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FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES

THEIR BASES AND DEVELOPMENT

BY

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TO

THE STAFF AND GRADUATES
OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

IN APPRECIATION OF CORDIAL RELATIONS
DURING THE LAST TEN YEARS

PREFACE

This work is the result of a deep interest in world politics extending over many years. Reading, teaching, and lecturing in this field of interest naturally resulted in formal notes and papers dealing more especially with the American aspect of these questions, and this volume is the outcome.

In Part I the conditions basal to policies and the agencies through which these are formulated are emphasized; in Part II the policies themselves are first traced in their general development, and then follow discussions of the more important foreign policies of the United States, including its relations with other countries. The whole is intended to be a study of conditions and development, not a chronological record of events; knowledge of history is assumed, and no attempt is made to supply detail merely for the sake of recording it.

The author has sought to give a clear and comprehensive account of the essential aspects of American foreign policies and to explain the several situations that result in the formulation of a policy or in its modification. Necessarily there must be a certain amount of repetition in important matters so as to present different aspects of fundamental policies.

As far as possible the author endeavors to discuss the policies objectively and impartially; but naturally some bias may creep in when recent events are under discussion, though not sufficiently, it may be hoped, to incur the charge of unfairness in presentation. His aim is to submit to the reading public and for college use and study a fairly

complete account of what citizens ought to know about the foreign policies of the United States that they may comprehend more readily the changing situations of the day as portrayed in book, magazine, or daily press, or in current discussion.

The United States is rapidly coming to the front in world affairs, and its citizens are developing a keen interest in other nations and in the dealings of these one with another and with the United States. In the long run the success of a nation's policies depends on the intelligent interest of its citizens in public affairs. Nevertheless, although citizens rightly should have a primary interest in the affairs of their own nation, they will know that nation best when they know it in its relations with its sister states, since every state is also a member of the family of nations. If this work helps to stimulate interest in national policies and serves as a guide in the attainment of a larger knowledge of world politics, the author will feel amply repaid.

J. Q. DEALEY

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FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES

PART I. BASES AND AGENCIES

CHAPTER I

NATIONAL POLICIES

Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. . . . If we remain one people, under an efficient Government, the period is not far off . . . when belligerent nations . . . will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.—Washington's Farewell Address

International relations. From the time of Grotius, at least, nations have been definitely seeking to work out principles, rules, and regulations as guides for international conduct. These are in part based on well-established custom, or on agreements as to what is practicable under given circumstances, or on ideals of human conduct thought to be applicable also to national conduct. These attempts to formulate rules and principles for the standardization of international relations result in international law, and the procedure, forms, and methods usually employed by nations in the conduct of international relations unitedly make up the art of diplomacy, so important in the politics of nations.

Yet a powerful nation in its intercourse with other nations is not eager to be bound too firmly by international conventions. States are, in fact, suspicious of one another's motives, and, like an individual on the frontier of civilization, each feels safest when well armed and on guard against possible enemies. A state considers that it is under obligation first and fundamentally to itself and only secondarily to other

nations. It believes in nationalism, not in internationalism. Yet in ideal theory all states should form a world commonwealth, a family of nations, and as friendly neighbors should work together amicably for the common good. This dream of world peace and of a golden age among nations has its attractions to idealists, who revolt against the antagonisms of clashing civilizations and desire to attain that "federation of the world" of which poets write. These two conflicting aspects of international relations result in a stress on two differing codes in a nation's morals: one a kindly coöperative attitude in times of peace and a willingness to go far in the formulation of joint agreements; the other a cautious, somewhat selfish attitude in times of stress and turmoil, emphasizing "safety first" and the law of self-preservation and self-aggrandizement even at the expense or destruction of others. In other words, nations in their peaceful moments may have broad idealizing policies; but on other occasions they may have, and perhaps usually do have, narrower policies looking toward the preservation and the expansion of national life and resources by fair means, or even by foul if the occasion seems to demand such.

Herbert Spencer, and others after him, have tried to show that this "ethical dualism" is inevitable in the nature of things. Spencer,[1] for example, argued that society develops militarism in an era of competition, and then industrialism by slow transition under changing economic conditions; the one is harsh, domineering, imperialistic, and selfish, the other kindly, sympathetic, coöperative, and altruistic. Ludwig Gumplowicz[2] also in his "race struggle" theory argued that social and national progress is made as the result of war, which is followed by slow processes of peaceable amalgama-

[1] "Principles of Sociology," Vol. I, chaps. ix–xii, also Vol. II, chaps. xvii–xix.
[2] "Der Rassenkampf."

tion and assimilation, so that society regularly oscillates between eras of ruthless struggle and of growing sympathy. Other writers, like Novicow,[1] deny the inevitability of war, with its low ethical codes, and assert that in future years war can and should be eliminated and the combative tendencies of men be sublimated into struggles against the harshness of environment, both physical and social.

National policies. Now a nation's policies, whether selfish or generous, are well worthy of comprehension, yet they are not always well defined nor vividly present in national consciousness. Many are transient in nature, dependent on changing currents of public opinion or on the passing fancy of a temporary executive or of a policy-determining body unable clearly to discern national needs. On the other hand, there are policies really fundamental because they vitally concern the life and the prosperity of the nation. All real national policies have such needs as their basis. These are the result largely of geographic, climatic, and economic conditions; of racial and sometimes religious considerations; and of the social thinking of the time based on inherited customs and traditions. Such influences as these must be understood by one who would comprehend the policies of his country, for they help to determine the way of looking at the facts in political life and to assist in interpretations of them suited to national needs. From such influences develop principles, theories, and accepted beliefs, and these in their turn voice themselves in governmental policies.

A permanent policy implies that there are well-grounded principles underlying governmental action and that these principles are inextricably interwoven with national situations and with the nation's life and destiny. Underlying the many fluctuating policies of governments are to be found

[1] "War and its Alleged Benefits."

these definite, bedrock policies, permanent in nature because they aim to preserve national existence and to voice the life and aspiration of the nation. Illustrations of such policies may be found, for example, in England's reliance on sea power, in Russia's glacierlike movement toward open navigable waters, in Italy's profound interest in the Adriatic and Mediterranean seas, and in the enforced militarism of France, necessitated by its geographic situation and its warlike neighbors.

Since each state must have its own peculiar problems and its own special policies, obviously there are inherent limitations on complete harmony in international relations, since international agreements and conventions assume that there is a general agreement desirous of the maintenance of a status quo. This, however, is a dynamic age; so that even though the creation of a fixed status among nations may be highly desirable for weak, backward, or declining nations, it yet may hinder human progress by restraints on the more capable states which rightly should expand in power and influence, seeing that they represent the morals and intelligence of higher civilization. The great states in the international world, therefore, are not eager to subordinate their policies utterly to supposedly larger world policies, unless it is reasonably clear that the resultant benefits will be general and not be a gain to rivals at their expense. Some theorists, to be sure, argue that the principle of internationalism must supplant that of nationalism, and that states must, if necessary, sacrifice themselves for the sake of the world at large. Perhaps future generations may see states attaining such heights of self-abnegation; but in this century, and as a result of the recent calamitous World War, it might best be assumed that a nation's policies will strive primarily for the perpetuation of national existence and for the enlargement of national

opportunity and welfare. Only incidentally will a nation strive for an idealistic internationalism.

Differentiation in policies. Fortunately nations for the most part may do this without harming their neighbors or intruding on their territories, seeing that a nation's policies are social as well as political, domestic as well as foreign.

Humankind has many common *social* interests, such as postal facilities, health precautions, the suppression of vice and crime, the safeguarding of the interests of women and children in the industries, and the promotion of international morals and intelligence. Similar problems exist also in each state in respect to its own population, so that states, nationally and internationally, are busied in the development of policies in such matters, arranged through domestic legislation or international agreements. A nation's policies have definitely *political* aspects when they affect national safety at home or abroad, involving diplomatic action or the use of armed forces on land or sea. National governments through their war and treaty powers formulate and seek to enforce the political policies of their nations in their relationship one to the other, and through their municipal and local governments and forces maintain domestic peace and order.

Domestic policies aim to safeguard citizens in their lives and property and to furnish to them enlarged opportunities for the amassing of economic wealth and the pursuit of happiness, both physical and cultural. If, for example, systems of transportation are needed, the state encourages or itself undertakes the building of roads, canals, railroads, or shipping-lines; if food is needed, it seeks to stimulate agriculture, stock-raising, or fisheries or to import foods from other countries having a surplus for sale or for exchange. Or, again, it may encourage education and the æsthetic refinements of cultural life. *Foreign*, or international, policies,

preferably through diplomacy but occasionally through war, aim to safeguard the life and the property of the nation as a whole and to furnish opportunities for national growth and welfare. States in their foreign relations should hope to remain friends, but must be prepared to become enemies, seeing that every state has potential enemies and must plan for safety against attacks from powerful rivals. Yet, assuming a situation of preparedness accompanied by attempts to maintain friendly contacts through alliances, treaties, and joint agreements, a state may well devote its chief energies to its domestic problems and seek to formulate domestic policies looking toward the development of inner national aims and purposes. To these should be given the best thought and the most efficient administration of which the government is capable.

It is often said that the United States has no policies, but this is far from the truth. Its policies, however, up to quite recent times have been almost altogether domestic, and through the success of these its population, wealth, and other resources have reached enormous proportions, so that it ranks as one of the leading states in the world. It has not hitherto needed to develop to any great extent international policies, because it was politically isolated from the European world and had no special interests to conserve abroad. On the other hand, states like France, Germany, or Great Britain, situated in the world's cockpit, inevitably must have clearly defined foreign policies, since war is an ever-present possibility. Moreover, they are compelled out of precaution to harmonize domestic policies with international policies. French or German railway systems, for instance, are not built merely to accommodate local traffic demands, but with an eye to the logistics of the transportation of troops and supplies in time of war. Obviously, therefore, in formulating

their policies states should make careful estimates of situations and should clearly see the relations between domestic and international policies.

There is another factor also that must be carefully taken into account. According to the Grotian theory in international law all states are equal in their sovereignty, so that each state is, as it were, an equal among equals. In fact, however, there are powerful states and weak states; there are states really independent, and others only nominally so; there are states looked on as admittedly leaders and dominant, and others that are by contrast compelled in fact to conform their policies to the determining influences of powerful neighbors. These neighbors may be aggressive and expansionist in type, so that the smaller state needs to be perpetually on guard lest it be overrun by a grasping neighbor. In the late war Switzerland was on paper protected by a guaranty of its neutrality, but this was best guarantied by its armed forces that guarded its borders throughout the entire period of the war. After all, the usual relations of states one toward another are not those of friendly coöperation and helpfulness, but rather those of fear and distrust. An isolated state may develop peaceful policies and kindly attitudes toward far-distant neighbors, but a state that lives in a war environment must be guided mainly by self-interest and should not rely overmuch on the altruism of its neighbors.

One might assume that in view of the importance to each state of its international policies it would devote its best thought and highest skill to the formulation of permanently wise policies, but this is seldom the fact. Many statesmen have single-track minds and cannot take into account a whole situation. Others again have rigid minds, lacking flexibility, so that they cannot move outside the ruts of custom and tradition, even though there are changing situations. Still

others are often ignorant and, with the best of intentions, do not know how to determine on wise policies in times of changing situations or of crisis. In these later years, fortunately, the whole question of policy is becoming a matter of scientific interpretation, so that statesmen fairly expert in the many factors in national or international life may be able more readily to comprehend how to estimate situations and how to determine what sort of policies a given state ought in the long run to formulate.

Early statements of American policies. That nation is fortunate whose statesmen realize the importance of right formulations of national policy and voice their opinions as an aid to their generation. In the early history of the United States it had two excellent formulations of these: first, in Washington's Farewell Address, so frequently quoted, and again in Jefferson's first inaugural address, emphasizing more especially domestic policies.[1] The essential part of this address reads as follows:

About to enter, fellow-citizens, on the exercise of duties which comprehend everything dear and valuable to you, it is proper you should understand what I deem the essential principles of our Government, and consequently those which ought to shape its Administration. I will compress them within the narrowest compass they will bear, stating the general principle, but not all its limitations. Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none; the support of the State governments in all their rights, as the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies; the preservation of the General Government in its whole constitutional vigor, as the sheet anchor of

[1] James D. Richardson, Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents.

our peace at home and safety abroad; a jealous care of the right of election by the people—a mild and safe corrective of abuses which are lopped by the sword of revolution where peaceable remedies are unprovided; absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, the vital principle of republics, from which there is no appeal but to force, the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism; a well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace and for the first moments of war, till regulars may relieve them; the supremacy of the civil over the military authority; economy in the public expense, that labor may be lightly burthened; the honest payment of our debts and sacred preservation of the public faith; encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid; the diffusion of information and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of the public reason; freedom of religion; freedom of the press, and freedom of person under the protection of the habeas corpus, and trial by juries impartially selected. These principles form the bright constellation which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation. The wisdom of our sages and blood of our heroes have been devoted to their attainment. They should be the creed of our political faith, the text of civic instruction, the touchstone by which to try the services of those we trust; and should we wander from them in moments of error or of alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty and safety.

As a nation expands in wealth, population, and intellectual energy, it inevitably must devote more attention to its foreign policies, for the reason that both domestic and foreign policies are intertwined one with the other, seeing that success in home policies involves wider interests beyond the borders of the state. One may epitomize this whole matter by noting that a state's fundamental policy is the preservation of national life and the promotion of its own welfare and that this can best be accomplished through stress on wise domestic policies and by the cultivation of friendly relations with other

states. If, however, a nation is in process of expansion, whether territorial, economic, or cultural, this involves new contacts, new problems, and hence readjustments from time to time in international relationships. National policy, in other words, whether domestic or foreign, must be open to amendment, must be modified with changing situations, and yet must keep steadily before it those fundamental principles that best voice the necessities of national existence and the aspirations of its inner life.

Public opinion. A nation with well-grounded policies should never rest satisfied with a mere formulation of these on paper. They must become rooted in the national mind through education and tradition, so that national action may closely conform to national policy. A nation's fundamental policies should be so deeply implanted in the everyday thinking of the average man that his reaction in opinion to an international situation will become well-nigh automatic. If there is an intelligent public opinion back of a nation's policies, national action can be immediate and without the need of "campaigns of education." The English react automatically to any threat against their supremacy on the sea, just as Americans do when the Monroe Doctrine is in question. Probably the average Englishman or American cannot explain with any clearness the meaning of sea power on the one hand or of the Monroe Doctrine on the other; but these have become traditional policies because they are based on permanent interests, and in consequence they are part of the national inheritance and are accepted on faith.

Public opinion, aided by the press, will readily adjust itself to slight modifications and newer interpretations of national destiny whenever these become necessary. Should radical modifications become necessary in times of stress a thorough discussion of situations and reasons would gradu-

ally bring about readjustments in the public mind. A nation's interests demand that its policies be intelligently understood by its citizens, whose own prosperity and happiness depend on their keen appreciation of the close connection between individual and national welfare. What is more important: a nation's leaders should fully comprehend the underlying principles of national policy and should have insight enough to enable them to comprehend the trend of the times and the necessity of readjustments to changing situations. Certainly that obligation is doubly incumbent on the leaders of a powerful state like the United States, standing for broad and generous platforms based historically on humanitarian principles and the Golden Rule. If, however, leaders arise ignorant of its historic policies and the bases for these, the uncertainties they create through their unwise policies may dull national appreciation of its real policies and result in temporizing policies that ultimately may bring disgrace or temporary disaster.

Bases for policies. In former centuries writers wrote much about the limitations placed on human conduct by natural law, supposedly in harmony, from a theological standpoint, with divine law. In more modern times stress is placed on newer forms of determinism, such as the determining influences of geographic and economic situations, and the culture patterns so important in group contacts. Similarly, nations also are considered as determined in respect to their fundamental policies. Obviously Tibet can never become a great farming country, nor Paraguay or Bolivia great sea powers, nor the Eskimos a populous or wealthy nation. All nations have limitations set by nature. By geographic situation some are born to the sea and others to the land; some have fertile soil and others have mineral wealth; some may expand their population almost indefinitely, but others are

compressed by their boundaries and doomed to race suicide; some are handicapped by a defective social heritage and others again have mental and social flexibility.

National policies should take these and similar factors into account. No nation can develop air-castle dreams into workable policies. Every policy must conform to situations; and unless they are clearly understood, policies inevitably lack substance and vitality. Really wise policies should take into account international as well as local situations and also the several policies of those states with which contact is most inevitable. If situations like these are comprehended and taken into account in the formulation of national policy, political wisdom will be at its best. For such reasons modern statesmen should have a far broader vision than those of earlier centuries, seeing that nowadays all nations are in contact and that geographic and economic situations are on a world scale and are complicated by racial and religious differences, by wide variations in national psychology, and by differing types of social and political organization. In former centuries a war leader cared nothing for strategy and led his men into a face-to-face conflict, relying on personal prowess; but a modern commander stations himself far behind the front, at the center of a maze of maps and wires, and directs his army in much the same fashion that a chess player moves his pieces. So, likewise, if one were to contrast the leadership tasks of Pericles and Lloyd George, each at the head of the Sea Power of his day, the pettiness of the Athenian field of action would be in marked contrast to the world field of Great Britain. One might also add that the patrician Athenian, lacking the broader point of view of the twentieth century, showed in his foreign policy a far weaker grasp of situations than did the plebeian but versatile premier of the British Empire.

Therefore, before any attempt is made to set forth the development of the policies of the United States, it will be well to consider (in general outlines at least) the conditions that help to explain the policies themselves, showing how these, as far as they are fundamental, are necessarily based on situations that make such a formulation of its policy well-nigh inevitable. Changes in these conditions, on the other hand, imply needed readjustment, so that there is a growth, a development, a differentiation in national policy, stressing now one aspect of national action and again another.

CHAPTER II

TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF THE UNITED STATES[1]

Whatever nation holds the valley of the Mississippi will eventually be the most powerful on earth.—NAPOLEON

Geographic discovery. Presumably primitive man never troubled his head about problems of territorial expansion. The whole world lay before him, and in his outward push from the "cradle of the human race" he met no human rivals. But with the passing of ages the better parts of the known earth became inhabited, and then began competition and land hunger. Expanding populations meant the need for expanding land boundaries and this expansion meant war and racial struggle. Each powerful race or nation sought its "place in the sun" and, if it could, gladly elbowed out those in its way. As classic illustrations of this, one may note the slow conquest of southeast Asia by the Chinese invading from the northwest, or the Aryan conquest of India, or Alexander's domination over the nearer East, or the steady march of the Roman Empire from the banks of the Tiber until it absorbed almost all the known world.[2]

One may imagine the thrill that came into European civilization when maritime discoveries in the fifteenth century opened up the new worlds of Africa and America. Here were practically virgin continents, thinly peopled by a population inexpert in modern warfare and therefore easily con-

[1] See Bibliography, section VI.

[2] See H. F. Tozer, History of Ancient Geography. Cambridge University Press, 1897.

quered and exterminated. For the next two hundred years the great nations of Europe sought to subjugate and exploit the better of these continents, the Americas, and in due time established their settlements as bases from which to expand. Spain as the discoverer and leading nation got the lion's share, claiming for itself practically all South and Central America except the Brazilian lands held by Portugal.[1] In later years the three great Atlantic powers of Europe strove for holdings and supremacy in North America; but a combination of circumstances joined with success in naval warfare to give England better opportunities for numerous permanent settlements along the coast as against the larger but more thinly populated areas claimed by its rivals, France and Spain.

North America. In 1750 North America was almost entirely controlled by these three great powers. England's possessions consisted of the Hudson Bay Territory, the Atlantic colonies, parts of the West Indies, and a dubious claim to all the territory west of the Appalachians as far as the Mississippi and southward to the Floridas. France's claim, aside from West Indian possessions, included the valleys of the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi and their tributaries, the latter claim extending from the Appalachians to the Stony, or Rocky, Mountains and including a slight claim to Texas through the discoveries of La Salle. Spain held in possession almost the entire Caribbean and Gulf regions, including the Floridas and Texas on the north, and through its Mexican holdings extended its boundary to the Pacific and as far north as the Oregon lands. In its Siberian expansion Russia[2] was working toward the Alaskan territory, and

[1] See Edward Heawood, A History of Geographical Discovery in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Cambridge University Press, 1912.

[2] F. A. Golder, Russian Expansion on the Pacific, 1641–1850. The Arthur H. Clark Company, Publishers, Cleveland, 1914.

in the earlier nineteenth century developed aspirations for expansion southward, even into California and Hawaii.

By the middle of the eighteenth century Spain was rapidly declining in power and prestige, France was still the leading continental power of Europe but was hastening on to the period of its Revolution, and Great Britain had definitely embarked on its career of expansion, so vividly depicted in Seeley's "Expansion of England." The English colonists on the west Atlantic coast were loyal subjects of the crown and were rapidly increasing in numbers and in wealth. The French colonists of the Quebec region at this time numbered about 80,000 as against about 1,200,000 in the English colonies, excluding negroes and Indians. Had France been powerful and aggressive and given its American colonies vigorous support, the history of North America might have been different. England, however, controlled the seas; and in time of war the French colonists had largely to shift for themselves, quite as the German colonies had to do when the World War broke out in 1914. Therefore, when open conflict arose in what is called the French and Indian War, the outcome could hardly be doubtful. The treaty of peace in 1763 transferred to England the ownership of French Canada and the disputed lands south of the Great Lakes. In the previous year France had ceded to Spain the district of New Orleans and its Louisiana Territory west of the Mississippi, partly that these might not fall under the control of England when peace terms were dictated and partly in compensation for the territorial losses Spain had incurred through its support of France in the war, for by the terms of peace Spain was compelled to cede to England the Floridas in return for Cuba, which had been captured by the English. Thus by the terms of the treaty all Canada and everything east of the Mississippi, excepting New Orleans, became British.

The Northwest Territory. But the expulsion of France and Spain from the eastern half of North America freed the colonists from the only enemies they had feared; so that when England, in pursuance of a new colonial policy, revived its navigation acts and sought to levy taxes on the colonies and to regulate their commerce and manufactures, discontent and open opposition rapidly developed. The climax of dissatisfaction came with the passage of the Quebec Act (June 22, 1774), which granted to the French colonists of Quebec control over all the Western lands between the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Great Lakes, thus dedicating this magnificent territory as a field for the expansion of a French and Indian civilization into lands that the English colonists rightly considered to be theirs by charter, conquest, and partial settlement.

At the outbreak of the Revolutionary War the colonists determined to win back that territory; and Colonel George Rogers Clark, under the auspices of Virginia, organized expeditions (1778–1779) which took possession, one after the other, of the British forts and posts on the Ohio and the Mississippi, so that the whole region was in the military occupation of the colonists at the close of the war. This expedition was one of the most daring episodes of the war, and Clark, "our first expansionist," well deserves to be honored as one of the "makers of the empire."

In the peace negotiations at Paris it was proposed by Vergennes, on behalf of France and at the suggestion of Spain, that the Confederation be restricted to the coast lands east of the Appalachians, extending as far south as East Florida, the Floridas having been recaptured by Spain from the English during the war. By this project the Western lands south of the Ohio were to be made neutral and left as territory for Indian tribes, and the lands north of the Ohio

were to remain under English control; that is, be left as a field of expansion for the former French colonists of Quebec. In this suggestion Vergennes was probably not actuated so much by a desire to handicap the colonies as by the hope that at some future time there might be a vigorous French population extending southward to the Ohio from Canada which possibly through changes in fortune might again come under the power of France and become the basis for a great colonial empire.

But this suggestion was vigorously resisted by the American commissioners, who henceforth carried on private negotiations with the English and finally succeeded in winning the title to the Western lands north and south of the Ohio, but to an even greater extent than was expected, since the upper Northwest Territory was also ceded and the northern half of West Florida. The entire area of the United States by the treaty of 1783 became 892,135 square miles, more than double the area of the original thirteen Atlantic colonies. This Western territory was a splendid addition to the expansionist possibilities of the youthful nation and proved to be a most efficient bond in holding together the loose confederation of states until it became merged into "a more perfect union." The Ordinance of 1787, one of the great national documents, arranged for democratic forms of government and for the subsequent statehood of this territory and thus became the basis for the American policy of territorial organization in the following century.

The Louisiana Territory. By the treaty of 1783 Spain received from England the Floridas, the northern boundary of which became a matter of dispute between Spain and the United States; furthermore, the citizens of the United States were eager to have the right of exit to the Gulf through the rivers of the South and especially through the Mississippi.

By treaty ratified in 1795 an arrangement was made with Spain respecting transportation on the Mississippi; but this privilege was threatened when Spain, by secret agreement in 1800–1802,[1] ceded back to France the New Orleans district and the Louisiana Territory.[2] Rumors of this cession soon reached the United States and caused serious alarm; for France had determined to reëstablish itself as a colonial power in North America, and Napoleon had compelled Spain to make the cession as a basis for this. To the Americans it was one thing to have a decadent power like Spain as neighbor, but quite another matter to have New Orleans under the powerful militaristic leader of France. The United States from the first had sought to guard against the danger of having France as a neighbor. In the treaty of alliance with France in 1778 it had stipulated that if Canada should be captured it was to become part of the Confederation and not to be returned to France. The Quebec Act of 1774 and the Vergennes proposal of 1782 have already been mentioned as threats to American expansion. The significance of this new French colonial policy was clearly perceived by President Jefferson, who declared, having France in mind, that "there is on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans."

In January, 1803, a resolution to place in the hands of the President $2,000,000 was introduced in Congress, the purpose of which, as reported by the committee, was the acquisition from France, if possible, of New Orleans and the Floridas so far as these were claimed by France. The committee report, adopted February 26, is well worth quoting in part as an

[1] This agreement, the treaty of San Ildefonso, was made October 1, 1800, but modified March 21, 1801, and signed by the king of Spain on October 15, 1802.

[2] See Everett E. Brown, Constitutional History of the Louisiana Purchase, 1803–1812. University of California, 1920.

illustration of democratic idealism combined with commercial sagacity and foresightedness. The recommendation is made,

> . . . not from a disposition to increase our territory; for neither the Floridas nor New Orleans offer any other inducements than their mere geographical relation to the United States. But if we look forward to the free use of the Mississippi, the Mobile, the Appalachicola, and the other rivers of the west, by ourselves and our posterity, New Orleans and the Floridas must become a part of the United States either by purchase or by conquest.
>
> The great question, then, which presents itself is, shall we at this time lay the foundation for future peace by offering a fair and equivalent consideration; or shall we hereafter incur the hazards and horrors of war? The government of the United States is differently organised from any other in the world. Its object is the happiness of man; its policy and its interests to pursue right by right means. War is the great scourge of the human race, and should never be resorted to but in cases of the most imperious necessity. A wise government will avoid it when its views can be attained by peaceful measures. Princes fight for glory, and the blood and treasure[1] of their subjects is the price they pay. In all nations the people bear the burden of war, and in the United States the people rule. Their Representatives are the guardians of their rights, and it is the duty of those Representatives to provide against any event which may, even at a distant day, involve the interests and the happiness of the nation.

This determination on the part of the United States was not made too soon. England also had heard of the proposed cession by Spain to France and was not pleased. It had no desire to see France again powerful in North America, nor was it any better satisfied when rumors came of America's desire to acquire New Orleans. England was still regretting

[1] This phrase (blood and treasure), which reappears in Monroe's message, is a favorite one in Japanese diplomatic discussions.

its blindness in so easily yielding its claims to the territory north of the Ohio, nor was it eager to see the United States become still more powerful by the purchase of New Orleans, the Floridas, or the Louisiana Territory. Troubles with France were multiplying, and war seemed so imminent that the British press urged the seizure of New Orleans and the Louisiana lands so as to thwart Napoleon's ambition and the possibility of American expansion.

Under the circumstances Napoleon saw the necessity of abandoning his plan for a colonial empire. He had failed to subdue insurrectionary Haiti as the first step toward a colonial empire, so that Haiti (and Santo Domingo) thereby became the first of the colonies to the south to win independence (1804). War with England was obviously impending, money was needed for preparation, and there was no possibility of defending New Orleans against seizure. He gave instructions, therefore, that the Louisiana lands as a whole be offered in sale to the United States.

Jefferson had authorized our minister in France, Robert R. Livingston, to open up negotiations for the purchase of New Orleans and the Floridas if possible, and James Monroe was sent over to aid him in the matter. Livingston at first met with no success in his negotiations; but shortly before Monroe's arrival, after Napoleon's change of policy, France hinted its willingness to sell the entire Louisiana Territory, including New Orleans. When Monroe reached France the matter was formally taken into consideration; and the commissioners, clearly perceiving the importance of the proposition, decided to exceed their instructions and to purchase the territory. When informed of the treaty President Jefferson, though privately filled with scruples as to its constitutionality, speedily summoned Congress in special session and urged the ratification of the treaty and the appropriation of the amount

of purchase. The Senate promptly ratified the treaty, October 20; and on November 2, after vigorous debate, Congress provided for the purchase price, so that the "greatest real-estate deal of history" (827,987 square miles) was completed. By this purchase the western valley of the Mississippi was secured to the United States, which thereby approximately doubled its area. The objections raised against the purchase came chiefly from New England and were based for the most part on charges of unconstitutionality, on the danger of war with Spain, and on the ultimate destruction of Eastern influence in the councils of the nation through the rise of Western interests.

The Floridas and Texas. The possession of the Mississippi and the rapidly multiplying population south of the Ohio now made inevitable the absorption of the Floridas. Spain's internal discord, brought about through the Napoleonic invasions and domestic misrule, made its control over its colonies merely nominal, so that the weakness of government in the Floridas caused them to become a sort of nuisance. But Spain, indignant at the loss of its Louisiana lands, was not willing to sell the Floridas to the United States. It should be remembered that in taking over the Louisiana lands from Spain in 1800–1802 France had agreed to return them to Spain if it decided not to retain them, a pledge that Napoleon calmly ignored in selling them to the United States a year later. The western boundary of the Floridas was in dispute, since the United States claimed that the western half of West Florida was included in the Louisiana Purchase, the western boundary of which was also indeterminate, since France had a sort of claim to Texas through discovery and colonization by La Salle as early as 1682. American aggression in the Floridas and the desire to have Texas definitely recognized as part of Spanish territory finally brought about the treaty

of 1819,[1] transferring to the United States the Floridas and carefully defining the western boundary of the Louisiana Purchase so as to exclude Texas, which thereby became admittedly Spanish. The annexation of the Floridas gave to the United States the mouths of the southward-flowing streams emptying into the Gulf of Mexico and added 72,101 square miles to the national domain. Most important of all, it gave control of the eastern half of the Gulf, thereby furnishing a basis for what afterwards developed into a profound interest in the Caribbean region. Henceforth the islands of the West Indies, Mexico, the Central American states, Panama, and the northern half of South America became in a sense neighbors in whose destiny the United States had a tangible interest.

This interest was doubled by the annexation of Texas in 1845. After winning its independence from Spain (1821) Mexico succeeded to its titles in all territory north of Central America. This immense area of rich and fertile lands was thinly populated and was sadly in need of settlers, but the Mexicans lacked the pioneer spirit, so that the lands apparently were doomed to lie waste. The Mexican Republic, anxious to encourage settlements in its northern lands, made colonization grants to Americans, who seized the opportunity to farm, largely with slave labor, the fertile soil in the valleys of Texan streams. Mexico, however, was in turmoil through rebellions and oscillated back and forth from a paper republic to a military despotism. This discord, coupled with the action of Mexico in abolishing slavery and also local government in Texas, created great unrest among its American residents, who finally revolted and established the Republic of Texas, and then, after winning their independence, sought admission as a state into the Union. Mexico protested

[1] Final ratifications were not exchanged until February 22, 1821.

against this proposed annexation, but in vain. Trouble broke out on the border, and war was declared by the United States against Mexico. Mexico's defeat was followed by the compulsory cession of the northern half of Mexico and the renunciation of its claims on Texas. A few years later (1853) when a dispute as to the boundary line arose, the United States, desiring a southern railway route to the coast, made the so-called Gadsden Purchase, which by original intention was to have included the head of the Gulf of California and the mouth of the Colorado River.[1] These accessions (Texas, the Mexican cession, and the Gadsden Purchase) together amounted to 948,025 square miles of territory, an amount slightly larger than the combined area of the Louisiana and Florida lands (900,088 square miles).

Oregon and Alaska. Meanwhile, in 1846, by compromise with Great Britain the northern boundary of Oregon had been settled. The claims to the Oregon land were founded on discovery, exploration, settlement, and grant from Spain, but equally good claims were held by England against the northern lands extending northward as far as the southern boundary of Alaska. The compromise continued the northern line of 49° to the coast and agreed on a water boundary through the Strait of Juan de Fuca.

To this accession of 286,541 square miles the Alaskan land was added by purchase in 1867. The value of this through its timber and fisheries had become recognized even before the Civil War. During the administration of President Buchanan a suggestion was made that the United States would be willing to pay $5,000,000 for Alaska, an amount not deemed sufficient by Russia. At the close of the war Secretary Seward, an ardent expansionist, who had already said in

[1] Congress hesitated over the appropriation of the additional amount, and Mexico finally refused to include these in the Gadsden Purchase.

an address, "The Pacific Ocean with its coasts and islands is destined in the future to become the great theater of the world's affairs," proposed to Russia the purchase of Alaska. Russia was willing, since at that time it had lost interest in a colony not contiguous and needing naval defense. It also feared that England had the intention of seizing it, as naturally it should have done in the Crimean War. A treaty was soon prepared and ratified by the Senate, practically without opposition. The cession included the Aleutian Islands, a chain extending from the mainland to a point ten degrees within the Eastern Hemisphere and but three hundred miles from the Siberian coast. In area it is estimated that 590,884 square miles were added to the national domains. The Oregon and Alaska lands combined (877,425 square miles) make an area somewhat larger than that of the Louisiana Purchase (827,987 square miles).

This completed the continental expansion of the United States. Within less than a hundred years (1776–1867) the United States had expanded from a coastal domain of less than a half million square miles to a territorial empire more than eight times as large—an area nearly equal to that of all Europe. This area was originally peopled by fewer than half a million of Indian population, so that the colonists had full room to expand, practically without hindrance, with few wars and these of no special consequence. In this expansion it replaced the paper titles of other nations by the real title of possession, occupation, and utilization, securing from them quitclaim deeds at a purchase expense of less than $50,000,000. Certainly the United States has in its continental territory a magnificent empire of lands in the temperate zone, forming a splendid basis for an expanding population, for an increase in national wealth, and for a larger share in the affairs of the world.

Island accessions. The war with Spain in 1898 resulted in the territorial basis for a Pacific policy, since the annexation of Hawaii and the acquisition of the Philippines and of Guam gave a tangible and important interest in the Pacific itself and in the Far East, supplemented a year later by the accession of part of the Samoa group in the South Seas, including the island of Tutuila with its excellent port of Pago Pago. The same war also made the United States a Caribbean power through the freeing of Cuba and the possession of Porto Rico; the purchase or lease of the Panama Zone for canal purposes followed in due order; and then came the purchase of the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917. These later additions to national territory gave to the United States a larger interest in the Caribbean region and in consequence affected its policy known as the Monroe Doctrine. These island additions to the national domain in the Pacific and the Caribbean, though small in area (being approximately only 125,856 square miles), cost almost as much in purchase price as the amount paid for all the earlier territorial purchases combined. The price of the Virgin Islands ($25,000,000) was greatly in excess of the price of the Louisiana Territory, so vastly superior in area and in inherent value. Other considerations now enter into such purchases, such as the desire for naval bases, coaling-stations, and strategic centers, as well as an ambition for commercial expansion and for a control over produce and raw material from tropical lands.

It is not strange that the United States, which within a hundred and fifty years has so naturally broadened out from a series of coastal settlements to an empire of island and continent, has been able to multiply its wealth and population so enormously and to gain prestige among the nations of the earth. Its numerous accessions of territory gave to the people a great feeling of buoyancy, of expanding interests, of

"manifest destiny." At first, hemmed in along a narrow strip of coast,[1] in contact with warring Indian tribes, three thousand miles away from civilization, the inhabitants anticipated no glorious future for America. The winning of independence and expansion westward put an entirely different face on the matter. Free fertile lands gave unlimited opportunity for economic gain and an increase of population. The valleys of the great rivers rapidly filled with energetic farmers winning the West to civilization and building up a sturdy, hardworking, landowning class readily inclining toward democracy. Favorable economic conditions and simple standards of living encouraged early marriages and large families, since migration westward was always possible when through increase of population competition became keener and arable lands dearer. Changes came through the Civil War and the rise of industries, and new situations and policies arose in consequence; but the broad expansionist spirit of the first century found its basis and explanation in the remarkable territorial expansion from coast to coast and from the Great Lakes to the Caribbean Sea.

[1] Territorial accessions of the United States, from the Census Report of 1920:

(In 1776 the estimated area was about 400,000 square miles.)

		Square Miles	
1790	Census area	892,135	
1803	The Louisiana Territory	827,987	
1819	The Floridas	72,101	
1845	Texas	389,166	
1846	The Oregon Territory	286,541	
1848	Mexican cession	529,189	
1853	Gadsden Purchase	29,670	
1867	Alaska	590,884	
1898	Hawaii	6,449	
	Philippines	115,026	
	Guam	210	
	Porto Rico	3,435	125,856
1899	Samoa	77	
1903	Canal Zone	527	
1917	Virgin Islands	132	
		3,743,529	

CHAPTER III

GEOGRAPHIC AND CLIMATIC CONDITIONS[1]

The most important geographical fact in the past history of the United States has been their location on the Atlantic opposite Europe; and the most important geographical fact in lending a distinctive character to their future history will probably be their location on the Pacific opposite Asia.[2]

Natural resources. In homely phrase a nation must "cut its coat according to its cloth." Its climatic conditions; its geographic relation to other parts of the world; its land area; the fertility of its soil; its wealth of forests; its water system; its natural ports and lines of communication, such as stream, valley, pass, and navigable lake,—all these are elements in its possibilities of growth.

These studies of a nation's land surface should be supplemented by a knowledge of the natural wealth hidden under the surface, materials that the ingenuity of man has learned how to utilize so as to aid him in his achievements. In human history can be traced his attempts to use stones or rock, from which he fashioned tools, weapons, and building-material; or, in later years, his use of clays in the making of brick or pottery, or of limestones in making cement. Metals also, whether precious or useful, have so important a function in civilization that sources of them, hidden away in a nation's territory, become basal for national wealth and for advances in commerce and manufactures. In this age of steam and

[1] See Bibliography, section VI.

[2] From "American History and its Geographic Conditions," by Ellen C. Semple. By permission of Houghton Mifflin Company.

electricity fuel supplies in the form of coals and oils are most important. The diamond fields of South Africa, the asphalt deposits of Trinidad and the Dead Sea, and the numerous natural deposits of salt and brine are illustrations of how specialized supplies of natural wealth give importance to various parts of the earth. Hence a study of a nation's natural resources above and below as well as on the surface of the earth becomes essential to national development and should be accompanied by a wise policy of conservation. Too often a nation recklessly consumes its stores of natural resources and in consequence finds national decay awaiting it.

Climate. In modern study climate is emphasized from the standpoint of temperature and humidity. Extreme heat or cold is not conducive to political development; the one enervating, the other benumbing the energies of man. Nor are even temperatures but slightly modified by seasonal changes thought to be helpful to progress. Marked variations in seasonal temperatures have stimulating effects on mind and physique, since they compel readjustments to changing conditions. Mankind through inventive ingenuity has developed modifications of nature in the form of clothing, shelter, and heating and refrigerating systems, so that temperature is to some extent at least under human control, and it is likely that this will be even more true in the future.

An arid climate like that of Sahara or Arabia will not support a dense population, except in so far as irrigation and artesian-well projects modify climatic possibilities by the artificial introduction of water. Humidity, to be at its best from the human standpoint, must be abundant and well proportioned among the seasons, and its result in the form of rain and snow should be conserved by forests, lakes, and streams, or in the artificial reservoirs of civilization.

One might almost say, so important are rains and streams

to civilization, that nations rise and fall as humidity is favorable or unfavorable. For, it may be inferred, the researches of Ellsworth Huntington[1] would seem to imply that the earth has cycles in humidity, possibly cosmic in nature and hence beyond the control of man, although to some extent at least under human control through the wise conservation of forest lands as aids to the preservation of lake and stream. From the importance of humidity as a basis for human existence Huntington argues that the concentration of high civilization inevitably must be found in those areas where the conditions of humidity are most favorable; such areas, for example, as northwestern Europe and in North America south of the line of Hudson Bay and north of that marked by the Ohio. In centers such as these, he argues, are to be found the highest possibilities of human advancement, since they are favorable to physical health and mental vigor.

Expansion of population. Favorable temperatures and a reasonable humidity result in fertile soils of grassy and arable plains and of forest land, and these make the natural base for a multiplying population, supplying, as they do, vegetable and animal foods for omnivorous mankind. A broad expanse of well-watered plains, with lake, river, and forest, gives a sure guaranty of a vigorous population, unless, as may happen, population multiplies relatively faster than food supplies, resulting in the inevitable calamities of heavy sickness and death rates as nature seeks to balance a multiplying life to a relatively decreasing food supply.

The early migration of peoples under the pressure of population on food or because of the lure of economic gain is naturally furthered by level plains or river valleys, or low passes over intervening mountain ranges. A land with a natural system of transportation, therefore, is distinctly an

[1] See Bibliography, section VI.

aid to civilization; whereas, by contrast, the jungle, the forest, wide rivers, arid plains, or steep ranges of mountains are nature's barriers to early migratory movements and hence mark out racial boundaries and the differentiation of cultures. The sea, for example, long remained an insuperable obstacle to human movement, except when dotted with innumerable islands as in the Ægean Sea or in the East Indian waters. In due time, however, the achieving brain of man conquers these obstacles set by nature, having learned the methods of opening or removing jungle or forest, of irrigating plains, of tunneling mountains, and, through the art of navigation aided by the compass, of sailing the seven seas, thus making possible a knowledge of both sea and land over the entire surface of the earth.

The geographic features of the United States illustrate fully the many-sided possibilities of national development. There is the commercial North with its ports; the agricultural South; the great Mississippi Valley; the Caribbean, the American Mediterranean with its Gibraltar at the Panama Canal; the lake region with its inland shipping; the Rockies with undeveloped water power and mineral wealth; and the Pacific coast lands, partly agricultural, but having at the north magnificent harbors destined to ultimate greatness as junction ports of great thoroughfares between the Far East, the South Seas, and the Atlantic. These diversified geographic regions naturally result in varying economic interests, each attracting different types of inhabitants, with the result that widely varying customs and attitudes of mind are developed. Through general education these regions may to some extent be coördinated and harmonized for national purposes, but obviously no federal government lacking control of education can completely harmonize the differentiated demands of these several sections nor develop foreign policies

satisfactory to all alike. One cause of weakness, therefore, in respect to American foreign policy is that its geographic diversity creates different interests, partly in opposition one to the other, making it hard to harmonize these into a common policy.

Human interest in geography. Knowledge of the relationship between geographic conditions and human interests was known in classic times, as shown by the discussions of Plato and Aristotle respecting suitable locations for states. Yet at the very beginnings of the human race climatic and geographic conditions completely determined the development of man, for the reason that he had no wit to comprehend or modify them and hence was adapted to them by the selective processes of nature. Such conditions guided his migrations, determined his physique, gave stimulus to his crude mentality, and in the course of thousands of years differentiated him through selection and survival into the many variant races of modern times.

Ancient mythologies, religions, literatures, and philosophies of these races reiterate in endless detail the many-sided impressions made on man by nature; he felt himself to be in the grip of the fates, dominated by the gods who lived in the starry heavens, and determined in his life by the variation of seasons with summer's heat and winter's cold, the abounding life of spring and the fruits of the autumnal months. The stormy sea and the bleak mountain, being, as he supposed, the homes of uncomprehended deities, filled him with dread; and torrential floods and parched plains were vividly contrasted in his mind as the baleful results of malevolent demons. Yet in later years some comprehension of the mystery of fire, the properties of metals, the advantage of flowing streams, and the possibilities of domestication and agriculture stimulated his mentality into inventive ingenuity,

and slowly he learned how to utilize and to modify the many-sided nature environing him.

In ancient days the world, in human thought, was huge and the external universe a mere addition, a sort of firmament or ceiling to the earth; but through geography man has come to know his world, and through astronomy to see the earth in its relations to the solar system and to the vast universe in which it is an infinitesimally small grain of dust. In anthropologic and geographic research it is fascinating to trace man in his beginnings in the secluded valleys and grassy plains of Asia and then to follow his migrations on land from continent to continent, and by boat from island to island group as he experimented with seagoing craft. In late years he has completed the circle of the earth, has discovered the location of the north pole in a frozen sea and the south pole on a high plateau, and has explored one by one the uttermost parts of the earth's surface. Today only the detail of discovery remains, and the airship will rapidly facilitate that. The earth's interior and the bottom of the sea are still *terræ incognitæ*, and scientists may in future centuries follow Jules Verne in exploring those also: under the sea through the submarine and under the land by descents into the openings of extinct volcanoes.

Through the study of social origins and the history of civilization one may trace the rise of human utilization of natural wealth in the hunting bands of primitive civilization, in the nomadic tribes with flock and herd, in the more prosaic husbandmen plowing the soil and experimenting with grain and fruit, in the smith as the father of all handicrafts and the ancient ancestor of modern machine-making, in the venturesome trader building up commerce and founding the market place and the city.

Geographically we think of these changing stages of civili-

zation as developing in Mesopotamia, in Egypt, in Crete, in India, in China—the great world centers of ancient civilization. From these by slow degrees, through caravan and vessel, radiated great thoroughfares that broadened in their reach until in due time they covered the earth with a network of land and sea routes over which at the present time the world's shifting population may travel with ease and safety. Through these routes, owing to the rapid multiplication of means of transportation and communication, the whole world has become interrelated so that even the extremes of the earth, such as Great Britain and Australasia, for example, are really nearer together than were villages fifty or a hundred miles apart a few centuries ago.

In classical writings, such as Plato's "Laws" or Aristotle's "Politics," we find stressed the importance of climatic and geographic factors in determining decisions as to the location of cities or the policies of government. Thucydides' "Peloponnesian War" is a remarkably fine study of the effects of geographic situations on the development of commerce and sea power and on the contrasts in policy between a land power (Sparta) and a sea power (Athens). In modern centuries Bodin, Montesquieu, and Buckle placed great stress on such factors, thereby reviving interest in these studies, and within the last sixty years splendid work has been done in showing in detail, from historical bases, the important place that these conditions have in the determination of national and international policies. One may study, for example, the ancient and medieval land trade routes of Asia, North Africa, and Europe as indicative of the rise and fall of empires; or the sea routes of the Malay and Chinese seas, of the Gulf of Persia, of the Nile and the Red Sea, and then of the Mediterranean, all steps in the direction of the conquest of the sea and a knowledge of geography.

North America. It was an epoch in the history of civilization when the Hanse cities[1] began the commercial conquest of the Baltic and North seas, and even more so when Portugal and Spain risked the dangers of the Atlantic until finally the world's oceans became known and new continents discovered. To the Europeans of the seventeenth century North America offered few attractions, since it was situated three thousand miles away over stormy seas and was a land of savages and forests and without civilization. Only vigorous pioneer stock of ideals and vision ventured the dangerous journey in the early years; but from the British Isles and from France, Germany, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands came settlers with spade and ax, who, under the determining influence of new situations, devoted themselves manfully to the removal of forest and brush that they might cultivate the fertile soil so abundantly supplied by nature. In New England good farming lands were relatively scarce, but fisheries, excellent harbors, timbers for ship construction, and water power turned the energies of the population slowly from farming into the fishing industry, commerce, and manufactures. The magnificent harbor of New York and the waterway of the Hudson made a natural passage to Albany at headwaters, and thence the traveler passed through the Mohawk valley toward the Great Lakes and the Northwest, substituting for the trail in later years the Erie Canal and the New York Central Railroad system.

The flat farming lands to the south, well watered and fertile, readily became an area of great plantations stretching westward to the Appalachians. Then, with the invention of the cotton gin, the black lands of the South as far as the Rio Grande became the cotton lands of the world, furnishing even today the bulk of the world's supply.

[1] See Helen Zimmern, The Hanse Towns.

In due time also pioneers from the middle colonies found the passes over the Appalachians into the Western country, so that population rapidly began to fill in the lands toward the Mississippi until the east bank of that stream was reached. From the time of the Louisiana Purchase streams of hardy frontiersmen, with gun, ax, and plow and accompanied by the slow-moving wagon, followed the buffalo paths, ascended the streams, discovered passes over the Rockies, and pressed on to the Pacific, turning the prairies into grazing lands and the fertile valleys into farms, and digging into the mountains for stores of hidden metals. It was the winning of the Far West that marked one of the most important migrations in human history, a migration peaceable in the main, since the Indians were relatively few in number and were unable to resist the invasion of their lands.[1]

Through its fertile lands and its grassy plains, supplemented by its excellent fisheries, the United States has become a natural center for food supplies, feeding its own population, exporting its surplus, and importing from the tropics the supplies best furnished by warm climates. Besides its wealth of metals, both precious and useful, the United States is also abundantly supplied by nature with timber, coals, and oil. These natural sources of wealth have powerfully affected national growth through the development of industries which, through an intelligent and skilled labor force supplemented by a mass of workers unfortunately not so skilled or intelligent, turn raw material of every variety into manufactured goods.

Industries and the city. But commerce, trade, and manufactures necessitate the massing of population into urban centers advantageously situated geographically. Therefore, cities are founded, one by one, on natural harbors; at sites

[1] See F. J. Turner, The Frontier in American History. 1920.

near the mouths, headwaters, and junctions of rivers; at waterfalls where power may be obtained; in the midst of mining or farming centers; at the termini of roads or on crossroads, whether natural or railway junctions. Among these the most favored by natural location, supplemented by human ingenuity and invention, become leading cities, each the metropolis of its district, drawing to itself as though by a magnet the cream of the trade, manufactures, and the capital and labor of the tributary region.

Yet even the large-familied population of the early nineteenth century was not sufficiently fertile to supply the increasing demands for workers caused by our westward territorial expansion and, after 1870, by the rapidly developing industries and urban centers, so that for the last hundred years the European nations were steadily drained of their surplus populations. This resulted in streams of immigrants in rapidly increasing numbers, until the World War created among European nations a home demand for surplus population, and at the same time business depression in the United States made further immigration unnecessary. The Immigration Act of 1924 indicates that henceforth unrestricted European immigration is at an end and that only selected immigrants, relatively few in number, are to be admitted.

Land or sea power. In classifying nations as by nature predominantly agricultural or commercial, the United States may be considered a land nation as distinct from a sea nation.[1] There are land nations, for example, like Russia, China, and India, whose vast areas of arable lands and comparatively small or poor coast lines of necessity turn men to agriculture rather than to commerce. The population of the great Mississippi Valley knows and cares little about the sea, finding abundant scope for energy in problems of the land. England

[1] See, especially, Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, chaps. iii and iv.

and Japan on the other hand are typical sea nations, driven to the sea of necessity and basing their activities on their commerce, shipping, and fisheries. England's possessions are scattered over the whole earth and are widely separated, necessitating a dominant navy and naval bases on all the seven seas. Russia's territory is contiguous and its seacoast relatively unimportant; hence it relies on its army, not its navy. The United States is so definitely a land nation that outside of its coastal cities it is hard to arouse interest generally in a merchant marine or in a navy. This presumably will be less and less true in the future. The western continent once was far away from the rest of the world. Its population was engaged in the development of its natural resources and in the cultivation of ever larger areas of land, so that it had little need of Europe except to sell to it surplus products and raw material in exchange for manufactured goods and luxuries. But in the last twenty-five years the world has become relatively small. Panama is one of the world's great crossroads, the Caribbean region has become to the United States a British Channel, and America's economic interests are passing rapidly across its borders and reaching into Europe and the Far East. Before many years intelligent Americans will realize the importance of the control of sea and air, and landed interests will then relatively diminish in importance.

The international struggle for natural resources. From the standpoint of international politics a nation's prestige depends somewhat on its geographic location, on its control of strategic centers, on the mass of its population and their physical and mental energy, and especially on the wealth the nation is able to accumulate from natural resources and the industry of its people. The world as a whole has many undeveloped or partly developed sources of wealth, and nations that have favored places in the sun through the possession of

these readily become preëminent among their neighbors. Fertile plains and river valleys have always been the fighting-grounds of nations. Mining centers, fuel supplies, and oils in these modern days are "bones of contention," as well as the famous fishing-grounds of the world, such as the British seas, the Banks of Newfoundland, and the waters adjacent to Alaska, eastern Siberia, and Japan. It is easy to see how in the last ten years international policies have been affected by the mines of Alsace-Lorraine, the Saar, and Silesia; how Japan's lack of raw material, fuels, and ores drives her to the continent; and how intense at present is the silent struggle among nations for the control of the oil lands of the world.

Or, again, consider the significance of the struggle between Germany and Great Britain for the control of the Persian Gulf in the years immediately preceding the war, or how keen is the competition for the coming fighting-ground of the century—western Asia from Constantinople on the Dardanelles to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, and the Balkan corridor leading to it. Great Britain, as the world's sea power, willingly incurs the hatred of Spain through its persistence in the control of Gibraltar. It has a profound interest in the Kiel Canal and in the entrance to the Baltic, in Aden at the entrance to the Red Sea, and in the maintenance of Singapore as a base that controls the Strait of Malacca and the roads to the South Seas. Or, again, consider why the Allies, more especially France, have so laboriously sought to surround Germany with a network of buffer states, separating it from Russia and refusing Austria permission to become part of the Empire; or why the great commercial nations of Europe and America are so eager to maintain the open door in China and to keep Japan or Russia from monopolizing the wealth and the man power of eastern Asia. In the United States similar illustrations are of course numer-

ous. The hunger for fertile lands and the desire for easy access to the seas, for example, explain much in its expansion movement. American isolation from Europe gave the basis for the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism, and the ownership of the Philippines and of the Panama Canal necessitated rapid readjustment in international points of view, the rise of a definite policy toward China, the policy of the open door, and newer policies in respect to the Caribbean and the nearer Pacific.

Geographic situation of America. In these days of rapid communication the seven seas are merely divisions of the world ocean which covers three fourths of the earth's surface. The great land mass of the earth is the continent known as Asia, Africa, and Europe considered as a unit, with Asia Minor as its heart and Constantinople as its logical capital. Outside this land mass, which contains two thirds of the land area of the earth, are adjacent world islands and island groups, the largest being the Americas and Australia, all combined making one third of the earth's land or one twelfth of the earth's surface. Australia is far away from the mainland by contrast with the Americas, which may best be considered as two large islands lying in the great world ocean, facing on the east the coast lines of Europe and Africa and on the west the coast line of Asia and the islands of Oceania. The Americas from the north pole to Cape Horn obviously form a unity apart from the main continental mass. On the face of it the land seems to be an elongated island, isolated and apart from the rest of the world, a self-sufficing group having its own peculiar interests that should not be entangled with those of the main world or even with the European part of it. This clearly was the situation once, and then the United States rightly developed policies of isolation and refused to entangle itself in political alliances with the nations of Europe. But

much water has gone under the bridge since that time; steam and electricity have reduced world areas until the Americas have become merely a great island lying between the two shores of the world continent. They are to the world what Great Britain is to Europe, or Japan to East Asia; and henceforth they can no more isolate themselves from world politics than those two nations can from the areas they adjoin. The real problem of the Americas, therefore, is to face the future, not the past, and to plan for a thousand years ahead. To that end they must aim to unify the common interests of their island group and to assume a share in constructively harmonizing the confused and conflicting interests of the continental world, containing the great mass of population and wealth.

In conclusion, a study of such situations clearly indicates the importance of a wise and thoughtful conservation of the natural sources of national wealth. A thoughtless nation, like the spendthrift or the prodigal son, wastes its substance in its eager desire to "get rich quick," failing to realize that future generations must to that extent inevitably be impoverished. The United States should think of itself as settled on these shores for the next million years and should systematically prevent waste, retaining for slower utilization those resources, such as oils and coal, that in the nature of things ultimately will become exhausted. England, through wasteful methods of mining and the exportation of the best coal at low prices, now begins to face a situation of increasing competition but with depleting mine areas and heavier expenses in mining. A nation should plan far ahead for its future generations and, through forethought, should maintain a continuously progressive civilization.

CHAPTER IV

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS[1]

The United States owe their vast wealth not merely to the great extent of their territory and of the natural resources contained in it, but also, and particularly, to the energy and ability with which the resources of nature have been exploited by the people. The energy and ability of the American people are very largely due to the practical and thorough education and training which they have received. Their abilities are rather acquired than inborn. America's economic success is largely due to the fact that, in the words of the late Mr. Choate, "education is the chief industry of the nation."[2]

Primary interest of the state. In theory the state's primary object is national self-preservation through war or preparedness for war. In modern days economic interests are practically primary, so that the state aims at the utilization and development of natural resources, hoping thereby through indirection to secure the general welfare. A nation's natural resources, aside from the physical and psychic capacity of its inhabitants, consist in its climatic and geographic situation and in the natural wealth contained in its land and waters. When utilized, these natural resources, such as the metals, coal, oil, nitrates, timber, rubber, cotton, the flora and fauna of land and waters, become the basis for economic situations on which depend chiefly the quantity and quality of population. Favorable economic conditions automatically tend to develop an expanding, energetic population, and this,

[1] See Bibliography, section VI.

[2] From "Economic Statesmanship," by J. Ellis Barker By permission of E. P. Dutton & Company.

reacting on and modifying economic situations, results in further economic progress. Handicaps may come through war or international rivalries, and human ignorance is always a bar to the effective utilization of economic opportunities; but peace makes possible a growth in economic achievement, and this implies a corresponding possibility of growth in human intelligence.

Economic theories. Economic theories also have a place in economic development, for men are prone to theorize as to the reasons for national economic success or failure and to act in accordance with the principles thus thought out. In this way economic theories arise, based largely on the study of passing situations, and if accepted dogmatically as the final explanation they are likely to hinder development. The American colonies, for example, just preceding the Revolution had excellent natural resources and a virile and energetic population, but were restricted in their economic development through the regulations placed upon them by the mother country. England in the middle of the eighteenth century followed in general the principles of the mercantile system at that time accepted in Europe. This system, combined with the British navigation laws and colonial policy, which really was an improvement in practice on the rival Spanish and Dutch colonial policies, represented the best economic thought of the time, though all these principles have since been rejected as unsound. Yet England itself, guided in policy by these principles (possibly in spite of them), seemed to be highly successful, for in the eighteenth century it became commercially supreme, took the lead in manufacture, and acquired a great colonial empire. One factor in this success was England's entire willingness to engage in war so as to further its policies. From 1688 to 1815 Great Britain spent sixty-four years in wars, chiefly with France and Spain,

and yet emerged from them all the mistress of the seas, the leading power in Europe, the wealthiest nation in the world through its supremacy in commerce and manufactures, and the greatest in colonial possessions, since Spain by that time had virtually lost its South American colonies.

On the other hand, when England's economic policies were applied to its American colonies they resulted disastrously, arousing rebellion and the revolution of 1776. The colonists in their policies rather naturally went to the other extreme and developed individualism by stressing the rights of man and believing in the inherent right of each to life, liberty, and property. They declared for freedom from governmental regulation and desired in international relations free seas, free commerce, and freedom for neutrals in time of war.[1] In the mother country, also, quite similar teachings were advanced by Adam Smith in his "Wealth of Nations," issued in 1776, but the laissez-faire policies that he advocated had small influence in England until after the Napoleonic wars.

Early economic interests. Since American commerce and manufactures had been subordinated to those interests in the mother country, they were not relatively important at the outbreak of the Revolution but did supply foundations for later years. The war gave to them some slight stimulus; but in the immediate years after the war they remained weak, for the European powers looked askance at a petty upstart nation, outside the European system, claiming recognition as one of the family of nations. In wealth and population the United States was only a third-rate power and might safely be ignored, especially as any encouragement extended to it might be, as Spain suggested, an incentive for other colonies to strive for their freedom—a gloomy foreboding that Spain

[1] America's first treaty of commerce with France (1778) illustrates this early desire for the open door to the world's commerce.

was able to verify a few years later.[1] Nor to European powers did it seem worth while to modify their commercial or colonial systems merely to gratify a nation whose entire exports and imports were less than $20,000,000 a year. Even Great Britain, which had the larger half of trade with the United States, refused to open its West Indian ports to American ships or to make a commercial treaty. Then, too, the government of the American Confederation was a mere shadow of a government, the states themselves were far from harmonious, and their finances seemed to be in a hopeless tangle and bankruptcy to be inevitable. Europe, moreover, had its own particular troubles at that time, since the French Revolution was impending, so that on the whole it seemed more politic to neglect the discordant Confederation, to let it die a natural death, and then to reabsorb it into the European system.

But the expected death failed to take place. The Convention of 1787 met and prepared a new constitution which was ratified by the states, and in 1789 a government designed to be "a more perfect union" was organized, with President George Washington at the head. The population at that time was about four millions, nine tenths of whom obtained their livelihood from agriculture. Even in New England, farthest advanced in manufactures, seven eighths of the population were farmers. The average home, however, was the center of household industries, each being largely self-sufficing, since

[1] Count d'Aranda, Spanish ambassador at Paris during the American Revolution, in a letter to his king, wrote: "The independence of the English colonies has been recognized. It is for me a subject of grief and fear. France has but few possessions in America, but she was bound to consider that Spain, her most intimate ally, had many, and that she now stands exposed to terrible reverses. From the beginning, France has acted against her true interests in encouraging and supporting this independence, and so I have often declared to the Ministers of that nation" (Moore, American Diplomacy, pp. 18–19).

money was scarce and manufacturing had hardly begun. The idealistic freedom policies of 1776 had been dulled somewhat by the harsh experiences of war, and the attainment of political freedom had brought along with it obligations and a heavy sense of responsibility. The new government admittedly had before it a serious task, but the Executive and Congress nobly responded to the demand for new legislation and proceeded to reorganize internal administration.

Economic expansion. Naturally matters of finance demanded early attention, and Hamilton's genius soon worked out the solution to the problem. National obligations were listed and bonded, and in due time were paid in full, thereby restoring national credit, which was greatly aided through the beginnings of a national banking system. Hamilton's report of December, 1791, gave a comprehensive summary of existing manufactures, there being then an annual output estimated at about $20,000,000.[1] These infant industries were made the occasion for tariff legislation, the beginnings of which had been made in 1789. At first the tariff was almost entirely for revenue; but the year 1816 ushered in the movement for the "protection of infant industries," although this did not make much headway until the necessities of the Civil War made a high tariff inevitable. In 1790 the patent system was devised, which, with later improvements, supplied a most effective stimulus to invention by making the procedure of application simple and the expense small. The system now is becoming inefficient, and newer methods for the stimulation of inventions are needed, since the rewards of invention in these days rarely go to the inventor but, instead, to the capitalist and the promoter. Almost the first fruit of our early patent laws was the invention of the cotton gin in 1793

[1] For this and an estimate of cotton exportation, see Tench Coxe, View of the United States, pp 281–285. 1794

by Eli Whitney, an achievement that turned the black lands of the South into cotton fields, created an enormous demand for slave labor, and indirectly brought on the Civil War by the cleavage in economic and cultural interests it effected between North and South. In 1790 the first cotton factory was erected at Pawtucket, and in that year the United States exported 2027 bales of cotton. In 1859, sixty-six years after the invention of the cotton gin, it raised about 4,000,000 bales of King Cotton grown by slave labor. Today the United States produces about half the world's cotton[1] and thereby dominates the cotton industry of the world, a domination that may possibly be aided by steady improvements in the capacity and the quality of cotton-picking machines, for these can hardly yet be considered a success. Other nations, however, such as England, France, and China, are seeking to promote the growth of cotton under their own flags and are meeting with favorable results.

Yet the twenty-five years of European upheaval, from 1789 to 1814, were troublous days for the youthful republic. As an ally of France the United States should in theory assist France in its wars; but conditions had changed, and European wars had no attraction to Washington, in charge of national administration. In 1793 he issued his famous proclamation enjoining neutrality, committing his country to a policy of peace and avoiding entanglements through political alliances with the states of Europe. This was followed by the Jay treaty of 1794, America's first commercial treaty with Great Britain, in which some grudging concessions to its commerce were made as a sort of return for its neutrality. It was at any rate a beginning of commercial understandings with the chief commercial power of the time and, as such, had its value. For the next twenty years American commerce had a

[1] From ten to fifteen million bales a year, about half of which is exported.

widely fluctuating value owing to war situations. What gains were made were chiefly due to the necessities of Europe, brought about by the severity and duration of the Napoleonic wars. Shipbuilding, which had played a relatively important part in colonial industries, continued to thrive during this period; and in 1807 Fulton's steamboat, the *Clermont*, steamed the hundred and fifty miles from New York to Albany in about thirty-two hours, "the earliest thoroughly successful steam navigation on record."[1]

It is obvious that in trying times like those of the Napoleonic period the policies followed would be to some extent temporary in nature. Under conditions as they were, isolation, non-entanglement with European wars, peace, neutrality, and freedom for commerce were crying necessities, and the United States placed great stress on these. It was a weak power, quite like Norway and the Netherlands in the World War, and it had no friends on one side or the other. Consequently it was kicked by either side or both indifferently; and though it protested vigorously at the indignity and retaliated in kind on occasions, it had to wait in patience until it might "grow up." This growth was attained within the fifty years after the downfall of Napoleon: America became of age in the Civil War, and from that time forth has advanced rapidly toward a leadership in the world's affairs. In this advance toward leadership several economic factors have had an important part:

1. **The westward movement.** With the passing of war after 1815 national energy was devoted primarily to territorial expansion and to the "winning of the West." The famous Ordinance of 1787 had made provision for the formation of new states under liberal and democratic forms of gov-

[1] Experiments in steam navigation were made as early as 1736 in England and in this country about 1763 and again from 1783 to 1790.

ernment. An excellent land homestead law stimulated a movement to the farming lands westward, so that population, both native and immigrant, poured into the Mississippi Valley[1] and in due time found its way through the passes of the Rockies into the coast lands of the Pacific. This expansion movement was powerfully aided by the rapid multiplication of improved agricultural implements and machinery, enabling the cultivation of enormous areas of fertile lands at comparatively small expense and at a relatively low expenditure of man power as compared with the handiwork system of the eighteenth century.

2. **Transportation.** Land expansion created a vigorous demand for better systems of transportation, and these came in due order: first, toll roads or turnpikes; then river boats with paddle and sail; and later the steamboat, that so long dominated river traffic. Canals also became numerous, so as to make connecting links between streams and bodies of water for transportation purposes, and finally, about 1830, came the railroad which with passing years rapidly improved in speed and in carrying capacity. In coming years, as exemplified already by an aërial mail service, speed in transportation will be attained through the airship, and ease in communication through wireless and radio service, supplementing the telegraph and telephone of the present.

3. **Manufactures.** Important though farming is as a basis for economic prosperity, one must not forget that advanced civilization depends primarily on commerce and manufactures. The fluctuating commerce of the Napoleonic war period was steadied and strengthened by the coming of peace, and American shipbuilders and sailors readily proved themselves capable of holding their own in competition with Great Britain. During the forty-five years from 1815 to 1860 the

[1] See J. K. Hosmer, Short History of the Mississippi Valley.

American merchant marine reached the height of its prosperity and efficiency. By 1860 it was almost neck and neck with Great Britain in the race for commercial supremacy, having at that time nearly one third of the world's tonnage. The Civil War, however, diverted national activity into other directions. The heavy protective tariffs of the war period attracted capital into manufactures, whereas commerce was hindered by the depredations of Confederate cruisers. The iron ship also had come and was rapidly superseding the earlier wooden vessels. In iron construction England was far ahead of the United States, which also was handicapped in competition through the high costs necessitated by the war and the tariff. In consequence, American shipping gradually withdrew from foreign trade and devoted itself to coastwise traffic, this being by law reserved as a monopoly for American vessels. It was the World War that first convicted the United States of its neglect of the merchant marine, and under a sense of overpowering need it spent over $3,000,000,000 wastefully in a hasty endeavor to meet the emergency of the war situation.

Aside from the need, driven home through war experiences, for a large and efficient merchant marine, there is now a growing determination on the part of the United States to enter into competition for the world's carrying trade. For about two generations American merchants and manufacturers have been satisfied to have and to hold home markets. Within the national area there are over three and one-half million square miles of territory, and free trade prevails over the whole area, which is netted with efficient systems of transportation and inhabited by over one hundred millions of people with high standards of living. It is a world market in itself, and there has seemed to be no need for markets beyond. But overabundant capital, having mastered the

home markets, is seeking new fields for investments, and in doing so the wisdom of the nation's control over its own merchant marine is apparent. The imperial resources of the British Empire are far greater than those of the United States; Japan has preëminence in the Far East; and Germany, if given opportunity, is bound to get back a large share of its former trade. Yet in a fair and open competition for the world's trade, there is abundant opportunity for all nations. The world's richest natural resources are hardly touched as yet; and by international agreement the nations ought to be able to agree on a policy of live and let live, ultimately, through coöperation, sharing equitably one with the other the world's trade. In illustration it may be noted that the new treaty of commerce between the United States and Germany (1923–1925) is based on the open door and a generous interpretation of the "most favored nation" clause.

4. **Utilization of natural resources.** Although the United States is immensely rich in ores and fuels, in its earlier years these for the most part remained undiscovered, and but little attempt was made to utilize what was known. Through the first half of the century the United States had to import gold and silver for the purposes of currency and the demands of art. The discovery of gold in 1849 in California and subsequent other discoveries of the precious metals have given America a leading place in the world's production; its copper deposits also are among the richest in the world. Down to 1830 it produced very little coal, the total output in that year being less than half a million tons; but from that date came the great demand for steam, and hence a corresponding demand for coal. American iron industries used to lag far behind England's; but the introduction of the Bessemer process during the Civil War, followed by the open-hearth process and the enormous demand for steel and iron created by

modern expansion, gave an impetus to the steel industry and to the manufacture of machinery, which has at last placed the United States in the lead as machine builders and given it a prominent place in the production of coal and steel. About 1860 began the production and refining of petroleum, which with its innumerable by-products has become one of America's greatest industries.

Now it is obvious that so vast an area of arable and grazing lands, with their immense capacities in the furnishing of food supplies for a heavy population, has already had a deep influence on national policies. But it is also clear that the economic situation of the United States has changed materially since 1870. The urban population, as shown by the census of 1920, has definitely passed the halfway mark (51.4 per cent), indicating that America is rapidly becoming an industrial nation. Furthermore, since 1898 it has plunged heavily into world politics through colonial extension and will never again be isolated and apart from world affairs. Since economic conditions have so radically changed, national policies themselves must likewise undergo modification, and already there are indications of such changes. There is in the world at present an intense eagerness for the ownership of metals and fuels, which are the essentials for an industrial civilization, and cutthroat competition for the main supplies of these seems almost inevitable unless nations can through conference and league agree to work together in amicable relations. This is the fundamental aspect of future world problems and brings the nations back to the old bases of social-contract theories. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries individuals were thought of as contracting one with another so as to avoid the chaos of continuous strife and selfish exploitation, but in this century stress is placed on groups and nations as the "individuals" to be

taken under consideration. Are nations to struggle in a *bellum omnium contra omnes, natio nationi lupus*, or will agreements and social compacts take the place of war and provide for the peaceful development and equitable division of the world's undeveloped resources? Our historic principles, as formulated by Jefferson, are for "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations." These aims have not become obsolete as the result of the World War, but they do need to be worked out into concrete policies and embodied into formal and working agreements such as those effected by the League of Nations and by the Washington conference on the limitation of armament.

5. **International economic contacts.** International understandings and agreements in economic matters are becoming increasingly necessary because modern states are as much international as national in economic interests. The enormous natural resources and economic possibilities in tropical territory or in lands under the sovereignty of the weaker states, like the lands of Africa and of Latin America, have heretofore been exploited by stronger nations through conquest, concessions, and capitalistic loans. There is an element of injustice in this, both to the exploited and to those nations that have no foothold or concessions in such lands. The modern mandate system points to the time when the interests of weaker nations will be safeguarded by international agreement and secret concessions be supplanted by open agreements interpreted when necessary by an international court of justice.

Furthermore, no nation, not even the United States, is self-sufficing in the sense that it can produce from its own lands all that is needed for national use. International trade, therefore, is steadily increasing in importance, whereby raw material and manufactured goods are freely exchanged in

harmony with "most favored nation" principles. Monopolies and restrictions so characteristic of national states are bound to yield little by little before the demand for the open door, for a larger freedom of the seas, and for a freer interchange of foods, raw material, and manufactured products. The many wars based on economic rivalry will cease only when every nation will admittedly have a right to a place in the sun by access to a fair share of nature's resources.

In the same fashion there is an increasing demand for an international regulation of the conditions of labor, safeguarding the rights of the exploited and aiming to build up wage standards toward the minimum of a living wage, generously interpreted. International labor conferences and the International Labor Office under the League of Nations illustrate this tendency. Indentured, contract, or coolie labor, or any form of peonage or slavery, is rapidly becoming anachronistic and in due time will be entirely suppressed by the pressure of an international public opinion. The existing situation in China, for example, with its strikes and boycotts, is largely due to the excessive capitalistic exploitation of Chinese labor and a growing realization on the part of the laborers that they are not treated as human beings. Again, as a result of the World War the United States has become the leading nation in capitalistic international investments. Through its many loans it now exacts tribute from all the nations of earth. Such a situation makes the United States a silent partner in the politics of all nations, so that in the long run it must inevitably sit in council with other nations in the discussion of world politics. Capital is becoming international, not national, and debtor and creditor need a common court for the interpretation and enforcement of contracts. In short, there is in rapid development an internationality among the nations, an *e pluribus unum* of national

states; and as these become more closely bound together in economic needs and interests, there must inevitably develop newer policies stressing political agreements common to all nations so as to eliminate the frictions so abundantly generated through national competition.

6. **Organization and regulation.** Natural resources, so basal for a nation's economic life, depend for their efficient utilization on human organization. There is existent a large group of economic institutional organizations, each emphasizing some needed aspect of economic activity, and all unitedly contributing to the success or the failure of the material side of national life. Without the assistance of these organizations natural resources are of small importance, remaining unknown or neglected, or else being wasted or misused by defective institutions through lack of foresight; but if carefully husbanded and scientifically developed by well-organized institutions, they become basal to success in the attainment of wise national policies.

Unfortunately national economic policies have not received that careful and unified attention which they deserve. The individualism of the earlier century still has a large place in economic systems, stressing competition rather than coöperation, and this is accentuated by our federal form of government with its forty-eight state jurisdictions. The development, in its broader aspects, has been from individual to corporate activity, then to larger and still larger combinations of corporations, and finally to a governmental regulation of these through state or nation. Governmental regulation is still immature, being too often submerged in local interests and party politics. There is clearly a national need for a definite realignment of economic powers between the states and the Federal government, making clear where control lies in respect to incorporation, transportation, and

supervision over the great industries such as coal, steel, oils, and textiles, as well as over banking and insurance. National and state systems of taxation are also in need of reorganization, and wastage by strikes and other forms of suspended production should be permanently eliminated. Underlying the whole scheme of modern industry is the need of science, with its innumerable applications to the many aspects of economic activity, and the need of a technic in handling great enterprises. Experts are well agreed that the essentials in a scientific technic involve a careful study of the situation so as to know the aims for which to strive, a thorough organization for the purpose of planning and standardizing mass output and methods, and an incentive on the part of those concerned to do their best. This incentive, unfortunately, is largely lacking in the relations of capital and labor. To the laborer, seeing that there is little incentive to take pride in his work and small hope of rising out of a wage-earning class, labor has become a joyless vocation, to be minimized as much as possible by shorter hours and reduced output. The proper harmonization of the mutual rights and obligations of capitalist and laborer forms one of the most fundamental problems in respect to national economic life.

7. **Labor.** Labor in earlier generations was the "fourth estate," having no rights worthy of special emphasis and associated in social opinion with slavery and serfdom. Stress on human rights in the eighteenth century made laborers, whether unskilled or skilled, into men and gave to them the rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." In the earlier United States national democracy and simple standards of living did not encourage class distinctions, aside from negro slavery, so that, to whites at least, "careers were open to talent." But the industrial age that developed after the Civil War, coupled with the freedom of slaves and the heavy

inrush of immigrants from nations of lower standards of living, has brought about an intense struggle between capital and labor, or between the organized heads of industries and federated combinations of skilled labor. Unquestionably decent and comfortable standards of living are essential to the success of a democracy, and these must be attained for the whole population before any final settlement can be reached. Nor can a democracy thrive when excessive profits become the perquisite of the predatory part of the industries. It is unfortunate also that a war vocabulary is employed in the class struggle, since it generates an attitude of mind that leads to vicious competition and class hatred. After all, in the ultimate economic system democracy and not autocracy will prevail. Labor and capital will be coöperative, with no sharp line between entrepreneur and worker and with a common realization of mutual interests in production, distribution, and consumption. This harmony will be accomplished through the guidance of social experts familiar with economics and sociology, making decisions based on situations and employing the teachings of social psychology in eliminating antagonisms and in harmonizing differences.

Men cannot and will not do their best work until the worry of unemployment, the dread of accident or sickness, and the curse of a low-wage system are eliminated. They need stimulus and incentive, not compulsion and threat. Monotonous work, insufficient rest, the lack of mental stimulus, and the deadly dullness of tenement life would make any sort of man ready for radicalism or violence. Men need hope, an opportunity to better their conditions, a faith that the management deals fairly and squarely with the workers, and a conviction that they through their delegates have a voice in the business that to them means life and home and security against the evils of economic serfdom.

Solutions such as these are slowly, too slowly, being worked out in the United States. Conservatives, blinded by threats of socialism or syndicalism, react to a condition of virtual warfare, thus intensifying the situation. Leaders of all kinds should have a clear vision and be able to see on both sides of every question. In the golden mean between conservatism and radicalism, along the roads of coöperation and scientific insight, lies the goal of economic harmony in the twentieth century.

CHAPTER V

RACIAL FACTORS AND IMMIGRATION

Bring me men to match my mountains;
Bring me men to match my plains,—
Men with empires in their purpose,
And new eras in their brains.
Bring me men to match my prairies,
Men to match my inland seas,
Men whose thought shall pave a highway
Up to ampler destinies.[1]

Racial conflict. A state has its material basis through the territory that it possesses, but, humanly speaking, a territory without population is worthless. In human migrations, however, salubrious climates and fertile lands abounding in flora and fauna always attract a population, which multiplies rapidly under such favorable conditions. Discovery and exploration give a presumptive title to lands, but the best national title deeds are based on occupation and utilization. Yet there are gradations in occupation and utilization. Arable lands occupied by hunting or nomadic bands are largely wasted, since even on fertile lands only a sparse population can subsist when engaged in the savage or barbarian vocations of hunting and grazing. These vocations have regularly been compelled to give way before the inroads of a farming population anxious to cultivate the soil.[2] In world history a

[1] "The Coming American," by Sam Walter Foss, from "Whiffs from Wild Meadows." By permission of Lothrop, Lee & Shepard Co.

[2] Familiar Hebraic legends give hints of this conflict: the hunter Esau yielded supremacy to the herdsman Jacob, and the herdsman Abel was slain by Cain, the farmer, who later founded cities.

backward or a degenerate stock wastes away or retreats to poorer lands before the aggressive movements of a more virile stock capable of a wiser utilization of the territory in question. Such struggles are illustrations of racial conflict, as explained by Ludwig Gumplowicz,[1] and in the period of the migration of peoples war was obviously the method employed for the settlement of rival claims to land. Since the incoming of humanitarianism and international ethical codes some recognition of the rights of native tribes has been obtained. Merciless exploitation and slaughter are rightly condemned, and there is an insistence that on reserved parts of disputed territory opportunities for development and ultimate incorporation into the nation be offered to the natives. The arrangements made by New Zealand with the Maori natives, and also the mandate system under the supervision of the League of Nations as applied to partly civilized peoples, furnish illustrations of approximations to modern theory. The whole line of development, from savage extermination and inhuman cruelty to the employment of humane treatment, may be shown in the Americas in the histories of the relations of the invading Europeans and the natives inhabiting the lands. The dealings of the colonists and the national government with the Indian tribes that formerly occupied the present territory of the United States are now a matter of history. In later years the government has made some amends for earlier exploiting policies through its guardianship of the surviving members of former tribes, its attempts to train them in the ways of civilization, and its purpose to incorporate them into the citizen body whenever they show capacity for self-control. They are now in rapid process of amalgamation with whites and blacks and are becoming assimilated, so that within a very few generations the mem-

[1] Franz Oppenheimer's "The State" makes use of Gumplowicz's theory.

bers of former Indian tribes will practically be absorbed into the racial stock of the United States.

The negro in the United States. Similarly, there is a slow change in our attitude toward the negro in the United States. Relatively few of the nearly eleven million negroes now living were themselves slaves, though practically all are the descendants of slaves. In 1860 about 92 per cent of the negroes lived in the South and on the plantations, but the passing of slavery allowed them freedom of migration. This has resulted in a slow movement toward urban centers and toward the North, a movement powerfully stimulated by the World War with its demand for labor in war industries. By the Census of 1920[1] it is shown that 15 per cent of the colored population are in the North and 34 per cent in urban centers North and South. At the same time the heavy percentage of increase in numbers before the war (an average of 30 per cent per decade) has sunk in the decade from 1910 to 1920 to 6.3 per cent. The trend northward and cityward will undoubtedly be sustained owing to the demand for unskilled labor as affected by our present immigration policy. The effect of all this will be that the negro will increasingly share in the larger economic and educational facilities of the North, and that the South, if it desires to hold its colored population, must offer equal facilities. One may anticipate, therefore, that the substantial gain in education and economic wealth made by the negroes since the Civil War will rapidly multiply under new conditions, so that the semi-serfdom of Southern negroes will tend to disappear as they attain higher social standards. Their voting strength in Northern centers will win for them greater consideration of their needs, and their progress in the North will stimulate similar conditions in the South. The newer South already begins to appreciate the

[1] See *Census Monograph No. 1*, Increase of Population in the United States.

new situation and to admit that radical improvement in the condition of the Southern negro must be made in order to hold him on the farming lands of that region.

Early colonists. The colonists of the eighteenth century were predominantly British, so that we think of the "Revolutionary fathers" as British in descent, though in fact they included Scandinavians, Dutch, French Huguenots, and Germans. It is estimated that there were about two hundred thousand Germans in the colonies by 1776. The German colonists of Pennsylvania have longest resisted amalgamation, largely owing to religious differences, but under the more intense pressure of the twentieth century racial and religious barriers are rapidly breaking down. The Napoleonic wars for a long period prevented immigration from Europe to any appreciable extent[1] owing to the home demand for man power, so that increase of population in the United States in early years came through a system of early marriages and large families. In later years, through the conditions of urban life and the competition of immigrants, native families tended to marry later and to restrict somewhat the number of their offspring, so that the term "race suicide" was originated[2] as a description of this process. Approximately half the white population is estimated to be of native descent and about 55 per cent of the remainder to be of northern European stock. The colored races amount to about 10 per cent of the whole population.

Immigration. The early policy of the United States toward immigration was generous in the extreme. Practically the only immigrants who came in the first forty years of na-

[1] The maximum estimate of all immigration from 1790 to 1820 is about three hundred and sixty thousand persons.

[2] By Professor E. A. Ross of Wisconsin University. In a recent paper he suggests as a more appropriate term "adaptive fecundity." *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XVI, pp. 176–184.

tional history were British, so that naturally the United States believed in the right of expatriation, threw wide open its doors to immigrants, and made naturalization easy. After the Napoleonic wars the free lands of the West kept calling for settlers, and an invitation was extended to the "oppressed of all nations" to come to these shores and enjoy the blessings of liberty. In those days America stressed the eighteenth-century teachings of human equality and believed that education and an improved social environment were the panaceas for human happiness. It was assumed that aliens who came in contact with American institutions would speedily become assimilated and absorbed into the population. As long as the steadily multiplying crowds of immigrants were British, they were warmly welcomed; but when the Irish famine and German political crises caused a steadily widening stream of immigrants from those countries, opposition began to arise against aliens, resulting in the "Know-Nothing" and "Native American" movements of the middle nineteenth century. For the Germans spoke a different language and naturally became clannish in their methods of life, retaining as much as possible their own type of civilization; the South Irish, who came in great numbers, although English-speaking, seemed "foreign" to the native Americans —a difference emphasized by the fact that they were Catholics in religion, a body not especially numerous at that time. From 1820 to 1870 there was a net immigration of about seven millions, nearly five millions of whom were Irish and German, about an equal proportion of each.

It was, however, the Civil War and the industrial revolution that followed the war that brought the immigration question definitely to the front. The demand for unskilled labor to enter into our multiplying industries and into the building of railroads soon exhausted the available supply

from northern Europe of stock somewhat similar to our own —British, Irish, Germanic, and Scandinavian. Other racial reservoirs were soon tapped, such as the French Canadian; the Italian from southern Europe; the Slav, together with the Greek and the Rumanian from eastern and southeastern Europe; and the Jew from Poland and Russia. Nor was Asia neglected, for from Asia Minor came Turks, Syrians, and Armenians, and from the Orient rapidly increasing numbers of Chinese began to land on our western shores, followed after the Spanish War by Japanese, who used Hawaii as a stepping-stone. The Chinese, indeed, had virtually been urged to come, according to the terms of the Burlingame Treaty of 1868, Article V, which reads in part:

> The United States of America and the Emperor of China cordially recognize the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects respectively from the one country to the other for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents.

The racial situation. At the same time the freedom of the slaves, effected by the war, and the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments to the Constitution accentuated the racial situation. Out of a total population in the United States of 4,000,000, the Census of 1790 gave an estimate of nearly 700,000 as the negro population, approximately 17 per cent of the whole. By the Census of 1920 the negro population has increased to 10,463,131, or 9.9 per cent of the whole population. This indicates the numerical problem of the negro in the United States: there is a steadily increasing number but a relatively decreasing percentage compared with the whole population. Furthermore, the census shows that the mulatto proportion of the negro population

is steadily increasing, being now almost one fifth of the whole. In other words, the process of amalgamation between white and black is slowly taking place, the proportion now being nine to one. It is not unlikely, therefore, that some centuries hence pure-blooded negroes will be relatively as rare as full-blooded Indians are at the present time. The conclusion from this is that when foreigners are allowed to enter a nation as inhabitants their blood will ultimately enter into the national stock, making a newer racial admixture of amalgamated blood, even though the fundamental stock remains as the basal race of the population.

Theories respecting immigration. There are those who argue that since all races have a common origin, racial differences in physique and mentality are not fundamental characters but variational, and hence that no bars should be placed by law against the immigration of any particular race or against the amalgamation of races. For, it is claimed, the processes of assimilation will Americanize all into a common type of civilization, thereby simplifying the problem of amalgamation. This point of view is usually accompanied by a belief that population should multiply without restriction, on the assumption that the earth will always be capable of providing sufficient food. Admitting the probable common origin of the human race, it may be argued in reply that present-day physical differences have become inbred through thousands of years of inbreeding and climatic and geographic selection, so that the fundamental races, such as the browns, the yellows, the blacks, and the whites, are to all intents and purposes fixed in type and are likely to remain distinct for all time.

The theory of the open door to all kinds and classes of immigrants is of course the older policy of the United States, which emphasized the "melting-pot" theory, but always with a sort of assumption that whites only, of British, Celtic, or

Germanic races, were the ones that should be blended into an American people. But when the rest of Europe and eastern and western Asia began to pour their surplus populations on America's shores, then, though those found welcome on the land and in the industries, objections based on *differences* rapidly began to come into the discussion.[1] Attention was called to differences in physique, in standards of living, in cultural civilization, and to the severe competition thrust upon the native stock in consequence of cheap labor based on low standards of living. Modern teachings of heredity called attention to the danger of admitting those with hereditary physical or mental taints; medical science emphasized the danger of contagious disease; educators noted the heavy burdens on society through the necessity of educating so great a mass of illiterates; trade unions fought against the importation of contract labor brought over deliberately so as to beat down the wages of the native American; students of politics objected to the boss-controlled vote of ignorant naturalized citizens; and social students lamented the slum and tenement sections of cities, the multiplying problems of pauperism, delinquency, and morals, and the influx of strange teachings in opposition to constituted authority and established forms of government. These discussions of the last fifty years have resulted in a lengthening series of restrictions on immigration, beginning with prohibitions against Chinese and contract labor and culminating in the present policy of restriction, whereby a comparatively small number of immigrants of selected types are admitted annually.[2] This policy

[1] See *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. XCIII, January, 1921, for a series of articles on "Present-Day Immigration." See also J. R. Commons's "Races and Immigrants in America."

[2] It is estimated that in contrast with a normal pre-war immigration of 800,000 but 294,000 aliens entered the United States during the first twelve months after the passage of the present immigration law.

of restriction will presumably become permanent as the nation becomes more familiar with modern theories of racial multiplication and admixture.

Americanization. The newer problem of racial mingling in the United States is implied in the term "Americanization." In earlier years it was assumed that the several racial stocks would readily become assimilated and in due time would amalgamate, so that the simile of the melting-pot was rather appropriate. The World War, however, revealed the fact that the United States was dotted with innumerable foreign colonies only partly assimilated and but slightly amalgamated. One effect of this discovery was the reëstablishment of the Ku-Klux Klan, stressing as national standards a native stock of a strictly American culture. The newer immigration policy aims in part to remedy the situation by cutting down vigorously the ratio of permitted immigration and discriminating in favor of the northern European nationalities. Civic and social agencies also take their responsibilities more seriously and aim to hasten the process of assimilation by a more kindly attitude toward the immigrant and by attempts to appreciate his type of culture while presenting that of the United States in more attractive form. From all these influences combined one may anticipate that, with restricted immigration and a wiser policy toward those actually admitted, another generation hence will see the passing of the foreign colony, whether urban or rural, and a movement toward real assimilation and partial amalgamation.

Increase in population. It is estimated that the world's population has more than doubled in the last hundred years, and indications all point to an overpopulation of the earth within a very few centuries. Medical science is driving down death rates, so that there is a steady excess of births over deaths. So true is this in the United States that, at the pres-

ent rate of increase, it is estimated its population will be about 250,000,000 by the year 2000 and likely to reach half a billion a century later.[1] Prolific races of lower civilization have such heavy death rates at present that they multiply somewhat slowly; but if medical science teaches them how to conquer disease, how to reduce infant mortality, and how to lengthen human life, their surplus population if allowed freely to migrate will easily swamp those civilizations whose standards of living are high. Hence the conviction is growing that hereafter each nation must care for its own offspring and see that they are supported within its own territories, rather than assume an inherent right to foist its surplus upon other, more fortunate nations. In other words, it is inevitable that nations which know the laws of health and have in consequence low death rates must reduce their birth rates proportionately so as not to have rapidly expanding populations in excess of their capacity to support them in decent living.

Quantity or quality. In former times stress was placed on quantity of population, under the theory that thereby the state was guarantied a permanent supply of laborers and soldiers. Military states or exploiting governments, established on slavery or serfdom, regularly encouraged the multiplication of human life as "food for cannon" and as animate property of a higher order than other live stock, such as cattle.[2] There are still survivals of this in the pride some nations take in rapid increases of population, irrespective of quality, on the assumption that a heavy population gives

[1] Estimate of Mr. Henry Gannett of the United States Geological Survey. It must be remembered, however, that estimates of future population cannot be made mathematically exact, since there will presumably be fluctuations in birth and death rates owing to changing conditions impossible to foretell.

[2] In Aristotle's discussion of slavery, for example, he says, "Instruments are of various sorts; some are animate, others are inanimate . . .; a slave is an animate possession, a kind of instrument . . . which takes precedence of all other instruments."—ARISTOTLE, Politics, Book I, sect. 4.

opportunities for industrial expansion. By contrast it would be absurd to think only of quality in population, since nations must develop population sufficient for national self-defense and for the efficient utilization of national resources. Preferably attention should be given through science to the development of both quantity and quality, avoiding the evil of swamping quality by excessive quantity. Consequently modern theories of population tend to favor low birth rates and aim to see that every child born shall have opportunity to develop physical stamina and vigorous bodily health. In other words, a modern nation should strive to reduce the rates of sickness, accident, and death, and at the same time, in harmony with eugenic teachings, should slowly eliminate inferior stocks and encourage propagation from that part of the population characterized by virility and mental capacity.[1]

Such programs in their negative aspects lay stress on the prevention of sickness through better conditions of living, through the use of serums and isolation of patients having contagious disease, and through precautions against accident as exemplified by protected machinery and "safety first" devices. Along with these are movements toward the classification of a native population, through psychological tests and social investigations, into grades of inferior, normal, and superior types. Thus methods of segregation of the most inferior are developed and reproduction of the obviously defective classes is prevented. A wiser education, also, stressing physical training, recreation, and mental stimulation, may restore apparently weak types into normal individuals, at least by the second or the third generation, so that the real problem of segregation and elimination may not have to deal with more than 1 per cent or 2 per cent of the whole population.

[1] For recent studies of population see Bibliography, section VI.

But the problem of the development of a healthy, wholesome population is bound up with a proper economic policy, for good standards of living based on a fair wage are indispensable. As a national ideal even so-called unskilled labor should be properly remunerated, since in fact all labor is relatively skilled and should be more so. In other words, there must be an economic basis for every improvement in a nation's population. A nation should therefore, with full consideration for the whole situation,[1] strive through scientific legislation to formulate a system of racial improvement. No nation of high civilization should encourage vocations and industries which can exist only by the payment of low-grade wages. Sweat-shop industries or those that can exist only by the employment of children or the degradation of labor have no rights in a well-organized commonwealth.

Social opinion. Finally, these points of view depend on what may be called a social attitude of mind. For the last twenty-five or thirty years this has been rapidly developing in the United States. It implies that the traditions, customs, beliefs, and standards of the presocial period should slowly be supplanted by social interpretations of national associated life. The selfish individualism of the past century should be superseded by a social individualism, in which capable individuals see the interrelationship of all social institutions and seek to develop, in consequence, a body of public opinion which reflects this social point of view. In a democracy like that of the United States great stress should be placed on the development of an intelligent public opinion. In a highly centralized, militaristic government the public opinion of the masses at least is relatively unimportant: leadership and the

[1] See the author's article "Eudemics, the Science of National or General Welfare," Presidential Address, in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XV, 1921.

opinion of the dominant class are the important factors in decisions; but in a democracy policies must, in the long run, meet with general approbation. Public opinion should not be identified with mob excitement or the vociferous demands of yellow journals, nor even with hasty opinions that seem to embody the point of view of the apparent majority. Real opinion is in harmony with long-established institutions, beliefs, customs, and traditional points of view. It is not necessarily the opinion of the intelligent or the experts within the nation, for these voice the trend of newer opinions rather than the real desires of the people as a whole. Such fundamental points of view are based on the nation's past as well as on its present; if they are modified at all, such a modification will be effected through slow changes in conditions and through what is called a campaign of education.

Since the rise of social psychology it has become possible to modify public opinion more rapidly than formerly by stimuli to the emotions and by the scientific presentation of information, so that in future years one may expect that public opinion will grow more intelligent as civic agencies use modern methods in the direction and education of public opinion. One has but to recall how the United States, once a pacifist nation which in 1916 elected a president on the platform "he kept us out of war," within less than a year was heart and soul in the war, submitting to drafts and heavy taxation and cheerfully subscribing to Liberty Bonds at par, with the full consciousness that in the markets they would promptly lose some 10 per cent of their value. The real public is profoundly interested in ideals, in world situations, and in action that ultimately works for democracy and human welfare. Racial hatreds, prejudices, narrow and partisan points of view, are never popular. They appeal to the mob mind but not to public opinion. The public opinion of

democracy loves justice and hates oppression. Rightly and intelligently trained, it becomes the great supporter of national policy. Those in authority should comprehend national policies; and if these latter are taught to citizens in school and in civic life, statesmen can perform their duties without hesitation, knowing that in so doing they are voicing the national will and gaining support by the real opinion of the citizens.

CHAPTER VI

FORMULATION OF POLICIES THROUGH GOVERNMENT[1]

. . . the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be provided for without government, . . . government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties it will regard the interests of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than state governments, . . . can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system.—JOHN JAY, in the *Federalist*

Beginnings of government. Many thousand years ago, long before there were well-defined social institutions, it would have been hard to find what today we call government. There was some sort of control over group activities, exercised by the older or stronger members of the group; but this was hardly definite enough to deserve the term "government," since primitive savagery lacked forethought. The root meaning of the word "government" is "steering," and presumably a steersman should have rather accurate information as to destination and the methods of navigation. Political government really began when group competition became intensified through the pressure of population on diminishing food supplies, resulting in numerous petty quarrels and wars for foods and favored lands. Successful warring requires careful leadership and accurate estimates of situa-

[1] See Bibliography, section VII.

tions, in order to form wise plans for the campaign to preserve and further the safety of the group. Early political government, therefore, is generally identified with warring, and it may still be said that the primary function of government is to carry on war, whether offensive or defensive.[1]

With the passing of centuries primitive groups developed into great nations held together by a war organization led by war chiefs, who tended to become hereditary kings and nobles. In their hands resided the war powers of the state, and in times of war they organized armies, planned campaigns, and led their forces to battle; in times of peace they maintained order within the state by suppressing violence or insurrections. For the war organization is fundamentally coercive, using force against those who endanger the life and property of individual or nation.

The state and social institutions. Side by side with this organization were the so-called social institutions, typified by the family, religion, and economic activities. These also were controlled by their natural leaders, closely connected in interests with the war leaders of the group-nation or even identical with them. In times of war the war organization naturally dominated the social organization so as to utilize the resources and man power of the group according to the exigencies of the situation. Such domination was irksome though necessary to the social organization and was submitted to as the lesser of two evils. In times of peace the social organization largely freed itself, when possible, from military authority and resumed its normal methods of social control. Yet wherever competition among nations for foods and land became keener, there was a constantly growing need for a war organization, and this in due time became permanent.

[1]See the author's "State and Government," Part I.

Under such conditions the war organization had of necessity to assume greater authority over the social organization and slowly evolved the theory that its power was supreme over society and its organizations. This gave rise to the state, a permanent organization for war and diplomacy, which gradually asserted its sovereignty over the whole field of national life and interests. The contrasting social theory, arguing historically, maintains that the state has a limited jurisdiction only and should not interfere with the rights of individuals or of social groups. In times of war there is a general acquiescence in the necessity of the state's exercise of supreme authority, but in an era of peace one may expect a denunciation of state supremacy and an insistence on the right of individuals and social groups to control their own activities without governmental interference. In illustration of this may be noted the so-called separation of Church and State in the United States and the modern pluralistic theory of sovereignty.

This contrast between the war organization and the social organization illustrates Spencer's discussion of militarism and industrialism already mentioned (p. 4). When war is uppermost, the war organization subordinates the social organization to itself, and national life becomes strongly militaristic; when peace prevails and wars seldom occur, the social organization subordinates and minimizes the war organization and stresses pacifism and social standards. The United States, for example, freed from dangerous neighbors, has hardly known the horrors of war as experienced in continental Europe, and hence it historically stresses social standards and industrialism. The years of the World War rudely disturbed its former peaceful situation, and there is now an obvious conflict between those who minimize the need of a war organization and those, on the other hand, who judge

that the present world situation demands an adequate military preparation. Secretary of State Hughes, in his speech at London, voiced the historic attitude of the United States when he said:

> There are certain things upon which you can count in your relations with the United States. You can count upon us as a non-aggressive power devoted to the interests of peace. We wish to promote friendship with all nations and among the nations.

Domestic policies are almost entirely policies of peace and hence rise from social demands. Foreign policies have in part peaceful aspects, such as a commercial policy voiced by commercial treaties; but they also have war aspects in that they aim to enhance national prosperity by lessening national friction with other states in order to avoid war if possible or, if war becomes necessary, to wage it without danger of defeat. It is essential, therefore, to know how nations formulate their foreign policies and what governmental agencies take part in this formulation.

Development of government. In old-fashioned forms of government, as already stated, war powers and also diplomatic powers were entirely in the hands of the monarch and his leading nobles. If brainy and forceful, the monarch might himself make necessary decisions as to policy, or, on the other hand, the real decisions might be made by his council of nobles and announced formally through him if announced at all. Naturally in decisions of this sort the attitude of the nation as a whole would in some fashion be ascertained as a factor in the decision, although public opinion in despotisms or autocracies is largely negligible. Decisions based on autocratic or class authority naturally are secret and, being so largely personal in their interests, may fluctuate with changing personnel. Policies become known, therefore, through

governmental action, not through public announcement, so that other nations are kept guessing and become suspicious in their ignorance of the policies adopted. The World War has apparently put an end to government of this sort, with the passing of Czar, Kaiser, and Sultan and the open registration of treaties with the League of Nations. In Japan, however, the decisions of emperor and cabinet are practically final and secret except as registered in some treaty placed on record at Geneva. But the Japanese parliament is fighting for a share in the formulation of foreign political policies and, through the recent enlargement of the electorate, the lower house may within a few years' time be able to exert a control over the fundamentals of foreign policy.

The rise of a parliamentary body with a democratic house is always an important crisis in government, as indicating that the old war organization is losing prestige and must share power with the representatives of the social organization, who from that time definitely assume a share in the responsibilities of government. When the need of royal leadership ceases to be so important as the interests of the landed nobility, decisions rightly belong to this body, whose spokesmen are the monarch's council and cabinet. And again, when the interests of a nobility cease to be so important as other interests, such as those of small landholders and leaders of commerce and manufactures, then the right to make decisions tends to pass from nobility to commons, who become empowered to send their representatives to sit in the monarch's parliament and cabinet. In this fashion monarchies throughout the political world have developed what is called cabinet government, in which a parliament, voicing itself through a cabinet that it controls, determines foreign policy and diplomatic action. Naturally in those states where king and nobility cease to exert real power, monarchy and

titles may be abolished and a republic established, the president of which may hold the same relationship to cabinet and parliament as did the former king.

The cabinet system. In the cabinet system of government the expression of power is centered in the cabinet, the members of which are in form named by the king or the president, but in reality are those who speak for the dominant party or group of parties in the parliament. In effect the cabinet is the executive committee or board of directors of the parliament, with large discretionary powers and in control also of the administration of government, since *ex officiis* they become heads of administration. As the responsible leaders in government they guide legislation, formulate policies, and determine governmental action. Yet in doing so they must always keep in mind the fact that they are supposed to voice the wish and will of parliament, and that before taking action they must have the formal approval of the parliament on really important decisions. In illustration it may be remembered that at the conclusion of the London conference on the Dawes Report, immediately after decisions had been reached and approved by the several premiers, the latter at once proceeded, before final action, to lay the results of the conference before their respective parliaments and to ask for their indorsement of the decisions reached.

The cabinet system of government is the prevailing and most common form of modern government. In principle the many cabinet systems are alike, but they differ in detail, chiefly in respect to the subjects that must be referred to the several parliaments for approval. In monarchical systems the cabinet commonly has larger discretionary powers than in republics, but the tendency is for the extent of this discretionary power to grow less and less. As governments become more democratic, parliaments increasingly insist on the

submission to them of all matters of real importance, so that the control over treaties is slowly passing to lawmaking bodies. This is more true of economic than of political treaties, but the trend is steadily in the direction of democratic control even of political foreign policy. This is partly due to the demand for a more open diplomacy and to the requirement made by the League of Nations that its members place on record all existing treaties, about one thousand of which have so far been recorded.

At times special situations necessitate alterations in the usual cabinet system. Thus in the World War England intrusted its affairs to a small war council so as to insure speedy decisions. In Spain corruption and incapacity in government brought to the front as dictator, General de Rivera, who for a time guided Spanish affairs without interference from king or parliament. In Italy governmental inefficiency stimulated the rise of the Fascists, headed by Mussolini, who gradually enlarged his powers until he became virtually the autocratic ruler of that country. Changes such as these, due to the exigencies of situations, are usually temporary, and when calmer times come a return is generally made to constitutional forms of parliamentary government. In Great Britain, however, since the British Imperial Conference of 1921,[1] it is becoming customary to secure the approbation of the premiers of the great dominions to any policy or treaty of imperial importance, and more especially of those premiers whose dominions are directly concerned.[2] The British Empire thus becomes a sort of federation, though without a written constitution, in which the federated kingdom and

[1] For an interesting account of this from a Far Eastern standpoint see Weale's "Indiscreet Chronicle," Part IV.

[2] For a short statement regarding the Imperial Conference of 1923 see *Current History*, January, 1924, pp. 601–606.

dominions unitedly determine policies common to the whole empire, though unquestionably large discretionary powers in matters primarily European will have to be intrusted to the premier and his cabinet. This is an important development and may result in the formation of a definite imperial council when more rapid means of travel and communication are secured through radio and air service.

Government of the United States. The mechanism of American government is not so simple as the governmental machinery that prevails in Europe; it is mystifying to Europeans and possibly also to most Americans. The troublesome points center around the terms "federation," "sovereignty," "Constitution," "separation of powers," and "the treaty-making power," so that the significance of these terms needs to be considered rather carefully.

The government of the United States is *federative*, or dual, not unitary. It is a form of government made up of (1) a Federal or national government and (2) state governments. Under the Constitution these so-called states have rights and powers that cannot be legally overridden by the national government without the formal consent of the states themselves expressed through an amendment to the Constitution. This is not true in unitary forms of government, for in these all power ultimately centers in the national government. In other words, the sovereign powers of the United States are divided by the Constitution into two parts, and these are assigned, respectively, to the Federal and state governments. These dual governments are coördinate, and neither can legally transgress on the other's powers. Since disputes may occasionally arise between these dual governments as to the extent of their respective jurisdictions, the Federal Supreme Court acts as arbiter, deciding in test cases whether by constitution any given power is Federal or state.

Inasmuch as the sovereign powers of the United States are divided between these two forms of government, it used to be said, from a Lockian standpoint, that the *sovereignty* of the United States was divided, the Federal government being partly sovereign and the states partly sovereign. It is now more common to say that sovereignty is indivisible; but that the United States of America, which alone has sovereignty, may by constitution delegate some or all of its sovereign powers, subject to recall, to the dual governments. From this standpoint the United States merely delegates the use of sovereign powers to the Federal government and, similarly, to the state governments, but sovereignty itself always inheres in the United States of America. According to this view the United States only is sovereign, and it would be incorrect to say that either the Federal government or the states are sovereign. They simply use, subject to recall, the several sovereign powers assigned to them by constitution, it being understood that the assignment of powers made to each can be altered only by a constitutional amendment. Thus the rights of the states by constitution to determine matters of women's suffrage and prohibition were made Federal also by the Eighteenth and Nineteenth amendments.

The *Constitution* is a written document and is amended with great difficulty, so that it is *rigid*, not *flexible*, to use the terms employed by James Bryce. Being rigid, changes can best be made through customary understandings and interpretations, the final interpreter of the Constitution being the Supreme Court of the United States. Therefore, even if Congress should pass a law that is approved and signed by the president, this in a test case may be declared by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional and therefore a law that will not be applied or enforced by the courts. If the Supreme Court refuses to acknowledge the validity of a law, it cannot

be compelled by the other two departments to accept it as law since by theory the three departments are coördinate in authority. There is nothing quite like this final interpretative power of the courts anywhere else in the political world; so that the place of the Supreme Court in the United States is a constant puzzle to other states, especially as, in addition to action on congressional statutes, it is constantly passing on state statutes also, refusing to enforce those that in its opinion do not harmonize with the Constitution of the United States.

In the cabinet system of government the executive and legislative departments of government are blended in action, so that in general they speak with a common voice and act in unison. The Federal government of the United States, by contrast, is organized in harmony with Montesquieu's theory of the *separation of powers*. Its cabinet is merely a body of assistants to the president, who is the executive of the state and the head of national administration, including the army and navy. The cabinet has no official connection with Congress and makes its recommendations to Congress through the president; these, however, are merely recommendations and may be entirely disregarded by the lawmaking body. For in the United States the Constitution separates the powers of the Federal government into three parts, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial, and arranges that each may manage its own business quite independently of the others.[1] Under this system the respective policies favored by the executive and the Congress may be hopelessly apart, whereas in the European system there is always a practical assurance of unity on any given policy.

Treaties. Under the cabinet system *treaties*[2] indorsed by

[1] There is, of course, the well-known system of checks and balances.

[2] For references to original source material respecting American treaties see Conover's "Working Manual of Original Sources," chap. xviii.

the cabinet are rarely rejected or modified by parliament except perhaps in unimportant details. Rejection by parliament of an important treaty recommended by the cabinet would result in the resignation of the cabinet, since it would no longer possess the confidence of the lawmaking body. But in the United States the Constitution provides that the president "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."[1] The first president, Washington, started with the assumption that he must personally consult the Senate in advance of negotiations; but on his first visit, after several days of contradictory suggestions, he left the Senate in anger, swearing that he would never again consult it in advance of negotiations. In diplomatic matters the president works through the Secretary of State, who, however, keeps him fully informed of the steps in the negotiation. At times the president may himself take charge of negotiations when the matter seems urgent enough to demand his personal attention.

In the conduct of negotiations the president is under no limitations. He may take under consideration or ignore what he wills. He may conduct negotiations in person, as President Wilson did at Versailles, or he may use the services of the Secretary of State or the usual diplomatic officers, or special agents if he prefers. Should the Senate or his cabinet make suggestions to him he is under no legal obligations to give heed to them. President Lincoln, for example, under his war powers issued the Emancipation Proclamation against the unanimous advice of his cabinet. The real limitation on his diplomatic power is that ultimately the president must submit his completed negotiations to the Senate for approval or

[1] See Ralston Hayden, The Senate and Treaties, 1789–1817. New York, 1920.

rejection. For the most part the executive and the Senate work together amicably. The recommendations made by the president must commend themselves by their inherent merit, or the necessary two-thirds vote will not be forthcoming. For this reason the president or the Secretary of State may talk over informally with the chairman or other members of the Committee on Foreign Relations (the oldest standing committee in the Senate)[1] such matters as he may care to submit for their point of view. Or the Senate itself, or even the House, may make a suggestion in the form of a resolution, such as the Lodge resolution of 1912 in the Senate, arising from the Magdalena Bay episode. Through informal conversations of this sort the two departments manage to keep in fairly close touch, though this is not always true. It may be added that a treaty may involve legislation or an appropriation, and in such matters the executive may sound the proper leadership of the House also for an expression of opinion.

The Constitution further asserts that "all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Now the treaty-making power may be interpreted so broadly as to assume that the United States may have as wide a range in treaty-making as any other international state; or it may be interpreted narrowly, on the assumption that the treaty-making power includes jurisdiction over those powers only which properly fall within the province of the Federal government. Since under the Constitution the states admittedly have no treaty-making power, the narrow interpretation just

[1] Formally organized in 1816, though temporary committees with similar functions had existed earlier. See Ralston Hayden, The Senate and Treaties, chap. viii.

mentioned would obviously place sharp limitations on treaty-making in the United States. The weight of evidence and decision plainly emphasizes the fact that the treaty-making power of the United States should be broadly interpreted so as to make it equal to the treaty-making power of any other international state. Therefore it should voice all the authority of the United States as a whole, not merely that confided to the Federal government. The safeguard for the states lies in the fact that treaties must meet with the approval of two thirds of those members present when the treaty is voted upon. Since the Senate represents the states directly, each having an equal vote, the consent of two thirds is a sufficient safeguard for the rights of the states.

In general, treaties aim to carry out national policies sanctioned by the president and Congress, such as policies of commerce, arbitration, or naturalization, but of course not all policies are embodied into treaties. The president may, for example, announce a policy along the lines of which he intends to act, and this, indorsed by later presidents, may remain for years a purely executive policy without sanction of Congress or of the Senate. For example, the Monroe Doctrine remained for two generations a purely executive policy; the open-door policy toward China began as an executive arrangement; the important Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917 was also an executive act;[1] and the "gentlemen's agreement" of 1908 in respect to Japanese immigration remained an executive policy until 1924, when, against the protest of the executive, the Congress canceled it by passing the exclusion clause in the new immigration act. This illustrates the possibility of conflicting policies, a subject so important that it deserves special treatment.

[1] For later history of this agreement see references in Index under Lansing-Ishii agreement.

Conflicting policies. Under the Constitution treaties and acts of Congress are coördinate in importance and are equally the law of the land; but since they are made through different agencies, the differing wills of the treaty-making power and the lawmaking body may come in conflict.[1] For example, Chinese immigration, permitted by the treaty of 1868, was barred by the immigration act of 1882; and the Supreme Court ruled that when treaty and act are in conflict, the later in time is valid as against the other. The "gentlemen's agreement" referred to above differs from this illustration in that it was an agreement of the executive only, not a treaty sanctioned by executive and Senate. Yet in both illustrations the action of Congress places the president in an unpleasant predicament, since he, having responsibility for treaties and diplomatic matters, must try to placate the offended state so as to restore friendly relations. For this sort of friction there is no remedy save mutual forbearance and on the part of Congress a greater pride in the observance of national contracts and diplomatic proprieties.

Treaties and the Senate. The necessity for the Senate's approval of treaties negotiated by the president made a serious complication in our early international relations. European powers in their negotiations used to consider matters settled when the properly accredited agents had affixed their signatures; but in the case of the United States the Senate has the right to reject or to ignore the treaties submitted to it, or to suggest changes in them. The first issue of that sort came in amending the Jay treaty. The amendment was of no special consequence, and the English government acquiesced in the change suggested, thus making a precedent. For many years the United States was com-

[1] For a study of the ratification and rejection of treaties see Senate Documents, 66th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. XIV, Articles 2 and 26.

pelled to give to irate foreign cabinets lengthy explanations of its method of ratification, but the system now is fairly well understood abroad, and the growth of democracy in the world has brought the method into some favor. Now it is not uncommon in Europe for important treaties to be brought informally before the legislative body for the purpose of getting the conflicting points of view of its members and parties. Furthermore, in general usage it is assumed that a treaty which conforms to instructions should be ratified as a matter of course; but since in the United States the instructions are discretionary with the executive, there is a fair possibility that the Senate may disagree. Each is jealous of its rights and prerogatives, so that at times differences do arise. The following conflicts may be cited as illustrations:

1. The northeast boundary arbitral award of 1831, submitted by President Jackson, was under consideration by the Senate for about six months and was then rejected. The matter was finally settled on practically the same terms by the Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842.

2. A treaty for the annexation of Texas, submitted by President Tyler in 1844, was rejected by a large vote, although ex-President Jackson had expressed the opinion that any senator who voted against the treaty was a traitor to the best interests of the United States. Texas was annexed in the following year through a joint resolution of the two Houses, which, requiring a majority vote only, passed the Senate by a close majority.

3. President Polk in 1846 was so uncertain as to the attitude of the Senate in respect to the Oregon treaty with Great Britain that he first submitted it informally and asked whether the Senate would ratify if he signed—a plain instance of asking *advice*. On being assured on this point he signed the treaty, and it was soon formally ratified.

4. In 1854 a reciprocity treaty failed of ratification by the Senate, and again in 1897 a treaty for the annexation of Hawaii was submitted but not acted on by the Senate. In 1898 the island group was annexed by joint resolution of Congress.

5. In 1867, when President Johnson submitted a treaty for the purchase of the Virgin Islands from Denmark, personal opposition to Johnson was so keen that no action was taken, and the matter was dropped.

6. In 1888 the Bayard-Chamberlain treaty—a treaty in settlement of the long-standing Canadian-fisheries dispute—was rejected, but by agreement in 1909 the whole matter was referred to the Hague Tribunal and was settled a year later, September 10.

7. Again, in 1904 Secretary Hay submitted several treaties for the arbitration of differences. Each treaty provided that before submitting the case to the Hague Tribunal the two parties should "conclude a special agreement defining clearly the matter in dispute." The Senate insisted on changing the word "agreement" to "treaty," so as to bring each particular case before it for approval. President Roosevelt strongly objected to this and refused to refer the modified treaties to the other powers for their ratification. In 1908, however, the matter was reconsidered, and the Senate's suggestion was accepted.

8. The most important illustration, however, of a conflict between the executive and the Senate in treaty matters came in 1919, when President Wilson submitted to the Senate the Treaty of Versailles. As is well known, the armistice was signed on November 11, 1918. Some three weeks before (October 24) President Wilson on the eve of a congressional election had appealed for indorsement at the polls, but the election resulted adversely, and a

Republican Congress was elected. On November 18 Wilson announced his determination to attend the conference at Paris; and in his message of December 2, personally delivered before Congress, he formally stated his intention, saying, however, "I shall make my absence as brief as possible." Two days later he sailed, having appointed as his fellow plenipotentiaries Secretary Lansing, ex-Ambassador Henry White, Colonel House, and General T. H. Bliss. On January 18, 1919, the Peace Conference was officially inaugurated, and a tentative plan for the League of Nations was reported on February 14. This was modified somewhat to meet criticism in the United States, and the revised plan was incorporated into the treaty, which was adopted on April 28 and handed to the German delegates on May 7. On President Wilson's return to the United States the treaty was submitted to the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, which then, after about four months, reported the treaty with reservations to the Senate. On November 19, after a discussion of about two additional months, a motion for ratification with fourteen reservations was rejected by a decisive vote, and on the other hand a motion to indorse without reservations was rejected by practically the same numerical vote. With the incoming of a new administration under President Harding (March 4, 1921) a new policy was adopted; peace was declared between the United States and the Central Powers (July 2), and before the close of the year special treaties of peace with Germany, Austria, and Hungary were ratified by the Senate.[1]

From these illustrations and many like them which might be cited it may be seen that the Senate's power is a real one, and that it is exercised at times adversely to the wish of the executive. In other words, the Senate also has dis-

[1] See page 313.

cretionary power, and in the exercise of this power it has the right to differ from the opinions of the president. In their negotiations, therefore, foreign powers should remember that in the United States a dual consent is necessary, and that adverse action by the Senate is always a legal possibility to be taken into account.

The president, however, still has a certain discretion after the Senate has taken action. If he strongly disapproves of the changes made or of the conditions or interpretations given by the Senate, he may refuse to take further action and refrain from exchanging ratifications. President Roosevelt's refusal to act in 1905 on the arbitration treaties amended by the Senate is an illustration in point. He sought in many ways to enlarge executive powers, and the issue mentioned above was an attempt to have certain arrangements with foreign governments considered as executive *agreements* not needing senatorial sanction. The same sort of issue arose in 1905 over the Dominican Republic. A protocol submitted by the President whereby that turbulent state would come under the control of the United States was rejected by the Senate. Using his general powers, however, the executive put the plan into effect as an agreement, and after a long delay the Senate in 1907 gave ratification to a modified form of the treaty.

Another source of friction in respect to treaties arises from the division of powers between the Federal government and the states. Crimes against state laws are of course tried in state courts, but the latter may at times be unjust in procedure or decision when the rights of aliens are involved. This may cause international friction, since complaint is made to the Federal government, which, however, has no right to interfere in state judicial decisions. The Federal government, therefore, finds it hard to explain that

our dual system of government stands in the way of a national guaranty of safety to alien life and property. Troubles of this sort have been rather frequent in the last fifty years, but so far Congress has refused to accede to the recommendations of the executive that the Federal courts be given jurisdiction by law over offenses against the treaty rights of foreigners resident in the United States.

There is a sort of rivalry between the executive and Congress and between the executive and the Senate, since each feels its importance and tries to enlarge its powers over the other. In treaty matters an executive of strong personality may be able to force his views on the Senate, or, by contrast, an executive of negative personality may find his recommendations resisted by senatorial leaders who prefer their own policies. Even Roosevelt had to yield to the Senate in arbitration policies, and our national history records many illustrations of rejected treaties and thwarted executive policies. Illustrations of conflict in respect to a similar power, the war power, might also be shown. Congress only may declare war. Yet it would hardly do so except on recommendation of the executive, since he is best informed of foreign situations and, as head of the army and navy, must carry on the war when declared. On the other hand, Congress might be forced into a declaration of war by situations created by the president through his diplomatic and war powers. These and similar conflicts illustrate some of the inconveniences of the system of separation of powers and emphasize the need of close coöperation between the executive and the Senate and the Congress.

Public opinion. Public opinion in a democracy is always important, so that it inevitably must be consulted in respect to permanent policies. In matters of great importance the president may seek to ascertain the general opinion of the

nation, and this, to an extent, may be obtained from the views of the press or those voiced in Congress, from the resolutions of state legislatures or the platforms of political parties, or from the results of local elections. Representatives chosen under our party system, however, do not fully voice public opinion, which is to some extent thwarted in elections through political bossism or the fetish of party loyalty or defective systems of balloting and representation: through the gerrymander, for illustration, or through the partisanship of much of the newspaper press of the country. These are inevitable evils under present circumstances, but will slowly change through the influence of a larger civic education. Because of this situation, however, the executive rightly must consult (as far as possible) the whole body of citizens; hence increasing intellectual contacts between executive and people are becoming common.

A president desirous of ascertaining general public opinion in respect to foreign policies must give heed to press comments, both news and editorial, and to statements from expert international writers. Interviews, direct or indirect, are given to representatives of the press; or public addresses are made (possibly by a member of the cabinet) in which hints of future policy are suggested, and press comments on these are carefully noted, as are also the letters of citizens favoring or protesting against proposed measures. Such opinions, on the whole, represent the intelligent minority, who, after all, largely determine the trend of general public opinion.

During the World War the government, through war-information bulletins, posters, and a systematic use of the press and civic organizations, exercised a powerful influence on public opinion. On the other hand, public opinion itself had under war excitement become responsive to timely sug-

gestions and hence reacted more readily to governmental propaganda in respect to the war and its operation. It is an indication of the coming time when the nation desirous of directing public opinion into newer points of view will systematically present information for the thoughtful consideration of its citizens and then abide by the decision of the resulting discussion. The "publicity pamphlets" issued by several of our states before an election, with *pro* and *contra* statements in respect to electional problems, are good illustrations of such a possibility.

Assuming that justifiable policies have been formed and announced, it is becoming increasingly important that the general public should have an intellectual appreciation of them. At times of crisis the government has no time to engage in a "campaign of education" to prepare the public for action. This should be part of a "preparedness program." Aside from the press, this can be accomplished through the lecture platform, through the numerous "current-topics" discussions of civic organizations, and, more formally, through the foreign-relations clubs of the intellectual world. Whenever intelligent men and women get together they should be able readily to secure such information as will enable them to appreciate the meaning of national policies and the relation of national situations thereto. Then, as situations change, as inevitably they must, the natural leadership of the nation will recognize the complementary changes to be made in policies and will favor constructive modifications instead of blindly opposing all change. The more closely policies can be brought into harmony with an intelligent public opinion, the more wisely will governmental activity manifest itself.

Possible changes in organization. Much more might be said in elaboration of the relationship that exists between the several departments of government and between these

departments and the general public, but sufficient has been given to indicate the methods whereby policies come to be formulated by government. Points of friction and occasional lack of harmony are inevitable under a dual form of government, with its separation of Federal powers among the three departments of government. Some argue that the remedy for this lies in a closer approximation to the British system, and a movement in that direction is apparent in the suggestion that members of the cabinet be allowed seats and voice in Congress but not votes. This might bring about a closer coördination of government and would allow the administration an opportunity to present its recommendations more definitely to the public at large. It is not likely, however, that the changes suggested would materially affect the present situation, and larger changes would involve an amendment to the Constitution.

It is possible that the divergence of view between the executive and the lawmaking branches of the government, so manifest since the war, has reached its climax. Public opinion is rapidly growing more intelligent in respect to international relations, and this will tend to harmonize the two branches of government. The important act signed in May, 1924, by the President, which provides for the reorganization of the diplomatic service and its consolidation with the consular service, will tend to stabilize our foreign practices. Friendly arrangements tending to bring about greater harmony of action might be made between the executive and the Senate. In the Washington Conference, for example, President Harding included in the American delegation the majority and minority leaders in the Senate (Senators Lodge and Underwood). Possibly it might be arranged that the Secretary of State be granted the privilege of the floor in the Senate when treaties were discussed,

or be made ex officio a member, without vote, of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, the chairman of which, in return, might be invited to attend cabinet sessions when foreign policies were under consideration. At any rate there are possibilities of readjustment even under the system laid down in the Constitution, and it may be assumed that friction will become less evident with passing years. After all, the American system, being founded on democracy, has its own peculiar advantages, and the possibility of an occasional conflict between the two agencies in treaty-making, each jealous of its prerogatives, adds a little to the zest of international politics.

The Department of State. In the United States, as already explained, the Federal executive alone has the right to negotiate treaties; but as an aid in his conduct of foreign relations a Secretary of State is associated with him, who is directly responsible to him rather than to Congress.[1] The Department of State[2] (originally known as the Department of Foreign Affairs), over which the Secretary presides, is the first administrative department in order of time to be organized by congressional act, and hence its secretary has priority in the president's cabinet and, after the vice president, in succession to the presidency in case of vacancy. The holders of the office have uniformly been

[1] An often-repeated quotation from Senator Spooner of Wisconsin says: "It is a department which from the beginning the Senate has never assumed the right to direct or control, except as to clearly defined matters relating to duties imposed by statute and not connected with the conduct of foreign relations. We *direct* all the other heads of departments to transmit to the Senate designated papers or information. We do not address directions to the Secretary of State, nor do we direct requests even to the Secretary of State. We direct requests to the real head of that department, the President of the United States, and, as a matter of courtesy, we add the qualifying words: 'if in his judgment not incompatible with the public interest.'"

[2] First organized in August, 1781; reorganized on July 27, 1789; renamed on September 15, 1789.

among our most distinguished statesmen, and six[1] of them attained the presidency.

The department serves as a medium for the conduct of foreign affairs through the diplomatic and consular services, having six divisions for the handling of affairs according to important geographic divisions of world politics.[2] Incidental to this, which is its really important function, are divisions and bureaus devoted to publicity work, appointments, passports, and the custody of records and communications. In size the Department of State is the smallest of the cabinet departments and has suffered from neglect down to the beginning of this century, when the pressure of rapidly multiplying business and international relations compelled a series of reforms, culminating in the passage of the Rogers bill, approved May 24, 1924.[3]

In the earlier years of national life the work of the department was not especially important and, with some shining exceptions, the personnel of both the diplomatic service and the consular service was mediocre.[4] In the fifties (1856) the growing importance of the United States brought about a more definite organization of these services, but small salaries and the "spoils system" were not conducive to length of tenure or wide experience in these important fields. In 1906, largely through the influence of Secretary Root, civil-service rules were introduced in part, and the consu-

[1] Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Van Buren, and Buchanan. No secretary has attained the office since the Civil War.

[2] These are western Europe, eastern Europe, the Near East, the Far East, Latin America, and Mexico.

[3] See Lay, Foreign Service of the United States, especially chap. iii.

[4] The President has a Secretary of State to advise him, who is sometimes a man of first-rate gifts, but more frequently only a politician selected because of his party standing, and possessing little knowledge of world affairs. The staff of the office has been small and too frequently changed.—JAMES BRYCE, Modern Democracies, Vol. II. By permission of The Macmillan Company

lar service was reorganized so as to aid in the development of commerce, more especially export trade. Later, in the year 1909 and again in 1915, civil-service rules were extended, and a more systematic organization of the foreign service was made.

The World War and the sudden rise of the United States to political prominence and economic leadership showed the department's organization to be so inadequate[1] to handle the many important problems thrust upon it that a thorough reorganization became inevitable, and through the insight and energy of Secretary Hughes this was accomplished by the Rogers act of the Sixty-eighth Congress, already referred to.

Under this law there are associated with the Secretary an undersecretary and four assistant secretaries of state, each having charge of definite branches of administrative duties. The diplomatic and consular services are carefully coördinated and to some extent blended with each other and with the personnel of the department, since members of any one of these three services may be shifted from one to the other for the sake of wider experience and promotion. A classified salary scale is included, with a retirement plan, a pension provision, and an enlarged but not complete civil-service basis.

There is an ancient grievance to the effect that wealthy Americans only can afford to hold important diplomatic

[1] In the two storm centers of that period, London and Peking, it is pathetic to read the many complaints from Ambassador Walter Hines Page ("Life and Letters") and from Minister Paul S. Reinsch ("An American Diplomat in China") in respect to the neglect given to recommendations and correspondence during the trying periods of the war. Those familiar with the handling of affairs during the Siberian episode for a time almost "despaired of the republic" because of the ineptitude of the State Department. Under the present reorganization, if only the personnel be kept free from the spoils system, such complaints are not likely to occur.

positions abroad, for the reason that the salaries paid are too inadequate to meet the entertainment expenses of the office.[1] The reorganization partly remedies this by providing for special allowances in order to meet the official expenditures necessarily made at diplomatic missions and for consular offices at capitals where the United States has no diplomatic officer. Provision is also made that the department shall include a training-school in foreign-service information for the instruction of new appointees; those who at the end of a year's time show capacity are to be placed in positions suited to their respective attainment and ability, so that thereafter promotion lies before them according to their deserts.

Obviously this reorganized system, if it continues to meet with the favor of Congress and the administration and is kept free from spoils and partisanship, will gradually build up in the Department of State and in the foreign service a trained personnel capable of handling efficiently the foreign relations of the nation. In the words of Secretary Hughes[2] made public soon after the passage of the Rogers bill:

> Through the passage of the Rogers Bill the serious limitations and inadequacies inherent in our present Foreign Service adjustment have been removed, and a substantial basis of reorganization achieved. The date of its enactment marks the birthday of the new service. . . .
>
> Through this salutary legislation young men of ambition are offered a career of almost unparalleled opportunity and attractiveness, and the country receives its best assurance of security and substantial achievement in the future conduct of its foreign affairs.

[1] See Lay, Foreign Service of the United States, chap. xiii.

[2] *American Consular Bulletin*, July, 1924.

CHAPTER VII

SEA POWER AND THE NAVY IN DIPLOMACY[1]

Nations, as well as men, almost always betray the most prominent features of their future destiny in their earliest years. When I contemplate the ardour with which the Anglo-Americans prosecute commercial enterprise, the advantages which befriend them, and the success of their undertakings, I cannot refrain from believing that they will one day become the first maritime power of the globe. They are born to rule the seas, as the Romans were to conquer the world.—TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in America

Sea power. *Sea power,* the short and pithy term popularized by Captain Mahan[2] a generation ago, applies to states having interests in commerce on the seas. Hence they engage in maritime shipping and, by implication, maintain a navy for their defense. From this point of view there are as many sea powers as there are states having definite interests on the sea and having shipping for commercial or warlike purposes. If, however, a comparison is made of the several powers in respect to their relative strength in commercial shipping and naval fighting, it is obvious that one is preëminent because of its superiority in commercial tonnage and battle capacity. Such a state, if able through its navy to protect adequately its maritime commerce, its coast line, and its outlying territories, and, if necessary, to enforce its demands against rivals on the sea, may be said in a peculiar and special sense to possess sea power.

Rival commercial powers regularly seek for supremacy on the seas because of the economic and territorial gain thereby

[1] See Bibliography, section VIII.

[2] A. T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on History. 1889.

acquired and the resultant prestige in international affairs. Struggles for supremacy lead to maritime wars resulting in the definite maritime subordination of the conquered to the conquerors. International law aims to harmonize these rivalries to some extent by seeking to regulate the rules of international conduct, both in peace and in war, and also by striving to safeguard the rights of neutrals and to preserve a generous freedom of the seas. A nation supreme in sea power may as a matter of policy be generous in its attitude toward its competitors, making the seas as free to the weakest as to the strongest, thereby arousing no antagonism because of unfair competition. Or, again, as at the Washington Conference, the great naval powers may by amicable agreement come to an understanding as to respective ratios of naval power, thus in a sense holding sea power in partnership. Still, as long as there is a vigorous competition for raw material, economic privileges, and territorial possessions, there is the possibility of unsettled situations that may result in a struggle for naval supremacy. For when a nation relies on maritime commerce for its foods, its raw material, and its exporting and importing trade, it seems wiser to be able to secure these through the possession of an adequate merchant marine supported by a dominating naval force than to have their safety guarantied by paper agreements or the good will of that nation's maritime rivals. For such reasons naval history has been one long struggle for naval supremacy, the conquering sea power dictating to conquered naval powers terms, harsh or generous, as might seem best under the circumstances.

Sea power in past centuries relied on fighting ships navigating on the surface of the sea; but the rise into prominence during the last few years of the submarine and the airship has complicated the situation, since supremacy in

the future will be determined not merely by the relative strength of battleships afloat but by submarine and aërial squadrons also. Hence the sea power of the future will be measured by the combined strength and efficiency of the joint fleet under, over, or on the seas. The future relative importance of each of these methods of warfare is still a matter of controversy; but the theory of sea power remains unchanged, though the factors to be taken into consideration are much more complicated.

Sea power in Europe. When commercial supremacy left the Mediterranean and the Baltic in the sixteenth century and concentrated in the Atlantic, Spain became supreme through its great navy and its traffic with the American colonies; but, by developing a monopolistic policy, it created hostility on the part of its commercial and political rivals and through naval defeats lost the supremacy to the Netherlands and to England. England under Cromwell developed a navy and fought the Netherlands, and then in later years fought France, emerging from the eighteenth century and the Napoleonic wars as the unquestioned "mistress of the seas" and the possessor of captured colonial territories in all parts of the seven seas. In the eighties Germany developed a colonial policy and, by its naval program of 1900, challenged England's supremacy on the seas, thus making it a war to the death. England at once abandoned its historic policy of isolation from alliances with Continental powers: it came to an agreement with Japan in 1902 to be free from responsibilities in the East; it came to an agreement with France in 1904 and with Russia in 1907; it cultivated friendly arrangements with the United States. And meanwhile it quietly concentrated its battle fleet in home waters, awaiting the coming of *Der Tag* of German prophecy.

The naval battle of Jutland destroyed Germany's hopes

of gaining control of the high seas; and though its submarine warfare almost compelled England's collapse through starvation, the final surrender of the German fleet and its sinking at Scapa Flow shattered Germany's dream of naval supremacy and left England still the mistress of the seas. This compulsory surrender of the fleet and the restrictions placed on Germany in respect to future naval construction illustrate the policy of supremacy on the seas practiced in naval warfare from the beginning. The conquered nation regularly is deprived of its war fleet and kept weak on the sea by restrictions or indemnity.

The United States and sea power. The United States in the first fifty years of national existence had no aspirations for supremacy on the sea and was ambitious merely to defend its own coasts and shipping as far as possible. Its navy was small, almost insignificant, and in war time it fought a sort of guerrilla warfare rather than an organized strategic campaign. For the destruction of enemy commerce it relied chiefly on privateers, a sort of semi-piracy highly remunerative to American shipowners. Its little navy did the best it could under the circumstances, in general keeping to this side of the Atlantic except when dealing with the Barbary powers. The War of 1812, so inglorious on land, was partly redeemed early in the war by naval encounters off the coast and by successful battles on Lakes Erie and Champlain; but the British fleet controlled the seas and blockaded American ports. American ships were usually well built; their sailors (volunteers, not impressed men) were excellent seamen and rather expert in gunnery, so that when a naval encounter did take place on fairly equal terms the ships regularly gave an excellent account of themselves. They were too few in number, however, to hold the coast against the British.

After these wars and down to the Civil War national policies were domestic and peaceful; agriculture and, to some extent, manufactures were America's chief interests, and territorial expansion was an absorbing passion. Yet the commercial East still retained an interest in maritime trade with Europe, with the other Americas, and, increasingly, with the Pacific, where its ships sought whale oil and guano, made contacts in the South Seas, and opened up trade with middle and eastern Asia as far as that could be done in view of the closed doors of the Oriental states. During this period there were no wars in Europe or America that necessitated a powerful navy; Great Britain was supreme and through its fleets kept the peace on the seas; commerce on the high seas was open freely to all nations under the principle of a "fair field and no favor." There was abundant trade for all interested powers; and the United States, through its speedy clippers manned by shrewd seamen of native stock, got its fair share, having by 1860 a merchant marine of about two and a half million tons in foreign trade, second only to Great Britain. Under such conditions of idyllic peace the United States saw no need for a navy larger than was necessary for routine or patrol duty.

In the Civil War the South had no navy worthy of the name, so that Northern naval activities were confined to blockading the coast of the Confederacy, a most important duty; to pursuing and fighting Confederate privateers that took to the high seas; and to coöperating with the army in its several campaigns near seaports or rivers. Farragut at Mobile Bay, the battle between the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor*, and the sinking of the *Alabama* illustrate these forms of naval activity. In naval warfare this was a period of transition: the wooden ship was yielding to the ship made of iron; the sail to steam; unarmored to ar-

mored vessels; the muzzle loader to the breech loader; the shot to the shell; the chance encounters to planned campaigns emphasizing a thorough training in strategy and scientific achievement. Consequently by 1880 the heterogeneous navy thrown together in the war had largely gone to the scrap heap, and the American navy had reached its lowest ebb. The war also destroyed the merchant marine, partly through the destruction caused by the Confederate cruisers and, again, through British competition in the use of the iron ship. Then, too, in the East capital and man power, developing in consequence of industrial and urban expansion, were diverted from commerce and were flowing into the better-paying industries and into the home commerce. Foreign freighters in great numbers took possession of America's maritime commerce, excepting the coastwise trade, and served as carriers for its exports and imports. Soon there was left no merchant marine of any consequence, peace prevailed, and to the legislators there seemed small need for a navy except for policing the coasts and for an occasional trip to some foreign country. The United States was marking time, awaiting the march of events in the international world.

Naval officers as diplomats. Few realize that in the first hundred years of American national history the navy and its officers formed a rather important part of the diplomatic service. In that period, owing to the lack of suitable consular or diplomatic agents in many parts of the world (more especially in those parts not then included in the circle of Western nations or their colonial possessions), many important tasks were intrusted to naval officers by Congress or by the executive, who readily could make assignments to such duties, for the reason that the president, in addition to his diplomatic powers, is also commander in chief of the army

and navy. Warships in the course of years travel and retravel the seven seas and thus enjoy many opportunities to promote the interests of the United States in advance of formal diplomatic action. Naval officers also, in their travels, come in frequent contact with foreign naval officers and governmental officials and thus readily acquire a knowledge not only of the "courtesy of the sea" but of that mass of ceremony common in diplomatic intercourse among those who officially represent different flags. As attachés also to some important diplomatic posts, many naval officers regularly acquire experience of great value to them in the exercise of later important commands. Thus, through their knowledge of foreign customs, languages, and ceremonial intercourse naval officers have been able to aid greatly in supplementing the work of the State Department. Furthermore, they are accustomed to command and are not averse to the use of force on suitable occasions, so that they have at times accomplished by open and forcefully persuasive methods much that would have remained undone if left to the tortuous and tardy methods of diplomatic machinery. They have, indeed, not infrequently from a sense of duty performed diplomatic acts on their own responsibility,[1] subject to reprimand and disavowal from Washington if the action proved to be a diplomatic blunder. One might infer from past actions that with their keen sense of commercial needs they lose no opportunity to advance the commercial interests of the United States and to secure in the more distant parts of the earth port facilities or island possessions that may ultimately prove advantageous to national interests, in such matters being often many years in advance of the less informed minds in charge of governmental poli-

[1] The action of Rear Admiral Mayo at Tampico in 1914 illustrates this assumption of responsibility.

cies. In illustration of the many-sided diplomatic activities of naval officers attention will be called to some matters of importance handled by them in the first century of national existence.

In the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Through his tactful energy and diplomatic skill at the court of France during the Revolution, John Paul Jones, without any definite authorization from the "Committee of Secret Correspondence" of the Continental Congress, finally secured in 1779 the command under the American flag of those French war vessels that won the victory over the *Serapis* and harried the coast of the British Isles, much to the consternation of English commercial interests. Again, the troubles of the United States with the piratical Barbary powers, to which for some years it paid a humiliating tribute (as did the European nations), were ended, and gloriously so, when at intervals for fifteen years (1801–1816) its little navy was intrusted with the task of punishing them for their many outrages against the commerce and flag of the United States. The several commanders, among whom Commodores Preble and Decatur stood preëminent, fought the pirates, bombarded their capitals, demanded satisfaction for injuries, and ended by making treaties that freed the United States from further tribute and opened the Mediterranean to its commerce. The punishment inflicted on the pirate states by the United States became an object lesson to the European powers also, and in consequence they soon freed themselves from the tribute and exactions that they had been compelled to pay for over a hundred years. In 1831 it was Commodore David Porter who exchanged ratifications of the first American treaty with Turkey (thus completing the opening of the Mediterranean), a treaty in the making of which several naval officers had participated,

including Commodores John Rodgers and James Biddle. In 1821, largely through the forceful energy and sagacity of Lieutenant R. F. Stockton, who was on the African coast enforcing prohibitions against the slave trade, the site of Liberia was secured by treaty from neighboring chiefs as a projected settlement for emancipated slaves from the United States. These services in the Mediterranean and on the African coast are typical of the sort of activity demanded in those days from naval officers.

In the Pacific. It was, however, in the Pacific that the navy gained its greatest laurels through its officers. Commodore Lawrence Kearny was at Hongkong in 1842 on the famous frigate *Constellation* when news came of the treaty of Nanking, whereby China opened five ports to British commerce at the conclusion of the "Opium War." Commodore Kearny promptly sent copies of the treaty to Washington, urging the administration to secure similar privileges for American commerce. Meanwhile he prepared the way by using his influence with Chinese officials; so that when Caleb Cushing arrived in 1844 he found the officials favorably inclined, and he speedily obtained the coveted treaty.

This led to movements toward the securing of a similar treaty from Japan. First, in 1846, Commodore Biddle on the *Columbus* tried to carry on negotiations while anchored in Yeddo Bay, but after ten days he gave up the attempt. Other abortive attempts were made by the United States in following years, but in 1852 a decision was reached to push the matter to completion under the charge of Commodore Matthew C. Perry, who was placed in command of a strong fleet well equipped for the purpose. On July 8, 1853, he entered Yeddo Bay and started negotiations which lasted for nine days but without definite results. In February of the follow-

ing year Perry returned to renew negotiations, and on March 31 he secured and signed the treaty that opened up Japan to Western influences. Other nations quickly followed the example set by the United States, the Japanese using the fair treaty submitted by the United States as the basis for the others. On his return voyage Perry stopped at the Riukiu Islands and made a treaty similar to that with Japan, and this was proclaimed by the United States on March 9, 1855.

The third of the hermit nations, Korea, was in similar fashion made open to the world's commerce largely through the influence of Commander Robert W. Shufeldt, who, beginning in January, 1867, sought to break down the barriers that kept Korea from contact with the Western powers. This attempt was unsuccessful and so also were other attempts made by American agents from time to time. In 1876 news came that Japan had made a treaty of amity and commerce with Korea. Commodore Shufeldt at once sought to arouse interest at Washington, and two years later was again authorized to try to negotiate a treaty. Japan was apparently not eager to share the privilege of commerce with other powers; but China, through the influence of the great viceroy Li Hung Chang, seemed more favorably disposed. The rivalry between these two Oriental powers for supremacy in Korea was strongly in evidence. After many protracted negotiations Viceroy Li took up the matter definitely, and at the end of much discussion as to the terms of the treaty, it was finally signed by the king of Korea on May 22, 1882.

As for island possessions, as early as 1826 an important step was taken when Commander Jones on the *Peacock* spent several months at Honolulu and on December 26, on his own authority, negotiated with the king a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation. This action was not indorsed by President Adams, but the treaty, though unratified, had

a sort of moral effect by stressing American influence in that island group. Incidentally, the Midway Island group, about 1126 miles northwest of Honolulu, was claimed for the United States in 1867 by the commander of the *Lackawanna*. In 1872, also Commodore Richard W. Meade, under instructions from Rear Admiral John A. Winslow, spent some time at the port of Pago Pago in the Samoan group. The situation was such that he virtually took possession, making a treaty to that effect with the native chiefs. This was submitted by President Grant, but was not ratified by the Senate, though it became the basis on which in 1899 that important port came under the flag of the United States.

The navy in recent years. Services such as these are not so necessary in these days owing to the ease of communication and the presence of American consular or diplomatic officers throughout the world. The type of diplomatic service now in use is exemplified in the navy's trip round the world in 1907 via Japan, China, and Australia, in which were combined a veiled warning to Japan, encouragement to China, and friendly relations with kinsfolk in the South Seas. A similar trip to the Australasian lands via Pago Pago was made by the Pacific fleet in 1925 for the purpose of maneuvering and also of strengthening friendly ties in that part of the world.[1] In Latin America Admiral Caper-

[1] The Associated Press from London on July 25 wires:

"The Sydney correspondent of the *Morning Post* says that a section of the press of Melbourne and Sydney interprets the visit of the American fleet to Australia as a mission of special significance, asserting that while the United States may not propose to fight anybody for Australia's protection, she has evolved a mighty weapon with which to defend general peace in the Pacific. The correspondent cites the *Melbourne Herald* as commenting: 'We feel comfort in the presence of the fleet of a friendly nation, showing that the coast of Australia lies within the range of her protection.' The Sydney *Evening News* raises a vision of a 'mighty armada of the combined sea power of America and Great Britain, in the consummation of which dwells the strongest hope of permanent peace in the Pacific.'"

ton's friendly visits to South American ports in 1917 had much diplomatic importance, as did the kindly assistance rendered in 1923 to Brazil through the sending of a naval commission under Rear Admiral Vogelgesang to aid that country in the reorganization of its navy. Nor should one omit the efficient diplomatic services of Admiral Knight of the Asiatic fleet in the troublous period of the World War and the Siberian episode. And the sending of Admiral William S. Sims to England at the entrance of the United States into the World War in 1917 well illustrates how powerful an influence in diplomacy was exerted by an intelligent, tactful officer who was thoroughly familiar with the possibilities of the naval situation and able to offer wise suggestions as to American capacity and opportunities for service in the war.

The navy reorganized. According to Bywater[1] the United States at the close of the Civil War had six hundred and seventy-four armed ships and was second only to Great Britain in sea power; but within fifteen years all but forty-one of these had passed from service, and even the forty-one were for the most part obsolete, so rapid had been the many changes in naval construction and equipment. After 1880 interest in the navy was revived somewhat, and by 1885 three protected cruisers had been constructed in harmony with modern standards. With these the newer navy was begun, and from that time regular expenditures for construction were made by Congress, though on an economical scale.

The beginning of a more vigorous attitude came about through the attention focused on the navy in the Spanish war. The blowing up of the Maine in Habana Harbor first attracted attention; then came Dewey's capture of Manila

[1] "Sea Power in the Pacific," chap. iii.

after destroying the Spanish fleet; following this was Lieutenant Hobson's spectacular attempt to block up the channel at Santiago; and, finally, the *Oregon* made its famous trip round South America to be present at the death of Admiral Cervera's fleet. What little glory there was in so unequal a war was concentrated on the navy, which forthwith became popular.

But other influences were at work that soon changed the whole situation. The great sea nations in the eighties had become profoundly interested in colonies and in expansion within the tropics. The age of steel, power, and oil had come; industries were expanding by leaps and bounds; commerce on the seas was rapidly multiplying; and in all this England found that there were two new rivals for economic supremacy—Germany and the United States. Germany's future lay on the water the Kaiser said,[1] hence that nation began to press England hard in manufacturing, in shipping, and in competition for colonial possessions. The United States also began to take more interest in the trade of the Far East and of Latin America, more especially in the Caribbean. Through the war with Spain it had secured distant and tropical colonies, and by annexation had acquired Hawaii and Tutuila. By the sacrifice of "blood and treasure" it had become a world power, had expanded its political horizon, and had become democratically imperialistic. Clearly it was time to build up a naval policy and to develop a modern navy. President Roosevelt had a keen appreciation of the situation and saw to it that reorganization and a stronger building-program went hand in hand.

In the earlier years of this century the apparent danger of the United States from hostile nations came, first, from an aggressive Germany eager for expansion and commercial

[1] "Unsere Zukunft liegt auf dem Wasser!"

supremacy and, secondly, from irate Japan indignant at America's immigration policy and suspicious of its attitude in the Far East. It is not likely that Germany would have ventured to attack the United States while England held the supremacy of the seas, nor would Japan have felt safe in warring against the United States unless it had felt assured of England's friendly neutrality or hearty coöperation, neither of which could be guarantied. The situation, however, was such that "safety first" demanded adequate preparation. By degrees, therefore, a fairly efficient American navy was built up, receiving from the World War its final stimulus in the great program of 1916, which took into account a possible German victory over the Allies and Germany's subsequent naval supremacy on the seas. By 1919 the executive was stressing a "largest navy" policy, hoping that the United States would thereby be able to guaranty the freedom of the seas—a favorite notion of President Wilson's. Some of the creditable performances of the navy while the United States was in the war were the services of destroyers and submarines in European waters, the five-battleship contingent at Scapa Flow with the Grand Fleet, the North Sea mine barrage proposed and mostly laid by the United States, the remarkable convoy and transport system in which the navy so greatly aided, and the employment of a naval personnel in charge of five 14-inch naval guns in active service on the front in France for over a year.

The naval ratio. After the close of the World War a decision was reached to divide the fleet into two divisions, the Atlantic and the Pacific, and in August, 1919, the Pacific fleet took its place along the western coast. An intensely hostile situation was at that time developing between the United States and Japan; so that by the year

1921 war seemed to some inevitable.[1] It was to meet this situation, as well as to prevent, if possible, further competition in naval construction, that the Washington Conference was called. The results of this conference eased the friction between the two countries and relieved in part the competition in armaments going on among naval powers, but the real causes of animosity still exist, and there is urgent need that the United States definitely decide on a permanent naval policy.

Under the terms of the naval treaty agreed on at this conference the United States is, in theory, placed on an equality with Great Britain in sea power. This statement is to be qualified by the admission that before a *real* estimate of relative importance can be made many other factors must be taken into account aside from a paper ratio of five to five. The essential point, however, is that as the United States closes a history of one hundred and fifty years it assumes in the eyes of the world an equal rank in sea power with Great Britain, and this necessitates a definite naval policy maintaining an effective five-to-five ratio under and over the water as well as on it.

In view of the enormous expansion of modern maritime commerce and colonial possessions it has become impossible for any one power to be completely supreme on the seas, especially in view of the possibilities inherent in warfare through submarine and air service. The Washington Conference, therefore, marked a new stage in development, since the world's three great naval powers, like a modern triumvirate, virtually divided the seas among themselves: Japan controlling the northwest Pacific, the United States the waters of the Americas, and Great Britain the Eastern

[1] See, for example, A. M. Poorley, Japan's Foreign Policies. 1920. See also H. C. Bywater, The Great Pacific War.

Hemisphere with the exception of the waters of eastern Asia. Admittedly this arrangement is tentative, being designed chiefly to suspend competition in capital ships. Important readjustments must necessarily take place at the expiration of the treaty on December 31, 1936.

Future work of the navy. In coming years, presumably, the United States will still emphasize its Monroe Doctrine and hence will feel responsible for the policing of the Western Hemisphere—the work of the navy. Unquestionably its control of the Panama Canal will necessitate in the Canal and Caribbean region strong fortifications and a naval patrol guarding in both oceans the approaches to the Canal. The American outer line in the eastern Pacific runs through Pago Pago, Honolulu, and Dutch Harbor in Alaska, with Pearl Harbor as its strongly fortified outpost and naval base. The United States will in coming years surely develop vigorous commercial relations west of this line in the South Seas and Australasia, and presumably it has no intention of surrendering control of Guam and the Philippines or of relaxing its deep interest in China, so that there will be need for patrol in these waters and along the Asiatic eastern coast. Then, again, the United States has become a world power—perhaps the most influential, certainly the wealthiest—and is bound to be creditor for long years to all Europe and the Far East, thus arousing jealousies. It also seeks to take the lead in industries, yet holds on to its high tariff system, thus arousing vigorous antagonisms. These numerous situations make inevitable an emphasis on sea power in order that American lines of communication over all the seas may be safeguarded. As this necessity will be felt more especially in the Pacific, naval strength must be concentrated in those waters rather than in the Atlantic.

In later centuries hostility and wars may pass away

through the joint efforts of conferences, regional agreements, and such agencies as the International Court of Justice or the League of Nations, but in this present century there will be a transition period from militarism to coöperation and arbitration. During this transition a nation situated as is the United States might better rely upon a strong navy as its chief line of defense. Ideally and preferably the two English-speaking nations should work hand in hand for the peace of the world, certainly for the peace of the Pacific, and in due time this *entente* may become a definite agreement. Failing this, one might surmise that the alternative is actual supremacy on the sea or a surrender of world leadership and a willingness to remain content with leadership in the Western Hemisphere only, withdrawing from the South Seas, the west Pacific, and the Far East.

CHAPTER VIII

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEALISM

The United States of America comprehend in their limits one of the fairest portions of the earth. Extending nearly from the Pacific to the Atlantic ocean, and spreading over the best portion of the temperate zone, on this northern continent, there is scarcely a nation or an empire, ancient or modern, that can sustain a complete comparison. . . . The tranquillity, the order, and the happiness of mankind, seem indeed to depend on the existence of large and powerful empires. . . . The tranquillity of our citizens, the permanence of our liberties, the beauties of our social system, the vigor of our republican institutions, depend on the preservation of a large and powerful empire on this continent; an empire, too powerful to fear foreign enmity, too large to be the sport of local faction; an empire, capable of concentrating its energies, and of directing them by a single impulse.[1]

Psychic unity. In modern psychology there is a teaching to the effect that human personality is a sort of federation made up of many minor personalities integrated and harmonized. Under normal conditions the integrated mind is a unit and in action exhibits a consistent personality. But under abnormal situations the psychic equilibrium may be disturbed, and the particular type of personality suited to the situation may dominate the mind, so that the resultant behavior would seem to be abnormal. Under such circumstances it would be unfair to assume that the person's abnormal conduct represented his real character. This should be determined by the usual conduct of the person concerned and from a knowledge of the motives that in general dominate his life.

[1] From the writings of Chief Justice Augustus B. Woodward (Michigan). 1809.

This teaching of multiple personality may by analogy be applied to nations also. No nation should be judged by an isolated act performed under the stress of excitement or at the suggestion of a perverted but temporary leadership. A nation, like a man, has on occasions its brain storms and its periods of abnormality. At such times its friends and neighbors should put on their best smile and await with patience the return of normal conduct and that restitution which will be dictated by a remorseful conscience, aided at times by the persuasive demands of its neighbors forcefully expressed. A nation, therefore, should be judged by its character as manifested in the light of history; it should not be judged by its occasional abnormal acts that are due to exceptional circumstances. The real mind of the nation should be ascertained from a knowledge of the principles and ideals that usually actuate its people and its leaders in the pursuit of their general policies, and its abnormal action should promptly be forgotten when a proper atonement has been made for acts of temporary insanity.

In the early nineteenth century the political economists of Europe talked much of the "economic man," just as, in more recent years, other theorists talk of nations whose policies are dictated by purely economic considerations. But the economic man of Ricardo, and the nation actuated by purely economic considerations, are mere fictions of the imagination. Policies of a purely economic sort are abnormal; for every nation is a composite of materialism and idealism, and both these elements are found mingled in national policy. There are times when a nation may be grossly materialistic in its policies; again, under different circumstances, an idealism that is utterly oblivious of material gain may dominate that same nation. In general, national character should be judged by noting the propor-

tions of these two elements that normally are manifested on the whole and in the long run. It is possible that nations grossly materialistic in their policies are comparatively short-lived, for governments that selfishly exploit their peoples or their neighbors and that neglect the ethical standards of national or international opinion will in due time meet their fate as the result of popular revolutions and international hostility.

Militarism. Herbert Spencer, in his "Principles of Sociology," showed that some nations are inherently predatory and militaristic and that others are industrial in type, shunning wars. Yet he also called attention to a transitional stage in which a nation may be passing from one stage to the other and in which war may be utilized for the promotion of economic interests. In this transitional stage the national mind may readily show a double personality: one essentially militaristic and aggressive, and the other industrial and prone to peace. Here, again, a knowledge of history and a study of the underlying principles that explain change in national life are needed to indicate a nation's real attitude of mind.

It has often been said, for example, that had Germany waited another twenty years, instead of warring in 1914, the growing industrialism of the nation would by that time have given it economic supremacy and supplanted the dominant militarism of the ruling class. The war, however, came as a climax to a vigorous militarism, and Germany sought to attain economic supremacy by war, through the suppression of industrial and commercial rivals. Germany in defeat has fallen from its supremacy in the councils of continental Europe and is now at the mercy of its rivals. Its transitional stage was obviously dangerous, since its militarism was essentially a form of economic exploitation and was

not checked by the inherent ethical idealism of the nation, for this had little opportunity for development or expression. As a rule economic or militaristic national policies are governmental in kind and are dictated by the dominant class, militaristic or oligarchic by nature, a class not in sympathy with what may be called the *social* opinion of the nation. This is regularly more idealistic, owing to the influence of traditional teachings in religion and morals and the *urge* of social and scientific aspirations. Therefore, whenever materialistic or militaristic tendencies incline to dominate governmental policies, there is need of a large freedom for public opinion so as to permit free expression to the idealism of the nation. Governmental policies untinged by idealism are dangerous in the long run to national existence. On the other hand, a government in close harmony with a public opinion guided by intelligence and moral idealism may seem to lose prestige through a failure to exploit others when opportunity offers, but it gains a moral prestige far more helpful to national greatness.

Government or people. In the earlier years of the late war President Wilson sought to make a distinction between the German government and the people of Germany, charging against the former the responsibility of plunging the world into war and implying that the latter had been forced into war against their wish. Unquestionably there are times when a distinction of this sort can be made, since on occasions a government may happen to be quite out of sympathy with its people; yet in the more democratic countries of the modern world social demands do formulate themselves into political policies, and these result in governmental action, since officials are made responsive to public opinion through systems of election. The United States itself, for example, has powerful economic ambitions and a keen eye for business,

so that it has often been accused of being mercenary and money-mad; nevertheless, underlying this economic craving for wealth, there is a great idealism voicing itself steadily in public opinion and acting as a check on incipient militarism or economic materialism. Under the influence of this opinion government and people, each relying on the other for support, coöperate in joint policies, ethical in the main.

Early political idealism. This has been true from the beginnings of national life; for it can readily be shown how economic and, at times, even sordid motives influenced the policies and actions of the Revolutionary forefathers, but underlying these actions was a bedrock of idealism that has profoundly influenced national history. In their early years the colonies desired to trade freely with the nations of Europe and to develop their natural resources unhindered by British interference. They desired to free their part of the new continent from the control of Europe, to establish a republic in the midst of a world of monarchies, and to remain neutral in a world war. Yet to accomplish these dreams they had to assert the right of revolution, the right of national freedom, the rights of neutrals, and the principle of the freedom of the seas. Of necessity they had to strike out a new path; and being weak and inexpert in the wiles of European diplomacy and largely under the leadership of young men, they formulated policies of an idealistic sort based on what John Hay referred to as the "golden rule," thereby arousing cynical amusement among the elderly diplomats of the Old World. The United States, of course, failed to convince quarrelsome Europe of the wisdom of the newer idealism; yet when finally peace came, and the United States became potentially great, its steady reiteration of its idealistic policies gradually made an impression, so that in due course of time and in a more democratic age many of the

political ideals of America's Revolutionary era have become acceptable in principle throughout the international world. In this fashion principles peculiar to the United States and arising out of its special situations have by common consent become accepted principles of international law, even though there regularly arise exceptions and modifications caused by new situations.

In general illustration of this matter and as a basis for further discussion in later chapters of their growth and modification with passing years, may be noted the broad principles of policy developed and emphasized throughout the history of the United States. Essentially they are all based on the ideals set forth by leaders like Jefferson, who so ably voiced the spirit of the times: first, in the Declaration of Independence as "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" and, twenty-five years later, in his first inaugural, as "peace, commerce, honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."

Ideals of freedom. First in order may be emphasized the notion of freedom: freedom of the seas, free fisheries in the open sea, an open door to the world's commerce, the rights of neutrals in time of war, and adherence to the principle that free ships make free goods. Admittedly it was assumed that by common agreement there should be reasonable regulations and some restrictions, but interpretations should be generous and against claims of special privileges on the part of powerful states. In short, stress was placed on the Grotian theory of the equality of sovereign states and not on the principle that might makes right. Naturally these idealistic principles did not seem attractive at the time to powerful commercial states fond of monopolies and closed seas and relying on sea power as the best guaranty of their special prerogatives.

Again, it was held that every man had inherently the right of migration, and hence might expatriate himself from his mother country and freely enter the land of his choice, ultimately to become a citizen of that land as fully as though born in it. To the warring monarchs of Europe this was an invitation to permit their fighting men to forsake their allegiance so that they might populate the empty lands of a despised republic! In similar fashion the right of revolution asserted that a people inherently had the right to withdraw allegiance from its mother country, to establish its own form of government, and to receive recognition as a member of the family of nations. A principle such as this looked ominous to the possessors of colonial empires; nevertheless it gave hope to many an oppressed nationality in later years and, even in the World War, was a determining factor when enunciated by President Wilson in his "Fourteen Points" speech.[1]

There was, moreover, a vigorous stress on friendship rather than on hostility as the basis of international relations. Open diplomacy and arbitration should remove many of the causes of war; friendly attitudes, open discussion, and open agreements in harmony with established principles of law should supplant suspicions and secret diplomacy; peace, not war, should be the normal situation among nations. Having such beliefs, the United States, in view of the chaos of wars in which Europe was so regularly embroiled, determined to isolate itself politically from Europe, to refuse all entangling alliances, and to hold aloof from European monarchical governments with their stress on the maintenance by force of the ever-changing "balance of power."

The golden rule. These are the principles that were emphasized over and over in the early years of the develop-

[1] Given before Congress on January 8, 1918.

ment of the United States. They are basal practically to all its policies of the last one hundred and fifty years, and though sometimes neglected or tempered with expediency, they still remain potent. In the World War the facile pen of President Wilson in his great addresses and papers made these principles dynamic,[1] so that their idealism restored morale to the dispirited allied nations and saved the world from a military despotism, thereby making possible the liberty of nations and "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at."

Although the national life of the United States in its present form extends over a period of nearly one hundred and fifty years, yet its long isolation from European entanglements down to quite recent times has kept its issues relatively simple. Its problems were chiefly domestic; international affairs rarely entered into the field of its horizon, and when they did, it sought to settle them peaceably and as quickly as possible. The United States was absorbed in the westward expansion of its territory, in the cultivation of the virgin soil of its farming lands, and in the development of its water power and natural resources. It was perfectly natural, therefore, that in the first generation of the Republic its policy was formulated as a policy of peace, of honest friendship with all nations, of an open door to commerce, and of freedom from entangling alliances with the warring states of Europe.

[1] In the daily press of June 19, 1925, there was a significant quotation. The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, in reviewing a book by Theodore Hahn on President Wilson, said: "Gradual exoneration of President Woodrow Wilson, whose reputation had been badly injured by the Treaty of Versailles, is keeping pace with the growing realization of the dangers today besetting European politics by the very general disregard for his ideas. If the world wishes to live in peace it will have to return to Wilson's theories." In the press of July 19, 1925, a prominent Turk, Djumhouriet by name, is quoted as saying: "We respect America as a nation grand and civilized. If the American Senate had defended Wilson's principles with the same courage as the Anatolian peasant did, Turkey would not have been forced to sustain a new war to protect its independence."

The Monroe Doctrine. Nearly fifty years after the Declaration of Independence, owing partly to the growth of commerce with Latin America, it seemed necessary to formulate more clearly the American attitude toward the new republics and states of the western continent, and this was done through the formal announcement of the Monroe Doctrine. The real basis for this policy was and is the well-settled conviction that the American continent henceforth was to be possessed by Americans only; that is, by its native inhabitants and the Spanish, Portuguese, and Anglo-Americans who had settled on its soil and made it their home. It was a continent to be dedicated as the home of a chain of republics freed from alien or monarchical domination or from considerations of a European balance of power. By implication, therefore, the United States would strenuously object to any attempts made by foreign powers to get a foothold on the continent, and would look with favor on all movements for freedom on the part of those sections of the Americas still held under alien flags. In other words, the United States assumes that in due time all the Americas will be entirely free from foreign control and will voluntarily voice themselves through a Pan-American congress made up of representatives of republics controlled by their own populations. The slogan "America for the Americans" is one that finds a ready response in the Americas and underlies in a fundamental way the entire policy of the United States.

Ideal of democracy. Moreover, running throughout the policy of the United States is the popular strong belief in democratic and republican forms of government. Its earlier experiences with European monarchies were such that the country developed a vigorous antagonism to monarchical forms of government, so that there is a sort of automatic

reaction always in favor of democracies and against monarchies. American students of political systems may understand that some republics are in fact despotisms and that some monarchies are devoted to the welfare of their peoples, but Americans as a whole will regularly react favorably to republics and adversely toward monarchies. Consequently the government in its policy favors the formation of new republics and, as a rule, will recognize them as independent states at the first opportunity; and, by contrast, it would strongly disfavor the establishment of monarchies in place of republics. This democratic idealism can be found dominant throughout the entire history of the United States. From the very beginnings of national life it may be found expressed in its historic documents, in the utterances of its great men, and in the common everyday beliefs of the average man. It is sometimes irrational and oftentimes visionary; but, wisely or unwisely, the innermost conviction of the American people is that every man inherently has the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that the general welfare of the whole people is best guarantied through a republican form of government organized democratically.

Unquestionably this attitude of mind has some influence in determining the relations between the United States and other countries. There is in American public opinion an inherent prejudice against monarchies, which are regularly suspected of being militaristic and expansionistic through methods of merciless exploitation. This feeling is shown even against Great Britain, although it is of kindred blood and is so largely democratic. A similar antagonism is at times manifested against Japan, because in theory it is autocratic and militaristic. Japanese policy after 1905 strengthened

this feeling of suspicion; so that the real irritation felt on the part of the United States is not primarily because of controversies in respect to immigration or the twenty-one demands made against China in 1915, but because of a distrust of what seems to be a policy of monarchic and militaristic expansion on Japan's part. Believing firmly, as Americans do, in the principle of nationality and in republican forms of government, their sympathies incline in those directions, and, rightly or wrongly, there is a sort of suspicion prevalent against Japan in respect to its policy toward republican China. Until 1905 this opinion was not held, for up to that time the United States had a deep sympathy for Japan in its struggles for admission into the circle of nations. That sympathy has now been transferred to China and Korea, which to Americans seem to be in the same situation that Japan was in the nineteenth century. Admitting, as one must, that Japan is much more efficient than those nations, this fact hardly seems to justify Japan's policies toward them, since those policies seem to be selfish and fundamentally for Japan's benefit and not for the benefit of the countries concerned. The United States itself has at times assumed control of alien peoples, as in the Philippines, Cuba, and other parts of the Caribbean region; but wherever it goes, it tries to develop prosperity, to multiply intelligence, and to make friends. On the contrary, Japan in the past (down to 1921, at least) made enemies, not friends, and sought to maintain itself apparently by force, espionage, and stern police administration.

Social ideals. Turning aside from the political aspects of American policy, one may now briefly consider its socio-political policies, since these so often somewhat influence international relations. It is the policy of the United States, for example, to assume that State and Church should be

kept separate. This is not because an antagonism is felt between the State and the Church, for that is not true. Rather is it due to the conviction that the best interests of religion are conserved by confiding them to social agencies, since it is believed that governmental control of religion tends to make it formal and materialistic. This religious freedom enjoyed by American citizens removes definitely from the sphere of politics one of the most irritating causes of internal discord, since all religions are impartially treated by the government, which never interferes with the religious beliefs or disbeliefs of its citizens.

Again, the preamble to the Constitution declares that one of the purposes of government is to "promote the general welfare." This ideal has had a great influence over American social policy, and applications of it are multiplying, not lessening. For the most part such matters are left to the states, not to the national government, so that each state may develop its own policy of public welfare. This allows for diversity and competition and is considered more advantageous than a national system, compulsory on all alike. Since there are forty-eight states, this might imply that there are forty-eight distinct systems, and to some extent this is true. Yet through publications and numerous national conventions each is kept informed of the policies of the others, so that there is a sort of uniformity prevalent, though with wide differences in detail. The states, for example, provide free elementary education for both sexes alike and make it compulsory, and then furnish free but not compulsory education through high school and college. It is held that an illiterate population is a dangerous population, and that the nation is at its best when a large fraction of its people has opportunity for a broad and generous higher education. Home life also is carefully safeguarded, but on a democratic

rather than a patriarchal basis. Women and children have well-recognized rights as against male kin or parents, and their interests are carefully protected by law. In economic life all careers are open to everyone. A person of the most humble birth and lineage may aspire to the highest honors in social, civil, and political life, and in the wage system the ideal of a generous living wage is stressed though not always realized. These fundamental ideals of American social life—religious liberty, economic opportunity, education, and the "career open to talent"—are part of the national social heritage and influence the general attitude toward other nations according as the latter favor or disfavor the same ideals. Internationally America's desire is to live at peace with all nations and to avoid wars, preferring arbitration and international conferences, where difficulties can be discussed amicably and compromises reached through a comprehension of others' points of view.

The natural outcome would be a world federation, an internationalism among nations such as that for which President Wilson stood. This, however, is a matter of slow development; social integration usually precedes political unity, and that is the growth of centuries. At present racial antipathies, religious antagonisms, economic competition, and the barriers of national language, customs, and traditions are too manifest to permit a soul unity among men; yet the altruistic spirit which is developing slowly but surely in the world is a sign that points in the long run to the international federation of nations. In due time the discordant nationalities of the earth will blend into a common humanity in which the ideals of fraternalism will unite with the ideals of liberty and equality. After all, men are one at heart, and the competition of an age stressing the "struggle for survival" will some day be superseded by coöperation in all matters essential to material and cultural civilization.

PART II. DEVELOPMENT OF POLICIES

CHAPTER IX

BRIEF OUTLINE OF NATIONAL POLICIES FROM 1776 TO 1925[1]

Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every other nation belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have the right to claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence of the United States, "to assume, among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them."—Third principle in the "Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations" (1916)

Independence. On July 4, 1776, thirteen of England's American colonies, through their delegates assembled in congress at Philadelphia, declared their independence and solemnly formed a "perpetual union" of sovereign states. The United States of America, thus born into the family of nations, became the first modern state in Christendom outside Europe and the elder brother of the long line of Latin-American states that came into existence in the first third of the nineteenth century. As a republic it fired the imagination of those who dreamed of political liberty and of freedom from the despotism of king or bishop, so that in Europe many thought of America as the land of freedom and the home of democracy.

Yet the new state did not meet with a hearty welcome from the courts of Europe. Rebellions were frowned upon

[1] See Bibliography, section I.

by the monarchs of that time, much fonder of absolutism than of republicanism, and colonial rebellions made a decidedly bad precedent in the opinion of colony-holding powers. The new nation, therefore, had to go "cap in hand" begging for loans, supplies, and military help. These were furnished by France, at first secretly and then openly, not out of love for liberty but because of hatred against England, which had defeated it in the Seven Years' War. To the autocratic monarchs of that time and to the nobility whom they represented, America was Bolshevist, given to propaganda and eager to recommend to monarchic Europe the principles of a republican form of government. These fears were abundantly justified, for within fifteen years from the Declaration of Independence all Europe was in turmoil through the outbreak of the French Revolution and through French teachings of liberty and equality.

The early situations. In 1776 the United States had a population of some three millions. These were far from homogeneous in race or united in interests, yet the mass of the population were British by birth or descent, including many Scotch-Irish from the north of Ireland. Virginia was the most populous state, followed in order by Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Massachusetts, and New York. There were few immigrants in those days on account of the difficulties of sea travel; but early marriages and large families were the rule, since the standards of living were simple and fertile land for each new generation was abundant.

Pioneer life makes for democracy; consequently, though there were many survivals of class distinctions, democratic principles were in rapid development. The few colleges of those times were not famous for their learning and in their curricula dwelt on past situations rather than on present problems. The classics and classical history were basal

courses, with faint gleams here and there of what was then considered scientific and contemporaneous information. A well-read gentleman might be presumed to have, aside from the classics, some knowledge of English history and possibly of such nations as the Netherlands, France, and Italy. To those who were liberal in their political opinions the political teachings of the Cromwellian revolution and of Harrington and Sidney were fairly well known. So also were John Locke's political essays written during the period of the second revolution of that century and furnishing to the patriotic leaders radical and democratic bases for their bills of rights and their political arguments. These leaders were for the most part aristocratic in their tastes but democratic in their beliefs; their followers, lower in the social scale, later furnished a leadership more radical but rather noisily patriotic.

Ideals of the Golden Rule. In local politics the colonists were expert through experience with town and county meetings and in colonial assemblies. Few, however, had what might be called a national point of view or had much comprehension of international relations. In many respects they were idealistic and fond of broad principles that could not always be applied to the everyday conditions of political life. Yet because of that very fact they formulated a somewhat remarkable program for the new nation, and this, though impossible of complete realization, has been a constant stimulus to the nation of later generations. If the leaders had been worldly-wise, cynical in respect to political ideals, and Machiavellian in their methods, they would have had far less success and would have aroused no enthusiasm for democratic ideals; but though they had their feet firmly planted on the earth, they had their heads in the clouds and dreamed of a democratic heaven where all men would be free and equal, where justice and fair dealing would rule, and

where every nation would proclaim and practice the Golden Rule in its relations with its fellow states.

In addition to the pioneer democracy and the social theories of the time, the precarious situation in which the colonies found themselves in 1776 made for a belief in generous principles. It is easy for a lamb about to be eaten by a lion to believe that every creature is entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The colonists were about to rebel against England, the leading European power and mistress of the seas. They were poor, disorganized, and far from harmonious in interests. By rebellion they would lose their commerce with the mother country and its West Indian colonies; they would not be able to secure manufactured goods from England nor to fish off the Banks of Newfoundland. Moreover, they had small hopes of securing open ports for their exportable goods or much assistance of any sort from European states. Worst of all, even when the war was over and freedom won, in place of the peace they had hoped for, Europe was plunged into the turmoil created by the wars of the next thirty years. Instead of taking sides in these wars with England or with France, as was expected, the United States declared its neutrality and soon found that in great wars small neutral states are between the devil and the deep sea. Then, too, it desired immigration so as to populate the Western lands; but the wars of Europe also needed men, so that European powers strongly objected to America's radical teachings respecting expatriation and naturalization, dreading the fascination of republican institutions. Stormy seas buffeted the newly launched "ship of state," and it was no wonder that the anxious leaders of the new republic longed for open diplomacy, peace, honest friendship with all nations, and a chance to develop their own system apart from the wars and intrigues of the Old

World. During that period, therefore, the policies of the golden rule—honest diplomacy, arbitration rather than war, and peace among the nations—were to be expected. In short, American demands were for justice, rights, and freedom in an international system in which the interests of the weak would be respected by the strong, even in time of war.

The golden-rule period would cover broadly the first fifty years of national existence. During those years the United States was a weak nation, looked on as a fit subject for exploitation by the European powers, and, being weak, it might supplicate but could not demand. The best that it could do was to assert its rights, to plead for justice, and to appeal to the idealism of the crude and ill-defined "law of nations" of those years, now known as international law. This attitude gave idealism to its statements of policy, exemplifying as they did mutual rights and obligations on the part of nations. Toward the close of the first fifty years of national life the European wars had ended and the United States had become powerful in potential wealth and man power. The Monroe Doctrine, therefore, had a slightly different tone: it still emphasized the golden rule, but it also reminded Europe that America had force and would use it if necessary.

The Monroe Doctrine. In 1823 the United States started formally on the second stage of its career in the formulation of foreign policy. From the beginning of its national life there was a well-founded conviction that its political destiny should not be interwoven with that of Europe. The necessities of the situation drove it into an alliance with France in 1778; but Washington in his administration wisely steered the country away from European war complications, and during Adams's administration it definitely broke off its political connection with France. Its early presidents all

realized the importance of isolating American national policies from those of Europe; so that even when the United States came to declare war on England in 1812, it did not form an alliance with France, but fought out its own quarrel in its own way.

Furthermore, in the Declaration of Independence it had asserted that a people has the right of revolution and may throw off the yoke of tyranny and organize any type of government best suited to its needs. Consequently when France became a republic in 1793, the United States gladly recognized it on principle; and when the Latin colonies on this continent asserted their right to freedom twenty-five years later, it was ready to admit the justice of their claims. Therefore, when danger threatened them from the Holy Alliance, and it seemed as though France, backed by autocracy, would seek to overthrow the liberties of those newly created states, the wisdom of American statesmen, the elder and the younger, blended into one policy the principles of earlier and later years and announced the *Monroe Doctrine*. This policy gave to Europe for the first time a formal statement respecting the policy of the United States toward Europe and the Americas. It asserted for the United States a leadership among the American states as the oldest and most powerful nation. It announced that henceforth this continent was not to be included in European estimates of the balance of power and was to be free from European domination, and that in the future the states of Europe should no longer seek to extend their political systems to the Americas nor to enlarge their territorial holdings.

Later aspects of the Monroe Doctrine. America has already celebrated the centennial of the Monroe Doctrine and can now fully recognize the importance of Monroe's

message in 1823.[1] It has kept the western continent free from European aggression and from the entanglements of European politics. England has not been able to enlarge its holdings in the region of the Caribbean, nor was France allowed to establish a colonial empire in Mexico, nor Germany to secure a foothold in South America or on the Caribbean. The same principle applies to Asiatic powers also, so that Japan may seek no prospective naval base in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine is today the best-recognized national policy, expressly exempted from outside interference by action in the Hague conferences and in the Covenant of the League of Nations; it is, as President Cleveland put it, a permanent policy.

The converse teaching of the Monroe Doctrine is that the United States on its part will not interfere in European politics and will refuse to form entangling alliances with European states. Although it isolates itself politically from European affairs, it of course keeps up social and economic connections and makes treaties and agreements in regulation of such intercourse and in settlement of troublesome situations, such as boundary disputes.

Yet it is hard to draw a dividing line between the political on the one hand and the social and economic on the other. The United States has participated in two Hague conferences, in the Algeciras conference over Morocco, in the London Naval Conference, and in the congress of Versailles at the close of the World War. It did not officially take part in the London conference on the Dawes Report, and yet the presence in Europe of Secretaries Hughes and Mellon and plain

[1] See *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Supplement, January, 1924, for a series of addresses on "Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine."

hints that the United States was unofficially behind the report were powerful aids in its adoption and its ratification by the respective governments. As President Coolidge wishes it put: the United States aids in the settlement of European problems not through entangling alliances, but through service, so as to avert war and promote peace. In matters that involve service the United States coöperates both unofficially and officially with numerous agencies and commissions of the League.[1] On January 27, 1926, the United States, by action of the Senate, voted to become a member of the Permanent Court of International Justice, provided that certain stipulated reservations were agreed to by those nations already members of the Court. Two days later an appropriation of fifty thousand dollars was made by Congress to pay the expense of participation in the preparatory commission for the disarmament conference to be held under the auspices of the League of Nations. On the other hand, the United States refuses to become a member of the League itself, fearing lest it may become involved in the discords and wars of Europe. It is still an open question whether economic interests and the trend of world politics may not force it into a more active participation in the political affairs of Europe and the nearer East, including North Africa.

Pan-Americanism. The Monroe Doctrine reflects the national attitude not only toward Europe but also toward the Latin states. To them it was a godsend that the United States in 1823 undertook to champion their cause and to warn off European aggression; so that when the news was received, a wave of gratitude swept over those lands, inspiring Bolivar to call together the Panama conference of 1826. But though the United States was friendly to Latin

[1] Raymond B. Fosdick, "Six Years of the League," in *League of Nations News*, January, 1926.

America, it was not completely so, for the reason that the Spanish republics were heartily in favor of the abolition of slavery, and this was not pleasing to the Southern states. American action in the case of Cuba also aroused suspicion in Latin America, since the United States did not seem to favor Cuban independence and possibly had its own designs against it. Into Latin America also were sent tactless politicians to represent the United States, and these aroused animosity through their lack of dignity and overbearing dispositions. All in all, suspicion on the part of the Latin states took the place of confidence, and this was accentuated by later actions in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean and was climaxed by Secretary Olney's dogmatic assertion that the United States is "sovereign on this continent."

For forty years after 1823 little or nothing was done to placate the Latin states, so that when the Civil War broke out they were openly unsympathetic and antagonistic. But as the result of the war the United States abolished slavery, thereby removing that blot from its record. It also compelled France to leave Mexico and kept Spain from attempts to enlarge its holdings on this continent. Slowly the United States began to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward Latin America, with the result that those states began to feel more kindly toward it, until under the leadership of James G. Blaine, Secretary of State, the first Pan-American Conference was called in 1889; in 1910 the organization of the Pan-American Union followed. This newer attitude is sometimes called the Pan-American policy. It aims to develop fraternal relations on this continent and harmony in joint American policies.

The Caribbean region. A sharp distinction should be made between the Monroe Doctrine itself and what may best be considered the policy in respect to the Caribbean

region. This latter policy takes into account the fact that for any powerful non-American state to have possessions in the Caribbean strongly fortified or potentially capable of fortifications is inherently dangerous to American peace and safety. Furthermore, weak states in this region, given to frequent revolutions and neglectful of their international obligations, are also dangerous, since foreign powers may be tempted to use coercion and seize their territories. A Caribbean policy, therefore, should in the first place see to it that the European possessions in that region are never enlarged or strongly fortified, and that they should in time become free or annexed to purely American states. In the second place, turmoil and useless revolutions in that region should be minimized, so as to lessen the danger of foreign interference in the affairs of these weak states.

In general, therefore, it may be said that American relations with Latin America are primarily based on the Monroe Doctrine, which is not a policy of domination or aggression but a safeguard, primarily to the United States and also to the Americas, against foreign (that is, European or Asiatic) interference. The Doctrine is supplemented by the Pan-American policy, which aims to cultivate friendly relations among all American states on the basis of a recognition of the equal sovereignty of each and all. There is a third policy, developed because of our deep interest in the Panama region and the seas and gulfs of the "American Mediterranean," which aims to release these lands peacefully from the domination of non-American states and to maintain a *pax Americana* in American waters by discouraging revolutions and encouraging the Caribbean states to develop stability in government and economic prosperity so that they can maintain peaceable relations with the world of states.

The United States and Europe. The political dealings of the United States with Europe from the time of the Monroe Doctrine to the year 1914 were confined almost entirely to warning European powers against territorial extension in the Americas. Such action in the Caribbean region was incessant; but in addition France and England were warned against attempts looking to the absorption of the Hawaiian group, and intimations were given to Germany to keep out of South America. Aside from such matters controversial dealings with Europe related almost entirely to the settlement of disputed claims, to boundary and fishing disputes, and to attempts to harmonize conflicting theories of expatriation, naturalization, immigration, and the rights of neutrals in time of war.

It is hardly necessary to say that since the year 1914 the attitude of the United States toward Europe has undergone considerable change. At the beginning of this century it had practically settled all its differences with European states and had started on a new policy of joint conferences for the formulation of constructive principles for international conduct. The policy of isolation and no entangling political alliances still held, however, and it was assumed that no European war would ever involve the United States. At the outbreak of the World War President Wilson announced American aloofness from European affairs and advised the nation to be neutral in thought and deed. He himself assumed that his function later would be to mediate between the warring nations so as to end the war with honor to both sides. Within a year, however, it was becoming evident that the struggle was a world war in which all nations silently or openly must participate. When the United States declared war in 1917, it was not so much against Germany and Austria as against autocracy, militarism, and a Junker

bureaucracy. It was a war for a peace without victory; it was a war to end war; it was a war to make the world safe for democracy, to restore oppressed nations to their rights, and to unite all nations into a world federation.

But at Versailles President Wilson found himself face to face with the diplomats of Europe, who calmly acknowledged the secret treaties made with Russia, Rumania, Japan, Italy, and France, pledging the spoils of war and making these agreements basal for the new treaty. Against such a cabal Wilson could do nothing effective, so that the treaty became a compromise made up of (1) the constitution for the League of Nations and (2) a dismemberment of Germany and the division of spoil among the Allies, smoothed over somewhat by the introduction of the system of mandates. The essential point to the United States, however, is that under the terms of the treaty it was to depart from its policy of isolation and to take part definitely in the settlement of European and world affairs.

As is well known, the upshot of the whole matter was the rejection of the treaty by the United States Senate, the triumph of the Republican party at the ensuing election, and the reassertion of the policy of isolation, leaving Europe to settle its own affairs as best it could. Unofficially the United States is now assisting in the economic reorganization of Europe, and to some minds this implies that it will inevitably become involved in European politics, since the vast sums invested in Europe or owed by European governments will necessitate some participation at least in European politics.

The United States and the Far East. In their development the principles of the Monroe Doctrine would be found as applicable to Asiatic powers as to European, but curiously enough the United States has not applied the princi-

ples of the isolation policy to the Far East and the Pacific. It is usual for the powers interested in the Far East to work together, in outward form at least, in their dealings with Oriental states, and in this policy the United States has in general acquiesced. In its earlier history its interests in the Pacific were primarily commercial. American clipper ships sailed to China and later to Japan. Its whalers traveled the whole Pacific, and seekers after guano and island products became familiar with the South Seas. In successive order the states with closed doors—China, Japan, and Korea—became open to Western commerce, and with these countries the United States made commercial treaties. In the nineties China was on the rocks and in danger of division among the powers. It was at this juncture that the United States came to the rescue through Secretary John Hay, who announced the "open door" policy and contrived to secure a grudging consent to it from the other powers, thus temporarily securing China against division.

After the Boxer rebellion, however, China entered upon a quarter-century of bitter experience. In 1902 Great Britain unwittingly became potentially hostile to China through alliance with Japan; in 1905 Russia, by defeat in war, was supplanted in Manchuria by Japan, which at the same time assumed supremacy in Korea, ultimately absorbing it. In 1911 China became a republic and thus entered on its present turbulent career, and in 1915 it ran head on against Japan's twenty-one demands. The European powers, in the midst of war and desirous of Japan's support, dared not interfere or even protest, and the United States confined itself to making a formal protest after China had yielded under threat to Japan's demands. When the World War ended, Japan was firmly in control of Chinese politics and was in possession of the larger part of the province of

Shantung, to say nothing of the footholds it had in Fukien, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia.

Meanwhile Japan had developed hard feelings against the United States because of its refusal to admit Japanese to terms of racial equality and because it seemed hostile to Japan's aggressive policy in China. Friction was intensifying, and war talk on both sides of the Pacific made the situation more serious. President Wilson had refused at Versailles to admit the principle of racial equality requested by Japan and had intimated that the United States would not acquiesce in the transfer of Germany's islands in the north Pacific to Japan without a clear understanding of American status in Yap and the other islands of the group. On the other hand, he had admitted Japan's domination over Shantung, thereby making a concession to Japan's secret treaty of 1917 with the Allies. This concession on the part of the United States greatly embittered the Chinese, who had already become suspicious of the United States because of the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917, in which Baron Ishii sold to Secretary Lansing a "gold brick" in return for an admission of Japan's special interests in its Caribbean Sea.

The whole situation was strained and dangerous. The United States met it (1) by the consortium proposal of 1920, which, when finally adopted by the powers, was rejected by China as a threat to her sovereignty; (2) by the call of the Washington Conference of 1921–1922, designed, among other matters, to settle if possible the troubles of the Far East. As a necessary preliminary to any agreements by the Conference, the United States and Japan came to terms respecting Yap and the mandate islands, and China and Japan reached a settlement on the Shantung matter. When these centers of friction had been removed, final sanction was given first to the naval ratio,

including the nonfortifications agreement; secondly, to the four-power treaty dissolving the British-Japanese alliance; thirdly, to the Chinese agreements, or the nine-power treaty, re-defining the open-door policy and securing certain privileges for China in the direction of a larger autonomy.

The general effect of the consortium and the Conference was to place restraint on Japan sufficient to cause it to modify its aggressive policy toward China and to adopt a policy of conciliation in its place. The manner, however, in which the immigration act of 1924 was passed by Congress again unsettled the situation and made Japan not so eager to develop an entente with the United States and with Great Britain. Another factor of great importance is the revival of Russia's interest in the Far East and its recent treaties with China and Japan. The situation in the Far East is unsettled at present, since China is in turmoil and seems determined to be free from foreign domination.

It seems obvious that the United States, after a hundred and fifty years of history, has a larger destiny before it. Under the flag is a magnificent territory with a rapidly growing population, which will grow more homogeneous as the result of the new immigration policy. A disproportionately large share of the world's capital is concentrated on these shores, and as a creditor nation the United States receives from practically all the other great powers tribute in the form of interest on loans and investments. Under such conditions the United States, willingly or unwillingly, must take part in world politics. The question really is whether, in the future, the United States will become grasping and ambitious to the extent of making wars of aggression or whether, on the contrary, it will prove generous and devoted to the Golden Rule, using its power to upbuild weaker nations, and, by service, securing peace among the nations.

CHAPTER X

POLICIES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD[1]

Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate—we can not consecrate—we can not hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.—Lincoln's Gettysburg Address

A new nation. The birth of a nation is always an important episode in the drama of world politics. Such an event is even more important when the newly born nation seems destined from its situation to play an important part in human history. Consequently when trouble broke out in England's American colonies soon after the close of the Seven Years' War (1763), and matters seemed to go from bad to worse, the statesmen of western Europe became deeply interested in the trend of affairs and began to speculate as to the outcome.

[1] See Bibliography, section I.

It had long been assumed that with the passing of time all American colonies would desire to cut themselves loose from the ties that bound them to their parent countries. Even in the year 1656 Harrington, in his "Oceana," had said, "For the countries of the Indies [the Americas], they are yet babes that cannot live without sucking the breasts of their mother cities, but such as I mistake, if when they come of age, they do not wean themselves." And on the eve of the Revolution itself, in April, 1776, the famous Turgot, at that time comptroller general of France, in a memoir to the king said with prophetic vision:[1]

> The absolute separation of the colonies from the mother country appears to me very probable. There will result from it, when the independence of the colonies is complete and recognised by the English themselves, a total revolution in the political and commercial relations of Europe and America; and I believe firmly that every mother country will be forced to abandon empire over its colonies, establish perfect freedom of trade with all nations, share with others this liberty, and preserve with their colonies the relations of friendship and kindred.

It was felt by the Continental nations that if the British colonies scattered along the North American coast should separate themselves from the mother country and win their freedom, the resultant humiliation to England would be a sweet morsel to France and Spain, smarting from recent defeats. Then, too, if those lands of raw material and growing commerce should become free, they might become open to Continental trade, to the detriment of England's growing monopoly of colonial trade. Yet, on the other hand, the rise of a new nation might disturb the balance of Europe and unsettle other colonial empires besides that of England. No one on either side of the Atlantic dreamed that the thirteen

[1] William H. Trescot, The Diplomacy of the Revolution, p. 40.

poor and sparsely populated colonies of the Atlantic coast would expand from sea to sea, would initiate an era of democracy and republican forms of government, and would hold the balance of power in a future world war. Their total population at that time was less than three millions; the people were chiefly engaged in farming; it was a rural population having few urban centers[1] of any consequence; commerce and manufactures were in their beginnings; civilization was crude, and relatively few persons had any education worthy of the name. But the colonists were hardy, thrifty, enterprising, and versatile in their capacities. Their Revolutionary leaders were for the most part politically intelligent and were familiar with political principles and expert in practical politics through experience in local administration. In the libraries accessible to them could be found the chief political writings of the English revolutions of the seventeenth century, and thus Locke's second "Essay on Civil Government," containing his famous exposition of the social-compact theory and his justification of the right of revolution against tyranny, was thoroughly known and often quoted by the colonial leaders. Its argument was reproduced by Thomas Jefferson in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, in its assertion of inherent rights, the consent of the governed, and the right of revolution.

Events leading to the Revolution. The colonies through their connection with England had naturally been embroiled in the wars of the mother country, more especially those against the Netherlands, Spain, and France. To England the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were centuries of wars. During that period the nation was engaged in that

[1] In 1790 there were but six of these having eight thousand or more inhabitants. The largest of them, Philadelphia, had but forty-two thousand, even including its suburbs.

expansionist movement described by John R. Seeley[1] in his "Expansion of England" (1883). Spain had lost its former supremacy in Europe and was rapidly declining in power; the Netherlands, once commercially supreme, had been defeated and made subordinate; the France of Louis XIV was fighting to maintain its supremacy, but England's sea power had humiliated it, and in the Seven Years' War had deprived it of its Canadian colonies and its claims to territory north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi. Spain also had lost the Floridas in that same war; consequently England emerged from the struggle owner of Canada and all the lands east of the Mississippi except the dépôt of New Orleans as the outlet for France's Louisiana territory, which, however, had been transferred in 1762 to Spain in partial compensation for its losses in the joint war.

The treaty of 1763 brought great relief to the English-American colonies on the coast. No longer need they fear the Spanish on the south nor the French on the north and west. A common flag waved over a boundless empire of arable lands awaiting settlement, and at once the pioneer began his westward march toward the Mississippi and the Great Lakes and the Gulf of Mexico to take possession of the territories at last freed from the dissensions caused by rival claimants. During the years of war the colonists had fought side by side with the English and had given blood and treasure in the common cause, so that naturally they expected to enjoy in peace and prosperity the reward of their toil.

But its many wars had given to Great Britain an immense colonial empire, and by controlling the seven seas with its navy it was able to expand its commerce into nearly

[1] See also his "Growth of British Policy" (2 vols.), 1895; also James A. Williamson's "A Short History of British Expansion." New York, 1922.

all parts of the known world. Obviously the easy-going method of colonial administration, good enough in the century of beginnings, was not suited to the great empire of the eighteenth century; so that a reorganization of colonial policy became necessary. If foresight were as good as hindsight, England would then have developed a theory of oversea dominions united amicably as "free states" in an imperial commonwealth; or, failing that, it might have worked toward an imperial parliament made up of delegates from the integral parts of the empire. Both of these possibilities were vaguely in mind and partly under discussion, at least during the turmoil from 1763 to 1776, but such ideas were too far in advance of the intelligence of those times. The great pattern of colonial administration at that time was the Spanish system, as applied to the American colonies of Spain, and England naturally turned to this as its model. The Spanish system assumed that colonies were property to be exploited for the benefit of the mother country, and that colonists were inferiors who should be governed from Spain and allowed such rights merely as should seem good to the home government. Parliament, therefore, without giving much consideration to the situation as a whole or to the difference between Spanish colonies composed mostly of exploited natives and English colonies made up chiefly of a combative and freedom-loving people, calmly proceeded to reorganize its American colonies quite after the Spanish system of colonial administration and seemed unable to understand why English colonists did not submit as passively to the system as did the inert natives of Latin America. The reorganization in brief, as worked out in detail, provided for (1) a far more thorough control of colonial administration, with consequent suppression of local governmental powers; (2) a taxing system levying

taxes through Parliament on the colonies as their share of the burden of imperial expense; (3) a stern subordination of colonial commerce and manufactures to those interests in the home country. In the England of the middle eighteenth century the king in Parliament was the final legal authority of the empire, so that there was no appeal from these several acts of Parliament.

Naturally the colonists did not sympathize with a policy of imperial centralization and aggrandizement so largely at the expense of their local and customary rights, and in consequence they protested vigorously. But writs of assistance in 1761 (against smuggling) were followed by acts for taxation, the regulation of navigation, the quartering of soldiers, the subordination of local government, the regulation of trials, the closing of the port of Boston, all followed in 1775 by a royal proclamation of rebellion. The whole situation was made worse by the Quebec Act[1] of June, 1774, which separated the Western lands from the colonies and transferred them to Canada. Henceforth there were to be three British colonial centers on the mainland of the North American continent: (1) the thirteen colonies of the Atlantic coast; (2) the Canadian lands extending as far west as England cared to claim and southward into the lands beyond the Great Lakes to the Ohio and lying between the Mississippi and the Appalachian Mountains; (3) the Floridas from the Gulf to the colonial lands south of the Ohio, with West Florida as its headquarters. The Northwest Territory thus transferred to Canada and to a predominantly French civilization was a magnificent domain full of future possibilities, and the colonists of the coast became heartsick when they realized that by act of Parliament they had been hemmed into the narrow plains along the Atlantic coast, and

[1] See Index for other references to this act.

that their hereditary colonial foes had been given opportunity to expand into the Western lands.

This whole policy of the British government aroused intense dissatisfaction among the colonists, who felt that the home country neither understood them nor had consideration for their interests. In their hearts they had become fond of liberty and the freedom of colonial life. Though English in customs and traditions for the most part, nevertheless they were rapidly becoming differentiated into Americans and were unwilling to be treated as mere pawns in the game of colonial imperialism. They began to realize that geographically they were too far away to work coöperatively with Europe; that they had a different set of interests from England's; and that, *isolated* as they were, they might better forgo their petty rivalries and jealousies and unite in a movement for the maintenance of their liberties. They saw about them abundant opportunities for fisheries, manufactures, and commerce, and land sufficient for the needs of many generations of a rapidly expanding population, provided only those coveted Western lands might be retained for their own use. At the same time, knowing how weak they were in comparison with England's power and resources, the colonies at first had no thought of open resistance or revolution. They met, like true Englishmen, in assembly and, in denouncing the oppressive acts of Parliament, set forth in historic fashion their bills of civil rights, their magna chartas of political guaranties, and their profound objection to the theory that Parliament had the right to override their age-long privileges, which to them had become fundamental and paramount as against the statutory powers of a lawmaking body. Supplementing this historic basis they made great use of the Lockian social compact, with its theory of inherent, natural, God-given rights,

superior to any powers exercised by man-made governments controlled by tyrannical kings and magistrates. Against the tyrannous acts of human government they arrayed the inherent right of a people to determine their own law, their own forms of government, and to take up arms against any power that sought to repress them in the exercise of these inherited and inherent natural rights.

Thomas Paine's "Common Sense." By the close of the year 1775 it seemed futile to hope that any honorable reconciliation could be made with England, and public opinion was rapidly reaching the conclusion that the only alternative before them was submission or independence. At this juncture came the publication of Thomas Paine's "Common Sense," which at once, by its eloquence and forceful argument, crystallized public sentiment in favor of independence. In this pamphlet Paine laid stress on human rights, on the real separation of British and American interests,[1] and on the necessity of making a new king in America—King Constitution—made by representatives of the people in convention assembled and binding on governments to be erected in harmony with the provisions of the constitution thus made. In closing this part of his argument he said:

> Let a day be solemnly set apart for proclaiming the charter; let it be brought forth, placed on the divine law, the word of God; let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know that, so far as we approve of monarchy, in America *the law is king*. For, as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other.

[1] "It is evident that they belong to different systems; England to Europe, America to itself." "It is the true interest of America to steer clear of European contentions." "Our plan is commerce, and that, well attended to, will secure us the peace and friendship of Europe, because it is the interest of all Europe to have America a free port."

In this and in his other writings Paine voiced the radical and idealistic attitude of the younger generation of Americans. He was a vigorous exponent of the rights of man and yearned after a more equitable social and political order. He had an optimistic belief in the inherent goodness of men and thought that by improvement in environment and education there might be achieved a general welfare and happiness not in America only, but among all nations, who naturally, in his opinion, should live in fraternal relations one with another. Through Paine and kindred spirits the demand for independence became increasingly insistent, so that on July 4, 1776, the Declaration of Independence was formally voted and, later, signed. It committed the United States to a war that in its outcome unsettled the balance of Europe, hastened on the cataclysmic changes of the French Revolution, and ushered into the world of nations a new state, the first republic of the New World.

Developing needs. The newly formed government soon found itself in difficulties, since its profitable trade with England was cut off, and other trade connections formerly safeguarded by the British flag (for example, in the Mediterranean) had not yet been made safe. Willing privateers, stimulated by the hope of prize money, gladly became a quasi-navy; but the Confederation had little money either to equip and pay its military forces or to secure necessary supplies in place of those usually imported from England. New outlets for exports and new sources of financial and military supplies had to be provided for as speedily as possible, but both of these necessitated treaty relations with other states, preceded by formal recognitions of independence.

It was clear that the new nation's best hope lay in winning the support of France. If the British colonies should become independent, it would be a severe blow to the naval

and commercial supremacy of that power, besides cutting her colonial empire in half. A weakened Great Britain and a friendly nation across the seas with ports open to French commerce might arouse hopes in France of regaining national prestige and perhaps regaining possession of its former colonies. Besides, revenge is always sweet; and a defeated and humiliated England would help to soothe French national feelings, so depressed by numerous defeats. On the other hand, France was by no means sure that the colonies would persist in their war for independence. If France prematurely entered the war, it might be left to bear the brunt of it and suffer another defeat at England's hands. In other words, France needed to be convinced, and did not care to be left to "hold the bag." Consequently it early became incumbent on the leaders in the Continental Congress to formulate policies, and to do so with great wisdom, since the success or the failure of the Revolution would depend on their keenness of insight.

Situated as the American states were, far removed from Europe and without dangerous neighbors, they saw no reason why, assuming independence were won, they should not be able to settle down at peace with all the world and systematically cultivate their lands, engage in commerce, develop their fishing-interests, and build up their manufactures. As Jefferson later worded it in his inaugural, they desired to secure "peace, commerce, honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none." In the eyes of the European states, however, the Confederation was merely a combination of rebellious colonies with little or no chance of winning their independence by force of arms against the might of Great Britain. The confederated states, therefore, could not go as an equal to equals, but had to go as a suppliant asking for favors in the forms of loans and recognition.

On principle the European states strongly disliked at heart the thought of encouraging rebellion against established monarchs; on the other hand, they were perfectly willing to add to England's troubles, provided no risk were involved in the process. Recognition of the rebellious colonies, of course, meant war with Great Britain, and that seemed then to be out of the question, but loans and secret assistance might be feasible. American leaders themselves recognized the difficulties inherent in the situation, but did the best they could—formulating their desires and intrusting the execution of them to tried and trustworthy men, among whom Franklin, John Adams, and Jay stand out preëminent.

The chief hope of the states lay in their ability to offer commercial privileges, and with this thought in mind the principles of a commercial policy were carefully worked out (September 17, 1776) and given to the envoys as the basis for any commercial treaties that might be made. The underlying principle of these instructions was what has come to be known as the open door. In its broad, earlier interpretation it meant that the ports of all nations should be opened without discrimination to one another's ships, neither favoring the ships of one nation as against another nor even one's own ships as against the ships of alien nations. This international idealism of commercial intercourse naturally has not been maintained in its entirety with passing years. National interests frequently are in opposition, and new situations modify older theories and tone down exalted ideals; yet the United States may well feel pride that the earliest formulation of its commercial policy was based on the principle of international comity and on a recognition of the fact that ultimately the interests of all nations are harmonious and that the truest national interest is best realized by a recognition of national obligations to the other states in the world of nations.

Treaties with Europe. In negotiating its first commercial treaties with France (1778) and the Netherlands (1782) the United States in general carefully maintained these broad principles of commercial reciprocity, so that the treaty with France was rightly characterized by John Quincy Adams as "our commercial declaration of independence," and might well be called the commercial magna charta of a new age. In passing, it may be said that the treaty finally made with the Netherlands was especially gratifying to the United States since the latter treated with that country on equal terms as a recognized nation whose friendship had value for its own sake and not, as in the French treaty, as an inferior power receiving courteous aid from a benevolently disposed superior nation.

In similar fashion the United States sought in its earliest years to maintain the broad doctrine that in time of war "free ships make free goods" and that neutral rights should be rigidly respected by belligerent powers. The French treaty, though it admitted the principle in theory, was ineffective, since it was made by two nations weak in sea power and was aimed at the state at that time mistress of the seas.[1] In 1780 the United States sought to win Russia's favor by indorsing its "armed neutrality" proclamation of that year, based on the principle of free goods; but this movement was a mere flash in the pan, and nothing came of it so far as concerned the United States.

[1] In respect to this matter Trescot wisely says: "If maritime strength is as essential an element of national power as territorial extent, it is difficult to say why one nation supporting its energies and securing its defence by its force on land, should enjoy under neutral flags an undisturbed and profitable commerce, while the other, whose corresponding advantage is its power on sea, is compelled to hold in costly inactivity its most effective means of offence."—"Diplomacy of the Revolution," p. 44; see also discussion of "Armed Neutrality," pp. 72–82.

Again, as a nation stressing peace, commerce, and friendship with all nations, its first thought was to secure recognition and help from France or other powers without the necessity of an entangling alliance for military or political purposes. But a little reflection made clear the point that recognition by France meant to that nation war with Great Britain; hence any arrangement made with France would necessitate a military alliance. Therefore, when the surrender of Burgoyne on October 17, 1777, gave promise that the Revolution might prove to be successful, and France recognized the Confederation, inevitably treaties of amity, commerce, and military alliance came rapidly as a matter of course. Yet the United States intuitively felt that this political alliance was a temporary policy, not a permanent one, and that in due time it must free itself from the entanglement of foreign alliances. The first rift leading toward a separation of interests came in the peace negotiations with Great Britain when the American delegates, suspecting that France was desirous of keeping the new nation in a position subordinate to itself and of restricting its territory to the Atlantic coast, secretly disobeyed their instructions from the Congress and signed the treaty without the knowledge of France. In this treaty the principle of the freedom of fisheries in the open sea was admitted by England, and a fair compromise was reached in respect to confiscated properties and debts.

In the preliminary overtures that preceded the negotiations for peace the United States showed a full appreciation of international principles in refusing to enter into negotiations with Great Britain until that power had unconditionally acknowledged the independence of its former colonies. Had this not been done, the price of recognition would have had to be met in the terms of the treaty. By securing recog-

nition as a preliminary to negotiation the United States was able to meet Great Britain as a sovereign state, on equal terms, and thereby could and did demand far greater concessions, which were granted all the more readily since the United States thereby became better disposed to England and needed to rely less on France.

Unquestionably the greatest triumph won by the American diplomats in the actual negotiations was the cession to the United States of England's claim to the western and northwestern territory east of the Mississippi and as far south as the Floridas, which had been ceded by Great Britain to Spain at the conclusion of the war with that power. This cession of the Northwest Territory was a guaranty of future greatness, since it paved the way for the purchase of Louisiana within the next twenty years and for the later expansion to the Gulf and the Pacific.

The policy of the United States toward the territorial problems of the American continent was clearly set forth from the beginning of national history, for the instructions given to its diplomatic envoys commissioned to France in September, 1776, expressly stipulated that English colonies in or adjacent to the United States should not be invaded or held under any circumstances by France. This requirement was virtually included in the treaty of 1778 except as to the West Indies, showing clearly that the United States had no intention of permitting the reëstablishment of a French colonial empire in North America, a principle that came to the front twice again in the nineteenth century when Napoleon I and Napoleon III planned empires in Louisiana and Mexico.

Newer theories of the times. As a closing statement in respect to this period, it may be said that from an economic standpoint the year 1776 has a double significance

in world history. It was the year when Adam Smith issued his "Wealth of Nations," a volume that by its stress on individualism and laissez faire profoundly modified governmental policy for a hundred years; it was also the year when the United States asked recognition from the continental nations of Europe, basing the claim not on its form of government but on its willingness to open its doors to the world's commerce and to advocate the principle that "free ships make free goods." These movements of 1776 toward economic freedom from the bondage of feudalistic and class privileges and national monopolization brought in their train the larger social freedom that inevitably followed the growth of economic freedom. But men were the better able to secure and broaden the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness when governments were established by the consent of the governed and when the general welfare of all was substituted for the predatory interests of the few. Laissez faire was followed by Bentham's "greatest happiness" and utilitarianism, and then by the great social movements of the last fifty years aiming at social betterment. The political experiment of 1776 likewise has broadened out to include practically the whole world, which is working slowly yet steadily toward political freedom and democracy.

CHAPTER XI

REORGANIZATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION TO 1815[1]

Of the American system of government, the two leading principles are, first, that laws and Constitutions can be rightfully formed and established only by the people over whom they are to be put in force; and, secondly, that the people being a corporate unit, comprising all the citizens of the state, and, therefore, too unwieldy to do this important work directly, agents or representatives must be employed to do it, and that, in such numbers, so selected, and charged respectively with such functions, as to make it reasonably certain that the will of the people will be not only adequately but speedily executed.[2]

Weakness of the Confederation. It is difficult for Americans of the twentieth century to picture to themselves the extreme weakness of the Confederation at the time of the signing of the treaty of peace with Great Britain. There was the shadow of a union but no real substance. Freed from the immediate dread of war, the thirteen states at once devoted themselves to local affairs and ignored the general interests of all. Thanks to patriotic leadership and the aid of France, independence had been won; but when peace ended the necessity of joint action in war, the reaction toward domestic problems destroyed interest in the affairs of the nation as a whole.

The Articles of Confederation were cumbersome and most inefficient through their stress on states' rights; the central power, lacking legal authority, military power, and finan-

[1] See Bibliography, section I.

[2] John A. Jameson, On Constitutional Conventions. By permission of Callaghan & Company.

cial resources, was weak beyond description. Though burdened with debt and virtually bankrupt, it could raise no revenue; though it was supposed to voice the diplomacy of the nation, it had no power to enforce the decisions of treaties nor to negotiate in respect to commerce, since the essential powers in regulation of commerce resided in the states and not in the Union.

Naturally the first thought of the Congress at the conclusion of peace was to reëstablish commercial relations with Europe. To that end, on May 7, 1784, Congress passed a series of resolutions tracing in outline the principles along the lines of which commercial treaties were to be made with other powers, and soon afterwards elected Mr. Jay as Secretary of Foreign Affairs. These principles emphasized the ideals of the open door, "free ships make free goods," and the confinement of the penalties of war to combatants; but they had no practical value, since weak powers do not dictate principles of commercial intercourse to dominant nations bent on competitive struggle and supremacy. During the war Continental nations had, to be sure, cherished hopes that with the return of peace they would be able to secure large shares of American commerce, but unfortunately for their hopes American trade at the coming of peace naturally drifted back to England as the center of the world's markets. By treaty the United States was bound to the political system of France through the mutual pledges made in the treaties of 1778; but its commercial interests were identified with England, and the advocates thereof in the East vainly strove for commercial arrangements with that power, so that there might be opened up to home markets the flourishing trade of the British West Indies and of other British colonies. Finally, however, the impotence of the Confederation, the need of uniform laws for commerce, and the fear lest the national government

should be involved in European complications and subordinated to their interests compelled governmental reorganization and brought about the adoption of the Constitution of 1788. Henceforth, instead of a loosely organized government without powers or authority, there appeared a strongly federated government in which the national powers of treaty-making were concentrated in the hands of president and Senate, and control over interstate and foreign commerce was given to the Federal Congress, which also had large powers of taxation and finance. The change was made in good time; for the French Revolution had begun, and for a quarter of a century the political foundations of the civilized world were rocked by the numerous wars of the Revolution and the Napoleonic era.

The federation. The nation was singularly fortunate in having at its head and in its service during those trying years its most experienced and patriotic leaders, drawn from the service of their states to assist in establishing the youthful republic on solid foundations. Under the Confederation the best men preferred to serve their states, owing to the impotence of the Union; but when Washington became president and statesmen were needed to work out the newer principles of legislation, administration, and judicial decision, the situation was speedily reversed, and the Federal government had no difficulty in calling to its offices the wisest and most experienced men of the nation. Throughout this entire period the "Elder Statesmen" were in charge, like the *genro* of modern Japan, and they built broadly and wisely in the construction of foreign and domestic policies.

In Washington's first term most attention was given to national organization and to the development of an efficient system of revenue and finance, but before long attention necessarily turned to the European situation and its proba-

ble influence on the destiny of the United States. At that time it was natural for the European nations to assume that the United States was still part of the European system and hence a factor in the balance of power. Though relatively small in importance, America had raw material, foods, and shipping which might to some extent strengthen in these essential respects the side on which it might throw its support. As to that side there seemed to be no question. It had fought England and was in alliance with France, so that obviously its influence and assistance would be thrown that way. France assumed as much, England did likewise, and public opinion in general at home and abroad was quite assured that the sympathies of the United States for republican France would, along with its alliance, carry it into the war for France and against England and its Continental allies. On the other hand, leaders like Washington had come to realize that American and European interests were drawing apart, that it would be most unwise for the United States to allow itself to be dragged into the weary round of European wars, and that, treaty or no treaty, the United States must refuse to take sides with either party and must declare its neutrality in the war which had just been formally declared between England and France.

The Proclamation of Neutrality. On April 8, 1793, Genêt landed at Charleston as the new minister of the French Republic and at once proceeded to commission privateers[1] to prey on English commerce, on the supposition that the United States would of course enter the war on the side of France. But on April 22, after careful consultation with his cabinet, Washington issued a proclama-

[1] For the depredations of these privateers the United States later paid damages, thereby establishing a precedent that made the basis of its later *Alabama* claims at the close of the Civil War.

tion[1] announcing that it was the policy of the United States to preserve neutrality and to comply strictly with the rules of neutrality laid down by the laws of nations.[2] This is the legal beginning of its policy of isolation; and when followed several years later (September 30, 1800) by a convention that virtually canceled its treaty with France, it became the precedent for the avoidance of entangling alliances. France stormed with indignation at the Proclamation of Neutrality, and for several years it persistently and contemptuously violated American rights as a neutral power, so that from 1798 to 1800 the two nations were practically at war; but Jefferson in his first inaugural address could assert, as the national policy, "entangling alliances with none," and by the Treaty of Amiens (1802) a short peace came at last to troubled Europe.

[1] Washington's proclamation was as follows: "Whereas it appears that a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands on the one part, and France on the other; and the duty and interest of the United States require that they should, with sincerity and good faith, adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards the belligerent powers: —

"I have, therefore, thought fit, by these presents, to declare the disposition of the United States to observe the conduct aforesaid towards those powers respectively, and to exhort and warn the citizens of the United States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever, which may in any manner tend to contravene such disposition.

"And I do hereby also make known, that whosoever of the citizens of the United States shall render himself liable to punishment or forfeiture under the law of nations, by committing, aiding, or abetting hostilities against any of the said powers, or by carrying to any of them those articles which are deemed contraband by the modern usage of nations, will not receive the protection of the United States against such punishment or forfeiture; and, further, that I have given instructions to those officers, to whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons who shall, within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the law of nations with respect to the powers at war, or any of them."

[2] The legislative basis for neutrality is found in the acts of June 5, 1794, and April 20, 1818.

It was in the midst of this turmoil that Washington issued his Farewell Address (September 17, 1796), in which he gave to his fellow citizens, at the close of his public career, the results of his thought and experience as statesman and president, setting forth in essence the principles of the golden rule, impartial neutrality, isolation, non-entanglement, and adequate preparation for national defense:

Observe good faith and justice towards all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. . . . Nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded, and that in place of them just and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated. . . .

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little *political* connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient Government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. . . .

Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

The Jay treaty. The Proclamation of Neutrality did not induce the British to refrain from the same sort of high-handed outrages against American neutral commerce as those of which the French were guilty. The British assumed that it was a mere paper proclamation, since American privateers were attacking their commerce. Though assaulted by both sides, the United States as a nation was too weak to do more than protest against the actions of both belligerents. But these were fighting a life-and-death struggle and they paid no attention to the remonstrances, since no neutral had any rights that they felt bound to respect. Yet, inasmuch as the United States had not at any rate allied itself with France, it seemed to Washington that this was an appropriate time to come to terms with Great Britain, if that could be done. He hoped to settle the many grievances, in part mutual, and, if at all possible, to secure a commercial treaty and the evacuation of the Western forts still held by the British against protest. The treaty settlement made by Mr. Jay[1] (November, 1794) was entirely one-sided; nevertheless it was probably the best possible under the circumstances. The United States waived much and got little, but that little did include the ultimate evacuation of the British posts in the northwest. The real value of the Jay treaty was its moral effect. The United States had concluded with one of the great belligerents of the war a treaty providing for the settlement of many disputed points, and its status as a nation was distinctly improved thereby. Furthermore, since immediate decisions could not be made in several particu-

[1] See S. F. Bemis, Jay's Treaty. 1923.

lars, provision was made for their reference to commissions of arbitration, thus establishing the policy of arbitrating differences in lieu of protracted discord or the verdict of war. For example, Great Britain had violated America's rights as a neutral and continued to do so for years. Ultimately the arbitration commission on neutral rights and obligations—one of the three commissions provided for—agreed on the principle that a government is liable for damages if it violates its neutral obligations. Thus the United States was enabled to recover a heavy indemnity from the British government in satisfaction of its claims. Through the Jay treaty, therefore, the United States avoided the danger of a war in which defeat would have been almost sure; it adjusted most of a long series of irritating disputes; it made a precedent in treaty-making along the lines of which Spain and France might follow; and it definitely embarked on the policy of the arbitration of justiciable disputes. As a weak nation unprepared for war it took the half-loaf as better than no bread and pocketed some grievances in view of the satisfaction of others, feeling, with Washington, that it could bide its time, since the day would yet come "when belligerent nations . . . will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation."

Spain and France. The westward movement of the English colonists over the Alleghenies had begun about the middle of the eighteenth century, George Washington himself, in his youth, being one of the first travelers in that region. During the Revolutionary War the question of the navigation of the Mississippi began to be an important question, although at one time the Continental Congress had offered to yield to Spain the exclusive right to navigation in return for an alliance; but with the treaty of peace confirming the United States in the ownership of the Western

lands and as far south as the Floridas, the right to navigate the entire length of the Mississippi became a burning issue to the American frontiersmen along its eastern shore. On several occasions after the conclusion of the war the United States had tried to effect a treaty with Spain, but had failed. Finally, however, Spain was brought to terms with the United States, partly, it is true, to secure America's good will toward Spanish colonies in the troublous times ahead and partly because of the complications brought about by the wars of France. Furthermore, aroused by rumors of the Jay treaty, Spain, still sympathetic with France, feared lest the United States would turn to Great Britain as against France. By the treaty of 1795 an agreement was reached as to the northern boundary of the Floridas, in general the line of thirty-one degrees, and for a limited term of years citizens of the United States were permitted to navigate the Mississippi freely to the ocean, with dépôt rights at New Orleans.

When in 1800 orders from Napoleon forced Spain to cede the Louisiana Territory back to France, the whole matter of the Mississippi was again brought into discussion, since the United States feared France in Louisiana far more than it feared Spain. The matter ended with the purchase (1803) of the Louisiana lands by the United States against the vigorous protests of Spain, which now rightly feared for the safety of the Floridas and its Mexican territory in view of the ambitions of the rapidly expanding nation it had so despised in earlier years. The confusion into which Spanish colonial administration fell during the Napoleonic wars was reflected in the neglect of the Florida colonies, with a resultant lack of law and order. This brought about complaints on the part of neighboring Americans; but in any case there was a natural urge toward the Gulf so as to get possession of the mouths of other Southern rivers also. Matters came to a

head in 1810, when some revolutionists seized West Florida and requested annexation to the United States. The president ordered the territory to be occupied as far as the Pearl River, and then to the Perdido, on the ground that it was part of the Louisiana Purchase; and a year later East Florida also was occupied, as a war measure, but it was returned to Spain some two years later. The final title to the Floridas was not gained until the treaty of 1819 with Spain. In all this may be seen the restless expansionist movement pressing on toward the Mississippi, toward the Gulf, and toward the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific. Though seldom mentioned as well defined and carefully planned, a policy of territorial expansion has characterized the American government from its earliest history; up to the present this has been uniformly successful, at the expense of little money and less friction.

It will be remembered that the United States in its Revolutionary period had promulgated and favored such policies as the open door to the world's commerce; the principle that free ships make free goods; the rights and obligations of neutrals and civilians in time of war, seeking thereby to save them from aggressions on the part of belligerent powers; and, incidentally, it had advocated the humane treatment of prisoners and the prohibition of unnecessary cruelty in the conduct of war. These principles were favored not merely because the United States, itself a weak nation, desired to come to lamblike terms of amity with the rapacious lion, but because its people were devoted to peace and fair play and desired to see all nations living amicably together as a great human family.

The Napoleonic period. This idealism, however, had little opportunity for realization in the warring generation of the first forty years of national existence. Though in

its treaties with the weaker powers the United States was able to insert such clauses, these powers were quite in the position of the mice who voted that cats should wear bells so as to warn mice of their approach. Who will bell the cat? was the question; and it was with this problem that the United States had to struggle during the period from 1793 to 1814. As in the recent World War, the great states of Europe were struggling in Napoleon's day for life and domination, and under the circumstances the smaller states ought to have felt thankful that they were allowed to live at all. The shipping of the United States was ground between the upper and nether millstones of the several wars, and there was no middle course to be followed between the Scylla of France and the Charybdis of England. America's rights as a neutral were disregarded by both: its seamen, whether naturalized or native, were impressed by England, and its commerce was so harried on the seas that in despair Jefferson resorted to embargo and non-intercourse acts, while Madison tried to meet the situation by the War of 1812. Neither policy met with success; and the Treaty of Ghent brought relief from the burdens of an inglorious war in which the defeats on land were to some extent balanced by slight successes at sea and the belated victory at New Orleans. The United States gladly signed the treaty without guaranties in respect to the causes of the war; but the fall of Napoleon put an end to the whole situation, and the issues at stake settled themselves (in their objectionable aspects at least) with the passing of years.

In some respects the "baptism of fire" experienced by the United States during these years of war was of great help to it. The warring states were too busy with their own troubles to pay much attention to the upstart republic three thousand miles away from the battle grounds of

Europe, so that it was saved from a possible subordination or subjection during the years of its weakness. And though the United States was trampled on when it got in the way, in its home lands it grew mightily in population, wealth, and territory, so that when the clouds of battle cleared away in 1815 it was no longer inherently feeble but, in potentiality, one of the great nations of Christendom. It was neither a military nation nor a sea power; but it stood for peaceful industry, for an honest commerce on all the seas, and for the pursuits of agriculture. It was stressing a general and free education for its children and was trying out the greatest experiment in democratic government that the world had ever known. To the war-weary Europeans the peace of America seemed like heaven itself, and before many years it became a magnet that attracted the "oppressed of all nations" to its shores.

CHAPTER XII

DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICIES FROM 1815 TO 1870[1]

As for myself, I have no hesitation in avowing my conviction that it is most especially in the conduct of foreign relations that democratic governments appear to me to be decidedly inferior to governments carried on upon different principles.

Foreign policies demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient. Democracy is favourable to the increase of the internal resources of a state; it tends to diffuse a moderate independence; it promotes the growth of public spirit, and fortifies the respect which is entertained for law in all classes of society: and these are advantages which only exercise an indirect influence over the relations which one people bears to another. But a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and will not await their consequences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong to an individual or to an aristocracy; and they are precisely the means by which an individual people attains a predominant position.

TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in America

Situations after 1815. The year 1815 marks a definite turning-point in the history of the United States. The Napoleonic wars were over, and peace had settled down upon the war-weary nations of Europe and upon a disillusioned America. The Treaty of Ghent had been signed, ending America's tutelage to England and the Continent, although the United States did not recognize this at the time. It had become obvious to Europe that the United States would fight in defense of its rights if necessary, and that in view of its

[1] See Bibliography, section I.

natural resources and rapidly multiplying population its friendship was worth more than its hostility. Aside from petty Indian wars and the war with Mexico, a long era of peace lay before the United States, to be broken finally by the Civil War over the questions of slavery and secession. The year marked the turn of the tide from the discord and sectionalism of the post-Revolutionary period to an "era of good feeling," national pride, and a boundless confidence in democracy triumphant.

On July 4, 1826, died John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, leaders and molders of opinion for a full half-century; in 1835 died John Marshall, who, by his legal interpretations as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, made the Constitution national; and in 1836 James Madison passed into history as the father of the Constitution. These were the last of the great leaders in the founding of the nation; after these Elder Statesmen came a new generation that knew the "fathers" only through the traditions of their achievements. By the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century the Virginia-Massachusetts monopoly of leadership was rudely shaken through the incoming of men from the developing West, where more popular forms of democracy prevailed. Thus national interests expressed themselves in terms of expansion, in the settlement of the "Farther West," and in the reorganization of national parties to voice the newer issues involved in slavery, land problems, and manufactures. "Jacksonian democracy"[1] was the term that characterized the new era, and Tocqueville's "Democracy in America" (1835) gave for that period a French point of view respecting the "experiment in democracy" then working out under the leadership of President Jackson.

During the first sixty years of the century the United

[1] See William MacDonald's work having this title.

States had expanded enormously in national territory. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 had been followed by the purchase of the Florida lands and then by the annexation of Texas and the lands of the Mexican cession. The Oregon boundary was settled in 1846 to include the magnificent valley of the Columbia. Into all these newer lands population was pouring, so that by 1860 the center of population had passed into the Old Northwest, the exact center being in southeast Ohio near the latitude of thirty-nine degrees.

In the South the rise of "King Cotton," through Eli Whitney's cotton gin and the fertility of the black lands, had powerfully stimulated the multiplication of a negro population through the systematic breeding of slaves and some smuggling from Cuba. In 1790 the negro population was about 750,000, employed chiefly in the cultivation of tobacco, almost entirely (87 per cent) in Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas. By 1860 there were nearly 4,500,000 negroes, concentrated chiefly in the Southern states and especially in the cotton lands of the lower South. The whole population of 4,000,000 in the United States (1790) had risen by 1860 to over 31,000,000, the white part of which was predominantly native-born stock, supplemented by immigrants chiefly from Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany. It is estimated that the net immigration into the United States from 1820 to 1860 was about 5,000,000, and 2,356,000 additional came in the period from 1860 to 1870. The "Know Nothing," or "Native American," party that flourished in the fifties was in opposition to the Irish and Germans, who came in increasingly large numbers during that decade and who seemed to the "native American" not to be in harmony with American ideals of the "hundred per cent" variety. The high rate of increase in the population during the period from 1790 to 1860 was due to the unusual

fertility of the native stock as affected by the abundant opportunities open to their offspring. During this period land was plentiful, life was simple in its standards, and agriculture was the general occupation, so that the rearing of large families seemed natural enough. The Civil War ended this pioneer period, and at its close came a great industrial awakening which stimulated inventions, improved methods of transportation, and developed highly skilled technic in business and industry. The effect of this was seen in the rapidly increasing immigration due to the enormous demand for unskilled labor in mines, mills, and railroad construction.

Economic changes. During the turbulent years of the early part of the century New England and the middle states had begun to turn their energies in part to manufactures. The patent law of 1790 had powerfully stimulated the inventive capacity of the Americans, and the protective tariff of 1816 added new impetus to infant industries. The problem of transportation especially attracted attention, resulting in the steamboat and the railroad, which supplemented the river and lake systems, as well as the post roads, turnpikes, and canals that were stressed so vigorously in earlier years.

Alongside this industrial development survived that devotion to the sea which from the beginning characterized the Atlantic states. The fishing industry and fishing-rights received much attention during earlier years; whaling and the collection of guano in the Pacific made that great ocean familiar to American seamen; and shipbuilding and the carrying trade were important items in national economic life, at least during the reign of the wooden ship. American ingenuity developed (more especially for the Far Eastern trade) the *clipper*, the last word in naval wooden construction at that time.[1] But in the fifties began the era of the iron ship,

[1] See A. H. Clark, Clipper Ship Era, 1843–1869.

and in its making the British easily surpassed the United States. During the Civil War Confederate cruisers drove Northern shipping largely from the seas; commercial capital was diverted to the industries; and by 1870 the American merchant marine, save in coastwise trade, was steadily dwindling in importance and soon ceased to be a factor in international competition.[1] With this brief statement of racial and economic situations as a background it may be easier to comprehend the development of policies during that period, affected as they were by the international political isolation of the United States and its absorption in the domestic problems that crowded so numerously on public attention.

Arbitration.[2] With the coming of peace at the close of the War of 1812 recourse was once more had to the principle of arbitration of international controversies. Arbitration, as John Bassett Moore defines it, "consists in the application of law and of judicial methods to the determination of international disputes." The Jay treaty of 1794 had provided for arbitral consideration of three troublesome questions,—boundaries, debts, and neutral rights and duties, —and the Spanish treaty of 1795 also made provision for the settlement by arbitration of the controversial claims arising out of Revolutionary situations. The Treaty of Ghent revived this peaceful method for the settlement of disputes by arranging for three arbitrations in respect to the boundary lines between the British possessions to the east and north of the United States. Final decisions were not completely reached at this time by the commissions; but the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817–1818, whereby both nations agreed to maintain in the Great Lakes only such vessels

[1] See Bibliography, section VIII.

[2] See M. N. Tod, International Arbitration amongst the Greeks. Oxford, 1913.

as were necessary to police the waterways, gave foundation for the policy of maintaining unfortified that long line of frontier between the United States and Canada.

Throughout this entire period arbitration was a definite policy on the part of the United States, but it was usually employed in the settlement of disputes with England in respect to boundaries and fisheries. The culmination of this earlier stage of arbitration came in 1871, after the Civil War, when the Treaty of Washington provided for four arbitrations. These included the perennial fisheries question and the boundary line (San Juan), but chiefly covered the claims growing out of the war and especially those for depredations of Confederate cruisers of British origin. Arbitration is now a recognized principle in all the dealings of the United States with the Latin-American states and, with some modifications in principle, has been incorporated into many of the treaties made in the twentieth century.

Recognition and the Monroe Doctrine. The most important diplomatic event of Monroe's administration was the rise into prominence of the many questions centering about the several revolts of the Latin colonies to the south, culminating in a definite policy of recognition and in the Monroe Doctrine.

The American Revolution had attracted to its aid from other countries many ardent lovers of liberty, and among these was Miranda, of Venezuela, who served under Washington and discussed with Alexander Hamilton and others his dream of South American independence. After a markedly checkered career he in later years returned to his country to aid Bolivar in his war for liberation. In 1816 he died in the dungeons of Cadiz after capture, having failed to see the vision of his youth realized,—the beginnings of the movement for the coöperative unity of all the Americas.

Even as early as 1791 the blacks on the island of Haiti had begun a war for freedom, and by 1799 this had been virtually attained under the leadership of Toussaint l'Ouverture. Napoleon, however, sought to reconquer the island (1801–1803), aiming to make it the corner stone of a new colonial empire that was to include the Louisiana Territory surrendered to him by Spain. The bravery of the blacks, aided by the scourge of yellow fever, defeated this plan, so that by the end of 1803 French troops had been withdrawn, the Louisiana lands had been sold to the United States, and the dream of colonial empire had vanished into thin air. In this Haitian struggle for freedom England and the United States actively assisted, influenced by the hope of commercial privileges.

In the years 1807–1808 Napoleon invaded Portugal and Spain, placing on the throne of the latter country his brother Jerome. At once the Spanish colonies in the Americas, so long exploited by Spain, seized the opportunity to revolt, one by one, at first against the possibility of French control, but finally with the declared purpose of achieving their independence. In 1807 the royal family of Portugal fled to Brazil and in 1815 established a kingdom coördinate with the mother country. After the return of the ruler to Portugal, Brazil became independent and, in 1822, under a hereditary ruler, formed an empire which endured until 1889, when the Emperor Dom Pedro was deposed and a republic established. It was not until 1836 that Spain, acknowledging inability to subjugate its revolted colonies, admitted their independence, with the exception of its West Indian possessions, chiefly Cuba and Porto Rico.

The Spanish colonies were largely aided in their rebellion by Great Britain, which furnished arms and allowed some of its experienced officers to assist in training the rebel

forces on land and sea. After the fall of Napoleon volunteers from France and the United States also participated in the struggle for freedom, and by 1818 Bolivar had with him, it is said, a legion of nearly ten thousand men made up from these nations. Under the leadership of such men as San Martin in the south, Sucre, Paez, Flores, and Bolivar the Liberator in the north, as well as such well-known Mexican leaders as Hidalgo, Morelos, and Iturbide, independence was gradually won, and a series of states claiming recognition presented new problems to the statesmen of Europe and the United States. At the far south was the Argentine Confederation, including Uruguay and Paraguay. On the Pacific were Chile and Peru, which then included Bolivia. At the north were (1) Colombia, including Ecuador and Venezuela; (2) the Central-American Federation; and (3) Mexico, including Texas, California, and the territory between these domains. At the close of 1822, over half the area of Latin America was held by the empires of Brazil and Mexico.

The revolts of the Spanish colonies had naturally attracted great attention in Europe, but more important matters delayed action until after the downfall of Napoleon. The chief allied powers (Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia) at once proceeded to restore order and to undo as far as possible the effects of French supremacy. Ferdinand VII was restored to the throne of Spain and at once adopted a reactionary policy. Meanwhile, under the leadership of the Czar Alexander, the autocracies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia formed a Holy Alliance, into the membership of which they invited other powers. The ostensible basis of the alliance was the pledge that Christian principles would be the only rule of action in the reconstruction of Europe. In January, 1820, Spain rose against the stupid despotism of Ferdinand VII and demanded the restoration

of its liberal constitution of 1812.[1] Similar popular revolutions in other parts of Europe were breaking out and seemed to threaten the downfall of autocracy. The Holy Alliance now interpreted "Christian principles" to mean the maintenance of autocracy and the suppression of free government; and this interpretation was formally voiced by the Agreement of Verona (November 22, 1822),[2] in harmony with which popular uprisings were suppressed, Ferdinand VII was restored to the throne, and consideration was given to his request that he be aided in his attempts to subjugate his revolted colonies. Eager to regain its place of influence in European councils, France had gladly undertaken the restoration of Ferdinand by force of arms and now expressed its willingness to assist in the suppression of the Spanish colonies, presumably hoping thereby to obtain the beginnings of a new colonial empire in Spanish America in place of that lost in the north. England, however, was decidedly unwilling to see Spanish or French colonial empires reëstablished in the Americas or to lose the flourishing trade it had built up in the Latin colonies. It withdrew its representative, the Duke of Wellington, from the Congress, thus signifying its disapproval of the principles and policy adopted by that body; and in the summer of 1823 (August 16) Foreign Minister Canning suggested to Richard Rush,[3] our minister to Great Britain, that the two powers unite in a protest against the intended action in respect to the Spanish colonies, at the same time pledging that England had no intentions of seizing any of the former Spanish possessions. By October Canning, becoming impatient at his inability

[1] This liberal constitution was largely imitated by the Spanish-American states when they made their constitutions.

[2] See J. H. Latané, From Isolation to Leadership (revised edition, 1922), pp. 21–24; also W. P. Cresson, The Holy Alliance. 1922.

[3] See the Canning-Rush negotiations and correspondence.

to secure prompt agreement by the United States to this proposition, concluded to act independently, and privately informed France of Great Britain's objections, securing France's pledge to take no action by force of arms.

As for the United States, Great Britain's proposal seemed to be entirely too important for a speedy decision. At first thought the United States appreciated the compliment of an invitation to join with Great Britain in a joint diplomatic action against the projected interference with Spanish America. It was a chance to work hand in glove with a former enemy supreme in commerce and in sea power and to bring together in close friendship two nations kindred in blood and alike in opposition to autocracy. On the other hand, such an entente might involve the ultimate subordination of American to British interests, making England's influence supreme on the western continent. The decision finally reached was that since England would not agree to accompany its protest with a recognition of the revolutionary states, the United States would act independently and formulate its own declaration. This wise decision, abundantly justified by its results, was followed by President Monroe's message to Congress on December 2, 1823.

Even as early as 1810 the United States had under consideration the recognition of the revolting colonies, and with passing years such a policy met with increasing support from sympathizers in this country, the chief of whom was Henry Clay. But the United States had other matters to think about during the Napoleonic era, and even after peace was declared it did not care to recognize Spain's colonies while in the midst of negotiations for the cession of the Floridas. Nor had the United States yet reached the point where it was ready to take the lead in recognition, especially as it was not convinced that *de facto* governments had yet been

established, for Spain was still endeavoring in a half-hearted fashion to suppress the revolutions.

But another question arose in connection with the matter. England was supreme on the seas, and for commercial reasons was sympathetic with the revolt of the colonies from Spain. The United States though potentially great was, after all, an inferior power. Therefore, should not the United States defer to England's leadership and refrain from recognition until England had acted? The first decision made was to suggest to England that there be a joint recognition of the new nations; but to this England would not give consent, fearing to complicate the Continental situation by an action that would surely irritate the powerful states banded together in the Holy Alliance. The final decision made was in the determination to recognize immediately the new st without waiting for England's coöperation. The initiative recognition on the part of the United States plainly meant that it assumed leadership in the determination of policies affecting affairs on the western continent. Therefore, when the Florida treaty had been signed and the United States was in possession, President Monroe adopted a definite policy toward Latin America. In a message to Congress on March 8, 1822, he suggested that the time had come for the recognition, and requested an appropriation to defray the cost of sending ministers to the new republics. Congress acquiesced in the recommendation and made the necessary appropriation, on the ground that the colonies, having declared and achieved their independence, "ought to be recognized by the United States as independent nations," thus following the precedent established in the case of the French Republic.

In 1793 Secretary of State Jefferson, having in mind the fact that the National Convention had just organized France into a republic, had written:

We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own government is founded, that everyone may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and that it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks proper, whether king, convention, assembly, committee, president, or anything else it may choose. The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded.

In this statement is contained the principle of recognition which was rather consistently maintained by the United States throughout the nineteenth century—the newly organized government must be the expression of the will of the people, and it must obviously be firmly established and in possession of the power of the nation. This principle was applied to the newly organized states to the south, and were recognized one by one. In 1822 Colombia and Mexico were recognized; in 1823 Chile and the Argentine Confederation; in 1824 the empire of Brazil and the Federation of Central America; and in 1826 Peru. Mexico when recognized was an empire under Iturbide, but by 1823 he had been overthrown and a republic established.

The Monroe Doctrine of December, 1823, was the natural consequence of this assertion of primacy in American affairs. It distinguished between the European and the American system; it warned the powers that henceforth they must not seek to extend their holdings in the Americas nor (Spain, of course, excepted) to use coercion against the Latin colonies which had asserted their independence; it made clear to the world that henceforth the United States proposed to lead in American affairs as against Europe. It was a declaration of independence on behalf of the Americas against European domination on the western continent. The Monroe Doctrine was, to be sure, merely an announcement of executive policy, unsupported by any action of Congress and not

binding on Monroe's successors in the presidency; but it expressed so completely the mind and purpose of the whole country and met with so hearty a reception in Latin America that the Holy Alliance dropped all notion of interference, and Europe, by its tacit consent to the Doctrine, admitted from that time forth that the Americas had ceased to be part of the European system.

One should not forget that underlying this great policy are important democratic principles which unitedly form the heart of the American system of government. The United States had fought for liberty in its revolution against the tyranny of king and Parliament, and it heartily indorsed, and still does indorse, national revolutionary struggles against absolutism and tyranny. It believed in human rights and in republican forms of government, and saw, in opposition to these, the reactionary monarchies of Europe suppressing freedom in the name of religion. Against this European system it placed an American system under which it hoped that there would exist in due time a series of republics extending from the north pole to Cape Horn, each guarantying to its people "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." In so doing the United States sought not merely to free itself from the entanglements of European alliances but, as an elder brother, to show the spirit of fraternity to other struggling republics by helping them in their weakness to become vigorously democratic in their civilizations.

The immediate consequences of Monroe's message were (1) the conclusion of an agreement with Russia limiting its Alaskan boundary on the south to 54° 40′, thereby putting an end to any possibility of a further expansion southward; (2) a plain intimation to both France and England that if Spain in its weakness should relinquish sovereignty over its West Indian possessions, the latter would not be permitted

to pass under the sovereignty of any other European power. In other words, the United States asserted that it would not disturb European states in their colonial possessions in the Americas, but that these possessions could not be enlarged nor, by implication, transferred to non-American powers. On the other hand, they might become free or be incorporated into existing American states and thus become part of the American system. Ultimately, it is assumed, all American territory will be controlled only by the states of the Americas.

The Monroe Doctrine will be more fully discussed in Chapter XIV; but in passing, it may be said that in later years, down to 1870, its principle was stressed (1) to restrain England from enlarging its possessions in Central America (this being accomplished chiefly through the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty) and (2) to prevent the establishment of a French colonial empire in Mexico during the period of the Civil War, when France, by the aid of French bayonets, sought to maintain the puppet emperor Maximilian on his tottering throne.

Implied in this earlier attitude of the United States toward the other American states is the idea of Pan-Americanism, which was eagerly seized on by Bolivar in his attempt through the abortive Panama congress of 1826 to form a Pan-American union for self-protection against the dangers of European aggression and for mutual assistance through the development of coöperative policies. Latin America at that time was hardly ripe for so forward a step, and the unwillingness of the United States to coöperate threw a damper on the plan. It was a noble dream on Bolivar's part, but its consummation remained for later generations.

Commercial policy. With the coming of peace in 1815 the United States began to revive its commercial policy of

the open door, so rudely shattered by the situations created by the Napoleonic wars, and sought to enlarge its commerce in foreign ports and to build up a merchant marine. As a step in that direction it declared war (1815) on the piratical state of Algiers, which had during the wars captured our vessels and made our sailors and merchants prisoners. Decatur entered the Mediterranean in June with ten war vessels, defeated the war fleet of Algiers, and attacked the city itself. The Sultan promptly came to terms, released his American prisoners, paid damages for his depredations, and gave pledges for future behavior. Similar action was taken against Tunis and Tripoli with similar results, and in this summary fashion the power of the Barbary pirates was broken, and henceforth the Mediterranean became a safe sea for American commerce. In consequence we were able by 1830 to conclude with the Ottoman Empire a treaty of commerce and navigation.

In 1784 the good ship *Empress of China* entered the port of Canton, carrying there for the first time the American flag. In 1792 Captain Gray, sailing northward from California in search of furs for the trade with China, entered the great river of the Oregon country, giving to it the name of his ship, Columbia. In 1778 the Hawaiian group had been discovered by Captain James Cook of England and soon afterwards was visited by American ships. These were followed by the missionary and the trader, who obtained a firm foothold in the islands, so that by the middle of the nineteenth century that group was looked upon as a remote outpost of American civilization, destined some day to pass under the flag. France and England were notified of this attitude and were politely warned against attempts at possession.

In the year 1833 treaties of amity and commerce were con-

cluded with Siam and with Muscat in Arabia, the first treaties in the Far East; in 1844 Caleb Cushing negotiated America's first treaty with China; in 1854 Commodore Perry succeeded in opening Japan to the world's commerce, securing on March 31 from Japan its first modern treaty; in 1882 Korea belatedly ended its period of isolation by following the example of Japan and, under the advice of the Chinese premier Li Hung Chang, made a treaty with the United States. At the time of the opening of the Civil War the flag of the United States had become known on all the seas and Jefferson's dream had been fulfilled—peace, commerce, honest friendship with all nations.

Immigration and naturalization. The Revolution was based on a belief in the inherent and inalienable rights of men, among which is the right of migration, a right indispensable to the enjoyment of other rights. Even as late as 1868 Congress declared that "the right of expatriation" is "a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and that any denial or restriction of that right is "inconsistent with the fundamental principles" of the government. A similar statement respecting Chinese immigration was incorporated in the Burlingame Treaty of this same year with China.

The implication from this was that any human being had the right freely to migrate from the land of his birth, to enter the land of his choice, and in due time to enter into contractual relations with the government of that country so that he might become a citizen of it and enjoy its rights and privileges. Under the naturalization act of 1790 any "free white" person who complied with certain conditions of residence and registration, and who forswore allegiance to his mother country was received *ipso facto* into

the citizenship of the United States and of the state in which he resided.[1] Since the conditions required were simple, involving merely a five years' residence, immigrants into the United States readily became citizens, thus transferring allegiance from their native country to their adopted country.

Yet under the older theory of allegiance, held throughout Europe, no person had a right to renounce his allegiance to the land of his birth without the permission of his government, so that, for example, a person born English remained English unless Parliament authorized a change of allegiance. England's treaty of peace in 1783 legally freed Americans from British allegiance but did not permit British migrating subjects to forswear allegiance to the British crown and become American citizens. Since even American courts admitted the validity of the older theory, the situation in brief was that naturalized citizens, while fully American from America's point of view, were, from the point of view of other countries, still citizens of their native countries. Applying this principle to the impressment troubles of the Napoleonic period, England was within its rights in claiming as its own citizens naturalized Britishers who happened to be within British jurisdiction. On the other hand, it had no right, save the right of the stronger, to board American vessels on the high seas and impress those asserted to be English by birth. Against this high-handed action the United States voiced a vigorous protest, but owing to its ill success in the War of 1812 no mention of this grievance was made in the Treaty of Ghent. However, since England was

[1] In 1870, as a result of the Civil War, Congress enlarged the privilege of naturalization so as to include aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent. By decisions of the Supreme Court Orientals, not being white, cannot under the law be naturalized.

enjoying peace and no longer had need to impress seamen into its navies, the whole matter fell into abeyance. James Buchanan, when Secretary of State, and later when President, was the first to maintain, so John Bassett Moore asserts,[1] that naturalization automatically frees one from the obligations of a former allegiance. In a state paper issued in 1859 it was asserted:

> . . . The moment a foreigner becomes naturalized, his allegiance to his native country is severed forever. He experiences a new political birth. A broad and impassable line separates him from his native country. He is no more responsible for anything he may say or do, or omit to say or do, after assuming his new character than if he had been born in the United States. Should he return to his native country, he returns as an American citizen, and in no other character. In order to entitle his original government to punish him for an offence, this must have been committed while he was a subject and owed allegiance to that government.

The next ten years brought about a modification of this extreme attitude owing to the sobering effect of four years of war experiences involving many problems of naturalization. Then, too, the necessities of war and of rapidly developing industries had brought into the country in increasing numbers great masses of immigrants from other countries than those of northern Europe. Thus the problems arising from a dual allegiance were multiplied. In 1868, therefore, the United States, while maintaining its principle that naturalization should free the person naturalized from the obligation of allegiance due his native country, admitted that nations had rights over their native-born citizens and hence it proceeded to negotiate treaties of naturalization in which the respective countries defined the conditions under which naturalization might take place. The treaty with England

[1] See "Principles of American Diplomacy," pp. 276–285.

(1870) fully granted the American contention. Other treaties followed suit, but in the main made certain reservations as to obligations incurred before emigration. These principles, worked out in 1868–1870, still remain as the national policy in respect to expatriation and naturalization, save that the requirements for naturalization are stricter, and many prohibitions have been placed upon free migration into the United States.

In general the American doctrine of expatriation has won in the international world, but with some modifications. Expatriation treaties are agreed on by the respective countries, and the state of birth has the right to demand that its requirements be satisfied before it releases its citizen from allegiance. On the other hand, the adopting state admittedly has in its discretion the right to refuse naturalization to any would-be citizens for reasons satisfactory to itself. The United States, for example, refuses naturalization to Orientals.[1] Moreover, the mere fact that a person in the United States has taken out his first papers does not make him a national. The process of naturalization must be complete and the intention to become a citizen must be bona fide before his citizenship is admitted.

In harmony with this policy is the policy in respect to *immigration.* The one implies the other, so that the person who has the right of expatriation has by implication the right of emigration and immigration. The same grounds, therefore, that would justify the United States in refusing naturalization would also justify it in refusing admission. More severe regulations for the one imply similar restrictions on the other, so that those who may be refused naturalization may also be refused the privilege of entrance, or vice versa. These modifications are, of course, based on

[1] See pages 348–349.

experience. Down to 1860 immigrants were similar in racial stock and were easily and naturally admitted to citizenship; but when great streams of immigrants from all nations on earth poured into the country after the Civil War, and they were seen to be largely different in racial stock and in civilization, the naturalness of their right to enter did not seem so self-evident. The United States, therefore, now tends to emphasize the principle that henceforth each nation must care for its own offspring and that the United States is no longer the haven for the outcast and the oppressed of the earth.

In conclusion, it seems obvious that the decade in American history beginning with 1818 and centering about the careers of Presidents Monroe and Adams and Secretary of State Clay practically determined three broad lines of development in respect to policies concerning the Americas. The first of these was formulated in the Monroe Doctrine, which has become the most fundamental policy of the United States. Secondly, the purchase of Florida, by giving a seacoast toward the south, turned the attention of the United States definitely toward the Caribbean and insured from that time forth a keen interest in whatever happened in that region. Thirdly, Bolivar's abortive movement for a Pan-American union in 1826, so heartily favored by Adams and Clay, was revived after the Civil War had settled the problem of slavery, and has developed into Pan-Americanism, a constructive policy aiming at fraternal coöperation among the numerous nations of the Americas.

Again, during the period from 1815 to 1870, aside from the problems of Latin America, foreign affairs played a relatively insignificant part in American politics. The really important problems were domestic and were concerned with the expansion of land and population, including the problems of immigration. The United States was seeking to ex-

tend its boundaries to the Gulf of Mexico and to the shores of the Pacific even at the cost of war. It emphasized its desire for an open door to the world's commerce and sought to have opened to its shipping the doors into the Mediterranean and the countries of the Far East. It desired peace and sought to arbitrate its difficulties and to neutralize its boundaries; yet, when necessity arose, it asserted leadership on this continent and announced its determination to insist on a divorce between the political interests and systems of Europe and those of the Americas. In all this it aimed to broaden out its democracy, it invited the oppressed from all nations to seek freedom and liberty on its shores, and yet it inconsistently remained a nation "half slave, half free." The Civil War ended that incongruity, but ushered in the problems of industrialism, even more insidiously dangerous to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

CHAPTER XIII

EXPANDING POLICIES, 1870-1920[1]

My active life is ended, but I leave the field with faith, a deep and abiding faith in the competency of this people, born and reared in the practice of individual liberty, to maintain their liberty with order and with justice, and to grow in the great process of developing self-government, to grow ever in capacity for feeling and for following ideals of life which rise above mere prosperity, mere security, and give what after all is the only thing worth accomplishing—achievement, not for one's self, but for others. . . . I retire from active life with a firm conviction that the American people are growing every year into greater competency to maintain and give renewed life to the ideals of the fathers of the American Republic.—ELIHU ROOT[2]

Industrial expansion. During the Civil War and after its close came that marked change in American economic life which turned the United States from a predominantly farming country into a nation stressing manufactures and trade. Its vast stores of coal and, later, of oil began to be utilized, somewhat wastefully; its wealth of iron ores and copper developed the metal industries; a steadily rising protective tariff added to the profits of manufacturing and stimulated the multiplication of industrial plants manned by cheap labor which came in increasing numbers from Italy, Austria-Hungary, and eastern Europe. The *corporation*, hardly utilized before the Civil War, came into prominence and assumed strange forms through the formation of trusts, syndicates, interlocking directorates, and "gentlemen's agreements" for fixing rates and prices. Domestic

[1] See Bibliography, section I.

[2] See *International Conciliation*, May, 1925.

capital multiplied, and foreign capital, seeking for profitable investments, found them in the United States. Capitalists became millionaires, and from these came multimillionaires who might almost become billionaires were it not for new forms of taxation, such as those on corporations, incomes, and inheritances.

Capitalistic interests, basing their arguments upon the individualistic and laissez-faire policies of the first two thirds of the century, fought to be free from the rising tide of legislation which aimed to place bounds on their vaulting ambition. In order to attain this and to secure special privileges and franchises, they sought control of parties, party machinery, and political and even judicial administration, so as to check hostile legislation and to gain legislation favorable to their interests. In the same fashion they fought legislation aiming to safeguard and improve the working conditions of labor and opposed movements looking toward the organization of trades unions and federations of labor. Capitalism even invaded agriculture, resulting in peonage among the freed slaves of the South, tenancy in the Middle West, heavy interest on farm mortgages, and capitalistic control of purchasing agencies for farm products and of storage and transportation facilities.

Under the stimulus of capitalistic industries came the urban center, with congested laboring populations and corrupted municipal governments working for the "interests" and the "bosses" and systematically exploiting the masses. Capitalism, intrenched through its control of national wealth, politics, and the press, levied toll on all that passed by, like the medieval robber barons of the Rhine, and, Kaiser-like, assumed that the existing system was divinely ordained, for, as one capitalist (Mr. Baer) said, "The rights of the laboring man will be protected and cared for, not by labor and agita-

tion, but by the Christian men to whom God in his infinite wisdom has given control of the property interests of this country."

In the philosophy of the time there was a justification for this sort of thing, since for a hundred years individualistic competition free from legislative interference had been set up as a governmental ideal. Darwinian theories of the survival of the fit and the elimination of the unfit were current teachings also, so that the former teaching of the divine right of kings to rule was becoming the divine right of capitalists to determine the fate of nations and the wage and living conditions of the people. Underlying the whole of it was the Machiavellian teaching that the end justifies the means and that bribery, corruption, and exploitation were justifiable methods for the attainment of capitalistic aggrandizement and domination.[1]

Democratic ideals. In opposition to these tendencies were the democratic ideals of the earlier century, emphasizing human equality and fraternalism and stressing the social teachings of equal and exact justice to all, human happiness as the aim of government, and the enlargement of life through the expansion of one's intellectual and emotional nature developed through a wise and free general education for both sexes and all classes alike. These ideals voiced themselves in a social philosophy that assumed many forms in its development, ranging from the radicalism of anarchism and socialism and the philanthropic almsgiving of the wealthier classes to attempts to develop a science of sociology as the basis for social reforms. In the labor world came a stress on the rights of labor, demanding rights for their organizations and improvement through legislation of working and housing conditions, along with shorter hours, higher

[1] See, on this period, C. E. Merriam, American Political Ideas. 1920.

wages, and the abolition of child labor. Political reformers sought for the suppression of graft and bossism, of special privileges and corrupt government, and endeavored to work out improved methods in municipal and Federal government. In social theories generally there was emphasis on social justice, social religion, social education, all aiming to show that coöperation for worthy ends should take the place of cutthroat competition and exploitation. One might well think, therefore, of the last fifty or sixty years in the United States as a struggle between conflicting types of civilization, as a transition from an older predatory type to a newer form of national life based on coöperation and involving definite changes in policy both foreign and domestic. Toward the close of this transitional period the nation was plunged into the World War, so that international issues of all sorts pressed to the front in their demand for consideration and embodiment in national policies. The years since 1870, therefore, are characterized by transitional situations and changing policies, at times selfish, at other times altruistic, out of which as the years pass will arise the policies that presumably will hold place for the remainder of the twentieth century. These perhaps will not be so idealistic as those based on the golden rule, but they should at least be policies for which no American in later years will have to apologize.

The main aspects of these changes in foreign policy will now briefly be indicated.

Land expansion. The land expansionist policies of the earlier half of the century found expression in two directions: (1) At the close of the Civil War the Alaskan lands were purchased from Russia (1867), thereby greatly enlarging American holdings on the Pacific coast. The Spanish War hastened the prospective annexation of the Hawaiian group (1898) and gave to the United States by conquest and

purchase the Philippines and the island of Guam and, by agreement with Great Britain and Germany, the island of Tutuila with its port of Pago Pago in the Samoan group. Other small islands of no special consequence had gradually been acquired in the mid-Pacific, but the essential additions were the Alaskan coast line, the mid-Pacific chain westward from Honolulu, and the base in the South Seas at Tutuila. (2) In the Caribbean region the island of Porto Rico was acquired from Spain as the result of war, control of the Panama Canal Zone was secured in 1904, and the Virgin Islands were purchased from Denmark in 1917. There are in addition naval bases and semiprotectorates in this same region. All this has brought about a new policy in respect to the Caribbean.

Immigration. As for population, the inrush of immigrants which so definitely developed after 1840 reached its maximum in the period from 1900 to 1910, when a net immigration of over 5,500,000 entered our ports. During the half century from 1870 to 1920 a net immigration of over 19,000,000 was registered, showing the enormous demand for cheap labor made upon Europe by our expanding industries. Naturally the situation aroused much comment, and by successive steps cheap labor from the Orient has been barred out —Chinese, Japanese, Indians, and others; restrictions have been placed on socially undesirable classes, such as the criminal, the insane, and the pauper; and by the act of 1924 a new policy has been adopted reducing considerably the percentage of permissible immigration, discriminating in favor of persons from northern Europe. The present policy represents the triumph of social and labor interests as against a capitalistic interest favoring practically free immigration and a surplus wage-population competing in the open market for opportunities to work. Along with this movement for restric-

tion and exclusion has also developed greater care in the granting of the privilege of naturalization. Members of excluded races are still forbidden citizenship through naturalization, and others who may become naturalized must present evidence of moral character and of an intelligent appreciation, through literacy tests, of the principles and practices of the government.

Relations with Latin America. When the smoke of battle from the Civil War had passed away, and slavery, secession, and even reconstruction had become dead issues, foreign interests began to attract attention. Among these was the question of relationship with the Latin nations to the south. The Monroe Doctrine, though not specifically mentioned, was back of the United States in its protest to France against the latter's actions in Mexico. Spain possibly had hopes of regaining Santo Domingo, judging from its actions during the Civil War; and in its own war with Chile and Peru (1864–1867) there may have been faint dreams of a revival of Spanish power in South America. But the return of Spain to power in the Americas would be contrary to the principles laid down by the Monroe Doctrine, and it did not come back. The Monroe Doctrine also seemed to be involved, in the opinion of President Cleveland and Secretary Olney, in the Venezuela episode of 1895, when it was surmised that England was using unsettled boundary lines as a pretext for the expansion of its Guiana territory. Still later it seemed to President Roosevelt that Germany was directing ambitions toward territory in the Americas, possibly in southern Brazil, but certainly in the region of the Caribbean—in Venezuela, for example, as shown by the events of 1902–1903. Finally, in 1912, when exaggerated rumors spread of Japanese designs for a commercial port at Magdalena Bay, Lower California,[1]

[1] See page 219.

the situation seemed to Senator Lodge serious enough to demand a resolution warning foreign powers against attempts to get any foothold on American shores that possibly might be used in later years as bases for naval or military purposes. All this is in illustration of possible infringement of the principle clearly laid down in the Doctrine; namely, that foreign powers shall not force their political systems on the Americas nor seek to enlarge their holdings.

The Caribbean. In this same period came the development of a definite policy in respect to the Caribbean region. This arose partly as the result of the war with Spain and partly because of the determination to construct a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. As the result of the war Spain lost the remnants of its former colonial empire in the Americas and ceased to have possessions in the Caribbean Sea. In respect to the Canal region the United States first negotiated with England for the surrender of its rights under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850. Then it purchased from the bankrupt French syndicate their franchises for the construction of a canal and sought to have these concessions confirmed and enlarged by Colombia, in order that the United States might itself construct a canal. Negotiations with Colombia failed; but Panama opportunely revolted, won its independence by the aid of the United States, and promptly negotiated a treaty with the latter in respect to the Canal Zone. These situations make the basis for a Caribbean Sea policy. Since the Canal is American and the Zone is controlled by the United States, it becomes necessary to see that no hostile or possibly hostile power gets too strong a foothold in that region. To that extent the policy is closely related to the Monroe Doctrine. But under the police-power theory advanced by President Roosevelt the United States, as the important power in the Caribbean region, may see to it that

the Latin states within or bordering on the Caribbean so conduct themselves by complying with their obligations as states that no danger of foreign complications will arise. In other words, they must not become "international nuisances" and must keep the peace. Should they fail in this the United States will take such measures as will insure their fulfillment of obligations and international duties. Naturally such a policy would be furthered if those nations that still hold possessions in the Caribbean should in due course surrender or sell their possessions. With the passing of Spain from the Caribbean four European powers retained possessions in that region, and of these only three remain since the purchase of Denmark's island group. In due time it is presumed that Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands will also free or otherwise dispose of their holdings, so that the Caribbean and its adjacent shores will be entirely American.

The Pan-American movement. The third development in respect to Latin America was in the revival of the Pan-American movement planned by Simon Bolivar. After the abortive Panama congress of 1826 several of the Latin states held congresses to plan out common policies, but the results of these were on the whole of small importance.[1] Secretary James G. Blaine, first under President Arthur and later under President Harrison, saw the importance of the revival of good feeling on the part of Latin America toward the United States and succeeded in bringing Pan-American delegates into conference at Washington in 1889. This has been followed by other conferences and by the formation of the Pan-American Union, which aims to cement in close bonds the sovereign states of the Americas. Stress is placed on friendly relations, economic arrangements, coöperation in law and science, and the use of arbitration in settlement of the many

[1] For a brief account of these see John Barrett's "Pan-American Union."

questions of dispute that arise from time to time among the nations. The basis of the union is the equality in sovereignty of the several states of the Americas and their willingness to work together fraternally and coöperatively for the common interests of the Americas.

Relations with Europe. The Civil War made the United States definitely conscious of the fact that outside the Americas was a world of states some of which were not necessarily fond of it and were perhaps even hostile. But the friction that had developed between the United States and imperial France passed away after 1870, when France became a republic, and the United States cheerfully and promptly recognized the new form of government. England during the last fifty years has gradually become somewhat democratized and, since the Venezuela episode, has steadily shown a friendly spirit toward the United States, yielding to its claims in the Caribbean and working coöperatively with it in world affairs. Before 1870 the United States had generally been on most friendly terms with the numerous Germanic states. This remained true also during the early years of the Empire, before Germany began to aspire after colonies overseas. Friction first developed over the ownership of the Samoa group, and then over the Philippines, as shown in the Manila Bay incident in 1898. The Samoa matter was settled amicably in 1899, but America's suspicions of German aims in South America and in the region of the Caribbean strained the relations somewhat. This situation was intensified by what the Kaiser thought to be the anti-Germanic attitude of the United States in the settlement made at Algeciras in 1906. All in all, Germany probably had the United States classed as a possible foe, and in 1914 presumably expected that if the United States did enter the World War, it would be on the side of the Allies and not of the Central Powers.

Relations with Russia were uniformly friendly from the time the United States made its first treaty (1824) down to 1911, when it broke off relations in view of the attitude Russia was taking toward naturalized American citizens of Russian birth who returned to their native land. Russia had no naturalization treaty with the United States and refused to admit that citizens of Russia who had become naturalized in America had thereby freed themselves from their former obligations. At the overthrow of the Czar's government in 1917 the United States opened preliminary negotiations with the Kerensky government and made loans to it. But the succession of the Bolshevist, or Soviet, government and the new revolution altered the situation. When that government confiscated American property and refused to acknowledge Russia's financial obligations, at the same time seeming to be engaged in propaganda in the United States against the republican form of government, all diplomatic intercourse ceased, and so far has not been resumed. Such in general were America's relations with the four great powers of Europe individually; so far as the smaller powers were concerned, dealings with them were of negligible importance.

In 1899, at the suggestion of the Czar, the first Hague conference had met, and in this the United States accepted membership. It was the first formal acknowledgment by the United States that there were world interests in the discussion of which it desired to share, taking its place as a leading nation with other nations in an international congress. The interest on the part of the United States was due to the fact that it was profoundly interested in the problem of world peace and had hopes that through the conference some tangible agreements would be reached toward that worthy end. Moved by the same motives, it entered the second Hague conference in 1907, taking part also in the conference

of Algeciras, in this case to safeguard its commercial rights in respect to Morocco. The London Naval Conference of 1909, in which it took a prominent part, attracted its support because of the hope that agreements might be made by the great naval powers in respect to fundamental principles to be followed in time of war, more especially in the case of neutrals. In the World War itself, when finally the United States entered the war, it was not as an ally but as an associate, thus seeking to maintain, in form at least, its policy of isolation from European politics. This attitude of isolation was reaffirmed when at the close of the war President Wilson presented the Treaty of Versailles for ratification by the Senate; for the Senate refused, on the ground that ratification involved membership in the League of Nations with its inevitable entanglements in European affairs.

As for its relations with Europe since the rejection of the Versailles treaty by the Senate, the United States has coöperated somewhat informally with the League of Nations, more especially in matters of morals. It has also kept unofficially in touch with movements looking toward the reorganization and rehabilitation of economic and financial measures, such as those embodied in the Dawes Report of 1924. It is probable that participation in such matters will inevitably lead to a closer coöperation in other matters also, more definitely political in nature; but, for the present at least, the United States still maintains its policy of isolation toward European politics and negotiates with the several states along lines customary before the war. With Russia alone the United States has no dealings, since the Department of State, voicing the president, refuses to recognize that nation under existing circumstances.

The United States and the Far East. As for the Far East and the Pacific, the last fifty years have shown a marked

development. Attention has already been called to America's territorial accessions made in and on the Pacific between the years 1867 (Alaska) and 1899 (Tutuila). On the basis of these the United States became clearly a Pacific power, with tangible territorial interests in the Far East. This is particularly true in respect to its relations with China and Japan. In 1899–1900 Secretary John Hay announced the open-door policy toward China and secured a more or less grudging acquiescence in it from other interested powers. In the year 1905 President Roosevelt brought together Russia and Japan and helped to effect the Treaty of Portsmouth which ended the war between these two powers. The same president refused to intercede in behalf of Korea, as required by the treaty of 1882 with Korea, when that country (1905) was threatened with absorption by Japan. From 1906 friction over immigration developed with Japan; and the bad feeling thus aroused has been constantly in evidence since that time, accentuated by the act of 1924, which definitely excluded Japanese immigration. During the years of the World War Japan made numerous aggressions against China, as typified by the twenty-one demands. In the opinion of the United States, Japan's action was contrary to its pledges in respect to the open-door policy, and it aroused considerable antagonism against Japan. This was intensified by the latter's actions in Siberia, contrary to its agreement of 1918. These numerous sources of friction created a feeling of hostility between the two countries, especially as the United States considered itself a sort of champion for China, whose fortunes at this time, supposedly through Japanese intrigues, were at their lowest ebb.

It was for these reasons that the Washington Conference was called (1921–1922), to consist of the nine powers (omitting Russia) that had tangible interests in the Pacific

and the Far East. The Conference had two objects in view: (1) the reduction of armaments and (2) the settlement, if possible, of the problems of the Far East. Along with the agreements made by the Conference were special agreements between Japan and the United States in respect to the mandate islands secured by Japan from Germany, and the cable rights of the United States on the island of Yap. Between Japan and China an agreement was made in respect to the restoration to China of Shantung and of Japan's special interests in that province. Through a series of compromises the Conference finally concluded several important treaties, among which were the naval and four-power treaties and a nine-power series of agreements respecting China, which tended to safeguard its territorial integrity and the open door to its commerce.

The United States in the year 1926 rounds out a checkered career of a hundred and fifty years of national existence, the last sixty of which have been crucial in its history. In 1866 it was a second-rate, debtor nation recovering from a four years' war and about to plunge into a capitalistic and materialistic era. It now stands a leader among great states, the chief creditor nation, wealthy, populous, and ambitious. It faces in the European section of the Eastern Hemisphere a broken-down world sadly in need of new policies and striving to develop constructive leadership in world affairs. What the outcome of all this will be still "lies in the lap of the gods."

CHAPTER XIV

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND PAN-AMERICANISM[1]

Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!—ALEXANDER HAMILTON, in the *Federalist*, 1787

The Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine is one of the most fertile subjects in the field of American political literature. It is the fundamental policy of the United States and is accepted by the average American as a principle no more to be questioned than a fundamental dogma of the Church. In the Europe that preceded the World War it was a red rag to swear at; to the average Latin American it resembled the black flag of piracy with its skull and crossbones; to some Americans, like Professor Bingham, it was an "obsolete shibboleth"; and to others again it justified every act of aggression against the weaker neighbors of the United States. A policy so fertile in interpretation attracted the attention of the Japanese, so that they also developed a Monroe Doctrine and have since joyously quoted American precedents for the interpretations and applications that they have made of their special version of Monroe's principle. More especially during the last thirty years the Monroe Doctrine has been in the world's limelight, and it is still

[1] See Bibliography, section II; also "The Meaning of Pan-Americanism," by J. B. Lockey, in *American Journal of International Law*, January, 1925, pp. 104–117.

a "burning question" among the Latin Americans, who hardly know whether to approve or to oppose it.

The Holy Alliance. In the European world of 1815 there were but five important states—Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia. The Napoleonic wars had finally ended and Napoleon was in exile at St. Helena. France was in subordination to the conquering "Big Four," who were trying to readjust the affairs of Europe. In the meanwhile the Czar, Alexander I, had developed a so-called Holy Alliance consisting of the autocracies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, the avowed purpose of which was to reorganize Europe on the basis of Christian principles. By 1823 "Christian principles" had been interpreted to mean the maintenance of autocracy and the suppression of political freedom. Popular uprisings in Italy, Portugal, and Spain were suppressed, France winning the favor of the Alliance by restoring autocracy in Spain by force of arms. In the spring of 1823 rumor had it that Ferdinand VII of Spain desired the help of the Alliance in an attempt to reconquer his American colonies. France again was to be the instrument of the Alliance, and it was hoped that England would acquiesce in the plan. But England did not give the approval hoped for. It had no desire to see Spain again monopolize the trade of the Spanish-American colonies, nor was it eager to see French troops in possession of a new colonial empire in the New World, as would surely be the case if they were successful in the suppression of insurrection among the wealthy colonies of decrepit Spain.

To head off the expected attack George Canning, secretary for foreign affairs, formally submitted to the United States in August, 1823, a proposition that the two nations unite in a joint protest against the plan and thus defeat it; for, it was assumed, the Continental powers would not dare to

act against the dominant sea power of the time, backed by the leading nation of the Americas. It was a splendid opportunity for the two great English-speaking nations to bury past animosities and to join "hands across the sea" in an alliance in favor of popular government against autocracy. For a time American statesmen were almost unanimously in favor of it, and Jefferson and Madison, the elder statesmen, so advised. Yet there was opposition; opposition caused hesitation; discussion followed; and after mature reflection it was decided not to accept the proposal but to make a formal protest independently. England, meanwhile, had itself grown cool in the matter and had quietly reached an understanding with France by stating its objections and its proposed action against interference. Since Great Britain controlled the seas its objection was final; therefore France withdrew its offer of assistance to Spain, so that no attempt was made by the Holy Alliance to help Spain to subjugate its colonies. On top of this decision came President Monroe's message of December 2 to Congress announcing his attitude toward the whole matter.

Monroe's message. President Monroe made a wise decision when he determined to reject England's offer. Had he decided otherwise Great Britain would probably have assumed leadership in American affairs and, through its sea power and large possessions in the Americas, would undoubtedly have secured a great influence in Latin America. By contrast, Monroe's message assumed that the United States had primacy in American affairs and that the European powers, including Great Britain, had subordinate interests.

In 1823 the United States was the only sovereign state on the American continent, with the exception of the revolutionary states whose independence had recently been acknowledged by the United States and of Brazil, which in the

previous year had separated itself from Portugal. The United States had an imperial domain of territory extending from the Atlantic to the Rockies and from the Great Lakes to the eastern half of the Gulf of Mexico. Its population was just about ten millions and was developing a vigorous pride in national life and a belief in "manifest destiny."

President Monroe's message to Congress was not merely a protest in behalf of the Spanish colonies against the proposed action of the Holy Alliance: it was a mature and thoughtful statement of policy in respect to the future relations of Europe and America. It gave notice to the international world that the Americas had come of age and that henceforth they would assume charge of their own destiny. It announced that the United States as the oldest and most powerful state on the continent desired to notify the European powers that there existed an American system, distinct from the European system, and that the United States would consider "as dangerous to our peace and safety" "any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere." It should be noted that in announcing an independent system and in protesting in behalf of the former Spanish colonies the United States was not acting as their agent but was proclaiming a policy for itself alone. It is the policy of the United States for the sake of its own safety, and it needs no indorsement from any other power on this continent; its definition, interpretations, applications, and indorsement are determined only by the United States in consideration of its own special and peculiar interests. Implied in this, however, is the thought that the peace and safety of the United States means the peace and safety of the Latin states. To them it is a policy of freedom from Europe and not a policy of subjection to the United States.

European colonies. In addition to the trouble over the Spanish colonies the United States had had sharp correspondence with Russia in respect to an apparent expansion southward of the latter's Alaskan boundary, so that this seemed to be a fitting time to declare itself on this question also. The message therefore announced that the United States had no intention of interfering with existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, but that, on the other hand, it desired Europe clearly to understand that henceforth the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they had assumed and maintained, were no longer open to colonization from Europe. In other words, quoting Mr. Elihu Root, this statement was "intended to carry to Russia and incidentally to England the idea that rights to territory in the New World must henceforth rest upon then existing titles, and that the United States would dispute any attempt to create rights to territory by future occupation."[1]

For that reason, although Monroe pledged the United States not to interfere with the existing colonies and possessions of European powers, the United States works in respect to such colonies on the principle of "speed the parting guest." When Russia at the close of the Civil War became weary of its Alaskan possessions, the United States gladly bought them, thereby bowing Russia out of the Americas. Sweden in 1877 transferred to France the little island of St. Bartholomew in the West Indies. On account of its lack of importance its transfer from a weak power to a strong one was not protested by the United States. Spain in the war of 1898 paid the penalty of many years of misgovernment and surrendered, after a possession of over four hundred years, the last remnant of its former colonial empire.

[1] Address before the American Society of International Law, April 22, 1914.

Denmark in 1916 sold the Virgin Islands to the United States, still retaining on the American continent the great island of Greenland, which is geographically more a part of Europe than of America. Canada since the World War has been practically a free state in a confederated empire, and to all purposes might be classed as one of the Pan-American states. Aside from Greenland, only three non-American states still retain possessions in the Americas—Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. By the close of this century possibly these possessions also will have passed from European control, or at least those within or adjacent to the waters of the Caribbean.

Need of the Doctrine. The strength of the Monroe Doctrine lay partly in the fact that it embodied the synthesis of the policies of the first fifty years of national history and, in addition, presented a forward-looking policy which embraced the ideals and aspirations of a rapidly developing nationalism. It included the open door to commerce of the Revolution, the neutrality and isolation policies of Washington, the no entangling alliances of Jefferson. At the same time it looked forward to an American system freed from European politics, working out its own destiny on its own continent in a new world. The policy, when announced by Monroe, was so obviously justifiable that after some mutterings of empty protest Europe settled down to digest more at leisure the inner meaning of this declaration from the upstart republic across the Atlantic.

It was indeed high time that the United States took such a stand. Russia was planning to push the southern boundary of Alaska as far as fifty-one degrees. Earlier in the century England had made attempts on Buenos Aires and already had large holdings in South and Central America and in the Caribbean which it might desire to consolidate

by the absorption of neighboring territory. At any moment decrepit Spain might be compelled to surrender Cuba and Porto Rico to England or France. France was still regretting the loss of her American colonies and would eagerly seize any opportunity to enlarge her holdings on the western continent. It was entirely possible that the European powers, now that they were freed from wars among themselves, would proceed under one pretext or another to divide up, as the three autocracies had divided Poland, the former colonial empires of Spain and Portugal in the Ar.. icas. If so, the American continent would become the cen' of struggles for territorial expansion, resulting in bi rivalry, endless wars, and a chaotic condition that undou edly would prove dangerous to the peace and safety of United States. Consider, for example, the situation of . rica today, partitioned among the powers and fought ove. at the councils of nations; or the situation of Asia, and especially China, in the dark years that immediately preceded the open-door declaration of John Hay. With these in mind who can doubt that had it not been for the Monroe Doctrine, South and Central America, and Cuba and Mexico besides, would long since have come under the flags of foreign powers, and the Caribbean would be lined with fortifications and its waters the scene of many a bloody battle for the supremacy of the Canal Zone?

Even after the policy had been announced the United States had to warn both France and England that Cuba must be let alone. These same powers also took a keen interest in the youthful republic of Texas when it won its independence from Mexico and sought to persuade it not to seek annexation to the United States. England in the forties became profoundly interested in Central America and the Canal region and was ambitiously seeking to en-

large its holdings, but through the settlement made by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 the British flag flew over no more territory in that region than England had had in 1823. France, taking advantage of the Civil War, invaded Mexico and set Maximilian on a shaky throne propped up by French forces; but American public opinion against recognition of this empire was voiced by the House (April 4, 1864) in declaring that "it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical government erected on the ruins of any republican government America under the auspices of any European power." the close of the war the United States moved its forces der General Sheridan toward the Rio Grande, and Secrey Seward politely asked Napoleon when he purposed to call his troops. Prussia at that time was stirring up trouble n central Europe, consequently Napoleon concluded that it would be wiser to have his troops nearer home. The army was withdrawn, the empire collapsed, Maximilian was shot, peace for a short time came to chaotic Mexico, and France moved on to Sedan. Even Spain in 1861, eager to gain additional foothold in the West Indies, landed troops and took possession of Santo Domingo at the request of a faction of its inhabitants, but that black republic proved to be rather indigestible and the troops were withdrawn in 1865.

Ambiguous interpretations. It has been hard sometimes to determine whether a given power was adding to its territories at the expense of the American governments or merely defining more exactly its claims to possessions held in 1823. In 1829–1833, for example, a dispute arose as to the ownership of the Falkland Islands, which Americans were using as fishing-stations. Argentina claimed jurisdiction, but so also did Great Britain, which in 1833 took possession on the ground of discovery and agreement with

Spain in 1771. The United States acknowledged British sovereignty, denying to Argentina an appeal to the Monroe Doctrine, on the ground that England had a valid claim to the islands before 1823. Argentina has always felt aggrieved at the decision, but the allied powers in the late war were rather pleased that an English fleet was in possession when a German fleet sought to enter the port of Stanley in December, 1914.

Again, trouble arose in the forties in respect to British movements in Central America. It must be remembered that, next to the United States, Great Britain, through its control of Canada, parts of the West Indies and C , and its possessions in Central America, was in those c greatest American power not Latin by race. As th est shipping nation and naval power in the world it naturally interested in the possibility of a canal at the I mus and sought to extend its holdings in Central America, more especially along the Atlantic Nicaraguan coast and also in the Gulf of Fonseca. When the United States secured Texas in 1845 and California in 1848, thus rounding out the Gulf of Mexico and securing a Pacific coast, its interest in the Isthmus region became keen, and a sort of rivalry developed between the United States and Great Britain for supremacy in Nicaragua and Colombia, each seeking privileges and concessions as against the other. It was this situation that brought about as a compromise the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, in which both powers agreed to withdraw from Central America (excepting British Honduras) and to pool on a fifty-fifty basis all their canal interests, whether at Panama, Nicaragua, or Tehuantepec. On the face of things this was an excellent compromise between two rival commercial powers almost ready to come to blows over the possession of the Canal region. From

the standpoint of the Monroe Doctrine, however, it was an admission that in the Canal region the two nations had equal rights, and hence that in such matters the United States had no leadership in control. The situation resulted in a deadlock so far as the construction of a canal was concerned.

A third illustration of ambiguity in respect to colonial possessions was the Venezuela controversy. British Guiana was a possession in 1823, but with indeterminate boundaries. As British interests pushed farther toward the interior a dispute arose with Venezuela over the boundary line, but Great Britain refused to arbitrate this, even though requested to do so by the United States. This resulted in the issuance of ultimatum from President Cleveland, through Secretary Olney (1895), in which the United States virtually demanded, as the supreme power in the Americas, that Great Britain arbitrate the matter with Venezuela. Great Britain was at once angered, perplexed, and amused, but kept cool in the preparation of a reply. At the same time the Jameson raid and the German emperor's telegram to President Kruger of the Transvaal (January 3, 1896) made dangerous foreign complications. The Guiana boundary was relatively insignificant by comparison with expansion in South Africa, and in any case Great Britain had adopted a policy of firm friendship with the United States. The result was that a conciliatory reply was sent, arbitration was agreed on, and as the decision was mainly in favor of Great Britain both the great powers were satisfied. It was, however, an admission on Great Britain's part that the United States was dominant in the Caribbean region. The Spanish War made this even more true; and finally Great Britain yielded to the inevitable and surrendered its claims on the Canal region and, by the later withdrawal of its West Indian

fleet, acknowledged the control of the United States in that entire region. From that time forth it seemed as though Secretary Olney had spoken the truth in saying "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law."[1]

Supremacy in the Caribbean. This lesson of American supremacy in the Caribbean was not lost on the European powers. When in 1902–1903 Germany along with Great B· ain and Italy blockaded Venezuelan ports, it first consu Washington and gave pledge that "under no circumsta· do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or th· manent occupation of Venezuelan territory." Nevert· Thayer, in his "Life and Letters of John Hay,"[2] assert Germany, whose fleet remained after the others had drawn, had to be forced out of its *temporary* occupation a secret ultimatum sent to the Kaiser by President Roosev· informing him that if the German fleet were not withdraw·· by a certain date Admiral Dewey (at that time in the West Indies with the American fleet) would drive it out.

Certainly after this experience and others like it the principle has become well settled that no foreign power, either European or Asiatic, will ever be allowed under the Monroe Doctrine to subvert American governments and substitute others or to occupy American territory in excess of that owned by such nations in 1823. A clearly understood principle like this makes for peace. When in 1900 the German Kaiser through his naval program challenged Great Britain's supremacy of the seas, it was in essence a declaration of war, since it was an attack on Great Britain's most fundamental policy. In the same fashion no foreign nation

[1] Secretary Olney, however, had no intention of asserting that the United States was legally sovereign; his stress was on "practically."

[2] Vol. II, pp. 275–290.

unwilling to war with the United States would for a moment think of endeavoring to enlarge its holdings or to secure a foothold in the Americas, knowing that persistence in such action would *ipso facto* invite sharp protests from the United States and perhaps provoke war. Even if a foreign state should war against a Latin state and defeat it, the United States would see that the terms of victory involved surrender of territory or sovereignty to that foreign r. As long as the United States maintains the Monroe y and is prepared to enforce it against foreign powers therwise would be eager to expand their territories at ense of the Latin states, a *pax Americana* may be as- ; for no foreign power could make any possible gains Americas that would compensate them for the burden anger of a war with the United States.

ome implications from the Doctrine. Under the terms the Monroe Doctrine European powers should not be permitted to gain territory or to enlarge their present holdings at the expense of American states. But what should be done in case a part of the Americas should of its own free will desire to come under the sovereignty of a foreign power? For example, the province of Yucatan (Mexico) in 1848 was threatening to secede and to offer to some foreign power sovereignty over its territory, appealing first to the United States and then to Great Britain or Spain. President Polk (April 29, 1848) hinted at its annexation to the United States, arguing that from its location "it would be dangerous to our peace and security if it should become a colony of any European nation." A few years earlier there had been a similar fear lest the free state of Texas should in some way be influenced to cast in its lot with Great Britain or possibly France. This, of course, was ended by annexation. The internal difficulties of Yucatan

settled themselves without recourse to secession, and a decision was not necessary; but it seems clear that the United States could not with safety permit the transfer of sovereignty, at least over any part of the Caribbean region, to any non-American power.

The climax of this interpretation came in connection with the Magdalena Bay episode of 1912. There was a supposition that a Japanese commercial company acting for Japan was seeking to get from Mexico control of Magdalena Bay in Lower California. This bay is a magnificent harbor, "deep, wide, and unobstructed at the entrance and has sufficient room for all the navies of the world to swing with the tide. Storms are practically unknown, and the temperature is mild and equable throughout the year."[1] Its handicap is that it has no fresh-water supply and is surrounded by a barren desert. Senator Lodge, under the impression that there might be some truth in the rumor, introduced into the Senate a resolution which was adopted. It reads as follows:

> Resolved, That when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power or control for naval or military purposes.

This resolution, of course, had no binding authority, since it was merely advice to the executive on which he might or might not act at his pleasure. But the Yucatan and Magdalena Bay episodes combined seem to indicate that the United States would vigorously protest against the acquirement by a foreign power of any foothold in the Caribbean or the

[1] *National Geographic Magazine*, July, 1923, pp. 95–96.

Canal region that might be used as a base for military purposes and thus become dangerous to the United States.

Possibly it may be stretching the Monroe Doctrine to have it extend in its applications as far as Hawaii; but even as early as 1842 Secretary Webster announced that American interests in those islands were such that the United States assumed that no foreign power would "take possession of the islands as a conquest, or for the purpose of colonization." This seems to imply that they were not merely under American protection, but that the provisions of the Monroe Doctrine applied to them. Similar but stronger declarations were made on several occasions during the next ten years, aimed more especially at France and England, which seemed to be threatening the independence of the island group. By this time California and the Oregon territory were under the American flag. Secretary Marcy in a statement of 1853 assumed that the other powers fully understood that the Hawaiian Islands were under American protection, and that some day they would become part of the United States. From the time of the Civil War American interests have dominated the islands, resulting in the reciprocity treaty of 1875 and finally in their annexation in 1898. Since that time they have formed the westernmost outpost of the Pacific coast line.

The two spheres. In the study of geography a child is likely to get the impression that the world is divided into two parts, the Eastern Hemisphere and the Western Hemisphere, and may readily assume that they are separate and distinct parts without much connection one with the other. Monroe's doctrine of the two spheres also implies the same thought: Europe is monarchical, militaristic, and continuously at war; its civilization is ancient, perhaps effete, and rigid in type; and its people live chiefly through manufac-

tures. By contrast, America in disposition is peaceful, and in government is destined to be republican; its civilization is youthful and flexible; and its people live in daily contact with the soil and nature. The three thousand miles of ocean that separates these two systems is symbolic of the fact that East is East and West is West, and that each should attend to its own business and not interfere with the other's.

The Panama congress. Assuming this, what relationship existed among the several states on the western continent? Unquestionably in Monroe's time thoughtful Americans of all sorts, North Americans and South Americans, were believers in the rights of man and in human equality and fraternity. They had no other thought but that the several states of the Americas would in spirit if not in fact form a great brotherhood, a Pan-American confederation in which each, great or small, would be equal one to the other, yielding homage only to the superiority of generous emotion and virtue. The climax of this attitude was reached in Bolivar's movement for the Panama congress of 1826, which proved to be a failure, largely owing to lukewarmness on the part of the United States.[1]

Sectional distrust. The issue of slavery had made a rift between the two sections. The Latin states were freeing their slaves, and the United States was retaining its system of slavery, perhaps discouraging the movement for the freedom of Cuba lest that also should become free territory. From the Spanish standpoint the acquisition by the United States of the Louisiana lands and of the Floridas was not an honorable record, and the free Spanish states to the south remembered this when they saw the United States dismembering Mexico and intriguing in Central

[1] See J. B. Lockey, Pan-Americanism: its Beginnings.

America and Cuba. Between the two sections distrust, misunderstandings, and suspicion developed. On the other hand, the United States, through ignorance of the problems and psychology of the Latin Americans, developed a sort of contempt because of their numerous insurrections and apparent lack of stability in political life. By 1870 the United States, emerging from its Civil War even more powerful than before, had become a great and influential state. The Latin states individually and collectively were relatively insignificant, and citizens of the United States not infrequently reminded them of it.

Pan-Americanism. Yet after the Civil War the situation became somewhat modified. The United States had freed its slaves; it had helped Mexico to free itself from the French, taking no territory in compensation; and when the Latin Pacific states warred with Spain, at their request it had mediated the matter and in 1867 secured an end to the conflict. The Latin states had from time to time held congresses of their own for the discussion of matters of common interest, and in 1881 Secretary Blaine, who had become deeply interested in the Latin states, invited them to a general conference at Washington to consider common plans for arbitration and the avoidance of war. This proposed conference was postponed, but was again invited in 1888 and met in the following year, when Blaine happened again to be Secretary of State.[1] Through his tact and enthusiasm an organization was formed which flourishes now as the Pan-American Union, so magnificently housed in the building at Washington presented by Mr. Carnegie. Through congresses and the union, aided by numerous commissions, the twenty-one states of the Americas are brought into con-

[1] Five of these congresses have so far been held, the last at Santiago, Chile, in 1923.

tact through their delegates and are slowly working toward a coördination of activities and interests. Commerce, finance, science, health, jurisprudence, and international law are subjects emphasized, along with gatherings for the cultivation of social contacts, such as the Congress of Women held at Baltimore in the spring of 1922 and the Congress of Journalists in April, 1926.[1]

Addresses by many public men and officials also have done much to strengthen kindly relations, more especially those of Presidents Roosevelt and Wilson and Secretaries Root and Hughes. They all have emphasized as the policy of the United States toward the other Pan-American states a strong desire for peaceable relations, a scrupulous respect for the rights of small nations, as well as a desire for the maintenance of constitutional liberty and for growth in mutual sympathy and harmony of purpose. Other agencies besides, largely educational in nature, are seeking to develop Pan-American fraternalism and an appreciation of the essential unity of the economic and cultural interests of all the states of the Western Hemisphere. When there is indeed a common set of interests, a common purpose, and harmonious points of view, then there will be at last a real American system.

This is the policy of Pan-Americanism; it stresses the fraternalism of an American system of nations as the best basis for the Monroe Doctrine and as the surest guaranty that the United States will deal justly with smaller nations, helping them to stability in government and to an assured independence.

Should the Monroe Doctrine become Pan-American? Many prominent Americans, North Americans and South

[1] The American Federation of Labor at its annual meeting in 1925 favored action looking toward the development of a Pan-American Federation of Labor.

Americans, have had the conviction that the Monroe Doctrine should be considered the policy of all the Americas and, by formal adoption, be made the fundamental provision of a Pan-American policy. But this proposition clearly does not meet with favor. Even aside from the United States, the "A B C powers"[1] would hardly be willing that decisions should be made by the determining vote of the smaller states, nor would the smaller states be willing to abide by decisions made by the four leading states. If, on the other hand, decisions had to be unanimous, no action of importance could be taken. Consequently when ex-President Brum of Uruguay presented to the fifth Pan-American Conference, at Santiago, Chile, a project for a League of American Nations, the matter was not even discussed, on account of its impracticability and the known opposition of the United States.

It may be that these demands for an all-American policy are based on a misapprehension as to the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, and that the present need is to separate in mind the real Monroe Doctrine from unwarranted additions made to it or from unjustifiable interpretations of it during the last hundred years. Thinking of the Doctrine superficially, one might be tempted to refer to it as an "obsolete shibboleth." There is no longer a Holy Alliance threatening to subjugate any part of the Americas; Europe's "balance of power" and its monarchic militarism no longer worry the United States; no power, European or Asiatic, assumes the possibility of colonization in the Americas; the Latin states, which were ostracized by Europe in 1823, are now full members of the family of nations and take part at will in Hague conferences or as members of the League of Nations. Yet these aspects, after all, are merely the setting

[1] Argentina, Brazil, Chile.

for the Doctrine itself, which is something far more fundamental and which, as President Cleveland said, "was intended to apply to every stage of our national life and cannot become obsolete while our republic endures." The real Doctrine and the one that remains eternally true is that the Americas are reserved for American states, and that no European or Asiatic power shall ever be allowed to acquire more territorial jurisdiction on the American continents than it had in 1823.

A policy for the United States. A further aspect is that this Doctrine was announced by the United States alone, as its own policy, without asking the coöperation or assistance of any other power, whether Great Britain or the Latin-American states. Although President Monroe at first favored a joint declaration with England and was undoubtedly influenced by sympathy for the colonies struggling for freedom, the Doctrine was not announced for their sakes or for England's sake but because a contrary policy would be "dangerous to our peace and safety." The criterion in every situation, therefore, will be, Is the situation one that may bring American territory under foreign control? If this is so, then the situation involves danger to the United States, which, under the Monroe Doctrine, would make formal protest and, if necessary, use armed forces to enforce its protest. As an illustration, suppose the facts are true, as stated in Thayer's "Life and Letters of John Hay," that after Venezuela in 1903 had agreed to arbitrate the disputed claims and the British and Italian fleets had withdrawn, the German fleet refused to leave. Here is a situation in which Germany, in violation of its pledge, apparently intended to remain in possession of Venezuelan territory. What else could President Roosevelt do but order Admiral Dewey (then in West Indian waters with the fleet) to drive

out the German ships unless they were promptly withdrawn in accordance with a secret time-ultimatum given to the Kaiser? The Monroe Doctrine would amply have justified the President's action, and the nation would have been solidly behind him.

Those who favor a thorough national preparedness for war as the best preventive against attack argue, and rightfully, that an aggressive nation would most carefully count the cost before it would venture to attack a fully prepared nation. But the Monroe Doctrine goes farther than this. For a hundred years it has stood as the fundamental policy of the United States, a policy developed primarily to insure the safety of the United States and to secure the peace of the Americas. It has been interpreted and applied to many controversial situations, so that its essential meaning has become familiar to the nations. In some cases this knowledge has not been palatable. Metternich, voicing the Holy Alliance, declared that "great calamities" would be brought upon Europe "by the establishment of these vast republics in the New World"; Bismarck, two generations later, is said to have called it a "species of arrogance peculiar to the Americans and quite inexcusable"; and Professor Wagner alluded to it as an "empty pretension." Yet the Doctrine stands firm and is acquiesced in by the international world. Its significance is comprehended, and it is clearly understood that behind the Doctrine is the power and might of the United States. In other words, a historic policy, like the Monroe Doctrine, is itself a preventer of war and a preserver of peace, for every foreign nation knows that any attempt on its part to act contrary to that policy means war. In consequence the Latin states to the south, notwithstanding their weakness in past years, have been guarded by a president's message as effectively as though they were

protected by armies and navies adequate to defend them against any possible attack.

As for the future, Pan-Americanism is well to the front and is slowly but surely developing a social and economic basis on which may be erected a kindlier relationship among the states that form the American system. By the end of this century the states of the Americas, including Canada, should be so firmly united by ties of common interests that in spirit at least they will form "an indissoluble union." By that time, also, American colonies under European flags will have become part of the "American system." Should the time ever come when the United States would need to maintain the Monroe Doctrine by force of arms against some foreign combination, the Latin states, without the need of a formal agreement, would stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States in defense of a policy which, though primarily that of the United States, is fundamentally the safeguard of the united Americas. Through unity of interest all would support the "mother of republics" in seeing to it that the American system of republics stretching from Cape Horn to the north pole was kept intact.

CHAPTER XV

THE CARIBBEAN SEA AND THE PANAMA CANAL[1]

There are appearances to authorize a supposition, that the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of Europe. . . . Those of them, which have colonies in America, look forward, with painful solicitude, to what this country is capable of becoming. They foresee the dangers, that may threaten their American dominions from the neighbourhood of states, which have all the dispositions, and would possess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful marine.

A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations towards us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a federal navy. There can be no doubt, that the continuance of the union, under an efficient government, would put it in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy, which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight, if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties This would be more particularly the case, in relation to operations in the West-Indies.—ALEXANDER HAMILTON, in the *Federalist*

Early interest in the West Indies. It has often been assumed that the attitude of the United States in the Caribbean is typical of its attitude toward the Latin states generally, and that its policies in that region are derived from, and are part of, the Monroe Doctrine. As a matter of fact, its profound interest in the Caribbean antedates the Monroe Doctrine, for there were beginnings of a policy in that sea before there were any Latin states on this continent. From the early years of the Republic American statesmen realized the importance of the West Indies to the colonies, both because of the large commerce carried on between the

[1] See Bibliography, section III.


THE CARIBBEAN REGION
Longitude West from Greenwich
EQUATOR
TROPIC OF CANCER
TROPIC OF CANCER
GULF OF MEXICO
CARIBBEAN SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
ATLANTIC OCEAN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MEXICO
CENTRAL AMERICA
SOUTH AMERICA
COLOMBIA
VENEZUELA
ECUADOR
PERU
BRAZIL
GUIANA
GALAPAGOS ISLANDS
BERMUDA ISLANDS (British)
BAHAMA ISLANDS
GREATER ANTILLES
LESSER ANTILLES
LEEWARD ISLANDS
WINDWARD ISLANDS
Washington
Richmond
Norfolk
Charleston
Savannah
Jacksonville
Atlanta
Nashville
Memphis
Louisville
St Louis
Chicago
Los Angeles
San Diego
San Francisco
Salt Lake City
Denver
Santa Fe
Oklahoma City
Fort Worth
Little Rock
Birmingham
Jackson
Montgomery
Mobile
Tallahassee
New Orleans
Houston
Galveston
Austin
El Paso
Juarez
Chihuahua
Monterrey
Brownsville
Matamoros
Laredo
Eagle Pass
Tampa
Miami
Key West
Havana
Pinar del Rio
Nassau
Kingston
Port au Prince
Jamaica (Br)
Belize
Guatemala
Tegucigalpa
San Salvador
Managua
San José
Panama
Panama Canal
Colon
Limon
Barranquilla
Cartagena
Caracas
Port of Spain
Trinidad I (Br.)
Georgetown
Paramaribo
Cayenne
Bogotá
Medellin
Quito
Guayaquil
Amazon R.
Orinoco R.
Magdalena R.
Rio Grande
Colorado R.
Lower California
Gulf of California
Yucatan Peninsula
Campeche
Merida
Veracruz
Mexico
Acapulco
Guadalajara
Monterrey
Durango
Mazatlan
La Paz
Tropic of Cancer
Equator
110°
100°
90°
80°
70°
60°
50°
30°
20°
10°
0°

two regions and because of the political dangers that threatened the youthful United States from that stormy center. The question, too, of a Panama canal is by no means a recent one. The possibility of a canal across the Isthmus was discussed in the early years of the Spanish conquest; it was revived in the beginning of the nineteenth century by the explorations made in that region by Alexander von Humboldt; and it was a favorite project of Simon Bolivar, who had it on the *agenda* of the congress at Panama in 1826.

The West Indies had political importance in the Revolutionary War, since it was from that region that Admiral De Grasse sailed with the French fleet to Yorktown, bringing reënforcements against Cornwallis and holding the bay against the British fleet. The British consequently failed to land needed supplies, thus compelling the surrender of Cornwallis a month later. This practically ended the war. After 1781 the open door to West Indian commerce was a burning question, but it was not until after the passage of the Jay treaty in 1795 that Great Britain permitted the United States to share in that trade with its colonies. In the same year the treaty with Spain gave the United States the right temporarily to navigate the Mississippi freely to the Gulf, using New Orleans as the port of transfer from river to seafaring craft.

Early notions of expansion. Among the earlier leaders of the nation Hamilton seemed to have a clear vision of a farsighted American policy. In the *Federalist* he had assumed that at some distant day the United States would occupy the continent from sea to sea; and later, in discussing America's right to navigate the Mississippi, he asserted that in order to control the passageway between the Gulf and the Atlantic, the United States must sooner or later acquire the Louisiana Territory and the Floridas also. Presi-

dent Jefferson, likewise, who was an admirer of France and opposed to entangling alliances, asserted his willingness to form an alliance with England rather than to submit to the dangers involved in the French possession of the Louisiana Territory and the mouth of the Mississippi. In his instructions to Livingston, minister at Paris, he said (April 18, 1802): "The day that France takes possession of New Orleans . . . seals the union of two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." The alliance proved to be unnecessary, since the United States was able to purchase Louisiana from France and thus become one of the powers on the Gulf of Mexico.

Interest in Cuba. Again, when Spain came under the power of Napoleon, Jefferson began to fear for Spain's possessions in the Caribbean, saying (1808):

> We shall be satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their present dependence [on Spain]; but very unwilling to see them in that of either France or England, politically or commercially. We consider their interests and ours as the same, and the object of both must be to exclude European influence from this hemisphere.

A little later he intimated to Madison, who had succeeded him in office, that if Spain's possessions in the West Indies were to be divided among the powers, it would be well to endeavor to secure Cuba, because of its commercial importance, as the share of the United States. By the treaty of 1819 Spain ceded the Floridas to the United States, thereby placing the latter in possession of the eastern half of the Gulf. By the same treaty the United States surrendered its weak claims to Texas and the western half of the Gulf. Secretary Adams on April 28, 1823, in a letter to Nelson, minister to Spain, expressed his opinion that soon Spain

would lose all its American colonies except Cuba and Porto Rico and might be tempted to transfer these to other powers. He warned against any possible transfer of Cuba to Great Britain, saying that the government would use all means against such a transfer. He then voiced his conviction that within half a century "the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself." In 1825, when president, Adams declined to enter into an agreement with Great Britain and France pledging that no one of the three would take possession of Cuba or allow any other power to secure it from Spain. He declined to join in this agreement on the ground that the United States had no designs against Cuba and would permit no other power to seize it. In the same year, in view of the presence of a large French fleet in the West Indies, the United States informed the French government that it could not permit a foreign occupation of either Cuba or Porto Rico. Similar notifications were given Great Britain and France on other occasions during the next thirty years, making clear the fact that as a matter of policy no strong power would be allowed to supplant Spain in its West Indian possessions, thus establishing possible bases from which attacks might be made against the United States. As the Monroe Doctrine put it, the United States would "consider any attempt on their part [the European powers] to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." Obviously, therefore, the earlier statesmen fully realized the strategic value of the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indies and looked for an extension of territorial power southward as well as westward.

In 1845 Texas was annexed, thus rounding out the western half of the Gulf of Mexico. This simply whetted the

appetite of the United States for more; and in 1848 it sought to obtain by purchase from Spain the title to Cuba, but it met no encouragement whatsoever. Then followed the Lopez filibustering expeditions into Cuba, secretly aided by Southerners eager for more slave territory, and though these failed, much ill feeling rightly developed in Spain against the United States. In consequence Spain appealed to Great Britain for protection against American aggression, as the result of which Great Britain again renewed its offer of 1825 for a tripartite agreement. This was declined by Secretary Everett, who based his refusal on the principle that it is the traditional policy of the United States not to admit European intervention in American affairs. During Pierce's administration other abortive and somewhat underhanded attempts were made to acquire Cuba, culminating in the Ostend Manifesto (1854), by which the American ministers to Great Britain, France, and Spain advised war against Spain to secure Cuba by conquest. This plan was promptly disowned by Secretary Marcy, but the whole affair did not shed glory on American diplomacy. On the other hand, in the sixties, when Napoleon III sought a colonial empire in the South Seas by way of Panama and Mexico, the protest against French troops in Mexico caused their withdrawal and the downfall of Maximilian.

Revolution in Cuba. Shortly after the close of the Civil War a rebellion broke out in Cuba, lasting sporadically for about ten years. On several occasions, because of the turmoil in that unhappy island, the United States was tempted to secure by intervention Cuba's separation from Spain through either annexation or independence. No formal action, however, was taken. The climax came in 1895–1898, when another insurrection broke out, and Cuba seemed to be on the verge of ruin. The situation became unendurable;

and on the score of humanity and moral obligation to put an end to an international nuisance the United States interfered, and in 1898 declared war against Spain. Fearing lest it should be charged with ambitious designs, and as a guaranty of good faith, Congress in declaring war, April 19, adopted a self-denying resolution, which reads "That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

Spain was defeated; Cuba by treaty became independent, under the guaranty of the United States in accordance with the terms of the Platt amendment; and Porto Rico and the small island of Culebra came under the American flag. The so-called Platt amendment of 1901 includes the final agreement made with Cuba, recognizing its independence but reserving to the United States a naval base and the right to interfere in times of disorder so as to insure stability in government.

Interference against Spain in Cuban affairs was based on the theory that Spanish government in Cuba had become so corrupt and incompetent that it made inevitable a chronic condition of insurrection. In consequence the situation in that island had become an international nuisance, the abatement of which devolved on the United States as a near and powerful neighbor and as the chief sufferer. This became, a few years later, President Roosevelt's theory of "international police power," under which, by interpretation, the United States may assume a sort of guardianship over neighboring nations and see that they do not become international nuisances. The first application of this policy under Roosevelt had reference to the proposed Panama Canal.

The Panama Canal. The definite interest of the United States in Colombia (New Granada) developed in the forties, when the canal question had become a cause of contention. In 1846–1848 the two powers made a treaty the gist of which was that the United States guarantied the neutrality of the Isthmus and Colombia's rights of sovereignty over it in return for the privilege of a free and open transit by rail or canal across the Isthmus. After the construction of a railroad across the Isthmus and the ratification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, national interest, aside from the Walker filibustering expedition, was diverted from that region because of the troubles developing over the slavery issue now at its climax.

During the Civil War France gave some attention to the problem of a Panama canal as part of a plan in Napoleon's mind for a French expansion into the South Seas. Secretary Seward, also, after the Civil War, sought to revive interest in the matter, and in 1869 President Grant warned Congress against the danger of allowing any European government to build a canal. Likewise President Hayes, in March, 1880, emphasized the point that any canal should be "an American canal under American control" and advised negotiations looking toward the modification of conflicting treaties. In 1878 a French company was organized to construct a Panama canal, but through mismanagement it became bankrupt in 1889, though it managed to extend its concession to 1904. By that time the difficulties of the project had become more clearly known, and the heavy death rate through malaria and yellow fever was a deterrent. The Spanish War brought matters respecting a canal to a crisis; and the United States determined to construct "an American canal under American control," provided the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty could be canceled. Through the skillful diplomacy of John Hay this was accomplished; new treaties were

made, the Hay-Pauncefote treaties of 1900 and 1901, and a treaty was arranged with Colombia. Colombia, however, on the ground of constitutionality, failed to ratify the treaty. The United States and Panama both became incensed at supposedly mercenary motives back of the rejection of the treaty; hence when on November 3, 1903, Panama revolted and declared its independence, the United States four days later recognized the new republic and refused to allow Colombia to make attempts to subdue Panama. A canal treaty was at once made with the new owner, French rights were secured by purchase, and a beginning was promptly made on the Canal, which was opened to traffic in 1914. The reason assigned by President Roosevelt for his share in the Panama episode was that the interests of civilization demanded a canal and that Colombia got in the way of the movement. Colombia refused to be reconciled for many years and finally the United States offered $25,000,000 as compensation. After several years of bickering and hesitation an exchange of ratifications was made at Bogotá on March 1, 1922, and the affair was officially ended.

The Caribbean region. Since the United States now controlled one of the great trade routes of the world, it became all the more important that the Caribbean region be safeguarded from possible attack. Just as England safeguards in every possible way the approaches to the Suez Canal from Gibraltar to the Gulf of Aden, so the approaches to Panama, up and down both coasts, must be secured against possible danger. This necessity creates a specialized Caribbean policy, having application in general to all Latin America north of the equator, both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. The policy is practically an assertion that in the Caribbean region, for reasons of national defense and protection of the Canal route, the interests of the United

States are paramount. The theoretically sovereign states in that region must conform to the national policy of the United States in the sense that they must take no action that might seem inimical to the latter's safety and interests. Foreign colonies also must conform in a similar manner and must not be made into bases that might be used against the United States; nor should the nationals of foreign powers seek to gain or be granted concessions that might in a military way ultimately be used against the United States.

International police power. On first thought the new principle was associated with the Monroe Doctrine and seemed to imply that the United States asserted hegemony over Latin America and that it might in due time extend its sovereignty over the Caribbean states and ultimately over all South America. In fact, however, the new principle has its own justification and has no necessary connection with the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine has a clearly defined meaning that should not be confused with other principles. As already stated, it is the national policy that aims to secure the peace and safety of the United States by seeing that foreign states shall not extend their territorial holdings nor their sovereignty in the Americas. The Americas are for Americans only, and foreign interests on the western continent are always to be kept subordinate to American interests.

On the other hand, the United States is a sovereign state and is the most powerful nation in the Americas. It owns and controls the Panama Canal and has large interests and possessions in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Caribbean Sea. This region has become the supreme danger spot of its international life, having the same importance to the United States as have the English Channel and the North Sea to Great Britain, or the Dardanelles to Europe and Turkey.

Inevitably the United States must see to it that the Caribbean region is safeguarded from all possible attack, and that under no pretext a foreign state is allowed to secure a foothold there which might become a basis for attack on the United States. Since by international custom a creditor state may seize the ports and customs of a debtor and bankrupt nation, the United States announces as its new principle a doctrine of international police power. Under this principle the United States, having permanent and paramount interests in the Caribbean, will insist that the smaller states of that region fulfill their obligations in order to maintain the peace and be free from the danger of seizure from foreign powers. If necessary, the United States itself will seize the ports and customhouses of delinquent states, pledging a restoration of sovereignty after finances are straightened out and the native governments can maintain order and fulfill their international obligations. This principle of international police power is derived by implication from the sovereignty of the United States, the supremacy of its interests in the Caribbean, and the necessity of suppressing "international nuisances" dangerous to American peace and safety. It has become a permanent policy, vigorously exercised on many occasions, and will find its ultimate justification if used honestly and honorably. It should be used only for the upbuilding and strengthening of the weaker states, aiming to make them fit for the full exercise of their own sovereign rights.

Conceivably this international police power may be invoked too easily and be used tyrannically, so as to give the impression of injustice and usurpation, but the remedy for that lies in protests and appeals to international public opinion. As a great power preëminent on this continent, the United States should be generous and kindly in its dealings

with weaker powers and should stress the Pan-American principle of fraternity and helpfulness one to another. Should a necessity arise that compels interference, its actions should harmonize with the golden rule and should be free from the suspicion of grasping ambition or exploitation, for "he who seeks equity must do equity."

Theories of sovereignty. The Caribbean policy brings up the whole matter of sovereignty and its application to smaller states. Grotius,[1] living in the age of the social contract, merely applied that teaching to international states. Just as society, as was then taught, is made up of sovereign individuals, so the society of states is made up of individual states, each of which is sovereign and equal one to the other. The social-contract theory in politics has long since passed away, and an organic theory has taken its place. This theory should be applied to international sovereignty also. There is a society of nations, and each nation, mature, rational, and moral, has the right to be considered sovereign and to be respected as such. But if a nation is weak and unable to maintain order and is continually in revolt or rebellion, then that nation rightly may be temporarily deprived of its sovereignty and placed under tutelage until it becomes normal once more. It is the same as the attitude of society to a criminal or a person with a contagious disease, to one who is sickly and in need of medical care; society has the right to segregate that person, in jail or hospital or reformatory, until he becomes fit to take his proper place in social life. The present situation with respect to China, for example, or the defeated Central Powers or newer states in process of formation or mandatories under the League of Nations furnishes applications of this newer theory of sovereignty.

[1] For a recent study see Hamilton Vreeland's "Hugo Grotius." New York, 1917.

Of course the danger is that under this theory a powerful state may make it the excuse for subjugating weaker neighbors; but on the other hand the theory assumes a public opinion, voiced by international law or by the League of Nations or, on this continent, by Pan-American congresses. If, for example, the United States had seized Haiti and the Dominican Republic, had suppressed their governments, had massacred many of their inhabitants, and had selfishly exploited their resources, unquestionably those powers or their friends would have appealed for redress to a Pan-American congress or to the League of Nations, and the pressure of international opinion against the United States would have become overpowering. As long, therefore, as the Caribbean policy has a defensive and a constructive aspect, supplanting incompetent and corrupt governments by those which are more truly in accord with public welfare, and as long as the United States is not afraid to go before the bar of public opinion and explain its motives and show results, it need not worry about a violation of paper sovereignties.

The Venezuela episode. In the light of such a policy the action of the last thirty years becomes intelligible and fairly consistent. The Venezuela episode under Cleveland may be considered as a vigorous statement of the essential principle. This was reënforced by the results of the Spanish War, waged on the principle that the situation in Cuba had become an international nuisance that should be suppressed by the nearest capable neighbor.

Then came the determination to build the Panama Canal, to fortify it, and later to secure, if possible, other routes in Nicaragua and Colombia. Immediately afterwards the newer policy began to shape itself, as seen in President Roosevelt's message of December 3, 1901. Having Venezuela in mind, he

said, "We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power."

Eight days later Germany notified the United States that it was trying to come to agreement with Venezuela respecting claims, but failing in this, it planned to present an ultimatum and blockade Venezuelan ports. Great Britain and Italy a year later joined Germany in this blockade, after both the great powers had given assurance to the United States that they planned no permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory. Through the good offices of the United States Venezuela was induced to come to terms, and the matter ended satisfactorily.

Roosevelt, however, recognized that "the existence of hostilities in a region so near our own was fraught with possibilities of danger." Another step, therefore, was taken (May, 1904) when a letter from the President, read at a dinner held in celebration of Cuban independence, said:

> Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendliness. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political matters; if it keeps order and pays its obligations—then it need fear no interference from the United States. Brutal wrong-doing, or impotence which results in the general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore its duty.

This policy was reasserted in the annual message of that year, and its first application was in the case of the Dominican Republic.[1]

[1] See Moore, American Diplomacy, pp. 261–262; also fourth annual message, December 6, 1904. For recent articles discussing the policy of the United States in the Caribbean see *Advocate of Peace* for July and December, 1925.

The Dominican Republic. President Roosevelt in 1905 submitted to the Senate a treaty with the Dominican Republic, under the terms of which the United States would act as receiver for that nation, taking charge of its receipts and paying its debts therefrom, so as to keep it free from foreign complications. The Senate refused sanction to this treaty, but the President put it into effect on his own responsibility, and two years later the Senate acquiesced in the situation by ratifying a treaty. In 1916 marines were landed on the island to maintain order, and on November 29 Rear Admiral Knapp declared the country temporarily under military rule. The Harding-Coolidge administration modified this policy by withdrawing the marines and by restoring native civil authority (July 12, 1924). The United States is still in charge of finances, aiming to reduce the national debt of that country.

Haiti. In Haiti[1] a similar situation arose when Rear Admiral Caperton landed marines on July 28, 1915. This was followed by the organization of a military government under naval authority, designed not to supersede the civil authorities, but to coöperate with them. Under the circumstances native civil authority was naturally minimized, so that for all practical purposes Haiti, like Santo Domingo, was under the control of armed forces. In harmony with the policy of the Coolidge administration the native civil government under financial supervision is once more functioning, enjoying the protection but not the dictation of American marines.

Central America. Without going into detail, a somewhat similar policy is in effect in respect to Central America. Nicaragua especially has received attention because of its possession of a future canal site. In the presidency of

[1] See "American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic" (a report prepared by Carl Kelsey, with bibliography), in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March, 1922, pp. 109–202.

Mr. Taft the so-called "dollar diplomacy"[1] of Secretary Knox was developed, and two attempts were made to apply it to Central America. In January, 1911, President Taft signed a convention with Honduras guarantying a loan for the purpose of rehabilitating its national finances. This the Senate refused to ratify. In June of the same year a similar treaty with Nicaragua, providing for a receivership, also failed of ratification by the Senate. In 1912, an insurrection having broken out there, marines were landed to protect American life and property, and a detachment remained at the capital until 1925 to assist the government in maintaining order. Negotiations in respect to treaty relations were promptly initiated, and after lengthy discussion a treaty was signed and ratified.[2] This provided for the lease, as a naval station, of Corn Island to the United States and granted exclusive right to the latter to build a canal and the right to establish a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca.

This treaty aroused much indignation in Central America, especially in Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras. The claims of these states were brought before the Central American Court of Justice and indorsed by decision of the court; but both Nicaragua and the United States refused to abide by the decision, and this slighting of its authority virtually put an end to the court.

In general the newer attitude of the United States toward Central America since the World War is that the several states must turn from revolutions and settle down to a strict compliance with constitutional forms. No president who attains to the office by unconstitutional methods is recognized, and despotic methods of government or useless wars between

[1] Some thought that this policy contained too much dollar and not enough diplomacy.

[2] The Bryan-Chamorro treaty, February 18, 1916.

the several states are strongly discouraged. To this end a Central American conference, designed to harmonize the states in general policy, was held at Washington in 1922–1923. Its conclusions, in the form of a general treaty of peace and amity, supplemented by eleven conventions providing for the reëstablishment of the General Court and for the limitation of armaments,[1] are under consideration by the several states. If finally adopted by all, this should result in the slow elimination of discord and the substitution of discussion and arbitration for perennial revolutions and petty wars.

Mexico. The Empire of Mexico, recognized by the United States in 1822, became a republic in the following year, and, owing to factional struggles, from that time forth passed from revolution to revolution, though enjoying occasional breathing spells. The war with Mexico was fought while Santa Anna, a militaristic despot, was in power. Constitutionalism reached its high-water mark in the adoption of the splendid constitution of 1857, which remained in force until displaced in 1917 by a revised constitution. During the years 1861–1867 came the French invasion, the overthrow of Maximilian's empire, and the reëstablishment in the presidency of Juarez, the "Washington of Mexico." Díaz came into power in 1876 and, barring the four years from 1880 to 1884, when his friend González was in the chair, remained as virtual dictator, ruling under the forms of a republic, until 1911. In that year he was expelled by revolution, and a most serious situation arose. Being next-door neighbor to Mexico and having enormous investments in it, the United States naturally took a deep interest in the situation. Many measures were tried, both peaceable and warlike, such as, for example, mediation through the "A B C powers"; military intervention through

[1] For texts see *International Conciliation*, No. 189, August, 1923; see also page 331 n.

the capture of Vera Cruz in 1914; Pershing's "punitive expedition" of 1916; "watchful waiting" on Wilson's part; and the newer policy of Secretary Hughes, who demanded guaranties as a condition to recognition. President Obregón, holding that the treaty in the terms demanded by the United States would virtually make Mexico a protectorate like Cuba, refused to sign, so that Mexico was refused recognition.

In respect to recognition it may be said that this demand from Mexico involved an additional requirement for recognition. Historically the United States has demanded that a new government be "accepted by the people, in possession of the power of the nation, and fully established." The new test demanded by Secretary Hughes was that the Mexican government be required to make pledges in respect to its international obligations, with an implication that the United States might henceforth compel the observance of all such pledges.[1] Obviously this was not recognition in the sense of international law, but was an attempt to reduce Mexico to a situation like that in Cuba. The United States itself had a somewhat similar experience in its negotiations with Great Britain in 1782: Great Britain wished to make recognition contingent on a satisfactory treaty, but the United States refused to negotiate respecting a treaty before recognition and won its point.

The Caribbean policy. In this development of affairs in the Caribbean it has become obvious that the United States is definitely committed to the policy (1) of allowing no rival nation to get a military foothold in that region and (2) of demanding that the states within the Caribbean maintain constitutional forms of government, fulfill their international obligations, and enter upon policies of economic coöperation

[1] For notes and official statements see *International Conciliation*, No. 187, June, 1923.

and political amity. In late years the presidents and secretaries of state have repeatedly affirmed that the United States has no designs against the territories or the sovereignty of the Caribbean states, and that it will gladly withdraw from its self-imposed mandates whenever the peoples of subordinated states show definitely their capacity to maintain stable and peaceful governments. The "big stick" and the use of international police power are intended only for "international nuisances"; complete sovereignty awaits them when they cease to be nuisances and perform their obligations. The aim of the United States, therefore, is not to use its power for conquest and annexation, but rather as a means of emphasizing its determination to insist on constructive policies on the part of the Caribbean states.

It is possible that this policy might be shared in the future with the larger Latin states. Cuba, for example, which has no racial prejudices such as exist in the United States, might become the leader of a federation of the islands of the West Indies under a common flag. Mexico, when free from domestic insurrection, might become the leading member of the coming federation of Central American states, barring Panama. These possibilities, however, should always be subject to the principle that in final international policy the decision of affairs in the Caribbean region lies with the United States.

Since the completion of the Panama Canal the whole Latin area north of the equator becomes to the United States a sphere of interest. The Panama Canal is the focus of what ultimately will become one of the great sea thoroughfares of the world—so great, in fact, that before many years the United States will presumably build the Nicaragua Canal to relieve the pressure on the facilities of the Panama Canal. The policing of this area naturally becomes the responsibility of the United States, since the other American powers on the

Caribbean have no naval forces, and no foreign power has police rights in that region.

Because of this newer situation the Monroe Doctrine has in part been eclipsed by the Caribbean Sea policy, since attention has been concentrated on events north of the equator. This is even more true since the danger centering in the German settlements of southern Brazil has passed away through the defeat of Germany. The states south of the equator, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, also have become important and responsible powers and are quite capable of defending their own interests. Yet the Monroe Doctrine is by no means obsolete as respects that part of America south of the equator. Should the situation arise the Monroe Doctrine would automatically revive and be applied with full vigor.

In pursuance of this same policy there can be no doubt that some day the United States will seek to persuade Great Britain, France, and Holland, the only remaining European powers left on the continent, to surrender their Caribbean islands and their possessions on the mainland, including the Guianas of South America. All three of the Guianas are no credit to their mother states, and those of Holland and France involve large annual deficits. Latin America is backward, but the Guianas are more so. They are exploited through coolie labor from Siam and China, from Java, and from India. The coolies come without families, and the social situation can be imagined but not described. There are less than two hundred miles of railroad in all three of these colonies and virtually no school system worthy of the name. It is inevitable that within a generation or two the Caribbean colonies of European powers must pass from their control and become part of the American system.

In conclusion, the present situation may be condensed into few words. The United States has a historic *Monroe Doc-*

trine, sanctioned by public opinion and cherished in national tradition. Its best work was accomplished at its inception, and yet it has been useful throughout later years. The existence of such a doctrine is now officially acknowledged through the Hague conferences and through the constitution of the League of Nations, and it is practically admitted by the actions of other nations. In detail, however, its meaning is vague because of the widely differing interpretations of our many administrations. The present tendency is to think of it, in the words of John Bassett Moore, merely as "the principle of the limitation of European power and influence in the Western Hemisphere." Alongside of this is the *Pan-American policy*, aiming to develop a unity or harmony of American interests so as to have in fact as well as in theory a truly American system as demanded by the Monroe Doctrine.

The most important in its immediate effects of all the policies of the United States toward the Americas is the *Caribbean policy*, emphasizing the paramount position of the United States in the Caribbean and Panama regions north of the equator and up and down the Pacific coast. This developing policy, based on national safety and national control of the Panama route, has vigorous and permanent foundations. Action under this policy will not always be justifiable under a strict interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, but it will find formal justification in the theory that the United States has paramount interest in the region that has come to be the American Mediterranean. Yet action under this policy of paramount interest should be exercised with great precaution and a proper regard for international public opinion, especially for the opinion of the Pan-American states. The actions of the United States should be just and fair to the nations within the Caribbean region. Their wealth should be developed for their benefit and kept from exploitation by

American concessionaries. If the United States merely exploits the people and their wealth, it ceases to be the America of former generations and will be classed with the imperialism of Kaiser and Czar. A protecting state has obligations, and the United States will fail in its obligations if the net result of its policy is simply conquest and exploitation. Public opinion in the United States will probably not indorse such action, though it would favor a policy of constructive upbuilding to create friendship and a voluntary coöperation in the maintenance of the supremacy of the Americas in the Caribbean. It may be that the methods used and the agents employed during the last twenty-five years have not always been wise or farsighted. Certainly the evidence seems to point that way. The remedy, however, is not to withdraw and cancel the policy, but to use more efficient agents, more suavity and courtesy in dealing with Latins, and to keep exploiters from securing control of the natural resources and the wealth that should rightly be used for the benefit chiefly of the permanent inhabitants of the land.

CHAPTER XVI

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Today Canada is a distinct national group. A federation, it is true, but with a genius for balancing centrifugal and centripetal forces. Canada possesses all the problems peculiar to a nation; but a nation within an empire. To the future belongs the giving of a constitutional form to this new experience in history. . . . The greatest solvent of political problems, if they are to be solved at all adequately, is time.[1]

In the discussion of Pan-Americanism the Latin states only are considered, because they are states in the international sense and Canada is not. Yet it is clear that to the United States the most important part of the Americas is Canada and that its changed situation since the World War fully entitles it to a place in Pan-American gatherings and in any conferences that meet to consider affairs in the Pacific and the Far East. This, however, may not be admitted by the United States if Great Britain retains a determining or even a powerful voice in Canadian decisions of policy. Heretofore the United States has looked upon Canada merely as a British colony in the Americas that may some day become part of the United States. Hereafter, however, Canada should be looked on as a virtually independent state, having no intention whatsoever of becoming part of the United States or of forming any union with it. Its affairs, therefore, should receive far more attention in the future than in the

[1] W. P. M. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada. By permission of the Oxford University Press.

past, and a policy should be developed toward it that would recognize the advantage of having in friendly rivalry two republics kindred in blood, differing somewhat in type of civilization, yet so closely related as to combine many ideals and problems in common. In this chapter, therefore, an attempt will be made to trace historically the growth of Canada and the relations of the United States to it as a basis for a newer attitude of mind and policy.

The British and the French. In the colonial period of American history, between the British colonies of the Atlantic coast and the French colonies at the mouth and along the valley of the St. Lawrence there was a chronic condition of hostility. In the north of present Canada the English had possession of the Hudson Bay region, and in 1670 had bestowed by charter proprietary rights upon the Hudson's Bay Company,—rights that lasted for two hundred years. This claim covered Hudson Bay, its adjacent lands and waters, and the lands westward drained by the rivers that flow into the bay. The French in entering the St. Lawrence naturally claimed (1) the adjacent land and waters at the mouth, (2) the valley of the river as far on either side as it was possible to claim, (3) the line of western lakes and the lands on either side thereof as far south as the Ohio and north toward Hudson Bay, and (4) the lands lying westward of the Great Lakes with boundaries known only to God. The English along the Atlantic claimed the coast northward to Labrador, joining the Hudson Bay claims, and had the Mississippi and the Great Lakes as their theoretical boundary on the west and northwest. On the Pacific slope Sir Francis Drake in the sixteenth century had sailed as far as Vancouver, making a vague claim by discovery to that region; in 1778 Captain James Cook visited that same region, seeking a passage from the Pacific to the Atlantic and collecting furs, which in the

following year were sold at Canton, China; in 1793 Sir Alexander Mackenzie crossed the Rockies to the Pacific and claimed the land as a British possession.

French claims at first included all the lands at the mouth of the St. Lawrence; but little by little, as the English got a firm grip on part after part, the colony of Acadia (Nova Scotia) constituted the chief possession of France in that region. The St. Lawrence valley formed the Quebec region and was the real center of French power. France in the eighteenth century was almost decadent in its government, so that it lost heavily in its duel with England, which was rapidly climbing toward supremacy. From the colonial standpoint the French and Indian War was the climax, since, as the result of defeat, France transferred to Spain as a friendly act its Louisiana Territory and to England, of necessity, its Canadian colonies. To the United States the humor of the situation lay in the fact that the British government was at first in doubt whether to demand the cession of French Canada or, as an alternative, the little isle of Guadeloupe in the West Indies, famous at that time for its sugar crop. This withdrawal from North America by France freed the British colonies from their former perennial fear of French attack from the north.

The Quebec Act. At the mouth of the St. Lawrence there were four definite centers for British settlement which in due course became the colony of Newfoundland and the provinces of Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. In 1774 the Quebec Act[1] was passed by the British Parliament, chiefly owing to the influence of "Captain-general and Governor-in-chief" Sir Guy Carleton in Quebec. The act included within the boundary of the province of Quebec the lands lying between the Great Lakes, the Missis-

[1] See R. Coupland, The Quebec Act. Oxford University Press, 1925.

sippi, and the Ohio, thus placing the Appalachians as the limit to the western expansion of the Atlantic colonies. The act also gave to the French colonists of Quebec a guaranty that they would be unmolested in religion and civilization. By this guaranty and the promise of unlimited room for expansion south of the Lakes, the British government gained the hearty support of the wealthy and clerical classes among the French colonists, so that Canada remained loyal in the Revolutionary War even after the entry of France as an ally to the American colonies. In fact, throughout Canadian history the French inhabitants have never looked with favor on any movement that sought to unite Canada with the United States; secure in their privileges of local autonomy and religious guaranties they prefer the known "bird in the hand to two in the bush."[1]

Political development of Canada. The territorial and political development of Canada is not generally familiar knowledge. The changes contributing to this development should be reviewed as a background for present situations. Under France Canada was governed from the mother country, paternally and without colonial representation, and this system, with necessary modifications, continued under the British until 1791. Meanwhile, by the treaty of peace with the United States the "northwest territory" south of the Lakes was lost to Quebec, which at the same time had been receiving as immigrants American loyalists driven from the colonies by the patriots of the Revolution. These immigrants settled either in the Maritime Provinces or on lands west of the settlement of Quebec, and, being for the most part intelligent Englishmen of social prestige, they demanded representative institutions. Consequently in 1791 their settlements were organized into Upper Canada (Ontario), and

[1] See J. C. Bracq, The Evolution of French Canada. New York, 1924.

the Quebec territory was set apart as Lower Canada. Both the Canadas were given representative institutions. This political organization aimed to allay racial friction and to allow each section to develop under its own auspices. In 1840 the Act of Union (proclaimed February 5, 1841) brought together these two provinces under a revised form of government based on the English cabinet system. The chief reason for the union was that friction between the two races had become accentuated, culminating in the rebellion of 1837–1838, and it was hoped that by uniting the two under one government there would develop through political compromise a blending of interests and civilization. At this time the population of the two Canadas was about 1,150,000, fairly evenly divided between the two races.

Within the next twenty-five years the lands west of Ontario came into political prominence. Trappers and settlers from the East were pushing westward into Manitoba and beyond. The Hudson's Bay Company had worked down to Vancouver, having a ten-year lease (1849–1858) of that island from the British government, the terms of which it failed to keep. The Oregon treaty made in 1846 with the United States gave a definite territory for British settlement on the Pacific mainland. The gold-rush excitement of those years brought settlers into both Vancouver and the mainland, and in 1866 they were united into the province of British Columbia.

The Civil War in the United States naturally aroused much interest in Canada; and in consequence of discussion the Act of Union of 1840 was superseded by an act (1867) organizing democratically the Dominion, or Federation, of Canada, which consisted primarily of Ontario and Quebec and into which the other provinces were invited to enter as constituent members—an invitation accepted by New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. The reorganized form of government was based

on the federal idea, but, taking warning from the American secession movement, the federal government was strengthened as against that of the provinces. The latter since that time have been seeking to enlarge their rights by legal interpretations. With the formation of the Dominion it had become obvious that the Hudson's Bay Company had outlived its usefulness, and after lengthy negotiation it was persuaded to sell out its rights (April, 1869), so that its immense territorial possessions passed over to the Dominion through act of Parliament, the formal transfer being made December 1, 1869. Meanwhile, owing to confusion in authority, the Riel rebellion (1869) had broken out in the middle west; but it was soon suppressed, and that region was organized into a province, Manitoba, which in the year 1870 became a member of the Federation, followed in 1871 by British Columbia. In 1873 Prince Edward Island also was admitted; but Newfoundland,[1] which includes the Atlantic coast of Labrador, still remains outside, preferring to retain its relations directly with the mother country. From the remaining territory to the north and west two additional provinces fronting on the United States, Alberta and Saskatchewan, were organized in 1905, making at the present time a federation of nine provinces, together with other territory such as the Yukon and the Northwest lands.

Attempts at annexation. Geographically, economically, and racially it might be supposed that Canada and the United States would ultimately become one country, and to many Americans this has seemed almost axiomatic. Even in the Revolution it was expected that Canada would welcome an opportunity to enter the Confederation. This same expectation, especially in the West, was an influence in the declara-

[1] The Miquelon group of islands south of Newfoundland remain under French control as fishing-stations.

tion of war in 1812, as shown by the projected invasion of Canada. The episode of the steamer *Caroline* in 1837 and the Fenian invasion of 1866 are mild illustrations of this same feeling, the exaggeration of which was seen in Senator Sumner's desire, expressed in his speech of April 13, 1869, to settle the *Alabama* claims in return for Canada and other British possessions in America. The climax was reached when President Taft in 1911 hinted, in his "parting of the ways" speech, that the American reciprocity act of that year was a step in the direction of annexation, an opinion which was echoed by Champ Clark, Speaker of the House. These rash remarks helped to defeat the bill in Canada, overthrew the Laurier government, and gave the distinct impression that Canada had national aspirations and no desire for annexation.

Boundaries. The geographic boundary line itself is largely artificial. Logically the St. Lawrence should be the boundary line, which would throw into the United States the Maritime Provinces. On the other hand, Alaska should, on the face of it, belong to Canada. The boundary line has from the beginning been a "bone of contention." The several steps in these controversies are indicated by the arbitration agreements that resulted in the settlement of the northeast line; in the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817 respecting armaments on the Great Lakes; in the settlement of the boundary line as far as the Lake of the Woods and of the line of forty-nine degrees from the Lakes to the Pacific, which terminated the Oregon controversy and saved a Pacific coast line for Canada; in the arbitration of the boundary through the San Juan channel. The purchase of Alaska by the United States added a new boundary dispute; but in 1903 this also was settled by arbitration adverse to Canada, so that at last, without war, the boundary line between the two countries is settled and remains by mutual consent unfortified.

Fisheries. Another debatable question from the beginning arose from disputes in respect to fisheries along the Canadian coasts and on the Banks of Newfoundland. After repeated controversies and arbitrations, in 1910 an arbitral decision worked out the points of difference so that an agreement satisfactory to all was made. A year later a joint agreement was reached settling troubles that had arisen in respect to the killing of seals in the open waters of Bering Sea, and in 1923 a halibut-fisheries agreement for the Pacific was made, apparently bringing to an end controversies in respect to fisheries.

Reciprocal interests. Economically the interests of the two sections have been so identified that reciprocity arrangements seemed natural and were tried with some success (1854–1866). Canada, however, has rightly feared that its natural resources would speedily be drained by the United States if the opportunity were given, and that the temporary benefits gained from reciprocity would ultimately become losses. The identity of interests is best seen in the farming sections of the West: farmers north and south of forty-nine degrees move freely from one section to the other and have common interests; the sections north and south of the Lakes are closely identified, having meeting centers at Detroit and Niagara or Buffalo; the Maritime Provinces have their natural affiliation with New England rather than with Quebec, their nearest neighbor in the Dominion. The surplus population from the Maritime Provinces easily migrates into the states, where larger opportunities await them; the overflow from Quebec also, instead of expanding into the West, enters the manufacturing industries of New England and the middle states. By the Census of 1920 there were 1,117,878 Canadians in the United States, 27.5 per cent of whom were of French descent. Since the entire population of Canada is less than nine millions, this heavy migration shows the "pull"

exerted by the larger mass on the smaller. This mingling of population brings in a confusion of culture traits, so that the social frontier is by no means the same as the legal boundary line. British Canadians soon merge themselves into the mass of Americans, but the first generation of French Canadians live in segregated communities and retain tenaciously their customs and language. The second and later generations, however, tend to break away, owing to the influence of the public schools and to economic contacts. Parochial schools when established tend to hold the younger generation to the language and customs of their parents, at least while in mill vocations and in village environment.

Rise of nationality. Notwithstanding the apparent mingling of economic and racial interests between the United States and Canada, there has long been developing in Canada a feeling of nationality. This has become so intense in late years that all thought of annexation has died out. The beginnings of this feeling of nationality may be traced best perhaps to the feeling of unity and of national expansion at the formation of the Dominion in 1867 and to the accession of the Hudson Bay territory in 1869. In 1870 there arose an organization stressing "Canada first," the union as against provincial or racial interests, and Canadian before imperial. The construction of transcontinental railways helped greatly by developing ease of communication and traffic in foods and manufactured goods. In the Boer War several Canadian regiments went overseas and brought young Canadians into touch with other colonials and with imperial problems. Since 1887 colonial or imperial conferences under the auspices of the British government have been held. Through these Canada has come in touch with the problems and policies of the Empire, at the same time presenting for joint consideration its own situations. These gatherings pave the way for the

development of those imponderable, intangible influences that bind nations together far more firmly than formal treaties and signed diplomatic agreements. So strongly nationalized has Canada become under these influences, and yet so definitely sympathetic with the Empire, that when the World War broke out Great Britain made no appeal to Canada for men or money but awaited natural developments; it had no cause for complaint at the way Canada poured out its "blood and treasure." As the result of the war the British Empire itself became a federation in fact, surrounding itself with "free states" or dominions legally subject to imperial sovereignty and deriving their chartered forms of government from Parliament, yet for all practical purposes so independent that they became members of the League of Nations. They may even send diplomatic envoys to other powers. In theory, however, these envoys derive their diplomatic powers from the imperial government, not from their respective dominions.

Canada, therefore, though under the sovereignty of Great Britain, is by unwritten constitution considered as authorized to exercise sovereign powers, subject to a theoretical veto that cannot conceivably be used. It is a nation, having its own nationals and a place in the family of nations. It controls its own trade relations and even may use this power against the economic interests of the mother country; it controls its own armed forces; it sits in the Imperial Conference and may interpose a veto against law or treaty that directly affects the Dominion itself. Yet should the Empire declare war, internationally Canada also would be at war and might be attacked by the enemy as a possession of Great Britain. Conceivably Canada might in anticipation of a dreaded war declare its independence, fully persuaded that Great Britain would offer no armed objection and might even grant a legal separation by act of Parliament. The indications, however,

are that Canada will remain in the Empire as the most important dominion under the flag. As part of the Empire it is relieved of many fears and has many privileges, such as reciprocal trading arrangements like those recently made (July, 1925) with the West Indies.[1] Great Britain is eager to have closer relations develop between Canada and England's Caribbean possessions, and should the new arrangement make good, England might wisely and well transfer control and responsibility over these to Canada. Great Britain also desires to place on the Canadian and Australian dominions responsibility for the *pax Britannica* of the Pacific, using Canada as a great thoroughfare for communication between east and west in supplement to the Suez Canal route, which is exposed to much danger in time of war.

All things considered, it seems reasonable to assume that the United States will finally dismiss thoughts of Canadian annexation and preferably seek to develop what already is in evidence: an *entente cordiale* between the two nations, helping Canada by kindly agreements, strengthening its influence internationally and in the Pacific, and encouraging it to take responsibilities as an American nation in the Americas. Should Great Britain transfer to Canada its Caribbean possessions, there might well develop a friendly rivalry between the United States and Canada as to which could develop a control most free from exploitation and most stimulating to the populations of that region. The potential wealth of Canada is enormous; it will in time have a large population made up chiefly of British-French stock and culture, kindred to our own. What better policy can the United States have toward Canada than that contained in Jefferson's famous phrase, "Peace, commerce, honest friendship"?

[1] Between Canada and the British West Indies, Bermuda, British Honduras, and Guiana.

CHAPTER XVII

THE PACIFIC AND THE FAR EAST[1]

The position of the United States in the Pacific is now of very great importance. The completion of that greatest of all industrial undertakings, the Panama Canal, has changed the whole problem of the Pacific in a way and to a degree that does not appear to be as yet realized in Europe. The United States has at the same time made a permanent way for herself across that ocean, with stations of first-class strategic and trade importance, at Samoa, Honolulu, Midway, Wake, Guam, and other islands; and she has the great possession of the Philippine Islands on the Asiatic side. . . . Happily American and British interests run on parallel lines in the Pacific, without colliding and with the prospect of much mutual advantage. But the Panama Canal is a work that will indirectly benefit all nations through the facilities it offers to the trade and commerce of the world, and all must recognize that the United States has been a good second to the British Empire in opening up the Pacific.[2]

Former political world. Twenty-five hundred years ago the political world was centered on and near the east Mediterranean, broadening out in later centuries into the whole of that great sea, with Carthaginian Africa and Italy at its center. A thousand years ago political activity began to move northward, toward the Baltic and North seas. From 1492 the Atlantic and its shores came into prominence, but for the last fifty years the world's political interests have been gradually concentrating in the Pacific.

It is hard to imagine the petty horizon of Europeans down to the middle of the fifteenth century. Life to them centered in the main round about the Mediterranean and Baltic seas, with some vague knowledge of the northeast Atlantic and the

[1] See Bibliography, section IV, 3, 4.

[2] Sir William MacGregor in "Problem of the Pacific," by C. Brunsdon Fletcher. By permission of Henry Holt and Company.


THE PACIFIC AREA
CHINA
SIBERIA
Vladivostok
Tientsin
Shanghai
Canton
Hongkong (Br.)
JAPAN ISLANDS
BONIN IS.
(Japanese)
KAMCHATKA
BERING SEA
ALEUTIAN ISLANDS
Dutch Harbor
ALASKA
Sitka
DOMINION OF CANADA
Quatsino Sound
Vancouver
Seattle
UNITED STATES
San Francisco
MEXICO
TROPIC OF CANCER
MIDWAY
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
(United States)
Honolulu
Pearl Harbor
WAKE (U.S.)
U.S. GUAM
YAP
MARSHALL IS.
(Japanese Mandate)
CAROLINE ISLANDS
(U.S.)
(Br.)
(Br.-U.S.)
EQUATOR
Manila
(U.S.)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
BORNEO
CELEBES
(Australian Mandate)
(Br. Mand.)
GILBERT IS.
ELLICE IS.
BISMARCK ARCH.
(Netherlands)
NEW GUINEA
SOLOMON IS.
(British)
JAVA
(Ang.-Fr. Con.)
NEW HEBRIDES
FIJI IS.
(Fr.)
SAMOA IS.
N.Z.
U.S.
PAGO PAGO
TONGO IS.
NEW CALEDONIA
(French)
(British)
MARQUESAS IS.
SOCIETY IS.
(French)
(Br.)
TROPIC OF CAPRICORN
AUSTRALIA
(Australian)
Sydney
Melbourne
TASMANIA
(New Zealand)
Auckland
Wellington
NEW ZEALAND
Panama Canal
ENGLISH
COLOMBIA
Buenaventura
GALAPAGOS IS.
(Ecuador)
Guayaquil
ECUADOR
PERU
Callao
BRAZIL
CHILE
120° Longitude 140° East from 160° Greenwich 180° Longitude 160° West from 140° Greenwich 120° 100° 80°
40° 20° 0° 20° 40°

Red Sea. Through his expeditions Prince Henry the Navigator of Portugal came to know the coast of Africa, which in later years was circumnavigated, thus opening a pathway to the Far East over the Indian Ocean.[1] The voyages of Columbus were followed in 1513 by the discovery of the Pacific by Balboa, and within the next ten years Magellan[2] sailed through the stormy straits that bear his name, and, crossing the Pacific via the Philippines, one of his ships, the *Victoria*, was the first to circumnavigate the globe. That was over four hundred years ago, and since that time voyagers have sailed over the whole of the Pacific's vast area and made it known to the world.

The Pacific. On the east side of the Pacific lies the long coast line of the Americas, stretching from Cape Horn even into the Eastern Hemisphere through the long chain of the Aleutian Islands. On the south is Australasia (including New Zealand), a continent in itself, which its small population is striving to hold for the whites of the Nordic type. The lands of east and southeast Asia from the Bay of Bengal to northeast Siberia contain a large fourth of the world's population and are rapidly becoming at the present time the center of human interest. Lying between these areas, east, south, and west, are the numerous island groups of the South Seas and the mid-Pacific, partly coral in formation and partly survivals of a sunken continent. These island groups are under the flags of Great Britain, Holland, the United States, France, and Japan.

The Pacific Ocean, covering about one third of the earth's surface, has been rightly called "the finest highway in the

[1] See J. P. O. Martins, The Golden Age of Prince Henry the Navigator. New York, 1914.

[2] For an interesting account of this voyage see A. S. Hildebrand, Magellan. New York, 1924.

world and the richest in possibilities of production and commercial power." The Australians have a map[1] showing the Pacific on a hemisphere between 70° west longitude and 110° east longitude which certainly gives a clear impression of the Pacific situation. The ocean with its island groups occupies the center of the map, on the east is practically all North America, and on the southeastern fringe is the Andes coast. The western part of the map includes, of course, Australasia, the East Indies, and the seacoast of eastern Asia. By bringing together the Americas, Australasia, and the Far East this map helps one to understand why the Pacific seems destined to be the center of the world's future naval and commercial activity.

Islands of the Pacific. In prehistoric centuries bold inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula launched their frail canoes on the waters of the Pacific and slowly passed from island to island, gaining added experience century by century. They developed the seagoing qualities of the boat, the oar, the outrigger, the double canoe, the triangular sail, and the war canoe, long and narrow and carrying at times as many as a hundred warrior seamen in search of foods and plunder, keeping time, as they rowed, to "chanteys of the sea." Their longer voyages might extend as far as from five hundred to a thousand miles, and they sailed without compass or chart, guiding themselves by the currents and winds and, at night, by the stars. These were the world's first real sailors, and the vocabulary of these Polynesian islanders is said to be rich in nautical and astronomical terms. The first sea kings, the most ancient sea powers known, centered about the Fiji and Tonga islands, the Java Sea, and the Sulu Archipelago. It was to the East Indian island groups that some of the voyages

[1] Reproduced in C. Brunsdon Fletcher's "Problem of the Pacific"; see also, in the same volume, pages 29–33.

were made as narrated in the Arabian Nights in the thrilling but exaggerated tales of Sindbad the Sailor.[1]

At the present time the island groups of the Pacific have an estimated population of one and one-half million of mingled blood, predominantly Malay, black, and Chinese. Closely massed near the western end of the Pacific, in southern and eastern Asia, is nearly half the world's population, mostly in China and India, barely affected as yet by Western civilization. When these, like Japan, catch the significance of science and education, as they surely will during this century, there will come a world adjustment that will once again make the lands of southern and eastern Asia the center of vigorous activity.

Ancient China. The average American is not on familiar terms with maps of the world. He is aware of the existence of a place called Europe, some of the states of which he probably could locate on the map, but his knowledge of Africa might better not be tested. As for Asia, he has a faint notion that there are places called India, China, and Japan to which missionaries are sent; but since the inhabitants of these lands are "heathen" and "colored," it is assumed that they are, of course, inferior. Occasionally statements are made as to the age and grandeur of the civilizations of these peoples; but on the whole such tales are not taken seriously, being classed with the Arabian Nights and the legends of ancient mythology. In other words, American schools too largely neglect to give a thorough knowledge of the Pacific and the Orient, although the future of the United States is deeply involved in the developments of the next fifty years in the Far East.

[1] The sea kings of ancient Crete may possibly rival these in time, but little is as yet known of them; see "The Sea Kings of Crete," by James Baikie. London, 1910.

Yet China was the center of a great civilization a thousand years before Christ, when our ancestors in western Europe were savages with but a rudimentary civilization. The Chinese seas were then the center of a great commerce; and Chinese ships in later centuries sailed even as far west as the Red Sea and Africa, having the use of the compass over a hundred years before it became known to Europe. The civilization of Europe, even under the Roman Empire, had come in contact with China through travelers and through stories about it relayed along the great travel routes extending from Peking to Constantinople and Egypt. It came more definitely in contact by sea after the utilization of the compass by Western mariners, the discovery of the passage round Africa, and the later discovery of America and the passage through the Strait of Magellan.[1]

The first Europeans to sail into China were the Portuguese and Spaniards in the sixteenth century, and commerce was soon followed by the missionary. The cupidity and ambitions of these nations became so manifest that the Orientals were alarmed, and at the beginning of the seventeenth century shut off intercourse with Europe, allowing only very slight trade relations at Canton and at Nagasaki. China, Korea, and Japan thereby became hermit nations almost entirely ignorant of the turbulent doings of the barbarians of the West, and were without special interest in the inventions and achievements of those remote countries.

The United States and China. When President Jefferson sent out the Lewis and Clark expedition (1804–1806), he desired not merely to explore the Louisiana lands and the possibilities of the Missouri River valley but also to learn more of the stretch of the great Columbia River, into which

[1] See E. H. Parker, China, her History, Diplomacy, and Commerce, from the Earliest Times to the Present Day. London, 1917.

Captain Gray had sailed in 1792. It was thought that the mouth of this river might be made the base for a flourishing fur trade with China. In 1784 Americans had opened up trade with Canton through the ship *Empress of China*, and it had been ascertained that China would gladly exchange its goods for furs. Captain Gray was seeking for furs on the northwest coast when he happily blundered into the Columbia River, so named from his ship. From that time many American ships made the voyage, sailing via Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope, thus becoming familiar with the southern and eastern seas. In later years also the whale and seal fisheries in the Pacific became profitable vocations, and still later the demand for guano brought temporarily under American control many of the guano islands in the southern Pacific. The Guano Act of 1856 laid the basis of American policy toward these islands, but not even the Department of State seems to know the political status of most of the guano islands exploited by American companies.

The first treaty of the United States of any consequence in the Far East was a treaty of amity and commerce made with Siam in 1833. In 1842, at the end of the so-called "Opium War," China was compelled to open up to Great Britain five ports[1] and to cede the island of Hongkong. Caleb Cushing was dispatched by the United States to secure similar privileges; by his tact he was able to secure in 1844 a treaty of amity and commerce gaining practically the same privileges as had been granted to Great Britain, including the exemption of American citizens from Chinese jurisdiction. This treaty was renewed in 1858 with slight modifications, and in 1868 the famous Burlingame Treaty was signed at Washington by a special Chinese embassy appointed for that purpose. Burlingame's constant aim in China, like that of Caleb

[1] Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, Shanghai.

Cushing, was to be fair and just in his dealings, so that the Chinese government came to consider the United States its best friend among the Western nations.

Chinese laborers had first begun to come to the United States about the time of the gold excitement of 1849, and their services were in steady demand. It is not strange, therefore, that the Burlingame Treaty encouraged the immigration of Chinese labor. But already local agitation in California had begun against the Chinese, and up to the eighties many were murdered by mobs. Continuous agitation against them brought about in 1880 a modification of the treaty, followed by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. The treaty revision of 1894 was followed by further legislation, so that at present teachers, students, merchants, and travelers only are admitted, and no Chinese may be naturalized.

The United States and Japan. As an ancient sea power Japan has had a rather remarkable history. In the thirteenth century Genghis Khan and his famous grandson Kublai made their extensive conquests, extending the empire from the Pacific far into Europe, with Peking as the capital. In 1263 Kublai conquered Korea and soon began to make preparations to invade Japan. The first attack was made in 1273 with a fleet of nine hundred war junks, but fierce fighting and storms compelled a retreat. In 1280 a second attempt was made with two very powerful fleets, one sailing from Korea and the other from South China. It was another Armada invasion, and the fighting lasted up and down the coast and on land for nearly two months. Finally great tempests destroyed so many of the ships of the invading fleets that the remainder gave up the contest, and no later attempts at invasion were made.[1]

[1] See Vice Admiral G. A. Ballard, The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan. New York, 1921.

At the end of the sixteenth century (1592–1598) Japan in turn sent two naval expeditions to invade Korea, but after several naval engagements and land battles the Japanese were defeated and withdrew. Within forty years of this time (1636) Japan, weary of Europeans and their methods, adopted the policy of isolation, shut the doors to European commerce, and became a hermit nation. For over two hundred years the Japanese remained practically aloof from the rest of the world, devoting themselves to literature and art and warring only among themselves. In 1853–1854 Japan again became open to Western influences and commerce through the kindly but forceful methods adopted by Commodore Perry, who secured a treaty of amity on March 31, 1854.

Townsend Harris, first as American consul general and then as minister, was sent out in 1856 by the United States to secure a commercial treaty, and the treaty he obtained (1857–1858) became the model after which Japan fashioned its treaties for the next forty years. By his kindly advice and helpfulness Harris proved of such assistance to Japan that during his five years of residence he led the Japanese to trust Americans as they did not trust representatives from Europe. By this time the reputation of the United States in the Far East for fair dealing was so well established that in 1882 it had no special difficulty in making its first and only treaty with Korea. This completed the opening of former hermit nations.

Toward all these countries the United States displayed a sincere friendship, dealing with them honestly, helping them with kindly advice given largely through veteran missionaries on the field, and offering them the benefit of American experience in diplomatic affairs. In the nineties it coöperated with Great Britain in removing Japan from international tutelage,

and at the end of the century, through Secretary Hay, it announced the policy of the open door for China.

Hawaii. Connections with Hawaii began in 1789, though the Spanish, British, and French had preceded Americans there. From 1790 American traders to China via Cape Horn regularly made Honolulu a port of call, and a most flourishing trade developed, followed by missionary settlements. In 1826 Commander Jones of the *Peacock* made a treaty with Hawaii, but it failed of ratification by the Senate through neglect. In 1842 Webster, then Secretary of State, was induced to take an interest in Hawaii; and on December 30 President Tyler sent a special message to Congress recommending its recognition and a guaranty of its independence, on the ground that its interests were involved with those of the United States and that it would be unfortunate if some other power were allowed to take possession of the islands and overthrow the native government. In August, 1849, however, two French warships entered the harbor of Honolulu and, on the plea of grievances, took possession but without hoisting the French flag. In December of the same year a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation was made between the United States and Hawaii, and later it was ratified. In view of this Secretary Clayton, in July, 1850, protested against the action of France, asserting that the United States could not allow that group to pass into the control of any foreign power. France paid no attention to this protest, and in the following year Secretary Webster made a still more vigorous protest and hinted that the navy had received instructions to preserve the independence of the Hawaiian Islands. This broad hint settled the matter, so that France withdrew its ships and adjusted its grievances peaceably.

America's interest in Hawaii was aroused by these discussions, and hence a movement for annexation developed

(1851–1855). The annexation was almost consummated, but Congress balked against the native demand that Hawaii be admitted as a state, and the treaty fell through. After the Civil War annexation was favored by Secretary Seward and later by President Grant; but the Senate ignored the recommendations, and the matter was dropped. In 1881 Secretary Blaine in a communication to the Hawaiian government announced the principle that American interests and rights in the islands were superior to those of any other country, and he plainly intimated that if Hawaii lost its independence, it must become identified with the American system. In 1875 Hawaii made a reciprocity treaty with the United States, and this was renewed in 1887. At the same time Pearl Harbor was ceded to the United States as a coaling-station. In 1887 marines were landed to restore order, and thereby suppressed an insurrection. In 1893, at the request of the American minister, marines were again landed to safeguard life and property. The day after they landed, however, a revolution broke out, the native monarchy was overthrown, and a provisional government was organized with instructions to seek annexation to the United States. President Harrison in February drafted and submitted a treaty and urged the Senate to ratify. Harrison, however, was soon succeeded by Cleveland, who withdrew the treaty and, after making investigations through a personal representative, Mr. Blount, refused to resubmit it lest the United States should incur the "imputation of acquiring them [the islands] by unjustifiable methods." In 1894 Hawaii established a republic and settled down to an independent existence.

When McKinley became president the annexation project was once again revived, since he was known to favor it. A treaty was made, but it failed to secure the necessary two-thirds vote. Meanwhile war with Spain broke out; and

Hawaii, eagerly siding with the United States, opened its ports freely to American ships against the protest of Spain. This again brought annexation to the front; and since two thirds of the Senate could not be had for the treaty, a joint resolution was prepared, as in the case of Texas, and received the majority vote of both Houses. On August 12, 1898, Hawaii at last became a part of the United States, entering as a territory, not as a state.

The Philippines. When the United States entered on its war with Spain, Admiral Dewey happened to be at Hongkong with a small but efficient fleet. On April 25, 1898, he received this order from Secretary Long:

> War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavor.

It has often been remarked that when Admiral Dewey on that fateful first of May fought and destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, American editors had to study geography so as to be able to inform the public where the Philippines were situated. In destroying the Spanish fleet Dewey destroyed also the hopes of two great nations, each of which, it is suspected, had its eyes on that group of islands. Japan, in its wildest dreams of expansion in the Pacific, cast longing glances in the direction of Hawaii and the Philippines and showed vexation when they became American. Germany, with its island possessions south of the equator and with Tsingtao to the north, had designs on the Philippines, and without question it would promptly have erected a strongly fortified naval base there convenient to Hongkong and Singapore.

When the peace commissioners met at Paris on October 1, 1898, the United States was still undecided as to what should

be done respecting the Philippines. Whitelaw Reid was the only member who heartily favored keeping the entire group; but after lengthy discussion his view prevailed, and entire cession of the islands was demanded from Spain, this demand meeting with the hearty approval of President McKinley. It was a bitter pill to Spain, but there was no alternative. By the terms of the treaty the Philippines and Guam became American, thus extending the possessions of the United States to the southeastern shores of Asia. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the Midway Islands had been formally occupied by the United States in 1867, and Wake Island was taken in 1898, thus completing the connections from shore to shore. In the negotiations with Spain the United States tried also to secure other Spanish islands in the Pacific, but was politely informed that they were not for sale. Nevertheless in the following year Germany, which had special commercial rights in these islands, secured them at the price of nearly four million dollars, a clear indication of that country's ambitions in the Pacific.

A most important consequence arising from the retention of the Philippines was that it gave the United States a definite interest in the Orient and a voice in Chinese affairs. The commissioners at Paris in demanding the cession of the Philippines had expressly declared it to be the purpose of the United States to maintain in the islands "an open door to the world's commerce." This open-door policy of 1898 was made applicable to China in 1899–1900, under the influence of John Hay, and developed into the most important of Oriental policies—the maintenance of China's integrity and the principle of "equal and impartial trade" for all nations.

It is readily seen that the acquisition of the Philippines completely changed the Pacific policy of the United States, which hitherto had considered Hawaii as part of the Ameri-

can system and held it as an outpost to prevent other powers from gaining so advantageous a point of attack against the west coast. Henceforth the Panama Canal became inevitable, and Pearl Harbor was made into a strongly fortified naval base, protecting the lines of communication to the Far East. This automatically involved a fleet on the Pacific, since that ocean now definitely came within the field of activity. In the nearly thirty years that have passed since the Philippines came into the possession of the United States a marvelous development has taken place in that group. The Filipinos are learning the art of self-government and seem to be desirous of independence, but under American protection. It is not likely that the United States will give them complete independence in view of the Wood-Forbes report of October 8, 1921,[1] which recommended "that the present general status of the Philippine Islands continue until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands"; and that "under no circumstances should the American Government permit to be established in the Philippine Islands a situation which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority." This recommendation has so far met with the approval of both Congress and the executive.

The Samoa Islands. In respect to the Samoa group, as early as 1850 Great Britain, the United States, and Germany had commercial agents there, and trade rivalry soon developed chaotic conditions. In 1872 Commander Meade of the United States navy visited the group and saw at once the value of Pago Pago as a coaling or naval station. On his own authority he made a compact with the natives securing that harbor to the United States. This agreement, however, was not sanctioned by the United States government; but the

[1] House Document No. 325, 67th Congress, 2d Session.

port was secured by another agreement made in 1878, an example soon followed by Great Britain and Germany. Political and commercial rivalries created a situation which rapidly went from bad to worse, until in March, 1889, the warships of the three powers stationed at Apia were ready for action and expectant of war. Then came the historic hurricane which wrecked every ship except the British *Calliope*, so that the immediate crisis was over. A temporary diplomatic arrangement between the three powers was soon made, which proved unsatisfactory. Finally in 1899 a treaty was signed and later ratified, dividing the group between Germany and the United States, assigning to the latter the island of Tutuila, with its splendid port, and a few other, unimportant islands.

Hay's open-door policy. It is well known that after the defeat of China by Japan in 1895 the great powers assumed that the Chinese Empire was about to break up, and in consequence each began to mark out its sphere of influence and to secure all possible concessions. Beginning with 1895 France and Great Britain secured concessions on the southern frontier, later getting at the southeast Kwangchow and Kowloon (near Hongkong) respectively; Russia, by the treaty negotiated by Lobanoff and Li Hung Chang in 1896 and the subsequent agreements of the next two years, secured rights for the Chinese Eastern Railway and its southern extension toward the Port Arthur cession, which also had been ceded on a twenty-five-year lease to Russia at this time; in Shantung, Germany gained the Kiaochow bay and its adjacent territory; and Great Britain added Weihaiwei on the north as a precaution against Russia. In Korea both Japan and Russia were intriguing for supremacy at the expense of that decrepit kingdom.

It was at this juncture that John Hay, following America's traditional policies of friendliness to China and freedom for

commercial expansion, addressed notes (September 6, 1899) to Great Britain, Germany, and Russia and later to Japan, France, and Italy. In these, though admitting the existence of "spheres" and "leases," he recommended an international agreement for the maintenance of the principle of equal and impartial trade for all nations in China and suggested that there be no discrimination for or against any nation in port dues or railroad charges. Great Britain gladly approved the suggestion, and the other powers somewhat unwillingly acquiesced.

Meanwhile the Chinese, angered at the threatened dismemberment of their country and at the weakness of their imperial government, broke out into the so-called Boxer rebellion, starting in the province of Shantung. When this had been suppressed by the allied powers, Secretary Hay, fearing that the vindictive feelings aroused might endanger the understanding, addressed a second note (July 3, 1900) to the powers, as follows:

> The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

This principle was adopted by the allied forces as the basis for the settlement to be made with China, thus securing a united guaranty of the integrity of China and of the open door. Spheres of influence, however, still remained after the Boxer rebellion, and there was a continuous struggle for concessions, so that the Chinese government, because of its weakness in yielding to those demands, steadily increased in unpopularity among its own people.

The British-Japanese alliance. The year 1902 is momentous in the history of the Far East as marking the time when the control of the sea power of the western Pacific passed from Great Britain to Japan through the alliance formed between these two powers. At the beginning of the twentieth century Great Britain was enjoying its policy of "splendid isolation," but was becoming nervous over the European situation. Russia was traditionally hostile, Germany had just thrown out its challenge for the supremacy of the sea, and France was unfriendly over the Fashoda incident. It seemed wise to Great Britain to reverse its policy of isolation, and as a beginning in that direction it made the alliance with Japan.

The first agreement, which was concluded on January 30, 1902, was really aimed at Russia. Japan was planning to fight for Korea against Russia, and England's part was to keep Germany or France from taking a hand in the struggle against Japan. In consequence England began to concentrate its fleet nearer home, leaving to Japan the guardianship in the main of British interests in China. In the treaty the two powers recognized the independence of China and Korea, also the special interests of Great Britain in the one and of Japan in the other. By the agreement each pledged joint defense of these interests and the maintenance of strict neutrality in case the other should become involved in war with a third power. Each agreed also to join the other in war if two or more powers should unite in hostility.

After the successful outcome of the projected war the treaty was revised (August 12, 1905) by recognizing Japan's rights in Korea and extending its Asiatic responsibilities to India, the frontier claims of which (against Russia) were guarantied. By 1911 Great Britain had adjusted these boundary claims with Russia, and on July 13 a reworded

treaty was renewed for ten years but with the stipulation that if either of the contracting parties should conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third power, it should not be obliged under the treaty to war with that power. The United States was at that time negotiating such a treaty with Great Britain and at the same time had developed friction with Japan. The stipulation was England's safeguard, therefore, against being drawn into a war against the United States as an ally of Japan's. Inasmuch as the treaty of arbitration was not ratified, the actual situation was in doubt.

The Russo-Japanese war. In the Russo-Japanese war the sympathy of the United States had been with Japan, and the excellent treaty of peace won by Japan was largely due to the influence of President Roosevelt. Tyler Dennett, an American writer on Far Eastern affairs, asserts[1] that shortly before the Treaty of Portsmouth was concluded, President Roosevelt agreed to use his executive influence on the side of the interests voiced by the British-Japanese alliance, receiving assurances that Japan had no designs on the Philippines and stating in return that the United States would not interfere with Japan in its dealings with Korea. Such an agreement, if really made, was purely personal on Roosevelt's part, since it had no sanction from Congress or from the Senate or, presumably, even from the cabinet, and had no force beyond his term of office, which expired on March 4, 1909. The essential point about this episode is that the United States during Roosevelt's term was in practical agreement with British-Japanese policies in the Far East and, by implication, was against the extension of Russia's influence in that region. It was Roosevelt also who because of this agreement refused to aid Korea in time of trouble, though by

[1] "Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War," chap. v.

treaty[1] the United States was pledged to extend its good offices. His point of view in respect to Korea apparently was that it would be better off under Japan than if independent, a view in which the Koreans do not concur.

Japanese immigration. Soon after the peace treaty had been made at Portsmouth, friction began to develop with Japan respecting the migration of its nationals to the United States. In 1900 there were about twenty-five thousand Japanese in the United States, mostly on the Pacific coast. This number seemed to be increasing so rapidly[2] that the Californians began to object, and discriminatory legislation, such as the San Francisco school act of 1906 and the land laws of 1913 and 1920, began to be passed. As such discriminations seemed to be in violation of treaty provisions and yet were not under the control of the Federal government, compromises had to be made, resulting in the Root-Takahira arrangement of 1907–1908, the so-called "gentlemen's agreement," which was reaffirmed in 1911. By the agreement Japan pledged itself not to give passports to Japanese laborers desirous of emigrating to the United States. The Japanese government kept its part of the compact, and in 1920 voluntarily ceased to issue passports to "picture brides"; that is, to Japanese women married by proxy in Japan to Japanese in the United States. Under our naturalization laws the Japanese, being

[1] There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United States and the King of Chosen and the citizens and subjects of their respective Governments.

If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.—Treaty of May 22, 1882

[2] In 1920, by census, there were in the continental United States 111,010 Japanese, 93,490 of whom resided in the three Pacific states. See, also, "Japanese Immigration," by Raymond Leslie Buell, in World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol. VII (1924), Nos. 5–6.

neither white nor black, cannot be naturalized, and this classification of them with other Orientals is a discrimination against their national and racial dignity not easily forgiven or forgotten. This racial discrimination on the part of the United States is a constant source of irritation to Japan, and it was intensified by President Wilson's refusal at Paris to indorse Japan's proposition for an "acceptance of the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals."

"Dollar diplomacy." During the administration of President Taft an attempt was made to apply Secretary Knox's "dollar diplomacy"[1] to China, since American capital began to turn to the Far East for opportunities for investment. In 1909 Knox made a proposition that all the railroad interests of Manchuria be pooled and managed by an international syndicate. At the same time American bankers sought admission to the European banking consortium at that time in process of formation. A flat refusal was received in respect to the consortium, although later the American group was admitted at the request of China, and loans were made in 1910 and 1911. As for the Manchurian proposition, Russia and Japan had come to a secret understanding (July 4, 1910) in respect to the division of Manchuria, so that they politely refused to consider the American proposition.

With the incoming of the Wilson administration the American banking group asked Secretary Bryan whether the government would still encourage them to invest capital with the consortium. Both Wilson and Bryan were unfamiliar with Chinese situations and saw only that the terms of the loan seemed to limit China's sovereignty; hence they declined to indorse further investments, with the result that the bankers made no additional loans. This ended the "dollar diplomacy" of the Taft régime in the Far East.

[1] See T. W. Overlach, Foreign Financial Control in China, pp. 215–216.

The consortium of 1920. By the year 1918 the Wilson administration, realizing its blunder in refusing permission for American bankers to remain identified with the six-power group, encouraged the formation of a new group made up of four powers (the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan; Belgium was admitted as a fifth power in December, 1920) to lend large sums to the Chinese government for the development of the country. The agreement did not recognize spheres of interests; but it provided for the pooling of existing economic interests and for joint control, through an international syndicate, of these interests and of loans. Japan tried hard to have Manchuria and the adjoining part of Inner Mongolia excepted from the jurisdiction of the consortium, on the ground that it had special interests in these regions. This was not admitted by the other powers; and Japan, compelled to yield to pressure, gained only slight concessions to save its face at home. The preliminary agreements were made at Shanghai on May 18, 1920, and were formally signed at New York on October 15 as a five-year agreement. The pledge given to the bankers by the Department of State was that if the bankers would coöperate with the government and follow the policies outlined by the Department of State, the government "will be willing to aid in every possible way, and to make prompt and vigorous representations, and to take every possible step to insure the execution of equitable contracts made in good faith by American citizens in foreign lands."[1] It should be said that the consortium did not meet with favor in China. Public opinion was opposed to it, fearing Japanese influence and further foreign interference and monopolies. Since the agreement expired in October, 1925, the movement has proved abortive.

[1] See T. W. Overlach, Foreign Financial Control in China, pp. 217–218; also Millard, Conflict of Policies in Asia, pp. 487–488.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FAR EAST AND THE PACIFIC[1]

Her [America's] policy in the Far East had constantly passed beyond the limits of real life because she had no vital interest at stake. She dreamed great dreams which ended in commonplace diplomatic morasses because she was never prepared to do more than throw out ideas which she allowed others to stamp out of existence. From the enunciation of the Hay doctrine of the Open Door in 1899 to the exchange of the Lansing-Ishii notes in 1917 she accomplished nothing that influenced in any degree the onward march of the peoples of the East, while contributing a great deal to their confusion and unrest.

What was she aiming at? Peace, perfect peace; she desired to enthrone peace and make all men love one another. But her method was by proclamation rather than by action, by abstention rather than by participation.[2]

Japan in 1902. The turning-point in affairs in the Far East came in 1921, the year of the Washington Conference. Japan occupied the center of the stage as the supposed villain of the play, China was the unwilling victim, and there seemed no saving hero in sight unless by chance the United States assumed the rôle of protector. It was the climax of a situation that had been developing since the formation of the British-Japanese alliance in 1902, which gave Japan a guaranty of national safety and an ambition to attain the leadership in eastern Asia. An ambitious Japan desirous of expansion might look in several directions: (1) as a naval power it might aspire to be the head of an island empire, based on Japan, extending through the Riukiu and Bonin islands and Taiwan, and looking toward the Philippines, the

[1] See Bibliography, section IV, 1, 2.

[2] From "An Indiscreet Chronicle from the Pacific," by Putnam Weale. By permission of Dodd, Mead & Company.


THE FAR EAST
☆ Capitals of countries
⊙ Capitals of minor divisions
Longitude East from Greenwich
80°
100°
120°
140°
20°
40°
SIBERIA
MONGOLIA
Gobi Desert
MANCHURIA
CHINESE REPUBLIC
INNER MONGOLIA
JAPAN SEA
KAMCHATKA PENINSULA
KARAFUTO
HOKKAIDO
HONSHU
SHIKOKU
KIUSHIU
JAPANESE EMPIRE
JAPAN
RYUKYU ISLANDS
TROPIC OF CANCER
PACIFIC OCEAN
YELLOW SEA
CHINA SEA
SOUTH CHINA SEA
BAY OF BENGAL
INDIA
TIBET
SINKIANG
KANSU
SHENSI
SHANSI
HONAN
HUPEH
ANHWEI
KIANGSU
CHEKIANG
FUKIEN
KIANGSI
HUNAN
KWEICHOW
SZECHWAN
YUNNAN
KWANGSI
KWANGTUNG
CHAHAR
JEHOL
CHIHLI
SHANTUNG
KOREA
TAIWAN (FORMOSA)
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
SIAM
HAINAN
NEPAL
BHUTAN
KUENLUN MTS.
TIEN SHAN MTS.
HIMALAYA MTS.
Great Wall
Chinese Wall
Lake Baikal
Lake Balkash
Selenga R.
Kerulen R.
Amur R.
Sungari R.
Ussuri R.
Tarim R.
Indus R.
Ganges R.
Brahmaputra R.
Irrawaddy R.
Yangtze R.
Yellow R.
Grand Canal
Urga
Ili
Tsitsihar
Harbin
Kirin
Mukden
Vladivostok
Otaru
Sapporo
Hakodate
Sendai
Tokyo
Yokohama
Kanazawa
Nagoya
Kyoto
Osaka
Kobe
Hiroshima
Kure
Nagasaki
Kagoshima
Peking
Tientsin
Port Arthur
Dairen
Taiyuanfu
Kaifeng
Sian
Lanchow
Tsinan
Tsingtao
Antung
Kunsan (Seoul)
Chinkiang
Nanking
Soochow
Shanghai
Hankow
Wuchang
Shasi
Anking
Wuhu
Hangchow
Ningpo
Wenchow
Foochow
Taihoku
Amoy
Taihan
Changsha
Nanchang
Kweiyang
Yunnan
Chungking
Chengtu
Lhasa
Calcutta
Nanning
Canton
Kowloon (British)
Hongkong (British)
Kwangchow wan (French)

Dutch East Indies, and, as an ultimate objective, Australia, whose climate and extensive area offered delightful possibilities of racial and territorial expansion; (2) if, as a military power, it looked westward, the domination of China seemed to be a natural objective, the older China of the eighteen provinces; (3) looking northwesterly, Manchuria and Mongolia offered a fitting field for a "farther west," and north as far as Lake Baikal lay Korea and eastern Siberia, with Sakhalin as the completion northward of the chain of islands facing the main continent. In these several directions lay a world empire abounding in nature's wealth and fertile lands and affording unlimited possibilities for racial enterprise on land or sea. It may be that Japanese statesmen in the early part of the century had vision enough to plan a "hundred-year program," based on a Pan-Asiatic movement headed by Japan and having as the objective the control of Asia by Asiatics.

Japan's alliance with Great Britain removed the British fleet almost entirely from Asiatic waters, and Japanese warships assumed the duty of policing eastern Asiatic waters. In the war with Russia Japan destroyed the Russian fleet, defeated its armies, and compelled it to relinquish its claims to Korea and its holdings in southern Manchuria. By treaty Japan secured lower Sakhalin, at the same time destroying Russian prestige at the court of Peking and exalting its own in being the first Oriental nation to defeat a great European power.

Japan's policy toward Korea and China. After the conclusion of the Russian-Japanese War Japan naturally desired to complete and to consolidate its holdings on the continent. In 1910 it absorbed Korea and, by private treaties with Russia in the years 1907, 1910, and 1912, came to an agreement with its former enemy as to their respective boundaries

in Manchuria when that Chinese province should fall into their hands, and of Inner Mongolia when that also should be taken from China. By these delimitations Russia was thrust to the north and kept west of Peking. When the World War broke out Japan needed no urging to seize from Germany Kiaochow and the Caroline Islands north of the equator, so that they passed under the Flag of the Rising Sun. These seizures were followed by expansion into the southern half of the province of Shantung westwards. In 1915 came Japan's twenty-one demands on China. These were later modified as a slight concession to international opinion, and Japan then threatened war if China did not yield by May 9. China, after waiting as long as it dared and hoping for some action on the part of the United States, signed the demands, making that date its "day of humiliation." On May 16 the United States sent identical notes to China and Japan to the effect that it "cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into, or which may be entered into, between the governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy, commonly known as the open door policy." The gains made by Japan through the demands are too numerous to give in detail, but they practically insured its control over Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, lower Shantung, and the province of Fukien.

This gain was followed by two riotous years of loan-making and concession-grabbing, at the end of which time Japan was virtually in control of the Chinese government. On July 3, 1916, Japan made a secret treaty with Russia, providing for a joint alliance for five years against any third party that should seek political domination in China contrary to the interests of either Japan or Russia. This enabled Russia to

concentrate its Siberian forces in the west, leaving eastern Siberia almost undefended. In 1918 Japan made its secret military agreement with China, which in terms looked like an impartial agreement but which in effect, had the war been prolonged, would have placed China's resources under Japanese control. In that same year Japan arranged to send a few thousand men into Siberia to coöperate with similar forces from the Allies and from America. In due time it had about ninety-three thousand men, who stayed on, contrary to agreement, after the Allies had withdrawn their forces.

Japan in the year 1917. The situation on the western battle front looked dismal enough to the Allies in the first half of 1917, and there was a natural suspicion on the part of Great Britain and France that Japan might in its own interest ally itself with the Central Powers. This seemed to Japan, therefore, a favorable time to get pledges from the Allies respecting the future. Secret treaties were made with the four allied powers,[1] beginning with Great Britain, February 16, whereby Japan agreed not to oppose China's entrance into the war and, in return, received pledges that at the peace conference the Allies would secure for it the German islands north of the equator and also Shantung.

In the fall of the same year the Ishii embassy from Japan came to the United States to discuss the diplomatic relations of the two countries. Baron Ishii made some remarkably fine addresses, and in his speech before the Senate he professed the most altruistic sentiments toward China and the United States and spoke much of Japan's honorable adherence to its pledges and treaties. On November 2 the Lansing-Ishii agreement was made, again pledging the two countries to maintain China's open door and political integrity, the United States on its part recognizing "Japan's special interests in China

[1] Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy.

based on territorial propinquity." No definition of these "special interests" was given, but Lansing apparently assumed that he was helping to keep Japan on the side of the Allies by indorsing a generous altruistic Monroe Doctrine for Japan. In reality he had been outwitted by a much keener man than himself. China, which understood Japan much better than did Secretary Lansing or President Wilson, protested vigorously against the agreement, both to Japan and to the United States, asserting that China as an independent nation should not be the subject of agreements on the part of foreign governments and expressing surprise that the United States would lend itself to Japanese imperial designs against China.

Japan's special interests. Japan's interpretation of "special interests" seemed to be that the United States acknowledged her paramount rights in Korea, Manchuria, Shantung, and the province of Fukien opposite Taiwan. On the other hand, Secretary Lansing, in his testimony before the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations on August 11, 1919, claimed that the Ishii agreement was primarily a reassertion of the open-door policy, and that in oral conversation with Baron Ishii he expressly stated that in his interpretation special interests were only those based on geographic position and were not to be considered as political or implying that Japan had paramount political interests in China. Each country naturally interprets the phrase in its own way; so that in return for an unnecessary reindorsement of the open-door policy, Lansing gave to Japan the enormous advantage of the phrase "special interests" without any authoritative written definition of that most unhappy phraseology. This unfortunate agreement came to a formal end on April 14, 1923, being superseded by the nine-power series of agreements made at the Washington Conference.

Japan had arguments to justify its course of action in China. Asserting that it needed additional territory for an expanding population and also raw material (especially coal and iron) for its growing industries, it claimed that these could only be procured by seizing lands on the continent. It also asserted that in self-defense it must possess Korea; and that having Korea, it must secure adjoining territory, such as Manchuria and the maritime province of Siberia, which otherwise might be used as bases against Korea. Japan has a Monroe Doctrine of its own, though it is more nearly a sort of Caribbean policy, under which it claims special interests as against other obtruding nations and asserts a sort of hegemony over the countries of eastern Asia.

Japan's Monroe Doctrine. In the United States it is assumed that the American and Japanese versions of the Monroe Doctrine are far apart. The United States in history, in area, in natural resources, and in population is easily the leader on the American continent. The corresponding place in eastern Asia belongs to China, though temporarily Japan has a military supremacy. The policy of the United States looks to the protection of other American powers against foreign aggression and to their self-development along lines of their own civilization. Japan seeks to dominate in order to exploit, and, judging from the fate of Korea, it intends to crush out the nationality of subordinated races and make them Japanese. Among whatever aliens it rules, hatred seems to develop because of oppression. This is shown by the attitude against the Japanese of the Formosans, the Chinese, the Koreans, and the Siberians when Japan was in possession. Japan aims to be considered the arbiter and supreme authority in eastern Asia; but eastern Asia fears Japanese supremacy, and when the Washington Conference was called, China, Korea, and eastern Siberia looked to it for help against Japan.

Japan and Great Britain. The British-Japanese alliance made in 1902, which continued in force until ratifications of the four-power treaty were exchanged, proved to be a great boon to Japan and a corresponding injury to other interests in the Far East. Aside from the results of the Russian-Japanese War in making Japan a great power with continental holdings, the effects of the alliance were: (1) The absorption of Korea by Japan, the establishment of a tyranny over the Koreans, and the attempted suppression of their civilization. (2) Japan was enabled to make its aggressions on China, believing that England as Japan's ally would probably not call its acts into question. The Chinese fully realized this and became as antagonistic to Great Britain as to Japan. (3) The same point may be made as to Japan's actions in Siberia: Great Britain made no protest in favor of Siberia. (4) The treaty gave Japan complete domination in the northwest Pacific, since the British fleet was withdrawn and British interests were left under the protection of Japan. (5) Japan, far from preserving British commercial interests, steadily sought to undermine them, as in the Yangtze valley and north China. (6) By 1921 the Chinese themselves saw that as a practical proposition Great Britain could not and the United States would not help them in their extremities, and that they must therefore submit to Japanese demands. In a word, in the entire western Pacific, north and south, there was only one power to be feared, and that power was Japan. There is no question that the most troublesome problem in the Far East in 1921 was the problem of this British-Japanese alliance. Great Britain, like the man clinging to the tail of an infuriated bull, secretly did not like the connection but did not dare to let go. For America's sake, for China's sake, and for England's sake, the Conference solved the puzzle by the four-power treaty.

China in 1921. Chinese nationalists were distinctly pessimistic in the year 1921. The republic, established with such great hopes, seemed to be a failure; its officers were impotent or corrupt; and discord prevailed throughout the land. Fukien, Shantung, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia seemed to be lost. Japan had a firm grip on the Chinese government, both national and provincial, and could take military possession of Peking at short notice. Chinese provincial governors were at war among themselves, partly through Japanese intrigue, and the south was in rebellion; a network of Japanese spies working through post offices established at all important centers kept the Chinese in terror; and China's best friends, Great Britain and the United States, seemed to be pro-Japanese, as shown by the British alliance, the Lansing-Ishii agreement, and the consortium,[1] which the four powers were seeking to force on China. The student and merchant classes, aided by the Chinese overseas, voiced public opinion in their attempt to boycott Japanese goods, threatened to boycott British goods if the alliance were renewed, and, though they trusted Americans, evinced distrust of the vacillating policy of the government of the United States. The Peking government, bankrupt and without prestige, merely lived from day to day, fatalistically awaiting the crisis that was sure to come soon. The combination of the situations in Japan and China was as a whole rather vicious, and many assumed that matters would go from bad to worse until a war in the Pacific would become inevitable. Indeed, in the year 1921 it was the definite opinion in the Far East and in Europe that the United States on its own account and on behalf of China would be forced into a war with Japan, and the only doubtful point seemed to be whether Great Britain under the terms of its treaty would assist Japan or remain neutral.

[1] See The Consortium, official text. Washington, 1921.

The Washington Conference. A conference on the limitation of armament had been planned by the Wilson administration, and Congress (August 29, 1916) had made an appropriation of $200,000 for the expenses. Wilson's later policy assumed that the matter properly would fall under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations. In view of the failure of the United States to enter the League, President Harding revived the notion of a special conference, added the general subject of Pacific problems, and restricted the membership to those nine nations that had definite interests in the Far East, omitting Russia, whose interests Secretary Hughes promised would be safeguarded by the Conference.

After preliminary inquiries had been made, official invitations were sent on July 10, 1921, and all the invited powers returned acceptances. But Japan, though willing to discuss limitations of armament and to endeavor "to reach a common understanding in regard to general principles and policies in the Pacific and the Far East," yet thought "that introduction therein [the *agenda*] of problems such as are of sole concern to certain particular powers or such matters that may be regarded as accomplished facts should be scrupulously avoided."

Since Japan was Hamlet in the play its wishes in this matter formed a kind of limitation on the possibilities of deliberation; and although there was frequent discussion as to past actions, such as the twenty-one demands, the results of the Conference were not retroactive but covered existing and future situations only.

The Conference met on November 12 and held, in all, seven plenary sessions for formal action. It worked, however, through subcommittees and through two committees of the whole—one devoted to limitation matters (five powers), and the other to the problems of the Pacific and the Far East

(nine powers). The Conference formally closed on February 6, 1922, after a session of nearly three months, having embodied its work into several agreements the most important of which are a naval treaty,[1] the four-power treaty, and a series of agreements known as the nine-power treaty, including an agreement respecting the Chinese tariff.

The significant features of the naval treaty are (1) the naval ratio and (2) the nonfortifications agreement. The ratio of five to five between Great Britain and the United States seems to imply that these two powers become equal on the sea and that henceforth Great Britain loses its supremacy in sea power. In fact, England already had changed its former two-power standard into a one-power standard, so that the adoption of the equal ratio gave it assurance that the United States would not seek to surpass England in naval power. On the other hand, it is quite certain that Great Britain will keep up its ratio to efficiency standards and that the United States will not. Sea power is based fundamentally on the necessity of protecting distant colonies and a merchant marine. Since Great Britain has greater needs in such matters by comparison with the United States, its navy obviously must be kept up with that end in view. As for other factors in naval strength unregulated by the agreement, such as the cruiser, the submarine, the air service, the supply of transports and auxiliaries, docking facilities, and so on, these are open to competition; consequently the nation that gives careful attention to them will really increase its actual fighting strength. One should not, therefore, unduly stress the apparent equality of the ratio, since it is more likely that the five of the United States will be nearer Japan's three than to Great Britain's five. Japan's ratio, while useless for an offen-

[1] There is a minor treaty also, respecting submarines and poison gas, but this has not yet been ratified by France.

sive against a great power, could on the other hand seriously damage an enemy's shipping in the Pacific and could readily defend its home waters on account of the immense distances a hostile fleet would have to cover.

The nonfortifications agreement. As for the nonfortifications agreement,[1] that is the price the United States paid for the ratio of five to three. Japan distinctly asserted that it would not accept the ratio unless it felt assured that no foreign power would have heavily fortified bases near Japan. This was yielded by the American delegation as a compromise, though naval officials presumably were solidly opposed to the agreement. Though this agreement is by terms limited to fifteen years, it is practically permanent. If the United States, having once waived the right to fortify Guam

[1] Article XIX.

The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder:

(1) The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (*a*) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska, and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (*b*) the Hawaiian Islands;

(2) Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the meridian of 110 degrees east longitude, except (*a*) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (*b*) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and (*c*) New Zealand;

(3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa, and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire.

The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace.

or the Philippines, should venture to build extensive fortifications there after the fifteen-year period, Japan would probably assume that to be an occasion for war. As long as Japan remains dominant in the northwest Pacific, as at present, it would be foolish to allow strongly fortified bases anywhere within striking distance of its shores. By the naval treaty, therefore, Japan retains naval supremacy in the western Pacific north of the equator.

One must not forget that in some respects the nonfortifications agreement hits Great Britain much harder than it does the United States. If Japan should make war on Great Britain's eastern possessions,—a contingency by no means impossible,—all British island possessions south of the equator would be exposed to raids by Japanese cruisers, to say nothing of poorly fortified Australasia. For this reason and for general reasons Great Britain has determined to develop the fortifications of Singapore as its naval base for the Far East.

The four-power treaty. The four-power treaty is a ten-year agreement between Great Britain, France, the United States, and Japan, guarantying the status quo of their respective insular possessions in the Pacific (but not Japan proper) and providing that on ratification the English-Japanese treaty of 1902–1921 should be terminated. By consensus of opinion the chief purpose of the four-power treaty was to enable Great Britain and Japan to part company without loss of face to Japan. On the surface of things Japan substitutes an innocuous treaty with three other powers—the three greatest powers in the world—for a more vigorous treaty with an unwilling ally. A Japanese paper, for example, was quoted as saying that Japan in the interest of peace had "secured water in exchange for good whisky." The United States itself had become fully convinced that the British-Japanese alliance

had been harmful in its effects in the East and would likely prove more so in the future; hence it was prepared to go some distance in order to see the cancellation of that treaty. From Japan's standpoint from ten to fifteen years of guarantied peace in the Pacific gave splendid opportunities to make hay on the eastern shores of Asia while the sun shone, and the results would probably be far greater than any possible gains among the islands of the Pacific.

The nine-power treaty. The nine-power treaty proper is a statement of general principles and pledges concerning China and is supplemented by the treaty relating to the customs tariff and a lengthy series of resolutions in respect to particular situations, such as those regarding military forces, post offices, extra-territoriality, radio, railroads, and existing commitments with respect to China. These agreements all combined, and considered along with the Shantung settlement, represent a decided victory for China which undoubtedly would have been larger had the Chinese delegates been supported by a strong and efficient government at home. To the extent that it was a victory for China, it was a defeat for Japan and those other powers the exploiting interests of which were affected by the decisions. These results were obtained by the united efforts of Great Britain and the United States working together to secure for China all the rights and pledges that could be secured under the circumstances. To that extent these three powers developed a moral entente, in which Japan did not share, for the reason that it made the concessions unwillingly, though gracefully when the necessity arose. From the standpoint of policy the chief advantage is that the open-door agreement is redefined in a much more careful way (Article I[1]), the joint contribution of

[1] The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree: (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of

Mr. Root and Secretary Hughes. Chinese sovereignty is again guarantied and also her territorial integrity. There is, furthermore, a condemnation of spheres of influence, and a pledge to respect China's neutral rights in time of war. The redefined open-door policy, therefore, has now the treaty sanction of nine powers, one of which is China itself; and, in addition, there is to be established by resolution a board of reference for the investigation of alleged violations of the treaty.[1]

Japan at the Conference. At the Conference Japan soon discovered what it already had strongly suspected; namely, that the other powers were not well disposed toward it Japan's record of the last fifteen years was against it, more especially its actions during the World War, when it so selfishly exploited China. China, by contrast, came before the court with clean hands, as the lawyers would say, demanding justice. Before the Conference had opened, it had been recognized in Japan that concessions must be made, and Shantung was slated for sacrifice. The Shantung episode had become an international grievance; it had made trouble at Paris and had had a large part in the defeat of the League in the United States; China had refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, and Chinese public opinion was so bitter against Japan that (besides the boycott) it refused to allow the open-

China; (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

[1] Although the other important treaties had been ratified, the ratifications of the nine-power agreement were not exchanged until August 5, 1925, for the reason that France had refused to sign, awaiting the settlement of a financial dispute with China.

ing of negotiations respecting the return of Shantung, demanding instead the cancellation of the twenty-one demands and the return outright of that sacred province.

The Conference knew that unless China and Japan could come to agreement on the terms whereby Shantung should be surrendered to China, the work of the whole Conference would have been in vain. During the last thirty days of the Conference, therefore, its delegates marked time while discussions innumerable were held between the two sets of delegates, aided occasionally by the good offices of the United States and Great Britain, represented by Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour. Concession after concession was yielded by Japan, until finally the minds of the conflicting delegates met on points of agreement, and the thing was done. The Conference and the public at large heaved a sigh of relief, for it saved the Conference from becoming a failure and saved maritime nations from an intense competition in navy-building programs and a plunge back into warlike situations. From the financial standpoint Japan was well paid for its "blood and treasure," but its prestige received a severe blow for the reason that the terms were so much easier than it had intended to secure. To the Chinese the return of Shantung was the fundamental demand, and, having that, they felt victorious. As far as the United States was concerned, the surrender of Shantung by Japan removed a great source of friction and, to that extent, eased the situation.

Japan's mandate islands. At the opening of the war the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator were captured by Japan, and those south of the equator by Australia and New Zealand. By the treaty of peace Germany surrendered these islands to the five principal allied and associated powers, to be intrusted as mandates by the League of Nations to mandatory powers. Since the United States is not

a member of the League of Nations, it apparently had no legal voice in the assignment of the mandates nor in the terms of the mandates. Yet the claim was made by the United States that as an associate of the powers to whom Germany surrendered its Pacific islands it should have a voice in the assignment and terms of the mandates. The issue was first made with Japan, and special claims were made for cable and other rights in the island of Yap. Japan strenuously resisted the claims of the United States, and the matter became a burning issue that remained unsettled at the time of the opening of the Washington Conference.

Japan by that time had been brought to admit the force of the American contention, and it also decided that concessions in respect to Yap and the mandated islands might materially help its position at the Conference. Therefore an agreement was reached early in the sessions of the Conference and was formally signed on February 11, 1922. By the terms of the agreement Japan made large concessions to the United States in respect to cables, commerce, and the rights of missionaries and of property. There was also a stipulation that annual reports be sent to the United States as well as to the League and that future modifications in the terms made by the League must meet with the approval of the United States.

This agreement in itself is not so important, since the islands, aside from Yap, are of small consequence; but it now became a precedent on which the United States based similar claims in respect to other mandated possessions formerly held by Germany, more especially the important British mandates south of the equator, including Nauru, the Samoan group held by New Zealand, and the numerous islands held by Australia.

At the Conference no formal action was taken respecting Siberia, but there was a vigorous exchange of views and an insistence on the part of Secretary Hughes that Japan should

promptly withdraw its troops from Siberia. The Japanese cabinet later took this suggestion into consideration and, as an evidence of good will, withdrew its armed forces from Siberia and (by later agreement with Russia) from north Sakhalin also.

Results of the Conference. What, then, in general, may be said as to the results of the Conference?[1] In the first place, the use of an international conference as a means of settling disputes and removing friction is fully justified. The Conference will go down in history as one of the most successful international gatherings ever held. It was well managed, it was beautifully organized, and its chairman made a great sensation by the proposition he made in respect to naval ratios. Just which power won most or lost most is a debatable question, impossible of immediate decision. The great general effect is that it removed the present danger of war in the Pacific and stopped competition in the building of battleships.

It seems clear that Japan had no reason to complain of the results of the Conference. It now admittedly has a "Caribbean region" of its own in which henceforth no foreign power will be allowed to acquire possessions with the expectation of fortifying them or to erect additional fortifications on what may now be held. Japan is supreme in the northwest Pacific, and no one power can defeat it in its own waters. It loses Shantung, but it gets heavily paid for its investment. By insisting that concluded treaties and accomplished facts should not be questioned at the Conference, it was able to retain the substance of the Twenty-one Demands treaty and the concessions extorted during the years 1915–1918.

As for the United States, it was able to get some substantial gains for China, and it also secured a temporary peace in the

[1] On the Conference see Buell, The Washington Conference, and W. W. Willoughby, China at the Conference.

Pacific by surrendering (1) its right to fortify its own colonies and (2) its expectation of attaining the supremacy of the seas through competition in navy-building. It also was able to detach Great Britain from alliance with Japan.

Great Britain was freed from the burden of naval competition with the United States and, except in the northwest Pacific, remains supreme on the seas of the Eastern Hemisphere. Its fortification area in that region now has 110° east longitude as its farthest east, excepting Hongkong and its Australasian and Canadian dominions. On the other hand, the termination of its alliance with Japan will compel it to establish an East Indian fortified base (Singapore) and a Pacific fleet.

Obviously the present situation in the Far East is but the climax of events since 1894. But "tomorrow will be another day," and new points of view should come to the front. By 1936, when the naval treaty expires, peace should have come to a war-worn world; Europe should be rehabilitated, and Russia restored as a member in the family of nations; China should be well on the way toward complete sovereignty, if this has not already been attained; and it is to be hoped that the United States and Great Britain will be working together in a moral entente for the peace of the world.

CHAPTER XIX

POLICIES TOWARD THE STATES OF EUROPE[1]

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little *political* connection as possible. . . . It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. . . . Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. . . . With me, a predominant motive has been an endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.—Extracts from Washington's Farewell Address

The colonists in the eighteenth century. Europe, and more especially western Europe, was to the American colonists in 1776 all the known world, aside from their own American shores. They knew, to be sure, in a hazy sort of way of Asia and other parts of the earth, but their dealings were with the western half of Europe, and even this was not known any too well. As colonials they were considered inferior, and as rebels they became bad precedents for other colonies; consequently, when they finally declared their independence and undertook by force of arms to free themselves from Great Britain's authority, they faced a supercilious Europe scornful of colonies setting an evil example of revolution and republicanism.

Yet from time immemorial new states have come into existence by way of rebellion or revolution. As disturbers of the

[1] See Bibliography, section V.

peace, however, they are rarely welcomed with joy by existing states, unless by chance one of the latter may rejoice at revolution in a rival state as affording it an opportunity for attack. In fact, in the older diplomacy it was axiomatic that your rival's extremity was your opportunity. Diplomats, therefore, secretly fostered internal dissensions in rival countries so as to give greater security to their own country or a better opportunity for a successful war. As recent illustrations in German history may be noted the Kaiser's telegram to President Kruger at the beginning of the Boer troubles (1896), Germany's intrigues in Ireland just preceding and during the World War, its attempts to foment discord and trouble in the United States in order to keep the latter out of the war, and its passing Lenin into Russia to make additional trouble in that distracted land.

During the eighteenth century the colonists had unconsciously been growing together in sympathies and in common interests. They inhabited the New World; they had similar dangers and problems and, in the main, common customs, traditions, and points of view. Thus, although they formed thirteen distinct and separate bodies politic they found it easy to unite together for common ends through the Congress and the Confederation, and they soon learned to speak of themselves as Americans.

The demand for independence. Their Declaration of Independence aroused bitter animosity on the part of the English government and no sympathy on the Continent. Yet the rebellious colonies were poor and sadly in need of arms and supplies, so that their first thought was how these might be secured from the continental states of Europe. The colonists had no desire to entangle themselves with European affairs, nevertheless they felt that under the circumstances entanglement was necessary and even desirable. Therefore

they promptly sent envoys abroad to borrow money, to secure supplies, and to make treaties, if possible, with the states on the Continent. To the latter they could offer the advantages of a share in a steadily growing commerce, and it was thought that this economic motive might be strengthened by an appeal to the desire for revenge that France and Spain presumably felt toward Great Britain. Therefore, although attempts were made to secure help from Russia, Prussia, and the Netherlands, the colonies relied chiefly on Franklin's influence in France to win for them the support of that powerful nation and, with it, some assistance from Spain. Secret assistance was at first grudgingly extended; but when the defeat of Burgoyne seemed to show a possibility of a successful rebellion, France determined to have it out with her ancient enemy, and, by making treaties of alliance and commerce with the colonies (February 6, 1778), declared war against England. Shortly before the close of the war the Netherlands, eager for a share in the commerce of the new state, also started informal negotiations with it and thereby had war thrust upon them by Great Britain (1780).

American independence was finally acknowledged by Great Britain, and a treaty of peace was made and ratified (1782–1783) whereby the United States became the first modern Christian independent state outside Europe. The close of the Revolutionary War permitted the United States to make treaties without offense to England; hence by 1789 it had negotiated treaties with the Netherlands, Sweden, and Prussia but had been unable to negotiate a treaty of commerce with Great Britain itself. In its treaties of amity and commerce the United States sought to develop a policy of the open door to the commerce of all the world, to stress the rights of neutrals,—of freedom of the seas with all its implications,—and to favor the humane treatment of captives and prisoners of

war. This policy, stressing the Golden Rule, found its best exemplification in the first commercial treaty with France in 1778 (the model for subsequent commercial treaties) and in the treaties with Prussia in 1785 and 1799.

The Napoleonic period. The French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic wars naturally caused great anxiety to the new American government. Its first thought was to rejoice at the spread of republican institutions, but hesitation came at the excesses of the Reign of Terror and the militarism of the following years. When the great war finally developed, with Great Britain and France as the opposing leaders of a divided Europe, it was natural that Americans should feel a keen interest in the struggle and should take sides, some with one, some with the other. England rather expected the United States to be on the side of France in view of its alliance with that nation and its interest in republics, and it was in consequence unbending in its attitude toward the United States in matters of dispute. But the Genêt episode of 1793, when France sought to use American ports as bases for privateering against England, brought matters to a climax; and Washington, after careful consideration, issued the proclamation of 1793, which committed the United States to a policy of neutrality, isolation, and non-entanglement in the political wars of Europe. This policy was more fully stated and developed by Washington in his Farewell Address and by Jefferson in his inaugural address, but the essence of it is contained in that short and simple proclamation which announced that the United States was to hold itself aloof from European complications and remain neutral in Europe's wars. The immediate effect of this was the negotiation of the first commercial treaty with Great Britain, followed by a row and virtual war with France, the abrogation of treaties with that power, and their later readjustment, with the omission of a treaty of alliance.

Washington and Jefferson showed in their papers that they were under no illusions in respect to the weakness of the United States. As a weak power its safety lay in external peace and in opportunities for internal development. Consequently they maintained that it should refuse to side with European states in their perennial wars; in time of war it should keep neutral to the best of its ability and it should maintain peace even under provocation. The wars with the Barbary States and with Great Britain in 1812–1814 showed that there were limits to its endurance; but even in the latter war it fought on its own account, making no alliances, not even a temporary one with France against England. From the fiery furnace of those Napoleonic years it emerged still independent, still in favor of isolation and no entangling alliances, and hoping for an era of peace that it might extend its commerce and develop its Western lands, so largely increased through the Louisiana Purchase.

The Holy Alliance. The Holy Alliance, with its threats against the independence of the Spanish revolting colonies, gave opportunity, after lengthy discussion and careful consideration, for the United States to announce definitely in the Monroe Doctrine (1823) its historic attitude toward Europe and, in addition, to proclaim the doctrine of the Americas for the Americans. The Doctrine emphasized the existence of an American system distinct from the European system, and incidentally reminded Europe of the fact that the United States henceforth considered itself a fully matured nation, able to care for its own affairs and to call to account those nations that ventured to interfere with its rights. This self-assertion of the United States was in part due to the rise of a strongly national sentiment in the younger generation that had been born after the Revolution and had had national questions thrust upon their attention through the turmoil of

the thirty-five years of national history since the adoption of the Constitution in 1788. Then, too, they had pride in the immense area of the nation's domains and felt confidence that under conditions of peace the United States was destined to attain greatness and prosperity.

The period of isolation. The next fifty years of America's national history were very simple in respect to European relations. The United States adjusted its war claims and boundary disputes with France, Spain, and England, usually by arbitration, which it has consistently used from the beginning in the settlement of conflicting justiciable disputes. By the treaty of 1824 it settled with Russia its southernmost boundary for Alaska, and at the close of the Civil War bought Alaska itself. It warned France and England against attempts to get possession of the Spanish possessions in the West Indies, and in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 it reached a compromise with Great Britain in respect to claims in Central America and in the Panama region. About the same time it warned Great Britain, and France more especially, against the seizure of Hawaii, since in view of recent accessions on the Pacific coast it now considered those islands an outlying post of the Americas. It also suggested to France after the close of the Civil War that it was inadvisable for French troops to remain in Mexico, a hint not lost on Napoleon III, with his dreams of a colonial empire in the Americas and in the Pacific. Yet the United States interfered with distinctly European affairs when it ventured to help strengthen a public opinion in Europe against the oppressions of Turkey in Greece and in behalf of the Hungarian movement for independence from Austrian control. On the whole, however, American annals were "short and simple." The United States was politically isolated and apart from European interests; it cared nothing for Europe's balance of power, its intrigues,

and its wars; it preferred to devote itself to the growth of democracy, to the winning of the West, to the settlement of domestic disputes with Mexico and the Indian tribes, and to the secession movement of the South.

But the year 1870 marked a turning-point in European and national history. In that year there came into existence, after the defeat of France, a united Italy and the German Empire. The same year also marked in the United States a constantly growing stress on industrial life, a neglect of the merchant marine, and a steadily increasing influx of immigration. Production could barely keep up with the home demand for manufactured goods, and free farming lands were rapidly taken up to raise foods and other supplies for a steadily multiplying population and for export. The Civil War had given a heavy protectional tariff, so that America's infant industries became mammoth-like in their proportions and began to enter into competition with European nations for the world's trade.

Great Britain. As for particular states in Europe, naturally enough American diplomatic relations with Great Britain have been numerous, involved, and often strained. In the first forty years of national history the United States fought two wars with Great Britain, and the two nations were mutually contentious between times. England was powerful, whereas America was relatively unimportant, and its rights were ignored in the midst of the great wars then raging. Great Britain was fighting for its life much of the time, and gave small heed to the poorly defined, hardly recognized rights of neutrals. But the terms of the peace treaties were generous; and although this was not true in the case of the Jay treaty, nevertheless it served to encourage commercial relations. After the final defeat of Napoleon the strain was relaxed, and somewhat kindlier relations developed. Great Britain coöperated with the United States against the Holy

Alliance, though, naturally, from the standpoint of its own interests; it favored (in part at least) the Monroe Doctrine when it was announced; and it followed the United States in the recognition of the South American republics. By treaty and arbitration the two nations settled numerous disputes respecting boundaries, fisheries, and indemnities, they coöperated in the suppression of the African slave trade, and, in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, they came to an amicable agreement respecting Central America and the Panama Canal. The Civil War bred bad feeling on both sides. In Great Britain popular opinion favored the North, especially after the emancipation, but official policy was rather strongly Southern in sympathy. The *Trent* affair and the *Alabama* episode did not help matters, but the comprehensive Treaty of Washington and the Geneva award settled in a satisfactory way most of the questions that were making trouble between the two countries.

The Venezuela boundary dispute with Great Britain, which had been brewing for about twenty years and into which the United States had been drawn, came to a head in 1895 and seemed for a time to threaten war. But good sense on both sides came to the front, arbitration was agreed on, and an award was finally made in October, 1899. In some respects this may be looked upon as the formal beginning of the Caribbean Sea policy. Cleveland, to be sure, made the Monroe Doctrine the basis for his argument, but there was slowly rising a recognition of the importance of a purely American influence in the circle of lands round the Caribbean. The war with Spain, and the building of the Panama Canal after the modifications secured by Secretary Hay in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, made the matter definite, and Great Britain at present fully recognizes the paramount interest of the United States in that region.

This surrender on England's part of its rights in the Panama Canal was one of several illustrations of a definite change of policy toward the United States. Beginning with the Venezuela episode of 1895, Great Britain has shown a steady determination to maintain friendly relations with the United States. Its attitude throughout the Spanish War was markedly sympathetic, showing at Manila Bay a willingness even to risk a war with Germany if necessary, and at the Washington Conference its harmonious coöperation with the United States made that famous gathering a success. As Mr. Balfour once put it, henceforth "between English-speaking peoples war is impossible."

France. Inasmuch as the first American treaty was made with France and inasmuch as France also made loans and furnished military and naval assistance, Americans have always felt peculiarly indebted to that country. They understood then as now that France aided them not because of love for them, but because of hate for England. Yet the aid was timely and was sadly needed. In the peace negotiations following the American Revolution France was hostile to the best interests of the United States; therefore the envoys finally negotiated secretly and reported the treaty to France only when it was completed and signed. The United States was practically at war with France in 1798 and abrogated its treaties. Within four years Napoleon's designs on Louisiana again developed friction, but, fearing he might lose it to England, he finally sold the land to America. During the next ten years American commerce suffered terribly at the hands of both France and Great Britain, but chiefly from the latter, since it controlled the seas. It fought England, therefore, but without making an alliance with France.

After the wars France sympathized with the Holy Alliance, since it probably hoped to get from the adventure a colonial

empire. In Jackson's presidency France and America almost came to blows over the question of indemnities for the destruction of shipping in the Napoleonic wars, but in 1836 the matter was settled amicably. In the Civil War France promptly followed Great Britain in recognizing the Confederacy as a belligerent and sought to form a combination of European powers for concerted action in favor of the South. This plan was not successful; but throughout the war Napoleon showed an unfriendly disposition, owing to his desire to get a firm foothold in Mexico. After the downfall of Napoleon III at the end of the Franco-Prussian War, and only five days after Sedan, the United States was the first to recognize the new republic (September 7). Since that time the relations between the two countries have been more uniformly friendly.

Spain. After the Florida cession made by Spain in 1819 American dealings with that weakening power were somewhat inharmonious. The recognition of the independence of Spain's revolting colonies and the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine aroused Spanish resentment. In later years the American government's obvious interest in Cuba, followed by filibustering expeditions, excited Spanish fears. From 1868 Cuba itself was in a chronic attitude of rebellion, and situations arose which compelled the United States to carry on almost constant negotiations with the mother country—negotiations all the harder because Spain had strong suspicions that Americans were sympathetic with the rebels and desired Cuba for themselves. By 1898 the whole situation had become impossible; Spain could not conquer Cuba and Cuba could not free itself from Spain, so that the affair had become an international nuisance. Finally, on April 19, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to use force to compel Spain to withdraw from Cuba. The war was of brief dura-

tion. At its close a treaty was drawn up at Paris whereby Spain ceded Cuba to the United States in trust. It also gave up all its other West Indian possessions in ownership, as well as the island of Guam from the Ladrone group, and surrendered for a price its interests in the Philippines. This ended the Spanish colonial empire in the Americas and the Pacific after an existence of nearly four hundred years, and made one less European state having holdings on the western continent.

Germany. The first American treaty with Prussia was secured by Franklin in 1785, and at the expiration of this a new one was negotiated in 1799. These were treaties of amity and commerce and took high ground in respect to the rights of neutrals and the humane treatment of prisoners. Throughout the following seventy years conventional relations were maintained with Prussia and other German states, the United States receiving in the years 1830 to 1860 over one and a half million immigrants from that racial stock.

In 1871 the new German Empire was recognized by President Grant, and friendly relations continued as before. Unfortunately the Samoan complication began to develop soon afterwards, but settlement of the difficulty was made by treaty in December, 1899. When Dewey captured Manila, Germany openly displayed anger against the United States in connection with the incident, so well narrated in Admiral Dewey's "Autobiography." Germany had undoubtedly determined to secure the Philippine Islands for itself and showed its chagrin at losing them. Its prompt purchase in the following year of the remaining Spanish islands, now in the possession of Japan, showed its ambition and desire for further expansion in the Pacific.

About the same time Germany's attitude toward South America in connection with colonies of Germans in Brazil,

and especially its attitude toward Venezuela in 1902, its policy toward China, its action in seizing Kiaochow and concessions in Shantung, its cruelty in the attack on Peking, all made a decidedly bad impression on Americans. Participation by the United States in the Algeciras conference, which ended so contrary to Germany's expectations, did not help the situation. In the year 1914 friction developed over Haiti. England sent an ultimatum to that state demanding payment of an indemnity, and France and Germany also desired to seize and control its customhouses so as to collect debts due to their nationals. But on Germany's statement of its desire the United States refused to consent to the participation of that country in the control of Haitian customs. The unexpected outbreak of the World War put an end to these anxieties for the time, but the situation helped to explain the occupation of the island in 1915. On the whole, one may safely infer that for the twenty years before 1914 Germany was not well disposed toward the United States and looked upon it as a potential enemy.

Russia. In the Revolutionary War Russia was unsympathetic and practically hostile to the colonies, since its interests harmonized better with those of Great Britain. Early in the nineteenth century Emperor Alexander I and President Jefferson were personally friendly and exchanged letters. This became an influence which resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Then came protracted negotiations for a commercial treaty, along with opposition to Russia's Holy Alliance and a hot dispute respecting the Alaskan boundary. In 1824 America's first treaty with Russia was made, agreeing on the boundary of 54° 40′ for Alaska and providing for freedom of trade. This was followed in 1832 by a more complete treaty of commerce and navigation.

In the Civil War Russia was friendly to the United States, largely, perhaps, because of its general opposition to all rebellions against constituted authority. There does not seem to be any basis for the belief that it was prepared to aid the United States with its fleet should the necessity arise. At the close of the war Secretary Seward, who knew the value of Alaska and feared that it might be acquired by Great Britain, took up the matter of its purchase from Russia. An agreement was soon reached and embodied in a treaty which was promptly ratified by the Senate (April, 1867), thereby eliminating another European power from the ownership of territory on the western continent. Roosevelt's friendly offices in mediating the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) marked the climax of friendly relationship. Afterwards came grievances concerning Russia's aggressions in Manchuria, thereby interfering with American trade, and also disputes respecting the treatment of American Jews in Russia, resulting in the abrogation (1912) of the treaty of 1832.

The World War. Attention also might be directed briefly to the two meetings of the Hague conferences (1899, 1907) and to the London Naval Conference of 1909, in which the United States met with European and other powers and sought to work out in unison joint understandings in respect to arbitration and other common international interests. In the Hague conferences the Monroe Doctrine was tacitly admitted as giving to the United States the right of reservations in respect to purely American questions. During the fifteen years from 1899 the government of the United States endeavored to conclude arbitration agreements with other countries. In the spring of 1913, more especially, Secretary Bryan suggested a form of peace treaty which sought to prevent wars by the interposition of delay for the purpose of investigation and negotiation, resulting in the many "Bryan peace

treaties" of the next three years. On the whole, during the hundred years from the downfall of Napoleon to the outbreak of the World War, the United States was consistently friendly toward Europe, refrained from entangling political alliances, and kept itself isolated from European politics. Europe was for Europeans, America was for Americans, and the Atlantic was the ocean barrier between the two sets of political interests.

The outbreak of the World War (July 28, 1914) at once thrust upon the United States innumerable problems in its attempts to maintain existing principles of international law. From the standpoint of policy it sought to maintain the rights of neutrals and to isolate itself from European embroilments so as not to become entangled in the wars of Europe. Yet as nation after nation plunged into the struggle and it grew into a world war affecting all nations, it became increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain an attitude of neutrality. Especially was this true after Americans lost their lives in the sinking of the *Lusitania* and other vessels.

President Wilson's addresses. During the first two years of the war[1] President Wilson apparently hoped that the United States might at the proper time offer its good offices to bring about peace, even a "peace without victory." With this thought in mind he began to formulate the bases on which peace might be established. About this time the project for a "League to Enforce Peace" attracted his attention and won his approval. In the election of 1916 the President was reëlected on a peace platform; but almost immediately, owing to the renewal of an intensive submarine warfare, the United States was forced into the war. Even then its traditional policy was theoretically maintained, since it did not ally itself

[1] See E. E. Robinson and V. J. West, Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913–1917. New York, 1917.

with the allied powers but merely associated itself with them. Throughout the war President Wilson acted as spokesman for the Allies and set forth in a series of remarkable papers the aims and ideals of the United States, the dangerous ambitions and militarism of the Central Powers, and the general terms along the lines of which peace should be made. The smaller neutral states, as well as oppressed nationalities all over the world, found in him their exponent in defense of the rights of neutrals and of the principle of nationality. Unquestionably his constant stress on idealistic principles had a powerful effect not only in stimulating the morale of the Allies and correspondingly depressing that of the Central Powers but also in keeping the Peace Conference from degenerating into a mad scramble for the spoils of war. There can be no question that Wilson's speeches, papers, and messages unitedly form by far the best and most comprehensive statement of American political principles and ideals yet formulated, combining, as they do, the great historic teachings of the United States with attempted applications to world situations.[1] In practice, however, ideal principles usually result in a compromise between what is ultimately best and what is immediately expedient. The President himself in the Versailles treaty had to make compromises in coming to terms with the opportunism of the diplomats of Europe. In some instances, like that of the Shantung matter, he blundered; and his lack of tact on his return in dealing with the Senate and a Congress of opposing politics lost him his victory, so that the treaty was refused indorsement and carried with it to defeat his favorite plan of the League of Nations

[1] His Fourteen Points address of January 8, 1918, for example, may briefly be summarized as laying stress on six principles: open diplomacy, free seas, the open door for commerce, the regulation of armaments, the rights of small nationalities and a fairer readjustment of frontiers, and a League of Nations to mediate among the powers, great and small.

and his pledge of guaranty of France's integrity against a future German attack.[1]

With the incoming of the Harding administration in 1921 it was assumed that the United States would resume its former policy of isolation and non-entanglement. Since the United States had not signed the peace treaties of the allied powers, it became necessary to make a formal declaration of peace and to negotiate separate treaties with the Central Powers, with which, technically, the United States was still at war. On July 2, 1921, a joint resolution of Congress terminating the state of war was signed by the President. The resolution expressly reserved to the United States all the rights and privileges accruing to it through its participation in the war or under the terms of the peace treaties made by the allied powers. These reservations were embodied in a subsequent treaty of peace made between the United States and Germany and signed at Berlin on August 25, 1921, and in treaties with the other Central Powers with which the United States had been at war. In this manner the United States, in theory at least, washed its hands of all concern in the discord and anxieties that beset the states of Europe, and resumed its policy of isolation.[2]

[1] See Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations.

[2] The citizens of the United States have always been rather provincial in respect to European politics, and even yet very little attention is given in the universities to the history and politics of nations other than the United States, although in reply one might truthfully say that theirs pay even less attention to American politics. Very few even of those in public life understand international politics or the governmental systems of Europe and editorials on international politics even in the great dailies sometimes show surprising ignorance. It is a common remark that the average American's opinion respecting Great Britain and France is determined by textbook histories of the Revolution denouncing the British Tory and George III and praising the France of Lafayette. The liberal England and the despotic France of that time, and the respective attitudes of those countries toward the United States since the Revolution, are unknown.

CHAPTER XX

CHANGING POLICIES TOWARD EUROPE[1]

The gods themselves made Europe; it is their playground, their battlefield, their chosen land endowed so as to draw out the achievements of brave men and high-minded women. It is a land of sunshine and of shadow, including the subtropics of the Mediterranean and the beclouded fjords and mountain ranges of the North. Its islands, lying in the soft breezes of sky-blue waters, are dreamy with the lotus, or they throb with the energy of stalwart men in love with tossing waters, preferring the howling of wintry blasts over storm-driven ocean waves. It is a land of fens and marshes, of fair plains watered by many streams, of rolling hills and dark forests, and is capped by snow-clad mountains where hermit souls may in peace contemplate the eternal. Every foot of its soil has been soaked in blood because of human rivalry, but out of that soil and struggle came art, philosophy, moral and spiritual aspirations, the conquests of science, human thought applied to human problems. Asia is old, Africa is dark, America is crudely new, but Europe is the fullness of life, for it combines the weakness of humanity with the energy of divinity. Europe is Athens and Rome, it is Paris and the Rhine, it is the Alps and the land of the midnight sun. In Europe the blessed and Europe the damned, the gods see the mirror of the brute becoming divine.

After the World War. The transitional nature of American politics at present is largely, but not entirely, due to the profound changes brought about through the effects of the World War. Before the war the United States, though potentially a leading nation, felt no special responsibility for world politics except those of the western continent. But the innumerable post-war situations, coupled with the bankruptcy of Europe and the resultant economic problems, so absorbed the attention and energy of the European states that they gave merely perfunctory notice to those situations

[1] See Bibliography, section V.

not immediately pressing and were entirely willing that the United States should assume responsibility in the Far East or wherever else it would. By contrast with their situation the United States had emerged from the war with great prestige and relatively small losses and, though also burdened with its own war debts, had become a great creditor nation, controlling much of the world's capital and almost half its gold. It was readily assumed by Europe, therefore, that America would "take up the white man's burden," would assist in the rehabilitation of Europe, and would take its place at the head of the League of Nations. Without question Europe was really stunned when the United States not only refused to sign the treaty of Versailles or to become a member of the League, but also freed itself from the entanglement of European politics by a return to the policy of isolation,[1] leaving the war-worn nations to extricate themselves from their troubles as best they could.

Back to isolation. With the incoming of the Harding administration and the ratification of special treaties with the Central Powers, many Americans rejoiced that the country had gone back to "normalcy" and to isolation, for Europe during the first five years after the war presented a sorry spectacle. The League of Nations was in existence; but its expected first president, Woodrow Wilson, was not in the chair, nor was the United States a member. Russia was running amuck with its Bolshevist propaganda and seeking to turn the world upside down. Turkey was patiently waiting to be carved and divided among the powers, according to secret treaties. Greece had hopes of gaining Constantinople and of the return of an Alexandrine empire. Italy was dreaming of the restoration of the glory of ancient Rome by making

[1] It has been wickedly remarked that "isolation is a predicament and not a policy."

the Adriatic an Italian lake and by getting foothold in the east Mediterranean and possibly in North Africa at Tunis. France was bemoaning the security guaranties promised but not given by Wilson and Lloyd George, and was scheming to make the Rhine its boundary; it also was wishing for sea control over the west Mediterranean so as to continue "its civilizing mission in Africa" and to insure the passage to and fro of its semicivilized black colonial troops as a potent battle factor for higher civilization and French supremacy. England, with its population so largely unemployed, was seeking to keep them from rebellion and at the same time to placate India, Egypt, Ireland, and the Ulsterites. Germany, in the throes of governmental reorganization and readjustment to the psychological attitudes of a conquered nation, was in black despair over the blindness of its former leaders and the ruin of its hopes. The United States, by contrast with this gloom and turbulence, was so prosperous that its citizens, politically isolated, looked down, as it were, from the golden streets of a peaceful heaven and thanked God that they were exempt from European damnation.

Time in the long run brings solutions to problems, and in Europe matters began to readjust themselves to new situations. The conquered nations contracted themselves into their new boundaries; new nations, like upstarts, tried to elbow their way into a favorable place in the sun even at the expense of their neighbors; the war hate of the first years smoldered dully, ready to break out at slight provocation; the war trenches were refilled with soil, villages were rebuilt, factories sought to reopen as industries, and human beings returned to the vocations of peace; but everywhere were the evidences of despair and pessimism, of misery, poverty, mental lassitude, and moral flabbiness—the effects of the strain of five long years.

The League of Nations and Europe. Under such circumstances the League functioned as best it could, umpiring political crises, safeguarding new states, rehabilitating the defeated powers such as Austria and Hungary, developing administrative machinery, providing for a Permanent Court of International Justice, and seeking through the protocol of October 2, 1924 (which failed of indorsement), to eliminate war by the compulsory arbitration of difficulties and by the limitation of armament. Soviet Russia, after vainly trying to dominate the world by propaganda, sought instead to be received into "good society" by modifying its radicalism, so that in consequence of numerous "recognitions" it is at least an associate of the family of nations if not a full-fledged member. Greece tried its hand at the conquest of Turkey, committed atrocities, aroused a hornets' nest in the form of a reorganized Turkish army, and was glad to back out into its own territory and stay there. Turkey seized the opportunity while its army was powerful to demand full sovereign rights, and got them at Lausanne,[1] since Europe has a profound respect for a victorious army on the march.

The question of the amount of war reparations to be paid by Germany having been vigorously discussed on several occasions without agreement, France brought matters to a crisis by its invasion of the Ruhr (January, 1923), and by a singular coincidence the United States about the same time withdrew its troops from its "piece of the Rhine," returning them to America. Somewhat earlier the United States had created a mild consternation among its European debtor nations by hinting that several notes amounting to some ten

[1] On quite similar lines the United States and Turkey agreed on a treaty at Lausanne also (August 6, 1923). On February 21, 1925, the Committee on Foreign Relations reported this favorably to the Senate, with slight reservations; but the Senate later returned it to the committee for further consideration.

or more billions of dollars were overdue and that it was time to arrange for time and terms of payment. This was a sad blow, for it had been hoped that the United States would cancel the war debts as its further contribution toward the costs of the war. Great Britain was the first of the debtor nations to take the hint and made arrangements for payment of its war loans from the United States.[1] There is a suspicion that it later succeeded in making its annual payments by cornering the rubber market, since the largest part of the annual output is of necessity bought by the United States.[2]

[1] The British war debt was approximately $4,600,000,000, and an agreement for repayment was reached in February, 1923. Several of the smaller debtor states followed Great Britain's example in this matter; but others, more especially the three large debtor states (France, Italy, and Belgium), delayed negotiations. On May 4, 1925, Ambassador Houghton in his Pilgrim Society address at London intimated very clearly that the United States expected these powers to make suitable arrangements at once, asserting that the United States would be glad to coöperate in the peaceful upbuilding of Europe, provided that the European states showed themselves eager to help themselves. Again, in November the American banking group intimated, at the suggestion of the government, that they would not consider making loans to those countries that had not made satisfactory arrangements with the government for the payment of their debts. As a result of these hints Belgium and Italy have completed their arrangements, France has come to terms with the American Debt Commission, though the agreement has not yet been ratified, and the smaller powers have all practically completed arrangements for the settlement of their debts. Russia is as yet the chief exception, owing to its unwillingness to comply with the suggestions of the Department of State.

[2] The London *Morning Post* of July 27, 1925, says: "One country is not entitled to complain if another country raises the price of a commodity. Her remedy is to grow the commodity herself. . . . Even at the risk of charging our American friends too much, it seems wise to maintain the present system with such modifications as experience may devise. If rubber is too high at present, we have at least the consolation that it is helping us maintain exchange and pay the American debt."

The reply to this attitude was voiced by Mr. Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, who, in an address at Erie, Pennsylvania, intimated that unless foreign monopolists ceased to force up the prices of raw material and of native products, such as rubber and coffee, the American government may feel impelled to adopt economic reprisals.—*Current History*, December, 1925, pp. 307–311

Commerce and finance. As for American commercial transactions with Europe and other parts of the world, the ancient principle of the open door is becoming a definite policy in which the United States, in the first place, objects to secret treaties and agreements providing for zones of special economic and commercial privileges and, in the second place, stresses the principle of economic and commercial opportunity for all nations. This first attitude was made clear at Lausanne (1922) by Ambassador Child in connection with secret treaties respecting Turkish natural resources, more especially the tripartite San Remo agreement of 1920 between Great Britain, France, and Italy. The second attitude is illustrated by the commercial treaty of 1923–1925 with Germany, the principles of which serve as standards for new or revised commercial treaties with other countries. The basal principle is equality of commercial treatment through the insertion of a "most favored nation" clause without conditions.[1] The Senate, in ratifying, reserved to Congress the right after one year to revoke those clauses which stipulated that no preferential treatment should be accorded American shipping or goods transported in American bottoms without allowing identical advantages to German goods and shipping. This was probably inserted for precaution's sake, and the right presumably will not be exercised by Congress. If it were, it would result, in the opinion of ex-Secretary Hughes, in a rivalry of discrimination that would be destructive to the interests of American trade. President Wilson in his administration refused to follow the instructions of an act of Con-

[1] Article VII of the treaty, in substance, stipulates that each of the high contracting parties binds itself to give to the nationals, vessels and goods of the other the advantage of every favor, privilege or immunity which it shall have accorded to the nationals, vessels and goods of a third State, and regardless of whether such favored State shall have been accorded such treatment gratuitously or in return for reciprocal compensatory treatment.

gress (the Jones Merchant Marine Act) based on a policy of preferential-tariff treatment of goods carried in American vessels. This would have compelled diplomatic modifications in over twenty important treaties and would have been responsible for endless confusion and tariff wars. This basal treaty with Germany emphasizes the contrary policy, that of fair competition on equal terms to all nations.

Loans by the United States. In respect to the numerous loans made by citizens of the United States to foreign countries, the Department of State has on several occasions given the attitude of the administration toward such loans. In general[1] the government assumes that if American business men are given equal opportunities and fair dealing, they can take care of themselves; if they engage in shady transactions or seek exploiting concessions, they bear their own responsibility and need expect no aid from the government. Neither will the government involve itself or promise the aid of military forces in the collection of debts, nor encourage loans for unproductive purposes or for military purposes. It favors loans made for constructive projects only, and gladly informs investors whether a projected loan conforms to fair standards demanded by the government. Yet even these are not guarantied by the government, since investors must ultimately use their own discretion and make their own decisions. In case of dispute or default the government will use its diplomatic influence to harmonize differences of interpretation and to safeguard in peaceable fashion the rights of its citizens in

[1] In the case of the more backward states in Latin America the United States, anxious to build them up constructively, has on occasions "agreed to a measure of supervision in the maintenance of security for loans which otherwise would have been denied or would have been made only at oppressive rates." Illustrations of this are part of the so-called "dollar diplomacy," as in Nicaragua, for example. Under the police-power theory in the Caribbean, "dollar diplomacy" has its justification.

contracts and loans made on fair conditions, for productive purposes, and in accordance with governmental standards. Under such a policy of justice to borrower and lender alike it is believed that American capital will be welcomed abroad and, on the other hand, that American investors will hesitate to put their money in unapproved or exploiting investments, knowing that the government will not support fraudulent claims but will oppose them.

Reparations. It is said that the Czar was largely influenced to call the first Hague conference (1899) by the argument set forth by Ivan S. Bloch, a Polish economist and banker who published a monumental work the gist of which was published in English as "The Future of War." In his work the author showed that henceforth modern warfare would be on so vast a scale and so fearfully expensive that a really great war would prove financially ruinous to both victor and vanquished. The bankruptcy of Europe at the close of the World War and the utter impossibility of saddling the entire costs of the war on the Central Powers testify to the accuracy of Bloch's main argument. In a small war reparations might be demanded from the conquered and payment be secured with comparative ease, as at the close of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. But in 1918 the tangible assets of the Central Powers were relatively small, and assured future payments could come only from rehabilitated nations gaining large returns from commerce and manufactures in rivalry with the conquering nations—a dilemma that greatly resembles the joking wager "Heads, I win; tails, you lose."

The Dawes Report. The American attitude toward the whole matter of war debts and reparations was clearly indicated by Secretary Hughes in his New Haven speech (December 29, 1922), in which he asserted that in the opinion of the United States the question of reparations must be kept sepa-

rate from that of debts. He suggested a commission of experts, selected from the several allied powers and authorized to present a reparations scheme that might end the deadlock then existing on this question in Europe. He also intimated that experts from the United States would gladly assist and would have the moral backing of the government but not its official backing. By the end of another year this suggestion had been approved by the European governments concerned and a commission of fifteen appointed, working through two sections, of which, respectively, General Charles G. Dawes (United States) and the Right Honorable Reginald McKenna (Great Britain) were chairmen. The outcome was the famous Dawes Report, issued in April, 1924, the recommendations of which were later unanimously adopted and put into effect.

The Dawes settlement illustrated well the attitude of the United States in general to European affairs during the first five years of the existence of the League of Nations. Officially it took no part in the discussions and decisions of Europe respecting economic and political questions. Yet in fact it was deeply interested in the settlement of these many problems and sent "observers" or officials or commissions to sit in an "unofficial and consultative capacity," through whom it may make informal suggestions and receive informal reports of transactions. Again, the United States informally encourages its citizens expert in such matters to help in their private capacity by suggestion or by coöperative action. Furthermore, when decisions are reached, it indicates informally its general attitude, so that American financiers may understand that the administration is or is not averse to their participation in loans or other economic or financial arrangements. Thus in indirect fashion the United States lends unofficial aid and advice, but formally remains isolated and officially knows nothing of what its private citizens are doing in such matters.

Many private citizens, in fact, have been extremely helpful to the League and continue to coöperate with it in every possible way under the conviction that it is perhaps the greatest constructive agency yet developed for world peace.[1]

The League and the United States. The League virtually includes the whole family of nations, excepting Turkey, Russia, the United States, and a very few minor powers.[2] It has become the agency through which take place the many administrative functions necessitated by the growing coöperative activities of the international world. It has become a sort of clearing house for the states, formulating progressive policies in finances, economics, communications, labor legislation, health, and morals. It supervises mandates so as to protect weaker peoples against exploitation, a task of great future importance. It serves as umpire in political disputes among nations and, through the Permanent Court of International Justice, adjudicates justiciable controversies. Since the League has become a permanent institution, now wellnigh indispensable to the working of international adminis-

[1] Two recent outstanding conferences in which the United States took part are (1) the Conference on the International Control of the Traffic in Opium, held at Geneva, November, 1924, to February, 1925 (see pamphlet, May, 1925, issued by the Foreign Policy Association, and "Opium as an International Problem: the Geneva Conferences," by W. W. Willoughby), and (2) the Geneva Arms Traffic Conference held on May 4 to June 17, 1925. Participation on the part of the United States in the first of these was not especially satisfactory, being complicated by the congressional instructions to the delegates. The second conference resulted in a General Convention (signed by eighteen states, including the United States) providing for control of the traffic and for publicity. A special protocol furthered by the United States for the suppression of chemical and bacteriological warfare was signed by the delegates of twenty-nine countries.

[2] Mexico refuses to ask admission or to coöperate because of offended dignity, since at the time the League was organized it was not invited to become a member. Germany under the Locarno Agreements was to apply for membership in the League and became a member in September, 1926. Brazil has withdrawn, but will probably return within two years.

tration, it has become clear that the United States must participate openly, not by backdoor methods, in the work of the League, if not to the full extent, at least in all but purely political issues. The movement in this direction is indicated by its decision to become a member of the Court of International Justice under reservations and to participate in the proposed Disarmament Conference. The admission of Germany into the League (September, 1926) would seem to make it even more imperative that the United States should sit in the Council of Nations so as to share in the discussion of world politics. Isolation from the Council may result in gradual ostracism from participation in affairs of the Eastern Hemisphere. Yet in this vigorous twentieth century the United States can hardly afford to "live in a house by the side of the road" and watch "the race of men go by." Only petty or decrepit states can hold aloof from a world at work.

The United States and Russia. Finally, it may be said that American relations with Russia still remain in an unsatisfactory situation. The treaty of amity and commerce of 1832 was denounced in 1912 by Congress because Russia refused to recognize the rights of naturalized citizens desirous of returning to Russia. As an associate in the World War the United States fought with Russia against the Central Powers, and at the time of the Kerensky revolution (1917) it made a loan to the Russian government to enable it to continue the war. With the incoming of Bolshevism the United States at first tried to coöperate, in the hope that that government also would aid in carrying on the war. But the Soviet government repudiated the public debts of Russia, confiscated all private properties (including those of aliens), and, overflowing with radical enthusiasm, sought by persistent propaganda to convert the political world to its theory of government. Since the new government was in full possession

of governmental authority and seemed to be voicing the popular will, having successfully exercised the right of revolution, under Jefferson's theory it should have been recognized, since other governments should not concern themselves with the form of government adopted by the successful revolutionary government. But the United States, under President Wilson, had in Mexico's case taken a further stand, objecting to recognition on the ground that Huerta had gained the presidency through assassination and that since he was not elected to his office, but usurped it, he did not really represent the wish of the people. Secretary Hughes also, it may be remembered, at first refused to recognize Mexico under Obregón unless the latter would agree to pledge that Mexico, under the constitution of 1917, would make no confiscation of American property rights existing at the time of the adoption of the constitution. These newer attitudes are reflected in the decisions as to the recognition of Russia. Clearly when Soviet Russia sought openly by paid propaganda to overthrow existing forms of government in theoretically friendly states, it became an outlaw among the nations, and the United States with others refused to recognize it. As Secretary Colby said, "We cannot recognize, hold official relations with, or give friendly reception to a government which is determined and bound to conspire against our institutions." When the enthusiasm for propaganda had waned through lack of results, however, the government in Russia adopted a new constitution (July 4, 1923[1]) and made some compromises in its communistic system to harmonize somewhat with the remainder of the financial and economic world. Its form of government seems now to be definitely established, and though in theory

[1] Adapting the document to the articles of confederation (the Alliance of Socialist Soviet Republics) adopted on December 30, 1922. See, for this agreement, *Current History*, March, 1923, pp. 953–955.

federated and democratic, in practice it is a close oligarchy. Asserting that it no longer fostered propaganda and that it had been recognized by practically the whole of the European-Asiatic world as well as by Mexico, Russia hoped to receive recognition at the hands of the United States. Secretary Hughes, however, refused to recognize Russia unless it would first acknowledge the financial obligations of preceding governments and restore confiscated properties to Americans. He emphasized the principle that in international morals a nation must comply with its obligations if it wishes to have equal intercourse with other nations. Russia has refused to make such pledges in advance of recognition as derogatory to its sovereignty, suggesting that such matters might well be settled by conference after recognition. Unquestionably a compromise must soon be reached, since the extreme radicalism of Bolshevism will be more likely to disappear through contact with other states than through ostracism.

CHAPTER XXI

CHANGING POLICIES TOWARD LATIN AMERICA[1]

In the United States the phrase "America for the Americans" means Latin America for the North Americans. The United States is to be feared because she is great, rich, and strenuous. . . .

There are two things that unite us to Spain: the beauty of our common language, and the memory of the anguish we have suffered from the United States. . . .

Nothing attracts us toward our neighbors of the North. By her origin, her education, her spirit, South America is essentially European. We feel ourselves akin to Spain, to whom we owe our civilization and whose fire we carry in our blood; to France, source and origin of the thought that animates us; to England, who sends us her gold freely; to Germany, who supplies us with her manufactures; and to Italy, who gives us the arms of her sons to wrest from the soil the wealth which is to be distributed over the world.[2]

Future importance of Latin America. Very few in the United States seem to realize the future greatness of Latin America, but all indications point to a great forward movement there within this century. In area it is two and three-fifths times the size of the United States; and it is easily the best part of the earth awaiting a more complete utilization, for, all told, its population is only about eighty millions. Its wonderful natural resources are as yet hardly touched, and in later years it will be the food granary of the world. South America's network of rivers will in due time be connected at their headwaters by canals, making almost the whole of that area accessible for navigation. After a century or more of political agitation and turmoil the twenty Latin states are

[1] See Bibliography, sections II and III.

[2] Samuel G. Inman, "Obstacles to Pan-American Concord," in *Current History*, February, 1923.

settling down to study their social problems and to build up their productivity and their trade over land and sea. Before the end of the twentieth century the population of Latin America will probably equal that of the United States,[1] and its wealth, potential and actual, will give it world prestige. Spain and Portugal are now third-rate powers, but as long as the world lasts they will live in their offspring and culture in Latin America.

Immigration. Since the World War the immigration policy of the United States and the act of 1924 especially have compelled the world's surplus population to find other lands to which they may migrate. A knowledge of sanitation and of the nature of tropical diseases is making homes possible in areas formerly considered too deadly for human beings. Both these factors combined tend to turn this surplus population toward Latin America. Into the lower half of South America the Italians more especially are pressing, there being no opportunities for them in the Italian colonies of Africa. Already there is a strong Italian influence in Argentina, which is strengthened by Mussolini's Italian policy to have an Italy overseas *in posse* if not *in esse*. It is not likely that Italy will ever seek to make this connection political while the Monroe Doctrine lasts. In other parts of Latin America colonization projects are also in process of development, of which at present the most ambitious is the movement of Japanese into South America and Mexico. Japan has a permanent commission on emigration which officially reports the settlement of some fifty thousand Japanese in Latin America, two thirds of whom are in Brazil and the other third chiefly in Peru and Mexico. Japan made a treaty of

[1] Java and Cuba are almost equal in size and fertility, but Cuba has a population of less than three millions, whereas Java supports over thirty-three millions.

peace and commerce with Mexico (October 8, 1924) which permits immigration. Through its steamship lines direct to American ports Japan is also seeking to obtain its share of the growing trade of Latin America and to cultivate friendly relations with its states. The Chinese also are to some extent emigrating to these sections and will go in increasing numbers when conditions become peaceful in their own country. In the opinion of present-day ethnologists the native races of Latin America, which, along with those of mixed blood, make up about two thirds of the whole population, are of kindred blood with the Chinese and Japanese; consequently one may anticipate a rapid amalgamation in future years.

It is possible that the racial situation in Hawaii is typical of what will later take place on a greater scale in certain sections of Latin America. The total Oriental population of the islands is about 62 per cent of the whole, and two thirds of it is Japanese. Only about 16 per cent of the population is of Hawaiian blood, pure and mixed. The small Caucasian population of fifty-five thousand is three-fifths Portuguese-Spanish, so that the population of Hawaii is American in name only. Among these several racial stocks amalgamation is taking place; therefore the population a hundred years hence will present a blend of Polynesian, Oriental, and Caucasian characteristics, physical and cultural. In Latin America also, although the civilization may remain Spanish-Portuguese, obviously the real racial stock will be predominantly an amalgamation of other races. In some three or four states, however, owing to the relative scarcity of native population, the Latin element may be in the majority.

Pan-Americanism. As for the relations of the United States with Latin America, it may be said that there is a trend from police-power policies toward the fraternalism

of Pan-Americanism. The fifth Pan-American Congress[1] was held at Santiago, Chile, from March 25 to May 4, 1923. While nothing of startling importance was accomplished, loose ends were gathered up after the long interval of thirteen years, there was a broadening and strengthening of administrative activities, it was agreed that all disputes failing of settlement through diplomatic means be referred to a commission of investigation for report, and the important decision was made that a commission of jurists should meet at Rio de Janeiro to codify Pan-American international law.[2] In preparation for the work of this commission, through the joint efforts of the Pan-American Union and the American Institute of International Law, some thirty projects of conventions will be presented[3] covering a wide range of subjects and especially stressing common rights and guaranties against territorial gains by conquest in the Americas. Most deserving of comment is the recommendation that forbids even the temporary occupation by an American state of the territory of any American republic in order to exercise sovereign powers therein even with the latter's consent, and that also forbids territorial acquisitions obtained by means of war to the detriment of any American republic. These inhibitions, of course, are aimed chiefly at the police-power theory developed by President Roosevelt and applied in the Caribbean.

Central-American Conference. Another important gathering was held at Washington from December 4, 1922, to February 7, 1923,[4] made up of representatives of the five Central American republics. The United States has always

[1] Previous congresses were held at Washington (1889), Mexico City (1901), Rio de Janeiro (1906), and Buenos Aires (1910). The sixth is to be held at Havana within five years from 1923.

[2] The postponed date set for this gathering is April, 1927.

[3] See *American Journal of International Law*, April, 1925, pp. 327–337.

[4] There was in 1921 an abortive movement of the same sort.

shown an interest in the formation of a federation of Central American states, though realizing the difficulties that lie in the way of such a consummation because of pronounced differences in racial, economic, and cultural interests. A Central American peace conference met in 1907 under the auspices of Mexico and the United States, the chief tangible result of which was the establishment of a Central American Court of Justice. But when the court gave decisions against the validity of the Bryan-Chamorro treaty of 1916, Nicaragua, backed by the United States, refused to abide by the decisions, and the court passed out of existence (1917). Several treaties drawn up at this conference and later ratified did not really go into effect owing to unsettled conditions in some of the Central American states.

As a result of its deliberations the conference of 1923 recommended (1) a general treaty of peace and amity and (2) eleven conventions covering the many problems of Central America.[1] Provision was made that each covenant should go into effect among ratifying states when at least three ratified. Not all the covenants have as yet been ratified by the several states, but it seems clear that if they are ratified and carried out in good faith a new era will open for Central America.

In harmony with the same general policy the United States healed its breach with Colombia by an agreement to pay, in

[1] A convention for the establishment of an international Central American tribunal; a convention for the establishment of international commissions of inquiry; a convention for the establishment of free trade; a convention for the unification of protective laws for workmen and laborers; a convention on the practice of the liberal professions; a convention relative to the preparation of projects of electoral legislation; a convention for the establishment of stations for agricultural experiments and animal industries; a convention for reciprocal exchange of Central American students; an extradition convention; a convention for the establishment of permanent Central American commissions; a convention for the limitation of armaments.

five payments, twenty-five millions of dollars as compensation for the latter's losses in Panama.[1] In March, 1925, the Senate ratified as an act of belated justice the Hay-Quesada treaty of 1904,—a treaty that had been pigeonholed for twenty years,—which surrendered to Cuba the sovereignty over the Isle of Pines. Troops have been withdrawn from the Dominican Republic, they were withdrawn in August, 1925, from Nicaragua, and those in Haiti (where no fighting has taken place since 1921) are stationed at Port au Prince and Cape Haitien to protect the Haitian government against insurrection. In South America an outstanding event was the arbitral decision of President Coolidge (March 9, 1925) respecting the controversy over the Arica-Tacna territory, a controversy which has troubled the peace of that region since 1878. Under the terms of the award a referendum in the disputed territory was to take place in the fall of 1925 under the supervision of a commission of three, on which the United States was represented by General J. J. Pershing. Difficulties arose in arranging the details of the plebiscite, however, and it was not held. The controversy still awaits settlement, since negotiations have been broken off (June) and the resultant embitterment forebodes the failure of mediation.

The United States and Mexico. The present situation in Mexico is confusing and needs a historical background for explanation. President Díaz, who was overthrown in 1911, had been for a whole generation a virtual dictator, representing conservative and economic interests and insuring stability. For some years, however, there had been a growing demand for a more democratic system, giving education to the masses and opportunity for them to acquire land and to free themselves from peonage. Madero, who overthrew Díaz, repre-

[1] Ratifications of the treaty were exchanged at Bogotá on March 1, 1922. Payments on this will be completed in 1926.

sented this rising democracy, but was soon assassinated by Huerta, who became president, heading a militaristic régime. President Wilson, however, with his stress on moral principles could not bring himself to recognize Huerta as president, since he had attained the office through treachery and murder. In April, 1914, an attack on American sailors at Tampico and the flag episode brought about a strained situation, and President Wilson ordered the occupation of Vera Cruz by marines landed from the fleet. At this juncture the "ABC powers" of South America offered to mediate, and Wilson accepted their offer so as to share responsibility with Latin states appreciative of Latin situations. Beyond the recommended recognition of Carranza, however, no practical results followed from the conference.

The upshot of the whole matter was that Huerta resigned, the navy withdrew from Vera Cruz, Carranza (representing the democratic movement) became president and was recognized as head of the *de facto* government, and Wilson settled down to a policy of "watchful waiting." Unfortunately Villa, half bandit, half patriot, stirred up trouble by a raid on Columbus, New Mexico. The Pershing expedition went to Mexico in pursuit (1916), but withdrew without tangible results except the irritation of Mexican susceptibilities. In 1917, under Carranza, a new constitution was adopted containing certain supposedly confiscatory provisions (Article 27) that profoundly stirred American investors in Mexico. Just then the United States entered the World War and Mexican affairs were sidetracked. In 1920 Carranza was killed in another revolution, and on September 5 Obregón became president by election and was inaugurated on December 1. Mixed with this whole situation was the struggle of vested oil interests, British and American, loudly protesting against the turmoil in Mexico and demanding settled condi-

tions at any price. From Wilson's standpoint it was a case of ideals against interests, and he preferred to see the latter suffer rather than to recognize a murderer as president or to make war on Mexico because of its outrages against American life and property.

Under Harding's administration the question of the recognition of Mexico came to the front, complicated, as it was, by the unrest in Mexico, by its need for finances, and by its loss of credit owing to confiscations, destruction of property, and claims for damages. Secretary Hughes at first offered a recognition (May, 1921) based on the condition that Mexico agree to safeguard American property rights existent before the adoption of the constitution of 1917, but this was promptly rejected by Obregón on the ground that such a recognition would seriously impair the sovereignty of Mexico. After continued negotiations, preliminary arrangements were made in respect to claims and finances, a judicial interpretation of the confiscatory provisions of the new Mexican constitution was given, and, on the basis of these agreements and understandings, Obregón's government was recognized (August 31, 1923). When an insurrection later broke out under De la Huerta, the United States, as an evidence of good will, placed an embargo on arms going to rebellious Mexicans and sold war material to the government itself that it might the more efficiently suppress rebellions. At the end of his term of office Obregón retired; and Calles, elected by popular vote to the presidency, was inaugurated on November 30, 1924. Like his predecessor, Calles favored radical measures aiming to develop prosperous farming and working classes, and hence continued the plan of confiscating landed estates for division among the peons and of placing curbs on unbridled capitalism by trying to hold Mexico's natural resources for the benefit of Mexicans themselves.

On June 12, 1925, following a conference with President Coolidge and Ambassador Sheffield, Secretary Kellogg for some unexplained reason made a statement to the press to the effect that the American government would continue to support the Mexican government only so long as "it protects American lives and American rights and complies with its international engagements and obligations." On the face of it the statement was offensive to the dignity of a sovereign neighbor state and was certainly undiplomatic as coming from the Secretary of State of a great nation. President Calles replied two days later, also through the press, asserting that Secretary Kellogg's statement embodied a threat to the sovereignty of Mexico which the latter could not overlook, and that Mexico "does not accord to any foreign country the right to intervene in any form in its domestic affairs, nor is it disposed to subordinate its international relations to the exigencies of another country." As President Calles was *persona non grata* to American investors, there was a suspicion that they were behind Secretary Kellogg's action. Secretary Kellogg's statement seemed to imply a return to the police-power theory as applied to Mexico and a renewal of attempts to place Mexico in political subordination to the policies of the United States, but it was more likely due to some error of judgment. Mutual explanations have since been informally made, and the more conciliatory policy is to be continued.

Naval mission to Brazil. Shortly before the opening of the Pan-American Conference at Santiago, Brazil announced its determination to build a more adequate navy, in view of the fact that its ships were rapidly becoming obsolete through age and had been weakened through service in European waters during the World War. The conference reached no decision as to limitation of armaments, owing to differences

of opinion among the "ABC powers." Brazil, after the conference, in pursuance of its determination to strengthen its navy at least to equal that of Argentina, requested advice from the United States. A commission of naval officers, under the leadership of Rear Admiral Vogelgesang, went to Brazil, placing at the latter's disposal the benefit of their experience and friendly advice. Had the United States not sent this mission, Great Britain would have been asked to send one and would gladly have consented, having in former years reorganized the Chilean navy. The mission was of great assistance to Brazil, returning to the United States (February, 1925), after a stay of over a year. In asking for this mission Brazil showed its friendly attitude to the United States, and the latter's cheerful compliance was greatly appreciated. It is not likely that Brazil has any intention of using its little navy aggressively, though Argentina, a sort of traditional rival, professed anxiety and also took measures to strengthen its navy.

Canada in the Caribbean. A new factor in the situation in the Caribbean is the series of trade treaties, announced in the month of July, 1925, arranged for a twelve-year period between Canada and Great Britain's possessions in the West Indies and the Caribbean region. These treaties provide for mutual tariff preferences and for regular lines of steamers, and are designed to bring the British American colonies into closer relations. Aside from the competition involved in the West Indian trade, the question of developing a Canadian interest in the Caribbean has many possibilities, such as absorption of British colonies into the Dominion, and Canadian participation in the Pan-American congresses.

The League and Latin America. A curious situation arises in the Americas from the complications brought about by the organization of the League of Nations. All the states

of the western continent are members of the League except the United States, Mexico, and Ecuador. Brazil is still a member but has given notice of withdrawal at the end of the two-year period. As members these Latin states are brought in close touch with world affairs and display ardent interest in the League and its objects, sending as their delegates some of the League's best and most intelligent working members. In this fashion the Latin states, and more especially the states of Europe, are drawing closer together, a more natural connection in many respects than that with the United States or Canada. It is not at present likely that the League would in any essential matter try to interfere with existing relations in the Americas, especially in view of Article 21 of the Covenant, which reads "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." But it is entirely conceivable that in later years (assuming that the United States does not become a member) the League may be in honor bound to take cognizance of strained situations on this continent in defense of member states. In this there is the possibility of a friction in which the interests of the Latin-American countries would place them in opposition to the United States, supported as they would be by the influence and growing power of the League. This is by no means a chimerical supposition, but one that might become very probable if the United States seemed to be aggressive toward its neighbors without sufficient justification.

Latin America and Europe. There is, furthermore, a strong sentiment in the Latin-American countries that their real affiliations should be with their European kindred—the Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Italian. Thus there may

develop in Latin America a *cultural* association that may lead it to look askance on Anglo-American advances from North America voicing a somewhat alien culture. In other words, the old grievances and attitudes of the nineteenth century against Europe are dead so far as the Latin-American states are concerned. With the quickening of communication between nations the states of Latin America will increasingly realize that they are not merely American and restricted to American problems, but that they have fraternal ties with their kinsfolk in west Europe and with the whole field of contacts in Europe and the nearer East and even also in the Far East, with which they may have increasing commercial and racial contacts. Pan-Americanism may have a sort of attraction; but if the theory of the United States is that the Latin states are satellite states revolving about a North American sun, this will hardly appeal to them. The United States, therefore, should consider the whole American situation somewhat broadly, not with its former unilateral provincialism; it should put itself in imagination in the place of its neighbors and endeavor to see American situations in the light of the larger twentieth century. The Latins, like ourselves, are idealistic, and it should be fairly easy for both sets of interests and culture to work out common policies based on a mutual comprehension of each other's points of view.

CHAPTER XXII

CHANGING POLICIES TOWARD THE FAR EAST[1]

There is every reason to believe that the fundamental cause for present disturbances in China is due to special privileges given foreign nations in treaty pacts and that the abolition of extra-territorial rights of foreigners is necessary to China's administrative integrity and sovereignty. The Chinese are an ancient and honorable people who have developed a distinctive culture of rare qualities and they have a right to demand the respect and deference accorded to national sovereignty.—Open letter from President Green of the American Federation of Labor to President Coolidge[2]

We feel our civilization has its own distinct value for, and its own distinct place in, the life of the world. Japan never will use her power as a weapon of selfish aggression—the most stupid act a nation can commit—but for the preservation of her Japanese heritage she will make any sacrifice. To the perfection of this heritage our sister nations have contributed much. These contributions we gladly acknowledge. Our one desire is to go forward in equal honor with those nations, each placing its special gifts at the service of all.—VISCOUNT KATO, prime minister of Japan[3]

The Pacific. The deepening interest in the Pacific on the part of the United States is very marked. Territorial accessions for eighty years past, one after the other, indicate the geographic and economic bases on which this interest is developed. The building of the Panama Canal touched the imagination of Americans and definitely turned their attention to the South Seas and the Far East. The Canal is a paying investment and is only at the beginning of its possibilities. In due time other canals at Nicaragua and possibly in Colombia (the Atrato River route) may be needed to supplement

[1] See Bibliography, section IV.

[2] Associated Press, dated July 12, 1925.

[3] Special article by Edward Price Bell in *Providence Journal*, June 27, 1925.

the main canal. This coastwise water route is of immense assistance in developing communication between coast lines on the Pacific and the ports of the Atlantic and the Gulf, and traffic will steadily work its way southward along South American shores and northward in the Pacific toward Alaska and eastern Asia. The main war fleet of the United States is henceforth to be based on the Pacific and not on the Atlantic, as heretofore. This will shift the center of interest and will necessitate other bases and docks along the Pacific coast. The Pacific ports already feel the stimulus of their coming greatness and are planning for large populations and business of later years. Before long an aërial service will develop which in due time, using as stepping-stones the Aleutian Islands to the north and the island groups of the South Seas, will develop speedy communication between the Americas and "farther west."

The dividing line between East and West is marked by the strongly fortified base of the United States at Pearl Harbor, flanked at the north by Dutch Harbor and at the south by Pago Pago. Beyond lies Australasia, as large as the United States. There white supremacy has been emphasized by the erection, along with Canada and the United States, of immigration barriers. Latin America, with its line of states on the Pacific, is still open to immigration from all nations. Its area is approximately equal to that of Australasia, Canada, and the United States combined. In the Far East lies the world's population, crowded in the extreme and desirous of expansion into newer countries as yet thinly populated. This congestion of population in southern and eastern Asia is perhaps the most serious problem confronting the peoples of the Pacific and Indian oceans. Siberia and Mongolia may absorb the expanding hordes from northern China, and possibly India will

pass its surplus westward and into Africa; but the southern Chinese and the Japanese can look only eastward and southward if they desire to migrate from their home shores under the pressure of Malthusian situations.

The mandate. It may be that in due time the mandate commission of the League of Nations may work out a partial solution for this racial problem; for in later years the idea of the mandate promises to be one of the chief contributions of the League, working in behalf of those parts of the earth as yet occupied by the semicivilized. In the American Revolutionary period the states on the Atlantic surrendered to the Confederation their land claims to the west, to be held in trust for future generations. It may be that in later years the undeveloped tropical lands may be given in trust to the League to work out common problems in respect to racial distribution and the safeguarding and upbuilding of the lower cultural races. Meanwhile the nations of the Pacific have begun to get together at Honolulu to discuss their own problems—the press, education, and (in 1925) the Institute of Pacific Relations (June 30 to July 14), aiming by joint discussion to work out common policies leading to "understanding and peace in the Pacific."[1]

Island groups of the Pacific. The United States has a part in the island world of the Pacific. By negotiation with Japan and Great Britain it has sought, in harmony with the maturer policy of the open door as exemplified by the new commercial treaty with Germany, to maintain an open door to commerce in the mandate islands taken from Germany by Japan and Great Britain. The visit also of the Pacific fleet to Australasia in the summer of 1925 and the floating of an Australian loan by American bankers gave evidences of grow-

[1] See Report of Institute of Pacific Relations. Honolulu, 1925.

ing good feeling on both sides[1] and a desire to coöperate in commercial relations. Again, through the four-power treaty the status quo of the legal ownership of the south and central groups is guarantied, and through the naval treaty there is a set area in the Pacific within which no additional fortifications are to be erected. Within this area lie Guam and the Philippines, both of which, notwithstanding the agitation of the Filipinos, will presumably be retained under the sovereignty of the United States, though doubtless practically complete autonomy will be granted to the Philippine Islands proper. It is assumed that if this island group were given complete freedom, with no guaranty of its integrity, its independence could not long be maintained. Its strategic importance is so great, to say nothing of its enormous potential wealth, that in later years it would inevitably become a prize for which both Japan and Great Britain would compete. The United States, as a peaceful non-Asiatic power in possession, arouses no animosity on either side, since the islands are but slightly fortified and are open to the world's commerce. If held by either of the other powers and fortified, a struggle would become inevitable. Even if the Democratic party, pledged as it is to Philippine independence, came into power in the United States, it is hardly conceivable that under the

[1] The people of the United States of America have shown to the world its will of peace and its deep desire to strengthen the bonds of friendship between nations. Under the guidance of your Government the powers and peoples of the Pacific have given practical effect to this will and this desire, and the achievements of the Washington conference are the happiest augury for the future peace of the world.

The visit of the United States fleet will strengthen the friendship between our peoples and widen and deepen our mutual understanding. Australia trusts that under divine guidance we shall realize the destiny that lies before us in peace and amity with all the nations of the world.—Baron Henry William Forster, governor-general of Australia. (Special communication in reply to a message from President Coolidge, July 27. *New York Times*, July 28, 1925.)

changed situations in the Pacific it would surrender control. Should the United States retain control and the British maintain their South Pacific fleet at a strongly fortified naval base (Singapore), the South Pacific would definitely and finally become Anglo-American in control and culture, the term "American" including also the Latins of the South Pacific and the Canadians of the north. Presumably the French, when they become weary of their holdings in the South Seas, will surrender ownership to Great Britain or the United States as part payment of their war debt.

The Far East. In the Far East the American historic policy is that of the open door, but since the Washington Conference it has broadened out in harmony with the several treaties then agreed on. The United States has now a Pacific policy based on the preservation of the integrity of China, the open door in China *and* in the Pacific, and the maintenance of a *pax Pacifica* by coming to terms with Japan in respect to the problems of the Pacific and the Far East. At the Conference the naval ratio gave Japan a fleet amply sufficient for defense but not for attack; the non-fortifications agreement gave it a northern area in which its fleet could be supreme; and by the four-power pact the status quo of its island possessions, not counting Japan proper, is guarantied.

China. In all this the underlying desire of the United States was to secure to China its domination over its own affairs and territory, subject, however, to existing arrangements which China, partly under compulsion, had made with the powers. The nine-power treaty went into effect, through the delayed ratification by France, on July 7, 1925.[1] The desire of the United States in this matter is that China as

[1] France ratified the naval and four-power treaties on July 11, 1923; ratifications of the nine-power treaty were exchanged on August 5, 1925.

speedily as possible be permitted by the powers to become a completely sovereign state, such as Japan became thirty years ago and Turkey in 1923. By treaty agreements among the powers China was in part (postal control and foreign troops) released from international domination, the granting of concessions or territorial privileges was to be discontinued, and commissions were to be organized to consider questions of extra-territoriality and of increase of customs charges to give the Chinese government a larger revenue.

But in late years affairs in China have been in rapid movement. The Chinese of the newer generation, many of whom were trained in Europe, America, Japan, or in the many missionary schools of China, have become convinced that China should at once resume its sovereignty and determine its own policies without dictation from alien powers. But among themselves there are many factions emphasizing different political points of view. Some few prefer a return to the empire, with a stress on ancient institutions; militarism, voiced by the dominant Tuchuns, or provincial war governors, prefers powers centralized at Peking; most prefer in theory a loose federation, with large powers in the provinces;[1] there is a separation of interests between north and south and between the commercial, manufacturing east and the rural west; and again there are factions voicing the influence of Japan, or of Russia, or of Great Britain. These conflicting interests result in internal wars and bitter dissensions; on one issue only they all unite—China must be for the Chinese.

In view of present situations, now that the nine-power treaty is in full effect, President Coolidge has arranged, more especially with Great Britain and Japan, for conferences on customs and extra-territoriality, but presumably also to take

[1] See the revised constitution in *Current History*, January, 1924, pp. 660–665. Another constitution is in process of preparation.

into account the whole situation, which demands careful consideration prefaced by the full conviction that temporizing or halfway measures will be of no avail. China has become convinced that "the only way to resume is to resume." Nothing short of a definite assurance of freedom from foreign control, and at no distant time, will satisfy China. The pledge of that freedom would soon restore peace and unify present discordant factions. The new situations that demand careful consideration are (1) the rise of an intelligent student class, intensely patriotic, who, as the intellectuals, easily assume leadership in Chinese public opinion; (2) the rise of a commercial, manufacturing, financial (bankers) set of interests that is fairly familiar with Western civilization and convinced that Western supremacy is no longer needed in China; (3) the growing power of a Chinese press, creating a public opinion, which is strengthened also by platform addresses of Chinese students—for they are naturally eloquent and very effective as speakers; (4) a keen sense of the handicaps to national progress because of the exploitation of Chinese natural resources by foreigners, who often attain through bribery concessions and special privileges of a value out of all proportion to the costs; (5) the attitude of Soviet Russia, which has fully recognized China's sovereignty, promoted its representative to the rank of ambassador, and shown generosity to China by yielding claims based on former exploitations.

The Chinese are of the opinion that if China were free from foreign control it would be able to restore order in the provinces, to revise its tariff system, and, by an increase in customs charges, to fund the national debt (about a billion and a half dollars). It could develop its roads, canals, and ports, could build up its own manufactures under suitable regulation of hours and sanitation, and could devote large grants to education, now so neglected yet so eagerly desired.

Meanwhile its chief hope lies in the United States as its traditional friend and sponsor for the open-door policy. Imperialistic Russia was formerly an object of suspicion to China, but now is friendly and has made a treaty with China on equal terms.[1] Great Britain was never popular in China, but became less so in view of its treaty with Japan (1902), which virtually turned China over to the tender mercies of Japan. Yet the British themselves are personally popular,—perhaps more so than are the Americans, who so frequently lack *savoir faire*. The Japanese, formerly despised by the Chinese as inferiors, have been feared by them since 1894 because of their effective military and naval organization; their officials in China are rarely popular, being haughty and domineering. Japan's attitude toward China during the World War has never been forgiven and has resulted in China's "day of humiliation."[2] Although the Chinese have confidence in the honesty and intentions of the United States government, they have small confidence in it except in an advisory and mediatory capacity, since its actions are usually belated and are apparently influenced by its desire to work in unison with other powers in Far Eastern questions. China's hope is that

[1] The text of the agreement between Soviet Russia and China, ratified by China on June 17, 1924, may be found in *Current History*, September, 1924, pp. 960–961. Comment on its provisions by a Japanese may be found on pages 955–959 and a general statement by a Chinese on pages 950–955. The treaty on the part of Russia cancels all agreements, treaties, special privileges, and concessions held by czarist Russia, its portion of the Boxer indemnity, its claims over Outer Mongolia, and its rights of extra-territoriality and consular jurisdiction. Provisions are also made respecting a commercial treaty, the readjustment of customs, and the situation of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. It is throughout a generous treaty, made on the "basis of equality, reciprocity, and justice," and must have been soothing to the national pride of the Chinese and in marked contrast to the treatment dealt out to it by other states. It has greatly strengthened national patriotism and necessitates similar treaties by other powers if only they interpret correctly the significance of Russia's action.

[2] May 9, 1915, when China was compelled to sign the twenty-one demands.

the United States will definitely and firmly assert a leadership among Western powers in Far Eastern matters and announce itself as prepared to favor China's complete independence in the shortest time possible for readjustment after discussion as to the time and methods of accomplishing it. A rehabilitated China, freed from control, would naturally form a moral entente with those in favor of peace in the Pacific. Its civilization is based on peace and a disbelief in the utility of war; and if once assured of security against war and sympathetically aided in readjustment, it would rapidly pass into the era of applied science and become a great nation.

The United States and Japan. As for Japan, it no longer has any intention of warring against the United States—if it ever did cherish any such design. The outcome of the World War showed the immense potential and actual strength of the United States. By contrast, Japan had no friends in the world at that time; it suffered heavy commercial and financial losses in the years immediately following the war; and the great earthquake of 1923, with its heavy loss of life and property, came as a final blow and weakened the morale of the people, showing as it did that nature in a day may destroy the toil of a generation. The Washington Conference really proved to be most helpful to Japan. Aside from the gains in security obtained from the treaties, Japan again came into friendly relations with the United States, readjusted its relationship with Great Britain on a satisfactory basis, and had the apparent determination to work with those two powers as far as possible. At the time of the Conference it adjusted with the United States complications over the island of Yap and the mandate islands; by coming to an agreement with China in respect to Shantung it removed that point of friction, since the people of the United States were strongly opposed to Japan's occupation of that famous peninsula; and

in April, 1923, the Lansing-Ishii agreement, no longer of importance since the making of the nine-power treaty, was formally canceled. Moreover, Japan's aggressions against China before 1921 were legally forgotten, and the net result in gains during the war period was considerable. Japan was enabled, as it were, to start over again with a clean slate and to readjust its policies to the new situations.

Yet there were still problems to face, more especially the relations with Russia and the immigration problem with the United States. In respect to China, Japan's newer attitude was that of conciliation on the basis of the status quo, with a sort of implication that it would act as leader in the Far East and exercise indirect authority in China's political affairs. As for the immigration problem, Japan maintained strictly the terms of the "gentlemen's agreement," and of its own accord barred out "picture brides" so as to ease friction. The sympathy and aid given by the United States at the time of the great earthquake and fire, as well as its prompt assistance in the form of a loan, were gratefully appreciated by Japan, so that an era of good will was rapidly developing. Then, like a thunderbolt, came the passage of the Japanese exclusion act of May, 1924, to take effect on July 1 of that same year. It was the year of a presidential election, just before the nominating conventions, and the vote of the Pacific coast was in general anti-Japanese. The innocent use of the term "grave consequences" by Ambassador Hanihara, which Secretary Hughes should have had softened, aroused anger in the Senate under the instigation of Senator Lodge, the phrase being interpreted as a "veiled threat." Secretary Hughes and President Coolidge both protested against the clause excluding all aliens not eligible to citizenship, but to no avail. The sober opinion of the country as a whole is probably against the exclusion; for if Japan had been put on the

same basis as other nations but one hundred and forty-six annually would have been permitted to enter the United States, a negligible quantity. As it is, the Congress, without good reason, deeply offended a proud and sensitive nation and aroused into activity the latent hostility in Japan against the United States. Though deeply wounded at the racial insult, the Japanese government officially maintained its dignity and made a formal protest (May 31). It rather assumes that at a later time the Congress will modify its action and put Japan on the same basis as that of other civilized nations.[1] Henceforth July 1 becomes Japan's "day of humiliation," to be observed by the whole nation as long as the exclusion clause works against Japan.

Japan and Russia. It presumably was this action of the United States that determined Japan to push to completion its negotiations with Russia which in some form or other had been under discussion for nearly four years. The original

[1] Japan assumes that in due time the United States will recognize in its policies the principle of racial equality among civilized nations. Since Japan is admittedly a civilized nation, its nationals would therefore receive in the United States the same privileges as those granted to the nationals of other civilized nations. If this principle were recognized, Congress would necessarily authorize the naturalization of others than "free white persons and aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent." In that case the quota provision of the immigration act of 1924 would apply to Japan on the same conditions as to other nations, remembering that the act does not bar out Japanese by name but as "aliens ineligible to citizenship." Japanese resident in the United States, therefore, would become eligible to naturalization and could claim the same civil rights as are allowed to resident nationals of other states. Such a change would automatically nullify the intent of the land laws of the Pacific coast aimed at the Japanese, which by their terms seek to exclude persons "ineligible to citizenship" from ownership of land.

From the standpoint of international relations this desire on Japan's part has a firm basis in international custom, and its acceptance on the part of the United States would remove one of the chief causes of friction now existing between the two countries. A refusal to admit the principle of racial equality must necessarily be based on domestic situations and policies, so important inherently as to dwarf relatively the international principle.

conditions laid down by Japan in its negotiations with the Far Eastern (Soviet) Republic in 1921–1922 were harsh, but by 1924 they were considerably softened. The Washington Conference had been held, at which Secretary Hughes openly urged Japan to withdraw its troops from Siberia. On second reflection the advice seemed good to Japan: Russia was unquestionably "coming back," with implied threat it was demanding Japan's evacuation of Russian territory, and it was soon to make with China the treaty of 1924. Siberia was evacuated (October, 1922), except northern Sakhalin, and after July 1, 1924, negotiations were pushed, concessions were made, and a treaty[1] was finally ratified (January 21, 1925). The Soviet government was itself delighted to get recognition from Japan and to come to terms with it, and made large economic concessions in eastern Siberia and northern Sakhalin, from which Japan withdrew its troops. Obviously Russia, having established treaty relations with China and Japan, is once again in the politics of the Far East and has henceforth a powerful voice in the affairs of eastern Asia.

It is clear that Japan still has its problems to face in eastern Asia. If it could transplant its surplus population to eastern Siberia, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia and settle it on the land as farmers, the future would look brighter; but the Japanese do not like the severe cold of the north, nor can they compete as colonists with the Chinese, who are steadily moving northward. Possession of new soil is ultimately determined in favor of those who cultivate it, and in this respect the future belongs to China. Japan's needed raw materials from the continent must come by agreement, not by conquest, and under newer theories of commercial intercourse private concessions are no longer favored, but rather

[1] For an explanation of the treaty see *Current History*, May, 1925, pp. 240-244.

open covenants openly made and open to free competition. It may be that the future of the East will be determined not by the sword, but by applications of science, intelligence, and high moral standards in business and in world politics. The League of Nations, in which Japan takes a deep interest, is steadily increasing its influence in promoting such standards in the political world.

In Far Eastern situations the voice of Siberian Russia is no small factor. After the downfall of the Empire in 1917 eastern Siberia went through many trials and tribulations owing to the conflict of warring factions and the presence of the allied troops. After troops of other nations had been withdrawn, the Japanese troops stayed on, Japan probably hoping that it might remain in permanent possession, perhaps as far west even as Lake Baikal. In connection with the Washington Conference Secretary Hughes had announced that the United States would see to the protection of Russian interests, since that country had not been invited to send delegates to the Conference, though delegates from eastern Siberia were unofficially present at Washington. This protection took the form of an open and urgent insistence that Japan should evacuate its troops from Siberia according to agreement. Japan took the advice; and by the end of that year (1922) the troops had been withdrawn from the mainland and Russia had resumed possession. This enabled the two countries to renew negotiations, and in due time came the recognition and the peace treaty, as already explained.

It is becoming obvious that Russia in the East has become an important factor and that it hardly seems possible to work out permanent policies without taking Russia into account. Its influence in northern China is powerful, enough so to make Japan nervous. It apparently desires to retain its interests in northern Manchuria; and if so, it will be in touch

with Korean patriotic malcontents, who may find Russia not unsympathetic with their desire to be free from Japan. Perhaps Russia still longs for "open water" on the Pacific and regrets the loss of its Pacific fleet. It has regained all its territories from Japan, though it has yielded large economic and fishing concessions. Whether Japan really can make use of these concessions is an open question; for the Japanese are personally unpopular in eastern Siberia, and Russian diplomats and administrative officers, whether czarist or Bolshevist, use tortuous methods in their negotiations and apparently are not too strictly bound by their pledges. At any rate, the Russian bear is once more on the Pacific and is in diplomatic fellowship with China and Japan. Consequently conferences and agreements that fail to take into account Russian desires will not be likely to prove permanent. One might suppose, therefore, that before long Russia must be recognized, so that its representatives may sit in conferences that discuss the affairs of eastern Asia.

The Chinese Eastern Railroad. The really important point at issue in the present political relations of Russia and Japan centers in Manchuria. This territory, rich in fertile lands and natural resources, is in area about equal in size to British Columbia, including lower Alaska, or is somewhat larger than the combined area of the three Pacific commonwealths of the United States: California, Oregon, Washington. It is nominally under the sovereignty of China, and its population is chiefly Chinese and will remain so, owing to a steady immigration, chiefly from Shantung.

In September, 1896, following the Lobanoff treaty of that year, Russia secured from China concessions and a contract, through the Russo-Chinese Bank, for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railroad from Chita to Vladivostok, a distance of about 950 miles, thereby shortening the route of



MAP OF MANCHURIAN RAILROADS

travel over 500 miles as against the Siberian line along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers.

In March, 1898, through pressure Russia induced China to lease to it the Liaotung Peninsula with the port of Port Arthur, and also secured a concession for a connecting line (the Southern Manchurian Railroad) between Harbin and Port Arthur. These concessions gave Russia virtual control over the whole of Manchuria, and through its strategic position it became a potential threat to north China, Korea, and Japan. The Russo-Japanese war was the outcome of this situation, resulting in Japan's supplanting Russia in southern Manchuria and in the annexation of Korea.

In 1909 Secretary Knox in behalf of China and the open door, which was fast closing in Manchuria, proposed the internationalization of the railway systems of Manchuria, but his proposal was coldly received and rejected by Russia and Japan. The World War made the Chinese Eastern Railroad the shuttlecock of politics, its control passing from nation to nation for the next ten years.

Amid many-sided protests from the other powers having financial interests in the road, Russia and China, May 31, 1924, came into agreement by treaty and provided for a joint management of the Chinese Eastern. Within a short time Chang Tso-lin, who is the real ruler in Manchuria but supposedly under Japanese control, arose in rebellion against the Chinese government and himself secured from Russia an agreement, September 20, 1924, virtually placing his government in control instead of the central government at Peking, much to the chagrin of that government, which naturally charged Russia with bad faith. The whole situation has therefore become a complex tangle of events in which Russia and Japan are maneuvering for position, each hoping to become the final victor in the struggle for the control of the

railroad and of northern Manchuria. Japan has its back to the wall, fighting to retain its hold on the mainland, without which it would lose its supremacy in the west Pacific. China hopes that in due time it may again reassert a real sovereignty over a land so essential to its safety, relying on the fact that its racial population will actually be in possession. Russia, even though Soviet, realizes the importance of open water and will never rest contented with the present domination of Japan in that region. All in all, Manchuria threatens to become a sort of Asiatic Poland or Alsace-Lorraine.

CHAPTER XXIII

TREND IN NATIONAL POLICIES

God of our fathers, known of old,
Lord of our far-flung battle-line,
Beneath whose awful Hand we hold
Dominion over palm and pine—
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget—lest we forget!

The tumult and the shouting dies;
The captains and the kings depart:
Still stands Thine ancient sacrifice,
An humble and a contrite heart.
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget—lest we forget!

RUDYARD KIPLING

On July 4, 1926, the United States sought to honor the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, the legal birthday of the nation. Naturally at that time the speakers made glowing comparisons between the situations of 1776 and today, stressing increase in area, in population, in wealth, and in international prestige. Yet all moralists, ancient and modern, emphasize the point that "pride goeth before a fall," and there is significance in the former ecclesiastical requirement that the night before knighthood must be spent in solitude and prayer. Power brings obligations, and world leadership should inspire a thoughtful appreciation of future responsibilities rather than boastful comparisons of the present as against the past.

Youth of the earth. Before the rise of modern science man used to believe that this human world of ours had reached old age and was decadent, thus banishing hope of any permanent progress. Science now teaches that mankind is yet in its infancy, and that practically an eternity lies ahead before the sun loses its heat and the earth becomes cold and unable to support life. Nor is it longer held that nations must inevitably "rise and fall." Those nations fall that lack forethought and that fail to husband their natural resources carefully. On the other hand, those nations are likely to survive that study thoroughly the situations environing them and plan out policies of a permanent sort which will promote the general welfare of their peoples. The United States, therefore, at the beginning of a new half-century of national existence, should make a survey of its situations and should study the trend of world politics, the better to comprehend the place that it may take in world action as a leading state in the family of nations.

A hundred and fifty years ago Europe practically made up the known world, the remainder of which was altogether unknown, or known only on its borders or fringes. Civilization was backward; science and its applications were almost unknown; and travel by land or sea was difficult, dangerous, and tedious in the extreme. In these days, by contrast, distance is rapidly becoming negligible; the whole of the world is fairly well known, including the two poles; and the isolations of the past are rapidly disappearing. This is the age of the utilization of natural power, through which have come the railroad, the steamer, the airship, the cable, the telegraph, the telephone, and the radio, tending to make into one people all the nations of the earth. Henceforth distances and isolation should be considered as diminishing factors and the world should be looked at as a unit whose parts are relatively

in close proximity. The Americas, though a hemisphere, have shrunk to an island group in the world-encircling ocean, having on the one side Europe and Africa and on the other the Asiatic lands at the west and the islands of the South Seas. Yet the American lands, lying, as they do, between the two great land masses, occupy a strategic situation extending practically from pole to pole and looking both east and west. Henceforth nothing really important can happen in the world without concern to the nations of the Americas.

By implication a unified geographic world should result in a unified mankind, but that is by no means the situation. The world's population is rapidly expanding; and international states vie one with the other for the possession of favored regions, thus producing rivalries and occasional wars, since a state once in possession tends to monopolize the land and to place restrictions on the immigration of the nationals of other states. Expanding populations hemmed in by what seem to them too narrow boundaries readily incline to take by force if possible the coveted lands of their neighbors. The expansion policies of Germany and Japan during the last twenty-five years, and the closing door in the immigration policies of Australasia, Canada, and the United States during the same period, illustrate the two aspects of this point. The whole of the land surface of the earth is now held in possession by the sixty or more states of the world, and each asserts its right to bar out from its territory alien settlements unless exceptions are made by treaty. Already there are indications of the coming struggle of the races for the right to utilize lands held but only slightly utilized. The yellow and brown races are at present kept from expanding out of their boundaries, but in due time they may demand their place in the sun and may strive to push northward, westward, and into Africa.

In earlier centuries racial and national competition was chiefly concerned with the struggle for hunting, grazing, and farming lands to secure needed food supplies for expanding numbers, but then came competition for trade routes and commercial facilities and for the control of supplies of raw material essential to manufactures. In late years the products of the tropics have brought about a struggle for the control of tropical lands. The great nations of the present are competing keenly for sovereignty over the equatorial belt of lands, realizing their future importance as reservoirs of foods, timbers, and metals. There is also in the industries a steadily increasing demand for metals and fuels, including oils, and this gives intensity to national rivalry in the competition for these essentials in modern economic life. Underlying the foreign policies of states, therefore, are the perennial competitions of the nations for lands, foods, and natural wealth to meet the demands of their expanding populations.

The Americas. The Americas are enormously rich in natural resources still largely undeveloped because tropical and arctic climates are as yet deterrents to human activity. Lying, as they do, between the great land masses of the earth, the Americas are becoming a thoroughfare in passing from east to west or from west to east. The Panama Canal and transcontinental railroads already indicate this, and one may expect that in later years railroad thoroughfares will find their way from western Europe to eastern Asia, making a backdoor entrance to China as well as the approach by sea. Similarly, the several river systems of South America will be connected by canals and united with transcontinental routes running north and south as well as east and west. The United States, established on the Caribbean and controlling the Panama Canal, will be at the heart of this system of transportation, the Canal region becoming to the new

order what Corinth on its isthmus was to the old in the days of Greek supremacy.

The American continent illustrates the type of problem that will become increasingly important to the nations with passing years. It contains a large area in the *tropics*, hardly utilized as yet by human beings but potentially capable of producing enormous resources and abundant foods for the support of a great population. The conquest of the tropics and the more complete knowledge of its possibilities in production are important problems. The Americas are also rich in mining resources only slightly known and utilized up to the present, but on the right utilization of these depends the economic development of nations. Russia, for example, has hardly begun as yet to use its natural resources; but when they are intelligently handled and scientifically utilized, the nation should become one of the richest in per capita wealth. Again, the thinly inhabited lands of the Americas are empty by comparison with the *ultimate* population that they can be induced to support. In population, however, there is the factor of quality as well as of quantity, and one might infer that new countries should make haste slowly in matters of immigration. Physical health, sound morals, intellectual capacity, and social inheritance are all factors worthy of careful consideration in an immigration policy. Practically empty countries, such as those of the Americas, should properly give careful heed to the problems of population. They should not be too eager to count heads for census purposes merely, knowing that whatever racial stock is admitted into a country must ultimately by amalgamation become part of the racial stock of that nation. Nothing is so deadening to a rising civilization as a sodden inert mass of underfed, dulled peasants who live from hand to mouth and have no dreams of tomorrow.

Policies toward Latin America. In seeking to develop wise policies for the Americas there will be need for all three of the American policies of the United States. The Monroe Doctrine will see to it that the Americas are controlled politically by Americans only,—Americans north and south in the larger meaning of the term. The Caribbean policy will see to the policing of that important region, keeping the peace, encouraging the maintenance of order, and seeking constructively to build up higher standards in those matters that make national life worth while. Pan-Americanism will stress the fraternal relationship of all American nations, from Cape Horn to the north pole. Through congress, conference, and commissions common principles in international law, economics, finance, science, and morals will be emphasized and the old Swiss motto of "All for each, each for all" made basal.

The real controversy at present rages about the Caribbean policy of the United States, with its assertions of a sort of sphere of interest in that region, its paternalistic attitude toward the weaker states, and its stress on an international police power to be exercised in the suppression of international nuisances and in the maintenance of peace in the Caribbean. The best solution of this troublous situation is for the states of that region to take their responsibilities seriously, to fulfill their obligations, and to develop stable governments free from numerous insurrections. When this happy situation is attained, there will be no need for the exercise of police power over them. This whole matter will undoubtedly be considered by the Commission of Jurists authorized by the conference at Santiago in 1923 for the purpose of codifying international law, both public and private, as far as it concerns the twenty-one states of the Americas. The commission is to meet at Rio de Janeiro in April, 1927, and will consider among other projects the rights and duties of nations

and the question of when, if ever, repression or conquest may be permissible within the Americas. If all parties concerned can agree on such principles and on a common international law for the states of the Pan-American Union, the Caribbean policy will cease to be important.

These policies, though primarily those of the United States, should in due time become general policies for all the Americas in unison, but such concord depends on many factors aside from mere geographic propinquity. By slow compromise reciprocal understandings in economics and political action must be worked out. Too often in the past Latin-American nations have been exploited by concessionaries and by usurious loans from foreign capitalists backed by the armed forces of the lender's state. Against this system the Drago Doctrine—that debts should not be collected by force of arms—rightly protests. Only weak countries grant concessions, and usually such grants are due to force or to the bribery of officials. Open contracts and fair agreements should be encouraged, and Pan-Americanism should be able to supply an economic and financial mechanism whereby the developmental needs of the weaker states can be made a matter of joint financing and accounting. In this fashion the natural resources of each can be developed without exploitation and used for the upbuilding of the nation occupying the land. Anyone at all familiar with past situations in Latin America must realize that disorder and rebellion largely, though not entirely, arise from alien exploitation and the unscrupulous bribery of native officials tempted through gain to betray the interests of their country.

Naturally such readjustments take time and plenty of it, but Pan-American organization is fairly complete and the problem is being attacked from many angles, so that solutions may develop rather rapidly. After all, the united

conscience of all the states is much keener than any one conscience acting in its own interests. In the long run all nations gain by fair dealing, and just methods employed in the development of the natural resources of Latin America would bring far greater wealth to the nations individually and collectively than the extortionate gains of concessionaries who ruin the country they exploit and destroy confidence in the morals of the country they represent.

The United States and Canada. The attitude of the United States toward Canada illustrates a different situation. There is no thought of exploitation or of gaining concessions in that land. Canadians are fully able to take care of their own interests and in times of need have a friend at court in the mother country. The United States has ceased to dream of annexation and recognizes the equality of Canada in the ethical meaning of that word; naturally the moral code among equals is fraternal. The two nations should develop a real *rapprochement* emphasizing common interests, competing for West Indian trade in friendly rivalry; and the United States should, when conditions are ripe, urge Canada to enter the Pan-American Union so as to bring its point of view to bear on American affairs. In earlier years Canada was merely a British colony echoing the views of Great Britain. Today it has its own individuality, determines its own policies, and is a connecting link between the United States and the great dominions of the British Empire. At bottom Canada is American, not British, American in the sense that it is an integral part of the Americas of the western continent. But Canada is also part of the English-speaking world of the Pacific, and with the coming of more speedy means of communication there is bound to develop a much closer relationship between itself and Australasia. British Columbia is the terminus for this intercommunication, which

proceeds overland from Great Britain to the Pacific, and from the South Pacific to Canada and the shores of Europe. One may surmise that in later generations the Americas, Australasia, and the nations of the west Pacific will develop a real entente of which the Institute of Pacific Relations which met at Honolulu (1925) is a "sign of the times." The institute is the social initiation of a *pax Pacifica*: it is working for a joint Pan-Pacific policy and for the elimination of discord and exploitation in the lands of the world's great ocean. In all this the United States should have a profound interest.

The Pacific and the Far East.[1] The problems involved in a Pacific policy are by no means easy, so that it is not strange that many in the United States hesitate at the thought of adding to the known west the problems of an unknown south and a farther west. Yet the United States is fairly well embarked on a policy of cultivating friendly relations in the South Seas; it desires to maintain the peace of the Pacific, and for many reasons—partly sentimental, partly economic —it desires to see established in China a strong republic, built on peaceable industry, thus maintaining its ideal of a warless civilization. It may be that if peace in the Far East be fully assured through conferences, Japan will lay aside its stress on militarism and become fraternally coöperative with its Pacific neighbors. Perhaps in a generation or two, with the passing of kings, a republic of a really rising sun will take the place of an empire whose sun at times seems to be setting rather than rising. It surely would be a world object lesson if on both sides of the Pacific, between the two poles, there were ranged varying systems of republics—Soviet, Oriental, Australasian, Latin-American, American, and Canadian—all

[1] For recent series of articles on the Far East, with lengthy bibliography, see *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. CXXII, November, 1925.

emphasizing a government based on intelligent public opinion and competing in rising standards of cultural civilization based on economic systems free from exploitation. These are the implications in what may become a sort of association of nations on the Pacific, working for peace and for a constructive civilization.

The Far East. There are at present three problems before the United States in the Far East, each pressing for settlement. First, China is demanding complete sovereignty at a relatively early date, and indications point to the assumption by the United States of a leadership in this matter. Russia took the initiative through its recognition and treaty, but to most Chinese it is still an object of suspicion for historical reasons and because of a fear of its present Bolshevistic teachings. Japan is feared and not trusted because of its policy toward China since 1914 and up to the Washington Conference. Vergil's line (*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*[1]) may well express the Chinese attitude toward Japan. Great Britain has seriously damaged its prestige in China through the Shanghai and Canton massacres; it is suffering a heavy boycott in consequence, and cannot under the circumstances take the lead in the settlement of affairs, because of its unpopularity. The logical consequence of these situations is that the United States must come forward as a trusted nation to aid China by kindly advice in restoring order as a preliminary to its resumption of sovereignty. This has already been manifested in American leadership at the Peking Customs Conference, which has agreed to recommend customs autonomy for China by January 1, 1929. Other measures of similar sort will follow, and in due time China will systematize its finances, fund its debts, develop social and educational programs, and firmly establish an efficient republic for that strongly democratic population.

[1] I am afraid of Greeks even when they present gifts.

The second problem is concerned with the exclusion policy of the United States against Orientals. It is not likely that the Congress of the United States will in the near future rescind the exclusion feature of the Immigration Act of 1924. Yet one may surmise that the Pacific coast will see more clearly within a very few years its real interests in securing a restricted number of fairly intelligent and reliable agricultural laborers and will withdraw its objections. If the choice lies between labor from the Orient or from Mexico, one might infer that the coast would prefer the Oriental. Certainly as an act of simple justice and fair dealing the United States is under a moral obligation to remedy the insult needlessly inflicted on a proud nation, and in the long run the United States would gain more from Japan's hearty coöperation than from its sullen submission from necessity to the present situation. Under the new law Japan has no responsibility in the matter, and it is thought that more Japanese than ever before are at present being smuggled into the United States over the border of Mexico, in addition to occasional desertions of seamen from Japanese ships. If the coast withdrew its objections and Congress placed the entire Orient on the ratio basis, the annual immigration permitted from the Far East would be less than twenty-five hundred persons. This would be a small price to pay for the gratitude and good will of those nations, and the influence of the United States as a state animated by a sense of justice would be a great factor in maintaining the future peace of the Pacific and the Far East.

The third problem is concerned with the return of Russia into the politics of the Far East. It has its treaties with China and Japan and is manifesting much interest in the internal affairs of China during the present crisis in that country. Russia also is apparently again resuming its interest in north-

ern Manchuria and the Pacific shores of Siberia. The Russian Union of Soviet Republics is eager to resume relations with the United States and is bound before long to reach some compromise in respect to its debts to the United States. If the United States should recognize Russia and resume relations, making loans for the material development of the natural resources of eastern and northern Siberia, Russia would doubtless cheerfully follow the lead of the United States in attempts to restore sovereignty to China and would for its own sake support constructive policies aiming at the preservation of China's political integrity and the development of an efficient and stable government. Peace in the Far East could be readily guarantied if the United States and Russia would resume their traditional friendship and work together for permanent peace in that region.

As for the Pacific proper, the status quo secured for island possessions under the four-power treaty and the nonfortifications agreement of the naval-ratio treaty has unquestionably come to stay. It was the price paid by the United States for the abrogation of the British-Japanese alliance and Japan's consent to the naval ratio. The nonfortifications agreement is America's indorsement of Japan's Monroe Doctrine and of its naval supremacy in the northwest Pacific, so that if this were not renewed at the end of the fifteen-year period, it would be considered an unfriendly act, leading on to suspicions, rivalry, and perhaps war. Japan has withdrawn from Siberia; and if it maintains its pledges in respect to the integrity of China made in the nine-power treaty, the two agreements above mentioned might best become permanent, as an aid toward the guaranty of peace in the Pacific. Japan in that case would make no attack against the Philippines or the South Seas and might even grow weary of its mandate islands; for if peace is maintained in the Pacific, Japan may

see no reason for maintaining her guardianship over these islands. They are an expense, not a profit; they cannot be fortified under the terms of the nonfortifications agreement; the open door to commerce is required by the terms of the treaty with the United States; the small area of the islands offers no outlet for surplus population; the natives have their rights safeguarded by the League of Nations, and they are not to be considered as nationals by Japan. All in all, the islands may prove to be a nuisance rather than an advantage, and Japan may be willing to surrender its mandate to the United States. Naturally the maintenance of the status quo implies that the United States shall retain the Philippines under its sovereignty so as to keep those islands from becoming a bone of contention among other powers. In other words, even if the Philippines are given complete local autonomy, it should be understood that the United States still controls their relations with other powers.

In conclusion, therefore, one may surmise that it would be the part of wisdom for the United States (1) to cement kindly relations with the Americas of the Pacific and with the Australasian lands; (2) to retain its island connections in the South Seas and westward across the Pacific, possibly adding by agreement in later years the mandate islands of Japan; (3) to develop amicable relations with Japan by the maintenance of present agreements and a recognition of the latter's legal racial equality; (4) to come to terms with Russia; and lastly (5), to cultivate assiduously the friendship of China, so that China's future development may employ as models the economic and educational standards of the Americas. China should become in that part of the world an Oriental United States, sympathetic with the democratic ideals of its sister republics on the American side of the Pacific and in the South Seas.

The United States and Europe. It is not likely that the United States will maintain toward Europe, the world's cockpit yet the home of Western civilization, its older policy of political isolation. Admittedly in this shortening world of the twentieth century the economic, scientific, and cultural interests of all nations are in contact, so that the individualism and peculiar cultural traits of each are bound to assimilate, one with the other, in greater or less degree. But if nations develop common interests in economics and in scientific achievements, they necessarily must have political associations at least, if not political alliances for purposes of war. These political contacts when they involve conflicting interests may have formal expression in conferences or through joint commissions, or the settlement of debatable matters may be made through diplomacy or arbitration or the decisions of an international court. But it seems clear that on the face of things the world's constructive program for the main situations in the Eastern Hemisphere will be administered through the multiplying subdivisions of the League of Nations, working out for its membership common principles and programs in respect to economic arrangements and standards in morals and in the applications of science. Already it has begun to set standards for industrial conditions and intellectual coöperation, as well as for suppression of the vicious traffic in women and opium. In such matters the United States must of necessity coöperate. In the *mandate* also there is the beginning of a new era for the peoples of lower civilization. Through the League will be voiced in due time a world conscience protesting against the exploitation of the weak by the strong. In such matters of international morality the United States must have a voice. It may be that such coöperation will take place without the necessity of "entangling political alliances," for it is becoming evident that a new

situation is developing in Europe. The Locarno series of agreements has cleared the air from the murkiness of the years following the World War. The opposing powers in the war are now on friendly terms, Germany has entered the League, and Russia no longer considers Germany as a possible war ally, though the two powers have made their own "Locarno" agreement through the treaty of April 24, 1926, signed at Berlin. The League of Nations continues to gain added prestige and has definitely become a league for the consideration and settlement of political questions of interest to the world of Europe, Asia Minor, and the shores of the southern Mediterranean. If its political aspects were confined to this region, the League might remain a world association for economic, moral, and scientific purposes, and with these activities the United States could heartily coöperate. The League might become in one aspect the agency for the harmonizing of the politics of Europe and the nearer East. In its other aspect it might be the association through which would be discussed and arbitrated the innumerable world problems in respect to the freedom of the seas, the open door to commerce, the regulation of international trade routes, the apportionment of centers of raw material as yet unutilized, as well as agreements in respect to mandates, labor conditions, Red Cross and similar activities, and the furtherance of international standards and scientific investigations.

In such matters of coöperation, however, it may be that another generation must come that "knew not Joseph." The bitterness and antagonism that centered about the policies and personality of President Wilson will die out with the passing of his generation, and a calmer view of American responsibilities in world politics will then come to the front. Before this century passes, the United States will take pride in the achievements of three great presidents: the Father of

his Country, the Savior of the Union, and the Founder of the League of Nations.[1]

The next half-century. On July 4, 1926, the United States began the second half of its second century, and during the next fifty years it will presumably assume leadership in the world of states. With its fleet it will preserve the peace of the Americas and of the Pacific; through its capital it will finance much of the world's business; and through the energy and capacity of its citizens it will be in contact with the world's work. For the successful accomplishment of these tasks it needs intelligent, farsighted policies based on a scientific appreciation of the many involved situations in world politics. It has its Pan-American problems, but toward these it has well-defined policies and a powerful organization of kindred states through which it may work—the Pan-American Union. Within the last twenty-five years it has definitely faced to the Pacific and already sees in embryo, as in the Washington Conference, an association of the states of this region, an association which some day will be made up of those only whose home lands are on the Pacific. The World War brought the United States to economic and financial leadership among the states of Western civilization. In the Eastern Hemisphere already there is established a world association, or League of Nations, partly political in its functions at present, but one that increasingly will voice the other interests of nations—economic, sanitary, intellectual, moral, and æsthetic. Whether the United States formally joins this

[1] Near the secretariat of the League of Nations at Geneva is a tablet with the following inscription:

A LA MEMOIRE DE
WOODROW WILSON
PRESIDENT DES ETATS-UNIS
FONDATEUR DE LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS
LA VILLE DE GENEVE

League immediately is in one sense a matter of indifference. It must coöperate, however, with the League in all non-political matters, because its interests will make such contacts inevitable. Thus there are at present in tangible form three great associations of nations: the Pan-American Union, a Pacific entente, and the League of Nations. In each and all of these the United States has its interests and through geographic position and power is becoming a sort of connecting link between the nations. From these associations in due time should come the peace of the Americas and of the Pacific, the peace of the eastern continent, and, ultimately, that "world federation" of poetic imagination.

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