go on arguing for a long time to come. It thinks that it has a few new things to say to most of its readers and a number of old things to say in a new way and with a new emphasis. The newest thing about the essential argument is probably just a new confidence that these things are the right things and that they need saying now. Some of them positively need shouting in the 1940's and indeed on until they can be said quietly again in the better literary style of that more leisurely and cultured age of comparative reason which we still hope lies ahead of us.

CHAPTER ONE

WHAT WE WANT AND WHAT WE GET—ENTER PSYCHOLOGY

1. *The paradox.* 2. *Economic causes and human emotion.* 3. *Wherein then lies our frustration? (a) Democracy during the Peace. (b) Disarmament deferred. (c) The Abyssinian "protest".* 4. *Is there something wrong with ourselves?* 5. *Two ways of looking at things.*

§ 1. *The paradox*

A FEW years ago the new Führer across the Channel was promising a stronger, happier Germany in a reign of a thousand years. And, under the inspiration of his words, tens of thousands of devoted Germans, men and women, set to work with a new-kindled enthusiasm to achieve, through the medium of a very moderate and halting state socialism, a new era of happiness for men and women. In the end some 60 million Germans more or less enthusiastically followed them. To-day hundreds of thousands of those Germans are dead, millions are suffering bereavement, mental anguish and physical disability and deterioration, tens of millions find themselves in utter disillusionment, with no better alternatives than to go on assisting in the smashing up of civilization or to throw it all up and start, doubtful and thoughtful, again.

A few years before that another new Leader sprang from the people on our side of the Channel. He promised the dawn of a better day and homes fit for our heroes to live in. Five million voters out of nine and a half supported him and sent to Parliament 472 members with which he could face an Opposition of 130. Seldom in history had the common people of England shown such earnest determination as was mustered behind him and his American colleague in

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their programme for a better world from 1918 onwards. It hardly proved a joint programme when it reached Versailles. But history shows its sponsors as trying (quite hard at times) to make a decent peace for Europe. And the cleavage between their programmes was nothing to the break-up of the ideal for which they had stood when, faced with clamorous reality, that ideal became replaced by other sentiments. It broke up in various degrees in all our minds. Once a year for twenty years we met again, those millions of us who failed in 1919. And for two minutes we renewed our vow of November 1918. We allowed the spirits of our dead to rise within us; we soothed them with our firm sweet reassurance of "Never again". And then we let their message go to sleep again in our minds. It never breathed upon the Reparations Conferences of the '20's or the monetary conferences, the economic conferences, or the Disarmament Conference of the '30's. Just once a year there was that spirit abroad in our land whose breath could have broken all those icy barriers between cold men at warm Geneva, if generous nation could have spoken to grateful nation and proud peoples had begun to show the virtue of their pride instead of its curse. But we let "tranquillity" follow "homes for heroes", and "the man you could trust" followed that. Before he had finished his pipe the sands were running out

The author of this book is 44. Who among his contemporaries, British or foreign, can remember a popular ideal, a thing the mass of men wanted for their own betterment or to set the world to rights, *ever* being realized? Why was that? You were defeated at the polls? Remember when you were successful! Your government was overcome by a *coup d'état*? Go back before that! Your ideals were frustrated by foreign enemies? Just how did that come about? You were deceived by unscrupulous politicians? Well, that is a point worth considering, *Were* you? And why?

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§ 2. *Economic causes and human emotion*

Some people point to economics and say they caused the ills of our time. By themselves, never: always and only through the values put upon them by our minds.

In the old era in Europe before 1914 it was not the real commercial rivalry between England and Germany that mattered. That probably affected directly a few thousand not very influential people. What mattered politically was that millions of Englishmen *thought* that Germany was rivalling England, just as millions of Germans thought that Germany was being encircled by England, France and Russia. Those thoughts grew in receptive emotional soils, and that was why they became political forces and contributed a very great deal to cause the First World War.

Even in the chaotic aftermath of the War, with its slide towards anarchy in Central Europe, economic events were never final causes. Many other results could have followed from such "causes". One obvious result would have been to organize Europe economically then and there. It could have been done. The brains that gave Germany her economy of 1933-39, or England hers of 1939-44, could have tackled the feeding and industrial revival of Europe in 1920 or 1932, just as they could have solved British unemployment in 1931, *if the will to do so had been there*.

Attitude of mind thus matters more than economic forces in causing events to happen, and so we must always look beyond those forces to men's interest in them and interpretation of them. For instance, the real function of Thyssen & Co in the Nazi Revolution was not that their money automatically made it a success. What Thyssen did was, first, to think Hitler worth backing, then to provide him with bread and butter for himself, flags and pamphlets for his friends, the hire of halls for that compelling voice, all until the new enthusiasm could influence enough ordinary Germans (in the political atmosphere of 1932) to give the

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Nazis half the seats in the Reichstag and Hitler himself a sporting chance for the Reichs-Chancellorship. Hitler then got his people with a mixture of "We can conquer unemployment", and "Germany, awake!", just as Lloyd George had got us with "Old Age Pensions" and the dawn of a better day.

Idealistic and economic motives mix in men's minds; but of the two factors, the emotional and the material, it is the second that is the more controllable. Nothing has been made clearer by five years of modern warfare than that economic forces are controlled comparatively easily under the most unpromising conditions whenever a few clever men are allowed to control them.

§ 3. *Wherein then lies our frustration?*

We know that we get a raw deal, we people of the world. If blind economic forces don't give it to us, what does?

Maliciously and selfishly controlled economic forces can certainly give us a lot of trouble and we ought to subject those in power to a careful study to try and find out what their malice and selfishness may have to do with our troubles. But for the present we shall be content with the broad question how far the cause of the frustration of our peoples in their search for a good life lies in their governors and how far it lies in themselves.

(a) Democracy during the last Peace

This book is concerned with current affairs, and recent history will serve for illustration. Let us consider our own country and its governors during the past 14 years. To begin with there are the 615 Members of Parliament who form the groundwork of our Government. We had only two General Elections in the 14 years before 1945, which sounds as if we could blame our rulers for a good deal. Why didn't they give us elections more often? But how many of us asked for them? How many of us regard electoral reform as immediately vital to our national welfare?

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Apart from 70 to 80 seats, the last House of Commons consisted of two parties, Conservative and Labour. At the first of our last two General Elections (in 1931) the Labour Party split and a minority joined the Conservatives in a National Government with a "doctor's mandate" to save the financial credit of the country and bring back prosperity. On the other hand the Labour Opposition demanded a solution of the unemployment problem, international economic appeasement and a successful Disarmament Conference. Nobody solved the unemployment problem and people got tired of talking about that. Economic Conferences were held; but they only served to show the determination of all national governments everywhere not to yield an inch of advantage to anybody. Selfishness and fear sealed the fate of all those conferences, and their only successes were where the selfishness of one government found common interest with that of another, or where sentiment somewhat modified cupidity, as occurred between some members of the British Commonwealth. The closure of the World Economic Conference was met by no storm of protest, only by a hundred million shrugs of the shoulder. What could one expect from human nature? What could one expect of national governments? Yet a majority of British electors were more or less responsible for putting one of those national governments where it was. Whose fault was it?

(b) Disarmament deferred

The Disarmament Conference (of 1932) lingered on. People everywhere feared that its failure would lead eventually to a return of the World War, and consequently there was much popular demand that it must and should succeed. Democratic statesmen talked in this strain at its opening, and its devoted chairman kept it going, first hopefully, then despairingly, to a long-drawn-out and bitter end. We may recall the positions taken up and the arguments used at

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that Conference. (1) England had disarmed further than other countries before the Conference met. The real reason for that was that England's menace had been the German Fleet, and the German Fleet was at the bottom of the sea. Unfortunately all that Britain proposed to the rest of the world was that they should first disarm themselves "to her level", and then all go on together to disarmament by "categories", the categories being carefully chosen by British experts to give relative strength to British interests. (2) France in her turn refused to curtail her army at all, except in exchange for international "security". She proposed an International Force, provision for the inspection of national armaments and of civil air forces, which latter were to be entirely internationalized. She did not propose Treaty Revision. (3) Italy and France together proposed the abolition of bombing. Britain rejected that. (4) Russia proposed complete disarmament. The rest of Europe professed suspicion. (5) Germany welcomed any form of disarmament until towards the end of 1933 when Hitler gave the Conference its *coup de grâce* by withdrawing both from it and from the League of Nations which sponsored it.

These were the positions taken up by the *governments* of those nations which were to suffer most in this war of ten years later. What were the *peoples* of those nations demanding? The success of the Conference? Yes! But the means? Communists throughout the world shouted for the Russian plan; non-Communists distrusted it. The Germans had no plan. I was travelling in Germany early in 1933. There was intense controversy raging over the recent victory of Nazism in its internal aspects. What would it do to the unemployed, the Jews, the capitalists, trade? Some discerning people feared its effects upon opinion outside Germany. But upon the subject of international affairs most Germans united in wishing to see their country stronger, regaining colonies, and playing an important part in world affairs. To

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the disarmed Germany of that period the Disarmament Conference emphasized a discrimination against their country which they wished to see removed but of whose removal they saw little hope except by themselves rearming. They had no enthusiasm for a League of Nations in which they had been able to play so small a part. Most of them regretted that their government should leave the League, because that departure foreshadowed an increasing danger of war. That was what most Germans seemed to be saying in 1933, whether they were Nazi or anti-Nazi.

In both France and England League of Nations sentiment was fostered by societies such as the League of Nations Union, by the Quakers and other religious bodies, and by the Labour-Liberal Opposition. The British Conservative Party was not at that time very interested in the success of the League, we know that Lord Cecil had great difficulty in maintaining at once his League enthusiasm and his Conservative Party loyalty throughout the period of Sir Austen Chamberlain's Foreign-Secretaryship, and the same was true under the National Government which placed Sir J. Simon in that office. But what of the idealistic and religious "Left Wing" of British politics? In 1932, I attended a student conference on international affairs organized by British and French pacifist societies. I found that, while each delegation attacked its own government for inertia, the French delegates to the conference nevertheless claimed that security went before disarmament, while the British delegates replied with denunciations of the "aggressive" use of force and suspicion of the international use of force. In fact the division of opinion between these "pacifists" was remarkably similar to the division between their respective governments. I do not think that there was anywhere in either country a notable opinion in favour of an accommodation between the two points of view. That British League of Nations Union sentiment condemned the French view of disarmament little less than did the most

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fire-eating Tory can be seen from a study of its journal *Headway* for that period. The same is true of the British Labour Party: they exhorted their own government to disarm, but seldom or never to come to an agreement upon the disarmament plans put forward by any foreigner

Far from being "thwarted", European public opinion of 1932-33, though not identical in outlook with that of its governments, was upon the whole everywhere national and unaccommodating.

(c) *The Abyssinian "protest"*

When we come to the second General Election, that of 1935, the grotesque discrepancy between the election programmes and the chief performances of the parliament which secured election are fresh enough in most of our minds. In 1935 both the British Conservatives in power and their opponents in opposition pleaded for a mandate for a "League of Nations policy". The League was in danger over Italy's attack on Abyssinia: the League must be upheld. The claim of the Conservatives was that they would uphold it better than the Socialists, and they were given the chance. But the new government, having immediately abandoned Abyssinia to Italy, dealt successively with Germany's expansions into Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland upon traditional national lines and, except for participating in a testy and unfortunate expulsion of Russia in 1939, never attempted to use the League of Nations again. The parliament elected in 1935 to support the League of Nations was the same parliament that embarked upon war with Germany in 1939 and instituted something near state socialism in Britain in 1940. What had the *people* of Britain to do with all that?

The first answer is, again, that, throughout this era of tension, conflict, and breakdown in Europe, there was hardly a British voice raised in demand for elections. In 1930 the Austrian people demanded elections because

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their government was binding them closely to Italy and that act was unpopular. Between 1933 and 1939 Hitler insisted upon giving the German people a whole series of elections because their agreement with the successive phases of his policy was sometimes held in doubt. How is it that the British people never asked for elections between 1935 and 1945, that in all that has happened since then they saw no issue upon which they could usefully express an opinion contrary to that of the government in power? One reason must certainly be that long experience gives us little confidence that our election votes will really produce good policies in the final outcome. But there is a more important reason. The betrayal of Abyssinia left people shocked and mystified; but it was not long before it was generally felt that it was now too late for any British government which was afraid of Germany to take any further action against victorious Italy.

The most important reason for the passive acquiescence of the British public in the policies of their government thus seems to have been that, throughout the four years that preceded the present War, *the majority of our public made more or less the same analysis of the situation as that upon which our government was acting*. Of the last year or two of peace, when the new Prime Minister was busy dealing with stop-press news in stop-gap fashion, we can say no more than that upon the biggest issues—Munich, rearmament, the declaration of war—public opinion seemed on the whole to favour the Government, while upon some other important issues—e.g. the attempted Russian pact, the Polish Alliance and conscription—its voice was never clearly heard.

§ 4. *Is there something wrong with ourselves?*

Looking back now at those years before this war in which we are still involved and the aftermath of which will involve

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the world for many a long day, it has become fairly clear that the period 1931-39 was one in which nearly everything a British Government could do wrong about foreign affairs was done. Peace was the paramount British interest. In 1932 European peace depended upon a disarmament agreement between Britain and France, an agreement which the Germany of Brüning would willingly associate itself with. We do not know how intrinsically difficult that was to achieve.¹ But the Disarmament Conference was allowed to fail by the British Government,² with the acquiescence of the British people, chiefly because of the view that foreigners (and particularly the French) were proving characteristically difficult to deal with. Again, between 1935 and 1939 the British public started by making one quite unsustained protest against British Government policy (over Abyssinia) and then resigned itself to speculating fatalistically as to whether war would or would not be the result of what was in fact a highly fluid and influenceable series of events—the League of Nations front against Italy, the Spanish Civil War, the unmet German demands, the German aggression by instalments, the Russian resources, strength for peace, and distrust of everybody. Throughout these events you cannot draw a line between the British Government and the British public, except perhaps to say that whenever there was a division in the public mind *the Government always expressed the more selfish impulse*. We shall see later that as a National Government it was bound to do that.

We cannot claim that in the less democratic states there is the same identity between people and government in their attitudes to foreign affairs as we find in Britain. But our own recent national history is really only typical of all national history in the fact that in the end national policy leads

¹ The French "Tardieu Plan" of October 1932 combined with increased provision for Treaty Revision could almost certainly have been made acceptable to all parties.

² See Cecil. *A Great Experiment*.

inevitably to trouble for its nationals and often to the loss of the very thing the nation is consciously seeking. Look, for instance, at France! She pursued "security" for twenty years—to 1940! For Germany the war of 1914-18 was the culmination of a bid for "a place in the sun"—and thereupon her territory shrank to half its former size. For Italy—her "Empire", for the U.S.A.—isolation, for Britain—peace, and the Nazi Greater Germany has led to 1945! We all get the thing we're *not* aiming at, or at least what we're not consciously aiming at.

Where lies the cause of this constantly repeated phenomenon of national life? Does it lie in the bad men among our enemies, as our political leaders always tell us it does? Is it the fault of the bad men of the world, who achieve their power by convincing millions of ordinary people that they are good men? Must we get rid of those selfish capitalists who played their part, for instance, in wrecking the Disarmament Conference? What about the other big bad groups of our world? Is Lord Vansittart right with his "butcher-bird", the bad nation? Or Herr Hitler, perhaps, over International Jewry? Or, when all these things are said, and the right thing has perhaps been done about them, will there still remain something *in the human mind itself* which will defeat our peace, welfare, and security until that thing itself be recognized and dealt with?

What of the future? Will Dumbarton Oaks, will Yalta, will San Francisco yield to the people of the world what those peoples want? For we may be sure that a new set of frustrations is being built up for us somewhere; and there is at least a danger that the very things we are aiming to achieve will again, be set at risk unless we can understand ourselves and our political natures much better than we have done hitherto.

§ 5. *Two ways of looking at things*

Before looking any further for causes it is worth noticing

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that there are always two ways of looking both at history and at current international affairs. One is the partisan national way. The other is the detached (or, since we remain human, the semi-detached) way. History can be written and is still usually written, as if only one nation really mattered: as the kaleidoscope of world history is reviewed, all other nations take their place as temporary allies or enemies of our Chosen People, as good or bad or indifferent according to the part they play in the glorious pageant of its life-story. From such a point of view an English historian can regard the hideous Thirty Years' War which devastated Europe in the seventeenth century as being of little moment to an Englishman, since it hardly impinged upon England's major preoccupations with the Presbyterians, the Stuarts, the Irish and the Dutch of that time. From such a point of view writers of contemporary history continue to reckon nations as "good" or "bad" to-day according to whether their national policy of the moment makes them our allies or our enemies. But to a true historian of the World, a horrible war, the rise or the fall of a dynasty, the emergence of an expanding power, the coalescence and the redistribution of forces and ideas in the world, these are real events of world history because they bring happiness or misery, new weapons or new thought to millions of men and women, and not merely because they bring success or failure, reward or punishment to a specially sanctified group. By such a test the wars of our present age are clear evidence of a very general malady, of which widespread human conflict is the constant feature, and the actual grouping of the combatants a matter of frequent alteration and somewhat haphazard revision.

Few of us have been trained to look either at history or at current affairs in the second way. To a Russian of the majority to-day, a communist supporter of Lenin and Stalin, there used to be no virtuous nation outside the U.S.S.R.: there were only potentially virtuous proletariats who so

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exasperatingly refused to rise against their capitalist oppressors. But since 1941 a series of democracies (all of them capitalist and some of them monarchies) have acquired a certain virtue for the Communist, because they became allies of the U.S.S.R. against their present enemies, the German Nazis. To a Frenchman of the majority, an erstwhile supporter of the Popular Front, then of Flandin, perhaps, Paul Reynaud and Pétain, Britain passed through the stages of traditional perfidy, friendship, military betrayal and unreasonable hostility to the doubts of to-day. The sympathies of the average Italian have been similarly wrenched. We know the changes our own British sympathies have suffered and continue to suffer in relation to the Great Powers of the world. And millions of Americans who started by seeing little merit on either side of this present war came to see merit on one side only, just as they did in the last one. Probably nearly half the world has radically changed its opinions of the rights and wrongs of world affairs during the last ten years. And the only way to make any sense of these kaleidoscopic changes of the public opinion of the world at large seems to be to regard those changes at least in part as a natural property of the millions of men and women who exhibit them.

So we shall be wise to start our enquiry into the psychological causes of war and peace by considering the emotions which ordinary people show when they are dealing with each other in large and powerful groups. But in order to do this our first question must be: How far are there ordinary people in respect of politics? What is there of a common psychology of man upon which to build our scientific laws of political behaviour? For the more of man we can discover in men, the nearer we shall come to a universal and uniform problem—and consequently to a general solution.

CHAPTER TWO

MORE ABOUT MAN, THE SUBJECT OF GOVERNMENT

1. *All men are human?*
2. *Statistical aids.*
3. *The testimony of psychoanalysis.*
4. *How emotion distorts judgement.*

§ 1. *All men are human?*

THAT "all men are human" is a truism worth taking stock of from time to time; and especially so to-day when many of us are so oppressed by the differences between men that what is common to man becomes forgotten and its meaning quite lost sight of.

Biologically man belongs to the large class of higher animals, the mammalia. This means that nearly all his essential organs are present in all those animals whose young are fed by their mothers upon milk. We share the great bulk of our animal economy with these animals and much of our mental function is similar to theirs. Differences in both are obvious: we would not expect fully to understand the human hand by studying the dog's paw. The proportions of our human skeleton, our hands, our brains, are examples of how man has been modified to meet peculiarly human ways of walking, working and thinking. But very much of what is at present known of the working of our hearts and livers and kidneys has been learnt from the dog and the cat, and not a little of how our brains work has been learnt from the cat and the monkey. And it is through experiment upon these humble brethren of ours that diseases become understood and that new drugs are tried out and found safe for human use.

When it comes to comparing one man with another, the anatomist and the physiologist have to search carefully in order to discover our differences and connect them with

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our successes or failures in life. The differences are there. If our blood contains twice as much sugar as it should, or there is a fall of 20 per cent. in the amount of iron which it contains, a whole series of symptoms begin to mark us out from our fellows, physically, mentally, or both. Even so, we remain nine-tenths normal; we eat and we sleep, we love and we hate, we can be coaxed, bullied and influenced by propaganda for the most part like our fellows. We remain Mr. Jones or Miss Smith to our colleagues, and it may be only when we go off on sick leave that our illness is brought home to them. But the doctor, with his special "slant", labels us "diabetic" or "anæmic". He puts us at once into a category of peculiar people, and he will be quite upset if we don't behave accordingly.

Now once we recognize differences between otherwise similar things we always tend to classify in terms of those differences, and so we easily come to over-emphasise them. Social life is full of such classifications. Speech is allowed to mark off the "gentleman"—until we learn better. By his surface appearances the negro gives many a white man the illusion of profound differences which are not there. We define the category; we expect those who fall into it to be full of peculiarities, whereas their only peculiarity maybe the one that put them in that category.

As far as physique goes, we have to accept the fact that men are everywhere much more like each other than they are different from each other. And there are reasons for believing that the mental and emotional make-up of mankind is as common to all men as is their physical make-up. When we are not thinking prejudicially we usually assume this to be the case. On the other hand it is often asserted that national or racial mentalities show peculiar features, and that these are of profound political significance. It is said to-day, for instance, that the Germans are more aggressive or more "sadistic" than the English.

Fortunately there are independent sources of information

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about such aspects of foreign character which enable us to compare them objectively with our own. One of these is the police-court record of the various countries. Another is psycho-analytical literature.

§ 2 *Statistical aids*

Let us consider Germany and Britain in respect of violence. For the past hundred years there has been a statistical branch of the Home Office collecting and tabulating and analysing the detected violence of our British citizens from year to year, recording prosecutions and convictions under such detailed headings as "Assaults of husbands upon wives", but also, alas, under such broad and confusing headings as "Indictable" and "Non-indictable Assaults". Meanwhile the Germans have been compiling an immense yearly *Statistisches Jahrbuch* which includes records of all charges and convictions for "Crimes of violence against the person". Neither party has compiled these statistics with the idea of proving or disproving the superiority in violence of their own countrymen. Unfortunately differences of statistical treatment and different court procedures prevent comparison of the total figures for crimes of violence in the two countries. But the following are the convictions for murder and manslaughter in England and Germany just before the last war, the most recent quinquennium in which Germany could be called normal

		<i>Average per annum</i>	<i>Convictions per million of population</i>
Murder	England	71	1.97
1909-13	Germany	93	1.45
Manslaughter	England	126	3.5
1909-13	Germany	216	3.4

It will be seen that, proportionately to the populations the figures are very similar.

Another statistical record of interest is the actual number

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of policemen required to keep order in each country. The following figures may be compared:

<i>Police Forces of England and Germany, 1913</i>			
<i>England and Wales</i>	<i>Force</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Number of people whom one policeman can keep in order</i>
(1) London	20,000	8 million	400 in London
(2) Rest of country	34,000	28 million	820 in the country
Total England and Wales	54,000	36 million	666 in England and Wales as a whole
<i>Germany</i>			
(1) Berlin	10,000	3 million	300 in Berlin
(2) Hamburg	1,700	1 million	600 in Hamburg
Total Germany	92,000	64 million	700 in Germany as a whole

Among all statistics it is necessary to walk delicately. The statistics of violence and murder throughout the world vary enormously. But that variation is found to march *with the political organization and stability rather than with any inherent qualities of the different peoples concerned.*

§ 3. *The testimony of psychoanalysis*

For thirty years before this war there have been international journals of psychoanalysis and streams of monographs circulating between the thousands of practising psychoanalysts in all civilized countries. Psychoanalysis deals with the unconscious emotional conflicts and the unconscious drives of men and women. By a comparatively simple technique introduced by its founder Freud, it lays bare the loves and hates and lusts and cross-purposes of men and women who believe themselves to be living decent lives but who have been driven by the stress of a breakdown or a neurotic symptom to seek medical advice. Under such psychoanalysis characters divide roughly into two types, according to how they deal with their deep emotional anxieties and desires: (a) There are those who

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depart from emotional equanimity into uncertainty and alarm—the “hysterical” type; and (b) those who are driven into stressful activities by deep and guilty passions which nevertheless they cannot by any activity escape. These latter—“obsessional” or “aggressive-obsessional” characters—are commoner in Britain (especially Scotland), North Germany, Holland and the Scandinavian countries, and also among the Jewish community; while hysterical types are commoner in France and Italy and the Latin countries. But both types occur everywhere, and every human variant occurs everywhere. Nowhere in a generation of psychoanalytical literature has it appeared that any findings of psychoanalysis are essentially peculiar to any country or race. Such is the effect of ideology upon judgement that some emigré German psychoanalyst now practising in England may rush to contradict me in this statement and to assert that he has found the English character to be very different from the German. This discovery would have been a very interesting one *before* the war: but it was never made. Freud did his pioneer work in Vienna. Certain Viennese or Freudian emphases were found wrong or rare for Paris and London. But all fundamentals remained the same. And to-day the Viennese school of psychoanalysis is showing the English patient his deep hopes and fears and desires and the upbuilding of his social conscience, treating (and we hope curing) him by scraping off the veneer of the gentleman or the artist, stripping the wolf of his sheep’s clothing, and revealing in London, as in New York, Rome, Berlin and Tokyo, the man or woman underneath. And within the man and woman we always find the child that we have all been, with its hopes and fears, many of them forgotten, many of them private and confidential, all of them linking their possessor to those hosts of other men and women, of all classes and colours and races and characters, which make up, or could make up, the community of mankind.

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§ 4. *How emotion distorts judgement*

Over against the biological and psychological fact that men and women are so much alike physically, intellectually and emotionally the world over, we have to set the social and political fact that they are so seldom willing to believe it.

This is due first of all to the fact that every one of us looks out on the world through his own spectacles and sees himself differently from how he is seen by others. We shall see later how each of us is equipped with a string of mental mechanisms for maintaining his own self-respect often at the expense of the truth.

When you come to think of it, do we not often value our self-esteem more than the truth as such? And, in order to think well of ourselves in the ways in which it is imperative for us to do we can unconsciously falsify facts, repudiate unwelcome accusations and forget our faults. We do not forget other people's faults in anything like the same way—nor do we remember their virtues as we do our own. That is one way in which we *make* other people differ from ourselves, to our own advantage.

Next, we are liable to misjudge other people by mistaking their identities. This is a comparatively deep emotional reaction; yet careful introspection can show us the beginnings of its workings. A certain tone of voice, colour of dress, manner, or appearance, is attractive or distasteful to us—irrationally, we would admit. It's obviously not fair, for instance, to give a man a job because he wears or does not wear a blue tie. The rationality of such emotional judgements is in the unconscious mind where deep memories and old but emotionally significant associations are aroused. A blouse like Mother's, a voice like Father's, a manner like our first schoolmaster—that is the sort of factor we often introduce into our judgements about new acquaintances or old friends returned. The psychologists call it an "identi-

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cation": it is an unconscious assumption that a superficial resemblance implies a deeper one.

Another deep emotional reaction plays havoc with human relationships directly people begin to get on each other's nerves. This is the "projection" of emotion on to an adversary. It goes back to the time when the infant does not know where its emotions come from and decides, quite reasonably, that any annoyance must come from outside itself. Two quarrelling members of a committee can each be found upon separate questioning to be convinced that not only did the other one start the quarrel, but that he, the victim, continued throughout to meet intolerable aggressiveness with a very mild statement of an opposite point of view.

These various emotional mechanisms play up to each other in deceiving mankind. By an unconscious identification Smith mistrusts all men like Jones, and is also gifted with a ready projection of his own consequent aggressiveness. Both Smith and Jones selectively remember their own contributions towards a harmonious social life, and each imagines a ready graciousness in his own manner which the other fails to detect. Given normal human competitiveness and vanity and put those two men to work together, and the stage is set for many of the trials of life.

Emotional judgements which involve selective remembering, identification, and projection, are not limited to the social and business sphere: they invade the sphere of domestic and matrimonial life. They are liable to colour all our personal dealings. And their assembly in the massive prejudices of groups has a great deal to do with the troubles of political mankind.

CHAPTER THREE

HOW WE GET OUR PREJUDICES

1. *Prejudice and self-respect.* 2. *How virtue conflicts with desire.* 3. *Our hidden motives and our irrational desires.* 4. *Our varying desires.* 5. *The fault in ourselves.* 6. *The remedy?*

§ 1. *Prejudice and self-respect*

HUMAN prejudice is universal. It depends upon a human need—self-respect. There are so many ways in which the human mind can evade facts: none in which it can discard the desire for self-approval. We men and women *must* try to think well of ourselves. And in order to achieve this end we have to disguise the truth from ourselves in a thousand ways. We deny, we forget, we explain away our own faults; we exaggerate the faults of others.

These are the methods by which the mind protects its own “vital interests” amid the facts of life which surround it. We may call this a sad state of affairs; but the sooner we recognize it the better. We may also call it the *Law of Inevitable Prejudice*, and as such it states a fundamental and universal truth.¹

This self-respect which we are all trying to keep up has a curiously mixed origin. In part it is certainly conventional. What we have to do in order to be “respectable” obviously depends on how other people behave and expect us to behave. Current convention thus affects our standards of justifiable behaviour. But we must remember that the influence of convention in determining our notions of right and wrong stretches far back into the past until it merges with the twilight of the training of early childhood. There we must now examine it further.

¹ That where judgement is influenced by unconscious emotion prejudice becomes inevitable.

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§ 2. *How virtue is bound to conflict with desire*

Why this need of training and convention in the making of citizens? Because what we have to do in order to be socially acceptable conflicts with what we originally wanted to do, and often with what we really still want to do. In order to become good or adequate members of a community it is necessary for us to observe certain standards of decency and co-operation, and to observe them *all the time*. We must be reasonably accommodating to others, reasonably honest and truthful. We must not kill. There are at least ten commandments old enough, and assimilated enough, to have an established ascendancy over our trained adult minds. There is also that "ideal" commandment of 2000 years ago to be reckoned with—that we love one another. We have gradually become aware of these standards, a certain measure of conformity with which is demanded of us *all the time*.

But what we wanted to do as infants (and what it is in our nature to want to do to-day) is to be very generous and friendly and co-operative at one moment, and very selfish and aggressive at another—very decent one minute and very indecent the next. The motives that normally drive primitive man (and are waiting to drive us when they get the chance) partake of three awkward qualities for civilized social life, in that (1) they are not obvious, (2) they are not rational, and (3) they are constantly varying. Now for adult social conduct, for the sort of people we have to be, and for the sort of people we have come to want to be, that just will not do.

§ 3. *Our hidden motives and our irrational desires*

It is difficult for some of us to believe that we are ever driven by motives of which we are unaware. But look at other people, your friends, your business associates, your

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family. You can see that it is vanity that drives one man to find his colleagues so difficult, that fear lies behind the aggressiveness of another. Many a wife goes in "terror" of a husband in whose presence she really wears the trousers.

We are all like this; but we find it difficult to acknowledge the real state of affairs, even to ourselves, for fear of losing some element in our self-esteem. The deeper we plumb the mind the more surprising are the motives that we find to be the mainsprings of men's actions, and the more astonishing the misconceptions that go with those motives. The following are two examples taken from psychoanalysis. (1) A joiner, a mild man who hated violence and could not understand the embitterments of individuals and nations. He had strict principles about taking life and had been a conscientious objector when asked to do so. But the mainspring of his emotional life was nevertheless a voluptuous aggressiveness which he had repressed with great difficulty, which readily appeared in fantasies and day-dreams and the escape of which, in close domestic settings, had lost him the affection of his wife. He did not love his fellow men but he had a conscience, and was unable to risk the threat to his self-esteem that he unconsciously felt the opportunities of warfare might offer. (2) A business man, unselfish to a fault and deeply regretful at the competitiveness of life, was yet stressful beyond measure in his emotional life. His conscious motive was to be kind. His unconscious motive was to annihilate his opponents whenever the conditions should enable him to do so, which, of course, they never did. How came he like that? Because he had never got over a feeling of childhood that his father competed too dangerously with him, in potency and power, and that life would never be safe until that threatening father was liquidated.

The examples of hidden irrationality which psychoanalysis provides often appear fantastic. But the unreality derives less from the peculiarity of the people with which

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that subject deals than from the depth of the mind at which it operates. It is not difficult to find powerful irrationalities in the minds of ordinary men and women: they appear directly one is allowed to look for them. There are men who are always playing for sympathy though they don't know it. There are women whose chief unconscious aim is to put other people in the wrong. Nearly all of us want to put other people in the wrong to some degree, and for the group and the nation we shall find this to be a very important spring of action. Such motives as these are based upon foolish, primitive and childlike logics of the deep and "undeveloped" parts of the mind—not the parts of the mind whose logic we polish up upon the intellects of the world around us.

§ 4. *Our varying desires*

Here we have to accept a bit of the psychology of Freud which has been confirmed by everyone without exception who has examined the Freudian approach to the mind by Freud's method of tracing feeling rather than thought (the method of "free association"). There is no doubt that emotionally the child is father to the man. Our adult emotional life is built upon the emotions of childhood, in its love, hate, fear, curiosity, etc. But whereas the adult has learnt judgement and caution, and many of his emotions undergo repression, the infant tends to express each emotion as he feels it. Those emotions are sometimes very pleasant to him, sometimes they are very much the reverse; his many satisfactions are intersected by endless thwartings. Partly in his own interests, partly in ignorance of his wishes, partly for her own convenience, and partly for purposes of training, the mother of every infant cuts short and cuts across and holds up many of his most considerable pleasures. In doing so she incurs his—quite temporary—hatred. Whether we regard it as his "natural love" that is thwarted or his "primary aggressive-

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ness" that is vented, or just his many-sided egotism that is touched, the young child's life is a mixed affair of pleasure and pain and his earliest attitudes are constantly fluctuating between profound satisfaction and intense annoyance with others, and especially with Mother

It is, of course, just as natural to hate when you are thwarted as it is to love when you are indulged. But in the course of development, as the child begins to remember things—instead of living minute by minute, each minute a separate life—his extremities of passion begin to fit ill upon one single object. Psychoanalysts discover that the first solution which young infants achieve of the problem set by the combination of Mother's all-sufficing gifts and Mother's infuriating denials is usually to believe in two mothers, a good one to be loved and a bad one to be hated. Such a very reasonable early solution soon ceases to explain the observed facts of life, however, and the young child has to face the much more serious task of learning to *hate with discretion the source of all goodness*. Social self-discipline has begun. How far it must progress depends first of all upon home circumstances. A home in which exhibitions of temper are neither anathema nor yet very disturbing will permit the child to grow up with less repression of his spontaneous aggressiveness than can occur in a family in which the atmosphere remains tense and lowering but undischarged, or one in which real violence, however rare, is an item in the adult life about him. But in any case the young child must learn to repress much ebullient passion. And as we grow up the gap between what we really are, emotionally, and how we have got to behave, steadily widens. Mr. Asquith once held it a reproach to the women voters of Britain that their minds "flicker with each gust of passion like a candle in the breeze." That is how all our minds naturally behave. But in the course of growing up to manhood they have been dragooned by sheer necessity into repressing half of our spontaneous feelings. In some cases

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the repression is so thorough that we never feel those feelings in our conscious life at all and can come to deny, though it may be with oaths, their very existence.

§ 5. *The fault in ourselves*

Yet, however disciplined we may be, properties of selfishness and reactions of unlawful desire remain in us normal men and women all through our lives. These impulses always remain capable of a temporary display which may endanger both our social status and our self-esteem.

The infantile emotions which are repressed by training are chiefly of two groups. (1) voluptuous and (2) aggressive. It is the second of these that concerns us here, for these are the passions that require every individual to be under the control of an adequate system of law and order. Society knows no more than the individuals concerned when or whence the violence will come. That "the same man in diverse times differs from himself" is the reason why society must be prepared for human inconsistency, human partiality and human violence *from any quarter*. Through the mental mechanisms we have described—fantasy-identification, projection, selective remembering—violent unco-operating and anti-social passions may spring up for a time in the mind of the best of citizens, seek and find a justification for their discharge, only to be subsequently explained away or forgotten or otherwise obliterated in the interests of his self-respect.

Freud thought that our aggressive impulses were our major selves expressing themselves upon the first available opportunity. So did Hobbes, who advised us to seize a fleeting moment of sanity to set up our social order before we broke out again into violence. Cicero disagreed (it is a very old controversy), and so in our own time did Ian Suttie, a pupil of Freud's who took up the cudgels in defence of the fundamental loving-kindness of mankind. The pundits

of both sides had reasons for what they held, though I think that for the most part those reasons lay in themselves, in their own turns of character one way or the other. For us the lesson is simple. *Human nature has in itself the seeds of socially disrupting injustice and violence, and many social climates favour the sprouting of those seeds.* Such is the power of that complex "self-respect" with which the inner self of each of us is surrounded, that we cannot see or cannot analyse or cannot remember—cannot assimilate shall we say?—our own contribution to the violence and injustice of our world. We see the mote that is in our brother's eye but not the beam that is in our own eye. We can turn our brother's little mote into a big beam: we have the mental machinery for that. But by virtue of the blind spot in our analysis of all that concerns ourselves we view our relationship with others unveraciously and distort it to our own moral advantage.

It is a universal practice to stereotype human relations by seeing the good in one place and the bad in another. It is truer to see good and bad as phases of conduct that flit and hover from man to man. And who shall say where each rests, since all of us are so blind?

§ 6. *The remedy?*

Yet someone must say. For every quarrel that can lead to serious strife a stable society must be able to provide a solution: a judgement must be given. Usually a remarkably good judgement can be given. The fact that men are strikingly blind to the merits of a dispute to which they are parties does not prevent human intellect and human will combining in a strong passion for justice directly self-interest is removed from the scene. On the whole, and provided they are reasonably intelligent, directly we secure unbiassed judges we secure good judges.

In its essence the problem of human law and order thus

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resolves itself into two parts. The first consists in finding out who really are the parties to disputes, who are the biassed people ; for they must be excluded from seats among the judges. The second is to stop dividing people into " good " and " bad " *as fixed categories* and arming the good against the bad. Since the categories are essentially shifting; it is high time that we learned to think more in terms of *impulse* and less in terms of men. A man who wants freedom for the down-trodden is a good man—when he wants that. But if that desire leads him to starve millions of his fellow-men he becomes a very bad man. Mankind needs to become clear about two truths here. One is that the characters of most men are very similar. The other is that those very similar characters are very mixed and can show very good or very bad qualities *according to circumstances*. It is only from those twin convictions that we can build our ordered society upon the one firm foundation that any society can have, namely a sound comprehension of human nature.

CHAPTER FOUR

HOW HUMAN SOCIETIES ACHIEVE ORDER. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LAW.

1. *Law an external force.* 2. *The "Moral Law".* 3. *Conscience and the "Moral Law".* 4. *The field of conscience.* 5. *Effective law.* 6. *The purpose of good law.* 7. *The psychological implications of democratic law.* 8. *Two existing theories of law.* 9. *All law a single concept.*

§ 1. *Law an external force*

LAW "a body of rules for human conduct within a community which by common consent of that community shall be externally enforced." (Oppenheim).

There are various ways of looking at law. Some philosophers have been content to define it as "rules for the guidance of conduct." A historian may think of it as a mass of regulations slowly built up from primitive societies to the present day; a legal idealist views it as "largely unconscious efforts of communities to realize their material and spiritual ideals" (Jenks). The man in the street understands law as something that has to be obeyed—the *effective* regulation of conduct. And he is right! He is thinking of the "law of the land." That law has been built up primarily to maintain order, and that by external discipline. Its source may be a tyrannous autocracy, or a "self-governing" democracy. It may be good or bad, just or unjust law. Whatever its origin and whatever its morality the law is administered upon its subjects from *outside* themselves. And it has behind it the force necessary to secure its observance—its so-called "sanction."

§ 2. *The "Moral Law"*

For countless ages philosophers have been urging men to improve their moral conduct and thus increase the

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sphere of "moral law." The ideal which they have held up to us has been subscribed to by many religious bodies, notably in our day by the Quakers. Its aim is that in the end we shall all be disciplined by self-control, and external force will cease to be a necessity in our lives. Here let us start at once as good moralists and good democrats by saying that not only will the ideal law (when it is discovered) serve the interests of the community as a whole, but also that the order we wish to maintain must come as near to self-government as human nature will permit. Why then is the man in the street right in thinking that effective law must operate upon him from outside himself? And are those philosophers right who think we can ever replace that law of force by an effective moral law which operates entirely from within?

There do exist laws which we can keep unaided. Adjacent farmers are required each to protect his own animals and each to keep up his own fences. If a farmer has a valuable herd of cows in a good pasture and the adjacent land is unfenced bog, it is unlikely that anyone will charge him with failing to protect his animals, though he may charge his neighbour with not doing his share of the fencing. But if his herd is lean and the pasture inadequate, and succulent crops are being raised outside, the charge of failing to protect his cattle is more likely to be heard from the other side of the hedge. Here then is the class of law that we may fairly be relied upon to keep unaided—a law which protects our own interests, or better, a law which we *continually wish to keep*.

§ 3. *Conscience and the "Moral Law"*

Are there other laws which men can be relied upon to keep unaided? For certain individuals and over particular matters, Yes! For mankind as a whole, for any considerable number of men, for any individual or group with whose

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responses we are unfamiliar, we must assume the answer to be No! A man can respond only to whatever emotion does in fact dominate him. He will obey a law which he does not at the moment want to obey *only if that obedience appears to lead to something that he does want*. When we exclude direct self-interest and direct pressure from outside, the only compelling force which remains is that of self-respect. The sphere in which we can rely on the operation of moral laws to make a man keep a law which he is tempted to break is consequently restricted entirely to situations in which we can rely upon the working of self-respect—of conscience—as a motive at all times stronger than any contrary personal desire.

Since we have found social man to be so greatly ruled by self-esteem, will that field not then be a large* one? No, the field in which society can rely upon man's conscience to make him do the right thing is a very small one. The psychological mechanisms of fantasy-identification, selective remembering and projection (all of them devices for shelving responsibility for anti-social action) have left only a very limited sphere of *reliable* action under the sway of the moral law. It is true that men frequently obey their consciences; the difficulty lies in ensuring that their consciences shall be "moral." It must be very rare for conscience alone to make a reliable citizen; for it is neither justice, nor truth, nor brotherly love that the social conscience is really designed to support, but only a self-respect which is the product of endless distortion of fact.

Thus it is that men need law in their established societies, not so much because their consciences are weak as because their consciences serve prejudices that are strong.

§ 4. *The field of conscience*

In his analysis of its emotional roots in infancy, Freud laid it down that the social conscience is "only a dread of

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the community," i.e., of the social sanction. Because the child dared not disobey its parents in matters which it felt to be vital, the grown man dares not offend his society and the accumulated deposit of its rules which is laid down in his mind "Thou shalt not kill . . . steal . . . bear false witness against thy neighbour . . ." These are rules that bind us closely *as long as we are acting within the society which claims our loyalty*. None of us always obeys his "conscience", but most of us usually do.

What happens to these guiding rules when our loyalty to one society sets us at war with another society? Is not every one of them broken, and broken with a clear conscience? Men whom no self-interest could tempt to murder will fly a bomber straight to the heart of an industrial city, just because it is an enemy city. Limitation of our society correspondingly limits our social consciences in their most fundamental controls upon our lives. For the most part our consciences do not operate outside our own society.

A man's conscience may unquestionably become attached to something higher and more fixed than any human society. But unless we know to *what* it is fixed we are still unable to be sure of his actions. A German was as secure against death from a Quaker in 1944 as in 1934; not so from a member of the Church of England. But whatever its attachment, a man's conscience always remains limited by his prejudices.

Thus it is that within their established societies men need externally administered law, not because their consciences are weak, but because their prejudices are strong, while outside their established societies men need externally administered law for both these reasons.

§ 5. *Effective law*

It should now be clear that law and order within a nation or in the world at large can never be built upon

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moral obligation; first, because men can act only according to their dominant impulse of the moment and their consciences cannot always succeed in dominating them, and, secondly, because even when we follow our consciences we are not being "moral" by anything larger than our own warped standards. Effective law cannot be attained through "moral" judgements and "conscientious" actions. Effective law consists in a correction of those very judgements and actions in order to secure a larger good. Good law exists where it does just because human nature is weak at those points and requires guidance from without.

How then can good and effective law be achieved within a self-governing democracy? If people do not wish to obey a law, how can we have the nerve to tell them that they are self-governing when we make them obey it? The answer is simple, though it is often overlooked. A modern social philosopher has given us the key phrase, that "*most men usually wish to obey the law*" (Lindsay). You will see how that separates the motives of the majority of men into two phases. Most of us, to whatever country or class we belong, desire to live in a stable society and want to help maintain the law and order which that stable society requires. At most times we can be counted on as being supporters of the law: that is our wish in general, for the sake of order and justice. But that is by no means our wish when our own particular interests are at risk; When that occurs we are at once face to face with two desires: to gain our point and to maintain our self-respect. Justice languishes in the presence of self-interest. And to our aid come all the mechanisms that hoodwink the self-respect—selective remembering, identification, projection—enough distorting mechanisms, one would think, to make us write in letters of fire over every schoolroom in the world:—"No man can ever be admitted a judge of his own cause."

Academic discussion of whether mankind is funda-

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mentally co-operative or not is quite beside the point here. Directly we adopt the test of the behaviour of men in any civilized community we see that most of them *behave most of the time as if* they were socially co-operative. At most times they *seem* to want law, order and justice. In creating democratic law we human beings can safely take ourselves at our face value in this matter, provided we apply the corrective of the law to each one of us as and when he needs it in the interests of justice. The sort of law we need is the correction of our selfish wayward and aggressive passions just whenever that correction is necessary to the welfare of the community as a whole, in the firm faith that that is also for the welfare of ourselves.

§ 6. *The purpose of good law*

Let us now define the purpose of good law. It exists *to express and to implement our physical, mental and spiritual needs by preserving that balance between the demands of our self-assertive and social instincts which we have agreed upon as necessary to our common social life.* It will be apparent how far towards democracy we are committing ourselves in this psychological definition of good law. For by it law becomes our very own: it is an extension of our self-control, the control of the selfish, unsocial, impulses of our minds in the interests of the socially co-operative impulses of our minds. It is Philip sober controlling Philip drunk.

§ 7. *The psychological implications of democratic law*

Law as I have just described it puts us all essentially upon an equal footing. It is democratic. And if the law is conceived of as fixing the conduct of all of us according to the standard desired by the best selves of all of us, three results immediately follow.

(1) First, the law becomes an aid to us all to live a good life together. The recognition of such a fact by the subjects

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of the law is of immense psychological importance. We know how Sir Robert Peel's "bobbies" came to be regarded by a large number of people not as spies upon their conduct but as aids to their convenience and well-being provided by the state. At one time it was feared that the new stringencies of the Road Traffic Acts and the frequent prosecutions for motoring offences would convert that general attitude of friendliness between public and police into one of hostility. Probably it was largely due to the very fact that the prosecuted public came to recognize that they were being caught in their selfish and negligent moments by legal machinery which for the most part had their approval that no such hostility developed. Philip sober was glad to see Philip drunk prevented from driving his car upon the public road. This should become typical of our general attitude to the law.

(2) Secondly, the recognition of law as an aid to all good citizenship must have a profound effect upon the makers and the administrators of law. For the law then ceases to pick out and label and proceed against the "bad" man. It is there to correct faulty impulses wherever they arise; and it should punish—as a father should punish—only to the extent necessary to correction. Under such an inspiration the law can become the best of mentors. Successful attempts have already been made to secure such an attitude to the young offender on the part of magistrates in Juvenile Courts. But the vista offered to layman and lawyer alike is a much larger one than that. It becomes the business of the law as a system to guide and correct us—nay, to advise us all upon how to live well and peaceably with our families, our neighbours and our fellow-citizens.

(3) Thirdly, when we really have made the law the servant of humanity in just this democratic way, we shall have acquired some right to talk about our "moral obligation" to obey the law. A law that emphasises our own major and better social impulses has a stronger moral claim than

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heretofore upon our obedience. Again in psychological terms, good law should *both externally guide and internally oblige us towards such a proportioning of our instinctual satisfactions as will enhance at once the welfare of our fellows and ourselves.* Since it represents what most of us want most of the time, we shall not only have a right to remind each other of our lapses, but also we can say to the chronic lapser that he really must bring his actions into line with the major desires of the majority of his fellows. He is "morally obliged" to do so. If necessary he must then be made to do so.

§ 8. *Two existing theories of law*

Let us compare this psychological view of democratic law with two current theories of law. One is the "Theory of Sovereignty," the other the "Theory of Co-ordination." Both theories exercise great influence at the present time, though (like the "wave" and "corpuscular" theories of light) neither of them explains all the facts. Indeed they are mutually exclusive theories, each of them being applied to a different sphere of law. Historically the "Theory of Co-ordination" was introduced to mitigate the evil influence which the "Theory of Sovereignty" has exercised in the sphere of International Law.

(a) The "Theory of Sovereignty" originally applied to Municipal Law, the "Law of the Land" as we know it. In effect this theory holds that law is not the product of popular decision but "the declared wish of a superior." That "superior" is now generally regarded as being the state rather than any personal sovereign. But the harmful part of the theory is that the sovereign state is thereby placed above the law. It has power "absolute, unlimited, indivisible, uncontrollable, inalienable" over all the members of the society of which it is the organ. It is doubtful if that imposing list of adjectives will strengthen the claims

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of existing law as more and more ordinary men and women come to hear of them. For, as Austin, the originator of the theory, well knew, the strength of the law does ultimately depend upon popular approval or acquiescence ; and such claims do not present the attitude of the state to its citizens in a very kindly or accommodating light.

But the most harmful consequences of the legal doctrine of "sovereignty" are not to be found in the Municipal Law for which that theory was formulated. The doctrine of the state as an unbossable boss came all too usefully into the international relations of the 19th century. The result has been disastrous to the last degree, and we are in danger of losing both law and liberty because of it. A borough mayor who receives too much deference in the Town Hall may put on a foolish swagger which brings upon him the derision of the outer world in which he is only Mr Smith. But the swagger and the touchiness of no mayor ever equalled the swagger and the touchiness which has been acquired by sovereign states. The state-government which has been fed upon the doctrine of its absolute internal sovereignty (itself a dangerous doctrine) becomes increasingly sensitive and hoity-toity about its treatment in the larger world of states. This touchiness has made International Law virtually impossible. It is impossible to make law between two uncontrollable people whose claims to everything they want are absolute and inalienable.

It must always have been obvious that in fact no government is free from constraints of various kinds put upon it by the actions of other governments. But governments could not bear to abandon the claim or give up the fiction that they were free of such restrictions. Thus the doctrine of "sovereign independence" of states grew out of the doctrine of the sovereign domination of the state over its citizens.

(b) At the same time (during the 19th century) there grew up an increasing demand that there should be some

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sort of law between as well as within nations. During the last 50 years much has happened to foster that demand. The anarchy of international relations which culminates periodically in war has led to increasing demand for effective International Law. Treaties were signed, and conventions agreed upon; and finally the League of Nations Covenant placed states under sufficient "obligations" of a so-called "legal" nature for lawyers and legal philosophers to begin to desire some new theory to account for and delimit the binding of nation-states to law. The "Theory of Co-ordination" was the result. According to this theory state members of the world community promise to obey an agreed law. They are then "bound" to keep that law. But they are only "morally" bound; and in the views of some writers they are bound only so long as they desire to be bound!

It is sad to record that such a theory of law exists to-day and that it has been made a solemn basis of International Law. If I were an international lawyer I should be very ashamed of that fact. In a sense it is honest to announce beforehand that your promises must not be held binding if you subsequently choose to withdraw them. But it would be more honest to call such a system by some such title as "temporary agreement" or "fleeting gesture" than to place it under the august title of "law." We shall see (in Chapter 8) that there is in fact no international law in the sense of rules that have to be obeyed. It remains as true to-day as when Austin said it a century ago, that International Law consists of "positive moral rules which are laws improperly so-called . . . not positive law at all, but a branch of positive morality."

§ 9. *All law a single concept—based on force*

Our psychological analysis of effective democratic law enables us to found all law, municipal and international

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alike, upon a single concept. The law of any society should represent the best selves of the majority of that society put into a commission of execution. The executive body must never include the worse selves of its members, and so it must never include a party to a dispute. That is why the source of the executive power in the case of municipal law should rightly be the state; but in the case of international law it must *never* be the state. The sharply contrasting theories of "Sovereignty" and "Co-ordination" which have just been described are designed by worshippers of the nation-state to concentrate all power in the hands of their idol; to enable the state to direct and administer the law wherever it has the power and to evade the law just where it most needs its guidance or control.

This obvious bowing of legal theory to the realities of power must engage our attention further. It has often been said that the history of law is the history of the *prevention* of justice in the interest of power; and there is certainly a close connection between effective power and effective law. Successful force naturally tends to make its own terms with the law, which amounts to making the law to suit itself. That is why a healthy system of law is possible only in a true democracy, in which the people themselves and not any more limited power group controls the law-making machinery of the nation. It is wise to recognize the fact that we originally got our laws from tyrants, part of whose interest *happened* to lie in "keeping us in order" and so in giving us a means of keeping order among each other. Some people will tell you that law grew out of custom. That has been true only of the customs which it suited our rulers to encourage us to keep or of customs which were too strong for them to modify.

Law then is based upon force. It grew out of force and it works through force. And since men naturally use force to achieve their vital interests we shall have just laws only in so far as those in real power find justice to be their vital

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interest. For our own folk at home we hope we are approaching that state of things : at least we have already gone a long way towards a legal system which does give impartial justice to individuals. But directly we start dealing with groups we still have to take account of the vagaries of power in our assessment of law. It may be true that few individuals in England now wield sufficient power to sway a court of law: but that cannot always be said of the more powerful groups even within the state. The group distorts justice in proportion to the divergence of its interests from the interests of justice and in proportion to its power.

We must now consider groups and how they get their power. Can we find in group relations—and above all in power-group relations—that majority in favour of justice and that vesting of judgement in impartial judges that true law and order require?

CHAPTER FIVE

GROUP AND NATION. A STUDY OF LOYALTY AND POWER

1. *The group.* 2. *The crowd.* 3. *Vested interest and power.* 4. *The emotion of loyalty.* 5. *Loyalty as an instinct.* 6. *Loyalty and the nation-state.* 7. *Race and racial prejudice.* 8. *The strength of the nation-state.* 9. *The limitations of national power.*

§ 1. *The group*

THE first thing a modern psychologist has to emphasise about a group is that it consists of individuals and that its emotions and its behaviours are the emotions and behaviours of individuals. 300 people gathered together in a hall for a political or religious or social meeting not only go in 300 individuals and come out 300 individuals but throughout their time in the hall they remain only 300 individuals. No brooding "spirit of the group" descends upon them: they are just themselves, though that may not prevent their behaving in a very peculiar manner.

The difference between the emotions which appear within a group and those which its members exhibit at other times is due to the following three facts:— (1) that people are influenced by the behaviour of others around them, (2) that certain emotions and sentiments (e.g., panic or rage or intolerance) are peculiarly strong when shared in groups, and (3) that a group nearly always exists for some definite reason—for some common purpose. Whatever has brought them together has made them a select and so a peculiar collection of people. Even a crowd is seldom a chance crowd.

Many years ago William McDougall marked out two main reasons for the formation of groups. One is a common purpose; the other is tradition. The first category includes such diverse groups as primitive hunters and the devotees

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of our exclusive creeds and sports. It includes the many "interest groups" of civilized life, all with conscious or unconscious "axes to grind." McDougall held that the nations of the world are chiefly built upon the second factor, tradition. We may question whether tradition is, however, in fact the most potent factor in separating the modern nation state from other groups.

§ 2. *The crowd*

Let us try to account for some of the remarkable behaviours of groups by considering the situations of the individuals of which those groups are composed and remembering the chief of the unconscious motives and mechanisms of the mind which we have already mentioned. Let us consider a crowd—a gathering of several hundred or several thousand people brought together by some common purpose (e.g. to hear a popular orator) or else in response to tradition (e.g. a New Year celebration or a Carnival). For that crowd to exhibit extravagant departures from the normal behaviours of its individual members there must become active in those individuals elemental emotions which are normally either quiescent or repressed. One such elemental emotion is a desire of the critical self to be lost in the crowd in experiencing and expressing primitive feeling. Then there are childish and primitive aggressive and voluptuous impulses which as individuals we repress out of regard for our correct and grandmotherly societies. Normally those societies with their respectable settings quieten our words and actions and correct our manners at every turn. But let it be a Carnival or a Scottish New Year's Eve, with each of us surrounded by people bent like ourselves upon relaxing those very standards for the time being. Then each relaxation around us assists that part of our conscience which is merely attached to the convention and practice of the moment to

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master our more permanent standards of conduct. The satisfaction and immunity from retribution which greets our riotous behaviour allow a further " regression " into simple, uncritical thought and feeling, and this is continuously aided by the suggestive and united leadership of those around us, all gloriously and primitively in pursuit of the quarry, whatever it be. Noisy choruses in unison, uniform and repeated dance measures, the loss of our recognizable selves behind masks or in darkness, a general acknowledgment that no one will tax us tomorrow with what we've said or done tonight—that is the exuberant crowd of Carnival or Hogmanay. Or if a crowd has gathered not upon common pleasure bent but bent upon common hatred—a political meeting in stirring times, a riot or similar commotion—then both individual self-respect and individual caution are liable to be thrown to the winds in a united response to aggressive leadership.

In such activities of the crowd its individual members feel absolved each by the example of his fellows. They also feel safe. If riot or revolution be the order of the day they may go on to merge themselves more deeply in the larger whole in heroic but easy self-sacrifice. In all these situations the higher critical faculties of the individual are in relative abeyance. He does not think of the future, of risks, of the wisdom of his actions, or of their morality. He thinks very little at all; but he feels a lot. No new qualities come to him from without ; but primitive impulses are "liberated from within by the withdrawal of the inhibiting influences of fear, of social conscience, and of the critical intellect. Those inner impulses are summoned to the surface either by the accepted common aim of the group or by the eloquence of its leaders. And, shouting, singing, rioting, burning, fighting, there we go, normal men and women with the lid of civilized conformity off. Of course we are " suggestible." We are also either dangerous or silly. But we are nothing other than ourselves.

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§ 3. *Vested interest and power*

We may note what a magnificent medium these psychological reactions of the group provide for the growth of foul weeds when the group becomes organised and the seeds of human selfishness are sown in it. Merely by belonging to a group men are liable and willing to cast aside not only the judgement but the scruples that guide them when they act alone. The group absorbs the social virtue of its members: they will work and suffer for it: often they will readily die for it. But what is left, when the group sentiment turns outwards towards the rest of the world, is not social virtue but social recklessness, and especially a recklessness of honour. "Loyalty to Smith-Jones' Powder Mills is all I require of my workers," said a very human and kindly manufacturer recently: "but I do expect that" Now the business of powder mills is to make and sell powder. And from such a conception of loyalty on the part of its directorate it is but a step for Smith-Jones' Mills to foster unnatural markets for their powder, to dilute their powder, to issue blatant advertisements about their powder—and, if their powder be gunpowder and they be giants in the trade, to lobby with millions of money against disarmament at Geneva, as they did in 1932.

You may say that only dishonest manufacturers would dilute their powder? If their powder were sugar and they diluted it with sand, that would doubtless be true. For the directors of our present companies were born into a world which had already decided long ago that it was dishonest to sand sugar; so that we may expect to find that in this matter the limited social conscience of the powder-maker will be swamped by the wider social conscience of the trained citizen. For the same reason an honest powder manufacturer is equally debarred from directly lying to a customer about the weight of powder he is supplying him with, and probably also about the actual assessable composition of

the powder. But it is evident that even in the England of the Puritan and Quaker ascendancy nothing was laid down for children to learn against describing a bar of chocolate as containing a three-course meal for twopence. And supposing there were a theory that the powder (it has now become a digestive one) would be just as good with twice as much chalk in it? Why examine the theory if chalk is cheaper than magnesia?

When society comes to deal with its constituent groups and their power, and the way they use that power, its task is probably less to deal with the flagrant dishonesty produced by the profit-making motive than to master the ready self-deception of the profit-makers. For while the universal self-deception of individuals judging their own cause is surrounded on all sides by the corrective judgement of other people who do not share their prejudices, the prejudice of a group is fostered in all its members by contact with each other, by the mutual approbation of a mutual admiration society. Our power groups, whether of social privilege, of industrial wealth, or of political or bureaucratic monopoly, are composed of men who believe their judgements to be right, their prejudices to be facts, and their dishonesties to be mere business acumen. And if such group interests ever have a chance of making laws, those laws will be made to suit them. Most of their bias will be unconscious. The "old school tie," the interests of the Union, the Church, the Firm, the Department, the Ministry—these are seen to be prejudiced interests by the outsider, but they are felt to be justifiable loyalties by those whose interest it is to maintain them.

Again, an interest-group with a profit-making motive must become competitive. With its heightened collective prejudice it is also bound to exaggerate the rivalry of its neighbours. It is thus bound to search for further power in order to "defend" its interests. And whatever of power it can accumulate will be used prejudicially to that end.

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Such actions naturally increase the antagonism of other power groups (which are of course equally prejudiced); and there will be a further search for power by all the parties concerned. This is a snowball effect which is not absent from individual competitive relationship, but every wave of the rising tide of antagonism is increased if it is an antagonism not of individuals but of groups. Group selfishness is greater than individual selfishness and finds less to mitigate it either in its surroundings or in its heart. Group prejudice is fostered and goes uncorrected within the group; power is more feverishly sought and more unscrupulously used. The threat which groups offer to order and peace is inherently and inevitably increased with their increasing size and power, for their prejudice and intolerance are thus increased. Thus the larger and more powerful groups become, the more will those groups need external law and force for their guidance and control.

§ 4. *The emotion of loyalty*

The source of strength of the power-group requires further examination. That strength rests very largely upon the loyalty of its members.

Human loyalty has its biological foundation in the gregariousness of the human species. From the earliest times social man had to be loyal. His conquest of nature, his protection against storm and flood, the needs of irrigation, cultivation, building, his protection against marauding animals and his defence against marauding men—all these needs have laid it firmly down in the minds of men that they must get together, work together, and, when challenged, fight together. The simplest form of loyalty which serves these needs is very little intellectual, little questioning, and very “instinctive” in its action. “Here is my appointed station: this is my group. I must work in it and with it: if need be I must fight for it”: that is

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how human loyalty is felt by simple men the world over. A distinguished soldier once declared the relative fighting powers of the armies of Europe to be determined more by training and equipment than by anything else. For, said he, "man is a fighting animal. If you train him well and lead him well he will nearly always fight, if necessary until he is killed." It is worth digesting this professional opinion that civilized men can be trained to act upon the sentiment of group loyalty, irrespective of all other factors.

What such well-trained soldiers themselves think about such matters is for them to tell us. Usually they tell us very little. But we may hazard it that the strongest intellectual motive of the simplest fighting man comes from a feeling of threat to the life of his group or of some members of it whom he especially cherishes. Our diversified civilization provides intellectual loyalties as varied as its varied devotions—to religion, art, sport or homely village stream and hill. Each of us has his own fantasy here. "If I have to fight I shall be fighting to defend this," said a hunting friend of mine in 1939, as he followed a steaming pack of hounds homewards through a misty November dusk along a Kentish lane. That picture of England may be very different from the one which is seen by the man who stands shoulder to shoulder with him in the fight.

§ 5. *Loyalty as an instinct*

We can trace the primitive biological roots of our instinctive group loyalties a little further.

The obvious biological reasons for group loyalty are two closely related ones, namely defence and acquisition by collective group action. Here we must not forget that the purpose of any instinctive action is successful adaptation. In a particular case an instinct may continue to operate where there is no conceivable chance of its leading to success. But its purpose remains success. And if it con-

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tinues to operate disastrously for the group, that group will give place in survival to others whose instincts are better adapted to reality. We must expect therefore that an important element of instinctive group loyalty will consist in devotion to those who can defend us and enrich us, in fact, to the strong and the successful. Instinctive loyalty is increased by success and weakened by failure. Romance and sentiment may traverse this unchivalrous element of loyalty often enough—for a time. A Highland clan has often fought rearguard actions to the death in steady loss of its territories to a powerful neighbour. The picture is all too familiar. But we must not allow the temporary effects of romance and tradition, incitement and propaganda to blind us to the fact that the group unit which claims power and *repeatedly* fails in its policies does tend to weaken the devotion of its members. It risks their alienation to more effective sources of protection and aggrandisement. Every schoolboy prefers to belong to a school which is constantly winning its matches.

§ 6. *Loyalty and the nation-state*

What is the place of the nation in the loyalty of modern man ?

The history of the nation-state is variable. On the whole it is short : it may go back 25 years or it may go back a few hundred. Its actual boundaries and territory have in most cases varied widely throughout that history. The nation-state is not a very firm historic unit. *But it is the modern unit of defence in danger.*¹ It is the power unit of the present world; the collective expression of human power upon what we feel to be the grand scale. It is not surprising then that a strong loyalty should be attached to

¹ Security, not attachment to tribes as such, was clearly primitive man's reason for his loyalties and prejudices¹—*Pace Sir Arthur Keith's Place of Prejudice in Modern Civilization* (1931).

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the nation-state. In its fundamental attraction for our gregarious instincts towards security and strength our nation has no competitor except for the few of us who may have hopes of attaching ourselves to some other nation, more powerful still. Most of us lack such desires : for our instinct is there and it already has its object. It is usually only the irrelevancies and accidents which mark migration that can make 20th-century men and women aware of any alternative objects for their national loyalty than the state they happen to live in.

But national loyalty is, nevertheless, a fostered loyalty based upon the two facts of power in the nation-state and habit in ourselves. Education and propaganda cultivate that loyalty, custom enshrines it, and sacrifice sanctifies it.

§ 7. *Race and racial prejudice*

But what of the blood ? What of race ? Are we not bound together racially by ties of blood running back not hundreds but thousands of years ? Here the biologist frowns. Scientifically our "race" is vague and intangible ; and it never marches with our nation. But if actual race is nebulous, racial prejudice is not ! We *think* we belong to superior races and we become devoted to them accordingly.

A good analysis of racial prejudice in the U.S.A. and elsewhere has been put forward by G. M. Stratton.¹ He shows us three things about it : (1) It is nearly or quite universal, i e., it is a feature of human nature to be prejudiced in this particular way. (2) But notwithstanding its universality, racial prejudice is seldom or never innate. It is not born in us. White children, for instance, show no prejudice against coloured children or coloured nurses until such prejudices are instilled into them by their elders. (3) This acquired universal "racial" prejudice is *not really racial at*

¹ *Social Psychology of International Conduct* (1929).

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all. It cannot be found to march with racial characteristics: it does not even march with strangeness, but *solely and everywhere with a feeling of group menace.* Examples come from every corner of the globe. Neither the early Chinese nor the early Japanese immigrants to California were disliked: each group became unwelcome only as their members undercut the security of white Californian labour. "Racial" prejudice was not in evidence between the partners of the Anglo-Japanese alliance: nor apparently was it present in German-Japanese relations of yesterday. It arises solely as part of economic and military enmity. Stratton proportions so-called "racial" prejudice to *the social injury one race group believes itself to suffer from another.* The physical and cultural contrasts of different races then become "the signs and badges of an opposing group." Our so-called "racial" prejudice is in fact a mere biological group reaction to losses threatened or experienced, "a response not inborn but continued by tradition and by fresh impressions of new harm received."

This analysis is to be commended to the student of minority problems. If the answer which it gives is the true one, then racial prejudice ceases altogether to be a biological problem. It remains an important psychological and political one, however, one of power-group antagonism misread as antagonism of race.

§ 8. *The strength of the nation-state*

It is now time for us to ask: "How rigid is nationhood, how established is national loyalty?" We have it on authority that loyalty is trainable, which itself suggests that it is transferable. Only those whose lives lie among the migrations of peoples know just how transferable national loyalty is. A few years will see a family from almost any corner of Europe turn into hundred-per-cent American citizens (of either American continent) † is a statistical

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fact that if you and I had been born in Holland, France, Germany, or Italy, or if our parents had migrated to any of those countries when we were young children, the chances are overwhelming that we should now be Dutch, French, German, or Italian in sentiment, and we should probably take the predominant Dutch, French, German, or Italian view of the politics of Europe today. It may astonish us to reflect that if we had been brought up in France we should probably have been supporters of Marshal Pétain, and that if in Germany we should probably still (1945) be Nazis. It would equally astonish Frenchmen and Germans to reflect that with a similar change of scene they might have supported Mr. Churchill in recent years (and would presumably have tolerated those British governments that went before). What then does hold the nation together as a unit, the most powerful group unit of our time? Two things only: *sentiment and power*.

National sentiment comes more from recent common experience than from remote tradition. Look at America ! The strength of patriotism is drawn from geography, language, economy, and a common heritage of history and habits. But these things contribute comparatively little unless we are made aware of them. It is the common interest *appreciated as such* that awakens our sentiments of loyalty. No facts of history or geography or any common heritage are anything like as significant as the teaching and appreciation of those facts. "A nation is made and kept together by an emotionally sustained education in nationhood." (Stratton.)

Then there is power. We have described how men seek to identify themselves with something strong, how they love to sink themselves within the group and lose their sense of responsibility, and if need be of guilt, because of the sanction which the group can give. We have seen how prejudice is increased by sharing, and noted how the interest of the group can be pursued with a passion and a lack of

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scruple which individuals acting alone could not sustain. A power-group that can at one and the same time express the deeper passions of aggressiveness and violence which *some* of us harbour, the chagrin at the thwartings of life to which *most* of us unconsciously subscribe, and *every man's* deep need of collective security—such a power-group can win human allegiance, and exact human sacrifice, and go on doing so almost indefinitely—as long in fact as it fulfils those conditions which the instinctive emotion of loyalty demands.

All this the nation-state claims to achieve for us today. We know roughly the history of how it has come to do so here in England. Barons collared power by bullying their serfs. Kings collared power, first by playing the barons off against each other, and then by enlisting the common people against them. Finally, certain greater and lesser gentry joined forces and captured the powers of the king in the name of and with the help of the common people. What were those powers? To collect taxes and spend the money; to administer the law; to “represent” the nation abroad—i.e., to control foreign policy. These three powers are now held by every ruling government in the world. And whether those governments frequently consult the people (like the Swiss), or listen to a “free” Press (like the British), or try to stifle all opposition everywhere like the German Nazis, they still collect that power which comes from money, from monopoly of legal administration, and from being the sole voice by which a nation can speak to its fellows. Here is power indeed! The very nature of our national set-up and our loyalty ensure that our governments face the outside world in no accommodating spirit.

There is a vicious circle here. The condition for the maintenance of national loyalty is a high and continuous demonstration of power. And for that power to be maintained the loyalty must continue to back the selfish and

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risky course of power politics. Successful power requires loyalty, and loyalty demands successful power. That is why national governments in a strenuous world come to lean more and more heavily upon propaganda. They must either demonstrate success or promise success—particularly when they require great sacrifices from their peoples.

§ 9. *The limitations of national power*

There are however very severe limitations to the powers of nation-states. Apart from other material limitations there are two which particularly concern us. They are: (a) the illusory nature of "sovereignty" and (b) the instability of loyalty.

(a) Every Foreign Minister knows that his country is not free to pursue its policy unhindered. On the contrary every power which it can exercise is strained to the very limit. For the limit set to the external policy of the state is just that provided by external frustration and nothing else. Without its allies—none of whom is it ever certain of far into the future—its power is already overstrained: its ministers must for ever be pleading and cajoling, compromising and threatening. For them the doctrine of sovereignty is a façade. The outworn arrogance of states is forced to accept an appearance of independence behind which the realities of international life are dealt with as realistically as the prejudices of statesmen and peoples permit.

(b) The instability of loyalty is an equally menacing handicap to statecraft. A loyalty that at bottom demands success is a brittle reed to the power politician. Men sacrifice themselves for their group again and again, as bees attack a bear, so that the group itself shall gain success and security, that at least the group shall survive. State-diplomacy that is successful can count upon continued loyalty; all history shows that. States that rally their

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people to the cry of danger will meet with a ready response once, twice, or thrice. But if the result is failure, the minds of men soon begin to seek for new and more effective loyalties. One major defeat may sap a nation's loyalty : a lost war may shake it to its roots.

Finally, if the state as an institution becomes associated in the minds of men with endless sacrifice and frustration of all good living, then state-loyalties will begin everywhere to waver and tire. It is wise for statesmen to remember that loyalty to the state is only one group loyalty among many, and that others are possible even in the field of power-groups. In short, no power on earth will preserve the sovereign nation states of the world if men once become convinced that they can see a better way of securing their lives, their liberties, their estates and their welfare.

CHAPTER SIX

INTER-NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

1. *International "anarchy".* 2. *Nations considered as "persons".*
3. *A weak analogy?* 4. *Why states act as persons.* 5. *The rôle of press and propaganda.* 6. *Can nation-states give us World Order?*

§ 1. *International "anarchy"*

THE nation-state is distinguished from all other groups of mankind because it is a power-group which claims "sovereignty." There are many other political power-groups in the world. Manufacturing plutocrats have possessed political power : they used it, for instance, against the German Communists in 1932. The Roman Catholic Church has political power : it used it against the British Government in the Irish Revolution. Trade Unions have power which they use to the advantage of their members and for their own political class. But none of these groups reaches the supreme egoism of the claim of state sovereignty. As we have seen (Chapter IV, § 8) that claim is twofold. The state demands to be regarded as the sole ultimate source of legal power within its borders. It also claims that it can accept the dictation of no power outside its borders upon any subject which it elects to consider a legitimate sphere of vital interest. Those are the claims of the sovereign state.

In 1939 the government of the world was parcelled out among about 60 "sovereign" states. What are the real relationships between these states? A comment often made in recent years is that international relations are in a state of anarchy. "Anarchy" means "without government," and that is in fact a strictly correct description of international society today. But we are more familiar with the term "anarchy" as meaning chaos within the state.

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The first thing to discuss here is this analogy between our small and our large units ; between individuals within a state and states within a world. How far does that analogy run ? Can an embryonic world society composed of 60 states be considered as if it were a society composed of 60 individuals ? How far does the state behave like a person in its relations with other states ? We would like to know, too, what sort of law would be necessary to produce international order between these 50 or 60 states of our modern world. If we find an answer to those two questions we can go on to discuss any alternative possibilities of giving really orderly relations to the 2,000 million real people of the world who at the present time happen to be divided up into these 50 or 60 states.

Between individuals the absence of law spells anarchy. We know that. we have studied how it comes about. It is because men have no fixity of interest for or against their societies instead they have fluctuating moods. A census would probably show that a vast majority of men everywhere want a stable society and are prepared to make some personal sacrifices in order to get it. We should have their vote for an ordered society, just as we might gain the vote of a dipsomaniac in favour of wide temperance legislation (perhaps even for prohibition) if we caught him in a moment of contrite sobriety. But while the drunkard knows, or *at least* half knows, that he will want his drink again, the healthy man does not know or *at most* is barely half aware that in the absence of law he is liable to come into insoluble conflict either with another individual or with society at large. We know that the reason for our inevitable conflict with others is the prejudicial judgement that sees our own contribution to a quarrel distorted and minimised, while that of our antagonist becomes distorted and magnified. But both in our public and in our private life within the state the power—the “sanction”—of municipal law is so constantly with us that we do not always realize how much

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it curtails and limits the exhibition of our natural moods. No violence, no theft, no bad language, no threats ! And if we forget or disobey, there stands the policeman !

Natural sociability, acquired prejudice, threatened violence, law, policeman—what of this sequence holds any analogy when you transfer the unit from the home community to the society of nations ?

§ 2. *Nations considered as "persons"*

It has been argued that there are great differences between the attitude of a man to his millions of unknown compatriots and that of a state to its 60 neighbours, most of whom are very well known to it indeed. To begin with there is no sociability of states comparable to a man's place in a well-loved community. A man idealises his nation ; statesmen do not idealise the world. Instead they too idealise their nations. Sociability between states is reduced to lukewarm courtesy which may just reach an uneasy friendship at the height of a successful alliance. The relations between state and state here become nearer to that of the rival business men of a city, who may combine in varying groups as convenience serves but none of whom really cares very much for the interests of any other.

But how far are we ever justified in looking at another nation as an entity, as a person—"Germany," "France," etc. ? The answer is "When it behaves as a person." On the whole the nearer you come to the government of your own country the less you see it as a person, for then you have increasing evidence that this "person" is under the direction of certain persons of whose characters you know something already and should try to learn more. The "national personality" which lies behind those real persons is a very vague and moveable and undependable unit. But most of us continue to regard foreign nations as persons and to be angry or sympathetic with them as

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persons, despite any knowledge we may have of their directing personalities because they seem to behave as persons.

If sociability is less between states than between individuals, prejudice is far greater. We know the sort of fantasies that the beloved nation and the hated nation arouse in us and how those fantasies are shared among us. Even statesmen often seem to see their own country as a beloved woman and its rivals and adversaries as villainous men. We must note the danger. Whenever our minds make a false unit out of a complex state of affairs we shall be sure to judge that state of affairs with prejudice. The passion that derives from prejudice is liable to follow such judgements.

Prejudices are built up by personification, fantasy-identification, and projection (Chap. II, § 4) between nations as between individuals. But national prejudices are heightened by being shared: for in our judgements of nations we each confirm our neighbour, we never hear the other side, and we seldom gain the advantage of hearing a neutral and impartial judgement upon the issue at stake. Thus the artificial "persons" of the nations acquire a greater distortion in the eyes of each other than could occur between any individuals who could sustain a claim to sanity.

§3. *A weak analogy?*

In yet another respect the world of states would seem to have less hope of ready order than has the national society of individuals. We refer to their standards of conduct. The moral standards both of statesmen and of peoples are lowered in their dealings outside their own nation. Perhaps this need not be so. But the reader will remember how Freud derives our conscience from our dread of *our own* society, and our need to please *our own* loved ones. Probably a good deal of our conscientiousness is limited by our loyalty in just this way. We see the process every day in business life,

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where a man's standard of integrity is highest among his personal friends and deteriorates towards the unknown and uncared for. In so far as our self-discipline is due to an unconscious fear of alienating the love and approval of authorities *which we feel we need*, our limited loyalty makes us good state-citizens but bad cosmopolitans.

It has been questioned whether "law" as the effective instrument of order which we recognize it to be at home can ever become an efficient agent of world order. We shall discuss this question fully in a coming chapter. With it goes the question whether an "international policeman" is a reasonable conception. But so far there do indeed seem to be notable weaknesses in the argument of analogy between order among individuals within the state and order between states in the world community. The 60 states of the world offer us less sociability to start building upon. They have more prejudice against each other, and their prejudices are less easily corrected. They are more ready to resort to violence and fraud, and generally less moral than well-brought-up men and women in a civilized community. In a word, they are more like untrained savages than civilized human beings living respectable lives.

§ 4. *Why states act as persons*

The question of national "persons" is not yet quite disposed of. For a chief reason for the unsociable, violent and immoral conduct of states towards each other seems to lie in just this fact that they continue to regard and treat each other as persons. Why then do they do so?

(a) The first answer is historic. Somebody had to inherit, or grab or combine with others to become "elected" to power in every organized society, and in each budding state. This was the only way in which order could be kept. And, as Machiavelli once put it, the desire of the upper

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classes for authority could be satisfied only because the lower classes wanted order and peace and were prepared to pay for that order and peace with their liberty. Once such governments were established they inevitably gained the loyalty of those lower classes among whom they kept order, because of the general disorder of the world at large. How could they help it? Between wars the government gave an order of a sort which was well worth having. Then it promised the people glory and riches if they would fight for it, and persuaded them that they would be even poorer than they were if the enemy (of the government) ever got hold of them. (By fighting brutally enough it is not difficult to prove this true in the event.) The government had little difficulty in insisting that their governmental ambassadors and diplomats, couriers and attachés were the only proper means of communicating with the kings, nobility, or "elected representatives" who were lording it over the next lot of workers and peasants, with *their* desire for order and peace and *their* weakness for vicarious glory and power. And there we were, French, English, Spanish and later Italians, Germans, and Americans, millions of people communicating with each other only through narrow channels which personified them and held all possible power in their hands.

(b) The second answer brings us very much into present day politics, which are the organized present-day expression of human vanity, cupidity, power and gullibility. Why do states *continue* to treat each other as if they were persons?

Men and women who have tasted power like power, cling to it, **do not** propose to give it up. Political power means running things at home and "representing" the country abroad—haughtily, arrogantly, as you represent a monarch rather than as you would represent Tom, Dick and Harry. It is great fun doing that.

Round about the sources of power cluster the

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“interests”¹. Merchants and financiers need order and desire privilege. Order comes from strong, steady, reliable government, privilege comes from being in that government or near it, meeting it, dining with it, persuading it to regard your concessions abroad as a national interest. While “it,” remember, is a cluster of men who by some means or other have “got there.” You mustn’t call them anything like that. If they are to have prestige at home and abroad they must now be depersonified as “His Majesty’s Government,” or in short “The Government” at home and “England” abroad. In Lord Grey’s *Twenty-five Years* you can see how often “the British Government” really meant the Foreign Secretary, who, relatively competent as he was, had originally expected to become the War Minister and would then have been “the British Government” in an entirely different setting. Real human people, both governors and governed, become lost in a Royal Inhuman Person, the Sovereign State.

Such personifications and depersonifications come easily to the human mind. But each carries with it immense dangers of over-simplification. The British Government is not a thing; England is not a person. Nor is Germany! When in 1936 Herr Hitler’s Government had been claiming for four years that “Germany” suffered adverse discrimination (which “she” did) and was threatened with attack (which “she” was not) the writer was asked by a German visitor to England why no proposal for removing the real discrimination (by general disarmament, access to colonies and an improved League of Nations system) came from any political party in England. The only possible reply was that all our political leaders and most of their followers saw 70 million German men and women as “Nazi

¹ “Will any one of them get up and say that the chance of getting these things (power and patronage), the hope of keeping them, the fear of losing them, do not form a powerful motive in the political life of this country?”—H. H. Asquith, *Life*, Vol. I, p. 70.

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Germany," and thus were unable to demand from our rulers the only concessions which could have modified the German régime or its policy. To the further question "Does no one over here realize that there is a flexible public opinion in Germany?" I had to reply that hardly any one of us saw anything in Germany but a handful of "leaders" and a host of uniforms. But we were wrong, and we still are wrong, to look at any nation in that sort of way

§ 5 *The rôle of press and propaganda*

It is not necessary to say much here about the fanning of international misunderstanding by propaganda and the press. If I had been content to get my idea of foreign countries from the British Popular Press of the last 20 years I do not see how I could have any conception of any single country which remotely resembled the truth. Its snippets of sensational news never portray a people. Our local press with its accounts of village entertainments, bowling-club prize-givings and parish politics comes near enough to depicting real life for us to be reminded by it of the workers and housewives of the district with their passions for gardening and football, tennis and dancing, and their absence of all passion for high politics. In contrast, the "National Press" shows us less and less of the real life of our own people, and little or nothing of the strangely similar but piquantly different lives of our foreign neighbours. Politically our National Press is steeped in prejudice: in the heightened ideologies of recent years nearly every journalist must become most strongly prejudiced in his political judgements. And it is in the light of the high policies of governments and newspaper owners that the prejudiced journalist has to earn his living.

But Foreign correspondents of our newspapers who live abroad often know their lands of sojourn well and could give us a much truer account of those lands

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than we are ever allowed to read. It is the increase in the deliberate distortion of news as it comes into newspaper offices which is the great journalistic crime of today. I do not refer to actionable lying. "The lie that is half a truth is ever the blackest of lies"; and at a time when truthful information about the foreigner is a crying need of all men everywhere, it is sad to record the testimony of the head of the London Office of the *New York Times* (F. Kuhn in *We Saw it Happen*) as follows :— "Distortion has become so common even in reputable (British) papers that it is hardly noticed; suppression occurs so frequently that I am keeping a museum of the choicest examples . . . An editor of what used to be Britain's greatest newspaper boasted . . . that he was as proud of what he withheld from readers as of what he published." That boast was made before this War started. Such perversions of news played their part in its occurrence.

Government propaganda is open to much the same criticisms, except that, so far, it has been on the whole an emergency activity of governments when they believe their nations to be in dire straits. That this condition now extends to nearly every national government in the world is itself a commentary upon the successful adaptability of the national-state unit to the requirements of modern humanity.

Propaganda consists in selection of news with intent to deceive, just like boosting a patent medicine. It seldom aims at presenting the whole truth about anything. The psychology of successful propaganda is an interesting study which does not directly concern us here. What does concern us is the assumption of virtue in this form of deceit. It pervades our national and international life with its Ministries of Propaganda and Information, its censorshipships and its muzzling orders. There is little hope of happy international dealings while the notion that the naked truth is not good for us persists.

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§ 6. *Can nation-states give us World Order ?*

We have briefly reviewed the psychology of present inter-national relations. In peace-time there was a League of Nations and an International Labour Office at work on the credit side. There are also a host of business and commercial influences for peace. Nevertheless peace ends, and these activities end with it. Far more potent is the influence for peace in the minds of nearly all ordinary men and women everywhere. It takes a lot to start a modern war. It takes endless fanning of fear, of lust for gain and victory: it requires the profound unconscious roots of those group or "racial" prejudices which are based on imagined social injury, and it needs the poison of propaganda by governments and newspapers all rolled together and weighing upon us for years to start a modern war. Psychologically the pivotal point in all this is prejudice, the ready ability to see ordinary foreigners as German Nazis and British War-mongers, as nations with a "Black Record" or a hostile and irredeemable policy—as everything in the world except the ordinary and susceptible men and women they are.

Chief among the focus-points of prejudice is our treatment of states as if they were persons. It is traditional. It ministers to the conceit of ministers and the prestige of diplomats, and they lead the way in doing it. But they do it because they are human—they are only just a little on the egotistical side of normal. Behind the politicians stand the lawyers. And as we pass through their ranks from legal practice back to political theory we find throughout that fantastic, morbid theory of state-sovereignty hovering over them, whispering in their ears the notion that the state is a sacred source of law and itself above all law.

We do wrong to allow our statesmen to think so much of their collective selves and to let our lawyers think so much of "The Law." The state is not a person but a machinery. It

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is not the source of law but the agent of the people. Your modern "democrat" apologetically asks to be allowed to record his choice between two sets of rulers (neither of whom he has asked for) about every five years (if the state does not happen to be too busy with a war to give him an election then). Is it not about time we bred a generation of true democrats who will take care to get a machinery of government that they can control, at least as definitely as the doctors control the British Medical Association? We must begin to realize that we are the source of law and see to it that we make the law and that it does what we want it to do.

But in the meantime and with things as they are, is there any hope of international law and international peace being effectively organized out of our sovereign state governments? I think that, despite the difficulty, when we review the minimal conditions which are required for order and peace we must still answer "Yes,"—provided our sovereign state governments take the one and only right course for their own future and for our security.

The 60 States of the world can be said to form a community of a sort although it is such a small one. If there were only ten of them they could still give us a peaceful world—*if they will themselves obey the law*. There is no reason why self-government should not be effective government, between democratic states as within a democratic state.

But we have seen that collective self-government is something quite different from individual self-control. If the states of the world will institute collective self-government in their community of sixty "persons," they can go on calling themselves "persons" and we millions will still be able to secure good lives for ourselves. This may not be a likely way to bring about World Order: it may not be the best way. But World Order *can* be brought about in this way. The nation-state governments can do it. And if the nation-state governments wish to be an institution with survival value they had better do it soon.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PERVERSIONS OF GOVERNORS* AND GOVERNED.

TYPES, TYRANTS AND IDEOLOGIES

1. *"Good" and "Bad" men.* 2. *Types of ruler.* 3. *Circumstances and "ideology".* 4. *Ideology from outside and in.* 5. *What determines an ideology?* 6. *Ideological settings in England and Germany.* 7. *Simplification and falsification in ideological thinking.* 8. *Character types that foster ideological conflicts.*

§ 1. *"Good" and "Bad" men*

It is time to discuss the bad men and their works.

You will remember how the actions and motives of the ordinary man show him to have natural social instincts binding him in co-operation and service to his fellows, and equally natural selfish instincts driving him to seek satisfaction at their inevitable expense. He has a social conscience, the purpose of which seems to be to secure the general victory of his social over his selfish impulses. He has not got a serene and impartial conscience, however, for that organ has strong, peculiar, and often fantastic roots in his unconscious ideas of what society requires of him, and also of what a "good" and worthy society is.

So we find the ordinary man doing, or trying to do, what he *believes* to be right. And since he has to deal with the two pulls, of strong selfish passion on the one hand and a tyrannical conscience on the other, the weak point in his system of morals remains, and will remain, his *judgement* of what is right. He is very unhappy when his passions pull against and temporarily overcome his conscience. He is very dissatisfied when his conscience roughly overrules his passions. But when he can manoeuvre his passions and his conscience into line with each other, then he is content, and no more questions are asked.

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Until he finds himself frustrated by events! That is where law steps in—to solve the riddle of two men with clear consciences each trying to settle things the “right” way, but finding that their “rights” are in conflict with each other.

The law does other things too : it claims to apprehend the “bad” man and punish him. But sometimes the bad man eludes the law. Sometimes he makes it! Nowadays we are trying to think of law as being made by ourselves to help us keep ourselves in order. But even in our so-called “self-governing” democracies many of us still feel that we have had very little to do with making the law and that we often give only half-hearted support to its operation. Much of the world is still governed by men who do not yet wish the law to be the means of the self-government of peoples. And it may be argued that many people in the world do not yet want to govern themselves. We shall now discuss a few obvious departures, both of governors and governed from the ideal we have set for them, that they shall be the executive officers and the sources of government respectively.

§ 2 *Types of ruler*

In the first place what are we to call a perversion, in governors and among the governed?

The objects of government may be stated (in an extension of Bentham’s famous rule) as the regulation of the life of the community to secure *the greatest happiness of the greatest number and an adequate minimum standard for all*. A perverted ruler is one whose policy is directed to some other goal than this. There are always two factors contributing to form the character of such a ruler : (1) an inherent tendency, and (2) circumstances.

Rulers are usually dominating people. They have won their personal position as leaders of political parties through ability conjoined to desire. The desires of prominent leaders tend to manifest themselves in one of two ways—a

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determination to demonstrate a superiority, or a determination to overcome a frustration or a deficiency. When we add that the concept of personal superiority is usually consciously entertained and accepted, while the feeling of personal deficiency is often unconscious and usually unacceptable to its possessor, it will be clear that these two emotional backgrounds of "superiority-feeling" and "inferiority-complex" can occur together. They often do. The man who feels he deserves it and the man who fears he does not deserve it can both pray with Nietzsche: "Grant me but one great victory!" The two backgrounds, of the little boy who felt he was a fine fellow and the little boy who was determined that others should yield him the palm, whether or no, merge in the deeper question of the unconscious mind: "Am I a fine fellow or not?" What marks out the man of achievement is the decision that, whatever the answer, something must be done about it. It depends on him. And political fame or prominence may be the result.

The actual and the psychological differences between rulers may be very striking. Sharp wits may enable the bully who is a coward at heart to thrust his way to the top of a party or a nation in blissful freedom from the challenges and humiliations which he once had to face in the school playground. The quiet plodder, ticking off his handicaps one by one, without haste but with never a thought of hesitation or subterfuge, may be there to meet him in a last-round struggle for supremacy. So also may the foaming paranoid, whose rearguard actions with the fiends that clutch at him can have no cessation on this earth. The gay and invincible only-child may be there too, reducing his opponents to a series of harassed and impotent nannies. The grim and aspiring younger son may be there, or the son whose life is still modelled to please the eye of a dead father or to uphold (in fantasy and metaphor) the honour of a perfect mother.

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Political power offers superb platforms to the unconscious play-actor from childhood—to shout defiance at erstwhile school-fellows whose hands are no longer able to reach out and twist his arm, to prove the prizeman in yet one more test, to hurl yet more fiends down to hell before the final reckoning comes, to scoff at still more nannies or greybeards. The perverted ruler is he who, either because of his unconscious fantasies, or for his more material gain, directs his people away from the paths of general happiness and universal subsistence. The perverted people is that people which allows rulers and circumstances to herd them down the slopes of Mount Welfare—in pursuit of a myth.

§ 3. *Circumstances and “ideology”*

In order to pervert his people the gifted ruler will require opportunity. Peoples may show besetting vices. Lethargy, suggestibility, power-lust, instability of purpose, obliquity, imaginative deficiency, are qualities not equally distributed among the nations. All these qualities are latent in every big nation, however, and the actual perversions of people are probably determined much more by circumstances than by any inherent factors. We may note that in four or five hundred years of nationalism in Europe every nation on the continent has partaken of vastly different sentiments and vastly different reputations throughout the chequered circumstances of success or failure which have attended their lives and policies.

The prime qualification for a distortion of sentiment among masses of mankind appears to be an awareness (or an apprehension) of an unfavourable environment. Ideologies flourish in hard times. The French Revolution, Italian nationalism, Irish nationalism, the Russian Revolution, the Third Reich have all in their turn sprung from a desire to overcome adversity and win a wider freedom and power, starting with very lean beginnings. And those revolutions

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were all perverted from the course of true happiness by the limitations of their ideological conceptions.

What is an ideology? The term has two distinct meanings, and it is appropriate that it should have. An ideology is a "science of ideas." But it is also "visionary speculation" (O.E.D.). And an ideologue is either a "theorist" or a "visionary"—according to whether or no he has our sympathy. By its double definition the dictionary shows us what any ideology looks like from two different sides, the inside and the outside. Thomas Hobbes knew this when he offered 17th-century England a choice of government between Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy, and suggested the alternative titles—Tyranny, Oligarchy and Anarchy—for those who might dislike any of them.

A modern ideology is a limited system of political ideas. It is characteristic of such systems to look very different from within and without. It is obvious to a modern Englishman that there are defects in "National Socialism" and to a modern German that Popular Government is not everywhere good government. The inspiration towards a better world which National Socialism was to a German and Democracy was to an Englishman was lost each upon the other. The reason for this is clear enough when we consider the development of ideological thought. We are inclined to forget the human idealism which precedes every ideology, and to which the ideology is offered as a panacea, a cure-all. Men and women, whether in France, Russia, Germany or England, in anxiety or despair about all future good, men and women who wanted better housing, better food, better care for the aged, a better life for themselves and a better future for their children—these are the raw material of every ideology. Someone of fiercer mind narrows down the ideal, hitches it to his own fantasy, and says with force and persuasion: "*This* is what you want! And *this* is how to get it!" The conception is in each case a limited one, a dogma too rigid for the facts. That being so,

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the loyal convert idealizes it in terms of his own concept of a universal good, while the critical onlooker seizes upon nothing but the defects of the theory and the vices of its operation. A dispassionate onlooker would not do this : but in politics the onlooker is not dispassionate, for he has a rival system of his own. If the reader will think of the claims of these two systems, national socialism and democracy, he will see what happens to any devotee of any ideology.

National Socialism called for the patriotic devotion of all classes of society. It taught that there was no room for selfishness of class or creed if the real interests of the national community were to be served, and that only inspired leadership could call forth and focus that unselfish devotion. Democracy, with its longer history and slower development, held that the people knew best : they must govern themselves by their elected rulers, free of the oppression of dominating autocrats or privileged classes. Such were the *theories*. The *facts* of National Socialism appear to have emphasised more the unchallengable national leadership than the socialism of the enterprise. But that did not prevent millions of its devotees from reiterating that class privileges were now abolished and that comradeship was at last complete—or nearly so. The *facts* of Democracy appear to have consisted more in a periodic affirmation (at comparatively infrequent General Elections) that the people ruled the state than in any serious attempt to create any machinery by which they could hope to do so. But that did not prevent millions of its devotees from reiterating that they lived in a free land of self-governing people and that they could not understand how intelligent foreigners could put up with any other system of government.

§ 4. *Ideology from outside and in*

Our chosen ideology thus starts with romantic claims

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which become extended ever more widely by its devotees till it appears to them as an adequate total remedy for all political life. Thus was 19th-century Liberalism, thus Socialism, Communism, National Socialism, Democracy. But whichever of these limited political systems we adopt, we shall not escape the devotee of another system who finds himself the bitter critic of ours. So that National Socialism, a pure white light of inspiration to a young German—a call to national service in peace and war, to selfless devotion to the ideal of nation and race, a symbol of purity, chivalry, high endeavour, repudiation of all sloth and ease, luxury and vice—that same National Socialism can seem to a hostile foreigner to stand for brutality, breach of faith, rapine, inhuman persecution, corruption, vice, lust, a degradation of all human values, something against which it is an ideal and a privilege to strive. While Democracy, which means freedom and order, truth, justice and humanity to a democrat, can mean to a Nazi a hollow sham, a cap drawn over the eyes of the common people, a cloak for grasping imperialism, a will o' the wisp with which the privileged few of a luxurious and degenerate community deceive the many through their stupidity and cowardice, a system which sets up soft, snobbish, flabby, selfish and sentimental values in place of the heroic, unselfish and comradesly vigour of a new reforming order.

Such are ideologies, and such their conflicts, viewed from outside. But are we ever outside—are we ever free of them? According to the class or party to which you belong, according nowadays to the country you live in, you will hear one side of an ideological conflict stated a hundred times and assumed a thousand times for once that you will hear the other. You have only to cross from Liverpool to Dublin for the word "England" to alter its meaning from "champion of the free" to "oppressor of the weak." You have crossed an ideological boundary. An ideology then is a group of political ideas to which is attached a strong and prejudicial

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emotional tone. It is one of those group prejudices in which modern man seems inevitably bound to participate.

§ 5. *What determines an ideology?*

The group of political ideas which we accept, like the religion which we adopt, may be settled merely by where we were born. In present-day England nearly everybody is " democratic " in the sense of eschewing class hatred, either of Right or Left, as a basis of policy. Here, again, environment matters more than birth in determining a political loyalty : and environment includes the physical, material and emotional " climate " of a people. The least important element of this climate is the physical. It does count for something, however, and that something marches with so-called " racial " and " national " character. Italian Fascism was a product of the warm south, bright and sharp, unthorough, almost gay, and where not gay not deeply held. Things Spanish are arid and fierce, whatever else they may be ; things Russian fierce and bitter. All northern political ideas are held tenaciously ; if really new they must develop slowly ; their logic and clarity is often very blurred. In France ideas may be clear, they will always appear logical, and they are only confounded by the perennial illogicality of all life and experience. Germany cuts across climate from grave to gay, from hard to warm and generous, from a very dour and introspective north to a very friendly south. In her recent adoption of one single ideology, and that a narrow one, she emphasises those surroundings which are more important than the merely geographical. Such surroundings are the material and the emotional.

§ 6. *Ideological settings in England and Germany*

The material reasons for any one choosing a group of political ideas, such as national-socialism or conservative-

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democracy, may be obvious or they may not. But they exist and should not be far to seek. In a conservative-democracy, for example, we find a considerable proportion of people who have something material to conserve. An inheritor of a great estate is usually to be found in the party of labour only during a phase of youthful revolt against parental opinion; and this usually occurs before he inherits his estate. Communists have seldom been the possessors of large amounts of private property. National-socialists thought their interests would be advanced by a nationalist policy abroad and a socialist policy at home. The early adherence to that Party of traders, arms manufacturers, derelict small shopkeepers, of unemployed or poorly paid workers, university students, intelligentsia, rentiers, and agriculturalists requires us to turn for explanation to the special material setting of Germany in 1933 and thence to the emotional climate which that setting induced.

The sharply peculiar setting of Germany in the years before National Socialism came to power was as clearly a cause of the acceptance of that doctrine as was the prolonged and less peculiar setting of 19th-century England a cause of the union of British sentiment into democratic nationalism, and its division into Conservative and Liberal—later Conservative and Labour—expressions of that democratic nationalism. This is shown by the experiences that led towards the results in each case.

A national experience of 19th-century England was a rising standard of living, of national wealth, power and prestige, with periodic sudden alleviations of anomalous situations among less favoured groups within the community. After the falsification of the Duke of Wellington's forecast that chaotic republicanism would follow the first extensions of the franchise, nearly everybody agreed to progressive welfare and the gradual "democratic" control of government, though these were always achieved through the medium of carefully managed elections. The workers of

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England were largely satisfied with their rising material standards ; nor, since Britain and Germany had defeated the French Revolution, were they led to expect much real public power. Most of them were content to press for a quicker pace in social reform. From time to time great scandals appeared—the mines, the factory children, housing, etc.—and these were remedied or partly remedied by government under popular pressure. As time went on increasing numbers of workers would have liked a workers' government, and decreasing numbers of employers would have liked to shoot them for that aspiration. But for the most part pride in the achievements of Victorian England abroad and at home united squire and tenant, owner and worker, in a tacit agreement that all should call themselves democrats and that none of them should rock the boat too violently. The same refusal to see each other as enemies comparable with the enemies which arose against their island from across the sea has continued to characterize the relations of British political parties up to the present time. Experiences which led to severe faction were the exception ; they occurred chiefly after the pride of achievement of Victorian England had waned in the humiliations of the South African War and the hazards and weaknesses of the First World War. Disapproval of the Peace Settlement of 1919, the General Strike of 1926, a profound disquiet at home and foreign policy after 1931, all these events awakened party strife. For a time "Democracy" meant less than "Labour," "Capital," "Unemployment," "Collective Security." But the rallying point of the nation still remained ; the strike leaders took pains to avoid chaos in 1926, and nearly the whole nation rallied to the assistance of the pound sterling during its critical illness in 1931. The national sentiment remained deep and deeply to be relied upon.

In Germany the emotional climate was very different. Germany's earlier expansion was not seen as an expression of united Germany, for Germany was not then united. The

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unity that induced Germans to follow Bismarck and the Kaiser to triumph and ultimate calamity was a unity behind a military hierarchy which belonged culturally to one State of the Union only, Prussia. The pageant was splendid; but it inspired the sort of loyalty that requires repeated success and a broader appeal for it to deepen into the convinced and instinctive devotion of nationality. Devotion to the Empire was a loyalty which was cut across for most Germans by many other loyalties, of geography, culture and social class. That is why, after the collapse of 1918 had been followed by tentative separatisms, and then by the era of professors and lawyers, highly class-conscious themselves with a "proletariat" in the background, new inspiration and new symbols were needed to combat those terrors of the 30's, economic depression, unemployment and foreign pressure. Germany, less habitually united than Britain or France, had found its social and political differences immensely enhanced by circumstances. The resources of post-war Germany were very slender: the industrialist must "rationalize" his industry or go bankrupt, which meant letting unemployment increase. Idle students aroused the ire of hungry workers. Landlords had little to share with their tenants except a bankrupt estate. Wiped out as a class by the inflation of 1923, the ex-rentiers felt cheated by workers whose wages kept at least roughly in step with changing money values. Russian communists, linking up with German, increasingly threatened an end to private capital. National surpluses could neither be shared out nor invested, but must be paid out in war reparations by governments which were neither able to refuse payments to the foreigner nor justify those payments to their own people.

Nevertheless the material divergences of interest between the classes of bankrupt and demilitarized Germany, great as they were, were less important than the spiritual bankruptcy which oppressed the whole people. To bring them

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together something greater than a new material climate had to be found. Hitler found them a spiritual climate, the vision of a new Germany, united within upon a basis of sacrifice such as would satisfy the socialist, and facing the outside world with a new nationalism that would arouse universal devotion, respect and awe—as well as materially satisfying the directors of heavy industry. “Ein Reich, ein Volk, ein Führer!”

In the end it is probably always the emotional climate that really determines the ideology. Hitler knew that. But even Hitler's intuition did not seem to tell him that, by driving the most powerful of European states into an atmosphere of unlimited nationalism, he was also providing the emotional setting for a rapid conversion of the other states of Europe either into a similar nationalism, or into militant federal groups, or into supernational communism, whichever seemed to the various people concerned to be the most hopeful way of resisting the threats and attacks of the New Germany. The present democratic nationalism of America and Britain, and the communist nationalism of Russia are the direct results of Hitler's spiritual awakening of Germany.

§ 7. *Simplification and falsification in ideological thinking*

Psychologically considered, ideological thinking is merely prejudicial thinking about politics. In earlier chapters I have tried to show how prejudicial thinking goes with us throughout our lives. We found that essentially prejudice is compounded out of the simple ingredients of simplification and falsification. It is true of any thing or any situation in life that *all* the real facts about it are very difficult to collect ; the truth lies at the far end of an avenue of very great length. The human mind nevertheless desires to reach conclusions and to reach them by not too arduous and uncertain a process. When we have come to conclusions about a thing

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we feel we have mastered it, docketed it, "taped" it. That is why we divide our acquaintances into "nice" people, "funny" people, "interesting" people, "bounders," etc. All behaviour, really so infinitely diverse, is stereotyped in our description of it; each term we use is a simplification. To the falsification that is implicit in such simplification new falsifications are added by emotion. About "Christians" and "cowards," "teetotalers," "vivisectors," we find ourselves thinking emotionally along well-worn rails, as of things well understood and felt to be wholly good or wholly bad as the case may be. In political thought ideologies represent the climax which such simplification and falsification reach when they are allowed to accumulate and continue uncorrected by public opinion and fact-finding law. Prejudices about religion, and even prejudices about race and colour, are open to more correction in the modern world than are nationalism and nationally held ideologies. For the ideologies of today—Fascism, National Socialism, Communism, and perhaps we must add Western Democracy?—have become so grouped as to elude criticism from within the national community which harbours them, and criticism from outside that community is either ignored or suspect. It is here that our psychological "Law of Inevitable Prejudice" (Chapter III, § 1) reaches its profound fulfilment. And in so doing it confirms our earlier conclusion that the chief function of law is the resolving of prejudice. Those who need law most are the groups in which power and the sphere of law have the same boundaries, i.e. the nationally and ideologically minded nation-states themselves. International Law needs to be the strongest law in the world.

It is, alas, a normal thing for normal men to fall victims to an ideology where one has got built up. It is equally normal for ordinary men to end by fighting each other on behalf of their ideologies if there is no system of law to correct their mounting prejudices. But when it comes to the building up

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of an ideological quarrel into a war, there are certain psychological character types which especially contribute to that consummation.

§ 9 *Character types that foster ideological conflicts*

(a) There is, first, the type of mind which psychologists recognize as "obsessional." "Obsessionals" are, on the whole, a superior type of person, at least as far as intellect and performance go. They exist in all national communities, but they are believed to be relatively more numerous in the harder northern climes than in the sunnier south.

The obsessional *has to* do things rightly. He (or she) is driven to do things well, not by sheer love of perfection, but by a huge conscience which has been developed under the spur of anxiety. "Something terrible will go wrong if I *don't* do the right thing" is the inspiring motto of the obsessional. He has to be painstaking, unselfish, meticulous, overworked, in order that nameless gods may be appeased. Such people may deeply resent the unconscious factors that drive them to such self-sacrificing perfection. They have to be devoted in their loyalties; but they are very ready to hate as well! And, since it is not easy for the intelligent adult to love and hate the same object at the same time (which is what the obsessional unconsciously wants to do), the obsessional mind makes a very rigid separation between good and bad, though often the division is made between very similar things. Things must be either worthy or unworthy, the world is full of causes to be served and causes to be scorned: all the greys are either black or white. Such people are naturally ready-made victims to ideological thought and they are to be found at the very centres and origins of all ideologies. They are always crying to us to take up arms against this or that in which they can detect menacing evil. When we let them have their way, they are liable to be unscrupulous in the exe-

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cution of their ideological "duties." For they are striving against "evil" and thus they feel themselves entitled, nay forced, to use the methods of evil. Obsessionals in key positions in society will lead crusades against violence by advocating blasting and bombing, and are ready to reply to cruelty with starvation, all in the name of "The Good," and without a qualm of conscience in the doing. The virtuous obsessional with the brutal unconscious mind is always with us, to keep the rest of us up to scratch in our greater beastlinesses.

(b) Secondly there is a passive element in some people which strengthens the hold upon them of any ideology to which they may have become attached. Normal men often strengthen an aspiring leader by their love of belonging to something strong. But what I have in mind is rather the love of being bullied. It is psychologically popular to call this "masochism," attribute it to ugly psychological origins, and apply the term incontinently to some forceful group to which we are opposed. But there is also a desire for common experience without responsibility, a feeling of being right because of suffering rather than a love of suffering as such. "We are together here in strength. And if we are bullied into obedience, we are no longer responsible for what we do, or for analysing our emotions. Then we can take what comes." What does come may be viewed (unconsciously) as a father's praise or a father's punishment: but if we are only faithful all will be well. Such blind, passive, ecstatic loyalty is an attitude much prized by some military commanders, for whom a brisk subservience is a high sign of grace.

Circumstances and the presence of susceptible types create our ideologies. The prejudice and loyalty of normal human nature carries them on. And if they are cut off from the only solvent of human prejudice, namely externally administered law, those ideological prejudices will mount until they find themselves in inescapable conflict with each

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other. Every ideology states certain view-points which appear entirely unreasonable to those outside it. Such views represent the uncorrected prejudices of a section of world society, of a group within the whole. Whether the conflicts are between classes or nations, between empires or federations, they will still occur so long as there is no means of reducing the claims of every ideology to its proper proportions in terms of total welfare.

CHAPTER EIGHT

INTERNATIONAL LAW: MYTH AND NEED

1. *The present state of International Law.* 2. *The League of Nations.* 3. *The Hague Court.* 4. *Guiding rules for World Justice.* 5. *Note: The place of "equity" in International Law.*

§ 1. *The present state of International Law*

We have studied people individually, in groups, in their nations and ideologies. We know what we mean by law and what its place in human life should be. What of "International Law," the "Law of the Nations"?

Everybody knows that all is not well with "International Law." Austin, one of the greatest of our British law writers of the 19th century, was categorically clear; it is "not law at all but a branch of positive morality." Law is a set of rules which control us, which keep us in order: International Law *asks* us to keep *ourselves* in order. It can never control us as long as "we" are "sovereign states."¹ In the early days of sovereign states, some 300 years ago, Grotius struggled with this problem, failed to solve it, and became the "father" of present "International Law" for stating his dilemma so clearly. In this book enough has already been said about human psychology for us to put the matter very briefly now. Human nature needs law to maintain order in the face of the recurrent selfish impulses which threaten it from all quarters. Either we recognize spontaneously that the "social sanction" must be obeyed, or the fact has to be dinned into us by training and events. When a community has won loyalty and reached cohesion it

¹ Unless we restrict the term sovereignty to its earlier sense of mere governing, a sovereign nation being a nation with a government. We may hope the Moscow Resolutions of 1943 used the term in this sense only, but nothing that has happened since suggests that they did so.

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may become true that "most men at most times" wish to obey the law which maintains its social order. That seems to me to be the true and best basis of law in a modern state—that we want it because we need it for our own control : and we may call such law "extended self-control." But our scrutiny of the analogy between national groups and individuals had made it perfectly clear that, if individuals need law, despite their social consciences and their social training, groups, which are more arrogant and more complacent and more prejudiced than individuals, need it more, and the nation state, which has little or no world-conscience, which receives loyalty but gives none, needs it most of all. The state represents the collective selfishness of its members, and also their collective arrogance. It extracts the social virtues of men and passes on to the world at large only their social vices.

For 400 years the states have staggered on, expanding or contracting, making endless holocausts of the people under their care and government, simply by following "nature" and fighting a war just whenever they felt it to be necessary. A few possible wars have been near misses: for instance there was no war between England and France over the Fashoda Incident in 1898, apparently because Lord Salisbury decided at the last moment that he didn't want one. But no war has ever yet been avoided by a purely legal restraint upon war-making states. That cannot be : because though the state needs curbing more than any other manifestation of human nature in the world, it has not yet been curbed. The state still stands by the doctrine of "sovereign independence," which means that the lawyers have to scratch their heads and devise theories of "Coordinate Entities" and such-like rubbish. It is fatuous to pretend that these supremely egotistical and insolent pieces of human machinery really are bound to law, "morally," or "contingently," or "by their own consent." The only way of being bound to law is *to have to obey it*.

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It is difficult to write about the present and the immediate future. We are in a condition of flux, and this time humanity may really be "on the march." Probably many small nations, in the bitter experience which has come from being next door to large ones, are now willing to give up that absolute sovereignty which in the 17th-century Grotius assumed to be inviolable. If so, it remains to be seen what larger federations will be open to them. If they have learnt their lesson, we must remember that it is insecurity that has taught them it, and that security will be what they want. We must not expect them to join *our* group merely because we are sure it is the right one.

It may be said that sovereignty was limited before this war started, by the League of Nations Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. It was not, though it ought to have been. The League of Nations Covenant "bound" nations not to resort to war under certain conditions—and the obligation was a promise signalized by a signature, as in any other breakable treaty between sovereign states. At least one British authority on international law still thinks that states can be bound by a "minimum undertaking" which they "can fairly be expected to make, and if they make, to honour" ¹¹ Here Prof. Brierly is indubitably wrong. Brothers in arms at the end of a successful war may *believe* that they can found peace upon their collective strength implemented by a promise. But they are mistaken. They make this mistake because, when they are in a mood of expansive benevolence to each other, they cannot foresee the coming divergences of their interests, and with their interests of necessity their moods also. In the 19th century, the successful Concert of Europe which followed the defeat of Napoleon gave Europe 40 years of peace; and that period was as long as it was, not because the friendship of the Powers lasted so long, but because the spheres of influence of the Powers could be separated

¹¹ J. L. Brierly, *London International Law Conference*, 1943.

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sufficiently to prevent a major conflict of interests from occurring. Directly that condition ceased, peace ceased too.

During this century we have so far had to be content with 20 years' interval between our wars. Looking back it is clear that the League of Nations of 1919 was based upon two clearly definable psychological errors. (a) The first was an assumption that the unity of will among the allies who dictated the peace would continue indefinitely into that peace. A phase of mutual goodwill appears to be stable so long as it is with us, whether we be individuals or groups. It is difficult to realize that that phase is brought about only by the continuation of a common interest. Among power-political units interests are ultimately bound to diverge and the divergence is bound to lead to quarrels. This is hardly surprising when we realize that each state conjoins essentially undefined and unlimited aspirations with the doctrine that no one shall judge the merit of those aspirations but itself. Under such circumstances it is only a question of whom you quarrel with first. Your quarrel with A may recreate the common interest you shared with B and C during the last war, or it may make you join hands with ex-enemy D. Common interests between sovereign states are very largely caused by war. Treaties of peace are usually based upon those common interests, often while they are in the very act of disintegration. The League Covenant of 1919 was itself such a treaty. (b) The second erroneous assumption upon which the League Covenant was based was that if any challenge came to the collective authority of the League of Nations it would come from a single and obvious aggressor. In truth no one can foresee upon what issue the next divergence of point of view between Great Powers will come. When it does come it will probably be a quarrel which excites a body of "neutral" sympathy for each side. In the end the alignment of Powers will depend upon their then interests as viewed by them, and never upon past promises or past goodwill. History

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confirms our expectation that nothing is so fleeting and unstable as international friendship.

§ 2. *The League of Nations*

It was in profound misapprehension of these psychological facts that the League of Nations was launched in that expansive phase of general goodwill of 1920. The League "bound" its members (morally) to a number of individual and collective actions upon any threat of war, and also provided some opportunities for conciliation and revision of unjust treaties. In general its decisions had to be unanimous to become effective. Moreover it bound a state only until that state had exhausted the procedures of conciliation. Such an organisation might look as if it ought at least to be able to act as a forum of world public opinion and collective force whenever there was one flagrant aggressor against World Peace. But the League did not act successfully even in that setting. When the solitary aggressor came—and he came twice—his aggression was against a solitary victim ! World Peace felt the draught, and the League machinery was started. But a League which had not shown itself just (by readiness to revise unjust treaties) and whose leading members were already diverging to follow their (misinterpreted) individual "interests"—in our case to favour "our good friend" Japan with our present Lord Chancellor and to avoid "mid-summer madness" against Italy with our late Prime Minister—such a League was ill-equipped for its task because it was not a world forum at all, but a *League of National Governments*.

We must not forget how much human devotion went into the League of Nations. Expressed in adequate institutions that devotion would probably have sustained World Order as it passed through the phase of doubtful novelty to that of established reliability. Devotion to the

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League was a devotion to the "one good thing" that had come out of the last war, the one institution that represented the firm wish of all peoples to avoid a repetition of that huge tragedy. But the League never had the power of irresistible achievement which alone will attract the keen loyalty of the mass of men. Its moral strength lay in its being the symbol of an ideal to the idealists of all nations. Scoffed at by its earlier opponents, it came to be held in a too sacred affection by its ardent friends. Its feebleness was glossed over, its huge faults whitewashed, its little successes boomed. Those who pointed to its vital weaknesses—that it lacked central power, that its institutions represented governmental selfishness instead of popular idealism, that it failed to achieve disarmament or even to attempt treaty revision—such counsellors were not welcome in the conclaves of its organized supporters. "The League way is the only way," was their slogan, when it was not narrowed still further to "Support *our* delegates at Geneva!" "Our" delegates were really only national government representatives at an International Conference. Of the British Foreign Ministers who headed delegations to Geneva, only one (Sir S. Hoare) ever made a speech which suggested to foreign listeners a willingness to put the interests of the community of nations before those of Great Britain herself. Nothing was ever done to implement that solitary speech. Few national representatives behaved much better.

§ 3. *The Hague Court*

The Permanent Court of International Justice (the "Hague Court") had some of the same faults as the League of Nations. It was set up in 1921 to judge (1) all cases which the national parties referred to it, (2) all cases in which reference to the Court is provided for in existing treaties or conventions, (3) certain other types of cases in which states had already declared their willingness to

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go to the Court. (4) The Court could also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question submitted to it by the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations.

By what rules were the judgements of the Hague Court to be guided? They were the following:—(1) Existing treaties (which form the “contract law” of states) come first on the list. That is why the Treaty of St. Germain, imposed upon defeated Austria in 1919 and re-interpreted in a Loan Protocol of 1922, prevented the Court from sanctioning the economic union of Austria and Germany ten years later, though that union was then desired by both the parties immediately concerned. Next come (2) international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, (3) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, (4) judicial awards and teachings of legal publicists. Finally (5) if both parties wish it, the Court could give decisions “in equity” (*ex aequo et bono*).¹

The judges of the International Court were elected as follows. The states put up a panel of judges, four each, only two of them to be of their own nation. From the list so made up fifteen judges and four deputy judges were chosen by the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations voting separately. A majority vote in both bodies elected. Each judge remained nine years and was then eligible for re-election. Nine judges formed a quorum. A nation had a right to be “represented” by one judge of its own nation when its case was before the Court.

There is the plan of the Court. It worked for nearly twenty years till it was engulfed in universal war. How did it work?

The Hague Court settled many small issues. But, excepting the proposed Austro-German *Anschluss*, no

¹ In addition various nations gradually signed an “Optional Clause” binding themselves to accept the jurisdiction of the Court in any decision concerning treaty-interpretation and international law and obligation, though many, including Britain, weakened their acceptance with reservations.

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important dispute between Great Powers was ever submitted to it. No one ever suggested submitting a dispute which was likely to lead to war. The practical weaknesses of the Court may be listed as follows. First, despite the careful selection of judges, those judges were inclined to show national bias, to cast a vote for their governments rather than to judge the case dispassionately. It is recorded (Lauterpacht) that in a series of 16 cases dealt with, in 12 the judges were each aligned with his own government's point of view, the judges of the defeated nation voting in each case against the majority. Secondly, treaty interpretation took first place as a guide to the Court. Now treaties are in practice usually the result of political pressure or of war—they represent the sort of “justice” a World Court should be there to *avoid* and to correct rather than to support. No case was ever judged in “equity”—i.e., on its sheer merits—so absolute justice was never attempted. Finally, the Court had no power of enforcing its decisions.

§ 4. *Guiding rules for World Justice*

The guiding rules for that first World Court were ethically and psychologically wrong. The principle of fair play, or “equity,” requires to be “enthroned”: it must take the first and not the last place in any adequate system of international justice. Simple guiding principles should be established for the judges to apply, principles which all men everywhere will regard as just, whenever they are not one of the interested parties to a dispute! We can safely call such a deposit of democratic international morality “Equity.” “Equity” has been variously defined with infinite legalistic sophistry throughout the ages. The Romans (at one stage of their career) defined it as “*in fairness and for the common good*,” and that definition will, I think, suit world society very well today.¹

¹ See note at the end of this chapter.

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Once we have defined what we mean by "equity" in this way, we should go on to instruct our International Judges that whenever equity conflicts with any other source of law, "equity shall prevail." This is a sound legal tradition, and it is the only way in which unjust remnants of international contract law, signed by sovereign states under various inequitable forms of duress, can be prevented from fouling international justice at its source. It might be claimed that it was because the world of 1921 to 1939 did not acknowledge such rules of equity either in international politics or in international law that none of the great disputes of the peace period—disputes such as those over German rights in Danzig or Czechoslovakia, or the return of colonies—could be submitted to the World Court with any hope of a just decision and one which the world as a whole would be prepared to support.

The national bias of international judges greatly worries many people who look forward earnestly to legal remedies for the lawless state of world society. How, it is said, can we ever expect to get fair judges from among the citizens of nation-states? Psychological considerations make this problem a smaller one than it has seemed to some observers to be. Judges are trained to administer justice dispassionately. But they are also trained to administer it *according to certain guiding rules*. When a court is told to apply an unjust treaty, judges with a passion for justice will look for alternative decisions, while the disinterested judge will coldly and "correctly" apply his guiding rules. How passionately interested present-day national judges can be can easily be imagined. But if we revised the guiding rules of our World Court so that inequitable decisions would never be required of judges we should remove one obstacle to justice, namely the passionate resentment which turns a would-be judge into a partisan advocate.

Another factor is involved here. Until equitable decisions become the rule, the World Court can have little

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claim to dignity or prestige. In the public mind the prestige of a court of law is related to the reliability and justice of its findings. And the greater the prestige of the Court the greater will be the sense of responsibility of the judges.

An orderly world will not strain the loyalty of judges as does our present disorderly one. If the passionate judge cannot be finally banished from the World Court (and he has not been finally banished from our Bench of Magistrates or our House of Lords), his passion will take on a very different tone in an orderly world of diminished or absent state-sovereignties. The existence of World Law in place of war will reduce the tension of strenuously contested cases ; for the " vital interests " of no nation will be at stake in a life and death struggle such as is so familiar in our present era. It is difficult for our generation to envisage the diminished tension of an orderly legal process, with whatever sanctions are necessary lying behind the law, but with no armed force drawn up behind the contesting states. For we are going to find that national armies must be replaced by international force—World Force—in the only sort of World Order that will adequately support a true World Court.

World Order need not fear a lack of able and dispassionate administrators. But World Justice can only be done when humanity has the courage and enterprise to endow the administrators of its laws with the necessary equipment, including adequate power and rules that guide judgement towards fairness and the common good of humanity.

NOTE

The place of " equity " in International Law

In the idea of " equity " as " fair play " the ancient Romans join the man-in-the-street over the heads of all the lawyers in between. The man-in-the-street assumes that

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certain things are obviously right and others obviously wrong. It is right to stand up for one's friend and wrong to steal your neighbour's chickens, particularly if he is poorer than you are. Not only are some things right and some things wrong, but it is common belief that it is possible to settle any human issue by the carefully informed judgement of plain men. That is to say there is, it is held, a justice which all men everywhere would agree to call just.

The lawyers have had difficulty with this conception because it is found that, while the man in the street feels confident that he knows what "fair play" is, the actual interpretation of "fair play" does vary as you pass from one civilization or nation to another, it even varies as you pass from street to street.

Despite this difficulty the assumption that there is a universal "natural" standard of right and wrong has played an important part in all newly-developing systems of law. The Romans for example applied this assumption of "Natural Law" to newly-administered territories at the many edges of their great Empire, and Medieval law in England allowed a citizen to appeal direct to the Lord Chancellor for fair play "in God's name and in the way of charity" where the written law bore hardly on his case. The Chancellor's decisions were given "*in equity*," as contrasted with decisions by the written legal rules. Continental jurists are familiar with the principle today; and not only the Statute of the International Court of Justice, but recent international treaties¹ provide for the settlement by this means of all disputes which are not otherwise provided for.

"Equity" then is the principle of decision in fairness and for the common good. And the legal difficulty which has always attended the "Law of Nature" conceived as a moral law, the difficulty of who is to tell us what *our* consciences should say, can be resolved in practice if men of all nations will come together and agree to say *something*

¹ e.g. the Belgian-Swedish and Belgian-Spanish Treaties of 1925.

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on this matter of universal fair play, and then see to it that that something is enforced. There can be no finality to moral progress ; the " Law of Nature " is only the orderly revelation of human nature, progressively understood.

The justice of the World community, the Law of Nations, will probably have to depend a great deal upon decisions " in equity " during the years in which World Law is taking definite shape as a code. Both the equity and the code that follows it will have to admit that it deals with a situation which is always changing because of the progressive morals, progressive knowledge and progressive experience of mankind.

CHAPTER NINE

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF WORLD ORDER

1. *The relevant facts of human nature.* 2. *The problem of the "Sovereign" power group.* 3. *The prospect of one dominating Power-Group.* 4. *World Order by co-ordination of States.* 5. *World Federation of Peoples.* 6. *Introducing World Democracy?*

§ 1. *The relevant facts of human nature*

OUR world consists of men and women whose characters and behaviour are sufficiently similar for our World Order to be built upon a basic human nature. We consider that we now have ample evidence for that.

Just as there is known to be material enough and power enough to yield a life of physical comfort for all on this planet, so there seems to be enough co-operative and friendly human nature throughout the world to enable all normal men and women to live a life of very great freedom and happiness. What is required in the psychological as in the economic field is an organisation which is based upon our knowledge of the facts. Economists have told us their requirements. The author of this book believes that there are psychological requirements of World Order, and that they also can be discovered and stated. The following propositions are based on the facts about human emotion described in the foregoing chapters.

(a) *The first step to peace, prosperity and human happiness is to secure order.* Over and over again human societies have failed because they paid attention to "rights," "justice," even "freedom," and neglected order. Unless order is secured, justice must soon break down; nor can freedom in disorder be general or amount to much. The moment that properly ordered relations end the minds of men are thrown open to passion and prejudice, commotion

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and chaos. The maintenance of the emotional stability upon which real justice and freedom depend requires order.

(b) *Order can be of two kinds, stable and unstable.* Order requires the control of human passion, notably greed, aggressiveness and lust: and since human nature does not provide for adequate self-control of these passions, they must be controlled from outside. Social order must enable A to control B. But if it does not also equally provide for the control of A that social order is essentially unstable. Any order based upon a division of society into a class that is ruled and a class that rules is unstable and bound to be impermanent. Those who point to economic conflict between proletarian and capitalist point to one instance only of the source of human disorder.

This is especially a problem of group psychology. Our partisan emotions are bound to follow the real interests of our group as we see them; and if our partisan emotions are involved in judgement, that judgement is inevitably perverted from true justice. For this reason any ruling class with executive power will always discriminate against other classes, and usually it will end by repressing them. The situation of such a divided society is always a potentially revolutionary one, though actual revolution may be staved off by a showy transfer of nominal power, or it may be long deferred from lack of the means to bring it about. The important point is that such divided societies can never offer a generally acceptable freedom. For the word "freedom" will mean two very different things to the giver and the receiver, the dominating class and the dominated. The Liberal oligarchies of the 19th century thought they had achieved British freedom: the workers in their mills did not.

(c) *A stable order requires good law, which means external judgement.* For a society to remain stable it must recognize the fact and the mode of operation of prejudice in its practical life. It must understand, for

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instance, that our inevitable prejudices are seldom due to sheer conscious selfishness ; they depend upon genuine unconscious misjudgements of our rights in our relationship with others, as when a property-owner holds that war-time strikers should be shot or a day labourer that all profiteers should be "liquidated." The necessary adjustment of such prejudicial judgements is achieved by a system of law. A stable society must provide by its laws for the impartial arbitrament of *all* conflicting interests within that society. Such a dispassionate system can be supported by us all. Often we are unaware of its universality : it seems as if it couldn't limit *us* since we feel *we* shall always be just. But in the end it does limit us the moment it finds us acting upon our own passionate minority of prejudice. The more stable the society the less it depends for its stability upon the control of Group A by Group B, and of Group B by Group A and the more it rests upon a general co-operation which includes each of its total members some of the time and most of its members all the time. Thus we reach the point when we can regard the law of our stable society as *a control of ourselves through each other*. When it really turns out to be that we can begin to call it good Democratic Law.

The most central fact in all the study of law and society is just this need to provide external judgement for every human dispute that may arise among us human beings. It is interesting and important to note that such a provision for man's need of law as a means of achieving order can apparently be made adequate only when it rests upon a democratic basis.

§ 2. *The problem of the "Sovereign" power group*

Upon this requirement of a stable order there impinges the problem of that great organized power group of today—the "sovereign" state. Between individuals the operation of the "Law of Inevitable Prejudice" is corrected by the

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“Law of the Land.” That law and the power that goes with it have bound us into national groups of increasing stability and democratisation. The problem before the world is the extension of such law to work between the national groups themselves.

Our human tendency to group will always remain and we do not want to remove it. We group ourselves for common interests, for common purposes, in common ways of life, by tradition, geographically, culturally, as economic classes, racially to some extent and nationally perforce. But the problem of the interrelation of groups need never disturb a statesman provided there exists machinery for resolving any dispute between those groups by adequate external judgement, by a just law which works. The task of World Order which is to secure impartial judgement and power of enforcement between all groups as well as between all individuals, finds that the crux of its problem is to secure laws to govern the sovereign power groups which between them now divide the whole force of the world.

We have become so used to attacks upon the fantastic claims of national sovereignty during recent years that we may be in danger of forgetting that the proper object of attack is not the nation but the sovereignty. We are still fresh from our experience of this awful era of sovereign states and sovereign nations. But the world already seems to be passing into a phase in which the unit will be enlarged from sovereign state to sovereign federation. No enlargement of the power group which does not also make the new unit subject to effective law can solve the fundamental problem of World Order. These larger federal groupings are insidious baits for man's long-enduring desire to belong to something strong. By collecting up and settling minor quarrels of the world (as the nation-states did before them), federations may make wars less frequent. But they leave them inevitable and they make them more severe. The notion that such power units as “United Europe” and

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“ Greater Asia ” and “ Pan-America ” (with the British Empire somehow parcelled out between the groups or forming a separate one on its own) could discuss their conflicts of interest amicably and in prolonged freedom from prejudice, veiled threat and open menace, is to assume that human nature will change when it is given a larger machine to handle, whereas it runs true to type throughout. Whether the world consists of single states and single nations or United States and United Nations our problem will still be *to reduce to order the relations between those groups by the rigid test of external judgement and power.*

§ 3. *The prospect of one dominating Power-Group*

The world may presently be tempted to accept an unstable solution of its problem in the hope that stability will somehow be achieved before another relapse into anarchy occurs.

The question asked is “ Can we hope to build a single power group, which is not world-wide or all-powerful, but which will be powerful enough to dominate the whole world sufficiently to maintain order and peace ? ” In these expansive days one can conceive of a Federation of United Nations trying to administer a Peace Settlement in which a substantial minority of world power was the ruled and they remained the rulers. Such an attempt was made in 1919, when Germany and Russia were excluded from the League of Nations, except that then no actual federation was formed. If no federation of the victors is formed this time and if the coming Peace Settlement is again to be upheld by promise and alliance alone, then we may confidently anticipate the early fragmentation of the united will that has won this war. Diverging group interest and prejudice will surely see to that. But even if an adequate federation is formed and that federation includes the preponderant military force of the world; if things are left at that, then,

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sooner or later, one of two things must occur. Either the substantial minority of purely governed peoples will have to be admitted to the system (thus creating at last a World Federation) or the cause of those disenfranchised peoples will remain liable to drive a wedge somewhere in the firmest unity of the federated victors. The genuine grievances of a power-group always arouse wide and even passionate sympathy. And in such a case as we foresee the grievances would be many and serious—the Law of Inevitable Prejudice would have seen to that. A federation that felt itself proof against disruption would therefore be wise to include the vanquished peoples (which is not of course the same as the vanquished governments) from the start.

§ 4. *World Order by Co-ordination of states*

The real ways to World Order are two, a *World-wide Co-ordination of states*, and a *World Federation of Peoples*. The first of these, a co-ordination of governments, is a practicable way of securing peace provided always that co-ordination includes the whole power of the world. It does not matter what you call it, "International Authority," "World Confederation," "League of Nations No. 2"—provided it is universal and provided also that it possesses the requisite institutions for resolving any dispute that can arise between the member-states by a judgement from a source of adequate power external to the parties concerned.

Let us assume such a World Confederation to be formed by a World Conference and to be composed of the states of the world as they will stand at the end of this war, or even as they stand now, with the necessary return of independence to nations which have lost it in the struggles of the Greater Powers. Let us assume too that the full doctrine of non-interference with the internal administration of states is to be adopted and that our sole concern is to co-ordinate the lives of the states of the world so that order shall reign

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in perpetuity. What are our requisites ? They are five : (a) A World Force with (b) its Executive, (c) a World Court, (d) a World Charter and (e) a Legislative Conference or Assembly.

(a) World Force

We can hardly repeat too often that order rests on force. Whatever local and national forces are required for policing or to deal with awkward internal minorities, there must be an arrangement to prevent such forces from ever being mobilized against the World Order to which the nations belong. That means a World Military (or "Police") Executive that can always call upon force superior to any that can be used against it. Not now, or next year, but when States A, B and C, now so contented and docile, become disgruntled with the World Order of 1965, and States D, E, F and G prefer to do nothing about it.

They *must* do something about it, or rather somebody must do it for them. Will a promise (a "minimum undertaking which they will both make and honour") do ? No, it will not ; for the simple reason that the then governments of those states will not see why they should keep that particular promise under the "altered circumstances" of the time. Or, more correctly, they will be emotionally unable to keep their promise against their later inclinations and will then find "reasons" to explain away that fact.

Here we are dealing with a part of the machinery of peace which must be made as nearly automatic in operation as the wit of man can make it. The World Authority must always be able to concentrate at any point in the world force sufficient to repel with certainty any challenge to its order and authority, whatever the emotions of individuals or groups may be at the time of challenge.

(b) Executive

The control and disposition of such forces is a technical military (or police) matter. In the political sphere there

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must be some body to "press the button" upon any threat to the public order of the world. That body would have to decide whether in any area of the world the local police are insufficient to maintain order, and if so order the World Police immediately to that spot.

When that is arranged and made quite plain, what will happen to the troops of the nation-states? Exactly what has happened to the police of the State of Massachusetts or the County Council of Surrey—they will be maintained at the level required for their internal functions and no more. No one will be able to find them any other function to perform—that is provided the other necessary steps in the organization of peace by co-ordination of states are taken.

(c) *World Court*

In 1913 the Constabulary of Ulster suddenly found itself reinforced by volunteers. And so wide a public opinion thought either that that reinforcement was reasonable or else that it was negligible, that a British Government suddenly found itself pitched into a civil conflict only made abortive by the outbreak of the First World War. How can we make sure that a similar slow landslide of public opinion does not gradually turn a "negligible" incident into a formidable issue upon which World Order might split? The answer is that we must apply principles and instruments of justice with which Dublin Castle and the British Government of 1914 were quite unprovided. We have to apply our sovereign rule of justice, that justice shall be sought *outside* the contesting parties. Justice must always be obtainable: there must be no delay of redress, or accumulation of grievances. World Order must thus provide not only a World Police or World Order Force but a World Court which is capable of giving a fair decision upon grievances of every kind that can arise. If we retain our present independent ("sovereign and equal") states, these

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grievances will be the grievances of states. And however quickly we build up International Law many of these claims for adjustment and revision will be made as appeals to an "Equity" which can be directed only by the broadest of guiding rules. The Court must be ready: it must be manned by judges of the highest repute. But, since the moral law which is "Equity," can really be given an acceptable "content" only by the common agreement of mankind, those judges must be given rules of guidance which will have the widest possible approval. Such guidance they must have. We cannot expect a judge to be both judge and moralist

(d) The World Charter

What sort of claims will come before the World Court?
(a) Questions of population versus living space? Then there should be a clause in the World Charter that says that no nation or people shall suffer curtailment in the good life of its citizens by virtue of overcrowded territories or lack of access to the means of that good life. (b) An unjust treaty still operating from the "bad old days" in which we now live? The World Charter should decree that treaties shown to be out of date or inapplicable in equity shall be abrogated and replaced by an agreement integrating the life of the local communities concerned with the good life of the world as a whole. (c) Another clause in the World Charter should define true "Equity" as being in the best interests of all peoples of the world and in the promotion of the interests of each individual in the world where these can be promoted within the jurisdiction of the World Court.

This last reservation is necessary only because the touchy governments of hitherto sovereign states are going to insist that they administer all the law within their own states themselves. The good life of their people as Englishmen, Frenchmen, etc. will still lie in their care. But the

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World Charter (*d*) should grant the free and unfettered dissemination of the news and views of men and women throughout the world. Local national governments will thus be kept busy by the demands of their peoples that their lives shall be brought by internal legislation to a level equal to that of the best-administered nation in the World Community.

We need not fear that repression of minorities, persecutions, brutal tyrannies and the more absurd of ideologies could survive in such a World Order. Repressive governments are inconveniences to everybody, and their own citizens put up with them only for the sake of a millennium which they expect to be reached by national conflict. Each tyranny at present in our world is the product of hard times, and most of them are the product of war and the discriminations of past tyrannies. Who would support the minority policies of Herr Hitler, Signor Mussolini or Sir Oswald Mosley in an orderly world with good government the rule in neighbouring states, and his own state not threatened even in his imagination?

(e) Legislative Assembly

Our initial World Charter may need revision by amendment, like the Constitution of the United States. Our codified laws will certainly need amending. So that beside a World Court there must be a Legislative Body. It is to represent states? Then let it do so, provided the rest of the machinery remains intact. Let it do so until the increasing democratization of the world renders a Second Assembly, a Lower House, or Congress, a legislative body drawn from the *peoples* of the world, an overdue necessity.

§ 5. *World Federation of Peoples*

This seems to me to be the second way in which a sound

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and stable World Order can be instituted. It is the better way. But it makes no bow to your prejudices in favour of your nation-state. It is the way of those who realize that national groups have been formed to be convenient units of organization in the historical past, but that there is nothing either fundamental or permanent about them. Our nation-states have all changed much in recent years, and many of them are due for very big changes in the near future. They seem permanent to us only because our own loyalties are wrapped up in them for the time being.

See how they change ! America was a collection of European colonies 160 years ago. Sixty years ago, as the U.S.A., she was almost wholly concerned with her domestic sovereignties. Today she is the leader of the Western World. England has passed in the same period from the control of one Empire to the control of another, and then on to the shedding of much of that second Empire as self-governing but associated states. In 150 years France has discarded a medieval monarchy and a huge empire, dominated Europe, led the way in modern imperialism, and shrunk again to a state interested almost entirely in itself and the freedom and integrity of life of its own people. Italy has passed in a hundred years from city-states to modern dictatorship and on into modern chaos. Germany has risen. Japan has sprung from nowhere into here. There is nothing very fixed about all that. The states of the modern world consist of fluctuating powers and highly unstable constellations. But for their members they represent inner cores of idealism, culture, peculiar ways of life. These things are of long duration in the hearts and minds of folk. They are in no way threatened by the World Order that is here suggested.

National culture has really nothing to do with national power, as you may see by looking at Scotland, Ireland and Wales. Is there any more reason why devoted Rhinelanders and Piedmontese and Catalans and Welshmen

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should lose their cherished cultures by sending representatives to a parliament at Geneva than by sending them to parliaments at Berlin, Rome, Madrid and London respectively? For purely cultural purposes each group of them should probably have a parliament much nearer home than they have at the present time. But for such purposes as trade regulation and transport and, above all, the maintenance of law and order, it has become impossible to limit world government to these "capital" cities and the "states" that go with them. The First World War came because we had not learnt the need of World Government; the Second World War has come because we did not realize precisely what changes World Government required. We proceeded by *agreement* and *promise*; and the only really "black record" internationally is the record of national promises. We thought, too, that we could hold partisan power and do impartial justice at one and the same time, which happens (probably through no fault of our own) to be not only a national but a human impossibility.

§ 6. *Introducing World Democracy?*

It is suggested that a stable World Order requires five established institutions. (a) A *World Force* to maintain order, (b) a *World Executive* to press all necessary buttons for the maintenance of order, (c) a *World Court* to judge the disputes and claims of the larger groups of mankind, and (d) a *World Legislature* to issue and revise (e) a World Charter of agreed Principles of Human Justice, and also to build and adapt World Law in whatever detail proves necessary to World Government.

One way of doing these five things is for all of us to keep our nation-states more or less as they are (we may hope and expect with increasing democracy within them) and have those states represented *as states* in a World Executive, take part *as states* in a World Court and World

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Legislature and *as states* be controlled by a World Guard or Police Force.¹ If we continue to insist upon our artificial and fluctuating but present and beloved states being independent of each other in their government of us, this is the way to World Order we shall have to choose. But is there any good reason why we men and women of the world should not really start governing ourselves through each other, not merely in our variably enlightened "democratic" states, but as World Citizens of a comprehensive World Democracy—I mean something more really self-governing than any democracy most of us have ever yet secured at home?

Our own country is hardly in the forefront of Democracy, though we like to pretend it is. Englishmen still cherish the notion that the election upon ephemeral issues of policy of candidates presented by political party organizations every five or ten years is all that is required of Democracy. We are proud of the fact that everybody over 21 has a vote at these occasional elections, and ignore the fact that half of those voters remain unrepresented while the other half are represented by a candidate whom none of them chose. In England we never think of referring current political issues direct to our people.

There already exist democracies more democratic than that! The Swiss for instance, with their method of referring important bills in both local and central legislatures direct to the electors, and the power which is given to the people to take the "initiative" in any matter by a quorum of signatures. A smaller proportion of the Swiss population than voted for our British Peace Ballot of 1935 can insist that their policy be put before the Chamber or dealt with

¹ The World Guard itself should under no circumstances consist of state or national units. It should be recruited from suitable young men of all nations, enlisting individually and brigaded irrespective of their nationality. They should possess the necessary linguistic ability to learn whatever World Language or languages may be adopted for official international purposes.

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by further "referendum" to the country at large. The Swiss have *begun* to govern themselves: they began it a long time ago. And, despite sharp divisions of class in town and country, and all the material for sectarianism which is provided by three major languages and two conflicting religions, the Swiss find that their budding democracy works.

If we are ever going to institute World Democracy we must see that we order our events properly. We cannot start World Elections to a World Parliament with half a dozen armed states looking satirically on with their powers of interference intact. We can discredit a World Parliament as easily as a League of Nations Assembly if we proceed in that way. First comes the signature of the World Charter and the giving up of national "self-help," the metaphorical handing over of swords, the actual disarmament of armies. The World Guard must next be provided for; its size decided, its first commanders selected, its equipment arranged. Then comes the election of the First World Assembly, consisting of candidates elected on a population basis. Here it may be necessary to apply a principle of custodianship for undeveloped peoples. If so, that custodianship must be vested in the World Authority. It must also be clearly shown just how that custodianship is to be reconciled with two fundamental clauses of the World Charter: (a) the clause affirming the fundamental equality of men and women everywhere, and (b) the clause affirming the prime concern of World Government to be human welfare placed before all partisan interests of all groups of men everywhere.

It does not matter if the first delegations to the World Assembly seem to have a national character. Since the first conflicting issues which arise under World Order will have a national flavour, the delegates must be felt to be representing nations; though this time it should be the peoples of the nations and not just their governments.

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Our safeguard will lie in the fact that nothing those delegates can do will ever hand back to their states power greater than they require for ruling their own people successfully.

CHAPTER TEN

FRUSTRATIONS, HOPES—AND A START?

1. *Sources of frustration.* 2. *Immediate dangers:* (a) *The poverty of democracy.* (b) *The red-herring of retribution.* (c) *Inertia and complacency.* (d) *Over-confidence.* 3. *A start?*

§ 1. *Sources of frustration*

To set up World Order and start World Peace we now have five essential political requirements which derive from the psychological structure of mankind. They are :—(1) a World Legislature, (2) an Executive, (3) a World Police, (4) a World Court and (5) a World Charter of the Rights of Man. We ordinary people may well ask ourselves now, near the end of the Second World War, how we stand in our hope of attaining such a World Order and Peace when it is over. What are our chances ?

Not very high at the present time, since no belligerent government in the world has declared itself to be fighting for World Order in any such sense. Our own (British) Government was primarily fighting against Hitlerite Germany, and according to our present Foreign Minister it has no better guarantee of future peace to offer us than collaboration between the three big allies which are winning the war.¹ The allied statesmen of 1918 had more to offer us than that, though in the end they gave us so much too little. Until a World Order which will work becomes a Peace Aim of peoples and a War Aim of the governments of the winning

¹ "I make no secret of the objective we set ourselves in foreign policy. The maintenance of peace after this conflict is over depends on a close intimate understanding between the nations of the British Commonwealth, the United States and the Soviet Union". (See Mr. A. Eden, House of Commons Debate, February 24, 1944.)

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side, every life lost in this war is likely to have been just a life lost—again.

This is not the place to analyse the conscious selfishness and arrogance that can thwart us. On the whole such things are not difficult of analysis, we can waste precious energy in pursuing such quarries. The few thousand bad men of our international world—the arms manufacturers who have lobbied against World Order in the past and will lobby against it again, the few statesmen who fought to retain the bombing aeroplane well knowing what it would bring to Europe, the few ambitious national leaders who gambled recklessly with the world's peace for their own glorification—these can soon be singled out by history; their infamy is already known to their enemies and it will soon be admitted by their erstwhile friends. But the place of such men as trouble-makers so easily becomes over-rated: the danger is not that they will escape punishment (which in the end they usually do), but that by the time their punishment is attainable it is out of date as a remedy and its pursuit has become purely vindictive. These men are the incidental beneficiaries life-rented (or less) in a legacy of general disorder. Their trick is over. It is the future that concerns us. In planning to hang a dead Kaiser in 1919 nobody thought of looking for the Reich-Chancellor's insignia in a house-painter's tool kit.

Were those insignia there? We ordinary people must look nearer home if we would prevent the frustration of our future lives. Hitler was probably right when he told the Saarlanders that the Allied statesmen had put him where he was. And did not we put the Allied statesmen where they were, more or less? If you voted "Coalition" in 1918 (which half of you did) and if you did not subsequently demand a referendum or new elections on the Peace Settlement that followed, you have your tiny responsibility for the Versailles Treaty and the subsequent history of Europe. If you voted Conservative or National Liberal in 1931 you

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helped to send Sir John Simon and Lord Londonderry to Geneva. You had no idea what that was to mean? Nor, it is to be hoped, had they! It is the unconscious, unintended contributions to strife that require recognition—not in detail, but in type. Such machineries as I have outlined provide the minimum and the only remedy that I can see for the type of misjudgement that springs from our partisan human nature and, left to human nature, always leads to conflict.

§ 2 *Immediate dangers*

There are some immediate practical dangers to peace-making after a war, which if they are not overcome will start us off in very unfavourable conditions upon our greater task of securing the peace of the future. In particular four such dangers seem to require emphasis today. They are (a) the poverty of democracy at home, (b) the pursuit of retribution, (c) post-war inertia and (d) over-confidence.

(a) *The poverty of democracy.* We British men and women are still too little our own masters politically: only very occasionally has any large body of us ever tried to become that. The Americans sometimes show lively signs of forming their own opinions. Historically the French people have probably tried more than any other nation to express their own collective will. They were usually unfortunate, often wrong. Soon we may hope to see them take up the task again. But we English, who talk so much of freedom, are a very docile people. Once in my life-time have we expressed political determination against our government's leadership. It was in December 1935 when we had been instantly and insolently betrayed by a government fresh from elections—the very same elections that provided us with our recent (1944) parliament. The determination we then expressed was to see the League of Nations set to work applying adequate sanctions against Italy's invasion

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of Abyssinia. But angry as we were that December, we found we were "hitting a pillow" and we grew tired before the Spring.

Habitually we leave far too much in the hands of our "professional" politicians. But in any democratic country and at any time there may arise leadership and a movement demanding the only possible structures of World Order. Such demands may even arise at one time in enough countries to ensure their success. At present it appears more than likely that those nations which have accepted war as their present lot will follow their successful war leaders into the peace. Those war leaders may carry us with them into a just and durable order. There are signs that one or two of our allied war leaders do understand much of the making of a good peace. Some certainly do not: and there are many dangers before any who do. Given our present stage of democracy, is our most enlightened public opinion capable of correcting any of the mischief into which our negotiating statesmen are likely to fall? Not easily!

(b) *The red-herring of retribution.* This danger applies to leaders and led alike. During warfare there may be a phase of clear vision that comes before the settlement. President Wilson had such vision in 1917 when he said: "All parties to this war must take part in the settlement," and when he enunciated his famous Fourteen Points. But the period of the settlement itself tends to concentrate attention upon those of the bad men who happen to have been defeated, upon immediate advantage for the victors at the expense of the vanquished, and upon the need of urgent remedies against exhaustion and collapse. The daily urgency and the weekly wrangles of the 1919 Peace Settlement removed from the negotiating statesmen the power to concentrate upon the permanent framework of peace, and in the end even overcame President Wilson's determination to see his League of Nations start upon its course unfettered by crying injustice, bitterness and malice.

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To all these distractions is added the pursuit of retribution, canvassed as a cult in press and on platform until the wisest statesmen yield to the hue and cry and allow precious energy to be frittered away in flogging dead horses.

(c) *Inertia and complacency.* Both inertia and complacency are prime faults of victorious peoples. The dangerous morass of post-war inertia into which a people is so liable to sink after its military exertions are over can lose a Peace by letting the settlement go by default. Our exertions have secured victory for the "right" side, and therefore there will be a "good" peace. Our interests consequently became civil and domestic and far away from "politics." This is a great danger. It is immensely important that fighting peoples should retain their political interests and determination into the period of peace-making. They should also try to avoid that natural identification of their own side with virtue unalloyed which leads straight to this supreme error—that "our" peace must be a "good" peace. The peace is good or bad *in itself*, from the way it is made and the energy that is put into it, not from the fighting that preceded it. A villain may make a good peace: many people think that Napoleon's peace would have been better for Europe than the peace that followed his downfall. Good men with a good cause can make a very bad peace. *Ord, brý* men will make a bad peace unless the principles which they follow are untinged by present passion and present opportunism. This time the peoples of the world must try to insist that their Peace Charter is well-drawn and of universal application, that it is drawn up calmly, if necessary in two stages; and then that it is applied in the face and over the heads of all those who would snatch any momentary advantage from the temporary disaster of their foes.

(d) *Over-confidence.* Another danger is of a different kind. The peace may be generous and still be all wrong. Generous moods, post-prandial, unbuttoned moods often follow

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vindictive moods. Do you remember 1928, the time of "Gentlemen's Agreements" and the Kellogg Pact? If not, think of two friends negotiating property or joining in business. There is now no quarrel between them, any quarrels there may have been are settled. No formal agreements—at least no legally binding documents—seem to be necessary. Each party feels generous, not a little because he believes his partner to be generous too. It is only later that there comes that accumulation of unexpected misunderstanding and unilateral interpretation (each judging his own cause) which leads in the end to recrimination and a breach. It has been so with international relations. Pacific settlements in an expansive phase and, in particular, agreements with friends and allies, are faulty because they are not severe enough, not clear, not binding, too sentimental. "We have fought side by side. We cannot quarrel . . ." That over-confident confusion between present intention and future probability leads to neglect of the *machinery* necessary to peace.

The lawyers know all about this side of human nature ; this is not their mistake. Nor perhaps is it a Latin mistake, or even a Teutonic mistake. But it is certainly an Anglo-American one ! Throughout the 1920's those poor Frenchmen had learnt one clear lesson from the past war—that they ^{unaided} defend their eastern frontier against Germany unaided—were continuously upbraided for not trusting their security to British friendship, British honour and British arms. The danger of a generous mood is that it rests upon evanescent emotion ; it indulges in wishful thinking ; it never foresees the future.

Above all mankind has double reason to fear a peace negotiated during a conflict between the two opposite ideas of retribution and generosity. Whichever wins, the peace is lost ; and a compromise has the faults of both systems. Peace can be built only by the creation of firm institutions for dealing flexibly with those unforeseeable claims of the

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future which will seem so just to one group and so unjust to another when the time comes. The only security is to ensure that all such disputes will be dealt with at once impartially and forcefully and upon the highest consideration of human welfare.

These seem to me to be the greatest emotional dangers in the path of peace-making : in our leaders the substitution of momentary expediency, national advantage and transitory friendship for firm and durable institutions ; in ourselves a lack of democratic assertion, inertia, and the delusion of chasing the bad men of the past as a remedy for the unforeseeable contingencies of the future ; finally, the danger of merely substituting generosity for vindictiveness. What the world needs is not sentiment of one sort or the other, but rather the proper *machinery* of peace. And that comes to much the same thing as saying that what we really need is an organized World Democracy.

§ 3. *A start ?*

Which brings me to a final thing that the world seems to need very badly, and which so far it entirely lacks. That is a World Democratic Party.

The World Democratic Party should be a party not limited by any antagonism of class or race or creed, but one in which the Citizens of the World affirm their common citizenship and their determination to see the machinery of World Government set up. It can start anywhere and membership should be open to citizens of any country.

Is that a challenge to states ? If some states find it so, and do not bow to it when it comes, then, by the illusions they set up and foster, illusions of greatness and virtue, of country and cause, of *Volk* and *Fuhrer*—those states become a supreme menace to the good life of their own people. Let us try to see to it that no such states ever again become a menace to the good life of mankind.

A WORLD CHARTER

SUGGESTED principles by which democratic states that desire World Peace should declare themselves bound and which should guide a World Authority in framing its laws and judgments.

(1) In both its legislative and judicial decisions the World Authority shall seek the enthronement of "Equity" and the welfare of all men.

(2) "Equity" means "in fairness and for the common good". The World Legislature and the World Court shall seek by their decisions to promote the best material and spiritual interests of all peoples of the world, and within their respective spheres and jurisdiction the interests of each individual.

(3) Where Equity conflicts with any other "law", Equity shall prevail.

(4) Treaties which are evidently out of date or inapplicable in Equity shall be abrogated and replaced by agreements integrating the life of the local communities concerned with the good life of the world as a whole.

(5) No nation or people shall suffer curtailment in the good life of its citizens because of overcrowded territories or remediable lack of access to the means of that good life.

(6) In considering its judgements the prime concern of the World Court shall be with human welfare and that consideration shall take precedence of all partisan interests of all groups of men everywhere.

(7) The real and fundamental equality of all men and women before the law is here affirmed in respect of World

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Law. The principle of custodianship must therefore continue to apply only where the Court is satisfied that it is in the highest interests of the peoples so guarded, and then only by direct mandate of the World Authority.

(8) Pending the introduction of a wider democratic initiative, access to the World Court shall be open to all democratically elected governments of states as such.

The MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION

JAMES BURNHAM

(A 140)

THE CONTROL of the world is passing into the hands of the managers. Capitalism has virtually lost its power and will be replaced not by socialism but by the rule of the administrators in business and government.

The capitalist system will soon disappear. Continuous mass unemployment, colossal unpayable national debts, wholesale destruction of food while thousands starve, show that it no longer works. The future governing class will not be the possessors of wealth, but the possessors of technical or administrative skill. Already they alone are satisfied, keen and confident.

This is Mr. Burnham's thesis, and he puts it forward with remarkable cogency, though, as he says, his hopes and personal interests are against his conclusions.

People who observe what is going on round them can confirm the Managerial Revolution from their own experience. "Why, that is just what I was saying" is the average reader's comment.

Mr. Burnham is a member of the department of philosophy in New York University. His book was first published in America in 1941, and made a profound impression. "Challenging," "Stimulating," "Sensational," are some of the Press comments. *The New York Times* called it "extraordinarily impressive."

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