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CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHARACTER

CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHARACTER

TRUE DEFINITIONS OF
ENTITY, INDIVIDUALITY
PERSONALITY, NONENTITY

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FROM PERFECTION TO INDIVIDUALITY

The aim of this study of consciousness and character is to provide a basis from which students may arrive at a true and exact understanding, first, of themselves, and, second, of the relation which exists between themselves and everything which makes up the setting of their lives—that is, their environment. During recent years, with what is regarded as advances in the study of psychology, it has been increasingly realised that human beings have little understanding of themselves. It has not been fully realised, however, that an understanding of *self* is the only source from which a real understanding of our surroundings can arise : that there is no other way through which we may gain the capability of making proper estimates of all the problems resulting from the necessity to exist in a relationship with those surroundings. A true understanding by each human being of what is actually represented by his consciousness and character will provide the key by which he may arrive at true valuations of the part which his

environment plays in his life; of the part which he must play if he is to achieve any truthful improvement in his vigour and joy of life, and, finally, at an understanding of the true significance and explanation of all human problems.

NEED FOR CLEAR DEFINITIONS.

Consciousness and character as at present understood are terms which have only a vague definition. Consciousness has come to be understood as summing up all our mental processes. Psychologists speak of our conscious mind, our subconscious mind, and also of unconsciousness. By the "conscious mind" they usually imply the intellectual appreciation of self and surroundings; of what they imply by the term "subconscious mind" they are vague and indefinite at best. They generally conceive, however, a sort of internal mental process of which the human being has little or no awareness; by unconsciousness they imply the state where the human being is temporarily without the capacity of maintaining a mental link with his surroundings.

The inadequacy and fallaciousness of these definitions can be easily understood by considering the state of what is called "unconsciousness." It

is known that during "unconsciousness" all the internal bodily processes—the functioning of the organs, the maintenance of the blood-flow, the self-freeing and self-healing qualities of the bodily system—are carried on without intermission. This means that, whatever has happened to the so-called "mental" processes, the body has not only retained its consciousness, but also its capacities to continue functioning as an organism. The bodily system as a whole cannot, therefore, be unconscious. Immediately full unconsciousness was brought about, the human being would have ceased to live.

This will give the basis from which a study of consciousness may begin. If not only the mental processes but the body as well is involved in consciousness, it can no longer be thought of as appertaining to the mind alone. It is necessary, therefore, to cease regarding consciousness as a merely intellectual thing. It must be thought of in its physiological significance. That is to say, by consciousness we must understand that factor in a living thing which distinguishes it from something which is inanimate. In other words, we must understand by it the functioning of the life factor in the human being.

ABSOLUTE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHARACTER.

At this point, however, the absolute interrelationship between consciousness and character becomes apparent. The human being is *the human being*—that is, he is distinguished from all other forms of life—by the uniqueness of his bodily form, and the way in which his life factor is manifested through that form. But it will be easily understood that everything which constitutes his life—his movements and his urges to make movements, all his actions and reactions—must be determined by his bodily form. If he had four legs and moved on all fours, his urges would be quite different from what they are now he moves about erect on two legs. If his sight and scent were different, his attitudes to his surroundings would be different. At every point it can be seen how the limitations of the bodily form determine his valuation of himself and his environment. In other words, his bodily form determines the way in which his consciousness can be manifested.

It can be seen, however, that the human being's bodily form and all that is incorporated with it—its capacities and its peculiarities—are strictly the

human character. Like consciousness, this term has come to be used with great indefiniteness. It is used in referring to the human being's moral worth, or to particular characteristics which he may possess, and often it is even applied to his demerits. When a person is obstinate, or intolerant of his fellow-beings, he is sometimes said to have a strong character.

Character, strictly, must include everything which characterises a particular human being. It is part of the human character to have two legs and two arms. It is also part of the character to have particular capacities of being vigorous in carrying out the functions of living. That is to say, the character must include every cell which makes up the human bodily system, together with the capacities of all those cells to function as a living organism. Since the human bodily cell-system is unique from all other bodily cell-systems, the human character must be the human bodily cell-system, together with the attributes which enable that cell-system to function as a human being.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHARACTER EXACTLY DEFINED.

From these considerations clear definitions of both consciousness and character can be arrived at. Consciousness must be the quality which enables the human being to live, to have the self-awareness and the awareness of his surroundings which constitute intelligence, and to institute within himself the functions which establish him as a living being. Character must be the sum total of the means by which the fact of being alive, and the carrying out of the functions of living, are made manifest.

It can be understood, however, that consciousness and character must also be absolutely inter-related. First of all, the fact of being alive can only be expressed through the bodily system. But this implies that the manifestation of being alive can only be expressed in just so far as the bodily system allows. If without a bodily system there would be no life, then the human being can be intensely or only dully alive in just so far as his bodily system allows freedom of expression to the life factor within him. We know the limitations imposed upon the expression of life by the loss of limbs, sight, hearing or any other of the bodily parts or senses. The consciousness, therefore, can

only express itself within the limits allowed by the bodily system as a whole.

But equally the character (that is, the bodily system and its attributes) is absolutely dependent upon the consciousness for the particular intensity of life which it manifests. No bodily movement could ever be carried out unless the urge to it were first present in the human being's awareness that he is able to make a movement. For instance, a human being could not move his limbs to avoid a threatening danger unless he first has consciousness that the danger threatens and that it is within his power to move. A man walking towards a river may be taken as an example. If he walks on and into the river, he may drown. But he cannot stop or turn away from walking into the river unless his consciousness becomes aware that a river is before him, and that though he is able to walk on the land he is unable to do the same on water.

This may be applied to any movement ever made or any movement possible to be made. The human being can only act under impulses from his consciousness. Consciousness and character are, therefore, always absolutely interdependent. Neither can ever function, even in the most minute

manifestation of life, except in conjunction with and within the limits of the other.

PROFOUND EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENT.

Here, however, it can be seen that a third factor comes into play—the human being's surroundings, or his environment. Environment may be summed up as everything which is outside the human being. And it can be understood that just as the consciousness can only express itself within the limits allowed by the character, so both must be similarly limited by the environment in which they exist. It is known, for instance, that the atmosphere exerts an unintermittent pressure upon the human being of approximately 14 lbs. to the square inch. If this were lacking, or if it were a much lighter or a much heavier pressure, the human bodily form would obviously be unlike what it is. Its capacities to express life would also be quite different. This, however, is merely an example to illustrate the general fact. The effect of environment is far more profound than is implied merely in the contours or capacities of the bodily form.

It was seen that consciousness is the quality by virtue of which the human being is alive and able

to continue living. But he only lives in relation to his environment. From the moment of the beginning of his life, all the infinite variety which makes up the cosmos is surrounding him. That is to say, his consciousness only begins with an awareness of himself in relation to his surroundings. He could not have a self-awareness unless there were something outside of himself from which to distinguish himself. Also every manifestation of life must be carried out in relation to his environment. He breathes because there is an atmosphere for him to breathe. He sees, hears, smells, tastes and touches because there are things external to himself which he may see, hear, smell, taste and touch. Consciousness, therefore, must be made up of self-awareness and awareness of surroundings, and, finally, of the awareness of the relationship which exists between that self and those surroundings.

This applies equally, however, with regard to the character. The bodily system is made up and maintained in existence by nourishments which are taken directly from the surroundings in the form of atmospheric, liquid and solid foods. The bodily composition is whatever it is made by nourishment. If the supply of nourishment from

the environment is discontinued the human being must cease to live as an organism.

It is known also that variations in immediate surroundings and changes in habits of taking nourishment result in definite variations of human bodily characteristics. There are the different colourings of human beings; different contours of face and limbs, all resulting from different natural environments and different habits of diet. Different diets will produce different dispositions.

So that the human character is wholly the product of the relationship between the human life-factor and its environment. It must be said, then, that just as the consciousness and character are absolutely interdependent, so environment and consciousness and character are also absolutely interdependent.

A study of human consciousness and character cannot proceed, therefore, except in conjunction with a study of the relationship which exists between the human being and his environment as a whole. But if, in studying consciousness and character, true valuations regarding them are to be arrived at, it is also necessary to show the purpose they serve, not only to the human being but in the universe as a whole.

DYNAMIC QUALITY OF HUMAN LIFE AND ENVIRONMENT.

This may best be arrived at by defining what the human being represents in the universe. In considering this it can be accepted that the universe is not a passive whole. It must be regarded as dynamic. As far as the human being is concerned, unless he constantly asserts himself energetically against it it will overwhelm him. If the human being has this capacity of asserting himself energetically against the environmental forces, he must himself be the expression of an energy value. That is, he may be regarded as the expression of an energy—or life—power. This is also implied in the fact that he has a consciousness and character. Just as a machine can only produce material or articles to the extent that it carries a power value, so the thing we know as human life can only produce the material of a conscious human character to the extent that it represents a life- or energy-power.

The human being is, therefore, what may be termed the expression of a *life-power*, and, this being so, it may be taken that the purpose of his existence is to give expression to that power. And

if human life can only be maintained by a self-assertion of equality with the environment, it may be said that the purpose of human life is to assert the *value of the human life-power* in relation to the environment.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHARACTER IN PERFECTION AND IMPERFECTION.

It will follow from this that the human being will have truthfully fulfilled the purpose of his existence in just so far as he affords his life-power the scope to express itself freely and fully in relation to the environment. This gives a basis upon which valuations of consciousness and character may be arrived at. If the human consciousness and character afford absolute and full freedom of expression to the human life-power, they may be regarded as perfect, and the human being can then be said to be existing in a state of perfection. But if the consciousness and character are such that the life-power is restricted of expression, then they must be imperfect and the human being must be regarded as existing in a state of imperfection.

This gives a basis from which a detailed consideration of human consciousness and character

may be carried out and from which valuations of human life, as we know it to-day, may be arrived at. The ground already covered may be summed up as follows :

The human being is the expression of a life-power, and the purpose of his life is to afford the utmost freedom of expression to that power.

The life-power only exists and gains expression in relation to the rest of the universe, which makes up its environment. The human being must also, therefore, exist only in relation to the environment.

The only media of expression this life-power has are the human consciousness and character. The consciousness is the quality which establishes the human being as a living thing, and the character is the total of the bodily system, which is the means by which the fact of living—that is, of being alive—is made manifest and the functions of living are carried out.

The human consciousness and character will be perfect or imperfect in just so far as they are adequate for affording full and free

expression to the human life-power : first, to establish its equality with the environment; and, secondly, to express itself as the manifestations of the organism.

QUALITIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND ATTRIBUTES OF CHARACTER.

At this point it is necessary to consider what qualities should appertain to the consciousness and what attributes to the character if they are to fulfil their function of affording scope for the human life-power to express itself. It has been seen that consciousness begins with self-awareness : awareness of the environment and awareness of the relationship existing between the human being and environment. But it has also been seen that the human being has to assert himself energetically against the environment. This being so, consciousness must embrace something more than mere awareness if it is to fulfil its function of maintaining the human being as a living manifestation in the universe. There must also be a quality which is the equivalent of knowledge. The human being must know himself if he is to express himself. He must also know the environment if he is to have an aware-

ness of the relationship between himself and it, and be able to express himself in that relationship.

COGNITION.

This quality of "knowing" may be termed *cognition*, and it may be said that the awarenesses which belong to consciousness must include cognition of self and of the environment. If the consciousness has this cognition, a cognition of the relationship between the human being and environment will result automatically. If two things are in relationship, a knowledge of both must include a knowledge of how they are related to one another.

With regard to the character, if it is to be an adequate medium for carrying out whatever impulses arrive from the consciousness, it must have attributes which give it the capacity of translating the cognition of the consciousness into bodily manifestations. It would, for instance, be useless for the consciousness to know that a danger threatened the human being if the bodily system was incapable of carrying out whatever movements would avert the danger. The character, therefore, must have the capacity of

translating the cognition belonging to the consciousness into bodily manifestations.

Here, again, it is possible to arrive at valuations by which to estimate the consciousness and character. The consciousness will fulfil its function of giving scope of expression to the human life-power in just so far as it can attain to cognition of itself and its surroundings. And the character will fulfil its functions in just so far as it can express that cognition in organic manifestations. If the consciousness has absolute self-cognition and absolute cognition of the environment, the human life-power will have absolute freedom of expression. But it could only have this if the character has the capacity of translating the absolute cognition into manifestations. It may be said, therefore, that a condition of human perfection would be the possession of absolute cognition by the consciousness, and the possession of the capacity to express absolute cognition by the character. In just so far as both the consciousness and the character fall short of these absolute values the human being must be regarded as existing in a state of imperfection.

KNOWLEDGE CONTRASTED WITH COGNITION.

It is important here, however, to discover just what the term "cognition" actually implies. Human beings to-day have a vast amount of knowledge regarding themselves and their relation to the environment. But is that knowledge cognition? Or is it something different—and perhaps inferior to cognition—which man has acquired as a substitute because he has lost the power of cognising? This may be decided by finding the difference between knowledge and cognition.

First of all, knowledge is something which must be learned. Human beings, for instance, have a knowledge of history—that is, of events which took place before their lives began. Obviously that knowledge has had to be acquired. But with regard to cognition we have seen that this must be something which is an essential part of their living self-awareness. It cannot be acquired. It must belong to the human being as a natural outcome of the fact of his being alive.

This can be understood by contrasting, say, the knowledge of an event in history with what

we accept as the knowledge of how to breathe. When a human being's life begins he breathes spontaneously. The awareness of the necessity to do so, and of how to breathe, is part of the fact of his being alive. It is an essential part of his consciousness to have that awareness. But of the fact of history he remains ignorant until it is imparted to him from outside of himself, through one of his organs of sense—by word of mouth, through the medium of a book or other method of teaching. That is to say, he does not spontaneously cognise it. He learns it and it becomes part of his acquired knowledge.

In this example a clear distinction can be seen between knowledge and cognition. Cognition is a form of deeper knowledge which the human consciousness has of itself as a quality of its existence, and which it uses spontaneously and instinctively. If this is considered in conjunction with the conclusion that in the perfect state the human being must have full cognition of himself and his environment, some understanding can be gained of the difference between a perfect human consciousness and the human consciousness as we know it to-day.

A full cognition would enable the human being

to be aware of everything appertaining to the environment with the same spontaneity as he now breathes or maintains his blood circulation. But if his consciousness enjoyed this perfection it could only do so because his character—his bodily system and its attributes—afforded it scope to do so. It would be necessary for the senses to have exquisitely fine and subtle yet an all-penetrating intensity of perception. It would be necessary for the limbs and bodily parts to have the capacity of carrying out movements and manifestations of unlimited vigour and manifoldedness. His character, therefore, would also have to be perfect. Being perfect, it would have the capacity of translating the full cognition of his consciousness into manifestations of the organism. That is to say, the human being would have not only a full cognition of the environment, but he would also be able to meet every impression the environment made upon him. And he would be able to do this with the same spontaneity and freedom from external help as belonged to his cognition. He could not give expression to the spontaneous awareness which cognition must be except through spontaneous self-manifestation. And he could not give that spontaneous self-manifestation

unless all the resources for carrying it out were vested in him alone.

ABSOLUTE INDEPENDENCE OF HUMAN MANIFESTATIONS IN PERFECTION.

This gives a further clue to the condition of the human being in the perfect state. It may be said that he is endowed with full cognition of himself and his environment, and has the capacity of expressing that cognition in his manifestations with the same spontaneity as belongs to cognition. That is, he would be an absolutely self-contained entity. In living he would need to rely upon nothing but the intrinsic resources of his own being.

The important fact to be noted in this connection is that he would be independent of all the myriad compensations which the human being of to-day uses. He would need no society, no buildings or clothes, no tools or weapons. He would be an absolutely natural being. In place of the intellectual appreciations and enjoyments which give zest to his life to-day he would have a bodily joy of life such as we of the present time would find it impossible to conceive. It is not merely that he would be free of the use of com-

pensations such as social life to-day gives him. Such a state does not merely imply what is understood by the term, at present in use, "back to nature." It rather involves a capacity of living life with an intensity and subtlety of vigour and sensibility which, to the intellectualised human being of the present time, would appear to have transcendental values.

QUALITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERFECT STATE.

Several other important points also result from this one fact of possessing full cognition and the capacity to express it. If cognition is full and spontaneous it could not err in its assessments of the environment. That is to say, the perfect human being would have the quality of infallibility as far as his valuation of his relationship with the environment was concerned. There could be no error because there could be no element of choice. Just as in the human bodily system of to-day the processes of the bodily organs are carried on infallibly (unless they are interfered with or disorganised from without), so in the perfect human being all his manifestations to-

wards and in response to the environment would be as infallible as they were spontaneous.

But this spontaneity and infallibility would also imply an absolute adequacy. We have seen that perfection implies that the human being is able to afford his life-power an equality with the environment and full freedom to express itself. If this equality and freedom is maintained by spontaneous and infallible responses, it follows automatically that those responses would be adequate. Both the equality and the infallibility would be infringed unless every manifestation was wholly adequate to meet the situation which it called forth or to which it was a response.

Finally, in such a relationship the human being would be existing in a state of peace with his surroundings. No discord could arise between him and them, nor within himself, where he had perfect equality with all existing things and was able to respond to them and express himself towards them with absolute spontaneity, infallibility and adequacy.

STATE OF PERFECTION CONTRASTED WITH HUMAN
LIFE TO-DAY.

This analysis of the human consciousness and character in the perfect state has been made in order to provide a basis for estimating consciousness and character in the human being of to-day, and for providing standards towards which suggested changes may be directed. The enormous difference between a consciousness and character which enabled the human being to live as a wholly self-sufficient entity, standing in a relationship of perfect equality and peace with the rest of the universe, and the human being of to-day, whose life is discordant throughout and who is utterly unable to meet the environment without complicated help from outside of himself, needs no stressing.

But it is important to discover what has happened to bring about such an immense decline. Why has the consciousness and character of human beings become so inadequate? To understand this it is necessary to revert once more to the part played by environment in characterising the human being. It was shown that he is the expression of a life-power. But that power only

gains its expression through the bodily cell-system. And the constitution of the bodily cell-system depends upon the kind of nourishment from which it is built up.

THE TWO BASIC FACTORS IN HUMAN LIFE.

It does not, however, depend entirely upon this. Two factors come into play. *On the one hand, dominating the process from within is the human life-power. On the other hand, being introduced and characterising the process from without, and also subject to the life-power's domination, is the nourishment.* This domination by the life-power is exercised through tendencies. From the formation of the first cell up to the point when the human bodily system has reached its utmost maturity these tendencies operate to bring about the unique formula of the human cell, the unique consciousness with which the cell is endowed, and the unique form taken, first by the cell, and finally by the whole cell-system.

LIFE-POWER CONSTANT; NOURISHMENT VARIABLE.

And these tendencies are constant. They do not act with one degree of intensity at one point and with a different intensity at another. Every

human being, whatever variation of detail there may be between him and his fellow-beings, has a common cell-formation and, at the basis, a common cell-constitution, a common process of life-functioning and a common contour of bodily form. This means that of the two factors which bring about the existence of human organisms, one, the life-power operating from within, is constant.

But, on the other hand, there is the nourishment being introduced from without, which is the material upon which the constant inner tendencies must come into play. And nourishment is variable. It can change with changing conditions of the environment, and is subject to the human being exercising choice amongst all the various materials existing in the universe. If the inner tendencies of human life are unvarying, however, it follows that there must be one range of nourishment which is perfectly adapted to fulfilling them. That is, there must be perfect and imperfect nourishment.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHARACTER VARY WITH
VARYING NOURISHMENT.

Also, if the human consciousness and character result from the effect of the inner tendencies upon the nourishment, with varying forms of nourishment there will be varying values of consciousness and character. And if there is one range of nourishment which is perfectly adapted to the fulfilment of the inner tendencies, there can only be perfection of consciousness and character when the bodily system is supplied with that perfect range of nourishment. Equally, when imperfect nourishment is introduced, imperfections of consciousness and character must arise.

In this can be seen the explanation and cause of human decline from perfection. It was not brought about from within the human being himself. No weakening of the value of his life-power has taken place. It is merely that obstruction to the full and free expression of that life-power has been brought about by the introduction into the bodily system of forms of nourishment not adapted to the fulfilment of inner human tendencies.

If the first introduction of such contaminating

forms of nourishment is considered, it is possible to follow the process by which reductions of the value of consciousness and character were brought about. The bodily cell-system of the perfect human being was constituted solely of matter forms through which the inner tendencies were able to realise themselves to the utmost degree. Then contaminating matter was introduced. As the inner tendencies are constant, they must have continued to operate towards the maintaining of the state of perfection in the human being.

But if perfection could only be maintained in the absence of such contamination, the aim of the tendencies would be towards the rejection of it. The human life-power, as we have seen, must be dynamic, and it would, therefore, offer dynamic resistance to the contamination.

It can be understood that this must have resulted in a reduction of the value of the consciousness and character. Up to that point they had been the full and free expression of the life-power. No obstructing factor had intervened, and they had carried the utmost value of the unvarying life-power in every manifestation towards or in response to the environment. But if some fraction of this life-power was diverted towards

rejecting the contaminating matter from the bodily system, the consciousness and character could only represent the life-power less that fraction. There must have been a reduction of the intensity of the consciousness and a loss on the part of the character of the capacity to translate the life-power in bodily manifestations.

It is important here to recall the complete interdependence of the consciousness and character. Just as the consciousness could not represent the cell-system if that system did not exist at all, so it can only represent the particular conditions of the cells at any one time. For instance, the consciousness of a human being who is intoxicated (that is, whose cells are obstructed with alcohol) can only represent him as an intoxicated person. It must actuate him to behave as a man who is intoxicated. But when the rejectory processes of the bodily system have carried away the alcohol, then the consciousness can once more represent the sober condition of the cells and actuate the man to behave as a man who is sober.

WEAKENING OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHARACTER
WITH CONTAMINATION ILLUSTRATED.

This instance will also serve to illustrate the loss of value in consciousness and character which follows upon contamination of the cells. The valuations and judgments of the intoxicated man are less exact, less in keeping with actuality, than those of the sober man. Similarly with the capacities of the bodily system to carry out actions. They are blurred and unreliable to just the extent that the consciousness is vague and inaccurate.

So with the first contamination of the perfect state. The consciousness was no longer representing cells whose formula was pure; it represented cells which were slightly contaminated. That is, it represented the cells and the contamination, just as the drunken man's consciousness has to represent the values of the bodily cells and the alcohol. Similarly with the character. Owing to the presence of contamination in the cells, the bodily capacities were obstructed, and when their manifestations such as movements were carried out, the energetic value of the movements was also obstructed.

If we now consider the means by which the

human being's contact with environment is maintained, it will be possible to observe the results of such a change in detail. The basis of the human being's contact with environment is his capacity of being sensible. Every impression from the environment must first impinge upon one of the organs of sense, and the consciousness must receive its awareness of the impression from that organ. For instance, one can only become conscious of a beautiful scene by means of the scene impinging upon the vision. Once it has done so the consciousness can have a relatively spontaneous awareness of it.

CONSCIOUSNESS REPRESENTS CELL SYSTEM AS A WHOLE
TOWARDS OR IN RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENT.

But the consciousness must represent not the organ of sense alone, but the whole bodily cell-system. If the beautiful scene instanced above were at the bottom of a steep cliff, it is necessary for the consciousness to have an awareness not only of the beauty but of the danger of stepping over the cliff-edge towards the scene. If its awareness applied to the eyes alone the human being would have a wholly pleasurable reaction to the scene and tend to move closer to its beauty. But

representing the whole bodily cell-system, the consciousness is aware not only of the beauty, but of the incapacity of the bodily resources to step or float down the cliff. It therefore sounds a note of warning in its reaction and restrains the human being from destroying himself for pleasure of the scene by stepping over the cliff.

This is important because it indicates the process which takes place in the linking up of the environment with the consciousness. The organ of sense (which, being in the bodily system, belongs to the character) first receives impressions from without. But in order to estimate the significance of any impression, its details must first be communicated to every cell. Then the decision of every cell regarding those details must be co-ordinated. They must be merged into one decision as to a response.

This also might be illustrated by an example of a human being seeing a rose on a tree. As far as his sight or sense was concerned he might decide to respond by picking the rose. But such a decision would be qualified by the cells of the hand which might suffer from the thorns of the rose in picking it. The human being might still pick the rose, but he would do it circumspectly out of con-

sideration for the cells of his hand. Innumerable instances might be taken to illustrate this, but the one example of the rose, taken in conjunction with the previous one of the beautiful scene and the cliff, makes it clear that the consciousness must at all times represent, not merely the organ of sense upon which any impression from the environment might first impinge, but the entire bodily cell-system.

From this fact it is apparent that there is a complete interrelation between all cells. The consciousness can represent no one cell or group of cells separately, but only the system in its entirety. And for this to be possible there must be constant and complete co-ordination between all cells. The whole bodily cell-system is, therefore, always in contact with the environment, and the organs of sense are merely, as it were, the agents of the whole corporate system.

CONTAMINATION REDUCES VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE IN RELATION TO ENVIRONMENT.

When contamination takes place, therefore, all the capacities and qualities of the human being are reduced in value to the exact degree that the contamination infringes the perfect freedom of the

cells. That is to say, his general sensibilities are at once less perceptive and subtle, his self-awareness is less exact in valuing the significance of what his senses perceive, and his capacity to respond to the functioning of his senses with the normal human manifestations is equally reduced.

But it was seen that the qualities of human manifestations in the perfect state were spontaneity, infallibility and adequacy. The reduction in value must, therefore, represent a loss of some degree of those qualities. But if the human being was able to exist in equality with the environment, and as a wholly self-sufficient entity, only through manifestations carrying the full value of those qualities, something of his self-sufficiency must be sacrificed as well.

It is understandable that in the early stages of contamination the human being might make up this loss merely by sacrificing some of his self-expressions and replacing them by actions of self-defence against the environment. Just as an artist meeting the environment of to-day might use his art, first to maintain himself and secondly to gain self-expression. The perfect human being affords his life-power full and free scope to express itself, not

only in response to the environment, but towards it through his own tendencies. And giving full and free expression to the life-power, his responses to the environment would only absorb the minimum of his energy, and his manifestations would be almost wholly self-expression. By a reduction of that self-expression and an increase of the energy expenditure involved in responding defensively to the environment, he would be able to make up the loss of value consequent upon only a slight contamination.

But even in such circumstances it would be necessary for him to be endowed with new qualities and characteristics which would fit him for existence under the changed conditions. As a completely self-sufficient entity manifesting himself with absolute spontaneity, he would stand in no need of any defensive qualities or capacities. His full cognition would amount to a pre-knowledge of whatever impressions from environment might impinge upon him. But with the cognition and, therefore, the spontaneity weakened, he would need to make up the loss by intelligent anticipation. But up to that point he would have no qualities by which to make such anticipation. It is now necessary to analyse how such qualities could be

brought into being as a result of the contamination.

CONTAMINATION IN CELLS MUST BE REPRESENTED
BY NEW QUALITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS IN
CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHARACTER.

It was said that the consciousness would come to represent the contamination in the cells equally with the cells themselves. But if the inner tendencies constantly operating in the human being are directed towards the rejection of the contamination, his consciousness must represent that tendency to rejection. This would constitute a knowledge that the contamination was an obstructive factor, and he could only have such a knowledge by having an awareness that he had lost his perfection. But having an awareness that he had lost his perfection, he would also have an awareness that he had lost some degree of his self-sufficient equality and spontaneity which belonged to him by right of that perfection.

ARISING OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF INFERIORITY AND
URGE TOWARDS PERFECTION.

This may be most simply stated by saying that, once contamination had been brought about, the

human being would have an awareness of inferiority to the environment as a whole. But if his consciousness entirely represents the aim of inner powers to reject the contamination, it would also be endowed with an urge to recover the lost equality and spontaneity.

As the environment, however, is not passive, but is always dynamically tending to overwhelm him, the mere awareness of inferiority and the urge to recover equality would not be sufficient to recover an equality with it. It would be necessary for some positive quality to arise in him, so that he might continue to meet the impressions from without which had become threatening. But a consciousness carrying an awareness of inferiority and of the need for equality would, as a corollary, have a fear of the environment. The human being's awareness of inferiority would constitute an acknowledgment of the environment's superiority. The awareness of a need to establish equality would constitute an awareness of a risk in meeting the environment.

FEELING-RESULT OF INFERIORITY TO ENVIRONMENT.

If the question of sensibility is considered again in conjunction with this it will be seen that a

change would have arisen in the sensations which impressions from without induced in the cell-system through the organs of sense. This can be understood from an example of a human being plunging into water. If the water is exactly of a temperature with his body, his sensations when the water touched his skin would not be in the nature of a shock. It would be a sensation purely, and not feeling in the sense of suffering. But that is because he has equality with the temperature of the water. If he had inferiority, by reason of the water being much colder or hotter than his body, the sensation would amount to suffering, and the suffering would be mild or intense to just the extent that the human being's bodily temperature was inferior to the water temperature.

The same considerations can be applied to any impression from the environment which a human being may have to meet. If he is equal to the impression, it merely induces what may be termed sensation—as distinct from feeling. If feeling is regarded then as being sensation which amounts to suffering, because the human being is inferior to the impression from the environment which induces the sensation, it may be said that the existence of an awareness of inferiority in the con-

sciousness would make him susceptible to feeling as distinct from sensation.

VIGILANCE-RESULT OF ARISING OF FEELING.

This susceptibility, combined with the awareness of risk in meeting the impressions from the environment, would bring about a tendency in the human being to endeavour to anticipate what impressions the environment would present to him. This in itself would be a new quality in him. From being absolutely self-sufficient, he would have become vigilant to anticipate threats from the environment. So that it may be said a new quality, that of *vigilance*, and a new characteristic, that of susceptibility to *feeling*, would be brought about once he had become contaminated.

It is now possible to sum up the results which were brought about in the human consciousness and character once the perfect bodily cell-system had been contaminated by nourishment not perfectly adapted to the full and free expression of the human life-power. The first change is a loss of equality with the environment and a consequent loss of spontaneity, infallibility and adequacy in responding to impressions from it. But

with the loss of equality came the awareness of inferiority and an urge to recover the equality. From these arose susceptibility to feeling and a quality of being vigilant to anticipate possible threats existing in the presentation of impressions from the environment.

It is from this point that the consciousness begins to grow more complicated. It had previously been simple, embodying only the full cognition of self and surroundings and through that, being enabled to impel the human organism to absolute freedom and completeness of manifestation. No relative assessments of various factors in the environment were necessary. No variety of attitudes to various factors was involved. No variety in the quality of his own manifestations was possible. He existed as a free, equal and harmonious factor, absolutely at one with the universe as a whole, and the perfect constitution and structure of his bodily cell-system afforded him absolute harmony within himself. His sensations in such an existence could only be those of a full and intense joy of life, and under such a stimulus his free and spontaneous manifestations could only have been expressions of absolute beauty, grace and vigour.

COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENTS OF FACTORS OF ENVIRONMENT-RESULT OF ARISING OF FEELING.

But all these absolute values must at once have been lost with the first contamination and with the inception of an awareness of inferiority, vigilance and feeling; variations in the quality of his manifestations must have arisen, and also in his attitudes to and assessments of the various factors constituting the environment.

The first outcome of the human being having to meet his surroundings with vigilant awareness was this forming of a variety of assessments with regard to the different aspects of the environment. Through his vigilance he could have an awareness that some of the aspects of environment were threatening, while others were neutral or benevolent. And there would be varying degrees of threat or benevolence in various aspects, so that he would have to assess his surroundings in what would amount to a scale of values. That is to say, he would for the first time have a range of attitudes.

Having a range of attitudes the quality of the actions with which the human being responded to environment would become variable. Where his

vigilance made him aware that any impression from the environment was benevolent, his responding action would be characterised by a relative self-sufficiency. But to just the extent that any aspect appeared threatening that self-sufficiency would be weakened. In full self-sufficiency his actions would be self-confident, because no awareness of inferiority would be involved; self-controlled, because no element of feeling of fear would be involved; and self-responsible, because he would have no dubiety as to his own natural resources being adequate to meet the impression. But to just the extent that his vigilance made him aware of a threat in any aspect of the environment, so his self-sufficiency would be weakened in responding to it, and his actions would be characterised by weakness of self-confidence, self-control and self-responsibility.

Both the consciousness and character of the human being would, therefore, have become complicated to some degree. In the consciousness the awareness of inferiority would bring about a range of attitudes, each adapted to the significance of particular aspects of the environment. These attitudes would, in turn, bring about varying self-assessments, resulting in varying degrees of aware-

ness of self-sufficiency. In the character the susceptibility to feeling would bring about degrees of suffering, such as fear; and the bodily system would come to act with varying degrees of definiteness and vigour, according to what consciousness of self-sufficiency impelled the action.

INCREASING BODILY WEAKNESS BRINGS RELIANCE ON OUTSIDE FACTORS.

In these early stages of contamination, however, the human being would not have lost his self-sufficiency to such a degree that he would be unable to respond to any aspect of the environment out of the resources of his own bodily system. Yet it can be understood that with the increasing weakness, consequent upon increasing contamination, a point would arise where his attitude to some aspect of the environment would be so lacking in self-sufficiency that he would be in danger of being overwhelmed. It is at this point that he would first begin to seek assistance from some factor outside of himself, and from then onwards his consciousness and character would become rapidly and increasingly complicated.

But before following their decline to this stage, it is necessary to examine what part the human

life-power has played in the decline so traced, and what the effects of that decline have been upon its scope for expression. It is important to remember that the aim and purpose of human life is to give expression to this life-power and that, as he falls from perfection, the human being becomes an increasingly ill-adapted medium for his true purpose.

LIFE - POWER RESISTS CONTAMINATION THROUGH
BODILY CAPACITIES OF SELF-FREEING, SELF-
HEALING AND SELF-HARMONISING.

It was shown that with the first obstruction of the perfect bodily cell-system, the life-power tended to reject the contaminating matter from the cells. At all stages of human decline this tendency is apparent in the human bodily system. It takes the form of the self-freeing, self-healing and self-harmonising capacities with which every human bodily system is endowed, and which operate without intermission from birth to death. These capacities are a matter of common knowledge so that it would be pointless to examine them in detail. *But it is important to note that they have remained under the direct domination of the life-power itself and still function solely through cognition. No intellectual appreciation of their work-*

ing has ever been possible to the human being while he is deriving their benefits, and no intellectual control of them has ever been achieved.

Through science some knowledge of these processes has been obtained, but it is beyond the highest scientific capability to institute them or carry them on, unless the resources and impulse for them have been spontaneously supplied within the human being himself. The best that medical science ever hopes to do is to stimulate them or facilitate them, but ultimately in all circumstances the body must be left to free, heal or harmonise itself when any obstruction, rupture or disharmony of it has been brought about. The human being has no knowledge of how to carry them on, but the cognition of how to institute and maintain them is vested spontaneously in the bodily consciousness itself. Their working can be instanced as a parallel to the example which was given earlier, of how breathing can never be wholly a matter of knowledge, but must always be commenced and carried on through cognition.

It can be understood that where the bodily cell-system was perfectly constituted no self-freeing, self-healing or self-harmonising processes could be carried on, for the simple reason that there would

be nothing upon which they could be brought to bear. Contamination is a necessity of their existence. The fact that they do exist, however, is unquestionable evidence of the tendency of the life-power to recover the perfection which has been lost, and the processes themselves are the operation of that tendency. The operation, however, takes place in the character—the bodily cell-system—and as the consciousness must always represent the bodily cell-system as a whole, there must be an urge in the consciousness which represents that tendency.

URGE TOWARDS PERFECTION—EXPRESSION OF LIFE-POWER.

This urge to return to the perfection which has been lost is as apparent in human consciousness, in all stages of decline, as it is in the self-restoring processes in the bodily system. Awareness of imperfection and a conception of the possibility of attaining perfection are common to all human beings. There has been no period throughout the part of human life, of which records have been maintained, when such conceptions have not played a vital part in affecting its trend. They have varied infinitely with changing bodily states

and changing mentalities, but they have always existed and always influenced humanity in its behaviour.

But it can be seen that this urge in the consciousness and tendency in the character have played a more direct part than merely to influence human beings in their conceptions of a remote perfect state. They have operated as a conscience in human attitudes and have provided the one check, without which the human race would have degenerated to the point where its existence would have been impossible, and where it would have been overwhelmed by an environment with which it had lost all power to cope. The working of this conscience can be traced from the first contamination.

The urge to recover the lost equality arises with the first obstruction of the cells and the first inception of the self-restoring processes. But because every subsequent action carried out by the human being suffers from the depletion of its full value, as a result of the obstruction in the cells, the urge to recovery must also be represented in every action. Such an urge could only be represented by an effort to make every action conform to the value it would have had, if it had carried the value of an

uncontaminated cell-system. But the awareness of inferiority being also present in the consciousness, there would be a realisation of how far the action fell short of perfection. And that realisation would inevitably carry an awareness that the life-power had not been wholly fulfilled. There would be what might be regarded as a sense of guilt.

In the early stages of contamination this would not present itself to the human being's consciousness as a mental appreciation of guilt, as we understand the working of a conscience to-day. The human being would still be responding to both his own urges and the environment, with instinctive relative spontaneity. But there would be a weakening of the joy of life which should accompany the sensations of carrying out actions, and also a subsequent awareness of shortcoming. And such an awareness would always set up a bias towards a return to perfection and away from increasing contamination.

So that the consciousness, quite apart from the general self-awareness in relation to the environment, always carries the direct value of the life-power's tendency to recover its full freedom of expression. It remains endowed with the cognition

necessary to institute and carry on the self-restoring processes in the bodily system, and is endowed with a restraining tendency in the form of a conscience which asserts the depreciated value of all the manifestations of a contaminated cell-system. Equally the character carries the value of the tendency in the capacity to carry on the self-restoring processes.

MIND-CONSCIOUSNESS ARISES WITH MEMORY.

These effects would, however, be countered to some extent by the representation of the cell-contamination in the human being's consciousness, and this factor is the most vital in determining the progressive decline which has taken place in human life. It is of greater significance, also, because it is the first arising of a memory to play its part in human consciousness and behaviour.

It can be understood that where human beings manifested themselves under the domination of cognition, and where every manifestation was spontaneous, memory could have no place. Cognition is an integral part of life itself. It has not to be learned, memorised and called upon as an acquired modification of a human being's consciousness. It is as much and as essentially a part

of him as the cells of his bodily system. But where contamination has been present the cells have been subjected to the presence of alien matter. That is, something had happened to them for which they were unadapted, and for which there was no inner necessity. It may be said that they had undergone an experience. This experience, in turn, was necessarily represented in the consciousness. It had to speak for the contamination in determining the human being's attitudes, because the consciousness must always represent the cell-system exactly as it is at the moment when the demand for a response is made upon it. When the cells had been modified by having experienced the presence of contaminating matter, the consciousness had to speak for the modified cells, and modify its attitudes accordingly.

This becomes clear when it is considered in relation to the choice of nourishment by the human being. While his consciousness represented only perfection of cell-condition, it would impel him to take nourishment in keeping with that condition. This may be colloquially paraphrased by saying: "What he had not had he would not want." But once contamination had been taken, his later choice of nourishment would be qualified by hav-

ing once experienced the use of contaminating nourishment. He would have had the experience of it, his cells would have been modified by it, and the representation of this modification and experience in the consciousness would tend to determine him to choose contaminating nourishment once more. This process must be regarded as the bringing about of a cell-memory, and the direction of the human being by that memory in his subsequent manifestations.

FIRST CONTAMINATION PREDISPOSES TO FURTHER CONTAMINATION.

So that, after once having taken contaminating nourishment, the human being would come to the next choice of nourishment with a divided consciousness. As a bias towards perfect nourishment there would be the operating of his conscience—his urge to recover the equality of perfection. But as a bias towards further contamination there would be the memory of the experience of having previously taken contaminating nourishment. And because every action of the human being must represent his whole consciousness and character, the result would be a compromise. He would not take perfect nourishment. But he

would not choose wholly contaminating nourishment. Yet the effect even of such a compromise would be to predispose him to further contamination still, because he would undergo a still further experience of its presence in his cells, and they would undergo a further modification as a result of again being obstructed in their functions by matter with which all the human being's inner tendencies had no affinity.

Here can be seen the basis of the opposing tendencies in human life which are so clearly apparent in the human being to-day. Always there is the urge to behave with individual nobility and altruism, but always the temptation to lapse into the decadent or degenerate behaviour which bespeaks the weakness of contaminated cells.

Philosophers have tried to explain this clash of tendencies in human beings by postulating the existence of two forces in the world—good and evil—both of which have power to influence the attitudes and behaviour of men. There is undoubtedly good and bad, but both are to be found, not as metaphysical elements having an intangible existence, but rather as definite realities influencing the human being from within himself. Good and bad, in fact, arose and became elements in

human consciousness with the first contamination, and the conscience which was analysed above defined each to the human being. When his actions were self-sufficient to a high degree, his conscience was not active and he had the awareness that they were good in his joy of carrying them out. When they were characterised by weakness of self-sufficiency, his conscience troubled him actively, and by the awareness of guilt it induced gave him the realisation that his actions were bad.

This outlines the further complications that arose in the human consciousness with contamination. In addition to awareness of inferiority and vigilance, the necessity arose for a variety of assessments of various factors in the environment, and a consequent variety of attitudes towards them. This in turn brought about a variety of self-valuations with regard to whatever actions were carried out, and this finally gave a conscience with an awareness of good and bad, and also a cell-memory of having undergone the experience of receiving contamination, and of being modified by its presence.

With regard to the character, there arose the complications of susceptibility to feeling, the in-

ception of the self-freeing, self-healing and self-harmonising processes, the modification of the cells which constituted the first memory modification, and a weakening of the capacity to carry out the manifestations to which the life-power impelled the human being.

Up to this point, however, the human being is still able to meet his environment and continue his existence in the universe as the organic expression of a life-power by relying solely upon his own bodily resources. He has not yet come to seek assistance from any factor outside of himself, he has acquired no knowledge, and his self-awareness in relation to the environment is still based on cognition. The cognition is weakened: it has lost the absolute spontaneity, infallibility and adequacy of the perfect state, but the human being is still able to rely upon it through his instinct, to dominate him in all his manifestations.

LINK BETWEEN HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHARACTER AT THE PRESENT TIME, AND CONCEPTIONS OF PERFECTION.

These initial stages of the human state—the perfection of the subject state, or state of origin,

and the initial stages of decadence through contamination—have been used as the basis for the first analysis of consciousness and character, because they point the goal towards which all human attempts to realise conceptions of perfection must aim, if they are to attain any measure of truthful success. In their values we can see standards by which the human consciousness and character as we know it to-day may be estimated. In the cause and explanation of the first decline we can see the causes and explanations of all subsequent stages of decline: we can see how the weakness of the human being in relation to his environment first arose, and the basic cause and process of all changes which have taken or are still taking place in the human being as an organism.

An understanding of these factors will make it a simple matter to analyse the intricate complications of consciousness and character which have gradually been brought about up to the present time. So far we have analysed all that has appertained to the subject as it refers to human beings relying upon themselves alone to express their own life-power and to make up their equality with the environment. But distinct from this study is that of the stages where they have come to seek and

rely upon assistance from outside of themselves. The next chapter will give a full analysis of the decline from individuality.

COMPENSATING FACTORS CONSOLIDATE PROGRESSIVE
DECLINE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHAR-
ACTER.

We know that the human being of the present day only copes with his natural environment by the aid of an infinite range of compensating factors—societies, cultures, towns, machinery and an endless gamut of contrivances and supplementations by which he bolsters up his self-weakness and so arrives at an appearance of equalising himself with the environment as a whole. But we also know that with all his supports he is becoming progressively and increasingly unable to maintain the equality. His problems multiply incessantly, they grow more and more insoluble, more and more complicated, more and more beyond the scope of his ever-dulling consciousness and ever-weakening character, to meet and overcome.

The greatest difficulty up to now has been for any one human being to choose from amongst the

medley of panaceas, solutions and reforms offered to him, any one which would square directly with his own difficulties or his estimation of the general problems. In the following studies where these points are dealt with, and where the explanation will be given of how such a state of existence is the direct and inevitable outcome of an age-old progressive weakening of the value of human consciousness and character, it will be made clear that only a completely new orientation of attitudes will be able to bring about a truthful and progressive improvement.

It has been shown here that in his perfect state of origin the human being was a completely self-sufficient entity. Also, that in spite of the contamination in the early stages of his decline, he remained able to meet and establish an equality with his environment out of himself alone—that is to say, his consciousness and character remained those of an individual. He suffered from weakness of self-sufficiency, but all his manifestations remained the expression of himself. In his weakness or his strength, his own individual needs and urges were the sole arbitrating factors underlying all his actions. And from subsequent studies it will become clear that in this direction alone—by

each human being initiating improvement within himself and of himself—will it ever be possible to bring about a general truthful improvement in the state of human life.

FROM INDIVIDUALITY TO PERSONALITY

One of the most vital facts of present-day human life—and the one, perhaps, which more than any other tends to consolidate human weakness and the present confusion in human affairs—is the valuation which is placed upon the external aids which we rely upon in coping with the environment. We no longer think of the social and mechanical organisations and contrivances as compensations for the general lack of natural vigour and self-sufficiency. In fact, the trend is rather to cease to think of them as being merely subsidiary to human beings, as things which should be used, adapted or discarded as human needs require. We have come to give them a significance of their own; as if they were worth valuing for their own sakes, and there is a definite tendency to think of adapting the human being to them, rather than them to the human being.

This state of things is not haphazard. There could have been no other result from the conditions out of which it arose, and unless some new

orientation is given to human attitudes and a new set of values established, the trend will continue to the point where the human being, as such, ceases to exist and becomes merely a servant of the contrivances which he himself brought into being.

CONTINUOUS DECLINE INEVITABLE WHILE CELL-MEMORY DETERMINES HUMAN REACTIONS.

The inevitability of this trend can be easily understood when the examination of the effects of contamination is continued beyond the point reached in the preceding chapter on consciousness and character. In that study the human being's decline was analysed from the state of his being a self-sufficient entity to that of his being an individual, and the resulting complications of his consciousness and character were shown. The most important of these, from the point of view of his later, further decline, was the bringing into being of a cell-memory which set up a predisposition to further contamination and, necessarily therefore, to further weaknesses and further complications. With this predisposition constantly represented in his consciousness and character, the point could not fail to be reached where he became too weak

of natural resources to form an equality with the environment by their means alone. He reached the state where, if he was not to be overwhelmed by his surroundings, he needed support from outside of himself. If his reactions at this point are analysed it will be possible to see the basis upon which all further decline rests.

It is important here to recall that human life can only continue to exist while human beings are able to establish some form of equality with the environment. It was shown in the previous chapter that the human being, when he exists as an individual, is able to cope with the environment by means of :

(1) An awareness of his inferiority which made him vigilant to anticipate threats in particular factors of the environment.

(2) The capacity for action through which he could utilise his natural resources in responding to various aspects of the environment.

ACTION DOES NOT ESTABLISH PERMANENT EQUALITY WITH ENVIRONMENT.

It can be understood, however, that the use of action could not bring about a re-establishment

of the absolute equality of the perfect state. Any human equality with the environment attained by means of action leaves the net value of the human being as inferior to the environment as it was before the action was taken. That is, the equality is only temporary and requires to be successively re-established as successive threats from the environment are opposed to him.

AN ILLUSTRATION.

This can be illustrated by using, as an example, a human being who has fallen into a river. In such circumstances, if the human being is still able to meet the environment by opposing only his natural resources to it, he will instinctively commence to swim. While swimming he is on equal terms with the river. It cannot overwhelm him. But his equality rests wholly upon his action in swimming. If he ceases to carry out that action—that is, ceases to swim—he will be overwhelmed. Nor is his equality with the river permanent—except to the extent that he retains the capacity to swim. Having once landed, he will still be under the necessity of swimming on any other occasion when he may have fallen into the river.

This provides a picture of the human being manifesting himself as an individual in relation to the environment. He has the resources of action within himself which enable him to cope with the environment, but he remains inferior to the environment as a whole. Only by the maintenance of his awareness of inferiority through vigilance, and by action when his vigilance has made him aware of any threat from the environment, is he able successively to make up an equality and so survive.

But if his natural resources are progressively weakened by progressive contamination, he must reach the point where he is without the capacity of adequate action. The same example applied to a human being of the present time will illustrate this. The capacity to swim instinctively is lost. It has become a performance to swim, and the knowledge of how to carry out that performance must be learned. Unless he had acquired that learning the average human being would be overwhelmed if left to his own resources to swim. It is not that the sense of inferiority has weakened. On the contrary, many human beings have a morbid fear of falling into water. It is the instinctive cognition of water as an aspect of the

general environment which has weakened. As a result there has been an equal weakening of the capacity to utilise natural resources, to take the action which would place the human being on terms of equality with water.

This example has been used merely to illustrate the relationship of the weakened human being with his environment. It can be understood, however, that in the gradual decline from the state of origin there was a point where, for the first time, the utmost use of vigilance and action proved insufficient to enable the human being to cope with one or other of the aspects of the environment. This was not because action and vigilance, as such, had lost any of their intrinsic value, but that the human being as an organism had become so weakened of natural resources that his action lacked the vigour and variety to meet the whole of environment.

LIFE-POWER ALWAYS FINDS EXPRESSION IN SPITE OF CONTAMINATION.

At this point, if it had not been possible for the human life-power to link the human being's resources with the resources of some factor outside of himself, he would have been overwhelmed and

the life-power suppressed. But it is an evident fact of the life-element in the universe that it cannot be suppressed entirely. The continued and increasing contamination of the human being is not a contamination of the life-power. It is merely a contamination of the medium through which the life-power expresses itself. This means that, as the human consciousness and character become less and less fit to give expression to the life they represent, the life-power tends more and more to find its expression through other elements in the universe.

The human being has always been—and remains—the first link between his life and its expression, but his bodily system has become an inadequate medium for carrying the energy load which represents the output of the life-power. He becomes, in actuality, merely a distributing centre through which the life-values are transmitted. He no longer gains self-expression from his existence, but becomes, first, a factor in a combination which expresses his life-power—for example, the combination of a human being and a weapon to meet various aspects of the environment—and, finally, merely a pawn and non-entity expressing only what is dictated to him by

codes and machinery which, at the basis of analysis, have taken his place.

The point, therefore, where, for the first time, the human being meets his environment by linking himself with some factor taken from the environment is one of the most significant in the existence of human life. And it will not be superfluous to examine in detail what takes place.

On the one hand, there is the human being with his awareness of inferiority, vigilance, feeling and capacity for action. On the other, there is some aspect of the environment which threatens to overwhelm him. Through his awareness of inferiority and feeling the human being comes to a realisation that all his qualities and attributes, at their utmost expenditure of energy, will be insufficient to preserve him. Through his existence as an individual, however, he has been under the necessity of assessing the various aspects of environment relatively. Some he has valued as being benevolent, others as malevolent. This valuation would enable him to become aware of the possibility of gaining assistance from some particular factor against some other factor or factors when his feeling—that is, his fear, in such

an instance—and his awareness of inferiority were of sufficient intensity to give him the consciousness that without some support he would be overwhelmed.

ILLUSTRATION OF POSSIBLE FIRST USE OF COMPENSATION.

A human being threatened by an animal can be used to illustrate this. If previously he had been able to cope with his animal environment merely by action—such as running or springing away—or even in his higher states by the mere intensity of his life-factor as expressed through him, he would have no awareness of defensive weapons. Yet when he became aware that he was unable to cope with the animal by his natural resources, it is understandable that an instinct of self-preservation would impel him to look beyond those resources for assistance. It is conceivable that he would use a stone or a bough from a tree as a weapon. That is to say, he would add the value of the stone or bough to his own value, and, by the combining of the two, preserve himself against the animal.

It must not be understood from this that the life of the individual can be visualised in terms

of the life of primitive savages. No native race which was not decadent or degenerate has ever been discovered within the period of recorded history. The example has been used merely as one which reduces the terms of the use of compensations to their simplest.

Simple as the example is, however, it will be found possible to make a parallel example from every use of external aids upon which human beings now rely. There is no exception. From the clothes we wear to the most palatial buildings we use; from the simplest mechanical contrivance to the most profound scientific discovery; all that society and culture represent, every supplementation of human life beyond the mere bodily resources of the weakest human being, is in effect merely a repetition or extension of whatever simple material aid was first relied upon by a human being to preserve him against the environment.

VIGILANCE INADEQUATE TO GUIDE HUMAN BEINGS TO COMPENSATIONS.

Initially, we have to realise that the quality in the human being's consciousness which made him aware of the possibility of gaining assistance from

one factor of the environment against another factor which threatened him differed substantially from the quality of vigilance. Vigilance was a preparedness of his self-capacities. Being aware that the mere fact of his existence left him inferior to the total dynamic value of the environment, he opposed himself to the environment self-defensively. His capacity of sense-perception was no longer exercised merely receptively. It was tuned to what was, in effect, a degree of tentativeness, of enquiry—an alertness to assess the degree of threat which any phase of the passing panorama of the environment might contain.

But this alertness was opposed to the environment as a whole and had reference only to it and his self-values. Its reaction to specific factors of the environment might be to impart to him an awareness of a threat from without, but in the face of such a threat he consulted only his own bodily resources and the capacity for action vested in them. There was no element of calculation. There could be no need for such calculation, since his awareness of inferiority had a basis of self-confidence. It gave him an awareness of the possible need for action, but it left him confident of being able adequately to meet any aspect of

the environment out of his own bodily resources alone—that is, by means of action added to the fact of his existence.

But once the human being had reached the point of decline where his sense of inferiority had no basis of self-confidence the nature of his attitude to the environment as a whole had to change. Vigilance would not then be adequate for his needs, because no matter how alertly he opposed himself to the environment, nor how swiftly he became aware of threats contained in any aspect of it, something more than the sum total of him himself—with all his resources of action—would be needed to preserve him against the threats. Through the increase of his awareness of inferiority he would have an awareness of this, and as a result oppose himself to his surroundings in different terms. He would realise that to remain merely “on the defensive” would leave him still inferior to particular aspects of them. The alertness in the exercise of his capacity of sense-perception would take on a positive seeking for the means of outside assistance. And as everything outside of himself would be embodied in the totality of his environment, this positive seeking would have to involve the relative assess-

ment of the various factors of the environment on that basis. He would have to assess particular factors in it, not merely in terms of their relation to him, but of their relation to the rest of the environmental whole, in order that he might decide the possibilities of each for use as a compensation for his own net weakness.

ARISING OF ATTENTIVENESS WITH NEED FOR COMPENSATION.

That is to say, instead of merely marshalling his own sense and intelligence to a degree of alertness, he would have to pay considered attention to the environment—even when he was not specifically threatened by it—in order to gain an awareness of the degrees of relative benevolence or threat to himself represented by each.

The quality of vigilance, therefore, changed with the greater degree of contamination of his bodily cells, which rendered him incapable of meeting the environment out of his own intrinsic resources alone, and with the increased awareness of inferiority which this changed condition expressed in his consciousness. It was replaced by attentiveness which constituted an attitude of calculation to the environment as a whole, whereby it could

be considered in terms of the possible assistance to be gained from its various factors.

But whereas vigilance increased with the gradual loss by the human being of his resources of capacity for action, the degree of attentiveness he would express to the environment would increase commensurately with his gradual gaining of memories of experiences. The loss of his capacity for action meant that he became progressively more susceptible to threats from the environment. He had an awareness of this through the awareness of his sense of inferiority. The increase of awareness of inferiority prevented him from meeting the environment with the same self-confidence, and with every loss of self-confidence he viewed his environment more vigilantly.

ATTENTIVENESS QUALIFIED BY EXPERIENCES.

With attentiveness, however, once it had guided the human being to the use of compensations, it would be expressed by a consciousness which included the memories of every experience of using a compensation. And these memories would direct the attentiveness. The consciousness of having once made up the deficiency of his own bodily resources by using the resources of some

factor taken from the environment would qualify the human being's attitude to the environment. And this qualifying would become more pronounced with increasing memories, and the acquiring of skills and accomplishments with the repetition of particular experiences. Reasoning would come into play. It would give the human being an intellectual awareness that threats from the environment could be met by using other factors in the environment in conjunction with his own resources. In effect, he would reason in such terms as :

“On a previous occasion I was threatened by a particular aspect of the environment, but was able to overcome the threat by linking my own resources with those of a compensation taken from the environment. If, therefore, I am threatened again, there are probably other factors in the environment which will help me in a similar way.”

DEGREE OF INFERIORITY IN RELATION TO ENVIRONMENT DETERMINES THE DEGREE OF ATTENTIVENESS.

On the basis of this reasoning, attentiveness would be intensified. The constant awareness of inferiority attached to his weakness in relation to

the environment as a whole would determine the human being to base his general attitude to his surroundings on this mental direction. And since his experiences and memories of them could only increase as his weakness increased relative to the environment, the increase of memories would be accompanied by an intensification of the awareness of inferiority. This means that, as far as his bodily determination is concerned, the human being is determined to be ever more and more attentive in his attitude to the environment. On the other hand, the accumulation of memories gives him an ever wider and wider range of experiences with which to direct his attentiveness.

So that, exactly as with vigilance, attentiveness increases with the growing weakness of the human being, but differently from vigilance, it is supported by a gradual accumulation of memories of experiences. This change in the human being's consciousness is of great significance because it represents the passing over from an attitude of instinctive self-assertion in relation to the environment, to one of intellectual estimation and of ego-assertion on the basis of acquired memories, skills and accomplishments.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN CELL-MEMORY AND MEMORY
OF USING COMPENSATING FACTORS.*

From the point of view of human consciousness and character the importance of this event lies in the modifications which automatically followed such an action. The most significant of these was the inception of a memory. It was shown that a cell-memory arose with the first contamination. But in acquiring a cell-memory the human being was not undergoing a modification to enable him to behave in conjunction with some factor outside of himself. The intake of nourishment, although all nourishment comes from without, is proper not only to him as an organism but as a life-expression. And as an organism he places no reliance upon the nourishment until it has been subjected to the processes within him which are under the domination of the life-power. Until it has become an integral part of him he can make no use of it.

The cell-memory, also, applies to him as a whole and brings its effects to bear upon him from within. It will be seen that the new memory is quite different. It applies only to a particular part of him,

* For full analysis of memories see "The Three Memories and Forgetfulness."

so that when it comes into play the human being's whole bodily system must come under the direction of one part. That is to say, for the first time, one of his manifestations is not an expression of him as a whole, but predominantly an expression of the particular part to which the memory applies—and not even of that particular part in its own unqualified right, but the part as it is modified or limited by the conditions imposed upon it by the outside factor to which the memory relates.

LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY COMPENSATING FACTOR.

This can be made more simple to understand by dissecting exactly what happens. We may take the example of the human being using a stone to assist him in coping with an animal. It is not sufficient for him merely to pick up the stone. He must use it in a definite way. But this way will be determined not solely by how his feeling impels him to use it, but also by how the stone is susceptible of being used. The stone, for instance, must be used differently from a bough, which the human being might also have taken, or from a modern weapon, if one thinks of a present-day human being in similar circumstances.

It may be said that the stone must be used in a

particular way, and that way is directed partly by the stone and partly by the human being's capacity of handling it. In that lies the first important difference between this manifestation and all actions previously carried out by the human being. Relying on his own resources alone (within his relationship to the environment), he himself was the sole arbiter of the quality and character of his own actions. Now he is circumscribed to act in a particular way, and in being so circumscribed he is submitting to limitations imposed upon him by a factor outside of himself.

MEMORY-MODIFICATION BROUGHT ABOUT IN CHARACTER MUST BE REPRESENTED IN CONSCIOUSNESS.

Since, as has been repeatedly shown, the consciousness and character are always absolutely inter-related, the human being's consciousness must have become modified by such a happening. It must have incorporated into itself the knowledge—not the cognition—that the movements of a particular bodily limb or part become limited when linked with a stone as a means of assisting in meeting a particular aspect of the environment. That is to say, he has learned something of which his internal resources of awareness could give him

no inkling. He had to be supplied with the knowledge from outside of himself. The fact on which the knowledge rests is not an intrinsic part of him. The knowledge cannot, therefore, ever become an intrinsic part of him. If he is to retain it as a part of his consciousness to be opposed against the environment in subsequent relationships, he will be able to have access to the knowledge only by remembering it. In short, having once used the stone, a memory of having used it would be brought about.

COMPENSATION ADDS NOTHING TO HUMAN BEING'S
REAL VALUE RELATIVE TO ENVIRONMENT.

But the same would apply in this event as applied in the previous example of the human being as an individual carrying out the action of swimming. He would have added nothing permanently to his bodily resources. Having overcome the one threat he would remain inferior to it if faced with it again. He would be under the same necessity to rely upon a stone as on the first occasion. Being under that necessity the same processes of awareness and realisation would be brought into play. But to use the stone on the second occasion would not be an innovation.

There would be the memory of the experience of having once used it.

And this memory would, as it were, become the paramount factor in the events of the second occasion. With the memory of having used the stone would come the memory of the limitations it imposed. Necessarily, the human being would come under the direction of the memory. His consciousness would have regard, not only to the bodily system it represented, but also to the stone. And since, of the two—the bodily system and the stone—the bodily system is the mobile factor, any limitation or modification of movement would have to be suffered by it and not by the stone. That is, the human being would not be a wholly free agent. He would come under a compulsion, and the compulsion would be directed by the memory.

In summing up what has actually taken place in these circumstances, it will be simplest to refer to the stone as the compensation—the factor which compensates the human being's weakness of natural resources. It may be said that the human being has for the first time taken a compensation, that in doing so he underwent the experience of using it, and in undergoing that experience he

acquired a memory of it. Also that since, in using the compensation, no permanent addition was made to his bodily resources, he remains liable to further needs of the compensation and, therefore, the need of again relying upon his first experience. Finally, that in the event of utilising the experience, he could do so only under the direction of his memory of it, and he would be forced to undergo the limitations of bodily movement which it applied to him.

COMPLICATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHARACTER WITH ACQUIRING OF MEMORIES.

As applied to the human consciousness this involves the knowledge of an experience being incorporated into it, and the acquiring of a memory which appertains to a particular limb or bodily part. As far as the character is concerned it involves the acquiring of what is, in effect, a skill. It may be said, for instance, that the arm has learned how to accommodate itself to the use of a stone. If the memory is repeatedly brought into play and the stone frequently used, the skill will become more clearly defined and be exercised with more facility, but even with merely the one usage the skill does exist. These are new complications

of the consciousness and character, as compared with those which had been brought about in the human being as an individual. But they are not the only complications resulting from that first use of a compensation.

MEMORY BRINGS ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME-VALUES.

The acquiring of a memory for the first time isolates a particular moment in time. Just as the memory would apply to a particular aspect of the environment and a particular degree of feeling induced by that aspect, so it would apply to a particular moment at which that combination was brought about. When the necessity arose for the memory to be brought into play for the second time, recalling the incident to the consciousness of the human being, it would also recall the time at which the incident occurred. And it could only do this by isolating the particular point of time concerned from all other points of time. This means that the consciousness would have to incorporate into itself an awareness of time as a factor in the environment distinct from all other factors.

INDIVIDUAL EXISTS ALWAYS IN THE PRESENT.

Up to the point of that first experience time could have played no part in the human being's consciousness. All his self-manifestations and responses to the environment were the outcome of cognition. Knowledge played no part; therefore memory played no part. With the presentation of every aspect of the environment instinct provided an adequate awareness of whatever action was fitting. This means that the human being could only have lived from sensation to sensation—or, in other words, he existed always only in the present.

MEMORY BRINGS ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS OF SPACE-VALUES.

But the same implications as apply to time are also to be drawn in relation to space-values. While instinct provides the awareness of what reaction will be adequate to any aspect of the environment which may be presented to an organism, the organism is only aware of the environment as a whole, aspect by aspect, as it meets them. There can be no such thing as place, because no one place can have any particular sig-

nificance in relation to which it can be contrasted with another. There can, therefore, be no awareness of space, since there is no awareness of location by which space may be gauged. This is true of the human being while he continues to exist as an individual.

Once he has acquired an experience, however, the compensation to which the experience relates must be marked off in his consciousness from all the rest of his surroundings. It has in a sense become part of him, first because it has imposed a modification on him, and secondly because without using it he could not have continued his existence. This means that he must have something of the same kind of awareness of it as he has of his own bodily system. He must know not only his own relation to it, but its relation to the rest of his (and its) surroundings. Yet the compensation has not become a part of him materially. It remains an external factor, something from which he can be removed and to which he can return. As far as his knowledge of his own relation to it is concerned, it would be sufficient for him to have an awareness of its particular characteristics. But to have an awareness of its relationship with the rest of his sur-

roundings he must define a location for it. That is to say, his consciousness must attach a space-value to it.

Having acquired an experience of using a compensation, the human being's consciousness must, therefore, for the first time embody a consciousness of space as a particular feature of the environment. In these early stages of reliance upon compensations such an awareness of space would be simple. It would rest on no standard other than the human being's consciousness of inferiority, because that is the only factor for which his memory has any significance.

The same is true of the time-value, which arose coincidentally with the space-value. His memory defines the time-point at which he underwent the experience, but his only standard for relating that time-point to the rest of his existence is the consciousness of inferiority which first brought the experience about, and which will make it necessary for him to repeat the experience if he is again presented with a similar threat from the environment.

To simplify the explanation, this point may be illustrated by a present-day human being whose life is threatened by an illness arising from

climatic and other conditions in which he is living. He might be recommended to take a holiday at a place of which he has never heard. If he went to that place and its conditions restored him to health, his memory of it would specifically include both the time of his visit and the location of the spot. But his memory would not basically rest upon the distance of the place, in miles, from any other place, but upon the fact that it was the place where he overcame his illness. Equally with the time-value he would attach to his visit. It would not rest specifically upon a basis of months and years. Its primary value would be that it was the time when he recovered his health by visiting the particular place. Yet he could never recall the place without attaching both that space- and time-value to it in his consciousness.

TIME- AND SPACE-VALUES SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO CONSCIOUSNESS OF INFERIORITY.

So far, then, it can be seen that the first use of a compensation resulted in the human being's character acquiring an experience and his consciousness a memory of that experience, his character acquiring a skill, and the consciousness

acquiring an awareness of both time and space as significant and specific facts of the environment, which must be related to his consciousness of inferiority.

But there are still further complications. In using a compensation the human being has for the first time carried out an action in which his instinct is modified from without. In essence no change in instinct can ever take place, but as far as its expression in the human being's consciousness is concerned it is modified by the remembering of an experience which will qualify all its subsequent workings. While existing both as an entity and an individual, the human being's relationship with environment determined his manifestations. But his instinct is his self-awareness in relation to the environment, and is, therefore, subject to no qualification from without.

EXPRESSIONS OF INSTINCT RESTRICTED BY COMPENSATIONS.

So that while the human being relied solely upon his natural resources he could be said to be solely under the domination of his instinct. But, as was shown, in using the compensation his action was subject to modification. It could be

carried out only as the compensation permitted. The compensation could be effectually used only in a certain way, and his movements in using it had to follow that way. Instinct could not have free play; limitations were imposed upon it.

But as those modifications had to be represented in the consciousness, an entirely new process took place. The human being was taught something. He had to learn how the compensation could be used, and *he had to learn from the compensation*. That is to say, *he had to learn from a thing which was not part of himself. For the first time he knew of something by having its details imposed upon him from without, instead of arising from within himself through cognition.*

This means that the human being had for the first time acquired an item of knowledge as distinct from cognition. It is not possible, therefore, to speak of his awareness of the compensation and the significance it has for him as being cognition. Once it is incorporated into his consciousness his manifestations will be affected by it, just as his more spontaneous actions were influenced by cognition. When he is again brought under the necessity of relying upon the compensation, he will have a knowledge of its significance to him-

self, *but only because he remembers having previously used it. That is to say, he will recognise the compensation. So that recognition—as distinct from cognition—has been brought into being.*

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTION AND ACTING.

There is also another aspect of this inception of knowledge and recognition. The human being in reality becomes an actor, acting a part, when he carries out an action under the direction of his memory. Since he cannot wholly decide the scope of his actions for himself, and must be taught certain limits by the compensation, his action becomes a performance. Whenever he repeats the use of a compensation he must repeat what he memorised as being the right way of using it, so that action—the relatively spontaneous answering of an impulse from within—becomes acting, the considered acceptance of a stylisation of behaviour imposed from without.

INCEPTION OF THINKING.

This gives two further complications—the embodying of knowledge into the consciousness and the imposition upon the character of acting in

place of natural action. Another important factor which results is that with the reliance upon memory the capability to think is first brought about. No thought could be involved in action, since, with instinct, there can be no selection between various possible responses. If instinct represents the degree of cognition attained by the human being with regard to any aspect of his relationship with the environment, the instinctive impulse to respond must be the only possible one to the human being, having regard to his particular degree of inferiority in relation to the particular aspect of the environment with which he is faced.

But when acting under the direction of a memory the circumstances are quite different. The acting is the product of two factors—the human being himself and the compensation. And since there are two factors, an element of variation or error is possible. The human being could allow too much of his own bodily resources to qualify his movements and so fail to use the compensation to its utmost possibility. Or he could allow the compensation to modify his natural capacity too greatly. The right mean of the adaptation of each to each can only be decided

upon by some process which represents an exact estimation of what actually was learned in undergoing the experience. That is to say, the human being must consider—or think—what is the right way of performing his act of using the compensation. So the capability of thinking must be added to his consciousness.

And this thinking or consideration about knowledge which has been acquired constitutes the first intellectual manifestation by the human being. Spontaneity is ruled out because, if the acting can only follow consideration, the comparative immediateness of the response must depend upon the definiteness of the memory on the one hand, and upon the conditions appertaining to the compensation on the other.

Also the first memory constitutes the inception of the mind, and acting must be carried out through the mind. It only represents the bodily system indirectly. The mind must qualify; it must direct the lines upon which the bodily determination shall be translated into an expression of the human being.

ARISING OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

Another point is that, because a possibility of variation and error has arisen, right and wrong is automatically brought into being. To fail of striking the mean between reliance upon the bodily resources and acceptance of qualification from the compensation would be to act in the wrong way. To strike the mean and use the compensation with the utmost gain from its resources and those of the bodily system would be to act in the right way. It was shown that with individualistic action there could be good and bad, represented by degrees of self-sufficiency in carrying action out. But now with intellectual acting good and bad become superseded by right and wrong.

THE PASSING OF SELF AND INDIVIDUALITY.

It can also be understood that those self-values of the human being as an individual can no longer apply when intellectual acting is carried out. Self-standards cannot be used to assess manifestations, in the bringing about and carrying out of which the human being is only a contributing factor. In the very necessity for a compensation

to supplement his own resources the human being must be devoid of all self-sufficiency. He cannot, in fact, be regarded as an individual any longer. In estimating the value of his behaviour he and the compensation must be assessed together. Some other values than self-values must, therefore, be established.

It can be shown that the proper basis for estimating the human being when he is performing an intellectual act is that of the ego, and the proper values to attach to him are those of ego-sufficiency.

This will become clear if the relationship of the human being to the compensation is again considered in terms of what his *net value* will be in relationship to the environment as a whole. *As an individual he was related to the whole of his surroundings as a self-contained unit. All his manifestations were wholly independent, and all his qualities and attributes belonged wholly and inalienably to him himself. He may be said to have had an "absolute title" in all he possessed.*

But with a reliance upon a compensation his only title to the use of it is his need of it and his capability of extracting it from the environment. But even in these circumstances he has no in-

alienable right to the assistance the compensation can yield. It always remains something apart from himself, something with its own qualities and characteristics and its own function in the universal whole, independently of the human being. He can, therefore, only assert his title to its use by asserting his need of it.

This is more easily understood by human beings of the present day because they are aware of the competition which has arisen with regard to the use of compensations which have become fundamental necessities of life—as, for instance, houses and clothes.

THE ARISING OF “I” AND EGO.

It can be taken, therefore, that the basic title of every human being to the use of compensating factors from the environment is his need of them. But in asserting his need he is, in fact, asserting himself as an “I.” In looking for some compensations he is actually specifying himself as a particularised human being. But he is not doing so on the basis of particular qualities and attributes with which he is endowed; he is doing so on the basis of particular weaknesses from which he suffers in his relationship to the environment

and particular needs which must be met if he is to establish that relationship on a basis of equality. That is to say, he is asserting himself, not as a "self" with a net intrinsic value equal to his situation, but as an "ego" whose net value is unique in needs for compensations for his inferiority. With "self" values he would have no need to assert himself distinctly from others, whether those others were fellow-beings or other factors of the universe. It is only when he stands in need of support from some outside factor that it becomes necessary to assert himself in relation to that factor. Then he must state himself as the "I" in order to link his needs with the compensations which will support him in his needs.

In such circumstances the intellectual acting through which he does utilise compensations must be estimated on a basis of ego-values; and he will be ego-sufficient—that is, ego-confident, ego-controlled and ego-responsible in just so far as he is able to make the right or wrong use of compensations. That is to say, he will be ego-sufficient in just so far as he is freely able to supply his needs and make up his inferiority through compensations.

It will be simplest and will most easily avoid any confusion between "action" and "acting" if the latter—intellectual acting—is referred to as behaviour. It is strictly a behaviour in accordance with rulings which are automatically laid down by the limited possibilities of a compensation. Behaviour cannot be spoken of with regard to the action of the human being as an individual, since action takes no cognisance of any external factor and is subject to no rulings except the domination of the life-power from within. But the use of a compensation provides, as it were, a manner or style in which the behaviour must be carried out, and in carrying it out the human being may be said to be conforming to rules of behaviour.

Before proceeding to examine all the changes in the terms and conditions of human life which must follow all these complications in the human being's consciousness and character, which resulted directly from the first use of a compensation, it may help to keep the lines of analysis clear if what has so far been arrived at is recapitulated.

In addition to attentiveness, memory, skill, and time- and space-values, the consciousness

is modified to carry knowledge and to recognise instead of cognising, and the character must acquire the capability of behaving in place of the capacity for action.

The consciousness must become capable of thinking—that is, it undergoes the first process of intellectualisation—and the character acquires the first basis of a mind. The consciousness must forego the assessing of its manifestations on the basis of good and bad and in terms of self-values, and these must be replaced by right and wrong and ego-values.

It will be understood that with only the first and single use of a compensation no sudden or marked change could have taken place in the human being as an organism. At that point it was not so much that he underwent complications as that, in relying for the first time upon a compensation, he, as it were, planted the seed from which they must inevitably follow. In essence every complication was brought about by that one act, but the complications themselves would only become clearly marked and affect the conditions of human life profoundly as their effects

came to be represented in the changing attitudes of the human being.

ABSOLUTE INTERDEPENDENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
AND CHARACTER IN ALL CHANGES.

It is important to notice here the unvarying and complete interdependence of the human consciousness and character. No change is ever brought about in the consciousness except as an adaptation to necessities for the preservation of the human being as an organism—that is, as a living bodily cell-system. Progressive contamination of the bodily cells makes the cell-system a progressively more unfit medium for the expression of its life-power. As it becomes more unfit it becomes weaker in relation to the stresses which the dynamic environment brings to bear upon it. But each new unfitness is met by a change of consciousness which enables the human being to meet the liabilities of his own weakness and so to survive.

CONSTANCY OF LIFE-POWER.

The constancy of the life-power is also shown in this. It never fails the human being. As his weakness progresses and the expression of the

life-factor becomes more difficult it endows him with changed qualities and characteristics, fitted to the changed conditions. When, because of the reduction of the bodily powers, the human being is finally helpless to cope with the environment by his own efforts alone, it indicates other factors in the environment with which he may ally himself, and so recover at least an appearance of the equality with his surroundings.

And within the bodily system the life-power unceasingly influences every organic process, tending to reject the contamination and bring the organism back to the purity, freedom and vigour of its state of origin.

But against this constant tendency the contamination present in the cells, being represented as it must be in the consciousness, operates as a continued predisposition to further contamination and further weakness. And when the decline has reached such a point as the necessity to rely upon compensations, this predisposition is consolidated by the very weakness it entails.

The reduction of natural vigour makes it impossible for the human being to assimilate the intensely vital nourishment for which the perfect organism was adapted. The bodily processes of

assimilation are to an extent devitalised and unable to cope with nourishment, unless it is nourishment whose value is reduced by a quota of contamination.

The loss of the self-values also plays its part in this predisposing to further weakness. Once the human consciousness came to an awareness of the possibility of relying upon support instead of remaining self-sufficient, what constituted a line of least resistance had been set up. To a weakened human being the individual effort, even when it was possible to him, would always involve a greater stress than the less vigorous falling back upon outside help. And the awareness that such behaviour was possible in one instance would point the way to its possibility in others.

This would always be combated by the conscience, which represents the life-power, drawing the human being back to his higher state. But this constitutes only a second voice calling the human being through his consciousness, and, with the intensity of his consciousness weakened by the complications to which it has been subject, he falls into a state of confusion and adopts the weaker way.

The first reliance upon a compensation was not

an isolated happening, therefore. It was followed by others, and gradually experiences and memories were accumulated, and human life came to be bolstered up by an ever-widening range of compensations.

ARISING OF ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN HUMAN BEINGS.

One of the most important effects of this was upon the relationship existing between human beings themselves. At the present time this relationship is all-important. It is responsible for most of the greatest problems with which the race is faced, and governs the trend of all developments in the mode and conditions of life. Yet when the basis of this state is analysed, it will be seen that it has not resulted from the mere fact that human beings exist. The life-power itself has not tended to bring it about. The real explanation lies in the advanced state of weakness human beings have reached—in their having become so weak of self-powers that they regard their environment as being no more than a mine of resources to be exploited for their support.

It was shown that the human being as an individual was wholly independent of everything outside of himself. That is to say, each human being

was independent of his fellows. Each could maintain himself against the environment without reference to any other existing thing. In such circumstances the relationship between one human being and another was neither possessive on the one hand, nor dependent on the other. There could be relations on the basis of fellow-sympathy or fellow-feeling, but no calculation could come into play.

ARISING OF COMPETITION.

In the initial stages of the use of compensations this would still hold good because the likelihood of a clash in the need for a particular compensation was remote. But with the increase in the dependence on outside factors the possibility of competition arose. It has been seen that, since a compensation can never be incorporated into the human being's bodily system, he can never possess an absolute title to it. There was, therefore, always the possibility that more than one human being would stand in need of the same compensation at the same time. And the possibility became increasingly likely with an increasing reliance on outside assistance. It was inevitable that the time and conditions would ultimately arise when two

or more human beings would compete for the use of one compensation.

But since every human being represents a positive and constant life-power which impels him to self-preservation, the establishment of such a competitive relationship was bound to bring other results. Whatever the outcome of the first clash, new attitudes between fellow-beings were bound to arise.

We can use, as an illustration, two human beings reaching for the same weapon when threatened by an animal. Even if both escaped through one gaining the weapon and the other failing to do so, the attitude of each to the other would be bound to undergo a change. First, there would be the awareness in the consciousness of each that the other could, in similar circumstances, constitute a threat to his freedom in the use of the compensation. But the one who succeeded in gaining the weapon would gain a consciousness of superiority in relation to the other. Equally, the one who failed to obtain it would suffer from a consciousness of inferiority in relation to the one who had succeeded. Even in such a simple example the basis can be seen of many traits noticeable in human beings to-day. It lays

the foundations for such traits as jealousy, pride, envy, resentfulness, boasting, cringing, hatred and so on.

It is not intended to suggest that all these were inculcated following upon the one first clash over a compensation. The illustration is used to show how competition arose, and how in that first clash, and repetitions and variations of it which must have subsequently followed throughout the progress of human decline, the seeds of all human aversions were sown.

These are important factors in analysing the basis of human consciousness as we know it to-day. Fellow-aversions have played a great part in determining the trend of changes in the conditions of human life, because their incorporation into human consciousness has been a vital factor in bringing about the attitudes of human beings towards one another, and towards the environment as a whole. And it is upon their attitudes that their valuations and conclusions regarding behaviour are invariably based.

But these were not the only results of the arising of competition. It was inevitable that its opposite, co-operation, would follow. Before there could be co-operation, however, it would be necessary

that human beings should possess the faculty of reasoning. They could not agree to combine their resources, whether of natural powers or compensations, or both, until they could reason that some advantage would follow.

ARISING OF REASONING AND CO-OPERATION.

The inception of reasoning followed that of thinking, and must, at first, have been specifically related to the awareness of time-values. Once the human being appreciated that his memory related to a point in time which he had left behind—that is, to a past value—he had made a distinction between past and present. But having made that distinction he could not fail to arrive at the further conclusion that, since one point of time had apparently receded into the past, others would be likely to do the same. He would suppose that the present would also, in its turn, become the past, and be followed by still further points in time.

In that supposition the human being had reasoned that he was likely to continue his existence into the future, or, in other words, he had established a future value. He had reasoned that because a thing had happened once it would be likely to do so again.

It is understandable that from this initial process the reasoning faculty developed, and became more subtle with a progressive accumulation of memories upon which to base it, and a progressive accumulation of weaknesses to make it necessary. Owing to the ever-present predisposition to further contamination, the accumulation of memories was inevitably paralleled by a continually growing need for further compensations and, necessarily, by the inception and intensifying of competition for the use of those compensations. The point, therefore, was bound to arise where several human beings would reason that advantage might be gained by a pooling of resources. Co-operation would follow and, in turn, would be likely to develop quickly, because by its means the human beings would appreciate the possibility of using compensations which would be beyond the scope of any one of them singly.

But, like competition, co-operation would bring definite changes in the consciousness of the human beings who entered upon it. They could only co-operate because of similar weaknesses and needs. And the appreciation of the support to be gained by their common efforts would bring about a fellow-sentiment between them. Their attitudes

to environment and to one another would tend to equate. This fellow-sentiment would provide the basis for such traits as tolerance, admiration, friendship, and so on.

It is important to note, however, that all these changes of consciousness, those resulting from competition and those resulting from co-operation, would rest upon definite changes in the characters of the human beings concerned. The contamination upon which all needs for compensations rest is the contamination of the bodily cell-system. The growing weakness in relation to environment is a weakness of bodily resources. The adaptation of the consciousness could only follow this modification of the character. It represents the expression of the growing unfitness of the bodily cell-system to afford the life-power a free medium for translating itself into the spontaneous and energetic manifestations of an organism.

SOCIETIES A DEBASEMENT, NOT AN ENRICHMENT OF HUMAN LIFE.

The significance of this is apparent when it is appreciated that the initial competition and co-operation between human beings was the first beginning of social relationships. By present-day

valuations the inception of socialisation was a great step forwards and upwards. It is regarded as being the foundation of all that is worthy, admirable or noble in human life. Yet, in fact, it was not more than a succumbing to a weakness and unfitness for life in its higher forms. It was the end of the most dignified state of human life, that of existing as an individual where the human being is accountable to and dependent upon no other thing than his own inner powers of vigorous action. It marked the end of rich, intense and vital sensation in all the more general manifestations of life, and the beginning of a state where, in the main, human reactions are the channelised, devitalised and impoverished intellectual responses.

It is not necessary to trace the developments of socialisation step by step. Given the first basis it is possible for everyone to follow the various stages for himself. There are no clearly defined lines marking off one stage from another, but the general trend is clear. The first co-operation and the appreciation of the advantages which followed; then the extension of the principle to the point where something in the nature of a loose community was formed; then, within the

community, the effects of the various modifications of consciousness which must have been brought about; the problems that must have arisen through the working of resentments and envies, intolerances and tolerances; the steps which must have been taken to minimise their effects; and, as a result, the growth of authority and the formations of institutions of power—the law, government, armed forces, etc.

SOCIETY INCREASINGLY INDISPENSABLE WITH PROGRESSIVE HUMAN WEAKNESS.

As the community only came into being at the instance of an imperative need in the weakness of the human beings who formed it, and the weakness is always progressive, it can be understood that there would never be a time when the community would not seem worth maintaining. It would become increasingly indispensable. The very advantages it offered would consolidate all the weaknesses it catered for. Human beings belonging to it would be further and further removed from direct contact with their natural environment; they would undergo a consistent weakening in those natural resources which had previously made such a direct contact possible.

So the society would always tend to be rated at an increasingly higher valuation; and no individual urge, however valid, would be allowed to imperil it. So the process would continue, on through the primitive community to the more complicated organizations, until civilization emerged. There is no aspect of a civilisation, even of one so complicated and confused as that of the present time, which cannot be traced back to that initial co-operation, and to some facet of human weakness in meeting the environment. And always, the parallel can be traced to weakness of bodily resources producing its corresponding adaptation of the consciousness—that is, of a weakness imposed upon the character from without through contamination of the bodily cell-system, obstructing the free expression of the life-power, so that it must find an outlet through a modified consciousness.

So that the absolute interdependence of the consciousness and character can be seen all through the many changes. And, equally, the constancy of the life-power can be seen, never failing the human being, leaving him to be obliterated by the environment, but meeting each change from without by a countering process from within; always

maintaining the organism, and making it possible for it to maintain itself and continue to manifest its particular qualities and characteristics.

VALUES APPLYING TO INDIVIDUALITY REVERSED BY
USE OF COMPENSATIONS.

One of the most important factors in these developments is the changing valuation by which the human being assesses his relationship to the environment. It was seen that with the reliance upon compensations and the ceasing of the reliance upon natural resources, individual values passed. The human being became an ego, asserting himself as an "I" in relation to other human beings with whom he might have to compete. But the scale of values, by which he could assess his behaviour in these conditions, would be the opposite of those appertaining to the state of individuality. Then he was self-sufficient, and his actions were good or bad in just so far as he was rich or weak in natural vigour and resources. But the use of compensations depends not upon strength, but upon weakness. That is to say, the human being who used them most and, therefore, gained the greatest skill in their use, would be the one who was

weakest and, therefore, stood in most need of them.

Yet the skill with which any human being used a compensation would determine the degree of ego-sufficiency with which he did so. With a greater skill he would use it with a greater facility and, therefore, with greater assurance—a greater degree of ego-sufficiency.

But as it is the use of the compensation which enables the human being to meet his environment on terms of equality, the apparent paradox is presented of the weakest human being meeting it with the greatest ease and, therefore, the greater degree of competence; and the least weak human being meeting it with the greatest effort and the less degree of competence. This paradox is extended to the values governing societies.

SOCIAL AUTHORITY INEVITABLY VESTED IN MEMBERS
WEAKEST IN SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

In societies it is the ego-sufficient human being who is rated highly; who is endowed with the authority to lay down rulings for the social organisation, and whose behaviour is accepted as a pattern upon which to base the standards of behaviour for the majority. And this again is not haphazard.

It follows inescapably from the weaknesses of those who make up the society. Standing themselves in need of the compensations which society provides, they are determined by their bodily conditions to attach a high value to the behaviour of one who has gained ease and facility in exploiting and supporting himself by those compensations.

This is only one more instance of the consciousness undergoing modifications parallel with the modifications brought about in the character by greater contamination and its resulting weaknesses. By standards of self-values, the conforming majority may be at a higher level than the minority which is so highly valued, but this in itself provides that the majority will be less egotistical. Just as the consciousness absolutely represents the character in all other ways, so with increasing weakness the awareness of inferiority increases commensurately. As a result, those able to behave with most ego-sufficiency—those who are most sure and assertive in their resort to compensations—have the greatest awareness of inferiority.

So that the degree of egoism manifested by any human being in relation to his fellow-beings is, as it were, a statement of the degree of inferiority he represents in relation to the environment as a

whole. In the society, therefore, those who are of a relatively higher self-value are less egotistical in asserting themselves and less likely to obtain a prominent place. On the other hand, those who are of a lower self-value, having a greater awareness of inferiority than the rest, will be egotistical in a greater degree. They will be ambitious of obtaining a preponderant share of the compensations provided by the society, they will be assertive and even calculated to be contemptuous of the majority, and will finally emerge in positions of authority and respect as though a natural superiority entitled them to do so. In fact, it is only a natural inferiority which qualifies them.

SOCIAL ORGANISATION MAKES POSSIBLE SECOND-HAND ACQUIRING OF KNOWLEDGE.

One of the most important contributory causes to this building up of a deceptive scale of values is the accumulation of knowledge. It has been seen that the first awareness that compensations might be used to outweigh natural weaknesses constituted the first acquiring of knowledge. Knowledge is, therefore, the accumulation of memories of experiences. But it is not only this. In those early stages when compensations had only just been

resorted to, no human being acquired the knowledge of experiences without undergoing the experiences. Gradually, however, and particularly when co-operation had been introduced, it became possible to acquire the knowledge of the experiences of other human beings.

This would not have progressed on any scale until societies were formed and clearly defined as multiple units of human resource. Then many things would conduce to make the second-hand acquiring of knowledge easy and, to an extent, even desirable from the social point of view. It would be, for instance, a vital necessity to find some way of cancelling out the conflicting traits of the human beings who made up the society. If all resentments, intolerances, hatreds, in fact all opposing sentiments were given full scope, the disruption of the society would inevitably result.

Yet all would agree that this could not be permitted. There would, therefore, have to be a "give-and-take" arrangement by which all submitted to some limitations. Particular crises would arise to impress this upon the members of the society, and a certain course of behaviour would be adopted by agreement. This would provide a precedent, and where a repetition of any crisis

arose, the precedent would be recalled and its example acted upon.

Necessarily, when the society had become complicated within itself, there would be a range of numerous precedents giving rulings for behaviour in various emergencies. But it would have been necessary for these precedents to be recorded or memorised. That is to say, it would have been necessary for the experiences of one set of human beings to be stored up as abstract knowledge, and then acquired by other human beings to whom they were not specifically related.

This process in turn would become complicated until, as for instance in a society such as our own at the present time, the accumulation of abstract knowledge would be so vast that further compensations such as books, archives and other mediums of recording were necessary to preserve it. It would also be necessary for certain members of the society to specialise in the recording and the interpreting of the recorded knowledge.

The important thing here is that, as all the rulings as to what constituted social or anti-social behaviour would be part of the accumulated knowledge, the specialists in knowledge would come to be regarded with respect by the remainder. Their

possession of knowledge would constitute power to affect the lives of others. In specialising in the possession of knowledge, however, a human being would acquire a preponderance of his experiences at second-hand. Long periods of his life would be devoted to modifying his consciousness by the experiences of others who, in the main, had long ceased to exist.

It would, in any case, be beyond the power of the bodily system of the human being who became the specialist in knowledge, to undergo the majority of the experiences which he so acquired at second-hand. Yet as his consciousness must represent those experiences once he had acquired the memories of them, he would present an example of one human being representing a consciousness which strictly belonged to other human beings. And because of his peculiar position he would have more than ordinary authority in the society.

ACCUMULATION OF ABSTRACT KNOWLEDGE RESULTS IN DECEPTION AND CONFUSION.

Obviously, the scale of values prevalent in a society which depended upon such a person for its rulings as to general behaviour is bound to be de-

ceptive, to give rise to deceptive conclusions, and to tend towards an ever-growing confusion. It is not merely that the consciousness of those who specialise in knowledge is modified. Every member of the society must be affected to a greater or less degree. The rulings would come to be hallowed as traditions; the laws regulating behaviour and providing authority for the institutions of power would be affected. These would touch life within the society at every point, and through them and in endless other ways there would be a trend towards bringing about modifications in the consciousness of the members of the society. And these modifications would have no basis in the bodily conditions of those who acquired them. The only bodily determination to their acceptance would be the indirect one of the need to preserve the society at all costs, as the one basic compensation upon which would rest all the other compensations which had become so necessary.

Such a process can never be smoothly and effectively carried on until the human beings who compose the society have become so degenerate that they are unable to respond intelligently to their bodily self-determination. Until that point in decline is reached, there must be a chaos of

conflicting opinions, grievances and social resentments, with confusion, discord and a measure of disruption resulting.

At the stages which have been dealt with in this chapter, all the complications of consciousness and character which are brought about still leave the human being as a self-determined organism. His individuality is all but lost and he is wholly unable to strike an equality with the environment through the means of his natural resources alone. But in his choice of compensations he still answers the determination of his own bodily cell-system. Even when he acquires experiences at second-hand as knowledge, he still has sufficient intelligent ego-awareness to remain personal in his acceptance of it. What his particular weaknesses need he will assimilate and utilise. What he does not need he will reject or remain impervious to.

INDIVIDUALITY REPLACED BY PERSONALITY WHEN HUMAN LIFE IS LINKED WITH COMPENSATIONS.

That is the state of the ego, or, more simply, the personality. In it, each human being asserts himself in all relationships as a personality, distinct as to his needs and wants, and as to his consciousness of those needs and wants. Whatever

limitations of freedom with regard to behaviour he accepts, he does not forego his personal identity. They are only such limitations as he knows are necessary to the preservation of the society in which he exists, and which he knows has become necessary to him.

The means by which his consciousness retains this awareness of personal identity are his opinions. Opinions are the egoistical equivalent of what in the state of individuality are the human being's instinctive attitudes. On the basis of carrying out his actions with particular degrees of self-sufficiency, the individual formed particular attitudes to the various aspects of the environment as he was called upon to meet them. As a personality such attitudes would not be adequate to the human being. All his personal—that is, his egotistical—behaviour is linked with factors outside of himself. His own attitude, based on his bodily resources, would only have a partial relevance for his behaviour, because he must always take into account the possible uses to which any compensation can be put.

PROCESS OF INTELLECTUALISATION.

Also, by the time that point is reached, the human being is to an extensive degree intellectualised. He can still answer his bodily determination, but as he can only do so through the medium of compensations, his accumulated memories—his mind—must come into play. And his mind is the accumulation of all the memories of all the experiences he has ever undergone. The mind, therefore, must direct the bodily determination, applying it in every instance to the particular memory and the particular compensation which will be relevant in the circumstances. In other words, the human being as a personality must form opinions through which he is able to estimate the significance of all impressions from the environment, and relate them to his particular bodily determination.

DEFINITION OF PERSONALITY.

That may be regarded as the definition of the personality: the human being whose consciousness, on the basis of his particular bodily weaknesses, assesses his relationship with the environment by a scale of values for which his opinions

provide the standards. Such a human being is obviously best adapted to life within a society, and the period of civilisation is his hey-day.

THE CONSCIENCE IN PERSONALITY.

There is one final important point, and that is the working of the conscience throughout these changes of consciousness and character. As was seen, conscience in the individual was expressed in the character as the bodily self-regulating processes. The only change possible in these processes, whatever other changes may be brought about, is that they must, necessarily, become less potent and vigorous as contamination becomes greater and greater. Every introduction of alien matter into the cell-system must be met by them, and be subject to their tendency to reject all that is not proper to the perfect bodily character.

These processes, therefore, continue with unabated aggregate intensity, although they are proportionately less effective as they are bound to cope with ever greater and greater introductions of contaminating matter.

In the consciousness, however, the changes are more complicated. Every new trait added to the consciousness, from the first awareness of time- and

space-values, on through the addition of thinking and reasoning and all the egoistic traits and forming of opinions, must be influenced by the urge to recover the lost perfection of the state of origin.

When this urge was first incorporated into the consciousness with the loss of the absolute values of perfection, however, it had only to influence instinctive awarenesses. But if such an urge continued to operate only upon instinctive awarenesses, it would have little significance for the complicated processes of conscious manifestation which appertain to the intellectualised human being. If it is to be effective in his case it also must be subdivided and new consciences arise adapted to new qualities. And just as the self-regulating processes in the bodily system operate against every modification brought about by new contamination, so in the consciousness the conscience acts upon every modification, however removed it may be from the pure instinctive awarenesses.

In human beings such as this chapter has analysed, therefore, the old instinctive urge remains and is recognisable. It takes the form of an instinctive acceptance that their mode and conditions of life are imperfect. *But with the accept-*

ance of imperfection there is also a conception of what constitutes perfection. This, however, since it must be translated into terms recognisable to the intellectualised consciousness, comes under the direction of the mind, and is interpreted by each human being in accordance with his opinions.

URGE TOWARDS PERFECTION UNIVERSAL.

Thus, in a state of civilisation, we get an infinity of conceptions of what would constitute perfection, each varying from the rest, as the human being who forms it varies from the rest of his fellow-beings, but each representing a tendency towards something higher and more noble than the sensations of life which their experiences have afforded them. It is one of the most significant facts of human life that this conception of a perfect state and acceptance of the imperfection of present conditions applies to human beings universally: no race, culture or society has ever been devoid of it.

LIFE-POWER AND MENTAL CONSCIENCE.

There is also, however, an egoistical conscience. This represents the influence which the mind

brings to bear upon our instinctive tendencies towards perfection. With the incessant contamination and the predisposition to further decline, the point must be reached where the preservation of the human being as an ego would mean the maintenance of a higher state than the one into which he is lapsing. To preserve it would mean setting a bulwark against further degeneration, and by that means saving the human being from drifting still further away from the perfection of his origin. But the human being's mind cannot give him the desire to do this. Always, his mentality as it grows more complicated inclines towards an ever greater and greater multiplication of the compensations by which life is supported and towards the surrendering of bodily and personal responsibilities to some code of life summed up in an idea or theory. Yet, because he has become so much intellectualised, it is only through mental appreciations that he can perceive even the most profound impulses of his life-power. The life-power then must express its tendencies towards perfection as mental inclinations.

Here we can see the egoistical equivalent of the individual conscience. The life-power cannot pro-

vide the human being with an inner-accusing when he meets his environment without relying upon his own bodily resources, because those resources would no longer be adequate to maintain him against the environment. But it can, and does, translate that urge towards perfection into a mental sense of guilt when he relapses into an acceptance of dictation and foregoes the direction of his own mind as represented by the asserting of his opinions and principles.

The functioning of this conscience is familiar to all present-day human beings. Every human being will know the sensation of guilt which expresses itself within him when he has allowed himself to act contrary to his opinions and prejudices. It is not always a vivid or intense compunction, and its general effect is rather to produce a conservatism; an inclination to preserve the status quo in human affairs as an old, and tried, and at least not disastrous method of conducting them.

Yet it has been recognised as a conscience, and has been given various names, according to the opinions of various human beings. It is spoken of as the social conscience, the civic conscience, self-respect or merely as the holding of principles

—but no human being who is a reputable member of society has wholly escaped its promptings.

This point in human decline, where the human being is a social being, a personality, highly intellectualised and artificialised, marks a rough dividing line in the stages of the various changes which the human consciousness and character undergo. There is a further stage where the personality weakens and the human being drifts into a state which must be called the state of nonentity. To analyse that will require a further chapter.

This chapter may be brought to a close at this point. It has traced the decline of the human being from the state of individuality through the various stages which produced the definite egoist or personality. Inevitably it has been impossible to analyse every facet of human behaviour, and the organisation in which that behaviour comes into being, and to trace each to the particular weakness of character from which it derived. But with the basis laid, the analysis can be worked out and a detailed understanding obtained of every phase of what has been regarded as human “progress.”

The important thing here is that a true valuation should have been established of how society

and social life is related to the consciousness and character of the single human being, and that a basis should be laid for each to assess himself, and his relationship with his surroundings, by standards that are valid and true.

FROM PERSONALITY TO NONENTITY

The final study of consciousness and character in the human being relates to his passing from the state of Personality to that of Nonentity, and it deals with conditions of life which are recognisable in the social order of the present time, or with imminent conditions, the trend towards which is also clearly apparent.

The states of Entity, Individuality and Personality were analysed in the two preceding studies. It has been seen that Entity was the absolute expression of human life and constituted the perfection of the state of origin. The Individual was a reduced expression carrying the limitations of the early stages of contamination, yet still meeting his environment solely out of his own bodily resources. The Personality is the expression of human life when the human being is linked with compensations subtracted from the environment to counter the weakness of bodily capacity in the human being.

Dealing with the more advanced stages of personality, it was shown that the trend of intel-

lectualisation resulted in the human being becoming more and more a representation of externals and less and less able to answer to the determination of his bodily cell-system. It will, perhaps, make an understanding of these final stages more simple to restate a few of the basic points upon which the state of personality rested.

The first point, which, as we have previously seen, should always be kept in mind in any study of consciousness and character, is that human life is essentially no more than the self-expression of the human life-power in relation to its environment. That is to say, when all the fantastic conceptions of human destiny and of the purpose of human life in the universe are reduced to their fundamentals, human life involves no more than two things :

(1) The meeting of the environment by the human organism.

(2) The expression of the organism's tendencies and urges against the tendencies of the environment.

It was seen that the personality has, in the main, lost the capacity of direct contact with the

environment. He is only able to live—that is, to maintain contact with the environment—by responding to it indirectly through the means of compensating factors. It was also seen that this indirect contact was maintained through the accumulated memories of experiences which he had acquired, either by experiences in the use of compensations or as abstract knowledge. The memories constituted a mind, and the mind directed the human being's behaviour.

But in this state the human being still perceived and was determined by his particular bodily condition. Through his capacity to feel he was able to assess the particular significance to himself of any impression from the environment on the basis of his own inferiority to it. The mind only came into play secondarily, directing or interpreting whatever bodily determination had resulted from any particular impression. The human being himself and his own natural resources, therefore, were represented in his behaviour, even though the representation was indirect. All his attitudes to his surroundings were based on his opinions, and his opinions were, in turn, based jointly upon the bodily determination and the accumulation of memories of experiences.

It was also seen that, throughout, all changes had been brought about by contamination taken in as nourishment, and that the weakness and complication had been progressive owing to the predisposition to further contamination which the first cell memory had set up.

IMPERMANENCE OF PERSONALITY.

Obviously, with this predisposition underlying all the human being's manifestations, the state of personality could not be permanent. Unless some means of obtaining a real improvement of the condition of the bodily cells were brought about, so that the predisposition could be counteracted, the decline from the state of personality was as inevitable as the previous decline had been, from Individuality to Personality.

And the direction which this decline must take could only be towards an ever-increasing loss of directness and definiteness of contact with the environment and, therefore, of a still further reduction of the degree to which self-values were represented in human behaviour. In terms of consciousness and character this means that the character would become less able to distinguish between various impressions received from the

environment, and the consciousness, therefore, less able to make any assessment of them in relation to the needs or susceptibilities of the organism. This means, in short, that the human being would be less and less able to perceive and answer his bodily determination.

ILLUSTRATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS UNABLE TO REPRESENT BODILY CONDITION AGAINST ENVIRONMENT.

This may be simply illustrated by using an example which was taken in one of the previous chapters. If a human being is intoxicated it means that his cells are charged with alcohol. As a result, in meeting the impressions which the environment makes upon him it is not predominantly his cells with their particular normal needs and susceptibilities which are represented in his consciousness. For instance, if he goes out of doors into dangerously cold air, he is susceptible to that air and needs protection from it. But his consciousness is unable to have an awareness of this. It is representing the fictitious warmth of the alcohol, and this representation overlays its awareness of the susceptibility of his bodily cells to suffer from the cold. He cannot answer in-

telligently to feeling. He imagines he feels warm and is independent of protection. He is, therefore, at the mercy of his environment as represented by the cold which threatens him. And because his consciousness cannot represent his cells except in their intoxicated state, he will not protect himself unless protection is forced on him—that is to say, unless it is dictated to him. In accepting this dictation the degree of self-abandon he would manifest in submitting to it would depend upon the degree of intoxication—that is, to the degree to which his cells were charged with the contaminating alcohol.

This is not an exact parallel of the contamination by which the human being permanently loses his capacity of meeting the environment intelligently. That process is much more gradual and less easily discernible. But the example does serve to show the processes involved. If the human being's contact with the environment has become so vague that he cannot assess the significance to himself of the impressions it makes upon him, he is at the mercy of the forces of the environment and must either be overwhelmed or submit to a dictation which will make the necessary assessments for him.

LIFE-POWER ACCEPTS DICTATION AS ALTERNATIVE
TO EXTINCTION.

It has previously been seen, however, that the life-power which human life represents does not abandon the human being. It cannot do so, since he is its medium of expression and must be used, however indirectly, as the means of expressing its urges and tendencies. As further and further obstruction is opposed to its expression through the cell-system, therefore, it continuously adapts the consciousness and character to meet the changed relationship with itself on the one side and the environment on the other. It does not permit the human being as an organic factor in the universe to be wholly overwhelmed, and it will, therefore, as an alternative, adapt him by inducing a willingness to submit to dictation. As an alternative to extinction and the complete loss of expression, it chooses the individual and personal obliteration of the human being, allowing him to become a tool of some dictatorial system, theory or idea.

Necessarily, this process does not take place suddenly. The predisposition to further contamination on which it rests operates gradually

and insidiously. There is first a growing weakness of opinions. The human being remains aware that he is receiving particular impressions from the environment, but instead of being egotistical and opinionated as to their significance to himself and what constitutes a proper response to them, he remains in doubt. Neither through his awareness of his bodily weaknesses nor his memory of experiences can he decide on a course of behaviour. It is then that he begins to look for some ruling from outside of himself which will indicate what his proper response should be.

PROGRESSIVE LOSS OF FEELING PARALLELED BY
DECLINE OF PERSONALITY.

What has actually happened is that the progressive contamination of his bodily cells has stupefied his capacity for all subtlety of feeling. He can still feel, but only in a vague and blunted way. And as his consciousness must be equally blurred, he cannot relate that vague feeling to any experience which his mind has recorded. He cannot form an opinion as to his relationship to his surroundings.

Yet the life-power within him still presses the

awareness of inferiority upon his consciousness. He still realises that if he could perceive its significance the environment threatens at innumerable points. Inevitably he looks to some other agent than himself to specify just how he is related to the environment; to provide something which will take the place of an opinion; to provide him with an idea or theory which will incorporate rulings to guide him in every phase of his life.

HISTORY SHOWS GRADUAL DECLINE FROM PERSONALITY.

The gradualness of the decline to this state can be seen if the historically recorded progress of human societies is examined. In their early stages communities involved the human being in few obligations. Common action was only taken in the rare event of some emergency threatening the members of the community individually and as a whole. Discipline was loose and only touched the life of the members of the society at a few points.

This was inevitable, because those who made up the community were not adapted to accepting

discipline. They were independent human beings, resentful of the intrusion of others into the normal course of their lives, and prepared to resist any measure undertaken by those responsible for the loose social organisation which was calculated to be oppressive or restrictive of their freedom to live as their bodily determination and their skills decided.

Again, it must be stressed that it is not intended to imply the primitive states of human life as known to history to represent the higher individualistic stage of human life. The example of primitive communities is merely taken to illustrate a degree of willingness to submit to dictation. The primitive state might be relatively higher as regards freedom to express bodily determination, but at its best it remains a low state of human existence, with intense degrees of suffering involved and a complicated inferiority to the environment as a whole.

Yet it can be seen that natural resources had freer play, and with the constant weakening of natural resources, resulting from the predisposition to further contamination which characterises all imperfect states, the means of maintaining life under the conditions of a loose and primitive social

organisation become progressively more difficult to practise.

The members became unable to withstand the rigours of climatic conditions and sustain the effort of obtaining food by means of their limited resources. They came to require more effective clothing and more elaborate shelter than previously. This produced an inventiveness in the more naturally weak members and they devised means of counteracting their insufficiency. As these means could not be discovered within themselves, the inventiveness trended inevitably to added and more complicated compensations.

But other members in turn, faced with similar weaknesses, saw the apparent advantages to be obtained from these compensations, and emulated the weaker few. In time, these added supports became a general need, and then competition to obtain them arose. The competition inevitably set up rivalries and factions which threatened to disrupt the society. The society, however, was a primary basis for the preservation of all the members and, this being so, it became necessary to adjust the organisation of the society to deal with the threat of disruption. In the circumstances a solution could only be found by all the members

agreeing to accept a further degree of discipline in their lives. By doing so they lost a further degree of their natural independence.

History shows that this process was repeated at intervals until out of the first loose society a civilisation had arisen. All civilisations give full scope to the inventiveness of the weaker members to provide an ever-widening range of compensations. Life within them has become channelised to the point where the great majority of those who compose it are specialists, contributing the results of one particular skill to the general welfare, and receiving in return the means of supplying all their other needs without further personal effort on their parts.

SPECIALISATION CONSOLIDATES INCAPACITY TO MEET ENVIRONMENT DIRECTLY.

Such conditions must result in a growing incapacity to meet the environment directly. And this growing incapacity must be met. All who compose the civilisation become more and more mutually dependent and, therefore, all must sacrifice something of their own urges to meet those of others. And the multiplication of this process,

with the multiplication of specialists, complicates the organisation by which life is upheld.

The important point in this is that the social organisation comes to bear more and more heavily upon the separate members. Their lives must be regulated by laws, precedents and social sanctions, with penalties provided for the infringement of the generally accepted code. The history of societies provides a record of the gradual complication of this process, and a continual resistance to it on the part of the more virile members of the community. First some new regulation has been propounded, found favour with some and been rejected by others. But gradually the whole society has become adapted to it, and the process of application and resistance has been transferred to some further ruling.

ARISING OF THE NONENTITY.

The first instance of some members of a society behaving as nonentities occurs early. Almost from the beginning there have been degenerates, prepared to abandon all individuality and personality in return for freedom from responsibility in conducting their own lives. These have been the sycophants, who would render blind allegiance to any

member of the society prepared to utilise them. They are not to be confused with slaves, who have been forced into the behaviour of nonentities by the compulsion of the institutions of power. But gradually, with the cumulative weight of social restrictions paralleling the progressive natural weakness, the numbers of those manifesting a servile attitude have increased, and an analysis of present-day society will show a state where this applies to the majority, and the imminent eclipse of all self-values in the great mass of humanity is apparent.

If a life under present-day conditions is examined this will be clearly seen. From its earliest years the oppressions of the social organisation begin to weigh heavily upon the present-day child. Immediately it begins to manifest the comparatively individualistic values that belong to the earlier and less contaminated stages of life, discipline is brought to bear.

DICTATORIAL TREND IN CARE AND EDUCATION OF CHILDREN.

For instance, even the youngest infants are not supplied with food as they manifest the need for it. A curriculum of diet is laid down and, irrespective of the bodily requirements, nourishment is given

at fixed and regular times. Then, as the child begins to grow, its own consciousness and character are not given scope to unfold freely and naturally from within. Organised attempts are made to impose developments upon it from without. There is, as an example, the mass education involved in teaching children in classes. No attempt is made to discover the particular tendencies and aptitudes of a single child. A curriculum of applying knowledge is imposed indiscriminately upon numbers of them.

And this is not confined only to the mental side of education. Physical training is also imposed. Children of varying degrees of bodily symmetry and differing proportions, who would naturally each have a unique rhythm and scope of movement, are subjected to exercises in groups, and frequently the exercises are carried out by numbers to a rhythm which is decided upon by the teacher, or by some authority who has never come into personal contact with the children concerned. In neither case has a thought been given to the unique physiological conditions of the pupils.

It may even be that the rhythm decided upon would not be adapted to any one of the children making up a class, yet all the power of organised

adults, often based upon threats of physical violence, is called upon to coerce the children into forcing their still mobile bodily systems to suppress their own rhythms and move by the dictated rhythm.

On the question of diet, also, the child is not guided to gain an awareness of its own bodily urges. Science has stepped in to lay down a range of foods which is accepted as generally desirable, and these are foisted upon children irrespective of particular bodily requirements, preferences, or tastes.

EFFECTS OF DICTATION UPON UNFOLDING CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHARACTER.

The effect of this upon the unfolding consciousness and character is not difficult to see. Before it reaches the age of adolescence the child is largely a synthetic and channelised product. The actual nourishment constitution of its cells, its bodily form—in so far as it incorporates developments which have been imposed upon it—embodies not more than a part of its own tendencies, and for the rest, embodies the ideas and theories of parents, teachers and educational authorities. And the child's consciousness has been forced to represent

these factors, with the result that the child's attitudes to his environment have already been to some degree standardised. Taboos have also been forced upon him, to conform with the social code of manners and conceptions of right and wrong, correct and incorrect. Many of his natural urges have been stultified and the manifestation of them in his actions or behaviour has been represented to him as shameful or reprehensible.

But just as previous changes have brought new traits during the decline through individuality and personality, so in these later redirections, every variation in the human being's relationship with the environment on the one side and his own life-power on the other, results in some new characteristic or quality. And these can be understood from a consideration of the human being undergoing adaptation to dictation.

CHANGES OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHARACTER BROUGHT ABOUT BY DICTATION.

The first change is in the quality, with which the human being assesses the various factors of the environment in relation to himself. We saw that with the loss of his self-values he was no longer able adequately to meet his surroundings by means

of vigilance. It became necessary for him to meet them attentively, assessing the possibilities of the various factors to be used for assisting him to meet other and more threatening factors. But this attentiveness was based on his own particular awareness of the degree of inferiority attaching to his particular bodily system. No two human beings would, therefore, manifest an identical degree of attentiveness. The quality would be expressed uniquely in each. And no matter how complicated the forms of assistance that, with increasing decadence, any human being used as a support for his increasing weakness and awareness of inferiority—that is to say, no matter how elaborately and calculatedly he came to manifest attentiveness—its qualitative value would always be determined by his particular bodily condition, and directed by his own mentality as represented by the particular memory modifications he had acquired.

DICTATION MUST SUPPRESS ATTENTIVENESS.

It will be clear, however, that in submission to dictation, attentiveness could no longer serve the human being, since the degree of attentiveness which any human being can manifest rests upon his awareness of inferiority, and the awareness of

inferiority rests upon feeling. Attentiveness has a basis of feeling. But it is just the loss, in the cells, of the capacity to react feelingly to impressions from the environment which brings about the self- and ego-abandonment to dictation. But since it is the life-power which impels the human being to seek dictatorial control as a means of self-preservation, he is not impelled to submit grudgingly or with reservations. He places himself unreservedly under its authority. This means that, although there can no longer be any modifications of the qualities and characteristics attaching to him, *from within him*, he is predisposed to accept such modifications from without—that is, from the dictation.

But the dictation could not utilise for its own ends the feelingly determined attentiveness. That would determine the human being to rely on his own acquired memories and make his behaviour unique. The essence of a dictation, however, is that it must evoke a uniformity of behaviour in those it controls. Otherwise, no code or régime of behaviour could be elastic enough to utilise the services of its human units. Chaos would result. The dictation must, therefore, impose a new quality to replace attentiveness.

DICTION PROVIDES STANDARDISED ASSESSMENTS
OF ENVIRONMENT.

This new quality will require that the human being shall not consult his own particular bodily system or mentality when he is faced with the various aspects of the environment which constitute the continuity of his life. As we have seen, he is already so stupefied that he could not, in any case, arrive at any valid assessments of his environment on the basis of feeling, and this is where the dictation plays its part. It provides him with ready-made assessments.

Again, however, since these assessments are not related to anything belonging to any particular human being as an organism, he can neither arrive at them for himself nor have a knowledge of them with any degree of relative spontaneity. They, as with everything else belonging to dictation, must be imposed upon him before he can react in terms of them. And being imposed upon him from without, they must first come to be represented in his character (his bodily cell-system) before they can be voiced in his consciousness. But the only way in which they can come to be represented in his character is by means of the imposi-

tion of memory modifications. They must be imposed upon him as brain-memories before they can be incorporated into his consciousness. And the sensitisations of the brain tissues representing these memory-modifications must be deeply and rigidly impressed if he is to be able to react to his environment in terms of them, with any degree of exactitude and efficiency.

DICTATION SUBSTITUTES CONCENTRATION FOR ATTENTIVENESS.

For such memories to be imposed upon the blunted perceptions of the degenerate who can submit to a dictation there must be something within him which represents co-operation in the imposition of them. Just as attentiveness made the decadent human being easily able to acquire the memories of the use of compensations reasonably, so now there must be a quality which will enable him to accept the imposition of the dictated memories through which he will be enabled to continue meeting his environment. It will be necessary that he shall concentrate such dull faculties as remain to him upon the task of accepting the modifications which the dictation seeks to impose. That is to say, he must no longer be atten-

tive to his environment, but must concentrate upon the rulings which are the dictation's interpretation of the environment.

Once again, however, it will be realised that there is no impulse from within himself to bring about this change in the quality of his consciousness. There is an indirect impulse in the urge which determined him to accept the dictation at all. But the vague expression of that urge only gives him a willingness to abandon himself to the dictation and all that it represents. Yet it is out of this willingness that the dictation is able to fashion in him the quality of concentration, which will enable him to become an efficient expression of it. His willingness to self-abandonment is bound up with the fantastic promises and threats attaching to the code, theory or régime to which he submits. In the hope of fulfilment of the promises and fear of the fulfilment of the threats lies, first, the impulse to submit willingly to the dictation, and, secondly, the factor of co-operation within him which will make it possible for the memory-modifications, representing the assessments which the dictation seeks to impose, to be deeply and rigidly impressed upon him.

This, then, is the first change that takes place

with submission to dictation. The quality of attentiveness attaching to egoistic meeting of the environment is replaced by concentration upon the assessments laid down by the dictatorial rulings. That is the change in the consciousness. The parallel change in the character is the modification of the bodily cell-system by the imposed memories which represent the dictation.

REASONING RULED OUT BY DICTATION.

It will be realised that the reasoning faculty which must play so great a part in the attitudes, assessments and behaviour of the human being who asserts himself against the environment on the basis of his own egoistic value can have no part in concentration. Reasoning, as was shown in the previous chapter, is selection among the memories which have been acquired by the human being. It must always be a calculation as to some future moment of the human being's life (even if it is a moment so immediately in the future as to be represented by the time during which a human being can think). But it is a calculation based on the human being's own past experiences and acquired knowledge, and related to his own awareness of inferiority and degree of feeling.

If, however, the human being is to meet his environment through the medium of ready-made assessments of it, which are imposed upon him by the dictation, calculation can play no part. He stands between the environment on the one side and the dictation on the other, and is merely a non-initiating link between the two. If he reasoned he would initiate his own behaviour. If he initiated his own behaviour it would not be in accord with the assessments laid down by the dictation.

THOUGHT REPLACED BY AUTOMATIC REACTION.

Even the thought which enables the human being submitting to dictation to link a particular aspect of the environment with the requisite imposed memory which applies to it in accordance with the dictation is not strictly thought. It is more truly an automatic reaction, similar to the reaction of a piece of machinery of which a control lever has been pulled. Thought as we understand it implies a degree of freedom of selection among the memories which represent our experiences and knowledge. It involves the choosing, according to our particular bodily determination, among a number of possible responses to any aspect of the

environment which may have impressed us. But in reaction, in accordance with the rulings of a dictation, there is no choosing. The one prescription laid down by the authority is the one correct reaction to any particular aspect of the environment. And in this the human being has not only the compulsion of the threats and promises attaching to the dictation, but the compulsion of his own inability to arrive at any conclusion which will adequately relate any impression from the environment to the memory-modification applicable to it. That is to say, the human being is compelled to the automatic response in terms of the dictation by his inability to think with any degree of validity.

TIME- AND SPACE-VALUE UNIQUE TO MEMORY-DIRECTED HUMAN BEINGS.

Another important change, which is implied in this, is that time and space have passed away with the human being's submission to dictation. We saw that time and space arose as calculable factors of the environment with the first use of a compensation. From that point, with every subsequent use of additional compensations, the awarenesses of time and space, which were represented

in the human being's consciousness, must have undergone an elaboration. Every newly acquired memory-modification gave a specific location in both time and space to some new factor of the environment. This process has been complicated until we have the intricate time and space conceptions which belong to human consciousness in the civilised state we know to-day.

But in the fact that it is the first memory which establishes the first consciousness of time and space there are important implications. The time and space consciousness must always be directed by the memory, and all subsequent accumulations of memories must bring about corresponding elaborations of the human being's conceptions of time and space. For instance, the intellectualised human being of to-day has an almost infinite variety of conceptions of both time and space. Everything of which he has a mental awareness is attached to some particular location in the whole of the environment and linked to some particular moment or moments of time. Even with the acquired knowledge, in respect of which he has not undergone experiences himself, time and space play their part, although the conceptions of them are less definite. In the case, for example, of a

knowledge of history, we visualise the locality and the occasion in which each event took place.

It follows from this, however, that time and space have a unique value for each separate human being. No two human beings have identical memories. In their conceptions of time and space, therefore, no two human beings are directed by identical factors.

CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME- AND SPACE-VALUES DETERMINED BY THE HUMAN BEING'S BODILY WEAKNESS.

The particular bodily capacities and capabilities for self- and ego-assertion in relation to the environment as a whole must also play their part in this, since it is upon these that the acquiring of memories rests. We saw that memories would play no part where the human being was able to meet his environment through vigilance and the use of his own bodily resources alone. Memories only arise with the reliance upon some external factor and the attentive singling out of it from the remainder of the environment as a means of support. It follows from this that any human being acquires memories exactly in accordance with his lack of capacity to meet the environment by his

own resources, and that his conceptions of time and space, being directed by his memories, will vary exactly in accordance with the variations of his weakness in relation to the environment.

From this conclusion we can see that every manifestation of every human being has its particular time- and space-value. Each manifestation is characterised by the particular degree of bodily capacity or incapacity belonging to the particular human being. It can carry an energy-value only in accordance with the degree of energy with which the bodily system, from which it emanates, is endowed. And its potentiality for equalising itself with the environment—that is, for establishing the human being who makes it on terms of equality with his environment—must also rest upon that energy-value. But, this being so, the extent to which it must be based upon a consciousness of time and space will also rest on the same basis. If, of itself alone, it could equalise the human being with whatever the environment opposed to him at the particular moment of making it, time could not enter in. Only the two factors, the net value of the human being and the net value of the environment, would be involved. But to just the extent that it lacked the energy-

value to make an equality of itself alone, the human being would require to be linked with memories in order that he could support it by assistance from compensating factors from the environment. And to just the extent that it required support it would be attached to time and space in order that the human being, out of his mental knowledge, could isolate the necessary supporting factors from the totality of the environment.

So that, up to the point where the human being ceases to manifest himself on the basis of his own bodily capacities, plus his own accumulation of memories, he and all his manifestations have a unique time- and space-value, based fundamentally upon his particular degree of bodily inferiority to the environment as a whole, and by that inferiority determining his experiences, upon his accumulation of memories.

DICTIONATION RULES OUT PERSONAL TIME- AND SPACE-VALUES.

When, however, a human being submits himself to a dictation and his manifestations express not his own uniqueness, but the set prescriptions laid down by the dictation, his own time and

space pass from him. He must no longer estimate his environment in terms of time and space based upon his own memories. If he did so he would arrive at valuations regarding it which would conflict with those laid down by the dictation. Equally, his own manifestations—his bodily movements and his behaviour generally—would violate the code of the dictation if his own time and space entered in. *The essence of a dictation is that it, and not the human beings who serve it, shall be represented in their behaviour under it.* We have seen that no dictation could be elastic enough to allow those who make up its units to function as unique organisms. It must impose its own standards and compel all who serve it to comply implicitly with them. And the unique conceptions of time and space which would derive from the unique bodily conditions and experiences of any one human being, and the unique time- and space-values which characterise the manifestations of any individual or personality, can be no exception.

DICTATION RULES OUT PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE.

Even past, present and future no longer exist for the human being who is wholly subjected to

a dictation. Manifesting himself under his own mental direction, any human being's past is summed up in the total of memories he has acquired and which constitute his mind. So with his present. His life-value at any time is represented by his capacity to establish himself on terms of real or apparent equality with the environment. But this value must always be represented by the natural resources of his bodily system (however weakened they may have become) plus the memories he has acquired of his own experiences or those of others. So that, moment by moment as he lives, his present is whatever relationship with the environment is possible, having regard to whatever his intrinsic bodily resources and acquired experiences may be. And these determine his future also. Essentially the future has no reality. It constitutes a mental envisaging of an extension of past and present. Nevertheless, while he remains under his own mental direction, the human being's future must be his own. He can only envisage it as his bodily condition at any moment determines him and at the direction and in terms of his acquired memories, whether the memories are of his own experiences or of the experiences of others which

he has learned as knowledge. That is to say, any human being's future is always based on his past and present. And all three, in the human being as a mentally directed being, are unique to him.

But where dictation takes the human being in control, past, present and future have passed away and are replaced by the indefinite values attaching to the theoretical, ideological or traditional past on which the dictation rests and the indefinite future in which the promises or threats attaching to the dictation are given their environment. This can be understood from a consideration of the indefinite religious past, in which the Creator is imagined as having given the commands embodied in the creed, and the indefinite future, in which heaven and hell are given their environment.

Or another example might be the past and future attaching to a utopian economic theory. The theory rests on premises advanced by its founder. The premises represent the interpretation which he placed upon his own experiences and the experiences of others which he has acquired as knowledge. But since this interpretation only visualises the human being as an automaton and ignores his organic and intel-

lectual uniqueness, it must be based upon false assessments and conclusions. That is, the past values on which the theory rests have no reality. And since its future must be conceived in terms of its past, that, too, must be divorced from reality—or, in other words, it can only be indefinite. It will be a future indefinitely located in a time when the theory will have received universal application to human life and human beings will have received fulfilment of its false and utopian promises.

But in any case, to have any reality, past, present and future would have to take into account the human being's net value as a life-manifestation—the degree of his capacity for self-assertion against the environment and the accumulation of memories of experiences which represents his mind, both of which are unique in each human being.

It is just these unique values which the dictation must suppress, however, if they should emerge, and which it does not in any case take into account when prescribing the human being's manifestation as a unit of itself. The assessments as to environment, the prescriptions as to behaviour, the "self"-assessments and the estima-

tions as to his fellow-being's which the dictation imposes upon the human being are wholly unrelated to the self- and ego-values which he may represent. They are also, therefore, wholly unrelated to any reality of time and space, of past, present, or future.

We shall be able to see this more clearly when we are considering a human being who is undergoing a course of disciplined training, by which a military dictation moulds him to the degree of efficiency necessary to its own functioning as an efficient whole. We shall see how by the dictation of a rhythm of movement in drill the dictation imposes its own time and space and utterly disregards whatever they might be if the human being's own bodily determination and mental direction played their part. From that one example it will be possible for anyone to analyse how, not only in the particular drilled movements on parade, but in everything appertaining to his life, the human being who submits to the dictation must utterly forego his own time- and space-values and accept those fixed by the dictation.

EXAMPLE OF DICTATION IMPOSING MEMORIES ON
HUMAN BEING.

We may consider a human being who is to undergo military training. If he is to become an efficient soldier he must have reached the point in decline where the ordering and regulating of every phase of his life will not prove irksome. He must be so dull of sensitive response to his own tendencies, urges and contact with the environment; so vague as to what responses his particular bodily and mental condition would determine and direct, in relation to the impressions from the environment, that he can willingly submit to having them wholly dictated from without.

If we first think of him taking his place on the parade ground, it can be seen how all his self- and ego-values are utterly negated. He is not, for instance, permitted to stand as his peculiarities of bodily form would determine. Orders are shouted at him dictating how he shall hold his shoulders, his head, his back, his arms and his legs. And when this stance has been imposed upon him he must remain in it, not until his muscles or his blood circulation urge him to

change it, but until he receives the order to do so from his superior officer. Even then the extent and manner in which he may relax is also ordered.

SUPPRESSION OF INDIVIDUAL AND PERSONAL UNIQUENESS BY DICTATION.

An analysis of this will show the extent to which the freedom of expression of his life-power through his consciousness and character is suppressed. Every movement of every human being should be unique to him, carrying his own time- and space-value, and must be so if it derives solely from his bodily resources. Each bodily form represents a unique degree of symmetry of form and harmony of bodily proportion. Each blood-stream as it circulates carries a unique energy-value and, therefore, a unique potentiality of vigour of movement in the limbs.

That is to say, a company of men carrying out the same evolution would, if their natural tendencies were not suppressed, each move with a particular tempo, in a particular manner and with a particular degree of vigour and grace. Even if the evolution involved the use of a tool or weapon, each would have a unique skill in

the manipulation of the weapon and a unique degree of energy to expend upon its use, and would, therefore, perform the evolution differently from any other.

If, however, a company of men are to carry out that evolution to a disciplined pattern, all these tendencies must be overcome. And, because there is no urge from within to do so, the actual overcoming of them must be brought about from outside, through the medium of commands which induce a memorised process of mechanical response. At first the company of men will be unable to carry out the commands according to the pattern laid down by the discipline, or they will only be able to carry them out with difficulty. Their own uniqueness of consciousness and character will tend to emerge, defeating the regularisation which discipline demands. But by constant repetition, with the fear of punishment in the event of defaulting and the hope of commendation in the event of conforming, they will finally become efficient. Uniqueness of consciousness and character will have been suppressed.

PRODUCTION OF THE NONENTITY.

In becoming efficient a series of memories will have been imposed upon the limbs and brains of the men undergoing the training, and a series of modifications to represent the memories will have been brought about in the men as organisms. In the case of the soldier on parade, his back and neck and other parts of his bodily form will have become stiffened, the capabilities of his limbs to carry out movements will have been channelised to accord with a military conception of smartness and the time and space prescribed by the military code.

But these changes must be represented in his consciousness, since his consciousness must always exactly represent his character, with its utmost capacity of living manifestation. This means that both the consciousness and character of the soldier will have been modified, not by any urge, need or want from within himself, not by any direct necessity of his relationship with the environment, but by a purely arbitrary dictation from outside of his bodily system. When he carries out the evolutions on the parade ground he himself is not represented in them in any way. They

were not designed to meet any demand from him, but to fit the tactical requirements of military manœuvring. As far as the regulations governing them are concerned, he exists only as a machine to carry out the evolutions mechanically. But as far as the natural tendencies of his life-power are concerned he is virtually non-existent, although he is moving and utilising his resources of organic energy.

Necessarily, such movements cannot be carried out with any degree of ego-sufficiency, so that they cannot be measured by the egoistic standards which may be applied to the human being as a personality. And they certainly cannot be assessed by the self-values which may be applied to the human being as an individual. The movements can only be performed with varying degrees of efficiency, and the degree of efficiency arrived at must depend upon the degree of self- and ego-abandonment with which the human being has responded to the dictation.

But it is not merely with regard to bodily movements that the dictation of military training is brought to bear. The military code prescribes everything which the soldier is permitted to do, say or think. Not only his behaviour but all his

attitudes to his environment (including that part of it represented by his fellow-beings) are dictated. No particular requirements or preferences with regard to diet are catered for; his hours of sleeping, exercising, working and recreation are rigidly prescribed; and he is not permitted to express views on any vital subject, except those which fit with his becoming a still more amenable tool of the regulations.

Tradition defines what he shall respect and emulate; he is uniformed exactly as all his comrades are uniformed, and is not permitted to wear any other description of dress; he is trained to estimate all his fellow-beings as sympathetic or antipathetic in just so far as they are well or ill disposed to all that his soldiership stands for; and he is allowed to arrive at no conclusions for himself regarding whatever may happen to him, but must accept blindly all the standards and valuations which are valid for the military code.

REPLACEMENT OF PERSONAL VALUES BY SERVILE QUALITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS.

If the soldier were capable of forming opinions for himself based on his own experiences and particular bodily condition, these would be bound to

clash with the standards and valuations laid down for him. With conflicting opinions of his own he could not, therefore, become an efficient soldier. So that when he abandons himself to the military dictation, not only must his self- and ego-values be replaced by efficiency, but all his opinions must be foregone and replaced by acquiescence in the rulings of the code. Also, obedience must replace his capability of thinking and reasoning, comradeship must take the place of the fellow-sentiments which characterise a competitive relationship between human beings who are personalities, and loyalty must replace the considered acceptance of authority by which the personality holds his place in the social scheme.

All traits such as intolerance, envy, hatred, admiration and their opposites, which characterised and qualified the egoistic human being, will continue to exist as far as their manifestation is concerned, but they will rest upon an entirely new basis. Instead of the motive for them being found in the human being who manifests them, it will be provided and dictated by the military code. The efficient soldier will be antagonistic to, and will hate, whatever clashes with the tenets of the military code; and he will envy and admire every-

thing which represents a more efficient expression of the code than he himself is capable of giving.

Strictly, these are not changes in the consciousness and character of the human being. They are the expression of a new consciousness and character which are imposed upon the human organism. They are patterned upon the traits which marked the human being as a personality, but that is merely because he is only susceptible of being used for the purposes of the code within the limits of his possibility of use. Just as the human being was circumscribed in his use of compensations by the scope of the particular compensation, so now the code is circumscribed when it uses the human being for its expression, and he himself is by way of being no more than a compensation for the code.

But in the same way that the human being, once he became intellectualised, shaped and fashioned compensations to extend their usefulness, so now he is shaped and fashioned by the code of dictation to which he submits. The natural tendencies of his bodily system are disregarded, and a new character, stiff and limited as befits a mechanical routine, is imposed upon him. His human consciousness is gradually broken down and sup-

pressed, and a new consciousness, a correct reflection of the implications of the code, paralleling the changes in his character, is impressed upon him.

BLUNTNES AND DEGENERACY QUALIFY FOR HIGHEST EFFICIENCY UNDER DICTATION.

The soldier has merely been used in this illustration as an example. It is not a denunciation of soldiers, as such. Many who serve with military forces have strong egoistic motives for doing so and merely accept the dictation calculatedly. They are not the ideal soldiers, and in given circumstances where they were called upon to violate their own opinions or tendencies too greatly, their loyalty and comradeship would break down. But the illustration does serve to show what actually takes place when a comprehensive discipline is imposed on human beings, and also the possibilities belonging to it if its human units are sufficiently blunt to become utterly servile tools. On the basis it provides, a new valuation of the trend towards mechanisation, standardisation and regulation, so apparent in modern social organisation, can be established. With that valuation it is not difficult to grasp the implications of that trend. Yet dictations most destructive of human individu-

ality and personality are not so obvious as that of militarism.

DICTATION OF IDEAS AND THEORIES MOST OPPRESSIVE.

Perhaps the most subtle dictation of all is that embodied in ideas and theories, particularly as the majority of these are linked with conceptions of the perfect state and the supposed improvement of the conditions of human life. With these the unceasing expression of the life-power in the human being is apparent, and the impulse in him to completely abandon himself to outside rulings arises directly from his consciousness of imperfection and his urge to recover perfection. The reason he turns towards an idea or theory which will provide dictatorial rulings for all his manifestations is merely that his capacities and capabilities of expressing his urges in terms of reality are blunted to exactly the extent that his cell-sensibility is blunted by degenerating contamination.

But even through this willingness to accept a dictation the working of the life-power as a conscience is still discernible. It was shown in the studies of individuality and personality how the

life-power always tends towards the rejection of the contamination by the maintenance of the self-regulating processes in the bodily system (the character) and by the influence of the conscience in the consciousness.

When the human being becomes the tool of a dictation his conscience can no longer influence him in relation to his behaviour. Since the consciousness and character which impel and carry out all his manifestations are not strictly his own, they will be unaffected by impulses from within himself. The nonentity could only perceive the prickings of conscience if he failed in loyalty, comradeship or efficiency. But then it would not be as the result of an impulse. He could only be susceptible on the point if he had not abandoned himself with full completeness to the prescriptions of the dictation—that is, if he had not wholly negated himself as to his impulses or memories. The prickings of a conscience in those circumstances could only be related to the promises and threats which are attached to all dictations. It would be fear of being involved in the penalties laid down or of losing the rewards promised.

ACCEPTANCE OF DICTATION LAST DECISION OF LIFE-
POWER.

Yet where the human being passes under the sway of an idea or theory, it is his conscience which, in reality, impels him to do so. The life-power influences him to submit to a dictation because without it he would be utterly overwhelmed. But it was seen that the consciousness in the higher state also embodies a conception of a state of perfection and an urge to move towards that state. Also, that the conception must be determined by the particular degree of decline which the human being had reached. He could not conceive a true perfection with an imperfect consciousness. His conceptions must carry the limitations of the consciousness and character in which they arise.

This is the explanation of the human being turning to the dictation, and choosing a particular form of dictation to which to submit. When he has reached the state where he is no longer able to arrive at conclusions as to his relationship with the tangible environment and his significance in the universal whole, his conception of the perfect state will be equally unrelated to reality and tangibility. He will only be able to see perfection in

an idealised state of life, or in the application to present conditions of human life of the tenets or premises of some utopian idea or theory.

Since the human being could never see a value in any utopian idea or theory unless he had lost the capacity to cope with the actual environment adequately, it is an essential of all such idealistic conceptions that they shall provide rulings and prescriptions, not only for the manner in which the human being shall carry out all his behaviour, but also as to the attitudes he shall adopt towards his surroundings.

REALITY LOST IN SUBMISSION TO IDEAS AND THEORIES.

For instance, in the case of a religious fanatic : the tenets of his religion are his law, to which he must abandon himself with utter servility, and the interpretations of all the facts of life which the tenets provide are the only standards he will accept. Reality means nothing to him. He dissociates the perfection he visualises from the environment he knows, and imagines it as being realisable only in an indefinite environment— heaven — and in an indefinite time-value—

eternity. And the indefiniteness of his visualisation is a statement of the degree to which his degeneration has removed him from direct contact with actuality. But for the consolations offered him by his imaginings, actuality would be unendurable, because he could arrive at no valuations of it which would relate him with it, except as a potential victim.

With utopian theories the divorce from actuality is not quite so complete. They have their basis in practical economics, and their perfection is conceived as realisable within the actual environment we know, but their time-value is always placed remotely in the future, and the environment they presuppose ignores all actualities. Yet again with these, prescriptions are given for all the human being's valuations and assessments. He must interpret every manifestation, which makes up his life and surroundings, in terms of the theory. He must accept the rules of behaviour it dictates and mould himself to the pattern it lays down as correct.

That is the basic essential of all fantastic ideas and utopian theories, that they shall provide an outside dictation to which the human being shall submit, allowing his consciousness and character

to become, not his own, but the synthetic and standardised product of the dictation.

It is another feature of the present-day trend of social organisation that politics are tending to pass within the scope of such dictations. All the bias in modern highly developed societies is towards the acceptance of dictatorships which profess to be working towards some utopian arrangement of human affairs. But the utopian arrangement always involves the obliteration of the human being as a free individual or an opinionated personality, and sacrifices him to a vague idealistic conception such as "the totalitarian state" or "the communistic state" or "socialism."

DICTATORSHIP NOT A HAPHAZARD DEVELOPMENT.

Again it is necessary to point out that this is not a haphazard development; it follows inevitably from the egoistic state of civilisation. As civilisation, which is the era of the personality, of egoistic assertion, opinions and mutual compromise, passes its highest point of development, the inequalities and anomalies it has produced lay the first foundations of such changes. In an age of egoists the greatest egoists will rise to authority

and control. The greater the egoism, the greater the awareness of inferiority and, therefore, the greater the desire to consolidate and safeguard the compensations which make life possible in the particular conditions.

But where egoism begins to veer into degeneracy a parasitical consciousness and character are produced. The egoist's fear of losing his compensations tends to make him avaricious of them and the authority which safeguards them. The desire for power to exploit other human beings arises, and then the desire to have the possession of compensations guaranteed as a right rather than as a reward for personal efforts.

So the parasites of capitalism come into being—the human beings who, while they do nothing to obtain possessions for themselves, and indeed have no skills or accomplishments by which they could obtain them in the competitive conditions of the social life, are safeguarded in their ownership by the laws and institutions of power.

Where this anomaly is consolidated in the social organisation utopian schemes must come into being. At the lower end of the scale degenerates are faced with their own lack of authority to possess compensations and with the

awareness of inferiority which makes them a need. Higher up there are egoistic members of the society who see the unfairness of the parasitical conditions and who are baffled in their own egoistic expressions by the authority with which parasitism is surrounded. The degenerates, because they lack the capabilities to assert themselves egoistically, fall back upon the fantastic promises to remedy such a state of affairs, which they can find in utopian theories of government and wealth distribution. The egoists will accept any means to undermine the authority by which parasitism is supported, and they, therefore, lend themselves to the utopian schemes, reasoning that by overthrowing the one set of institutions of power they will be able to find scope for their egoistic desires. These are the opportunists who are to be found associated with all revolutionary movements.

DEGENERACY ROOT CAUSE OF IDEAS AND THEORIES.

But such developments can only rest upon the blunting of consciousness and weakening of character. Until progressive contamination has reduced the average level of bodily vigour and intelligence throughout the community, and deca-

dence is verging into degeneration, they are impossible. A community of more definite personalities would have the intellectual capabilities and bodily skills to assert themselves against parasitism. Their contact with environment would be sufficiently vivid for them to arrive at valuations having a nearer approximation to reality. They would seek, not for a utopian solution of their difficulties, but a personal solution, and because they still constituted a majority in the community they would be able to cope with the parasites and degenerates who upheld parasitism on the one hand, or sought to apply such fantastic conceptions as theories and ideas on the other hand.

A significant feature of the consciousness and character of degenerates, who behave under the dictation of an idea or theory, is their lack of all sympathetic association with their fellow-beings. The egoistic personality is capable of cruelty and injustice in the treatment of others. But there is always a personal basis for his behaviour. His fellow-beings stand in various relationships to him on the basis of the extent to which they threaten his freedom to make use of the compensations he needs. But while he can still behave with ego-

sufficiency, his fears of such threats are not overwhelmingly strong. His resentments of others are always tempered by his appreciation of his own skills and accomplishments. Even when he cannot behave with a high degree of ego-sufficiency he is always sympathetically disposed to those with whom he can share fellow-sentiments and opinions, and is prepared to respect the rights of others to their ego-assertion, provided it is not directed against him personally or is not calculated to disrupt the social organisations on which he relies.

Also in opposing those who threaten him he can never be wholly callous. He himself is still capable of feeling and, therefore, of appreciating feeling in others. The era of civilisation is, as a result, a comparatively beneficent one. Whatever atrocities and cruelties it perpetrates are not blind and inhuman.

INHUMANITY AND CALLOUSNESS OF DEGENERATE FANATICS.

It has already been shown in history, however, that when the more degenerate human beings come under the sway of an idea or theory, consideration, mildness and restraint no longer exist.

The degenerate has himself lost the capacity for subtlety and acuteness of feeling. If cruelties are inflicted upon him he can still suffer, but not with the same vividness as in the higher, more sensitive levels of life. His cells are more clogged with contamination; their sensitiveness and delicacy of perception are lost, consequently his consciousness is less incisive. It can only have more or less vague and blunt awarenesses of any sufferings inflicted upon the bodily cell-system or injustices inflicted upon the mind which that cell-system embodies.

Having become degenerated to that degree, the consciousness retains no capability to appreciate the feelings of others. Since it has itself submitted to the dictation of an idea or theory to replace its lost faculties, it can have no understanding of the opinions, sentiments, needs and wants of other human beings. And having no understanding, it can have no tolerance of them. The theory becomes the one significant thing in the total environment—the one thing to which consideration should be given.

When behaving under the dictation of a theory or idea, therefore, the degenerate is utterly callous. In carrying out the prescriptions and

commands to which he is prepared to yield blind obedience he is capable of any cruelties. And there is always scope for the exercise of his callous cruelty. While there are still personalities existing in the society all schemes to apply a dictation will meet with resistance. And the degenerates can never overcome this resistance by appealing to the reason of the more egoistic members. One who is still able to accept his bodily determination and mental direction can never give servile obedience to a dictation. He might calculatedly accept it because he realised his inability to cope with the force supporting it, but he would remain a disruptive element in the dictatorial system. He would conform to the prescriptions only in so far as he found it necessary to preserve himself, and would resist whenever an opportunity appeared to offer.

It is in crushing such resistance that all the cruelty and callousness of the servile degenerates becomes evident. Nothing can influence them except the wish to be efficient units of the dictation, and they are insensible to all appeals on the basis of feeling, sentiment, thought or reason. They carry out the commands they receive with the same insensate drive as might characterise a

machine, and this accounts for the atrocities and ruthlessness which have marked all the activities of fanatics endeavouring to impose an idea or theory upon the social organisation.

It has not been possible in this analysis of the human being, who has become a nonentity and lost all personal and individual values, to show the same definite emergence of new characteristics and qualities as was possible in analysing the previous higher states of human life. There is not the same link between the human being's bodily system and every change which takes place in his consciousness. Previously the motive of and impulse to all action or behaviour was brought about in the bodily system. It was possible to see the human being receiving impressions, assimilating them, assessing them on the basis of his capacity or capability of meeting them and marshalling the resources of his consciousness and character to respond. But with the human being as a nonentity he himself is no longer the source of his own behaviour.

SUMMING UP.

In summing up, however, it can be seen that the first impulse to abandon himself to a dictation

comes from within the human being. As the last vague self-impelled awareness and assessment of his inferiority he sees his own incapacity to preserve himself in any way through his own initiative, and then abandons himself to a dictation. Once he has done so he has ceased to exist as an initiating and deciding factor in the universe. Yet it is his life-power which impels him to accept the dictation as the last possible means through which it can preserve him as an organism and as a medium of its own expression.

But having abandoned himself to the dictation, he is not a suitable instrument for its expression—that is, the expression of the dictation—until a consciousness and character representing it have been imposed upon him. His life-power is then expressing itself, not through him, but through the dictation in him.

The consciousness and character which will represent the dictation is imposed upon him by the ordering of every phase of his existence in terms of the dictation's prescriptions. He becomes subject to rulings and commands to which are attached promises and penalties. The promises have no definite value. If they had, they would have no appeal for the degenerate. The vagueness of his

own perception of reality must be represented in them if they are to touch his imagination. In the nonentity, imagination is the equivalent of the reasoning faculty in the personality. Since he has no practical awareness of his own bodily determination in relation to the impressions his environment makes upon him, he has no key to the significance of his own experiences. He, therefore, interprets them not rationally on the basis of thought and experience, but fantastically, imagining vague and indefinite significances, which to him have all the validity of reality.

When the dictation spurs him, by promises and threats of penalties, to become efficient, this same indefiniteness must belong to the threats of penalties and promises. He could neither be persuaded by promises having a definite value, nor threats which were related to reality and definite valuations of his relationship with environment. They too must appeal to the only faculty through which he has any power of assessment—that is, to his imagination.

This can be illustrated by recalling the heaven and hell of religious fanatics. It is well known that promises and penalties regarding their life in their actual environment mean little or nothing to

them. Only promises and threats regarding their "future" life appear to them as having any weight. The promises and threats which are the spur to fanatic absorption in utopian economic theories are equally fantastic, even if less obviously so. They must always be so while they are unrelated to the present reality of environment and human life in relation to it.

The servile human being, then, is subjected to commands and prescriptions which he carries out under the stimulus of fantastic promises and threats—the carrying out of these commands representing the undergoing of a series of experiences. Since the human being has not been considered in the formulation of the commands, but only the code or tenets of the dictation, these experiences are imposed upon him without regard to the uniqueness of his consciousness and character at the time of their application. In undergoing them, however, the human being's character is modified by them. This was illustrated by the example of the soldier on parade with the resulting modification of his limbs. But such modifications must be represented in the consciousness, so that the human being's consciousness also comes to represent the dictation.

As there is no variation of the experiences applied to different human beings, the old egoistical opinions which resulted from the experiences undergone by the personality cannot result. This being so, the traits which characterised the personality with his memories of his own experiences will not apply to the nonentity. He must learn how to be, not ego-sufficient, but efficient. He must learn to have, not sentiments based on his own unique bodily condition, but to behave with loyalty and have an attitude of comradeship towards those who share the servility of his dictation.

Finally, he must learn to express through himself all the attitudes which are prescribed by the dictation as correct for those who represent it. And because his capacity to feel has been blunted and confused, he will be able to adopt those attitudes without regard to fellow-feeling or fellow-sentiment. Whatever behaviour may be involved in the expressing of any attitude, however cruel or callous it may be judged by instinctive and intellectually based standards, he must carry it out blindly and correctly according to the code.

It is well worth while to consider what nobility, dignity or virtue can remain attached to human life

when this state is reached. Putting aside all the fantastic ideas or theories which are at present in existence, human life remains the self-realisation of a life-power against an environment we call the universe. When we are estimating what this actually means, it must always be borne in mind that we estimate with the consciousness and character we possess at the present moment. And we know that no man has a consciousness and character belonging wholly and solely to himself. We are the products of a long process of socialisation. We represent heredity in so far as we have inherited particular predispositions. We represent history (both past and contemporary) since we have been subject to various forms of education and training throughout our whole lives. And we represent other people since we have been influenced by their example, precept and coercion.

But is it the most satisfactory expression of human life that we should so represent other factors than ourselves? Is it most satisfactory, even if judged by the consciousness with which we make our assessments at the present time? If, at its essence, human life is no more than the expression of our life-power against the environment, the purest and highest expression it can attain must be

where that life-power has a full freedom to realise its urges and tendencies, of itself and by itself alone, with no factor interfering between the pure energy basis of any urge or impulse and the bodily system which is the proper medium of expression for the life value in us.

Once the human being has been intellectualised his freedom is lost. He is still impelled by urges and tendencies from within, but he is unable to express these freely. They must either be suppressed entirely, out of deference to the needs and wants of those who are sharers in the supporting society, or he must cramp and artificialise them to prevent their expression being anti-social.

Even in a social order, where egoism still has scope, the tendencies which are the natural expression of the human being are hedged about with innumerable restrictions. By the time he has reached adulthood he has become a synthetic product, representing himself only indirectly through the compensating amenities of the society. He is subject to bodily suffering which cramps his will towards movement and his scope in establishing direct contact with the natural environment. He is subject to competition with the resulting envies, intolerances, aversions, humilities, greeds and arti-

fices. He is faced with the indignity of having to rely upon his fellow-beings for the maintenance and protection of himself against the environment, and in nearly every manifestation he is restricted and modified by having to rely upon some weapon, tool or accessory.

Even his opinions cannot be held and asserted unquestioned. New experiences challenge them, new weaknesses arise to make them untenable. The trait of possessiveness, which results from the necessity to have compensating factors and rely upon them, brings about ambitions. But it is a truism that ambitions cannot be wholly realised; that they must ultimately result in disappointment and disillusion.

That is the keynote of life as it is lived at the present time—and, indeed, as it must be lived by intellectualised human beings—that all our efforts and aims end in frustration. And apart from all practical considerations, there is the inner awareness of frustration and imperfection to defeat man's joy and vigour in life. He carries his awareness of imperfection like a burden on a journey. In his moments of highest exaltation, his life-power urges upon him the appreciation that he is still falling immeasurably short of life's utmost potentialities.

He no more has internal than external peace. Just as his contact with his surroundings and fellow-beings is a gamut of discords and conflicts, so his inner being is a field of discord and oppositions. His bodily processes are functioning incessantly to reject the contamination with which he loads his cell-system, and his instinctive qualities of awareness and consciousness are disturbed by urges and the workings of conscience which express the life-power's efforts to reject the restrictions and modifications under which they suffer.

In human life as it is known at present, urge conflicts with urge, will with will and purpose with purpose; not because they are of themselves mutually antithetical, but because the weakness and incapacity of the human being prevents their spontaneous expression through him. Just as his relationship with external factors is one long compromise, so within he must be incessantly modifying and devitalising his urges and tendencies, to temper them to his weakened resources of bodily and intelligent expression.

The dignity and nobility which would belong to a being independent of all outside supports can have no place in intellectualised life. But by the intellectual approach to the fact of being alive, we

fail to see this. We value our intellectualisation. The prospect of not having intellectual interests, of being unable to assess our surroundings by intellectual standards, seems a prospect of loss and denudation. But this does not take into consideration the incalculable loss we have suffered in foregoing the joy of intense and vigorous bodily self-expression—the real joy of life which would carry the value of the un baffled energy of the life-power, and give such a richness and variety of sensation that our present effete systems might perhaps disrupt at its intensity if they could sense it.

The intellectual sees the return to reliance upon our own bodily resources as a return to the primitive, a going-back, a decline into savagery. But he forgets that it is with his mind, with his intellect itself, that he makes this assessment. He forgets the richness and variety of the only slightly more spontaneous reactions which he enjoyed as a child, before education and training had channelised him and narrowed down his scope of self-expression. There can be no loss in the return to reliance upon our own bodily resources, since any urge or impulse must, at its basis, be an expression of the bodily tendencies, and there can be no loss as a result of gaining self-realisation more directly.

But there can be and is a great loss in the foregoing of intellectual enjoyments, if they are only to be replaced by the servile acceptance of ready-made and dictated pleasures. As far as the egoistic enjoyments of the personality are below the spontaneous instinctive joys of the individual, the gulf is not so great as between the intellectual enjoyments and those the human being must be content with once he lapses into nonentity and becomes the tool of a dictatorial code or régime. Then all his dignity and nobility is lost. His life becomes less than a compromise, for he has no longer any self- or ego-value to oppose to his surroundings. It becomes a mere sequence of obediences. His will, tendencies, urges and strivings become merely so many cogs and levers to be turned and pulled at the sole discretion of the forces he serves. He is still a human being in so far as he continues to be an organic type endowed with life, but all his resources of energy and intelligence are perverted to serve something which is not representative of him in the least degree.

He has no freedom and no scope. Whether he continues to exist or ceases to be is of no consequence, since the ultimate of his state would be to produce a universal sameness throughout the

whole species. All variety of sensation and manifestation would be gone. Life would have lost all its richness and manifoldness and colour. From manifesting life as a power in the universe; from being a dynamic presence—self-aware, self-sufficient, and having the dignity of being equal to all his fellow-manifestations in the universe—the human being would have become a creature of utter insignificance. Such life-power as remained to his clogged, blunted and degenerate cell-system would be devoted in utter servility to the preservation of an un-living code or régime, and his consciousness and character would have been regimented into a standardised pattern representing not the ultimate expression of human life-power, but its ultimate degradation.

It is in the hope that human valuations may be given a bias which will reveal the risks of the present trend and establish a basis of truth and reality for their conceptions and aims, that these analyses are made.

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